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GLOBAL NEWS-PIGM ISSUES: TOWARDS A CONVERGENT PERSPECTIVE

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

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The Ohio State University
1984

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Dedicated to all who believe that this could be a better world, and are doing something about it.
I am very thankful to all the correspondents who took time off their busy schedules to talk with me. Without their cooperation this study would have been most difficult, if not impossible. Thanks too to the staff of the Foreign Press Center both in New York and in Washington, D.C. Particular thanks to Mr. Nicholas Kinc, who was very helpful in the very difficult task of locating the correspondents interviewed. And to Elvira Koch, for helping me gain entry. My thanks too to The Ohio State University (especially the Department of Communication) for giving me the opportunity. Above all, I am most thankful to my kins and friends whose care nourishes me. Thanks indeed.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Late in 1983, the United States government formally notified the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. The two main grievances expressed in the notice were (1) that UNESCO was being financially mismanaged and (2) that the organization had become "political", practicing activities and views that contravened free-press principles. Unlike ideological differences, the financial mismanagement seems a rather easy matter to redress through due processes; it is therefore unlikely to be a major cause of the United States' momentous decision to withdraw from a premier international organization. One can only conclude from this that the U.S.' displeasure with UNESCO is essentially ideological. A major aspect of the ideological differences is an international issue over the global flow of news and information.¹ The issue consists essentially of a call by the developing countries for "a new international information order," and the concern of the Western countries that the advocacy is an effort to impose mass media cens-

¹ The term issue is used here to mean "A point of discussion, debate, or dispute. A matter of wide public concern" (The American Heritage Dictionary.)
At the time of this writing, it is still several months away from the deadline by which the U.S. will actually have to decide whether to withdraw from UNESCO or not. And few people will bet which way the decision will go. If the U.S. carries out its threat, it will be the first time since its short-lived withdrawal from the International Labor Organization that it has retreated from a major international organization. And the loss of its substantial contribution to UNESCO's budget is expected to definitely strain the organization financially. That the issue of an international information order can have this much influence suggests how salient it has become in international affairs. Whether the U.S. withdraws from or remains in UNESCO, there is little doubt that the issue that engendered the threat deserves as much academic scrutiny and clarification as feasible. The following study of the orientation, hopes and views of Non-Aligned World correspondents in the United States is intended for that purpose.
Focus of Study

The 'new order' issue encompasses several complaints and counter-claims at three levels: communication-flow, information-flow, and news-flow. Hence, it is variously referred to as a communication issue, an information issue or a news issue. Since these concepts differ rather significantly but are yet interwoven, it is important to clarify how they differ and how they relate. The clarification will also serve as a conceptual delineation of the topic under study.

Communication, information and news are in descending order of inclusiveness. That is, communication is the most inclusive while news is the least inclusive. Ogden and Richards' (1936) distinction between the symbolic and the emotive uses of words may, in fact, be said to be two types of communication. Symbolic communication then is factual—data-based, measurable, observable or inferable. It is the tool of the scientist. Emotive communication, on the other hand, is evaluative or expressive. It is the tool of the poet and the artist. Relating this to the issue at hand, a global 'communication order' refers to the processes by which both factual experiences (information) and emotive experiences (values) are transmitted internationally. In specific terms, these would include the circulation of data, books, motion pictures, broadcast programs and, of course, news.
While the communication order is concerned with the transmission of both symbolic and emotive experiences, the information order—in a strict sense—pertains only to the transmission of the symbolic experience. Thus, a discussion of the information order would include only references to the transmission of data or factual information.

This distinction between communication and information is predicated on the assumption that symbols can be value-free. But, as semanticists (Hayakawa, 1939; and Weaver, 1953) have variously pointed out, language is intrinsically value-laden. Thus, with the possible exception of mathematical equations, all information is 'contaminated' with values and insinuations. Not surprisingly, information flow is itself subject to the same issues of value transfer that would otherwise have applied only to communication flow. In any case, the distinction remains important because it separates issues of explicit value transfer (as in the case of the effects of imported TV programs) and matters of the dissemination of 'objective' items which are nonetheless value-laden. It is with the latter issue—the issue of information—that this study is concerned. More specifically in fact, this study is concerned with that specific aspect of information, news, which Galtung (1980) describes as "that which is different from yesterday." This study, then, does not address concerns over the flow of data, TV programs, the distribution of the electromagnetic spectrum for broadcasting, etc.
publications, and the like. It is concerned with the nature of global news coverage and dissemination.

Following is a review of news-flow concerns as articulated in the international information order debates.

**Direction of News Flow**

The question here is who determines news for the rest of the world? Is there reciprocity in the international flow of news, or does one people's concept of news become the fact for the rest of the world? But then, can there be a balanced flow, and in fact is a one-way flow necessarily harmful?

Advocates of the new order maintain that news-flow is one-directional, from the North (especially the West) to the South. Masmoudi (1979) estimates, for instance, that eighty percent of international news is disseminated by the major (mostly Western-based) news agencies: the Associate Press (AP) and the United Press International (UPI)—both of the U.S., Reuters of Britain, Agence France Presse (AFP) of France, and TASS of the Soviet Union. The four Western agencies, often referred to as "the Big Four" are of course commercial, and they sell their news 'wares' all over the globe. The new order advocates maintain that such a news flow pattern is inequitable, and is injurious to the social, economic and cultural well-being of developing countries.
But there are arguments to the contrary. Merrill (1981, p. 156) has pointed out, for instance, that unevenness of flow is a basic characteristic of news—and not only of news flow, but of water flow, oil flow, money flow, population flow, and food flow.

Similarly, Skurnik has reported that editors in developing countries which he studied are not passive recipients of the foreign news disseminated by the international news agencies. The editors sift through and use only those items that meet their editorial yardstick. Skurnik's point then is that the editors' gatekeeping role mediates the direct influence of Western news agencies. Therefore a one-way flow is not as problematic as suggested by advocates of a new order.

The Nature of News Coverage

Just as with the issue of direction of news-flow, there are also opposing perspectives on the matter of content. Developing countries contend that their affairs are generally ignored, and that when they get coverage it is typically biased and in a negative light. In other words, they contend that they are mal-covered both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Naturally, the Western media have their defenders. The Western, particularly American journalistic tradition, as Epstein (1973) has noted, holds that news is disseminated
from nobody's point of view. News is said to have attributes that are easily identifiable by the professional journalist, who then reports it with detachment and objectivity. If certain events are not reported, it is because they are not newsworthy, and the fact that the reports are negative reflects some inherent nature of the events reported. In other words, either the newsworthy aspects of the event are negative, or the negative aspects actually make the event newsworthy. The argument goes that the integrity of a news organization depends on its credibility, which derives from the objectivity, accuracy and balance of its reports. The point, in effect, is that if a news program or news organization is competitively successful, it must not be violating these tenets of journalism. Quite often, U.S. journalists do concede—as did Westin in the speech cited in the preceding footnote—that their news judgment is affected by financial considerations, but they maintain that objectivity prevails nonetheless.

On the specific issue of mal-coverage of developing countries, there is also the argument that the problem derives largely from the "closed-door" policies and tyrannical tem-

---

2 This explanation of newsworthiness and objectivity is heard most often from U.S. media personnel themselves, usually in their defense of their domestic news orientation. Instances: Av Westin, the producer of ABC Network's 20/20 News program during a speech at Ohio State University (April 11, 1983); and Mike Wallace, the veteran CBS investigative correspondent for CBS's "60 Minutes" during an appearance on ABC's periodic 'Media Watch' program.
dencies of the governments of developing countries. As Merrill (1981, p. 154) notes, "Western journalists say that if there is a problem with news-flow it largely rests with the controlled systems in which they are trying to report."

Stanley Meiser has to be one of those journalists. In an article in the Columbia Journalism Review (Nov/Dec 1978), he details his experiences and those of his colleagues in several developing countries. The experiences include physical ruffling, liability to imprisonment, and threats to life. Meiser goes as far as recommending that the U.S. should consider such treatments of American journalists in formulating its relations with the countries in question. On the same matter, Righter (1976 & 1981) has noted that government officials in developing countries often take refuge behind alleged traditional excuses to evade foreign press scrutiny of their corrupt practices. Thus, when the officials' involvement in fraud is uncovered, they resort to accusing the Western media of infringing on their cultural values, and by so doing, they conveniently sidestep their own breach of conduct.

The Search for Alternatives

Depending on what one sees as the problems, solutions will definitely vary. Developing countries are pursuing two strategies in their quest for an improved international news-flow. One is to expand their own means of news disse-
mination through the establishment of national and regional news agencies and the "fooling" of those agencies (Ivacic, 1978; and Boyd-Farrett, 1980). The other is to pressure the international news media to reconsider and amend their present orientation and practices. The first strategy has resulted in a burgeoning of national and regional news agencies in the developing world. And the second—the strategy of pressuring—is manifested in the UNESCO-based debates over a new world information order, a debate that—among other things—has resulted in the inauguration of the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems (the MacBride Commission) and the International Program for the Development of Communication (IFDC).

Not surprisingly, these strategies have evoked intense opposition and concerns. Critics of the new order advocacy contend that it is a Marxist-inspired effort to bring the international news media under government control. Much of such charges are made by the Western news media themselves. (See, for instance, "Third World Vs Fourth Estate" Time, Nov. 2, 1976.) But similar views are also held in more academic circles. Righter (1976, p.113), for instance, articulates the charge of Marxist incursion when she indicts the advocacy with the argument that "information integrated into national development programmes is likely to be closely directed by governments many of whom will echo Lenin's views of the place of information in society." To these critics
then, the issue is largely an ideological one—a tussle between Western democratic values and the non-democratic tendencies of the Marxist-influenced, megalomanic governments in developing countries. In its extreme position, this view rejects the NIEC debate outright, contending in effect, that the journalist's news value should not be questioned. As Merrill (1981, p. 157) puts it,

As long as the Western agencies are operating in a free-enterprise system and are doing the collecting and transmitting, they are the ones who will make these decisions. It is not reasonable for anyone to think otherwise.

Besides the view that the new order is inherently censura, there are concerns also that the thrust of the developing countries' second strategy (expanding their news dissemination capacity) is eventually to displace or reject the operation of the major international news agencies in these countries. (Again, see the Time magazine article cited above.)

Whatever one's views may be, it is obvious that the issues are complex, and the ideas they generate are still fuzzy. The complexity derives from the combination of ideological, political, sociological, cultural and economic dimensions; and the lack of clarity is consequent on the incipience of the debate itself. The process of clarifying the issues would entail some effort to look at all the dimensions in combination rather than in isolation. And that would require an articulation of the issues by those who are
closest to understanding (through experience) all the dimensions of the issues. This study of the views of Non-Aligned world correspondents is intended for that purpose—to arrive at a convergent perspective on the divergent concerns.

The study will deal with the following broad questions: (1) What exactly are the nature and manifestations of the problems of global news-flow? (2) To what degree are the roots of the problems internal to developing countries and to what degree are they external? (3) And what measures are necessary to redress the problems?

The theoretical basis for these questions and the rationale for having Non-Aligned world correspondents articulate the issues will be discussed in the next chapter. That will be followed by a description of the research method in Chapter III. The substantive findings of the study are reported in Chapters V and VI to reflect the Center-Feriphery theoretical framework of the study. Chapter VII, which deals with solutions, could have been merged with those two chapters, but a chapter on solutions is judged to be a better option for jointly discussing options and proposed means of redress. The final chapter will be a commentary on the findings. Linking the introductory and substantive chapters is an intermediary chapter (Chapter IV) which serves two functions. First, it will be a portrait or snapshot of the respondents—a means of "knowing" them. Secondly, it will contain a discussion of the correspondents' news val-
ues, the yardstick by which they assess the internal and external dimensions of global news-flow. The yardstick, in effect, will become a test of the subsystems assumption.
De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach (1975) identify three tasks of mass communication research as the ascertainment of the impact of society on the mass media, the nature of the mass communication process, and the impact of the mass media on society. These are, of course, highly related concerns, as each task bears on the others. On the issue of international mass communication, as in other areas, the tasks indeed converge. The complaints of developing countries and the corresponding counter-points pertain to perceived effects of the international mass media on those societies. And to the extent that those effects are real, they must derive from the nature of the mass communication process. Moreover, the formal international debates over international communication are themselves indicative of the means of societal impact on the mass media. The issue of global news-flow then encompasses all three epistemological concerns of mass media research.

However, the new order debate is not directly about the nature of the mass communication process; nor is it about its effects per se. Rather, its main thrust is over what
measures may or may not be taken. In other words, the controversy is over the question of what societal means ought to be brought to bear on the mass media to re-direct them. Given that, this study will proceed basically from the epistemological framework of societal impact on the mass media.

In stating this epistemology, De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach (1975, pp. 12-13) ask, "What has been the impact of societies on their mass media? What have been the political, economic or cultural conditions which have led them to operate in their present form?" To further explain the link between this question and the framework of this study, a number of observations are necessary.

First, while De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach use the term "society" to refer to the political entity of a nation-state, the basic idea of their question also applies to the broader community of states. That is to say, just as intra-national economics and politics determine the course of the media within a state, international economics and politics determine the international dimensions of media development. Such expanded use of the term 'society' is particularly valid in the context of the long-suggested but only recently prevalent notion of an inter-related and interdependent systemic world. The idea--which has inspired international studies like the World Order Models Project (Mazrui, 1975
and Galtung, 1980, among others) and the "Program for Survival" report (Brandt, 1980)—is that the global community of nations is increasingly taking on the characteristics of a national entity in terms of the fundamental functional bonds that link nations together. Accordingly, international problems, it is suggested, are demanding collective action—a world view rather than a nationalistic view. Given that, the epistemology of societal impact on the mass media is as relevant to the international society as it is to the national society.

A second observation is that while De Fleur and Ball-Bok—each apparently emphasize historical evolution in referring to societal impact on the media, they no doubt also include deliberate policy interventions. In other words, society influences the media not just as the soil on which the media grow, but also as the farmer who makes deliberate decisions about what to grow and how to grow them, when to transplant and when to harvest.

Thirdly, it is reasonable to assume that policy interventions are necessitated by perceived societal needs. Given that, differences among components of the society—national or global—over needed interventions have to result from differences in their needs and interests. To arrive at a policy that would serve the general good then, these conflicting interests have to be reconciled. This dissertation aims to make a contribution in that regard.
Anyone who has attempted to mediate a conflict knows too well that it is not an easy task to reconcile conflicting interests. The difficulty is even further compounded when the interests are emotionally charged. Such is the case with the new order debate, in which, as has been suggested elsewhere, ideological sensitivities play a greater role than they should (Ikelema, 1983). Reconciling conflicting interests in such a context is most difficult because it is the nature of ideologies that they trigger an antagonistic rather than an accommodating posture towards perspectives that even faintly indict them. With an antagonistic posture, issues can only be articulated defensively. Yet, as a first step towards reconciling conflicting interests, the issues have to be articulated to simultaneously reflect the conflicting concerns. Such articulation can be most objectively done by those who transcend the ideological sensitivities either by not being tainted by any of the relevant ideologies or by being tainted by all. The latter applies to correspondents from developing countries. For that reason, their views on global news-flow is held to represent a point of convergence of the conflicting perspectives.

Correspondents from developing countries are considered to transcend the ideological sensitivities because they are a product of the socialization process that has shaped and sustained Western news values, and as citizens of developing countries, they are also influenced by nationalist loyalties.
ties. The two broad ideological influences have a counter-effect on the correspondents and so enable their articulation of a convergent perspective on the issue of global news-flow.

The following review of literature will bear out the above premise. The review will cover the literature on socialization and pertinent perspectives on international transactions. The review of socialization will serve to trace the path by which news values develop.³ (The importance of this aspect of the review lies in the fact that the news-flow controversy revolves around values.) The rest of the review will provide the conceptual basis for the claim that Non-Aligned World journalists transcend the dichotomy of the value-basis of the news-flow controversy.

The Socialization Process

The socialization process comprises three phases or levels: cultural, professional and organizational.

³ This review is not intended to be a comprehensive synthesis of the research in socialization. It is only a review of representative research that has a direct bearing on news-coverage processes.
Studies in anthropology, sociology and political science (among others) have made it indisputably clear that everybody's values and perceptual framework are to a great degree a function of the cultural context in which the person develops. And the term culture is used here in its broadest sense to refer to the social, political, economic, psychological, and intellectual orientation of a people. If that is the case, the newsman's values are definitely the product of the cultural processes that define his cognitive world. The fairy tales he was told as a baby, the comic books he read as a child, the history lessons he absorbed in classrooms and street corners, the clothes he learned to wear, the food he grew used to eating, all combine to structure his perception of what is normal and what is abnormal, what is ordinary and what is 'strange', who is beautiful and who is not.

Besides these natural processes of attaining a cultural identity, there are also conscious efforts to inculcate in citizens values that accord with the socio-political thoughts of the elites of society--specifically the thoughts of those elites in control. The indoctrination process in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries is well known and often condemned for its stifling of intellectual independence. What is not as often stated is that the same process of indoctrination takes place everywhere else--perhaps
not as overtly nor with the same degree of coerciveness, but equally indoctrinating nonetheless. Cummings and Wise (1978) have pointed out for instance that the routine singing of "The Star Spangled Banner" in U.S. schools, the regular salute of the American flag, and the often recited wisdom and philosophy of the 'founding' fathers (as manifested in the U.S. Constitution) all serve the same function as ideological agitation: they indoctrinate. Having been so indoctrinated, one inevitably uses the values absorbed as the model against which others' values and practices are applauded or condemned.

As applied to news value, the role of culture and indoctrination has been well documented in several studies. These include studies by Galtung and Ruge (1965), Drew (1972), Gertner and Marvanyi (1977), Peterson (1979), and Lawrence and Timberg (1979). In their often cited multi-national study, Galtung and Ruge conclude that patterns of news selection among the news media studied reflect the structures of the socio-cultural context. Similarly, Peterson's study of journalists at the foreign desk of The Times (of London) shows that cultural differences was the major factor determining variations in their news value. And in their study of U.S. news media coverage of three international conflicts, Lawrence and Timberg find what they refer to as a conformity to the "dominant paradigm of U.S. mono-myth." That is, events are covered or not covered depending
on how they fit into the cultural map or stereotypes. Even within a given culture, there are subcultural differences in news values. Drew's study of white middle class reporters in the U.S. shows, for instance, that their conception of news reflects the needs of America's white middle-class.

Not surprisingly, Gerhner and Marwanyi are able to provide empirical evidence to demonstrate how different regions of the world have different conceptions of news. In their report, appropriately titled "The Many Worlds of the World's Press," they point out that it is not uncommon that an event of global importance may be played up in the press of one region and completely ignored in another. Or the same event may be reported to emphasize different aspects of it. Thus, an event takes different meanings depending on who is reporting it. In most of the cases none of the versions may be said to be the accurate representation of the event; rather, each version concurs with the values, expectations, fears and hopes engendered by the cultural milieu in which the event is reported.

Indeed, as Siebert et al (1956, p. 1) summarized it several years ago,

the press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structure within which it operates. Especially, it reflects the system of social control whereby the relations of individuals and institutions are adjusted. . . . [An] understanding of these aspects of society is basic to any systematic understanding of the press.
Professional Socialization

Newsmen's news values become more finely tuned in the process of acquiring the techniques of the profession. Colleges, departments and schools of journalism are fast becoming a prominent part of the academic setup all over the world. But as Foyd-Earrett (1970) point out, they teach the same values that obtain in the profession. These values include, in particular, the modus operandi of ascertaining newsworthiness. Depending on the primary needs of a given order, the emphasis could be on commercial returns, political patronage, or ideological relevance. As Kruglak (1962) and Hollander (1972) among others have pointed out, when ideological relevance is the primary concern, events that do not contribute to its propagation are either ignored or down-played. These range from hazards like plane crashes to threatening realities like citizen dissensions and policy failures. In contrast, when commercial advantage is the primary concern, news becomes defined not by the usefulness of the knowledge its dissemination entails, but by its potential for being marketed profitably.

In this respect, Schiller (1975) has traced the concept of objectivity to the need for mass-merchandizing of news. In the essay, "The Genesis of the Free-Flow Principle," he had argued that objectification was intended for the production of news that has maximum mass appeal. That is, as Einstein would describe it, "news from nowhere" or news from
nobody's point of view. Given this, Epstein (1973, p. xiv) recommends

the approach of treating a news service as a business organization rather than as a collective faculty for highly independent newsmen, i.e. "the press". The particular output, the formulation of "news", might then be explicable in terms of what the news organization had to do to stay in business.

If staying in business is the primary concern of the news media, it follows of course that any new entrant to the profession of news gathering has to learn that business first. The knowledge may be acquired in the classroom, in the lab, or through internships. But most importantly, it has to be there. That is professional socialization, or socialization at the intermediate level.

Organizational Socialization

The third or micro level of socialization takes place within the individual organization itself. At this level the newsmen's news values are further tuned to harmonize with the particular orientations of the given organization.

Studies of newsroom dynamics (among them Breed's, 1955; Atwood, 1973; and Dimmick's, 1979) have shown that the editorial consistency of news organizations results not so much from stated policies and management dictates, but from a socialization process by which new employees become aware of the unstated means of success in the organization. The process entails reinforcements, peer influence, and esteem for
superiors. A newly employed reporter pays attention to what his superiors write about, how they write them, what nuances are implanted. The new reporter also notices what stories are typically carried on the front page, which feature articles are allotted the greater space, and which 'beats' are most frequently covered. It will not be long before he absorbs the organizational values and acts accordingly.

