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LEGAL AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1965: RECENT ENTRANTS' EMPLOYMENT AND SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

The Ohio State University

PH.D. 1983

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LEGAL AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1965:
RECENT ENTRANTS' EMPLOYMENT AND SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School
of The Ohio State University

By
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* * * * *
The Ohio State University
1983

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I cannot express enough thanks to my husband, John H. Williams, for his ceaseless encouragement and optimism, and simply for being himself during this period.
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CHAPTER 1: THE RESEARCH TOPIC

Introduction

As one of the three components of population change, migration has obvious demographic importance. Moreover, legal and illegal immigration to the United States, impelled by rapid population growth and inadequate economic expansion in the developing world, has reached levels that command the increasing attention, not only of scholars, but also of government officials and special interest groups. The ostensible ceiling on legal immigration is 270,000 entrants per year, but recent annual admissions have greatly exceeded this limit: in 1977 the total was about 399,000 legal entrants; in 1978, 502,000; in 1979, 526,000; in 1980, 808,000; and in 1981, 697,000. It has been estimated, from imperfect data, that perhaps half the growth of the United States population is now due to net legal and illegal immigration (Bouvier, 1981).

However, current immigration has theoretical and practical significance beyond the sheer increase in entrants and the issue of their contribution to American population growth. In 1965 the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 underwent major changes that, together with subsequent refugee admissions, have dramatically altered the composition, not just the size, of the legal immigrant population. What had been a predominantly European stream is now largely from
Mexico, Central America, the West Indies, South America, and Asia; and it is quite likely that the burgeoning illegal alien population comes from about the same origins as the legal one. Some recent (post-1965) entrants, notably those with professional and technical occupations, are admitted according to selective economic criteria. Most entrants are not. They may be relatives of persons already here, either immigrants or citizens; they may be refugees; or they may be illegal aliens. In view of the shift since 1965 in immigrants' origins and the disparities in their occupational backgrounds, three questions are pertinent to immigration theory and policy and thus to this dissertation.

The first two are theoretical. Do recent entrants play a complementary or substitutive (competitive) role vis-à-vis Americans, specifically, native born whites and native born minorities (blacks and Hispanics) in the labor market? In Spengler's theoretical formulations (1956, 1958), complementary relations are expected when immigrants and natives have different occupational structures; substitutive relations are predicted when immigrants and natives are occupationally similar. The second question is closely associated with the first. Do recent entrants have an occupational structure that, in theory, promotes the upward mobility of the native born white majority? According to Spengler (1958), the upward mobility effect is expected when immigrants are occupationally dissimilar to (and, presumably, of lower status than) natives of the receiving country, but not when immigrants and natives have comparable occupational structures.

Lipset and Bendix (1959: 106) have argued that most whites "benefit economically and socially from the existence of . . . 'lower castes'
[blacks, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans] within their midst," as native born whites are thought to have benefited from mass immigration to the United States during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Between 1820 and 1939 immigrants "tended to enter, in disproportionately large numbers, into the lower portions of the American occupational pyramid" (Spengler, 1958: 29), and the movement of native born whites into higher status, complementary positions thus, theoretically, was facilitated. Spengler (1956, 1958) has noted that this pattern was particularly evident with respect to the then "new" wave of immigrants, those from southern and eastern Europe, who generally had less skilled occupational backgrounds than their counterparts from northern and western Europe and than native born whites.

However, the effect of mass immigration on indigenous black Americans apparently was quite different. Two studies (Eldridge and Thomas, 1964; Thomas, 1954) have demonstrated an inverse relation between immigration during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and black migration from the agrarian south to the industrial north, where immigrants were heavily concentrated and where living standards usually were higher than in the south. Spengler (1958), also aware of the inverse relation, has interpreted it as meaning that blacks and immigrants at least partly avoided settling in the same areas in order to mitigate economic competition with each other.

Whether immigrants are still, theoretically, substitutive toward native born minorities, complementary toward native born whites, and likely to further the whites' advancement will be considered in subsequent chapters.
The two theoretical questions should be asked about both legal immigrants and illegal aliens, disaggregated insofar as feasible by their countries or regions of origin, a task that has not been attempted before but will be undertaken in this dissertation. It is possible that legal immigrants are more positively selected than illegal aliens and/or that illegals' clandestine status makes them an exploited class of workers (Bustamante, 1977; Cardenas, 1976; Cornelius, 1976; Dagodag, 1975; Kirkland, 1982; North and Houstoun, 1976; Oswald, 1982; Samora, 1971). Hence legal immigrants and illegal aliens may have very different occupational structures, which may involve different relations toward the American labor force. The opposite possibility, that the origins of recent entrants may be a more important factor in occupational structure than legal or illegal status per se, has been neglected in previous research and remains to be considered here. For example, more legal immigrants and illegal aliens come from Mexico than from any other country. It seems worthwhile, therefore, to examine whether the occupational structures of legal and illegal Mexican entrants differ substantially.

The third question germane to the dissertation is a practical one. Are recent entrants actually depriving disadvantaged Americans, chiefly minorities, of employment? Difficult though this question may be to answer, it has important implications for the pending revision of American immigration policy. To the extent that displacement really is occurring, additional restrictions on legal immigrant admissions and/or better control of illegal immigration may be needed.
Seven hypotheses, based on the three questions discussed above, will be examined in later chapters. The rest of this chapter will present the hypotheses and definitions of major terms, principal sources of information and limitations of the data, and organization of the dissertation.

Hypotheses and definitions of terms

Six of the hypotheses that will be tested in the dissertation relate to the theoretical issues of recent entrants' complementary or competitive role in the labor force and their role in the upward mobility of native born whites. Whereas legal immigrants as an aggregate are expected to have an occupational structure like that of all persons employed in the United States, illegal aliens are expected to be overrepresented in what is termed "lower level employment" (Wool, 1976) or the "secondary labor sector" (Briggs, 1975; Doeringer and Piore, 1975; Edwards et al., 1975; Fogel, 1975; Piore, 1975). However, the proportions of legal immigrants and illegal aliens in the secondary sector are expected to vary according to the entrants' origins, and some legal immigrants, not simply illegal aliens, are expected to approach or exceed the representation of native born minorities (blacks and Hispanics) in lower level employment. If supported, these hypotheses would suggest that, theoretically, legal immigrants as an aggregate are substitutive or competitive with respect to the whole United States labor force, and illegal aliens play a complementary role; but that illegals and some groups of legal immigrants compete with native born minorities, who are overconcentrated in the secondary sector, and complement native born whites, most of whom are in the primary sector.
Support for the hypotheses also would indicate that, in theoretical terms, illegal aliens and some groups of legal immigrants may promote the upward mobility of the native born white majority in America, but that legal immigrants as an aggregate are unlikely to perform this function.

The seventh hypothesis is that illegal aliens and some groups of legal immigrants in the secondary sector actually are displacing disadvantaged Americans, especially native born minorities.

Below, the hypotheses are listed in order of their appearance in later chapters.

Hypothesis 1: Legal immigrants as an aggregate have an occupational structure like that of all persons employed in the United States.

Hypothesis 2: The representation of legal immigrants in the secondary labor sector varies according to their origins.

Hypothesis 3: Legal immigrants from certain origins approach or exceed the representation of native born minorities of native parentage (blacks and Hispanics) in the secondary sector.

Hypothesis 4: Compared with all persons employed in the United States, illegal aliens as an aggregate are overconcentrated in the secondary labor sector.

Hypothesis 5: Illegal aliens as an aggregate approach or exceed the representation of native born minorities of native parentage (blacks and Hispanics) in the secondary sector.

Hypothesis 6: The representation of illegal aliens in the secondary sector varies according to their origins.

Hypothesis 7: Illegal aliens and those legal immigrants who are in the secondary sector actually are displacing disadvantaged Americans, particularly native born minorities.

The representation of legal immigrants and illegal aliens in the secondary sector usually will be measured by their proportions in lower level occupations, although at times data on earnings or incomes will supplement or substitute for occupational information.
The representation of American workers in the secondary sector refers to the proportions of employed persons or of the United States labor force in lower level occupations, as reported in government documents (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1980; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1973a). Terms like "American workers," "employed persons," and "United States labor force" will be used synonymously in the dissertation, with the understanding that the labor force really includes persons who are unemployed and looking for work.

The term "legal immigrants" here denotes foreign born persons admitted to the United States as permanent resident aliens, plus refugees, who eventually become eligible for permanent resident alien status. In strict usage "legal immigrants" is a redundant phrase, because immigrants are, by definition, legal. Also, technically, naturalized Americans (persons who were once immigrants but have been granted American citizenship) are no longer immigrants. They are, instead, part of the larger foreign born population. In this dissertation, however, the distinction between naturalized citizens and immigrants could not be retained.

The word "aliens" is used in the legal sense, without any negative connotation intended, to mean nonnaturalized foreign born persons. Their status in this country may be either legal or illegal.

The phrase "illegal aliens" includes two types of nonnaturalized foreign born persons, classified by methods of entry into the United States. Entrants without inspection, thought to constitute the much larger category, are individuals who cross the borders surreptitiously, without documents. Visa abusers may have fraudulent documents, or they may come into the country with legitimate
nonimmigrant visas but subsequently violate the terms of admission, often by working. Whereas Mexicans and, to a lesser extent, Central Americans are heavily represented in the first category, the second classification includes illegals of many different nationalities (U.S. House of Representatives, 1978b). In North and Houstoun's study of apprehended illegals, only 5 percent of the Mexicans, compared with 62 percent of the non-Mexican Western Hemisphere respondents and 83 percent of those from the Eastern Hemisphere, were visa abusers. Occasionally, "illegal entrants" will be used to denote "illegal aliens," even though the latter term is the more inclusive one.

The phrases "secondary labor sector" and "lower level occupations" are interchangeable. Piore described occupations in the secondary sector as "characterized by low wages, poor working conditions, instability, lack of advancement opportunities, [and] slight skill requirements" (1975: 42). Wool ascribed virtually identical characteristics to lower level employment, namely, "low pay, little skill, little challenge, and little or no upward mobility" (1976: 26). He provided these examples of lower level employees, from a ranking based on the percentage of white high school graduates, twenty-five through thirty-four years old, in each occupation in 1960: farm and nonfarm laborers; domestic servants; other personal service workers; hospital attendants; laundry and drycleaning operatives; and operatives in textile, apparel, and leather manufacturing.

In the dissertation an attempt was made to determine whether certain broad occupational categories from the 1970 census (see Table 1) could be identified as belonging entirely or largely within the secondary
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<td>assemblers, except transportation equipment;</td>
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<td>child care workers, except private household;</td>
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<td>bottling and canning operatives;</td>
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labor sector. Occupations from the census detailed classification (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1973b) were evaluated according to six criteria: complexity of the worker's functions with respect to "data, people, and things," specified in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (U.S. Employment and Training Administration, 1977); formal education and amount of vocational training required for the occupation, together with earnings and working conditions, from the Occupational Outlook Handbook (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1978); and the status of the occupation, measured by applying Duncan's socioeconomic index to the 1970 detailed occupational classification (Hauser and Featherman, 1977). The criteria were chosen because they incorporate virtually all dimensions of lower level or secondary sector employment, as previously defined.

This method provided an update as well as a cross-check of Wool's percentage ranking and produced remarkably similar findings. The three lowest level occupational categories, by all criteria, are farm and nonfarm laborers and private household workers, with other service workers and operatives next in order. Occupations in the first three categories involve very simple relations toward data, people, and things; require, at most, a high school education and minimal job training; generally entail much physical exertion for low pay (below the 1976 average of $4.87 per hour for production and nonsupervisory workers in all private industries except farming); and have low socioeconomic index scores. The same characteristics typify most occupations in the nonhousehold service and operatives categories, except that the work may be less demanding physically and, particularly for unionized operatives,
the wages better. Thus the secondary labor sector is defined as comprising these five categories; the other six categories, four of which are white collar, make up the primary sector.\(^1\) Table 1 gives examples of specific secondary sector occupations.

One point about the preceding classification requires elaboration. Most, but not all, nonhousehold service workers and operatives have lower level occupations. Examples of higher level service workers are dental assistants, firemen, and policemen. Likewise, the high wages of unionized truck drivers and operatives in chemical, petroleum, and transportation equipment manufacturing place these workers more in the primary sector than in the secondary one. That such exceptions are few is the reason for including the nonhousehold service and operatives categories in the secondary sector, albeit at the upper end. In contrast, farm and nonfarm laborers and private household workers are unambiguously at the very bottom of the occupational hierarchy.

Sources of information and limitations of data

In this dissertation an effort, previously untried, will be made to integrate diverse sources of information about legal immigrants' and illegal aliens' employment, and relate the findings to contemporary issues in American immigration policy.

\(^1\)Any subsequent references to the secondary sector and the primary sector (lower level and higher level employment) that are not based on the 1970 census occupational categories are noted as such.
The topic was investigated partly through two computerized literature searches (Social Sciences Retrospective and Sociological Abstracts) at the Mechanized Information Center of The Ohio State University Libraries and through bibliographies such as Illegal Aliens and Alien Labor (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 1977) and Population Index (Princeton University, 1965-1982). Additionally, organizations in Washington, D.C., including Congress, the Library of Congress, the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, the Population Reference Bureau, and the Washington Area Group on Immigration Research, provided access to Congressional testimony, government reports, and working papers that would have been located with great difficulty, if at all, through other sources. Attendance at numerous hearings conducted by the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, the United States House of Representatives Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, and the United States Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy made it possible to obtain not only valuable testimony but also insight into the great difficulty of enacting equitable immigration legislation.

Attention in the dissertation will center on post-1965 legal immigrants and illegal aliens from Mexico (who are overrepresented in studies of illegals); the rest of the Western Hemisphere except Canada; and the Eastern Hemisphere, excluding Europe and Oceania. For comparative purposes, however, references will be made to entrants from other origins (mainly legal European immigrants) and to the occupations of earlier entrants. Two of the Cuban refugee studies (Rogg, 1974; Wenk, 1968) that will be cited undoubtedly sampled at least some pre-1965 entrants.
Hypotheses 1 through 3, pertaining to legal immigrants, will be tested with data on their occupations at origin and destination, since it is possible that they experience downward mobility after coming to the United States. (This procedure could not be followed uniformly with Hypotheses 4 through 6, concerning illegal aliens. The emphasis will be on their employment at destination.)

Legal immigrants' occupational backgrounds, as reported on their visa applications, will be taken from the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Annual Reports for 1960 through 1977 (the latter year being the latest one for which INS data were available). It is possible that women's occupations were underreported on the visa applications (North and Weissert, 1973), and, therefore, that the proportions of immigrants in lower level occupations at origin were understated; but otherwise the INS data appear to be good.

An extensive search for literature on legal immigrants' occupational adjustment at destination yielded useful, though not abundant, information about their employment in the United States. Most of the studies that will be reviewed are based on random or systematic probability samples (Montero, 1979; North and Weissert, 1973; Rogg, 1974; Wenk, 1968) or near-saturation samples (Kelly, 1977; Portes et al., 1977) of selected legal immigrant groups. Chiswick (1977, 1978, 1979) analyzed public use data from the 1970 census.

In addition, INS data and data from a 1970 census report (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1973a) will be used to compare the occupational distributions at origin and destination of persons who entered the country from 1965 through 1969 and were employed here in 1970.
Because the purpose of surveying the literature on legal immigrants' and illegal aliens' employment is to obtain an approximation of their distributions across occupations, case studies generally were not considered appropriate for inclusion. There were exceptions, however (Cardenas, 1976; Maram, 1980).

The literature on illegal aliens' employment deals almost exclusively with nonprobability samples of selected illegal alien groups, though Cornelius (1976, 1977, 1978) studied a random probability sample of males in nine rural localities of Jalisco, Mexico.

This literature will be grouped by three research methods, each subject to considerable sampling bias: studies of apprehended illegals in the United States (Dagdag, 1975; North and Houstoun, 1976; Samora, 1971); research using the records of immigrant service organizations (an ancillary part of the North and Houstoun study, concerning unapprehended illegals, 1976; Van Arsdol et al., 1979); and studies conducted in the illegals' countries of origin (Bustamante, 1977; Cornelius, 1976, 1977, 1978; Poitras, 1981).

The chief problem with the first research method is that the samples selected depend on apprehension tactics used by the INS. Thus, for example, males, illegals in the southwest, and Mexicans tend to be overrepresented. Nor is detainment the ideal condition under which to

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2Three additional studies (Cardenas, 1976; Community Research Associates, 1980; Maram, 1980), which do not fit into the above categories, will be discussed briefly in Chapter 4.
collect information from illegal aliens. Many of them, despite their imminent deportation, intend to return to work in the United States and may give less than candid answers to questions they perceive as jeopardizing their goal.

The second type of research has the advantage of sampling illegals who are living in the United States when interviewed but are not answering questions under duress. The main source of bias in this method is that the respondents have sought help from service organizations and may differ from illegals who have not done so.3

Research conducted in the illegals' countries of origin avoids most shortcomings of the first two methods but presents another problem: the samples obviously exclude persons from these origins who reside in the United States. Illegals who return home may be quite different from those who remain here.

As may be inferred from the foregoing discussion, the three research methods tend to be complementary. That is, the bias in one is at least partly corrected by the others. To the extent that the findings prove consistent, they should represent the most nearly accurate information available on illegal aliens in this country.

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3For the same reason, Wenk's (1968) random sample of case files from the United States Catholic Conference may not be representative of the whole Cuban refugee population in the United States at the time of the study, even though it is a nationwide sample.
Organization of the dissertation

The following chapter will present background information about American immigration laws before and after 1965, several consequences of the legislation enacted in 1965, recent developments in legal and illegal immigration to the United States, and the demographic effect of immigration on this country. Chapter 3 will test Hypotheses 1 through 3. Chapter 4 will test Hypotheses 3 through 6 and will draw some analogies between illegal aliens in the United States and the guest workers of northern and western Europe. In Chapter 5, Hypothesis 7 will be examined. Chapter 6 will discuss current issues in American immigration policy, as they relate to the preceding material; the discussion will focus on the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982. The final chapter will present an overview of the dissertation, with suggestions for future research.
CHAPTER 2: A SURVEY OF UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION

Introduction

American immigration policy is alleged to rival the federal tax code in complexity. Thus the brief history of United States immigration laws that will be given in the next section of the chapter will be, necessarily, simplified. The third section will note effects of the 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 on the origins, occupational composition, and average annual number of post-1965 entrants. The fourth and fifth sections will discuss recent trends in legal and illegal immigration to this country, and the impact of immigration on American population growth, respectively. The last section will present the summary and conclusions.

Major United States immigration laws

Federal immigration laws, beginning with the act of 1875, have served three general purposes: to deny or to facilitate entrance for qualitative reasons and to limit numbers of entrants (U.S. Departments of Justice, Labor, and State, 1979).

Grounds for exclusion, originally immorality and criminality, have been applied at various times to persons deemed mentally defective (1882), indigent (1882), diseased (1891), subversive (1903), illiterate (1917), or likely to displace native born workers (1952, 1965) (U.S.

Facilitated entry usually has pertained to three types of legal aliens: persons with exceptional abilities, relatives of American citizens or permanent resident aliens, and refugees (U.S. Departments of Justice, Labor, and State, 1979). For instance, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 gave first preference for the allocation of numerically restricted immigrant visas to persons with exceptional, needed skills; the second preference went to the parents of adult American citizens and to citizens' unmarried sons and daughters (Keely, 1979). The 1952 Act also provided for refugees to enter the country under the United States Attorney General's parole authority (Taft et al., 1979).

Other measures have been taken to admit nonimmigrant workers for limited periods. Under the bracero program, which operated from 1942 through 1964, 4,000,000 to 5,000,000 Mexican contract laborers were employed on farms in the United States (Craig, 1971; Ehrlich et al., 1979; U.S. Congressional Research Service, 1980). Annual admissions of braceros were highest, at 445,000, in 1956 and lowest, at 178,000, in 1964 (North, 1971). Currently, several classes of temporary foreign workers are admitted to the United States each year, including those of
distinguished merit and ability (H-1), other temporary workers (H-2), exchange visitors (J-1), and intracompany transferees (L-1) (North and LeBel, 1978; U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1977). In 1977, for example, 15,702 H-1 workers and 27,760 H-2 workers entered the country. Whereas professionals made up 96 percent of the H-1 class, 55 percent of the H-2 class were farm and nonfarm laborers and service workers (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1977).

The first law passed explicitly for the numerical limitation of immigrants, as well as for ethnic and racial reasons, was the Quota Act of 1921, followed by that of 1924 (U.S. Departments of Justice, Labor, and State, 1979). During the first and second decades of the twentieth century, immigration averaged 820,239 and 634,738 persons per year, respectively. These figures were high even in relation to the substantial average annual immigration during the last two decades of the nineteenth century (524,857 in the 1880s and 369,429 in the 1890s), but they were higher yet when compared with average annual immigration during the decades preceding and following the Civil War (281,455 in the 1850s and 274,214 in the 1870s) (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1976). Moreover, public concern was aroused because immigrants from southern and eastern Europe were far outnumbering those from northern and western Europe. The Quota Acts, particularly the 1924 act, both reversed this pattern and reduced the immigrant stream. The numerical restrictions did not apply, however, to independent Western Hemisphere countries (Fuchs and Forbes, 1981; Roney, 1981).
The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act retained the 1924 ceiling of about 150,000 immigrants annually and based national origins quotas on "one-sixth of one percent of the foreign born population of each nationality in the United States in 1920," with a minimum quota of 100 immigrants per country (U.S. Departments of Justice, Labor, and State, 1979: 63). Independent countries of the Western Hemisphere continued to be exempt from the numerical restrictions, but, as before, the 1952 legislation was biased in favor of northern and western European countries (Fuchs and Forbes, 1981).

In 1965 the Immigration and Nationality Act was extensively amended, abolishing the national origins quota system and establishing a new preference system for the allocation of numerically restricted immigrant visas. The amendments restricted each nation of the Eastern Hemisphere to 20,000 immigrants annually and the hemisphere itself to 170,000 annually. Not until 1976 were the 20,000 per-country limit and the preference system extended to the Western Hemisphere, although eight years earlier a ceiling of 120,000 was imposed on annual immigration from this hemisphere. In 1978 a yearly worldwide limit of 290,000 immigrants replaced the hemispheric ceilings. Under the 1965 legislation the first, second, fourth, and fifth preferences further the goal of family reunification. The third preference goes to persons with exceptional abilities, and the sixth applies to needed workers. However, many immigrants, including the immediate relatives (spouses, minor children, and parents) of adult American citizens, are exempt from the preference system and hence from the worldwide immigration ceiling (U.S. Departments of Justice, Labor, and State, 1979; U.S. House of Representatives, 1977).
Another change made by the 1965 law, as amended in 1976, was the requirement that applicants for immigrant visas under the third and sixth preferences and a small residual nonpreference category must receive labor certification (North and LeBel, 1978). According to this stipulation, "no worker shall enter the United States unless the Secretary of Labor certifies that there are not sufficient able and qualified workers in the United States and that the alien would not adversely affect wages and working conditions" (Keely, 1971: 160).

The 1965 amendments also dealt with adjustment of status, the procedure by which nonimmigrant aliens (under certain conditions and without having to leave the United States) may become permanent resident aliens. In 1976 this provision was extended from natives of the Eastern Hemisphere only to those of the Western Hemisphere as well (Keely, 1975; U.S. Departments of Justice, Labor, and State, 1979).

Another provision of the 1965 amendments was the explicit allowance for the yearly admission of 17,400 refugees under a seventh preference category, although many others have entered the United States outside this category, under the Attorney General's parole authority. Classified as conditional entrants, refugees must wait two years and undergo investigation before having their status adjusted to become permanent resident aliens. However, the treatment of conditional entrants is quite similar to that accorded immigrants: they "are not restricted from working, and, like immigrants entering under the first, second, fourth, and fifth preference categories, do not need labor certification" (U.S. Departments of Justice, Labor, and State, 1979: 70).
The Refugee Act of 1980 broadened the definition of the term "refugees" to include persons compelled to leave their native countries because of actual or feared political, racial, or religious persecution. This definition applies to individuals anywhere in the world, not just in communist or Middle Eastern countries, as was formerly the case (Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 1980; U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate Judiciary Committees, 1981).

The act also eliminated the seventh preference category for refugees, lowered the yearly worldwide immigration ceiling from 290,000 to 270,000, and increased the number of refugees permitted to enter the United States annually from 17,400 to 50,000; but additional individuals may be admitted at the President's discretion, after consultation with Congress. By late 1982 the 50,000 limit no longer will apply. Instead, the entire number of annual admissions will be determined by the President, in consultation with Congress (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1980; U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate Judiciary Committees, 1981).

Under the 1980 act the federal government is authorized to reimburse states and localities for expenses incurred in providing financial and medical assistance to refugees for a maximum of three years after their arrival in this country. Such assistance includes Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Refugee Program Assistance (financial and medical), and Medicaid (U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate Judiciary Committees, 1981).
Effects of the 1965 amendments

How the legislation enacted in 1965 has altered the composition of the legal immigrant population is evident when the major sending countries from 1956 through 1965 are compared with those from 1967 through 1976 (U.S. Departments of Justice, Labor, and State, 1979).

European immigration to the United States decreased by 27 percent in the later decade, although the decrease for the continent concealed wide variations among countries. Inflow from northern and western European countries was greatly reduced: by more than 70 percent from Austria, Ireland, and the Netherlands; by 60 percent from Sweden and 55 percent from Denmark; by almost 50 percent from France and Switzerland; and by 41 percent from the United Kingdom. Eastern European immigration also generally was reduced, for example, by 73 percent from Hungary and 49 percent from Poland. However, immigration from several southern European countries showed substantial increases: 322 percent from Portugal, 176 percent from Greece, and 120 percent from Spain. The largest numbers of European entrants came from Italy (200,279), the United Kingdom (147,135), Greece (129,076), and Portugal (122,306).

Inflow from Canada, though it decreased by 57 percent during the later period, was still considerable, at 138,945 persons.

Although Africa accounted for the second largest proportional increase, 179 percent, in immigration to the United States from another continent, the African countries contributed relatively small numbers of entrants in both decades. For example, Egyptian immigration increased by 272 percent, but only 25,966 persons, in the later period. Increases of 2,684 percent for Uganda and 607 percent for Nigeria translated to totals of 2,283 and 4,787 immigrants, respectively.
The countries of Oceania also accounted for a large percentage increase, 154 percent, but a relatively small total number of 30,207 immigrants from 1967 through 1976.

In the later decade immigration to the United States from Mexico, Central America, and the West Indies1 increased by 89 percent and from South America by 27 percent. Countries with the greatest percentage increases, but generally not the largest numbers of immigrants, were Trinidad and Tobago (1,538 percent), Guyana (979 percent), Jamaica (778 percent), Barbados (368 percent), and Haiti (329 percent). Only a 31 percent increase was recorded for Mexico, but this country led all others worldwide in numbers of immigrants to the United States, 419,770 from 1956 through 1965 and 550,964 from 1967 through 1976. Other important origins of immigrants in the later period were Cuba (302,638), Jamaica (130,404), and the Dominican Republic (121,818).

The greatest proportional increase, 369 percent, in immigration to the United States from another continent was recorded for Asia. Only two Asian countries, Indonesia and Japan, experienced decreases, of 69 percent and 10 percent, respectively. The more than 2,000 percent increases for India, Thailand, and Vietnam were partly due to the low numbers of immigrants from these countries from 1956 through 1965. Countries where the largest numbers of Asian immigrants originated in

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1The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is excluded here, although, particularly since World War II, many Puerto Ricans have migrated to the United States mainland. The net flow was greatest during the 1950s, when an estimated 456,000 Puerto Ricans settled on the mainland. In the 1960s net migration was far less, but not negligible, at an estimated 165,000 persons (Irwin and Warren, 1972).
the later decade were the Philippines (270,078), the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China (166,480), Korea (166,422), and India (115,800). Other important origins were Hong Kong (45,608), Japan (44,068), and Thailand (32,184).

Thus from 1967 through 1976, compared with 1956 through 1965, European immigrants diminished somewhat in numerical importance, relative to entrants from Asia and especially from Mexico, Central America, the West Indies, and South America combined. These Western Hemisphere immigrants, 870,256 persons in the earlier decade, constituted the largest stream, 1,537,957 persons, in the later period. Only 224,342 Asians immigrated to the United States from 1956 through 1965, but 1,052,688 came here from 1967 through 1976. In both periods the numbers of European immigrants were substantial, 1,400,051 during the earlier decade and 1,016,110 during the later one; however, Europeans were the smallest of the three major streams in the later period.

Corresponding changes in the occupational composition of legal immigrants have resulted from the 1965 amendments. In the period 1969 through 1972, compared with 1961 through 1965:

the percentage of professional-level workers increased greatly; the contribution of clerical and sales workers was halved; blue-collar workers increased slightly; and farm-related occupations fell . . . . There were trends toward blue-collar occupational levels for Europe and the Americas and the professional level for Asia, Africa, and Oceania (Keely, 1975: 187).

From 1961 through 1965, 46 percent of all immigrants who reported professional and technical occupations at origin were Europeans, and only 10 percent were Asians; but from 1969 through 1972 Europeans and
Asians constituted 20 percent and 56 percent, respectively, of the professional and technical category. Several combined factors apparently caused this turnabout: abolition of the national origins quota system, under which few Asians had entered; the propensity of Asians to apply for visas under the third preference category; and "the generally lower occupational status of [other] immigrants with relative-preference, sixth preference, or non-preference status" (Keely, 1975: 186).

Finally, the 1965 amendments have dramatically affected the size, as well as the composition, of the legal immigrant population. The average annual number of immigrants was about 388,000 from 1967 through 1976, 100,000 more than the annual average from 1956 through 1965 (U.S. Departments of Justice, Labor, and State, 1979).

Recent trends

During the late 1970s non-European countries continued to be the major contributors of legal immigrants to the United States. Approximately 60 percent of the immigrants admitted in 1978 were from Cuba, the Dominican Republic, India, Jamaica, Korea, Mexico, the Philippines, the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People's Republic of China, and Vietnam (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1978). Between 1977 and 1979 only 5 percent of all legal immigrants came from northern and western Europe; another 8 percent were from southern and eastern Europe. The vast majority were Latin Americans (42 percent) and Asians (39 percent) (Population Reference Bureau, 1982b).
Furthermore, annual admissions of immigrants have continued to increase, far exceeding the nominal ceiling of 290,000 per year (270,000 as of 1980). About 399,000 immigrants entered the country in 1977, 502,000 in 1978, 526,000 in 1979, 808,000 in 1980, and 697,000 in 1981. The totals for the late 1970s included refugees who were paroled into the country, about 5,000 of them in 1977, 24,000 in 1978, and 98,000 in 1979. Immigration for 1980 included 232,000 paroled refugees and an additional 135,000 Cubans and Haitians classified as special entrants. Estimated refugee admissions for 1981, under the 1980 act, comprised 217,000 persons, who were included in the immigration total (Population Reference Bureau, 1982b; U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate Judiciary Committees, 1981). Nor is it reasonable to expect a precipitous decline in future numbers of refugees seeking admission to the United States, considering that refugees worldwide were estimated at more than 11,200,000 in 1977 and 13,200,000 in 1978 (Taft et al., 1979), and that bona fide refugees have become difficult to separate from the economic variety (Carlin, 1982; U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 1982).

