INFORMATION TO USERS

This reproduction was made from a copy of a document sent to us for microfilming. While the most advanced technology has been used to photograph and reproduce this document, the quality of the reproduction is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help clarify markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or “target” for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is “Missing Page(s)”. If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating adjacent pages to assure complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark, it is an indication of either blurred copy because of movement during exposure, duplicate copy, or copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed. For blurred pages, a good image of the page can be found in the adjacent frame. If copyrighted materials were deleted, a target note will appear listing the pages in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being photographed, a definite method of “sectioning” the material has been followed. It is customary to begin filming at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. If necessary, sectioning is continued again—beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. For illustrations that cannot be satisfactorily reproduced by xerographic means, photographic prints can be purchased at additional cost and inserted into your xerographic copy. These prints are available upon request from the Dissertations Customer Services Department.

5. Some pages in any document may have indistinct print. In all cases the best available copy has been filmed.
A COMMUNICATION STUDY OF ARTHUR F. HOLMES

AS A WORLD-VIEW ADVOCATE

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
Joseph Russell Corley, B.A., M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University
1983

Reading Committee:  Approved By
William R. Brown
James L. Golden
Donald J. Cegala

James L. Golden
Co-Advisor

William R. Brown
Co-Advisor
Department of Communication
To Gena Whose Love

Sustains Me
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Through the years my debt has grown beyond adequate expression. Special appreciation is due to Professor Arthur F. Holmes of Wheaton College and Professor William R. Brown who consented to my close scrutiny of their writings. Both have been colleagues and friends, both have encouraged my work, both deserve greater accreditation than this study provides.

For over eight years now James L. Golden has advised my work. He has helped me keep my sight clear, counseled me through important choices, and believed in my gifts. Others in the department have helped me, especially Goodwin Berquist and Donald J. Cegala. I cherish our years together.

During my time as a student and my research on this project, the members of the Indian Springs Church of Christ have provided fellowship, prayers, faithful support, and a challenging professional experience. Special among that family during this project were the Youngs, the Ezzells, the Richardson, the Goodmans, Nancy and Kathy Florence, and Kay and Matthew Epling.

My parents, Pat and Joe, have generously supported me, and my sisters and their husbands have loved me. Esther and Gene Arlen have constantly provided practical aid beyond the call of duty. Friends including the Frisbys, the Santis, the Gates, the Gibbs, Jim Jinkins, and the Nyestes have been loyal.

My family has grown during these years and patiently they have sacrificed for this project. Barbara and Joel will now see more of their Father and Mother. Gena has typed, read, supported, trusted, forgiven, and loved. She has given me strength.

Finally I thank God for this opportunity, and pray that my quest will not end.
VITA

October 5, 1953 ................... Born - Nashville, Tennessee

1975. ....................... B.A., David Lipscomb College
Nashville, Tennessee

1975-1979 ......................... Teaching Associate, Department
of Communication, The Ohio
State University, Columbus, Ohio

1976. .......................... M.A., The Ohio State University,
Columbus, Ohio

1979-1983 ......................... Minister for the Indian Springs
Church of Christ, Columbus, Ohio

PUBLICATIONS

"Rhetoric in Transition," in The Rhetoric of Western Thought, 3rd ed.,
James L. Golden, Goodwin F. Berquist, William E. Coleman (Dubuque:

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Communication

Studies in Rhetorical Theory and Criticism. Professors
William R. Brown and James L. Golden

Studies in Communication Theory. Professor Donald J. Cegala

Studies in Mass Media. Professor Thomas McCain
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART ONE: COMMUNICATION METHOD AND MODEL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. A COMMUNICATION METHOD FOR A WORLD VIEW STUDY</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Project</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description and Rationale</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan and Data</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triangulated Dialogue as Method</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footnotes</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. WILLIAM R. BROWN'S COMMUNICATION MODEL OF WORLD VIEWS.</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction.</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamental Concepts</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhetorical Purpose</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message Processing</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language and Strategy</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning Names</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhetorical Function of Names</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Communication Process Model of World Views.</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology as Communication Process</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrapersonal Needs Cycle</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal Power Cycle</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Power of Ideology to Create</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Hierarchy</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Power of Ideological Adherents
to Negotiate and Realize Ideological
Hierarchy .................................. 61
Interpretative Attention-Switch Cycle ... 65
Extending the Model ...................... 71
A Complementary Approach .............. 72
Ideologizing and Intervention .......... 75
Intrapersonal Needs Cycle ............... 75
Interpersonal Power Cycle .............. 77
Interpretative Attention Switch Cycle . 82
Conclusion ................................ 84
Footnotes .................................. 87

PART TWO: ARTHUR F. HOLMES' ADVOCACY OF A
WORLD-VIEW DISCIPLINARY IDENTITY .... 95

Chapter

III. PHILOSOPHY AS PERSPECTIVAL; AN
INTRAPERSONAL AND INTERPERSONAL
QUEST FOR UNDERSTANDING ............ 96

Introduction ................................ 96
Philosophy as a Perspectival Quest ...... 98
The Perspectival Quest ................... 100
The Reconstructed Idea of Metaphysics . 108
Language and the Philosopher's Quest .. 118
Philosophy as Communication Process . 125
The Historical Disciplinary Community
of Philosophers ........................... 126
Dialogue: An Action Corollary .......... 130
The Rhetoric of Philosophical Decisions 131
Conclusion .................................. 138
Footnotes .................................. 143

IV. WORLD-VIEW ELABORATION AS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
COMMUNICATION PROCESS .............. 147

Introduction ................................ 147
The Growth and Survival Need for World Views 149
The Perspectival Anatomy of World Views 154
Perspectival Elaboration as Disciplinary
Communication Process .................. 160
Conclusion ................................. 170
Footnotes .................................. 175
V. CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY: A DISCIPLINARY NAME
FOR THE INTERDISCIPLINARY TASK OF
WORLD-VIEW ADVOCACY ........................... 177

Introduction ........................................ 177
Christian Philosophy: An Integrative
Disciplinary Name ............................... 178
The Interdisciplinary Advocacy of "Christian
Theism": An Action Corollary ............ 193
The Rhetoric of Contrasted Perspectives . 197
Conclusion and Transition ................. 205
Footnotes .......................................... 208

PART THREE: ARTHUR F. HOLMES' ADVOCACY OF
WORLD-VIEW CONTENT............................. 211

Chapter

VI. THE PERSPECTIVAL STANCE OF CHRISTIAN THEISM:
A CREATIONAL ONTOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS .... 212

Introduction ........................................ 212
God-Creation Distinction and Relationship .... 216
Ingredient Ideas ..................................... 216
Perspectival Modelling ........................... 226
Persons in Christian Perspective:
Relational and Responsible Agents ......... 240
Naturalistic Views of Freedom and Failure . 240
Persons in Christian Theism ................... 245
Conclusion .......................................... 255
Footnotes .......................................... 260

VII. FAITH SEEKS UNDERSTANDING: INTERPRETIVE
REALISM AS A CREATIONAL EPistemology................. 263

Introduction ........................................ 263
A Creational Epistemic Framework: Perspectival
Attention Management .............................. 267
Interpretive Realism as an Epistemic Gestalt:
An Elaborative Attention Switch ........... 278
The Practical Justification of Belief .......... 289
Persons as Responsible Agents Who Believe .. 295
Rational Assessment: Think-With-Ability . 296
Value and Action Projects: Live-With-Ability. 305
Universal and Perspectival Basic Beliefs .... 311
Conclusion .......................................... 316
Footnotes .......................................... 320
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Below are abbreviations of works by Holmes that are often cited in the study. A full entry is provided in the bibliography.

ATCT .............. All Truth is God's Truth
"CFG" ................ "Crusoe, Friday and God"
"CNL" ............... "Concept of Natural Law"
"CP" ................ "Christian Philosophy"
CP20 .............. Christian Philosophy in the Twentieth Century
"CR" ............... "Commitment and Rationality"
CWV ............... Contours of a World View
FSU ............... Faith Seeks Understanding
"HVNL" ............ "Human Variables and Natural Law"
ICC ............... The Idea of a Christian College
"JB" ............... "The Justification of Belief"
"LLF" ............... "Language, Logic, and Faith"
PCP ................ Philosophy: A Christian Perspective
"PRB" ............... "Philosophy and Religious Beliefs"
"QM" ............... "Question of Method"
PART ONE

COMMUNICATION METHOD AND MODEL
CHAPTER I

A COMMUNICATION METHOD FOR A WORLD-VIEW STUDY

Introduction

Michael Polanyi articulated a fundamental idea that guided his work as a philosopher: "We know more than we can tell." If Polanyi was right, then constantly human knowers must search for methods, new and old, to help them explore that which they find so difficult to tell. That human quest for meaning must move in two directions: inward and outward. The knowing person seeks to articulate knowledge of self and of the physical and social worlds within which the knowing person is immersed in intimate interrelationship.

David Gill asserts another epistemological idea, "We must have a 'place to stand'--to attend from--in order to be able to attend to anything at all." Gill's metaphor is that of persons located spatially and viewing the world from that stance. Applied epistemically, persons always know perspectively, from a conceptual point of view. Given Polanyi's theme, the human knower cannot exhaustively articulate the personal perspective relied upon to attend to other things. But perhaps there are methods which help one acknowledge and increasingly articulate aspects of that personal perspective.

In many ways this study wrestles with these two orienting epistemic claims. Throughout, the project surveys the thinking of two
of persons and world views. This chapter reflects upon the project and a method developed for knowing more about world views from a distinctive communication stance. Chapter two highlights William R. Brown's communication model of world views. Chapters three through eight rely upon both method and model to study the world-view advocacy of Arthur F. Holmes, a Christian philosopher. This consideration of Holmes' philosophy-as-rhetorical-action modifies aspects of my communication stance. Chapter nine surveys the project by highlighting insights, suggesting implications, and providing comments concerning future possibilities.

The Project

Description and Rationale

If a method for gaining knowledge is justified in relation to an overall epistemic project, then needed is a description of the chosen project and a rationale. This is done on two levels: first, I provide reasons for the intrapersonal scholarly relevance of the project, then reasons for the interpersonal relevance of the project within a community of scholars.

My personal interests as a communication scholar lie at the boundary of rhetoric, philosophy, and theology. Trained as a rhetorical/communication scholar, my interests consistently have focused upon "world views," those comprehensive human understandings about what is ultimate in life and how that which is ultimate endows all of life's thought and action with meaning. Questions of ultimacy traditionally are the academic province of theologians and
philosophers, but increasingly communication scholars study world views by asking how human understandings of ultimacy rise and fall through the process of communication.

This rhetorical view of world views was introduced to me primarily through the teaching and writing of Brown. As I studied his discussions about the rhetorical processing of world views, what he said and wrote increasingly made sense to me. He taught me to understand rhetorical criticism as an investigative method of world-view discourse by which a critic gains insight concerning how people meaningfully experience life and how they rhetorically come to experience it that way. While I worked under Brown, my thinking increasingly took on a definite shape, thus providing a conceptual place to stand. Given Polanyi's claim, there is much about that standpoint that I can not articulate; one purpose of this project, however is to clarify and extend my explicit knowledge.

In my rhetorical studies of world-view advocates (i.e., those individuals who articulate and apply world views) I came across the writings of Arthur F. Holmes, a Christian philosopher whose discourse strongly persuaded me to see the world, and especially my scholarly identity, differently. As a communication scholar I was intrigued by his discussion of the central meaning of Christian theism and his application of theistic themes as a contribution to contemporary philosophical thought. Knowing that he had shifted my understanding of certain issues, especially in epistemology, I wanted to articulate better how he potentially accomplishes that rhetorical goal with a broader audience.
As I studied the writings of Brown and Holmes, a threefold purpose emerged for this project. First, I explicate and extend Brown's model of world views as communication process. Through articulating and applying that model in relation to a carefully chosen case, it is tested and strengthened. Second, I see the philosophical work of Holmes from a distinctively rhetorical point of view. Viewed through Brown's model, Holmes is seen as a world-view advocate simultaneously processing both world-view identity and content. Third, I more clearly develop and state my personal scholarly identity, conceptual framework and interests, and future projects. These three purposes are jointly accomplished through a method of triangulated dialogue. By that term I signify a three-party investigative argumentation oriented by the goal of understanding a chosen topic. In this project the chosen topic is world views. As the third party to the dialogue, I strive to extend rhetorical theory by providing critical insight concerning both Holmes and Brown, as well as to define a personal disciplinary standpoint. My stance is both distinct from and related to theirs (while more than an imitator, I confess that I am not a self-made man). This personal disciplinary identity serves as a beginning point for future work and functions open-endedly as a stage in scholarly development.

The choice of Brown and Holmes as partners in dialogue needs greater justification than that of "personal relevance." The broader rationale for these two world-view scholars is two-fold: (1) Seen individually, both men are respected in their fields of scholarship and have contributed to the scholarly study of world views. (2) Seen together these men provide integrative possibilities for future
world-view studies: (a) Brown's communication thrust transposes Holmes' philosophical description and advocacy of world views so that they are seen as rhetorical process; (b) Holmes' philosophical thinking about world views and the case study of his advocacy of a world view identity and content. illuminate and extend Brown's communication model. Integratively studied through triangulated dialogue, the work of these two scholars provides conceptual insight and clarification and opens a path for future world-view investigations from a rhetorical-philosophical perspective.

I first studied under Brown in 1976, in a course taught with professor Jack Douglas. In that course, and another taken under Brown the following year on the rhetorical criticism of social realities, I was introduced to the idea that through talking, writing, and other means of rhetorically acting together, persons create and maintain comprehensive interpretations of themselves, others, and the world. Such understandings have been variously labeled "world views," "rhetorical visions," and "ideology."3

Much of Brown's writing focuses attention upon the communication processing of ideologies (or world views) as comprehensive human construals of reality. In writing since 1978, he has been developing an integrative model of intrapersonal and interpersonal categorizing processes involved in the creation and maintenance of ideology in communication systems. He defines an ideology as "any symbolic construction of the world in whose superordinate 'name' human beings can comprehensively order their experience and subsume their specific activities."4 His model develops an organismic metaphor of
integrative wholes that progressively develop across time. His theoretical concern is less with the what of any particular world view (a substantive emphasis) than with the universal how of world-view dynamics-in-the-large (a process emphasis).

Brown's model treats ideology as a function of symbolic processes and primarily develops three interrelated points:

1. The abstracting nature of symbol-making includes specialized transformations of experience which ascribe complex interpretative relationships to the world and which fulfill a propensity unique to the human being.
2. In the social process of symbolic abstraction inheres the power of ideology to reify interpersonal roles, status and hierarchy; participants in an ideology negotiate and ratify such relationships.
3. Such symbol-making and symbol-sharing—by which interrelated entities and individual needs, motives, and beliefs are named—leads to a communication-system view of the rise and fall of ideologies; they flourish when the communication system compensates for vicious circles, and they decline when it fails to do so.5

Interestingly, he describes his work as an "ideology of ideologies" and gives presence to the universal human propensity to discourse upon the topics of being, knowing and valuing in the negotiation of ultimate meanings. Brown's process model directs attention to the symbolic negotiation of world views as comprehensive systems of belief which locate, interpret, integrate, and orient human thought and action.

Chapter two of this study details Brown's model showing its development over time and its central relevance to this project. Chapters three through eight translate Holmes' philosophical work into a "Brownian" perspective.

As a Christian philosopher Holmes writes about world views in general and advocates Christian theism as a particular world view. His
philosophical discussion of world views contributes conceptual clarification for my use of Brown's model. His advocacy of Christian theism provides a relevant contemporary case that tests and extends Brown's model.

Much of Holmes' work focuses upon the relationship between a philosopher's world-view disciplinary identity and interdisciplinary work. He has developed the methodological notion that all philosophy is "perspectival," that is, philosophy is done from a distinctive point of view. For Holmes that term mediates dogmatic and sceptical philosophical extremes. The dogmatic extreme sees validity only in one perspective and fails to have epistemic humility concerning human knowledge as a personal quest. The sceptical extreme sees all perspectives as relative and lacks epistemic confidence concerning human knowledge as reliable. Holmes' perspectival understanding of "philosophy" mediates dogmatism and scepticism by acknowledging strengths and weaknesses both positions. In doing so Holmes participates in a major movement among contemporary philosophers.

In light of his perspectival definition, Holmes gives the term "Christian philosophy" a positive significance so that faith and scholarly learning can be understood as integratively contributing to one another. When he thinks of the primary task of the Christian philosopher it is not in terms of defending Christianity. He argues, "My concern is not so much the defense of the faith against the destructive inroads of non-Christian philosophy, as it is to explore the constructive contributions that may be made by philosophical inquiry to Christian thought and by Christian perspectives to legitimate
philosophic thought."6

As a Christian philosopher, Holmes works as a reformed evangelical scholar in the advocacy of a Christian understanding of God, persons, and nature as it bears upon the thoughtful and practical demands of life. In doing this he develops an interpretation of Christian theism as a world view. As a reformed evangelical scholar, Holmes works within, while not limited to the framework of, reformation theology strongly influenced by John Calvin, especially as that frame of thought has been interpreted by Dutch and Swiss reformed theologians. As a reformed evangelical scholar, Holmes fits into a broad group of Christians who, according to Bloesch, strongly emphasize "the message of the New Testament church regarding salvation through the cross and the resurrection of Jesus Christ. To be evangelical means to believe that we are justified only by grace through faith in Him who suffered and died for our sins."7 Theologically understood, reformed theology is evangelical; but not all evangelical theology, however is reformed.

Concerning Holmes' work as a world-view philosopher, Nicholas Wolterstorff, internationally known as a reformed Christian philosopher, wrote in a letter: "Arthur is among the most respected Christian philosophers in our country . . . . His work in helping to develop a contemporary Christian world view has been very competent and solid indeed."8 Holmes recently published Contours of a World View, an introductory volume providing an orienting framework for a projected ten-volume series entitled Studies in a Christian World View, sponsored by the Institute for Advanced Christian Studies. Its
editor-in-chief is Carl F.H. Henry; leading evangelical scholars will address key academic areas in the following nine volumes. Holmes' volume is central in chapters six through eight of this study.

As a writer Holmes has been instrumental in the development of what Donald Bloesch calls the "Evangelical Renaissance." By that term Bloesch signifies a movement among some evangelicals to avoid the obscurantist stance of fundamentalism and to contribute broadly and creatively to contemporary scholarship and culture. Robert Webber describes this movement as developing a "centrist position," one that mediates the left of liberal Christianity and the right of fundamentalist Christianity. He argues the importance of Holmes in helping articulate this centrist stance:

The third group among centrists are the Reformed Christians. The central feature of their influence is the concern to apply the Christian faith to all areas of life. The most powerful translation of these ideas into the neo-evangelical community have come from the writings and lectures of Francis Schaeffer and Arthur Holmes.

Holmes' work has mainly been in the area of translating a Reformed worldview consciousness into the evangelical community. His recent works on The Idea of a Christian College and All Truth is God's Truth have sensitized evangelicals to the religious nature of all life and work and have helped evangelicals break away from the privatization of faith which relegates God to personal experience.

Holmes' personal influence among evangelical scholars comes not only through his publication but also through his work as a scholar-teacher. Stephen Evans, Professor of Philosophy at Wheaton College, wrote in a letter that Holmes has, "singlehandedly produced a generation of evangelical philosophers, not to mention all the theologians, pastors and missionaries who have studied under him." William Hasker dedicates his Metaphysics: Constructing a
World View (a volume in the InterVarsity Press series Contours of Christian Philosophy) to Holmes and acknowledges him: "Among my teachers I should like to single out Arthur Holmes, to whom the book is dedicated. For many years he has been for me a model of a Christian philosopher, scholar and educational statesman." Among others who acknowledge Holmes as an important evangelical scholar are Gordon R. Lewis, and William Dyrness.

On a more general level Holmes' philosophical work is of potential interest to communication scholars. His interest in epistemology and the dialogic nature of philosophic argument directly relates him to those scholars with interests in "rhetoric as a way of knowing." His relevance to these concerns specifically include his discussion and practice of argument; his emphasis on universal basic human beliefs, perspectival commitments, pluralistic world-view elaboration, truth, relativity, rationality, justification; his distinction between epistemological and metaphysical objectivity and subjectivity; and his book-length treatments of philosophical method and relationships between major areas of human knowledge. He has worked with contemporary philosophers representative of critical realism, phenomenology, process philosophy and ordinary language philosophy; such work is relevant to developing interests among communication scholars. His concern with values and ethics relates him to an enduring emphasis among rhetorical critics and historians. He is also of interest to those concerned with religious and educational communication.
Holmes is of particular relevance to Brown's conceptual model to be discussed in chapter two. First, he is an example of Brown's human being with an intense "growth-and-survival need" of construing the world. Second, he is keenly aware of "relational categorizing," Brown's "locus of ideology." Third, Holmes provides a way of conceiving change in the way basic beliefs find expression in historically relative world views. His work as a world-view rhetor exemplifies the continuity-change tension of world-view maintenance in the attempt to combine versions of the past and future in an overarching vision that makes contemporary existence meaningful. He also provides a unique example of a scholar promoting a world view which, in Brown's terms "glorifies the elimination of breaches in world construal."

Fourth, Holmes is a "power-share holder" within the communication system of contemporary evangelical scholars. Chapters three through five see his work as negotiating his place among scholars. Fifth, as he urges a particular version of reality, he is aware of competing reality construals, both sacred and secular, and his world-view rhetoric of contrasting perspectives provides an example of "attention-management" through extensive "anomaly-masking" and "anomaly-featuring."

I have shown why both Brown and Holmes are worthy of study as individuals. Needing justification now is the study of both scholars in an effort to seek a conceptual integration concerning future world-view studies from a rhetorical-philosophical point of view. The rationale for engaging Brown and Holmes as partners in a triangulated
dialogue about world views is two-fold: theoretical and practical.

Theoretically, when jointly studied Brown and Holmes' writing makes sense of world views. I want to articulate why their different angles of vision on world views provide insight. Their understandings can be seen as more than complementary accounts arising out of different disciplines; I believe that their rhetorical and philosophical views can be integrated. What each writer emphasizes strengthens what the other fails to stress. Brown emphasizes communication processes in the creation and maintenance of world views. Holmes emphasizes the philosophical aspects of world view content and related issues. Brown, as a rhetorical scholar, models those processes which seem universal in world-view negotiation. As a philosophical scholar, Holmes articulates a specific world view and addresses content aspects which seem universal in all world views. Brown's model needs both philosophical scrutiny and practical application in relevant case studies. Holmes' world view advocacy needs to be seen as content in process. The result of moving back and forth between both scholars is two-fold: a different slant on their work and a progress report on the rhetorical-philosophical study of world views as both communication process and substance.

Practically, I have personal access to both men. Both agreed to be studied and have made sacrifices to aid this effort. They have worked through rough copy and helped see integrative possibilities as well as personal weaknesses or oversights. They have provided encouragement and assistance at every level of the study. Such involvement strengthens the reliability of the research.
The question could be raised concerning personal bias. Can one so close to scholars and their ideas be trusted to see them honestly? Such a question (restated of course) can be raised about any academic pursuit worthy of a scholar's devotion. Scholarly inquiry is born as persons wonder about that which does not easily yield its secrets to investigation. Scholars devote time and energy because of the personal allure of an idea or question. Their personal involvement motivates their quest for knowledge. Chapter seven of the study addresses the epistemological concern about the degree of subjective involvement in the scholar's quest for objective knowledge. In brief, scholars claim to know that which is both intrapersonally and interpersonally true. With the integrity of his person, a scholar confidently asserts claims before a knowing audience in the humble pursuit of intersubjective accreditation. Brown and Holmes do not constitute the whole of my critical audience. The one reading these words is both (1) invited to help me see what I overlook and (2) asked to consider the possibility of personal prejudices. The history of human knowledge is full of examples of those who mistakenly were accredited as knowing, as well as those who were called fools and later were declared prophets. I hope this work is not foolish. It certainly is not prophetic. Perhaps it can contribute in some way to the scholarly quest to know.

Plan and Data

Having introduced the two scholars engaged in dialogue for the purposes of this study, I now survey the project in relationship to the question that provides an integrating focus: From the standpoint of
world views as a communication process, how does Holmes as a Christian philosopher advocate Christian theism as a contemporary world view? The explication of this question divides the dissertation into three related parts. The fourth part summarizes and points forward by asking: What communication insights and implications arise from the consideration of the research question?

Part one of the project addresses the introductory phrase, "From the standpoint of world views as a communication process ..." Here is a discussion of the project as a whole, the method for accomplishing the project, and Brown's communication model or world views. Here is laid out is what Gill calls "a place to stand." Chapter one describes the project, the scholars studied, and the method of "triangulated dialogue" as the way in which these scholars are studied in order to answer the orienting research question. Chapter two features Brown's communication model as it has developed over time. That chapter is central in that it provides the conceptual standpoint from which Arthur F. Holmes is viewed as a philosopher-rhetor. It is that conceptualization which is modified through interaction with Holmes. Together these chapters articulate key aspects of my conceptual standpoint.

Part two addresses the first half of the question, "... How does Holmes as a Christian philosopher ..." This part is concerned with Holmes' advocacy of a world-view disciplinary identity as a Christian Philosopher. Relying upon Brown's model and its emphasis on constructing and maintaining intrapersonal and interpersonal ideological identity, I study some of Holmes' writings as promoting a
disciplinary identity for himself and others like him or seen in relation to him. Chapter three considers his development of the disciplinary name "philosophy" and the disciplinary role "philosopher." As Holmes addresses specific content questions, he defines and positions himself as a philosopher active in a philosophical communication system. Chapter four considers his development of (1) "world views" as an interdisciplinary topic of study and (2) his interdisciplinary identity in relation to the three key disciplines (philosophy, theology, and science) he sees sharing responsibility in the creation and maintenance of world-view content. Chapter five considers his negotiation of an integrative understanding of the identifying name "Christian philosopher" as it relates him both to the larger academic community and to the community of evangelical scholars. Together these chapters provide a specific case of the general rhetorical problems: "How shall one define oneself in relation to others so that others understand who one is and what one does?" "How shall persons see themselves and act together as an interdependent community to do that which cannot be done alone?"

Part three of the study answers the second half of the question "... advocate Christian Theism as a contemporary world view?" Relying upon Brown's model and its emphasis upon intrapersonal and interpersonal interpretative processes, this part considers how Holmes interprets and applies the name "Christian theism" as a comprehensive and contemporary world view. Chapter six investigates how Holmes defines and argues the basic themes of what he calls the "unifying perspective" of Christianity. Holmes promotes what Brown calls an
"attention switch" concerning a philosophical way to think about those themes in relationship to a conceptual model. There Holmes addresses the universal world-view topics of metaphysics and ontology. Chapter seven turns to knowledge, the world-view topic of epistemology, and clarifies (1) Holmes' articulation of a theistic framework for epistemology that is adduced from the themes of the unifying perspective, (2) his promotion of a specific stance within that framework, "interpretive realism," and (3) his interpretive realism approach to the justification of belief. Chapter eight considers the world view topics of values (axiology), society, and history showing how the perspectival themes and Holmes' epistemic stance of interpretive realism function in his discussion of (1) a theistic framework for thinking about each topic and (2) the epistemic implications for knowing values, persons, and history.

Throughout, part three shows Holmes' managing attention on two levels: (1) on the perspectival level he draws attention to those basic themes that unify Christians in contrast to non-Christian perspectives; (2) on the elaborative level he draws attention to a personal and specific elaboration of perspectival themes that distinguishes his thought from that of other Christians. These two types of attention management, perspectival and elaborative, grow out of Holmes' concept of the "anatomy of world views" discussed in chapter four: (1) a world view is a systematic elaboration (2) of the basic themes of a unifying perspective.

Part four concludes the study by highlighting insights and articulating implications for a program of research. Chapter nine
reflects upon the entire project and compresses what has gone before so that the three distinctive communication contributions of this research can be seen more clearly. First, the case study of Holmes' rhetorical processing of world-view disciplinary identity and content shows the heuristic value of Brown's model for the development of a theory of rhetoric as an "architectonic productive process." McKeon uses this term to emphasize the capacity of rhetoric to construct social reality (rhetoric's architectonic function) and to motivate the realization of possible social realities in relationship to the problems and possibilities of human existence (rhetoric's productive function).17 This emphasis clearly links Brown's work to current interest in rhetoric as a way of knowing.

Second, Brown's model is used throughout the study to suggest a process transposition of Holmes' more static descriptions of philosophy, the disciplinary elaborations of world views, and the management of world-view meanings. Such a shift stresses the centrality of communication process in the development of world views and in the production of world-view communities. Third, it is argued that Holmes' epistemology of interpretive realism provides a way to rescue Brown's model from the extremes of sceptical relativism and solipcism. It does this by emphasizing the mutual relationship between universal communication processes and these universal practical necessities of human existence that are structured (i.e. interpretively related) through communication process.

In regard to the interaction between Brown and Holmes, I suggest some general areas of study in the research program concerning rhetoric
as an architectonic and productive process. Also, I highlight some specific research concerns for myself and others who share an interest in the rhetorical processing of world-view identity and content among Christian scholars. I note that such specific concerns can serve both the research program of communication scholars and evangelical scholars as they intervene into the processing of scholarly understandings.

Finally, I briefly address the need for investigating the relationship between academic negotiations of world views and the practical necessities, concerns, and conversations of everyday life. Here I call for further conceptualization of how world views are processed across diverse levels of society.

The primary data for this study consists of the writings of Brown and Holmes. Those works central in the study of Brown are the papers and book which anticipate, illuminate, and/or extend his "Ideology as Communication Process." I am indebted to him for allowing me access to unpublished materials and for his patient explication of ideas in classes and private conversations. His work is reviewed in chapter two.

Those works primarily relied upon in the study of Holmes are three major philosophical works: Christian Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, Faith Seeks Understanding, and Contours of a World View. Also considered are his other books, articles, editorials, and book reviews. I am indebted to discussions during his stay in my home in January 1982, to his correspondence, his patience with inquiring phone calls, and his comments on this study. He graciously sent manuscripts for books not yet published, lectures presented, and articles I could
not personally access. My study data also include critiques of his ideas by others. Their comments have helped evaluate strengths and weaknesses of his views.

**Triangulated Dialogue as Method**

As a communication scholar with specific interest in rhetoric, I am interested in the processes by which persons, through verbal and non-verbal communication, accomplish purposes which they cannot achieve alone. As a rhetorical critic interested in more than appreciating and evaluating samples of human discourse, I want better to understand and explain how messages function in the creation and development of world views. To work as a rhetorical critic concerned with the project outlined above I have developed a method of triangulated dialogue.

The name chosen as a methodological term grew out of my interactions with Brown and Holmes. Brown first introduced me to the term triangulation, using it to signify tripartite interactions within a system. Holmes and Brown both have shaped conception of dialogue as a fundamental method of exploring and wrestling with the ideas of others in the honest aspiration toward deeper insight. For me "triangulated dialogue" represents a three party interaction devoted to conceptual clarification and systematic understanding concerning a topic of mutual interest. As a rhetorical critic engaged in triangulated dialogue, my topic of interest is world views; my focal concern is with the language of world view discourse as it functions to categorize relationships and beliefs and thus orient thought and action.
Polanyi reminds one of two central ideas: (1) persons are never neutral in what they know and (2) persons know more that they can tell. Throughout the process of triangulated dialogue I attempt to develop and articulate my personal scholarly stance in relation to Brown and Holmes. I knowingly expose it to the critical thought of others in order to gain greater objectivity in my subjectivity. As a method it enables a partial articulation of what makes sense to me as I have thought about (1) world views as communication process and (2) Holmes' advocacy of Christian theism as a world view.

Brown and others suggest that creativity can be stimulated by putting two ideas together and seeing similarities and distinctions. In authentic triangulated dialogue this is requisite. Through this process I do more than describe two thinkers; I think about their ideas in an effort to develop my own. In a sense, I serve an apprenticeship yielding myself to two scholars in order to indwell their thinking and eventually take a personal stand. Dialogue as intellectual midwifery gives birth to an interdependent person rather than creating a dependent puppet.

Triangulated dialogue is essential as a method given the breadth of my scholarly interests. The concept "world view," and its cognates, focuses attention in comprehensive ways. I need reliable guides, both in the history of ideas and in the contemporary forum, to provide adequate orientation for present and future scholarship. Brown and Holmes serve as two such guides. Both consistently point beyond their own thinking to that of others—as well as encouraging my own thought. Both are less interested in a disciple than in a colleague.
The emphases of these two partners in dialogue is important. Both manage attention in distinctive directions. Brown's rhetorical background, communication focus, and world-views-as-process emphasis is strong. His weakness lies in the lack of an overt articulation of a philosophical stance concerning fundamental issues. Holmes is strong on philosophical analysis and provides an emphasis upon world-view substance, but he lacks a communication-process thrust that potentially deepens his discussion of world-view elaborations. To say all this only acknowledges the obvious concerning their scholarly specializations: Brown is a rhetorician and Holmes is a philosopher. I think world views are best studied at the boundary of philosophy and rhetoric, emphasizing both substance and process, both rhetorical and philosophical concerns. Such thinking avoids reducing world views to communication process and opens them to more universal considerations; at the same time it seriously acknowledges the centrality of communication process in world view creation and maintenance. Both Holmes and Brown have taught me much about dialogue: Brown in his use of Burke, Pepper, Boulding and others in the development of his communication model; Holmes in his dialogue with contemporary philosophical thought, especially in his works *Christian Philosophy in the Twentieth Century* and *Faith Seeks Understanding*.

From a different angle of vision on this method, Rosenfield argues four basic components that possibly interact in rhetorical criticism: (S)peaker, (M)essage, (E)nvironment, and (C)ritic. In light of the discussion of triangulated dialogue, I see the following relationships: SMC(e)T. SM represents Holmes and his messages. C(e)
represent myself, the critic, who also functions as a part of Holmes' audience environment, that is, I experience his works as a representative of his audience and I study his work as one reflective about that rhetorical experience. T, an additional term, represents Brown's theoretical conceptualization upon which I rely to see Holmes rhetorically, and which I attempt to understand, modify and extend through the process of critical application. Rosenfield argues that the value of C involvement in criticism is the development of communication theory. The method of triangulated dialogue attempts to control and to articulate various aspects of C involvement.

As this dialogue progressed, I moved back and forth from Brown's model to Holmes' philosophy. Throughout I discussed ideas with both men as they read early drafts of the study. My concern was that I clearly understand their work. As I studied Holmes, often it was as one looking through his language and seeing his world construal. As I wrote about Holmes, constantly I relied on Brown's emphasis upon language and his model of world views as communication process. As I wrote about Brown, often it was as one indwelling his model after years of thinking about it. As I thought about possible modifications and extensions of Brown, often I relied upon Holmes' philosophy in two ways: (1) to conceive of a general philosophical grounding for the model, and (2) to consider more world-viewish "perspectival" implications for the use of that model in the disciplinary role of a "Christian communication scholar."

As I have spent the last year and a half moving back and forth between Brown and Holmes, I have come to see differently.
Increasingly, I have found life illuminated in thoughtful and practical ways. Brown's work has increasingly moved my attention to (1) language as symbolic action, (2) a communication-process understanding of world views, and (3) rhetorical criticism as a heuristic approach for the scholarly study of world views. In short, he has played a central role in naming me a "communication scholar." Holmes' work has moved my attention to (1) the possibilities of a Christian faith-and-learning integration, (2) a philosophical understanding of world views, and (3) a perspectival approach in articulating a world view framework for communication scholarship. In short, he has played a central role in naming me a "Christian communication scholar."

**Conclusion**

Some mention should be made of the one dissertation that directly relates to this study. Randall E. Anderson primarily applies Brown's concept of attention management in the case study of Carl F. H. Henry, another evangelical scholar and a key leader in the movement toward a new understanding of "evangelical scholarship." Our similarities include interests in world views as rhetorical process, the epistemic limits of world view creation, Brown's conceptual model, and contemporary evangelical scholarship. Anderson's focal thrust is upon the symbolic processing of conceptual continuity and change. Differences emerge at two levels. First, I stress the advocacy of disciplinary world-view identity, moving beyond attention management of content. Second, my case study of Holmes' differs in that while Holmes' approach to language and thinking is related to Henry's, it is
at the same time distinct. As a professional philosopher, Holmes is much more in touch with contemporary philosophical thought and emerging styles of "both-and" reasoning. As a professional theologian, Henry is defining theological positions in relation to the contemporary theological climate and his "either-or" style of thinking and writing is confessedly rationalistic. I believe the content emphasis, as well as the thinking and writing styles, of our case studies have affected both Anderson and myself in (1) what we emphasize and (2) how we emphasize it. Both studies argue (1) the value of Brown's conceptualization for communication scholarship and (2) the importance of the movement among a segment of evangelical scholars led by men like Henry and Holmes.

Finally, reflection upon this project raises three areas of concern. First, overall the project raises more questions than it provides answers. Still I think it (1) contributes some conceptual insight, (2) clarifies some central ideas and issues, (3) provides a distinctive communication interpretation of Holmes, and (4) articulates a personal starting point for future research. Second, because I personally have an informal background in philosophy, I am limited in my ability to philosophically evaluate and critique either Holmes or Brown. Such a limitation may also in fact allow me to see better the philosophy of Holmes as rhetorical action and allow me later to study philosophy for communication purposes. This study has brought me into philosophy through the "backdoor" of rhetoric.

Third, some might complain that this study attempts too much. Neither a pure think piece nor a simple application of an accepted
model or method, it often becomes a personal report of the scholar's position. I acknowledge this criticism, yet I do not necessarily see this as a flaw. As I have studied and written, my attempt has been to bring forth a greater comprehension of reality. In his *Personal Knowledge*, Polanyi argues:

Comprehension is neither an arbitrary act nor a passive experience, but a responsible act claiming universal validity. Such knowing is indeed *objective* in the sense of establishing contact with a hidden reality: a contact that is defined as the condition for anticipating the indeterminate range of yet unknown (and perhaps inconceivable) true implication.21

As I have dialogued with Brown and Holmes, face-to-face and through their writing, my personal comprehension has sharpened and deepened. Needed now is an evaluation of claims to validity and a further exploration of theoretical, practical, and personal implications. This dissertation is more than a report of personal impressions. It is an argument submitted for evaluation in the attempt to advance an intrapersonal and an interpersonal understanding of world views. It is addressed to those critics who like myself desire a deeper knowledge of things worth knowing.
FOOTNOTES


5Ibid.


8Letter dated May 26, 1983.

9Bloesch, Evangelical Renaissance, p. 31.

Letter dated June 2, 1983. Evans is the series editor for InterVarsity Press' *Contours of Christian Philosophy*. His general preface to that series strongly reflects Holmes' thinking: "These books will evaluate alternative viewpoints not only with regard to their general strength but also with regard to their value in the construction of a Christian world and life view. Thus the books will explore the implications of various views for Christian theology as well as the implications that Christian convictions might have for the philosophical issues discussed. It is crucial that Christians attain a greater degree of philosophical awareness in order to improve the quality of general scholarship and evangelical theology . . . . Although the books are intended as examples of Christian scholarship, it is hoped that they will be of value to others as well; these issues should concern all thoughtful persons. The assumption which underlies this hope is that complete neutrality in philosophy is neither possible nor desirable. Philosophical work always reflects a person's deepest commitments. Such commitments, however, do not preclude a genuine striving for critical honesty," from David L. Wolfe, *Epistemology* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1982), p. 7.


21Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, pp. vii-viii.
CHAPTER II

BROWN'S COMMUNICATION MODEL
OF WORLD VIEWS

Introduction

The writings of Brown provide the first set of materials used in this interaction investigation of world views. His research as a rhetorical critic, historian, and theorist features the ontological assumption that humans are symbol-using creatures.¹ In moving attention away from other aspects of persons, he focuses thinking upon persons' rhetorical nature as symbol-makers and symbol-sharers. He explores the implications of this assumption by pressing it to its limits.

This chapter views Brown's writings as an extended discourse arguing a conceptualization of world views which is centered on and oriented by the concept of communication process. His emerging model attempts a comprehensive accounting of how humans negotiate and make real their world views through symbolic action. In this discussion I use the terms "ideology," "world view," and "rhetorical vision" as interchangeable names for any comprehensive interpretation of self, others, and the world which endows life with meaning. A world view names and orients human existence, thinking, valuing, feeling, and acting by infusing all of life with significance.
Brown's communication perspective of rhetorical visions is an "ideology of ideologies" which treats world views as a function of communication process. His is a theory of (1) how world views are negotiated over time as ultimate and comprehensive relational abstractions and (2) how they are maintained by members of a communication system whose lives are integrated by an ideology's symbolic reality. He argues, "the communication and creation of ideologies proceed together, rather than springing full-grown from the mouth or pen of individual ideologues." His model indicates that the communication study of rhetorical visions can focus on any or all of three related levels: (1) the content of ideology processed in a communication system, (2) the processing of ideology in a communication system, or (3) the ideological community created and sustained through ideology processing.

This chapter surveys Brown's major theoretical theme: persons are a symbol-using creatures with the fundamental need to construe a world and live out that world view with others. By way of overview this chapter outlines some fundamental concepts, the transposition of those ideas into a systemically modeled conceptualization of world-view process, and finally the elaboration of that model with an emphasis upon intervention.

Fundamental Concepts

Brown asserts that for communication scholars the fundamental thrust of any explanation should be the human propensity to symbolically transform experience. He does not deal with the
physiological bases of this symbolizing process. Instead he chooses naming (or categorizing), as the primary starting point for understanding what ultimately makes every activity "human." In 1972, Makay and Brown published The Rhetorical Dialogue. In that introductory textbook are three chapters for which Brown was primarily responsible and which provide an elementary insight into his understanding of rhetorical purpose, the processing of messages by an audience, and the relationship between language and rhetorical purpose.4

Rhetorical Purpose

Concerning the pervasiveness of rhetoric Brown argues, "Unless man ignorantly assumes that he can know this world by means other than symbolic conceptions, many of which have to be mediated by ordinary language, he should know that rhetoric sometimes is the only way of knowing reality; and, finally rhetoric often is the only meaningful way man can perform an action."5 Rhetorical action is purposeful symbolic action to persuade. Brown outlines the criteria by which he determines a "rhetorical purpose":

[1] when a person desiring changes in knowledge or in institutions sees that others must mediate his goal, [2] when he offers them uncoerced choice from among a relatively wide range of options, and [3] when he does so predominantly by means of interaction.6

Criterial to purposeful rhetorical action is neither the kind of goal chosen nor the successful achievement of that goal. What is essential for rhetoric is the voluntary interdependence of people to mediate one another's needs "primarily on the basis of shared
symbols"—verbal and/or non-verbal.7

Brown argues that "by means of rhetoric . . . [people] report reality . . . affect reality as perceived by others . . . seek not only social change but social stability."8 He believes that the advocacy of world views, social continuity and change, shifts in epistemological, ontological, and axiological conceptions, etc. can be subsumed under two rhetorical goals: (1) "the adjusting of human relations (the 'relationship' side of any message)" and (2) "the accomplishment of tasks (the 'content' side of any message)."9

Relationship goals are divided into two sub-categories: intrapersonal and interpersonal. Commenting on intrapersonal goals, Brown observes:

At first glance, the intrapersonal goal of adjusting oneself to himself may not seem to require mediation from others and therefore may not become rhetorical, as we have defined that communication purpose . . . However, such purpose clearly becomes rhetorical when we understand that others frequently have to serve as mirrors [mediators] for ourselves. Nor do we limit this mediating role to that of the pastor, the counselor, or the psychologist.10

Developing this idea he observes that persons create messages that "will invite certain interpretations of . . . [self] from others, not only to help . . . obtain cooperation from them toward some mutual goal (an interpersonal, task-related intent) but also to reassure . . . [ourselves], in some specific way of self-worth."11 Such goals are often "subsidiary though always present to some degree" in rhetorical situations.12 I later emphasize the omnipresence of intrapersonal goals, especially in the advocacy for the mediation of growth-and-survival needs in the rhetoric of world-view identity.
Interpersonal goals are more dominant. Brown compares and contrasts these two types of relational goals:

When you want your honesty, intelligence, good will or other traits not so much to be reflected upon you as to win acceptance for you, then your aim has become an interpersonal one. . . . Perhaps a way to separate the goal emphases in these two closely related purposes is this: in the intrapersonal emphasis our aim is to be able to accept ourselves; in the interpersonal emphasis our aim is to have others accept us. In any final analysis such a separation is not possible.\(^{13}\)

Brown distinguishes two types of interpersonal goals. First, increasing/decreasing social distance defined as "the feeling of closeness or remoteness that one individual feels for another . . . the degree to which one has 'out-group' feelings of suspicion . . . unkindness . . . alienation . . . and/or hostility toward another group or individual."\(^{14}\) Second, increasing/decreasing social power relationships among communicators. Here he defines "power" in terms of the interrelated ability of communicators to reward or punish one another. He emphasizes the conceived nature of power relations as they are realized in concrete actions.\(^{15}\)

In his later work, Brown stresses the importance of interpersonal social-identity building and role-taking as related to power in choosing the future of a world-view communication system. For now it is important to understand how pervasive are relational goals are rhetorical action:

We should not assume that the "relationship" part of messages exists only in certain passages of discourse; to some extent every statement implies a relationship between sender and receiver that ranges from equal-to-equal, to higher-status-to-lower, to lower-status-to-higher.\(^{16}\)
Content goals are not disjunctively opposed to relational goals as if relational messages lack substance. Rhetors seeking content goals focus attention upon "conceptions less obviously bound up with relating people to people and more obviously bound up with relating overt or covert actions to people." The following passage clarifies the term:

When the rhetor's purpose becomes 'content' or task-centered, he aims at approach or withdrawal behavior from his listener not in relation to himself, primarily, but in relation to some proposal of his or of another. His rhetorical purpose is to effect acceptance or rejection of (1) conceptions as facts, (2) evaluation of them, and (3) policies based upon them. He usually hopes that his listeners will in fact act upon his recommendations, but the immediate, instrumental rhetorical goal has to be the winning of a choice which sooner or later will be operationalized.

Content goals are central in Brown's discussion of attention-management in promoting and/or retarding attention shifts between polar conceptualizations (i.e., gestalts or templates) of reality.

A rhetorical problem is "an outgrowth of the rhetorical purpose. The problem is created as a rhetor encounters obstacles to his goal achievement." This relationship between the rhetorical purpose, obstacles, and rhetorical problem is seen as the "primary content-producing motive for the rhetor." Brown states the generic "frame" of this relationship: "How can I achieve the goal/goals of _______ by overcoming the obstacles arising out of _______ without creating the following undesirable side-effects?" Included in possible negative side effects are "polluting of one's goal, debasing of oneself, and diminishing of one's partner in dialogue."
Before considering how audiences process messages, a few comments. First, Brown's view of rhetorical purpose is thoroughly dialogical. He asserts, "All parties to dialogue are in some measure rhetors with their own purposes . . . All . . . have an interchangeable role with that of rhetor: each party is an audience for the other."22 As this idea is developed in Brown's systemic model of world views, intrapersonally each individual simultaneously functions as an audience, advocate, and gatekeeper while participating in the interpersonal negotiation of an ideology.

Second, in my case study of world view rhetorical action, Holmes' overt primary rhetorical goal is a content one: "To rekindle and disseminate that vision" of "integrating the whole of human knowledge under the primacy of the word of God into an organized Christian view."23 He perceives two key obstacles: first, naturalistic world views dominate Western thought so that Christians occupy the status of what Peter Berger labels a "cognitive minority."24 Christians must work hard to maintain the credibility of basic beliefs. Second, different elaborations of Christian theism, especially popular ones, are often outdated, naive, or penetrated by non-Christian assumptions; therefore they are perceived by some thinkers to be shot through with anomalies. Holmes must first articulate a world view that can stand with credibility as a minority view in modern society. Second, he must do so in such a way that his primary audience of evangelical scholars considers his proposal as (1) resolving key anomalies perceived in other versions and (2) articulating Christian commitment in a heuristic manner with future implications for thought and action which should be
jointly pursued. Holmes' content goal of world-view advocacy is studied in chapters six through eight.

Holmes is sensitive to the relational aspects of rhetorical action. In chapters three through five, I show that Holmes' content-oriented rhetoric also serves relational goals. Holmes conceives of the intrapersonal and interpersonal identity of philosophers in relationship to themselves as philosophers and to others in a world-view communication system. He also conceives of a personal name, "Christian Philosopher," which orients his own action among philosophers and Christians. In short, he articulates a world-view disciplinary identity.

Holmes' writing invites a relationship with his readers. Dialogical in style, it is neither confrontive, combative, nor dogmatic. He invites the reader to work through proposals as he articulates the broad contours of a contemporary Christian theism. He leaves his proposals open-ended for the honest reflection of others and for necessary revisions. He values pluralism in Christian thinking and provides a rationale for why such diversity ought to be cherished by other Christian thinkers. His argumentation is such that a reader recognizes intelligent reflection while at the same time feels invited to explore ideas together with Holmes as a scholarly peer who continues to seek faithful understanding with a humble confidence.

Message Processing

Persons construct interpretations of experience at various levels of abstraction ranging from the sensory level to the level Brown calls
ideologizing. Brown's approach to the processing of messages is grounded in the proposition: "Images your auditors hold in relation to your rhetorical purpose help to generate your rhetorical problem." His concern is not primarily with a detailed analysis of how attitudes, beliefs, and values cluster together as with how they function in the construction and interpretation of messages. His discussion employs the terminology of attitude change and ego-involvement theory. He suggests three dimensions of message processing: assimilation-contrast, addition-deletion, and rationalization. He does not portray this as an exhaustive list, but as a suggestive one that accounts for much of what occurs when persons listen to others talk.

First, through the term assimilation-contrast, Brown argues that audience members compare and contrast a message in relationship to a belief system, interpreting it as similar to or different from personal beliefs, attitudes, and values. Brown outlines three key variables in this process:

1. The auditor has needs of which he is to some degree aware; these needs determine not only his attention but also the sense that his well being is at stake. Thus he is 'ego-involved' in his reception of messages. (2) The auditor has images which serve as standards [anchorages] by which to assess incoming messages. (3) The messages themselves are ambiguous to a marked degree, although not seemingly so in the perception of receivers.

As auditors assimilate and contrast a message and their relationship with a messenger they do so in diverse ways. Often such a process can be thought of as a continuum; persons understand a message as ranging in degrees of closeness to or distance from a personal belief system.
Some make these judgements in a carefully reflective manner; most make them in a taken-for-granted way. These ideas are key in Brown's intrapersonal cycle of ideology processing.

Second, addition-deletion is a related term which signifies that a message is "filtered" as details, qualifiers, and other aspects of an intended message are dropped out, added to, amplified, and distorted. Persons listen and remember selectively in relation not only to a belief system but especially to action projects which shape their interest. Brown uses two concepts to think about this process: context and system. A message context is "the collection of concepts relatable to a message being received. When the . . . context is rich, he tends to fill in considerable detail for the message, whether . . . justified or not. When . . . sparse, he tends to drop out . . . details."27 Related to context, and more central to Brown's later thinking, is system:

With system or configuration emphasis shifts to the relationships among details. Thus the presence of one part of the pattern [in the message] may lead to prediction of the presence of the rest . . . , which is a filling in . . . ; in addition an increment of perception and conception occurs; some details become "foreground" and others become "background"; the pattern influences perception of the parts. 28

Brown continues his discussion of system:

What we call a system organizes apparently random details, produces a whole somehow greater than the parts . . . , and produces the conviction that comes with "insight" into the pattern. The operation of such a system not only facilitates recall of what is said, but also probably includes more than what was said or clearly implied.29

Any "living" world view functions as a dynamic conceptual system for its adherents. In The Rhetorical Dialogue, Brown's example of a
conceptual system is the "American Dream." He considers the national dialogue which has generated "a specific series of anchorages of American 'god-terms' [and 'devil-terms'] forming a system ... within which most Americans communicate with each other."30 These god and devil terms are words that generate strong emotional responses. Listeners associate them with "patterns of images that unite ... at the highest level of abstraction and divide ... when lower levels of meanings are defined."31

As ego-involved persons with action-projects and complex belief systems, listeners actively attend to messages, often understanding them in ways foreign to the intent of a rhetor. At times auditors are confronted with ideas in a message which contradict an authentically held belief system. This fact leads to the third dimension highlighted by Brown, rationalization. By this term he implies that a receiver discovers "ways to be comfortable or justified with his image system when ... [a] message seems in any way to disturb it."32 He argues that rationalization is influenced by at least two variables: "The importance or salience of the image or image system to the individual; the clarity with which another image contradicts the first."33 Opportunities for rationalization arise when listener-source perceptions and/or message interpretations appear incompatible with ego-involvement in a conceptual-system which serves as a personal anchorage. One may "predict roughly a receiver's predisposition to rationalize, ... [but we] probably cannot predict the direction the rationalization may take."34
Brown's purpose in highlighting these three aspects of message processing is basic: to heighten awareness of the *active audience* that interprets messages. He comments, "We do not offer these descriptions of how listeners process incoming messages to condemn them. We try instead to suggest that such processing is part of what it means to be human."

A world-view rhetor, aware of such processes, attempts a responsible analysis of an audience, especially in light of basic world-view beliefs, specific elaborations of those beliefs, and world-view action projects most closely related to a chosen rhetorical purpose. Such analysis assists the development of a message and anticipates its potential effects. A world-view critic might explain the appeal of a particular rhetor or rhetoris in a world-view communication system from the starting point of message interpretation. One might describe/explain characteristic processing patterns of specific world-view communities. Of great interest to Brown is how major conceptual changes (or "attention shifts") are rhetorically promoted and realized within a world-view community.

Of importance to world-view rhetors like Holmes is the construction and maintenance of supernatural world views in pervasively naturalistic societies. As mentioned, Peter Berger provides insight into the sociological-philosophical aspects of religious belief in secularized society. Especially crucial are the problems of belief plausibility and legitimization as the process of secularization shapes the thinking of theistic believers. A theistic rhetor who desires relevance in relation to modern thought is confronted with the rhetorical problem of being perceived as one who has either (1)
betrayed the truth through compromise with secular thought or (2) refused to go far enough in honest dialogue with modern thought.

Of related interest, Brown's discussion of "system" implies that basic beliefs of a world view can be integrated into similar but distinguishably different organic wholes for rhetorical purposes. Content-oriented rhetorical action promotes changes in or reinforcement of (1) conceptions which compose the basic substance of an ideological system or (2) conceptions of integrating relations among elaborated beliefs of a world view. Rhetorical action with relational goals promotes (1) authentic enactments of social relations already asserted by an ideology or (2) changes in ideological conceptions of social hierarchy.

I show the reconstituting of content organic wholes in this chapter. In this first section, I present Brown's articulation of some elementary ideas about rhetoric; the next section shows these ideas transposed into systemic relationships as he integrates them into a communication-process model of world views. In the third section, the particular problem of social intervention interests Brown and shapes conceived relationships among these basic concepts and thus extends his model.

As a world-view critic/theorist with an interest in this processing of ideas and relationships into new organic wholes, I am especially interested in Holmes' conceptualization of "the anatomy of a world view" discussed in chapter four. He distinguishes a unifying perspective composed of a world view's basic beliefs, attitudes, and values from the possible elaborations of that perspective. According
to Holmes, elaborations are historical translations of basic beliefs and applications of them to contemporary problems. Much of perspectival processing is accomplished through the use of models borrowed from contemporary science and philosophy. For instance, Holmes articulates the fundamental themes of Christian theism through the use of a personalistic model which features intentional action. Through this modelling he addresses questions concerning metaphysical, epistemological, and axiological issues and practical implications.

Language and Strategy

Language is a central idea in Brown's thinking: man as a symbol-making creature shares symbols for rhetorical purposes. This stance is strongly influenced by the work of Susanne Langer and Roger Brown.37 He asserts that "the process of making experience into symbols is the essentially human activity."38 Relevant to this study are three concerns: (1) how persons learn and relate linguistic categories to non-linguistic categories, (2) how names function rhetorically, and (3) how ideologizing is a specialized function of this general human process. The first two are highlighted in this sub-section; the third is a focal concern in the "ideology as communication process" section. It must be emphasized that Brown has not published a carefully developed philosophy of language. In this section the view he presents is an elementary one primarily intended for an undergraduate audience for introduction purposes.
Learning Names

Brown's discussion is shaped by the idea that "language provides an efficient way to catalog the world because we can use a single name to refer to phenomena that may differ in many ways but that are alike in one or more determining, criterial ways." In discussing how persons acquire language and use linguistic categories to order their world of experience, he begins with the ideas of "concept attainment" and "criterial attributes":

For our purposes it is useful to think of "concept" as "category": that is to say in forming a category we tend to group related phenomena together . . . . The criterion on which you decide one . . . item does not belong [to a group of differing but potentially relatable items] is the indicator of the [criterial or defining] attribute which a category member must possess. In spite of differences . . . category members will possess this attribute. However . . . a categorizer may shift the criterial attribute and thereby shift group membership also . . . . Accompanying the shift of criterial attribute is a shift in attention: you become "set" to attend to that attribute rather than another . . . . Three dimensions of such expectancy . . . . [are] approach or avoidance . . . . a "blinder" effect . . . . , [and] seeing unity in diversity [or "transcension"] . . . . Concept attainment as categorizing behavior consists primarily of finding "differences that make a difference" with regard to group membership . . . . Thus concepts can be considered as categories.40

Brown argues that if we consider the "sounds or smudges that we call words" to be linguistic-categories then the "association of a non-language category . . . with a language category or word "becomes a creative possibility for rhetorical action." Words as words are categories with their associated criterial attributes and expectancies . . . . We as language users make our sounds or smudges co-vary with concepts." In this meta-abstracting, relational categorizing which associates linguistic and nonlinguistic categories
"the significant determiner of equivalency or difference is . . . whether the difference in sound or appearance in turn makes a difference in the nonlinguistic category or concept referred to."43

Brown discusses "The Original Language Game" following Roger Brown's research in *Words and Things*. He summarizes this process of language acquisition:

We must say that two conditions, at least, must obtain: (1) we must somehow hit upon the concept that *everything* can have a name and (2) we need another person to form a "language community" with us so that arbitrary symbols may be argued as pointers to nonlinguistic categories. The "other, let us suppose, is the tutor who already knows what the criterial attribute is in the nonlinguistic category . . . . The co-occurrence of object (nonlinguistic category) and name (linguistic category) is apparently necessary to the association of referent and name. Not, however, until we are able to apply the names . . . to other [new] instances of each [non-linguistic categories] . . . do we have in language the symbolic operation (name-as-separate-from-thing) as opposed to the signal operation (name-as-part-of-thing).44

This fundamental process grows in complexity with human development and includes languaging about abstract, non-empirical concepts. Brown believes that "behaviors involved in attaining names are also involved in using them."45 Mature membership in a language community, such as a world-view communication system, implies the possibility of this ongoing and sophisticated process of forming and testing the adequacy of asserted relationships between categories and experience. The shared conception of an anomaly in a world view arises when someone asserts that an accepted categorization of reality is "inadequate," i.e., that the expectancies created by a name are violated by experience. What Brown calls "attention-shifts" (1) recategorize experience under a new complex name or (2) reinterpret an
old name so that it now "fits."

Important here is Brown's insight that higher levels of abstraction create difficulties with this view because often language does not function in a referential or empirical way. Words like "freedom," "science," "democracy," "Christian world view," and "Christian philosophy" represent complex ideas which an ideological community "make real" through "action corollaries". In his important book, *Imagemaker: Will Rogers and the American Dream*, Brown talks about his concept of action corollaries in relationship to the general themes of the American Dream:

Along with the theorems of the dream . . . , the dreamers offered corollaries, in the form of recommended actions, that together constituted a strategy for realizing the vision of the dignity and worth of the individual. The action corollaries were more than simply a means to an end. Their observance offered tangible evidence that the common man was developing his boundless possibilities, that he was claiming virtue for his own, and that he was growing to the fullest possible self-realization. In this light, the action corollaries seemed a substantive part of the dream.

Within a world-view community there is often discussion about whether a complex of specific actions fulfill communal expectations and can be linguistically categorized as "appropriate enactments" of action corollaries.

It should also be pointed out that Brown conceives each part of speech as a name. He states, "By 'naming' we mean more than nouns; a verb is a name, usually of an action; an adjective or adverb is usually the name of a quality; prepositions and conjunctions are names for relationships." Such an emphasis, along with his discussion of high level, non-empirical abstractions, shows that Brown does not
simply think of language in a narrow scientistic sense as referential. For him, language constitutes interpretations of reality and it does so in complex ways. For example, mature world-view communities talk about various aspects of life in taken-for-granted ways. The use of language in everyday conversation and in more formal kinds of rhetorical discourse often assumes that names for and assertions about complex abstractions and non-empirical realities are of the same status as strictly empirical names. It is important to note that even what the scientist might term "strictly empirical names" focus attention in various ways so that the personal understanding of "facts" is interpretive.

Rhetorical Function of Names

By way of overview the following passage directs attention to the concept of "rhetorical-function-of-names":

Once a name is learned its application to a new instance carries with it the expectancies toward that instance shared by the language community. This makes possible the rhetorical functioning of names: as names for an entity shift, so to some extent do the perceptions of it. For new or unfamiliar phenomena, therefore, the name given them can go far toward determining attitudes toward them. Advocates of causes are aware of the importance of names and attempt to attach names to phenomena that will arouse appropriate expectancies.49

Names asserted in rhetorical discourse function in at least three ways. First, "names point to different criterial attributes among those potentially determining and thus 'clarify' what often in reality is ambiguous."50 This capacity of asserted names to focus our attention is basic to Brown's notion of attention-management developed later. Fundamental to this concept is the role of language in the
construction of a conceptual gestalt (or template) which accounts for some aspect of human experience or thought. Potential shifts in these configurations are possible when "questions of accurate naming generate rhetorical dialogue." A new name asserted for acceptance focuses attention on alternative criterial attributes; acceptance brings a new sense of understanding.

Second, "associated with such shifts in criterial attributes are suggestions of approach or avoidance behavior." Tactically the use of "god" and "devil" terms affect such behavior. Their application to people, facts, and issues generates expectancies which "oversimplify and obscure reality, as well as inspire cohesion and cooperation" and/or division in a communication system. "The linguistic name suggests the action toward a nonlinguistic category" and also "influence[s] approach or avoidance responses by listeners to the user of the name . . . ."54

Third, names in rhetorical discourse also "produce either a 'blinder' effect or a 'transcending' effect [or both]." When expectancies function as blinders they "set" or "predispose" persons to respond in a given way, one appropriate to a specific interpretation of reality. Names feature some aspect of the world and simultaneously mask others, thereby blinding us to the whole. Associated with blinding is transcension. "This function of language is to move attention from what divides . . . [people] at one level of naming toward attention to what unites them at another level of naming."57 The rhetor striving for transcension attempts to categorize reality so that listeners perceive themselves as unified in their diversity.
Transcension relies upon the ability of a rhetor, confronted with a divisive issue, to successfully propose a complex name which apparently subsumes those divisive aspects in a coherent manner; in short he manages attention to a level of abstraction which results in agreement and unity.

These related dimensions of language function rhetorically as persons "(1) project an image of ourselves to others, (2) invite some interpersonal relationship that centers upon the amount of social distance and/or power, and (3) make some statement about the world that invites some particular response to the world." The critic may study how changes in naming affect "changes in social distance, perceived power, and cooperation in task accomplishment." In Brown's model of world views this idea is central.

Rhetors must do more than simply assert names for rhetorical purposes. They must give reasons why "their names for reality are the appropriate ones." A rhetorical discourse explains the naming of self, others, and the world in relationship to some controlling purpose. Rhetorical discourse as a complex name asserted for acceptance provides information, reasonable support, and various appeals to move an audience to adherence. Brown calls this rhetorical reasoning and describes its basic structure:

(1) The statement of a name . . . (2) the statement of its appropriateness because of the criterial attribute which the phenomena possess . . . followed by (3) a statement of the expected appropriate response; or (4) a listing of reasons that the categorizing of reality is accurate . . . . Such steps in naming cause the unfolding of an extended utterance—an instance of complex naming.
This definition of rhetorical reason is broader than formal logic as understood by philosophers. It allows for various kinds of rational appeals to an audience for accepting the adequacy of an "asserted and amplified" naming of reality. Such a view is similar to Holmes' "lived-logic" of adduced meanings discussed in chapters three and seven.

Related to the idea of rhetorical reasoning is message invention. From this point of view messages are thought of as the development and justification of the appropriateness of names applied to nonlinguistic conceptions in hopes of bringing about approach or avoidance behavior. This view leads to "one major name generator [the universal topic of all rhetorical invention] . . . the concept of 'the difference that makes a difference.'" Brown asserts:

The two superordinate topics implicit in all rhetorical dialogue are (1) "this-is-different-from-that" and (2) "this-is-the-same-as-that." A glance tells you that they conform to what we have earlier called assimilation and contrast: the topics are, therefore, intrinsically related to basic processes in perception. The rhetorical function, however, of such overarching categories is not clear until we relate them to approach-avoidance values, in which case either value may be associated with either topic. For instance, when the uncategorized "this" is differentiated from a categorized and negative "that," then the "this" gains in approach value . . . sometimes the rhetor will attempt to show both that an ambiguous phenomenon fails to fit one category . . . and does fit another . . . . Brown subdivides this name-frame. For example, value polarities such as "better-worse," "workable-unworkable" and "old-new" are specific versions of the more general one and are also used to suggest appropriate approach-avoidance behavior. The result of rhetorical invention is "a long series of asserted names . . . [which produces] a gestalt, a configuration . . . ." offered as the most
adequate name for some aspect of reality and suggesting appropriate behavior.65

In my study of Holmes, I find him to be a philosopher-rhetorician extremely sensitive to language. His style is concise and carefully thought out. His languaging generates an impression of him as a humble yet confident scholar. He carefully develops understandable arguments and casts them in the language of contemporary scholarship. He carefully defines terms, elaborates complex names, argues for conceptual distinctions that make a difference, and emphasizes relational terms among distinguishable concepts. One who reads him closely and indwells his language, finds the world interpreted in a distinctive and intriguing way. In chapter three I consider his philosophy of language which complements that available in Brown's writings. In chapter seven I discuss perspectival attention management. By that term I signify a rhetor's use of language that results in trascension. Members of a community see themselves as united by the basic themes of the unifying perspective. They also see themselves united in contrast to those who do not believe those themes.

By way of summary and overview, Brown's view of man-as-symbol-user can encompass much of what is unique in human behavior. Related to world-view rhetorical action, persons not only symbolically transform sensory experience but organize it into comprehensive social realities and argue that certain reality construals are more adequate than others. Persons share their life-world understandings. Such visions are made "real" as humans talk and act together as if those visions were ultimately true. In this fundamental thrust Brown is clearly
influenced by the work of Burke. The following section shows these fundamental ideas transposed into a system's view of ideology as communication process. This transposition provides a more coherent and dynamic conception of persons in dialogue for world-view rhetorical purposes. Such a shift emphasizes some of the above details more than others and stresses integrative relationships among concepts.

**A Communication Process Model of World Views**

In 1978, Brown published "Ideology as Communication Process." That article has continuity with the conceptualization just discussed as well as a difference. Taking the foundational idea of persons as symbol-users creating messages to accomplish rhetorical purposes, he sharpens his understanding through a systems model of communication process. His focal concern is less with the relationship of single messages to an audience and more with the large-scale dynamics of societal world-view process. With his eye fixed on the creation of ideology and ideological communities, he (1) highlights three fundamental sub-processes and (2) isolates intervention strategies, tactics, and maneuvers for promoting/retarding changes in a world-view system. This section considers the fundamental sub-processes as articulated in the 1978 article and some implications. The next section explores Brown's subsequent refinement of his perspective as it features the potential for strategic intervention into vision processing.