At this point then, the newsman's news values have become rigidly set. He can identify news with as much certainty and precision as a chemist can, the elements. Interestingly, news organizations do not think that the values so impressed last indefinitely. Journalists whose activities keep them away from the full strength of the socialization processes are periodically re-oriented. As Lessond (1937, p. 47) points out for instance, American foreign correspondents are recalled periodically because employers at home come to believe that the correspondent who has stayed for a long time in a country becomes "so sympathetic to the point of view of the country ... that he no longer sees affairs there with the perspective they want him to maintain." (See also Epstein, 1973, p. 137.) Thus, a continuous effort is made to ensure that the socialization process is not reversed.
**NAN Journalists and Socialization**

As noted in the previous chapter, one of the purposes of this review is to explain how Non-Aligned World journalists transverse the various perspectives of the new order debate. But so far the review has only made the point that news values are impressed through processes of socialization that derive from the demands of the socio-cultural milieu. The question now is, how can NAN journalists—socialized as they are in their own cultural setting—be in a more vantage position to provide a synthetic view of the issue?

The answer lies essentially in the fact that much of the developing world has over the years, directly or indirectly, been a part of the Western culture. Perhaps, Galtung's description of three stages of colonialism provides as cogent an argument of this point as one can make. As summarized in Chapter I, Galtung posits that colonialism does not end when the colonizing power physically withdraws from the colony. Rather the colonizing power leaves behind cultural and economic "bridgeheads" which ensure its continuing influence on the social, political and economic order of the 'former' colony. The bridgeheads are then sustained through a communication structure between the 'colony' and the 'colonizer' in which the colonies are more of 'recipients' than 'transmitters' of values and information. (See also Mazrui, 1976.) Therefore, the socialization process by which the NAN journalist develops his news values includes aspects of the Western journalist's socialization.
Specific studies have demonstrated this. Golding (1977), for instance, has used the phrase "the transfer of an ideology" to describe professionalism in developing countries he studied. Similarly, C'O'Brien's (1977) study of the orientation of journalists in Algeria and Senegal shows that their professional orientation is "imported." Of course, that is not to say that there is no difference between NAW and Western journalists. The point rather is that they share basic professional values, which makes a high degree of identification with each other inevitable. Journalists in the developing countries are therefore in a position to understand and appreciate the professional commitments and limitations of their colleagues in the West. Indeed, apart from Western influence, one would argue (as does d'Arcy, 1981) that the right to free expression is rather intrinsic in human nature. Therefore, efforts to stifle that right would evoke at least a degree of resentment anywhere anytime. The degree of resentment and the outward reaction would vary of course, depending on the cultural conditioning in a given context. But it seems reasonable to assume that journalists in pluralist countries as defined here are unlikely to have been so conditioned as to be receptive to the advocacy of additional infringements on their rights.

This is important in the light of the premise of this study because it means that NAW journalists are in the most vantage position to articulate the issues to reflect simul-
taneously the concerns of developing countries (the advocates of the new order) and the concerns of the West or in particular the concerns of the Western media (the critics of the advocacy). To clarify this point, it should be noted that there are two major contending perspectives on the new order issue. From one perspective, it is a developmental issue in which the economic advantage of the developed countries is pitted against the dependency of the developing countries. From the other perspective, it is an ideological issue in which the value of press freedom is pitted against a drive to sacrifice it. Given the first perspective, theories of loyalty would predict that NAW journalists would be firmly in support of the new order advocacy. (See Guetzkow, 1955.) But given the second perspective, they would be opposed to it. As anyone who has closely examined the arguments for and against the advocacy would conclude, however, both perspectives do touch on genuine concerns. Given, as has been shown, that NAW correspondents have a stake in either side of the concerns, it is a valid contention that they transcend both dichotomies of the debate. The contention is indeed supported by the subsystems approach to the study of international organizations.
The Subsystems Theory

The subsystems theory is the approach of seeking to understand the 'output' of international organizations by studying two major influences on a representative: his interaction with the bureaucracy he represents and his interaction with his fellow representatives at the organization. The representative's interaction with the home government is referred to as the representative subsystem, and his interaction at the organization is referred to as the participant subsystem. The outcome of the activities of the organization is said to hinge on the degree to which representatives reconcile or streamline the demands of the two subsystems (Cox & Jacobson, 1973; Jacobson, 1979).

The importance of this approach lies in the fact that few social or political issues are really of a dichotomous 'either-or' nature. They are usually negotiable in a way that entails modifications of previously held views. The representative of any government is the one that deals not just with the stark logic of the opponent's positions but actually interacts with the human representative of that position. The interaction with fellow representatives often go beyond the official and officious proceedings and debates; they also entail personal dimensions in which individuals talk with each other not so much as negotiators but as human acquaintances and colleagues. (See for instance Alger, 1965.) In the process, the representative develops a degree of ca-
maraderie with his colleagues, which significantly changes his global outlook and his views on the particular issue. Within the representative subsystem, he becomes therefore the one likely to be most sympathetic to the concerns of opposing members of the participatory subsystem. And within the participatory subsystem he of course is the one most intimate with the concerns of his representative subsystem. His ability to reconcile or balance the two 'pulls' and then to articulate that balance is the crucial factor in the attainment of the goals of the organization.

The subsystems theory is, of course, intended to apply to international organizations in which delegates are representatives of a larger interest beyond themselves. But it is adaptable to other forms of international organizational or non-organizational interactions in which individuals may not formally be representing larger interests or bureaucracies. For instance, though journalists are not representatives in the formal sense that diplomats and delegates are, they do however interact internationally with their colleagues through membership in international organizations of journalists and the sharing of office spaces in press centers around the world. Therefore, they must experience the two-way pull very much as diplomats and delegates do. Given this, their links and attachment to their home country may be considered a subsystem—call it the nationalist subsystem. And their international interaction with their col-
leagues may be seen as the other subsystem—the professional subsystem. This taxonomy is particularly applicable to the NANE correspondents who are residing in or operating from the countries that are critical of the new order advocacy. That, of course, is the case with the subjects of this study. At least theoretically then, the correspondents in this study hold a pivotal position. They have the potential to sway the new order debate one way or the other. Another way of looking at this study then is as an inquiry to ascertain what direction the correspondents would sway global news policies if they could in practice.

**Framework for Analysis**

Implicit in the claim that Non-Aligned World correspondents transcend the dichotomies of the news-flow controversy is the view that the issue is not, strictly speaking, between countries. Rather, it involves 'interest groups' which transcend territorial boundaries. This argument has been advanced elsewhere (Ibelema, 1983) and is supported by recent perspectives on international relations. One such perspective is Galtung's Center-Periphery approach to global problems of inequity. It will be summarized here because it adds depth to the subsystems approach and provides the conceptual framework for analyzing the findings in this study.

Galtung (1971 & 1980) identifies four actor-groups in the equation of global relations. They are the center of Center
(CC), the periphery of Center (pC), the center of Periphery (cP), and the periphery of Periphery (pP). By Center (capital "C"), Galtung refers to countries that hold dominant positions relative to others. These include colonial powers in all the phases of colonialism (discussed in Chapter I). The Peripheries (capital "P") are the dominated countries. They include all or much of the developing world. The same pattern of relations also exist internally. Thus, within every country there is a center (small 'c') and a periphery (small 'p'). The centers are the elites that wield economic, political and social power, and the peripheries are the faceless masses. On the basis of this typology, Galtung (1980, p. 55) posits that much of the problems of global inequality comes to be because "actors are tied to each other in interaction relations and interaction patterns that in themselves serve to distribute resources in an inequalitarian manner." In other words, inequities are to be understood by analyzing the patterns of interaction and relations between Centers and Peripheries on the one hand, and centers and peripheries on the other.

Galtung's Center-Periphery framework is a major deviation from both the traditional state-centric approach and the Marxist bourgeoisie-versus-proletariat dichotomy. Galtung argues that the state-centric orientation leads to an over-emphasis on inter-territorial relations and a lack of consideration of cross-territorial commonalities among actor-
groups within the territories. That, at a time when "The magic of territory is waning somewhat; [when] to defend values, styles of life, and structures is becoming more meaningful than to defend geography" (Galtung, 1980, p. 207). The Marxist dichotomy does reflect cross-territorial commonalities, but as Galtung points out, it lumps together periphery of Periphery and periphery of Center on the one hand and center of Periphery and center of Center on the other. Galtung argues that if there is to be a dichotomy it should be periphery of Periphery versus the rest.

![Diagram](image.png)

**Figure 1: Center-Periphery Relational Structure**

In this light, one may analyze the issue of global newsflow in terms of the relations of both the Center (Capital
and the center of Periphery to the periphery of Periphery. Journalists of developing countries are assumed to be a part of the periphery of Periphery. They are therefore at the receiving end of both relational power equations. The Galtung model then provides the conceptual framework for analyzing their articulation of the issues.

In summary, the theoretical basis of this study is rooted in two research traditions: mass communication and international relations. The theoretical bases may be summed up by the following propositions: one, that the issue of global news-flow is to be seen in the context of societal impact on the mass media—one of three epistemological concerns of mass communication research; two, that underlying the controversy are news values which develop through a tri-phasal socialization process; three, that to reach an understanding on the issues, a convergent perspective is necessary and that such a perspective can be articulated only by those whose socialization process transcends the two contending perspectives; four and finally, that an analysis of the issue has to proceed from a framework of relational patterns not just between countries, but also within countries.
CHAPTER III: RESEARCH METHOD

Population and Sampling

Sampling Universe

The working universe in this study are Non-Aligned World (NAW) correspondents in the United States. The study is limited to correspondents from countries where the news media are, in principle, not an integral part of the government. These countries are here referred to as pluralist countries. The study is so limited to exclude those correspondents from countries where the news media are essentially an instrument of governing. These countries are here referred to as collectivist countries. As Kruglak (1962) and Hollander (1972) among others have noted, the question of journalistic independence is irrelevant in collectivist countries because to them, it is not a prized value. Since, as is implicit in the preceding chapter, it is an assumption of this study that the correspondents whose views are sought do not see their news media as an arm of government, correspondents from countries where the media are, do not belong in this study. Moreover, since the news media in collectivist countries are not commercially competitive in
the same fashion as the news media in pluralist countries, it is assumed that correspondents from collectivistic countries do not have the first-hand experience to assess the needs and circumstances of the Western news media. Again, the existence of such an experience is embodied in the premise of the study. Finally, the restriction serves the pragmatic methodological function of limiting the heterogeneity in the ideological background of the respondents, thus making the data generated more manageable in analysis.

For the purpose of this study then, a country is considered pluralist if any of its news media—newspapers, magazines, radio, television or wire services—may be privately sponsored. (The *World Press Encyclopedia* is the main source of the necessary information to determine qualification.)

The study is also limited to correspondents in two major U.S. cities: Washington, D.C. and New York. Each of the two cities hosts one of the highest concentration of foreign journalists in the world, one being the U.S. capital and the other being the de facto capital of the world (as seat of the United Nations).

Correspondents were considered to belong in this study if they are citizens of the Non-Aligned World (NAW) and were working for a NAW news organization either on a full-time or a part-time basis. The NAW news organization did not have
to be based in the Non-Aligned World, but it had to be either owned by or oriented to serving developing countries. In this respect, Inter-Press, the Rome-based news agency is included in the sample population. Also, correspondents from non-pluralist NAM countries who were in the employ of a pluralist NAM country are included. There was no case of the reverse. There were a few cases, however, of correspondents who were in the services of NAM news operations but had just had their services terminated, usually as a result of financial difficulties at the home base. Those correspondents still had active interest in journalism and were therefore included.

For operational purposes, the Non-Aligned World is considered to include all the developing countries that have ever been or are now affiliated with the Non-Aligned Movement.

Sampling Procedure
The sample of correspondents interviewed is purposive and stratified. It is purposive in that correspondents were chosen on the basis of specific assumptions regarding their attributes, as just outlined. The sample is also stratified so as not to over-represent those regions that have many more correspondents in the U.S. than others.

Based on cultural and geographic considerations, the developing world is here divided into five regions: Sub-Saharan
Africa, Central America and the Caribbean (including Mexico), South America, Asia, and the Middle East (including North Africa). This division appears quite uneven in terms of the size of the area and population each consists of. But the unevenness appears more so than it really is. On closer examination, one finds for instance that while Asia is very large, many of the countries that it consists of (including China, the U.S.S.R., Japan and Vietnam) do not fit in the population under study. In contrast, most of the countries of Central America and the Caribbean (particularly the latter) meet the sampling criteria.

In addition to the regions listed above, Yugoslavia is also included in the sample. Though it is primarily collectivist and therefore does not strictly meet the sampling criteria, it is selected as a special case for two reasons. First, its collectivist orientation is considerably 'pluralistic'; in other words, though its media are sponsored by the party or government, they exhibit a greater degree of independence and autonomy than the media in other Communist countries. (See Robinson, 1977.) Secondly, its prominent role in the establishment of the Non-Aligned movement (See Mortimer, 1980) and its leadership of the Non-Aligned News Agencies Pool (See Ivacic, 1978) qualifies it as a country that should not be excluded in a study of this nature.

The original research plan was to interview 50 correspondents. Of the 50, four were to be from Yugoslavia and the
rest about equally distributed among the five regions. Also, specific countries which were judged to be most representative of the pluralist criteria of this study were also chosen. But preliminary investigation showed that many of those countries did not have resident correspondents in the U.S. The research strategy had therefore to be adjusted to available correspondents. To maintain a balanced heterogeneous sample of the countries that meet the criteria of news media pluralism, the original sample size was reduced to 41. Three of the interviews could not be completed. In one case, the correspondent abruptly terminated the interview, expressing irritation at being kept from his weekend social life for too long. In the other two cases, the interviews were terminated because of emergencies the interviewees had to attend to. Unlike other similar cases, these two could not be re-scheduled because of time conflicts. The usable sample then was of 38 correspondents.

The 38 correspondents are distributed among the six regions as follows:

- **Africa (Sub-Saharan)**: 4
- **Asia**: 12
- **Central America and the Caribbean**: 4
- **South America**: 7
- **The Middle East**: 9
And each region is represented by countries as follows:

Africa: Ethiopia, Nigeria and Sudan.

Asia: India, Indonesia, South Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Taiwan.

Central America and the Caribbean: Guatemala, Jamaica, and Mexico.

South America: Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela.

The Middle East: Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia.

The two Yugoslavian correspondents interviewed represented the news agencies Tanjug/Pool and the political daily Borba, respectively.

Of the 38 correspondents interviewed, 63 percent said they were working for private-enterprise news media, 21 percent for government-sponsored operations, and 16 percent for "other" ownership types. 5

4 With its present political setup, Ethiopia does not really meet the criteria of media pluralism as stipulated here. An Ethiopian correspondent was included in the sample nonetheless because she was in the employ of another NAA country which meets the criteria.

5 These figures are actually misleading since the private-enterprise news media listed include those of countries like Saudi Arabia, where such news media are heavily subsidized by the government. (See Hugh, 1979.)
Process of Locating Interviewees

The toughest aspect of the research was locating the available correspondents. The initial effort was made in March 1983. The Directory of Foreign Correspondents in the United States was to be relied on for the purpose. But at that time, the latest issue in circulation was the 1981 edition. And, in fact, given the lag between the collection of such directory information and its actual publication, there was no doubt that the directory information may not have been really current even in 1981. It was definitely not current enough in 1983, particularly in the light of the high turnover among foreign correspondents. It was used, nonetheless, because there was no alternative.

In March 1983, a contact letter and response form were sent to seventy-five correspondents in New York. The same letter and form were to be sent subsequently to about as many correspondents in Washington. But despite the enclosure of a stamped self-addressed envelope, the response rate was extremely poor. Only about eleven responses were received. Of the eleven, eight agreed to the interview. The other three declined for various reasons. One said she traveled in and out of the country too frequently to make the scheduling of an interview feasible; another said he was

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6 The directory is published by the U.S. Foreign Press Center, an arm of the State Department. According to the FPC official in charge of the directory, new editions could not be published at that time because of some legal tangles that had to be cleared.
too busy; and the third gave no reason. Again, only seven responses were received. About twenty-five of the letters sent were returned by the post office as undeliverable. Not much could be said about the rest. Since the lack of currency of the directory information was considered a major factor in the poor response rate, the effort to contact the correspondents by mail was abandoned. Instead, the interviewer went to New York and Washington to make the contacts in person and by telephone.

This was indeed a difficult approach, but it was not as problematic as it could have been. That was because the offices of foreign correspondents in New York and Washington are concentrated in the same areas and facilities. In New York they are concentrated at the United Nations press area, and in Washington they are mostly in or around the National Press Building. Moreover, the Foreign Press Centers in New York and Washington had files that contained more up-to-date information on resident correspondents. To the extent that the files were not current, the officials helped ascertain who could be contacted and who could not be. The interviewer also learnt of and obtained a copy of the 1983 Directory of

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7 Since many of the letters were addressed to offices, including in particular the United Nations Plaza, it was assumed that they were delivered collectively for internal distribution; and that in the absence of the addressees, the offices simply discarded the letters rather than turning them over to the post office to be returned to sender. That is to say, the number of unreturned mails is not an indication of the number of correspondents who actually received the letter and failed to act on it.
the United Nations Correspondents Association. Given these resources then, interviews were arranged both through personal contacts and by telephone calls.

The interviews were conducted in three phases. The first two phases took place in New York in April 1983 and May 1983, respectively; the third phase took place in Washington in June 1983. About equal numbers of correspondents were interviewed in each city: twenty in New York and eighteen in Washington.

The correspondents were generally cooperative. With a few exceptions, they readily accepted requests to be interviewed. The usual cause of hesitation was their busy schedule. Some correspondents simply would not commit themselves to an appointment but left the option open to the interviewer to keep trying. Quite a few who committed themselves did not show up, apparently because of unforeseen engagements. Correspondents from under-represented regions were given priority in terms of tenacity in trying to interview them. As is evident in the regional distribution of the correspondents interviewed, Africa and Central America and the Carib-

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*In one such case, the interviewer waited at a restaurant for over an hour before deciding to give up. But as he was about to take the subway back to the Foreign Press Center, he saw the correspondent disembarking from another train. She was on her way home, after transmitting a broadcast piece to her Central American country. She said she did not anticipate the dispatch to last as long as it did. In spite of the weariness that comes with the end of a day's job, she obliged to have the interview take place then.*
bean are particularly under-represented in the sample. That is because there were very few correspondents from these regions. For instance, only six Black African correspondents were residing in New York and Washington. Four of these were interviewed, and intense efforts were made to interview the other two. One was willing to be interviewed but was too busy to commit himself, even after repeated discussions with the interviewer. The other said bluntly that he would not submit to the interview because he had a policy of not submitting to interviews.9

But, again, the correspondents were generally enthusiastic about offering their opinions, and most did what they could to make themselves available for the interviews.

9 This correspondent was contacted three times, the first time by mail and the second time by telephone. He declined both times. The interviewer called again with the hope of persuading him by pointing out the irony of a correspondent— who makes a living by obtaining information— having a policy of not granting interviews. He would not wait to be persuaded. With considerable agitation he sternly requested to be left alone. Colleagues acquainted with him later confirmed that it was indeed his policy not to grant interviews. One speculated that it had to do with his sensitivity to and insecurity over the state of affairs in his country.
Interview Techniques

The interviews were unstructured. Questions proceeded from broad non-directive levels and became increasingly focused as the given correspondent determined the direction and nature of subsequent questions. Each interview began with the question, "When you think about journalism, news gathering and dissemination, what do you see as problems? What are your concerns?" The wording of the question varied slightly from interview to interview, but generally remained very close to this. Correspondents knowledgeable about the NIOC debate often responded with the question, "You mean the 'new international information order'?" To that, they were told to respond the way they as individuals saw the issue of news-flow rather than rehash a line of debate of which they were knowledgeable. Some other correspondents wondered if the question pertained to the state of the press in their country or internationally. They were told to address whatever concerns they thought were important to them. With a few exceptions, the questions were of course open-ended. The closed-ended questions were asked after the questioning along the lines of the correspondent's own thoughts had been satisfactorily pursued. In most cases such pointed questions were unnecessary because often the correspondents had answered them along the way. Such questions included those about specific developments or charges, like the use of UNESCO as a forum for the NIOC debates and the issue of licensing. (See Appendix B.)
Although the interviewer would have preferred to have the interviews take place in more relaxed settings, most of the interviews actually took place in the correspondents' offices. That was the choice of most of the correspondents who would rather not sacrifice their scarce private time out of work for an interview. The disadvantage here was the atmosphere of business and distraction. Often, the sessions were interrupted repeatedly as the correspondents answered phone calls or took a few minutes to attend to some urgent task. That strained the flow of those interviews and put a certain pressure for their being brought to a quick end. Unfortunately, it could not be helped. It is a consolation, though, that conducting the interviews in the offices helped acquaint the interviewer with the correspondents' life on the job. It was a useful experience both for establishing rapport with the correspondents and for understanding and interpreting their perspectives. Not all the interviews took place in the offices, though. Quite a few were conducted in more relaxed circumstances—in restaurants and the correspondents' homes.

The duration of the interviews varied considerably, depending mostly on the depth of the correspondent's articulation of his views. Some interviews lasted for over two hours, while others lasted for under one hour. Most of the interviews lasted between an hour and an hour and a half. Most of the short interviews were with correspondents who
felt they were not knowledgeable enough to say much about the issues. A few others appeared to have deliberately kept their responses brief and shallow to bring the interview speedily to an end. In other cases, the correspondents had to leave before the interview could be concluded. In some of these cases, the concluding questions (on solutions and prospects) were rushed. In three cases, the outcome was judged to be inadequate for inclusion and was dropped from the analysis.

In conducting the interviews, the recommendations of authorities of unstructured interviewing—Payne (1951), Gross and Mason (1953), and Banaka (1971)—were closely followed. The correspondents were assured that the study is of an independent and academic nature; that the anonymity of their responses would be guaranteed; and that there were no right or wrong answers. To the assurance of anonymity, the majority of the correspondents gestured or expressed absence of concern. But quite a few insisted on it; some even mentioned it as a condition for accepting to be interviewed. Also, considerable care was put into the wording of the questions, and the interviewer was always attentive to possible differences in interpretations of words and phrases. To this end, question "loading" and ambiguity were avoided as much as was possible in dealing with the often vague concepts involved. For instance, it was realized very early that most of the correspondents were not familiar with the
academic and political terminologies of the debate. Accordingly, questions that presumed such knowledge were either reworded or dropped completely, as necessary. (The specifics will be noted in subsequent chapters.)