The preceding figures do not include illegal aliens, of course, and, as will be discussed in the next section, unassailable estimates of illegal immigration do not exist; it is widely believed, however, to be increasing. Like legal immigrants, illegal aliens tend to come from non-European countries. Mexico is by far the most important origin, though the proportion of Mexicans in the resident illegal alien population is no doubt smaller than indicated by INS data on apprehendees (Siegel et al., 1980). Mexicans are overrepresented in the data primarily because INS agents are concentrated in the southwestern
United States (Petersen, 1978), but also because undocumented entrants, many of them Mexicans, are more vulnerable to detection than are visa abusers (North and Houstoun, 1976). In 1978, 92 percent of all deportable aliens located by the INS were Mexicans; 4 percent were from the Western Hemisphere, excluding Canada and Mexico; and the remaining 4 percent were from the Eastern Hemisphere (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1978).

Two aspects of the complex relationship between Mexico and the United States are important in explaining the predominance of Mexicans among illegal aliens. First, seasonal movement across the border became a common practice generations ago, as Mexicans responded to the demand for cheap agricultural labor in the American southwest. Some analysts (Ehrlich et al., 1979; Keely, 1977) believe that when the bracero program ended in late 1964, many of the former participants continued working in this country, albeit illegally. Second, the imposition in 1976 of a 20,000 annual limit on immigrants from each Western Hemisphere nation meant that Mexico's demand for immigrant visas greatly exceeded the supply. Average annual immigration from Mexico was 38,386 from 1967 through 1976 (U.S. Departments of Justice, Labor, and State, 1979).

Other reasons for the increased flow of illegals, the push and pull factors that make further illegal immigration likely in the future, are both demographic and economic. Economic expansion is insufficient to keep pace with high population growth rates in the developing countries of the Eastern and Western Hemispheres. The annual rate of natural increase in these countries combined is 2.1 percent, and at this rate their populations will double in thirty-four years. Mexico, to cite a
specific and especially pertinent example, has an even higher rate of natural increase (2.5 percent annually) and hence a shorter doubling time (twenty-eight years). Moreover, 39 percent of the combined populations of the developing countries and 42 percent of all Mexicans are under age fifteen (Population Reference Bureau, 1981). The economies of these countries, in which unemployment and underemployment are longstanding problems, surely will not be able to accommodate the enormous numbers of young persons who soon will be of working age. Such realities make, and will continue to make, the United States a powerful magnet for illegal aliens, the same as for legal immigrants from non-European nations. The attraction is intensified now by high wages, relative to the standards of the developing countries, and by perceived possibilities for employment here (Davis, 1974; Newland, 1979).

Immigration and United States population growth


These numbers are, regrettably, only approximate, because the INS stopped recording emigration statistics after 1957 (Keely and Kraly, 1978). Between 1908 and 1957 about 15,700,000 immigrants entered the United States, and about 31 percent of them (4,800,000 aliens) emigrated from it (Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1982).

Since 1957 indirect methods have been used to estimate emigration of the foreign born, as in the following examples. Warren and Peck (1980)
obtained the expected foreign born population for 1970 by applying life table survival rates to the foreign born population enumerated in the 1960 census, then adding legal immigrants who entered the United States during the 1960s and survived until 1970. The difference between the expected population and the actual one enumerated in 1970 provided the estimate of intercensal emigration, 1,140,000 persons. This figure equaled slightly more than 5 percent of the foreign born persons enumerated in 1960, plus about 18 percent of the immigrants admitted during the decade. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982) studied a probability sample of 3,758 persons from the 1971 cohort of 370,478 legal immigrants. The sample was matched with INS naturalization records for each year until 1979 and the alien address report file for 1979, to yield longitudinal information about naturalized and nonnaturalized individuals. Life tables were used to estimate survivors of the cohort over the eight-year period. Although the lower limit of emigration could not be determined for the whole cohort, up to 50 percent of the cohort might have emigrated from the United States by 1979. The accuracy of this estimate depended largely on the completeness of the alien address report file (that is, the unknown extent to which aliens in the cohort really did register annually with the INS, as they were required to do). Insofar as the file was incomplete, the estimate of emigration was upwardly biased.

Other unknowns are the amount of gross and net illegal immigration per year and the size of the resident illegal alien population (Keely, 1977), though illegal immigration appears to be increasing.
INS data are one indicator of this phenomenon. Few agents were added to the INS border patrol from 1964 through 1974, yet apprehensions of illegals by the border patrol jumped from 43,993 in the earlier year to 640,913 in the later one (North and Houstoun, 1976). Apprehensions by the border patrol and all other INS agents were 86,597 in 1964, 788,145 in 1974, and more than 1,000,000 annually from 1977 through 1979 (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1978, 1979). Indeed, the figures for 1977, 1978, and 1979 were much higher than legal immigrant admissions for the corresponding years (about 399,000, 502,000, and 526,000, respectively). It should be noted, however, that INS data on apprehensions are somewhat inflated, because they refer, not to individuals, but to arrests. In other words, the same person is counted as many times as he or she is caught.

Various attempts have been made to estimate the illegal flow and stock. Heer's (1979) analysis of Current Population Survey data on persons of Mexican origin in the United States between 1970 and 1975 involved estimating the amount of change in this population due to natural increase and net legal immigration and attributing the residual to the net illegal Mexican flow, 82,300 to 232,400 persons annually. Robinson (1980) compared trends in white males' age-specific death rates from 1950 to 1975 for the United States and ten selected states (five eastern and five southwestern), to obtain estimates of the white male illegal population, twenty through forty-four years old, of the ten states in 1975. The range was from 577,000 to 4,673,000 persons. These figures were sensitive to two assumptions about the computation of the
death rates: that most illegals' deaths were included in the numerators (based on vital statistics), and that few illegals were included in the denominators (taken from decennial census counts and intercensal population estimates). Siegel et al. (1980), having reviewed the efforts of Heer, Robinson, and other analysts, conservatively and very tentatively estimated the resident illegal alien population at 3,500,000 to 5,000,000 persons.

What can be calculated with much greater certainty than estimates of net legal immigration, gross and net illegal immigration, or the stock of illegal aliens are projections of the American population that show different future population sizes according to various assumed levels of fertility and net immigration. The United States has a current population size of about 232,000,000 persons, a growth rate of about 1 percent, and a total fertility rate of 1.9 (below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman). Approximately 697,000 immigrants were legally admitted to the country in 1981 (Bouvier, 1981; Population Reference Bureau, 1982b). Espenshade et al. (1982) have demonstrated that if fertility remained below replacement level, immigration would not be incompatible with the eventual attainment of stationary population growth. However, net legal and illegal immigration as high as 750,000 persons per year, combined with below-replacement fertility of 1.8 births per woman, would mean a total population of 301,485,000 persons and a growth rate of .05 percent in the year 2080. Net annual

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2Though projections also must take mortality into account, the other two, more volatile, components of population change (fertility and migration) are the topic here.
immigration of 750,000 persons, plus slightly higher (but still below-replacement) fertility of 2.0 births per woman, would result in a population of 372,204,000 persons, with a .3 percent growth rate, by 2080 (Bouvier, 1981). So, given this level of net annual legal and illegal immigration, with a total fertility rate of 1.8 to 2.0, the American population would be 30 percent to 60 percent larger within the next century. To assert that 750,000 is roughly the correct net annual immigration figure would be speculative; but such a number might not be an unreasonable guess, in view of the probable extent of illegal immigration. Conversely, if net annual legal and illegal immigration totaled only 250,000 persons, but fertility rose just above replacement, to 2.2 births per woman, the American population in 2080 would be growing at .4 percent and would equal 383,209,000 persons, a 65 percent increase over the present size (Bouvier, 1981). Future population size, then, depends very much on fertility and immigration together, not on one variable or the other in isolation; and of these variables, fertility is even less amenable to legislative control than is immigration.

Summary and conclusions

The first federal laws passed explicitly to restrict numbers of immigrants, as well as for qualitative (ethnic and racial) purposes, were the Quota Acts of 1921 and 1924. In 1965 the discriminatory national origins quotas were abolished, and a new preference system was established to allocate numerically restricted immigrant visas (U.S. Departments of Justice, Labor, and State, 1979; U.S. House of
Representatives, 1977). The present numerical ceiling on legal immigration is officially 270,000 entrants a year, but in practice many individuals are admitted outside this limit (U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate Judiciary Committees, 1981).

Priority in immigrant admissions usually has been given to three types of legal aliens: persons with exceptional abilities, relatives of American citizens or permanent resident aliens, and refugees. Current immigration policy emphasizes the latter two types more than the first one (U.S. Departments of Justice, Labor, and State, 1979; U.S. House of Representatives, 1977).

Since 1965 changes have occurred in legal immigrants' origins and occupational composition (to be explored further in Chapter 3). From 1967 through 1976, compared with 1956 through 1965, European immigrants diminished somewhat in numerical significance, relative to entrants from Asia and particularly from Mexico, Central America, the West Indies, and South America combined (U.S. Departments of Justice, Labor, and State, 1979). In the period 1969 through 1972, compared with 1961 through 1965, Asians superseded Europeans as the immigrants most likely to report professional and technical occupations at origin (Keely, 1975).

Legal immigrant admissions increased markedly after 1965. The average annual number from 1967 through 1976 was approximately 388,000, 100,000 greater than the annual average from 1956 through 1965 (U.S. Departments of Justice, Labor, and State, 1979).

Recent trends in legal immigration have been toward larger proportions of non-European entrants and sharply increased annual
admissions, especially of refugees. Between 1977 and 1979 only 13 percent of all legal immigrants were Europeans; the overwhelming majority were from Latin America (42 percent) and Asia (39 percent). On the average, about 586,400 total legal immigrants and 142,200 refugees were admitted yearly from 1977 through 1981 (Population Reference Bureau, 1982b; U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate Judiciary Committees, 1981).

Illegal immigration also evidently is increasing. Like legal immigrants, illegal aliens tend to come from non-European countries; Mexico is the single most important origin. Apprehensions of illegals by the INS exceeded 1,000,000 per year from 1977 through 1979, as opposed to 788,145 in 1974 and 86,597 in 1964 (North and Houstoun, 1976; U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1978, 1979). The resident illegal alien population has been conservatively estimated at 3,500,000 to 5,000,000 persons (Siegel et al., 1980).

Though estimates of net legal immigration, gross and net illegal immigration, and the stock of illegal aliens are problematic (Heer, 1979; Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1982; Keely, 1977; Robinson, 1980; Siegel et al., 1980; Warren and Peck, 1980), population projections accurately show different future population sizes based on various assumed levels of fertility and net immigration. For instance, given net legal and illegal immigration of 750,000 persons per year and a total fertility rate of 1.8 to 2.0 (below replacement), the American population (now about 232,000,000 persons) would grow by 30 percent to 60 percent within the next century (Bouvier, 1981). The potential effect of immigration on future population growth is, therefore, hardly trivial.
CHAPTER 3: THE EMPLOYMENT OF LEGAL IMMIGRANTS

Introduction

Chapter 1 presented the seven hypotheses of interest in the dissertation, all concerning the employment of recent (post-1965) entrants to the United States. The purpose of this chapter is to test the first three hypotheses, pertaining to recent legal immigrants.

Hypothesis 1: Legal immigrants as an aggregate have an occupational structure like that of all persons employed in the United States.

Hypothesis 2: The representation of legal immigrants in the secondary labor sector varies according to their origins.

Hypothesis 3: Legal immigrants from certain origins approach or exceed the representation of native born minorities of native parentage (blacks and Hispanics) in the secondary sector.

Support for these hypotheses would suggest that, in theory (Spengler, 1956, 1958), legal immigrants as an aggregate are substitutive or competitive vis-à-vis the United States labor force generally; but that some groups of legal immigrants compete with native born minorities, who are markedly concentrated in the secondary sector, and complement native born whites, most of whom are in the primary sector. Similarly, support for the first three hypotheses would indicate that, theoretically, legal immigrants in the aggregate are not likely to promote the upward mobility of native born whites, but that some groups of legal immigrants may do so.
The second section of the chapter will cite occupational data based on the 1910, 1920, 1950, and 1970 censuses to put the discussion of recent legal immigrants' employment into twentieth-century perspective. Next, Hypotheses 1 through 3 will be tested with INS data on the occupations at origin of persons who immigrated to the United States from 1960 through 1977. The fourth section will present information about recent immigrants' employment and earnings or incomes at destination and will reexamine the hypotheses accordingly. In the last section the findings will be summarized and the conclusions discussed.

**Occupations of the foreign born population, 1910-1970**

Two census monographs (Carpenter, 1927; Hutchinson, 1956) are useful in examining if, in the past, immigrants did tend to cluster in lower level employment, theoretically complementing native born whites and furthering their advancement in the occupational hierarchy.

Carpenter's data suggest that this employment model was indeed valid.¹ The censuses of 1910 and 1920, on which his monograph is based, marked the last two decades of mass immigration and the heaviest flow before the restrictive Quota Acts of 1921 and 1924 took effect. At the earlier census date foreign born whites, compared with native born whites of native parentage, were underrepresented in every higher echelon employment category but public service and overconcentrated in

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¹Lower level employment is defined here as agriculture, extraction of minerals, domestic and personal service, manufacturing, and transportation. Higher level employment consists of professional service, public service, trade, and clerical occupations. These designations correspond to the general occupational divisions in the 1910 and 1920 censuses. The data refer to gainful workers, aged ten years and older.
all lower echelon work except agriculture. A single lower level category, manufacturing, included 43 percent of all foreign born workers, but only 23 percent of the native born. The foreign born were twice as likely as natives to be domestic and personal service workers (12 percent versus 6 percent) and half as likely to have professional service occupations (3 percent versus 6 percent). By 1920 the pattern of employment had changed little.

Hutchinson compared occupational data from the 1910 and 1920 censuses with those from the census of 1950, when the foreign born constituted a much smaller proportion of the total population than in 1910 (7 percent versus 15 percent). Occupations for 1910 and 1920 were regrouped to conform to the 1950 classification. For every occupational category Hutchinson computed the concentration of white foreign born workers, relative to all white workers of the same sex. Relative concentration figures less than 100 indicate underrepresentation of the foreign born, and figures exceeding 100 indicate overrepresentation.

During the forty-year period white foreign born men tended toward increased representation in higher level occupations and decreased concentration in lower level ones, but their occupational structure remained less favorable than that of all white male workers. Progress was less consistent for white foreign born women, relative to all white

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2Lower level employees are defined here as farm and nonfarm laborers; service workers, including private household workers; and operatives. Higher level employees comprise professional and technical workers; managers, officials, and nonfarm proprietors; sales workers; clerical workers; craftsmen; and farmers. The 1950 data refer to persons at least fourteen years old in the experienced civilian labor force.
female workers. In every white collar occupational category except one (managers, officials, and nonfarm proprietors), the foreign born of both sexes continued to be underrepresented, although their representation usually had improved by 1950. For instance, the relative concentration of foreign born men as professional and technical workers increased from 63 in 1910 to 64 in 1920 and 76 in 1950; for foreign born women the gains were from 41 to 45 to 64, respectively. In the lower level blue collar categories (operatives and nonfarm laborers) foreign born men were overconcentrated throughout the period, but less so in 1950 than at the earlier dates. However, the relative concentration of foreign born men as service workers increased from 149 in 1910 to 162 in 1920 and 189 in 1950. Foreign born women also were overrepresented in the lower level blue collar and service categories. Furthermore, their relative concentration as operatives and nonfarm laborers became greater between 1920 and 1950. At all three dates the foreign born were underrepresented as farm laborers, but their concentration had increased markedly by 1950. Overall, Hutchinson's data suggest that, in theory, the occupational distributions of white foreign born workers and all white workers remained largely complementary in 1950 (though the foreign born were somewhat less relegated to the secondary sector than at the earlier times), and that this complementarity continued to benefit the white majority.

It can be argued that the employment of the foreign born, especially of males, was upgraded considerably between the time of Hutchinson's study and 1970. Table 2, computed from 1970 census figures on employed persons, supports this point. Almost identical proportions of foreign born men and native born men of native parentage (38 percent and 37
### TABLE 2: PERCENTAGE OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYED PERSONS, BY NATIVITY, UNITED STATES, 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational category</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Native born of</td>
<td>Native born of</td>
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<td>native parentage</td>
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<td>Foreign born</td>
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<tr>
<td>Professional, technical, and kindred</td>
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<td>16.0</td>
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<td>workers</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Managers and administrators,</td>
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<td>10.7</td>
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<td>except farm</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sales workers</td>
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<td>6.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clerical and kindred workers</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen and kindred workers</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>21.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operatives</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers, except farm</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers and farm managers</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm laborers and farm foremen</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers, except private</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>household</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private household workers</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>37,817,696</td>
<td>2,504,886</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

percent, respectively) were in the secondary labor sector. The principal discrepancy was that foreign born men were more likely to be nonhousehold service workers. In the professional and technical category foreign born men had greater representation than their native counterparts, and the proportions of the two groups in most other higher level categories were very nearly equal. In theoretical terms, the data indicate that by 1970 foreign born men, relative to native born males, had largely substitutive occupations and had ceased promoting the natives' upward mobility. However, these generalizations are somewhat less applicable to foreign born women, vis-à-vis native born females of native parentage. Foreign born women were underrepresented in two white collar categories (professional and technical and clerical) and overconcentrated in one lower level category (operatives). They were, therefore, more clustered in the secondary sector than were native women (47 percent versus 36 percent).

A slightly more complex pattern emerges when the foreign born (males and females combined) are compared with the three largest groups in the native born population of native parentage (see Table 3). In 1970 the occupational distribution of the foreign born, a predominantly white population of European origin, most closely approximated that of the native born white majority, was somewhat similar to that of native born Hispanics, and least resembled that of native born blacks. Relative to native born whites, the foreign born were overrepresented in the secondary labor sector, but they were underrepresented in relation to native Hispanics and especially native blacks. The respective proportions in lower level occupations were 33 percent, 42 percent,
### TABLE 3: PERCENTAGE OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYED PERSONS, BY NATIVITY AND ETHNICITY OR RACE, UNITED STATES, 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational category</th>
<th>Native born of native parentage</th>
<th>Foreign born</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>Blacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional, technical, and kindred workers</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers and administrators, except farm</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales workers</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and kindred workers</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen and kindred workers</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operatives</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers, except farm</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers and farm managers</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm laborers and farm foremen</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers, except private household</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private household workers</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td><strong>53,555,809</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,127,904</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See Table 2.
49 percent, and 64 percent. Identical proportions of the foreign born and of native born whites had professional and technical employment. The main differences between them were the lesser representation of the foreign born as clerical workers and their greater tendency to be operatives and service workers. It appears that, theoretically, the foreign born were most competitive vis-à-vis native whites, were least competitive with native blacks, and had an intermediate relation toward native Hispanics.

Recent immigrants' occupations at origin

Whereas the 1970 census presents occupational information about all foreign born persons employed in the United States at a given time, the INS provides data about the occupational backgrounds of successive immigrant cohorts before and after enactment of the 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Accordingly, Table 4 presents the occupational distributions of immigrant cohorts during four consecutive periods, 1960 through 1964 to 1975 through 1977 (1977 being the latest year for which INS data were available). The data refer only to persons who were employed in their countries of origin, not to all arriving immigrants. For comparison, the table also shows the occupational distributions of the experienced civilian United States labor force in the same periods.

During the four periods arriving immigrants and the United States labor force were quite similarly distributed in white collar, blue collar, farm, and service work, but differences can be noted within particular occupational categories. Arriving immigrants were more
### TABLE 4: PERCENTAGE OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ARRIVING IMMIGRANTS WITH OCCUPATIONS AT ORIGIN REPORTED, AND OF THE EXPERIENCED CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE, UNITED STATES, 1960-1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational category</th>
<th>Arriving Immigrants</th>
<th>United States Labor Force</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960-1964</td>
<td>1960-1964</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional, technical and kindred workers</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers and administrators, except farm</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales workers</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and kindred workers</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen and kindred workers</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>operatives</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers, except farm</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers and farm manager</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm laborers and farm foremen</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers, except private household</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private household workers</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                       | 24.4 | 12.9 | 12.9 |
| Professional, technical and kindred workers | 4.7 | 9.9 | 9.9 |
| Managers and administrators, except farm | 2.7 | 6.2 | 6.2 |
| Sales workers | 12.6 | 16.4 | 16.4 |
| Clerical and kindred workers | 14.0 | 13.0 | 13.0 |
| Craftsmen and kindred workers | 11.4 | 18.9 | 18.9 |
| operatives | 7.2 | 5.1 | 5.1 |
| Laborers, except farm | 1.9 | 2.6 | 2.6 |
| Farmers and farm manager | 3.0 | 2.2 | 2.2 |
| Farm laborers and farm foremen | 7.9 | 10.2 | 10.2 |
| Service workers, except private household | 10.3 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
| Private household workers | 7.7 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| **Total** | **100.0** | **100.0** | **100.0** |

|                       | 28.4 | 13.8 | 13.8 |
| Professional, technical and kindred workers | 4.9 | 10.1 | 10.1 |
| Managers and administrators, except farm | 1.8 | 6.3 | 6.3 |
| Sales workers | 8.3 | 17.3 | 17.3 |
| Clerical and kindred workers | 13.9 | 13.1 | 13.1 |
| Craftsmen and kindred workers | 12.3 | 17.2 | 17.2 |
| operatives | 10.2 | 5.3 | 5.3 |
| Laborers, except farm | 0.7 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| Farmers and farm manager | 3.8 | 1.7 | 1.7 |
| Farm laborers and farm foremen | 9.2 | 11.6 | 11.6 |
| Service workers, except private household | 6.3 | 1.7 | 1.7 |
| Private household workers | 9.4 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| **Total** | **100.0** | **100.0** | **100.0** |

|                       | 25.2 | 14.6 | 14.6 |
| Professional, technical and kindred workers | 7.9 | 10.2 | 10.2 |
| Managers and administrators, except farm | 2.6 | 6.2 | 6.2 |
| Sales workers | 10.0 | 17.7 | 17.7 |
| Clerical and kindred workers | 12.3 | 13.0 | 13.0 |
| Craftsmen and kindred workers | 16.2 | 15.9 | 15.9 |
| operatives | 7.6 | 5.3 | 5.3 |
| Laborers, except farm | 0.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 |
| Farmers and farm manager | 3.9 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Farm laborers and farm foremen | 9.4 | 12.6 | 12.6 |
| Service workers, except private household | 4.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 |
| Private household workers | 9.4 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| **Total** | **100.0** | **100.0** | **100.0** |

Sources: Data on arriving immigrants were computed from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1960-1977, Annual Reports, Table 8. Years of arrival refer to fiscal years (July 1-June 30 through 1976 and October 1-September 30 thereafter). Data on the United States labor force are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1980, Handbook of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 2070, Table 7. The latter data are based on monthly surveys of 56,000 households in the noninstitutionalized civilian population.
likely than American workers to have professional and technical occupations, a likelihood that tended to increase over time. Whereas the proportion of professional and technical workers in the United States labor force grew from 11 percent in 1960 through 1964 to 15 percent in 1975 through 1977, the proportion among immigrants was 19 percent in the first period, 25 percent in the last one, and above 25 percent in all except four years after 1965. As for the other white collar occupations, immigrants were, especially until the latest period, less likely to be managers than were American workers, and lower proportions of immigrants had clerical and sales jobs from 1975 through 1977 than from 1960 through 1964. In every period immigrants were overrepresented as nonfarm laborers, but less so from 1975 through 1977 than from 1960 through 1964. Conversely, immigrants were, until the most recent period, underrepresented as operatives. At the highest blue collar level, that of craftsmen, the proportions of immigrants and American workers differed little. Immigrants were consistently underrepresented as farmers but overconcentrated as farm laborers. Immigrants were always more likely than American workers to have private household occupations, particularly during the second period, but were underrepresented in nonhousehold service work.

From 1960 through 1977 the proportion of arriving immigrants in the secondary labor sector fluctuated, whereas the proportion of American

---

3Relatively few Americans were engaged in agriculture, either as farmers or as farm laborers, during any of the four periods, especially the last ones. The clear secular trend has been toward urban employment (Carpenter, 1927; Hutchinson, 1956). By 1980 the farm population constituted under 3 percent of the total, a dramatic reversal from 1790, when the population of the United States was 95 percent rural (Population Reference Bureau, 1982a, 1982b).
workers in this sector decreased steadily (see Figure 1). The result was that in many years, especially after 1970, immigrants were somewhat overrepresented in the secondary sector. However, as previously discussed, immigrants also tended to cluster in the professional and technical category, throughout the eighteen years but particularly after 1965 (see Figure 2).

Generally, immigrants who entered the country from 1960 through 1977 were, in theory, more substitutive than complementary with respect to the United States labor force, and it is unlikely that they promoted the occupational advancement of native born whites (see Table 3).

However, the immigrants were not a homogeneous aggregate. Their occupational backgrounds varied considerably by their origins, as shown in Tables 5 through 8. These tables, like Table 4, group years of arrival into four successive periods and refer only to immigrants who were employed in their homelands.

Conspicuous in the tables is the professional and technical category. During each period immigrants from every origin except Mexico, Central America, the West Indies, and South America were much more concentrated in this category than were members of the United States labor force, whose representation increased from 11 percent in 1960 through 1964 to 15 percent in 1975 through 1977 (see Table 4). Asia, which gained great importance as a contributor of immigrants to the United States, also sent some of the highest proportions of professional and technical workers: 38 percent from 1960 through 1964, more than half during the next two five-year periods, and 44 percent from 1975 through 1977. Similarly high proportions were recorded for
FIGURE 1: ARRIVING IMMIGRANTS AND THE EXPERIENCED CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE IN THE SECONDARY LABOR SECTOR, UNITED STATES, 1960-1977

FIGURE 2: ARRIVING IMMIGRANTS AND THE EXPERIENCED CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE IN PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL OCCUPATIONS, UNITED STATES, 1960-1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational category</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>Central America, the West Indies, and South America</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Oceania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional, technical, and kindred workers</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers and administrators, except farm</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales workers</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and kindred workers</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen and kindred workers</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operatives, except farm</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers, except farm</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers and farm managers</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm laborers and farm foremen</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers, except private household</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private household workers</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td><strong>76,162</strong></td>
<td><strong>95,506</strong></td>
<td><strong>123,334</strong></td>
<td><strong>318,040</strong></td>
<td><strong>32,384</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,142</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,253</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Computed from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1960-1964, Annual Reports, Table 8.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Category</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>Central America, the West Indies, and South America</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Oceania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional, technical, and kindred workers</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers and administrators, except farm</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales workers</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and kindred workers</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen and kindred workers</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operatives</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers, except farm</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers and farm managers</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm laborers and farm foremen</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers, except private household</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private household workers</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>55,714</td>
<td>57,267</td>
<td>248,898</td>
<td>299,206</td>
<td>101,213</td>
<td>10,497</td>
<td>4,055</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Computed from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1965-1969, Annual Reports, Table 8.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational category</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>Central America, the West Indies, and South America</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Oceania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional, technical, and kindred workers</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers and administrators, except farm</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales workers</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and kindred workers</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen and kindred workers</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operatives</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers, except farm</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Farm laborers and farm foremen</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<td>Service workers, except private household</td>
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<td>11.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private household workers</td>
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Source: Computed from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1975-1977, Annual Reports, Table 8.
Africa. In contrast, Mexico, which sent far more immigrants to the United States than were sent by any other country, contributed low proportions of professional and technical workers: 3 percent in every period except 1965 through 1969. Among Central American, West Indian, and South American immigrants, the proportion of professional and technical workers was initially double that in the United States labor force but decreased steadily, from 23 percent in the earliest period to 11 percent in the latest one. European representation generally increased, from 19 percent in 1960 through 1964 to 24 percent in 1975 through 1977.

In the remaining white collar occupations Mexicans again were underrepresented, vis-à-vis immigrants from every other origin and American workers. During each period not even a tenth of the Mexicans, but roughly a third of the United States labor force, reported managerial, sales, and clerical occupations. Central American, West Indian, and South American representation in these three categories decreased from 30 percent in the earliest period to 21 percent in the most recent one, and the decrease for Africans was similar (from 36 percent to 24 percent). The proportions for Asians were 27 percent and 24 percent, respectively, and for Europeans, 27 percent and 20 percent, respectively. The decreases occurred mainly in clerical but also in sales occupations. Conversely, almost all immigrant groups had greater representation in the managerial category from 1975 through 1977 than from 1960 through 1964.

During every period Mexican immigrants, compared with all others and with the United States labor force, were overconcentrated in blue collar occupations. Whereas half of the Mexicans reported such jobs from 1960
through 1964, almost two-thirds were blue collar workers in the latest period. In the first three periods the great majority of Mexican blue collar workers were in the lower level category of nonfarm laborers. From 1975 through 1977, however, the proportion of Mexicans in this category decreased to 27 percent, and there were increased proportions of operatives (25 percent) and craftsmen (13 percent). Central Americans, West Indians, and South Americans also showed a clear trend toward increased proportions in blue collar work: 30 percent in the earliest period and 48 percent during the most recent one. The operatives category expanded most, from 15 percent initially to 27 percent (slightly higher than the proportion of Mexican operatives) during the latest period. In contrast, the proportion of American workers with blue collar occupations decreased somewhat, from 37 percent in 1960 through 1964 to 34 percent in 1975 through 1977, mainly because the proportion of operatives grew smaller. The representation of European immigrants in blue collar occupations generally resembled that of American workers, but the Europeans were consistently more likely to be craftsmen and less likely to be operatives. The proportions of Asians and Africans in blue collar work were initially low (20 percent and 19 percent, respectively) and decreased steadily until the latest period.

Immigrants were usually less likely than American workers to be farmers. Only Europeans consistently approximated Americans in this category.
The pattern was different in the farm laborers category, where Mexicans, compared with all other immigrants and with American workers, were greatly overconcentrated from 1960 through 1964. At that time 22 percent of the Mexicans, but merely 3 percent of the United States labor force, performed this lower level work. The trend among farm laborers was toward a steep percentage decrease for Mexicans, a moderate increase for Europeans, and a slight decrease for American workers; from 1975 through 1977 the proportions for the two immigrant groups were nearly identical (9 percent and 8 percent, respectively), and both exceeded the proportion of American farm laborers (2 percent). The initially low proportions of Central American, West Indian, South American, Asian, and African farm laborers changed little over time.

During the first two periods Asians and Europeans were the immigrants most likely to have nonhousehold service occupations and most similar to the United States labor force in this respect. In the last two periods, however, Mexicans, Central Americans, West Indians, and South Americans had the highest proportions of nonhousehold service workers.

