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PEOPLE'S PARTICIPATION IN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING:
EVALUATING THE US ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT

The Ohio State University

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PEOPLE'S PARTICIPATION IN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING:
EVALUATING THE US ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

Janice Love, B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University

1983

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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ii
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This research has developed out of the convergence of two related concerns about the study of international relations. The first is the need to document what significant impact, if any, nongovernmental organizations have on the conduct of world politics. The second, a more normative interest, is a desire to understand better how to create or enhance effective citizen participation in global problem solving.

Concern over whether or not nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play any important role in international affairs inevitably arises when one engages in the study of transnational relations. Since the time when transnational phenomena first began capturing the attention of international relations scholars (Angell 1969; Burton 1974; Feld 1972; Keohane and Nye 1972; and Rosenau 1969) this question has remained inadequately addressed. Ultimately it is the issue of impact that makes all other inquiries about NGOs interesting to international relations scholars. If NGOs' efforts are effective, what is the impact and how do they make it? It is hoped that this study will be a contribution to our understanding of the significance of at least one group of NGOs in world politics. The group chosen for investigation is a part of the international anti-apartheid movement.

The second concern about the study of international relations that gives rise to this investigation is the need for greater understanding
of how to create or enhance effective citizen participation in international problem solving. The normative assumption underlying this concern is a fundamental democratic value: people should be involved in making decisions and helping to solve problems on issues that affect their lives. Certainly it is clear that international affairs have an impact on people and that people engage daily in international interactions, either directly or indirectly, knowingly or unknowingly. Although much of this participation is unwitting and haphazard (e.g., buying imports, working for a foreign-based multinational corporation, vacationing abroad, etc.), a great deal of it is by deliberate choice.

The consequences of the deficiency in studies on the impact of NGOs in world politics put scholars desirous of creating more informed and active world citizens in an awkward position. They can describe in some detail the wide variety of efforts in which would-be problem solving NGOs engage, but they have little basis on which to give any policy advice. The scholar can say little authoritatively to citizens about how to be effective in their organized attempts at tackling global issues. Thus, in addition to the first purpose described, this research is a modest effort to add to our ability to give reasonably sound advice to NGOs on the making of their foreign policies.
CHAPTER I

THE STUDY AND ITS CONTEXT IN LITERATURE

One international problem that NGOs have been trying to address effectively for several decades is apartheid, the legalized system of racial segregation and oppression in South Africa. Apartheid as a term was first used in 1944 by Dr. D. F. Malan, head of the National Party in South Africa. Although it became official policy with the National Party electoral victory in 1948, the system had its foundations much earlier in South Africa's history (Carter 1958; Marquard; Magubane; Thompson and Wilson). Just as the system has a long history, so does resistance to it both inside and outside the country (Gerhart; Karis and Carter; Kotze; Minty; Roux; and Shepherd). Shepherd offers the most complete account of the nongovernmental contributions to the anti-apartheid movement, and Minty offers a useful analysis of British anti-apartheid NGOs. Shepherd asserts that in its totality the international movement is composed of:

- the exiled and imprisoned leaders (from the region of southern Africa) of all races; the international opposition to apartheid; the various groups, classes, parties, organizations in the 'homelands'; as well as the external movements, intellectuals, organizations (essentially nongovernmental)... Many governments from various parts of the world are also a part of the anti-apartheid movement. Their activities tend to cluster around the United Nations and its related organizations (p. 6, first parentheses mine).

Thus, people and institutions all over the world have been attempting to abolish this system of racial oppression, and NGOs have been a significant part of those efforts.
In order to address the broad question of the effectiveness of NGO involvement in international problem solving, I have chosen to focus this investigation on certain sets of NGO anti-apartheid activities as a case study. Although they will be discussed as a context, it is not the intention of this study to deal systematically with the world-wide NGO anti-apartheid efforts. I have narrowed the case study to examine the United States NGO involvement in the movement, and, in particular, two specific arenas of activists' work will be evaluated in depth: campaigns targeting governmental institutions in Connecticut and Michigan. Although I will attempt at the end of the investigation some speculative generalizations on NGO efforts to have an impact on a wide range of global problems, this research has particular pertinence to U.S. citizens who desire to tackle the issue of apartheid.

The anti-apartheid movement in the U.S., defined broadly here as aiming to abolish the systems of racial domination in the world complex of southern Africa (i.e., South Africa, the territory now called Namibia, the former Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau, and the country now called Zimbabwe), got its start in the early 1950s with the founding of several organizations concerned with African affairs (Shepherd: 33-36). The U.S. movement has experienced several phases, and the goals and strategies pursued within the movement have varied considerably across time and among the organizations committed to anti-apartheid efforts. The movement will be described in some detail in Chapter III, but it is instructive at this point to illustrate some of these wide-ranging NGO campaigns.
Anti-apartheid movement participants have targeted their efforts at several kinds of institutions or organizations: governmental bodies (e.g., the U.S. executive branch, Congress, state legislatures, city councils); corporate entities (e.g., multinational corporations, banks); and nongovernmental, noncorporate institutions (e.g., university administrations, churches); and resistance movements with southern Africa. Among their various campaigns have been: lobbying the executive branch and Congress to maintain and enforce sanctions against the illegal Rhodesian regime; attempting to convince U.S. corporations not to trade with or invest in southern Africa through the use of shareholder resolutions, boycotts, picketing, work-stoppages, demonstrations, etc.; requesting institutional investors such as universities, churches, pension funds, etc., to put pressure on these corporate entities not to maintain their southern Africa investment; pressuring local and state governments and other institutions not to deal with banks that make loans to the government of South Africa; raising funds and humanitarian supplies to be sent to liberation movements; and many more such activities. The organizations and their participants in these campaigns have come from various sectors of society including: churches, student organizations, labor unions, women's organizations, research centers, general citizens' groups, groups organized primarily in the black community, and others. As is illustrated here, the U.S. movement has involved many sectors of society in a number of kinds of campaigns in its attempts to find some means of abolishing apartheid.

This investigation of the anti-apartheid movement as a case study proceeds in three steps. First is an overview and description of the
international movement and its U.S. component (Chapter III). Then follows an in-depth examination of a sample of U.S. NGO campaigns in Connecticut and Michigan and an evaluation of these campaigns' impact (Chapters IV and V). Thirdly, conclusions are drawn regarding these evaluations, and there is a discussion of what implications this case study might have for an examination of NGO involvement with other problems. The specific research design and methodology used in the study is discussed in the next chapter. Prior to that discussion, however, it is helpful to put the anti-apartheid movement in the context of social movement and interest group literature.

Participants in these various and sometimes discrete campaigns usually see themselves as a part of a wider and somewhat coherent anti-apartheid movement. To picture these efforts in their totality as being a social movement is also a useful conceptual device for the purpose of this study. McCarthy and Zald (p. 2) define a social movement as "voluntary collectivities that people support in order to effect changes in society." In a review of the numerous definitions of social movements, Blaser and Saunders (pp. 3-5) find that almost all definitions contain this same attribute. Other attributes summarized in their review and adapted here are: a set of shared values among the social movement participants; a group identity; a duration capable of measurement in years; a frequent involvement in innovative or noninstitutional activities; and some elements of structured organization. This latter attribute is facilitated in social movements by what McCarthy and Zald (p. 2) define as social movement organizations (SMOs): "the carrier organizations which consciously attempt to coordinate and mobilize
supporters." The anti-apartheid movement contains all of these elements in various combinations at different points in time. Before continuing the discussion of the anti-apartheid movement itself, however, we need to examine scholarly literature relevant to the activities of movements in general and also a related phenomena, interest groups.

Social Movement Framework

Gerlach and Hine (1970) provide a framework within which to examine the structure of social movements as a whole, both the various groups contained in a movement and the dynamics between the groups across time. These authors used the framework to investigate the black power movement and the pentacostal movement, and Cassell (1977) employed it in her observation of the women's movement. The Gerlach and Hine framework is used in this study not only because it helps to focus the descriptive aspect of the inquiry by pointing out places to look for pertinent data, but it also will facilitate greatly the evaluative part by turning attention to how various groups through their interaction within the movement have an impact on each others' goal attainment (or nonattainment) and on the creation of unanticipated or second order consequences.

Three characteristics typifying a social movement as outlined by the framework are: decentralization and polycepalous (many-headed) leadership; segmentation; and reticulation. Decentralization and poly-cepalous leadership mean essentially three things: (1) there is no central command post or policy-making body for all of the movement; (2) there are multiple leaders, no one of whom controls, regulates, or makes binding decisions for the entire movement; (leaders are not even
likely to know everyone involved in the movement); and (3) there is no objective criteria for membership in the movement as a whole, although groups within the movement may have membership requirements (Gerlach and Hine 1970: 34–41).

Segmentation refers to the social structure of the movement and means that the movement

is composed of a great variety of localized groups or cells which are essentially independent, but which can combine to form larger configurations or divide to form smaller units... each unit has different ideas about how to achieve the more general objectives of the movement and each interprets the movement ideology in its own way. New cells are formed from the splitting of an old cell, from proliferation by the gathering of new members under new leaders, and from combinations and permutations of these.

Segmentation occurs for a variety of reasons, some of which include: competition among leaders or sects of participants; ideological differences; previous social and personal cleavages or geographic distance. Gerlach and Hine name a fourth reason as well: "an ideology of personal access to power .... the assumption that individuals in the movement have direct personal access to knowledge, truth, and power." Each individual can have personal initiative with regard to the movement and is urged to take personal responsibility for it (Gerlach and Hine 1970: 41–55).

Reticulation in a structure is when "the cells, or nodes, are tied together, not through any central point, but rather through intersecting sets of personal relationships and other intergroup linkages." The various groups in the movement, therefore, do not represent simply an amorphous collection but are an organized network. Reticulation is accomplished through several channels: personal ties (kinship, friendship,
etc.) between members; personal ties between leaders; traveling "evangelists" who give speeches, organize rallies, etc. and under whose leadership diverse groups may unite temporarily for events or activities; unifying events or rituals in which commitment is renewed and information is shared (with or without an "evangelist"); national or regional associations of movement organizations; and basic beliefs or ideological components shared by all segments of the movement (Gerlach and Hine 1970: 55-61).

As will become more clear as this report continues, the anti-apartheid movement fits very well into the Gerlach and Hine framework. It is characterized by decentralization in that there are several identifiable leaders of the movement, none of whom can speak for or command the entire movement; by segmentation since localized groups with various goals and various strategies are working on campaigns across the country; and by reticulation in that these groups form networks to share information and to work together on specific tasks. The utility of the Gerlach and Hine framework, as suggested earlier, is that in addition to contributing an illuminating vantage point from which to describe the movement, it also aids the evaluation of campaign effectiveness. Some of the authors' discussions of the advantages and disadvantages to decentralization, segmentation and reticulation in a movement are directly pertinent to campaign evaluation. The advantages and disadvantages have important bearing on campaign impact and goal achievement.

Two advantages in such movement organization examined by Gerlach and Hine (1970: 73-78) are social innovation and minimization of failures. More innovation may occur because among the many groups within
the movement "variation is maximized, options are explored, and new solutions may be found for various problems." Failures may be minimized because "decentralization maximizes experimentation which may give a better chance of hitting on new solutions to problems" (Cassell 1977: 117). Thus, diverse movement organizations may form symbiotic relationships in which experimentation or new discoveries by one group may lead to another group's success in a campaign (Freeman 1975: 145). Other advantages are perhaps the movement's abilities to unite disparate elements for short term or single goal coalitions without forcing them to bind together in any permanent way, and a maximization of strategic options, i.e., hitting the target from several different vantage points at one time.

Some of the disadvantages in such a structure, however, can be: the duplication of efforts among groups that do not find themselves in a workable symbiotic relationship -- most of which can usually ill-afford to waste resources in experiments or explorations of options that fail; group conflicts and factionalism; the ability of adversaries to "divide and conquer"; and the potential absence of a critical mass for any specific strategy to succeed.

This framework points out the need to examine the relationship between movement organizations involved in various campaigns whether or not those campaigns are successful. If a campaign is successful it may inspire other groups to attempt similar activities, possibly producing more successes. Or, we may find that a successful campaign had its genesis in a different campaign that did not achieve its goals. Thus when a campaign fails, it may have important consequences for the success or failure of other groups' efforts.
Determining what factors produce a successful campaign or understanding why a campaign failed is often a difficult task. Whereas Gershon and Hine provide a framework within which to examine the anti-apartheid movement, others point out variables that facilitate further the assessment of effectiveness. We will now look at some of those variables.

Movement Effectiveness

Sociologists tell us that "the topics of dynamics and effects of social movements are surprisingly understudied," especially in comparison to the amount of attention paid by scholars to the conditions that give rise to movements (Marx and Wood 1975: 403, 406). Nevertheless, some contend, "it is clear that major changes come through social movements. Social movements rarely leave their host society unchanged; often they have an impact on other societies as well" (Perry and Pugh 1978: 285). In the sparse literature which exists on the impact, consequences or outcomes of social movements, the variables which are mentioned in discussions of movements' effectiveness can be grouped in four categories: (1) the types of goals the movements pursue; (2) the strength of the movement; (3) the types of tactics or strategies chosen; and (4) the reaction to the movement by the target institutions and the host society. No precise relationships of these groups of variables to movement effectiveness are spelled out in the literature, but a discussion of them provides useful guidance in narrowing the search for clues as to what makes a movement more or less successful.
Goals

Movements or differing groups within the same movement seek varying degrees of change in their target institutions. Some groups desire total change, in which case they are usually labeled revolutionary or radical. Others desire only partial change and they are normally called reformists. Some groups may have a mixture of types of goals with only partial change sought in immediate or short-term future and total change desired in the long run.

Perry and Pugh (1978: 272) assert that the degree of change desired will have a bearing on the types of tactics a group chooses. Reformist goals are more likely to be pursued with tactics which lie within general societal norms. If a group seeks radical or revolutionary change there is greater chance that its tactics will not be within the "usual normative boundaries"; they may be more innovative and extreme than the tactics exercised by a group seeking partial change. The implication of this relationship between goals and tactics is that the reform group may have a better chance at success simply because it is less challenging to the norm -- in its tactics as well as its goals. In their discussion of several hypotheses on effectiveness Marx and Wood (1975: 405) report an assertion of Roberta Ash which suggests a similar relationship: "The less a movement challenges basic political-economic values and interests, the more likely it will be to succeed."

It is clear, however, that degree of change sought is not a variable sufficient to explain the success or failure of groups within a movement or of a movement itself. No simple relationship exists between types of goals and chance of effectiveness. Groups seeking reform have
failed in the past and revolutionary efforts have succeeded. Freeman (1975: 6) advises that both reformism and radicalism can have their pitfalls; that an uneasy tension exists between amount of change desired and the probability of achieving that change.

Movements that conform themselves to the norms of behavior in order to participate successfully in political institutions often find themselves forsaking their major goals for social change. Long-range ideals are warped for the sake of short-range gains. But movements that hold steadfast to their radical goals and disdain political participation of any kind in an 'evil' system often find themselves isolated in a splendid ideological purity which gains nothing for anyone. They are paralyzed by their own fear of cooption; and such paralysis is in turn the ultimate cooption as inactive revolutionaries are a good deal more innocuous than active 'reformists.' Thus a successful movement must not only maintain a balance between personal and political change, but also a creative tension between its 'politics' and its 'vision.' It must keep well in mind where it wants to go while accepting the necessity of often following a twisted and tortured road in order to get there.

One benefit of examining the anti-apartheid movement in the framework of Gerlach and Hine (1970) as discussed previously is that it helps us better understand the relationships among diverse groups within the same movement and the implications of these relationships for the groups' effectiveness. Cassell (1977: 119-120) in her study of the women's movement and Gerlach and Hine (1970: 72) in their study of the black power movement report that the presence of radical groups within a movement has helped the reform groups get sought-after responses from target groups. When a radical group presents demands which are interpreted as too challenging and unreasonable, the target group may become disposed to accept more moderate demands of a reform group. This in turn, Gerlach and Hine suggest, may lead to an "escalation of effort" because the validity of some demands are recognized, the whole movement achieves
some success, and the various groups in the movement experience renewed pride and determination to pursue further demands. Marx and Wood (1975: 402), however, warn that there is likely to be a delicate balance in the interactions of extreme demands from one group with moderate demands from another group. "Too strident, or powerful, a radical group may lead to backlash and repression by the dominant group, and to attention being focused away from the normative changes sought by the moderates."

Thus, it is clear that in this examination of the anti-apartheid movement and its effectiveness it will be important to monitor not only the degree of change sought by the various groups as reflected in their goals but also the interaction of the differing demands for change from various groups with differing goals.

Strength of the Movement

Perry and Pugh (1978: 272) maintain that the strength of a movement or groups within it may have a bearing on success since "the strong movement has more alternatives than the weak one." In examining the women's movement Cassell (1977: 118,133,150,168,169) emphasized the need for good internal organization within a movement organization in order to achieve effectiveness. A group with good organization may not achieve its goals, but a group without good organization is almost destined not to achieve its goals. Good organization consists minimally of some degree of formal structure, formal leadership, and a chain of command, and it is one of several indicators of strength according to Marx and Wood (1975: 401).
Other indicators of strength listed by Marx and Wood are:

number of adherents, degree of their commitment, power and prestige of adherents, financial resources of the movement, support (or lack of opposition) of various noninvolved pub­lics, interest groups and other movements, ability to influ­ence key decision-makers or media,... The strength of a move­ment at any given point in time is a composite of variables such as the above, and they do not necessarily all move si­multaneously in the same direction (e.g., mass membership could be in opposition to tightness of organizational struc­ture).

Marx and Wood (1975: 405) also list conditions under which groups that are not strong, "relatively powerless groups," can be more effec­tive. Some of the conditions they list echo tactics suggested by Saul Alinsky (1969 and 1972) and they will be discussed in more detail in the next section. They also reflect assertions made in the previous discussion on degree of change sought. These conditions bringing about greater likelihood for success for less powerful groups are:

1. Their demands can be seen as consistent with the broader values of the society.
2. They can gain the support of more powerful third parties and/or show how their demands will benefit other groups as well.
3. Their demands are concrete and focused.
4. They can clearly fix responsibility for the situation they are protesting (e.g., protesting against an urban renewal project as compared to protesting over inadequate housing).
5. Pressure is brought to bear on the responsible party and there is minimum discomfort to those not responsible.
6. They adopt new techniques which authorities have not had experience in dealing with.
7. Neutral third parties are present who have an interest in restoring harmony.
8. The powerless group is willing to negotiate, and its de­mands do not have a zero-sum quality.
9. Their demands involve a request for acceptance of social diversity, equal treatment, or inclusion, rather than dom­ination over, or change in the practices of, the dominant groups towards itself, or fundamental redistributions of income and power.
10. The powerless group seeks to veto a proposed policy rather than to see a new policy implemented.
11. The minority population is large enough to organize itself for conflict but not large enough to be perceived as a serious threat to the dominant group.

Thus, it seems that a movement which is not strong might still succeed under certain conditions, but these authors suggest that a strong movement will have a higher probability of achieving its goals because greater strength implies more available options. Certainly for this research it will be important to note in some detail what the strength of the movement and movement organizations is.

Tactics and Strategies

In analyses of how a movement might engineer its tactics for achievement of its goals, several authors agree: "...there is no a priori way of judging whether or not a tactic will be successful and there is no such thing as the successful tactic" (Wilson 1973: 235; see also Alinsky 1972: 138; and Perry and Pugh 1978: 272). Marx and Wood (1975: 403) assert that the absence of knowledge of which tactics will work under what circumstances results "partly from a lack of systematic study, partly from the historical uniqueness of each situation, and partly from the fact that what happens to a social movement may only be slightly related to its strategies." Both scholars and tacticians have given advice, however, on principles to guide the tactics and strategies chosen by movement leaders.

In an introductory test on social movements John Wilson (1973: 236) describes three principles to guide the choice of effective tactics, while in his primer for radicals Saul Alinsky (1972: 127-183) lists thirteen such principles, a number of which coincide with Wilson's suggestions.
Wilson's three principles to guide tactics are breadth, simplicity, and flexibility.

Breadth. A tactic has breadth when it applies pressure to the target from a number of different fronts simultaneously (Wilson 1973: 236); for instance, utilizing boycotts, stockholder resolutions, and workers strikes against a corporation all at the same time. Two of Alinsky's rules deal with this point (1972: 128, 129). One suggests to "keep the pressure on, with different tactics and actions, and utilize all events of the period for your purpose." The second is: "The major premise for tactics is the development of operations that will maintain a constant pressure upon the opposition."

Simplicity. Wilson (1973: 236) maintains that simplicity lies in the leadership not imposing burdens on movement participants too heavy for them to bear and in fusing symbolic and pragmatic elements. He cites the example of the Mississippi Freedom Ballot which, in 1963, both demonstrated that blacks could vote in large numbers (80,000 participated in a mock election) and educated the participants in how to carry out a civic duty. Alinsky (1972: 127, 128), in a similar vein, tells the activist, "Never go outside the experience of your people," and "A good tactic is one that your people enjoy."

Flexibility. Wilson (1973: 236) writes that

Flexibility means avoiding total and irrevocable commitment to any given set of tactics, and it means foresight and planning for the reactions which a given set of tactics is likely to provoke. The first rule of flexibility is to avoid employing all the power at the movement's disposal in any given tactical campaign.... Without a reserve, the movement is devoid of retaliatory power and is likely to lose face and momentum.... Flexibility also means being in a position to anticipate and respond to the reaction a given tactic will provoke from the opposition.
Alinsky (1972: 6) concurs in Wilson's observation on the need for flexibility and suggests in addition that activists always be prepared with suggestions for policy options other than those being pursued by the target. If the target should suddenly agree that the activists are justified in their demands, the activists should be prepared to continue the discussion with policy alternatives, not allowing the struggle to end when the opposition meets the first set of demands. Marx and Wood make a similar suggestion in condition #8 in the previous discussion on powerless groups. That is, the group should be willing to negotiate and the demands should not have a zero-sum quality.

Besides these rules or principles in which he agrees with Wilson, Alinsky (1972: 127-129) carries his advice further. He notes the importance of perception on the part of the opposition by asserting that, "Power is not only what you have but what the enemy thinks you have"; and, "The threat is usually more terrifying than the thing itself." He also is cognizant of the importance of timing: "A tactic that drags on too long becomes a drag." Like Marx and Wood in the previous discussion, he suggests (1972: 127-130):

Whenever possible go outside the experience of the enemy.  
(See Marx and Wood condition #6.)  
Pick the target, freeze it, personalize and polarize it.  
(See Marx and Wood conditions #3, #4, #5.)

The three authors recognize that there are difficulties in maximizing all of their suggestions at one time, not only because it is a very complex task but also because some of the principles or rules have potential built-in contradictions. For instance, how does a group maximize breadth of tactics while not going beyond the capabilities or resources of the movement organization (i.e., maintain simplicity)?
Alinsky, in addition, recognizes that activists, in the midst of campaigns, will often not have time or inclination to rationally calculate all the alternatives before them and choose the best ones. The point he makes, however, is that activists need to give serious contemplation prior to their campaigns to a set of principles for tactics, or a frame of reference, out of which they can give almost instinctual responses when called on to make tactical choices. His *Rules for Radicals* is an attempt to spell out and illustrate such a frame of reference — one which evolved out of his own experiences as an activist for several decades.

What, in summary, is the importance of this discussion of the relationship between tactics and campaign effectiveness for this investigation of the anti-apartheid movement? Alinsky's rules, Wilson's principles, and Marx and Wood's conditions provide a useful backdrop against which to examine the tactics employed by anti-apartheid movement organizations — a backdrop that demonstrates a great deal of consensus between a practitioner and two scholars. An important question to ask in this research is whether or not movement leaders give systematic thought to the principles which guide the tactics chosen, and if so, what are those principles or "rules of thumb?" If the movement leaders do not have an explicit frame of reference, do their actions suggest an implicit one? On the other hand, if their activities seem to be rather randomly chosen, how do they fare? Are haphazard tactical decisions any more fruitful than planned or very deliberate ones?
Reaction to the Movement

A fourth set of variables which sociologists hold to be important to movement effectiveness is the reaction to the movement by both the targeted institutions and the "bystander publics." There exists, as far as can be uncovered here, however, no generalizations about the nature of this relationship and probabilities of effective actions on the part of movement campaigns. Freeman (1979: 187) and Marx and Wood (1975: 401) all assert that these relationships are complex and non-linear. Attempts by targeted institutions to control a movement under some conditions can kill its effectiveness (or even the movement itself) whereas under other conditions such attempts can contribute to movement growth and attainment of goals. On the other hand, no reaction at all, or a reaction of ignoring the movement, can dissipate a movement's efforts or cause movement groups to resort to extreme tactics. Important to note as well is that the movement's activities are located in a wider context, a society in which the public's reaction to either side might be decisive in determining the outcome. Despite the lack of information on the relationship between target or public reaction and movement effectiveness, several authors describe the types of reactions available to the target and they speculate on how the public's reaction might figure in as significant.

One such target reaction, as suggested above, is simply for the target to ignore the movement. Perry and Pugh (1978: 277) report Oberschall's view that recognition is key to legitimizing the demands of the movement and to institutionalizing the conflict between it and its target. A favorable public opinion can help the movement obtain recognition
from the target and a negative view or lack of knowledge by the public can create the opposite outcome. Thus, movement campaigns often attempt to mobilize public support and/or sympathy through various tactics. "As a general rule, movements try to turn bystander publics into conscience constituencies who will supply the movement with additional resources, and try to prevent them from becoming antagonists who will discourage targets from responding to the movement" (Freeman 1979: 187). Wilson (1973: 251) goes as far as to say that "no social movement will succeed in bringing about large-scale change unless it wins public sympathy or at least acquiescence for its activities." The media may play an important role in helping the movement gain recognition from the public and/or the target institutions. Molotch (1979: 91) maintains that "news coverage is critical to sustaining social movements."

A tactic used by targeted institutions to keep the public or media from taking a movement seriously is ridicule. If the target can convince others that movement participants are simply deviants with no justifiable claims, the movement will have more difficulty in achieving its goals. The media and the public can be convinced to laugh at and make fun of the movement. The tactic of ridicule, however, can be used by the movement, too. Alinsky (1972: 128) advises activists that "ridicule is man's (sic) most potent weapon. It is almost impossible to counterattack ridicule. Also it infuriates the opposition who then react to your advantage."

Besides capitulation, other reactions by target institutions can vary from minimal reform, to cooptation of the movement leaders, to repression, to sabotage and violent suppression (Perry and Pugh
1978: 278-279). If a target partially meets the demands of the movement such a response could satisfy the moderate followers enough to keep them from supporting greater demands by participants committed to achieving more than reforms or partial changes. The target's tactic of cooptation may also involve meeting some minimal level of demands while offering movement participants personal rewards for cessation of their activity. A movement's resistance to minimal reform and cooptation strategies on the part of the target institution would seem to depend in large part on the level of commitment of movement participants.

The outcome of target reactions which employ coercion (e.g., repression, sabotage, violent suppression) is difficult to predict, and again, the public and media would seem to be important factors moderating the effects of these coercive target responses. If there is some degree of support or sympathy for the movement's goals among the public and media, the use of coercion can backfire and lead to greater support for the movement. Alinsky (1972: 129-130) gives several suggestions on how to turn the use of coercion by targeted institutions into a positive outcome for a movement. For example, several authors maintain that the violent reactions to sit-ins and nonviolent demonstrations in the South in the 1960s by policy and organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan were very helpful in gaining support for the civil rights movement. In this case authorities were seen as acting immorally and outside expected norms (Freeman 1979: 188; and Wilson 1973: 257-258).

With little or no public and media sympathy toward the movement, however, coercion and violence can drive a movement underground, force it to respond with violent tactics (both of which would inhibit movement
effectiveness), and/or kill it. Such tactics by the target may have an initial effect of strengthening movement participants against a common enemy, but if used consistently and/or if taken to intimidating and destructive extremes, in the long run the movement is not likely to sustain its activities (Freeman 1979: 187).

Marx (1979) attempts to analyze the various means by which institutions or people external to a movement could damage or facilitate movement effectiveness. Table 1-1 represents Marx's own summation of his analysis, and it reflects a number of points covered in the above discussion.

In this investigation of the anti-apartheid movement and its effectiveness it will be important to learn what responses target institutions, the media, and, if possible, the public have made to the movement's efforts. The discussion contained here will guide the search for these reactions and their consequences in anticipation that movement organizations' interaction with their targets and their environments can be important to achievement of their goals.

**Interest Group Effectiveness**

I will explore here some interest group studies to gain a better understanding of still other variables which could make a difference to the effectiveness of anti-apartheid campaigns. The distinction between concepts of interest group and social movement or social movement organizations is not always clear, and in this case it is not particularly pertinent either. What is useful about studies of interest groups is that they point to variables affecting the outcome and impact of
TABLE 1-1
Some General Strategies for Facilitating or Inhibiting a Social Movement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To Facilitate the Movement</th>
<th>To Inhibit the Movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate capacity for corporate action</td>
<td>Inhibit capacity for corporate action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make it possible for energies of movement to go toward pursuit of broader social change goals, as well as maintenance needs</td>
<td>Direct energies of movement to defensive maintenance needs and away from pursuit of broader social goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create favorable public image; develop and support ideology</td>
<td>Create unfavorable public image and counterideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give information to movement</td>
<td>Gather information on movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate supply of money and facilities</td>
<td>Inhibit supply of money and facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate freedom of movement, expression, and action; offer legal immunity</td>
<td>Inhibit freedom of movement, expression, and action; create myth and fact of surveillance and repression; apply legal sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build and sustain morale</td>
<td>Damage morale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruit supporters</td>
<td>Derecruitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build leaders</td>
<td>Destroy or displace leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage internal solidarity</td>
<td>Encourage internal conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage external coalitions with potential allies and neutral relations (or conflict only insofar as it is functional) with potential opponents</td>
<td>Encourage external conflict with potential allies and opponents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate particular actions</td>
<td>Inhibit or sabotage particular actions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
nongovernmental groups' political activity, some of which have not been covered in the previous survey of social movement literature.

Interest group literature has a problem similar to that of social movement literature: many of the discussions evaluating interest group impact and effectiveness are speculative or nonevidential in nature, although studies describing the groups themselves and documenting their activities are more empirical and plentiful. Despite this shortcoming, some of the variables suggested by the literature as related to the success or failure of interest groups are: the locus of the decision-making process which is targeted for group influence; the time it takes for the target to come to a decision; the number of competing interests trying to have an impact on the decision being made; and a cluster of variables similar to what was called "strength" in the earlier section of this chapter.

Locus of Decision

The targets of most interest group activities are governmental bodies, but within that one large category of targets are several different kinds of decision structures. Cohen (1959; and 1973: 78-126), Hughes (1978: 199), and Milbrath (1967: 250) all maintain that interest groups have greater access, and thus potential for influence, when a decision is being made in Congress or with Congressional consultation rather than when the executive branch has sole jurisdiction. Congress is more accessible primarily for three reasons: (1) it is a body of elected representatives who to some degree can be held accountable by their public constituencies; (2) there are more rewards and punishments available for use by interest groups when dealing with the legislative
branch rather than the executive branch; and (3) Congress usually takes longer to make decisions than does the executive branch because of its committee system, public hearings, etc.; and interest groups, therefore, have more time to make their input.

Hermann (1978: 76-78) characterizes governmental organizations as having three structural properties likely to be significant to their decision-making processes. Although he does not discuss these properties with regard to interest group or social movement attempts to affect governmental decisions, the schema he presents facilitates this discussion of the variables relevant to interest group impact. The three properties are: physical size, power distribution, and member role. He dichotomizes each property and describes them as follows:

Physical size. Decision making units can be large or small. Although the exact breakpoint between large and small units must necessarily be arbitrary, the position taken here is that a significant division point may frequently occur when the number of participants reaches between 20 and 30 individuals. More important than the precise number are changes in group choice processes that occur then a) subgroups within the larger collection begin to dominate decision tasks, b) individual participation begins to be sharply inhibited by group size, or c) rules of procedure proliferate to govern group interaction. (1978: 77)

Power distribution. Hermann suggests that distribution of power can vary from the extreme of one "individual who can commit the decision unit even against the opposition of every other member" to the other extreme of unit members sharing power almost equally (1978: 78).

Member role. This property "refers to whether the individual participants in a decision unit have the latitude to take any position they wish or whether they represent a governmental bureau or agency whose approval they must maintain" (1978: 78),
For purposes of this investigation it is helpful to speculate in an elementary way on the relationship between the properties of a decision structure and its accessibility to those who would try to affect its decision output. As has already been suggested, large bodies are probably more accessible than small bodies of decision makers. More people in a decision group simply mean more points at which the interest group might lobby.

On the surface, a similarly simple relationship would seem to be reasonable with regard to the property of power distribution. The more evenly distributed power is among the decision makers, the higher the possibility that any one member might be persuaded to the cause of the interest group. The decision makers are not under the thumb of any authoritarian leader. On the other hand, however, if power is concentrated, the interest group would have fewer persons to convince of its position, although convincing these few (or that one) would be essential. Therefore, there seems to be no linear relation between power distribution in a decision unit and its susceptibility to influence by interest groups. It would be reasonable to suggest the proposition that only when an authoritarian leader is willing to listen to interest group concerns is a structure of concentrated power likely to be as accessible as a structure of distributed power.

In considering the property of member role, those decision units in which members have greater latitude over the decisions they make would seem to be more open to influence by interest groups than units in which members are obligated by constituent bodies to take certain positions. If members come to a decision structure with fixed positions, the
interest group would be required to successfully lobby the members' constituent bodies prior to the decision process. This greater task appears to make a unit with low levels of member latitude over their own positions much less accessible to an interest group.

This discussion would tend to suggest that large units with somewhat equally distributed power among its members who are not obligated to hold fixed positions are more approachable for interest group efforts. On the opposite extreme, small groups with power concentrated in the leadership and members with fixed positions are much less accessible, unless the leadership can be wooed by the interest group. However, at least six other combinations of these three properties exist (Hermann 1978: 79-83), and this discussion of the relationship of the properties to accessibility could be carried much further. Since this study is exploratory, I will not attempt to speculate further on specific relationships; but further in the investigation I will try to suggest how the decision structure of the target might have made a difference in the effectiveness of a campaign.

Time

The length of time a campaign target takes to make a decision can be very important to interest group effectiveness according to two authors. Hughes (1978: 213) and Milbrath (1967: 249) agree that longer time (more than a month according to Hughes) allows for more input by interest groups and therefore more chances to have an impact. Short-term efforts are likely to be effective only if they are massive. The relationship between time and effectiveness actually may be more curvilinear, however, since extremely slow decision making may lead to
diversions from its task or dissipation of energy for the interest
group, or, it may allow time enough for the rise of significant opposi-
tion.

Number of Competing Interests

"Counterveiling" opinions or a great deal of conflicting interest
group activity drawn to an issue can, Cohen (1973: 144-145) asserts,
leave a governmental body free to take almost any position on an issue.
Since there is no prevailing opinion among the concerned groups, there
is no consensus to which the government must react. The interest groups
have counter-balanced each other so as to moderate or weaken each other's
effectiveness. Sometimes the outcome of such situations is that a de-
cision will be delayed for further study. In such a situation, the
interest group with the greatest degree of persistence would seem to
have a greater chance of affecting the final result.

Strength

There are a number of variables which together would indicate the
strength of a campaign carried out by interest groups. Two such var-
iables which are rather obvious and to which Hughes (1978: 184,211)
points are good financing and good organization, neither of which Hughes
defines or discusses in any detail. Thorough research on the issue
under consideration and the decision makers and their procedures is
reported by Cohen (1973: 203) and Milbrath (1967: 235-236) to be impor-
tant to effectiveness. To achieve sound research or to gain access to
information a group may need contacts within the decision making arena.
Hughes (1978: 175) notes that inside contacts have been crucial to the success of some interest groups' efforts and at least helpful to others. Convincing persons outside the decision making arena may prove useful in convincing those within the decision making arena. Cohen (1973: 107-113) and Chittick (1970: 265) stress the importance of persuading journalists and news media publishers of an interest group's position. Chittick discusses how some interest groups have sponsored "fact-finding" trips for journalists and others have prepared articles themselves for newspaper or magazine publication (1970: 268-269). Cohen (1959: 21) also stresses that NGOs should try to educate "policy influencers" about the issues of importance to them. Milbrath (1967: 242, 250) discusses interest group attempts to solicit public opinion support and argues that in many cases such attempts have been fruitless because "few people listen to propaganda." Compared to the power of some government officials in shaping public opinion, he maintains that interest group direct impact is miniscule. Therefore, the interest group should pay careful attention to how it communicates its message; and it should be aware that its efforts will be much more difficult if in conflict with those of powerful governmental officials.

Several authors assert that legitimacy and credibility of representation and activity on an issue lend strength and credence to an interest group's campaign. Cohen (1959: 12, 17-19) attributes lack of legitimacy as the cause of ineffectiveness of many civic and religious organizations while he notes it is the reason for success of many business groups. For instance, business organizations are seen as having a great deal of specialization in their area (Cohen 1973; 95-107), they
have a great deal of expertise (Cohen 1959: 22; Hughes 1978: 211), and they are very practical and realistic in their policy recommendations (Hughes 1978: 211, 216). In contrast, civic and religious organizations are seen by many whom they attempt to influence as being too idealistic and impractical (Cohen 1959; 1973), and they often claim to represent a very ambiguous or unbelievable constituency (e.g., the people in the pews) (Chittick 1970: 241).

This problem of legitimacy or credibility may be in some respects beyond the direct control of the interest group. For instance, church groups may have such a poor image at this point among State Department officials that there is little chance that they will be able to rectify it. Milbrath (1967: 240-241) suggests the following as ways to enhance one's chances of being considered legitimate and credible. The purpose of the group as a whole should be directly linked to the issue it is trying to affect. The group should try to be honest and accurate in its assertions. It should attempt to develop expertise and creative insights into the subject matter. Any message conveyed or contact made should be in an inviting fashion: pleasant, inoffensive, well-prepared, well-informed, and direct. The group itself should be very convinced that its position has legitimacy, that it is "right," and it should be able to convince the decision makers that they will benefit from joining, agreeing with, and/or advocating that same position. Hughes (1978: 213) points out that persistence of effort sometimes helps to establish credibility.

Another important factor in interest group strength is leverage over decision makers. For example, Jewish groups are attributed with
success on influencing Middle East policies because of their voting strength in large urban areas (Cohen 1973: 158; Hughes 1978: 179) and because of their ability to raise funds for election campaign contributions. Milbrath (1967: 198) points out the utility of "rewards and punishments" to influence, and Cohen (1973: 203) asserts that lack of leverage leads to lack of effectiveness.

In summary, the variables grouped here under strength are: financial resources; internal organization; thorough research on the issue and the decision making process where it is being considered; contacts within the decision making arena; support from groups and individuals (e.g., journalists, "policy influencers," other interest groups, etc.) outside the campaign; legitimacy and credibility of the interest group; and leverage over the decision makers involved.

**Independent Variables**

This discussion of social movement and interest group literature leaves us with a "shopping list" of variables which scholars suggest might be important to nongovernmental organization effectiveness. As has been noted at more than one point in the previous discussions, however, few clues are given about the precise relationships between effectiveness and these variables or about the relative importance of the variables in relation to one another. Therefore, their use in this study will be for heuristic purposes rather than for the purpose of detailing specific hypotheses. It is hoped that the shopping list will lend aid to the comparison among the sample of campaigns evaluated for their impact.
In order to give some structure to the shopping list, the variables can be divided into what Herbert Simon (1969) would call the inner environment, the sphere of potential direct control by the movement organizations involved in the campaign; and the outer environment, everything else relevant to the campaign. Table 1-2 lists the variables drawn from the previous discussion in these two categories.

Conclusion

This chapter introduces United States NGO campaigns within the anti-apartheid movement as a case study in organized citizen activities attempting to have an impact on international problems. Literature regarding social movements and interest groups is examined and a shopping list of variables are provided as tools to aid the investigation of three basic questions: What does the anti-apartheid movement look like in the U.S. generally and in the specific cases to be examined here? Do the movement's campaigns succeed or fail in producing their desired outcome? And, why do they succeed or fail?

Before moving on to describe the anti-apartheid movement in more detail, and to evaluate the effectiveness of the sample of campaigns, some discussion of methodological issues is in order. We turn now to that task.
TABLE 1-2
The "Shopping List" of Independent Variables

**Inner Environment**

1. Goals
2. Tactics
3. Strength
   a. Number and kinds of organizations involved in the campaign
   b. Degree of involvement and commitment of each organization
   c. Number and degree of involvement and commitment of individual participants
   d. Amount of coordination among the organizations in the campaign
   e. Financial resources
   f. Staff resources
   g. Research efforts and amount of information gathering
   h. Support from groups and individuals outside the campaign
   i. Contacts with key decision makers
   j. Legitimacy and credibility of the SMOs involved
   k. Leverage over the targeted institution or decision makers

**Outer Environment**

1. Reaction and opposition to the campaign
   a. From the targeted institution or decision makers
   b. From other organizations or counterveiling campaigns
   c. From the media
2. Target: the type of decision making arena involved (i.e., size, power distribution, and member role)
3. Time available to the campaign
NOTES

INTRODUCTION AND CHAPTER I

1. Interest group is defined by Zeigler and Peak (1964: 3) as an organized social aggregate which seeks political goods that it is incapable of providing for itself. Social movement organizations have been defined previously in this chapter as "the carrier organizations that consciously attempt to coordinate and mobilize supporters" of social movements (McCarthy and Zald 1973: 2). One distinction between the two is that not all social movement organizations attempt to have an impact on political processes, whereas all interest groups do; for example, some social movements are only interested in personal change in their participants, not change in societal institutions (e.g., Pentacostals). Another distinction is that interest groups are often directly affected by the outcome of the political process which they try to influence (e.g., business groups lobbying for less governmental regulation; or church groups lobbying for continuation of their tax-exempt status; etc.). In contrast, social movement organizations are often not directly affected by the outcomes they seek (e.g., students protesting the Vietnam War even after the draft had ended; or human rights groups seeking an end to U.S. aid to repressive regimes; etc.). In addition, SMOs are more transitory than interest groups in most cases, interest groups tending to be highly institutionalized.

2. Simon's work in the Science of the Artificial has been adapted for use as a policy engineering framework by Bobrow (1972) and Sylvan (1979). I am employing only certain aspects of this engineering framework in this study.
CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY

In evaluating the impact of NGO anti-apartheid campaigns, one encounters several significant methodological problems that must be resolved carefully. Among these are: how to choose a sample or set of cases for investigation; how to define campaign effectiveness; how to design an evaluation that will help determine the degree of campaign effectiveness; and what sources of data to use to achieve the most thorough analysis. Each of these methodological questions will be examined in some detail in the chapter. Prior to that examination, however, we need to briefly discuss the merits and shortcoming associated with the general methodological approach used here: the case study.

The Case Study as a Research Methodology

In the heat of discussions over behavioral, quantitative and nomothetic approaches to political science in past years, the case study method was much criticized as generally being too descriptive in character and incapable of properly testing theoretical propositions because, by definition, there is only one measure of any pertinent variable. Critics conceded, however, that case studies might be appropriate for heuristic purposes when conducting exploratory investigations of questions or issues about which little is known. Some even allowed that theoretical propositions might be testable if the case study approach became the comparative case study approach. Despite intense criticisms,
the approach has always had many who would defend it, and among these is Eckstein who maintains that case studies can be useful to every step in the process of building theories, from initial descriptive explorations to confirming or refuting theoretical propositions or hypotheses.

The discipline at this point seems to have settled into some comfortable toleration of methodological pluralism, and the debates about the utility or dysfunction of case studies do not evoke the polarized responses of earlier years. A case study methodology has been chosen for this research because it has advantages useful to the investigation, as will be discussed, but it also has shortcomings that need also to be examined.

The most important criterion for choosing a research methodology is its appropriateness for the subject matter to be examined, and the approach chosen here is appropriate for at least three reasons:

1. There has been little systematic investigation of much of what is under investigation here -- i.e., the impact of NGOs in international affairs, the U.S. anti-apartheid movement, or particular campaigns targeted at state and local governments. Thus there has been little development of descriptive or analytic concepts, frameworks, or theories against which to compare the data from the study. In these circumstances case studies can be particularly useful because they stay close to the material and have the potential to uncover variables or relationships between variables that begin to explain what happened and why. Those same variables and relationships can then be applied to other cases until a body of literature sufficient to support more generalized concepts,
frameworks, or theories can be developed. Case studies are well suited for exploratory research.

(2) They are also a helpful approach to evaluations. When the research question involves not only why outcomes occur but also whether or not they have the intended or any impact, understanding the details and nuance of the subject matter can be important. And, (3) as George and Smoke suggest, "differentiated theory" may be of most use to decision makers. That is, they argue that case studies, if done systematically and carefully, may be one of the most policy-relevant approaches to research.

Another set of labels for the distinction in kinds of theoretical conclusions we are advancing might be "undifferentiated" versus "differentiated" generalizations. What decision-makers seek from policy science is differentiated theory -- theory that discriminates among different cases and classes of cases to throw up variables of direct diagnostic and predictive significance. A policy-relevant theory ... needs to differentiate among different classes of cases that arise, the differing populations of significant variables in the different classes, and the values of these variables that have implications or meaning for potential policy situations (George and Smoke: 637).

Because the intention of this research is to be useful to NGO decision makers, the case study approach is appropriate and perhaps the best strategy available.

For these reasons combined, case study methodology was chosen, but important to note here is that the investigation actually employs a comparative case approach. Two cases will be examined separately and together to discern the variables and patterns that are unique to each and common across both. Russett argues that because many case studies have been only descriptive or unsystematic in their analysis, they have not fulfilled their potential as building blocks for theory. If one
employs similar systematic approaches in examining and comparing more than one case, however, that potential may be better realized. This kind of comparison will be attempted here. Choosing cases for comparison, however, leads to the next significant methodological issue to be discussed: How does one select a sample out of a number of possible cases?

**Sampling Criteria**

Out of the totality of NGO efforts in the international anti-apartheid movement, I chose to examine the U.S. movement simply because it is more accessible to me geographically and in terms of contacts previously established. Within the U.S. movement, I chose to examine divestment campaigns -- campaigns targeting institutional investors to pressure them to remove their funds from businesses that operate in South Africa -- because they have been a major thrust within the movement. To evaluate their impact would be to evaluate efforts that, in many respects, lie at the heart of activists' and NGO efforts. My intention was, after systematically describing the entire U.S. movement, to examine the impact of an aspect of the movement that has commanded a great deal of activists' time and energy rather than a less central thrust. But within the divestment segment of the movement there is still a great deal of choice to be made about narrowing the research focus. The divestment question can be examined from the point of view of the organizations involved in conducting campaigns, or, the campaigns themselves. In his speculations about the impact of interest groups in foreign policy decision making, Cohen (1959) argues that the analyst gets better insights into impact if the unit of analysis is the specific
issue targeted rather than any particular organization that attempts to be influential. When using the issue as the unit of analysis, the investigator must also look at the work of all the organizations and their networks involved in targeting the issue, but one does not get sidetracked by interesting, but perhaps, tangential, examinations of organizational detail or history. In addition, one can get a good grasp of the impact of any particular NGO by examining the issues it attempts to impact in concert with others.

Following Cohen's suggestion, the unit of analysis for the evaluative section of this research will be particular divestment campaigns. A campaign corresponds to an issue in Cohen's discussion and consists of a coherent set of activities by persons and organizations directed at achieving a specified outcome. Theoretically there is no time limit on how long a campaign might last but in this study we find that they rarely are extended beyond two years. There may be several campaigns across time or across space directed at achieving the same outcome, but they can be distinguished from one another by the degree of cohesiveness among their activities and proponents.

Divestment campaigns vary in terms of the goals sought, strategies and tactics, types of participants, and targeted institutions. Again, in keeping with Cohen's issue emphasis on impact assessment, I have selected my sample of cases on the basis of the target involved, keeping target as a constant and allowing the other variations to continue. And, the campaigns chosen are those targeted directly at state and local governments with businesses as immediate indirect targets. Other institutions targeted but not covered in the valuation are businesses (directly) and
other institutional investors such as universities, unions and churches. The selection of the state and local government campaigns came as a result not so much of pure methodological criteria, but on the basis of my attendance at a conference focused on these campaigns. At that conference in June 1981, I began to develop contacts and associations with persons involved in these efforts and, for research purposes, was able to develop more quickly points of access for data collection than was possible for other types of campaigns. Therefore, convenience became an important criterion at that point. In addition, some of these campaigns were in progress at that time, and it became clear that there are advantages to being able to watch them unfold rather than attempting to reconstruct what happened post-hoc.

The implications of this selection were that I would not be able to compare potential differences involved in targeting more than one kind of institution (e.g., states vs. universities) and that I would leave unexamined a wide range of activities involving lots of people in campaigns targeting other institutions. Campaigns in Michigan and Connecticut were chosen at that time from the known campaigns conducted in about twelve states and fifteen cities. Since that time other campaigns have begun in other cities and states, as will be discussed in the next chapter. It became apparent that city campaigns were often the prelude to state campaigns; therefore, to look at locations where both had occurred would give some indication of the dynamic between the two. Another distinguishing criteria became whether or not a campaign had actually taken place. For example, some states like Nebraska have passed legislation,
but the passage came about primarily as a result of the efforts of a legislator and his or her staff or aides. Thus there was no active NGO involvement to evaluate.

The last criterion for selecting Connecticut and Michigan came in an attempt to examine three cases with varied outcomes, i.e., cases where the activists seemed to have achieved what they wanted, cases where they appeared to have failed, and cases of partial success. At the time (June 1981) Connecticut was seen to be a success, California a failure, and Michigan a partial success. California was eventually eliminated due to shortages of research funds for travel to on-site investigations and pressures of time. Choosing cases according to the variety of their outcomes rather than the similarity of their outcome has the disadvantage of allowing even greater amounts of variation to be explained in the study; but especially since the study is exploratory in nature, that disadvantage seemed to be outweighed in my preferences by the possibilities of getting a better grasp on the contrasts in circumstances leading to different outcomes. Besides, there were at that time not a great number of successful campaigns from which to choose. Connecticut was the only state that had actually experienced a campaign and had become a total success (and that was to change within a month because of a veto by the governor). Michigan and Massachusetts were the only partial successes, and the remaining states had been failures or were just beginning to experience campaigns. Again, the number of successes, partial successes and failures has changed since June 1981, as will be explained in Chapter III.

Because of the narrow focus of the case studies, the results of this research will have limited generalizability. It is hoped, however, that
the research will add to our understanding of NGO political influence and possibly lead to more informed groundings for future investigations. In addition to selecting a sample of cases for evaluation, the investigator is faced with the methodological question of how to define effectiveness and what evaluation design to use in determining the impact of these campaigns. It is to this question that we now turn our discussion.

Defining Effectiveness and Design of the Evaluation

Defining effectiveness and choosing a design for the evaluation are integrally related, and to deal with both I chose to employ an adaptation of what House calls the behavioral objectives or goals-based approach to evaluation. One of the difficulties in using policy literature about evaluation is that much of it is focused primarily on evaluating social service programs, rather than NGO political campaigns. Nevertheless, House and others point out general considerations that must be taken into account in evaluations and they are useful for this study.

House discusses a total of eight broad approaches to evaluation. The goals-based approach was chosen here for two reasons: (1) it is suitable for examining the data available; the data are not quantitative and thus other approaches, such as systems analysis, that use quantitative techniques are inappropriate; and (2) it provides a standard or criteria for determining effectiveness: the goals of the participants. Other standards might be created, as in a goal-free evaluation, but since any standard is arbitrary, I preferred to have the activists themselves impose the set of criteria rather than my imposing it for them. Thus effectiveness gets defined as whether or not the campaign has met its own goals; or, to allow for more subtlety in analysis, the degree
to which the campaign meets its own goals. The campaign outcomes will be compared to the goals and the results will demonstrate effectiveness—degrees of success or failure.

One of the problems with goals-based evaluations is that the analyst may be biased in examining only those outcomes pertaining to goals; i.e., the evaluator may overlook unanticipated or unintended outcomes. This is not an inherent flaw in the approach, however, and this research attempts to uncover all outcomes, whether intended or not. Another problem is that the analyst has a major job to accomplish before the evaluation can proceed: discerning and clarifying the goals to be used in judging the outcomes. This problem will be discussed in detail later in this section.

A third difficulty with this approach is that the evaluator may become too focused on outcomes and neglect important processes that can determine or affect outcomes. In this regard we must attempt to decide whether the outcomes can be attributed to the interventions (efforts of the campaign), or whether they result from other factors. The shopping list of variables in Table 1-2 will be used to analyze why the outcomes occurred and the degree to which they can be attributed to the campaigns in question. But imputing causation is difficult. Patton suggests that "Evaluation research does not provide final answers, but it can provide direction. Thus, evaluation research does not lead to final statements about causal linkages, but can reduce uncertainty about such linkages. Therein lies its potential" (p. 180). Explanations for causal linkages that compete with that of the campaigns themselves must be explored. Applying the earlier work of Campbell and Stanley to evaluation research, Rossi, et al. (p. 171-175) name a number of factors in addition to the
intervention (campaign) that could account for the outcome and suggest that the net (or intended) effect can only be surmised by taking the gross effect (the outcome) and subtracting all contaminating or confounding causal factors in order to see if any effect that can be attributed to the intervention remains. Their discussion is in the context of more rigorous research designs (quasi-experimental) but they provide useful guidance to understanding competing causation in less rigorous designs such as this one. The sources of competing explanation which they suggest are:

  a. endogenous change -- "the condition for which the intervention is seen as a remedy may change of its own accord" (p. 172);

  b. secular drift -- "relatively long term trends in the community or country in question may produce changes that enhance or even mask the effects of a program" (p. 172);

  c. interfering events -- "short term events may also produce enhancing or masking changes" (p. 173);

  d. maturational trends -- "Programs that are directed toward changing persons in infancy, childhood, or adolescence have to cope with the fact that these are periods of considerable change in the individual's life cycle" (p. 173);

  e. self-selection -- "those portions of a target population that are easiest to reach are usually also those who are most likely to change in the desired direction for other reasons" (p. 173);

  f. stochastic effects -- chance or random fluctuations;

  g. unreliability -- unreliability in the data collection procedures;
h. program-related effects — "The actual evaluation endeavor itself may result in contamination" (p. 175).

These kinds of competing explanations are investigated for their relationship to the campaign outcomes. Should few or no other competing causes seem relevant to the outcome as far as the research can discern, the campaign itself will have been given much more credibility in having been important to creating the outcome.

The research here will go farther than the goals-based approach outlined by House to incorporate an evaluation of what Patton calls a program's "theory of action." The theory of action involves the means (tactics, strategies) undertaken by the program, or in this case campaign, to reach its desired end-states (goals, objects). To evaluate a theory of action is to assess whether or not there is reason to believe the campaign can work, given what information we have available. Patton's suggestions for assessing the theory of action are (pp. 179-198):

a. delineate in detail a means–ends hierarchy of how the program (campaign) is theorized or proposed to work; i.e., the evaluator connects the specific strategy of the campaign to its desired outcome in logical sequences consisting of a "chain of objectives";

b. identify crucial validity assumptions: i.e., spell out the underlying theoretical assumptions and the explanatory logic that is the basis of the campaign participants' beliefs that the strategies or actions chosen will actually lead to the desired goals;

c. check the internal logic of the theory of action for consistency; "The means-end relationships delineated ought to be reasonable in the sense that there are no conceptual leaps of such magnitude that
critical intervening actions are ignored" (p. 186). Important also will be to note if there are any changes in the theory of action during or after the campaign.

Therefore, in all the evaluation aspect of this research will attempt to do three things: analyze the theory of action, determine if there are causal linkages between the campaigns and any outcome that might occur, and assess the degree to which the campaign met its goals. We will now discuss the method for discerning and clarifying goals.

**Discerning and Clarifying Goals**

Participants in the divestment campaigns may have multiple and even conflicting goals. The goals may be long-term or short-term in nature, and not all goals may be apparent. Through interviews with participants and through reviewing organizational documents, I arrive at my interpretation of the proponents' goals. In order for a goal to be included on the list of goals, unless it is in an official document like organizational minutes, at least two people must assert it. That is, if only one interviewee has a particular goal, it will not be included in the list. All goals are listed despite the potential conflicts between them and the conflicts are then discussed. The goals are divided into categories of short-term (defined as less than a year), medium-term (one to two years), and long-term (three or more years). The persons interviewed about their goals will be discussed in the next section. In the interviews, attempts were made through fairly long discussions to have the respondents be as clear as possible about their goals. Despite these efforts, if goals still remained hidden, they are unaccounted for in the study.
Sources of Data

A number of sources of data were used for both the descriptive and evaluative aspects of this research. The sources fall into two major categories: documentation and interviews, both of which will be discussed below.

Documentation

Documents were gathered from a wide range of sources including: the UN Centre Against Apartheid, US House and Senate hearings and reports, the State Department, research organizations, national anti-apartheid movement organizations, legislative and other governmental offices in the states and cities where anti-apartheid measures have been introduced, businesses and other targeted institutions or groups opposed to divestment efforts, and local anti-apartheid groups conducting campaigns. The research organizations that had gathered information pertinent to this research and were willing to share some of it with me are: Africa News, a news and information organization located in Durham, NC, publishing a weekly digest on African Affairs; and the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), a Washington, D.C, research corporation publishing materials about the impact of social and public policy issues on corporations and institutional investors. National organizations involved in anti-apartheid work that were generous in their willingness to allow me access to their files and/or publications are:

American Committee on Africa (ACOA), New York City
Campaign to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa (COBLSA), Washington, D.C.
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), New York City
Washington Office on Africa (WOA), Washington, D.C.
World Council of Churches (WCC), Geneva, Switzerland

More information on these organizations is contained in Chapter III. One
of their functions, however, is to collect information on the international and US anti-apartheid movements and their offices are rich sources of data.

A great deal of documentation on campaigns and legislation in many cities and states was available at the Conference on Public Investment and South Africa in New York City in June 1981. As a result of attending that conference I also was able to correspond with a number of legislators and activists to collect legislation and other pertinent material from campaigns across the country. In particular, divestment proponents in Connecticut and Michigan were very helpful in supplying information on campaigns in their states.