The interviewer also kept to the recommendation of being "warm and pleasant" without getting emotionally involved with the interviewee's perspective. In general, there was no difficulty adhering to this strategy. But in a few cases it did cause some problems. Knowing that the interviewer himself was a citizen of a developing country, quite a few of the correspondents seemed puzzled or even irritated at being persistently asked to illustrate or justify their charges. Such reaction occurred mostly when the interviewer tried to elicit expressions of the correspondents' deeper thoughts by appearing to take a counter-position to their stance. Again, the reaction almost never reached a 'crisis' proportion. One possible exception was an interview with a correspondent who seemed to be in his late fifties or early sixties. He became extremely emotional, speaking at length about the failures of developing countries to take charge of their fate, and suggesting that the interviewer's apparent lack of awareness of the issues was symptomatic of the developing world's problem of subservience. The interviewer managed to remain calm during all this. After apparently giving vent to his emotions, the correspondent became more tractable and the interview proceeded with a greater degree
Method of Information Processing and Reporting

The interviews were recorded on cassettes and transcribed later for analysis. Since the pattern of the interviews varied from correspondent to correspondent while they essentially covered the same grounds, the transcription process involved listing responses under 'coded' categories such as "problems," "solutions," "licensing," and "development journalism." These were counted to determine frequencies and percentages. In reporting responses to closed-ended questions—for instance, questions that required 'approve or disapprove' responses—percentage figures were used. However, in cases where the responses to such questions were generally not clear-cut— or in cases where the responses could only be accurately reported with the specific definitions the respondents attached to them, the responses are reported to suggest their thrust or direction. In these cases figures are omitted entirely. Responses reported in frequency figures are those that individual correspondents mentioned in response to an open-ended question. The word mentioned is underscored here to draw attention to the fact

10 The correspondent seemed to have become a little remorseful about his reaction. At the end of the interview, he apologized for it and said he may have been carried away by his sensitivity to the issue. He even invited the interviewer to lunch at his expense and was a little displeased when the interviewer would only have a cup of tea.
that the frequency figures reflect volunteered comments. In other words, only the correspondents included in the frequency-count actually commented on the specific matter. This is important because the frequency counts would have been much higher if the rest of the correspondents had been asked to comment on such comments. Indeed, when such comments were judged to be particularly important, they were put to subsequent interviewees. Where such was the case, it is reported to reflect the volunteered and prompted categories.

The emphasis in reporting the data of this study is to approximate as closely as possible the individual's unique perception of the issues. For this reason, the data are analyzed mainly qualitatively. Frequency and percentage figures were used as necessary to group the responses. The purpose of such quantitative reports is to aid the accompanying qualitative analysis. (See Miller, 1975.) The figures were not subjected to any statistical tests because the limitations of the sample invalidates such tests.

In keeping with Haves' (1978) recommendation of "reflexivity" in communication research, specific references to or citations of the correspondents' comments are often accompanied by a phrase, clause or sentence describing the pertinent circumstances of the comment or the correspondent. Pertinent, that is, to enhancing an understanding of the context of the given comment. And when deemed necessary,
the specific 'interview encounter,' the antecedent question and answer process that gave rise to a comment, is recounted either in the text or in a footnote.

**Limitations of the Study**

A number of limitations have been noted along the way in this chapter and more will be noted at points where their acknowledgment is most pertinent.

The main limitation of this study lies in the sample used. Because of the strategy of representing six different regions in the study, the sample had to be stratified. And within a given region, the number of correspondents interviewed are too few for comparative analysis. For this reason, the analysis does not group responses according to regions, to ascertain patterns and trends. This is a weakness since such response patterns and trends may have indeed existed, given the apparent political diversity in the political setup of the regions and countries in the survey.11

The other major weakness of the study is related to the first: it is the question of generalizability of the findings of the study. The universe under study are, of course, Non-Aligned World journalists in general. That is those in

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11 If the diversity had been among regions alone, qualitative analysis would have been attempted in this regard. But within regions, there are considerable variations among the countries. Since few countries were represented in the sample by more than two correspondents, it was impossible to compare the countries either.
pluralist countries as here defined. The findings here can only be generalized to them to the extent that their colleagues posted to the U.S. may be said to speak for them. But as evident in the rationale for their selection as subjects of study (Chapter I), the correspondents are not necessarily typical. However, the same rationale would suggest that the correspondents are upwardly mobile and may indeed be opinion leaders among their peers.
CHAPTER IV: THE SUBJECTS AND THEIR NEWS VALUES

This is a study that seeks to clarify an issue of international importance by having a group of human beings articulate the issues as they see them. Given its humanistic approach, it is important that the reader 'knows' the people whose articulation of the issues are being reported and discussed. The purpose of this chapter then is to 'introduce' those people.

It would have been very much in keeping with the methodological orientation of this study to write a portrait of every correspondent whose comments are reported in the following pages. But besides the undesirable consequence of generating an enormous volume, there is the problem of privacy violation. As noted in the preceding chapter, the correspondents were guaranteed anonymity. Writing individual portraits will be a negation of that understanding. Therefore, what is provided in this chapter is a 'group picture'. The correspondents are described in terms of age and sex distribution, educational background, and career history. Their news values are also discussed here. As Galtung (1980, pp. 28-29) has noted, "it may be that more important
than the source of the values is the effort to state them clearly and honestly, for others to see and judge. To discuss the correspondents’ values then is to present the ideals they hold as goals, and to test the claim of ideological transcendence.

To ascertain their news values, the correspondents were asked to state their own meanings for freedom of the press, social responsibility, and news. To make their definitions more concrete—to put them in a practical perspective—the correspondents were also asked how they handled or would handle certain situations related to the definitions. Then, as was quite often, they were reluctant to commit themselves one way or the other, specific events were cited or scenarios described, and they were asked to say how they would handle them.

**Demographical Data**

**Sex and Age**

Of the total of 36 correspondents interviewed for this study, only seven were females. Surprisingly (given the image of women in that region), four of the eight women were from Arab countries or were working for an Arab media. One, in fact, was the bureau chief of an operation that comprises fourteen correspondents, possibly the largest single Non-Aligned World news operation in the U.S.
Based on their background and career history, the correspondents were estimated to be in their 30s, 40s, 50s and 60s. Specifically, eleven of the correspondents were assessed to be in their 30s, fifteen in their 40s (the modal age group), eight in their 50s and four in their 60s.

**Education**

Although many of the correspondents did not have a formal training in journalism, most are well educated. Three have the doctoral degree, eleven have master's degrees or non-doctoral professional degrees, thirteen have bachelor's degrees, and eight have no degrees. The other three cannot be classified. At least two more of the correspondents started a doctoral degree program but abandoned it. Another one was pursuing it on a part-time basis at the time of the interview. Some of the eight who have no degrees actually started university studies but dropped out. Only four of the correspondents had no university education whatsoever. They are the ones in their late 50s and 60s who learned on the job and "climbed the ladders" over the years. One de-

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12 It was not deemed necessary to ask the correspondents their ages since there is no need to know that precisely. The interviewer's best estimation is judged to be adequate for a general idea of their age distribution.

13 The correspondents who cannot be classified are those from whom the information could not be obtained for a variety of reasons. For instance, now and then a correspondent would evade certain questions about himself and the interviewer would refrain from pressing.
scribbled himself as having "learnt the hard way" (Interview #38). Another who said he started writing at the age of five added, "I have writing in my blood" (Interview #9).

Among the degree holders, the most popular subject of study is political science/international relations. Eleven of the correspondents have at least one of their degrees in this subject. The next most popular subject is journalism/mass communication, with nine mentions. Economics and law tie for the third position as each was mentioned six times. English literature and mathematics/physics are next with three and two mentions respectively. Of the nine correspondents who have degrees in journalism/mass communication, four studied it at the master's level after taking to reporting following completion of a degree work in another discipline.

Career Background

Almost all the correspondents interviewed have been reporting from the U.S. for at least one year. Specifically, ten have been in the U.S. for 1 to 2 years, eight for 3 to 5 years, nine for 6 to 10 years, and seven for over 10 years. One of the remaining four has had less than one year's experience. The remaining three cannot be classified.

The years of over-all journalistic experience are predictably much higher, on the average more than double the years of U.S. experience. Two correspondents have had an over-all
experience of 1 to 5 years, ten have had 6 to 10 years experience, eight have had 11 to 15 years, six have had 16 to 20 years, and nine have had an over-all experience of over 20 years. Only one correspondent has had less than one year's experience. He and the two correspondents who have had only 1 to 5 years over-all experience are among the few correspondents who never practiced journalism at home before becoming correspondents in the U.S. They were appointed correspondents because they were already in the U.S. as students.

For many of the correspondents, the many years of journalistic experience have been in diverse areas. Most of the correspondents for instance, have worked for two or more news media operations. Many have criss-crossed from one medium to another, acquiring experience in newspaper, magazine, wire service and broadcast journalism. A few have served as correspondents in other countries, usually in their region of the world. At least five have had experience as correspondents in other Western countries.

For correspondents from countries where English is not commonly spoken, expertise in the language is the number one criterion for their assignment to the U.S. (In fact, at least two of the correspondents became journalists in the first place because they were hired by newspapers to translate reports and documents written in English.) In most cases, familiarity with the language came with incidental
familiarity with the U.S., directly through having been in the U.S. or indirectly through studying about the U.S. in their home countries. For countries where English is commonly spoken, journalistic experience coupled with expertise in international affairs and economics is the major criterion. Knowledge of economics is a particularly important criterion because many of the countries represented in this study see high stakes for their economies in developments and decisions made in Washington (by the U.S. government) and in New York (by the U.N. and related agencies).

The correspondents also had diverse non-journalistic experiences. In fact, as may be evident from their educational profile above, many stumbled on journalism in the process of pursuing other careers. Usually, they undertake journalism as a part-time or even a pass-time activity while studying for a degree in another field. Then down the road, their interest in journalism grows or their prospects brighten and they make a complete switch to journalism. The two correspondents who have their degrees in mathematics and physics are dramatic examples of this. One said he planned to become an engineer, but about the same time that he discovered an interest in journalism, he realized that he lacked an aptitude for engineering. Accordingly, he switched to journalism. Another interesting example is that of an interviewee who stumbled on his present career because, while he was a student in political science, his
fondness for the game of cricket led him to contribute articles about the game to a local newspaper. Upon graduation, he was hired by the paper as a staff sports writer. Subsequently he developed an interest in international affairs and as a result became an avid reader of international news. He soon acquired expertise in the field and was reassigned to diplomatic reporting— an assignment that was to lead to his becoming a foreign correspondent in the U.S.

In spite of the fact that most of the correspondents did not set out to become journalists, many of them (about 50 percent) did start with journalism as their first major job. Among those who started with non-journalistic major jobs, teaching and civil service work are on top of the list, with five cases of each. Other careers mentioned are law practice, military service, psychotherapy and business. Three of the former teachers did their teaching at the university level, including one in law school. Of those who were in the civil service, one was a director of public relations in a government ministry, while another was a press secretary to a government.
Views on Freedom and Responsibility

The concept of freedom (or independence) of the press is easily the most talked about in the discussion of news-flow. Yet, it is possibly the most difficult to concretize. While it is widely considered a relative concept, Heintz (1979) and Kg'wenc (1961), among others, have suggested that either it exists or it does not. In attacking the call for a new international information order for instance, Heintz has written that just a little government controlled information is like being just a little pregnant" (1979, p.130). Similarly, Kg'wenc, a Kenyan journalist has written "... there simply happens to be no middle ground... Freedom is an indivisible entity." The correspondents interviewed in this study were asked to comment on this view of press freedom. To relate their comments to a shared experience, given that they have all been exposed to the U.S. press setup, the correspondents were also asked if press freedom in their respective countries should be the same as in the U.S.14

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14 This question implies, evidently, that press freedom in the U.S. is at a high level. Thus, it appears to second guess the correspondents' own opinion of the U.S. press. However, as will be noted in subsequent chapters, the correspondents do indeed regard press freedom in the U.S. as being at one of the highest levels (if not the highest) in the world. And the question was asked only after a correspondent had stated or implied that opinion, which was the case almost all of the time.
Limit of Press Freedom

The correspondents overwhelmingly reject the Heintz-Mgwenno absolutist view. They neither think that press freedom can be absolute nor that it necessarily ought to exist in their own countries at the same level or in the same fashion that it exists in the U.S. Twenty nine of the 38 correspondents interviewed regard press freedom as a relative concept which can only be assessed in the context of a nation's culture and circumstances. Only five of the correspondents think that a press is either free or not free. Even among the five, the view is usually modified by what the respondent says subsequently. Four of the interviewees were either too obtrusive or self-contradictory to be classified. The correspondents' response to the question of whether press freedom should be the same in their country as it is in the U.S. bears the same ratio.

A South American correspondent (Interview #30) expressed the view of most of his colleagues when he said that:

In general, you will like to see complete freedom of the press in every country. But it will be foolish not to put it in the context of the social, cultural, economic and political forces of each country. It has to insert itself into that reality.

An example of that reality, one correspondent noted, is that to Muslims, a picture of Prophet Mohammed is offensive. If, therefore, a newspaper carries the prophet's picture in an Islamic country, that would be an abuse of press freedom.
(Interview #16). Another correspondent placed the emphasis a little differently (Interview #27):

Each country has its special needs and necessities. The main thing that is the spinal cord in any given country is that you can say what you want to say without hurting, of course, somebody else. You have to respect everybody...you have to understand you can hurt someone by saying what you want to say.

Two other correspondents (Interviews #10 and #16) described the necessity for some constraints by quoting what is apparently an Asian maxim: "freedom is not freedom of the wild ass." By this, they said, they meant that press freedom does not entitle anyone to recklessness. Two other correspondents agreed in the following words: "You have to be responsible" (Interview #38). "You cannot without limit exercise the freedom of the press" (Interview #21).

A correspondent linked his views of press freedom to his skepticism about the integrity of journalists. He said that while he is against government control, partial or total, he realizes "the dangers of leaving it entirely to the journalists. The assumption that the journalist is upright, moral, selfless...may be wrong" (Interview #32). Another correspondent who has worked for the United Press Institute added that he used to be "a great freedom monger. But when I hear freedom of the press being talked about here [in the U.S.] I ask myself whose freedom?" He went on to note that "freedom should be a two-sided coin: freedom for the sender and for the receiver" (Interview #10).
Some of the correspondents not only expressed their views of press freedom but were also critical of those who expect uniformity among countries. Many pointed out, for instance, that when Americans discuss the media (or other institutions) in other countries, they expect that the institutions should conform to U.S. values and should reflect American thinking.

It wouldn't happen; it will never happen. It shows more ignorance [on their part] if they expect Eastern countries or Third World countries or Latin American countries, for that matter, to be on the same footing with the American press...because the experience of the United States is different from the experience of other countries (Interview #26).

Like the rest of his colleagues, the correspondent just quoted quickly pointed out that his views of press freedom as being contextual is not an endorsement of censorship and control. His point rather is that journalists should exercise a sense of social responsibility as necessitated by the context in which they operate. As another correspondent put it, referring to freedom and responsibility (Interview #2):

I don't think one is possible without the other. I cannot defend the freedom of the journalist just for freedom's sake. If I'm going to defend the freedom of journalists, I'm going to defend it only because I assume that the end result will be a higher good for the national interest.

In summary then, the argument of those who link press freedom to social responsibility is essentially that the viability and even survival of their societies hinge on such responsibility; that in the absence of social responsibility, censorship and control become both inevitable and necessary.
In contrast, three correspondents expressed the view that press freedom is independent of social responsibility. They are among the five who expressed the view that press freedom is absolute: that there are no gradations or variants. They believe that journalists should not be obligated to be socially responsible, their argument being that the concept of social responsibility is too closely linked to governments. In other words, what is considered socially responsible is usually what is in the interest of the government as distinct from what is in the interest of society at large. In any case, the journalist's own career interest will guide him ultimately to be responsible. For, an irresponsible journalist or one who incessantly is vicious or irreverent in attacking the government or anyone else will soon offend and alienate his audience.

**Drawing the Line**

For correspondents on both sides of the argument, stating in specific terms what constitutes social responsibility was very much of a problem. When asked where they would draw the line between their duty to report and their sense of social responsibility, most of the correspondents said they would make the decisions as specific situations arose. When pressed to state a situation in which they would refrain from publishing a news item, the correspondents invariably mentioned national security considerations, which they would
not or could not define in specific terms. A scenario was then described and the correspondents were asked to say how they would handle it.

**SCENARIO:** As a reporter, you obtain information which if published will inflame public passion and possibly lead to riots and even the overthrow of a government. Would you go ahead and publish it? 15

Many of the correspondents still hedged on this question, again saying that it will depend on the real situation. When pressed however, most stated a course of action. Twenty-three said "No" they would not publish in such circumstances, and seven said "Yes" they would. The responses of eight of the correspondents remained uncommitted, or could not be classified.

The overwhelming majority who would not publish are those who define national security liberally to include social order. Here is a sample of typical justifications for the 'No' response: Not to be concerned with effect "will be a tragic mistake" (Interview #30); "Anything that will compromise national security or even political unity" should not be on the media (Interview #26); "If there is a clear and

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15 The correspondents were told to assume the absence of any form of reprisals or threat consequent on their decision. Some of them pointed out that the decision to publish or not to publish lies with the editors—the gatekeepers. These correspondents were then told to assume that their editors would go by their (the correspondents') decisions.
present danger, I will not publish it" (Interview #3); "If it is in the real national interest [not to publish it], I will not publish it" (Interview #9). The rest of the justifications fall within one or more of these four.

It is of interest to note that except for the second justification, all the responses above are really non-committal. The emphasis in the third justification, for instance, is on 'clear' and 'present,' and in the fourth on 'real.' Indeed, the correspondents, invariably made a distinction between the interest of the particular government and the 'real' national interest. One correspondent who said he does not believe in journalism thriving on controversy offered this guideline with respect to his country (Interview #5):

One should have the nation at heart. Sensitive items should be played down. There are certain things that if published will whip up public sentiments. That can plunge us into another civil war. One should play down those things.

Sometimes, safeguarding a particular government also comes within the realm of genuine national interest. An Argentine correspondent (Interview #6) said, for instance, that if she were in Argentina during Juan Peron's rule, she would have been "vociferous" in criticizing his dictatorship at the risk of being jailed. In contrast, she said, she would be "more protective of the present military regime because the country has gone through so much turmoil in the last

16 The interview took place before Argentina conducted national elections that brought civilian rule back to the country in 1983.
few years, it is time to give it a chance— not to attack the government so much because the country is in the beginning of a process [of change]." Another correspondent (Interview #10) very much in the same vein, described his orientation to government as being "critically supportive." He argued against the suggestion that the press in the developing countries should, like the Western press, serve a role of opposition¹⁷ to the government:

The government is the principal change agent. Therefore, the same attitude that this people [Western journalists] have toward their government, we don't have. We look to our government for change to improve our country. I do not automatically look at the government as an enemy, not automatically. I would like to report our government critically but respectfully.

He went on to point out that as a young journalist he used to "make the same mistakes" that Western journalists make:

To be against the government was part of my training as a British colonial journalist. I no longer feel that way. I think I made a mistake then to have that attitude... I think we should be critically supportive of the principal change agent.

The nine correspondents who would publish in the context of the scenario described see things differently, of course. Their argument, essentially, was that the journalist's responsibility is to bring information to public awareness. The journalist is not in the position to judge the outcome of his reports. If he is, he never knows if a report that

¹⁷ The correspondent apparently refers here to what is commonly known as the "watch dog" orientation of the press. See, for instance, Iambeth (1977).
he censors will turn out to be one that would have served an important public use, if it had been published. Four of the correspondents illustrated this point by citing the circumstances surrounding the Bay of Pigs invasion by the U.S. They argued that if the American journalists who knew of the scheme had not cooperated with the U.S. government and censored themselves, they would have served public interest. For, by publishing the story they could have caused the plot to be abandoned, saving the U.S. the embarrassment of the ensuing rout.

However, these correspondents did concede that if there is clear evidence that their publishing an item would cause a direct threat to lives, they would "think twice." In this respect, they differ only slightly with the correspondents who would not publish. The difference is that while the threat to society 'posed' by the scenario described was enough to cause the 'won't publish' correspondents to impose self censorship, it was not enough for the 'yes-publish' correspondents. Indeed, when the Bay of Pigs incident was mentioned to the 'won't publish' correspondents, most said they would not publish. The reason for many, however, is that they believe such publication would endanger the soldiers deployed for the operation. When asked to assume that deployment has not actually taken place, many responded that one must not make such assumptions about a covert operation.
Another case the correspondents were asked to comment on was that of the self-censorship by journalists who knew that the Canadian Embassy in Tehran was shielding some American Embassy personnel when Iranian nationalists seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and held the personnel hostage. Without reservation, the correspondents said they, too, would have censored themselves.

Along with national security and the safety of individuals, ideological commitments also color the correspondents' view of press freedom. The case of a correspondent whose region is fighting to secede from the mother country is particularly insightful. She was uncompromising in her views of press freedom, insisting that all the rights to determine how it is exercised belong to the journalist. To test how far she was prepared to go in her defense of her principle of press freedom, she was asked how she would react if after her region has gained sovereignty someone advocates that they rejoin the parent country. May a journalist exercise his right to press freedom to that degree? "No," she responded. "That would be treason!" (Interview #33). When asked why someone must not have that right of expression, she said such advocacy would fly in the face of the public weal.
Consensual Press Freedom

That brings us to the view expressed by a number of correspondents that the determinant of press freedom is the need of the public expressed through democratic channels or legitimated by cultural norms. This consensual view was implicit in the response of many of those correspondents who link press freedom and social responsibility. But interestingly, it was explicitly stated by some of those correspondents who think that press freedom should be independent of social responsibility. At first glance, this view of press freedom does not seem different from the notion of press freedom prevalent in the West and other democracies. But on closer examination, one finds that it differs markedly, for instance, from the tenet of the U.S. First Amendment, at least as it is widely held by the U.S. press. While the U.S. press has tended to interpret the First Amendment as giving precedence to individual expression over public opinion, the consensual view of press freedom subordinates individual expression to public will. Thus, from the perspective of the U.S. press, any law or cultural norms that restrict press activities are an infringement on press freedom. But to these correspondents a press is free to the extent that the only constraints on it are those that emanate from public will or consensus.