After the second period the proportions of these Western Hemisphere immigrants with private household occupations decreased, whereas the percentages of Asians and Africans with such occupations tended to increase slightly over time. From 1975 through 1977 the proportion of private household workers in the United States labor force was so small (1 percent) that, by comparison, virtually all immigrant groups were overrepresented in this lower level category.
As indicated by the preceding discussion, the various immigrant groups had quite different representation in the secondary labor sector. Figure 3 shows the proportions of immigrants from selected origins in lower level occupations from 1960 through 1977; the representation of the experienced civilian United States labor force is shown also. Compared with the other immigrant groups and with the United States labor force, Mexicans were consistently and dramatically overconcentrated in the secondary sector. Their representation, which exceeded 72 percent in every year, was even greater than that of native born blacks of native parentage in 1970 (64 percent). Conversely, the proportions of Asians and Africans in the secondary sector were the lowest shown in Figure 3, and after the mid-1960s they fluctuated at levels far below the representation of native born whites in 1970 (33 percent). Central Americans, West Indians, South Americans, and Europeans had intermediate positions, relative to the other immigrant groups. In every year following 1965, immigrants from the three Western Hemisphere regions were overconcentrated in the secondary sector, vis-à-vis American workers, and the disparity tended to increase with time. However, these immigrants never were clustered so extensively in lower level occupations as were the Mexicans. After 1965 the representation of Central Americans, West Indians, and South Americans in the secondary sector generally resembled that of native born Hispanics in 1970 (49 percent). Though Europeans most closely approximated the representation of the United States labor force in the secondary sector, they were overconcentrated there in all but two years after 1968.
FIGURE 3: ARRIVING IMMIGRANTS FROM SELECTED ORIGINS AND THE EXPERIENCED CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE IN THE SECONDARY LABOR SECTOR, UNITED STATES, 1960-1977

Sources: See Figure 1.
It was previously shown (in Figures 1 and 2) that, as an aggregate, immigrants who entered the United States from 1960 through 1977 had a fairly bipolar occupational distribution, with clusters at both the top and bottom of the hierarchy (the professional and technical category and the secondary labor sector, respectively). However, this generalization is weakened when the immigrants are disaggregated by their origins (see Figures 3 and 4). In many years Chinese immigrants had a rather bipolar distribution; but, overall, Asians and Africans were an immigrant elite because of their high proportions in the professional and technical category and low proportions in the secondary sector, a pattern that became somewhat more pronounced after 1965. Mexicans were at the opposite extreme, always the most concentrated in lower level occupations and the least likely to be in the top echelon. Central Americans, West Indians, and South Americans, as well as Europeans, tended to occupy a middle range, though during the 1970s the position of the former group approached that of the Mexicans.

The data in Tables 3, 6, 7, and 8 suggest several theoretical points, based on the occupational backgrounds of the post-1965 entrants, about their substitutive or complementary relations toward the three largest groups in the native born population of native parentage. Mexicans, because of their great overconcentration in the secondary labor sector, seemed the most complementary immigrant group with respect to native born whites and the most likely to further their upward

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4 Immigrants from the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People's Republic of China are combined in this category.
Figure 4: Arriving Immigrants from Selected Origins and the Experienced Civilian Labor Force in Professional and Technical Occupations, United States, 1960-1977

Sources: See Figure 2.
mobility. From 1970 on, Mexicans, Central Americans, West Indians, and South Americans appeared more substitutive than complementary in relation to native born blacks and Hispanics. Europeans seemed more competitive than complementary vis-à-vis native born whites. Asians and Africans, who were conspicuously overrepresented in the professional and technical category and underconcentrated in lower level occupations, tended to complement both the native minorities and the native white majority. However, the Chinese (for whom data are not presented separately in Tables 6 through 8) were an apparent exception to the Asian pattern. Their generally bipolar employment background suggests that they were competitive with natives at the two extremes of the occupational hierarchy.

Recent immigrants' occupations at destination

Of course, describing immigrants' occupations at origin, as was done in the preceding section, is not necessarily synonymous with describing their work in the United States. On the one hand, many researchers have found that immigrants with higher level occupational backgrounds tend to experience at least initial downward mobility in this country, because of discrimination, unfamiliarity with the English language and American culture, difficulty in obtaining licenses for certain occupations (for example, the practice of medicine), and nontransferability of some skills (as in the legal profession) (Casal and Hernández, 1975; Chiswick, 1977, 1978, 1979; Kelly, 1977; Liu et al., 1979; Moncarz, 1978; Montero, 1979; North, 1979b; North and Weissert, 1973; Parlin, 1976; Portes et al., 1977; Rogg, 1974; Stein, 1979; Sung, 1976; U.S.
General Accounting Office, 1977; Wenk, 1968). On the other hand, there is evidence of slight upward mobility, albeit within the secondary labor sector, for persons with lower level occupational backgrounds (North, 1979b; Rogg, 1974).

Much of the research on immigrants' occupational adjustment in the United States concerns refugees and suggests that, within a given stream, the refugees' occupational backgrounds change over time. Thus, to cite the streams of interest in this dissertation, earlier arrivals from Cuba and Indochina tended to be members of the elite in their homelands, whereas later entrants ranked lower in the occupational hierarchy (Bach, 1980; Fagen et al., 1968; Grant, 1979). Nevertheless, extensive downward mobility, in the short run if not the long run, was typical of every refugee sample in the following studies.

Wenk (1968) reported on a nationwide survey of 200 Cuban refugee families selected randomly from the case files of the United States Catholic Conference. Of the 534 adults included in the sample, 356 were employed in Cuba and 364 in the United States. Two categories from the author's classification of employed persons are meaningful in the present discussion: in the receiving country the proportion of professionals was more than halved (decreasing from 34 percent to 15 percent), and the proportion of unskilled workers was almost quintupled (increasing from 8 percent to 36 percent).

Rogg (1974) studied a random sample of 250 Cuban heads of households in West New York, New Jersey. At the time of the research (1969), the West New York area contained one of the largest settlements of Cubans outside Dade County, Florida. Ninety percent of the respondents were
refugees, having arrived after Castro came to power in 1959. Downward occupational mobility occurred among 83 percent of the respondents who had high socioeconomic status in Cuba and 4 percent of those with low status. Forty percent of the respondents employed at origin were proprietors and professionals; at destination only 5 percent of the employed respondents were so classified. The proportion in the secondary labor sector rose from 26 percent to 78 percent, but this increase occurred entirely in the operatives category. The respondents actually were less likely to be service workers or laborers in the United States than in Cuba.

A study by Portes et al. (1977) compared Cuban occupations with the first ones held at destination by 590 male heads of families, eighteen to sixty years old, who arrived in Miami from late 1973 to early 1974. The sample included approximately 90 percent of all such entrants. The proportions of respondents in the primary and secondary labor sectors at origin and destination could not be determined from the information available. However, the researchers observed that 60 percent of the sample experienced downward mobility. Only 5 percent of the Cubans employed in Miami were professionals, managers, and technicians. Thirty-eight percent were unskilled laborers, and 48 percent were classified rather contradictorily as skilled laborers. On the whole, the data indicate considerable movement into the secondary sector.

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5This term is the one used by Rogg.

6The secondary sector here includes three occupational categories designated by Rogg: operatives, service workers, and laborers.

7This term and the two that follow were used by the authors.
Kelly (1977) reported on 129,792 Vietnamese refugees who fled their country for the United States in 1975. From the information given, it was not possible to determine what percentage of the refugees were in the secondary labor sector in Vietnam, although the author noted that they were an elite in terms of their educational backgrounds and that 31 percent of the household heads had professional and technical or managerial employment in Vietnam. The refugees' occupational distribution in the United States was not available, but Kelly pointed out that just 10 percent of the Vietnamese professional and technical or managerial workers were able to find comparable employment at destination. The rest experienced downward mobility, as did 45 percent of the refugees with blue collar backgrounds. Moreover, of the refugees who worked at least forty hours a week in this country, 37 percent had earnings indicative of very low level employment: $1.25 to $2.50 per hour, compared with the $2.39 minimum hourly wage in 1976.

Montero (1979) (also Stein, 1979) presented the results of five surveys conducted by Opportunity Systems, Inc., from 1975 to 1977 with a systematic sample of Vietnamese refugees shortly after their resettlement in the United States. Occupations before immigration and at the final survey date were reported for 472 heads of households. During this period representation in the professional category plummeted from 30 percent to 7 percent, and that in the secondary labor sector increased from 18 percent to 43 percent.

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8The primary labor sector is defined here as professional workers, managers, clerical workers, sales workers, and craftsmen. The secondary sector comprises operatives and transport workers, laborers, and other blue collar workers. The occupational categories are the ones designated by Montero.
In 1979 Opportunity Systems, Inc., reinterviewed 716 of an original 1,000 Indochinese refugee heads of households who were resettled in the United States between 1975 and 1978 (Bach and Bach, 1980). Unlike the all-Vietnamese sample described by Montero, only half of these respondents were Vietnamese; the rest were Laotian (26 percent) and Cambodian (24 percent). The data presented by Bach and Bach show marked improvement in the refugees' incomes with longer residence in this country. Sixty-one percent of the respondents who arrived in 1977 received $800 or more per month, compared with 70 percent of those who came here in 1976 and 78 percent of those here since 1975. As of 1979, 18 percent of the employed refugees had professional and technical occupations, and 25 percent were in the secondary labor sector. These figures, although not strictly comparable with the ones presented by Montero, do suggest that, with time, the refugees regained some of their lost occupational status.

The next studies to be reviewed pertain to immigrants generally, as well as to refugees, and provide longitudinal information about their employment and earnings or incomes in the United States. The findings show downward mobility initially but upward mobility with increasing time spent at destination. That persons from the Eastern Hemisphere fared better than non-Canadians, particularly Mexicans, from the Western Hemisphere was to be expected from the information given earlier about arriving immigrants' occupational backgrounds (see Tables 5 through 8).

North and Weissert (1973) analyzed a sample of 5,000 immigrants, eighteen through fifty-nine years old, who were admitted to the United
States in 1970. The sample was selected randomly from INS files for nine states with substantial immigrant populations. Occupations for the 2,555 immigrants employed in their homelands were obtained from visa applications, and occupations for the 3,108 immigrants employed at destination were taken from alien registration cards filed in January, 1972.9

Of the immigrants employed at origin, 26 percent had professional and technical occupations, and 33 percent were in the secondary labor sector. (These proportions closely resemble those for all immigrants employed at origin who arrived here in 1970, as shown in Figures 1 and 2.)

As for persons in the sample who found employment after immigration, 17 percent had professional and technical occupations, and 50 percent were in the secondary sector. Twenty-one percent of the employed immigrants were operatives; 13 percent had nonhousehold service occupations, and 12 percent were nonfarm laborers. North and Weissert attributed part of the apparent downward mobility to the greater employment of immigrants, especially women,10 here than at origin and to the concentration of these new workers in lower level occupations.

9These totals exclude housewives and students.

10Among new immigrant workers (persons not employed at origin), females outnumbered males by almost four to one. It is possible that some of these women were not really new workers, but, instead, that women's employment at origin was underreported on the visa applications. In either case an observation made by North and Weissert remains valid: the visa applications understated the numerical impact of immigrants on the American labor force.
However, the immigrants' occupational backgrounds and their occupations at destination varied considerably according to their origins, which North and Weissett dichotomized as the Eastern and Western Hemispheres. Of the immigrants who were employed before coming to the United States, 39 percent from the Eastern Hemisphere, but only 13 percent from the Western Hemisphere, had professional and technical occupations. The proportions in the secondary sector were 26 percent and 42 percent, respectively. (These figures are roughly consistent with the proportions for arriving immigrants in 1970, by selected origins, shown in Figures 3 and 4.) The differences persisted among immigrants employed in the receiving country. Despite a common pattern of downward mobility, entrants from the Eastern Hemisphere remained far better represented than those from the Western Hemisphere in professional and technical work (28 percent versus 9 percent) and much less concentrated in the secondary sector (39 percent versus 58 percent).

North (1979b) reported on a follow-up study of the 5,000 immigrants who entered the United States in 1970 (North and Weissett, 1973). In one part of the study, Social Security Administration (SSA) earnings totals, which exclude housewives and students: 2,691 applicants for visas (1,326 from the Eastern Hemisphere and 1,365 from the Western Hemisphere) and 3,455 aliens who filed registration cards (1,792 from the Eastern Hemisphere and 1,663 from the Western Hemisphere) (North and Weissett, 1973: 131). For some reason that is not explained in the research report, these totals for applicants and registrants are higher than those given previously (1973: 100-101).
data for 1970 through 1975 were used to analyze a random subsample of
1,393 immigrants. The rest of the study concerned 254 persons (110 from
the Eastern Hemisphere, 138 from the Western Hemisphere, and the others
of unreported origins) who were selected nonrandomly from the whole
sample and interviewed in 1977. North pointed out that Canadians,
Europeans, professional and technical workers, and more affluent
immigrants were overrepresented among the 254 respondents.

The SSA data, presented separately for employed men and women in the
immigrant subsample, showed that their earnings, relative to those of
their American counterparts, improved with increasing time spent in the
receiving country. In 1970 the employed immigrant men received 72
percent of the median annual earnings of all male workers in the United
States ($5,158 versus $7,175). Five years later the figure was 86
percent ($6,889 versus $8,033, in 1970 dollars), suggesting that the
male immigrants still had not achieved parity with the larger male work
force but were moving toward it. By 1971 the median for the employed
immigrant women already exceeded that for all female workers ($3,654
versus $3,300, in 1970 dollars), though neither amount was great.

Not surprisingly, the occupational diversity of immigrants from the
Eastern and Western Hemispheres (North and Weissert, 1973) was reflected
in their earnings. In the SSA subsample median annual earnings (in 1975
dollars) were $8,158 for Eastern Hemisphere immigrants, $7,684 for
non-Mexican Western Hemisphere immigrants, and $6,263 for Mexicans. The
study group of 254 respondents had a similar pattern of average earnings
in 1976.
Data for the study group, as for the whole immigrant sample (North and Weissert, 1973), showed considerable downward occupational mobility, initially, for immigrants employed in the United States. At origin 35 percent of the study group respondents were professional and technical workers, and 18 percent were in the secondary labor sector. The proportions were 24 percent and 38 percent, respectively, for immigrants in their first work at destination.

Over time, however, the study group's position improved. In their current or most recent American employment, 27 percent of the respondents were professional and technical workers, and 32 percent had lower level occupations. Furthermore, the respondents' median weekly income (unadjusted for inflation) rose steadily the longer they remained in the United States, from $108 in their initial employment to $238 in their current or most recent employment.

It should be noted also that, compared with American workers between 1970 and 1977 (see Figures 1 and 2), the 254 respondents were always much more likely to have professional and technical occupations and, except in their initial employment at destination, less likely to be in the secondary sector. In the whole sample (North and Weissert, 1973) Eastern Hemisphere immigrants, but not those from the Western Hemisphere, were greatly overrepresented at the top and just slightly overconcentrated in lower level occupations after only two years in the United States.

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12 Retrospective data were collected on the respondents' first occupations in the United States, their occupations in 1972 and 1975, and their current or most recent occupations.
Chiswick's (1977, 1978, 1979) analyses of public use data from the 1970 census produced a familiar pattern: immigrants generally experienced a short-run loss of occupational status in this country, but in the long run both their occupational levels and their earnings rose considerably; the extent of initial downward mobility and later upward mobility varied according to the immigrants' origins.

Chiswick's (1977) research focused on white male immigrants who were employed in 1969, were twenty-five to sixty-four years old in 1970, and were from four origins: English-speaking developed countries, Cuba, Mexico, and other countries. More recent entrants (1965 to 1970) were compared with earlier ones (1950 to 1964). Thirty-eight percent of the 1,941 more recent immigrants changed occupational categories between 1965 and 1970, with downward mobility the typical result. Loss of status was least for immigrants from the English-speaking countries and greatest for Cubans and Mexicans. Twenty-three percent of the 7,162 earlier immigrants changed occupational categories between 1965 and 1970, usually improving their status. Upward mobility was greatest for Cubans; it was least for Mexicans, particularly unskilled Mexicans, and immigrants from the English-speaking countries (presumably because the latter group already was positioned favorably in the occupational hierarchy).

Subsequently, Chiswick (1978) used multiple regression to compare the average annual earnings of foreign born and native born white males, with years of schooling, years of labor market experience,

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13The men were employed in 1969 and were twenty-five to sixty-four years old in 1970. The origins of the foreign born were given previously (Chiswick, 1977).
weeks worked, marital status, and geographic distribution held constant. He found that after thirteen years in the United States, the foreign born had earnings equal to those of the native born. After twenty years the foreign born earned 6 percent more than the natives.

Comparisons within six ethnic or racial groups\textsuperscript{14} (Chiswick, 1979), using multiple regression and holding constant the same variables as were just mentioned, showed that almost all immigrant men eventually matched and then exceeded the average annual earnings of their native born male counterparts. Parity in earnings occurred at the following intervals after immigration for these foreign born groups: eleven years for blacks, thirteen years for Filipinos, fifteen years for Mexicans, and eighteen years for the Japanese. Chinese immigrants approached, but did not achieve, earnings parity with native born Chinese-Americans. The number of native born Cuban-Americans was so small that the native born white male majority served instead as the comparison group for foreign born Cubans. Eighteen years after their arrival in the United States, the Cuban immigrants achieved earnings parity with the native majority.

Nevertheless, there were pronounced differences in earnings among groups of the foreign born. Whereas the Japanese, for example, had relatively high earnings, the Mexicans did not. The findings again demonstrate the selectivity of immigrants according to their origins.

\textsuperscript{14}The men's ages and employment status were given previously (Chiswick, 1977, 1978).
Further evidence of the extent to which immigrants' occupations change between origin and destination is shown in Tables 9 and 10. The tables present the occupational distributions of immigrants who entered the United States from 1965 through 1969 and foreign born persons who immigrated to this country during the same years. The data on arriving immigrants, from the INS, refer to their occupations at origin. The 1970 census data on the foreign born give their occupations at destination. In other words, Tables 9 and 10 show the occupational distributions of persons before and after immigration, with the period of immigration (the combined years 1965 through 1969) held constant. The two populations of employed persons are not, of course, identical in size or composition. For example, some entrants who had worked abroad might not have been employed in the United States at the census date, and vice versa. Still, the populations very probably are well enough matched to justify comparing them. The results of the comparison basically agree with other research findings, already discussed, about immigrants' short-term occupational adjustment in this country.

In two respects the entrants from 1965 through 1969 were downwardly mobile: both the aggregate (Table 9) and selected groups (Table 10) were less likely to have professional and technical occupations at destination than at origin, and their representation in the secondary labor sector increased by roughly 10 percent. However, the increase occurred largely in the operatives category and also in nonhousehold service occupations. Almost without exception, the foreign born were less likely to be in the lowest part of the occupational hierarchy, as farm and nonfarm laborers and private household workers, here than

<table>
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<td>4.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Farmers and farm managers</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm laborers and farm foremen</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers, except private household</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private household workers</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td><strong>776,853</strong></td>
<td><strong>763,962</strong></td>
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</table>

Sources: Data on arriving immigrants were computed from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1965-1969, Annual Reports, Table 8. Data on the foreign born were computed from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1973a, Census of Population, 1970, Subject Reports, Final Report PC (2)-1A, National Origin and Language, Table 18. The latter data are based on a 5 percent sample of the population and refer to persons at least sixteen years old in 1970 who immigrated to the United States from 1965 through 1969.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>Central America, the West Indies, and South America</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arriving</td>
<td>Foreign</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>born</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional, technical, and kindred workers, except farm</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Managers and administrators, except farm</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sales workers</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and kindred workers</td>
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<td>3.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen and kindred workers</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Operatives</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers, except farm</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers and farm managers</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
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<td>Service workers, except private household</td>
<td>5.3</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Private household workers</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>57,267</td>
<td>70,012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See Table 9.

aEurope here comprises the following countries: Austria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia.

bChina here includes the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People's Republic of China.
abroad. Similarly, research by North (1979b) and Rogg (1974) showed the predominance of operatives in the secondary sector at destination but not at origin.

Despite a common pattern of downward mobility among the foreign born, irrespective of their origins, they certainly were not homogenized by coming to the United States. On the contrary, their diverse occupational backgrounds appear to have influenced significantly the work they found here, so that the less advantaged entrants remained less advantaged when employed in this country, and the more advantaged retained their relatively better positions (see Table 10). Mexicans working in the United States were by a wide margin the most concentrated in the secondary sector (81 percent), followed by Central Americans, West Indians, and South Americans (58 percent), the Chinese (50 percent), and Europeans (44 percent). Conversely, in the professional and technical category the Chinese were the best represented (28 percent), with Europeans next in order (20 percent), then Central Americans, West Indians, and South Americans (10 percent), and finally Mexicans (2 percent). Both rankings were precisely the ones observed for arriving immigrants from these origins, although, as noted previously, each group had a lower share of professional and technical workers and a higher percentage in the secondary sector here than abroad.

For comparative purposes it should be reiterated that the three largest groups in the native born population of native parentage (see Table 3) had the following representation in lower level occupations as of 1970: whites, 33 percent; Hispanics, 49 percent; and blacks, 64
Thus, with respect to all three groups, Mexican entrants employed at destination were greatly overconcentrated in the secondary sector; the foreign born from Central America, the West Indies, and South America were overconcentrated in relation to native born whites and Hispanics. Compared with native whites, Chinese and European entrants were considerably more likely to be in the secondary sector; but they, especially the Chinese, also were more likely to have professional and technical occupations.

Theoretically, the data in Tables 3 and 10 suggest that, among the foreign born who immigrated from 1965 through 1969 and were employed at destination in 1970, Mexicans were the group most complementary vis-à-vis native born whites of native parentage and most likely to promote their upward mobility. Mexicans, Central Americans, West Indians, and South Americans were the most likely to substitute for native born blacks. However, the proportions of Chinese and European entrants in the secondary sector were high enough to indicate that they, too, were more competitive than complementary with respect to native born minorities (blacks and Hispanics). It is especially noteworthy that in 1970 the operatives category contained the largest share of each native minority group and of every foreign born group except the Chinese. Slightly more than a third of the Mexicans, Central Americans, West Indians, and South Americans were in this category, as were about a quarter of the Europeans and the native minorities and almost a fifth of the Chinese. In addition, rather large proportions of these groups, especially the Chinese and native blacks, were nonhousehold service workers. Thus potential competition between the foreign born and native
minorities evidently was greatest in the upper part of the secondary sector, where the foreign born were much more concentrated at destination than at origin. Conversely, Europeans and particularly the Chinese appeared competitive with native whites in the professional and technical category. It would be erroneous, therefore, to assume that virtually all of these Eastern Hemisphere entrants were likely to further the native whites' occupational advancement, though many seemed to be so.

Summary and conclusions

This chapter has tested the first three of seven hypotheses stated at the beginning of the dissertation.

Hypothesis 1: Legal immigrants as an aggregate have an occupational structure like that of all persons employed in the United States.

Hypothesis 2: The representation of legal immigrants in the secondary labor sector varies according to their origins.

Hypothesis 3: Legal immigrants from certain origins approach or exceed the representation of native born minorities of native parentage (blacks and Hispanics) in the secondary sector.

Whereas the data on immigrants' occupations at origin and destination partly, though not entirely, support Hypothesis 1, the data unequivocally support Hypotheses 2 and 3. The discussion below refers to the first hypothesis. Findings and conclusions for the next two hypotheses will be presented later in this section.

Comparison of all arriving immigrants' occupations at origin with the occupations of the whole United States labor force during four consecutive periods (1960 through 1964 to 1975 through 1977) (see Table 4) has shown that immigrants and American workers were quite similarly
distributed in white collar, blue collar, farm, and service employment; but differences occurred within specific occupational categories. From 1960 through 1977 (see Figures 1 and 2) immigrants always were overrepresented in the professional and technical category and usually were overconcentrated in the secondary sector as well. Their occupational distribution was, in other words, rather bipolar. Nevertheless, it resembled the Americans' distribution enough to suggest that, theoretically, immigrants as an aggregate were somewhat more substitutive than complementary with respect to the United States labor force, although immigrants (because of their tendency toward overconcentration in lower level occupations) seemed not unlikely to further the upward mobility of native born whites.

Studies of legal immigrants' occupational adjustment in the United States have indicated considerable short-term downward mobility after immigration, especially for persons who belonged to the professional and technical elite in their homelands and for refugees (Chiswick, 1977; Kelly, 1977; Montero, 1979; North, 1979b; North and Weissert, 1973; Portes et al., 1977; Rogg, 1974; Stein, 1979; Wenk, 1968).

Similarly, Table 9 has shown that entrants from 1965 through 1969 were less likely to have professional and technical occupations in this country than at origin (20 percent versus 24 percent) and more likely to be in the secondary sector (49 percent versus 40 percent). The latter increase, however, occurred entirely in the operatives and nonhousehold service categories, since the proportions of farm and nonfarm laborers and private household workers were lower at destination than at origin. Upward mobility within the secondary sector after immigration also has been noted by North (1979b) and Rogg (1974).
Two qualifications should be added to the preceding information on occupational adjustment at destination. Bach and Bach (1980), North (1979b), North and Weissett (1973), and Wenk (1968) have shown, as has Table 9, that immigrants' representation in the American professional and technical category equals or exceeds 15 percent, which was the proportion of the United States labor force in this category from 1975 through 1977 (see Table 4). So, notwithstanding immigrants' initial downward mobility, they evidently are at least as likely as American workers in the aggregate to be at the top of the occupational hierarchy. Furthermore, several researchers have found that, over time, immigrants' occupational status tends to rise, along with their earnings or incomes (Bach and Bach, 1980; Chiswick, 1977, 1978, 1979; North, 1979b).

For these reasons immigrants' occupations at origin may predict their early or eventual occupations at destination with sufficient accuracy that the conclusions based on their occupational backgrounds may be applicable to their American occupations as well.

The preceding discussion is, of course, about legal immigrants as a whole. The following discussion refers to Hypotheses 2 and 3, about immigrants disaggregated by their origins.

The occupational backgrounds of immigrants from 1965 through 1977 have shown that Mexicans were greatly overconcentrated in the secondary sector, relative to all other immigrant groups, the United States labor force generally, and the three largest groups in the native born population of native parentage in 1970 (see Tables 3, 6, 7, and 8 and Figures 3 and 4). Central Americans, West Indians, and South Americans, the immigrant group with the next-highest representation in the
secondary sector, were more concentrated there than American workers as an aggregate and than native born whites. In many years these immigrants approximated the representation of native born Hispanics in lower level occupations as of 1970. During the 1970s non-Canadian entrants from the Western Hemisphere were, theoretically, more substitutive than complementary in relation to native born blacks and Hispanics. Mexicans were, in theory, the most complementary immigrant group vis-à-vis native whites and the most likely to further the whites' upward mobility. The Europeans' occupational distribution bore many resemblances to that of the United States labor force, despite their greater concentration in the secondary sector in all except two years after 1968. Europeans were, theoretically, more competitive than complementary with respect to native whites. Asians and Africans tended toward an elite position, with high proportions in the professional and technical category and low proportions in the secondary sector, vis-à-vis American workers generally, native whites, and native minorities. Theoretically, these two immigrant groups tended to complement both the native minorities and the native white majority. However, the Chinese usually had the somewhat bipolar distribution that characterized immigrants as an aggregate. Their employment background suggests that they were, in theory, competitive with native born Americans at both extremes of the occupational hierarchy.

It is consistent with the differences in recent entrants' occupational backgrounds that persons from the Eastern Hemisphere have been found to fare better in the United States than non-Canadians, especially Mexicans, from the Western Hemisphere (Chiswick, 1977, 1979;
North, 1979b; North and Weissert, 1973). For example, in North and Weissert's sample of immigrants employed at destination in 1972, Eastern Hemisphere entrants were much better represented than Western Hemisphere entrants in the professional and technical category and much less concentrated in lower level occupations. Compared with native born whites in 1970 (see Table 3), the Eastern Hemisphere immigrants were almost twice as likely to have professional and technical occupations (28 percent versus 16 percent) and were not greatly overconcentrated in the secondary sector (39 percent versus 33 percent). The Western Hemisphere entrants exceeded the proportion of native Hispanics in the secondary sector (58 percent versus 49 percent) and approached the representation of native blacks (64 percent).

Also, Table 10 has shown that, of four foreign born groups who entered this country from 1965 through 1969 and were employed here in 1970, Mexicans had by far the highest proportion in the secondary sector (81 percent). Central Americans, West Indians, and South Americans were next in order (58 percent), followed by the Chinese (50 percent) and Europeans (44 percent). Relative to native born whites, every foreign born group was overconcentrated in lower level occupations, but Europeans and particularly the Chinese were overrepresented in the professional and technical category as well.

Thus, theoretically, some of these Eastern Hemisphere entrants, who are substitutive for native whites at the top of the occupational hierarchy, do not promote the whites' upward mobility. Mexicans, at destination as in their occupational backgrounds, are, in theory, the immigrant group most complementary toward native whites and most likely to further their occupational advancement.
Two trends are evident from the data in Table 10. Though the four foreign born groups were by no means homogenized after coming to the United States, all of them were more concentrated in the secondary labor sector at destination than at origin. A related trend after immigration involved movement into the upper part of the secondary sector (the operatives and nonhousehold service categories) rather than the lowest level categories (farm and nonfarm laborers and private household workers). Theoretically, this movement put every foreign born group into more direct competition with native born minorities in the secondary sector than would have occurred if the entrants had retained the exact occupations they had at origin. It will be recalled from Tables 3 and 10 that in 1970 the operatives category contained the largest share of each native minority group and of every foreign born group except the Chinese. In addition, substantial proportions of these groups, particularly the Chinese and native blacks, were nonhousehold service workers.

In theory, then, despite pronounced occupational differences between and even within legal immigrant groups, many immigrants tend to substitute for native born minorities; and competition seemingly is keenest in the upper part of the secondary sector, where work may be slightly better paid and less arduous physically than at the absolute bottom of the occupational hierarchy. Whether theory corresponds to reality in the secondary sector is the topic of Chapter 5.
CHAPTER 4: THE EMPLOYMENT OF ILLEGAL ALIENS

Introduction

The preceding chapter tested the first three hypotheses of interest in the dissertation, pertaining to recent (post-1965) legal immigrants to the United States. The purpose of this chapter is to test the next three hypotheses, as presented in Chapter 1, concerning recent illegal aliens.

Hypothesis 4: Compared with all persons employed in the United States, illegal aliens as an aggregate are overconcentrated in the secondary labor sector.

Hypothesis 5: Illegal aliens as an aggregate approach or exceed the representation of native born minorities of native parentage (blacks and Hispanics) in the secondary sector.

Hypothesis 6: The representation of illegal aliens in the secondary sector varies according to their origins.

