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The Ohio State University

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A PARTY DIVIDED AGAINST ITSELF: ANTICOMMUNISM AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE REPUBLICAN RIGHT,
1945-1956

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

William F. Crandell, B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1983

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I owe a great amount of thanks to Gary W. Reichard, Warren Van Tine, and Allan R. Millett for their advise and helpful criticism of this work from start to finish. Their patience in persuading me to pare it down to a reasonable size has been vital. Fred I. Greenstein of Princeton was also generous in his time and comments. The Harry S. Truman Library Institute funded part of my research. Several people at major repositories were quite helpful: Benedict K. Zobrist, Dennis Bilger, Warren Orville, Elizabeth Safly, and Erwin Meuller of the Truman Library; Kathleen Nowak and Lois Hinson of the Eisenhower Library; Jean Halliday of the Seeley G. Mudd Library at Princeton; and Julia Young and Margie Baritt of the Bentley Historical Collections at the University of Michigan were all particularly free with their time and recommendations for finding specific materials.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</th>
<th>ii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. INTERNAL DIVISIONS WITHIN THE G.O.P.</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. THE REPUBLICANS, ALIENS, AND ALIENATION</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. TERRA INCOGNITA, 1945-1948</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. CRUSADE IN AMERICA: EISENHOWER'S ELECTION AND FIRST YEAR</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. CONTINUING PROBLEM OF JOE McCARTHY</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE COLD WAR, 1954-1956</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

v
LIST OF TABLES

FIGURE PAGE

1. GOP Senate seats resulting from the elections of 1936-1948 ..................................154
2. GOP House seats resulting from the elections of 1936-1948 ....................................154
3. GOP House seats resulting from presidential elections, 1936-1948 ..........................155
4. GOP House seats resulting from off-year elections, 1936-1948 ............................155
5. GOP Senate seats resulting from presidential elections, 1936-1948 ...........................156
6. GOP Senate seats resulting from off-year elections, 1936-1938 .............................156
7. GOP percentage of the presidential vote, 1936-1948 ..............................................157
8. Dewey gains and losses, 1944 to 1948 ...............173
9. Dewey victories in 1948 .................................174
10. Dewey gains and losses, 1944 to 1948, victories in 1948 .................................175
11. States with a simultaneous decline for both parties .............................................177
12. States with a major GOP decline and a minor Democratic gain .............................178
13. Recapitulation of states in which most lost Republicans from 1944 clearly did not vote for president in 1948 ........................179
14. States with a major Democratic gain and a minor Republican loss .........................180
15. States with a major Democratic gain and a minor GOP loss (from figure 14) shown with states in which most lost Republicans clearly abstained (from Figure 13) ..............182
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>&quot;Eisenhower support&quot; scores of Republican Senators in the 83rd Congress</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Relationship between Eisenhower support ranking and vote on censure</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Relationship between period of entry and vote on censure</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Relationships between regions and vote on censure</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>The Easterners Shift</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

This is a study of the use of anticommunism — and in particular McCarthyism — as a political device by a Republican party that was desperate for electoral victories. American historians have shown increasing interest in the losing side of historical struggles, such as Loyalists in the American Revolution, Northern Democrats during the Civil War, and American Indians. The present study is a part of this re-examination. It is an exploration of the effects on the Republican Party of its disastrous defeats during and after the Depression. For twenty years the GOP could not win a presidential election. In that period, it had only one congressional majority, the 80th Congress of 1947-1948. In the four congressional contests from 1930 through 1936, Republican ranks dwindled from 56 to 16 senators and from 267 to 89 representatives. In many cases, these losses were mirrored at the state and local levels.¹

Had such defeat affected only the losers, the study of what the New Deal realignment did to the Republicans would be of interest only as a collective human interest story: How Hundreds of Politicians and Millions of their Supporters Coped with Adversity. What made the Republican debacle significant was that the effects of continued defeat changed the party, and the altered GOP in turn had its own impacts on American politics. Foremost among these

¹
was the party's contribution to the anticommunist hysteria that followed World War II. This period of hysteria was widespread and pervasive, and what is called "McCarthyism" was merely its cutting edge. The broader phenomenon has as yet no name, although David Caute's label "The Great Fear" seems applicable. The Great Fear had something to do with foreign affairs and the growth of Soviet power, but it was overwhelmingly a domestic fear. It had something to do with the traditional American paranoia of radicalism, but it was a concern all out of proportion to the actual power and influence, let alone numbers, of radicals in the United States after the War.

The Great Fear mostly concerned politics. Michael Paul Rogin has shown the McCarthy's support, for example, came not from a mass base, but from Republican elites. Caute, comparing the phenomenon in America with the absence of comparable behavior in his native Great Britain, boasts:

[T]eachers and professors were not purged; dis­missals in the civil service were few and confined mainly to genuinely sensitive jobs; Parliament did not go witch hunting; there was no Un-British Activities Committee to whip up enmity toward radicals or fellow travellers; no rash of loyalty oaths brought disgrace to the professions; welfare benefits were not denied to Communist veterans or their widows; union officials were not required by law to sign non-Communist affidavits... Having stumbled through the Cold War with this myopic attitude, Britain emerged with just as few Communists as before.
There is a clue of great value here, although Caute does not seem to see it. In the British system the same party that controls the legislative branch always controls the executive. Party discipline is of a very high order, so there is no chance for the minority to make use of disaffected majority members to thwart the administration, unless the executive has blundered terribly. What a coalition of conservative Democrats and Republicans in Congress did to the Truman administration could not be done to a British Prime Minister by Parliament without forcing a new election, one in which party defectors could expect reprisals.

The Great Fear of postwar America has generally been portrayed as a period in which politically ignorant people tried to attack communists but, being unable to discern communists from liberals, hurt a great many liberals by mistake. This is the liberal view, written by liberals who participated in the period. The more recent, revisionist view is that leftists were the targets of conservatives - i.e., people to the right of leftists - and the most of the victims were radicals, but when McCarthy attacked the more moderate of the conservatives, powerful moderates who served corporate interests put an end to the worst abuses only.
Neither of these views is wholly wrong, but both miss quite a bit. Although leftists of all sorts—communists, socialists, anarchists, Trotskyists—were the nominal targets, and were among the victims, there were many others. Several of the major unions underwent power struggles that were also purges. So did the Democratic party: much of the New Deal coalition to the left of Truman was cast out in 1948. Factions and individuals attacked their rivals in fields as disparate as the Army and motion pictures. Others who had no particular rivals simply used the period to promote themselves. Liberals applied the red smear to leftists, moderates to liberals, conservatives to all of the above. Civil servants took it from both sides: the Truman administration weeded out anybody who might conceivably be a later embarrassment, and the Eisenhower team drove out thousands of government employees, either replacing them with Republican appointees or abolishing their jobs. It was a brutal period, considering how little actual blood was shed. Very, very few participants behaved admirably.

In all of this public cruelty the Republicans played a major role, but by far not a solo part. It is the contention of this study that the contribution of the Republicans to the postwar anticommunist fear was conditioned by their defeats in the 1930s and 1940s. Overall the New deal was a positive and generous force in American
history. It gave hope and brought relief in the Depression. In so doing, it brought into the political process and to full citizenship most of those who have since constituted the majority of Americans, that is, people who are not White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs). It expanded unions. It fought, however sporadically, against discrimination and for human dignity. It built a prosperous economy in which most people did well, rather than a few. The coalition and leadership that the New Deal spawned fought World War II, destroyed fascism, and made the United States a great power. Necessary changes were made that benefitted most Americans, and, indeed, the world.

Yet none of these was an unmixed blessing, and none of them was free of costs. Since the end of the New Deal, most of its critics who suggest that its role was to fasten upon the United States a corporate power system have been leftists, but in 1934 many conservative Republicans made the same charge. Whatever current damage the American economy suffers from what is generally called "welfare" is certainly traceable to the New Deal's drastic expansion of government involvement in social problems. And though the benefits of cultural diversity outweighed the loss of cultural unity, nonetheless it was a loss, one that many Americans believe is manifested in increased crime rates, declining performance by high school and college graduates, and the absence in our own time of political majorities with
with sufficient strength to direct change. Poverty, employment, discrimination, and military dictatorship show considerable strength half a century after the New Deal began.

Republican resistance to the New Deal was often shortsighted and selfish, but it was not wholly wicked, as many Democrats charged. The New Deal was avowedly experimental, but it rarely admitted mistakes. Instead, it was prone to blame its critics for obstructionism. In mobilizing support for changes that were positive, many New Dealers used tactics that were negative. There is a cynical maxim that no good deed goes unpunished. It might be more accurate to say that no good deed is entirely good, and the hostility and abuse that are part of a useful accomplishment will be repaid in kind. In the case of the great postwar fear, the Republicans found their chance to undo what they considered the damage done by the New Deal, and to avenge themselves for hurts they had not deserved. This is not to absolve the Republicans. But it is important to see how things work. Twenty years of Democratic dominance accomplished a great deal of good, but not without a great deal of unwarranted abuse. The Democrats were made to pay for that after the war, and so were many others. One has only to listen to contemporary Republicans talk about the New Deal to know that the account is not yet settled.
This is a study of political leadership and tactics. It will examine the reasoning involved, and it will examine the emotions. Politics in the United States, particularly in this century, cannot be likened to the cool playing of a chess match. For one thing, there are too many players, and the structure of leadership does not provide a single captain for each team. It is generally accepted that the president should control his party in Congress. If he does not, he is assumed to have failed to do so. The party out of power has no clear leader. Its latest standard bearer is called its titular head, by which is meant that he has no real power. He may be widely blamed for its latest defeat. The chairman of the National Committee has even less power over the party, controlling nothing. The congressional leaders of the minority party have weak mechanisms for providing a collective leadership (the House and Senate policy committees) but they do not function well if the defeat has split the party, or if a party split has caused the defeat. An American party out of power resembles a football team in which any or all of the backfield call their own plays each turn, each with his own followers on the line. Such a team would very quickly get very angry. It would see other members of its own team aiding the other team. Continuous defeat would make things much worse.
It is common for American political scientists to decry the lack of party discipline in the United States. The British model is often given as an example of intelligent government based on party unity. If only, it is urged, the parties could be restructured so that members of Congress were responsible to their party leaders, the rough edges could be removed from public life. Still, it is hard to see how members of Congress could be made responsible to anybody other than their own constituencies without doing violence to the concept of representative government or to the diversity of American culture. Britain is a much smaller and much more homogenous country than the U.S., and may be capable of both party discipline and representative democracy. In the United States, there are conflicting forces, except in time of a major realignment, when a political tide sweeps a new majority to power with a somewhat consistent program.

Even in realignments, there are pockets of resistance, and it was in such pockets that the Republican party survived the Roosevelt tidal wave. Because of the regional differences in American culture, the GOP survivors were not at all alike. During the remainder of the Depression, they organized into two wings that were both allies and rivals. This split was intensified by the battle over neutrality from 1937 through 1941, and it did not heal during World War II.
This work will examine the changes wrought in the Republican party in the decade that followed World War II. On the surface, it appeared that a somewhat divided party with an instinct for its own jugular finally achieved enough unity in 1952 to elect a president and majorities in both houses of Congress, only to embarrass itself with petty bickering so that it lost its congressional majorities for the next quarter of a century. Closer analysis shows that a fierce internecine battle persisted throughout the decade, pitting a moderate wing of Republicans (primarily from the East) against a conservative Republican grouping (primarily from the Midwest). The sniping may have been petty, but the battle itself was over matters of great importance: how to win elections and how to run the country.

Four aspects gave the struggle its characteristic bitterness. First, each wing of the party blamed the other for two decades of defeats. Second, during most of the postwar period, the Republicans were a minority of limited effectiveness in Congress. Third, a general air of international crisis and impending American defeat existed throughout the decade after World War II. And fourth, political and social change remained an unbalancing factor.

The moderates made no important ideological changes themselves. They clung to the policies for which the conservatives had despised them throughout depression and war. That is, they generally echoed the policies of
liberal Democrats, except that they wanted to spend less and they wanted the administration to be made up of moderate Republicans. Meanwhile, after 1941 the GOP right began to change several of its policies, responding to changes in its perceptions of national defense wrought by the war in the Pacific, to the political lessons of years in political exile, and to the foreign policy conclusions it drew from the postwar expansion of communist power. One additional lesson the right would learn in the mid-1950s was taught by President Eisenhower: many Republicans were no more to be trusted than Democrats. The GOP right, once stigmatized for its isolationism, had become interventionist, but it was still isolated.

The Republican party, at least since the Depression, had developed into two wings, somewhat corresponding to James MacGregor Burns's presidential and congressional wings. The former tended to be moderate, the latter conservative. Each was a shifting coalition from one issue to the next, but each showed considerable stability. They acted, as Burns suggests, as two separate parties under one name. Some Republican voters had little awareness of the split's existence, confusing it with mere candidate rivalries, as between Dewey and Taft. But many Republicans who consciously identified with one wing did not very much like or trust the adherents of the other wing. Their mutual rancor sometimes exceeded their mutual
This work will cover the first decade of the Cold War, 1945-1956. During this period the two wings of the GOP, like the two cultural-economic sectors of American society they represented, had an uneven geographic distribution that tended to make them regional parties. This regionality was at times deceptive, as it was due primarily to the changing demography of American development. The moderate Republicans represented the more conservative side of both urban culture and major industrial-financial concerns. The conservative Republicans represented -- and dominated -- what remained of the rural-small town culture and the entrepreneurial economy outside the South. The two cultural-economic sectors were not evenly distributed but concentrated, that of the moderates mostly in the east coast (with steady growth in the cities and suburbs of the midwest and the west coast), and that of the conservatives spread across the midwest and the far west, with residual
pockets in New England and upstate New York. This distribution, and the balance between the two sectors, changed constantly in favor of urban and corporate concentration throughout the period. It should be noted that, in the period 1945-1956, the South lay outside the regions of Republicanism, though it has since moved toward the national pattern, with a moderate urban GOP and conservative rural Republicans.

It is the contention of this work that the Republican party survived the Depression and the Second World War despite its long inability to regain majority power because it represented sizeable and significant portions of American society. That is, for better or worse, it symbolized the beliefs, aspirations, and prejudices of millions of Americans better than did the Democratic party. It did so despite its internal divisions because whatever wing of the Republican party dominated a particular place was the one that best represented that place, or at least best represented the opponents of the New Deal there.

How the GOP lost its majority during the Depression is well recounted elsewhere. The Democrats mobilized masses of new voters and converted significant numbers of Republicans into Democrats. Most members of both groups were not WASPs but members of religious, ethnic, or racial groups whose positions were insecure prior to the New Deal. This study will examine the efforts of those who remained Republicans to regain their lost supporters. It will pay
only scant attention to those doomed efforts of the first decade of the realignment, attempts to return the disaffected by repeating the politically bankrupt credos of Hooverian economics. It will pay a bit more attention to the parallel efforts of Republicans to win over enough voters to regain power through appeals to isolationism. Although isolationism did not return the GOP to majority status, it deepened the moderate-conservative split, and left recriminations that had important effects in the principal phase of the Republican effort to return to political power.

That phase was the exploitation of the "Great Fear" of communist infiltration of the U.S. government. By 1945 the Republicans had spent fifteen years losing election after election for defending their domestic policies. They had abandoned isolationism and were eager to prove it. Most of the important isolationists were dead or defeated, and the infusion into Congress after 1946 of new Republicans, many of whom were service veterans, 11 reduced the taint of isolationism in the public mind, even though the Democrats still used the term as a bloody shirt. Then, too, the Cold War presented a new situation. As public fears of Soviet power and communist infiltration grew, a record of hostility toward Russia was far less a liability than it had been when Russia was an Ally.
The Republicans' goal after the war was a new realignment that would give them presidential and congressional majorities. Such a realignment would not require persuasion of a majority of voters to switch parties, but only that the minority party hold on to most of its adherents while getting enough supporters of the other side to switch so that the balance would change in favor of the minority. This is not easy, however, or it would be done more often.

The special advantage of foreign policy as a potential realigning issue after 1945 was that it might detach enough voters from the Democrats to make a new majority without driving away voters who had remained Republicans for reasons of domestic policy. Usually, American voters are not vitally interested in foreign policy; they are more concerned about bread-and-butter issues. Thus, correctly handled, foreign policy might be used to win over people who were vitally interested in it, while leaving the rest of the body politic unaffected. Because the New Deal had succeeded in restoring prosperity, domestic issues might be less salient to voters such as Roman Catholics and people of Eastern European ethnicity. Both groups were assumed to be vehemently opposed to the situation which the Democrats had allowed to develop in Eastern Europe at the end of the war. Because many Eastern European ethnics were Catholics, ethnic and religious ties would reinforce each
other, presumably overcoming whatever ties still remained
to the ghost of Roosevelt. The GOP had had a fair share
of these votes before the Depression. If it regained
merely a fair share of these votes, it could be the major-
ity party again.

Besides the potential that foreign policy had for de-
taching Democratic voters, it also had utility for retaining
Republican adherents. There were similarities of outlook
between the foreign policy and the domestic approaches of
each party, which might be -- and often were -- drastically
oversimplified as follows: at home and abroad the Demo-
crats were generally inclined towards generosity and trust
of their fellow man, while the Republicans were generally
inclined to see the New Deal's generosity and trust as
expropriation and political chicanery. Most Republicans
disliked the eager interventionism that characterized both
the domestic and foreign policies of the Democrats under
Roosevelt and Truman. Thus an attack on the Democrats along
foreign policy lines had the effect upon the initiated of
reinforcing their general hostility to New Deal-Fair Deal
policies. For the rest of the electorate, such a foreign
policy attack did not register that way. It did not bring
up, for the majority, the painful issue of Republican
domestic policies. Thus foreign policy attacks had a
symbolic use for the Republicans in holding their own and
a superficial use in reaching for disaffected outsiders.
When the GOP attacked the Democrats' foreign policy on the narrower issues of loyalty and national security, this duality was heightened.

In 1963, after the McCarthyite phase of the Great Fear had presumably ended, Professor Wilmoore Kendall raised the question, "What was everybody so mad about? What was the issue?" (Kendall was no dispassionate observer, and his answer, that conservatives were angry because liberals objected less to communism than to fascism, was disingenuous and polemical.) Yet Kendall raised a critical clue when he suggested that "we must not take for granted that the real issue[s] ever, at the time, actually got put into words, ever actually thrust [themselves] into the consciousness of the actors in the drama." This work contends that the "real" issues in McCarthyism were more emotional than factual, but nonetheless flowed logically out of conflicting cultural and economic positions.

The central thesis of this work is that McCarthyism was a domestic political phenomenon primarily of Republican origin, aimed at New Deal Democrats although ostensibly concerned with national security matters. It was a device to regain power, one that satisfied the fears, hates, and frustrations of a GOP in political exile. This is not to deny that most congressional Democrats, from the very conservative Senator Patrick McCarran to the very liberal Senator Paul Douglas, also played the game, either to win
intraparty struggles of their own or in what they considered self-defense. Rather, it is to assert that what made McCarthyism the dominant force in American politics in the early 1950s was its use as a partisan weapon by the Republican party, a weapon that united Republicans and divided Democrats.
1. The actual balance was:

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<th>Other</th>
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<td>39</td>
<td>56*</td>
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<td>245*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>51*</td>
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<td>1948 election</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>54</td>
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<td>199</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>47</td>
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*indicates Republican majority

The great decline in Republican Strength since the beginning of the Depression is somewhat exaggerated because the GOP had done unusually well in 1928, adding thirty House seats and seven Senate seats to their already sizeable (and more typical) majority. Note that after 1936, off-year elections consistently produced GOP gains. (Congressional Quarterly, Inc., Members of Congress Since 1789 Washington, 1977, p. 178.


11. Of 13 new Republican Senators in the 80th Congress, nine were World War II veterans, including Henry Cabot Lodge, William Jenner, William F. Knowland, and Joseph R. McCarthy. Wayne Morse, who also served in World War II, had been elected in 1944. In the House, thirty-one of the fifty-five new Republicans after 1946 were Second World War vets, one of whom was Richard M. Nixon. Two other Republican World War II veterans had begun House careers as a result of the 1944 election. Congressional Directories, 1943-1947.

CHAPTER ONE

INTERNAL DIVISIONS WITHIN THE G.O.P.

For about a quarter of a century after the Second World War, most of the world admired and wished to be like the United States. American prosperity, Yankee ingenuity, the nation's pragmatic pursuit of freedom and well-being, its military strength, even its music, cars, and cigarettes were envied and desired. The Russians wanted to catch up, and right-wing dictators all over the globe sought American Cadillacs, money, and protection. America was the yardstick for the world.

But which America? America as it may be sampled in New York City, or as it occurs in Los Angeles? The America of rural Kansas or that of backwoods Mississippi? There are, of course, cultural differences in every country, and different regions have different economic needs throughout the world. But the sheer size of the United States makes divergences possible on grand scales.

The politics of any society is based on the cultural and economic values of that society. But there are several overlapping societies in the United States. Historically, the nation developed region by region, and its cultures are therefore regional. There are other, cross-cutting social divisions. Economic class is one, but it has diminished in importance since the height of the New
Also important are religion, political affiliation, and race or ethnicity. Region sometimes seems to be the most important of these variables because different cultures are unevenly distributed across the country, so that a given culture usually dominates a given region. In some situations, these two variables exert conflicting influences, while in others they are mutually reinforcing. A Southern Catholic may have to decide whether to vote as a Southerner or as a Catholic, but a Midwestern Protestant is more likely to vote as both without difficulty.

A region with sufficient diversity will have both a dominant culture and at least one minority culture, each with its own political arm, that is, each with its own party organization. If there is only a single politically potent culture, the region will have little effective political competition. But in a region with more than one politically potent culture, active party competition will exist. Theodore J. Lowi writes that "[E]lectorally, American parties represent outcomes in general: parties seldom shape or represent outcomes in particular." That is, an American voter is not so much voting for a specific program as for an outlook, identifying his or her own political hopes and fears with those of a party. Some observers believe that because American political parties are not able to discipline their legislators as effectively as do most European parties, there must be less professionalism to American
representation. Actually, the American voter picks the candidate or party that most supports not merely a few of his or her issue positions, but the voter's whole way of life, hoping that the candidate or slate will have the expertise to enact whatever measures will secure those aspirations.\(^4\)

Because of the high degree of autonomy in the federal system, the heterogeneity of local and state parties is as great as the cultural and economic diversity of the communities and states. The political parties that represent regions are coalitions of smaller parties, and are in turn the building blocks of the national parties. The national parties are for this reason absolutely decentralized, unable to discipline mavericks whose own constituents support them.

Further, the less diverse a region, the fewer cultures are represented by political organizations of their own. There seems to be a strong relationship between cultural diversity and urbanization. Perhaps population density -- actual physical proximity -- requires a greater degree of "live and let live" attitude than does population scarcity -- room to get away from minor annoyances.

In the period 1945-1956, the national Republican party was composed primarily of two kinds of smaller party organizations: one that was a coalition of urban Republican groups, and another that was a coalition of small town
and rural Republican groups. Many cultures were not represented within the GOP. First, for historical reasons, the South was not significant in the Republican party. (Of the former Confederate states, only eastern Tennessee, which had been Unionist in the Civil War, sent Republicans to the House; no Southern state sent a Republican to the Senate between 1932 and 1956.) Similarly, in parts of the Midwest there were counties that had voted Democratic during the Civil War and had remained Democratic ever since. Generally these counties had received a steady influx of Southerners since the Civil War.

Nor did the GOP include the cultures of the urban working class after the mid 1930s. Overwhelming majorities of urban workers had been won by and conceded to the New Deal coalition of the Democrats. The same was true of most ethnic minority cultures that were not WASPs. The anti-Catholicism of the 1928 campaign had begun to push the majority of Catholics away from the GOP, and the New Deal pulled them into its ranks. Likewise, most Jewish voters concluded that a party that despised Catholics and immigrants had little to offer Jews. Blacks, whose attachment to the Republicans dated from the Civil War, got a cold shoulder from the Hoover campaign in 1928 (which was trying to win over the South), but retained their Republican sympathies until the 1936 election, when they defected en masse. The GOP had not set out to purge itself
of all but nativist stock, but the effect of the New Deal realignment was a defection of Catholics and Jews, Eastern and Southern European ethnics, and blacks on a massive scale. The few members of these groups who remained Republicans had only limited local effect, and were not much trusted by their co-partisans. In essence, by 1940 the GOP was more an all-WASP party than it had been since its founding.

Yet despite the terrible defeats inflicted upon the Republicans in the Depression, the GOP was not finished. There were a few constituencies that remained fairly safe Republican territory during the worst of the years in exile. Four states (Oregon, North Dakota, Vermont, and Maine) sent only Republicans to the Senate from 1933 to 1942. Two others (Kansas and New Hampshire) were held by Republicans 70% of the time, and three (Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Delaware) sent Republicans to the Senate 60% of the time. In the same decade, sixty-two seats in the House were always in Republican hands, another twenty-two were held by Republicans 80% of the decade, and a further twenty-six House seats were held by Republicans 60% of the time. These more-or-less safe GOP House districts were located in California, Oregon, the Midwest, eastern Tennessee, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, upstate New York, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine. In California, they were both urban and rural.
In the eastern states, they were entirely outside the major cities. In the Midwest, they included many cities, but not the major ones (Chicago, Detroit, St. Louis, Kansas City, Cleveland, or Indianapolis.) Thus the eighteen Senate seats and 110 House seats that were fairly secure for the GOP in the worst decade of its history were overwhelmingly representative of rural and small town constituencies, most of which were located either in the Midwest or outside the metropolitan areas of the east and west coasts.

The safest districts for Republicans fell into the two categories that describe the two wings of the GOP. What made the difference between those states that sent conservatives to the Senate and those that sent moderates was the demographic diversity of those states. North Dakota and Vermont were uniformly conservative, and elected Republicans to every House seat they had. They were quite consistent, and sent only Republican Senators to Washington as well. But Maine and Oregon, the other safe Republican Senate seats, sent both Republicans and Democrats to the House. Two of Maine's three districts elected a Democrat once in the decade, and the third sent one twice. Oregon had one district that elected only Republicans, a second that returned only Democrats, and a third that went Republican 60% of the time.

In such states the statewide vote was quite different from the vote of any given district. A candidate for the
House could be as narrow in his views as his district, but a Senate candidate in such a state needed broader appeal that was only possible through compromise. New York had fifteen House seats that always went Republican, and many of the representatives who filled them were arch-conservatives. But New York also had twenty-one House seats that were never held by a Republican in that decade. The state did not send Republicans to the Senate between 1933 and 1942, and when it did, they had to be moderates like the state's one successful GOP gubernatorial candidate, Thomas E. Dewey. Where Republicans could survive elections without tempering traditional Republican conservatism, they did so, and these made up the core of the conservative wing after the Crash. They held many rural and small-town districts in eastern states, but the statewide contests in the East were decided mostly by the cities. Thus the basis of the conservative wing in Congress was the Midwest, where the cities were less powerful and were often underrepresented in House seats. Where the cities controlled statewide elections, if the GOP survived, it survived by becoming moderate.

Thus, in the discussion that follows of the cultural and economic bases of the Republican party, it is important to remember that much of the American culture and economic interest is omitted. This chapter will discuss not American urban culture as distinguished from American
small-town and rural culture, but Republican urban culture as it differed from Republican small-town and rural culture. Therefore in describing the interests of urban professions, there is no intention to suggest that all urban professional were Republicans. They were not. Rather, what will be under discussion will be the interest of those urban professionals who were Republicans. This is not an attempt to describe American society, but only the two principal factions of the Republican party. There were hundreds of differing interests represented within each party, but those interests had sufficient similarities to ally into groupings that were fairly cohesive over time.

These two Republican groupings could be generalized as the urban (or moderate) wing and the rural (or conservative) wing of the party. None of these terms is completely adequate. But such other familiar sets of labels for these two wings of the GOP as "internationalist/isolationist", "presidential/congressional", "Dewey Republicans/Taft Republicans", or even "me-too Republicans/neanderthals" are less useful. These wings were far from homogeneous. Individuals floated between them or shifted freely from one to the other, so no label could be very accurate over time. The labels used here are simply the most useful of the many in use.
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

It is common in defining the wings of a political party to portray them as primarily representing opposing ideologies within the party, although other distinctions based on region, personality, or economic factors are often employed. But because each wing may represent not merely a political program but one of several competing ways of life, the distinctions can also be viewed as cultural. A culture organizes to fulfill its needs through social organizations, political parties, and many other institutions. In the decades following the Depression, the Republican party contained two broad cultural groupings: one urban and urbane, the other small-town and rural (including those whose values remained those of the small-town or rural culture, but who were no longer part of such environs.) The massive defections to the New Deal of variant cultures permits such a generalization. After the period under consideration, many of these groups would trickle back to the Republicans, and the picture would become more complex again. But in the decade 1945-1956 the Republican cultures were overwhelmingly WASP, and almost always fit one of these two descriptions.

