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JOHN DRYDEN'S USE OF CLASSICAL RHETORIC
IN
THE CONQUEST OF GRANADA

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
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* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1983

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A. E. Wallace Maurer
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To
Lola Elizabeth Nichols Nettles
and
Abraham Nettles

My Parents
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Chapter I. A Curiously Omitted Background Fact

The bases for discussion of Dryden's heroic plays have remained limited to the same few topics adumbrated by Margaret Sherwood in her 1898 work, John Dryden's Dramatic Theory and Practice. Sherwood describes the plays as so different "in motif, language, and construction from ordinary drama that a standard of judgment is hard to form for them."¹ The plays, she claims, "contain no ruling idea working its way out through character into action."² Of his treatment of character, she says that "it is the essay method of dealing with character." Dryden presents character by stating "trait after trait" and illustrating each trait by a fitting anecdote. Sherwood claims that this method of identifying and illustrating by anecdotal repetition is the same method that Dryden uses when he deals with passions as an attribute of character. She concludes that of the characters in the heroic plays, each is a "single trait dominated by passion. Maximin is all tyrant; Aureng-Zebe all magnanimity; Valeria is incarnate self-renunciation; Almeria is personified revenge."³ Dryden is motivated, Sherwood decides, by his desire to make a clear statement. The desire to make a clear statement is explained by defining Dryden as a public writer who wrote for particular occasions, who had a sense of public purpose intensified by his official position as poet laureate and historiographer royal. Her summary evaluation of
the heroic plays essentially denies the plays their rightful place and status as dramas. Here is what she says:

But criticism of Dryden's heroic plays is almost too easy. In strict sense they are not drama. They lack insight into the tragic forces that bring struggle to life. Without *motif* to bind the action together, they are also without the unity of clever dramatic structure ... To excuse the sensationalism found in language, theme, and structure on the ground that it appealed to the taste of the age, is not to absolve the critic and the thinker who knew better than his age what was excellent in art.\(^4\)

That studies of the heroic plays have not ventured too far beyond these limits can best be demonstrated by noting that Anne T. Barbeau, K. G. Hamilton, and George McFadden, when they write about the heroic plays, make essentially the same claims about them that Sherwood does: Barbeau about Dryden's treatment of character and Hamilton and McFadden about an evaluation of his motives for writing in the way he did.\(^5\) Barbeau asserts that Dryden was not interested in drawing characters who were in any sense "true-to-life." She says that Dryden's characters are "exemplifications of various attitudes concerning the obligations of a son to his parents," and so forth.\(^6\) She implies that what appears to be the absence of psychological realism in the characters can be explained and accounted for by recognizing them as personified ideas rather than as imitations or representations of human nature. Similarly, in trying to account for the unusual dramatic structure, Hamilton and McFadden claim that the
needs of didacticism so overshadowed the requirements of drama that the drama suffered. Sherwood's opinions have been echoed in other studies of the heroic plays that have concentrated on Dryden's use of sources, on his treatment of character, on his dramatic structure, on his ideas, or on his literary or dramatic theory in relation to his practice in the plays. While since 1967 a few works have attempted a reevaluation of the plays, seeing them as ironic or satiric, these newer works are also motivated by a desire to explain what have been described as the non-dramatic elements in the plays, or failures in the development of characterization. The few existing studies of individual heroic plays also concentrate on similar aspects of the plays: sources, treatment of character, dramatic structure, language, ideas, and the play in relation to Dryden's dramatic theory as expressed in the prefaces, prologues, dedications, and epilogues. No book length study of any of the heroic plays exists.

My reading in the works referred to so far has revealed to me that all of them approach the plays from the perspective that they are somehow outside of the dramatic tradition or as Sherwood says, "In strict sense they are not drama." There is an implicit assumption that the heroic plays fail as drama and must be explained as "mere" rhetoric or as "mere" didacticism posing as drama. This prevailing view is inadequate because it fails to take into account the use that Dryden made of rhetoric in generating and structuring his plays.

The limited view of Dryden's drama and the accumulated commentary exhibiting the absence of the rhetorical perspective is curious, as I see it, because rhetoric as a way of seeing and thinking about
literature was common until the eighteenth century. It is not that rhetoric is a new notion. Rhetoric and poetry have been intimately related. Rhetoric is a perspective from which English plays of the Renaissance have been viewed; it is a perspective from which Dryden's poetry and dramatic criticism have been viewed; but it is not a perspective from which his heroic plays have been studied. It is true that some studies deal with his use of rhetoric in prose and poetry, and some concentrate on his relation to the dramatic tradition of the Renaissance. Those dealing with his use of rhetoric in the poetry and prose focus on his use of metaphor, on his use of imagery, on the rhetorical pattern of neo-classical wit, and on his use of rhetoric in prose. But these studies concentrate on purely stylistic matters in the prose and poetry and not on rhetoric in Dryden's drama.

Similarly, some studies relate Dryden's plays to the Jacobean and Caroline dramatic tradition, as for example the works of James W. Tupper, Arthur Kirsch, Robert D. Hume, and John Harrington Smith et al.; but they too, fail to specify the use of rhetoric by Dryden. The heroic plays, like their literary predecessors, must be understood in the context of a rhetorical tradition which emphasized a peculiar treatment of character, complicated plots of antithetical or parallel design, and a disposition for "fine writing" which includes stylized verse, elaborate figurative language, and the proliferation of witty debates.

Studies focusing on the Renaissance dramatists's use of rhetoric do, of course, already exist. William G. Crane's *Wit and Rhetoric in the Renaissance* (1937), T. E. Baldwin's *William Shakespeare's Small*
Latine and Lesse Greeke (1944), Sister Miriam Joseph's Shakespeare's Use of the Arts of Language (1947), Eugene M. Waith's The Pattern of Tragicomedy in Beaumont and Fletcher (1952), Madeleine Doran's Endeavors of Art (1954), Charles Osborne McDonald's The Rhetoric of Tragedy (1966), and Marion Trousdale's Shakespeare and the Rhetoricians (1982) are examples of studies that explore the rhetorical aspects of Jacobean and Caroline drama beyond the level of images, metaphors, figurative language, or, in a word, style. Indeed, McDonald argues for a continuum of "rhetorical teaching [in schools] that influences dramatic creativity from Greece through the Renaissance" at every level of the drama including generation, structure, and the treatment of character as well as style.

None of these studies of Renaissance drama, however, included Dryden, but they point a way for us. Lillian Feder reminds us cogently that traditions as strong as rhetoric do not dry up over night; such springs continue to bubble forth. Rhetoric's relationship to poetry from antiquity until the eighteenth century was inextricably merged in theory and practice. In Dryden's England, rhetoric was still an actively bubbling-forth spring. The neglect of rhetoric as a perspective from which the plays might be analyzed is curious, therefore, in light of the closeness of the relationship between the two and of Dryden's reputation as a consummate rhetorician.

Only one study exists today that concerns itself with John Dryden's use of classical rhetoric in his heroic plays. That study is selective and identifies one rhetorical principle which occurs in virtually every heroic play of Dryden's -- scenes of argument and
persuasion. I believe that Dryden belongs in the tradition of rhetorically grounded drama, and I wish to demonstrate that Dryden's use of rhetoric in The Conquest of Granada is in the dramatic rhetorical tradition. Rhetoric informs the entire drama from the presentation and design of the characters, to the scenes involving the use of the techniques of the suasion and the controversiae, to the theme and its parallel or antithetical complement, in short to every level of dramatic design.

My study seeks to avoid the pitfalls described by Wittgenstein for philosophical investigations: dismissing as irrelevant concrete cases which could help one to understand the usage of a general term and, instead, concentrating on trying to find the common element in all of its applications. Many critics of Dryden's heroic plays have lumped them all together as if what were true of one is true of all. While that may be true in the ultimate, it behooves all who study the plays to understand all they can about each of the "concrete cases" before insisting on finding the common element or elements in them all.

The heroic plays of Dryden have been judged to lack tragic form, or to exhibit unresolved formal problems. The Conquest of Granada reveals a definite form, and shows itself to be a part of the tradition of rhetorically based drama in the tradition of Shakespeare, Marston, Webster, and Beaumont and Fletcher. Studying the play from a rhetorical perspective and from the perspective of Dryden's own definition of a play provides a clue to what Dryden's audience must have seen in the plays to make them so popular. The Conquest reveals a finely tuned artistic temperament converting the requirements of
didacticism to the complex aesthetic form of drama. The medium through which this distillation or refinement occurs is rhetoric. Dr. Johnson said that Dryden's "compositions are the effects of a vigorous genius operating upon large materials."¹⁵ This can nowhere be seen to greater effect than in The Conquest of Granada.

Dryden writes of the composing process, "wit writing," in terms that come out of the rhetorical tradition: finding the thought (dianoia or inventio), arranging the thought in the most effective way (taxis or dispositio), and dressing the thought in the most appropriate words (lexis or elocutio). The composing process is described in these terms throughout his critical prefaces. Because of the consistency with which Dryden used these terms, I have chosen to examine one of his heroic plays from the perspective of rhetorical concepts (from among those that were commonly known to sixteenth- and seventeenth century schoolboys) and to compare them in a detailed fashion to specific rhetorical techniques Dryden uses in The Conquest. It will be seen that rhetoric as taught in schools provided the drama with an already established form through which it might most sharply state its ideas, shape its characters, and manipulate them into action sequences of parallel or balanced form.

Speaking of all Restoration tragedy, Eric Rothstein writes:

Perhaps the greatest paradox of Restoration tragedy is its seeming austerity of rhetoric . . . when in fact its mimetic technique makes the play itself a willing metaphor of the world. We have the apotheosis of a rhetoric of things -- acts, feelings, situations -- rather than words, as those
parts of drama that had hitherto had a subsidiary
and expressive effect suddenly became central. 16

Perhaps nowhere are these words more appropriate than to Dryden's play
which is the subject of my enquiry, with this exception: the audience
knows of the rhetoric of things through the conversations of the
characters in the play. Each act, situation, and speech is itself an
exemplification of the ubiquitousness of rhetoric in *The Conquest of
Granada*.

In order to appreciate more fully Dryden's heroic play, it must be
studied in light of the rhetorical context of Dryden's thought.
Failure to do so results in the loss that always accompanies reductive
and convenient generalizations about the nature of the heroic play as
generic experiment, no longer of serious importance. I begin my
study, therefore, by surveying the changing attitudes toward rhetoric
and its relation to poetry in the history of western thought. In
Chapter II "The Tradition of Rhetoric and Poetry," I summarize the
changing attitudes toward rhetoric. In Chapter III, "Dryden and the
Tradition of Rhetoric and Poetry," I examine their part in shaping
Dryden's thinking about the nature of a play, and relate the product
of that thought to his definition of a play in *The Conquest of
Granada*. Dryden sees drama as rhetoric -- in the sense of
representing human nature experiencing changes of fortune, to the end
that the audience is persuaded, influenced, moved, and changed by
means of language. My study seeks to establish three points for the
modern reader: first, that a theory of classical rhetoric current in
Dryden's England and known to every schoolboy accounts in some measure
for Dryden's definition of a play; second, that the appeal of the plays for his audience can be explained by the shared expectations, growing out of the historical relationship of rhetoric to poetic and the resultant effect on schooling of the period leading up to the Restoration, that audience and author brought to the theater; and third, that elements of rhetoric are integral to the characterization, structure, and design of *The Conquest of Granada*.

Rhetoric accounts for certain peculiar differences between Dryden's concept of the heroic play and modern, neo-Aristotelian, or post-romantic expectations of what a play should be or do. In Chapter IV, "Inventio and the characterization in *The Conquest of Granada*," I describe Dryden's use of the commonplaces of *inventio* in ethopoesis. Dryden's treatment of character as it is described herein conforms to his definition of a play as a "just and lively image of human nature, representing its passions and humours, and the changes of fortune to which it is subject, for the delight and instruction of mankind" and to his definition of a play as the representation of the "conversations of several persons." Dryden develops his characters by a dramatic rendering of the two sides (parallel or antithetical) that are possible in the presentation of any commonplace or common topic, and the variety of comparisons with other characters helps each character to emerge more clearly than either could have without the explicit or implicit comparisons, as a just and lively image of human nature. This chapter identifies several rhetorical concepts that lend themselves to dramatic adaptation and which have been identified by Dryden as parts of the composing process. By contrast, neglect of the
rhetorical perspective and of Dryden's own definition of a play result in the inadequate and incomplete descriptions of its characters and design.

In Chapter V, "Dispositio and the Design of The Conquest of Granada," I analyze and exemplify the structure and design of the play. My study of The Conquest of Granada attempts to follow Dr. Johnson's advice that "to judge rightly of an author, we must transport ourselves to his time, and examine what were the wants of his contemporaries, and what were his means of supplying them. That which is easy at one time was difficult at another." Dr. Johnson goes on to say in this passage that "Dryden at least imported his science and gave his country what it wanted before; or rather, he imported only the materials, and manufactured them by his own skill."17 This chapter illustrates Dryden's considerable skill in adapting techniques of suasoriae and controversiae in scenes of argument and persuasion. It shows how the rhetorical figures of testimony provide the basis for the design of the play. But what this chapter demonstrates most conclusively is that rhetoric serves as a kind of poetic for the drama. Principles of classical rhetoric contribute to the richness and power of the presentation of character, the balance of the structure, and the intricacy of the design.

Of course, any study which isolates one facet of a play ignores other important and compelling facets -- in this case, the exigencies of theatrical representation and a detailed study of elocutio. With some misgivings, I have omitted elocutio. One reason for this omission is that stylistic analysis contributes least to the understanding of
this play. For another, the study of the design and the
categorization are of significantly greater interest to
understanding the use of rhetoric than is *elocutio*. For a third,
compelling reason, is that Irvin Ehrenpreis has already studied
important aspects of *elocutio* in *The Conquest of Granada*. Moreover,
students, who are the most likely readers of this essay, will already
be familiar with the techniques of stylistic analysis, and with the
elements of style. They are less likely to be familiar with the
concepts of *inventio* and *dispositio* as they relate to the study of
literary works of the seventeenth century and earlier. Rhetoric is,
even today, most closely associated with style. More important to
Dryden's play than style, however, is the study of rhetoric as a
generating and structuring device. *Inventio* is a rhetorical means of
generating matter for the play, and *dispositio* incorporates the means
of structuring the events within the play. The neglect of the study
of Dryden's use of rhetoric in the heroic plays may account in part
for their current status as unsuccessful experimental dramas, or as
escapist drama outside, somehow, of the mainstream of English literary
or theatrical history. John Dryden's knowledge of classical
rhetoric and his use of it in his poetry and prose have been widely
studied. The curious omission of rhetorical analyses of Dryden's
heroic plays is astonishing.

In summary, my goal is to provide a corrective to this omission by
showing the intimate relationship existing between rhetoric and poetry
from antiquity to the eighteenth century in Chapter II and the effect
of that relationship on Dryden's theory of drama in Chapter III. In
Chapter IV I will define *inventio*, one comprehensive rhetorical concept, show its widespread use in composition theory, and describe Dryden's use of its in his treatment of character in *The Conquest of Granada*. In Chapter V, I will define *dispositio*, show its acceptance and use in discourse and composition theory, and show how Dryden used it along with two other rhetorical techniques — *suasoriae* and *controversiae* and the figures of testimony — to structure the same play. My conclusions about the effect of Dryden's use of rhetoric are presented in Chapter VI.
Chapter II. The Tradition of Rhetoric and Poetry

In his article "Poetry as Instrument," Oscar G. Brockett discusses poetry as an instrument for affecting audiences and comments that it is at the point of communication of poet with audience that poetry and rhetoric overlap. \(^1\) Roger Hornsby argues that "rhetoric and poetic makes a false dichotomy . . . art is moral and has a connection with the world of men." \(^2\) Hornsby insists that rhetoric is not an added dimension to literature; "it is the means of organizing the work; it is the basis for the "poetics" of the work. It is the means the author used to create his work, and it is also the means whereby he wants us to understand it." These comments by modern scholars on the relation of rhetoric and poetic reveal a renewed interest in the old question of the relationship between rhetoric and poetry. Modern readers face great difficulty in understanding works of literature of the seventeenth century and earlier because they lack sympathy with and understanding of the rhetorical tradition. C. S. Lewis comments on this difficulty with regard to rhetoric and poetic in his history of sixteenth-century English literature:

While Tudor education differed by its humanism from that of the Middle Ages, it differed far more widely from ours. Law and rhetoric were the chief sources of the difference. . . . In rhetoric more
than in anything else, the continuity of the old European tradition was embodied. Older than Church, older than Roman Law, older than all Roman literature, it descends from the age of the Greek Sophists. Like Church and the law, it survives the fall of empire, rides the renaissance and the reformation like waves, and penetrates far into the eighteenth century. . . . Nearly all of our older poetry was written and read by men to whom the distinction between poetry and rhetoric, in its modern form, would have been meaningless. The "beauties" which they chiefly regarded in every composition were those which we either dislike or simply do not notice. This change of taste makes an invisible wall between us and them. . . . We must reconcile ourselves to the fact that of the praise and censure which we allot to Medieval and Elizabethan poets only the smallest part would have seemed relevant to those poets themselves. 3

Lewis' comments are equally true for the seventeenth century. John Dryden shares with his time the assumption that rhetoric is one of the tools that artists can use to assist in the creation of their works. He assumes that art has moral purpose, that it has an audience, that the work itself is an instrument of communication by which the poet can instruct, delight, and instruct while he delights the audience.

It is unfortunate that the familiar "docere and delectare and movere" seems trivial and unimportant today. As Hornsby clarifies the ideas combined in this concept, however, docere means fundamentally to know, and to show, as well as to inform. By combining the meaning of the ability to delight or to give pleasure and the meaning of the
ability to move or to transport the audience, this noble concept joins the motives of both poetry and rhetoric. The failure to give full connotative value to the concept has the effect of reducing the phrase in which it is most often embodied to a cliché which falsifies the perceptions of the ancient and renaissance worlds. Dryden was not deceived.

In *A Defense of an Essay of Dramatic Poetry* Dryden writes:

'Tis true that to imitate well is a poet's work; but to affect the soul, and excite the passions, and above all to move to admiration (which is the delight of plays), a bare imitation will not serve.

The title of the essay reminds the reader that it is poetry about which Dryden is concerned, and the passage reflects the joining of two ideas about poetry: poetry as imitation and poetry as rhetoric in the sense that the poem seeks to affect its audience in specifically didactic ways. These two ideas have often been seen as separate by modern scholars. W. B. Yeats' famous question, "What is rhetoric but the will trying to do the work of the imagination?" captures the essential denigration of rhetoric at the expense of the imperfectly understood creative aspects of poetry -- often called inspiration and usually intended to connote an unbidden impulse to expression. In the ancient and Renaissance worlds, however, poetic imitation was seen as a means of achieving certain desirable effects in an audience. Sir Philip Sidney declared in fairly typical fashion, "Poetry . . . is an art of imitation . . . a speaking picture: with this end, to teach and delight." This view derives from the ancients who perceived
rhetoric as having three or four distinct aims or ends: to move, to teach, to debate, and to defend. Aristotle proposed these ends; Cicero speaks in behalf of their achievement; Quintilian demonstrates the method by which they can be accomplished. M. T. Herrick states rightly that the differences between rhetoric and poetry as argued by modern scholars are usually little more than disagreements between critics whereas in actuality the relationship between rhetoric and poetry has been almost inextricably intertwined. Herrick also observes that to cite persuasion as the critical difference between rhetoric and poetry is to suggest a "significant difference" between them, but is not to identify the decisive difference. Ancient rhetors saw the distinction between rhetoric and poetry as "two habits of conceiving and ordering, two typical movements: [in rhetoric] primarily intellectual, a progress from idea to idea determined logically; [in poetry] primarily imaginative, a progress from image to image, determined emotionally. The distinction between rhetoric and poetry is more fundamental than that of so called literary forms. A brief account of the significant train of thought in the development of the idea of rhetoric suggests certain major ideas which led eventually to a view of poetry as an instrument of communication, of instruction, of amusement, or delight, which employs rhetoric as a kind of poetic of the work of art.

Aristotle's basic distinction between poetry and rhetoric is whether the work is mimetic or nonmimetic: poetry is mimetic and rhetoric is nonmimetic. Mimesis was the most important fundamental difference between a poem and an oration. According to Bernard
Weinberg, for example, the Aristotelian distinction between rhetoric and poetry is best described as the difference between the persuasive and the aesthetic, the actual and the hypothetical, or the internal characteristics dictated by the demands of the specific occasion and the internal characteristics dictated by the author's resolve to achieve perfection. He observes that Aristotle's *Poetics* concentrates on those qualities of the work of art which make it beautiful and "productive of its proper effect"; that "Aristotle is at no time neglectful either of the audience in whom this proper effect is produced or of the reality which is represented in the artificial work of art"; that his aim, however, "is neither to analyze audiences nor to study nature," but "to discover how a poem produced by imitation and representing some aspect of a natural object -- its form -- in the artificial medium of poetry, may so achieve perfection of that form in the medium that the desired aesthetic effect will result."¹¹

Weinberg explicitly denies a rhetorical aspect to Aristotle's *Poetics* when he writes: "statements about the 'effect' of which I have spoken may be made either in terms of the kind of reaction within an audience or of the structural particularities within the work which produce the reaction. In either case, the audience is considered in a general way; it is a general and universal audience, never particularized through race, time, place, class, or personal idiosyncracies. It is composed of men sharing the common feelings and experiences of all mankind, having the common convictions that actions spring from character and that events spring from causes, susceptible of enjoying the pleasures afforded by the imitative arts, and capable through
their sensitivity and their habits of reading and distinguishing good
works from bad. Otherwise it has no distinctive qualities as an
audience. Hence the position in the Poetics is not a rhetorical one,
because nowhere is the poem made to be what is it in order to have a
particular effect of persuasion upon a particular audience; moreover,
nowhere does the 'character' of the poet enter as a structural element
in the poem."\textsuperscript{12}

Weinberg asserts the absence of a rhetorical dimension in the
Poetics. What he writes about the effects of poetry on the audience
it reaches, the structural particularities which bring the audience
and the effects into conjunction, agrees exactly with what he asserts
about the rhetorical dimension of Horace's Ars Poetica. That work,
according to Weinberg, "regards poems in the context of the society
for which they are written. It considers above all the dramatic
forms, in relation both to nature and to their capacity to please and
to instruct an audience of a given kind that would see them in a given
age under given circumstances. What goes into the making of any poem
will be determined in large part by the expectations, the requirements,
the tastes of this particular audience."\textsuperscript{13}

Wilbur Samuel Howells dissents from the point of view expressed by
Weinberg and offers an opposing one. He argues that Weinberg's
position or, more accurately his interpretation, of Aristotle's
Poetics and Horace's Ars Poetica is inaccurate. Howells claims that
although Weinberg's thesis is promising and comprehensive, to follow
it would lead to some abberations. Howells thinks that "Weinberg's
interpretation of Aristotle and Horace . . . plainly indicates that
any given work of literature, regardless of the convention which would classify it in advance as a poem, or play, or a novel, or an oration, or a philosophical dialogue, or a history, or a treatise on science or art, is to be regarded as a member of the family of rhetorical or the family of poetical compositions, not by deciding where it would be by tradition, but by deciding whether it conforms to the rhetorical thesis of Horace or the poetical thesis of Aristotle. Under this interpretation, that is to say, orations would sometimes be classified as specimens of rhetoric and sometimes as specimens of poetry, the difference being that in one case they would have been designed to have structural particularities to make them capable of persuading a given audience and in the other case to have structural particularities to make them capable of giving esthetic delight to mankind. The same rule would apply to tragedy . . . Aristotle . . . saw the poetic principle as something which on the one hand, would never be present as the controlling influence in an oration, even if the orator sought only for perfection of internal form as he composed it, whereas, on the other hand, the poetic principle would always be present in any kind of poem, even if the poet sought to write it only in terms of the expectations, requirements, and tastes of his own era."¹⁴

The controversy over what constitutes rhetoric and what constitutes poetic continues in the present day. Some other more brief distinctions have had the ring of slogan about them. Hoyt Hudson sums them up in the following ways: "rhetoric states, poetry suggests; rhetoric is heard, poetry is overheard; pleasure is the
effect of poetry, persuasion is the effect of rhetoric."  

Following statements in which C. F. Johnson observes that the pleasure we take in poetry rarely rests "on the conscious perception of technical skill, but usually on an unconscious perception of order," Hudson attempts to explain our perception of rhetorical order and poetic order by placing discourse on a scale ranging from poetry to rhetoric. The discourse most free from rhetoric or most purely expressive and concerned with impression are lyric and rhapsodic poems, idylls, pastorals, narrative poetry -- including the romance and the epic, dramatic poetry, didactic poetry, satire, odes for special occasions, and epigrams, in that order. So that when we arrive at epigrams, we are firmly in the camp of rhetoric. Modern tastes incline to the view implied and expressed by this scale, that the personal lyric, being the least rhetorical, is the highest form of poetry and epigrams, being the most objective, audience directed, the most rhetorical, "low" verse.

Hudson recognizes that there is some "rhetorical necessity" in every poem and that rhetoric may "heighten" rather than degrade a composition. Just or proper proportion, then, determines whether the work is poetry (like Lycidas) or rhetoric (like Adonais). Some works are apparently unclassifiable (like Thyrsis) because they suffer from improper proportion of rhetoric and poetry. Other examples of works that are difficult to classify are "pieces written with a persuasive end, though claiming the style of imitative literature." Examples of this type are George Bernard Shaw, a preacher/rhetor, a "writer of comedies and clever in the use of . . . imitative rhetoric," and John
Bunyan, a preacher/rhetor whose work moves "into the realm of poetry even though its intent was persuasion." I wonder that Dryden is not included in this category -- either of these categories -- because so many moderns would, by these criteria, include him.

Hudson's use of a scale, a continuum upon which to display discourse, is hardly more than a means of expressing personal preference in evaluating writers. Depending upon literary fashion, any writer's position on such a scale would vary with different critics and perhaps with the same critic at different times based upon his or her scope of information and knowledge, intellectual development, or critical perspective based on literary fashion. The value of Hudson's attempt to distinguish between "pure" rhetoric and "pure" poetry is its revelation that a "pure" specimen of either kind is rare. Moreover, Hudson argues that poetry in some of its more usual forms is strongly influenced by rhetorical concerns and, therefore, "tinged" with rhetorical elements. Hudson recommends that literary critics and interpreters learn the knowledge of the devices for getting and holding audience attention and for manipulating audience response and reaction, the better to distinguish between poetry and rhetoric.

Hudson asserts further that all poetry employs but subordinates the arts of logic, rhetoric, and grammar. Logic, rhetoric, and grammar are fused and functioning simultaneously in dramatic poetry, which not only imitates human nature, or men in action, but also relies on the speeches of its characters to produce desired effects of persuasion or transport (in the sense of the writer of On the Sublime),
or both. This kind of speech is at once persuasive and imitative, communication and imitation, addressed both to audience and other players, combining all, fusing all the language arts.

No survey of the relation of rhetoric to poetry would be complete without the energy and enlightenment of the works of C. S. Baldwin. He states that the real difference between ancient and modern attempts to separate rhetoric from poetic is the failure of moderns to distinguish between the art of composing and the product that derives from the process of composition. In the ancient world, explains Baldwin (as we have already seen in another context), "rhetoric and poetic connoted fields of composition, two habits of conceiving and ordering, two typical movements. The movement of the one [rhetoric] the ancients saw as primarily intellectual, a progress from idea to idea determined logically; that of the other, as primarily imaginative, a progress from image to image determined emotionally. This distinction is more fundamental than that of so-called literary forms . . . It is a difference of conceiving, ordering, uttering." Baldwin's distinction immediately reminds one of Dryden's similar distinction between "wit writing" and "wit written." Baldwin makes a crucial distinction and is more clear about his reasons for doing so than is Hudson, who readily admits a "rhetorical element in poetry," but relegates rhetoric to second place and does not perceive the differences that Baldwin and Dryden make when they separate the composing process from the composed product. Aristotle makes the same distinction when he speaks of rhetoric as dynamis, a power, or a faculty or facility for, and poetry as an artifact or
productive art. Rhetoric is a means of achieving and poetry is the thing achieved. Aristotle's *Poetics*, as we have it, does not include a dynamis for poetry, and that may be either because he assumed the same dynamis for both rhetoric and poetry, or, his treatise on poetics is lost to us, or his treatise is incomplete, dealing only with the drama and the epic as far as their constitutive parts are concerned and with their dynamis only and not all other forms.