Brown unfolds the processes of world-view discourse and extends his exploration of human existence from a communication starting point.
Although much of his work focuses upon the symbolic-processing of the American Dream at the national level, his model is not limited to societal communication systems. It will be argued that extensive work needs to be done in at least two areas: first, there is needed a better understanding of reality processing in smaller groups who constitute their identity in such ways as to identify with abstract societal gestalts while negotiating resulting tensions. Second, more work is needed to further Brown's early investigation of the complexity of negotiating of national rhetorical visions in a pluralistic society. Ultimately this is a call for greater precision as the scope of Brown's model is extended and tested.

**Ideology as Communication Process**

Initially it is important to understand Brown's use of the term "ideology." He does not use it in a negative sense but in reference to:

> Any symbolic construction of the world in whose superordinate "name" human beings can comprehensively order their experience and subsume their activities. By "ideology," therefore, I do not mean a pejorative "false consciousness." I do intend to indicate with the term an affective charge not so clearly suggested in a name such as "categorical framework," which to me would direct attention away from the interpenetration of symbols and values.

> To me, an ideology is requisite to any world view. Given such a definition, the communication scholar commits to treating ideology as a function of symbolic process, which entails the notion of communication process.

Interesting for this study is the phrase "an ideology is requisite to any world view." This indicates that ideology is the indispensable heart of a world view, the core belief commitments or meanings that eventually are elaborated in a comprehensive construal of reality. If
this is a correct interpretation of that phrase, then "ideology" is similar to what Holmes means by the term "unifying perspective." There are other places in Brown's work where ideology seems to imply more than a unifying perspective; there "ideology" seems to be synonymous with "world view." For purposes of clarity in this study I equate "ideology," "world view," and "rhetorical vision." When indicating the basic beliefs requisite to authentic world-view commitment, I use the terms unifying perspective or perspectival stance.

Brown's article can be understood, in the terminology of our first section, as rhetorical reasoning amplifying and asserting the complex name "ideology as communication process" by showing that "the creation and communication of ideology proceed together." He summarizes this communication-centered "ideology of ideologies" as follows:

To show ideology as a function of . . . [communication] process, and always locating ideologizing within symbolmaking in general . . . these sub-points [are necessary] . . . (1) The abstracting nature of symbol-making includes specialized transformations of experience which ascribe complex interpretative relationships to the world and which fulfill a human propensity unique to the human being . . . (2) In the social process of symbolic abstraction inheres the power of ideology to reify interpersonal roles, status, and hierarchy; participants in an ideology negotiate and ratify such relationships. (3) Such [intrapersonal] symbol-making and [interpersonal] sharing—by which interrelated entities and individual needs, motives, and beliefs are named—leads to a communication-system [intrapersonal and interpersonal related] view of the rise and fall of ideologies; they flourish when the communication system compensates for vicious circles, and they decline when it fails to do so.68

Intrapersonal Needs Cycle

The complex name "intrapersonal categorizing as ideologizing" focuses attention upon "ideology as the function of intrapersonal
relational categorizing that fulfills a unique growth-and-survival requirement of the human being: to construe a world of connected entities."69 Brown argues that persons "categorize experience so that it seems repeatable" and claims that "ideology is grounded in the abstracting process common to all symbol-making . . . it follows from a specialized aspect of that operation [relational categorizing]."70

His discussion of symbol-making extends the discussion of language in the first section. Again following Susanne Langer and Roger Brown he details three levels of the symbolic transformation of experience. First, sensory abstraction is the "making of experience into symbols in which the limitation upon our senses provide selections and therefore abstractions from the universe of stimuli."71 Second, formal abstraction is the "conceiving of a form" or concept: we reify "some kinds and not others."72 Our minds abstract "attributes" as being "separable from yet applicable to" phenomena. Such symbolizing "populates the world with such entities" as "color," "size," "shape," etc. Alternative attributes are potentially "seen" in diverse phenomena. "Each alternative analogizes a potential 'form' for categorizing an experience and thus render[s] it 'unproblematic.'"73

Finally, meta-abstraction is the "third order of stimuli arbitrament" which involves the imputing of "complex interrelationships among formal abstractions."74 The study of meta-abstraction is concerned with "the 'rules' for constituting categories" or isolating the fundamental "categories of categories."75 Following the work of Bruner, Goodnow, Austin, and Roger Brown, he refers to three such
meta-categories: conjunctive, disjunctive, and relational. The locus of ideologizing is relational categorizing which "not only involves the conjoining of abstracted characteristics but also delimits the relationships among them." Brown elaborates this meta-category:

Once the entity of "relationship" is abstracted and reified, a resource for the symbol-making creature is to make abstractions of abstractions to produce "configurations" of relationships, thereby providing the cognitive economy of systematically organizing a wide array of concepts. That is, such a specialized transformation of experience into symbols makes possible subsuming or entailing relatively less abstract concepts so that the categorizer is able to "predict," "fill in," "expect," or "deduct" the presence of less highly abstracted attributes in the experience being categorized.

Brown distinguishes ideological relational categorizing from other types by associating it as "the abstracted dimension of ultimacy, the carrying to its nth degree the principle of perfection available through language symbols." "Ultimacy" is defined as "that category of experience on which one is willing to bet the meaning of one's life." This whole-person commitment of "betting the meaning of one's life" is "the extension to its extreme of the symbol-maker's quest for 'attribute configurations' that will comprehensively subsume human experience." Such activity is "the unique human propensity . . . considered to be as essential to the human creature as cell division is to the organism."

His conceptualization of intrapersonal categorizing relates to interpersonal communication. Symbol-making is dependent upon human interaction. Without symbol-sharing, symbol-making is drastically limited if at all possible. In modeling the components of the
intrapersonal subcycle, Brown thinks of the individual as simultaneously enacting three roles which relate the individual to others who also enact these universal communication roles.83 First, each part is an audience with growth-and-survival needs, which influence attention. Ideologizing itself is a basic human growth-and-survival need. Second, each is a source capable of advocating those needs to others conceived of as legitimate need fulfillers. World view need mediation focuses upon two kinds of advocacy: (1) that which features ideological gaps threatening world view adequacy and calls for resolution, and (2) that which proposes solutions for such ideological anomalies. Both kinds of advocacy express growth-and-survival needs which can only be met by response from significant others. Third, each is a medium or "gatekeeper for what to report and what to regard as information [an appropriate needs-meeting response] from others."84

Before I discuss the interpersonal cycle some comments are in order. First, a critical study which makes intrapersonal categorizing its focus would emphasize how a world view organizes persons' needs-meeting lived experience of the world. The critic would explicate a world view as it is experienced by adherents. The critic might generate empathetic understanding of how an ideological community conceives, in Holmes' terms, the empirical adequacy, rational coherence, and personal relevance of a world view. Such a focus would consider how intrapersonal perceptions of world view inadequacy arise and are shared so that a construal of reality once held to be existentially authentic is now threatened. This work would lead to
both an extension of the model as well as a practical guide for social intervention. Brown has already begun to explore some of these areas.

Second, by asserting the integral relation between intrapersonal symbol-making and interpersonal symbol-sharing, Brown leaves open a path by which a rhetorical theorist can escape the claim that world views are completely subjective. This integral relationship demands intersubjective considerations in the creation and maintenance of comprehensive social realities. In a later discussion I argue that the possibility of gaps between human categorizing and the reality categorized implies that symbolizing can be questioned and that certain symbolic constructions of reality are more adequately justified in light of certain practical demands of life. In that discussion Holmes' "interpretive realism" as an epistemological stance is helpful as I address the question of how persons evaluate the adequacy of a world view.

Interpersonal Power Cycle

In amplifying the name "interpersonal categorizing as ideologizing," Brown emphasizes "how symbol-sharing brings about the social negotiation of ideologies and their associated human groupings." A focal understanding of this sub-system requires relying upon what was said about intrapersonal ideologizing. While the two categorizing processes can analytically be separated, they proceed together as an integrated system. While persons can focus attention only upon one sub-process at a time, that is best done by relying upon a tacit awareness of the other sub-process. Brown notes the difference
that this shift in focal attention brings to an understanding of the ideologizing process:

Stressed less will be the intrapersonal sense-making of the world and accented more will be the interpersonal behaving as though the world makes sense. In moving from the internal to the communal experience of ideology, I intend no ambiguity but rather mean to say that the discussion of the individual implies understanding of the group and vice-versa.86

Brown summarizes this interpersonal cycle which he calls the "power-cycle":

Ideologies become "homes" for their human builders by seeming to them to provide "places" via motive, statuses, roles, and rules in a given community espousing a particular secular [or sacred] religion . . . . At bottom, such places will be seen as the function of human beings' resources for dealing interpersonally with symbols, drawing upon the reifying nature of symbol-making to ascribe reciprocal, complementary, and comprehensive social relations to members of a community. Since each ascription of motive, role, and status must be mutual, however, it will also be seen that a "place" must be negotiated among ideological adherents made consubstantial by acting together as if under some superordinate symbol system.

To act as if one adheres to ideology is a special case of social identity building . . . . Ideological hierarchy [is treated] as a specific side to symbol-mediated needs, motives and statuses.87

The Power of Ideology to Create Social Hierarchy

Brown uses the term "power" in two ways: (1) the power of ideology and (2) the power of ideological adherents. First, he emphasizes the power of an accepted ideology to order the social world comprehensively by naming relationships among persons. To show this he outlines the general process of social identity building:

To begin with, the creation of "self"-wants, or motives, and of interpersonal "relationships" depends upon the communication of such "needs," "purposes," and "relations" as these categories are reified/abstracted/attributed to a "self" by "others". . . . In brief, because human symbolic transformation abstracts and reifies
categories of experience, human creatures can infer and ascribe or impute "needs/motives" to others based upon whatever behavioral symptoms they can observe and categorize . . . . Given such attributed motives, it is clear both to a self and to others that one acts in ways that socially shared motives would explain. Hence, one behaves "as though the world makes sense" . . . . Bound up with such attributions of motives is the reification of "self" and "other" in "relationship." [Roger] Brown's work on the "original word game" suggests to me that the distinction between "self" and "other" arises primally at any juncture at which one symbol-user acts as tutor to any would-be user. Then and thereafter, the very distinction between "self" and "other" creates the entity of interpersonal relationship. Additionally during a symbol exchange, a "self" becomes an "other" and an "other" becomes a "self" as first one and then the other becomes a hypostatized "reflecting consciousness."88

This general process leads to the abstracting of community relationships which can be characterized as either "reciprocal" or "complementary." Peer relations are "attributed when the 'self' and 'other' reciprocate with the same category of reified social identity."89 A shared name like "gang members" confers not only a mutually shared identity but also implies "motives" for explaining types of behavior. "Hierarchical relations are attributed when the 'self' and the 'other' exchange names that complete each other."90 Examples include privates and sergeants, ingroup members and outgroup members. Brown goes on to note:

Interestingly, such complementary social identities make possible the implication up and down the hierarchy, either of shared (cooperative) "motives" or of contrasted (competitive) ones even while holding constant individual "places" such as superior and inferior.91

Thus far I have summarized Brown's view of the general process of social identity. He argues that ideologizing is a specialized aspect of this process:

Not . . . until hypostatized social relationships are rendered comprehensive does their specialized aspect as
ideological hierarchy obtain. Such comprehensiveness is dependent upon the resources of language-making. Symbols not only reify reciprocal and complementary entities but they also...engender the notion of perfection in the "world"... Every ideology posits a great chain of being, culminating in some "highest reach of aspiration"... As one carries out actions attributable to a specialized status in a comprehensively graded set of social "relationships," one is behaving in the eyes of "others" as though an ideology were making sense of the world to one... Carrying out such actions is tantamount to role-taking... Roles can include, in addition to "motives," attributed "beliefs" in "relationships" among abstracted entities.92

The Power of Ideological Adherents
to Negotiate and Realize
Ideological Hierarchy

At this level of analysis Brown is interested in how the social hierarchy posited by an ideology is made real through interpersonal relationship enactments. The realization of ideological hierarchy is conceptualized as having a dual aspect:

[1] The emergence of interpersonal roles comes in response to three questions: "Who am I?" "Who are you?" and "Who is that?" The "answer to any one of these," point out role theorists, "constrains answers to the others." The reason is that social identity depends on the exchange of mutually understood role enactments: "Locating the role of the other locates reciprocally the role of the self and activates corresponding role expectations." Such expectancies constitute rules, or more precisely what I call... action corollaries, those deeds by which a self is to demonstrate a commitment to and competency for participation in an ideological community. [2] As these behaviors are exchanged (negotiated in the first sense), they require consensual validation that the doer does meet the criteria that inform, i.e., categorize the role itself (negotiation in the second sense). The negotiation, then, of mutual agreement to social identity becomes overtly ideological when individuals act towards each other as though their acceptance or rejection of role performance depends upon presence or absence of behaviors upon which "motives" and "beliefs" associated with ideology are attributable.93

In short, world-view identity is made real as persons authentically enact the action corollaries of their world view and as others confirm the appropriateness of those enactments.
A crucial aspect of enacting a world view is participation in talk about the world view. Ultimately world-view maintenance depends upon adherents symbolically interacting to create relevant interpretations. Brown notes that "the power to create ideologies is shared among all the parties utilizing symbols to mediate mutual 'needs,' 'motives,' 'beliefs,' and 'identities."

This mutuality of interpersonal roles in world-view creation and maintenance is signified by the term "power-shares." Using Kuhn, Brown discusses three specific, interdependent shares of responsibility that constitute the interpersonal ideologizing power cycle in science: innovators, ratifiers, and cumulators. In later work he develops more generalized communication-centered categories for power-shares borrowing Bormann's rhetorical vision terminology. He argues that the critic should identify key power shares in relationship to the case study chosen. The following passage summarizes interpersonal ideologizing:

By abstracting entities such as "self," "other," "relationship," "role," and "status," and by attributing to one another—through action corollaries—ideological "motives" or "beliefs" that would account for their behavior, human beings act as though the world makes comprehensive sense to them.

Given this view of interpersonal symbol-sharing and world-view construction, a number of ideas follow. First, Brown claims that social identity building specifically becomes ideological when a hierarchy is "rendered comprehensive." If much of one's communication involves mutual participation in more than one distinctive world-view community, then the sustaining of an "integral self" in relationship to various, and often contrasting others, raises the problem of
pluralistic world view identity. For example, in chapter five I show Holmes' negotiation of the complex world-view name: "Christian Philosopher." Such a term is vital for him as a devoted Christian and a professional philosopher who seeks whole-life integration. His role enactment becomes increasingly complicated as he addresses himself to both Christian and non-Christian philosophers and other scholars who evaluate his enactment of "philosopher" action corollaries. This ideological intra- and interpersonal identity problem results in his advocacy of an integrative relationship between "Christ and culture," "secular and sacred," "revelation and reason," and "faith and learning." His is the problem of authentically living at the boundary of two or more world-view communication systems.

Second, in the discussion of intrapersonal ideologizing anomalies were mentioned. One source of anomalies is the failure of an ideology to posit a social hierarchy which legitimately meets needs. Failure of a world view to integrate persons adequately (power in the first sense) leads to negotiations (power in the second sense) for the modification of ideological conceptions of relationships and their associated action corollaries. Failure to adjust an ideology to social gaps can lead to the decay of a world view.

Third, for the critic whose focal concern is the power-cycle, the "emphasis in public-address history falls less on reification and more on reifying . . . . Here, without losing sight of names as reality, the historian attends primarily to their social accomplishments." Outlining some of the "social accomplishments of hypostatizing" Brown includes:
The human experience of "personality" on the part of "self" and "other" or "others," with "needs" attributable to all and with their "relationships" not only "hierarchically" graded from "inferior" to "peer" to "superior" but also "interdependently" arranged, according to "power" which is shared among "groups" to achieve "ends" or "goods" depending on the nature of "attention" by the symbolizing creatures involved.

Criticism could focus upon how messages function over time in the creation and development of such reifications with the possibility of (1) comparing and contrasting the communal experience of human relationships over time or (2) comparing and contrasting that group with other communities whose social reifications significantly differ. Such studies might aid those considering the advocacy of transformed hierarchy, especially as such advocates understand the potential problems of the social reality they propose as a needs-meeting alternative.

Most relevant to my study of Holmes are questions of pluralism and world-view maintenance, some of which are addressed in later chapters. How does Arthur Holmes negotiate a disciplinary identity as he participates in more than one world-view community? What problems does he face as he attempts to promote integrative relations between apparently contrasting world-view communities that traditionally view each other with hostility? What stance seems most adequate for the rhetorical purpose of mediating between potentially conflicting world-view communities? What action corollaries are used to evaluate such a person's ultimate commitment to a specific ideological hierarchy? If Holmes' integrative naming of the faith and knowledge relationship were widely accepted by Christians, what changes would result in social relationships among Christian and non-Christian
scholars? What changes must occur by both Christian and non-Christian scholars for there to be dialogue? To what extent can Holmes "incarnate" basic Christian beliefs in contemporary thought in the attempt for rhetorical relevance for "secular man," while at the same time still be accepted as a member of the evangelical Christian worldview community? How well does Holmes' proposed conceptual integration function as a needs-meeting response for young Christian scholars forming their worldview identity? Answers to these questions suggest further development of Brown's ideas.

Interpretative Attention-Switch Cycle

By way of transition it must be re-emphasized that ideologizing individuals are simultaneously participants in an ideologizing community. In Brown's modelling, the critic considering various power-shares of the interpersonal cycle treats each collective party (i.e., members of a power-share) to ideologizing as if the various members of that party communally share the same intrapersonal experience. Brown relates these two sub-cycles as an integrated communication system by positing an interpretative sub-process and asserting the hypothesis: "ideologies flourish when the communication system compensates for vicious circles that otherwise exacerbate gaps in human beings' construed worlds . . . [and] decline when the communication system fails so to compensate."101

The first important idea is systems. Having earlier argued that a system's view posits integrated relations of components into an organic whole, I turn to Brown's "two criteria for systemic views of
communication." First, "the need to show the mutuality of influence among components." Given the first two sub-cycles, this implies a third sub-cycle that is not outside the system as part of an environment, but one which is fundamental to both human symbol-making and sharing. Second, this cycle needs to be conceived in such a way that it enables a critic to posit "principles by which world views wax and wane." Brown argues that such a sub-process must account for:

(1) The success or failure of ideology in meeting intrapersonal growth and survival needs and (2) the compatibility or lack of it in the negotiation of interpersonal roles relevant to ideology . . . . It must account for gaps in symbolizing and for tendencies toward . . . vicious circles.

Discussing gaps in ideology, he argues that they are "endemic to the abstraction of concepts. The nature of symbolic transformation is to omit attention [blinder] to aspects of experience categorizable under alternative rubrics." Since world views comprehensively and coherently account for all reality, such gaps or hiatuses:

are regarded as anathema among adherents of a world view. Accordingly ideological communities find ways to meet the possibility that an outgroup or an innovator will recategorize experience and call attention to a heretofore unconceived, and therefore worrisome, gap in doctrine. The student of communication has . . . . interest in . . . . such moves as (1) constituting an ideology in ways that make it "immune to corroboration" [after Bormann], (2) constructing an ideology as a set of open-ended "sovereign wishes," [after Burke], or (3) building into an ideology itself a tenet glorifying the discovery and elimination of breaches in the "world" construal . . . . If one looks closely at such symbolic moves to anticipate and rectify gaps, one sees that they depend upon the very phenomena responsible for isolating them in the first place, namely a shift in attention during categorizing. For example, concentration may be redirected [1] from one level of metaphor to another, [2] from a "loose" to a "strict" construction of a set of "sovereign wishes," and [3] from anomaly-masking during scientific theory development to anomaly-featuring. Such an operation points to a
Key here is the idea of a "shift in attention" as "a systems-regulating concept." Because gaps are inherent in human constructions of symbolic reality, attention management becomes the key to ideology creation and maintenance. In later work anomaly-masking and anomaly-featuring become not simply one of many options, but the strategy of strategies in all rhetorical discourse by which rhetors promote "seeing" similarities and differences.

Next, Brown relates the idea of gaps to vicious circles. A vicious circle occurs when "two or more maladaptive dynamics feed off each other." Brown proposes a universal ideology action corollary. When a vicious circle becomes a "crisis" for a rhetorical vision communication system, "members of an ideological community act as if hiatuses in a world view would invalidate it." A communication system is categorized as "deviance-amplifying" when its members experience a vicious circle without a periodic trend reversal. "In such a communication system a world view decays. A 'deviance-compensating' cycle occurs when there is 'periodic refocusing of attention' by which gaps are either masked or a vision is modified, thus ending a vicious circle."

Summarizing the integrated sub-processes for making ideology Brown posits:

(1) Predominantly intrapersonal roles in which each party to communication combines "source" [advocacy] "audience" [needs] and "media" [open-channel] behaviors and which to avoid vicious circles, require response from (2) predominantly interpersonal roles, in which each party to communication enjoys some power share in symbol exchanges and which--to avoid deviance amplifying--require (3) compatibility-preserving attention
switches, so that doctrinal hiatuses in the ideology are compensated for.110

Given the earlier discussion, people have a basic growth-and-survival need to construe an adequate world view. The perception of inadequacy results in increased (1) advocacy of anomalies, (2) need for solutions and (3) open channel behavior toward others in the ideology processing communication system. A perceived lack of an adequate need-responsive solution from legitimate power-shares results in a vicious intrapersonal cycle. The sustained interpersonal failure to respond adequately brings the power cycle into a vicious circle as members of the ideological community corporately experience world-view gaps and turn to one another without generating acceptable solutions. An ideology radically brought into question loses "power" to legitimate social-identity.

A "shift in attention during categorizing" compensates for such vicious circles. If the advocacy of a solution meets with enacted approval, then the intrapersonal growth-and-survival need for a plausible unifying world view is satisfied. The ideological community that maintains its ideology once again subsumes social-identity under its superordinate name, although social relationships may now be altered in significant ways. The ability of a world view to survive vicious circles authenticates the viability of the belief system to the community of believers (and sometimes to those who would not accept the status of "believer").

It should be emphasized that the perception of gaps is often brought about communicatively as people in everyday life practically
test and discourse upon what Holmes calls the "think-with-ability" and "live-with-ability" of a world view. The human propensity to ask questions always leaves open the possibility that "new" gaps will be "detected" and/or "created," or "old" ones rediscovered.

Brown's case study in the article is Kuhn's work on paradigm "revolutions" in science. It is an interesting example that suggests the possibility of ideological perspectival commitments maintained during and through times of "revolution." There are those, including Kuhn, who assert that after such revolutions "science" itself is totally different. Yet Brown's conceptualization indicates that if men and women still use the core ideological theme of "scientific progress" to name themselves and render their lives meaningful, then a perspectival tradition has been maintained with continuity through change. In my understanding of his conceptualization of the growth and development of the scientific tradition, Stephen Toulmin better shows this evolutionary continuity through change of intellectual disciplines than does Kuhn. A communication-centered interpretation of his work Human Understanding promises fruitful yields in this area.

A critic choosing attention-management as a focal concern would map out details of how shifts in attention have been or are being promoted, eventually yielding a theory of attention shifts. Just as interesting as successful shifts are those that fail, especially if comparisons and contrasts can yield detailed indications of reasons for particular successes and failures. I think more work is needed in conceiving and studying attention management if Brown's systems-regulating concept is to provide some degree of determinancy.
beyond positing a general principle of world-view maintenance which potentially ends up functioning as a self-fulfilling prophecy (i.e., the critic argues after the fact that a world view died because its believers did not compensate for deviance).

My case study of Holmes as a world-view philosopher-rhetorician takes an attention-management focus in chapters six through eight. He conceives of "Christian theism" as a unifying perspective variously elaborated in the history of thought. This historical dialogue on the meaning of basic perspectival beliefs has resulted in a plurality of "Christian" world views. He argues that such pluralism is expected and valuable, as well as characteristic of the two other major perspectival traditions in Western thought: naturalism and idealism. His work, if accepted, conceives of the basic beliefs of any of the three perspectival traditions as matters of faith and ultimately beyond final rationalistic justification in the foundationalist sense of that term. He argues that the pluralism of world-view elaborations as versions of basic belief interpretations and articulations is open to critical evaluation, and when necessary world construals should be revised (or even given up). For now it is enough to stress that Holmes' major move for assuring the vitality of a Christian world view is that described by Brown as "building into an ideology itself the tenet glorifying the discovery and elimination of breaches in the 'world' construal."

Brown believes that the processing of ideology should become an integrating concern for communication scholars. Such a focus would lead to the analysis of reification processes at various levels. It would understand human behavior not by using causal models of the
natural sciences but by employing analogies from the ways humans understand language.

The great value of his model is that it asks critics to hold in constant relationship three processes of world-view rhetorical action. This task is difficult, especially as the model is applied to large-scale societal dynamics. At that level some key problems arise: It can be asked whether in a large society a group of power-share holders do indeed collectively experience the same intrapersonal needs. It seems problematic at this stage of model development whether the discussion of attention management is detailed enough to account accurately for the tactical processing of societal attention shifts over time. To what extent and in what ways do large ideological communities exist in consensus concerning their interpretations of a world view? Such "problems" are not so much a threat to Brown's model as they are difficulties expected in any early formulation of a general theory of human behavior. Such problems call for more precision in the theory construction process. I now consider some of Brown's own work in these areas.

Extending the Model

Brown has further elaborated his communication model of world views since 1978. In this later work he emphasizes (1) the compatibility of this model of world view with Bormann's, and (2) the possibilities of strategic intervention into world view processes premised upon an organic metaphor. Key in this work on intervention is the term "development." His thinking in both these areas extends his
process model.

A Complementary Approach

Since 1978, Brown has compared and contrasted his conceptualization with Ernest Bormann's formulation of rhetorical visions. Primarily this has been done by using Stephen Pepper's descriptions of world hypotheses, including contextualism and organicism, applying the former to Bormann's work and the latter to his own. Brown argues that these potentially competitive views can be seen as complementary ways of construing rhetorical data. By doing so he is promoting an attention switch by an epistemological tactic. He argues that Bormann's conceptualization "leads to an appreciation of a group's world view as communication product" which provides "in detail the life-world of a human grouping .. ." Contextual modelling yields knowledge of an event as "the complex Now as historic reality .. . [which] is the basis for coping participation." In contrast Brown's conceptualization emphasizes "the growth-process of an idea-environment over time." Brown's organic modelling of world views stresses the "determining dynamics" of an ideology and yields knowledge of an event as "an evolutionary reality .. . [which] is the basis for facilitative/inhibitive participation."

Bormann views a rhetorical vision as providing adherents "a rich context for events," an interpretative gestalt which renders reality significant. He does not attempt to integrate the relations between context and event in a determinate way. Contrastingly, Brown views a rhetorical vision, as both product and process, being
intimately bound up in an "integrative perspective" of context and event. For Brown, the integrated relations among context and event are "determining dynamics":

They are to the developing whole what the genotype is to the developing organism. For example, organismically as either the embryo or communication event is simultaneously process and product in its series of progressive developments, control of either is not an available goal in the sense of changing the end of an already-developing embryo from one species to another or of the communication event to a different genre. Rather, available in organismic versions of communication knowledge are only the strategies of facilitating or inhibiting such successive developments as the growth, flourishing, and maintenance or decline of rhetorical visions.

Using Burke's idea of "progressive developments," Brown models the maintenance of a rhetorical vision's continuity through change. In contrast to a world view "decaying" and "dying" in a vicious circle, a "healthy" and "thriving" world view evolves, in a developing spiral, as an organic whole. A world view is progressively realized and adapted through the reflection and action of its adherents. Their individual and collective thought and behavior, and resulting consequences, test, in Holmes' terms, the think-with-ability and live-with-ability of a world view.

Brown argues that the organic model of rhetorical visioning best features reality constituting processes and that a contextualist model best features the substantive themes of a social reality, although neither model is restricted to consider only that which it features best. I show in my case study of Holmes that the ideology-as-communication-process approach can adequately feature the substantive details of a life-world. When it does, the idea of process undergirds and shapes the discussion in distinctive ways.
I prefer Brown's model both for its organic-process focus and its allowance for a description of world-view content that is more topic free and open to the ways in which adherents thematically articulate their life world. Bormann's model focuses upon content but interprets a rhetorical vision as a narrative drama with characters and a plot. Translating a world view as a complex lived-fantasy, the critic sees a world view as a script which renders the whole of life meaningful to the actors. It allows the critic both distance (one knows that a play is just a play) and empathetic understanding (one is caught up in the drama). One major short-coming is that Bormann appears to rule out questions of truth and justification, although the critic may evaluate the world view aesthetically. Such an approach is useful, but not as heuristic for my chosen project.

When Brown's model is used to feature content as process it forces the critic always to be mindful of the human contribution in world-view creation. Its non-narrative description of categorizing as content is more open to questions of the justification of world-view beliefs. Hermeneutically the model has difficulties as it moves up levels of abstract analysis and attempts to describe societal dynamics-in-the-large. At that level, the modelling of societal substantive and processural detail is always difficult, no matter what the model. The attempt to gain scope often leads to a sacrifice of precision. This is also a problem for Bormann's model. For the communication critic who wants to build theory in understanding the processing of world views, Brown's model is heuristic and open to further development. I also believe that my discussion of Holmes'
advocacy of world-view content shows the potential of Brown's model as a critical tool. Especially important for content studies, given Brown's model, is Holmes' conceptualization of world views covered in chapter four.

Ideologizing and Intervention

As I move away from one of the later interests of Brown (i.e., comparing and contrasting his way of seeing world views with that of Bormann's), I want to consider a more central concern: Brown's practical interest in locating "topoi for intervening into socially constructed realities." His three sub-processes of ideologizing suggest that such topics of intervention rhetoric:

Derive from system-maintaining/threatening moves such as [1] the possibility of facilitating/inhibiting openness to interpersonal cues among participants in a rhetorical vision...called "open-channel behavior"; [2] the possibility of facilitating/inhibiting the complementarity of roles within whatever hierarchy is legitimized by the rhetorical vision; and [3] the possibility of facilitating/inhibiting systems-balancing attention-shifts in vision behavior. Such strategic junctures for intervention, in general, will be seen to arise from integrated relationships among socially mediated perceptions (1) of human needs and (2) of power, together with (3) selective attention.

Intrapersonal Needs Cycle

To date the least amount of work in model development has been in the area of the intrapersonal needs-cycle. In class lectures Brown has argued that there are two fundamental human needs inherent in symbol-using: (1) the need to categorize our experience so that it becomes repeatable and (2) the need to posit the ultimate category which orders all other categories and endows our lives with
significance. In his work as a theorist, Brown "postulate[s] that all or a substantial number of participants in a rhetorical vision experience the need to resolve hiatuses and poor fits between the vision's account of reality and what they take as direct experience." His emphasis is upon the idea that promissory themes of a vision lead to vision-threatening needs when those promises fail to become real in the experience of participants. An example is the American Dream and its themes of "freedom" and "equality" which for many Blacks have not been met; such failure leads to societal advocacy for a needs-meeting resolution.

Theoretically an intrapersonal cycle is kept from becoming a vicious circle by input from the interpersonal power-cycle. Therefore, the interventional strategy proposed for those who would intervene is to facilitate/inhibit "openness to interpersonal cues among participants in a rhetorical vision . . . 'open-channel behavior.'" Tactically this is accomplished in at least two ways: (1) attribute/deny needs, thus increase/decrease conceived needs salience; (2) legitimize/delegitimize those in the power-cycle capable of meeting needs.

The strength of Brown's model is seen here. Powerfully it focuses attention upon strategies and tactics. Its weakness at this stage of development is the very level of abstraction he has chosen for analysis. As mentioned earlier, he thinks of persons as collectively sharing the same intrapersonal need. This assumption may oversimplify societal experience. What is needed is a way of modelling rhetorical need creation over time and across large groups of people. How do
members of a society come to experience visional gaps and the resulting need for resolution? How do members within a power-share attribute/deny needs, and legitimize/delegitimize those capable of responding? How do participants outside a given power-share (i.e., those constituting other shares of responsibility in a conceived power-cycle) influence these attributions/denials, legitimizations/delegitimizations? How far can "symbol-sharing" go in explaining the experiences of (1) a hiatus and (2) a needs-meeting response? This is a call for case studies which focus upon the details of the processing of change in groups that come jointly to experience needs and search for their resolution.

Interpersonal Power Cycle

Interpersonally members of a world-view community act together in the name of their world-view and thus make real its social reality. Such corporate living as if the world-view makes comprehensive sense of life occurs both within a power-share and between or among power-shares constituting the communication system. Strategic intervention is premised upon facilitating/inhibiting complementary relationships within and between power-shares.

Brown's "symbol-based conception of power" emphasizes "the interdependence of symbol users as they mediate each other's goals." He argues:

"Power" depends upon shared perceptions that during future-choosing, selves and others must mediate each other's goals in order to realize those futures . . . . Growing out of this mutual attribution of influence, "power" becomes "real" only through the process of reification.
This view of power "as the collection of 'shares' [responsibility] which individuals or groups have in picking a version of any future" is connected with Brown's interventional concerns:

In speaking of "power" I do not refer to it as "cause" but rather as "interaction" leading to stability and to alteration in society. At bottom, the difference in the two definitions of power lies between mechanistic and evolutionary conceptions of change. In the former, if one accepts the root-metaphor theory of knowledge [after Pepper], the starting point is the lever; in the latter, it is growth. As I extend these starting points it follows that conceptions of "power" derived from these two schools of thought would depend, respectively, upon goals of control and of intervention. In relation to Burke's well-known distinction, then, control implies a one-to-one relationship between the lever of rhetor's act and "motion" in the audience. Intervention, on the other hand, implies a mediating relation between the rhetor's act and ongoing "action" of the audience. To Boulding, "The watchword is interaction, not causation," although "we recognize that some processes frequently dominate others." Conceived, then, as human interpretations of mutual dependency during acts of future choosing, "power" is compatible with a growth-based, evolutionary version of change as consequence of interacting influences.

In his paper "Power and the Rhetoric and Social Intervention," Brown provides case studies showing how people make power real by "attributing power to each other in future choosing" and how "'power' effect[s]/affect[s] the organizing of persons into 'society.'" He argues that persons make power "real" by "ascribing mutual roles to each other in future-choosing." "Power" is related to the organization of people into society and focuses upon the meanings of ideological hierarchy that shift over time in an evolving spiral of enacted relationships.

Turning specifically to the possibility of strategic interventions into a power-cycle, Brown models a vision-manager's perspective of four interdependent roles following Bormann's discussion of the "chaining
out" of fantasy themes:

Although to vision participants shares in future-choosing will be seen thematically . . . ., from the vision manager's view, the power roles pertain to parts taken in creating a symbolic environment . . . . Their [rhetorical vision] creation and/or maintenance proceeds as [1] fantasy-theme inventors increase their output, accompanied by [2] increased choosing from among such themes by improvisors/empathizers and [3] by higher levels of ratification by enactors, who consensually validate new or modified themes by making them or their corollaries behaviorally real; further, all of these relate to increased chaining-out of themes/visions to larger publics by diffusers. 136

Given such a view the key to intervention is promoting/retarding complementary relationships among power shares. As Brown works out this overall strategy he argues that the generalized social meanings of "threat," "exchange," and "integration" are tactically promoted resulting in interdependent role perceptions that can be characterized as:

(1) Complementary, so that each power share "completes" the other/s and a hierarchy is affirmed; (2) competitive, so that each powerholder "overlaps" the other/s and a hierarchy is challenged; and (3) a mixture of the others, so that a hierarchy is both affirmed and challenged. 137

Alterations among these power interpretations is posited as necessary if the power cycle is to avoid vicious circles and vision decay.

These three generalized social organizers tactically used to promote strategic purposes are taken from Kenneth Boulding. 138 They can be thought of as "rhetorical stances" 139 in the negotiation of hierarchy made real through advocacy styles, languaging, rhetorical events, etc. The basic premise of "exchange" is "you do something I want and I will do something that you want." A "threat" tactic is premised on the idea "you do something I want or I will do something that you do not want." An integrative stance creates the
perception "I will do something because of what I am and because of what you are." Such tactical stances are variously used in a historical dialogue within and among world-view communities to manage dynamic relationships among ideological adherents. Certain tactical stances may be more characteristic of a given ideological community at a given time. Ideally, to me, a mature community primarily emphasizes integrative stancing among power-shares. Examples of integrative communities may be hard to find at the societal level. Integrative rhetors, like Holmes, continually portray the possibilities of such community.

The critic focusing upon power-cycle development over time will be interested in (1) the negotiation and enactments of relationships within a power-share and between power-shares and (2) how these interpretations are brought to bear in choosing the future to be actualized. Threat, exchange, and integration may not exhaust tactical stances characteristic of in-groups and out-groups in the negotiation of hierarchical interdependence. Given Brown's view, each communication system moves back and forth from competitive to cooperative relationships. Often such relationships are best characterized as a dynamic mix between various in-group and out-group coalitions.

Brown argues that some relational changes are the result of attention-switches in views of personhood. The major ontological attention-switch occurring in defining a power-cycle is the shift from/to collective-stressing identity to/from individuality-stressing identity. Such a shift focuses attention upon either the
primacy of intrapersonal needs or the collective good of all power-shares integrated in a communication system. Brown summarizes his view of power and social intervention:

Its genesis is interpretation of human interdependency in choosing from among alternative paths to the future. By ascribing to self or selves and others the ability to affect in some way the outcome of future-choosing, social actors reify or realize power. When symbol users act as though such "power" is distributed into shares, hierarchical relationships are periodically invented, confirmed, or challenged. As the renegotiation of power-shares takes place, the consequence is social maintenance by the means of combining social stability and change.

Those who would intervene, consciously or deliberately, in a society's "power" relationships, would be limited by the condition that other power shares also are always potential interveners. While the influence of attempted interventions, hence, is conditional, interactional, and circular, it nonetheless is describable in coherent and comprehensive terms for both the communication scholar and change-agent.

In every power cycle there is a rhythm between the introduction of new ideas and the development of those ideas—as they are tested via action corollaries, critical reflection, and the fit between vision themes and lived experience.

It should be pointed out that although Brown isolates a generic vision-manager's model he recommends a case-specific, thematic characterizations of power-shares as they are perceived by participants of an ideological communication system. This has great value in that it keeps the critic from an arbitrary imposition of a scheme that is rigidly determined before the data is considered. Also of importance is Brown's conception of generic roles among power-shares. In the discussion of the intrapersonal need-cycle I noted that people constituting a single power-share are seen as communally experiencing certain needs. The question arose as to what extent and how that
happens. Perhaps critics providing such details will consider the systemic principle of "systems within systems" as they study the sub-power-shares constituting a single power-share, a paradoxical but crucial idea. I address some of these interpersonal aspects in chapters three through five.

Interpretative Attention Switch Cycle

In 1982, Brown published "Attention and the Rhetoric of Social Intervention." It further develops the concept of "attention-switch":

Dynamically considered, [it] amounts to a grand strategy for the rhetoric of social intervention as its corollaries lead to changes in the way human beings name and thus make "real" their relationships. Formally, the strategies for promoting gestalt-shifts are only two, arising from the recurrent question of "same" or "different" that human categorizers ask about their experiences in relation to other events. Each strategy, anomaly-masking and anomaly-featuring, may be advanced by tactics such as switching from one cognitive style to another, and each such change is actualized by such traditional rhetorical maneuvers as turning the tables, arguing from residues, and the like. "Look at it this way instead of that way," these rhetorical maneuvers say, in the service of anomaly-masking or anomaly-featuring among human conceptual systems.

Brown likens a conceptual attention-shift to a perceptual gestalt-shift and argues:

An attention switch requires (1) at least two patterns or interpretative "templates" always be potentially involved in our sizing up a situation; (2) each pattern itself be capable of rendering the situation coherent; and (3) movement from one to another—with a consequent reconstituting of the situation—be necessary before a "switch" will have occurred.

He notes that attention-shifts at a societal level require "multiple rhetors" working over time and in various ways (not just oral discourse) in the promotion of social meanings. He is
interested in the ways an attention-switch renders peer and hierarchical social relations coherent and the means by which they are made real through "social-ordering communication dynamics." Brown chooses the metaphor of a stone dropped into quiet water to help conceive of the "ripple effects" of an attention-shift in a social system:

Ever-widening "circles" of influence arise (1) insofar as applying a new "template" enables community members to attribute new needs and qualities to themselves and to be more or less active in advocating them to others in the social system; (2) insofar as such pattern-giving entails the relative opening or closing of communication channels with members of an in-group and/or out-group; (3) to the extent that such a new structure of experience constitutes in-group/out-group relationships as being either competitive or cooperative, or one and the other. The attention-switch clearly assumes strategic importance as a difference that relates to many differences. Likewise, efforts to prevent or delay a shift of attention...comprise a social intervention for forestalling social changes that could reverse leading trends. In any meaning based version of social dynamics, the attention switch notion serves as a strategy for strategies, assuming many variations within two basic forms [anomaly-masking and anomaly-featuring]... Brown identifies some tactics which are used to actualize a rhetorical gestalt-shift. Transcendence (see the earlier discussion of the transcension function of language), changing conceptions of epistemology, axiology, and ontology, "going from one level of metaphor to another," and "moving between strict and loose construction of any portion of a lifeworld as a 'set of sovereign wishes.'" Brown outlines the vision-managers' model of rhetorical vision attention-shifting:

In the process of rhetorical visioning, there occurs a constant trade-off in human beings' attention between the plausibility or precision of a symbolic reality, on the one hand,
and its comprehensiveness as a world view, on the other. The greater the claim to comprehensiveness of a vision's interpretation, the more likely are anomalies to be conceived between rhetorical vision and common sense experience; relatedly, with such anomalies featured in persons' attention, the less precise or plausible the rhetorical vision is seen to be, along with there being less social support for masking such misfits by calling them untypical, accidental, irrelevant, and so on; with more featuring of conceived anomalies and less precision or plausibility ascribed to the vision, its comprehensiveness is qualified and restricted, accompanied by a decrease in conceived anomalies—thus reversing a trend and preventing a vicious circle in the interpretative sub-system of rhetorical visioning.152

The weakness of the above description is that it portrays only two options: mask anomalies or reduce the world-view's claim to comprehensiveness. A third alternative, premised upon what I argue about Holmes is to extend a world-view elaboration through adequately accounting for the anomaly. Such a move enhances precision without sacrificing scope. This relates to Brown's conceiving of a world view as open-ended in its elaboration and appears to be the ideal of a scholarly community.

Conclusion

In my project as a whole this chapter plays a central role. Throughout this study I rely upon this conceptual framework, a times more tacitly than others. For example, in this chapter I have often spoken about Brown's work as a scholar in "Brownian" terminology. (More of this could be done; for example, one could study Brown as a change agent attempting an intervention in a system of scholars who live out their lives in the name of communication). In the next three chapters I consider Holmes' advocacy of some fundamental philosophical conceptualizations and show that in such rhetorical action he promotes
an intrapersonal and interpersonal disciplinary identity. In chapters six through eight, I consider Holmes' promotion of an attention-switch concerning a way to model an elaboration of basic beliefs of Christian theism as a world view.

As Holmes advocates world-view content, he enacts his world-view identity. In turn, his advocated and authentically indwelt identity controls the contours and details of his world-view content. I show that Holmes' willingness to participate integratively in both the larger community of scholars and the smaller community of evangelical scholars sets him at a point of creative tension. His assertion of positions must consistently develop within two fields of argumentation: philosophical and theological. Potentially he is open to the categorization of "compromising scholar" as he mediates human attention. Yet at the same time he is also categorizable as an "insightful integrative thinker."

Holmes' dialogical advocacy of world-view content and identity is an invitation to a thoughtful consideration of proposals. Such advocacy potentially is needs-meeting for those who, like Holmes, experience the need to approach thinking as Christian scholars. Acceptance of his thinking by others and their enactment of suggested action corollaries, makes real the vision that he articulates. His work at Wheaton College allows a close community context for the articulation, development, and joint enactment of his ideas.

Within the community of evangelical scholars, Holmes is not a lone innovator. He works with others in the creation and maintenance of a contemporary and scholarly world-view content and identity.153
Given Brown's generic power-shares: (1) Holmes and others have invented world-view content and relational themes (2) which have been and are being improvised upon by other scholars and (3) ratified through enactment by scholars and students who actively promote such themes (4) among the larger community of evangelicals. As such change emerges, "evangelical Christianity" is seen and experienced by some as a progressive development. For others, the shift is seen as discontinuous, and the ratifiers and enactors of this new vision may be categorized as "dangerous liberals" or worse. I direct the reader to part two of this study where Holmes' advocacy of world-view identity is considered in detail.
FOOTNOTES


2"ICP," p. 124.

3Ibid., p. 139.


5"The Rhetorical Purpose," p. 65.

6Ibid., p. 104.

7Ibid., pp. 66-67.

8Ibid., p. 73.

9Ibid., p. 76.

10Ibid.

11Ibid., p. 77.

12Ibid.

13Ibid., pp. 77-78.

14Ibid., p. 78.

15Ibid., p. 79.

16Ibid., p. 84.
17Ibid., p. 85.
18Ibid.
19Ibid., p. 73.
20Ibid., p. 75.
21Ibid., pp. 104-108.
22Ibid., p. 124.
23CWV, pp. vii-viii.
26Ibid., p. 128.
27Ibid., p. 134.
28Ibid.
29Ibid., p. 136.
31Ibid., p. 141.
32Ibid., pp. 127, 158.
33Ibid., p. 142.
34Ibid., pp. 144-145.
35Ibid., p. 158.


39 Ibid.

40 Ibid., p. 469.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid., p. 370.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.


46 Ibid., p. 371.


49 Ibid., p. 371.

50 Ibid., p. 372.

51 Ibid., p. 373.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid., p. 372.

56 Ibid., p. 374.

57 Ibid., p. 378.

58 Ibid., p. 367.

59 Ibid., p. 372.

60 Ibid., p. 377.
Three points should be made here: first, Brown's "ideology of ideologies" is itself "an ascription of complex interpretive relationships" which focuses attention upon three basic processes of ideologizing. Second, he uses "power" in two different senses: (1) the power of ideology to create social reality and (2) the shared power of ideological participants to negotiate and make real its social reality. Third, he posits a systemic principle upon which interventional strategy can be premised.
91Ibid., p. 130. We should note here that in later papers there is a shift in terminology. "Complementary" comes to be equated with "cooperative" and contrasted to "competitive." A third hierarchical meaning is also introduced: "mixed."

92Ibid., p. 130.
93Ibid., pp. 130-131.
94Ibid., pp. 131-132.
95Ibid., pp. 132, 136.
96See section three of this chapter.
97"ICP," p. 132.
98I believe this accounts for much being written by evangelical scholars calling for new models of church and Christian fellowship, see for example, Howard A. Snyder, Liberating the Church (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1983).
100Ibid., p. 233.
101"ICP," p. 133.
102Ibid.
103Ibid.
104 Ibid., pp. 133-134.
105 Ibid., p. 134.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid., p. 135.
110 Ibid.


113 "ICP," pp. 139-140.

114 "Toward a Complementary Version of Rhetorical-Vision Theory," unpublished paper, Ohio State University, 1982, p. 3 (henceforth referred to as "CV82"; the earlier version of this paper is referred to as "CV81"). See Stephen Pepper, *World Hypothesis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1942).

115 Ibid., p. 9; see also pp. 1-6.
116 Ibid., p. 3.
117 Ibid., p. 9, see also pp. 6-8.
118 Ibid., p. 8.
119 Ibid., p. 7.
120 Ibid., p. 8.


122 "CV82," p. 11.

123 Lecture delivered May 13, 1983 at the Ohio State University in Communication 617.

124 "CV82," p. 11.
126"CV82," p. 10.
127Ibid., pp. 11-13.
128"Power and the Rhetoric of Social Intervention," unpublished paper, Ohio State University, 1982, pp. 1, 3 (henceforth "PRSV").
129Ibid., p. 5.
130Ibid., p. 3.
132Ibid., p. 6.
133Ibid.
134Ibid., pp. 13-14.
135Ibid., p. 23.
138 Ecodynamics, ch. 7, 8, 9.
139See Wayne C. Booth, "The Rhetorical Stance," College Composition and Communication 24 (1963), 139-145.
140"CV82," p. 17.
141"PRSV," p. 38.
142From a lecture-discussion in Communication 617 on 4/9/81.
145Ibid., p. 18.
146Ibid., p. 18; an example of the process among black Americans is provided, pp. 18-22.
147Ibid., p. 19.

148Ibid., p. 22.


152"CV82," p. 19.

PART TWO

ARTHUR F. HOLMES' ADVOCACY OF A WORLD-VIEW

DISCIPLINARY IDENTITY
CHAPTER III

PHILOSOPHY AS PERSPECTIVAL: AN INTRAPERSONAL
AND INTERPERSONAL QUEST FOR UNDERSTANDING

Introduction

Part one of this study featured the communication model and method relied upon as a conceptual standpoint to answer the question, "How does Holmes as a Christian philosopher advocate Christian theism as a contemporary world view?" Part two consists of chapters three through five and addresses Holmes' rhetorical problem of advocating a world-view disciplinary identity which he labels Christian philosopher. Relying upon Brown's model and its emphasis on the construction and maintenance of intrapersonal and interpersonal ideological identity, I study a selection of Holmes' writings and treat them as messages which categorize large groups of people in unique disciplinary relationships. I also show how Holmes realizes his negotiated identity via the proper enactment of action corollaries.

Brown argues that two primary rhetorical purposes generate messages: relational goals and content goals. In the discourse under rhetorical scrutiny in these chapters the content goal was probably primary in Holmes' mind, but relational purposes are obvious. Both goals are closely bound together. For example, in this chapter I consider Holmes' categorization of the disciplinary field, "philosophy," and the disciplinary role, "philosopher." In section
one, Holmes addresses specific content questions as he (1) defines philosophy as a perspectival quest for clear, coherent, and systematic understanding, (2) reconstructs the ideas of metaphysics, and (3) articulates a view of language. Through the advocacy of these categories he also distinguishes himself from and relates himself to other philosophers who jointly constitute a philosophical disciplinary communication system.

In section one the focus is primarily upon Holmes' advocacy of an intrapersonally needs-meeting categorizing of "philosophy." Holmes rhetorical problem is to define philosophy in such a way that it can be seen as a disciplinary activity open to and done by persons who bring authentic personal commitments to their task without compromising themselves or their quest for vigorous thought. In doing so, Holmes wants to avoid the extremes of (1) a scepticism that views all philosophy as a relative rationalization of personally chosen perspectives or (2) a dogmatism that sees only one perspective as providing insight concerning the fundamental questions of life. As he develops the "perspectival" category for philosophical methodology, Holmes shows its relevance for a modest approach to metaphysics and worldview elaboration. He also argues a central place for language in the process of creatively adducing philosophical understanding. The emerging definition of philosophy is one that rejects notions of either complete objective neutrality or complete subjective relativity. The philosopher is seen to be a person engaged in the communication process of gaining an intrapersonal understanding of life that has interpersonal disciplinary credibility.
The second section transposes these ideas, as well as Holmes' view of (1) the history of philosophy, (2) dialogue as the philosophical action, and (3) the logic of philosophical decision, into a communication-process view of philosophy as a disciplinary communication system. This section clearly opens the history of philosophy to further study by communication scholars with interests in the rhetorical processing of philosophical identity and understanding.

Throughout this chapter attention is focused upon identity rhetorically processed within a disciplinary communication system constituted by scholars living out their lives in the name of philosophy. Chapter four features world-view negotiation as an interdisciplinary task as Holmes categorizes the disciplines of philosophy, theology, and science as key power-shares within a world-view communication system. Chapter five shows Holmes' negotiation of the world-view disciplinary name Christian philosopher. His advocacy of that identifying name relies upon the perspectival notion developed in this chapter. That name locates him among philosophers and within the interdisciplinary world-view negotiating communication system as one who lives his life at the boundary of philosophy and Christian theology; his realization of that name is a power intervention within the community of scholars.

**Philosophy as a Perspectival Quest**

Given Brown's framework, one would expect that an ancient name like "philosophy" would be variously understood and debated. Diverse conceptualizations of this term focus attention upon different
"criterial attributes" asserted for categorizing philosophy and "action corollaries" appropriate for a philosopher. A stance concerning the nature of philosophy bears upon the conception of philosophical problems and methods, the articulation of philosophical positions, and the critique of others who call themselves "philosophers." As I consider Holmes' conceptualization, my interest is in (1) "perspective" and "quest" as orienting terms of his definition, (2) metaphysics as a specific aspect of that quest that centrally concerns Holmes as a world-view advocate, and (3) the role that Holmes gives to language in the accomplishment of the philosophical quest.

Throughout, Holmes argues as a thinker who relies more heavily upon "both-and" categories than upon "either-or" categories. As an integrative thinker he attempts to avoid the blind spots typical of polar extremes, while at the same time acknowledging what may be seen from the standpoint of an extreme. The key extremes in his attention management include dogmatism-scepticism, cognitive-existential, science-humanities, and objectivity-subjectivity. The position Holmes develops is one that seeks to meet the intrapersonal growth-and-survival need for honesty and humility in asking questions of ultimate concern without compromise. Holmes argues that such questions can be asked honestly only when the philosopher does so confessing personal commitments (i.e., a perspective) that shape thought and action. Such perspectival confession must be accompanied by a humility that recognizes the integrity of philosophical scholarship. Holmes' categorizing makes room for diversity of thought. He values pluralism, but at the same time he attempts to help the
reader (1) order that diversity of thought and (2) see possible limits of pluralism. In short, his categorizing provides a place to stand and a general orientation for philosophical disciplinary development as a scholar.

The Perspectival Quest

As one who generically defines his intrapersonal and interpersonal scholarly identity as a "philosopher," Holmes is faced with the related question: Who are philosophers? What do philosophers do? How do philosophers accomplish their work? His answers to those questions unfold personal conceptualizations of "philosopher" and "philosophy" which relate Holmes to himself, to others, and the world (and, as I show in chapter five, to God). When Holmes discourses upon these questions as a teacher and a writer he urges others to see things this way. As he addresses these issues his most original contribution is his epistemological/methodological assertion that all philosophy is perspectival. His construal of philosophy as a perspectival quest, as well as his related understandings of metaphysics and language, is relevant to world-view studies by philosophers and communication scholars.

At the most general level Holmes claims, "Philosophy may be identified . . . [1] by the foundational questions that comprise its subject matter and [2] by its theoretical objectives and [3] logical methods."2 The philosopher systematically examines the conceptual assumptions which tacitly shape the investigations of other scholars, especially questions about knowing, being, and valuing. Two primary
theoretical objectives comprise the philosopher's "quest": conceptual clarity and systematic understanding. These objectives are combined in different ways and emphasized variously. For example, modern analytic philosophy is primarily concerned with "conceptual clarity" in its attempt to understand concepts and relationships among them. Such a task cannot be accomplished without relying upon some systematic understanding of reality that thereby shapes inquiry, choices, analysis, and arguments.

On his part, Holmes personally emphasizes the "systematic understanding" aspect of the philosophical quest. He describes the orientation of this emphasis, "It attempts to put all our philosophical concepts together into a carefully developed coherent exploration of God, man and the universe, the nature of our knowledge of them, and the bearing of all this on our values . . . ."³ Such an emphasis relies upon conceptual clarity in the pursuit of a coherent and comprehensive understanding of life. To acknowledge the human limitations of all philosophy and the need for humble open-endedness in the attempt to see life steadily and as a whole, Holmes stresses the term quest. The philosopher continually strives for greater understanding across the whole of life.

According to Holmes, the philosopher's quest potentially serves society. In the following quotation, I feature the philosopher-as-societal-agent rather than "philosophy" as an impersonal abstraction that somehow itself functions in society. Note Holmes' articulation of the philosopher's potential contribution to the articulation and enactment of world views:
Philosophy is but one cultural activity. Culture as a whole is the developed pattern of human life as it centers around certain key beliefs and values. [The philosopher] seeks to clarify those beliefs and values, to explore their theoretical bases and to develop a systematic understanding of things. [Potentially the philosopher encourages] . . . a process of intellectual maturation . . . [which] involves a refining of ideas, a re-expression of ideals, a careful sifting of naive notions . . . .

In a maturing culture [the philosopher] provides an intellectual conscience to probe existing thought patterns, to push thought beyond what is historically or culturally relative, and to argue for what is universally true. [The philosopher] can develop an overall world view as a guide in the processes and conflicts of history . . . . It is [the philosopher who] develops the world views that religion and culture propose . . . . Marx and Nietzsche, Dewey and Hegel, Locke and Rousseau, Augustine and Aquinas, Sartre and Marcuse, each has made history by developing an ideology to guide society.

Many philosophers would agree with Holmes' general description of the questions and objectives which orient the philosophical quest. He is more original and controversial when he turns to the third ingredient of his definition, "logical methods," (i.e., how the quest is accomplished). His position, and the resulting conflicts, focuses upon the implications of his key methodological proposal: "all philosophy is perspectival."

In 1969, Holmes published *Christian Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*. This work advocates and develops his perspectival proposal and its implications by mediating attention on the conceptual continuum stretching between the poles of "dogmatism" and "scepticism." In chapter two's discussion of attention-switches, I noted Brown's term template, an "interpretive gestalt" which organizes reality into meaningful patterns. A switch occurs when one template is exchanged for another. Associated with the template of dogmatism are terms including objectivism, rationalism, empiricism, scientism, formal
logic, theoretical knowledge, and propositional truth. Associated with
the sceptical template are terms including subjectivism, relativism,
historicism, voluntarism, existentialism, lived-logic, practical
knowledge, and personal truth. Holmes' articulation of philosophy as
perspectival mediates these two conceptualizations of philosophy. He
is promoting an attention switch that provides a methodological middle
ground for doing philosophy.

Holmes understands contemporary philosophy as a revolt (an
attention switch) from the dogmatic rationalisms and empiricisms that
emerged from the acceptance of Descartes' methodological conception of
philosophy. He describes three major issues in that shift away from
dogmatism and towards scepticism:

(1) Contemporary philosophers protest the limitation of
knowledge to what fits a scientific model, whether in the narrow
rationalism of a Cartesian deductive system or in the narrow
empiricism of Locke and his positivistic descendents. The
principal objection is that an exclusive emphasis on either clear
and distinct ideas or sense-data leaves no room for
self-knowledge. This means turning from closed systems and
positivistic dogmatism to the more traditional quest for meaning
in life . . . .

(2) Contemporary philosophers protest the alienation of man
by methods and theories that derive wholly from the natural
sciences; it is not enough to consider man as an object to be
studied by behavioral scientists and manipulated by social
technicians . . . . The task of philosophy is rather to illuminate
the world as we find it, to give meaning to life as we live it

(3) Contemporary philosophers have joined Kant and Hegel in
protesting the bifurcation of subject and object in modern
philosophy. Subjectivism and objectivism are equally inadequate.
If we are to grasp the meaning of objective science and the
meaning of the self, we must hold them in unison and recognize
that a subject-object continuum precedes both . . . . Methods
gereed to object alone or subject alone have limited value. We
need one that can see the two together . . . . If science and
existence, nature and value, are . . . to be properly related, we
must give attention to world-views and to the possibility of
metaphysics.6
Holmes argues that the contemporary shift away from the now obvious anomalies of the dogmatists was significant. Philosophers like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Dilthey, and James directed philosophical attention to neglected concerns and have made positive contributions by (1) broadening and enriching the understanding of human experience and reason, (2) stressing the importance of individual facts and of experience and life as we live it, and (3) emphasizing the personal aspect of knowledge rooted in historical human existence. At the same time, some of these thinkers have pressed towards extremes in the opposite direction by (1) accepting the conceptual splits created by the dogmatists and over-emphasizing neglected polar terms, (2) rejecting the possibility of a reconstructed idea of ultimate questions concerning such issues as the relationships between human existence, facts and values, and (3) emphasizing historical and subjective relativism to the extent that questions concerning objective truth and knowledge are understood as meaningless or irrelevant. Holmes' perspectival proposal, seen as an alternative attention template, mediates these two poles. He urges the philosopher to "keep in mind the relation of description to argument, of the existential to the cognitive, and assess the place of logical argument and empirical evidence in shaping and justifying world views today. For argument and evidence provide intersubjectivity which overcomes the relativism of the solitary thinker." 7

Holmes argues that there is the need for philosophical methodology sensitive to both cognitive and existential concerns. He agrees that
philosophy cannot be methodologically neutral as the rationalists assumed, but he equally affirms that the subjective dimension of philosophy does not necessarily exclude rational or objective criteria. Holmes argues that all philosophy "is perspectival in so far as it sees things from a wholistic life-world standpoint that centers on some religious or quasi-religious commitment." A perspective is not a neutral set of axiomatic presuppositions from which a system of thought is deduced. Instead, it is an authentically chosen, guiding image which is believed to make sense of life: "A guiding perspective grants a sense of direction, a vision of how, in principle, things can be seen to make sense." Philosophy is best understood as a personal-rational activity which develops the contours of this vision of reality:

Philosophy is indeed a rational activity, but . . . reason is a personal activity, and the person is a social and historical individual. Philosophy is done from personally held perspectives, replete with beliefs and values and existential concerns. It is and must be self-critical, but it remains confessional, convictional, the articulation of prephilosophical insights into the meaning of life and the mystery of existence. The beliefs we hold, the philosophical traditions we espouse, the particular formulations we work out, are not descriptions but interpretations of our world. They are responsible to empirical data, phenomenological and otherwise; they must be able to "cope" with or . . . "fit" the facts, but beyond this they are not validated by empirical considerations, nor entirely by logical considerations, but rather they are authenticated by being "true to" the convictions we hold because they give meaning to life.

In his lectures on perspectival philosophy, delivered at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, he distinguished three integrated, and often taken for granted, ingredients of any individual's perspective: the ideosyncratic, the universal, and the world-viewish:
The ideosyncratic is peculiar to the individual, to the peculiarities of his temperament, background, education, interests, etc. It is the kind of thing James seems to stress in "The Will to Believe," and that by itself might give rise to a hopelessly relativistic situation. The universal is generically human, rooted in essential human needs, universal areas of value, and action, our common being in a common world. It is the kind of thing that phenomenologists like Heidegger try to describe. The world-viewish is the perspective of an entire tradition of thought, be it materialistic, Marxist, Hindu or Christian. All three of these ingredients are blended in the total perspective one brings to philosophical inquiry.\textsuperscript{11}

An individual's perspectival stance can perhaps best be understood as a whole-person faithful commitment which functionally relates to a wide range of cognitive awareness and activity. A person exploring the implications of a chosen perspective is engaged in the process of "faith seeking understanding." Holmes outlines eight functional relationships between faith and understanding which he asserts are "true generically of all human beings":

(i) Faith arouses interest in understanding.
(ii) Faith affects perceptivity and selectivity.
(iii) Faith includes a cognitive content we incorporate in larger understanding.
(iv) Faith gives unity to understanding.
(v) Understanding apprehends and articulates faith's cognitive content.
(vi) Understanding expounds and elaborates faith's cognitive content.
(vii) Understanding explores the bearing of faith on every area of life and thought.
(viii) Understanding explores the justifiability of cognitive content.\textsuperscript{12}

Before I turn to the implications of this perspectival conception for doing metaphysics, some communication-centered comments are in order. First, Holmes' methodological conceptualization of philosophy as a perspectival quest addresses two key problems: (1) Intraperso


growth-and-survival need to see all of life as a Christian—this includes his calling as a philosopher. In chapter five I show how this perspectival understanding makes that possible. (2) As a philosopher, Holmes participates in the interpersonal communication system of philosophers and experiences their negotiation of philosophical understandings. Those experiences contradict the visions of philosophy as (a) a neutral and objective articulation of human knowledge or (b) a subjective and relativistic rationalization of personal beliefs. This failure of fit between visions and practice results in Holmes' proposal as an attention switch which takes into account both subjective and objective aspects of the philosopher's life. This reconceptualization better accounts for his lived-experience of philosophy.

Second, Holmes prefers the term "perspectival" over "presuppositional" for a rhetorical/methodological reason. The two terms create different expectations:

Further, the term "presuppositional" suggests a logical premise from which deductions are made . . . a deductive system is not the only way to elaborate a coherent pattern of thought. Informal logic has its ways, too. Plato's philosophy is a kind of "symphonic" system in which one or two basic themes are elaborated in each successive dialogue. The presuppositional view traditionally implies that the source of ideas is either empirical or a priori. Holmes argues that many philosophical ideas arise in a different manner:

Some ideas . . . are not "necessitated" by causal processes (as classical empiricism assumed) or by logical argument. I suggest they may be freely "thought up," the fruit of a creative imagination, so that understanding is extended not just by induction and deduction but also by adduction. We adduce ideas as possible interpretations, as hypotheses to explore, and from their perspective we think.
Holmes' awareness of the history of philosophical concepts like "presupposition," "deduction," and "induction" led him to choose "perspective" and "adduction" as key terms in his alternative template for "philosophical methodology." The terms focus attention differently, with the result that the conceptualization of philosophy is potentially shifted for readers.

Third, Holmes' perspectival understanding of philosophy is fruitful for communication scholars. Rather than viewing communication as something done after philosophy is completed with its tasks (i.e., the advocacy of truths discovered), it bestows upon communication a central position in doing philosophy. As I show later, much of one's perspective is constituted through and sustained by interaction within a traditional world-view community. Ideas used to unfold perspectival meanings are often adduced; much of the adductive process is connected closely to the intersubjective, existential matrix of a communication community. The attempt to rise above complete subjectivism and relativism is dependent upon dialogical argument as a fundamental communication process. Reason is not limited to formal deductive processes modelled after geometry but is broad enough to embrace practical reasoning, what Perelman calls "rhetoric." More is said about dialogue and philosophy as communication process later in this chapter.

The Reconstructed Idea of Metaphysics

Some twentieth-century philosophers have been either anti-metaphysical or sceptical about metaphysical knowledge. Holmes
combines his personal interest in systematic understanding and his perspectival notion of philosophy and applies them to contemporary questions concerning the possibility of metaphysics and the meaningfulness of world views. First, he articulates key problems which led to the widespread distrust of metaphysics among many contemporary philosophers:

Distrust of metaphysics . . . focuses on rationalistic dogmatism with its universal and necessary conclusions. At least three reasons for this distrust emerge.
(1) Reason has no direct path of logical inference from objective, scientific knowledge to an understanding of reality . . .
(2) Rationalistic systems use a logic of the universal rather than of the unique individual . . . We are compelled to look for a metaphysical method that does justice to the unique and the free, and to the liveness of faith and history . . .
(3) Rationalistic metaphysics fails to account for the diversity of systems and traditions which itself has produced . . .

These difficulties have been highlighted by the philosophical sceptics since Hume and Kant. In Christian Philosophy in the 20th Century, Holmes categorizes this scepticism as greatly contributing to the progress of philosophy. In the history of philosophy, the sceptic's role has been crucial in developing a "reconstructed idea" of metaphysics:

The idea of metaphysics, like the idea of philosophy in general, has been subject to historical variations. The Aristotelian notion of a science of being qua being was followed first by the Cartesian ideal of a deductive science of all substances and then by idealist projections concerning an absolute reality beyond the paradoxical world of appearances. Each transition was aided and abetted by a period of scepticism about the possibility of metaphysics—the scientific empiricism of the Renaissance, the criticism of Hume and Kant, and now the radical questionings of analysis and existentialism. But the conclusion that classical metaphysics . . . is either impossible or meaningless need not produce . . . philosophically sceptical results. The dilemma . . . can be avoided. For as in the past scepticism has twice precipitated reconstruction of the idea and method of metaphysics rather than its full and final abandonment, so at the
present juncture analysis and existentialism have opened the way
to a concept of metaphysics that is modest because of the
chastenings it has received, but which continues the interest and
draws on the heritage of the past.17

After an extensive analysis of the existential, phenomenological,
and analytic movements in philosophy, Holmes shows how those movements
themselves point to metaphysics as an unavoidable human construction
both in the covert assumptions necessary for doing philosophy and in
the overt development of revised metaphysical ideas. He notes that the
distrust of rationalistic metaphysical systems led thinkers like
Collingwood, Lazerowitz, and Dilthey to conceive of metaphysical
visions of reality as subjective and relativistic projections which
reveal nothing outside the human thinker immersed in a historical
context. Emphasizing the historical, psychological, and existential
aspects of metaphysical systems, they denied the cognitive value of
these social constructions for relating persons to any ultimate reality
in a revealing manner. According to Holmes, this relativistic emphasis
in the study of metaphysics is often an exaggerated shift in attention
away from the dogmatic extreme. He argues an alternative view:
"Concepts and categories and world-view perspectives must be
articulated not just as historically relative notions but as attempts
to rise above the particularity of all experience and all history and
to see things as a whole."18

For Holmes, epistemological questions concerning the logic of
metaphysical systems and their truthfulness are meaningful if given an
epistemological framework that recognizes both the existential and the
cognitive aspects of knowledge. He urges treating metaphysical
theories as "hypotheses rather than apodictic conclusions, cognitive hypotheses about the world seen from various viewpoints." In the following quotation he proposes an alternative conceptualization which relies upon his perspectival gestalt. It extends those ideas and draws out the implications for metaphysics:

Philosophy begins with wonder, wonder at the mystery of existence and about the meaning of life. It begins also with preconceptions imbibed from one's culture, inherited in the course of history, or taught by religion. It brings these preconceptions to bear as guiding images in the process of philosophical inquiry. When the attempt is made to neutralize preconceptions, then it selects other guiding hypotheses suggested by one area or another of human experience. From such perspectives as these it draws analogies and extends them to wider areas than literal, univocal language can cover. It elaborates the meaning of its analogies in metaphysical categories that are applied in precise detail to every range of fact and that structure our understanding of the whole range in coherent form. Perspectival philosophy thereby creates both synoptic speculation and categorial systems. It is a modest yet imaginative undertaking, for the cognitive claims it makes avoid both the dogmatism of the rationalist and the relativism of the sceptic.