This urban/rural model is based on the concept of an urban culture and a rural culture, and is not the more familiar "Eastern/Midwestern" division. In many states,
both cultures were very much in evidence. New York City may have been cosmopolitan, but much of upstate New York was not. Similarly, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, Missouri were all states in which one or two major cities competed with the small towns and agricultural areas to dominate the statewide contests. Such states therefore sometimes had senators and governors who were moderates or liberals, but congressmen who ranged from reactionaries to leftists.

What kind of senator was elected thus depended less on whether the state was in the East or the Midwest than what the urban/rural balance in the state was. A comparison of three senators illustrates this. Henry Cabot Lodge (Massachusetts), Styles Bridges (New Hampshire), and Robert A. Taft (Ohio) all served before the war as isolationist Republican senators. All three also served in the Senate from 1947 to 1952, during which time Lodge and Bridges, the two Easterners, voted together 53% of the time on major issues, while Lodge and Taft agreed 48% of the time, and Bridges voted with Taft 73% of the time. Lodge represented a decidedly urban state, while Taft and Bridges were from states in which the
rural/small-town culture still predominated. The pattern of their agreement scores over time is of interest:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>80th Congress</th>
<th>81st Congress</th>
<th>82nd Congress</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1947 1948</td>
<td>1949 1950</td>
<td>1951 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lodge and Bridges</td>
<td>70% 100%</td>
<td>50% 40%</td>
<td>40% 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lodge and Taft</td>
<td>80% 100%</td>
<td>70% 60%</td>
<td>50% 30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges and Taft</td>
<td>70% 100%</td>
<td>60% 80%</td>
<td>70% 60%</td>
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</table>

Except at the height of postwar Republican unity (the Eightieth Congress in 1948), the two Easterners never had the highest agreement score in any year.

The same pattern is recognizable when one compares party unity scores, that is, each senator's percentage score for agreeing with the majority of his party, rather than agreement merely among the three. In party unity scores for 1945-1952, the urbanite Lodge was even further from Taft and Bridges:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>overall party support</th>
<th>overall opposition to party position</th>
<th>party support on actual votes*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lodge</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taft</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The first two columns represent declared positions as well as actual votes; the third column is only actual votes cast.
Again, Easterners Lodges and Bridges differed sharply, while the two non-cosmopolitans, Bridges and Taft, had very similar party unity scores. This was even clearer over time:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lodge</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taft</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Party unity scores may indicate either how closely senators follow the leadership of the party or, for party leaders such as Taft and Bridges, how closely the party follows them. One might suggest that rural/small-town senators like Taft and Bridges played a greater role in shaping the policies of the GOP in the Senate than did urban senators like Lodge. This parallels the predominance in the congressional wing of the GOP of those rural states which saved the Republican party during the Depression, as described at the beginning of this chapter.

The locus of the urban GOP during the postwar decade was still in the East, north of the Potomac River, but it was gradually spreading to the growing cities and suburbs of the rest of the country. There was a cultural lag of sorts that made cities like Kansas City, Missouri keep a somewhat more rural attitude than cities of the same size in New England, an urban region. Given the steady
expansion of the cities through both population growth and concentration of industry during and after the war, however, time was on the side of the urban cause.

The Republican urban ideal was formed during the progressive era. It was a vision of a hopeful future through science, industry, education, cosmopolitanism, and cultural refinement. Skilled management would erase the blight of poverty and ignorance. The kind of intelligent leadership that could erect skyscrapers, build highways, and dispose of a city's waste merely by turning valves would surely be able to figure out solutions to crime, probably through education and employment. The idea of urban decay was not widespread in the forties and fifties.  

Urbanites understood that to make such a vision into reality would demand a sizeable degree of centralization (at least within each metropolis), modernization, sophistication, change on a large scale, and an ability to tolerate both complexity and diversity. This they found easy to accept. Cities cannot exist without most of these, so they were nothing new. To many, the very idea of the city was modernization itself. The GOP protagonist of urbanization understood change to be both inevitable and benign. Ignorance and intolerance would give way to knowledge and brotherhood, darkness to light. One could either accept change and try to make it beneficial, or one could stand in the way. One could not blame other people for failing
to be visionaries, but the dream had to be put over on those who opposed it. If the ignorant did not understand (and therefore approve) a change, it would be best not to let them in on it.  

Since no one could stop the urban tide, no one was responsible for it. The Republican urbanites felt that they could not be blamed for the problems of urbanization. Economic and social dislocation, crime and vice, changes in moral standards, and any loss of political or economic freedom due to centralization -- these drawbacks were merely part of an inevitable tide. The urbanites believed that although they should be credited with whatever actual improvements occurred, they should not be held accountable for things that got worse.

The urbanites' tolerance of ethnic, religious, and cultural minorities may have been merely practical. One could not hope to keep all of the other groups at bay indefinitely. Such toleration was reinforced by mutual need. Employers who might otherwise prefer that all minorities go away nonetheless needed workers. These minorities voted, and it made more sense to harness their votes than to alienate them. The businessman or professional who might not have invited these people into his home would have been glad to see them in his store or office.

Diversity and mutual need produce freedom. Those who in a more homogeneous society would have been persecuted
for their religious beliefs, political opinions, artistic temperaments, sexual proclivities, or criminal practices could find communities of shared interests in the city. To the urban Republicans the creative vitality of the nation was found in the cities, and perhaps its creative tension as well.16

Generally these views held by urban Republicans are described as "modernist"17 -- a loaded term which carries approving connotations. To call the urban Republicans modernists implies that the rural Republicans were out-of-date and intolerant. Many of them were; but it is important to remember that the approach of the urban Republicans was not the only possible modern approach. Conservative Republicans did not want to beat their tractors into plowshares or give up electricity. They simply did not agree that modernity made the needs of the cities binding on all Americans.

After the election of Roosevelt, both Republicans and Democrats who favored the urban ideal agreed that the old-fashionedness rooted in rural culture jeopardized their goals. The urban dream was promoted through widespread use of the news media, public relations, and the popular culture (movies, radio, and magazines.) This was done by manipulating and reshaping many of the myths and symbols in the nation's culture. In the movie version of The Grapes of Wrath, for example, which was produced under
the detailed supervision of Darryl F. Zanuck -- a moderate Republican who campaigned in 1940 for Wendell Willkie -- there were several changes of emphasis from John Steinbeck's novel. Material stressing the hopelessness of poor farmers under capitalism were left out, as were implicit calls for revolution. The chronology of Steinbeck's story was revised, so that while the book showed the Joad family being given government help that was inadequate, the movie made the government relief camp the happy solution to the difficulties the Joads had faced. To strengthen this impression, the novel's bitter finale -- which Steinbeck intended to leave the reader unsatisfied -- was omitted. Zanuck gave personal instructions to avoid blaming the plight of the migrants on "the big growers," and noted on the script, "Be sure to characterize caretaker of Government Camp as being a particularly fine, good man." Both author Steinbeck and director John Ford consciously fit the material into the larger American mythos of the westward migration.  

Controls of the myths and symbols of a culture through the media and the arts allowed important political messages to be sold unobtrusively. Social and economic problems were dramatized with the solutions the urbanites wanted. Even more important, the negative effects of the conservatives whom urban Republicans viewed as opposing progress could be depicted. Not surprisingly, the conservative villains turned out to be the ignorant, the reactionary,
the stubbornly traditional, the unsophisticated, the minor entrepreneur. When Zanuck ordered that the "big growers" not be blamed for exploiting the migrants, he specified that the script should hint that the guilty parties were "fly-by-night labor contractors." By lumping these targets into one bunch and holding them up to attack and ridicule, the protagonists of the urban culture weakened opposition to the urban dream and drew criticism away from people like themselves.

If the urban dream is a vision of a hopeful future, the rural and small-town ideal envisioned a contented past besieged by the forces of change for the worse. Just as Republican urbanites ignored and denied responsibility for the harmful effects of urbanization, so also did rural Republicans discount and refuse blame for what was wrong in the era of their dreams, which tended to be the period of their youth. For the leading Republican conservatives of 1945-1956, this was the period around 1890-1914. Richard Lingeman describes in detail small-town life of that era, portraying what one reviewer calls the balance of "the goodness that did exist" with the "claustrophobic narrowness" of the culture. The same small-town culture that inflicted one person with claustrophobia would have made another feel comfortable and secure. Republican defenders of the small-town way of life were primarily those whose
positions in the local elites were threatened less by the Depression than by the New Deal.

These were not necessarily the rich, though they may have been the most well-off in town. If they were not actually wealthy, they were at least contented, or expected to be satisfied with rural or small-town life, but felt that the social change fostered by the government had ruined their prospects. Some of these people hoped to regain their potential by undoing the New Deal. Others saw their dreams unalterably blighted, and wanted revenge. The hatred for Roosevelt which so invigorated the isolationism of the Republicans before Pearl Harbor, and which continued to heat the irons that McCarthy and his aides applied to the feet of old New Dealers, was the hatred of the dispossessed. The class divisions heightened by New Deal rhetoric stripped the leaders of rural and small-town areas of the affections and loyalties of their social inferiors. What was truly significant about the failure of the 1936 Literary Digest poll was not simply that its over two million middle- and upper-class readers were not representative of the whole electorate, but that such elites had for many years prior to 1936 been so representative of the whole electorate that earlier polls conducted by Literary Digest in the same manner had been quite accurate. In other words, Republican elites across America had been in tune with the majority of voters
before the New Deal, which had stripped them of their following. 21 This was a major part of Franklin Roosevelt's Crime.

What was Franklin Roosevelt's Crime? It was nothing less, small-town Republicans insisted, than the destruction of the American way of life, by which they meant their own way of life. The damaging effects of the Depression were felt at every level of American society. Yet some segments were easier to aid than others. Roosevelt became a political hero by opting to help the greatest number of people possible. Those who were both well-organized and willing to repay the Democrats with their votes got help. 22 Republicans and the unorganized lacked the power to get a share of the New Deal's largesse. Thus the recovery effort focused on major industries and major unions, as well as the urban vote. There was considerable logic to this. Without political power, Roosevelt could help nobody. He also knew that there were real limits to what even the most interventionist government could accomplish. The smaller a business operation, the harder it was for the government to reach it. Besides, small businesses were largely owned by Republicans, who would be ingrates. With fifteen million unemployed, the administration could not afford to spend as much time aiding a factory with a hundred employees as a major corporation. And what little could be done for agriculture was done quickly through the
powerful large farm organizations. The New Deal treated major farmers as businessmen, pressing them to adopt production controls. Beyond that, small farmers and people involved in small businesses would simply have to hold out until the recovery of the entire economy saved them or they would have to find other work.\(^{23}\)

The major corporations, which could not have grown large without some degree of efficiency, were the easiest to help and the most dangerous to ignore. Many of them had already found that they could pay union wages and survive. Many others quickly learned this when large unions sprouted up with federal blessings, and made it cheaper to settle strikes than to break them.\(^{24}\) The New Deal made relief for major corporations a top priority, even at the expense of smaller businesses. When FDR's National Recovery Administration allowed the larger companies in each kind of business to draw up quasi-legal "Codes of Fair Practices" for themselves and their smaller competitors, without fear of anti-trust prosecution, the New Deal let the major corporations force their smaller opponents to adopt wages and prices that only the big could afford. Complaints and non-compliance from small business were denounced as "chiseling" and "unpatriotic."\(^{25}\)

Roosevelt's aid to unions was another step in the same wrong direction from the viewpoint of small business.
The difference between union or NRA Code wages and the pay that the unemployed might otherwise have settled for could make a fatal difference in the profit margin. The New Deal, whether it intended to or not, decreed that only the efficient (read "large") would prosper. Others might not even survive. Swift & Company did not have to rely on procedures that sometimes let tainted food slip by, but marginal operators like the Schechter Brothers did.26 Small business had always competed with big business by reducing prices, which helped the consumer, especially in hard times. Under the NRA, price competition was labelled "destructive competition" and was forbidden. The alliance between progressives and small business in opposing monopoly was abandoned by the New Deal, and this was resented by small businesspeople. They wanted the Depression to end just as desperately as other Americans did, but they felt that the administration was demanding all the sacrifices from them, while the powerful corporations and unions were invited to enrich themselves.27

The very people whom the New Deal helped least, the small businesses and professional classes, were those who, along with big business, had prospered before the Crash. For a decent amount of work, most of them could be fairly sure of a comfortable income and the respect of their community. Hard work or unusual ability might bring any of them great success. Those who were economically independent
in the era before the Depression tended to be competent, if not excellent, and ambitious, if not ruthless. They held, or would inherit, positions in an elite that was not without merit, and they felt entitled to those positions. Roosevelt diminished the worth of those holdings by discrediting the old elite and bringing many more people into the political process than had been in it before.

Herbert Hoover had tried to ameliorate some of the worse effects of the Depression without changing the basic economic and social system, which he felt had been wrongly blamed for causing the Depression. He insisted that the collapse had resulted from World War I:

... the enormous destruction, the economic consequences of the Treaty of Versailles, revolutions, unbalanced budgets, hugely increased armaments, inflation, and gigantic overproduction of rubber, coffee, and other commodities, through overstimulation through artificial controls, and a score of other aftermaths of the war... finally broke through all efforts to fend off their explosive forces. The wounds of Europe were so deep that the total collapse of most European economies in mid-1931 plunged us into depths not witnessed since our depressions of 1820, 1837, and 1872.

To Hoover such periodic slumps were the prices of free economy, which would right itself in time. The least prosperous, whom Hoover and his co-partisans viewed as the laziest and most improvident, would suffer most, but the structure of the American economy would emerge intact. In contrast, the New Deal aimed not only at recovery, but
at instituting changes that would end the cycle of boom and bust.\textsuperscript{30} The small business owners and professional people who dominated the political elites of rural and small-town districts -- especially those west of the Appalachian mountains -- came to realize that whether or not they had supported Roosevelt in 1932, the New Deal was doing little to help them and did some things that caused them real harm. There had always seemed to be a limit to the economic pie, and in the Depression there was less to share than ever before. Somebody would have to do without, and Roosevelt seemed to be trying to assure that it was the small-town and rural Republicans who suffered.

Not only did Roosevelt require small business to use big business methods, which put the former at a disadvantage. Worse yet, if they made any money at all, FDR forced them to give more of it to their employees than their employees had ever required before. In a zero-sum economy, whomever Roosevelt did not help, he hurt. If he deserved credit for the good he did, Republicans argued, he also deserved blame for the damage done. Roosevelt was partly to blame every time a chain store forced a family business to close, every time a farm boy went to a city to find work, every time a union local demanded to get more money without more work. The amount of blame the conservatives ascribed to Roosevelt was exaggerated as much by his taking credit for the positive side of these situations as
by their fears of the harm in them. Roosevelt was the most powerful proponent of urbanization and industrialization in the country; and the people he hurt or scared most were already lifelong Republicans.

But playing favorites in the economy was not the whole of Franklin Roosevelt's Crime, in the eyes of the rural Republicans. By favoring bigness, Roosevelt not only encouraged but rewarded concentration. Big business had become even bigger, organized labor acquired economic and political power beyond the worst fears of ownership, and government expanded into areas that had never been any of its business. Always the New Deal promoted a shift of power to more people than had had power before, all of who were organized. In 1928, outside the major cities, virtually all prestige and power had been in the hands of local elite composed of white Anglo-saxon Protestant men. As a counterforce for redistributing that power to large number of people, Roosevelt and his policymakers fostered the rise of a national elite. It was composed of major corporations and the unions whose workers they employed, and of government bureaucrats whose job was to aid the corporation and the unions. Power and prestige were re-distributed by the government at the expense of local elites. Many prerogatives of ownership had been taken over by the government, and either retained there or passed on to the corporations and the unions. And always
the old elites were denounced for everything that had gone wrong. Eric Goldman quotes an "upper-income liberal" who described his suburb as "rabidly anti-Roosevelt" but insisted that their hatred is not economic. The real source of the venom is that Roosevelt challenged their feeling that they were superior people, occupying by right a privileged position in the world. I am convinced that a lot of them would even have backed many of his economic measure if they had been permitted to believe the laws represented the fulfillment of their responsibility as "superior people." They were not permitted that belief. Instead as the New Deal went on, it chipped away more and more at their sense of superiority.33

What added insult to injury for the conservatives was that even when the New Deal got its way by deriding and stripping the old local elites of power and prestige, it still took the New Dealers five years longer to effect recovery than the Republicans thought their own measures would have taken, and at that it took a global war to restore full employment.

Big business was thought by many rural and small-town Republicans to be too greedy to complain about what Roosevelt was doing. He was bribing big business, conservatives believed, as he was bribing the greedy, improvident masses by giving them more than they had earned. In the process, they felt, the gradual erosion of American entrepreneurial culture had been accelerated and even encouraged. The pressures of centralization shrivelled small towns and
small businesses. The pace of American life had become frantic. Roosevelt's policies seemed to destroy the balance and harmony of American society, and to run roughshod over the constitutional provisions that kept Americans and their economy free. They could see no purpose in Roosevelt's policies other than his retention of the presidency.34

There was, in this view, one other destructive element in Franklin Roosevelt's Crime. Roosevelt was credited with popularizing the idea that it was the responsibility of government rather than of the individual to take care of self and family. If personal responsibility no longer counted when times got tough, would it count at all? And if so, why should anybody bother to put in a decent performance on the job? If pride of workmanship failed, how long would productivity and the economy survive? And if personal responsibility ceased to exist, how could a democratic form of government endure?35

This vision of an America undone by opportunistic New Dealers and their unrestrained supporters lay at the heart of the Republican right's objections. Theirs was a bitter vision of spoiled hopes. Much of their disappointment was simply the difference between reality and dreams, yet part of it reflected changes that had occurred
under the New Deal with Franklin Roosevelt's encouragement. Hoover summarized the feeling in a parable:

All this reminds me of the small girl who said, "Mother, you know that beautiful jug you said had been handed down to us from generation to generation?" Mother replied, "Yes, Ann, what of it?" And Ann answered solemnly, "This generation dropped it."36

Franklin Roosevelt's Crime was to rob small-town elites of their birthright. The power and privilege they had expected had been divided up into smaller shares, most of which were given to people to whom the elites had once felt superior.

The conduct of the rural and small-town wing of the Republican party towards Roosevelt's retainers in the decade after 1945 is a clear example of Machiavelli's dictum that "men must either be caressed or else annihilated; they will revenge themselves for small injuries, but cannot do so for great ones."37 The New Deal inflicted minor injuries -- defeats, insults, loss of status, doubts -- on many rural and small-town people who identified as Republicans, whether they were GOP politicians, farmers, businesspeople, or professionals. These injuries were often deliberate and callous, inflicted with temporary impunity because the New Dealers had the electoral majorities to do as they saw fit. Such injuries were enough to make apparently impotent Republicans vengeful, but not enough to render them harmless.
In the decade after Roosevelt's death, the main goal of the GOP right was to wreak revenge on the New Dealers. According to Richard Lingeman, the small-town culture of the early twentieth century -- the idyllic period for most Republican conservatives -- had its roots in the Puritan small towns of colonial New England. Milton Viorst agrees, describing the waves of westward movement that settled the Midwest, and the predominance of Yankees in building that culture. "Not New England," he notes, "but the Midwest became the heartland of America's Puritan culture." Puritanism is not simply a religion but an entire culture, pervading every aspect of public and private life, and it was overwhelmingly a middle-class culture associated with the rise of the bourgeoisie in Great Britain and the United States. Even in its most secular aspects, it was a belief system of local elites, positing rule by democratic means of the elect -- not of an aristocracy -- over the masses for the common good. Puritanism was thus at once democratic and intolerant. Local elites defined the norms and set the political agenda while garnering majority support for their programs, with little toleration of minority views. In early New England this was because God himself formed and informed the majority. This notion was reinforced by habit and a long run of successful leadership.
The Puritan culture was still, in the early half of this century, the dominant force in most of the United States outside both the South and the major cities. Most of the people who inhabited these towns, villages, and farms could neither have quoted nor endorsed the sermons of Cotton Mather and Jonathan Edwards (although there were those who did both.) Nor would any of them have accepted the label "Puritan" with good humor. The term had acquired a derisive connotation long before this century. The Puritan congregations of New England dropped that name in the early seventeenth century. By the end of the Civil War, they had even renounced Calvinism. Yet this gradual secularization of the Puritan faith did not mean a renunciation of the Puritan culture.

Some modern social scientists discount the effects of religion on culture, explaining the shift in values as the development from a precapitalist to a capitalist base. Economics does, of course, exert a major influence on a culture, and upon its politics. But it is not the only influence. John Petrocik, discussing party coalitions, writes, "Ethnoreligious differences account for party identification more effectively than any... other characteristics...." (The other variables he tested were social status, education, occupation, union membership, region of residence, and size of the place of residence.)
This confirms the finding of Paul Klepner about an earlier period that partisan affiliations were not rooted in economic class distinctions. They were political expressions of shared values derived from the voters' membership in, and commitment to, ethnic and religious groups.43

Indeed, this has long been true. The Republican party, throughout its existence, has generally been supported by adherents of pietistical and evangelical church groups, while the Democrats drew on liturgical churches such as the Catholic and Lutheran. Each proclivity may attract a specific personality type: Republican policies and the doctrines of pietistical and evangelical denominations both stress individual responsibility, self-restraint, and good stewardship, while the Democrats and the liturgical Christians have both emphasized community responsibility for the unfortunate, generosity of spirit, and intercession for transgressions.44 Such linkages need not depend on devoutness. They can simply be modes of behavior and outlook.

The essential beliefs of the Puritan culture still dominant in small-town America in the early twentieth century began with the assumption that the prosperous and the good were the same people.45 They were also overwhelmingly of Yankee stock: not merely WASPs but Anglo-Saxons born in the United States (outside the
South, which they saw as a hotbed of licentiousness, slavery, and corruption.) The social order was seen as good and sensible, if not actually the will of God. Without moral compulsion, reinforced by law, mankind would sink into sloth, depravity, tyranny, and poverty. Implicit was the idea that those who were not the chosen -- the good, prosperous descendants of Yankees -- must be kept in line. Otherwise, what happened to farmhands, servant girls, and the like was of no real importance.46

The essence of Puritanism is its ability to reconcile opposing ideas through acceptance of both of them, by denying that contradictions exist. It did not trouble the Puritans to believe simultaneously in material advancement and in preaching against putting on airs, nor did it trouble them much that they believed in absolute moral codes that none of them could fully keep. While the urbanites tended to be tolerant of human weakness, the Puritans generally showed understanding only to their own kind. For Puritans who understood their theology, the concept of grace explained away these contradictions.47 While the specific theological reasoning behind this concept of grace was probably not widely understood even in the seventeenth century, the habit of reconciling contradictions by accepting conflicting notions did not disappear. It was this mental habit that allowed conservative Republicans to forgive what many of them admitted were Joe McCarthy's...
sins while holding the old New Dealers strictly accountable for whatever breaches they might have committed. To a stern moralist of opposing views, such as H. L. Mencken, this trait of the small-town culture was the worst kind of hypocrisy. But to be guilty of hypocrisy, one must be aware that one is doing something that contradicts what one believes and professes. It is not hypocritical to believe differing things simultaneously, only ambivalent.

Rural Republicans, with their Puritan roots, had a sense of being a righteous "chosen" people in a world of evil. Their bigotry against outsiders, especially non-Anglo-Saxons, was rarely the kind of insistence on "genetic purity" that once dominated the South. Rather, it stemmed from a sense of cultural superiority that saw the American way of life as the culmination of centuries of struggle against tyranny and ignorance. It was as if every racial and ethnic group had gone through a series of historical Skinner boxes, and only the Americans had come out through the passages that let to enlightenment. It was ominous, in this view, that Easterners in the United States so slavishly worshipped the European culture and all things British that they were the willing tools of European financiers in trying to enslave the Americans west of the Appalachians. This attitude is perhaps the obverse of the Eastern notion that the small towns and open space of the United States are the habitat
of unlettered louts who should be ignored. Arrogant provincialism has no demographic limits.

Additional tendencies among rural and small-town Republicans should also be noted. They preferred the slower pace of life outside the cities, and the slower rate of social change. Yet small-town Republicans looked forward to hard work and plenty of it. They prized the Puritan work ethic, believing that it produced positive results when the government did not interfere. Moreover, they tended to rate their own work as hard and productive, while imagining that citydwellers worked neither hard nor well.

Rural Republican culture also included a sense of cultural, inferiority, manifested in hostility toward urban life, snobs in general, and intellectuals in particular. There was a defensive pride in education, an eagerness to show that every town had its learned men and women. Rural Republicans disliked the supposition of many Easterners that west of the Appalachians there existed few paved roads and fewer people who could identify the author of Hamlet. This inferiority complex was part of a feeling of being caught up in impersonal forces of change, which flowed from the cities and over which the people of the small towns and farms had no control. This feeling made it easy for rural Republicans to feel that they were the victims of a conspiracy, of persecution. Their children
saw parodies of rural culture in movies and in magazines. New ideas were praised from the outside without any defense of the old ways. Rural Republicans felt they could not get a fair hearing: in any debate against sophisticates, they would be ignored because they were not fashionable, ridiculed for being hard-working oafs.50

It was this sense of powerlessness that gave rural and small-town Republicans their fear of innovation and change. If urban liberals destroyed the institutions that were vital to either American freedom or rural prosperity, these institutions might not be capable of resurrection. Much of the fury of the conservatives towards those liberals who had flirted with communism during the 1930s came from this attitude: what kind of maniac would have to try communism (or narcotics, or prostitution, or suicide) to find out if it is harmful? This fear of change is, unfortunately equally suited to blocking good or bad ideas. It is precisely because such conservatism is so overcaustious that it is ignored even when it should perhaps be heeded.

Narrowness, exclusionary tendencies, self-righteousness, and an air of persecution combined to give the Republicans of small-town and rural America a sense of cultural unity. They knew that differences existed between various small-town cultures, but they were aware, too, of common tendencies and common enemies. They could be conscious that they oversimplified, but they suspected their
opponents of overcomplexification, and felt that their prejudices merely balanced the others. They were fighting for their way of life, and they were willing to play rough.

The two Republican cultures -- urban and rural -- were indeed at war with each other. Presidential elections usually produced at least minimal unity against the Democrats, but this was insufficient for victory unless the Democrats were in even worse disarray, as appeared to be the case in 1948 (until the votes were counted), and was the case in 1952 and 1956. In fact, repeated electoral defeats only reinforced intraparty rancor among Republicans. Whichever wing of the party was able to win the nomination, the other was likely to lose interest and turn out in low numbers. The moderates, after all, feared the conservatives more than they feared the Democrats, and the conservatives saw no real difference between the moderates and the Democrats, so there was little incentive for the side that lost the nomination to vote.

Thus, as a divided minority party, the Republicans had two electoral strategies, neither of which worked in presidential elections. The moderate strategy, used in 1940, 1944, 1948, was to win over enough independents and disgruntled Democrats to carry a majority. But a candidate such as Dewey, who appealed to disenchanted Democrats, would bring out voters who could not be relied upon to vote
for other GOP candidates in the same election, so he would hurt the rest of the slate. Furthermore, such a candidate would not pull out the votes of the whole GOP right, so diminished Republican numbers would scuttle the standard-bearer and further doom the rest of the party ticked in areas where most Republican voters were conservative. Such a candidate would, however, aid Republican candidates in areas where moderate Republicans dominated because he would add credibility to local and state GOP moderates. Thus the moderates preferred this strategy to the other, which helped local conservative Republicans at the expense of local Republican moderates.