"That Aristotle's survey of human expression included Poetic as well as a Rhetoric is our chief witness to a division oftener implied in ancient criticism than stated explicitly," writes Baldwin. Baldwin's distinction between the art of moving men of affairs and "sharpening and expanding their vision" is the same or similar distinction being made by many modern scholars, except that he is specific as to the means of identifying that difference in the composing process rather than in the product itself. For in the composing process it is possible to see differences of movement based on the ends desired; in the product, we can only observe ends achieved. Here is Baldwin's summary of the relation of rhetoric to poetic:

. . . One is composition of ideas; the other, composition of images. In the one field life is discussed; in the other it is presented. The type of the one is a public address, moving us to assent and action; the type of the other is a play, showing us in action moving to an end of character. The one argues and urges; the other represents. Though both appeal to the imagination, the method of one is logical; the method of poetic,
as well as its detail, is imaginative. To put the contrast with broad simplicity, a speech moves by paragraphs; a play moves by scenes. A paragraph is a logical stage in a process of ideas; a scene is an emotional stage in a progress controlled by imagination. Both rhetoric and poetic inculcate the art of progress; but the progress of poetic is distinct in kind. Its larger shaping is not controlled by consideration of inventio and dispositio, nor its detail by the cadence of the period. In great part it has its own technic... To set forth the whole technic, the principles of imaginative composition, in a single survey is the object of Aristotle's Poetics.¹⁹

Now what happens in the Poetics is that the first section moves from a definition of poetic in general to the mode of drama (chapters i-v). The second section discusses plot as the mainspring of tragedy (chapters vi-xviii). The third section defines epic and compares it with tragedy (chapters xxiii-xxvi).²⁰

In the second book we learn that tragedy is an imitation of an action which is serious, determinate, in language enhanced by rhythm, melody, and song, by action rather than narrative, whose end is emotional catharsis. Moreover, tragedy is primarily plot, the subsidiary elements of which are character, diction, thought, spectacle (including make-up), and song. Later on in this section we learn that thought (dianoia) and diction are the rhetorical elements (chapter xix). In as much as characters are presented through speech and not through narration, diction, an element of rhetoric, is the primary means of presenting character, one of the primary elements of plot as...
well as the means of presenting the thought or dianoia of the plot. Once again, almost at the very source of our ideas about poetry and its relation to rhetoric, it becomes clear that rhetoric and poetry are interwined in such a way that rhetoric is, as Hornsby observed, the basis for the poetics of a work. Rhetoric is the dynamis or faculty of showing the progress of the work in composition.

W. B. Yeats' question, mentioned above, "What is rhetoric but the will trying to do the work of the imagination?" expresses most clearly modern assumptions about the mystical power of poetry to come only as a result of inspiration and not at the behest of the would-be poet. Aristotle has not given us a complete poetic because even he has not provided an explanation for why some works achieve an undefinable quality which romantics choose to call poetry and why other works remain at the level of what those same romantics choose to call rhetoric. Perhaps the unknown author of On the Sublime provides a clue to the distinction when he writes "a figure seems best when it is not noticed as a figure." A more familiar expression of the same idea is that when the technique is concealed the product is art, when revealed, rhetoric. Brockett also says that "we tend to label plays propagandistic or didactic only if the emotional and intellectual purposes have not been adequately assimilated into the aesthetic powers." Whether or not the techniques of art are revealed or concealed is a matter of literary fashion. In Dryden's England, display of technique was not negatively valued. Lewis reminds us cogently that the 'beauties' of many works of the seventeenth century and earlier are lost to us because we lack
sympathy with and appreciation for the rhetorical tradition.

The distinctions between rhetoric and poetry, as we have seen, are usually expressed in some fashion similar to that of John Stuart Mill, who said that rhetoric is heard; poetry is overheard. Baldwin sums up the perceived differences by asserting that rhetoric is said to instruct and to move men of affairs, to be a composition of ideas, to discuss, to argue and urge, and to proceed on the basis of paragraphs. Poetry is said, by contrast, to "sharpen the audience's vision," to be composition of images, to represent life, to be a play, to be imaginative, to move by scenes. Both are said to appeal to the imagination, and to progress, one by paragraphs as a logical stage in the progress of an idea controlled by the intellect, the other by scenes, an emotional stage in the progress of an idea controlled by emotions. But so far all have failed to specify exactly what the poetic of poetry is.

Aristotle relegates thought (dianoia) to rhetoric in his Poetics. He thereby avoids showing the process by which thought operates in a poem. Diction is also an element of rhetoric. The question is how do these two elements, thought and diction, work in poetic discourse so as to distinguish it from rhetorical discourse? In tragedy where there is no narration, the words of the characters in a play, though last in the order of parts, are first in the eyes and ears of the spectators; for it is only through the speech of the characters that the idea of the play gets itself articulated. In this instance, the "will" must do the work of the imagination because it is only through the voluntary, judicious act of will in the poet that the imagination
is formed, expressed, and presented. The rhetoric of poetry is essentially that; rhetoric provides the power or the facility for shaping, expressing, and presenting the work of the imagination.

Other modern critics besides Brockett and Hornsby have attested to this use of rhetoric even in modern works. I. A. Richards has hypothesized that there is a continuum, a scale of discourse which ranges from scientific to poetic, with the referent on the left side of the scale to empirically verifiable fact and the referent on the right side to the imagination. In this scheme rhetoric is a separate 'technê' or art spanning the entire scale. Rhetoric is not a stepchild in Richards' system as it is in Hudson's. Rhetoric is the dynamic in the act of communication. Kenneth Burke states frankly that "effective literature could be nothing else but rhetoric." Burke explains the downgrading of rhetoric in the following manner: "As artists no longer wished to produce the kinds of effects which the devices of rhetoricians were designed to produce, they overshot the mark -- [began] to turn against rhetoric in toto. Thus, since the rhetorical procedure had become identified as the art of appeal, the artist who chose to appeal in other ways felt that he had given up any attempt to appeal at all. This led, above all, to a denigration of form (formal devices being a major portion of the rhetorician's lore); and the one factor in keeping such denigration of form from doing great damage was the artist's tendency to preserve many more aspects of form than he was aware of." Use of the concept of rhetoric as "explicit recognition of the relations between audience and work" is significant in Wayne Booth. He focuses sharply on the inner
workings of fiction and "frankly and explicitly [studies] the art of communicating with readers, of imposing a fictional world upon readers, of controlling the responses of readers." In all of these works by Richards, Burke, and Booth, the term rhetoric is permitted to imply functional techniques, strategies for reaching audiences, for achieving certain effects, for investigating the structure of the poem, and for finding out how the poem works. In this world, rhetoric does not decorate the thought, is not a secondary consideration of style; it is an incarnation of the thought and an expression of the idea the poem seeks to present.

Richards, Burke, Booth, Brockett, Hornsby, and Bryant are among the modern scholar/critics who see rhetoric in this light. In the Renaissance and Restoration, however, their ideas were common. Most writers in those early periods perceived poetry as having a rhetorical dimension. The works of Cicero were a major factor in setting the tastes of the period, and he certainly taught that rhetoric was needed by everyone who wished to say something well, and he included poets, scientists, architects, and others in the statement: "Your natural science itself, your mathematics, and other studies which just now you reckoned as belonging peculiarly to the rest of the arts, do indeed pertain to the knowledge of their professors, yet if anyone should wish by speaking to put these same arts in their full light, it is to oratorical skill that he must run for help." Scaliger, the foremost critic of the Renaissance, saw a fruitful distinction between poetry and rhetoric as had Aristotle; poetry was mimetic and rhetoric was persuasive. But even Scaliger maintained in his Poetics that
philosophy and poetry have persuasion as their ends in the same way as oratory. Scaliger believed with most critics that poetry should be didactic and this didacticism is usually regarded as identical with persuasion. Scaliger reasoned that the main difference between rhetoric and poetry was that poetry used meter and was written in verse and rhetoric did not and was not.

In his *The Two Harmonies*, K. G. Hamilton shows that the seventeenth century "inherited a tradition in which poetry was closely associated with, if not wholly dominated by, considerations that were essentially rhetorical. Then, either as a result or a cause of this association, poetry was seen as having a didactic moral purpose which in its turn focused the attention of the critics ultimately on the poet's audience, rather than on the poet himself or his poem. Thirdly, because rhetoric is primarily a matter of an effective style, so discussion of poetry tended to revolve around style; which, however, at its highest level . . . could encompass a doctrine which sees 'poetic ornament' as giving the very life and truth to the subject matter of poetry."  

If it is true that the aim of poetry is to delight and the aim of rhetoric to persuade or instruct, then Dryden's desire to imitate well and to affect the soul in the nature of a poet, and to move to admiration, in the nature of a rhetor, combines the work of the poet and the work of a rhetor. Ancient and Renaissance rhetoric held that it was the aim of rhetoric to effect persuasion and there was wide agreement that this end was best served or achieved by informing, winning, and moving the audience. Frank Huntley has pointed out that
all of Dryden's dramatic criticism should be interpreted as a consistent exploration of how dramatic poetry can best fulfill its rhetorical function. Huntley argues persuasively that, although Dryden often alludes to Aristotle, Horace and Quintilian are his true masters; and drama as rhetoric, in the sense of persuading, influencing, or moving a particular audience by means of language, is his main concern. Dryden's later essays on dramatic subjects amplify the definition which he thus worked out at the very beginning of his career.

Dryden's first major act, according to Huntley, was to define "a play" in the Essay in very general terms. Later, Dryden develops specific definitions for comedy, heroic drama, and tragedy. He begins with 'human nature' as something to be presented in dramatic form. The poet invents plot (changes of fortune) and characters (passions and humours) which he disposes in his plays; then he expresses these in a style (elocutio). The parts of a play, whatever the genre, are usually divided between 'contrivance' and 'writing.' 'Fancy' and 'judgment' in varying measures are demanded of the poet. Huntley believes that the emphasis on genre derives from rhetorical considerations, providing the occasion or the purpose of the author in producing an effect upon the audience. The audience can expect to be instructed or delighted as it is appropriate for comedy, the heroic plays, or tragedy.

Huntley believes that the Essay of Dramatic Poesy is best understood as an indication of Dryden's conviction that the drama is a kind of rhetoric and locates the center of Dryden's critical theory
in rhetoric. Dryden's definition of a play as a "just and lively image of human nature, representing its passions and its humours, and the changes of fortune to which it is subject, for the delight and instruction of mankind," implies that a play should affect, excite, and move the audience. The justness or accuracy and the liveliness or that part which gives delight are the result of artistry. Poetry is served by rhetoric because rhetoric provides the means by which that artistry is achieved by men of natural gifts. Rhetoric, as Hornsby states, is the basis of the poetics of a work whose purpose is communicative rather than merely expressive or simply esthetic.

It is necessary at this point, after this discussion of the relation of poetry to rhetoric, to stipulate a definition for rhetoric in this essay, and in so doing to survey briefly the changes of fortune to which the word and the concept of rhetoric have been subject. At the same time, it will be seen that the idea of rhetoric, its philosophy and techniques have been as pervasive as Lewis' comments (quoted above) indicate.

There are, of course, many ways to define rhetoric. It may be defined as one of the language arts, or as a theory of discourse, or as a form of verbal communication, oral or written, having a definite set of technical elements which are used by speakers, writers, or actors, in specific ways, for specific purposes of persuasion or action, directed towards specific audiences of auditors, spectators,
or readers. Bernard Weinberg has shown that the definition of rhetoric has changed from century to century as the idea of rhetoric has expanded to cover the whole of the art or contracted to cover only a part of it. Generally, the idea of rhetoric has contracted or expanded in response to political climates or to intellectual fashion. The definition of rhetoric has moved from "considerations of language, to the arguments or the passions expressed by language, to the effects produced by rhetorical compositions, to the relationships between such compositions and abstract concepts ('truth' or 'justice'); then back to language again.

George Kennedy makes a useful distinction between the art of persuasion itself and the technical apparatus clustering around art forms or discourse when those techniques are not being used for their primary oral purpose. Kennedy calls rhetoric-as-philosophy primary rhetoric and rhetoric-as-technique secondary rhetoric. This distinction between primary and secondary rhetoric is useful in looking at the history of the term whose meaning has changed from time to time. Sometimes primary rhetoric has been expanded, sometimes contracted. Secondary rhetoric, too, has been emphasized or deemphasized according to the current critical fashion.

The expansion/contraction phenomenon begins with Aristotle. Aristotle saw rhetoric basically as proofs and arguments useful in rhetorical situations. He defined rhetoric as "the faculty of discovering the available means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatsoever." Aristotle identifies three kinds of rhetorical proofs: first, emotional or pathetic proofs which consist of those
parts of the speech that are designed to affect a specific audience; second, ethical proofs, designed to present to that audience the apparent moral character of the speaker [this is not necessarily to be understood as the speaker's "true" character, but his "rhetorical" character]; and third, the logical proofs, which are the means of making the argument itself, stated in forms appropriate to the audience: the enthymeme, a shortened syllogism — a kind of rhetorical deduction — which omits a premise, and the example, a kind of rhetorical induction, or means of producing the universal from the particular case. Rhetoric is not, for Aristotle, a language art in the same way that it was to become for later rhetors. Aristotle emphasized the importance of style, for he believed that the orator must not only know what to say, but that he should have the eloquence to say it effectively; but his main idea of rhetoric is one of proofs and arguments.

After Aristotle, rhetoric's utility was limited to pleading in law courts. In this scheme of affairs, rhetoric was contracted from the broad view of Aristotle to a fairly narrow concentration on manuals of technique for logical argument, for arrangement of the parts of a speech, and for style. These manuals distinguished three kinds of speeches: epideictic, deliberative, and forensic. Manuals of this type divide rhetoric into five faculties: inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, and pronunciatio. Under inventio, the orator lists the 28 commonplaces. Under dispositio the orator lists the quantitative parts of a speech in their proper order: the exordium, the narration, the division, the proof and refutation, and the
conclusion. The third faculty, elocutio, or style, provides the framework for the treatment of the three styles: the grand, the middle, and the simple (and their cognate defective styles), and of the figures of thought and of diction, described in great detail. The Rhetorica Ad Herennium and Cicero's De Inventione follow this format and cover essentially the same parts.

Cicero's Topica summarizes the sources of arguments or topics (in other times and places called commonplaces) as "definition, partition, etymology, conjugates, genus, species, similarity, difference, contraries, adjuncts, consequents, antecedents, contradictions, causes, effects, and comparisons of things greater, less, and equal." Cicero's De Oratore breaks away from this narrow legalistic rhetoric and concentrates upon the technicalities of structure and argument. It expresses a theory of rhetoric that is broadly based historically and philosophically. It presents the rhetor as a man of great natural talents and gifts, of good character, who is soundly educated in all areas of philosophy, science, and language. Issues and topics, kinds of speeches and the arrangement of the parts of a speech are less important than the genius, the knowledge, and the character of the orator. With this shift of focus from the technical aspects to the user of the arts, Cicero anticipates Quintilian's later adaptation of this emphasis on the good man who speaks eloquently.

Quintilian completes the shift from concentration upon technique to a concentration on the user of techniques by a man of good character. Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria has as its center of attention the total rhetor, the complete orator. The Institutio aims
to educate the complete orator who will be a "good man" who is eloquent. The good man should be educated in philosophy, ethics, and politics. He should not be narrow in his education, nor should his education be "for a specific situation only." Rather the education of the orator should be universal. The orator should become a master of all the technical rhetoric which Quintilian introduces in his *Institutio* and then examines, expands, and reduces to precepts.

Quintilian sees the Aristotelian definition of rhetoric as too limited and too concentrated on *inventio*. Cicero's definition depends too heavily on the end or purpose of persuasion.\(^{38}\) It is true that other things can be persuasive; the orator himself, for example, as well as money, power, rank, authority, sex, all have the power to persuade effectively without words. In his work, therefore, Quintilian does not pay too much attention to audience as Aristotle and Cicero do; instead, he gives more attention to the construction of arguments, and he gives the most attention to the morals of the orator. Rhetoric can be, after all, an art, a science, a virtue, a power, or a perversion of any of these; a bad man can be as persuasive as a good one.\(^{39}\) Quintilian believes that the ultimate in persuasion is in the ethos of the orator and it is through the efforts of a good man speaking eloquently that the end of argument — persuading the audience — will be achieved. He gives the aim of rhetoric as the ability to think and to speak rightly.\(^{40}\)

During the Middle Ages (by which I intend to designate roughly the fourth through the fourteenth centuries), those functions of public oratory — the forum, the law courts, and the open letter — ceased to
exist. At the end of the Roman Empire, public oratory either no longer existed or was so transformed that the art of rhetoric had to be redefined. Many of the rhetorical treatises were lost and were not rediscovered until the Renaissance. Some parts of the *Institutio Oratoria* and Cicero's *De Invenzione* were retained, but none of the *De Oratore* was; and the ubiquitous *Rhetoricae Ad Herennium*, erroneously attributed to Cicero and owing at least some of its popularity to that illustrious name, was retained. Those rhetorics emphasized the technical aspects of the art of rhetoric. Nevertheless, rhetoric as a way of thinking and writing came to pervade all intellectual pursuits of the Middle Ages.

Rhetoric gave to all intellectual pursuits their basic forms and orientations. Rhetoric became not so much a distinct art but rather an approach to the intellectual disciplines that was almost universal in its application. Weinberg describes this expansion of rhetoric in the following manner:

In the domain of civil philosophy, the Ciceronian distinction of deliberative, demonstrative, and judicial oratory provided the basis for speaking on all matters pertinent to civil affairs. Theologians discovered in rhetoric the devices for interpreting theological writings: the recognition of four possible 'senses' of a work (literal, allegorical, moral, and anagogic) resulted from a transposition into the spiritual domain of interpretative techniques developed for mundane works. The Augustinians thus made of rhetoric an instrument of theology. As a part of logic, largely in the Aristotelian tradition,
rhetoric took on the function of treating 'probable' (as opposed to 'necessary') matters, producing for those matters the kinds of proofs of which it was especially capable. It could therefore accompany logic and dialectic as instruments for the various branches of rational philosophy. In its own right, narrowly reduced to a simple art of words, rhetoric pursued its inquiry into questions of style, the figures, and the general concerns on 'eloquence.' It was regarded as a form of discourse using special kinds of language and achieving distinct kinds of persuasion.

The importance and scope of rhetoric in the Middle Ages has been summarized in the following manner by Richard McKeon:

In application, the art of rhetoric contributed . . . not only to the method of speaking and writing well, of composing letters and petitions, sermons, and prayers, legal documents and briefs, poetry and prose, but to the canons of interpreting law and scripture, to the dialectical devices of discovery and proof, to the establishment of the scholastic method which was to come into universal use in philosophy and theology, and finally, to the formulation of scientific inquiry which was to separate philosophy from theology. In manner of application, the art of rhetoric was the source both of doctrines which have long since become the property of other sciences . . . and of particular devices which have been applied to a variety of subjects . . . .

From these two passages by Weinberg and McKeon it is obvious that rhetoric became much more than a language art or even a theory of
discourse. Rhetoric became, in the Middle Ages, a way of seeing the world, a way of ordering experience. Rhetoric was not only universal in its application; it was universal in its influence since all educated men in western culture conversed in a common language on matters of church, state, or education, regardless of nation or geography, using principles established by or growing out of rhetoric.

Sister Joan Marie Lechner shows that the pervasiveness of rhetoric extended into the Renaissance and the Restoration. She demonstrates that rhetoric was the elementary basis for all instruction in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English schools regardless of the particular arts or sciences followed. All of the standard surveys of the influence of classical rhetoric during these periods give evidence of the continued dominance of rhetoric in the Renaissance and Restoration schools.43

Peter Ramus attacked Quintilian's theory of rhetoric as an overexpansion of the idea of rhetoric and proposed in his day to limit rhetoric to elocutio and pronunciatio, thereby placing inventio, dispositio, and memoria into the category of dialectic or logic. Ramus did not totally succeed in his Rhetoricae Distinctiones in Quintilianum (1559) in discrediting Quintilian in his own time, but his scheme for reorganizing and categorizing all knowledge based on theories he had learned from rhetoric still has some adherents in today's world. Specifically, the commonplaces or topics were used by schoolboys to form commonplace books, those encyclopedic compendia of information arranged in systematic patterns producing a "circle" of learning when arranged according to the "Ramist method."
Theoretically, a commonplace collection arranged in this method would have each heading or topic divided and subdivided until "all that could be known about that subject seemed to be included in that circle." The recent edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* has used this scheme to arrange the information included therein in a "great circle of learning." Although Ramus had many important followers in his day (as, indeed, he does in our own), he did not succeed totally in restricting the parts of rhetoric, *inventio* and *dispositio*, to logic or dialectic. In the seventeenth century, literary critics and poets seemed interested in developing catholic attitudes towards the various arts in an attempt to unify them, rather than following the Ramist tendency toward compartmentalization.

Weinberg shows how the French writer, Rene Rapin, a great favorite of Dryden's, because Dryden regarded him as an interpreter of Longinus, extended *elocutio* to all forms of expression in poetry, history, and philosophy, as well as oratory. Rapin saw *elocutio* (the current name which was the equivalent of rhetoric) in all areas as seeking the dual aims of instruction and pleasure, with pleasure serving instruction. In this instance we see a narrow term describing a broad concept. A part of the whole has been substituted for the whole as to name and suggests narrowness; but the concept has been returned to its former breadth. Pleasure was to be achieved through the tacit knowledge of rhetoric in both artist and audience to the end that the audience would be instructed and delighted by the author. The author would employ rhetoric in every choice that he made in creating the work, and the audience would apply the principles of
rhetoric in every moment of exposure to and experience of the work of art itself. In all, the communication triangle formed between author, work, and audience was made possible by the kind of education that became available in England as a result of the history of the development of rhetoric as an art, a science, a theory of discourse, a form of verbal communication, a way of ordering experience. The habits of mind formed by learning the formulated precepts of rhetoric totally informed the practice of communication in speaking, in writing, in artistic expression. The shift from the precepts of rhetoric to the taste formed by it and the loss of the idea of a separate art of rhetoric itself were significant modifications of the idea of rhetoric; they were the beginnings of a break with classical rhetoric.

In spite of the persistence of Horace, Cicero, and Quintilian in the school manuals well into the eighteenth century, new trends were developing. But Dryden, in mid to late seventeenth century was still writing in the tradition of classical rhetoric.

The preceding summary of classical rhetoric is based on an article by Bernard Weinberg in The Dictionary of the History of Ideas. Other writers have dwelt at length on the subject. But it is George Kennedy's recent work, Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition From Ancient to Modern Times, which helps us to see that modern critics who oppose the nexus of rhetoric, poetic, and literary criticism as a distortion of all three disciplines, may do so because they see speech as an act and literature as primarily a text.

The time, place, and the immediate reaction of an audience are
important in oral speech in a way that they are not important in literature. However, Kennedy points out that when rhetoric was studied at such an early age, "like language itself, it tended to become an instinctive part of students' mental framework and to influence their formal expression in writing." Here is what Kennedy writes about the difference between oral and scriptorial forms of communication:

A number of successful speeches fail to persuade readers in their written form; a number of great published works in oratorical form were failures when delivered. In particular, a speech is linear and is usually given but once. A speaker has greater need to repeat his main points than does a writer. The audience has little opportunity at any moment to look back at what the orator said ten or twenty minutes before; it has little opportunity to consider the structure of the whole; many effective literary features such as complex structure or imagery are easily lost on an audience which is carried away by the emotions of the moment; devices of ethos and pathos cleverly obscure lack of evidence or logical inconsistencies once an audience has the will to believe . . . .

Literary critics of antiquity, even the great 'Longinus,' borrowing the system of rhetoric for literary analysis usually treat a literary text as similarly linear and say nothing about the structural and imagistic devices peculiar to a written work. One reason for this is presumably the fact that works of literature in antiquity, including poetry, were usually read aloud and thus regarded as a speech-act even though, unlike true
speech, they were intended for repeated readings. Rhetoric had been conceptualized and was readily at hand as a system of analysis for literary critics; the peculiar features of literary composition were not conceptualized and presumably existed as a kind of secret among a guild of poets who learned them by imitation, experimentation, and something which they regarded as inspiration. Careful comparison of the subtle literary techniques of Horace in his *Odes* with the warmed over rhetoric of his verse treatise, *The Art of Poetry*, well illustrates the gulf between practice and theory.

Kennedy uses the term *letteraturizzazione* to describe the repeated slippage (historically) of rhetoric into literary composition. He describes some of the factors encouraging the tendency and a few of its manifestations; he discusses the ancient view of the relationship of rhetoric to poetry in general, and the particular case of the theory of imitation developed in classical times and renewed in the Renaissance by critics and writers. Kennedy assures us that within the classical tradition, the relationship of rhetoric to poetry is rather clear, even if it is not always understood. He writes:

> In the classical world there were many different arts. Some of them were more basic than others . . . . Aristotle thought of rhetoric as an art of communication, parallel to dialectic, whereas he saw poetics as a productive art, like painting. As seen in the so called liberal arts of later times, basic arts were regarded as limited to grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic, which are the three arts of communication, and geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music, but certain other
arts are nearly as primary, including physics and medicine. Some arts, however, are clearly secondary developments, built upon one or more of the basic arts. Secondary arts include some of the noblest forms, such as architecture, which involves both physics and geometry. In the purest classical tradition, poetics, or the art of poetry is also a secondary art which uses the three arts of communication -- grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic -- and also uses music in the creation of a text. Poetics is properly the study of the specific compositional needs of the poet working within the poetic genres. These needs include plot (or at least unity of narrative), characterization, the choice of appropriate poetic diction, and not least, an understanding of the conventions of the genres within which the poet works. The classical art of poetry is not an art of free composition. These topics are what Aristotle in the Poetics and Horace in The Art of Poetry discuss. They are also the topics of the classicizing poetics of sixteenth-century Italy and seventeenth and eighteenth century France and England. 47

And those poetics included without strain of mind the drama. We must be clear about that effortless conclusion because the objections to a rhetorical/poetical critical tradition become seemingly more complicated when the form of literature being discussed is the complex form of drama, where speech is both text and represented act, where all the rhetorical features of orality are required in the text, and where in each individual performance of the drama the immediate reaction of the audience is an important factor.
Poets and rhetors working within the tradition of classical rhetoric as it was perceived in the Renaissance and Restoration see poetry primarily as an act of communication between poet and audience for the purpose of effecting a desired behaviour or belief in that audience. They did not see a conflict between rhetoric and poetry as modern readers do. Plato saw poetry as a kind of rhetoric:

Socrates: Well now, suppose that we strip all poetry of song and rhythm and metre, there will still remain speech?
Callicles: To be sure.
Soc.: And this speech is addressed to a crowd of people?
Cal.: Yes.
Soc.: Then poetry is a sort of rhetoric?
Cal.: True.
Soc.: And do not the poets in the theatres seem to you to be rhetoricians?
Cal.: Yes.
Soc.: Then now we have discovered a sort of rhetoric which is addressed to a crowd of men, women, and children and slaves.

