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SOVIET NATIONAL RELATIONS: ELITE ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS IN THE 1970S

The Ohio State University

PH.D. 1983

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SOVIET NATIONAL RELATIONS: ELITE ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS IN THE 1970S

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

James Walter Warhola, B.A., M.A

The Ohio State University

1983

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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION

When the Bolsheviks seized power in St. Petersburg in the Great October Revolution of 1917, they inherited a country of extreme multinationality. This characteristic was a consequence of Tsarist policy of expansion beyond the Muscovite center which had been operating since the 17th century. The Bolsheviks were neither oblivious to the problematical character of this multinationality nor unequipped with a world-view which prescribed its solution. Armed with the ideological prescriptions of revolutionary socialism, the general line was that genuine self-determination (as opposed to the "hypocritical", Woodrow Wilson type), would be the natural and desirable consequence of revolution and a policy of proletarian internationalism. However, the problematical nature of the Soviet state's multinationality appears to have been sorely underestimated. The revolutionaries soon found themselves engaged in a bloody civil war, one dimension of which was the violent and determined resolution of several nationality groups to form independent states.
The Soviets not only managed to maintain the areas which were previously under control of Tsarist Russia, but by the time of the entrance of the USSR into World War II had expanded the territorial control of the Soviet state into areas never controlled by Tsarist Russia. Throughout the period from Lenin to Brezhnev, Soviet nationality policy has taken many diverse and at times rather unexpected turns. Nevertheless, the ideological rationale for dealing with the country's multinationality has remained largely the same, namely the embodiment of socialist, proletarian internationalism in the form of a Soviet people who would build communism. Significant ideological nuances have appeared in nationality policy throughout the Soviet era, and these will be explored in the course of this study.

Since 1967 the Soviet leadership has formally maintained that the "national question" in the USSR has been resolved on the basis of "Leninist nationality policy" consistently pursued by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet state. This rather general phrase can have a variety of meanings, however, and an important part of this research effort will involve the determination of the specific

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content of this and other key terms and phrases used by the Soviet political elite.

There are several aspects of the national question in the USSR which cannot be dealt with simply by the enunciation of ideological phrases, however, and evidence suggests that the Soviet leadership is cognizant of this. In 1919 the Soviet All-Union census indicated that the population had reached slightly more than 262 million inhabitants. Of these, only 52.4% are ethnically Russian, a figure which has been declining for some time. In and of itself, however, this figure is not particularly troublesome, as the pre-Revolutionary percentage of Russians was a mere 44%, or 75 of 170 million. What is particularly problematical for the leadership is the direction in which the demographic trends are moving, in conjunction with the unsettling and at times fissiparous tendencies of social and political modernization. In the post-war era the world has seen the emergence of newly independent nations, many of which are multi-ethnic. A vast number of these, perhaps the majority, have experienced varying degrees of intra-national antagonism. This range extends from calls for greater local autonomy to outright independence. Furthermore, this push for self-determination has not been limited to these newly

independent states, but includes old, "established" democracies which were often presumed to be beyond this stage of nation-building.  

Many students of Soviet politics have noted for years that certain tendencies of modernization would eventually create difficulties for the maintenance of national cohesion in the Soviet Union. With 92 national groups listed in the 1979 census, there is certainly potential for nationalistic fulminations within the USSR if present trends continue, as they in all likelihood will. The most fundamental question which students of Soviet politics can address with regard to the issue of the national minorities appears to be the perceptions of the leadership of the nature of the

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nationality question, and their attitudes toward its solution. Although the Soviet leadership formally contends that the national question has been resolved, both they and the academic community recognize that appropriate response to this issue will take various forms throughout various historical stages in the process of building communism. Soviet society is currently at the stage of "mature socialism" according to the Soviet leadership, incidentally.

Since the late 1950s the Soviet leadership has characterized itself as a collectivity, above and beyond the abuses of the "cult of personality" which the Party and Soviet society suffered under Joseph Stalin. This shift was seen as an appropriate return to "Leninist norms of Party life", "Leninist style of leadership", and so forth. These changes have directly affected the character of national relations, and Soviet nationality policy as well. These changes will be dealt with in detail in Chapter One. In order to appreciate the significance of the nationality question in the USSR, it will be helpful to outline the basic substantive questions involved very briefly here. These substantive questions will be dealt with in detail in Chapter Two.

---

The substantive questions of the politics of Soviet nationality relations are basically as follows. First of all, the Soviet leadership claims that the nationality problem is one of the most complicated in all of social life, and yet has been resolved in the Soviet Union by the pursuit of "Leninist nationality policy". However, it is recognized in the West that a series of quite pressing problems remain in the area of Soviet nationality relations. Thus the question becomes first of all one of the basis of the Soviet claims, and secondly the evidence of Western scholars that nationality relations in the USSR are indeed problematical for the leadership. The basis for the Soviet claims are essentially twofold. First of all, the USSR has managed to avoid nationalistic fulminations among minority groups quite successfully. As is generally known, the post-war world has seen ethnic assertiveness in virtually every type of country imaginable. The Soviets appear to have done an admirable job of avoiding the worst forms of minority fulmination. Secondly, the Soviets point to impressive gains in social amenities and services for the minority groups, and incessantly quote statistics demonstrating the great improvements in living standards of the minority groups since their incorporation into the Soviet Union.
In terms of the Western perceptions of the national problem in the Soviet Union, three general areas are usually presented as evidence that the problem is far worse—or potentially far worse—than the Soviet leadership is willing to admit. First of all, a series of demographic changes are operating in the Soviet Union which appear to spell trouble for the Soviet leadership. Secondly, increased modernization is likely to have a disruptive social effect upon the minority groups, as it has in virtually every other country in this century, and particularly in the post-war era. Thirdly, there seems to be a consensus among Western students of the USSR that the leadership has managed to maintain national cohesion and apparent harmony through a skillful balance of force and sensitivity to nationalities' interests, feelings, and so forth, although most students seem to place greater emphasis on the former factor. Thus the core substantive questions in Soviet nationality relations involve the ability of the Soviet leadership to continue the admittedly successful maintenance of nationality stability and apparent harmony in light of seemingly imminent socio-political transformations.

If we are to assess the Soviet capability to so contain the national problem, it is imperative that we begin to understand the Soviet elites' perceptions of the national
problem itself, and their attitudes toward its further development. Until now no method has been available to assess elite attitudes on the national question, and most work involves demographic, biographical, or historical approaches to understanding the politics of national relations in the USSR. This study will make use of the Soviet Elite Perceptions Project which attempts to analyze the perceptions and attitudes of the Soviet Politburo of the 1970s through systematic content analysis of all available public utterances (oral and written). Although explanation of the methodology will take place in Chapters 3 and 4, some introductory remarks are appropriate. The project proceeds from the assumption that different Politburo members are likely to have different orientations, perceptions, policy preferences, and attitudes toward various issues. This general assumption has been fairly well established in Western studies of the Soviet Union. Thus, the project is designed to enable the researcher to tap various attitudes and perceptions of each Politburo member on a wide variety

7 This may seem to contradict the statement made earlier about the Soviet's claim to have resolved the national question in a conclusive manner. It should be emphasized here that the Soviets recognize the need to "further understand" the various processes in ethnic relations - to them this in no way represents an admission that the national question has not been resolved. It merely means that as socialism matures and develops into communism, various ethnic processes will take place which require further understanding.
of issues within four major domains. These are namely foreign policy, the economy, nationality relations, and dissent.

The procedure used was content analysis of each public speech or article of each Politburo member for relevant words or phrases in each of the four main areas (see Appendix A for a list of some of these "cognitive objects" to be used in this study). In the process of coding each cognitive object, the coder also assigned an affective score to it. This was done by assessing the Politburo members' apparent evaluation of the object (i.e., is it seen as positive, negative, etc.), and his apparent perception of the potency of the object (i.e., is it seen as weak, strong, etc.). In this way we may determine the salience of the issue (by virtue of the relative attention it receives from the Politburo member), and the attitude and perception of it as well.

The findings from this study will be extremely useful and important for a number of reasons. Perhaps the most significant result of this study will be the illumination of two key questions in the politics of Soviet national relations, namely who has real power in terms of nationality affairs, and how is this power exercised in the management of the country's ethnic groups. Also, given the recent
political succession, it is extremely important that we have a sense of the orientations of possible successors. This is certainly true in the area of national relations, where leadership attitudes and perceptions will most certainly determine the political responses to the emerging nationality issues. In addition, by examining leadership attitudes and perceptions throughout the decade of the 1970s, we will be able to determine any changes in orientation to the national question over time. These may be on the individual level, or may be changes in orientation of the entire Politburo. These and many other areas of nationality relations in the USSR can be addressed from analysis of the data. I will conclude the study with a chapter summarizing the findings from the data, and with a discussion of some of the ramifications of the current literature for the future of the politics of national relations in the Soviet Union.
2.1 TSARIST EXPANSION

With the defeat of the Tatars at Kazan in 1552 the Tatar yoke had been overthrown, and Russia was soon to undergo a long process of territorial expansion. Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries the major direction of this expansion was eastward, such that by 1649 the first Russian settlement on the Pacific coast, Okhotsk, was established. During the reign of Peter the Great (1698-1725), the empire was expanded somewhat southward, but perhaps the most celebrated and significant of his achievements was on the north-western front. After defeating the Swedes in 1709 in the Ukraine, Russia succeeded in establishing a foothold on the Baltic as well. In 1713 the political center of the empire was moved from Moscow to the Baltic coast, and the capital city called St. Petersburg, capital of the Russian empire until 1918 when the successful Bolshevik revolutionaries relocated the political center to Moscow.8

Under Catherine the Great (1762-96), the imperialist expansion continued, although the direction had shifted largely southward, such that by the end of her reign the northern shore of the Black Sea was under Russian domination. This time period also marked a further westward expansion as Finland was incorporated into the empire in 1809. Also, Poland was partitioned several times such that much of the country remained under Russian domination until after WWI.9

Part of the southward push of this time brought the Caucasus area under Russian control as well: Georgia succumbed in 1801, Azerbaidzhan in 1806, and Armenia in 1828.10 It should be emphasized that these areas were hardly incorporated into the Russian Empire in a spirit of good-will and voluntarism, but rather were subjugated by force, and not without serious resistance at times.11

pp. 9-11.

9 Ibid., p. 11.

10 Ibid., p. 13.

11 See, for example, the section on the Caucasus in the Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities, Katz, ed. NY: The Free Press, 1975. It is also interesting to note the vociferousness with which Karl Marx denounced Russian imperial expansion, Roman Smal-Stocki, The Nationality Problem of the Soviet Union, Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1952, pp. 43-52. Pronouncements against Russian imperialism by Karl Marx himself can only lead one to question the allegedly "voluntaristic" incorporation into the empire of minority groups at times maintained by the
The next stage of territorial expansion was eastward again, into Central Asia. Although certain northern areas of present-day Kazakhstan were brought under Russian domination as early as the 1730's\(^\text{12}\) the real drive into Central Asia began in the second half of the 19th century. Though little resistance was offered on the Kazakh steppes (then called the "Kirghiz Steppe" by the Russians) per se due to the relative scarcity of population, the Russian forces encountered stiff resistance in the ancient cities of the Khanates south of the Kirghiz Steppe.\(^\text{13}\) Nonetheless, by 1887 the entire region was of what is now Central Asia was under Russian control, and Russia's manifest destiny, so to speak, was nearly complete, at least from a territorial perspective.\(^\text{14}\) In terms of the type of rule under which these subjugated peoples were compelled to live, however, the Russian conquests marked merely the beginnings of social revolution

Soviet leadership.

\(^{12}\) There seems to be evidence that the peoples inhabiting this region did indeed invite the Russian conquistadores in, apparently to secure protection from the aggressions of peoples to the southeast. *Handbook*, p.216, Lydolph, p.14.


\(^{14}\) It may interest the reader to note that this very same year, 1887, also marked the final conquest of the American Indian tribes by the United States Government in its own quest for manifest destiny.
as radical as could be conceived. After a short span of 30 years, from 1887 to 1917, these areas of conquest would be faced with upheaval and change at least as great as that of the Russian conquest, namely the Great October Revolution of 1917. Before dealing with the Bolsheviks' conception of national relations within the Empire-turned-Soviet state, however, a very brief look at Tsarist nationality policy will be helpful in understanding the magnitude and complexity of the national question which was soon to confront these successful Bolshevik revolutionaries.

Richard Pipes has characterized Tsarist nationality policy as essentially "French colonial" style of rule. By this he means that local elites were more or less co-opted, and that forcible assimilation into the Russian mainstream was not the principal defining characteristic of imperial rule. Hammer notes that the forced Russification of minorities which did take place under the Tsars was not really practiced until the last several decades of Tsarism, and was "a departure from the earlier and more lenient attitude of the government". Furthermore, there is some

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evidence that certain Tsarist policies had a net effect of encouraging the traditional religions of the indigenous folk. Nonetheless, it should be fairly obvious that politically the national minorities were subjugated, even though certain indigenous cultural characteristics were tolerated, or in some cases even encouraged. As we shall see, this policy of tolerance of indigenous culture has been generally followed in the Soviet era, although the degree of tolerance has varied quite considerably depending upon the time period and region of the country.

To Lenin and the Bolshevik party, however, Tsarist nationality policy represented but one of the nefarious characteristics of Tsarism. As the "prison house of nationalities", Imperial Russia could only be rectified politically by revolution, with "self-determination" to be the key word of the Bolsheviks' ideological orientation on the national question.

Lenin's and the Bolsheviks' insistence on political self-determination for the minorities within the empire was rooted in the thought of Karl Marx and Freidrich Engels. In addition, there is evidence that Lenin's personal

orientation in this question can be traced to his childhood and adolescent experiences. Specifically, it has been argued that a friend of the Ulyanov family, one Il'minskii, a Chuvash by nationality, had impressed Lenin's father with the importance of native language instruction for the local minorities. Lenin's father, a provincial school administrator, found the idea persuasive and promoted this system of language instruction for the region's minorities, which comprised about 1/3 of the population of Ulyanovsk. Although a major motivation for this sensitivity to national minorities seems to have been rooted in a desire for their conversion to Orthodoxy on the part of Lenin's father, Lenin himself may have absorbed this sensitivity and later rechanneled it into a sort of political expediency in pre-Revolutionary propaganda, and ultimately in the Revolution itself. As we shall see, this sensitivity was not to be forgotten by future minority elites.

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19 Ibid., p. 99.
2.2 THE BOLSHEVIKS IDEOLOGICAL ROOTS AND POLITICAL INHERITANCE

There are two basic reasons for the following outline of the ideological roots of the Bolsheviks, and particularly Lenin and Stalin. First of all, it is impossible to understand adequately the development of Soviet nationality policy up to and including the 1970s without attention to the details of ideological nuances. Secondly, and even more important, the identification of key ideological terms will form the core of the analysis of this study. More specifically, the content and meaning of many terms must be understood as they developed historically if the analysis is to have any real meaning at all. This will become apparent as we proceed.

Many of the terms and/or phrases used to describe and prescribe national relations have been preserved by the leadership, some have been abandoned, and some new ones have emerged in the 1970s, as we shall see. These of course provide our key to the understanding of the attitudes and perceptions of the political elite toward national relations in the USSR. (A list of such issues and terms to be analyzed in the course of the study is found in Appendix A).

The Bolsheviks' position on the national issue was by no means homogeneous, and was ostensibly rooted in the thought of Karl Marx and Freidrich Engels. According to Marx, the problematical character of national relations was rooted in
the class antagonisms of capitalist society. Perhaps the most cogent statement of Marx's position on national minorities is to be found in the Communist Manifesto, wherein he states that "the proletariat have no nation", and furthermore that "national differences are daily disappearing" (under capitalism). Marx viewed the question of national minorities clearly in terms of class relations, and especially in terms of the "Klassenkampf", or class struggle which, for him, characterized all but the most primitive of human societies. For Marx, oppression of national minorities seems to have been a function of their being in an essentially subordinate economic position in society, and their "national culture", national heritage, customs, and the like mere superstructural phenomena which, like religion, made life at least marginally tolerable for the lower, oppressed classes. This tolerability, however, was and is at the expense of economic structural transformation. Accordingly, even if some of a national minority were of the bourgeoisie class, the class struggle of the many against the few still characterizes the society. With the development of capitalism, however, the proletariat will allegedly recognize that, regardless of nationality, they have "class interests" which supercede national

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differences. This doctrine is known as 'proletarian internationalism'. This idea is also what leads Marx to assert that national differences will diminish as capitalist society develops: "...the supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish even further." This doctrine of proletarian internationalism is still the official line, although the current leadership seldom refers to it.

In order to appreciate the development and/or adaptation of Marx's thought by Lenin it is imperative to recognize in Marx's thought the alleged stages in human history, and how each of these characteristically relate to the question of national minorities. Under primitive social conditions there were no 'classes' per se and economic domination was not fully extended into the "political realm", at least regarding relations among "national" (or more properly speaking, tribal) groups. Under feudal conditions, however, the proletariat could well be of differing nationalities, yet still under the same politico-economic yoke of subservience. In this case, the most salient cleavage would be the economic one, not the national one. Under capitalism, these relations of dominance are to reach a breaking point, and the proletariat of all nations are to recognize that nationalistic appeals as well as claims to national culture,

21 Ibid., p.236.
heritage, etc. are essentially bourgeois conceptions, engineered to perpetuate class exploitation.

A highly important aspect of these historical stages for the evolution of the national question is the notion in Marx that each stage of history must "expire" or exhaust its capacity for the further development of productive forces before the next stage of economic relations can manifest itself in history. The somewhat familiar passage from Marx's *Preface To A Critique Of Political Economy* will suffice to underscore this aspect of Marx's conception of historical progress.

No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself.22

Lenin was to substantially modify this idea, arguing the possibility of "by-passing" historical stages under certain conditions. These modifications would become critical for future Soviet nationality (and foreign) policy.

There can be no question that Lenin claimed to address the question of national minorities in the Russian empire from a Marxist standpoint, both substantively and methodologically.23 Accordingly, the conceptual framework as

22 Ibid., p.390.

well as the terminology with which he approached the national question was heavily clothed in Marxist garb. Thus, Lenin understood the Russian empire's nationality question in essentially class terms, much in the way Marx did. However, Lenin emphasized that the "spirit" of Marx must be understood in order to avoid equivocation or confusion about what the "letter" of Marx really meant in a specific context. For example, on one specific occasion (the London International Congress of 1896), Lenin made clear that Marx was correct on the position of the independence of Poland as that situation existed for the third quarter of the 19th century, but maintained that Marx's position was no longer in force per se. As aristocratic Poland disappeared and was replaced by capitalist Poland, according to Lenin, "Marx's standpoint...ceased to be correct by the twentieth century." Lenin seems to have found himself in a position where Marxist thought needed to be developed and/or adapted to concrete historico-political circumstances if the 'spirit' were not to be killed by the 'letter'.

24 Ibid., p.168ff.

25 Ibid., p.169.
This raises a number of important questions about the historiography of Lenin, but here is not the place to develop this theme. The important point for our study is that the fundamental conception of national relations in Lenin's thought is rooted in Marx's conception of history and class relations.

Lenin was clearly convinced of the veracity of Marx's teachings and valiantly defended them against all heresies. He was also convinced of Russia's desperate need for social revolution to apply Marxism to solve the national question there. The question became for Lenin one of applying the Marxist paradigm to the Russian empire. His thought obviously developed over time, but before delving into it any further, a brief look at some of the characteristics of the empire in Lenin's day is relevant.

At the close of the 19th and opening of the 20th century, the Russian empire was less than half Russian in terms of ethnic identity, with the non-Russians in the West (Ukrainians, Poles, etc.), the North-west (Baltic peoples), and the South-Southwest (Central Asian and Caucasian peoples) comprising about 56% of the population, or 95 of 170 million. Russia at the time was also far less developed along the capitalist path than Western Europe or

26 Ibid., pp. 155-9, 165-6.
America, and therefore not "ripe" for proletarian revolution in strictly orthodox Marxist terms. Nevertheless, Engels' letter to Tkachov in 1880 (apparently with Marx's recognition and approval) makes clear that both Engels and Marx felt that Russia's time for some sort of revolution was near:

Russia is undoubtedly in the eve of a revolution... Here all the conditions of a revolution are combined, of a revolution which, started by the upper classes of the capital, perhaps even by the government itself, must be rapidly carried further, beyond the first constitutional phase, by the peasants; of a revolution which will be of the greatest importance for the whole of Europe if only because it will destroy at one blow the last, so far intact, reserve of the entire European reaction.27

Thus the question becomes the type of revolution which Russia would undergo, and Engels and Marx seem to see a bourgeoisie revolution in the making. The importance of this for the development of Lenin's nationality policy is that this early stage of capitalist development in Russia was bound to be characterized by "national movements" clamoring for national independence. These movements would represent "the formation of national states, under which these requirements of modern capitalism are best satisfied - the national state is typical and normal for the capitalist

world.\textsuperscript{28} Lenin goes on to state that since these national movements characterize the capitalist age, and Russia is still a multi-national "prisonhouse of nations", then to hasten the impending revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism to communism, it will first be necessary to create conditions for capitalism's full development—i.e., via independent national states. Lenin couches the concept in the terminology of "national self-determination", which, when combined with "proletarian unity" across these national boundaries, forms the core of Lenin's thought on the national question. He wrote:

Complete equality of rights for all nations; the right of nations to self-determination; the unity of the workers of all nations—such is the programme that Marxism, the experience of the whole world, and the experience of Russia, teach the workers.\textsuperscript{29}

Nevertheless, to understand this properly and to avoid confusing it with a Woodrow Wilson-esque, bourgeois type of self-determination, Lenin again claims to draw upon Marx (and Marx's "categorical requirement ...of theory in investigating any social question...(i.e.), that it be examined within definite historical limits).\textsuperscript{30} So wrote Lenin in early 1914, nailing the imminent breakup of

\textsuperscript{28} The Lenin Anthology, Tucker, ed., p. 154.

\textsuperscript{29} The Lenin Anthology, Tucker, ed., p. 180.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., p. 157.
Europe's empires.

However, to understand the question of the nationalities in the Russian empire from a Marxian perspective, Lenin insists on a distinction of two stages of capitalist development. The first is the collapse of feudalism and absolutism and the formation of the bourgeois society and state. In this stage "national movements become mass movements," such that all classes are drawn into participation. The second stage is the more fully developed capitalist society where class antagonism is intense and which is the "eve of the capitalist downfall."31 Furthermore, according to Lenin's analysis, Western Europe went through phase two from 1789-1871, and Eastern Europe and Asia embarked on this phase beginning around 1905, the year of the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War.32

Lenin then proceeds to outline five characteristics of Russia's concrete historical-social conditions which make "the recognition of the right of nations to self-determination a matter of special urgency in our country."33

31 Ibid., pp. 157-8.
32 Ibid., pp. 161-2.
33 Ibid.
These five conditions are as follows. First, Russia is a multi-national empire which contains "subject peoples" in the border regions. Secondly, "suppression of subject peoples is much stronger here than in the neighboring states." Thirdly, in a number of cases "the oppressed nationalities inhabiting the border regions have compatriots across the border, who enjoy greater national independence." Fourth, "the development of capitalism and the general level of culture are often higher in the non-Russian border regions than in the center." Fifth and last, "it is in the neighboring Asian states that we see the beginning of a phase of bourgeoisie revolutions and national movements which are spreading to some of the kindred nationalities within the borders of Russia." Historical progress, according to Lenin, lies in recognizing these nations' rights to self-determination via formation of national states, and also to combat "bourgeois nationalism". Only in this way can "we defend the interests of democracy and the alliance of all proletarians of all nations on an equal footing." It is also interesting to note that Lenin at this point, three and one-half years before the October Revolution of 1917, intimates that Russia may or may not

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34 Ibid., p. 163.
remain a multi-national state—something which Lenin the victorious revolutionary and his followers generally did not see as problematical. It seems clear that Lenin saw the real enemy of the oppressed nationalities as the bourgeoisie of the various nations, and that when a subject people wrenches itself loose from national oppression, the capitalist structure is ipso facto weakened. For this reason Lenin emphasized aspects of the nationalities struggle for "true" liberation (meaning economic as well as formal-political). The first of these was a renunciation of bourgeois nationalism within any political context, and especially "Great Russian Chauvinism." The second was to maintain inter-national proletarian solidarity. The following should clarify why self-determination along these two lines was particularly significant for the ultimate

36 In all fairness, however, it should be pointed out that there was some discussion about the precise nature of the political relationship of the Ukraine to the Russian "center" from 1918-21, even though it is certain that the Bolsheviks in Moscow were fully determined to maintain Soviet power in the Ukraine, as they were in all former imperial areas. The question was rather one of the type of relationship between Russian proper and the Ukraine, i.e., the degree of autonomy which the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic would have vis-a-vis Moscow. See Yaroslavl Bilinsky, "Mykola Skrypnyk and Petro Shelest: An Essay on the Persistence and Limits of Ukrainian National Communism" in Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices, Jeremy Azrael, editor. NY: Praeger Publishers, 1978, pp.109-119.

triumph of socialism:

If the proletariat of any one nation gives the slightest support to the privileges of its own national bourgeoisie, that will inevitably house distrust among the proletariat of another nation; it will weaken the international class solidarity of the workers and divide them, to the delight of the bourgeoisie. Repudiation of the right to self-determination or to secession inevitably means, in practice, support for the privileges of the dominant nation.38

After the successful revolution of November 1917, Lenin seems to have maintained the thrust of these views, though some further developments and adaptations did occur. Perhaps the first of these is the whole question of how the revolution could have succeeded in backward Russia, to say nothing of some of its very backward nationalities, given the ideological framework laid down by Marx. Lenin amended, or added a proviso, to Marx’s historical sequence of stages of socio-political development by maintaining that under certain conditions the capitalist stage can be by-passed. Contemporary Soviet thinking credits Lenin with this ideological tour de force, maintaining that under Party leadership a feudal society may move directly to socialism, by-passing the capitalist stage. Needless to say no contradiction is seen between the concept of historically determined stages of social development and the notion that proper political leadership could obviate one of these

38 Ibid., p.166.
stages in history. The doctrinal apology here is that once socialism has broken into the world, so to speak, and triumphed in a particular society (i.e., Russia), other societies could proceed more or less directly to socialism. Since socialism had been so born into the world in 1917 with the Great October Revolution, other societies could more or less obviate the birth pangs and labor-delivery of capitalism by following the Party’s lead. Furthermore, by so following, such a society would realize its true self-determination and fulfillment under socialism, as the above citation by Lenin suggests. This line is still valid according to contemporary Soviet ideological pronouncements.30

Another aspect of Lenin’s thought concerning the nationalities which was to affect his post-revolutionary stance was the insistence on ‘two cultures within every national culture’. These were namely the (proto-)proletarian, internationalist culture, and the culture of the dominant class, manifesting itself as “bourgeoisie nationalism.”40 Closely related to this was

30 See, for example, "Self-Determination", in Leninism and the National Question, Fedoseev et.al., Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977. This book is from the Institute on Marxism-Leninism, affiliated with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and as such represents the “official” Party line.

Lenin's iron insistence, which continued well after the Revolution, that Great Russian Chauvinism was antithetical to true democracy and socialism — "it is this Great Russian nationalist poison that is polluting the entire all-Russia political atmosphere", he wrote in 1914. In March, 1919, several months after the Revolution, he reiterated this theme at the Eighth Party Congress, speaking against both Great Russian Chauvinism which would merely perpetuate national oppression in the new Soviet Socialist Republic, and also against the elimination of all national differences under socialism. Recall that in every national culture there are two cultures, according to Lenin, namely the proletarian, internationalist one, and the dominant, bourgeois one. It should be fairly obvious from this that the "national differences" which would be allowed (and even encouraged) are those of the former type. However, the question of the desirability of maintaining "national differences" became rather problematic after the Lenin era, as we shall see later.

Closely related to this is the question of defining a "nation" with any degree of precision and balancing the importance and role of the nation as a historical entity.

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41 Ibid., p.178.
42 Ibid., p.659ff.
This question bedeviled Lenin and his ideological compatriots, however, and its resolution had a very significant effect upon the later development of the nationality policy of the Soviet Union. Although this is obviously an exceptionally complex historical and theoretical (anthropological) issue, only two aspects of this ideological development will be dealt with here as they touch most directly upon our concerns. The first is the struggle between Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg over the question of the role of the national state in the development of capitalism. The second is the practical struggle between Lenin and Stalin over the political (institutional) form of the newborn Soviet state, and their ideological struggle of differing conceptions of the historical role and destiny of the "nation" as an historical, ethnographic unit in the evolution of humanity towards communism.

Regarding the Rosa Luxemburg issue, the question seems to have been whether or not political independence for nations within empires should be fostered and hailed as progressive by the revolutionaries. As was indicated above, Lenin argued that such subjugated nations indeed should have such independence, so that they could develop politically and economically, and ultimately make the transition to socialism and true self-determination. Luxemburg, on the
other hand, appears to have argued, in an almost Trotskyite manner, in favor of a "revolution first" position. More specifically, Lenin charges her with neglecting the "concrete historical situation" of each country in question, and thus with misperceiving the manner in which a subjugated nation can proceed to socialism. Ultimately, of course, Lenin's views were successful, and the Bolsheviks proceeded to hail the breakup of the European empires and formation of national states as significant phenomena in the global process of transition from capitalism to socialism. One very important consequence of the outcome of this ideological struggle between Lenin and Luxemburg is that contemporary Soviet nationalities may regard it as a token of Lenin's sensitivity to national feelings and consciousness, and to their very right to continue to exist. Both of these would have apparently been sacrificed by Rosa Luxemburg (a la Trotsky) to world revolution. As such Lenin can be seen as the true representative of nationalities' interests from the perspective of this particular ideological polemic.