If metaphysics is to avoid the confusion of self-deception and provide both intellectual satisfaction and personal authentication, it must be true to the perspective which gives it birth and guides its quest for unity. Eclectic categories lack coherence, and the claim to neutrality in the conflict between perspectives is an illusion. If a metaphysic is to avoid becoming a dream castle in the air, a wild abstraction, it must keep in touch with the facts and make every effort to ensure an adequate "fit." Phenomenology can help by deepening and broadening awareness of our variegated and multilevel experience, by pointing up phenomena to be taken into account, by explicating structures and relationships of importance. Analysis can help by mapping linguistic uses and exposing oddities in thought and expression which might otherwise be overlooked. Linguistic phenomena are part of human experience, they are world facts to be taken into account. Analysis can also help unpack the meaning of an analogy and articulate both the wide denotation of a categorical term and the pregnant symbolism of its connotative meaning. It can clarify the relationship between perspective and categories and facts.

Highlighted here are four key ingredients of Holmes' reconstructed idea of metaphysics, ideas later applied in his articulation of a world
view. First, like all philosophical endeavors, metaphysics is perspectival. It is not a neutral science but the honest, self-critical quest of a philosopher for seeing life steadily and as a whole even while being immersed in life. Holmes notes that Pepper develops a similar approach to metaphysics by isolating four root-metaphors drawn from common human experience, which serve as focal ideas for organizing life into meaningful patterns. Holmes follows Casserly's assertion that a philosopher may draw a perspectival focus from a "historically unique event which gives meaning to his life and coherence to his thought . . . ." Later I show that Holmes' perspectival focus is drawn from the singular historical event of the incarnation of Jesus Christ.

Second, metaphysics is exploratory. It is an open-ended quest for greater understanding rather than a rationalistic attempt to construct a final closed system. Holmes notes:

Because of the finiteness of the philosopher, his subjectivity and historicity, the fragmentary state of his knowledge and the impoverishment of his creativity, because of the vastness of the task of seeing things as a whole in an ordered conceptual scheme, because of growing insights, mounting scientific knowledge and new philosophic methods—for all these reasons metaphysics is and will remain unfinished business. But as conceptual exploration, it does succeed in opening up terrain, in noting cul de sacs and charting the ground covered, in sketching new horizons and hazarding new explanations. It clarifies new problems in light of old, it elaborates alternative perspectives and poses choices. Holmes suggests that responsible exploration at this level is both contemporary and historical. The philosopher struggles with new problems on the contemporary scene with an awareness of the controversies and contributions of the past. This exploration
recognizes and appreciates pluralism within and across perspectival traditions.

Third, metaphysics is categorial. As a philosopher brings his perspective to bear in the exploration of the whole of life, the meaning of the perspective is developed through the elaboration of a categorial scheme. Much of Holmes' thinking here is shaped by Everett Hall as well as thinkers like Aristotle, Kant, and Whitehead:

Everett Hall has examined the functions of categories in philosophic systems. He distinguishes first between empirical concepts and philosophic categories. Empirical concepts are generalized ideas which give material content to our knowledge, while categories provide structure for thought. Empirical statements are verified or diversified by appeal to specific observations, but while categories make no sense apart from the experiences which they structure, they are accepted or rejected because of the order and clarity of thought and expression which they afford.

Categories must be distinguished also from merely linguistic predicates. While they try to be fair to the structure of both experience and language, categories do more than just "shape up our talk." They indicate certain commitments about the extra-linguistic world as it is independently of our philosophizing. Metaphysical systems are about the world, not just about language. One cannot deny this without making categorial commitments of one's own.

Categories picture the pervasive and formative characteristics of the world which are indicated by the large-scale structural aspects of experience and language rather than by particular observations or individual terms. Every philosophy has its categorial commitments and in this sense is metaphysical. From within the philosophic position they appear to be analytic. In the context of the system these commitments are necessarily true; without them the whole position would fall apart. Yet viewed from outside, from another position, they appear to be synthetic statements and are criticized as distortions of fact.

There is no presuppositionless philosophy, neither phenomenology nor analysis, neither historicism nor psychologism. All are caught in the category predicament.

If categorial assertions are not empirical statements then [questions of] truth or falsity do not apply to them as they do to ordinary factual statements. On the other hand, Hall's argument that categorial assertions are about the world, not just about language, means that they are true or false in what they say about
the structure of things. Whether or not a philosophical system is ever complete and perfect or ever has apodictic certainty, it will be adequate to the degree that it captures the structure of things and "fits" the facts of experience.

The task of metaphysics is more than the mapping of language or the formalizing of thought. It is to illuminate human experience. Categorial commitments should be judged in this light. Are they fruitful or not? In the final analysis the most adequate and most fruitful scheme is judged to be nearest to the truth.25

As an example of philosophical categories, Holmes articulates Christian theism through the categories of "creation," "personal agency," and "historical fulfillment."26

Important to the elaboration of a metaphysical system is the philosopher's use of analogies, metaphors, symbols and paradox. Holmes develops Emmett's emphasis upon "metaphysics as an analogical way of thinking":

By use of symbol, analogy, and metaphor language extends itself beyond the scope and the fragmentation of ordinary experience. It affords insights which free the mind from the limitations of empirical fact and formal proof and facilitate the speculative work of imaginative rationalization. Metaphysics . . . reveals important analogies between different kinds of experiences and thought, real and recognizable analogies which imaginative rather than scientific uses of language succeed in capturing, and in doing so suggest a scope for the analogy which extends even further than was originally intended . . . .27

For Holmes, this language-sensitive development of a metaphysical system is much closer to the way people in everyday life develop world understandings than is the rationalistic deductive development of an axiomatic system. This position opens metaphysical elaboration to the communication scholar's expertise in categorizing as process.

Finally, metaphysics is synoptic. The philosopher in quest of systematic understanding "seeks an explanation that relates the parts to the whole and enables us to conceive the universe as a unified and
intelligible order." As Holmes details the meaning of this synoptic aspect there are similarities with Brown's notion of relational categorizing as the locus of ideology mentioned earlier. Holmes elaborates:

The synoptic quest for coherent understanding of the whole compels us to move beyond either the individual or the collected contents of experience. We try to fill the gaps in experience and to extrapolate beyond the known. We give order to disparate elements and accord importance to some more than others. We postulate relationships and adduce explanations. This is speculative thinking in pursuit of synoptic understanding.

The relationship between one's perspective, its categorial scheme, and the practical demands of human existence are complex. The synoptic development of a metaphysic is an activity which demands creative insight and rigorous honesty concerning human experience. Methodologically, Holmes proposes an approach to synoptic understanding through the use of a "symphonic model" which emphasizes the adduction of ideas and their coherent articulation in contrast to a "geometric model" which features the deduction of conclusions.

Holmes argues that the symphonic approach is true to human experience and lived-knowledge. The deductive method based upon geometry results in a system that excludes much of what constitutes the rich variety of human existence. He emphasizes that a symphonic model broadens the meaning of terms like "logical" and "rational":

Philosophy done from any perspective is more like adducing meanings than deducing conclusions, more like expanding a world hypothesis than working out a theorem, more like the elaboration of a vision or the etching in of a coherent picture than like the operation of a computer. . . .

Geometrical systems do not provide the only kind of logically coherent view. A symphony is a coherent thing with a consistent logic: a unifying theme is worked out in a variety of movements as it is applied to different situations and materials . . . .
The difference between the geometrical and symphonic models of philosophical system, that is to say between the syllogistic and the categorical system, and between deduction and "adduction," may be seen in the contrast between two kinds of recent philosophical analysis: the ideal language variety . . . and the ordinary language variety . . . . The one is dedicated to the formalization of a view into axioms and inferences and conclusions, the other to the recognition that the logic of actual discourse is less formal and more varied than the geometrical ideal implies. It employs constructs and logical mapwork and categorial schemes, and describes the nature of metaphysics in these terms. Not all true statements are logically implied with such a system, for categories are interpretive principles, not axioms. They embrace and illuminate rather than imply.

A categorical system built on the symphonic model would lack the tightly argued, closed appearance of one built to match the geometrical ideal. The same categories might be applied to the same areas of inquiry in a variety of ways. This indeed is what has happened historically.30

The context of this quotation is a critique of Gordon Clark's "Christian rationalism." Clark has influenced a number of evangelical Christian philosophers and theologians, including Carl F.H. Henry.31 Clark's work reflects a theory of argument and language that sharply contrasts with that of Holmes'. Holmes continues:

I suggest that while analogy, symbol and even paradox are indeed literary devices, they are still vehicles of the understanding. They represent exploratory probes, the stretch of the mind to grasp what is unfamiliar or remote, the attempt to probe the mystery of something utterly unique, or even to capture some elusive but alluring thought. For a finite man who knows in part and sees through a glass darkly these devices are indispensable. For a creative thinker treading new paths they are essential. They are legitimate tools for the Christian who is trying to understand the revelation of a mystery and to grasp the cognitive significance of a unique historical event such as the Incarnation.32

Before I detail Holmes' understanding of language, some communication comments are in order. First, this modest and chastened view of metaphysics avoids both dogmatic and sceptical extremes and opens the way for the acceptance of world-view discourse as meaningful.
By "meaningful" Holmes includes, while pointing beyond, an existential understanding of the term. A world view as a metaphysical system is a symbolic construction of reality which relates persons as symbol-users to that which has ontological status beyond their symbol-making and symbol-sharing. This "knowing relationship" can be evaluated in terms of the practical demands for both human thought and action.

Second, Holmes' criteria for contemporary metaphysical thinking are useful for communication scholars with world-view interests. These four dimensions provide a way of evaluating world-view advocates and the content of their advocacy, a critical move beyond description. Given Holmes criteria, the critic would argue about how well a rhetor, or community of rhetors, extends and applies a perspective through a categorial system in the exploratory quest for synoptic understanding.

Third, Holmes accounts for (1) common-ground among members of different perspectival metaphysical traditions and (2) conflicts among members of the same traditional community:

If different schemes overlap and have certain categories in common, it is (1) because the world we are trying to understand is a common one and (2) because we have a largely common heritage of thought. These things, as well as our distinctive perspectives, influence our metaphysical formulations. (3) Likewise when categorial schemes differ, it may be because of differences in experience and philosophic exposure; these differences are negotiable. But far less negotiable are differences due to divergent world perspectives. A plurality is therefore possible, not only of different traditions, but also of positions within a common tradition and sharing a common perspective.33

From a communication standpoint, this view is important; it applies Holmes' three aspects of a perspectival stance. First, the universal aspect of a perspective accounts for the fact that persons can have
understanding across communication systems because they exist in an ontologically real world which impinges upon their conceptual schemes. Second, the world-viewish aspect of a perspective involves the common heritage of thought shared through interaction in a world-view community that has an historical tradition. Third, the idiosyncratic aspect results in a pluralism of categorial interpretations within a world-view community. The relationships among these three aspects, as well as the similarities and differences which center around them, are negotiated in a world-view community. World-view rhetoric about these relationships and resulting actions lead to changes that may be experienced intrapersonally and interpersonally as continuous or discontinuous.

**Language and the Philosopher's Quest**

Already it is evident that Holmes regards language as more than an object of philosophical contemplation. For him language is an inherent part of the philosopher's creative perspectual quest for understanding. This section highlights Holmes' view of language, a position that has helped me clarify a foundational stance for my own scholarly concerns. I find Holmes' articulation a heuristic one open to development. My discussion highlights (1) three general kinds of meaning which interest philosophers, and (2) Holmes' comparing and contrasting two models for a philosophy of language.  

Holmes highlights three kinds of meaning which should be taken into account in any philosophy of language: extensional, intensional, and personal. A stress upon *extensional* meaning focuses human
attention upon the relationship between a word (or statement) and the thing referred to by that word, upon how a word denotes empirical objects and events. The concern is with the factual coverage of a statement whose truth is evaluated in terms of empirical correspondence. A stress upon intensional meaning focuses human attention upon the relationship between a word (or statement) and clusters of concepts (either formal or informal), upon how a word connotes a context of associated beliefs and values. The concern is with the consistency of a statement with others that could be made; truth is evaluated in terms of rational coherence. Holmes notes that both kinds of meaning stress the cognitive function of language as it ascribes interpretations of human experience.

Personal meaning is concerned less with the cognitive and more with the existential. With this emphasis persons are seen to act and create through language. A stress upon personal meaning focuses human attention upon the relationship between language and existence, upon how persons establish/constitute, relate to and act in their world through language. The concern here is with confessional involvement in life, and truth is evaluated in terms of existential authenticity. For Holmes these three kinds of meaning proceed together because persons are reflective agents. Stress upon one kind of meaning without regard for others results in reductionism. He holds that "truth" stretches across the existential-cognitive continuum so that human subjectivity involves concern for objective matters.

When Holmes contrasts the scientific and humanistic models for philosophy of language, he shows how each model features one or more
kinds of meaning. Philosophers using a scientific model (i.e., a model premised upon a positivistic notion of science) emphasize (1) the extensional meaning of signs thus seeing language as fixating facts, and (2) intensional meaning, understood as the formal logic relations among signs. They see language as "a form of behavioral response that uses arbitrary signs in order to indicate and communicate factual information." Holmes argues that this view, characteristic of ideal language philosophers, reduces philosophy to a form of scientism concerned with truth as factual correspondence. He argues its inadequacy because (1) persons interpret facts (i.e., there are no neutral descriptions), (2) persons experience patterns of facts and adduce and explain these relationships, and (3) this view denies truth considerations concerning artistic, literary, and moral expressions seeing them only as emotive responses.

In contrast to the scientific model, the humanistic model stresses (1) personal meanings, especially as they are developed through symbols, myths, paradox, metaphors, etc., as well as (2) intensional meanings understood as informal, adduced relations among concepts. Holmes elaborates this model and its resulting view of truth:

On the humanistic model, language creates meaning rather than just fixating facts. It captures the unique and revealing and so opens up the mystery of life; it gives birth to the symbols that express what I really am, the ideas and values that structure my being. The locus of truth, then, is not in the factual statement but in the meaning-giving perspective. Truth becomes an ideal for which men strive, the ideal of mystery unravelled, of life made whole. It allures men and in doing so draws them from their most creative expression and far-reaching thought. "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." Truth reveals itself in response to a man's self-disclosure and man reveals himself in response to the disclosure of truth. Knowing the truth depends upon our openness to it and upon being willing to act on it.
Subject and object cannot be separated. 39

He elaborates this relation between language, understood humanistically, and a bi-polar conception of truth. He anticipates the claim that such a notion denies "truth":

The point is that truth on the humanistic model stretches between two poles: the personal—being true to myself and my most ultimate commitments, to the beliefs and values that make me what I am; and the more objective—being true to things as they are and as a whole. Scripture exhibits this bipolarity: it speaks of our being "in the truth" as well as of our "knowing the truth".

This bipolarity has sometimes been taken as a denial of absolute truth. For two reasons this is a mistake. First, it is primarily the recognition that truth is a value, an object of personal concern rather than of detached indifference. Soren Kierkegaard says this dramatically: truth is subjectivity. He does not mean that it is private, relative, a matter of individual preference; he never denied the objectivity of truth, nor the appropriate role of scientific investigation. He meant rather that a man makes the truth his own by embracing it with passionate concern.

Second, Paul Ricoeur, the French Protestant philosopher, points out that truth and hope are related concepts. Truth for man-in-history is always incomplete. Our foreglimpses are but "earnests" which look beyond the limitations of the present; truth remains an "eschatological ideal" which we cannot yet articulate completely.

On the humanistic model, then, truth is a value, an object of personal concern as well as careful investigation; truth is dynamic; it shows itself to those who are open to the truth; it has a bipolar structure, an objective reference and a personal perspectival nature. Response to the truth is not a mechanical assent or a mathematical "Q.E.D." but a confession of faith: "I have heard about this, but now I see and know for myself."40

A key difference that makes a difference between these two models of language is their understanding of "symbols" and "signs". The scientific model stresses precision in the pursuit of refined correspondence. That concern leads the philosopher to reduce symbols, analogies, metaphors, etc. to signs with univocal meaning. In contrast the humanistic model construes these linguistic phenomena as the creative heart of human languaging. What the scientific philosopher
labels vague and confusing language that obscures the world of experience, the humanistic philosopher values in its power to "evoke" imaginative thought that transcends the world of experience and . . . elicits personal involvement".41 In a lengthy passage Holmes talks about the relationship of signs to symbols and the personal meaning function of the latter:

Symbols, whether verbal or nonverbal, whether artistic or religious or cultural or psychological, tell us more than signs. A symbol points beyond itself and its immediate referent; it interprets and evaluates and expresses created meanings . . . . A sign is static; it points to something familiar, which can thereby be clearly recognized and readily noted. A symbol is dynamic; it opens up new vistas of thought and new levels of reality. It is an exploratory probe, part of a living and growing language, an attempt to capture an elusive idea, to pin down a general conception, to focus on a certain kind of experience. Like a metaphor or analogy it gropes toward what cannot be literally stated. Because it speaks indirectly by means of words that taken literally refer to something else, it may seem vague and opaque. Yet it is still revealing and it elicits insight . . . .

The paradox analogously opens up the uniqueness of an event or person that bursts the bounds of our ordinary expectations. It is para-doxa, contrary to opinion, to call anyone the "wisest fool in Christendom". An expression like this enables us to grasp something peculiar about a man that more direct and strictly logical statements shun. If there is "paradox" in human freedom, it is because man is unique in creation; categories like chance and necessity derived from mechanistic science do not fit; man is different. And if there is "paradox" about the ways of God, it is because he contradicts not himself but us: our empirically built concepts are shattered by him who is causa sui and sui generis. The paradox points up such uniqueness better than more formal statements; symbol captures levels of reality and experience better than do arbitrary signs.

We use paradox and we use symbol when more literal language and more abstract categories fail to embrace the experience we face. Symbol is more imaginative than logical abstraction just as paradox is more adaptable to logical surprises than is a set of self-consistent propositions. A symbol does not indicate incommunicability any more than a paradox indicates ultimate logical contradiction, but both symbol and paradox express the limitations of more prosaic language and abstract thought. They respond creatively to concrete novelty rather than denying its possibility on a priori logical or scientific grounds. They
recognize elements of mystery which a scientistic view of language precludes from both life and thought.

The symbol is distinguished from the sign not only by this cognitive power of opening up new levels of reality but also by disclosing new levels of the self. As an interpretive, meaning-adducing expression, it is not purely objective. It reveals an object in relation to the particular subject "I", and it reveals the self as subject always in relation to objective situations. At such a preobjectifying level of consciousness there is no object-in-itself apart from a subject, nor subject-in-itself apart from an object. Subject and object are correlative terms and correlative realities. A person is most fully personal when he makes the world his own, and the world is more meaningful when it becomes his. This is uniquely true of our relationship with other persons.

The adequacy of a symbol is not that of a one-to-one copy, like a photostatic copy of what is already public and patent. Its adequacy is determined by both poles. On the one hand, it must represent faithfully what is known more literally of the object, and must also further disclose the object by suggestion, by imaginative stimulus, by the creative use of analogy, etc. On the other hand it must have disclosure value for the subject, for me at this juncture of history; it must give meaning for me to the object of which it speaks; it must enable me to understand myself and my world more intimately and to find my place more effectively in life; it must have the power to communicate, to elicit response, to create action.

What does it reveal about the self as subject? It shows the stuff I am made of. It enables me to be authentically and freely myself. It discloses my ideas and values, my perspective on life, my attitudes and hope and fears—those things that make me the unique person I am. If we wish to take seriously both language and the humanities (including metaphysics), then we will not explain them away. We will recognize them as truly human creations and start to explore them on their own terms, looking through them at both the objective and the subjective worlds they reveal, and recognizing their ability to elicit creative response.

It is interesting to note that Holmes uses "symbol" in a narrower sense than does Brown, who speaks of language as symbolic action. My guess is that Holmes' conceptualization of "symbol" and its function is close to Brown's and that Brown's central thrust concerning the symbolic nature of all language is no problem for Holmes. Both men dominantly employ the "humanistic model" for their thinking.
From reading Holmes' discussions of the two models of language one recognizes quickly that his strong preference is in the direction of the humanistic model, but as is characteristic of his philosophical approach across all topics, Holmes refuses to be neatly categorized by an "either-or" disjunction. His "both-and" style of conceptualizing recognizes strengths and weaknesses of positions. He specializes on doing this when positions clarify subjects by polarizing thought. Just as he sees the necessity of all three kinds of meaning in the analysis of language, so he recognizes that both scientific and humanistic models make contributions. They also have dangerous anomalies that might be overlooked by overly enthusiastic adherents:

Here, then, are two models and two views of language. One, taken exclusively, requires all cognitive language to exhibit the precision and clarity and logical vigor of descriptive science; the other sees language as an expression of the creative human spirit at work in the world. We have objected to the reductionism of the former: it embodies an essentially naturalistic view of man. We may also object to the latter—to Cassirer's idealism—and to Sartre's radical view of freedom. Neither the naturalistic nor the existential extreme is wholly satisfactory. We do well, with Plato, to decline to settle the argument one way or the other. Some words do amount to arbitrary signs, and denotative language does derive its meaning from the phenomena to which it customarily refers. Yet some language is not this way: it is far more creative. Nor need human creativity imply too radical a freedom—only the imaginative power to see things whole, to build world views, to devise symbols, to pursue and grasp and express meanings that are not given in fragmented sense data nor in perfunctory speech and conventional expressions. We must neither reduce man to a verbalizing response mechanism nor apotheosize him as the tragic creator of cosmic meaning. Finite man in God's image is neither mechanism alone nor absolute freedom. He is a created creator: as created he is part of nature, subject to nature's law; as creator he transcends nature and establishes a world of his own. Created to create, his freedom is at best but a finite image of God's.43

Holmes' view of language is important in this study. His sensitivity to language and communication is evident both in his
writing and teaching. His view clearly opens philosophy to being conceived as philosophical-rhetorical action in a communication system. Relying on Holmes' description of philosophy, I now explore that possibility in some detail.

**Philosophy as Communication Process**

As a scholar interested in how ideas and issues develop across time, Holmes is closely related to Brown. He personally has not overtly conceived of philosophy as communication process, but in this section I show how three central topics in his discourse about philosophy (along with the last section's discussion of language) easily transpose into a communication-centered understanding. First, Holmes argues that contemporary philosophers ought to do their work with a firm grasp of how the historical community of philosophers discoursed upon the fundamental topics of philosophy. Second, he argues that dialogue is a basic philosophical activity. Third, he suggests three "universal" topics of argument that function variously in the rhetorical discourse of philosophers who justify their philosophical decisions.

As seen from Brown's communication model, philosophers interpersonally negotiate both philosophical understandings and power-shares in a disciplinary communication system (the first section of this chapter sampled Holmes' advocacy of a philosophical understanding in this historical dialogue among philosophers). In chapter four I show another angle of vision concerning this community of philosophers. There Holmes names it as one of three key
disciplinary power-shares (i.e., philosophy, theology, and science) in the negotiation of world-view content. In this chapter, the focus is upon interactions among power-shares within the disciplinary community of philosophers. In chapter four the focus is upon interactions among philosophers, scientists, and theologians as they constitute interdependent power-shares of an interdisciplinary communication system. Chapter five addresses a specific rhetorical problem of disciplinary identity experienced by Holmes and others like him as he participates in this complex negotiation of both disciplinary identity and understandings. There we see his needs-meeting advocacy of "Christian philosophy" as an integrative name which functions, intrapersonally and interpersonally, to locate and orient his perspectival quest.

The Historical Disciplinary Community of Philosophers

As a philosopher Holmes values the careful study of the history of philosophy. He conceives of the philosopher as a participant in the historical disciplinary community of philosophers. For him the study of that historical conversation is necessary if contemporary philosophers are to do their job as critical thinkers concerned with clarity and system. He sees historical understanding as a self-critical attempt to discern continuity in change.

The history of thought . . . presents . . . a growing clarification of certain perennial alternatives . . . . There have developed lasting traditions which maintain continuity amidst diversification and find increasing clarification through ongoing dialogue . . . . Certain key concepts gain transhistorical status while being expressed in different historical forms . . . . Historical dialogue brings the major options into focus and
clarifies the factors involved in making a choice.\textsuperscript{44}

This emphasis on the importance of historical dialogue develops through Holmes' discourse on a humanities model for thinking about the history of philosophy. This model, already employed in his discussion of language, features a particular understanding of the term "progress."

Note how he again uses the attention continuum of dogmatism and scepticism:

The dogmatist tends to look upon philosophy as an extra special science that settles things once and for all and the history of that science as the inevitable road to final truth. The sceptic, too, expects philosophy to be scientific, and when it fails to meet his expectations of scientific progress by not answering questions in publicly confirmable or generally agreeable fashion, he gives up. In both cases the model imposed on philosophy is that of a science rather than the humanities. If we are to value the history of philosophy more than the sceptic but less than the dogmatist, we must see more closely the sort of thing it teaches that is of philosophical worth.\textsuperscript{45}

As Brown emphasizes, a major categorizing maneuver in human communication is the topic, "this-is-more-like-that-than-the-other."

Holmes makes this move in talking about "progress" in the history of philosophy modeled after the humanities:

It is sometimes objected that the history of philosophy shows no progress such as science can boast. One response is to point out that philosophy is not a special science, dealing with a particular area of data. It is scientific in two other senses only, that it methodically seeks theoretical understanding and that its conclusions must do justice to scientific knowledge. It makes progress accordingly by adjusting its categories and developing its conceptual schemes so that they can cope adequately with scientific developments . . . .

In other regards, however, philosophy is closer to the humanities than to the sciences, and its progress should be judged accordingly. For centuries the humanities have continued to reflect on life and its meaning, to express man's longings and portray his ideas. The history of literature and art depicts changing world views—classicism, romanticism and so forth. Good work in the humanities is marked by creativity in method and clarity of expression, and by the penetrating insights its symbols
afford. Philosophy similarly makes progress in improving old methods and creating new ones, in clarifying concepts of lasting value and elucidating current views of life and the world, in its revealing insights into things that do not change—the nature of man and God, the structure of the world and history. And within any one tradition a philosophy makes progress by keeping its perennial themes in up-to-date form. Homer and Bach and Plato are therefore not surpassed by scientific progress as are Galen and Ptolemy and even Newton. We continue to value them for their own sake long after we refer to Galen "for historical reasons only."

The progress represented by T.S. Eliot and Rachmaninoff and Whitehead is real, but it is not intended to "settle" once and for all whatever it was their forbears grappled with. We still learn directly from Homer as well as Eliot, from Bach as well as Rachmaninoff, and from Plato as well as Whitehead, even if science today has no reason to read Galen or Grosseteste or even Newton "in the original."46

Given this view of progress in the history of philosophy and Brown's emphasis upon attention management and switches, it is interesting to note again Holmes' conceptualization of the sceptic's traditional disciplinary role in the history of philosophy. The sceptic focuses attention upon the anomalies unaccounted for by an accepted philosophical system. He contributes to progress because others take seriously his critique and respond. Holmes gives scepticism a significant "power-share" in a communication system hierarchy of philosophers; at the same time he limits the possibility that a sceptical attack could successfully destroy the notion of progress in the history of philosophy:

Scepticism about philosophic history is itself a considerable unity . . . . It occurs as a reaction; it works like an intellectual purgative; it forces epistemological criticism and stimulates methodological innovation. It is a significant part of our heritage. As such, it can neither dogmatically rule out all order, all other philosophical traditions, for the very fact of a sceptical tradition indicates that history has at least some order; nor can scepticism itself be ignored (as the dogmatist proposes), for its criticisms are too penetrating. Philosophically, it has both much to teach and much to learn. In these regards historical scepticism points beyond itself to a view
that is neither dogmatic nor sceptical.⁴⁷

Such a conception of scepticism traced historically, employing Brown's model, suggests a communication-centered way to think about philosophy. If one thinks of power-shares premised upon Holmes' description of philosophical method, then three key disciplinary power-shares emerge. Dogmatists form a power-share by conceiving of philosophy as systems building modelled after science and mathematics. Their systems-building rhetoric is predominantly characterized by anomaly-masking as they feature the consistency and coherence of their thought. Sceptics form a power-share by conceiving of philosophy as systems deconstruction modelled after criticism. Their rhetoric is characterized by anomaly-featuring as they feature the systemic failures and the gap between system and life. A third power-share, which I call a perspectivalist position, is formed by conceiving of philosophy as systems maintenance via continuity through change modelled after the humanities. Their rhetoric is characterized by both anomaly-featuring and anomaly-masking. During an historical period of philosophy one group dominates in the negotiation of what counts as "good philosophy," but in the long history, all are interdependent partners relying upon one another in competitive and complementary ways (i.e., a "mixed" mutual interdependence). All maintain their intrapersonal and interpersonal identity through oral and written dialogue. Given this methodological categorizing of philosophers perhaps other power shares could be identified.
Dialogue: An Action Corollary

Closely connected to Holmes' view of the history of philosophy is "historical dialogue." Such dialogue involves more than passively reading books or listening to lectures. It is the rigorous self-critical activity of philosophers immersed in history and "wrestling" with great conceptions concerning perennial questions. I use Brown's term "action corollary" because for Holmes this behavior follows from the perspectival definition of philosophy: dialogue is a behavioral indication of philosophical commitment. Holmes argues, "Doing philosophy includes . . . a creative historical dialogue, the construction of a thesis and the gradual elaboration of an idea --procedures which . . . I maintain to be necessary." Holmes talks about the context, nature, and value of this central philosophical action:

As the common heritage of all present systems and theories, the history of philosophy affords one context in which they wrestle together with common problems. Wrestling means dialogue, the frank and close interplay of ideas and of diverse positions. What the laboratory and the experiment are to the scientist the Socratic dialogue is to the philosopher. Philosophy without its history is blind. It must interact with great thinkers of the past, face enduring problems rather than those which fade away, and enter empathetically into traditional lines of thought which grow and occur but are never fully refuted. Dialogue with history reveals defects in our thinking; it broadens the range of questions we handle; it gives new insight and sharper concepts, it compels us to judge a position against the background of the whole history of philosophy. It sets the philosopher free from narrow prejudice to make his views his own. To that extent the variety of perspectives neither teaches relativistic scepticism nor elicits blind dogmatism. It opens up our philosophical views to correction and refinement, and provides a logic to guide philosophical decision.

Dialogue enables us to gain insights from others and adapt them to our own use, it helps eliminate pseudo-differences, it sharpens ideas and strengthens arguments, it forestalls
misunderstandings, it enlarges the scope and clarifies the content of a tradition. By interaction with the whole history of philosophy, the philosopher "takes stock" of the factors involved in his choice of a perspective and in the justification of that choice.50

As with his perspectival emphasis, Holmes' notion of dialogue is rooted in the commitment that communication is central to doing philosophy. Persons engaged in dialogical argumentation (i.e., argument modelled after the Socratic personal-critical conversation about ideas) shape conceptions of what it means to be a person who exists, acts, knows, and values. Philosophy is a sophisticated rhetorical endeavor to argue comprehensive views of reality within a critical communication system. Ideally the philosopher both says "See the world as I see it!" and asks "What are we blinded to when we look at the world from this perspective?" Philosophy, given Holmes' understanding, is both invitation and inquiry: the honest address to an audience concerned with better understandings.

The Rhetoric of Philosophical Decisions

Given his perspectival and dialogical conceptualization, Holmes is confronted with a key question: "If all philosophy is perspectival... and... metaphysics is too, and if neither existential nor analytic procedures enable us to determine finally the truth of a perspective, what is the nature of philosophical argument and what sort of logic guides the choice of a particular standpoint?"51 In answering this question, Holmes again mediates the scepticism–dogmatism continuum of attention. He notes that often the sceptic categorizes truth questions as "meaningless," while at the same time providing some justification
for that category. Others develop a line of argument based upon their definitions of truth. The rationalist discourses upon the topic of logical consistency, the empiricist upon the topic of correspondence, and the existentialist the topic of personal authenticity.

Holmes rejects the sceptical stance as inadequate and seeks an integrative understanding of the three justificatory topics isolated by rationalists, empiricists, and existentialists. Each group of philosophers reduces the notion of truth by focusing attention upon one available criterial attribute. In contrast, Holmes suggests that all three topics are important in what I call the "rhetoric" of philosophical decision (he prefers the label "logic"). Employing these universal topics philosophers may stress, for rhetorical purposes, one topic over others given a chosen stance or problem. These topics function variously within the philosophical communication system and across a broad range of theoretical and practical decisions. Below I consider how Holmes personally develops them in light of his view of philosophy as a perspectival quest.

Holmes conceives of philosophical decisions as responsible and reasonable choices. He rejects categorizing choices as "philosophical" when they are made "arbitrarily or capriciously or as the result of conditions which should interest the psychologist or sociologist rather than the philosopher".52 His emphasis in philosophy as a quest for truth and meaning results in a broad understanding of the human knowledge of truth as both cognitive and existential:

The logic of world-view decision is neither that of mathematics nor that of empirical science. While such decision respects logical and factual considerations, it must also take
into account the personal element—the freedom of the responsible thinker, and the right to disagreement at the most basic level of fundamental presuppositions. In any case truth for man is still incomplete. It is what Paul Ricoeur calls an alluring "eschatological ideal" rather than a fully present actuality. It is an ideal towards which we strive and which we try to approximate but which does not reveal itself fully and finally to any logic of finite minds. The pursuit of an ideal is both an existential and an intellectual matter.... We seek an understanding which will help us grasp things as an intelligible whole, that will give meaning and authenticity to our own lives by illuminating the world in which we are immersed. In this quest we use neither a scientific nor a formal logic, but what can be called a "lived-logic" geared to life-view thinking. Its criteria are those implicit in the question-mark which symbolizes the alluring pursuit of truth.53

Given Holmes' perspectival emphasis, questions concerning truth and justification are first addressed using the topic of personal authenticity:

Philosophy, though perspectival and confessional, is still a discipline of the mind. The presence of value judgements and personal commitments rules out the neutrality postulate, the cult of objectivity, and rationalistic dogmatism, but philosophical decision remains deliberate and reasonable, an activity which gives my philosophical views authenticity. By making a conscious commitment, I accept responsibility and exercise my freedom. Philosophical decision is neither a behavioral response nor a mathematical calculation nor wish-fulfillment. It is a personal choice, true to myself as well as to the facts as I see them, and as such reveals what I am and articulates my commitments.

In this sense, a decision is made against norms .... Here I stand; I can do no other. This is the perspective that illuminates experience and frees me from the threat of meaningfulness that hangs over life. It grips me with a sense of urgency and the conviction of reality. It makes me fully human.

This existential norm of personal authenticity is involved in all consciously perspectival decisions. If it does not operate at all, consciously or unconsciously, a philosophical view is held inauthentically, in an impersonal and detached way, as a result of unthinking response or biographical accident. To call it "existential" is to relate it to the personal, historical situation of the philosopher—not to relegate it to non-cognitive, passionate dimensions of experience, and not to detach it from legitimate questions about the origin of a belief or the justification for retaining it. It is to stress that the whole person is involved in philosophical decision—not just the intellect abstracted from historical involvements, nor the
man-in-history abstracted from trans-historical concerns about the meaning of history and life and existence altogether. Philosophical decision is an authentic function of a person immersed in existence.54

For Holmes, personal authenticity is inadequate as a sole criterion for the justification of philosophical decisions. Philosophers engaged in the critical and dialogical development of a perspective need "additional criteria . . . . secondary in the usual order of developing a philosophy but strategic if argument, correction and criticism are to go on."55 Holmes elaborates the topics of empirical adequacy and rational coherence through asserting the proposition: "Philosophy is an attempt to take things as they are and to see them as a whole."56

The phrase "take things as they are" results in responsibility for the empirical adequacy of philosophical choices. Holmes observes that "the philosopher is not interested in speculating on what might have been but is not, nor on what might lie beyond the scope of all possible experience, but in understanding experience as men find it in the lived world."57 Citing Pepper, Holmes emphasizes the need for both "precision in application to actual experiences and scope in extending to experience of all kinds."58 This concern with empirical fit results in broadly defining "experience":

Empirical criteria depend on the definition of "experience," and this is an ambiguous term. We . . . [urge] a "wider empiricism" as against narrow sense-datum theories . . . . It is arbitrary to select some dimensions only as "hard data" and to reduce everything else to this: positivism and intuitionism and formalism all commit this sin. The task of philosophy is to take things as they are, to interpret their differences, and to give meaning to the whole.59
For Holmes, the concern for the empirical adequacy of philosophical theories and metaphysical categories must be open-ended because history is incomplete and human experiencing continues. The principle of parsimony functions as a key consideration in discussions of adequacy: "Experience must wear its interpretation with ease without being cramped. The interpretation should grace experience, illuminating its mysteries, and giving meaning to it as a whole."

The second phrase of his proposition "to see them as a whole" points to the criterion of rational coherence. Holmes comments:

A philosophical perspective must have the power to integrate, to reveal the oneness in the many and the order in diversity and change. This may be accomplished variously . . . by historical understanding, imaginative symbol and analogical concept, as well as by causal connection or logical relationship . . . . Unity and coherence are more complex than either a causal nexus or a deductive system. A work of art has unity and a family is cohesive—the former by virtue of its central theme and the latter because of the values that bind its members together. A philosophical system also, whether or not it can give a complete account of logical and causal connections, may still exhibit the unity which its perspective affords and so give order and purpose to all life.

Holmes argues for a broad definition of "rational":

If more than logical implication is required, then other than formally logical procedures are needed in scrutinizing coherence claims—anything in fact which will help us see what makes the position in question will do the job. Here . . . the history of philosophy can help, revealing various nuances to an idea and various formulations of a tradition, exhibiting how coherence has been achieved in the past and in that light exploring how the present version intends to do so. Analysis also helps, in sorting out related issues and explicating the connections between them, in mapping the use of metaphor or symbol and showing its surprising scope, in detecting logical and linguistic relationships that would not be made evident without the use of such tools.

Holmes acknowledges the difficulties involved in the philosophical criticism of a perspectives. Given the limits of human knowledge there
are no absolute proofs:

When all this has been said and done, the fact remains that an integrating perspective is best understood from within and that one has to see things as a whole from that perspective for oneself, in order to appreciate fully the power of coherent explanation it possesses. To one so committed a position is more obviously coherent than to one not so committed. Evidence of coherence there is, in the philosophical elaborations that are given, so that dialogue is possible; but the evidence and the arguments are at their best to one who personally appreciates what they are about and can enter into them authentically.64

This difficulty is not the admission of a reluctant sceptic; neither is it a denial of objective controls which structure decision making. It is the expression of the practical necessity of a middle path between dogmatism and scepticism. In perspectival argumentation no philosopher...

...can claim [complete] objectivity—all they can claim is honesty in scrutinizing their subjectivity, an honesty which always commits both of them to still further dialogue. No [perspectival] position is ever proven or disproven objectively: our subjectivity and historicity see to that. But the fact that a position is chosen subjectively does not make it irrational to positionalize oneself—unless the choice is insisted on uncritically. A middle ground between dogmatism and skepticism is in sight.65

Holmes' rhetoric of philosophical decision is guided by a conception: "the allure of truth." In the following quotation he relates truth and meaning while envisioning philosophy as the quest for both, a quest structured by the practical necessities of human existence:

The overall logic of philosophical decision is such that the demand for empirical adequacy and rational coherence, like the demand for existential authenticity, stems from the allurement of truth, from philosophic inquiry itself. Traditionally, laws of logic have been imposed on human thought in the name of eternal necessity. They may be intrinsic to thought itself, but thought is historically and existentially rather than logically necessary. Man-in-history, man immersed in existence, is drawn into
philosophic reflection by the mystery of life and the quest for meaning. Mystery calls for illumination, meaninglessness demands intelligibility, and a man gropes for both. Philosophy is existentially necessary and so are the demands which inquiry places on us. Philosophical views that are not true to a man's basic commitments, that do not fit the facts as they are, or that do not give coherence to things—such views fail because they fail to meet the needs from which thought arises. Laws of thought, then, are neither logically necessary nor conventional; they inhere in the philosophic enterprise as such and in the human situation from which it arises; they transcend the conflict of different perspectives. It is the structure of meaning which imposes on us the demand for coherence—and by the same token for adequacy and authenticity as well. The quest for meaning and truth, then, becomes the attempt to see things as they are and as a whole.

This idea of truth embraces both personal and cognitive aspects of knowledge:

We find a conception of truth that is larger than the traditional correspondence or coherence, yet that does justice both to them and to existentialist insights. Philosophical thinking stretches between two poles: the personal, being true to myself and my commitments, to the disclosure of reality which makes me what I am, and the more theoretical, understanding things as they are and as a whole.

It is clear that Holmes discourses upon these three topics in a distinctively perspectival way. As a perspectivalist, he acknowledges strengths and weaknesses of both sceptics and dogmatists. He discourses upon the question of justification by transposing and integrating the three topics often singularly stressed by these various philosophers. Viewed from their chosen stances, he compromises; viewed from his stance they reduce. Viewed from a communication perspective, the justification of philosophical decisions is an intriguing rhetorical transaction and problem.

What does all this imply from a communication point of view? Seen as a communication system, philosophers discourse upon questions,
issues, and problems categorized as "philosophical concerns." Given Holmes' methodological discussion, their methods for discoursing upon these concerns provides a way to conceive of power-shares (it should be noted that given Holmes' emphasis upon perspectival traditions, one could also conceive of power-shares premised upon perspectival content: naturalism, idealism, theism, etc.). As philosophers "do philosophy" they take stands, justifying them via oral and written argumentation. Their justificatory discourse is rhetorical: it is addressed to an audience, potentially shaped by at least three universal tactical topics, and aimed toward "gaining an adherence of minds". Given Brown's model, philosophy as communication process deserves closer scrutiny by rhetorical critics.

Conclusion

This chapter treats Arthur Holmes as a rhetor-philosopher managing attention concerning the categorization of "philosophy" as a discipline and "philosopher" as a disciplinary identity. As shown, his perspectival idea locates him methodologically among philosophers like Pepper, Emmett, and Hall. Among the larger philosophical community this stance appears to be gaining greater acceptance as I show in chapter seven. If so, Holmes is a part of a new movement among philosophers not so much as one of the primary innovators but more as an early improviser.

Holmes' advocacy among philosophers as a whole has less impact than it does within his primary audience of evangelical scholars and educated laymen. There he positions himself as an innovative advocate
of distinctive disciplinary identity. Given his perspectival conceptualization, theological commitment legitimately contributes to the philosopher's quest for clear and coherent meaning as that quest is pursued within a pluralistic disciplinary community of philosophers. At the same time that quest for humble and honest understanding shapes the personal perspective

Among evangelicals Holmes' perspectival gestalt as content is potentially processed in one of at least four ways: (1) It may be labeled as a biased attempt to make room for worldly philosophy in the community of faith and therefore rejected as dangerous. (2) It may be assimilated and contrasted as another sceptical reaction to dogmatic philosophy and therefore seen as another proposal emphasizing the subjective relativity of human thought. (3) It may be assimilated or contrasted in such a way that it is understood as an eclectic position that does not provide concrete direction and therefore dwells ultimately in a no man's land of watered-down synthesis. (4) It may be seen as a viable position to be adopted: one of a number of proposals involved in bringing about what Jerry Gill describes as an "axial-shift toward a post-critical philosophy." According to Gill this general shift among philosophers can be seen as a movement strongly influenced by the rhetorical-philosophical action of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the later Wittgenstein, and Michael Polanyi. I say more about this in chapter seven.

For the community of evangelical Christian scholars, Holmes' proposal is most relevant to those who, like Holmes, experience a similar intrapersonal growth-and-survival-need for an authentic
integration of faith and contemporary learning. Thus, his perspectival emphasis is not greeted warmly by all evangelicals. It contrasts with rationalistic presuppositionalists like Clark and Henry, especially in its emphasis on the choice of a symphonic model for elaborating a perspective and in its acceptance of the contribution of modern philosophy to Christian thinking. Holmes can also be seen as a rhetor creating the intrapersonal need for a faith-learning integration, and therefore a dangerous rhetorician who opens Christian faith to worldly knowledge.

Evangelical adoptors of Holmes' perspectival proposal will have a "both/and" mentality capable of embracing apparently opposing ideas and seeing this as a fruitful way of gaining mature understanding of a complex reality. They will stress integrative relationships over conjunctive or disjunctive ones and work towards the integration of thought via paradox, metaphor, and analogy. They probably will share Holmes' commitment to the importance of a systematic understanding of life as experienced: a quest born in wonder and drawn by the allure of truth.

In chapter five I show more clearly the personal disciplinary identity developed by Holmes as he relies upon his perspectival definition of philosophy. There it functions in his articulation of an integrative categorization of "Christian philosophy."

At the more general level are the two questions: What does Brown help one see about Holmes? What does Holmes help one see about Brown? Already the first question has been addressed. Holmes' writing concerning "philosophy" has been transposed into a communication frame.
From there Holmes is seen as identifying himself within a disciplinary community of scholars. He primarily locates himself in this discipline through "both-and" categorizing that focuses attention on distinctions and relationships among categorized approaches to philosophy. The task of establishing disciplinary identity is a universal one that is open to further communication study. Brown's model and Holmes' description provide a beginning point for that communication study of philosophers as a disciplinary communication system.

Holmes provides insight into Brown's model. Greater work needs to be done relating the model to a philosophy of language. Holmes' view briefly highlighted above works together with what Brown has already published, but this provides a framework hungry for detail. Second, if philosophy is not unique as a discipline and if Holmes is right in his perspectival categorization of philosophers, then communication scholars also need to articulate those perspectival beliefs, attitudes, and values that shape their scholarship. This is especially important for scholars studying world views and those studying communication aspects considered essential to being human, since perspectival commitments will make the greatest differences in these areas.

A third concern involves the question of world-view justification. If world views are seen more from a humanities model than from a scientific one, then justification is a complex process that proceeds more like Holmes' symphonic model employing creative adduction than a geometric model employing deduction. Again a more carefully articulated philosophy of language might along with an epistemological stance sensitive to language would serve Brown's communication model at
this point. In chapter seven I consider Holmes' epistemological stance of interpretive realism as one possible alternative that meets this conceptual need. That epistemic gestalt joined with Brown's model, may provide an approach to the language based logic of adduced meanings.

In turning now to chapter four, I emphasize disciplinary identity less and interdisciplinary identity more as the communication system of philosophers will be featured as a power-share in the larger communication system oriented by the task of negotiating a needs-meeting world view. That chapter prepares the reader for chapter five, in which Holmes is seen developing a disciplinary name for the interdisciplinary task of world-view advocacy.

2PCP, p. 11.

3Ibid., p. 12.

4Ibid., pp. 15-17.

5CP20, see chapter 2.

6Ibid., pp. 71-75.

7Ibid., p. 75.


9"PRB," p. 36.


11"QM," Trinity Evangelical School Lectures, Deerfield, Illinois, April 1982, p. 12. Note: What Holmes does not feature is how these three ingredients are integratively processed. The threefold emphasis seems sound except that it may be difficult to clearly separate the world-viewish from the ideosyncratic, especially if: (1) educational pursuits are carried out in a world-view community, (2) "background" and "interest" are created through contact with other world-view adherents, and (3) "temperament" is shaped through communication. The distinction is helpful because adherents of the same world view community do differ, and this diversity must be accounted for. A communication theory of world views would address the formation and integration of these, and possibly other ingredients.

12Ibid., pp. 7-8.

14Ibid., p. 11.


16"PRB," pp. 30-33.

17CP20, pp. 182-183. In his comments on the first draft, Holmes noted that "This was written in the 60's. In the 80's metaphysics is again active and respectable—at least, any rate, at the analytic level—less so yet the system-building of old."

18Ibid., p. 184.

19Ibid., p. 193.

20Ibid., pp. 208-209.


23"PRB," pp. 33-34.


25CP20, pp. 198-201.

26Ibid.


28FSU, p. 47.

29CP20, p. 197.


33 "PRB," p. 37.


37 Ibid., p. 17.

38 Ibid., pp. 17-18.

39 Ibid., pp. 18-19.

40 Ibid., p. 22.

41 "Three Levels of Meaning in God-Language," p. 93.


43 Ibid., pp. 10-11.

44 CP20, pp. 195-199.


46 Ibid., pp. 219-220.


48 Ibid., p. ix.

49 Ibid., pp. 223-224.

50 Ibid., p. 226.

51 CP20, pp. 232-233.
52 Ibid., p. 232.
53 "PRB," pp. 41-42; also FSU, pp. 51-53.
54 CP20, pp. 232-233.
55 Ibid., p. 234.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., pp. 234-235.
60 Ibid., p. 235.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., p. 236.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., pp. 236-237.
65 "PRB," p. 18.
66 CP20, pp. 237-238.
67 Ibid., p. 239.
68 See Perelman's New Rhetoric, pp. 11-47.
CHAPTER IV

WORLD-VIEW ELABORATION AS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY COMMUNICATION PROCESS

Introduction

Chapter three gives presence to Holmes' advocacy of "philosophy" which simultaneously accomplishes two rhetorical purposes. Seen as the advocacy for conceptual change his discourse articulates a methodological proposal that mediates dogmatism and scepticism: philosophy is a perspectival quest for conceptual clarity and systematic understanding accomplished through the process of historical dialogue within the disciplinary community of philosophers. Seen as advocacy for relational reasons, his discourse functions intrapersonally and interpersonally. Intrapersonally, the perspectival understanding of philosophy enables the philosopher to be true to himself and what he believes to be most real in life. Interpersonally, the perspectival philosopher dialogs with dogmatic and sceptical members of a philosophical communication system in the negotiation of philosophical understandings. That disciplinary communication system can be understood and studied as methodologically premised power-shares processing philosophical understandings by taking stands and justifying them through dialogical argumentation.

147
This chapter still sees Holmes discoursing for both content and relational purposes. In discussing his conceptualization of world views, I primarily consider his latest work, *Contours of a World View*, as it sets out (1) his argument for the fundamental growth-and-survival need for comprehensive life-interpretations; (2) his idea of the general anatomy of world views and the relationship and distinction between a unifying perspective and its world-view elaboration; and (3) his discussion of the interdisciplinary development of world views with an emphasis on the three power-shares which he argues contribute most to a world view's content and shape: theology, philosophy, and science.1

Seen as rhetoric for content purposes, Holmes asks his readers to think in a distinctive way about world views. From this standpoint Holmes extends Brown's conceptualization by (1) more carefully articulating the human need for world-views, (2) providing a way to think about a structure of world views in process (his distinction between perspective and elaboration enables the critic to talk about continuity through change), and (3) conceiving of three generic power-shares involved in world-view negotiation.

Seen as rhetoric for relational purposes, Holmes attempts three things among the audience of evangelical scholars: (1) Intrapersonally, he argues that a world view must meet a basic human need in a particular way. For Holmes, Christian theism meets this need, and he advocates it as a growth-and-survival solution for others. (2) Intrapersonally, some Christians are existentially threatened by the pluralism of Christian world views; Holmes advocates a solution to that
problem through his perspective-elaboration distinction and relationship proposal. (3) Interpersonally, Holmes sees three key disciplines contributing to the construction of a relevant Christian world view. He features a view of philosophers, and therefore of himself, not so much as members of their own communication system, but as members of one sub-system jointly engaged with other sub-systems in interdisciplinary world-viewing (in chapter five I show how Holmes negotiates a perspectival name for himself as an authentic participant in this negotiation of world views).

This chapter is organized in much the same fashion as chapter three. There Holmes articulated content conceptions of philosophy and I showed how these categorizations allow the communication scholar to see philosophers as participants in a disciplinary communication system processing philosophical identity and understanding. Here Holmes articulates content conceptions of world views and I show how those categorizations allow the communication scholar to see philosophers as joint participants in an interdisciplinary communication system processing world-viewish identity and understanding.

The Growth and Survival Need for World Views

Holmes, like Brown, argues that human beings hunger for comprehensive interpretations of reality. Holmes sees this need as rooted in the practical demands of human existence and leading to a perennial quest for meaning. Philosophers, like Holmes, take this quest to the ultimate extension in their critical construction of systematic metaphysical views. Much simpler expressions of the need
and its fulfillment are found when a parent answers the child's question "Why?"

Holmes categorizes this human need as fourfold: "the need to unify thought and life, the need to define the good life and find hope and meaning in life, the need to guide thought; the need to guide action." The need to unify life can be expressed in a sophisticated manner ("What is it that ties everything together, matter and mind, life and death, art and science, faith and learning, and makes this a universe?") or in a simpler style ("What is life and why do we live?"). Persons desire coherent patterns which focus their lives. A world view, when authentically held, fulfills that desire by providing a way "to see things as a whole . . . to get one's bearings on the map of life, to know one's way in a confusing interplay of ideas, to find relatedness in what we do."

Persons unify their lives in relation to what they name as their highest good in life. Holmes argues that persons engage in a "quest for a life that is good rather than bad, for purpose in life rather than emptiness, for something that promises hope rather than despair." A world view names a *summum bonum* that "gives everything else its value and purpose."

When persons unify their lives in relation to a highest good they give direction to their thinking and acting. They must think about selected things in specific ways; their value-laden thinking shapes what they do and how they do it. They are compelled to think and act selectively in a complex world. A world view meets this need for selection by giving priority to potential areas of action. Because
needs-meeting world views must unify and guide thought and action by integratively relating the whole of existence to some highest good, they are constantly faced with practical demands. This pragmatic dimension of world views is important for Holmes when he addresses questions concerning the justification of world views. He argues that persons must be able to think-with a world view as well as live-with it.

Holmes' conception of a universal human need for world views strengthens the rationale for the communication study of these comprehensive reality construals. If human existence necessitates the symbolic processing of world-interpretations and if such action meets a complex yet fundamental ontological need, then a careful program of study is called for.

Given the four-fold need as articulated by Holmes, communication scholars would study how world-view communicators advocate a given world view by adapting it to various expressions of the human need for ultimate patterns of meaning. This implies that participants of a communication system must variously busy themselves in rhetorically evidencing the adequacy of their world view in words and deeds. When questions arise concerning the legitimacy of a world understanding in meeting this need, then the community's world view must be revised or risk becoming delegitimized.

World views create patterns of need expression and fulfillment. In a pluralistic society members of a world-view community are constantly confronted with alternative expressions and potential fulfillments of needs. Such relativism raises questions concerning
whether an accepted world view is "really" needs-meeting. In chapter seven I show that Holmes characterizes world view justification discourse by two universal tactical topics, "think-with-ability" and "live-with-ability." Both topics are rooted in the basic ontological need for comprehensive meaning and are used to constantly relate a world view to community processed needs.

An historical communication study of world views might address a variety of questions. Does world-view discourse across time and cultures support Holmes' argument for the four-fold human need (that is, do we find these aspects of the need functioning as world-view advocacy topics)? What have been characteristic patterns of showing a world view's sustained need-meeting capacity? What kinds of conversion rhetoric addressed to these needs seem most effective at different times or in different communication systems? How have these needs been variously named (affirmed, denied, expressed, etc.) by world view communities? How are these needs symbolically mediated? How can scholars account for periods of widespread needs crises in world view communities? How are these needs related to continuity and change in a world view communication system?

Such an historical study might consider individuals who have specialized in world-view rhetoric. Some, like preachers, proclaim the faith and make it real by reinforcing dogma. Others act as the sceptics in the history of philosophy: they challenge an ideology. Others, like Holmes, are gifted in seeing the gaps between an interpretation of life and lived-experience and work to adapt a world view. For contemporary relevance, an historical survey of traditional
world view perspectives would highlight the problem of pluralism and world view maintenance. I later show that Holmes, working in a pluralistic situation, teaches a community to cherish pluralism and its value for maintaining modesty concerning reality interpretations. In contrast, some rhetors emphasize the potential dangers of a pluralism which makes world views problematic. These two rhetorical stances, as well as others, should be related to the human need for comprehensive patterns of reality and the learning of both patterns and attitudes toward them.

As one looks at Holmes' discussion it is interesting to consider Brown's argument that world views variously combine ontology, axiology, and epistemology. Holmes' described need is ontologically rooted: the personal search for meaning is a practical necessity of human existence. Persons seeking meaning must develop ontological and metaphysical conceptions of what is real and what is ultimate. Related to that quest is the axiological concern for conceptualizing a highest good and ordering other values. "Think-with-ability" involves epistemological conceptions and "live-with-ability" draws human attention back to the practical ontological demands of those universal action projects necessary for personal existence. Holmes details the universal human need; Brown draws attention to the processing of particularized interpretations of that as it is made real for and experienced by individuals.
The Perspectival Anatomy of World Views

Holmes' conceptualization of world views distinguishes the "unifying perspective" which "unifies and guides both thought and action and defines the highest good" and "elaborations" of those "variables which give it a particular formulation at a certain juncture in history, or in a more specific philosophical milieu." Holmes' perspectival thrust in philosophy, especially in metaphysics, is used in his categorization of world views. The term "unifying perspective" categorizes that core cluster of attitudes, values, and beliefs which characterize the ultimate faithful commitment of the members of a world-view community, both in the present and historically. It provides focal communal identification for persons who may be extremely diverse in their interpretive elaborations of a perspectival name like "naturalism" or "Christianity."

Perspectival commitment can be conceived as a faithful stance arising in human communication. Potentially it may develop and mature into a carefully articulated world view. Holmes comments:

The genesis of a world view is at the prephilosophical level. It begins without either systematic planning or theoretical intentions, with the beliefs and attitudes and values on which people act. There are feelings about one's world, too, as well as beliefs and attitudes, and the values that different things in that world offer us. In this sense everybody has the beginnings of a world view, and from reflection on these unanalyzed and unsystematic beginnings a more carefully examined and systematically developed view takes shape.

Using Wilhelm Dilthey's conceptualization, he details this world-view development process:

He [Dilthey] called the pre-theoretical beginning a world picture (Weltbild), claiming that it arises from one's life world (Lebenswelt) and in time gives rise to a formulated view
(Weltanschauung). Since both we and our worlds have a great deal in common, the variety of possible world views is limited...10

A second thinker Holmes reviews is Herman Dooyeweerd,11 who conceives of a "religious ground motive" at the heart of one's existence:

Dooyeweerd...looks for what unifies the inner life of a person, and so maintains that among all the possible pre-theoretical sources of a world view the religious is central and provides the unifying core...12 The unifying perspective within one's pre-theoretical beliefs, attitudes and values is an essentially religious one. Of course, it does not have to be religious in some overt or institutional sense; a religion substitute does the same thing, for in every case the issue of both life and thought come "out of the heart" (the unifying core) of a person...12 The nature of a religion is to retie or reunite what would otherwise be fragmented thought or a fragmented life.

Climactically, in the following passage Holmes integrates Dilthey's and Dooyeweerd's ideas in his own notion of a unifying perspective. Note how he relates the human need for meaning, religion, and the nature of a perspective:

What unifies and guides thought and action and defines the highest good is this religious or quasi-religious stance. All world views are..."perspectival," that is to say that they develop from the standpoint of such a unifying perspective. I speak of "religion" at this stage rather than of beliefs, because a religion is more than a set of concepts or doctrines...13 It also includes attitudes and values and hopes, and the activity of the "cultus" in celebrating its faith and implementing it; in fact for the genuine believer religion involves all one's perceptions and aspirations and doings, one's entire "life world"...13 In any "lived religion" that unifies the believer's life world, an overall perspective or "world picture" is present, the beginnings of that more reflective conceptual scheme we call a "world view."

Given this conception, the perspective of a world view is no neutral matter. Perspectival commitment is "faith," a whole-person stance concerning what is ultimate. Holmes conceives of a world view
community as "confessing" its perspective and attempting to show its validity as a way of understanding life:

A world view is . . . the confession of a unifying perspective, and this confessional character is true of secular and religious views alike. By the same token . . . the credibility of a world view may be seen to depend on the capacity of its unifying perspective to effectively unify all aspects of life and thought in a meaning giving way.¹⁴

Holmes notes that because persons share a common existence in a common world there are limits to the basic kinds of world views. He argues historically that there are three great confessional traditions in the West: naturalism, idealism, and theism. Each tradition is characterized by a peculiar focal content while variations on these perspectival themes is enormous.

Using this conception of a perspective-elaboration distinction and relationship, Holmes addresses an intrapersonal growth-and-survival-need experienced by some. There are those (dogmatists) who would argue that there is only one right way to view life: theirs. There are others (sceptics) who would argue that the great diversity of opinions among dogmatists shows that there is no "true" (i.e., reliable) way to view life. Both positions potentially experience intrapersonal tensions: the dogmatist because of the pluralism of dogmatic views, and the sceptic because either (1) he humbly bestows "ulimacy" to the sceptical stance or (2) he finds his basic need for a world view unfulfilled.

Holmes' conceptualization potentially addresses these difficulties as it (1) orders some of the pluralism of belief systems by urging readers to see traditional unifying perspectives, (2) allows pluralism
to be valued as it reminds persons of (a) the limitations of human conceptualizations and (b) the greater think-with-ability and live-with-ability of some elaborations over others, and (3) opens the way for seeing continuity through change. Given Holmes' world-view conceptualization and Brown's concept of attention switch, revolutionary changes (although sometimes perceived as evolutionary because they come gradually) primarily would be categorized as conversion attention-shifts from one perspective to another. Evolutionary changes (although sometimes perceived to be revolutionary if they come too fast) primarily would be categorized as developmental attention-shifts relating to changes involving perspectival elaborations.

From a communication standpoint, I like Holmes' conceptualization. Combined with Brown's emphasis on process, it yields a focus of structure in process. This thrust simultaneously (1) highlights the lived-experience of a world view as it orients human thought and action and (2) provides a convenient way to talk about continuity through change.

Holmes' view of language and meaning becomes relevant at this point. Language used in world-view advocacy must translate traditional meanings so that they are understood in contemporary ways. A world-view rhetor must carefully choose symbols that generate identifying understanding. Holmes argues:

The power of symbols to communicate effectively and elicit response depends on their personal as well as their more purely cognitive meaning. All three levels of language are involved: extensional, intensional, and personal. But the personal requires some point of contact in experience that is itself humanly
involving: Gilkey talks of contact with the life-world and its existential meanings. The life-world of the phenomenologist is distinguished from the more objective scientific world of the positivist and traditional empiricist ... The life-world is the world-for-me, existentially loaded and personally involving. Provided the extensional is united with and not separated from the cognitive, I see every reason to suppose that this is indeed the point of contact in personal meaning.15

Holmes applies this idea in a discussion of rhetorical problems facing Christian world-view advocates:

In time it often happens that what was once a fresh, meaningful symbol becomes hackneyed and effete. As Tillich points out, it "dies." For symbols are not arbitrarily assigned static indices; they are born for living people in a dynamic culture, and sometimes they die. The way to keep them alive and growing, to relive their suggestiveness, to enrich and deepen their meaning, to expand them and from them to generate further symbols, to press back still more the frontiers of understanding and elaborate more fully a living vision of the meaning of things, to enrich by means of them our own selfhood and self-understanding.

Religious symbols are subject to the same processes. Bishop Robinson, in his popular Honest to God, rejects an overliteralized theology for an existential one. The overliteralized theology—caricature though it is—fails to give meaning to God for men today. Robinson's successors tell us God has died in our generation. The symbols have lost their meaning. Part of the trouble, I suspect, is the lack of creative and exploratory religious literature. When the church freezes its language and its theological status quo in a world where language and culture change and knowledge grows, it allows God to die. But when the church rediscovers the meaning of language and so values aright the written revelation, it becomes a creative, redemptive force in society and in the world of thought. The Bible is a corpus of literature of various forms, and its language is rich in symbolism. Its worlds must not be reduced to static signs; they are creative expressions, part of a living literature that is pregnant with meaning for men in every day.

The credal affirmation that God is "Father Almighty, Maker of Heaven and Earth" is one example. As a literal, scientific description it is inadequate. "Father" does not signify one who either begets children or works to support them. But it suggests analogous things about God the Creator that are uniquely appropriate to him. It opens up to us glimpses of the unique character of the Almighty and his distinctive relationship to the creation of which we are a part. The theology of the early church attempted to explore the meaning of the symbol, to expand it. In the process other symbols were introduced and interrelated. The
Logos concept, for instance, played a leading role in the drama. God the Father, creation, logos—these were key symbols in Patristic theology. They helped the church understand and communicate the Christian message in a world that knew about emanations from the One but not about ex nihilo creation, and whose logos was an impersonal cosmic necessity. These symbols may still live. Their meaning is open-ended, not closed and exhausted. Men still seek the logos that gives meaning to human existence and history, for they must still live with life's mystery.16

In chapters six, seven, and eight I show how Holmes attempts such translation work among evangelical scholars and educated laypersons through an elaborative model and a keen awareness of the current intellectual climate. In those chapters I argue that he accomplishes his task through two related types of attention management, thus extending Brown's concept by integrating it with Holmes' "anatomy of world views." **Perspectival attention management** focuses human attention upon the core beliefs, attitudes, and values of a unifying perspective and ideally unites a diverse perspectival community as it contrasts it with other perspectival traditions. **Elaborative attention management** applies the perspectival themes across the various topics of world-view discourse in the attempt to show the contemporary needs-meeting think-with-ability and live-with-ability of a unifying perspective. Such work articulates a perspective and potentially divides a perspectival community as adherents see themselves contrasted to one another in their elaborative diversity. At the same time such rhetorical processing creates elaborative communities within a perspectival community.

Given Holmes' conceptualization, communication scholars might investigate how world pictures, life worlds, and world views proceed
together as process. Holmes says that a world picture "arises from one's life world." If a life world is the lived experience of the world, then such experience is structured by both physical reality as well as communication. A communication-process study of this relationship would result in claims concerning (1) the mutual shaping of life worlds and world pictures via participation in a world-view community; (2) the developmental transformation of one's life world as a world picture is worked out in a more reflective world view; (3) the various strategies, tactics, and maneuvers used by members of a world-view community to relate a world view in a relevant way to the diverse life worlds of members so that it continues to be existentially relevant; (4) the constraints a life world places upon world view construction. Of interest on a higher level of observation would be the scholarly reification of descriptive terms like "life world," "world picture," "world view," and "unifying perspective." What is the appeal of such terms to certain scholars? How do they focus scholarly attention upon the human need for meaning? What is the ontological status of such terms?