If supported, these hypotheses would suggest that, theoretically (Spengler, 1956, 1958), illegal aliens as an aggregate complement the United States labor force in general; that they substitute for or compete with native born minorities, who are heavily concentrated in the secondary sector; and that illegals complement and are likely to promote the upward mobility of native born whites, most of whom are in the primary sector. However, the possibility that the origins of recent entrants may be a more important factor in occupational structure than legal or illegal status per se also will be considered here.
The next three sections of the chapter will review different methods that have been used to gather information on illegal aliens' employment and earnings or incomes: studies of apprehended illegals in the United States, research using the records of immigrant service organizations, and studies conducted in the illegals' countries of origin. Most comparisons of these different methods will refer to four major studies (Cornelius, 1978; North and Houstoun's research on apprehended illegals, 1976; Poitras, 1981; Van Arsdol et al., 1979);

One study combined several research methods, two of which differed from those to be described subsequently. Community Research Associates (1980) studied four samples of primarily Mexican illegal aliens in San Diego County. Included were 211 unapprehended illegals (73 percent male), who had applied for permanent resident alien status as the result of a class-action suit; 247 apprehended illegals (92 percent male), for whom INS I-213 forms were filed in 1979; 122 apprehended illegals (96 percent male), who were interviewed at an INS detention center in 1979 and 1980; and 50 unapprehended illegals (60 percent female), who were selected by the snowball sampling method and interviewed at unspecified dates. Employment data for the respondents were reported by industries, not occupations, and were remarkably similar across samples. The last group of respondents worked mainly in services and retail trade, but in the first three groups agriculture was the most important industrial category, followed by services and retail trade. Earnings were generally low. For example, average hourly wages for the second and third samples were $3.61 and $3.05, respectively.

Two additional studies are relevant here, though neither provided much methodological information. Cardenas (1976) gave a short summary of his case study of 100 illegal Mexican aliens in San Antonio. Approximately two-thirds of the respondents clearly had lower level occupations, as nonfarm laborers and service workers. The illegals' average wage was $2.15 per hour. Maram (1980) briefly mentioned a snowball sample of 1,300 illegal Hispanic aliens who lived or worked in Los Angeles County. These persons, like those interviewed by Cardenas, were predominantly secondary sector nonagricultural workers. Their two chief employers were the garment and restaurant industries, in that order.

The terms used to describe illegal aliens' work are those designated by the various researchers and are not always identical to the 1970 census occupational categories (see Table 1).
the other research will be mentioned as appropriate. In the fifth section some analogies will be drawn between illegal aliens in the United States and the guest workers of northern and western Europe. Finally, the results of the studies of illegals will be summarized and the implications discussed.

Studies of apprehended illegal aliens in the United States

Two studies conducted in the United States on apprehended Mexican illegal aliens provide some information, albeit limited, about their work.

Samora (1971) summarized the results of interviews with 493 male apprehendees who were being held in three INS detention centers in the southwest. Fifty-seven percent of the respondents had done farm work in Mexico, and, of the men employed in the United States when apprehended (51 percent), "the majority" worked in agriculture (1971: 91). Hourly wages for 82 percent of the employed illegals were $2.00 or less.

Dagodag (1975) analyzed a sample of INS I-213 forms that were filed for 3,204 apprehendees, 92 percent of them men, in the Chula Vista, California, border patrol sector in 1973. Of the 1,128 illegals who reported their Mexican occupations, 92 percent had been laborers. However, 82 percent of the 2,611 individuals who reported their activities at the time of apprehension were seeking employment, rather than working, in the United States; another 15 percent were employed in agriculture and the remaining 3 percent in industry and services. That such a high proportion had not found employment is not surprising, since 77 percent of the total sample were apprehended within three days after entering the country.
Neither of the preceding studies approaches the scope or detail of North and Houstoun's research (1976), which is based on interviews held in 1975 with 793 apprehended illegal aliens who were being detained by the INS. The respondents were at least sixteen years old and had worked in the United States for no fewer than two weeks.

Although interviews were conducted in nineteen sites across the country, attention was focused on three geographically diverse metropolitan areas that, according to INS data on apprehensions, contain much of the illegal alien population: Los Angeles, New York, and San Antonio. Of the total interviews, 28 percent were allocated to California; 30 percent to Arizona and Texas; 30 percent to Miami, Newark, New York, and Washington, D.C.; and 12 percent to Chicago, Detroit, and Seattle.

The composition of the sample, which was 91 percent male and 61 percent Mexican, can be attributed to two factors: INS apprehension techniques tend to net far more males than females, and Mexicans predominate among apprehended illegal aliens in the three border states where more than half of the interviews were held. Thirty percent of the sample came from the Western Hemisphere, excluding Mexico, and the remaining 9 percent from the Eastern Hemisphere.

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3This category included five Canadians, in addition to illegals from Central America, the West Indies, and South America.

4The Eastern Hemisphere category combined twenty-nine Europeans with seven Africans and thirty-nine Asians.
The 788 respondents who reported their most recent occupations in the United States were underrepresented in white collar work and overrepresented in the other broad occupational divisions, relative to the experienced civilian United States labor force from 1975 through 1977 (see Table 4). Whereas 49 percent of the latter group were white collar workers, just 6 percent of the illegal aliens were so classified. Fifty-seven percent of the illegals, but only 34 percent of American workers, had blue collar occupations. Twenty-one percent of the illegals were service workers, and 16 percent were farm workers; the proportions of the United States labor force in these divisions were 14 percent and 3 percent, respectively.

North and Houstoun noted that the respondents' occupational status would have been even lower if women and service workers had not been seriously underrepresented in the sample, because of INS apprehension methods. Since the study focused on metropolitan areas, it is possible that farm workers also were underrepresented; however, the researchers presented plausible evidence to the contrary. The great majority of their respondents had entered the United States at the Mexican border, in close proximity to agricultural employment opportunities, but most had sought and found urban occupations. This pattern is in accordance with the belief of the INS and other observers that, whenever feasible, Mexican illegals are forsaking rural for urban employment (Crewdson, 1980; Gay, 1981; Portes, 1979). A recent estimate, given to the United States Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy (Simpson, 1982b), is that only about 15 percent of all Mexican illegals are farm workers.
The respondents' earnings and time spent at work in the United States were consistent with their low occupational status. North and Houstoun compared the illegals' wages and hours during their most recent employment with those of all United States production and nonsupervisory workers in 1975 in seven industries: contract construction; finance, real estate, and insurance; manufacturing; mining; nonhousehold service; transportation and public utilities; and wholesale and retail trade. Without exception, the illegal aliens received markedly less money. Their average hourly wage was $2.66, whereas the other workers received $4.47; and the illegals' average work week was considerably longer (45 hours versus 36 hours).

Moreover, the respondents appeared to profit little from longer employment. Illegals in the United States fewer than two years had worked here an average of six months, a much shorter time than the average of forty-one months for illegals here at least two years. Yet the average hourly wages of the two groups were quite similar ($2.40 and $2.97, respectively).

It follows from this discussion that the illegal aliens were much less likely than American workers were from 1975 through 1977 to be in the professional and technical category (2 percent versus 15 percent) and far more likely to be in the secondary labor sector (78 percent versus 37 percent). Theoretically, the illegals' occupational structure complemented that of American workers and furthered the upward mobility of native born whites of native parentage, whose representation in lower level occupations in 1970 was 33 percent (see Table 3).
The proportions of native born blacks and native born Hispanics in the secondary sector in 1970 were 64 percent and 49 percent, respectively. Thus North and Houstoun's respondents were overrepresented there, vis-à-vis the native minorities, mainly because of the illegals' greater tendency to be farm and nonfarm laborers. These two categories contained 29 percent of the illegals, compared with 12 percent of the native blacks and 9 percent of the native Hispanics. The three groups actually had similar proportions of operatives (28 percent, 24 percent, and 24 percent, respectively) as well as nonhousehold service workers (18 percent, 20 percent, and 15 percent, respectively). So, in theory, an observation made about legal immigrants (see Tables 9 and 10) also applies to North and Houstoun's respondents: they were most substitutive for native minorities in the upper part of the secondary sector.

However, illegals from different origins had diverse occupational backgrounds, and some of the diversity was transferred to their American employment.5

At origin Eastern Hemisphere illegals had the highest occupational status. Non-Mexicans from the Western Hemisphere were next in order, and Mexicans had indisputably the lowest status. The proportions of the three groups with professional and technical occupations were 21 percent, 10 percent, and 2 percent, respectively. Forty percent of the

5Occupations at origin and most recent United States occupations were reported for 628 persons in the sample.
Eastern Hemisphere entrants were in the secondary sector, compared with 50 percent of the non-Mexican Western Hemisphere illegals and 78 percent of the Mexicans.

At destination the proportions of Mexicans and Eastern Hemisphere entrants in the professional and technical category were reduced by slightly more than half. The representation of non-Mexican Western Hemisphere illegals in this category decreased to 2 percent, and their concentration in the secondary sector increased to 78 percent. Eighty-four percent of the Mexicans had lower level occupations, but the proportion of Eastern Hemisphere illegals in the secondary sector remained constant.

Several changes occurred within the secondary sector. Mexicans were less likely to be farm laborers at destination than at origin (27 percent versus 49 percent) and more likely to be operatives and nonhousehold service workers (23 percent versus 13 percent and 14 percent versus 2 percent, respectively). A parallel trend was evident among other Western Hemisphere entrants: the proportion of farm laborers decreased from 12 percent to 5 percent; representation in the operatives and nonhousehold service categories rose from 27 percent to 37 percent and 5 percent to 21 percent, respectively. The proportion of Eastern Hemisphere illegals in nonhousehold service occupations increased most dramatically, from 6 percent to 35 percent, but their representation in every other lower level category decreased. Whereas 27 percent of them had been operatives abroad, only 4 percent were in this category in the United States. Interestingly, the tendency toward greater concentration in the operatives and/or nonhousehold service
categories than in other lower level categories after immigration also was noted for legal entrants (North, 1979b; Rogg, 1974; Tables 9 and 10).

Occupational differences, by origins, were reflected in the illegals' American earnings. Mexicans received the lowest average hourly wage ($2.34), and illegals from the Eastern Hemisphere received the highest amount ($4.08). For non-Mexican Western Hemisphere entrants the average wage was $3.04 per hour.

Two factors are important in explaining the Mexicans' low earnings. Of the three illegal alien groups, Mexicans were the most likely to be farm laborers, who generally are ill paid whatever their origins. Even more significantly, however, Mexicans were concentrated in the southwest, where wages typically are low for agricultural and nonagricultural workers alike. The average hourly wage earned by all illegals in this region was $1.98, by far the lowest of any region surveyed, and the average hourly wage in the twenty-three counties bordering Mexico was lower still ($1.74). The majority of respondents who received these wages were not farm workers.

Because Mexicans predominated in the sample, their characteristics greatly influenced those of the aggregate. However, not all of the illegal aliens were in the secondary sector, and the differences occurred largely according to their origins. Among North and Houstoun's respondents, as among legal immigrants (North, 1979b; North and Weissert, 1973; Table 10), Mexicans were the least advantaged before and after immigration. Other Western Hemisphere entrants fared somewhat better, and persons from the Eastern Hemisphere were the most advantaged.
Of the three illegal alien groups at destination, Eastern Hemisphere entrants most closely approximated native born whites' representation in 1970 in the professional and technical category and the secondary sector (10 percent versus 16 percent and 40 percent versus 33 percent, respectively). Nevertheless, the Eastern Hemisphere illegals were much more likely than native whites to be nonhousehold service workers (35 percent versus 10 percent), and they were, theoretically, substitutive for the native minorities, particularly native blacks, in this part of the secondary sector. Mexicans and other Western Hemisphere illegals were, in theory, generally competitive with the native minorities, complementary vis-à-vis native whites, and likely to promote the whites' occupational advancement.

Research under the auspices of immigrant service organizations

An ancillary part of North and Houstoun's research consists of information collected from forty unapprehended illegal aliens in New York City and eleven in Washington, D.C. The interviews were conducted in the offices of the Catholic Migration Service and a law firm specializing in immigration.

Instead of being predominantly from Mexico, as were the apprehended illegals, 71 percent of the unapprehended sample came from other Western Hemisphere countries. Twenty-three percent were from the Eastern Hemisphere, and only 6 percent were Mexicans. Also, in contrast to the almost all-male sample of apprehended illegals, 41 percent of the unapprehended respondents were women.
Though only a quarter of the unapprehended group employed at origin had lower level occupations, in the United States the figure increased sharply to two-thirds. Like the apprehended illegals from the Eastern Hemisphere, most of the unapprehended respondents in the secondary labor sector at destination had nonhousehold service occupations.

The research of Van Arsdol et al. (1979) compares well with North and Houstoun's study of apprehended illegal aliens in detail, though not in geographical extensiveness. Van Arsdol et al. gained access to the records of a legal and social service agency, the One Stop Immigration Service Center, in Los Angeles. The One Stop sample comprised 2,905 illegal aliens, sixteen years of age and older, who came to the agency between 1972 and 1975 seeking to legalize their status in this country.

Only 28 percent of the illegals studied by Van Arsdol et al. had ever been apprehended by the INS, and the sample differed from North and Houstoun's respondents in several other important respects. Because kinship ties with American citizens or permanent resident aliens were the basis for most of the One Stop clients' claims to legal status, illegals with such connections were greatly overrepresented in the One Stop sample. Also, females constituted a higher proportion of this

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6In the following discussion all references to North and Houstoun's study concern only their sample of apprehended illegal aliens. The unapprehended illegals, who were primarily from the Western Hemisphere outside Mexico, had occupations more like the non-Mexicans' than the Mexicans' occupations in the sample of Van Arsdol et al. However, North and Houstoun's unapprehended respondents were more concentrated in white collar employment and service work, both abroad and in the United States, than were the non-Mexicans studied by Van Arsdol et al.
sample than of North and Houstoun's respondents (36 percent versus 9 percent). Most of the persons studied by Van Arsdol et al. were Mexicans (93 percent, as opposed to 61 percent of North and Houstoun's respondents). The rest were from Central America, Cuba, and South America. Thus the sample of Van Arsdol et al., unlike that of North and Houstoun, did not include any Eastern Hemisphere illegals.

The 1,970 One Stop clients who were employed in the United States generally had higher occupational status than North and Houstoun's respondents had at destination. Eleven percent of the former group (males and females had almost identical representation), compared with 6 percent of the latter group, were white collar workers. Blue collar workers also were more prevalent in the One Stop sample (76 percent of the males and 65 percent of the females) than in the North and Houstoun sample (57 percent). However, the concentration of male One Stop clients at the highest blue collar level, that of craftsmen, was 32 percent, twice the proportion in North and Houstoun's sample. Thirteen percent of the male One Stop clients and 25 percent of the females, versus 21 percent of North and Houstoun's respondents, were service workers. The data provided to Van Arsdol et al. did not include an occupational classification for farm laborers. Presumably, though, few of the clients would have been so categorized, since virtually all were urban residents. The male One Stop clients and North and Houstoun's respondents were equally represented as nonfarm laborers (14 percent), but an additional 16 percent of the latter group were farm laborers. Accordingly, One Stop clients were less likely to be in the secondary labor sector (57 percent of the males and 69 percent of the females) than were North and Houstoun's respondents (78 percent).
Still, One Stop clients were disadvantaged with respect to the United States labor force from 1975 through 1977 (see Table 4). The illegals' representation in almost every occupational category for which data were available resembled that of North and Houstoun's sample more than that of American workers. Just 4 percent of the One Stop clients, but 15 percent of the United States labor force, had professional and technical occupations. The proportions of the two groups in the secondary sector were 60 percent and 37 percent, respectively. Like North and Houstoun's respondents, the One Stop sample had an occupational structure complementary to that of American workers and conducive to the upward mobility of native whites, at least in theory.

One Stop clients were overconcentrated in the secondary sector with regard to native born Hispanics of native parentage in 1970 (49 percent) and only slightly less clustered there than native born blacks (64 percent) (see Table 3). Theoretically, the illegals tended toward substitutive relations with both native minorities, most conspicuously in the operatives category.

In incomes, as in occupations, One Stop clients seemed more similar to the North and Houstoun sample than to other workers. It should be noted that data on earnings or incomes in the two studies are not directly comparable. Whereas One Stop clients reported their annual incomes, North and Houstoun's respondents were asked about their gross hourly and weekly wages. Nevertheless, when Van Arsdol et al. compared the incomes of One Stop clients between 1972 and 1975 with those received by the Los Angeles metropolitan area population in 1970, they found the illegal workers as disadvantaged as North and Houstoun's
respondents were with respect to all United States production and nonsupervisory workers in seven industries. The North and Houstoun sample earned 60 percent of the average hourly wage received by the larger group of workers ($2.66 versus $4.47). Male One Stop clients received just 56 percent of the median annual income of the Los Angeles metropolitan area male population ($4,816 versus $8,542). Female clients fared better, relative to all females in the metropolitan area, but the medians for both groups were very low ($3,737 and $4,461, respectively). Another resemblance between the two samples of illegal aliens was the negligible effect of continued residence in the United States on earnings or incomes here. One Stop clients who had lived in this country longer than two years had a median annual income just $500 higher than that of earlier arrivals.

Also, according to Van Arsdol et al., the male One Stop clients' median annual income amounted to only 68 percent of that received in 1970 by the male Hispanic population of the Los Angeles metropolitan area, which in turn was disadvantaged vis-à-vis the larger male population of the same area. Hispanic females, conversely, received somewhat less than $3,800 per year, whether or not they were illegal aliens.

As did North and Houstoun, Van Arsdol et al. disaggregated illegal aliens' occupations and the money they received by their origins. Thus it is possible to compare the studies in these respects, which may help to explain an inconsistency in the findings: of the three illegal alien groups studied by North and Houstoun, Mexicans had by far the lowest occupational status; yet the One Stop sample, even though it contained
almost a third more Mexicans, generally had higher occupational status than North and Houstoun's sample. Since most of North and Houstoun's respondents were men, the following comparisons with the One Stop sample refer to male clients only.⁷

At origin and in the United States, Mexican⁸ One Stop clients had higher occupational status than North and Houstoun's Mexican respondents. Likewise, Central Americans, Cubans, and South Americans⁹ in the sample of Van Arsdol et al. had higher status than North and Houstoun's non-Mexican Western Hemisphere respondents. As in the North and Houstoun study, Van Arsdol et al. found that Mexicans had lower status abroad than non-Mexicans. However, this difference was lessened among One Stop clients at destination, because of the Mexicans' greater tendency to be craftsmen.

Before coming to the United States, 8 percent of the Mexican One Stop clients and 19 percent of the non-Mexicans had professional and technical occupations. The proportions among North and Houstoun's respondents were 2 percent and 10 percent, respectively. In the One Stop sample 45 percent of the Mexicans, compared with 21 percent of the

⁷Among Mexican One Stop clients employed in the United States, the sexes had similar occupational distributions, except that women were much more likely to be private household workers and much less likely to be craftsmen. Among non-Mexicans employed at destination, women were most overconcentrated in private household occupations and most underrepresented in the professional and technical category.

⁸The discussion pertains to 1,230 Mexican males employed at origin and 1,336 employed at destination.

⁹Of the Central American, Cuban, and South American men, 84 were employed at origin and 88 worked in the United States.
other clients, were in the secondary sector, but 78 percent of North and Houstoun's Mexican respondents and 50 percent of the other Western Hemisphere illegals had lower level occupations.

In the United States, Mexican One Stop clients were less likely than non-Mexicans to be professional and technical workers (4 percent versus 10 percent). North and Houstoun reported proportions of not quite 1 percent and 2 percent, respectively. Mexicans in the One Stop sample were slightly more likely than other clients to be in the secondary sector (57 percent versus 53 percent). The same pattern was evident in North and Houstoun's study, though the proportions of Mexicans and other Western Hemisphere illegals with secondary sector occupations (84 percent versus 78 percent) were much higher than in the One Stop sample.

A trend toward greater concentration in the operatives and nonhousehold service categories than in other parts of the secondary sector after immigration was noted for North and Houstoun's Mexican and other Western Hemisphere respondents. It was also apparent in the One Stop sample. The Mexicans studied by Van Arsdol et al. were at least twice as likely to be operatives and nonhousehold service workers in the United States as at origin (30 percent versus 15 percent and 12 percent versus 5 percent, respectively). Among non-Mexicans the increases were more than threefold (from 8 percent to 28 percent and 4 percent to 15 percent, respectively). One Stop clients' representation in the remaining lower level categories changed minimally between origin and destination, except that the proportion of Mexican nonfarm laborers decreased from 25 percent to 14 percent.
The data on incomes in the United States by illegals' origins were given only for families in the One Stop sample, not for individuals. Mexicans, compared with other clients, were much less concentrated in the three lowest income categories (26 percent versus 35 percent) and slightly more concentrated in the three highest categories (20 percent versus 17 percent). Van Arsdol et al. suggested that the differences were due to the Mexicans' longer residence in this country and possibly to multiple earners within families. The second of these two reasons seems more plausible, since, as already discussed, duration of residence appeared not to increase individual incomes substantially. Mexicans' overrepresentation as craftsmen also may have contributed to their higher incomes.

The differences in occupational status by origins for the two samples of illegal aliens were reflected in their earnings or incomes. Among North and Houstoun's respondents, Mexicans employed in the United States were far more likely than other Western Hemisphere illegals to be in the three lowest hourly wage categories (41 percent versus 17 percent) and far less likely to be in the three highest categories (19 percent versus 42 percent). This pattern was the opposite of that discussed for the One Stop sample, although in the latter sample income disparities by origins were not so pronounced.

It might be supposed that the differences just described between illegal aliens in the North and Houstoun and the One Stop samples were related to apprehension status: the former group consisted wholly of apprehended illegals, whereas the latter group was largely unapprehended (72 percent). The data of Van Arsdol et al. on occupations and family incomes in the United States by apprehension history (previously
apprehended or never apprehended) were used to examine North and Houstoun's contention that apprehended illegals are more disadvantaged than those who escape detection. The occupational data support this argument, albeit rather weakly.

Among Mexican males\(^{10}\) in the One Stop sample, the unapprehended were more likely than apprehended to have white collar employment (12 percent versus 7 percent), despite the almost equal proportions of the two groups in professional and technical occupations (4 percent and 3 percent, respectively). Unapprehended men were only slightly less concentrated than apprehended in the secondary sector (56 percent versus 59 percent). Unapprehended Mexican women were somewhat more clustered than their apprehended counterparts\(^{11}\) in lower level occupations (69 percent versus 65 percent), but they also were overrepresented in white collar employment (12 percent versus 5 percent), especially as professional and technical workers (6 percent versus 3 percent). For males and females combined, family incomes of apprehended tended to exceed those of the unapprehended.

Among non-Mexican One Stop clients,\(^{12}\) the most appreciable difference between apprehended and the unapprehended was in

\(^{10}\) The discussion refers to 497 apprehended and 839 unapprehended Mexican men who worked in the United States.

\(^{11}\) Seventy-eight of the apprehended Mexican women and 404 of the unapprehended were employed at destination.

\(^{12}\) Males and females are combined here. Only twenty-three of the non-Mexican apprehended were employed in the United States, a number low enough to make occupational comparisons with the unapprehended, by sex, virtually meaningless. Of the non-Mexicans who were unapprehended, 129 worked at destination.
professional and technical occupations: none of the former group, but 7 percent of the latter one, had such employment. The proportions of the two groups in the secondary sector were 65 percent and 62 percent, respectively. Family incomes, however, were generally higher for apprehendees.

The findings for both Mexicans and non-Mexicans suggest, as Van Arsdol et al. pointed out, that white collar illegals are more successful than others in avoiding detection. Part of this success, though, may be attributable to something besides the white collar workers' characteristics per se. The INS inspects certain white collar sites less frequently than, for example, manufacturing and construction sites and therefore may be expected to capture fewer illegal white collar workers. It seems reasonable to infer from the data that illegal white collar employees, especially those with professional and technical occupations, in the United States may be more numerous than previously supposed, precisely because they may be the most likely to go undetected and thus uncounted.

The primary reason for the better position of One Stop clients, relative to North and Houstoun's sample, in this country is that Mexicans, who constituted 93 percent of the One Stop sample, had higher status occupations than North and Houstoun's Mexican respondents; but differences among other Western Hemisphere illegals in the two samples also favored the One Stop clients. These observations conform to the expectation that different methods of selecting research samples would yield divergent findings, though the divergences were only partly due to apprehension history.
Nevertheless, like North and Houstoun's Mexican and other Western Hemisphere respondents, both the Mexicans and the non-Mexicans studied by Van Arsdol et al. had much lower occupational status at destination than native born whites had in 1970. Whereas only 4 percent of the Mexicans and 6 percent of the Central Americans, Cubans, and South Americans in the One Stop sample were professional and technical workers, 16 percent of the native born whites were so classified. Conversely, the respective proportions of the three groups in the secondary sector were 60 percent, 63 percent, and 33 percent. Native whites were, theoretically, much more likely to benefit from the illegals' presence than were native blacks or native Hispanics, whose respective proportions in lower level occupations were 64 percent and 49 percent. The probability of competition was, in theory, greatest in the operatives category, which contained almost a third of each illegal alien group and about a quarter of each native minority group.

Country of origin studies

Bustamante (1977) presented selected findings from interviews conducted in 1975 with 919 illegal Mexican aliens who had been deported by the INS. Nine Mexican border cities were the interview sites. Although information about the illegals' occupations in the United States was not given, Bustamante reported the average incomes, by Mexican states of origin, that 401 of the illegals received in the

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This discussion pertains to 1,818 Mexican One Stop clients and 152 non-Mexicans (men and women together) who were employed in the United States.
United States during the year before apprehension. The averages, which were low enough to indicate intermittent employment in the secondary labor sector, ranged from $105 to $1,480.

A more extensive project is Cornelius's ongoing research, begun in 1975 and reported to date in several monographs (1976, 1977, 1978). Unless otherwise noted, the following discussion refers to his 1978 report.

Nine rural localities in the state of Jalisco were the research sites. A random sample of 1,001 male residents, seventeen to sixty-five years old, yielded 994 usable interviews. Thus, unlike the illegal aliens studied by North and Houstoun and Van Arsdol et al., the Jalisco survey respondents were all Mexican men, living in Mexico when interviewed. Another distinguishing feature of Cornelius's sample is that 51 percent of the respondents had never worked in the United States, and 17 percent had worked here legally, either during the bracero program or later. However, as many as 32 percent of the respondents had been employed illegally in the United States, 9 percent before 1969 and 23 percent subsequently; it is to this group of 317 men that the following discussion refers. Sixty-nine percent of the Jalisco illegals, compared with only 28 percent of the One Stop sample, had been apprehended at least once by the INS, but Cornelius's data were not broken down by apprehension history.

Comparisons with North and Houstoun's study refer only to their apprehended respondents.
The absence of detailed information about the Jalisco illegals' occupations in Mexico precludes most employment at origin comparisons of this sample with the samples of North and Houstoun and Van Arsdol et al. However, Cornelius (1977) did note that most of the Jalisco illegals were agricultural laborers in Mexico, as were about half of North and Houstoun's Mexican respondents. Among North and Houstoun's other respondents, the proportions employed as farm laborers at origin were much lower (12 percent of the non-Mexican Western Hemisphere illegals and 2 percent of the Eastern Hemisphere illegals).

Cornelius (1978) classified individuals who had worked illegally in the United States according to sectors of employment here: agriculture, industry, commerce, construction, services, and other. Though this categorization differs from the occupational distributions presented by North and Houstoun and Van Arsdol et al., some comparisons nevertheless can be made.

Of the Jalisco illegals who worked in this country before 1969, 81 percent were employed in agriculture, presumably as farm laborers. Among illegal workers after 1969, the proportion in agriculture was reduced by almost half but still included far more respondents (45 percent) than any other sector. North and Houstoun reported that 27 percent of their Mexican respondents, 5 percent of the other Western Hemisphere illegals, and none of those from the Eastern Hemisphere were farm laborers in the United States. The proportion of farm laborers among American workers from 1975 through 1977 was just 2 percent (see Table 4). As for the native born population of native parentage in 1970 (see Table 3), 1 percent of the whites, 2 percent of the blacks, and 3
percent of the Hispanics did farm labor. So, relative to every other group, the Jalisco illegals, even the more recent ones, were greatly overconcentrated in this lower level work.

Cornelius pointed out that decreased agricultural employment among the Jalisco illegals since 1969 does not necessarily mean that the Mexicans are competing more successfully than before with American workers for desirable jobs in other sectors of the economy. It mainly reflects the fact that there are proportionately more unskilled or low-skilled jobs available today in commerce, industry, construction, and services than in agriculture (1978: 55).

To substantiate his point, he noted that the proportion of illegals with skilled and semiskilled occupations increased little after 1969 (from 12 percent to 14 percent). In other words, 86 percent of the more recent illegals were unskilled.

Cornelius unfortunately did not specify the occupations to which the terms "skilled," "semiskilled," and "unskilled" referred; but no doubt the unskilled workers, and probably some of the semiskilled ones as well, had lower level employment. For example, the three American occupations reported with greatest frequency by the post-1969 Jalisco illegals were farm laborer, dishwasher or waiter, and unskilled construction worker (Cornelius, 1977). A conservative estimate, then, is that 86 percent of the post-1969 respondents were in the secondary labor sector.

This proportion is remarkably similar to the one given for North and Houstoun's Mexican respondents at destination (84 percent) but exceeds, to varying degrees, the proportions for other groups. Seventy-eight percent of North and Houstoun's non-Mexican Western Hemisphere
respondents and 40 percent of those from the Eastern Hemisphere were in the secondary sector in the United States, as were 57 percent of the Mexican men and 53 percent of the other men studied by Van Arsdol et al. From 1975 through 1977, 37 percent of the United States labor force had lower level employment. In 1970, 33 percent of native born whites, 64 percent of native blacks, and 49 percent of native Hispanics had such employment.

Like the other two samples of illegal aliens, the Jalisco illegals had little money in addition to predominantly lower level employment in this country. Cornelius (1978) reported that the average hourly wage of illegals who worked here in 1976 was $2.50. This amount was slightly less than the $2.66 paid to North and Houstoun's respondents, which in turn was only 60 percent of the average hourly wage earned in 1975 by all United States production and nonsupervisory workers in seven industries. The Jalisco illegals fared scarcely better than North and Houstoun's Mexican respondents, who received $2.34; both groups earned much less than North and Houstoun's non-Mexican Western Hemisphere respondents ($3.04) and those from the Eastern Hemisphere ($4.08). It was noted previously that hourly wages were not available in the study by Van Arsdol et al., and that data on annual incomes for individuals in the sample were not disaggregated by origins. However, since male One Stop clients received only 56 percent of the median annual income of males in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, it seems reasonable to assume that the One Stop men and the Jalisco illegals were similarly disadvantaged.
Considering employment and earnings together, the post-1969 Jalisco illegals most closely resembled North and Houstoun's Mexican respondents at destination. In theory, both groups complemented the United States labor force as well as native born whites; and native whites were the probable beneficiaries of the Mexicans' relegation to the secondary sector, where the Mexicans were likely to compete with native blacks and native Hispanics.

The research of Poitras (1981) is valuable for comparative purposes, because it was conducted entirely in Costa Rica and El Salvador instead of Mexico. Whereas Costa Rica affords its citizens a good measure of democracy and some material comfort, El Salvador offers strong incentives for immigration to the United States: poverty, rapid population growth, unemployment, and political violence.