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44 Ibid., pp. 167-9.
Another crucial aspect of Lenin's nationality policy was the manner in which the national minorities were to be related in the structure of government of the new Soviet socialist republic. Joseph Stalin, who had been the Party's commissar for nationalities, favored a policy of so-called "autonomization". This involved incorporating the national minorities into the Russian Republic and giving them ostensibly "autonomous" republics of their own within the Russian Republic. This move would obviously restrict their real autonomy and "self-determination". Lenin, again fearing the emergence of Great Russian nationalism, wanted the nationalities to have their own national republics co-equal with the Russian Republic. Though Lenin's position technically won the day in the 1923 Soviet Constitution which provided for such republics, Lenin's death in January 1924 and Stalin's subsequent climb to power saw in fact a general policy of increasing Russification of national minorities. The important point here is that Lenin's policy, though followed in form, was substantially altered in execution under the rule of Stalin and his drive to centralize and personalize political power. With Lenin's death a new era was to follow in the development of national minorities.

relations in the USSR, and the ideological differences between Lenin and Stalin which may have appeared so trivial in the hectic days of the Revolution, Civil War, and Intervention were to have serious consequences for Stalin's nationality policy.

2.3 **SOVIET NATIONALITY POLICY UNDER STALIN**

In spite of the fact that Stalin's "autonomization" program for the nationalities was neglected and Lenin's idea of a federal structure was adopted, the "spirit" of Stalin's approach eventually triumphed after Lenin's death. The intellectual roots of Stalin's later Russification have been traced very well by Helene Carrere d'Encausse, who notes that Stalin's book *Marxism and the National Question* conceives of the historical role and destiny of the nation quite differently from Marx and Lenin, although much identical terminology was of course used. Specifically, though Stalin regarded the nation as a product of capitalist development, the characteristics by which he defined nationhood "...stresses those...independent of socioeconomic developments: ethnicity, territory, and culture." This more or less led him to regard the nation not as a transitory phenomenon, a function of the capitalist stage of human

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history, but rather as a permanent facet of social life. This was to have very great consequences for Stalin's subsequent handling of the national question. d'Encausse notes that

Stalin attempted to solve the nationality problem in two new and distinctive ways. First, he placed the most important of the Soviet nations, the Russian, in a privileged position and subordinated the others to it. Second, he considered relations between nations to be similar to relations between classes, that is, to be determined by force rather than by education or understanding (emphasis added).

The first point is rather clearly seen in Stalin's early autonomization plan, whereby the national minorities would have allegedly "autonomous" political (sub-)units within the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. The second aspect was not to manifest itself clearly until the 1930's. Stalin did not share Lenin's almost vitriolic disgust and contempt of "Great Russian Chauvinism" and by the early 1930's had shifted the emphasis on national relations to criticism of "bourgeois nationalism" as the worst form of deviation. This switch of emphasis is exceptionally

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important, as it signified the move from a "Leninist" nationality orientation, if not actual policy, to one of Russification. Bilinsky has noted that "...Lenin in his last years came to believe in the cultural flourishing of nations as a precondition for an eventual merger..."\(^{35}\) It should be fairly clear from the comments above about the "privileged position" of the Russian nation in the Soviet family of peoples that any such merger under Stalin would be Russo-centric.

Such a Russo-centric nationality policy was indeed pursued by Stalin throughout the 1930's, and was to take on an even greater intensity from the war years until his death in 1953. One of the characteristics of this Russo-centric nationality policy was Stalin's abolition of "korenizatsia", or the Leninist principle of cultivating and using local


elites to administer the minority areas. Undoubtedly a function at least in part of Stalin's drive for greater personal power, this abolition of korenizatsia also resulted in less autonomy for the national minorities. With the intensification of the purges in the 1930s, power was further centralized in Stalin's hands in the area of national relations as it was in virtually every other aspect of Soviet society. Thus it appears that Stalin's de facto promotion of Great Russian chauvinism was done to further his own personal power as well as to ostensibly counteract "nationalist deviations" and the survival of "bourgeoisie nationalism," as he claimed at the 17th Party Congress in 1931.

With the onset of WWII, Stalin's nationality policy became increasingly repressive, reflecting the paranoia that permeated his rule. This paranoia was manifested most graphically in the wholesale deportation of certain minority groups from their traditional lands, such as the Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars, Chechen-Ingush, etc. In general, however, the major reason for the increased level of

51 de'Encausse, "Determinants and Parameters", p.47. See also Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone's "Tadzhikistan and the Tadzhiks", in The Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities, p.322.

repression during the war seems to have been Stalin's realization that Russian nationalist sentiment could be an extremely useful and powerful affective device for the war effort. It was apparently at this time that the idea of the Russian people as 'elder brother' to the other Soviet peoples was popularized. This was clearly a function of Stalin's notion of the historical perdurability of 'nations' as well as the leading role of the Russian nation in the Soviet Union. Adam Ulam has noted that at the war's end Stalin toasted 'the Great Russian people' and not 'the Soviet people' per se for the valiant rescue of the socialist motherland from Hitler's fascism. In any case, Stalin must have been acutely aware of the collaboration of many Ukrainians, Belorussians, and others with the Germans, and this probably served to reinforce his pro-Great Russian orientations.

The remaining years of Stalin's rule saw no improvement of the political situation of the national minorities, although Fairbanks has argued that Beria...consistently saw an appeal to the non-Russian nationalities as a way of advancing his political fortunes; after Stalin's death he

54 d'Encausse, "Determinants and Parameters", p.51.
saw it as the most important of the several means he used." Beria was of course ultimately quite unsuccessful in his bid for further power, perhaps a testimonial to the inertial force of Stalin's revival of Great Russian nationalism, his administrative policies, or both.

Another evidence of Stalin's pro-Great Russian orientation was manifested in his alleged "genius-like" discoveries in the field of linguistics, of all things. Essentially he maintained in "Marxism in Linguistics", (Pravda, June 20, 1950) that language per se was not superstructural in the orthodox Marxist sense, and therefore an enduring historical characteristic of a people. The Soviet people, so the Stalin logic went, would have Russian as such a language, and hence no need to be concerned with the sensitivities of maintaining native languages, let alone adopt policies which would foster and/or encourage national minorities' languages. Although not quite this explicit, this was clearly the force of this linguistic "discovery" by Stalin. Thus the reign of Stalin saw a serious departure from many of the central ideas of Lenin on nationality relations. This was to change, however, and do so rather


quickly. These changes were ostensibly done to restore 'Leninist nationality policy', and to correct the abuses of the 'cult of personality under Joseph Stalin. It is to this post-Stalin era that we now turn.

2.4 KHRUSHCHEV AND THE NATIONAL MINORITIES

With the death of Stalin in March, 1953, a new era was soon to follow for national relations in the USSR. The era of 'collective leadership' ushered in with the departure of Stalin also marked a qualitatively different orientation on the part of the leadership concerning the national question. d'Encausse notes that

Nikita Khrushchev and his colleagues departed from Stalinism and attempted to strengthen the Soviet regime by institutionalizing it. In the realm of nationality policy, this led them to abandon forced Russification in order to achieve an equilibrium between the dominant Russian political culture and the national cultures. It also led them to accept a certain degree of political decentralization in order to give some real meaning to the federal system.\(^5a\)

This renunciation of Russification seems to have been done in fact as well as intention, as the most heavy-handed abuses of the Stalin era were deliberately abandoned by the new leadership. Several other characteristics of nationality policy in the Khrushchev era deserve attention, however, as they would have a substantial impact upon the direction of

\(^5a\) d'Encausse, "Determinants and Parameters", p.51.
such policies in the 1970s.

Another highly significant aspect of de-Stalinization in the realm of national relations has to do with the role of the Party in Soviet society. It is well known that Khrushchev attempted to return to "Leninist norms of Party life", "Leninist style of leadership", and so forth as a means of legitimizing Soviet rule while indicting the cult of personality. This general move can be seen in shifted emphasis within nationality policy, and had serious repercussions for both the role of the Party in minority affairs, and for national relations in general.

Two specific phenomena indicate the type of transformations of the role of the Party in nationality affairs after Stalin's death. The first of these is the change of Party attitude toward certain functions and specifically the administrative level at which these functions were to be carried out. Teresa Rakowska-Harmanstone has written that

Khrushchev's concessions to republican leaders were reflected at the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU in the condemnation of nationalist purges and wartime deportations of "disloyal minorities", and in promises of rehabilitation and revision of national historiographies. The new and more lenient Party attitude found its expression in

concessions between 1955 and 1957, when some of the federal powers were transferred to the republics (in planning financing, judicial administration, and light industry management).\(^6\)

In addition to this transfer of certain responsibilities to republic-level administration, a new policy of Party cadre recruitment was initiated. The new emphasis was to be on "technical competence" as well as on correct ideological orientation. Noting that this new orientation in nationality policy really began to operate in the early 1960s, d'Encausse writes that

the consequences of this have been considerable, especially at the periphery. This new technical elite has tended to hold that decision making should be a function of reality rather than of ideology. It has demanded an increasing share of power in decision making at the highest level, that of the Party, and has refused to content itself with a subordinate position. At the federal level this evolution has not yet proved decisive. The political leadership has retained its supremacy, and the demands of Party technocrats are more of a source of conflict for the future than a decisive element determining current policy.\(^6\)

Given the demographic and other trends which suggest that nationalities' power and influence may indeed be growing,\(^6\)


\(^6\) d'Encausse, "Determinants and Parameters", pp.52-3.

\(^6\) The literature on this point is rather extensive, but for some of the more significant works, see Helene Carrere d'Encausse, Decline of an Empire, Newsweek Books, 1979;
such a rise of the "periphery" may well become the "decisive element." It has been argued that some of these tendencies have been more or less reversed, or at least retarded, since the ouster of Khrushchev and the emergence of Brezhnev as unofficial head of the Politburo, and even since the second half of the Khrushchev years. While this theme will be explored very shortly, it is important to recognize at this point that with the Khrushchevian assertiveness of sorts occurred, with national minorities somewhat less inhibited in expressing what Bakowska-Harmstone has termed "orthodox nationalism". By this she refers to a type of nationalism which chooses to operate within the Soviet system, and which is apparently


tolerated ideological assertions. Years is the
With the development and practice of greater degrees of member of himself by
This may be represented as the newly formed nationality minorities
assumed a new function for nationalism. There was a threat the peoples of building (rastavyet)

65 Teresa Razia in the Bull tz Europe 1986 University
tolerated by the leadership, even to this day. The ideological "protective umbrella" under which such assertions have been made during and since the Khrushchev years is the invocation of "Leninist nationality policy." With the de-mythologizing of the Stalin cult, the thought and practices of Lenin of course were accorded an even greater degree of veneration than previously. Hence, no member of a national minority could draw obloquy upon himself by calling for Leninist nationality policy.

This resurrection of Leninist nationality policy represented only the tip of the political iceberg in terms of the new terminology used to represent the country's nationality policy. Aside from being used by national minorities for self-assertion, however, the leadership also assumed a new set of terms to express the country's policy for national relations. The core of this new terminology was a threefold, chronological succession of processes which the peoples of the Soviet Union would undergo in the process of building communism. The first stage was a flowering (rastv'ret) of the nationalities in terms of culture,


language, economy, etc. The second stage was a *drawing together* (sblizheniye) of the peoples as economic, political, cultural, and other forms of integration became more pervasive. The third and final stage in this teleological forecast was to be the *fusion* (sliyanie) of the Soviet peoples into a single Soviet "narod" (people or nation) under full communism. This line was put forth by Khrushchev at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961, with suggestions made that the "rapprochement" was currently taking place, with the fusion of peoples apparently imminent.  

Rakowska-Harmstone notes that the whole process was represented as a part of a dialectical sequence in which the development and "flowering" of particular national cultures serves at the same time to strengthen their common content and thus to build an ever closer unity. The growth of mutual assistance and exchange strengthens this unity in the economic and cultural spheres; the Russian language as the language common to all Soviet people, plays a special role as unity-promoting factor. Unity is promoted also by demographic change which fosters greater national heterogeneity in nationally homogeneous areas.

This threefold schema generally continued to be propagated until the end of the decade. However, the latter years of the Khrushchev era were marked by a reversal of the earlier "thaw", and a concomitant but gradual recentralization of

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66 d'Encausse, "Determinants and Parameters", p.52.
certain functions, such that minorities' gains in political autonomy (scarce as they were) were negated somewhat.68 In summary, the Khrushchev era definitely marked a qualitative shift away from the Russifying abuses of the Stalin era. The main manifestations of this shift are threefold. They include decentralization along the lines of delegation of certain functions to minority-controlled administrative jurisdiction, recruitment of minority cadres based on "competence" as opposed to rote political loyalty per se, and a shift in terminology to describe the teleology and the dynamics of national relations within the Soviet Union. These measures were all undertaken with the explicit intention of restoring "Leninist nationality policy" and ensuring against the abuses of the cult of personality.

Perhaps it should be added that certain minorities which had been deported to other areas of the USSR by Stalin were "rehabilitated" and exonerated once Khrushchev had de-sanctified the cult of personality. From all evidence available, these phenomena all had the effect of stimulating national assertiveness as well as greater self-identity of

minorities. In some respects the Brezhnev regime vaguely resembles the Stalin era in terms of intolerance of dissent.\(^6^9\) While it may be over-suggestive to point out that the current Politburo members were at a very susceptible age in the Stalin era, they may well have absorbed some of his tactics of neutralizing opposition. Although no cult of personality of the magnitude of Stalin's has dominated the area of national relations in the USSR, there seems to have been a resurgence of more authoritarian methods with the national minorities under Brezhnev, and it is to this era that we now turn.

2.5 NATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE BREZHNEV ERA

Referred to as the politics of "consensus", "oligarchy", and even petrifaction,\(^7^0\) the political system in the Soviet Union since the ouster of Khrushchev has been characterized primarily by (relative) stability and predictability. One of the major goals of the new leadership was to establish a sense of order and regularity in the administration of the Party as well as the State, and to move away from the Khrushchevian "scheming" and administrative fiats. In the

\(^6^9\) Barghoorn, loc. cit.

realm of nationality politics, this trend seems to have kept nationalist assertiveness in check by allowing Moscow to retain a tighter hold on minority areas. There are two aspects of this which deserve attention, as they would directly affect the politics of national relations in the 1970s. The first is the administrative-organizational aspect, and the second is the highly significant, but somewhat subtle, shift in terminology used to describe and prescribe the character of national relations in the Soviet Union.

In terms of the administrative changes, the net effect of the post-Khrushchev reaction was to generally shift authority back to the "center", i.e., Moscow, and to reduce it at the republic levels. Also, the apparent haste with which these measures were instituted suggests that the new Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership had few doubts about the desired direction of nationality policy. Hakowska-Harmstone notes that the new collective leadership of Brezhnev and Kosygin took steps almost immediately to reorganize state and economic administration on the lines reminiscent of the old Stalinist pattern... The recentralization took place especially in the spheres of planning, technology, capital inputs, production allocations, wages, prices, finances, and statistics. The net result for republic hierarchies was that while they lost powers in the sphere of economic management previously exercised at the regional level, the new approach to regional administration was abandoned and the republics were reinstated into
the old chain of command. 71

These measures were part of a general trend that amounted to what might be called an "all-Union", or centralizing, orientation. 72 That is to say, the good of the entire country would take explicit precedence over republic or minority interests, or "localisms" as they would be perjoratively labeled. Three broad policies have been identified which served to promote this trend. These are (1) in-migration of Russians into the minority areas, (2) economic and social integration, and (3) cultural integration, the latter generally referring to gaining of proficiency in Russian language, and "Russification" of indigenous culture. 73 Although these trends were noted by American scholars in the early 1970s, it should be emphasized that all three have increased in intensity during the past decade. 74 I might mention briefly that the Soviet


74 For trends in the migration patterns, see Teresa
leadership, academic community, and other social organizations have been quite cognizant of these trends, viewing them as generally positive. However, they also recognize that these and other demographic trends are imminently problematical in the long run for the "building of communism". To me this represents an unequivocal, though somewhat cryptic, admission that the national question remains extremely important, notwithstanding proclamations of its "resolution" since at least 1967, at the 50th anniversary of the Great October Revolution.75

Although this "All-Union" mentality had become dominant by the late 1960s, several characteristics differentiate it quite distinctly from the Stalinistic trampling of national


75 For the general Soviet position on this, see National Relations in the USSR at the Contemporary Stage, Moscow: "Nauka" (Science) "Publishers (USSR Academy of Science), pp. 80-2, (author's translation). Richard Pipes provides another version of this "resolution" in "Solving the Nationality Problem", Problems of Communism, vol. 16, 1967, pp. 125-31. For the Soviet version of the demographic trends outlined above, see Leninism and the National Question, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977,
minorities. First of all, recognition was given to the legitimate role and function of "national differences" and "national feelings". Perhaps this has been little more than a perfunctory or token sensitivity to such questions, necessary since the Khrushchev years to avoid or undercut minority fulminations. Nonetheless, the very use of such terminology by the leadership and larger society seems to represent at least the need to acknowledge minority sensitivities, if only to keep them in political check by so doing. How long they can continue to do so remains another question, however.


However, the Soviets are very quick and very adamant in distinguishing between national feelings and nationalist feelings, the former being fully protected by socialism, and the latter condemned as bourgeoisie attempts to sabotage socialist development. For example:

national feelings, which the Party has always treated with the utmost consideration, are one thing, and nationalist feelings are another. They are intolerable, especially in a developed socialist society...national prejudices are being encouraged and inflated by imperialist strategies in the hope of undermining the unity of the Soviet people. (Leninism and the National Question, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977, p. 341.)
Another very important aspect of this apparent resurgence of Leninist sensitivity to national minorities under Brezhnev has been a set of subtle changes in the terminology to describe (and prescribe) the nature of national relations. The old Khrushchevian formula of "flowering→ rapprochement→ fusion" was quietly altered, such that by the late 1960s the fusion aspect was more or less abandoned. Rakowska-Harmstone notes that in an important respect this represented "a return to the early Leninist formula". She cites an article from the September, 1969 issue of Kommunist (the Party's monthly theoretical journal):

Each Soviet nation and nationality brings its own weighty contribution into the successful construction of the new society. In the process of the creation of communism they reach many-sided flowering and ever closer rapprochement with one another. In all spheres of material and spiritual life of the Soviet people there are multiple lines common to all nations. However, the rapprochement of Soviet nations and their internationalist unity should not be regarded as the merger (or fusion—i.e.). The removal of all national differences is a long process, which cannot be achieved except after full victory of communism in the world and its firm establishment. Kommunist, Sept. 1969.  

Rakowska-Harmstone suggests that continued emphasis by the Soviet leadership of the importance of "national liberation" for the underdeveloped world may eventually backfire internally, with Soviet minorities exerting demands, or "national feelings" for their own "national liberation". "The Soviet Union" in Protection of Ethnic Minorities, pp. 130ff.

This is an extremely interesting quote, and represents quite well the apparent shift of perception by the Party of the nature of national relations. First of all, there is of course a much greater sensitivity to the 'removal of national differences' in this statement than Stalin ever expressed. This is most probably the result of the inertial forces of national assertiveness in the Khrushchev years. Secondly, the 'timetable', as it were, for the qualitative shift from "drawing together" (or rapprochement) to fusion seems to be postponed indefinitely. This of course represents a substantial shift from the Khrushchevian imminence of ultimate fusion or merger. I interpret this shift as a recognition by the leadership that among other things, national relations would remain problematical for the foreseeable future at the very least. Finally, I concur with Rakowska-Harnstone that this reconceptualization of the role of "fusion" in the prescription of national relations does indeed represent a "return to the early Leninist formula." As such it became a sword with two edges, so to speak: the leadership could justify the objective gains of minorities since the establishment of Soviet power (in education, social services, etc.) by pointing to the Leninist Party's role, and simply ignore the past abuses, or

70 Quoted from Rakowska-Harnstone, "The Dilemma of Nationalism", p. 128. Emphasis by R-H.
attribute them to the cult of personality and "mistakes of subjectivism". On the other hand, the national minorities could appeal to Lenin (with this new reconceptualized version of national relations), and call for respect for national differences, feelings, and interests. Recall that Yaroslavl Bilinsky has noted that "...Lenin in his last years came to believe in the cultural flourishing of nations as a precondition for an eventual merger...". Rakowska-Harmstone has pointed out this use of Lenin's thought by national minorities, commenting on its myth-like character:

The adherence to the Leninist myth is the touchstone of legitimacy in the Soviet Union today, in the aftermath of 1956. The ever-growing number of members of minority elites use Lenin's views on national relations, which they view as pledges of genuine equality for the minorities, to support their arguments for current policy objectives in debates on investment allocations and economic management, cultural matters, and cadres policy.

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\(^{a0}\) Note this rather strong citation from *National Relations in the USSR at the Contemporary Stage*, Moscow: "Nauka" (Science) Publishers (Academy of Science of the USSR), 1979, p.111: "attention to national interests is one of the most important aspects of Leninist nationality policy". (Author's translation). I do not believe a statement of this sort would have been published before the 1970s, let alone during the Stalin years. Perceptions of the character of national relations in the USSR have undergone substantial change in the 1970s.

\(^{a1}\) Yaroslavl Bilinsky, "Ukrainian National Communism", p.114.

\(^{a2}\) Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Study of Ethnic Politics..."
We must bear in mind, however, that this period since the mid-to-late 1960s has also been characterized by the recentralization discussed earlier. Part of this involves administrative centralization, as mentioned above. Another important aspect is the Party's role in the expression or repression of nationalities' assertiveness. d'Encausse suggests that it may be more of the latter than the former:

slow evolution of the peripheral communist organization...may help to explain why, since the beginning of the decade, the national parties have been subjected to a number of purges and reprimands, while the CPSU has shown a remarkable stability as regards the composition of its directing organs.83

Thus, by the early 1970s a sort of dialectic was operating in the politics of Soviet national relations: centralization, "integration", and above all stability were fostered, yet at the same time a certain sensitivity to nationalities was exercised. Rakouska-Harmstone suggests that these dialectical pressures result in a greater sense of nationalism among certain minorities. Writing in 1974, she maintained that

the force of nationalism seems to be on the rise in a dialectical process of challenge and response - with integrationist and assimilationist


pressures resulting in nationalistic challenges to the central leadership, which responds with policies that unwittingly engender greater nationalism. 8a

Rather than use the old "fusion" notion to characterize national relations in the new era, however, the leadership has adopted some new terminology, and reemphasized certain aspects of the old. Two such examples are obvious and important enough to warrant our attention. The first is the idea of a "new historical community of people — the "Soviet narod" (soviet people). This was first used at the 24th Party Congress in 1971. 8b This is not a "fusion" of nations, nor a mere multinational conglomerate,

8a Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Dialectics of Nationalism", Problems of Communism, vol. 27, no. 3, (May-June) 1974, p. 11. For a Soviet view of these "integrationist and assimilationist pressures", see National Relations in the USSR at the Contemporary Stage, Moscow: "Nauka" (Science) Publishers (Academy of Science of the USSR), 1979, especially Chapter 2, "Economic Conditions of the Development and Rapprochement of Nations", pp. 46-113, and Chapter 3, "The Influence of Changes in the National and Social Structure of the Population and the Further Rapprochement of the Peoples of the USSR", pp. 114-146. Also very interesting is the Soviet view of Lenin's different versions of "assimilation", namely a "subjective", or forced type brought about by bourgeois exploitation, and an "objective" type which emerges in the course of the "further development of socialist societies", pp. 186-8, same work. (Author's translation of titles and text).

but one in which national differences **legitimately** remain. 86 Furthermore, this community is **not** simply a "sum of parts, living side by side, but rather a community made up of many common traits, which unite them in a common whole." 87 Again it should be emphasized that this idea of recognition of 'national interests' and 'differences' is an integral part of this new picture, and is sanctified by invoking Lenin: "...attention to national interests is one of the most important aspects of Leninist nationality policy." 88 you will recall. Thus the 'dialectic' which Rakowska-Harmanstone has identified is certainly pushed on by such apparent latitude to national minorities and their interests.

The leadership keeps this latitude in check by first of all viciously condemning any forms of nationalism, and secondly by constantly emphasizing the "unity of the Soviet peoples" - a much blander characterization of national relations than the Khrushchevian schema. These notions are diametrically opposed:

The new historical community, the Soviet people, is advancing towards complete social homogeneity and the complete unity of nations and nationalities... The Programme of the CPSU envisages the achievement of the total unity of

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86 **National Relations in the USSR**, p.28.
88 **National Relations in the USSR**, p.111.
nations and nationalities, which is one of the most important conditions for building communism. To achieve complete unity it is also essential to overcome all manifestations of nationalism, to create an atmosphere of unyielding intolerance towards nationalism in socialist society. 

Thus nationalism is a force to be combatted, although "national" differences, interests, and feelings are to be respected. One can understand how such a scenario could serve to "unwittingly engender nationalism", as has been suggested above.

Thus, something of an uneasy yet outwardly pacific scenario characterizes Soviet national relations as they have developed and evolved up to the decade of the 1970s. Centralizing, integrationist tendencies are accompanied by various ideological pronouncements which appear to condone national assertiveness. The question of the attitudes and perceptions of the top leadership of the country are obviously crucial to the direction in which the politics of national relations are to turn. Rakowska-Harmstone has most appropriately declared that "it is this question of attitudes which is crucial today for both leaders of the CPSU and for students of the national problem in the USSR." I concur completely. She has further remarked as

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89 Leninism and the National Question, pp.339-40.
90 Ibid., p.341.
follows:

Since the late fifties and early sixties ethnic relations in the Soviet Union have been characterized by growing conflict between the vested interests of major republics and the imperatives of All-Union political and economic integration. This conflict is becoming increasingly visible, but its dynamics are still almost totally unexplored. The study of these dynamics, constituting an immensely complex set of relationships which extend into all spheres of political, social, and economic life, may well provide a key to the understanding of Soviet ethnic politics and their future course. It appears that ethnic relations are the subject of an important debate within top Party circles, but no agreement has emerged on how to best counteract growing ethnic nationalism (emphasis added). 

By studying the Soviet Politburo's attitudes and perceptions of national relations in a systematic manner we will come to a much deeper understanding of this unquestionably important debate, and move forward a substantial distance in making sense of the dynamics of the politics of Soviet national relations in the 1970s.

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Chapter III

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES OF SOVIET NATIONAL RELATIONS

3.1 SOVIET AND WESTERN PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONALITY RELATIONS

The current Soviet leadership has solemnly pronounced that the national problem, "one of the most complicated in the life of mankind,"\(^3\) has been resolved "completely, finally, and irreversibly."\(^4\) The basis of this resolution has been the adherence to and development of "Leninist nationality policy." We have seen how this formulation can be quite broad, and to my knowledge the Soviets have made no attempt to explicitly or comprehensively define this key term.\(^5\) From the Soviets' perspective, however, the claim to have

\(^3\) Leninism and the National Question, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977, p. 188.

\(^4\) National Relations in the USSR at the Contemporary Stage, Moscow: "Nauka" (Science) Publishers, 1979, p. 26.

\(^5\) The closest thing I have encountered to such a definition is found in the "Nauka" (Science) Publishers work, National Relations in the USSR at the Contemporary Stage, (Moscow, 1979), and is as follows: "the principles of (Leninist) nationality policy - equality, sovereignty, consideration of national interests - are carried out in the same measure in our country in the relations among large, as well as small, ethnic communities." (My translation)
resolved the national question such that the USSR serves as a model for other multinational countries has a good deal of prima facie plausibility on certain counts. The USSR represents a curious amalgam of widely diverse cultures, languages, climates, and substantially different levels of development at the time of incorporation into the USSR. The undeniable gains in social services, amenities, etc. under Soviet rule, and the apparent harmony and cohesion among nationalities serve as indicators to the Soviets that their nationality policy is correct.6 Furthermore, while the post-war world has witnessed serious nationality troubles in virtually all types of socio-political systems,7 the USSR seems to have largely escaped any serious ethnic disruptions since the 1920's, with the exception of course of the collaborators in WWII. The Soviets attribute this harmony and "friendship of the

6 For example, the Baltic region, and especially Latvia and Estonia, were quite developed in terms of industrialization, education, etc., compared to Central Asia at their respective times of incorporation into the USSR. Also, some areas, notably Georgia and Armenia, are often noted for their long cultural and historical continuity, and national awareness. See also Table 1 for growth rates in education in the lesser developed areas of the USSR during the past two decades; one can appreciate from this the Soviet claim to have brought about positive changes in the lesser developed areas in certain areas.

7 See Walker Connor's excellent "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" World Politics, vol.22, no.3, April, 1972.
### TABLE 1

**Growth Rates of Education by Republic**

Growth Rates of Educational Levels, % Growth from 1959-79, measured in terms of proportion of pop. per 1000, over 10 years of age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic, by rank:</th>
<th>Any Above Primary</th>
<th>Completed Higher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>176.73%</td>
<td>295%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>240.51</td>
<td>Belorussia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavia</td>
<td>216.66</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussia</td>
<td>195.39</td>
<td>Moldavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>182.42</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>180.50</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgizhistan</td>
<td>179.53</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR</td>
<td>178.67</td>
<td>Kirghizistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhikistan</td>
<td>177.84</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>168.90</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>163.21</td>
<td>RSFSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaidzhan</td>
<td>163.00</td>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>160.22</td>
<td>Tadzhikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>160.20</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>155.80</td>
<td>Azerbaidzhan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>149.65</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

peoples to adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideology, and specifically to "Leninist nationality policy". There is more to the apparent harmony and national cohesion than such a facile and ambiguous account as this, however. We do well to take a closer look at other possible sources of the apparent stability and harmony of Soviet nationality relations.

Severyn Bialer has suggested that there are other reasons for the apparent cohesion and harmony among Soviet nationalities, and outlines two major factors which seem to account for a good deal of the stability of the system. The first of these is a sort of balance which the Soviet leadership has struck between excessive repression and excessive liberality in the treatment of national minorities. In other words, the haphazard applications of force, and/or gross neglect of nationalities' interests (which often characterize ethnic politics in multinational countries), has been successfully avoided by the Soviet leadership. Bialer writes that

> absence of acute crises in Soviet multinational relations reflects, first of all, the success of the central Soviet leadership in creating a proper balance, from the point of view of its goals, between repression and tolerance and flexibility as well as the preservation by this leadership of the "nerve", the will to succeed.