**Perspectival Elaboration as Disciplinary Communication Process**

A world view, according to Holmes, is the reflective elaboration of a unifying perspective. Given Brown's idea that world views do not spring full-blown from the mouth or pen of an ideologue, and Holmes' fourfold universal human need for comprehensive meaning, one would expect the development of world views to be a central concern that involves the thought of many scholars as together they attempt to
elaborate and keep alive a unifying perspective that is authentically held and believed to be think-with-able and live-with-able. Holmes emphasizes three disciplines which he holds contribute significantly to the content development of a world view. Given Holmes' view and Brown's terminology, theologians, philosophers, and scientists constitute three generic power-shares in the interdisciplinary negotiation process of a communication system's world view.

As one generic interdisciplinary power-share, theologians study and develop the belief content of a particular religion. (With his interest in developing a Christian world view, Holmes is personally most interested in Christian theology). Given Holmes' definition of a unifying perspective as a religious or quasi-religious commitment, the question is raised concerning how to apply "theologian" to members of a community whose perspectival content is atheistic. "Theologian" can be expanded to cover any ideologue who "expounds on beliefs ingredient to the unifying perspective of a . . . world view and so contributes to the development of an initial Weltbild into a . . . Weltanschung."

Holmes acknowledges that many theologians speak to theologians in ways divorced from general human concerns. He contrasts theologians who speak primarily within their disciplinary communication system with world-viewish theologians who consciously draw out the interdisciplinary implications of a perspective and address non-theologians and their practical concerns. These individuals are often more than popularizers or translators of theological theology; their dialogue with non-theologians and the concerns of life lead them
to be creative about the meaning of a perspective. Their open dialogue in the larger context of a diverse interdisciplinary communication system stimulate contemporary and relevant perspectival thinking.

Holmes recognizes the diversity of thinking even among theologians/ideologues within a specific perspectival tradition and values it. Note how he names such pluralism within the Christian perspectival community:

I find this diversity helpful. Sometimes it is exaggerated, and sometimes it has become schismatic and overly contentious. Yet as finite human beings we tend to think one-sidedly, and . . . the . . . mind needs the criticism and balance provided by others who interpret . . . [the perspective's] teachings differently or lay different emphasis or systematize things differently. Criticism can keep us from unduly distorting things. Different emphases complement our own. Both can help us regard our own conclusions with appropriate modesty, and keep us from the kind of sectarianism that closes its mind to other formulations and emphases. Perhaps more important for our purposes, diversity can show the varied appeal of a . . . view of things and will prevent us from putting all of our eggs in one intellectually fragile basket. To vary the metaphor, theological options provide backup systems should undue problems develop with one particular formulation. After all the formulation is man-made . . . .

Holmes' call for an appreciation of pluralism within a perspectival tradition is not a request for acceptance of anything asserted in perspectival language. Instead, it is a demand for rigorous self-criticism. Pluralistic criticism potentially opens the way to discern perspectival control beliefs that cut across diversity in a unifying way. Holmes calls theologians working in a pluralistic context to a mediating path which avoids both dogmatic sectarianism and relativistic ecumenicism.

Holmes views this theological/ideological development of unifying perspectival meanings as the most influential discipline in the
negotiation of world-view content. Work in this area establishes what Wolterstorff calls the "control beliefs" used by all other parties in the world-view dialogue. Theologians begin to apply these beliefs in a systematic way to diverse areas of concern. From a communication point of view theologians/ideologues are those individuals who reify a perspective by determining meanings to be improvised and ratified and further applied by others. They must share their naming power with others, especially if their reifications are to function as more than abstract theology for theologians.

In the next generic interdisciplinary power-share, philosophers serve an integrative role in world-view development. Holmes distinguishes theology and philosophy:

Theology . . . studies the teachings of a particular religion . . . . Philosophy, at least as it is practiced nowadays, analyzes the logic of ideas and arguments in any field of experience or thought, religious or otherwise . . . . These concepts and arguments fall into several distinguishable groups . . . (1) logic, methodology and the claim to truth (epistemology), (2) the overall and varied nature of what is taken to be real (metaphysics), (3) the values involved in such human endeavors as morality, art and politics (axiology). Since these kinds of philosophical analysis relate to every area of life and thought, two consequences follow: philosophical issues are omnipresent, and overall philosophical positions of a synoptic and systematic nature arise . . . . It therefore contributes an understanding of foundational issues . . . that order science and history and art as well as theology, so that the integration of one's thought proceeds at a basic theoretical level that all disciplines have in common.21

The philosopher's primary negotiational task is to develop systematically the fundamental contours of each world-view formulation as well as ensure conceptual clarity, consistency, and coherence.

Like theologians, philosophers may write primarily disciplinary philosophy addressed to philosophical audiences concerning technical
problems. There are also world-viewish philosophers who work as interdisciplinary scholars with an orientation to the general lived experiences of persons, and who address fundamental questions basic to the shared human quest for comprehensive meaning. Holmes primarily works as a world-viewish philosopher whose personal interests focus upon the "interplay of theology and philosophy." This chosen interdisciplinary identity focuses attention upon the relationship and distinction he has set between philosophy and theology. Conceptual boundaries are potentially problematic. Rhetoricians and philosophers have emphasized this through the centuries by calling into question boundaries which groups of people take for granted. Holmes, as a philosopher-rhetor, articulates a normative claim of what should be the conceptual boundaries between two disciplines which historically have defined their interdisciplinary relationship in both complementary and competitive interdependence. Theologians/ideologues rely upon philosophical assumptions and methods in order to articulate perspectival content. Philosophers work from an authentically chosen perspective that is inherently "theological." Clearly distinguishing "world-viewish theology" from "world-viewish philosophy" is difficult in some cases. For Holmes the names "theologian/ideologue" and "philosopher" function to give a focal emphasis in a chosen disciplinary quest. These scholarly names, along with their associated ideals and action corollaries, at times are invoked in the disciplinary and interdisciplinary attempt either to (1) argue the appropriatness or inappropriateness of a scholar's work or (2) avoid taking seriously those ideas which affirm or threaten a comfortable taken-for-granted
position. I shall explore this problem in more detail in chapter five. There Holmes is seen dealing with this relationship and distinction, as he develops an integrative understanding of the interdisciplinary identity "Christian philosopher."

Holmes discusses the potential contribution of scientists as the third generic interdisciplinary power-share in a world-viewing system. He refers to their negotiational action in societies which depend upon and prize science. He argues that while the sciences contribute to world view development they do not provide a world view:

Science . . . is an empirical and theoretical inquiry into natural processes and relationships. As such, its domain does not include the meaning and purpose of human existence nor the exposition of a unifying perspective on life. And it uses theoretical models limited to certain ranges of data, and statistical methods which have no access to non-empirical possibilities and non-natural processes and relationships. In this regard a "scientific world view" that admits only what scientific methods can handle is unduly restricting.

If with the positivists and many existentialists we regard science as purely empirical, then the most science can offer is empirical generalizations of considerable generality. To extrapolate from what is empirically observable to everything that involves a logical non sequitur. On the other hand, if with more recent philosophers of science we regard science as creative theorizing by the use of models or paradigms, then claims made for a scientific world-view are claims for an overall model geared to natural processes and relationships. Again a suppressed premise is at work, that everything in existence exhibits the same kind of relationships and processes and so can be subsumed under the same model. And this is the thesis of monism, in this case of philosophical naturalism. Such a scientific world-view is therefore more "scientism" than science; it is in reality a naturalistic philosophy.23

Rather than contributing directly to the unifying perspectival beliefs or the ultimate values of a world view, the scientists' major contributions to world-view construction are (1) models of nature used to extend human understanding of nature; and (2) accumulated data about
the physical universe, data that must be accounted for adequately.

Borrowing Kuhn's idea of paradigms negotiated through scientific revolutions, Holmes argues that at least four major paradigms have dominated science:

The Pythagorean model, based on the view that nature was a mathematical order, was extended by Plato into a theory of universal forms and gave shape to a classical world view with its stress on rational contemplation, on harmonious unity as the mark of both justice and beauty, and a mystical union with the divine. Aristotelian science turned attention more to change in nature and human art, stressing final causes or ends. A teleological world view emerged, suggesting a hierarchical arrangement in both creation and society and a natural law ethic based on humanity's essential ends. Renaissance and Newtonian science, by contrast, abandoned final causes, and explained things in terms only of matter and motion—the mechanistic model often likened to a "billiard ball universe." The notion of particles of matter combining by laws of motion found parallels in a psychology of atomistic sensations combined by laws of association, and a social philosophy of isolated individuals united by social contract. But 19th and 20th century science has again been remodeled, this time by energetic physics, by Einstein's relativity theory and by developmental biology into a conception of a relational process of a more organic sort—like a force-field or a bio-system. Art no longer adheres to the form and uniformity of Newtonian space and time. The notion of community—even a community of nations—replaces hierarchical structures, and themes like alienation and reconciliation have come to the fore.

Having briefly described these four conceptual gestalts, Holmes shows historically how different perspectival traditions used these models in their drive toward systematic development. Chapter six considers this process of elaborative development of a perspective through a chosen model.

Holmes' discussion of these three disciplines is interesting in relation to ideas developed in chapter three. In this chapter the communication system of philosophers is conceived of as a sub-system/power-share in the interdisciplinary negotiation of world
views. Given Holmes' description in chapter three of the philosophical community, it is obvious that theologians, philosophers, and scientists do not monolithically function as united communities negotiating one world view for all persons. Within each power-share there are debates which result in perspectival and elaborative differences that make differences. Negotiation processes across power shares are extremely complex. The study of such processes demands extensive conceptual reflection and macro-scopic case studies. Only then can communication scholars begin to produce a world-view theory. Conceptualizations of process on a much smaller level might primarily focus upon (1) the influx and negotiation of ideas into one of three interdisciplinary power-shares, (2) the negotiations among theologians, philosophers, and scientists who jointly share a specific perspectival commitment, or (3) a particular rhetor or group of rhetors as they negotiate and enact their share of power in systemic negotiations. My study falls into the third category.

Of interest also are the three tactical topics involved in philosophical justification. Given the three generic power shares, theologians/ideologues might be seen as specializing in the topic of what constitutes "personal authenticity" within a particular perspectival community. Philosophers and scientists both primarily discourse upon the topics of what constitutes the rational coherence and empirical adequacy of an elaboration. The philosopher discourses upon epistemology concerns as well as metaphysical/ontological and axiological experiences. The scientist argues about both coherent models and empirical evidence. Given Brown's framework, the
communication scholar is interested in more than content debates. The negotiation of interdisciplinary hierarchies and power-shares into competitive, complementary, or mixed communication systems is a key issue. For example, in American society scientists have experienced an enormous share of power in world-view negotiation and often have been seen in competition with certain theological stances. The communication scholar would be interested not only in what led to this social hierarchy but also the potentiality for future negotiations that shift that hierarchy. I see Holmes as a rhetor-philosopher advocating such a shift.

Whether a communication scholar accepts Holmes' four scientific models, or Pepper's four world hypotheses, or some other number of influential conceptual gestalts, there is a need to study the communication use of models in world-view processing. Such a study would investigate how a model is named as more or less "adequate" in contrast to those rejected as "inadequate." Scholars might trace the rhetorical appeal of a specific world view and its translation of the perspective into the thought forms of a dominant intellectual climate or conversely its transformation of those thought forms. Related to that thrust are problems raised by the distinction and relationship between a perspective and its elaborative model. Holmes raises one when he argues that models which are appropriate for understanding nature may be inappropriate for other kinds of being:

Scientific conceptions of nature affect our thinking about every natural process and human activity and are frequently extended by way of analogy to God. A careful evaluation of world views must then distinguish between criticisms of the way they are modeled and criticisms of their underlying perspective, and
Christian thinking must be self-critical in regard to the model it employs . . . . We shall suggest that scientific models falsify when they are extended beyond their original domain of natural phenomena, and that a largely different model, a personalistic one, is needed for thinking about certain aspects of man as well as about God.25

This distinction appears useful and is further developed in chapter six.

A second problem arises concerning whether people in everyday life experience this distinction between a perspective and an elaborating model, and if so, to what degree. It seems that for most people a perspective is intimately thought of in terms of some dominant model. When someone calls for a change of models, this may be understood as a perspectival attack that moves a community in a revolutionary direction. For the scholar, questions are raised: Should we conceptually distinguish a perspective from its model? How intimately is a perspective drawn into a model so that a shift in models is experienced as a revolution in perspectival meaning rather than an evolutionary development? This relationship and distinction also suggests a tactical topic for change agents concerned with world view maintenance, one used by Holmes with great skill, as will be seen.

In his discussion of world view negotiation Holmes mentions other ingredients that affect perspectival formulation and development including historical, social, cultural, psychological, personal, economic, and political aspects. He chooses not to feature these influences on world-view processing while at the same time acknowledging their relativizing impact.26 As a philosopher Holmes realizes that together these ideas feature the relativistic pole of
human experience and raise the subjectivistic problem. He poses the
difficulty: "If these variables are at work, so that all sorts of
subjective and relativizing influences are admitted and even a
Christian world view has to be seen pluralistically, then are we
committed to the kind of relativism in which nothing is true for
everyone?"\textsuperscript{27} For some communication scholars this world-view
question may seem only a philosopher's reification. For Brown the
questions of relativism and subjectivism seem beyond communication
concerns except for the exploration of how people dialogue on these
terms. Personal interest opens me to Holmes' articulation of an answer
as a possible foundation for the rhetorical study of world views. This
concern is addressed in chapter seven.

Conclusion

Throughout the chapter I have commented on Holmes' conceptualization of world views. Here I draw some implications of this discussion to a sharper focus. Like Brown, Holmes argues that world views do not spring full blown from the mind of a brilliant individual. A world view is a complex and interdependent elaboration of fundamental perspectival commitments about the meaning of human existence in the world. Both a perspective and its elaboration into a world view are symbolic constructions of reality; their existence depends upon human communication process. These intersubjective interpretations are constrained in that they must be related to the lived experience of persons. They are therefore tested and modified by persons who deeply need meaning concerning ultimate questions.
As just summarized, Holmes highlights a triadic interdisciplinary dialogue in shaping the perspectival content and world view contours. Brown's model suggests extending this systemic view of ideologizing. First, these power-shares are important, but there are others. For example, it seems that individuals categorizable as "artists" compose a fourth party in this dialogue. Painters, writers, musicians, and others constitute a "humanities" share of power that contributes significantly to content while giving presence to perspectival relevance of a world view. Also, Holmes makes little mention of the larger "public" and its significant part in the larger world-view dialogue, although he does certainly acknowledge its role as a primary audience.

I mentioned the possibility of tracing the waxing and waning dominance of a given power-share across time in a world-view community. Given Holmes' emphasis upon these three power shares, it would seem that certain individuals enhance their credibility for contributing to the negotiation of a world view as they become fluent in more than one area of study. For example, a Christian scholar of interest to me is Thomas F. Torrance, who is fluent in theology, physics, and the philosophy of Michael Polanyi. He seeks and promotes integrative understanding of these areas and can be seen as a credible rhetor, like Holmes, who promotes complementary, or even "consecrated," relations among scholars.

Of interest is Holmes' emphasis upon "perspectival traditions" and their various formulations historically. Communication scholars might attempt histories of these traditions and their relationships. How
does the existence of one perspectival tradition depend upon the existence of competing ones? How is continuity and change related to and dependent upon interperspectival dialogue? How is conflict within a traditional perspectival community shaped by differing conceived relations with other perspectival traditions?

Given the interdisciplinary nature of world-view processing, what role can the communication scholar assign himself as an interdisciplinary identity? Given Brown's model and his concern with intervention, some communication scholars may serve as participant-observers and/or advisors concerning strategic intervention into world-view processing. Another role is that of translator across disciplines as world-view content is comported, contrasted, critiqued, and articulated. Such a role would require the scholar to be conversant in more than one disciplinary language. Related to the role of translator is bringing disciplinary discussions in touch with non-academic world-view adherents. Another potential role is that of historical critic-theorist. Such scholars would not only monitor ongoing interactions, but also view such dialogue historically and provide better understanding concerning the processes under scrutiny.

If one considers the ideas in this chapter as rhetoric for relational purposes, the three key topics provide insight into Holmes' reflection concerning his personal primary rhetorical purpose in life as an advocate of a Christian world view. First, Holmes finds that Christian theism meets his growth-and-survival need for a world view. He authentically adheres to that perspective as it unifies and guides thought and action in relationship to God the Creator. As a world-view
rhetor he shows others, both Christian and non-Christian, the capacity of Christian theism for meeting that basic need. For his Christian audience he legitimizes the think-with-ability and live-with-ability of the Christian perspective via its elaboration into a world view. He argues for its respectability in contrast to various formulations of other perspectives, especially naturalism. For non-Christians, he points to conceived anomalies between their perspectival elaborations and their lived experience, thus threatening the need-meeting promise of that world view. He then tries to show how Christian theism re-orders life and better meets the basic human need for meaning.

Second, Holmes' conceptualization of world-view anatomy provides him a unified view of diversity and an answer to the problem of pluralism. It also functions as a strategic approach in his positive articulation of Christian theism (I show this in chapters six through eight). Third, Holmes' description of the key sources of world-view content provides insight into his personal understanding of those scholars with whom he must dialogue. I show in the next chapter that his open participation raises a key intrapersonal and interpersonal rhetorical problem which he seeks to resolve through the advocacy of an integrative conceptualization of "Christian Philosophy."

In that chapter I consider Holmes as a perspectival advocate, who establishes an intrapersonally relevant name that allows him to do his work as a Christian philosopher interdependent with theologians and scientists. I overview his sophisticated management of perspectival and elaborative attention as he compares and contrasts (1) a Christian perspective to a naturalistic perspective and (2) various formulations
of both. Having developed a faith-learning integration he can work as an interdisciplinary philosopher-rhetor in dialogue with theologians and scientists from different perspectives in the construction of a Christian world view. His general conceptualization of world views provides a strategy for his world view negotiation.
Holmes prefers to talk about "disciplines" as conceptual sources rather than scholars engaged in these disciplines. For communication purposes I emphasize the scholars in these disciplines as jointly producing power-shares in world-view negotiation.

2 CWV, p. 5.
3 Ibid., p. 3.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., p. 4.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., p. 31.
8 Ibid., pp. 31-32.
10 CWV, p. 32.
12 CWV, p. 32.
13 Ibid., p. 33.
14 Ibid., p. 33-34.
15 "Three Levels of Meaning in God-Language," p. 93.
17 Ibid., p. 34.
18 Ibid., pp. 35-36.
For example, this is what C.S. Lewis was interested in when he used the term "Mere Christianity," see *Mere Christianity* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960), pp. 5-12.


CWV, p. 39.

Ibid., p. 40. It should be noted that he writes more technical philosophy as well.

Ibid., p. 41.

Ibid., pp. 42-43.

Ibid., pp. 43-44.

Ibid., pp. 44-45.

Ibid., p. 45.


Brown suggested "consecrated relations" in the first draft of this study. More on this in chapter five.
CHAPTER V

CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY: A DISCIPLINARY NAME FOR THE
INTERDISCIPLINARY TASK OF WORLD-VIEW ADVOCACY

Introduction

In chapter three, I showed Holmes' disciplinary conceptualization of the philosopher engaged in a perspectival quest for clear and systematic understanding. In chapter four, I showed Holmes' view of the philosopher's shared power in the interdisciplinary negotiation of a world view that meets the basic human need for ultimate meaning that unifies and guides thought and action. This chapter considers Holmes' addressing two rhetorical questions: (1) How should a Christian conceive of the relationship between faith and philosophy? (2) How should a Christian philosopher approach the advocacy of a systematic view of life? The answer to the first question establishes boundaries for the answer to the second. The second question concerns specific enactments of what Brown calls "action corollaries," those sets of behaviors that follow from a belief system, behaviors that can be categorized by others as signs of authentic commitment.

As Holmes uses his perspectival conceptualization of philosophy, he develops an integrative understanding of Christian faith and philosophical concern. That name meets his intrapersonal need for clear, coherent, and unified thought and action. That name opens him
to interpersonal participation across perspectival traditions as he dialogues inside and outside the philosophical disciplinary communication system. It allows him to draw upon both Christian and non-Christian theology, philosophy, and science, in the self-critical effort to think with openness and rigor in his exploration for synoptic interdisciplinary understanding.

A resulting action corollary for a Christian philosopher, given Holmes' definition, is interdisciplinary world-view advocacy that takes a confident perspectival stance in the elaboration of a world view that is informed by contemporary theology, philosophy, and science. Holmes' enactment of that action corollary is characterized by advocacy that emphasizes comparisons and contrasts, the adduction of ideas, and an engagement of an audience in dialogue through language that is relevant and argumentation that is incisive.

Christian Philosophy: An Integrative Disciplinary Name

Holmes' claim that all philosophy is perspectival is strategic in his development of the complex name "Christian Philosophy." This term has a controversial history, especially since the 1930's when it was the focus of heated debate.¹ This controversy has a dual focus: on the general level it concerns how to name the relationship between Christian faith and learning; on the specific level it concerns whether philosophy can be "philosophy" if it is "Christian."

At a general level, a basic problem for any scholar who is a Christian is the question: "How should my Christian commitment relate to thinking?" Holmes articulates this general concern in terms of
philosophy and Christianity:

Undergirding all questions concerning the relation of Christianity to philosophy lies the obvious fact that the Christian religion lives in a pagan culture and the obvious implication that it must without compromise adapt itself to the task of living in and communicating with that culture. If Christians are to understand, appreciate and profit from their faith, they must be able to think about it in ways that they themselves find meaningful—ways shaped by their culture with its traditions, education, language and philosophies. If Christians are to understand their history and culture, and even the history of theology, they must understand the philosophies that shape these things. If Christians are to communicate their faith to others it must be in ways that are meaningful to others, ways provided by the culture they share: traditions, education, language, philosophies, etc. The history of philosophy and of Christian theology and of apologetics, and the transforming effect of the gospel on the intellectual life of the individual and the culture, attest this inevitable interaction.  

Before considering three possible names for the faith-learning relationship, it is important to understand what Holmes means by the term "Christianity." For him the term signifies belief in God the Creator and His redemptive action in human history which finds its focus in the person and work of Jesus Christ. The following quotation compresses many of the ideas constituting this conceptual gestalt which focuses and orients the perspectival commitment of evangelical Christians. It is important to remember that for Holmes perspectival faith involves both existential and cognitive concern. Note that he articulates his understanding by talking first about a "Christian message": a Christian is one who is faithfully named by the proclaimed Word about God's action in Jesus Christ. The message features a particular interpretation of ultimate reality, how it comes to be known, and the human relational response appropriate to it: 

The Christian message begins with an all important diagnosis of the nature and need of man. It is addressed to man as a
responsible agent who thinks and acts and lives before God, his creator. Man is both a rational being and a moral agent, and so the Christian message assumes he is capable both of understanding the ideas it proclaims and of undertaking responsible moral action. As a responsible and rational agent man stands before God in the image of God and is unique in the earthly creation. He alone is equipped for the interpersonal relations that produce human culture, and for a personal knowledge of and fellowship with God. This image of God in man is marred by sin: His understanding is obscured, his morality debased, his relationships broken. As a result the individual, the group, and their cultural achievements all suffer.

Christianity claims that God reconciles sinful man to himself and so to one another. To that end he enlightens the sinner's understanding of an historical process of revelation climaxing in the incarnation of Jesus Christ. Because of the impact of God's revelation and redemption on their thinking and living, Christians have had . . . a distinctive impact upon the culture of their day. Christianity may therefore be defined as that religion of revelation and redemption which centers on the divine person and historic work of Jesus Christ who reconciles man to God and to one another.3

Having been named by this construal of reality, the Christian is confronted with a decision: How to relate to people who do not share the perspectival understanding of life and culture premised upon Christian belief. There are at least three ways that evangelical Christians conceive the relationship between sacred commitment and secular culture. Each relational name suggests appropriate actions which realize the conceptualization in the flow of human existence.

The disjunctive relational name conceives of a radical sacred-secular split, a divorce between Christian faith and pagan culture which rejects Christian values and truth. This position conceives of a competitive interdependence among the interdisciplinary power-shares discussed in chapter four. It portrays the world as utterly evil and in stark contrast to Christianity. Here sacred revelation competes with secular reason. Christian faith is understood
as against all that is not overtly Christian. Its action corollaries (i.e., those sets of behavior which appropriately enact a belief system) include depreciation of art, writing, and learning that is not clearly Christian and suspicion of attempted commerce with the pagan world outside overt evangelistic action. Accompanying this stance is the view that only certain "religious" activities (including prayer, Bible study, worship, and missions) are truly sacred. The result of all this is the creation of a community of like-minded Christians who live as independently as possible from worldly society.

Holmes rejects this relational name for both philosophical and Biblical reasons. First, for the philosopher interested in truth, it is a practical impossibility, as the history of philosophy indicates:

To a significant extent the history of western philosophy is the story of the interpretation of Judeo-Christian and Greek thought . . . . Both the Scriptures and western philosophy speak about God and nature, morality and society, truth and goodness, and across these common frontiers ideas, values and perspectives are continually being traded . . . . Commerce is inevitable. Supply and demand maintain an exchange that is to mutual advantage, for as philosophical problems are illuminated by Biblical insights, so theological expression is clarified and structured by philosophical contributions. Some would acknowledge this historical commerce and argue that the result has not been Christian philosophy but the compromise of Christian content with pagan ideas. Holmes develops a second line of argument when he asserts that the Biblical writers, properly understood, do not support such a disjunction. They often use cultural ideas "converted" to express theistic content. An example is John's use of the Greek concept of "logos" to express an understanding of the incarnation. If Christians are to think and speak meaningfully,
they must use language laden with cultural meanings: therefore, a complete disjunction is impossible.

Holmes notes that historically the move toward disjunction has often been a reaction against conceived accommodating identification of Christian faith with some aspect of pagan culture. Disjunction then functions as does scepticism in the history of philosophy: as a purgative. He holds that such a move must eventually take a positive thrust if the disjunctive community is to avoid becoming a closed system (i.e., a counter-culture out of touch with the contemporary world of thought and action) and if the larger communication system is to gain insight from the power-share of Christian theologians.

The conjunctive relational name conceives of a sacred-secular co-existence. It promotes a cooperative interdependence among power-shares in interdisciplinary world-view processing. Christian faith and pagan culture live as neighbors who at times interact in a fruitful exchange which results in Christ and culture, faith and learning, Christianity and philosophy. Potentially revelation complements reason by adding to what the secular mind knows (although at times the relation becomes threatened, potentially leading to a disjunction). Action corollaries suggested by such a name stress complementary interaction between Christian and non-Christian thinkers. The Christian chooses ideas congenial to theological commitment and supplements "worldly" ideas with Christian content. Christians can embrace an existing form of government, economics, or scholarship and view it as compatible with Christian values. "Sacred duties" such as worship, prayer, theological study, etc. can co-exist with secular
involvement like work, school, and politics with minimal interference. Holmes views this relational name as more adequate than a disjunctive stance, but he also finds this co-existence unsatisfactory: "It recognizes the possibility of positive and fruitful dialogue, but it still suggests external relations, a dualistic and somewhat superficial interaction . . . a relationship of faith to reason that is more superficial than essential."7

In suggesting a third relational term Holmes chooses a mediating path, not so much between disjunction and conjunction, but between them and an opposing stance that accommodates Christian faith to non-Christian learning. According to Holmes, the liberal identification of Christianity with contemporary culture tends towards the secularization of Christian distinctives. As liberals sacrifice "classical" Christian beliefs to modern insight, evangelicals often react moving away from cultural contributions to a contemporary understanding of Christianity. Holmes is confident that there is a relational name which avoids both secularizing accommodations and sacred-secular dichotomies.

The relational name of integration stresses an incarnational relation between faith and learning which if enacted would yield a "consecrated" interdependence among interdisciplinary world-view power-shares. According to Holmes, the faithful perspective of an individual penetrates all of life in a redemptive and wholistic sense. Faith incarnates itself in contemporary culture and thereby brings an integral transformation of human thought and action.
Acceptance of this relational understanding involves a significant terminological shift and results in a different set of action corollaries. "Sacred" no longer is limited to "distinctively religious matters"; instead, the term refers "to what is holy in the sense that it is or should be dedicated to God, and in that sense everything in creation should be treated as holy, and nothing may be withheld from him."8 The term "religious" no longer is limited to activities like worship or evangelism or occupations like the ministry. Instead the word signifies "conscientiousness about everything in life, and . . . regard for God in everything we do."9 Such a terminological transposition promotes an wholistic integrative understanding of life in the world. For Holmes it leads to the development of a coherent world view that sees all of life related to God the Creator and His revealing redemptive work in the world.

Holmes develops this integrative ideal in terms of that philosophy which Christian philosophers would produce, one rooted not in a metaphor drawn from common human experience but in the singular event of Christ's revealing and redemptive incarnation:

A . . . philosophy in which faith and reason are internally related and essential to each other, a redemptive sense in which faith makes reason whole, opens up the truth to it, informs it, gives it value and purpose. The redemptive impact of Christianity should be all pervasive, transforming life, thought and world-outlooks. Christian philosophy should attempt to interpret the meaning of all things in the light of God's self-revelation in Christ.10

For him Christian philosophy is distinctive "in both its guiding perspective and its conclusions . . . [its] focal ideas are not just congenial but native to Christianity . . . [it] is guided not by
fragments torn from the full context of the Christian revelation but by the essential core of the Biblical message. ¹¹

Such an integrative understanding of relationship is tied to Holmes' perspectival conceptualization of philosophy. The Christian perspective, analogous to naturalistic or idealistic perspectives, is a pluralistic tradition unified by a distinctive world stance and relevant to the whole range of philosophical concerns. ¹² Holmes characterizes some of the unity and diversity among Christian philosophers:

Christian philosophers . . . tend to agree on those broad Biblical principles which makes their thought at all Christian; they will for example, be theistic rather than naturalistic . . . [and] place limitations on epistemological and ethical relativism, their philosophy of history will bear the imprint of the doctrine of providence, and so forth. Christian philosophers also tend to group themselves according as their theological preferences affect their philosophical choices . . . . Christian philosophers, even those with the same theological preferences . . . will still disagree about many matters in ways which coincide with differences among philosophers generally. They will even hold to different ideas of the nature of philosophy. ¹³

This unity and diversity among Christian philosophers expresses itself methodologically. At one level of abstraction Christian philosophers are unified: they do philosophy from a Christian perspective. In areas of specific methodological choices there is both freedom and limitation. In his article on Christian philosophy for the Encyclopedia Britannica, Holmes observes,

Christian philosophy employs various common methods: Speculative, Analytic, or Phenomenological. Christian philosophers tend however, to oppose reductionistic methods that eliminate metaphysics . . . or normative value judgements or that are narrowly empirical, acknowledging only scientific fact. The Christian belief in God as Creator of all is a metaphysical belief implying an evaluation of man and nature, thus any philosophical methods that place this belief or its consequences beyond
meaningful discussion are naturally to be criticized by the Christian. . . . Christian philosophers cultivate methods that are specially developed to subserve their peculiar concerns, such as the use of analogy in understanding the transcendent God or the use of symbol or paradox in drawing implications from his historically unique acts.\(^\text{14}\)

Holmes' *Christian Philosophy in the Twentieth Century* is both an excellent treatment of methodological concerns and a good example of Christian perspectival dialogue in the honest search for insight across perspectival traditions.

Given this perspectival emphasis Holmes establishes two relationships and distinctions. First, Christian philosophy is not to be thought of as "crypto-theology." Theology and philosophy share some similar concerns and mutually contribute to one another's development, but they differ in their subject matter and method:

Some questions, as for instance the problem of freedom and determinism, are discussed by both theology and philosophy; but whereas theology proceeds exegetically [in Christian theology this means the exegesis of Scripture] to articulate a doctrine, philosophy explores the larger scope of experience and thought in order to discover the logical structure of meaning and evidence.\(^\text{15}\)

Holmes is not a theologian interested in developing a systematic theology. He is a philosopher interested in developing the intensional meanings (an elaboration) of that which has deep personal meaning (the Christian perspective, especially the "God-creation distinction and relationship) for him and a community of believers. Second, Christian philosophy is not to be equated with the "philosophy of religion" which is "but one branch of philosophical inquiry. Christian philosophy is interested not only in the structure and basis of religious experience and belief but in the whole range of philosophic disciplines as
Holmes refines this perspectival view by emphasizing a key attitude and resulting action corollaries. First, because Christian philosophy like other perspectival traditions is pluralistic it must be thought of as an exploration rather than a final system. The Christian philosopher aspires toward more penetrating integration in an endeavor to see all of life as a unified whole. The final system is not something man achieves: only God knows comprehensively. Second, the exploratory nature of the endeavor suggests action corollaries: the Christian philosopher should be characterized by a humble confidence in dialogue. He should be open to criticism which evaluates the integrity of his perspectival elaboration. This attitude and its resulting actions frees him in his "quest for an alluring ideal whose perfection eludes finite men in historical situations."  

When Holmes directly addresses the question "Can philosophy be philosophy if it is Christian?" he argues that the question assumes that philosophy is an autonomous and neutral theoretical activity. Given his perspectival theory of philosophy he rejects this assumption. He argues that such a view asserts a normative disjunction between perspectival commitment and philosophy as it is to be practiced in the lived-world. The result is an anomaly between promise and practice:  

Religious neutrality is existentially impossible ... The philosopher cannot be purely objective ... I inevitably speak of things-for-me, never purely and objectively of things-in-themselves. The most a philosopher can expect of objectivity is not neutrality but intellectual honesty—the honesty to recognize his perspective, to scrutinize his subjectivity, to examine and refine his viewpoint while still developing its implications.
Given a communication interest, one sees the disciplinary importance of Holmes' advocacy of this integrative conceptualization of "Christian Philosophy". His exposition of the faith-learning integration proposal has cognitive (attention), existential (intrapersonal), and social (interpersonal) implications. If Holmes' proposal switches attention, then cognitively there arises a new emphasis upon a rigorous interdisciplinary way of thinking from a perspectival stance. For example, a Christian philosopher would conceive of a philosophy of education that would result in a distinctive interdisciplinary approach to Christian education that moves beyond the study of Scripture and chapel. "Christian scholars" (a generic version of the term) would relate their perspectival commitments to concerns in their chosen fields in the attempt to produce a type of scholarship that contributes to knowledge outside of scholarly circles composed primarily of Christian. Action corollaries for such scholars would include a scholarly openness toward the challenge of ideas from non-Christian sources and genuine participation in the dialogue concerning contemporary questions and problems shared by all thinkers.

For example, in rhetorical studies contributions could be made concerning contemporary epistemological and axiological issues. Just as Holmes raises the "Christian philosophy" question, so one could probe the ancient question of a "Christian rhetoric." The same conjunctive and disjunctive relationships have characterized the Christian stance toward rhetorical theory. Thus far, to my knowledge, an integrative Christian rhetorical theory has not been produced.
Great thinkers like Augustine and Campbell have at best produced fruitful conjunctive theories of rhetoric.

The existential (intrapersonal) implication of Holmes' proposal focuses upon the Christian scholar's sense of personal disciplinary identity. If the integrative name is accepted, and if all scholarship is understood as a person's attempt to relate perspectival commitment to thought and action in an integrative way, then the Christian scholar would not see himself as either beneath other scholars in producing biased work or above other scholars in the proud sense of being immune from the problems that limit all human thinking. Such a view provides a healthy sense of confident humility made real in the following actions: The Christian scholar, like any other scholar, would confess both perspective and personal limitations. Like any other scholar, the Christian is freed to think enthusiastically about the applicability of his perspective to the whole of life as well as to particular problems. Intrapersonally, this view endows the Christian scholar with (1) a deep sense of meaning and purpose, in understanding scholarly work in light of God's call and His creational mandate given to persons to be a good stewards of personal gifts and of the creation and (2) a sense of wholeness and holiness concerning every area of his thought and action.

The social (interpersonal) implication can be conceived in terms of Brown's power-cycle. The three relational names for the faith-learning relationship parallel Boulding's terms of threat, exchange, and integration. A Christian scholar who sees faith and learning disjunctively will typically promote interdisciplinary power relations with non-Christians premised on the meaning of threat. The
resulting communication system would be one characterized by competitive interdependence. Holmes sees this as the problem of many in the evangelical church so strongly influenced by the the fundamentalist-modernist controversies. A Christian scholar who sees faith and learning conjunctively will typically promote interdisciplinary power relations with non-Christians premised on "exchange" resulting in either complementary or mixed interdependence, especially concerning issues that are categorized as "secular" and "non-partisan." Such a stance in the academic world often results in the Christian scholar writing for two audiences in separate styles. His faith, a personal matter that makes ethical differences, contributes little content to thinking outside an overtly Christian communication system.

Given Holmes' integrative stance, interdisciplinary power relationships are potentially those of "consecrated interdependence" premised upon the meaning "integrity." The Christian scholar seeks to gain and advance understanding in dialogue with both Christians and non-Christians. (As Holmes so often says, "All truth is God's truth, no matter where or by whom it is found). There are two difficulties encountered by one indwelling and enacting such a stance: (1) if such a scholar is truly open to non-Christian thought he may be conceived as compromising and accommodating the Christian faith by other scholars constituting the evangelical community; (2) if he authentically brings a Christian perspective to bear in the larger community of scholars he may be perceived as biased and irrelevant, especially if those non-Christian scholars personally reject a perspectival
conceptualization of their own scholarly endeavors and hold instead a notion of "neutral" scholarship.

Emphasizing the Christian philosopher's interdisciplinary task in world-viewing, Holmes sees the Christian philosopher as potentially contributing in three ways.22 First, the Christian philosopher serves theology by calling for conceptual clarity and system by making it possible to articulate Christian ideas in changing intellectual climates so that the church lives in authentic relationship within the larger society.23 Second, the Christian philosopher serves the apologetic task of helping the church address the scholarly and non-scholarly world. Holmes highlights this communication-centered action corollary:

He will strive for a clarity of understanding, a consistency of argument and a contemporaneity of expression which, by humble dependence on the illuminating power of the Holy Spirit, will commend the faith to the secular mind. He will seek to show that Christianity is intellectually respectable, that it is relevant, that it is defensible, that it is the most appealing of all voices which clamour for the ears of contemporary man.24

Third, the Christian philosopher serves as a cultural conscience in guiding the values and actions through the articulation of a coherent world view.25

As one who does more than engage in conceptual clarification and system building, Holmes enacts the action corollaries of the integrative relational name. His writings are clear examples of this faith-learning stance. His work at Wheaton has developed the incarnational idea in practical ways. When Holmes began teaching there he taught in the Department of Bible and Philosophy, which was part of
the Division of Biblical education and apologetics. Between 1955 and 1957, he was appointed director of the philosophy program within the departments. To that point the philosophical emphasis had been apologetics, and Holmes was the first faculty member with a Ph.D. in philosophy. He began to develop a faculty specifically trained in philosophy and eventually led the move to establish a separate department of philosophy which identified itself under the division of humanities. Currently there are four and a half full time philosophy professors. Their approach to philosophical studies has been strongly shaped by Holmes' thought, teaching and action as the chairman of the department.26

Holmes has also played a role in the formation of the Society of Christian Philosophers, a group meeting in conjunction with the American Philosophical Association. The leading individual here was William Alston, who had a conversion experience while at Oxford. The society was formed in April, 1978, and for the first four years Holmes served on the executive committee. The purpose of the group is twofold: "to promote fellowship among Christian Philosophers and to stimulate study and discussion of issues which arise from their Christian and philosophical commitments."27 The society serves to encourage rigorous thought and action both among and outside Christian philosophers. In 1984, it is launching a scholarly journal, Faith and Reason, of which Alston is editor.28 Such actions make real the disciplinary name "Christian philosopher."
The Interdisciplinary Advocacy of "Christian Theism":
An Action Corollary

As a Christian philosopher Holmes speaks to a primary audience composed of those individuals whose identity is characterized by their participation in a communication system that, given Brown's rubrics, processes an evangelical Christian world view. Some in that system, including Holmes, indwell the integrative name "Christian scholar." When they attend to specific areas of scholarly concern, the notion of an "evangelical Christian world view" functions as a background framework from which they attend to questions and problems. Occasionally, their specific scholarly interests become background and their focal attention shifts to the evangelical interpretation of "Christian theism" as a world view. As a philosopher, concerned with world-view questions, Holmes contributes greatly when world views become focal to members of the evangelical community. His interdisciplinary participation realizes the integrative understanding of "Christian philosophy" in distinctive ways.

In 1983, IFACS, the Institute for Advanced Christian Studies, began publishing a ten-volume series entitled "Studies in a Christian World View." The first volume, Contours of a World View, is written by Holmes. In the preface of that volume he outlines both the purpose of the series in general and of his volume in particular:

To rekindle and disseminate that vision [of integrating the whole of human knowledge under the primacy of the word of God into an organized Christian view] is of strategic importance today. Christianity has vitally important implications for every area of life and thought, implications that need to be developed; but to live and think Christianly in today's world, with meaning and hope, does not come easily. It means ferreting out the influence of non-Christian assumptions and bringing distinctively Christian
presuppositions to bear in their place. To identify and articulate these distinctives systematically in relation to the world of ideas is to develop a Christian world view. I am convinced that the most persuasive case for Christianity lies in the overall coherence and human relevance of its world view.

The present volume is merely an introduction. It sketches in broad strokes the overall contours of a distinctively Christian world view in relationship both to the history of ideas and to the contemporary mind. Working at the intersections between theology and philosophy, it outlines a Christian view of things as a live alternative to the naturalistic humanism of our day. Subsequent writers in this series will contribute the more specialized task of uncovering the presuppositions at work in their particular fields and of addressing those fields in greater depth from a Christian perspective. My own task is more preliminary, generalized, and suggestive: an integrative overview of what I believe it means to think Christianly today. It leaves unargued many of the theological and philosophical issues that arise. Yet such an overview is important because it sets the parts on a common foundation.

In the rest of this chapter I consider Holmes' general strategy, tactics, and maneuvers employed in the interdisciplinary rhetorical action of advocating the world-view name "Christian theism." In following chapters I detail the content of his perspectival elaboration as he relates Christian commitment to contemporary culture. His rhetorical purpose in all this is content centered: "a proposal as to the shape that Christian thought takes, and an invitation to pursue its implications further because of the intellectual credibility and the human appeal of its claims."

Strategically Holmes moves the reader toward this goal through both anomaly featuring and masking. Anomalies featured are of two types. First, on the perspectival level he features the major anomalies of a key perspectival alternative to Christian theism: naturalistic humanism. Then, on the elaborative level he features anomalies of various elaborations of Christian theism, especially as
those formulations depend upon models borrowed from science. When he
masks anomalies at the perspectival level of attention he presents the
Christian perspective as a needs meeting alternative to naturalism; at
the elaborative level he shows the Christian perspective as most
adequately articulated through a personal agent model.

Brown suggests three tactical foci in attention management:
tonology/metaphysics, axiology, and epistemology. As a philosopher
Holmes addresses each. In metaphysics he argues for three
distinct levels of being: God, Persons, and nature. His most
interesting proposal calls for a shift to a personal-agent conceptual
model for thinking about God and persons. Also he uses a metaphysical
model of historicized individuals that is sensitive to both the
individual and collective views of persons. In epistemology, his
greatest conceptual proposal advocates an epistemological switch to
"interpretive realism." In axiology, he draws out implications of the
metaphysical and epistemological attention switches as he articulates a
fact-value relationship of "value potentiality and develops a
creational natural law axiology.

Named via Perelman's terminology, some primary rhetorical
maneuvers employed by Holmes to manage attention include argument by
comparison, reasoning by analogy, unlimited development, and the
inclusion of the part in the whole. Perelman describes argument by
comparison as argumentation "where several objects are considered to
evaluate them through their relations with each other." Holmes
consistently compares and contrasts the perspectival tradition of
Christian theism with naturalistic humanism. He outlines this
In preparing to address a Christian worldview to the contemporary scene... it becomes imperative to understand the essentials of [naturalistic] humanism, along with its various formulations and the source of its appeal... to glimpse the tradition from which it arises, to distinguish its current formulations, and to identify the basic points at which it either concurs or is in tension with Christian theism. He also compares and contrasts various perspectival elaboration of both naturalism and Christian theism.

In Perelman's discussion of reasoning by analogy, he highlights it as a way to establish the structure of reality. Holmes primarily uses analogical reasoning in his metaphysical discussion that attempts to establish a satisfactory way of thinking about the relationships and distinctions among God, man, and nature. This is especially true as he develops a personalistic model for thinking about God, a process model for thinking about nature, and both models when thinking about persons as being simultaneously the bearers of God's image and creatures of the natural order. The argument of unlimited development "insist[s] on the possibility of always going further in a certain direction without being able to forsee a limit to this direction, and this progress is accompanied by continuous increase of value." Although Holmes acknowledges limits to his proposals for the personalistic model, he holds that this proposal is more powerful and fruitful than the alternatives he rejects and that its implications deserve extensive exploration. Holmes argues whole-part relationships and distinctions at various levels, especially when he treats epistemological questions. He addresses subjectivism, relativism, kinds of knowledge, justification, etc. by relying upon this line of argument...
and by stressing the failure of many thinkers to take into account this whole-part categorization of relationships among epistemic terms.

It is important at this point to mention Holmes' approach to the critique of thinkers. As a critic he represents fairly their positions. He refuses to create straw dogs in his featuring of anomalies. His presentation of Christian theism is an honest and self-critical attempt to understand his own perspectival commitment. He points out both the strengths and weaknesses of his views, and he conveys an attitude of humble openness to deeper understandings. He writes as one not worried about proving detailed points; instead, he displays the coherent credibility of his ideas as an interpretive framework. In short, he realizes the action corollary of the Christian philosopher engaged in open interdisciplinary dialog.

The Rhetoric of Contrasted Perspectives

I mentioned that a major rhetorical maneuver employed by Holmes is argument by comparison. The rhetorical processing of a world view depends upon comparing and contrasting it with another world view. By doing so differences that make a difference are stressed. According to Holmes, the major contemporary competitor of Christian theism, as it is understood in the West, is naturalistic humanism. Below I survey his analysis of that world understanding. This account is central to Holmes' advocacy of attention switches and implications covered in chapters six through eight. In this section, I primarily treat Holmes as a rhetor engaged in perspectival anomaly featuring with the purpose of promoting a perspectival switch away from naturalistic humanism and
to theistic humanism.

As Holmes names contemporary times as a "troubled age," his rhetorical-philosophical diagnosis of the situation points to the difficulty of human existence oriented by world views that begin with nature as the ultimate reality and articulate an understanding of man without reference to God the Creator.

Today's world is ravaged by dehumanizing barbarism and torn by ideological conflict. Its barbarisms are outrageous violence, a terrifying nuclear standoff, extremes of poverty, wanton abuse of natural resources, usurpation of political power for sectarian ends. Our ideologies are partly to blame. They come from both East and West, but the dominant tradition is a secular, naturalistic humanism that approaches human existence without the theistic basis for human values on which Western culture was built. Art and science have indeed made tremendous strides, giving us new art-forms and new thought-forms, with new concepts and theories and technologies to match. But they too are penetrated by the ideologies of the day whose values and presuppositions permeate society, shape the spirit of our times, and affect both thought and action.38

He believes that secularized world views create problems of great magnitude for contemporary man and fail to meet the basic human growth-and-survival need for meaning and value. This failure, if it is experienced at the intrapersonal level opens the way for an alternative world understanding:

When things go topsy-turvy and accepted foundations of life are upset, when meaning seems lost and we wonder if there is an ultimate hope, then the need for a clear and reliable world view is especially acute. Ours is just such a troubled age. It has so lost its religious moorings that some call it "post-Christian." Education has been thoroughly secularized, where once it conveyed a religious view of life; a scientific mentality shapes the popular world view, where once the most formative influence was Christian; moral decisions in medicine and scientific research are too often determined by what technology makes possible, rather than by ethical principles rooted in the sanctity of God's creation; business and politics too often operate on the Vince Lombardi motto that "winning is the only thing," rather than in the interests of economic or political justice; the arts reveal an
underlying loss of religious perspective; and a purely "secular religion" has made an appearance.39

Given Brown's view of ideological processing we have two poles of attention established: secular or naturalistic religion and sacred or supernaturalistic religion. In their attempt to understand life persons have moved from a supernaturalistic rendering of reality to a naturalistic one. Holmes does not analyze what led to the modern shift toward naturalism; instead, he indicates that a new shift is needed. Holmes is attempting intervention into this process by promoting that shift away from a naturalistic unifying perspective to a supernaturalistic one elaborated on a new model (a "progressive development" in Brown's terminology). This switch from naturalistic humanism to Christian humanism is not the only move modern persons can make. There are other theistic options, alternative formulations of naturalism, as well as Eastern alternatives.40 As Holmes features conceived anomalies of four versions of naturalism he argues that they fail because of the unifying perspective which they elaborate. If one accepts his critique as valid then one would look away from naturalism toward an alternative unifying perspective. Holmes hopes that Christians like himself will be ready to show the relevance of a contemporary Christian theism to those looking for transcendent meaning and purpose.

One might ask, "What is signified by Holmes' use of the complex name naturalistic humanism?" Every world view is oriented by a basic belief concerning ultimate reality, that stubborn fact that each human reckons with at death. Philosophical naturalism asserts that nature is
the ultimate reality and that all human experience and values must be reduced to and seen in relation to nature. The terms God, miracle, and supernatural have no metaphysically objective reference; instead, they are simply names which for persons create an illusion that something or someone besides nature is ultimate.

Every world view includes anthropological commitments which answer the question: "What is it to be human?" Holmes observes that the name "humanism" may be applied to "any view that recognizes the dignity of persons and seeks to better the human condition." By comparing and contrasting two unifying perspectives, he argues that historically two versions of humanism have interacted in the West: theistic and naturalistic. Theistic humanism names persons as significant because they are God's creation; they find their full identity when properly related to their Creator. Naturalistic humanism names persons as significant because they are the evolutionary high-point of nature. The first is a theocentric view of human existence and valuing; the second an anthropocentric one. In summary Holmes observes:

Contemporary secular humanism . . . . views persons as a part and product of the physical world, and it limits values to what has value for humankind. In Protagoras' famous dictum, man is the measure of all things. This is both a naturalist (rather than theistic) and an anthropocentric (rather than theocentric) view, and it stands in contrast to theistic humanism over the very nature of reality, the existence of God and His activity in human history. It denies any theistic basis for human worth, for values generally, and for hope and meaning in this life. The secular humanist's source of hope is entirely immanent in nature and humanity and cannot transcend their limitations, rather than being located outside of nature and man in a transcendent God.

Holmes summarizes four world-view formulations which interpret the whole of life from these naturalistic and anthropocentric starting
points. First is "scientific humanism" with its distinctive optimistic assurance that "scientific reasoning is the key to solving all our problems." Often this view has been characterized as "scientism" because it attempts application of methods successful in the physical sciences to all human problems. This methodological optimism is expressed in the statement, "Science has given us control over natural processes; now its methods can guide human and social conduct and greater progress can thereby be assured." The resulting view of human beings is a reductionistic "physicalism" in which human thought and action must be completely explained in relation to complex integrations of physico-chemical processes.

A second formulation, "romantic humanism," has an ancient tradition, but its modern expression is primarily a reaction against the reductionistic and dehumanizing tendencies of scientific humanism and the resulting technological society. The orienting god terms for romanticists include "free spirit," "experience," and "self-fulfillment." Holmes comments on the historic roots and development:

Its roots lie as far back as Greek Cynics like Antisthenes and Diogenes who repudiated the corrupting influences of institutionalized society in favor of an innocent state of nature. The same theme keeps reappearing. Nineteenth century romanticism is usually traced to writers like Rousseau who espoused the virtues of a free spirit and a self-reliant soul, because human nature has been alienated from its essential goodness by the artificiality of an externalized culture. The American transcendentalist Thoreau regarded men and women more as a part of nature than as members of society, and advocated communion with nature as the necessary means to clear-minded self-reliance. The value of life is in the experience. Nineteenth century romanticists generally reacted against value-free scientific objectivity and the analytic mind. "We murder to dissect," wrote Wordsworth. Natural instinct, intuition and feeling rather are
value-laden and more to be prized. Both scientific and romantic humanism are optimistic formulations of the naturalistic perspective: "as persons, we are a part and product of nature, and . . . all values depend on us. Both place their hope in human resourcefulness with nature's resources . .."46

In contrast to these hopeful outlooks stands an "existentialist" interpretation of naturalism. Holmes observes:

Existentialist humanism developed in reaction against both scientism and romanticism. On the one hand scientific objectivity ignores human values and a technological society dehumanizes us. On the other hand the romantic vision is unrealistic, too optimistic about life and progress. In identifying persons with nature it fails to reckon with nature's indifference to us and our values. We live our lives alone in a world that is alien to our concern.47

Atheistic existentialists assert that meaningful existence is created in a courageous choice against and struggle with an impersonal and absurd universe which ultimately negates human existence in death. Holmes describes the world as Sartre sees it:

The world . . . is utterly indifferent to us and our values. Nothing in earth or heaven supports the human quest. The bleakness of this outlook is underscored by science, for the existentialist sees science as objective and empirical, operating in a world of bare facts. Mechanistic science with its causal explanation of everything created this picture. Positivism with its insistence on empirical verifiability reinforced it. Fact and value thus are divorced. Whatever our place in nature, neither nature nor science support the values we pursue. The world is neutral to all our weal and woe.48

"Marxism," the fourth naturalistic formulation, again portrays persons as caught in a struggle, a fight against economic forces in pursuit of human liberation from oppression. Holmes briefly describes the thrust of this world understanding which often employs the devil terms "alienation" and "conflict" and the god terms "creativity," "freedom" and "liberation":
Concern focuses on the problem of alienation. Creative human activity would naturally bring joy in living and a sense of freedom, for by their labor people create the world they inhabit and they shape their own lives. But constructive creativity is thwarted by corporate greed, and the compulsion to amass wealth alienates workers from their own labor. They lose their self-determination and are shaped instead by economic forces they did not create. Inevitably conflict has ensued, and liberation is needed...49

The secular marxist denies a transcendent God and asserts that man "himself should be regarded as the supreme being, and world history becomes the creation of man through human labor and the development of man for man."50 According to Holmes, the Marxist, without transcendent reference points for evaluating the action of evolutionary man, increases the possibilities for evil and exploitation.

This lack of transcendent reference is intrinsic to all versions of secular humanism. Holmes draws out this perspectival difference that make an ultimate difference between these various formulations of naturalism and possible formulations of Christian theism:

Liberation, meaning in life, a free spirit, human progress—these are the ideals of contemporary humanism. They are implicitly interrelated, and we meet them in various combinations. A Christian world view must take them seriously, addressing the human needs they manifest. But their twofold root, naturalism and anthropocentrism, is the point of basic difference. For contemporary humanism people create their own world and in measure create themselves. For Christian theism people are discoverers of God-given possibilities in the world, and thus of God-given possibilities for themselves. For contemporary humanism, we are our own lords, our own highest end, and the measure of everything else. For Christian theism, we remain God's servants; our highest good is God; it is God who is to be lord, not us. The difference between humanism and theism is the difference between these two highest ends, and it is immense.51

Holmes argues that all four versions of naturalistic humanism are forms of "philosophical monism"52 and therefore share in the
general conceptual problems of monism:

Monism's perennial problems concern human individuality and the overcoming of evil. In the first place, if nature is a causal process of which persons are wholly a part and their lives a product, then what value have individuals, and what significance has their apparent freedom? Does the naturalistic basis of contemporary humanism cut the ground from beneath its own hope that we can create the kind of life we want?

In the second place, if evil is necessitated by natural processes, then how can finite beings who are themselves a part and product of nature hope to overcome evil? Maybe we can accelerate the outgrowing of some problems and devise means to solve others but as long as nature and humans continue to generate evils, any hope for lasting deliverance seems destined to disappointment. Yet while naturalism faces these problems, the strength of Biblical theism partially resides in its handling of these very same ideas.

In both of these passages Holmes highlights potentially troublesome anomalies for naturalistic humanism and suggests that Christian theism adequately resolves these difficulties. He argues these crucial conceptual difficulties lie not in the world-view elaborations but in the perspectival commitments which ultimately shape the development of a world view. If this analysis were accepted by a naturalist, and experienced at an intrapersonal level then a perspectival switch would be possible: a move away from naturalistic humanism to theistic humanism. Holmes justifies such a conceptual move by showing "how Christian theism's insistence on the sanctity of creation, and of persons in particular, opens horizons for a Christian humanism with another basis for values, another conception of social institutions, and so on." In chapters six through eight I show how he attempts this rhetorical purpose.

At length I have focused attention upon Holmes' rhetoric so that it is seen as "conversion rhetoric" promoting a perspectival switch.
The same passages can be seen differently as "edifying rhetoric": By featuring anomalies in naturalistic humanism, Holmes builds and enhances Christian theism as a perspective that can be indwelt with personal authenticity while it unifies and guides contemporary thought and action more adequately than its chief competitor.

**Conclusion and Transition**

As this chapter draws to a close a discussion of Holmes' advocacy of world-view disciplinary identity, it also opens the discussion of Holmes' enactment of the world-view interdisciplinary action corollary: the advocacy of world-view content. Much time has been spent to this point developing Holmes' disciplinary standpoint as a Christian philosopher. What insights may one draw from this discussion?

Chapter two mentioned Berger's discussion of the need to legitimate a cognitive minority in a pluralistic society. In this chapter presence has been given to Holmes' personal attempt to do that. When one's perspectival commitment reigns as a cognitive majority, little attention must be paid to the "perspectival" aspect of disciplinary identity. A member of a cognitive majority may take for granted the basic beliefs of the many and look with proud scorn on those basic beliefs of contrasted perspectives. As a member of a cognitive minority and aware of this perspectival problem, Holmes has avoided a retreat into a cognitive minority ghetto. Neither has he chosen to "bracket" perspectival beliefs in order to work as an "objective" scholar. Instead, he has chosen a disciplinary name that accepts the pluralistic situation and attempts to find a place to stand
as a disciplinary equal. I have already mentioned how easily this stance is contrasted as compromise by both Christians and non-Christians. That is why Holmes and others like him must not only discourse upon the disciplinary name but also produce a high-level of scholarship that realizes the identity with credibility.

This task of disciplinary credibility is the great rhetorical problem. It is one that Holmes understands can only be overcome as a generation of scholars work together across disciplines producing outstanding scholarship, training the next generation of scholars, and shaping the larger evangelical community's understanding of what is taking place. As mentioned in the introduction, Holmes' greatest rhetorical impact probably is as a scholar-teacher, a role-model who orients students to work as change-agents both in the scholarly community and in churches.

As Holmes teaches a generation of scholars he must not only say what "Christian philosophy" is, but what it is not. As an example, one of the more popular "educated speakers among evangelical laypersons is Francis Schaeffer. Newsweek labelled Schaeffer: "The Guru of Fundamentalism." As noted in the introduction, Weber cites both Schaeffer and Holmes as important spokespersons in the development of a "centrist" position among the "new" evangelicals. Among some evangelicals, Schaeffer is categorized as a philosopher-theologian, but in the Newsweek article, Holmes was cited as rejecting this category: "Many of our students arrive here with some exposure to Schaeffer.... We then use Schaeffer as an example of how not to do philosophy." The category of Christian philosophy is one that Holmes wants to define
carefully.

The realization of Holmes' disciplinary identity is a difficult task. As the reader turns to part three of this study there is a detailed description of the content of Holmes' world-view elaboration. That part provides not only an example of how world-views are rhetorically elaborated but also an example of the enactment of the interdisciplinary action corollary of world-view advocacy from the disciplinary role of Christian philosopher, understood integratively.
FOOTNOTES

1 See CP20, especially Ch. 1, 5, and 6; also "CP."


3 Ibid., pp. 19-20.


5 CP20, p. 1.

6 ATGT, pp. 8-15.

7 CP20, p. 2.

8 ATGT, p. 17.

9 Ibid.

10 CP20, p. 2.

11 Ibid., p. 8.

12 Ibid., pp. 3-4.

13 Ibid., pp. 35-36.

14 "CP," p. 556.

15 CP20, p. 2.

16 Ibid., pp. 2-3.

17 Ibid., p. 37.

18 Ibid., p. 32.
19 See ICC, Ch. 4.

20 See Corley, "Rhetoric in Transition."


22 PCP, pp. 38-40.


26 Holmes shared this with me in a phone conversation on May 31, 1983.

27 From a notice about The Society of Christian Philosophers received on October 5, 1983.

28 Ibid.

29 This "from-to" structure of attention integrates Brown's idea of attention with Polanyi's view of the structure of our knowing, see Personal Knowledge.

30 CWV, p. viii.

31 Ibid., p. ix.


34 CWV, pp. 15-16.


36 Ibid., p. 287.

37 Ibid., pp. 231-241.

Philosophical monism asserts "one all-inclusive reality out of which every particular emanates." See CWV, pp. 8-10.
PART THREE

ARTHUR F. HOLMES' ADVOCACY OF WORLD-VIEW CONTENT
CHAPTER VI

THE PERSPECTIVAL STANCE OF CHRISTIAN THEISM:
A CREATIONAL ONTOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS

Introduction

Chapter six begins a different focus in this study. Together with chapter seven and eight, it features Holmes' advocacy of Christian Theism as a think-with-able and live-with-able contemporary world view. Chapters three through five focus upon who Holmes conceives himself to be as he articulates a disciplinary and interdisciplinary identity as a "Christian philosopher." These final chapters feature how he realizes that identity as he enacts the interdisciplinary action corollary of world-view advocacy. Chapter six deals primarily with perspectival attention management as Holmes features the major and the minor themes of Christian theism's unifying perspective. By comparing and contrasting this perspective with that of naturalism, Holmes brings these metaphysical and ontological beliefs into sharper focus. In chapter six I also show his promotion of an elaborative attention switch concerning a model to be used adductively in an integrative extension and elaboration of these themes. He urges a personal agent model that yields insight concerning relationships and distinctions between God, persons, and nature.

212
Chapter seven and eight elaborate the idea "faith seeking understanding." Through elaborative attention management Holmes plays out the unifying themes of the perspectival stance as he "symphonically" develops the contours of a Christian world view. He argues the think-with-ability of Christian theism as he addresses the epistemological world-view topic and the live-with-ability as he addresses the world-view topics of values, society, and history. Together these three chapters show Holmes promoting (1) Christian theism as a needs-meeting unifying perspective and (2) distinctive understandings within the perspectival framework as relevant options for contemporary Christians. These chapters follow the outline of Contours of a World View. That work is understood as a rhetorical act by Holmes that brings much of his thinking to a sharp focus while promoting a fresh articulation of Christian theism and thus making real his disciplinary identity as Christian philosopher.

Throughout the next three chapters I further develop two concepts already mentioned for the study of world-view advocacy. Perspectival attention management signifies that rhetorical action that primarily features the unifying themes of a perspective. There are two primary functions of such rhetoric. First, such advocacy may promote a perspectival attention switch, a conversion from one perspectival stance to another. I do not view this as being the primary purpose of Holmes' perspectival advocacy. His attention management at this level seems guided by a second rhetorical goal: reminding the Christian perspectival community of those beliefs, attitudes and values which unite their diversity. This second purpose focuses human attention
toward perspectival distinctives which contrast one perspectival community from others and away from elaborative distinctives which contrast and divide adherents within a perspectival communication system. Perspectival attention management is the primary goal of Holmes' rhetorical action considered in chapter six.

Elaborative attention management signifies that rhetorical action that primarily features distinctive elaborations of the unifying perspectival themes. Again there are two primary functions for such rhetoric. First, such advocacy may promote an elaborative attention switch. Such switches usually are experienced as evolutionary developments although for some they are more like revolutionary conversions. In either case, within the unifying perspectival framework of basic beliefs, attitudes, and values, a new interpretive gestalt is formed. Through such switches in human attention, commitments come to be understood and experienced in distinctively different ways. Second, elaborative attention management may function to reinforce an elaborative stance already taken. Such advocacy is an important task, especially with contemporary pluralism. Much of Holmes' advocacy is at the elaborative level especially because of the perspectival disciplinary identity he has negotiated for himself. In chapters seven and eight I show that Holmes' general rhetorical strategy involves (1) perspectival attention management in the development of a unifying framework concerning the topic discussed and (2) elaborative attention management in the advocacy of a gestalt which is needs meeting for him and that he believes will meet the needs of others like him.
As I turn now to the central content of this chapter, I feature Holmes' advocacy of an authentically indwelt unifying perspective. "Christian theism" is the complex name Holmes uses to signify his perspectival stance and its elaboration as a world understanding. I showed in chapter five that as Holmes manages perspectival attention, he discusses naturalistic humanism as the major perspectival competitor in the West. He argues that it can be characterized by two focal perspectival themes: the ultimate reality is "nature" and human existence is understood as a part and parcel of nature. In sharp contrast, Christian theism has two control themes which unify it as a perspectival stance: (1) God is the ultimate reality, distinct from, yet related to the natural order he created; (2) persons are relational and responsible agents, God's creatures, who bear God's image in their natural existence. Holmes highlights and articulates these control ideas by contrasting them with a naturalistic perspective. He then proposes an elaborate attention-switch by modelling these themes through a personalistic model. He compares and contrasts this model with four others historically used by Christians. He features anomalies in those alternatives and argues the value of new insight yielded through a switch to an action-centered model of persons. Overall this chapter is an extended discourse on the metaphysical and ontological world-view topics.
God-Creation Distinction and Relationship

Ingredient Ideas

According to Holmes each unifying perspective names and articulates certain skeletal universal basic beliefs. In any perspective the fundamental basic belief answers the question, "What is ultimate?" Each world view explores the content and bearing of that basic belief. Holmes calls this conviction concerning ultimacy "the watershed for different world views." Historically, Christians fundamentally agree that God is ultimate, but they express this conviction using different names. Holmes names this complex belief, "God-Creation Distinction and Relationship." Below he highlights the faithful commitment which the name signifies. Its meaning is rooted in a historical tradition, a tradition Holmes argues is still relevant for contemporary thought:

"I believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of Heaven and Earth," affirms the Apostles' Creed, repeated by believers through the centuries. At its very outset the creed recognizes a distinction and a relationship between God and his creation. On that distinction rests our hope. In that relationship God acts. And so the creed goes on to speak of Christ's Incarnation, of the Holy Spirit, the church and our eternal destiny, for the God-creation distinction and relationship sets the stage for the whole drama of human history and hopes. It is the overall context of Christian belief and the basis of all ultimate meaning. The creed confesses a living God. No detached spectator on the world and its fate, he is the leading actor. All powerful, he retains and excercises the initiative. This is the most basic theme in a Christian world-view.2

The metaphysical terms "God" and "creation" are developed by Holmes through the polar terms "relationship" and "distinction." His integration of these terms focuses attention and results in a conceptual clarification that allows for systematic understanding.
Brown argues the central importance of the rhetorical topic "the difference that makes a difference." Holmes employs this topic in the development of his name for the major theme in Christian theism. He notes, "Since everything else is an amplification of the theme, it therefore differentiates, when more fully developed, Christian from non-Christian views of life and the Christian faith from non-Christian religions." For example, this theme differentiates between forms of philosophical monism and dualism:

Monism loses the distinction between God and creation, either absorbing the creation into God (as with neo-Platonism, pantheism and some Eastern religions) or else losing God in the creation (as with materialism, philosophical naturalism and secular humanism). On the other hand, dualism confuses the relationship by affirming the co-eternity of God and matter, or spirit and matter, and so denies that God is an almighty maker of all, who acts with full freedom in his creation. The God-creation theme thus differentiates Christian theism from other world-views and is crucial to thinking Christianly about anything at all.