Households containing individuals who had gone to and returned from the United States were identified from national samples of 2,200 households in Costa Rica and El Salvador. The persons thus selected were asked to identify others like themselves, to augment the number of respondents. A total of 573 interviews took place during 1979, 314 in Costa Rica and 259 in El Salvador. All respondents had spent at least a month in the United States since 1969 and were about eighteen years of age or older when interviewed. Only 3 percent of the Costa Ricans, but 27 percent of the Salvadorans, had been apprehended while in this country. Apparently by mistake, Poitras did not specify the numbers or percentages of men and women in the Costa Rican and Salvadoran groups; he noted simply that males outnumbered females, particularly among the Costa Ricans.
Little information was provided about the respondents' occupations at origin, except for the observation that high proportions of both groups, 30 percent of the Costa Ricans and more than 50 percent of the Salvadorans, had been students before they came to the United States. Also, at least 60 percent of the respondents' fathers had "above average occupational status" (1981: 114). These findings suggest the absence of acute poverty in the respondents' backgrounds.

Occupational data were not presented separately for legal and illegal workers. Most of the sample who worked in the United States did so illegally, that is, without proper visas, but there were exceptions. Whereas only 8 percent of the Salvadorans had visas that permitted work, 28 percent of the Costa Ricans had such documents. The extent to which this minority held upper echelon occupations here remains unknown, and so cannot be taken into account in the following discussion.

Most recent occupations in the United States were reported for 548 respondents, who tended to have higher occupational status than illegal aliens in the other major studies had at destination. The proportions of white collar workers in the samples of Poitras, North and Houstoun, and Van Arsdol et al. were 25 percent, 6 percent, and 11 percent, respectively. Blue collar workers made up 40 percent, 57 percent, and 73 percent, respectively, of the three samples. Like the One Stop clients, the workers studied by Poitras were almost entirely urban. He reported that only 3 percent of the respondents were farm workers, as opposed to 16 percent in North and Houstoun's sample and 45 percent of the post-1969 Jalisco illegals in Cornelius's research. However, Poitras found a higher proportion of service workers (32 percent) among
his respondents than the proportions reported by North and Houstoun and Van Arsdol et al. (21 percent and 16 percent, respectively).

The respondents' earnings were commensurate with their generally higher occupational status. Their average hourly wage was $4.11 (in 1972 dollars), not a great deal less than that earned in 1975 by all United States production and nonsupervisory workers in seven industries ($4.47) and considerably more than the averages received by North and Houstoun's sample ($2.66) and the Jalisco illegals in 1976 ($2.50). Hourly wages were not reported for the One Stop clients, but they had a low median annual income ($4,556).

However, relative to the United States labor force from 1975 through 1977 (see Table 4), the 548 respondents were underrepresented in white collar occupations (49 percent versus 25 percent) and overrepresented as service workers (14 percent versus 32 percent). The respondents were not much less likely than American workers to have professional and technical occupations (11 percent versus 15 percent), but they were somewhat more concentrated in the secondary labor sector15 (44 percent versus 37 percent). Their occupational structure, vis-à-vis that of

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15The primary and secondary labor sectors are defined here according to the occupational categories used by Poitras, which differ from the 1970 census occupational categorization used by North and Houstoun and Van Arsdol et al. The primary sector includes professional and technical workers, managers, sales workers, office workers, skilled craftsmen, and semiskilled craftsmen. The secondary sector comprises transportation workers, laborers, farm laborers, and personal service workers (private household and nonhousehold). This definition of the secondary sector probably is conservative, because some of the respondents ambiguously classified as "semiskilled craftsmen" (12 percent of the 548 workers) quite possibly were operatives.
American workers, was, in theory, more complementary than substitutive, and they were fairly likely to promote the upward mobility of native born whites.

The respondents approached the concentration of native born Hispanics of native parentage in the secondary sector in 1970 (49 percent) but were much less clustered there than native born blacks (64 percent) (see Table 3). Theoretically, the likelihood of competition between the respondents and the native minorities was most evident among service workers.

Occupational and earnings differences between the 290 Costa Ricans and 258 Salvadorans who worked in the United States favored the former group. The Costa Ricans had more than twice the Salvadorans' representation in professional and technical occupations (15 percent versus 7 percent); they were only about half as concentrated in the secondary sector (30 percent versus 59 percent); and they had a higher average hourly wage\(^\text{16}\) (\$4.48 versus \$3.71, in 1972 dollars). In fact, the Costa Ricans received the highest average hourly wage of any illegal alien group for whom comparable information was available.

Nevertheless, comparisons with the other major studies of illegal aliens' occupations in the United States show that the Salvadorans were not so disadvantaged as Cornelius's largely agrarian sample from Jalisco, Mexico, or North and Houstoun's Mexican respondents. The

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\(^{16}\text{It should be added, though, that sex, not simply origin, was an important factor in the workers' earnings. Costa Rican and Salvadoran men received average hourly wages of \$4.61 and \$4.17, respectively, but women in the two groups earned only \$3.94 and \$3.18, respectively.}\)
Salvadorans generally resembled the Mexicans and the Central Americans, Cubans, and South Americans studied by Van Arsdol et al. The proportions of these three groups with professional and technical occupations were 7 percent, 4 percent, and 6 percent, respectively; the proportions in the secondary sector were 59 percent, 60 percent, and 63 percent, respectively. However, unlike either group of One Stop clients, the great majority of the Salvadorans with lower level occupations were service workers. Indeed, the proportion of service workers in the Salvadoran group exceeded even that reported for North and Houstoun's Eastern Hemisphere respondents (45 percent versus 35 percent).

The Costa Ricans' occupational status surpassed that of North and Houstoun's Eastern Hemisphere respondents, and every other illegal alien group as well. The proportions of Costa Ricans and Eastern Hemisphere illegals with professional and technical occupations were 15 percent and 10 percent, respectively. Thirty percent of the former group and 40 percent of the latter one were in the secondary sector, with service work the major type of lower level employment.

Native born whites were, in theory, more likely to benefit from the Salvadorans' than the Costa Ricans' occupational structure, although, relative to native whites, the Costa Ricans were underrepresented in white collar occupations (50 percent versus 30 percent) and overconcentrated as service workers (11 percent versus 20 percent). Native Hispanics and especially native blacks, whose respective proportions in private household and other service occupations were 16
percent and 28 percent, appeared, theoretically, most vulnerable to
competition from Costa Ricans and Salvadorans in this part of the
secondary sector.

Illegal aliens and guest workers compared

The tendency for illegal aliens to have occupations that, in
theoretical terms, complement those of native born whites in the United
States and facilitate the whites' upward mobility seems analogous to the
situation in northern and western Europe, where gastarbeiter, or guest
workers, perform tasks largely shunned by the native born labor
force (Böhning, 1972; Petersen, 1978; Piore, 1979; Power, 1979; U.S.
Departments of Justice, Labor, and State, 1979).

The total number of guest workers is not precisely known. However,
in 1974, just after the program peaked, the number was estimated to be
more than 6,500,000. At that time 65 percent of the workers were
located in the Federal Republic of Germany and France. Other host
countries include Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The guest workers are
primarily from the Mediterranean region: Algeria, Greece, Italy,
Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia (Martin,
1980).

17 The French and Swiss refer to the guest workers as foreign
workers, or travailleurs étrangers and Fremdarbeiter, respectively (U.S.
Departments of Justice, Labor, and State, 1979).

18 The United Kingdom is a special case, since most of its entrants
are from Commonwealth countries: various African nations, India,
Pakistan (a member of the Commonwealth until 1972), and several
countries of the West Indies (Studlar, 1979).
Generally, the sending countries have economic problems common to the origins of illegal aliens in the United States: high unemployment rates and low wages, which frequently are combined with high population growth rates. In contrast, most of the receiving countries experienced, as did the United States, more than two decades of economic expansion following World War II; they made available unemployment and welfare benefits that afforded their citizens the option of rejecting ill-paid or low status employment.

Most Gastarbeiter, like many illegal aliens in the United States, have few skills. The chief difference between the two groups is the guest workers' lesser representation in agriculture. They are found mainly in automobile assembly and other metalworking industries (Germany), building and construction (France and Switzerland), and services (Sweden) (Martin, 1980). Piore (1979) noted that citizens of the host countries usually disdain assembly line occupations, particularly in the automobile industry, as having low status, and they avoid construction work for the same reason.

At the outset the guest workers generally were regarded as an impermanent adjunct to the indigenous labor force, to be imported during labor shortages and exported during recessions (Mayer, 1975). This

France, with a history of declining birth rates and an official desire for population growth, initially welcomed foreign workers as permanent settlers. From 1968 onward, the government adopted much more restrictive policies. In 1977 an attempt was made to stop family reunification, but the effort was so controversial that it had to be abandoned. In the same year departure grants were authorized for persons relinquishing their residency or work permits. Nevertheless, it is still possible for aliens to be naturalized (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 1980).
idea was known as the Konjunkturpuffer concept (Power, 1979). It corresponded perfectly to the migrants' initial self-image as "target workers," that is, persons seeking to maximize their savings while minimizing their time spent in the host countries (Böhning, 1972: 62). But, in Böhning's analysis, the migrants almost invariably found that a year or so abroad did not give them sufficient savings to guard against deprivation at home; and the longer they remained abroad, the greater their desire for consumer goods became. These factors brought about extended employment in the host countries. If married, the workers often eventually sent for their wives and children, both to be reunited with them and to have the wives augment family incomes by entering the labor force. In such a way the period of migration has been prolonged indefinitely, perhaps for life or until retirement.

European scholars have called this phenomenon the "illusion of return," which is partly "a psychological response to perceived discrimination" (Miller and Martin, 1982: 86). The concept is useful, not only for explaining why the guest workers have tended to remain in northern and western Europe, but also for predicting the behavior of illegal aliens in the United States. It suggests the possible fallacy of taking at face value, as Cornelius (1978) has done, illegals' firm assertions that they do not intend to settle permanently in this country. Short-term intentions may bear no resemblance to long-term realities.

Thus, with the oil crisis of 1973 and the ensuing recession, came an end to European recruitment of the Gastarbeiter, but an end as well to the myth that they were strictly temporary residents of the host
countries (Reichert and Massey, n.d.). Several countries, including France and Germany, offered the guest workers inducements to return home (Hansen, 1979; Krane, 1979; Newland, 1979), and an estimated 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 of them departed. However, approximately 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 Gastarbeiter remain employed in the host countries (Böhning, 1979; Miller, 1982a). Furthermore, since many of them were joined by their wives and children, decreasing numbers of guest workers seldom meant decreasing numbers of foreigners. On the contrary, the foreign born population of Germany increased by 100,000 between 1973 and 1975; that of France increased by 400,000; that of Switzerland was unchanged (Martin, 1980). The host countries, with a total population of about 220,000,000 persons, now contain an estimated 13,000,000 to 14,000,000 aliens (Miller, 1982a; Miller and Martin, 1982).

It should be pointed out that the roughly 250,000 saisonniers (seasonal workers) employed by the French and the Swiss deviate somewhat from the pattern of permanent or semipermanent residence of other foreign workers in northern and western Europe (Miller, 1982a). The saisonniers are at least as similar to H-2 workers as to illegal aliens in the United States. In 1979 seasonal workers constituted 5 percent and 17 percent, respectively, of the French and Swiss alien labor forces. The saisonniers who come to France are principally from Spain and are concentrated in agriculture, but in Switzerland the saisonniers are mainly Italians employed as construction, hotel, and restaurant workers. Unlike guest workers generally, the saisonniers are required to repatriate within a year and therefore do not hold their jobs indefinitely; nor, while in the host countries, may they change
employers. Although the Spanish *saisonniers* in French agriculture may be joined by their wives and children, family reunification usually is denied to other seasonal workers, a restriction that has exacerbated problems of illegal residence and employment (Miller, 1982a; Power, 1979). But, compared with alien labor overall, "relatively few seasonal workers leak into permanence" (Miller, 1982a: 225).

The lesson that a foreign workers program, apart from the strictly seasonal variety, tends to become a de facto immigration program should not be lost on the United States, where proposals for a guest workers arrangement with Mexico have received recent support (Mathews, 1981; Semler and Gonzales, 1981; Smith, 1981).

**Summary and conclusions**

Chapter 4 has tested the second set of hypotheses that were to be examined in the dissertation.

**Hypothesis 4:** Compared with all persons employed in the United States, illegal aliens as an aggregate are overconcentrated in the secondary labor sector.

**Hypothesis 5:** Illegal aliens as an aggregate approach or exceed the representation of native born minorities of native parentage (blacks and Hispanics) in the secondary sector.

**Hypothesis 6:** The representation of illegal aliens in the secondary sector varies according to their origins.

Flawed though the data from studies of illegals' employment are, they do support these hypotheses. Moreover, the data suggest some noteworthy parallels between recent (post-1965) illegal aliens and recent legal immigrants.

The findings of Poitras (1981) and Van Arsdol et al. (1979) indicate that illegal aliens with white collar, especially professional and
technical, occupations in the United States are more likely than other illegals to escape detection and thus may be more numerous than most researchers have thought. Still, there seems little doubt that illegals in the other broad occupational divisions far surpass their white collar counterparts in numerical importance.

Some studies that were reviewed (Bustamante, 1977; Community Research Associates, 1980; Dagodag, 1975; Maram, 1980; Samora, 1971) did not give the information necessary for determining the proportions of illegal workers in the secondary sector.

However, in every other study except the one by Poitras, illegals with lower level occupations made up well over half of the aggregate sample: 86 percent of Cornelius's (1978) post-1969 Jalisco respondents, 78 percent of the apprehended illegals and 66 percent of the unapprehended sample in North and Houstoun's (1976) research,20 roughly 66 percent of the Mexicans interviewed by Cardenas (1976), and 60 percent of the illegals studied by Van Arsdol et al. (1979).

Also, to the extent that women have been underrepresented in research on illegal aliens, illegals' concentration in the secondary sector probably has been understated. The studies by Poitras and Van Arsdol et al. have shown women to be less advantaged than men, as is the case among legal immigrants (North, 1979b; North and Weissert, 1973) and Americans generally (Waite, 1981).

It is evident from the data presented that illegal aliens in the aggregate are much more likely to be in the secondary sector than are

20All subsequent references to North and Houstoun's research concern only their sample of apprehended illegals.
American workers as a whole (see Table 4 and Figure 1). Theoretically, illegals complement the United States labor force and native born whites of native parentage (see Table 3), whose representation in lower level occupations in 1970 was 33 percent; and, in theory, illegals further the whites' upward mobility. Illegals usually far exceeded the concentration of native born Hispanics in the secondary sector (49 percent) and, except for the samples of Poitras and Van Arsdol et al., were more concentrated there than native blacks (64 percent) as well.

A theoretical point made in Chapter 3 about legal immigrants, concerning their possible substitution for native born blacks and native born Hispanics, applies to illegal aliens also. Though Cornelius, Dagdag, and Samora found that farm workers predominated among illegals employed in the United States, the likelihood of competition between illegals and the native minorities seems most pronounced, not in agriculture, but in the operatives and nonhousehold service categories. Approximately a quarter of North and Houstoun's respondents and the native minority groups were operatives, as were almost a third of the illegals sampled by Van Arsdol et al. Roughly a fifth of the persons studied by North and Houstoun and Poitras and exactly that fraction of native blacks were nonhousehold service workers; more than a tenth of the One Stop sample and the native Hispanics were in the same category.

As expected, various methods of sampling individuals who worked clandestinely in the United States produced divergent results. Nevertheless, the differences, by origins, in illegal aliens' lower level employment strikingly resembled the secondary sector distinctions among legal immigrants. Table 10 has shown that, of four foreign born
groups who entered this country legally from 1965 through 1969 and were working here in 1970, Mexicans were the most conspicuously clustered in lower level occupations (81 percent). Central Americans, West Indians, and South Americans came next in order (58 percent), then the Chinese (50 percent) and Europeans (44 percent). Other researchers also have found legal entrants from the Eastern Hemisphere to be more advantaged in the United States than non-Canadians, particularly Mexicans, from the Western Hemisphere (Chiswick, 1977, 1979; North, 1979b; North and Weissert, 1973). For example, in North and Weissert's sample of immigrants employed at destination in 1972, the proportions of Eastern and Western Hemisphere entrants with lower level occupations were 39 percent and 58 percent, respectively. Likewise, the studies reviewed in Chapter 4 have shown an obvious tendency for Mexican illegal aliens to be the group most concentrated in the secondary sector; other Western Hemisphere illegals were usually somewhat less disadvantaged than the Mexicans; and North and Houstoun's Eastern Hemisphere respondents were generally the least relegated to lower level employment. Only two groups, Mexicans in the One Stop sample and Costa Ricans in the research by Poitras, had higher occupational status than was consistent with this pattern.

The intent of this generalization is not to deny the existence of any occupational differences between legal immigrants and illegal aliens from the same origins. Judging from the imperfect data available, the most salient difference is that Mexican illegals are more likely than their legal counterparts to work at the base of the occupational hierarchy, as farm laborers, notwithstanding the apparent preference of both groups for other employment.
However, origin, not just legal or illegal status, seemingly bears a closer relation to the type of American work performed by recent entrants than has been recognized heretofore. This phenomenon may be at least partly explained by the tendency of persons who have worked illegally in the United States eventually to apply for and be granted permanent resident alien, or legal immigrant, status, thus blurring the distinction between illegal aliens and legal immigrants. There is evidence (Hirschman, 1978; Portes, 1979) that such a practice is commonplace among Mexicans, who form the largest legal and illegal streams from a single country.

The most disadvantaged illegals were those studied by Bustamante, Cornelius, Dagdag, and Samora. All were Mexicans; almost all were men. Most had been apprehended by the INS at some time, and many were farm laborers with very low wages in the United States. They best fit the stereotype of the illegal alien: an impoverished Mexican peasant man driven to accept menial, ill-paid work across the Rio Grande. Mexicans in North and Houstoun's sample had only slightly better employment than the post-1969 Jalisco illegals. Not so concentrated in agriculture, North and Houstoun's Mexican respondents still were overwhelmingly located in the secondary sector (84 percent, compared with 86 percent of the more recent Jalisco illegals) and received low wages. However, in the largely unapprehended urban sample of Van Arsdol et al., Mexicans had a lesser likelihood of secondary sector employment than they had in the other studies. The proportion of Mexican One Stop clients with lower level occupations (60 percent) was actually quite similar to the
proportions given for the Central American, Cuban, and South American One Stop clients (63 percent) and the Salvadorans studied by Poitras (59 percent).

Non-Mexican Western Hemisphere illegals in the research of North and Houstoun, Poitras, and Van Arsdol et al. had more urban, higher status employment and/or greater earnings or incomes than were reported for Mexicans by Bustamante, Cornelius, Dagodag, and Samora. Also, among North and Houstoun's respondents, non-Mexicans from the Western Hemisphere were somewhat less concentrated than Mexicans in the secondary sector (78 percent versus 84 percent) and were better paid.

The Costa Ricans studied by Poitras and the Eastern Hemisphere respondents in North and Houstoun's sample least conformed to the popular conceptualization of the illegal alien. The Costa Ricans had rather high earnings, as well as lower representation in the secondary sector than was found for the Eastern Hemisphere respondents (30 percent versus 40 percent) or any other illegal alien group.

Theoretically, most illegal groups were quite complementary vis-à-vis native born whites and facilitated the whites' upward mobility. (The Costa Ricans studied by Poitras and North and Houstoun's Eastern Hemisphere respondents were, in theory, least likely to perform this function.) Every group of illegals with a high concentration in the nonagricultural part of the secondary sector, particularly in the operatives and/or nonhousehold service categories, tended, in theory, toward substitutive relations with native blacks and native Hispanics, whose respective proportions in these two categories combined were 44 percent and 39 percent as of 1970.
Because illegal aliens, like legal immigrants (see Tables 9 and 10), evidently do have a propensity for employment as operatives and nonhousehold service workers in the United States, the clear theoretical implication of Chapters 3 and 4 is that the relations of many legal and illegal entrants toward the native minorities are more similar than previous research has shown. Chapter 5 will consider whether substitutive relations exist in fact as well as in theory.
CHAPTER 5: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF RECENT ENTRANTS ON NATIVE MINORITIES IN THE SECONDARY LABOR SECTOR

Introduction

The two preceding chapters have shown that substantial proportions of recent (post-1965) legal immigrants and illegal aliens, especially but by no means exclusively Mexicans, are clustered in the American secondary labor sector, mainly as operatives and nonhousehold service workers. Thus, according to Spengler's theoretical formulations (1956, 1958), these recent entrants are substitutive with respect to native born minorities (blacks and Hispanics), who are also most heavily concentrated in the upper part of the secondary sector. It is, however, one thing to state that certain recent entrants theoretically compete with native minorities and quite another to show that competition really is occurring. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to examine the last hypothesis of interest in the dissertation.

Hypothesis 7: Illegal aliens and those legal immigrants who are in the secondary sector actually are displacing disadvantaged Americans, particularly native born minorities.

The second section of the chapter will discuss the use of unemployment rates to test Hypothesis 7, and the third section will discuss the possibility of both substitutive and complementary effects. Next, the summary and conclusions will be presented.

Most previous research on illegal aliens understandably has not given equal attention to legal immigrants and hence inadvertently has
conveyed the impression that only illegals work in the secondary sector to any important extent. Indeed, they probably are more concentrated in lower level occupations than are legal immigrants; and illegals, because their clandestine status makes them vulnerable to exploitation, may have fewer opportunities for advancement into the primary sector. Still, it is clear from Chapters 3 and 4 that the effects of recent entrants cannot be neatly dichotomized as those attributable to legal immigrants versus those due to illegal aliens, although, necessarily, the rest of this section will focus on illegals.

On the one hand, several scholars contend that illegal aliens compete with Americans, notably minorities, for lower level occupations. An emphatic proponent of this view is Briggs, with his assertion that "the impact of illegal entrants on selective labor markets in the United States is substantial" (1976: 361). One such labor market is in southern Texas, where Briggs has inferred the adverse impact of illegal Mexican aliens on other residents from high unemployment rates and above average reliance on public assistance. In his opinion many Mexican-Americans from this area "are literally forced to join the migratory labour force because the local labour market is overrun by illegal Mexican immigrants and [legal] border commuters" (1975: 358).

A more recent and more inclusive observation is that

unemployment rates in the United States are the highest of any of the Western industrialized nations. Unemployment rates among Hispanics, blacks, women; and youth far exceed the national aggregate unemployment rates. Yet we as a nation continue to tolerate a growing number of illegal immigrants who compete for precisely the same secondary labor market jobs in which these citizen workers with the highest unemployment rates are already found (Briggs, 1981: 14).
North and Houstoun (1976) reported that 73 percent of the apprehended illegal aliens they surveyed held Schedule B occupations in their most recent American employment. Schedule B occupations are those for which would-be legal immigrants are denied labor certification, because the United States Department of Labor considers supplies of native born workers adequate to fill any vacancies. Put another way, indigenous workers in these positions are perceived to be most vulnerable to competition from immigrants. The great majority of Schedule B occupations are in the secondary sector.

With respect to the Mexican border region of the United States, Stoddard has observed that the presence of illegal Mexican aliens "causes greatest suffering among the lower strata of uneducated, blue collar citizen laborers who . . . are Americans of Mexican ancestry" (1976: 169). Similarly, Fogel (1975, 1977) and Samora (1971) have argued that the ready availability of illegal Mexican labor perpetuates low wages, poor working conditions, and insecure employment for native born minorities. In a balanced discussion Bradshaw has noted the lack of an accurate measure of employment opportunities, relative to competitors for the opportunities, along the border, but has observed that

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1The labor certification program applies to only a small proportion of legal immigrants (certainly fewer than 12 percent, the proportion in 1975), and so does little to protect domestic workers. Most immigrants are relatives, who do not have to receive certification. And immigrants do not necessarily stay in the occupations for which they were certified. "It has been variously estimated that within two years of entry 57 to 66 percent of immigrants in the labor force change occupations" (Abrams and Abrams, 1975: 20).
by probably any standard, the potential labor force supply . . .
would be considered excessive . . . . We have no evidence that
opportunities on either side are increasing as rapidly as the
population becoming of labor force age (1976: 40).

On the other hand, some scholars argue that illegal aliens do not
displace minorities from lower level occupations. Historically, young
persons, immigrants, blacks, and whites from depressed rural areas did
much of America's undesirable work. Today, the secondary sector is
marked by high voluntary unemployment as native born workers trade one
job for another within this sector (Doeringer and Piore, 1975).

According to Wool (1976), reduced growth of the youthful labor force
because of low fertility rates and, to a lesser extent, upward mobility
of blacks have produced labor shortages in the secondary sector. The
gaps are being filled by illegal aliens (Cornelius, 1977, 1978; Piore,
1975, 1977, 1979). Cardenas (1976) cited the following evidence of this
trend, from interviews conducted in San Antonio with 100 Mexican
illegals and supplementary interviews with Mexican-Americans, blacks,
and whites: in one construction firm illegals were laborers, whereas
Mexican-Americans and blacks were craftsmen; in manufacturing plants,
meatpacking, for example, illegals were relegated to the dirtiest work,
which Mexican-Americans and blacks avoided.  

Piore (1975) concluded

2Maram's (1980) case studies of 499 Hispanic garment workers and
327 Hispanic restaurant employees in Los Angeles County (research
distinct from his snowball sample of 1,300 Hispanic illegals, mentioned
in Chapter 4) produced results superficially similar to those of
Cardenas. Maram compared illegal aliens with legal workers (permanent
resident aliens and American citizens combined) and found illegals
overrepresented in the least desirable jobs. In the garment industry
illegals were overconcentrated as sewing machine operators, pressers,
and trimmers (92 percent versus 68 percent) and underrepresented as
supervisors (2 percent versus 13 percent). In restaurant work illegals
were much more likely than legals to be busboys or dishwashers (50
from studying legal Puerto Rican migration to Boston that employers there recruited Puerto Rican workers in the late 1960s to fill positions no longer accepted by blacks, and that recruitment of illegal aliens now occurs elsewhere for the same reason.

Unemployment rates as a measure of displacement

The use of unemployment rates to indicate displacement of disadvantaged Americans by legal immigrants and/or illegal aliens constitutes a rough measure, since high rates may be due to factors other than, or in addition to, the presence of these entrants. One obvious factor is the decline of the domestic automobile and steel industries. Nevertheless, the rates provide some empirical evidence about an important subject.

Cornelius (1978) attempted to show that illegal Mexican aliens did not adversely affect other residents of eight labor market areas in the United States, which were selected for their high concentrations of percent versus 16 percent) and far less likely to be waiters or waitresses (15 percent versus 32 percent). However, the data presented separately for each sex and each specific occupation showed that large proportions of legal and illegal workers had the same jobs. In the garment industry 55 percent of the illegal male workers and fully 50 percent of the men who worked legally were sewing machine operators; 74 percent of the illegal female workers had this job, but so did 58 percent of the women employed legally. Among female restaurant workers, 71 percent of the legals and 64 percent of the illegals were waitresses. These proportions, though computed from some low numbers of workers, do not indicate a purely complementary role for illegals.

The areas are Anaheim-Santa Ana-Garden Grove, Chicago, Dallas-Fort Worth, Houston, Los Angeles-Long Beach, Oklahoma City, San Antonio, and San Diego. Cornelius did not specify how the high concentrations of Mexican illegals in the areas were ascertained.
Mexican illegals, because the average unemployment rates of the areas were below the national averages in all but two years from 1968 through 1977. His computations, however, erroneously involved averaging the rates of areas with varying labor force sizes.

North (1979a) discredited these computations and correctly based the average unemployment rate for each year on the total number of unemployed persons and the total labor force size of the eight areas. The results revealed that the average unemployment rates exceeded the national averages in five, not two, of the years.

Data from the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the Department of Justice were cited by Thompson (1982b) to show the apparent lack of a relation between agglomerations of illegal workers and unemployment rates in forty cities or metropolitan areas. Whereas thirteen of the twenty places with high concentrations of illegals had unemployment rates below the national average of 7.7 percent for July, 1981, all twenty of the places with low concentrations of illegals had rates exceeding the national average.

In a more refined analysis Li (1981) used the 1976 Census Bureau Survey of Income and Education (SIE), which collected demographic

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4The cities or areas with high concentrations of illegal workers are Albuquerque; Amarillo, Texas; Anaheim-Santa Ana; Beaumont, Texas; Chicago; Corpus Christi; Dallas-Fort Worth; Denver; El Paso; Fort Lauderdale; Houston; Los Angeles; Miami; New York; Orlando; San Antonio; San Diego; San Francisco; Tucson; and Washington, D.C. The cities with low concentrations are Baton Rouge; Buffalo; Decatur; Detroit; Dubuque; Eugene, Oregon; Flint; Gary; Huntington, West Virginia; Johnstown, Pennsylvania; Kankakee, Illinois; Muncie; Muskegon Heights, Michigan; Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Rockford, Illinois; Salem, Oregon; Toledo; Tuscaloosa; Williamsport, Pennsylvania; and Youngstown. The concentrations of illegal workers probably were determined from INS data on apprehensions, but the source was not made explicit.
information from 440,815 individuals, including 26,889 who were foreign
born, to test for a relation between the proportions of immigrants^5
and the unemployment rates of native born minorities (blacks and
Hispanics) in 110 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) of the
United States. The zero-order correlation coefficient between immigrant
centrization and minority group unemployment was positive but not
statistically significant (0.147). Nor was any significant relation
disclosed by multiple regression, with proportions of Hispanic
immigrants and native minorities and population sizes of the SMSAs
controlled. If immigrants are substituting for the native minority
groups, displacement is not evident at this level of aggregation.

Substitutive and complementary effects

It seems untenable to deny that certain recent entrants compete with
disadvantaged Americans for jobs in the secondary labor sector, since
the majority of workers in this sector are the native born of low
socioeconomic status (Briggs, 1980; Fogel, 1980), not legal immigrants
or illegal aliens. Also, the latter two groups seem to have a
competitive advantage because employers apparently prefer them to the
available alternatives. Again and again employers reportedly have

^5Some illegal aliens probably were surveyed, although they were
not separable from legal immigrants in the SIE data. SMSAs with high
proportions of legal immigrants quite possibly have high concentrations
of illegals as well, since new entrants, whatever their legal status,
typically settle near earlier arrivals from the same origins (Kelly,
1977; North and LeBel, 1978; North and Weissert, 1973; Poitras, 1981;
Siegel et al., 1980). The process is that of chain migration (MacDonald
and MacDonald, 1964).
commented that legal immigrants and especially illegal aliens are less demanding, more productive, and more reliable than other workers (Abrams and Abrams, 1975; Chaney, 1980; Cornelius, 1976; Dickey and Nunes, 1980; Fogel, 1977; Piore, 1975; Reubens, 1978, 1980). Frederickson (1982: 217) summarized a study by Community Research Associates of fourteen farmers, twelve electronics manufacturers, and eleven restaurant employers in the San Diego area. The employers obviously favored foreign born workers (Mexican illegals on the farms and in the restaurants and legal Asian refugees in electronics assembly) over Americans, particularly blacks. The illegals and refugees, besides being cited for greater productivity and reliability, "represented lower labor costs and were seen as being less likely to organize or speak up for themselves." Hence the employers' "claimed 'need' for foreign labor results in the bypassing of available domestic labor, thereby contributing to the unemployment rate." Many legal residents of the United States have complained to government officials that illegal aliens have taken jobs from them. In 1971 the INS district director in Chicago stated that he had a file of almost 6,000 such complaints.