This conservative strategy was to nominate a conservative like Taft and run on a platform repudiating the New Deal. This would maximize the anti-New Deal vote, which was a majority in areas of conservative GOP dominance. Such a campaign would be emotionally satisfying and would aid the GOP right in other contests. They also insisted that it would elect a Republican president, which does not seem to have been likely. But it would also have bolstered the attacks of Democrats upon local Republican moderates as opponents of the New Deal, and would thus
have kept many moderate Republicans out of Congress. Dewey said of this strategy:

They want to drive the moderates and liberals out of the Republican party and then have the remainder join forces with the conservative groups of the South. Then they would have everything very neatly arranged, indeed. The Democratic party would be the liberal-to-radical party. The Republican party would be the conservative-to-reactionary party. The results would be neatly arranged, too. The Republicans would lose every election and the Democrats would win every election... I am against it.51

But conservatives like Taft believed in the strictly anti-New Deal approach. Taft advised Dewey in 1948 to get tough with Truman's programs, but Dewey stuck with the moderate strategy. When Dewey lost, Taft wrote that Truman's programs threaten a complete elimination of liberty in the United States. The result of the election was a tragedy, largely because it was entirely unnecessary. Dewey could have won, and we could have elected a Republican Congress if the right kind of campaign had been put on.52

To conservatives, moderates like Dewey were spineless opportunists who would rather win than be right, and did not even win.53 In short, each wing of the party had a presidential strategy that could not elect a Republican president, but which would aid it other candidates at the expense of the other wing's candidates. They had sound reasons for enmity.
For the most part, each wing of the GOP was composed of politicians and their supporters. They had a personal stake in congressional elections which was reinforced by the power Congress had to make or break public policy. Arthur Larson, describing his days on President Eisenhower's staff, reports,

One day in the summer of 1956 I found myself engaged in a long argument with a county chairman in Pennsylvania. The argument was getting nowhere.... Finally my collocutor, a grizzled and kindly old political warhorse, grinned, patted me on the shoulder, and [said], "Your trouble is that you think the most important thing in the world to me is to get Eisenhower elected. Well, it isn't. The most important thing to me is to keep my job as county chairman and keep control of this county." 53

Although they would not have admitted it publicly, and did not often say so to each other, many Republicans had a sense during the Roosevelt years that they could not win the presidency no matter what they did. What kind of standard bearer they nominated therefore did not determine who would be elected president but who would be elected to every other office on the ballot. The GOP had survived in the urban districts, if at all, by nominating moderates, who had a slim chance to win where conservatives had none at all. But it survived in the rural and small-town districts by nominating conservatives, because those constituencies wanted conservatives. Across the nation, Republicans gained in off-years because there was
no national candidate to contradict local Republicans. In 1940, 1944, and 1948, moderate Republican standard bearers undercut the conservatives by disillusioning their local supporters and contradicting what they said. Although no conservative won the presidential nomination in this period, the Republican majorities of the 80th Congress in 1948 performed the same function not only for Dewey but for other moderate GOP candidates, demonstrating that their promises could not be kept.\textsuperscript{55}

Thus, although there was much in the battle between the two wings of the Republican party that seemed trivial, the underlying issues and the electoral stakes were major. The central issue was which of two ways of life the machinery of the federal government would be used to support. The rural and urban cultures had coexisted for over a century, but each interfered with the other's plans. Each opposed and feared the other's goals and existence. The cities had to grow and change to survive, and to do so they had to be free of inhibiting forces. The rural and small-town culture could not remain unchanged while the cities dominated the nation and its economy. It seemed to many Republicans that no compromise was possible at a fundamental level. The conflict of cultures was too strong to be overcome by mere partisan politics.
ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES

The culture and the economic interests of any society will reinforce and mirror each other. What is economically necessary will be respected in the culture, and the cultural norms will suggest and also limit the kinds of economic activity permissible. As a society develops, its culture and economy will intertwine until it is difficult to determine which controls the other. So it was with the cultural differences between the two wings of the Republican party. Each had its own economic interests, many of which conflicted with the other’s. The economic needs of each wing were culturally reinforced.

Moderate Republicans in the decade after the war tended to be urbanites. Most of them lived in the cities and the suburbs, and the rest identified with the urban outlook. In the economic analysis that follows, it is important to remember that it is the economic goals of urban Republicans, and not those of all citydwellers, that are under discussion. Thus the economics of labor is not of direct interest here, nor that of Democrats and independence who held leading positions in big business. The latter tended to have similar economic interests to their Republican counterparts. What separated these people into different political identifications was primarily enthnoreligious backgrounds and the cultural differences.
growing out of them. Urban economic concerns, except for those of labor and the poor, had much in common and cut across party lines, facilitating alliances of urban Republicans with liberal Democrats. The following discussion, however, will focus only on the four main sets of urban economic interests represented within the GOP: major corporations ("big business"), high finance, various professions, and old wealth.

The major corporations whose interests were represented within the urban wing of each party are those referred to by John Kenneth Galbraith as "mature corporations." Although their actual owners were often Republican moderates, it was their management that played a more important role within both the corporations and the urban GOP. The interest here was not primarily profit: as Galbraith explains in The New Industrial State, if management (or "technostructure") could make the arrangements necessary for the continuous survival of the corporation, thus guaranteeing the management's own position, the profits would be satisfactory. It had to make the needed deals to secure sources of supply and markets at predictable prices and volume. For this reason, corporate managers, regardless of their party preference, were not only able, but willing, to live with massive government intervention in the economy.
They needed levels of regulation that insured the quality of their supplies and that made sure that no competitor could outsell them by flooding the market with shoddy goods. They needed government contracts on a scale that regulated aggregate demand for goods, which meant heavy government expenditure for military items. Furthermore, military expenditure advanced technological development, essential to maintaining and advancing the position of major corporations over smaller and foreign competitors.\textsuperscript{58}

What big business did not need was reckless competition from small entrepreneurs. Galbraith makes a convincing case that the real function of government regulation is not to hamper the major corporations, but to prevent destructive competition from smaller owners who might have the freedom to change their operations rapidly.\textsuperscript{59} As will be discussed below, these dreaded competitors formed the business component of the small-town and rural wing of the GOP.

Just as big business needed government intervention in the economy, so did it need major labor unions. It had to have a dependable labor supply, avoid strikes, and encourage loyalty to individual corporations. The managerial effort that would have been required to work out labor relations separately with every union local would have been staggering. In effect, the corporation hired the major union to arrange its labor needs.\textsuperscript{60} In industry-wide
negotiations, a settlement acceptable to most workers could be imposed on locals that might have held out for more if they negotiated for themselves. Perhaps also a large, centralized union, once established, commanded less intense loyalty than an independent local might have. In any case, moderate Republicans learned during the New Deal to be far more tolerant to large unions than did their conservative counterparts.

Galbraith stresses the difference between the "mature" corporation run by its management and the large entrepreneurial corporation still run by its owner. For example, when Henry Ford still ran the Ford Motor Company, he waged a vicious campaign to avoid unionization. Ex-convicts were hired as security police, and attempts to murder union leaders have been laid on his doorstep. In the same period, General Motors, which was run by management rather than by owners, learned that strikes were expensive, disrupting production and incurring the displeasure of potential purchasers who sympathized with the workers. Charles E. Wilson, the president of GM who later became Eisenhower's Secretary of Defense, learned his lesson in a strike that lasted 113 days. He later persuaded the United Auto Workers to accept a five-year contract with a cost-of-living escalator, then a very advanced idea for maintaining peace with labor. The part of the technostructure that was Republican learned in the 1930s and early 1940s
that government intervention and big unions were more help than hindrance to the operations of major corporations, and this corporate portion of the urban GOP has since insisted on the "impossibility" of undoing Roosevelt's work.

Especially since World War II, big business has relied on foreign markets as well as domestic ones. World War II caused not only tremendous expansion of American business enterprises through their physical plants, their labor forces, their managerial structures, and their business volume, but the expansion as well of the horizons of American businessmen. Before the war only a handful of corporations had global interests, and these were often stymied by British and French colonialism. Although the major financial firms had considerable involvement overseas, very few American manufacturers did. Even the major auto companies did little exporting, choosing instead of manufacture different cars in Europe for sale there. By the end of the war, American business leaders began to understand precisely the size of world markets and what local political obstacles blocked their paths. If the power of the federal government could remove these obstacles, it would benefit American business interests.63

Overseas business interests, as they grew, tended to make urban Republicans become internationalists. Allen and John Foster Dulles, whose law firm was primarily
involved in European financial affairs, were among the first urban Republicans to denounce Nazism, which threatened both their investments and their friends on the Continent. Financiers and major exporters, as well as shipping and ship-building companies, were primarily located on the coasts, especially the east coast. These interests provided the major component of eastern internationalism. By way of contrast, before the war those major corporations involved in making autos, rubber, steel, and glass were primarily located away from the coasts (all but steel were mostly in the Midwest), and they did little exporting. They were highly interdependent, and the only foreign concern any of them had was that rubber had to be imported from Southeast Asia. Thus the leadership of these Midwestern corporations had little interest in foreign policy, tending to be isolationist with regard to Europe, but to demand firmness when Japanese aggression threatened rubber sources. With the postwar broadening of business interests abroad, both financial and manufacturing concerns came to favor government policies that promoted or protected foreign markets.

The needs of high finance were related to those of the major corporations. Galbraith contends that expertise has been replacing capital as the dominant factor in modern production since the mid 1920s, thus rendering high finance dependent on big business rather than the other way around,
as it was in J.P. Morgan's heyday. By 1940, Republicans involved in financial circles therefore had a substantial interest in furthering the needs of the major corporations. In addition, the government was inextricably bound up in all matters of banking and currency. A stable economy -- which seemed at that point to mean a government-supervised economy -- was of the higher concern to major financial organizations. Insofar as these upper levels of finance also had international interests, international stability was also of great value to them. Like big businesspeople, financiers wanted no wars, no closing off of countries to high finance. A desirable policy to them was strong without involving their country in war.

The third group of economic interests among the urban Republicans was a composite consisting of professionals and semi-professionals who served big business, high finance, and old money. Foremost among these were corporate lawyers, who had direct interests in the welfare of their clients. Other professionals had a less direct tie to these groups. The press, for example, had to serve its advertisers as well as its readers, including thousands of people bound up in the interests of major companies. The point here is not merely that publishers distorted the news to favor their advertisers. The larger news organizations were either corporations themselves or were owned by even larger corporations. Underlying values were thus shared by
corporate and journalistic elites. The same was true, again indirectly, for intellectuals affiliated with major research foundations and universities. They were by no means homogeneous, but there were common interests. Similarly, many clergy, doctors, and lawyers of urban firms served congregations or clienteles of such people, and likewise shared with them many points of view and some economic interests.68

The fourth component of urban GOP economic interests was made up of the Republican families of great wealth, many of which were descended from successful entrepreneurs. Unlike many newly wealthy people, who were still caught up in the entrepreneurial attitudes of the GOP right, a great number of the wealthiest Republicans with old fortunes could be found in the party's moderate wing. In part this may have been noblesse oblige. They could afford to support generous policies. But more likely it was due to culture and urban location. Of course, many of these fortunes had originated in the great cities and stayed there. Few people went west after making their fortunes. Others followed a pattern of conscious elevation in social class: John D. Rockefeller, for example, started in Cleveland, Ohio, made his money in oil, and moved to the East. He remained a prototypical entrepreneur all his life, but he began attaching culture to his children, endowing colleges,
operas, and libraries. His grandsons grew up as leaders of the urban wing of the Republican party. 69

Families with old fortunes wanted to keep them and the status they had once conveyed. As prestige in merely owning money declined, the scions of these families needed opportunities to manifest their own talents. Some did well in business or finance, but many preferred elective or appointive office. They needed domestic political and economic stability, which would protect their investments and secure their social, economic, and political positions. Without destabilizing changes in society, the holders of old money could be confident in their knowledge of the system and of the right people. They were willing to see reforms that would change particulars in the system without disrupting its basic balance. Like Franklin Roosevelt, Republicans Leverett Saltonstall, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Nelson Rockefeller typified the flexible conservatism of the sons of wealthy families. 70

This kind of "pragmatic conservatism" aimed at heading off drastic social change by reforming the worst abuses of the existing social system. Allen Dulles, in his 1938 campaign for a New York congressional nomination, criticized "a few die-hard Republicans who do not realize
that the world has changed in the last fifty years," and later added,

Reform came and it was long overdue, hence hasty, often ill-conceived but with all that I would not undo a single one of the real social reform measures of the past six years. Some of them need a lot of repairing to make them work but the principles back of them are here to stay.71

Likewise his brother Foster stated in 1950 that welfare efforts should be limited merely by fiscal responsibility and the need to protect individual responsibility.72 Such positions often seemed to differ only in degree from Roosevelt's.

Yet the moderate Republicans had greater affinities for the GOP conservatives than for the New Deal Democrats. Although the moderate and conservative wings of the Republican party represented distinctly different cultural and economic interests, both agreed that the New Deal had to be opposed because it promoted more taxes, spending, and government activity than either GOP wing wanted. Like their rural counterparts the urban Republicans were the most conservative political force of any significance in the areas where they were strong. The principal disagreement between the two wings of the GOP was whether to conduct a flexible defense against the New Deal or a rigid one. Allen Dulles, in the speech just cited, followed his
endorsement of "the real social reform measures of the past six year's with a caveat:

But the trouble is that we have been misled by these reforms. [T]he impression has been created that the Government owes every man a livelihood without effort on his part. This idea may be the ruin of us.... Social reform that is not tied up with a sound financial policy is a snare and a delusion.73

What the two wings of the GOP agreed on was that the proper level of federal spending and intervention in the economy was little or none. What they disagreed on was which. Their very unity on minimizing government programs was a source of conflict, however. David R. Mayhew's study of party differences in Congress from 1947 through 1962 found that the two major parties dealt differently with the special interests of their districts. Categorizing districts as farm, city, labor, or western constituencies, Mayhew found that members of both parties supported special interest legislation beneficial to their own kind of district. But Democrats tended to co-operate by supporting special interest legislation from other kinds of districts, while Republicans co-operated by opposing such legislation unless it favored their own type of constituency. Thus in co-operating to minimize federal programs, Republicans worked against each other's special interests. This was a "no-win" situation.74
In similar fashion to that of the urban Republicans, the economic interests of the small-town and rural Republicans complemented their cultural vision. Much has been written about the "blind dogmatism" of these conservatives, and their unreasoning tenacity in holding to classic economic ideas opposing any intervention by the government into the economy. It would be more to the point to attack the conservatives for putting their own economic interests ahead of those of the nation, but the conservatives believed that what helped the entrepreneur helped the country. For the most part, the economic interests of small-town and rural Republicans differed from those of the urban sector, and their goals were not often served in the same way. The most important economic interests represented within the conservative wing were what Galbraith calls "immature corporations" (by which he means both small businesses and those run as if they were small businesses, by owner-entrepreneurs for profit, rather than by a highly-developed management team interested in its own continuity.)

Other important economic interests in this wing were those of farmers and the rural and small-town counterparts of the professions already discussed.

Small businesses needed maximum competitive freedom if they were to survive against major competitors. Although major corporations had the facilities for extensive research and development efforts, advantages in productivity lay
with smaller businesses because improvements in method in smaller firms did not require a massive and complex schedule of integration into an old system. Whatever public benefits might have accrued from government relations and inspection, the small business complained most about the costs of regulation. Small businesses lost their competitive edge in speed when they had to wait for government approval of innovations and new products. The volume of paperwork generated by government intervention was a small part of the cost for a major corporation, and often amounted simply to doing corporate paperwork the way the government wanted it done. For small companies, paperwork required by the government usually represented a true burden in extra time and cost. 76

Further, in large-scale production by major corporations, additional costs and some minor inefficiencies were offset by economies of scale and the ability to control markets. The company with a small volume of business had no such economies of scale to cushion costs and inefficiencies. This was why small companies rather than large ones complained about "ridiculous" safety standards, and why small businesses tended to continue their opposition to organize labor. If their larger competitors, which had so many advantages, were, de facto, stuck with a need to pay more for labor, small businesspeople said to let them pay it without requiring the same of small companies.
Right-to-work laws have been sponsored by the small business sector, not by the major corporations. It was not easy for small businesses to pass costs along to the consumer as it was for the major corporations. The company that could neither cut costs nor raise prices to survive faced real trouble. The problem of competing with major corporations existed before the New Deal, but the New Deal exacerbated it greatly, and the small business sector of the GOP resented this.  

It might seem that the owners of small businesses would promote legislation to curb big business. Indeed, they did so during the progressive era under the formula of antitrust legislation, but they could not justify legislation against mere bigness as easily as they could justify prohibiting monopolies. What remained of anti-monopoly fervor in small businesses was spent in fighting the NRA in 1933 and 1934. Rather than expand the doctrine of monopoly to cover an industry dominated by a few large companies rather than a single company, small businesses opposed legislation designed to favor big businesses over small ones. Their own hopes for growth and their increasing dependence on the good will of major corporations kept them from opposing bigness per se. And as the last defenders of laissez-faire capitalism, small businesspeople could not justify limiting the options of major corporations without undercutting their own insistence on competitive freedom.
The needs of owner-entrepreneurs of large companies (such as Henry Ford, Colonel Robert McCormick of the Chicago Tribune, Frank Gannett of the Gannett newspaper chain, Sewell Avery of Montgomery Ward, General Robert Wood of Sears, and Jay C. Hormel of Hormel Meats) were not always similar to those of the owners of small businesses nor to those of stockholders and managers of the "mature" corporations. They were not marginal operators and were not terribly worried about profits. What often concerned the owner-entrepreneurs most was keeping the control and prestige that had always gone with owning and running a major company. In the Republican small-town culture, nothing commanded respect like owning one's own business. To have founded it as well, and to have built it into a fortune, was exceedingly honorific.\(^78\)

It was still a primary objective of the entrepreneurs after the war to re-establish their importance and power in American society. This was true of the older entrepreneurs who still survived, and it was even truer of the newly-arrived entrepreneurs who made their fortunes during and after the war. The latecomers had invested themselves in their elevation and wanted the rewards, and many had not had the chastening experience of working within major corporations. They wanted to protect their profits, avoid control by the government and the unions, and put an end to
the erosion of the powers of owners which they saw in liberal rhetoric and policies.

The economic needs of farmers, especially in the period before the rise of agribusiness, closely paralleled those of small business. Republican farmers were primarily family farm owners. What help they could get from the New Deal came early. FDR's initial farm program was made up of only those relief measures on which the major farmers' organizations could agree. Much of what the New Deal later was aimed at helping the poorest farmers and farmworkers, and was of little use to Republican farmers. Nor did they like all that the government did. Aid to one agricultural sector sometimes made things more difficult for another, such as when price supporters for grain raised the costs paid by dairy farmers.79

Farmers tended to think that farm prices should reflect the importance of their products. This built an economic conflict between farmers and the cities, whose residents naturally wanted low food prices. As economic power concentrated in urban hands, the ability of farmers to control their prices was weakened. Much of the resistance of Republican farmers to the liberal policies supported by Democrats and urban Republicans stemmed from their fear and hostility towards urban power.80

The professional classes of rural and small-town Republicans generally had the same interests in their
clients that urban professionals had in theirs. Lawyers in private practices had similar interests to those of the entrepreneur: they likewise operated their own economic enterprises, and they wanted the respect that was traditionally due them both as lawyers and as independent ventures. Their clients were the owners of small-town businesses and family farms, and the lawyers could not profit unless their clients did. This was even more true of bankers in small towns.

The press was in a similar position, having to take community values into account. Most of the small-town press and even many large Mid-western newspapers were entrepreneurial enterprises, facing the same small business problems as other companies in their communities. Small-town papers may have had to be even more cautious about the interests of advertisers than their urban counterparts, since their advertisers needed them less. The people of Abilene, Kansas, having little choice, would more likely have patronized the local stores without seeing newspaper ads than would Macy's customers had that chain withheld its ads to teach the New York Times a lesson.

So, too, did clergy reflect community values, at least much of the time, as did schoolteachers and the faculties of small colleges and many state universities. Again, they shared both values and interests. Agricultural extension agents carried professional rank at state
universities, and they either served farmers well or faced trouble. That was their job. Even doctors depended to some extent on good will, and they, too, were owners of private enterprises. What is more, all of these small-town and rural professional people, most of whom were hereditary Republicans, had their own personal interests in making government simple and keeping taxes low. These interests were not necessarily shared by urban accountants, lawyers, and consultants, many of whom derived their livings from making sense of complex laws and regulations.

Thus, if the postwar Republican party is understood as having been divided into two wings -- one urban and moderate, the other rural, small-town, and conservative in its outlook (even when its adherents lived in cities) -- sensible patterns begin to emerge. Groups with similar cultural reference points and economic needs lined up against other groups whose views and goals conflicted with theirs. Both wings favored hierarchies based on merit, but the urban groups wanted a big, amorphous pool of talent on a national scale, while the outlanders defended a more closed and localized social system with clearer distinctions. The city interests expected to create their own positions through social change and growth; the small-town and rural citizens saw change as diminishing what they could accomplish, and undermining their inherited status. Each group detested the other's milieu. Each wing of the
Republican party also assumed that the other was out to make America over in its own image.

What this meant for party unity and for political coalitions was that the second most important party in the United States, the only real alternative to the Democrats, was rarely united after 1930. The split made it easy for the Democrats to discredit the GOP and keep the wounds from healing. What internal divisions the Democrats had were very different, and while Roosevelt lived the prospect of easy victories kept the Democrats united. Theirs was a coalition of very different constituents, and the party of FDR was quite capable of thriving on disagreements, perhaps because Democrats would support each other's special interests. Not so the Republicans. Before Joseph McCarthy made his Lincoln Day speech in 1950, all that Republican party spokesmen could agree on was an imprecise degree of opposition to increase taxes, but not on any particulars.

Were it not for the tendency of both groups of Republicans to see themselves as both the legitimate heirs of Lincoln's party and a better grade of people than were in the corresponding wing of the Democratic party, there might have been such a realignment as Dewey feared that would have put the urban GOP into the Democratic party and allied the rural and small-town Republicans with the
Dixiecrats in a new conservative party. But neither wing was willing to forego the proud party name, nor the votes that went with it.

This conflict between urban industrial interests and those of the agrarian Midwest existed when the Republican party was founded, but it was of minor importance until the New Deal forced Republicans to take sides for or against what Roosevelt was doing. In that issue lay the heart of the GOP problem for the mid-twentieth century, and out of the split came McCarthyism, the only political device that united Republicans. Ironically, as will be seen in Chapter Five, it was the split that destroyed McCarthy.

During the first decade after the Second World War, the domestic positions of the two GOP wings changed very little. The urban Republicans became a bit more comfortable with their position as they saw that it served their economic interests as well as their political interests. Meanwhile the conservatives did not shift away from fiscal conservatism and traditional Republicanism, but they found new emphases in the area of foreign policy that appeared to strengthen their position: they finally abandoned an unrewarding insistence on American non-involvement in foreign affairs and became anticommunist interventionists.
NOTES -- CHAPTER ONE


6. The only important exception to this statement applies to the national Republican nominating conventions, and really only to that of 1952, but what made southern Republicans significant in 1952 was that they had no base in the electorate, and instead survived on what patronage the congressional wing of the party could give them. Thus, in delegate disputes, Taft's southern delegates had less legitimacy than Eisenhower's caucus-elected delegates. Burns, Deadlock, pp. 182-196. Note that the early growth (1948-1956) of the GOP in the South toward real party status began in the cities and paralleled the urban wing of the party. Sundquist, Dynamics, chap. 12.


8. The most widely accepted definition of the Midwest lists Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.

9. The data on safe Republicans seats are compiled from name and party lists in Congressional Directories for the first session of Congress from the Seventy-third


19. Ibid.


31. Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 157, 189-190; Polenberg, War and Society, pp. 13, 218-219; Hoover, Memoirs, 3: 420-432.


38. Lingeman, *Small Town America*, chap. 1; also see pp. 275-276, 313, 340.


41. Ibid., pp. 212, 219, 234; Viorst, Fall from Grace, pp. 12-13; Schrag, Decline of the Wasp, pp. 14-18, 44-45; Miles, Odyssey, p. 22; Lingeman, Small Town America, pp. 30-31, 36, 39, 57, 476.

42. Petrocik, Party Coalitions, p. 59.


46. Lingeman, Small Town America, pp. 53-269, 271, 285-286.


53. Lubell's surveys convinced him that Taft would have won narrowly in 1952, presumably not carrying in congressional majorities. But because the conservative wing of the Republican party did not get to nominate a standard bearer in the 1940s or 1950s, the effect of such a candidacy remains speculative. Lebell, Future, p. 222n.


57. Ibid., pp. 28-33, 92, 149-158, 166-171.


60. Ibid., pp. 263-274.


66. Schrag, Decline of the Wasp, pp. 52-53; Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, pp. 185-189.


68. Wecter, p. 245.

69. Ibid., pp. 78-79, 88-90, 177. For information on Rockefeller, see Nevins, John D. Rockefeller: The Heroic Age of American Enterprise (New York: Scribner's, 1940), 2 vols.; the subtitle is important to understanding the attitudes of entrepreneurs.


71. Speeches, July 7, 1939 and August 26, 1938, Allen Dulles Papers.


73. Speech, July 7, 1939, Allen Dulles Papers.


76. Ibid., pp. 13-17, 227, 253, 305-306.


CHAPTER TWO

THE REPUBLICANS, ALIENS, AND ALIENTATION

Foreign policy seemed to offer the Republican party political opportunities after World War II. It was a field less dangerous for the GOP than domestic policy, on which the party consistently lost elections and was badly divided. "We cannot possibly win the next election," wrote Senator Robert A. Taft,

unless we point out the utter failure and incapacity of the present Administration to conduct foreign policy and cite the loss of China and the Korean War as typical examples.... We certainly can't win on domestic policy, because every domestic policy depends entirely on foreign policy. 1

Republican candidates expected their remaining supporters to stay faithful, in which case foreign policy debates would probably cost the party nothing. Yet there were voters in the New Deal coalition whose attachment to the Roosevelt legacy had been weakened by the end of the economic crisis, and who had strong complaints about Truman's postwar diplomacy. Many Republican leaders felt that if they exploited this disaffection, enough voters might be won back to the GOP to give it a majority. 2

The disaffected Democrats fell into two categories: old-line conservatives, not only from the South, who had always been suspicious of leftist influences in the
Roosevelt White House, and who drew sinister parallels between what they saw as domestic socialism and Roosevelt's patience with Stalin during the war, and people of eastern European ethnics and Catholics (many people were both) tended to be among those most attracted to the New Deal for economic reasons. For many of them, this remained their primary political motivation. But others were now economically secure enough to discard identification with the Democrats based on economic class if they became angry enough about the fate of eastern Europe and its churches, or if they feared the spread of communism. In 1948, Harry Truman retained the support of most members of both of these groups, and left the rest undecided and not voting. But after the 1948 election, Truman lost the active support of the conservative Democrats, and many of the eastern European ethnics went over to the Republicans, if only temporarily.

To recognize foreign policy as an area of political vulnerability for the Democrats was one thing, but for the Republicans to take advantage of that opening was another. Because there were parallels between each party's domestic policy and its foreign policy, it was possible for the Republicans to use attacks on the administration's diplomacy in symbolic form, that is, to make attacks that could be taken either at face value or as indications of a wide failure. Rural Republicans understood these assaults as
symbolizing a blanket condemnation of the New Deal. To them, naivete and bunglins experimentation characterized not only Roosevelt's foreign efforts, but everything he did as president. To mention any fault was to suggest all of them. But to moderates both inside and outside the GOP, who endorsed many New Deal measures, the specifics of Republican attacks on foreign policy might win approval without the risk of discussing domestic problems. Such attacks were therefore among the few things both wings of the party could agree upon.

There were pitfalls, however, for the Republicans in using foreign policy as a symbolic issue. For one, the feelings of the party faithful in both wings could not be taken for granted. Both sets of Republicans wanted more than symbolic results, and both had fears and hostilities that were equally open to symbolic attack. Murray Edelman writes that for radical right movements, victory never occurs.

The threat that is feared is not based on observable conditions; and the goals, like all political goals, is a normative category and not a specific empirical state of affairs. Tangible action or benefits therefore cannot bring satisfaction. On the contrary, everything that happens is perceived... as further confirmation of their initial assumptions and of the continued and growing reality of the threat.9

Victories in policy were less credible if they did not include victories in selecting the personnel implementing
those policies: conservative Republican generally expected Eisenhower's policies to be satisfactory during his first months in office, but his nomination of James Durkin, a union member, as Secretary of Labor affronted them. Even worse was the appointment of Charles Bohlen, a career diplomat who had accompanied FDR at Yalta as an interpreter, to be ambassador to the USSR. Even the assurances of Secretary of State Dulles (a moderate Republican) that Bohlen would not formulate policy were insufficient to mollify the GOP right. It was only after the right's own leader Robert Taft vouched for Bohlen's integrity that the conservative opposition splintered. In a highly-charged political atmosphere, almost everything had symbolic implications, making it hard for the GOP to use symbolic attacks safely.