In the classical world, then, poetry—including, let it here be unforgottably noted, drama—and rhetoric are one.

We must recognize the truth of Kennedy's comment (even if we do not wish to choose it as our own critical posture) that modern celebrations of poetry as superior to rhetoric largely represent the efforts of romanticism to free poetry from convention and rule and to make it either the unlimited expression of the poet's personal genius, speaking primarily to himself, or a philosophical glimpse of a higher
reality unapprehended by the other arts. Modern celebrations of poetry as superior to and separate from rhetoric may have had their aegis in misreadings of Longinus' text *On The Sublime*. Certainly critics of the seventeenth century began to look upon Longinus as a classical authority for such a view; but they significantly distorted his account of the sublime in order to do so.

The basis of Longinus' critical system is rhetoric. It is from rhetoric that he draws his categories and terminology. "Great thought" and "strong emotion" are aspects of rhetorical invention; the remaining sources of the sublime are parts of the rhetorical theory of style. The treatise *On The Sublime* is intended by its alleged author, Longinus, as a practical aid to composition. He seems to think that an aspiring poet can, to some extent, achieve sublimity by study and the imitation of literary excellencies. He gives the following precepts for achieving the sublime: the poet must have the power to conceive great thoughts and strong emotion; he must use elevated figures of speech and thought, noble diction, and dignified word arrangement. These precepts are based on the rhetorical faculties of invention, disposition, and elocution. The appeal therefore to Longinian authority by seventeenth century and modern scholars (itself a rhetorical technique in argument) for precedence in the elevation of poetry over rhetoric fails if only because the authority appealed to uses a system for achieving what he calls the sublime which is entirely based on rhetoric. Those critics of the seventeenth century, the romantic and modern critics who wish to separate poetry from rhetoric, seized one feature of Longinus' works which emphasized the
"natural" gifts of poet/orator rather than his acquired skills. For Longinus writes that to describe the passions naturally and to move them artfully is the greatest commendation of a poet; but he must be born with that faculty. Notice, however, that Longinus specifically states that nature must be assisted by art.
Chapter III. Dryden and the Tradition of Rhetoric and Poetry

Dryden was at the vital heart of the tradition of rhetoric delineated in the preceding chapter. He was there because his age was. His age educated him unto it. It was the aim of the grammar school to inculcate precepts and examples of rhetorical techniques in middle level students. At Westminster school, where Dryden was a student, the method of instruction in all forms was unremitting exercise and memorization. Students were required to memorize the precepts, then to employ them as tools for analysis of literature and for learning to compose themes, chreias, letters, and other forms of discourse. To study a poem, for example, the boys were expected to read it, construe it, parse it, scan it, describe its metrical form, point out the places or topics used, point out the forms of logic employed, the figures of eloquence, and, finally, to write a verse of their own in imitation of it usually in Latin or Greek, occasionally in English. Another customary exercise required the boys to compose Latin prose and then turn the prose into Latin verse into one or more of the prescribed metrical forms.

It is not unreasonable, therefore, to assume that such rigorous training in classical rhetoric would carry over into a student's adult life. Rhetors from Aristotle to Quintillian to Hugh Blair have claimed that mastering of the principles of rhetoric would shape the
learner's thoughts, habits of mind, and modes of expression. John Brinsley's *Ludus Literarius* (1612) describes a school boy's typical day. Foster Watson's *The English Grammar Schools to 1660: their Curriculum and Practice* specifies that the curriculum was fairly consistent in both public and private schools and in the cities as well as in the counties. Watson concludes that "the grammar school system in the 16th and 17th centuries entered deeply into the national thoughts and life..." The aim of the curriculum was to inculcate religious principles through classical education. So steeped was Dryden in rhetorical experience and design that Lillian Feder, J. Bottkol, and Amanda Ellis have, as a matter of course, found it necessary to comment forcefully on Dryden's knowledge and use of rhetoric.

Dryden seldom uses the word 'rhetoric' in a definitive way. He does, however, use the terminology of rhetoric -- invention, disposition, elocution or style -- in explanatory ways throughout his critical prefaces. Explaining the use of metaphors and hyperboles during a discussion of the imitation of nature -- where 'nature' means whatever has pleased the cognoscenti through the ages -- Dryden asserts in the preface to the *Author's Apology for Heroic Poetry* that Aristotle formed the rules for poetry from his observations of the works of Euripides, Aeschylus, and Sophocles. 'Rules' in this context connotes something like 'precept' or direction-for-doing something rather than an imperative requirement. Aristotle observed the Greek dramatists' work and the effects the works produced in the audience, analyzed the features in the works that generated certain effects,
described the patterns common to those features, and thus produced models or patterns of what we know as figures and tropes. When the patterns had been identified and described, they were categorized on the basis of usefulness in certain rhetorical situations. The 'rules' (i.e., models, patterns, or precepts), then, are 'natural' in the sense that they existed in the artists and produced the effects in the audience before they were identified, analyzed, categorized, and described, by Aristotle. Aristotle, thus, merely recorded a 'natural' occurrence. The tropes and figures derived by Aristotle's recognizing and recording of them have pleased the cognoscenti in all ages and have been imitated by poets since. "Therefore is rhetoric made an art," writes Dryden; "therefore the names of so many tropes and figures were invented: because it was observed that they had such and such effect upon the audience. Therefore catachresis and hyperboles have found their place amongst them; not that they were to be avoided, but to be used judiciously, and placed in poetry as heightenings and shadows are in painting, to make the figure bolder, and cause it to stand off to sight."³ Dryden made no distinction between rhetoric and poetry. Art imitates nature in order to persuade the audience of a particular point of view, or to change beliefs or behavior or to encourage virtue and discourage vice. The tools or instruments of persuasion, in this case, the figures and tropes, were made available and poets could choose from among those known or invent (which is to say discover the already existing) means of achieving the desired effects. Judgment, which Dryden calls the "master-workman in a play," assists in making the best selection for imitating nature accurately.
Dryden's definition of wit could also be a definition of rhetoric. In the Preface to Annus Mirabilis Dryden writes; "the composition of all poems is, or ought to be, of wit; and wit in the poet, or wit writing (if you will give me leave to use a school distinction), is no other than the faculty of imagination in the writer . . . Wit written is that which is well defined, the happy result of thought, or product of the imagination . . . ." In this definition, Dryden begins by separating the process from the product, the imagining or the thinking about the topic at hand, to the result of that thinking, the product. He goes on in the definition to move from the general to the particular notion of wit, then defines the topic by saying what it is not, and concludes by stipulating his definition of wit. This process is one of the prescriptions given for forming definitions in the school rhetorics. Wit writing is the process, wit written is the product; in general, wit is both the process and product of the imagination. The wit of an historical or heroic poem consists in the delightful "imagining of persons, actions, passions, or things." The negative part of the definition stipulates that wit is not merely the more obvious figures or tropes which might come to mind immediately: the jerk or sting of an epigram, the use of antithesis, the use of puns, the use of sententia. Wit is "some lively and apt description, dressed in such colours of speech, that it sets before your eyes the absent object . . . ."

Dryden has defined wit in other terms as the "propriety of thoughts and words" (Apology for Heroic Poetry). He explains it like this: "propriety of thought is that fancy which arises naturally from
the subject, or which the poet adapts to it [this is another way of saying *inventio*]. Propriety of words is the clothing of those thoughts with such expressions as are naturally proper to them; and from both of these, if they are judiciously performed, the delight of poetry will result."\(^6\) In the *Life of Lucian*, Dryden explains that he thought this definition original to himself until he discovered a similar idea in Aristotle, but expressed "in other terms." He apparently refers to the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle, in which Aristotle suggests that the style of a discourse must be appropriate to its purpose and audience; and to the *Poetics* wherein Aristotle writes of literary decorum.\(^7\) But Dryden did not need to return to Aristotle for authoritative support and testimony; Francis Bacon writes that it is the duty and office of rhetoric to "apply reason to the imagination for the better moving of the will."

Wit, fancy, and imagination have been used almost synonymously by Dryden in these definitions and the language used to explain the concept they signify could have been used to describe and define parts of rhetoric. As Bacon says that reason must be applied to imagination, so Dryden says that judgment is a curb to imagination or fancy. Imagination in a poet is a "wild and lawless faculty which must be curbed."\(^8\) The first happiness of the poet's imagination, writes Dryden in the preface to *Annus Mirabilis*, is "properly invention, or finding of the thought; the second is fancy, or the variation, deriving, or moulding of that thought, so found and varied, in apt, significant, and sounding words: the quickness of the imagination is seen in the invention, the fertility in the fancy, and
the accuracy in the expression."\(^9\)

Imagination is defined in this instance in the terminology of classical rhetoric. The faculties of rhetoric are invention, disposition, elocution, memory, and pronunciation; the first three of these terms have been used by Dryden consistently to explain his theory of the way poetry is made. Dryden's use of terms from classical rhetoric to describe critical precepts and creative processes follows the lead of classical rhetoricians who saw poetry — especially dramatic poetry — as a kind of rhetoric. R. S. Crane (as well as Kennedy, mentioned earlier) points to the Aristotelian distinction between poetry as a productive art and rhetoric as a faculty or power of discovering and using with respect to any subject the available means of persuasion.\(^10\) Book III of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* deals with questions of style and organization, and Crane sees this book as being the closest possible approach in rhetoric to the forms with which poetics begin. Crane assumes that "the development of 'thought' in poetry involves the use of devices which are obviously common to rhetoric and poetry; but imitative poetry, for all that, remains an art distinct from that of oratory in its ends, forms and principles of construction; and it is also . . . as art distinct from that which produces the various kinds of 'poems' which we have come to call didactic."\(^11\) Nevertheless, Dryden does see dramatic poetry as sharing with rhetoric its main feature, persuasion, whereas Crane does not. Crane limits the "constitutive parts of any rhetorical composition" to three: "thought (dianoia), including all the devices or argument; style (lexis); and arrangement (taxis); the
principle of construction in any speech, being the particular thesis, whether deliberative, forensic, or epideictic, concerning which it seeks to persuade its special audience. I should conjecture that had Aristotle dealt anywhere with didactic poems it would have been in terms of some such analytic as this, with the major distinctions those of argumentative means rather than formal ends.\textsuperscript{12} As a matter of fact, Aristotle does call thought and diction parts of tragedy as we have already seen.\textsuperscript{13} Apparently Dryden thought so as well, because dianoia, lexis and taxis are equivalent to inventio, elocutio, and dispositio or invention, elocution, and disposition, or arrangement. These are the terms that occur consistently in Dryden's critical prefaces as the parts of a poem, as one definition of wit, as the "happiness" of the imagination, in short, as the primary means through which poetry is made.

Murray W. Bundy has shown that in the sixteenth century, interest in medieval faculty psychology became associated with poetry and the 'invention' of rhetoric began to be explicitly connected with the imagination of poets by such writers as Ronsard, Puttenham, Sidney, and Gascoigne.\textsuperscript{14} In his article "'Invention' and 'Imagination' in the Renaissance," Bundy suggests the possibility that 'invention' meant something different to those writers when it was applied to poetry than it had meant when applied to rhetoric. Bundy recalls a poem by Stephen Hawes (1509), The Pastime of Pleasure, which is an allegory of the seven liberal arts. Under the topic of rhetoric Bundy shows how Hawes considers 'inuencyon,' 'ymagynacyon,' 'fantasy,' 'estimacioun,' and 'memory.' Bundy agrees with D. L. Clark that it is
hard to find any connection between these words and the tradition out
of which they come. Bundy decides that "like others acquainted
with the medieval views, Hawes undertook to treat poetry under the
categories of the rhetoric of the trivium, and, finding it necessary
to consider the invention of the poet, and seeing little or no
connection with the invention of the orator, turned for assistance to
an equally familiar psychology derived from the Middle Ages. Hawes
interpreted the processes of invention in terms which would be
familiar to every reader, in terms of the five inward wits: common
sense, imagination, fantasy, judgment, memory. He thus achieved a
marriage of rhetoric and psychology which had important consequences
for the history of the poetic imagination." By this unifying
feat, according to Bundy, Hawes makes poetic invention synonymous with
poetic imagination and fantasy. In this view, 'inventive' and
'imagination' become synonymous; 'estimacioun' or judgment is seen as
the necessary check upon the rational mind. Thus reason and
imagination or fancy and judgment are fused into psychological
imagination and its reasonable use.

It may not be true that invention has a completely different
meaning in this usage. If imagination can not be taught and the
creative process is universally considered to be unteachable, then
"invention" may simply be a means of describing the undescribable;
only in this instance, a systematic method of generating matter for
arguments which may stimulate the mind into its own creative activity
is substituted. Aristotle said that metaphor was the critical faculty
which could not be taught; Longinus and others believed that a true
orator/poet had to be born with that ability, but both believed that art could enhance natural endowments. The three "happinesses" of the poet's imagination, invention, fancy, and elocution, are strikingly like the three parts of poetry and painting as they are explained in _A Parallel Betwixt Poetry and Painting_, except that Dryden uses the term "colouring" instead of elocution. Notice the similarity:

The principal parts of painting and poetry next follow.

Invention is the first part, and absolutely necessary to them both; yet no rule ever was or ever can be given how to compass it. A happy genius is the gift of nature... How to improve it, many books can teach us; how to obtain it, none; that nothing can be done without it, all agree... 

Under this head of invention is placed the disposition of the work; to put all things in beautiful order and harmony, that the whole may be of a piece. ...

I am now come... to the third part... colouring. Expression, and all that belongs to words, is that in a poem which colouring is in a picture. The colours well chosen in their proper places, together with the lights and shadows which belong to them, lighten the design, and make it pleasing to the eye. The words, the expressions, the tropes and figures, the versification, and all the other elegancies of sound, as cadences, turns of words upon the thought, and many other things which are all parts of expression, perform exactly the same office both in dramatic and in epic poetry.
Again, in The Preface to the Fables, Dryden uses the language of rhetoric to compare the excellencies of ancient writers. Virgil's chief talent was "propriety of thoughts"; Homer's invention; and in each instance the comparison proceeds on the basis of the three named rhetorical concepts — inventio, dispositio, and elocutio — which are observed in the practice of the ancients. Then, Dryden reiterates the importance of design, the product of invention and disposition: "Now the words are the colouring of the work, which, in the order of nature, is [sic] last to be considered. The design, the disposition, the manners and the thoughts, are all before it; where any of those are wanting or imperfect, so much wants or is imperfect in the imitation of human life, which is the very definition of a poem. Words . . . are the first beauties that arise and strike the sight; but if the draught be false or lame, the figures ill disposed, the manners obscure or inconsistent, or the thoughts unnatural, then the finest colours are but daubing, and the piece is a beautiful monster at best." 

The use of rhetoric as a language with which poetry can be discussed, examined, evaluated, and made is not new with Dryden. It survives a long history of such use. Watson indicates in his "Glossary of Literary Terms" that Dryden came at the end of a long history of classical criticism and rhetor/poets. He writes that Dryden's literary terms have four origins. The first of these which is here relevant, is the classical inheritance of Renaissance England, "already in decay when Dryden was born, and largely based on the Poetics and Rhetoric of Aristotle, the Ars Poetica of Horace -- by far
the most quoted of all Dryden's critical sources, but also the least original — the *Ad Herennium* then attributed to Cicero and the *De Oratore* which was certainly his, and the *Institutio Oratoria* of Quintilian . . . . Dryden's classical debt, though great, was strikingly smaller than that of Elizabethan critics . . . in this sense he stands near the end of a tradition, at a point where the English were either adopting English terms in place of classical ones or, more commonly, where they were abandoning terms altogether in favor of a less technical mode of criticism." Dryden used classical terms even though he sometimes "Englished" them as in the case of 'manners' for ethos and disposition, invention, and elocution for their Latin forms elocutio, dispositio, and inventio. For the term elocutio Dryden frequently substituted other terms entirely, such as "colourings" or the circumlocution "clothing the thought." As I have already noted, sometimes Dryden used the term "design" to signify the product of two processes, inventio and dispositio. On other occasions, he translated mythos as "design" and in so doing seems to equate mythos with fable and plot. There is a certain fluidity about the term. Instead of using the term topos Dryden uses the English metaphorical equivalent "heads" in his notes or first draft of an *Answer to Rymer*. Sometimes Dryden uses the term "persons" and sometimes the term "characters" when speaking of the characters in a play.

The clearest evidence of the influence of rhetoric on Dryden's critical vocabulary is the use that he makes of rhetorical terms in giving the parts of a poem. I have already shown that these are
called invention, etc., after rhetoric, but in the Heads of an Answer to Rymer, Dryden gives the parts of a poem as:

(I) The fable itself;
(II) The order or manner of its contrivance in relation of the parts to the whole;
(III) The manners or decency [decorum] of the characters in speaking or acting what is proper for them, and proper to be shown by the poet;
(IV) The thoughts which express the manners; and
(V) The words which express the thoughts.

Heretofore we have seen Dryden use 'design' to denote the product of inventio and dispositio. When he uses "design" as the translation of mythos or fable, it connotes both the story, or fable, and the plot or the actions in a play. Part II corresponds to what Dryden calls dispositio in Annus Mirabilis and the manners, Dryden's central concern in the heroic plays, are here listed in the third place, and correspond to nothing in the parts of a poem given in Annus Mirabilis, but quite well to the elements of character in his discussion of "Biography" in the Preface to the Life of Plutarch. Parts IV and V (the thoughts which express the manners, and the words which express the thought) are the two elements res and verba, things and language, or a subject and the words in which it is expressed, or content and its verbal form; based on Quintilian, they are the two elements without which purposive discourse could not exist. 22

Many questions arise out of Dryden's critical vocabulary. It would be tempting to pursue some of them, such as the nature of the relationship between wit, imagination, and fancy, or the many connotations of 'design' in the prefaces. Mary Thale has already
examined the meanings of "imitation of nature" in Dryden's works, and similar studies could be done on several other terms.

A central question in Dryden studies has been that of what he means by the term imitation. Kennedy has some useful insights about Aristotelian concepts of imitation in poetry and rhetoric. He defines imitation as of two kinds: first, dramatic imitation or imitation of an action, and a corollary, imitation of an actor or mimicry of a person. As an example of the latter, he gives Socrates as he is imitated in *The Clouds* of Aristophanes. A second kind of imitation is the way that art imitates life or nature. In this kind of imitation, photographic detail is important. Whatever the kind of imitation, the crucial factor is the ethical or emotional quality of the person or action imitated. The concepts or levels of imitation are important in poetics, aesthetics, and philosophy because they constitute a background for the specific and more limited use of imitation in the theory of classical rhetoric. It should be remembered that a kind of imitation occurred in the composition of oral literature in Greece. At least to judge from modern oral poets, the young poet learned by listening to and imitating the older; the young orator did likewise. Further we have seen that the teaching methods of the sophists were based on imitation. The Sophist spoke and only occasionally perhaps reduced his techniques to rules; the student listened, admired, and imitated verbatim, as Phaedrus seeks to do, sometimes not verbatim, but in the spirit of the master. This kind of imitation would involve subject, arrangement, style, and delivery, but it is likely that style
was often the most conspicuous element. ... To speak like Gorgias means to speak in Gorgias' style.²⁴

The kind of imitation that Kennedy refers to as limited in use but used in classical rhetoric is similar to the kind of imitation about which Dryden writes in several of his works. He writes in An Essay of Dramatic Poesy (Crites is speaking), "to imitate the ancients well much labour and long study is [sic] required. ... "²⁵ In the Preface to Troilus and Cressida ... Dryden writes "I will conclude my reflections on it [the source from which he imitated a scene in the play] with a passage from Longinus, concerning Plato's imitation of Homer: "We ought not to regard a good imitation as a theft, but as a beautiful idea of him who undertakes to imitate, by forming himself on the invention and the work of another man". ... ²⁶ In the Parallel Betwixt Poetry -- regarding imitation as copying the works of other artists -- Dryden writes, "without invention, a painter is but a copier, and a poet but a plagiary of others. Both are allowed sometimes to copy and translate; but as our author tells you, that is not the best part of their reputation ... But to copy the best author is a kind of praise, if I perform it as I ought ... "²⁷

In order to "perform it as he ought," Dryden uses the rhetorical technique of invention in his adaptation of the works of another, whose work is worthy of the praise that the imitation implies it is due. In one other place Dryden describes the manner in which such an imitation is performed as it ought to be. The subject in that case is the way in which a writer uses a fable and the analogy is made to a
Dryden is aware also of another kind of imitation, and that is the imitation of nature, which may be said to be a first principle in Dryden's drama and literary criticism. Imitation of nature, however, does not have a single meaning. It seems to operate on the same kinds of levels that Kennedy describes in the passage on imitation quoted above. Mary Thale has shown that "by exploiting the ambiguities of both 'imitation' and 'nature' he [Dryden] interprets the phrase in several different ways": nature as idealized human nature, nature as observed reality, nature as imitation of accepted models, and nature as idealized reality; imitation as the closest possible replica and imitation as conscious contrivance.

"Nature" as observed reality is a kind of representation of human beings "acting as they do in real life." Dryden's more important use of this concept of nature is "justifying passions and humours," that is to say those qualities he so admires in Johnson, Fletcher and Shakespeare. New classical comedy, he admits, imitated the character of men, but it represented that ethos only in generalized types. We can infer from this that the best imitation of nature would represent not general types, but individualized characters. English humorous comedy does not imitate general types because a "humour" is a trait peculiar to "some one person, by the oddness of which, he is immediately distinguished from the rest of men." Dryden also defines humour as "the ridiculous extravagance of conversation, wherein one man differs from all others." When Neander makes this statement, we can be sure that the connotation of extravagant is not
what we would mean by it today. It probably means "to stray outside of the bounds," or that peculiar mark of the individual's speech that varies from some ideal norm of speech. The *Oxford English Dictionary* cites many examples of this sense of the word in Dryden's England. We might think of it as an individual's idiolect or a linguistic pattern unique to an individual in a particular language or dialect of a language.

A second meaning of nature in Dryden's concept of "imitation of nature" is idealized human nature or a representation of life as it ought to be. Dryden recognizes that in the extreme, this definition is not suitable to drama. But in a modified form it is acceptable. Dryden writes in the *Parallel of Poetry* that "there may be too great a likeness [to observed reality] . . . To take every lineament and feature is not to make an excellent piece, but to take only so much as will make a beautiful resemblance to the whole: and, with an ingenious flattery of nature, to heighten the beauties of some parts, and hide the deformities of the rest."

Nature may also mean "whatever has pleased people" over a long period of time. "Those things which delight all ages, must have been an imitation of nature" (*Author's Apology for Heroic Poetry and Poetic License*). From this point of view, an imitation of nature is "an imitation of those features in the classics which have been approved of by the *consensus gentium*," according to Thale. Since Aristotle's "rules" are a codification of the features in Sophocles, Euripides, and Aeschylus which pleased, adherence to those rules produced an imitation of nature. Thale argues that Dryden's chief reason for
emphasizing this concept of nature is to justify the elevated style of the heroic plays. Dryden points out that strong figures of speech — catachresis and hyperbole — have been included in the art of rhetoric, which also condifies practices sanctioned by the consensus gentium. To illustrate that these bold figures are imitations of nature, Dryden quotes four examples from Virgil and one from Horace; in so doing, he appeals to the authority of those who have pleased all through the ages.31

The fourth meaning of nature is allowance for the heightening of reality appropriate to the genre. Again, as Thale shows, this definition justifies the exaggerations of the heroic play where characters are exalted "above the level of the everyday." The heightenings, Dryden says, must be appropriate to the characters, the subject, and the occasion. All beyond is monstrous": 'tis out of Nature, 'tis an exccessence, and not a living part of poetry.

In addition to using nature in various significations, there are at least two meanings for imitation. In the first instance, imitation means "the closest possible replica." Couple this meaning of imitation with the first signification of "nature," or "nature as observed reality," and one can see that to do so stresses the need for likeness between the play and the reality it represents. Imitation also means "conscious contrivance" and bears the same relation to "idealized nature" as "closest possible replica" does to "observed reality." Dryden writes that "A play, as I have said, to be like Nature, is to be set above it; as statues which are placed on high are made greater than life, that they descend to the sight in their just
proportions." Thale shows that for Dryden, "the perfect drama would comply with all the possibilities inherent in the phrase 'imitation of nature.'" It would approximate empirical reality by observing the unities and by representing recognizably human characters. At the same time it would heighten and beautify observed reality and would represent the most affecting circumstances of human life in such a way as to stir up the audience. Imitation of nature is an inclusive phrase intended to synthesize "apparently opposite features of ancient and modern drama." Thale summarizes the utility of the phrase to Dryden's criticism in this way:

The elasticity of the phrase . . . enables it to function as a harmonizing agent . . . bringing together ancients and moderns, the foreign and the domestic, poetry and painting, art and science; and the concept . . . is the principal means by which he achieves this reconciliation.

Dryden found a way to harmonize the many different ideas of drama to which he had been exposed in his attempt to form a drama for the English state that kept within the traditions already established by generations of dramatists from ancient Greece through the Italian Renaissance, through the English Renaissance, down to his own time. He perceived that each age must develop the conditions anew. The rhetorical and poetical theories of the ancients, their reinterpretations by continental and English critics, and the practice of English dramatists in the previous ages, were all reconciled in the critical theory developed by Dryden, expressed in the Essay of
Dramatic Poesy, and briefly sketched in the definition of a play given therein. As Thale observes, the test for what is permissible in a drama is "not the presence or absence of contrivance, but the pleasure which the contrivance produces."  

The "contrivance" of literary works is based on the arts of rhetoric. Rhetoric is, as Hornsby reminds us, the basis for the poetics of the work. An audience for Dryden's heroic plays must use rhetoric as the basis for understanding the work. The communication that the poet desires depends upon it. Through the use of the technical parts of secondary rhetoric called invention and disposition, Dryden generates the characters and thought for his text and structures the plot. Through the use of elocution, he locates the dialogue of the characters in the play and determines the level or kind of speech appropriate to each speaker. Through the primary or philosophical rhetoric, his concept of creativity is shaped. Rhetoric is the basis of the poetics of his creative effort, and it is the standard by which the work ought to be judged. Reading poetry of the seventeenth century and before requires a knowledge of rhetoric because rhetoric is necessary to the comprehension and appreciation of poetry. As C. S. Lewis reminds us, our older poetry "was written and read by men to whom the distinction between poetry and rhetoric, in its modern form, would have been meaningless."

In the eighteenth century, Bishop Whately observed that "different writers seem not so much to have disagreed in their conception of the same things as to have different things in view when they employ the same term." I shall stipulate here that what I mean by rhetoric
in this essay is all effective communication between the audience and the communicator. The communicator transmits ideas by logical, emotional, and personal language according to his purpose in communicating and reinforces those ideas in various forms of discourse. Discourse, in this context, includes poems, letters, plays, sermons, essays, biographies, histories, and so forth. The communicator will use language whose structure, grammar, and figures of speech and thought are determined by the means of transmission. This broad definition includes all of what we now think of as rhetoric and literature. It is an unabashedly pragmatic and purposefully broad definition. Dryden's view of a poem, a dramatic poem, is clearly pragmatic.

Because he sees the practical ends of a drama are delight and instruction, we are secure in saying that Dryden's purpose in tragedy is to achieve moral and didactic ends. Dryden writes,

To return to the beginning of this Enquiry, consider if Pity and Terror be enough for Tragedy to move, and I believe upon a true definition of Tragedy, it will be found that its work extends farther, and that it is to reform Manners by delightful Representation of Human Life in great Persons, by way of Dialogue. If this be true, then not only Pity and Terror are to be mov'd as the only Means to bring us to Virtue, but generally Love to Virtue, and Hatred to Vice, by shewing the Rewards of one, and Punishments of the other; at least by rendering Virtue always amiable, though it be shown unfortunate; and Vice detestable, tho' it be shown Triumphant.
If then the Encouragement of Virtue, and
Discouragement of Vice, be the proper End of Poetry
in Tragedy: Pity and Terror, tho' good Means, are
not the only: For all the Passions in their turns
are to be set in a Ferment; as Joy, Anger, Love,
Fear, are to be used as the Poets common Places;
and a general Concernment for the principal Actors
is to be rasi'd, by making them appear such in
their Characters, their Words and Actions, as will
Interest the Audience in their Fortunes.  