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The balance of repression with tolerance and flexibility works out according to a quite clear formula: first, no concessions whatsoever where central issues are concerned and decisive and immediate repressive measures against any effort to undermine the system of nationality relations in the USSR; second, a relatively high degree of tolerance and flexibility on those issues contested between the central Russian authorities and the ethnic population or elites which are marginal and do not bear directly on the basic shape of the system.99

The second factor which has promoted stability and an appearance of harmony in Soviet nationality relations has been the effective use and handling of indigenous folk in administration and leadership. This characteristic has to some extent marked national relations since before the Revolution. We have seen how the Russian domination of conquered territories was done largely "French style" (cf. pp. 11, 12). Lenin's policy of "korenizatsia" represented essentially a continuation of this tradition, and although suppressed during the Stalin years, it has reemerged as a very important aspect of the politics of nationality relations in the USSR in the decade under study. Bialer has noted the "formal freedoms" which are "crucial as the safety valve for...rising and unfulfilled national aspirations and as a basis for the containment of the

national problem in the Soviet Union."\(^{100}\) In addition to these "formal freedoms" and ostensibly Leninist sensitivities to national feelings and interests, the Soviet leadership has delegated some real political power to the minority regions. This power has served somewhat ironically to stabilize nationality relations and above all to preserve Soviet power. Bialer again notes that

the crucial element in the Soviet political process which explains the leadership's ability to contain the nationality problem is the existence and development of indigenous elites in the basic ethnic regions. The Soviet leadership, in contrast to its own prerevolutionary past and to other empires, has been willing and able to allow or even foster the development of ethnically indigenous elites who have a stake in the system... if it is true that the Russians rule the Soviet Union, it is equally true that the ethnic elites to a varying but almost always significant degree govern their own regions. (emphasis in original).\(^{101}\)

This suggests very strongly that the apparent stability and harmony of Soviet nationality relations is founded upon more than brute, Stalinistic repression, and that some degree of delegation of political authority has ironically served to contain certain nationalistic discontent which has bedeviled other modern, multi-ethnic countries.

\(^{100}\) Ibid., p. 213.

\(^{101}\) Ibid.
However, the Soviet pronouncements about the national question being resolved "completely, totally, and irreversibly" appear to have little substance in light of some rather weighty and concrete difficulties facing the leadership. If it is true, as Bialer has suggested, that the Soviet leadership has managed to handle nationality relations by using kid gloves as well as the iron fist, it is also true that the magnitude as well as the number of nationality difficulties has been mounting in recent years. All evidence suggests that the Soviet leadership is aware of this.\textsuperscript{102} The leadership response to these very potential trouble spots will be crucial for the direction of the USSR as a country. One of the main purposes of this study is to illuminate these possible responses, and the likelihood of their occurrence, based on our knowledge of the elite's attitudes and perceptions of the national question in the 1970s. To accomplish this, some further explication of the specific difficulties is called for, and to these we now turn.

3.2 EMERGING ISSUES IN SOVIET NATIONAL RELATIONS

We have outlined some of the shifts in language and terminology used by the Soviet leadership in the 1970s. The most important of these include near abandonment of the "fusion" ideal, the increased use of "Leninist nationality policy", especially by minority elites, and a heavy emphasis on friendship and familial-type relations among Soviet nationalities. Perhaps above all, emphasis has been placed on the innocuous "unity" of Soviet peoples. In terms of the real novelty in terminology, the idea of the Soviet peoples as a "new historical community" has been propounded since the 24th Party Congress in 1971 to signify the progress in consciousness of the Soviet people toward full communism. Although all of these trends have been noted by students of Soviet national relations, and they tell us much about the leadership as a whole, they reveal little if anything about individual Politburo members' perceptions of and attitudes toward the various issues in nationality relations. In this respect the study is squarely in the tradition of the "conflict school" of Soviet politics. This analytical orientation emerged in the early 1960s and basically asserted that the Soviet leadership is not a

monolithic, faceless political mass, but rather was composed of individuals with varying (and at times sharply differing) policy orientations, goals, perceptions of issues, and so forth. Furthermore, these differences can be discerned from references by Soviet leaders to various issues, apparent emphasis placed on certain themes, and even at times open disagreements in the press and specialized journals. We will deal with this approach again in Chapter 3 on the methodology of the Soviet Elite Perceptions Project. At this point it is sufficient to recognize that the research effort represented by this dissertation lies in the conflict school tradition, and as such proposes to understand the individual orientations of Politburo members


on quite specific issues in Soviet nationality relations.

With this recognition of shifts in terminology used to describe and prescribe Soviet nationality relations, and being alerted to the likelihood of substantially different orientations on the nationality question among Politburo members, we can now outline the major difficulties which the Soviet leadership faces in nationality relations. Only then can the Soviet elite's attitudes and perceptions of the national question be analyzed in a meaningful way.

3.2.1 The Demographic Dimension

The most obvious and most discussed area of Soviet nationality relations by Western observers has to be the whole set of demographic issues. One virtually cannot read a piece of work dealing with the Soviet minorities wherein the question of demographic changes is not dealt with, and for good reason. One could easily devote a major study to a number of these changes, but for our purposes a basic outline of the demographic difficulties will suffice.106

106 The body of literature dealing with Soviet demographic
First and foremost among these is the phenomenon of disparity of growth rates among the southern minorities (particularly the Central Asians and Azerbaidzhanis) and the Slavic peoples, and especially the Russians. Table 2 demonstrates the magnitude of this disparity. One can see that the Slavs are slightly below the national average for both time periods (1959-70 & 70-79). The traditionally Muslim peoples (generally speaking, the Central Asians and Azeris) are all well above the national average, with the Uzbeks and Tadzhiks over 4 times as great.

There are several practical consequences of this trend. Economically, the problem is basically that the manpower shortages are in areas where population growth and in-migration are slowest, while an over-abundance of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>% of USSR Population</th>
<th>% of increase</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>1959-70</th>
<th>1970-79</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slavs:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>53.37</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>16.86</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussians</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asians:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhiks</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmeni</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghizi</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasians:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaidzhani</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgians</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavians</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
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<td>Balts:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanians</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvians</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonians</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others:</td>
<td>6.31</td>
<td>5.87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR Total:</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(unskilled) labor exists precisely where the growth rates are highest, namely Central Asia. These areas may be experiencing a shortage of highly skilled labor, and the logical (short-term) remedy for this is to attract those skilled laborers from other areas of the country, generally the Slavic and Baltic areas. This has apparently been attempted, but with negligible results. Given the Soviet Union's heavy emphasis on further economic growth, and the fact that much of the Party's de facto legitimacy as the "leading and guiding role in society" rests upon increasing the living standards of the people, this demographic problem may well have serious political implications.


Lydolph, pp.115-7, 138-9, 149-52.

For example, the 1977 Soviet Constitution, article 45, chapter 2 states that "The highest goal of social production under socialism is the fullest possible satisfaction of people's growing material and spiritual requirements"; and, "the principal tasks of the
There is a simpler political ramification of the growth rate disparity between Slavs and traditionally Muslim peoples. This is the obvious fact that a greater proportion of non-Slavs in the Soviet population is likely to translate into greater political power for these minorities by virtue of their larger numbers. No one, to my knowledge, is predicting an imminent non-Slav takeover or even serious prospects for actual civil war in the near future, but these demographic trends seem to point toward a translation of greater numerical force into political force of some sort. It is not the place to develop this theme, but rather to emphasize that the leadership's perceptions and attitude toward the national question will be crucial for

socialist state of all the people are: creating the material and technical base of communism, improving socialist relations and transforming them into communist relations, rearing the man of communist society raising the working people's material and cultural living standard... See also Article 6, chapter 1 on the Party's role in such development. From The New Soviet Constitution of 1977: Analysis and Text, Robert Sharlet, Brunswick, Ohio: King's Court Communications, Inc., 1978.


111 One scholar has suggested that these and other trends may even produce a backlash, as it were, of Great-Russian nationalism as the non-Slav minorities grow and develop within the USSR. See Enders Winbush, "The Great Russians and the Soviet State: The Dilemmas of Ethnic Domination", in Soviet Nationality Policies and
the outcome of this accretion of political power by the minorities.\textsuperscript{112}

The second major nationality issue which is explicitly demographic is the phenomenon of the smaller ethnographic units being "eaten up" by units to which they are most similar, culturally, linguistically, and so forth. For example, it has been pointed out that as the smaller ethnographic groups (and especially "tribes" or "national groups" as Soviet demographers call them) modernize, they begin to be integrated, willy-nilly, into the next larger ethnographic unit such that they identify with that unit.\textsuperscript{113}

Also, rather than being "Russified" as is at times assumed in Western thinking, many such minorities appear to be in


\textsuperscript{112} Generally speaking, the leadership response could be either to tolerate greater minority autonomy as in the early Khrushchev era, or to actively resist it, as did Stalin in his consolidation of power in the late 20's-early 30's. As this theme is central to the study, it will be explored in detail in the data analysis in Chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{113} See Teresa Hakowska-Harmstone, "The Soviet Union", in \textit{The Protection of Ethnic Minorities}, Nikolai Movikov, "Nationalitaeten der UdSSR im Lichte des Parteikongresses und der Volksanzahlungsergebnisse"
fact identifying with the larger minority which they most resemble culturally, linguistically, and geographically. Although a degree of Russification is taking place in such circumstances, what is politically significant is that some of the larger minority groups are growing inordinately fast due to this type of assimilation. This growth, along with the natural increase mentioned above, far exceeding the national average, may well put these 'major' minorities in a stronger political position vis-à-vis Moscow in the coming years. Again it is not appropriate to deal here in any detail with specifically how this translation of greater numbers into greater political strength might occur, but rather to underscore that the demographic changes which are

Osteuropa, vol.31, no.9-10, (Sept.) 1981. For the Soviet view of these integrationist trends, see I.R. Vinnikov, "National and Ethnographic Groups: Central Asia As Reflected in Statistics", Part I, in The Soviet Review, vol.22, no.3 (Fall) 1981, pp.41-6, and Part II, vol.22, no.4 (Winter) 1981-2, pp.13-33. As one might expect, these integrationist phenomena are seen as manifestations of progression toward full communism, and their potentially problematical character is not dealt with per se in these works.

See Vinnikov, loc.cit., especially pp.32-33. See also Leninism and the National Question, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977, especially Part II: "The Solution of the National Question. Development and Convergence of Nations Under Socialism", p.193, and National Relations in the USSR at the Contemporary Stage, Moscow: "Nauka" (Science) Publishers, 1979, p.16. In terms of the Russification question, it is pertinent to note Brian Silver's differentiation between Russification and Russianization, the former designating a reorientation of the minority's ethnic identity, and the latter
taking place in the Soviet Union represent a potentially disruptive situation in terms of ethnic identification, and ultimately in terms of political loyalties.\(^6\)

However, Soviet demographers appear to greet even this type of intra-minority assimilation as a sign of "nature socialism", and not as a potential threat. For example, Vinnikov states that "convergence within particular regions often occurs under the influence of the largest and most developed nation of that region,"\(^7\) and suggests that this process is part of Soviet society's further development of socialism. However, he is rather quick to add that it is the Russian language and culture which play a special role in maintaining the unity of the entire country: "Russian

signifying the adoption of certain Russian cultural patterns, and/or acquisition of Russian language capabilities, but nonetheless maintaining explicit identification with the traditional ethnic group. In the case of Russification, the ethnic minority member no longer considers himself/herself a member of the ethnic group per se, but rather a Russian. The political importance of this "Russification" trend is that minorities may function well in an essentially Russian-dominated area, yet display increased ethnic assertiveness as their position, numbers, and power increase. Brian Silver, "Social Mobilization and the Russification of Soviet Nationalities", *American Political Science Review*, vol.68, March, 1974; and also, "The Impact of Urbanization and Geographical Dispersion on the Linguistic Russification of Soviet Nationalities", *Demography*, vol.11, February, 1974.

\(^6\) According to Vinnikov (cf.fn.2), these would include especially the Tadzhiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmenis in Central Asia, and the Azerbaidzhanis, Georgians, and Armenians in the Caucasus.
culture is a universal means of interethnic contact among peoples of the country.\textsuperscript{116} He also adds that these processes of assimilation and convergence are not limited to Central Asia, and are also occurring significantly in the east and northwest regions of the country.\textsuperscript{119} Whether we are justified in concluding from this that all such "integration" will ultimately result in Russification is not clear.\textsuperscript{120} The Soviets would deny that it does, and one Soviet work admits that a good deal of research needs to be done in the conceptualization of national relations in the current stage of mature socialism, and especially concerning this question of "further integration."\textsuperscript{121} Such an admission suggests to me that there is a good deal of leeway in terms

\textsuperscript{116} Severyn Bialer has correctly pointed out that "the Soviet Union can tolerate a great deal of resentment in the case of minor nationalities which do not have their own republics...without major strains on the political system and its stability" (Bialer, p. 220). As these minor nationalities are assimilated into the larger minority groups, however, their resentment may not disappear quite so quickly; at any rate, their assimilation into these larger minority groups would appear to strengthen such a group politically as well as numerically. See also Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Ethnicity and Change in the Soviet Union", in Perspectives for Change in Communist Societies, T.Rakowska-Harmstone, ed., Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979, especially pp. 169-70. See also John F. Besemeres, Socialist Population Politics, White Plains, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., pp. 78-83.

\textsuperscript{117} Vinnikov, p. 31.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
of the direction in which Soviet national relations could go in the coming years. It is relevant at this point to underscore that old-style Russification is not the necessary outcome of such a reconceptualization of national relations by the Soviet elite. Much will of course depend on the orientations of this elite, both within and outside official government circles. Thus the question of the Soviet leadership's perception of the entire national question becomes crucial for the direction of nationality policy. That is, do they perceive it as threatening, as a model for other multiethnic societies, are some Politburo members apparently indifferent to minority questions, and so forth. Also of great importance is the attitude of the leadership.

Ibid., p.32.

However, I would tend to agree with Nikolai Novikov, who recently stated the following concerning this theme.

Sie allen Nationen und Nationalitäten der UdSSR aufzudrängen—darin besteht das Wesen der Nationalitätenpolitik der Sowjetische Führerung und damit auch das Wesen der sogenannten Russifizierungspolitik. Diese besteht keineswegs darin, den anderen Nationalitäten echt russische Muster des Lebens, der Arbeit, und der Kultur aufzuprägen; das wäre schon deshalb unmöglich... Was man Russifizierung nennt, lauft in seinem Wesen darauf hinaus, dass die Zentralorgane der Macht ständig in allen Landesteilen den Einfluss jener parteibuerokratischen Kader verstärken, die aus der russischen und in letzter Zeit auch der ukrainischer Nation hervorgegangen sind. Vor allem Russen und Ukrainen wird von der Zentralmacht die Aufgabe zugewiesen, alle übrigen
to various aspects of nationality relations. It is obvious that maintenance of Soviet power is paramount to the leadership; the question becomes one of how they will do this, and here their attitudes toward the nationality question will largely determine the type of response to the various ethnic pressures which appear to be building in the USSR.

There are two further demographic phenomena which point to difficulties for the Soviet leadership in the handling of national minorities. The first of these is the changing percentage of indigenous people in the minority areas. Essentially what is happening is that in the republics with the higher population growth rates the percentage of the

Nikolai Novikov, "Nationalitäten der UdSSR im Lichte des Parteikongresses und der Volkszählungsergebnisse", Osteuropa, vol. 31, no. 9-10 (Sept.-Oct.), 1981, pp. 819-20. This statement represents to me the generally accurate description of the nature of current "Russification" and its implications for minorities' political power. I also find Novikov's orientation fully in line with Bialer's analysis (cf. fn. 1-3). However, Novikov's subsequent comment that "will man die soziale und politische Bedeutung der Veränderungen in der nationalen Zusammensetzung der Bevölkerung der UdSSR einschätzen, so muss man die Besonderheiten dieses totalitär-kommunistischen Staates im Auge behalten" (p. 823) appears to me to undervalue the importance of the leeway and "formal freedoms" which Bialer
population which is indigenous is increasing, while the areas with relatively low population growth rates are experiencing a relative (percentage-wise) decline in indigenous folk. This is particularly important as it means essentially that the proportion of Russians and Ukrainians in the minority areas (and especially Central Asia and the Caucasus) is declining. See Table 3.

Table 4 indicates that the percentage of Russians and Ukrainians living in the minority regions is decreasing substantially.

appropriately recognizes as crucial for the functioning of the system (Bialer, pp. 212-3).

See National Relations in the USSR at the Contemporary Stage, pp. 23, 64.

For the rationale behind including the Ukrainians in this group with the Russians (which Novikov also did), see Bialer, pp. 224-4. He states that

It is not surprising that the treatment of the Ukrainians managerial and technical intelligentsia and especially the political and administrative elite differs from that in all other republics. In one crucial respect it goes beyond that of even the other self-administered republics: Ukrainians are afforded the opportunity to advance in significant numbers into the central elite and to serve in important positions, both as representatives of the authorities in the non-Slav republics and as officials of all-Union central functional bureaucracies (Bialer, pp. 222-3).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Group as % of Own Republic</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slavs:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>-.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussians</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asians:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekks</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhiks</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmeni</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghizi</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasians:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaidzhani</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgians</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavians</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanians</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvians</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonians</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 4

% of Russians and Ukrainians in Republics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Republic</th>
<th>% Russian 1959</th>
<th>% Russian 1979</th>
<th>% Ukrainian 1959</th>
<th>% Ukrainian 1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>42.8*</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhikistan</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghizistan</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasus:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaidzhan</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>8.5*</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavia</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Region:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* These figures are from the 1970, not 1959, census.
The immediate implication of this shift in proportion of indigenous folk is that the minorities are likely to be in a position of greater power vis-a-vis the central Moscow government. Recall Bialer's point that "if it is true that the Russians rule the Soviet Union, it is equally true that the indigenous ethnic elites to a varying but almost always significant degree govern their own regions." With the demographic changes outlined above operating, it would appear that this power to 'govern their own regions' could only increase. This does not necessarily mean that their governance will or even could take on an explicitly anti-Soviet, or anti-communist character. It does suggest, however, that Moscow may well have to deal with what

Bialer then proceeds to list a lengthy number of Ukrainians holding high positions outside the Ukrainian Republic, quite convincingly demonstrating that these people serve quite often as "elder brothers" in the minority areas, as the Russians have traditionally done.

123 Bialer, p. 213.

124 See also Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR", Problems of Communism, vol. 27, no. 3 (May-June), 1974, p. 11:

the force of nationalism seems to be on the rise in a dialectical process of challenge and response - with integrationist and assimilationist pressures resulting in nationalistic challenges to the central leadership, which responds with policies that unwittingly engender greater nationalism.

See also her "Study of Ethnic Politics in the USSR", in Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe, George
Eakowska-Harmstone has termed "orthodox nationalism", that is, one which tolerates Soviet rule in a given minority area, but demands a greater degree of local autonomy, or more regional self-rule. This is at times referred to by the central leadership as "localism", or "regional tendencies" and are generally frowned upon. These and other relevant terms will be addressed in the section on "nationalist deviations" in the data analysis, and will reveal a good deal about how the leadership might respond to further nationalist pressures for greater autonomy. As Rywkin recently stated,

Muslim numbers, which represent an irreplaceable source of future Soviet manpower supply, at the same time endanger the traditional

Simmons, ed. Detroit: University of Detroit Press, 1976, p.29. Novikov would seem to dispute this, arguing that these demographic trends do not necessarily point to an erosion of Russian control or an increase of minorities' political power. He states that

Aus dem Abnehmen des Anteils von Russen in der Bevölkerung der Zentralasiatischen und transkaukasischen Republiken darf man keine voreiligen Schlüsse ziehen. Es bedeutet nicht, dass dort die russische Schicht schwinden wird, und es verhindert nicht die von der Sowjetführung betriebene Politik der Entnationalisierung. Vor allem weicht ja doch die absolute Zahl der Russen in Zentralasien.

Novikov, p.819. When we recall that Novikov perceives the Soviet Union as a 'totalitarian-communist state' that is highly centralized and guided by 'Soviet-Marxist doctrine' which foresees the ultimate erasure of all national differences, one can understand why he concludes that these demographic changes will not diminish Russian control over
Russian-dominated Soviet power structure...The Basnachi cavalry is not about to descend into the valleys and cities of Central Asia to challenge the Russians; but the growing weight of geopolitical circumstances, demographic reality, and Muslim ethnic "innate drives" will increasingly do so, in a less dramatic but no less dangerous way.125

The perceptions of the leadership of the national question, and their attitudes toward this growing weight of circumstances will undoubtedly have a major impact upon the direction of nationality politics in the coming years.

The final aspect of demographic change which may well lead to greater minority assertiveness, and ultimately to greater minority political power is the increase of ethnic minorities who are claiming their native language as their first language. This is especially true of the younger generations among some groups, most notably the traditionally Muslim peoples. Bialer has noted that

From this linguistic point of view the ethnic identity of non-Russian Soviet nations which are organized in union republics seems very strong and shows no signs of significant decline. As a matter

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of fact in some respects it is stronger today than in the first decade of Soviet power. It is even more noteworthy that the identification with one's own language is stronger among the youth than among middle-aged generations.126

This use of the native language may well indicate a conscious, deliberate desire to identify more with one's own nationality group than with being a Soviet citizen per se. Evidence exists that recent trends in literature are pointing toward greater ethnic consciousness, and even a quasi-glorification of the (pre-Soviet) past, particularly in Central Asia.127 While this and other such evidence may be largely anecdotal, it does suggest that the idea of a "new historical community of people" whose primary allegiance and identification are with the Soviet system is not taking root among all Soviet nationalities to the degree professed by official sources.128

While all these demographic trends will certainly change the composition and perhaps in some cases the identity of the Soviet population, it would probably be unsafe to maintain that they will necessarily lead to anti-Soviet political assertiveness by national minorities in and of

126 Bialer, p.209 (fn.4).


128 See also Byukin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge, pp.149-53.
themselves. After all, the official Soviet position is that these changes in demography are all signs of increased 'socialist integration', and this in turn is a sign of the further rapprochement (sblizhenie) of all Soviet nationalities. To support their case, comparison is made between the allegedly harmonious, prosperous nature of Soviet nationality relations, and the admittedly dismal record of most of the world's multi-ethnic countries in maintaining national harmony and political cohesion. However, it is pertinent to recall that the 'harmony' among Soviet peoples appears to be grounded in an unflinching readiness to use force as well as the use of political concessions, official sensitivity, and the like.

Thus, the real substantive question appears to involve the conditions under which nationalities' heightened consciousness will be channelled into political assertiveness. The demographic trends outlined above appear to make such assertiveness possible. In most areas of ethnic conflict in the modern world, however, it seems to have been the forces of modernization which acted as a catalyst in transforming ethnic consciousness into political activity of one sort or another. The question of modernization and Soviet nationality relations is thus a critical substantive

129 See Leninism and the National Question pp. 446-533.
issue, and to it we now turn.

3.2.2 Modernization and Soviet Minorities

By the end of the 1960s the idea that modernization was somehow linked to political instability began to circulate in Western social science. Within the next few years this general thesis was further developed and applied specifically to poly-ethnic societies, and especially those in the developing countries. The general thrust of the thesis is that as societies modernize, certain important political consequences tend to follow. These include increased citizen participation in politics, an increased sense of political efficacy, and what Lerner termed

130 Perhaps the most famous proponent of this view was Samuel Huntington, who argued that although modernity tends to be associated with stability, modernization as a social process seems to foster instability. See his Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, especially pp. 32-92. This idea was of course not new, and had been suggested by Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development", American Political Science Review, vol. 55, Sept., 1961.

empathy. Finally, modernization was seen to bring about a sharply increased sense of ethnic awareness and "politically" ethnic assertiveness in poly-ethnic societies. The implications of this thesis for the Soviet Union should be quite clear. Indeed, many have more or less predicted that the minorities of the USSR will ultimately assert themselves such that the survival of the country itself will be challenged and threatened. Although many students of Soviet politics have stated that the emerging nationality problems are not likely to reach unmanageable proportions in the near future, all seem to agree that the problems are quite serious. It seems very likely that these difficulties will evoke changes in the Kremlin's

authors had anticipated the problematical character of ethnic relations some time earlier; see, for example, Roger Emerson's From Empire to Nation, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960, and Charles Anderson's Issues of Political Development, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1967.

Deutsch, ibid.

Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, Inc., 1958; The important thing about this type of empathy is that it allows the "modernized" individual to conceive of him/herself as an efficacious political being, as opposed to a relatively passive one, politically speaking, which Lerner apparently viewed as the pre-modernized or "traditional" individual's only political conceptions of the world.

See Donald Horowitz, "Patterns of Ethnic Separatism", Comparative Studies in Society and History, April, 1981; also, Anthony Birch, "Minority National Movements and
stance toward nationality groups. Again Bialer's comments warrant citation for their balanced assessment of the complex of forces operating in Soviet nationality relations.

The Soviet Union is the only state which after WWII has been able to thwart the successful global trend of national and ethnic self-assertiveness against central authority. The growing autonomous aspirations of the minority peoples of the Soviet Union and of the minority segments of the political elite, however, may become at some time in the future the major factor contributing to change in the system... the multinational character of the Soviet Union poses potentially the most serious threat to the legitimacy of the Soviet state and to the stability of the Soviet regime.\(^{137}\)

Thus the spectre of nationalist pressure from various ethnic groups may well come to the Soviet Union as it has to so many other multinational societies.

Theories of Political Integration\(^{1}\), World Politics, April, 1978, pp.35ff., for a good discussion of the propensities and conditions under which ethnic groups tend to assert themselves. For an excellent work dealing with the effects of modernization and its tendency to promote nationalism in the USSR, see Nationalism and Human Rights: Processes of Modernization in The USSR, Thor Kamenetsky, ed., Littleton, Colorado: Libraries Unlimited, Inc., 1977.

Perhaps the most notable among these is Zbigniew Brzezinski, "From the Future to the Past", in The Dynamics of Soviet Politics, Cocks, Daniels, Heer, eds. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1976.

In terms of this idea of nationality pressures bringing change to the Soviet system in one form or another, Rakowska-Harmstone has written as follows:

all available evidence indicates that the rate of growth of the national self-assertion of major Soviet ethnic groups exceeds their rate of assimilation into a common Soviet value system. The problem, while not officially acknowledged, is recognized by the Soviet leadership... In the opinion of this writer, ethnic conflict is now the major force for change in the Soviet Union. It presents no immediate threat to the stability of the system, but in the long run the buildup of centrifugal ethnic forces may well contribute to a major change in the nature of the Soviet state as it is today, and may even lead to its eventual disintegration. At present, the ethnicity-generated change is slow and evolutionary, even as the forces pressing for it are accelerating (emphasis added).  

It is highly plausible that modernization might spur on these 'autonomous aspirations' and 'national self-assertion' even more. The situation becomes even more noteworthy when we recall that modernization - meaning among other things industrial, technological and general economic growth - has

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137 Bialer, p.212.

138 Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Ethnicity and Change in the Soviet Union", in Perspectives for Change in Communist Societies, Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, ed. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979, p.169. It is also important to note at this point that the situation is complicated, especially in Central Asia, by the association of religious identity with national identity on the part of the indigenous folk; see Alexander Bennigsen, "Several Nations or One People?", Survey, vol.24, no. 3, (Summer) 1979, wherein three levels of ethnic consciousness among Muslims are explicated.
been a goal pursued vigorously by the Soviet leadership since Lenin's time, and certainly continues today. As mentioned earlier, an integral part of the soviets' claim to legitimacy for Soviet power rests on the achievements in modernizing the "formerly backward areas", as they are referred to by the leadership. The Soviet leadership also considers the further "equalization" among republics in terms of socio-economic conditions to be an integral part of the further building of socialism. Success in this area has been mixed. As such, we might expect the central leadership's push for further modernization to continue unabated.

One writer has noted that

(t)he results of recent investigations of interrepublic relations are not without some ambiguity. Yet it is reasonably clear that Soviet leaders have achieved only partial success in the fields of regional equalization and social justice, both regarding per capita indicators of consumption and output and the structural composition of the economy. At the same time, substantial, uncompensated net transfer of resources has been taking place among republics, with no consultation of their population. Western specialists contend that a considerable part of the national income produced in the Ukraine and several of the other republics in the European USSR has long been withdrawn unrequited, a conclusion corroborated by at least one authoritative Soviet work.

Leslie Dienes, "The Development of Siberian Regions:"
3.2.3 **Soviet Ideology and Stability in Minority Areas**

The precise political consequences of this further modernization are of course very difficult, if not impossible, to discern. However, it is not implausible to assume that the demographic trends which point to increased ethnic minority power will be reinforced by modernization. This increased power will probably emerge from the tendency of the socio-political consciousness of the ethnic group to increase as it comes into the modern world, so to speak. As is commonly known, Western style survey research is not currently possible in the Soviet Union, and thus attempts to tap attitudinal changes among minority groups are not really possible in a rigorous or systematic manner.\(^\text{140}\) This is of course especially true in the sensitive area of political loyalties, nationalist consciousness, and so forth. Nonetheless, the global experiences of heightened national consciousness and assertiveness which appear to proceed from modernization do seem to be occurring in the Soviet Union as

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well, only in a much more muted form. As Bialer has pointed out, however, the Soviet leadership has managed to keep this assertiveness within manageable proportions by a skillful and balanced use of force and concessions. Thus the crucial question becomes whether or not this skillful balance can be continued indefinitely. We have seen that the nature and magnitude of the demographic and other trends are increasing quite seriously. These trends will almost invariably attract the attention of the Soviet elite in a major way. In turn, their response to these trends, conditioned of course by their perceptions of the issue, will affect not only the lives and destinies of many Soviet ethnic minorities, but the future of the USSR as a country.

Another important aspect of the leadership's maintenance of stability in minority regions of the USSR has been the use of ideological promises and manipulations. Constant reference and comparison is made between the harmonious, friendly relations among Soviet nationalities and the antagonistic relations which allegedly characterize bourgeois capitalist and developing countries. The Soviet Union (and particularly Central Asia) is portrayed as the exemplar for the developing world. An important aspect of

141 See Rakowska-Harmstone's "Study of Ethnic Politics", "Dialectics of Nationalism", "Ethnicity and Change", etc. and Daniel Matuszewski, loc.cit.
this portrayal is the Soviet Union's active support for the "wars of national liberation" in the third world. Such support has been a major part of the Brezhnev regime's foreign policy, especially in the 1970s, and these struggles are seen by the Soviet leadership as one of the key forces for the promotion of world communism.\textsuperscript{143} It has been suggested, however, that the incessant harping about "national liberation" in the third world may actually backfire to some extent at home, with various nationalities in the USSR longing for a "liberation" of their own.\textsuperscript{144} Novikov has stated that the highly important shift from "fusion" of nationalities to the much blander "unity" in the late 1960s–early 70s was done in large part to accommodate this new emphasis on national liberation in the third world.\textsuperscript{145} If he is correct, then this is rather solid

\textsuperscript{142} See, for example, Leninism and The National Question, Part 3; also, Sharif Rashidov, First Secretary of The Communist Party of Uzbekistan, "Soviet Central Asia As A Model For The Developing Nations," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: The Soviet Union, 16 October, 1972.