Holmes also uses the theme to relate and differentiate Christian theism to and from other theistic variations. He argues that in the Old Testament God is portrayed as a personal creator in sharp contrast with nature gods viewed by their believers to be "a part of creation, akin to natural phenomena or nature's inhabitants." God is portrayed as both the personal Maker of heaven and earth and the living and sovereign Lord of history. Christian theism's emphasis upon this distinction and relationship is shared by other theistic stances including Judaism and Islam. Holmes asserts that this common ground is at the same time characterized by differences that make a difference. This primary theistic distinction lies in the Christian development of the God-creation relationship in the doctrine of incarnation:
Christianity differs from other theistic religions like Judaism and Islam in the fuller account it gives of the God-creation relation. The Old Testament in this regard is incomplete and anticipates the New, where God acts by incarnating himself in his creation, something fully consonant with theistic possibilities. What Jesus is and does and makes possible is seen as God's active relationship to his creation: his life and death and resurrection, his teaching and that of the apostles, his church and its role in the world, his active presence through the Holy Spirit, his kingdom among us yet still to come. Christ fulfills the Jewish and anticipates the Islamic hope in a God who is active. Moreover, the bare theism of philosophical theology is given rich content, and the "stuttering deism" that thinks God might act just occasionally in a world he made is put to shame. The full scope of the Christian religion is not only self-consistent but also makes theism more complete and more internally coherent than other theistic faiths appear to be; such scope, inner coherence and self-consistency are marks of truth.

Yet by the same token, not all that other religions claim is completely false. We live together with our common needs and common humanity in a common universe, God's creation whether we recognize it as such or not. All human beings have access to this "general revelation," for God has not left himself without witness. Some religions perceive its significance more than others. Some miscontrue, distort and reject it more than others and add entirely mistaken elements. But the creation and its witness to the Creator is a necessary if insufficient factor in understanding the religions of the world. Paul's preaching built on it, with the added assertion that the witness of nature holds all people accountable to God (Acts 14:15-17; 17:22-31; Rom. 1:15-32). The Judeo-Christian tradition benefits as well from Biblical revelation, and Christianity from its fullness. The content of the New Testament, when all is said, is ultimately responsible for Christianity's richer understanding of God's relationship to us in Jesus Christ.6

Chapter four shows Holmes' view that theologians, philosophers and scientists potentially share power in the interdisciplinary creation and maintenance of world views. Theologians primarily contribute an understanding of foundational beliefs and issues and thereby orient the integrative articulation of a world understanding. Scientists primarily contribute models for thinking about nature and articulate empirical data to be accounted for. As a philosopher who works at the interdisciplinary boundaries of theology and philosophy, Holmes
expounds the content and philosophical relevance of Christian theism by emphasizing the theme of Creation. He does so with (1) a sensitivity to the Biblical data and (2) an openness to the ideas of theologians, and (3) an awareness of current trends in science. His exposition of the theological name "God, the Almighty Creator" focuses attention upon seven "ingredient ideas." As a philosopher-rhetor he advocates this major theme as providing "the context within which human existence should be understood and life should be lived. Humanity's meaning is to be found not in people or in their natural environment but in relationship to their maker, for God is the source not only of all being but also of value, hope, and purpose." Briefly highlighted below are these seven key ideas. They orient Holmes' disciplinary thought about issues and function as control beliefs in the critical evaluation of other beliefs and in the interdisciplinary development of elaborative gestalts.

First, God created *ex nihilo*, "out of nothing." This idea emphasizes God's free and sovereign transcendence, his ultimate distinction from everything else. He is not a part of creation, and it is not a part of him. He is qualitatively different from what he created. God is eternal, free, and self-existent; the creation is temporal, dependent, and contingent. The second idea moves attention in the opposite direction. The living God providentially continues his creative activity. Holmes comments, "He continually imparts existence to his creatures . . . .The Biblical writers speak of him sustaining . . . the orderly operation of what he made, of his providential care, of the history of redemption, of his present and
coming kingdom . . ." Here God's \textit{immanence} is emphasized; he is not the transcendent God of deism, but the personal God who relates himself to his creation. Theologically it has often been difficult to maintain an integral relationship between these polar ideas of transcendence (distinction) and immanence (relationship). For Holmes, they must be thought about together, functioning as a context for the other five ideas. Difficulties emerge when one is emphasized more than the other. His name for the theme concerning ultimacy: God-creation distinction and relationship, aids one in holding these ideas simultaneously.

Third, God freely creates with \textit{purpose}. The transcendent God chooses whether and what to create and his choice is purposeful. He continues his creative activity in pursuing his gracious purposes. This work finds its revealing and redemptive focus in the incarnation of Christ in history, the arena of God's gracious purposes. Holmes argues that this is "a teleological universe, one designed and guided for the achievement of intended ends . . . . It is a personal teleology, a transcendent Creator's active pursuit of good ends for his creation." I discuss the implications of this idea in chapter eight's survey of Holmes' creational view of history.

Fourth, God creates \textit{ad extra}, "to the outside of himself." Holmes comments, "He gives something a reality of its own and grants it the exercise of delegated powers." There is both \textit{creaturely reality} and \textit{freedom}, both are distinct from but related to divine reality and freedom. Creaturely reality is "dependent, contingent, and finite"; creaturely freedom is "dependent and limited." Nature is no mere
appearance, and human freedom is no illusion; both are good gifts of the Creator which ultimately accomplish his purpose. Holmes observes:

God's delegation of powers implies that he works through means that he has made, physical, psychological, economic and political means, for all these are delegated powers. In his general providence God works within their limited possibilities. In special acts of providence he achieves what otherwise would not occur, and miracles transcend the limitations of creaturely processes. Yet none of this is capricious, for in all God does there is purpose.13

This delegation of power leads to the fifth idea: the creation is "ordered, structured, and law-governed for good ends . . . . The fundamental idea is that there are constants in every aspect of nature which have been created by God, and to know something about them is to know something about the will of God."14 From these two ideas concerning the ontological status and structure of the universe, an epistemological proposal emerges which limits conceptual relativism. Holmes asserts that human knowledge is the personal effort to articulate an understanding of an ordered universe and its Creator. Epistemic claims are interpretations of reality made (1) with universal intent and (2) in hopes of accreditation by other knowing persons. I explore these epistemic implications in chapter seven and their impact on other key topics in chapter eight.

The sixth component results from the last three: "God's purposes in his work of creation are the basis for all value."15 Rather than deny or depreciate physical reality, Christian theism, as Holmes develops it, emphasizes the goodness of the entire creation brought forth and maintained by the Creator for his good ends. Holmes gives presence to the axiological implications of this idea:
Here is objective basis for aesthetic and economic and other values. The way God intended things to be also serves as a moral indicator. If God's creation has value, then the enjoyment of its benefits can celebrate God's goodness. All of life, in fact, becomes just such a celebration—provided one recognizes the one who made it so heartily good.

Here a theocentric view of values stands in sharp contrast to the anthropocentric one of naturalistic humanism. Some naturalists divorce "objective facts" from "subjective values" and thus reduce human valuing to an emotive, non-cognitive phenomenon either divorced from or only tangentially related to the world of bare facts and the empirical and/or rational knowledge of it. These axiological contrasts and implications are discussed in chapter eight.

Holmes acknowledges the potential anomaly which the problem of evil poses for Christian theism at this point. I do not provide the details of his theodicy, but stress the central thrust of his position. He holds that the presence of evil "is not God's doing, nor were God's creatures originally made evil. Rather evil has occurred in a creation that was good." Central to his discussion are the theological ideas of the fall, the incarnation, death and resurrection of Christ, and the sovereign power of God to triumph over evil by ultimately using it for his good ends. He summarizes his position:

[It is] an affirmation of hope, not the claim that ours is the best of all possible worlds. It is the affirmation of a transcendent teleology in which God's good ends will prevail and his kingdom will come. The Christian approach to evil is thus theocentric ... for the values that evil threatens have a theistic basis. Our highest good, our true well-being, is to serve God's good ends, not the other way around .... This is not an anthropocentric universe .... It still has purpose, and God in all his goodness is still sovereign. This is what the death and resurrection of Christ proclaim, and that is why the believer can still put his heart into life's tasks.
The final component of the Holmesian articulation of a gestalt for the God-creation distinction and relationship involves the idea that God has mandated certain creational tasks or responsibilities for persons as his stewards. Holmes highlights this idea in relation to those already mentioned:

That God has delegated powers to his creatures implies that we are responsible for assignments that are implicit in the very nature of things. That this is a law-governed creation requires our adherence to that law. That its orderliness is intelligible mandates us to try to understand and to act in relation to what we know. That the creation is good requires us to value it . . . . We are servants, not masters, servants who discover order in God's creation and good possibilities in what he has made. These tasks which serve and bear witness to the Creator, are attended by the handicaps of our finiteness and are twisted by our perversity. Evil and error show themselves in science and art and society: all that man is and does, all of human culture cries out for the grace of God. The whole creation awaits the kingdom yet to come, while yet it praises the maker.\textsuperscript{19}

This theocentric view of persons as related to and responsible before God stands in sharp contrast to the anthropocentrism of naturalism. Even when the two world views overlap concerning the details of human existence in nature, their descriptions and explanations of details diverge as perspectival stances bear upon the conceptualizations. I pursue this view of persons in the second half of this chapter and in chapter eight's discussion of society.

Two comments relevant to communication should be made. First, perspectival content always consists of "faithful ideas": ideas authentically held to be true and trustworthy by faithful believers. This is the case regardless of the world-view community. This is not to argue that such beliefs are beyond rational control or that some perspectival choices cannot be eliminated for "good reasons." It is to
assert that ultimately persons choose perspectival gestalts as true, faithfully indwell them, and understand reality by relying upon them as trustworthy. Given this understanding of the necessity of perspectival choice, the scholar interested in the communication aspects of human choice-making and evaluation may contribute to the understanding of the various processes involved within world-view communities to bring persons to the point of perspectival conversion and to sustain persons in their perspectival choices through complex rhetorical actions including education (faith seeking understanding), intellectual defense (apologetics), and the intersubjective acting as if the perspective is true (faithful living in community).

Second, when a rhetor like Holmes engages in perspectival attention management, articulating and arguing the control beliefs of a perspectival stance, one becomes aware of the communication processing of a perspective. His description of the central theme of the "unifying perspective" reifies the term, making one think metaphorically of a "perspective" as something itself concrete, capable of being "viewed" and "described." As he outlines these "ingredient ideas," one is aware that other Christian scholars might make alternative choices and highlight these or other control beliefs differently. Alternative explications might feature different aspects of the complex biblical data and rely upon other groups within the pluralistic theological community, and (3) articulate these ideas in such a way that they contrast with science. In outlining the perspective of "Christian theism" Holmes attempts to articulate basic beliefs shared by evangelical Christians. Many evangelicals would
stand mute if asked, "What are the component beliefs of the God-creation relationship and distinction?" In actuality, Holmes, as a philosopher, summarizes what he believes are the key ideas and advocates them as being capable of focusing the perspectival commitment of those who would be named "Christian." He is saying "think of your faith in God and his creation in this way."

When rhetors like Holmes reify a perspective in discoursing about it, their writing and talking have constraints. Such naming occurs within the context of an interdisciplinary perspectival community, and it must make sense of the adherents' commitment if it is to function as a faithful and orienting articulation. Holmes' rhetorical action is primarily intended not to draw human attention to the names themselves but to bear witness to a reality distinct from, yet related to, those names. A relevant linguistic constitution of a perspectival stance orders and orients human thought and values in a way that meets the human need for a world view that endows all of life with meaning and orients thought and action in relation to a highest good. A world-view rhetor attempts to show how a proposed perspectival articulation accomplishes these tasks. Such argumentation enhances the possibility of communal ratification through action. When a large number of people accept a particular way of thinking about perspectival commitment, they take it for granted, indwell it and rely upon it in their everyday thought and action. It then becomes a lived reality: a life world that has been reflected upon.
Perspectival Modelling

Perspectival beliefs may be thought about in different ways. When a rhetor turns from the basic beliefs of a unifying perspective and turns towards a distinctive way to think about those beliefs then he is engaged in elaborative attention management. Conceptual models which feature an organizing pattern, order and relate perspectival beliefs so that persons can apply them across the broad range of human thought and experience. Holmes argues that in the processing of world views, the philosopher often finds an appropriate metaphor to be developed into a model useful for thinking integratively about perspectival content. This task, often conducted in dialogue with scientists, has not been problem free. Holmes notes a key historical problem in modelling perspectival belief:

Philosophy itself has been influenced by scientific models for understanding nature. . . . The problems they pose seem to stem from trying to conceive of everything in the same way as we think of natural processes. The analogy does not always work, and a reductionist tendency often results in which God and man are made in the image of nature.20

Holmes highlights four such models that in the history of thought have shaped the dialogue about God and creation. I survey Holmes' analysis of (1) how each model features either transcendence or immanence and (2) the anomalies which indicate the inadequacies of models drawn from science. His criticism of each model relies upon that model's ability to take into account the seven ingredient ideas of Christian theism. The model he proposes, on the other hand, is an elaborative attention shift, one not drawn from the sciences but from contemporary analytic philosophy's naming of persons as "agents."
The first dominant model for discursing about the God-creation distinction and relationship was drawn from Plato's formistic understanding of reality. It features the God-creation distinction through its emphasis upon transcendent forms which give order to chaotic matter. It stresses a time-eternity dualism contrasting the goodness of eternal forms and the inferior nature of temporal things. Augustine "converted" the Platonic model, giving it Christian content; he transposed it by emphasizing the perspectival beliefs in God as a personal Creator who freely and purposefully created a good world ex nihilo. Augustine's Christian commitment penetrated and transformed the Platonic view of reality, but the transforming process was mutual---some perspectival beliefs, as outlined by Holmes, were accommodated to ensure conceptual fit. Holmes describes this mutual modification:

Augustine's Platonism created problems. It justified his ascetic tendencies and turned the contemplative life in a mystical direction, for by depreciating the temporal and the changing he had depreciated the creation itself. Since timelessness is better than time and immutability than change, freedom from natural appetites and freedom from change are the ideal. Augustine was particularly close to the Neo-Platonism of his day, which super-imposed a hierarchical order on things, a great chain of being, complicating Plato's relatively simple ranking of time and eternity. The hierarchical concept affected Medieval thinking about good and evil and about the structure of nature and society, whether political, ecclesiastical or domestic. And it persists in our thinking today.

The heritage of Platonism in Christian thought is a mixed blessing. On the one hand it provides a metaphysic for explaining the order of creation and gives an objective basis to value; on the other hand it introduces an unchanging order, a fixed hierarchy that downplays the gift of being as such. On the one hand it values the eternal, but on the other hand it depreciates the temporal. It confuses evil with change and good with immutability. It stresses contemplation of unchanging truth and the knowledge of God, but not the scintillating variety of earthly experience. Thus it can detract from daily tasks of stewardly service and the physical enjoyments of life.21
The second model was based upon Aristotle's teleological metaphysic and developed a concept of nature in which Plato's universal forms and hierarchy of being are maintained. This model differs because it (1) features an inner teleology and (2) values change. Coming-to-be-and-passing-away is no longer depreciated as a purposeless evil. In contrast to Plato, Aristotle held that "change is ordered for good ends . . . . Every being and every process of change has not only a material cause (the stuff of which it is made), an efficient cause that produces it, and a formal cause that accounts for its structure, but also a final cause or good end to which it tends." Aquinas combined this model with his Christian commitment. He argued that an analogy exists between nature, man and God, and that Aristotle's four causes could be used to map out how God the Creator gives being and purpose to the creation. In contrast to the Platonic model this one was more adequate in its scope and practical implications. Holmes argues in such a way that one potentially sees this shift as a "progressive development":

Here then is a more positive view that sees the gift of finite and changing being as good. No longer should temporal existence be depreciated. All being is sacred, blessed by God, participating in his purposes, participating in his love. Where the Thomistic view prevails, positive consequences have followed for art and science, along with a lessening of the ascetic and mystical tendencies of the Platonic train. Literature and art have flourished, and some have argued that confidence in the purposive order of nature encouraged scientific inquiry and the rise of modern science.

Both these Greek models share difficulties which Medieval scholars debated. Much of that controversy focused upon the distinctions and relationships between polar concepts, especially universals and
particulars, time and eternity, and freedom and determination. Both models featured the priority of universal forms which determined particulars. Given such emphasis questions arise: "How do we explain individuality and how can individuals be free? And if God created in accordance with universal forms, was his really a free and creative act?"24 Such questions led to a breakdown in the acceptance of the early models. Thinkers like William of Occum "rejected the reality of universals . . . . Largely out of respect for the sovereignty of God, he explained creation and its order simply as what God willed to be, and the good as what God decrees."25 A new model was sought to think about God and creation, one that did not feature universals, teleology, and the ontological relationship between facts and values.

The Renaissance model of the universe resulted as thinkers explored the machine metaphor. The mechanistic model moved attention away from universals and teleology by featuring causal mechanisms. Holmes summarizes the idea that animated early scientific thought: "Natural forces move particles of matter, creating new and changing configurations."26 The model, applied to God and creation, featured God as the transcendent creator who brought all things into existence and started the great mechanical forces now in operation. What the model masked were "the purposiveness of God's creation, his continued creative beneficence, and the relation of fact to value."27 Like the two earlier models, this one stressed the God-creation distinction, but it did so in such a way that eventually the God of scripture was seen by many in a deistic way, as the God who does not interfere with the great machine of nature. This neglect of
the idea of God's sustained relationship to creation was pushed to an extreme as some thinkers treated "God" as an hypothesis used to account for what science could not explain. This hypothesis was increasingly replaced by scientific "knowledge"; a naturalistic idea of the universe and man's place in it came to dominate mechanistic thinking. Christians necessarily rejected this scientific model of nature as the great machine with no maker, but many continued to use the mechanistic model in its "converted" form to think theistically.

Holmes describes the emergence of a fourth model based on an organismic metaphor. This switch in model resulted as anomalies inherent in the mechanistic view became apparent to some:

Nineteenth century scientific conceptions provided yet another model for thinking about God and his creation. Dissatisfaction with the mechanistic view of a nature that is lifeless and alien to humankind, and dissatisfaction with the lifeless god of deism that went along with that view, became evident in Romanticism. Meanwhile a new awareness of process and change arose, both with the rise of history as a discipline and in developmental biology. At the micro-level modern genetics was beginning, and at the macro-level evolutionary theories gained widespread attention. Physics was shortly to provide new understanding of the interrelatedness of things, first in electromagnetic field theory and then in relativity physics. The result was a picture of organism-like growth and unity in nature.28

The theological integration of this model moved attention away from the God-creation distinction and the transcendent emphasis of the three earlier models and shifted attention towards immanence. Writers like Schleiermacher "reacted against the remoteness of an overly transcendent God with a monistic metaphysic that made God immanent in nature and the human spirit . . . . God is the all-embracing creative spirit manifested in human consciousness and culture."29 The
theological use of the model downplays or rejects the idea of *ex nihilo* creation and reinterpretsthe incarnation so that "Christianity, while further advanced than other religions, is neither qualitatively different nor exclusive in its truth." This model is employed by thinkers like Hartshorne and Cobb in the development of contemporary process theology. Holmes characterizes the result by featuring the monistic anomaly.

Here too monism prevails in panentheistic form: everything exists in God, a constituent in his experience, rather than external to him and created *ex nihilo*. The God creation relation is therefore symmetrical rather than asymmetrical: the creator is with his creatures, sharing their experiences and their destiny, and he himself changes in certain regards—a far cry from the remote god of deism. But God is only a final cause, luring nature to higher ends, not an efficient cause, a God who acts.

While Holmes' discussion of process theology and the concept of evolution is excellent, it is too extensive to be detailed here. He says more about the process model and its theological applications than the other three because of its current saliency in contemporary scholarly circles. He is currently engaged in extensive research on Whitehead's influence on the contemporary negotiation of world views. Noted below is a sample of Holmes' anomaly-masking and anomaly-featuring concerning the contributions and difficulties of process models for thinking about God-creation relationships and distinctions:

The process model is attractive to some Christians. First, it sees the God-creation relation in a continuous historical teleology, rather than as an isolated first beginning of things. Second, it admits that every finite thing is changing and contingent: no fixed forms confuse the scene or depreciate change. Third, it overcomes the radical time-eternity dualism that Plato bequeathed to theology, and so it brings God closer to our experience. Finally, it has made peace with modern science.
But from the perspective of Biblical theology problems persist. The process theologian calls God creator in that he provides the goal that draws out nature's creativity and allures it for his ends. But nature is still immanent in the process-God, part of his experience, not an *ex nihilo* and *ad extra* creation. He does not transcend it, nor does he perform mighty acts in history. The acts of God recited in Scripture are but symbols of his immanence in our creative powers, so that any real difference between nature and grace, or general and special revelation, is forfeited. No uniquely divine Incarnation occurs. Again, if both we and nature are part of God's experience then the further difference between good and evil blurs, and hope depends on natural historical change rather than on the saving acts of God. A totally different world view, more monistic than theistic, results. Kierkegaard's complaint about the immanence theology of his day applies here: the apostle is reduced to a genius, revelation becomes originality, and the essential qualitative difference between God and man has disappeared. God and man, like king and servant, have become equals.32

Holmes concludes his criticism of process theology by stressing the problem of a conceptual model that neglects God's distinction from his creation because it features the relationship:

Process theologians major in God's relationship to nature and his presence within human history and experience, as if the continuum runs from God through the human spirit into material things, and all are gradations of one and the same Being. God's transcendence is missing, both his qualitative otherness and the numerical distinctness by virtue of which he is free to act in his creation in ways that immanent processes alone could not produce. An immanent teleology is their stress, not a transcendent God who acts. But for Christian theism the created world is not a finite and passing appearance of some more inclusive reality, but it is real in itself, even if dependent on God.33

As Holmes features anomalies of theological models borrowed from science he consistently emphasizes the priority of the ingredient theological beliefs concerning the God-creation relationship and distinction over those models used to articulate perspectival commitment. He refuses to compromise these control commitments (rooted more in an interpretation of scripture than in any one theological school) and chooses instead to search for a model sensitive
to his chosen theological content. Part of his critique is possible because these older models have been applied historically and their gaps have become apparent to many who have tried to live and think with them. Holmes is convinced that these anomalies are rooted in the models borrowed from science and not in the perspective of Christian theism itself. He therefore calls for a developmental switch rather than a revolutionary one. It is "developmental" in that perspectival commitments are not abandoned but undergo a "progressive development" when mapped out differently. Holmes conceives his attention shift as a methodological one:

The problems pose a methodological question: if God (and human beings to a lesser extent) is qualitatively different from nature, how far can models drawn from natural science help? Are we not asking for problems by conceiving of God in the image of nature?

To get at this methodological question consider whether God, on "nature" models, can still be conceived as a fully personal being. Monistic philosophies have most difficulty here and naturalism most of all, if nature is unthinking, unloving, unchoosing in all it does. For God the creator thinks, loves, chooses. How then can understanding nature help us to understand persons, especially a personal God who unlike us is not part of the natural world at all? He is far more discontinuous from nature than we, and transcends it in ways that we do not. Idealistic forms of monism have trouble too, for personhood implies a capacity for deliberate action, which in turn implies an agent who transcends the situation in which he acts. Yet the idealistic monism that underlies much of immanentist theology denies God that transcendence . . . 34

Holmes looks to philosophers, not scientists, for a model of persons to be used to think about God.

The current philosophical development of the concept of persons is rooted in "Kant's clear-cut distinction between natural processes determined by causal mechanisms and free moral agents acting out of respect for duty." 35 Holmes notes that a number of personalistic
models have been developed, including those rooted in American personal idealism and continental existentialism. The personal-agent model he chooses is borrowed from contemporary analytic philosophy. Its thrust will remind rhetorical scholars of Burke's distinction between persons and things: "things move, people act." The following passage highlights the main emphasis of the model and its implication in light of both Holmes' ingredient ideas and his critique of alternative models. The extensive quotation allows Holmes to explicate this model in his own carefully chosen words:

Another personalistic model comes from recent analytic philosophy where a distinction has been drawn, based on what ordinary language reveals of human experience, between events and actions. An event is produced by causes and therefore occurs in the natural course of events. An action is performed by an agent for reasons of his own and with inner intentions. An action might be prevented by moral persuasion, but not an event. The one is personal and free, but not the other.

The living God of Christian theism is an agent who acts. Creation was not a natural event with natural causes, nor were the Incarnation, the prophetic word, or Christ's founding of his church. These were intentional acts of God, for reasons of his own. Miracles are spoken of in the New Testament as signs and wonders, signs of God's activity that make us wonder at his power and purpose. They require the notion of persons, not the analogy to a natural process.

The model works, moreover, without a time-eternity disjunction. God's transcendence and sovereignty are preserved without a Platonic timeless eternity devoid of change, successive experiences or duration. How a timeless God could purpose, act, and then delight at the outcome, would remain unknown. Rather, on the personal action model, his sovereignty is preserved by his mighty acts: the creator-logos acts in providence, in revelation and incarnation, in saving grace, in his church and in final triumph. The concept of an agent who acts clears the ground for such affirmations.

Eternity need not mean timelessness but simply everlasting duration, in God's case without creaturely limitations but with perfect memory and anticipation, with an unbroken flow of consciousness devoid of frustrated purpose or of change of mind and intention. As the Supreme Agent, God transcends all others and remains forever the sovereign creator of all.
The picture that results, then, is not of one great chain of being in which all beings, God included, differ only by degree and so are qualitatively alike. God's transcendence means not only that he is numerically distinct from his creation but also that he is qualitatively different. Of all his creatures, we are told, humans bear the clearest resemblance to their maker; yet God is far more than any image we bear.

In some regards we are qualitatively like the natural world, yet in other regards quite different. We are persons, free agents, able to transcend in some ways the causal processes which otherwise rule. In this regard we image God. But God has no roots in nature at all, so there the analogy between him and human beings ceases. He is absolutely free. He is infinite in wisdom, goodness, love and power, and we are finite in these qualities. But God is qualitatively far more than all of this, for he is *sui generis*, unique, the only God there is, and he is self-existent.

The process categories of the nineteenth century model, therefore, seem remarkably applicable to man as part of nature but pose problems when it comes to humans as persons and to God. Is God in process at all? The Bible suggests what the agent model implies: successive acts which he anticipates, acts he subsequently performs, whose results he calls good. But God himself, who he is in his nature and character, does not change. This is not the symmetrical relationship of process theology in which both God and the world are changed. Nor is it the unmoved and unmoving God of Platonic dualism or Enlightenment deism. It is rather an asymmetrical relationship in which God both cares for the lilies and sparrows, and rejoices when sinners repent. Thus a Christian view of the God-creation relationship can avoid the pitfalls against which recent thought has over-reacted, and can learn from what both process and existential thinkers have tried to reinsert. The One who acts is indeed a living God who is with us, the source of hope in every sphere of life.

Given this model, Holmes stresses three metaphysical/ontological distinctions: God, man, and nature. He argues against any reductionism that denies unique reality to any of these. Arguments from analogy must recognize these limits to analogical thinking that attempts to conceive of similarities:

Limited analogies exist between nature and man...and a different analogy exists between man and God, but no overall qualitative similarity runs through them all beyond the fact that they all are. Monistic metaphysics, that makes everything qualitatively alike, distorts the picture either of nature (as does idealism) or of man (as does naturalism) or of God (as does
anything less than a theism with creation ex nihilo. Monisms have a reductionist effect, levelling differences too real to deny.38

For Holmes the use of a process model for thinking about the natural world and man as a part of nature holds great promise as long as scholars maintain delicacy in their modelling of humanity, recognizing that some aspects of human nature are best understood in contrast to nature and in relation to God.

Brown has argued that one must not only assert a name but also give reason why that categorizing of reality is acceptable. Holmes justifies his choice of a personal agent model. First, it comports well with the theological beliefs named as ingredient to the perspective. He shows its conceived capacity to elaborate those beliefs in a coherent manner which does not emphasize the importance of one belief to the exclusion of others. Second, he argues that it fits the human experience of God recorded in scripture and in man's religious history. Third, it allows for a conception of persons which avoids behavioristic and scientific reductions and relates human identity both to that which transcends nature as well as to natural processes. Fourth, it yields a coherent world view that one can both think-with and live-with. In regard to my discussion in chapter five of Perelmanian rhetorical maneuvers, Holmes argues the potentiality for a "qualified unlimited development" of the personalistic model. In the following passage he acknowledges limits while also describing the persons for whom his advocated, need-meeting solution might appeal:

The coherence of a Christian world view seems more complete and compelling with a personalistic formulation than on the nature-models of earlier thought. The Platonist indeed needed a
most perfect being to complete and unify his system, the Thomist a necessary being and prime mover, the mechanist a first efficient cause, and the idealist an immanent ground of being. God, so conceived, satisfies the philosophical need to complete and unify one's understanding. But can any and every philosophical conception of God serve as the supreme good a world view calls for, unifying human values and purposes and giving ultimate meaning to life? Where in their schemes is the living God we need? Yet it is precisely this need which the personal agent model meets, extending beyond the theoretical demands of abstract thought to the more existential demands of life and hope. Any argument for God as agent will of course be system-dependent too. George Mavrodes suggests that arguments are person-relative in not being uniformly persuasive. This is plainly so with an agent-God argument: it will be most effective for those who, seeking the supreme good, see that only a God who acts gives life unity, wholeness and hope. This subjective precondition affects the arguments' worth, as Jesus himself said: "if any man is willing to do . . . he will know."39

In Holmes' discussion of model choices and in his elaborative advocacy of an alternative he uses argument from analogy. In discussing the four nature models for thinking about the God-creation relationship and distinction, he features an anomaly that results in an analogical breakdown. His control perspectival beliefs about God lead one to think about God as distinctively different from nature; the attempt to apply nature models in thinking about God deny that difference that makes a difference. Holmes' alternative analogy, drawn from a philosophical analysis of human action, stresses persons who act in distinction from things that "move."

In considering the communication processing of perspectival beliefs, Holmes' advocacy of an appropriate model is central. Models enable a rhetor to do more than assert skeletal content. A good model features characteristics and relationships among beliefs and maps out key implications. Without the model these aspects might not be thought of. Certainly a well chosen model extends those aspects implicit in
skeletal beliefs. With historical models, anomalies are more evident than with contemporary models because of the critical discourse which constitutes the history of ideas. In the framework constructed by each model, perspectival beliefs are seen differently. Problems are encountered as those models focus human attention to some aspect of a complex reality while blinding it to others. In Holmes' call for a qualified unlimited development of his chosen model he does so in order to test how far the agent metaphor can be taken and to see what degree of empirical adequacy and rational coherence results from rigorous application and criticism.

The communication scholar, given Brown's model and Holmes' outline of major models used in Christian thought, might trace the detailed interdisciplinary processing of perspectival themes through new elaborative models. Questions arise: How do models come to be seen as inadequate by some members of a community? How do those individuals promote the shared perception of inadequacy and rhetorically create a growth-and-survival need for a new model? How are similar ingredient ideas experienced differently when they are integrated with alternative models? Are there strategies, tactics, and maneuvers that better promote such innovations within certain kinds of communication systems? Given Brown's model what kinds of predictions are possible concerning future attention shifting towards or away from innovative models.

As a Christian philosopher engaged in the interdisciplinary rhetorical action of advocating a world view Holmes makes real the integrative relationship between faith and learning stressed in chapter five. He works philosophically to develop the creational theological
theme rather than attempting a philosophical translation of any one systematic theology. He sees that theme as it has been discoursed upon historically through the use of various scientific models. His argument reflects the influence of Kuhn's notion of scientific paradigms mentioned earlier. As Holmes looks at historical interdisciplinary development, he accounts for much of it by reference to emerging models that focused human attention in new ways.

In the coming chapters it becomes evident that the ideas developed in these last few pages centrally animate Holmes' thought as a Christian philosopher and structure his realization of that role in the rhetorical act of world-view advocacy. Consistently he articulates a creational framework by managing perspectival attention concerning a central world-view topic. Then he manages elaborative attention in proposing a stance within the frame. That gestalt-stance focuses the ingredient ideas of the major perspectival themes in a unique way. In the next section the minor perspectival theme is related to the God-creation distinction and relationship theme. Holmes' interdisciplinary view of persons relies upon theological ideas, the philosophical model of agency, and input from the sciences. This secondary theme is also crucial in Holmes' later development of gestalt-stances within the creational frame. Together the two themes serve to control Holmes' interdisciplinary elaboration of world-view contours.
Persons in Christian Perspective: Relational and Responsible Agents

Holmes' version of the major theme of Christian theism signifies ultimate reality with the complex name, God-creation distinction and relationship. The second important theme is anthropological. Every world view names persons and the meaning of their existence. World views accomplish this by relating persons to ultimate reality. This section shows how Holmes contrasts his view with that of naturalistic humanism by observing that the difference that makes a difference "focuses on two essentials: whether our unique freedom is to be understood most basically in relation to nature or to God, and how can we be held responsible for our failures." As he highlights four interpretations of the naturalistic view of persons, Holmes articulates the elaborative intensional meanings of the terms "human freedom" and "human failure." His strategic rhetorical purpose in this critique of the four elaborations is ultimately to feature a central anomaly of the naturalistic perspectival stance: accounting for persons. He then directs attention to the capacity of Christian theism to resolve this gap.

Naturalistic Views of Freedom and Failure

In Holmes' analysis, the meaning of "human freedom" varies according to the model chosen to elaborate the perspectival stance of naturalism. The rationalist model influenced by Aristotle emphasizes the power of reason to liberate man. Through thoughtful deliberation and decision persons triumph over ignorance, emotions, and conditioning to seek the good. The mechanistic model causally explains
human behavior and threatens the concept of freedom; mechanists who argue for freedom usually do so by reference to some concept like Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy. The romanticist model features freedom by relating it to the creative vitality which permeates nature and finds its deepest manifestation in the human spirit. The dialectical model employed by both existentialist and marxist conceives of freedom emerging in a synthesis of conflicting opposites. Holmes observes that both existentialists and marxists have difficulty giving hopeful and positive content to freedom when primarily it is understood in relation to conflict.

In his discussion of these four models, Holmes varies in the amount of anomaly featuring. He is most forceful concerning the inadequacies of the mechanist model. In sharp contrast to its tendency towards determinism, he highlights a "personalistic and teleological model." It is a model he uses theistically, but other philosophers have developed it from a naturalistic starting point. He summarizes the thrust of this model of persons as agents:

The purposes and values we deliberately embrace play the crucial role. Teleology means that a process or activity is end-oriented rather than just antecedent oriented, so that intentions and ideals also shape what we do. Human action starts with freedom to consider pursuing some project, and then the nature of that project defines what is actually possible in light of the limitations that various causal mechanisms impose. Thus causes operate too, creating both the situations in which freedom acts and the possibility and limits of action. Physical circumstance, genetic inheritance, and so forth are causally given; they define the limits of what is possible, and perhaps incline us more in one direction than another. But at times the values we see in another direction become attractive and alluring, and that direction takes precedence over what would eventuate if we did nothing at all. We then break away from the prior process and rise above the "otherwise" course of events in pursuit of our ends. In retrospect we say that we could have done otherwise than
we did, we had the power of contrary choice. What decides things here is often the values we have interiorized for ourselves and have made our own in the projects we pursue . . . . This is not a teleology, then, that is altogether immanent in nature; it is a teleology that is free at times to transcend immanent processes. This is often true of the way we influence one another. In an I-Thou relationship which makes the other person an end-in-herself, of value for her own sake and considered in all one does, the other person is not manipulated or forced in mechanical fashion. Rather she is liberated from both outer constraints and inner restraints, to think and act freely for herself. The relationship offers values she freely embraces. On this model, freedom is the capacity to transcend what causal mechanisms alone would produce, the capacity to act for the sake of ends with inner self-determination. This "libertarian" alternative is neither complete indeterminism, nor is it a matter of causal necessity.42

This passage articulates the personal agent model as a resolution of the anomalies present in the other models. Holmes presents it as a good fit of the human experience of personhood. It is the model he converts to a theistic perspective of persons, although it also seems to work better with a naturalistic perspective than the four formulations Holmes features and criticizes as inadequately accounting for human freedom.

At root, Holmes is less concerned with the elaborate modelling of freedom and more interested in the conceived major anomaly a naturalistic perspective has concerning "freedom." Holmes' perspectival attention management as criticism, if accepted, would lead a person not to look for an alternative model (like the personalistic one highlighted), but to consider an alternative perspectival stance. A switch in models would be a developmental move; a switch in perspectives would be a revolutionary one. In the following passage Holmes argues the perspectival difference that makes a difference concerning the term "freedom":
The naturalistic models for thinking about freedom all have the same problem: any distinctive, positive meaning to humanness eludes us when we see it only in relation to nature. In the image of nature alone, the uniqueness of personhood and the meaning of freedom fade, for then we are not unique after all and do not transcend this world of which we are a part . . . . In Christian perspective the key is that persons are not made in the image of nature but in the image of a personal God; both the person and his freedom must be seen first in relation to God, and only secondarily in relation to nature . . . . Biblically, human freedom is neither absolute not illusory, but is dependent on God and on the particular form the relationship to God takes. Freedom starts there, and so do its limitations.43

Holmes next turns to a related term, failure. If human beings have some freedom, then they are also responsible for their exercise of that freedom. All world views that argue for human freedom must account for human failure and the evil that results. Holmes uses the same four models to characterize some possible naturalistic interpretations of "human failure."44

The rationalistic model accounts for human failure by pointing to the problem of emotions as they distract reason from its pursuit of the good. Here is a dualism of passion against intellect, a dualism rooted in the way things are in nature. The mechanistic model accounts for failure by relating it to genetic, psychological, sociological, historical, and/or other processes which condition humans. Failure demands not punishment but therapy that reconditions. The romanticist model emphasizes the stifling of the creative spirit as the reason for failure. Social institutions and personal choices lead to the stagnation of man's free spirit. The dialectical model sees failure as resulting from "being on the wrong side of the dialectic in progress."45 Holmes claims that discussions of naturalistic understandings of "human failure" are rooted in a prior question. If
nature is ultimate, and values are anthropocentric choices, then how does one ultimately determine the meaning of terms like "failure," "evil," "bad," or their polar opposites? For Holmes, if such terms are, at bottom, only personal and social conventions with no reference beyond human namers, then one cannot ultimately justify the condemnation and/or praise of diverse enactments of values and value hierarchies. Brown's communication model potentially accounts for the fact of diverse value meanings and their reification in human action, but Holmes raises the philosophical question of the ultimate existential and cognitive meaningfulness of a sentence like "The Nazi treatment of the Jews was evil." He argues that the consistent naturalist has perspectival difficulties here and contrasts the theistic view.

Before turning to Holmes' contrast of the theistic solution, a comment. Holmes' overview of models is selective. There are variations of each model; some are more live-with-able and think-with-able than others. His major rhetorical purpose is to argue that a naturalistic perspective inadequately names human freedom and failure. Given Holmes' theistic stance, the naturalistic ascription of dignity, worth, value, freedom, and hope fails to provide an adequate rationale rooted in nature. Holmes argues that the most adequate understanding of these terms demands a different perspectival starting point: the God-creation relationship and distinction. He asserts that, given a theistic understanding, the term "person" is more than a comforting name constructed by human symbol-makers. As a name it points beyond nature and human processes to an ultimate reality that is
the personal source of human personhood. For a Christian audience, Holmes' rhetoric of contrasted perspectives functions to reinforce the conceived adequacy of the theistic perspective.

**Persons in Christian Theism**

While still working to manage perspectival attention, Holmes moves away from anomaly-featuring and towards anomaly-masking. Again as he does this, perspectival and elaborative attention management proceed together. While developing the theistic framework for thinking about and acting as persons, Holmes features the terms relationship, responsibility, and fallen and redeemed. The first two he uses to relate the Christian view to key notions about persons as seen by contemporary scholars emphasizing process and agency. The latter stresses two ideas that are strongly stressed by evangelical theologians. Holmes realizes that Christian conceptualizations of persons vary. Historically, Christian thinkers have converted the four models used by naturalists to think about human freedom and failure. As Holmes advocates his theistic personalistic model he does so as an acknowledged "interpretive realist." He holds that this is an interpretive gestalt that responsibly accounts for the reality it claims to interpret. Given this epistemic stance (discussed in chapter seven), Holmes argues confidently that it adequately categorizes persons and provides contemporary relevance. At the same time it is open to a conceptual revision that (1) better fits the experience of being human, (2) grows out of interdisciplinary insight, and (3) provides greater coherence in understanding.
As he develops a theistic perspective of persons in contrast to a naturalistic one, Holmes emphasizes that a Christian anthropology is theocentric in its starting point and Christocentric in its coherent elaboration:

We must bear in mind that the Bible speaks about humankind both in explicit assertions and in its history and its realistic portrayal of individuals. Moreover, it presents Jesus Christ as the Ideal Man, Son of Man as well as Son of God, both fully human and fully divine. In him we see what the Creator intended us to be like. Humankind was made in God's image, but among all the daughters and sons of Adam, only Jesus Christ fully embodies the image of the living God. A Christian view of the human person should therefore be explicitly Christocentric.46

He develops an interdisciplinary view of persons that he hopes is relevant to both the humanities and the behavioral sciences because it is articulated in relation to their interdisciplinary input. The result is a "three-layered approach." He names persons as (1) relational beings who are (2) responsible for their relationships and (3) who have been radically affected by the fall and by grace.47

The first key term Holmes uses to focus elaborative attention concerning persons is "relationship." He argues, "Humans exist within a vast and complex system of interrelationships. No individual, nor all of us together, can exist in isolation, for both individually and collectively we originate and draw sustenance from outside ourselves. Physically, psychologically and in every way, we depend on the whole scheme of things in which we participate."48 At this level of abstract naming many naturalistic humanists would agree with Holmes. Given Brown's model one would expect differences to emerge when Holmes specifically names and organizes these relationships. Holmes labels the fundamental human relationship theocentrically. Persons are seen
as dependent creatures who bear the image of their Creator:

Most basically we exist in relation to God the Creator. From him we draw our very existence, our livelihood, our abilities and resources, every good quality of our existence, our purpose, meaning and hope—all this the doctrine of creation implies. In him we live and move and have our being, and to him we remain accountable. It is the overarching theme of the Bible and it is central in both Christian theology and a Christian world-view. We exist before God in all we are and do. Whether we recognize it or not, if God is creator of all, then we are always and in everything dependent on him.

But this relationship includes more than dependency, for human beings are made in the image of God. Persons in God's image have their focus and meaning outside themselves, their uniqueness consists in a theocentric existence, and they therefore cannot be viewed in naturalistic fashion. The Bible does not point to one unique part or aspect of the person as God's image, but takes a more wholistic view. As entire beings combining spiritual and physical existence in personal and historical activity, humans reflect the God who is personal and who acts historically too.

One writer, following an ancient usage whereby the king was an image of the gods, their representative on earth, suggests that God's image in us means that we represent him who is spiritually present but physically unseen. We symbolize his presence in the way we combine the spiritual with the physical in this earthly life.

The New Testament points in a similar direction, for there it is the Son of Man who is the image of the invisible God. He is the eternal spirit incarnated and active physically, fully God and fully man, reaffirming thereby not only the value of creation generally but also that of human persons in particular. The value of being human is thus ultimately in bearing God's image in this world, an astounding calling indeed . . . . Our highest end, our all-inclusive supreme good is to glorify God and enjoy him forever . . . . as dependent, we must seek God in all we do. As responsible image-bearers, we represent the Creator in all of it too.49

This complex name perspectively distinguishes Christian theism from other alternatives. Integratively understood, it transforms and orients other basic relations. Holmes claims that we "do not exist in relation to God apart from but rather within our other relationships."50 He names three other crucial relations: nature, others, and self.
Our relationship with nature is characterized by both dependence and responsibility. We are dependent upon nature, and the sciences deepen our understanding of this profound dependence. As agents with some degree of transcendence we are not completely determined by natural forces. An overemphasis on dependence moves towards mechanistic naturalism; an overemphasis on transcendence results in naive understandings of human freedom which deny persons their identity as creatures of nature. Holmes rejects both an "other-worldliness" which depreciates the created order that God declares to be good and a "this-worldliness" which denies the idea of the sacred dimension of life. Over emphasis on either idea results in a "sacred-secular split." The dependent and responsible relation to nature named by Holmes results in an appreciation of science, art, physical pleasure, etc., as those activities are seen in relationship both to the Creator and to the universe brought forth through his purposeful creative action.51

The third and fourth relationships are those featured in Brown's communication model: interpersonal and intrapersonal relationships. Theocentric interpersonal relations are characterized by responsible interdependence. Holmes rejects the idea that our humanity can best be understood in individualistic terms. Persons need to give and receive love: they are meant to be God's representatives as loving agents. These relationships with others are to be characterized by the values of love and justice. Persons are to act toward one another in ways that acknowledge human dignity, worth, and value rooted in God's character. They are to treat others as persons, not as things used or
manipulated for selfish purposes. Holmes argues the potential result of such action:

If we relate to each other as persons, subject to subject with trust and openness and mutuality, then communication develops, and friendship. This is egalitarian, equal persons equally respected and equally responsible. It evokes love, not the eros that desires for oneself, often selfishly, but the agape that gives of oneself in serving the other. Such relationships to other persons are the matrix where freedom and responsibility come alive. I become my brother's keeper, and he becomes mine.52

The communication scholar might recast the first sentence with a stronger communication emphasis: "But if we communicate with each other as persons, subject to subject with trust and openness and mutuality, then relationship develops, and friendship."

In discussing the intrapersonal relationship Holmes argues that we need to avoid the polar extremes of either "the repression of individuality and freedom in oppressive systems of politics or economics and even in the family" or "the exaltation of freedom as savior and lord in narcissism and other individualistic extremes."53 The other three relationships, when properly valued, help establish and maintain a balanced concept of self. Holmes argues:

The limited nature of our freedom and the limited value of individuality are evident in our relational existence. I am a creature of God, subject to God's love and purposes. I depend on nature, which supplied my genetic materials and much of my environment. Other persons and the society of which I am part shape me too. Together, all of these relationships provide possibilities and parameters for what as an individual I can become. To that extent I am a product of relationships; my freedom is limited, I cannot do or be whatever I might want.

Yet I am not a product of these relationships alone. I am what I am, the individual I am, by virtue of the possibilities I have actualized out of many that existed. It depends on how by the grace of God I have put it all together, interiorizing experience, accepting, rejecting, sifting, reshaping. Human individuality is real, because God's image in man makes it possible for spirit to shape a life, and so I am in measure under
God my own doing.54

In discussing the person as an individual relational being, Holmes stresses two concepts: integrity and temporality. He argues that Biblically "the heart" is understood as the "integrating core of an individual's life character"; what a person values, loves, thinks about, and cherishes in life results in meaningful relationships and action.55 A person's conception of temporality is central to identity in that the present is understood in terms of past and future, especially the future reality of death. The "Christian view" of human temporality is structured by the ideas of God's providential and graceful action in human history. Holmes develops these ideas into a Christ-centered view of history discussed in chapter eight.56

Given this discussion of persons as relational, Brown's model can be thought of in at least two ways. First, as the model is relied upon to understand Holmes' discoursing upon the name "person" then it leads one to think of terms like "God," "persons," "self," "nature" and "relationships" in a nominalistic sense of reified abstractions. They are names created and made real by persons like Arthur F. Holmes through communication process. Their ontological status is of no concern, but the way they are processed as content categories and realized in ideological hierarchy is of central concern.

If one views Brown's model from the stance of Holmes' ontological description the question is raised, "What does Brown feature best and what does it leave out?" One ontological relationship not featured by the model is the person-nature relation. Nature is talked of not in an "onto-relational"57 sense, but in the sense that persons have ideas
about nature and advocate these ideas in the negotiation of world views. An onto-relational view would see communication process itself rooted in nature and explore how talk about nature is shaped and constrained by the practical necessities of that relationship. A second advocated ontological relationship is the God-person relation. Given Brown's formulation, at best all one can talk about are human ideas about God and their processing through observable behavior. A theistic understanding of the model would lead to modification open to revelation as communication process. Such a concept would be enhanced by an adequate man-nature relational component since Christian theism argues that God reveals himself both through his mighty acts in history and in the hearts of men. Holmes' personal agent model of God might be fruitful in such discussions, although Brown's process thrust is overtly more inclined to process theology understandings of revelation. What Brown's model features best are those interpersonal and intrapersonal relationships and the centrality of communication in their emergence and development.

In Holmes' dialogue about "persons," a second key term grows out of the relational notion. Persons are named as responsible agents. Earlier I showed Holmes' concern over naturalism's difficulty with talking in a perspectivally meaningful way about the terms "freedom" and "failure" if persons are understood as part of nature alone. Given Holmes' theistic relational view, persons are viewed as "obligated and answerable" before God for their relationships. Holmes summarizes:

If the relational character of the human person is one dominant theme that confronts us in Scripture, a second and equally dominant theme is that God holds us responsible. This
fact of being obligated and answerable to God is overwhelmingly clear, and distinguishes humans from other earthlings. We are responsible for imaging God's activity in the physical world. Our vocation is summed up in the creation mandate to be responsible for filling the earth and exercising dominion. We are here by divine appointment.

The scope of human responsibility includes the entire range of relationships we have just considered. We are obligated and answerable first and foremost and in everything to God, responsible for a relationship to him that is marked by creaturely worship and loving obedience, responsible therefore for how we think about God as well as how we act. We are responsible to him in our relationship to nature, for respecting our physical being and the natural resources with which we are entrusted, for using and conserving them wisely for economic and aesthetic and other ends, not with self-indulgent exploitation or abuse but with a grateful enjoyment that celebrates and responds to God's goodness. Responsible art and science, a responsible economy and technology, responsible bodily care and physical enjoyment—this is all implied. We are responsible too for other persons: I am always my brother's keeper. Social morality arises from respect for others, because their worth and dignity depends on their being God's creatures in God's image too. But respect for persons extends equally to myself as to others: I am responsible for how I treat myself and how I handle my present and future possibilities. Self-respect and personal development are matters of Christian stewardship.

To be responsible in any of these regards implies that I can do something that will make the relationship different. Freedom and responsibility are inseparable, for as creatures of God we are never completely autonomous or independent, never absolutely or unqualifiably free. We exist always in relation to God, with God-given freedom and with responsibility to him.58

In his discussion of responsibility, Holmes applies the personalistic model and argues that humans are both reflective beings responsible for the whole range of mental activity and valuing beings responsible for what and how they value. Their thinking and valuing are activities which shape other actions. When persons value something, they love it, and what they love orders and orients their action in the world. When they think and imagine they often do so in relation to both action projects and other persons.59 Chapter seven considers persons as reflective beings and the epistemological implications;
there I show that Holmes' understanding of the justification of beliefs is rooted in his view of persons as responsible, reflective and valuing agents in God's created order. Chapter eight discusses persons as valuing beings and the axiological implications, especially as those values are brought to bear upon ethical decisions and the creation of social institutions in history. Brown's model features how understandings of knowledge and values are relationally processed through words and deeds. His emphasis complements and extends Holmes' thinking. Holmes' view of persons potentially serves as a control perspective for communication theorizing.

The third category for Holmes' "three layered approach" to persons involves "relationships and responsibilities . . . radically affected by both sin and grace." Sin and grace are key terms in a Christian theism that attempts to remain true to the evangelical theological interpretation of Biblical data. Few terms seem as foreign to modern naturalists as "sin." Holmes comments, "Naturalists who see a human person as wholly a part and product of nature find no distinctively inner subject to hold responsible, but have to turn instead to outer influences which they claim make one what she is." As he highlights what he means by the term sin Holmes asserts three points. First, the root of all sin is human kind's refusal to accept the God-creation relationship and distinction. Rather, than living as God's unique creature pursuing God's purposes, humanity lives as lord of nature and works to accomplish its own purposes. Second, the sinful revolt against God penetrates all other relational responsibilities resulting in alienation. Third, sin
pervades both the inner and outer life of humanity. Inwardly it affects how one thinks, feels, and intends to act. Outwardly human sinfulness becomes a social reality affecting the structures, purposes, and operations of society.62

Holmes argues that the effects of sin are limited. Good is done, beauty is created, meaning and purpose are found by both Christians and non-Christians. He uses the theological concept of "common grace" to emphasize God's general providential limiting of the effects of human evil. His development of the theological idea of God's special grace and salvation is brief. He emphasizes the Christian theme, "God forgives sinners and . . . the new life in Christ is pervasive and more powerful than sin."63 He argues that God has dealt with human sinfulness and that his grace brings reconciliation; it penetrates and transforms those aspects of life affected by sin. Although God's grace brings present transformation in a fallen world, the Christian lives in hope of a future revelation of God's kingdom.

Given this understanding of persons as relational, responsible, fallen and redeemed, Holmes elaborates a theistic intensional understanding of the term "freedom":

A Christian conception of liberty now emerges. It is not the liberty of the individualist who accepts no responsibility to others except to respect their equal rights. John Stuart Mill's libertarianism, with its basic principle that only to avoid harm to others can liberty be restricted, falls short of the Kingdom of God. The rule of self-interest, from a Christian point of view, is bondage. Christian liberty is freedom from that, a freedom to obey the law of God from the heart and to serve others sacrificially in love. It is liberty limited by what creatureliness implies of interdependency and interrelatedness, and captivated by God's purposes. It renews the person, restores relationships, and gives a present taste of what the Kingdom of God was at creation intended to be, and what it will yet
Before closing this discussion, it should be noted that Holmes says little in his writings concerning certain perennial problems which characterize philosophical anthropology. One such area concerns the "mind-body" distinction and relationship. The quotation below conveys Holmes' presentation of the basic theistic components to be taken into account by a Christian philosopher and briefly comments on his personal preference as to a position:

The Biblical components for an acceptable view of persons are relatively simple, if we remember that the Scriptural notions of "soul" and "spirit" are not metaphysical concepts but more descriptive of functions. Our creaturely dependence on God for every aspect of our existence is the first. The uniqueness of persons in God's image is also crucial, along with the fact that we are ourselves agents whom God holds responsible for character and choices, thoughts and actions. Human beings too are capable of a kind of community that is unique in creation. As far as a future life is concerned, relatively little is said in Scripture about disembodied existence (between death and resurrection) beyond Paul's statement that absence from the body means being in the presence of God. The larger emphases and fuller statements refer to a fully orbed life following the resurrection of the dead. In this an essential unity of personality, functionally at least, is clear.

Within these parameters the alternatives are various. Some options may appear better suited than others if we think, for example, that Platonic and naturalist solutions squeeze the Biblical components out of their most natural shape. Some may appear more adaptable to our knowledge of cybernetics, or the like. My own preference is for a body-soul dualism in close organic unity, so that we function in many if not all regards as wholistic beings rather than having separate body functions and soul functions. But this preference must stop short of claiming that no other kind of view will do. We simply do not know enough to make so strong a claim.65

**Conclusion**

This chapter features Holmes' perspectival attention management concerning the two major perspectival themes that constitute Holmes'
version of "Christian theism." As a communicator Holmes effectively manages attention through an argumentative pattern. He presents ingredient ideas focusing them through contrast with naturalistic competitors. He articulates coherent relationships among them through a personalistic model, thus focusing elaborative attention potentially in the direction of an elaborative switch in categorizing. He develops his case using interdisciplinary materials drawn from the historical and contemporary dialogue among theologians, scientists, and philosophers. As he constructs a perspectival framework using these ideas, he leaves room for a number of detailed positions. Holmes' great strength lies in his clear presentation of ideas and his articulation of their possible relationships through the use of a personalist agency model. His dialogical rhetoric through which he enacts the philosopher role invites the reader to evaluate his proposals as personal possibilites. If Holmes is considered advocating perspectival conversion a weakness lies in his lack of description concerning how a position is experienced when accepted. He may do more of this than many philosophers, but one is left with the feeling that perspectival commitment is primarily a matter of ideas presented for thoughtful acceptance. I am not sure that one can adequately overcome this failure to create the feeling of a perspectival lived-world without shifting to narrative or another literary genre.66

Given my communication interests, a communication scholar would want to know more of the details of how these ideas, models, and asserted relationships and distinctions have come to be negotiated within interdisciplinary communities through time, and how they are
being made real by other contemporary evangelical scholars. Holmes' writings evidence to the fact that theological, philosophical, and scientific ideas proceed together in various relationships in the historical attempt to negotiate world views. As a world-view advocate, Holmes actively draws from diverse sources, using them critically to elaborate his perspectival commitment. His honesty, openness, and humility together as enactments of key action corollaries, make real his chosen disciplinary name, "Christian philosopher."

Personally I like Holmes' proposals. First, his emphasis upon what unifies Christians as a perspectival communication system draws attention away from elaborative differences that historically have split Christians into divisive groups. Attention focused on the perspectival level allows for an appreciation of diversified unity and opens some Christians to recategorize "enemies," now seeing them as perspectival allies. Second, his integration of perspectival themes on an agency model makes sense to me as one who participates in a disciplinary community where such a view has been stressed. It moves attention away from the conceptual anomalies of other models and motivates a re-thinking of the perspectival themes. Finally, I find his relational and responsible view of persons as agents to provide a strong philosophical grounding for my use of Brown's model, especially when combined with a metaphysical model of society developed in chapter eight.

It is now important to turn to Holmes' playing of these themes in the symphonic development of a world view. Chapter seven shows how he takes this theistic framework and manages elaborative attention in the
promotion of an epistemic switch towards "interpretive realism."
Chapter eight shows how this theist frame combined with the interpretive realism gestalt functions in Holmes' discoursing upon the world-view topics of values, society, and history. Throughout, Holmes can be seen as simultaneously focusing attention perspectivally and elaboratively. Perspectivally, he contrasts theism to naturalism and shows how the theist thinks, values, and acts in distinctively perspectival ways. Elaboratively, he develops gestalt positions which interpret perspectival themes in distinctive ways. Both chapters can be thought of as exemplifying the theme "faith seeks understanding."

As Holmes discourses upon these world view topics and provides rhetorical reasons for accepting asserted complex names, he reasons in an interdisciplinary fashion. He provides a theological/perspectival rationale for his proposals as well as more general philosophical reasons. Where relevant he develops ideas, models, and evidence from the scientific community. Throughout, his attempt is to provide a strong and broad case for those few gestalt-stance proposals that he asserts as "best choices." As a Christian philosopher who values pluralism, Holmes does not assert many such specific stances. When he does so, one finds an interdisciplinary rationale drawing attention towards that stance in a persuasive way. When he does so one also recognizes Aristotle's ethical proof functioning as Holmes risks his disciplinary credibility in asserting a way of seeing.

It is interesting to see the following chapters and Holmes' disciplinary identity in relation to his perspectival stance as articulated in this chapter. Holmes has attempted to develop an
interpretation of Christian theism that is truly open to all areas of human knowledge. In contrast to the naturalist, he is open to the idea that ultimate reality is not nature and that therefore the theologian must be listened to in making sense of human experiences of God. At the same time, seeing nature as real and ordered, Holmes also recognizes, along with the naturalists, that religious experiences do have a natural dimension that can be explored scientifically. In contrast to fundamentalist interpretations of the Christian perspective, Holmes recognizes that philosophers, scientists, and other scholars contribute to human knowledge. At the same time, seeing all knowledge as perspectival, Holmes also recognizes, along with the fundamentalists, that not all that is claimed to be known has the same epistemic status and that some thought should rightly be rejected as evil. Holmes' view of persons is theological while still relevant in relation to studies of persons within the social sciences. In short, Holmes has developed an interpretation of a perspectival stance that allows him to authentically participate as an evangelical scholar in the larger interdisciplinary dialogue about world view.

Holmes' articulation of this stance and the general contours of a Christian world view may be his great contribution as a world-view advocate. Holmes' great gift is his capacity to see both possibilities and limits in what he thinks about. He provides the Christian scholar a strategic way to think about and participate in the larger world of scholarship. Not only does he recommend how this should be done, but he also does it with integrity.
FOOTNOTES

1CW, p. 57.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., p. 58.
4Ibid.
5Ibid., p. 59.
6Ibid., pp. 60-61.
7Ibid., pp. 61-62.
8Ibid., p. 62.
9Ibid.
10Ibid., p. 64.
11Ibid.
12Ibid.
13Ibid.
14Ibid., pp. 65-67.
15Ibid., p. 67.
16Ibid.
17Ibid., p. 68.
18Ibid., p. 69.
19Ibid., pp. 69-70.
20Ibid., p. 71.
21Ibid., p. 73.
22Ibid., p. 74.
23Ibid.
24Ibid.
25Ibid.
26Ibid., p. 75.
27Ibid.
28Ibid., p. 76.
29Ibid.
30Ibid., p. 77.
31Ibid.
32Ibid., pp. 72-73.
33Ibid., p. 80.
34Ibid., pp. 80-81.
35Ibid., p. 81.


37CWV, pp. 85-87.
38Ibid., p. 88.
39Ibid., pp. 90-91.
40Ibid., p. 107.

41This paragraph briefly summarizes Holmes' discussion in CWV, pp. 92-100.
42Ibid., p. 97.
43Ibid., pp. 99-100.

44This paragraph briefly highlights Holmes' discussion in CWV, pp. 100-106.
46Ibid., p. 107.
47Ibid., pp. 107-126
48Ibid., pp. 107-108.
50Ibid., p. 110.
51Ibid., pp. 110-112.
52Ibid., p. 113.
53Ibid., p. 114.
54Ibid., p. 115.
55Ibid.
56Ibid.

57See Thomas Torrance, Reality and Evangelical Theology, pp. 42-51.
58Ibid., p. 117-118.
59Ibid., pp. 118-119.
60Ibid., p. 121.
61Ibid.
63Ibid., p. 125.
64Ibid., pp. 125-126.
65Ibid., pp. 120-121.

66I personally think this is the great strength of C.S. Lewis. He writes both fiction and non-fiction, and his creative use of language in non-fiction has a unique quality matched by few.
CHAPTER VII

FAITH SEEKS UNDERSTANDING: INTERPRETIVE REALISM

AS A CREATIONAL EPISTEMOLOGY

Introduction

Having surveyed the unifying themes of Holmes' perspectival stance of Christian theism I now turn to a universal topic of world-view discourse: epistemology. Every world-view community develops perspectival understandings of what persons know and how they come to know. For some communities these understandings seem widely shared and taken for granted. In other communities a deconstruction of an epistemic gestalt occurs and questions about knowledge become crisis issues of conflict.

Holmes' life work has found one primary focus as a world-viewish elaborative advocate of epistemological concerns. His dissertation, his books, and many of his articles discourse upon what and how persons know, the nature of human knowledge, the implications of epistemology for education, theology, morality, etc. His writing and teaching have significantly contributed to the epistemological dialogue among evangelical scholars. He has functioned as a change agent in promoting an elaborative epistemological attention shift away from a "critical" epistemological theory to what Polanyi named a "post-critical philosophy."
Working as an interdisciplinary world-view advocate among evangelical scholars and thus realizing his role as a perspectival participant in the philosophical disciplinary community, Holmes mediates a major shift in understanding "knowledge." Jerry Gill describes an epistemic shift within the community of philosophers as an "axial shift." He summarizes this attention switch led by three key modern philosophers:

The defining characteristics of critical philosophy cluster around three concepts: experience, meaning, and knowledge. As an overall posture it is the legacy of Descartes, Hume, and Kant in the Enlightenment, and Russell, the young Wittgenstein, and A.J. Ayer in the twentieth century. Experience is viewed as essentially a passive encounter with discrete "objects" of physical reality. Meaning is defined in terms of a static, one-to-one relationship between objects and linguistic signs. Knowledge is based exclusively on an explicit process of inference from evidence to conclusion . . . .

The cutting edge of the above posture, indeed the point of the term "critical philosophy," is the assumption that all epistemological claims can and must be subjected to critical analysis in which the meaning of each and every term is rigorously specified and in which belief is never allowed to exceed objectifiable data and/or premises. In a word, the hallmark of critical philosophy is the demand that all aspects of experience, meaning, and knowledge be made explicit in a strict, rational sense. There are no reasons which reason knows not of.

The consequences of this approach for the philosophy of religion—as well as for all disciplines that deal with intangible dimensions of human experience—have been disastrous. For intangible reality is by definition out of the question for a philosophy that assumes the necessity and the possibility of making everything explicit. Whatever religious claims mean, it is clear that they involve the affirmation of a reality which in some sense transcends the observable and the explicit. Thus the present stalemate in the philosophy of religion.

Some have sought to overcome this standoff by advocating an existentialist posture in which religious belief is viewed as a matter of sheer commitment quite apart from any cognitive claims. In addition to finding this option basically irresponsible both philosophically and religiously—primarily because it provides no way of distinguishing between authentic commitment and credulity—I find it inadequate because generally it grants too much to established, critical philosophy. Simply to concede cognitivity, or to protest against its captivity at the hands of a
narrow definition of reason by taking an irrationalist stance, is
to fail to strike at the root of the difficulty. The very board
on which the game has been played needs to be exchanged for a
fresh one. Or, to change the metaphor (which is not merely a
semantic triviality), the axis around which the issues orbit needs
to be relocated.

My alteration of the epistemological axis of philosophy of
religion is designated "post-critical," a term of Michael
Polanyi's, in order to indicate that I am not advocating a naïve,
romanticist return to a classical/medieval perspective. The
insights of modern thinkers are valuable in and of themselves;
they only become insidious and debilitating when transformed into
dogmas. This latter phenomenon can only be avoided by a thorough
reconsideration of the actual character and shape of experience,
meaning, and knowing. To put it pointedly, it is imperative not
to lose sight of the fact that each of these dimensions of human
existence can only take place within the space provided by certain
factors which themselves cannot be explicitly analyzed and which
are nevertheless embodied in the very act of rational analysis.

The fulcrum for effecting a relocation of the epistemological
axis has been provided by three quite diverse contemporary
thinkers whose works intertwine around the three major themes of
experience, meaning, and knowledge. Merleau-Ponty's
phenomenological explorations of experience, Wittgenstein's later
investigations of language, and Michael Polanyi's insights
concerning the personal and tacit foundations of knowing all
combine to form a radically different epistemological fabric...

The unifying motif that draws these thinkers and themes
together is that of active participation. Each philosopher
stresses the constitutive character of human participation in
relation to the nature of experience, meaning, and knowledge.
This motif runs absolutely contrary to the passive, static, and
objectifying emphasis of critical philosophy. Post-critical
philosophy acknowledges the relational and bedrock character of
the structure of the human "form of life" or way of
"being-in-the-world" and seeks to understand understanding by
accrediting this relational involvement rather than viewing it as
a form of contamination. It stresses the primordial and logically
primitive quality of intentionality and trust in giving rise to
knowledge, experience, and meaning.

All of this produces positive results for the philosophy of
religion . . . . The crucial notions of revelation, God talk, and
religious truth are interpreted in the light of the fresh point of
departure provided by post-critical philosophy. Revelation and
religious experience are treated as mediated in and through the
other dimensions of reality. God talk is understood as
multidimensional and metaphorical in nature, as neither "literal"
or "symbolic" but nevertheless cognitive. Religious truth is
viewed as having an essentially tacit basis and structure, as
would befit knowledge of mediated reality expressed
metaphorically. Interpreting these crucial notions in this way
liberates them from the confinement imposed by the self-negating
dogmas of critical philosophy.²

An entire dissertation could be devoted to Holmes and other key
scholars like him who work as epistemological change agents among
evangelicals. Holmes' work is not a slavish copy of other
philosophers. Enacting the philosophical action corollary of dialogue
discussed in chapter three, Holmes personally wrestles with
contemporary thought and develops a personal epistemological stance
through that authentic dialogue. Chapter three shows Holmes' overall
methodological position developed in Christian Philosophy in the
Twentieth Century. That perspectival methodological thesis was worked
out in dialogue with analytic, existential, and phenomenological
thinkers. In his next major work, Faith Seeks Understanding, he
developed an epistemological stance of "interpretive realism" in light
of modern epistemic discussions among philosophers, theologians,
scientists and others concerning the conceived anomalies of various
epistemic stances including naive realism, phenomenalism, dogmatism,
idealism, and existentialism, etc.