Then, too, there were constraints of reality: outside the borders of the United States lay allies deathly afraid of nuclear war, colonial nations looking for support in their struggles for independence, and an increasingly powerful Soviet Union and its allies. Were it not for these external realities, America's politicians might have been able to conduct a wilder psychodrama in the 1950s than they actually did, battling for possession of the public's fears, hates, and hopes. As it was, whoever was actually running the government was required to display some sobriety.

Both wings of the GOP attacked the Truman administration's foreign policy, avoiding making specific
countersuggestions that would cause disharmony, but implying that better policies were available. But each wing of the GOP was so suspicious of the other that it read into the other's attacks on Democrats parallel attacks on themselves. Urban Republicans courted their constituents by disparaging conservative Democrats: midwestern Republicans would lash out at what they saw as the starry-eyed idealism of internationalist Democrats. But what each wing hated most about the Democrats, besides their majority status, they also hated about the other wing of the GOP. Only in the early 1950s, when McCarthy offered the unifying notion that the Democrats were soft on communism did the two wings find a way to attack the ruling party without further dividing their own.

The outlook of the moderate Republicans in foreign policy was based on a tolerant internationalism rooted in their cosmopolitan culture. If live-and-let-live made sense in the urban environment, why should it not be even more sensible in the global arena? The same ties of economic interest existed between urban Republicans and foreign markets as between urban Republicans and other people in American cities. Given these interests, they believed, there was no room for the kind of narrow moralism that wanted to enforce a single code of conduct, a true religion, or the "right" form of government everywhere. Urban Republicans with foreign business interests felt no
compulsion to reform foreign cultures and governments before trading with them.\textsuperscript{11}

The global tolerance of the urban Republicans included an attachment for other peoples. Some urban Republicans had economic interests abroad and did not want them disrupted. Others, concerned with global military maneuvering, believed that maintaining friendly bases and friendly governments was worth some risk and expense. Many had a wider appreciation of cultures than could be satisfied within American boundaries, a respect for diversity, a fondness for traditions older than their own. To many conservatives, on the other hand, this appeared to be slavish adoration and imitation of foreign cultures.\textsuperscript{12}

But economic concern was not insignificant. Economic interests overseas were a very real part of the American economy throughout the twentieth century. Significantly, in the isolationist period, the only isolationists who warned that foreign trade entanglements could get the country into a war were those from states whose produce was not generally sold directly to foreign customers (Gerald Nye of South Dakota, Robert LaFollette of Wisconsin, and Henrik Shipstead of Minnesota, for example.) Despite sizeable agricultural exports, these isolationists and their constituents did not really seem to feel that they were involved in foreign trade, perhaps
in part because they sold primarily to brokers within the United States. There were other strong isolationists who demanded that American merchant vessels be protested wherever they sailed; such persons usually came from coastal states with a direct and widely-perceived interest in foreign trade (for instance, Hiram Johnson of California, Edith Nourse Rogers of Massachusetts, and Hamilton Fish of New York.) Economic interests required both the preservation of nations in which those interests were located and a general situation of global stability. Insofar as the urban Republican commercial and financial interests could influence government policy, they wanted American power to promote peace and stability, even at the risk of war.

In contrast, although American farmers had exported their produce since the colonial era, the foreign economic interests of farmers did not make them internationalists. The experience of World War I confirmed an isolationist tradition for them. Naval blockades had reduced agricultural exports at a time when war-related production increased American manufacturing exports. A great many midwestern farmers despised and feared Great Britain, and Wilson's failure at Versailles reinforced these attitudes. The efforts of Herbert Hoover to feed Europe's starving millions during and after the war, on the other hand, was not seen as part of American involvement in the war, but
as good business that was also humane. In the early months of World War II, farm bloc isolationists wanted to sell food to Europe again, but to restrict all other sales. Farmers drew the conclusion from the first war that food sales were humanitarian, but other sales to belligerents would result in the United States going to war to protect its trade or secure its investments. Thus while most urban Republicans who had overseas economic dealings became internationalists, Republican farmers were led by the lessons they drew from World War I to fear the entanglements of foreign trade, and they became isolationists. The actual experience of World War II reversed that lesson, and American agricultural exports grew in volume during and after the war. This coincided with the abandonment of isolationism by the conservative Republicans after Pearl Harbor.14

Although a few urban Republicans had been fascinated with the idea of the United States as a global power as early as the McKinley administration, most urban Republicans did not acquire such a vision until the period of the two world wars, 1914-1945. Until the First World War caused the European powers to borrow heavily from the American bankers, the United States remained an indebted nation built on European finances.15 By World War II, the American business and financial community had grown self-confident enough to want to expand its interests abroad on a major scale. Midwestern conservatives who
thought of eastern bankers as the stooges of British financiers never understood how hard the liberals of both parties worked during World War II to dismantle the colonial regimes of America's allies, which blocked their trade, even as Allied armed forces dismantled the Axis. A British Colonial Office memo dated 21 April 1943 complained that the commercial interests of the United States constituted an informal empire. "Independence is a political catchword," the writer complained,

which has no real meaning apart from economics. The Americans are quite ready to make their dependencies politically "independent" while economically bound hand and foot to them and see no inconsistency in this.16

None of the followers of Robert Taft did as much to thwart the British Empire as that exemplar of the urban GOP, John Foster Dulles.17 The confidence of urban liberals of both parties in America's ability to be a major world power after the war was expressed in visions that amounted to imperialism without colonialism, a hopeful dream in which the small nations of the world could be led without oppression to emulate and trade with the United States.18

The expansion of both fascism in the 1930s and communism after World War II cut off some nations from this mutually beneficial scheme and threatened to cut off others. Whether their interest in other nations sprang from economic ties or from respect for other cultures, or simply from
having friends abroad, urban Republicans wanted the government to oppose such expansion. Late in the 1930s leading Republicans from the urban wing, most of whom no longer held office, began to call for action to contain Nazi Germany. In Congress, where virtually all of the Republicans were from the rural wing, the GOP was isolationist, with party solidarity holding until Hitler's successes in 1940 and 1941 reduced American agricultural as well as industrial exports to Europe and made conservatives see the danger the Axis posed to American security.

After the Nazi menace had been destroyed, Britain yielded its role as chief guarantor of the global status quo, and the American people concluded that they could accomplish anything. Then the urban Republicans found another problem. The destruction of the Axis should have left most of Europe free -- open to American business and to cultural exchanges -- but the Russian onslaught had sealed off half of Europe. As the Cold War worsened, hopes of a great volume of trade with Russia and eastern Europe faded. When the eastern block stayed out of the Marshall Plan's efforts, which rebuilt western Europe's ability to trade, these hopes were given up. At the same time, there appeared to be a serious drive on the part of the Soviets to expand further, cutting off Greece, Turkey, Iran, China, and perhaps Italy and France from the West. This, urban Republicans felt, had to be prevented, but
because of the need for global peace and stability, they aimed to prevent communist expansion without going to war. These two potentially conflicting desires led the urban Republicans to endorse the idea of containment, later augmented by the concept of nuclear deterrence of war.22

With very few exceptions, urban Republicans considered war a policy of last resort. Mere preparedness met the needs of most defense contractors with less risk, and produced regulation of aggregate demand without interrupting supplies and markets as a war would. Arms makers have prospered, as a rule, in both war and peace since 1945, and they were a fairly small segment of the urban interests represented in the urban GOP. There was less pressure for war per se in the urban wing of the Republican party than the GOP right believed, or than the New Left has assumed.23

The urban GOP had reasons to counsel firmness short of war. The stockpiling of nuclear weapons has considerably reinforced these reasons, but they existed in 1940 as well. War on a major scale not only closed off markets and bankrupted foreign customers, it also cost heavily in lives and in taxes. Urban Republicans bore this latter cost heavily. With increased taxes went an expansion of the levels of the government controls and government power beyond what the urban Republicans could comfortably support. During the Second World War the urban GOP did less foot-dragging than the rural wing on such issues as foreign aid
for Britain and Russia, and it supported FDR's higher priority for Europe than for the Pacific (while the rural wing did not), but it did not cease its opposition to increased government controls. Both war and the government interference that war required interrupted the long-range planning of major corporations and financial interest, and took some decisions out of the hands of the technostructure. The major corporations made vast sums of money during the war, but they disliked losing control of their inner workings.

Urban Republicans did not modify their views on foreign policy after the war because they did not have to. Pearl Harbor seemed to vindicate the argument of the internationalists that neutrality could not keep America safe from war, and the full revelations of the horrors of Nazi Germany ended most doubts that the United States had an interest in Hitler's defeat. Because the urban Republicans had merely tolerated the alliance with Russia, and had not become as enthusiastic about the USSR as some Democrats had, it was not difficult for them to expand the idea of containment of a totalitarian threat to include the Soviets. Far from having to modify unpopular and unworkable foreign policy ideas, the urban Republicans found that World War II confirmed what they believed.

The rural and small-town wing of the Republican party was at odds with many of these positions. They tended to distrust foreigners, including both foreign governments and
foreign-born Americans. The conservative outlook was one of insecurity, which made them seek safety by uniting with their own kind of people. Historical patterns of immigration reinforced this separateness. With very few exceptions -- most of whom were German or Scandinavian -- the immigrants who came to America from Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries came to cities first and remained overwhelmingly urban.25 There were jobs and communities of immigrants in the cities, and little to attract them to the rural regions. The pressure to assimilate was also greater in rural and small-town America after the closing of the frontier. (The Germans and Scandinavians who settled in the Midwest in the early nineteenth century were among the founders of the Republican party, and were not seen as outsiders where they lived in large numbers, so they were not targets of the anti-foreign attitudes of rural Republicans.)26

Those attitudes were based on cultural prejudices. Rural Republicans felt that God and the Anglo-Saxon way of life had give America a special role in the world, and a culture unlike any other, based on law and reason. They saw Europe as a cesspool of peoples who had sold out the great heritage of western civilization to live in laziness, ignorance, depravity, and militarism. "European quarrels," said Robert Taft,

are everlasting. There is a welter of races there so confused that boundaries cannot be drawn without
leaving minorities which are a perpetual source of friction.27

Because foreigners were seen to have corrupt motives different from those of Americans, there would have been no way to deal rationally with them. They had to be kept at a distance, either through exercises of strength or through having nothing to do with them.28

Until at least the end of World War II, rural Republicans doubted that America could dominate the nations of Europe (as it did with those of Latin America), and they had little desire to do so. As Republicans they opposed enslavement and believed in liberty. And had they overcome these scruples, they had no use for servants whom they saw as lazy, ignorant, and unreliable.

Furthermore, many rural and small-town Republicans felt that the cosmopolitan urbanites were so tolerant of diversity that they had no fear of foreigners. Cityfolk seemed overconfident, and thus doomed to undergo deception and defeat. By the end of the Progressive era, most urban Republicans had given up on opposing immigration and the political machines the immigrants built. Instead, urban Republicans followed McKinley's formula of appeasing and using these machines wherever they could. To the rural GOP it seemed that the immigrants used urban political machines to advance claims based not on reason and law, but on expediency and need. This was an influence
fundamentally opposed to the Yankee vision, which threatened to undo the Anglo-Saxon grip on the legal and cultural system in America. Yet the urban GOP seemed simply to capitulate to it.

Besides the danger of being swamped by the wrong kinds of immigrants, conservative Republicans believed that foreign influences eroded American values in other ways. Pressures from involvement in foreign relations might cause internal change in the United States. The underlying fear behind the Bricker Amendment was that treaties had the force of law, and that other executive agreements could bind Americans without congressional assent. Conservative Republicans wanted any agreements with foreign governments that might affect American laws or commerce to require the approval of bodies in which they had some power, such as Congress and the state legislatures. Because they distrusted both presidential conduct of foreign policy and all dealings with foreigners, it did not bother them that the Bricker Amendment would hamstring the president in conducting foreign relations. That was what that Bricker Amendment was intended to do.30

This rural Republican fear of foreign involvement was not absolute. Senator Arthur Vandenberg, when he was still a leading isolationist, wrote

If by "isolationists" you mean those who think America can live exclusively unto herself alone
in this foreshortened world, I doubt if more than a very small percentage of our opposition would accept this definition.31

The fear of foreign involvement ran highest around the beginning of World War II, when rural and small-town Republicans feared that foreign ties would drag the country into the war. Vandenberg wrote in his diary on December 11, 1941 that the Axis declarations of war vindicated the non-interventionists:

We have insisted from the beginning that this course would lead to war and it has done exactly that.... I remember saying... two years ago... "you cannot be the arsenal for one belligerent without becoming a target for the other." Well -- aren't we?.... The point is that we did everything we could -- by proxy -- to help defeat Germany, and said so.32

Rural Republicans felt that the sentimental ties of immigrants for their homelands, mobilized in the urban political machines that the Republicans so despised, would promote foreign involvement. In fact, these ties usually worked against American interventionism, and sometimes aided the Republican cause. Americans of eastern European backgrounds who supported Roosevelt's prewar moves to hamper Nazi expansion were outnumbered by Irish and German-American voters who opposed policies that favored Britain over Germany. Italian-Americans complained bitterly about Roosevelt's condemnations of Mussolini before America entered the war. After the war, all of these groups tended
to blame the Democrats for softness towards Soviet expansion, and were somewhat more prone to vote Republican.\textsuperscript{33}

One of the major changes in the Republican right during the first postwar decade was that fear of non-WASPs diminished with the grudging realization that many Catholics and Jews steadfastly opposed the spread of communism. Non-WASP governments such as Israel, Spain, and Nationalist China were anticommunist stalwarts. The "New Right" of the McCarthy era was in some ways the last New Deal victory in behalf of tolerance: many midwestern Protestant Republicans came to realize that Irish Catholics like Joe McCarthy and Jews like Roy Cohn could be just as fierce anticommunists and ferocious nativists as Anglo-Saxons of old stock like Everett McKinley Dirksen and William E. Jenner. Except in a few fringe groups, public statements of loathing for non-WASPs became unacceptable as the right learned to accept the allies it had available.\textsuperscript{34}

Unlike the urban wing of the party, the rural wing underwent something of a transformation in its foreign policy outlook during and immediately after World War II. The change was primarily one of strategy rather than of philosophy. Rural Republican distrust of foreign involvement had always been both nationalist and unilateralist. In the period between the world wars, unilateralism took the form of isolationism. The two are often confused, but a unilateralist policy need not be isolationist.
Isolationism implies a careful avoidance of ties with foreign nations, perhaps even avoidance of foreign trade, while unilateralist policy allows a nation to act on its own in foreign affairs without getting the approval of allies. It can be either pacifistic or belligerant. Arthur Vandenberg, who remained something of a unilateralist even after giving up non-intervention for support of American international cooperations, wrote in 1946,

America must behave like the Number One World Power which she is. Ours must be the world's moral leadership -- or the world won't have any.35

Vandenberg argued during the war that the United States could have allies but still put its interests forward as strongly as Britain and Russia did. His assessment of America's interests, of course, differed from that of Roosevelt, who held that it was in America's best interest to further cooperation with the allies through compromise.36

There were some real isolationists before the war, such as William Langer, Gerald Nye, and George Norris, who were pacifists and anti-imperialists to such an extent they preferred that American commerce withdraw from the seas rather than take military measures to protect it which might lead to war. These were the most vociferous of the non-interventionists. They came from the old Progressive segment of the western GOP, which was a dying faction. Even Nye supported national defense.
During the war the GOP tried to conceal the losses among its isolationists by emphasizing the successes of renominated isolationist incumbents. Yet many Republican isolationists were not even renominated. In Minnesota, for example, in 1942, Harold Stassen and Joseph E. Ball, both Republican internationalists, were nominated over isolationists, and incumbent isolationist Representative Oscar Youngcahl was defeated by Walter Judd of the nascent China Lobby. Many GOP isolationists survived the 1942 elections because the off-year contests favored Republicans. In the 1944 election, however, such isolationist stalwarts as Nye, Hamilton Fish, Bennett Clark, and "Cotton Ed" Smith were defeated by the same voters who retained Roosevelt and Republican internationalists such as Leverett Saltonstall and Wayne Morse. Republican unilateralists who were dedicated isolationists were few and politically insignificant in Congress after the war.  

Prewar "isolationism" was a coalition strategy which united a few pacifists, a handful of German sympathizers, and many conservative Republicans who were unilateralists though not pacifists. Men like Vandenberg, Frank Gannett, and General Robert Wood, for example, supported the arch-isolationist group America First until Pearl Harbor, but by 1943 they were trying to draft General MacArthur to run against Roosevelt, believing that nobody else had a chance
of winning. Most of them, as Allen Dulles suggested, simply hated Roosevelt, and opposed him instinctively.38

Roosevelt recognized the unilateralism of most "isolationists" and tailored his efforts to aid Britain accordingly. In 1940 and 1941, FDR won support in Congress for measures later described as internationalist, which he sold as measures to strengthen American defense in case the Nazis succeeded in Europe and still had ambitions. He was careful to avoid suggesting that American forces should be built up to go to the aid of the British, instead splitting the unilateralists from the other isolationists by arguing that only a strong America could protect itself. Thus he justified Lend-Lease as a way to loan out military goods which "would be more useful to the defense of the United States if they were used in Britain than if they were kept in storage here." Similar defensive justifications were given for his April 1941 assumption of a "temporary protectorate" over Greenland, his proclamation of most of the Atlantic as western hemispheric waters off limits to the naval and air forces of belligerents unless they had colonies in the western hemisphere (only the Axis powers had no such colonies), and his order to report the positions of Axis naval and merchant vessels over the radio, which aided the British Navy. In his May 27, 1941 fireside chat, Roosevelt made the Atlantic part of America's defense.39
By labelling his pro-British policies defensive, FDR undermined the unity of the non-interventionists. Even America First favored defense. Thus Roosevelt built up support for repeal of the neutrality legislation and even for Lend-Lease to Britain (and subsequently the USSR) by arguing that to avoid war United States had to build up its defenses and help Britain to keep the war from expanding. Since unilateralists could support these positions without favoring intervention, Roosevelt found the majorities he needed.

Unilateralist Republicans let the most vociferous opponents of international efforts take the lead in shaping the debate. Other Republicans, such as Robert Taft, were also unilateralists, but were preoccupied with domestic politics, which they considered more important. The coalition of non-interventionists of the late 1930s united pacifists, unilateral nationalists, and fiscal conservatives who hated Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, but it was led by the more fervent pacifists. It was reactive, opposing what Roosevelt proposed, but doing little to initiate policy or to retain the widespread public support with which it had started.

That public support made isolationism politically attractive to conservative Republicans. The 1936 election had shocked them, because they had expected to be returned to power by a public they presumed to be fed up with the New
Deal. The election made it apparent that domestic Republicanism was not the stuff of electoral majorities. When Roosevelt began looking for ways to oppose the spread of fascism in Europe, it seemed to rural Republicans that a viable issue had materialized. Primarily concerned with defeating the New Deal, the GOP conservatives believed with Taft that Roosevelt was using foreign policy to distract attention from his domestic "failures". They thought this was a foolish move on his part. Between the wars a clear majority of the American people believed that participation in the First World War had been a costly error, the result of pressures from arms manufacturers and financiers in the East. This feeling was widespread, but it was particularly strong in the rural areas of the North that were already returning to the Republican fold. This may have made rural Republicans overconfident about the utility of isolationism for detaching votes from the New Deal coalition.

Conservative Republicans were the greatest Roosevelt-haters, and they used isolationist charges that FDR planned to drag America into the war as a symbol of what they felt were his "dictorial" tendencies. As the 1940 election approached, they hoped to fight the campaign on this issue. But when Wendell Willkie, a Wall Street internationalist who had never been a Republican before, was nominated by eastern Republicans, the non-interventionist, predominantly
rural wing of the GOP felt that the urban wing had betrayed the party and stripped it of sure victory. 43

In fact, public opinion was changing rapidly even as the GOP met to nominate a candidate. Hitler, more than FDR or the urban GOP, outflanked the impregnable position of the isolationists. But there had been a broader miscalculation in the hope that isolationism would undo the Roosevelt coalition. Isolationism was the most extreme form of unilateralism, and the non-interventionists put themselves behind increasingly extreme leaders. By 1940 few congressmen were in leading positions in the non-interventionist groups, and more pro-Germans could be found there. This should have indicated that public support was waning, as well as Republican support. 44

An examination of the distribution of House seats suggests that isolationism added little to the Republican vote. Although southern Democrats had joined conservative Republicans in Congress after the 1938 election in frustrating a broad range of New Deal efforts, isolationism was spectacularly ineffective in gaining southern votes, perhaps because the portion of the southern populace that was allowed to vote was overwhelmingly Anglo-Saxon and had historic cultural and economic ties with Britain. Only three congressional districts in the South were represented by isolationists more than forty per cent of the time.
between 1933 and 1942, two in Tennessee and one in Kentucky -- all safe Republican seats.

Most congressional seats held by isolationists were merely rural ones held by Republicans since 1933. This was especially true in the midwest: in Illinois, one of the four districts always held by a Republican in the decade 1933-1943 was rated ninety per cent isolationist; the other three safe GOP districts were over eighty per cent isolationist. In Indiana, only three of the state's twelve seats had a difference of more than ten per cent between how frequently Republicans held them and how often isolationists did. In Kansas, only one out of six had more than a ten per cent differential. In Maine, Vermont, and the rural districts of Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan, the GOP and isolationist scores were very similar.

These figures cannot prove conclusively either that Republicans got votes because they exploited isolationism or that certain seats were isolationist only because the rural Republicans who held them were isolationists. Isolationism was not a salient issue in the first half of the 1933-1942 decade, yet most of those seats held by isolationists were safe for Republicans. This at least suggests that Republicanism, not isolationism, was what counted. James Hagerty noted as he watched Willkie tour the midwest in 1940 that "the so-called isolationist belt" had changed
its traditional view "if the audience reaction to Willkie's speeches was an adequate indicator." Whether or not the midwest was abandoning isolationism in 1940, Kansas, Nebraska, the Dakotas, Iowa, Indiana, and Michigan all abandoned Roosevelt, and this, rather than foreign policy, probably explained Willkie's reception. The New Deal had crested by 1938, and it is likely that Republicans would have made gains in the next few elections whether they differed with Roosevelt on foreign policy or not.45

Thus the isolationist issue did not add significantly to the votes the Republicans already had. Isolationism failed as a political device, and it was discredited as a foreign policy approach. Had the Republicans been able to run an isolationist in 1940 and to have the clear-cut debate the non-interventionists wanted, they would probably have lost, because Roosevelt would doubtless have taken virtually the same position he and Willkie actually took: not that the United States should enter the war, but that it should supply Britain so that the US could remain at peace. This position was also, by mid-1940, the position of most Americans. At least, it was the position of most Republicans, or Willkie could not have appeared from nowhere to win the nomination. He won because the other serious Republican candidates, Taft, Vandenberg, and Dewey, had already committed themselves to a more isolationist position than either most Republicans or most Americans could
support. When the Japanese torpedoed the last isolationists, they merely added to the already considerable disrepute of the Republican party. Having been the GOP line in Congress, isolationism now looked like sympathy for the Axis. American entry into the war destroyed the political viability of isolationism, ended the political effectiveness and the careers of leading Republicans, and forced most GOP unilateralists who were not pacifists to shift their strategy from one of global meekness to one of global pugnacity. Isolationism ended up costing the rural Republicans votes without keeping the United States secure, and the only ones who defended it at all were those who could not admit that Roosevelt had been right.

Once the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor, no unilateralist who was not a pacifist could object to fighting back. Both Vandenberg and Taft, for example, were to insist privately to the end of their lives that Roosevelt could and should have avoided driving Japanese to attack, but neither saw any alternative to fighting once they had attacked. However, as neither Vandenberg nor Taft had been a true isolationist, it took neither conversion nor opportunism for them to support the war effort. Shortly before his death in 1951, Vandenberg wrote to a student,

Prior to World War II, the oceans were virtual moats around our continental bastions. All this changed progressively at Pearl Harbor and thereafter.... The atom bomb sharply altered the
problem of national defense.... In other words, I believe I have only been keeping abreast realistically with the progress of our times.... I suppose I am now called an "internationalist". But I still think that our American fidelity must be to our own American security.... This is only another way of saying that I think the "nationalist" of yesterday still recognizes this axiom when, as a matter of intelligent self-interest, he demands "collective security" as the only means to defend our American welfare....

Nor did Taft change his views. Two weeks after Pearl Harbor, Taft still hoped aloud that "a satisfactory peace" could be arranged before it became necessary to build up an American army for overseas combat. On July 5, 1942, two months after the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Ohioan said of the non-interventionists, "Not only was their view a reasonable one, but nothing has occurred to prove it wrong." Within a month of his death in 1953, Taft wrote to an old colleague from his non-interventionist days, insisting that their attitude had been right before Pearl Harbor, "and while times have changed and we have to make a good many concessions today, fundamentally it is the right policy now." Taft's 1951 book, A Foreign Policy for Americans, was primarily a modernization of the "fortress America" concept, making allowances for improved aircraft and atomic bombs. The changes Taft, Vandenberg, and most other Republican unilateralists made after Pearl Harbor were superficial in the sense that they did not accept the idea that they had been wrong; rather, they believed that the
situation had changed, and they developed new unilateralist strategies to fit changing times.

Consistent with unilateralism was the insistence of midwestern Republicans on giving first priority to the war in the Pacific rather than to Europe. Part of this was reactive resistance to FDR's aims. Yet any effort in Europe would require hashing our problems with Britain and Russia, not to mention weak governments-in-exile. But Russia was not involved in the Pacific War, and Britain had almost no strength there. China was desperate for aid, and although Chiang Kai-shek did little that was asked of him, he also did little that conflicted with American supremacy in the Pacific and Asia. By the end of the war, Britain had to ask Roosevelt's permission to contribute its naval and air forces to the projected invasion of Japan, and FDR turned down the air units as unneeded. Thus, giving a priority to the Pacific and Asia as the rural Republicans urged would have given the United States a free hand to promote and protect its own interests. If, they thought, the necessity for compromise in Europe meant that the United States could not, in all likelihood, get any better settlement there than it got at the end of the First World War, why incur heavy losses there?

Because many observers saw no difference between isolationism and unilateralism, they explained the postwar behavior of rural Republicans as residual or unreconstructed
isolationism. Holding that those from outside the east coast had opposed realistic involvement in foreign affairs before World War II, such analysts believed that these Republicans never saw their error. In this view, rural Republicans voted against foreign aid after the war, opposed the formation of NATO, despised the Korean War, and so hampered a realistic, liberal defense of the free world against communism that one can only understand their actions as neoisolationism, a stubborn insistence that nuclear weapons reinforced the defensive usefulness of the two oceans. Harry Truman loved this logic, probably believed it, and reaped great political harvests from hitting the postwar GOP for "isolationism." The major premise was that whoever opposed the internationalists was an isolationist, and the minor premise was that such people had been willing to see the Nazis conquer the world. Both premises were mistaken.