Further, in the Grounds of Criticism in Tragedy, Dryden writes:

To purge the passions by example, is therefore the
particular instruction which belongs to tragedy.
Rapin, a judicious critic, has observed from
Aristotle that pride and want of commiseration are
the most prominent vices in mankind; therefore to
cure us of these two, the inventors of tragedy have
chosen to work upon the passions, which are fear
and pity. . . .Rapin writes more particularly that
no passions in a story are so proper to move our
concernment as fear and pity; and that it is from
our concernment we receive our pleasure, is
undoubted; when the soul becomes agitated with fear
for one character, hope for another, then it is
that we are pleased in tragedy, by the interest
which we take in their adventures.
Chapter IV. Inventio and Characterization in The Conquest of Granada

The activity of the mind in the composing process called inventio was often described by the classical and Renaissance scholars and rhetors in metaphorical terms as "hunting" for topics, identifying their locations, and "exploring" their "regions." In the classical era, orators certainly perceived these metaphors in terms of a mental process, but increasingly in the Renaissance, commonplace books became the "woods" and "fields" to be hunted, the "treasuries" or "storehouses" to be inventoried and identified, or "regions" to be explored for topics, for materials to be used as examples and allusions, or for techniques of amplification. Classical orators were familiar with the metaphorical figure of the "hunter" exploring various localities in his search for the metaphorical "game" or "place" needed to plead, to exemplify, to amplify, or to develop his speech or text. Cicero, for example, mentions it in his De Oratore:

Again, in art, in observation and practice alike, it is everything to be familiar with the ground over which you are to chase and track down your quarry. When you have mentally encompassed all that area, if only you are quite hardened to practical dealing, nothing will escape you, but every detail of an affair will come up with a rush
Quintilian joins Cicero in underscoring the part which both art and practice must play if success in creation of texts is to be achieved. Quintilian insists upon a knowledge of "localities" and limits the hunting area to a particular "locality" or "place" rather than to a "broad plain" as Cicero had. Quintilian's comparison corresponds to his belief that scarcely any *locus communis* could be applied to every circumstance. Quintilian explains:

> For just as you will not succeed in finding a particular bird or beast, if you are ignorant of the localities where it has its usual haunts or birthplaces, as even the various kinds of fish flourish in different surroundings some preferring a smooth and others a rocky bottom ... so not every kind of argument can be derived from every circumstance, and consequently our search requires discrimination.²

The metaphorical relationship between *inventio* and hunting in Quintilian's more restricted interpretation has also been employed by Francis Bacon. In his discussion of "artificial memory" (in which are stored the places which have been digested and prepared in advance), the principal part is "prenotion" which Bacon interprets as a "kind of cutting off of infinity of search."³ The main idea is that if a hunter has no notion of the quarry for which he searches as he searches, he looks about as if in infinite space; if an orator has some idea of the thing for which he searches, "the memory ranges in a narrower compass; like the hunting of a deer within an enclosure."⁴

In the same chapter on "artificial memory," Bacon discusses emblems
and calls them "intellectual conceptions reduced to sensible images."

Emblems are rhetorical means of impressing the memory more forcibly through their sense appeal. Bacon writes "one will more easily remember the image of a hunter pursuing a hare than the mere notion of invention." It will be seen that Dryden uses emblems in the process of refining his characters in the same manner that he uses other "places" of inventio.

Dryden discusses the art and practice of composition under the phrase "wit writing":

The composition of all poems is, or ought to be, of wit, and wit in the poet, or wit writing (if you will give me leave to use a school distinction) is no other than the faculty of imagination in the writer which, like a nimble spaniel, beats over and ranges through the field of memory, till it springs the quarry it hunted after; or, without metaphor, which searches over all the memory for the species or ideas of those things which it desires to represent.

Dryden uses the same metaphor again in the Preface to the Fables where he is discussing the use of loci communes in the making of characters in Chaucer's Canterbury Tales. After describing the variety of characters and their discourses as belonging to their "age, their calling, and their breeding," Dryden writes:

But enough of this: there is such a variety of game springing up before me that I am distracted in my choice, and know not which to follow. 'Tis sufficient to say, according to the proverb, that here is God's plenty.
This discussion of Chaucer's use of the *loci communes* of *inventio* (which Dryden translates as invention as is now common, if misleading somewhat) in *ethopoesis* follows a comparison of Homer and Virgil on the basis of their skill in *inventio, dispositio,* and *elocutio.* Virgil's chief talent was *elocutio,* Homer's *inventio,* and the English writers' in *dispositio.* Because he conducts the comparison between Homer and Virgil on the basis of their skill in *inventio* and *dispositio,* Dryden associates his ideas of *ethopoesis* and the process of composing with their rhetorical foundations. In another discussion of *ethopoesis* in the *Grounds of Criticism in Tragedy,* Dryden expresses the same opinions as will be seen later. Watson notes that the spaniel analogy is a Renaissance commonplace in psychology and criticism. Watson cites a use of the same metaphor by a Spanish Physician named Juan Huarte. Its subsequent translation by Richard Carew named "a very swift imagination" as the "second necessary talent of the orator," and added that "the same supply (as it were) the place of a brach [perro ventor], to hunt and bring the game to his hand." Watson also cites Hobbes' use of the same by now familiar figure; says Hobbes' use of the figure is better known and may be Dryden's immediate source: "Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compass whereof he is to seek; and then his thoughts run over all the parts thereof . . . as a spaniel ranges the field till he find a scent."

H. James Jensen links Dryden's use of the terms 'fancy' 'imagination,' and 'wit,' when he defines 'fancy' as 'the faculty which envisions those images and ideas which emanate from invention,
which have their origin in the mind as opposed to nature. 'Fancy' in this sense is the same as 'imagination.' The two terms 'fancy' and 'imagination' would always be interchangeable except that 'fancy' frequently has the connotation of being included within 'imagination' as that part of the mind which produces whims, idiosyncrasies, and superficial characteristics of style . . . . 'Fancy' is a lawless faculty which the judgment controls by bringing it in line with nature and common sense, the realities of the world." A critical discussion of the terms in full is outside the scope of this essay, but Jensen's clarification of the relationship among the terms is satisfactory. The point is that Dryden links in specific ways the imagination, fancy, and wit writing with the rhetorical concepts of inventio, and he uses the loci communes of inventio in the discussion of characterization, in argument, and in amplification.

The subject of the meaning of the term "wit" in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is much confused and has been frequently debated. William G. Crane's Wit and Rhetoric in the Renaissance clarifies the term and its use and suggests a way of understanding how Dryden came to use it as a synonym for "fancy" and "imagination." Crane shows how relatively simple it is to determine the senses in which "wit" was used and understood in the early sixteenth century. Shortly before 1550, however, the word began to appear in contexts where careful analysis was required to determine its meaning. In the latter half of the sixteenth century, "wit" became particularly associated with rhetorical devices such as proverbs, maxims, exempla, apothegms, definitions, and set descriptions, as a number of
collections of such matter explicity testify. Titles such as Wits Commonwealth (1597) and Wits Theatre of the Little World (1599) were plentiful. At the same time, there is ample evidence that the school rhetorics depended heavily upon such materials for the amplification and embellishment of themes.

The basis for this use of the term "wit" may lie in the fact that many sixteenth century translators turned the Latin 'ingenium' into English as "wit," especially where context dealt with rhetoric and the expression of thought. Crane gives numerous examples of this practice, a few of which are reproduced here. One early example of the association of "wit" and ingenium as closely related to rhetoric is found is Cicero's De Oratore. In this work, "wit"/ingenium is discussed as a means of acquiring a full, ornate, style by imitating Demosthenes and other Greek orators.

Leonard Cox's The Arte or Crafte of Rhetoryke, explains:

Inuencyon is comprehended in certayn placys, as the rhetoriciens call them out of whom he that knoweth the faculty may fetche easily suche thynges as be mete for the mater that he shal speke of. . . . The theme proposed, we must after the rules of Rhetoryke go to our owne Placys that shal anone shewe unto us what shal be to our purpose.

Going to the "places" that show what "shal be our purpose," is the means of providing arguments and matter for amplification of arguments for orations, just as De Oratore is concerned largely with ornateness, amplification, and embellishment. "Wit" was regarded as a necessary prior to amplification of a topic and was frequently linked to
Inventio, the first division of rhetoric, comprised the means, logical and otherwise, extrinsic and intrinsic, of investigating and developing a subject. Gabriel Harvey, the Cambridge Don, explains that *inventio* "consisted of the processes of dialectical investigation which serve for the development and amplification of a theme."^{16} Frances Meres, too, defines *inventio* in his address to the reader in the *Wits Treasury* as the place where "all the source of wit may flowe within three chanels, and bee contriued into three heads; into a sentence, a Similitude, & an Example . . . ." These are devices of amplification, the sentence [*sententia*], the similitude, and the example. They were particularly associated with wit by the men and boys who compiled the commonplace books. At times, the expression "figures of amplification" was understood to include also *exclamatio*, *apostrophe*, and *prosopopoeia* which depend for their force upon appeals to emotion.

These were especially regarded as manifestations of wit, either used singly or in combination, or grouped together. Such treatises as Erasmus' *De Copia*, Agricola's *De Inventione*, Peacham's *Garden of Eloquence*, and Puttenham's *The Arte of English Poesie* all give examples of these devices which became the chief quality of wit in the later sixteenth century. Sometimes they are presented under the heading of "invention," sometimes "variety of matter," or occasionally "plenty of matter." Always, though, the interest and the intent was to provide a means of generating matter for developing a theme, a thesis, a chria, a confirmation, a comparison, or an oration.^{17}
Today, few literary scholars of the Restoration heroic drama in general or of Dryden in particular pay attention to the principles of rhetoric, especially inventio, set forth as topoi in Aristotle, as topica in Cicero, or as loci communes in Quintilian and in the works of a host of Renaissance adherents of these ancients. Scholars of the Renaissance drama, on the other hand, have made extensive use of the resources of rhetoric to the study of drama in that period. By way of review, therefore, I shall discuss inventio, then explain how it was used in the formulary rhetorics in schools, and finally give an example of how it was used by writers and speakers, before describing its application to The Conquest of Granada.

Inventio, the discovery of the intrinsic and extrinsic sources of argument as well as the means by which those arguments can be most effectively presented, requires analysis of the facts in a given case, or the amassing of material consisting of things to discuss which are probably true. The next requirement is to determine the status of the case, which is to say, its character or its main issues. The main questions asked in determining the status of a case are: (1) What is it? Did it happen? What are the facts? This question (or these) is called an sit. (2) How is it defined? What is it in terms of size, use, or function? To what is it similar or different? This feature is quid sit. (3) How may the facts or the definition be interpreted. This feature is called status generalis or quale sit. This is an intrinsic method of analysis, it is logical, and it shows only how to judge arguments, not how to find them. Finding the thought, or inventio, is a function of the loci communes, or extrinsic methods of
persuasion. To determine the nature of the case, then to survey the means of presenting it effectively whether as epidictic, forensic, or deliberative oratory are the primary uses to which inventio can be put.

These are not the only uses, however. Once the nature of the case has been determined, the means of presenting it decided upon, the development, the amplification and the ornamentation are all derived from inventio. If Aristotle's definition of rhetoric is recalled for a moment, it will be seen that his definition of rhetoric is in actuality a definition of inventio. Quintilian points out that one of the shortcomings of Aristotle's definition of rhetoric is that it is too limited to inventio: the discovery of the available means of persuasion on any topic whatsoever is a good description of inventio, but it is an incomplete definition of rhetoric.

Cicero discusses inventio in De Partitio Oratoria. Here he instructs his son in the precepts of inventio, especially the location of arguments. He defines a locus communis metaphorically as a 'place' where arguments are stored:

But when the line of discussion is decided upon [status], the speaker must have before him a point of reference to which to refer all the lines of argument obtained from the topics of invention. . .

This is enough for one who sees the hidden content of each topic and who has the topics in question neatly labelled like storehouses of arguments. 18

Cicero's metaphor of storehouses suggests a connotation for inventio or "inventory" rather than the customary translation by the word "invention." The activity of searching among the treasures or stock
of a storehouse in order to find from among neatly labelled contents materials that could supply one with matter for argument and amplification suggests more of an inventory than an invention. The metaphor from Cicero, nevertheless, led many scholars and would be rhetors to desire a means for making this cerebral activity more concrete. Aristotle had suggested in his *Topics* that incipient orators should select also from the written handbooks of arguments, and should draw up sketch-lists of them upon each several kind of subject, putting them down under separate headings, e.g. "on Good," or "on Life," and that "On Good" should deal with every form of good, beginning with the category of essence. In the margin, too, one should indicate also the opinions of individual thinkers, e.g. "Empedocles said that the elements of bodies were four . . . ."¹⁹

Quintilian acknowledged that anyone using such forms [as commonplace books] "would find his fluency increased . . . be prepared to deal with any case."²⁰

The commonplace book, based on inscriptions from the ancients (as well as certain descriptions), became a physical "place" in which writers and speakers stored and labelled their collected treasures. Other common metaphors for those treasuries and repositories of loci communes were forests, gardens, military camps, and plains of battle. The "places" were identified according to their nature and function, or as dialectical, rhetorical, or stylistic. During the Renaissance in England, there grew up "gardens" of eloquence and "gardens" of
pleasure, yielding flowers of rhetoric. Ben Jonson called his commonplace book *Timber: or Discoveries upon Men and Matter*, thereby suggesting the organic growth of forests, pre-selected and harvested into timbers, and implying their utility as a material to be used in thinking and writing about men and matter.

Commonplace books or phrasebooks (as the less imaginative sorts called them) served not only as storehouses of found or collected arguments, they served also as stimulants for amplifying arguments from their exempla, testimony of the ancients, and proverbs. By having a ready supply of materials like these in a physical "place" in large numbers, keepers of these books were supplied with embellishment and ornament both for style and argument.

The author of the *Ad Herennium* gives the primary purpose of the locus communis as "amplification to stir the emotions of the hearers." He gives ten loci communes under the sub-heading "conclusion," which are to be used to amplify a topic: who is the authority, who is affected, what are the effects of such indulgence, could others be emboldened to do the same, is a judgment revocable, is the crime intentional, pre-medicated, foul, cruel or sacrilegious, how does this crime compare with other wrongs, what are the attendant circumstances, and how may one appeal for pity? These very practical loci communes are obviously suited for judicial speeches, but even there, they serve (and this is the point) to amplify the argument rather than to analyze it. Copiousness was a much admired feature in discourse, and orators strove to achieve it in their discourses because it demonstrated their skill and appealed to the emotions of
the audience. Repetition always has that effect. Repetition and variation, however, evoke both admiration and emotional response in the audience. Repetition and variation are forms of amplification.

Longinus, too, writes that amplification consists in accumulating all the aspects and topics inherent in the subject and thus strengthening the argument by dwelling upon it. Amplification, he writes, "is language which invests the subjects with a kind of grandeur . . . . There are indeed ten thousand kinds of amplification . . . without the sublime, none forms the perfect whole."

Henry Peacham provides a threefold use of the commonplace in service of amplification: "to teach and tell things plainly, to amplify largely, and to prove and conclude mightily." Peacham suggested such topics as "noble and famous enterprises, great and worthy; virtues, wicked and horrible facts as murders, parricides, tyranny, and slaughter."²²

It is clear that the commonplace as a principle of amplification was usual in Renaissance and Restoration England. The training in copia which occupied the first years of the grammar school served as preparation for the more artistic process of amplification. Sententia, exempla, figures of style, and the collections in commonplace books all looked toward the building of the future oration or poem by which its pleasing form and moral content would serve to move the hearer or reader. Because amplifying a theme or poem always looked to the emotional effect produced on the audience, the process itself is most consciously rhetorical and is usually connected with elocutio only. Although elocutio is its most obvious and usual
manifestation, amplification is first a process in **inventio**.

The **places** most commonly associated with the expansion and variation of a theme were distribution, description, collection, and **comparison**. **Progression** and acclamation were also included as offshoots of collection and comparison. Blount defines progression as the exercise by which one begins at the lowest, when he would praise or "discommend" someone, and moves to the highest. Under "progression," Blount considers the "circumstances" both of persons and things. Acclamation is called a "sententious clause of a discourse, or a report . . . . It is a general instruction for every man, commonly for his pains in reading a history, or other men's Books for some private use of it to himselfe." [It only serves for amplification] "when after a great crime or Defect exclaimed upon, or extoll'd, it gives a moral Note worth credit and observation."^{23}

The idea of abundance, of copia, in matter for discourse and the idea of moral instruction were a kind of **sine qua non** with the orators and authors who fostered amplification to an exaggerated degree. Two directives are found in nearly every instruction for assembling and employing the commonplaces: provide copiousness of material and put it in a carefully arranged order. Renaissance rhetors gave distinction to figures of amplification; they thought of amplification as being intellectual, skillful, and conscious, that is, "addressed to stir in the hearer an approval of the art."^{24} Reading, writing and assembling an abundance of literary wealth seemed to be the burden of the schoolboy's day in sixteenth and seventeenth century England. It is not surprising, in light of this constant drill, that the same
rhetorical devices manifested themselves in the literature of the
period, sometimes consciously, and, at other times [no doubt] when
skillfully integrated with the piece of art, scarcely noticeable. 26

Lechner has argued persuasively and demonstrated conclusively that
for the Renaissance orator every plan for persuading and moving
listeners lay in the places containing the reward of virtue and the
punishment of vice. 26 Commending virtue and censuring vice was the
essence of eloquence, and all else that was added -- the tropes and
schemes of stylistic diction, the rhythmic patterns of words, or
copious invention of any kind -- was directed towards embellishing and
adorning the proverbs, maxims, and sententiae. These morals and
sayings became the figures of thought which "lent credibility to the
arguments and stole their way into secretly into the minds of the
audience." 27

A sentence, says Richard Rainolde, is

an Oracion in a fewe wordes, shewing a godlie
precept of life, exhorting or diswadyng: the
Grekes doe call Godly preceptes, by the name of
Gnome or Gnomon, whiche is as moche to saie, a rule
or square, to direct anythyng by, for by them, the
life of manne is framed to all singularitie. Thei
are divers sortes of sentences, one exhorteth, an
other diswadeth, some onlie sheweth: there is a
sentence simple, compound, profitable, true, & soche
like. Frame your oracion upon a sentence. . . . 28

Sententiae were the seeds which grew into the various literary forms
or into the flowers of rhetoric, beautifying, but informing too, the
poetic and oratorical pieces. Lechner writes that in the literature
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries "and in the instruction manuals for the Prince, and commonplace books, the themes of praise of virtue and the vituperation of vice is virtually an obsession . . . The educational works of the Renaissance indicate that despite the prevalence of dialectic or logic in a certain sense, rhetoric was the elementary basis for all instruction." She continues to add that regardless of the art or science followed, the skillfull or effective use of the places or topics was inextricably bound up with moral sententiae, aphorisms, and proverbial sayings. Any training in the use of commonplace books would involve a familiarity with such moral dicta. The long, tedious hours spent by students in memorizing, paraphrasing, translating, and expanding axioms of virtue would so certainly color their way of thinking, order their thoughts, that they would compose and analyze all texts and oral speeches in light of the training so received.

i (b)

The commonplace has been discussed, first, as means of finding and developing any topic for argument and, second, as a collection in which arguments so found and varied might be stored and catalogued for easy reference and ready access. The third use is commonplace as a theme or an oration developed out of the Renaissance obsession with the themes of virtue and vice. The first commonplace has been referred to as locus communis, the second has been referred to as the commonplace book, and the third will be called the commonplace theme.
It is hoped that this usage will avoid confusion which may arise when particular things are referred to by the same name.

Aphthonius distinguished carefully between the commonplace theme and other themes and orations (such as chria, laus and vituperatio, and narratio), each of which has its own particular purpose. Only the commonplace theme amplified virtue or vice as an abstract impersonal theme. The commonplace theme could exist on its own, or as a speech to be used within another speech which centers on the praise of virtue and the censure of vice. Richard Rainolde defined a commonplace theme in words that recall his definition of sententiae:

a common place is a Oracion, dilatyng and amplifying good or evill, whiche is incidente or lodged in any man. This Oracion is Called a commonplace, because the matter conteined in it, doth agree uniuersally to all menne, whiche are partakers in it, and guiltie of the same. 30

Aphthonius demonstrates that a commonplace theme differs from a thesis in that a commonplace theme amplifies and increases while a thesis explains and proves. The former is representation, the latter is explanation; the former conveys, the latter analyzes. The distinction between the former and the latter will be important in understanding the form of the heroic play, The Conquest of Granada, for its is a dramatic presentation of a commonplace theme. The commonplace theme is universal in character, adaptable to forensic, ceremonial, or political debate. It may be used on its own or as a part of a larger speech. The commonplace theme has the same parts as other orations -- proposition, reason, proof, embellishment, and conclusion. Only the
exordium is missing. Aphthonius explains that the commonplace theme required no exordium because the oration was not an argument, it was an amplification of an already proven or already accepted truth. Sometimes, when it was used as a speech within a speech, the commonplace theme would be brought into the speech just before the conclusion was rendered, where it served as a sort of last appeal to judge or audience; a delightful and pleasing oration which was to arouse the audience and move it to a favorable decision. This penultimate place in an oration has traditionally been reserved for the display of the orator's powers of eloquence. Quintilian described its place in these terms:

We may give full rein to our emotions, place fictitious speeches in the mouths of our characters, call the dead to life, and produce the wife or children of the accused in court.

The *locus communis* is a dialectical or rhetorical "place" for finding and developing arguments, the commonplace book is a physical "place" for storing dialectical and rhetorical "places," and the commonplace theme employs materials derived from the first two in poems and orations in praise of virtue or censure of vice. Together they form the basis for considering the uses to which "places" have been put in poetry and essays of the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries in general and for *The Conquest of Granada* in particular.

Here are the words of a few Renaissance poets and rhetors which speak to the devices of the poet or rhetor with regard to the praise of virtue and the censure of vice. Puttenham lists the devices of a poet:
Wherefore the poet in praising the manner of life or death of any mean person, did it by some little dittie or Epigram or Epitaph in few verses and meane stile conformable to his subject. So have you how the immortal gods were praised by hymes, the great Princes and heroicke personages by ballades or praise called Encomia, both of them by historical reports of great gravite and Majestie, the inferiour persons by other silent poems. 33

Philip Sidney devotes much space and rhetorical zeal to the didactic purpose of this art which leads to the way of virtue.

Poetry is a hart-ravishing knowledge which setteth vertue so out in her best colours as to lead and draw us to as high a perfection, as our degenerate souls . . . can be capable of. 34

Thomas Wilson, the rhetor, adds his voice to the examples of Renaissance poets in testimony to the universal recognition of the commonplace that virtue and vice were not only subjects for orations and poems, but ends to be desired from literature.

For undoubtedly there is no one tale among the poets, but under the same is comprehended some thing that pertaineth to the amendment of manners; to the knowledge of truth, to the setting forth of nature's works, or else to the understanding of some notable thing done. 35

The character as a literary form was assisted in its development by the use of the commonplace books. Sententiae, phrases, verses, and
classical allusions in particular would half create a character, a type, which the reader could then complete in his own mind. The phrases would be used for observing decorum in characterization; the sententiae would provide the theme expressing the epigrammatic truth to be moralized, and classical allusions would provide exempla. As a literary type, the character comes closest to the commonplace theme in its concern with virtue and vice. In fact, the character is an illustration of a virtue or vice with an appropriate praise or dispraise as applied to a general type of person more than to a particular person. At least this was true of the early character in the Renaissance. The character grew out of rhetorical exercise. Boys were assiduously drilled in the rhetorical figures, among which were those particularly well suited to the character sketch: illustratio, ethopoeia, prosopoeia, and descriptio. The figure of thought, "character" as this exercise was termed in rhetoric, developed from the topic descriptio. If the subject of the description was an abstract virtue or vice, a real or imaginary person was used to personify the virtue or vice in order to produce a more vivid effect. The descriptio was expanded, then, according to the dialectical or analytic "places" as definition, division, etymology, and the like. The "places" of rhetorical invention were used to extend the amplification and adorn it. The rhetorical topics or "places' might be justice, honor, profit, pleasure, and so on.36 Thomas Blount gives these instructions for developing a character:

But he that will truly characterize a man, in a feigned story, must first learn handsomely to
describe a humour, a passion, a vertue, a vice, and therein, keeping decent proportion, add but names, and knit together the accidents and encounters. This perfect expressing of all qualities is learn'd out of Aristotle's tenth Book of Moral Philosophy. 37

This description is little more than the development of a topic, probably derived from a harvest of commonplaces, universal in its nature, but also applicable to a particular person, with certain refinements. Erasmus gives these instructions for what he called personae descriptio:

Suggested by the study of the character of Theophrastus, which he noted, looked like the work of a grammarian, not a philosopher. There were moral types in his examples such as 'amantis luxoriosi, avari, voracis,' and they were to be described according to the eleven places of Cicero. . . . 'Prosographies more characteristic of orators' are those in which a certain character is depicted in his own colours, as it were . . . . Thoughts of the man talking with himself are more common in poetry. 38

It can be seen that both the character and the commonplace theme relied heavily upon the commonplace book containing in excerpts the philosophy and literature of Greece and Rome, the Hebrew and Christian scriptures, the poets and philosophers of all ages. The books were pillaged for the sententiae, epigrams, verses, classical allusions, and so forth, which assisted in the development of these two types of themes as literary form. The contents of the books would be culled for observing decorum in characterization, the sententiae would
provide the theme expressing the epigrammatic truth to be moralized, and again, the classical allusions would provide examples. Both the character and the commonplace could be used either as independent orations or as particular types within another oration. Both forms lent themselves to the construction of drama, as the commonplace theme might provide the subject and the character suggest the kind of characterization which could best develop, express, and present the theme. The adherence to the doctrines of decorum, and the strong emphasis on moral teaching lent themselves to the useful and delightful teaching required for the literature of the age.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the locus communis was assigned a much more comprehensive area of application than the classical orators had afforded it. Examples of these books in the Folger and Bodleian Libraries attest to their use as teaching tools, as "great circles" of learning, (to use a Ramist expression), as examples of moral and literary choices made by schoolboys, commonplace books were ubiquitous. Scarcely an occasion of speaking or writing arose when the commonplace book was not sought for and applied to discourse. The "places" were literary ornament, practical counsels; they were present in schools, courts, pulpits and social gatherings, surgical and medical practices; they were the multipurpose means for inventio, dispositio, and elocutio. Virtue and vice, the main theme, gave them also their universal character, and was as well, the end desired from them. In the commonplace book, virtue was witnessed and conveyed rather than rewarded or interpreted. From their earliest days at school, boys were trained in the precepts of virtue which were
embodied in practically every exercise of composition. Lechner believes that this training "accompanied [the boys] through life and resulted in a mentality conditioned to the observation of everyone and everything in terms of virtue and vice."

iii

Scholars of the Restoration have not used rhetoric as a perspective from which the heroic drama of John Dryden might profitably be studied. They have frequently said that the drama was 'rhetorical,' but with the exception of Richard Larson, no one has specified in what way the dramas were rhetorical. Another problem faces those who would study the dramas for their use of rhetoric and that is the modern lack of sympathy with and knowledge of rhetoric as it was known by schoolboys in Dryden's England. It will be helpful, therefore, to illustrate at this point, the method by which the loci communes were applied in generating and structuring a text. Abraham Fraunce explains that the topics of invention provided the author with plentiful matter for composition, and an audience with a technique of analysis for the adequate understanding of what someone else has composed:

If we shall, ...draw any one word through these generall places of invention, it will breede a great plentie: and varietie of new argumentes, while wee mark what be the causes, effects, parts, whole, generall, speciall, subjectes, adjunctes thereof, and so forth in all the rest: and this either in
making and enditing our selves, or els in resolving
and as it were dismembering that which others have
done. 40

An example of genesis through invention is the following from Thomas
Wilson:

And to make this more plaine, I will goe through
the places, with one certaine worde, and looke what
helpe I shall finde there, for knowledge of the
same. The worde shall bee (a Kyng) or (a
Magistrate.)