The kinds of documents collected across the sources are: legislative records such as the legislation itself, legislative analyses, records, minutes and testimonies from committee hearings, and records and minutes of floor debates and votes; other governmental records such as reports, analyses and opinions from state treasuries, investment agents, civil rights offices, and other bureaucracies; campaign or other anti-apartheid group materials such as promotional pamphlets, newsletters, self-histories, speeches, testimonies, and minutes from organizational meetings; opponent groups' reports, analyses, and testimonies; research reports of research organizations' surveys of anti-apartheid activities and impact; and newspaper and news magazine clippings.

Most of these data sources have problems or biases associated with them. For example, reports or analyses from opponent or proponent groups are likely to contain interpretations of information from the perspective of the sponsoring group. Because such documents often have political or
polemic purposes in addition to communications or informational purposes, their assertions must be checked for fullness of accuracy. For example, state treasuries often oppose divestment legislation and their legislative analyses frequently overstate the potential financial damage that divestment might cause. Activists, because they are proponents and because of their limited access to state financial records and lack of familiarity with investment procedures, often understate the potential for financial harm. Sources like these, however, are rich in data about decision making processes, e.g., who was arguing for what at what point.

A problem with state records from legislatures and bureaucracies is that they are sometimes incomplete or unavailable. For example, minutes from committee hearings may not be kept properly or may be misfiled and thus difficult to locate. In addition, records are often not printed until weeks after an event occurs causing delays in getting information. State offices may promise to send reports that never get sent, or staff people may be too busy to help locate the information needed. Good access to records often depends on developing some level of friendly acquaintance with secretaries and clerks who know best where the information is and how to get it. At several points spending time chatting or taking breaks with clerks proved to be a good investment in later getting records I needed.

Newspaper and news magazine clippings were useful in the research but there are also difficulties with this source. There is often little depth of information available in news articles, and journalists sometimes get their material from opponents or proponents without independent checks on the accuracy of their assertions. In addition, there is
always the problem in writers interjecting their own biases in any interpretation of events.

Because of the problems associated with all sources of data, it is important to get confirmation of information from more than one source while maintaining critical and skeptical judgment about all sources.

Interviews

I sought interviews with people at the national and international levels in organizations concerned with the anti-apartheid movement and in Michigan and Connecticut where the specific campaigns of interest were conducted. A list of all the persons interviewed is contained in Appendix A.

I attempted to get interviews with persons in the following national and international organizations: staff in the UN Centre Against Apartheid and members of the UN Committee on Apartheid; staff in the South African UN Mission in New York and Embassy in Washington; staff of the South Africa Foundation; South African journalists in Washington and New York; representatives of the African National Congress; participants in resistance efforts inside South Africa; executives in corporations and banks with operations in South Africa; State Department staff involved in southern Africa work; legislative staff for Africa subcommittees in the US House of Representatives and Senate; academics involved in or studying anti-apartheid work; staff in the research organizations mentioned earlier; staff of all the anti-apartheid organizations mentioned earlier plus another one in Washington, D.C., TransAfrica; and investment counselors. The only place where I was unable to get any interviews was the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, and the reason was because the staff person got snow-bound out of town and missed our appointment. I always
attempted to get more than one interview in each organization but was only partially successful. Generally with nongovernmental organizations I was able to get more than one interview per organization but with governmental and business organizations I was only able to get one per organization.

To secure interviews I went through a process of first writing the person a letter introducing myself and my research; second, calling the person to confirm their receipt of my letter and to set up a time and place for the interview; and third, calling the person a day or two before the interview to reconfirm our arrangements. My access to persons at the United Nations, South Africans in the resistance movement, and staff in research and anti-apartheid organizations was greatly facilitated by friends of mine who know people in those organizations and were willing to recommend me personally or in writing. In some cases, for example, with members of the UN Committee Against Apartheid, I was told by those with whom I spoke that their interviews would have been impossible without my having had the personal contacts. Access to the State Department, Congressional staff, corporate executives, and South African officials was surprisingly easy and most were willing to see me on the basis of my credentials of being a college instructor. I learned who to ask for interviews through reading documents I had collected but also by asking everyone I interviewed who else I should talk to. There was a great deal of consensus from all quarters about who were the significant persons related to the movement, its opposition, and its observers.

In Michigan and Connecticut I sought interviews with: activists in divestment campaigns; legislative proponents, opponents, and leadership; legislative aides; staff in state bureaucracies that had any relationship to the legislation proposed; lobbyists from organizations opposed to the
campaign (mainly business lobbyists) and lobbyists (other than the activists already mentioned) sympathetic to the campaigns; business, church, or community leaders in any way related to the campaigns; and journalists who had written about the campaigns or legislation. Because of time limitations in my on-site investigations, some of these interviews were conducted by phone and are so designated in the list of interviews. The only group of people with whom I was unable to get any interviews is journalists, all of whom were difficult to reach and unavailable when I was in the state.

The process for finding out who to interview and for securing these interviews was much the same as the process for getting the interviews described above except that access to the activists, especially in Connecticut, was more difficult than I anticipated. The Connecticut activists had experienced some red-baiting during some of their campaigns and were very wary of outsiders. They were also very reluctant to be studied. After realizing that I would need to establish greater credibility with them, I requested recommendations from several of my friends and acquaintances in the anti-apartheid movement, I wrote a two-page introduction for myself describing the research and my own involvement in anti-apartheid activities and then listed four references, all of whom are well-respected nationally in anti-apartheid circles, I also got a letter of introduction from the chair of my thesis committee that I could use if necessary to establish that I was legitimately involved in research. My anti-apartheid references made phone contact on my behalf with the activists, and from that point on they became accessible to me. The activists in Michigan put no limitations on my use of their files or contact with campaign participants.
In fact, they were generally pleased to be the subjects of research and were very helpful in getting me information I needed. Activists in Connecticut were also extremely helpful but limited my access both to members of their group and to files. Their primary concern with regard to members of their group seemed to be that I not intrude upon already over-extended people. They were happy to supply me with information specifically requested from their files, but I was not free to search on my own through their documentation. At several points we had to negotiate over who and what I would see, but in the end I believed that the limitations were not too disruptive to the research process because a great deal of information was available from a number of sources. Plus, the degree of cooperation grew as we became better acquainted. In both states I was given the opportunity to sit in on meetings of the anti-apartheid groups.

There are several texts that are useful in preparing for conducting research interviews such as those by Gorden, Hyman, Kahn, and Merton. I taped most of the interviews after requesting permission to do so from the respondent. I always suggested to the respondent that I would be happy to turn off the tape recorder at any point if it inhibited candid responses on their part. There were only a few who objected to the use of the tape recorder. The limitations of using a recorder are (1) that the researcher never can be sure whether or not it is inhibiting responses, and (2) there is a massive amount of work to do after the interview in transcribing or taking notes from the tapes. The advantages, however, from my perspective far outweigh the disadvantages and they are: (1) that the researcher is able to interact freely with the respondent without being encumbered by taking notes; (2) the interview can proceed more quickly, perhaps allowing
All of the interviews were semi-structured and in all cases I had notes prepared on points I wanted to cover. But I also attempted to direct the conversation in ways that fitted the particular respondent and his or her insights and experiences. Interview schedules are included in Appendix B, but they represent the broad categories of information desired, not the actual questions used in every interview.

Some interviews lasted for two hours whereas others lasted for fifteen minutes, depending on the time available from the respondent, the amount of information he or she was willing to reveal, and the dynamics between the two of us. In the majority of cases I got almost all the information I was seeking. Most interviews were pleasant and some were even fun, but a few were characterized by negative overtones. The latter seemed to occur primarily when respondents were under a great deal of pressure from other demands on their time. The only way to handle this kind of situation is to remain courteous at all times, try to secure more than one source for the information needed, and ask the respondent if someone else in the organization might be able to answer my questions.

Processing the Data

When all the data were collected I went through the documentation and interview tapes and recorded pertinent information on "code sheets." I used colored paper to categorize data with a separate color for each of the variables listed in Table 1-2 plus still other colors for information on outcomes and materials unrelated to the variables. I had no firm operationalizations for the variables and at times was able to fit the same
piece of information in more than one category. The lack of precise operationalizations did not hamper the analysis since the variables were designed primarily to be heuristic devices. This color-coded categorization of material aided the efficiency of the analysis and writing process enormously. With this method, transcribing the interviews became unnecessary.

In any research process there are ethical issues that must be considered, and it is to that topic that we now turn the discussion.

Ethical Issues in the Research

The first ethical dilemma I faced was the question of whom am I helping? One of my intentions in the research, as stated in the previous chapter, is to provide an analysis that will be of use to persons in NGOs engaged in attempts at international problem-solving. My interest in the anti-apartheid movement is both as an academic and as a sporadic participant. Within my own mind and from the inquiries of activists, I face the issue of the degree to which my research will be helpful not only to the movement but also to its opponents, especially the South African government. The government is well known to take a keen interest in the U.S. movement -- monitoring its activities, sending representatives to work against it in a number of locales, and even infiltrating its organizations. In conversation with activists we agreed that the information most useful to the apartheid regime would be particulars about individuals, their networks and friends, and some of their activities that are not freely exposed even within the movement. Therefore, I agreed to leave out certain pieces of information regarding these things, and I agreed to allow activists to read drafts of this report before it becomes public information in order that they can advise me on the possibility of it
containing damaging information. Only one activist with whom I had contact believed that the research as a whole should not be done at all.

A second ethical question has to do with keeping confidences. On a number of occasions respondents preferred that I not use information they had divulged and some preferred nonattribution. In all cases I have honored those requests and I believe they have not interfered with the overall quality of the product. Leaving out such information sometimes means neglecting interesting details or connections, but it does not alter the basic thrust of the analysis.

I have throughout this project felt a responsibility to the profession of academics as well. At all times I believed that my conduct in interactions with respondents or in acquiring documents would reflect on the efforts of all who are engaged in research. For the sake of maintaining the widest possible access to the information we need, I felt an obligation to other academics to maintain standards of honesty, reliability, and courtesy so that those with whom I interacted would remain open to similar experiences in the future with others engaged in research.

Such are the methods and their accompanying dilemmas in this research. Now we move to examine the anti-apartheid movement as a whole and the particular campaigns in Connecticut and Michigan.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER II

1. Other approaches discussed are: systems analysis, decision making, goal-free, art criticism, professional review, quasi-legal, and case study.

2. Examples of evaluation criteria or standards other than goals are: evaluating consumer products for safety; evaluating social services on the basis of the needs of their recipients; evaluating professionals on the basis of criteria established by their profession; etc. No outside standard for evaluating anti-apartheid divestment campaigns was apparent.
CHAPTER III
AN OVERVIEW OF THE ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT

The anti-apartheid movement is a multiracial, worldwide movement consisting of governmental and nongovernmental actors operating at international, national, and subnational levels in an attempt to end racial oppression in southern Africa. At the heart of the movement are the efforts of both black and white people from the region itself. These anti-apartheid activists work from within the country or from outside, depending on whether or not they have been forced into exile. Africans in southern Africa have been resisting white domination since they first encountered colonialism (Gerhart; Karis and Carter; Roux), but in the last three decades they have gotten considerable support from outside the region. These activities from outside southern Africa have varied in number and intensity across time. However, they have focused attention on the issues of racism and apartheid consistently since the early 1950s when several organizations were founded in Britain and the United States with anti-apartheid work as their principal purpose (Shepherd: 116-139). Other organizations struggles prior to the 1950s to help end white minority rule in the region, and notable among these was the Council on African Affairs -- a radical, black-led and interracial organizations based in the US and devoted to the liberation of Africanš (Lynch). But the founding of the UN at the end of World War II, the push for self-determination and independence on the
part of colonial territories, and the 1948 electoral success in South Africa of the Afrikaner's National Party were among the events that precipitated the beginnings of persistent and organized international anti-apartheid efforts.

Because the activities have stretched across three decades and because they involve a wide array of organizations working in a number of different campaigns, the boundaries of the movement are difficult to discern. Even the label "anti-apartheid" is somewhat misleading because movement efforts have almost always focused on white minority rule and racial oppression in all of southern Africa -- including the former Portuguese territories of Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau (West Africa), as well as Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) and Namibia (South West Africa). For purposes of this study we will define the anti-apartheid movement as consisting of those organizations and persons who endeavor to support the struggles of black people from the region in their attempts to end white minority rule. This definition excludes some who maintain that they are attempting to help end apartheid but who do not follow the initiatives or suggested guidelines for action of persons who have lived under racial domination. The people or organizations left out of this definition may be well intentioned and perhaps effective in their programs, or they may be fraudulent. Whichever is the case, however, they are not considered to be a part of the movement because they distinguish themselves from a mainstream assertion among activists who seek to end racial oppression -- that those who have experienced the oppression ultimately have the best understanding of how to end it. This assertion brings to the movement some degree of shared values and group identity,
two attributes important to the definition of social movements in general (as discussed in Chapter I). Thus not to subscribe to it is to be outside the movement. The definition is problematic in that blacks from the region are themselves not always agreed on what should be done to rid the world of apartheid. But, as will be discussed later, a great deal of consensus does exist about principal emphases for the movement.

The international character of the movement will be examined first and then will follow a more in-depth discussion of its US component.

The International Anti-Apartheid Movement

Outside the region of southern Africa where blacks combat racial oppression directly, the anti-apartheid movement has consisted of four principal thrusts of activity which will be examined briefly. These thrusts are: efforts to achieve sanctions; direct aid to liberation movements or the victims of white minority rule; research and publication; and educational work. Within these efforts, governmental anti-apartheid activities frequently occur in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as the UN or the Organization of African Unity (OAU), but unilateral actions or collaboration with nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) is not uncommon for a few governments. There have been impressive examples of international coordination among NGOs but the bulk of their activities have been on the national or subnational levels. Churches, students, trade unions, women's, and general civil rights organizations have been prominent among the NGOs most persistent in anti-apartheid work. Several sources document the activities of the international movement (e.g. Hudson; Minty; Shepherd; Sjollema; numerous UN Centre Against
Apartheid publications). The discussion here will be limited, however, to a few illustrations of the major thrusts listed above. More detail will be given in a later portrayal of the US anti-apartheid movement.

Sanctions Activities

Sanctions activities within the movement have been of a very broad character. The discussion here will focus primarily on the efforts targeted at South Africa rather than the whole of southern Africa. Attempts have been made to isolate South Africa militarily, economically, politically, culturally, and in sports. For the most part, NGO activists especially have wanted to prevent any contacts with South Africans that would in any way aid or affirm apartheid while at the same time not cut off much needed assistance to the victims of racial oppression.

A significant amount of the governmental sanctions activities have been centered in the United Nations. In 1962 the General Assembly first called for sanctions against South Africa. Then in 1963, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution for a voluntary embargo on military sales to South Africa. The embargo was made mandatory in 1977 following the political unrest in South Africa in 1976, the death in detention of Black Consciousness leader Steve Biko, and the repressive measures taken by the South African government against dissidents in 1977.

Subsequent actions at the UN included General Assembly resolutions in 1979 calling for an oil embargo, a cessation of trade and investment, no further credits from the International Monetary Fund, and comprehensive economic sanctions. In 1981, the General Assembly passed more sanctions related resolutions after an International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa, co-sponsored by the UN and the OAU was held in Paris in May. In addition to endorsing the Declaration from
that conference, the General Assembly, in a detailed outline of activities to be banned, again called for the total isolation of South Africa, asking member governments to sever "diplomatic, military, nuclear, economic, cultural, academic, sports and other relations with the apartheid regime..."
The year 1982 was declared as the International Year of Mobilization for Sanctions against South Africa, and the Assembly adopted a program "to make world public opinion aware of the grave situation in South Africa and in southern Africa as a whole...so as to mobilize the maximum support for comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations" (Centre Against Apartheid, January 1982: 1-3).

Outside the UN, governments have taken concrete measures toward sanctions. The OAU has endorsed a trade boycott of South Africa since 1963, and at its request, the Arab states in OPEC placed an embargo on all oil sales to South Africa in November 1973. From that time until 1979, South Africa relied on Iran, an oil producer not observing the boycott, for a reported 87 percent of its oil imports (Myers, et al.: 127; The Sanctions Working Group: 59). The Swedish government in 1979 passed legislation prohibiting Swedish businesses from owning companies in South Africa or Namibia or from owning interests in South African or Namibian companies. It further stipulates that businesses currently invested in these countries cannot expand their operations (Sjollema: 125-7). In 1976 Norway stopped granting export credit guarantees for trade with South Africa, and Canada removed its commercial consuls from South Africa and ended access to its Export Development Corporation facilities for sales to the apartheid regime in 1977. The U.S. Congress passed legislation in 1978 limiting the Export-Import Bank's credit to
South African purchasers, and the Carter administration adopted policies curbing sales of computers to the South African government and sales of many other items to its police and military (Christenson: 62; Myers, et al.: 127; Sjollema; Stoltenberg).

NGOs have been at the forefront of pressing governments and businesses alike for the severence of economic and military links with South Africa. Such activities in the US will be discussed in some detail in a later section of this chapter, but a few illustrations here will serve to demonstrate the international character of these pressures. Campaigns to end bank loans to South Africa have been prominent among groups in several countries including Belgium, Britain, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States. More coordination has occurred across national boundaries in bank campaigns than in most others (Shepherd; Sjollema; von Bothmer; Haslam; Baker). Two well-known Christian international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the All Africa Council of Churches (AACC) have withdrawn their monies from banks making loans to South Africa as have many organizations and individuals within countries where bank campaigns have been conducted (Sjollema; UN Centre, March 1978). NGO efforts to end trade with and investment in South Africa have occurred in all the countries mentioned above as well as in Australia, New Zealand, and Sweden. Much of the governmental action to curb economic relations with South Africa illustrated earlier, especially in the West, has come after intense activist campaigns to achieve such measures or more. INGOs that have gone on record as favoring some form of economic sanctions against South Africa are: the World Council of Churches, the World Peace Council (WPC), the All
Africa Council of Churches, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the World Confederation of Labour (WCL), the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), the Organization of African Trade Union Unity, the International League for Human Rights, and the Nordic Trade Union Council (Commission on Human Rights).

There is a great deal of cooperation between the UN and NGO sanctions efforts in international as well as domestic campaigns. For example, the Centre Against Apartheid monitors and encourages sanctions activities by providing activists with publications, research, publicity, and co-sponsorship of conferences and receptions.

In attempting to limit or end economic relations with South Africa these various organizations have responded to the wishes of a number of prominent black leaders who have indicated their support for the economic isolation of South Africa. To oppose foreign investment in South Africa is a crime under the Terrorism Act punishable by penalties ranging from five years imprisonment to the death sentence. Therefore, resistance leaders in South Africa must be cautious about advocating the cessation of trade and investment; but despite the danger they face, significant voices favoring sanctions have been heard within the country. Table 3-1 lists South Africans who have made known their support for economic disengagement from South Africa. To get around the legal problems, their statements have often come in the form of the following illustration:

I firmly believe if disinvestment could start it could bring a hastened end to apartheid. Perhaps an exodus of American companies from South Africa could bring change.

Tomazile Botha (quoted in Africa Fund, 1980)
TABLE 3-1
South African Advocates for Economic Sanctions Against South Africa

2. Steve Biko, Black Consciousness Movement leader, in an interview with Canadian Forum in 1977; (killed in police custody in 1977)
4. Tozamile Both, leader of the 1979 strike at the Port Elizabeth Ford Motor company plant; statement in an interview with the Johannesburg Sunday Post in 1979; (detained and banned in 1980; subsequently escaped into exile)
6. Chief Albert J. Luthuli, former president of the African National Congress and Nobel Prize winner in 1964; (deceased)
7. Pan-Africanist Congress (banned in 1960)
8. Oliver Tambo, Acting President-General of the African National Congress; in an interview with the US Guardian in 1980; (in exile)
10. Donald Woods, former editor of the East London (South Africa) Daily Dispatch; reported in Yale Graduate Professional in 1980; (banned in 1977; now in exile)

Sources: Africa Fund, 1980; ICCR Brief, May 1979; Schmidt
Such advocates fully realize that if South Africa suffers economic hardship, blacks within the country will suffer disproportionately. They still seek sanctions, however, because they believe that economic pressures can contribute to the demise of the apartheid regime. The argument is well put by the South African Black People's Convention Congress statement in 1972:

Advocates of continued investment claim that if foreign investors withdraw this would result in large scale unemployment of Blacks. Withdrawal can only mean the downfall of the Vorster regime...
Black people in general are prepared to suffer any consequences if this means ultimate Black freedom...
Foreign investors claim their presence in this country contributes toward the development of the Black community. This claim is disputed by the reality of the Black experience in this country. We resolve therefore...
To call upon foreign investors to disengage themselves from this white-controlled exploitative system.
(quoted in Africa Fund, 1980)

Although the prevailing opinion among resistance leaders inside and outside the country appears to favor trade and investment embargos, there are black leaders in the country who oppose sanctions. Three notable ones are: Lucy Mvubelo, head of the black clothing workers union; Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, head of the 150,000 member Inkatha movement and head of the KwaZulu homeland; and Percy Qoboza, editor of the World, the newspaper with the largest circulation among blacks in South Africa; Mr. Qoboza was also a member of the Soweto Committee of Ten and was detained by the police in 1977. The World was banned in 1977 as well (Myers, et al.: 51-2)

Despite the opposition to sanctions by some blacks, there is wide recognition of a firm consensus in favor of an economic embargo developing among most black leaders. In a March 1978 diplomatic cable,
US Ambassador William Bowdler reported:

that blacks who reflect on foreign investment as an issue are now roughly divided between those favoring disinvestment and those who would like to see it remain in instances where it contributes to black aspirations directly and in the near term. A smaller segment continues to favor investment on any basis.... With radicalization of black attitudes, (the) tendency to call for disinvestment grows stronger,... (the) role of American firms here will become increasingly controversial and (the) rationale for continued presence will seem less and less persuasive to growing numbers of blacks.
(quoted in Myers, et al.:52)

The economic sanctions debate has been a controversial aspect of the anti-apartheid movement. The potential for sanctions to aid in bringing about an end to apartheid will be evaluated in depth later in this chapter. But the foregoing discussion demonstrates that calls for sanctions have been made repeatedly over the last 20 years and proposals for punitive economic measures against apartheid have gained legitimacy in many quarters.

As stated earlier, economic or military sanctions are not the only kind of international isolation sought for South Africa. Activists have attempted with mixed outcomes to persuade entertainers and tourists from visiting the white dominated country, and South African sports interactions worldwide have been the focus of major anti-apartheid campaigns in several countries. Believing that sports are an important channel through which South Africa can win friends and supporters around the world, governments, NGOs and IGOs have with a high degree of success actively sought to keep South Africa from participating in a wide range of sports events and to persuade athletes of other countries from visiting South Africa. For example, due to international pressures especially from African governments, South Africa was excluded from
the 1968 Olympic games and was expelled from the Olympic Movement itself in 1972. And, in a three year campaign with demonstrations that at one point brought out more than 50,000 people, British anti-apartheid activists helped achieve the cancellation of the 1970 South African cricket tour in Britain (Lapchick 1977: 9-14).

These illustrations serve to demonstrate that a central component of the international movement has been efforts to cut the apartheid regime off from any support or affirmation it may receive from around the world. While working for sanctions of various kinds against white minority rule, however, many organizations in the movement also have endeavored to give direct aid to the victims of racial oppression. We turn now to discuss that important thrust in the movement.

Direct Aid

Direct aid has come in several forms, the bulk of it being military and non-military assistance to the liberation movements that are or have been engaged in guerilla war against the white minority regimes. The oldest and strongest of the groups fighting the South African government is the African National Congress (ANC), founded in 1912 within the country and outlawed by the government since 1960 -- at which point it began operating underground and from outside the country. Among its leaders have been Chief Albert Luthuli, Nobel Peace Prize winner in 1961, Nelson Mandela, currently serving (since 1964) a life sentence, and Oliver Tambo, presently the head of the organization. Although apparently in disarray at this point, the second group claiming to be engaged in warfare against the apartheid regime is the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), founded in 1959 from a dissident group within the ANC. Its first and most reknowned campaign was a nonviolent demonstration at Sharpeville to
protest pass laws in 1960. Police responded to the demonstrators with gun fire and 67 Africans were killed; 186 were wounded. The Sharpeville incident was the turning point for both groups in their decisions to begin guerilla actions against the regime. Robert Sobukwe was the most famous of PAC leaders and he remained in detention or under ban until his death in 1978.

There are numerous other liberation movements from other southern African countries. The South West People's Organizations (SWAPO) is the group fighting the South African government for control over Namibia. In the conflict over Zimbabwe both the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) received aid from abroad. In a coalition in the last years of the war, these groups together formed the Patriotic Front. In the wars in the former Portuguese colonies of Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea Bissau, the major groups were: Mozambique -- FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique; Angola -- MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola), and UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola); and Guinea Bissau-- PAIGC (African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde). These movements, some of which are now governments, received assistance from both governmental and nongovernmental sources.

Direct aid from the international anti-apartheid movement has had other targets as well; for example aid has been granted for scholarships for black students (refugee and non-refugee); legal defense or other aid for prisoners, detainees, exiles, or refugees; financial support for the families of these persons; and refuge and relocation for deserters from the regimes' armed forces.
African governments and especially the frontline states -- those countries bordering the white minority controlled territories -- have made some of the most important contributions to those resisting racial domination. The governments of Tanzania and Zambia, for example, have harbored refugees, accepted exiles and given some of the liberation movements a base from which to operate. The newly independent countries of Angola and Mozambique joined the ranks of the frontline states once the Portuguese government was forced in the mid-1970s to end colonial rule. More recently Zimbabwe has joined the group. The governments in these countries now suffer frequent retaliation by the South African army for the physical support they provide to those who are in resistance to apartheid. The South African government appears determined to disrupt their political and economic stability in order that they become unable to provide a great deal of assistance to the liberation movements.

The governments of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have been responsible for major amounts of military assistance to the liberation movements in southern Africa. As is typical of the rivalry between these two communist powers, when one supports a particular group, the other will support a rival group. The Soviet Union has had close ties to the ANC in the South Africa conflict, SWAPO in Namibia, ZAPU in Zimbabwe, and the MPLA in Angola. China has at various times been most allied with the PAC in South Africa, ZANU in Zimbabwe, UNITA in Angola, and FRELIMO in Mozambique.

Western governments have also given funds to liberation movements or other victims of white minority rule, and they often channel such monies through national and international NGOs. The Scandinavian governments
are the largest contributors but other Western governments, such as the Netherlands, Australia, West Germany, Canada and the United States have also provided assistance (Shepherd: 130-34).

The UN has been an important source of funds and other aid for liberation movements and others from southern Africa through several programs established in the 1960s as a result of Afro-Asian governments' pressures. Two of the most important of these programs are the Southern Africa Trust Fund and the Fund for Namibia. The UN also has a Special Committee on Apartheid, a committee of the General Assembly, and its staff counterpart in the Secretariat, the Centre Against Apartheid. Through these structures the UN stays in close touch with liberation movements (Shepherd: 128-33).

NGO and INGO direct aid has also been noteworthy. The International University Exchange Fund (IUEF), founded by European student movements in the 1960s, existed primarily for providing scholarship aid and training for Africans in southern Africa to remain and work with liberation movements. It also granted funds to southern Africa student movements for research, publication, and financial aid. The Black People's Convention (BPC), and Black Allied Workers' Union and political detainees were also recipients of IUEF aid. With an annual budget over $300,000, its funds came primarily from Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and Canada (Shepherd: 127). This organization was infiltrated by South African government agents in the 70's, and since then the World University Service has sponsored a similar scholarship program but not on the scale of the IUEF.

Legal aid and support for the families of prisoners and detainees is provided by the International Defense and Aid Fund (IDAF) begun in 1956
and now with branches in over a dozen countries. A great deal of the IDAF budget comes from Scandinavian governments and from the UN trust funds for southern Africa and in this way the organization is an important conduit for governmental aid. Shepherd asserts that IDAF has shown remarkable ingenuity in getting assistance to families of imprisoned Africans and in hiring counsel for their defense (p. 124-25). The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Amnesty International (AI), and the International League for Human Rights have also been significant contributors to the defense of the rights of prisoners in southern Africa.

Church related INGOs such as the World Council of Churches, the Lutheran World Federation, and the All Africa Council of Churches have provided assistance to refugees and scholarships for students. In addition, in 1970 the WCC founded a Programme to Combat Racism with one of its purposes being to give grants to liberation movements for educational, medical, publication, or other humanitarian purposes. From 1970 to 1980, the WCC gave over $2 million to movements from all of the southern Africa countries (Sjollema: 130-1). The AACC also has a similar program.

Trade union INGOs also have provided direct aid to victims of white minority rule. Among these have been the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the World Federation of Trade Unions (Shepherd: 128), and the Organization of African Trade Union Unity (Centre Against Apartheid, March 1980). Other INGOs making financial or material contributions to southern Africans are: Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization; All-Africa Students Union, International Union of Students; World Federation of Democratic Youth; and World University Service (Centre Against Apartheid, March 1978).
NGOs in many countries have participated in direct aid programs through the INGOs discussed above or through more localized organizations. Much of this aid comes from relief organizations, churches, students, and local or national anti-apartheid organizations in western countries, but significant numbers of NGOs from non-Western countries, such as Eastern Europe or Africa, give assistance as well (Centre Against Apartheid, March 1978; Seibt).

Often many of the organizations involved in direct aid are the same ones attempting to achieve sanctions against South Africa, but this is not always the case. The other two major components of movement activities, research/publication and educational work, also are carried out frequently by the organizations already mentioned.

Research/Publication and Education

In order to raise money for direct aid or to convince people and organizations to join the efforts to isolate South Africa, organizations in the anti-apartheid movement do a great deal of educational work about southern Africa, racism, and the international support apartheid receives. To back up these educational and other activities, there is a vast amount of research and publication being conducted in a relatively few organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental. In addition, organizations and individuals who are hesitant to campaign actively for sanctions or direct aid (for example, academic associations), sometimes make important contributions through research or educational work.

These components of the movement, however, are rarely ends in and of themselves. More often they are support services for activism, and in this respect they play a vital role in the movement. As will be demon-
strated later in this study, the movement's credibility, legitimacy and success depend in part on the depth and accuracy of its members' understanding of those forces they want to oppose.

The US Anti-Apartheid Movement

The anti-apartheid movement in the US is composed primarily of nongovernmental groups whose activities signify a rejection of the major thrusts of US government and business policies toward southern Africa. Since apartheid became official in South Africa in 1949, US governmental policy toward the area generally has fluctuated between acquiring closer ties with white minority regimes on the one hand, and verbal condemnation, some punitive measures and a search for moderate solutions on the other hand. Never has the US government attempted to apply major pressure and persistent strong measures against the South African government while at the same time building close ties to or identification with the liberation movements or newly independent black states in the area (Danaher 1980). It is this last option that is the most appealing to most anti-apartheid groups in the US.

US businesses operate in an environment in which officially the US government neither encourages nor discourages commerce with or in South Africa. Despite this official stance, several arms of the government, such as the Export-Import Bank, in the past in fact have facilitated business relations between the two countries. However, the business climate in South Africa has been on the whole so attractive for companies that they have needed no prodding from the US government to help them see that a lot of money could be made in the country. Thus, especially in the last two decades, US banks and corporations have become increasingly important
business partners for South Africa. The extent and nature of US trade and investment in South Africa will be discussed in the next section of this chapter, but important to note here is that the US anti-apartheid movement has generally opposed the growth of this country's involvement in the white minority controlled nations.

Going against the flow of governmental and business relations in southern Africa, the US movement has coexisted with, influenced, and been impacted by the anti-war, civil rights, black power, and corporate responsibility movements in this country. At the same time, it has embodied the same four major thrusts of activity -- sanctions, direct aid, education, and research/publication -- that characterize the international movement. Table 3-2 outlines these four types of activity as manifested in the US, their targets, their strategies and tactics, and the types of groups involved. Table lists the national organizations, the SMOs, that lead the US movement. This discussion will focus primarily on economic sanctions activities, but first will come some illustrations of the other thrusts of activities. Shepherd gives further description of specific US campaigns (prior to 1977).

-- In May 1972, 20,000 black people marched in Washington to express solidarity with southern Africa liberation movements.

-- In the summer of 1976, the Women's Division, Board of Global Ministries, United Methodist Church sponsored a study of southern Africa in various "schools of mission" held across the country in which approximately 15,000 women spend three days to a week (depending on the particular program in their area) involved in intensive courses on southern Africa.

-- in 1981 alone, the on-going aid programs of the Africa Fund: gave $10,000 to the Women's Council of the ANC to help finance a daycare center
### TABLE 3-2

Major Thrusts of Activity in the US Anti-Apartheid Movement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Activity</th>
<th>Primary Targets of the Activity</th>
<th>Strategy/Tactic</th>
<th>Type of Group Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Sanctions        | Governmental organizations - mainly legislatures  
|                  | National  
|                  | State  
|                  | Local  
|                  | Businesses - as direct and indirect targets  
|                  | Financial corporations (i.e. banks)  
|                  | Nonfinancial corporations  
|                  | Nongovernmental institutional investors  
|                  | Universities  
|                  | Churches  
|                  | Labor Unions  
|                  | Private Individual Trusts  
|                  | Sports organizations and individual athletes  
|                  | Entertainers and artists  
|                  | Academic associations and scholars  
|                  | Lobbying  
|                  | Letters, calls to decision makers  
|                  | Negotiations with decision makers  
|                  | Extended discussions between groups of activists and groups of decision makers  
|                  | Provision of testimony, research, expertise to decision makers  
|                  | Demonstrations, picketing, and other direct action  
|                  | (re businesses) Shareholder resolutions  
|                  | (re businesses, sports and entertainers) Boycotts  
|                  | (re businesses) Withdrawing funds  
|                  | Churches - Local  
|                  | Regional  
|                  | National  
|                  | University groups  
|                  | Students  
|                  | Faculty/staff  
|                  | Labor Unions  
|                  | Local  
|                  | National  
|                  | Black Organizations  
|                  | Local  
|                  | Regional  
|                  | National  
|                  | Other community groups  
|                  | (e.g. women's groups)  
|                  | Groups organized specifically for anti-apartheid work  
|                  | Local  
|                  | National  


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Activity</th>
<th>Primary Targets of the Activity</th>
<th>Strategy/Tactic</th>
<th>Type of Group Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Aid</td>
<td>Governmental organizations</td>
<td>Lobbying</td>
<td>Churches - Local</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International</td>
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<td>Regional</td>
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<td></td>
<td>National-executive and legislative</td>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nongovernmental groups and individuals</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Blacks</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Churches</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Students</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neighborhoods/communities</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Black Organizations</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Local</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Regional</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other community groups</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Groups organized specifi-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cally for anti-apartheid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>work</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Local</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 3-2, cont.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Activity</th>
<th>Primary Targets of the Activity</th>
<th>Strategy/Tactic</th>
<th>Type of Group Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>Those being mobilized into anti-apartheid campaigns</td>
<td>Show films</td>
<td>Churches - Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leaders of campaigns</td>
<td>Provide speakers (from local, community, or national organizations, or southern Africa)</td>
<td>Regional National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decision makers in some of the targeted organizations</td>
<td>Teach-ins</td>
<td>University groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Seminars</td>
<td>Students Faculty/staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Leafleting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Demonstrations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Distribution of publications</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Research/Publication/Media</strong></td>
<td>Those being mobilized into anti-apartheid campaigns</td>
<td>Publication of pamphlets, newsletters, magazines, books</td>
<td>Black Organizations - Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leaders of campaigns</td>
<td>Production of films, records</td>
<td>Regional National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decision makers in some of the targeted organizations</td>
<td>Research on economic, military, political and social conditions in southern Africa</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|                           |                                                                                                  | -business relations between southern Africa and the West                          | Other community groups (e.g. women's groups) |}
|                           |                                                                                                  | -other kinds of relations between southern Africa and the West                    | Groups organized specifically for anti-apartheid work |}
|                           |                                                                                                  | -anti-apartheid strategies and tactics                                             | Local National                          |
### TABLE 3-3

US National Anti-Apartheid Organizations

Those with anti-apartheid work as their primary focus:

1. American Committee on Africa (ACOA), New York City
2. American Coordinating Committee for Equality in Sports and Society (ACCESS), New York City
3. Africa Fund (AF), affiliated with ACOA, New York City
4. Campaign to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa (COBLSA), Washington, DC
5. International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa - US Committee (IDAF), Cambridge, MA
6. Lutheran Coalition on Southern Africa, Minneapolis, MN
7. South African War Resisters (SAMRAF), New York City
8. Support Committee for African Liberation Day (SCALD), New York City
9. TransAfrica, Washington, DC
10. Washington Office on Africa (WOA), Washington, DC

Those with anti-apartheid work as a major program focus (partial list):

11. American Friends Service Committee - Southern Africa Program (AFSC), Philadelphia
12. Congressional Black Caucus, Washington, DC
13. Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), New York City
14. Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, New York City
15. National Black United Front, New York City
16. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)

* means black organization
for South African refugees in Zambia; distributed 50,000 copies of a brochure describing the conditions of Namibian refugee centers; gave $11,000 to the SWAPO Women's Council for training and education of women refugees; shipped over a half ton of penicillin to Namibian refugee centers; gave a small grant of emergency funds to prevent the eviction of a South African woman living and attending college in North Carolina; sent books and periodicals to both Namibian students living in Lusaka and to the Mozambique Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Africa Fund 1981).

-- The Namibian Medical Refugee Aid Drive in Minnesota, in cooperation with the Africa Fund, sent $50,000 worth of medicines, equipment and books to Namibian refugees in 1981 (Africa Fund 1981).

-- Dumisani Kumalo, staff member of ACOA, spoke on southern Africa and anti-apartheid activities at over 20 colleges and universities across the country in 1981 (Africa Fund 1981).

-- In 1980, a broad-based coalition of over 100 civil rights, anti-apartheid, political, religious, and sports groups was formed to mobilize protest and direct action against a 1981 tour of a South African rugby team, the Springboks. The group, Stop the Apartheid Rugby Tour (SART), operating on a budget of about $5000, organized protests in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Rochester, NY, Washington, DC, and Racine, Wisconsin. Upwards of two thousand people gathered in the rain for a demonstration in Albany, NY against a game that attracted 300 spectators. After these protests and demonstrations, New York City mayor Koch and the Chicago city council withdrew permission for the use of facilities in their cities for the Springboks. Two hundred members of Congress voted for a sense of the Congress resolution calling for the tour to be cancelled. Top officials
in Rochester, Los Angeles, Newark, New York State and Illinois spoke out against the tour. There were three national television shows on the tour and the protests. In the end, the tour experienced five cancellations and two secret matches. A major leader of the SART protests received numerous threats (tied to his SART activities) by phone, had a car destroyed, his home broken into, and for a month was forced to hire bodyguards for constant protection for himself and his family (Lapchick 1981).

--- In 1979, the Institute for International Education, financed by private donations, began a program of scholarships for black South African students (not exiles or refugees) to study in US college and universities. In 1980, the US Congress passed legislation (sponsored by Rep. Stephen Solarz, D-Brooklyn) that provided $8 million over two years for this program (New York Times, Dec. 31, 1982).

--- In 1982, a research section of the American Friends Service Committee (NARMIC) produced a book, *Automating Apartheid: US Computer Exports to South Africa and the Arms Embargo*, designed to educate constituents on the ways in which the US computer industry is aiding apartheid. The book was distributed widely by church groups.

--- As a part of the cultural and entertainment boycott, Stevie Wonder, Kool and the Gang, Dionne Warwick and Quincy Jones have declared that they will not perform in South Africa or the homelands.

These illustrations are not a comprehensive cataloguing of anti-apartheid events in recent years, but they do serve to give some glimpses on the wide variety of activities and groups working on research and publication, education, direct aid and non-economic sanctions. Economic
sanctions efforts, however, have been the dominant thrust in the US movement and it is to a discussion of this work that we now turn.

Economic Sanctions Activities

Most anti-apartheid activists and sympathizers agree generally that US corporate involvement serves to buttress racial domination by whites in South Africa, Namibia and formerly in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. And most would advocate some form of sanctions against South Africa -- a cessation of trade, investment, and/or bank loans. What is disputed among activists, however, is what strategy to pursue in order to achieve an economic delinking.

Activists have attempted to influence US business to end their dealings with South Africa through methods that target the business directly and those that target them indirectly. With the latter, the activists try to convince a third party to help the movement achieve corporate economic disengagement. The third party is usually an institution with significant holdings or investments but has on occasion also been the US government. The institutional investors targeted have included churches, labor unions, universities, student associations, and state and local governments. The various strategies and tactics used to influence all of these targets on the sanctions question are listed in Table 3-2. The dispute within this list in basically between the use of shareholder resolutions or other methods that involve the maintenance of a relationship with the business in order to influence its policies "from the inside" versus a withdrawal of investments or other tactics that end connections to businesses that have operations in South Africa. The first strategy is often labeled the corporate responsibility approach and the second is called the
divestment approach.

The corporate responsibility approach has been used in a wide range of issues in addition to apartheid and in many respects is peculiar to the United States. As Vogel points out, advocates of corporate responsibility maintain that those who are affected by the business should help to shape its policies; that is, business decisions should be made more public by having greater citizen participation in their formulation whether the policy is about consumer product safety, the manufacture of weapons, the hiring of women and ethnic minorities, or involvement in South Africa. Having become popular in the early 1970s, the use of shareholder resolutions in annual meetings of corporations is a favorite method of the corporate responsibility approach. An individual, group, or institution that holds stock in the corporations submits a policy resolution for vote by all the stockholders. The activist resolutions rarely receive as much as five percent support, but the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has ruled that as long as the resolution receives three percent support, it may be reintroduced in subsequent years. If three percent is not achieved, the resolution is dead. Thus activists have celebrated victories when they receive more than three percent approval for their resolutions.

Vogel maintains that the SEC has been of great help to activists in various rulings regarding the rights of stockholders to participate in setting corporate policy. This is why the strategy is most popular in the United States: the SEC has in some respects forces corporations to take these activists' efforts seriously.

Church organizations were the first actively and persistently to
pursue corporate responsibility issues regarding South Africa, and
the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR -- formerly
the Corporate Information Center) coordinates and organizes most of these
church activities. Since 1971, ICCR has constructed social profiles on
corporations, explored alternative investment opportunities, and guided
particular churches in filing resolutions. The resolutions filed do not
always request that the corporation or bank withdraw its operations.
Sometimes they ask for policies such as a ban on new investment, no sales
to the government, police or military, or adherence to particular labor
practices. Sometimes they simply ask for disclosures of information
that activists have been unable to acquire elsewhere.

In recent years churches have been joined by other institutional
investors such as universities or state pension funds. For example,
in spring 1982, the American Lutheran Church was joined by eight other
organizations, including the California Public Employee Retirement System
and the California Teachers Retirement System, in sponsoring a resolution
to prevent Xerox corporation from expanding its operations in South
Africa or selling its products to the police and military. With the
combined support of these eight sponsors the resolution received an
unusually high vote of 10 percent of the Xerox shares, representing
about 1.5 million shares (Africa News May 31, 1982).

Another frequently used corporate responsibility tactic has been to
hold dialogue sessions between activists and/or their sympathizers and
corporate executives in order to express concerns, negotiate some accep-
table policy, or get better information about the business' behavior. In
some rare cases (and not on South Africa-related issues), shareholder
suits have been filed against corporations as a means to achieve activists goals.

Although they reacted very defensively to shareholder challenges in the early years of this approach, corporate executives now take them more in stride and even initiate dialogue sessions themselves. Many stay in close touch with consulting firms like the Investor Responsibility Research Center in Washington, DC (IRRC) to find out the latest trends in institutional investors' corporate responsibility activities. In his analysis of the corporate responsibility movement generally, Vogel suggests that on the whole shareholder resolutions have been quite modest in their demands and that corporations typically have responded in one of four ways: on rare occasion management has endorsed the activist resolution; they have negotiated compromises with activists to have the resolution withdrawn voluntarily; they have successfully opposed the resolution and then declared a policy change that essentially does what the resolution requires; and they have simply and steadfastly refused any compromise (Vogel: 198).

In summarizing the effects of shareholder pressures, Vogel asserts that the most important impact has been, along with other significant pressures, in setting the agenda in governmental processes. "The extent to which demands addressed to the corporation anticipate the substance of subsequent government regulations of business is indeed striking" -- including the southern Africa cases of corporate compliance with the embargo against Rhodesia, the decision of the Department of Commerce (under Carter) to restrict the sale of technology to the South African government, and the role of the US in Angola during Portu-
gueze rule (Vogel: 13). Other than the almost unintended indirect impact on business through subsequent governmental regulation, Vogel maintains that the challenges have had mostly procedural rather than substantive effects on the corporations in question.

One of the unfortunate effects of the shareholder approach in the eyes of some anti-apartheid activists is to offer a more palatable policy option to institutional investors who are the targets of divestment campaigns. The divestment approach seeks to have investors or consumers disengage from businesses that refuse to end their ties to South Africa. Divestment activists have attempted to get churches, universities, states and other institutions to sell their shares or withdraw their patronage from banks and corporations that do business in or with South Africa. Sometimes the institutional investor's response to pressures has been not to disengage from the business but to pledge to join in shareholder resolutions against management. Divestment advocates assert that shareholder resolutions and dialogue sessions may have some limited utility in the movement, especially for purposes such as disclosure of corporate practices, but they resent that such tactics have diverted activist energies away from a drive towards total disengagement and that corporate responsibility actions have taken the wind out of the sails of some divestment campaigns, especially among church and university investors. Furthermore, divestment advocates disagree fundamentally with corporate responsibility advocates about the long-term prospects for reforming private profit making organizations into "good citizens" accountable to the public interest. In some respects the dispute boils down to a pro-corporate versus anti-corporate position.
Despite the dispute among activists regarding the divestment and corporate responsibility approaches, there is a great deal of cooperation among individuals and leaders in the anti-apartheid movement across this division. For example, ICCR has played an important role in supplying research and information to divestment proponents and in securing church cooperation in campaigns to withdraw accounts from banks making loans to South Africa. And, despite the opportunity to opt for the corporate responsibility approach, many institutional investors have been convinced to take divestment policy positions instead. Tables 3-4 through 3-6 list the South Africa sanctions-related activities (including divestment) of US churches; tables 3-7 and 3-8 show the results of campus divestment activities; and tables 3-9 and 3-10 display labor unions and black organizations' actions for corporate withdrawal. Some of the tables list divestment actions as being total or partial. Total means that the institution will no longer hold any stocks or bonds in corporations (including banks) that do business in South Africa. Partial means that the institution has withdrawn funds from certain businesses but not others, or that some of its funds (e.g. bank accounts) have been withdrawn while others (e.g. stocks) have not. The total and partial divestment policies do not normally include selective purchasing policies in which the institution chooses to buy its supplies only from companies not involved in South Africa.

Churches were the earliest targets of divestment activists. Shepherd and Vogel both discuss in some detail the first major bank campaign in the US in 1966 when Protestant denominations withdrew an estimated $23 million from 10 banks, including First National City Bank (now Citibank), to protest the banks' policies of making loans to South Africa. After the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Church &amp; Year</th>
<th>Bank Accounts Closed</th>
<th>Bank Investments Withdrawn</th>
<th>Corporate Investments Withdrawn</th>
<th>Divestment Policy:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$banks $ amount</td>
<td>$banks $ amount</td>
<td>$companies $ amount</td>
<td>partial/total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Baptist Church Pension Board</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Friends Service Committee</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>$1.3 million</td>
<td></td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Lutheran Church 1980</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$2 million</td>
<td>27 (in process) $29 million</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Disciples of Christ 1976</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episcopal Church 1981</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Council of Churches 1980</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$4.7 million</td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformed Church in America - General Synod 1980</td>
<td>Began a policy of complete divestment from corporations and banks involved in South Africa; specific actions taken unknown at this point</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Church of Christ - Board for World Ministries 1979</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church &amp; Year</td>
<td>Bank Accounts Closed</td>
<td>Bank Investments Withdrawn</td>
<td>Corporate Investments Withdrawn</td>
<td>Divestment Policy</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$banks</td>
<td>#banks</td>
<td>$amount</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Metho­dist Church</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-General Con­ference 1980</td>
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<tr>
<td>-World Division,</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Glo­bal Ministries</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Women's Division,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Glo­bal Ministries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Board of Global</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministries</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Board of Church</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Presbyteriana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church 1981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Presbyteriana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church 1981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Unitarian Universalist Association 1980</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$292,119</td>
<td>$292,119</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Established a policy that UMC agencies should not do business with or invest in banks making loans to South Africa

Began a policy of divestment from financial institutions "insofar as practicable"; specific actions unknown at this point

| Sources: ACOA draft on divestment actions taken by churches, 1982; Howard and Smith |
1. American Baptist Church National Ministries: its position requests corporations to cease further investment in South Africa and to terminate present operations as expeditiously as possible.

2. Episcopal Church: its position urges banks and corporations to cease business with the South African government, not to expand their business in South Africa, and to cease any business in the country that does not assist "in the struggle for human dignity and freedom..."

3. United Church of Christ: its position is to exert moral pressure on banks and corporations to cease doing business with South Africa.

4. United Methodist Church: its position is that investments of any unit of the church should be examined with respect to their possible involvement in any business whose operations are supportive of apartheid.

5. United Presbyterian Church: its position urges businesses and financial institutions to discontinue operations, investments, and loans in South Africa.

Source: Howard and Smith

2. The Lutheran School of Theology withdrew investments from Illinois Continental Bank in 1981 because of the bank's policy of doing business with South Africa.

3. The New Brunswick Theological Seminary announced in 1982 that it would divest from companies doing business in South Africa.

4. Davis Community Church (California) withdrew its accounts from Security Pacific National Bank of Davis in 1980 because of the bank's South Africa policies.

5. The Adrian Dominican Sisters (Adrian, Michigan) divested 6,000 shares of common stock from Citibank in 1981.

6. The American Baptist Church regions of Cleveland and New York closed their Citibank accounts. The ABC of Metropolitan New York withdrew a $1.5 million investment portfolio from Citibank in 1981.


8. The Holy Name Province of Franciscans has withdrawn seven checking and savings accounts from Citibank.

9. The Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary of Monroe (Michigan) divested 1,100 shares of Citibank stock.

10. The Riverside Church (New York City) withdrew all operating accounts (of about $6 million) from Citibank in 1981.


12. The Union Theological Seminary (New York City) withdrew accounts from Citibank worth about $4 million in 1980.

The following Roman Catholic Orders and Protestant denominations have announced a pledge to buy no Citibank Certificates of Deposit, notes or bonds because of the bank's South Africa policies. All of these investors have securities as part of their portfolios.

Protestant and Orthodox Agencies

American Baptist Church National Ministries
American Friends Service Committee
American Lutheran Church
Church Women United
Episcopal Church Publishing Company
National Council of Churches
Reformed Church in America
Unitarian Universalist Association
United Christian Missionary Society of the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ)
United Church Board for World Ministries
United Methodist Board of Global Ministries
United Presbyterian Church Foundation
World Council of Churches
TABLE 3-6, cont.

Roman Catholic Orders and Dioceses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order/Institution</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adrian Dominican Sisters, Michigan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congregation of Sisters of St. Joseph, Buffalo, NY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Fathers and Brothers, Province of St. Albert, Illinois</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marianist Society, New York Province</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Catholic Rural Life Conference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order of St. Augustine, Pennsylvania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Milwaukee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servants of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, Monroe, MI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisters of Charity, Nazareth, Kentucky</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisters of the Good Shepard</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisters of Loretto</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisters of Mercy, Buffalo, NY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisters of Mercy, New York Province</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisters of Notre Dame de Namur, Connecticut Province</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisters of St. Francis of Assisi, Milwaukee, Wisconsin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisters of St. Francis, Clinton, Iowa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisters of St. Francis, Wisconsin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisters of St. Francis, Stella Niagara, NY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisters of St. Francis, Allegheny, NY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisters of St. Joseph, Rochester, NY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisters of St. Mary, Buffalo, NY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Saint Mary Academy *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our Lady of Mercy Generilatos *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*means no information on bank securities.

Source: ACOA draft on divestment actions taken by churches; Howard and Smith
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University &amp; Year</th>
<th>Total Amount Divested</th>
<th>No. Businesses</th>
<th>Partial/Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amherst 1978</td>
<td>$1.3 million</td>
<td>4 corporations</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antioch 1978</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston Univ. 1979</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandeis 1979</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>1 corporation</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlton 1979</td>
<td>295,000</td>
<td>1 bank</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colby 1980</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>2 corps./1 bank</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia 1979</td>
<td>2.7 million</td>
<td>3 banks</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampshire 1976</td>
<td>40,000 (initial)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvard 1981</td>
<td>50.9 million</td>
<td>1 bank</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haverford 1982</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1 corp./2 banks</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howard 1978</td>
<td>1.8 million</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Univ. Maine 1982</td>
<td>3 million</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Univ. Massachusetts</td>
<td>at least 600,000</td>
<td>at least 3 corps.</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Michigan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Univ. 1980</td>
<td>2.5 million</td>
<td>1 corporation</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan State 1979</td>
<td>8.3 million</td>
<td>15 corps.&amp;banks</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Univ. Michigan 1979</td>
<td>306,117</td>
<td>1 corporation</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Michigan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Univ. 1982</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mt. Holyoke 1981</td>
<td>459,000</td>
<td>1 corporation</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Univ. of New</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>York, Oconto 1978</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>1 bank</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio State 1978</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>1 corporation</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio Univ. 1978</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>4 corporations</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon Bd. of Higher</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education 1977</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>established a policy of total divestment that is now being challenged in court</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutgers 1980</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>7 corporations</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith 1977</td>
<td>697,728</td>
<td>1 corporation</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swarthmore 1981</td>
<td>2.2 million</td>
<td>3 corporations</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tufts 1979</td>
<td>100,000+</td>
<td>2 corps./1 bank</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wesleyan 1980</td>
<td>367,000</td>
<td>1 corporation</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williams 1980</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>1 corp./6 banks</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Univ. Wisconsin 1978</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>25 corporations</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yale 1979</td>
<td>1.6 million</td>
<td>2 banks</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vassar</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>6 banks</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ACOA draft on university divestment actions

* year the policy was established
1. The Association of Students of the University of California at Los Angeles: the association withdrew their funds from Bank America and Security Pacific Bank in 1980. The action represented a total divestment and amounted to $25 million.

2. The Co-op system at the University of California at Berkeley: withdrew accounts totalling $4 million from Bank America to protest their participation in loans to South Africa (1978 report).

3. The Student Council for the entire University of California system has called on all students to withdraw their accounts from Bank America to protest their loans to South Africa (1978 report).


Source: ACOA draft on university divestment actions
TABLE 3-9
Labor Unions' Divestment Activities

The Joint Furriers Council withdrew an $8 million payroll account and a $16 million welfare and pension account from Manufacturers Hanover Trust in 1977.

The United Radio, Electrical and Machine Workers Union withdrew a $4 million payroll account from Chase Manhattan bank because of its loans to South Africa.

The following unions have taken positions against economic involvement in South; those with asterisks (*) have withdrawn funds from banks that make loans to South Africa.

AFL-CIO
Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcherworkers' Union
International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union
Service Employees International Union
United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implements Workers
Of America (UAW)
AFSCME Local 1716 of Hartford, AFL-CIO
Joint Board Fur, Leather and Machine Workers Union of the United
Food and Commercial Workers International Union, AFL-CIO
Illinois State AFL-CIO
International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Local 6
District 1199 National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees
Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Workers Union, AFL-CIO
District 31 United Steel Workers of America, AFL-CIO

Sources: ACOA 2–80 and October 1979; Houser; Myers; Nesbitt (1977)
TABLE 3-10
Black Organizations' Divestment Policies

1. The Coalition of Black Trade Unionists in 1980 called upon the "American trade union movement to withdraw their bank accounts including pension funds from banks that make loans to South Africa and also from banks that loan money to companies that invest in South Africa."

2. The NAACP in 1966 asked the US government to prevent any further investment by American companies in minority-dominated governments; in 1980 the organization called on US corporations to withdraw their investments in South Africa and reaffirmed its call for economic sanctions against South Africa.

3. The National Black Agenda for the '80s (a meeting in Richmond, VA in 1980 of 1000 black leaders representing over 300 organizations) passed a resolution requesting the US government "to sever all economic, diplomatic, political, and cultural relations with South Africa.

4. The National Black Caucus of State Legislators passed a resolution in 1981 calling on their members in 42 states to introduce divestment legislation.

5. The Summit Conference of Black Religious Leaders on Apartheid (a 1979 meeting of religious leaders from 38 states and 52 cities) demanded immediate economic disengagement of US corporations from South Africa.

6. TransAfrica, a national black lobby on African affairs, actively works to break all US economic and political connections to South Africa.

Sources: ACOA 2-80; 1-82; Shepherd; White
protests, the banks did not renew the loan arrangements with South Africa on the pretext that South Africa no longer needed the money. In fact, however, the banks began to make secret agreements for loans. These secret loans were uncovered in 1973 when activists learned through the "Hanover Documents" sent to the ICCR that American banks were lending funds to South Africa through the European-American Banking Corporation. The bank campaign was renewed and some of the results can be seen in tables 3-4, 3-5 and 3-6. Banks' responses will be discussed in more detail at the end of this chapter.

As is the case in other countries, the activities of the US movement tend to intensify in reaction to events in South Africa. After the 1976 riots in South Africa which were triggered by the protests of school children in Soweto (an African township), there were renewed efforts on the part of anti-apartheid activists to have the US ties to South Africa broken. Authoritative sources (Study Commission) have estimated that at least 1000 people died in the Soweto riots and other disturbances following the children's protests, and most of those who died were shot by the South African police. Following these civil disturbances, in 1977 the South African government moved to silence many of its opponents through a series of detentions of individuals and bannings of both people and organizations. This vigorous repression, coupled with the death of Steve Biko a leader of the Black Consciousness Movement inside the country (until it was banned) who died from beatings received in prison, served further to fuel the fires of anti-apartheid work, and especially divestment efforts, in the late 1970s.