Postwar debates reveal that unilateralism rather than isolationism continued to motivate the rural Republicans. Many of them supported the formation of the United Nations. This is sometimes explained solely as the result of terrific popular pressures, which surely existed. But the UN was structured in a way that was compatible with unilateralism: it did not oblige its members to go to war, nor
did it assume command if they did. Taft felt that the UN Charter

was better than a military alliance or an international state, and it wisely left to the member nations domestic matters such as control over immigration and minorities.53

Truman won strong GOP support for the Truman Doctrine, which was explicitly unilateralist, and grudging support for the Marshall Plan, which was also a unilateralist effort in its inception and control.54 Conservative Republican opponents of the Marshall Plan attacked its costs, its "welfare" tendencies, and the pretense that Russia was not excluded from American aid. This pretense was not discarded by the administration, allowing Republican conservatives to denounce the administration's feigned willingness to give American tax dollars to the communists. Senators William Jenner and Hugh Butler went farther, complaining that there was nothing in the Marshall Plan to stop communist aggression. Yet when they were asked to ratify the creation of NATO, a specifically non-unilateralist construction, they voted against it.55

Unilateralism was not solely a Republican attribute: it makes more sense to see both Truman and Vandenberg as unilateralists with some appreciation for allies than as internationalists, especially if by "internationalist" one means "liberal internationalists". The purest unilateralists were the rural and small-town Republicans, whose sense
of superiority over and distrust of all foreigners led them to brook no interference even from friendly governments abroad. William Knowland wanted to "unleash" Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists against communist China, but he did not propose to send American troops with them. This had also been MacArthur's position. It was not to be an internationalist decision: the United States would unleash whomever it wanted to unleash. This distrust was not racial or even ethnic; Jenner denounced American confidence in Britain, which McCarthy labelled a socialist country.56

The rise of the USSR, a potential foreign enemy that exemplified everything that was abhorrent to the Republican right, put an end to the right's last vestiges of antimilitarism feeling. Before the war the right, much more than the moderates, wanted to avoid wars, and for many of the same reasons. This attitude did not change sharply, but in the decade after World War II it looked to many of them as if war need no longer be a drawn-out affair. The advent of nuclear weaponry seemed to them to give a new wisdom to the old western proverb, "Shoot first and ask questions later." They thought that nuclear weapons had crushed Japan (as if constant defeats for three years had contributed nothing). Further, it seemed that if wars could be won through air power and nuclear bombs, any potential aggressor would back off if faced by a resolute America.57 Thus in 1954, General Curtis E. LeMay, commander
of the Strategic Air Command and a hero of the Republican right, set up a plan to leave the USSR "a smoking, radiating ruin at the end of two hours." "I want to make it clear," LeMay told his officers,

that I am not advocating a preventive war; however, I believe that if the United States is pushed in the corner far enough we would not hesitate to strike first.58

Having been led by isolationists and tarred as appeasers, the right had no taste for further appeasement, and was eager to find cases in which its opponents were the real appeasers. In 1940, Henry Wallace made the claim that "Every Republican is not an appeaser, but you can be sure that every Nazi, every Hitlerite, and every appeaser is a Republican."59 Harold Ickes, Roosevelt's Secretary of the Interior, echoed this charge. "The Republican Party in 1940," he said, "contains the equivalent of England's and France's pro-Nazi appeasers of 1938 -- the men with the black umbrellas."60 This charge was all the more unfair in light of Roosevelt's own weakness during the Munich crisis. Yet Roosevelt, far from trying to halt these attacks, agreed with them, claiming privately that

You can't say that everyone who is opposed to Roosevelt is pro-Nazi, but you can say with truth that everyone who is pro-Hitler in the country is also pro-Willkie.61
When Truman likened the postwar moves of the Soviets to Nazi aggression and then proclaimed his intention to avoid a global war, Republican conservatives felt they had a clear case of Democratic appeasement of an enemy more formidable than the Nazis. When many of the urban Republican internationalists who had denounced their fellow Republicans before the war as appeasers supported Truman's foreign policies, the Republican unilateralists felt betrayed.62

Thus the two wings of the Republican party had great areas of difference in their views toward aliens, whether inside or outside a firm foreign policy and war. Both favored American preeminence and American toughness. Both felt that an America that commanded respect was safer than one that did not. Neither had any tolerance for weakness in foreign policy, especially weakness toward communists in a Democratic administration. In opposition to the Democrats, the two wings could get by with attacks that suggested no specific alternatives.63 That is to say that when on the offensive, foreign policy reinforced Republican unity, and disagreements could be avoided through vagueness. To have offered specific alternatives other than appeals to strength and loyalty would have risked intensifying the party split and losing voters who disliked specific policies. As the opposition party, the Republicans found foreign policy their only safe issue.
But when they took over the government in 1953, the Republican would have to come up with policies of some kind, rather than criticize the policies of another party. The 1952 election gave the executive branch to the urban Republicans because urban voting strength had won them control of the presidential nomination, and it gave control of Congress to the rural and small-town wing, because the urban Republicans controlled far fewer seats than either the rural wing or the Democrats. This institutional division between the president and Congress, overlaid with the urban-rural Republican split, would doom the party to a rift over foreign policy in which Eisenhower was opposed by his own party in Congress. In their long years in political exile, the Republicans found that foreign policy was the only issue that might unite them and get them additional votes. It is not clear in retrospect that this strategy actually worked, but it is clear that most Republicans believed that it would. What the GOP did not know until its return to power was that foreign policy could divide any party that had to implement it. This division destroyed their unity in victory and kept McCarthyism from disappearing after 1952.
NOTES — CHAPTER TWO


2. Patterson, Mr. Republican, p. 491; Sundquist, Dynamics op. 311-314; Burnham, Critical Elections, p. 68.


7. Murray Edelman explains a symbolic use of language thus: "The words a group employs and on which it relies to evoke a response can often be taken as an index of group norms and conceptual frameworks.... Signs evoke an intense response only for those already taking the roles that make them sensitive to the clues that are given off." *Symbolic Uses of Politics*, chap. 6, esp. pp. 121-123.

8. Ibid., pp. 125, 130-131, 149-150. Cf Miles *Odyssey*, "The Hiss case was an historical indictment of New Deal Democracy." (p. 128; emphasis in original.)


12. John Foster Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness" in Life (May 19, 1952), p. 146; Gerald P. Nye, "War Propa-


15. Miles, Odyssey, p. 43.


18. See the discussion of "the American Century" in Miles, Odyssey, pp. 63-65.


20. According to Rieselbach, 81.9% of the Republican representatives in the 76th Congress (1939-1941) voted together as isolationists. Roots of Isolationism, p. 49.


Sept. 4, 1937, p. 60; Commercial and Financial Chronicle 145:1317, 1329-1330. Also see Miles, Odyssey, p. 118.


27. Taft speech in Congressional Record, March 2, 1940, Appendix p. 1218.

28. Lubell, Future, p. 58; Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 27, 75-79.


31. Letter to Irving Glasband, November 18, 1941, Arthur H. Vandenberg Collection, Michigan Historical Collections, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.
32. Diary entry, December 11, 1941, Vandenberg Collection.


35. Diary entry, April 29, 1946, Vandenberg Collection.


37. Robert Griffith, "Old Progressives and the Cold War", JAH 66:335-338; Ronald L. Feinman, Twilight of Progressivism: The Western Republican Senators and


41. Drummond, Passing, pp. 209-212.


44. Drummond, Passing, p. 181; Cole, America First, pp.70-74.

45. John Robert Moore, "The Conservative Coalition in the United States Senate, 1942-1945", Journal of Southern History 33:368-376; Ralph H. Smuckler, "The Region of Isolationism", APSR, 47:401; Sundquist, Dynamics, pp. 245-246, 256-257; Congressional Directories (dated June 1933, January 1935, January 1937, January 1939 and January 1941; these correspond to the maps drawn in Smuckler's article for the same period, and allow parallel examination of which districts were held by Republicans and which were held by isolationists.) Also see Joyner, Dilemma, p. 46; Mayer, "Republican Party", p. 2280.


47. Letter to John H. Bell, Jr., February 26, 1951, Vandenberg Collection.

48. Address to the Executives Club of Chicago, December 19, 1941, Taft Papers; ibid., "Summary of Remarks of Senator A. Taft on 'Wake Up, America' Program July 5, 1942"; Patterson, Mr. Republican, p. 608;
Taft, Foreign Policy for Americans. Also see Divine, 1952-1960, pp. 9-30.

49. Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 438-439; Miles, Odyssey, pp. 72-79, 149-151; Alexander, Holding the Line, pp. 4-5; Darilek, Loyal Opposition, p. 66.


53. Quoted in Patterson, *Mr. Republican*, p. 295.

54. Theoharis, *Seeds*, p. 53. Also see Vandenberg, *Papers*, p. 381; Truman, *Memoirs Years of Trial and Hope* (New York: Signet, 1965), pp. 138-139, 142-144. Initially, Truman felt that "without Russia there would not be a world organization." Truman, *Year of Decision*, p. 87. But after talking with Stettinius, Harriman, Forrestal, Stimson, Marshal, and King, Truman told Molotov that the U.S. was determined to proceed with setting up the U.N. "no matter what difficulties or differences might arise with regard to other matters." Ibid., pp. 93-97; Vandenberg, *Papers*, p. 176; 344-345.

Plan precisely because it was unilateral. (pp. 277-2778). See also idem., vol. 95, part 7, 81st Congress, 1st Session, pp. 9769-9770, 9775, 9803, 9826; idem., vol. 95, part 8, pp. 9880-9884, 9886-9889.


60. Ibid., p. 49.

CHAPTER THREE: TERRA INCOGNITA, 1945-1948

From the end of 1945 through the elections of 1948, the Republicans found themselves in unfamiliar political terrain, in which defeat was no longer certain, but the way to victory remained unclear. The Depression was over, and wartime spending had brought back prosperity and high rates of employment. If the economy remained healthy, Republicans reasoned, people would feel no need for the Democrats to whom the nation had turned only in desperation. And if the economy faltered again, the blame could attach only to the Democrats, who had preached the doctrine that the party in power was responsible for the economy. The claim that the Republicans were heartless would no longer matter now that charity was a dead issue; the Democrats feared a postwar depression, but the issue of the Great Depression seemed a mere memory.

Furthermore, World War II was finally over. The war had been, as far as most Republicans believed, a windfall for the Democrats. The Republicans had taken much of the blame for the war because of the party's earlier isolationism. Besides, the war had made support for the governing Democrats seem patriotic. Labor used the war to trade long hours and heightened production quotas for recognition of unions and increased federal protection. New Deal social programs were sold in Congress as necessary war measures
for the home front. Republicans, who tended to see themselves as the only "real" Americans, found themselves suspected of disloyalty while left-wing labor organizers, Catholics, Jews, and even blacks were welcomed into the political process. The war had been bad for the GOP and now it was over. A younger generation of Republicans, some of whom had been legitimized by serving in the war, had already begun replacing the isolationist liabilities of the previous decade.¹

What made the Republicans most optimistic was that Franklin Roosevelt was dead, replace by a complete nonentity named Harry Truman. Roosevelt had been a consummate practitioner of his art. All decisions had ended up in his hands, and he had made them or refused to make them as suited his needs. Republicans believed that Roosevelt had bribed the public to vote for him by taxing the well-to-do; the people had loved Roosevelt. Truman had been bequeathed a majority party that was breaking apart. The New Deal coalition was now falling into disarray, its survival dependent on giving rewards to its constituent groups at a time when it was no longer possible to benefit some Democratic groups without injuring others. The internal contradictions of the New Deal had begun to unravel it.²

Southern Democrats had reduced support for New Deal measures after the 1938 election, when Roosevelt failed in
his attempts to purge southern Democrats whose reforming zeal was inadequate. As prosperity had returned, many Roosevelt supporters had felt less need for the New Deal. In the farm states, the GOP had resumed much of its pre-war, pre-Depression supremacy. Many ethnic and working-class voters had a greater feeling of security and felt less urgency about those who were still in need.³

There was also a growing feeling in the electorate that enough was enough. People wanted the men released from the armed forces, and they wanted wartime taxes and other economic measures ended. Unions wanted the right to strike for better conditions and an end to wage controls. The level of government intervention in the economic and social life of the nation was beginning to get wearisome. Yet the Democrats were slow to give up the powers they had taken during a decade of crises. The party that would strip the New Dealers of powers they wished unwisely to retain could be popular at the polls.⁴

One other set of problems undercut the unity of the Democratic coalition. The settlement of the Second World War was beginning to look like a failure. People had learned in the late 1930s and early 1940s that peace would not come unaided. Support for an international organization to prevent further wars was very high. Yet many voters were convinced that the latest war, which had been fought to secure world peace, had left great unresolved
problems that might cause another war. The Cold War had already begun, although most people only knew that the hoped-for period of international friendship had not come about. The Republicans believed that if the president could take credit for whatever went right in the world, he could also be made to take responsibility for much of what went wrong.\textsuperscript{5}

Even with the Congress Truman had inherited, in which Democrats held the House by 242 to 190 and the Senate by fifty-six to thirty-eight, he had few successes. The conservative coalition of Republicans and southern Democrats in Congress was in its eight year in 1946. During that summer, when Republicans and Democratic defectors whittled down the system of price controls to what Truman considered a dangerous level, he vetoed their bill, leaving the nation unprotected. Prices shot up six per cent in a month, then climbed another nine per cent before the fall election.\textsuperscript{6} Truman also insisted on extending the powers granted to the presidency in wartime, claiming as late as July 25, 1947 "that the emergencies declared by President Roosevelt on September 8, 1939 and May 27, 1941, and the state of war continued to exist." His threat to draft striking railroad workers was so far removed from reality and so clearly unconstitutional that it prompted Senator Taft in effect to champion the rights of labor, leading the
opposition to the enabling legislation and defeating it in the Senate. Thus in disarray, the Democratic party asked for renewal of its mandate in the fall of 1946.

Although there seemed by 1946 to be no more obstacles to a Republican comeback, it was still not clear how the party should proceed. The political situation in the United States after World War II was unknown territory. The nation had been forever changed by the two epic ordeals it had gone through -- the Depression and the War. The security of the pre-Depression days -- the slower pace, the decentralization, and the lack of big government, large unions, and major corporations -- would not return.

With the Depression gone, the GOP could denounce government intervention in domestic economy without appearing to oppose economic recovery. In the 1930s, the Republicans had been split, with one camp seeming to oppose any effort to salvage the nation's economy, and the other seemingly composed of poor copies of the Democrats. Yet the Republicans were still split after the war over the correct amount of government intervention. Urban moderates, allied to the major corporations, favored the considered degree of intervention which benefitted them. Rural and small town conservatives supported little government activity beyond police protection of private property.

Likewise, foreign policy issues would not die. Isolationism had been sunk at Pearl Harbor. Most isolationist
Republicans had died or failed re-election, replaced by either Democrats or Republicans who were not isolationists. As America's Soviet ally had evolved into an opponent, conservative Republicans, who had been most prone to isolationism, began to favor tough diplomacy or even war against communists. When the right had been dominated by isolationists, it had been simple to combine opposition to foreign involvement with opposition to government spending. For the first few years after the war, conservatives tried to combine opposition to communism with opposition to spending, but came away confused. Even intelligent conservatives like Robert Taft had real difficulty supporting government spending, whether for domestic welfare programs or for national defense. Taft's speeches left the impression that he might have opposed outlays for even military spending in time of invasion, because he so believed that government spending would ruin the country. Republican conservatives took several years to realize that merely hoping to deter the advance of communism with security investigations and no expenditures was not a politically credible position.

To the 1946 Republican slogan of "Had Enough?", the nation answered "Yes!" The Republicans had played a cautious game, echoing Senator Vandenberg's analysis that "in the excellent position we occupy, our greatest anxiety is simply not to make any last-minute mistakes." Most
Republican candidates left foreign policy alone. They lacked a clear vision of the postwar world, and could not have ducked the party's isolationist past. Any position the party might take would cause internal bickering and would help unite the badly split Democrats. Rather than offer solutions, those few Republicans who mentioned foreign policy limited themselves to taking such potshots as Taft's remark that Truman sought a Congress "dominated by a policy of appeasing the Russians abroad and fostering Communism at home."^1^1

Indeed, Truman had enough trouble merely dealing with domestic policy. Price controls had brought black marketeering, yet the Democrats has clung to controls until drastic meat shortages had forced Truman to abandon them in October. Both the threat of strikes and Truman's vacillation alienated voters. Support from Catholics had begun to wane due to Soviet occupation of Catholic eastern Europe and the perceived role of communists in American unions. The Democrats' major problem was that they had governed too long, becoming arrogant in their securuty and rooted in their accretion of power. They were accustomed to leadership by a president who could and would do all the work and make all the decisions.^1^2

There was no such president in 1946. Truman was as aware of his inadequacy to replace Roosevelt as everybody else was. He did not campaign for any Democratic
congressional candidates in 1946, and it is reasonable to infer that he had been asked to stay out. The chairman of the Democratic party, Robert Hannegan, would not let Truman address the nation by radio on the eve of the election on behalf of the party, instead playing recordings of FDR. The Democrats lost fifty-five House seats and thirteen Senate seats, thus forfeiting control of both houses for the first time since 1932. The losses were mostly in urban areas, scattered across every region but the South. Within a week, Democratic Senator J.W. Fulbright of Arkansas suggested that Truman appoint a Republican as Secretary of State and then resign. The new 80th Congress took a similar tack, passing a new bill within six months that shifted presidential succession after the vice president to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate instead of cabinet officers. Specifically, this meant that if Truman were removed from office before the 1948 election, he would be succeeded by one of two Republicans, Speaker Joseph W. Martin or Senator Arthur Vandenberg, rather than Secretary of State George C. Marshall.

Truman's problems with the 80th Congress have been well detailed elsewhere. Thanks to Vandenberg and the fear of Soviet communism, he got most of what he wanted in foreign policy. Vandenberg, in fact, had advised Truman to "scare the hell out of the country" about Soviet aims,
advice Truman accepted whole-heartedly. The Congress which Truman later characterized as "do-nothing" adopted and funded the Truman Doctrine of aid to Greece and Turkey, passed the Marshall Plan for European economic recovery, enacted the unification of the armed forces under a single Department of Defense, and created the Central Intelligence Agency. It also loaned the United Nations sixty-five million dollars to build its headquarters, ratified the Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance, and passed the Vandenberg Resolution promoting collective and regional mutual assistance agreements. It even enacted a peacetime draft law. Its record on foreign policy might be criticized, but only by critics of Truman's Cold War policies.19

But on domestic policy, Congress did not support Truman. It passed a tax reduction bill favorable to Republican interests and excluded newsboys from Social Security coverage, both over Truman's veto. The major blow was the passage -- agains over a veto -- of the Taft-Hartley Labor-Management Relations Act on June 23, 1947. The bill was denounced by labor unions as a "slave-labor" bill, but Truman made no objection to the violation of civil liberties implied by the clause requiring labor leaders to sign anticommunist affidavits. Truman's opposition to the bill would help him win labor support in 1948. Other acts of the 80th Congress which Truman criticized included the
Hope-Aiken flexible price support bill, the 22nd Amendment limiting presidential terms, and the extension of rent controls.20

The 80th Congress was not progressive, but because half of its twin Republican majorities were moderates, it did not seek to uproot the New Deal from American government. Many of its efforts were aimed simply at hampering the administration rather than at confronting it head on. It spurned Truman's request for a three-year renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, but passed a one-year extension in limited form. It adopted a bill diluting antitrust restrictions on railroads despite Truman's veto, and it overrode another veto to bar 750,000 workers from public assistance which it authorized. It did nothing about Truman's requests to increase the minimum wage or enact civil rights legislation. Even Taft tried to promote bills favoring public housing and federal aid to education, which the Republican Senate passed and the Republican House killed.21

Congressional investigations proved to be the greatest tool available to the Republican Congress for the harassment of the executive. The Senate Appropriations Committee looked into charges that insiders made four million dollars on the commodity market by using inside information. This raised the question of corruption that was to dog Truman throughout his presidency. On the House side, the
Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) captured the headlines in 1948 by airing the testimony of former Communist Party members Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley, who testified that various important administration officials had been party members during the Depression and World War II, and had participated in espionage. This issue had no apparent effect on the 1948 election, but it was a sleeper that would awaken by 1950.\textsuperscript{22}
Those who criticize Truman's legislative record in the 80th Congress assume that the president's objective in dealing with Congress must be to enact legislation. Although Truman would have been pleased had the 80th Congress been more forthcoming in this way, this was not his goal in presenting his legislative program. Rather, Truman followed the advice of Clark Clifford to use the 80th Congress as a foil in preparing for the 1948 election. Instead of coming up with proposals on which Democrats and Republicans might compromise, Truman aimed his proposals at segments of the public. Unions, minorities, liberals, and cold warriors were not promised reasonable goals, but everything they wanted. Not only did demanding utopia put the Republican Congress in the position of perpetual naysayer, it also made Truman appear to be the best hope of the affected groups. The implication was that if Truman could not deliver with a GOP Congress, it made sense to re-elect him with Democratic majorities. Nobody but Truman thought there was any chance of this happening.  

Although the Republicans had suffered a terrible decline between 1930 and 1936, they had been making a steady comeback since. The steadiness of the GOP recovery...
was obscured by the variations between presidential and off-year elections. There were millions of American voters who turned out only for presidential contests, although they did generally vote for other offices at these times. In the years of the Democratic majority, these voters tended to be much more pro-Democratic than those voters who turned out for most elections. The Democrats always fared better when Roosevelt was on the ballot, and the Republicans always cut into the Democratic majority when there was no presidential election.
Figures 1 and 2, showing the rise and fall of Republicans in each house of Congress for elections from 1936 through 1948, thus present two jagged lines:

The unevenness is due to the fact that two very different electorates voted in alternating elections -- one in presidential years, the other in off-years. To see clearly the steady progress made by the Republicans after 1936, one must examine those two electorates one at a time.
The figures below show the number of Republicans in the House; figure 3 shows those elected in presidential elections, and figure 4 depicts those elected in off-year contests.

Without the distracting jaggedness caused by putting the presidential and off-year contests together, it becomes clear that Republican victories were increasing steadily in both presidential and off-year elections to the House of Representatives. In both charts the curves are similar and steady through 1946, then they dip in 1948.
Figures 5 and 6 show the same trends in the Senate: figure 5 has the number of GOP seats resulting from presidential elections, and figure 6 shows those won in off-year elections. (It must be remembered that only a third of the seats in the Senate are up for election in any year.)

Thus it becomes clear that, although the fact was obscured by the see-saw effect of alternating presidential and off-year elections, which appeared to virtually wipe out each
off-year GOP gain, after the New Deal crested in 1936 the Republicans steadily increased their share of the vote in both houses of Congress.

The same curve is suggested by the percentage of the presidential vote received by Republican candidates in the same period, although this curve is less dramatic.

The same tendency appeared in both houses of Congress and in the presidential races: the GOP was increasing its share of the vote over time, approaching a majority. Actually, it was more accurate to say that the Democrats were losing strength over time. The switch was not so much to the Republicans as away from the Democrats, because the GOP did not win a presidential majority until Eisenhower's candidacy mobilized millions of new Republican voters in 1952.25
But to Republican eyes, given their belief that the nation was rightfully theirs, it appeared that the people were coming to their senses after a long national debauch, and returning to the GOP. Many Republicans understood the election of the 80th Congress as a mandate to undo the New Deal, and they likewise believed beyond doubt that the 1948 election would put the executive branch back in the hands of its rightful owners. The figures showed them that their return to rule had been halted every time Roosevelt's name had appeared on the ballot, but now that name would be gone, and the Democratic party was hopelessly divided.

In 1948, as in 1940 and 1944, Republican candidates fell into two types, conservatives who wanted to shake the tree, and moderates who were content to wait until the fruit fell at their feet. Foremost among the proponents of a vigorous assault on the New Deal and the Fair Deal was Robert Taft, although there were other conservatives who thought Taft lackluster and hoped to "draft" a willing General MacArthur. The moderates were led by Governor Thomas Dewey, who had polled an impressive 45.89% of the vote against FDR in 1944. Other moderate hopefuls were Senator Arthur Vandenberg, whose strategy was to await a convention deadlock rather than campaign, and the eager young Harold Stassen. At the GOP Convention, Dewey led Taft, Stassen, and a pack of long shots on the first two ballots, winning on the third. Many conservative delegates
voted for Dewey because they wanted to play it safe when victory was so likely, by nominating a candidate who would not remind voters that they distrusted the GOP. But what won him the nomination was that the populous states with the votes were represented by moderates who could not imagine a conservative standard-bearer winning or helping their state tickets. They thought Dewey was the safest bet both for the presidency and for the other GOP candidates across the country. Since the conservatives believed their individual prospects were very good, they did not bolt.26

Harry Truman was luckier, although it did not appear so at the time. The left wing of the Democratic party, fed up with Truman's foreign policy and red-baiting, showed a great deal of interest in Henry Wallace's third party effort, the Progressive Citizens of America. Likewise, southern Democrats had tired of interference with their treatment of blacks; when the Democratic Convention rejected Truman's mild civil rights plank in favor of a more aggressive one offered by Hubert Humphrey and the Americans for Democratic Action, the delegates from Mississippi and Alabama walked out. Shortly afterwards, a group of southern Democrats calling themselves the States' Rights Democrats, but always thereafter known as the Dixicrats, nominated South Carolina Governor Strom Thurmond as their candidate. To all appearances the Democratic party had had lost both the southern vote and the leftist/labor
vote, both of which had been crucial to FDR's last slim victory.  

In reality, neither group was lost. At the congressional level, neither the Progressives nor the Dixiecrats posed any threat to the Democrats because they ran no congressional candidates. The congressional races would follow the pattern they usually did in a presidential year, favoring the Democrats. Republican congressional candidates had both the presidential electorate and the majority's preference for the Democrats against them, but they expected to improve on their 1946 base. When the votes were counted, they suffered badly.

In the presidential contest, there was no doubt that Truman was doomed. What saved him was his "failure" with the 80th Congress. First, the brilliant ploy of calling the 80th Congress into a post-convention session to enact Truman's proposals showed the discrepancy between what Dewey promised to deliver and what he might be able to get from a Republican Congress. Dewey, totally absorbed in his own race, was furious at being embarrassed by congressional Republicans. These same Republicans, most of whom were up for re-election, were equally indignant that Dewey chose not to defend their actions.

The campaign itself was a four-candidate contest, but only a one-man fight. Thurmond remained a purely regional contender. Wallace, having denounced the Republicans in
1940 and 1944 as Nazi sympathizers, now cut himself off further from American politics by referring to Truman's "Hitlerite" methods. Truman made a whistlestop campaign of 31,000 miles, in which he largely ignored Dewey and attacked the Republican-dominated 80th Congress, warning of calamity should such a Congress return with a president of its own. In effect, he dared Dewey -- over and over again -- to defend the congressional record of his party.  

Dewey did not deal with Truman's charges. To defend the 80th Congress was to run on its record as a conservative Republican. This would deny Dewey any hope of winning over disgruntled Democrats and independents, and it would jeopardize the candidacies of many moderate Republicans. To accept Truman's criticisms in any degree would be to anger the conservatives, whose support he would need both as a candidate and as president. When Truman called Congress into special session and urged the adoption of the GOP platform, Taft concluded that Congress must neither give Truman what he asked -- for which Truman would take credit -- nor simply adjourn immediately. Dewey said nothing publicly, but sent envoys to Taft to ask for passage of the Displaced Persons Act, crucial to winning various ethnic group votes. Taft refused, got minor credit legislation approved, and got Congress to adjourn after two weeks.
Frustrated, Dewey turned to foreign policy. On June 25, he blamed Truman for inadequate aid to Chiang Kai-shek. Eight days later he tried to distinguish between those aspects of foreign policy in which the GOP had been allowed to participate (such as the UN and the Marshall Plan) and those on which bipartisan foreign policy had been precluded by Truman (such as China, Palestine, and Potsdam.) Senator Vandenberg quickly fired off a letter to John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State presumptive of the Dewey administration, urging him to remind Dewey "that the next Republican Secretary of State is going to need Democratic votes in the Senate just as badly as the present Administration has needed Republican votes. I have no illusions that the Republican isolationists have surrendered. They will be "back at the old stand" next January.

It is particularly our job - yours and mine - to see that bipartisan liaison in the next Congress does not become impossible. Otherwise November will represent a pyrrhic victory.