\textsuperscript{143} See Leninism and the National Question, Part 4.


evidence that the leadership is quite sensitive to the possibilities of ethnic political fulmination, and ready to anticipate potential troubles and deal with them ideologically rather than rely on pure brute force.

Nevertheless, the precise form of such a backfire in minorities' political allegiance is not at all clear. The point is well taken, however, that continued Soviet support for 'wars of national liberation' may ultimately have some unexpected consequences for nationality relations at home. Thus this aspect of Soviet foreign policy, and especially the ideological rationale behind it, may prove unsettling for Soviet nationality relations. At any rate, the attitudes of the leadership toward the entire national question will play a decisive role in determining the direction of national relations within the Soviet Union, and Soviet foreign policy as well.

3.3 ADDRESSING THE SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS
To even begin assessing possible responses to these various nationality pressures, we must understand the Soviet elite's perceptions of the national question, and their attitudes toward the complex of issues which comprise the question. It should be clear by now that leadership attitudes toward the various issues in the national question have historically
played a vital role in determining the character of national relations in the USSR. This is true for relations among nationalities as well as relations between Moscow and a given national minority group. Consider, for example, the substantially different attitudes taken by Stalin and Khrushchev toward the nationalities. Earlier in this work the basic orientations of the Brezhnev era leadership were roughly outlined. We have seen that an emphasis has been placed on unity, familial cooperation, and that serious attention is allegedly devoted to nationalities' interests, feelings, and so forth. Finally, the idea of a qualitatively new ethnographic grouping — "the Soviet people, a new historical community" — has become the official characterization of Soviet national relations since 1971. These characteristics of the Brezhnev regime's nationality policy are markedly different from its predecessors.

However, evidence suggests that the Politburo of the 1970s is not entirely unanimous on nationality affairs. Behind the facade of collective leadership, occasional signs point to substantial differences in orientation toward the national question. These include the ouster of Shelest in 1973 ostensibly for "nationalist deviations", and the sudden removal of Podgorny in 1977, which has been analyzed by one observer as a possible result of his nationality
orientations. Also, Theodore Shabad commented some years ago that the decision to abandon a plan of major geo-economic reorganization may well have been due to pressures exerted on Moscow by minority elites. This suggests quite strongly that different orientations do exist among the Soviet elite, and that policies affecting the national minorities are indeed affected by these differing orientations. This makes the study of the current elites' perceptions and attitudes not only very important for assessment of the nature of contemporary national relations, but also for the imminent leadership succession, which will result in the removal of some, the promotion of others, and a substantial increase or power for some already on the Politburo.

This study seeks to analyze and clarify these elite orientations - more specifically, the perceptions and attitudes of the elite - by use of the Soviet Elite Perceptions Project. The assumptions and methodology of this project will be explicated in the next chapter. Before

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moving on to this, however, it is appropriate here to briefly consider the basic questions which will be addressed with the data. As will be seen, these questions emerge directly or indirectly from the larger scope of substantive issues in Soviet national relations as they have been outlined in this chapter. By analyzing each Politburo member's perceptions of the various issues of the national question, and attitudes toward these issues, a sort of 'cognitive map' can be established which should paint a much clearer picture of Soviet nationality politics than any previously available. Thus, some of the questions with which our data analysis will begin are as follows.

1. To whom on the Politburo are nationality affairs most salient?
   a) national minority members?
   b) the "core leadership?"
   c) are nationality affairs handled in a "collective" manner, or how?

2. What role do minority elites members play on the Politburo?
   a) are they merely tokens, and their presence merely perfunctory?
   b) do the national minority members of the Politburo hold any real power?
c) can the minority elites thus influence national policy in a substantial way?

3. What are the attitudes of specific Politburo members toward the various issues which comprise the national question, i.e., which members tend to display orientations along the following lines:
   a) pro-Great Russian
   b) pro-national minority
   c) pro-unity vs. favoring greater minority autonomy
   d) apparently excessive criticism of nationality deviations

4. Of those likely to survive the succession, what attitudes towards the national question are manifested?
   a) what effect will their succession (or demise) have upon Soviet national relations, and Moscow's general nationality policy?

5. During the decade in question, what trends appear to be surfacing in the direction of Moscow's nationality stance?
   a) has the trend been toward greater 'Russification', and under whose apparent stimulus?
   b) has the trend been toward greater minority autonomy, and under whose stimulus?
c) if tensions continue between Moscow and the 'peripheries' over priorities, policies, etc., what prospects appear likely for greater 'liberalization' of Moscow's minority orientation?

The next chapter will deal with the methodology and procedure of the Soviet Elite Perceptions Project. After this, the above questions will be addressed.
Chapter IV

METHODOLOGY IN THE SOVIET ELITE PERCEPTIONS PROJECT

4.1 BACKGROUND AND ASSUMPTIONS

The Soviet Elite Perceptions Project was initiated in 1977, and completed in early 1982 at The Ohio State University. The project was initially developed by Dr. Philip D. Stewart and Mathematica, Inc. (Bethesda, Md.). The first stage of the project was completed in early 1980. However, evaluation of the work completed to that date prompted a further effort to expand the time period under study and to re-examine the results of the Bethesda coding. The second stage of the project was carried out at The Ohio State University under the supervision of Dr. Philip D. Stewart and administered by Mr. Roger A. Blough. As a result of the second effort, the time period covered was expanded, ranging from January, 1970 to July, 1979. Another important aspect of the second effort was that several other Politburo members were included in the study who were not dealt with in the Bethesda phase of the project.
The project was designed to determine the perceptions and attitudes of the Soviet Politburo in the 1970s by thematic content analysis of written and spoken materials. Four major areas of Soviet politics were addressed, namely foreign policy, the Soviet economy, social dissent, and nationality issues. This study will obviously focus on the last issue. Three dimensions of attitude are analyzed in this study: salience, evaluation, and potency of issues as perceived by the members of the Politburo. Each of these dimensions will be explained in greater detail shortly. First, however, a look at the basic assumptions underlying the project is in order.

The first major assumption is that the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party is the locus of political power in the Soviet Union. This assumption is so widely accepted that it really requires no elaboration here; rather, the fact that the Politburo is the locus of power underscores the significance of the study. The fact is that major policies acquire meaning and importance only as they are articulated, shaped, and formulated by the Politburo.

The next major assumption underlying the research effort is that substantial differences may exist among members of the Politburo in terms of policy preferences, general orientation to issues, and relative significance of issues,
and even the definition of various issues. This broad assumption is generally associated with the "conflict school" among Western students of Soviet politics. The conflict school emerged in the early 1960s as a sort of reaction against the "totalitarian model" of Soviet politics which had circulated in the previous decade. The essence of the conflict approach is that the Soviet elite is not a monolithic mass, but rather a group within which struggle and conflict over policies, orientations, and so forth takes place regularly. By the latter 1960s, the "interest group" orientation began to be applied to Soviet politics. This orientation posited Soviet elite politics as involving an element of struggle and conflict among various institutional

bases within Soviet society (the military, heavy industry, agriculture, etc.), and that these bases had representatives, or spokesmen, at the highest levels of government and the party.\footnote{149}

Although the general thrust of both the "conflict school" and the interest group approach to Soviet politics has received wide acceptance in American social science,\footnote{150} the explanatory power of each of these orientations respecting Soviet politics is seriously limited on several counts. First of all, although the conflict and interest group approaches assert that struggle among elites at the personal and institutional levels is endemic to Soviet politics, we are often left with little if any information about Politburo members' likely orientations on specific issues, how these orientations might change over time, or how a given elite even defines an issue. All these difficulties


\footnote{150} Dissenters include William E. Odom, op. cit., and David Powell, "In Pursuit of Interest Groups in the USSR", \textit{Soviet Union}, vol. 6, no. 1, 1979.
are in large part due to the nature of the public utterances of the Soviet elite. Such public expressions have been characterized as esoteric communications because of the cryptic meanings, veiled references, nuances, and so forth which have historically characterized Soviet elite communications. Although Western analysts attempt to obviate the difficulty of esoteric communication by Kremlinological means, the results produced by these means have the double weakness of lack of real rigor, and difficulty in placing the findings in a broader theoretical perspective of Soviet political processes. For example, by closely following the arrangements and placement of Soviet elites in public photographs, we may gain insights into who may be rising in power, 'falling from grace', etc., but this method will reveal little about how and why such an individual elite is experiencing a change in political fortune. In other words, such a methodology is somewhat lacking in providing the analyst with a broad picture of Soviet elite orientations to specific issues.

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Thus, the conflict and interest group orientations have hitherto been useful but quite limited in terms of providing a sense of the inner relations of the Politburo and its structure of power. This limitation has certainly been true concerning our understanding of nationality politics. The Soviet Elite Perceptions Project is designed to address the problem of specific elite orientations by examining each Politburo member's orientation in light of the entire group on specific issues.

The second major difficulty with the conflict and interest group approaches involves the perception of the national question itself in the USSR; we must recall that the whole idea of a "national question" in the Soviet Union is ostensibly resolved as a matter of official policy, and therefore not an issue per se to the political elite. In this respect references to national relations in the USSR are likely to be even more cryptic and esoteric than on other issues over which some disagreement is more likely to be expressed. This factor obviously increases the necessity and value of the study, as other methods have not proven capable of determining specific elites' orientations on the national question. Nonetheless, evidence exists that in the decade of the 1970s alone at least one individual was removed from the Politburo for nationality-related
reasons (Petro Shelest, April, 1973), and I will argue that in another less celebrated case, Nikolai Podgorny (removed May, 1977), nationality orientations played a substantial role in his removal.\textsuperscript{153} The question becomes one of making enough sense of the esoteric communication of Soviet nationality politics to determine the orientations of each Politburo member, and relate these to the larger structure of power in the Politburo.

Thus, the Soviet Elite Perceptions Project is in the intellectual tradition of Kremlinology, but represents a much more systematic and rigorous attempt to determine individual orientations of Politburo members. By comparing all Politburo members on the same sets of issues, differences among the members will emerge much more clearly than by using traditional Kremlinological procedures. The problem of determining nationality orientations is both complicated and made more crucial by the acknowledged fact that Western analysts are really quite unaware of a specific "Soviet nationality policy" per se. Brian Silver has most appropriately written that no real "nationality policy"

exists per se, and that Western scholars have often merely assumed that one does exist. In reality little is actually known about how policy is made, or even the specifics of "policies" which emerge from the Politburo.\(^{154}\)

Thus the problem of understanding elite orientations to nationality issues is made difficult not only by the phenomenon of esoteric communications, but also by virtue of the nebulous content or substance of Soviet nationality policies. Yet these factors make an understanding of the personal orientations of the Politburo all the more crucial - if no concrete "policies" are available for analysis, then we must turn to the perceptions and attitudes expressed by the elites as the starting point for understanding Soviet nationality politics at the elite level.

The second broad assumption underlying the project is that Politburo members' orientations to issues can be determined from public speeches and writings. Although several objections may well be raised concerning this aspect

\(^{154}\) That is, little is known about elites' orientations aside from the extremely general official "policy" of building communism, and molding the "new Soviet man" in the process. This orientation would of course be embraced by any professed communist, and therefore provides little information in terms of specific orientations of Politburo members on just how to go about reaching these very general goals. See Brian Silver, "Soviet Nationality Problems: Analytic Approaches", *Problems of Communism*, vol. 27, no. 4, July-August, 1979.
of the methodology, the advantages of examining public statements far outweigh the objections. It has been argued that Soviet elites' public expressions, both written and oral, are censored, edited, overseen, and generally not necessarily indicative of a given Politburo member's orientation. However, we must recall that Politburo members' time and energy are quite limited, and therefore the issues which they address (as well as the manner in which they are addressed), must give some indication of the perceived salience of the issue to a given Politburo member. Furthermore, it is a well established principle of Kremlinology that silence on an apparently significant issue often indicates displeasure or disapproval with official policy or issue stance.

Objection may also be raised concerning the appropriateness of studying public statements in light of the fact that Soviet elites are known to employ staff speechwriters. As such, public statements and writings would not represent elites' "real" attitudes toward issues. However, the fact remains that Soviet elites have historically been called to task for material which has

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155 This factor is by no means insignificant, given the advanced age of virtually the entire group; see Appendix C for specific ages.

publicly appeared under their name, and at times with serious consequences.157

Finally, the project is built on the intellectual foundations of socio-psychological approaches to political behavior as developed by R.E. Lane and D.O. Sears,158 and Charles E. Osgood159 regarding attitudes toward issues. Osgood determined that attitudes may be analyzed in terms of evaluation of an object, perceptions of the potency of the object (meaning here the perceived strength, or power of an idea or thing, irrespective of its evaluative character), and the activeness of the object. These dimensions will be further explained shortly. In analyzing the composition of attitudes, the relative weight given to each of these three

157 The case of Molotov is very instructive here; see Hyron Rush, pp.91-2. Also, it should be remembered that Shelest's troubles began soon after the publication of his book, Our Soviet Ukraine in the early 1970s — a rather drastic example, but illustrative of the fact that even Politburo membership does not mean immunity from scrutiny of published or spoken materials. I am indebted to Dr. Roger A. Blough, the administrator of the OSU phase of the project, for these insights into the objections and value of studying the public materials of Soviet elites. It is also instructive to bear in mind that even if public speeches did not reveal personal attitudes as such, they would at the very least reveal attitudes and beliefs deemed to be publicly relevant and appropriate. It is these latter beliefs and attitudes, in any event, which shape politics and policy.


159 Osgood, Saporta, and Nunally, "Evaluative Assertion Analysis", Litera, III, pp.48-102; Osgood, G.J. Suci,
dimensions was roughly 80% to evaluation, 15% to potency, and 5% to activity. Due to the relative insignificance of the last dimension in relation to the other two, activity is not analyzed in this study.

4.2 **PROCEDURE IN ANALYSIS**

The first step in determining the salience of the national question is to ascertain the proportion of references to all nationality issues to all issues coded in the project. Recall that the four general areas of the project are foreign policy, the Soviet economy, dissent, and nationality issues. Other minor areas coded were the various references to Brezhnev as leader of the Soviet Union, the role of science and technology in Soviet society, conceptions of the Party and its role in society, and so forth. Thus, while the project is not absolutely exhaustive in terms of coding every aspect of Soviet political elites' attention, a considerable effort was made in the conceptual stages of the project to include enough important areas of attention to be able to discern patterns of salience with considerable

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160 The idea here is to determine the Politburo members' relation to Brezhnev by the manner in which he refers to the General Secretary.
specificity. Thus, the amount of attention that a Politburo member devotes to nationality issues compared to other issues in the study will serve as a good indicator of the salience of the national question to that member.

The next step in determining orientations to the national question is to ascertain the salience of specific nationality issues to each Politburo member. This is accomplished by determining the relative attention that each Politburo member devotes to a particular issue. Nine issues will be examined, most of which are comprised of more than one cognitive object, or a specific word or phrase.61

In the process of coding the various themes in the project, attention was devoted to assessing the apparent affective orientation of the Politburo member to the cognitive object. Affective orientation is assessed here in terms of two dimensions, evaluation and potency.62 Evaluation refers to the perception of the cognitive object

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61 A cognitive object is word or phrase which in some measure points to a policy relevant indicator. Appendix A provides a breakdown of the issues and their constituent cognitive objects. Coding was done for cognitive objects and not for issues per se.

as good, bad, positive, negative, worthy, or worthless.\textsuperscript{163} Potency refers to the perception of the cognitive object as strong or weak, potent or powerless.\textsuperscript{164} In the case of a theme which is inherently problematical (from a Soviet perspective), whether or not the problem involved has been resolved. Sensitivity to the latter concern in coding nationality-related cognitive objects was thus very important, as the official position is of course that the national question itself has been resolved.\textsuperscript{165}

In order to determine the affective orientation of Politburo members with greater specificity, coding for evaluation and potency was done on a seven point scale ranging from \( +3 \) to \( -3 \). The process of coding was done

\textsuperscript{163}For example, Bashidov's evaluation of "Leninist nationality policy" can be seen to be quite high from the following citation: "...our socialist achievements are the result of the unswerving implementation of Lenin's nationality policy, which insures the cohesion of all the country's people's in a single, unified, fraternal family and orients them toward the common objective." S.R. Rashidov, "Leninism: The Banner of the People's Progress," in Pravda Vostoka, 17 October, 1972, pp. 2-3.

\textsuperscript{164}For example, the idea of the "friendship of the peoples" is seen by Rashidov as a strong, powerful force (as well as a good and positive one): "...the friendship of the Soviet peoples has undergone severe trials and has withstood them with honor. It has been cemented by the blood of the Soviet people, shed in abundance in a joint struggle against the enemies of the motherland..." Rashidov, ibid.

\textsuperscript{165}For example, the following reference by Rashidov to the national question received a negative potency score:
according to a 'decision-tree' analysis, wherein the coder first determined whether the cognitive object was perceived as positive or negative. After this, the degree of positive or negative affect was determined (+1, +2, or +3, etc.). Although such a procedure might appear rather subjective, a considerable amount of time and energy was devoted to coder training with specific examples from actual speeches. Also, the large number of cases and the fact that speeches were randomly distributed for coding should help to decrease the possibility of systematic biases in coding.

Reliability in coding was found to be at levels generally considered acceptable for social science research of this type. In the first step in coding, at which determination of positive or negative affect was made, reliability was nearly 100%. Coding within one point (+1 or +3 for +2, etc.) the reliability level was in the high 80% 's, and exact matches were in the range of 55-65%. In terms of reliability for coding salience, (i.e., the number of cognitive objects coded), it should be mentioned that the speeches were double-checked by the project administrator, Mr. Roger A. Blough, to assure that as many cognitive

"During socialist building in the USSR the economic and cultural backwardness of previously oppressed nations and nationalities was rapidly liquidated. And with the victory of socialism in our country the nationalities question was also resolved, and Lenin's nationalities policy triumphed." Rashidov, ibid.
objects as possible were in fact coded. According to Krippendorf, richness of data may be achieved by sacrificing some degree of reliability. We determined that richness of data should be the prime concern in the research effort, and proceeded accordingly, although serious effort was made to keep reliability levels at as high a level as feasible.

A total of over 200,000 cognitive objects were coded in both phases of the project, and nationality references comprise 3.45% of all references in the final project, or a total N of 7,163 cognitive objects (see Table 5). A total of 27 Politburo members were included in the study at one time or another. Some, such as Pelshe, Shevarnadzhe, etc., were not coded due to the small amount of public statements made during their tenure on the Politburo. Others who are on the Politburo as of this writing may not be included due to their recent entry into the Politburo (Gorbachev, Tikhonov).

The following are some examples of how specific nationality-related cognitive objects were coded. They are provided to give the reader a sense of the differences among various levels of affect. Each quote may contain several cognitive objects; those underlined are the cognitive

objects which are given as examples of coding scores.

Sharif Rashidov (2/4/76 in Report to 19th Uzbek Party Congress: "The great friendship and brotherhood among peoples constitute the life-giving source of the mighty power of our state, the foundation and guarantee of the successful building of communism." Evaluation: +3, Potency: +3

G.A. Aliyev (4/21/78): "Our Fundamental Law demonstrates the triumph of the great ideas of friendship and brotherhood of the peoples of the USSR, the wisdom of the Leninist nationality policy which insures the genuinely democratic reconciliation of the common interests of the multinational USSR and the interests of each of the republics which make it up..." Evaluation: +2, Potency: +2

Mikhail Suslov (10/23/74 Speech in Tashkent): "Dear friends, there are two orders of Lenin and an Order of Friendship Among Peoples on the Uzbek SSR's banner. These awards express more eloquently than any words that the working people of Uzbekistan are making a worthy contribution to the common cause of the struggle of all the Soviet peoples for the victory of communism." Evaluation: +1, Potency: +1
Sharif Rashidov (3/26/73 speech to Uzbek Party aktiv): "The building of the material and technical base of communism, in which all the country's peoples are participating, is the economic basis for the nation's development and rapprochement. Evaluation: +1 , Potency: +1

Sharif Rashidov (11/22/74 speech to Karakalpak Party meeting): "The victory of October, and the establishment of national statehood in the former colonial districts of Russia, including Karakalpakia, put an end to colonial oppression and created conditions for the establishment of equal relations between the nations. Evaluation: -1 , Potency: 0

Mikhail Suslov (10/23/74 speech in Tashkent): "A generation of people has been brought up on the principles of internationalism and in the spirit of high ideological fiber, devotion to the cause of communism, and irreconcilability toward manifestations of nationalism. Evaluation: -2 , Potency: 0

"We are rightly proud of the outstanding successes achieved in solving the national question in our country. The economic and sociopolitical roots of nationalism have long since been liquidated here." Evaluation: -3 , Potency: -3
G.A. Aliyev (1/29/76 report to the 29th Azerbaidzhan Party Congress): "...we believe that social sciences do not generalize profoundly enough the experience of communist construction, the implementation of Leninist nationality policy and the strengthening of the friendship of the peoples, and the party guidance of economic and cultural construction in the republic. They do not always expose bourgeois falsifiers' ideological diversions on time, with the requisite militancy, and in a scientifically substantiated way." Evaluation: -2, Potency: +1
Chapter V
DATA ANALYSIS: POLITBÜRO PERCEPTIONS OF ISSUES

5.1 BREAKDOWN OF ISSUES
The first step in determining the Soviet elites' perceptions of nationality issues is to look at all references to these issues in the study. Table 5 provides the breakdown of these issues for the whole time period under study (1970-79), and for each of the 24 Politburo members. The most commonly used terms to refer to national relations in the USSR are those which describe the character of national relations. This issue alone comprises nearly 40% of all references to national relations in the study. The cognitive objects which comprise this issue describe Soviet national relations as a friendly, brotherly, family which is "drawing together", and as a 'new historical community of people' (Appendix A). The widespread use of these terms - especially in the 1970s - has been recognized for some time.

What appears novel about our findings is the fact that the set of cognitive objects which comprise the "Unity" issue constitute only 11.8% of all nationality references in the study, or not even 1/3 of the "Character" issue.
Although the "Unity" theme has an important role in the 1970s, these data suggest that Western literature has perhaps underestimated the importance of the communal-familial theme in assessing the Politburo's perceptions of Soviet national relations. We shall return to the unity theme shortly, as it requires more explanation. First, however, the full significance of the very high percentage of references to the "Character" issue must be brought out.

The issue entitled "Substance of National Relations" is comprised of cognitive objects which describe what Soviet national relations consist of; i.e., how the relations actually operate. Thus such terms as cooperation, interaction, common tasks and interests among Soviet peoples, the All-Union division of labor, etc., describe the means by which nationalities are building communism. The "Character" issue, by contrast, is comprised of cognitive objects which are more normatively prescriptive, calling for that which should be, as well as describing what national relations are actually like at present. Table 6 shows the elites' attitudes toward these two issues, and the "Unity" issue as well.

Not only is the issue of the character of national relations much more salient to the Soviet elite than the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>% of Nat. Ref.</th>
<th>mean eval.</th>
<th>mean pot.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Character</td>
<td>39.85</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>2855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Natl Min.</td>
<td>17.12</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>11.89</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Gr.Russ.</td>
<td>10.71</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substance</td>
<td>7.48</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crit. of Dev.</td>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>-1.44</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideolog. Ref.</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The Nat'l Quest.&quot;</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>-0.64</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Sov.Natl Pol.&quot;</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>7163</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total N: 7163
### TABLE 6

**Attitudes Toward Character, Substance, and Unity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Mean Saliency</th>
<th>Mean Eval.</th>
<th>Mean Pot.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Character</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substance</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
substance as these terms have been defined above, but the character is also evaluated more highly, and perceived as more potent as well (Table 6). The significance of these figures is twofold. First of all, the USSR may be viewed as an "engineered society" inasmuch as the ideology upon which the entire society is ostensibly based revolves around the idea of "building communism". This connotes a very strong sense of teleology, or goal orientation on the part of the ideology. Yet such a teleological conviction does not seem to be reflected in comparing the cognitive dimensions of these two issues of character and substance. Not only is the mean salience score considerably higher for the character issue than the substance (over 4.5 times as great), but character is evaluated higher as well. Thus, the emphasis by the elites on the normatively prescriptive character, as opposed to the substance of national relations, may be viewed as a preoccupation with the exigencies of maintaining order at the expense of large amounts of attention devoted to the specifics of how nations actually manage to get along. Pragmatism over teleology, in other words. 167

167 The Soviets would probably counter such an interpretation of these data by asserting that the construction of communism is precisely that - a construction project. As such, the Party must not only serve as architect of the new society, by laying down the substantive principles of national relations under
The second major point to be made from Table 6 emerges from a comparison of the mean salience scores for the character and unity issues. It is at times maintained that the "unity" theme had become the dominant theme of national relations in the 1970s. There is a sense in which this is true, especially regarding the ultimate goal of Soviet national relations which under Khrushchev was "fusion", or the merger of all nationalities such that one's identity was not made in reference to national or ethnic origin. The idea of fusion was indeed virtually dropped by the late 1960s, as noted earlier. However, to maintain simply that the unity theme has supplanted the old Khrushchev formula is to miss several very important aspects of the Soviet elites' perceptions of national relations in the 1970s. This shift

... communism, but also serve as the model and exemplar for the current society by holding forth the normatively prescriptive characterizations of communist society both as it is perceived now by the leadership, and as it will actually be in full fruition under communism. The appropriate rebuttal to this argument is to look at the scores on the issues of "Unity" and "Ideological Orientations", which provide rather ample evidence that the teleological optimism and dynamism of the earlier years (particularly the Khrushchev era) has been supplanted by emphasis upon themes which unmistakably connote a more static and maintaining conception of national relations in the USSR.

of terminology reflects a serious reorientation by the Politburo to national relations.

The first significant aspect of the shift toward the unity theme in the 1970s is that it may have been a conciliatory and/or concessionary measure directed toward the national minority elites who sensed a threat from the strictures of the old goal of fusion. It may have also been a measure by the Russian elites to contain minority protestations generated by the celebrated emphasis on "national liberation" in the Third World during the decade under study. I tend to agree with Novikov that the new emphasis on national liberation may have indeed precipitated the "unity" theme; however, the question of who among the elites precipitated this shift is very important, as it would point not only to the purpose of the shift (i.e., as a reaction by minority elites or as a forestalling of micro-nationalism at home), but also to the role and function of the minority elites on the Politburo. We will return to address this question in greater detail at the end of Chapter 6.

169 This idea was suggested by Novikov, Osteuropa, and discussed as well by Helene Carrerre d'Encausse, "Party and Federation in the USSR: The Problem of the Nationalities and Power in the USSR", Government and Opposition, (vol. 13, no. 2) Spring, 1978, pp. 142-46; Rakowska-Harmstone (1981), Bilinsky (1978).
Nevertheless, with the adoption of the unity theme and the heavy emphasis upon the issue of the character of national relations by the Soviet elite, the dynamic, optimistic nationality formula of the early 1960s appears to have evolved into a much more static, or "maintaining" position. The significance of this phenomenon lies primarily in that it reflects the Soviet leadership's increasing sensitivity to national relations in general in the 1970s, and specifically to nationalities' subtle but effective pressure for greater elite attention to their interests, consciousness, and so forth. To illustrate this further, we now turn to the issue referred to by the Soviet elite second most often, which I have entitled the pro-national minority orientation.

The cognitive objects comprising the pro-national minority issue call for some clarification. Perhaps most importantly, this issue should not be construed to reflect an orientation by any particular elite which is in any sense "pro-national minority" to the point of being anti-Soviet. Obviously no one harboring such an orientation would make it to the Politburo. Rather, this issue points to a perception of and attitude toward national minorities which would not only maintain their identity as nationalities, but also be sensitive to their interests, consciousness, and role in the
larger picture of Soviet society. At the very least it connotes a desire to avoid the excesses of the Stalin years, and to assure that they are not repeated.

Some cognitive objects in the pro-national minority issue more or less prima facie signify an orientation of sensitivity and or sanguinity toward the minorities, such as "nationalities' interests", the USSR as a "voluntary union of republics", and "Tsarist exploitation of minorities". Others, however, are not quite so clear. "Leninist nationality policy" has been identified earlier in the work as a potentially powerful focal point for minority elites who wish to advance the interests of their group without their loyalty to the USSR being called into question.

I have also included in this issue the cognitive object, "USSR as a multinational state." Although there is nothing antithetical about perceiving the Soviet Union as a multinational state and also as a "new historical community of people" (included in the "character issue"), the former term seems to connote a more perdurable quality about the nationhood of the various peoples of the USSR. Such

Recall that the perdurability of nationhood was ironically enough one aspect of Stalin's perception of national relations; the crucial difference between his emphasis on national perdurability and that of contemporary Soviet minorities is that Stalin used the idea of enduring nationhood to foster what amounted to Russian nationalism, whereas the minorities may emphasize the idea to avert being
perdurability can be seen as an assertion of national identity of the various minority groups, but also of their prerogative of at least attempting to exert some influence upon their political fate within the Soviet system.

It is largely for this same reason that the cognitive object "equality of nationalities" has been included in the pro-national minority issue. From the standpoint of a reasonably loyal national minority who wished to nonetheless avert any perceived Russian encroachment, it would make sense to emphasize the formal and constitutionally guaranteed equality of all nationalities. Doing so would be ideologically "safe" as well as remaining within the constraints of good political sense. As such the use of terms as apparently mild as "the USSR as a multinational state", and "equality of nationalities" may in many cases be understood as a manifestation of the "orthodox nationalism" referred to earlier in this work (cf. pp. 74-76).