One of the places where divestment campaigns were most evident was
on college and university campuses. Students and sometimes faculty pressured their institutions' boards of trustees to sell the South African related stocks and bonds in their endowment funds' investment portfolios. Not only did these activists achieve some measure of success in a number of universities, as can be seen in tables 3-7 and 3-8, but this new wave of activity also brought an influx of fresh leaders into the national movement. Many of these university-based campaigns spilled over into other arenas when their leaders began targeting still another set of institutions -- state and local governments.

Anti-Apartheid Campaigns in State and Local Governments

State and local governments were targeted by activists in the early 1970s but just in the last few years has there been a major emphasis in the US movement on the withdrawal of their funds from businesses operating in South Africa. Tables 3-11 and 3-12 show the states and cities where anti-apartheid legislation has been introduced. This segment of the US anti-apartheid movement was chosen for greater examination and evaluation in this study as one place in which we might begin to understand the impact of the whole movement. Chapters IV and V will be devoted entirely to a description and evaluation of campaigns in Connecticut and Michigan.

State governments have responsibility for regulating large investments for state employees' pension funds and state university endowments. They also have sizable deposits in banks and make purchasing arrangements with companies for goods and services the state uses. Cities also have bank deposits and purchasing agreements, and some have financial
### TABLE 3-11

State Anti-Apartheid Legislation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Divestment</th>
<th>Partial Divestment</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut 1980 (3)</td>
<td>Connecticut 1982 (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas 1982 (2)</td>
<td>Illinois 1979 (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland 1982 (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts 1982 (2)</td>
<td>Massachusetts 1979 (2)</td>
<td>Massachusetts 1977 (1)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota 1979 (2)</td>
<td>Minnesota 1981 (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska 1980 (1)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio 1979 (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon 1979 (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oregon 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania 1981 (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas 1981 (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin 1978 (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Wisconsin 1977 (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The year designation represents the first year that legislation was introduced. The number in parenthesis represents the total number of bills introduced.

Total divestment means that a bill requiring divestment of all state controlled investments has been introduced. Partial divestment means that a bill requiring divestment of some state funds (e.g. bank deposits or university endowments) or partial amounts of all funds has been introduced. Other means that a bill on apartheid but not on divestment has been introduced (e.g. a resolution condemning apartheid or calling on Congress to invoke sanctions).

* nonbinding resolution

* some of these bills are non-binding resolutions

Source: ACOA 1981 and documents collected from the organizations involved.
TABLE 3-12
City Anti-Apartheid Legislation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City &amp; Year</th>
<th>Divestment</th>
<th>Selective Purchasing</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California Berkeley 1979</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotati 1978</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davis</td>
<td>T* 1978</td>
<td>T 1980</td>
<td></td>
<td>passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut Hartford 1980</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware Wilmington 1982</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia Atlanta 1982</td>
<td>T*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois Chicago 1977</td>
<td>X*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana Gary 1975</td>
<td>X*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland Baltimore 1981</td>
<td>X*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts Cambridge</td>
<td>T* 1979</td>
<td>P 1980</td>
<td></td>
<td>passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan East Lansing</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota Duluth 1980</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York New York 1977</td>
<td>T*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon Multnomah County Commission 1982 (includes Portland)</td>
<td>T*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania Philadelphia 1981</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas Dallas 1982</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>pending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>X* 1975</td>
<td>X* 1976</td>
<td></td>
<td>substituted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin Dane County Bd. of Supervisors 1977</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madison 1976</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>passed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* nonbinding
1 public referendum
Source: ACDA 1981 and documents collected from the organizations involved.
holdings for pension funds. Seeing the potential for bringing greater pressure to bear on companies operating in South Africa, activists try to convince state legislatures and city councils to join the divestment efforts. This potential was brought to their attention in part by alternative investments advocates who promote the use of pension fund monies for revitalization of cities and communities experiencing capital flight. A number of organizations have arisen in recent years to organize alternative investment strategies and their efforts received a boost with the publication of Rifkin and Barber's *The North Will Rise Again: Pensions, Politics and Power in the 1980s*.

Anti-apartheid divestment campaigns targeting state and city governments are important for at least two reasons: state and city financial holdings are considerably larger than those of universities or churches; and policy makers across the country are forced into the debate about South Africa and divestment; i.e. discussions about how Americans can help end apartheid are no longer confined to idealistic religious communities or the ivory towers of university campuses, but local lawmakers and governmental bureaucrats are now involved in the issue as well. At this point, legislation has been introduced into at least 16 state legislatures and 21 city councils. Legislation has passed only in six states although other governmental actions have been taken in five additional states. Connecticut, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota and Nebraska have had legislation pass with different outcomes in each case. These cases will be discussed briefly.

Comprehensive divestment bills affecting all state investments were passed in Connecticut in 1980 and 1981. The 1980 bill called for the
withdrawal of funds from corporations that have not adopted the Sullivan Principles. The Sullivan Principles were designed by executives from businesses investing in South Africa and are an attempt to apply fair employment practices to corporations' operations in South Africa. These principles will be discussed in detail at the end of this chapter.

Believing that the inclusion of the Sullivan Principles in the 1980 bill compromised the goal of divestment, in 1981 activists from the Connecticut Anti-Apartheid Committee pushed for comprehensive legislation requiring withdrawal of state funds from all banks and corporations, their affiliates and subsidiaries doing business in South Africa, regardless of their position on the Sullivan Principles. The legislation involving approximately $186 million in investments passed with an almost three-quarters majority in both houses, but the governor vetoed the bill after intense lobbying by businesses affected by the legislation. The veto was sustained when both houses voted a second time on the bill, but in 1982 a compromise bill was passed requiring divestment from corporations not conforming to a list of criteria regarding their operations in South Africa. Further details about the Connecticut case can be found in Chapter IV.

Anti-apartheid legislative activities began in 1978 in Michigan when students and faculty at the University of Michigan asked their state representative to introduce a measure requiring all state universities to divest their holdings in businesses with ties to South Africa. After exerting pressure for several months, students were frustrated by the unwillingness of the University of Michigan Board of Trustees to pursue a divestment policy, and they sought a remedy through legislation that
would affect all state universities. The legislation did not pass the first year it was introduced or even for several years thereafter.

With encouragement from a number of groups in the state, the next year the sponsor of the bill decided to seek total divestment of all state funds. The sponsor reintroduced the university divestment bill and introduced two other measures: one requiring state pension funds to divest and one prohibiting the deposit of any state funds in banks that lend to the government of South Africa or any of its parastatals. In 1980, the banking bill passed and has been implemented by banks in the state agreeing to end their loans to South Africa. In 1982, the university bill passed and became law after a long and arduous process in the legislature. The pension bill has met a great deal of opposition, and although hearings were held on the bill, up until recently its backers are giving it lower priority as they pursued the passage of the university bill. The Michigan case is also the subject of a thorough evaluation which can be found in Chapter V.

After passing a budget amendment in 1979 that prohibited any further South Africa-related investments, in 1983 the Massachusetts legislature became the first state legislature to pass and override the governor's veto of legislation that would require divestment of all holdings in companies doing business in South Africa. Affected are $91 million in stocks and bonds in 27 major banks and corporations that were acquired prior to the time that the 1979 legislation went into effect. The activists in Minnesota were not so successful. In 1982 the governor there vetoed a bill preventing any future investments of state funds in South Africa-related companies, and the legislature failed to override the veto.
Sponsors there plan to reintroduce similar legislation.

Non-binding resolutions were passed unanimously by the Nebraska state legislature in 1980 and by the Kansas legislature in 1982. The resolutions urged the divestment of state monies, and the Nebraska measure involved approximately $25 million in investments. It has not been implemented, however.

In Wisconsin legislation is awaiting action, but other state anti-apartheid measures have been taken. In 1978, the University of Wisconsin Board of Regents divested itself of stock in all businesses with investments in South Africa. This action came as a result of a ruling by the state Attorney General that investments by the university in such businesses violated a statute establishing a "no discrimination" standard required of the Regents' investments. The standard provided that "no such investment shall knowingly be made in any company, corporation, subsidiary or affiliate which practices or condones through its actions discrimination on the basis of race, religion, color, creed or sex...." (Wisconsin Office of the Attorney General). A total evaluation of investment policies resulted from this ruling with an outcome such that the Board of Regents increased their investment earnings.

A different kind of governmental response was made in California. After many years of pressure on the state legislature about the issue of corporate responsibility in southern Africa and in other issue areas, in 1980 the governor established a Public Investment Task Force to "develop general guidelines to assure that public investment practices meet socially responsible criteria and public interest goals" (California).

In Oregon a court case has resulted from a challenge to the Board of
Higher Education regarding its right to pursue a divestment policy.
The challenge came from the Attorney General who said that such investment
decisions should be the jurisdiction of the Oregon Investment Council.
In 1978, People for Southern African Freedom, an activist organization
working for divestment, began court proceedings to overturn the Attorney
General's ruling. To date the case has not been resolved. In 1982,
Kentucky Governor John Y. Brown sent a trade mission to South Africa to
initiate economic ties. After numerous meetings with black legislators
and leaders of the NAACP in the state as well as national anti-apartheid
leaders, the governor reversed himself and decided not to seek economic
linkages with South Africa. In still another state, non-legislative
action occurred as far back as 1974 when the Attorney General of Alabama
took action against the importation of South African coal because he
maintained that the coal was produced by slave labor or indentured labor
under penal sanctions (Shepherd: 7). Thus although the bulk of state
government actions have been through legislative channels, other signifi­
cant anti-apartheid actions also have been taken by executive branches.

Campaigns target at city governments have produced outcomes as
interesting as those of state governmental activities. In 1975, the
Washington, DC and Gary, Indiana city councils were the first to adopt
anti-apartheid resolutions recommending that city services and supplies
not be purchased from a specific group of companies involved in southern
Africa and listed in the resolution. Neither action was binding. However,
a binding selective purchasing policy was passed soon thereafter in
Madison, Wisconsin in 1976. The cities of Berkeley (1979) and Davis (1978)
had referenda in which the public voted to support divestment as a means
to contribute to anti-apartheid efforts. The Berkeley action was binding and the Davis action was not. But in 1980, the Davis city council passed a resolution implementing the policy preferences expressed in the referendum. One of the most significant sums of money affected by a city anti-apartheid action is the $70 million that will be withdrawn from South Africa-related corporations as a result of a 1982 policy passed in the Philadelphia city council. Philadelphia became the first large US city to pass a binding resolution prohibiting public employee pension funds being invested in corporations operating in South Africa and Namibia. Finding out the specific amounts of money involved in any of these actions is difficult often because the sponsors themselves do not know the financial impact.

The patterns of behavior that emerge across the cases where state or city governments consider anti-apartheid action are very interesting and useful for analytic purposes. When surveying the cases, one pattern that becomes evident is that of the presence or absence of a campaign pushing for such legislation. Some state and cities have experienced sustained organizing and lobbying by activists while legislation in other states is a result of personal interests of a particular legislator or his/her staff. Examples of the former are the states of Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin, and the cities of Hartford, Washington, DC, East Lansing, Madison, Berkeley and Davis. In all of these cases it is possible to identify a particular group of people who are responsible for getting and keeping anti-apartheid legislation on the government agenda. In many of these cases, the campaigns
were initiated by activists first at the city level (e.g. Hartford, East Lansing, and Madison) and after successful campaigns in those arenas, then taken to the state level.

In places where there has been no campaign or group of activists pushing the legislation (e.g. Nebraska, Nevada and Ohio; Cotati and Sacramento), there appear to be two principal sources for governmental initiative both of which demonstrate social movement concepts introduced by Gerlach and Hine and discussed in Chapter I: decentralization and polycephalous leadership, segmentation and reticulation. First, some of the legislators or their staff have been involved in other anti-apartheid work outside the legislature or city council, often in some place other than their present geographic location. Or, they are close friends of people who are anti-apartheid activists. Because of their previous activities or those of their friends, they are linked into a communications network that continuously feeds them information about the nation-wide anti-apartheid movement. They may have read in a national anti-apartheid newsletter about legislative activities in other states, or they may have heard such news through friends. Out of their own interest in anti-apartheid work, they initiated legislation in relative isolation from the active support and persistent backing of other activists. Legislation in the states of Nebraska and Texas and the cities of Cotati and Sacramento came about through such a process. These cases illustrate the communications networks and personal connections that make for reticulation, the independence of initiative that defines decentralization and polycephalous leadership, and the varieties of ideas and activism that compose segmentation.
The second major source for governmental activity when there is no pressure group or interest group to sustain the effort is the targeting of potential local sympathizers and activists by national anti-apartheid organizations. For example, in 1980 TransAfrica systematically contacted over 70 black legislators across the country to discuss the issue of apartheid with them, inform them of anti-apartheid activities nationwide, and provide them with the text of a model divestment bill that they were encouraged to introduce. Later, in 1981, two leaders of the national movement addressed a workshop on divestment at the annual conference of the National Black Caucus of State Legislators (Robinson, interview). In June 1981, nine national organizations concerned with anti-apartheid work sponsored a conference to which a number of state legislators and city council members were invited. Some public officials received financial subsidies in order that they could come. Many had sponsored anti-apartheid legislation, but others were there to learn how to do it (Irish, interview). Legislative activities in Nevada, Ohio, Texas and other places are primarily a consequence of these national organizations' initiatives, and they highlight the concept of reticulation.

Reticulation, segmentation, and decentralization also characterize the legislative anti-apartheid work in places (listed previously) where campaigns are sustained by a group or groups of activists. Reticulation occurs in a variety of ways, one of which is that the state and local activities receive resources from each other and from national organizations. In most of these states, the local activists have called on experts from national groups to testify during legislative hearings, to lobby legislators, and to do educational work in their communities in support of the legislation. The national organizations also publish
important information regarding strategies, updates on recent events in the US and South Africa, and research on the apartheid issue and economic ties to South Africa. This occurs through newsletters, pamphlets, and books. In addition, they provide a communication node for persons wanting to check on current news.

In these cases, however, there are no persons at the national level who are in any way directly organizing work of these activists or taking command over their decisions. There are also important differences and controversies among the groups in terms of ideology, composition and basis of their membership, strategies, legislative goals, etc. Some illustrations will demonstrate the point: the work of these groups is decentralized and polycephalous in nature.

In Connecticut the activist group (the Connecticut Anti-Apartheid Committee) has had a great deal of support and recruitment from labor unions, some of whose pension funds are directly affected by the anti-apartheid legislation. Church organizations, black organizations, student groups, and other citizen groups have all provided important backing through endorsements, contributions, lobbying, etc., but the core of the group and much of the organizational momentum comes from unions. In contrast, the Southern Africa Liberation Committee, the group responsible for a great deal of the legislative activity in Michigan, comes primarily from a university setting as does the Madison Area Committee on Southern Africa. The groups are made up of faculty, staff, and students who since the early 1970s have not only been involved in legislative activities but also have pressed for and achieved university divestment at their universities.
In terms of ideological diversity, some groups conducting campaigns articulate their efforts as being part of a larger issue (human rights, the struggle against capitalism, etc.) whereas others prefer to keep a more narrow focus specifically on the question of South Africa. The differences in ideology in the state and local campaigns can have important implications for questions of strategy. Those who see anti-apartheid work as a part of the more encompassing struggle against capitalism often want to forge linkages and coalitions with groups working on more domestic issues such as workers' rights and conditions or discrimination against racial minorities. Those who prefer their work to be centered specifically on South Africa (or southern Africa) often do not view themselves or their work for racial justice in South Africa as an anti-capitalist struggle. Or, they see efforts to broaden the issue as dissipating to their energies and threatening to their abilities to appeal to their constituencies. They do not believe that the people whom they seek to mobilize will understand or be receptive to a critique of capitalism. Furthermore, the movement as a whole has experienced enough red-baiting that even some who view themselves as working in the context of anti-capitalist efforts want to keep the focus of anti-apartheid work narrow so as to avoid counter-productive public images.

Another contentious division in the movement that is somewhat related to the ideological issue is the degree to which the movement is mass-based; that is, the degree to which the campaigns educate and mobilize large segments of the American public. No one in the movement would deny that they would prefer to have backing by public opinion that clearly and decisively rejects apartheid. But in the midst of divestment
campaigns, leaders have to make difficult choices about what concrete activities to pursue to achieve their goals, and they have to react to events that are sometimes beyond their control. This leads to differences in strategies regarding how much time divestment activists spend doing educational work or other activities that will involve and convert large numbers of people. For example, in some states and cities activists have discovered that intense lobbying (which by definition is not highly visible to the public) can consume all of their time and often lead to desired legislative outcomes. Thus a legislative victory is achieved and policy elites will be fairly knowledgeable about the issue, but the awareness of American people about South Africa is likely to be changed very little.

Another controversy that illustrates the decentralized and polycephalous nature of the movement is the racial mix of the movement. It is impossible to discern without a great deal of further research what exactly is the racial mix of local activists who make up the hundreds of small anti-apartheid organizations across the country. With one exception, however, the major national SMOs are run and staffed by white people. Whatever the reasons are for this predominance of whites at the national level (and the reasons appear to be numerous and complex), it can have important implications for the SMOs abilities or abilities either to mobilize black support for the movement or to enhance authentic black participation in campaigns at all levels. There is no operating consensus within the movement about how to deal with this issue, and groups across the country as well as SMOs differ in the degree to which they seriously attempt to address it.
Despite these controversies and disputes, and as was described earlier, there is a great deal of cooperation among leaders within the movement. The movement does have coherence, and reticulation is real. For example, most of the SMOs came together to sponsor the June 1981 national conference on anti-apartheid organizing for state and local campaigns. After the conference, however, one organization, the ACOA, was assigned the responsibility for keeping all the others informed on campaigns' progress and needs. ACOA has called on its own staff as well as leaders from the other organizations to be the "traveling evangelists" to speak or lobby in legislatures, city councils, or educational events organized by local activists. And, national newsletters help to keep participants across the country current on campaigns' successes and failures. But even the function of reticulation itself is an issue within the movement because some local activists do not believe that they, or other "grassroots" organizers, get enough support, aid, or appreciation from national organizations.

Segmentation is also clearly demonstrated in the divestment efforts backed by organized anti-apartheid groups; that is, groups and individuals may coalesce for particular purposes or even longer term work; or, they may fracture into smaller units, each pursuing divestment work in its own way. One of the most interesting stories in this research that shows segmentation is about the dispersal of some of the group responsible for the city council selective purchasing resolution in Madison, Wisconsin, one of the earliest legislative actions in the country.

The name of the group was the Madison Area Committee on Southern Africa. An organization by that name continues to exist in Madison and
continues to press for state legislation. Our concern, however, is with four people (two couples) who left the group and moved to jobs in different parts of the country. One couple moved to North Carolina (after spending some time in Africa) where they began working on the weekly news bulletin about Africa, Africa News. This bulletin carries stories about anti-apartheid activities across the nation and has highlighted news on state and city campaigns. In this way the couple has made an important contribution to the divestment communications network.

The second couple moved to Michigan where they were pivotal in helping the Southern Africa Liberation Committee (SALC) there organize the drive for the East Lansing City Council resolution in 1977. They have also made vital contributions to the state anti-apartheid legislative campaigns, including the passage of the banking bill in 1980 and the university bill in 1982. A third couple who had been involved in SALC campaigns with the second couple moved to California and have been a part of divestment campaigns there. Segmentation has occurred because, when people relocated, they left leadership positions in one place to spread their influence and become leaders in similar efforts in other places.

These concepts from Gerlach and Hine can be applied not just to the state and local legislative campaigns but also to the entire anti-apartheid movement both in the US and worldwide. Such is not the purpose of this report, however, and we now turn to discuss a question that is at the heart of all divestment campaigns: would divestment from or economic sanctions against South Africa contribute to ending apartheid?
The Sanctions Debate

Despite the length and intensity of the debate over divestment and economic sanctions against South Africa, it has received very little scholarly attention. The lack of a broad base of rigorous analyses hinders efforts to evaluate the potential impact of sanctions and the theory of action of significance to this study. Often underlying the call for sanctions by anti-apartheid groups is a theory of action that asserts a relationship between the economic isolation of South Africa and the ending of apartheid. In order to achieve the purpose of this study -- an evaluation of the performance of campaigns targeting state and local governments in pursuit of sanctions-related goals -- this overall theory of action must be tested for its logic and plausibility.

The success of sanctions against South Africa depends on many factors, some easier to anticipate and discuss than others. These factors include: the goals desired by advocates; South Africa's vulnerability to outside pressures; the kinds of sanctions imposed; and the number of countries, especially trade and investment partners, participating in the sanctions. Each of these factors will be discussed in some detail.

Goals

As has been shown, there are a wide variety of groups and people, both governmental and nongovernmental, who advocate either implicitly or explicitly some degree of economic isolation of South Africa in pursuit of an assortment of goals. Some see sanctions as a moral imperative against an evil system. Such persons maintain that no commercial benefits should accrue from interactions with a racist regime whose economy is founded on modern day slavery. Most people who take this position do
not do so as purists; that is, they realize that in an imperfect and unjust world one cannot escape some degree of interaction with despicable political and economic systems both at home and abroad. But they want to take a stand; and they believe that to begin to rid the world of injustice, they must focus their energy somewhere. Therefore, why not focus it on one of the most odious of systems, the only constitutionally racist state in the world?

Some people desire sanctions as a way to express their support for black people in southern Africa, and especially for liberation movements engaged in guerrilla warfare there, such as the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and the South West People's Organizations (SWAPO), all of whom have called for the economic isolation of South Africa. This support for sanctions comes not because these advocates always have a thoroughly reasoned and logical theory of action with regard to how sanctions will end apartheid, but because authoritative institutions they respect and trust have requested their solidarity on the issue.

Many activists are engaged in these efforts because they believe such activities to be an efficacious way of raising consciousness and educating Americans or Westerners about racism, apartheid, and the role of corporations and governments in perpetuating these phenomena. Since the United States, Europe, and Japan are South Africa's most important economic partners, activists see these environments as laboratories and sanctions as an easily accessible issue from which to politicize and mobilize their constituents on the broader questions of economic and racial justice. Thus as discussed previously, from this ideological vantage point, advocating
South Africa's economic isolation may not, in this case, be an end in and of itself so much as a means or a catalyst.

The goal of punishing the South African government, whites or the system as a whole is foremost in the minds of some sanctions advocates who want to impose deprivation or embarrassment on the wrong-doers. Sometimes particular segments of the regime such as the military and police are singled out as limited sanctions targets because of their significant role in enforcing apartheid. Regarding general sanctions, however, critics correctly point out that those who likely will suffer first and most from South Africa's economic isolation are the Africans, the very ones sanctions advocates hope to aid. Therefore, the punishment would seem to be misplaced. Advocates respond to this criticism by pointing to the assertions of significant numbers of black leaders themselves as illustrated in table 3-1. These leaders say that the South African black community would prefer to endure the short-term increased hardships of sanctions that might help end apartheid, than the long-term debilitating and deadly effects of the racist system they have experienced for centuries.

Some have goals of improved relations with black African states when they advocate a partial or total embargo. Since support for the liberation of southern Africa has been a cornerstone of OAU policy since its founding and since some governments like that of Nigeria and the frontline states go to great lengths to demonstrate that support, favoring some kind of sanctions, especially on the part of governments, become a symbol and a signal of the desire for better relations with Africa as a whole.

The goal usually assumed to be foremost in the minds of those who
advocate comprehensive sanctions is that of ending apartheid. This would be accomplished by imposing economic hardship on the country as a whole, and especially on the whites, to undermine their persistence in maintaining the apartheid structures. Sanctions are seen to be economic warfare, and coupled with the guerilla war and internal civil disturbances already in process, proponents hope to rid the world of this form of racism. That this goal is not always the most pressing one for many advocates is important to note particularly when evaluating the success of sanctions-related activist campaigns. These activists may be able to achieve a great deal of what they set out to accomplish through calling for sanctions without attaining the comprehensive economic isolation of South Africa or the certain near-term end of apartheid. Activists as well as other advocates may also have varying combinations of these (or perhaps other) goals in mind when pursuing sanctions. It is impossible to evaluate the logic and plausibility underlying all of this goal-oriented behavior. The focus here will be on analyzing the theory of action of the last goal because it is the most significant in terms of what the white South African government has to win or lose. If sanctions advocates are right that the economic isolation of apartheid will speed its demise, the white South Africans have a lot to lose; if the advocates are wrong, they could be wasting a lot of time. It is beyond the capabilities of social science to predict whether the advocates are actually right or wrong, but we can suggest whether their arguments seem rational and reasonable based on the data available to us; or, whether they seem beyond reasonable calculation and therefore a matter of faith.

This theory of action asserts two basic causal relationships:
(1) that sanctions will bring about economic hardship, and (2) that economic hardship, together with other forms of significant pressure such as guerilla warfare and civil unrest, will significantly weaken the resolve of the South African government to maintain apartheid. The first assertion will be discussed in the following sections the second assertion is what concerns us now.

Although governments often behave as though they are confident of the desired outcome, Porter suggests, "there is neither logical reason nor historical evidence that political or psychological collapse inevitably follows economic hardship" (1979: 58). Porter then chooses to ignore this aspect of the theory of action in his economic analysis, but other analysts raise important issues about it. If we are to judge from previous experiences, in general there is reason to doubt that the desired political outcome can be achieved through the application of sanctions alone (Barber; Doxey 1980; Wallensteen). The failure of sanctions in bringing about a speedy end to white minority rule in Rhodesia (Doxey 1971; Porter 1978; Strack) is often invoked as an analogy (although an imperfect one) to demonstrate the potential for a similar failure in South Africa. Some analysts believe that sanctions would achieve the effects opposite those hoped for by advocates -- a white intransigence to domestic political change often referred to as a retreat "into the laager" (Ball). There is some evidence that this occurred in Rhodesia (Doxey 1971).

This evidence is not conclusive, however. In his study of several sanctions cases, Barber suggests that economic isolation can make the target more susceptible to other kinds of pressures that might be significant in changing its behavior, and Strack asserts that eventually
the sanctions against Rhodesia did contribute to the attainment of majority rule. Ferguson and Cotter dismiss the argument that heavy pressures would make whites intransigent by noting that the most rigid of the apartheid structures have been put in place during periods of relative political calm when the regime was free of external pressure; that is, lack of outside pressure has made the government intransigent, believing that the system will always survive (p. 255-8). Myers, et al. (p. 69-81; 141-2) also argue that political and economic crises in South Africa have been accompanied by increases in cleavages and political dissent among whites and in proposals for significant alterations in apartheid structures. Therefore, the fear of a "retreat" or intransigence on the part of the majority of whites may be ill-founded. During political and economic crises, however, the government has been quick to quell such dissent and crush the opposition it fears, even among whites. How much white dissent, civil unrest, emigration, and strong credible opposition would arise in times of severe economic hardship versus how much increased loyalty and determination to protect apartheid against all odds there would be, is impossible to answer. But coupled with other major pressures such as domestic black unrest or rebellion and intensified guerilla incursions, it is not difficult to assume that sanctions could help rock even the well fortified apartheid foundation.

All of these contentious propositions about the political results of sanctions assume that severe economic hardship could be achieved through outside pressures on the South African economy. It is that assumption that will now be tested.
South African Vulnerability to Outside Economic Pressures

Over the last 50-60 years the South African economy has undergone great structural change in a period of rapid industrialization. During this process the country has experienced greater participation in the world economy and has become even more dependent on trade and investment than before the development of manufacturing industries. There is a consensus among analysts that "foreign capital and foreign trade have been critical to the economic development of South Africa providing the foreign exchange required for industrialization and for the expansion of an increasingly capital-intensive economy" (Myers, et al.: 39; see also First, et al.; Houghton; Litvak, et al.; Porter 1979; Rogers 1976; Seidman and Seidman).

In its trade the bulk of South Africa's exports are now and have been for many years minerals, raw or slightly processed. The most important mineral exports are: gold, coal, diamonds, platinum, uranium, iron ore, and copper. Gold alone made up about 46 percent of total volume of exports (excluding re-exports) in 1974, and other minerals accounted for another 27 percent (Porter 1979: 587). In 1980, minerals accounted for 76 percent of the country's total foreign exchange earnings of $26 billion, and gold is so important that for every decrease of $10 in the price of gold, foreign exchange earnings drop by about $220 million (Study Commission: 130-6).

Unlike exports, the character of South Africa's imports has changed substantially since the beginning of the century, reflecting changes due to the industrialization of the economy. The percentage of imports in national income has remained relatively constant, about 20 percent of GDP (Houghton; Porter 1979: 588), but table 3-13 illustrates the trends in
TABLE 3-13

Composition of South Africa's Imports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Import</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1974</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate inputs(^a)</td>
<td>560.2 (51.0%) (^d)</td>
<td>645.5 (42.2%)</td>
<td>2,045.9 (41.7%) (^d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer goods(^b)</td>
<td>231.4 (21.1%)</td>
<td>322.7 (21.1%)</td>
<td>775.5 (15.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital goods(^c)</td>
<td>306.4 (27.9%)</td>
<td>556.2 (36.4%)</td>
<td>2,047.4 (41.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total(^e)</td>
<td>1,098.3</td>
<td>1,529.9</td>
<td>4,905.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Includes "raw (or crude) materials" and "processed or manufactured materials" other than "capital equipment."

\(^b\) I.e. "articles ready for retail sale or consumers' use."

\(^c\) I.e. "capital equipment."

\(^d\) Figures in parentheses are percentages of totals.

\(^e\) Columns do not sum to total because two minor hard-to-classify categories are omitted.

Source: Porter 1979 : 589
their changing composition. The data show that, proportionately imports of consumer goods have been declining while imports of capital goods have been rising. It is the capital goods (especially machinery and transport equipment) that have been so crucial to the industrialization of the South African economy. Because these particular imports are vital in providing much needed technology, their importance is further heightened. One economist estimated that foreign technology accounted for 40 percent of South Africa's growth in gross domestic product from 1957 - 1972 (Myers, et al. : 39).

Typically South Africa imports more than it exports. This problem is integrally related to its high need for capital equipment imports. From 1955 to 1975 the country experienced a deficit in its current accounts in all but seven of those 21 years. Deficits in the total balance of payments occurred in thirteen of these years (Houghton: 180-7; 292). Legum explains that "the root cause of South Africa's economic problem lies, on the broadest level in the inability of its production process to develop sufficiently to be able to supply its industries with modern machinery and equipment" (quoted in Litvak, et al. : 41). Porter (1979: 589) confirms that domestic industry provides "only the plant in which (capital equipment) is housed."

Because of its chronic trade and payments imbalances, private foreign investment has been of considerable importance to South Africa in paying for its deficits. In 20 of the 29 years from 1946 to 1975, the economy experienced net inflows of foreign private capital (Houghton: 182; 292), and during the years 1970 to 1977, foreign capital coming into the country annually averaged $580 million or 9.4 percent of gross invest-
ments (Spandau quoted in Porter 1979: 591). Between 1974 and 1976 alone, the flow of foreign investment to South Africa was more than $6 billion, enough to offset the current account deficit for those years (Myers, et al.: 39). By 1979 total foreign investment was $26.3 billion, "an amount equivalent to 20 percent of the value of South Africa's industrial plant" (Study Commission: 133). About 40 percent of this investment was direct — i.e. foreign company ownership of South African subsidiaries or affiliates, and about 60 percent was indirect — i.e. international bank loans and foreign ownership of stock in South African firms (Study Commission: 133). South Africa's total foreign capital liabilities for 1976 are shown in table 3-14.

Most of South Africa's trade and foreign capital come from the West. Table 3-15 shows the value of South Africa's imports and exports with its leading trading partners. The country's foreign investment comes principally (80 percent of its) from Great Britain, the United States, West Germany, Switzerland, and France. In early 1979, direct foreign investment was $11 billion, with $6 billion held by British interests (10 percent of Britain's worldwide direct investment), $2 billion by US interests (1 percent of US worldwide direct investment), and $2 billion by other European countries (Study Commission: 134). Note that although Japanese interests trade with South Africa, due to the Japanese government's restrictions, they do not have direct investments there.¹

US direct investments in South Africa has grown a great deal over the last 30 years. In 1950 it had a book value of $140 million; by 1961, it had risen to $353 million (Litvak, et al.: 44). The Rockefeller Study Commission reports
TABLE 3-14
Foreign Assets and Liabilities of South Africa, 1976a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Liabilities</th>
<th>Net Liabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term</td>
<td>989</td>
<td>2,660</td>
<td>1,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>1,787</td>
<td>6,343</td>
<td>4,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nondirect</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>6,684</td>
<td>6,316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government b</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term c</td>
<td>1,221</td>
<td>2,235</td>
<td>1,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>2,008</td>
<td>1,363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,010</td>
<td>19,929</td>
<td>14,919</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. At end of year.
b. Banks are included under "government."
c. Short-term assets include "gold reserves" and "SDRs."

Source: Porter 1979: 591
TABLE 3-15
South Africa's Imports From and Exports to Its Leading Trading Partners

(in billions of U.S. dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>1.160</td>
<td>1.302</td>
<td>1.348</td>
<td>1.054</td>
<td>1.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>1.234</td>
<td>1.520</td>
<td>1.172</td>
<td>1.012</td>
<td>1.281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.410</td>
<td>1.382</td>
<td>1.240</td>
<td>1.124</td>
<td>1.543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>0.424</td>
<td>0.489</td>
<td>0.498</td>
<td>0.610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.962</td>
<td>0.873</td>
<td>0.710</td>
<td>0.764</td>
<td>0.910*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>0.653</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td>0.976</td>
<td>1.340</td>
<td>2.340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>1.398</td>
<td>1.390</td>
<td>1.100</td>
<td>1.538</td>
<td>1.450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.755</td>
<td>0.884</td>
<td>0.895</td>
<td>1.106</td>
<td>1.222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0.321</td>
<td>0.504</td>
<td>0.755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.773</td>
<td>0.880</td>
<td>0.763</td>
<td>0.909</td>
<td>0.946*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*figures for Japan are for the first 11 months of 1978

Source: Myers, et al.: 45
US direct investment in South Africa has increased an average of $100 million a year since the mid-1960s, when it stood at $500 million. In the 1970s most new US investment came from the reinvested earnings of South African subsidiaries. Return on US investment averaged over 15 percent for 1970-74, declined to 9 percent in 1975, and then rose to 14 percent for the period 1976-78. Over 50 percent of US direct investment is held by Ford, General Motors, Mobil, and Caltex Oil. Altogether, some 350 American companies have subsidiaries in South Africa and over 6000 do business there (p. 13405).

Although the amounts of foreign investment have been impressive, more impressive are the vital contributions that this investment makes to the whole economy. As noted earlier, capital equipment imports are crucial to the country since it is not able to supply the bulk of its own capital equipment needs. But beyond this, important sectors of the economy are dominated by foreign companies. In 1980, Myers, et al. reported (p. 39):

Five multinationals -- Shell, British Petroleum, Mobil, Caltex and Total -- collectively control close to 83 percent of the petroleum market in South Africa and generate 91 percent of the service stations. Volkswagen, Ford, GM, Datsun, and Toyota hold the major share of the automobile market; the sole South African company, Sigma Motors, has acquired 14 percent of the market by manufacturing Chrysler, Peugeot, Citroen, Mazda and Leyland cars. Mainframe computer sales are split between IBM and British-owned ICL, each with one-third of the market, and Burroughs, Control Data, Sperry Univac and Siemens play lesser roles. Only in mining and agriculture are the companies and operations primarily South African, and even in those sectors, some major international corporations such as Exxon, Union Carbide, US Steel, Phelps Dodge, Del Monte, Tate and Lyle, Rio Tinto Zinc and Newmont Mining play an important role.

Foreign lending by banks is also vital to the South African economy and has been increasing in importance in the last decade due to several factors: the government's own need for greater amounts of capital since the early 1970s to finance state-owned corporations (parastatals) formed to boost electricity production, port capacity, energy resources, and min-
eral exploitation; vast increases in government spending for military purposes in the mid-1970s with much of these purchases imported; increases in the prices of imports, especially for oil with a four-fold increase after the Arab oil embargo; and a decline in the price of gold in 1976 (Myers, et al.: 41-2). Litvak, et al. suggest that loans are particularly important to apartheid not only because they help finance economic development and military preparedness, but also because they have come "primarily during periods in which South Africa has faced serious economic and political instability" (p. 58). They are, in some senses, a measure of the financial community's assessment of the political stability of South Africa. Litvak, et al. report further:

In 1960 a peaceful crowd demonstrating against the pass laws was fired upon at Sharpeville. This Sharpeville Massacre, combined with other serious unrest in South Africa during 1960-61, caused a massive flight of foreign capital. Two hundred and seventy-one million dollars was taken out of the country in 1960 and $63 million in early 1961. Foreign reserves dropped from $350 million to $245 million. The net outflow of foreign capital continued through 1964. As South Africa entered a state of emergency, American banks came to the rescue and shored up the economy. Shortly after Sharpeville, financiers in the US put together loans adding up to $150 million. Foremost among these was a $40 million revolving loan offered by a consortium of ten American banks including Chase Manhattan and Citibank.

...Despite the political crisis of the Angolan War and internal South African unrest since Soweto, US banks have again made their financial resources available. As noted earlier, the amount of their outstanding loans to South Africa doubled between early 1975 and late 1976 -- a $1 billion increase. Commenting on the ability of the South African government to borrow from foreign banks, the Financial Mail stated a month after Soweto: "a unique feature of the market has been the support of US banks. Apparently more finance has come from this quarter than ever before."

Between January and November 1976, $777 million was loaned to the South African government, state corporations and private businesses. The majority of these loans were reported after the black township uprisings in June. (p. 58-59).

Klein gives thorough documentation of US bank loans to South Africa.
Most of the loans have come from: Chase Manhattan, Citibank, Manufacturers Hanover Trust, Morgan Guaranty, and Bank of America. Many US loans have been made through international consortia like the European-American Banking Corporation, and at times even regional banks have participated in loans to South Africa.

In summary, there is no doubt that trade and foreign capital are of vital importance to the South African economy. Does this mean then that sanctions could bring about significant economic difficulty for the apartheid regime as many anti-apartheid activists believe they would? The answer to this question depends in large part on the type of sanctions imposed.

The Kinds of Sanctions Imposed and The Number of Countries Observing Them

There are two basic kinds of economic sanctions with variations on each kind. The two are: trade sanctions to prevent imports and exports of goods, and capital sanctions to prevent the import of financial investments. Within trade embargos there have been proposed bans on imports in general and on particular imports (e.g. oil or military supplies) as well as proposed bans on exports. In an attempt to evaluate some of these proposals, Porter created an economic simulation of the effects of sanctions on the South African economy. His analysis of long-term outcome concludes that if an embargo were to cut off South Africa from importations of capital equipment, in the long run "South Africa's growth should effectively cease. Indeed, as time went and depreciation became relevant, the output potential of South Africa would be reduced unless it could rapidly develop from a very undeveloped base its own capital
goods industries" (1979: 590). Marvin comes to the same conclusion. In addition, Porter asserts that in the short run, the impact of sanctions on imports of capital equipment could also have a serious impact.

How much impact would depend on the effectiveness of the embargo.

If South Africa's imports were reduced by less than one-fourth, little economic damage would be inflicted — each one percentage point cut in imports would cause about a one half percentage point cut in GDP. Once imports were reduced by more than one-fourth, the damage would become more significant. The elasticity of GDP reductions with respect to import reductions rises to about one and one-fourth, as import reductions reach one half. Should imports be cut by more than one-half, massive unemployment and relocation of white labor (as well as nonwhite labor) would have begun to occur.

Myers, et al. (p. 140) report that Spandau, a South African business analyst at the University of Witwatersrand, agrees with this conclusion based on his own investigation of the consequences of import sanctions.

In Porter's discussion of capital investment sanctions, he claims that the cessation of foreign direct investment could also hurt the apartheid economy's growth potential in the long run. This result is primarily due to a consequent reduction in the country's access to new technology and the benefits of corporations' research and development. In the short run, however, this kind of sanction alone is not likely to have any severe impact, even on the balance of payments or on imports. This is in large part because the government would retaliate against investors. Myers, et al. (p. 138) enumerate the regime's strict foreign exchange controls put in place after the capital flight accompanying the disturbances surrounding Sharpeville (1960) to hinder corporations' withdrawal. Porter (p. 590-1) asserts that

There is no possibility that South Africa would permit the actual physical withdrawal of the capital equipment which is the foreign net asset position in South Africa. Should
foreigners attempt to unload the shares, loans, mortgages, etc. that represent claims on South African output, they would threaten disorder in the financial and foreign exchange markets of South Africa, but they would not reduce the economy's capital stock one iota. Of course, the financial disruption might make it difficult for South Africa to operate this capital at capacity. The most that "disengagement" can mean, therefore, is the cessation of new (and replacement) investment ... basically a growth related (i.e. long-term) threat. (Second parentheses mine.)

Porter and others dismiss the possibility of export sanctions against South Africa because the country has a very important commodity in fairly high demand with an easily disguised origin: gold. The other important mineral exports also could not be easily stopped for much the same reasons. Besides, Porter maintains, the only merit in stopping exports is to deny South Africa the foreign exchange to buy imports, and there are other ways of preventing imports that are not so troublesome.

With regard to commodity specific import sanctions, Myers, et al. discuss the case of oil but come to no definitive conclusion on the impact of a total oil embargo. They do suggest that at minimum, "economic growth would be retarded, new investment from abroad would slow to a trickle or cease altogether, and unemployment and the cost of living would rise" (p. 140). Clearly, however, the South African government worries about such an embargo for the oil-poor country because it is reported to have stockpiles good for two to 10 years in abandoned coal mines in the northern Transvaal. Plus, it is seeking, with the help of American technology from the Fluor corporation, to expand its production of oil from coal through its parastatal SASOL (Myers, et al.: 140;180)

With regard to an embargo on another specific commodity, computers, Myers, et al. (pl 141) suggest that the impact could again be serious. In an anecdotal analysis, the authors quote one banker as saying,"Without
spare parts, our computers would be down within two years. Without computers, we would need 2,000 trained bookkeepers. And where would we get 2,000 bookkeepers?"

In his evaluation of the impact of sanctions, Porter issues several caveats, some of which should be mentioned here. South Africa has never really prepared for sanctions in a concerted fashion. If the government should do so, the conclusions offered here would be altered by these new circumstances. He also suggests that the longer the world's governments take in instituting sanctions, the more possibility the country has for preparing itself. In addition, Porter is concerned that "sanctions must work quickly, for they are increasingly averted by long-run adjustment" (p. 585). He therefore (with agreement from other analysts) asserts that the type of embargo with the greatest potential for damage is a stoppage of imports. And for this type of sanction to be most effective, it must be total — a cessation of all imports. "Partial sanctions achieve partial results" (p. 584). It is this last point that raises still further concerns about the efficacy of sanctions.

In a report of their investigation into the possibilities and probabilities of sanctions, the Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa concludes that among South Africa's major trade and investment partners, there is little or no likelihood that the European governments in power in 1981 would impose any further embargos against South Africa. Therefore, they recommend that the US should not pursue any further sanctions. It is generally assumed that if any one of South Africa's major trade and investment partners imposed any kind of trade or investment sanctions, the others would simply pick up the slack, getting a
bigger share of a profitable pie. This conclusion is drawn too quickly and too easily, however, because there does not appear to be any serious examination in the literature of the substitutability of the specific products and capital investments provided by any one of these countries to South Africa. For example, there has been no definitive study on how quickly and at what costs the South African economy could recover from a partial or total imposition of sanctions by the United States.

What is fairly clear, however, is that, if judged by their behavior in the UN, the governments of the United States and Britain provide the biggest obstacles to further embargoes against apartheid. Without the participation of these two governments, whose nations constitute the largest of South Africa's trade and investment partners, no sanctions efforts are likely to have severe economic consequences for South Africa. It is reasonable to speculate, however, that if these two governments attempted to isolate South Africa economically without the support of other partners such as Germany, France and Japan, their actions alone could result in significant hardship for the apartheid regime. As stated earlier, however, the US government has never been willing seriously to consider any economic sanctions beyond the embargo on the sale of military items voted by the Security Council in 1977. Britain has even closer ties of "kith and kin" to South Africa and its policy makers show no signs of willingness to go further in economically isolating South Africa.

Our overall conclusions about the potential impact of sanctions must be cautious and qualified. If the goal of economic sanctions were to be to bring severe economic hardship to South Africa, to be most effective
the following conditions should be met:

1. at least one-half of the country's imports must be stopped from entering the country; (other economic isolation measures such as the cessation of capital flows into the country or commodity specific embargoes --e.g. oil -- could potentially do serious economic hard to South Africa, but they are not as effective in the short-term);

2. enough governments and/or businesses must be willing to enforce the sanctions to achieve one-half reduction in imports; and

3. other trade and investment partners not enforcing the sanctions must not increase their supplies of imports.

If the goal of sanctions is ultimately to end apartheid by causing severe economic hardship, then one further condition must be met: the partial (as stated in #1 above) or total economic isolation of South Africa must be accompanied by other factors that threaten the foundation of apartheid. Such factors might include: from the world community -- diplomatic pressures on the South African government; more vigorous enforcement of the arms embargo; cessation of all military and nuclear cooperation with South Africa; humanitarian and/or military aid to the liberation movements; increased support to the front line states, etc.; from the people in South Africa -- increases in civil unrest or disobedience among whites and/or blacks such as work stoppages, demonstrations, etc.; guerilla incursions by liberation movements; refusals to serve in the military, etc.

It is impossible to predict what mix of these factors would end apartheid, but the effective economic isolation of the country would in all likelihood be one factor that could speed the process.
There are several implications of these conclusions for divestment proponents whose goals are to speed the end of apartheid through the imposition of economic difficulty on the country. Their assertions that the apartheid regime would suffer considerable hardship if economic sanctions were enacted are credible. So much of their activity has been focused on preventing direct investment, however, when prevention of trade (specifically exports to South Africa) may be the more harmful measure to impose. In that western governments are not likely to institute trade or investment embargoes (as the activists are quite aware), any direct actions against businesses to pressure them to disengage from South Africa can only hope to achieve partial results — most likely results far short of the severe economic hardship desired. If pressures on businesses are persistently heightened, especially in Britain and the United States, so as to restrict their relations with South Africa to a greater and greater extent, the costs of acquiring goods necessary for maintaining growth in the South African economy probably will become higher and at least be of some inconvenience to the regime. But beliefs that such inconvenience or that piecemeal restrictions on business activities with South Africa could help bring about fundamental political change are, at this point, a matter of faith.

The opponents of sanctions also operate out of assertions of faith, but contrary to those of sanctions proponents, their assertions, especially those of the progressive force argument, are often not grounded in a credible analysis of the South African political economy.
The Progressive Force Argument

The basic thesis of the progressive force argument has been around since the 1940s and has been put forward by both South Africans and non-South Africans. This thesis is that economic growth accompanied by continued investment inevitably will bring about the destruction of apartheid. Foreign trade and investment are therefore seen to be good not only for growth but also for the eventual improvement of political and economic conditions for blacks. Livak, et al. attempt to outline the progressive force position and demonstrate why it is inaccurate. This discussion will draw heavily from their work.

The assumptions undergirding the progressive force argument that apartheid will disappear with ever greater amounts of economic growth are as follows: (1) Historically, the development and persistence of discrimination against blacks in South Africa can be traced to (a) an irrational factor of pure racial prejudice, preserved especially by Afrikaner cultural and social exclusivity, and (b) a rational "desire of the white working class in South Africa to gain and protect a privileged position in the labor market" (Litvak, et al.: 12-3). (2) The political structure of apartheid has been essentially irrelevant and often dysfunctional to the country's economic development. And

(3) "industrial growth continually intensifies the need for skilled labor in South Africa, yet the white population is becoming insufficient as a source of such workers. This means that more blacks must be trained for and employed in jobs formerly held by whites. But...promotion of blacks to these positions cannot be accomplished without significantly weakening apartheid. Africans will have to be paid more and migrate less. Ultimately... this will produce an entrenched, unionized black workforce which will have the power to demand those things which it has for so long been denied. The alternative to this scenario is economic stagnation (Litvak, et al.: 25)."
In contrast to this position, Litvak, et al. contend that there is a great complementarity between economic development in South Africa and the systematic disenfranchisement of blacks because at the foundation of the economy is cheap and powerless African labor. In a survey of the history of the country, the authors demonstrate that much of the legal structure of the apartheid system was put in place before the 1948 National Party victory, at a time when the country was evolving into an industrial society. After the Nationalists gained the reins of government and up to the present, however, apartheid -- with its mechanisms for labor recruitment, restrictions on African unionization, colour bar, pass laws, Bantustans, and powerful coercive apparatus -- essentially remains as a "modern mechanism for preserving and regulating the flow of black labor in and out of industry" (p. 17).

Looking back at the evolution of South African race relations... one sees that the subservient situation of Africans resulted from various laws and institutions. Far from being ends in themselves, i.e. expressions of white race prejudice and cultural chauvinism, such policies were a response to the dynamics of a capitalist economic system attempting to establish itself at the southern tip of the African continent. First this meant attaining political dominance over the indigenous population through acquiring a monopoly on the use of force. Then it meant utilizing such superiority to force the African population out of its pre-capitalist subsistence food production and social arrangements into migratory labor. Finally, it meant insuring that the conditions which kept this labor cheap could be sustained. Although the white workers clearly benefited (and continue to benefit) from this state of affairs, their collaboration has largely been a defensive reaction to the insecurity of being in the same labor market with Africans who could be forced to work at an exceedingly low wage.

All of this is not to say that racial prejudice among whites in South Africa does not exist. On the contrary, racism is rampant and virulent, and strongly influences relations between the races. But these racial attitudes have prospered in South Africa because of their power to give legitimacy to the existing distribution of wealth and power (p. 16).
These authors maintain further that, although the South African economy will need increasing amounts of skilled African labor, there is no reason to believe that the apartheid structure will need to be dismantled in order to increase the skill level of Africans. Indeed, the government has proven itself to be quite clever in instituting some legal changes (such as some suggested by the Riekert and Wiehahn Commissions) that improve the stability and training of the workforce while still denying it access to increased political or economic power. Although the progressive force argument cannot be disproven absolutely, the preponderance of evidence suggests that "white domination will adapt to economic imperatives while retaining key features of apartheid. Progressive force advocates tend to exaggerate the demands of economic change and underestimate the durability of repressive institutions" (p. 36).

In addition, those who argue against sanctions often assert that, out of its own desires for a stable investment climate and a healthy skilled workforce, the business community in South Africa has been and will be an effective political lobby on behalf of improved conditions for blacks. An examination of both domestic and international business as a lobby in South Africa, however, does not support such a claim. Within South Africa, business lobbies rarely become active on issues outside a narrowly defined realm of rather specific business concerns. Their most intense and broadly defined political involvement came during the period of economic recession and political instability (1960 - Sharpeville, and 1976-77 - Soweto). This suggests that only during the years of disruptive political unrest and a sluggish economy did businessmen begin to question the government's apartheid policy. During the boom years of the 1960s and early 1970s business groups were fairly inactive in terms of
their attempts to impact broad political, social, and economic issues. This inactivity results not only from the fact that businesses enjoy very favorable investment conditions but also because of swift and punitive retaliation by the government against those companies and business groups that have on occasion openly opposed government apartheid policies (Myers, et al.: 69-81; 141-2).

Thus opposition to sanctions based on an assumption that the international and South African business communities can be used for progressive and significant change in South Africa appears to be groundless. Despite the possibility of good intentions on the part of some businessmen, the business sector has shown itself historically to be very reluctant to oppose apartheid policies except under quite adverse conditions for brief periods of time with very modest proposals. That these sanctions critics want to pursue tried and failed policy options for change, as opposed to the untested and controversial sanctions option, is testament more to their allegiance to business than to the validity of their argument. In fact, across the years, apartheid has been good for business and business has been good for apartheid.

Responses to Activist Pressures

The evaluative purpose of this research is limited and will not adequately address the impact of the entire US anti-apartheid movement as discussed in this chapter or even the sanctions thrust within the movement. Some indications of overall impact can be discerned from the evaluation of the specific campaigns in Connecticut and Michigan discussed in the next two chapters; but it is important at this point to outline some
apparent patterns of reactions to the movement by businesses, governments, and nongovernmental groups. These reactions deserve further detailed investigation to shed greater light on the impact of the movement as a whole.

Business Responses

Adoption of a code of conduct for their subsidiary operations has been the most frequent corporate response to pressures. This code of conduct, the Sullivan Principles, has also been used by some institutional investors as a criterion for divestment such that their holdings in businesses that do not adopt the Principles are sold. The code is named after its founder, Rev. Leon Sullivan, a black Baptist minister from Philadelphia who is well-known for his US community-based workers' training programs which have prepared hundreds of thousands of ethnic minorities for skilled work. Sullivan was named to the Board of Directors of General Motors in 1971 as a result of pressures on GM to include blacks on its Board, and he began at that point to challenge the corporation to withdraw its business from South Africa. Across several years, however, he was unable to convince anyone else on the Board of his position, and out of frustration, he began to develop the code of conduct for businesses operating in South Africa. In March 1977, after close consultation with corporate executives in a number of South Africa-related firms, Sullivan announced his six criteria for fair employment practices in South Africa as shown in table 3-16. They already had the endorsement of 12 businesses with South African operations, and they immediately began to attain wide popularity in the US business community. By the end of 1978, there were 105 signatories, and at the close of 1979, there were 135. At this point
TABLE 3-16

The Sullivan Principles

PRINCIPLE I: Non-segregation of the races in all eating, comfort and work facilities.

PRINCIPLE II: Equal and fair employment practices for all employees.

PRINCIPLE III: Equal pay for all employees doing equal or comparable work for the same period of time.

PRINCIPLE IV: Initiation of and development of training programs that will prepare, in substantial numbers, blacks and other non-whites for supervisory, administrative, clerical and technical jobs.

PRINCIPLE V: Increasing the number of blacks and other non-whites in management and supervisory positions.

PRINCIPLE VI: Improving the quality of employees' lives outside the work environment in such areas as housing, transportation, schooling, recreation and health facilities.

PERIODIC REPORTING

The signator companies of the Statement of Principles will proceed immediately to:
- Utilize a standard format to report their progress to Dr. Sullivan through the independent administrative unit which he has established on a 6-month basis.
- Ensure periodic reports on the progress that has been accomplished on the implementation of these principles.

Source: Schmidt: 113-5.
there are over 150 American businesses that have pledged themselves to implementing the Principles. In 1978, Sullivan amplified the code to require signatory companies to support "the elimination of discrimination against the rights of blacks to form or belong to government registered trade unions, and to acknowledge generally the right of black workers to form their own union or to be represented by trade unions where unions already exist." In 1979, he added the demand that companies "assist in the development of black and non-white business enterprises, including distributors, suppliers of goods and services and manufacturers."

Corporations were also told to lobby the South African government for changes such as the "abolition of job reservations, job fragmentation and apprenticeship restrictions for blacks and other non-whites" and to "support changes in influx control laws to provide for the right of black migrant workers to normal family life" (Myers, et.al.: 301-3; Schmidt: 14-17).

Sullivan established The International Council for Equality of Opportunity Principles to report on the progress of signatory companies and the Arthur D. Little Company, a Cambridge consulting firm, was contracted to survey companies' compliance progress and report its findings every six months. Arthur D. Little sends corporations a lengthy questionnaire which their management fills out and returns to the consulting firm. The respondents are then categorized and reported as:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th># Corps. in Category (1981)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Making good progress</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Making progress</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Needs to become more active</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Endorsers with few or no employees</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. New signatories</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Non-respondents</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. Signatories headquartered outside the US</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. Non-signatories</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At first there were major difficulties in getting corporations to respond to the questionnaires but the number of non-respondents has decreased across time. Many, however, still leave the most sensitive questions unanswered. In addition to having signatories respond to the survey, Sullivan sent a team of observers to evaluate 25 companies' compliance in 1979.

Other codes of conduct have been developed by the European Community and the Urban Foundation, a white South African business organization attempting to improve working conditions for blacks. The South African government has not interfered to prevent corporations from becoming signatories on any of these codes, and it even approved the final draft of the Sullivan Principles (Schmidt: 47).

The Sullivan Principles and other codes have been widely condemned by anti-apartheid activists and many black leaders in the US and South Africa as being reformist, irrelevant to fundamental change in apartheid, and/or diversionary to the progress of the divestment movement. The 1979 Conference of Black Religious Leaders on Apartheid resolved "that the Sullivan Principles, though well-intentioned, are no longer sufficient and that the very presence of United States corporations in South Africa serves to legitimize the apartheid system of white supremacy" (Schmidt: 107). Subsequently 58 black and white US national church, labor, academic and other professional leaders signed a lengthy statement opposing the Sullivan code. In the statement they asserted that the principles "provided precisely what the companies were looking for: a guaranteed public relations success which promised maximum credit for minimum change" (ACOA undated). Business executives do not dispute this claim. A
manager of the Goodyear Tyre and Rubber company South African subsidiary said that Sullivan knocked divestment efforts "on their head...He has helped improve the image back in the US of American companies in South Africa (Business International: 251).

In a lengthy analysis of the principles, Schmidt concludes that they are unlikely to have any significant impact on apartheid. Even advocates of the code, such as the Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, assert that it is unlikely to impact or alter apartheid structures and will only make a positive impact on the lives of a very few blacks. Less than one percent of all blacks employed in South Africa work for American companies. The reasons for the severe limitations on the principles' potential are several. First, companies, by the admission of some of their own managers, are reluctant to comply, and since their compliance is monitored through self-reporting, it is impossible to get an accurate assessment of their progress. Second, some of the changes brought about through attempts at compliance have been hardly even disguised as cosmetic.

Herman Nickel, the current US ambassador to South Africa wrote in 1978:

In line with the Sullivan code, GM duly removed the offending signs from the lavatory doors in its Port Elizabeth plant, only to replace them with color-keyed doors: blue for whites and Chinese (the latter considered honorary whites for lavatory purposes), orange for blacks and coloreds.

The primary reason that the codes can have little impact, however, is because companies are forced to work within a legal and white trade union system in which blacks are denied citizenship in South Africa and fundamental economic, political, and social rights. The codes cannot and do not attempt to address themselves to the basic structures of apartheid such as the homelands, migratory labor, pass laws, and the complex legal
restrictions on any government opposition. If they did, they would not be
tolerated for long by the government. At best, the principles can contri­
bute to the development of a small black middle class with greater stakes
in the system, a development promoted by some segments of the apartheid
regime itself and in the interest of corporations who need greater
numbers of skilled black workers.