Roosevelt had arranged for Dewey to be briefed on foreign policy in 1944, and now Truman arranged it again. Dewey was again co-opted, coming out in support of Truman's handling of the Berlin blockade. Dulles, who was busily planning his post-election policies to defuse tensions with the USSR, advised Dewey not to speak out on Palestine, and kept him from making further statements about Berlin. Although the polls had shown the public opinion favored
the GOP to handle foreign policy, fear of reviving the party's internal differences kept Dewey from using foreign policy in the campaign.34

A month before the election, Vandenberg delivered a nationwide speech on bipartisan foreign policy, aimed at dispelling the isolationist label. He deliberately emphasized the similarities of the parties on such issues and minimized the differences. Truman was so pleased that he invited Vandenberg to the White House for a private chat and told him how much he appreciated the speech's tone. Uneasy afterwards, Vandenberg commented to his wife, "If that isn't a strange reaction to a campaign speech, I never heard one. It almost makes me wonder whether it did the GOP and good."35

 Apparently it did not help the party. Dewey went out of his way to avoid specific attacks on Truman or aggressive defenses of the GOP. Vandenberg had sent material to Dulles to back his claim that the 80th Congress was the best ever, at least on foreign policy. Dewey took his defense of his party in Congress no farther than asserting that it was "one of the best." Instead, he made frequent appeals for "national unity", hoping, at least, for party unity. Dewey was careful to give nobody a reason to desert the GOP, but he also failed to provide a reason to rally to it.36
Perhaps more important to Truman's narrow victory was how his strategy of no-compromise healed the split in Democratic ranks. On Truman's left was Henry Wallace, with little chance of being elected. Very little separated the two on domestic policy.\textsuperscript{37} Regardless of whose fault the Cold War was from 1944 to 1947, it now looked to most liberals as if Russia were no longer innocent of responsibility. With the coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade, both of which took place in 1948, Stalin had ceased to be "Uncle Joe." Wallace was foolish enough to accept publicly the Soviet explanation that Jan Masaryk had jumped out of a window to his death because he was despondent over his illness, when even the most generous of liberals suspected that either the despondency had resulted from the communist takeover, or that Masaryk was murdered. Most liberals felt that the lesson of Munich was inescapable, but Wallace's response to the Berlin blockade was to argue that the United States "can't lose anything by giving [Berlin] up in the search for peace." With Wallace's campaign hopeless and Truman offering most of the same pledges on domestic issues, many liberals stayed with the Democrats. Truman's support for Israel also undercut Wallace's use of that issue with Jewish voters, and the adoption into the platform of the ADA civil rights plank virtually destroyed Wallace's appeal in Harlem. The liberal split remained serious, but it was not fatal.\textsuperscript{38}
The defections from the Democrats in the South were few, costing only thirty-nine electoral votes out of 351. Most local Democrats stuck with the party, and some even endorsed Truman. Only in the deep southern states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and South Carolina did the state Democratic parties keep their pledge to list Thurmond rather than Truman on the ballot as the official Democratic nominee. Those four were the only states Thurmond won. He was never a serious presidential candidate, appearing on the ballot in only seventeen states with 180 electoral votes, fewer than two-thirds of what he needed to win. He could not have approached even that number. His candidacy was a protest that briefly threatened to deny the Democrats the votes they needed to win the election, but a vote for Thurmond was not a vote for the next president. This kept career politicians from jeopardizing their own positions by supporting Thurmond to the detriment of their own party. 39

Without the encouragement of most southern Democratic politicians, southern voters were generally disinclined to waste their votes on Strom Thurmond. It was argued that the Republicans had been pushing a civil rights package like the ADA's for some time, and that they meant it. Truman had had this plank forced on him, and there was no reason to believe he would honor it, especially as he ignored the issue of civil rights except once, in Harlem...
late October, when it was too late to cause much trouble in the South. He managed to get the credit for civil rights advocacy from those who favored it without getting the blame from most of those who opposed it. It was a neat trick.

If the dual schism in the Democratic party was of little importance for what it subtracted from Truman's vote, it counted greatly for what it added. Disaffected moderate and conservative Democrats who had been furious in 1946 with what they perceived as the leftist sympathies of the Democratic administration did not doubt, after Truman's moves to counter the Soviets and his ferocious red-baiting of the Wallace effort, that he would crack down on communism. This was especially important among Catholic voters, but it cannot have been ignored in the South either, at a time when the Dixiecrats were trying to portray the administration as pro-communist. On the other hand, to both blacks and left liberals, the apparent exodus of the southern Democrats over the party's civil rights stand could only be seen as the harbinger of a revitalized liberal party no longer dependent on the votes of the racist South. Both the Wallace and the Thurmond campaigns were made up of local political leaders with extremist, narrowly-supported bases. They represented greater numbers in their own hopes, and in the fears of others, than they did on election day. In damming Truman
they had too little strength to hurt him, but their opposition certified him as "OK" to large numbers of other voters. With enemies like these, Truman found just enough friends to win the election.42

Explanations for the 1948 presidential election abound. Dewey said afterward that Republicans became "overconfident" and did not vote very heavily. Truman gave credit to labor, presumably for not supporting Wallace.43 In fact, Wallace took little away from Truman. Rather, he appears to have mobilized people who did not normally vote for any major party. In the seven states in which Wallace got two per cent or more and Truman's share of the total vote declined from Roosevelt's in 1944, Truman's decline in actual votes was significantly lower than Wallace's vote except in Michigan. In two states (California and North Dakota), Truman's slippage was only half of Wallace's total. In another two states (Oregon and Washington), Truman's loss was about a third of Wallace's tally. In Wisconsin it was twelve per cent, in Idaho under one per cent of Wallace's vote. Thus in six of the seven states in which Wallace got two per cent or more and the Democratic total declined, most of Wallace's votes apparently came from sources other than the Democrats. The left wing of the New Deal coalition proved very slender. And in Michigan, where Wallace got less than half of Truman's decline, it was not Wallace who gave the state to
Dewey. Truman got 103,451 fewer Michigan votes than Roosevelt in 1944. Even if all 46,515 Wallace votes came from 1944 FDR supporters, Truman still lost another 56,936 1944 FDR votes. Dewey carried Michigan in 1948 by only 35,147 votes. The split between Truman and Wallace may have discouraged a significant number of Michigan Democrats from voting in 1948, but Wallace's campaign did not win enough votes away from Truman to cost him the state.  

The generally accepted explanation for the result in 1948 is that a switch in the farm vote, caused by rising prices and fear of another depression under a Republican Congress, awarded the victory to Truman. But the existence by 1948 of a well-established Republican split suggests another explanation: conservative Republicans, seeing little difference between Truman and the "me-too" candidate Dewey, abstained from voting for any presidential candidate in sufficient numbers to give Truman the victory by default. This was what conservative Republicans thought had happened. Taft not only believed that he could have won with congressional majorities, he told friends. "I am absolutely certain that Dewey could have won if he had put up any kind of fight at all and dealt with the issues before the people." The Louisville Courier-Journal characterized Dewey's positions as "Agriculture is important. Our rivers are full of fish. You cannot have freedom without liberty. The future lies ahead." Dewey
avoided taking positions on issues both because it was his nature to do so and because he hoped to avoid alienating any potential voters. Any position he might have taken would probably have cost him more conservative Republican votes than he ultimately lost by being uninspiring. The party was divided, and Dewey was part of its leftmost wing. Ten million votes were cast for president in 1948, and some 683,000 people -- nearly seven per cent -- voted for local offices without voting for any presidential candidate. Usually there are more who vote for president but not for lesser offices. More damaging to the Republican party were those Republicans who did not bother to vote at all.48

Evidence derived from the 1948 vote itself confirms that there was a serious decline in the voting of conservative Republicans. They did not, for the most part, switch to Truman. Many of them cast no vote for president or no vote at all. An analysis of the performance of Republican voters in the 1948 election would be easier if modern "exit polls" had been taken as voters left their polling places. No such polls exist, nor would they show those Republicans who did not vote at all. But evidence of a systematic fall-off among conservative Republicans can be obtained by comparing Dewey's performance against Roosevelt in 1944 and against Truman in 1948. In 1944 the New Deal's popularity was declining. Wartime dislocation was at its peak, and was much worse for the Democrats than
for the GOP. Republicans and southern Democrats defended successfully against FDR's effort to make voting easy for servicepeople. Both parties expected the soldier vote to be heavily Democratic, and only half of the nine million men and women in uniform actually got to vote. Likewise, large numbers of factory workers shifted location and were kept from voting by state laws that required as much as two years residence. Although there were Republicans among both dislocated groups, it was clear that the Democrats lost far more votes of this kind.

But if wartime dislocation improved Republican percentages, it could not increase the actual number of Republican votes cast. Dewey got a third of a million fewer votes in 1944 than Willkie received in 1940 (FDR lost over a million and a half votes.) Still, in 1944, Roosevelt was the issue. Republicans did not have to be enthusiastic about Dewey to vote eagerly against Roosevelt. Any GOP nominee against FDR would have maximized the regular Republican vote.

This situation in 1948 was very different. Truman elicited disgust from Republicans, but not the visceral hatred most of them felt for Roosevelt. To urban Republicans, Truman was a small-town political hack, very different from the urbane Dewey. These moderates saw such striking differences between the two that they could not imagine anybody failing to agree with them. But by 1948
the rural GOP knew Dewey as an urban Republican. His positions were much closer to Truman's than to theirs, and his urbanity made him more alien to many rural Republicans than Truman was. Faced with a choice, as they saw it, between a moderate Democrat who was a midwestern urban hack and a moderate Republican who was an urban quasi-New Dealer, many Republicans could not tell which was worse. Many did not resolve the issue to vote for either one.

The conservative wing of the GOP, based in rural and small-town America outside the South, had its real strength in the midwest (although Missouri was more likely to act as a border state than like other midwestern states, and Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois, the most industrialized of the midwestern states, sometimes acted a bit like eastern urban states). Conservative Republicans also had strength in upstate New York, although statewide contests were usually controlled by either moderate Republicans or Democrats, and in the most sparsely-populated New England states, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine. In thirteen of these sixteen states, and in seven other states bordering on them, the Republican candidate got fewer votes in 1948 than he did in 1944. The moderate strategy was to add to the Republican base the votes of disaffected Democrats who would support a moderate Republican over Truman. Dewey did not, in fact, attract many additional
votes, and he did not keep the base of Republican
regulars intact either.51

It cannot be absolutely proved that significant
numbers of rural and small-town Republican voters ab­
stained from voting for president, but alternative ex­
planations make little sense. If the conservative Repub­
licans did defect to Truman, what happened to the Democrats
from 1944? One cannot suggest a significant defection of
mid-western Republicans to Truman without explaining why
huge numbers of Democrats abstained, keeping the Truman
totals relatively low. Except in the South, Democratic
defectors did not go to Thurmond. And only in New York
did more than five per cent of the vote go to Henry
Wallace, although that option appeared on the ballots of
forty-five states. Demographic changes will partially
explain why the total vote for both parties increased in
the Southwest, but they fail to explain the consistant
pattern of decline in Republican voting solely in states
where the Republicans were predominantly conservative.
In 1948, Dewey got more votes than in 1944 in twenty-five states, shown in Figure 8 in white. But in the twenty-three states shown shaded, Dewey's actual vote declined. Those states included every midwestern state except Illinois, as well as conservative Maine and mixed New York.
Dewey actually carried sixteen states, indicated on Figure 9, with 189 electoral votes, ninety-three more than he won in 1944. He added Oregon, Michigan, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, and New Hampshire, mostly urban states, to what he had won in 1944.
Yet Dewey lost five states in 1948 that he had carried in 1944: Wyoming, Colorado, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Ohio, all western or midwestern states in which the conservative Republicans were stronger than GOP moderates. As Figure 10 shows, there were seventeen states in which Dewey gained (white), but got no majority (no slanted lines). Of the twenty-three states in which Dewey's vote
declined (shaded), seven were so Republican that he carried them anyway (slanted lines).

Dewey's declines by themselves do not indicate whether the missing Republicans in conservative regions stayed home or voted for another candidate. It seems unlikely that conservative Republicans preferred Henry Wallace over other alternatives, but some of the southern Republicans may have chosen Thurmond. Others, particularly in the midwest, may have voted for Truman either because he seemed more like them or because they preferred his farm policies. But it was in the midwest, upstate New York, and New England that the Republicans who least accepted the New Deal predominated, and it would be surprising if many of these ideologically-attuned Republicans shunned the moderate Dewey for the less-moderate Truman. A comparison of the Republican and Democratic votes at state and lower levels demonstrates that most conservative Republicans could not have shifted to Truman, and therefore must not have voted for president.
In five midwestern states (North Dakota, Nebraska, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Ohio), the number of actual voters for both parties declined. Because the Democrats got fewer votes than in 1944, it is clear that the lost Republicans in these five states did not switch parties. They simply did not vote for president.
In two other midwestern states, Iowa and Indiana, there were major Republican declines and much smaller Democratic gains. Even if all the Democratic gain came from disaffected Republicans, again most missing Republicans did not vote for Truman, but abstained from voting for president.
Figure 13. Recapitulation of states in which most lost Republicans from 1944 clearly did not vote for president in 1948

Thus in the seven midwestern states highlighted above, the missing 1944 Republicans clearly abstained rather than vote for Dewey or Truman.
Figure 14. States with a major Democratic gain and a minor Republican loss

In three midwestern states (South Dakota, Kansas, and Minnesota) and in West Virginia, the Democratic gain in popular votes for president since 1944 was so much greater than the corresponding Republican decline that it is clear that the Democrats mobilized additional voters.
In Minnesota, for example, the Farmer-Labor party and the Democrats merged to make a new state party in 1944; by 1948 the new Democratic-Farmer-Labor party, now free of the radical image of the old Farmer-Labor organization and the suspicion of Catholic domination that had dogged the Democratic party, added 135,683 votes to its 1944 congressional totals. Most of the Minnesota gain turned out to elect Hubert Humphrey to the Senate. He ran 36,528 votes ahead of Truman and 140,866 votes ahead of his party's total for its nine congressional candidates. Presidential candidates usually run ahead of others on the same ticket; if Truman received merely ninety-five per cent of Humphrey's vote, the remaining five per cent being more than Wallace drew in Minnesota, Truman's statewide increase would be accounted for without any GOP crossovers. So even if every vote the GOP lost from 1944 in these four states went to Truman, they could not account for the Democratic increase. But as it is clear that the Democrats in these four states mobilized most of their gains independently of any Republicans switching to Truman, it is quite possible that there was no significant Truman vote in these four states from lost Republicans.
Figure 15. States with a major Democratic gain and a minor GOP loss (from figure 14) shown with states in which most lost Republicans clearly abstained (from Figure 13)

- Decline in vote for both parties (GOP loss not switching to Democrats)
- Major GOP decline, minor Democratic gain (Most GOP loss not switching to Democrats)
- Major Democratic gain, minor GOP loss

The three midwestern states (South Dakota, Kansas, and Minnesota) discussed on the preceding page fit so clearly into a regional pattern of states in which most lost Republicans clearly did not vote for President that it strengthens the conclusion that the Democratic increases in these states did not come out of Republican losses, and that most Republican losses in these three states were due to Republicans not voting for president, as was clearly true in seven other midwestern states.
Thus, in the midwest there were only two states, Missouri and Illinois, in which it is not either clear or strongly likely simply from the statewide votes, that most Republican losses in 1948 came from abstainers. In Missouri fourteen per cent of the state's Republican vote disappeared from 1944 to 1948, with the Democrats gaining about the same number of votes. With Truman as a favorite son, many Missourians who voted for Dewey in 1944 might have switched to Truman in 1948. In Illinois, Wallace was not on the ballot, yet the Democratic nominee got 84,764 fewer votes than in 1944, while Dewey added only 21,789. Truman carried the state. Certainly the Democrat's loss cannot be explained by the Republican's gain. Illinois was already one of the most industrial -- and thus atypical -- states in the midwest. Missouri and Illinois do not appear from statewide figures to fit a midwestern pattern of abstentions among conservative Republicans. A closer examination not only shows that the rural and small-town areas of these states did fit the same pattern, but also clarifies the party split. 54

In Missouri there were only two counties in which Dewey did not lose votes from 1944. He gained ninety-four votes in Boone County (Columbia) and 5,461 votes in suburban Saint Louis County. Truman gained over FDR's 1944 totals in all but six rural and small-town counties, but his gains were substantially smaller than Dewey's losses.
in most of them. Truman made up the difference in a few urban areas, primarily in Saint Louis, Kansas City, and their suburbs. In the absence of any evidence of a great postwar migration to these cities, Dewey's losses, steadily larger than Truman's gains, show that at least half of the Republican loss in each county did not switch to Truman. In twenty-five of the state's 115 counties, Truman's gain was greater than Dewey's decline; these were counties of every population density. Truman mobilized additional voters across the state, and it is reasonable to suggest that fewer than half the Republicans Dewey lost were crossovers. The GOP kept forty-two Missouri counties it won in 1944. The Democrats kept forty-three, and won the remaining thirty away from the GOP. Dewey did not win a single county away from the Democrats. 55

Likewise, in Illinois Dewey's 1948 vote declined in all but eight urban counties. The GOP retained a majority in seventy-seven of the state's 102 counties. Truman kept the seventeen counties that FDR won in 1944, and added only eight others. Yet he carried the state. In Cook County (Chicago), Dewey gained 91,141 votes over his 1944 showing, and Truman lost 58,731 of FDR's votes. Even so, Cook County gave Truman 200,836 more votes than it gave Dewey, and Truman's statewide margin was only 33,612. In the ninety-four counties where the Republican vote declined, Dewey lost 79,977, more than twice Truman's
margin. Unlike Missouri, most of the lost Republicans clearly did not go to Dewey outside the larger cities. Truman lost votes in seventy-one counties, so the missing Republicans did not go to him there. In most of the thirty-one counties in which Truman gained votes, he added far fewer than Dewey lost. Adams County, where Dewey lost 1,235 and Truman gained 1,227 is much less typical than Edgar County, where Dewey lost 679 and Truman gained 23, or Jackson (Dewey - 1,714, Truman +204), or Pope (Dewey - 541, Truman +103), or Wayne (Dewey -699, Truman +51). There were six counties in which Truman added substantially more than Dewey lost, so again there were places where the Democratic gain is explained by mobilization rather than by GOP crossover.56

What made the statewide figures for Missouri and Illinois appear at odds with the 1948 midwestern pattern was what made them atypical most other years. The votes of their major cities (Saint Louis, Kansas City, and Chicago) were large enough to balance the small-town and rural votes of the rest of both states when the urban voters turned out. In the rest of the midwest, rural and small-town voters controlled the states. In 1948, many of these midwestern rural Republicans did not vote for president.

What happened in the midwest also happened in New York and in New England. Both New and Maine showed declines for
both parties: again, the GOP loss did not shift to Truman. The GOP gained in both New Hampshire and Vermont. The party gained half the Democrats' loss in Vermont, and virtually all of it in New Hampshire. Two explanations are consistent with the pattern of Republican fall-off in conservative strongholds. One is simply that Republicans in both states saw enough differences between Truman and Dewey to prefer Dewey, even if they did not prefer him strongly. The second explanation is that while some conservative Republicans may have abstained in disgust, Democrats in the Northeast may have crossed over to Dewey because they found the change from the polished Roosevelt to the plain Truman too much of a jolt. In New York, the GOP vote declined by 146,484, the Democrats 524,034; in Maine, Dewey fell 5,200, Truman 28,715. Both declined, but Truman lost from three to five times as many. Dewey's gain of 4,399 votes in Vermont cannot explain the Democratic nominee's loss of 8,263, so it is not clear there whether half that loss shifted or whether the 1944 Republicans turned out in decreased numbers, replaced by a larger shift. But whatever may have been the case in Vermont and New Hampshire, it is clear that Republicans in Maine and New York did not vote as strongly for Dewey in 1948 as in 1944; nor did they vote for anybody else. As is clear with most of the states of the midwest, significant numbers of conservative Republicans did not
vote for president given a choice between a Democrat and a moderate Republican. 57

Indeed, it seems possible that many did not vote at all. The GOP lost twenty of the thirty-two gubernatorial contests held, as well as control -- by decisive margins -- of both houses of Congress. Republicans lost nine Senate races in 1948, of which only Delaware was an eastern state. Eight of those seats had belonged to incumbents running for re-election. As discussed in chapter one, the GOP also lost seventy-five House seats, forty-two of which were in rural districts. Many of the remaining lost seats were in urban districts, but in midwestern states, where the political culture still predisposed Republicans toward the conservative wing of the party. 58

One such district was Nebraska's second, where GOP incumbent Howard Buffet was defeated by 3,244 votes. The total vote in the district was 9,714 lighter than in 1944. Buffett had won his previous two elections by margins of over twenty-five per cent. But in 1948, he reported that "the regular Republicans of deep convictions stayed away from the polls in large numbers in Nebraska in 1948."

Dewey's vote in Nebraska dropped by twenty per cent (65,106 votes). The four GOP congressional candidates' votes dropped ten to thirty per cent (67,780 votes). 59

Indeed, in states across the midwest, GOP candidates got fewer votes than in 1944. In Illinois, where Dewey
lost 79,977 votes in ninety-four of the 102 counties, the
total vote for GOP congressional candidates dropped by six
per cent, and six Republicans lost their seats. Most of
these were in Cook County, where Dewey added over 91,000
votes to his 1944 figure and Truman lost over 58,000 of
FDR's 1944 supporters. This suggests that Dewey's ability
to draw disaffected Democrats and independents to the polls
only hurt other Republicans. The GOP senatorial candidate,
incumbent Wayland Brooks, also dropped six per cent state­
wide from the 1944 GOP senatorial vote, and was defeated. 60

Dewey's vote declined by six per cent in Indiana, and
the vote for Republican congressional candidates fell by
ten per cent: five GOP seats were lost. In Iowa, Dewey's
vote dropped ten per cent. Sharp voting declines occurred
in the most Republican counties. The GOP congressional
vote was down six per cent, not enough to cost the party
any of its eight seats, but the senatorial vote fell by
ten per cent from 1944, costing incumbent Republican
George Wilson his seat. Dewey's Minnesota vote dropped
eight per cent, and the GOP congressional vote declined by
nine per cent, which defeated three Republican incumbents.
And in upstate New York, the vote for the eighteen con­
gressional candidates fell by 1,029,134 (thirty-five per
cent), costing three more seats. When one reads accounts
of the subsequent bitterness of conservative Republicans
towards Dewey, one should keep these losses in mind. They
blamed him for leading the party "down the path to defeat" in state and local races of every sort, as well as in the presidential contest. Dewey played it safe in 1948, and the result was a Republican debacle. 61

Dewey's analysts calculated after the election that the crossover strategy had nearly worked. Had 29,294 people who voted for Truman been persuaded instead to vote for Dewey, assuming that they were properly distributed in Illinois, Ohio, and California, Dewey would have carried all three states and won by 265 electoral votes to 225. 62 But this would have been a disaster. Dewey would have become president with two million fewer votes than Truman, and with solid Democratic majorities in both houses. Of the three states, only Illinois had a Senate race, won by Democrat Paul Douglas by over 400,000 votes. 63 Therefore the results in the Senate would have been unchanged, fifty-four Democrats and forty-two Republicans. And even if the hypothetical switchers had been distributed to maximize GOP House returns, the three states had only thirty-four seats, of which only nineteen were not already held by Republicans, while the actual Democratic majority rested on a ninety-two seat margin. 64 Dewey would have been the first president in a century to be elected with both houses against him, and he would have been elected although Truman had a solid plurality of the votes cast. Dewey ran on a campaign of changing nothing but
the effectiveness with which existing policies were administered, and he would have lacked a mandate even for that. Even by the most adroit use of the appointment powers, he would have had a Republican party behind him that was divided and hostile. The behavior of the McCarthyites in the early Eisenhower years suggests that Dewey would not have escaped being the target of the anti-communist forces. Two days after he would have taken office as the weakest president yet, the Chinese communists took Peking. If Dewey's defeat was a disaster for the Republican party, his victory through a shift of under 30,000 votes would have boded worse.65

Yet it was Truman and the Democrats who lost most in 1948. Truman had won running on a set of promises designed not to form a realistic program but to embarrass a Republican Congress. Now he had solid majorities and clear responsibility, but the 81st Congress, though Democratic in name, was little more inclined to enact his program than the 80th had been. Truman was going to disappoint the liberals and minorities as much after 1948 as he had prior to it. He had also pushed the left wing of the New Deal coalition out of the Democratic party and alienated the South.

Into this mess strutted a president who had finally been elected on his own. Jules Abels says rightly that
the election had wrought a metamorphosis in Truman's personality:

The former diffidence and humility were gone. The new confidence and assurance were displayed in his role as Commander in Chief during the Korean War. The election welded his bonds to political machines, made him less sensitive to press opinion, and increased his loyalties to the associates who had stood by him in his hour of travail. These effects colored his reaction to the scandals, uncovered by Democratic-controlled committees in Congress, which rocked Washington during his second Administration.66

After 1948 a cocksure, over-promised president captained a divided Democratic party. An equally divided Republican party, convinced that it had been cheated out of its just reward, let go its last restraints and turned unhesitatingly toward revenge, as Mao Tse-tung advanced on Peking.
NOTES -- CHAPTER THREE


4. Ibid, pp. 13-14; Goldman, Crucial Decade, pp. 20, 121; Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 307-309; Mayer, Republican Party, p. 467.

5. Goldman, Crucial Decade, pp. 34-38, 59-61, 78-79; Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, chaps. 8 and 9.


8. Divine, *1940-1948*, pp. 188-189. Also see Chapter 2 of this work.

9. Patterson, *Mr. Republican*, pp. 373, 384-387; Taft *Foreign Policy for Americans* pp. 73, 110-112.


11. Patterson, *Mr. Republican*, p. 313.


19. CQ, Politics in America, pp. 4, 9; Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 388-389, 392-393; Vandenberg to John Foster Dulles, August 9, 1943, Vandenberg Collection, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan; Goldman, Crucial Decade, pp. 57-60; Divine, 1940-1948, p. 226.

20. CQ, Politics in America, pp. 4, 9. Internal papers of the Truman administration show attempts, in the first drafts of a presidential veto message, to raise objections to the anticommunist affidavit clause, not on civil liberties grounds, but because the authors thought it better that communist leaders be fought openly within the unions; there was no question of a union having a right to elect a communist to its leadership. Arthur Meyer raised the only constitutional objection in a separate memo, but he was overruled by Clark Clifford, who described the anticommunist affidavit clause as "a statement of policy which has been sorely missing from national thinking on a subject of industrial relations. The final veto speech omitted mention of the clause, except insofar as it was hinted at in a passage that said,

The bill would increase industrial strife because a number of its provisions deprive workers of legal protection of fundamental rights. They would have no means of protecting these rights except by striking.


21. CQ, Politics in America, pp. 4.9; Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 389, 391-392; Goldman, Crucial Decade, pp. 52-57; Ferrell, Off the Record, p. 178.

22. CQ, Politics in America, pp. 4-5; Acheson, Creation, pp. 250-254.

23. Memorandum for the President, Clifford Papers, Truman Library. The Gallup Poll in the spring of 1948 showed only 38% approving of Truman's performance as president.


193, 221, 301-303; CQ, Politics in America, p. 8;

31. Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 419-422.


33. Letter to John Foster Dulles, August 2, 1948,
Vandenberg Collection.

34. Divine, 1940-1948, pp. 224-226. Also see the following
documents from the Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton
University: Allen Dulles to John Foster Dulles,
October 22, 1948, Allen Dulles Papers; John Foster
Dulles cable, "DEWEY ALLEN DULLES EYES ONLY", October
25, 1948, ibid.; John Foster Dulles to Dewey, October
26, 1948, ibid.; "Item F", October 25, 1948, ibid.;
"Top Secret" (undated, about October 25, 1948), ibid.;
Allen Dulles to John Foster Dulles, October 23, 1948,
ibid.; John Foster Dulles cable to Dewey, October 29,
1948, ibid.; Allen Dulles to Vandenberg, November 1,
1948, ibid.; Dewey to John Foster Dulles, November 2,
1948, ibid.; cable "For Dewey", September 6, 1948,
John Foster Dulles Papers; cable "FOR FOSTER DULLES"
marked "Recd Sept 2", ibid.; caple "For Dewey, Number
28", October 21, 1948, ibid.; cable "For Dewey, Number
29", October 21, 1948, ibid.; Memo to J. F. Dulles,
October 22, 1948, ibid.; To Foster, October 22, 1948,
ibid.; For John Foster Dulles, October 23 [1948],
ibid.; letter "Dear Allie", November 4, 1948, ibid.
35. Speech, October 4, 1948, Vandenberg Collection; undated letter (about October 6, 1948), ibid.

36. CQ, Politics in America, p. 8; Vandenberg to John Foster Dulles, August 9, 1948, Allen Dulles Papers; John Foster Dulles to Vandenberg, August 10, 1948, ibid.

37. Hamby, Beyond the New Deal, pp. 185, 222-223, 244-246; Abels, Jaws, pp. 208-213.

38. Ibid., pp. 211-213, 245-246; Hamby, Beyond the New Deal, pp. 230-231, 246; Parmets, Democrats, pp. 86-89.

39. Ibid., pp. 82-85; Abels, Jaws, pp. 213-223; Sundquist, Dynamics, p. 249; CQ, Politics in America, pp. 5, 8; Mayer, "Republican Party", p. 2287; Divine, 1940-1948, p. 494.

40. Parmet, Democrats, pp. 82, 88; Abels, Jaws, pp. 244-245; Goldman, Crucial Decade, pp. 85-86.


42. Abels, Jaws, pp. 296-298; Lubell, Future, pp. 200-204, Parmet, Democrats, 85-86, 89.

43. Divine, 1940-1948, p. 273; Patterson, Mr. Republican, p. 365; Abels, Jaws, p. 294.

44. CQ, President Elections, pp. 94-95, Richard Scammon, ed., America at the Polls: A Handbook of American
Presidential Election Statistics, 1920-1964

45. Ibid., pp. 290-294; Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 365-366; Hamby, Beyond the New Deal, p. 267; Parmet, Democrats, pp. 79-80; Leuchtenberg, Troubled Feast, p. 18; Phillips, Truman Presidency, pp. 248-249; Goldman, Crucial Decade, pp. 89-90; Mayer, Republican Party, pp. 469, 474; idem., "Republican Party", p. 2287; CQ, Politics in America, p. 8.