Such manifestations at the Politburo level are significant in that they not only underscore leadership awareness of nationalities' interests, but also allow them "lost" (ethnographically) within this "new historical community". On the positive side, one must again view the matter in chronological perspective: a "new historical community" would be much less threatening than the old idea of "fusion" to a national minority member concerned about the perpetuation of his/her national identity, heritage, and so forth.
to be expressed at the highest levels of political power in the Soviet Union. These interests, of course, must be understood as functioning within the context of the perceived good of the whole Soviet society. Nonetheless, such a scenario of expression of orthodox nationalism at the Politburo level would have been all but unthinkable under Stalin's regime.

It is very significant that the pro-national minority issue constitutes over 17% of all references to national relations in the study. Second only to the issue of the character of national relations in percentage of elite references, this level of attention demonstrates at the very least a sensitivity to national minorities on the part of the Soviet elite. In my estimation it also represents a deliberate effort to at least attempt to return to the Leninist tradition of formal acknowledgement of the rights, interests, and identity of national minorities under socialism. To demonstrate that the Politburo under consideration indeed makes an effort to restore the Leninist conception of national relations, Table 7 presents the data

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171 At this juncture Rakowska-Harmstone's point that ethnic relations are the subject of an important debate within top Party circles is particularly pertinent. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Study of Ethnic Politics in the USSR", in *Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe*, George W. Simmonds, Ed., Detroit: University of Detroit Press, 1977, p.29.
from several cognitive objects comprising the pro-national minority and criticism of deviation issues. (More general examination of these issues will follow). A crucial point to recall in examining Table 7 is Stalin's pronouncement at the 17th Party Congress in 1931 that chauvinism and especially "great power chauvinism" (i.e., Russian chauvinism) no longer constituted the central problem in national relations, but rather "nationalist deviations" of various sorts. As was emphasized in Chapter 2, this pronouncement by Stalin represented a fundamental reorientation to national relations on the part of the Communist Party of the USSR and the Soviet government.

This of course should not be construed to mean that the Soviet elites under study have downplayed the potential threat of nationalist deviations to the USSR, or even that they take such deviations less seriously than did Stalin. The crucial difference is that whereas Stalin did not really

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172 To underscore the fact that this pronouncement by Stalin was but a foretaste of the Russo-centrism to come, it is pertinent to recall that by the time of the 17th Party Congress, the most serious form of "nationalist deviation", namely the Basmachi revolt, had been crushed well beyond the point where it could threaten the cohesion and/or survival of the country. The fact that Stalin was hardly speaking idle words is dramatically underscored when we recall that the whole phenomenon of "national communism" was effectively eliminated by WWII. Alexander A. Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslim National Communism: A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, pp. 26, 92.
### TABLE 7

**Selected Cognitive Objects in Issues**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cognitive Object</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean Evaluation</th>
<th>Mean Potency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leninist Nat.Pol.</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>1.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gr. Power Chauvinism</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-0.85</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chauvinism</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>-1.58</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>-1.43</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE</th>
<th>% of Nationality References</th>
<th>Mean Evaluation</th>
<th>Mean Potency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-national Min.</td>
<td>17.12</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism of Dev.</td>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>-1.44</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
emphasize the ostensibly "Leninist" orientation of his handling of national relations, the Politburo under question does, and this has very real importance. This is especially true of the national minority members of the Politburo, as we shall see in the next chapter. This reemergence of emphasis on various aspects of nationalities' rights and interests will be seen to be coming largely from the national minority elites, and a few particular Russian Politburo members. Again, this phenomenon supports the idea that the relatively heavy emphasis on the pro-national minority issue is more than a mere window dressing, and probably reflects the "increased pressure" which minorities have placed on the Soviet political system in the post-Khrushchev years. Recall also Bialer's point that

173 Nevertheless, it must be born in mind that Stalin claimed to be in the Leninist tradition, see his The National Question and Leninism, NY: International Publishers (no publication date given; written by Stalin in 1929). However, the critically different conceptions of national relations between Lenin and Stalin as outlined in Chapter 2 of this study indicate rather clearly that Stalin's claim to be following Lenin is a gross perversion in every sense of the term, and justified on the basis of political expediency. Whether Stalin so perverted them consciously or unconsciously is quite irrelevant: the fact remains that the Stalin years represented a qualitatively different position on national relations than that envisaged by Lenin. The important point is that this difference has not been lost upon contemporary Soviet minority elites. (Cf. pp. 31-36 of this work).

179 Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR", Problems of Communism, (vol.27, no.3)
The Soviets' success in containing any nationalist upheavals can be attributed to concessions to minorities as well as resorting to pure force. The fact that such a large portion of all Politburo references to nationality issues were to some degree oriented positively toward minority identity, interests, etc., makes Bialer's point all the more pertinent.

Thus, one major characteristic of the Politburo of the 1970s regarding national relations is that it has collectively attempted to at least formally remain sensitive to the best in the Leninist tradition. The fact that the mean potency and evaluation scores for the pro-national minority issue are relatively high compared to other issues indicates that the Politburo indeed perceives this issue as alive and well as an aspect of Soviet national relations (Table 7).

The issue "criticism of deviation" received relatively little attention from the Politburo under study. Only 6.13% of all references to nationality references were of this type. However, the pattern of elites' attention to this issue compared to other nationality issues provides a very illuminating picture of their function regarding national relations as well as their perceptions and attitudes.

May-June, 1974, pp. 10-12.
The first thing which should be clear from the relatively low percentage of references to national deviations is that the Politburo focuses its attention more on the positive than negative aspects of national relations. This is certainly understandable, given the official position that the national question has been completely resolved in the Soviet Union. Table 7 demonstrates this elite orientation rather forcefully - the mean potency for all references to nationalist deviations is -0.57, indicating that this issue is perceived by the elites as patently unproblematical, as the ideology maintains. The mean evaluative score of -1.44 indicates the high degree of negative orientation to this aspect of national relations compared to other nationality issues (Table 5).

Thus at this point we can maintain that the relatively small percentage of attention to deviations is due in most part to the ideological incongruity between the resolution of the national problem and the persistence of nationalist deviations. In the next chapter we will examine the issues from the perspectives of individual elites, revealing a pattern which suggests a functional division of labor among elites. As we shall see, national deviations are taken more seriously than the low percentage of references to them would initially suggest.
We have seen that the Soviet elite focuses its attention predominantly on the positive, progressive aspects of national relations—their character (39.89%), substance (7.48%), the unity theme (13.89%), and terms which suggest a concessionary orientation toward nationalities (pro-national minority, 17.12%). The group of cognitive objects which I have labelled the "pro-Great Russian" issue is a further example of the elites' emphasis on that which they perceive as positive, and potent. In spite of the rather mediocre level of attention to this issue by the whole Politburo (10.71% of all nationality references), this issue is crucial to both understanding the Politburo's attitude toward national relations, and to our understanding of the various functions which various elites appear to perform in maintaining the cohesion and stability of Soviet society.

The issue of "pro-Great Russian" orientations is perhaps the most precarious of all issues in the study in terms of the Politburo's maintenance of its own ideological integrity. It should be clear by now that the Politburo places great emphasis on the positive aspects of national relations, and the contribution of things Russian to Soviet history, society, and culture are certainly an important dimension of this emphasis. However, the intensity and severity of Lenin's opposition to "Great Russian Chauvinism"
and his perception of Tsarist Russia as a "prison house of nationalities" must be well recognized by the Soviet elite, and to some degree by the not-so-elite. In addition, one important indictment of Stalin's cult of personality was his blatant glorification of things Russian, and his personal Russo-philism which led to abuse of Soviet nationalities in both the ideological and practical realms. Thus the Politburo of the 1970s should be expected to exercise caution regarding the praise of things Russian, so that no charges of Great Russian chauvinism in any form (Tsarist or Stalinist) could be leveled. Therefore the real dilemma remains one of emphasizing the positive contribution of things Russian without crossing the ideological line into chauvinism. It is probably this potential danger which kept the proportion of nationality references to the "pro-Great Russian" issue at a moderate level of only slightly more than 10% of all nationality references.

However, the modest level of attention to the pro-Great Russian issue is offset somewhat by the very high mean evaluative score for this issue, 1.92. Table 5 shows that


176 That is, in the ideological realm the ideals of the Revolution had been thoroughly perverted by Stalin; in the practical realm the USSR under Stalin was with little doubt a "prison house of nationalities" as much as it was under Tsarist rule, if not worse.
this is the highest mean evaluation score for any nationality issue. This suggests that the contribution of things Russian to Soviet nationality relations— the language, culture, and history—is indeed an important aspect of the Politburo's attitude toward national relations.\(^{177}\)

The mean potency score of the pro-Great Russian issue is moderately high compared to other issues at 1.55, suggesting that the Politburo collectively perceives the contribution of things Russian as a powerful factor in Soviet national relations, as well as a very valuable one.

In order to gain a sense of the fidelity of the Politburo under study to certain explicitly ideological themes in Soviet national relations, the issue "ideological references" was established as a separate analytical category. These references represent the most quintessential "ideological" cognitive objects in the study regarding national relations, although other cognitive objects obviously have ideological content (Appendix A). Most

\(^{177}\) Lenin's essay, "Two Cultures in Every Culture," enables the current Soviet elites—Russian and otherwise—to glorify the "progressive aspects of (pre-revolutionary) Russian culture" without implicating such culture in the ideological condemnation of Tsarist Russian society and culture. Lenin expounded a theory of a "proletarian culture," and a "bourgeoisie culture" within any macro-cultural milieu, and of course advocated the advancement of the former and destruction of the latter. "Two Cultures Within Every Culture," The Lenin Anthology, Robert C. Tucker, ed., pp. 654–8, 675–6.
of the cognitive objects in this issue are essentially "pure" Marxist themes, in the sense of being pre-Leninist. These references are still in use by the Politburo, but comprised only 4.20% of all nationality references. This low percentage suggests that the Politburo does not focus much attention on the ideological fine points of national relations, or even on the end goal, or telos, of such relations under full communism. Rather, greatest emphasis is placed de facto on maintaining the 'friendly family' which constitutes contemporary Soviet society. Again the leadership's collective attitude toward national relations appears to be much more static and practically oriented than in the 1950s-60s, as evidenced by the relatively small amount of attention which these explicitly ideological references receive.

A curious aspect of the "ideological references" issue is that the mean potency score — indicating the Politburo's perceptions of the power, or efficacy of the issue — is one of the lowest of any issue in the study, being a mere 0.65. The mean evaluative score is 1.41, or close to the mean for all issues. Thus, although these explicitly ideological references are perceived roughly as positive, or valued, as other issues, they are decidedly not perceived as being quite so potent. This seems to reflect the practically
oriented nature of the Soviet elite in the time period under study, and their preoccupation with a 'maintaining' position. Such a position may ultimately be at the expense of ideological refinement, or even the promise of a relatively rapid transition to 'full communism.' At any rate, the top priority of the group of elites under study regarding national relations appears to be the inculation of their perception of Soviet nationalities as a friendly, brotherly, and unified family into the consciousness of the Soviet people, and to do so while keeping nationality-related upstarts at an absolute minimum. The manner in which all nationality issues examined in this chapter are balanced in the collective perception of this Politburo supports the idea that explicitly Marxist ideological pronouncements do not play a particularly significant role in this task.

The final aspect of elite attention to nationality issues involves the use of the phrases, "the national question" and "Soviet nationality policy." Table 5 shows that these terms are used very infrequently. It has been suggested several times in the study that "Soviet nationality policy" is not a particularly fruitful concept to employ in attempting to understand the politics of national relations in the Soviet
The Soviet elites certainly do not appear to perceive national relations as somehow handled by a specific, or determined "policy" as such, but rather by a general attitude of familial (parental) benevolence and emphasis on the positive aspects of multinational social life. The most plausible explanation for this lack of a specific policy is that the Soviet leadership apparently wants to maintain enough flexibility to grant concessions and proffer conciliations wherever appropriate or expedient, and yet be able to punish national minorities' behavior and or attitudes which could possibly upset the balance of harmony among peoples.

As the data in the next chapter will suggest, a differential orientation toward various national minorities seems to be in effect. This theme will be explored more fully in chapters 7 and 8. It is also interesting to note that both the mean evaluative and potency scores for "Soviet nationality policy" are very low compared to other issues (0.52 and 0.42, respectively), indicating that the concept of a single Soviet nationality policy is not perceived with a great deal of enthusiasm by Soviet elites, nor seen as a very powerful idea to describe the official

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176 I would reiterate here the remarks made to this effect by Brian Silver, Problems of Communism, July-August, 1979, pp. 72ff.
position on national relations.

Because of the expressed conviction that the national question has been resolved completely in the USSR, it is not surprising that references to it directly by the elite are relatively few. If any evaluative affect is expressed toward this issue, it is almost invariably negative (mean evaluation, -0.24). As a concept, "the national question" is of course officially perceived as resolved, and hence impotent in the practical and ideological realms: this perception is reflected in the negative mean potency score of -0.64 for this issue (Table 5). The analysis in the following chapter will demonstrate that this official perception belies the specifics of individual perceptions and attitudes toward issues of national relations, however.

While the foregoing analysis reveals a good deal about the macro-orientation of Soviet elites in the 1970s, it tells virtually nothing about the individual patterns of attention to specific nationality issues. These individual patterns hold the real key to understanding Soviet nationality politics at the elite level, and to these we now turn.
Chapter VI

INDIVIDUAL PATTERNS OF ATTENTION AND ATTITUDES

6.1 ATTENTION TO ALL NATIONALITY ISSUES

Since the ouster of Khrushchev in late 1964, the Soviet Politburo has sought to identify itself as a collegial body which guides the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The CPSU in turn acts as the leading and guiding force in Soviet society. Because of the expressed conviction that the national question has been fully and irreversibly resolved, the appearance of solidarity among the top Party leaders on nationality issues is paramount. Indeed, cursory examination of Politburo members' public statements might appear to confirm this alleged solidarity—most of the same terms are used by all; blatant incongruities in any specific elites' references to nationality issues are extremely rare, and of course all firmly agree that the national question has been resolved.

The central concern of this chapter is to establish patterns of attention and attitudes toward the various issues of Soviet national relations. These patterns demonstrate that various elites differ substantially on
perceptions and attitudes toward issues, and that these differences in turn have serious consequences for the maintenance of personal power at the Politburo level. The larger role of nationality issues in the maintenance of personal power will be the subject of the next chapter.

The salience of nationality issues to any particular elite is the most basic aspect of that elite's orientation to the issues. Table 8 shows the salience of nationality issues to each of the elites included in the study. Salience is determined by calculating the percent of attention to all nationality issues from all issues coded in the project.279 (The breakdown of all issues by salience, evaluation, and potency is provided in Appendix C).

Generally speaking, it is the national minority members to whom nationality issues are most salient, and this should come as no surprise. Bashidov appears to be the Politburo spokesman for nationality affairs, with over 18% of his references devoted to nationality affairs. It is significant that a non-Slavic elite is in this position, as Bashidov is one of the few non-Slavic Politburo members in the 1970s.280

179 Recall that the four broad areas of Soviet politics included in the project were foreign affairs/international relations, the Soviet economy, nationality issues, and dissent.

180 Although other non-Slavic elites were on the Politburo during the period under question, only Bashidov (Uzbek), Aliyev (Azerbaijanzhan), and Kunaev (Kazakhstan) were
# TABLE 8

## Salience of Nationality Issues, By Elite

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>% of References to Nationality Issues</th>
<th>Nationality Issues</th>
<th>Total N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bashidov ***</td>
<td>16.45</td>
<td>1517</td>
<td>8220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podgorny**</td>
<td>16.91</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>2394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunaev***</td>
<td>10.69</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>9039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andropov</td>
<td>9.90</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suslov</td>
<td>9.42</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>3373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomentsev</td>
<td>7.82</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>3145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polyanski**</td>
<td>7.67</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aliyev***</td>
<td>7.13</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>5483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shcherbitsky**</td>
<td>6.59</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>11498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelest**</td>
<td>6.09</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>3609</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**mean = 5.65**

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>% of References to Nationality Issues</th>
<th>Nationality Issues</th>
<th>Total N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hazurov#</td>
<td>4.42</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>2101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brezhnev</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>12512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazherov#</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>12978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ponomarev</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirilenko</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>4560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grechko</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>6154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulakov</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>2147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelepin</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ustinov</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>2800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosygin</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>7455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gromyko</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grishin</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>6265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanov</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>8069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voronov</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7551</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** Non-Slav

** Ukrainian

# Belorussian

* These numbers represent the total standardized N for the entire project; standardization was done for comparability among elites.
The two other non-Slavic members, Kunaev (Kazakhstan) and Aliyev (Azerbaidzhan), are both well above the median score. However, Aliyev devotes considerably less attention to nationality issues than Kunaev. As we shall see shortly, Aliyev in fact more closely resembles the "minority-conscious" Russians than the non-Russians in terms of attitudes toward nationality issues, as well as in the perceived salience of these issues.

There are two other very important types of Politburo members to whom nationality issues quite salient, namely the Ukrainians, and a group of three specific Russian elites. We will deal with the Ukrainians first. It is not mere pedantry to remind ourselves that the Ukraine has persistently represented some degree of threat to the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union since the 17th century. Especially in this century, the persistence of dissidence in the Ukraine and even the noted intensity of nationalism among Ukrainians living outside the USSR seem to be both qualitatively and quantitatively greater than among any other single Soviet included in the study. Pelshe (Latvia) was omitted because of the very small amount of public statements by him, and Shevarnadzhe (Georgia) was omitted because of his late inclusion into the Politburo, his relative dearth of public statements, and his apparent unimportance on that body.

Because of the skewed character of the scale (due to Bashidov and Podgorny), it makes more sense to use the median score here as the measure of central tendency.
national group. In addition, the Ukrainians represent the largest minority group in the Soviet Union (being 16.21% of the population). They are also quite advanced in terms of economic development, education, and modernization in general. These factors combined make the Ukrainians a very distinct national group within the USSR. It is very significant that each of the four Ukrainian Politburo members in the 1970s perceives the nationality issues as quite salient, and especially noteworthy that Podgorny is second only to Bashidov in terms of relative attention to nationality issues (16.9%). Shcherbitsky's high level of attention to national relations is very significant, as he is properly regarded by Western students of the USSR as a major figure on the Politburo. Further examination of his perceptions and attitudes will be critical for understanding the functions of various elites. Because of the ouster of Shelest in April 1973 explicitly for his orientation to

It is instructive to note that Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone considers the Ukrainians to be the Soviet nationality with the greatest degree of nationalism and "intensity of nationalist demands." Next are the Balts. "The Soviet Union", in Protection of Ethnic Minorities, Robert G. Wirsing, ed., 1980, p.135. The fact that there is always at least one very important Politburo member from the Ukraine - and none from the Baltic areas - seems to be a reflection of relative potential which the two areas have for creating serious problems with national harmony and unity. The Baltic areas are simply too small, geographically and otherwise, to generate the amount of anxiety which the Ukraine does in terms of national protestations.
national relations, an understanding of his attitudes and perceptions will be very illuminating concerning the nature of personal power maintenance at the Politburo level.

The final group to whom nationality issues are salient is comprised of three Russians: Andropov (9.90%), Suslov (9.42%), and Solomentsev (7.82%). In light of Andropov's assumption of the position of General Secretary of the CPSU in November 1982 shortly after Brezhnev's death, Andropov's salience score is very illuminating. Not only is he the leading Russian in terms of attention to nationality issues, but it is also true that he replaced Suslov after the latter's death in January 1982 in the capacity of a Party Secretary. The fact that Andropov and Suslov are remarkably similar in terms of attention to nationality issues is very noteworthy (9.90% and 9.47%, respectively). It is entirely possible that the question of attention to nationality issues not only played a critical role in Andropov's assumption of Suslov's position, but also that by the time of Brezhnev's death in late 1982 a Party General Secretary was called for who was both attentive to nationality issues and cognizant of their importance in the larger scheme of guiding Soviet society.

The final group of individuals who seem to represent a distinct type regarding national relations are those below
the mean in terms of percentage of attention to nationality issues (Table 8). The only non-Russians in this group are the two Belorussians, Mazurov (4.53%) and Hasherov (4.13%). Their relatively low level of attention to nationality issues is probably best explained by the fact that Belorussia is an important region economically and geographically, but not really in terms of national protestations or potential for disruption of the country's harmony and cohesion.

The remainder of those who do not devote great attention to nationality issues are all Russians. Functionally, this group appears to devote itself to other issues, with occasional references to nationality issues in either a perfunctory way, or simply to reassert the USSR's wise handling of national relations as evidence of the allegedly superiority of Soviet society.

Nonetheless, several interesting aspects of this group with low attention levels to nationality issues should be mentioned. First of all, Brezhnev is not particularly attentive to national relations compared to other issues. This might be expected, as his position obviously called for attention to a very wide variety of issues. Again perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of Brezhnev's salience level emerges when compared to his successor Andropov's. It may
well be that national relations had managed to assume such significance in the collective perception of the Politburo that an Andropov was in effect mandated. We will return to this theme in the next chapter; first, however, we will examine patterns of attention and attitudes toward specific nationality issues by individual members. From this analysis the various nationality-related political functions can be more clearly determined.

6.2 ATTENTION TO SPECIFIC ISSUES BY INDIVIDUAL ELITES

Figures 1 through 4 represent the patterns of attention to nationality issues by individual elites. Figure 1 presents the pattern of attention of the three non-Slavic elites, figure 2 the pattern of the Ukrainians, figure 3 the pattern of the nationality-conscious Russians, and figure 4 the pattern for the remaining, non-"attentive" elites. Examination of these figures, and especially figures 1-3, indicate that the crucial differences among the elites revolve around three issues: pro-national minority orientations, criticism of nationalist deviations, and the pro-Great Russian orientations. To a lesser degree the issue of "Unity Among Soviet Peoples" is significant, but mostly as a subsidiary consideration of the three main issues. Table 9 presents the mean scores for salience, evaluation,
and potency for these issues for all elites with above average attention to national relations. We will examine the non-Slavs first (figure 1).
A = Soviet Nationality Policy
B = The National Question
C = Ideological Orientations
D = Criticism of National Deviations
E = Substance of National Relations
F = Pro-Great Russian Orientations
G = Unity of Soviet Peoples
H = Pro-nationality Orientations
I = Character of National Relations

Figure 1: Patterns of Attention to Issues: Non-Slavs
6.2.1 Non-Slav Perceptions and Attitudes

The first thing which one notices in figure 1 is that all three non-Slavs are well above the mean on the pro-Great Russian issue. Hashidov's percentage of references to this issue is almost ludicrous—nearly four and one-half percent of all his references coded in the study. Note also that with exception of the pro-Great Russian issue, the very general curve of the lines of each member in this figure follows roughly the mean for the entire Politburo, except higher. Only Aliyev deviates from this pattern, especially regarding the Unity and Criticism of Deviations issues, where he devotes less relative attention than the other two non-Slavs.

It is also significant that each person represented on this figure is well above the mean on the pro-national minority issue, with Hashidov and Kunaev far above the Politburo mean. On the issue of Criticism of Deviations, however, only Hashidov is above the mean, and even he is only slightly so (0.59% to 0.39%); Kunaev is precisely at the mean, and Aliyev is below (0.24%). Thus, while the pro-national minority and pro-Great Russian issues are very salient to the three non-Slavs, criticism of nationalist deviations is not. Emphasis on national relations by these
### TABLE 9

Scores For Selected Issues for Attentives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE</th>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>Pro-Great Russian</th>
<th>Pro-National Minority</th>
<th>Critical of Deviations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sa</td>
<td>Ev</td>
<td>Po</td>
<td>Sa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>non-Slavs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aliyev</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunaev</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>1.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashidov</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>2.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ukrainians</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podgorny</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>3.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shcherbit.</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelest</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polyanski</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nationality-Conscious Russians</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andropov</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suslov</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomntsv.</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sa = Salience, Ev = Evaluation score, Po = Potency score
three members is mostly on the character issue, praising things Russian, and pro-national minority references. It would be misleading to regard the high number of references favoring national minorities by these three elites as mere formality and without substantive significance. The real question becomes one of whom these minority elites are in fact representing—e.g., are they the voice of Moscow in the provinces, or vice-versa? Students favoring the totalitarian conception of Soviet politics would probably maintain that the former is correct, and that the non-Slavic elites (as well perhaps as the Ukrainian elites) are the emissaries of Moscow to the minority regions. If this were the case, however, we should expect the non-Slavic Politburo members to be at the forefront of combatting national deviations. However, their attention to national deviations only exceeds the mean in the case of Rashidov, and figure 1 demonstrates that his level of attention to deviations compared to other nationality issues is low.

The above point is even more persuasive when we note that the group tends to perceive national deviations as slightly more potent than does the Politburo as a whole (Table 9). If they were indeed the messengers of Moscow to contain national deviations and no more, we could expect much more
relative attention to these deviations. Such a higher level of attention to deviations is a characteristic of the Ukrainian elites, as we shall see shortly. Also, analysis of the attention patterns and attitudes of the nationality-conscious Russians suggests very strongly that containment of nationality deviations in general is more a responsibility of Russian elites.

Rashidov, Kumaev, and Aliyev are also above the Politburo mean on the issue of Ideological References. This indicates that their attention to nationality issues is again no mere formality, and that their perceptions of national relations are more attuned to the finer points of Marxism-Leninism. The fact that their mean potency and evaluation scores are generally above the Politburo mean suggests that their attention to these finer ideological points of Soviet national relations is based on a conviction of the efficacy of that ideology.

What does the above outline suggest about the role of the non-Slavs on the Politburo? There is a real sense in which they are the emissaries of Moscow, inasmuch as they have obviously ascended the Party hierarchy and occupy at least candidate positions in its leading organ. However, the

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156 It should be born in mind that the Party 2nd Secretary in minority regions is generally Russian, and it is he who performs this task of monitoring the provinces as such.
amount of attention devoted by them to the pro-national minority issue also points to their function as monitor-representatives of their regions, keeping Moscow attuned to the various national minority groups. Recall Bialer's two points about the minorities to a large extent governing their own regions, and that Moscow has pursued a balanced policy of concessions and conciliation as well as use of force to contain nationality problems. From this perspective we may view the pro-national minority emphasis not as vacuous references to futile ideals, but rather one manner of securing these concessions and conciliations. This of course does not mean that these non-Slav elites are "pro-national minority" to the point of advocating anything less than complete loyalty to the USSR, but rather that the interests, feelings, and consciousness of national minorities should be taken seriously into account in policy considerations. At the very least it signifies a concern to avoid a repetition of the abuses which national minorities suffered under Stalin.

If this pro-minority orientation is genuine, why then the heavy adulation of things Russian by the non-Slavs? Notice that the Ukrainians are quite different from the non-Slavs regarding attention to things Russian (figure 1842).

Note the difference in emphasis in the following two citations, which are somewhat typical: S.R. Rashidov:
plausible explanation appears to be that in order for the non-Slav elites to ensure their position on the Politburo, due regard for the elder brother is necessary. It is the non-Slavs who appear principally to perform the function of recalling the positive aspects of things Russian, as they are responsible for over 72% of all references to the pro-Great Russian issue among all elites in the study. The relationship among the three issues of pro-national minority, criticism of nationalist deviations, and pro-Great Russian orientations will be clearer after examining the attitudes of the Ukrainian elites, and to them we now turn.

"The great Russian people, who had won the profound respect and complete trust of all our country's people through their heroic constructive labor, selfless militant struggle, unshakeable loyalty to the principles of internationalism, unselfishness and magnanimity, comprised the basis of the new international community of Soviet socialist nations. Our country's peoples rightly call the Russian people their elder brothers and the first nation among the USSR's various nations."

From "The Triumph of The Leninist Nationality Policy", in Kommunist Tadjikistana, 11 May 1972;

P. Shelest: "Even while we were still on the road to October V.I. Lenin taught the Ukrainian Bolsheviks to develop persistently in the masses the feeling of proletarian internationalism. He emphasized that their major task was to uphold the unity of actions against the common enemy and to struggle decisively against bourgeois nationalism and chauvinism. The leader's historic instruction that a free Ukraine was possible only if there was unity of action between the Great Russian and Ukrainian proletariats and that without such unity there could be no question of it became the
It should be pointed out first of all that the four Ukrainians in this study constitute a unique group among the elites, chronologically as well as functionally. Shelest was removed from the Politburo in April 1973 allegedly for nationalist deviation, and Podgorny was also removed not quite so ignominiously, but certainly unceremoniously. Polyanski was also removed in March 1976. Although his pattern of attention to nationality issues is high and worthy of discussion, his removal can in all probability be traced to his unenviable position as Minister of Agriculture, especially in light of heavy criticism directed program of the communists and all the working people of the Ukraine. (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 21 April, 1970, p. 81).  


In view of Podgorny's unceremonious ouster from the CPSU Politburo on May 24, 1977 - see Pravda,
at him after the 25th Party Congress in early 1976. Of the four Ukrainians, only Shcherbitsky survived politically the entire decade, and remains an apparently powerful figure on the Politburo as of this writing. Figure 2 shows the breakdown of issues for the Ukrainians.

The most striking feature – aside from Podgorny's position far above the mean for most issues – is the relationship between the pro-Great Russian and Criticism of Deviations issues. All four elites are above the mean for percentages of references to nationalist deviations, with Podgorny (1.13%) Shelest (1.11%) well above the Politburo mean of 0.39%. Furthermore, each of the Ukrainians takes a dimmer view of deviations than the Politburo as a whole (Table 9). The potency scores are interesting as well; Podgorny perceived deviations as essentially impotent (score of -0.16), while Shelest (0.03) and Shcherbitsky (0.16) saw them as only mildly potent.