One needs to emphasize that the consensual view of press freedom was explicitly stated mostly by correspondents who
strongly defend press freedom. Their statement of this view followed intense questioning in an effort to have them reconcile what appeared to be an inconsistency between their view of the individual's right to free expression and the right of a society to keep its values from being violated. One illustrative case (Interview #33) has been discussed above. Another insightful example is the case of a moslem correspondent who said that there is an “ultimate freedom” which every country should strive for. He was then asked if freedom of the press should be practiced in his country as it is in the U.S. and he said it should. How about the view that countries are different; that freedom of the press as practiced in the U.S. would be inappropriate in the developing countries beset with political instability? He responded: “How else? If you want someone to learn to swim, you have to drop him in a stream.” Well, as a moslem himself, would he approve of the circulation of Playboy in his Islamic country or does he find its prohibition justified? He responded that a society should establish its standards through open discussion. If the people would rather not have it circulated, and good moslems should not, then it should not be circulated, he said. He was finally asked if the freedom of the minority who want to read Playboy is not thereby violated. He said the public’s right not to have such material circulated in their midst takes precedence over the right of some individuals to have it (Interview #33).
Similarly, the correspondent cited earlier (Interview #33) was asked how she could say that there is freedom of the press in the country whose media she worked for when admittedly she could not write reports that are pointedly critical of the head of state. She responded:

It is the public, our readership, that decides. A correspondent can't change the situation; a correspondent serves the people, the readers. If they want more, then the newspaper should serve. If they are content with what they have, then it should be that way. So, I think it is the demand that counts, not what journalists want to do. The public has to be ready for certain material.

For a similar reason, another correspondent said he would approve of his government censoring someone who advocates communism in his country (Interview #29).

As stated earlier, explicit statement of the consensual view of press freedom was made following rigorous questioning. It is important to note this for two reasons. First, it should be evident that those who stated it did so to reconcile conflicting values rather than to suggest a goal. The correspondents did not necessarily start out with the idea of press freedom emanating from public consensus. They reached that conclusion because it served as the point of convergence of different values or ideas they had. As an indication, at the end of Interview #31, the correspondent noted that his own thought had become clarified as a result of the interview. Secondly, the correspondents who stated the consensual view of press freedom did so not to indict
press freedom but to defend it. It would be wrong then to conclude that the correspondents are content with every constraint that is legitimated by consensus. It is simply that in defining what press freedom is, they give primacy to public opinion, believing that if the will of the public reigns, it will ultimately lead in the direction of the greater potential.

**Views on the Nature and Function of News**

The correspondents' definitions of news revolve around the phrase "to inform," as in creating awareness: "To inform and educate" (Interview #31); "To create a well informed public" (Interview #21); "To inform with facts, not biases" (Interview #33); "To provide the whole truth" (Interview #9). A pointed definition is that "news is ... any event that will affect the life of the people" (Interview #12). These definitions, which are representative of the bulk of the responses, are indicative of a prescriptive utilitarian orientation to news. However, the correspondents stated that gossip, trivia and the scintillating also constitute news. For instance, the correspondent just quoted (Interview #12) pointed out that if he were an editor he would give in to readership demand and carry "wild gossip" about a 50/50 mix of the substantive and the frivolous." Reflecting the opinion of most of his colleagues, he said that the substantive is the real news, and gossip and trivia are the baits that entice the audience to news.
Along with the utilitarian definition of news is the view that facts alone do not constitute news; they should be made sense of. Interviewee #32 said for instance, that "news is not just bare facts; it's also putting it in perspective to educate, else it loses its significance." Most of the correspondents agreed. Interviewee #13 explained for instance, that if Gromyko and Schultz meet, it is not enough to say they met. One has to explain why "without going into whether it is good or bad."

While the purposive utilitarian view constitutes the major thrust in the correspondents' conception of news, there are a few definitions that support the man-bites-dog orientation. Interviewee #15 defines news as "something unique." And Interviewee #14 offers a definition that combines both the utilitarian and the oddity orientations: "News is something that has not happened before ... and that does have interest for many people, that is likely to affect people, that is likely to shock people." One correspondent expressed the avowedly commercial orientation of publishing "what sells" (Interview #24).

Whatever the individual correspondent's orientation, the consensus is that news is (or at least can be) a very powerful instrument.
**Views on Development News**

In general, the correspondents echo the definition of development news as "a concept of news that deals with issues of development rather than what will sell the [most]" (Interview #2). The dominant view is that development news is not or should not be uncritical, nor should it be exclusively good-news. Rather, as the definition above suggests, it differs from the 'normal' Western news in that, positive or negative, the criteria for its selection is whether it serves the developmental needs of the society. Thus, a report about why a project failed is as much a development news as is a report on how one succeeded. The underlying factor is that both reports provide necessary information for future efforts.

**Summary and Conclusion**

Based on the foregoing, the following is a summary-description of the characteristics of the subjects of this study. They are mostly in their thirties, forties, and early fifties, well-educated (though not necessarily trained in journalism), and they are highly experienced. In news values, the correspondents are centrist. They cherish press freedom, but more as a societal utilitarian value than as a gra-

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10 About five of the correspondents said they had no idea whatsoever of what development news is. Eight others said they knew the concept too vaguely to offer a definition.
tuitous right. They recognize the need for objectivity, not as an end but as a means of attaining society's goals. And they define news to emphasize the substantive and still include the frivolous. The correspondents' centrist orientation supports the premise of this study: that Non-Aligned World correspondents transcend the contending perspectives on the news-flow controversy. It is from a vantage position, then, that they assess the news media in their own countries and the news-flow internationally.

On the basis of the foregoing, the correspondents may be placed in an existing typology of journalists. Merrill (1974) has expounded the idea that the professional journalist is a free-willing rebel, rather than a "conformist spokesman for some collective of society." In contrast, social responsibility theorists like Peterson (1966) link professionalism to altruism and concern for the social welfare. In an attempt to reconcile the contradicting positions, Schwartz (1978) undertook a Q-Sort study of journalists and reported isolating two types of journalists which coincide with Merrill's and Peterson's descriptions. They are the inner-directed journalists who are motivated by personal pleasure, knowledge and work, and the other-directed journalists whose values emphasize order, society and altruism. Schwartz finds too that most of the more successful journalists are inner-directed. Since Schwartz's clean-cut isolation is not within the means of the methodology of this dis-
sertation, and given that Schwartz's subjects are different from the subjects of this study, it is necessary to be tentative in making comparisons between the two findings. That granted, one has to note that the views and facts discussed in this and the preceding chapter suggest rather strongly that the correspondents are individually a little bit of one of Schwartz's categories and a lot more of the other.

Specifically, most of the correspondents express an other-directed value orientation while retaining some inner-directed tendencies. The correspondents' views of news and press freedom are suggestive of an other-directed orientation. The inner-directed aspect of their values is evident mainly in their concern for job security over professional commitment. Only five to eight of the correspondents may be said to be mainly inner-directed. They are those who said, for instance, that press freedom should not be linked to social responsibility. The rest are decidedly other-directed—concerned mainly with the welfare of their societies.

As professionals then, the correspondents are much more within the mold of Peterson's concept of professionalism than they are within Merrill's. This runs counter to Schwartz's findings, but it is an additional enhancement of the correspondents' role as evaluators of the news media inside and outside their countries. For, as other-directed professionals much of their assessment of developments would be in the light of how such developments affect society at
large rather than how they affect them as individuals or a vested interest group.
CHAPTER V: THE INTERNAL FLOW

This is the first of the two pre-eminent chapters in which the realities of global news-flow are examined from the correspondents' perspective and within Galtung's Center-Periphery framework. The chapter is concerned with the internal conditions in the Peripheries which have a bearing on global news-flow.

The insight the correspondents provide here derive from their personal experiences. Some of the experiences, they had (or have) first hand. Others, they had (or have) indirectly through awareness of what happens or has happened to colleagues in the same or other news media organs.

The discussion here does not revolve around the specific values articulated in the preceding chapter. But these values are embodied here. They are clearly discernible throughout the chapter and, in fact, throughout the rest of the dissertation. Rather, the chapter is organized around three major headings. The first is concerned with the news media environment—the economic, political and socio-cultural factors that affect news-flow in the correspondents' countries. The second section synthesizes the correspon-
dents' evaluation of how their home journalists cope with the pressures. And the third section deals with their evaluation of the quality of the news media in their countries. In two additional sections, a macro perspective is presented in which the implications of the correspondents' assessments are related to the broader question of the Non-Aligned World's concern for greater participation in international news dissemination. The discussions are based on the correspondents' responses to the interviewer's prompting that they describe the news media in their countries.

**Pressures of Press Freedom**

This section is about the news media environment in developing countries. The correspondents report considerable constraints therein.

**Structural Pressures**

Financial constraints are mentioned by all but a few of the correspondents as the major inhibitor of press freedom in their countries. Its most serious manifestation is the lack of diversity in news operations. The economic base of most of the countries simply cannot support viable diverse news operations. The result is that most news operations are either sponsored by or financially dependent on governments. In countries where privately-owned news media thrive independent of government assistance, the tendency is also to-
ward monopoly. That means that irrespective of who owns the news media in these countries, lack of diversity is a prevalent attribute. Lack of diversity means lack of choice, which results in a media environment that is conducive to censorship. Even in countries where there are many news operations that can be independent of the national government, they are often controlled, formally or informally, by one or the other political constituency. And given the ethnic basis of many such political divisions, if a journalist falls out of favor with the news operation in his own constituency, his chances of being accepted somewhere else are considerably slim. Thus, even where there is an apparent diversity, there is still little choice.

Such media environment is said to be conducive to censorship because while it is not, per se, a cause of censorship, it makes censorship a very simple process even in countries where political practices and the distribution of power mitigate against it. In those countries, censorship does not result from decrees, orders or punitive measures. It derives mainly from relational forces; it is to be understood in terms of what a journalist has to do (or thinks he has to do) to make his relation with his superiors work to his advantage—that is, what he has to do to succeed in circumstances of want and deprivation. Such is here referred to as structural-based censorship.
Given that structural-based censorship is the most frequently mentioned by the correspondents (namely twenty-eight times), it is apparently the most widespread in the countries represented in this study. However, though it exists in all the countries, at least potentially, it appears to surface and become more significant, as the more coercive forms of censorship (that will be discussed later) begin to disappear. For, correspondents from countries where political differences are more openly and freely expressed are the ones most concerned with structural-based censorship. Apparently, a country has to attain a fairly high degree of openness and free expression before structural-based censorship can become salient.

Characteristically, structural-based censorship is effected through threat to economic security. The threat is either directed at the entire operation or at individual journalists. The threat to an entire operation obtains in situations such as in Nepal, Sri Lanka and Venezuela, where privately-owned news media depend heavily on government advertisements or subsidies. This threat usually implicit, but its reality hangs over the organization, reinforced each time a government official calls to complain about something. In some extreme cases, the news media respond not only to the sensitivities of their own government, but also to those of foreign governments from whom they receive financial support (Interview #12). The threat to individuals
obtains irrespective of whether they work for a government-sponsored or privately-owned media. It is the threat to a journalist's job, promotion, or other entitlements if he chooses not to tow the line.

Governments have a straight-forward reason for wanting a line to be towed. Simply put, a government wants to be in full political control and uses whatever leverage it has to ensure that the media align themselves to that end. And typically they have lots of leverage. Along with leverage through media ownership and advertisement, governments also pressure journalists through control of facilities like housing and transportation. As an example, one correspondent cited the case of a colleague who was denied a seat on the government-owned national airline because the colleague's paper was very critical of the government. Along with a few other journalists invited from his country to attend a conference, the colleague was to fly the national carrier to Europe en route to Mexico. All the other invited journalists flew the airline free of charge; he was told "there are no seats left." He had to request for and was granted free passage by the airline of a neighboring country (Interview #16).

For private publishers, the reasons for wanting lines to be towed are more diverse. Often, the private-owner acts in response to perceived government pressures. Sometimes, he is a key political figure, and censors to advance his polit-
ical aspirations. Other private owners impose censorship sometimes to impress the government with hopes of obtaining some political or economic rewards. And in some rare but significant cases, the government itself goes out of its way to court the loyalty of successful, and therefore influential news media entrepreneurs. A correspondent cited the case of the managing director of the paper he worked for, who was routinely invited to be with the prime minister when he made top level appointments. The publisher's loyalty thus assured, he steered his paper in the direction of loyalty to the government. In all of these cases therefore, there is little difference between government-ownership and private-enterprise in terms of the journalists' subservience to government.

Thus, the main characteristic of structural-based censorship then is that it results not from the political powers of government but from other features of the media environment which produce loyalty or acquiescence. The primary feature is the dire lack of a robust and diverse financial base for news media operations. Inevitably, only a few independent news operations exist. Journalists, therefore, have few alternatives and little choice. Keeping their jobs become their foremost concern. And some do more than is necessary to keep it. The result is that though structural-based censorship is not essentially coercive, it has an effect that goes far beyond the reality of the threat it po-
ses. (This will be discussed in the section on response to pressures).

**Political Pressures**

This is censorship that derives from political power—the power to coerce, imprison, expel, execute or otherwise physically punish a journalist. Political pressures differ from structural pressures in that while the latter, in principle, allow for free will and choice, the former do not. For instance, faced with political-based censorship, the journalist or publisher is concerned with his safety, and he has no alternatives. But faced with structural-based censorship, he is concerned only with financial security; in this case, he has options, though few opportunities.

Political-based censorship then is the more commonly recognized form of censorship, usually credited with being the major constraint on press freedom in developing countries. However, the correspondents interviewed cited it far less frequently, compared to structural-based censorship. From the correspondents’ responses, one can deduce a few reasons for this. First, though political-based censorship results in penalties as severe as death and exile, they are not as problematic because such extremities are relatively rare. Their frequency is magnified because they attract considerable attention. Secondly, built-in political plurality resulting from multiple competing power bases (ethnic, geo-
graphic or religious) mitigate against overt political-based censorship. For, in such contexts, harsh censorship measures easily spark social and political unrests, which undermine the government's power. Thirdly, NAW governments, concerned about their images abroad, are beginning to resort to more subtle forms of control—like structural-based censorship. When the pressure is overt, it is in the nature of a complaint or a 'request'.

Such 'requests' are passed down the hierarchy: from the government to a publisher or managing director, then to the editors and down to the reporters. One correspondent described the prevalent procedure in his country this way:

They [the government] don't tell you 'don't.' They can't do that. They say 'Could you consider for our national interest not to publish this or to hold it down.' A lot of the time we will say 'we will think about it.' But it doesn't mean it is guaranteed. So, a lot of the time they are unhappy with us. But again because we are such a big paper—we are influential, they can't do anything about it (Interview #29).

Another correspondent illustrated this kind of direct pressure by recalling one of his experiences as the news director of a government-sponsored television station. He had angered the military by televising a report of a group of citizens protesting that one of them had been cold-bloodedly

19 The correspondent apparently did not strictly mean that the government cannot censor them. His subsequent comments, like that journalists dared not attack the president by name, made it clear that the government could, indeed, say "don't" if it chose to, if it were expedient to.
shot by soldiers. The army chief of staff invited the news director to his office to express his fury over the report, which he said portrayed the army to be on rampage. The army chief said the soldiers shot the man only because their lives were threatened by him. The news director said he found no evidence of a serious threat to the soldiers—no guns or other weapons. And when he had called the army to obtain their own version of what happened, no one would talk to the press. The news director said it was uncertain whether the soldiers were provoked or not. What was certain was that the man had been shot by the soldiers and the residents of the area were protesting it. He felt obligated to air the story. The tense encounter with the army chief ended with his announcing he would appoint a military spokesman to communicate with the press on such incidents in the future. The news director, in turn, promised he would check with the spokesman before airing similar reports (Interview 11).

While such light-handed political-based pressures are the most frequently mentioned, there are also experiences of the more heavy-handed sort. Four of the correspondents said they had personally faced the threat of jail. One of the four said he had had army colonels supervising the newsroom he worked in. Another said he had had to go on self-exile (Interview #10). Two other correspondents said they felt the jailing of other journalists to be a direct threat to
them. One cited the case of a journalist who had written an analytical piece on a series of arsons that had destroyed a number of buildings that housed vital government offices. The writer had concluded the article by predicting the particular government building which he said would be the next target of the arsonists by virtue of its importance and given that armed guards for the building had been withdrawn. The building, surely, was on fire the day after the article ran! The writer was promptly detained on charges that he must have been privy to the arson. He was released only after a court dismissed the case four weeks later (Interview #5). The correspondent who cited this case said while such detention was not common, it made him wary nonetheless.

A somewhat different form of political-based censorship is political thuggery and terrorism. Three correspondents mentioned this form of censorship. It ranges from rough-handling of journalists by thugs at the service of political interests, to kidnapping by terrorists who have been offended by reports. One correspondent said some of his colleagues at home had had their houses burnt down (Interview #11). Another said he had witnessed newsmen, particularly television journalists being prevented by thugs from getting to scenes of incidents or sources of news (Interview #5).

One would say then that political-based censorship still exists to a problematic degree even in the more politically tolerant developing countries. But its effect is not nearly
as pervasive as the effect of structural-based censorship.

In countries where political-based censorship is the major form of censorship, it is often rooted in non-political facets of the society, which gives it an entirely different hue. For that reason, political censorship in those countries will be discussed as cultural-based in the sub-section that follows.

**Cultural Pressures.**

These are pressures that emanate from traditional values, including religious beliefs and practices. In the light of the consensual view of press freedom discussed in Chapter IV, one would say that cultural-based censorship is, in fact, no censorship at all. If it is, then it is the most legitimate of all, for it represents the will of the people.

Cultural pressures were mentioned mostly by correspondents who are from or are working for news operations of countries where religious mores are rigidly upheld, or where the form of government is still basically traditional (like a monarchy). Specifically, eight of the ten correspondents who mentioned this form of censorship are either from the Middle-East, or were working for Middle-East news operations, or were employees of publications that circulate mainly in the Middle-East. The other two are from Asian countries where religion is a major factor of political life. To some, cultural-based censorship is not a problem
at all. In fact, two of those who mentioned it did so to refute what they saw as misguided criticisms of their countries' press system. But others, especially those correspondents who work for news operations of other countries, express very strong disenchantment. It is because of them that cultural-based censorship is treated as censorship at all.

It already should be apparent that cultural-based censorship is largely voluntary, even autonomous censorship. To journalists who are a part of the culture, it is second nature. They have been brought up to know what may be said and what may not be said. But for expert reporters or those from the outer fringes of that culture, it is as much an infringement of press freedom as any other form of censorship. Rather than a tradition to be lived, cultural-based censorship is to them an order to be obeyed.

Ostensibly, the order is from the people. But to the extent that the government takes measures to enforce it, cultural-based censorship becomes also a political censorship. And here the line between the two becomes thin. For often, governments take advantage of the cultural and religious sensitivities of segments of the population to enforce measures intended for political control. And as one correspondent argued, in those countries where there is little open discussion of public issues, it is actually inaccurate to describe any measures as being based on public will. For,
what appears in that context to be public will may be only
the advocacy of an entrenched, and sometimes militant seg-
ment of society (Interview #31).

For instance, the most frequently mentioned example of
cultural-based censorship is that one cannot directly criti-
cize the head of state (president, king, or whatever title
he is known by). That ethic often has its origin in the di-
vine reverence accorded leaders in most traditional socie-
ties. They are seen as representatives of God, deities or
prophets. Such values become the basis for modern leaders
to insulate their political powers from public yearnings.
Effective direct criticism then becomes possible only if
made by another traditionally revered figure, who bases such
criticism on his own authority to interpret religious or
traditional canons. Since the journalist is rarely in that
privileged position, he can legitimately levy such criti-
cisms only to the extent that he conveys the thoughts of the
authoritative figure. Even when these conditions are met,
such criticism may still lead to factional clashes as one
group holds another to be guilty of pandering blasphemy or
cultural taboos.

All the same, the major difference between political-
based and cultural-based censorship is that while the first
is based on political means, per se, and geared primarily to
law and order, the second derives from public will and is
concerned with values and traditional processes.
tries where religious and traditional values are fervently upheld, cultural-based censorship is the norm. And political-based censorship, per se, is rendered unnecessary. For, as a result of socialization, most journalists have no qualms operating within limits that are acceptable to the governments. When political-based censorship is imposed, it is often on a cultural rebel, or at least, it is justified as a cultural-based censorship is apparently acceptable to the people.

**Summation on Pressures**

It is necessary to conclude this section on bases of censorship by pointing out that the classification is not intended to suggest that any of the categories of censorship exists exclusively of the others. Rather, what one gathers from analyzing the correspondents' responses is that while the three exist side by side, one tends to predominate in a given country. Which category predominates depends on the nature of the political set-up. Cultural-based censorship goes with political leadership that is strongly rooted in tradition or religion. Political-based censorship, particularly in its harsher forms, predominates in countries with a strong central government. Structural-based censorship, which one may describe as the most 'enlightened,' is predominant in the more open pluralist countries. All three categories constrict information flow, but qualitatively...
their effects differ. That will be discussed in the section that follows.

Response to Pressures

What will be discussed here are the correspondents' assessment of journalists and journalism in their countries. As is the case with many other subject matters that they commented on, the correspondents offered diverse and sometimes differing views of how correspondents in their countries thrive. On the basis of the diverse views, NAW journalists are here discussed in three categories to reflect their various levels of acquiescence (or lack of it) to the pressures of their media environment. There are journalists who stay deep within safe borders in exercising their privileges as journalists; there are those who reach the outer limits and with prudence try to extend it; and there are those who cross the border and enter the zone of danger.