Other corporate actions regarding pressures to divest range from
ending their business relations with South Africa to strong defense of
their investments and refusals to yield to pressure. Polaroid is apparently
the only corporation to have severed its ties with South Africa as a result
of activists pressures, although a number of other businesses have
pledged not to expand their operations or, in the case of banks, make
new loans. It is difficult to discern whether or not company managers
decide not to reinvest on the basis of activist pressures or because of the
investment climate in South Africa itself. This study does not attempt
to address this issue, but important to note in this regard is the continued
and growing amounts of US business operations with and in South Africa --
indicating that there are a number of corporations who evaluate the
investment climate in South Africa as still being quite good. Examples
of corporations that have at varying times in recent years announced that
they would not expand their operations in or with South Africa are:
Borg Warner, Burroughs, Control Data, Ford, General Motors, Gulf and
Western, Johnson and Johnson, and Kimberly-Clark. Kodak announced a
policy of no sales to the South African government. Banks that are
committed to no new loans to the South African government or any of its
instrumentalities are: First Chicago Corporation, Merrill Lynch, Chemical

Myers, et al. report that corporate executives claim that due to activist pressures "they are forced to devote more time and energy to their South African operations than the scale of those operations would normally warrant" (p. 307). Another indicator of corporate attention to the issue is the number of business reports analysing anti-apartheid efforts, such as those done by Business International and The Conference Board, or corporate brochures and advertisements explaining their South African operations. General Motors and Dresser Industries are examples of corporations that have had concerted public relations campaigns to promote positive images of their subsidiaries. Dresser is also famous for its refusal to yield to any activist pressures. Similarly, Dow Chemical threatened not to make any more donations to Michigan State University if its stock was divested because of its South African connection (Myers, et al.: 304).

Another important development related to divestment pressures is that some companies attempt to attract business on the basis of their policies of no or restricted ties to South Africa. Chemical Bank has received many institutions' deposits that were withdrawn from Citibank, and Robert Schwartz of Shearson/American Express is one of several investment managers promoting his firm's services for social responsibility (or "clean") investing.

In all, business responses have been mixed. There has been some
restriction of business relations with South Africa but no large-scale withdrawal of operations there. Many companies seem to have been inconvenienced by activists' pressures and most with operations in South Africa appear to pay close attention to the issue. As the Conference Board report puts it: "There is one stubborn and intractable issue that will not go away -- South Africa" (Janger and Berenheim: 22). But, so far, pressures have not mounted enough to threaten a crippling blow to corporations that remain tied to South Africa.

US Government Responses

Within the US government, response to divestment pressures has varied from one administration to another and from one part of the government to another. Persons interviewed in the State Department, Congress, the South African Embassy, and Washington-based nongovernmental organizations believe that whereas officials within the Carter administration might have been willing to listen to divestment or sanctions arguments, they were never willing to take such arguments seriously. In the Reagan administration, however, there is no one even willing to listen to the argument. In contrast to policies under Carter, the Commerce Department under Reagan has loosened restrictions on sales of technology and military equipment to South Africa. The current administration has also increased cooperation and exchanges on nuclear technology. The State Department denies that anti-apartheid activities are significant but nevertheless continues to monitor the movement and especially actions targeted at state and city governments. An outside consultant who subsequently became a Special Assistant to Chester Crocker, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, wrote a report on such activities for the State Department in 1981.
Thus the foreign policy bureaucracy pays attention to the movement, but the State Department official interviewed in this research effort commented sarcastically with regard to the impact of divestment activities that, if activists were serious about bringing down apartheid, they would make better use of their energies by focusing more on sending direct aid to the guerilla organizations.

Numerous bills have been introduced in Congress, primarily in the House, to restrict US business with South Africa. In 1978 alone, 20 bills or resolutions calling for some form of economic sanctions were sponsored, but the bills and resolutions rarely get out of committee. In substance they range from endorsements of the Sullivan Principles, to denials of foreign tax credits to American companies operating in South Africa, to calls for US sanctions against South Africa. A successful legislative effort on South Africa came in 1978 as an amendment to the Export-Import Bank Authorization Bill, the so-called Evans amendment. The amendment limited Eximbank facilities "to borrowers in South Africa not associated with the South African government who were certified by the secretary of state to be making good progress in implementing a code of conduct that is essentially the Sullivan Principles." The effect of the amendment (under Carter) was to cut off Eximbank credit guarantees and credit insurance programs for South African borrowers (Christenson: 62).

In 1978, Congress paid a great deal of attention to the issue of US corporate interests in South Africa. Senator Dick Clark (D-Iowa), then chair of the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, held hearings in January on "US Corporate Interest in
Africa," and Representative Charles Diggs (D-Michigan), then chair of the Subcommittee on Africa, together with Jonathan Bingham (D-New York), chair of the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, both of the House Committee on International Relations, held hearings in the summer on "United States Private Investment in South Africa." The hearings served to further legitimize activists' concerns over US economic ties to South Africa. With Clark and Diggs now gone, the members of Congress who currently introduce anti-apartheid legislation are Howard Wolpe (D-Michigan), chair of the House Subcommittee on Africa, Rep. William Gray (D-Pennsylvania) and Rep. Steve Solarz (D-New York).

On the whole, anti-apartheid activists have not gotten much support from Congress for their efforts. However, South African interests seemed worried enough about the activities of Clark and Wolpe to join with others in efforts to unseat them. Clark lost his election in 1980, but Wolpe won his in the 1982 election (Washington Office on Africa, Autumn 1982).

South African Responses

South Africans, both those sympathetic and those in opposition to apartheid, care a great deal about the US anti-apartheid movement, the divestment issue, and the possibility of economic sanctions. The South African government maintains five official consulates and ten honorary ones in cities across the US to promote friendly relations between the two countries. In addition, the 1978 exposure of the "Muldergate" scandal in South Africa (through findings by the official South African Erasmus Commission) revealed that Eschel Rhodie, Secretary of the Department of Information, together with Prime Minister John Vorster, Minister of Information Connie Mulder, and General Hendrick Van den Bergh, head of the
then Bureau of State Security, approved a plan to spend at least $73 million on projects to buy politicians and media and to finance pro-apartheid groups around the world. The Commission maintains that the group's US contact, John McGoff, a Michigan publisher, received at least $11.75 million to buy the Star, but he got the Sacramento Union instead. He denies the Commission's charges but is under investigation by both the US Securities and Exchange Commission and the Department of Justice for his South Africa-related activities (Washington Office on Africa, Summer 1982).

The South African government also spends millions of dollars each year on lobbying efforts in the US. Three prominent firms representing South Africa are: Basin and Sears for $500,000 a year plus expenses (i.e. John Sears); Smathers, Symington, and Herlong for $300,000 a year; and Kimberly Cameron Hallamore for $63,000. Plus, four of the so-called independent homelands retain at least five lobbyists (Washington Office on Africa, Autumn 1982). Two nongovernmental organizations from South Africa that enhance relations between the two countries are the South Africa Foundation with John Chettle as director and the US-Namibia (Southwest Africa) Trade and Cultural Council. Both are located in Washington, DC.

Although persons interviewed in the South African Embassy and UN Mission maintained that divestment campaigns have not directly harmed South Africa in any way, they admit that they keep a close watch over these activities and issue periodic reports on them. When asked why the government monitors the campaigns if they are not dangerous to its interests, an official responded that it was like playing baseball; a good
team would know its opponents well, wouldn't it?

South Africans have been sent to lobby against divestment legislation in several states, South African interests have paid Americans to lobby in their behalf, and South African Foundation officials have testified in hearings on some bills. The most recent South African lobbying efforts against the Massachusetts divestment bill received a great deal of press attention (Boston Globe, January 28 and 29, 1983). In 1980, the Foundation published an extensive report on US divestment activities, and there have been cases of South African agents infiltrating anti-apartheid groups.

South Africans in resistance to apartheid both inside the country and outside monitor the US movement closely. This is not as difficult as it might seem for those inside South Africa because the country's media gives special coverage to US anti-apartheid events. There even have been several stories on state divestment legislation in newspapers there. South Africans from inside and outside the country were interviewed for this research, and although all of them believe that the major dynamics for change in apartheid will come from within the country and region, they claim that they and others in opposition get an enormous boost in morale to know that US citizens have joined them in the struggle against apartheid. Those in the country express a feeling of the breakdown of their isolation when they learn of international anti-apartheid activities.

Even though they do not have the resources of the South African government, representatives of the ANC and SWAPO have actively promoted divestment campaigns in the US through speaking tours and testimonies in hearings in various legislatures. Activists have often called on them
and sponsored events for them to give their perspective on apartheid. Thus alongside the South African government's attempts to win friends in the US are the liberation movements' attempts to do the same.

The United Nations Response

The UN Centre Against Apartheid and Committee on Apartheid also monitor the US movement closely and aid it in several ways. The Centre publishes reports on anti-apartheid activities around the world and in the US and provides a great deal of information to activists. In addition, members of the Committee have hosted receptions for activists when they held conferences in New York City, and UN facilities have been used for such meetings, including the provision of space for press conferences at meetings. With this support the UN gives the US movement much-needed legitimacy.

Although all UN-related persons interviewed expressed appreciation for anti-apartheid efforts in the US, one respondent was less enthusiastic about NGO contributions to attempts to end apartheid. In the end, he believed, government actions matter most.

Conclusions

This chapter has given a context for analyzing and evaluating anti-apartheid campaigns targeted at state and local governments. These campaigns are a significant new thrust in an international and national movement that over a number of years attempted through a variety of means to increase the economic pressures on South Africa. As has been demonstrated, sanctions efforts are but a part of the entire spectrum
of anti-apartheid efforts, but they form a very important part, a part
to which opponents and proponents pay close attention.

The next two chapters will examine in-depth campaigns in the
states of Connecticut and Michigan in order to describe what happened,
to analyze why events happened as they did, and to assess the campaigns'
impact.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER III

1. Japanese corporations such as Nissan and Toyota get around this restriction by licensing South African wholly owned subsidiaries to manufacture their products.

2. See for other suggestions on US policy options: Danaher; Ferguson and Cotter; Study Commission; Crocker.

3. For further discussions of recent changes made in the apartheid structure see: de St. Jorre; Myers et al.; Saul and Gelb; and Study Commission.

4. According to the 1981 report, some corporations fit in more than one category.

5. Despite this legislation, US exports to South Africa increased 30 percent in 1979 over 1978 levels. But the legislation may be more important to American banks who use Exim guaranteed loans as part of their reserve requirements and are therefore able to increase the level of their loans (Christenson).
CHAPTER IV
THE CONNECTICUT CASE STUDY

On June 1, 1981, the Connecticut General Assembly gave final approval to the most far-reaching divestment legislation ever passed by any governmental body in the United States when the state Senate voted 25-10 in favor of House Bill 5740. The bill provided that no state funds were to be invested in corporations or banks doing business in South Africa. The House of Representatives had endorsed the legislation by a margin of 101 to 35. Despite such overwhelming legislative support for the act, Governor William A. O'Neill yielded to intense pressure from large businesses in Connecticut and vetoed the bill.

To demonstrate both some degree of sensitivity to particular segments of his party and his eagerness to be counted as an opponent to racism and apartheid, O'Neill appointed a task force to formulate investment legislation that he hoped would satisfy business, maintain sound investments, and placate anti-apartheid activists. The task force recommendations were adopted in their entirety by large majorities of both houses in the General Assembly in April 1982. Although it falls short of what the previous bill was intended to achieve, the activists' goal of full divestment, with the Governor's signature this legislation now stands as the most comprehensive state law on divestment in the country.

This chapter will analyze the history of anti-apartheid legislation in Connecticut, the implementation of these bills, the variables that contributed to their passage, and their impact.
Legislative History and Implementation

In four years the General Assembly has entertained five different bills on the state's investment in corporations doing business in South Africa. Three of these acts have passed the legislature and two have become law; two died in committee.

The first bill was introduced in 1979 by Representative Boyd Hinds, a white civil rights activist and legislator from Hartford. The Finance, Revenue and Bonding Committee held hearings on the legislation but never reported it out of committee. It is not surprising that divestment legislation was introduced in the Connecticut General Assembly at that time. For several years, especially in the aftermath of the 1976 Soweto riots, other institutions in the state had been targets of anti-apartheid divestment campaigns, and some of them had yielded to these pressures to varying degrees. At least four colleges and universities in the state had taken positions on the investment of their funds in South Africa related companies, and in 1979 Yale University decided to sell $1.5 million worth of J. P. Morgan and Co. bank stock because of its loans to the South African Government (Myers: 339-371). Corporations located in Connecticut had been under attack for their South African presence, and the Hartford City Council had begun facing the issue in 1978 as a result of efforts by a group known as City Workers Against Apartheid.

In addition to his state legislative work on South Africa, Hinds had been involved in a variety of other anti-apartheid activities. Operating from a civil rights organization in Hartford, he had submitted stockholder resolutions on South Africa to Connecticut businesses,
devoted energy to the Hartford City Council divestment campaign, and brought the question of the financial links between South Africa and state funds to the attention of Lieutenant Governor Killian. Killian, who was trying to win black and liberal support in a Democratic party primary campaign against Ella Grasso, advocated divestment in his campaign platform. The concept of disengagement from South Africa, therefore, was nothing new in the state, and for some like Rep. Hinds, it was a part of their on-going civil rights commitment.

Proximity to New York City is also a factor that makes Connecticut susceptible to activism on apartheid. A number of organizations devoted to fundamental change in South Africa are located in New York, and many anti-apartheid campaigns have been conducted there. Connecticut proponents of divestment have had easy access to the resources of these organizations (such as speakers, research, etc.) as have activists in other Northeastern states. In general, the Northeast has experienced a higher concentration of anti-apartheid activity than any other region of the country. Thus Hinds's legislative initiative in 1979 was an extension of similar proposals confronting other institutions in the same environment.

Unrelated to the introduction of Hinds's bill was the formation in August 1978 of the Connecticut Anti-Apartheid Committee (CAAC). Several recent college graduates who had been participants in anti-apartheid work on their campuses were eager to continue their previous efforts toward isolating South Africa. Spurred by a remark of Lt. Gov. Killion reported in the press that state pension funds were invested in companies operating in South Africa, the group began making plans to lay the
groundwork for legislative action. They wanted to build a broad, multi-racial coalition of support for such efforts among labor unions, churches, and community organizations. Unaware that Hinds's bill existed their work deliberately focused on educational and consciousness-raising activities about South Africa and the role of U.S. corporations there. These efforts were intended to show how people in the U.S. might express their solidarity with South African blacks and help achieve change in apartheid. Their goal over the next several years was to achieve complete withdrawal of all Connecticut state funds from corporations doing business in South Africa.

In the first year and a half the CAAC, with a nucleus of between six and ten people on their steering committee, was devoted to a wide range of educational and support-building activities: distributing fliers and pamphlets, getting endorsements from community leaders, showing films, sponsoring conferences and speaking engagements with black South Africans and Americans with expertise on Southern Africa, writing newspaper articles, holding social and cultural events focused on South Africa, doing research on Connecticut investments and the issue of sanctions against South Africa, and obtaining support and endorsements from organizations around the state. These activities were not randomly targeted throughout Connecticut but were specifically focused on organizations and networks where people in the CAAC already had contacts and credibility. Most of the CAAC steering committee have strong ties with labor unions, and some serve in leadership positions in their unions. Others are well known for their involvement in voluntary organizations.
Because this group was well connected with labor groups, community organizations, and churches, and because each person devoted a great deal of time to the work (two to three nights a week) (Buchanan; Hoffman, interviews), the Committee achieved impressive accomplishments by early 1980. Among the early endorsers of the CAAC calling for divestment legislation were the Connecticut State Labor Council, the Hartford Labor Council, Operation P.U.S.H. of Hartford, the Hartford NAACP, and a number of state representatives. Unions representing state employees whose pension fund investments were at stake also endorsed the campaign: the Connecticut State Federation of Teachers, the Connecticut Education Association, and District 1199 of the New England Health Care Employees (ACOA January 1982: 1). In addition, the CAAC had established three branch chapters in Hartford, New Haven, and Waterbury and was publishing a monthly newsletter with a mailing list of 500 people. Well publicized events such as speeches by black South Africans prominent in the resistance movement would draw 80-100 people from across the state (Buchanan; Hoffman). In addition, the CAAC would provide speakers or films for other groups interested in hearing more about South Africa. The Committee received some media coverage, especially when they brought in well-known speakers, and the group was responsible for a regular column on South Africa in the weekly Hartford Inquirer, the largest black newspaper in the state (ACOA January 1982: 2).

More about the nature of these educational and organization-building activities and the people conducting them will be covered later in this chapter. The foregoing description, however, should
serve to demonstrate that a significant amount of publicly visible activity was on-going, and the group was building a substantial amount of organizational support.

In early 1980, Representative William Dyson, a black school teacher from New Haven and a Democrat, introduced the second bill to insure "that no monies are invested in corporations doing business in South Africa" (Green: 2). The monies involved were primarily pension funds although some other minor investment funds do exist. Once again, the CAAC was unaware of Dyson's intentions to submit this bill. Although the Committee had attempted to hold a group discussion on divestment legislation with a number of legislators in October 1979 (cancelled due to a special legislative session called by Gov. Grasso on the day the meeting was to be held) (CAAC November 1979), it had no ties to Dyson at the time. He initiated the act without prompting from the Committee but with the support of the legislative Black Caucus.

The CAAC soon learned of the bill's existence, however, and although the group was unprepared at that point to launch a major lobbying effort in the General Assembly, members testified in support of the legislation when the Appropriations Committee held hearings. The bill met opposition in committee and in order to get it passed, Senator Sanford Cloud, a lawyer from Hartford, a Democrat, and the only black senator, amended it to include the Sullivan Principles -- to require divestment from all corporations doing business in South Africa "which have not adopted the Sullivan Principles" (Chapter 32, Title 3, Section 3-13f, Connecticut General Statutes). Dyson, who admits that he knew very little about the Sullivan Principles, their effectiveness,
or the controversy surrounding them, agreed to the amendment as a means for getting favorable committee recommendation. The CAAC was very disappointed with the revised bill. The group would have preferred to let it die in committee again and organize stronger backing for another attempt at full divestment the next year rather than set the precedent of adopting the Sullivan Principles as a criterion for investment. But momentum for the legislation was already established.

Another important actor in Connecticut's divestiture debate, Henry Parker, the State Treasurer and a prominent black politician, indicated his support for the bill as amended. The legislation passed the Senate with no apparent difficulty but met obstacles in the House. Dyson attempted to amend the act to remove the Sullivan Principles provision after discussions with the CAAC which convinced him that the Principles were ineffective and a bad precedent. His amendment failed. Other more conservative representatives wanted to apply the same standard of morality in investment decisions to other issues: the conflict in Northern Ireland and the seizure of American hostages in Iran. It is not clear whether these attempts at extending the concept of divestment were offered in good faith or were intended to so overload the bill that it would be defeated. The outcome, however, was that the bill was finally passed with the following amendment: the state Treasurer shall insure

that state funds are not invested in any corporation engaged in any form of business in Iran which could be considered to be contrary to the foreign policy or national interests of the United States, particularly in respect to the release of all American hostages held in Iran. (Section 3-13g, Title 3, Chapter 32, Connecticut General Statutes)
To implement this legislation the Treasury Department conducted research to discover which companies investing in South Africa had signed the Sullivan Principles. Officials discovered that the state owned stock in fourteen companies which they believed would be affected by the law. Letters were written to these companies indicating that their stocks or bonds would be sold unless they became Sullivan signers. The Treasurer wanted to use the legislation to urge companies to endorse the Principles rather than simply abandoning their stock immediately. Through correspondence the Department found out that three of the fourteen companies had become recent signatories, some had too few employees (less than ten) to qualify for the Sullivan Principles, and other held less than fifty percent ownership in the South African subsidiary and thus could not control its policies. Exceptions were made for corporations in these last two categories, and in the end, seven corporations' securities were sold (Van Meter). Table 4-1 illustrates the companies whose stocks were sold and the approximate amounts of funds involved. By waiting until the prices went higher than the original purchase prices, the state earned about $2 million from the sale (Jacklin, August 16, 1981). According to the 1980 Treasurer's Annual Report, the state is responsible for investing various funds whose total assets come to about $1.6 billion, but the percentage of the total pension fund affected by the implementation is unknown.

One company whose stock was divested sent a hostile response to the Treasurer's office. Dresser Industries, noted for its refusal to sign the Sullivan Principles and for its public relations campaigns justifying its South African investments, wrote a haughty and antagonistic
TABLE 4-1
Corporations Divested in Implementation of
1980 Sullivan Principles Legislation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company Name</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baxter Labs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dresser Industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMS International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubrizol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owens' Corning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pepsico</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teneco</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
letter. Ironically, Dresser was simultaneously applying to the Connecticut Development Authority for a loan to build a facility in the state, but the anger from neither party spilled over into the deliberations about the loan (Van Meter, interview).

Meanwhile in other arenas, the CAAC methodically continued its educational work and gathered more endorsements. The Committee also researched corporate involvement in South Africa, the extent of the state pension fund investment in these corporations, and the financial impact on the pension fund portfolio of selling the stocks and bonds of these companies. The information from this research was reported to legislators and was considered by the CAAC as fundamental to laying the groundwork for another attempt at comprehensive divestment in 1981. In June 1980, the Committee sponsored a dinner and guest speaker in commemoration of the June 1976 Soweto uprisings by black youth in South Africa. Dumisani Kumalo, an exiled South African black journalist, was the featured speaker. The CAAC used the occasion for fund-raising and building support for their 1981 legislative drive. Over 100 people from across the state attended (ACOA January 1982: 2).

In September 1980, at the invitation of Henry Parker, Rev. Leon Sullivan came to Connecticut, to the state where his Principles had become enshrined in law. The occasion was a Conference on Social Responsibility sponsored by the Treasury Department and held at Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, an investment agent for the state. The conference focused on two subjects: corporate social responsibility in minority recruitment in the United States; and South African
investments. Rev. Sullivan gave the keynote address for the sessions on South Africa (Governor's Task Force: 19).

Sullivan took the opportunity to preach a warning on U.S. investments in South Africa to the corporate managers, government officials, and academics gathered to hear him. He emphasized that not enough corporations had signed the Principles; (at that point 140 out of 350 U.S. companies with affiliates in South Africa had signed) (Lowery: Cl). He complained that the signatories were moving too slowly in their implementation, and he advocated no new or expanded investments and no bank loans to the South African government (Governor's Task Force: 19). Threatening to abandon the Principles in favor of total divestment, he shouted, "Let it be heard in corporate boardrooms in America that their affiliates in South Africa must either shape up or ship out" (Lowery: Cl).

Apparently Sullivan's reception was polite, somewhat cool, and even awkward at moments (Lowery: Cl). Some people present had expected more sympathy from him for a corporate perspective on the issue, and his overbearing, loud style offended some. Participants had not come to hear a preacher yell at them (Russell, interview). What the speech accomplished, however, was unmistakable clarity that even Sullivan himself felt the Principles were problematic. This gave confirmation to some of the critique of the Principles the CAAC had been making all along.

What the conference as a whole accomplished was to reinforce the legitimacy of using social criteria in addition to prudent financial criteria for investing state funds. Treasurer Parker had gone on record to affirm the 1980 legislation as "a first for state governments in
the country, (and) an important addition to Connecticut's public policy on investment" (Governor's Task Force: 19).

The next significant event in the history of Connecticut's anti-apartheid legislation was the introduction in January 1981 of two divestment bills. The acts were worded differently but were substantively the same. Both required the withdrawal of all state investments from corporations or banks doing business in South Africa. The addition of banks was different from the previous legislation in 1979 and 1980. The two bills' authors were Representative Dyson, who had become the chair of the legislative Black Caucus, and Representative Abraham Giles, a black representative from Hartford. Dyson's bill was referred to the Appropriations Committee and Giles's to the Finance, Revenue and Bonding Committee. Because there was a better chance of getting Giles's bill out of the Finance Committee, proponents concentrated on facilitating its passage and allowed the Dyson bill to eventually die in the Appropriations Committee. The text of Giles's legislation is shown in Table 4-2.

This time the CAAC was well prepared and ready to devote considerable energies to the passage of this legislation. The group's persistent educational efforts had paid off in the form of at least fifty individual and organizational endorsements (see Table 4-9, next section). The research efforts bore fruit when CAAC Chairperson Christy Hoffman was able to give sophisticated and reliable testimony on the effectiveness of the Sullivan Principles, the financial impact of divestiture on state investments, South African black support for corporate withdrawal, and the nature of U.S. companies' involvement in South Africa (Finance
Table 4-2

Legislation Introduced by Representative Giles

1981

House of Representatives, May 5, 1981. The Committee on Finance, Revenue & Bonding reported through Rep. Stolberg of the 93rd District, Chairman of the Committee on the part of the House, that the bill ought to pass.

AN ACT CONCERNING THE STATE INVESTMENT POLICY IN RELATION TO SOUTH AFRICA.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened:

Section 1. (NEW) The state treasurer shall review the invested assets of all state funds to ensure that no such assets are invested in: (1) Any financial institution asking loans to the republic of South Africa, a national corporation of the republic of South Africa or a subsidiary or affiliate of a United States company operating in the republic of South Africa or (2) any stock or obligations of any company doing business in or with the republic of South Africa. On or after the effective date of this act no such assets shall be invested in any such institution or any such stock or obligations and any such assets so invested on said date shall be disinvested within a reasonable period of time as determined by the state treasurer

Sec. 2. Section 3-13f of the general statutes is repealed.

Sec. 3. This act shall take effect from its passage.

Committee Vote: Yea 19 Nay 7

No one testified in opposition to the bill and throughout the legislative process, no organized opposition was apparent. Several lobbyists for business concerns say they knew about the legislation but were burdened by other priorities. Believing that its chances for passage were not very high, they decided to watch the bill but not work to oppose it. Other business lobbyists claimed that the act simply slipped by them unnoticed. In any case, at that point no one was coordinating business interests. In addition, both proponents and opponents recognized the emotionally charged atmosphere surrounding the bill. The debate was cast such that anyone opposing the act risked being perceived and labeled a racist. No business groups wanted to risk such a label even though some felt their best interests would be served if the bill were defeated.

The CAAC activists lobbied intensively for the bill in the last weeks prior to its passage. Two members of the CAAC steering committee, Christy Hoffman and Peggy Buchanan, spent every evening after work for about three weeks talking to legislators about the bill (Buchanan; Hoffman, interviews). Rep. Dyson personally introduced them to key leaders in both houses and gained access for them to people who were otherwise difficult to reach, especially in the last weeks of a legislative session. The two were able to provide information that many
legislators desired and were perceived as expert and persuasive. Every legislator interviewed remembered their presence and saw it as significant in the passage of the bill. Rep. Dyson and other Black Caucus members also lobbied for the bill among their colleagues.

In an action unrelated to the divestment debate Treasurer Parker lent credibility to proponents' arguments that pension fund investments could be earning higher returns if removed from the large corporations investing in South Africa and that, as a matter of principle, the funds ought to be invested insofar as possible within the state. He announced that $400 million worth of stock from pension funds' portfolios would be made available to finance mortgages in Connecticut. The CAAC activists pointed to this program as proof that profitable alternative investments could be found (ACOA, January 1982: 3).

Two objections which threatened the bill's adoption arose from within the legislature after the bill had come out of the Finance Committee and before it was passed. One was that the state might incur a loss of funds if forced to sell its fixed securities in the near future; the potential loss would be due to prevailing high interest rates. Therefore, an amendment was added to the bill by its author, Rep. Giles. It read: "provided that such disinvestment shall not force the state to incur a financial loss" (House, May 27, 1981: 20). The second objection was that the act was too comprehensive. It was to apply to investments in companies doing business in or with the Republic of South Africa. It would apply not only to companies with subsidiaries in South Africa but also those that trade with South Africa. Some legislators felt that it might even be interpreted to apply to companies whose
products were sold by a third party to South Africa. This was considered a serious definitional problem and an impossible provision to regulate. Giles proposed another amendment that simply removed the words "or with." This was intended to leave the act applying only to corporations doing business in South Africa (House, May 27, 1981: 20). Interestingly, no parallel amendment was offered to limit the legislation's very broad impact on the holdings of bank securities from banks that make loans "to the Republic of South Africa, a national corporation of the Republic of South Africa, or a subsidiary or affiliate of a United States company operating in the Republic of South Africa."

For some the definition as amended was still not clear enough, and it was to arise as a major difficulty later. But the bill was adopted 101 to 35 by the House and 25 to 10 in the Senate (House, May 27, 1981: 27; Senate, June 1, 1981: 340).

Once the act was passed the organized opposition began. Business leaders from major banks, insurance companies, industries, and law firms in Connecticut lobbied both the Treasurer and Governor in meetings that were undetected by the CAAC or legislative proponents. A list of businesses represented is shown in Table 4-11 in the following section. Persons interviewed who were present at these meetings were generally reluctant to admit that they were there and were hesitant to give the names of others present. There is still some hesitancy to be associated with the push for the veto. The delegation asserted a number of arguments against the legislation and in favor of a veto:

(1) foreign policy is the preserve of the federal government; the state should not be involved in making foreign policy;
(2) their businesses are good corporate citizens of the state and those that have investments in South Africa are signatories of the Sullivan Principles; this legislation would punish and stigmatize them along with the less conscientious businesses which are not involved in attempting to bring about what these men see as positive change for blacks in South Africa;

(3) the legislation was inconsistent with important sectors of opinion and policy with regard to South Africa -- for example, U.S. foreign policy, a recent Rockefeller Commission report (Study Commission), and Rev. Sullivan's organization;

(4) other responsible and palatable options for taking a stand against apartheid were available; furthermore, this group was willing to help search for such alternatives;

(5) the bill was too comprehensive, removing most of the large U.S. businesses from the portfolio and virtually all banks;

(6) the definition of "doing business in South Africa" was ambiguous, and therefore, the legislation was sloppy;

(7) the measure would likely have a negative impact on investment income and appropriate diversification of the investment portfolio;

(8) the act will create a bad business climate in Connecticut and discourage future investment; and

(9) the legislation was considered and passed in haste without due consideration for its impact on businesses in the state or the state's pension fund investments.

The validity of these arguments is mixed. The assertion about the ambiguity of defining "doing business in" is the most credible.
Connecticut law and U.S. law use the term "going business" in at least three different ways\(^3\) and thus some clarity was needed. The Treasurer would have had the authority to provide that clarity once the bill became law, but the business group was not willing to leave that responsibility to him. There is also some legitimacy in claiming that the impact of divestment could have a potential negative impact on the investment portfolio. The specific impact on Connecticut's pension funds was unknown. Although the CAAC had provided expert analysis from a pension investment study on divestment in California (Baldwin \textit{et al.}) and from an investments analyst to prove a benign if not positive effect, no official and definitive impact study had come from the Treasurer's office. Some officials seemed to think that divestiture would make little difference to the funds (Jacklin, August 16, 1981), but the lack of an authoritative analysis from those whose responsibility it was to invest the state's funds left reasonable doubts in some peoples' minds. These businessmen wanted to reinforce those doubts as much as possible.

The business group's argument regarding the haste with which the legislation was considered is not valid but only an indication that some business lobbyists were either caught off guard or did not want to enter into the legislative fray. The state's interference with foreign policy assertion is weak because essentially the state was regulating its own investment policy with the act. The other arguments are simply opinions which the business community predictably holds in a very contentious debate. The point of the legislation for the proponents was to lump all corporations which have subsidiaries in South Africa together, regardless of their position on the Sullivan Principles. The Principles
are useless for creating fundamental change in apartheid and serve only as a facade for businesses to hide behind, the proponents maintain. They believe that the most responsible option regarding state investments and apartheid is complete withdrawal of funds from businesses operating there. Therefore, the proponents disagreed with some segments of opinion regarding South Africa (i.e., U.S. foreign policy, Sullivan, and the Study Commission report), and they wanted the legislation to be as comprehensive as possible.

Despite the mixed validity of their arguments, the business group's pressure worked. Unwilling to make a public statement before the bill's passage, Treasurer Parker wrote a long letter to the Governor describing his meeting with opponents and indicating a list of options to pursue on the issue other than signing the divestment act into law (Table 4-3). Although his letter was couched in language indicating support for the concept of divestment, Parker's signal was unmistakable. As one of the leading black politicians in the state, he gave O'Neill plenty of room to veto.

Simultaneous and overlapping with the discussions between business leaders and O'Neill and Parker was another event which would affect the outcome of this entire political process. The event was the initial planning of an itinerary and agenda for a group of South African religious leaders being brought to the state by the Episcopal Diocese of Connecticut. Having witnessed the divestment debate in the state and being concerned about the issue of apartheid in general, decision makers in the Diocese decided to invite twelve South African Christians of all races to Connecticut to interact with church members and others
TABLE 4-3

List of Governmental Options From State Treasurer Parker's Letter to the Governor

-- Formulate a task force similar to one in California in order to consider appropriate, alternative, anti-apartheid action.

-- Review the possibility of new Connecticut legislation which would build upon our state's important Sullivan Principles bill, by requiring not only that corporations doing business in South Africa be signers of the Principles as a condition of investment, but also that they get a good rating in the audit conducted for Doctor Sullivan by the Arthur D. Little Company.

-- Review other possible legislative solutions, perhaps in harmony with the recommendations of the Study Commission on United States Policy Toward Southern Africa, which released its report this spring. That report opposes disinvestment but favors restricting expansion and new investment in South Africa.

-- Initiate a corporate campaign, led by Connecticut-based Sullivan signatories, to convince recalcitrant corporations in Connecticut and the country to sign the Sullivan Principles.

-- Review the possibility of adopting state policies aimed at making a positive contribution to the success of Zimbabwe, because the success -- or failure -- of this nation will have great bearing on the future of South Africa.
interested in South Africa. The purpose was not only to expose both black and white Americans to South Africans and apartheid but also to expose South Africans to Americans in a variety of settings and occupations. On the planning committee for the South Africans' visit were two persons who had been involved in discussions about the recent legislation with the Treasurer. One was Dr. Edythe Gaines, Commissioner for the Public Utilities Control Authority, a close personal friend of Henry Parker, and a prominent black leader in the state; the other was Isaac D. Russell, a lawyer and senior officer in Day, Berry and Howard, one of the largest law firms in Connecticut. While on a six months leave, Russell had worked in Johannesburg for the Urban Foundation, a white South African business organization formed after the Soweto riots in 1976; it attempts to upgrade the standard of living for certain segments of blacks.

With input from Gaines and Russell, the planning committee decided to hold a conference on "an appropriate response from Connecticut government and business to apartheid in South Africa" (Episcopal Diocese), and with the help of Parker they asked the Governor to co-sponsor it. In addition to the South African church leaders the conference would host governmental leaders, business leaders whose companies had investments in South Africa, and "other influentials" -- activists pushing the divestment legislation. The committee saw itself as providing "an arena in which ethical questions can be discussed separately from the pressures that logically come in the legislative process" (Cook, interview). What the conference also provided was an easy opportunity for O'Neill to demonstrate an interest in the issue in the
aftermath of the veto. Thus some who were advising the Governor to veto the bill were also helping to provide a cushion for the blow. They arranged the next step in a continuing examination of the relationship between state investments and apartheid.

The Governor vetoed the bill on July 1, 1981. His veto message maintained that the measure "is too sweeping in nature and does not provide the State of Connecticut with a positive step-by-step mechanism to achieve this goal." He stated that the legislation would "punish a number of state firms who have been engaged in meaningful actions to support the human rights of South Africans" through the Sullivan Principles which, he continued, "are minimum standards by which corporations should operate in South Africa regarding minority (sic) employment practices" (O'Neill). Other problems he cited were the definition of "doing business," the definition of "reasonable time" in which the Treasurer could implement the bill, and the potential of negative impact on investment returns.

The veto message carried a reference to Parker's letter and further pledged

to provide the leadership which will insure the necessary incentive to end apartheid and carry out the good intentions of House Bill No. 5740 in a more effective manner. The following will be done: 1. I will ask the corporations of the State doing business in South Africa to further explore appropriate actions to end apartheid; 2. A review will be made of current Connecticut legislation for the purpose of strengthening the "Sullivan Principles" concept; 3. A complete impact analysis of divestiture will be undertaken to determine the results which such action would have on the State pension investments (O'Neill).

The CAAC was completely caught off guard by the veto. Lobbying the Governor was something the Committee never considered necessary
to a successful campaign. Confident of the outcome, the members celebrated the legislative victory at their second annual Soweto commemoration dinner in June. Shortly after the veto, however, the group quickly mobilized a campaign to override it. Members wrote letters to legislators responding to each of O'Neill's objections; they wrote and provided information for newspaper articles; they were interviewed on radio; and the Committee held a press conference. A case study of the campaign published in a pamphlet by the American Committee on Africa describes the post-veto activity as follows:

At the press conference members of religious, civil rights, community and labor organizations spoke in favor of the bill. This was the broadest display of public support yet to come together and was considered very successful. Operation P.U.S.H. of Hartford and the Hartford Black Ministerial Alliance became particularly active at this time. Telephone calls and other lobbying were at their peak in terms of broad participation. The Committee argued that the Governor had shown himself to be easily influenced by business, (and) that the state was being governed through backroom deals.... (ACOA, January 1982: 4).

But the attempted override failed. After an emotionally charged debate, the House voted 81 to 61 to override. This was 20 votes short of the necessary two-thirds majority (House, July 20, 1981: 53). The CAAC and legislative proponents readied themselves for another round the next year.

The Episcopal Diocese held its conference on Connecticut governmental and business response to apartheid in October 1981. Present were eleven South African religious leaders. The twelfth, Bishop Desmond Tutu, an Anglican bishop and prominent African leader, was not allowed to come by the South African government. His passport had been revoked when he advocated corporate withdrawal from South Africa in a previous
trip outside the country. As stated earlier, representatives of the Treasurer's office, the legislature, businesses, and local churches were also present. It is not clear what the planners might have expected the South Africans to say in such a gathering, but what they said was not what business executives wanted to hear. They gave a stinging critique of the Sullivan Principles as irrelevant to meaningful change in South Africa (Cook; Hoffman, interviews) and although they refused to risk their own safety back home by commenting publicly on the divestment question, "they indicated a lack of enthusiasm for foreign investment in their nation.... They said foreign investment helps only a tiny percentage of the South African black work force" (Cohen). The participants in the one-day conference left with the understanding that this group of South Africans did not believe foreign investment in any form was helpful in their struggle against apartheid (Shapiro, interview). Therefore, the Governor had ended up cosponsoring a conference that placed in question his own position regarding state investment and South Africa.

To help carry out the tasks to which he had pledged himself in his veto message, O'Neill appointed a Task Force on South African Investment Policy in December. The charge to the Task Force was to review the State's current legislation with the objective of strengthening the Sullivan Principles' concept; work closely with businesses and corporations which do business in South Africa; and analyze the impact of divestiture on state pension funds (Governor's Task Force: 4).

Fourteen persons were named to the Task Force and Parker was asked to chair it. The distribution of members was as follows: two
corporation executives; two bank executives; two lawyers, one from an insurance company and one from a large law firm; two executives from investment firms; two representatives from labor unions; two legislators; and Edythe Gaines, a black political influential discussed earlier. Notably missing from the list are representatives of the CAAC, although the two labor union leaders were both members of CAAC, and one was its chair, Christy Hoffman. Five of the members were black, but none were there representing black community organizations such as Operation P.U.S.H. or the NAACP. The members' names and institutional affiliations are shown in Table 4-4. Note that many of the names are familiar ones in this story. O'Neill had received help in putting the Task Force together from at least Park and Cloud (Cloud). Although the group represented a diversity of opinions on the issue, the deck seemed to be stacked in favor of business; but, as will be explained later, there turned out to be no unanimity of opinion among business interests.

From February 25, 1982 to April 21, 1982, the Task Force accomplished a formidable and colossal assignment. Some Task Force members' estimates of their time devoted to meetings, consultations with allies outside the Task Force, phone calls, research, etc., range from a low of 50-60 hours to a high of 80-100 hours. The level of participation by almost all members was high and every member interviewed expressed surprise at the degree of commitment sustained across the two months. At first the question of time line and when the finished product was to be reported was unsettled. The Treasurer hinted that the work could go beyond the spring, past the closing of that year's legislative session in June. Several members, however, expressed their frustration at such
TABLE 4-4

The Governor's Task Force on South African Investment Policy

The Honorable Henry E. Parker
Task Force Chairman

Sanford Cloud, Jr., Esquire  Allan R. Nelson, Vice President
Counsel  Connecticut General Investment
Aetna Life & Casualty  Management Company
Hartford, Connecticut  Bloomfield, Connecticut

Christy L. Hoffman  Doctor Edythe J. Gaines, Commissioner
AFL – CIO  Public Utilities Control Authority
Waterbury, Connecticut  New Britain, Connecticut

The Honorable William R. Dyson  Dean J. Patenaude, Vice President
State Representative  Connecticut Mutual Insurance Co.,
New Haven, Connecticut  Hartford, Connecticut

John Russell  Isaac D. Russell, Esquire
United Auto Workers  Day, Berry and Howard
Waterbury, Connecticut  Hartford, Connecticut

Peter deWilde Shapiro, Vice President
The Connecticut Bank and Trust Company
Hartford, Connecticut
President - The Urban League of Greater Hartford, Inc.

The Honorable Abraham L. Giles  Frank Stanley, Senior Vice President
State Representative  Hartford National Bank and Trust Co.,
Hartford, Connecticut  Hartford, Connecticut

William W. Hamilton, Manager  Russell T. Semelsberger
International Communications  Vice President
General Electric Company  Otis Elevator Company
Fairfield, Connecticut  Farmington, Connecticut

At points during the proceedings, Jack Hughes substituted for Russell Semelsberger and Frank V. Donovan substituted for William Hamilton.
a suggestion and urged that the work be accomplished as quickly as possible. They wanted to try to submit a report, and if appropriate, attempt to get legislation passed in the current session.

The group began its work by holding an orientation session for a full day. The agenda covered the topics of an overview of South Africa and apartheid, the role of U.S. corporations doing business in South Africa, and the effectiveness of the Sullivan Principles. Persons addressing these topics were well known experts, and they brought a variety of perspectives to the discussion. Some were advocates of economic sanctions against South Africa and corporate withdrawal while others fully supported the Sullivan Principles approach. None were in favor of making investment decisions based on financial criteria alone (Governor's Task Force: 27).

Later in the deliberations the Task Force spent a half day hearing reports from consultants hired to study the impact complete divestiture would have on the state's portfolio. These reports provided an analysis of the most extreme policy the group could recommend. Anything short of complete withdrawal of investments from corporations in South Africa was assumed to have a less momentous effect on investment risk and return.

Three investment management consulting firms ran computer models comparing the current portfolio to two hypothetical portfolios: a so-called "sanitized" portfolio without corporations which have investments in South Africa and a "standard" portfolio designed to provide a control group of investments (using the Standard and Poor 500). The purpose was to measure the difference in degree of risk involved in each set of investments and the rates of return. A low-risk portfolio is considered
to be one in which holdings are diversified across a wide range of businesses or places for investment (e.g., auto industry, banks, electronics, oil, etc.) and across types of investment (e.g., stocks and bonds). Diversification means that the entire portfolio is not vulnerable to a possible negative trend that any one segment of the market might be experiencing at any given time.

With some slight differences, the three reports concluded with substantially the same results. They suggested that the "sanitized" portfolio would be less diversified than the other two, and thus potentially was more risky. One consultant noted, however, that the increased risk was not significant (Governor's Task Force: 41). The reports also agreed that there were slightly higher returns in the "sanitized" portfolio, although again, one firm said the differences were not significant.
The third common conclusion was that divestment would require withdrawal from the "larger, more financially stable companies," focusing the portfolio on "lower market capitalization (smaller) companies" (Governor's Task Force: 32). In recent years these companies typically have yielded higher returns but are generally considered to be potentially more risky investments. The findings of one study were summarized as follows:

In conclusion, the exclusion of the unacceptable companies from the mutual equity fund will not have any negative impact. In fact, the study has shown the "sanitized" portfolio to outperform both the original portfolio and the market (Governor's Task Force: 34).

A second, less positive analysis concluded:

Reducing the universe of stocks to non-trading corporations (corporations not invested in South Africa) substantially increases portfolio risk while potentially increasing returns. Possibly of greater importance is that it removes the larger, more financially stable companies as potential
alternatives for selection by the State's Investment Managers. This hindrance could have a substantial negative impact on the portfolio's future behavior (Governor's Task Force: 32; parentheses mine).

What the Task Force itself concluded from these reports was that using social criteria for investment decisions did not necessitate abandonment of prudent financial criteria or responsible fiduciary behavior.

Besides contracting with these consultants for their analyses of the impact of divestment, Parker solicited comments from seven investment advisors from the state's employees retirement plan whose firms are responsible for investing about one-half of the state's pension funds. The common conclusion of these seven reports was that complete divestment, in the words of one report, "would seriously restrict the universe of available equity investments for the Connecticut Employees Retirement Plans" (Governor's Task Force: 45). Two advisors noted, however, that their investment approach already emphasized smaller, less institutionally recognized companies and thus complete divestment would be less burdensome to them. Several mentioned a preference for the Sullivan Principles approach, and one advisor asserted that smaller companies should not be considered more socially responsible.

These smaller companies which do not currently have any connection with South Africa should not be given credit for their socially responsible actions because for the most part the only reason they do not deal in South Africa is their size and not any conscious decision on this social matter. As these companies grow and increase their markets, there is every reason to believe that they will do business in South Africa if it is profitable for them to do so. The proposed bill (i.e., full divestment) gives no credit to the companies that are acting in a socially responsible matter (sic) in their dealings with South Africa and favors companies who, because of their size or product line, have no current business in South Africa (Governor's Task Force: 48).
Therefore, although the consultants' formal studies on the whole suggested divestment would have no substantial negative impact on the portfolio, the investment managers were adamant in insisting that it would hinder their normal investment approaches and decisions.

The activity which consumed most of the Task Force efforts was negotiations over specific recommendations. A wide range of alternatives were considered, as shown in Table 4-5. The CAAC was primarily responsible for proposing option E, and Russell suggested D. The origin of the other alternatives is not known. From this list the group settled on an approach fairly quickly. The Sullivan Principles would be kept as a criterion for investment but other criteria would be added. This resolved the most fundamental question underlying the Task Force work -- whether or not the state would withdraw its investments from all corporations with South African operations. The response was no.

What remained was to decide on the rest of the criteria. This final chore proved to be the most contentious aspect of the group's work.

Basic to deciding on the criteria was the old problem of defining "doing business." Giles had attempted to take care of this difficulty in the legislature by amending his full divestment bill. His amendment had intended the definition to apply to companies with subsidiaries in South Africa. The Task Force followed the same basic sentiment when it settled on this meaning for the term: "conducted or performing manufacturing, assembly, or warehousing operations within the Republic of South Africa" (Governor's Task Force: 16). The sticky problem came when the group applied the definition to banks and financial institutions such as insurance companies (many of whom are based in Connecticut and
TABLE 4-5
Legislative Options Considered by the Task Force

A. Recommend that the State Legislature adopt a resolution condemning the practice of apartheid in South Africa and expressing its concern to the White House on current United States policy toward the government of that country.

B. Recommend that the State of Connecticut not purchase any goods or services from any United States corporation doing business in South Africa.

C. Draft legislation which would improve on the Sullivan Principles.

D. Draft legislation improving upon the Sullivan Principles and requiring social development expenditures.

E. Draft legislation keeping Sullivan Principles and requiring no sales to the military, plus the following:
   1. No sales of strategic materials to the government or its agencies;
   2. No discharging of employees for striking;
   3. No investment in homelands or growth points;
   4. Recognition of unions.

F. Support the existing bills but defining what "doing business in South Africa" means.

Source: Governor's Task Force: 8.
some of whom act as investment agents for the state). Would the state be required to cease investing in a bank that loaned money to a corporation "doing business" in South Africa? Would such a loan constitute the bank's "doing business" in South Africa? Because of the enormous administrative burden of enforcing a broad definition, the group decided to be more lenient with financial institutions by defining their doing business as "lending money to the Republic of South Africa or any agency or instrumentality thereof" (Governor's Task Force: 16). Russell, who offered the definition, knew that it would make the entire Task Force package much more palatable to the bank representatives, but at least one industry representative questioned this outcome. He believed the banks had bought their way out of the controversy while leaving the industrial sector to suffer (Donovan; Russell, interviews). Tempers flared and if there had previously been a united front among business interests, there was now a sizable crack in it.

A second major issue which caused a great deal of tension concerned a criterion of sales to the government, police and military in South Africa. The CAAC through Hoffman had proposed that all companies with sales to the government or military be disqualified from the portfolio. The two corporate executives whose companies, United Technologies Corporation and General Electric, have subsidiaries in South Africa practicing such sales objected vehemently to this idea. Except for the second labor representative, Fussell, Hoffman got no support for her proposal from the other members. Her fall-back position was to suggest no sales of "strategic" products or services to the government, police, or military with the term strategic defined as: "armaments, aircraft,
vehicles or computers, and spare parts and services with respect there­to." In order to clarify the definition in a manner acceptable to the corporate representatives, William Hamilton amended the definition with the phrase: "as defined in the Export Administration act and also as defined by the joint actions of the U.S. Departments of State and Commerce" (Donovan; Russell, interviews).

The Export Administration Act was passed in 1978 under the Carter Administration as a means of compliance with the 1977 United Nations Security Council Resolution 418 banning the export of military equipment to South Africa. The United States voted in favor of Resolution 418 and it is binding on all U.N. members. Under Carter the Export Administration Act prohibited the exports of all goods and technology to the South African military and police, but under the Reagan administration, in March 1982, the prohibition was altered significantly "to allow sales of various kinds of electronic equipment, computers, clothing and medical goods to South African government entities, including the military and police" ("The Scope...": 9). Being close monitors of U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa, both Hamilton and Hoffman knew of this very recent change in regulation. Because it now allowed a wider range of products to be sold to the South African government, Hamilton proposed it for use by the Task Force. For the same reason Hoffman rejected it. Now knowing specifically what the Export Administration Act entailed, the remainder of the committee was reluctant to approve Hamilton's amendment.

Another amendment was suggested by Jack Hughes, a UTC representative. He suggested that the group use the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR: U.S, Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter 22, Part 121)
to define their recommendation. This regulation authorizes the president to exercise control over exports to all countries of arms, ammunition, and implements of war listed in the provision. Whereas for purposes of the U.S. government ITAR applies to exports, the Task Force would be suggesting its use under Connecticut law as a standard to apply against subsidiaries of U.S. corporations in South Africa. After seeing copies of ITAR the group was willing to accept it as a definition of arms with the added clause "and data processing equipment and computers sold for military or policy use or for use in connection with the pass system" (Governor's Task Force: 16). Because subsidiaries of U.S.-based computer firms (e.g., IBM, Control Data) supply a great deal of computer equipment to the police and military in South Africa (unhampered by the ITAR provision) and because these sales have been repeatedly criticized by anti-apartheid activists, Hoffman and Fussell wanted to ensure these companies would be excluded from the portfolio.

The debate over the definition of strategic was especially virulent and threatened to cause the demise of the whole effort. During those particular meetings the industry representatives almost resigned from the Task Force, and the reluctant CAAC persons had to be coaxed by Parker and Cloud to accept the final compromise (Table 4-6) as the best attainable solution (Donovan; Hoffman; Russell, interviews). The underlying issue at stake was, of course, whether or not the state would be able to invest in the largest employer in the state, UTC, and another major corporation headquartered in Connecticut, GE. The intention of the CAAC was to get as many South Africa-related companies as possible excluded from the portfolio, including any Connecticut-based corporations,
TABLE 4-6
Task Force Recommendations

STANDARD I
That the State Treasurer disinvest from those corporations doing business in South Africa which have not obtained a performance rating in the top two categories of the Sullivan Principles rating system prepared by the Arthur D. Little Company.

STANDARD II
That the State Treasurer disinvest from those corporations doing business in South Africa which supply strategic products or services for use by the government or for use by the military or police in South Africa.

STANDARD III
That the State Treasurer disinvest from those corporations doing business in South Africa which fail to recognize the right of all South African employees to organize and strike in support of economic or social objectives, free from the fear of dismissal or blacklisting.

ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
A. That the State Treasurer, in administering a law inclusive of these recommendations, may require a social audit of corporations doing business in South Africa.

B. That the State Treasurer consult with the Investment Advisory Council in developing, interpreting and administering any policy relating to these standards.

DEFINITIONS
"doing business in South Africa"
Conducting or performing manufacturing, assembly, or warehousing operations within the Republic of South Africa or, if a bank or other financial institution, lending money to the Republic of South Africa or any agency of instrumentality thereof.

"strategic products and services"
Articles designated as arms, ammunition and implements of war as described in 22 C.F.R. - 121, (U.S. Code of Federal Regulations) (See Appendix V) and data processing equipment and computers sold for military or policy use or for use in connection with the pass system.

Source: Governor's Task Force: 3 and 16.
but the UTC and GE representatives were not going to idly witness the state's implicit condemnation of their operations. In the end, Hoffman and Fussell agreed to forfeit the inclusion of UTC and GE in order to save the possibility of reaching a final product -- a rather broad set of divestment criteria applicable to a number of other corporations and banks.

A third major area of contention was what the Task Force would report as its conclusion from the divestiture impact study report. Parker wanted the Task Force to interpret the various pieces of advice it had received as solidly asserting that total divestment would be financially unsound. He also wanted some affirmation of the Sullivan Principles approach. Hoffman objected and maintained her stance in several hours of debate (Hoffman, interview). In the end, the Task Force report stated the opinions of the consultants and advisors in a straightforward fashion without taking a position on their findings. Similarly, it describes the opposing viewpoints on the Sullivan Principles.

After these two intense and at times rancorous months of work, the Task Force submitted to the Governor an 81-page report of its activities with its unanimous recommendations which are shown in Table 4-6.

Meanwhile in the legislature, Representative Stolberg, Co-Chair of the Finance Committee, had a bill ready and waiting to be amended with the Task Force proposals. The bill was a repeat of the previous year's legislation, and although there had been hearings (with a number of the CAAC members testifying again and business interests bringing their first testimony on the issue), no one was convinced that the act would pass as it stood. With the Task Force recommendations, however, the
legislation, House Bill 5975, was passed by overwhelming majorities
in both houses and signed by the Governor. The bill is shown in
Appendix C.

At the time of this writing the Treasurer's office is in the process
of studying the implications of the recent action taken. One summer
intern had been hired and a Treasury Department staff person had been
assigned a full-time task of researching which companies' stocks and
bonds will need to be sold and how it might be done must prudently. At
this preliminary stage no one in the Department can say exactly what the
outcome will be, but others have begun speculating.

One investment manager on the Task Force believes that the new law
will go little beyond the 1980 Sullivan Principles act. He asserts
that substantially less than half the approximately $220 million in
the portfolio currently invested in corporations doing business in
South Africa will be affected. The CAAC estimates of the amount
affected run from $70 million (CAAC, May/June 1982: 1) to $100 million
(Kauffman, 1982: 3). The corporations which the CAAC expects to be
eliminated from the portfolio under the first standard (i.e., rated in
the first two categories of the Sullivan Principles) are: Dow Chemical,
Union Carbide, TRW, Westinghouse, and American Express. The group
asserts that under the second criterion (no strategic sales to military,
police or government) Ford, General Motors, IBM and Control Data secur-
ities should be sold. The third standard (recognition of the right to
strike without fear of dismissal) needs further research before the
Committee will know its effect. Bank stocks which are expected to be
dropped from the portfolio because of their loans to the government of South Africa are from Citibank, J. P. Morgan, and Bank America (CAAC, May/June 1982: 1-2).

Some interpretation of the law will be required, and officials in the Department admit there are a number of companies which fall into a gray area where there is some ambiguity about their qualification under the three criteria (Van Meter, interview). For example, if a bank makes a loan to the South African government for housing, such monies may simply provide the flexibility for diverting other government resources to meet military needs. Technically the loan is for housing, but in effect it contributes to enlarging the pool of funds from which the regime may draw for any of its needs. Under the law the bank stocks would probably be allowed but such an investment would seem to have potential for violating the spirit of the enactment.

Another example of the need for interpretation would be on the issue of firing striking workers. If a company has fired such workers in the past but promises not to do it in the future, should Connecticut keep or sell its stock? As was the attitude in implementing the 1980 legislation, Parker wants to use the 1982 law to encourage business to abide by the three standards. He is willing to act with patience and negotiate with a company about its practices before withdrawing the state's investment (Parker, interview). Apparently the benefit of the doubt will favor the corporation, but Parker also says that he has "the spirit and determination to carry out the letter of the law" (Kauffman, 1982: 10).

Already discrepancies with regard to interpretation are arising between the CAAC analysis of which stock should be sold and a preliminary
list from treasurers of corporations whose securities are likely to be kept (VanMeter, interview). A few companies potentially in dispute are: American Express, Citicorp, Dow Chemical, and Union Carbide. The implementation could prove to be as contentious an issue as was the process of coming to agreement on the state's policy.

The history of the political process on the question of state investments and apartheid demonstrates that three different policy outcomes were achieved in three years: a partial divestment law using the Sullivan Principles, a vetoed full divestment bill, and a second partial divestment law designed to strengthen the first. The story of how Connecticut addresses the issue will continue to unfold, but at this point it is important to analyze why these outcomes occurred. What factors are responsible for the passage of the various pieces of legislation, the veto of the 1981 act, and the formulation of the Task Force recommendations? The next section of this chapter will examine this question.

Why These Outcomes

To help structure the analysis of why divestment legislation succeeded in varying degrees in Connecticut, the "shopping list" of variables introduced in chapter one (Table 1-2) will be used. The variables have served as clues for investigation rather than as precise indicators in this exploratory study. As in chapter one they are divided into two categories: the inner environment, the sphere of potential direct control by the organizations involved in the campaign; and the outer environment, everything else relevant to the campaign. The campaign leading up to the passage of the 1981 full divestment bill, the Governor's veto, and activists' post-veto efforts will be investigated
in some depth using the variables. A less structured approach will be taken in analyzing the task force negotiations which are not considered to be a campaign on the part of the activists. The passage of the 1980 bill will be examined only briefly since there was no campaign organized to promote it either.