Nationally,
much direct testimony was given to a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee in 1971 that legal U.S. residents, usually persons of Mexican origin, are refused employment or laid off... because of the availability of illegals. This practice occurs in both farm and urban industries and in the northern parts of the United States as well as the Southwest (Fogel, 1978: 125-126).

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6The topic of competition between legal immigrants and illegal aliens, though well worth examining, is peripheral to this dissertation. Nevertheless, an argument can be made that if illegals are displacing legal immigrants, they are also substituting for native born minorities.
These pieces of evidence, too numerous to be dismissed as trivial just because most are anecdotal, indicate that certain individuals are being displaced.

It is at least equally probable, however, that some disadvantaged Americans shun work in the secondary sector because they consider it less attractive than unemployment benefits and welfare payments.

Arnoldo S. Torres, a spokesman for the League of United Latin-American Citizens, put the matter this way:

I worked for the California legislature for two years as a budget analyst, and in my interviews with welfare recipients, my interviews with the administrators of welfare programs, my interviews with community people, there was a consensus that the welfare approach is very much a disincentive for people to go to work (quoted by Raspberry, 1980: A21).

Villalpando (1977) cited two instances in which attempts were made to fill employment vacancies created by the apprehension of illegal aliens. When 2,154 such positions became available in Los Angeles, the California State Human Resources Development Agency tried unsuccessfully to fill them with unemployed citizens, who rejected the jobs. In San Diego positions for hotel workers, food handlers and processors, laundrymen, and miscellaneous operatives were vacated by the arrest of 340 illegal aliens. Ninety percent of the jobs were taken, not by unemployed citizens, but by legal commuters from Mexico.

The question is why situations like these occur, and the answer quite possibly concerns wages. According to North and LeBel,

our labor standards policies (through low minimum wages and underfunded enforcement efforts), coupled with our informal immigration policies (permitting the admission of large numbers of low-paid illegal workers), do little to increase the rewards for working (1978: 167).
Cornelius (1978) and North and Houstoun (1976) agreed that approximately three-quarters of the illegal aliens in their studies received at least legal minimum wages. However, violations also were reported; and even though most wages were legal, they were generally low enough to be unattractive to domestic labor. According to Villalpando's (1977) estimates, illegals working in San Diego County earned an average of $2.10 per hour, or $4,368 a year, assuming continuous employment (which usually was not the case). The latter figure was less than the annual $4,800 in tax-free welfare payments that a family of five persons could have received at the time. Furthermore, illegal aliens are not the only entrants who may furnish cheap labor. Scattered research on legal immigrants (Bach and Bach, 1980; Chiswick, 1979; Kelly, 1977; North, 1979b) has shown that they, too, may work for low wages in the United States, especially if they have been here a short time, are Mexicans, or are refugees.

It is important to emphasize that low wages, not low status occupations, appear to be the chief reason why certain Americans reject employment in the secondary sector. For example, each year thousands of persons apply for the privilege of collecting garbage in San Francisco and New York City, but they do not do so in many other communities. Why the difference in worker supply? It is because garbage collectors in these two cities are very highly paid, they are unionized, and they enjoy liberal fringe benefit packages (Briggs, 1980: 17).

Similarly, during the recession of the mid-1970s in northern and western Europe, unemployed citizens seldom competed for the guest workers' occupations "as long as unemployment insurance benefits equaled or
exceeded the wages obtainable in low-status guestworker jobs" (Martin, 1980: 11). The same point has been expressed in economics as the "induced unemployment model."

In it, the effective labor supply of domestic low-skilled workers is assumed to be an upward-sloping function of the real wage .... This may be justified on the grounds that the domestic low-skilled population has nonmarket alternatives to employment (such as receiving government income transfers ...) (Johnson, 1980: 334).

If the induced unemployment model is correct, the next question is why wages in much of the secondary sector remain so low as to be noncompetitive with income transfer payments. It can be argued that an abundant supply of legal immigrants and particularly illegal aliens, who often willingly perform menial tasks for very little money, helps to keep wages depressed in many lower level occupations. One would expect critics of the current laissez-faire policy toward illegal immigration to have expressed this argument, and so they have, repeatedly (Briggs, 1980, 1981; Fogel, 1977, 1978, 1980; North and Houstoun, 1976; North and LeBel, 1978). But even Cornelius (1976, 1977), who has been far more sanguine about the status quo, has conceded the point. Especially revealing is his observation that "the depressant effect of illegal migration on U.S. wage scales is often cited as a problem by [Mexican] migrants with papers--most of whom have a personal history of one or more illegal entries into the U.S." (1976: 27). These respondents, with their newly won legal status, have voiced the same complaint about illegal aliens that was made about immigrants long before a naturalized American named Samuel Gompers stated it as the official position of the American Federation of Labor in 1923 (Ehrlich et al., 1979).
Although recent entrants' effects on wages are difficult to demonstrate empirically, given the nature of the topic, two attempts are discussed below. Whereas Fogel's (1978) research concerns illegal Mexican aliens, Smith and Newman's (1977) work pertains to legal and illegal entrants from Mexico. Underlying both studies are certain assumptions about the entrants: that they disperse as they move northward from the Mexican border, and that they are largely confined to lower level occupations.\footnote{In these studies, as in the articles by Johnson (1980) and Wachter (1980), the authors referred to levels of skill rather than the primary and secondary labor sectors per se.}

Fogel hypothesized that wages paid to unskilled workers, but not to skilled workers, in California and Texas rise with increasing distance from the Mexican border. Using BLS data for 1972 and 1973, he confirmed that average wages for unskilled occupations, but generally not for skilled ones, were higher in Los Angeles than in San Diego and higher still in San Francisco. However, Fogel acknowledged his belief that illegals are less concentrated farther from the border to be questionable when applied to California. Los Angeles, with its large Hispanic population, may be an even stronger magnet for illegal aliens than San Diego is. Moreover, the data for Texas only partly supported Fogel's hypothesis. Average wages for both unskilled and skilled occupations were higher in Dallas than in San Antonio. The latter finding illustrates a major problem with the study: uncontrolled factors, besides the presence of illegal aliens, may influence wages.
Smith and Newman used multiple regression to estimate income differentials between the border area of Texas and Houston. Data were from the 1970 census. Taking into account occupation, hours and weeks worked, duration of residence, education, ethnicity and race, age, sex, and marital status, the authors found that annual incomes (adjusted for regional differences in the cost of living) were 8 percent lower in the border area than in Houston. The regional income differential was greater in the low income than in the high income sector (14 percent versus 4 percent), and it was greater in low skilled than in high skilled occupations (13 percent versus 7 percent). These findings, though limited, unambiguously support the argument that recent entrants contribute to depressed wages in the secondary sector.

However, most discussions of wage effects are based, not on observed wages, but on models or forecasts of labor supply, as in the following examples.

Johnson (1980) constructed a model to estimate the impact each additional legal immigrant or illegal alien in the United States has on the labor force. He concluded that an unchecked high rate of entry of low skilled labor would adversely affect the wages of low skilled American workers, while augmenting the earnings of high skilled workers and owners of capital.

Wachter (1980) arrived at essentially the same conclusion by a different route. He compared his projections of labor supply with BLS projections of labor demand, taking into account low fertility in this country since the late 1960s. The result was a predicted shortage of
1,500,000 male nonfarm laborers and service workers by 1985. A continued flow of illegal aliens would fill this gap, producing both benefits and costs. Benefits would accrue to high skilled workers and employers of low skilled labor. Costs, in the form of continued low wages, would be borne by low skilled American workers, who are, increasingly, native born minorities.

Summary and conclusions

This chapter has examined the last of the hypotheses that were to be considered in the dissertation.

Hypothesis 7: Illegal aliens and those legal immigrants who are in the secondary sector actually are displacing disadvantaged Americans, particularly native born minorities.

Research to date does not allow firm conclusions to be drawn about Hypothesis 7. It appears that recent (post-1965) entrants to the United States, legal immigrants and illegal aliens, who are employed in the secondary labor sector have two relations vis-à-vis disadvantaged Americans, specifically, native born blacks and Hispanics: in certain cases displacement occurs, but to some extent the entrants accept lower level jobs that the disadvantaged reject in favor of government income transfers.

Unfortunately, the relative importance of the dual effects (substitution and complementarity) of recent entrants' employment in lower level occupations cannot be determined now, and perhaps this assessment never will be made definitively. It is ironic, considering the public furor generated by the economic aspects of immigration (see
Chapter 6) and the lesser attention paid to its demographic impact (see Chapter 2), that the latter issue furnishes the clearer guide to policy, the topic of the next chapter. Legal immigrants' and illegal aliens' contribution to the size of the American population can be quantified more easily and stated with less ambiguity than can their labor market effects, despite imperfect data on net annual legal and illegal immigration.

Still, some tentative generalizations pertaining to Hypothesis 7 can be drawn from this chapter and the two preceding ones.

Displacement of native born minorities by legal immigrants and illegal aliens in the secondary sector may be least in the worst paid, lowest status, most arduous occupations: farm and nonfarm labor and private household work.

Substitution may be greatest in the upper part of the secondary sector, particularly in the operatives category, but in various nonhousehold service occupations as well, where wages may be somewhat better than at the very bottom of the occupational hierarchy. This generalization accords with Johnson's (1980) induced unemployment model and with the empirical findings from the previous two chapters. Table 3 has shown that in 1970 far more native born blacks and native born Hispanics were operatives and nonhousehold service workers (44 percent and 39 percent, respectively) than were farm and nonfarm laborers and private household workers (20 percent and 11 percent, respectively). The same point applies to legal immigrants as an aggregate (see Table 9) and to separate immigrant groups, especially non-Mexicans (see Table
10). Also, Chapter 3 has shown that illegal aliens, notably non-Mexicans, are much less concentrated as farm laborers than the stereotype of illegals suggests. They, like their legal counterparts in the secondary sector, apparently tend toward employment in the operatives and/or nonhousehold service categories (North and Houstoun, 1976; Poitras, 1981; Van Arsdol et al., 1979). It seems that native born blacks and Hispanics are not alone in seeking higher wages and eschewing the lowest level occupations.

However, displacement of native minorities by legal immigrants and illegal aliens throughout the secondary sector may become a more acute problem when unemployment rises. The induced unemployment model assumes that government income transfers are an alternative to lower level work, but in the current recession this supposition is not entirely realistic. With the national unemployment rate at 9.7 percent, the rates for blacks and Hispanics at 19.4 percent and 14.2 percent, respectively, and the rates for black and Hispanic teenagers (sixteen through nineteen years old) at 46.5 percent and 33.1 percent, respectively, in the third quarter of 1982, the pool of potential or actual lower level workers has reached formidable depths (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1982). Simultaneously, unemployment compensation and welfare benefits, including AFDC and food stamps, have been made less easily available than they once were (Piven and Cloward, 1982; Time, 1982). Under these conditions competition for even low wages may intensify.
CHAPTER 6: CURRENT ISSUES IN UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION POLICY

Introduction

A topic of recurrent concern to the United States Congress, immigration has received progressively greater attention over the past decade or so.

Just five years after the 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act were passed, Congress established the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future. Included among the commissioners' findings were three pertaining to immigration: that civil and criminal sanctions should be imposed on employers of illegal aliens (employer sanctions), that legal immigrant admissions should not exceed 400,000 annually, and that immigration policy should be reexamined periodically to monitor its demographic impact (Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, 1972).

The Select Committee on Population, authorized by the House of Representatives in 1977, recommended various other measures having to do with immigration, including: increased funds for the INS border patrol; improved screening of applications for nonimmigrant visas, to reduce visa abuse (unauthorized work) by persons who enter the country as businessmen, students, or tourists; expenditures to provide better data on the numbers and characteristics of legal immigrants and illegal aliens; federal reimbursements to state and local governments for the
costs of educating and providing medical care for illegal aliens' children; consideration of a guest workers program with Mexico; and agricultural and trade concessions to Mexico, to promote economic development and thereby reduce the push factor in illegal immigration (U.S. House of Representatives, 1978a, 1978b). The committee also observed that

"... even if immigration were limited to legal movements of the present size, we would still continue to grow for at least another 100 years before leveling off at about 300 million. Decisions must be made about the future size of the U.S. population, and population policy cannot be made without a corresponding immigration policy (U.S. House of Representatives, 1978b: 32).

In 1978 Congress established the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, which generated numerous volumes of public hearings, consultations, research reports, and staff reports for the purpose of reviewing and suggesting changes in the existing immigration system. The commissioners' priorities were more humanitarian than demographic or economic, for instance: that refugees and immediate relatives (spouses, minor children, and parents) of adult American citizens should continue to be exempt from numerical restriction; that the category of immediate relatives should be expanded to include unmarried adult sons and daughters and grandparents of adult American citizens; and that legalization, or amnesty, should be granted to persons who became illegal aliens before January 1, 1980, contingent upon the enactment of measures to curtail further illegal immigration. One such measure would direct sanctions against employers of illegal aliens, but the commissioners could not agree on a means for verifying job applicants' eligibility to work. Though the commissioners did not favor the creation of a guest workers program, they did not oppose a limited
expansion of the existing H-2 temporary workers program (U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate Judiciary Committees, 1981). These deliberations established a basis for the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982 (U.S. Senate, 1982; U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 1982), certain provisions of which will be analyzed subsequently. Because of delays in the House, the ninety-seventh Congress failed to pass the act (Washington Post, 1982). However, its provisions will be as important when reintroduced later as they were in 1982.

Hearings have been held on the findings of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy; on immigration measures proposed by the Reagan administration, resulting from the President's Task Force on Immigration and Refugee Policy\(^1\) (Smith, 1981); and, most recently, on the Immigration Reform and Control Act. That myriad organizations have lively, often conflicting, interests in immigration policy has been obvious at these sessions. The next section of the chapter will indicate why committees, consultations, hearings, reports, and task forces have substituted thus far for comprehensive new legislation: airing the issues serves a conciliatory function, but enacting a major revision of the present immigration system, whatever the final form, inevitably will offend some constituencies.

Sections three through seven will discuss issues pertaining to legal immigrants who are not refugees, refugees, control of illegal

\(^1\)President Reagan's initiative is not without precedents. The Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Aliens, appointed by President Ford, released its findings in 1976, and the report of President Carter's Interagency Task Force on Immigration Policy followed three years later (U.S. Departments of Justice, Labor, and State, 1979).
immigration, amnesty for illegal aliens, and legal temporary foreign workers, respectively, as these issues relate to preceding chapters. The last section will consist of the summary and conclusions.

Immigration and special interest groups

Illegal immigration and proposals for increased legal importation of temporary foreign workers (under the H-2 program or a guest workers program) are the bétes noires of organized labor. Spokesmen for the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) have stated unequivocally that illegal aliens are an exploited class of workers who depress wages, undermine labor standards, and compete unfairly with disadvantaged Americans for jobs (Kirkland, 1982; Oswald, 1982). Similar generalizations have been applied to temporary foreign laborers, by whatever name they are called. Accordingly, representatives of the AFL-CIO (Allstrom, 1982; Donahue, 1981; Kirkland, 1982; Oswald, 1982), the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU) (Chaikin, 1982), the Labor Council for Latin-American Advancement (Otero, 1982a, 1982b), the National Association of Farm Worker Organizations (Castellanos, 1982), and the United Farm Workers (Bower, 1982a, 1982b) unanimously oppose any expanded temporary workers program and unanimously support employer sanctions, backed by a secure system for identifying legal and illegal job applicants. The AFL-CIO has urged that fines up to $1,000 per worker per day be imposed on employers of one or more illegals, and that repeated violators be subject to criminal penalties (Oswald, 1982). The ILGWU, believing its
members face particularly harsh competition from illegals, has advocated fines as high as $10,000 to $20,000 for each offense by an employer, plus criminal sanctions against repeated violators (Chaikin, 1982). The rationale for recommending such high fines is that lower amounts would not counteract the economic incentive for hiring illegals. Also, the unions have endorsed amnesty for illegal aliens, if it is linked to strong deterrents against further clandestine immigration.

Whereas organized labor concurs on these issues, there is less than total agreement among civil libertarians and civil rights advocates.

On the one side are the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the National Urban League, most of whose members belong to very old native stock. Like the unions, the NAACP contends that illegal aliens and legal temporary foreign workers adversely affect disadvantaged Americans. A spokeswoman for the organization has given this testimony:

We not only believe, ... we know that undocumented workers do have a disparate impact on unskilled, unemployed, and marginally employed blacks. I can just say that even in an office building in downtown Washington I have seen within 1 month's time the persons who had maintenance jobs in that office building have changed completely, and there is no one in the maintenance hierarchy who speaks English (Simmons, 1982: 287).

Both the NAACP (Simmons, 1981, 1982) and the Urban League (Cooper, 1982) favor civil and criminal penalties for employers of illegal aliens, together with amnesty for illegals. Neither organization explicitly opposes an identification system for prospective employees.

On the other side are the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) (Shattuck, 1981, 1982a, 1982b), the Asian-American Legal Defense and
Education Fund (1982), the League of United Latin-American Citizens (Bonilla, 1982; Torres, 1982a, 1982b), the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund (Hernandez, 1982; Huerta, 1982a, 1982b; Martinez, 1981), the National Council of La Raza (Yzaguirre, 1982), the United States Commission on Civil Rights (Flemming, 1982), and the United States-Asia Institute (Kee, Norman, 1981, 1982). Though generally opposed to any type of guest workers program and favorable toward liberal amnesty for illegal aliens, these organizations have parted company with the NAACP and the Urban League by endorsing neither employer sanctions nor a national identification system. They are absolutely convinced that sanctions would cause employers to discriminate against individuals, particularly minority group members, who look or sound foreign, and that an identification system would threaten the right to privacy as well as other civil rights. In the dramatic phrasing of Shattuck (1982b: 102) and Torres (1982a: 85), an identity card "would quickly cease to be merely a passport to employment, and become the domestic or internal passport which is the hallmark of so many modern police states."

Moreover, the president of the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund has dismissed as a misperception, "inspired or exacerbated by racial and nativist prejudice against Mexican immigrants," the allegation that illegal aliens displace Americans in the job market (Martinez, 1981: 152). This position, of course, directly contradicts the one taken by the NAACP's Washington, D.C.,
bureau director, quoted previously (Simmons, 1982: 287). The opposition of the two minority group leaders parallels the tension repeatedly observed at street level, not only between native born blacks and foreign born minorities, but also among different foreign born minority groups (Boodman, 1980; Dickey and Boodman, 1979; Hansard, 1981; Leff, 1980; Reese, 1981; Washington Post, 1979). To paraphrase the social psychologist W.I. Thomas (Volkart, 1951: 81), the belief that displacement is real is producing real consequences.

Another proposed change in immigration policy, elimination of the fifth preference category for the allocation of visas, has brought objections from the American Committee on Italian Migration (Cogo, 1982), the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund (1982), and the United States-Asia Institute (Kee, Esther, 1982). At present, the fifth preference allocates 24 percent of 270,000 numerically restricted immigrant visas per year to the brothers and sisters of adult American citizens. The multiplier effect of this provision, which facilitates the reunification of extended families, is so great that a backlog of 500,000 fifth-preference applications existed by 1979. Rosenzweig (1982: 213) has described the multiplier effect as follows:

the admission of one immigrant who has foreign-born siblings or who marries an individual with foreign-born siblings automatically creates additional potentially qualified visa applicants, who, when admitted, can petition for the siblings of their spouses. Indeed, if the immigrant's parents are admitted, they can in turn petition for their brothers and sisters, resulting potentially in the addition of the brother and sister in-laws [sic], uncles, cousins, etc., of the original immigrant.
Against arguments that the fifth-preference provision has become unmanageable and that economic criteria, such as exceptional skills, should weigh more heavily in immigrant selection than is now the case (Chiswick, 1982; Rosenzweig, 1982), Cogo, Kee, and the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund have raised a humanitarian issue based on cultural differences in the definition of "close relatives." In their opinion family reunification not only should remain the primary objective of United States immigration policy, but also should continue to include the extended family that prevails in many countries of origin, rather than be limited to the nuclear family that is the American norm.

Though noncommittal about the fifth preference category, business organizations have tended toward an odd alliance with the civil libertarians and civil rights groups against proposals for employer sanctions and a national identification system. The United States Chamber of Commerce\(^2\) has maintained emphatically that sanctions would constitute an unfair shift, from the federal government to private employers, of responsibility for controlling illegal immigration; that a counterfeit-proof identification card could not be devised; and that any comprehensive identification system would be exorbitantly expensive

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\(^2\)The national organization does not represent quite all of its affiliates on these issues, however. The California Chamber of Commerce would accept employer sanctions and a "simple documentation procedure" for workers, if agricultural employers were allowed easier access to legal foreign labor (Van Maren, 1982: 516). The Houston Chamber of Commerce has given tentative support to sanctions, provided that they and any verification system are not unduly cumbersome (Welch, 1982).
(Thompson, 1982b). More to the point, business regards employer sanctions as fraught with

the potential for much worse in the way of abuse, bureaucratic abuse, than we have experienced in OSHA [the Occupational Safety and Health Act] or . . . in equal employment laws or . . . in all of the other laws which have been enacted over the last couple of decades to regulate . . . employment (1982a: 525).

A spokesman for the National Restaurant Association has expressed similar objections about extra paperwork and regulations (Neville, 1982), as well as concern that "the employer not be placed between the rock of the Justice Department [INS] and the hard place of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission" (a law against hiring illegal aliens versus a mandate for hiring legal immigrants who belong to minority groups) (1981: 70). The American Farm Bureau Federation strongly opposes penalizing agricultural employers of illegal aliens and favors an expanded H-2 program or a guest workers program, under which alien farm workers could be recruited for periods up to three years (Heringer, 1982). The National Council of Agricultural Employers has not taken a firm position against the proposed penalties for hiring illegal aliens, but has warned that shortages of farm laborers could occur if employer sanctions were imposed and amnesty were given to illegals without a simultaneous increase in the legal importation of temporary foreign workers. The association believes that amnesty would cause illegals to desert agriculture for year-round employment (Ellsworth, 1981, 1982b).

State and local governments have other concerns, namely, the actual and potential financial burden on areas where illegal aliens and refugees are concentrated. According to the National Association of Counties,
Los Angeles County, California, estimates that unreimbursed costs of providing health care to illegal aliens totaled $121 million during the past fiscal year. Bexar County, Texas, estimates that over half of its unpaid medical debts, or over $3 million, can be attributed to illegal aliens (Todd, 1982: 49).

The National Association of Counties (Huber, 1981; Todd, 1982), as well as the Governor of Colorado (Lamm, 1982), the Mayor of New York City (Koch, 1982), and the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (Pollard, 1982) suspect that the federal government will try to impose on states and localities any welfare costs associated with granting amnesty to needy illegal aliens. Counties, for example, usually provide "general assistance, emergency assistance, or in-kind assistance to indigent persons who are categorically ineligible for Federal welfare programs such as AFDC or SSI" (Todd, 1982: 49). Not surprisingly, the representatives of state and local governments want amnesty linked to strong measures, including employer sanctions, to reduce the flow of illegals. Furthermore, the National Association of Counties (Huber, 1981) and the United States Conference of Mayors (Hanna, 1981) perceive that many refugees will not become self-supporting within the three-year limit established by the Refugee Act of 1980. These organizations have sought assurance of continued federal reimbursements to states and localities for refugee assistance, regardless of the time limit. The Mayor of Rockville, Maryland (Hanna, 1981), the Mayor of San Jose (Hayes, 1982), and the National Association of Counties (Huber, 1981) have alleged that even the current costs of providing refugee services are not covered fully by federal funds. The San Diego County Board of Supervisors has recommended a fixed ceiling of 50,000 refugee admissions per year (Bates, 1981); in addition, the board and other nonfederal

Finally, the Federation for American Immigration Reform and Zero Population Growth (ZPG), organizations apprehensive about legal immigrants' and illegal aliens' contribution to United States population growth, want not only stronger deterrents against illegal immigration to accompany any amnesty program for illegal aliens (Conner, 1981; Eisen, 1982), but also stricter limits on legal immigrant admissions. Both groups have called for sanctions against employers of illegals (Conner, 1981, 1982a; Eisen, 1981) and a secure system to verify job applicants' eligibility for employment in this country (Conner, 1982b; ZPG Reporter, 1982). However, the Federation for American Immigration Reform favors bringing all immigrants, including refugees, under a yearly immigration ceiling (Conner, 1982a), whereas ZPG prefers including refugees, but not the spouses or minor children of American citizens, in an annual numerical restriction (Eisen, 1981). Another slight divergence between the two organizations is that ZPG opposes any sort of guest workers program (Eisen, 1982), but the Federation for American Immigration Reform supports "easier access" to H-2 workers for agricultural employers who can demonstrate a lack of domestic farm labor (Conner, 1982a: 142). On the whole, the positions of both groups accord more with those of black civil rights advocates, organized labor, and state and local governments than with those of business, civil libertarians, and other civil rights activists.
Legal immigrants: nonrefugees

The United States currently admits most legal immigrants according to their family ties, not on the basis of economic or labor force criteria. Under the present Immigration and Nationality Act, there are six preference categories, shown in Table 11, for the allocation of numerically restricted immigrant visas (U.S. House of Representatives, 1977). Four of them (the first, second, fourth, and fifth preferences), which account for 80 percent of the restricted visas, enable American citizens and permanent resident aliens to be joined by various family members. (The other 20 percent of the restricted visas are divided equally between the third and sixth preferences, which pertain to persons with exceptional abilities and needed workers, respectively.) In addition, the immediate relatives (spouses, minor children, and parents) of adult American citizens are exempt from numerical limitation. Whereas about 114,000 immediate relatives entered the country in 1976, approximately 151,000 came here in 1980 and the same number in 1981. Between 200,000 and 250,000 per year are expected for the rest of the 1980s, as recent refugees become citizens and bring in their immediate relatives. These unrestricted admissions, combined with the unlimited refugee admissions that will be discussed in the next section, have resulted in burgeoning legal immigration totals. The purported immigration ceiling is 270,000 entrants annually; actual admissions increased from about 467,000 in 1976 to approximately 808,000 in 1980 and were estimated at 697,000 for 1981 (Population Reference Bureau, 1982b; U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate Judiciary Committees, 1981). Besides ignoring the demographic effect of legal
**TABLE 11: CURRENT AND PROPOSED PREFERENCE SYSTEMS FOR ALLOCATING IMMIGRANT VISAS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preference category</th>
<th>Current Immigration and Nationality Act</th>
<th>Proposed Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 percent of 270,000 visas</td>
<td>15 percent of (350,000 visas, minus the number of immediate relatives admitted in the previous year), plus unused A4 visas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:</td>
<td>Spouses and unmarried sons and daughters of permanent resident aliens</td>
<td>A2: Spouses and minor children of permanent resident aliens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26 percent of 270,000, plus unused first-preference visas</td>
<td>65 percent of (350,000, minus immediate relatives from the previous year), plus unused A1 visas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:</td>
<td>Members of the professions or persons with exceptional abilities in the sciences and arts</td>
<td>A3: Married sons and daughters of citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 percent of 270,000</td>
<td>10 percent of (350,000, minus immediate relatives from the previous year), plus unused A1 and A2 visas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:</td>
<td>Married sons and daughters of citizens</td>
<td>A4: To clear existing fifth-preference backlog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 percent of 270,000, plus unused first-through third-preference visas</td>
<td>10 percent of (350,000, minus immediate relatives from the previous year), plus unused A1 through A3 visas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:</td>
<td>Brothers and sisters of adult citizens</td>
<td>B1: Members of the professions or persons with exceptional abilities in the sciences and arts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24 percent of 270,000, plus unused first-through fourth-preference visas</td>
<td>75,000 visas, minus the number of special immigrants admitted in the previous year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:</td>
<td>Needed skilled and unskilled workers</td>
<td>B2: Needed skilled workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 percent of 270,000</td>
<td>unused B1 visas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>B3: Investors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>unused B1 and B2 visas, not to exceed 10 percent of (75,000, minus special immigrants from the previous year)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

immigration, the present law scarcely considers its possible impact on
the American labor force, since only third- and sixth-preference visa
applicants, plus a small number of residual nonpreference applicants,
must receive labor certification (North and LeBel, 1978).

The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982 (U.S. Senate, 1982;
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 1982) would continue the policy of
reuniting relatives, although with a decidedly stronger emphasis on the
nuclear family than on the extended family, and with slightly more
attention to demographic and economic concerns. Numerically restricted
annual immigrant visas (see Table 11) would be increased from 270,000 to
425,000, 350,000 of them designated for family reunification and the
remaining 75,000 for persons with exceptional abilities. (Under the
present third preference category, 27,000 such persons may be admitted
yearly.) The new A2 preference category would allocate 65 percent of
the 350,000 visas to the spouses and minor children of permanent
resident aliens. (The current second preference allots 26 percent of
270,000 visas to the spouses and unmarried sons and daughters of
permanent resident aliens.) The present fifth preference category,
which gives 24 percent of restricted visas to the siblings of adult
American citizens, eventually would be eliminated, to curtail the
exponential increase in fifth-preference visa applications and to offset
the greater number of visas proposed for the A2 preference category and
for persons with exceptional skills. Immediate relatives of adult
citizens would continue to enter the country without numerical
restriction, but the number admitted each year would be subtracted
from the next year's 350,000 visas. Thus total immigrant visas could not exceed 425,000 (350,000 for family reunification plus 75,000 for persons with exceptional abilities) unless annual admissions of immediate relatives became greater than 350,000, well above the current level.

These proposed revisions represent an important step toward a real ceiling on yearly immigrant admissions, instead of the present spurious limit. The suggested changes would help to control United States population increase and might restrict growth of the secondary labor sector, which is partly due to immigration. Chapter 3 cited North and Weissert's (1973) finding that, in a sample of 5,000 immigrants, new workers at destination (immigrants whose visa applications did not indicate any employment at origin and who therefore had been admitted as relatives) were concentrated in lower level occupations. Other studies reviewed in Chapter 3 have shown extensive downward mobility among refugees, at least in the short run (Kelly, 1977; Montero, 1979; Portes et al., 1977; Rogg, 1974; Wenk, 1968). This research is consistent with the belief, expressed, for example, by Chiswick (1982) and Rosenzweig (1982), that persons admitted to the United States on humanitarian grounds, as relatives of naturalized citizens or permanent resident aliens, or as refugees, are less positively selected than immigrants

Likewise, the number of special immigrants (a small, select category) admitted without numerical restriction in a given year would be subtracted from the following year's 75,000 visas for persons with exceptional skills.
admitted according to occupational criteria. In other words, relatives and refugees may be more likely to enter the secondary sector.

The conflict between humanitarian and pragmatic goals defies easy resolution, and the previously noted objections by several immigrant organizations (Cogo, 1982; Kee, Esther, 1982; Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund, 1982) to the proposed deletion of the fifth preference category are wholly understandable. Culturally determined attachment to an extended family, like attachment to a native language, cannot be expected to vanish simply because a person has settled in a society with different norms.