None of the correspondents said that journalists in their country consisted exclusively of one or the other category. Rather, all three categories exist in all of the countries. However, as each correspondent discussed the performance of journalists in his country, his emphasis makes it clear which category of journalists he judges to have the most impact. Therefore, each category of journalists will be discussed in relation to the bases of censorship discussed in the preceding section to suggest the nature of the interac-
tion between each basis of censorship and each category of journalists' response.

This section could have in addition provided a systematic and detailed assessment of the professionalism of NAW journalists as was provided of the correspondents interviewed. But that is not possible because the correspondents did not and were not asked to provide a point-by-point assessment of the professionalism of journalists in their countries. Rather, they made such assessments only sporadically, often to explain why their home journalists perform at certain levels. These assessments will be discussed here also to reflect the purpose for which they were made.

The Conformists

These are the journalists who stay deep inside safe borders. Some do so out of their own cultural or religious sensitivity; others, perhaps most, do so because of paranchid concern for safety and financial security. Those who conform because of acculturation are contented. The others are not but are too afraid even to explore the frontiers of their rights. They are the ones with whom this subsection is mainly concerned.

Conformist journalists are like soldiers who yearn to win a battle but are too fearful even to come close to the battlefield. There is a mile between the rights they exercise and the rights they can safely exercise. Such conformism
does result in what may be described as the precedence effect. That is a situation in which the frontiers of rights that can be exercised shrink to the limits of rights actually exercised. It is a peculiar case of the mountain coming to Acmeth! The conformists would subsequently take equal steps backward and thus pave the way for further curtailment of press freedom. The precedence effect is best illustrated by the experience cited by one correspondent.

As a news writer in a government-sponsored radio station, he was responsible to his editors and news director, who by the formal rules of operation had complete editorial discretion over the news that was broadcast. They did not have to get editorial clearance from anyone else before airing a news item. Yet, from time to time, they would call government officials to obtain what the correspondent said "amounted to permission" to air certain news. Once permission had been sought for a certain news type, the government officials subsequently expected comparable news items to be cleared before airing. The news director and the editors knew that and obliged. So, month after month, the list of items that had to be cleared grew. And the station, which at the time the correspondent joined it was largely independent of government ministries, had, by the time he left it four years later, begun routinely to disseminate news that had been approved by government officials.20 (Interview #5).

20 The correspondent did not say to what degree he contrib-
Reasons for conformism. The primary reason for conformism is, of course, job security. But there is more to it. As the correspondent just cited explained, some journalists conform not just to safeguard their job, but also to impress their superiors, including government officials. In the anecdote above for instance, the correspondent explained that part of the reason for seeking clearance that was not required was to have someone to shift the blame to if the report stirred a beehive. The other part was to express loyalty to superior officials or, as the correspondent put it, "to get into the good book." The benefits range from more rapid promotion, to appointment to a more 'lucrative' office.

While some journalists are concerned with safeguarding their jobs and getting promoted, some others do what is necessary to make ends meet in the meantime. In fact, financial want was mentioned as a cause of conformism by all but a few of the correspondents who commented on conformism. To illustrate the extent of poverty among journalists in his country, one correspondent narrated a story he said is very popular among them. The story is of a reporter assigned by his newspaper to investigate and write about poverty and

uted to the conformism as a newswriter. But it is indicative that he admitted he considered himself "a civil servant first and a journalist second." He said, too, that having reached the level he had in his career, he would not do anything that could jeopardize it.
begging in the country. After writing and turning in the copy, he went back to the typewriter to type his letter of resignation. He was leaving journalism, he wrote, to take up a more lucrative job—begging! (Interview #16). The correspondent said the story is of no known origin, and it very well may have been the product of a witty mind. But the reality of a journalistic career in his country was such that journalists there did not see the story as an improbable fiction. It very well could have happened!

Of course, the scope of financial deprivation among NAW journalists varies from country to country, and one can very easily pick up the variation from individual journalists' assessment. On the whole however, it may be said to be a toothing problem, even in some of the countries that are economically better off. The result is that affected journalists frequently find it necessary to trade their professional commitments for food and shelter, sometimes literally speaking. For instance, in countries where there are subsidized housing, journalists compete with other citizens for them. And if they have to use their positions as journalists to advantage, many do. One correspondent described it this way:

A guy who is covering the Ministry of Housing, for example, knows he might have a housing problem, he might have to get a government house. So, he is very good with the minister. He plays up the minister. He gets his favors done. It is the old policy of you scratch my back and I scratch yours (Interview #16).
And the journalist who lives in a government housing does not have to cover the Ministry of Housing to find it necessary to compromise his press freedom. Knowing that the Ministry of Housing is only an arm of government, the conformist journalist would find it necessary to "play up" other ministers as well. Potentially, every minister can transmit his wrath or pleasure through the Ministry of Housing, or for that matter, through any other ministry. For instance, two correspondents from a country where subsidized housing is built specifically for journalists said that journalists who live in those houses do come under threats of eviction when the government is displeased with their reporting. The administrators of the housing units simply look for contractual basis for their eviction, including violations that other occupants get away with.21 (Interviews #3 & #4).

Another reason given for conformism as one correspondent put it, is that "the journalistic community does not support its own" (Interview #5). He cited examples of individual journalists who, in standing by their professional convictions against pressures to the contrary had received little active backing from the union of journalists and other organizations of journalists. Only two other correspondents

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21 Another correspondent from the same country said he lived in those housing units until he acquired his own house, and he never felt pressured by anyone (Interview #3). A fourth correspondent, also from the same country, said such pressures are possible but he was not aware of them (Interview #38).
volunteered similar complaints. However, it is likely to be a more widely-held grievance than is reflected in the frequency of mentions. As an indication, one may recall that union impotence or inactivity was cited as one of the causes of the correspondents' apathy in professional organizations.22

With so many reasons to conform, many NAI journalists find it necessary not just "to play it safe," but also to do whatever is necessary to please their proprietors and the government. Worse still, some journalists "have a false vision of what the government wants" (Interview #34). Yet, they do whatever they can to please, believing that they cannot err in being loyal.

**Areas of prevalence** Only two of the correspondents interviewed admitted to being conformists. But most were unmistakable in suggesting that the majority of the journalists in their countries are conformists, irrespective of the dominant basis of censorship. One may say, though, that conformism is most problematic in countries with predominantly structural-based censorship for those are the countries where the potential for enhancing press freedom is the greatest. The consequences of not yielding to structural

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22 The problem, however, definitely does not obtain in all the countries. In fact, correspondents from some countries credit union pressures for some of the progress that has been made in their countries in the affairs of journalists.
pressures are not as disastrous as could be in the case of political or cultural pressures. Cultural-based censorship demands acquiescence because of its sensitivity and legitimacy. And given that it is so deeply engrained in society, it is not highly responsive to journalists' efforts to minimize it. Therefore acquiescence to cultural pressures is not as harmful as in the case of structural pressures. Acquiescence to political pressures is also more harmful than acquiescence to cultural-based pressures. That is because political-based censorship is not as legitimate and often not as deeply engrained as the cultural. It can, therefore, be more successfully challenged than cultural-based pressures. But then the penalty for challenging political-based censorship can be so high that the risk may not be worth taking. Moreover, as will be discussed in a subsequent section, if not carefully done, challenge to political-based censorship can provide justification for the censorship. So again, though acquiescence to political-based censorship encourages dictatorship, it is still not as counter-productive as conformism in the context of structural-based censorship, which actually results in the lessening of existing freedoms through the precedence effect. For these reasons, conformism is held to be most problematic in the context of structural pressures. It is next most problematic in the context of political pressures and least problematic in the context of cultural pressures. (See Figure 2 for diagrammatic depiction.)
Figure 2: Conformist Journalists Under Pressures

It is illustrative of the seriousness of conformism in that in some countries where structural pressures are the major roots of censorship, a curious sort of press freedom exists whereby outspokenness and criticisms are always di-
rected at those, including the president, who have no lever-
age over the given news operation. Press freedom exists, 
but it is cross-territorial. You can be outspoken, provided 
it is not against the political interest of your owner or 
sponsor. There is press 'freedom,' but no journalistic in-
dependence or objectivity. The seriousness of conformism in 
this context lies in the fact that there is no over-riding 
political threat to journalistic independence. Media pro-
prietors succeed in imposing their will because journalists 
as a body acquiesce.

To summarize, the main problem with conformism in the 
context of structural-based censorship is that the journal-
ists guilty of it fail even to explore the frontier of their 
rights, something they could do without any risks to their 
life or even jobs. Not exploring the frontier means not 
trying to extend it, and even risking its closing in on 
them.

The Frontier Journalists

These are the journalists who exercise their press freedom 
rights to its very limits and seek further potentials. Es-
sentially, they conform too. But unlike the journalists la-
beled here as conformists, frontier journalists do not stay 
deep inside a safe territory. They operate within the outer 
fringes of the zone of tolerance and, with an eye on expe-
diency, try to extend it. One correspondent’s statement of 
the difference is most vivid:
You know the limitations; you know how far you can get. Some people take more risks and push it to the very limits and that limit becomes the minimum. Others, they play it safe and they tow the line... It is a constant battle... (Interview #25).

Another correspondent, saying very much the same thing, provided additional insight and details about frontier journalism:

We know our limits. For example, we will be very foolish to attack by name the president. We will never do that. We know it will be suicidal... [But], we don't become so timid as not to do anything at all. It is a matter of making your own judgment. It is like brinkmanship. You go to the edge but you don't go over or you fall (Interview #29).

Implicit in the above quote is the idea of trade-off, which is one of the two major strategies of frontier journalists, the other being subtlety.

**Trade-offs.** This strategy entails knowing what the government or proprietor is most sensitive about, exercising greater caution in those areas, and being more forthright in other areas. On the whole, it appears that governments are most sensitive on religious matters, followed by political and then economic matters. Of course, this does not apply to every country. Some countries do not have any problems with religion, at all. But in those countries where there are religious-based factionalism or where religion otherwise plays a major role in the task of governing, religious matters are of greatest sensitivity. The reason, as one correspondent explained in the context of his country is that
political issues are bread and butter issues. They don't evoke intense emotions [relatively speaking]. All they entail is that the policies of the government is not good. Emotions are high instead on religious issues ... the people's beliefs (Interview #8).

Prudence would suggest, therefore, that a journalist not ridicule or be overly critical of religious beliefs, practices and policies.

There are areas of political sensitivity too, and they vary from country to country. Expectedly, national security matters including concern for public unrest, were invariably mentioned as an area of political sensitivity. The sensitivity is, of course, highest in countries at war or experiencing political turbulence. In India and Pakistan, for instance, journalists developed a code of ethics that forbids mentioning in news reports the names of religious or ethnic groups involved in a violent clash, particularly if the clash resulted in deaths. The reason is to avoid whipping up the passion of the factions whose people were victims. If necessary, names are released only after passions have died down and the situation is under control.

The next most frequently mentioned point of political sensitivity is direct editorial attack of the president. Where direct attack is a sensitive issue, frontier journalists resort to subtlety and indirect attacks, which will be discussed later.
The next most sensitive area of concern is international relations. This concern applies to countries which have sensitive relations with neighboring (usually more powerful) countries or even distant allies. A Palestinian correspondent working for a Persian Gulf country said, for instance, that the Iran-Iraqi war is a most sensitive topic for the country he works for. Being too weak to withstand the wrath of either Iran or Iraq, the Gulf country has presented a neutral public face. Journalists understand the sensitivity and realize that any editorial position on the war will be taken in Iran and Iraq to be the government's position. Accordingly, they refrain from editorializing on it. Another example is that of an Asian correspondent who said the sensitivity of a triangular relationship between his country, a neighboring country and the U.S. is a major cause of censorship in his country. He illustrated this with arms sale agreements between his country and the U.S., a development that invariably infuriates the neighboring country. When his country's press gets information about such an agreement, it treats it as a major news item. In the process, it makes the deal known to the neighboring country, which sends strong protests to the U.S. and brings whatever diplomatic pressures it could to bear on the U.S. government to abrogate the agreement. The U.S. would then reprimand the correspondent was asked if the neighboring country would not otherwise get the information from the U.S. press, for instance. He responded that the country gets
respondent's government for letting its press play up the agreement. The government would consequently reprimand the press. It would "request" that the press not publish such items, at least until the deal has been sealed. Subsequently, the press would either censor itself or face government action24 (Interview #29).

Economic issues comprise the third major area of government sensitivity. This area is not as insidious as the religious or the political areas, yet it is constraining all the same. It applies particularly to those countries whose financial structures are at the brink of collapse or who rely heavily on the goodwill of other countries to support their economies. Countries which are financially propped by others are sensitive about reports that may alienate their financial backers. Examples of such reports are harsh crit-

much of such information from his country's press. It will eventually get the information from other sources, but usually much later.

24 This is one of two times that a correspondent said a protest by the U.S. government to his government was a cause of censorship. In the other case, a correspondent said he had filed a news story about an upcoming visit of Vice-President George Bush to his country. The U.S. Embassy in his country was displeased that the plan was disclosed so early before official announcement of it. The Embassy apparently conveyed their displeasure to their host government. The government, in turn, conveyed the displeasure to its Embassy in Washington, the correspondent's source of the information. The Embassy officials were infuriated with the correspondent and subsequently refused to cooperate with his news-gathering efforts. Just one week after the report, the innocuous information was officially released during a U.S. State Department press conference. And one wonders why all the row! (Interview #5).
icism of the patron country and charges of financial mismanage-
ment against the receiving government. The sensitivity
of countries at the brink of financial collapse stems from
fears of the effect of certain reports on their financial
institutions. An economic correspondent for a South Ameri-
can paper said, for instance, that his editors sometimes
censored his reports about loan negotiations between his
country and international financial institutions. The edi-
tors reasoned that given the state of financial tension in
the country, certain reports could cause public panic and so
provide the last tip to send the country to financial
abyss\(^\text{25}\) (Interview #37).

These then are just a few illustrations of the sensitivi-
ties. Whether the frontier journalist finds them justifiable or not, he takes them into account. That enables him to
chart his course more skilfully, if begrudgingly, through
the land mines of censorship.

**Subtleties and surrogates.** The frontier journalist then
does not, like the ostrich, bury his head in the sand when
confronted with danger. He finds his way around it by

\(^{25}\) The correspondent disagreed with his editors: "If there
is a panic, it will not be because of coverage." He ar-
gued that given the oligopolistic financial structure of
his country, those whose panic could have serious conse-
quences would have had inside knowledge of the outcome of
the negotiations, any way. The correspondent did not say
if the editor was responding to pressures from the gov-
ernment or his superiors. But, based on the correspon-
dent's gloomy assessment of press freedom in his country,
one would say that either or both pressures were at work.
avoiding what has to be avoided. And when he finds it prudent, he is subtle rather than overt, indirect rather than direct. Referring to subtleties, one correspondent, for instance, said of himself "I am a master at that" (Interview #9). He cited his coverage of the Camp David Accord which he said he could not explicitly criticize. Instead, he took pains to point out the equivocalness of certain clauses in the accord. On the surface, his criticism appeared to address only some specifics and mechanics of the accord. But in reality, it was intended to make the point that the accord, as a whole, was based on a shaky foundation of unresolved issues.

The question then is whether the reader or audience do, indeed, get the point. The answer was often a qualified "yes." Subtle criticisms are picked up by at least enough people to spread the point around. "The readers read between the lines" was a frequent explanation. Like the journalists, the readers know what can be said and what cannot be said. Therefore, they actively search for underlying meanings. The government too, gets the point, but as a correspondent said it cannot do anything because "the writer is not violating any norms" (Interview #9).

But, though the correspondent do get their points across through subtleties, they do not find the strategy entirely satisfactory. "It is still frustrating" was the way one correspondent put it (Interview #35). The frustration
arises, of course, from having to skirt around the subject matter and not having the choice to put across a view as effectively and directly as one could. As another correspondent complained, "It is one thing to be able to say what you want to say; it is another to say it the way you choose (Interview #27). Another correspondent who expressed disdain for diatribes like "this traitor did this or that traitor did that," nevertheless complained:

It hurts me as a journalist when I have to curtail some of the ways I like to say things... But in order to get my message across, as someone who is trying to be a credible journalist, I also have to compromise... and discreetly put my point across (Interview #13).

Similar complaints were made of the strategy of directing attacks at surrogates. For, to paraphrase a correspondent, when journalists cannot say anything about the president, they end up giving the village mayor hell (Interview #9). Another correspondent said the use of surrogates results in virtual total censorship in his country since "where it matters, you cannot say it" (Interview #12). He said that while all political powers in his country lie with the royal family and the army, both are taboos as subjects of criticism. So, while everything else may be criticized, none really matters, politically. Certainly, governments do pick up the cue when their subordinates come under criticism. But their response, often, is to replace or reshuffle their cabinet and so pacify public sentiments while maintaining
the status quo. Criticisms directed at the top cannot so easily be diffused.

**Prevalence.** In spite of the pitfalls of their strategies, frontier journalists are nevertheless the best hopes for an independent, credible and professional press in the Non-Aligned World. They are an elite and apparently budding minority group, more enlightened and more dedicated to their profession than the rest in their calling. They are also occupationally more resilient. That gives them the sense of security or self-confidence to experiment and explore the frontiers of their rights and privileges. Their resilience derives from excellence in the profession, vocational versatility, or sheer commitment to principles.

Frontier journalists exist in the context of all three censorship bases, and potentially, they can have an impact in all three contexts. But for the same reasons that conformism is judged to be most harmful in the context of structural-based censorship, frontier journalism is also most useful in that context. As explained before, structural pressure is the form of censorship that can be most easily contained by the journalists' resolve; the frontiers for freedom can easily be expanded if prudently explored. In comparison, again as explained earlier, political-based and cultural-based censorships can be fraught with extreme dangers. And cultural-based censorship is not very responsive
to efforts to minimize it. Therefore the efforts of frontier journalists do not produce maximal results in either contexts. It does in the context of structural-based censorship. (See Figure 3 for diagramatic depiction).

Figure 3: Frontier Journalists Under Pressures
The Cliff Jumpers

This third category of journalists are those at the other extreme from conformism. Unlike frontier journalists, cliff jumpers cross the frontier rather than explore it; they violate the rules of good brinkmanship: they do not just get to the edge, they go beyond it... and fall. Cliff-jumping then is journalistic fanaticism often rooted in political or religious factionalism. Cliff jumpers go beyond the edge because they have a cause and their cause has a following.

In countries where structural-based censorship is dominant, journalistic fanaticism is often within the context of cross-territorial exercise of press freedom, as described earlier. That is journalists who flagrantly go beyond what is acceptable do so in hauling abuses not at those in control of their own areas but at political opponents, which may include the central government. But in countries where political-based censorship can be strongly enforced, journalistic fanaticism provokes an iron-fisted clamp-down on press freedom. Thus, just as the conformists induce infringement of press freedom by default, the cliff jumpers spark it by exercising press freedom to a fault.

Periodic press freedom/the steam effect.

However, cliff-jumping may itself be the result rather than the cause of a government offensive against the press. That happens in countries where a relatively high degree of
Press freedom has existed before a sudden strict imposition of political-based censorship. Journalists are intimidated initially to abide by the constraints. But as the imposition continues, they become restless. Soon, someone will speak out, followed by another and another. In no time, there will be a chorus of outbursts of attack against the government. Sometimes, such outbursts follow the governments' decision to relax censorial measures. Whatever the impetus for the outburst, the outcome is the same. Often, it reaches a frenzy and the government brings down its feet again. And the cycle repeats. It is like the well-known figure of speech about a boiling pot with the lid held down. For as long as the heat is on, the entrapped steam will sooner or later find an outlet, by exploding, if necessary. Cliff-jumping then is not always a factional-based journalistic fanaticism. Sometimes, it is simply an outlet for pent-up frustration resulting from prolonged deprivation of the right to free expression. That is the steam effect.

*Areas of Prevalence.* It should be evident that cliff-jumpers have their major impact and exist mostly in the context of political-based censorship. Given the extreme sensitivity of cultural-based censorship, there is little reason for cliff-jumping in that context, except when there is a crisis. And in the context of structural-based censorship, there is not as much reason for cliff-jumping, since politi-
cally, there is a liberal environment for press freedom. As mentioned before, cliff-jumping there is in the form of cross-territorial exercise of press freedom. Although, it has the effect of tempting the government to resort to political measures of censorship, it still is not as much a factor as is conformism. Cliff-jumping is most consequential in the context of political-based censorship because both nourish and encourage each other. They provide each other with a reason for being; just as the cliff-jumpers resort to excesses to vent pent up frustrations, governments justify political-based censorship on the grounds that they have to curb those excesses. It is another case of the chicken and the egg. (See Figure 4 for diagrammatic depiction).
Figure 4: Cliff-Jumping Journalists Under Pressures
Content Under Pressure

The pressures on NAA journalists and the three categories of journalistic response to them combine to produce media content that the correspondents find unsatisfactory, or the whole. This section deals with the major problems they mentioned. Each problem will be discussed to relate it to the applicable pairs of "pressure" and "response."

Shallow Journalism

The most frequently mentioned quality problem is that news in NAA media is typically shallow, uninspired and protocol-oriented. Such quality problem has often been attributed to a lack of financial means, paucity of trained journalists, and political repression. While these factors variously apply, the fact remains that the problem of shallowness persists even in situations where the factors are minimal, and it exists beyond what the factors warrant. The reason is that where conformism is a surer guarantor of career success than is professional excellence, journalists have no incentive for a Pulitzer-Award quality of work. Their personal interests are better served massaging the ego of a boss or heaping invectives at his foe. Since neither flattery nor invectives need substantiation, the journalists find little need for investigative journalism. Therefore, the newspapers and airwaves are, for the most parts, filled with news of courtesy calls and announcements made by the president,
high government officials, corporation heads and the like. Such news is not just shallow. As nine of the correspondents noted, it is also elite-oriented. It ignores the realities of life at grass-roots and mirrors the superficial world of politics, protocol and polemics.