The definition
Every King, or Magistrate, is the minister of God,
for a goode end, to the punishing of naughtie
persons, and the comforting of godly men.

The Genus
The Minister of God.

The Species
Either a Tyraunt or a godly King, the one ruleth
according to his lust, the other according to right
and justice.

Conjugates
The Officer, the Office, to beare an Office, if the
Office can not be spared, the Officer cannot be
spared.

Adjuncts necessary
Wisedome, earnest labour, cunning in sciences,
skilful both of warre and peace, these al must
needes be in every Magistrate.

Adjuncts contingent
To be liberall, to be frugall, to be of a temperate
life, al these happen in good Magistrates.
Deedes necessary
To defende Religion, to enact godly Lawes, to
punish offenders, to defend the oppressed: all
these are necessarie in a King, and are never found
in a Tyraunt.

Subjects
Moses, David, Salomon, Ezechias, Josias, Charles
the Emperour, Edward the sixt of the name King of
England.

The efficient cause remote
God himselfe, or els the ordinaunce of God.

The efficient cause proximate
Unquiet subjects, rebelles, disobedient people, are
the cause why Magistrates are ordeined, that the
rather they may bee ruled, and kept in good order.

The final cause of a Magistrate
This ende he must needs observe, that alwaies the
people live in quietnesse, & in honest conversation
passe their whole life.

Effects
Peace is made, Realme enriched, all thynges
plenteous, but where a Tryaunt ruleth, all thynges
are contrary.

Testimony
The xiii to the Romaines, let every soule be
subject to the powers. 1Peter.ii Be subject to
the King.

Adjuncts contingent
The Scepter is a token of Justice, even as a Sword is
a signe of revengemet, or wrathe, paying of
subsidies, Taxes, Tributes, Rent, or any suche
like, Yeoman of the garde, and al other waiters,
Soldiours in warre, the obedience of the subjects, the honour given unto him, triumphes made, running at the Tilt, fighting at the barriers, fighting at the Tourney. All these are contingentia to a King, that is, although these thynges bee not in a common wealth, yet there may be a king, yea, and although there be no king in some Common weale, yet these things may be every ech one of them, as it were in Athens, where the people had the rule of the Common weale, and al was referred to their judgement.

Similitudes
That which the sheepeheard is to the sheepe, the same is the Magistrate to his Subjects. That which the master of the shippe, is to the shippe, or the master of the household, to his house, or the head to the whole body; the same is the Magistrate to his Subjects.

Comparison
Servantes must bee obedient, and subject to their Masters with all reverence, as we read in the Scripture: how much more then should the subjects be obedient to their kings and soveraigne Lord, which by the ordinaunce of God, is appointed to rule and to have governaunce over them. 41

Wilson says that he does not search out all the loci communes in this argument, nor is it necessary to do so in every instance. One ought, however, to search most of them and then select the arguments best suited to the purpose of the discourse. The duties of a prince as a topic served as material for many examples in rhetorics of the era. Aphthonius uses the topic as an example when he makes a "Commonplace [theme] Against a Despot." Aphthonius begins by describing the
commonplace theme as its has already been described except that he gives the parts of it as follows:

It [the commonplace theme] is like a second speech amplifying the evil [or good] things connected with anyone. It is so called because of its applying alike to all those who had part in the particular matter; for example a traitor applied to all alike who shared in the practice.

It is like a second speech and like an epilogue; wherefore the commonplace does not have an exordium, we make up the pattern for the exordia for the purpose of training the young. After these, you will place topics form "the incompatiable" in the first position; then you will add the exposition, not as though explaining, for the matter has been examined, but as if spurring the listener. After this you will add comparison, attaching a greater blame to the accused through contrast; then a topic, so-called intention, in which you attack the motives of the agent; then a digression, in which you shrewdly reproach his past life; then a rejection of mercy and the final topics of the exercise drawn from these goods: the lawful, the just, the rational, the possible, the probable, the imminent.42

In the commonplace against a despot, Aphthonius draws a portrait of one who will inflict harm upon the judges because when a despot gains control, no other judging is allowed; then he examines the cases of ancestors who planned a state free of domination and gives the reasons
why: The vagaries of fortune, established norms of conduct. Law "came into being for the bodies of citizens as the rectifier of evils caused by misfortunes. In the exposition, Aphthonius has the speaker imagine himself to be the man with evil purpose at the moment when he wished to take control of the state:

This is what he would say to himself":

Why are these things so, O gods? Though I have been shown to be above the crowd, shall I suffer myself to have equality with the rest in every single case? And am I allowing my fortune to acquire wealth in vain, if I shall be providing the same things for the many? Shall poor men assemble to form judgement on me? And is that which seems best to the many to become a law for me? What escape, then, shall there be for these things? I will seize the citadel and I will put the law aside to perish wretchedly; thus I will be the law to the many, not they to me.

Next, Aphthonius compares a murderer to a despot and says that the murderer is dreadful, but a despot is worse because one who commits a foul deed against one person is bad but one who enslaves a people is worse. In the following section on intention, he says a despot can only act from intention. A murder, it is implied, may have some extenuating circumstance, but not the tyranny of a despot. In the digression, Aphthonius points out that both the past and the present life of the despot are at issue, where in all other cases only the present deeds are judged. He urges rejection of mercy for the despot, even to ignoring the cries and wails of his children, because the offspring of the despot will continue the enslavement he initiated.
This rejection of mercy is followed by the short, balanced statements of the lawful, just, rational, and possible:

[Lawful] And if it is lawful to honor those freeing the fatherland, it follows that those reducing it to slavery are to be punished.

[Just] And it is just that a penalty should be fixed among us equal to the harm that this man has done.

[Rational] Further, the despot will pay what is due by falling, for he will be causing the laws to have prevailed.

[Possible] Moreover, it is easy to accomplish punishment of the present offender. For whereas this man needed armed guards to set up his despotism, we in our turn will not need allies to put an end to the despot. But the vote of the judges will suffice to destroy the entire power of despotism.

In one section of the Commonplace Against a Despot, one of the techniques used was ethopoesis. Here the orator imagines himself to be a person at a crucial moment in his life and speaks as he thinks that person might have spoken then. In this case, Aphthonius does not have in mind a particular character, but a particular type of character, a despot. What his imaginative presentation achieves is a fictional "type" character. If he had chosen a particular historical personage, he would have imagined different words for him to speak. In either case, the process of *inventio* can be seen to be operating in the selection of the materials presented in the parts of the oration and in the imaginative representation of the character tyrant.

In a drama, much the same technique can be used. All the
available means of persuasion are again called into play: logos, pathos, and ethos. In the Poetics, Aristotle treats character and thought as two of the six formative elements of drama, which have as their essential function the arousal of pity and fear in order to purge the audience of an excess of those emotions. Aristotle defines character and thought as follows:

Character in a play is that which reveals the moral purpose of the agents, i.e., the sort of thing they seek or avoid, where that is not obvious . . . .

Thought, on the other hand, is shown in all they say when proving and disproving some particular point or enunciating some universal proposition. 45

Not only in their speeches but even in their actions the characters of drama employ logos and pathos to convey their thought:

The thought of the personages is shown in everything to be effected by their language -- in every effort to prove or disprove, to arouse emotion (pity, fear, anger, and the like), or to maximize or minimize things. 46

Because character must play such a strong role in the drama, "to effect everything" through the thought, through conversation between and among characters, instructions for how to make characters are of great importance. All the formulary rhetorics of the Renaissance had some passage of instruction on how to make a character, and a few of those instructions have already been given in this essay. Consider those of Aphthonius.

Aphthonius recommends that after an orator decides upon the type or types of characters he will present, he must then decide whether
the characterization is to be an emotional one, a moral one, or a combination of both. An emotional presentation "shows feeling in relation to everything." The orator must make the character speak words which will demonstrate his courage or his cowardice. In order to do this, he might choose to show how his character might respond to an unfamiliar situation or experience. Aphthonius gives the example of a man born, reared, and living on land when he is first exposed to the sea. Such a character might express either fear or wonder, but whatever he says, his words will reveal his character. When a character is made to utter words which show both his emotional and his moral response to a situation or experience, the presentation is called a combined characterization. In a drama, an orator or author strives for a complete portrayal of character, and so presentations in drama are most often of the combined or moral kind.

Choosing the type of characterization — ethopoeia, idolopoeia, or prosopopoeia — and the form of presentation — emotional, moral, or combined — is not enough, says Aphthonius, to make a complete description and definition of a character. To complete the ethopoesis, each character must be described, defined, and compared or contrasted with others who are similar or different. He urges orators to make complete characterizations that are embellished and unrestrained, but accurate. A technique he recommends from demonstrative rhetoric which can be used in ethopoesis is to combine an encomium and its opposite, vituperation, into one form, comparatio. For an encomium, he says, "you should work it out under these topics."
You will make the exordium according to the subject at hand; next you will place genus, which you will divide into race, fatherland, forbears, and fathers; then you will take up education which you will divide into inclination to study, talent, and rules; then you will bring out the most important topic of the encomium, the achievements, which you will divide into the spirit, the body, and fortune, -- the spirit like courage, or prudence, the body like beauty, swiftness, or strength, and fortune like wealth, and friends. To these you will add comparison . . . .

As an added instruction to orators who are engaged in making a comparison, Aphthonius reminds them that it is not fitting to set one "whole" against another, for this is dull and unimpressive. He recommends that they should set one point against another because that would be impressive at the same time that it added copiousness to the comparison. Summing up what Aphthonius recommends in the way of techniques for ethopoesis, we see that drawing character involves first selecting the type of characterization, either ethopoeia, idolopoeia, or prosopopoeia; then, selecting from the emotional, the moral, or the combined emotional and moral form of presentation; and, finally, comparing salient features of the characterization -- the places of genus and its parts, race, fatherland, etc., education and its parts, inclination to study, talent, etc., achievements and so on -- with their parallels or opposites.

Describing and defining character through the use of places requires some clarification and amplification at this point. Places are rhetorical terms which indicate a general class of considerations
which could serve as sources from which a rhetor might draw suggestions in treating a theme or an oration. **Places** were thought by Aristotle to be appropriate for use in developing arguments or demonstrations of a general character on general subjects. **Places** could be used by anyone dealing with any subject as a rhetorician or a dialectician in the category of the probable, but not as scientist dealing with matters of empirical demonstration and proof. **Places**, sometimes called commonplaces (loci communes) to distinguish them from special places used in scientific proofs, are used in cases where the probable rather than the provable are at issue. Characters in fables or fiction fall into the category of the probable because they represent another person's (the orator's or author's) perspective on the character being represented. Since the orator is working from a private perspective, his view of the character is not subject to scientific proof. Moreover, sometimes the character may not even fall into the category of the probable, especially when the character is idolopoeia.

Through the use of **places**, then, general assertions about character can be made. When **places** are used to make assertions about character (because **places** constitute the verbal means by which things are described), the interest in character is on two levels: on the level of character itself and in the means by which character is being defined and described. Characters in fables and fictions must use speech and language to describe themselves and other characters, their emotions, and their morals. Language, in its defining aspect, is general and it is only through and by means of the general (similar
to Saussure's *langue* without which there can be no *parole*) that anyone can understand the author's intent. Aristotle writes in the *Metaphysics* that it is only so far as the particular is universal that it can be known. The rhetor's desire to communicate his view of character to the audience encourages him to use general notions about character to describe and define his fabled characters; the combination of definition with comparison allows general notions about character to become specific as each *place* is varied and amplified during the course of the comparison or series of comparisons.

In the course of a comparison, a character may be praised or blamed for an action. It is proper to ask whether his/her action was honest or dishonest, was easy or difficult to accomplish; to enquire into his or her health, situation, or disposition, studies, or habits of mind or body. To do so is to use *places* to gauge response to the praise or blame given to a character. It is this general tendency of mankind to order experience in this way which leads the rhetor to use the same techniques to present character. Admittedly the verbal structures "health," "situation," "disposition," etc., are not aspects of character; they are categories or *places* by and through which character can be described. In order to define a particular from general notions about character, no single term will suffice; amplification and variation are required. General *places* can be amplified and varied until, through the additional use of comparison, a particular character emerges. That emergent character will resemble other characters but will be distinguishable from them if the places chosen to be used in the description and comparison are apt.
It is time now to look at what Dryden has to say about ethopoesis, i.e. the making of a character. The most complete description of his ideas about character is to be found in *The Grounds of Criticism in Tragedy*. There he explains "when a fable is designed, and not before, the persons are to be introduced with their manners, characters, and passions." Manners in this instance must be understood to mean ethos. This use of manners is an example of Dryden using three words to define and amplify the same ideas. All three words — manners, characters, and passions — are intended to express copiously one idea: ethos. Included in the notion of ethos is more than only the person; it is also his nature and disposition, his characteristic spirit, his moral portrait as it has been formed by his race, his birth, his status in his country or among his people. Jensen points out this meaning of "manners" in his *Glossary of John Dryden's Critical Terms*. "The chief qualities of a person's character (in a work of art)" is Jensen's main definition. He goes on to say that "Manners" always have to be appropriate and consistent to characters, and as such are closely connected to decorum and correctness." In *The Grounds of Criticism in Tragedy*, Dryden writes:

The manners in a poem are understood to be those inclinations, whether natural or acquired, which move and carry us to actions, good or bad, or indifferent, in a play; or which incline us to such or such actions...

The manners arise from many causes; and are either
distinguished by complexion, as choleric or phlegmatic, or by the differences of age, or sex, of climates, or quality of persons, or their present conditions; they are likewise to be gathered from the several virtues, vices, or passions, and many other commonplaces which a poet must be supposed to have learned. . . .

[Manners] . . . may be composed under these general heads: first, they must be apparent; that is, in every character of the play, some inclination of the person must appear; and these are shown in action and discourse. Second, the manners must suitable to the person; that is, to the age, sex, dignity and the other general heads of manners . . . . The third property is resemblance and this is founded upon the particular characters of men, as we have seen them delivered to us by relation of history; that is, when a poet has the known character of this or that man before him, he is bound to represent him as such, at least not contrary to that which fame has reported him to have been. . . . A character, or that which distinguishes one man from all others, cannot be supposed to consist of one particular virtue or vice, or passion only; but 'tis a composition of qualities which are not contrary to one another in the same person.

"Manners" is being used by Dryden in the passage quoted above to signify ethos. Ethos is achieved by Aphthonius in what he described as the combined form. It is the complete dramatic character. Both are using rhetorical places as a means of achieving ethopoesis. Both aim primarily to present character in terms that are general enough
for the character to be recognized but particular enough for him to be
distinguished from all other characters who may resemble him. Both
Aphthonius and Dryden recommend that character-makers be true to the
original when a known person is being represented. Dryden advocated
this practice of resemblance even when he did not always practice it.
In the preface to Don Sebastian, for example, Dryden apologizes for
altering the character of Sebastian by writing, "Tis true I have no
right to blast his Memory, with such a crime: but declaring it to be
fiction, I desire my Audience to think it no longer true, than while
they are seeing it represented." Both writers recommend
describing and defining character in terms of places which may be said
to be general (ancestry, sex, race, class, etc.) and in terms of
special skills, talents, actions and so on. Dryden speaks of a
"composition of qualities which are not contrary to one another in the
same person." In each case, the places are verbal means by which
general and particular assertions about character can be made.

The emphasis given to places as verbal structures is important
because Dryden defines a play as a "just and lively image of human
nature, representing its passions and humours, and the changes of
fortune to which it is subject, for the delight and instruction of
mankind." All of the discussants in the Essay of Dramatic Poesy
agree to this definition. Moreover, Dryden refers to this definition
and calls it his own again in the Defense of an Essay. This
definition has the effect of emphasizing emotions at the expense of
action. It is "human nature" that is the center of our attention and
interest in the heroic plays, and "human nature" is represented to the
reader or viewer through the words spoken by the characters. A second, more usual definition of a play, and one to which Dryden himself turned in *The Grounds of Criticism in Tragedy*, is the Aristotelian idea of a play as the imitation of an action. Because a play by the first definition, however, focuses attention on the speech and conversation of the characters, the verbal and poetic parts of a play take preeminence over the one, entire, and complete action. The "action" in the first definition is merely the "changes of fortune" to which a character might be subject. The characterization is unified in a play built upon this definition, even when the action may be discontinuous or chronological.

The dramatic means of presenting feelings, emotions, or passions is through the speech of the characters in conversation. Recall that Dryden writes in the *Defense of an Essay*, "If I am not deceiv'd, a Play is supposed to be the work of the poet, imitating, or representing the conversation of several persons." The emphasis on the words and thoughts of the characters is in its most basic form, a rhetorical interest. Dryden wished to "affect the soul and excite the passions" of his audience for which a bare imitation would not serve. Dryden also points to Davenant as an authoritative source in the writing of heroic plays. In his preface to *Gondibert*, Davenant quotes Lucan who said: "For wise poets think it more worthy to seek out the truth in the passions then to record the truth of Actions . . ." The immediate reason for the statement in Davenant's Preface is to distinguish between the imaginative act of a poet and the factual chronicle required of an historian. The quotation from Lucan serves
in this case to point up one significant, often overlooked distinction, about the heroic plays: they are primarily interested in a poetic/dramatic rendering of the passions of a character and his speech through the use of rhetorical techniques. The last part of Dryden's definition of a play tells why: the "just and lively image of human nature" is presented for "the delight and instruction of mankind." For an audience to be delighted or instructed or both, it must first be persuaded. According to Aristotle, rhetoric is the use of all the available means of persuasion.

Keeping in mind the rhetorical instruction for making characters, Dryden's own thoughts about making characters, and his definition of what a play is, let us now look at the character of Almanzor in The Conquest of Granada. Almanzor represents in terms of genus a noble man whose ancestry (and thus his race) is unknown until the end of Part Two; in terms of talent and achievement, a skilled horseman, in terms of virtue and valor, a person of great physical courage and personal appeal, a leader of men, valiant, honorable, and passionate. These descriptions — genus, race, talents, virtues, and so forth, — are all places which describe him. But seeing Almanzor only in terms of places without comparing him to others who share some attribute with him, or contrasting him with someone from whom he is completely different, results in an incomplete portrait. The refining process, the differentiating process, the distinguishing of Almanzor from Maximin, for example, is accomplished through various techniques of comparison.

In The Conquest of Granada, Almanzor is variously compared with
Lyndaraxa and other major characters. The comparison with Lyndaraxa is based on the figure of Fortune. This figure, Fortune, had become so familiar in its descent from the Roman Goddess Fortuna that it showed up in places as widely dispersed as a printer's device on the title page of Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* and as a moral of a play in Shakespeare's *Henry V*.

[Printer's device from a 1583 edition of Aphthonius' *Progymnasmata* (London: Thomas Marsh). Reproduced by University Microfilms, STC series, Case 28, Reel 126 STC #701]

Look at the picture of Fortune in the printer's device and consider the following quotation from Shakespeare:

"... Fortune is painted blind, with a muffler afore his eyes, to signify to you that Fortune is blind; and she is painted also with a wheel, to signify to you, which is the moral of it, that she is turning and inconstant, and mutability and variation; and her foot, look you, if fixed upon a spherical stone, which rolls and rolls, and rolls."
In good truth, the poet makes a most excellent description of it. Fortune is an excellent moral. Notice that in the Shakespeare quotation Fortune is both male ("he" is blind and has a muffler before "his" eyes) and female ("she" is painted with a wheel and "she" is inconstant). Using the figure of Fortune and the Shakespeare quotation as a gloss on The Conquest of Granada, it is possible to see that the description of Fortune is appropriate both to Lyndaraxa and to Almanzor. Although Almanzor is frequently described by others in the play in terms of storms and tempests (which also suggest passion, turbulence, and unpredictability, he describes himself as Almahide's fortune, Boabdellin's fate, and Abdalla's fortune and fate.

Lyndaraxa identifies with Fortune as she watches Abadalla foment a rebellion which she has inspired. When the news of the battle reaches her, Lyndaraxa responds in this way:

... Hero-like, with torches by my side,
Farr by the Omen, though, my love I'le guide;
No: like his better fortune I'le appear:
With open arms, loose vayl, and flowing Hair, Just
Flying forward on my rowling sphere,
My smiles shall make Abdalla more then Man;
Let him look up and perish if he can.

Fortune, here, describes and defines the turbulence of Lyndaraxa's emotional state. It has the quality of an emblem, when it is used as a description. It firms and fixes the description in a form that is easily remembered.

The juxtaposition of the characters of Almanzor and Lyndaraxa in
relation to the moral of Fortune as glossed by the Shakespeare
quotation demonstrates one example of the adaptability of rhetorical
techniques of comparito and emblem to the treatment of character in
the generation of a drama. By the end of Part Two, each side of the
comparison is clearer than either side would be alone. Lyndaraxa is
given objective ethos as a person driven beyond her control, which is
meant both to convey and exculpate her actions. As with Lyndaraxa, so
with Almanzor. The comparison allows the figure Fortune to portray
with verisimilitude positive and negative qualities of the same idea.
Almanzor and Lyndaraxa become the two sided figure, the dissoi
logoi
of unbridled passion and its effect on character. The comparison
illustrates vividly two characters whose genus, situation, and values
differ, but whose experience of the same passion produces opposite
effects. Dryden presents this one aspect of the characters in a
figure whose possibilities are infinite. The comparison is produced
in the spirit of what Aphthonius calls an "unrestrained form"; it is
embellished with different figures of speech and does not attempt to
present the 'whole' character to view all at once, for that would be
dull. The drama defines the context in which the comparison occurs.

Another emblematic glimpse of Almanzor is to be had by looking at
the figure Occasion. Here is a poem accompanying the emblem in
Whitney's A Choice of Emblemes [1586]:

What creature thou? Occasion I doe shewe
On Whirling wheel declare why dost thou stande?
Bicause, I still am tossed too, and froe.
Why dost thou houlde a rasor in thy hande?
That men maie knowe I cut on eurie side,
and when I come, I armies can diuide.

But wherefore hast thou winges vppon thy feete?
To shewe, how lighte I flie with little winde.
What meanes long lockes before? that suche as meete,
Maye houlde at firste, when they Occasion finde.
Thy heade behind all balde, What tells it more?
That none should houlde, that let me slippe before.

Why doest thou stande within an open place?
That I may warne all people not to staye,
But at the firste, Occasion to embrace,
And when shee comes, to meet her by the waye...

In Dryden's play, Almanzor is described in just these terms:

It is indeed Almanzor whom you see,
But he no longer is your Enemy.
You were ungrateful, but your foes were more;
What your injustice lost you, theirs restore.
Make profit of my vengeance while you may,
My two-edg'd sword can cut the other way.
I am your Fortune; but am swift like her,
And turn my hairy front if you defer:
That hour when you delib'rate is too late:
I point you the white moment of your fate.

In Part Two, Almahide is speaking to Almanzor and she says to him;

Alma: Thou strong Seducer, Opportunity!

Of womankind, half are undone by thee!

Occasion and Opportunity in this instance behave almost as synonyms. The main feature of the resemblance is the inability to seize the chance once the moment is passed. Opportunity and Occasion are emblematic of the portrayal of Almanzor in The Conquest.

The most important comparisons in The Conquest are those that
WHAT creature thou? Occasion I doe shewe.
On whirling wheelie declare why doth thou stande?
Because, I still am tossed too, and free.
Why doest thou holde a razor in thy hande?
That men maye knowe I can on enemie side,
And when I come, I armes can dausde.

But wherefore hast thou wings upon thy feet?
To shewe, how light I flye with little winde.
What meanes loyge lockes before such as meete,
Maye holde as priete, when they occasion finde.
Thy head behinde all bald, what tellis it more?
That none snaide boulde, that let me sippes before.

Why doest thou stande within an open place?
That I maye warne all people not to paye,
But at the priete, occasion to embrace,
And when shee comes, to meete her by the maye.
Lysippes so did thinke it best to see,
Who did devise mine image, as you see.

From Geoffrey Whitney: A Choice of Emblemes 1586
[slightly reduced]
center around the idea of what it is to be a king. Recall from the Wilson passage the definition of a king: "the minister of God, for goode ende, to the punishing of naughtie persons, and the comforting of godly men." Definition is the first place, and the other places through which Wilson takes the reader are the species, necessary adjuncts, contingent adjuncts, deeds necessary, proximate and final causes, effects, testimony, and similitudes. In each case, new matter is generated for the play. When the matter assumes a dramatic form, characters must be found who can at once be (or represent) the place considered and, at the same time, maintain the status of an individual character. Historical personages are among the possibilities, and distance is desired to avoid any charge of lesse majestie. England is less than a generation away from regicide and only ten years away from the restoration of Charles as Dryden dramatizes a commonplace theme on the duties of a king. Choosing the Granada of the late fourteen hundreds, immediately after Columbus sets out to explore new worlds in behalf of Ferdinand and Isabel at the moment of their victory over the Moors in Spain, seems a safe and exotic bet. Remembering, too, that comparisons of kings might benefit from the technique of progression, Dryden begins with Boabdellin, about whom little that is good can be said, and moves toward good king Ferdinand. Boabdellin's activities can be described only in negative terms. "Deedes necessary" for a king, according to Wilson, are to "defende religion, enact godly Lawes, punish offenders, defend the oppressed." In none of these cases does Boabdellin succeed. He does not show up well against Almanzor at their first encounter, he never inspires love in Almahide,
and he winds up losing his country. His motives for wanting to remain king are on a par with those of Lyndaraxa: he wishes to live for private pleasure rather than for public good. When he regrets that his kingdom is lost, it is only because he realizes that,

Kings who rule with limited Command
Have Players Scepters put into their Hand.
Pow'r has no balance, one side still weighs down;
And either hoysts the Common-wealth or Crown.
And those who think to set the Skale more right,
By various turnings but disturb the weight.

Boabdellin does not honor his oaths; he does not succor the oppressed; he does not keep his promises; he is base and he has attained his office by deceit. Boabdellin wishes to have the pomp and ceremony of the office without its responsibilities. There are three speeches in one act in which he talks about his desire to celebrate his love.

That other aspirant to kingship, Boabdellin's brother Abadalla, also wishes to be king for all of the wrong reasons. His attempted usurpation is begun simply because he wishes to have the beautiful Lyndaraxa for his bride. Unfortunately for him and for Granada, the only condition on which Lyndaraxa will entertain his suit is for him to be king. Abdalla is not cozened by her; he sees her deceit. But he will have her at all costs. So, he takes advantage of Almanzor's displeasure with Boabdellin, joins up with Lyndaraxa's clan, and almost succeeds at wresting the throne from his brother. The occasions on which he sees Lyndaraxa during the attempted usurpation provide some interesting scenes of accusation and persuasion as the next chapter will show. But private desires are insufficient reasons
to wish to become king.

Lyndaraxa wishes above all things to be the queen. She is willing to marry any man who can make her the queen, but unfortunately Boabdellin loves Almahide, Abdelmelech is not in line for the throne, and Almanzor, the only male in the play who has been approached by her who is unsmitten with her charms, does not want the job. When she soliloquizes

O could I read the dark decrees of fate,
That I might once know whom to love or hate!

... ...