The 1980 legislation containing the Sullivan Principles lays the foundation and sets a precedent for future governmental action on apartheid, but its passage is the result primarily of the efforts of a few black legislators backed by the legislative Black Caucus. Because the bill was amended in committee to include the Sullivan Principles, it met virtually no opposition. It represented a moral and symbolic stand the legislature could take with little or no cost attached. Although many felt it was the right thing to do, the law was something the rest of the legislators could "give" to the Black Caucus in a routine political exchange. The CAAC had testified on the bill and urged its passage, but the group had not mobilized its supporters or lobbied on behalf of the measure. The bill passed with little notice and by itself does not provide a very interesting study of legislative processes.


In contrast, the 1981 full divestment bill was the object of a long campaign and fascinating process. To establish why the campaign got as far as it did, it is important to understand where it was intended to go -- that is, its goals. The campaign goals are listed in Table 4-7. They have been discerned through interviews with proponents in the CAAC steering committee and the Black Caucus and from a list of goals published by the CAAC as its aims for 1980.5
TABLE 4-7

Connecticut
Proponents' Campaign Goals

**Short-term**

1. For proponents to express solidarity with the struggle of blacks and others in South Africa resisting apartheid;

2. For proponents to take a principled stand against apartheid and U.S. corporate investment in South Africa;

3. For proponents to draw attention to the issues of apartheid and U.S. corporate involvement in South Africa;

4. To continue support for the Patriotic Front (of Zimbabwe) and SWAPO (of Namibia) through educational work (articles, newsletters, etc.) and, if necessary, with other actions; (for proponents to do this)

5. To show support for anti-racist actions here in the US whenever possible; (for proponents to do this)

**Medium-term**

6. For the state to take a principled stand against apartheid and U.S. corporate investment in South Africa;

7. For proponents to achieve complete withdrawal of state investments from corporations with investments in South Africa and from banks making loans to the South African government or its parastatals;

8. For the state to express solidarity with the struggle of blacks and others in South Africa resisting apartheid through divestment of its pension funds;

9. For the combined actions of the national anti-apartheid movement to constrain any further U.S. government or corporations' cooperation with and support of the South African government;

**Long-term**

10. For proponents and the state to contribute to the ending of apartheid;

11. For proponents and the state to contribute to the world-wide anti-apartheid movement's efforts to completely isolate South Africa economically;

12. For proponents to raise the consciousness of working and middle class people in Connecticut about the structure and behavior of multinational corporations with regard to:
   a. their support for apartheid;
   b. U.S. government facilitation and defense of their operations;
   c. the similarities of anti-corporate struggles in the U.S. and abroad, especially in South Africa.
All participants and proponents in the campaign are not agreed on all the goals they seek. Everyone emphasizes that the issue of apartheid is the focal point of their work, and there is no disagreement about the goals having to do directly with apartheid or U.S. investments in South Africa (i.e., numbers one through eleven). There is disagreement, however, about goal twelve because in it apartheid and U.S. investment in South Africa become vehicles for raising larger questions about the structure and organization of the United States and South African economies as well as the world economy. Some proponents, especially those in the labor unions, see goal twelve to be as important as one through eleven. The analysis underlying it provides a framework through which to view their entire effort. Other proponents, especially those in the legislature and community organizations, regard ten as secondary to their central concerns (embodied in one through eleven). This disagreement over goals is essentially an ideological conflict that the CAAC has deliberately subdued in the interest of pursuing a broad coalition of supporters (as discussed in the previous section).

The goals in Table 4-7 have been structured into categories of short-, medium-, and long-term to try to take into account variation in the time needed to attain them. A time dimension is crucial to judging effectiveness since some goals are intended for quick achievement whereas others remain a life-time vision. For purposes of this study, short-term is considered to be less than a year, medium-term one to two years, and long-term three or more years. The goals in Table 4-7 are identified with proponents, the state, or the US national anti-apartheid movement. Proponents hold and advocate all these aims, but
they hope to accomplish some themselves and others they also want to have the state or the total movement accomplish.

In the context of the discussion of goals in chapter one, proponents' goals for the state require substantial change in Connecticut's investment policies. As suggested in the first chapter, the assertion of social movement literature generally is that groups seeking greater degrees of change have less likelihood of achieving their desired outcomes, whereas those seeking lesser change have a better chance at succeeding. Therefore, from the beginning the CAAC faced a big challenge.

The short- and medium-term goals feed into the long-term goals and, together with strategies and tactics chosen, these nearer objectives provide a route by which proponents hope eventually to achieve the most distant aims. As was discussed in chapter two, the combination of these means and desired ends is the theory of action (Patton) for the campaign. The theory of action for the 1981 campaign is shown in Figure 4-1. Numbers in the figure correspond to the goals listed in the table.

Part of the process in a goals-based evaluation is to discern whether or not the activists have a logical theory of action. Could one reasonably expect that what the proponents want to accomplish can be accomplished through the route they have proposed? Does any sequence in the theory require a leap of faith rather than a rational understanding of the issues? Judging the logic of any proposed strategy for political change is difficult, and outcomes are not predictable with
FIGURE 4-1

CAAC Theory of Action

- Holding educational & cultural events
- Monthly newsletters
- Newspaper columns
- Letters to the editor
- Press conferences
- Demonstrations
- Leafletting
- Speaking at other organizations' meetings
- Endorsement of other organizations
- Anti-racist work
- Discussing issue with leadership in other organizations & soliciting their support

- Public attention
  - Media attention
  - Legislators & other gov't officials building awareness of the issue
    - Legislation becomes law & is implemented
    - Pressure on legislators
    - Pressure on media & public

- Education; more serious study
  - Endorsements and coalition building

- Recognition of people expressing a moral preference & solidarity

- Lobbying, negotiating in legislature; research

Additional actions:

- Other divestment & sanctions campaigns across the US & worldwide
- Internal dynamics & pressures on apartheid
- Corporate withdrawal from SA & imposition of sanctions against SA
- Destabilization of the SA regime
- The end of apartheid
high degrees of accuracy. Using the best evidence available, however, the logic and rationality of a theory of action can be tested.

This evaluation will begin with the last segment of the CAAC theory of action, the destabilization of the South African regime through sanctions. Many in the general anti-apartheid movement assert that the imposition of economic sanctions on South Africa and corporations' withdrawal of their investments is one means for speeding an end to apartheid. Although sanctions and corporate withdrawal are not the only factors which the movement believes will bring down apartheid, they can be an important complement to resistance efforts inside the country. This working assumption and the nature of U.S. corporate investments in South Africa have been discussed and analyzed in chapter three. The CAAC operates out of this same understanding of the issue and its theory of action reflects its attempt to contribute to the wider pressures for sanctions. No segment of the movement is isolated and participants believe their efforts combine to create a powerful force.

In applying the discussion of the divestment debate in chapter III we can suggest that the CAAC theory of action is a mixture of rationality and faith. The theory has the best chance of holding if sanctions were imposed by all nations' governments. Anything short of comprehensive international enforcement preventing trade and investment in South Africa leads to less confidence in the theory, and activists understand this. They have always maintained that their movement must be international to be effective, and INGOs exist to try to coordinate efforts across national boundaries. The activists in Connecticut believe that
their work will aid the entire movement's pressures toward sanctions and that these smaller contributions will accumulate to be large forces.

Targeting institutional investors to achieve enough pressure on companies to cause their withdrawal from South Africa is a strategy chosen by anti-apartheid activists to maximize the leverage exerted on the corporations. Since institutional investors hold more stocks and bonds than individual investors, and since they are more accessible to activists than the corporations themselves, the choice makes good sense. However, pressures and hassles from stockholders are peripheral to the factors that lead a company to make international investment decisions -- that is unless the pressures are great enough to cause the corporation financial harm in some form. There is potential for such a cumulation depending on the number and size of activists' campaigns. Should that potential be realized, one could expect serious consideration of withdrawal from South Africa by corporate executives.

The first parts of the CAAC theory of action, the process of getting a state legislature to pass a bill, are easier to assess. The strategies and tactics are standard procedures commonly believed to aid in producing a desired legislative outcome and draw public attention to an issue. These are not the only strategies available, but they are logical and rational ones.

The early sequences in the theory of action, therefore, are the most dependable ones. The later sequences are not only more difficult to judge, but they are also more reliant on a combination and accumulation of pressures from arenas completely outside the influence of the
CAAC members. That such pressures will accumulate is a matter of activists' faith in the total movement.

Another "shopping list" of variables to be considered as significant in facilitating or hindering the campaign is the arena targeted. In this case, the arena probably helped activists' efforts instead of going directly to the companies which invest in South Africa to pressure them to withdraw, or to the Treasury Department to convince officials there of the need for divestment, the activist chose a more accessible forum -- the legislature. Being a large public arena with a responsibility to pay some attention to citizens' concerns, the legislature provided easier entrée for the CAAC. The group knew several legislators who were already sympathetic and they hoped to convince more.

Time was also on their side. Since late 1978 the Committee had been organizing for a mobilization of effort by a large number of people. Members had not been willing or ready to attempt such a mobilization in early 1980 when the Sullivan Principles bill was being considered. But by early 1981 they were prepared and a few legislators were still interested in pursuing full divestment with them. In addition, by 1981, the issue was no longer new to the legislature and few legislators were unaware of or caught off-guard by the activists' interest in pursuing the issue; nor did they seem to be, however, at a saturation point in terms of tolerating the issue being raised again. Therefore, timing seemed to facilitate the campaign.

As was suggested earlier, that the Connecticut legislature was targeted for such a campaign should be no surprise. It is a logical arena into which to carry a question that was being promoted in other
institutions nearby, and its receptivity had already been demonstrated. Other contextual elements need to be noted as well. During this debate and for over half of the last twenty years the Democratic party controlled both houses of the General Assembly and the governorship (Jewell and Olson: 34). Within the General Assembly in 1981 there were three black senators (out of thirty-six) and seven black representatives (out of 151), and the State Treasurer, an elected official, is also black.

The number and proportion of black legislators is not high, but one could assume that among the ten there would be some sympathy for full divestment. The state work force is heavily unionized, and activists report that there are a number of groups in Connecticut working on a wide range of social issues which might be considered liberal or leftist. The networks among these organizations seem to be fairly good in that there is overlapping leadership in some cases and deliberate attempts to maintain good communications across groups. Since Connecticut is geographically a small state, state-wide organization and mobilization for activists' causes is easier.

All of these factors would seemingly characterize Connecticut as being fertile ground for a legislative divestment campaign. Any conclusion about the state's positive propensity to accept such legislation, however, should be tempered with an acknowledgement of the importance of business interests to the state, especially in the southern part near New York City. A number of large corporations, many of them multi-nationals, are headquartered in Connecticut. Table 4-8 illustrates which of these companies have investments in South Africa, and one can easily assume they are hostile to the concept of withdrawing their
TABLE 4-8
Connecticut Businesses with Investments in South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>PRODUCT(sold to/in South Africa)</th>
<th>SULLIVAN SIGNATORY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Express International Corp., Stamford</td>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>Air freight</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chesebrough-Pond's Inc., Greenwich</td>
<td>Manufacturing/sales</td>
<td>Cosmetics</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Echlin Manufacturing Co., Branford</td>
<td>Manufacturing/sales</td>
<td>Automotive parts</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Electric Co., Fairfield</td>
<td>Manufacturing/sales</td>
<td>Locomotives, appliances</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grolier Inc., Danbury</td>
<td>Marketing</td>
<td>Educational &amp; reference materials</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heublein International, Farmington</td>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>Kentucky Fried Chicken</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Playtex Inc., Stamford</td>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>Women's undergarments</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loctite Corp., Newington</td>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>Adhesives, chemicals</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olin Corp., Stamford</td>
<td>Manufacturing/sales</td>
<td>Swimming pool chemicals</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perkin-Elmer Corp., Norwalk</td>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>Sophisticated measuring devices</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richardson-Vicks Inc., Wilton</td>
<td>Manufacturing/sales</td>
<td>Drug products</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remington Products Inc., Bridgeport</td>
<td>Distributor</td>
<td>Shavers &amp; accessories</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Stanley Works, New Britain</td>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>Handtools</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stauffer Chemical Co., Westport</td>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>Agricultural chemicals</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texasgulf Inc., Stamford</td>
<td>Exploration</td>
<td>Gold, platinum, chrome</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Carbide Corp., Danbury</td>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>Chrome, vanadium</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniroyal Inc., Middlebury</td>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>Tires</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Technologies Corp., Hartford</td>
<td>Manufacturing/sales</td>
<td>Elevators</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xerox Corp., Stamford</td>
<td>Sales/service</td>
<td>Photocopying equipment</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

investments. Therefore, whereas a lot of contextual factors in Connecticut should help the CAAC achieve its goal, some others would hinder it.

Strength: The 1981 Campaign

One of the major inner environment variables which should affect the outcome of a campaign is its strength. Strength is actually a multifaceted and complex set of variables which deserves thorough examination. The CAAC was able to develop a great deal of strength in many areas as it entered and conducted its 1981 campaign. One of those was a very broad coalition of endorsers and supporters outside the legislative arena. Table 4-9 lists these endorsements.

As was stated previously, the CAAC began soliciting support in late 1978. Members would attend other organizations' meetings, discuss the issue of apartheid and U.S. corporate involvement in South Africa, and request endorsements. They also held their own events often featuring well-known speakers or entertainers from South Africa (e.g., Dumasani Kumalo, an exiled journalist; Tozamile Botha, an exiled black labor and community organizer; Jennifer Davis, an exiled white economist and Executive Director of the American Committee on Africa). The events always focused on apartheid and the U.S. connection to it, but they also were designed to encourage people to socialize with one another, have fun, and enjoy each others' company. These events were usually cosponsored by union, community, or university organizations (e.g., UAW, Region 9A; International Students' Association, University of Hartford; Operation P.U.S.H.). The events paid for themselves and even helped to raise funds. The Committee operated all its activities on a budget of about $1500 per year (Buchanan, interview).
TABLE 4-9

CAAC Endorsements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labor Organizations</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J. Brown, President, New England Health Care Workers Union, District 1199</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hank Murray, Educational Director, UAW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Wilhelm, Secretary-Treasurer, Local 217, Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut State Labor Council (AFL-CIO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Hartford Labor Council (AFL-CIO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meriden Labor Council (AFL-CIO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterbury Labor Council (AFL-CIO)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>New Haven Labor Council (AFL-CIO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bristol Labor Council (AFL-CIO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartford Area Coalition of Labor Union Women (CLAW)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Haven Federation of Teachers, Local 933</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut State Federation of Teachers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Workers Liberation League</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFSCME Local 1716</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Association of Machinists, District 91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Farmworkers Support Committee, New Haven</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican Socialist Party, Hartford</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Representative Thirman Milner</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Church Organizations</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter-Denominational Ministers Alliance, Hartford</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>North United Methodist Church, Hartford</td>
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<tr>
<td>American Friends Service Committee, Connecticut</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Black Organizations</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afro-American Cultural Center, New Haven</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hartford NAACP</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>National Council of Negro Women, Hartford</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Harriet Tubman Club</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anti-Apartheid Organizations</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City Workers Against Apartheid, Hartford</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visiting Nurses Association, Anti-Apartheid Committee, Hartford</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Others</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US Representative Toby Moffett</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor George Athanson, Hartford</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Representative Boyd Hinds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee of 24, Hartford</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croswell Arrien Council, Waterbury</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vieques Support Committee, Hartford</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Haven People's Center</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Peace Center, New Haven</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearl Street Community House, Waterbury</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Del Vecchio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edwin Vargas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartford Peace Coalition</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hartford Chile Solidarity Committee</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Coalition for a Just Society</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homefront, Hartford</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Farmworkers Support Committee, New Haven</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Haven Puerto Rican Solidarity Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican Socialist Party, Hartford</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rudy Arnold, City Councilman, Hartford</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Representative Thirman Milner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Guardians of the Hartford Police Department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut Education Association</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Gaining access to a wide range of organizations and their meetings was not difficult for the CAAC. Most of the core group (about six to ten) people are active in and hold leadership positions in other organizations. For example, two persons mentioned earlier, Christy Hoffman and Peggy Buchanan, both are well connected in other groups. Hoffman, twenty-seven, is a machinist in a Pratt-Whitney (United Technologies) jet engine factory and is the Steering Committee chairperson in the plant's local International Association of Machinists. Buchanan, twenty-eight, is a Connecticut state employee doing training workshops for other state employees; she is also in leadership in the Connecticut State Federation of Teachers (a public employee union) and works closely with other activists groups, one focused on feminism and another on El Salvador. The CAAC nucleus is composed of other persons similarly well known for their involvement in community organizations in Connecticut. Thus to promote their educational efforts and to gain support for the campaign, the CAAC called on their acquaintances in these various networks.

Another factor which aided in achieving endorsements was the single issue focus of the campaign. The Committee was very deliberate in not allowing its work to branch out into other issues or even other aspects of the issue of racism. Although the question of broadening their focus was discussed several times, the group decided to resist it. Other organizations were already working on some of those other issues which were enticing to the CAAC members, and they felt that the divestment campaign alone was plenty to handle. The Committee also was determined not to fall prey to sectarian in-fighting among themselves,
a problem which characterizes some leftist groups. The nucleus of the CAAC was not all of one ideological persuasion, and most felt that achieving a successful campaign necessitated appealing to a wide range of people of varying political perspectives. If you were committed to the withdrawal of U.S. corporations from South Africa, you were welcome in the group. This single-issue ideologically open policy cost the group a few of its workers who wanted to promote a broader issue and more narrow ideology; but it helped to gain the Committee a wide range of participants devoted to its principal goal (Buchanan; Hoffman, interviews).

To maintain its network of supporters the CAAC kept frequent communications with them. The Committee distributed fliers with the names of endorsing organizations and supportive statements from many of their leaders. Educational materials were also disbursed, and a newsletter was sent out monthly to a list of names which by 1981 had 500 names on it. The four-page newsletter carried articles on events in Southern Africa, anti-apartheid activities across the United States, and Committee activities and announcements. The newsletter as well as special mailings were used to alert supporters of legislative committee hearings and upcoming votes in committees or in the House or Senate. Press conferences and statehouse rallies were also held at critical junctures in the campaign. Appendix E contains examples of the CAAC newsletter, press releases, and educational materials.

The Committee had a number of good vehicles for communications, an outstanding network of contacts, and some very articulate spokespersons. However, to sustain campaign momentum across three years required more
than good means of communications; it also required a convincing mes-
sage. What could the CAAC tell people to persuade them that they should
care about the exploitation of black people in a country half-way around
the world? This question of relevance was one of the most difficult
tasks the group faced (Hoffman 1981).

The argument about U.S. corporations' support for apartheid through
their presence in South Africa and through the products they provide to
the government and the economy in general are familiar ones in the
anti-apartheid movement. The CAAC asserted that the state workers' pen-
sion funds should not be benefiting from investments earned through a
racist system; that citizens could both demonstrate solidarity with
South African blacks and contribute to changing apartheid by demanding
divestiture of those pension funds. This argument was not sufficient,
however, and the Committee took it further. They brought it home. As
Hoffman (1981) put it:

It's important, we found, to draw connections between what
is going on in South Africa and what is going on in the
U.S.... It's important to draw the connections between the
fact that Uniroyal in Naugatuck, Connecticut has closed down
its plants, and Uniroyal in Naugatuck, Connecticut has also
invested in the Bantustans of South Africa; that Olin has had
a very long and bitter strike with its workers in New Haven,
Connecticut and it is selling guns to South Africa; and that
banks are redlining our communities and are making loans
to South Africa.... These connections have been very impor-
tant for us to draw for the people we are reaching out to....

Asserting that workers and people in general in Connecticut had
something in common with South African blacks and that they all had
reason to be angry at the same companies was a convincing message,
especially to unions. The strength of the message combined with the
strength of means of conveying it mobilized a lot of organizations to add their support to the campaign.

Campaign strength consisted not only of the broad coalition of endorsements the CAAC generated outside the legislature but also of supporters inside the General Assembly. The Black Caucus continued to be strong backers of divestment legislation in general, but some had to be persuaded that the 1980 Sullivan Principles bill was not sufficient. The Caucus members interviewed admitted that at the time of the Sullivan Principles amendment they knew very little about the Principles and were willing to use them simply to salvage the legislation. Once they learned details about the Principles from the CAAC they were ready once again to promote full divestment and it was not necessary to solicit their support. The CAAC requested Rep. Dyson to reintroduce his bill although he would have done so without the request, and Rep. Giles introduced his legislation without the group's encouragement. Dyson now chaired the Black Caucus and his credibility in the House as well as his leadership in encouraging the divestment concept among legislators proved to be crucial, as will be seen later.

Outside of the Black Caucus the CAAC was able to win support among other legislators as well. Particularly significant support came when the group convinced the leadership of both the Finance and Appropriations Committees that the legislation should be passed. The campaign, therefore, gained a great deal of its strength from the number and kinds of supporters both inside and outside the General Assembly.

A second major source of campaign strength came from the CAAC steering committee. The assets its members bring are: devotion to the
work, skillful leadership, credibility and legitimacy among both supporters and adversaries, and carefully nurtured supportive relationships among themselves. The members' devotion to the work is demonstrated in several ways. One is that half of them have been in the steering committee since the founding of the CAAC in 1978. These people have given a great deal of time to anti-apartheid work both in terms of years and in terms of the daily requirements of keeping the organization going. Those interviewed reported that they regularly spend at least two nights a week and often a large segment of Saturdays on CAAC tasks. It is also not uncommon for members to take off time from their employment for Committee activities. Thus the commitment level in the steering committee is very high.

The members' connections to other organizations have proven useful in gaining endorsements for the CAAC, but the organizations have made another contribution as well. They have been arenas in which the group could acquire valuable leadership skills. Most of the persons in the steering committee have been activists and leaders among activists for over five years. They have gotten a great deal of experience in a variety of organizations, and they are well known in these other activist groups for their skills, their determination, and their commitment to a broad range of social justice issues. They pay close attention to details of organizing and they are consistent and reliable in their work. For example, they know how to raise money to underwrite CAAC activities and publications; they know how to carry out thorough research both on the issue itself and on how to promote the issue; they are articulate and accomplished public speakers; they are tenacious
and persuasive negotiators; and they demonstrate good political judgment by reacting to and molding events in the political environment to fit their needs and by creating their own events to further their cause. These various leadership qualities have brought credibility to them as individuals and legitimacy to their work in the eyes of both friends and foes. Since credibility and legitimacy are often lacking in such organizations (Cohen 1959), this is no small accomplishment.

In addition, the steering committee functions as a group to foster good relations among themselves. Some are good friends and it is not unusual for them to spend time together outside of CAAC work. Observing one of their meetings it was evident that they are careful to consider every person's opinion. In consensus style, if someone has misgivings about a decision, the group takes that doubt seriously and re-examines the question. The meetings seem to be well planned (e.g., a written agenda) and they are run efficiently in terms of sticking to the subject at hand until a decision is reached. Differences of opinion do arise but the group seems to do a good job of managing its conflicts.

Therefore, as suggested by social movement literature, the strength of a campaign makes a significant contribution to its effectiveness. In this case strength lay principally in the widespread support the CAAC was able to generate for divestment and in the Committee's skillful and committed leadership.

Strategies and Tactics: The 1981 Campaign

Once the campaign had momentum its proponents had to map their legislative course carefully and adapt it as events unfolded. Two elements they found necessary to passing a bill were testimony on its
behalf and lobbying. Hoffman testified for the CAAC in both the Appropriations and Finance Committees where Dyson's and Giles's bills were placed. She explained in detail a critique of the Sullivan Principles and why the 1980 bill would not suffice for state investment policy. She also addressed the issues of the financial implications of divestment for the pension funds, the nature of U.S. corporations' investments in South Africa, and the support among black South Africans for economic sanctions. In the Finance Committee she answered several questions on these various topics. Some representatives of CAAC endorsers testified, too, including persons from District 1199 of the New England Health Care Employees Union, the Connecticut State Federation of Teachers, Hartford AFSCME Local 1716, and the University of Connecticut School for Social Work (Appropriations Committee 1981; Finance Committee 1981).

The testimony served the purpose of defining the issues, providing vital information to decision makers, and giving evidence of support for the legislation. Excerpts of some of the testimony were put into a handout and distributed to all legislators. The testimony also functioned to begin casting the question as basically a moral one. Potential opponents began to realize that to raise objections was to risk being perceived as a racist.

Representative Dyson proved to be crucial to the CAAC lobbying effort both when the bills were in Committee and once Giles's legislation was favorably reported out. Hoffman and Buchanan estimate that they spent every evening for about three weeks at the Capitol talking to legislators about the bill in the period just before it was up for a
vote. During that time Dyson accompanied them to legislators' offices, introduced them, and requested that his colleagues spend some time with them. He gained access for them to the Democratic leadership in both houses, to committee leadership in both committees, and to other influentials. He also regularly provided information on which legislators were reluctant and which ones had further questions on the measure. The two CAAC representatives would then target these people. Once the bill reached the point of floor debate, these two even helped the bill's backers prepare their arguments.

Simultaneously with their lobbying efforts, Hoffman and Buchanan were providing other CAAC members with information about lawmakers who needed outside pressure to help persuade them. Representatives from the Committee's endorsing organizations would then be asked to call or write these legislators requesting their support. This persistent lobbying effort paid off in that every legislator interviewed remembered Hoffman's and Buchanan's work, and two persons said they believed it was a principal reason the bill was successful.

Two tactical decisions which facilitated passage were the choice to go with Giles's bill rather than Dyson's and Giles's last minute amendments to narrow the scope of the act and ensure protection from financial loss. Giles's legislation was heard in the Finance Committee where it stood a very good chance of being reported out favorably due in some measure to the active support of the Committee Co-Chair, Rep. Irving Stolberg. Dyson's bill was placed in the Appropriations Committee and its chances were slim. Thus the proponents chose to abandon Dyson's bill and push for Giles's. The amendments Rep. Giles added to his bill
have already been discussed. These amendments were not sufficient to take care of doubts to be raised later, however, and if there were a significant error in the campaign it was not enough careful attention to nuance and precision in the wording of the legislation. This error was not a fatal one but it did cause problems.

Reaction and Opposition: The 1981 Campaign

The nature of the reaction to a campaign from a number of quarters can be crucial to the effectiveness of the activists' efforts. Reaction to this legislative campaign was on the whole positive or neutral, and there was no organized opposition to the bill during the General Assembly's consideration of it. Since the only pressure was from proponents, legislators had free rein to pass the legislation with little wariness about who might be antagonized by such an action.

In the General Assembly the bill was seen as a "little" bill (Landau-Painter, interview) in that it did not command a great deal of attention throughout the legislature but neither did it go unnoticed. Majority and minority leaders in both the House and Senate were well aware of the measure, but they did not devote a lot of time to it because it did not have a lot of complications to be worked out. It was a relatively "easy" piece of legislation that did not get into trouble.

The question of whether or not state governments should get involved in foreign policy matters arose during the debates and discussions around the bill. When asked about this in interviews, the lawmakers responded in two ways. Many said that essentially the issue is not a foreign policy issue but one of how the state will regulate its investments. The state government may choose the criteria it wants for such
regulation, and if decision makers choose not to invest in companies present in South Africa, it is simply a matter of managing monies in a socially responsible and morally satisfying manner.

When pressed, however, almost all respondents agreed that there was a foreign policy dimension to the issue. They all said that foreign affairs are normally peripheral to the responsibilities of state governments except in rare cases. Some international issues become significant as matters of principle and the legislature decides to make a statement about them. As the Senate Majority Leader put it:

...when a state legislature feels that it's important enough to make a statement on any issue, I feel it should do so — whether it's a bilateral nuclear arms freeze, whether it's equal rights for women, or whether it's that this country should impose sanctions against a nation that is carrying out a policy we feel is totally undemocratic and totally against our philosophy (Schneller, interview).

If state legislatures should take stands on important issues, what makes the issue important? For the Connecticut General Assembly, apartheid and investments became significant because a group of people was persistent in pressing the question. Although the CAAC kept it alive and in the attention of decision makers, the fact that the issue meant a great deal to the Black Caucus became the rationale for passing it in many legislators' minds. Legislators reported that they typically will support a bill (1) if it does not adversely affect their constituents (whoever the constituent is defined to be); (2) if it is helpful to some of their colleagues in the legislature, the Black Caucus in this case; and (3) if it is generally in line with their political philosophy. In many respects like the 1980 Sullivan Principles law, the divestment
bill was seen as something that the legislature could give to the Caucus without much political or financial cost (Schneller; Stolberg, interviews).

During the bill's consideration in the Assembly neither Governor O'Neill nor Treasurer Parker took a public position on it. Parker spoke privately about the bill with a few legislators, but there is no trace of any reaction by O'Neill during the legislative process. None of the legislators interviewed anticipated his veto. Although Parker had established precedents of using social criteria in addition to financial criteria for investments and he had actively promoted the concept of corporate social responsibility, there is reason to believe that his preference was to keep the status quo -- the 1980 Sullivan Principles bill which he was in the process of implementing. Typically (as will be seen in the Michigan case) money managers are very reluctant to have others continually tampering with how they make their investments. Parker was under enormous pressure from his black colleagues, however, to remain unopposed to the legislation.

In addition, one Treasury Department official claims that, like some segments of the business community, people in the Department were caught off-guard by the momentum of the bill. They did not believe it had a very good chance of passing and (except for Parker) had not paid much attention to it. They became aware that a response from Treasury might be appropriate only after the legislation had passed the House. Before they could muster an analysis (four days), the act had passed the Senate (VanMeter, interview). Therefore, due to the combination of a somewhat unaware bureaucracy and the political imprudence of a black
Treasurer opposing legislation sponsored by the Black Caucus, a major source of potential opposition to the bill was quieted.

CAAC members had met with the Treasurer twice in April after the bill was out of committee. At one meeting they took a pension analyst with them to lend credibility to their assertion that state investments would not be harmed by the legislation. This meeting may have helped Parker understand the dynamics of the issue better, but more persuasive pressure came from the Black Caucus. The Committee did not attempt to lobby O'Neill, and although it is not clear that their arguments would have fallen on sympathetic ears, this was another mistake in the campaign.

Another arena of reaction that can facilitate or harm the progress of a campaign is the media. A regular column on South Africa was sponsored by the CAAC in the Hartford Inquirer, a weekly and the largest black newspaper in the state. The Hartford Advocate had printed a lengthy story on the Hartford City Council discussions about pension fund investments in South Africa as early as 1978 (Kauffman 1978) and both daily papers, the Advocate and the Hartford Courant, had carried a story on the continuation of these same City Council discussions in 1980. These daily papers, however, did not pay much attention to the state divestment campaign until the veto in July 1981. Therefore, the state's major media did not seem to significantly help or hinder the CAAC efforts.

The last notable source of reaction and potential opposition which needs examination is the business community. There are two explanations for why there was no organized business opposition to the 1981 bill while the Assembly was considering it. One is that there was no common
concern among business interests about the bill. Some segments were aware of it, monitoring it, and even providing notice about it to interested parties. For example, the Connecticut Business and Industry Association (CBIA) watched the legislation with interest. CBIA is a business organization with 5000 Connecticut companies as members. One of its primary purposes is to serve as a lobby for business concerns, and there are four full-time lobbyists on the staff. Almost every large corporation in the state is a member of CBIA, but most of its members are small companies. Although CBIA paid attention to the 1981 bill and even reported on it in a newsletter, the Association took no active role in opposing it for three reasons: (1) most CBIA members were not affected by the legislation; the big corporations that would be affected had their own lobbyists who had expertise on the issue and could pursue the matter if they chose to do so; none of these big businesses requested help from the Association at the time, and the CBIA lobbyists decided to simply wait and see what happened; (2) these lobbyists had a number of other pressing issues which would affect most of their members (e.g., unemployment compensation, taxation) to consume their time; (3) the divestment legislation was politically sensitive; if it were necessary to oppose it, the lobbyist did not want to risk the Association being labeled racist by coming out against it; if the big corporations felt it necessary to oppose the bill, their lobbyists could help take the heat and risk the label, too.

In retrospect from the other side, some of the lobbyists from the large companies complained that CBIA should have taken more of a lead in opposition. Part of their role, said one person, is to absorb some of
the controversy for the business community at large. The problem was, however, that there was no united business interest on the issue. There was a big business-small business split because small businesses had no concern at all about the legislation.

The second reason there was no corporate opposition in the legislature is that the corporations' lobbyists misjudged the bill's chances for passage. The lobbyists interviewed were all aware of its existence but were unaware of the amount of support it was receiving. Since a similar bill had been amended to their satisfaction the year before, they felt confident that the Assembly would simply let this one die. Opposing it as a matter of principle could be interpreted as a racist reaction, and in their estimation there was no other reason to oppose it. They did not believe the bill had a chance and no one alerted them that it did until the House had already passed it. Thus another sector from which one would have expected sophisticated and determined work against the act was virtually silent.

In summary, the 1981 CAAC legislative campaign succeeded because (1) the CAAC had created and made known to the legislature a political climate sympathetic to full divestment; (2) the Black Caucus had given the act impetus in the Assembly and together with the CAAC had generated momentum for its passage; and (3) hearing no significant objections, legislators decided to yield to proponents' pressures. This campaign demonstrated impressive CAAC organizing and lobbying skills, and Table 4-10 provides a digest of the variables which contributed to the effectiveness of their efforts. The Committee had only a month to celebrate, however, before their victory became a defeat.
## TABLE 4-10
Summary of Variables Significant in the Passage of the 1981 Legislation

### Inner Environment

1. Goals: required a great deal of change
2. Tactics and Strategies:
   a. extensive and expert testimony
   b. persistent lobbying
   c. access to legislative leadership
   d. negotiations and compromise over language in the legislation
3. Strength:
   a. broad coalition of endorsements and supporters inside and outside the legislature
      (1) numerous educational events
      (2) members' access through networks to large number of organizations
      (3) individual members' reputations for legitimacy and credibility
      (4) single-issue focus of the campaign
      (5) frequent communications with supporters
      (6) credible and salable (relevant) argument in favor of divestment
      (7) extensive research on the issues and how to press for the Committee's position
      (8) Black Caucus support and support of other influentials in the legislature
   b. highly committed and skilled CAAC leadership

### Outer Environment

4. Reactions and Opposition:
   a. Legislature: receptive to being convinced to pass the bill
   b. Treasury: no opposition and no activity on the bill; now charged with implementing the divestment law
   c. Governor: no opposition and no activity on the bill
   d. Business: no active opposition and little activity at all
   e. Media: little attention
5. Target: large and accessible
6. Time: began the campaign two years prior to its heaviest thrust; had about three years total
7. Generally conducive political environment in the state despite the heavy business influence in Connecticut
Post-Passage Reaction and Opposition: The Veto

Immediately after the legislation got Assembly approval, large corporations and business associations mobilized their forces and requested meetings with both the Treasurer and the Governor. Some sent letters requesting the Governor to veto the bill. The decision-making arena had shifted and now the companies, among friends, could say behind closed conference room doors what they had been unwilling to say in the legislative debate. A list of some of the corporations and organizations represented in the lobbying effort is shown in Table 4-11. The arguments made by this group against the bill have already been discussed but the participants' reasons for opposition need further analysis. As was noted earlier, those engaged in pressuring O'Neill to veto the bill were reluctant to have themselves identified. And, because the process was a closed one within a small group, the dynamics of what occurred are not easy to discern. The broad issues raised are clear, however, and can be discussed as follows.

Table 4-8 lists the large businesses in Connecticut that have investments in South Africa. These industries are important to the economy of the state, and one of them, United Technologies, is the largest single employer in the state. To be placed on a proscribed list of investments was an accusation of bad corporate citizenship. It was, as some put it, a slap in the face. Since most of these companies were Sullivan signatories, they felt they were doing their share for progress in South Africa. They wanted to be rewarded rather than punished for their efforts under the Principles because compliance was costing them money, time, and headaches. They had already confronted the issue of
TABLE 4-11

Partial List of Businesses or Business Organizations That Lobbied for the Veto

1. Aetna Insurance Corporation
2. Connecticut Bank and Trust
3. Connecticut Bankers' Association
4. Connecticut Business and Industry Association
6. Day, Berry and Howard Law Firm
7. General Electric Corporation
8. Hartford National Bank
9. Insurance Association of Connecticut
10. Union Carbide
11. United Technologies Corporation
their investments in South Africa in other arenas, and they did not accept or succumb to the critique that their operations bolster apartheid. The Connecticut businessmen interviewed said that the withdrawal of state monies from their stocks and bonds was not likely to affect the value of those securities nor would it convince them to pull out of South Africa. Divestment would also not make them take their plants, factories, and headquarters out of the state. What it would do, however, is give them a bad image, and in general the whole concept made them very angry. The state has no business, they believe, in pronouncing where they should or should not conduct their international business.

For banks, the image problem was even more significant and the legislation was more stringent. If the state could not hold investments in banks that lend money to corporations doing business in South Africa, the state probably could hold no bank securities at all. This would be a condemnation of the whole financial sector. Furthermore, banks and insurance companies are entrusted with the management of some of the state's portfolio (about half the funds are managed outside the Treasury Department). The legislation would curtail the range of investment possibilities open to them and would interfere with their standard investment philosophies.

Thus big business and the business associations finally came in a united effort to persuade the Governor to protect their interests. Although many of these companies traditionally back Republican rather than Democratic party candidates for governor, divestment proponents and opponents interviewed agree that O'Neill is nevertheless well known for his sympathy for business concerns and his relative lack of sympathy
for labor issues. This corporate pressure together with the go-ahead from Parker proved effective and O'Neill complied by vetoing the bill.

Why the veto was not overridden is fairly easy to explain. Although initially caught off-guard by the veto, the CAAC and Black Caucus rallied their forces and continued their pressure for full divestment. They received a great deal of help from their supporters and in the media. Whereas the press has been relatively quiet during the first consideration of the bill, no fewer than nine articles and editorials on the veto appeared in the major newspapers within the twenty days between the veto and the Assembly trailer session. Most of the articles reported the events in a straightforward fashion whereas the editorials were generally sympathetic to divestment. But now the group faced counter pressures from business lobbyists, the leadership's pressure for party loyalty, and the widespread perception that a suitable outcome could still be achieved through the Task Force the Governor promised to appoint. The Task Force provided a middle option for those who wanted it. And, no matter how morally significant the bill had been in its initial passage, that significance diminished considerably for Majority leaders and Democratic followers when party faithfulness and gubernatorial embarrassment were at stake. Overriding vetoes in Connecticut is difficult and rare, and although the bill originally passed with majorities large enough to defeat a veto, enough troops fell into line that the legislature sustained this and all O'Neill's vetoes. The level of support for the bill was evident, however, when a majority voted favorably for the override.
The Task Force Work and Recommendations

Although far short of requiring complete divestment, the Task Force recommendations represent the most comprehensive set of criteria for partial divestment yet achieved by any state legislature in the U.S. Every Task Force member interviewed after the report was submitted (seven persons) marveled that the diverse group had achieved unanimous proposals so far-reaching. A combination of several factors seems to account for this outcome.

One was leadership provided by Parker and Edythe Gaines. Parker was described by several members as forceful in style and determined to achieve a workable product. To have the Task Force fail would have been a disturbing political embarrassment for himself and the Governor in an election year, and the press was already predicting an inconsequential outcome (Polman, April 6 and 8, 1982). Gaines proved to be a skilled mediator and negotiator. Members report that on several occasions at crucial junctures she was responsible for maintaining communications between opposing factions. She found middle ground between seemingly irreconcilable points of view. In addition, there were two members from the business community, Shapiro and Russell, who were accustomed to this kind of work -- tasks that require skill in bridging the corporate-civic gap. Both had had previous experience in making a link between the two sometimes disparate worlds and enjoyed doing it.

The commitment level of participants was another factor contributing to the success of the Task Force. The amount of time donated has already been mentioned. Besides attending meetings the members were submitting drafts of their own ideas, marshalling the resources of their
organizations to provide research for options being considered, and holding sub-group caucuses to consolidate positions. Why so many of the fourteen were willing to go to such lengths for this group is only partially explicable. Some are highly involved with the issue of U.S. corporate investment in South Africa as a priority in their lives for personal reasons (e.g., Hoffman) or for professional reasons (e.g., Hamilton). Others were very committed to helping the leadership in the state resolve a very sticky issue (e.g., Gaines, Cloud). Besides being interested in the issue, a few had a fascination for the process and enjoyed being in the fray (e.g., Russell). And some, of course, saw their firms' reputations at stake (e.g., Hughes, Semelsberger, Shapiro).

Another significant reason for the Task Force staying together was the business representatives' unwillingness to be blamed for its failure. One industry representative admits to having wished in the middle of the process that the labor representatives (CAAC) would get frustrated enough to walk out. He wanted the Task Force to fail. He felt confident that no total divestment legislation would get past the legislature again because, in the next round, the business community would fight hard and publicly against it. If the Task Force failed and there was no possibility of passing new legislation, there would be no change in the status quo -- the Treasurer would continue to abide by the 1980 Sullivan Principles bill. Although this man wanted it to fail, and although at points he and other business representatives were contemplating resigning, he was not willing to be the scapegoat for its failure. He wanted the proponents to provide the scapegoat.
In the beginning Hoffman and Fussell were unsure that they would remain on the Task Force. They took a "wait and see" attitude. As the lack of legislative support for another full divestment bill became clear, they decided to stay and achieve as much as possible through the Task Force (Hoffman, interview). Parker had sent a letter to the General Assembly leadership requesting a delay in consideration of any further divestment legislation until the Task Force reported (Dyson, interview). Even though the CAAC had been pushing for a repeat of the previous year's legislation, the group soon realized that the chances of such an outcome were growing smaller. Therefore, Hoffman and Fussell were not to play the role others wanted them to play in breaking up the Task Force, and as the process progressed all parties seemed to have greater investments in sticking with it.

The CAAC could have gained one more vote for their side by demanding an official representative in addition to Hoffman and Fussell as labor representatives. Another vote probably would not have mattered for the most difficult decisions, however, because they were ultimately resolved by negotiation rather than majority rule.

Hoffman and Fussell are credited by several members as being the reason the report goes as far as it does. A number of members had been willing to settle basically for a Sullivan Principles approach. One such participant said, "We went further than we thought we would, and I think she (Hoffman) backed off somewhat," Hoffman especially was perceived as composed, very intelligent, competent on the issue, a hard-nosed opponent, and a negotiator with exceptional political judgment. One business representative said, "She's very crafty.... I only wish she were on our
She and Fussell provided the cutting edge. The 1981 campaign had tested their organizing and lobbying skills but the Task Force tested their mettle in the rigors of face-to-face confrontations and negotiations with their opponents. They pushed their proposals to the brink and then backed off such that the end product had much more substance and merit from their perspective than many people, even CAAC constituents, expected.

Hoffman and Fussell are both personally very committed to achieving complete withdrawal of state funds from corporations investing in South Africa, but they were also receiving pressure from the more leftist elements among their constituents. The CAAC steering committee had been criticized for spending too much time on legislative processes and not enough time doing further educational and organizational development in communities. Constituents were also questioning the Committee's participation on the Task Force since many were convinced it could only yield anti-apartheid rhetoric and more sophisticated Sullivan Principles.

The Committee justified its legislative work and Task Force participation in several ways. Their 1981 campaign had proven that, with the right combination of favorable forces and hard work, the legislature could be a fruitful arena for achieving their goals. Now that the decision-making process had been removed from the Assembly into a more closed arena, their work would become more difficult in many respects, but there was still potential for a constructive, although not completely satisfying, outcome. Other arenas through which to pressure companies were either more closed (e.g., direct pressure on corporations themselves) or less resourceful and powerful (e.g., university or church investment
portfolios). The legislature and state government were both relatively accessible and in command of millions of dollars in South African-related investments. Plus, succeeding in the passage of the 1981 bill demystified the legislative process for Committee constituents and demonstrated the power of their organization. "Playing politics" and all the concomitant compromise and negotiation had become necessary but it also had proven useful. The group was not sure it would remain committed to working in the legislative arena, but at the time of this writing it was still determined to achieve full divestment. Members had begun to evaluate their work over the last several years and assess what new directions, if any, they would now take. The impact of the Task Force process and resolution on the cohesion and internal dynamics of the CAAC is as yet unknown. The core group seems to be in solid support of Hoffman and Russell's work in the Task Force, but the compromise reached may have a negative impact on CAAC's relationship with some of its constituents.

With the CAAC representatives pushing the Task Force to the limits of criteria acceptable to the businessmen, the Task Force recommendations were, in sum, a result of Parker's determined leadership, a few members' mediation at crucial points between the opposing factions, and everyone's commitment to staying with the process. In the end, the CAAC and the business group really had no choice but to stay with the process. Neither wanted to be blamed for its failure and neither wanted the state to act without them there to protect their interests.

Looking in retrospect across the last several years, the CAAC campaign was, in all likelihood, not sufficient by itself to produce the various outcomes related to anti-apartheid issues. Clearly, however,
it was a necessary and pivotal driving force. Without the CAAC efforts Connecticut would not have the divestment legislation it now has; nor would the 1981 bill have passed. The other factors which contributed to causing these consequences have been discussed in this section, but analyzing these variables and their causal relationship to the outcomes only partially fulfills the intent of this research. The next section will discuss the impact and importance of these consequences.

**Impact and Effectiveness**

All political processes have intended and unintended consequences; some of these consequences are immediately evident and others are not so easily detected. Although all of the traceable outcomes of the CAAC campaign will be discussed in this section and in the conclusions of the last chapter, effectiveness will be defined using the goals-based approach to evaluation discussed in chapter two. That is, the degree to which the campaign was effective is the degree to which it met its own goals. The goals and theory of action have already been discussed, and the theory of action has been evaluated. Together these posit what proponents **would like** to happen. The campaigns' effectiveness and impact must be judged on what actually **does** happen. Table 4-12 lists outcomes, evident at the time of this writing, of the entire political process that dealt with the anti-apartheid legislation. These outcomes are categorized according to their principal recipients.

Table 4-13 contrasts the proponents' goals with outcomes to demonstrate achieved, partially achieved, and unachieved goals. Three of the goals -- expressing solidarity with those resisting apartheid (#1), taking a principled stand (#2), and drawing attention to the issue (#3) --
TABLE A-12

Partial List of Outcomes in Connecticut

For the State Government of Connecticut

Legislature
1. the General Assembly took a principled stand with all three bills;
2. the 1981 campaign convinced many legislators that the Sullivan Principles are inappropriate and inadequate for bringing change in South Africa; these legislators experienced a change of attitude;
3. some legislators now receive public relations materials from the South African government;
4. some legislators are dispensing the Task Force report to interested persons inside and outside the state as an example of a good model to follow;

Executive
5. top elected officials (the Governor and Treasurer) and their staffs have spent considerable time on the issue;
6. Treasury officials announce publicly that the implementation of the 1982 act will be careful and thorough;
7. the Treasury Department has assigned one full-time person to implementation of the 1982 bill;
8. the entire process has put the Treasury Department in communications with several corporate responsibility groups, e.g., the Investor Responsibility Research Center, the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, and the Corporate Data Exchange;
9. some stocks and bonds will be sold (as yet undetermined) and some have already been sold in implementing the 1980 legislation;
10. the Department plans to monitor closely companies with investments in South Africa whose stocks are not sold to ensure the state can lawfully keep their securities;
11. Department officials intend to provide outside managers of part of the state's portfolio with a proscribed list of investments so that these managers can comply with the law;
12. the Treasurer discussed the Task Force report and 1982 legislation with other state treasurers at a 1982 Northeast States' Treasurers' Conference;
13. the Treasurer was able to submit to the Governor a unanimous Task Force report from a group with widely opposing opinions;
14. the Governor vetoed the 1981 bill;
15. the Governor was perceived to anger black and labor elements of his party with the 1981 veto;
16. the Governor and Treasurer were perceived to be pleasing a wide range of politically active groups with the Task Force report; through it they took a stand against apartheid without alienating business, labor, or the proponents;

For Business
17. some stocks and bonds have been sold by the state (1980 implementation) and some will be sold (as yet undetermined for 1982 implementation); no Connecticut bank securities are likely to be sold;
18. business executives (especially those on the Task Force), business lobbyists, and their staffs have spent a great deal of time on the issue;
19. business executives from corporations with South African investments will be required to fill out forms and reply to correspondence from the Treasury Department if they want the state to keep their securities;
TABLE I-12 Continued

20. the business community in general was publicly criticized for not engaging in open debate on the issue in 1981;
21. some business representatives on the Task Force have dispensed the Task Force report to interested persons inside and outside the state as an example of a good model to follow;
22. some business people report a change in their attitudes about the issue; they no longer believe that a company can claim its presence in South Africa is good in and of itself; these people have become convinced that corporations must sign the Sullivan Principles or some comparable code of conduct if they are to remain in South Africa;
23. some business people report that their belief in the Sullivan Principles as an appropriate and adequate policy for corporate responsibility in South Africa has been reinforced;
24. no corporations have announced any withdrawal of their investments in South Africa as a result of Connecticut’s governmental actions (see last chapter for more discussion of this);
25. a General Electric South African subsidiary, Southern Sphere Mining, withdrew from a $135 million mining venture in the KwaZulu homeland citing the state of Connecticut’s new investment policies (the 1982 bill) as one of the reasons for its withdrawal (New York Times, Nov. 3, 1982);
26. the Connecticut Bank and Trust and the Hartford National Bank, as members of the Private Export Funding Corporation (PEFCO), stopped lending money to South Africa in 1980 when PEFCO ceased lending money to South Africa (prior to the Connecticut divestment campaign);

For the U.S. Government
27. the U.S. State Department, the Department of Commerce, and the Africa subcommittee’s staff in the House and Senate are aware of the state’s actions (see last chapter for further discussion);

For South Africa
28. the South African Embassy and U.N. Mission are aware of the state’s actions (see last chapter for further discussion);
29. the South African press has reported on the state’s actions;
30. representatives of the resistance movements (i.e., African National Congress) are aware of the state’s actions and have communicated their approval to the CAAC;

For the Anti-Apartheid Movement
Nationally
31. local and national groups across the country have taken a great deal of interest in the Connecticut campaign; the American Committee of Africa has chosen it to be a case study for publication and distribution through its networks;
CAAC
32. the CAAC focus on the legislative arena has brought criticism from leftist elements in its constituency;
33. the group was forced to adapt to circumstances that took the issue out of an open forum (the legislature) into a small, closed decision-making arena (the Task Force);
34. the group was perceived to be pressing for a principled cause;
35. through the entire process the Committee gained credibility and legitimacy for the organization and for individual leaders from supporters, from opponents, and from interested observers;
36. the group gained a large number of endorsements and support for its campaign.
TABLE 4-13
An Evaluation of Goals and Outcomes in Connecticut

Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Achieved</th>
<th>Partially Achieved</th>
<th>Unachieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>29, 30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>36?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>(unknown)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>9, 10, 11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>(see chapter III and VI)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>(unknown)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1, 9, 10, 11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22, 23, 24</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>17, 31, 34, 35</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>36?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outcomes unrelated to goals: 13, 16, 26, 32, 33
are seen to be achieved by the proponents because of the outcomes of having widespread recognition of the Connecticut divestment process (as shown in the outcomes listed) in the state, in the country) among those attentive to the issue), and among South Africans. Goal 11, that of proponents making a contribution to the worldwide anti-apartheid movement, is listed as both achieved, partially achieved and unachieved. This is because a number of outcomes do make such a contribution, but because no corporations have withdrawn from South Africa directly as a result of the Connecticut process and because some have been convinced that staying in South Africa can do some good, divestment has not fulfilled all that proponents had hoped that it would. The Connecticut legislation, however, does appear to be one of the factors considered by GE in its on-going assessment of its operations in South Africa, and therefore, the goal is also listed as partially achieved.

The goals related to having the state take a principled stand (#6), withdrawing investments from corporations doing business in South Africa (#7), and expressing solidarity with those in resistance to apartheid (#8) are all seen as partially achieved or unachieved -- partially achieved because in the end the state did not do all that activists wanted it to do, and unachieved because of the particular outcome of the governor's veto. Goal 9 can only be assessed in the context of the entire national anti-apartheid movement, and whether or not activists participated effectively in other anti-racist actions (goal #5) or will ultimately contribute to the ending of apartheid is unknown. Also, it is impossible without further research to evaluate the educational and consciousness-raising efforts of the CAAC (goals #4 and #12). We can speculate that some education and consciousness raising must have occurred in the many
events held by CAAC for such purposes, in their lobbying efforts, media exposure, or other educational work, but there is not enough evidence to evaluate whether or not such outcomes did in fact occur. Five outcomes (listed at the bottom of the table) appear to be unrelated to goals.

In summary, we can assert that at this point Connecticut divestment proponents seem to have been moderately successful in achieving what they set out to accomplish. We turn now to an examination of divestment campaigns in Michigan and in the last chapter to a comparison of the two cases.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER IV

1. All Connecticut General Assembly Committees are joint committees between the House and Senate.

2. These colleges and universities have divestment policies: Connecticut College, Trinity College, Wesleyan University, and Yale University.

3. Isaac Russell made this assertion in an interview for this research.

4. Through Russell the firm provides investment advice to the Treasurer on municipal bonds.

5. The list was the only published goals available among the literature and newsletters of the CAAC. It appeared in the April 1980 newsletter.

6. Parker would not discuss his position on the 1981 bill in the interview for this research.

7. Massachusetts passed a more comprehensive total divestment bill in December 1982.
CHAPTER V
THE MICHIGAN CASE STUDY

In recent years the Michigan Legislature has been inundated with various types of legislation on South Africa. Although there is considerable repetition of substance in separate bills across several years, in all, eighteen pieces of legislation have been introduced since 1978 by four different principal sponsors. Two of these legislative pieces were resolutions and both achieved passage: one by the House and the other by both the House and the Senate. Of the sixteen bills, several have successfully passed through committees and two have become law (in 1980 and 1982).¹

A wide spectrum of institutions and financial transactions have been targeted through all these bills — public employee pension funds, educational institutions' investments, and state bank deposits. In no other state have activists and legislators attempted to achieve so broad a set of governmental anti-apartheid actions. This chapter will discuss and analyze the history of all this legislation, the implementation of one of the acts that has passed, the variables impeding or facilitating passage of the bills, and the impact of the campaigns behind the legislation.

Legislative History and Implementation

The principal impetus for initiating anti-apartheid legislative cam-
Campaigns in Michigan have come from university-based activist organizations. Since the early 1970s many colleges and universities across the state have experienced divestment campaigns directed primarily at the educational institutions themselves but often spilling over to affect other targets as well. Although most campus activities intensified in reaction to the Soweto riots (1976) and the death of Steve Biko (1977), groups at several colleges and universities have maintained a focus on South Africa for close to a decade. These environments continue to provide a base of organization for anti-apartheid campaigns.

The most significant of these campus-based anti-apartheid organizations is the Southern Africa Liberation Committee (SALC) at Michigan State University in East Lansing. It has promoted more campaigns than any other group, been the most persistent group in pressing for state legislation, lasted the longest, and benefited from a very strategic location near the state capital. Since 1974 it has moved its efforts from one arena to another as its campaigns met with some measure of success. Beginning primarily with an educational emphasis, the group started a long-term commitment to anti-apartheid activities that, across eight years, would target the East Lansing city council, the Michigan State University Board of Trustees, and the Michigan Legislature.

SALC was founded by persons who had participated in and helped organize anti-war activities during the Vietnam conflict and who decided in the early seventies to turn their energies to southern Africa work. Led by a campus minister, Warren (Bud) Day, and a political science graduate student, Carol Thompson, the group spent most of its time in its early days providing education opportunities on Southern Africa for students and supporting campaigns conducted by national anti-apartheid
organizations. Much of the group's work across the years has been also to provide direct aid (e.g. clothing, information) to liberation movements.

In spring 1976, SALC began to look for local institutions at which sanctions and divestment activities might be directed. Members believed that divestment was an important means to continue their educational efforts on South Africa while also addressing the issue of the role of multinational corporations in both South Africa and the US. Having close contact with national anti-apartheid organizations and with activists in other parts of the country, SALC members were aware of the strategies used in 1975 targeting city councils for selective purchasing campaigns in Gary, Indiana and Washington, DC. The group decided to try to convince the East Lansing city council to adopt a policy of purchasing goods and services from companies not involved in South Africa. Day and Thompson laid much of the foundation for these efforts, but both moved out of town in the fall of 1976 before the campaign got into full swing. Prior to leaving they asked a friend who had just returned from working on corporate responsibility issues for the Toronto Committee on Southern Africa, William Derman, to assume some major leadership responsibility for the city council campaign. Derman is an anthropologist at Michigan State (MSU) with an African area specialty. Fortunately for SALC, other shifts in academicians' locations brought David and Marylee Wiley, two Africanists with many years' experience on Southern African issues, to town in February 1977. David, a sociologist, took the position of Director of the MSU Center for African Studies, and Marylee, an educator,
became the Outreach Coordinator of the Center. Thus at a crucial time of leadership change and at the point that SALC turned its attention to the East Lansing city council, it fortuitously benefited from the influx of talent and experience from three persons with high commitments to and great expertise in anti-apartheid work.

SALC participants had good reason to believe that the East Lansing city council would be receptive to its request for selective purchasing. Unlike the university administration and Board of Trustees, the council had yielded to pressures from the anti-war movement and passed resolutions condemning US military involvement in Vietnam. Taking positions on foreign policy issues was nothing new for the body. If SALC could achieve a victory with the city council, members believed they could use that experience to convince the university and the state to divest. SALC press releases from 1977 as well as interviews with participants reveal that the organization had such a long-term strategy in mind.

SALC provided educational materials to council members and requested a public hearing on the issue. The group's initial approach, modeled on that of Washington, DC and Gary, Indiana, was to pressure for a boycott of nine specific companies that had the largest investments in South Africa. After support for the issue was demonstrated by SALC participants lobbying council members and attending weekly council meetings in large numbers, a public hearing was scheduled for March 30.

SALC took charge of organizing and publicizing the hearing. The group invited representatives of corporations as well as national and
local anti-apartheid leaders to make presentations. IBM sent a person to speak and a film. Panax also sent representatives, and an American lawyer, Donald de Kieffer, attended on behalf of the South African embassy. Speakers in support of the resolution included Tim Smith from the Corporate Information Center (later to become the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility – ICCR), Warren Day (returned) representing the American Friends Service Committee, representatives from Amnesty International, former African Peace Corp workers, African student groups, local churches and community groups, and the high school student council. Individual faculty members from the university also spoke in favor of the proposed resolution. According to press reports, over 200 people attended the hearing.