May 25, 1977 – the question may be raised whether Podgorny's old ties with the Ukraine and with Shelest in particular were a factor in his dismissal. I believe so, but this is not the place to develop that theme. (p.105)

Figure 2: Patterns of Attention to Issues: Ukrainians
One also notices immediately on figure 2 that each of the Ukrainians’ references to the pro-Great Russian issue is quite low in proportion to their attention to other nationality issues. Snelest (0.14%) and Shcherbitsky (0.43%) are slightly below the Politburo mean, and although Podgorny is above the mean (0.62% compared to 0.49%), one can see from the figure that even his percentage of references to the pro-Great Russian issue forms a huge gap in his pattern of attention to the issues. Podgorny, by contrast, presents the most maverick pattern, and his percentage of references to the pro-national minority issue is very high at 3.69%, or over 3 1/2 times the Politburo mean of 0.99%. As an example of Podgorny’s emphasis on themes which connote a sensitivity to national minorities, observe his comments from an article entitled “50 Years of A Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - Of A Unified, Multinational Government” (Kommunist May 1972, no. 8):

“The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was founded on the basis of the free and broad voluntarism of the peoples, voluntarily uniting themselves in a single, fraternal family of equal, sovereign, Soviet republics. The USSR is a single, unified, multinational government, constructed in accordance with the principles of proletarian internationalism and democratic centralism. The principles of Soviet socialist federalism - verified by life itself - safeguard in the best way the consideration of the general interests of all peoples of the USSR with the national interests of each of them, the continued advancement of their economy and culture, and the all-around strengthening of their friendship.” (Author’s translation).
the Politburo mean of 1.41, as well as being the highest of
the four Ukrainians (Table 9). His potency score,
incidentally, is substantially below the Politburo mean,
suggesting that he perceived the position of national
minorities in Soviet society as somehow below what it should be.

A very revealing aspect of Podgorny's attitude toward
national minorities is found in his references to the
cognitive object "national differences among peoples", part
of the Criticism of Deviations issue. Of all Politburo
members in the study, only Podgorny registered a positive
evaluative score for this cognitive object, while other
elites expressed no affect one way or the other (0.00
evaluation score), or in the case of a few, mild negative
evaluation, (Table 89 10).

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89 The author regrets that the Podgorny speeches containing
these references were not available at the time the study was written; however, the following citation by
Kulakov should indicate the general nature of the
negative evaluation of "national differences" by the
other elites: "With the arrival of Soviet victory, an
end came forever to national differences. The people of
the Caucasus united into a friendly, fraternal family
and merged on the path of social progress and creative
labor." (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report:
TABLE 10

Summary of Cognitive Object "National Differences"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>mean evaluation</th>
<th>mean potency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Podgorny</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brezhnev</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulakov</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voronov</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunaev</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shcherbitsky</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suslov</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ustinov</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Others</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(evaluation and potency range = +3.00 to -3.00)
How then do the issues of pro-national minority, criticism of deviations, and pro-Great Russian orientations appear to be related regarding the four Ukrainian elites? It appears that the Ukrainian elites have a greater responsibility for containing nationalist deviations than do the non-Slav elites by virtue of their respective percentages of attention to this issue. It is also entirely likely that the Ukrainians generally have both a larger and more intense measure of nationalist deviation to deal with than the non-Slavic elites do, in spite of the notion that the Central Asians represent one of the most potentially troublesome groups in the Soviet Union. 190

However, the criticism of deviations issue must be understood in light of the pro-Great Russian and pro-national minority issues. Both the Ukrainian and non-Slavic elites are above the mean (0.99%) regarding pro-national minority expressions, with the exception of Shelest (0.94%). It seems that the Ukrainians and non-Slavs

190 See for example Rywkins' *Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Central Asia*, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1982. He writes in the preface that "By the year 2000 the sheer numerical strength and the continuing unassimilability of the Soviet Muslim masses will present the Soviet state with its greatest internal challenge: the survival of the empire inherited from the tsars." pp.viii.ix. This may well be true, but the fact remains that historically it has been the Ukrainians who have hitherto represented the greatest challenge to the integrity of Soviet Union as a nation-state.
must either proffer expression of praise for things Russian (as do the non-Slavs), or focus serious attention on national deviations (as do the Ukrainians) to effectively balance their emphasis on aspects of Soviet national relations which are conciliatory and concessionary to national minorities.

What then of Podgorny, Shelest, and Polyanski, all removed during the 1970s, with national relations either explicitly or implicitly involved in each case? In the case of Shelest, even a relatively low percentage of references to the pro-national minority issue (0.94%) compared to the Politburo mean of 0.99% was not offset by a very high level of attention to deviations (1.11% of all his references, exceeded only by Podgorny at 1.13%). Shelest also expresses a severely negative attitude toward deviations (mean evaluation of -2.42 compared to the Politburo mean of -1.44).

When we look more closely at Shelest's whole orientation to the pro-Great Russian issue, we find that it is not only his low level of attention to this issue (0.14%, Politburo mean of 0.49%) which is striking, but also his mean potency score is very low: 0.50, compared to the Politburo mean of 1.55. Thus, although his evaluative orientation to this issue is slightly above average (2.00 to 1.92), this very
low potency score distinguishes Shelest as not regarding things Russian as particularly potent, or more specifically in this case, not particularly efficacious in Soviet national relations. This is an extremely important point, for it is precisely this aspect of Shelest's nationality orientation that drew heavy criticism of his 1970 book, Our Soviet Ukraine, and which appears to have ultimately led to his ouster in 1973.

A pattern of attention to nationality issues roughly similar to Shelest's is also found in Podgory. Not only is Podgorny's attention to the pro-national minority issue far higher than any other elite, but his evaluative score suggests a very sympathetic attitude to minorities, combined

Note for example Shelest's very coincidental mentioning of the "elder brother" in the triumph of communism in the Ukraine:
"The great honor and wisdom and the undying glory of the Ukrainian people lies in the fact that it resolutely stepped out against the class enemies.... We are proud of our fathers and grandfathers who, in the tempestuous years of the revolution, together with the Russian proletariat, stormed capitalism and unsparingly fought for the victory of Great October." From Pravda Ukrainy, 29 October, 1971 (pp. 1-3).

Lowell Tillett, "Ukrainian National Communism and the Fall of Shelest", Slavic Review, December, 1975. In the actual critique of Shelest's book in Kommunist Ukrainy, "On The Shortcomings and Errors of a Certain Book", (April 73, no.4), Shelest is directly accused of failure to insufficiently recognize the Russian element in the Ukraine's socialist formation and development:

A serious shortcoming of the book is the fact that its author examines a number of important
with perception of relative impotence, as we have noted earlier. Podgorny also devotes more relative attention to national deviations than any member in the study, with 1.13% of all references to this issue compared to the Politburo mean of 0.39%. However, Podgorny’s attention to the pro-Great Russian issue is perhaps the most remarkable aspect of his whole pattern of attention to nationality issues. Even though his salience, evaluative, and potency scores are all slightly above average (Table 9), the proportion of his nationality references which are devoted to this issue is strikingly small, as figure 2 graphically demonstrates. This apparent failure to demonstrate proper regard for things Russian may well have jeopardized his

questions of the history of the Ukraine to a certain degree in isolation, separate from the country’s general development.... For example, the book talks about the reunification of the Ukraine with Russia — this outstanding historical event having enormous significance for the further development of the fraternal peoples — as an ordinary, run-of-the-mill fact. The author never mentioned that, thanks to this historical act, the Ukrainian people were saved from foreign enslavement. He does not mention what advantages the people obtained by entering into a uniform, centralized Russian state.... the book does not reveal the beneficial influence of Russian culture on the formation and development of Ukrainian literature, art, music, and on their mutual enrichment. ...Elements of economic autarky are obvious in the book.... One of the chief tasks of this book could have been illumination of the phases of development of cooperation of the Ukrainian people with the Russian and other fraternal peoples of our country.... (From
position on the Politburo, and played a significant role in his ultimate replacement as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet in 1977.\textsuperscript{193}

It is significant that Bialer regards Podgorny as among the "core leaders" under Brezhnev in the 1970s; given Podgorny's very high level of attention to nationality issues, it seems reasonable to speculate that his removal was related to his orientation to national relations. As with Shelest, it appears that Podgorny's criticism of nationalist deviations was simply not enough to offset his relative neglect of things Russian in the whole, larger picture of Soviet national relations. Obviously we cannot attribute their political demise exclusively to their orientation to national relations - many other factors must certainly have been involved. However, due to the high level of salience of nationality issues to these elites, it would appear extremely unlikely that their attitudes toward such

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}

\begin{footnote}
193 It has been argued that Podgorny's removal was a part of Brezhnev's assumption of greater power in the late 1970s, Jerry Hough and Merle Painsod, \textit{How The Soviet Union is Governed}, 1980, Cambridge: Harvard University Press (p.371), and Severyn Bialer, \textit{Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union}, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp.71-3. These data, however, point more toward Bilinsky's idea that nationality issues were directly involved in the removal of Podgorny (Bilinsky, 1978,p.105).
\end{footnote}
issues were irrelevant considerations in their removal.

The case of Polyanski underscores the vulnerability of Ukrainian elites. Although he was almost certainly removed for reasons connected with his position as Minister of Agriculture, his pattern of attention to nationality issues suggests that his orientation there may have contributed to his vulnerability. Polyanski generally follows the pattern of the mean on most issues, except for high degrees of attention to the substance and pro-national minority issues. This relative emphasis on substance may be interpreted as a focus on the actual ways that the Soviet people relate—cooperation, interaction, etc., reflecting his conception of the role of the Ukraine in the life of the country (and especially the agricultural role) —a very important one by any standard. However, the more important set of issues appears to be again the pro-national minority and criticism of deviations issues, where the attention to the former is high, and attention to the latter is quite low for a Ukrainian. On the pro-national minority issue, his high salience score is connected with high evaluative and potency scores as well, pointing to a sanguine view of the recognition of minorities in the Soviet Union. However, this

This point is especially significant inasmuch as Shelest was also accused of placing too much emphasis on the Ukraine in comparison to the economic life of the whole country (Bilinsky, 1978, pp. 122-26).
view is accompanied by a relative lack of attention to deviations, and no more than average attention to the pro-Great Russian issue. This general combination, as with Shelest and Podgorny, may have also contributed to the political vulnerability of Polyanski, and his ultimate removal as well.

6.2.3 The Nationality-Conscious Russians

The next group of elites which represent a distinct analytical category is composed of Andropov, Suslov, and Solomentsev. Although each of these elites devotes an above-average share of attention to nationality issues, their patterns of attention and attitudes toward various issues reveal a great deal about the politics of Soviet national relations at the elite level (figure 3).

Hough wrote in 1980 that "in all three leadership successions — Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev — the man selected as General Secretary has been the Politburo member with the most previous experience dealing with the non-Russians". While it may not be technically accurate to state that Andropov had "the most experience dealing with the non-Russians", it is the case that he was the most attentive to national relations among the Russian elites,

A = Soviet Nationality Policy
B = The National Question
C = Ideological Orientations
D = Criticism of National Deviations
E = Substance of National Relations
F = Pro-Great Russian Orientations
G = Unity of Soviet Peoples
H = Pro-nationality Orientations
I = Character of National Relations

Figure 3: Patterns of Issue Attention: Nationality-Conscious Russians
and more so than even most Ukrainians on the Politburo. Given Andropov's assumption of the position of Party General Secretary in November 1982 after the death of Brezhnev, Andropov's pattern of attention to nationality issues may have serious consequences for the future direction of Soviet national relations. Andropov's pattern of attention to nationality issues is somewhat unusual; as with most Russian Politburo members, minority-conscious and otherwise, he pays little attention to the pro-Great Russian issue. Perhaps most remarkable about Andropov's pattern is his very high level of attention to the Unity issue. His percentage of references to this issue is over 3 times the Politburo mean (2.43% to 0.78%). This heavy emphasis on the unity issue is very important, as we shall see in the next section. The high level of attention to this issue by Andropov suggests that he may have precipitated, or at least encouraged, the shift toward the unity theme in the 1970s—note his very high percentage of nationality references to this issue.

However, what reveals much more about Andropov's perception of national relations is his relatively low percentage of references to the pro-national minority issue and fairly high level of attention to criticism of nationalist deviations. Also, his percentage of references to "the national question" as an issue represents the
highest level of attention to this issue of any Politburo member in the study. It is very significant that Andropov's potency score for "the national question" as an issue is 0.00, compared to the Politburo mean of -0.64. Recalling that a negative potency score on a problematical issue represents the degree to which the issue, as a problem, has been resolved or rectified, Andropov's pattern suggests a perception of the national question as one that remains an issue in its own right. His relatively high attention level to national deviations supports and augments this interpretation of the data, formal pronouncements about the resolution of the national question notwithstanding.

In many respects Suslov's pattern of attention resembles Andropov's, with the major exception of the pro-national minority issue. Suslov devotes more relative attention to this issue than any other Russian. Given his extremely powerful position in the Soviet leadership literally since Stalin, the cognizance of national minorities which his salience score represents may well have enabled the national minorities to push for greater recognition in the post-Khrushchev era. Although Suslov's evaluative and potency scores are not particularly high for this issue, I believe the very high salience score nonetheless represents at least a keen sensitivity to national relations on
Suslov's part, and some desire to handle them in a more ideologically appropriate manner than did Stalin.

However, Suslov tempers this sensitivity with a very high level of attention to national deviations and quite negative perception of them (mean score of -2.04 compared to the Politburo mean of -1.44). In addition, his percentage of references to the issue "ideological references" is well above the mean (0.41%, Politburo mean of 0.20%), and his evaluation of these references is likewise significantly greater than the mean (2.08 compared to the Politburo mean of 1.41). This pattern suggests not only that Suslov is astute in nationality affairs, but that functionally he served as a central figure in handling national relations at the elite level. Sharply critical of national deviations, he is nonetheless sensitive in significant measure to the formal rights, interests, and identity of the national minorities. Indeed, it may well have been this balance of attention to the critical issues of national relations, as well as his broad range of responsibilities in technically

196 Note these characteristics in the following citation: "Putting forward and defending the rights of nations to self-determination, Lenin simultaneously showed up the complete inconsistency of the bourgeois nationalistic demand for national cultural autonomy, which objectively constituted an encroachment on class and international cohesion of the proletariat." (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: The Soviet Union, 1973).
unrelated matters (foreign affairs, the economy, etc.) which enabled Suslov to remain a crucial and powerful figure among the Soviet elite until his death in January 1982.\textsuperscript{197}

The final nationality-conscious Russian is Solomentsev. In examining his pattern of attention to issues it is important to bear in mind his position as head of the Russian Republic, and that many of the smaller national minorities of the USSR which are being most effectively Russified are those located in the Russian Republic.\textsuperscript{198}

Examination of figure 3 reveals a pattern of attention which follows the Politburo mean quite closely. The only outstanding issues in terms of salience to Solomentsev are the pro-Great Russian and Character of national relations.

\textsuperscript{197} The following citation will help to demonstrate these characteristics of Suslov's attitude toward national relations:

It should be born in mind that the ideologists of imperialism, trying to weaken the unity of the peoples, are gambling on reviving nationalism and inflaming nationalist prejudices. All this indicates the need to continue to tirelessly educate the working people in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, irreconcilability toward any manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism, in the spirit of profound respect toward all nations and nationalities.


His attention to the pro-Great Russian issue is the highest of any Russian on the Politburo, and his mean evaluative and potency scores for this issue are above the Politburo mean as well. Although the high salience score undoubtedly reflects his position as head of the Russian republic, the fact that it is the highest of any Russian elite suggests some Russo-centrism. The fact that the minorities within the Russian republic are not nearly as important, politically, as those with their own republics perhaps enables this pro-Great Russian orientation to be expressed without a strong concomitant demonstration of pro-national minority orientation (1.12% of Solomentsev's references, compared to the Politburo mean of 0.99%).

Solomentsev's relatively high percentage of attention to nationality issues comes largely from his heavy emphasis on the character of national relations (figure 4). He is not only well above the Politburo mean for this issue, but much higher than any other Russian (4.39%). This may reflect a perception of national relations in the Russian republic as essentially static, or in a maintaining position, as outlined in the preceding chapter. At any rate, Solomentsev does not devote a great deal of attention to national deviations, and this relative neglect is very likely linked to the static conception of national relations which is
reflected in the heavy emphasis on the character of national relations. Inasmuch as the minorities within the Russian republic are probably the least problematical for the leadership, this low level of attention to deviations is not really surprising.

6.2.4 Elites Non-Attentive to National Relations

The final type of Soviet with regard to national relations is that group to whom nationality issues command relatively little attention. Hough is probably quite correct in stating that "no important political decision is made without the nationality component being taken into account." However, the preceding analysis demonstrates not only that patterns of attention to various issues comprising the national question differ substantially among Soviet elites, but also that these differences point to an apparent functional division of labor - or at least of responsibility - within the Politburo. Given the fact that the remaining elites in the study do not devote a great deal of attention to nationality issues in any sense, it follows that this type of elite more or less relegates nationality concerns to others. The major exception is Ponomarev, who seems to

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200 While avoiding sarcasm for its own sake, it is well
### Issue Salience of Attention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>I</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>The National Question</td>
<td>Ideological Orientations</td>
<td>Criticism of National Deviations</td>
<td>Substance of National Relations</td>
<td>Pro-Great Russian Orientations</td>
<td>Unity of Soviet Peoples</td>
<td>Pro-nationality Orientations</td>
<td>Character of National Relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4:** Patterns of Attention to Issues: Non-Attentives
join Andropov and Suslov in focusing a relatively large proportion of his attention to criticising national deviations. As evidenced by his mean potency score (0.27 compared to the Politburo mean of -0.57), Ponomarev does not perceive nationalist deviations as powerless, but rather as quite potent, compared to other elites.201

His negative mean evaluative score of nationalist deviations (-2.00) is well below the Politburo mean of -1.44, identifying him as regarding deviations as a very negative force in Soviet society, as well as somewhat potent. His percentage of attention to "the national question" as an issue is also well above the Politburo mean, revealing him as another of the apparent watchdogs of national relations.

worth remembering at this point that the Soviet Union certainly has its share of problems and difficulties which are more or less unrelated to nationality issues, and that it is impossible that every Politburo member could devote the same proportion of attention, time, and energy to all problems. The fact that 1/3 of the Politburo members under study, (8 of 24), devote over 7% of their attention to nationality issues of all issues in the Soviet Elite Perceptions Project should again underscore the seriousness with which the Soviet leadership collectively regards national relations at home.

201 Note the following citations by Ponomarev which indicate this orientation:

The effective struggle against the preachings of anti-communism, anti-Sovietism, and nationalism is a necessary prerequisite for the utilization of growing opportunities which may now be created through proletarian internationalism, through the strengthening of the ties between the workers'
among the Russian elites. Although he may well formally declare the national problem to be resolved, his attitudes toward these issues indicate something otherwise.

Several other phenomena connected with figure 4 merit examination. Brezhnev's level of attention to nationality issues is relatively low, but remarkably along the lines of the Politburo mean. Given the fact of his political preeminence in the decade under study, this pattern lends further credence to the idea that the mean scores for salience of various nationality issues are balanced vis-a-vis each other in a way that is indicative of roles, functions, and even expectations of various elites on the Politburo. In other words, various patterns of deviation from the mean, depending on the nationality of the elite in question, may be politically dangerous or beneficial.

movement of the capitalist countries and concrete socialism... The (Communist) Manifesto declares: "through the elimination of the class antagonisms within nations, the hostile attitude of nations toward one another is eliminated" (Marx, Engels, Works, vol. 4, p. 479). The experience of history shows that this is a difficult problem. It was all the more difficult in a country with more than 100 nations and nationalities which were in widely differing stages of socioeconomic and cultural development.

Ponomarev speech in East Berlin, 15 March 1973, commemorating the 125th anniversary of the Communist Manifesto, from Neues Deutschland, 16 March 1973, pp. 6-8. One certainly gains the impression from this quote that official claims to have "completely resolved" the national question are somewhat premature, or facile at best.
Deviation from the mean as such, however, is not only tolerated but also apparently expected of the national minority elites. The only exception to this pattern is the case of the Belorussians, Hasherov and Hazurov, who call for brief comment.

The most significant thing about the Belorussians' attention to nationality issues is that it is relatively low, in both cases below the Politburo mean (table 8). Furthermore, the pattern of attention to the issues so closely follows the mean that one must conclude that nationality issues per se are simply not a major concern of these two elites. It was noted earlier that Belorussia never really represented a threat to the Soviet Union in terms of nationalist protestation, and this fact is very likely the best explanation of the apparent unimportance of nationality issues to either of these two elites.

The fact remains, however, that Hasherov and Hazurov are both minority elites. It is also the case that they were both Politburo members apparently in good standing, and neither was removed politically. Hasherov died in 1981, and Mazurov retired (without suspicion) in 1978. Their low profile regarding nationality issues and the relative unimportance of Belorussia concerning nationality protestation in all probability contributed to their political well-being and longevity.
6.3 THE ROLE OF THE UNITY THEME IN THE 1970S

One final question remains in this chapter concerning individual patterns of attention and attitudes toward specific issues, and that is the role of the "unity among Soviet peoples" theme in the decade under study. The two general ideas about the role of the unity theme are as follows. The first position holds that the relative emphasis upon the unity theme in the 1970s was in effect a concessionary measure, intended to downplay the harsh "fusion" goal of Khrushchev. As such the unity emphasis could be understood as one manifestation of the Soviet elites' conciliatory response to the rise of nationalist demands. The second view, not mutually exclusive, has it that the shift toward the unity theme was to offset potential minority protestation which might emerge from the leadership's constant dwelling on "national liberation in the Third World" in the 1970s as a qualitatively higher step.

202 See, for example, Nikolai Novikov, "Nationalitaeten der UdSSR im Lichte des Parteikongresses und der Volkserzählungsergebnisse," Osteuropa, vol. 31, no. 9, September 1981, p. 812-3; see also Helene Carrere d'Encausse, "Determinants and Parameters of Soviet Nationality Policy", in Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices, Jeremy Azrael, editor; NY: Praeger Publishers, 1978, p. 57. She writes: "Fusion entails not only assimilation but also the eventual dissolution of previously existing elements. Unity, on the other hand, suggests that the separate elements will continue to exist. The nonassimilationist implications of this concept seem to be a response from the periphery." (Emphasis added).
in the construction of communism. Concerning the first idea, the analysis in chapter 5 reveals that a move toward a more static and defensive, and less dynamic position toward minorities on the part of the leadership characterizes the decade of the 1970s in general. This shift from the old Khrushchev formula to "unity" as a major theme is clearly an important element in this general reorientation under Brezhnev. There is certainly no necessary loss of national identity in the "unity" scheme of things, as with the "fusion" ideal, as noted earlier. As such the unity theme definitely represented a concessionary measure. However, the data do not provide evidence that it was the national minority elites who emphasized this theme more than the Russian elites. Table 11 shows the relative emphasis upon the unity theme by the elites in the study.

It is clear that it is not the national minority elites who stress the "unity" aspect of Soviet national relations, but rather the Russians who place greatest relative emphasis on this issue. Curiously enough, however, the evaluative and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>Mean Evaluation</th>
<th>Mean Potency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grechko</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>1.84</td>
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<td>1.44</td>
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<td>1.92</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ustinov</td>
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<td>2.11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Romanov</td>
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<td>1.70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gromyko</td>
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<td>2.00</td>
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<td>Hazurov</td>
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<td>1.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Podgorny**</td>
<td>1.74</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suslov</td>
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<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shcherbitsky**</td>
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<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brezhnev</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shelest**</td>
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<td>1.65</td>
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<td>Polyanski**</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voronov</td>
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<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasherov</td>
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<td>1.61</td>
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<td>Ponomarev</td>
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<td>Kunaev***</td>
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<td>Solomentsev</td>
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<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashidov***</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aliyev***</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

mean = 11.89%

Mean = 1.46

evaluation and potency range = +3.00 to -3.00

** = Ukrainian, *** = non-Slav
potency scores for every non-Slav and Ukrainian on the table are both higher than the Politburo mean. This phenomenon is probably due to the fact that since almost all aspects of national relations are the primary domain of the non-Slavs and Ukrainians (except of course the criticism of deviations, which is primarily a Russian domain), and they generally tend to perceive these issues in a more sanguine manner.

Nevertheless, the main point of table 11 should not be understated. The fact that the Russians devote more of their nationality attention to the Unity issue than do the national minority elites indicates that the second hypothesis concerning the role of the unity theme is probably the more correct of the two. It is also significant that Andropov and the two defense ministers represented on Table 11 are all very high on the list. Andropov appears as one who encouraged this emphasis on unity. As ambassador to Hungary from 1953-57, he was made acutely aware of the danger to socialism that a lack of unity engenders. In the case of Ustinov and Grechko, the relative emphasis on unity is probably a reflection of their function as heads of the ethnically diverse Soviet military, where unity is desperately important.
The Ukrainians devote more relative attention to the issue than do the non-Slavic elites; this may be a function of their lower percentage of pro-Great Russian references compared to the non-Slavs. Since the Russians generally devote very little attention to things Russian in Soviet national relations, they of course devote a larger proportion to other issues, and especially to the Unity issue. The same is true, but to a lesser degree, for the Ukrainians. Nevertheless, the relatively high percentage of references to the unity theme by the Ukrainians was apparently no substitute for adulation of things Russian in terms of their maintenance of personal power and position on the Politburo. Hence, the centrality of the pro-Great Russian issue in Soviet national relations again appears as a critical factor in elite attitudes concerning personal power. Even the relatively heavy emphasis on the unity theme and criticism of deviations could not absolve the Ukrainians from suspicions of "national communism" or even a mildly inappropriate orientation to national relations. Shcherbitsky represents the only exception to this pattern: his pattern of attention to issues represents almost a paragon of balance, moderation, and conformity — very similar to the Belorussians. He is also similar to the Belorussians in maintaining himself above suspicion regarding national relations at home.
Conversely, the relative neglect of the unity theme by the non-Slavs apparently did not jeopardize their political position at all. This in turn points to the conclusion that the role of the unity theme in the 1970s has been used more by the Russian leadership to undercut potential domestic protestation over "national liberation" than as a conceptual tool by which the minority elites registered dissatisfaction with the long-dead "fusion" ideal of an earlier era.

This chapter has outlined the major patterns of attention and attitudes toward issues by the elites in the Politburo of the 1970s. The crucial issues around which elite perceptions and attitudes toward national relations revolve are the pro-national minority, criticism of national deviation, and pro-Great Russian issues. To a lesser degree the unity theme reveals orientations toward national relations and functions of specific elites on the Politburo. We have not only seen that various elites have distinct nationality-related functions, but also that it is incumbent upon an elite to exhibit a proper balance among issues in order to sustain political power on the Politburo.

In order to further understand these elite interrelations and to place them within the context of concrete historical circumstance of the 1970s, the next chapter will examine Politburo orientations to national relations in major time
periods of the decade. It will also deal with two other factors which are closely related to personal power at the Politburo level, namely the political and personal relations of specific elites to Brezhnev, and the question of economic development, especially patterns of economic investment in the minority areas. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the ramifications of the findings of the study for Soviet national relations in the 1980s. A final chapter will summarize and conclude the work, and give indications of appropriate avenues of research on Soviet national relations.
Chapter VII

CHANGES IN ELITE ORIENTATION, AND MAINTENANCE OF PERSONAL POWER

7.1 INTRODUCTION: QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED

In chapters 5 and 6 we have examined elite perceptions of nationality issues, and attitudes toward these issues, for the entire decade of the 1970s. Not only did substantial differences appear among elites regarding issue orientation, but patterns of attention to nationality issues also appeared to have serious consequences for the maintenance of personal power on the Politburo. The concerns of the present chapter are primarily twofold. First, in order to understand the Soviet leadership's macro-orientation to national relations in the decade under study, we will look at differences in elite orientation to nationality issues in major time periods. This will not only enable us to further understand Soviet nationality politics by identifying significant trends during the decade and speculate as to their causes, but also make possible enlightened discussion of likely future trends in the elites' handling of national relations. Secondly, we will explore in greater detail the
relationship between elite orientation toward nationality issues and the maintenance of personal power on the Politburo.

Although analysis of nationality issues in various time periods will shed light on the role of these issues in maintaining personal power at the elite level, we will augment that analysis by also examining elites' references to Brezhnev. By so doing we will shed a good deal of light on the role of the Party General Secretary regarding personal power, and regarding nationality issues as well. The chapter will conclude with discussion of the politics of national relations under General Secretary Andropov. Before beginning the analysis, however, a brief explanation of the rationale for the time period divisions is appropriate.

The major time periods into which the decade is divided are as follows. The time period from the beginning of our data collection (January 1, 1970) until the end of April, 1973 constitutes the first period. It was in April 1973 that Shelest and Voronov were ousted from the Politburo, and Grechko and Gromyko were admitted. This was a substantial turnover of personnel, and important differences in Politburo-wide orientations are likely to be found in the succeeding time period.
The second time period is from May 1973 to April 1976. In the case of elites who departed from the Politburo relatively shortly after the end of this period, their data was included in this second period as well. This is the case for Podgorny, Kulakov, and Mazurov. This time period also saw the death of Grechko, the removal of Polyanski and Shelepin, and the entrance of Aliyev. Thus, the second period witnessed a very substantial personnel turnover; especially noteworthy here is the ouster of two additional Ukrainians, Podgorny and Polyanski. It should also be born in mind that the 25th Party Congress of the CPSU was held in early 1976, so this time period may be seen as the final year of the 24th Party Congress era. The final period, May 1976 to the end of July 1979, constitutes the remainder of time for which data was collected.

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204 Due to the crucial role of Aliyev, data was collected for him for the entire period of the project, 1970-79, even though he was not appointed to the Politburo until 1976. It is important to recognize that throughout Soviet history a representative of the Caucasus region has always been present on the Politburo.

205 In this final time period data was collected by sampling speeches and coding therefrom, as opposed to coding all available speeches. This was necessary in light of various constraints, and although some validity and reliability may have been compromised slightly by so doing, I have sufficient confidence in the data to warrant their inclusion in this study.
This time period breakdown will make possible the examination of both Politburo-wide and individual emphasis in each time period. It will also enable us to consider the effects of major events not directly related to nationality affairs, but which may have precipitated a shift in nationality issue orientation on the part of individual elites and/or the Politburo as a whole. This will in turn deepen our understanding not only of nationality politics per se, but of intra-Politburo power and processes as well.

7.2 Macro-Trends: Changes in Salience and Issue Emphasis
7.2.1 Changes in Salience of Nationality Issues Over Time
The first question regarding elite perceptions of nationality issues in different time periods is the salience of these issues, measured in terms of the proportion of attention which they received compared to all other issues in the project. Table 12 provides the breakdown of attention to nationality issues by the whole Politburo, for each major time period. Two dimensions of issue-attention are provided on this table. First, the amount of relative attention to each nationality issue, as a proportion of all nationality issues, is provided. This will enable us to determine which nationality issues increased, or decreased in attention vis-a-vis other nationality issues over the
entire decade. Secondly, the table provides the data for attention to each issue as the proportion of all issues in the project. This will indicate how salient a specific issue was in each major time period compared to all other issues in the project. This latter consideration will be dealt with first.