I will be constant yet, if Fortune can;
I love the King: let her but name the Man,

she is really serious. Her words also show that her wish to be queen is not founded on correct grounds. Lyndaraxa pits brother against brother, increases factionalism within the state, pits friend against friend, and eventually brings death to them all: Abdelmelech, Abdalla, and herself. All of this internal strife going on at the same time that Granada is at war with outside foes, Ferdinand and Isabel, demonstrates that Lyndaraxa's motives for wishing to be queen have nothing to do with being God's vicegerent on earth, with giving succour to the homeless, or defending the oppressed. Her desire, she tells Abdalla, is motivated by her will to live "without controul":

... Because I've seen
This day, what 'tis to hope to be a Queen.
Heav'n, how y'all watch'd each motion of her Eye:
None could be seen while Almahide was by.
Why wou'd I be a Queen? because my Face
Wou'd wear the Title with a better grace.
If I became it not, yet wou'd it be
Part of your duty, then, to Flatter me.
These are not half the charms of being great:
I wou'd be somewhat . . . that I know not yet:
Yes; I avowe th' ambition of my Soul,
To be that one, to live without controul:
To be so happy as but one can be. 71

Lyndaraxa's naivete is ironic when her life is compared with
Almahide's, who is queen and whose life is circumscribed on every side
with controls. Lyndaraxa is asked what it is to be a king; she
replies:

A King is he whom nothing can withstand;
Who men and money can with ease command:
He is a King, who does a crown possess.
If you would have me think that you are he,
Produce to view your marks of Soveraignty.
But, if yourself alone for proof you bring,
You're but a single person; not a King. 72

The fact that she is telling this to a man who has attempted
unsuccessfully to usurp the throne for her is only a part of the
interest in this scene. The fact that two of the wishers for power
are willing to agree that being a king means to "live without
controul" proves that neither of them is a good candidate for the job.

To compare Lyndaraxa with Abdalla or with Boabdellin in terms of
their desire to be monarch is to see in all cases persons who are not
made of the stuff of a true monarch. Almanzor, on the other hand, is
made of the stuff of kings, and is, as he says, only while he chooses
to be so, a private man. The attributes of power hover about him from
our very first encounter with him. His act is kingly, if inappropriate because he is not king. In fact, whenever Almanzor appears on stage in the first part of the play, he is singularly misguided in his behavior at the same time that he is singularly king-like in his motivation. Almanzor really sees it as the duty of a king to take the weaker side to help his friends when in need and without weighing the cost, to be honorable in his doings, to serve his lady with valour, and to be successful in battle because he dares to trust in the right. 73 It is not until Ferdinand actually appears that the audience sees a real king. He possesses all the attributes of kingly power, and he is the first person with whom Almanzor identifies. All the attributes of a king that the Wilson example holds up are represented by Ferdinand and his Queen Isabel.

One of the similitudes for king is head of the family. In this world, that means the father. We meet only one mother, the ghost of Almanzor's mother. The fathers, type of similitude for king, learn to become better "monarchs" when they accept the lessons of love and unity from their children. Abenamar has reared two exemplary children in Ozmyyn and Almahide. Both have learned the lessons of duty, honor, and valour. Both have learned obedience to their fathers. Both, however, have also learned to honor their commitments, and sometimes these conflict with duty to their father. When the time comes, both maintain their ways before their fathers at the same time that they use every means at their disposal to achieve reconciliation in the family. They succeed in doing so after much trial and tribulation; but in the end they are successful.
The same is true of Benzayda. Although she and her father, Selin, have been a part of the opposing faction, they, too, show models of strong family ties that contrast sharply with the infidelity of Lyndaraxa and her brother Zulema. Because Selin and Abenamar are as fathers similitudes of kingship, the part of the drama which represents them should not be seen as a subsidiazyr plot. The families and the vicissitudes of their fortunes are another means of amplifying the commonplace theme, "unity preserves a commonwealth and discord destroys it." Of the kings, the would-be kings, and the real kings, then, Boabdellin commands the contingent adjuncts of a king but not the necessary adjuncts of monarchs; Almanzor commands the necessary but not the contingent adjuncts of a monarch; but Ferdinand and Isabel possess all. It is expected that under the tutelage of Ferdinand and Isabel Almanzor and Almahide will acquire the contingent adjuncts so that they may rule in Granada.

The characters in The Conquest are representations of the attributes of a king, either a good king or a bad king, and they are at the same time individual recognizable characters. They are conveyed according to the dramatists' view of them and are not candidates for Freudian or psychological analysis. They are passionate, interesting, and appealing. Lyndaraxa is absolutely fascinating. Abdalla is pitiful. He knows her weakness, her deceit and is willing to risk all in the attempt to gain Lyndaraxa's favor, without apology. His actions, if not tragic or heroic, are at least evocative of a kind of fascinated horror at his obsessive passion. Boabdellin is simply despicable. No one wonders that only obedience
to her father ties Almahide to him; and his death (offstage --- reported by Arcos) is only of passing interest. Almanzor raises one's total concernment because he is so completely unprepared for the society in which he finds himself, because he is rendered either speechless or hyperbolic at his newly experienced love for Almahide, and because his honor is so touching when he is confronted with the spurious reasoning of a Zulema, the scheming of Abdalla, or the wiles of Lyndaraxa.

Dryden suggests other comparisons in the play by juxtaposing scenes, by having characters repeat similar phrases to different effects, or by placing certain characters in similar situations. Two scenes of the first kind — juxtaposed scenes — which also happen to have similar phrases repeated to different effects, occur in Part II when first Almanzor and then Zulema attempt to experience physical passion with Almahide. In the first instance, the ghost of Almanzor's mother delays and thereby prevents the rape; in the second instance, Abdelmelech hears Almahide's cries and intercedes in her behalf. His attempt to rescue Almahide leads to complications for Abdelmelech and Almahide, because Lyndaraxa comes to the aid of her brother and hatches a plot which jeopardizes the lives of both Almahide and Abdelmelech. Almanzor and Zulema have each come to Al mahide with similar intentions: in Almanzor's case, he knows Almahide loves him, he has served her gallantly, he has tried to love her nobly, without expectation of reward. At this point, however, he tries to seduce her using words and phrases very similar to those with which Zulema has persuaded Abdalla to usurp the throne from Boabdellin
in Part I of the play. Almanzor, however, recognizes that he is misusing language and says to Almahide:

A happiness so nigh, I cannot bear:
My loves too fierce; and you too killing fair.
I grow enrag'd to see such Excellence:
If words so much disorder'd, give offence,
My love's too full of zeal to think of sense.
Be you like me, dull Reason hence remove;
And tedious forms; and give a loose to love. 74

Zulema has used similar reasoning in his argument with Abdalla. Whereas both Almahide and Almanzor recognize that his language is "disorder'd," Zulema and Abdalla may also know it, but they act as if it were true reasoning or "right reason," and make decisions to act based upon it. The effect of the language is, therefore, different.

Zulema has said to Abdalla:

Reason but Shows a weak Physitian's skill:
Gives nothing while the raging fit does last;
But stays to cure it when the worst is past.
Reason's a staff for age, when Nature's gone;
But youth is strong enough to walk alone. 75

In both scenes, a character is being tempted to pursue a course of action which goes against reason and which is doomed to fail. Both persuaders, Almanzor and Zulema, belittle the importance of reason, or appeal to the pleasure of unreason for a moment when a decision is imminent. Abdalla knows that the argument is specious but he wishes to have Lyndaraxa at all costs. Almahide loves Almanzor, too, but she loves honor more than pleasure or Almanzor, and she does not give in.

A scene of the third kind, one in which different characters...
invite comparison because they are in similar situations, involves a
comparison between Lyndaraxa and Almahide because each is loved by
more than one man. Abdalla and Abdelmelech love Lyndaraxa; and
Almanzor, Boadellin, and Zulema love Almahide. Zulema is not a
potential king, and so can be discounted in the comparison. That
leaves two triangular relationships which have about them the quality
of incompleteness that is balanced by the complete and noble loves of
two other pairs of lovers, Benzayda and Ozmyn and Ferdinand and Isabel.

At the point in the play where we meet her, Almahide believes it
is her duty to love the man her father has chosen for her to marry.
She has complied with his choice, even though not her own. There has
never been a complaint about the union because her own heart has never
been consulted. When she meets Almanzor, however, and learns to know
and admire him -- even to love him -- she regrets her father's choice,
but chooses to obey him. When Almanzor's request for her is denied,
Almahide laments:

How blest 'twas I before this fatal day!
When all I know of love, was to obey!
'Twas life becalm'd; without a gentle breath;
Though not so cold, yet motionless as death:
A heavy quiet state: but love all strife,
All rapid, is the hurrican of life.
Had love not shown me, I had never seen
An Excellence beyond Boabdelin.
I had not, aiming higher, lost my rest;
But with a vulgar good been dully blest.
But, in Almanzor, having seen what's rare,
Now I have learnt too sharply to compare,
And, like a fav'rite quickly in disgrace,
Just know the value 'ere I loose the place. 76

Having acknowledged her duty to her father, Almahide marries Boabdellin according to paternal wishes. Her attitude about the marriage is expressed in this way:

I'll cherish Honour, then, and life despise;
What is not pure, is not for Sacrifice.
Yet, for Almanzor I in secret mourn!
Can Vertue, then, admit of his return?
Yes; for my love I will, by Vertue, square;
My Hart's not mine; but all my actions are . 77

Of course, it is fine for Almahide to make such a decision for herself, but she cannot expect to bind Almanzor to the same conditions of behavior without his consent. Almahide, too, has much to learn about love. Ozymy and Benzayda and Ferdinand and Isabel will teach Almanzor and Almahide the lessons they need to learn about true heroic love. Almahide's vision of her own love for Almanzor is a love of sacrifice, in which she sacrifices her love to honor and virtue.

Almanzor has never been infected with love until his encounter with Almahide for the first time. He does not expect to be so afflicted and is rendered first incoherent, then speechless by the effects of his passion:

Alman.: You are . . .
Almah.: . . . I know I am your Captive, Sir.
Alman.: You are . . . You Shall . . . And I can scarce for / bear . . .
Almah.: Alas!
Alman.: . . . 'Tis all in vain; it will not do:'
I cannot now a seeming anger show:
My Tongue against my heart no aid affords,
For love still rises up, and choaks my words. 78

It takes Almanzor the better part of both parts of the play to learn to love rightly. He must overcome his temper, his seeming vacillation, the undependability of the promises of two Princes (Boabdellin and Abdalla, after he attempts to usurp the throne of Granada), exile, harsh requirements of honour he finally comes to know himself and love. As he is honourable always, he must learn only to love properly. Boabdellin, Abdalla, and Lyndaraxa must learn everything about love and what it is to be a king.

Boabdellin, also in love with Almahide, has already been shown to be the bad king. He is also a bad lover. First of all, he insists that Almahide marry him even after he knows that it is Almanzor that she loves. Then, he refuses to trust her or to believe in her honor, even when she tries to give proof of her fidelity. Next, he continues to use the services of Almanzor to retain his throne because he fears becoming a private man. He wishes to be king even though he is not suited for the office by temperament or ability. Finally, he is so jealous that no one could be honest or true enough for him. One speech typifies his attitude toward love:

Marriage, thou curse of love; and snare of Life,
That first debas'd a Mistress to a Wife!
Love, like a Scene, at distance should appear;
But Marriage views the Gross-daub'd Landschape neer.
Loves nauseous curse! thou cloyst whom thou shouldst please;
And, When thou cur'st, then thou art the disease.
When Hearts are loose, thy Chain our bodies tyes;
Love couples Friends; but Marriage Enemies.
If Love, like mine, continues after thee,
'Tis soon made sour, and turn'd by Jealousie.
No sign of Love in jealous Man remains
But that which sick men have of life; their pains. 79

Boabdellin's jealousy is less well founded even than Othello's because there is no Iago in Granada. His own mind is the poison in the relationship.

Compare Boabdellin's thoughts on love and marriage with those of Isabel after she, believing that "The Courts of Kings,/To all Distress's shou'd Sanctuaries be," gives succour to Ozmy and Benzayda as they flee the wrath of their fathers:

Your Thanks some other time I will receive:
Henceforward, safe in my Protection live.
Granada, is, for Nobel Loves renown'd;
Her best defense is in her Lovers found.
Love's a Heroique Passion which can find
No room in any base degenerate mind:
It kindles all the soul with Honours Fire,
To make the Lover worthy his desire.
Against such Heroes I success should fear,
Had we not too an Host of Lovers here.

The Fair and Brave on each side shall contest;
And they shall overcome who love the best. 80

Since Isabel and Ferdinand stand for all that is right in a Christian kingdom, heroique love and an unified commonwealth, all the lovers in the play must be measured by this yardstick. It is easy to see that
Benzayda and Ozmyn will, when they are Christian converts, be the very type of Ferdinand and Isabel; Almahide and Almanzor, when they have been adopted by Isabel, because they are already heroic, will also advance to their stage as great lovers. They will unite Cordova and Morocco (as Ferdinand and Isabel have united Castile and Aragon).

Ozmy and Benzayda will, to some extent, do the same; both pairs will be perfected.

Lyndaraxa, on the other hand, destroys all that she touches. She ends by having separated herself from filial loyalty and by having caused the death of Abdalla, Abdelmelech and herself. Lyndaraxa and Boabdellin represent selfishness and incapacity either to govern or to love well. Where Almahide sees love as beyond her control, Lyndaraxa believes her actions to be entirely within her control. She does not make such a distinction. She will love whoever can make her queen. Love is an act of will or a matter of choice where she is concerned. Lyndaraxa's passion is for power not for love. In fact, there are several speeches in which this equation of power with love is made explicit:

Abdel.: Too well I know her blandishments to gain,
Usurper-like, till settled in her Reign,
Then proudly she insults, and gives you cares
And jealousies; short hopes and long despairs.
To this hard yoke you must hereafter bow;
Howe're she shines all Golden to you now.

Lyndaraxa speaks of her power often. After showing her considerable skill in argument, in rendering Abdelmelech almost helpless in his
attempt to persuade her to love him instead of Abdalla, she accuses him of jealousy and promises not to believe him to be her lover until he becomes submissive:

    Lynda.: And, till you that submissive Servant prove,
           I never can conclude you truly love. 82

She says to Abdalla, in the very next act, almost the same thing:

    Indulgence does not with some tempers sute;
    I see I must become more absolute
    ... 
    Either confess your fault or hold your tongue;
    For I am sure I'm never in the wrong. 83

Repeatedly in scenes with Abdalla and Abdelmelech, Lyndaraxa wheedles, threatens, teases, pleads, insults, and manipulates them into submission. Indeed, it is only Almanzor who is not moved by her intreaties. With him she vows to use all her "arts" to flatter, cajole, and plead him into her power. When she fails, it seems that she is the most surprised person. Her "way with words" is spoken of in terms of rhetoric. Abdelmelech asks her:

    Have I not answered all you can invent;
    Ev'n the last shadow of argument?
Lynda.: You want not cunning what you please to prove;
But my poor heart knows only how to Love.
And, Finding this, you Tyrannize the more: --
'Tis plain, some other Mistriss you adore:
And now, with studied tricks of subtility.
You come prepared to lay the fault on me. ... 
You would with Wit, your want of love maintain.
But, by my own Experience, I can tell,
They who love truly cannot argue well. 84
This argument from Lyndaraxa must have had her audience laughing out loud, because it comes after she has just demolished Abdelmelech's argument for the second time, and after she has shown her skills in rhetoric with Abdalla as well. One wishes that Lyndaraxa and Boabdilin had been in love, since they seem to be the male and female of the same type. Both require constant proof of their power over the beloved. Both will use any tactic to gain the advantage. Both seem to equate love with power and to desire absolute power over the loved one.

A review of Dryden's treatment of character as it has been presented in this chapter will show that a rhetorical treatment of the making of a character is a consequent function of Dryden's definition of a play as a "just and lively image of human nature, representing its passions and humours and the changes of fortune to which it is subject, for the delight and instruction of mankind," and to his definition of a play as the representation of the "conversations of several persons." (The latter will be more obvious when the design of the play is discussed in the following chapter.) Dryden develops his characters by a dramatic rendering of the two sides (parallel as in the kings and fathers, or antithetical as in the good and bad examples of a king) that are possible in the presentation of any locus communis. The variety of comparisons with other characters helps each character to emerge more clearly than either could without the comparisons, as a just and lively image (or picture) of human nature. At the same time, it is possible to see that the failure to consider a rhetorical perspective and Dryden's own definition of play results in
the inadequate and incomplete descriptions of ethopoesis by Sherwood (who describes the method as the repetition of trait after trait) and Barbeau (who describes the characters as exemplifications of various attitudes). Moreover, their evaluations of the plays are also determined by their implicit or explicit assumptions that the standard for judging the play is Aristotelian — that Dryden was attempting unsuccessfully to imitate an "action" rather than to image "human nature." Dryden did not leave his assumptions to guess work.
Chapter V. Dispositio and the Design of The Conquest of Granada

Quite simply, dispositio is the arrangement of the speech. Quintilian, however, is anxious that orators know that it is not only that certain parts go before or follow certain other parts, but also that the arrangement strive to achieve some sort of wholeness or cohesion beyond chronology or relationship. He writes:

It is not enough to arrange the various parts: each several part has its own internal economy according to which one thought will come first, another second, another third. While we must struggle not merely to place these thoughts in their proper order but to link them together and give them such cohesion that there will be no trace of any suture: they must form a body, not a congerie of limbs.

Thomas Wilson distinguished two kinds or ordering. The first is the traditional order of exordium, narration, confirmation, confutation, peroration; the second shows variation from that order to gain certain desired effects, principally through the weighing of reasons. Once the reasons have been evaluated, the most effective order results from placing the strongest argument at the beginning and the end, with the weakest argument reserved for the middle of the oration.
In *The Conquest of Granada*, Dryden is dramatizing the commonplace theme that unity preserves and discord destroys a commonwealth. When such a theme is dramatized, the commonplace theme is presented in terms of the virtue of the good and the vice of the bad side of this proposition whose truth is already accepted by the audience. The play is, then, arranged in terms of the order of the parts of a commonplace theme in praise of virtue and vice; and the argument proceeds on the basis of the parts of the oration -- exordium, narration, confirmation, confutation, and peroration -- with the strongest arguments at the beginning and the end and the weakest arguments in the middle. In true Dydenian fashion, the weakest argument is the most colorful. The strongest argument for unity in a commonwealth is "imaged" by Ferdinand and Isabel; the strongest argument against discord in a commonwealth is "imaged" by Boabdelin; and the weakest and most colorful argument is "imaged" by Lyndaraxa and she is in the middle of both parts of the play. Selin and Abenamar represent arguments by analogy; Benzayda and Ozmyn represent argument by comparative example; and many incidents, such as the jousts, the tourneys, represent argument by testimony.

The primary technique Dryden uses in the play is the adaptation of scenes dramatizing *suasoriae* and *controversiae*. If the play were the representation of an "action" one would expect the plot to move on the basis of cause and effect and to "contain a ruling idea working its way out through character into action," to use the description of Margaret Sherwood. That is not the case in this play, because, as we have seen, Dryden is interested in representing to view, through the
conversations of persons, a "just and lively image of human nature, representing its passions, and its humours, and the changes of fortune to which it is subject, for the delight and instruction of mankind."
The whole idea behind the Renaissance commonplace theme on virtue and vice, also its main purpose, was the encouraging of virtue and the censuring of vice. Further, the controversiae and suasoriae have as their subjects many problems which involve the changes of fortune, and the behavior of humans as a result of those changes. A combination of the two forms, in the hands of a skilled, or inspired artist could produce something like the heroic plays. I wish to state at the outset of this chapter that I do not believe that Dryden sat down with the intent to do so. Nevertheless, it will be seen that his training permitted just such an occurrence.

The controversiae and suasoriae of Seneca the Elder were frequently printed with the essays and epistles of his son. Renaissance and Resoration schoolboys were probably well acquainted with them because they had been known continuously throughout the Middle Ages. They are not so well known today and some description of them is, therefore, necessary. In his book, Seneca the Elder reconstructs for his sons the activities of the Roman schools of declamation which he had attended as a young man. The boys between the ages of twelve to sixteen were given by their teachers historical or fictional themes upon which they composed declamations. In the beginning, they practised deliberative oration -- known as suasoriae -- in which they imagined themselves to be Alexander, deciding whether or not to sail the ocean, or Agamemnon, deciding whether to sacrifice
These exercises are similar to the exercise in ethopoeisis described by Aphthonius, except that the emphasis is different. In the suasoriae the argument is most important, and in the ethopoeisis developing character is most important. In the Roman schools, then, as the boys developed these deliberative skills, they advanced to the more difficult controversiae.

In these exercises, the boys had to imagine themselves delivering a judicial oration in the forum either for or against a disinherited son or an accused wife as in the examples below:

A rich man disinherited his three sons. He asks a poor man for his only son to adopt. The poor man is ready to comply; when his son refuses to go, he disinherits him.  

A wife, tortured by a tyrant to find out if she knew anything about her husband's plot to kill him, persisted in saying that she did not. Later her husband killed the tyrant. He divorced her on the grounds of her barrenness when she bore no child within five years of marriage. She sues him for ingratitude.

Eugene Waith demonstrates how declamations which had started as school exercises became the vogue in Augustan Rome "at the very moment that their function as a practical training for the political arena was lost." Emperors do not need declaimers to assist them in deliberating, however, and Roman schoolmasters allowed the art of declamation to develop into a very specialized art form. Audiences of parents and afficianados particularly enjoyed epigrams, sententiae, those short witty sayings that were especially effective as neat
Audiences applauded, also, the brilliant descriptive digressions and apt or appropriate exempla.

In time, however, the declamations came to stray far from reality. They seemed to be manufactories of stock characters -- rich man or poor, good son or bad -- and implausible situations -- pirates, poisons, coincidences, sudden discoveries, reversals of fortune, ghosts. (If these complaints sound familiar to us, it is probably because these are the same charges leveled against Dryden's heroic plays.) According to Waith, "fourteen centuries later [than Roman schools], declamations were studied in England at the culminating point of the education in the upper grammar school or sometimes in the university."

After the question had been posed (as in the example of the pirate chief's daughter or the tortured wife given above), pupils demonstrated their prowess by composing a declamation in favor of each side of the argument and then against each side. In this way they practised the rules of rhetoric and had the opportunity to improve their skill at copiousness, enrichment, amplification, and variation of phrase and argument, so highly prized in Augustan Rome, and in Elizabethan, Jacobean, and Caroline England. "Brilliant elaboration," says Waith, "was still the object of the exercise, as it had been when Seneca compiled the controversiae." We hear very little about Seneca the Elder today, partly because we no longer have ties with or sympathy for the classical tradition of rhetoric which was still intact in Dryden's England. An example or two of Seneca's
Controversiae will show how they were presented and argued.

The Oath Sworn by the
Husband & Wife

A husband and wife took an oath that if anything should happen to either of them, the other would die. The husband went off on a trip abroad, and sent a message to his wife to say that he had died. The wife threw herself off a cliff. Revived, she is told by her father to leave her husband. She does not want to, and is disinherited.9

Seneca recalls the arguments of eight declaimers in behalf of the woman and three for the other side. Then he explains that the argument itself does not require a division because apart from the question of equity, everything else is a matter of development. Seneca then shows how the master teacher, Latro, brought up questions of conjecture: that is a point of fact, as opposed to a question of equity or morality. He shows also the various colours used by different declaimers. "Romanius Hispo used this colour: the oath had been a joke -- the man had sworn as lovers constantly swear every day. . . . The wife had realized the message was a trick and had flung herself from a place where a fall could not be fatal, in order (he said) that 'just as I had frightened her by a false report, she could frighten me by a fictitious danger.' "10 When Ovid declaimed on the same question, he spoke as if he were the husband and asks the father of his wife: "We acknowledge our mistake. We forgot, when we swore, that there was a third party -- who loved more; may it always be so, ye gods. -- Do you persist Father-in-law? Take your daughter back; I
was the sinner, and I deserve punishment. Why should I be the cause of censure to my wife, of childlessness to her father? I shall leave the city, flee, go into exile, endure my loss as best I may with a miserable and heartless endurance. I should kill myself -- if I could die alone."

From these examples and from Seneca's comments it is clear that the *controversiae* include a brief enumeration of the circumstances of the case, the citation of statutes relevant to the argument; then one speaker, taking the side, let us say, of the father wishing to disinherit, presents his case; then another speaker presents the opposing case. The choice between the persuasiveness of one of the two speakers is left open. These exercises in *controversiae* challenged the users to devise novel and witty arguments, to investigate all the angles (colores or colours as Seneca called them). Waith notes that every circumstance favored the cultivation of wit, ingenuity, polish, and ornamentation. The applause was for the surprising application of a philosophical commonplace, the vivid description, the clever analysis of motive, the epigram. Declamation, having become an end in itself, evolved into an art form of a very special sort.

It is not uncommon to find among the writers about the schools in Renaissance and Restoration England that eloquence was the most highly prized of the arts and received a major emphasis in education. Every schoolboy had to develop the skills demanded by the *controversiae* and had his tastes formed to a greater or lesser degree by the rhetorical concepts implicit in his training. Such training
was important, too, for the drama. The requirement that students invent a series of scenes based on the central conflict of the case in order to convey a certain interpretation of circumstance and character is essentially a dramatic technique. It is possible to see from Seneca's collection of *Controversiae* that many of the most memorable and moving parts of the declamations were scenes of torture, of bravery, of recognition, or of repentance, evoked for the audience with the utmost dramatic art. The student was required not only to imagine the scene, but also to place himself in the position of one of the fictitious (not to say fantastic) characters and to speak as that character might have spoken (as in the Ovidian example). Manuals on rhetoric called this device *ethopoeia* (literally the creation of character), or *prosopopoeia* (personification), or *idolopoeia* (ghosts, phantasms, or spirits). The most popular rhetoric of the Renaissance and Restoration eras was that of Aphthonius of Antioch, *The Progymnasmata*, and its Englished version, *The Foundacioun of Rhetorike* by Richard Rainolde. It gives as an example of *ethopoeia*, the lament that Hecuba might have made after the fall of Troy. Aphthonius and the others stress the importance of observing strict decorum in selecting the *loci communes* for choosing character traits and words suitable to them -- their age, sex, station, occupation, disposition, and so on, on the character being made. Although this practice could and did encourage the creation of "type" characters, some writers moved beyond mere "types" by their imaginative use of the tools of rhetoric.

Dryden tried to overcome the limitations of "types" by using
additional techniques of rhetoric, primarily *comparatio*, as has been shown in the previous chapter. There is no getting by the fact, though, that *ethopoeia* is related both to the creation of character for the drama and for the type of essay known as the 'character' derived from the Theophrastan type.

In chapter two of this essay, it was shown that the rhetors always recognized the relation of dramatic poetry to rhetoric. In this chapter, it should be seen that the extensive use of *ethopoeia* in the declamation, both *suasoriae* and *controversiae*, is emblematic of the running together of two traditions -- drama and rhetoric -- said by C. S. Baldwin to be theoretically distinct. We saw earlier that the imitation of an action, best exemplified in the dramatic scene, and the persuading of men to a desired course of action, best exemplified in the oration, had the tendency in the *controversiae* and *suasoriae* for rhetoric to take on the coloration of poetic and vice-versa.