This chapter does not provide the detail of the Holmesian dialogue
nor a philosophical critique of his position. Its scope is more
modest. First, it features (1) perspectival attention management
concerning a basic theistic epistemic framework adduced from the
controlling perspectival beliefs outlined in chapter six, and (2)
elaborative attention management concerning a distinctive creational
epistemic gestalt of interpretive realism. Holmes accomplishes the
latter by conceiving of a key anomaly in modern epistemological
theories concerning the relationships between belief and knowledge, practice and theory, subjectivity and objectivity. He manages attention through a whole-part argument that recategorizes these epistemic relationships and promotes interpretive realism as a needs-meeting attention switch. Finally, I consider Holmes' theory of the justification of belief articulated from the stance of interpretive realism and sensitive to his view of persons developed in chapter six. Some material in that section extends ideas covered in chapter three concerning the "rhetoric of philosophical decisions." I consider his theory of justification as potentially providing tactical topoi to be further studied by communication scholars interested in the process of world-view justification. In chapter eight I consider some of the consequences or "ripple effects" of this interpretive-realism switch as it is applied in Holmes' discourse on the world-view topics of moral, social and historical knowledge. This chapter concludes with some communication implications. I limit my comments there to the implications for studies of world views as communication process.

A Creational Epistemic Framework: Perspectival Attention Management

The basic themes of an authentically held unifying perspective have implications for a theory of knowledge. Conversely, a coherent theory of knowledge illuminates and promotes the think-with-ability of basic perspectival themes. Holmes wants to avoid two extremes as he develops an epistemic view. He rejects the proud dogmatism of rationalistic and empiricist foundationalism as well as the sceptical despair of subjectivists and relativists. He believes that the
God-creation relationship and distinction theme can be played out epistemically in the adduction of a framework that allows for "confident humility": the distinction implies "epistemic humility," the relationship implies "epistemic hope."5

Chapter three explicates Holmes' position that an authentically held perspective is developed into a world view through the process of adduction in a manner analogous to the composer's creative, thematic development of a symphony. Ideally this adductive process is a responsible action guided by a perspectival commitment authentically held as a reliable stance from which the whole of life can be understood. Holmes argues that this development of a perspective is motivated through the "allure of truth," which leads one to take seriously both empirical and rational considerations in the honest and open-ended exploration of life.6 In the following passage the creational theme of Christian theism is articulated as a general epistemic orientation:

A Christian theory of knowledge must reckon first with the creatureliness of man. On the one hand God fully knows himself and his creation, and his perfect knowledge is both the source and the norm of truth for men. On the other hand, God's knowledge is neither fully or directly open to human inspection so that our knowledge neither exhausts the range of information known to God nor fully comprehends the meaning of any one thing. We "know in part" and "see through a glass darkly." Creation, in other words, is an asymmetrical relationship: God's knowledge is complete and self contained independently of man, but finite man is epistemologically as well as metaphysically and morally dependent on God.7

This chapter shows how this creational theme guides Holmes' epistemic rhetoric. Holmes' books, especially Faith Seeks Understanding and All Truth is God's Truth, are extended discourses
which manage attention at the perspectival level to articulate a theistic framework and at the elaborative level to take a stance within this creational frame of knowledge. Holmes brings these ideas into sharp focus in his *Contours of a World View*. There he specifically outlines the seven ingredient ideas of the unifying theme of Christian theism and articulates the epistemic implications he adduces from them:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Creation</th>
<th>Epistemological Consequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) transcendent God, creating ex nihilo</td>
<td>- a locus of unchanging truth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) living God, creatively active</td>
<td>- &quot;God with us&quot; in our knowing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) purposeful creation</td>
<td>- the possibility of revelation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) delegated powers</td>
<td>- the knowledge we need in responding to God's purposes is accessible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) an ordered creation</td>
<td>- our cognitive powers are God-given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) creation has value</td>
<td>- knowledge and wisdom are possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) creational tasks</td>
<td>- reason itself is law-governed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- human knowledge has value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- error is due to either natural lack or moral perversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- a mandate to seek and act on the understanding that is possible⑧</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Holmes develops these implications by advancing four claims which provide a creational epistemological framework. Within this framework, various theistic epistemic gestalts can be and are developed resulting in a pluralism. Within this frame Holmes adduces his own stance of interpretive realism.
According to Holmes, the four structuring claims of the creational frame are: (1) God is the transcendent and personal locus for truth; (2) God's relationship to persons is the basis for human epistemic hope; (3) there is a Christocentric unity of truth; and (4) human knowledge is possible yet always affected by humanity's finite and fallen nature. As Holmes advances these claims he does so in perspectival contrast to much of modern thought. He describes contemporary persons as having grown intensely uncomfortable with notions like absolute truth, the universality of truth, and the unity of truth. Holmes' position at this level is one about which most evangelicals would agree. This discussion of framework ideas can be seen as perspectival discourse that unifies a world-view community by contrasting it to other perspectival traditions. Below are the outlines of this creational epistemic as articulated by Holmes. Note throughout how personal perspectival meaning functions to give distinctive intensional meaning to epistemic terms including "truth" and "knowledge."

Holmes summarizes the first epistemic claim in the statement, "All truth is God's truth." God the Creator is the transcendent locus, the ultimate point of reference in Christian discussions of truth. Holmes argues, "God's own knowledge, all inclusive, perfect and unchanging, is the ultimate locus for truth. To say something is true, then, properly includes the claim that God knows it to be the case." "Truth" in a creational framework takes on distinctive intensional meanings. First, it is understood as absolute and unchanging; it is objective to persons as knowing creatures. Human knowledge of God's truth is
relative and may be distorted, but God knows perfectly. Second, truth is also personal. In contrast to Plato's view of truth as "a self-existent and independent thing," Christians view truth as "a property rather than a thing, a property ultimately of God's wisdom and knowledge and only derivatively of ours."¹¹

The second claim involves the God-creation relationship as the basis for epistemic hope. In contrast both to the Greek view of humans wrestling knowledge from the gods and to a naturalistic view of humans wrestling knowledge from nature, the Christian view sees persons as "invited to inquire by one who purposely made nature orderly and gave men and women the intelligence to discover its laws."¹² God, who is perfect and unlimited in knowledge "is with us in our knowing, a continually active and revealing God . . . . All we can know and shall ever know is thanks to God and still depends on him."¹³

Holmes believes that the Christian hope for reliable knowledge of truth is based upon God's personal reliability. He develops the creational idea of "truth as reliability":

This notion of "reliability" is central to the Biblical concept of truth. The Old Testament word for truth (emeth) is used primarily of moral qualities like loyalty, veracity, and faithfulness in keeping one's word. People can be faithful, but God himself is the wholly reliable one who can be trusted completely. He is true. The same notion is conveyed in the New Testament. We read of faithful men and faithful (reliable) sayings, and of a true (or reliable) vine. Words can be both trustworthy and true (Rev. 21:5; 22:6), for a true statement is one that honestly tells us how things really are. A true belief about something is one that is assured. To know the truth is to have reliable knowledge that should be followed. Said the Pharisees to Jesus, "we know that you are true and teach the way of God truthfully....tell us, then, what do you think?" (Matt. 22:16-17). Even in their scepticism, they realized that whatever is truthful should be heard and followed: to walk in the truth is to act on it. Hence one can "suppress the truth" by wickedness...
(Rom. 1:18) as well as by verbal denials. Truth as reliability is then a property of people, and derivatively of assertions, teachings, beliefs and purported knowledge. It is a reliability and trustworthiness that warrant belief and action. Do as he says! Believe it! Act on it! You can trust him! It's true! Truth is not something impersonal, purely theoretical or impracticable. It is something we can firmly believe and confidently live by.14

In a similar way, Holmes develops a creational idea of personal knowledge in contrast to the Greek idea of knowledge as theoretical objectivity:

For the Greek philosophers knowledge is episteme; the noun form as well as its meaning suggests something abstract, objective, and conclusive. The further term theoria suggests the theoretical, or a spectator attitude to life. The Biblical writers prefer the broader terms ginosko and epiginosko, verbs whose action suggests "epistemological subjectivity." They emphasize less the static qualities of objects and more the human act of knowing, be it hearing or seeing, or having moral convictions, or knowing other people, or knowing God. The verb is even used in the Septuagint of marital intercourse: plainly a man does not "know" his wife in a detached, theoretical way, nor is our knowledge of God and his grace detached and theoretical either. To know is to know for oneself, to interiorize what is learned, to act on it, to make it one's own. Such knowledge is life related: it not only affects personality and conduct but is part of life's action. Knowledge, being personal . . . , brings responsibility: a man must measure up to the truth he knows and behave accordingly, or the very truth condemns him. He must "do the "truth" he knows (e.g., I John 1:6,8; 2:4; 3:18-19).15

To argue that knowledge is personal is not to argue that knowledge is completely subjective. Holmes reasons that both objective and subjective conditions shape personal knowledge: Objective conditions include those aspects of the created order that are intelligible to us and stand over us as knowing creatures. Subjective conditions include the responsible use of our cognitive ability delegated to us by God. Such cognitive processes are law-governed; there is a valid distinction between sound and unsound reasoning. Other subjective factors like
emotions, fatigue, environmental, sociological, and psychological conditions affect the scrutiny of evidence and clear thinking.\textsuperscript{16}

The view that God is active in all human knowing implies that personal knowledge of God is dependent upon (1) his being with persons and revealing himself in historical deeds and in scripture and (2) their being open to his revelation and thinking responsibly to understand it:

Theism logically implies the possibility of Divine self-revelation, for the living God is active in his creation, active therefore in relation to our knowing and especially in our knowing him. Since the whole creation bears witness, along with the way we are made, we can appropriately refer to this as general revelation of God. But God has revealed himself far more explicitly and fully in his redeeming work and most fully in Jesus Christ: this, along with the Biblical record of it, provides a more specific revelation that is reliable, true.

Again, objective and subjective conditions are at work, and for both we depend on God. The objective conditions include the historical acts of God, the incarnate Christ, the intelligible and reliable Biblical record. They are all necessary to the knowledge God intended. The subjective conditions include our God-given ability to read and understand, to perceive the truth about God and his grace, to respond believingly to the Christ. But this involves our values, for it takes an open heart and mind. For this too we depend on the goodness of God.

The Bible is crucial to human knowledge, but not just in supplying extra tidbits of information, nor even in adding a knowledge of theology to our knowledge of nature. It is crucial to our knowledge of God. In it we meet the God who acts. We meet the Christ, the living Logos, whose coming best reveals our maker, his purposes and his love. Our more general knowledge is fragmented by itself, hungry for unity and purpose. It provides the context in which and to which the Bible speaks, the backdrop of the Biblical frame wherein our place in nature as both the glory and shame of the universe, along with the meaning of human culture, our sensitivity to people and their needs, our religious hopes and emptiness, are all addressed. Scripture reveals the maker of nature's splendors; it speaks of his purposes that should shape our values and culture, of a new man as well as the old, and of a "pure religion and undefiled" that serves Christ in serving others. In revealing God in Christ it calls us to thought and life that is whole. Everything else then falls into place.

The theistic basis for knowledge, then, includes not only the possibility of divine self-revelation that is implicit in theism
as such, but also its actuality. It is therefore completely consonant with all this to speak of Christ as the living word of God, and of the Bible as God's word written. The Protestant Reformers spoke of Scripture as the only final and sufficient rule of faith and life, a decisive and unchanging point of reference to which we can be held accountable. As God's word its authority, like that of Christ himself, extends over every area of thought of life.17

The third epistemic claim concerning the Christocentric unity of truth, grows out of the first two. If all truth is God's truth, then truth is unified as a whole in God's personal knowledge of it. If human knowing is based upon God's relationship with his created order, then human knowledge finds unity as it is properly related to God and bears witness to his purposes in creation. This unifying relationship of the human knower to God's knowledge implies that all human knowledge of truth is sacred, whatever the specific nature of the truth known: scientific, personal, metaphysical, moral, historical, theological, etc. Thus far this is a theocentric view, but Holmes argues for a Christocentric coherence of truth:

The Bible pushes us one step further from a general theocentric view to a Christocentric unity of truth. For its unifying theme is the promise and advent of Christ. Other themes are treated in this context, and so the whole of Scripture is properly read in this light . . . . The Christ incarnated himself in nature, in history, in human culture, in all that makes up the human situation.18

This unifying principle orients Christian thinking and must be worked out in areas of scholarship and practical involvement. For Holmes this idea provides a rationale and key categories for his concepts of "Christian philosophy" and "Christian world view." For him, the attempt to find Christocentric integration in all of life is a creational mandate, a task variously pursued by persons across the
whole of life. 19

The fourth control idea in Holmes' epistemic framework emphasizes the God-creation distinction and the resulting epistemic humility necessary for human knowers. In principle the Christocentric knowledge of truth is possible; in practice human knowers fall short of the ideal. First, persons are seen as finite, limited, fallible, and dependent. Holmes asserts:

We lack clarity . . . concentration . . . information . . . time . . . objectivity . . . Lack of concentration . . . reflects our emotional, physical, and social ties and limitations. Lack of objectivity is due to our personal and historical needs and involvements . . . . We know in part. We see through a glass darkly. Human knowledge is at best a progress report, and, because we have to make judgements notwithstanding these limitations, it remains fallible. Our information may get outdated; our arguments may be invalidated; our interpretations and theories may be shot down. 20

A second difficulty for human knowers is that they are fallen. Some epistemic failures are the result of sinful pride, laziness, wasted intellectual energy, prejudice, and carelessness. Because of finiteness and fallenness there is ambiguity and doubt in human knowing. Yet for Holmes there is also epistemic hope because God preserves the possibility for reliable knowledge necessary for responsible practical action in the created order. Human reason is reliable, a good gift from God to be properly stewarded. There are objective conditions for knowledge under which human epistemic claims stand and are tested. 21

All of this brings one back to Holmes' central philosophical notion that persons responsibly pursue knowledge guided by their authentic perspectival commitment. Holmes argues about the
relationship between Christian commitment and human rational activity:

I speak of "responsibility to seek", because another pervasive factor in the human nature of knowing is the relation of personal commitment to rational activity. Whereas the existentialist and the 'rationalist might try to separate these two, a Christian view of knowing recognizes that separation is impossible. In fact, once the world-view dependency of epistemology is recognized, and once the effects of prephilosophical beliefs, attitudes and values is seen, the separation of commitment from knowing breaks down.

By "commitment," I mean a whole-hearted and whole-life involvement such as any world view and any religious or quasi-religious faith entails. Commitment in this sense and rational activity are inseparable, for reasoning is a personal activity, inevitably affected by our most basic beliefs and values. That Christian commitment influences thought, and thought contributes to Christian commitment is evident in a variety of ways . . . .

4. Christian commitment includes assent to true beliefs, but is much more than that.
5. Christian commitment brings unity to both thought and life.
6. Christian commitment grounds confidence in knowing.
8. Reason articulates and elaborates on those beliefs.
9. Reason pursues cultural tasks mandated, illuminated and informed by Christian commitment.

The point is two fold. First, other commitments are related to thought in analogous ways, so that what we have said provides a basis for developing a personalistic approach to human knowledge.
Second, it underscores human responsibility in the quest for truth. Universal objective and subjective preconditions for knowing are largely given, and we are of course responsible for using such resources wisely and well. But commitment is an individual affair: commitments vary. We need to scrutinize our commitments and the perspective they give lest we suppress the truth as the Bible warns. An unexamined life of learning is not worth living.22

Thus far Holmes' rhetoric has featured perspectival themes in adducing an epistemological framework shared by Christian theists. His rhetorical purpose at this level is to articulate a frame that (1) unifies the diversity among evangelical scholars as it stresses basic perspectival beliefs and thus contrasts theists to other perspectival traditions, (2) provides an overarching rationale for knowledge within which more specific epistemic stances may be taken, and (3) opens the reader to a particular epistemic stance which Holmes calls interpretive realism. This perspectival framework opens the way for an elaborative switch because it is sensitive both to current epistemic issues in the larger interdisciplinary community and to splits among contemporary evangelical scholars.

Holmes' articulation of the creational epistemological frame is well tuned to many contemporary ideas in theology and philosophy. Gill's quote earlier stressed the axial shift in philosophy which emphasizes the personal nature of knowledge. Among many contemporary evangelical theologians, there is concern and conflict over uniting personal (existential) and propositional (cognitive) understandings of knowledge.23 Holmes' creational frame and its mutual emphasis on (1) both objective and subjective concerns and (2) the distinction between God's knowledge and human knowledge, allows one to see how such
conceptual splits emerge among evangelicals if their thinking style emphasizes "either-or" categorizing. Holmes' "both-and" articulation of a framework opens a path for resolving this theological controversy. His advocacy of interpretive realism promotes the path he has developed.

Interpretive Realism as an Epistemic Gestalt: An Elaborative Attention Switch

The creational epistemological framework potentially unifies Christians in their thinking about "truth" and "knowledge," especially as it perspectivally contrasts them to alternative perspectival epistemic frameworks. Within the creational frame there is room for diverse epistemic gestalts. Particular elaborations emerge as the creational ideas are variously modelled. Evangelical scholars display a pluralism in their epistemic theories, and Holmes can be seen as an elaborate advocate promoting "interpretive realism" as one such gestalt.

Primarily Holmes promotes his view through a disciplinary approach: (1) highlighting the general epistemological continuum that structures philosophical discoursing upon epistemology, (2) tackling key conceptual problems that concern philosophers, and (3) developing his personal position in light of key tensions experienced in the philosophical community. Holmes does all this as a Christian philosopher, thinking perspectivally and processing a contemporary world view. Therefore, he also provides interdisciplinary reasons for "interpretive realism." His processing of an epistemological stand has
rhetorical implications. First, the disciplinary rationale for interpretive realism is relevant outside of Christian circles; it is a part of what Gill labels the axial-shift to post critical philosophy. Second, Holmes generally avoids becoming bogged down in evangelical factions concerning the topic, although he certainly takes strong stands, as chapter two's discussion of his contrast to Clark's Christian rationalism indicates. Third, his position has withstood, and has been modified through, criticism from philosophers whose primary concern is epistemology. Therefore his advocacy of it potentially has greater credibility among evangelical scholars. Those evangelicals who, like Holmes, participate in contemporary scholarship and experience the contemporary epistemic tensions may find Holmes' stance as intrapersonally needs-meeting, especially as he provides both philosophical and theological reasons for his gestalt. Conversely, others may see Holmes' epistemic gestalt as importing worldly ideas in heavenly language, thus, endangering "Christian" thinking. Personally I find Holmes' interpretive realism needs-meeting. It articulates a view of knowing that fits the central thrust of Brown's model of knowledge as communication process while indicating limits to human interpretive processes. In turning now to Holmes' proposal, highlighted first is his featuring of how philosophical attention has historically shifted and is now shifting concerning key epistemica relationships.

Brown argues that human attention can be thought of as moving between polar terms of a conceptual continuum. An attention switch occurs when such attention moves from one interpretive gestalt to
another in such a manner that reality is experienced and understood differently. Holmes' description of the history of philosophy and its shifting epistemological understanding exemplifies Brown's claim. As I showed in chapter three, Holmes highlights this philosophical shift and characterizes it as a move from dogmatism to scepticism. The dogmatic rationalism of Enlightenment philosophers with its emphasis on the logical and propositional nature of knowledge eventually resulted in a revolution which stressed relative and personal aspects of knowledge. Interestingly both extremes articulate certain key epistemic relationships in a similar manner. Both see belief and knowledge, practice and theory, subjectivity and objectivity, as disjunctively related terms. The rationalists emphasize knowledge, theory, and objectivity, while the sceptics stress belief, practice, and subjectivity. It is at this point that Holmes focuses attention and offers a new way of epistemic seeing. Rather than disjunctive thinking concerning these terms, Holmes calls for integrative thinking based upon a whole-part model: belief is the whole and knowledge is justified belief; practice is the whole and theoretical thought is one important human project; subjectivity is the whole and objectivity is a responsible move made by a subject who values truth.

As Holmes charts the dialogue on these three epistemic relations in the history of philosophy, he finds a recurring attention management pattern: Greek and Enlightenment rationalists sought an objectively certain knowledge in contrast to mere belief; they stressed theoretical knowledge as detached and neutral objectivity devoid of subjective involvement on the part of the knower. Both Hume and Kant are
portrayed as key change agents who shifted philosophical attention in a revolutionary direction. Their followers often went to extremes, completely rejecting the epistemic ideals of earlier thinkers and thus stressing subjectively based beliefs over certain knowledge, the primacy of practical involvement in life over detached contemplation, and subjectivity of the knower over the notion of autonomous reason. The revolt against dogmatic rationalism resulted in a relativistic scepticism premised upon disjunctive understandings.24

As Holmes features the anomaly of both extremes he argues that problems arose because of exaggerated distinctions premised upon an either/or pattern of thinking. He argues that knowledge and belief, theory and practice, objectivity and subjectivity are intimately related and suggests the use of a whole-part pattern which would lead one to conceive of these relationships integratively. First, he considers the relationship between belief and knowledge. For Holmes there is no infallible human knowledge for finite and fallen creatures, but there is knowledge in the sense that certain beliefs are strongly supported by evidence, argument, and personal conviction and therefore more "justified" than other beliefs. Knowledge, then, is belief that has practical, contextual justification:

The knowledge-belief distinction cannot be drawn between the infallible and fallible, for the human nature of knowing does not admit infallibility. Nor should the distinction be placed between the rational and the emotive, as if knowing is completely rational and not at all emotive, while belief is emotive and not rationally based in any way. Nor can it be reduced to a simple conjunction that adds beliefs to what is certain. Somehow the two are more intimately related, more integrated with each other than that . . . . . . . Belief involves the human subject and is more holistically personal than any detached and purely logical inquiry . . . . . . The act of belief is the act of a person, related to all that a person
The relation then is that of the whole to the part, not that of one part to just another. Kierkegaard says this forcefully. He complained that the age of reason, the Enlightenment, was an age without passion. Passion is not just a passing emotion; it is whole-hearted, whole-personal concern and involvement. An age without passion, he declares, is an age without values—whether religious, ethical, economic or political values, or intellectual for that matter. Unless I believe in truth and love the truth heartily, what intellectual values do I have? Will I give myself intensely to knowing? Man does not live or even think by reason alone. Out of his heart comes his thinking.

If the two are thus related, then evidence and argument and degrees of certainty are admissible in belief. Recent epistemology does not continue the Platonic distinction, but sees knowledge as a sub-set of belief, part of a larger whole. Knowledge is defined as "justified true belief." Attention is on the cognitive content of belief rather than on the more whole-personal act; and within the cognitive content of belief some can be called knowledge, distinguished within the compass of belief by evidence that justifies one in believing. To prove a belief indisputably true may be asking too much of human knowing, but to justify believing it true is not. Fallibility is admitted, yet the evidence and argument may still be sufficient to justify belief.

These two developments, the whole-personal/part-personal distinction and the justification of belief, clearly provide a mediating alternative between the rationalist and sceptic extremes. It coheres much better with a creational point of view, for it combines the epistemic modesty of a fallibilist position with the epistemic hope of being sure.25

Second, concerning the theory-practice relationship Holmes develops his position in light of both the strengths and weaknesses of the philosophical extremes he rejects. He ties belief and knowledge to the practical necessities of living as responsible agents capable of reflective thought. His featuring of anomalies and his development of a relational name is done using his creational epistemic framework as a set of control belief:

From a creational standpoint the main problem with the practice extreme is its anthropocentrism; and from that, relativism follows. But the theory-extreme has problems too; its elitism, its lack of epistemic modesty, its failure to see that the creature and his knowledge exist in order to serve, and its
tendency to reduce the person to one part of the person, the rational . . . . Is another alternative to this either/or possible? How can the two be better related?

First, we remind ourselves of a strength in the Platonic model, the recognition of a cosmic order that transcends all change. This gave epistemic confidence that unchanging knowledge of unchanging order is in principle possible, whereas unchanging knowledge of changing particulars is not. From a theist standpoint, too, this is an ordered universe, a law-governed creation. Not everything is in flux; not every old order changes, giving place to new. The practicalist extremes see change with little uniformity, little order that we cannot change. The theist sees that order is the context for change, that it makes wise change possible, and that a theoretical knowledge that understands the order is requisite for purposeful action. She is committed to both order and change, the orderliness of creation and redemptive change. Both theoretical and practical knowledge are therefore needed: educationally, practice needs theory, and theory makes a difference to practice; and theoretical disciplines underlie our "how-to-do-its" in every walk of life.

Second, a human being is not to be distinguished in Cartesian terms primarily as a rational being but as a person, a responsible agent who acts. In the context of action arise thought and theory, but they are not always situationally addressed as for Dewey, for theoretical thought is itself a responsible activity for people in God's creation. We rightly explore the works of God and contemplate their maker. Contemplating, we stand in awe, though contemplation also equips for action.

Again we have a whole-part distinction. The Scottish realists of the eighteenth century seem to have recognized it. Their epistemology focused on "common sense beliefs" that are so necessary to the conduct of life that we cannot live and act without them. Such beliefs are established not by rational proofs but by virtue of the fact that God made both us and the world as he did. Theoretical thought is a part, derived from the whole practice of life and serving it well, both by informing specific activities and by contemplating God and his creation. Belief is wholistic, arising from the practice of life and essential to action. So it appears that belief and practice are partners which knowledge and theory serve.

Finally, as Holmes considers the subjectivity of the human knower involved in a complex universe, he argues the need for an epistemic gestalt which takes seriously both subjective and objective dimensions of human knowing and their integral relationship. In the context of this subjectivity-objectivity discussion he develops the epistemic
stance of "interpretive realism." As an elaboration on the name he comments, "It is realistic in affirming the independent objective nature of the things known, their metaphysical objectivity. It is interpretive in affirming that to know is always to interpret the facts that are given, so that epistemological subjectivity is present." To promote this shift in epistemological understanding Holmes employs the rhetorical maneuver of conceptual clarification. In the extensive quotation below Holmes develops and applies his central distinction between (1) epistemological and (2) metaphysical objectivity and subjectivity. Note how he masks anomalies that may be featured by critics and argues that this adduced idea fits both the creational framework and human experience:

Some third alternative then is needful in epistemology other than the extremes of complete objectivity and complete subjectivity. We can take a first step towards it by adopting a distinction . . . between two very different senses of objectivity and subjectivity that are often confused, the metaphysical and epistemological. Metaphysical objectivity is the objective reality of a state of affairs independently of whether or not we know or believe anything about it at all. Thus sticks and stones and cabbages and kings exist objectively, and so does God: God knows it is so, whatever any of us mortals think, and his knowledge is the ultimate locus for all truth about reality. But unicorns and centaurs have no such metaphysical objectivity, at least in the sense of reality we apply to cabbages or dogs. They exist only in our imagination and myths, in our minds, dependent on their being known. Another case is my own daughter, for I have none. Her status is entirely imaginary, in my mind, metaphysically subjective. The scientific humanist will claim that God, like Santa Claus and centaurs, is metaphysically subjective too, existing only in mythology and imagination and, like some vague fear, he is "all in your mind." He exists nowhere else independently.

On the other hand, epistemological objectivity is the knower's attitude of detachment, uncern, uninvolve in regards to an object of inquiry. Epistemological subjectivity is his involvement and personal concern with whatever it is he may know.
The distinction pays dividends. Some rationalists are concerned that any admission of subjectivity is a denial of metaphysical as well as epistemological objectivity, but that patently is not the case and does not logically follow. My knowledge of what is independently real may well be subjectively influenced and may involve me passionately, but that does not affect its metaphysical status. Metaphysical objectivity and epistemological subjectivity are quite compatible with each other and come ready-mixed all the time. Fears to the contrary were unfounded.

Again, the romanticist complains that reason is cold and impersonal; this is equally unfounded. The Enlightenment may have idolized that sort of epistemological objectivity, but it is not necessary at all. If the pursuit of truth flows really from the love of truth, impassioned inquiry naturally follows.

Yet again, concern is heard that once we admit subjectivity, all objective controls are lost. Objectivity and subjectivity, both in the metaphysical sense, may indeed be incompatible and mutually exclusive, but not epistemologically. Objective controls do still operate—public evidence and logical arguments for example—at the same time as subjective influences like predispositions, fears and hopes, and they can even make us change our minds, resolve our fears and abandon some hopes. Knowing is in every case an individual mix of subjective and objective factors.

This fits well with the creational view of creaturely dependence and finiteness, for it is the not-so-simple nature of dependence that involves us subjectively in knowing. What leads us to ask questions, to inquire, to think, to need to know anyway, but our disconcerting dependence on all that surrounds and affects our existence? Emotionally we are dependent, and emotional dependency drives us to inquire. Physically, economically, socially and in a myriad of ways our dependency shows. Our identity is at stake, our present security and future hopes, our values, our very selves. We need, we value, we hope and even vaguely believe, we think in a cultural and historical setting—all of this is our subjectivity and affects both how and what, as the persons we are, we think and know.

A creational approach has further advantages here, for we are part of an ordered creation, our dependency and needs reflecting the balance and purpose of the whole. Subjectivity then need not be just a liability but also an asset. There is meaning and purpose to those areas of need and value which all human beings inevitably possess, a universality to our subjectivity. Philosophers have attempted purely objective, causal arguments for the existence of physical bodies. But it is telling that our universal physical needs show subjectively the reality of our bodies and cry out for the reality of a physical world of which we are part and on which we depend. Philosophers have argued too for the existence of other minds, trying to construct purely objective, logical proofs. But it counts epistemologically that
our inner being yearns for other persons and that togetherness and empathy reveal us to one another for what in reality we are. Again, philosophers have constructed objective arguments for the existence and nature of God, but epistemologically it is significant that our hearts are restless, as Augustine observed, until they rest in God. Subjectivity is an asset as well as a liability in knowing. Hence I have suggested universal subjective consideration, namely value areas and action spheres, that help justify belief.  

Holmes argues that this crucial conceptual distinction "fits" the whole-part model employed for thinking about belief-knowledge and practice-theory:

Epistemological subjectivity, I suggest, represents the whole of our being out of which we think and with which we believe and understand and seek to know. Epistemological objectivity is a move we make by momentarily and partially detaching ourselves from all we are and holding ourselves and the demands of our being in abeyance. We seek objectivity because of what we are subjectively, because of what we need and want and value. The same pattern holds here as with knowledge and belief and with theory and practice: knowledge with confidence, along with theory and objectivity, while unduly elevated in the Greek and Enlightenment traditions, is part of knowing but not the whole. The necessities of our existence require more, for a man's life does not consist in the abundance (or scarcity) of objective and logically certain theories he possesses. Subjectivity is more wholistic than objectivity and yields a fuller knowledge.

Given the whole-part understanding of subjectivity and objectivity, Holmes argues an epistemic implication: "facts" are best understood as "interprefacts." This name stresses the epistemologically subjective apprehension of a metaphysically objective state of affairs. Interprefacts are facts "perceived and understood by a human person who clothes them in the habits of his human experience and perspective." Holmes also acknowledges the importance of perspectival commitment in the determination of what to count as a fact. A perspectival commitment opens or closes a person to possible reality interpretations. For example, a naturalist excludes explaining
events as "miracles." Given the naturalistic perspective, supernatural occurrences in a closed universe are impossible. Likewise a theist may label a naturalistic event a "miracle" seeing the direct intervention of God where a natural explanation is adequate. Holmes also sees mutual interaction between "facts" and "interpretations." There is always the possibility that the human experience of certain metaphysical objectivities may count against a given perspectival commitment or its elaboration, thus potentially leading to a shift in either an elaborative understanding or a perspectival stance.

In his important work Faith Seeks Understanding, Holmes first developed interpretive realism as an epistemic gestalt. There he reminds the reader of the danger of reducing all knowledge to that appropriate to any one particular field of knowledge. Each area of knowledge seeks to interpret properly a certain aspect of a metaphysically objective reality. Rocks and planets are different from historical events, moral principles, and persons. The ever-present danger of scientific naturalism is to view scientific knowledge as the paradigm of knowing, reducing and modeling all other ways of knowing after the physical sciences. In contrast Holmes argues that the human knower is humbly responsible for the reality he strives to interpret in order to gain confident understanding. Persons are obligated to work honestly with openness and integrity, led by that aspect of reality under investigation. Personal knowledge stands under and open to further disclosures of metaphysical objectivity. Such openness leads to a concern for the justification of interpretations, a human project arising out of the practical demands of life.
Before turning to an interpretive realism understanding of "justification," two comments. First, Holmes' epistemic gestalt provides one possible philosophical foundation for Brown's communication model. That model strongly features the intrapersonal and interpersonal interpretive aspects of human knowing. In doing so Brown extends Holmes. Yet the model stresses interpretation so much that it is open to the difficulties of "phenomenalism." Holmes describes the phenomenalist view of science developed by Hume, Kant and their followers: "Science tells us nothing of reality, nothing that is either true or false. It provides only useful information about generally observable conditions and predictable events." Interpretive realism avoids phenomenalism as well as the extreme of naive realism against which phenomenalists reacted. The naive realist assumes objectively neutral descriptions of reality are possible and that certain and infallible knowledge is achieved by humans.

As a foundational epistemic stance, interpretive realism would open the communication scholar to consider not only processed interpretations and their perspectival justifications, but also the possibility and limits of meta-perspectival justifications of belief. Such an epistemic stance would place the world-view communication critic at the boundary of rhetoric and philosophy in the effort to (1) reliably describe perspectival stances and elaborations and (2) evaluate the interpretive adequacy of such symbolic constructions of reality. Holmes addresses this second possibility in his discussion of the practical justification of belief. He argues that there are cognitive and existential practical necessities which a world view must
address if it is to adequately fulfill the human need for ultimate meaning: the need for think-with-ability that is at the same time live-with-able.

Second, as Holmes promotes interpretive realism he argues in various ways. The discourse featured above summarizes his most recent, and I think most persuasive, promotion of the innovation. As he uses the whole-part model to articulate epistemic relationships, Holmes avoids philosophical detail that would be of less interest to an interdisciplinary community of scholars. He features the anomaly of conceptual disjuncts common in many fields and then articulates an integrative way of seeing epistemic terms. In that extensive passage elaborating epistemological and metaphysical objective and subjective relationships and distinctions, Holmes provides a heuristic set of terms that potentially function across disciplinary fields and make sense of a variety of issues. In doing so he provides an understandable philosophical rationale for these asserted categories. In that same passage he shows theological reasons for accepting such relationships and distinctions, thus tying it to the theistic frame of knowledge. The same pattern of reasoning can be seen in his discussion of the justification of belief.

The Practical Justification of Belief

Working within a creational framework and relying upon his epistemological gestalt of interpretive realism, Holmes develops a theory of justification which takes seriously both the structure of human existence in a created order (realism) and the human quest for
understanding and significance (interpretation). In contrast to the "foundationalist" categorization of "justification," Holmes is not convinced that persons can develop a broad foundation of indubitable and incorrigible premises from which to deduce a complete and adequate system of certified knowledge. In contrast to a "fideist" categorization of "justification," Holmes does believe one can marshall evidence and arguments which substantially warrant some beliefs more strongly than others. His approach categorizes the justification process as a theoretical project rooted in the practical necessities of human existence. He terms this "the practical justification of beliefs." He argues:

We must regard knowledge not as logically conclusive and incorrigibly certain, but rather as belief that for its own purposes is rationally justified. It is justified in practice (viz., for its own purposes), even when some theoretical difficulties remain, as long as it rests on good reasoning . . . . The evidence we have and the basic principles of reasoning combine with the practical demands of life and thought to thoroughly justify certain beliefs.34

This section explores Holmes' elaborative attention management in articulating this theory of justification and considers it as potentially providing (1) topoi for world-view justification discourse and (2) a meta-perspectival approach for evaluation of world views. Holmes' overall strategy for the justification of belief is to see beliefs as they interrelate with other beliefs in a coherent whole and thus form what Quine calls a web of beliefs.35 The world-view advocate is seen as responsible for (1) an authentically held perspective which promises to unify thought and action and (2) universal aspects of human subjectivity which every perspectival
elaboration must take into account for a world view to remain existentially relevant.

In taking this approach Holmes asserts that world views can be evaluated, criticized, and revised in light of objective conditions, practical demands, reflective thought, and universal value areas. He stands in sharp contrast to both subjective and dogmatic approaches to the justification of world views. The quotation below highlights his strategic approach to world-view justification in contrast to the subjectivist's rejection of such attempts. Underlying this discussion and focusing the reader's attention is Holmes' distinction between epistemological and metaphysical subjectivity and objectivity and his whole-part model of the key epistemic relationships. This passage concisely articulates Holmes' gestalt for justification:

A world view embodies beliefs and values, and sometimes stories (a creation account, for instance) that symbolize truths beyond what they overtly describe, and so a kind of ideology appears. The subjectivist tells us that all this is purely subjective, without objective basis or truth. The usual argument is that because beliefs and values and world views differ from one person or culture to another they must be relative to (presumably a product of) those different cultures, histories, personalities and other conditions. Pluralism argues for relativism, and relativism argues for subjectivism....

Plainly the subjectivist fallacy lies in supposing that beliefs and values are altogether subjective and not at all objective. An either/or mentality has taken charge, to which one could as well reply with Caesar's "et tu Brute." The subjectivist theory, taken on its own terms, would be an entirely subjective affair. In order to make truth-claims for subjectivism, it must itself be an exception to its own rule. But then subjectivism as a general theory has contradicted itself and is false. This "self-referentiality argument" is hard for either the subjectivist or the relativist to avoid....

To acknowledge subjective feelings and to admit relative influences on our beliefs and values therefore need not imply a total relativism or total subjectivism. Moreover, within the plurality of world-view formulations (and conflicting beliefs and values) there are discernible types of view and patterns of
argument; objective considerations are appealed to, and universally alike public facts are involved. Pluralism need not imply complete relativism, nor indeed does it imply subjectivism, but only that the incompleteness of evidence may logically allow different conclusions. Most thought is a mix of the objective and the subjective and of both universal and relative considerations, and reason's task has always been to disentangle them.

Phenomenological philosophy arose, in fact, over this very issue. Edmund Husserl was concerned about naturalistic explanations of human thought, whether "psychologistic" (explaining it all as a product of psychological processes) or "historicist" (... a product of historical processes). If those explanations are accepted, he argued, then science is altogether without a firm foundation in anything universal and can make no claim to universal truth. Consequently he proposed to describe what is universal in human thought and consciousness, when all particular objects and psychological and historical conditions are "bracketed." As one of Husserl's recent exponents puts it, the only cure for subjectivism is more discriminating and self-critical subjectivity, "which will show the very limits of subjectivity." Objectivity exists amid all our subjectivity, and subjectivity in all our objectivity; we need therefore to identify the objective and universal and detach it from the purely relative.

I am not making a brief for phenomenology as such, although I do think it is on the right track in trying to disentangle the universal from the relative in our subjectivity. Whether or not we can argue (against cultural relativism) that the same values appear in all cultures, at least universal "value areas" are evident—areas such as life and health, sex and marriage, property and economic needs, etc. Although we can hardly argue that precisely the same beliefs about nature appear universally or the same explanatory categories are universal, (as Aristotle and Kant assumed), at least universal "category areas" are evident—some sort of causal or quasi-causal concept is needed, and quantitative concepts, and so forth. We can also appropriately speak of "universal basic beliefs," belief in one's own existence, belief in a real world external to one's consciousness, belief in some ultimate reality which I cannot push around but must reckon with in the final analysis. They are very skeletal and almost everyone would flesh them out in more particular ways, but there they stand nonetheless, unavoidable ingredients of human reflection. Moreover, whatever we think of the actual basis for logical law, whether metaphysical or linguistic or whatever, at least the law of non-contradiction is a universal condition of intelligible thought. Aristotle's famous "negative proof" shows this by asking that one who denies the law practice his denial in speaking. Unintelligible utterances may be possible without it, like talk of a square circle, but unintelligible utterances hardly qualify as intelligible thought or speech. Where this law of logic is ignored, all logic and intelligibility are gone. These types of
universality, at least these, are present in all world views, whatever the differences and whatever the subjective or relative factors involved. It is then to universal factors like these, pre-philosophical factors rooted in the generic nature of human existence in a common universe, that appeal must be made in justifying the truth-claims people make.

It might well be objected that Kant transposed these universals into the human mind, reducing them to subjective principles of thought. A two-fold response is immediately possible without getting into the technicalities of Kant's philosophy. First, we have already noted that epistemological subjectivity does not itself necessitate metaphysical subjectivity. It is at least possible that universal category areas and basic beliefs and laws of logic apply to what is independent of our thinking. Second, the universal value areas...apply to human "action spheres" of a universal sort, so that overt activity in the world around us is involved and not just a subjective theoretical framework. If thought is in fact related to action, then the "pure reason" Kant criticized becomes a philosophical fiction. "Practical reason," related to overt action, admits metaphysical postulates of its own. The question then concerns the truth of what is proposed.36

Holmes' approach to the justification of belief is important for this study. His explication of these universal preconditions of belief and his suggestion that there are discernable patterns of argument used in support of discernable types of view opens the way for conceiving a "rhetoric of world-view justification." As Holmes expounds these ideas he extends his "logic of philosophical justification" as well as his ingredients of a perspective: the universal, the world-viewish, and the ideosyncratic (see chapter three for both of these ideas). The reflective perspectivalist attempts to discern and relate these three aspects of a perspectival stance in order to gain a more rigorous self-understanding and to give reasons why one choice is made over others. World-view rhetors may either clarify or obscure these three aspects in the attempt to justify a perspectival elaboration. Below Holmes describes some of the universal practical necessities that he
agues structure world-view belief. He also provides a rationale for how they function in world-view justification:

A world view is a very complicated kind of theory intended to guide and unify thought and action, so that "coherence" becomes more complicated as well. Yet we can make good use of the universal points of reference discussed above in trying to ensure a coherence that maintains contact with "metaphysical objectivity." Universal laws of logic make it possible to draw logical implications so as to see if a set of beliefs leads to self-contradiction. A world view must be both internally consistent, and consistent with whatever general beliefs it accepts. Universal value areas identify the range and variety of human concerns which a world view must address. The supreme good it affirms must give value to the "goods" in universal areas, and must bring all these values into a coherent unity. This, it will be remembered, is intended in the very nature of a world view. Universal action spheres are given guidance by a world view, which must therefore speak to both ends and means of human action, giving meaning both to each action sphere and to human life as a whole. Universal categories of thought need the explicit formulation and interrelation a world view gives, if they are to function as explanatory principles. Yet in interrelating categories, a world view must not blur their differences by reducing, for example, the causes of historical events to the purely physical or purely psychological. Coherence integrates without reductionism. Universal basic beliefs, too skeletal in themselves to give much guidance to thought or life, gain content from the general outlook of a world view, and are fleshed out within the particular historical formulations the view takes. Coherence is not evident at the skeletal level, but it is provided by a world view. Yet different views offer different unifying foci and various degrees of overall coherence result.

These considerations apply by virtue of the inclusive nature of a world view, with the range of beliefs and values it seeks to draw into a coherent whole. The intent is to explain the whole range of human experience by reference to what is most ultimately real. By identifying what is universal, then, in human experience, we can evaluate alternatives in terms not only of their consistency but also of the completeness with which they integrate things into a unified and meaning-giving whole.

Inasmuch as this approach depends on the nature of world views, it is in principle "meta-perspectival," independent of any one view, and applies to the evaluation of theistic and naturalist views alike, which will differ in these regards by degree. Moreover, this approach addresses not only logical and theoretical concerns, but also human values and actions and the overall meaning of life. It seeks what is most "think-with-able" and "live-with-able," a world view that has most intellectual adequacy and most human relevance. World views, it must be remembered,
arise at the pre-philosophical level, in the whole-personal context of human existence and reflection. A Christian world view's claim to truth, then, will be justifiable in these wholistic terms.\textsuperscript{37}

In considering Holmes' approach, I first highlight the need to display both the "empirical adequacy" and "rational coherence" of world-view beliefs (their think-with-ability) as well as their "existential relevance" to universal value areas and action spheres (their live-with-ability). Holmes does this in relation to his perspectival view of persons as responsible (reflective and valuing) agents, a theme developed in chapter six. Second, I consider his proposal concerning the relationship between skeletal universal basic beliefs and specific perspectival basic beliefs, especially the function of the first in the articulation and justification of the latter. Throughout, I transpose Holmes' philosophical ideas in a beginning attempt to conceive of a "rhetoric of world-view justification."

\textbf{Persons as Responsible Agents Who Believe}

Holmes articulates a view of "reason" in light of his anthropological perspectival theme and a whole-part model of epistemic terms. For him the justification of belief is an epistemologically subjective move made by the whole person in an effort to achieve a greater degree of epistemological objectivity concerning what is real, or metaphysically objective. Holmes argues: "Reason is a human activity, a function of human existence. \textit{Sum ergo cogito}; it proceeds out of the heart of what a person is with concerns and conditions
rooted in the whole of our humanness. Reasoning is part of life as a whole. Thus, the justification of belief is understood in light of what it is to be a responsible agent, one who (1) reflects, (2) values, and (3) acts:

As a rational being a man examines evidence and arguments and brings them to bear both on what he values and on what is proposed to his belief and action. As a valuing being he is motivated not only by what he knows but also by what he loves. If a man really loves the truth, this will direct his thinking, but if not he is likely to prostitute both knowledge and truth to lesser and more selfish ends. His values help to shape his beliefs. As a personal agent man believes in order to act. He has many particular projects in life that require him to formulate and justify beliefs, as well as the overall project of life itself which he struggles to understand in order to live with meaning and purpose. His projects determine what knowledge he seeks and what degree of certainty is needed for belief and action.

Holmes considers these three ontological aspects of persons as functioning in a crucial way in the overall project of belief justification. A world-view rhetor articulates beliefs in relation to empirical and rational, axiological and ontological criteria through specific lines of argument that move the listener's attention in the strategic direction of conceiving a perspective's think-with-ability and live-with-ability.

Rational Assessment: Think-With-Ability

Typically, discussions of the justification of belief consider the rational demands involved in showing the think-with-ability of a world view. Holmes argues that this reflective assessment of belief involves two related aspects: (1) showing the empirical adequacy of beliefs and (2) displaying the rational coherence of a system of interrelated beliefs. According to Holmes the empirical adequacy of a belief is
"shown" when evidence for that belief is accepted by persons as "rationally adequate." "Adequate evidence" does not result in the certain proof of a belief; instead it functions "to authorize or justify belief, to make it an intellectually honest and morally responsible act, to provide whatever degree of assurance is necessary for the practical purposes of this particular belief." Holmes argues that the adequacy of a belief is evaluated by three key criteria: the universal principle of induction, universal aspects of human experience in a common world, and intersubjective checks concerning publically available evidence.

For any belief to be understood as "rationally following" from adequate evidence there must be a personal adherence to what Holmes calls the "basic belief" in the universal principle of induction. He argues that the human belief in such a principle is less a logical necessity than it is a practical necessity: human thought and action is impossible without some means of moving from individual experience to more general conclusions. Inductive logic formalizes this inductive principle and aids subjective knowers who evaluate "responsible thinking":

According to . . . inductive logic, "adequate" evidence will always be incomplete but must still be sufficiently representative of the whole to justify inductive generalizations. We must consequently face squarely all available evidence and tailor our conclusions to the evidence rather than vice versa.41

Holmes has not given up his notion of interpretfacts; he argues that as responsible reflective agents persons can honestly and openly scrutinize interpretations. Modifications of interpretations of metaphysically objective reality are not only possible, they are a
moral responsibility.

Holmes argues that showing "empirical adequacy" also involves the consideration of universal aspects of human experience. A world view attempts to interpret the complete range of human experience. The move to do so involves showing both the sufficient scope and the good fit of a perspective as it is brought to bear upon the whole of life through elaborative discourse. When a world-view advocate successfully discourses upon the topics of scope and precision, he increases the conceived justification of a perspectival elaboration. Holmes comments on these two concerns in world-view justification.

Adequacy, then means there is a sufficient scope of evidence to bear witness to the whole . . . . Moral aesthetic, social, historical, and religious experience must all be accounted for, as well as scientific evidence. Insofar as they exhibit universal traits, they too bear witness to the truth. The empirical adequacy of any world-view, whether theism or naturalism or whatever, depends on its being able to embrace universal aspects of all kinds of human experience. But more than "scope" is needed. Good fit is also essential, because it is possible that a belief might take account of an experience but push it out of shape, distort its natural import, smother it with other input, and refuse to let it speak . . . . The analogy of good fit is drawn from the fit of a shoe: it (the belief) must neither cramp nor distort the foot (the evidence) nor be so loose that the foot can neither control it nor wrinkle it into its final shape. The greater the scope of evidence and the better the fit of a belief, the greater becomes its empirical adequacy and so its justification.42

A final criterion for evaluating the empirical adequacy involves intersubjective checks in light of evidence that is publically accessible. The case for a particular belief is "strengthened if it can be investigated by other people at other times and in other situations. We can invoke intersubjective checks to offset the possibility of one individual or a few distorting the case or begging
the question." For a communication scholar this third criterion is central to the other two. Intersubjective checks are fundamental in the rhetorical process of categorizing and applying categories concerning "proper inductive reasoning" and the "scope" and "fit" of a web of beliefs concerning "universal aspects of human experience." Ideally, this intersubjective rhetorical dialogue (1) helps world-view adherents to transcend ideosyncratic aspects of perspectival commitment, (2) aids in the discernment of what is universally true for all world-view communities, and (3) enables a sharper clarification between authentic perpectival commitment and particular world-viewish elaborations of a perspective. Such rhetorical dialogue must occur within and across contemporary and historical perspectival communication systems.

The second major rhetorical goal in the rational assessment of beliefs involves discoursing upon the topic of rational coherence in the attempt to display how one belief relates to others in an interrelated and mutually supportive web of beliefs. According to Holmes such discourse moves attention in two directions. The first is a negative movement which depends upon the universal principle of non-contradiction. He holds that this principle is another practical necessity for human thought and action. It is universally binding if persons are "to avoid any logical inconsistency, either of a given belief or within the whole body of what we believe. The principle . . . affirms that a proposition and its contradictory cannot both be true at the same time and in the same respect." This principle functions in (1) the rejection of any contradictory propositions as
"false" and (2) the modification of any belief which initially appears to contradict other authentically held beliefs. Concerning this second aspect, Holmes argues that a contradiction within a web of beliefs is like calling "check" in a chess game: "the chess player can often move out of check and still preserve his overall position." Similarly, beliefs may be modified to resolve apparent contradictions.

A complementary aspect of displaying the rationality of beliefs involves creatively developing the **rational coherence** of a system of beliefs. It is rooted in the **universal quest for unified meaning** and involves showing the "systematic interrelatedness of beliefs." According to Holmes, human knowers desire **factual interrelatedness**: By enlarging the system of factual beliefs we exhibit more fully their interrelatedness as a whole, and so their believability. A convincing play or novel is, among other things, one whose many pieces hang together coherently. A historical account is said by some writers to be plausible when one event is shown to follow another in human contexts with "dramatic inevitability." This is a coherence test of truth.

There may also be demands for **formal interrelationships** of beliefs modeled after the deductive patterns of the rationalists. As I have shown, Holmes is most interested in those coherent relationships developed by and shown through a more **informal** logic of adduction. The logic of adduced beliefs distinguishes between a "wild idea" that "stands all by itself, unrelated to any substantial body of knowledge, . . . [with] no logical relations to recommend it" and a "creative belief" that not only fits with other ideas but also illuminates them and increases the significance of the entire web of belief.
Holmes asserts that a coherent world view is not proven by deductively moving from cognitively certain propositions. Instead, through the process of adduction, a case is built for the justification of both perspective and its elaboration. A perspectival advocate shows how a world view unifies "our understanding of things by introducing as a focal point of reference some particular religious or quasi-religious belief . . . . the interrelated unity of the whole attests the truth of this central belief." As argued in chapter three, the process of adduction is premised upon a symphonic rather than a mathematical model and relies upon categorial rather than deductive thinking. It extends adduced categories through use of analogy, paradox, stories, creative ideas, etc. to explore the broad ranges of human thought and experience in the quest for synoptic understanding:

[We need] a symphonic model for systematic thought, in which a common theme, played with different variations gives intelligible unity to the entire piece. The man who knows the theme finds meaning in each movement and discerns a common purpose in what otherwise seem bare facts or bewildering techniques. The symphonic model is suggested by philosophic systems that are categorial rather than deductive . . . . An example of the categorial is Whitehead. He selects from experience concepts he finds especially revealing and then uses them as interpretative principles of the utmost generality; they become categories of thought which help us conceptualize the world not as a collection of fragmented facts but as a coherent whole.

Categories give philosophic expression to an integrating world-perspective and . . . . the worked out system applies these categories (and thereby the world perspective) to all life and experience. The truth of a system is accordingly seen both in its rational coherence and in the adequacy and scope of its handling of experience. The categories fit.

For Holmes, the formulation of a perspective through adduced and applied categories is more subject to challenge and change than is the authentically held perspective itself. Holmes therefore warns
over-enthusiastic perspectival apologists:

The inadequacies of one formulation of naturalism or idealism or Christian theism do not of themselves invalidate that perspective. They simply indicate that a particular formulation is problematic and needs improvement or change, so that one might turn to alternative formulations of the same world-view instead of abandoning it altogether. This is important in Christian apologetics, for it explains how naturalists can continue to be optimistic about such a view when one naturalistic philosophy after another (Lucretius and Hobbes, for example) has been roundly criticized, and how Christianity can survive the purported demise of its Platonic, Aristotelian, Enlightenment, and Romanticist formulations. The Christian apologist must be careful neither to overstate the force of his criticism of other positions nor to overrate his opponents' critique of a Christian position; for both he and they might well be able to avoid the problems with which they are confronted by reformulating the underlying world-view in some new fashion. It is unfortunate that the case for Christianity is sometimes tied in people's thinking to a Greek metaphysic, or to a Cartesian view of mind and body, or to an empiricist view of verifiability. This also implies something basic to the scholar's study of the rhetoric of justification. In chapter three Holmes argued that the choice of a unifying perspective is justified first and foremost because it is authentically held to illuminate all of life; existentially the person chooses a perspective because none other makes sense of life. At that level, the rhetoric of world-view justification may consist of versions of "personal testimony." But because the perspective is held to make sense of the whole of life its formulation as a world view demands justification. As persons in a perspectival community think through and live out the implications of their chosen perspective they elaborate it into a world view, thus forming "elaborative communities." At that level justification discourse attempts to show the think-with-ability and live-with-ability of a perspective interpreted through its historical elaboration. Holmes'
anatomical conception of world views opens the communication scholar to evaluate these justifications of perspectival formulations as rhetorical processes, while it sharply limits the scholar's ability to adjudicate ultimate perspectival choices.

Relying upon Holmes' philosophical discussion of the rational assessment of world-view elaborations, there emerges a framework for the rhetoric of justification as it strategically focuses attention in conceiving the think-with-ability of a world view. Using a quotation from David Wolfe, one of Holmes' students who is now a professor of philosophy, I develop four tactical topics used across world-view communities in discourse promoting the strategic goal of perspectival think-with-ability:

The criteria which result from a clarification of the most general theoretical project are consistency (freedom from contradiction within the interpretive scheme), coherence (internal relatedness of the statements within the interpretive scheme), comprehensiveness (applicability of the interpretive scheme to all experience), and congruity (appropriateness of the interpretive scheme to the experiences it covers).52

Philosophers have long studied their disciplinary arguments in light of these criteria. What is needed is a rhetorical theory of how these topics are used in everyday life to justify and make real the think-with-ability of a particular world-view alternative in contrast to other options. Given Holmes' discussion, comprehensiveness (scope) and congruity (precision) are topics which, when effectively discoursed upon promote the conception of a perspective's elaborated empirical adequacy. Such discourse relies upon an intersubjective agreement concerning (1) some interpretation of the universal principle of induction and (2) how that principle is to be applied to "public
evidence" and "universal areas of human experience." Such discourse might also feature anomalies in current intersubjective agreements concerning the categorizing of "induction," "evidence," "experience," etc.

Consistency and coherence are two complementary topics which together promote the conception of a perspective's elaborated rational adequacy. Again such topics are discoursed upon in relation to intersubjective understandings, either relying upon them to build a case or challenging them to promote an attention switch. The topic of consistency relies upon intersubjective interpretations of "non-contradiction." The topic of coherence relies upon intersubjective choices concerning universal categories of thought, especially those categories which are currently featured in distinctive ways.

World-view advocates will find diverse ways to manage attention and promote perspectival think-with-ability as they rationally assess elaborative beliefs by showing empirical adequacy and rational coherence. Often justification has been thought of in terms of lines of argument that move thinking in the tactical direction of a rational assessment. The rhetoric of world-view justification would include this thrust but also would be open to non-discursive moves that also tactically promote or retard the conceived think-with-ability of a perspective. Such non-discursive moves often challenge the think-with-ability of an elaboration by showing that world-viewish though does not meet the action and value demands of human involvement. Thus, the conceived live-with-ability impinges upon and actually
penetrates conceptions of think-with-ability. I turn now to Holmes' insight into this relationship.

Value and Action Projects: Live-With-Ability

For Holmes, the justification of world-view beliefs must address humans as valuing agents. He sees the action project of justification itself motivated by the human valuing of truth and knowledge. In his view, values have a cognitive aspect and are thus open to the theoretical action of rational assessment. He observes that in value discussions, persons "bring argument and evidence to bear in ways that help . . . transcend purely individual and cultural considerations and move towards the universal." If values are not only emotive, but also include a cognitive aspect, then "they should be rationally coherent both within themselves and with our other beliefs . . . . The overall rational coherence of such beliefs and values attests their truth. In Holmes' theory such ordering of values into value hierarchies is a world-viewish task in that a unifying perspective names ultimate reality and the highest good. All other values are organized around these core commitments. Different axiological theories variously affect the process by which value hierarchies are constructed and tested via practical applications in action projects.

Holmes is not simply interested in the ordering of specific values and the justification of that process. He is also interested in how human valuing functions in the assessment of "true beliefs." He states, "In order to get at the universality of truth we must . . . ask what is universal and unchanging in human values; otherwise we risk
allowing all our beliefs to become as relative as some of our culturally and individually relative values." He admits that the philosophical dialogue about values does show the relativity of particular human values. At the same time he also claims that this dialogue reveals, what he terms, universal value-areas generic to human existence:

All men in all cultures and at all points in history hold values in the area of physical life and well-being; the particular formulations may vary, producing disagreements about abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, war, restrictions on the possession of lethal weapons, and so forth, but we all make value judgements of some sort in this general area. Likewise in the area of sex and marriage: particular formulations may allow monogamy, polygamy, or concubinage, even homosexual behavior and group marriages, but we all develop values in this area. So too with economic values: anthropologists find that the formulated rights and rules about work and property vary, but values are nonetheless evident in regard to a man's work or property or to those of his family or tribe.

Within each area a particular morality formulates its beliefs. Christians (and others) argue for some universally binding general rule in each area, such as those we find in the second half of the decalogue. We are likely to disagree about their application, for instance to capital punishment or war. We may regard these as legitimate but tragic exceptions to the rule about killing, or we may argue that they too are wrong. But the point is, first, that we argue our differences and so bring them to some degree under logical and factual control and, second, that value-areas are universal even if the particular formulations are not. For these two reasons the values that help shape beliefs are not entirely relative. Insofar as we can show that our value judgements are rationally coherent and universally applicable, to that extent a resultant belief is not entirely relative to the individual or his culture but lays claim to universal truth.

There is more about Holmes' view of values and perspectival beliefs in the next chapter, for now it is enough to emphasize his value-centric aspect of world-view justification. If there are universal value areas then world views must address them. According to Holmes, such universal areas function as tests of each world-view elaboration: a
world view must articulate responsible beliefs which guide thinking in these areas and ultimately result in action. Those world views which ignore such considerations are open to criticism concerning world-view scope. Those world views which do address such concerns are also open to criticism because the precision of particularized beliefs is often inadequate for the broad range of human existence. In Holmes' view, such criticism is valuable in that it potentially leads to a more mature formulation or the demise of an inadequate world view.

Holmes also holds that persons as agents act to realize certain authentically held values. Values not only provide a teleological allure, they also determine how good ends ought to be pursued:

A man not only thinks and values, he also has projects in which he acts. His thinking and valuing shape his projects, determine the means he adopts, and thereby guide his actions. Reciprocally his projects shape his thinking and influence his beliefs. This aspect of our being has been stressed by both pragmatists and existentialists. John Dewey argues that thought is always directed towards the resolution of practical problems and that the beliefs we hold are relative to the particular problem situations they address. There is no universal and unchanging truth to be believed. Sartre meantime speaks of everything a man says and does and of his whole life as a project related to the very meaning of his existence. Words and deeds and beliefs and actions are his attempts to make a place for himself in anotherwise empty and alien world, for again there is no universally true and unchanging meaning in life. While I am not satisfied with these analyses of human action, they do emphasize the primacy of the practical and uncover the influence of action-projects on our beliefs.

But essentially the same question arises as in the relation of values to beliefs: are beliefs always relative to different action-projects? My response is essentially the same as before: insofar as in our projects we debate our goals and reason about the application of means to ends, to that extent our projects and the beliefs they engender are exposed to rational controls. Only if our projects are capriciously selected and if our means are utterly random, only then will the beliefs involved seem utterly relative. That beliefs relate to purposes and projects, therefore, means that they address a definable problem, not that they are devoid of reasonableness or of any relevance to
Given this view, the projects one chooses (and such choices are often made in light of world-view commitments) demand certain beliefs that shape our actions and enable decision-making concerning the accomplishment of those chosen projects. Holmes is interested in the universal areas of human action projects. His creational metaphysic leads him to assert that within the created order there are certain creational mandates concerning structured action spheres generic to human existence. These universal tasks are variously understood by world-view communities, for each community formulates specific beliefs about each sphere of action and then justifies those beliefs through both words and deeds. Holmes expounds this idea and provides an example:

Our projects arise within the ordered creation of God. Man and the world in which he must act are not the chance product of a blind evolutionary process, but the purposively ordered outcome of divine creation, somewhat distorted now to be sure, but still attesting the wisdom and purpose of God. Christian writers therefore speak of "orders of creation" or of "law spheres." Our economic activity, family activity, political activity, and so forth, each takes its place within environmental structures and in relation to structures of personality that God creatively ordained. In all his actions man relates not to a world of evolutionary uncertainties that may as easily destroy as preserve him, but to an ordered creation of which he is an intended part. Man's task is to find his place and exercise his role in each area of his life in accordance with its natural order ordained by God. . . . If each such area of activity is ultimately ordered neither by chance processes nor by man's adjustment skills but by God, then what a man comes in the process to believe should be governed by what he finds is universal about that order of creation, not just by the ad hoc demands of an immediate problem. His beliefs need not be entirely relative, but can accumulate as an interrelated whole—as is the world we inhabit and as is truth itself. . . .

When, for example, I am faced with alternative political beliefs, I cannot decide how to act or vote in a particular situation on purely pragmatic grounds. Rather, I must justify my
beliefs, be they politically conservative or liberal, in relation to my understanding of political morality, the essential nature of human society, and the place of the political order in God's creation. This involves consideration of Biblical materials on the role of the civil authorities in maintaining peace and furthering justice in a world twisted by sin, a grasp of the moral as well as the political dimension of the present situation, and an understanding of the political philosophies which guide our present governmental policies and actions. A particular political belief is justified by its coherence within my total understanding of the political order as it applies to the problem at hand. This too is a rational test...

The relation of a belief to a particular problem does not then deprive that belief of universal controls, because the universal orders of creation within which particular problems arise are subject to the law and purposes of God, and the belief in question is justified by its coherence within our larger understanding of appropriate creation orders.\textsuperscript{58}

Holmes has broadened the general notion of justification. Many disciplinary discussions of philosophical topics of justification focus around the criteria involved in rational assessment. Holmes' more wholistic view of epistemology recognizes that a needs meeting world view is intersubjectively required to do more than interpret factual data and order ideas. A world view is also justified as it unifies and orients human action in relationship to values.

Given this discussion of the justification of belief, the "rhetoric of world-view justification" is modestly, yet significantly extended. The extension is modest in that Holmes' discussion in this area is skeletal, perhaps because philosophers have for so long emphasized the overtly epistemic (think-with-able) aspects of the justification of belief. The extension is significant for now. Holmes is in the area of "axiological" and "ontological" world-view justification: discourse focuses human attention upon world-view beliefs in such a way that the conception of their live-with-ability is
enhanced. Axiological aspects of world-view rhetorical justification involve conceiving relationships among a chosen highest good, value hierarchies, and specific value beliefs which interpret "universal value areas." Connected to these axiological aspects are those ontological "action spheres" that are universal practical necessities. Human involvement in universal action spheres needs guidance and unity. Human valuing needs realization in life. A world-view community enables members to see relationships between perspectival commitments, values, and world-viewish deeds.

In this area of the rhetoric of world-view justification, Brown's concept of action corollary is useful. World-view communities suggest authentic world-viewish behaviors; they categorize (1) which kinds of actions are world-viewishly appropriate, (2) how those behaviors should be enacted, and (3) which enactments are actually acceptable. If as Holmes asserts there are universal action spheres, then world-view communities must negotiate action corollaries appropriate for each sphere and do so in light of perspectival beliefs and values. World-view rhetors move attention to conceive more clearly (1) the relationships asserted between beliefs, values, and actions, (2) contradictions between those asserted relationships, and/or (3) the need to address additional areas, to revise old understandings, or to act in new ways.

Rhetorical scholars may enable broader interdisciplinary understanding of world-view justification than that provided by many within the discipline of philosophy. Rhetoricians such as Martin Luther King and Ghandi skillfully used both non-violent demonstrations
and interpretive discourse to promote conceptions of the un-live-with-ability of dominant political world views. Brown's model seems highly capable of featuring (1) both discursive and non-discursive methods for the overall rhetorical processing of conceptions of perspectival live-with-ability and think-with-ability and (2) strategic ways of intervening into those processes. Holmes provides key tactical topics that he argues universally structure that strategic processing of live-with-able and think-with-able world views.

The potential for conceptual integration towards a theory of the rhetoric of world-view justification needs further work. For now it is of interest to see how Holmes conceives of world-view justification as an aspect in the universal action project of the elaboration of a world view.

Universal and Perspectival Basic Beliefs

Holmes argues that the creation and elaboration of a world view can be understood as a universal action-project, the generic human project to develop a complex belief system about the meaning of human existence. This action project is the quest for an overall meaning in life that unifies thought and action. According to Holmes this project involves the fleshing out of skeletal universal basic beliefs, those beliefs that are practical necessities for personal existence. This "fleshing" out process can be understood as the incarnation of universal basic beliefs in a perspective. In this theoretical categorizing effort Holmes has been arguing for a conception of the relationship between two kinds of basic beliefs. (1) Universal basic
beliefs generic to persons are evoked by the practical necessities of life in an ordered creation and are "essential to universal humanness."

These skeletal beliefs, Holmes argues, compose the "perspective of the universal human life world." \(^{59}\) (2) Particular basic beliefs are those essential for authentic perspectival commitment; they are evoked by human existence in a historical perspectival community. Holmes explores the nature of and relationships between these two kinds of beliefs in light of the justification of an elaboration.

As a world-view philosopher, Holmes has been strongly influenced by Scottish common sense realism. In one place he comments:

As an undergraduate I was introduced to Scottish realism, and nurtured the hope that it might provide a neutral epistemological basis for natural theology. In graduate school I pursued this interest, and wrote a doctoral dissertation on the realistic argument in twentieth century theories of perception. My conclusion, in brief, was that a realistic epistemology depends on one's choice of philosophical method: whether to start de novo as did Descartes, and to create ex nihilo the entire furniture of heaven and earth; or whether to start in situ, with the knowledge we already seem to have—whether with common sense . . . or with scientific knowledge . . . or with concrete experience . . . —and then proceed to analyze that. The realists, I found, pursued this latter option, taking the existence of material things for instance to be a given. The philosophical question, is not whether they or I (including my body) exist, but what I am, what is the nature of things. \(^{60}\)

The Scottish common sense realists like Thomas Reid discussed a notion similar to Holmes' universal basic beliefs. Holmes comments on their emphasis:

These beliefs which we know so surely to be true . . . are spontaneous interpretations of experience rather than logical inferences . . . . This is all due to the human constitution, a matter of common sense, not reason, and it is common to all men. Our very nature evokes beliefs and bears witness to their truth. \(^{61}\)
Holmes asserts that all humans share certain basic beliefs which arise because of "the practical and wholistic demands of human nature and existence," but he holds that such beliefs are actually few in number and skeletal in nature. He outlines his understanding of these generic basic beliefs:

The law of non-contradiction is essential for meaningful discourse and action, as Aristotle's negative demonstration shows. Likewise something like a principle of induction is needed. But these are formal principles without much material content. We can add the existence of external objects with properties of some uncertain sort and in a coherent arrangement for some reason or other. I can include my own existence and my mental states, and the existence of other persons analogous to myself who share the world I inhabit. We can add that we communicate with one another, and have a part in ordering our lives together. And I would include the belief that something is basic to all this, whatever it is, and that I have to reckon with such an ultimate reality in the final analysis.62

Note: For communication scholars it is interesting that he includes the process of ordering our lives together through communication. Brown's model may be uncovering universal processes of this practical necessity of human existence. A communication investigation of Holmes' list would consider the universal communication processes involved in the "evoking" of basic beliefs, although it should avoid the temptation of reducing such beliefs to the status of communication products alone.