The council did not pass its resolution until August 3, 1977. In the intervening four months, SALC members collected signatures on petitions in support of the issue, solicited favorable letters from community leaders, and negotiated with council members on a reformulation of the resolution. There were legal objections to naming specific companies so the activists helped its supporters on the council to write a new resolution stating that the council would seek suppliers "who do not have investments, licenses, or operations in the Republic of South Africa. The entire
resolution is shown in table 5-1.

The opposition was also active during this interim period. DeKieffer and representatives of the Panax Company made some attempt to mobilize opinion against the resolution. John McGoff, president of Panax (no longer in business) and an American prominent in South Africa’s "Muldergate" scandal, tried unsuccessfully to speak on a program with DeKieffer in a university dorm to present the South African point of view. The program was canceled due to protests from a number of people on campus.

There was also a great deal of publicity on the issue. In 1976 and 1977 no fewer than 18 news articles and editorials appeared in the Lansing Star, the major daily newspaper, and the State News, the campus daily. The State News editorials supported selective purchasing. Although it is likely that trade-offs on other issues helped convince some council members to support the measure, SALC members were pleased when the resolution passed 5 - 0.

City administrators now include in all correspondence regarding city purchases and contracts a statement of the selective purchasing policy, and bids have been rejected on the basis of a company’s South African involvement. Furthermore, in April 1978, at SALC’s request, council members communicated the action they had taken to Michigan Senators and members of Congress in a letter requesting that these representatives join in the effort to bring about US sanctions against South Africa.

Having achieved their first victory after a year and a half of hard work, SALC was ready to target another institution with a second divestment campaign. At this point (late 1977), there was disagreement among members about whether to seek divestment by the university or the state
Resolution on South Africa by the City Council of East Lansing

Based on the public inquiry conducted by the East Lansing City Council on March 30, 1977, and other information which has been made available to the Council, the Council resolves as follows:

1. The minority white government of South Africa should not be assisted to maintain its system of apartheid, of economic repression, and of force, terror and violence against the majority non-white people of Southern Africa. The Republic of South Africa should not be assisted to occupy the territory of Namibia or to continue as the primary supplier of war material to the illegal regime of Rhodesia.

2. The people of the United States know, because of their historical experience with systems of segregation, the disastrous and long-lasting effects of segregation upon the nation and its citizens; they therefore bear a special responsibility not to support such systems.

3. American investments, licenses or operations in South Africa have helped the minority white government to grow and to perpetuate apartheid. A number of American corporations investing in South Africa have voluntarily taken advantage of the racial system of job discrimination and low wages. Likewise, some American corporations have increased their business activities, while repression has increased and in spite of pleas from the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and many world leaders.

4. To implement this policy, the City of East Lansing, to the extent authorized by applicable law, shall seek competitive suppliers of goods and services who do not have investments, licenses, or operations in the Republic of South Africa. The City shall attach to all invoices and bids the following statement signed by the Mayor:

"The City Council of the City of East Lansing is gravely concerned about the system of segregation and official repression against the non-white majority in the Republic of South Africa. Our concern forces us to seek when and where possible and in accordance with applicable law, competitive suppliers of goods and services who do not have investments, licenses, or operations in the Republic of South Africa."

5. This resolution shall expire automatically upon action by the Council.

Passed 5-0 on August 3, 1977.
as the next step. After holding a retreat to discuss strategy, the group decided to launch a state divestment campaign (Derman, interview). Meanwhile, other arenas experienced anti-apartheid activities that would disrupt this plan.

As SALC was busy convincing the city council to adopt its selective purchasing policy, activists in the Washtenaw County Coalition Against Apartheid (WCCAA) in Ann Arbor were pressing for divestment at the University of Michigan. A series of educational events and public forums were organized by the WCCAA in mid-1977, and a number of student organizations, with the endorsement of the campus newspaper, addressed the UM Board of Regents on May 20 to call for divestment. After a great deal of publicity on the issue and a long campaign by WCCAA, the Board voted in March 1978 to divest of "'stock in any firm that fails to ... abide by the school's bank policy (no new loans to the South African government except where detrimental to apartheid) or adhere satisfactorily to the Sullivan principles'" (Myers, et.al.: 366).

This policy was a great disappointment to WCCAA members who continued to press for complete withdrawal of investments in companies doing business in South Africa. A student referendum was held on campus in April on the question of divestment and students voted 3109 to 1169 in favor of total withdrawal (Ann Arbor News April 24, 1978). In addition, using public events to draw attention to the issue, student demonstrators protesting US investments in South Africa disrupted a commencement address by then Vice President Mondale. Out of frustration over the Board of Regents' unwillingness to agree to total divestment, the WCCAA group approached their state legislative representative, Perry Bullard, asking him to intro-
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duce a bill prohibiting all state universities' funds from being invested in South Africa. Bullard responded favorably to the activists' request. His legislation will be discussed shortly.

In the meantime, observing 1976 and 1977 anti-apartheid events in East Lansing, Ann Arbor and at other universities at the height of anti-apartheid campus activities nationwide, and having suffered through recent student demonstrations over university connections to the Shah's regime in Iran, the MSU Board of Trustees Investment Committee decided to preempt divestment pressures at MSU, which they believed to inevitable, and hold a public hearing on the issue. The date of the hearing was scheduled during a break between the 1978 winter and spring terms when few students would be on campus. Hearing news of this development, SALC publicized it in letters and advertisements in the university newspaper, and members requested that the meeting be postponed. The Trustees agreed to reschedule it for March 30.

SALC supplied the Trustee's Investment Committee with a "South Africa Facts" folder of information on apartheid and in support of divestment. The folder included statements from institutions favoring sanctions or divestment such as the 1976 National Democratic Party platform. At the hearing, the Trustees listened to arguments from a wide spectrum of viewpoints: persons from SALC advocating total divestment (including Africanists from the African Studies Center); persons taking positions in favor of a Sullivan Principles approach; some favoring maintenance of the status quo; and one MSU professor, Leon Weaver, who suggested that the South Africa regime was becoming more liberal in its policies toward Africans. Remarkably, after hearing the debate on March 30, on March 31,
1978, the MSU Board of Trustees voted to begin, as of December 1, 1978, a program of "prudent divestment" of all holdings in companies doing business in South Africa. They referred their new policy to University Committee on Academic Environment (UCAE) - mostly faculty - to establish procedures for divestment and also voted to withdraw deposits from banks "granting or renewing loans to the Republic of South Africa" (MSU Board of Trustees, March 31, 1978).

With this resolution, however, SALC's work on university divestment had just begun and their work on a state campaign got diverted. Reflecting ambivalence among some Trustees and some within the administration on the Board's recent action, the UCAE went through an extended process of hearings and deliberations, all well-attended by SALC members who testified on appropriate occasions. The issue was widely debated on campus, in a faculty committee called the University Committee on Faculty Governance, and in the local press. SALC organized demonstrations and solicited letters of support from campus organizations and the State News to press for early resolution of the issue and a speedy report of divestment guidelines by UCAE. Once the UCAE responded favorably in fulfilling its task, conflicts over legal liability and general reluctance on the part of MSU investment counselors had to be overcome. Opposition to the Board's policy was also voiced by some faculty members, and Dow Chemical threatened to cease making financial contributions to MSU if the policy were implemented.

SALC attempted to facilitate implementation by obtaining expert opinions demonstrating the feasibility of divestment from outside investment analysts and from attorneys. In addition, Derman and David Wiley, as
academics with expertise on Southern Africa, wrote extensive papers detailing the effects of US investments on the South African economy, the ineffectiveness of the Sullivan Principles, and the conditions under which Africans work. This information was sent to the Trustees for their consideration. Two SALC members who had joined the group after attending the March 1977 city council hearing and who subsequently became significant in the leadership of the organization were Frank and Pat Beeman. At this point they began to monitor every meeting on campus related to the divestment issue. Having been active in civil rights issues for many years, their specific interest in Southern Africa came through a family connection to a church worker in Namibia. Frank is a professor who has been at MSU for 35 years.

In July, the Investment Committee recommended a resolution that the Board adopted requesting the "federal administration to take immediate action to deny tax advantages to all corporations doing business in South Africa..." They asked that this resolution be sent to the President, Chairs of the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees, Secretary of State, Michigan members of Congress, the Michigan Legislature, the South African government, and the US Ambassador to the UN (MSU Trustees, July 1978). In December the Board adopted a resolution activating its earlier divestment policy, and in March 1979, it gave specific guidelines for divestment procedures to its investment firm, Scudder, Stevens and Clark. By December 1979, MSU's divestment process was complete and the portfolio reorganization had netted the university almost one million dollars. Activists in Michigan were delighted with their second victory.
The MSU case, the first large public university to divest, was extensively publicized through international anti-apartheid networks that the Tanzanian Ambassador to the United States, Paul Bomani, wrote MSU President Edger Harden congratulating him on the Board's action. Anti-apartheid groups all over the country continue to cite this case in their various campaigns as evidence that divestment can be profitable.

During the university campaign, SALC had not forgotten its intention to pursue state divestment through the legislature. Members discussed the possibility of state legislation on divestment with the East Lansing representative, Lynn Jondahl. Jondahl was a former campus minister and previous colleague of Warren Day. He supported the concept but was unable to introduce legislation because he was in the heat of another controversial legislative battle on a Michigan "bottle bill" (requiring deposits on soft drink and beer bottles and cans to control litter). However, he later became a supporter of bills put forward by other legislators. Thus activists from two locations were pressing their representatives to use the legislature for the anti-apartheid cause.

Table 5-2 outlines a chronology of the many anti-apartheid events across the state that reinforced each other and began to give momentum to state legislative campaigns.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>SALC founded</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>March 30: East Lansing city council public hearing on the selective purchasing resolution</td>
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<td></td>
<td>May 20: student organizations address the University of Michigan Board of Regents and call for divestment by the university</td>
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<td>August 3: East Lansing city council passes the selective purchasing resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>February: Michigan legislature passes Concurrent Resolutions No. 462 requesting Congress to impose sanctions on South Africa</td>
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<td>March 17: University of Michigan Board of Regents adopt a partial divestment policy (modified in 1979)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>March 30: Michigan State University Board of Trustees holds hearings on divestment</td>
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<td>March 31: MSU Trustees pass a resolution of intent to divest completely of the university's investment holdings in South Africa-related companies</td>
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<td>April 18: East Lansing mayor and city council members send letter to Michigan Senators and members of Congress urging them to press for sanctions against South Africa</td>
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<td>May 8: Bullard introduces HB 6341, first educational institutions' divestment bill</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December 8: MSU Trustees pass a resolution implementing their previous divestment policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>July 13: Bullard introduces HBs 4831-4840, the second educational institutions divestment bill and the first pension fund divestment legislation</td>
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<td>September 21: University of Michigan Regents vote to amend and elaborate their partial divestment policy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>November 9, 27, and December 4: House Civil Rights Committee hearings on HBs 4831-4840 in Kalamazoo, Detroit, and Lansing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>prior to March: Smith introduces HB 5446 to prohibit the deposit of surplus state funds in South Africa-related banks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March 4: House Civil Rights Committee hearings on HB substitutes 4831, 4838, the education and pension fund bills and HB 5446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March 18: House Civil Rights Committee approves HBs 4831, 4838, and 5446</td>
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TABLE 5-2, cont.


April 15: Legislators sponsor reception in the Capitol for representatives of southern Africa liberation movements, ANC, SWAPO, and the Zimbabwean Patriotic Front

May 20: House passes HB 5446

June 4: Joint hearings on divestment legislation by the House Civil Rights Committee, Senior Citizens and Retirement Committee, Subcommittee on Retirement of the Appropriations Committee, and the Department of Treasury

June 4: Senate Judiciary Committee approves HB 5446

November 19: Eastern Michigan University Board of Regents votes to divest its holdings of South Africa-related stock beginning with $2.5 million divested from Manufacturers' Hanover Trust Co. of New York

November 21: Senate passes HB 5446

November 25: House passes Senate version of HB 5446

December 17: Governor Milliken signs HB 5446 into law to become Public Act No. 325

1981

March 4: Smith introduces pension fund divestment bill, HB 4315, assigned to the Senior Citizens and Retirement Committee

March 24: Governor Milliken hosts public ceremony for signing Public Act 325 of 1980 with nine Nigerian state and federal legislators present

April 2: Bullard reintroduces the educational institutions fund divestment legislation, HB 4553

August 21: activists from across the state hold a meeting with legislative sponsors to map strategies for promoting the divestment legislation

November 17: House Civil Rights Committee hearings on HB 4553

December 15: Legislators host breakfast honoring representatives of ANC and SWAPO, southern Africa liberation movements; the representatives are in Michigan to speak at a conference at the University of Michigan on sports sanctions against South Africa

1982

January 26: House Civil Rights Committee approves HB 4553

May 13: House passes HB 4553 with Cropsey's amendment to include Soviet Union-related companies as proscribed investments

December: Senate Judiciary Committee approves HB 4553

December 13: Senate passes HB 4553
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The first piece of legislation introduced in Michigan was not a result of these particular university groups' pressures, however. A 1978 House Concurrent Resolution was sponsored by Jackie Vaughn, a black Democratic state representative from Detroit who subsequently has become a state senator. The resolution requested the Congress and President of the US "to impose immediate sanctions against the South African government in response to that country's disregard for human rights and dignity" (State of Michigan 1978). The specific stimulus for the introduction of this measure is unclear. Vaughn was generally aware of anti-apartheid activities around the country at the time and served a district in a city where support groups for several southern Africa liberation movements were active. Whatever the origins, this resolution served as another symbol legitimizing the cause of those activists in East Lansing and Ann Arbor who sought further state actions.

Vaughn's resolution passed in February 1978, and in May of that same year, Bullard, in response to constituents requests introduced the first divestment bill, House Bill 6341. HB 6341 was an act to amend Michigan's Elliot Larsen Civil Rights Act to prohibit investment by educational institutions in "a corporation, partnership, or association which encourages or condones through its actions or inactions, legally required discrimination against an individual on the basis of race, religion, color, national origin, or sex." By the time the activists' desires to end university investment in South Africa got translated into legislation, the scope of
institutions targeted and the behavior prohibited had broadened consider­ably. With Bullard's bill all educational institutions (public and private) and a wide range of potentially discriminatory investments would be affected.

HB 6341 was referred to and voted out of the Civil Rights Committee, but it never reached a vote on the House floor because Bullard preferred to reintroduce it the next year without having experienced a defeat (which seemed inevitable) the first time around. Beginning with this bill, Representative Bullard and his staff became the driving force within the legislature behind all attempts at divestment, and this sponsorship is seen to be an important asset by activists.

By 1982, Bullard had been a representative with a fairly safe seat from Ann Arbor for nine years. Across these years he has gained influence and staff support in the legislature as a result of having chaired at different points three committees: Civil Rights, Labor, and Judiciary. Each of these committee assignments brought with it one or more staff persons such that his office now has an accumulation of six staff working on his behalf, one of whom has principal responsibility for guiding divest­ment legislation through the house. Bullard's ability to assign large amounts of staff time to divestment legislation would later prove impor­tant in getting bills through committees and through the legislature.

Bullard took on the divestment cause willingly and with great enthusiasm. He describes himself as a strong organizational Democrat who
believes in party discipline, but he has often been willing to facilitate legislative causes that others were unlikely to touch. For example, early in his governmental career, he sponsored bills to decriminalize marijuana and prostitution. He has also introduced a state freedom of information act and a bill to grant solar and wind energy tax credits. He is proud of having been the principal mover behind the bills on South Africa because they fit well into his overall political philosophy. He is a democratic socialist, a member of an organization formerly called the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee (DSOC), and he held a position on the DSOC national advisory committee. Bullard acquired these political leanings through witnessing the Vietnam war first hand. He volunteered to serve in Vietnam and came out of that experience radically changed. Associating himself with those who oppose "wars on the edge of the empire" -- US governmental support for and military intervention on behalf of repressive regimes -- he believes that US corporations' financial ties to South Africa might one day lead to US military involvement in the area to protect such investments. Thus he gladly sponsors divestment legislation and other bills that he hopes will help educate the public about US domination abroad, while also bringing about what he believes are only "small reforms and minor adjustments" in the overall US political and economic system.
With encouragement from activists around the state, support from a few legislative colleagues, and more information about divestment campaigns around the country, Bullard took a more comprehensive approach to divestment legislation in 1979. He introduced ten bills (HBs 4831 – 4840) with the first being an almost identical repeat of the 1978 measure on educational institutions (HB 6341) and the other nine designed to prohibit specific pension funds from being invested in any business "which practices or condones through its actions or inactions, discrimination against an individual on the basis of race, religion, color, national origin or sex." To eliminate overlap in bills 4832 – 4840 and in order to narrow the investment prohibitions specifically to South Africa, within a few months Bullard introduced substitutes for the ten bills with revised versions of HB 4831, 4832, 4834, 4835, 4837, and 4839. These bills disallowed investments by educational institutions and pension funds in "an organization that is listed in the register of organizations doing business in South Africa as prepared by the Department of Civil Rights...."

In addition, HB 4831 required the Department of Civil Rights to compile such a register. Some of the impetus for substituting the original ten bills came from criticism that they were too broad and incapable of implementation because they referred to a wide range of discriminatory investments. Table 5-3 lists all the South Africa-related legislation
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Resolutions</th>
<th>Education Funds</th>
<th>Pension Funds</th>
<th>Bank Deposits</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>432 Vaughn*</td>
<td>6341 Bullard</td>
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<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
<td>4831 Bullard</td>
<td>4832 Bullard</td>
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<td>4833 Bullard</td>
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<td>4834 Bullard</td>
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<td>4838 Bullard</td>
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<td>4839 Bullard</td>
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<td>4840 Bullard</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>449 Collins*</td>
<td>4831 Substitute Bullard</td>
<td>4838 Substitute Bullard</td>
<td>5446 Smith*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td></td>
<td>4553 Bullard*</td>
<td>4315 Smith</td>
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</table>

* legislation that has passed
introduced in Michigan.

Bullard assigned Barbara Eldersveld, one of his legislative aids, the task of working on the divestment legislation for about half of her staff time. In autumn 1979, together she and activists from Ann Arbor and East Lansing, joined by another anti-apartheid group from Western Michigan University (Kalamazoo), began a major effort to gain endorsements and a public show of support among a broad spectrum of groups and individuals.

In its efforts to promote the legislation SALC began showing films about South Africa on campus at MSU about every two weeks. Members felt it important to continue educating the university community about the issue. The group had shown films during the campaign to achieve MSU divestment but had discontinued the effort for about six months after the Trustees' December 1978 activation of their divestment policy. Every time a film was shown (with audiences varying from three to 60, according to the Beemans) literature on the divestment bills would be distributed and people would be asked to contact their representatives urging passage of the legislation. SALC also developed five separate large (each about six feet high and six feet long) portable educational displays of posters and other information dramatizing apartheid and US investments in South Africa and promoting the legislative measures. These displays would be (and still are) carried to various public events (festivals, art shows, meetings, etc.) and/or periodically placed in the first floor of the capitol building near a main entrance.

The several activist groups across the state and Eldersveld began tapping their networks of friends and colleagues at work and in voluntary
organizations to solicit letters and resolutions in support of state divestment efforts. Eldersveld also coordinated the organization of three Civil Rights Committee public hearings on all the substitute bills in separate parts of the state: one in Lansing, one in Detroit, and one in Kalamazoo. The number of people present to testify in favor of the bills ranged from eight in the last hearing to twenty-three in the first. Those presenting testimony included Africanists from the universities, ministers from local congregations as well as councils of churches, civic leaders, and representatives of student organizations. There is no record of the number of people attending the hearings to listen to the testimony.

Before the Civil Rights Committee acted on the 1979 bills, Bullard made new substitutions in early 1980. The language of HB 4831 pertaining to educational institutions was refined further but the substance remained unchanged. All bills regarding pension fund investments were substituted by a new, comprehensive measure, HB 4838. In addition, Bullard's staff developed a new bill having to do with the deposit of surplus state funds. This new piece, HB 5446, was introduced to prohibit the deposit of such funds in banks making loans to the South African government, a national corporation of the South African government, or to a US firm operating in South Africa.

To get a broader base of support for the divestment bill and in order to make visible black legislators' endorsement of the effort, Bullard asked Virgil Smith, a black lawyer and state representative from Detroit since 1977, to be the principal sponsor for HB 5446. Smith had long been acquainted with and critical of South Africa's apartheid policies and
enthusiastically agreed to take on the bill. Soon thereafter, he became the Legislative Black Caucus chair which proved useful later in getting the bill passed.

The winter and spring of 1980 were packed with activities surrounding both the state divestment measures and anti-apartheid events underway at two universities, Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo and Wayne State University in Detroit. Eldersveld organized film shows on South Africa at the capitol building and put together fact sheets and information packets (8 - 12 pages) with background materials and newsclippings on South Africa and anti-apartheid activities. These were sent to constituents. Several legislators pushing for divestment (Bullard, Collins, Smith and the black caucus) hosted a reception in April for several representatives of southern Africa liberation movements visiting the state. The guests of honor included Theo-Ben Guirirab (SWAPO), Johnstone Makatini (ANC), Andrew Mtetwa (ZANU-Patriotic Front) and Ernest Simela (ZAPU-Patriotic Front). For this occasion the House of Representatives passed a resolution (No. 449) commemorating the South African Freedom Conference at Wayne State that was responsible for bringing the liberation movement representatives to Michigan. The conference was put together by a broad-based ad hoc Coalition for Southern African Freedom made up of state representatives, Detroit city council members, academicians, labor union representatives, and members of Congress from the Detroit area. It and the related activities at the capitol helped further legitimize and publicize the activists' pressures for withdrawal of state funds from businesses involved in South Africa. In the meantime, endorsements and letters of support for the bills were sent from groups and individuals across the
state. A list of endorsers is shown in table 5-4.

Using information supplied by SALC members, Eldersveld brought in several outside experts to testify before the Civil Rights Committee and lobby House members to support the two divestment bills and the banking bill. One of the experts was Bill Sutherland, a staff person for the southern Africa program of the American Friends Service Committee. A second was Dumisani Kumalo, a South African journalist in exile working for the American Committee on Africa who appeared to testify in several states (including Connecticut) and on many college campuses (including Western Michigan University that spring). Robert Schwartz of Shearson Loeb Rhoades (now Shearson American Express), an investment firm in New York City, was a third expert witness who was brought in to help convince legislators that the state could make prudent and profitable investments that excluded South Africa-related companies. Pullard's office insured that news conferences were held and press releases sent out every time anti-apartheid visitors appeared in the state.

The Civil Rights Committee held two more hearings on all three bills in March. Opposition to the bills began to surface in these hearings. The State Department of Treasury opposed the divestment concept altogether. In a written analysis, the Department offered detailed criticism of HB 5446, the banking bill. It noted that state agencies and departments throughout the state use local banks as convenient and safe depositories for daily receipts. Delayed depositing of monies, decreased control, increased risk, and potential loss of some interest were all listed as possible consequences of having to go greater distances to deposit funds (if a local bank were disqualified under the legislation). The Department
TABLE 5-4

Divestment Legislation Endorsements
Dates and Bills

Campus Groups and Individuals

PIRGM-MSU, Public Interest Research Group in Michigan; no date, general endorsement of divestment
Michigan Student Assembly, University of Michigan; 1979 - all bills
Michigan Higher Education Student Association; 1979
Graduate Employees Organization, University of Michigan, Local 3550 of the American Federation of Teachers; 1980 - 3 bills
Student Government, Eastern Michigan University; 1980 - 4831 and 4838
Dr. David Gordon, Political Science Department, University of Michigan 1981 - 4553
Dr. Joel Samoff, Political Science Department, University of Michigan 1979 - all bills
Gayle H. Partmann, Coordinator, African Studies Program, Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan; 1979 - all bills

Church Groups and Individuals

Coalition for Peace and Justice, Catholic Diocese of Lansing; 1978 - 6341
Bishop Thomas J. Gumbleton, Auxiliary Bishop of Detroit, Catholic Church; 1980 - general endorsement
Church and Society Committee, Episcopal Diocese of Michigan; 1980 - 4831 and 4838
Senate of Priests, Catholic Diocese of Lansing; 1978 - 6341
Groundwork staff, a newsletter from a Catholic intercongregational center for Michigan justice and peace activities, Lansing; 1980 - 4831 and 4838
United Ministries in Higher Education at Michigan State University; 1980 - 3 bills
Don Van Hoeven, Campus Minister, Western Michigan University; 1980 - general endorsement
### Church Groups and Individuals, cont.

- Committee on Missions of the Covenant Association United Church of Christ, Jackson, Michigan; 1980 - 4831 and 4838
- Rev. Frederick L. Houghton, St. Paul's Episcopal Church, Brighton, Michigan; 1979 - all bills
- Catherine Wagner, Assistant Director, Archdiocese of Detroit; 1980 - 4831 and 4838
- Sister Mary Rebecca Lorenz, Sisters of Mercy, Detroit; 1981 - 4553
- Rev. Philip E. Henderson, United Presbyterian Church, Lansing; 1981 - 4553
- Duane Vore, Michigan Council of Churches, Lansing; 1979-1981 - all bills
- Rev. Donald Coleman, Campus Minister, University of Michigan; 1979 - all bills
- Michigan Council of Churches

### Labor Groups and Individuals

- Irving Bluestone, Vice President, United Automobile Workers, Detroit; 1980 - general
- Communication Workers of America, District 4, Lansing
- Michigan Coalition of Labor Union Women; 1980 - general endorsement

### Other Groups and Individuals

- Peace Education Center Policy Committee; 1979 - all bills
- Greater Lansing Area Chapter of the United Nations Association; 1980 - 3 bills
- Metropolitan Kalamazoo Chapter of the NAACP; 1980 - 3 bills
- Women's Conference of Concerns, Detroit; 1980 - 3 bills
- Allan Cooper, Common Cause; 1979 - all bills
asserted that

this bill would create unnecessary costs to the Department of Treasury and the banks resulting from the filing and handling of the required affidavits. It is already cumbersome for banks to qualify as depositories of state funds. Banks must post collateral with the State Treasurer for the full amounts of such deposits. Act 88 of the Public Acts of 1979 added the requirement of banks to file reports with the commissioner of the Financial Institutions Bureau showing they are in compliance with anti-redlining requirements. Further hindrances imposed by this bill could convince banks that the requirements for acquiring state funds are not worth the benefits to them, and choose not to qualify for our deposits. This could be very detrimental to the State and its taxpayers by limiting the number of banks available as state depositories (Department of Treasury, May 1980).

With regard to the intention of the legislation to help in ending apartheid, the Department's analysis concluded that "those companies which adhere to the Sullivan Principles would appear to provide a positive impact in helping to put an end to apartheid" (Department of Treasury, May 1980).

A State Department of Commerce representative appeared also to oppose the banking bill (5446). He argued that HB 5446 could not be practically implemented and that the state government should not be involved in attempting sanctions activity against South Africa. Not all of the relevant state agencies opposed the legislation, however. The Department of Civil Rights endorsed the educational institutions' investments bill (4831) and supported the concept put forth in the other two. The State Board of Education originally supported the idea of the first version of HB 4831 but objected to its breadth. However, now that the current version of 4831 pertained only to South Africa, the Board lent its support to the measure.

From the private sector, the Michigan Manufacturers' Association (MMA) sent a lobbyist to speak generally in opposition to all three pieces of legislation, and although they have never testified against the bills,
lobbyists from General Motors and Ford have visited Bullard to try to convince him to stop sponsoring this legislation. The banking community, however, was less willing to be identified visibly as an opponent. Michigan Bankers' Association (MBA) lobbyist, Don Heikkinen, and Robert Duff from the National Bank of Detroit both noted their concerns about the banking bill at the hearings. They wanted more time to study the implications of the measure, suggested that it lacked clarity, and asserted that it would be impossible to implement in its current form. But, they were also willing to spend time with the Bill's proponents to refine it and make it more acceptable to bankers.

The MBA is a multi-purpose organization providing group insurance, educational seminars, legal advice and a lobby at the state legislature for Michigan banks. All but two banks in the state (over 360) belong to the Association. It has a staff of twelve persons, three of whom are registered lobbyists. Heikkinen is a senior vice president and staff counsel for the organization, and he took principal responsibility for negotiating with legislative proponents on changes the MBA wanted in the bill. He felt that legislators' desires to condemn apartheid were laudable, but he also believed that the state should not be involved in attempting to prohibit investments in South Africa. In his view, the legislation would add one more area of unnecessary governmental regulation to the banking business. By prohibiting deposits of state funds in banks that lend to corporations doing business in South Africa, the state was only indirectly targeting corporations, the real culprit, while punishing banks, secondary actors. And, he maintained, this indirect targeting would have no impact on corporations' investment policies. Therefore, if
the state was going to be involved in sanctions or divestment activity (which it should not be), he believed it should go after the businesses like GM, Chrysler, and Ford that make the investments and not cause problems for other organizations, like banks, as indirect targets. Furthermore, if the state passed such legislation, it would have no place to deposit its funds since almost all the larger Michigan banks had some sort of business dealings with the US operations of corporations that invest in South Africa. Smaller banks already had difficulty qualifying to be depositories because a constitutional provision does not allow state deposits in financial institutions to exceed 50 percent of the institution's net worth. However, Heikinen believed that the banking bill had enough momentum to pass in some form, and he therefore decided not to oppose it outright. He wanted to try "to clean it up as best we could." There was a public relations liability attached to coming out against a bill designed to combat racism, and he did not want to create an image problem for Michigan banks.

Another part of the provisions of HB 5446 was that the state could not make deposits in banks that lend directly to the government of South Africa or to one of its parastatals. According to information disseminated by the Campaign to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa (COBLSA), based at the time in New York City, five Michigan banks had participated in loans to the South African government. The Treasury Department reported that only one of these banks, the City National Bank of Detroit, was at the time a depository for state monies. Both the MBA and representatives of the bank itself claimed that they knew of no such loans to South Africa, but in any case were willing to agree to the part of HB 5446 that prohibited
them from making direct loans. Through negotiation between Heikkinen, Eldersveld and Treasury Department representatives, the bill was rewritten to forbid deposits of state funds in banks that loan to the South African government, a national corporation of the South African government, or "to a subsidiary or affiliate of a United States firm operating in the Republic of South Africa." This meant that banks in Michigan could continue to lend to US corporations such as GM and be allowed to receive deposits of state funds; but they would not be able to loan any money to public or private businesses located in South Africa such as GM's subsidiary there. Since there is no evidence of Michigan banks ever having lent directly to a South African subsidiary of a US corporation, Heikkinen was willing to remain unopposed to HB 5446 in this form. The Treasury Department then removed its opposition apparently for two reasons: officials there also believed the rewritten measure would not disqualify any banks as depositories, and the legislative black caucus applied pressure to Loren Monroe, the black state treasurer, to support the bill. With this second source of opposition gone, a major obstacle to the bill's passage was overcome. Smith, as the bill's sponsor, also agreed to the revision.

At this point, Bullard and Smith decided to press first for approval of the banking bill before trying to get the education bill (4831) passed. The pension bill (4838) would be the last one attempted because it had received the greatest initial amount of negative reaction. They correctly assessed the degree of difficulty in passing each of the three bills and strategically ordered them so as to get an early victory (with 5446) that would contribute momentum for passage of the other two.

After lobbying by activists, the House of Representatives passed
HB 5446 by a vote of 58–40 on May 20, 1980, and it was sent to the Senate. In the Senate, proponents managed to get it assigned to the committee they believed would be most sympathetic, the Judiciary Committee chaired by Basil Brown, a black Democrat and the Senator with the greatest length of service (27 years) in the legislature. Whereas Eldersveld and Bullard had shared with Smith the principal responsibility for guiding the bill through the House, at this point Smith took over the task of facilitating it passage in the Senate. Smith pressured Brown to achieve a quick, positive endorsement by the Judiciary Committee; but Brown, unaware of the previous painstaking negotiations between the MBA, Treasury, and Eldersveld over the bill's language, allowed the measure to be amended so as to restore it to its original provisions — prohibiting deposits of state funds in banks that lend to corporations operating in South Africa. After being convinced that the measure would never pass the Senate in this form, Brown agreed to amend it on the floor of the Senate to match the House version, and he also agreed to help Smith press for its approval.

Smith and Brown both were involved simultaneously with court reorganization legislation that had won them some unexpected conservative allies and friends in the Senate. They called on those allies to help secure the banking bill's passage. When HB 5446 got to the Senate floor, however, there was an attempt by Senator Frederick to amend it. His amendment would have broadened the scope of the bill so far that support would be impossible, even by its proponents. He wanted to add a phrase stating: "Nor shall a depository of state funds practice or condone, or be based in a country which practices or condones violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations" (Senate Journal #90:
1854). The amendment failed (12-18) even though some Senators argued that the legislature should not single out South Africa for condemnation. For example, Senator Welborn asked, "Why shouldn't we, if we're going to address the oppression of blacks in South Africa, address the oppression and torture and the killings of Christians in the Communist countries?" (Senate Journal #114: 2728).

With Brown's amendments to bring the Senate version in line with the House version, the legislation passed on November 21, 1980, by a vote of 22 to 7. Because the wording was still not precisely that of the House version, the bill went back to the House to receive final confirmation on November 25. Once again a conservative member, Alan Cropsey, attempted an amendment, this time to include the Soviet Union in addition to South Africa as a proscribed direct investment for banks desiring to qualify as state fund depositories. This amendment failed narrowly (46-47). The bill was finally adopted by a wide margin of 68-28, and with the governor's signature became Public Act 325 of 1980, shown in appendix E.

This was not the first time nor the last that Representative Cropsey tried to amend the divestment legislation. Alan Cropsey is a conservative, religiously fundamental Republican (graduate of Bob Jones University) who has opposed all of the divestment legislation. He is the only legislator who has made a point of tracking and consistently trying to amend or defeat these measures. He would prefer that the legislature not involve itself at all in foreign policy issues, but if a statement is going to be made or regulations passed on South Africa's violations of human rights, he wants to give the same treatment to other abusive governments, especially communist ones. That US businesses have any dealings with the USSR
distresses him, and he is convinced that the Soviet Union will overtake
the US with technology and machinery sold to that government by US companies.
With regard to South Africa, although he thinks apartheid policies need
to be "relaxed considerably," he is not sure that blacks there are ready
for self government — "existing under white rule for a while longer might
not be so bad." He does not view himself as a racist but concedes that
others might see him that way. He is the only opponent to the legislation
interviewed who was not worried about openly challenging the legislation
and being labeled a racist.

Back in March 1980, when all three bills were before the Civil Rights
Committee, Cropsey attempted to amend the educational institution invest­
ments bill (4831) by proposing that, in addition to South Africa as a
prohibited investment, all the countries (104 of them) listed by Freedom
House as 1980 violators of human rights also be included in the legislation.
In addition, he wanted to attach the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
as the definition of human rights. His amendment failed in committee
(2-8), and the same day that the banking bill was adopted by the committee
(March 18, 1980) the education and pension fund bills also received committee
approval.

Although, as was stated earlier, Bullard and Smith decided as a matter
of tactics to pursue the passage of the banking bill first, they did not
abandon the other two measures. On June 4, 1980, after the House's
first passage of HB 5446 but before the Senate passage, a joint hearing
on HB 4831 and 4838 was held by the House Civil Rights Committee, the
House Senior Citizens and Retirement Committee, the Retirement Subcommittee
of the Appropriations Committee, and the Department of the Treasury.
Robert Schwartz, as mentioned earlier, was invited by Eldersveld and Bullard to testify. Schwartz specializes as a financial counselor in "socially responsible" investments, as discussed in chapter III. He builds clients' portfolios around investments that avoid companies or types of holdings the client considers socially irresponsible (such as companies in South Africa, anti-union companies, polluters, violators of OSHA rules, etc.). Even though by this time the MSU divestment experience had proven that divestment could be accomplished without financial loss, proponents felt that the expert testimony from a person such as Schwartz could only help their cause. Therefore, SALC provided the funds to bring Schwartz from New York and Eldersveld set up the hearing. In addition, Eldersveld solicited an opinion from a California law firm specializing in investment and financial planning, Turner and Jovanovich, about the feasibility of divestment. The letter confirming Schwartz's testimony, stated that "it would be quite feasible to construct a portfolio for the State of Michigan that restricted investments to those domestic corporations' securities (not invested in South Africa) and the portfolio need not sacrifice diversification, safety, or potential growth by excluding the multinationals and other companies involved in South Africa."

Again, the hearing provided an opportunity for opposition to be voiced and this time it came from Johannes G. Pienaar, midwest director of the South Africa Foundation who has spent a great deal of time in Michigan opposing anti-apartheid work, as will be seen later in this chapter.

Throughout the remainder of 1980, activists and legislators stayed busy securing the passage of the banking bill, and they were unable at this point simultaneously to move forward with HBs 4831 and 4838. They were pleased with the victory on HB 5446, however, and were confident that its
passage would aid in promoting the other two. Meanwhile, another Michigan university adopted a policy of withdrawing its funds from corporations doing business in South Africa. On November 19, the Eastern Michigan University Board of Regents voted to divest its holdings of South African stock (Ann Arbor News, November 20, 1980).

In the spring of 1981, Bullard reintroduced the education institution investments bill (now numbered 4553 – see appendix F) and Smith took over sponsorship of the pension funds bill (now numbered 4315 – see appendix G).

Divestment activities around the state and at the legislature slowed somewhat in 1981 after a very busy year and several victories for the activists in 1980. One major event occurred, however, on March 24, when there was a public ceremony for Governor Milliken to sign the banking bill. His signature had been given officially in December 1980, but the SALC activists and the legislators wanted to have an additional public rite of passage. The occasion came when nine Nigerian state and federal legislators were visiting in Michigan. Since the government of Nigeria has been a major supporter of anti-apartheid activities in the UN, Bullard and the activists felt that it would be appropriate for the visitors to witness the Michigan state government's anti-apartheid work. The Nigerians were taken to the capitol, and in a public show of support for sanctions activity against South Africa, they watched Governor Milliken sign the banking bill. Speaking on behalf of the group to the governor and the press, Prince Israel Moronfoye, Speaker of the House of Assembly in the state of Kwara, congratulated the people of Michigan on having the farsightedness to pass such a bill. Another member of the group, Olutade Ismail, noted that, with Nigeria
providing the US with a great deal of its oil imports, it was in the US interest to keep a strong commitment against racism and to join with Nigeria in anti-apartheid actions.

In the summer, following the spring reintroduction of the pension fund and educational institution investments bills, Bullard and Smith invited anti-apartheid activists from across the state to a strategy meeting on how to promote and press for passage of the remaining legislation. The strategy session was hosted by SALC in August with about 20 persons from across the state present — almost all from university environments. Eldersveld came representing Bullard and Smith also attended. The group shared news of events in their separate locations and discussed ways to help speed the passage of the legislation. Discussion also centered around a fall conference in the state focused on South Africa and divestment. The group hoped to bring South Africans prominent in the resistance movement to the state for such a conference in order to boost a legislative campaign. From information available, however, the conference never got off the drawing board.

Another anti-apartheid discussion was held for legislators at the capitol in December, however, when participants from a University of Michigan symposium on a sports boycott of South Africa came to Lansing to speak. Included in the group were: Michigan member of Congress George Crockett; Dennis Brutus, a poet in exile from South Africa; Johnny Makatini, ANC representative to the US and UN; and Peter Mechihange, SWAPO's foreign affairs representative.

More hearings were held by the Civil Rights Committee in November 1981 and January 1982. This time only the education bill was on the agenda.
because the pension bill had been assigned to another committee, the Senior Citizens and Retirement Committee. Only proponents appear to have been present at these hearings. In November, four representatives of religious or university groups testified in favor of the divestment measure, and in January, SALC brought in another outside expert, Gail Hovey, Research Director for the American Committee on Africa in New York, to lobby and testify on behalf of the legislation.

Although Cropsey's attempted amendment to the education bill in 1980 was apparently the only opposition targeting this particular divestment effort voiced openly in any of the hearings, the measure had raised concerns in some less visible quarters and faced some difficulties. One issue that had to be faced was the scope of institutions affected by the bill. As introduced by Bullard the legislation would affect the investment policies of both private and public educational institutions serving any age level of student (primary, secondary, higher educations, etc). Believing that such an act could bring "undue governmental interference in the affairs of private educational institutions that receive no public funds" and "contravene various US Supreme Court opinions ensuring the separation of church and state" (House Legislative Analysis, 1980), some opposed its application to private institutions. Although the Association of Independent Colleges and Universities had made its objections known, it is not clear precisely who the legislative opponents were; but Representative Dressel (Republican from Holland) moved to amend the bill in the January meeting so as to limit its scope to public educational institutions. Such an amendment was acceptable to Bullard, and it passed the committee unanimously. The legislation as a whole was then adopted without opposition
by the committee.

This bill got its impetus from and has always been discussed in terms of the investment policies of universities. In Michigan there are 41 public institutions of higher education -- two-year and four-year universities and colleges. These institutions are listed in table 5-5. Information about endowments of colleges and universities is shown in table 5-6. What percentage of this money is invested in corporations with South African operations is unknown. Since two of these schools had at the time already adopted total divestment policies (MSU and Eastern Michigan University), 39 would be affected by the legislation, including the University of Michigan which has a partial divestment policy. What, if any, affect this measure would have on educational institutions other than those for higher education is not clear and does not seem to have generated any discussion.

Another organization that had concerns about this bill was the Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Association (TIAA) whose lobbyist, Bob Smith of Coomes, Farhat, Smith and Hoisington lobbying firm, had visited several legislators to seek their opposition to it. Smith reports that TIAA is worried that the bill might be construed so as to prevent universities from doing business with the insurance company because it invests in companies that do business in South Africa; but he also says that Bullard assured him that such was not the intention of the legislation.

Other objections of unknown origin reported in a 1980 analysis from House of Representatives research staff were as follows:

Article 8, section 5 and 6 of the Michigan Constitution stipulate that the board of control of each public college and university in the state must have "control and direction of
TABLE 5-5
Michigan Public Institutions of Higher Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Name of Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Alpena Community College, Alpena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;L</td>
<td>Bay De Noc Community College, Escanaba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Central Michigan University, Mt. Pleasant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;L</td>
<td>Charles Stewart Mott Community College, Flint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Delta College, University Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>* Eastern Michigan University, Ypsilanti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Ferris State College, Big Rapids</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Glen Oaks Community College, Centreville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Gogebic Community College, Highland Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Grand Valley State College, Allendale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;L</td>
<td>Henry Ford Community College, Dearborn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;L</td>
<td>Highland Park Community College, Highland Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Jackson Community College, Jackson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Kalamazoo Valley Community College, Kalamazoo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;L</td>
<td>Kellogg Community College, Battle Creek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Lake Superior State College, Sault Ste. Marie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Lake Michigan College, Benton Harbor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Lincoln Community College, Flint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Macomb County Community College, Mt. Clemens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>* Michigan State University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Michigan Technical University, Houghton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;L</td>
<td>Mid-Michigan Community College, Harrison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Monroe County Community College, Monroe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Montcali Community College, Sidney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;L</td>
<td>Muskegon Community College, Muskegon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;L</td>
<td>North Central Michigan College, Petoskey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Northern Michigan University, Marquette</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;L</td>
<td>Oakland Community College, Bloomfield Hills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Oakland University, Rochester</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Saginaw Valley State College, University Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>St. Clair County Community College, Port Huron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;L</td>
<td>Schoolcraft College, Livonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;L</td>
<td>Southwestern Michigan College, Dowagiac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>* University of Michigan, Ann Arbor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>University of Michigan-Flint, Flint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Washtenaw Community College, Ann Arbor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Wayne County Community College, Detroit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Wayne State University, Detroit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>West Shore Community College, Scottville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key:  
C = County  
S = State  
L = Local  
S&L = State and Local

* those with partial or total divestment policies

TABLE 5-6

Endowments of Michigan Institutions of Higher Education
(in thousands of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Publicly Controlled</td>
<td>$157,980</td>
<td>$153,997</td>
<td>$168,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privately Controlled</td>
<td>96,225</td>
<td>101,444</td>
<td>119,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Institutions (total)</td>
<td>$254,205</td>
<td>$255,441</td>
<td>$287,595</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In 1980, the University of Michigan alone accounted for $126,627,000 of the publicly controlled endowments.

all expenditures from the institution's funds." Similarly, Article 8, section 7 provides that public community and junior colleges must "be supervised and controlled by locally elected boards." Some people feel that House Bill 4831 (the education bill, now #4553), by imposing restrictions on the investments of these institutions, would contravene these constitutional provisions. (House Legislative Analysis, 1980; my parentheses)

Bullard's staff believe that such worries are unfounded. The independence of universities in terms of their academic freedom, the crucial arena in which the courts have required noninterference by the legislature, would not be challenged by the legislation. And, through other provisions in civil rights legislation, the state had already established its ability to prohibit discrimination by universities. This act would be simply an extension of the nondiscrimination demands of the state (Memo to Bullard, January 1982). Although there was some rumor that the University of Michigan would fight the legislation in court if it passed, these points of opposition do not seem to have been aired publicly and did not seem to have caused much discussion in the legislature.

No substantial objections to HB 4553 were made by any state agencies. The Department of Treasury was the only agency with an inclination to oppose the act, but since the Department had no jurisdiction over the matter, it issued no statement on it. As has already been noted, the Department of Education by this time supported the measure (although not actively) and the Civil Rights Department had approved of it from the beginning. Since there was a provision in the legislation that the Civil Rights Department compile a register of businesses operating in South Africa (from information obtained from the US Department of Commerce), this Department expected to incur enforcement costs of about $35,000 per year if the measure passed. Roy Castillo, the legislative liaison for the Depart-
ment, said that the agency staff had supported the bill enthusiastically, believing that there was a moral responsibility to do so. With quite large recent budget and staff cuts due to the economic difficulties facing the state, however, he had doubts that they would be able to enforce it properly if it became law.

After HB 4553 received Civil Rights Committee approval in January 1982, it met the first of four major obstacles on the House floor in February. When the bill received its second reading Representative Ballentine moved to place a tie-bar on the bill; that is he amended the legislation to require that this "act shall not take effect unless House Bill No. 4315 (the pension bill)... is enacted into law" (House Journal, No. 17: 307; parentheses mine). This amendment was an attempt to kill the legislation since there was little chance the pension bill would pass in that legislative session. Indeed, activists had no plans to press for its passage at that time. The amendment was carried by a vote of 56-36.

The second opposition amendment came on the same day when Representative Mueller attempted to insert a provision requiring that educational institutions "not accept funds from any organization that does business in the Republic of South Africa... (House Journal, No. 17: 307). This amendment was defeated by a margin of 50 - 42. The third attempt to kill the legislation by burdening it with unacceptable provisions was a familiar amendment from Alan Cropsey which would prohibit educational institutions from encouraging or condoning imperialistic communism, religious discrimination, ethnic discrimination or terrorism by knowingly making or maintaining ... an investment in an organization operating in the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics" (House Journal, No. 17: 309). Before the amendment came to a vote another representative moved postponement of the vote.

Knowing that his bill would face further difficulty from an apparently well-organized opposition, Bullard attempted to strike a compromise with Cropsey. The two representatives met and agreed that Cropsey would remove some of his inflammatory language in the amendment and Bullard would not oppose it. In return, Bullard would make a motion to remove the tie-bar and Cropsey would support this effort. Thus, in Cropsey's amendment was passed reading as follows: an educational institution shall not encourage or condone religious discrimination or ethnic discrimination by knowingly making or maintaining after February 1, 1983, an investment in an organization operating in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" (House Journal, No. 55: 1089). The tie-bar was removed (with a vote of 60-39) but the measure faced still another amendment attempt. Representative Maynard reintroduced Mueller's motion to prohibit institutions from accepting money from businesses operating in South Africa. The motion failed again, 44-55. The legislation was then passed by the House by an overwhelming vote of 75-25 on May 13, 1982. The deal that Bullard had struck with Cropsey appears to have worked in the end to help secure passage. Other factors that contributed to its passage were (1) SALC members making numerous phone calls and recruiting others to write letters and postcards to legislators urging them to vote for the bill, and (2) an information sheet compiled by Eldersveld and SALC members and given to all legislators showing the wide range of cities and state governments and universities that had considered or approved similar measures. Legislators interviewed reported that they had received phone calls and mail and had found the information
sheet helpful. It added further legitimacy to the action the bill would require.

Now the Senate was faced with a bill requiring divestment by educational institutions from businesses operating in South Africa and the USSR—a radical alteration of the kind of bill proponents desired. Bullard's staff expressed confidence that a serious attempt to remove Cropsey's amendment would be made in the Senate.

At the time of this writing, this bill has been referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, still chaired by Basil Brown. Brown seems to be disinterested in the bill and there are conflicting reports regarding the likelihood of committee approval. The reasons for Brown's lack of active support are also unclear. Without Senate approval, the measure will have to be reintroduced in the new legislative session and begin the entire process again.

Although Bullard and Smith deliberately postponed their attempts to get the pension bill passed, the legislation did receive attention. The strategy of building momentum for its approval by first securing passage of the banking and educational institutions bills was not lost on opponents to these measures. Both opponents and proponents knew that the pension bill would face general difficulty, and in anticipation of a campaign by activists to pass the measure, the opponents want to capitalize on and increase those difficulties as much as possible.

A major source of opposition is in the Treasury Department. In a 1981 Department analysis of HB 4315, Treasury staff reported that as of February 29, 1980, the six retirement funds for which the Treasurer has the investment function had these amounts (book value) invested in corporations
doing business in South Africa: $220 million in fixed income holdings; and $386 million in common stock holdings (55% of the total common stock holdings), for total South Africa related holdings of $606 million.

The total portfolio amounted to $4.8 billion on that date; thus about 13% of the entire portfolio would be affected, most of this in common stock. As of November 25, 1981, the entire portfolio was worth $6.1 billion, and the analysis estimated that the 1981 investments would contain the same representation of companies doing business in South Africa. If the 13% figure holds for this larger 1981 portfolio, the amount of money involved is approximately $793 million. In addition, there is a Municipal Employees Retirement System (MERS) that has its investments handled within the Bureau of Management and Budget. No figures are available on the amounts or South Africa-related investments within the MERS portfolio.

The State Treasurer, Loren Monroe, one of the highest ranking black state officials (appointed by the governor in 1978), stated in an interview for this study that pension funds investments should be based on three criteria: safety, return, and social responsibility. He is convinced that using all three criteria is possible and maintains that he is generally supportive of the concept of socially responsible investment. In May 1980, however, he issued a statement against the pension fund bill saying: "The indignities faced by Blacks in South Africa are many, but I also know that as state treasurer it is wrong, illogical and irresponsible to divest stock holdings in order to soothe the consciences of persons who feel that a hollow, sacrificial gesture with other people's money will end the inhumanity of whites against Blacks in South Africa" (Michigan Chronicle, May 3, 1980). He also noted that prominent US blacks have opposed
divestment. In addition, the state's Investment Advisory Committee announced its objections (State Journal, June 8, 1980) and Monroe's staff have written a legislative analysis under his signature that strongly opposes the pension bill. These staff maintain that all of their training as portfolio managers makes them view any attempt to limit their flexibility in investment decisions with alarm. They see their primary responsibility to be that of making safe and profitable investments for the state of Michigan, and to do this they want to make decisions on financial criteria alone. From their perspective, divestment severely restricts the flexibility of the state's investment program because it would limit the number and kinds of investment opportunities available. They believe it interjects a harmful set of investment criteria, and thus threatens their ability to carry out prudent management. Furthermore, they maintain that pension fund divestment cannot be compared legitimately to the profitable divestment process that took place at MSU because the state operates under much more stringent legal investment regulations than does the university. If there was reduced investment performance, this could result in an increase in employer contribution to the public employee retirement system -- i.e. more tax dollars. In addition, they believe that divestment by institutional investors would have no impact on the corporations doing business in South Africa because their investments are made in the secondary market, not in new issuances of stock. Therefore, divestment would have no impact on South Africa either, they argue. These staff members also suggest that holding a company's stock may be a good way to get entree for influencing its South Africa policies (Lindsey, Stevens, and Townsend, interviews).
A third major Treasury argument against the pension fund bill is that it is "counter productive to the efforts of the Executive Office and the legislature to revive Michigan's economy" since the bill would prohibit the state from holding stock in such important Michigan based companies as Burrough, Chrysler, Dow Chemical, Ford, GM, Kellogg, and Upjohn (Department of Treasury, Nov. 25, 1981). Table 5-7 lists corporations headquartered in Michigan that have South African subsidiaries.

In order to state their opposition to apartheid while opposing HB 4315, the Treasury Department staff have suggested an amendment to the bill almost identical to the amendment placed on the banking bill. This proposed provision would prohibit pension funds from being invested in companies making "a loan to the Republic of South Africa, a national corporation of the Republic of South Africa, or a direct investment in a subsidiary or affiliate of a United States firm operating in the Republic of South Africa... 'subsidiary or affiliate of a United States firm operating in the Republic of South Africa' means as determined by the United States Department of Commerce a firm incorporated under the laws of the Republic of South Africa, domiciled in the Republic of South Africa, and controlled by a United States firm. A subsidiary or affiliate shall not be construed to mean a subsidiary or affiliate or parent that is located in the United States" (Department of Treasury, Nov. 25, 1981). This proposed amendment would in all likelihood mean that no pension monies would need to be divested if such legislation passed, and this is precisely what the Department staff would like to have happen.

The portfolio manager for MERS, John Fonger, took a position on the pension fund divestment bill very similar to that of the Treasury Depart-
TABLE 5-7
Michigan Businesses with Investments in South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Product sold to/ in South Africa</th>
<th>Sullivan signatory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asgrow Seed, Kalamazoo</td>
<td>Manufacturing/ sales</td>
<td>Seeds</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bundy Corp., Detroit</td>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>Tubing</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burroughs Corp., Detroit</td>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>Business machines and computers</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark Int'l, Buchanan</td>
<td>Manufacturing/ sales</td>
<td>Earth moving and mining equipment</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chrysler Corp., Detroit</td>
<td>Manufacturing/ sales</td>
<td>Automobiles</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dow Chemical Co., Midland</td>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>Chemicals and pharmaceuticals</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dow Corning Co., Midland</td>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>Silicone products</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal-Mogul Corp., Detroit</td>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>Automotive parts</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford Motor Co., Dearborn</td>
<td>Manufacturing/ Sales</td>
<td>Automobiles</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Motors Corp., Detroit</td>
<td>Manufacturing/ Sales</td>
<td>Motor vehicles, earth moving &amp; locomotive equipment, power &amp; industrial products</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kellogg Co., Battle Creek</td>
<td>Manufacturing/ Sales</td>
<td>Food products</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leco Corp., St. Joseph</td>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>Steeling sampling devices &amp; electronic instruments</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National-Standard Co., Miles</td>
<td>Manufacturing/ Sales</td>
<td>Wire</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upjohn Co., Kalamazoo</td>
<td>Manufacturing/ Sales</td>
<td>Pharmaceuticals</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valeron Corp., Royal Oak</td>
<td>Manufacturing/ Sales</td>
<td>Engineering tooling</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ment staff, and he, too, had communicated his opposition and the opposition of his board of directors to Bullard (Fonger, interview).

The Michigan House of Representatives Senior Citizens and Retirement Committee to which the pension fund divestment bill has been referred has a chair who is quite sympathetic to the divestment cause but very cautious about setting up non-financial criteria for investments. The chair, Representative Francis Spaniola, a former teacher and a Democrat who has served eight years in the House, promises to watch the bill closely, and without his support, the bill will probably never get out of committee. Spaniola has discussed the bill at length with people in the Treasury Department and has a great deal of sympathy for their position because he, too, believes that, above all, the safety and profitability of the investments must be upheld. As chair of the committee, he feels that a responsibility to ensure a prudent approach to investments is a public trust placed in him by the state's retired employees. At the same time, however, he feels great antipathy for apartheid and is eager to have the state of Michigan be on record in active opposition to the racist system. He believes that the Treasury Department proposed amendment would leave the bill lifeless but that total divestment (what the bill now requires) is financially unsound. He wants a solution in between these two positions.

Spaniola gets occasional visits from a few lobbyists concerned about the bill, one of whom is Gert J. Grobler, a representative from the South African Consul General in Chicago. Grobler has come by his office about twice a year since the bill originally was introduced (1979) to encourage Spaniola's opposition. Grobler has supplied him with information against
divestment, including a report of the Connecticut governor's veto of
divestment legislation. Spaniola also gets lobbied by SALT members and
the experts they periodically bring to town to testify. He reports that
he makes plain to these various lobbyists that "if there's a way I can
support divestment without harming the sanctity of the funds, I will
support it" (Spaniola, interview). Whether or not the bill's proponents
can either negotiate such a "middle road" with Spaniola or convince
him that divestment can be accomplished without damaging the safety and
profitability of the fund remains to be seen.

Another active source of opposition to this measure is from an
association of the retirees themselves. The Retirement Coordinating
Council is a coalition of public employee organizations with one of its
major functions being that of a lobby on behalf of public employee retirees.
The RCC has sent out occasional "Red Alerts" to members across the state
warning that their funds are in jeopardy due to the introduction of HB 4315
and its predecessors. Both Smith and Bullard have received mail as a
result of these letter-writing campaigns. And, Treasury Department officials
and staff in the Bureau of Retirement Systems are in close touch with the
RCC about their united opposition to the legislation.

Less active and vocal opposition has come from the business community.
As was mentioned earlier, lobbyists from GM, Ford and the MMA have all
made known their organizations' desires to have the bills defeated, and
a Bob Smith from Coomes, Farhat, Smith and Hoisington, representing
TIAA (as mentioned before) has lobbied against the pension fund bill in
addition to the educational bill. From the interview with Richard
Augenstein of the MMA, it appears that the business community is not very
worried that either the pension fund bill or the educational institutions funds bill will pass. Thus they have not been very active in lobbying against them. Spaniola's prediction is that, if the HB 4553 passes the Senate for final approval, business organizations will then mount a concerted drive to defeat HB 4315. At this point their opposition is not deeply felt by legislators.