Rhetoric used imaginative appeal to influence audience response. *Controversiae* became in Seneca's Rome, in Shakespeare's England and in Dryden's England, a form of entertainment in which most of the resources of poetry were employed in the service of rhetoric. George Puttenham would not have been surprised to learn this. He wrote, "the poets were also from the beginning the best persuaders, and their eloquence the first Rhetoricke of the world. . . .He continues:

Now if our presupposall be true, that the Poet is of all other the most auncient Orator, as he that by good & pleasant perswasions first reduced the wilde and beastly people into publicke societies and civilitie of life, insinuating unto them, under
fictions with sweete and coloured speeches, many wholesome lessons and doctrines, then no doubt there is nothing so fitte for him as to be furnished with all the figures that be Rhetoricall, and such as do most beautifie language with eloquence & sententiousnesse. . . .So as if we should intreate our maker to play also the Orator and whether it be to pleade, or to praise, or to advise, that in all three cases he may utter, and also perswade both copiously and vehemently.16

It is not uncommon for scholars to call Dryden's heroic plays (or any of his serious drama) rhetorical -- although few have been specific about the precise way in which they are rhetorical. One suggestion is that they are intended to please his audience and that makes them rhetorical; another suggestion is that the characters, too, have the nature of "stock" or "type" characters, or that they are "exemplifications of ideas" and that makes the drama somehow rhetorical.17 Richard Larson has shown that one of Dryden's dramatic techniques is rhetorical without calling the plays themselves "mere rhetoric." Richard Leslie Larson's Dryden's Dramatic Technique demonstrates the relationship between Dryden's view of the rhetorical, even didactic purposes of tragedy and the ability of the dramatist to achieve the desired effects. The relationship centers on the achievement of concernment in the audience for the characters being represented in a drama and the means used to achieve that concernment. Questions such as "how" drama, and particularly tragedy, works, "what" are the characteristics which make drama effective, "what" are the means used to achieve the twin goals of delight and
instruction simultaneously and thereby achieve drama's rhetorical purposes, are answered by defining concernment and identifying the means Dryden uses to achieve concernment in the plays. Larson shows that:

Dryden's critical writing . . . reveals that he changed his opinion as to how best to achieve "concernment" in a spectator. Early in his career as critic he had thought that the liveliness of varied action and elaborate, impassioned discourse would move the spectator, and would be sufficient to assure the excellence of a play; later he insisted that the attributes, without order and justness of representation, were inadequate. As a historical and theoretical critic, Dryden appears to have confronted the problem of how to reconcile these apparently opposite critical inclinations. As a practical critic who was also a practising dramatist, Dryden believed that he faced the same problem in writing plays: how to balance liveliness with order and accuracy . . . For Dryden, convinced that drama was a branch of rhetoric for instructing man in wise and noble conduct... wanted a technique that would assure his plays the liveliness they would need to fulfill their objectives as rhetoric, while eschewing unnatural plots and incredible characters.18

Larson's answer is that Dryden found the technique he sought in two particular versions of the "confrontation scene." This is a scene in which "characters whose purposes are in conflict face each other directly."19 He shows that the confrontation scenes are most effective when one character appeals to another to behave according to
the wishes of the first character, and those in which one character accuses a second character of behavior which is undesirable or reprehensible in the judgment of the accuser. A brief way to describe these scenes is to call them scenes of persuasion and scenes of accusation. These scenes frequently include some argument in verse (for which Dryden is so famous), show both participants expressing a strongly felt emotional commitment to their positions, and include emotions such as sexual love, admiration, despair, jealousy, sympathy, anger, and others. Dryden wrote that these emotions are to be the poet's commonplaces and one of the means by which the poet can raise concernment in the audience. Both types of scenes, accusation and persuasion, create emotional involvement in the persuader or the accuser and in the audience, generate an arresting dramatic event by showing that the outcome of the scene of confrontation will affect each character, and provide the material for a scene which will satisfy the needs of the practicing dramatist and the theoretical critic. Moreover, such scenes will achieve these ends "without violating unity of action, [and] without cluttering the stage with superfluous characters obliquely related to the main action . . . [such scenes] present a 'lively' encounter [on stage] and can engage the spectator's 'concernment,' that is to say, his active interest and sympathetic involvement in what was taking place." The rhetorical technique of creating scenes of persuasion and accusation also produced "the suspense that comes when one's interest in the characters has been aroused but one is uncertain about when future confrontations will take place, or about how the outcome of the
scenes will affect the future behavior and the emotions of the participants. "He [Dryden] found that as a substitute for encounters on the battlefield, passages of descriptions or narration, surprising actions, elevated expressions of subjective feelings, impassioned or dispassionate searches for truth, painful self-examinations, soliloquies -- all fairly common tools in the dramatists' kit -- incidents of persuasion or accusation offer the dramatist the opportunity to secure durable emotional excitement without exaggerating or falsifying nature." If the feelings developed on stage are credible, a spectator can share them. Once he begins to share these feelings, and to believe that they are important, once he takes sides in the confrontation, he is experiencing 'concernment.' Giving the spectator such concernment, Dryden found, was a palatable and efficient way to instruct him.”

Larson's brilliant rhetorical analysis is the only one of the heroic plays which uses rhetoric as a perspective from which the plays might profitably be studied. His analysis demonstrates that scenes of persuasion and accusation are used in a number of the plays.

No one, however, has claimed that the emotional appeal of Dryden's characters may be explained in terms of rhetoric, or in terms of the controversiae or suasoriae of Seneca the Elder. It must be emphasized that there is no intent to impute to Seneca the status of a source for Dryden's drama, for his plots, or for any scenes therein. In any case, Waith wisely observes that no source accounts for the final product from a poet. However, the form of the declamations, their strong evocative, emotional appeal, their use in amplification, their
moving descriptions, their merging of rhetoric and poetic, make them extremely adaptable for a drama which seeks to "image" human nature, its passions and humours, and the changes of fortune to which it is subject. Controversiae are emblematic of Dryden's heroic drama: their extensive use of imaginative description, their use of ethopoesis, their incorporation of rhetoric into poetic, their sententiae, so useful in balanced phrases in heroic poetry and in poetry with didactic intent, their elegant language, and their sensational themes together with their emphasis upon exciting detail show the influence of display oratory. The controversiae have the distinct character of the debate, and in Dryden's typical scenes of argument and persuasion, described so accurately by Larson, questions of a hypothetical nature are incorporated. Questions such as: "What are the attributes of a king?" "How far is one bound by oaths or obligations?" "Can oaths or vows be rendered invalid by circumstances beyond the control of the obliged person?" Or, "Are oaths rendered invalid by ingratitude?" are explored in the scenes or argument and persuasion.

Dryden has developed the situation of the controversiae with considerable skill. In The Conquest of Granada, a play in two parts, the first part is built around crucial scenes of argument and persuasion between Almanzor and Almahide, Lyndaraxa and Abdalla, Lyndaraxa and Abdelmelech, Ozymyn and Benzayda, and at least one
between Abdalla and Abdelmelech. In the first part of the play it is established that Almahide will not dishonor her father's wishes in her choice of husband even when the choice is not consistent with her own; that Lyndaraxa will give herself to the suitor who can make her queen; that Ozmyn and Benzayda will find a way to overcome the parental disfavor with which their love has been greeted or dissolve the union; and Abdalla, resisting the advice of Abdelmelech, has decided to pursue Lyndaraxa's love, even when he (and everyone else) knows that she is false, mutable, and not in love with him. (Abdalla and Lyndaraxa and Abdelmelech represent both the other side of the Almanzor/Boabdelin/Almahide triangle, and the Benzayda/Ozmyn pair.)

The second part contains the climax of the play, the resolution of all the dilemmas set up in Part One. There is a sense of immediacy and urgency given to these plots by the overriding plan which is to show that unity preserves and discord destroys a commonwealth in the dramatization of a commonplace theme.

Each of the story-lines contributes in some way, either as confirmation or refutation of the question under discussion, to the main theme, at the same time that is serves to stimulate concernment in the audience. The design allows for dramatic encounters evoking emotional responses in the audience to the scenes of passion, sorrow, incipient love, repentance, argument, persuasion, attempted murder and attempted rape, while at the same time expanding on the theme of praise for good monarchs (fathers included), censure for bad ones, and, sympathy for incipient lovers and kings. Moreover, the scenes carry forward the declamatory exercises and demonstrate copiousness,
amplitude, and variety. The confrontations between Lyndaraxa and Abdalla, or between Lyndaraxa and Abdelmelech, for example, border on the risible and are fully engaging in themselves while they show one element of discord, both within two families (Lyndaraxa's and Abdalla's), within the state (in the form of Abdalla's almost successful usurpation), and in the factional division between two erstwhile friends (Abdalla and Abdelmelech). The family is the microcosm of the state and is broken up when Lyndaraxa succeeds in getting Abdalla to usurp his brother's ill-gotten throne. The attempt is doomed to fail, by powers that neither of them can control; further, even were the attempt successful, Ferdinand and Isabel are already preparing to conquer Granada. Additionally, if he had succeeded, he would only have been a slave to Lyndaraxa, who would have been the despot.

As a feature of the design of the play, then, the scenes between Lyndaraxa/Abdalla/Abdelmelech employ the techniques of the controversiae, and thereby provide a measure of the poet's skill for the audience to admire, engage the audience's concernment for the characters in conflict, provide material for amplification and argument, and add copiousness for the moral the author wishes to convey. Moreover, the scenes provide contrasts between characters. Look at, for instance, Act Two of Part I in which Lyndaraxa tells Abdalla on what terms she might be his. Then, compare the scene in which she explains her behavior with Abdalla to Abdelmelech, over whom she is trying to retain her power, because she may have to settle for him as a husband.23 The scenes are not very far removed from each
other, so that even in the theatre the memory of one would be fresh in
the viewer's mind as he saw the other. Lyndaraxa's skill in
manipulating argument to her advantage is wonderful to behold. As
another example of the comparison between scenes or persons in the
same situation reacting differently, look at Act Three of Part I. In
the first section, Almahide, just learning that a siege is under way
expresses sorrow, while Lyndaraxa, responding to the same news,
events great excitement and joy. It may be that Lyndaraxa's joy is
caused by her secret knowledge that the attempted usurpation has
begun; nevertheless, her ambition, compared with Almahide's lack of
ambition for the throne, is highlighted because of the proximity of the
speeches and the proximity of the characters. For another comparison,
see the speeches that begin Act One of both parts of the play. In the
first part the speaker is Boabdilin, in the second part, Ferdinand.
Notice that the concerns of their speeches are different. Boabdilin's
concerns are private pleasure; Ferdinand's are public policy.

It would be futile and mistaken to try to attribute each feature
of The Conquest to any one rhetorical technique such as the
controversiae. It is worth repeating that no source accounts for the
final product of a poet. Yet, as one source, rhetoric accounts for
more of the characteristic features of The Conquest of Granada,
indeed, for its form, than is at first apparent. The situation in
Granada is presented in Part One, Act One:  Granada is besieged from
without by Ferdinand and Isabel, from within by a weak and ignominious
king, rival factions, disloyal and disintegrating families, and an
uncontrollable foreigner whose strength and skill are necessary to the
survival of the state. Further, there are the ambitions of private citizens which conflict with public interests. There are the private interests of the public figures which conflict with practical policy. This situation provides the opportunity for the scenes of controversiae in which characters speak to different sides of an argument put forth on the loci communes which explore or inventory the topic, What is the duty of a king to himself, his subjects, his peers in other realms, his family, his country? Other topics which can be argued in the scenes of controversiae are what are the duties of a parent to his child? What are the duties of a child to his parent? How are the questions of filial loyalty and spousal loyalty to be resolved when they are in conflict? The dramatization of such scenes provide the highpoints of Dryden's play. In some of the scenes, attempts at persuasion fail or are interrupted by events; when these occur, they create suspense or anticipation for the next encounter between these conversants. Such scenes are often continued throughout both parts of the play. (Examples are the scenes in which Almanzor tries to persuade Almahide to love him and reject Boabdelin, and those in which Ozymyn and Benzayda attempt to persuade their parents to reconsider their decisions to disinherit them.)

Although it is dangerous to make generalizations about the scenes of argument and persuasion, or the controversiae, it appears that a tendency towards abstraction, even when the argument seems to be character-specific, seems to be typical. Whether the subject is the relative merit of death over separation from the beloved or of the obligations to parents versus obligations to honor, the emphasis falls
upon the intellectual issue rather than upon tensions between the opposed personalities. In this instance, the dramatic situation is not forwarded by the scene under consideration, but the abstract question itself is all important as one variation in the amplification of the many-sided argument on-going between Ozmyn and Benzayda or between the two of them and their fathers.

In the controversiae, as we have seen, character and actions, introduced to demonstrate the commonplace theme dramatized, tend to become the focus of attention and interest and may even dominate the form. But this is not necessarily so. The dramatic situation used as the basis of the debate about the quality of the king, for example, radically affects the nature of the play. The various arguments are made to grow out of the dramatized commonplace theme rather than from random encounters. Every aspirant to kingship, for instance, is interesting as a contrast, comparison, confirmation, or confutation of the idea of a good king. The dramatic expression of the concept of nobility, the tensions between rivals in the play, or the tensions generated by the controversiae can be the focus of the audience's attention. The main commonplace need not be the chief attraction.

The author has provided the framework of a progression from a weak, inferior King Boabdelin in a divided, disunified state, through several would-be kings, toward a right and proper king, leading a Christian, loving, unified commonwealth.

The dramatic concentration upon scenes worked up from hints in the argument of the controversiae emphasizes the big scene. They did so in Senecan drama, they did so in Tudor and Stuart drama, and they do
so in Dryden's drama. Larson has said that the scenes of argument and persuasion helped to raise concernment and admiration in the audience. Those scenes also place Dryden's play firmly within the rhetorical tradition of other English dramatists who were influenced by the Greek dramatists of the Second Sophistic. In this tradition, the part (e.g., the dramatized controversiae) may challenge the whole for the attention of the audience, whether as reader or spectator. Dryden has tried to overcome the possibility of the potential fragmentary nature of the play by using the scenes within a framework where they contribute toward making a "whole body, not a congerie of bones." The point made by Eugene Waith with regard to the last scenes of these plays is applicable as well to Dryden's as to the Tudor and Stuart drama about which he writes:

In the last scene the purpose of the play is clearly stated to be the mingling of profit and delight recommended by Horace. At the same time, it is obvious that the didactic element is less strong. . . . Poetic imitation, though exploited in a rhetorical way, is more important than persuasion, the avowed end of rhetoric. This paradoxical situation is analogous to what we find in Augustan Rome, where rhetoric exercised a vast influence over poetic, while in the schools of rhetoric, dominated by the sophists, spoils from the province of poetic were part of the brilliant display which replaced the original aim of persuasion. It can scarcely be doubted that these involved interrelations had their effect upon the writers. . . .who perpetuated the classical tradition.
The art of declamation—specifically controversiae—exerted a shaping influence on the concept of what a play should be and on the concept of dispositio. The arrangement of the materials of the play has been seen to be as emotionally affective as any Greek tragedy, or Tudor drama. Because this is true for Dryden's play as it was for Terence and Plautus, for Beaumont and Fletcher, other plays by Dryden should be reexamined with an awareness that their rhetoric is not a negative feature, not the excesses of an innovator, an experimenter in genre, but is inherent in the tradition in which he was working. The rhetorical effectiveness of a scene is not an irrelevance; it is rather one of the "beauties" of a play, and should be appraised seriously as part of the total effect of a play. With a renewed understanding of the rhetorical tradition, it is also possible to perceive a kind of continuity which often seems lacking in accounts of the heroic plays of Dryden, and, indeed, in the development of English drama in the Restoration. For as Waith observes, "the controversiae, with all that they stood for, were present at the beginning, were influential for years through the plays of Seneca, and were finally the inspiration of a new period of experimentation by the Jacobean" as well as at least one Caroline dramatist, John Dryden.

The design of The Conquest of Granada is based on the rhetorical figure of testimony. The design incorporates two ritual combats framing two actual combats. In the first ritual combat Divine
sanction is given to Almanzor and in the second to Almahide. These scenes occur in the first act of Part One and the last act of Part Two. In the two actual combats, the attempted usurpation of Abdalla and the continuing war with Spain which occur in the intervening scenes of both parts of the play, Divine disapproval is given to Boabdellin and Abdalla and Divine approval to Ferdinand and Isabel. The ritual combats testify to the authenticity of Almanzor and Almahide and the actual combats testify to the cosmic desirability of order moderated by love.

Testimony as a rhetorical figure involves both artificial and inartificial arguments and proceeds either from men or from supernatural powers. The testimony of oracles, soothsayers, prodigies, dreams, apparitions, ghosts, and so forth is confirmation or witness from supernatural powers, cosmic forces, or Divine power. Trial by combat is a form of testimony because the outcome of the combat is presumed to be determined by supernatural influence and is therefore evidence of Divine participation in the affairs of men on the side of truth, honor, and justice. The testimony of men includes proverbs, apothegms, pledges, oaths, and vows. Both kinds of testimony, of supernatural powers or of men, have the character of witness and the force of authority. Those arguments proceeding from supernatural powers are inartificial, external proofs; those proceeding from men may be internal or external proofs in argument, and may be artificial or inartificial. When the arguments appeal to authority, to laws, to witness, to contacts, or to any agency outside of the argument itself, they are external and inartificial; when they
grow out of the subject and proceed from definition, division, genus, or any of the other twenty-five topics given in Aristotle (and exemplified earlier in this essay by Abraham Fraunce and Thomas Wilson), they are internal aids to arguments and are called artificial (because they employ the "arts" of argument) proofs.  

In The Conquest of Granada, Almahide extracts vows of fidelity, love, and service from Almanzor; Ozmy and Benzayda pledge vows of constancy to each other; Selin and Abenamar swear oaths of eternal hostility to Ozmyn and Benzayda; Lyndaraxa extracts vows of fidelity and perpetual service from Abdalla and Abdelmelech; Boabdalin breaks vows that he has made to Ferdinand, Almanzor, and Almahide; the ghost of Almanzor's mother intervenes on behalf of Almanzor's good conduct, and voices from heaven prevent Arcos' murder by Almanzor. All of these acts and the speeches which accompany them are forms of testimony. Statements that many generations of people have thought to be true are also considered testimony. The Conquest makes use of many sententiae, proverbs, and maxims which express the wisdom of the people. Quotations from the Bible and from respected authors are forms of testimony and they, too, show up in The Conquest.

The most potent form of testimony in The Conquest, however, is the testimony by combat which both begins and ends the play. These ritual combats frame the actual internal combat of the usurpation of Abdalla and the external war with Spain. In Part One, Act One, the ritual combat of the tournament is spoken of as a War, as a contest of Arms. Abdelmelech, in reporting the results of the tournament to Boabdelin and the others as they are reviewing the events of the day says:
Castile could never boast, in all its pride,
A pomp so splendid; when the lists set wide,
Gave room to the fierce Bulls, which wildly ran
In Sierra Ronda, 'ere the War began . . . . 28

That the characters in the play know these ritual combats are a
form of testimony is evidenced by their comments about the outcome.
As the ritual combat which will justify and exonerate Almahide begins,
Boabdellin says:
You judges of the field, first take your place:
Th' Accusers and accus'd bring face to face.
Set guards, and let the Lists be opn'd wide,
And may just Heav'n assist the juster side. 29

Alabez, a Zegry, expresses the same wish:
Swear on the Alcoran your cause is right:
And Mahomet prosper you in fight. 30

Selin, too, believes Divine intervention will assist the juster cause:
So, let the events of Arms decide.
The chances of the fight, and every wound,
The trumpets, on the Vistors part resound. 31

Abdelmelech, when the event has been determined, says: "Heav'n thou
art just!" 32

The ritual nature of the combat can be seen in the patterned
language of words spoken and actions taken by the participants in the
combat, the words of Alabez, quoted above, carry with them stage
directions which indicate that the participants should "Touch their
foreheads with the Alcoran, and bow." 33 Zulema and his brother
Hamet, when swearing to the truth of the charges they have made
against Abdelmelech and Almahide, make the following statements:
Hamet: For whom, in witness of we both have seen,
Bound by our duty, we appeach the Queen
And Abdelmelech, of adultry.
Zulema: Which like true Knights we will maintain or dy.  

Later, when Ozmy, Almahide's brother, must swear to the truth of his claim in Almahide's behalf, must speak, he says:

To prove these Zegrys, like false Traitors, lye;
Which, like true Knights we will maintain or dye.  

The repetition of the formula for ceremonial phrases reinforces the descriptions of the combat which have been represented by the passages of descriptio imaging the contest.

Even though Lyndaraxa tries to insure the victory of her brothers over Almanzor and Ozmy, her treachery is to no avail. In the end, the testimony of the supernatural forces confirms the virtue of Almahide. The testimony of the ritual combat implies affirmation for the actual combat as well.

When the fortunes of war cause temporary changes in the fortunes of the characters, they have the opportunity to engage in the suasoriae and controversiae (described above), winning thereby the audience's attention, admiration, and concernment. The symmetry of the groupings of characters on the stage, the parallel scenes, the balance of the design, are emblematic portrayals of moral dilemmas.  

That such a design exists in this play belies the assertion of R. J. Kaufman that the heroic plays of Dryden "display no sense of a continuing quest or design."  

If the climax of the play is defined as that point after which no essential change can take place without affecting the structure of the
play's action or changing the nature of the protagonist, then it must be said that the climax of this play takes place when Almanzor comes to Granada. For when he arrives in Granada, no action which happens could happen differently, given the nature of Almanzor and the other characters. When Abdalla explains who Almanzor is to Boabdelin he says:

This, Sir, is he who for the Elder [Xeriff of Fez] fought,
And to the juster cause the Conquest brought:
Till the proud Santo, seated on the Throne,
Disdain'd the service he had done, to own:
Then, to the vanquish'd part, his hate he led;
The vanquish'd triumph'd, and the Victor fled. . . .

When Boabdelin refuses to reward his service, or to acknowledge any further debt to him, Almanzor changes allegiance and assists Abdalla in his attempted usurpation. He repeats the same behavior that he had exhibited with the Xeriff Brothers in Fez. When Abdalla repeats his brother's and Santo's behavior and refuses to reward Almanzor after pledging to give him whatever he desires, Almanzor returns to the service of Boabdelin. Each time he changes sides, his behavior affects the fortunes of other characters in the play. The flow chart below shows the consequences of the behavior of Almanzor with respect to his shifts in allegiance. In the center of the chart are Almanzor's shifts in allegiance; on the right side are listed the consequences of each shift to other characters in the play; on the left side are the situations which give rise to the suasoriae and controversiae taking place on stage as the changes and shifts take place. The chart shows the progress of Almanzor only in Part One of The Conquest, because
Figure 3. Flow Chart of Almanzor's Centrality to the Design of The Conquest of Granada
Part Two finds the internal factions resolved, although not unified, Almanzor exiled, and Boabdellin leading his own troops, without much success. The behavior of Almanzor in Part Two is confined primarily to the exile and later to the service of Boabdellin. The situation set up in Part One is resolved in Part Two, with only one shift on Almanzor's part: he is shown by the directions of voices in the Heavens that Arcos is his father, Ferdinand, his uncle, and Almahide his true bride.

As an example of the effect Almanzor's changes have on others in the play, Lyndaraxa's extreme behavior in Part One, Act Three is a good example. She must keep both Abdelmelech and Abdalla in a kind of balance because she must have one of them to further her ambitions. When she speaks to Abdalla, the tides of war have shifted and her response to each of them is carefully worded in order to protect her interest pending the outcome of the battle. When Almanzor fights for Abdalla, he captures Ozymyn. One of the requests he makes of Abdalla as recognition of his service is that Ozymyn be freed because he acquitted himself so well in the battle. Abdalla grants this request; but because he does not also grant Almanzor Almahide's hand (Almanzor's second request), Ozymyn is left in the hands of Selin, his mortal enemy. Ozymyn then has a chance to meet Benzayda, fall in love with her, and escape to the Spainards in order to save their relationship from the destruction with which it would meet from either of their parents. Another example of the changes of fortune to which others are subject as a result of the changes Almanzor makes is that of Boabdellin, who ultimately laments that his own impotency in battle
makes occasion for his rival's fame. In Part Two, Act One, Boabdil
remarks:

Almanzor has th' Ascendant o're my Fate:
I'me forc'd to stoop to one I fear and hate
Disgrac'd, distrest, in exile, and alone,
He's greater than a Monarch on his Throne.
Without a Realm a Royalty he gains;
Kings are the Subjects over whom he Reigns. 39

Almanzor is less subject to human limits than are the other
characters. For Almanzor, life has hitherto been an endless sequence
of battles in service of others. He has not, therefore, confronted
his own mortality. He has not learned to love. He has not achieved
the wholeness typified by the complete relationship of Ferdinand and
Isabel. Even though he exercises enormous control over the fates of
others in the play, he does not know his own fate. His life has been
a continuous moving about in power. He does not respect the
institutions of authority in Granada. He has never failed. Indeed,
he is not stopped in Granada by Boabdil, nor by Abdalla, nor even by
Almahide; he is frustrated in Granada by his incipient love for
Almahide. For it is her love which has the potential for completing
him as a human person. The fact that all the lines of interest in the
play converge in or around the person of Almanzor is theatrically
powerful. Almanzor and Almahide are representatives of incipient
order. Almanzor himself is implicitly compared with Ferdinand, whose
presence is felt throughout the play even before he comes on stage.
He hovers over the action, representing order, perfect love, and all
the attributes of a good king. By contrast, Almanzor seems quixotic,
adolescent, and unduly confused about the nature of his personal reality within a political state. Almanzor's discovery of his human frailty, his kinship with others, his obligation to measure his behavior in light of the existing political realities is, on the part of the dramatist who created him, an imaginative feat. Almanzor's poignant realization of the fact that a hero with insufficient concern for the order of the society in which he lives, a hero with insufficient regard for the motives of those who seek and employ power becomes the delusioner and the jeopardizer of others who are betrayed by the illusion of perfection in his character. Ozymn's release into the hands of Selin was potentially lethal for Ozymn; only the vicissitudes of war and the expediency of Selin's quick departure to fight in the war save Ozymn's life. Almahide seems to think that Almanzor is a God; a superhuman who can be required to perform miracle after miracle only because she asks him to do so out of love for her. When Almanzor reveals his true humanity in expressing his physical desire for her, Almahide says to him:

Deny your own desires: for it will be Too little now to be deni'd by me. Will he who does all great, all noble seem, Be lost and forfeit to his own Esteem? Will he, who may with Heroes claim a place, Belie that fame, and to himself be base? Think how August and god-like you did look When my defence, unbrib'd you undertook. But, when an Act so brave you disavow, How little, and How mercenary now!40

Lyndaraxa, who sees clearly, if through eyes of personal ambition, has
tried to tell Almanzor that he is only human, like other men; "Your love's not refin'd to that degree," she tells him, but he refused to hear her, as rightly he should. Almahide, on the other hand, is unclear of vision and, like Almanzor, must be adopted and instructed by Ferdinand and Isabel before she is fit to be queen.

Several critics have tried, unsuccessfully, to show that Almahide instructs Almanzor in the ways of goodness. That is a misreading. Almahide's "teachings" of Almanzor are really her attempts to gain absolute control over his emotions and behavior. What she asks of him is unreal and improbable. Moreover, what she asks him to do is to be eternally submissive to her will. In this she compares favorably with Lyndaraxa who also must exercise complete dominion over the minds of her lovers. Almahide has put too much confidence in the power of "vertue" to protect and sustain her. It is Esperanza who instructs Almahide, along with Isabel, that the Christian God must replace virtue as the repository of her trust. In the following exchange, as Almahide stands on the gallows awaiting the outcome of the ritual combat which will either convict or exonerate her, Almahide is instructed by Esperanza:

Alma: Let never woman trust in Innocence;
Or think her Chastity its own defence;
Mine has betray'd me to this publick shame:
And vertue, which I serv'd, is but a name.