Holmes asserts that universal basic beliefs are pre-theoretical and that therefore they can function in the justification of perspectival interpretations of these beliefs through a world-view elaboration. He argues:

But someone will object that if reason is not autonomous, neither are universal skeletal beliefs perspective-independent. Two replies are possible. First, universal skeletal beliefs are pre-theoretical assumptions, rooted in the demands of the human constitution
rather than in reason. They are evoked by physical, psychological and social conditions that are both universal and essential to our humanness. Accepting their rudimentary and skeletal form is significantly different from accounting for them in some theoretical way. The rationalist may even accept them in practice while doubting or denying them in theory (the paradox which puzzled G.E. Moore). But the theist has good theoretical reason for neither doubting nor denying them, if he believes that God made us and our world in this belief-evoking way, and that God does not deceive. Accepting them initially is a religiously neutral practical necessity, while explaining them theoretically is not.

Second, these universal skeletal beliefs on the one hand, and more particular beliefs on the other, are not mutually exclusive, for universal belief-evoking conditions function in particular historical and cultural ways. Particular belief-evoking conditions are variations within universal conditions. Together they provide a common matrix for belief. Our humanness therefore evokes not only a skeletal universal belief that, for instance, external objects and people exist, but it also calls for particular fleshed out beliefs about things and people. It not only evokes belief in some ultimate reality with which we must reckon, but also needs a more specific fleshed-out belief about ultimate being that can illuminate and guide life and thought.

While universal skeletal beliefs are in practice necessary for any human subject, they are not by themselves either think-with-able or live-with-able. That we act implies universal beliefs. How we act depends on what specific content these beliefs are given. We need beliefs in every sphere of thought and action (the economic, familial, political, aesthetic, etc.) in order to find order and direction to our activity in those spheres. Other than universal belief-evoking conditions therefore intrude, not only specifically religious, but also historical and cultural and psychological and scientific. The universal remains hungry for the more specific, which the universal alone cannot supply. Believing there is a natural order, we need to know what it really is like. Believing there is an ultimate existent, our hearts are restless till they can rest in something more. While skeletal beliefs may be theory-neutral, therefore, I suggest that nobody actually holds just those rudimentary outlines. Universal beliefs are fleshed out differently for people of differing perspectives ....

Now we can see how universal skeletal beliefs help justify particular beliefs. They are the backdrop, the context for particular beliefs. He who comes to God must believe that God is. And he who confesses that Christ is come in the flesh must believe that an external world of things and people exists. But universal skeletal beliefs, while prerequisite to Christian belief, do not logically imply it; they are necessary but not sufficient ....

Consider also how one's faith affects understanding .... It affects perceptivity and selectivity: that is, particular
beliefs give specificity to skeletal beliefs, and it is specificity that they need for both think-with-ability and live-with-ability.

The content of faith gives unity to understanding: that is, particular beliefs combined with skeletal beliefs to form a coherent scheme, one which satisfies universal human conditions. Understanding expounds and elaborates a perspective, and explores it bearing on every area of life and thought; therefore fleshed out skeletal beliefs exhibit the completeness and coherence of a faith.

Belief in the Christian God, for instance, is a particular belief with which Christians flesh out the universal skeletal belief in some ultimate reality. It along with other beliefs gives specificity to our thinking in this and other areas. It unifies what would otherwise be a motley morgue of separate skeletons into a living and coherent arrangement. It fills out skeletal beliefs in a live-with-able and think-with-able way.63

Holmes isolates two ways in which universal basic beliefs function in the justification of a perspectival elaboration, both are related to what he argues about developing the rational coherence of a belief system. First, universal basic beliefs function negatively to eliminate some options. If any particular belief involved in a web of beliefs contradicts universal basic beliefs, then the option must either be revised or abandoned. Holmes claims:

Universal skeletal beliefs thus place limits on what positions we might as humans (and as Christians) consistently adopt, and argue against some of the insanities of any age. If particular beliefs are evoked to give to universal skeletal beliefs the specificity we need to think and live with, then particular beliefs which contradict the universal are ruled out, and "un-think-with-able" or "un-live-with-able" beliefs are eliminated as well.64

Second, universal basic beliefs function as control beliefs in the development of possible perspectival elaborations. They do not secure any one final possibility. Holmes comments, "They will fit some theories more readily than others. And they provide a perspective-independent point of appeal even when combined with
particular beliefs of one sort or another."65
This area of Holmes' thinking needs further exploration. If he is
accurate, and I feel that he is, then it will enable communication
scholars to see that which universally constrains rhetorical
interpretive processes. Perhaps there are universal basic beliefs that
Holmes has not highlighted that a careful study of world-view discourse
would uncover. Perhaps he has included that which is not universal.
His emphasis upon the movement back and forth between the universal and
the world-viewish in human belief again provides a way to discover (1)
the objective in human subjectivity and (2) the ideosyncratic that
humans conceive to be universal or a necessary part of perspectival
commitment.

Conclusion

Arthur F. Holmes has carefully promoted interpretive realism as an
elaborative gestalt switch within the creational framework for
epistemology. His advocacy has been an important part of a shift among
some evangelical scholars, one influenced by that axial-shift among the
larger community of scholars. In 1971, he argued that the contemporary
philosophical climate was ripe for a shift towards a Christian theory
of knowledge that admits the informal, adductive logic:

Contemporary philosophy is ripe in at least two regards for a
Christian theory of knowledge that begins with the creatureliness
of men. (1) It is ripe for what by deductivist and inductivist
standards is a rather informal logic. (2) It is ripe for what by
the standards of objective neutrality is an appeal to
subjectivity. Informal logic is not now presumed to be illogical,
and subjectivity is not now equated with subjectivism.66
In a letter dated October 11, 1983, Holmes suggests that among evangelical scholars there seems a movement in that direction: "the present situation has fulfilled that expectation, if one takes into account the work of [Nicholas] Wolterstorff and the Toronto Seminar on Rationality in the Calvinist Tradition."67

Personally I have found Holmes' interpretive realism a useful stance open to my communication interest. Brown's model details intrapersonal and interpersonal interpretive processes in a heuristic manner, and I think provides the best interpretation of world-view communication process yet available. As an interpretive realist, I would argue that it must continue to be developed in light of that complex reality it tries to model. Holmes' emphasis on reality and the practical necessities of human existence help to see both interpretive possibilities and limits of world-viewing processes. I believe he is on track in discussing universal practical necessities that impinge upon human interpretations. More needs to be done at this intersection of the thinking of these two scholars.

In regard to Holmes' interdisciplinary task as a world-view advocate, this chapter deepens one's understanding of the complex and demanding identity he has chosen for himself and argues for others. Realizing that a world-view advocate may confuse the ideosyncratic, world-viewish, and universal aspects of a perspective, Holmes attempts to provide a method for assessing interpretations of reality. His mediating stance of interpretive realism is a rigorous one that acknowledges the perspectival and elaborative aspects of human knowing while at the same time brings them under certain epistemological,
axiological, and ontological controls. Such a stance opens Holmes to input from outside the community of evangelical scholars as well as allows him to make a contribution to that larger interdisciplinary circle of scholars. The stance of interpretive realism itself is one that grew out of his scholarly action of honest perspectival dialogue within the discipline of philosophers. I think that is why it has the general appeal and credibility that it does. It is the advocated answer of one who has deeply experienced the growth-and-survival need of affirming both the interpretive nature of knowledge and the reality of God's created order.

When I first read Faith Seeks Understanding I was impressed with the way it articulated a path between dogmatic naive realism and sceptical phenomenalism. Holmes' philosophically relevant and theologically elaborated gestalt focused my thinking in a new way. In short, I experienced an attention switch. Already there was movement in that direction, and perhaps past it; movement promoted by my study of Brown and of Michael Polanyi. But it was Holmes who articulated a convincing integrative relationship between "interpretation" and "reality." Up until that time I had moved back and forth between seeing them conjunctively and disjunctively. More has to be done in charting out the implications of this integrative name for rhetorical studies. I look forward to that exploration, especially as a communication scholar trying to make sense of how people justify and make real their life-world interpretations.

The next chapter shows how this epistemic stance and the theistic themes function together in Holmes' discourse upon the world-view
topics of values, society, and history. There, some of the ripple effects of Holmes' epistemological switch are seen as he addresses the human knowledge of values, persons, and history.
FOOTNOTES


3These first two sections primarily focus upon his concise presentation of these themes in CWV, chapters eight and nine. Footnotes will refer the reader to places which provide greater detail.

4These consequences are worked out in some detail in FSU as Holmes develops interpretive realism as an epistemic approach to different fields of knowledge including science, metaphysics, history, morals, persons, and religion.

5CWV, p. 128.

6For Holmes' detailed discussion of this see CP20, pp. 234–238, and FSU pp. 51-59.

7"LLF," p. 429.

8CWV, p. 128.

9ATGT, pp. 1-15.

10CWV, p. 129.

11Ibid.

12Ibid, p. 130.

13Ibid.

14Ibid., pp. 130-131; also ATGT, pp. 34-36.

15ATGT, p. 36.

16CWV, p. 131.
17Ibid., pp. 132-133; for an extensive development of these ideas see FSU, pp. 134-162; also ATGT, pp. 70-83.

18CWV, p. 133.

19Ibid., p. 134, see also ATGT, pp. 8-31, 124-140.

20CWV, p. 134; see also ATGT, pp. 49-69.

21CWV, p. 136; see also ATGT, pp. 84-101.

22CWV, pp. 136-137.

23For example see Clark Pinnock's discussion of these tensions among evangelicals concerning "Biblical Authority" in Biblical Authority, ed. Jack Rogers (Waco, Tx: Word Book Co., 1977), pp. 47-73.

24CWV, pp. 138-149; also CP20, pp. 41-76 and ATGT, pp. 38-48. FSU stresses this pattern as it manifested itself in the negotiation of types of knowledge.

25CWV, pp. 141-142.

26Ibid., pp. 143-144.


28CWV, p. 150.

29Ibid., pp. 147-150.

30Ibid., pp. 151-152.

31Ibid., p. 150.

32FSU, p. 18ff.

33Ibid., pp. 13-18.

34ATGT, p. 106.


36CWV, pp. 45-49.

37Ibid., p. 51-53.


39ATGT, pp. 104-105.
40Ibid., p. 166.

41Ibid.; for a fuller discussion of induction see pp. 94-99.

42Ibid., pp. 106-107.

43Ibid., p. 107.

44Ibid., p. 108; for further discussion see pp. 85-94.


46"JB," p. 10.

47ATGT, p. 110.

48Ibid., pp. 110-111.

49Ibid., p. 111.


51ATGT, p. 112-113.


53ATGT, p. 114.

54Ibid., pp. 113-114.

55Ibid., p. 105.

56Ibid., p. 115.

57Ibid., p. 117.

58Ibid., pp. 119-121.

59"CR," p. 12. Holmes has recently developed these ideas in a focal manner in CWV.

60"QM," pp. 8-9. It is interesting to note that the 1983 Philosophy Conference of Wheaton College has chosen the theme "Scottish Common Sense Realism."


64Ibid., p. 15.
65Ibid., p. 16.

67I have already mentioned Wolterstorff's *Reason Within the Bounds of Religion*; he, together with Alvin Plantinga is publishing *Faith and Rationality* (South Bend: Notre Dame Press, forthcoming, 1983), his chapter in that book, "Can Belief in God Be Rational if it has no Foundations." The Toronto Conference Lectures will be published as *Rationality in the Calvinist Tradition* (Washington: University Press of America, forthcoming, 1983), Holmes' "CR" will be published there along with Wolterstorff's, "Thomas Reid's Reply to the Sceptic."
CHAPTER VIII

FAITH SEEKS UNDERSTANDING: A CREATIONAL VIEW
OF VALUES, SOCIETY, AND HISTORY

Introduction

The close of the last chapter stressed Holmes' view that the basic beliefs of a world view are justified in light of rational and valuational requirements as well as by the action projects of persons. An advocate of a unifying perspective attempts to show that a particular world view elaboration meets the practical demands of reflective and valuing agents. In this chapter I consider how Holmes' theistic perspective with its metaphysical and ontological notions articulated through an agency model along with his epistemological framework and stance of interpretive realism function in his discourse upon the universal world-view topics of values, society, and history. This discussion unfolds the intensional meaning of Holmes' unifying perspective. As he elaborates these final contours of a Christian world view, he again seeks a path between relativism and dogmatism in proposing an understanding which (1) allows for an integrative pluralism and (2) orients thought and action.

Holmes develops a view of valuing agents-in-community who pursue good ends in the created order. Those actions occur in the context of both a social and physical order and actualize, thus making real a
world view. Such action creates and maintains a distinctive historical society. In Holmes' view, this process of historical embodiment is not chaotic: God's created order limits the possibilities of human social existence (some visions of humanity are inhumane and others are impossible). God's providential action draws human history towards his good ends in such a way that his gift of freedom to man is neither violated nor diminished. There is relativity in all of this, but not an unlimited relativity. There are absolutes in all this, but neither impersonal nor arbitrary absolutes.

As Holmes seeks perspectival understanding in these areas and proposes a framework for that understanding, he works as a "limited absolutist": one who recognizes the sovereignty of God who created a contingent order open to the relational and responsible actions of reflective and valuing agents. He relies upon two related metaphysical concepts in his elaborative attention management: (1) value-potentiality in nature and (2) a process view of historical concrete universals.

Holmes' discussion of these topics have possible conceptual implications for a scholar doing criticism while relying on Brown's model. These areas are close to the underlying assumptions of Brown's model, and Holmes' philosophical positions provide one alternative grounding for that model. His theistic rationale for these proposals provides good reasons for a Christian scholar to integrate such views. The end of each section briefly addresses these possibilities.
A Theistic View of Values

Brown's communication-process model implies that persons construct and combine conceptualizations of being, knowing, and valuing in the maintenance of world views. Having considered the key metaphysical and epistemological aspects of a Holmesian Christian theism, I turn to his rhetorical processing of an axiology. His advocacy of the axiological implications of his perspectival commitment features (1) the theistic framework for understanding the source of value obligation in contrast to a naturalistic anthropocentric basis, and (2) a creational approach to the knowledge of normative values and moral decision-making. Holmes' pattern of categorizing is similar to that highlighted in chapter seven. He employs key perspectival control ideas in the construction of a theistic axiological framework within which a variety of axiological gestalts could be articulated. At this level, Holmes' rhetoric of contrasted perspectives focuses perspectival attention: he reminds Christians of key points of perspectival agreement which should unify them in contrast to other perspectival approaches. When Holmes develops a "creational natural law gestalt" concerning values and the human knowledge of them, he directs elaborative attention and proposes a particular stance within the theistic frame. In Contours of a World View and in recent key articles, he promotes this proposal primarily by comparing and contrasting his creational natural law stance to the covenental voluntaristic stance represented by Jacques Ellul, a Christian scholar with an international reputation.

Consistently, the conceptual "obstacles" of relativity and pluralism structure much of Holmes' rhetorical action. Again he deals
with these contemporary problems via two tactics. First, his **metaphysical tactic** argues that there are creational limits to the relativity of human valuing. Relativity occurs because of the historically contingent nature of human existence in God's created order. Nature is open to human agents and provides a range of possibilities which are variously actualized in the actions of persons who value (1) different possibilities and (2) the means by which these possibilities ought to be pursued. Holmes argues that relativity is metaphysically limited because certain actions are impossible and others are ultimately destructive of persons as valuing agents. History, the arena of value actualization, displays both the variety and the limits of human valuing. Second, Holmes uses an **epistemological tactic** that (1) allows for the acceptance of pluralism both across and within perspectival communities, (2) provides a way for taking responsible, confident, and humble stands in a pluralistic situation, and (3) provides a pattern for seeing order in human valuing.

**A Perspectival Framework of Value Obligation**

As Holmes comments upon the centrality of values to human existence he sets up the primary perspectival rhetorical problem of valuing in a pluralistic society:

In every sphere of human activity, values are involved: moral values, aesthetic values, psychological values, political values, intellectual values, economic values, religious values, and so forth. Such values shape our lives, our society, our culture; and it is the pursuit of such values that is one of the major distinctions of human beings in this world. Yet ours is a pluralistic society in which no one set of values prevails, nor
just one supreme good to integrate them all. Both agreements and disagreements exist: values we agree on, like peace and tolerance and liberty enable us to live together; yet disagreement about values often divides Christian ideals from those of contemporary naturalistic humanism.1

Given a pluralistic society two key questions arise: How are Christians to conceive of values? Given fundamental value disagreements, how can Christians provide perspectival justification for value obligation? These questions shape Holmes' rhetoric of contrasted perspectives as it takes an axiological focus.

Holmes argues that persons value and that values are always personal. He defines values as "good ends, ideals we ought to pursue."2 This definition combines both a teleological emphasis on good ends and a deontological emphasis on personal obligation. This person-centered understanding of values is a rejection of Platonic axiologies which treat values as universals that exist independent of persons. Holmes notes that naturalistic humanists might agree with his personalistic value-stance but that their rationale for such a claim differs at the perspectival level:

The humanist rejects Platonism because of his anthropocentrism: things have value only to human beings and the human community, for our betterment, as good ends we ought therefore to pursue. The Christian rejects it because of his theocentrism: things have value ultimately to a personal God, for his purposes, and God's values are then the good ends we humans ought to pursue. The agreement is that values, to be valuable at all, must be of value to valuing beings to persons. The disagreement is over whose valuing makes something truly valuable and obligatory for us, whether ours or God's.3

While Holmes' definition stresses values as personal theoretical abstractions, it also relates values to the wholistic concerns of persons and the practical necessities of human existence. Values are
not just concepts persons reflect upon; persons interiorize values, order them, and act in light of them:

To value is to prize, to idealize a goal or an end. What we value therefore guides what we do. How we value affects the intensity and determination with which we do it. How responsibly we act depends significantly on our values. The Bible speaks of this when it speaks of what and how we ought to love, for to value is to love. We are not to love ourselves more highly than we ought, not to love the things of the world in certain ways, not to love the praise of men, but to love God, to love justice, to seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness.

We love a vast array of things and all sorts of possibilities, sometimes less and sometimes more of them than we should. Some are more valued than others and some less, and it is possible to be lured in a variety of conflicting directions by conflicting values. What we need to give life order, unity, and overall direction is a unifying end that we value most of all and regard as the very highest. For if values shape actions, then one's highest value or supreme good will shape the other values themselves and doubly shape the actions. Free and responsible action requires not just values but the right values, rightly ordered to enhance the highest good.

Such a view again focuses perspectival attention upon the contrast between theistic and naturalistic understandings of values, differences rooted in perspectival basic beliefs:

The difference between a Christian and a humanist understanding of values is profound. First, the naturalist claims that our obligation to pursue certain values rather than others, whether individually or in the context of social institutions such as marriage and government, is based simply on human interests, or on the social conventions and contracts that arise in the course of history.

The obligation is entirely self-imposed; and the self-imposed obligations of man and society, like New Year's resolutions can too easily be neglected or changed. Without some independent standard, enlightened self-interest might well find cause to override the interests of the community. Even if humans have a natural altruistic tendency as some have tentatively generalized, how can we infer altruistic obligations from that? Does it imply ought? Would it do so also if unbridled rather than enlightened self-interest marked us all? Would unbridled self-interest then be the good end we ought to pursue? What does make values obligatory? Whence comes the binding force of unchanging moral duty, if there is no independent authority transcending local interests and social change? Has the humanist an adequate basis
for obligation to the values we ought to pursue? ....

Second, the difference between humanism and Christian theism involves the anthropocentric claim that the highest end integrating all of our values is the human community itself, and that all other values should flow from this.

In contrast to the naturalist, the theist speaks of value obligation and an integrating highest good in light of the theistic control theme: God-creation distinction and relationship. As he featured anomalies concerning the naturalistic stance, Holmes raised questions focusing upon value obligation. He provides a theistic response to these anomalies by elaborating four claims rooted in the theistic perspectival theme. These claims provide a theistic axiological framework. As he summarizes the four aspects of this framework for values, one again sees the ingredient ideas of the God-creation theme functioning as control beliefs:

1. God the creator is our highest good, and his good ends we ought to pursue.
2. God the creator is just and loving, as we ought to be in all the ends we pursue.
3. The ordered creation has potential for God's good ends; what is attests what ought to be.
4. God mandates the pursuit of these ends through his providence and grace, which is our hope.

First, the basic belief in the God-creation distinction and relationship implies that "the eternal God is completely and unchangeably good . . . . He is his own highest end." He does not stand judged by anything outside of himself: there are no independent universals that limit or constrain his goodness. Human agents are dependent upon and obligated to their Creator: "We do not exist for ourselves but were created for God's good purposes, to glorify and enjoy him forever." Persons are to value God as their highest
good (i.e. to love him with all their heart) and are obligated to pursue his good ends in every area of life as agents. Such valuing "integrates all of life and gives lesser ends their worth."10

This first axiological commitment opens the theist to divine command theories of moral law. Holmes comments:

In moral philosophy, divine command theories . . . [relate] ethical terms like good and right to what God wills for us, and bad or wrong to what he forbids. Two emphases appear. First the content of our moral obligations is coexistent with what God wills for us . . . . The second emphasis is that God is the ultimate source of our moral obligation, the only one who has authority over us all, and whom all of us should obey.11

The major objection to such a theory is that of arbitrary imposition: What keeps God from commanding that which is evil? Holmes argues:

For at least two reasons this could not be: first what a person wills reflects his values and character. Second, in a good and wise being it reflects his knowledge of others' real needs. God's law, then expresses both his character and his concern for his creatures.12

Such a theory leaves open-ended the epistemological question concerning how one knows God's law. Holmes' creational approach to moral knowledge is featured in the next section.

A second aspect of Holmes' theistic axiological framework involves the notion that values reveal the character of the person. Holmes argues that Scripture portrays God as just and loving, both in his divine law and in his actions. Holmes reasons that as "image bearers" persons are obligated to be characterized by these two "overarching moral principles" of love and justice: we should pursue love and justice in loving and just ways.13

Aware of the ambiguities of these two terms, Holmes defines them. Justice implies "treating equals equally, distributing benefits and
liabilities equitably without favoritism, prejudice or 'respect of
persons,' in every sphere of life."14 Love is more than a
spontaneous emotion. He claims, "Love is not just personalized concern
devoid of specific moral obligations . . . . Love is an active concern
for every aspect of a person's well-being . . . ."15 He relates
such moral love to the agape that characterized Jesus' compassionate
caring that cherished the well-being of others. He rejects a
disjunction of these two ideals. "Just-love" avoids both favoritism
and a selfish insistence of personal rights; it results in involvement
with others for the glory of God, often at a high cost. "Justice
stresses more the outward ordering of life, while love is an inner and
more personalized concern for the benefit of others."16

A third aspect of Holmes' axiological framework is rooted in the
creational idea that God meaningfully ordered the universe and
providentially acts to accomplish his good ends. Here Holmes
recategorizes the common contemporary ethical disjunction between
"fact" (what is) and value (what ought to be). He argues that God's
creation is not value neutral; fact and value are related by the
purposes of God. In developing this aspect of the axiological frame,
Holmes manages attention between two metphysical views of nature: a
"value-neutral position" that sees nature as devoid of value and a
"value-actuality position" that locates value in nature. His mediating
metaphysical position emphasizes "value-potentials" and the possibility
of value-actualization by human agents.

God created with purpose and declared what he made to be
good, of value, to himself. A relation exists therefore between
what "is" and what "ought" to be, between fact and value. The
physical world is not without purpose, value-free or value-neutral, to be manipulated at will for whatever we might desire, nor is its worth altogether relative or anthropocentric. Fact and value are united by God's purposes in creating . . . .

But the theist accepts neither the pessimism and subjectivism of value-neutrality nor the over-optimism and romanticism of value-actuality. The one ignores the Biblical claim that the creation was good, the other is unrealistic about natural and moral evil. Yet the value inherent in God's purposive activity, affirmed by a value-judgement at creation, was reaffirmed by the incarnation of Christ in this world. Creation, even in its present state, has value-potentiality. The kingdom of God is at hand, among us now only partially and in its fullness still to come. The creation holds potential for good, for it was ordered by God and is law-governed as a means to his good ends. Moral law is God's law, not in legalistic fashion as if law is an end-in-itself, but in order that people and society should be as God intended, just and loving, imaging God himself. Both the principles that underlie the law and the ends to which the law is directed, then have a claim over us as the creator's principles and ends, possible by virtue of who he is and the way he made things to be. Moral law and natural law command us because the lawgiver is God: as his creatures we are obligated to his, his authority and his purposes, and to actualizing value-potentials in the way his law commands.17

The fourth aspect of Holmes' value frame emerges from the first three. He holds that God has delegated responsibilities to persons made in his image. He argues:

God has given us a creative mandate to pursue his purposes, actualizing values he intended. Our task, according to Genesis, is to replenish and subdue the earth: this implies untapped possibilities in nature from its very beginning . . . . Value-pursuits therefore pervade our relationship to nature, as well as to God and to each other. Responsible action is mandated in every sphere of life.18

This human pursuit of God's purpose is structured by (1) immanent forces in nature, (2) the actions of other persons which express their freedom to pursue values in distinctively personal ways, and (3) God's providential action. God's grace frees persons as agents to act for him; his promise to act in history for the accomplishment of his overall purposes gives hope even in a fallen world.19 Holmes
rejects those views which neglect these three factors affecting human valuing and value-pursuits.

These last two aspects of Holmes' theory of value obligation need further explication. He features attention on value potentiality as a complex name for the relationship between fact and value. The adduced justification of that relational name depends upon Holmes' articulation of the control themes of Christian theism's unifying perspective and the agent model he employs to develop those themes. He elaborates this "value-potential" concept in a critique of Jacques Ellul's "value-neutral" concept and the rejection of natural law theories. Holmes again works to justify an attentional focus concerning the fact-value relationship, one that moderates the value-neutral and value-actual poles:

a. Everything within his life-world has potential for a valuing being. For God, then, all creation has value in terms of what possibilities and purposes to fulfill. Nature cannot have value either in itself or for itself, but only by and for the creator who gave it possibilities he wants to accomplish. Value-actuality and value-neutrality are not then the only options.

b. Negative as well as positive values are possible, according to what is achieved. The very possibility of evil, in fact, depends on there being value-potentiality rather than either full value-actuality or full value-neutrality. With the former there would be no room for evil; with the latter it would not matter. Murder, adultery, theft, and every inhumanity can only be considered evil, because life and marriage and property are neither value-neutral nor fully value-actualized. Evil denies to their value potentiality the actualization sought. Not everything turns out all right in the end.

c. Value potentiality is related to "action projects" of valuing beings. To have value either for God or for man, something must have potential in relation to its purposes and ends. But humans have action projects in common, areas of value and spheres of action that are universal: physical life and health, work and economics, sex and marriage. Here is an identifiable ordering of creation, and in each action-sphere certain value potentialities are at stake. We act to preserve or
improve life and health, we work for economic ends, we marry to achieve certain goals. Common action spheres identify value areas essential to man and facilitate the formation of moral rules that are universally binding. Value-potentiality leads to a creational ethic.

Values are not actualized by some inevitable process of nature or history . . . . Our phenomenology of fact and value suggests a "transcendent teleology," where value-potentials are actualized by agents who in some measure at least transcend the process, inject something new, and secure outcomes which in the normal course of events would not occur. Natural processes provide necessary conditions that make possible those good outcomes, but they are insufficient for their actualization. Such in fact is the precondition of both human action and divine.

Contributing to a value-potentiality with a transcendent teleology is a vast amount of recent philosophical work which distinguishes between events and acts, or between process and action . . . . Man from one perspective is an event in a process, but he is more fundamentally an agent who transcends that process to act freely out of moral duty . . . .

The point is that actions partake of both nature and freedom. Freedom is an active pursuit of values. Nature provides the necessary value-potential. Nature and values are therefore related, and this is made evident in human action. Man actualizes the value-potentiality things have for him by transcending what might otherwise be the natural course of events and acting to achieve those ends which otherwise might never be actualized at all.20

Holmes relates fact and value by bringing his personal-agent modelled perspectival beliefs to bear upon the problem. It focuses attention and provides a rationale for the relational name. Holmes argues that there are at least two major fact-value gestalts which function within the Christian framework. In the context for the above passage Holmes is contrasting his view with that of Ellul, a Christian theist who strongly rejects any tendency toward a creational natural law ethic. Holmes describes these two primary stances within the theistic frame:

Every theist, if consistent, regards God's will as the ultimate basis for moral obligation. This gives rise to two markedly different directions for ethics and for the theology of law. On the one hand, God's will is expressed in his creation, so
that our knowledge of the creation is indirectly an understanding of God's will. Christian natural law theories... are of this variety, providing the basis for a universal and unchanging morality that judges and proposes the laws that men make. On the other hand, God expresses his will in a covenant of grace in Jesus Christ, so that our knowledge of him is itself a knowledge of God's will.21

These contrasting possibilities of axiological stances within the theist value frame move attention away from ideas that unite and towards issues that divide. These two stances (or gestalts) show that perspectival frameworks themselves are articulated in relationship to the pluralistic dialogue among theologians, philosophers and scientists. Metaphysical models make differences concerning framework ideas and ways they would be featured. For Holmes, the third idea, "The ordered creation has potential for God's good ends; what is attests what ought to be," is crucial. Ellul might not consider such a belief as a part of the framework. I turn now to such elaborative differences within the theistic framework for values.

A Creational Natural Law Stance Concerning Moral Knowledge

Thus far a perspectival framework within which theists can think about values has been outlined. Within this frame Holmes isolates two major axiological stances: "covenantal-voluntarism" and "creational natural law." This section shows Holmes managing elaborative attention as he philosophically develops his axiological gestalt through combining it with his interpretive realism in order to address key questions: How can we know moral principles? Is there a pattern for reasoning about moral decisions? Can Christians gain ethical insight from non-Christians. In clarifying his creational gestalts, I show
Holmes managing elaborative attention through contrasting his stance with Ellul's and thereby featuring underlying philosophical and theological differences, interdisciplinary differences that make a difference.

Holmes observes that Ellul's covenental view of ethics relies upon three control beliefs: (1) a nominalism which rejects any notion of universals or a fixed order of creation, (2) the idea that sin has completely destroyed God's image in man, and (3) the belief that fallen man has no knowledge of God's will or the good. In contrast to Holmes, Ellul holds for a disjunctive relationship between fact and value so that there are no creational indicators of good or evil; nature is value-neutral. Fallen man cannot know what is good. In contrast Holmes' creational interpretation of the natural law tradition is epistemically more hopeful:

(1) It opts for a rationalist rather than a voluntarist view of ethical and political obligation . . .
(2) It stands in contrast, indeed in conscious opposition, to legal positivism . . .
(3) Natural law stresses the deontological element in ethics, rather than accepting a purely teleological or utilitarian theory, for it judges laws and actions not so much by their effects . . . as by universal principles and unchanging moral ends . . .
(4) Natural law has a minimal content . . .

From a communication point of view, both interdisciplinary axiological interpretations are processed in a theistic perspectival communication community. The contrast between stances becomes clear as Holmes develops his epistemological approach concerning ethics. He notes that "the method of reasoning whereby that basis [i.e., the theistic framework] yields us moral knowledge is not explicit. The
Christian will therefore be attracted to ethical theories that base obligation in the nature of things, but has no precommitment to any one theory of moral reasoning. In *Faith Seeks Understanding*, Holmes considers rational, empirical, intuitive, emotional, and linguistic approaches to moral knowledge and evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of each, implying that all feature attention upon different aspects of the epistemic process. He argues that no one approach is completely satisfactory if it stands alone, and that each one has been argued by Christians. Yet since that book he has moved in the direction of the natural law approach to the knowledge of values and moral decision making.

In contrast to Ellul, Holmes' primary rhetorical problem is to provide a constructive understanding of the relationship between theological and philosophical ethics. Theological ethics stresses special revelation from God; philosophical ethics stresses moral knowledge derived from human experience and reflection. While a convental thinker like Ellul is leery of the value of philosophical ethics, a creational thinker like Holmes is not:

Some religious people are sceptical about philosophical ethics. They claim that since moral law is given by God, it can only be known by special revelation, and a gulf consequently separates Biblical morality from all philosophical ethics. If we are to relate philosophy constructively to Christianity it is important to examine this claim.

Notice . . . two cases of non sequitur: (1) Granted (a) that moral values and obligations derive ultimately from the will and character of God, it does not follow (b) that they are known only by special revelation . . . . (2) Granted that the moral law is known by special revelation, it does not follow (c) that Biblical morality is wholly other than philosophical ethics. Regardless of men's ethical disagreements general and special revelation themselves cannot contradict each other, for God cannot contradict himself. Truth is a coherent whole.
Here Holmes' general epistemological theme is being played out: "All truth is God's truth." In contrast to Ellul, Holmes affirms the possibility that fallen men have ethical insight, and that they shed light on ethical questions asked by Christians. This asserted position is important given those power shares for world-viewing which Holmes stresses and his resulting interdisciplinary name "Christian Philosopher."

Holmes' approach to the epistemic questions about values manages elaborative attention in a distinctively philosophical way. By doing so he demonstrates the potential philosophical contribution to theistic ethics and he clearly identifies himself as a philosopher who can contribute to theologians in the interdisciplinary world-view dialogue. The key question for Holmes is "What knowledge can we gain of God's laws and purposes that will help identify good ends that ought to be pursued?" A key obstacle at this juncture is that of "relativism." Here Holmes focuses attention through conceptual clarification. First he distinguishes two types of relativism:

(a) Our knowledge of the truth is relative to our personal and historical limitations. This is epistemological relativity. It may mean either (a1) that moral change reflects our changing understanding of unchanging moral principles, or (a2) that moral change reflects the lack of any unchanging principles or absolute truth. (b) There are no unchanging moral principles that apply to all men at all times in history and in all cultures of the world. This is ethical relativism, and it is plainly an interpretation (a2) placed upon (a) epistemological relativism, which is itself an interpretation of the fact of historical change.

A second conceptual clarification distinguishes two types of ethical relativism. "Descriptive relativism" involves showing the diverse ways
values have been conceived historically. "Normative relativism" absolutizes relativism as an ethical principle by asserting that all norms are relative. He argues:

Descriptively, relativism is far from complete, for all human beings have much the same needs, hence the same value areas and spheres of action; anthropologists point out that all cultures seem to have taboos against incest, distinguish murder from war or execution, have some sort of family obligations, and some rules related to the economic necessities of life. Moreover, it does not follow that different value systems are equally valid and ought to differ as much as they do, nor that they would in equally valid enlightened societies. Normative relativism, then, does not automatically follow. And a complete normative relativism is self-refuting: for if no values are universally binding, neither is the value of tolerating different values. A more limited relativism therefore follows.29

Relying upon these two clarifications, Holmes conceives of a continuum of philosophical stances concerning universal value obligations and moral choices. In so doing, he refines his personal disciplinary identity among philosophers. The first two stances are both versions of ethical relativism: unlimited relativism and limited relativism. He observes, "While neither kind permits unchanging moral rules for specific areas of life, they differ about overall principles. The former admits no universal principles at all, while the latter allows there may be some."30 Joseph Fletcher's situation ethic with its universal principle of agape is an example of limited relativism. At the polar extreme from the unlimited relativist is the unlimited absolutist, the dogmatic legalist who "regards all situations as the same and ignores exceptions, so that he applies universal principles without variation."31 Holmes argues that the legalist commits a logical fallacy in denying the existence of varying moral situations. He reasons that this problem "does not justify us in
denying all universal characteristics. As we come to understand something of man and his world, we grasp general features that give specific content to the obligation of love. The general characteristics of ethical situations produce general rules to guide the conduct of love."32 This position, one he indwells, he labels limited absolutism. Holmes argues that it mediates between versions of ethical relativity and dogmatic absolutism. He further categorizes this position:

Limited absolutism . . . allows several kinds of relativity.  
(a) Relativity in the application of universal principles to different situations . . . .  
(b) Relativity in our understanding of those principles and in the history of their application to life . . . .  
(c) Relativity in mores that are due to cultural differences of principle . . . .  
At the same time the Biblical ethic affirms absolute elements.  
(a) The character of God, loving and just, who articulates the law not as an arbitrary imposition but as wise guidance for human life. The "logic" of morality is rooted in the wisdom of God.  
(b) The moral law, variously delineated . . . . and applied to varying historical situations . . . .  
(c) The summary of the moral law in the law of love, which extends a second mile beyond the explicit law in the pursuit of righteousness, social justice, and human compassion.  
Limited absolutism, defined in this way, relates unchanging moral principles to historical change. It does so by relating ethics to God.33

A limited absolutist must make moral decisions. Holmes argues an approach by categorizing "the relationship between ethical principles, general rules, and particular cases"34 and "a structure for our thinking . . . that moves from (i) theological and philosophical bases (God and his creation) to (ii) overarching principles (justice and love) that apply to every area of human responsibility, to (iii) area rules reflecting universal values, the good ends intended for each
action sphere, to (iv) *case decisions*, which brings the above to bear on more particular kinds of situations."35 This gestalt if accepted and internalized patterns the moral decision-making and action of a Christian theist in a distinctive manner.

As Holmes develops his decision-making gestalt he first emphasizes the theological and philosophical basis of values. Earlier these have been highlighted as the theistic framework. Holmes argues that a person authentically commits himself to some understanding of ultimate reality. Such a choice becomes a basic integrative ethical orientation. In the theistic frame, God is the highest good, and if God exists then he is normatively the supreme good for all persons, whether they acknowledge him or not.36 Given his creational stance, Holmes holds that an understanding of nature as God's created order has normative implications for persons. For him the creational version of natural law ought to function as "a formal principle that tells us to look at the inherent nature of things rather than at desires and consequences alone."37 Holmes comments on the function of the theological and philosophical bases. Together they provide:

> Formal rather than constitutive ideas, in the sense that they do not tell us anything specific that we ought or ought not to do, but rather identify the kind of reasoning which is believed to underly whatever specific moral advice may be given . . . . It indicates the kind of reasoning thought appropriate in ethics; but it does not by itself and without input produce . . . any general moral rule or action decision.38

Given Holmes' general theistic frame, his creational stance, and his view of the interdisciplinary elaboration of world views, both theological and philosophical reasoning guide a person in the application of more specific ethical principles.
Overarching ethical principles are central for moral decisions and actions. For Holmes, the anthropological theme of Christian theism concerning the value and dignity that persons have before God and its relationship to the major theme, leads to the adduction of two principles. God created persons in his image, values them as unique in the created order, acts towards them with love and justice, and commands them to be loving and just in their relationships. These beliefs imply that persons ought to value persons and act in relationship with one another guided by love and justice, the two overarching and universally obligatory moral principles of a Christian humanism rooted in the nature of persons. For Holmes, these principles ought to orient moral reason and action as they bear upon complex moral situations in the negotiation of just and loving ends and means.

Holmes adds a third level for consideration in ethical thinking. This next layer of concern distinguishes him from limited relativists who advocate a limited number of general moral principles as relevant for situational choices. In contrast, Holmes believes that human agents can identify specific normative values and rules relevant to the universal action-areas which structure human existence in the created order:

What we have said about the nature of persons can now be brought to bear in identifying more specific values. Not all legitimate values are universally binding, for some ... are culturally relative. But God made us all responsible agents in relation to himself, to nature, to other persons, and to ourselves ... . Relationships are value-laden, and it is possible to identify in them universal value-areas and action spheres that are essential to being human. Within these action spheres we seek to actualize the values we deem important—intellectual, aesthetic,
economic, social, sexual, familial, and so on. While each of these areas is essential to a fully human quality of life, the specific values people pursue vary ... We need to identify as good ends, those universal values we all ought to pursue.40

The question is how to identify these values. Given the creational ethical gestalt and his epistemological gestalt of interpretive realism, Holmes suggests an approach that allows two disciplinary methods for the interdisciplinary discernment of values.

First, Biblical theology explores God's special revelation in the attempt to discern what Scripture teaches "about the intended purposes of each human action sphere."41 This results in a world-viewish theology of human value areas. Holmes believes that the Ten Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount focus attention upon some of the universal values and rules that ought to guide thought and action. He emphasizes the need to make a distinction between at least two types of rules Biblical theologians find in Scripture:

The Bible itself contains two kinds of rules. Some, like the second table of the law, are unchanging, universal obligations stated in general terms. Others, as in Exodus 21-23, apply those moral obligations to changeable particular situations. The first kind we may call "moral laws," the second "prudential rules." The legalist elevates all rules to the level of moral laws, while the new morality reduces them all to prudential rules ... . The two are distinguishable in Scripture and must be distinguished in our thinking.42

Second, a philosophical study of creational indicators stresses creation as a general revelation of God's law and attempts to discern those "moral indicators in the very nature of . . . [a] kind of activity itself." Such study is perspectivally categorized as a "further exploration of the fact-value relationship discernable in these human action spheres."43 This second disciplinary method
considers both rational and empirical aspects of human experience. Holmes provides a rationale for the contribution of philosophical ethics by "playing" the God-creation theme:

This is indeed an ordered and purposive creation . . . its order and potential are God's doing, not in least independent of his freedom in creating. Ours is one of many possible worlds God might have created, but his choice in creating it included the choice of inherent value potentials.

Of course, if God were arbitrary and capricious, then neither creational indicators nor biblical theology would help at all. We would be condemned to a skepticism from which only frequent special revelations could save us. In an ordered creation, however, not everything is equally possible . . . .

Romans 1-2 . . . [ties] moral law to the God-creation relationship and . . . distinguish[es] natural from unnatural activities . . . [by claiming] that the moral law is somehow written into creation, into the very heart and essence of our being. The reference is not to what comes naturally to some but not to others by virtue of individual differences, but to what is natural or unnatural in some universal sense for all humankind, by virtue of what God intended in the way he made us all. So the moral law summarized in the second table of the Decalogue speaks of universal obligations regarding human life, economic needs (stealing deprives others of needed resources), human sexuality and marriage, and the truth about people . . . .

Within a creationally based approach to moral knowledge, God's law is in no way arbitrary, but addresses the essential nature of human persons. As relational and responsible beings, we share universal areas of value and activity whose inherent ends bear witness to universal values God intended. 44

From a communication systems standpoint, Holmes highlights two disciplinary shares in an interdisciplinary power-cycle that contributes to a contemporary Christian ethic. Biblical theologians and philosophical ethicists are seen as working together, potentially in consecrated interdependence. He argues that "the former is often more explicit and decisive, while the latter helps us see underlying reasons and addresses issues that fall outside the biblical purview." 45 Both shares are needed in discerning differences between universal moral laws and relative prudent rules. Other power
shares are not clearly articulated by Holmes, but it is clear that all parties involved in ethical dialogue are not simply attempting to discover universal values, they are called to pursue and apply those values in the changing situations of contemporary society. For example, in an essay on the sixth commandment, Holmes articulates some potential areas of Christian involvement in society, social roles that collectively participate in the power negotiation and application of the moral law "Thou shalt not kill":

If we are to apply the sixth commandment to our society, we must learn to use moral persuasion as it was used in the Old Testament days through prophetic preaching, through legislation, and other means. Therefore, we need morally informed, morally responsible people at strategic points in society. We need them in international affairs, in national and local government, in criminology, in law enforcement and the military, in medicine and medical ethics, in the mass media and in education. We need preachers with the courage and the wisdom of the Old Testament prophets who will apply the law of God to the life of our land. The commandment, then becomes God's call to bring love and justice to bear in the conflicts and violence of a broken world, in eloquent testimony of the redeeming love and justice of God Himself.46

Holmes is not arguing for a "Moral Majority" approach to the social application of values to contemporary problems, but neither is he allowing for a Christian withdrawal from social concerns or an accommodation to liberal politics. Given his pattern for making moral choices and his integrative understanding of Christian identity, the Christian is urged to authentically participate with openness and confident humility in ever-widening circles of social influence. Given Holmes' gestalt, such Christians would be capable of both contributing to the dialogue and learning from it.
Finally, important in Holmes' approach to ethical decisions is the actual moment of decision that is aware of the complexities of given cases. In creational theistic ethics such choosing involves a consideration of (1) God's purpose and the value-potentials in the relevant action spheres, (2) the rights and duties of persons involved, (3) the relevant facts, consequences, and concerns, and (4) the best means for doing justice with love. Many ethical situations are complex; clear-cut choices are not always available in a contingent universe where human freedom has resulted in evil that penetrates and affects every social institution and every person. There is no royal road to moral choices and actions. Holmes argues that the Christian, like every other person, must make tough ethical choices. Differences lie not in the moral dilemmas to be faced, but in the perspectival frame for values and the axiological stance used to aid in moral decision-making.

In summary, Holmes as a limited absolutist applies a theistic framework for values in developing a pattern for responsible thinking about value choices and moral actions. His resulting gestalt orients persons for deciding responsibly in complex situations. It does not prescribe detailed absolute answers ahead of time, yet it does provide a place to stand. Holmes' perspectival framework concerning values and their relevance to contemporary life allows pluralism within the context of absolute limits. His particular perspectival stance suggests ways for discerning and acting within those limits.
Communication Implications

The preceding pages surveyed Holmes' rhetorical processing of an axiological position. He combines perspectival ideas, metaphysical concepts and models, and interpretive realism to develop both a theistic framework for valuing and a creational natural-law stance within that frame. In general Christian theists unite in their thinking about the framework, but they divide concerning specific ways of applying that framework concerning moral choices. I have also shown how Holmes, as a limited absolutist, combines interpretive realism to develop a pattern for moral decision-making. Future studies of world-view communication could enrich current understanding of how metaphysical and epistemological stance variously combine in the advocacy of world-view axiologies. Brown has suggested this critical task, and it seems central to extending our knowledge of world-view communication. Holmes' contrast with Ellul shows how such epistemic and metaphysical differences make axiological differences.

Holmes admits degrees of relativity concerning values and moral decisions, but he does not detail the processes by which axiological diversity emerges within and across historical perspectival communities. Brown's model is capable of yielding such insight and would feature how values and value hierarchies rise and fall in human interaction and how they are creatively justified and applied in relation to the perspectival "highest good" and the contemporary moral situation. If a scholar were to choose such a focus, the assumed scholarly position concerning the relationship between facts and values should be "confessed." Given Holmes' discussion, one could ask whether
Ellul's value-neutrality or Holmes' value-potentiality view is more adequate for communication studies. Ellul's voluntarist approach to values sees no inherent fact-value relationship. His nominalistic understanding of universals and his positivistic view of human laws is potentially congruous with Brown's model. Such an undergirding commitment would lead the scholar to see no inherent relationships between values negotiated and the practical demands of human existence. If that scholar were Christian and following Ellul's lead, then non-Christian communication systems and their discourse upon values would contribute little if anything to Christian thought except another example of fallen humanity's depravity.

In contrast, Holmes' value-potentiality thrust would lead the scholar to consider if indeed there are areas of universal values for which a world-view community must provide direction if it is to be needs-meeting. Such a scholar might contribute a method for discerning such areas through the study of human negotiation of values and moral action. Such a view might help account for why world views wax and wane, especially if the scholar can highlight (1) how value areas are world-viewishly discerned, (2) how action corollaries are recommended for the community actualization of value potentials, and (3) how such discernment and recommendations are revised over time. Holmes could be studied further as one among many evangelical value-rhetors who discern, recommend, and revise values. For example he discusses the value-areas of work and play and recommends appropriate actions. He also discusses how Christian views of war must be revised in light of the contemporary technology for warfare.
Given the value-neutrality and value-potentiality gestalts as well as other understandings of fact-value relationships, scholars should clarify personal stances. The Holmesian stance cuts against the positivist memory that is still strong among some communication scholars who still claim value-neutrality in their writing. Paradoxically, their pursuit of such neutrality is oriented by the value of "scholarly objectivity." The possibility of actualizing that value depends upon the nature of human thought. Personally, Holmes' value-potentiality intrigues me, but its ramifications for communication scholarship need further reflection.

A Theistic View of Society

As Holmes addresses the world-view topic "society," he relies upon his perspectival themes of persons as relational and responsible agents existing together in God's created order. For him, the Christian stance toward social theory must account for three components: natural processes, human endeavor, and God's providential involvement in creation. Relying upon the perspectival themes, Holmes manages elaborative attention by (1) employing a metaphysical model of "historicized and concrete individuals" and (2) developing four claims that structure a theistic framework for thinking about social institutions. His view of persons as interdependent creature's combines with his interpretive realism in an epistemic stance concerning how knowledge of persons arises through social interaction.

Holmes' discussion throughout is of relevance to Brown's model which features persons in the process of negotiating social order and
social identity. I believe that once again much of what Holmes argues potentially serves as one philosophical grounding for a version of Brown's model.

**Metaphysical Models and Society**

As Holmes categorizes and develops a view of "individuality" and "society" he rejects two metaphysical models which historically feature attention of one existential aspect without the other. The first is "the Greek model of form and matter, particulars and universals, [which] separates our essential nature from temporal change and so has difficulty exploring and valuing individuality."51 During the Medieval period it resulted in an hierarchical absolutism that "gave potentially repressive authority to the head of a family, the head of a state, a feudal lord, or a papal head of the church."52 As a corrective to the extremes of this model, Enlightenment thinkers "reduced society to a collection of independent, isolated atoms joined together under laws of reason in a man-made contract."53 The popularized version of this model is seen in Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe*. It employs the model of "mechanistic science whose particles of matter were conjoined by external forces, social institutions as such had no place in the state of nature: family and civil order are not indigenous to us, but are artifices overlaid on the natural associations of individuals."54 This atomistic view of persons so stresses individuality that it has "difficulty accounting for the intrinsically societal nature of our existence."55
In contrast to these two models and in an attempt to mediate attentional extremes Holmes converts a metaphysical model of "concrete universals" developed by idealist thinkers. He argues that such a model stresses historical fulfillment and "conceives of the individual immersed in social processes through which he comes to know and be himself." The model features the individual's internal relatedness "to the community and the social processes in which he takes part." In an extensive passage Holmes discourses upon this idea. This quotation is central to Holmes' thinking and his advocacy for a way of viewing social life. It is central for me because it provides a way of thinking about Brown's process model of world-view communities. Note how this elaboration relies upon what was earlier said about value-potentiality, value-neutrality, and value-actuality:

The relation of individuals to the whole civil society and of positive law to natural law presents itself as one case of the relations of particulars to universals . . . . No man is an island, and . . . , civil society is not an independent and universal reality in which people somehow participate. A civil society is rather an individual, dependent, historical thing—not a fixed but a developing society. If . . . fed . . . into the problem of universals, it would suggest a concept of law and society that rests . . . on a recognition of the inherent value of historical individuality. In other words . . . a historicized theory of universals . . . seeing the state as neither the real universal that shapes individual destiny nor a merely human artifice of a particular sort.

What we need . . . is to see their [i.e. individuals and society] changing historical nature as having real value within the unchanging potentiality of the whole created order.

1. No man is an island. He does not participate in an ocean of remote universal objects that wash up on his shores, nor does he surrender his rights in order to create order in a nominalistic world. From birth he is both dependent and independent, a social being, an individual embodiment of historical possibilities and natural laws. As Buber put it, "I-Thou" is the primary word, not "I" or "Thou" alone.

2. The state likewise is not just a conglomeration of particulars; it is an historically individual thing. Civil
societies like persons are individual embodiments of unchanging possibilities in the created order. As such they have value in themselves; they have legitimate ends that may not be reduced to the ends of individual self-interest. Civil society and the civil law that orders the pursuit of its ends are therefore the "powers that be," ordained by God in a sense that particular rulers and particular legislation is not. The state has functions in the created order that no individual man per se can either assume or ignore.

Every individual thing in creation, whether a person or the civil society to which he belongs or a piece of positive legislation, is a historical development, not immutable but in some regards changing. Individual things are not fixed atoms of experience isolated from time by space, nor is their destiny determined by participation in and privation of fixed forms. Individuality has more meaning than that allows, and more positive importance to the whole. But how we value individual persons and civil societies and positive legislation depends on how we value our history, and on what meaning we find in the temporal character of all created existence. Individual persons both shape and are shaped by the civil society of which they are a part. Individual persons and individual civil societies shape and are shaped by the movements of history and the purposes of time. But civil societies, like individual persons are not yet fully rational or fully just. A man can honestly value his national heritage, and still be incisive about social evils . . . .

What I am suggesting is that natural law rests on the value and purposes invested by God in the created order, but without the myth of a disorganized state of nature preceding an ideally rational society now on earth. The created order is a historical process in which positive law should become a concrete approximation, appropriate to the requirements of history, of universal possibilities that are basic to the nature of things. The ideal of natural law is rooted in the potentialities of the created order. As an ideal it is capable of different embodiment in positive law at different times.

The positive laws of a historical society are no more deduced from universally necessary principles than are the positive practices adopted by a free person for his individual ends: both are in measure free to choose. For Hegel a civil society and its choices are determined by the historical dialectic that works through and beyond the antitheses of the past to some synthesis that is not-yet. It seems to me that while the process may not be strictly dialectical, it is plainly the case that a civil society and its laws are shaped by working through and beyond the historical conditions which help define its possibilities. The rational method involved is neither entirely deductive nor strictly dialectical but rather dialogical: thinking "through and beyond" existing situations and existing laws in light of those unchanging values for man as a creature of God which have been called "natural law."
This idea of concrete universals is integrative with Brown's model, thus extending his use of Pepper's organic metaphor for world view process. In turn, Brown's model enables a detailed communication investigation of the "dialogical" processes through which potentials are identified and realized in historically unique ways which shape future possibilities and actualizations. The idea of a dialogical process through which societies think through and beyond existing situations and laws needs to be focused through Brown's communication understanding of the realization of world-views in human community via world-viewish acting together through words and deeds.

As a hospitable and integrative conceptualization of communication process, the concrete universal model needs reasons for acceptance. In an interdisciplinary way Holmes highlights a philosophical and theological rationale for this organic view of society:

The issue today is much the same as in ancient Greece, when the Sophists debated whether morality and social institutions are based in social convention (nomos) or in human nature (physis). Plato and Aristotle vigorously argued the latter, relating human nature to eternal and universal ideals. "By nature," Aristotle insisted, humans are social and political animals. Neither the family nor the polis is a voluntary association of individuals, for each has an organic unity of its own. The European tradition in political theory has continued an organic kind of view . . . social institutions are native to human history, and . . . the social unit is not an optional association of individuals but has a life and character of its own. In biblical perspective, some social institutions are said to be ordained by God and rooted in the nature of his human creatures. They are his idea, his doing, not ours. In making us relational beings, he ordained that we live our lives in such contexts.69

Brown's model is open to the sophists' interpretation of social institutions as "man made device[s] to be modified at will,"60 but overall it better fits the European organic view of social
institutions. And for the Christian scholar Holmes provides perspectival reasons for the organic view.

For Holmes, a theistic framework for thinking about "society" combines perspectival themes, metaphysical concepts and models, and an axiological stance. He understands a social institution as a "part of God's law-governed creation, its purposes therefore essential to the good ends for which we are made." Such a view offers a general framework within which one not only describes existing institutions, but also evaluates them and calls for change. Holmes does not deny the historically relative aspects of such institutions. In light of the history of social changes, he argues for the constant need for reforming communication structured by the prophetic themes of peace, justice, love, hope and fulfillment. In his view, social institutions are always penetrated by evil and in need of redemption. Holmes' view leads to moral evaluations of society premised upon a view of persons as interdependent agents called to mutual service. Persons as agents are responsible not only for their personal relationships to God, nature and others, but also for the kinds of social institutions they create and participate, for those institutions in turn shape the lives of persons. There are four major claims that constitute Holmes' framework for persons as societal agents: (1) There are certain social institutions ordained by God. (2) Each kind of institution embodies human relationships to God, to nature and to other persons. (3) Three features may be distinguished, discerned, and evaluated in the study of social institutions. (4) The need for social change requires ethical considerations for social change agents.
First, Holmes argues that there are at least four kinds of social institutions that "are said biblically to be ordained by God and rooted in the created nature of human kind: marriage, work, government, and religion." These are not the only social institutions that "represent human action spheres and serve human needs," but they are fundamental ones. He argues that as each institution has been variously negotiated and enacted at different junctures in history each has been penetrated by evil, often with destructive consequences as evidenced by church inquisitions, governmental tyranny, slavery, child abuse, etc. Each institution has been, and may again be, transformed by God's grace. Holmes argues that "social institutions are vehicles of God's work on earth and the locus for responsible human activity. The living God creates with purpose, and is still active through means such as these which he made."

Second, Holmes claims that in the context of these institutions persons are called to enact relationships to God, persons, and nature. He argues that this theistic belief transforms the way one sees such institutions:

But does the Christian theist simply add to what the humanist already sees? He does add, to be sure, but what the Christian sees in relationship to God changes the way he sees relationships to nature and other persons, and changes the way he sees the institutions of society. To see nature as God's creation is to see ourselves as responsible to him for how we treat and use it. To see that people are created in God's image is to respect them for what God made them to be, rather than molding and manipulating them for our own self-interest. To see marriage ordained by God is to respect its integrity and God's purpose for it; we may rewrite the wedding ceremony, but we cannot remake the concept and purpose behind it. To see work and governmental authority as ordained by God similarly affects the sanctity of work and the uses of power. A Christian view of social institutions is such that our relationship to God affects every other relationship and
the institutions in which those relationships function.66

Third, Holmes distinguishes three features criterial in the theistic evaluation of any institution. The first is God's purpose for an institution. His "good ends for social institutions are the overriding values we ought to pursue in and through institutional functions: in the four institutions they are familial . . . economic . . . political . . . and religious values."67 These good ends are "distinctive value-potentials" which are actualized in various ways, some good and others evil. Holmes highlights some of these value-potentials:

Familial values . . . include growth in mutual love and service that extends beyond the family as such, while bearing witness to its maker . . . . Inherent in work are economic values . . . the service of others and . . . providing a more human quality of life that bears witness to the Creator . . . . God's purpose for human government . . . [is] peace and justice, the shalom envisioned for his kingdom . . . . God's purpose for the church . . . [is] worship and fellowship that gratefully dedicate every aspect of life to God, and so to God's purposes in this world.68

The second feature of social institutions involves the moral quality of relationships which characterize institutional life. Holmes argues that love and justice are the two key principles here. Love is most relevant in those institutions characterized by interpersonal intimacy; here justice makes sure that people's rights and interests are protected. In work and government, where organizational structure is often complex, justice is a key value in considering the ends and means of the institution as well as human rights. Even here love is necessary because persons compose the institution.69
The third feature involves the organizational and authority structure. Holmes comments: "This third feature...is different from the other two, for, while God's purposes and moral principles are uniform and do not change, institutional structures vary greatly. Their historical development is largely left to responsible human creativity." He argues that often organizational change comes with conceptual shifts based upon metaphysical models. Shifts from the medieval hierarchical model to the enlightenment atomistic model to the modern organic model led to different conceptions of human existence both intrapersonal and interpersonal. He observes that actions premised upon these models realize particular forms of social order. Often individuals, including Christians, rigidly adhere to a particular concrete historical form of an institution rather than engaging in a critique of that form in light of God's purposes and the universal principles of love and justice. At times such failure has functioned to justify social injustice and retard the transformation of an historical institution. Holmes believes that social structures are best thought of as means through which persons attempt to realize God's purposes with love and justice. He reasons:

Obviously not every kind of structure is equally compatible with the values at stake. Yet we often tend to argue more vigorously over institutional structures than we concern ourselves with unchanging purposes or the moral quality of relationships. We argue like legalists about the authority of the husband and father or about sex roles in egalitarian marriages, more than we address the purpose of marriage and what justice and love mean in its operation. We dogmatize about our own economic system without attending enough to God's purpose for work and to the application of justice and love in economic relationships. We laud our political system, forgetting that the Kingdom of God is not a representative democracy and paying too little attention to God's purpose for government and to the practice of justice and love in
This suggests that we are not told to adhere to one particular form of organization, but to participate in ways expected by the specific form of organization in which historically we find ourselves. This does not imply that all structures are equally good, and that there is nothing to choose between them; for while cultural variants and human creativity are legitimately involved, yet from a Biblical perspective all organizational structures stand under the judgement of God. The concern again and again is whether a structure serves God's purpose for that kind of institution, and whether it best contributes to just and loving relationships.

Holmes argues that evil is both a personal and a social reality. Change in social structure does not necessarily lead to improvement unless it is accompanied by change in persons who act within the structure. A central problem of evil in social institutions is that of power. Power in itself is not sinful, but when exploited without regard for God's purposes and without love and justice towards persons it becomes a destructive evil. Holmes argues for "an ethic of power that places moral limits on power and guides its use." Such an ethic is not fully developed by Holmes but its basic contours include limitations connected with: "the divine purpose for which the kind of institution exercising power exists, and the respect for persons that underlies justice and love." Holmes asserts, "Power should restrain power that is outside of these bounds, and might even change the structure of an institution in which power is repeatedly and unrestrainedly usurped."

There are practical ways that power can be limited including systems of checks and balances and a free enterprise system that balances competing self interests. Holmes describes the pluralistic ideal for limiting the power of social institutions:
Different kinds of institutions by their very existence should limit each other. The family has functions that government may not usurp, and so does the church. This kind of pluralism places built-in limitations on institutions of every kind. But the ideal goes beyond mutual limitations to mutual cooperation: government should respect family, church, and business activity, protecting their integrity and their freedom to pursue their proper ends aright. The church should encourage participation in family, government, and industry, extending its prophetic voice and redemptive role to their activities as well. God's kingdom, and the Christian humanism that goes with it, embraces all of life's tasks.75

Holmes' claim that evil is a social reality results in his fourth claim which directs attention towards a Christian view of social action directed at changing institutions. Holmes argues that Christians find what I would call "thematic patterns in a rhetoric of social change" in Scripture including law, prophets, gospel, and the millenial hope:

Law serves two purposes: to enforce a minimal justice in society, and to be a pedagogue . . . in helping to shape a conscience . . . . The prophetic role was to reaffirm moral law and apply it to the life of the land, calling people to repent, to do justice, and to love mercy. Law and prophets together prepare people for the gospel of God's forgiveness, which teaches us to forgive, to love as God loves, and to give ourselves for the sake of others . . . . There is also the millenial hope that sets before us the unchanging goal of shalom, with its perfect peace and justice throughout the world. Drawn together into a pattern, these themes call for participation in what God himself is doing in society, by working redemptively in the institutions of our times and so changing the direction of things.76

Christians have employed various means to actualize their visions of social order. Holmes provides a partial list of some means by which social change may be affected. He lists them in an "order of increasing seriousness and moral ambiguity":

1. The life of a community that bears witness to a better way.
2. The preaching and teaching of the church.
3. Social work.
4. Education.
5. Publication, and use of the media.
6. Political pressure groups to affect legislation and regulation.
7. Campaigns to influence decision makers.
8. Entering power structures (e.g. public service, management, stockholder's meetings) to change things from within.
9. Holding elective office and electing better representatives.
11. Strikes and sit-ins.
12. Acts of civil disobedience, with the intention of being arrested in order to have a law tested in the courts.
15. Non-violent revolution.

Holmes acknowledges that for some Christians the threat or use of force is unacceptable. Those who are willing to enact forceful means must make sure that such acts, like all others, are carefully scrutinized in light of ethical principles:

Two views of revolution are current today, for example, one based in the Marxist dialectic and one in a Christian natural law tradition. The former sees confrontation as essential to change, and the destruction of existing institutions is therefore necessary. The other sees revolution as a last resort to be used only in the most extreme instance of tyranny after all other means have been tried and have failed. In this tradition, moreover, the use of force is severely limited; it belongs only to governmental authorities and not to private parties. Hence, said John Locke in his famous Second Treatise on Civil Government, if a tyrant so usurps his trust that the just ends of government are hopelessly thwarted, then the people may establish another government on whose authority force may then be used against the tyrannical "usurper." Power can only be used within clear ethical limits, and the moral rules governing revolution are analogous to the better known rules of the just war theory.

A parallel situation exists in regards to civil disobedience. As worked out in ethical theory and in the careful practice of Martin Luther King and others, civil disobedience is permissible only against extremes of injustice where lesser recourses have failed. I must operate within the law in all regards, except that the unjust law is disobeyed. I may suffer arrest and trial, but the injustice goes on trial thereby: legal appeals and public sentiment can produce legal correction. Just cause, just means, and just ends are equally essential.
In a law-governed creation made for good purpose but now corrupted, yet entered by one who suffered arrest and punishment in order to redeem people and bring a kingdom of justice and love, the restraint of power within the limits of justice and love is essential, even at the cost of suffering. Less extreme measures than armed revolution and civil disobedience are usually possible, and very often effective. Yet even then moral limitations on power must be observed. The power of the pen, the influence of the media, the words of the preacher, the rhetoric of the politician, the kinds of pressure exerted, the nature of an educational process—all these must be fair to all sides, considerate of persons, and morally restrained.

The history of Christianity provides ethical and unethical examples of each maneuver outlined by Holmes. Communication scholars might help understand how various maneuvers were chosen and enacted as consistent with perspectival beliefs and how such moves in a Christian rhetoric of social change were interpreted both inside and outside a given perspectival community.

In summary, Holmes' rudiments of a social theory calls evangelicals away from both separation from and identification with a given social order. He provides an outline for conceiving of society and social change. His position is coherent with his basic beliefs and allows for pluralism. It is more overtly "Christian" than his epistemological theory in its reliance upon theological justifications. Like his view of values, and often relying upon that axiological stance, he develops a social theory in light of God's purposes in the created order. Social action to transform social evil is a moral responsibility for agents concerned with God's purposes. Holmes provides the contours for a theistic way of seeing social issues, evaluating social realities, and choosing responsible courses of social action.
For Holmes' evangelical audience there are three ideas that are centrally important: (1) the recognition of historical models used for organizing social institutions, (2) the need for the ongoing evaluation of every social institution in relation to God's purposes, the overarching ethical principles of love and justice, and specific institutional values, and (3) the moral responsibility for acting to correct social evil. In articulating these ideas Holmes does not provide a comfortable place to stand. The Christian is called to rigorously reflect upon the contemporary social situation with honesty, refusing to see God's will in simplistic terms. That Christian is also helped to see the need for social involvement. Some actions and institutions are better than others and deserve support; others should be acted against because of the degree of evil that characterizes them. Care must be taken in distinguishing the two. Because good and evil are mixed, consistent responsible reflection and action will characterize the Christian's participation. Holmes' position concerning social theory is open-ended and allows one to consider political and social choices without being tied to any one political party or historical version of an institution. His framework says little about any institution, but provides general orientation for active participation in diverse and changing social institutions. His skeletal stance is hungry for more detail, but it is much better than many stances which have been worked out in a compromising marriage with the thought of an historical nation, institution or party.

An application of Brown's approach in case studies of the social processing of world views could provide more data and detail concerning
the claimed universality of Holmes' four institutions. If Holmes is right then the critic should always find world-view conceiving of both the nature of such institutions and relationships among them. Perhaps world-view communication scholars would reconsider Holmes' key world-view power-shares in the context of his view of society. Theologians, philosophers, scientists, and others might jointly be conceived of as interdependent members of an "educational" social institution which is variously related to the four other key institutions. How should world-view processing be thought of given these societal power shares? Also of importance is the contemporary pluralistic dialogue through and beyond historical situations in the reconstitution of highly pluralistic institutions. Holmes' rhetoric of perspectival disciplinary identity shows one strategy for the development of a pluralistic identity that distinguishes while it opens the way for relationships. The question arises: How would a chaining out of Holmes' perspectival categorizing of human thought and identity change interactions at the societal level?