That the absence of investigative journalism is largely due to lack of incentives is, indeed, evident in the fact, as one correspondent noted, that not only are the negative not investigated, but the positive are not, either; not only are the affairs of government glossed over, social trends are similarly not examined (Interview #5). Thus, though opportunities exist for investigative journalism in all censorship contexts, few journalists bother to pursue them because there are easier ways to 'succeed' than to go through the rigors of fact-finding.

Evidently, conformist journalists are, in this light, responsible for shallow journalism. It is indicative of their numerical dominance that shallow journalism is so pervasive in the Non-Aligned World.

**Opinionated News**

This is the second most frequently mentioned problem with news quality in NAW media (11 mentions). It exists in two closely related forms. One is filling the news media with opinions rather than reports; the other is lumping opinions and facts together without distinction. The correspondents
who mentioned this problem are mostly from or work for countries where cultural-based censorship is dominant—that is the more traditional countries. Predictably, the correspondents attributed the problem to journalists' lack of training. But one can also explain it in terms of the atmosphere of conformism. Given flattery and invectives as the underlying criteria for newsworthiness, it is to be expected that views will be explicitly injected into news. And in the absence of investigation, it is far much easier to offer one's opinion than to write a factual analysis. In this light, it is not surprising that even with the necessary training, journalists would still mix news and opinion and offer more of the latter.

Related to the problem of opinionated news is what some correspondents referred to as an "ideological" orientation to news (6 mentions). It is not strictly speaking ideological; based on the correspondents' explanations, one would say that the word 'partisan' is more applicable. It is an orientation in which news coverage is geared to support or promote a political view or interest. For instance, a South American correspondent pointed out that during elections, his country's national news agency (which he represents) provides more information about candidates of the ruling party than candidates of other competing parties (Interview #34).
Credibility and the Internal Flow

All of the discussions in this chapter point to credibility problems, a factor the correspondents overwhelmingly cite as the second most important determinant of the pattern of news flow. There are credibility problems for the news reported and for those who report it.

Scepticism and Audience Communalism

The major credibility problem lies in the general public's perception of news media content. As mentioned earlier, the discerning general public consume news with scepticism, particularly when the news media is identified with one political interest or the other—which is mostly the case. And when they have a choice, people opt for the news organization that 'represents' their constituency or political stance. It is a simple case of preferring the consonant to the dissonant even when both are equally suspect. Not uncommonly, therefore, NAM newspapers target their audiences not on the basis of content-type preferences (as is the case with the difference in orientation between The New York Times and the New York Daily News, for instance) or for reasons of geographic proximity, per se (as is the case of the local orientation of most U.S. newspapers); rather, they target their audiences by the criteria of ethnicity or

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26 As will be elaborated on in Chapter VI, technological and financial means were cited as the most important factor.
political communalism. Thus locked in and with no intention of striving to appeal to all potential readers, the newspaper can conveniently ignore the tenets of objectivity, which, as Schiller (1975) has argued, is inspired by mass marketability. Audience communalism and news media lack of credibility, thus, reinforce each other to keep a stricture on the quality and scope of the internal news-flow.

Image of Journalists

While discussing their professional interactions in the U.S., a number of correspondents complained that journalists from developing countries were looked down upon by their Western colleagues. According to them, their image is not good at home, either. In most of the countries, the general public regard journalists as instruments of politics rather than as independent professionals. Often, it is a blanket image which tarnishes even the efforts of the dedicated ones. Ironically, even the very government officials who are the "beneficiaries" of journalistic sycophancy also "have no regard for [NAW] journalists," to quote one correspondent (Interview #5). Eleven correspondents complained, for instance, that NAW governments would rather grant interviews or disclose "big scoops" to foreign journalists than to NAW journalists. Among the explanations offered is that

Such targeting applies, of course, only in countries where there is any degree of news media competition and ethnic plurality.
NAACP governments hold their own journalists in contempt.\textsuperscript{28} It is not surprising, therefore, that of fourteen correspondents who commented on access to news sources, eight said they have greater access in the U.S. than in their own countries.\textsuperscript{29}

**Summary**

The correspondents identified three types of pressures on press freedom in their countries. They are here labelled structural, political and cultural. Structural-based censorship is said to be the most problematic and widespread, though the most "enlightened." Three types of journalists are also identified, who reflect the major strategic responses. They are the conformists, who are unduly cautious; the frontier journalists, who, as professionals, do the best they can in any given circumstances; and the cliff-jumpers, who fail to exercise restraint and often provide governments with good reasons to impose censorship. Frontier journalism is said to be the most suitable response in all censorship contexts, being most effective, however, in the context of structural-based censorship. The net effect of pressures and responses is negative, as they result in credibility...

\textsuperscript{28} The other explanations will be mentioned in the discussion of the external flow.

\textsuperscript{29} The other six correspondents said the opposite is true. They attribute their difficulties in the U.S. to their being foreign.
problems for NAA journalists and news media.
CHAPTER VI: THE EXTERNAL FLOW

This chapter deals with the international dimension of news-flow. It focuses especially on the nature and characteristics of the news disseminated by the Center and the forces that shape it. The emphasis is, of course, on those aspects of news dissemination that bear on Center-Periphery relations.

Complaints are weighted based mainly on the number of correspondents who mentioned them. How concerned a correspondent is about an issue is also considered. For instance, often a correspondent would mention dependence and then add that it is not really a problem or that it is not an issue to complain about. Such mentions are not included in the frequency count. Thus, concern with an issue affects the frequency count, which places the complaints in relative perspective.

This chapter also presents the correspondents' insight by discussing their anecdotal illustrations of the problems as they see them manifested in the Center media. It should be noted that the emphasis in the anecdotes is on the U.S. media, even though the U.S. is only one of the Centers that
hold the leverage on international news-flow. The reason is that the correspondents are in the U.S., which makes the U.S. media their point of reference. That limits the globalism of their illustrations. But the limitation is not a severe one. The U.S. is the leader of the Center. Its two major news agencies (the AP and the UPI) are, respectively, the largest and second largest in scope of international operation. It is not therefore a severe limitation that the U.S. media is here a surrogate for the Center media.

The chapter consists of four major divisions. The first is concerned with the degree of coverage developing countries receive in the U.S. media. The second and third sections deal, respectively, with the nature of news coverage accorded developing countries and the reasons for such coverage. In the fourth section, the correspondents' view of the issue of dependence is discussed to relate it to their assessment of the U.S. as well as the Non-Aligned World news media.

Coverage of the Non-Aligned World
The correspondents addressed two concerns. One is concern for quantity—the scope of attention a country receives in the news media; the other is concern for quality—the nature of that attention. Only three correspondents said their countries receive enough attention in the U.S. news media. And all but one mentioned one aspect or another in which his
country is mal-covered. But the correspondents were not as concerned with quantitative as with qualitative mal-coverage. "The important thing is to carry something that is realistic whenever they carry at all," was the way one correspondent put it (Interview #16). A majority of the correspondents acknowledged that it is unrealistic to expect the U.S. news media to cover their countries in details, if the news media are to remain viable. Their point is that what is of immediate interest to the readers is what newspapers carry. Some of these correspondents noted that such pattern of selectivity is universal. To underscore this point, a South American correspondent asked and answered a rhetorical question: "How many stories have [there been] in my newspaper about Upper Volta? I tell you none. I never read one" (Interview #24).

Concerns with the lack of coverage were mainly over cases where it became a cause of distortion. One correspondent illustrated this by citing the U.S. media coverage (or lack of it) of the news-flow issue itself. He noted that the U.S. news media carried editorials denouncing the MacBride Commission report without providing news coverage (or objective reports) of the substance of the report. He argued that by offering their opinions in lieu of objective summaries of the report, the news media distorted the essence of the recommendations of the MacBride Commission (Interview #10).
There is also the view that the U.S. media exclude news about developing countries to a much greater degree than is necessitated by market-place demands. This view was volunteered by about 39 percent of the correspondents. A correspondent who said there are tens of thousands of people of his nationality in the New York area complained, for instance, that he has tried unsuccessfully to convince the news media in the area that they have an audience for news that his agency could supply. To support his claim, he pointed out that his New York office had started to disseminate news using a phone-answering machine. The news is recorded on cassettes and fed into the machine so that anyone who calls an assigned number can listen to it. He said the service sometimes received as many as 1000 calls within a 24-hour period, a lot of the calls being long distance. He argued that it is indicative of the demand for such news that so many persons pay (for long distance calls) to tune in to the news service (Interview #19).

**Manifestations of Mal-Coverage**

**Oddity and Sensation**

The most frequently mentioned complaint is that news about developing countries are selected by the criteria of oddity and negativity; and that when the subject of a report is not necessarily negative, the darkest aspect of it is highlighted or the report is otherwise sensationalized. This mani-
gestation of mal-coverage was mentioned by twenty-three of the correspondents. All the twenty-three had instances or anecdotes to back up their claims. Here are some of them.

Instance #1: Pakistan completed the construction of a huge dam that cost over a $1.6 billion, one of the biggest ever built. The New York Times reported the construction in a few paragraphs in its news-brief feature. The report essentially mentioned American participation in the project. Two years later, soil erosion caused one of the eight tunnels of the dam to break. That received "enormous, blown-up coverage" in the Times and other U.S. news media (Interview #8).

Instance #2: India launched a satellite. The Washington Post reported it with the highlight that the satellite was transported to the launching site on an ox-drawn cart. The report became a source of humor to Americans who read it. "They had a good laugh out of it." The point the report made was that, its technological advancement notwithstanding, India was still backward.

The correspondent who narrated this case contrasted the emphasis with the real significance of the launching. India had already tested an atomic bomb. Its launching of a satellite meant its capability to deliver 'the bomb' had been enhanced. With an intercontinental ballistic capability, India would become a major factor in the global power equation. The correspondent said if the situation had been re-
versed and he were covering such launching in the U.S., the implication for world affairs is what he would have emphasized. He said he discussed the coverage with an editor of the paper and the editor agreed that the emphasis was wrong. There was no explanation of how the story, nonetheless, survived all the gatekeepers' scrutiny (Interview #32).

Instance #3: Nigeria was building a new capital city in order to move the national government away from the present over-crowded capital, Lagos. The Wall Street Journal carried an article which depicted the new capital as "a clearing in the bush." The article said the only structure up in the new capital was the presidential palace, where "the president and his four wives and six mistresses" would enjoy themselves.

The correspondent said the description was so far removed from reality that he wondered if the writer of the article ever observed what he wrote about. He said too that the article was "so tasteless" that an official of the Nigerian Consulate requested to meet with the publisher of the paper (Interview #5).

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30 The interviewer asked the correspondent if it was true that the satellite was ox-carted to the launching site and if so why a mechanized means was not used to transport it. He said "It very well may have been true." He speculated that the government may have determined that access to an ideal launching site was much easier on an ox-drawn cart than by alternative means. It must have been a matter of convenience rather than backwardness.

31 The correspondent did not say if the meeting ever took place and, if so, what transpired.
Instance #4: King Fahd of Saudi Arabia made a speech calling on Muslims to abide by the doctrines of the concept of ijtihad. It is a concept that urges believers in Islam to keep making efforts always to become better Muslims. The Washington Post interpreted the speech to mean a call for Islamic fanaticism—a sort of modern-day Jihad, as promoted by the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. Before it carried the article, the Post called the Saudi News Agency bureau in Washington to cross-check the facts. The bureau informed the paper that ijtihad and Jihad are two entirely different concepts. That in calling for ijtihad, the King was only reminding Muslims of their commitment to personal growth in Islamic faith. Notwithstanding the agency’s clarification, the Post went on to print its own interpretation, which portrayed King Fahd as becoming radical.32 "They apparently didn't find it [the agency's interpretation] adequately exciting" (Interview #36).

The next two instances also illustrate such preference for the sensational. Both are about Nigeria. One was narrated by an African correspondent and the other by an Asian correspondent.

32 The interviewer later obtained a copy of the paper and examined the article. Titled "Saudi King seeks Islamic law review," the front-page report states essentially that King Fahd would like to see Islamic laws updated in the light of contemporary realities. If then the article depicted the king as a radical, it was in the direction of modernization rather than conservatism, as was the case with Khomeini's revolution.
Instance #5: Early in 1983, the Nigerian government ordered all illegal aliens to leave the country within two weeks. Most of the estimated two million people affected waited until the eleventh hour. Their effort to meet the deadline at the last minute resulted in chaotic situations at Nigerian ports and borders. *Newsweek* covered the development under the headline "Nigeria's Outcasts: The Cruel Exodus." One of two main pictures that accompanied the story showed soldiers whipping a crowd into order. It was captioned "Crowd control, Nigerian style..." As it turned out, Nigeria never used soldiers for the purpose. The picture must have been taken in one of Nigeria's neighboring countries where the expelees were returning to or passing through.

The correspondent who cited this case said the error must have resulted from the use of pictures provided by freelance photographers. But he added that it nonetheless was indicative of *Newsweek*'s opting to sensationalize the story. He argued that *Newsweek* must have had several pictures that accurately conveyed the situation in Nigeria. It chose the one that was most sensational33 (Interview #5).

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33 *Newsweek* subsequently carried a letter from a Nigerian Embassy official who pointed out the error. The magazine noted its regrets but did not explain how the error occurred.
Instance #6: It was 1969. Nigeria's civil war was coming to an end. Western reporters swooped on secessionist areas that had just been taken over by the federal government forces. One of the reporters was heard calling out: "Is there any women here who have been raped and who speak English? Please step forward" (Interview #16).

Instance #7: A man was sentenced to jail in India for assaulting a young woman. The New York Times carried a news story which said the man was jailed because he kissed a young woman in public. The impression created was that India was still a culturally rigid and, perhaps, backward country in which kissing in the public is an offense punishable by imprisonment. In actual fact, the man was jailed because he assaulted a young woman by kissing her without her consent.

The correspondents who cited this case (two of them) blamed the writer rather than the paper. They said the writer interpreted it the way he did because jailing for assault is too commonplace in the U.S. to make a scintillating story about another country. He sensationalized it to be published (Interviews #3 & #4).

The correspondents said that the U.S. media do not apply the same standards in domestic coverage. Of fourteen correspondents who made the comparison, twelve said the affairs of the U.S. and its allies are not so distorted. They admitted that the U.S. press is also oriented to the pictur-
esque in domestic coverage, but they said the orientation is not always negative. One correspondent noted, for instance, that "when the [U.S.] economy turns around, it is reported as much as when it gets into trouble" (Interview #8). And the correspondent who complained about the coverage of India's launching of a satellite said the negative slant is in contrast to the U.S. news media's coverage of the U.S. space program. The U.S. program is covered to glorify U.S. technological advancement and superiority. Even when a problem develops, it is portrayed as one more obstacle to be overcome by American ingenuity (Interview #32). And one of the correspondents who cited the "public kissing" report said of the distortion: "They wouldn't have done that if it were Israel" (Interview #4).

Lack of Balance

Complaints about the lack of balance in U.S. news reports were the second most frequently voiced, with fifteen cases. Essentially, the complaint is that when there are more than one view of an (international) issue, as is usually the case, the U.S. news media report the issue prejudicially. Most of the slants mentioned were in favor of the U.S. or its ally.

Expectedly, Arab correspondents invariably believe that the U.S. media cover Middle-East conflicts in favor of Israel.
A few non-Arab correspondents from diverse regions said so too. In a typical criticism, a non-Moslem Arab correspondent said:

If there are two demonstrations on 42nd Street, one pro-Israel and one anti-Israel, I can bet you that the one that will get the greatest coverage is the pro-Israel demonstration. And [there will be] a very degrading coverage of the one that is anti-Israel (Interview #13).

An Asian correspondent concurred: "Talk to the PLO guys and they will tell you how hard it is to get their views across in the New York Times [for instance]."

These are cases of imbalance by default. There are also cases of active pro-Israel sympathies in news reports. For instance, the use of the term "terrorists" to designate the Palestinian Liberation Organization was questioned by nine correspondents (five Arabs, two Asians and two Africans). The argument was that the tag ignores the Palestinians' legitimate claim that they are fighting to re-establish their nationhood.

Another example: Following Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the army continued to sustain casualties from ambush attacks on its personnel. American journalists would ask Israeli officials on TV: "How long are you going to wait before you will react?" "When will your patience run out?" The correspondent who cited this example said that such questions revealed an "implicit commitment" to Israel. "Israel is an occupier. It is only paying the price of oc-
cupation. So, what does 'patience' mean in the context?" (Interview #26).

This correspondent, like the rest who see an anti-Arab slant in the U.S. news, did concede without prompting that U.S. coverage of the invasion did not spare Israel. But the explanation was that "the vulgarity of Israel's action" made it inevitable that the press report them (Interview #13). Some of these correspondents expressed the hope that the U.S. news media would continue in their 'new-found' courage to report the Middle-East even-handedly. Others were sure that the pro-Israel slant was back. The case of reporters asking Israeli officials when their patience would run out is one indication cited. In another instance, a correspondent said she had long noticed a trend of the news media reporting only about Israel's plans to withdraw, a trend that "once again puts Israel in a positive light."

What they are not saying is that the Israelis are still the occupiers of Lebanon; what they are not reporting is the economic manipulations of Lebanon via occupation; what they are not reporting is how the Palestinians in camps are prisoners and how their human rights are being stepped on. ... they are not reporting how the Israelis are imposing their so-called peace on Lebanon and how they brought so many impossible conditions so that Syria will say "he can't live with that."

34 In fact, the correspondent was in the defensive, refuting charges that the coverage was anti-Israel. He said that it could not have been, given that much of the reports were transmitted from Israel and Israeli authorities censored what displeased them.

35 The interviewer reminded the correspondent that the peace treaty with Israel was overwhelmingly approved by the Le-
The correspondent added that the reversion to over-locking Israel's reprehensible actions "is not just unfair, it is also dangerous."

Such instances of U.S. media pro-Israel stance constitute only a fraction of the imbalance picture as the correspondents articulated it. Most of the examples the correspondents cited have to do with a pro-U.S. stance in U.S. news media reports. The imbalance is mainly by default. That is, the U.S. news media play up American version of issues and fail to adequately represent contradictory views.

Instance #1: Following the Cancun Summit in which political leaders of developing countries met with those of Western industrial powers to discuss economic concerns, President Ronald Reagan painted a very positive picture of the outcome of the summit during his press conference. It was apparently an attempt to impress on the American public that he had led the West successfully to come to terms with the countries calling for a new international economic order. The press conference was heavily covered and President Reagan's assessment was widely disseminated. In a similar press conference, Indira Ghandi and Julius Nyerere expressed the views of the developing countries. Their appraisal was

banese Parliament, which included a sizable representation of anti-Israel constituents. She said that "that shouldn't blind the press to the conditions. It was the best alternative as the Parliament saw it."
Far less positive. Far less attention was paid to their view. When subsequently little developed from the summit, "the world was taken aback." Only the relative few who heard the Ghandi-Nyerere appraisal knew that Cancun held out little hope for a tangible development (Interview #11).

Instance #2: During the Cancun summit, again, President Reagan met with his Nigerian counterpart President Shehu Shagari. After the meeting President Reagan announced to the press that the two had discussed Libya's involvement in Chad's civil war. "He gave the impression that Nigeria was 100 percent behind what they [Americans] were doing [about Libya's involvement]. On reading the published reports, the Nigerian foreign minister called a press conference to point out that there was no such support. But "the whole world had already been fed the Reagan version and hardly anyone carried the Nigerian version... Americans dominate the news" (Interview #9).

Instance #3: Long-standing differences between Libya and the U.S. have surfaced in the U.S. media in various forms. One of the most spectacular was the dog-fight between American and Libyan jets, during which two Libyan jets were shot down and one of the pilots killed. Soon after, the U.S. government issued a statement claiming that Libyan President Mu'ammar Ghadaffi had sent a hit-squad to the U.S. to assassinate the U.S. president. Throughout the incident, the U.S. press played up the U.S. government version. Ghadaffi was
portrayed as a bellicose fanatic capable of irrational extremes. In contrast, U.S. stationing of its warships off Libya's coast was not portrayed as an adequate provocation. The U.S. government's hit-squad story was similarly disseminated without questions. Yet, no evidence was made public to back the claims. When subsequently U.S. intelligence failed to uncover the potential assassins, the press let the story die, without ever questioning its credibility (Interview #5).

Instance #4: During the Falkland Islands war between Argentina and Britain, the U.S. formally declared its support of the British. The U.S. press reported the war prejudicially against Argentina. The U.S. press held Argentina's account of events suspect but disseminated Britain's version as facts, "though the British were manipulating [the news] just as much." Also, stories of foreign correspondents being expelled from Argentina were used to discredit Argentina. No mention was made of the expelled journalists' offenses which included dealings with spies, illegal possession of instant transmission machines, and other activities which are security risks in a war setting. The correspondent who mentioned this said she had the "first-hand" experience of the "built-in bias in coverage" when she was posted to Argentina as a consultant/producer for the U.S. Cable News

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36 This view was expressed by both South American correspondents who commented on the war.
Network's coverage of the war (Interview #6).

Other Manifestations

Two other manifestations mentioned are ‘lack of perspective’ (eleven correspondents) and ‘factual inaccuracy (six correspondents).

Reasons for Mal-Coverage

Political Bias

Mentioned by twenty-seven correspondents, political bias is the dominant explanation of the mal-coverage of developing countries. It was cited as the reason for imbalanced presentation and distortion, and even for inaccuracies. The correspondent in Interview #19 stated the general sentiment when he said:

Walter Cronkite and Dan Rather may appear to be objective by giving two or three versions of an issue. But such objectivity is only technical. On close examination, in the final analysis, they are for the system.

The following excerpts, which reflect the same thinking, are representative of the correspondents' comments.

[The American news media] are independent in the sense that they don't require government assistance in the way that some Third World countries do. But to tell me that they don't see themselves as being a part of the large strategic interest of the U.S. is a lie (Interview #11).

37 By first-hand experience, the correspondent was referring to her association and familiarity with the foreign press corp, rather than any incidents at her own network.
Though American journalists may attack Reagan or a Congressman, they generally don't say anything that is fundamentally against the American point of view. They call it press freedom. That is okay, if you say so. I don't know (Interview #19).