The table demonstrates that as the decade progressed, nationality issues received less and less attention compared to other issues. In the first period, almost 7 1/2% percent of all issues coded were nationality issues; in the second period the figure had dropped to only 4.6%, and in the final period only 3.9% of all issues coded involved national relations. The biggest drop in attention to national relations is from the first to second periods, and this can probably be best explained by the Shelest ouster. The absence of Shelest's nationality references as such did not make much difference in terms of a significant decrease in number of total nationality references. Rather, the very fact that he was officially ousted for ostensibly deviating from sound nationality orientation must have sent a chilling political shock regarding nationality politics through Soviet elites from the Politburo on down. We of course are not privy to precisely who within the Politburo initiated and/or motivated the Shelest ouster, although we may be in a
### TABLE 12
Nationality Issue Salience: Major Time Periods

#### Nationality Issues In Major Time Periods

Breakdown of Nationality Issues:
% of References to Each Issue/ (% T for project)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Character</td>
<td>39.85</td>
<td>37.31</td>
<td>46.00</td>
<td>31.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% project T</td>
<td>(2.28)</td>
<td>(2.77)</td>
<td>(2.11)</td>
<td>(1.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Nat.Min.</td>
<td>17.12</td>
<td>19.03</td>
<td>13.37</td>
<td>20.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% project T</td>
<td>(0.98)</td>
<td>(1.41)</td>
<td>(0.61)</td>
<td>(0.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>11.69</td>
<td>12.14</td>
<td>11.71</td>
<td>11.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% project T</td>
<td>(0.68)</td>
<td>(0.90)</td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Gr.Russ.</td>
<td>10.71</td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td>12.62</td>
<td>24.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% project T</td>
<td>(0.61)</td>
<td>(0.53)</td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td>(0.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substance</td>
<td>7.48</td>
<td>8.70</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>4.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% project T</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.65)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crit.Deviat.</td>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>7.89</td>
<td>4.32</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>% project T</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.59)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
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<td>Ideolog.Ref.</td>
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<td>4.24</td>
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<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
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<td>&quot;Nat'l Quest.&quot;</td>
<td>2.22</td>
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<td>0.86</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>% project T</td>
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<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
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<td>&quot;Sv.Nat.Pol.&quot;</td>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
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<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100% (5.72%) 100% (7.42%) 100% (4.60%) 100% (3.94%)

N = 7163 3977 2543 643
position to address this question later in the chapter. Nevertheless, at this point it seems reasonable to regard the Shelest removal as having cast a long shadow over other elites' perceptions of national relations, and this in turn is most probably responsible for the substantial drop in total attention to nationality issues from the first time period to the second.

In the third time period we see yet another decrease in attention to nationality issues relative to other issues coded. There appear to be two major reasons for this further decrease in attention to national relations by the Politburo. First, the obvious factor is that as the decade progressed, national relations were perceived by the leadership as less and less problematical for Soviet society, and hence received an ever smaller proportion of elites' attention. Such an interpretation would probably be favored by the Soviets, who of course have argued since 1967 that the national question has been officially resolved in the Soviet Union. This interpretation should not be dismissed lightly: even if national relations in reality continued to represent a major difficulty for the Soviet leadership, the fact that nationality issues received less and less attention compared to other issues points to an elite perception of these issues as less important than
other issues. The question of which nationality issues received greater or lesser attention (and by which individual elites) will be the key to further understanding the nature of this general diminution of attention to national relations throughout the decade. We will return to these questions shortly. Before so doing, however, we must further account for the general decline in relative attention to nationality issues as the decade progressed.

Another major reason for the steady decline in proportion of attention to national relations in the decade of the 1970s was the simple fact that of the 9 minority elites examined in this study, 4 had departed from the Politburo by 1977. Of these 4, three were Ukrainian, (Shelest, Podgorny, and Polyanski), and one was a Belorussian (Mazurov). All three Ukrainian elites were removed essentially by political force, and Mazurov retired, apparently in good political graces. This virtual decimation of the ranks of the minority Politburo elites seems to have had two effects. The first was of course the diminution of raw numbers of references to nationality issues by virtue of the simple fact that fewer minority elites were present on the Politburo to make such references. Since it was the minority elites who provided the bulk of the references to national relations, with a smaller proportion of such minorities on the Politburo, we could expect a smaller proportion of nationality references.
A third major reason for the decline in proportion of nationality references from the second to third periods is the possibility of political "fallout" from the ouster of the Ukrainians. By the late 1970s not only Shelest, but also Podgorny and Polyanski had been politically ousted from the Politburo, with the question of nationality orientations appearing to have played a significant role in the removals. Again here we must recall that of the three Ukrainians, Podgorny especially was a powerful figure on the Politburo, and was surely not removed for petty considerations. Although we cannot be dogmatic either on the specific causes or political effects of his removal, the fact that he devoted such a great deal of attention to nationality issues compared to other Politburo members does strongly suggest that his nationality orientation affected not only his own personal political fate, but also the nationality orientations of other elites as well. In other words, remaining Politburo members may well have taken a cue, as it were, from the fate of the Ukrainians, and altered their public references to national relations accordingly. Again, however, we cannot be too certain on this point, but it is not unreasonable to suppose that the attrition of several elites to whom national relations were very salient had some effect on the attitudes and perceptions of the elites who remained in power, and especially the minority elites.
Thus, as the decade progressed, the amount of attention devoted to nationality issues declined not only because of the fact that 4 of the 9 ethnic minority elites included in the study were no longer present to provide references to nationality issues, but also at least in part because the ouster of the three Ukrainians may have cast a pall over the minorities who remained. This will become more evident as we look at the patterns of issue attention in each time period. It is to this question that we now turn. In the next section the question of the changing orientations and apparent roles of individual elites will be addressed.

7.2.2 Changes in Nationality Issue Emphasis Over Time

Table 12 shows the breakdown of all nationality references in each time period by issue. The importance of discovering the changes in issue emphasis is twofold. First of all, by tracing the relative importance of each issue vis-a-vis other nationality issues we will be able to discern changes in the Politburo's orientation to national relations in general, and specifically to help point to likely future directions of nationality politics at the elite level. Secondly, by understanding which nationality issues were emphasized or de-emphasized in each period relative to other nationality issues, we may be able to establish a larger
pattern of shifts in issue attention, which in turn may suggest possible roles and functions of various individual elites. In addition, we should be able to identify more clearly which specific elites were responsible for larger shifts in issue emphasis.

7.2.3 Changes in The Russian Element of National Relations
The most general trend which can be seen from Table 12 is that greater and greater emphasis was placed upon the "pro-Great Russian" issue, apparently at the expense of other nationality issues. Of all nationality references, this issue comprised 7.1% in the first period, 12.6% in the second, and a large 24.8% in the final period (table 12). We should also note here again that the percentage of pro-Great Russian references of all references in the project steadily increased as time went on, and that it was the only nationality issue to do so. The figures here are .53% for the first period, .58% for the second, and .98% for the final period. These two sets of figures point unequivocally to a heavier emphasis on things Russian in Soviet national relations by the Politburo, and as we shall see shortly, especially by the minority elites. The question becomes one of the origin and substantive significance of this heavier emphasis.
The most plausible explanation for the increasingly heavy emphasis on things Russian lies in the suggestion made earlier, which attributed minority elites' adulation of things Russian at least in part as an attempt to ensure their own political viability. The fact that by the final period of the decade virtually one-fourth of all references to Soviet national relations were in the "pro-Great Russian" category indicates that the Politburo had become more Russo-centric as time went on. Not only were there fewer and fewer references made to national relations, but those that were expressed were more and more likely to offer some recognition of the "elder brother". This Russo-centricism is also manifested by the fact that the proportion of elites on the Politburo who were ethnically Russian increased as the decade went on, due of course to the attrition of the Ukrainians and retirement of Mazurov.

7.2.4 Increasing Reticence About National Deviations

This increasingly Russo-centric Politburo orientation was accompanied by a persistent decrease in emphasis on national deviations. Table 12 shows a substantial drop in both percentages of total references to this issue, and a decrease in percentage of nationality issues as well. Thus the idea of national deviations was given less attention.
both as an element of Soviet national relations and as an issue in and of itself. In the final period this issue commanded a miniscule 0.09% of all coded references in the project. This lends further credence to the idea that as the decade progressed, the Soviet leadership came to perceive the national question as resolved to an even greater degree. It is also likely that as time went on, the political viability of the minority elites came to depend more and more on recognition of things Russian in Soviet society, with national deviations becoming simply not a matter for much public discussion.

There is an alternative interpretation to the data, however, and that is to apply the Kremlinological principle that an issue that is ignored may be one that has actually become more of a problem for the leadership. Although this interpretation must certainly be considered seriously, at this point the precise meaning of this failure to give much attention to deviations probably cannot be determined with any real certainty. Nevertheless, there are several other considerations in the interpretation of the data.

Another very important reason for the considerable decrease in attention to deviations is that the three Ukrainians who devoted such a large proportion of attention to the deviations issue were all removed from the Politburo
by early 1977. The remaining Ukrainian, Shcherbitsky, was seen to have devoted little relative attention to nationalist deviations, and likewise the non-Slavs emphasized other, more positive aspects of national relations.

A final possible reason for the sharp decline in references to national deviations is that the occurrence of such deviations may have actually declined. Since the removal of the three Ukrainian Politburo members can to some degree be accounted for by their orientation to national relations, it is certainly plausible that the regime dealt with perceived deviations in a similarly harsh manner down through the lower levels of the Party, governmental organs, and in the larger society as well. In this case there most certainly would have been a decrease in the actual occurrence of deviations. It is also likely that the whole domestic socio-political ambience generated by the leadership's emphasis on detente brought with it an increased suspicion and/or xenophobia on the part of the leadership. Such an attitude by the leadership would have almost certainly resulted in a crackdown on deviations of any sort. This in turn would have then reduced the incidence of deviations, perceived or real.\textsuperscript{206} Thus, although we have no reliable way

\textsuperscript{206} Frederick C. Barghoorn has suggested that the period of detente resulted in a harsher line toward dissidence in
of knowing whether the incidence of national deviations actually increased, decreased, or remained the same in the 1970s, the fact remains that the Soviet leadership devoted less and less attention to deviations as time went on. Only time will tell if they have indeed reduced deviations to a point where they are no longer an issue, or whether this general neglect of deviations in public utterances by Politburo members is a sign that deviations are more of a problem now than earlier. Because of the harsh fate of the Ukrainian Politburo members, however, I am inclined to favor the notion that a system-wide crackdown on deviance occurred during this decade, and that the incidence of deviations declined as a result.

7.2.5 Decline in Perceptual Finesse By The Politburo

The nationality issues of "Unity", "Substance", and "Ideological References" also were all emphasized less and less as the decade progressed. They each received a persistently decreasing share of total attention, and also commanded a smaller and smaller share of nationality references as time went on. The percentage of total

references to the "Substance" issue fell from .65% in the first period to .17% in the last, and the percentage of total references to the "Ideological References" issue fell from .31% to .11% from the first to last periods. Likewise these two issues received less and less attention compared to other nationality issues. The "Substance" issue decreased from 8.7% to 4.3% of all nationality references, and "Ideological References" fell from 4.2% to 2.7% (table 12).

What do these figures indicate about the Politburo's macro-orientation to national relations in the 1970s? They suggest first of all that an increasingly simplified perception of national relations developed as time went on. Both the "Substance" and "Ideological References" issues involve a fairly sophisticated understanding of national relations. These issues deal with the finer points of national relations both ideologically and teleologically. The data indicate that as the decade progressed this perceptual sophistication was blunted considerably.

The important question becomes that of the substantive significance of the Politburo's move toward a cruder perception of national relations. The most likely ramification of this relative crudeness is a less tolerant orientation to deviations of any sort, and perhaps a more
suspicious attitude toward even the "orthodox nationalism" discussed earlier. The implication of the data is that the leadership became less and less willing to collectively concern itself with subtleties of national relations. Also, given the fact that less and less relative attention was devoted to national relations themselves as time went on, it would appear that the leadership in general simply did not wish to be bothered with nationality affairs. Such an attitude would not seem to make for a particularly sanguine view toward nationalities social and/or political sensitivities. In short, what these larger trends seem to point to is a situation where nationalities interests might not be taken as seriously into consideration in substantive policy formulations, at least by the Politburo as a whole.

However, several minority elites patterns of issue attention point to something of an attempt to counter-balance this trend. We shall deal with these changes in minority elites attention patterns in greater detail in the next section. First, however, several other characteristics of Politburo-wide shifts in issue emphasis merit attention.

The level of attention to the "Unity" issue remained roughly the same throughout the decade in terms of its proportion of references within all nationality issues. In
the first period the "Unity" issue comprised 12.1% of all nationality references, in the second period 11.7%, and in the third period 11.0%. Thus, this issue retained its salience vis-a-vis other nationality issues, although it did experience a slight decline. In more absolute terms, however, this issue was more typical of the general decrease in attention to national relations. In the first period, references to the "Unity" issue constituted 0.90% of all references in the project; in the second period the figure dropped to 0.54%, and in the third to 0.44%.

The fact that the "Unity" theme commanded roughly equal proportions of all nationality issues in each period suggests that it continued to represent a fairly important aspect of the leadership's perception of national relations. In the preceding chapter it was observed that the push for the emphasis on "unity among the Soviet peoples" seemed to come largely from the ethnically Russian elites. In light of this, and the persistent decrease in attention to national deviations noted earlier, the sustained attention to the "Unity" issue (relative to other nationality issues) reinforces the notion that the whole theme of "unity" was more of a safeguard against perceived nationalities' demands than a symbol of minorities' appeals. In other words, rather than focus on the negative aspects of national
relations (e.g., the deviations), the trend was to largely maintain the relative emphasis upon the "unity" theme in order to counterbalance any potential nationalistic protestations. This is of course not to imply that the emphasis on the "Unity" issue was solely to keep minority political fulmination in check; however, when interpreted in light of the data on the "Deviation" issue, this "counteractive" aspect of the "Unity" issue appears to be a very important one indeed.

7.2.6 Vacillation on "Pro-National Minority" Emphasis

Two nationality issues experienced substantial vacillation within the decade in terms of relative attention from the Politburo. These were the "Pro-National Minority" issue and the "Character of National Relations" issue. The "Pro-National Minority" issue appears to have been almost avoided in the second period, compared to the first and third periods. This is true for its percentage of nationality references and also for its share of total references coded (table 12). Again the occurrence of the Shelest ouster is probably the main reason for such a significant drop in attention to this issue. Although we must be cautious on this point, it is the case that Shelest was seen by some in the West as something of a contemporary
"national communist" (e.g., the Bilinsky argument, outlined earlier). Inasmuch as this argument is valid, we could certainly expect the leadership to collectively shy away from "pro-national minority" orientations after Shelest's ouster, which was publicly justified on the basis of his nationalities' orientation.

The resurgence of the "Pro-National Minority" issue in the final period can perhaps be seen as something of a return to normalcy, although we have seen that there was a very sharp rise in attention to things Russian in the final period as well. The general pattern of attention to these two issues throughout the decade further supports the notion that they are highly interconnected in what the Politburo apparently perceives as an appropriate orientation to national relations. That is, the minority elites are apparently expected to provide adequate public recognition of the Leninist legacy of sensitivity to minorities' rights, interests, and feelings, and also to provide such an unquestionable recognition of things Russian that the loyalty of that particular minority elite to the USSR's status quo remains safely above reproach.

Why then the sharp vacillation in attention to the "Character of National Relations" issue? Although the percentage of total references to this issue decreased in
each successive period (2.77 to 2.11 to 1.33 percent, table 12), the vacillation in terms of percentage of nationality references to this issue is considerable. From a total percent of 37.3 in the first period, this issue commanded a large 46.0% of nationality references in the second, and down again to 31.2% in the final period. The sharp rise in percentage of nationality references to this issue from the first to second periods can be accounted for first of all by the concomitant decrease in proportion of attention to nearly all other nationality issues. This is especially true in light of the considerable drop in attention to the "Pro-National Minority" issue from the first to second periods. Again the major contemporary "nationality" event, the Shelest removal, must be considered here. It is likely that this occurrence engendered something of a shyness toward nationality issues in general, as noted earlier. Shelest's removal probably also dampened elites' public references to national relations such that the bland 'characterization' of national relations which this issue represents became more or less the standard nationality reference point to a much greater degree than during the earlier 1970s.

In the final period the "Character of National Relations" issue commanded a far smaller proportion of nationality references than in the second period: from 46.0% to 31.2%
This phenomenon is very significant inasmuch as attention which this issue had received in the second period appears to have been channeled into the "Pro-Great Russian" and "Pro-National Minority" issues. It is these two issues which seem to provide the key to personal power maintenance regarding national relations.

We have already examined the increasingly heavy emphasis on the "Pro-Great Russian" issue as the decade progressed. How then are we to understand the sharp vacillation in attention to the "Pro-National Minority" issue vis-a-vis other nationality issues? The change in percentage of nationality references which this issue received is substantial: from slightly over 19% in the first period down to 13.3% in the second, and rising to slightly over 20% in the final period. Also, the percentage of total references also increased slightly from the second to third periods, rising from 0.61% to 0.79% (table 12).

Perhaps the best explanation for this reemergence of attention to the "Pro-National Minority" issue rests in the idea that it became politically "safe" to once again display positive orientations to nationalities' interests, rights, feelings, and so forth. There are several plausible reasons for this "safety", including the fact that greater emphasis was also being placed on the Russian element in national
relations at this time. Also, it is the case that by this final period the only remaining minority elites on the Politburo were those whose pattern of attention to nationality issues seems to have placed them above suspicion. As such, they could bear the major responsibility for publicly enunciating the Leninist tradition of consideration for minorities, and do so without threatening the apparent Russian-centric political orientation of the contemporary USSR.

At this juncture the major consideration becomes that of the patterns of attention of individual elites during the different time periods. Such analysis will not only enable us to understand Soviet nationality politics at the elite level by suggesting apparent roles and functions of specific elites, but also help point out possible macro trends for the future of Soviet national relations. It is to these individual patterns of attention and attitudes toward issues that we now turn.

7.3 **Individual Patterns of Issue Attention and Attitudes Over Time**

Table 13 provides the breakdown of percentage of attention to nationality issues of the total number of references coded, by individual elites, and for each major time period. Generally speaking, most elites devoted less relative
attention to nationality issues as time went on. For a good portion of the Russian elites, however, the attention level increased somewhat in the second period, then subsided in the final period (Gromyko, Kosygin, Andropov, Ustinov, and Suslov; table 13).

This is significant because the minority elites almost all exhibit precisely the opposite pattern: there seems to be something of a shying away from nationality issues in this period by the minority Politburo members. In the final period, the former pattern reemerges—increased attention to nationality issues by minority elites, and less attention from the Russians. The two exceptions to this general pattern are Mazurov and Aliyev (both minorities), whose attention level resembles the pattern of the Russian elites.207

An important factor about this shifting of emphasis on nationality issues among elites is that the minority elites appeared to have reassumed the function of addressing nationality issues in the final period, with the Russians seeming to have more of a passive role.208

207 This should come as no surprise, as Aliyev was seen to be the most Russified of the minority elites; Mazurov, as we observed, did not appear to regard nationality issues as particularly salient, and his "Russian" pattern of attention over time suggests that he too was thoroughly "Russified" in terms of his perceptions and attitudes toward national relations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aliyev</td>
<td>8.10</td>
<td>8.45</td>
<td>5.94</td>
<td>7.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andropov</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>13.14</td>
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<td>2.55</td>
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<td>4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grechko</td>
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<td>3.57</td>
<td>dead</td>
<td>3.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grishin</td>
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<td>0.73</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>1.64</td>
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</tr>
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<td>4.03</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>3.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.49</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>2.15</td>
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<td>2.21*</td>
<td>out</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kunaev</td>
<td>13.42</td>
<td>7.43</td>
<td>9.80</td>
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<td>1.86</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>4.42</td>
</tr>
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<td>4.87*</td>
<td>rtird.</td>
<td>4.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>9.86*</td>
<td>out</td>
<td>16.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2.19</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>3.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>15.48</td>
<td>20.47</td>
<td>18.45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Romanov</td>
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<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>1.19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shcherbitsky</td>
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<td>4.29</td>
<td>7.01</td>
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<td>out</td>
<td>6.09</td>
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<td>3.79*</td>
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<td>Solomentsev</td>
<td>21.31</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>6.12</td>
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<td>11.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Voronov</td>
<td>0.43*</td>
<td>out</td>
<td>out</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: $N = 3977$ 2543 643 7163

% of Total References to Nationality Issues:

7.42 4.60 3.94 5.72

*these figures are from the beginning of the period until the departure of the elite from the Politburo
Table 14 shows the proportion of all nationality references that were provided by the minority elites. For the entire decade, the 9 minority members provided nearly 70% of all nationality references.

Here we can see more clearly something of a shying away from public reference to nationality issues on the part of the minority elites in the second period. Whereas in the first period they uttered over 70% of all references to national relations by the entire Politburo, this figure dropped to only 62.5% in the second period. In the final period, however, the minority elites—now only 5 in number, incidentally—provided over 80% of all references to national relations. Thus, it would appear that once those elites whose nationality orientations were suspect had been removed from the Politburo, the whole subject of national relations became more of an affair for minority elites' attention. As such, nationality issues were addressed relatively infrequently by the Russian elites, and in much less sophisticated terms at that, as noted earlier. With the national question being ostensibly resolved in this decade,

Solomentsev and Grishin are exceptions here, both of whose attention patterns resemble that of the minority elites. In Grishin's case, even the increased level of attention in the final period is very low, only 2.6% of his total references to all issues coded. Solomentsev, as we shall see shortly, truly does resemble the minority elites regarding attention to nationality issues.
### TABLE 14

Minority Elite Nationality References, by Time Period

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>N: 70-73</th>
<th>N: 73-76</th>
<th>N: 76-79</th>
<th>Total N</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Slavs:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aliyev</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunaev</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashidov</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>1517</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total N</strong></td>
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<td>959</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>2875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ukrainians:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podgorny</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>105*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polyanski</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>15*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shcherbitsky</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelest</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>220</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total N</strong></td>
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<td>443</td>
<td>86</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
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<td>17.4</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Belorussians:</strong></td>
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<td>Hasherov</td>
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<td>53</td>
<td>536</td>
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<td>Mazurov</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total, All Minorities:</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>72.7%</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>81.3%</td>
<td>69.9%</td>
</tr>
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<td>3977</td>
<td>2543</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>7163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* these figures include data from the beginning of the time period until the departure of the elite from the Politburo (see Appendix B for specific dates of departure).
it appears to have become almost exclusively the domain of the (admittedly few) remaining minority elites on the Politburo.

It is important to recall that as the decade progressed, greater and greater attention was devoted to the "Pro-Great Russian" issue, and less and less to most other nationality issues. The major anomaly was the Pro-National Minority issue, which very significantly decreased in the second period, and was again reemphasized in the third. The important question thus became that of who specifically was responsible for these two most important shifts, and what they signify in the larger scheme of Soviet national relations.

Tables 15 and 16 demonstrate that it was the national minority elites who were largely responsible for both the increased attention to things Russian, and the increase in attention to pro-nationality themes from the second to third periods.

This phenomenon further supports the notion that the minority elites bear the greatest responsibility for perpetuating and publicly articulating the "Leninist tradition" in Soviet national relations, yet must temper this emphasis with a concomitant public recognition of things Russian.
### TABLE 15
Shifts in Issue Emphasis: Pro-Great Russian, by Elite

% Total Of All Issues Coded

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minority Elites:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aliyev</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunaev</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashidov</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>15.72</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shcherbitsky</td>
<td>0.41</td>
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<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polyanski</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-out-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podgorny</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>-out-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazurov</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>-out-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasherov</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nationality-Attentive Russians</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andropov</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brezhnev</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ponomarev</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomentsev</td>
<td>4.2b</td>
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<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suslov</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Brezhnev has been included due to his political preeminence during the decade, and Ponomarev for his apparent "watchdog" function.
### TABLE 16

**Shifts in Issue Emphasis: Pro-National Minority, by Elite**

% Total Of All Issues Coded

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minority Elites:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aliyev</td>
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<td>1.46</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunaev</td>
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<td>2.24</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>2.19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rashidov</td>
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<td>3.70</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>2.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shcherbistsky</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polyanski</td>
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<td>4.54</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>-out-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podgorny</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.26</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>-out-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mazurov</td>
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<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>-out-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashov</td>
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<td>1.32</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nationality-Attentive Russians:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andropov</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brezhnev</td>
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<td>1.48</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ponomarev</td>
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<td>1.42</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomentsev</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>1.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suslov</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Brezhnev has been included due to his political preeminence during the decade, and Ponomarev for his apparent "watchdog" function.
The significance of this general shift of nationality issue emphasis as time progressed is that the tradition of official sensitivity and recognition of national minorities' interests, feelings, and consciousness continued and even appears to have gained some momentum as the decade continued, after the lapse during the 1973-76 period. However, it is crucial to recognize that this virtual reassertion of national minority considerations took place within the context of a more intense focusing on things Russian, and a much less sophisticated perception of national relations by the Politburo as a whole, as noted in the preceding section.

It seems very significant that level of Russian elite attention to national relations did not subside until after the removal of the three Ukrainians whose patterns of nationality issue-attention was most atypical of all Slavic elites.209 After the minority contingent of the Soviet Politburo had been reduced to Aliyev, Kunaev, Bashidov, Shcherbitsky, and Masherov, the proportion of nationality references uttered by the Russian elites had dropped considerably, and it is doubtful that the connection is

\[209\] The non-Slavs, it should be recalled, were equally atypical in terms of issue attention. However, the crucial difference is that the non-Slavs' atypicality was characterized by heavy adulation of things Russian and virtual avoidance of national deviations - and by the fact that all three non-Slavs survived, politically.
totally fortuitous. Again this suggests that once the whole subject of national relations was in 'safe hands', politically speaking, the Russian elites apparently felt less and less need to even refer to national relations publicly. Although we cannot be dogmatic on this particular interpretation of the data, the fact remains that the ethnic Russians' attention level to national relations peaked roughly at the time when those with maverick attention patterns were ousted. The important factor to bear in mind is that national relations were a very salient issue for those ousted Ukrainians, and it is difficult to imagine that their orientations to the issue played no part in their political fate.

There is of course ultimately no way of determining all the factors involved with the maintenance of personal power by the minority elites, or even the relative weight of such factors. Elite turnover on the Politburo obviously does not involve numbers large enough to subject to statistical analysis as such. This is not to suggest that every case is strictly sui generis, as some patterns do seem to be apparent. However, for purposes of intellectual honesty it should be emphasized that even the general conclusion up to this point - that patterns of nationality issue attention do appear to have played a role in personal power maintenance
and/or loss - is rather tenuous. Nevertheless, the evidence is not entirely without merit, especially given the absence of other, more satisfactory explanations. This is especially true for the case of Podgorny's removal, about which no Western students of Soviet politics have been able to account for with any degree of certainty. The important point is that the preceding analyses must be viewed as merely breaking the ground concerning our understanding of the role of an individual elites' orientation to national relations in the maintenance of personal power.

However, our understanding of personal power maintenance can be further deepened by examining another set of data produced by the Soviet Elite Perceptions Project, namely the apparent perception and attitudes expressed toward Brezhnev by any given elite. By looking at patterns of elites' references to Brezhnev in the decade under study, we will to some degree be able to determine the importance of an additional factor in the maintenance of personal power on the Politburo, and especially regarding the minority elites.
7.4 REFERENCES TO BREZHEV AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PERSONAL POWER

Our purpose in this section is not to provide an exhaustive treatise on the role of the General Secretary in intra-Politburo politics, or even to do so for the case of Leonid Brezhnev. Rather, the aim will be to examine the number and types of references to Brezhnev by the elites included in the study, and to interpret these references in light of the national relations data analyzed up to this point. The main goal will be to further understand Soviet nationality politics by examining the patterns of elites' attention to Brezhnev in the 1970s, and especially by the minority elites.

It has been argued that as the 1970s went on, something of a personality cult was developing around General Secretary Brezhnev. There is little doubt that as the decade progressed, Brezhnev amassed greater and greater political power. The frequency with which a given elite referred to Brezhnev, and the specific terms used, may provide a clue as to the personal and political relationship of that elite to Brezhnev. This in turn may shed light on

Soviet nationality politics by comparing the attention patterns of those elites who were removed politically with those who remained, and even advanced, in political power.

The first consideration is the frequency of references to Brezhnev by any given elite, as a proportion of all coded references. However, the important question becomes that of the signification of frequent reference to Brezhnev. Does it indicate that the elite is publicly recognizing Brezhnev in order to repay political favor, or to attempt to establish himself as a close associate (and/or "ally") of the General Secretary? Or could frequent reference to Brezhnev be used as a political "cover", as it were, to safeguard the individual elite's political position by paying homage to the "primus inter pares"? There is no certain way of determining which of these possible interpretations are valid, or to what degree. However, a common denominator in each seems to be that of recognition of Brezhnev, publicly. Thus perhaps the best way to proceed with the analysis is to consider frequent reference to Brezhnev simply as some form of recognition of the General Secretary, either personally or positionally, and to attempt to interpret this recognition in light of the apparent "Brezhnev cult" which was developing.  

211 The more precise meaning of this public recognition can perhaps be determined with greater specificity at a
Table 17 provides the ranking of elites by the percentage of total references to Brezhnev of all items coded in the project. The mean for all elites is 3.17%. Two very interesting phenomena appear from this data. The first is that every Politburo member on this list who was removed politically during the 1970s was below the mean in percent of references to Brezhnev, without exception. In most cases these individuals were far below the mean.

We must exercise caution here, as the connection which this evidence provides hardly warrants a claim for causation of the removals. However, in light of the fact that Brezhnev's power increased as the decade went on, it does not seem unreasonable to conjecture that elites were to some degree expected to proffer a measure of public recognition to the General Secretary, and to his role in the Soviet political milieu. At any rate, it is difficult to conceive of the frequent reference to Brezhnev provided by Aliyev, or Ustinov, Gromyko or Kunaev as having had a detrimental effect on their respective political positions.