Important to note is that although Smith and Bullard are delaying a push for HB 4315, Eldersveld and the SALC activists have continued to promote the bill in their educational work. They have developed brochures and handouts describing the pension fund bill along with materials put together to promote the educational institutions fund bill and earlier, the banking bill. The three bills are seen by the activists as a "package" in that they are all useful as educational tools in bringing about awareness of apartheid and US complicity in it. SALC communicates with Bullard and Eldersveld about when they need to mobilize supporters to contact legislators to get particular bills passed, but in the meantime, they keep busy laying an educational foundation among people and organizations across the state on both bills that have not yet passed. Examples of SALC and Bullard's office educational materials are in appendix H.

The story of the anti-apartheid legislative efforts in Michigan would not be complete without an examination of the process underway for implementing the banking bill. After July 4, 1982, the state was to have no deposits in banks that make loans to the South African government, one of its national corporations, or a subsidiary or affiliate of a US firm located in South Africa. The Financial Institutions Bureau of the Department of Commerce is in charge of enforcing the legislation and at the most
recent visit to Lansing for researching this question (May 1982), the FIB had taken several steps to meet the July deadline. In February 1982, the Bureau sent out a letter to the chief executive officers of banks serving as depositories of state funds that "a new prerequisite to qualify a bank as a depository of state funds and political subdivision funds" had been added to state law. The letter attached an affidavit form requiring the bank to state that it has not made any loans of the kind prohibited by Public Act No. 325. In an attempt to help banks comply, in April the Bureau supplied a list of US corporations operating in South Africa from the US Department of Commerce. The list is compiled by the American Consulate General in Johannesburg as a service to US business and is not an official list of the Department, which says it cannot guarantee the accuracy of the list. The FIB also suggested that the bank executives consult their legal counsel for assistance in complying with the law. The banks will only have to file one affidavit declaring themselves in compliance. That is, there will be no annual filing requirements. The letter states that "once an affidavit is filed, the Bureau will assume that the filed affidavit is valid until the bank files another affidavit reflecting a change in status relating to the existence of loans to South African entities listed in the Act."

At the time of writing, the implementation impact is not known. Treasury Department officials and staff at the MBA did not, at the time of my interviews with them, expect any banks to be disqualified as depositories. They all believed that no Michigan banks make loans directly to the South African government, South African national corporations, or US corporations' subsidiaries located in South Africa. The effect of the
compromise amendment, to which Smith agreed to achieve passage of the bill, seems to be that a law was created that leaves unchanged the list of banks that qualify as depositories of state funds. This is not to say, however, that the banking bill and campaigns surrounding all of the divestment legislation have had no impact. Indeed, one impact is that banks serving as depositories must in essence promise not to make loans to South Africa in the future if they want to remain as depositories.

Before an analysis of impact can be thoroughly made, however, a discussion is needed on why the banking bill became law, why the educational institutional funds bill passed the House, and the obstacles facing the passage of the pension bill. It is to this discussion that we now turn.

Why These Outcomes

Once again we will employ the table 1-2 "shopping list" of variables to aid an analysis of why divestment legislation had achieved partial success in Michigan. The Michigan legislature has considered a number of divestment bills, and this discussion will attempt to generalize across the several campaigns launched to push them through the legislature, the two most significant campaigns being those for the passage of the banking bill through both chambers and for the educational institutions bill through the House of Representatives. Differences between campaigns will be noted when they appear to be significant in affecting the outcomes.

Goals, Theory of Action, Target, Time and Context

One of the inner environment variables significant in the activists' divestment efforts is the matter of what proponents hope to achieve, or their goals. Table 5-8 displays proponents' goals categorized by time
TABLE 5-8
Michigan Proponents' Campaign Goals

Short-term

1. For proponents to take a principled stand regarding not having Michigan institutions profit from racism by having monies invested in corporations or deposited in banks doing business in South Africa.

2. For proponents to send a message to corporation executives that they will continue to suffer moral pressure to withdraw from South Africa.

3. For proponents to demonstrate solidarity with blacks and others in South Africa resisting apartheid.

4. For proponents to send a message to the South African government that segments of the American people are committed to the isolation of South Africa from western country's economic and military support.

5. For proponents to demonstrate disagreement with US governmental foreign policy toward South Africa.

6. For proponents to pursue the freedoms and responsibilities as American citizens to promote and preserve justice in the US and abroad.

Medium-term

7. For proponents and the state to remove the state of Michigan's direct support and participation in the perpetuation of apartheid.

8. For the state to take a principled stand against apartheid and US corporate investment in South Africa.

9. For proponents and the state to get corporations and banks to rethink their policies and expend energies doing so.

10. For the combined actions of the national anti-apartheid movement to strengthen the hand of progressives in the corporations to pressure their own companies to change labor practices, particular selling practices, etc. and to pressure South Africa.

11. For the combined actions of the national anti-apartheid movement to prevent new investment in South Africa.

12. For the state to demonstrate disagreement with US governmental foreign policy toward South Africa.

13. For the combined actions of the national anti-apartheid movement to place constraints on US foreign policy makers to prevent further US government support for and cooperation with the South African government.

14. For the combined actions of the national anti-apartheid movement to legitimate the call for sanctions and non-cooperation with South Africa among US policy elites at all levels of government.

15. For the combined actions of the national anti-apartheid movement to place constraints on the South African government in carrying out apartheid policies.

16. For the state to demonstrate solidarity with the struggle of blacks and others in South Africa resisting apartheid.
17. For proponents and the state to aid fundamental change in South Africa to bring about an end to apartheid.

18. For proponents and the state to contribute to world-wide anti-apartheid efforts to completely isolate South Africa economically.

19. For proponents to politicize the people in Michigan to have anti-corporate and anti-capitalist attitudes and behavior.

20. For proponents to educate people in Michigan about racism, South Africa, the US corporate role in supporting racism in South Africa, and the struggles for liberation against white minority rule in southern Africa.

21. For the combined actions of the national anti-apartheid movement to educate US policy elites in legislative arenas at all levels of government about racism, South Africa, the US corporate role in supporting racism in South Africa, and the struggles for liberation against white minority rule in southern Africa.

22. For the combined actions of the national anti-apartheid movement to convince US policy elites at all levels that actively working for black majority rule in South Africa (through non-support of the minority government) is in the long-term interest of the US government and all people (including whites) in South Africa.
needed for their achievement. As in the analysis of the Connecticut campaigns, long-term is considered to be three or more years, medium-term is one to two years, and short-term is less than a year. This list of goals comes from interviews with activists in SALC and legislative proponents as well as from SALC meeting minutes or other SALC documents. The goals are not specific to the legislative campaigns conducted by the activists. Many could pertain to the totality of their anti-apartheid work, but their use here is for an analysis specifically of their legislative divestment efforts. Table 5-8 is the researcher’s interpretation, amalgamation and categorization of these various goals statements. Again, as with the Connecticut case study, they are identified as for the proponents, the state, or the wider national anti-apartheid movement because the proponents themselves want to accomplish some whereas they want the state or the total movement to accomplish others.

The activists in Michigan reflect an ideological cleavage in their long-term goals that is more pronounced than is a similar division among the Connecticut proponents discussed in the previous chapter. Some activists see apartheid as an issue which is particularly useful in raising fundamental questions about the nature of economic organization, the necessity of understanding capitalism as an inherently unjust system of political economy, and the underpinnings that capitalism provides for racism. These sentiments are reflected in goal #19 in table 5-8. Others prefer to downplay, or in some cases even ignore, the issues related to a broader focus on capitalism and concentrate instead on an analysis and ultimate targeting of the specific systems of racial injustice in southern Africa. Goal 17 is a capsule statement of these concerns. The East
Lansing activists have discussed this cleavage among themselves in some detail, and they all have fairly clear understandings of where each person stands. Some of the activists who identify their efforts most closely with having the principal focus be on southern Africa do not have large differences with those in the former category in their analyses of the significance of capitalism in perpetuating injustice in southern Africa or worldwide. Their difference in focus, however, seems to emanate from two other sources: a difference in opinion about tactics and strategies for anti-apartheid activism generally, and an experiential distinction between those who have lived and worked in southern Africa and those who have not. The debates over long-term strategies and tactics have revolved around a focus on campaigns highly visible to the public that have high yields in terms of exposure and education of non-elites to the issues and some payoffs in terms of institutional policies (e.g. demonstrations, mass mobilizations, teach-ins or study groups, targeting a series of local -- i.e. community/city, not state -- institutions), versus campaigns varying in public visibility, less focuses on non-elites and educational efforts, but highly effective in terms of institutional policy changes (e.g. lobbying behind the scenes, targeting legislatures and larger institutional investors). Those whose principal focus is southern Africa and who have the first-hand experience in southern Africa sympathize more with the latter category of strategies. Those whose main goals are anti-capitalist in character generally fall into the first category. These ideological cleavages are not for the most part disruptive of SALC's work because the group has agreed to disagree on the long-range issues while concentrating on achieving the short-term goals. Tensions have
arisen when these philosophical orientations were pertinent to the formulation of short-term goals, but the group attempted not to let such tensions alienate members. One of the ways for doing this was to make the decision on short-term goals on the basis of who wanted to and had the time to work on particular campaigns. That is, if any member(s) wanted to pursue a particular campaign (e.g. passing the banking bill) and if they could convince others in the SALC group to help them, they could launch their campaign with the blessings but less active support of other SALC members who preferred to try a different strategy. One activist describes the working style as "truly a participatory democracy in that those tho stick around all the time and do the work also de facto set the policies." The outcome of this non-directive approach to their work is an orientation of the bulk of SALC's efforts in recent years around legislative campaigns. And, for reasons unrelated to this ideological division, the person who felt most closely identified with anti-capitalist ideology no longer participates in SALC activities.

In the context of the discussion of goals in chapter one, the degree of change required by the specific goals aimed at the state legislature is fairly comprehensive. That is, the proponents' desire for the state
to end its economic associations with South Africa in several arenas —
banking, pension investments, and educational institutions' investments.
In fact, no one seems to know fully the extent of impact the education
funds and pension funds bills might have because of a lack of clarity over
just how many and which specific institutions and funds would be affected.
Thus, these goals require more change than would be necessary if, for
example, the Connecticut proponents' goals were achieved; and, as social
movement literature points out, the greater the degree of change sought,
the more difficult achieving it is likely to be.

The theory of action represented by these goals is not significantly
different from the general anti-apartheid movement's theory of action or
that derived from the Connecticut activists' goals. Some of the differ­
ences between the ways in which the proponents in these two states went
about trying to achieve their goals will be discussed in the last chapter,
but at this point, the same general evaluation given previously can be
applied to the Michigan proponent's theory of action. That is, it is
a combination of a rational and realistic appraisal of how to reach a
desired political outcome combined with idealism and faith that a positive
contribution is being made to the ending of apartheid. As in the previous
analyses, however, the early parts of the theory of action are the more
dependable and rational ones. The farther along in the theory one gets,
the more faith required; the predictive capabilities of scholars and
activists are not so highly developed as to foretell exactly what will
be responsible for the changing of the apartheid system. Thus activists
are necessarily motivated in part by faith that they are on the right
track.
Two outer environment variables, the time line and the arena targeted, have been for the most part assets in the campaign. Bullard introduced the first divestment bill in 1978, and then the additional divestment legislation was introduced in both 1979 and 1980. The proponents have had, therefore, a significant amount of time to organize support for their campaigns. As the educational institutions funds and pension fund measures continue to await passage, however, the opposition takes advantage of the opportunity to organize against the legislation, and time may begin to work against the proponents. They have gathered resources and learned skills important to their legislative efforts across these four years, but there are some indicators that opponents have, too. These factors of opposition and campaign strength will be discussed later, but at this point we should note that, all things being equal, the quicker that passage of the remaining bills can be pressed, the better the chances for success.

As was the case in Connecticut, the legislative arena has proven to be a responsive target for the activists. For example, an identifiable core of legislators (varying from 21 to 25) have co-sponsored the education bill with Bullard since 1978. Other helpful contextual factors are that during 1978-82, the Democratic Party had majorities in both houses, although the governor has been a Republican during this time. In the legislature in 1981-82, there were 13 blacks out of 110 representatives in the House and three black Senators out of 38. Again, as in Connecticut, the State Treasurer is black, but this racial identity so far has not really materialized into a campaign asset.
The Michigan legislature is a logical place for divestment campaigns in that, as has been described earlier in this chapter, other institutions in the state have been similarly targeted, especially since the Soweto riots in 1976. In addition, former Representative Charles Diggs and Howard Wolpe, currently a member of Congress from Michigan and chair of the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, have both been in the forefront of national legislative anti-apartheid work.

Although these factors would seem to make Michigan a conducive environment for passage of divestment legislation, there are other contextual variables that work against that possibility. One is the significant presence of large corporations in Michigan, like Chrysler, GM, and Dow Chemical, have major investments in South Africa. As shown earlier, table 5-7 lists the corporations headquartered in Michigan with subsidiaries in South Africa. With the severe economic problems that Michigan has faced in recent years (i.e. high unemployment and the near failure of the Chrysler corporation) some law makers have been skeptical of divestment for fear that it might hurt some of Michigan's largest employers. In fact, SALC activists believe it to be remarkable that the banking and educational institutions funds bills have received so much legislative support in times of such economic hardship and retrenchment. In addition, corporate lobbyists have kept watch on the two remaining bills and some can be expected to oppose them. Therefore, when considering a wide range of contextual factors, the state of Michigan can be seen to be a mixed environment in which to seek support for divestment legislation.

Strength, Strategies and Tactics

An important asset for the proponents and a part of the strength
of their campaigns was the number and kind of endorsements they received from groups and individuals around the state. Table 5-4 lists those who formally endorsed the divestment or banking bills. The table shows that most of the backing for the bills came from church-related or university-related organizations or individuals, although there is support from labor and community groups as well. The preponderance of support comes from university and church groups because those are the people that the activists in the state know best. A significant number of representatives of this list showed up at the eight Civil Rights Committee hearings held on the various pieces of legislation from 1978-82, and the endorsers were often called on by proponents to contact their legislators to encourage their support.

Divestment proponents spent a great deal of time and energy cultivating these endorsements, and their efforts to do this have already been discussed to some degree. Activists worked to acquire support in several ways: (1) continual educational efforts involving speaking at various organizations' meetings, film showings at MSU averaging two to three times a month across three years, literature and educational packet distribution, large mobile displays placed at public gatherings and receptions and speaking engagements for outside experts; (2) use of personal and professional organizational networks and contacts to solicit divestment support among friends and acquaintances who play leadership roles in these organizations; and (3) frequent mention of campaign progress in these organizations' newsletters (e.g. Peace Center Newsletter - a mailing list of 300 people, newsletter of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom). The activists did not maintain their own newsletter but Elders-
veld, out of Bullards' office, frequently would mail out updates, hearings
notices, clippings and news releases to supporters.

Throughout these campaigns there have been activists groups across
the state working in support of the legislation, but both Eldersveld and
SALC members assert that, outside of the labor support which Eldersveld
achieved, SALC is responsible for gaining most of the endorsements.
Legislators, staff in the state bureaucracies, and members of the
business community are aware of support across the state for divestment
and report that it has created a favorable climate for the legislation -- a
climate that assumes that the legislature will act favorably on some
form of the legislation, and that to be against the bill is to run the
risk of being labeled racist.

Despite the success in gaining a significant number of supporters,
however, the list of endorsements has some shortcomings. One is a notable
lack of clearly identifiable black organizational backing for the bills. If a campaign is going to create a climate of opinion surrounding the
legislature such that divestment is seen as the only valid anti-racist
action to take, then black endorsement and active support is essential.
Without it, the campaigns lack an important and powerful source of legi-
timacy that can add a crucial dynamic. Another significant sector missing
from the list is retired workers' groups, unions, or others whose pension
funds are the target of the pension fund divestment bill. Without support
from these quarters proponents can be accused of taking risks with others'
money, and worse still, will encounter these groups as active opponents.
A third group whose support was actively but not very successfully culti-
vated is that of labor. Labor unions are powerful organizations in
Michigan, and although the UAW endorsed the divestment legislation, labor unions have not been active supporters in terms of mobilizing workers to contact legislators or even having lobbyists campaign on behalf of the bills. Certainly the campaigns could have gained important strength and greater momentum with further support from these groups.

So far, the activists divestment campaigns have had substantial legislative support, however. They always received strong approval from the House Civil Rights Committee, and as was stated earlier, the education bill has had no fewer than 21 co-sponsors since it was first introduced in 1978. The black caucus, with Smith as its chair, endorsed all the divestment legislation, and Smith's leadership was significant in assuring passage of the banking bill in the Senate. The black caucus is not, however, in the forefront of persistently pressing for the measures, most likely due to other major concerns occupying members' time. Support for the bills has not been cast as a crucial test of legislators' contribution to anti-racist struggles. The lack of heavy pressure from the caucus and the opposition of the Treasurer is partially responsible for this tone in the debate. Although in general the legislative support has been both substantial and consistent for these two bills, proponents will have difficulty sustaining that level of support for the pension bill as will be explained later in the discussion of opposition.

The most important legislative ally and the principal mover behind the bills, Perry Bullard, has been a vital part of securing passage of the two bills that made it through the House. Without his backing, his careful attention to tactics, and the energetic involvement of his staff, especially Eldersveld, in tracking and promoting the measurers, the
banking and education bills probably would have encountered much more difficulty. Even though Representative Smith was the main sponsor of the banking bill, Bullard and Eldersveld can be credited with a major portion of the work that achieved House passage.

In promoting state divestment, there was somewhat of a division of labor between the activists (outside the legislature) and Bullard and Eldersveld (inside the legislature). Activists, especially members of SALC provide a mobilization of support for the bills outside the legislature, the expertise on Southern Africa and divestment needed to legitimate the campaigns, and plenty of contacts around the country who can serve as outside experts. Bullard and Eldersveld function to take headcounts of support in order to know when to bring the bills in for a vote, to alert activists and other supporters for times when testimony, intensive lobbying, or phone and mail campaigns are needed, and to negotiate on amendments that potential opponents may be considering. This means that both work on and control over the campaigns are shared by the activists and the legislative sponsors.

Bullard's work on the bill would be reduced substantially, however, if he did not have a staff person (out of six) who, at crucial points in the campaigns, could spend at least half her time on these measures. Eldersveld's time has been an important contribution to the success of the campaigns, and it has relieved the activists of many administrative burdens that might not otherwise have been accomplished. Plus, Eldersveld's contribution seems to have been more than just that of time. Several people inside and outside the legislature remarked on her high commitment to securing passage of the bills even though she knew little about South
Africa or divestment when she started on the campaigns. One legislator stated that she took on the divestment bills as "much more than a job; she took them on as a burning cause that needed to be handled well." In the division of labor described earlier, however, she has relied heavily on the activists to back her up when she needed advice and information.

The two activist groups that have been most prominent in pushing the legislation are the Washtenaw County Coalition Against Apartheid (WCCAA) and SALC, but SALC is now the only remaining functional organization although it, too, has experienced a decline in membership and active participation in the last two years. The reasons for the decline of the WCCAA are unknown because I was unable to reach some of its former leaders for interviews. My suspicions are that the group became inactive when some of its most energetic and enthusiastic participants moved from the University of Michigan.

Remarkably, since 1974, SALC has been able to sustain itself and its anti-apartheid work through leadership transitions. Without SALC members' on-going efforts, divestment would not be a live issue in the Michigan legislature. One of SALC's best assets is the personal commitment and perseverance of a core group of members. This core group is now about five people although 10-15 others would consider themselves members of SALC and sporadically attend meetings. Four of the core members have strong personal connections with persons in Southern Africa or South African exiles and have been working on anti-apartheid or anti-racist efforts other than divestment campaigns for many years. They see their contribution to anti-apartheid work as on-going and as life-long. One of its current manifestations is the legislative
measures, but these people devote major amounts of time to anti-apartheid work in other arenas, too. In addition to this very strong commitment to racial justice in southern Africa, the core group members also have a high personal commitment to each other as friends and colleagues that have fought important battles together across several years. The occasional ideological tensions discussed earlier have never deeply divided the group. They stay active on the campaigns despite the burden of time these activities consume because of their Southern African friends and because of each other.

Two members that seem to bear a heavier burden than anyone else are the Beemans. They stay in close touch with Eldersveld, monitor every meeting or hearing connected with the bills, keep SALC records, oversee the film program and literature table, move the portable displays from one public gathering to the next, and keep the other SALC members informed on current events. All the activists interviewed considered the Beemans crucial at this point in holding the organization together.

Another important SALC asset is the expertise of the Wileys and, in previous years, of Bill Derman on Southern Africa and the international anti-apartheid movement. All three are Africanist and have been crucial in providing information and interpretation of events necessary to the conduct of the campaigns. The division between experts and non-experts has been troublesome for SALC at points, however, and may be particularly worrisome with regard to student participation in the organization. At this point there are very few students involved in SALC, and those who are come through their own organizational base of the Public Interest Research Group in Michigan (PIRGM), a consumer interest organization.
SALC old-timers speculate that the occasional domination of experts in SALC meetings was intimidating and discouraging to students, causing some to drop out of the group.

There also may be other important explanations for the decline in student participation (such as decline in student activism generally), but this segment of the membership is not the only one declining. There are fewer active non-student members now than in previous years, and there seems to be no one explanation for why this has occurred. Shifts in personal priorities and demands on members' time, moves to other locations, and no interest in working on legislative campaigns (and not enough people to work on more than one type of anti-apartheid campaign at once) seem to be some of the reasons; but since my interviews were almost exclusively with those who are still active, these reasons for others leaving may have little validity. Although the core group is likely to remain highly committed in the future, the decline of their organizational base may prove troublesome as they continue pressing for passage of the educational institutions funds and pension funds bills. There are too many tasks for too few people who are already too busy.

One resource that SALC has not had but has not needed is money. The budget has been about $1500 a year raised primarily through members' contributions, literature sales, and grants for films and speakers from the MSU student government. They also have never had a staff person of their own although Eldersveld has functioned in a staff capacity for the campaigns. In addition, SALC has no office but is a member organization of the Peace Education Center, a coalition of activists groups in East Lansing. Through the Peace Center, SALC members get access
to office machines, file cabinets and other necessary equipment. There is a staff person for the Peace Center, and at points she (Barbara Thibeault) has served as a communication node for SALC members as well as outside supporters. Thus the campaigns have been run with few resources, little office space, and no full-time staff.

An important source of strength in the campaigns that has been mentioned already is the high level of expertise and sound research put into the legislative divestment efforts. Since the legislative divestment efforts have been based primarily in the universities of Michigan with Africanists participating in the various activist groups, the campaigns never lacked for up to date information and thoughtful analysis on Southern Africa, the international and national advocates for sanctions against South Africa, the potential impact of sanctions and the current strategies of the anti-apartheid movement in the US and worldwide. Furthermore, these people knew where to get outside experts both to validate their arguments and to supply expertise they could not provide.

Some of the anti-apartheid activists/experts that have visited to speak and press for divestment are: Dumisani Kumalo, a South African journalist mentioned in connection with the Connecticut campaign and currently working with the ACOA; Gail Hovey, the Research Director of ACOA; Tim Smith, The head of the ICCR; and Prexy Nesbitt, former research secretary of the World Council of Churches Program to Combat Racism. In addition, representatives of the liberation movements involved in guerilla war in Southern Africa have been hosted in Michigan and have spoken to legislators. Proponents report that these members of the ANC and SWAPO have been especially important in securing black legislators'
active backing of the bills.

Members of SALC and Eldersveld have attempted to build their case by calling on financial experts to testify about the financial feasibility and prudence of divestment. As was discussed previously, Robert Schwartz of Shearson American Express was brought in by SALC to testify in the joint hearings held in 1980. He documented the financial success of portfolios that take into account social responsibility criteria of various kinds and discussed his willingness to provide the state with further financial advice on such matters. In the hearing some decision makers perceived him to be promoting his own business, but others maintained that, despite the self-promotion, he supplied important evidence on the potential profitability of divestment. Proponents solicited similar testimony from other investment experts and their files contain two letters giving further confirmation of their position. One is a 1978 letter from Landon Thomas of the Fiduciary Trust Company, New York City; the other is a 1980 letter from Stefan Jovanovich of Turner and Jovanovich Attorneys at Law in Los Angeles. All three experts agree that a portfolio excluding South Africa-related companies need not sacrifice diversification, safety, or potential growth. For still more evidence in this matter, activists point to the profits made by MSU in the portfolio reorganization that accompanied its divestment.

Other outside help for the campaigns came from activists in other states pressing for state divestment. Proponents in Michigan have incorporated clippings, educational material, and other pieces of information into their brochures and other educational materials from campaigns in
Nebraska, Oregon, Massachusetts, and California. Pamphlets and research done by ACOA and the Africa Fund in New York have also been useful in Michigan divestment work.

One arena of research that was never successfully tackled, however, was the extent of South Africa-related stocks held by the various Michigan institutions affected by the anti-apartheid legislation. In 1981, the Treasury Department finally came up with an estimate figure ($793 million) for investments affected in the pension funds it manages, but these are not the only funds covered by the pension fund bill. Plus, there seems to be no definitive analysis of the amounts that would be divested if the educational institution funds bill passes. This is difficult and tedious research to conduct, and although several attempts were made by Eldersveld to investigate the total amount of monies at stake, it is not surprising that proponents have not taken enough time out from other pressing matters to accomplish the task. Their case could be strengthened, however, if they could speak authoritatively on the actual impact of the bills.

The sophistication and depth of expertise that has been marshalled for these campaigns has helped to establish an asset important to campaign strength that is often very difficult for activists to achieve: legitimacy. At least two strong opponents of the divestment efforts view the proponents as "leftist intelligensia aimed at producing revolution," naming Bullard specifically as a "card carrying socialist" (Augenstein; Cropsey, interviews). But other opponents, observers, and supporters give them higher marks for credibility of argument and cleverness of strategy. Their access to impressive outside experts as well as their own qualifications as experts has been noteworthy among several legislators interviewed.
Another source of legitimacy for these efforts is that proponents constantly remind legislators of the good company they would keep by passing the legislation. Lists of other institutions around the country that have divestment policies or that have advocated sanctions are circulated to legislators to assure them that they will be joining an important mainstream movement for racial justice already begun by others whom they respect. Among these other institutions are, of course, MSU and the East Lansing city council. The legislature itself, members are reminded, passed a resolution in 1978 supporting sanctions against South Africa. The divestment bills, proponents argue, would simply implement the position taken in the resolution.

Eldersveld reports that campaigns' legitimacy was also aided enormously when Zimbabwe gained independence. When black majority rule came through a popular election of those who had led the guerilla movement against a white minority government, weight was added to proponents' arguments that the long-term interest of the US lay in supporting blacks' struggles for an end to apartheid in South Africa; that, if the US government was not going to demonstrate solidarity with South African blacks in their conflict with the apartheid regime, then other institutions in the country must show support for blacks -- show that the State Department and others officiating over foreign policy are not representing the will of the American people. Plus, Zimbabwean independence helped to convince some that black governments in Southern Africa are more capable of building multiracial societies based on equality than were white governments.

Thus proponents in Michigan have built strong campaigns across four years despite some problems along the way. This strength has come from
a combination of factors described here including: the number of public endorsements collected by proponents; the level of personal commitment and perseverance by a core group of activists; fairly strong backing in the legislature, including Bullard's willingness to devote significant amounts of his staff's time to the campaigns; sophisticated and in-depth research and expertise; and an achievement of legitimacy in the perceptions of most people interviewed.

In addition to a strong campaign, at several points there were important tactical choices made that aided the campaigns a great deal. After consolidation of all the 1978-79 bills into three measures specifically targeted at South Africa (instead of the general issue of human rights) a useful overarching strategy or tactic was to push for passage of only one piece of legislation at a time and to start with what seemed to be the easiest measure, the banking bill. This served to focus proponents' energies and prevented the development of firm unity among opponents in banking, other businesses, the State Treasury, and retirees groups. In addition, the passage of the banking bill has been used to build legitimacy and momentum for the educational institution funds bill.

Another tactic that proved helpful in recruiting further legislative support and lending credibility to the bills as attempts to achieve racial justice was Bullard's recruitment of Smith to sponsor the banking bill and then the pension bill. Furthermore, Bullard and Smith proved themselves capable in negotiating with opponents to reach compromises in amendments that then neutralized the opposition. This was done with the Michigan Bankers' Association and with Cropsey and his amendment to the educational institutions funds bill.
Both men also demonstrated good legislative skills by carefully attempting to have their bills brought onto the floor of the House or the Senate at a time when their chances for passage were good — i.e. after headcounts of supporters were taken and after some assessment had been made of potential for amendments. In addition, they tried to achieve favorable committee assignments for the bills in both houses, and Smith closely monitored and nurtured the banking bill's progress through the Senate.

Lastly, a significant strategy was the orchestration of help outside the legislature. Activists, especially SALC, would rally supporters and find good witnesses to testify when Bullard or Eldersveld indicated that a good time was approaching for hearings or a floor vote. This proved to be a productive division of labor that demonstrates a symbiotic relationship between the activists and the legislators/legislative staff.

Campaign strength and tactics are crucial multifaceted inner environment variables in an analysis of why these divestment efforts succeed or fail. Outer environment variables that are also very important are the reaction and opposition to the campaigns. We now turn to an examination of this reaction and opposition.

Reaction and Opposition

As was stated earlier, although there have been significant pockets of opposition, so far there has been no resistance to the divestment legislation organized across all or several potential opponents. This has meant that the greatest amount of pressure on the legislature has come primarily from one direction, those favoring passage. One might expect significant opposition from the business community but relatively
little has materialized. Even the MBA did not demonstrate entrenched opposition to the banking bill. Believing that it would inevitably pass, the MBA lobbyist chose instead to seek an amendment that would dampen its impact. The businessmen interviewed agreed that being against this package of legislation is difficult because of the possibility that they would be seen as racist or pro-apartheid. When opposition statements were made they were carefully worded. For example, the Michigan Manufacturer's Association formally opposed the bills on the grounds that they raised difficult legal and constitutional problems regarding jurisdiction in foreign policy. The MMA and the car manufacturers have done some lobbying against the bills but up until now it has not amounted to much. No lobbyist has been involved enough with the legislation even to propose a Sullivan Principle-type amendment. Not only do they claim to be preoccupied with much more serious legislative issues, but I suspect they the possibilities for final passage of both the educational institution funds and pension funds measures to be quite low. This assessment of these bills' future, however, may lead to a degree of inattentiveness. For example, one business lobbyist interviewed in May 1982 was unaware that the educational institution funds legislation had just passed the House. If the education measure passes this session, I expect business lobbying to become quite heavy against the pension bill.

Active opposition from the executive branch has been limited to the Treasury Department. In contrast, both the Civil Rights and Education Departments have supported the legislation -- the Civil Rights Department all three bills and the Education Department the education measure. Treasury did not take a position on the education bill because the staff did not
believe it to be in their jurisdiction, but their opposition to the banking
bill remained significant until two events occurred: the amendment
negotiated by the MBA, the legislators, and Treasury to limit the scope
of the legislation, and pressure to support the measure on the Treasurer,
Loren Monroe, from the legislative black caucus. The staff are not likely
to be convinced easily to say yes to the pension fund bill. There is
a high probability that they will help mobilize strong forces against it.
They are in contact with the Retirement Coordinating Council which early
on urged defeat of the bill and generated the beginnings of an opposition
campaign among their constituents. Treasury staff have also maintained
close consultation with the Senior Citizens and Retirement Committee of
the House and its chair, Spaniola. The committee is not likely to approve
the bill with strong opposition from both the retirees and Treasury.
Spaniola is not in full agreement with Treasury's proposed amendment to
take the meaning out of the measure. He would like to see some compromise
between what the legislation now proposes and the pure symbolism of the
Treasury amendment. In any case, however, the pension bill will not
have smooth sailing and may not survive the legislative process unless
a major mobilization of supporters can be pulled off by the proponents.

One precedent that adds to the reluctance of Senior Citizens and
Retirement Committee members to support the pension fund bill was a proposal
that state controlled pension funds be used to bail out Chrysler when it
was nearing bankruptcy. Legislators were very wary of using pension
monies for this purpose and have guarded their fiduciary responsibility
carefully since then.

Other significant legislative opposition to the banking and education
measures has come from conservative Republican legislators, like Alan Cropsey, who on principle reject the legislation for several reasons. They believe that the state ought not be involved in making laws on foreign policy issues; they assert that South Africa should not be singled out as a violator of human rights because they think the biggest threat to human rights is communism; and they generally do not believe the state should be attempting to place moral restrictions on businesses. These legislators tried several tactics to defeat the banking and education bills. Usually this came in the form of amendments that would be so obnoxious to supporters that, if passed, the supporters would abandon their efforts. There were a core of opponents consistently voting against these bills, especially in the House.

Some legislators report that on the whole, seeing no significant vocal and organized opposition, many of their colleagues were willing to "give" these bills to Bullard and the black caucus. That is, these legislators would not obstruct legislation to which they had no principled objections if the passage was an important achievement for the sponsors and if no one was actively asking them to oppose it.

Besides the Retirement Coordinating Committee's early 1980 activities on the pension fund bill, there seems to have been no other nongovernmental organizations attempting to rally forces to defeat the divestment campaigns. The Association of Independent Colleges and Universities of Michigan went on record as opposing HB 4831, and there were rumors that authorities at the University of Michigan might fight the legislation in court on the grounds that the state has no right to tell the university how to invest its monies. But there were no traceable lobbies from these organizations
or detectable attempts on their part to mobilize greater opposition.

Interestingly, however, Michigan has been targeted by people outside the state who want to take away momentum from the divestment campaigns all over the country. The most obvious of these are South Africans themselves. Their public appearances probably do not represent the entirety of their efforts in lobbying and speaking against the legislation, but these appearances alone are substantial and noteworthy. Not all of South African activity in Michigan has been targeted at the divestment bills in the legislature and not all of it has been conducted by Americans on behalf of the South African government or Foundation. The activity appears to be directed, however, at accomplishing several goals: educating community leaders and elites that South Africa is an important ally of the West and the US, and that life for blacks in that country is relatively good -- certainly much better than in other African countries or than South African critics would have one believe; combating the divestment movement generally in whatever arenas become its targets; winning friends among Michigan community leaders through a variety of means including buying that friendship; and campaigning against Representative Howard Wolpe so that he will not be returned to Congress to continue anti-apartheid work there.

To accomplish these goals the South African Consulate in Chicago, Embassy in Washington, and the South African Foundation have employed a wide range of tactics. As described earlier, two men have been sent to testify at hearings -- DeKieffer, an American lawyer retained by the Embassy, testified in the East Lansing city council hearing in March 1978, and Pienaar from the South Africa Foundation testified in the joint
hearings in the House in June 1980. In addition, legislators have received mailings of materials promoting South Africa, and a lobbyist, Grobler, from the Chicago Consulate, visits Spaniola to discuss the legislation, especially the pension bill, about twice a year.

To create better relations between the US and South Africa, Leon Weaver, an American criminology professor at MSU, has given numerous pro-South Africa testimonies in various arenas, sought to arrange travel tours to South Africa so that people in Michigan can learn the "truth" about South Africa, and arranged for South Africans to speak in various fora in Michigan. There apparently are small, formal friendship associations for South Africa in Grand Rapids, Williamstown, and Birmingham out of which Americans and South Africans give speeches and presentations to clubs, schools and any other willing audiences. South Africa Foundation representatives have been seen speaking in Kalamazoo, Battle Creek, Grand Rapids, and Lansing, mainly to Rotary and Kiwanis Clubs (Washington Office on Africa, Autumn 1982).

Two of the more extravagant, bold, and worrisome South African attempts to win influence have been the use of a wealthy Michigan businessman to buy media influence in the United States and the campaign seemingly to unseat Howard Wolpe. In the first incident, as described in chapter III, John McGoff, former head of the now dissolved Panax Corporation, was utilized by the South Africa Department of Information to try to buy US newspapers. McGoff is a resident of Williamston, Michigan, and he used to visit South Africa frequently. At one point he owned a printing firm there, but he no longer travels to South Africa because the governmental
commission charged with the investigation of the Department of Information misappropriation of funds claims that McGoff pocketed over $6 million of Departmental funds that were to be used to buy newspapers. In the past, however, McGoff was involved in promoting South Africa in Michigan in various arenas including universities, the East Lansing city council, and in private settings such as clubs. He also arranged low-cost tours for Michigan influential to visit South Africa. His current commercial operation, Global Communications, Inc., still controls several newspapers in the state.

A less well-documented project of the South African government is to unseat Howard Wolpe. Wolpe is now the chair of the Africa Subcommittee of the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs and has visited South Africa in this capacity. He met with Prime Minister Botha, and a great deal of publicity accusing Wolpe of having a shouting match with Botha followed in press all over the world. He has been attacked extensively by the Namibia News Gazette, a South African newspaper published about six times a year in Washington by the US-West Africa Trade and Cultural Council, Inc., with wide distribution to academics, politicians, business people and others. Pienaar gave speeches in Michigan attacking Wolpe during his campaign for reelection, and there were purported to be well-known friends of South Africa managing and helping to finance the campaign of Wolpe's opponent, Richard Milliman (Washington Office on Africa, Autumn 1982).

South Africa's extensive activities in Michigan are in part likely to be the results of having both close friends and determined opponents in that state. People in Michigan on both sides have gained national
prominence in either the pro-apartheid or anti-apartheid forces. That the pro-apartheid forces have not been highly organized against all the divestment legislation in Michigan is interesting, but some of them clearly have attempted to establish a climate of opinion against all sanctions efforts across the state. As the fight over the pension fund bill gets heated, the heavy South African presence may become even more visible.

Another significant arena of reaction that can harm or help the Michigan campaigns is the media in the state. The issue of divestment in various arenas sporadically has captured the attention of newspapers in the state, especially those in Lansing and Ann Arbor and especially the campus newspapers at MSU and the University of Michigan. For example, in 1976 and 1977, no fewer than sixteen articles or editorials appeared on the East Lansing city council's entertainment and passage of the selective purchasing resolution. Of these, 11 articles appeared in the MSU paper, the State News. From 1978 to January 1982, no fewer than 20 articles or editorials appeared in newspapers across the state on the legislative divestment campaigns. Two of these articles were of national significance -- in the New York Times (June 2, 1978) and one a UPI story (Michigan Daily, June 7, 1980). Nine of the 20 articles appeared in campus newspapers whereas the remainder were found in prominent Michigan papers such as the State Journal and the Michigan Chronicle or in small town papers such as the Kalamazoo Gazette and Muskegon Examiner. The 20 articles and editorials used here as illustration are probably not the entire population of newsprint items that were generated by the campaigns. No attempt to systematically survey Michigan newspapers was made. The articles and editorials uncovered do demonstrate that the legislative divestment campaigns were
getting attention, but we cannot surmise from this evidence alone how extensive the media attention was or whether it helped or harmed the campaigns. Bullard's staff was confident of the positive contribution media coverage could make because they were diligent in notifying newspapers and radio stations of any events (e.g. hearings, guest speakers) related to the divestment legislation. Some of the articles written can be traced to this staff work, but the utility of the press coverage to the success or failure of the campaigns is difficult to determine.

The factors contributing to the success of the Michigan divestment legislative campaigns are summarized in table 5-9. They are: (1) a climate of opinion in favor of the legislation created by proponents and communicated to legislators; (2) important compromises in the provisions of the banking and education bills; (3) removal of the little opposition that existed for the banking and education bills; and (4) a legislative willingness to accept proponents' pressures to pass these two bills. Certainly the proponents' activities alone were not sufficient to secure the outcomes they desire; but without them, or even with the legislators and activists acting separately, the two measures that have found some degree of success would not have passed. Whether or not the same combination of factors will succeed in achieving the final passage of the education bill and a receptive hearing for and passage of the pension bill remains to be seen.

What remains for this analysis, however, is to discuss the impact of the campaign outcomes.
TABLE 5-9
Summary of Variables Significant in the Passport of Divestment Legislation in Michigan

Inner Environment

1. Goals: comprehensive and requiring a great deal of change

2. Tactics and Strategies:
   a. extensive and expert testimony
   b. pushing for passage of the bills one at a time, beginning with the easiest to pass and ending with the most difficult
   c. negotiations with potential opponents on amendments
   d. persistent lobbying as well as phone and mail contact with legislators

3. Strength:
   a. a significant number of endorsements and supporters inside and outside the legislature
      (1) continual educational efforts
      (2) use of personal and professional networks and contacts
      (3) use of support organizations' newsletters for updates on campaign progress; mailings of educational packets and pamphlets
      (4) assignment by Bullard of significant staff time to the promotion of the legislation
      (5) consistent support among a substantial core group of legislators, including the black caucus
      (6) Bullard's leadership in steering the measures through the legislature
      (7) experts on southern Africa and divestment in leadership in the activist organizations
      (8) single issue focus of the campaign
      (9) legitimacy established and maintained for the activists and for the campaigns
   b. highly committed, expert, and skilled campaign leadership

Outer Environment

4. Reaction and Opposition:
   a. Legislature: receptive to being convinced to pass banking and education bills; more resistance likely to the pension bill
   b. Department of Treasury: active opposition to pension bill; unopposed to banking bill as amended (after initial opposition); no activity on education bill
   c. Department of Civil Rights: supportive of all three measures
   d. Department of Commerce: inactive opposition to divestment concept; charged with implementing the banking bill
   e. Department of Education: supportive of educational bill
   f. Business: bankers willing to compromise; others expressing opposition but exhibiting relatively little activity
   g. Media: some attention
   h. South African Embassy, Consulate, and Foundation: significant and visible opposition expressed through lobbying and testimony
   i. Retirement organizations: mobilizing opposition to the pension bill

5. Target: large and accessible

6. Time: an accumulation of four years' work; heaviest thrust of activities was two years after the first bill's introduction

7. Mixed (some positive or supportive factors, some negative) political environment in the state
Impact and Effectiveness

As in the Connecticut case study all of the detectable intended and unintended consequences of these campaigns will be examined in a goals-based evaluation.

The goals and theory of action have already been discussed and assessed for their significance in the campaigns' effectiveness. Important at this point is a calculation of what the campaign consequences were. Table 5-10 lists the outcomes evident at the time of this writing, and they are categorized according to their principal recipients. Table 5-11 contrasts these outcomes with proponents' goals -- the achieved, partially achieved, and unachieved goals. The table also lists unintended consequences.

An examination of table 11 demonstrates that at least seven of the 22 activists' goals have been fully achieved resulting in some important degree of success for the Michigan campaigns. Proponents have effectively: taken a principled stand against racism, apartheid, and US corporate involvement in apartheid (goal 1); demonstrated solidarity with those from Southern Africa in resistance to apartheid (goal 3); sent a message to the South African government of their commitment to sanctions (goal 4); demonstrated disagreement with US governmental foreign policy (goal 5); achieved a principled stand against apartheid and against US foreign policy toward South Africa by the state (goals 8 and 12); and, together with the state, have made a contribution to sanctions efforts of the world-wide anti-apartheid movement (goal 18). Five of the goals have been partially achieved, whereas the achievement of another six is difficult to assess in isolation from an examination of the national anti-apartheid divestment movement. The degree of success in meeting three of the goals is unknown.
TABLE 5-10
Partial List of Outcomes in Michigan

For the State Government of Michigan

Legislature
1. Education bill with the USSR amendment passed the House in May 1982.
2. The amended banking bill passed both houses in 1980.
3. The legislature took a principled stand by passing the HB 5446, the banking bill; the House took a second stand by passing HB 4553, the educational institutions funds bill.
4. Legislators have hosted, interacted with, and publicly commended representatives of the southern Africa resistance movements (i.e. ANC and SWAPO).
5. At least one legislator, Spaniola, has been visited by South African lobbyists; several legislators have received promotional materials from South African interests.

Executive
6. Different departments advocated different positions on the divestment bills.
7. The Department of Treasury staff have spent time analysing the implications of banking and pension bills; also contributed to the negotiated amendment to the banking bill.
8. The Department of Commerce Financial Institutions Bureau staff have spent time: (a) notifying depository banks of the requirements of Public Act 325, (b) soliciting affidavits re their compliance, and (c) obtaining information from the US Department of Commerce re US corporations' subsidiaries or affiliates located in South Africa.
9. Department of Civil Rights staff have spent time monitoring and supporting the legislation.
10. The Governor signed PA 325 into law and hosted a public signing ceremony with Nigerian officials present.

For Business
11. Depository banks were required to submit affidavits re their compliance with PA 325, i.e. no loans to South Africa; bank staff time and money (for lawyers) spent to comply with PA 325.
12. As far as is now known, no banks were disqualified as depositories due to PA 325.
13. The Michigan Bankers Association lobbyist negotiated the amendment to the banking bill.
14. Staff from the National Bank of Detroit spent some time on HB 5446, considering its implications, testifying, and negotiating the amendment.
15. Business lobbyist, especially from car manufacturers, have spent some time on all the measures.

For the US Government
16. The US State Department, Department of Commerce, and the Africa subcommittees' staff in the House and the Senate are aware of the state's actions.
TABLE 3-10, cont.

For South Africa

17. The South African Embassy and UN Mission are aware of the state's actions.
18. Representatives of the South African government and the South Africa Foundation have spent time testifying and lobbying against the bills in the legislature.
19. Representatives of the resistance movements (i.e. ANC and SWAPO) have spent time giving speeches and lobbying in support of the bills; they have indicated their approval of the state's actions.
20. The South African press has reported on divestment actions in Michigan.

For the National Anti-Apartheid Movement

21. Smith and Bullard shared information on the Michigan legislative divestment campaigns with other anti-apartheid activists at a June 1980 conference in New York City.
22. Smith made a presentation at the National Conference of Black Legislators in Baltimore, October 1981, to alert black legislators around the nation to the issue.
23. Legitimacy for the movement is gained due to sanctions policies being adopted by a city council, two universities, and the state legislature in Michigan.
24. There is an accumulation of experience on how to conduct legislative divestment campaigns.
25. Local and national groups across the country have taken a great deal of interest in the Michigan campaigns.

For the Michigan Divestment Proponents

26. From 1977 to 1982 SACL has helped to achieve sanctions policies in three arenas: East Lansing, and the state legislature.
27. The activists are perceived to be pressing for a principled cause.
28. The activists gained a large number of endorsements and support for their campaigns.
29. Through the entire process the activists have gained credibility and legitimacy for their organizations and their leaders.

Other

30. A Nigerian governmental delegation expressed approval of the state's passage of the banking bill and urged Michigan officials to continue their anti-apartheid efforts.
TABLE 5-11
An Evaluation of Goals and Outcomes in Michigan

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<tr>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Achieved</th>
<th>Partially Achieved</th>
<th>Unachieved</th>
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Outcomes unrelated to goals: 5, 6, 7, 12
The proponents are assessed as having only partially succeeded in sending a message to corporate executives that their investments in South Africa are perceived to be immoral (goal 2) because it is not clear to what extent the policy makers in Michigan businesses invested in South Africa have been forced to pay attention to the issue. Their lobbyists have had to contend with the issue, and if the pension bill gains enough support for passage, corporate executives will become aware of a moral statement being made. Until that time, however, it is possible that the policy makers are not fully cognizant of the attempts to apply moral pressure against them.

The goal of expressing solidarity with those from Southern Africa in resistance to apartheid (goal 3) is listed both as achieved -- because of one outcome -- and partially achieved because of others. Because representatives of the liberation movements have expressed their approval and appreciation for the proponents' legislative accomplishments, the goal is considered, in one respect, fulfilled. But because the state has not yet passed all the legislation in the form that the proponents most desired, it is considered as yet only partially achieved. For this latter reason, goal seven, getting the legislation passed, and goal 16, having the state demonstrate solidarity with those from Southern Africa in resistance to apartheid, are also considered partially accomplished.

Although initially two proponents wanted, through their campaigns, to politicize people in Michigan to have anti-corporate and anti-capitalist views, one of these people is no longer active. Certainly more people are aware of US corporations' involvement in South Africa as a result of the campaigns but how many more is unclear because no
no data exists to assess this. Plus, although the awareness level may have been increased, this does not mean that it will be accompanied by anti-corporate or anti-capitalist points of view. Because the campaigns have been quite narrowly focused on South Africa, because they have not been mass campaigns, and because this goal has not been significant for most campaign participants, it is likely that this goal of politicization (or even widespread education) has probably not achieved any notable measure of success.

The impact of these campaigns on the investment policies of US corporations and on policy making in the US and South African governments (goals 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17, 21, and 22) have been discussed to some extent in chapter III and will be discussed again in the next chapter. In summary, however, we can state that, despite some difficulties in their four years of campaigning for divestment legislation, the Michigan proponents have succeeded in accomplishing a significant amount of what they set out to do. More of their impact and a comparison between their efforts and those of the divestment proponents in Connecticut will be examined next in the concluding chapter of this study.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER V

1. The education bill passed the Senate on December 13, 1982, after this report was complete. Thus the report does not reflect this outcome and no thorough investigation of the process of passage has been undertaken.

2. The colleges and universities that have had divestment campaigns are: Kalamazoo, University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Western Michigan University, Eastern Michigan University, Wayne State University, Central Michigan Unviersity and Oakland University (Rochester). The ones with divestment policies are: University of Michigan, MSU and Eastern Michigan University.

3. The companies to be named were General Motors, Firestone, IBM, ITT, Mobil, Motorola, Union Carbide, Caltex, and Kennecott.

4. The activities of these support groups were not investigated due to lack of time and research funds. They seem, however, to have little direct bearing on the state divestment campaigns although they do serve as further evidence that the anti-apartheid movement is active in the state. Another set of anti-apartheid activities prominent in the state have been carried out in Kalamazoo, Michigan. These, too are not addressed in this study.

5. Pension funds affected would be those of: municipal employees, judges, probate judges, Michigan legislators, state employees, public school employees, and fire and police workers.

6. There is some disagreement as to which funds would be covered by the substitute bill 4838 and subsequent pension bills (4315). A House Legislative Analysis claims that retirement funds included under the 1980 version of 4838 would be those for state police, state employees, public school employees, probate judges, and judges (notably leaving out the state legislators). Officials in the Treasury Department and the Retirement Bureau in the Department of Management and Budget assume that all public employee retirement systems are affected at state, county, and local levels.

8. A Corporate Data Exchange study (Klein) also lists the City National Bank as extending S50 million in credit to the South African Ministry of Finance from 1972 - 1975.

9. All bills receive three readings in the Michigan legislature before they are allowed to pass. At each of the first two reading the bill must be passed temporarily to reach the next reading.

10. Legislative Retirement Fund, Michigan State Police Pension Fund, State Employees Retirement Fund, Probate Judges Retirement Fund, Judges Retirement Fund, Public School Retirement Funds are the funds for which Treasury has fiduciary responsibility.

11. A shortcoming of this goals list is that it does not include expressions of goals by activists in Michigan anti-apartheid organizations other than SALC. Attempts to interview activists in these other organizations were not successful.

12. Africanists participating in the anti-apartheid campaigns in universities other than MSU are: Len Suransky, Political Science, University of Michigan; Joel Samoff, Political Science, (formerly) University of Michigan; Gayle H. Partmann, African Studies, Oakland University; James D. Graham, History, Oakland University; Vincent Khapoya, History, Oakland University. Other academics: Don Cooney, Social Work, Western Michigan University; Don VanHoeven, Western Michigan University.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

This study began as an attempt to help discern the importance of NGOs in world politics. We will continue with that effort through comparing the case studies presented in the previous two chapters and by discussing some general reflections on divestment campaigns, the anti-apartheid movement, and the process of evaluating activism. The two case studies were structured to address two central questions: How are campaign outcomes achieved? And, of what significance are they? These same questions will provide the basic structure for the comparison between cases in this chapter as well.

Comparison of the Campaign Processes

Goals and Theory of Action

If we compare what the proponents wanted to achieve in both states, we see important differences and similarities. The two divestment groups wanted publicly to demonstrate their own opposition to apartheid and their pro-sanctions stance, and they also wanted their state governments to establish divestment policies. By pressing for and achieving such policies, proponents believe that they are making a significant contribution to world-wide sanctions efforts. Their contribution provides further public legitimation of the divestment option.
The goals diverge, however, over what precise steps the proponents want the state to take. In some respects in Michigan the aims were much more ambitious in that legislation was introduced to cover three separate arenas of the state's economic ties to South Africa: bank loans and deposits of state funds; the investment portfolios of university endowments; and the investment portfolios of pension funds. Proponents began with the easiest of these legislative goals and have yet to press in a concerted fashion for the most difficult. In contrast, the Connecticut proponents had a singular legislative goal, and it was a very difficult one: total divestment of state pension funds. With this important difference in goals, the two sets of divestment campaigns are problematic to compare in terms of their achievements. This issue will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

Another important dissimilarity in the goals of the two groups is the degree to which they wanted to raise public consciousness about the structure and behavior of corporations and the linkages between corporate collusion with racism in South Africa and the United States. Having an important base in labor union activities, the Connecticut activists were more clear in their public expressions of anti-corporate sentiment than were the Michigan activists. In fact, those in Michigan who were most concerned that SALC campaigns reflect an anti-corporate perspective are no longer active in SALC. The group now is much more focused than it was in earlier years on the issue of racial oppression in South Africa and not on the issue of the relationship between capitalism and racism generally. Interesting to note, however, is that the principal legislative sponsors in both cases are somewhat out of step with
the ideological expressions of the activist leaders. Dyson in Connecticut is not publicly identified as a socialist or as being anti-corporate in his beliefs whereas Bullard is. As was stated in both case studies, the question of ideological identification has been a bit contentious in both sets of campaigns with each group resolving it in a different fashion. The Connecticut group suppressed the question for pragmatic reasons. The Michigan group allowed those who wanted to work on any particular campaign to do so, and those who did not want to work were not required to in order to remain a member of SALC. This laissez faire style meant that those who gave the most energies to the legislative campaigns were not interested in promoting anti-corporate beliefs and attitudes.

The theories of action, an extension of goals, also have interesting variations in the two cases. Connecticut activists believe more strongly than do the Michigan proponents that there is a relationship between their efforts and an outcome of black majority rule in South Africa. They have a great deal of faith in the theory of action outlined in the Connecticut case study in Figure 4-1. That is, they see themselves contributing to world-wide sanctions activities that, if successful, will aid in ending apartheid and in bringing about a non-racial political system that reflects the will of the majority. The Michigan activists express more scepticism about their work. Most are reluctant to predict that sanctions or corporate withdrawal would eventuate in majority rule. They are convinced, however, that US and other Western corporate investments, trade and loans buttress apartheid and must be removed. As one activist put it, they know that economic ties help
sustain white minority rule. Therefore, the ties must be severed. They are not sure that breaking the relationship (or, in the aggregate imposing sanctions) will bring about black majority rule, but they are confident maintaining the relationship cannot help, and indeed obstructs, majority rule. Thus, some of the Michigan activists express their theory of action in terms of removing obstacles to change rather than contributing a significant international factor to cause change.

Tactics, Strategy, Strength and Opposition

A significant difference in tactics and strategies of the two sets of campaigns is the amount of publicity sought and the amount of public education attempted. For example, in order to get endorsements, the Connecticut activists did a great deal of public speaking at other organizations' meetings, hosted receptions for out of state visitors, and organized cultural and educational events for large numbers of people. They also promoted their campaign in weekly columns of a newspaper targeted at black audiences, wrote occasional editorials for other newspapers, held rallies at the capitol, and requested interviews with newspaper reporters. Their intention was to be highly visible.

The Michigan group was much more low key. Although they got about the same number of endorsements as the Connecticut group did (Tables 4-9 and 5-4), the endorsement list consists mainly of persons rather than organizations. This reflects a difference in style in that Michigan activists wanted simply to demonstrate to legislators that
important community leaders across the state supported their efforts. The Connecticut group wanted to show the same thing plus have the organizations themselves become aware and active on the issue. Thus Connecticut activists took their educational goals more seriously and spent a great deal of time pursuing them. However, it is doubtful that the endorsement of an organization rather than a leader would make a great deal of difference to legislators in either state. That is, legislators knew in both cases that there was a climate of opinion favoring divestment within certain politically aware constituencies, and they had to respond to it.

Despite the difference in degree of publicity and public endorsement sought and achieved, the Connecticut campaign was not a mobilization campaign in the sense that large numbers of people were brought into the political process. And, in neither state was a massive mobilization of popular support necessary for the adoption of the legislation. Indeed, had a massive and highly visible mobilization occurred early in the process, it may have alarmed opponents and alerted them to the need to pay more attention to the bills and to the creation of counter-proposals to divestment. This is a speculative assertion, however.

The trade-off in not having mobilization campaigns is that activists' educational efforts reach fewer people. Leaders of community organizations such as church groups, black organizations, labor unions, etc. and governmental officials in the two states may be well aware of the apartheid and divestment issues as a result of the activists' campaigns, and that is a significant achievement. But there is not likely to have been a substantial increase of awareness and education among the
public in general. In this regard, the campaigns resembled lobbies more than movements and the activists have probably not achieved their educational goals to the degree that they desire.

Again like lobbies, the campaigns in Michigan and Connecticut were led and run by small groups of about six people. Unlike most lobbies, however, very little money was needed for conducting the campaigns. They were financially inexpensive but very costly in terms of proponents' commitment of time. In both cases the activists afforded the time and energy required because of their high personal commitment to the issue. An important difference between the Connecticut and Michgian experiences, however, was in who managed the on-going decisions regarding campaign strategy and tactics -- e.g. decisions about when and how to press for floor votes, the acceptability of language for amendments, the organization of testimony at hearings. In Michigan these kind of decisions were made by Bullard and Eldersveld within the legislature whereas in Connecticut strategy was basically in the hands of the activists. Thus the activists in Connecticut retained more control over the campaigns than did those in Michigan. This is not to say that Connecticut activists did not have well-established and fruitful working relations with legislative sponsors, but they were less dependent than were their Michigan counterparts on these sponsors for making crucial decisions about the management of the campaign.

This difference is due in part to the fact that the legislative sponsors in Connecticut do not have any aids or professional staff. There
is no one in Connecticut anti-apartheid circles with a position comparable
to that of Eldersveld's in the Michigan legislature. Hoffman and Buchanan
function in Connecticut in the roles that Eldersveld fulfills, and if
they did not, the legislators themselves would not be able to pick up
the slack in the work. Michigan legislators are full-time lawmakers and
each one has at least a secretary for support staff. Many have aides, too,
and as was discussed in Chapter V, Bullard alone has six full-time staff.
Legislators in Connecticut are part-time lawmakers, and only committee
chairpersons have secretaries and/or aides. Most of these support staff
also work part time.