The government does not tell journalists "Don't do this, do that." The process is highly sophisticated. It involves a lot of explaining, making the journalist a part (Interview #8).

They report news as the government" (Interview #25).

[The objectivity of the U.S. media ] is just within the country. When they are dealing with the affairs of other countries, they all come together (Interview #5).

In domestic affairs, [the U.S. press] is more balanced and representative; in international affairs, it is nationalistic (Interview #33).

I do not believe the U.S. press is objective. In fact, the elements of influence on the Western press many of them command as much criticism as elements of the Third World press. They cannot afford to lose a certain big account; so they will not rock the boat with that big account (Interview #13).

[The U.S. media] have access to more data, even about our own countries. That gives their reports a semblance of veracity... semblance in the sense that [even] statistics can be very deceptive (Interview #2).

The stories [in the U.S. news media] are canned (Interview #9).

The correspondents adduced several specific instances as the bases of their assertions. Many of the instances had been mentioned in the discussion of imbalance. Most of those that have not been mentioned have to do with observed collaborations between U.S. government officials and U.S.
journalists. Quite a few correspondents mentioned that they had been present when U.S. government officials take aside American journalists to provide them with information that is not made available to the foreign press. Others cite instances in which the U.S. press had turned against or become favorable to a country in correspondence with the deterioration or improvement, respectively, of U.S. relationship with that country.

The most revealing instance is one mentioned by a Caribbean correspondent whose country has had a fluctuating relationship with the U.S. At the time of the instance, diplomatic relations between the two countries were strained and deteriorating over the Caribbean country's growing friendliness with Cuba. *Newsweek* magazine sent a staff writer to the Caribbean country, apparently on a fact-finding mission on which to base a news analysis of the situation. "To our surprise and even to the surprise of Americans in [the country], he stayed as the guest of the American ambassador... So, where is the independence?" (Interview #11).

It is, perhaps, in response to this correspondent's question that many his colleagues point out the contrast between the image of countries like the Soviet Union and Syria which are ideological/political foes of the U.S. and, on the other hand, countries like Britain and Egypt which are political allies. If you go by the Western media, an Asian correspondent said, you "will think the Soviets are the worst guys in
the world [and] the Syrians are the most belligerent..." (Interview #23). A Middle-East correspondent referred to the same influence, in contrast, when he said: "King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, he is the greatest as far as the American [media] are concerned" (Interview #9). Similarly, another correspondent said that before Pakistan began to co-operate with the U.S. in its efforts to counter Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, "Pakistan was probably one of the worst countries in the world--stories about whipping, hand-cutting dictatorship, no political activities." After the co-operation began, that changed. "The same situation is there, yet you don't hear anything negative about Pakistan anymore."38

Profit-Oriention

According to one correspondent, the essence of the U.S. media's profit orientation is contained in a statement in Arthur Miller's famous play The Death of a Salesman. The statement is that "Everything in life is selling and buying" (Interview #19). That correspondent, along with sixteen others, credited the orientation with the sensational coverage of developing countries. The basic idea is that the U.S. media sensationalize news about developing countries

38 There is a certain irony to some of these examples. In some of the cases, as in the reference to King Fahd, correspondents from the countries that were said to be favorably covered actually had their own mal-coverage grievances. In most cases, however, the correspondents who mentioned such favorable coverage did so in reference to their own countries.
and cover only their problems because the media believe that that is what the audience is interested in.

The seventeen correspondents who offered this explanation constitute almost fifty percent of those interviewed. Yet, the frequency is fewer than expected, given that market demand is the explanation most frequently put forward by researchers and the Western media.

It is not clear why more correspondents mentioned political/ideological bias than market-demand. But, it is indicative that of the seventeen correspondents who mentioned market-demand, twelve were sceptical about the validity of the explanation. Some wondered if the media have to provide only what the audience wants instead of what it needs. Others dismissed the claim entirely, saying that Americans want to know more about developing countries but the media just would not provide such information because they would not make as much money. The most frequent criticism, though, was that the media created or encouraged the demand they now fulfil. In their own ways, seven of the correspondents expressed the same view as the correspondent in Interview #10:

I know as an editor that I can corrupt my readers' tastes. You give them a diet of trash and they will get hooked on it. It is very easy to demean, degrade people's values.

The correspondents were asked if such "diet of trash" is not inherent in a competitive setting. Some, including the correspondent just quoted, cited the success of the New York
Times as proof that the news media can be substantive and viable. Others said there could be a more judicious mix of the positive and the negative, the substantive and the frivolous. And one correspondent who seemed particularly resentful noted that factual and impressionistic accuracy should not be sacrificed for commercial expediency:

Yes, you have to take into account what the reader wants. Absolutely. That is mandatory. But you cannot say I am writing this misleading piece of information because my reader wants me to. It is not fair; it is incorrect; it is only an excuse... (Interview #13).

Moreover, with such coverage, "ultimately, you are doing injustice to your own readers by letting them grope in the dark" (Interview #32). Another correspondent who also conceded that demand and competition shape U.S. media news coverage, nonetheless said that in meeting commercial necessities, the media are "not trying hard enough" to be fair in their coverage of developing countries (Interview #8).
Cultural Differences

Twelve correspondents credited mal-coverage to Americans' limited awareness of developing countries, some noting that mal-coverage and lack of awareness are mutually reinforcing. "They cover well when they know what they are talking about," was the way one correspondent put it, then added "but often they don't know what they are talking about" (Interview #20). "They don't understand, the American journalist doesn't know anything about us," was another journalist's expression of the sentiment (Interview #28).

Such lack of understanding, the correspondents point out, results in misperceptions and misinterpretations of the affairs of developing countries. One indication which has been noted elsewhere is that "Americans feel that things should be done everywhere as it is in the U.S. They forget that countries have different needs and setups" (Interview #6). Accordingly, the argument goes, American journalists apply invalid criteria in their assessment of developing countries. An example a correspondent said is most prevalent is the negative portrayal of military regimes in developing countries. The correspondent said that American journalists would not be as harsh in their depiction of military regimes if the journalists comprehended the socio-political reality that engendered the regimes. "Were it not for the military, the Third World would be in chaos" (Interview #21).
The cultural awareness gap also results in insensitivity. In this respect, some Asian correspondents noted that, in covering riots in the correspondents' countries, American journalists specify the names of groups involved and the number of casualties, in violation of the journalistic ethic observed in those countries. The correspondent who mentioned American media's continued use of the word 'untouchables,' also cited it as an example of insensitivity.

One correspondent introduced an additional dimension to the 'cultural differences' explanation when he said that part of the reason his country has an over-all positive image in the U.S. media is because his country is "highly Westernized." He explained:

When American journalists go to a place and find a Holiday Inn or a Hilton and a waiter or taxi driver who speaks English, they feel comfortable; they say this is like home. Otherwise, they describe the place as backward (Interview #29).

The correspondent was, of course, largely figurative in the specifics he mentioned.

Other Explanations

Two other explanations mentioned are 'a-priori' ideas and 'individual failings.' Nine correspondents said that salience of developing countries results mainly from preconceived notions; four attributed it to the abilities and dispositions of individual journalists. The second group noted that quality of coverage varied with correspondents.
**Summary**

Absent from the correspondents' attributions is the view often expressed in political circles that the mal-coverage is born of some kind of conspiracy. The closest to that view is the explanation that part of the mal-coverage is because the media do not want a rise in the U.S. public's sympathy for developing countries. (The two correspondents who offered this explanation said if there is such a rise in sympathy, it would result in more U.S. aid to developing countries, and the U.S. media would not like that.) Why the conspiracy "theory" is not popular among the correspondents is not clear. Perhaps, because they are journalists, they look at the issues strictly in terms of the means and limitations of the profession. Or, more likely, their experience in the U.S. simply did not corroborate the charge of conspiracy.

**Dependency and Cultural Imperialism**

The complaint that developing countries depend on developed countries, specifically on the 'Big Four' news agencies for their news is one in the forefront in the agenda of new order advocates. But when asked to say what they considered to be problems in global news dissemination, only a few mentioned it. And some of those did so only to make the point that "cultural imperialism" is too strong a term to use in reference to the present structure of international informa-
tion flow. Yet, given the short-comings the correspondents attributed to the Western media, one wonders why the Periphery news media continue to subscribe to their services. To probe this, the correspondents were asked why their home offices find Western news services credible and continue to subscribe to them.

U.S. Media Appeal

"There is no alternative" was the recurrent explanation for continued subscription to Western news services. Almost all the correspondents said that the logistical superiority of Western news services is simply imposing. They noted that clients are attracted by the vendor whose service is most comprehensive, everything else being equal.

A second explanation is that the news media in the developing countries are even less credible. This explanation was stated explicitly by only a few correspondents, but it was implicit in the comments of most. To probe it further, each correspondent was asked to compare journalism in his country and journalism in the U.S. In response, the correspondents acclaimed U.S. journalism. Almost everyone said the U.S. press is more free; seventeen praised the quality of writing and the insight of analysis in U.S. papers; and American journalists themselves were often described as "dedicated," "courageous" and "enterprising." To the question of how their country's news media excel the U.S., the
answer was almost always "I can't think of anything." Sometimes the correspondents were even more pointed: "There is only weakness on our side."

The third explanation of the appeal of Western news media is that their biases are more subtle, which makes them more credible. This explanation was explicitly stated by five correspondents, but it was evident too in the responses of those correspondents who said objectivity in the U.S. media is "only technical." Some of the correspondents attributed the subtlety to U.S. journalists' sophistication.

The fourth reason (mentioned by nine correspondents) was, using one of the correspondents' phrase, "colonial mentality." It is the conscious or unconscious belief that "what is foreign [that is what originates from colonial 'Centers'] is better" (Interview #24). The South American correspondent who offered this definition noted, as an example, that his home editors would pay to a Western news service over three times the amount they would pay to an indigenous journalist for comparable content and quality story. A Taiwanese correspondent added that such preference for news disseminated by Western news services is a manifestation of a wider problem. He said it was not uncommon in his country that people would boast about their superior 'American-made' clothings only to notice with indignation that the tag says "Made in Taiwan." Often, he said, such clothes were bought by people who traveled to the U.S. or other foreign coun-
tries, in the belief that they were American-made. Their pride is gone when they realize that the clothing item is not American-made, after all. That the quality remains the same is no consolation.

**Summary**

The foregoing may be summarized as follows: (1) That the correspondents see qualitative mal-coverage as a greater concern than quantitative mal-coverage. (2) The correspondents are most concerned with qualitative mal-coverage in the forms of sensationalism and the absence of balance. (3) They believe that developing countries are mal-covered by the U.S. media to a much greater degree than developed countries; and that countries whose political and economic interests are most aligned with those of the U.S. receive more positive coverage. (4) They see nationalist influences and excessive commercialization as the main reasons for the mal-coverages. (While the latter factor negatively affects both domestic and international coverage, the former affects only international coverage.) (5) Like the Periphery media then, the Center media fall short of the standards articulated by the correspondents. But that notwithstanding, the Center media remains an attractive global purveyor of news because of their logistical and stylistic strengths, historical advantages and cultural bridgeheads. And so they maintain dominance.
CHAPTER VII: VIEWS ON OPTIONS

This chapter is a discussion of the correspondents' views on options for redressing the problems they identified. The correspondents commented on concerns over expulsion of journalists, licensing, and UNESCO's role in the news-flow debates. They also suggested what needs to be done to enhance news dissemination in and by developing countries.

UNESCO and the New Order Advocacy

Given that UNESCO's role in the news-flow debates is itself controversial, the correspondents were asked to comment on its involvement. Twenty-one percent of the correspondents felt they were inadequately knowledgeable about the issue to comment on it. Sixty-three percent (or eighty percent of those who commented) said UNESCO's involvement was necessary.

The correspondents who were supportive of UNESCO were guarded in their comments. The general view was that while it is not ideal to have a governmental body like UNESCO lay down the parameters of global press operation, there was no alternative forum for focusing the important issues at
stake. Three of the correspondents who endorsed UNESCO's efforts felt that the debate should have been carried on at a professional level, that is among journalists. They noted that UNESCO played into Western hands by having the issue deliberated on by government representatives, thus giving the debate an ideological rather than a professional hue. But the rest were either sceptical of the prospects of that option or dismissed it outright. "It would have been a hell of a mess," was one correspondent's summation. And she was typical:

As a journalist, I certainly wouldn't like the politicians telling me what to do. But then, to be realistic, such a debate cannot take place amongst journalists—... I tell you who the losers would be—the Third World journalists. Because we are not a hell of a lot; we are so few. Some are ill-trained, some are so anxious to be journalists that they will give up their rights amongst these well-trained old-time deans of journalism (Interview #13).

Many of the journalists, including the one just quoted, recommended a middle ground. That is that professional journalists should have featured more prominently in the UNESCO debates. They said that UNESCO could have relied more on journalists' testimonies, and delegates should have had two or more journalists as advisers.40

40 The correspondents based this recommendation on a vague idea of what transpired, rather than on specific knowledge of delegate representations during the UNESCO sessions in which the news-flow issues were debated.
There was also the view that UNESCO's image in the U.S. is undeservedly negative. The correspondents attributed the image to corporate vested interests represented by organizations like Freedom House, which they said circulate distorted information about UNESCO. One correspondent underscored this view with the succinct comment: "The [U.S.] government exists for business" (Interview #14).

Sixteen percent of the correspondents were in outright opposition to UNESCO's role. Three of the six correspondents rejected the new order advocacy on the grounds that its thrust is to control. Of the other three, one said he rejected it because the advocacy is "idealistic." Another said the real problem is that developing countries are not open. And the third felt strongly that the debate is counter-productive since it antagonizes the West. Like the correspondents cited earlier, he said the debate ought to have been undertaken within the profession rather than among government officials.

The Issue of 'Licensing'

Since the idea of 'licensing' journalists is a major concern in the news-flow debate, the correspondents were asked to comment on it. They typically responded with the questions: "What does licensing mean? How is it to be implemented?" Those who asked the first question-- and they constitute the majority of the sample-- were told to assume that licensing
means approximately the same as when applied to doctors and lawyers. For the second question they were asked to go by their best instincts.

Twice as many correspondents categorically rejected the idea as said they approved of it. Specifically, forty-seven percent said they would disapprove of such a measure, while twenty-four percent said they would approve. Eleven percent would neither approve nor disapprove because they believe the label "licensing" is a Western media distortion. The rest of the correspondents (eighteen percent) had no comments.

Among the correspondents who disapproved of licensing, i.e. the plurality, the likely inhibition of the creative process was the most frequently mentioned reason for the disapproval. Their fear was that a licensing process would exclude potentially creative prospective journalists on technical grounds.

Doctors, lawyers etc. receive fees for independent practices; therefore, licensing is justified in those respects. But journalism is mainly a creative process. It should not be licensed. Let creativity take its course (Interview #3).

Journalism, of all professions, is the one closest to the grassroots, the closest to the people, the closest to everyday living. And you are going to license that? I have a feeling, having studied the issue that that is not the best thing (Interview #21).

Once you can sell your product, once you can sell your article and people buy, do you need a license? I don't think so (Interview #15).
No one has the right to determine who qualifies to write (Interview #31). The other frequently mentioned concern was that it would be difficult to establish and implement the criteria for licensing. A common recommendation was that each news operation has to make its own determination. Most of these correspondents did reflect on the positive potentials of licensing. They pointed out that there is a need to weed out incompetent journalists. But they did not think that setting up universal standards is the right approach.

The correspondents who said they approved of licensing include mostly those from countries, like Egypt and Venezuela, where specific standards for qualification as a journalist are already in place, and those who believed that 'licensing' is not different from accreditation. Venezuelan correspondents pointed out, for instance, that in order to become a professional journalist in their country one has to become a member of the College of Journalists, a professional body set up through a joint effort of journalists and the government. They said it has, since its establishment, enhanced journalistic performance in the country. They saw no reason why similar standards cannot be set internationally or at least within other countries. The other category of approving correspondents pointed out that in the U.S. a journalist has to obtain an accreditation specifically to cover the White House, another accreditation to cover Con-
gress, another to cover the Pentagon, and so forth. "There is no difference," they said. Some other correspondents were more tentative in their approval: "It depends on what I see as possible end results. If it is to censor, no. If it is to set standards, yes" (Interview #2). Similarly, another correspondent made his approval conditional on whether or not such licensing would be administered by "a journalistic body" (Interview #5).

Then, there is the third group of journalists who said that licensing as an issue resulted from Western distortion. One of these correspondents, who described the term as "absolute nonsense," traced the issue to the MacBride Commission. He said that 'licensing' was proposed by Sean MacBride himself during a session of his commission. But the idea was voted down 15 to 1 with MacBride casting the only 'yes' vote. The idea was accordingly dropped. But Western critics have since kept it alive as if the Commission's report actually contains recommendation that journalists be licensed. Besides, even as proposed, 'licensing' was not intended for censorial purposes. The correspondent, who seemed to be well acquainted with Sean MacBride, an Irish diplomat, described him as "one of the freest souls in the world." "He couldn't have proposed licensing." The correspondent said that what Sean MacBride proposed to the commission he chaired was that an international accreditation system be implemented that would enfr...
eign correspondents on their host governments. The correspondent said the proposal was voted down because the rest of the commissioners reasoned that journalists did not need any special protection: "Danger is part of their job" (Interview #10).

The Question of Expulsion

The correspondents were asked (1) Would you approve of your government expelling a foreign correspondent under any circumstances? (2) Would you approve of your government expelling a foreign correspondent for what he writes? The first question was standard; the second was asked when the correspondent had earlier made it clear that non-journalistic offenses were justifiable reasons for the expulsion of a journalist.

Invariably, the correspondents mentioned genuine security concerns and violation of law as justifiable bases for the expulsion of a foreign correspondent. But on the question of whether a foreign correspondent may be expelled simply for his views or the slant of his coverage, the correspondents rejected expulsion by about the same percentage margin that they rejected 'licensing.' Fifty-five percent of the correspondents said a journalist may not be expelled for the slant of his coverage, while thirty-two percent felt mal-coverage could justify expulsion.
Many of those who said mal-coverage is not a justification for expulsion did not specifically give reasons for their stand. Presumably, they see such expulsion to be a breach of press freedom. Among those who gave reasons for their stand, the image of their countries (apparently in the West) was the most frequently mentioned concern. They said the expulsion of journalists convey the impression of dictatorship. "Why make headlines?" was one correspondent's question (Interview #36). Another correspondent said, as if in response, "All you get is bad press" (Interview #16). The correspondents recommended pressures on the offending journalists instead. The correspondents said that the distortions and mal-coverage should be brought to the attention of the journalists as often as they occur. One said that if after repeated "attentions" the distortion persists, the journalist should be "excluded from privileges like exclusives and scoops" (Interview #37). Another said that pressures could be brought to bear on the journalist through complaints to the journalist's home office. He cited the "Jewish lobby" in the U.S. as an example (Interview #4). The correspondent who asked "Why make headlines?" went further than the rest to recommend that rather than expel an offending journalist, the host government should be patient, wait until the journalist's visa status is due for renewal and decline to renew it. None of the other correspondents who rejected expulsion would recommend this tactic. In
fact, one took a diametrically opposed stand when he said of
mal-coverage: "We should be strong enough to accept it or
proud enough to let people say what they feel" (Interview
#10). And, in accepting breach of security and law as the
basis for expulsion, most of the correspondents, indeed,
stated that it has to be proven or clear-cut. One corre-
respondent pointed out, for instance, that interviewing dissi-
dents is not in itself a breach of security and should not
be a basis for expelling a journalist.

The correspondents who would approve of expulsion on
grounds of mal-coverage frequently cited societal interest.
Again, they made a distinction between a particular govern-
ment's interest and societal interest. They would approve
of the expulsion of a foreign journalist if he:

systematically works against the country (not the
government). For example, if he tries to draw two
nations into war (Interview #34),
works against societal consensus (Interview #31),
or
shows fragrant disrespect for the country (Inter-
view #2).

These correspondents, however, were also hesitant in recom-
mending expulsion. Like the correspondents who rejected ex-
pulsion they said there should be repeated warnings and com-
plaints before expulsion may be resorted to. One, in fact,
started his statement of approval with the remark "I am em-
barrassed to say this." He then stated his position thus:
"Frankly, I am for freedom of the press. But what I've seen of certain journalists, I wouldn't hesitate to ban them" (Interview #1).

**Enhancing NAI Participation**

The correspondents said the core of enhancing news dissemination by developing countries rests mainly on the developing countries themselves. Foremost among their recommendations is the enhancement of the credibility of the news disseminated in and by the developing countries. Very closely related to that is the view that many developing countries need to become "an open society." And thirdly, the correspondents, with a few dissensions, endorsed news agency pooling and other forms of news exchange programs and agreements.

**Establishing Credibility**

To the question of what the developing countries have to do to counter Western dominance in news dissemination, one correspondent started his response with the statement: "Just because we are the Third World doesn't mean we can afford to be Third rate" (Interview #10). Another said "We have to impose ourselves" (Interview #25). And still another, referring to the West, said "We have to beat them at their own game" (Interview #13). These three statements very well sum up the correspondents' views about what the developing coun-
tries have to do. Establishing credibility in their view means upholding journalistic independence and improving the quality of journalism. With varying degrees of optimism, the correspondents predicted that the U.S. news media would open up to NASA news services if the credibility and quality of the services become impressive.

Since many of the correspondents who recommended this strategy also complained that the U.S. news media are just not receptive to foreign services irrespective of credibility, they were asked to justify their prescription. The thrust of their responses was that establishing credibility is a sine qua non. With it and with continued efforts made to that end, there is hope that the U.S. market would gradually open up. But without credibility, any effort would fail even before it started.

It should be recalled here that the correspondents generally view U.S. journalism to be biased in favor of U.S. goals and values while also believing that it rates highly in credibility. Recall too that the correspondents discussed what they believed to be the techniques that made such combination of journalistic attributes possible. Here they suggest that the path to NASA media credibility lies in their use of the same techniques of news writing that have proven so successful for the Western news media.