Later point. In spite of the large amount of material written about the Brezhnev era there does not appear to be a firm consensus at this point as to the precise meaning of such public reference to the General Secretary.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>% Total</th>
<th>mean evaluation</th>
<th>mean potency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aliyev</td>
<td>16.21</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ustinov</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gromyko</td>
<td>6.42</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunaev</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ponomarev</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grishin</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andropov</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashidov</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shcherbitsky</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- mean = 3.17 ---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
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<td>Solomentsev</td>
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<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelepın</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanov</td>
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<td>0.40</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masherov</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosygin</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulakov</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polyanski#</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mazurov</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grechko</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brezhnev</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podgorny#</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelest#</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voronov#</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

mean = 0.79  1.06

(evaluation and potency range = +3.00 to -3.00)

* from standardized total

# removed politically
It is also very interesting to note that for most of the individuals removed politically, the low percentage of references to Brezhnev was nonetheless accompanied by an above average evaluation score. This is especially the case for Podgorny and Shelest (table 17). Although we cannot be certain of the precise meaning of this phenomenon, one can suspect that the relatively few references to Brezhnev provided by these elites were shrouded in more affective terminology to serve homage to the emerging Brezhnev cult, albeit perhaps perfunctorily. In any case, the fact remains that for each of those removed politically, very little relative attention was devoted to public recognition of General Secretary Brezhnev. It is the attitude behind this apparent nonobservance of the Brezhnev "cult" that may have contributed to the political vulnerability of those who were removed.

The second major phenomenon which appears from table 17 is that each of the three minority elites ousted—Shelest, Polyanski, and Podgorny—expressed public recognition of Brezhnev at a level well below the Politburo mean, and certainly far below that of any of the three non-Slavs. Again here we cannot attribute the cause of their removal to this virtual failure to publicly recognize Brezhnev and his role; in all probability many factors were
involved. However, it is not unreasonable to surmise that the homage paid to the General Secretary by Aliyev, Kunaev, Rashidov, and Shcherbitsky may indeed have contributed to their political well-being. It should be emphasized that it was probably not the uttering of public references per se that augmented the political power of these minority elites, but rather that this frequency of references indicated a willingness to recognize and operate within the political status quo. This is especially true in the case of the non-Slavs. 212

Another aspect of elites' references to Brezhnev is the type of reference to him. In designing the Soviet Elite Perceptions Project it was established that three basic

212 Jeremy Azrael has suggested that the election of Rashidov and Kunaev into the Politburo was done to "hold the lid" on potential minority protestation at the mass level:

"...there is every reason to surmise that they figured prominently as a part of a highly premeditated effort to mitigate the spectre of a destabilization of the "nationality front" in the country's Turkic republics".

Inasmuch as this is the case - and we have no real means of proving or disproving the idea definitively, although it certainly appears plausible - we could expect these two elites to regard their position on the Politburo as tenuous, and rightfully so. If this is the case, it would seem that their frequent reference to Brezhnev represented at least in part a deferential gesture to the prevailing political realities, and to ultimately secure their own political well-being. "The "Nationality Problem" in the USSR", Jeremy Azrael, in The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy, Seweryn Bialer, ed., Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981, p. 144.
types of reference could be discerned. These are references connoting a personal warmth, a "neutral" orientation, and one connoting a distant relation to Brezhnev (see Appendix A for the specific composition of each of these types). Table 18 provides the breakdown of all references to Brezhnev for each elite in the study, for each type of reference.

The Politburo mean for distribution of references among the three types is 17% for "personal warmth", 36.5% for a "neutral" orientation, and 46.3% for references connoting a distant relation. For those elites ousted, the proportion of references to Brezhnev in the 'distant' category appears disproportionately high: for Shelest, 90%; Polyanski, 81%; Podgorny, 61%; Kulakov, 67%; Shelepin, 93%; Voronov, 100% (table 18). Thus, their public recognition of Brezhnev was not only of a low frequency level, but the manner in which they referred to him was not suggestive of a close relationship to the General Secretary.213

213 To gain a sense of the differences among these types of reference, observe the following citations by Rashidov and Podgorny. Rashidov states the following:

Our celebrations derive particular significance from the participation of that loyal Leninist and tireless fighter for peace and the people's happiness, Comrade Leonid Illich Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, who was the soul organizer, and inspirer of the nationwide drive to open up the virgin lands.

The Soviet people remember well how you, Leonid Illich, who headed the Kazakhstan party organization at that unforgettable time, devoted
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>Personal Warmth</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Distant</th>
<th>% total/ N</th>
<th>% total/ N</th>
<th>% total/ N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aliyev</td>
<td>17.66/157</td>
<td>26.99/240</td>
<td>55.34/492</td>
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<td>50.00/9</td>
<td>50.00/9</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>92.38/97</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grechko</td>
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<td>31.66/19</td>
<td>46.66/28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grishin</td>
<td>9.82/23</td>
<td>29.05/68</td>
<td>61.11/143</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Gromyko</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>43.70/59</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>60.65/74</td>
<td>22.95/28</td>
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<td>20.58/7</td>
<td>67.64/23</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Kunaev</td>
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<td>44.72/195</td>
<td>25.91/113</td>
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<td>32.59/74</td>
<td>62.55/142</td>
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<td>7.69/2</td>
<td>88.46/23</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Podgorny</td>
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<td>33.33/6</td>
<td>61.11/11</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>81.81/18</td>
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<td>58.90/43</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Rashidov</td>
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<td>34.76/97</td>
<td>36.55/102</td>
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<td>Romanov</td>
<td>16.16/2</td>
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<td>35.26/61</td>
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<td>44.87/175</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>93.33/42</td>
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<td>90.00/9</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Solomentsev</td>
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<td>41.86/36</td>
<td>30.23/26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suslov</td>
<td>7.29/7</td>
<td>59.37/57</td>
<td>33.33/32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ustinov</td>
<td>12.38/26</td>
<td>62.85/132</td>
<td>24.76/52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voronov</td>
<td>0.0 / 0</td>
<td>0.0 / 0</td>
<td>100.00/3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean | 17.06% | 36.58% | 46.34% |
Total N | 652 | 1398 | 1771 |
For most of the other national minorities, the pattern of references to Brezhnev is much closer to the Politburo mean in terms of types of references. In the cases of Kumaev and Rashidov, nearly 30% of all references to Brezhnev were in the "personal warmth" category (table 18). The high incidence of this type of reference would seem to lend credence to the notion that their position on the Politburo is somewhat tenuous, and that frequent reference to Brezhnev is indicative of a deferential attitude. Their degree of "personal warmth" expressed toward Brezhnev (as measured by the data on table 18) is not matched by any other elite. This pattern, as well as their relatively frequent public reference to the General Secretary, suggests at the very

all your knowledge, wealth of experience, rare organizational talents and bubbling energy to the cause of the accelerated development of all sectors of the republic's national economy.... The Soviet people are sincerely grateful to you for all this, Leonid Illich.

S.R.Rashidov, speech addressing a Virgin Lands Anniversary Meeting, Tashkent, Uzbekistan. (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: The Soviet Union, 22 March 1974, page R1). Contrast this with one of the somewhat rare references to Brezhnev by Podgorny:

The Soviet proposals for the reduction of armed forces and armaments...have had a great reaction in the world. We maintain, and this was once more confirmed in the speech of Comrade Brezhnev at the festivities in Tbilisi, a clear position: ...

Speech by Podgorny to his electoral constituents in Moscow, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: The
least a willingness to recognize and function within the prevailing political climate.

Although we cannot be certain as to the role which this type and level of public recognition of Brezhnev played in the political fortune of these minority elites, it does not appear to have been detrimental to their careers as Politburo members. Again the important factor seems to be the attitude of the individual elite which motivated this much public recognition of Brezhnev. Such an attitude certainly seems consistent with the presence of even a small-scale "personality cult" which was apparently operating in the latter Brezhnev years.

Nevertheless, this type of public expression should not be construed as a necessary condition for the safeguarding of one's political position on the Politburo, even for minority elites: witness the relatively low level of attention to Brezhnev by Masherov and Mazurov (table 17), as well as their general forbearance of terms connoting a person warmth (table 18). Also, Brezhnev's successor Andropov does not seem to have been given to publicly expressing warm personal references to Brezhnev, although his frequency level of Brezhnev references is above the Politburo mean (tables 17 and 18). Nonetheless, it would

seem that the most appropriate way of interpreting the data is to consider frequent reference to Brezhnev as a factor which may have served to augment the political power of those in a potentially vulnerable position, as well as indicative of a deferential attitude toward the political status quo. However, it does not appear to be a necessary condition for political security as such.

Another way of considering the role of public recognition of Brezhnev in personal power maintenance is to examine the proportion of all references to Brezhnev provided by the minority elites. Table 19 provides the breakdown of these data. The national minority elites expressed over 60% of all references to Brezhnev. Even more striking is the fact that the 3 non-Slavic elites provided over 40% of all such references. It is clearly these elites who were most given to publicly recognizing the General Secretary.

However, a considerable proportion of all references to Brezhnev was provided by Shcherbitsky. What makes Shcherbitsky's relatively high proportion of references especially remarkable is its magnitude compared to that of the other three Ukrainians. Although the three others were of course not on the Politburo as long as Shcherbitsky (table 17 provides the standardized percentages), the difference in emphasis among the Ukrainians is unmistakable.
TABLE 19
References To Brezhnev: Minority Elites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>Total N</th>
<th>% of Politburo Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Slavs:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aliyev</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>23.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunaev</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>11.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashidov</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>7.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1604</td>
<td>41.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ukrainians:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podgorny</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polyanski</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shcherbitsky</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>10.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelest</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>440</td>
<td>11.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Belorussians:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasherov</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mazurov</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>5.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>253</td>
<td>6.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minority Total:</strong></td>
<td>2297</td>
<td>60.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Politburo Total:</strong></td>
<td>3821</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Shcherbitsky not only devoted a great deal more attention to Brezhnev than his Ukrainian compatriots did, but expressed these references in personally warm terms to a much greater degree than the others did. It is difficult to imagine that the attitude which motivated this frequency and type of reference to Brezhnev did not contribute to his political power, as it apparently did to that of Aliyev, Kunaev, and Hashidov.

What then of the Belorussian minorities, Hasherov and Mazurov, whose attention level and type of reference to Brezhnev were low and "distant", and yet who appeared politically secure throughout the decade? It should be born in mind that the two Belorussians both exhibited relatively low salience levels regarding nationality issues, and their patterns of issue attention resembled the majority of the Russian elites more than the other minorities. Since they were evidently not present on the Politburo qua minorities (as Kunaev, Hashidov, and Aliyev appeared to be),

Perhaps it should be noted here that the departure of each of these two elites was somewhat unique, although it is generally considered that they were not removed politically per se. In 1978 Mazurov retired, (the only elite in this study to do so, in the time period under study), and Hasherov was killed by a vegetable truck in Moscow in early 1981. Although one could certainly speculate that these two occurrences were deliberately brought about for the purpose of removal from the Politburo, I am not aware of any literature which has seriously examined this possibility.
perhaps they did not feel constrained to publicly pay homage to either the things Russian in Soviet national relations, or to Leonid Brezhnev personally, in order to maintain their political power and position. Again we cannot be dogmatic on this point, and it bears repeating that public recognition of Brezhnev was apparently not a prerequisite for the maintenance of personal power as such on the Politburo. However, those national minority elites who did so - and who used warm personal references in so doing - were those who have survived politically and even advanced in position.2a5

In the next and final chapter the findings from the study will be concluded and summarized, and the implications for the politics of Soviet national relations will be outlined. Suggestions for direction in future research in Soviet national relations will close the study.

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2a5 Aliyev was promoted to full, voting Politburo membership in 1982. For a fuller account of Aliyev's political ascendancy see Archie Brown, "Andropov: Discipline and Reform?", Problems of Communism, (vol.32, no.1) January-February, 1983, pp.26-29. Shcherbitsky, Kunaev and Rashidov have evidently experienced no negative repercussions since the 1982 succession as of this writing. This of course proves nothing, but suggests a great deal.
Chapter VIII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

8.1 PRELIMINARY COMMENTS

The Soviet leadership has maintained for over 15 years that the "national question" in the USSR has been resolved, completely and irreversibly. This claim is supported by the apparent absence of serious micro-nationalistic protestation in the Soviet Union, and the gains in social amenities by the various minority groups. The data examined in this study indicate that the Soviet top leadership of the 1970s indeed perceived the national question as less and less salient, as measured by the amount of public reference to the various issues involved. However, whether or not the national question is in fact actually "resolved" is perhaps more of a semantic issue than a substantive political one. The Soviet Party leadership recognizes that national relations still require "further understanding" in terms of their role and function in the transition of humanity to communism. This type of terminology signifies that the whole question of national relations is by no means a dead issue, notwithstanding official claims to its having been "resolved".

- 237 -
The fact is that there are and historically have been many important themes used by the Soviet leadership to refer to national relations in the USSR. How these themes are used by the leadership - emphasized, deemphasized, or ignored - provide clues by which we can begin to understand the perceptions and attitudes of the leadership toward national relations. The importance of understanding elite orientations rests in the fact that leadership attitudes toward the various issues which comprise the national question have historically appeared to be a very salient factor in the regime's handling of minorities, and for the domestic (and even foreign) policy of the USSR as well.

At this point it should be emphasized that the notion of a "Soviet nationality policy" - and especially a single, specific "policy" - is almost never used by the Soviet leadership, and in fact has very little conceptual utility for our understanding of the politics of Soviet national relations at the elite level. Thus the most fruitful manner of proceeding to understand nationality politics in the Soviet Union appears to be to examine specific elites' perceptions of and attitudes toward specific themes within the whole question of national relations. The purpose of this chapter will be to review the most salient characteristics of the Politburo's perception and attitudes
toward national relations in the 1970s, and to comment on the general utility of the methodological approach employed in the study.

8.2 MAJOR FINDINGS

As the decade of the 1970s progressed, less and less of the Soviet elites' attention was devoted to nationality issues. The general trend throughout the decade was also toward a cruder or more simplified perception of the nature of national relations, manifested by an increasing neglect of the more sophisticated themes which have historically been used by the Soviets to describe and prescribe national relations. In addition to these two phenomena, there was also an increased emphasis on the (ethnically) Russian element of Soviet national relations as the decade progressed. Indeed those minority elites who tended to neglect this aspect of national relations in their public expressions were removed from the Politburo politically. Given the fact that the Politburo itself became more ethnically Russian in terms of its constituency, these phenomena can only be interpreted as a general trend toward a more Russo-centric Politburo orientation to national relations.
This Russo-centrism can be seen perhaps more clearly by the shifts in nationality issue emphasis within the decade by the Politburo as a whole. The themes connoting a positive orientation to national minorities' rights and interests were reemphasized in the latter years of the decade, and this occurrence is not without significance. However, the whole political milieu surrounding this reemphasis of the "pro-national minority" themes must be considered to properly understand the nature of this shift in emphasis.

First of all, during the middle years of the decade personnel turnover on the Politburo was such that nationality considerations cannot be disregarded as peripheral factors. The minority elites who were neither given to much public recognition of the Russian element of Soviet national relations nor to Leonid Brezhnev personally were the Ukrainians (Shcherbitsky excepted), and each of these proved politically vulnerable by virtue of their ultimate removal from the Politburo. Although we of course cannot attribute their political demise exclusively to this failure to publicly recognize the Russian element and Brezhnev personally, the fact remains that national relations in general represented a very salient set of issues to each of these elites, and it hardly seems likely that their orientation to the whole subject was not a
consideration in their removal. Rather, it appears that their orientation to national relations was increasing incompatible with the larger direction in which the Politburo as a whole was moving regarding its public references to nationality issues.

Secondly, the other minority elites seemed to have "laid low" as it were, during the middle years of the decade both in terms of quantity and type of public references to national relations. The ethnically Russian elites devoted a much larger share of the Politburo's attention to national relations at that time. This phenomenon further supports the notion that something of a macro-orientation toward a greater Russo-centrism was in fact precipitated by the Russian elites themselves. It is true that in the latter years of the decade the other minority elites once again demonstrated a greater propensity to devote public attention to nationality issues. However, the pattern of attention to specific nationality issues indicates that the "pro-national minority" themes were accompanied by a heavy adulation of things Russian and an almost total forbearance of publicly mentioning nationality deviations of any sort.

This is not to suggest that the reemergence of emphasis on the "pro-national minority" themes is without substantive significance, or was merely a perfunctory sort of homage to
the Leninist tradition of formal sensitivity to national minorities. Rather, the reemphasis on public expression of such themes appears more suggestive of a situation wherein the national minority elites had perhaps adapted to the more Russo-centric political climate on the Politburo, yet were at the same time mindful of their responsibility to publicly enunciate the Leninist tradition. If this sort of adaptation represents an accurate account of the minority elites' shifting pattern of attention to nationality issues, it is also evidenced by a good deal of public recognition of General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. The minority elites were found to refer to him much more often than other elites, and to do so using terminology connoting a warm personal orientation to him. The three non-Slavic elites in particular were given to frequent public reference to Brezhnev, and this may well have served to augment their apparently tenuous position on the Politburo.216

216 This matter of the minority elites' possibly adapting themselves to a changing political climate is not without large-scale precedent in Soviet history. Adam Ulam has suggested something of the sort:

"The Bolsheviks' nationality policy served them well during the first years of the Soviet regime. Yet it became clear very early that Communism represented what might be called political assimilation and that whatever the ethnic composition of the party leadership at the time, the psychological meaning of this assimilation implied, even in those earliest and most internationally oriented years of Soviet power, a degree of Russianization."

Adam Ulam, "Russian Nationalism", in The Domestic
Do the above phenomena signify that a genuine or 'true' spirit of sensitivity to the political fate of Soviet national minorities has been subverted at the Politburo level by a pervasive Russo-centrism? The data do not necessarily warrant such a conclusion. The fact that the minority elites had apparently adapted to the prevailing political realities does not necessarily mean that the content or motivation behind the "pro-national minority" references was purely instrumental or even spurious. It would be gratuitous cynicism to maintain that the Soviet leadership is using the best ideas in the Leninist legacy solely to augment the power of the Russian element in Soviet society, and this would certainly appear as "great power chauvinism" to Party ideologues. We have seen that the Soviet leadership has been rather sensitive to charges of "great power chauvinism" in national relations since the end of the Stalin era. Indeed, one crucial aspect of "Leninist nationality policy", by anyone's reckoning, is a conscious attempt to obviate "great power chauvinism", that cardinal

Context of Soviet Foreign Policy, Seweryn Bialer, editor; Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, p.5. This may be something of an overstatement of the degree of "Russianization" necessary to gain or hold one's political position. However, if Ulam's point is even partially valid, then the shift of nationality issue emphasis on the part of the minority elites during the 1970s probably did indeed represent an adaptation of sorts to the larger direction in which Politburo orientations were moving.
sin in the Leninist ontology.

It was determined in Chapter 2 of this study that the Soviet leadership has evidently succeeded in containing potential nationalistic protestation by a skillful combination of concessionary measures toward minorities, and a willing readiness to use repressive force if and when necessary. In light of this characteristic of Soviet power maintenance, the sustained (and even increased) public expression of themes connoting official sensitivity to minorities' rights and interests by Politburo-level elites should most probably be interpreted as a concessionary measure, or a fulfilling of "Lenin's behests", to use the Soviet phrase.

It is significant that the minority elites were the ones who were largely responsible for the resurgence of the public attention to the "pro-national minority" themes. This suggests not only that their function on the Politburo is to publicly enunciate this crucially important aspect of the Leninist legacy, but also that they may have indeed initiated a Politburo orientation which was in some measure more sensitive to minority rights and interests.
Nevertheless, the larger trend in Soviet elite attitudes toward and perceptions of national relations in the 1970s appears unmistakably more Russo-centric as the decade progressed. The important questions become why this might have occurred, and what the larger ramifications are likely to be for Soviet national relations, and for the Soviet political system in general. In Chapter 2 attention was devoted to some of the various phenomena which point to the likelihood of minority unrest in the USSR. These include the demographic trends disfavoring the Slavic sector of Soviet society, and the fact that modernization as a social force has tended to engender political unrest among national minorities throughout the world in the 20th century. It is entirely likely that these various socio-political pressures, combined with the suspicious paranoia noted to have accompanied detente, in fact lay behind the larger trend toward a more intense Russo-centrism in the Politburo's orientation to national relations in the 1970s. Although the formal commitment to sensitivity to minorities remains very much in force, the actual political balance between concessionary measures to minorities and repressive force may well have shifted more toward the latter factor as the decade of the 1970s continued.
Another important consideration in interpreting the larger trends indicated by the data is the whole set of economic factors which characterized the Soviet Union in the latter 1970s, and indeed thereafter. It is well recognized that the question of continued rapid economic growth is becoming increasingly problematical for the Soviet leadership. This situation hardly calls for forecasts of an imminent demise of the Soviet social system, but it certainly is placing constraints upon the options available to the leadership in terms of domestic social policies. Given the primacy of improved living conditions in the larger ideological framework within which the Soviet leadership operates, one could speculate that the increasingly Russo-centric Politburo orientation to national relations may be an indication that sensitivity to the subtleties of minority rights and interests would not be considered at the expense of the expediencies of economic growth. The specific considerations here would be such factors as labor availability, capital and labor resource allocation, and related concerns which would certainly have a bearing on the thinking of the top leadership in such an intensely centralized socio-political system as the Soviet Union.
This is not the place to develop the theme of precisely how these economic considerations fit into the larger scheme of the politics of Soviet national relations. Rather, it is to suggest that the findings of this study may well represent a good starting point for the analysis of why and how the question of nationality politics may have been involved in the decisions of the leadership to embark upon a given course in undertaking to resolve these admittedly grave and complex economic difficulties.

Before concluding the study it is appropriate to comment on the general utility of the method which lay at the heart of this research effort. Although the claims made for content analysis may at times seem exaggerated in terms of its ultimate usefulness, in the present case thematic content analysis has certainly appeared as a worthwhile device which has generated some light on an important area which has largely remained inaccessible up to this point. It is also true that the analysis and interpretation of public utterances by Soviet leaders is a very delicate affair under the best of circumstances, as we have been recently reminded by Jerry Hough.\footnote{See his letter to the editor, \textit{Problems of Communism}, (vol.32, no.1) January-February, 1983, pp.79,80.}
Nonetheless, the fact remains that considerable differences among elites have emerged in the course of the study, and it is extremely unlikely that these different patterns of public reference by elites are entirely fortuitous. Here of course the critical problem becomes a hermeneutical one, yet to address the question of how to interpret the data it is necessary to consider the larger scope of substantive questions involving Soviet national relations. In this respect the strongest advantage of the methodological approach employed in this study is that it enables the researcher to begin asking a set of new (and one hopes higher order), questions regarding the politics of Soviet national relations. In other words, the data generated by the Soviet Elite Perceptions Project would prove to be of little value unless interpreted in light of the understanding of Soviet national relations developed by non-quantitative means. From this perspective the methodological approach employed in the study is more than a mere alternative device, but one which further develops our understanding of national relations by building on previous knowledge and breaking some new ground as well.

Thus, while the results of the research effort must be offered to the larger academic community with due modesty and forbearance of grandiose claims, the patterns of issue
attention (both among individual elites and over time in general) do indeed appear to represent phenomena substantial enough to merit attention. Although at least as many questions may be raised as a result of these findings as have been answered by them, such a situation may be seen as an indicator of fruitful inquiry in general. If this be the case, continuation of research along the same general methodological lines would not be inappropriate.

The question of the Soviet elites' attitudes and perceptions of national relations - what they "see" when they look at the ethnic mosaic which is the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - will continue to determine in no small measure the fate not only of the various peoples of the USSR, but the nature of the Soviet system itself. This will of course have an important bearing on the manner in which the Soviet Union relates to the larger world, albeit in a somewhat indirect way. As such the measure of understanding which has been provided by this study will serve to clarify the nature of the Soviet Union by illuminating but one aspect of its political life. Hopefully it will also have served as a modest example of the happily eclectic nature of methods available in modern social science.
Appendix A

COMPOSITION OF ISSUES EXAMINED

1. Pro-Great Russian Orientation
   a) Russian People as Elder Brother
   b) Aid of the Russian People to Minorities
   c) Russian as Common Language
   d) Russian National Culture
   e) Russian Language
   f) The Great Russian People
   g) First of All, The Russian People
   h) Virtues of The Russian People
   i) Russian Progressive Thought
   j) Russian Social Thought
   k) Russian People as First Among Equal

2. Pro-Unity Orientation
   a) Unity of Soviet Peoples
   b) Moral Unity of Soviet Peoples
   c) Fusion of Soviet Peoples
   d) Unification of Soviet Peoples
   e) Union of Soviet Peoples
f) Historical Unification of the Russian National State

g) Ideological Unity of the Soviet Peoples

h) Social Unity of the Soviet Peoples

3. Character of Soviet National Relations

a) New Historical Community: The Soviet People

b) Rapprochement of Soviet Peoples

c) Brotherhood of Soviet Peoples

d) Friendship of Soviet Peoples

e) Gradualism of Merging of the Soviet Peoples

f) Kinship of the Soviet Peoples

g) Family of Soviet Peoples

4. Substance of National Relations

a) Cooperation among Soviet Peoples

b) Common Interests of Soviet Peoples

c) Interaction among Soviet Peoples

d) Common Soviet Culture

e) Common Task of the Soviet Peoples

f) Common Character of the Soviet People

g) All-Union Division of Labor

5. Critical of National Deviations

a) Nationalism

b) Great Power Chauvinism

c) Nationalist Feelings
d) Nationalist Ideology

e) National Differences of Soviet Peoples

f) Chauvinism

g) Nationalist Deviations

h) Bourgeois Ideology

i) Nationalist Dissensions

j) National Conceits

k) Separatist Tendencies

l) Localism

6. Pro-National Minority Orientation

a) Nationalities' Interests

b) Flowering of Soviet Nationalities

c) Leninist Nationality Policy

d) Equality of Nationalities

e) Tsarist Exploitation/Oppression of Minorities

f) Voluntary Union of Republics

g) USSR as a Multinational State

7. Ideological Orientations

a) Internationalist Brotherhood

b) Marxist-Leninist World View

c) Internationalist Consciousness (within the Soviet Union)

d) Proletarian Internationalism

e) Internationalist Upbringing
8. Soviet Nationality Policy

9. The National Question

10. References to Brezhnev: Personal Warmth
    a) (Personal Contribution of) General Secretary CPSU
       CC Leonid Illich Brezhnev
    b) Leonid Illich

11. References to Brezhnev: Neutral
    a) Leonid Illich Brezhnev
    b) Comrade Leonid Illich Brezhnev
    c) (Brezhnev as) Chairman of the Presidium of the
       Supreme Soviet
    d) (Brezhnev as) Soviet President

12. References to Brezhnev: Distant
    a) Leonid Brezhnev
    b) Comrade L.I.Brezhnev
    c) Comrade Brezhnev
Appendix B

POLITBUBO MEMBERS INCLUDED IN THE STUDY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>Birthdate/Entry*</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aliyev</td>
<td>1923/1976</td>
<td>1st Secretary, Azerbaidzhan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andropov</td>
<td>1914/1967</td>
<td>Chairman, KGB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>General Secretary, CPSU                                              11/82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brezhnev</td>
<td>1906/1956</td>
<td>General Secretary, CPSU                                               Died 11/82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernenko</td>
<td>1911/1977</td>
<td>Central Committee Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grechko</td>
<td>1903/1973</td>
<td>Minister of Defense                                                    Died 4/76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grishin</td>
<td>1914/1966</td>
<td>1st Secretary, Moscow City Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gromyko</td>
<td>1909/1973</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirilenko</td>
<td>1906/1957</td>
<td>Central Committee Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosygin</td>
<td>1904/1957</td>
<td>Chairman, Council of Ministers                                         Died 12/80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 254 -
Kulakov 1918/1971 Central Committee Secretary
Died 1/78

Kunaev 1913/1966 1st Secretary, Kazakhstan

Hasherov 1918/1966 1st Secretary, Belorussia
Died 1981

Mazurov 1914/1965 1st Deputy Chairman, Council
of Ministers
Retired 1978

Podgorny 1903/1958 Chairman, Presidium of Supreme Soviet
Removed from Politburo 5/77

Polyanski 1917/1958 1st Deputy Chairman, Council of
Ministers;
USSR Minister of Agriculture
Removed from Politburo 3/76

Ponomarev 1905/1972 Central Committee Secretary

Bashidov 1917/1961 1st Secretary, Uzbekistan

Romanov 1923/1973 1st Secretary, Leningrad Region

Shchrbil. 1918/1965 Chairman, Ukrainian Council of
Ministers;
1st Secretary, Ukraine
Shelest 1908/1963 1st Secretary, Ukraine

Removed from Politburo 4/73

Shelepin 1918/1964 Chairman, AUCCTU
(trade union council)

Removed from Politburo 4/75

Solomontsov 1913/1971 Central Committee Secretary
Chairman, Russian Republic
Council of Ministers

Suslov 1902/1955 Central Committee Secretary

Ustinov 1908/1965 Central Committee Secretary;
USSR Minister of Defense,
(1976–present)

Voronov 1910/1961 Chairman, Russian Republic Council
of Ministers until 1971; Chairman,
People's Control Commission

Removed from Politburo 4/73

* This date signifies entry into the Politburo as either a candidate or full member.
### Appendix C

**SCORES OF ISSUES FOR EACH POLITBURO MEMBER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RUSS</th>
<th>UMI</th>
<th>CHR</th>
<th>SUB</th>
<th>DEY</th>
<th>PNAT</th>
<th>IDEL</th>
<th>NOU</th>
<th>SHP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aliy.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>1.55-2.25</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.25</td>
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S = mean salience, E = mean evaluation, P = mean potency
RUSS = pro-Great Russian, UNI = unity, CHR = character,
SUB = substance, CDEV = criticism of deviations,
PNAT = pro-national minority, IDEL = ideological references,
NQUE = the national question, SNP = soviet nationality policy.
REFERENCES


Ponomarev, Boris (1973). Newspaper article in Neues Deutschland, 16 March.