Another difference in the legislative environments for the two
sets of campaigns is the degree of participation by the black caucus in
actively pressing for the divestment measures. In Connecticut prominent
members of the black caucus were the bills' principal movers but in
Michigan they were not. Smith played a key role in getting the banking
bill through the Senate and the caucus has been supportive of the legis­
alation; but Bullard, with the caucus' blessings, has taken the lead in
pressing for divestment in Michigan. Interestingly, both states have
black Treasurers -- in Michigan an appointed one (Monroe) and in
Connecticut an elected one (Parker). Although Parker cannot be charac­
terized as enthusiastic about divestment, he did not publically oppose
the legislation and was responsive to proponents' pressures, especially
pressures from the black caucus. In contrast, Monroe has publically
criticized pension fund divestment and has given leadership to an attempt
by Treasury Department staff to undermine the pension fund bill. He did,
however, support the banking bill once it was amended and describes himself as a supporter of socially responsible investment. What is clear from both cases is that black public officials are not automatically in favor of anti-apartheid activists' divestment efforts.

The two cases share some other outer environmental factors in common. They are both in Northern industrial states with previous experiences of fairly high concentrations of anti-apartheid activism in other institutions. And, they both have major investments by corporations with substantial operations in South Africa. The latter factor so far has proven to be more of a hindrance to divestment in Connecticut than in Michigan, but that is probably because the pension fund bill has not yet been the focus of attention in the Michigan legislature. The matter of geographic location has been a significant pattern in all the state and local campaigns. The states that have passed binding divestment legislation (Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Minnesota) are all Northern states. No states in the Southeast have had legislation introduced (see Table 3-11), but a few states in the West and Southwest are among those entertaining divestment bills. Atlanta (Table 3-12) is the only Southeast city to have either considered or passed divestment legislation. However, the anti-apartheid movement generally has never been strong in the Southeast. Its greatest areas of concentration have always been in the Northeast and in California.

The degree to which the state political environment will tolerate the entertainment of such campaigns is a factor that may prove to be important to passage of divestment legislation, but is not addressed by the research here. It may be the case that lawmakers, government
officials, and the general public in states such as Michigan and Connecticut on the whole are more willing to listen to arguments for divestment because they are accustomed to pressure from a wide range of political perspectives. Perhaps they have greater experience with and less objection to "liberal" or "leftist" causes than persons in other states. For example, would the same mix of factors that made for success in either Connecticut or Michigan work in Alabama, Texas, or Utah? This is a question that could be answered best by a full range of case studies on the divestment campaigns in all the states where legislation has been introduced.

Despite Michigan's distance from the Northeast, the location of most national anti-apartheid organizations, the campaigns there have benefited from the willingness of national organizations, especially ACOA, to be of assistance in providing expertise and information. Both sets of campaigns used literature developed by ACOA and had ACOA staff as well as other prominent anti-apartheid figures lobby and testify in the legislatures and make presentations in other arenas in the states. Both groups of proponents are appreciative of the aid they have received from national organizations, but the activists in Michigan have been critical of these organizations for not giving more attention and publicity to state and city campaigns earlier in their development. The Michigan activists do not believe national organizations have a responsibility for initiating state or city efforts, but they would like to see more concentrated efforts
at giving these campaigns support services and high visibility so that other anti-apartheid activists across the country can apply the experiences gathered so far to their own situations.

Although the activists in both Connecticut and Michigan were quite resourceful in bringing research and expert testimony to support their divestment efforts, their opponents, especially those in Michigan, were not so quick to draw on such useful tools. The activists in both states always held an advantage over their opposition in being more knowledgeable about the issues involved. The business community in Connecticut eventually used outside expertise to their advantage, an important instance being during the sessions to convince the governor to veto the 1981 full divestment bill. Business leaders pointed to the recently released Rockefeller Study Commission advocacy of both the Sullivan Principles and no divestment as a precedent for the state to follow, and this helped to persuade the governor to veto. But even in the Task Force negotiations where the business representatives had their corporation staff helping them come up with policy options, Hoffman proved herself expert, capable of thorough analysis of the issues involved, and a formidable negotiator over details and technicalities.

An important difference in the two states' campaigns is that some of the activists in Michigan are academics whose area of expertise is Southern Africa. The Connecticut activists did not have the benefit of such advanced formal training. The Michigan activists are also well-established professionals in their community whereas the Connecticut activists are younger and, with one exception, less well known for their professional status than their connections to other activist groups.
and leftist causes. This meant that the Connecticut group had more work to do to establish their credibility with regard to expertise about the issue. Interestingly, however, they did more research (that proved very useful to their campaign) on the actual impact of divestment on state funds than did the Michigan activists.

There were other important differences in strategy as well. The Connecticut activists sought and got support from two types of groups that were not among the endorsers of the Michigan divestment efforts: labor unions and black organizations. Having the backing of the unions whose pension funds were at stake was quite helpful in the Connecticut campaigns, and the lack of this kind of support is likely to be an important detriment to passage of the Michigan pension fund bill. Black organizations' endorsements in Connecticut added enormous weight to the activists' pressures for the state to take an active stand against racism. Without similar support in Michigan activists are vulnerable to the charge, even from black leaders like Loren Monroe, that they are trying to make "a hollow, sacrificial gesture with other people's money" (Michigan Chronicle, May 3, 1980). On the other hand, the Michigan activists used church-related networks quite effectively in their campaigns whereas the Connecticut activists appear to have less church-related support or involvement.

Part of the strength of both sets of campaigns was the creation of a political climate in which, for those attentive to the issue, the only clear anti-racist option for state
policy was total disengagement from South Africa. Activists were able to cast the debate such that a moral issue was at stake, and to be against the legislation was to risk a public association with racism. Because of their careful coalition-building across racial lines both inside and outside the legislature, the Connecticut activists did a more effective job of creating this type of political climate and defining the issue as a moral stand against racism; but both groups of proponents were able to stretch the spectrum of seriously considered policy options to the point that many decision makers did not view complete divestment as an extraordinary measure; i.e. total divestment became an acceptable policy outcome. Then, when compromise was necessary, proponents could fall back on less stringent divestment options that, although disappointing in some respects, were important legislative accomplishments of economic disengagement from South Africa.

That decision makers both inside and outside of government felt vulnerable to the label of racist or an association with racism is surely a relatively new phenomena in American politics and is not the result of these particular anti-apartheid campaigns. However, the activists were responsible for invoking this vulnerability -- using the perceived political liability of leaders and state institutions being seen as supporters of apartheid to their campaigns' advantage. That the activists were able to do this in a time of economic hardship and greater visibility of conservative political forces nationwide is surprising and even remarkable.
Surprising also is that opposition forces, and especially business groups, were not more united and clever in discovering and proposing policy options that would promote a non-racist image of themselves and still prevent divestment legislation from passing. In both states, the opposition was fairly fragmented, especially in the beginning, and there appear to be several explanations for this. One is that business opponents seem initially to have miscalculated the potential for passing the bills and allowed themselves to remain preoccupied with other pressing issues. Another is that there was no united business voice in either state. Bankers and industrialists were at times at odds as were those representing big business versus those representing small business.

The only highly visible opponents, especially in the legislatures, were those on the fringes of the far right, and the more moderate opposition was not in a hurry to be identified with these people. With time, however, in both cases the opposition became better organized and more aware of counterproposals palatable to a wide range of people involved in decision making but undermining of activists' efforts.

Another similarity in the two states' processes is that they were both incremental -- in Michigan by design and in Connecticut by accident. The Michigan legislative sponsors had in mind a strategy of building momentum from the easiest bill to pass to the most difficult, but they have at the same time given opponents more opportunity to get better organized to defeat or significantly compromise the pension fund bill. In Connecticut, up until the point of the veto, the incremental strategy seemed to work in the activists' favor. They took a suboptimal outcome
of the passage of the first bill, the one containing the Sullivan Principles, and showed why it was unacceptable. They convinced enough people of its unacceptability and won what they believed to be an optimal outcome, a total divestment bill. It may have been that the passage of the Sullivan Principles bill actually helped the next year's campaign in that it introduced the issue and put the state on record as willing to take a stand on the issue. After the veto, however, activists faced a tough battle to forge an acceptable outcome in the face of enormous pressures to compromise a great deal. Because of their clarity about the limits of their willingness to compromise, in the end the activists got a product that took the business community far beyond where it expected to go (in the Task Force recommendations).

In both cases, in summary, there seem to be three general sets of factors accounting for the degree of success achieved in the divestment campaigns. The first is the thorough, persistent, and intense work done by the proponents to create a political climate within and around the legislatures in which total divestment was taken to be a serious policy option. In both cases, activists demonstrated very good abilities in convincing legislators and enough politically relevant people outside the legislature that divestment was the morally preferable alternative for state action. The campaigns were seen to have some important degree of support, to reflect some of the best expertise available on the issue, and to be gaining greater legitimacy as time passed. Thus the highly committed and intense involvement of a relatively few clever people is in large
part responsible for these campaigns' success.

The second major factor in explaining success is that the opposition was slow to respond and get organized well enough to counteract the divestment campaigns. In addition, activists had anticipated many of the arguments their opponents might raise and had established counter arguments well in advance. The activists were much quicker and more thorough at establishing that morality, expert opinion, and a high degree of consensus among those who pay attention to the issue was on their side. In the face of visible and persistent pressure from proponents and with disorganized, and at times reticent, pressure from opponents, legislators yielded to proponents' demands.

That the issue was an issue of race was the third major factor aiding the campaigns. One of the reasons that some opponents were reticent is that they did not want to risk being labeled racist. Many legislators were also wary of such an association. Once opponents began to get organized to articulate a different perspective on the issue -- that a conscientious person could be against divestment and racism at the same time -- this factor became less powerful. For a long time in both sets of campaigns, however, legislators and opponents believed themselves to be vulnerable to being seen as racists if they openly and actively opposed divestment. In that the question of race is somewhat peculiar to this issue, activists attempting campaigns on other international issues may face more obstacles in counteracting their opponents than did the groups in Connecticut and Michigan.

With both a great deal in common and with significant differences,
the two groups of divestment proponents under investigation here have achieved much of what they set out to do in both states. We move now from a comparison of how they achieved what they did to a discussion of the significance of these campaigns.

Comparison of Outcomes and Impact

In both Michigan and Connecticut divestment proponents succeeded in getting legislation adopted that curbs each state's economic ties to South Africa. Although significant compromises in the measures were required to get them passed, these laws stand as some of the toughest and most far reaching sanctions related legislation in the country. And, they stand as further evidence that state legislatures are willing to make laws with foreign policy implications.

As one might expect, there are interesting similarities and differences between outcomes of the two sets of campaigns. One of the most obvious differences is the legislative outcomes. Two pieces of legislation having to do with state bank deposits and university endowments have passed in Michigan whereas the final law passed in Connecticut restricts investments of pension funds. Activists in both states have been working about the same amount of years (1978-82) to achieve passage of these bills.

The Michigan legislature has had more exposure to the issue of apartheid than has the Connecticut legislature because it has passed legislation on South Africa other than the divestment bills. In addition, Bullard has sponsored several educational events on the issue
for his colleagues, and he together with other legislators have hosted receptions for visitors from South Africa.

Representatives of the South African government or Foundation apparently have paid more attention to the divestment process in the Michigan legislature. Or, at least their presence in Michigan is more easily detected than in Connecticut. As was explained in the Michigan case study, however, the South African government and its friends have had a strong interest in Michigan anti-apartheid activities for some time.

In the executive offices in the two states, officials have been required to spend significant amounts of time on the divestment issue. Because of the veto in Connecticut, the governor there was much more involved in the debates around the issue than was the Michigan governor. In addition to the governor in Michigan, however, three other departments — Treasury, Commerce, and Civil Rights — have spent time analyzing the bills, suggesting and negotiating amendments, testifying in committee hearings, and implementing the resultant laws. Among state departments, only the Treasury Department in Connecticut has allocated major amounts of staff time to the issue and to implementation. Because the final product was the result of a task force recommendation, with the task force being chaired and managed by the Treasurer, it is likely that the Treasury Department in Connecticut expended a great deal more resources considering divestment policy options than did any of the governmental bureaucracies in Michigan. In addition, the Connecticut Treasurer commissioned outside research to analyze the options available
for the state's investments. When the campaign to push for passage of the pension fund bill gains momentum in Michigan, however, executive officials there will be required to pay more attention than they have at this point to the issue.

Although at the time of this writing the actual amounts of money affected by these laws is not yet clear, it appears as though the state investments bill in Connecticut will impact substantially more funds than the banking bill and university endowment bills in Michigan combined. However, if the Michigan pension bill eventually passes, that state will have the most comprehensive set of divestment laws in the country. Not only will there be large sums of money affected but also three separate types of funds will be governed in part by divestment criteria.

Businesses with connections to South Africa from both states and beyond are well aware of the new divestment policies in the state for several reasons. Representatives from some of these corporations and/or persons hired to lobby on their behalf have contacted legislators and other government officials in attempt to change or prevent passage of some of the legislation. Business representatives in Connecticut also took an active part in shaping the Governor's Task Force recommendations and in promoting the type of compromise reached there to decision makers in other arenas. In order to do business with either state (i.e. to qualify as a bank depository in Michigan or as an allowable investment in Connecticut), banks and corporations have had to complete questionnaires and affidavits
explaining their connections, if any, to South Africa. This means that company managers necessarily have allowed the divestment issue to impinge on their decisions with regard to how to run their businesses. Bankers in Michigan must promise not to loan money to the South African government or corporations located there whereas in Connecticut corporations must demonstrate their compliance with a complex set of criteria set down by the state. General Electric has cited the Connecticut legislation as the basis for some of its decisions regarding business in South Africa. The implementation impact of the educational institutions' investment bill in Michigan is not yet clear.

The Sullivan Principles as a code of conduct for corporations did not arise as a significant issue in Michigan, but in Connecticut they became a serious compromise for which businesses and governmental officials pressed. On many occasions activists and legislative proponents had to argue forcibly why the Principles were an unacceptable alternative to calls for divestment. One result of these thorough discussions about divestment and the Sullivan Principles is that some corporate executives are more convinced than ever that the code is a necessary, responsible, and adequate business response to divestment pressures. This, from the perspective of the activists, is not progress on the issue although in neither case did activists expect to convert business leaders to their point of view.

Others who have been attentive to these processes in Connecticut and Michigan are South African governmental officials and others from that country who would defend apartheid as well as leaders in the resis-
tance movements. Both the sympathizers and the opponents of apartheid from South Africa have been involved in trying to influence the process in these two states (and other states) because both parties strongly believe that international opinion and pressures can be important in the outcome of their struggle for control of the country. The US government, i.e. the State Department and the US Congress, also pays attention to the issue and monitors its progress.

For the national anti-apartheid movement, divestment campaigns targeting state and local governments may prove to be one of the most powerful components of the movement's activities for several reasons. One is that the campaigns are decentralized and thus hard to counteract. Activists have many points of access across the 50 states and potentially could have divestment policies operating all over the country. Because there is no one institution, for example like the US Congress, that can say yes or no to these divestment policy proposals for the entire nation, activists may have better chances of winning approval in a number of arenas. In this regard, targeting state and local governments is like targeting individual colleges and universities, except that in the case of these governments, a great deal more money is at stake. Targeting these institutions is also somewhat similar to targeting local church institutions across the country, but in the case of churches there are always national organizations that can establish national policies or guidelines. For state and local governments there is no national authority to which opponents can appeal for help in this matter. However, the decentralization may
make activist efforts more difficult, too. If opponents have no national place of final appeal, neither do proponents. Sharing of information and strategy among activists becomes even more important in these kinds of campaigns.

Many divestment activists hope that divestment actions by state and city governments will build momentum toward Congressional action for economic sanctions measures of some sort. Momentum might be built and certainly state and city actions give legitimacy to the call for divestment and sanctions, but to get Congress to address the issue in a way that will begin to satisfy activists will require a concerted campaign or series of campaigns directed specifically toward that purpose. There is no reason to believe that Congress will respond automatically to a series of states' or cities' divestment actions.

Another important result of these campaigns is additional evidence that these governments are willing to get involved in making judgements about foreign policy issues. Some state governments have been demonstrating for some time that they understand the significance of world interdependence. For example, they establish trade offices or missions abroad or send teams of representatives to other countries to attract foreign investment to their areas. The divestment measures show, however, that they will get involved in foreign policy even when there is no clear and direct material benefit to be had. Having local politicians discuss and act on an issue like apartheid may help remove the mystique of foreign policy that keeps it as the preserve of the federal executive branch in many peoples' minds -- including many in the federal
executive branch. And, it will give greater legitimacy to the policy of non-cooperation with South Africa.

Divestment campaigns in Michigan and Connecticut as well as in other states are proving useful in several ways to the sanctions thrust of the total US anti-apartheid movement itself. There is a mounting accumulation of evidence that divestment does not pose a substantial financial risk to the investment portfolios involved. The testimony from investment analysts, the studies conducted on the Connecticut portfolios, and the experience of divestment itself helps to undermine opponents' contentions that social responsibility with regard to apartheid-related investments is financial irresponsibility. So far, the implementation of the 1982 legislation in Connecticut is not complete (nor for the 1982 bill in Massachusetts) and thus the evidence from that case is not yet clear. If the process proves to be financially sound, however, as was the case with the 1980 implementation and as has been the case for other institutions such as universities, important precedents will be established.

There is also an increasing number of fairly successful divestment campaign experiences across the country, and activists in these places could do other activists in other places a great deal of good by sharing information about strategies to a greater degree than is being done now. Some efforts by national organizations are being made in this regard but not enough. Groups across the country are still having to forge their way through campaigns in some important and perhaps detrimental isolation from one another.
For the activists in Connecticut and Michigan the divestment process in their states has been important for the internal dynamics of their groups. The Michigan proponents have accomplished the passage of two of the pieces of legislation they want to become law, and of course, they have learned a great deal along the way. As they approach the fight over the pension bill, however, they have less organizational strength than in past years, and whether or not they will be able to sustain themselves and an operational base from which to attain passage of the most difficult piece of legislation is not clear. As is the case with the Connecticut group, their organization is not highly institutionalized and is very dependent on the participation of a few people who carry a great deal of the work. Their future operation will depend in large part on the degree to which those individuals can continue to carry the bulk of the work and/or recruit new energetic and committed participants.

When this research was conducted, the Connecticut Anti-Apartheid Committee was at a point of self-evaluation regarding what task they wanted to tackle next. We will have to wait to see if they maintain the organizational momentum that carried them through several years of vigorous and fruitful divestment campaigns.

Whether or not these two sets of anti-apartheid activists carry on with similar or new campaigns, however, they have already made a substantial and important contribution to the US movement. In addition, their efforts have been appreciated worldwide by those attempting to end apartheid.
In the end, the question of which group of activists was most successful is a difficult one. The legislative goals sought were different for the two cases. The Michigan proponents have a more comprehensive approach to restricting the state's relationship, and they have achieved two-thirds of the legislation they wanted. But they have probably not yet overcome two-thirds of the difficulty to be encountered in such a program of action. The Connecticut proponents set out to get in many respects a very difficult piece of legislation passed and achieved a great deal, but not all, of what they wanted. Thus, although the Michigan proponents have more state laws to show for their efforts, their organizational abilities, campaign strength, and resolve in the face of determined and clever opposition has not been tested to the degree that was the case in Connecticut.

In reflecting on the process of evaluation itself, we find that in this study the goals-based evaluation provides in some respects a fairly generous standard for judging success and failure because of the ambiguity of some of the campaign goals. The goal of getting legislation passed is clear, but what is not clear is how much compromise in the language of the bills is too much. It proved easier to get bills passed once changes were made regarding the stringency of their provisions. The activists in both Michigan and Connecticut are satisfied that they have achieved passage of the toughest laws possible given the political realities they face, and certainly it is to their credit that the measures are as far reaching as they are. Nevertheless, substantial compromises were made, and if the goals were to
get the original legislative intent passed, the campaigns have fallen short of reaching those aims. Thus, other goals that are also somewhat ambiguous -- expressing solidarity or taking a principled stand -- are attained but to a lesser degree than they would have been had the original legislation passed.

**General Reflections on the Study**

Through their campaigns and their many achievements, both sets of activists have demonstrated well that nongovernmental groups within countries can in many respects effectively address international problems. Because this research analyzes particular campaigns within one major issue area, we have not learned with any certainty or clarity: (1) whether or not there is a difference in the factors that make for NGO success on international issues versus domestic issues; or (2) the degree to which the experiences in the Connecticut case are applicable to other international issues besides apartheid. However, some speculations on these points are in order.

There are some reasons to believe that activists may find state and local governments to be unreceptive to entertaining legislation on international issues. Decision makers could argue quite easily that they have neither the expertise nor the jurisdiction to make judgments on such matters. All of both the expertise and jurisdiction lie with the national government, they could assert. Furthermore, officials at almost every level of government are generally more burdened than they want to be with more parochial concerns that they believe to be more
This research has demonstrated, however, that activists were able to convince lawmakers that these arguments could not stand up to pressure. The divestment proponents provided not only well-respected outside experts to back up their proposals but they themselves demonstrated a high degree of consistently reliable knowledge on the wide range of issues at stake. This information and expertise was made freely available to decision makers at strategic points during the debates. The campaigns in both states had a high degree of legitimacy in this regard, and activists were well-respected for having done their homework.

The question about jurisdiction was fairly easily resolved in these cases because, in addition to taking a moral stand on an important international issue, legislators were carrying out their on-going responsibility for management and oversight of state funds. No one could deny that the states were obligated to set criteria by which funds would be invested or deposited. Furthermore, most legislators agreed that if they felt any issue was sufficiently important, they wanted the state government to make itself heard on it despite the possibility that the state had no jurisdiction. Some even felt proud that they could cultivate friendly relations with African groups even though official relations between such groups and the US government might be strained.

The slow and disjointed response of opposition forces in these campaigns may be due in part to the issue having a primarily international focus. The issue is not as well-known or well-understood by the
public as would be the abortion issue or the Equal Rights Amendment, and except for retirees whose pension funds are at stake, there is no group that stands to win or lose an immediate and tangible benefit. Companies stand to win or lose a moral judgment on their operations and the public relations benefits of being seen as good corporate citizens, but they are not likely to suffer substantial financial harm. Thus no groups immediately rose to protect their own interests and to counteract effectively the arguments for divestment. Opponents also believed that, because it was an international issue, the legislature would not pay it a great deal of attention. In other words, activists might be able to move divestment legislation through the legislative process without raising the ire that a domestic, more well-known and contentious issue might attract. Important to note, however, is that the Connecticut activists not only made sure they had no active opposition from the retirees, they also succeeded in enlisting the retirees' endorsement.

Activists working on other international issues could learn a great deal from the efforts of the Connecticut and Michigan activists, especially in the factors that gave strength to their campaigns. It is interesting that resolutions on other international issues such as the arms race are being entertained in state and city governments. There may be a saturation point regarding the degree to which these subnational lawmakers are willing to act on such questions, however. It is likely that on any international problem, activists will have to convince these officials that they have sufficient expertise, jurisdic-
tion, and constituency pressure to make an informed and appreciated decision. To the rest of the world such decisions could be an indication of the degree of support or nonsupport there is for official US foreign policy among elected representatives of the American people. This is precisely what divestment activists want: visible, legitimate, and responsible voices from across America objecting to and providing alternatives to continued US governmental and corporate support for apartheid.
APPENDIX A

Persons Interviewed in This Research

For the Connecticut Case Study

Activists

Peggy Buchanan, Co-Chair, Connecticut Anti-Apartheid Committee; former treasurer of the CAAC; June 2, 1982.

*Christy Hoffman, former Co-Chair, CAAC; March 22, 1982.

Legislators

*William Dyson, Representative, New Haven; March 22, 1982.

Marcella C. Fahey, Senate Co-Chairperson, Appropriations Committee, General Assembly; June 2, 1982 (by phone).

*Abraham L. Giles, Representative, Hartford; March 23, 1982.

Boyd Hines, former Representative; June 1982 (by phone).

Cathy Landau-Painter, Legislative Aid to Ernest N. Abate, Speaker of the House; March 22, 1982.

Timothy J. Moynihan, Assistant Majority Leader, House of Representatives; March 22, 1982.

Richard F. Schneller, Senate Majority Leader; June 3, 1982.

Irving J. Stolberg, House of Representatives Co-Chairperson, Finance, Revenue and Bonding Committee; June 3, 1982.

State Executive Office Staff

*Henry Parker, Treasurer, State of Connecticut; June 1982 (by phone).

Lee Van Meter, Deputy Treasurer, State of Connecticut; June 22, 1982 (by phone).
Persons in Business

Joseph Crisco, Corporate Coordinator of Government Relations, United Technologies Corporation; June 3, 1982 (by phone).


David Delabetta, Director, Governmental Relations Program, Connecticut Bankers' Association; June 1982 (by phone).


*Dean Patenaude, Chairperson, Investment Advisory Council, State of Connecticut; Vice President, Securities Division, Connecticut Mutual Insurance; June 21, 1982 (by phone).


*Peter Shapiro, Vice President and Director of Governmental Affairs, Connecticut Bank and Trust; June 3, 1982.

*Dale Van Winkle, Vice President, United Technologies Corporation; June 1982 (by phone).

Others

*Sanford Cloud, Counsel, Aetna Life and Casualty Insurance Corporation; former Representative; June 3, 1982.


*Edythe Gaines, Commissioner, Public Utilities Control; June 21, 1982 (by phone).

People with whom I attempted to have interviews but was unsuccessful

John G. Groppo, House of Representatives Majority Leader.

Jay Jackson, Counsel to the Governor, State of Connecticut.

*Russell T. Semelsberger, Vice President, Otis Elevator, United Technologies.
Others:
Michele Jacklin, Reporter, Hartford Courant
Bruce Kauffman, Reporter, Hartford Advocate
Dick Polman, Columnist, Hartford Courant

Those who refused to be interviewed:
*Frank Stanley, Senior Vice President, Trust Division, Hartford National Bank

* Task Force members
APPENDIX A, cont.

For the Michigan Case Study

Activists

Frank Beeman, Faculty, Michigan State University; SALC member; January 27, 1982
Pat Beeman, SALC member; January 27, 1982
William Derman, Department of Anthropology, Michigan State University; SALC member; January 27, 1982
David Dwyer, Department of Anthropology, Michigan State University; SALC member; January 27, 1982
Linda Linteau, student, Michigan State University; member PIRGM; January 29, 1982
David Wiley, Director, African Studies Center, Michigan State University; SALC member; January 27, 1982
Marylee Wiley, Outreach Coordinator, African Studies Center, Michigan State University; SALC member; January 28, 1982

Legislators

Perry Bullard, Representative, District 53 (Ann Arbor); January 28, 1982
Alan L. Cropsey, Representative, District 88 (DeWitt)
Barbara Eldersveld, Legislative Aid to Representative Bullard; January 29, 1982
David Evans, former Chair of the House Civil Rights Committee; January 28, 1982
Virgil Smith, Representative, District 10 (Detroit); January 28, 1982
Francis (Bus) Spaniola, Chair of the Senior Citizens and Retirement Committee, House of Representatives; May 20, 1982
Jackie Vaughn III, Senator, District 5 (Detroit); May 21, 1982

State Executive Office Staff

Roy Castillo, Assistant Director, Department of Civil Rights; May 20, 1982
John Fonger, Director, Municipal Employees Retirement System, Bureau of Retirement Systems; May 20, 1982

Norvel Hansen, Deputy Director, Bureau of Retirement Systems, Michigan Public School Employees Retirement System; May 20, 1982

Gordon Lindsey, Assistant Director in the Bureau of Finance, Department of Treasury; May 20, 1982

Barry Stevens, Administrator in the Stock Division, Bureau of Finance, Department of Treasury; May 20, 1982

Loren E. Monroe, Treasurer, State of Michigan; May 20, 1982

Curtis Townsend, Deputy Treasurer, Department of Treasury; May 20, 1982

Persons in Business

Richard Augenstein, Michigan Manufacturers Association; May 19, 1982

Don Heikkinen, Senior Vice President and Staff Counsel, Michigan Bankers Association; May 21, 1982

Bob Smith, Coomes, Farhat, Smith and Hoisington; June 1982 (by phone)

People with whom I attempted to have interviews but was unsuccessful

Activists:
Joel Samoff, former faculty, University of Michigan; former member of WCCAA

Rachel Samoff, former member of WCCAA

Len Suransky, faculty, Center for African and Afro-American Studies, University of Michigan

Executive Office Staff:
Phillip E. Runkel, Superintendent of Public Education, Department of Education

Legislators:
Basil Brown, Senator, District 3 (Highland Park)

Those who refused to be interviewed:

William Amerman, Investment Director, Department of Treasury
APPENDIX A, cont.

Others Involved in Apartheid Issues

Activists

Carol Collins, Coordinator, Campaign to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa, Washington, DC; January 16, 1982.

Myloann Heckathom, leader of the Stop Banking on Apartheid Campaign in Berkeley, California, New York City; June 13, 1981.

Gail Hovey, Research Director, American Committee on Africa, New York City: January 21, 1982.

George Houser, Director Emeritus, American Committee on Africa, New York City; January 19, 1982.

Paul Irish, Associate Director, American Committee on Africa, New York City; January 21, 1982.

Dumisani Kumalo, Projects Director, American Committee on Africa, New York City; January 21, 1982.


Prexy Nesbitt, Secretary for Programme, Programme to Combat Racism, World Council of Churches in Geneva, Switzerland, Columbus, Ohio; April 7, 1980.


Tim Smith, Executive Director, Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, New York City: January 21, 1982.

US Government Officials

Robert Cabelli, Consultant, US Department of State (now the Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs); January 19, 1982 (by phone).


Persons in Business

J. Wayne Fredricks, Executive Director, International Governmental Affairs, Ford Motor Company, New York City; February 18, 1982.

Wilfred Koplowitz, Vice President International Public Affairs, Citibank, New York City; February 18, 1982.

Robert Schwartz, Vice President, Shearson American Express, New York City; January 20, 1982.

Mark Sussman, International Affairs Analyst, Corporate Social Policy, Chemical Bank, New York City; February 18, 1982.

United Nations Officials

Abdennour Abrous, Chief of Branch, United Nations Centre Against Apartheid, New York City; January 18, 1982.

Yusuff Maitama-Sule, Nigerian Ambassador to the United Nations and Chair of the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid; August 14, 1981.

Hamib Semichi, Algerian Representative to the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid; August 14, 1981.

South Africans


South Africans, cont.


Two persons currently living in South Africa who are a part of the resistance movement there.

Others


Ron Walters, Professor of Political Science, Howard University, Washington, DC; January 11, 1982.

People with whom I attempted to have interviews but was unsuccessful

Randy Barber, Director, Pension Investment and Control Issues, Washington, DC.

Goler Butcher, Professor of Law, Howard University, Washington, DC (former assistant to Representative Charles Diggs).

Chris Chamberlain, Aid to Senator Paul Tsongas, Washington, DC.

Leonard G. Miller, First Vice President, Associate General Counsel, Shearson American Express, New York City.

Eugene Reddy, Assistant General Secretary, United Nations Centre Against Apartheid, New York City.

William Schweke, Conference on Alternative State and Local Policies, Washington, DC.

Daniel Simpson, Director for Southern Africa Affairs, Africa Bureau, US Department of State, Washington, DC.

Marie Lee Swearer, Vice President, Corporate Responsibility, Chemical Bank, New York City.
APPENDIX B

Questions for Interviews

The following are illustrative of questions used in semi-structured interviews. Not all questions were asked of each person interviewed because of time constraints in some interviews and in order to avoid unnecessary redundancy in others. Some redundancy was built into the questions in order to insure full coverage of the information desired. The questions below are grouped in categories for divestment proponents, opponents, and observers. However, during interviews sometimes respondents were asked questions from more than one category, depending on the person. Questions were also often tailored to the specific situation in order to take advantage of the particular person's expertise or position, and they were not always asked in the sequence presented here.

Proponents

1. When, where and why did you get involved in anti-apartheid work?

2. When and how did you get involved in these particular campaigns?

3. Tell me the history of the campaign. Who was involved? How did the idea arise? When did the group start planning it? How much planning took place?

4. What role have you played in the campaign? What specific jobs have you done, or what specific duties have you been assigned?

5. What does your group want to accomplish in these campaigns? Has the group ever discussed its goals? If so, is there a written record of that discussion? Is there any disagreement in the group about its aims?

6. How did you organize the campaign? What specific actions did the group take to try to get legislation passed? Why did you take these actions? Why did you believe they would be helpful?

7. How many groups, besides yours, support your efforts? What did those groups do to support the campaign? How did you get their support? What are your on-going linkages (if any) to them?
Proponents, cont.

8. How many people were involved in the day-to-day management of the campaigns? On average how many people come to your organization's meetings? Is anyone paid to help carry out this work?

9. How much time did you devote to the campaign? How much time do you think others devoted?

10. How much money was spent on the campaign? Where did the money come from?

11. Why did the legislation pass (or not pass)?

12. What information did you find it necessary to acquire in order to conduct the campaign? Where did the information come from? Who researched it?

13. What kind and how much contact have you had with other anti-apartheid groups around the country? How have they responded to your work? Have they been helpful, harmful, indifferent?

14. What kind and how much contact have you had with governmental officials? Were they helpful, harmful, or indifferent to the campaign? What responses did they make?

15. How do you think others in the community view you and your organization? How visible are you as an organization? Do you think anyone not directly involved in the campaign or its targets knows that the campaign occurred? What evidence is there that "the public" paid any attention?

16. How have legislators responded to the campaign? What have you done to make them pay attention to and support the legislation? Which legislators have been helpful and how? Which have opposed the campaign and how?

17. What nongovernmental organizations have opposed the campaign? What actions did they take? When and how did you find out about their opposition? What arguments have they used against the legislation? Have you ever met with them? For what purpose?

18. What attention have you gotten from the media? Have you sought this attention?

19. Has the South African government or its representatives paid attention to the campaign? Do you have any evidence of their presence in opposing the legislation?
Proponents, cont.

20. What impact do you think the campaign has had, if any? What evidence do you have that there has been any impact (on the state government, businesses, individuals, other anti-apartheid campaigns, etc.)?

21. What are the plans for your group's work in the coming year?

22. Who else should I interview -- in government, in business, in the anti-apartheid group, journalists, among divestment supporters, etc.?

Opponents

1. Tell me about your organization. What purpose do you have? Who do you represent? How big is your staff?

2. What is your interest in the divestment legislation? When did you get interested in it? (Follow-up with specific questions to find out how much the respondent knows about the legislation, campaign, its progress, etc.)

3. How do you feel about the state legislature entertaining such a bill? Does it have responsibility for or jurisdiction over such matters? What is at stake in this legislation?

4. What position has your organization taken on the legislation?

5. What have you done, if anything, to inform others of your position? Have you attempted to organize any sources of support for your position outside your organization? What contact have you had with others holding a similar position?

6. How much and what kind of contact have you had with proponents?

7. How much attention has the campaign received in your organization? in the legislature? in the community?

8. How much time have you personally spent on matters related to this legislation? How much time have other staff in your organization spent?

9. What impact, if any, will the legislation have (on the state government, on businesses, individuals, etc.)?

10. What is your image of the proponents of this legislation? Why are they pressing for it? How good are they at convincing legislators to pass the bills? Who are their supporters?
Opponents, cont.

11. Who else should I interview -- in government, in business, etc.?

12. Have you or anyone else you know been contacted by the South African government or its representatives?

In addition, for governmental officials:

13. How has the divestment law been implemented? What specific steps were taken in the process of implementation? How much staff time has been devoted to the implementation? How much money is affected?

Observers

1. When and how did you become aware of the campaign/legislation? Why did you become interested? How much do you know about other anti-apartheid campaigns?

2. How much and what kind of contact have you had with proponents? with opponents?

3. What is your image of the proponents (and opponents)? Why are they pressing for passage of the legislation? How good are they at convincing legislators to do what they want? Who are their supporters? (Repeat questions for opponents.)

4. What strategies have the proponents used to get the legislation passed? What strategies have the opponents used? How successful has each side been?

5. Outside of the principal parties involved, who, if anyone, is paying attention to this legislation? How much attention has it received?

6. How do you feel about the state legislature entertaining such bills? Does it have responsibility for or jurisdiction over such matters? What is at stake in the legislation?

7. What is the impact of the campaign/legislation? What difference does it make? What will be the cumulative effect if a number of states pass such legislation?

8. Who else should I interview?
APPENDIX C

Connecticut House Bill 5975
Substitute House Bill No. 5975

PUBLIC ACT NO. 82-324

AN ACT CONCERNING THE STATE INVESTMENT POLICY IN RELATION TO SOUTH AFRICA.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened:

Section 1. Section 3-13f of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof:

[The state treasurer shall review the major investment policies of the state for the purpose of ensuring that no moneys are invested in corporations doing business in South Africa which have not adopted the Sullivan principles. All moneys invested in such corporations shall be disinvested within a reasonable period of time, and no new moneys shall be invested in such corporations.]

(a) In carrying out his fiduciary responsibility, the state treasurer shall, within a reasonable period of time, disinvest all state funds currently invested in any corporation doing business in South Africa and invest no new state funds in any such corporation unless such corporation satisfies all the following minimum requirements: (1) such corporation has adopted the Sullivan principles and has obtained a performance rating in the top two categories of the Sullivan principles rating system prepared by Arthur D. Little, Inc.; (2) such corporation does not supply strategic products or services for use by the government of South Africa or for use by the military or police in South Africa and (3) such corporation recognizes the right of all South African employees to organize and strike in support of economic or social objectives, free from the fear of dismissal or blacklisting. The state treasurer shall consult with the investment advisory council in developing, interpreting and administering any policy relating to these requirements. For the purposes of this section the term "doing business in South Africa" shall mean conducting or performing manufacturing, assembly or warehousing operations within the Republic of South Africa or, if a bank or other financial institution, lending money to the Republic of South Africa or any agency or instrumentality thereof, and the term "strategic products or services" shall mean articles designated as arms, ammunition and implements of war in 22 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121,
Substitute House Bill No. 5975

AND DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT AND COMPUTERS SOLD FOR MILITARY OR POLICE USE OR FOR USE IN CONNECTION WITH THE PASS SYSTEM AS PRACTICED IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA.

(b) IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT TO INVEST STATE FUNDS IN ANY CORPORATION, THE STATE TREASURER, IN ADMINISTERING THIS SECTION, MAY REQUIRE A SOCIAL AUDIT OF ANY CORPORATION DOING BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA.

Sec. 2. This act shall take effect from its passage.

Certified as correct by

________________________________
Legislative Commissioner.

________________________________
Clerk of the Senate.

________________________________
Clerk of the House.

Approved ____________________________, 1982

________________________________
Governor.
APPENDIX D

Examples of CAAC Newsletters, Press Releases, and Educational Material
ANOTHER AFFRON'T TO THE PEOPLE BY GOV. O'NEILL: SOUTH AFRICA

During the month of May, 1981, both houses of the Connecticut legislature overwhelmingly passed a bill calling for total divestment of state funds from companies in South Africa. Despite this overwhelming mandate, Governor William O'Neill took it upon himself to veto the bill on July 1, 1981. Why did he do this? O'Neill once again succumbed to corporate pressure, totally ignoring the wishes of the public at large. O'Neill has bought the line that corporations in South Africa are promoting increased democracy there when it is clear that in fact corporate interests are instrumental in allowing the racist apartheid regime to continue. In addition, O'Neill has bought the line that divestment of state funds would jeopardize the rate of return presently being earned by state funds. However, it is clear from studies and actual practice in other states (notably California and Wisconsin) that higher rates of return can be earned on funds re-invested in socially responsible ways. The great majority of Connecticut legislators were not fooled by these ideas, and voted for divestment. A great number of community, labor, and church groups have also endorsed divestment. Liberation movements in South Africa are calling for divestment.

WE HAVE A CHANCE TO OVER-RIDE O'NEILL'S VETO!

The bill will go back to the House and Senate during July for re-confirmation. WE NEED YOUR ACTIVE HELP in lobbying the legislature and contacting the community.

ATTEND THE PRESS CONFERENCE

THURSDAY, JULY 16th

4:00 P.M.

IN FRONT OF THE CH.ITAL, HARTFORD
(WASHINGTON ST AT CAPITAL AVENUE)
Connecticut Anti-Apartheid Committee
P.O. BOX 727 WATERBURY, CT 06720
WATERBURY 203-754-0296 — HARTFORD 203-243-1672

April 24, '82

It is the position of the Ct. Anti-Apartheid Committee that complete sanctions, on both trade and investment, should be applied against South Africa. Our intention is to work towards this goal in every way possible at the local, state and federal levels. With this in mind, members of the Committee agreed to serve on the Governor’s Task Force on Investment in South Africa as representatives of both the AFL-CIO and the CTU.

After intense negotiations, the Task Force has emerged with the recommendations attached. While clearly short of total divestment, it is our position that these recommendations together are a meaningful step towards limiting corporate support for apartheid. Most significantly, the recommendations go beyond the simple workplace reforms called for in the Sullivan Principles, which we believe should be minimum conditions of employment for workers everywhere. The recommendations also target companies which sell strategic products to the military and government of South Africa, those companies which are most directly assisting in the white minority government’s administration of apartheid.

The recommendations also apply pressure on U.S. companies to bargain with striking black workers instead of dismissing them, as is the practice under South African law. The organization of black workers and a strong union movement in South Africa is a great threat to apartheid and cannot be effective without the ability to strike. It is our responsibility to assist the brothers and sisters of this movement in every way possible.

We believe that over half of the companies doing business in South Africa which are now in the state’s portfolio will be excluded by the proposed standards. The very presence of any U.S. corporation in South Africa provides support to apartheid and we will continue to document and educate the Connecticut public about these links. Those companies remaining outside the scope of this bill will be under particular scrutiny.

It is only because of the great support of the people of Connecticut for divestment that the Task Force was forced to agree to such recommendations. These, if signed into law, will be the strongest stand yet taken by any state’s government against apartheid. Until victory is won, however, and the people of South Africa are free, we will continue to fight for the total isolation - economic, political and cultural - of apartheid.
LEGISLATIVE ALERT

The bill (HB 5740) which requires the divestment of state funds from companies in South Africa has been reported favorably out of the Finance Committee by a vote of 9 to 7 with 2 abstentions. This is a very positive sign for this bill, which has real national significance. While many other states are currently discussing similar bills, and some have passed different versions, this would be one of the strongest statements to date against U.S. support of apartheid in South Africa. It is especially important in light of the Reagan Administration's friendlier relations with the South African government.

Your support in getting this bill passed is absolutely crucial. A phone call to your area legislators urging their support of HB 5740 could make the difference. Democratic leaders (listed below) also need to hear from you. If you can't reach them through a personal phone call, a letter is second best. If you need addresses or phone numbers, call us at the numbers above.

Here are some facts about the bill:

1. The bill calls for the sale of stocks and bonds of companies and banks which do business in South Africa.

2. For example, the state would sell its stock in Mobil Oil, a major supplier of oil to South Africa, and Control Data, which has illegally sold computers to the South African military, among other companies.

3. The bill would affect approximately 15% of the entire pension fund. We have every assurance from financial experts that these stocks can be replaced in a way which would not harm the pension fund but may, in fact, improve it.

4. By passing this bill, Connecticut is joining a movement which is not only national, but international, in scope. It will not be an isolated act. Many countries (for example, Japan) do not permit investment in South Africa, and many states and towns have taken or are considering some action on this issue.

5. The unions representing almost all of the workers participating in the fund are supportive of the bill.

The bill will probably not be voted on for several weeks but we must get organized NOW. With everyone pulling together we should be able to make this a victory!
APPENDIX E

Michigan Public Act 325 of 1980
AN ACT to amend section 5 of Act No. 105 of the Public Acts of 1855, entitled as amended "An act to regulate the disposition of the surplus funds in the state treasury; to provide for the deposit of surplus funds in certain financial institutions; to require certain reports by those institutions; to lend surplus funds pursuant to loan agreements secured by certain commercial or industrial real and personal property; to authorize an appropriation; and to prescribe the duties of certain state agencies," as added by Act No. 55 of the Public Acts of 1979; being section 21.145 of the Compiled Laws of 1970.

The People of the State of Michigan enact:

Section amended; surplus funds in treasury.

Section 1. Section 5 of Act No. 105 of the Public Acts of 1855, as added by Act No. 55 of the Public Acts of 1979; being section 21.145 of the Compiled Laws of 1970, is amended to read as follows:

21.145 Financial institution as depository of state funds; eligibility; disclosure reports; list of financial institutions failing to comply; conclusive presumption of compliance; certification of compliance as condition to deposit of additional funds; prohibited conduct; affidavit; definitions.

(M.S.A. 3.693)

Sec. 5. (1) The state treasurer shall not deposit any surplus funds belonging to the state in a financial institution with total assets of more than $10,000,000,000 at the end of its last full fiscal year unless the financial institution complies with subsection 15, and files with the commissioner, either voluntarily or pursuant to Act No. 135 of the Public Acts of 1977, being sections 445.1611 to 445.1614 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, the disclosure reports required pursuant to section 61 of Act No. 135 of the Public Acts of 1977, being section 445.1606 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, and 1 of the following:

a. The disclosure reports required pursuant to section 63 and 4 of Act No. 135 of the Public Acts of 1977.

b. A copy of the information to be disclosed under section 64 of Act No. 135 of the Public Acts of 1977, relating to mortgage loans foreclosed, and a copy of the federal loan application register maintained by savings and loan associations pursuant to federal home loan bank board regulation, 12 C.F.R. 526.10, together with the following information as to each loan application:

i. The type of loan applied for, divided into the following categories: home improvement loans; conventional mortgage loans on 1- to 4-family, owner-occupied dwellings; conventional mortgage loans on 1- to 4-family, nonowner-occupied dwellings; federal housing administration, farm home administration, or veterans administration mortgage loans; loans secured by junior liens; and loans on family dwellings for 5 or more families.

ii. If a loan application other than for a loan secured by a mortgage on a multifamily dwelling is denied, the reason given for the denial.

iii. The county code assigned by the commissioner.

iv. The information required to be disclosed under subsection 1, b. or c. relative to the reason for denial of a loan, the owner-occupied or nonowner-occupied dwelling designation for a conventional mortgage loan, and the county code shall be provided only with respect to loan applications received after September 1, 1978.

v. If a loan application is denied, the reason given for the denial.

vi. If a loan application is denied, the reason given for the denial.

vii. If a loan application is denied, the reason given for the denial.

viii. If a loan application is denied, the reason given for the denial.

ix. If a loan application is denied, the reason given for the denial.

x. If a loan application is denied, the reason given for the denial.

xi. If a loan application is denied, the reason given for the denial.

xii. If a loan application is denied, the reason given for the denial.

xiii. If a loan application is denied, the reason given for the denial.

(2) During December of each year, the commissioner shall request each financial institution in this state not required to file reports pursuant to section 8 of Act No. 135 of the Public Acts of 1977, to voluntarily file the reports as provided in subsection 1 before March 31 of the following year.
Before May 1 each year, the commissioner shall publish a list of financial institutions with total assets of more than $10,000,000.00 at the end of their last full fiscal year which have failed to comply with subsection 5j, or which have failed to file with the commissioner reports substantially complying with the requirements of subsection 1 for the last fiscal year of that financial institution ending not later than December 31 of the prior year. A financial institution which does not appear on that list shall conclusively be presumed to have complied with subsection 5j and to have filed the required reports for purposes of determining its eligibility to be a depository of state funds. Additional funds shall not be deposited in a financial institution which appears on the list until the commissioner certifies that the financial institution has complied with subsection 5j and has filed the required reports, or until 91 days after the end of a subsequent year for which the required reports are filed with the commissioner, whichever occurs sooner.

5 To be a depository of surplus funds belonging to the state, a financial institution shall not encourage or condone legally required discrimination against an individual on the basis of race or color, by knowingly making or maintaining a loan to the Republic of South Africa, a national corporation of the Republic of South Africa, or to a subsidiary or affiliate of a United States firm operating in the Republic of South Africa. A financial institution shall be considered to have complied with this subsection if the financial institution has filed with the commissioner an affidavit attesting to the fact that it has after July 4, 1952 no existing loans to the Republic of South Africa, a national corporation of the Republic of South Africa, or to a subsidiary or affiliate of a United States firm operating in the Republic of South Africa, as determined from information obtained from the United States department of commerce. As used in this subsection:

(a) "Financial institution" means a bank chartered under the laws of this state or of the United States.

(b) "National corporation" means a corporation, or a subsidiary or affiliate of a corporation, that is more than 50% owned or operated by the government of the Republic of South Africa.

(c) "Subsidiary or affiliate of a United States firm operating in the Republic of South Africa" means, as determined by the United States department of commerce, a firm incorporated under the laws of the Republic of South Africa, domiciled in the Republic of South Africa, and controlled by a United States firm. A subsidiary or affiliate shall not be construed to mean a subsidiary or affiliate that is located in the United States.

(d) "Surplus funds" means, at any given date, the excess of cash and other recognized assets, that are expected to be resolved into cash or its equivalent in the natural course of events and with reasonable certainty, over the liabilities and necessary reserves at the same date. Surplus funds does not include the proceeds of bond and note issues which are deposited for a period of not more than 10 days in a financial institution for settlement purposes.

Approved December 17, 1950.
APPENDIX F

Michigan House Bill 4553
HOUSE BILL No. 4553


A bill to amend section 402 of Act No. 453 of the Public Acts of 1976, entitled as amended

"Elliott-Larsen civil rights act,"

being section 37.2402 of the Compiled Laws of 1970.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN ENACT:

1 Section 402 of Act No. 453 of the Public Acts of 1976,

being section 37.2402 of the Compiled Laws of 1970, is amended to read as follows:

Sec. 402. (1) An educational institution shall not:

(a) Discriminate against an individual in the full utilization of or

benefit from the institution, or the services, activities, or programs

provided by the institution because of religion, race, color, national

origin, or sex.
(b) Exclude, expel, limit, or otherwise discriminate against an individual seeking admission as a student or an individual enrolled as a student in the terms, conditions, or privileges of the institution, because of religion, race, color, national origin, or sex.

(c) For purposes of admission only, make or use a written or oral inquiry or form of application that elicits or attempts to elicit information concerning the religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, or marital status of a person, except as permitted by rule of the commission or as required by federal law, rule, or regulation, or pursuant to an affirmative action program.

(d) Print or publish or cause to be printed or published a catalog, notice, or advertisement indicating a preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based on the religion, race, color, national origin, or sex of an applicant for admission to the educational institution.

(e) Announce or follow a policy of denial or limitation through a quota or otherwise of educational opportunities of a group or its members because of religion, race, color, national origin, or sex.

(F) ENCOURAGE OR CONDONE LEGALLY REQUIRED DISCRIMINATION AGAINST AN INDIVIDUAL ON THE BASIS OF RACE OR COLOR BY KNOWINGLY MAKING OR MAINTAINING AFTER JULY 4, 1981, AN INVESTMENT IN AN ORGANIZATION OPERATING IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA.

(2) THE DEPARTMENT SHALL COMPILE, FROM INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, A CURRENT REGISTER OF ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA. THE DEPARTMENT SHALL MAKE THE REGISTER AVAILABLE, UPON REQUEST, TO A PERSON, BOARD, OR COMMISSION FOR A REASONABLE CHARGE.
(3) As used in this section:

(A) "Investment" means money placed in shares of stock and other equity interests. Investment does not include a bank deposit made in the ordinary course of business.

(B) "Organization" means a United States firm, or a subsidiary or affiliate of a United States firm, as determined by the United States Department of Commerce.

166 '81
APPENDIX G

Michigan House Bill 4315
HOUSE BILL No. 4315


A bill to amend Act No. 314 of the Public Acts of 1965, entitled as amended

"An act to authorize the investment of funds of public employee retirement systems or plans created and established by the state or any political subdivision; to authorize the use of public employee retirement system funds managed by the state treasurer to enter into loan agreements secured by certain commercial or industrial real and personal property; to impose duties on the state treasurer and the attorney general; and to authorize an appropriation,"

as amended, being sections 38.1121 to 38.1131 of the Compiled Laws of 1970, by adding section la.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN ENACT:

1 Section 1. Act No. 314 of the Public Acts of 1965, as amended, being
2 sections 38.1121 to 38.1131 of the Compiled Laws of 1970, is amended by
3 adding section la to read as follows:
4 SEC. 1A. NOTWITHSTANDING OTHER PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT, A PUBLIC
5 EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEM SHALL NOT ENCOURAGE OR CONDONE LEGALLY REQUIRED
6 184 '81
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST AN INDIVIDUAL ON THE BASIS OF RACE OR COLOR, BY
KNOWINGLY MAKING OR MAINTAINING AFTER JULY 4, 1981, AN INVESTMENT IN AN
ORGANIZATION OPERATING IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA. A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT SYSTEM SHALL BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE COMPLIED WITH THIS SECTION IF
THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEM HAS NOT MADE AN INVESTMENT IN AN
ORGANIZATION THAT IS LISTED IN THE REGISTER OF ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING IN
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, AS PREPARED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS
PURSUANT TO SECTION 402 OF ACT NO. 453 OF THE PUBLIC ACTS OF 1976, AS AMENDED,
BEING SECTION 37.2402 OF THE MICHIGAN COMPILED LAWS.

Section 2. This amendatory act shall not take effect unless House Bill
No. ______ (request no. 166 '81) of the 1981 regular session of the
legislature is enacted into law.

184 '81
APPENDIX H

Examples of SALC and Bullard's Office Educational Material
PERRY BULLARD
MICHIGAN STATE REPRESENTATIVE

VOICE YOUR SUPPORT TO FIGHT
APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA

WHY IS APTHEID AN ISSUE?

—Violations of human rights in South Africa are among the most severe in the world. It is the only country which has formal legal barriers that deny basic political and human rights to over 80% of its population. This system based on race is known as apartheid.

—The blacks in South Africa take home less than 23% of the wealth earned each year. They are required to carry a "pass book" which registers racial identification and, if unemployed, they are relocated to distant bantustans (barren "homelands" which comprise 13% of the land). They are arrested, tried and punished by a government that denies them basic rights.

WHY DIVESTITURE?

—Foreign corporations supply most of the technology that assists the government in enforcing its Apartheid policies.

—U.S. and foreign banks supply the government with money necessary to invest in military and police efforts to maintain control over the black majority. U.S. investment amounts to $1.7 billion and is second in the world.

—The involvement of U.S. corporations in South Africa contradicts U.S. domestic and foreign policies and poses a danger of U.S. military involvement to protect economic interests if peaceful change there does not occur.

WRITE TO: (in this order)

1) Your State Representative
2) Your State Senator
3) Speaker Bobby Crim
4) Majority Leader Joe Forbes

ADDRESS:

The Honorable ___________________
Michigan House of Representatives
or/ Michigan Senate
State Capitol Building
Lansing, Michigan 48909

MESSAGE:

1) Ask them to support House Bills 4831, 4838 and 5446.
2) Tell them why they should support these bills.
3) Have groups and organizations to which you belong write resolutions in support of these bills.
4) Send copies to Representative Perry Bullard, State Capitol, Lansing, MI. 48909.

THE AFTERMATH OF A PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION BY CHILDREN

WRIT TO: (in this order)

1) Your State Representative
2) Your State Senator
3) Speaker Bobby Crim
4) Majority Leader Joe Forbes

ADDRESS:

The Honorable ___________________
Michigan House of Representatives
or/ Michigan Senate
State Capitol Building
Lansing, Michigan 48909

MESSAGE:

1) Ask them to support House Bills 4831, 4838 and 5446.
2) Tell them why they should support these bills.
3) Have groups and organizations to which you belong write resolutions in support of these bills.
4) Send copies to Representative Perry Bullard, State Capitol, Lansing, MI. 48909.

OVER
NOW YOU CAN DO SOMETHING
ABOUT APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA

Three bills were reported out of the House Civil Rights committee on Mar. 18, 1980 that will prohibit investments of certain state funds in cooperations operating in South Africa.

They will come up for vote on the house floor in late April.

House Bill 4831: Requires the State Civil Rights Department to compile a register of corporations that operate in South Africa and prohibits state educational institutions from investing in corporations operating in South Africa.

House Bill 4838: Provides that after July 4, 1980, state employee retirement systems managed by the State Department of Treasury divest from those corporations operating in South Africa.

House Bill 5446: Requires that the State Treasurer shall not deposit any surplus funds belonging to the state in a financial institution that makes loans to the Republic of South Africa, to corporations of the Republic of South Africa, or to any South Africa operations of U.S. corporations.
DON'T FINANCE
THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
WITH
SOUTH AFRICAN LIVES

PLEASE!
SUPPORT REP. BULLARD'S BILL HB 4553, PROHIBITING INVESTMENT OF MICH. EDUCATIONAL FUNDS & REP. SMITH'S BILL HB 4513, PROHIBITING INVESTMENT OF MICH. PENSION FUNDS IN SOUTH AFRICA.
WRITE TO:
1. YOUR REPRESENTATIVE AND SENATOR.
2. BOBBY CRIM, SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE-ASK FOR SUPPORT ON THE HOUSE FLOOR.
3. JOE FORBES, MAJORITY LEADER OF THE HOUSE.
4. ASK YOUR CHURCH, LABOR OR EMPLOYEE GROUPS TO WRITE.
5. PLEASE SEND ANY RESPONSES YOU RECEIVE TO REP. BULLARD.
AT THE CAPITOL BUILDING
LANSING, MICH. 48909
I. It is illegal under South African law for black South Africans:
   1. to buy land
   2. to vote
   3. to travel without a pass book
   4. to organize politically
   5. to take effective action thru labor unions
   6. to be unemployed

II. American investment in South Africa is large and continually growing. It is illegal under South African law for American corporations to advocate these rights—even were they so inclined, which they aren’t.

III. The Sullivan principles—adopted by some corporations—even where applied—do not answer to the free survival of black South Africans.

IV. Black South African leaders have asked that American corporations leave because the American corporate presence aids in the perpetuation of this repressive regime.

Please Help!!
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