One correspondent sought to crystallize the suggestion in these words:
Since you know there is a problem, since you know this is unfair, how do you deal with it? You are on the weak side and they are on the strong side. You don't just go and say 'you're no good, you're only on the strong side.' You know that it is the fact. What you have to do is beat them at their own game. Become more competent, pay attention to what you are doing, and do it with impeccable credibility so that they will have to live with it (Interview #13).

Another correspondent illustrated the potency of the credibility game with reference to his own experience as the editor of a Europe-based MAF magazine. He said that when he became the editor, the weekly had a circulation of about 8000. But by the time he left the magazine, it had attained a circulation of 34,000 with a minimum readership of 120,000. In addition, the paper became a widely quoted source of news and views on matters about his region. The correspondent said that the magazine meanwhile maintained its editorial slant and continued to espouse the cause it was committed to.

Why [is it successful]? Because it is good, it is professional, it is different, and it is, quote unquote, objective.... It is our job as upcoming countries to impose ourselves through the professional requirements that they ask for, that they demand of themselves. Why should we be any lower? (Interview #25).

Other correspondents emphasized the broader aspects of credibility: the need to open up society. These were the same correspondents whose views were cited in the discussion of the consensual concept of press freedom. Their argument, again, was that allowing free expression within a society is
the cornerstone of journalistic independence. One correspondent described a stage approach: First there is (1) the closed society, which should mature into (2) an open society, which, through free discussions, reaches (3) a stage of consciousness in which rights and wrongs are clearly defined through consensus (Interview #31). The correspondent said that while the U.S. has long attained the second stage, many NAM countries, including his own, are still in the first stage. He did not think any country has yet attained the final third stage.

Similarly, the correspondents who said government-press relationship in their countries is characterized by cycles of repression and outspokenness (see "Periodic Press Freedom" in Chapter V) also pointed out that the cycle can only be broken if the government refrained from over-reacting to the initial outburst of outspokenness. It should be recalled that the phenomenon, described here as "the steam effect," results when journalistic excesses following relaxation of heavy censorship becomes a cause for re-invocation of censorship. The correspondents pointed out that initial outbursts are the inevitable result of the frustrations of prolonged suppression—the steam effect. The argument was that when the initial steam dissipates, when the novelty of free expression wears out, people would develop a more judicious sense of how to use their right of free expression. If they did not, it would not be long before the society at large would reject them as unworthy of attention.
What is needed is sustained freedom. Tolerate for sometime. The yellow press will ultimately fall down. The point will come when the people will say 'Ch no, this paper is abusive, they do not understand, they are always wrong in their reporting,' and then [the people] will turn to the more responsible papers (Interview 48).

**Pooling and News Exchange**

Another recommendation is that the Non-Aligned World should intensify its efforts to link their various news agencies. Some of the correspondents who recommended this strategy pointed out that a most problematic aspect of the dependence on the West is that neighboring NAM countries often have to obtain news about one another from Western news agencies. It is a problem that pooling and other news exchange programs can largely eliminate. Some of the correspondents said, in fact, that the Non-Aligned World News Agencies Pool has already put a dent on such dependence.

However, there were some very intense criticisms of Pool. Six correspondents said they did not endorse the news agencies people because it is only an exchange of "government propaganda." Two of these correspondents said they had actually worked on Pool desks during the early days of the set-up. That gives their account the validity of first-hand experience. The correspondents added that the quality of Pool news may have improved over the years. One correspondent suggested that in place of Pool, there should be a NAM news agency financed entirely by "a co-operative of journal-
The view that the Non-Aligned World needs an independent news agency was widely shared. But most of the correspondents still felt that any exchange agreement among NAW countries is better than none.

Diversification of sources

With hardly any exception, the correspondents said their countries should continue to subscribe to Western news services, among others. Their stance seems to derive from their scepticism over the likelihood of an independent and viable NAW news service that can provide global news coverage. They suggested, instead, that subscription to diverse sources should be used to supplement domestic efforts. To mediate the effect of reliance on foreign news services, the correspondents recommended careful scrutiny of reports, the use of one's own correspondent's file to put reports in context, and the localizing of news reports (the last mentioned meaning to provide the local angle of a news item or to emphasize its local relevance.

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This is very much like the set-up of Inter-Press, the "Third World" news agency with its headquarters in Italy.
The correspondents are supportive of the UNESCO initiative, but they are against government regulation of the press. They reject licensing as a means of raising journalistic standards, and expulsion as a measure against offending foreign journalists. They recommend joint efforts by developing countries and the enhancement of news media credibility as measures for enhancing news dissemination by the developing countries. However, they believe that the developing countries should continue to subscribe to Western news services.
CHAPTER VIII: SUMMARY AND COMMENTARY

Imperialism is a structure; it is not a collection of wicked people, although it may make ample use of such people. — Galtung (1980, p. 113).

An Integrated Perspective

In introducing the topic of this study, three questions were raised as follows: (1) What are the nature and manifestations of the problems of global news-flow? (2) To what degree are the roots of the problems internal to developing countries and to what degree are they external? And (3) what measures are necessary to combat the problems? The correspondents' views suggest that the problems derive essentially from relational patterns within developing countries, and between developing and developed countries. Their views suggest too that the internal dimension of the problems intensifies the external dimension, and vice versa.

In the developing countries, journalists are at a considerable disadvantage in their relations with their employers. Their disadvantage derives mainly from an acute lack of opportunities, and in some cases traditional hierarchical patterns of relations. The result is that they become confor-
mists: they aspire not to excel as credible and independent professionals, but to be in consonance with the vested interests of those who employ them. Accordingly, they disseminate news that is overtly partisan, oriented to protocol, or otherwise shallow.

In external news-flow, the problem is also relational in that international news purveyors have vested interests and concerns which are not the same as those of other countries in which they operate. The Western news media are global in scope but not necessarily global in sentiment. They are an integral part of the center of Center. In serving developing countries then, they are like an umpire refereeing a game in which he has vested interests. For developing countries, therefore, international news-flow is like a game of unequal chances. If the umpire calls the game prejudicially against them, it is not because he is evil or wicked. It is inherent in the role, given the relational pattern. In both the internal and external dimensions then, redressing the problems would entail not just a challenge of the outcomes but a re-ordering of relational patterns.

And not only is such a re-ordering necessary, but both the internal and external dimensions have to be addressed simultaneously. For, as is evident in the correspondents' views in the preceding chapter, each dimension lessens the attractiveness of options for redressing the other. In their responses to questions about solutions, the correspon-
dents wavered. For instance, their support of the UNESCO initiative is tentative and conditional. They are enthusiastic about the lofty goals, but they are concerned about the potential for their misuse. They support a re-ordering of the Center-Periphery relational status quo, but they also fear changes that would make them more vulnerable to their own power structures. In effect, they are as concerned with 'protecting' themselves from the power structure within, as they are from the power structure without. Given the tension, one can easily see how those most affected by the conditions would have difficulty tackling them. Similarly, the option of news agency pooling is weakened by the credibility problem of the participating agencies. It will take simultaneous fundamental changes in both the internal and external relational patterns to redress the global news-flow problems.

Options for Fundamental Changes

There are essentially two options for fundamentally redressing the shortcomings of global news-flow. One is axiological and the other is structural. The axiological option is to bring about a change in how people see themselves in relation to other people. That is, to bring about a world view which would reduce the propensity for exploitation and fragmentation. The structural option is to bring about changes in relational patterns so that unequal advantages
cannot be exploited. The two necessary changes may seem rather far-fetched as policy options, the first seeming particularly so. But fundamental changes are often far-fetched. Except by revolutions, they never take place overnight. But to set sight on them is to follow a course that by evolution or revolution will lead to the desired destination. What follows then is a description of what the necessary changes will entail.

A Human-centric World View

To understand what it means to bring about a world view that would reduce the propensity for exploitation and fragmentation, let's examine the alternative orientations. Steiner (1982, p. 19) has identified "three images of global politics" which she says "compete for the loyalties of people in the West today. (One wonders why she limits the conception to the West!) The images are those of (1) "the global state of war," (2) "the international society of states," and (3) "the cosmopolitan community of humankind." Steiner distinguishes the three images as follows:

The state-of-war image depicts an anarchical system in which states are pitted against one another in an unending struggle for power and status that is limited only by the rules of prudence and expediency. The society-of-states image depicts a global social framework in which states regulate conflict and structure cooperation on the basis of common rules and institutions. The cosmopolitan image focuses not on states, but on individuals who are joined by transnational interests and universal values into a community of humankind.
Evidently, the society-of-states image underlies the spirit of the dialogues and negotiations over global flow of news and information. But the practices described in the foregoing chapters as characterizing news-flow leads to the conclusion that the state-of-war image actually propels actions. For instance, the greater mal-coverage of the Peripheries and, in particular, the mal-coverage of those countries whose political commitments or economic interests are at odds with those of the news purveyor's country is suggestive of a state-of-war conception. Not surprisingly, the dialogue and negotiations have been less than amicable. In any case, even the society-of-state image cannot spur fundamental changes in news-flow practices because it embodies the relational pattern that is the crux of the matter, and it presumes the pursuit of narrow self-interests. Measures spurred by the society-of-states image would, at best, combat some symptoms. That leaves the cosmopolitan society of mankind as the image that can bring about fundamental changes.

As Steiner notes in the essay cited, this image is considered Utopian by many. But a number of scholars and observers of world trends have noted that various global developments are making such a world view a necessity. Mendlovitz (1974), in his introduction to the World Order Models Project series Preferred Worlds for the 1990's, has identified "three major historical processes, or if you
will, revolutions, [which] have propelled mankind toward global community. These processes are the ideological revolution of egalitarianism, the technological and scientific revolution and the closely allied economic-interdependent revolution." With respect to the third process, Brandt (1980) has made a cogent argument to the effect that developed countries have a stake in the economic fortunes of developing countries: that the world economy as a whole and the economies of developed countries in particular will become healthier as the economies of developing countries grow equitably, the reverse of course being also true. It seems then that in reality "a global community has emerged," as Mendlovitz asserts. What has to follow is a global orientation in thought and policies—a human-centric orientation.

Such an orientation will lead to a de-emphasis of ideological differences, a reduction of political opportunism, and an emphasis on common interests and basic human needs. And most importantly, it will result in a healthier and more respectful view of mankind. In the context of Center-Periphery news-flow, a human-centric orientation will mean that countries will be covered even-handedly (not necessarily equally) and with respect and empathy. Within the Peripheries, it will mean also that the news media will be run not to perpetuate a status quo or to promote parochial goals, but to serve the needs of the masses. These goals and values are very much the same articulated by the correspondents
in stating their views of the function of news and the role of journalists in society (Chapter IV).

**De-Coupling Advantages**

If a human-centric orientation cannot be brought about easily, then a more readily attainable option is to re-order relational patterns so that advantages cannot be exploited as easily. Galtung (1960) has proposed 'de-coupling'—the breaking down of colonial and feudal structures of relations and a realignment on the basis of equality of advantages. That means, for instance, the strengthening of trade relations among developing countries and a simultaneous decrease in trade between developed and developing countries. The idea will be particularly effective in redressing the inequalities in global news flow.42

As applied to Center-Periphery news-flow, de-coupling would mean a major trend among the Peripheries toward mutual reliance (on themselves) for news about themselves and about the rest of the world, and a drastic reduction in their reliance on the Center news media. In this regard, the Non-Aligned News Agencies Pool is a step in the right direction. But its present scope and setup is inadequate to induce fundamental changes in the structure of global news-flow.

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42 As described by Galtung, de-coupling is a far more fundamental measure than what is described here. Galtung is anarchistic, as his ideas preclude contemporary national sovereignty rights. In contrast, de-coupling as described here, is within the present order of sovereignty.
Present, it is an inter-governmental arrangement in which mostly government-sponsored news agencies exchange news. That arrangement may weaken the advantages of the Center in the Center-Periphery news-flow, but it also strengthens the centers in the Peripheries in their relation with their peripheries to the extent that the information thereby disseminated is that sanctioned by the governments. So, rather than a Pool of government-sponsored agencies, there is a need for an associated news agency to which all news media organizations in the Peripheries may belong. With pertinent modifications, such an agency may be patterned like the U.S.-based Associated Press or the Caribbean News Agency. That may not eliminate the problem of center dominance, but it will at least ensure that non-governmental influences are embodied in the arrangement.

Indeed, for external de-coupling to realize its ultimate goal, there must be similar changes within each Periphery. Unfortunately, internal peripheries are not independent of their centers even to the marginal degree that Periphery countries are of the Centers. De-coupling as just described then is not as easily implementable internally as it should be externally. Still, it is applicable.

Internal de-coupling can take a variety of forms. It can take the form of strengthening solidarity among journalists through the establishment of strong unions. Such unions should provide a counter balance to the power of the cen-
The unions can effectively insulate their members from the structural pressures that induce conformism by working towards a system of employment and dismissal of journalists in which the Union has a major voice. An open code may be established, for instance, by which a journalist, once employed, may not be dismissed except for reasons of proven incompetency or gross misconduct. In such a system, the Union should be a part of the final arbiter. Strong unions can also forestall conformism and encourage frontier journalism by using every legal means at their disposal to combat any threat to the security or independence of any of their members. Such a solidarity is maturing in India, but in spite of its potentials, it is still lacking in countries like Argentina and Nigeria where ideological differences impede its development.

Another internal decoupling measure is to attempt to separate political power from mass media power. That would entail a policy by which governments and political parties are excluded from the rights to own a news medium. Within such a policy, governments will be legally bound to provide a specified or specifiable percentage of their annual budgets for news media development and operations. But the policy-making and executive bodies of the public-funded news media will consist of independent citizens nominated or elected to represent diverse cultural, social, intellectual,
geographic and occupational constituencies. Such a body may also influence privately-owned news media by setting standards of ethics and objectivity, and possibly through the exercise of regulatory powers. An alignment between such a body and the union of journalists will provide a bulwark between the center and the periphery, between the power bases and the masses. It will thus guarantee security for journalists, and elevate journalistic standards and practices, while ensuring news media diversity and openness.

With internal and external de-coupling, there will be greater equity and enhanced relevance in global news flow. Still, these measures together will produce maximal results only if they are accompanied by marked improvements in the economic welfare of the Peripheries. Structural measures to redress news-flow problems then have to be accompanied by structural changes to bring about economic equity (as recommended by Brandt, among others).
Appendix A

CONTACT LETTER AND FORM
March 9, 1983

Dear Correspondent:

This letter is from a Nigerian graduate student at the Ohio State University. I am doing research for doctoral dissertation on Third World correspondents in the U.S. The research will seek an understanding of how Third World correspondents perceive news.

I am writing to inform you that you are one of the sample of correspondents to be interviewed for this study. Your acceptance to be interviewed is being requested.

Please complete the attached form and return it to me by March 23, 1983. (Early return will be very helpful.) If you miss the requested deadline, do return the completed form, anyway, as soon as you can. A stamped self-addressed envelope is enclosed for your convenience.

If you accept, I will come to interview you in person at a location convenient to you.

Please note again that this study is undertaken by me alone strictly for academic purposes. Your responses will be held in strict confidence. Names of respondents will not be disclosed and no direct attribution of responses will be made to the respondent's media organ or home country.

Your acceptance to be interviewed will be very much appreciated. Please, REMEMBER TO MAIL BACK THE ATTACHED FORM BY MARCH 23 (WED).

Thanks very much.

Sincerely,

Minabere Ibelema.

(Academic Adviser: Prof. Monaghan)
Contact Form for Interview of a Sample of
Third World Correspondents in the United States

IF YOU'D RATHER NOT BE INTERVIEWED, PLEASE GIVE THIS FORM AND THE
ACCOMPANYING LETTER TO THE NEXT MOST SENIOR CORRESPONDENT IN YOUR
OPERATION WHO DOESN'T MIND BEING INTERVIEWED. IF NONE, COMPLETE
THE FORM ANYWAY AND MAIL IT.

1. Check one:
   ( ) a. I accept to be interviewed.
   ( ) b. I will accept to be interviewed only if ________________
   ( ) c. I decline to be interviewed. Reason:

2. Name of Correspondent ________________________________

3. Nationality* ________________________________________

4. Name of media organ you work for ______________________

5. National/Regional origin* ______________________________

6. Address of your U.S. operation (where you are located.)
   ______________________________________________________
   ________________________________  Zip Code ___________

Phone numbers:
   (If you don't mind being called at home, please enter both
   home and office numbers. Enter first the number at which
   you are most easily reached.)

7. Ownership of media organ you work for is by (CHECK ONE.)
   ( ) a. Government
   ( ) b. Private enterprise (including stock ownership.)
   ( ) c. Other (SPECIFY) ______________________________________

IF YOU CHECKED 'a' OR 'b' IN QUESTION # 1, COMPLETE THE REST OF THE
FORM. IF YOU CHECKED 'c', STOP AT THIS POINT AND MAIL THIS FORM.

8. If you are to be interviewed in April 1983, what time periods
   will be most convenient for you? See chart next page. You do
   not have to enter more than one time period for a given day.
   But if you do, enter them in the order of preference. Also,
   indicate your preferred days by entering any of the numbers
   1 thru 7 next to each day, 1 being first choice.
9. Comments (if any): __________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________

PLEASE RETURN THIS FORM IN THE ENCLOSED ENVELOPE (BY MARCH 23, 1983)

TO: Minabere Ibelema
The Ohio State University
Department of Communication
205 Derby Hall
154 N. Oval Mall
Columbus, Ohio 43210

BY COMPLETING AND RETURNING THIS FORM EARLY, YOU HAVE BEEN VERY HELPFUL. THANKS VERY MUCH.

* This information is requested for sampling purposes only.
Appendix B

INTERVIEW GUIDE
INTERVIEW GUIDE

Note to respondents:
What news is and how it is covered or should be covered has been an issue for some time now. The purpose of this interview is to find out what you as an individual journalist thinks about it. Your responses are to be your own opinion rather than the policy of your employer or organization. The questions are NOT intended to test knowledge. There are no right or wrong answers.
Your responses will be held in strict confidence. Your name will not be disclosed. And there will be no direct attribution of your responses to the media organ you work for or your home country.

Biography and Rapport Questions
1. What's your typical day on the job like?
2. Do you like it? (Well rewarded?)
3. Any obstacles as you go about your job?
4. How long have you been a correspondent in the U.S.?
5. How did you get to become a correspondent? (Previous experience, including education.)
6. Other than media organs, are you a member of any organizations whose sole concern is with matters of the press and journalists? List with brief descriptions.

Questions about the problem
All questions in ALL-CAPS should be asked before the rest. Follow up afterwards for details as the responses necessitate.
7. WHAT TO YOU ARE THE CONTENDING POSITIONS ON THE ISSUE?
8. HOW ARE YOU YOURSELF AFFECTED BY THE ISSUES?
9. AS A CORRESPONDENT, HOW DO YOU DECIDE WHAT TO COVER, WHAT TO GIVE PREFERENCE?
10. To you, what does "free-flow" of news consist in?
11. What of "freedom of the press?"
12. What of "the right to communicate?"
13. "Development news:" Does it have any meaning to you? What is it?
14. Does development news interest people? Have mass appeal? If it doesn’t, is that a problem to the journalists and media organs which practice it?

15. What do you see to be UNESCO’s stand on the issue of news? (MacBride Commission recommendations?)

16. In your judgment, is UNESCO’s involvement yielding any results? What are the results?

17. I asked for and you listed some press organizations you are a member of. Summarize the position of each on the issues we have been discussing.

18. Assess the progress of each toward its objectives.


20. Assess the progress of your region’s news agency. Is it worthwhile?
   (a) PANA (for Africans)
   (b) CANA (for the Caribbean)
   (c) Central American News Agency (ACACAN)
   (d) Middle East News Agency (KENA) (Egyptian)
   (e) Asian News Agency
   (f) Tanjug (Yugoslavia)

21. Assess the progress of your country’s news agency. Is it worthwhile?

22. Assess the news coverage of your country by the international media. (Scope, Selection, Objectivity, Fairness.)

23. Assess the news coverage of your country by your country’s media. (Independence of journalist, Diversity, Social Responsibility.)

24. Explain why there is a difference.

25. Which coverage do you think is more in the best interest of your country?

26. Which coverage, if any, do you prefer?

27. As a journalist, are you satisfied with the way your government relates to journalists? (Hiring practices, Censorship, Threat.)

28. What were your own experiences as a journalist in your country?
Questions about Solutions

29. WHAT WOULD YOU RECOMMEND AS 'SOLUTIONS' TO THE ISSUES YOU IDENTIFIED?
   (Role of individual journalists. Role of media organs. Role of
governments. Role of the general public.)

30. WHAT WOULD YOU RECOMMEND FOR [the specific problems identified to
    which response to #29 did not cover]

31. IF THESE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE NOT FOLLOWED, WHAT OPTIONS WOULD YOU
    FAVOR?

32. What can be done about the problem facing development news?

33. Social responsibility and the independence of journalists: how should
   the conflict be resolved?

34. Do you think the UN or any of its related organs such as UNESCO
   should be involved in the search for solutions?

35. In your judgment, is UN/UNESCO's involvement yielding results? What?

36. What do you think about the idea of licensing journalists?

37. How about licensing only journalists who are in other countries
   covering news for their home media or the international agencies?

38. Would you approve of your country banning foreign correspondents
   and letting the international agencies obtain news about your
   country only from your country's own news agency or news media?
   (Under what circumstances?)

Questions on Prospects

39. WHAT DIRECTIONS DO YOU EXPECT THE ISSUES TO TAKE FROM NOW ON?

40. WHAT DO YOU PREDICT WILL HAPPEN IN THE NEXT 5 TO 10 YEARS?
    What are the prospects of:

41. The MacBride Commission recommendations? [Not to be asked if
    respondent has earlier indicated lack of awareness]

42. The International Program for the Development of Communication.

43. The national/regional news agencies.


45. Do you foresee your home government banning foreign correspondents
    from your country sometime in the future?
Concluding Biography Questions

46. What are the main sources of information for the opinions you've expressed?

47. What are your career plans?
REFERENCES


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