Critical application of Brown's model to historical and contemporary cases could provide other answers. It may practically help formulate strategy, tactics, and maneuvers for social intervention in a pluralistic society. Communication studies of historical social change may serve contemporary social agents who desire to innovate but who lack ways of conceiving such interventions at strategic junctures. Brown's work has already begun this task in a promising way. Holmes' Christian framework for society places ethical limits upon Christian interventions into societal processes. All possibilities for change
are not equal and all means for actualizing social change are not ethical. Communication scholars might study changing conceptions, for both Christians and non-Christians, of ethics in relationship to social intervention.

**Personal Knowledge**

Now considered are some of the epistemic consequences of Holmes' metaphysical modelling of persons in relation. The mechanistic model which looks at persons individualistically, as atoms externally related, also typically views the human mind in isolation from the body, from the physical world, and from other minds. Knowledge of other minds is premised upon the notion of a detached, introspective process of analogical inference. Holmes critiques this model:

It is a mistake to conceive the individual in a way that makes my mind a world apart from my body and from other minds and bodies too. The mistake comes from supposing that self knowledge is a direct introspective awareness of mental states, rather than a more indirect awareness mediated through my words and my actions in the world. I know myself whole, in being myself, bodily involved in the world rather than separated from it . . . . The concept of a person is in ordinary language logically prior to separate concepts of mind and body.  

Holmes argues that the mechanistic view of persons has difficulties with both intrapersonal solipsism and interpersonal relationships:

The danger of solipsism is involved by the model of isolated minds independent of their bodies and hidden from each other. If more than ideas and inferences is involved, if I know other people as whole persons, and if we begin together in community rather than in mutual isolation, then solipsism is not a problem at all. A model that treats other minds as detached objects also creates difficulties for interpersonal relations . . . . In order to do justice to the combination of subjectivity and objectivity in personal knowledge, and of thought and feeling in religious faith and human love, our knowledge of other minds must be more intimate
than analogical inference.80

The last section showed Holmes' application of a metaphysical model of persons appropriate to process views of reality. That view of interpersonal relations is combined with his epistemology of interpretative realism in the advocacy of a communication-centered understanding of the process by which persons come to know persons.

His discussion of personal knowledge develops four key ideas:

(a) Personal knowledge is a product of social existence, not of isolated individuals.
(b) Personal knowledge is a function of bodily experience, not of hidden minds.
(c) Personal knowledge involves emotion, not intellect alone.
(d) The logic of personal knowledge is that of personal communication, not of inductive inference.81

First, personal knowledge is a product of social existence. Holmes argues that persons-in-relation are unlike marbles in a bag or a set of chairs in a room which are externally related. An organic view of society sees persons as essentially interdependent. Such interdependence leads to a view of persons premised upon the idea of integrity. Holmes asserts:

In metaphysical terms it means turning from pluralism towards a more monistic view, and from the theory of external relations to a theory of internal relations . . . . We need . . . to recognize the complexity in a unified thing. The individual is himself a complex unity, composed of many ingredients. Societies are individual as well, each composed of various members, yet possessing a unity of its own that is perceived and valued by those who belong.82

In discussing the nature of this interpersonal relatedness and the resulting understanding of social knowledge he uses Buber's idea of the "I-Thou" relationship:

We reveal ourselves to each other as persons in the dynamic of being, living, working, growing, and thinking together. I open
up to you as you open yourself to me. . . . I experience "we-ness" directly: the "we" of our togetherness is not an intellectual construct or an inference at all, but a directly experienced thing.83

Not all interpersonal relations can be described in terms of personal "integrity." Brown, drawing on Boulding, notes that some interpersonal relations are characterized in terms of "threat" or "exchange," that is in "I-it" terms. Holmes recognizes this and argues that relations can be characterized by degrees of "togetherness" and "distance" (both qualities are in fact aspects of I-Thou relations, for we need, recognize, and cherish the personal integrity of the other whom we love). He observes that too often distance dominates social relations, and perceptions of alienation threaten to fragment society.

Second, personal knowledge is a function of bodily experience. Holmes argues that persons are seen as essentially social beings who have bodily unity and who exist bodily in a shared world. They do not exist as minds separated from their bodies and isolated from others. Minds do not scientifically and neutrally observe bodies and infer personal bodily existence and the existence of minds that animate other bodies. Holmes observes:

Interpersonal knowledge is a function of the "lived-body" [the body as it is experienced directly in life rather than the body as a physical object for scientific observation]. To know you is to know that you have "live" bodily experience. I know this as we share experiences together . . . . As we enjoy ourselves "whole-heartedly" together and "open up" to one another with sincerity, we come to know each other as whole persons. Our bodily incarnation in a common world is the point of contact wherein we reveal ourselves to each other for what we are altogether.84

In this common world of community "we discover who we are and become what we do."85
Phenomenologists have stressed this theme. I believe that its development as a foundational control idea for Brown's conceptualization of persons is needed. Brown's discussion of communication process at times seems divorced from the lived-world of persons. One might argue that such an emphasis upon bodily experience is more appropriate for a contextualist, yet Holmes seems to be working with both models in an attempt to understand the process of historicized personhood-in-society. Such modification of Brown's model may be difficult, but already its emphasis upon intrapersonal needs being interpersonally mediated provides the juncture for conceptual extension.

Third, personal knowledge and personal relations involve emotion as well as intellect. Persons considered in wholistic terms, rather than in terms of faculty psychology, are understood as a unity in thinking and feeling. "Personal knowledge is both emotional and cognitive . . . . Any kind of emotion toward another person presupposes some knowledge of what he is experiencing. What emotion does, then, is to give force and vivacity to the knowledge we think we have already, and to relate us to one another in whole-personal experiences that enlarge the knowledge with which we begin."86 This emphasis relies upon Holmes' view of the subjective-objective dimensions of human knowing. The emotional aspect of personal knowledge involves empathy and rapport: persons feel into the lived experience of others. The intellectual aspect of personal knowledge involves a stance of objectifying distance that allows reflection upon similarities and differences between persons and groups of persons. Both combine in the
wholistic pursuit of knowledgeable personal relationships.

The fourth aspect of personal knowledge is rooted in the idea that persons share a world of language. Holmes argues that the logic of personal knowledge is that of personal communication. It is not the empirical logic of referential views of language:

We use language to do many other things than state facts. Existentialists point out that by speaking we inject meaning into life and establish our own identity, for the important thing is not always what a person says in objective terms but why he finds it necessary to say it at all. My language reveals me as I am. . .

Language can convey uniqueness. It is more than a collection of common nouns properly structured in sentences. Meaning is given by personal context of speech as well, by the intonation, facial expression, and bodily gestures that help us convey more closely the oddities of our case . . .

Personal language is different from the language of empirical observation and theoretical proof . . . [it] conveys knowledge of other persons by stories and symbols and paradoxes and engaging dialogue, by imperatives and exclamations, rhetorical questions and pleas.87

In another place he argues:

Personal language is different: it values and interprets what you are, it is an imaginative, creative elaboration of persons and ideas. . . . Personal language communicates well about persons. . . . It reveals in a myriad of creative ways what each of us is like and what we find in one another. Personal language is the language of living literature. It is not the language of science but of the humanities, not thoughtless emotion or emotionless thought but of life lived whole. To call it non-cognitive is to reduce art and literature and creative expression to nothing but emotive discourse.88

At the heart of this communication process by which persons know persons is dialogue:

Socrates mastered the art of dialog . . . he engaged people in discussion. Instead of assuming that all words name things, he recognized that language ordinarily serves other purposes. Dialog is intellectual midwifery. It brings out what is in another mind, makes clear what is obscure, and corrects misconceptions that a man may have even of himself. . . . In the Lysis, Socrates maintains that dialog is a natural activity for lovers. To him,
knowing someone is still a rational task, but it is a form of
cognition that is (a) dialogical rather than empirical, and (b)
ingredient to, rather than abstracted from, the context of life
and society.89

Dialog . . . is obviously no instrument for the isolated
mind, but for persons with something to share. It is an honest
sharing of ideas in the conscious attempt to understand one
another. As such it assumes our integrity as participants and our
willingness to reveal what we think and why. In honest dialog we
drop our masks and open ourselves to one another as fully as we
can. In an atmosphere of mutual trust, one self-revelation
elicits another and understanding grows.90

By way of summary, Holmes' gestalt of personal knowledge is
modelled after a phenomenological account of "interpersonal relations
. . . [as] the vehicle of individuality"91 and is rooted in a
larger metaphysical framework of historical individuality within a
created order. Persons find fulfillment in relation with other
persons. Togetherness and distance are necessary aspects of such
relationships. Fulfillment comes as persons learn values which
integrate their lives and as they pursue actualization of those values
in the lived-world shared with other persons. Historical individuality
relies upon the presence of others who live together in a community
that allows enough distance for persons to be unique.

This view of personal knowledge is not only appropriate to Brown's
communication model, it is a view that should be extended and worked
out in light of the process dynamics featured by Brown's model and in
relation to the discussion of language in chapter three. At places
Holmes' stance sounds more like an ideal rather than a phenomenological
description of the ways in which persons communicatively come to know
themselves and others. Still it is far superior to a mechanistic
understanding. A careful use of Brown's model as it features the
movements back and forth between intrapersonal and interpersonal processes, might sharpen the description of how persons in world-view communities come to know themselves and others both inside and outside a perspectival community. The strength of Holmes' description is that it keeps a focus upon the "lived-logic" of personal knowledge. The strength of Brown's description is that it keeps a focus upon the diverse possibilities through which personal knowledge unfolds. The question becomes "Can these two emphases be integrated to yield a more comprehensive understanding of personal knowledge?"

A Theistic View of History

In his portrayal of a Christian view of history, Holmes features perspectival attention as he contrasts the theocentric view with a naturalistic one. He describes the modern gestalt as one "which looks to the historical development of human power and freedom for the solution of every problem." The naturalistic humanist often employs names like "progress," "evolution," and "freedom" to develop an idea of history which optimistically orients human existence exclusively within the natural universe. Holmes argues that the idea of freedom is important to the naturalist and is used in at least two senses: (1) the freedom of persons to meaningfully act and therefore create human history, and/or (2) freedom as the ultimate goal towards which human history moves. The first implies that in some sense persons are metaphysically free. The second projects a vision towards which humanity progresses: the great expectation of liberation from all oppression. Holmes questions the legitimacy of these two ideas if
persons are understood as part and parcel of nature seen as a closed system of cause and effect. How can persons optimistically and realistically assume progress if "humankind and history are closed in to their own possibilities to an immanent teleology with no outside sources of hope."93

In contrast Holmes argues the Christian rationale for hope and meaning in history. Below is an outline of his historical framework:

(1) The God of history is the God of creation, continuously active, purposive, the living God who is always with us . . . . [The] God-creation relationship is the overall context of history . . . . The leading actor is God; his supporting cast changes but the same drama continues, and it gives indications of a hope that will be fulfilled in the end . . . .

(2) History reveals the accountability of persons as responsible agents in relationship to God as well as to nature and to other persons . . . . Rather than economic or political explanation of events, [the Bible] gives moral and religious explanations . . . . Human sinfulness, not just freedom, accounts for a great deal of what occurs . . . .

(3) History actualizes value-potentials inherent in human existence, potentials for good that can be turned to evil ends . . . . The Biblical hope is that good will triumph over evil by God's intervention in history . . . .

(4) History is about human culture and social institutions, instruments of God's purposes, that ideally nourish good and restrain evil. History is not human history until it includes the role of economics, politics, family and church, of art and science and ideas.94

Given this historical template one can look back upon Holmes' idea of "the concrete-universal nature of individuality." Holmes observes that in many ways this view of historicized individuality is similar to Hegel's view, but there is a distinctive difference: the Hegelians were optimistic in their absolute monism in which the state becomes "the absolute marching through time, spawning and absorbing individuals as it goes."95 In contrast, Holmes transforms such a model by "converting" it to the basic beliefs of Christian theism:
God's transcendence over his ex nihilo creation allows historical individuals and civil societies more independence of operation than Hegel's Absolute could afford. By the same token history depends on the inherent possibilities of the created order as well as the continued creativity of an immanent God."^96

For Holmes, the Christian view of history stresses neither value-neutrality or value-actuality. It affirms God's work accomplished in the past, his care for and involvement in present affairs, and his providential action to draw creation to its consummation in the future through the final revelation of the kingdom of God in the return of Jesus Christ.

Thus far Holmes' perspectival understanding of history has been stressed. He also draws out some epistemological consequences concerning how persons know a historical event and how they report what they know. Holmes rejects positivistic views of history which assume that the historian neutrally reports history as an objective science. His epistemic approach to historical knowledge is that of interpretive realism.^97

The interpretive aspect of historical knowledge is rooted in the historian's perspectival gestalt concerning those key features that make history possible. From the Christian viewpoint that includes God, persons, and nature. Holmes asserts:

Such perspectives... affect how we read history and how it is written .... History is no more an objective, empirical science than any other science, and less so than some because it comes so close to the beliefs and values of those who read it and write it. How we see human existence and social institutions, and what basis we give for values, affect the selection and interpretation of historical materials .... A Christian view of history .... is theocentric from beginning to end. God is with us.

Of course, an overall perspective of this sort does not of itself predict the outcome of a historical crisis or say why particular things happened. It may unmask self-deceptions and
expose some myths. As an overall point of view it suggests what we should emphasize in reading of the past, and what should concern us most as we watch history unfold and participate in shaping our own future. If the moral quality of relationships within institutions are paramount in history, then they should be the basis for our assessment of things, and for our own involvement.

As a consequence of the interpretive nature of historical knowledge, Holmes holds that the historian should confess his perspective and highlight those control beliefs which function as a priori principles in historical interpretation. For the Christian historian "any sufficient statement will include the concepts of God in creation and providence, of man in sin and grace, of the redemptive work of God in history and the eschatological hope of its fulfillment." A Christian view of history sees it as the meaningful medium of God's personal revelation; history finds its climactic focus in God's revealing and redeeming action in the incarnation of Christ.

The realistic aspect of knowing and reporting history involves both rational and empirical controls:

The rational control stems from the way in which criticized concepts escape the limits of individuality and rise above the prejudices of time and place. Analysis and self criticism are paths to self-transcendence [and a responsible rational coherence of thought].

Empirical controls upon historical interpretation coincide with the criterion of empirical adequacy. History is not purely imaginative identification with the past, but a reconstruction is made possible by the painstaking investigation of evidence. It attempts to discover relations between events and to see things as an organic whole. Therefore it must make sure of its ingredient facts. It must see men in their physical and economic environments, for human response cannot be detached from the forces to which they respond. It must understand the values and beliefs that motivated men, and the ideological conflicts they face. We can present an account of their behaviour which has what Michael Scriven calls "plausibility in depth" to anyone
who knows what people are like. The human drama of history is like a good play. A particular scene is necessary where it comes in a play, not because it is logically deducible but because it is "dramatically inevitable" in a genuine human story. Likewise the dramatic inevitability of a past event is revealed by the role it plays in a larger and more complex train of human reasons and circumstances. An historical explanation is a good one not only when it covers all the facts, but when it fits the way we know people are and the beliefs and values we know them to be working with. 100

One can see that such a view of historical knowledge forces the historian to do more than write pleasing world-viewish history, such interpretations must stand—under the historical reality to which they bear witness.

Again there seems a positive point of integration between Holmes and Brown. Brown's model can feature in great detail those intrapersonal and interpersonal processes through which world-viewish interpretations rise and fall. World-view communities will be seen as most responsible when their confident interpretations humbly stand under the reality signified in interpersonal symbol sharing. Potentially the interdisciplinary processing of historical knowledge safeguards against dangerous abuses in historical understandings.

Conclusion

As I have personally tried to understand Holmes' intent in the pages of this chapter, I have often found myself in a strange world. Chapters six and seven feature Holmes' position on issues and concerns that I had considered long before I read him. Values, society, and, to a lesser extent, history are areas that I have more or less taken for granted. Even for Holmes, the ideas discussed in chapters six and seven are more carefully developed. In recent years he has turned
increasingly to articulate a personal view of values, thus leading to his move towards a creational natural law theory mentioned earlier. His views concerning society and history are still skeletal. What I do find most valuable in his discussions of these topics are (1) his use of perspectival themes and process models to articulate a position and (2) his application of his interpretive realism. His discussion of these topics by relying upon earlier ideas helps illuminate the think-with-ability of those prior positions. It shows the "ripple effects" of metaphysical and epistemological choices in other areas of world-view understanding.

In my opinion, much more is needed in working out these three contours of a world view, especially the last two. I hope Holmes finds time to pursue the think-with-ability of his perspectival themes in these areas. It should be noted that as Holmes develops these areas increasingly he moves in the practical direction, showing how perspectival themes used in thinking about values, society, and history can be lived with in moral choices, social institutions, and historical action. He does more in other places to draw out more concrete implications of Christian theism, but that is beyond my concern at this point.

Throughout this chapter, more than in any other, I have commented upon integrative possibilities between Brown and Holmes. The reason for this is Holmes' integration of metaphysical process models with an interpretive realism epistemic to discourse upon his view of persons as historical valuing social agents. Brown's model features the historical communication processing of social and value
interpretations. It stresses not only the human negotiation of values, but the historical and value-laden negotiation of the intrapersonal and interpersonal meanings of personhood and community. Most of what I have said is at best suggestive of possibilities for integration. I consider some of these possibilities in the closing chapter. I intend to pursue many of them in future scholarly work.
FOOTNOTES

1CWV, p. 155.

2Ibid.

3Ibid., pp. 155-156.

4Ibid., p. 119.

5Ibid., pp. 156-158.

6Ibid., p. 158.

7Ibid., p. 164.

8Ibid., p. 158.

9Ibid.

10Ibid.

11Ibid.

12Ibid., p. 160.

13Ibid.

14Ibid.


16CWV, p. 161.

17Ibid., pp. 161-163.

18Ibid., p. 163.

19Ibid.

21Ibid., p. 233.

22Ibid., pp. 233-235.


26Ibid., p. 85.

27CWV, p. 165.

28FSU, pp. 88-89.

29CWV, p. 165.

30FSU, p. 89.

31Ibid., p. 96.

32Ibid.

33Ibid., pp. 97-98.

34"HVNL," p. 72.

35CWV, p. 172.

36Ibid., p. 165.

37"HVNL," p. 77.

38Ibid., pp. 72-73.

39CWV, p. 166.

40Ibid., p. 167.

41Ibid.

43CWV, p. 167.
44Ibid., pp. 168-169.
47See CWV, pp. 170-172 for two examples of case decisions; and Ethics, chapters nine-twelve. Also relevant here is "HVNL," pp. 72-74.
48See CWV, pp. 214-234.
50CWV, p. 175.
51"CFG," p. 329.
52CWV, p. 176.
53Ibid., p. 175-176.
54Ibid., p. 176.
56Ibid., p. 330.
57Ibid., p. 329.
59CWV, p. 177.
60Ibid.
61Ibid.
62Ibid., p. 176.
63Ibid., p. 178.
64Ibid.
65Ibid., p. 179.
66Ibid., pp. 180-181.
67Ibid., p. 181.
68Ibid., p. 182.
69Ibid., pp. 182-184.
70Ibid., p. 184.
71Ibid., pp. 184-185.
72Ibid., p. 187.
73Ibid.
74Ibid.
75Ibid., p. 188.
76Ibid., p. 189.
77Ibid., p. 190.
78Ibid., pp. 190-191.
79"CFG," p. 324.
80FSU, p. 122.
82FSU, p. 125; see also "CFG," pp. 326-327.
83"CFG," p. 326; see also FSU, p. 126.
84FSU, p. 128.
85"CFG," p. 328.
86FSU, p. 129.
87Ibid., pp. 130-132.
89FSU, p. 123.
90Ibid., p. 130.
91"CFG," p. 328.
92CWV, p. 192.

93Ibid., p. 193.

94Ibid., pp. 193-195.

95"CNL," p. 208, see footnote.

96Ibid.

97For a detailed discussion and critique of positivist, idealist, and existentialist views and his interpretive realism proposal, see FSU, pp. 60-84.

98CWV, pp. 195-196.

99FSU, p. 82.

100Ibid., pp. 80-81.
PART FOUR

COMMUNICATION INSIGHTS AND IMPLICATIONS
CHAPTER IX

REFLECTIONS ON THE PROJECT AND
A PROJECTION OF A FUTURE

The animating question throughout this project has been this: From the standpoint of world views as communication process, how does Holmes as a Christian philosopher advocate Christian theism as a contemporary world view? Part one of the study surveyed the meaning of "world view as communication process," by explicating Brown's model of those rhetorical processes involved in creating, realizing, and maintaining comprehensive interpretations of life. Part two viewed Holmes rhetorically processing the disciplinary identity "Christian philosophy" and articulating an action corollary (a behavior that realizes a conceptualization) of "world-view advocacy." Part three treated Holmes as realizing his identity of Christian philosopher through rhetorically processing a version of "Christian theism" as a comprehensive symbolic reality.

This chapter surveys the communication insights of this research as it argues the heuristic value of Brown's model in the study of rhetoric as an architectonic and productive process. Concluding that survey of the research I argue the two major theoretical yields of this project: (1) Brown's model provides communication dynamics to Holmes' conceptualization of philosophy. (2) Holmes provides a way to rescue Brown's process model from the extreme of sceptical relativism. Next I
articulate implications of this study for furthering the program of research concerning the rhetorical processing of social reality. Finally, I suggest the practical relevance of such rhetorical studies of world views.

**Rhetoric as an Architectonic and Productive Process**

Throughout this study Holmes has been investigated from a distinctively rhetorical point of view. A philosophical study of Holmes would have related his work to the contemporary philosophical dialogue and provided a critique of his positions. A theological study of Holmes would have considered his integration of Biblical texts and theological ideas into a unifying perspective applied across a broad range of theoretical and practical topics. This rhetorical study of Holmes has seen him from the perspective of Brown's model as a philosopher involved in rhetoric as an architectonic and productive process.

Richard McKeon called rhetorical theorists and critics to transform contemporary understandings of rhetoric so that it is understood as an "architectonic productive art" centrally involved in the articulation and development of new human communities and productive of solutions to problems confronting a technological age. As I understand McKeon's call, he urges a progressive development in contemporary understandings of rhetoric similar to views of rhetoric that flourished during the time of Cicero and the Renaissance. According to McKeon such rhetoric functions (1) architectonically when it reconstructs social reality in relation to
contemporary problems and possibilities and (2) productively when it contributes to the social realization of some of those possible solutions to complex problems.

Similar to McKeon's urging, and premised upon it, is Hauser's argumentation concerning the future direction of scholarly rhetorical studies of discourse:

Rather than as artifact or as a product of commonalities, as reflection of a milieu, substance is seen as, taught as, perceived as the creation of milieu. Substance grows out of the experience of rhetoric. That experience is one in which a matter indeterminate in some way is made less so by the rhetor's discourse. Rhetorical performance can construct understanding, evoke feelings, forge consensus, and induce action for resolving the matter that called rhetoric into being. In a productive rhetoric, substance is transformed from expression of external content to acts created through public appeals—realities brought into being through rhetoric. Its arguments are warranted insofar as they have force in forging the type of consensus that will permit action.2

This dissertation contributes to this area of academic investigation. Throughout it has relied upon Brown's model to feature Holmes rhetorically processing a disciplinary identity and realizing that identity through the articulation and advocacy of a contemporary world view that is in touch with the demanding problems of contemporary thought and action.

As I have considered the Brown-Holmes interaction in this study, I have increasingly seen the need for a model that enables me to think integratively about what both men emphasize concerning human conceptualizations of life. Brown emphasizes the intrapersonal and interpersonal communication processing or construction of world views. Holmes emphasizes ways in which such world-viewing processes are constrained by practical necessities and metaphysical objectivities.
Brown is most interested in the variety of ways humans interpret life and realize various interpretive possibilities. Holmes is most interested in those possible ways in which the person as symbol-maker and symbol-sharer becomes self-critical about symbolizing processes and questions the adequacy of belief in relationship to the practical demands of life.

Through this extended triangulated dialogue with Holmes and Brown, a central point of convergence emerges: world views are the products of a complex interaction between interpretive processes and the practical necessities of human existence. Peter Toon suggests a way of conceiving such interaction:

The model of the Interaction between the "Structuring Elements" and the "Structured Elements." We are all familiar with this type of interaction in nature and technology. Into the making of a nest in the branches of a tree go the structured elements—grass, paper, mud, etc.—and these elements are made into the nest by structuring elements—the bird's beak and claws, the formation of the branches, the laws of gravity, etc. In a factory, on the production line, the materials go in at one end as structured elements (e.g., as steel or rubber) and are made into the finished product by the structuring elements (the machines and operators).

Brown's conceptualization features structuring elements or what might better be termed the symbolic structuring processes. Holmes' phenomenological description of universal practical necessities features some of those structured elements that are architectonically processed in the human production of world-view content and communities. My Brownian interpretation of Holmes captures him in the act of processing reality and suggests the transposition of a number of "descriptions" into communication process terms. My reflection upon Brown in light of Holmes' philosophical description and argumentation
has enabled me to think of some possible ways to rescue Brown's model from the problems of sceptical relativism. Below is (1) a summary of the general interaction and (2) speculation upon these two primary yields of that interaction.

Survey of the Whole

Chapter two of the study features Brown's model of world views as communication process. If we shift our attention concerning that model by applying the name "rhetoric as an architectonic and productive process," we see clearly how the model has functioned throughout the study. Brown provides the communication scholar with a heuristic conceptualization for understanding the dynamics of rhetoric as an interpretive structuring process. He relates three universal processes jointly involved in conceiving, realizing, and maintaining social realities. His application of that process model to the cases of science as ideology and the American Dream, show that rhetoric relies upon more than argumentation. More fundamental than argument is symbolic action, for through discursive and nondiscursive symbol-making and symbol-sharing, human beings adjust relationships, beliefs, attitudes, values, and actions. Argumentation arises out of human linguistic interactions with objective realities. Persons urge one another to conceive of needs, relationships, action projects, values, value hierarchies, systems of beliefs, etc. in distinctive and often contrasting ways. Persons-as-rhetors call upon one another to enact what they claim to be real, to realize new possibilities, to change understandings and actions, and ultimately to live out their lives in relation to some ultimate purpose in a needs-meeting way. Brown's
model aids the change agent who intends to intervene into these architectonic and productive processes. Holmes is one such agent; throughout the rest of the study he is primarily viewed in the rhetorical action of architectonic and productive intervention. This rhetorical interpretation of Holmes is a distinctive contribution to the field of communication studies. Seen through Brown's model, Holmes processes disciplinary identity and world-view conceptualizations by comparing and contrasting them to alternatives and asserting them for consideration, acceptance, and enactment.

Part two of the study views Holmes as rhetorically processing both the disciplinary identity of Christian philosopher and a central action corollary that realizes that identity: the advocacy of a reasonable and relevant world view. As Brown's model emphasizes the interrelationships among intrapersonal needs, interpersonal relationships, and interpretations of reality, part two shows Holmes adjusting needs and relationships by shifting an interpretation of "philosophy."

The need for such a shift among Christian philosophers is highlighted by Nicholas Wolterstorff's argument that in the 19th century, evangelical Christian scholars experienced a radical shift in their understanding of the relationship between Christian faith and scholarship. He cites two scholarly innovations that led to that shift: (1) Darwin's conception of design without a designer and (2) the higher criticism of theologians which led to a conception of revelation without a revealer. These disciplinary conceptions eventually led Christian scholars to reconceive what had been an optimistic
conjunctive "both-and" relationship between faith and learning (i.e., faith and learning were seen as complementary) to a pessimistic disjunctive "either-or" divorce (i.e., faith and learning were seen as competitive) which resulted in the practical withdrawal of most evangelical scholars from the larger scholarly world. After World War II this disjunctive stance was increasingly experienced as an inadequate and irrelevant orientation for scholarly identity. There emerged among Christian scholars a shared need for a new conception of possibilities concerning the faith-learning relationship. Holmes' advocacy of disciplinary identity is part of this joint architectonic productive processing of a need, a needs-meeting reconceptualization, and the enactment of Christian scholarship.4

Chapter three views Holmes' symbolic moves to reconceive philosophy by avoiding both dogmatic and sceptical extremes. Holmes argues a perspectival conception of philosophy as a quest for clear and coherent understanding. He argues that view of philosophy as potentially resolving problems of conceptual extremes and providing a way to "reconstruct" metaphysics. Holmes conceives of all philosophers as being caught in the universal predicament of developing a faithful perspective concerning foundational questions. The philosopher works in a pluralistic social system integrating authentic perspectival commitments and contemporary philosophical understandings. Throughout that chapter I showed Holmes processing an interpretation of what it is philosophers do. That "perspectival" gestalt is an attempt to interpret responsibly the broad range of philosophical activity.
In that chapter I argue that Holmes' philosophy of language extends what Brown has thus far written about the nature of language, especially in Holmes' emphasis upon the limits to the freedom of symbolizing processes. I also show how Holmes' conception of philosophy could be dynamically transposed by Brown's model so that philosophical understanding and the community of philosophers can be seen more clearly as the product of communication process. In the terminology developed in this chapter, some groundwork is laid for the rhetorical study of philosophers as they employ different methods in an architectonic and productive rhetoric. Dogmatic, sceptical, and perspectival philosophers are seen as negotiating philosophical understandings through historical dialogue.

In that chapter I also began developing a way to think about Brown's model concerning the epistemic status of beliefs. It is argued that Brown's model emphasizes how communication process structures philosophical conceptions of reality. It was also noted that thus far he has done little to feature how what is structured impinges upon and thus limits structuring processes. For example, Holmes' interpretation of philosophy is responsible for the literary, sociological, historical, and psychological data. In relation to his perspectival notion of philosophy, Holmes articulates three variables that constitute personal perspectival understanding: (1) universal aspects, those practical necessities of thought and action that cannot be denied in human existence, (2) world-viewish aspects, the common heritage of interpretive thought which addresses universal areas in unique ways and which enables an individual to identify with and participate in an
interpersonal world-view community, and (3) ideosyncratic aspects which allow for great individual variety within a world-view community. Connected to this is the discussion of Holmes' "logic of philosophical decision" in which he provides a general approach to the scrutiny of personal choices in the attempt to weigh or evaluate interpretive positions. Again, I transpose Holmes' description into a more dynamic conceptualization arguing that he isolates three key topoi in the "rhetoric of philosophical decision." This idea is further explored in chapter seven.

Chapter four features Holmes as he architectonically conceives of interdisciplinary relationships involved in the negotiation of world-view meanings. Holmes opens the way for an interdisciplinary dialogue on "world views" through his anatomy model of world views. For Holmes, this anatomy conception also functions to unify some of the diversity of world-view discourse. Holmes argues that a world view can be thought of as consisting of (1) a unifying perspective of basic beliefs, attitudes and values and (2) a reflective elaboration of that perspective across the whole of life. This conception of a world view leads Holmes to discuss the content development of world views. By transposing his more static conception, I posit key power shares in an interdisciplinary world-view community: theologians (broadly defined), philosophers, and scientists. According to Holmes, theologians/ideologues contribute most to the content development of the unifying perspective, philosophers help in the systematic elaboration of that perspective across broad ranges of thought, experience, and action, and scientists contribute both models of nature
and empirical data to be taken into account. All are jointly engaged in processing world-view meanings that meet the universal human need for unity and guidance in thought and action.

Given the Brown-Holmes interaction there were three primary communication contributions from this chapter. First, Holmes’ description of the disciplines involved in the development of a world view is static. Given the dynamics of Brown’s model, groundwork is laid for conceiving of the interdisciplinary interactions in the production of world views and world-view communities. These three disciplines highlighted by Holmes, and perhaps others, need to be studied if rhetorical scholars are to grasp better how social reality is processed and what social realities are being processed within academic communities. Next, Holmes’ anatomy of world views was developed in relation to Brown’s discussion of attention management. First, there can be attention shifts concerning both a unifying perspective and particular elaborations. Second, such shifts are potentially retarded or speeded up by two kinds of attention management: Perspectival attention management focuses human attention upon the core beliefs, attitudes, and values of a unifying perspective in rhetorical attempts to maintain, reconstruct, or deconstruct a perspectival understanding. Elaborative attention features perspectival themes applied across broad ranges of human thought, experience, and action in the rhetorical attempt to maintain, reconstruct, or deconstruct an elaborative understanding.

Finally, Holmes’ discussion of the universal human need for a world view more clearly articulates Brown’s assertion that humans need
comprehensive renderings of reality. As Holmes discusses this human need for world views, he provides a theme for world-view justification: A world view is justified for a people when it unifies and guides their thought and action in relation to a highest good. World-view rhetors will constantly be at work in raising and resolving problems concerning the needs-meeting capacity of world view alternatives. Again, the intimate relationship between structuring processes and that which is being structured is seen and serves as the basis of a communication-centered approach to world-view justification developed in chapter seven.

Chapter five grows out of chapters three and four and shows how Holmes (1) conceives an integrative understanding of "Christian philosopher" that fits his perspectival conception of philosophy and is open to the interdisciplinary interactions within a pluralistic world-viewing community and (2) articulates "world-view advocacy" as an action corollary by which Christian philosophers can realize their integrative disciplinary name. In light of the study as a whole, this chapter provides the key transition. Chapters three and four are primarily examples of rhetoric as an architectonic process functioning to reconceive disciplinary reality. Chapter five moves more in the direction of rhetoric as a productive process. After contrasting conjunctive and disjunctive ways of conceiving the relationship between Christian faith and learning, Holmes negotiates an integrative conception. From that point in the study, he is viewed as one engaged in the personal realization of that disciplinary identity through the action corollary of world-view advocacy. The latter half of the
chapter features his overall approach to the rhetorical processing of Christian theism as a world view. Chapters six through eight explore that action of advocacy in great detail.

Part three of this study can be viewed in at least two ways. First, in relation to part two it is seen as productive rhetoric, an enactment of Holmes' disciplinary identity of Christian philosopher, an enactment that aids in the production of a community of Christian philosophers. Second, as philosophical discourse it functions architectonically in reconceiving conceptual relationships and potentially transforming shared understandings of a unifying perspective. This second sense raises some fundamental philosophical questions concerning the philosophical specification of Brown's model. Throughout the study, these questions are not dealt with in great depth; instead, they function as suggestions concerning the need for further theoretical work in the development of a rhetorical theory of symbolic evolution. Key to each question is the relationship between interpretive processes and the practical necessities and metaphysically objective realities being processed.

Chapter six investigates Holmes' philosophical use of theological ideas in the construction of a unifying perspective. It emphasizes perspectival attention management as he engages in what I call a rhetoric of contrasted perspectives: Holmes contrasts Christian theism with both naturalism and other versions of theism. It also features elaborative attention management as he articulates these perspectival themes upon a model drawn from the philosophy of action. This chapter treats Holmes addressing two metaphysical/ontological world-view
topics: the topic of ultimate being and the topic of anthropology. The first topic addresses the question, "What do we reckon with when we die?" The second topic addresses the question, "What is it to be a person?" Positions taken in answering these two questions constrain answers to other universal world-view questions. In this chapter Brown helps see Holmes rhetorically constructing a symbolic reality. Holmes uses two complex names to focus attention concerning the central themes being discussed. First, "God-creation distinction and relationship" is the name explicated to address the ultimacy question by conceiving of three ontologically distinct, yet related realities: God, nature, and persons. Second, "Persons as relational and responsible agents" is the name expounded to answer the anthropological question. Holmes' discussion of thematic elaboration through chosen models shows clearly how in the history of thought ontological/metaphysical distinctions and relationships have been affirmed/denied, multiplied/reduced and valued/devalued. His use of a personalistic agency model and his openness to process notions in relating persons and nature, both serve in an architectonic elaboration of perspectival belief that functions productively in other areas.

Given this study, world-view communication scholars need to do more work investigating how models are used to relate ideas and how those models themselves become reified. Brown has done some of this work using Pepper, but more needs to be done. Holmes' distinction between a unifying perspective and its various elaborations through selected models in the history of thought can help in this task.
Chapter seven shows Holmes managing elaborative attention in constructing a theistic framework for understanding the world-view topic of epistemology and articulating an interpretive realism stance within that frame. This chapter shows Holmes promoting an epistemological attention switch within the community of evangelical scholars. There one sees Holmes, perhaps more clearly than anywhere else, living in dialogue with non-Christian perspectives. He argues that an epistemological shift within the larger philosophical community better fits the Biblical view of truth and knowledge. He advocates that shift among evangelical scholars using a whole-part model that reconceives crucial epistemic relationships.

This chapter extends those possibilities and questions raised in chapters three and four concerning the tendency of Brown's model to move its users in the direction of sceptical relativism. Using some of Holmes' distinctions and relationships I argue that Brown's model can be modified so that it addresses the issue of world-view justification by emphasizing the interpretive dynamics involved in generating and warranting epistemic claims. Using Brown, I transpose Holmes' discussion of the practical justification of belief into what could now be called justification topoi in an architectonic productive rhetoric. Central in that discussion is the way rhetors argue the needs meeting think-with-ability and live-with-ability of world-view beliefs in relation to universal practical necessities that constrain human symbolic constructions of reality. If this view were further elaborated it could contribute to the dialogue among rhetorical scholars concerning rhetoric as a way of knowing. Brown emphasizes
some of the structuring processes in human knowledge. While Holmes adds to these processes, he primarily emphasizes universal elements that are structured by human knowers.

Chapter eight shows Holmes relying upon his conceptions of ontology and epistemology to construct the general contours of an axiology, a social theory, and a philosophy of history. As Holmes articulates positions he does so remembering the interdisciplinary relationships he has posited. His view of values, society, and history are thoroughly theistic, yet they are open to contributions from scholars working from non-theistic perspectives. For example, Holmes' creational interpretation of a natural law theory of morality is one that acknowledges the relativity of complex moral situations and the possibility of ethical insight from non-theists. At the same time, Holmes argues that God's valuing is the absolute basis for human values, that the Biblical notions of love and justice are universal ethical principles to be applied in all moral choices, and that there are universal value area rules that provide general guidance in moral decision making.

In that chapter, I note that to avoid sceptical relativism Brown's model needs greater axiological specification in two related areas. First, it needs to address the question of universal value areas. If, as Holmes asserts, there are universal areas in human valuing, then a communication study of world-views would explore how and what meanings are negotiated as human symbol-sharers attempt to discern values and decide moral dilemmas. Such studies might also provide insight into the further discernment of those universal areas that are variously
interpreted. Second, what is the relationship between fact and value? Brown certainly rejects the value-actualization view of nature (i.e., the view that romantically denies evil in the way things are) and on the surface seems to lean strongly towards the value-neutrality view of nature (i.e., the view that separates facts from values). It was suggested that Holmes' position of value-potentiality provides an interesting alternative that could develop Brown's model axiologically so that nature is seen (1) as holding potential for the actualization of good and (2) as providing indicators concerning values and morality. Such a position allows for the avoidance of moral scepticism without embracing a naive notion of dogmatic absolutism.

Holmes' constructed view of society is skeletal. In that discussion he is seen employing a metaphysical process model of historicized concrete individuals in order to conceive of organic relationships between individuals and society. Such a model complements and potentially extends Brown's organicist philosophical specification. Questions are raised as Holmes outlines four universal social institutions: family, work, government, and church. If these are universals, then again the communication scholar is called upon to help conceive how various understandings are negotiated and realized. I suggest that these institutions be related to the interdisciplinary power-shares involved in world-view processing thus enlarging the conception of shared power in the negotiation of world views. I argue that Holmes' description of "society" lacks the needed dynamic that a model like Brown's provides. Relatedly, Holmes' perspectival view of persons combines with his interpretive realism and social theory as he
outlines a communication-centered view of interpersonal knowledge. Again, it is suggested that Holmes' emphasis could be better articulated within Brown's model so that the dynamics of personal knowledge are more clearly seen.

Finally, I briefly outline Holmes' view of history as it conceives of human freedom in relationship to God's providence. He combines his view of history with his interpretive realism to discuss the possibility of the human knowledge of persons as historical agents. My discussion of Holmes' view of history, society, and values stresses a central argumentative pattern: a perspectival frame is articulated, an elaborative stance is taken, and epistemological issues are raised and addressed.

In brief review of this summary, the discussion of Holmes using Brown's model provides rich and diverse communication insights concerning how rhetoric functions architectonically in the production of social reality. I add to Brown's discussion of attention management, use his model to investigate the reification of disciplinary identity and world-view stances, isolate some potential limits to the human processing of reality, show one possible way to link Brown's model to the epistemic concerns of some rhetorical scholars, and raise some key philosophical questions concerning Brown's model. In relationship to this summary I want to discuss the two key theoretical yields of this study: (1) Brown's dynamic transposition of Holmes' conception of philosophy and (2) Holmes' potential for moving Brown's emphasis away from the extreme of sceptical relativism.
Philosophy as Communication Process

Throughout the study I feature Holmes as a philosopher processing world-view identity and content. Using Brown's model I consistently make two interpretive moves: (1) I interpret Holmes as a rhetor using language to manage attention architectonically in the production of new understandings that lead to responsible reflective action. (2) I transpose Holmes' philosophical descriptions of social and conceptual continuity and change to show clearly the communication process dynamic of such phenomena. Such work features the structuring communication processes essential to doing philosophy.

As I interpret Holmes' philosophy as rhetorical action, I consistently show his construction of a coherent argumentation concerning relational terms and the resulting complex names. Much of Holmes' philosophy is devoted to naming and justifying conceptual relationships: (1) Faith "integrates" with learning "perspectively" in a way that is different from "disjunctive" and "conjunctive" relations. (2) A perspectival philosophy "mediates" dogmatism and scepticism. (3) A perspective "unifies" an elaboration. (4) A unifying perspective is "distinct from" while "related to" various elaborative formulations or world views. (5) Such elaborations develop as perspectival meanings are "mapped onto" a model and "applied to" various issues and actions. (6) Various disciplines "interrelate" as they contribute to world-view meaning. (7) God, persons, and nature are related by the ultimate relational name "God-creation relationship and distinction." (8) Persons are "relational" and "responsible" (in their thinking "and" acting) agents whose relationships are affected by "both" the "fall"
and "redemption." (9) A "whole-part model" is used to conceive of key "epistemic relationships." (10) "Interpretive realism" reminds one of the subjective epistemic relationship to metaphysical objectivities. (11) "Universal value areas" and "action spheres" are constitutive and constraining aspects of the creational arena for human existence.

Acceptance of Holmes' argument would result in the acceptance of a large population of conceived relations asserted as adequately naming and orienting human thought and action. Such an emphasis upon conceived relationships is not limited to Holmes. It is basic to the foundational work of philosophers and scholars. Persons interpret and thereby structure their worlds. Their interpretations shape what is accepted as true and gives direction to their study. Discourse is a central structuring process that develops and advocates the conception of good reasons for belief in relational names.

On a more macroscopic level, in chapters three and four I take Holmes' interpretations of philosophy and the key disciplines that contribute to world view meaning and transpose them in terms of communication dynamics. In both places Holmes' philosophical descriptions provide the materials that I structure in relationship to Brown's model: my work "speeds up" what in Holmes' work is more static. My work suggests the need for communication scholars to detail those interactions which result in historical manifestations of philosophical and world-viewish understandings and communities. Such a process interpretation would show communication as one central driving force that creates and sustains disciplines like philosophy and interdisciplinary unity and diversity concerning models and meanings of
reality.

I also suggest that as Holmes elaborates a world view, he does not provide enough emphasis upon process. His description of the anatomy of a world view gives little sense of the rhetorical processes involved in conceiving integrative associations and disintegrative dissociations between a unifying perspective and various elaborations. He gives presence to different models used by thinkers to elaborate world views, but communication scholars need to develop histories, and perhaps a theory, of how such models are processed in human understanding. His interpretive realism acknowledges the role of interpretation, but needs a model like Brown's to show the communication-centered nature of interpretation. He argues for social institutions that are a part of the created order and for the possibility of social action to re-order those institutions. Brown's model provides a way of conceiving relationships between institutions as created, realized, and changed through communication.

I also show how Holmes' description of the criteria used in the weighing of belief can be transposed into rhetorical topoi that are variously discoursed upon across world view communities. Such a transposition emphasizes the idea that although such criteria vary in meaning and importance across world view communities and in relationship to various projects and questions, still they function in those communities in the attempt to get in touch with reality.

In short, this view of Holmes opens the way for communication scholars to treat philosophical understanding as more than a product of argumentation. More basically philosophy is a purposeful activity to
get in touch with reality; action dependent upon the human capacity to make and share symbols. Also, this view implies that communication scholars can contribute to the philosopher's work in calling attention to communication process as an essential dynamic in all disciplinary understanding.

Interpretations of Metaphysical Objectivities and Practical Necessities

Throughout the study I have raised possible implications of Holmes' philosophy for Brown's modelling of interpretive structuring processes. Relying upon Holmes I have consistently argued for two related modifications: (1) Brown's model can be philosophically articulated so that it mediates dogmatism and scepticism. (2) Brown's emphasis upon interpretive structuring process needs to be thought about in relationship to those practical necessities of human existence which constrain what is think-with-able and live-with-able.

Brown's model, as published thus far, moves strongly in the direction of sceptical relativism. Readers of Brown could argue that given his model one cannot distinguish between epistemically adequate and inadequate beliefs. I would argue that in those articles there are some hints concerning ways to avoid complete relativism and that his very advocacy of the model is itself a rejection of complete scepticism. His use of Pepper in unpublished papers epistemologically roots his model in an organic metaphor which clearly places limits upon developmental directions of the processing of human understanding and communities. Relatedly, chapter eight mentions Holmes' metaphysical model of society which provides greater detail concerning how
individuals and society are interrelated in historical processes that actualize certain value and action possibilities and thus constrain and shape future valuing and acting. That model posits a metaphysical relationship between facts and values, nature and action, individuals and society. One thing is obvious: as Brown's model is philosophically specified in greater detail it will become increasingly perspectival in overt ways. The only way for Brown to avoid charges of scepticism and relativism is to articulate a clear philosophical stance. Holmes provides one methodological approach for such stancing.

Holmes points out that persons distinguish between "adequate" accounts of phenomena and those inadequate accounts that do not "fit" or "cohere." Persons vary in their reasons for acceptance and rejection of beliefs. Careful reflection shows that as reasons for beliefs are given some have better grounds for being counted as "good reasons." The human symbol-user has the capacity to be critical of symbolic constructions of reality and can conceive of differences between dangerous anomalies, those that can be safely ignored, and those that must be reasonably accounted for if a world view is to thrive. There are better versions of reality as well as those that deserve to be abandoned. For Holmes, dialogue is a key to epistemic discernment: the historical and contemporary intersubjective wrestling with ideas is born in the self-critical attempt to gain a greater scrutiny of human subjectivity, in the quest for clear and coherent understanding.

Holmes' distinction between metaphysical and epistemological subjectivity and objectivity is crucial in this discussion. A
metaphysically objective reality is basically unaffected by one's epistemic stance toward it: it exists even if one denies its existence. Epistemological subjectivity is the knowing relationship between a person and that which is known. Epistemological objectivity is a move a person makes to weigh more rigorously the adequacy of beliefs.

Brown's model potentially features the intrapersonal and interpersonal aspects of how such epistemic moves are made. Holmes stresses the motive for such moves: persons desire to be in touch with what is real.

This leads to the notion of universal practical necessities. Chapter seven details my transposition of Holmes' position (see "Justification of Belief") which emphasizes the notion that personal existence in this universe is constrained in certain universal ways. Human freedom is articulated in relationship to physical reality as well as basic biological, psychological, sociological, axiological, epistemological, and communicative needs. Such needs are variously interpreted and their advocacy and experienced fulfillment may vary widely across cultures, but these areas must be addressed by a world view if its adherents are to experience it as both intellectually adequate and practically relevant. Communication scholars should busy themselves in discerning such universal practical necessities and explicating how they (1) are structured through interpretive processes and (2) function as topics in a rhetoric of world-view justification.

Given the need for a mutual emphasis upon structuring processes and those aspects of life being structured in world-view rhetoric, what modification of Brown's model emerges? The rhetoric of world-view justification should be a part of the larger study of world views as
communication process. Wolterstorff suggests some epistemic distinctions that might be further developed. He argues that humans have "belief dispositions," the inclination to generate beliefs given their experiences. Some of these dispositions are innate to human beings (memory, sense perception, intuition, reasoning, etc.). Others are conditioned through interaction with others and the world. Wolterstorff also argues that persons "govern" the functioning of their belief dispositions: they govern what they accept as a reliable belief and the govern the direction of these dispositions concerning those things and areas they want to develop beliefs about.

Given Brown's model, I suggest the following. Innate belief dispositions are an aspect of intrapersonal symbol-making. Conditioned belief dispositions arise through interpersonal symbol-sharing about life-world experiences. Governance of belief disposition is motivated by the need to unify and guide thought and action: attention is managed (1) to unify beliefs through the governance of what people accept as reliable and (2) to guide belief through governance of the key directions in the further development and application of beliefs. Key to belief governance is (1) the fundamental motive to be in better touch with reality and (2) the conviction that beliefs vary in their epistemic adequacy. Persons have some capacity as responsible reflective agents to weigh and control what they think about and how they think about it. Communication scholars ought to direct their own belief dispositions in the area of the rhetorical justification of belief in the attempt to generate acceptable beliefs concerning how humans responsibly process beliefs and relate those beliefs to the
practical demands of life.

Toward a Program of Research

Thus far I have summarized the communication insights provided by this study. It is now important to consider some implications of this study as a part of a program of rhetorical research. This study is a project within the larger program of research that attempts explication of the rhetorical processing of human conceptions of reality. Given the discussion of this chapter such a program might be entitled "the development of a theory of rhetoric as an architectonic productive process." In this program of research Brown's model is one among many, but this study has accredited its heuristic value in advancing the epistemic goals of scholars involved in this broad area of research.

Given my dissertation, one area of interest among such scholars would be developing a greater understanding of the rhetorical processing of disciplinary identity. Brown's emphasis upon ideological identity and Holmes' perspectival conception of scholarship provide an interesting world-view approach to such research. Of special interest are those ways in which disciplinary environments are managed between monistic and pluralistic understandings of perspectival stances as they relate to understanding. Monistic extremes would involve a dogmatic refusal to allow competing perspectival options besides the one reigning perspective (All cognitive-minority participation must be masked). Pluralistic extremes would involve relativistic renderings of any epistemic claims. Mediating paths would allow perspectival pluralism while seeking common ground based upon universal aspects that
impinge upon perspectival constructions. This alternative is the one called for by philosophers like Holmes and being worked out within the philosophical community.

Another area of interest would be the development of epistemic topoi and epistemic processes involved in generating and evaluating knowledge claims. Given Brown's communication processes and Holmes' epistemic idea of interpretive realism, a potential framework is developed for such work. Chapter seven suggests one such approach, but much more needs to be done in this area central to an architectonic rhetoric.

A third area of study would concern the articulation of relationships among universally structuring rhetorical processes and universal aspects of reality being structured. The emphasis here would be upon discerning both universal rhetorical processes involved in the construction of comprehensive understandings of reality and those universal aspects of reality that sometimes stubbornly resist being structured by a comprehensive world view. Brown isolates three rhetorical processes: intrapersonal, interpersonal, and interpretative. Holmes suggests some universal practical necessities that must be accounted for if a world view is to be experienced as live-with-able and think-with-able. Both men's views could be tested, refined, and extended.

Finally, Brown has consistently called for a greater understanding of continuity and change in world views. The study of the symbolic waxing and waning of social reality is of central interest to developing a theory of rhetoric as an architectonic productive process.
Holmes' anatomy of world views concept might serve as a means to write histories of world view development. Such histories might lead to a clear understanding of the dynamics of elaborative shifts which ultimately allow the preservation of perspectival commitments. Kuhn's work raises this problem as he describes the "revolutionary" shifts which occur among scientists while they still maintain their scientific disciplinary identity. Such paradoxes are intriguing, especially as they occur across disciplines and larger world-view communities, so that humans can conceive perspectival continuities across the centuries of intellectual change.

Questions arise concerning methods by which such directions in research may be pursued. Among many possibilities; I suggest only two. One answer involves a renewed call for interdisciplinary team research as scholars drawn from theology, philosophy, science, and other disciplines work with rhetoricians in the attempt to interpret human constructions of reality and the constructive processes. Rhetorical scholars on such teams would need (1) a solid theoretical perspective that could be seen by others as making sense of work in their disciplines and (2) a working vocabulary in fields outside of rhetoric. Such work would also be a practical aspect of promoting McKeon's call to change contemporary understandings of rhetoric.

Throughout this study I have used the method of triangulated dialogue to investigate the topic of world views. I believe the method is heuristic, and can be used to develop a scholar's understanding of rhetorical processes involved in diverse disciplinary areas. Key in the use of such a method is the appropriate choice of dialogue partners.
and careful attention paid to their use of disciplinary categories. Brown and Holmes have helped me develop a personal conceptual framework for world-view study. In the process my understanding of both men has sharpened, my own disciplinary identity has matured, and my understanding of Christian theism as a world view has been clarified and deepened.

**Christian Studies in Rhetoric**

Thus far I have addressed the insights and implications of this study for communication scholars in general. I close with a much more specific focus. These final pages comment upon the impact of this study in relation to my own scholarly identity and future. They are relevant to others with an interest in the rhetorical processing of disciplinary identity among Christian scholars who potentially contribute to the development of a contemporary world view. Given Holmes' articulation of key power shares, much work is needed in the study of ongoing disciplinary interactions. My next choice of a case study will be someone working at the boundary between theology and philosophy or theology and science. Two possible candidates mentioned in this study are Thomas Torrance and Nicholas Wolterstorff. More comprehensive studies of large scale interactions among theologians, philosophers, and scientists are also needed.

Increasingly I have realized the great need for both historical and contemporary background in philosophy, theology, and science as they relate to the problems of society. By "background" I do not imply a scholarly expertise in each field. I do mean a growing informed
context that enables me to summarize better data, evaluate positions, see implications, and translate across universes of discourse. One ongoing project I would like to pursue is the monitoring of the *Studies in a Christian World View* series mentioned in this research. Here ten outstanding Christian scholars are architectonically producing an interpretation of the world. There are other such joint projects that could be monitored and studied.

Such specialized studies must be conducted with an eye towards larger theoretical questions of interest to rhetorical scholars. At the same time this research could contribute to an understanding among evangelical scholars of their work, and it may eventually function to shape the direction of that work. Also such study would sharpen my own disciplinary identity as a Christian communication scholar. Wolterstorff argues the value of a strong knowledge of Christian theology and philosophy for the Christian scholar:

> Where Christian theology and Christian philosophy are not in a healthy and robust state, or where their results are not widely diffused among scholars, I see little hope that the rest of Christian scholarship can be solid and vigorous. Christian philosophy and theology are at the center, not because they are infallible . . . but because it is in these two disciplines that the Christian scholar engages in systematic self-examination.7

I believe Wolterstorff is correct in his claim about the importance of philosophy and theology. Given the view of rhetoric as an architectonic and productive process, it too potentially serves a central role as the process by which understandings across disciplines are developed and integrated.

At a more basic level my study of Holmes' perspectival understanding of scholarship has forced me to begin asking what a
Christian approach to communication studies would be like if patterned after Holmes' approach to philosophy. Thus far, a few basic skeletal ideas emerge. Each needs further thought as Christian scholars together inquire into the integrative relationship between faith and communication theory.

First, at the metaphysical and ontological level, the two themes of the theistic unifying perspective as articulated by Holmes would lead to thinking about communication in two ways: (1) the God-person distinction and relationship and (2) persons as a part of the created order. The first would place the study of communication in a theological frame and consider symbolic action as an aspect of our being made in God's image. It would contribute to Christian thinking about the concept of revelation. The second idea shares common ground with other perspectives that emphasize persons as relational and responsible agents who communicate for rhetorical purposes. It would emphasize the biological and social processes that shape personal freedom in creating, sharing, and realizing symbolic constructions of reality. Both levels would influence evaluations of world-view discourse, methods of study, and ethics.

Second, epistemologically, Holmes' interpretive realism makes sense. A view of the rhetorical processing of knowledge must articulate epistemic limits to both dogmatic and relativistic renderings of knowledge. The philosophical view of universal practical necessities and its theistic articulation in a creational framework provides an interesting area of study concerning the limits and possibilities of categorizing and rhetorical processing of
justification rationales.

Third, Holmes' view of value-potential and actualization and his societal gestalt again help see skeletal "creational limits" to the world views that human symbolizers can indwell. His brief discussion of social action needs further development given a communication-centered view of social dynamics. Brown's model provides a heuristic starting point for that task.

It would be interesting to see how such elements would combine in a version of a Christian theory of world views as communication process, a theory which is neither conjunctive nor disjunctive, but integrative in its relationship to both contemporary thought and social action. Such a project demands years of careful thinking on the part of many scholars, both Christian and non-Christian, both inside and outside the discipline of communication studies. Such work is an interdisciplinary life-project that I hope to pursue from the standpoint developed in this project.

Practical Relevance of World-View Studies

A question could be raised concerning the value of such studies in relationship to the practical demands of daily life. Three things need to be said. First, world views arise through everyday communication experience. In chapter four I highlight Holmes' claim that every person has what could be called a world picture that makes sense of life. Such an image grows out of interaction experiences with other persons and with nature. A world view is the reflective attempt to organize and apply this image in systematic ways across all of life.
Often such reflection feeds back upon everyday understandings of life and changes common images of reality. Sometimes such scholarly reflections are called into question because as abstractions they fail to articulate with the common experiences, needs and demands of daily life. For this reason the interdisciplinary negotiation of world views must be seen in relationship to the larger matrix of social interaction.

Second, many people may often have little sense of "having a world view" until they discourse with someone who understands life from a sharply contrasting point of view. In our pluralistic society it is hard to live without some recognition of contrasting perspectives. What is easy in such a social situation is to take cognitive stances toward life-world meanings that deny the hard questions raised by this study. In general, when persons sceptically assert that everything is relative without asking about the possibility of common ground and universal constraints concerning being, knowing, and valuing or when they dogmatically deny the possibility of insight from any but their own cherished perspective, then the need for reflective studies such as this one is increased. It provides a motive for the humble and confident quest of greater reliability in human interpretations of life.

Finally, communication scholars will best serve the public by reminding persons of both the structuring processes and the structured practical necessities of life that together mutually interact in the rhetorical construction of conceptual names. As persons live out their lives in relationship to some ultimate reality and to one another they
need (1) greater appreciation of what different groups conceive of as ultimate and (2) some basic ways to negotiate thought and action in a pluralistic society. Rhetoric as an architectonic and productive process must be relevantly related to such practical needs by communication scholars concerned with how persons can live out their lives in world-viewish ways without destroying one another in the name of some chosen ultimate reality.
FOOTNOTES


2Gerald A. Hauser, "Searching for a Bright Tomorrow: Graduate Education in Rhetoric During the 1980's," Communication Education 28 (1979), 266.


6Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 182-191.

7Wolterstorff, Reason Within the Bounds of Religion, p. 104.
APPENDIX

A GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS

**Action Corollary:** Brown's term for those recommended behaviors that follow from a belief, value, or attitude. Such actions are understood within a community to realize the commitments of that people. Such enactments can be evaluated as authentic expressions of belief.

**Anatomy of a World View:** Holmes' concept for thinking about the nature of world views. He distinguishes a unifying perspective, a general image of reality which is authentically held to unify and guide both thought and action in relation to a highest good, from perspectival elaborations, those various historical formulations and applications of a unifying perspective.

**Anomaly:** A conceived abnormality or gap between an interpretation of life and experience. According to Brown, world-view attention is strategically managed in relationship to possible anomalies. Anomaly-featuring is the rhetorical attempt to highlight poor fits between conceptions of a world and experience in that world. Anomaly-masking is the rhetorical attempt to downplay the seriousness of conceived gaps, take them into account, deny them, etc.

**Attention Management:** Through symbolic action persons influence what others focus upon and how they focus upon that. Rhetoric is the attempt to manage attention; it calls people to think in specific ways about a fact, issue, action, relationship, etc. Given Holmes' world view anatomy, this study develops two types of world-view attention management: (1) **Perspectival management** directs human thinking to those beliefs, attitudes, values, and feelings that supposedly constitute commitment to a unifying perspective. (2) **Elaborative management** directs human thinking to how perspectival commitment is or ought to be applied to various areas of human thought, experience, and action. Brown argues that rhetors often strategically plan large scale movements of attention and consider how to intervene tactically into human symbol-sharing in order to accomplish those larger goals. He is interested in the **rhetorical maneuvers** that specifically manage attention including forms of argumentation, demonstration, media presentations, etc.
Attention Shift (Switch): A dramatic change in the way persons interpret some aspect of reality. When a shift occurs, that which is the focus of attention is understood and experienced differently.

Axiology: The study of values, their meaning, basis, status, justification, etc. A universal topic of world-view discourse.

Complex Name: A group of words which jointly are intended to signify a conception. An example is Holmes' "God-creation relationship and distinction."

Creational Framework: This complex name is used to signify the articulation of an overarching theistic position that unifies many particular stances. "Creational" signifies a belief in God's action as the creator of the natural order.

Disciplinary Identity: A view of self that is related to some conceived field of knowledge.

Dogmatism: An unwarranted confidence concerning the truth of a doctrine or system of beliefs.

Epistemology: The study of knowledge, what is known, how it is known, the nature and extent of knowledge. A universal topic in world-view discourse.

Growth-and-Survival Need: Brown's term for those practical necessities for the existence and development of persons. Persons interpret these needs and the appropriate means of fulfillment. Often such needs must be met through the aid of others, thus leading to the rhetorical advocacy of a needs-meeting response.

Interpersonal Power Cycle: One of three sub-cycles in Brown's model. The emphasis here is upon the human capacity to share symbols which create and maintain social relationships.

Interpretative Attention-Switch Cycle: One of three sub-cycles in Brown's model. The emphasis here is upon the human capacity to manage attention to change and/or maintain world view meanings concerning self, others, the world, and appropriate action corollaries.

Interpretive Realism: Holmes' epistemic stance which emphasizes both an objective metaphysical reality and the epistemologically subjective conceptualizations of that reality.

Intrapersonal Needs Cycle: One of three sub-cycles in Brown's model. The emphasis here is upon the human capacity to make symbols which label self, others, and the world. Persons need to organize their lives and see relationships.
**Metaphysics:** The attempt to provide a comprehensive and coherent account of what is real. In this work it is used as a synonym for ontology and is treated as a universal topic of world-view discourse related to the development of the meaning of a unifying perspective.

**Naturalism:** A traditional unifying perspective which asserts that nature is the ultimate reality and that persons are completely a part and product of natural processes.

**Ontology:** The study of being. In this work it is used as a synonym for metaphysics and is treated as a universal topic of world-view discourse related to the development of the meaning of a unifying perspective.

**Perspective:** As Holmes uses this term, it implies those basic commitments (beliefs, attitudes, values, and feelings) about the meaning of the world. A unifying image of life that is authentically held by a person and often shared with a group of people.

**Philosophy:** The quest for clear and coherent understanding of fundamental questions using a variety of logical methods.

**Philosophy as Perspectival:** Holmes' central methodological proposal concerning philosophy. He argues that every philosopher develops philosophical positions from a point of view that is authentically believed to make sense of life.

**Power Shares:** Brown argues that persons share responsibility in the creation and maintenance of world view content and community. Relationships among groups of people who share power in the negotiation of world views range the continuum between competitive to complementary.

**Practical Justification of Belief:** Holmes' emphasis upon the responsible requirements that human existence places upon beliefs which persons hold to be reliable. Beliefs are justified in relationship to the projects of life. He uses two terms to describe general areas of belief evaluation: Live-with-ability involves the responsible demands that human valuing and acting place upon a belief or a system of beliefs; persons must be able to authentically live what they believe. Think-with-ability involves the demands that responsible human thought places upon belief; a belief must meet certain logical, empirical, and critical requirements to be warranted. In short, beliefs must be personally relevant and intellectually adequate.

**Practical Necessity:** A universal need of human existence that must be addressed by persons in their beliefs, values, attitudes, and
actions.

Reify: Treating abstractions as if they were concrete existing entities.

Relational Categorizing: Persons use language to order their world. One way they do this is through linguistic terms which feature relationships between other terms: and, but, neither-nor, either-or, both-and, whole-part, etc.

Rhetoric: Purposeful symbolic action to persuade persons concerning their beliefs, attitudes, values, feelings, relationships, and actions.

Rhetoric as an Architectonic Productive Process: A complex name that emphasizes rhetorical processes which function to reconceive social reality (architectonic) and realize those new conceptions in relation to obstacles and possibilities (productive).

Rhetoric of Contrasted Perspectives: My term for rhetorical action that manages human attention in relationship to two unifying perspectives in order to feature their similarities and differences. It often functions either to reinforce perspectival commitment or to change it in either revolutionary (conversion) or evolutionary (developmental) ways.

Rhetoric of Disciplinary Identity: Rhetorical action for the purpose of (1) relating one's self to a field of learning, (2) reconceiving one's discipline, and/or (3) relating one's discipline to an interdisciplinary community.

Scepticism: A doubting of the possibility of warranted confidence concerning the truth of a doctrine or system of beliefs.

Science: The systematic empirical and theoretical inquiry into natural processes and relationships.

Social Reality: Meanings shared by persons concerning one another and the nature of life in the world; intersubjective interpretations of reality.

Theism: A unifying perspective that names God the ultimate reality and sees persons as related to God in some way(s).

Theology: The study and development of the basic beliefs of a specific religion.

Triangulated Dialogue: A three-party investigation of a chosen topic; through careful consideration of that topic from three points of view an argumentation is generated that attempts integrative insight.
Teleology: The study of ordered or purposeful phenomena and how their order is reached through developmental processes.

World View: A comprehensive interpretation of self, others and the world. A system of beliefs, attitudes, and values that unifies thought and action. A world view defines what is ultimate and what it is to be a person; it interprets questions concerning knowledge, values, and action projects. The term is used interchangably in this study with "ideology" and "rhetorical vision."

World View as Communication Process: The emphasis of this complex name is upon world views as they arise in and are realized through human symbol-making and symbol-sharing. Brown's model stresses this approach to the study of world views.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Major Works by Holmes


Chapters Contributed to Books by Holmes


**Scholarly Articles by Holmes**


"Science and Human Values." Gordon Review 6 (1960), 31-34.

"The Theist and His Premises." Basic College Quarterly (1959), 4-6.


"Whitehead and Ethical Monotheism." Faith and Philosophy, forthcoming.

Popular Articles by Holmes


"Christianity and Naturalism" Christianity Today 3 (June 8, 1959) 10-11.


"Why Oppose Gambling?" Eternity 28 (June 1977), 16-18.
Book Reviews by Holmes


Responses, Editorials, Lectures, and Brief Articles by Holmes


Some Responses to Holmes


Geisler, Normal L. "Theological Method and Inerrancy: A Reply to Professor Holmes." Bulletin of the Evangelical Theological Society 2 (1968), 139-144.


Some Review of Holmes' Books

All Truth Is God's Truth:


Christian Philosophy in the Twentieth Century:


Faith Seeks Understanding:


The Idea of a Christian College:

Kephart, John E. Library Journal 100 (1975), 979-800.


Reimherr, Otto Lutheran Quarterly 28 (1976), 89-90.

Philosophy: A Christian Perspective, An Introductory Essay:

Rubboli, M. *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* 20 (1977), 81-82.


Other Sources


Booth, Wayne C. "The Rhetorical Stance." *College Composition and Communication* 24 (1963), 139-145.


______. "On What to Publish." Paper presented to the Central States Speech Association annual convention, Lincoln, Nebraska, April 7-9, 1983.


Hauser, Gerald A. "Searching for a Bright Tomorrow: Graduate Education in Rhetoric During the 1980's." Communication Education 28 (1979), 259-270.