One further provision of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (U.S. Senate, 1982; U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 1982) merits attention in this section. It is the proposed increase from 20,000 to 40,000 immigrant visas a year for Canada and Mexico. (Other countries would be held to the present 20,000 limit.) In practice, the Canadian allotment very probably would be underutilized, as it is now, and the residual would go to Mexico. This measure would acknowledge the special relationship that the United States has with its contiguous neighbors, especially Mexico. It also might rechannel part of the illegal flow from that country. As Chapter 2 pointed out, average

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4 Each country's annual allotment would be reduced by the number of immediate relatives and special immigrants, in excess of the 20,000 restricted visa holders (40,000 for Canada and Mexico), who entered the United States during the previous year. For instance, if a country (other than Canada or Mexico) used all of its 20,000 restricted visas in a given year, and 5,000 immediate relatives and special immigrants were admitted from that country during the same year, the next year's allocation of restricted visas would be 20,000 minus 5,000, or 15,000.
yearly legal immigration from Mexico was 38,386 from 1967 through 1976; the 1976 extension from the Eastern Hemisphere to the Western Hemisphere of the 20,000 per-country limit on annual immigration meant that Mexico's demand for immigrant visas far exceeded the supply (U.S. Departments of Justice, Labor, and State, 1979). However, the proposal is not entirely desirable, since it would do little or nothing to reverse Mexicans' pronounced tendency to have lower level occupations in the United States. Chapters 3 and 4 have shown that among legal immigrants and illegal aliens, Mexicans are the group most likely to be in the secondary sector (Chiswick, 1977, 1979; North and Houstoun, 1976; Table 10).

Legal immigrants: refugees

The United States ranks first worldwide in refugee admissions and contributions to international refugee agencies, though not in refugees as a proportion of the population or in contributions per capita. The latter honors belong to Canada and Sweden, respectively. Between mid-1975 and mid-1980 the top five receiving countries and the numbers of refugees they accepted were: the United States, 595,000; Canada, 74,000; France, 68,700; Australia, 44,000; and the Federal Republic of Germany, 28,300. In 1979 the five largest contributions were from: the United States, $165,800,000; Japan, $75,900,000; Germany, $62,800,000; the United Kingdom, $38,800,000; and Sweden, $28,600,000 (U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate Judiciary Committees, 1981).
Recent refugee admissions to the United States have risen dramatically, from about 95,000 in 1976 and 5,000 in 1977 to approximately 367,000 in 1980. Although 1980 was an atypical year (the refugee total included roughly 135,000 Cubans and Haitians classified as special entrants), admissions remained high, at an estimated 217,000 persons, in 1981 (Population Reference Bureau, 1982b; U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate Judiciary Committees, 1981). The latter figure is more than four times the 50,000 persons expected annually under the Refugee Act of 1980.

Similarly, applications for asylum in this country have increased from fewer than 5,000 in 1978 to more than 105,000 in 1982 (U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 1982). The increase evidently is due not only to political turmoil abroad but also to poverty and greater sophistication in circumventing American immigration restrictions. Word has spread that seeking asylum here is a quick means to a better material life, even if one is not a bona fide refugee (compelled to leave one's native country because of actual or feared political, racial, or religious persecution). Further complicating the asylum issue is the tendency for political and economic oppression to occur simultaneously, as in the Caribbean area and Indochina (Beyer, 1980; Carlin, 1982; McGrath, 1982; Thornton, 1981).

The United States needs a fair yet efficient way to identify and deport aliens who request asylum but are unqualified for it. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (U.S. Senate, 1982; U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 1982) would make an undocumented alien subject to deportation unless the individual could demonstrate his or her
eligibility for refugee status in a hearing before an administrative law judge. Though denials of asylum could be appealed to a newly created United States Immigration Board, the protracted appeals that routinely take place under the present system would not be encouraged. The measure probably would lessen misuse of the appeals process, but it would not reduce the extensive delays that now typify initial asylum hearings. On the contrary, by establishing a statutory procedure for asylum applications, the proposed legislation might increase such delays (Conner, 1982a).

Moreover, the proposed law fails to address other related problems: bias in determining refugee status; and uncontrolled refugee admissions that, together with unlimited admissions of naturalized adult citizens' immediate relatives, have made the ostensible yearly immigration ceiling of 270,000 entrants a meaningless figure.

The maltreatment of Ethiopians and Haitians who have been granted or have sought refugee status in the past few years has provoked outcries from the ACLU, the NAACP, and TransAfrica, a lobby that represents African and Caribbean blacks. In the Ethiopian case persons admitted to the United States as refugees later had this status revoked and were threatened with deportation. The official explanation for the reversal was a change in foreign policy, under which the Ethiopian regime was no longer defined as repressive; however, the racist implications of the incident are apparent (Simmons, 1982; TransAfrica, 1982). Likewise, early in 1982 approximately 2,100 Haitians seeking asylum here were being held in detention centers pending decisions on their cases; the usual practice is to let applicants for asylum go free while their
status is being evaluated. Two federal court judgments, *Laissez-Moi Vigile et al. v. Sava* and the *Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti*, have supported the Haitians' charges of discrimination based on race and national origin (Shattuck, 1982a; TransAfrica, 1982). Greater scrutiny obviously is needed to ensure that claims for refugee status are considered entirely apart from race, origin, or the type of political regime (communist versus noncommunist) accused of repression.

The ambivalent reception accorded the 1980 Cuban and Haitian entrants was not unique. American refugee policy has had its other confused periods, conspicuous among them the rejection of many European Jews who were trying to escape from Nazism during the 1930s (U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate Judiciary Committees, 1981). Traditionally, though, the United States has regarded itself as a haven for the persecuted. The previously cited figures on refugee admissions attest to the fundamental accuracy of this belief, which was codified in the Refugee Act of 1980. The act stipulates that by late 1982 there no longer will be a limit on the annual number of refugees who can enter

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Nevertheless, it should be noted that 2,593 of the approximately 125,000 Cubans who entered the United States and asked for asylum in 1980 were still encamped, awaiting resettlement, a year later. Another roughly 1,800 persons, thought to have been felons in Cuba, were in prison and likely to remain there (Walsh, 1981). Detainment of the Cubans as well as the Haitians was partly a desperate response by the federal government to the human flood that suddenly inundated southern Florida. Only after news of the government's draconian tactics reached Haiti did the flood subside (McGrath, 1982). In contrast, until 1980 asylum had been requested, not en masse, but by individuals or small groups, occasionally and without furor (U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate Judiciary Committees, 1981).
the country, not even the nominal restriction of 50,000 persons. Instead, the President, in consultation with Congress, will determine the entire number of yearly admissions (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1980; U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate Judiciary Committees, 1981).

The measure will provide vital flexibility in times of crisis and is commendable for this humanitarian reason. However, as is now the problem with the unlimited admission of immediate relatives, the Refugee Act makes no attempt to balance humanitarianism against demographic and economic considerations, specifically, the sizable addition to the United States population and to the secondary labor sector that future refugee flows might represent. The imbalance could be partly corrected if refugees were treated as the Immigration Reform and Control Act has proposed to treat immediate relatives: the former group, like the latter one, could continue to enter the country without numerical restriction, but the number of refugees admitted in a given year would be subtracted from the next year's total of 350,000 family reunification visas. Including refugees under an annual immigration ceiling would not be unprecedented. It already is done by Australia and Canada, which, like the United States, historically have been countries of immigration (Carlin, 1982).

Another aspect of the Australian and Canadian immigration systems is particularly instructive for the United States: admission limits that are revised periodically, according to fluctuations in fertility. Espenshade et al. (1982) have demonstrated that if fertility remained below replacement level, immigration would be compatible with the
eventual attainment of a stationary population, and Espenshade (1982: 91) has noted several advantages of linking immigration totals to fertility levels. Such a policy would not necessitate problematic predictions of fertility trends; it would entail less rigidity than fixed ceilings; and it "would be easy to implement; immigration levels could be adjusted on the basis of simple demographic criteria."

Illegal aliens: employer sanctions and identification of workers

Though aliens who enter the United States surreptitiously or work here without authorization can be deported (U.S. House of Representatives, 1977), virtually no federal proscription exists against employing such aliens. This lopsided situation can be traced to the so-called "Texas proviso" that was inserted into the Immigration and Nationality Act at the behest of southwestern agricultural lobbyists (Conner, 1982b: 154; Rawitz, 1982: 163). Under the act it is a felony "to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection" any alien who is in the country illegally, but "employment (including the usual and normal practices incident to employment) shall not be deemed to constitute harboring" (U.S. House of Representatives, 1977: 81). Eleven states

6The sole exception is the Farm Labor Contractors Registration Act, which prohibits contractors of migrant labor from "recruiting, employing, or utilizing with knowledge aliens not lawfully admitted or not authorized to work" (Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 1981: 629).

7California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, and Vermont simply prohibit the employment of illegal aliens. Job applicants in Maine and Virginia are required to sign statements affirming that they are eligible to work in the United States. An alien applying for a job in New Hampshire must show an INS document (Conner, 1982b).
have succeeded in enacting, if not enforcing, employer sanctions
(Conner, 1982b; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1980a). However, at
least five major attempts to pass similar federal legislation have died
in Congress (Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 1981).

A sixth major proposal, contained in the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1982, would make it illegal
to hire, or for consideration to recruit or refer, for employment in
the United States an alien who is known to be unauthorized to be so
employed or for an employer of four or more employees to hire anyone
without complying with the verification procedure, . . . and . . .
to continue to employ an alien lawfully hired after enactment after
acquiring knowledge that the alien is not authorized to be so
employed (U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 1982: 31).

The "verification procedure" would require employers of four or more
persons to examine a job applicant's Social Security card or United
States birth certificate, plus one of the following documents: a
driver's license, another form of identification issued by the state, or
some other document approved by the United States Attorney General.
Alternatively, an American passport by itself would provide sufficient
identification. The employer would have to sign a form (and keep it for
possible INS inspection), attesting that he or she had examined what
appeared to be proper identification; the prospective employee's
signature on the same form, avowing his or her eligibility to work in
the United States, also would be required. For noncompliance with the
verification procedure, an employer could be fined $500 per job
applicant, even if the applicant were an American citizen. The latter
stipulation was designed to discourage employers from requiring
verification only of the foreign born, in other words, discriminating
against them regardless of their legal status. Employers of illegal
aliens could be fined $1,000 for the first offense and $2,000 for the second offense; because a single offense might involve many illegals, these sanctions are rather weak. Employers would be subject to a criminal misdemeanor penalty of up to $1,000 and/or six months' imprisonment for subsequent violations. The use, manufacture, or sale of fraudulent identification documents would be a felony, punishable by a fine up to $5,000 and/or five years' imprisonment (U.S. Senate, 1982).

Under the proposed law the President could authorize, within three years, a more secure system to verify employment eligibility. Exactly what such a system would entail was left unspecified, but two constraints would be placed on it, to protect civil liberties: the system could not be used for any law enforcement purpose except the one just mentioned; and if an identification card were involved, an individual could not be required to carry it as a type of internal passport (U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 1982).

Despite the protests that business organizations, civil libertarians, and some civil rights groups have registered against employer sanctions (Bonilla, 1982; Flemming, 1982; Heringer, 1982; Hernandez, 1982; Huerta, 1982a, 1982b; Martinez, 1981; Neville, 1981, 1982; Shattuck, 1981, 1982a, 1982b; Thompson, 1982a, 1982b; Torres, 1982a, 1982b), sanctions seem more than justified by the probable magnitude and adverse effects of illegal immigration.

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8The sanctions were mollified by an amendment that represented a concession to business interests. Originally, the bill would have imposed more expensive penalties of $1,000 per illegal alien for the first violation and $2,000 per illegal for the second violation (U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 1982).
It is true, of course, that other measures could be used in conjunction with this one. The Immigration Reform and Control Act, for example, has expressed "the sense of Congress" that resources for the INS border patrol and other enforcement activities should be augmented (U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 1982: 33). The act would subject persons who smuggle unauthorized aliens into the country to criminal penalties of a minimum $2,500 fine and up to a year's imprisonment. It also would provide that aliens who have failed to maintain continuously a legal status since entry in the United States will not be eligible to adjust from nonimmigrant to immigrant status within the United States. The present statutory provision prohibits such adjustment only if a nonimmigrant has failed to maintain legal status because of unauthorized employment (1982: 39).

Better enforcement of several existing laws that do not exempt illegal aliens from coverage would lessen the economic incentive for employing them: the Fair Labor Standards Act regulates wages, hours, and working conditions; the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, among other functions, provides for payments by employers and employees to the Social Security fund; and the National Labor Relations Act guarantees the right of labor to organize and governs collective bargaining.

Stricter enforcement of the previously discussed Farm Labor Contractors Registration Act is needed as well, especially since neither the Fair Labor Standards Act nor the National Labor Relations Act covers agricultural workers (Otero, 1982b; Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 1981; Torres, 1982b).

Desirable as these reforms would be, however, employer sanctions (preferably mandating a minimum fine of $1,000 per unauthorized worker) are nonetheless the key to controlling illegal immigration. The under
secretary of the United States Department of Labor has stated flatly that "enforcement of existing wage-and-hour laws would not nearly be adequate to cope with the problem" (Lovell, 1982: 34). The acting INS commissioner has emphasized the impossibility of sealing the American borders against illegal and fraudulent entrants or apprehending more than a small fraction of illegals in the interior.

Without an enforcement tool to make the hiring of illegal aliens unprofitable, INS efforts to prevent the participation of illegal aliens in the labor market will continue to realize, at best, only limited success and, at worst, failure to keep pace with the growing numbers of illegals in the workplace (Meissner, 1982: 4).

According to the Department of Justice, many employers hire illegals because they know there is no law against the practice. Meissner has estimated that 75 percent of all employers would comply voluntarily with such legislation. INS efforts would be targeted on the remaining 25 percent.

If sanctions were enacted, they certainly would not be unique to the United States (Miller, 1982b). Illegal immigration from poorer to richer countries is a worldwide phenomenon (Bouvier, 1979; Castles and Kosack, 1973; Johnson and Williams, 1981; Power, 1979). In northern and western Europe, for example, illegal aliens are believed to equal between 10 percent and 15 percent of the legal alien population, currently estimated at 13,000,000 to 14,000,000 persons (Miller, 1982a; Miller and Martin, 1982). Nine European countries (Austria, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland) have considered the problem serious enough to authorize fines against illegals' employers. In most of these countries, the employers also can be imprisoned and/or forced to pay
any wages and pension benefits due the illegals, pay for their repatriation, or lose the right to hire legal aliens. In France illegals' employers are subject to the full range of penalties, including fines up to approximately $600 and imprisonment up to a month for first offenses and double these amounts for repeated offenses.

Whereas French enforcement efforts remained fairly constant between 1977 and 1979, the number of reported infractions decreased from 4,458 to 3,793 during the same years. Miller observed that the decrease indicates a decline in relatively easy to detect illegal alien employment in urban areas. Employer sanctions and their enforcement have had an obvious deterrent effect upon many employers but French authorities are careful to note that sanctions have driven some employers and the illegal aliens they hire further underground (1982b: 213).

Recommendations have been made to the French Ministry of Labor (Miller, 1982b) and by German labor unions (Martin, 1982) for better enforcement of employer sanctions.

In this country sanctions enacted at the state level have produced negligible results, partly because few resources have been allocated to enforcement. Only one judgment, a $250 fine, has been returned against an employer (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1980a). In at least one state, California, the original sanctions bill was rendered meaningless by amendments that reflected the interests of growers and hotel owners, groups thought to rely heavily on illegal workers. The final version, intentionally ambiguous, prohibits the knowing employment of aliens "not entitled to lawful residence in the United States if such employment would have an adverse effect on lawful resident workers" (Calavita, 1982: 3). During the early 1970s California courts ruled that the statute was an unconstitutional encroachment on exclusive Congressional
authority over immigration. Though the United States Supreme Court reversed these decisions in 1976, the law is treated as nonexistent. Evidence from the eleven states suggests, as do the French and German experiences, that employer sanctions must be rigorously applied to have widespread effectiveness. But the California fiasco, the repeated failure of sanctions legislation in Congress, and the already weakened proposal in the Immigration Reform and Control Act demonstrate that special interests pose a formidable obstacle even to enacting strong sanctions, let alone enforcing them.

Nor have proposed systems for verifying eligibility to work in the United States escaped criticism, much of which is legitimate. It seems likely that the efficacy of any system would be directly proportionate to its bureaucratic complexity, cost, and odiousness to civil libertarians.

On the one hand are proposals that would use existing types of identification and would require the signatures of employers and job applicants (citizens as well as aliens) on official verification forms. The plan set forth in the Immigration Reform and Control Act already has been discussed (U.S. Senate, 1982; U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 1982). North⁹ (1982) and Rawitz (1982) have presented variations. The proposals are flawed by the notorious ease with which identifiers like drivers' licenses, INS alien registration cards (so-called "green

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⁹North has offered his plan as an interim verification system, until a more secure one can be developed.
cards"), Social Security cards, and United States birth certificates can be counterfeited or otherwise fraudulently obtained (Conner, 1982b; Simpson, 1982b).

Under North's plan both employers and job applicants would be told that copies of "new hire reporting forms" must be filed with the INS, ostensibly for verification (1982: 198). Though all forms would be sent to the INS, just a sample actually would be screened, at a roughly estimated cost of $40,000,000 to $50,000,000 per year. North believes that the procedure would intimidate a substantial number of prospective illegal workers, a belief founded on the experience of Los Angeles County. There, and elsewhere in California, applicants for AFDC, food stamps, General Assistance, and Medicaid must document their eligibility to receive benefits; illegal aliens are ineligible. Permanent resident aliens must include information from their green cards on their welfare applications, which, they are told, will go to the INS for examination. Upon learning this, about a fifth of the aliens withdraw their applications, thus identifying themselves as 'probable illegals and saving Los Angeles County more than $50,000,000 annually (North, 1980, 1982). The success of this program obviously depends on the illegals' conviction that the INS will scrutinize their immigration status. In reality, county welfare workers screen the welfare claims, and only those that arouse suspicion are forwarded to the INS district office.

Rawitz's plan offers simplicity, low cost, limited reliance on existing documents, and minimal new bureaucracy. Persons claiming to be native born American citizens would not have to show identification. Nor would the INS have to keep records on job applicants. Instead, as
would occur under the Immigration Reform and Control Act, employers would retain the requisite forms for possible INS inspection. Rawitz's long tenure as chief immigration judge and associate commissioner for enforcement at the INS has convinced him that many illegals, particularly Mexicans, would forgo employment rather than sign false claims to citizenship, permanent resident alien status, or some other status entitling them to accept work. His proposal is based on this premise and on the assumption that most employers are law abiding. Only if his rationale were accurate would the plan be effective, and it is less than certain that persons already subject to criminal penalties for entering the United States illegally would balk at additional subterfuge, even though misrepresentation of citizenship is currently a felony (Simpson, 1982a).

On the other hand are plans that would create a new national identity card (which would be intended solely as a work permit) and/or a federal computerized data bank to verify the eligibility of job applicants for employment in the United States (Loeff, 1981; North, 1981; Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 1981). Objections to these proposals have to do with their potential infringement on civil liberties, the virtual impossibility of devising a counterfeit-proof card, and the expense of any effective system.

The ACLU's position against employer sanctions and a national identification system was mentioned earlier (Shattuck, 1981, 1982a, 1982b). In Shattuck's opinion an identity card for workers would become an internal passport, strengthening "the government's already broad police power to stop, question, and search"; a data bank would
become "both an enormous repository of personal information and a means for tracking and controlling the lives of American citizens" (1982b: 102). These Orwellian concerns are far from trivial, but they may be overstated. National identity papers are commonplace in most countries of northern and western Europe (Miller, 1982b), which remain democratic nevertheless.

The problem inherent in designing a new national identity card without also establishing a computerized data bank is the likelihood that any card could be counterfeited, just as currency is counterfeited now, and that the black market for forged documents would greatly exceed the present one for false Social Security and green cards (Rawitz, 1982; Shattuck, 1982b; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1980). However, counterfeitability obviously would decrease as the difficulty of producing the card increased. Proposals range from a fairly uncomplicated version (the individual's Social Security number, name, birthdate, sex, and height printed on bank note paper) to a highly sophisticated one (a photocard bearing a fingerprint and a magnetic strip, on which all the above information, plus the individual's birthplace and perhaps other personal data, would be encoded) (Conner, 1982b; North, 1981).

The computerized data bank could be used with or without identity cards, to check either the information on the cards or simply the job applicants' identifying numbers, probably Social Security numbers. In either case the employer would call a toll-free number, supply the necessary data, and have the data confirmed as authentic or rejected as
inauthentic, much the way credit card transactions are now checked by telephone (Conner, 1982b; North, 1981). The system would require the federal government to maintain information on every person authorized to work in this country. Although the system could detect forged identity cards or numbers, it "could not cope with one form of fraud, the transfer of a whole identity from one person of the same sex and approximately the same age to another" (North, 1981: 358).

Conner (1982b) has proposed a decentralized system that would use Distributed Data Processing and would check only Social Security numbers. His plan is attractive because it would avoid the cost and possible civil liberties abuses of a new national identity card (though not of the computerized data bank); would put the ultimate responsibility for verifying employment eligibility on the federal government instead of the employer; would not require the employer to complete or store verification forms; and would provide an automatic record of every transaction, showing that the employer followed the verification procedure and did not discriminate against individual applicants. Among the potential problems with this system are its complete reliance on expensive, complex technology "and the necessity of dealing with the government for each person hired" (Conner, 1982b: 158). The National Council of Agricultural Employers, for example, has testified that any telephone verification system would be infeasible for growers who have to hire a hundred or more workers in a single day and must do so expeditiously (Ellsworth, 1982a).
The cost estimates for an identity card and/or a data bank vary, of course, but there is consensus that any effective system would be quite expensive. For instance, in 1977 the INS undertook a seven-year project to produce and issue counterfeit-resistant registration cards to permanent resident aliens, a task of much narrower scope than one involving new national identity cards would be. Expenses for the first three years were estimated at $13,000,000. A subsequent estimate placed development and operation costs at $67,000,000, with ongoing costs expected (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1980a). Another report by the General Accounting Office noted that reissuing Social Security cards on "tamper-resistant paper" could cost $850,000,000 to $2,000,000,000 (1980b: 20). Figures requested by the United States Department of Labor gave the initial outlay for a photocard with encoded information for every person authorized to work, plus a computerized data bank, as $352,630,000 (in 1979 dollars), which eventually would decrease to and stabilize at $152,360,000 annually (North, 1981). Both the initial and annual estimates include $25,000,000 for field inspection. According to North, this system could be made self-supporting if $9 or $10 were charged for each card. Conner (1982b) estimated the cost of his proposed data bank without a new national identity card at $100,000,000 yearly.

One more figure is worth citing in this context, however. The Congressional Budget Office (1979) has estimated that, for each percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, income transfer payments rise by $7,000,000,000, or approximately $7,000 per unemployed person. Thus, if illegal aliens were displacing as few as 100,000
Americans in a given year (a modest supposition, since the INS reported in 1978 and 1979 that apprehensions of illegals were exceeding 1,000,000 a year and in 1980 Siegel et al. conservatively estimated the illegal population at 3,500,000 to 5,000,000 persons), the annual cost in government income transfers would be $700,000,000. The latter amount far surpasses the projected cost of any new national identity card and/or computerized data bank.

Still, the cost of a new system, together with the threat it might pose to civil liberties and the additional federal bureaucracy it inevitably would generate, suggest that caution is in order. If, as Meissner (1982) and Rawitz (1982) have asserted, most employers would comply voluntarily with a proscription against hiring illegal aliens, a verification system based on existing documents might suffice, at least for the period specified by the Immigration Reform and Control Act. Rawitz's proposal would entail the least expense and the fewest complications, though it would impose further federal paperwork on employers. If his plan or one like it proved ineffective after a trial period, perhaps three years, then a new strategy could be implemented. Of these strategies, Conner's (1982b) appears the most desirable, for reasons already discussed. The point to be emphasized is that because illegal immigration probably cannot be controlled without employer sanctions, postponing sanctions until the advent of the perfect verification system seems unwise.
Amnesty for illegal aliens

Another important issue pertaining to illegal aliens is their proposed legalization. Under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (U.S. Senate, 1982; U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 1982), illegals who had lived continuously in this country since January 1, 1977, would qualify for permanent resident alien status; those here continuously since January 1, 1980, would be eligible for temporary legal status and could become permanent resident aliens after three years, if they learned rudimentary English. Neither category of legalized aliens would be able to receive federally funded public assistance for three years. To assuage the fear of state and local governments (Huber, 1981; Koch, 1982; Lamm, 1982; Pollard, 1982; Todd, 1982) that amnesty would impose a substantial welfare burden on them, the Senate Judiciary Committee (1982: 49) expressed its intention that "each applicant for legalization, including all dependents, be carefully screened to meet the requirement . . . that he not be likely to become a 'public charge'." This assurance is rather thin, especially since the INS and the State Department previously "have interpreted 'public charge' to exclude persons receiving assistance through such programs as 'food stamps' and 'rent subsidies' . . . " (U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 1982: 49-50).

Though unassailable as a humanitarian gesture and as a recognition that certain illegals are de facto members of American society, the amnesty proposal has two major drawbacks.
It would add millions of persons to the United States population, including both the legalized aliens, who eventually would become citizens, and their immediate relatives (spouses, minor children, and parents), who currently are exempt from numerical limitation. The need for changes in the family reunification provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, to help control United States population increase and possibly to restrain growth of the secondary labor sector, has been discussed previously. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (U.S. Senate, 1982; U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 1982) would bring legal immigrants' immediate relatives under an annual ceiling of 350,000 family reunification visas and would eliminate the fifth preference category, which now allot 64,800 restricted visas a year to the siblings of adult American citizens and is increasingly oversubscribed. Granting amnesty to illegal aliens without simultaneously enacting these limitations on legal immigrant admissions would multiply, by an unknown quantity, the admission of immediate relatives (above the present nominal limit of 270,000 restricted visas) and the demand for fifth-preference visas.

There is also every likelihood that amnesty would invite, rather than deter, further illegal immigration. Prospective illegals hardly could be blamed for reasoning that they, too, ultimately would be legalized, contrary to official pronouncements. Australia furnishes a sobering example, having provided "three absolutely final amnesties for illegal immigrants in the past twenty years" (Conner, 1981: 343). Similarly, in 1973 Canada offered to "regularize the status" of visitors who had overstayed their visas. Together with legitimate visitors,
about 50,000 illegal aliens took advantage of the program, and it is believed that their success has emboldened other illegals to seek permanent immigrant status (Johnson and Williams, 1981: 46).

However, the alternatives for the United States are not simply blanket amnesty versus mass arrests and deportations. A third possibility, suggested by the Federation for American Immigration Reform (Tanton, 1982), is a statute of limitations for violations of immigration laws, under which aliens whose status had been illegal for, say, ten years or more could become permanent resident aliens. Such a provision would serve two purposes. It would apply only to illegals long established in this country and, by reducing the number of legalized aliens, would mitigate their demographic and economic impact.

At the very least, though, any amnesty program should be contingent upon revisions in the family reunification system and the enactment of strong employer sanctions legislation, to lessen the incentive for future illegal immigration.

Nonimmigrants: temporary workers

Since 1952 the Immigration and Nationality Act has provided for the admission of certain nonimmigrant aliens, known as "H-2 workers," "to perform temporary services or labor, if unemployed persons capable of performing such service or labor cannot be found in this country" (U.S. House of Representatives, 1977: 19). To obtain H-2 workers an employer files a petition for visas with an INS district director and submits an application for labor certification to an office of the
federally assisted State Employment Service. The application must be approved by the United States Department of Labor and the Attorney General (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 1980).

Superficially, the H-2 provisions resemble the bracero program that was in effect from 1942 through 1964 and, like the H-2 provisions, authorized the admission of temporary foreign workers with limited rights in the United States. However, far fewer H-2 workers than braceros have entered annually (for example, 27,760 of the former group in 1977, versus 436,049 of the latter group in 1957); and the H-2 workers are not exclusively Mexican farm laborers, as the braceros were. In 1977 Mexico's share of H-2 entrants was only 4 percent, compared with 16 percent for Canada and 38 percent for Jamaica (the largest single contributor). The underrepresentation of Mexicans is partly attributable to decisions by the Labor Department that citizens or permanent resident aliens could fill employment vacancies in the areas where Mexicans have been sought, or else that employers have not met the requirements for the admission of Mexican H-2s (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 1980). The H-2 class is a miscellaneous one, in which agricultural and other laborers (notably Jamaican

10Though the term "bracero program" refers strictly to the admission of Mexicans for temporary agricultural work in the United States from 1942 through 1964, lesser numbers of other foreign workers entered temporarily during the same period. For example, more than 300,000 aliens, including almost 220,000 Mexicans, worked in United States agriculture from 1942 through 1947. Also, late in World War II, Mexicans were admitted to work on American railroads, but their importation for this purpose stopped not long after the war ended (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 1980).
sugarcane cutters and apple pickers, French-Canadian woodsmen, and Basque and Hispanic sheepherders), athletes and entertainers, craftsmen, and service workers predominate (North and LeBel, 1978).

The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982 opted for expediting the current H-2 provisions rather than devising a guest workers program based on the European model (see Chapter 4).

Some of the proposed H-2 amendments evidently were written in response to agricultural lobbyists' complaints that there are not enough willing, qualified domestic workers to satisfy the needs of growers and ranchers (Ellsworth, 1981, 1982b; Etchepare, 1982), and that the Labor Department is obstructionist in delaying and restricting labor certifications as it does (Heringer, 1982). Under the proposed statute employers would apply for H-2 agricultural workers no more than eighty days before they were needed, and the Labor Department would have to grant or refuse their certifications at least twenty days before the workers were needed. If the twenty-day deadline were not met, requests for certification would be considered approved. Denials of certification would be subject to prompt review. In addition, the Attorney General would have to consult with the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), not just, as at present, the Department of Labor, about all regulations governing H-2 agricultural workers (U.S. Senate, 1982; U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 1982). It should be pointed out that the USDA is considerably more sympathetic to the importation of temporary workers than is the Labor Department. Whereas the former organization has a mandate to promote American agribusiness, the latter
one exists primarily to further the interests of American workers. A USDA attorney, while testifying in favor of an expanded temporary workers program, echoed an opinion held by his constituents: during the short harvest season, "growers of many agricultural commodities, particularly certain fruits and vegetables, need large numbers of workers and the need cannot be satisfied from the available domestic labor supply" (Barnes, 1982: 16). The Labor Department's counterargument is that sufficient indigenous farm labor would become available if recruitment efforts, wages, and working conditions were markedly improved (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 1980).

According to one group of immigration restrictionists, the proposed H-2 amendments are a guest workers program called something else. They "could result in hundreds of thousands of temporary workers being brought into the country, many of whom will never go home" (ZPG Reporter, 1982: 5). The proposed legislation would limit the time H-2 agricultural workers could spend in the United States to eight months a year; exceptions would be made only for special individuals like sheepherders, who are now and would continue to be allowed to stay here for three-year periods. However, there apparently would be no limit on the time H-2 nonagricultural workers could remain in this country (U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 1982).

The point was made in Chapter 4 that currently H-2 workers in the United States resemble the French and Swiss saisonniers, rather than the northern and western European Gastarbeiter generally. Despite ZPG's alarm about permanent "temporary" workers, the similarity between H-2 agricultural entrants and the saisonniers probably would continue or
perhaps be intensified if the Immigration Reform and Control Act were passed, since both groups then would be required to repatriate within a year. The outcome for H-2 nonfarm entrants would be less certain, because the time limit would not apply to them.