46. Patterson, Mr. Republican, p. 425.

47. Ibid., p. 413.


50. CQ, Presidential Elections, pp. 93-94.


52. CQ, Presidential Elections, pp. 94-95.


54. CQ, Presidential Elections, pp. 95-96.
55. Scammon, Polls, pp. 262-63.
56. Ibid., pp. 130-131.
57. CQ, Presidential Elections, pp. 94-95.
58. CQ,
62. Memo dates March 2, 1949 in Allen Dulles Papers. Also see Peterson, Statistical History, pp. 102-103; Abels, Jaws, p. 290; CQ, Politics in America, p. 9.
63. Ibid., p. 106.
64. Long Dir 1946; Cq NERS, P. 178.
65. Fried, McCarthy, chap. 9; pp. 199-221; Theoharis, Seeds, chap. 8; Alexander, Holding the Line, pp. 48-62; Abels, Jaws, pp. 302-303; Cq, Politics in America, p. 9.
CHAPTER FOUR

CRUSADE IN AMERICA: EISENHOWER'S ELECTION AND FIRST YEAR

Between 1948 and 1952, American politics became very bitter. Whether they blamed Dewey publicly or not, Republicans of every stripe had concluded from the 1948 election that the Democrats could not be defeated without attacking them frontally on some issue which the Democrats had mishandled. In 1949 and 1950, Republican members of Congress added a new criticism to their arsenal: that the Democratic administration had communists and communist sympathizers within its ranks who influenced national policies to the benefit of the Soviets and to the detriment of the United States. President Truman, who was eligible to run for re-election in 1952, and his Anglophile Secretary of State Dean Acheson were the principal targets of Republican attacks.

By the beginning of 1952, national unity was evaporating rapidly. The Fair Deal had stalled in Congress, but Truman assumed his domestic policies still had public support. Only 35% of Americans surveyed in early 1952 disagreed with the statement that Korea was "an utterly useless war." Yet Truman was preparing to run again. With Dewey no longer viable, the GOP seemed most likely to nominate Senator Robert Taft to face Truman. Taft
planned to run on a platform of outright opposition to the New Deal, and his approach to foreign policy was even more divisive. In a small book written in 1951, Taft advocated a modernized "Fortress America." A Truman-Taft contest would have increased the polarization of the country. Faced with that prospect, General Dwight D. Eisenhower decided that although he preferred to retire to private life, nobody else could unite the nation as president. Eisenhower was not one to shirk what he believed was his duty, and he thus began a crusade to end the internal divisions that plagued his country. On January 7, 1952, he agreed to let Henry Cabot Lodge announce that Eisenhower would run as a Republican for the presidency. For the next two years, most of Eisenhower's efforts were directed at depolarizing American politics.

The bitterness that dominated American politics after 1948 grew out of Republican experiences of the previous two decades. The Republican party had survived in Congress because a minority of states and congressional districts, most of which were small-town and rural in make-up, provided safe seats for the most diehard Republicans. As the New Deal had succeeded, its urgency waned, and the number of Republican districts rose, although they passed 50% only in 1946. Realizing that the GOP could not win national elections, or even a majority of congressional elections, on its domestic policies, most Republicans
had shifted their emphasis in the late 1930's to foreign policy. Yet this did little, before the war, to break the Democrats' grip on victory. Isolationism won votes only where conservatism had already given Republicans a clear advantage. And after Pearl Harbor, isolationism was generally viewed as disloyalty, hurting the GOP at a time when support for the Democrats was otherwise diminishing.

After Dewey's 1948 defeat, another aspect of foreign policy began to look useful to Republicans: anticommunism. It was a convenient banner for rallying Republicans. For over a decade, anticommunism had been synonymous with GOP opposition to the New Deal. Conservative candidates tossed words like "communism" and "socialism" around freely. The New Deal had appropriated and redistributed some of the wealth, power, and prestige of the small-town elites who made up the core of the GOP right, and had done so with sufficient votes behind it that it felt no need to win these groups over. Instead, the New Dealers had derided and castigated Republican elites, keeping them hostile to changes. To many Republicans, such developments were socialistic. In any case, Republicans were made insecure in a country that had been theirs to run. They felt a desperate need to stop social change and an accompanying urge for revenge against their tormentors.
After their defeat in 1948, having tried and failed to win elections with reasoned arguments over domestic and foreign policies for fifteen years, many Republicans no longer cared whether they were fair or not. When a dinner guest complained to Taft about unfair methods used by Republicans on the House Un-American Activities Committee, Taft, generally thought to be a man of emotionless intellect, snapped, "What difference does that make? I am always being unfairly attacked and confused, for that matter." William S. White calls the years 1949-1952 "the sad, worst period of [Taft's] life," and James T. Patterson says of that time, "The temptations of politics, more than anything else, had turned Taft toward irresponsibility." What was true of Taft, the GOP's leader in Congress and the exemplar of the party's conservative wing, was true of those he led. Fearful and vindictive, seeing no decent way to win, Republicans adopted the tactics of the red smear.

The emerging conflict between the powerful Soviet Union and the United States immediately following a global war of competing ideologies made many Americans suddenly afraid that American communists would commit acts of sabotage and espionage should a war break out. This fear reinforced the Republican right's old claim that New Dealers were secret socialists or communists. The connecting links between the external threat and the New
Dealers were few, if any. But conservative Republican anticommunism was never concerned, except rhetorically, with the Soviet Union. Nor did Republicans show much interest in avowed communists. Their targets remained the New Dealers and the New Deal's policies. Fear of Russia was a varnish added to the years of opposition to liberal policies. As late as 1948, for example, the Chicago Tribune was still attacking the foreign policies of Truman, Marshall, and Vandenberg as pro-British, a slant it had used for a decade. It was not hard to add "pro-communist" to a litany of charges that already included "dictatorial," "warmongering," "unpatriotic," "wicked," "Fascistic," and "pro-British," weeding out the obsolete epithets only as they became threadbare. The precise terms did not matter. They were only devices to make a loud, angry cry sound rational. But the targets of the red hunt were always the same New Deal policies and politicians the conservatives had opposed all along, with the new anti-Soviet rationale pinned on as an "I-told-you-so."  

Thus did the Republicans attempt to block David Lilienthal's appointment to head the new Atomic Energy Commission because he was "soft on communism," as shown by his having run the hated Tennessee Valley Authority for FDR. A few Republicans opposed the Marshall Plan as a socialistic giveaway, a charge made more sinister-sounding by Truman's pretense that Marshall Plan aid was
also being offered to Soviet-dominated nations, Dean Acheson, appointed Secretary of State in 1949, came under intense Republican fire from his confirmation hearings until he left office. Acheson had broken with the New Deal over economic policy in the mid-1930s, but he came to FDR's aid in the fight over isolationism. Many Republicans felt that their best chance to beat FDR was when he ran for an unprecedented third term in 1940 while espousing the cause of aid to Britain; Acheson had sided with Roosevelt in that critical time. From this many Republicans concluded that he was pro-communist. Six GOP senators voted against his confirmation. Even Senator Arthur Vandenberg, who was generally supportive of the Truman-Marshall-Acheson foreign policies, noted in his diary with some surprise after Acheson outlined his plans for the May 1949 Paris conference,

One thing is sure -- if there was ever any suspicion about [Acheson's] being pro-Russian it is all different now. As a matter of fact, he is so totally anti-Soviet and is going to be so completely tough that I doubt there is any chance at all for a Paris agreement.8

If Vandenberg thought Acheson's anti-Soviet attitudes would satisfy his Republican colleagues that the Secretary was not really pro-communist, he misunderstood the origin of their charges. Like the Alger Hiss case, Republican charges that the Democrats were "soft on communism" were an historical indictment of the New Deal,
aimed as much at the Roosevelt administration as at Truman's. No amount of anticommunist foreign policy on Truman's part could spare his administration from charges of softness on communism as long as Truman stood for continuing the New Deal.  

Yet the rest of the nation did not agree. Just as voters had not been repelled from FDR's policies when Republicans called them "communistic," they were not repelled by the results either. The public could not be scared away from the Democrats unless the GOP made it appear that the same liberals who were supposedly advancing communism in domestic policies were also aiding a powerful communist enemy in foreign policy. Truman, as other historians have suggested, helped make this connection credible. His program of loyalty investigations of federal personnel seemed to endorse the charge that there was something dangerous there. His foreign policy pronouncements magnified the Soviet threat.  

Truman's contributions to the creation of the Cold War are hotly contested. What he added to the Great Fear, however, came from an inconsistency in his foreign policy that made his administration vulnerable to charges of softness toward communism. Truman thought and spoke in the language of hyperbole. He was not one to call his opponents liars if he could call them "pathological liars par excellence." Even in his diary, Truman tended repeatedly
to discuss his villains in comparison to "Jenghiz Khan, Tammerlane, Machiavelli, and Napoleon." When he criticized his former Soviet allies, he used the same bombastic style, calling their system "a Frankenstein dictatorship worse than any of the others, Hitler included." While Truman likened Stalin's government and policies to those of Nazi Germany, he worked very hard to avoid going to war with Russia, but he continued to snipe at the Republicans for having tried to keep the United States from going to war with Germany. From what he said in public, a case could be made that Truman and his administration thought Russia was as bad as Nazi Germany, but had undisclosed reasons for doing nothing about it, or that they were only pretending to believe in the communist threat.

Communism in any form was anathema to all Republicans because above all they believed that human freedom must be based on private property. Thus they were generally uncritical of any derogatory statements made about the Soviet Union. Their question was not, "If the Soviets are really as bad as the Nazis, what are the Democrats doing about it?" Rather, assuming that anything the Soviets did was at least as bad as anything the Nazis did, they asked, "If the Democrats really believe that the Soviets are as bad as the Nazis, what are they doing about it?" Their emphasis, indeed, was not on what should be done, but on the credibility of the Democrats' anticommunism. It
was very hard for most Republicans to believe that a party that so tampered with property rights really opposed communism.

Given this seeming inconsistency of the Democrats, it was not terribly hard to convert dissatisfaction with the situation in eastern Europe into suspicion. It was plausible, though probably not correct, to contend that the USSR would have collapsed in 1941 or 1942 without American aid. This argument, which ignored the effect such a collapse would have had on the outcome of the war with Germany, was popular with people who had not been very much in favor of fighting the Nazis, most of whom considered the Soviet Union a greater threat. Roosevelt had put war aims first when he insisted on avoiding political conflict with Russia over the final demarcation line between Soviet and Anglo-American military advances, and he recognized that Britain and the US could not have obtained a better settlement at Yalta without going to war with Russia. FDR died believing that he could make Stalin honor the Yalta agreements on internal democracy in the eastern European nations. Whether he could have done so is unknowable, but Truman could not. It fell to Truman either to accept to Soviet consolidation in eastern Europe in 1947-1948 or go to war. As he chose the former, nobody could disprove the Republican argument that tougher bargaining from 1944 on would have freed those nations. Few
Republicans advocated war with Russia -- it would have been politically dangerous, and some of them were still noninterventionists at heart -- but they could damage the Democrats by pointing out the inconsistency of their position. Such political damage would serve all the aims of the GOP: improve Republican chances in elections, weaken the administration's ability to create social change, and wreak vengeance on the New Dealers.  

Even though the Russians consolidated their European holdings in 1947-1948, the situation there was essentially static. They gained no ground that they had not held when the war ended. The creation of NATO appeared to guarantee this. If containment was seen as weaker than a policy of smashing the USSR, at least it seemed to work. But when China fell in 1949 to the communist armies of Mao Tse-tung, the claim that the Democrats were soft on communism seemed to be proved. In fact, the Truman administration had not handled China well. Administration officials generally disliked communism and wanted it to lose in China, and they feared the effects of a communist victory both on Soviet power and in domestic politics. On the other hand, they saw the Nationalist government as corrupt and semi-fascist. The outcome in China was beyond American control, but the administration had learned in the war that Americans could do anything. They did not realize their limitations until Chiang was past saving. They tried to push both sides
into an American solution -- a coalition government. But once the Japanese invaders had withdrawn in 1945, the Nationalists and the Communists had no overlap in their agendas. There was over a decade of killing between them, and they wanted nothing more than each other's destruction. Compromise, in this situation, was impossible. When it became clear to American policymakers that Chiang Kai-shek would do none of the things that would allow his government to survive, they decided to abandon him as quickly and as quietly as possible.  

The State Department cut off aid to the Nationalists, since it did not want to arm the communists, and the Nationalists were losing or surrendering American arms and supplies as fast as they arrived. Acheson released a White Paper on China in August 1949, explaining that nothing the United States did could help the Nationalists. This realization came a bit late, following massive American aid and the commitment of national prestige, and it fell on a public that was not prepared for it. The Roosevelt and Truman foreign policymakers were overwhelmingly men who saw Europe as the key to global affairs, and they paid little attention to China and the rest of the world. Yet many Americans cared at least as much about China as they did about other nations. It was a trade partner for some, and it had been the principal target of American missionary efforts for the past century. Just
as many easterners were preoccupied with Europe by ties of trade and proximity, so were many westerners concerned with Asia. Not only was there a receptive public for concerns about China, there was a political base to express them. Conservative Republicans had been Asia-firsters during the war, had always detested the preoccupation of liberal easterners with Europe, and had long believed that communists in the administration would do anything to aid the Soviets. Chiang's weaknesses were what they liked about him: he was a Christian in a non-Christian land, he had no qualms about using force to shatter unions and communist organizations, and he professed an attachment to the United States.14

Many of the leaders of the "China Lobby" were prominent Republican conservatives, including Senators William F. Knowland (California), Herman Welker (Idaho), Homer Ferguson (Michigan), Milton Young (North Dakota), John W. Bricker (Ohio), Wallace Bennett (Utah), Arthur Watkins (Utah), Alexander Wiley (Wisconsin), and Representatives Robert Chiperfield (Illinois), Walter Judd (Minnesota), and John M. Vorys (Ohio). But there were also Republican moderates who supported the Nationalist cause, such as Senators Margaret Chase Smith (Maine), Charles Potter (Michigan), H. Alexander Smith (New Jersey), Irving Ives (New York), and Ralph Flanders (Vermont). When the Nationalists fled the mainland in December 1949 and the
administration revealed its willingness to allow the communists to attack Formosa, Republicans even including Taft demanded that Truman use the Navy to protect what was left of the Nationalist cause. Truman refused to do so until the Korean War began in late June 1950. Throughout this period, most Americans assumed that the Kremlin controlled all communist parties, and thus saw the revolution in China as Soviet aggression unchecked by American policy. To most Republicans, the willingness of the Democrats to ally with Stalin and to prevent his government's destruction when that was possible, followed by their refusal to prevent the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek, was abhorrent.

So charges of softness towards communism grew both more numerous and more effective from late 1948 to early 1950. For the most part, the Republicans offered no alternatives, only criticisms. Generally, too, leading GOP anticommunists from the cautious Taft to the more reckless Nixon were careful not to claim that all Democrats were communists, or even soft on communism. Rather, they charged that such people were scattered throughout the administration, without giving names. Left vague, these charges could not be disproved. Senator Joseph McCarthy's innovation was that he made these old charges explicit. From his first speech on communism in February 1950 onward,
he gave plenty of names and figures. He never had them right, but he had them.\textsuperscript{17}

For a person's name to become a work in the vocabulary, as Dean Acheson later said was the case with Senator McCarthy, Judge Lynch, and Captain Boycott,\textsuperscript{18} takes either a special person or special circumstances. McCarthy seemed in his heyday to be a political success. Thomas C. Reeves, a recent biographer, says that McCarthy's "native intelligence and his formidable energy were largely squandered."\textsuperscript{19} His contemporaries saw him as endlessly cunning and dangerous. In fact, the man was in over his head from the beginning. He never understood the material he presented, and it seems reasonable to suggest that he could not distinguish between truth and lies, even his own. After the first few speeches about communists in the State Department, when two reporters asked him for details, McCarthy said, "Look, you guys. That was just a political speech to a bunch of Republicans. Don't take it seriously."\textsuperscript{20} But people did. Here, at last, was something concrete, something that could be proved or disproved.

No sooner had McCarthy made his foolishly specific charges than the Democrats pounced on him. They had felt that the general line of Republican attacks hurt them, and in McCarthy they had a perfect foil. He was one of the least capable, least respected senators, and he was wrong in all his particulars. Exposing him would imply that the
even less specific charges of other Republicans were likewise false. Truman and Acheson blasted him by name, and the Democratic majority in the Senate conducted hearings to show him up as a phony. This put the Republicans in the position of having either to defend McCarthy or to see their best weapon -- the charge of softness on communism -- blunted. Republican senators professed to believe McCarthy's "evidence," and issues a minority report after the investigation of the Tydings Committee which supported McCarthy and claimed that efforts to discredit him were part of a coverup. The Democrats had gone after McCarthy believing that he was the GOP's weak link, but they had merely made the GOP reinforce him.\footnote{21}

With the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, charges of incompetence and even treason by Democrats could no longer be laughed off. Most Americans saw Korea as possibly the beginning of World War III, and many felt that, somehow, it should have been avoided.\footnote{22} Republicans, fearful of being called isolationists again, did not oppose the war \textit{per se}, but blamed the Democrats for causing it by signalling the Russians that the US would not defend South Korea. In a speech on January 12, 1950, Secretary Acheson had detailed what he called America's "Pacific perimeter," the line which the United States must hold against communist advances. It did not include either South Korea or Formosa, from which the administration had
been trying to disengage for several years, although Acheson did imply a warning to potential aggressors that the UN might take action in case of attack.²³ American troops had been pulled out of South Korea in June 1949 due to more important commitments, after the Departments of State and Defense agreed that

From the standpoint of military security, the United States has little strategic interest in maintaining the present troops and bases in Korea.²⁴

When North Korea invaded, the Democrats vehemently denied that Acheson's speech had invited Soviet aggression, but even Averell Harriman, in 1977, conceded that "Acheson's speech was one of the things which made Stalin, I think, believe that we would not intervene militarily."²⁵ What hurt the Democrats was not that the public thought communists in the administration had tried to give South Korea away, but that the public feared war with Russia and thought the administration had blundered into a conflict that could involve the USSR.

McCarthyism was primarily a partisan political device used by Republicans against Democrats. It seemed at the time to be very effective: in 1950, Republican candidates in over half the thirty-six Senate contests found that they were running against communist sympathizers. Herman Welker attributed seven GOP Senate victories, including his own,
to McCarthy personally. Republican Senator Owen Brewster of Maine called the election a "triumph" for McCarthy's claims of communist influences in the State Department. Again in 1952, GOP hopefuls would express shock at discovering the communist leanings of their opponents, and the GOP would win the presidency and majorities in both houses. Again McCarthy's personal efforts would be credited with resounding success.26

Yet recent studies of these elections show that McCarthy and McCarthyism were given credit for a usefulness they never possessed. Richard M. Fried has concluded that in 1950, McCarthyism was the decisive factor in only three Senate races, those in California, Maryland, and Utah. Of those, the Democratic candidates in California and Maryland were also badly hurt by bitter primary battles that left their state parties split. Fried concludes:

Most significantly, the Republicans' gain of five Senate and twenty House seats conferred control of neither chamber and represented smaller midterm increments than the GOP had achieved in 1946, 1942, or 1938.... A closer examination of the 1950 results oughts to have tempered the optimism of the McCarthystes and the despondency of their foes. Both groups, however, interpreted the election as a mandate for McCarthy....27

A parallel measure of the ineffectiveness of the communist issue as a vote-getting device appears in the House elections. The principal anticommunist legislation of 1950
was the McCarran Internal Security Act of 1950, which was passed by overwhelming majorities in both houses over Truman's veto (57-10 in the Senate and 248-48 in the House). Few doubted that opposition to it was political death, yet "of 21 Democratic congressmen who voted against the McCarran Act," Fried notes,

only 5 lost (two in quests for Senate seats); conversely, of the 28 Democratic representatives beaten in November, 23 had supported the measure.28

Also, in 1952, McCarthy campaigned for ten GOP Senate candidates, of whom six won -- an apparent sixty per cent success rate. Yet there were more important factors in many of those contests. The ten McCarthy-backed candidates ran five per cent behind the norm for Republican Senate candidates that year, and since three of the four who lost were beaten by less than five per cent, it is possible that this McCarthy handicap cost them the elections. In all six states where McCarthy candidates won, Eisenhower ran so far ahead of them that it may be argued that the McCarthy handicap was insufficient to cost the party those seats.

Summing up the 1952 races, Reeves notes that moderate Republicans ran considerably better than their rightist colleagues. Pollsters found that less than three per cent of the public was concerned about internal subversion, but the external communist threat aroused much greater voter
interest. There is no evidence, Reeves concludes, to sug­
gest that Nixon, Jenner, and McCarthy won many votes for
the GOP with their attacks on "treason." 29

Why, then, did most politicians in both parties con­
cluded that McCarthyism was an invincible political force?
For conservative Republicans, the answer was that they
wanted to believe so. McCarthyism summed up their fears
and hostilities toward the Democrats, and it allowed them
to vent their hatred without having to defend Hoover-style
domestic policies. The same was true of the moderate Re­
publicans, who had nobody to rally around after Dewey's
final defeat. The divided GOP had only this one issue
in common: they hated the Democrats and agreed that some­
how the Democrats were destroying the nation. Conserva­
tive Democrats believed the red smear worked because be­
lieving it strengthened their potential for purging their
own party of its left wing. This was also true of many
moderate and liberal Democrats, such as Hubert Humphrey,
who likewise engaged in factional rivalries against op­
ponents to their left, and who could argue that such op­
ponents had to be driven out of the Democratic party if
it were to survive. Both conservative and liberal Demo­
crats were short-sighted: all they could see was that
Democrats accused of communist sympathies had lost elec­
tions. They assumed there was a correlation. 30
So before the campaigns of 1952 began, the GOP found that only McCarthyism could unite it, and believed that only McCarthyism could win elections for it. Henry Cabot Lodge, for instance, would later oppose McCarthy strongly, but when he ran against John F. Kennedy in 1952, Lodge found McCarthyism appealing. McCarthy offered to campaign for Lodge in Massachusetts, stipulating only that he would not attack Kennedy directly. Kennedy was a personal friend, and his father was one on McCarthy's financial backers. Lodge later told Herbert S. Parment,

I sent back word that if he wanted to come in and attack my opponent that would be one thing, but I knew he didn't want to do that and I certainly didn't want him coming in just on the basis of defending me.31

Lodge, like many other Republicans, did not care after 1948 how he won elections, as long as he won.

Into this ugly vendetta, in January 1952, stepped Dwight D. Eisenhower, presumed to be a political innocent. If he really was an innocent, he did not remain one. Eisenhower was recruited for the presidency by men like himself, political moderates such as Lodge, Thomas Dewey, Senator James Duff of Pennsylvania, and publisher Roy A. Roberts of the Kansas City Star. The goal of these moderates was to restore the United States to centrist unity. Eisenhower and his backers generally agreed on a program. To avoid further polarization, they would attempt neither
to undo the New Deal nor to expand it. This would allow cuts in budget and taxes. It would retain those features of the New Deal, in areas such as labor relations and defense spending, that were of benefit to both major corporations and large blocs of voters. Such a consolidation of the New Deal would surely reduce class hostilities and the insecurity of the middle class. Toleration of diversity, both cultural and racial, would be encouraged, but not legislated or enforced.32

Eisenhower and those around him believed that reality dictated a continuation of American foreign policy, essentially containment. The General believed that the Russians were interested in expansion, but not at the cost of war. He had seen the devastation of Russia from World War II, and his knowledge of Soviet political and military leaders convinced him that the USSR would not be ready for war for many years, and did not want one. If it were clear to the Soviets that aggression would lead to war, they would not commit aggression, but would settle for political and economic competition with the United States. Thus there was no need to destroy the USSR. War, in the nuclear age, would be slaughter without useful results, not war as Eisenhower understood it (the use of force to accomplish national goals unattainable in any other way.) But if both aggression and war could be prevented by
American firmness, there would be no reason why the US and the USSR could not have at least peaceful relations.  

Eisenhower believed that a credible threat of war in the face of Soviet aggression would require not only nuclear weapons, but also well-organized armies of allied western nations. Reliance on American air and nuclear power and on allied ground forces would allow the United States to reduce troop strengths and thus defense costs. Further, Eisenhower feared that public reaction to Truman's sending American forces to Korea might lead to renewed isolationism. But reliance on allied ground forces would work only if America's allies were absolutely convinced of America's commitment to them. Eisenhower therefore feared Taft's nomination. He also knew that Europeans saw McCarthyism as isolationism, as did many American moderates and liberals. Thus one of the General's primary goals was to end McCarthyism because of its deleterious effects on America's allies.  

Another of Eisenhower's primary goals was to end the Korean War on an acceptable basis. He saw victory as impossible without running a serious risk of global war and heavy American losses. Public dissatisfaction with both stalemate and casualties was a major polarizing force, and McCarthyism fed on this dissatisfaction. The war must be ended as quickly as possible, and similar conflicts must be avoided.
The status quo orientation of Eisenhower's foreign policies may seem to conflict with campaign rhetoric about "liberation." It does not. "Liberation" of the communist satellites of Europe was a wishful policy dreamed up by John Foster Dulles, the GOP's aspirant for Secretary of State. "Liberation" was not a call to war, but represented an optimistic assessment of operations the CIA already had underway to encourage disharmony in the eastern European nations. Dulles's brother Allen briefed him on these operations, which they both hoped would lead to so much internal difficulty that the Russians would be compelled to withdraw from these nations. Dulles mentioned occasionally that his model was Yugoslavia's split with Russia. The Dulles version of liberation would theoretically have avoided a major war, a fact important to moderates. If "liberation" became confused in the public mind with a belligerent policy to strip the USSR of the nations it held, it is because it sounded like "rollback," a phrase concocted by Republican congressional candidates in 1952 to imply that the new Republican administration would roll back the Iron Curtain. Eisenhower and Dulles were careful not to promise this, and Eisenhower got angry when Dulles was reckless enough to imply it. 36

Although Eisenhower hoped his candidacy would unite the GOP, he could not win the nomination without exacerbating the party split. The General abandoned his dreams
of being drafted and instead announced his candidacy when he was persuaded that Taft would otherwise lock up the nomination before the convention. Although both Taft and Eisenhower won primaries, they did not have a clear primary confrontation. Neither was clearly ahead when the Republicans convened in Chicago in July.

Three contested southern delegations, from Georgia, Texas, and Louisiana, held the deciding votes. Because the GOP almost never won elections in the South, Republican organizations there survived only on the little patronage that Republicans in Congress had been able to bestow during two decades as the national minority party. Thus the party machinery in all three states was run by men loyal to Taft. These southern regulars had kept control of their state conventions although outnumbered by newly-recruited Eisenhower delegates. Eisenhower's November victory would depend on his mobilization of eleven million new voters, a process begun in seeking the nomination. James MacGregor Burns characterizes the delegate contests as a fight over who spoke for the GOP, the regulars who worked in good and lean times, or the independents and disgruntled Democrats who were attracted by favorable prospects.37

This was essentially the conflict between the conservatives who favored maximizing the Republican vote and the moderates who insisted on attracting independents and discontented Democrats. The moderate strategy had failed
in 1940, 1944, and 1948, and the conservatives wanted no more of it. Thus Senator Everett Dirksen, a solid Taft backer, pointed from the rostrum at Dewey and charged, "We followed you before and you took us down the path to defeat." But the battle was not solely one of Republican regulars against newcomers. Gallup's mid-June poll persuaded many Taft admirers that Taft would lose in November, but Eisenhower would not. Many Republican politicians thought the General would help their own prospects more than the Senator, and major corporations such as Ford and General Motors preferred Eisenhower. All twenty-three Republicans governors signed a manifesto demanding a rule change to keep Taft's disputed southern delegations from voting until the convention had ruled on all three disputes.38

Eisenhower won every vote at the convention by a narrow margin. Denouncing Taft for "stealing" delegates, Eisenhower's forces won two crucial votes on rules, giving them the Louisiana delegation. When they won on Georgia, Taft conceded Texas. The first ballot for president put Eisenhower within nine votes of victory, starting a stampede to switch votes in his favor. But 280 Taft delegates refused to go along even when Eisenhower had clearly won. Only after the General paid a call on the Senator did the conservatives agree to a unanimous nomination.39
Throughout Eisenhower's presidential campaign and his first year in office, he used symbolic acts to win the confidence of both sides in a divided America. As a candidate, he had only speeches, but he had more options available after he won. By appearing to be a political novice, he seemed not to side with either the New Dealers or their foes. He had no old scores to settle, no record to live down. Many voters, conservative as well as liberal, thought him inadequate, but nobody saw him as an enemy. With his vague and deliberately inarticulate statements, almost anybody could believe that Ike shared his or her views. Then too, he let his subordinates take the blame for things that went badly and avoided taking credit for things that went well, because in a polarized nation whoever got credit for success necessarily made enemies. Fred Greenstein has shown that Eisenhower concealed the fact that he was a clever political operator because it would have made people cautious and it would not have embellished his reputation for honesty.