Esper: Leave then that shaddow, and for succour fly
To him, we serve, the Christians Deity.
Vertue's no god, nor has she power divine:
But he protects it who did first enjoyn.
Trust, then, in him, and from his grace, implore
At the same time that Almanzor is given a coronet of Spain by Ferdinand, Isabel adopts both Almanzor and Almahide as her "god-children" and renames Almahide Isabella of Granada. Isabel calls herself their Patroness, and promises them to each other in marriage. Almahide must learn that Love is a heroick passion, not a tyrant who demands absolute obedience. Like Lyndaraxa who tells Abdelmelech that "she who is loved must little Letts create," and that lovers "must be conquer'd," Almahide also speaks of love as a tyranny over the loved one. Almahide tells Almanzor,

No Lover should his Mistriss Pray'rs withstand:
Yet you contemn my absolute Command.

On the other hand, Isabel says that

Love's a Heroique Passion which can find
No room in any base degenerate mind:
It kindles all the Soul with Honour's Fire,
To make the Lover worthy his desire

... The Fair and Brave on each side shall contest;
And they shall overcome who love the best.

This praise of love from Isabel leads the audience to a preview of what the outcome of the play will be. Isabel and Ferdinand have an Herioque Love; Ozmyn and Benzayda, when they have learned of the Christian Deity will also have perfected love; Almanzor and Almahide will have one year in which to perfect their ideas about love and the Christian Deity. Through this heroic love, unity will reign in Granada and Morocco as it has in the union of Castile and Aragon.
The controversiae and the suasoriae which take place on the stage result from the off stage actions and fortunes of Almanzor in the actual wars. The ritual wars take place on the stage and provide the color, ceremony, and spectacle which engaged the attention and admiration of the audience. The controversiae and suasoriae engaged the concernment of the audience for the fates of the characters as they experience the changes of fortune to which human nature is subject in war.
Chapter VI. Conclusion

In my study of *The Conquest of Granada*, only the conventions operative between audience and author have been determined with any certainty. The "meaning" or the possible "meanings" of the play must be the subject of another study by other critics or scholars. Geoffrey Marshall writes that "we have reached the dead end of arguing with Dryden about delight and instruction. The argument has been exhausted of its informative potential and should be abandoned. . .[It is hoped that] by examining Restoration serious drama as another example of the variations that artists have worked upon theme and genre, and not as a series of failures to be either Elizabethan or twentieth-century, we can come closer to understanding what artistic conventions are and how they work. Even if we choose to use the artifacts of a culture to tell us about the culture and not the artifacts, we must still begin with the artifacts. There is no need to retreat to the old new criticism in such as statement. Careful examination of *The Conquest of Granada*, say, need not foolishly exclude whatever external or internal material seems to be useful. What does seem foolish is to read *The Conquest of Granada*, respond with distaste, and conclude that Dryden was incompetent as a serious dramatist."¹

¹ My study has been conducted in the spirit of the quotation given
above by Marshall, and of the two quotations from Dr. Johnson, and of one from Wittgenstein given in the Introduction. All three passages recommend that scholars approach individual works of art on individual terms. This is not to suggest that they should never be studied in light of a tradition or of a genre. But before they can be compared with other works, they need to be clearly understood on their own terms. The Conquest of Granada is not only social commentary and religious and political ideology. It is a drama or, to use Dryden's own description of it, a dramatic poem, intended to be performed. Dryden was skillful enough in other literary genres to choose the appropriate form for the message he intended to communicate. I have studied one play in an attempt to understand its characters, structure, and design. I have used rhetoric as a perspective from which to study it because Dryden is often spoken of as a consummate rhetorician but his plays have not been studied from the point of view of rhetoric. From that study, I conclude that the old clichés about the heroic plays are untrue. Certainly they do not apply to The Conquest. The Conquest is not "terminal tragedy" as R. J. Kaufman claims; it is not as David Ogg, the historian, remarks, a play in which Dryden "has taken leave of reality before the play begins"; it is not a play in which Dryden flatters "exactly those romantic notions and grandiose dreams of the self which comedy sets out to deflate"; and neither is it a play which is, as Anne Righter claims, "essentially frivolous ... literary and hollow."2 Sherwood, Barbeau, and McFadden have imperfectly and incompletely described the bases for characterization and the design in The Conquest; Sherwood
thinks it is serious, but not a play; and Barbeau thinks it is
seriously a play of ideas. McFadden takes it seriously, but sees it
as a polemic. It is a play which is, as the excellent studies by
Kirsch, Rothstein, and Waith have shown, a serious play and not
necessarily a play only in terms of its ideas. Hughes and Ehrenpreis
take the play seriously as drama, but they see sexual love as the
motivating dramatic force in the hero and in the play. Hughes
describes the structure as "perfectly balanced imitative counterpoint,
traveling inexorably towards eventual integration. . . ."3 But
Hughes concludes that "love and heroism are chimerical and destructive
ideals, bewitching their adherents with infinite dreams but betraying
them into impotence and self-destruction.4" Ehrenpreis also
believes that "sexual passion is central to Dryden's scheme."5
Sexual passion explains for Ehrenpreis the surprising reversals
observed in the characters. He describes the pattern of the play as
"debate, emotional climax, and peripety."6 The "capricious impulse
of sexuality" is useful for dramatic purposes in The Conquest. The
design, Ehrenpreis says, places the issue "of genre in a stronger
light; for . . . Dryden's design implies an attitude towards social
institutions and moral traditions that belong to a particular literary
form."7 He identifies that form as "ironic romance," and links it
to a tradition of "courtly, mannered, acting out of chivalric ideals
illuminated by Renaissance scepticism."8

The play is actually much less complicated and more conventional
than either of these two studies by Hughes and Ehrenpreis suggest.
Almanzor is the focus of dramatic interest in a play which seeks to
demonstrate the truth of a sentence. Rhetorically, the figure of testimony which shapes the play also confirms the truth of the sentence. Dryden demonstrates the truth of the sentence unity preserves and discord destroys a commonwealth through the use of rhetorical techniques of amplification, variation, prosopopoeia, idolopoeia, ethopoeia, suasoriae and controversies. He uses commonplaces, techniques of inventio, dispositio, and elocutio (Ehrenpreis's short study of elocutio in The Conquest of Granada is excellent). The characters he draws on the instructions from classical rhetoric are presented in big scenes of suasoriae and controversiae which focus the audience's attention on the ethical, moral, and political issues in question at the same time that they engage the audience's concernment for the fates of the characters who speak in the scenes. Dramatically, Almanzor sets in motion the events which contribute to Spain's ultimate conquest of Granada. But the play's title tells before the fact what the outcome will be. Almanzor, therefore, and his progress from imperfection as a solitary independently acting in society without regard for its social conventions to his union with Almahide and his recognition of authority --both civil and Divine-- is the center of dramatic interest. The figure of testimony used as the basis of the design, sets Almanzor in ritual, then actual, then actual again, and then ritual combat again. His performance in those combats attests to the Divine order in the universe. The right prevails and order is restored to Granada in traditional ways for traditional reasons.

Granted, that sexual passion, intrigue from Abdalla, Lyndaraxa and
others, the chivalrous code, the exciting language of the play, all contribute to dramatic interest. They do not, however, constitute the overall design of the play. The pattern in The Conquest of Granada is determined by the ritual combat that frames the play at the beginning and the end, and the actual combat that forms the great middle of the play as testimony, as external aids to argument, as a supernatural or Divine confirmation that Unity preserves and discord destroys a commonwealth.
Notes to

Chapter I. A Curiously Omitted Background Fact

1 Margaret Sherwood's *Dryden's Dramatic Theory and Practice* (Boston, New York, and London: Lamson, Wolffe and Co., 1989), p. 59. It will be the practice in this paper to cite reference by author, or by author and short title when required once they have been entered in the notes.

2 Sherwood, p. 61

3 Sherwood, p. 66.

4 Sherwood, p. 80.


6 Barbeau, p. 16.

which was carried on for a number of issues between W. S. Clark, "The Sources of the Heroic Play," RES 4 (1928), 49-63, and Kathleen Lynch, "Conventions of the Platonic Drama in the Heroic Plays of Orrery and Dryden," PMLA 44 (1929), 456-471. They cite also the influential B. J. Pendlebury's Dryden's Heroic Plays: A Study of Their Origins (London, 1923). Unfortunately, the shadow of Gerard Langbaine's "Essay on Dryden" in Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century, 1685-1700, Vol. III, ed. J. E. Spingarn (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968), pp. 110-147, has clouded most of the early works which sought to study Dryden's sources. Langbaine's assessment of Dryden as an arrogant plagiarist, liar, and artless craftsman seems to have been implicit in the assumptions of many of the source studies, notably Pendlebury's. Dryden's own evaluation of his "borrowings" differs substantially from Langbaine's. See his Preface to An Evening's Love in Works, IX.

Sherwood's position on Dryden's treatment of character is as follows: "It will easily be seen that the types of character represented in these plays do not lend themselves to profound dramatic treatment. The complexity in character which gives significance to drama, in the representation of action and reaction of character and circumstance, is not here. Each person is a single trait dominated by a single passion" (p.66). Sherwood's identification of the characters in the heroic plays as types is echoed by Michael Alssid, who also sees the characters as types (see note #1); Barbeau describes the characters as "ideas of human nature" and "exemplifications of various attitudes" (p. 15) (see note #2); Selma A. Zebouni, Dryden: A Study in Heroic Characterization (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965), says that the characters represent Reason in conflict with Passion and that Passion learns to submit to Reason during the course of the play: in all of the heroic plays a hero learns to subdue his passions. The characters are "types" in this reading also.

Sherwood's view of the design in the plays is this: "they are without motif to bind the action together," and "they are without the unity of clever dramatic structure." In these remarks, she is
corrected by Michael Alssid in "The Design of Aureng-Zebe," JEGP 64 (1965), 451-469, which shows that the structure of the play is identifiable to the reader who looks for it. As an example, in his study of Aureng-Zebe, Alssid shows that the design follows the pattern of "chaos, restoration, and succession of the true prince [which] is traced in detail, and this pattern of "heroic" action is the dominant one in this play." Further, Alssid argues that "each play has a unique central design which subsumes common themes under it and which requires special attention" ("The Perfect Conquest..." p. 540); H. Grant Sampson's "The Hero and the Structural Design of The Conquest of Granada," Wascana Review LXX (1982), pp. 69-79, reminds us that readings which focus on "the intellectual design" or the play as a "model of all historical, political, or social change" disregard the play's structural formality "which is an essential element in all of Dryden's dramatic works" (p. 69).

Waith, agreeing with Sherwood in the matter of the plays as non-dramatic, disagrees with her about whether the plays are representations of ideas. Waith says "One would be hard pressed to defend Dryden's heroic tragedies as dramas" (p. 882). Agreeing with Alssid, Waith calls them "dramatic poems." Jean Gagen, "Love and Honor in Dryden's Heroic Plays," PMLA, LXXVII (1962), 208-220, and Scott A. Osborn, "Heroical Love in Dryden's Heroic Drama," PMLA, LXXIII (1958), 480-490, both emphasize rightly the diverse ideas that are gathered under these catch-all terms. Neither of them takes into account the dramatic use of these ideas and in so doing seem to give weight to Sherwood's statement that there is no ruling idea working its way out through character into action.

Sherwood, along with most other scholars of Dryden's dramatic theory in relation to his dramatic practice, concentrates on the principles set forth in the Essay of Dramatic Poesy, the Defense of that essay, The Grounds of Criticism in Tragedy, and A Parallel Betwixt Poetry and Painting in order to determine Dryden's critical posture. Sherwood notes, as most others do, that it is sometimes difficult to pinpoint Dryden's meaning of the phrase to "imitate nature." "Throughout Dryden's critical work," she says, "imitation of nature is taken as the basis for all poetry, but the phrase is used in varying senses. Sometimes it means photographic literalness in the representation of mere fact. Sometimes it suggests the deeper meaning, the attempt to objectify the inner significance of action or event, such as is seen in the great imaginative work of Shakespeare or Sophocles. Passages of the latter kind are rare" (p. 16). In another place she indicates that a critic who knew as much about artistic standards as Dryden could not be excused when his own work fell so wide of the mark (p. 80). C. V. Deane makes the same points in Dramatic Theory and the Rhymed Heroic Play (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1951); Edward Pechter's Dryden's Classical Theory of Literature (Cambridge: The University Press, 1975) argues "if French neo-classicism tended to emphasize the heroic mode and its attendant moral function, it may be precisely in terms of the epic element, the
elevation central to its definition, that the heroic play was a failure" (p. 21). Another point of view which derives from a study of the meaning of the phrase "imitation of nature" has been presented by Robert D. Hume, *Dryden's Criticism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), Arthur Kirsch, *Dryden's Heroic Drama* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), and Dean T. Mace, "Dryden's Dialogue on Drama," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 25 (1962), 87-112. These works see a distinct difference in a play that seeks to imitate an action and a play that seeks to imitate human nature. Each gives a definition of what the phrase means in its critical perspective and each shows how that phrase is operative in the heroic plays. I have been greatly influenced by Mace's distinctions: "For the modern reader the most interesting of the disputes in the Essay [of Dramatic Poesy] is not the quarrel between ancients and moderns or French and English, but between two clearly defined and contradictory aesthetic principles which Dryden derived from his comparisons of several dramatic traditions. The first of these principles is that poetry should be founded on the "history" of things as they are, worked up with design and order, but nevertheless with the assumption that the human mind is more satisfied by art which is "representational." The second is that poetry should ignore the "history" of things and take pains only to "affect," to move the emotions and stir the imagination. . . . Here are two "natures," the nature of "history" and the nature which Dryden called that "nature wrought up to an higher pitch" . . . . It is precisely these two natures which Dryden brings into conflict in the Essay of Dramatic Poesy; and it is this conflict. . . . an antagonism between psychological truth and external objective truth [which is the] source and test of art" (pp. 88-89). Dryden's attempt to reconcile the difference resulted in his theory of and his practice in the heroic plays.

8 Studies which have gone beyond the outlines sketched by Sherwood in her early study are: D. W. Jefferson, "'All, all of a piece throughout': Thoughts on Dryden's Dramatic Poetry," *Restoration Theatre*, ed. John R. Brown and Bernard Harris (London: E. Arnold,
1965), pp. 159-176; and "The Significance of Dryden's Heroic Plays," Proceedings of the Leeds Philosophical and Literary Society, 5 (1940), 125-139; Bruce King, Dryden's Major Plays (Edinburg, 1966); Robert S. Newman, "Irony and The Problem of Tone in Aureng-Zebe," SEL 10 (1970), 430-458; Derek Hughes, Dryden's Heroic Plays (Lincoln, The University of Nebraska Press, 1981). Jefferson sees the plays containing heavy doses of irony and says it can be seen in rhetorical reverses in the ornamental speeches; King says the works are satires of a public writer containing distorted representations of human nature (p.2); Newman argues that the heroic plays are "ironic works which at once affirm and deny particular aspects of the heroic ethos" (p. 439) (Newman disagrees with Jefferson and King in the manner of argument and the method of proof. He thinks the plays are comic irony rather than heroic solemnity but sees the distinguishing elements in Aureng-Zebe as parody, contrasts, shifts in tone, ambiguities of meaning, reversals of meaning, and ironic qualifications.); by contrast, Hughes sees the plays as "humane, intelligent, and subtle studies of the disparity between Herculean aspirations and human reality" (p. 4). That the disparity may result in characters that are ambitious and in some sense unrealistic, he accepts as one of the problems with the plays for modern readers.

9 For quite a long while there were no studies of the heroic plays that focused on one individual play. Most studies assumed that the plays were so similar in theme, structure, and character types that what was said of one was equally true of all. Alssid was one of the first scholars to call into question the practice of grouping the plays for study. The Indian Emperor (see note #2) was the first study and it was followed by Alssid's "The Design of Dryden's Aureng-Zebe," JEGP LXII (1965), 451-469. There is still, however, no book-length study of any of the heroic plays. The following list identifies studies of individual heroic plays by author in alphabetical order: Anne T. Barbeau (see note #7) studies individual heroic plays by Dryden to discover their "intellectual design"; Alan S. Fisher, "Daring to Be Absurd: The Paradoxes of The Conquest of
Granada," *Studies in Philology* 73 (1976), 414-439; Bruce King, "Don Sebastian: Dryden, Tillotson, and Tyranic Love" *RES*, n.s., XVI (1965), 364-377; and *Dryden's Major Plays*, (Edinburg: Oliver and Boyd, 1966); Arthur Kirsch, "The Significance of Dryden's Aureng-Zebe," *ELH* XXIX (1962); Dougal MacMillan, "The Sources of Dryden's The Indian Emperor," *HilQ* XIII (1949-50), 355-370; Pierre Legouis, "Quinault et Dryden: Une Source de The Spanish Fryar," *RLC* XI (1931), 951-962; Moody E. Prior, *The Language of Tragedy* (New York, 1947) (Prior's work touches on the rhetorical use Dryden makes of images as an organic function in relation ot the whole play. It does not discuss the design, plot, characters in relation to rhetoric as a generating or structuring device); H. Grant Sampson (see note #7) (Most important of the recent studies of Dryden. Structural formality is central to Dryden's plays and *The Conquest of Granada* is typical. The relationship of the hero to the various lines of action as they constitute a formal structural pattern is limited. This, argues Sampson, is typical even though it flies in the face of received opinions about the heroic plays in general and Dryden's in particular); D. Shergold and Peter Ure, "Dryden and Calderon: A New Spanish Source for The Indian Emperor," *MLR* LXI (1966), 369-383; James W. Tupper, "The Relation of the Heroic Play to the Romances of Beaumont and Fletcher," *PMLA* XX (1905), 584-621; John A. Winterbottom; George McFadden, *Dryden: The Public Writer, 1660-1685* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1978); Selma A. Zebouni, Dryden; Derek Hughes.


11 "The Relation of the Heroic Play to the Romances of Beaumont and Fletcher," *PMLA*, 20 (1905), 584-621; *Dryden's Heroic Drama*,


16 Rothstein, P. 182.


furious gestures of the hero, the rant and the declarations of passions are "literary and hollow," she says. Moreover, faced with the real issues of the age, the dramatist of the heroic plays "retreated into a land of rhetorical make-believe." Not until Moody E. Prior's *The Language of Tragedy* (New York, 1947), pp. 171-177, with its study of *Aureng-Zebe* are the heroic plays treated as literary or dramatic achievements rather than as cultural phenomena. John Winterbottom's "The Development of the Hero in Dryden's Heroic plays," *JEGP* LII (1953), 161-173, focuses on Almanzor in *The Conquest of Granada* a part of a tradition in which the hero is recognized as a "type" character. The works of Prior and Winterbottom are cited in Michael Alssid's "The Perfect Conquest: A Study of Theme, Structure, and Characters in Dryden's The Indian Emperour," *SP* LIX (1962), 539-559. Alssid cites three decades of criticism which places the plays outside of the mainstream of literary tradition, and he attempts a close reading of one play in an effort to examine it in terms of a "large experiment in drama in which Dryden attempted to reproduce on stage heroic poems "in little." Alssid had tried to do a similar thing in his published Ph.D. dissertation *Dryden's Rhymed Heroic Tragedies: A Critical Discussion of the Plays and of Their Place in Dryden's Poetry* (Salzburg: Institut fur Englische Sprache, 1975).

*Dryden's Heroic Drama* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 147-148, is the first book which argues successfully (finally and correctly) that the heroic plays conform to and are in the established tradition of English drama. Arthur Kirsch writes therein that Dryden was a transitional figure -- the last of the Jacobean and Caroline court dramatist tradition and the first of the sentimental dramatist. This position as transitional figure defines the limitations of his plays and contributes, says Kirsch, to their enduring interest and vitality.
Notes to

Chapter II. The Tradition of Rhetoric and Poetry

1 Rhetoric and Poetic, ed. Donald C. Bryant (Iowa City: University of Iowa Monographs, 1965), pp. 15-25. All further references to this work will be cited hereafter as Bryant.

2 "The Relevance of Ancient Literature," in Bryant, pp. 87-95.


4 Hornsby in Bryant, p. 88.


8 This clarification of the relationship among these three scholars is given by Charles S. Baldwin in his very important and influential work, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic (New York: Macmillan, 1924).


10 Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric, p. 3.

11 "Formal Analysis in Poetry and Rhetoric," in Bryant, pp. 36-45. The discussion is carried further in Weinberg's History of

12 Weinberg, History of Literary Criticism, I, 351.

13 Weinberg, History of Literary Criticism, I, 371.


18 Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric, p. 3.

19 Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric, p. 135.

20 The Rhetoric of Aristotle, trans. Lane Cooper (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentiss-Hall, Inc., 1932). In further references to this text, pages and columns of the Berlin text, provided by Cooper, because they allow for reference in many other editions of Aristotle's works, are given. The Berlin text is Aristotelis Graece ex Recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri. Edidit Academia Regia Borussica (Berlin, 1831). [The Rhetoric occupies in Vol. 2 the pages, columns, and lines 1354a1 - 1420b4].

21 See note #6 above.

22 Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric, p. 124.


24 John Stuart Mill, Dissertations and Discussions, (Boston: W. V. Spencer, 1868), I, 97.


29 Booth, p. 99.

30 All references to Cicero's works [including the Ad Herennium] are to the Loeb Classical Library Editions. De Oratore, I: XIV:61.

31 Scaliger, Poetics, I, i.


34 Huntley, p. 70.


38 De Oratore, II: XV:5-7.

39 All references to Quintilian are to the Loeb Classical Library Edition. Institutio Oratoria, II: XIV:5; XV:4.

40 Institutio Oratoria, II: XV:37.

41 Weinberg, DHI, IV, p. 173.

42 Richard McKeon, "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," in Critics and
43 SR. Joan Marie Lechner, Renaissance Concepts of the Common Places (New York: Pageant Press, 1962). All of the discussion contained in my essay on the subject of commonplaces is heavily dependent upon SR. Lechner's important study. It is cited hereafter as Lechner.

44 Weinberg, DHI, IV, 171.

45 Kennedy, p. 111.

46 Kennedy, p. 109.

47 Kennedy, p. 115.

48 Plato, Gorgias 502d2.

49 Kennedy, p. 116.

Notes to
Chapter III. Dryden and the Tradition of Rhetoric and Poetry


3 Watson, I, 201.

4 Works, I, 53.

5 Works, I, 53.

6 Watson, I, 207.

7 Poetics, XXII.

8 Works, VIII, 101.

9 Works, I, 53.


11 Crane, The Language of Criticism, p. 86.
12 Crane, *The Language of Criticism*, p. 197, 57n.

13 Aristotle, *Poetics*, XIX.


16 Bundy, "'Invention' and 'Imagination' in the Renaissance," p. 540.

17 Watson, II, 194; 195; 203.

18 Watson, II, 194; 195; 203, 274.

19 Watson, II, 275.

20 Watson, II, 295.

21 Watson, I, 2295.

22 *Works*, XVII, 190.


24 Kennedy, p. 117.

25 *Works*, XVII, 16.

26 Watson, I, 206.

27 Watson, II, 186-187.

28 *Works*, X, 212.

29 Thale, 318.

30 *Works*, XVII, 60.

31 Watson, I, 203-204.

32 *Works*, I, 55.

33 Thale, p. 324.
34 Thale, p. 324.
35 Thale, p. 326.
36 Thale, p. 326.
38 *Works* XVII, 186-187
39 Watson, I, 245.
Notes to

Chapter IV. Inventio and Characterization in The Conquest of Granada

1 De Oratore, ii: 34, 147.
2 Institutio Oratoria, V: 10: 19-23.
4 Bacon, Works, V, 105.
5 Bacon, Works, I, 53.
6 Watson, II, 278-279.
7 Watson, II, 274, 275, 277.
8 Watson, I, 8n. Hobbes Leviathan I: iii.
11 See Anthony Copely's Wits Fittes and Francies (1595), Gabriel Harvey's Three Proper and Wittie Familiar Letters (1580), Heliodorus' An Aethiopian Historie Written in Greeke. . .Very Wittie and Pleasaunt Englished by Thomas Underdoune (1699), Francesco Sansovino's The Quintessence of Wit (1590) trans, Robert Hitchcock, John Lyly, Euphues (1587), Ralph Lever's The Arte of Reason, Rightly Termed Wicraft (1573), Thomas Lodge, Wits Miserie and the Worlds Madnesse (1596), Frances Meres' Wits Treasury, being the second part of Wits Commonwealth (1598) and literally dozens of other such titles which testify to the ubiquitousness of the word wit in titles of the period.


14 De Oratore, I:i, VI:xxi, and XXV – XXXiii.


19 *Topics*, I: 14:105b.


24 Lechner, p. 182.

25 Lechner, p. 183.

26 Lechner, p. 188.

27 Lechner, p. 189.

28 Rainolde, fol. XXr.

29 Lechner, p. 212.

30 Rainolde, fol. XXXiijv.


33 Puttenham, p. 44.
With regard to the drawing of character, Aphthonius presents three types of characterizations: ethopoeia, idolopoeia, and prosopopoeia. Ethopoeia involves the fabrication of a character and his speech from known persons. As an example of ethopoeia, Aphthonius uses Hercules, who has been known, but whose character and speech in a play or an oration have been created for a specific purpose. Idolopoeia, which means "the making of a spirit," involves the fabrication of the ghosts of dead persons. The ghost of Almanzor's mother in The Conquest is an example of idolopoeia. Prosopopoeia requires the making up of a thing as if it were a person. Aphthonius uses the example of Menander's character Confusion as an example. A
more familiar name for prosopopoeia is personification.

49 Nadeau, p. 273.

50 Nadeau, p. 279.


52 Nadeau, p. 268.

53 Watson, I, 248.

54 Watson, I, 248-251.


63 See respectively Part I: III: i: 379-80; III: i: 9-10; and III: i: 515-523; in *Works* XI.

64 Part I: III: i: 263-269, in *Works*, XI.

65 My copy of the emblem is obtained from Rosemay Freeman's *English Emblem Books* (New York: Octagon Books, Inc., 1966), facing page 18, Illustration #2.

66 Part I: IV: i: 24-33, in *Works*, XI.

67 Part II: IV: iii: 219-220, in *Works*, XI.
68 Part II: I: ii: 49-52, in Works, XI.


70 Part II: IV: ii: 71-72; 77-78.

71 Part I: II: i: 137-150.


74 Part II: iv: iii: 210-216; Works, XI.

75 Part I: II: i: 215-219; Works, XI.


79 Part II: III: i: 12-22.


Notes to
Chapter V. Dispositio and the Design of The Conquest of Granada

1 Institutio oratoria, VII:X:16.


3 Suasoriae 2: 1-2; and Suasoriae 3: 1-2.

4 Controversiae 2: 1-1.


7 Seneca, 2: Xii.


9 Controversial 2: 2-1.

10 Seneca, pp. 257; 259.

11 Seneca, p. 263.


13 Works giving evidence of the training received by scholars in schools of the seventeenth century include G. F. Russell Barker,

14 For information on the popularity of Aphthonius' Progymnasmata, see D. L. Clark's "The Rise and Fall of Progymnasmata in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Schools," Speech Monographs XIX (1952), pp. 29-263.


16 Puttenham, p. 196.

17 See note #18 in Chapter I


19 Larson, p. 25.

20 Larson, p. 25.

21 Larson, p. 25.


24 Waith develops his idea in all of the works of his mentioned in note #6.


Several critics identify Almahide as teacher to Almanzor: The most recent, Derek Hughes' *Dryden's Heroic Plays* (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press, 1981), p. 91; earlier studies which identify Almahide as the teacher include Michael Alssid, *Dryden's Rhymed Heroic Tragedies*, I, 190-213; Osborn, "Heroical Love," pp. 480, 489; Gagen, "Love and Honor," pp. 214-216. Hughes does concede that
"only when Christianity supplants the false and ephemeral order are regeneration and unity possible."


44 II COG, V, iii, 36-37, Works, XI, p. 189.

Chapter VI. Conclusion

Notes


3 Hughes, p. 80.

4 Hughes, p. 114.


6 Ehrenpreis, p. 31.

7 Ehrenpreis, p. 33.

8 Ehrenpreis, p. 34.
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