Chapter 4 also discussed the "illusion of return" (Miller and Martin, 1982: 86), the European guest workers' protracted residence in the host countries, contrary to their original intentions. It follows that the importation of foreign workers, unless strictly seasonal, tends to evolve into a de facto immigration program, and the European experience with this phenomenon is so enlightening as to warrant further discussion.

Recruitment of the Gastarbeiter was undertaken with lofty expectations, promulgated by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): integration of "the foreign worker into the national employment market," "special measures . . . to ensure that the foreign worker is not treated as an inferior," "general and occupational education," and so forth (Rist, 1979: 45). Likewise, the International Labour Organisation stipulated in 1975 that alien and native workers should have equal access to "vocational training and employment of their own choice," "remuneration for work of equal value," employment security and benefits, housing, safe working conditions, and social services. Additionally, "all possible measures should be taken . . . to facilitate the reunification of families of migrant workers" (Miller and Martin, 1982: 158-159, 161).
In practice, the guest workers do have certain rights, including family reunification, unemployment compensation, and unionization; but their treatment is not entirely commendable. For instance, natives receive preference over foreigners in the hiring process as well as in promotions, and aliens are notoriously relegated to barracks or substandard housing (Castles and Kosack, 1973; Mayer, 1975; Miller and Martin, 1982; Power, 1979; Reichert and Massey, n.d.). The inescapable reality is that numerous demographic, economic, and social problems are resulting from the guest workers' permanent, or at least long-term, residence in northern and western Europe.

Being young, with generally high birth rates (Power, 1979), they account for disproportionate shares of natural increase in the host countries, where the fertility of the native born hovers near replacement level. For example, 10 percent of all live births in France are to aliens; the figures for Germany and Switzerland are 16 percent and 30 percent, respectively (Miller and Martin, 1982).

Though replenishment of the European labor force is thus ensured (Kayser, 1977), there are currently too many, not too few, competitors for available jobs. According to the OECD, the European unemployment rate has increased every year since 1974 and may reach 10.5 percent in 1983 (Rowen, 1982). Moreover, the guest workers' recent unemployment rates have exceeded those of the native born (Martin, 1980), partly because alien labor is concentrated in industries vulnerable to recession (Power, 1979). In the case of Germany, the 1980 unemployment rates for the Gastarbeiter and the larger work force were 11 percent versus 4.5 percent. Under the French, German, and Swiss systems, aliens
and natives are equally entitled to unemployment benefits. When these expire, usually after a year, the foreigners technically are ineligible for other income transfer payments, but often receive them anyway, for humanitarian reasons (Miller and Martin, 1982).

Besides drawing unemployment benefits, the guest workers and their dependents make costly demands on schools and health care facilities (Hansen, 1979; Mayer, 1975; U.S. Congressional Research Service, 1980). They also suffer from increasing xenophobia as unemployment and general economic conditions worsen (Graham, 1982), and, in turn, they are becoming militant. Miller (1981: 83-123) has detailed their participation in hunger and rent strikes, work stoppages, occupation of factories and housing, and other "extraparliamentary" forms of protest against discrimination.

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11Some American schools face a similar problem, due, however, to illegal aliens instead of legal foreign workers. In mid-1982 the United States Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional laws denying free public education to illegals' children (Barbash and Babcock, 1982). Though laudable for benefiting the children, the decision has raised two issues of urgent importance, given the present budgetary constraints on federal, state, and local governments: the financial ability of certain school districts, such as the Brownsville, Texas, district, to comply with the ruling is by no means assured (Balz, 1982); and the decision may have established a precedent for overturning laws that now bar illegals from receiving food stamps, Medicaid, Medicare, unemployment compensation, and other transfer payments (Babcock, 1982; Barbash and Babcock, 1982). Furthermore, it seems probable that legal immigrants like H-2 workers and their families would be deemed eligible for any benefits granted to illegal aliens, if the matter were ever adjudicated.
The plight of the alien workers' children is at once volatile and poignant. Miller and Martin (1982: 76) have written that

in the hopes of curbing juvenile delinquency . . . and preventing the creation of a potentially disruptive mass of unemployed teenagers belonging to neither the homeland nor host societies, European states have granted work permits to migrant children despite their bans . . . [on] foreign-worker recruitment.

However, there is no certainty that these children, exposed to the norms prevailing in the host countries, will long tolerate the secondary labor sector employment accepted by their parents (Kayser, 1977; Kreuzaler, 1977; Martin, 1980; Piore, 1979). The opposite occurrence seems more likely, but better job opportunities for the second generation are not forthcoming. Among other obstacles, the children's academic and apprenticeship records are often poor, mainly due to language barriers and inadequate tutoring (Castles and Kosack, 1973; Power, 1979; Reimann and Reimann, 1979; Wilpert, 1977). Of the foreign children enrolled in German grade schools, only a third complete an elementary education. Illiteracy among aliens, children as well as adults, is a serious problem throughout northern and western Europe (Miller and Martin, 1982).

The strong possibility exists that the guest workers and their families are becoming a "permanent underclass" (Hansen, 1979: 4), with few guarantees of eventual socioeconomic advancement, naturalization, or voting rights (Krane, 1979; Reimann and Reimann, 1979).

In revising the H-2 provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the United States might well observe these caveats drawn from the European predicament: first, to recognize that some occupations are
purely seasonal, whereas others are long term; and, second, to avoid any program that would place nonimmigrant aliens in the latter type of employment. On the one hand, it would be inhumane arbitrarily to label certain workers "seasonal" and demand their repatriation within a year if, in fact, the jobs for which they were hired did not end after a season. Observers of the European scene have reported that numerous workers who are designated *saisonniers* for administrative purposes actually are engaged in ongoing occupations; they may or may not be forced back to their homelands (Böhning, 1979; Power, 1979). With respect to the United States, Miller and Martin (1982) have called for an unambiguous distinction between short-term and long-term employment and the placement of workers accordingly. On the other hand, permitting the European *Gastarbeiter* to retain their jobs indefinitely has produced significant unintended consequences: the immigration of many guest workers and their families, and the concomitant problems that were just described. Importation of the *saisonniers* has entailed far fewer difficulties for the host countries, albeit at the price of treating the temporary workers inequitably (Miller, 1982a).

A plausible argument can be made that agriculture has unique requirements for seasonal labor and hence that agricultural employment is the only kind, within the secondary sector, for which H-2 workers should be admitted to the United States. A spokesman for the National Council of Agricultural Employers attested to the temporary nature of farm labor with data pertaining to an unspecified year: "only 758,000 [persons], out of a total hired farm working force of 2,652,000, worked 150 or more days out of the year, and only 423,000 worked more than 249 days" (Ellsworth, 1982b: 125).
Agriculture is not only inherently seasonal but also a relatively rare occupation for Americans. The secular trend has been very definitely away from it (Carpenter, 1927; Hutchinson, 1956). Table 4 has shown that the already low proportion of farm laborers in the United States labor force decreased further from 1960 through 1964 to 1975 through 1977. Even native born blacks and native born Hispanics of native parentage, who were much more likely than native born whites to have lower level occupations in 1970 (64 percent, 49 percent, and 33 percent, respectively), were not conspicuously overconcentrated as farm laborers (2 percent, 3 percent, and 1 percent, respectively) (see Table 3). This point is consistent with the one made in Chapters 3 and 4 that the native minorities are clustered at the upper end of the secondary sector (as operatives and nonhousehold service workers), not in the lowest level categories (as farm and nonfarm laborers and private household workers). The same generalization applies to legal immigrants in the aggregate (see Table 9), though 15 percent of the Mexicans who entered the United States from 1965 through 1969 and were employed at destination in 1970 were farm laborers (see Table 10). With this exception H-2 agricultural entrants appear to complement, instead of substitute for, both native minorities and recent immigrants. A slight expansion of the H-2 agricultural workers program should not change the complementary relation, provided that the continuing labor certification process restricts H-2s from entering micro labor markets in which black and Hispanic farm workers are known to be concentrated. Florida and the southwest are two salient examples (Bower, 1982b).
There should be no pretense, however, that such an expansion would absorb a substantial fraction of the illegal aliens now in the United States or obviate the need for strong employer sanctions.

Apprehensions of illegals are, after all, exceeding 1,000,000 yearly (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1978, 1979). Completely apart from any domestic labor force considerations, H-2 agricultural admissions of this magnitude would lead the federal government into yet another bureaucratic quagmire (Briggs, 1980). When the Reagan administration, in contrast, proposed a guest workers agreement with Mexico, the annual number of entrants was set at only 50,000 (Smith, 1981).

Furthermore, the French and Swiss importation of saisonniers has stimulated, not curtailed, illegal residence and employment (Miller, 1982a; Power, 1979), as did the American reliance on braceros. During the bracero period Mexicans were drawn northward in greater numbers than could be accommodated by the legal flow, limited initially by Mexico to 50,000 a year. The situation was exacerbated on the U.S. side by the ... general grower dislike of the worker protections required under the formal contracts. Many U.S. farmers were willing accomplices in the illegal entry of the Mexican nationals ... (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 1980: 26).

The preceding quotation is relevant to the present as well as the past. Although the Immigration Reform and Control Act would require neither Social Security nor unemployment insurance payments by employers for H-2 workers, various analysts have urged that these payments be made mandatory, to protect the H-2s and to remove the possible financial incentive for employing them (Castellanos, 1982; U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate Judiciary Committees, 1981). Both goals
are admirable; so, too, would be the right of temporary foreign agricultural workers to join American unions. But the evidence from the bracero era clearly indicates that illegal aliens are favored over legal nonimmigrant aliens when the latter entrants are given certain protections and employers are not prohibited from hiring illegals.

Additional unpleasant realities should be noted. An expanded H-2 agricultural program would continue, necessarily, to relegate the workers to a subclass, and not just because of employers' preferences. If H-2s were granted the same privileges enjoyed by permanent resident aliens (the right to change jobs, the right to remain indefinitely in the United States, and so forth), the probable results would be twofold: they, like legal immigrants and other persons with a choice in the matter, would drift away from agriculture; and they, the initially temporary entrants, would become de facto immigrants, as in the European situation. Moreover, easier availability of H-2s, whatever their number, would do nothing to upgrade the deplorable conditions under which domestic farm laborers currently subsist (Bower, 1982a, 1982b; Geffert, 1982; North and LeBel, 1978). That Americans would rather not be farm laborers is scarcely astounding in view of their average earnings in 1979: $2,489 for at least 250 days' work (Castellanos, 1982). They die from occupational accidents at three times the rate for the average American worker; and their infant mortality rate, an indicator of poor education, health care, nutrition, and sanitation, exceeds the national average by 125 percent (Bower, 1982a).
The H-2 program undoubtedly will survive and perhaps will be expanded, over the protests of organized labor (Allstrom, 1982; Bower, 1982a, 1982b; Castellanos, 1982; Chaikin, 1982; Donahue, 1981; Kirkland, 1982; Oswald, 1982; Otero, 1982a, 1982b). It may well alleviate some labor shortages caused by Americans' avoidance of farm work and their access to better paid, less strenuous employment or to income transfer payments, but it is not praiseworthy in the other respects discussed.

Summary and conclusions

Conflicts among special interest groups (organized labor, civil libertarians and civil rights advocates, business organizations, state and local governments, and activists concerned about the impact of immigration on United States population growth) pose a formidable obstacle to the enactment of any comprehensive new immigration legislation. Though the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982 is dormant at present (Washington Post, 1982), the issues addressed by it are likely to become more urgent the longer action on them is postponed. Thus the major provisions of the bill, summarized below, remain important.

Regarding legal immigrants, the Immigration Reform and Control Act would revise the preference system to emphasize reunification of nuclear, rather than extended, families and admission of persons with exceptional abilities (see Table 11). Under the A2 preference category 65 percent of 350,000 annual family reunification visas would be allotted to the spouses and minor children of permanent resident aliens. The current fifth preference category, which provides for the admission
of the siblings of adult American citizens, would cease to exist after elimination of the present backlog. Another 75,000 visas per year would be allocated to persons with exceptional skills.

Immigrant visas for the contiguous neighbors of the United States, Canada and Mexico, would be increased from 20,000 to 40,000 per year. Visas not used by one country would be available to the other. This provision very probably would mean about 60,000 to 70,000 visas annually for Mexico, since the Canadians do not now use their full allotment. Greater access to legal immigrant status might rechannel part of the illegal Mexican flow, but it would do virtually nothing to reduce Mexicans' high concentration in the American secondary labor sector. Chapters 3 and 4 have shown that among legal immigrants as well as illegal aliens, Mexicans are the group most likely to have lower level occupations (Chiswick, 1977, 1979; North and Houstoun, 1976; Table 10).

The Immigration Reform and Control Act also would move toward a real limit on annual immigrant admissions, instead of the present nominal ceiling. Though immediate relatives of adult citizens would continue to enter the country without numerical restriction, the number admitted each year would be subtracted from the next year's 350,000 family reunification visas. Similarly, the number of special immigrants admitted without numerical restriction in a given year would be deducted from the following year's 75,000 visas for persons with exceptional skills.

However, the proposed bill did not confront the issue of unlimited refugee admissions. The Refugee Act of 1980 stipulates that by late 1982 the entire number of such admissions is to be determined annually
by the President, in consultation with Congress (U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights, 1980; U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate
Judiciary Committees, 1981). Refugees could be brought under an annual
immigration ceiling, while still permitting refugee totals to fluctuate
according to international political conditions, if the number of
entrants in a given year were subtracted from the next year's allotment
of 350,000 family reunification visas. Other countries of immigration,
Australia and Canada, already include refugees in their annual immigrant
limits (Carlin, 1982).

Additional refugee issues that need attention are abuses of the
asylum process as a shortcut to immigration; extensive delays that now
characterize initial asylum hearings (Conner, 1982a); and biased
evaluations of claims for refugee status (Shattuck, 1982a; Simmons,
1982; TransAfrica, 1982), based on race, national origin, or the type of
government (communist versus noncommunist) charged with repression.

Concerning illegal aliens, the Immigration Reform and Control Act
would make it illegal for employers of at least four workers knowingly
to employ persons unauthorized to work in this country, or to hire
anyone without examining his or her identification. Acceptable
identifiers would be either an American passport by itself or,
alternatively, a Social Security card or United States birth
certificate, plus one of the following documents: a driver's license,
another type of identification issued by the state, or some other
document approved by the United States Attorney General. The proposed
legislation assumes that such identification would verify the job
applicant's eligibility for employment. Failure to comply with the
verification procedure would carry a possible fine of $500 per job applicant. Employers of illegal aliens could be fined $1,000 for the first offense and $2,000 for the second offense; they would be subject to a criminal misdemeanor penalty of up to $1,000 and/or six months' imprisonment for subsequent violations. The relatively lenient penalties, the exemption of individuals with fewer than four employees, and the reference to "knowing employment" (a person who claimed ignorance about an alien's illegal status probably would not be held liable for employing the alien) represent compromises with business lobbyists; but these employer sanctions certainly would be preferable to none.

Every proposal for verifying a job applicant's eligibility to work in the United States, including that in the Immigration Reform and Control Act and the plans offered by Conner (1982b), North (1981, 1982), and Rawitz (1982), has flaws. Existing identifiers, such as drivers' licenses, green cards, Social Security cards, and United States birth certificates, can be quite easily counterfeited or otherwise fraudulently obtained (Conner, 1982b; Simpson, 1982b). It is unlikely that even a new national identity card could be made counterfeit-proof. Furthermore, a new card and/or a federal computerized data bank would be expensive and might threaten civil liberties (Shattuck, 1982b; Torres, 1982a). Rawitz's plan, which would use documents currently available and would entail the least cost with the fewest complications, might suffice for the time being. Ultimately, a more sophisticated system, perhaps the data bank described by Conner, might have to be instituted. However, because employer sanctions probably are crucial to controlling
illegal immigration, they seem well justified, despite the likelihood of an imperfect verification system.

There remains the issue of amnesty for illegal aliens. Under the Immigration Reform and Control Act illegals who had lived continuously in the United States since January 1, 1977, would qualify for permanent resident alien status; those here continuously since January 1, 1980, would be eligible for temporary legal status and could become permanent resident aliens after three years, if they learned elementary English. The proposal is commendable on humanitarian grounds and as an acknowledgment that certain illegals have established themselves in American society. Nevertheless, granting amnesty to persons who eventually would achieve American citizenship, without simultaneously revising the family reunification provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, would multiply, by an unknown number, the admission of these new citizens' immediate relatives (outside the present nominal limit of 270,000 restricted visas) and the demand for fifth-preference visas (see Table 11). Moreover, it is hardly credible that amnesty would not give rise to further illegal immigration, particularly if enacted in the absence of strong employer sanctions legislation.

With respect to legal temporary foreign workers, the Immigration Reform and Control Act would make it easier for employers to obtain H-2 workers, especially in agriculture. The proposed measure also would limit the time H-2 agricultural entrants could stay in this country to eight months annually; exceptions would apply only to special individuals like sheepherders, who are presently and would continue to be allowed to remain here for three-year periods.
It can be argued that agriculture has unique, difficult to meet, requirements for seasonal labor and that agricultural employment is, therefore, the only lower level work for which H-2s should be recruited. In general, H-2 agricultural entrants appear to complement, not substitute for, native born blacks and native born Hispanics of native parentage (see Table 3), as well as legal immigrants in the aggregate (see Table 9) and separate non-Mexican immigrant groups (see Table 10). A slight expansion of the H-2 agricultural workers program, with continuing labor certification, should not alter the complementary relation. However, such an expansion should not be expected to absorb many illegal aliens or make strong employer sanctions unnecessary.

What seems prudent for the United States to avoid is a guest workers program modeled on the European experience (see Chapter 4). Unless the importation of foreign workers is kept strictly seasonal, it tends to become a de facto immigration program, with numerous adverse demographic, economic, and social consequences (Castles and Kosack, 1973; Graham, 1982; Hansen, 1979; Kayser, 1977; Krane, 1979; Martin, 1980; Mayer, 1975; Miller, 1981; Miller and Martin, 1982; Piore, 1979; Power, 1979; Reichert and Massey, n.d.; Reimann and Reimann, 1979; U.S. Congressional Research Service, 1980).
CHAPTER 7: OVERVIEW

Introduction

The 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 set in motion a trend toward increased numbers of legal immigrants, mainly from non-European origins: Mexico, Central America, the West Indies, South America, and Asia. These entrants have been joined by sizable, if not precisely known, numbers of illegal aliens, also largely from non-European countries. Mexico is the single most important origin. Legal and illegal immigration to the United States in 1980 quite possibly exceeded 1,000,000 entrants, a record annual sum. It has been estimated, from poor data, that perhaps half of the country's population growth is now due to net immigration. With assumed net legal and illegal immigration of 750,000 persons per year and a total fertility rate of 1.8 to 2.0 (below replacement), the American population (currently about 232,000,000 persons) would be 30 percent to 60 percent larger in the year 2080 (Bouvier, 1981). Thus the potential effect of immigration on population growth is not to be ignored.

However, immigration has theoretical and practical significance beyond demographic concerns. In this dissertation a previously untried effort has been made to integrate diverse sources of information about legal immigrants' and illegal aliens' employment, and relate the findings to contemporary issues in American immigration policy. The
next section of the chapter will review the research questions, some answers, and their implications for policy. The last section will offer ideas for future research.

**Hypotheses, major findings, and policy implications**

The dissertation has addressed three questions about the employment of recent (post-1965) entrants to the United States.

The first two questions were theoretical: does the occupational structure of recent entrants make them complementary or substitutive (competitive) vis-à-vis Americans, specifically, native born whites and native born minorities (blacks and Hispanics) in the labor market; and does their occupational structure contribute to the upward mobility of the native born white majority? In Spengler's theoretical formulations (1956, 1958), complementary relations between immigrants and natives are expected when they have different occupational structures; substitutive relations are predicted when immigrants and natives are occupationally similar. The upward mobility effect (Spengler, 1958) is expected when immigrants are occupationally unlike (and, presumably, of lower status than) natives of the receiving country, but not when immigrants and natives have comparable occupational structures.

It was thought possible that legal immigrants and illegal aliens might have very different occupational structures, which might involve different relations toward the American labor force. The opposite possibility, that recent entrants' origins might be a more important factor in occupational structure than legal or illegal status per se,
had been neglected in earlier research and was considered here. Hence the theoretical questions were asked about both legal immigrants and illegal aliens, disaggregated insofar as feasible by their countries or regions of origin, a task that had not been attempted before.

The third question posed at the beginning of the dissertation was a practical one, relevant to immigration policy: are recent entrants in fact taking jobs that otherwise would be held by disadvantaged Americans, especially minorities?

Seven hypotheses, based on these three questions, have been examined in preceding chapters. The hypotheses are restated below and the research findings summarized.

Hypothesis 1: Legal immigrants as an aggregate have an occupational structure like that of all persons employed in the United States.

The data on legal immigrants' occupations at origin and destination do not entirely support Hypothesis 1.

From 1965 through 1977 immigrants at origin had a rather bipolar occupational distribution. Compared with American workers, arriving immigrants always were overrepresented in professional and technical occupations and usually were overconcentrated in the secondary sector too. Although their distribution resembled the Americans' enough to suggest that, theoretically, the immigrants were somewhat more substitutive than complementary toward the whole United States labor force, they might have facilitated the upward mobility of native born whites.
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These conclusions may hold fairly well for immigrants' occupations at destination also. Despite evidence of considerable short-term downward mobility after immigration, legal entrants seem at least as likely as American workers in the aggregate to have professional and technical occupations. Furthermore, over time, immigrants' occupational status tends to rise, along with their earnings or incomes.

Hypothesis 2: The representation of legal immigrants in the secondary labor sector varies according to their origins.

Hypothesis 3: Legal immigrants from certain origins approach or exceed the representation of native born minorities of native parentage (blacks and Hispanics) in the secondary sector.

The data on legal immigrants' occupations at origin and destination unequivocally support these hypotheses.

The occupations at origin of arriving immigrants from 1965 through 1977 have shown that Mexicans were greatly overconcentrated in the secondary sector, relative to every other immigrant group, the whole United States labor force, and the three largest groups in the native born population of native parentage (whites, Hispanics, and blacks, whose proportions in lower level occupations in 1970 were 33 percent, 49 percent, and 64 percent, respectively). Central Americans, West Indians, and South Americans, the immigrant group with the next-highest representation in the secondary sector, were more concentrated there than American workers as an aggregate and than native born whites. These immigrants frequently approximated the representation of native born Hispanics in lower level occupations as of 1970. The Europeans' occupational distribution resembled that of the United States labor force, notwithstanding the Europeans' greater concentration in the
secondary sector in all but two years after 1968. Asians and Africans tended to be an immigrant elite, with high proportions in the professional and technical category and low proportions in the secondary sector, vis-à-vis American workers generally, native whites, and native minorities. However, the Chinese usually had the somewhat bipolar distribution characteristic of immigrants in the aggregate. During the 1970s non-Canadian Western Hemisphere entrants were, theoretically, more substitutive than complementary with respect to native blacks and native Hispanics. Mexicans were, in theory, the immigrant group most complementary toward native whites and most likely to promote the whites' upward mobility. The same inference can be made about Mexicans in their American occupations.

The differences, by origins, in recent entrants' occupational backgrounds apparently persist at destination. Of four foreign born groups who entered the United States from 1965 through 1969 and were employed here in 1970, Mexicans were far and away the most relegated to the secondary sector. Central Americans, West Indians, and South Americans were next in sequence, followed by the Chinese and Europeans. Relative to native born whites, each foreign born group was overconcentrated in lower level occupations; but the Chinese and, to a lesser extent, the Europeans were overrepresented in the professional and technical category also.

Hypothesis 4: Compared with all persons employed in the United States, illegal aliens as an aggregate are overconcentrated in the secondary labor sector.

Hypothesis 5: Illegal aliens as an aggregate approach or exceed the representation of native born minorities of native parentage (blacks and Hispanics) in the secondary sector.
Hypothesis 6: The representation of illegal aliens in the secondary sector varies according to their origins.

The data, though flawed, from studies of illegal aliens' employment support these hypotheses. Moreover, the data suggest some noteworthy, heretofore undisclosed, parallels between recent illegal and legal entrants.

Illegal aliens in the aggregate evidently are much more likely than American workers as a whole to have lower level occupations. Theoretically, illegals complement the United States labor force and native born whites, and enhance the whites' occupational advancement. Illegals often greatly exceeded the concentration of native born Hispanics in the secondary sector and usually were more clustered there than native blacks. A theoretical point made about legal immigrants, concerning their possible substitution for the native minorities, applies to illegal aliens as well: the likelihood of competition seems most pronounced at the upper end of the secondary sector, in the operatives and nonhousehold service categories, where 44 percent of native blacks and 39 percent of native Hispanics were concentrated in 1970.

In addition, the differences, by origins, in illegal aliens' lower level employment strikingly resembled the secondary sector distinctions among legal immigrants. Mexican illegals had the greatest representation in the secondary sector; other Western Hemisphere illegals tended to be slightly less disadvantaged than the Mexicans; and the few Eastern Hemisphere illegals who were studied were generally the least confined to lower level employment.
The intent of this analogy is not to deny the existence of any occupational differences between legal immigrants and illegal aliens from the same origins. Judging from the imperfect data available, the most salient difference is that Mexican illegals are more likely than their legal counterparts to work at the base of the occupational hierarchy, as farm laborers, despite the apparent preference of both groups for other employment. However, origin, not just legal or illegal status, seemingly bears a closer relation to the type of American work performed by recent entrants than has been recognized before.

In theory, most illegal groups complemented native born whites to a conspicuous degree and furthered the whites' occupational advancement. Every group of illegals with a high proportion in the nonagricultural part of the secondary sector, notably in the operatives and/or nonhousehold service categories, was, theoretically, competitive with native blacks and native Hispanics.

Because illegal aliens, like legal immigrants (as a whole and disaggregated by origins), evidently do have a propensity for employment as operatives and nonhousehold service workers in the United States, the relations of many legal and illegal entrants toward the native minorities seem, theoretically, more similar than previous research has shown.

Hypothesis 7: Illegal aliens and those legal immigrants who are in the secondary sector actually are displacing disadvantaged Americans, particularly native born minorities.
It is, however, one thing to state that certain recent entrants theoretically substitute for native minorities and quite another to show that substitution really is occurring. Research to date does not allow for firm conclusions about Hypothesis 7. Legal immigrants and illegal aliens in the secondary sector at destination apparently have two relations vis-à-vis disadvantaged Americans, specifically, native born blacks and Hispanics: in some cases displacement occurs, but to an unknown extent the entrants accept lower level jobs that the disadvantaged reject in favor of government income transfers.

A few tentative generalizations are that displacement may be least in the worst paid, lowest status, most arduous occupations (farm and nonfarm labor and private household work); greatest in the upper part of the secondary sector (especially in the operatives category but also in various nonhousehold service occupations); and more acute as rising unemployment is coupled with less easily available income transfer payments.

Perhaps the foremost conclusion to be drawn from this dissertation is that immigration is neither a catastrophic nor a trivial problem for the United States.

Steps could be taken to mitigate the demographic and possible labor force effects of immigration. The principal measures would involve setting a real limit on annual admissions of legal immigrants (refugees included), which might be revised according to periodic changes in fertility; giving economic and family reunification criteria more nearly equal emphasis in legal immigrant admissions; establishing severe
penalties for illegal aliens' employers; and avoiding a European type of guest workers program, that is, the long-term importation of foreign workers.  

The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982 would only partly meet these objectives. Numerically restricted annual immigrant visas would be increased from the present 270,000 to 425,000, 350,000 of them designated for family reunification. No numerical limit would be imposed on the admission of adult American citizens' immediate relatives (spouses, minor children, and parents) or on refugees, but the number of immediate relatives admitted each year would be subtracted from the next year's 350,000 family reunification visas. The current fifth preference category, which allocates visas to adult citizens' siblings, eventually would be eliminated, and visas for persons with exceptional abilities would be increased from 27,000 to 75,000 annually. The proposed legislation would make it illegal for employers of four or more individuals knowingly to employ persons unauthorized to work in this country, although noncompliance would entail rather lenient sanctions: $1,000 for the first offense, $2,000 for the second offense, and a criminal misdemeanor penalty of up to $1,000 and/or six months' imprisonment for subsequent violations. Finally, the Immigration Reform and Control Act would facilitate the entry of legal temporary foreign workers, particularly farm laborers, under the existing H-2 program. The time virtually all H-2 agricultural workers could remain in the United States would be limited to eight months a year, a stipulation that would keep this aspect of the program strictly seasonal. However,
there evidently would be no restriction on the time H-2 nonagricultural workers could stay here.

Despite the compromises embodied in the Immigration Reform and Control Act, it was among the most controversial proposals brought before Congress in 1982. The power of special interest groups, with their conflicting mandates, is such that any major revision of the American immigration system will be difficult to legislate, and the need for revision probably will become more urgent the longer it is delayed.

Suggestions for future research

That legal immigrants are, initially anyway, more concentrated in the secondary labor sector in the United States than at origin suggests several new research questions. First, if discrimination is a factor in downward mobility, is it a more significant factor for Mexicans than, say, for Asians? Negative selection, not discrimination, appears to explain Mexicans' low status in this country. For instance, whereas many Mexicans who are now legal immigrants were once illegal aliens, Asians often enter the country with third-preference visas (reserved for persons with exceptional abilities). Nevertheless, the possibility of differential discrimination might be considered. Second, are political refugees, because they have been uprooted from their homelands, unique among legal immigrants and therefore uniquely in need of English language training and job placement services; or would other immigrants admitted on nonselective humanitarian grounds, as relatives of naturalized citizens or permanent resident aliens, instead of by
selective occupational criteria, also benefit from these services?

Third, how effective are available services in promoting immigrants' eventual upward mobility out of the secondary sector, and what modifications might better conserve human capital?

There is an obvious necessity for improved data on the relations of legal immigrants and especially illegal aliens toward native born blacks and Hispanics in the secondary sector. Additional studies of specific work places, like the research by Cardenas (1976) and Maram (1980), could be used to supplement aggregated occupational data that show high concentrations of recent entrants and native minorities in the operatives and nonhousehold service categories. Multiple case studies would reveal any consistent tendency for recent entrants and native minorities in these categories to hold identical jobs or complementary ones. Another research method, follow-ups of attempts to fill employment vacancies created when illegal aliens are arrested (Villalpando, 1977), could show whether unemployed citizens have a pattern of accepting or rejecting the jobs.

With respect to American immigration policy, information from other countries might provide insights as valuable as those pertaining to the European Gastarbeiter and saisonniers. For example, if research were conducted on the effects of national identity papers in northern and western Europe, the findings might indicate whether a national identity card meant to verify eligibility for employment in the United States would undermine civil liberties here. Also, monitoring the Australians' and Canadians' periodic revisions of limits on legal immigrant
admissions, corresponding to fluctuations in fertility, might prove instructive for the United States. However, without direct emigration data this country lacks accurate net legal immigration figures from which to calculate legal immigrants' share of population growth.
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