During the 1952 campaign Eisenhower worked hard to win the confidence of the GOP right. He had won the nomination by persuading many conservatives that he, not Taft, could win. When Taft and his followers sulked after the convention, Eisenhower met with Taft and got him to state that they agreed on domestic issues with only "differences of degree" on foreign policy. His choice of Nixon as a
running mate was a sop to the right, as was his contention that Acheson's speech caused the Korean War. Although he despised McCarthy, Eisenhower generally left him alone, dropping a pointed defense of Marshall (which amounted to an attack on McCarthy) because he felt it inexpedient.

Eisenhower believed that he needed to win if he wanted to reunite the nation, and he could not achieve unity without winning the confidence of the conservatives. 41

The campaign was bitter. Republican candidates accused their opponents of communist sympathies, and Democrats argued that the Republicans undercut their policies and helped the Kremlin. Truman was among the most vituperative. Pointing out that Eisenhower had said in 1945 that the Soviets wanted only friendship with the United States, Truman commented,

Perhaps if he had given us better advice in 1945, we wouldn't have had so much trouble waking up the country to the danger of Communist imperialism in 1946, 1947, and 1948. 42

Truman blamed Ike for not gaining access to Berlin in 1945 (although FDR had concurred in that decision), and for urging in 1947 the withdrawal of American forces from Korea that Truman carried out in 1949. What Robert A. Divine calls Truman's "lowest blow" was his charge that Eisenhower's endorsement of the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act was "the very practice that identified the so-called 'master race' in Nazi Germany." This remark led
Jewish leaders to criticize Truman. Even the reticent Democratic candidate Adlai Stevenson characterized calls for withdrawal from Korea as isolationism and calls for escalation as likely to start World War III. Stevenson offered no way out of Korea except the peace talks that had dragged on since July 1951. Meanwhile in October 1952, American battle casualties ran to almost a thousand per week.43

Eisenhower carried thirty-nine states, adding about eleven million new votes to Republican totals. They did not seem to come from disgruntled Democrats, as Stevenson won twenty-seven million votes, the same total that Roosevelt and Truman had received in the 1940s. In fact, since about twenty per cent of the Democrats, primarily Irish and Polish Catholics, voted for Eisenhower, Stevenson probably also attracted some new votes. The Republicans gained slim majorities in the House (221-211) and in the Senate (48-47). The war was a more decisive issue than Ike's popularity. Gerard Lambert of Princeton, a pollster hired by Sherman Adams for the Eisenhower campaign, found the stalemate in Korea second only to government waste and bureaucracy as a matter of "grave concern." In the twenty-seven major cities, he found Korea ranked first with independent voters. George Gallup found that sixty-seven per cent of the people sampled thought Eisenhower could "handle the Korean situation best," compared to nine per cent who thought Stevenson could do so. Stuck in a costly
and dangerous war that the administration was afraid either
to quit or to try to win, the country opted for change to
a man whose calmness in crisis had been proved in World
War II. Eisenhower had set out to reunite the country,
and his candidacy had already begun to do so. Fifty-five
per cent of those voting liked Ike. It was a start.44

Eisenhower's election with GOP congressional majorities
might be thought to have been just what the two wings of
the Republican party wanted. For the moderate wing, it was.
But to the conservative wing of the party, Eisenhower's
plans represented no victory. To them, victory would nec­
essarily include their own vindication and the repeal of
the New Deal. They wanted a president who would denounce
and abandon Roosevelt's policies as ruinous, un-American,
and demogogic. They believed they had just received a man­
date for this. As Eisenhower's policies unfolded during
his first year in office, they came to realize how far
apart he and they were on substantive matters. His at­
tempts to win their confidence were not enough. The con­
servatives felt they had again been seduced and abandoned
by the moderates.

They were not powerless to vent their feelings. They
had in Joe McCarthy a master of a technique that had
brought such an administration to heel since 1950. And
McCarthy, always glad to make headliness, would be happy
to avenge the snubs he had received from the Eisenhower
administration was full of people who were as soft on communism as the Truman administration.

McCarthy's career between Eisenhower's inauguration and his own censure demonstrated his great willingness to go after Eisenhower. When he was finally censured in December 1954, McCarthy abandoned caution altogether and attacked Eisenhower personally, but this was not his first attack. Certainly he harrassed the new administration. Furthermore, he took directions in his forays that tended to blaze trails which pointed to the president. If the Army, the CIA, the State Department, and the White House staff -- all McCarthy targets in 1953 and 1954 -- were filled with communists, nobody other than Eisenhower could possibly have been held responsible. Eisenhower had stood by George Marshall when the right denounced him just as Acheson had stood by Alger Hiss. So if people accepted McCarthy's charges in general, Eisenhower made a likely suspect. As early as March 13, 1951, Eisenhower noted in his diary that "Drew Pearson reports Senator McCarthy is digging up alleged dirt with which to smear me if I run for president." McCarthy was willing to attack Eisenhower, and he owed his success to the conservative Republicans in Congress who had protected him since 1950, and who wanted the New Deal undone. 45

The conservatives had other weapons in their arsenal besides McCarthyism. Now that they controlled both houses
of Congress, they could at least hamper the president's ability to govern as they had done in the 80th Congress. They could investigate, they controlled appropriations, they could pass legislation and bargain to get it signed, they could stall, and they had some ability to sell their own ideas. But the cheapest, easiest, and most feared weapon at their disposal was the unrestrained junior senator from Wisconsin.

Eisenhower, meanwhile, worked hard to defuse McCarthyism by settling the issues and doubts on which it depended. McCarthy's support was not based on public outcry, but on midwestern Republican elites and their distrust of the executive branch for what seemed to them to be softness toward communism. Most of this "sofness" was no more than support of the New Deal, but there were other areas that appeared related to Soviet power. These were Eisenhower's primary targets. If he could separate the two issue areas of New Deal domestic policies and Soviet power, he could contain McCarthyism and watch it die.

Some of the distrust of the executive branch really derived from fears that the government had been infiltrated by communists and communist sympathizers who acted as Soviet agents. The spy cases of the late 1940s and early 1950s had heightened these fears by grounding them in reality, however slimly. McCarthy and others had then expanded these fears with their suggestion that actual
communists were less dangerous than "parlor pinks," people who sympathized with communism enough to be used by the Soviets, but who had no clear communist affiliations. Because the civil service had expanded rapidly during the New Deal-Fair Deal years, and because it still contained many of the original personnel, hired during the Popular Front period, McCarthyites contended that the executive branch was shot through with possible Soviet agents. Worse, they argued, the Democrats were so inclined to cronyism that they covered up their mistakes by deliberately not searching for these communists.

The Truman administration refused to face the issue squarely, believing the Republican charges were false. Truman himself contended during the 1948 campaign that these accusations were a "red herring" designed to distract voters from the "real" issues. Clark Clifford, Special Counsel to the President, reported to Truman that the consensus of a staff meeting on security investigations was that nothing new or important had come out of the various investigations. George M. Elsey, Administrative Assistant to the President, wrote in a memo,

The administration's most vulnerable point is "Communism." It has been apparent for many months that a principle [sic], if not the principle [sic], attack of the Republicans in the coming campaign will be that the administration is riddled with Communism.... Our hopes that this issue will die are ill-founded. There is paydirt here, and the Republicans have no intention of being diverted....
Elsey was primarily concerned about political damage rather than security. When Administrative Assistant David Bell raised the issue of efficiency in the proposed President's Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights (PCISIR), Elsey noted, "We don't want 'efficiency' -- we want a group that has public appeal and can sell the country."49

Others in the White House took similar positions. Stephen J. Spingarn, another Administrative Assistant, wrote a memo in June 1950 on the PCISIR proposal detailing pros and cons. Spingarn saw no security problem from communist sympathizers, but he did worry about anticommunists. "The internal security of the United States is being seriously injured," he wrote, "by people who cannot or will not distinguish between communists and anti-communist liberals."50 Yet Spingarn had no doubts that these unfounded attacks would succeed:

There are definite political indications that this cheapest type of political attack is, as usual, one of the most effective regardless of its truth or falsity. Messrs. Smathers, Hickenlooper, Nixon, and now Willis Smith have all made it... a principal issue in their Senate primaries and all have won.51
Spingarn's real concern was allaying the unfounded fears he believed the public shared. "Aside from the 1950 election," he continued,

we also have to look ahead to 1952 and expect a renewal of the same type of attack. It is not believed there is any reason to fear that a commission of fair-minded men, whatever their political persuasion, will find that the Government's internal security measures have been seriously inadequate in major respects.52

Since May, 1950, Spingarn had advocated the formation of a presidential commission to dispel supposed public fears. In his original proposal, it was also clear that he was interested in reassuring the public, not in searching for subversives:

[The Commission] should include a number of Republicans, about half the whole Commission. It should also include strong Catholic representation, since the information I receive is that that charges of disloyalty and homosexuality [sic] among Government employees have made the greatest inroads among Catholics....

I believe that the proposed Commission would have a wide appeal in Congress and the country generally, would serve a very useful function, and might help substantially to allay fears by many Americans of both parties as to whether or not these important problems are being properly handled.53

Special Counsel Charles S. Murphy agreed, and co-authored with Spingarn a memo to Truman urging that such a commission take over from the Tydings Committee. Murphy
and Spingarn suggested that the Tydings Committee could
issue an interim reported that might state

that the Subcommittee has examined the files
sufficiently to determine that they are the
same loyalty files which were furnished sev­
eral Congressional committees during the Re­
publican 80th Congress and that those commit­
tees did not find any basis for action at that
time.54

Murphy continued to try to persuade Truman that the proposed
PCISIR would defuse the communist issue.55 Truman finally
agreed, and asked former president Herbert Hoover to head
such a commission. Hoover was now bitterly partisan, how­
ever, and refused to help the Democrats to get off the hook.
His reply to Truman was both revealing and disingenuous.
"I doubt," he wrote,

if there are any consequential card-carrying com­
munists in the government, or if there are, they
should be known to the F. B. I.... I suggest
that the current lack of confidence arises from
the belief that there are men in Government
(not Communists) whose attitudes are such that
they have disastrously advised on policies in
relation to Communist Russia. The suspicion
is that they continue in the Government....
Without a widespread inquiry into the past
and present of such men and the facts, the
answer to this problem could not be determined.
The Congress itself is likely to be engaged in
such investigations anyway.56

Hoover understood that congressional investigations were
aimed at discrediting the administration, and after all
the abuse he had taken from the Democrats, he was quite
willing to see the Truman administration tarred as traitors.
Undeterred, Truman appointed the Commission on January 21, 1951, under the leadership of Admiral Chester Nimitz. But it was quickly hamstrung by Senator Patrick McCarran, a right-wing Democrat from Nevada, and it disbanded within a few months, never having begun its tasks. 57

Despite widespread agreement among Democrats that the issue was phony, they did not have the courage to treat it that way. The administration vacillated between decrying the charges as false and instituting programs and investigations to see if they were true. Although the aim of the various loyalty programs Truman set up was to demonstrate that there was no communist threat in the federal bureaucracy, these efforts failed. They made the issue seem worthy of investigation and no matter how carefully the administration picked the conservatives who were to legitimize the various boards and committees, it could never count on them to vouch for the loyalty of the New Dealers they investigated. 58 Because the communist issue were merely a smokescreen, having nothing to do with either public fears or Soviet espionage, Truman's attempts to treat it as a serious problem failed. Nonexistent public fears could not be dispelled, and disloyalty could not be disproved, if only because it is hard to disprove a negative statement.

In contrast, when Dewey had claimed in the 1944 campaign that "Communists are seizing control of the New Deal,
through which they aim to control the Government of the United States," Roosevelt had not responded by holding a public search and arguing the nonexistence of traitors from his failure to find them. Instead, he had first ridiculed Dewey for characterizing the New Deal as both communism and monarchy on the same day. Then he spoke seriously:

> When any politician or any political candidate stands up and says, solemnly, that there is danger that the Government of the United States -- your Government -- could be sold out to the Communists -- then I say that candidate reveals -- and I'll be polite -- a shocking lack of trust in America....

Perhaps Truman had made too much of the communist issue himself to say that it was a false issue. Whatever the reason, he and his staff treated the charges with respect, and thus added to their credibility.

In fact, the communist issue engendered little concern among the public, and that probably only because of the fear of war. There simply were not enough people who feared the New Deal to cause such a national crisis. But there were people, especially zealous anticommunists, who, while not objecting to the New Deal, were very much concerned about communism, and accepted charges that policies they disliked were the work of infiltrators. This was McCarthy's audience, the only source of support
he had other than the conservative Republicans opposed to the New Deal.

To achieve national unity, Eisenhower needed to overcome both McCarthyism and the fears that fed it. Other distrusts also stood in the way of national unity. Many people feared both fascism and unionbusting, and saw McCarthyism as merely a part of one or both. Racists and anti-semites and begun using the red smear, as had both anti-union business leaders and competing factions within labor. Many citizens were also afraid of what excessive partisanship was doing to American politics. By undercutting McCarthyism, Eisenhower would reduce these related fears.61

Merely by being elected, Eisenhower settled those fears that were based on Truman's personality, such as cronyism, excessive partisanship, and inadequacy. His own reputation for skillful leadership and honesty dispelled such fears. Furthermore, his campaign speeches assured the public that he was sufficiently concerned about communism, both at home and abroad. As president, he would keep up a display of searching for communist infiltrators and of beefing up the military, primarily with nuclear weapons. Eisenhower shared Truman's belief that it was the fearful public, rather than simply conservative politicians in Congress, who supported McCarthyism.
Fortunately, many of Eisenhower's attempts to calm the public worked on members of Congress.

A Republican administration backed by a Republican Congress would be seen to diminish any threat posed by holdover New Dealers. There would be no partisan reason to cover for them. On the other hand, Eisenhower's unwillingness to dismantle the New Deal also had two calming effects. First, it reassured those New Deal adherents who feared that any Republican administration would undo the good done under Roosevelt and Truman. Second, some people who were not diehard opponents of the New Deal nonetheless saw some New Deal measures as suspect; they now had Eisenhower's implicit assurance that the New Deal was all right.

In his first year in office, Eisenhower moved to undercut McCarthyism. Specific moves included his elimination of fears that the Yalta agreement had contained "secret surrenders" hinted at in Republican rhetoric, his refusal to let McCarthyites block the appointment of career diplomat Charles Bohlen as ambassador to Russia, his ending of the war in Korea, his defeat of the Bricker Amendment, and his attack on "book burners" in a commencement speech at Dartmouth.

The GOP platform of 1952 had contained a pledge to repudiate the Yalta agreement, and by the end of January 1953, Republicans had introduced no fewer than five such
bills. One based repudiation on Soviet violations of the agreement, but the others blamed Yalta for the postwar division of Europe. Eisenhower and Dulles agreed with the Democrats' position that the agreements were the best that could have been obtained in 1945 without a war with Russia, that Russia had violated important pledges in the agreement, and that in any event the agreements provided access rights to Berlin which the Soviets might withdraw if the US repudiated the agreements. This was the position taken by the Captive Peoples resolution sent to Congress by the president. Congressional Democrats gave it quiet support -- it "cleared" their party of treason -- but Republican members of both houses were dismayed. Taft, speaking for angry GOP senators, proposed an amendment stipulating that the resolution did not, in the opinion of Congress, "constitute any determination" of the validity of the Yalta agreements. This threatened to lose the support of the Democrats. As this point, Stalin died. The administration used his death to convince Republican congressional leaders that the resolution was "inopportune," and all parties agreed to let the issue die quietly in committee without floor debate. Eisenhower's failure to repudiate Yalta implied that there was nothing to Republican charges of a sell-out, an impression later confirmed by the Department of State's publication, in 1955, of the full text of the agreements.62
The nomination of "Chip" Bohlen was the strongest defense yet made by the Eisenhower administration against McCarthyism and congressional interference in the executive branch. To critics, Bohlen was guilty of two "crimes:" he was an interpreter at the Yalta conference, and he defended the Yalta agreements. These were not sufficient reasons to deny him confirmation. The nomination was opposed by Senator Styles Bridges, a leading conservative Republican, and McCarthy joined him immediately. At the same time, Taft, the GOP Senate Majority Leader, announced that he would support Bohlen's nomination despite his distaste for Yalta. Taft was concerned that the GOP show both unity and responsibility now that it held power. 63

The allegation against Bohlen was that the State Department's security officer, Scott McLeod, had declined to approve him as a security risk, having seen Bohlen's FBI file, which contained "sixteen pages of derogatory material." McLeod had been appointed as part of Dulles's efforts to placate the right. He was a former FBI agent who had also worked as an investigator for Senator Bridges. Most observers suspected that McLeod's primary loyalty was to Bridges and McCarthy, and it seems likely that he was the source of their information on Bohlen's FBI file.

John Foster Dulles testified during the confirmation hearings that McLeod had left the decision whether to clear Bohlen up to Dulles, who had no problem vouching
for the nominee. Efforts by Bridges and McCarthy to summon McLeod before the Foreign Relations Committee were covertly blocked by Dulles himself. Committee staff trying to locate McLeod could not find him, and Dulles confided to GOP Senator Alexander Wiley his intention to keep McLeod from testifying because the whole controversy was "made up out of imagination." Wiley, a domestic conservative who had shifted from isolationism to internationalism, was generally useful to the president in opposing McCarthy, perhaps because the unrestrained junior senator had run his own candidate against Wiley, the senior senator from Wisconsin, in the 1950 primary. Wiley chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the Bohlen hearings, and was as helpful as possible, consulting Dulles on a strategy for dealing with McCarthy's charges. Publicly, he called this an effort to "cut through rumor and get at the facts," adding, "We want facts and not a lot of rot."64

Dulles had testified to seeing the FBI's summary of Bohlen's file, but not the file itself, which the FBI did not want to release. McCarthy's claim was that the summary was inadequate, that the real "derogatory material" was concealed in the raw file. Taft, Dulles, and Wiley worked out a way to deal with this claim. Taft was already concerned that McCarthy did not know when to quit, having been apparently useful in defeating the Democrats but now endangering Republican unity. In January, when
Taft reorganized the Senate under GOP leadership, he confided to Richard Rover that he had engineered "a brilliant coup" by bottling McCarthy up in Government Operations, where he would spend his days studying reports from the General Accounting Office, and by letting the furor over communism expire under the deadening touch of Jenner and Velde. "We've got McCarthy where he can't do us any harm," he said. He went on to say that while he thought the Democrats had been too casual in their approach to Communists, he himself had never thought that Communists represented half as serious a menace as the Left liberals and welfare statists. He wished to be able to do battle with them and not have the issue confused by talk about spies and saboteurs.65

Taft did not have McCarthy bottled up, as the campaign against Bohlen demonstrated, so Taft moved to close the bottle.

The Taft-Dulles-Wiley strategy was to allow a senator from each party, both with unimpeachable records as anti-communists -- but also with the sense to support the administration -- to review the actual raw file on Bohlen and report to the Senate whether there was any cause for alarm. Putting this plan into effect required Eisenhower to overrule Attorney General Herbert Brownell and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, who were reluctant to show the files to any outsider, even a senator. Taft himself, for the Republicans, and John Sparkman of Alabama, for the Democrats, read through Bohlen's raw file on March 24, 1953,
and they reported to the Senate the next day. Taft knew his colleagues well, and he left them no room for fudging:

So far as I know, no suggestion has been made by anyone that there is in the files anything that is not fully covered in the summary. The so-called sixteen pages of derogatory information relate to entirely separate matters. The greater part of it consists of statements of persons who disagree with Mr. Bohlen's principles with respect to foreign policy. They think he played perhaps a larger part than others played in the Yalta conversations and that he was closer to Mr. Acheson than they would like. In other words, they were statements of political differences with Mr. Bohlen.

So far as I remember, there was no one who did not end up by saying that although he disagreed politically, he had full confidence in the character, the morality, and the general standing and reputation of Mr. Bohlen.

There was no suggestion anywhere by anyone reflecting on the loyalty of Mr. Bohlen in any way, or any association by him with communism or support of communism or even tolerance of communism.66

Here was a considerable break with the McCarthyite position. The most respected conservative in the Senate not only characterized foreign policy differences as "political", rather than as issues of loyalty, but he asserted that Bohlen's views, even about Yalta, did not constitute "communism or support of communism or even tolerance of communism." Then Taft put his own reputation on the line in Bohlen's behalf:

So I myself came to the conclusion that Mr. Bohlen was a completely good security risk in every respect, and I am glad to so report to the Senate of the United States.67
In so doing, Taft drew a line that the McCarthyites dared not cross: if they wanted to continue their attack on Bohlen for disloyalty, they must now also attack Taft as a dupe or a "front man for communists." Not even McCarthy was that reckless. Taft was not finished, though. He wanted there to be no loose ends:

Looking one step further, because of the publicity about Mr. McLeod, I obtained from him a statement that... [he had access to no other material than that which Mr. Dulles, the Senator from Alabama [Mr. Sparkman], and myself had, and upon which we have based our judgment.68

The Bohlen case was notable because Eisenhower stuck to his nominee despite McCarthy's attacks, and because Taft had challenged the McCarthyites either to exhibit some restraint, or to show that they lacked any restraint or sense. Most of the Republican right took the former course, satisfying themselves with some careful grumbling about Yalta. Only thirteen votes were cast against Bohlen's nomination, two of which belonged to conservative Democrats, McCarran of Nevada and Johnson of Colorado.69 But McCarthy, even though he had sense enough not to attack Eisenhower or Taft by name, could not back away from Taft's challenge. After Taft left the Senate floor, McCarthy rose to threaten his fellow Republicans:

[For 20 years the American people have been tasting nothing but the dregs of defeat -- the
defeat of such fundamental concepts as loyalty, honor, and duty....

Where statesmen should have been working for us, traitors and their dupes have connived against us.... The names of Hiss, Lattimore, and Acheson have become synonymous with defeat, disgrace, and dishonor...

Finally last fall the American people became so sick of the entire sorry mess that they voted by an overwhelming majority that we clean out Washington lock, stock, and barrel....

I campaigned against those New Deal-Truman Senators who felt that regardless of the cost to the Nation they had to blind the eyes and close the ears of the American people to the fact that we were rapidly getting a Government of, by, and for Communists, crooks, and cronies. If the day ever comes that we, the Republican Party, follow that same course which we so vigorously condemned, then it will indeed be a black day for America and the world.

We want no Lattimores in our Republican Party. But what is more important, if any are found, we want no Tydings whitewash of them.... If one is found it must be exposed, regardless of how much our own party may bleed because of the exposure.70

McCarthy's threat, made quite bluntly, was to treat Republicans who got in his way as he had treated Tydings, whose defeat for re-election in 1950 was generally attributed to McCarthy's personal attacks. Before he finished that afternoon, McCarthy also challenged the veracity of Senator William Knowland, a leader of the China Lobby and generally a McCarthy supporter. Knowland was furious. "If we have so destroyed confidence," he replied,

in men who have been selected to hold high places in the Government of the United States, God help us; God help us if that is the basis upon which we have to operate.71
After applause from the galleries had subsided, McCarthy intoned,

\[ \text{Let me say to the Senator from California that apparently I conceive my duty as a Senator of the United States in a somewhat different light... I take my position on this matter very seriously.}\]

Pointless menace and innuendo of this kind worried McCarthy’s fellow Republicans and caused some of them to re-evaluate their support for him.

Between the time of the Bohlen debate and Taft’s death in July, McCarthy did not attack the Eisenhower administration again, although he let off steam and caused a few headlines and diplomatic headaches with his attempts to negotiate agreements with certain foreign shipping companies that traded with communist China to persuade them to cease this trade. Although McCarthy allowed aides Roy Cohn and G. David Schine to garner press coverage in Europe by touring American embassies and prompting the burning of "suspect" books in their libraries, McCarthy himself did not tangle with the administration until after Taft’s death at the end of July 1953. Eisenhower was later to argue that McCarthy was a Senate problem and could best be handled by the Senate. The outcome of the Bohlen case suggests that he was right. That case also began the alliance of the moderate Republicans and the Democrats on national security-foreign policy issues.
There were two other issues that Eisenhower put to rest in his first year as president as part of his effort to depolarize the nation. The first was the Korean War, and the second was the Bricker Amendment.

Korea had kept McCarthy's charges on the front pages. During the war, no security measure appeared too aggressive, not even McCarthy's witch-hunting. Peace talks had begun on July 10, 1951, although fighting continued, a static kind of fighting that meant no great offensives but constant, costly skirmishing. Then on May 7, 1952, the cease-fire talks became deadlocked over the issue of repatriation of prisoners. The Chines insisted that prisoners who wanted to remain in the West be returned by force, which the UN refused to do. The deadlock lasted through the 1952 elections and into the summer of 1953. 75

Eisenhower was determined to end the deadlock. He thought the war too costly in both lives and money, and he feared the garrison state. It was one thing, however, to want to end the stalemate, and another to do so. Eisenhower agreed with the Truman administration that he could neither try for victory (because of the high risk), nor accept defeat. 76 There were, however, two middle courses, both of which he resorted to. The first was to accept the limited nature of the war but break the stalemate. The second was compromise.
While the peace talks were still deadlocked in February 1953, Eisenhower began considering in the National Security Council the use of tactical nuclear weapons against the communists' main supply concentration. This option was not MacArthur's dream of a major war to destroy the communist regime in Peking, but a careful escalation that would use nuclear weapons only to win the limited war in Korea. Dulles and Eisenhower saw no crucial distinction between nuclear weapons and others, and thus felt that the Soviet response would not have differed from how the USSR would have reacted to a conventional offensive. The President suggested that if the other UN nations objected to using nuclear weapons, he would ask them to provide three or more divisions of troops instead for the same purpose. His goal remained ending the stalemate within the context of a limited war. In April, when Dulles urged that previous agreements be scrapped in hopes of getting a better settlement, Eisenhower put an end to the idea, saying that the American people would not stand for calling off the armistice and starting the war again.

Instead, when talks deadlocked again in May, Eisenhower had Dulles pass a message to China through Prime Minister Nehru of India that if there were no progress soon in the talks, all previous limits on targets and weapons would be removed. This threat was accompanied by the shipment of atomic warheads to American bases on Okinawa. Within two
weeks, the communists had agreed in substance with a revised UN proposal on prisoners, and despite sabotage by the South Korean government, a truce was signed on July 27, 1953.\textsuperscript{79}

The implied threat to use nuclear weapons was kept secret at the time. Even today, Robert A. Divine has written, it is impossible to know whether Eisenhower was bluffing or not. It is also unknown what role the threat played in changing the communist position, as it had been changing erratically since Stalin's death in March. Certainly the preparations had been made to use atomic devices, and intelligence of this may have convinced the communists that the Dulles message was no bluff. It probably was not. Eisenhower had confided to his diary in 1952 his belief that "properly balanced strength will promote the probability of avoiding war." The idea appeared frequently in his writings and speeches that a nation that is prepared to fight will not need to do so. But the nuclear threat was not the only method he used. Diplomacy was used before resorting to nuclear weaponry, and the final prisoner agreement allowed the communists to save face and assure themselves of the honesty of UN assertions that half the North Korean and Chinese POWs did not want to go home.\textsuperscript{80}

The ending of the Korean War was a major blow to McCarthyism, as was indicated by McCarthy's public applause for South Korea's attempts to prolong the war. A
week after the armistice, McCarthy referred to "our tremendous defeat in Korea." The Asia-first segment of the GOP right was unhappy with the truce, which, as they saw it, ended the war without victory. Yet they made few public complaints. For three years they had denounced the Korean War as a blunder; they could not tell a war-weary public that the conflict must go on. Vice President Nixon was credited with quieting criticism and winning crucial support for the settlement from conservative Republicans. Even the outspoken Jenner opened a speech that quarreled with the organization of the peace talks by saying, "I rejoice... that the fighting and the dying have ended in Korea." Knowland called the truce "peace without honor," but better than a "stalemated war." Republican representative Dewey Short insisted that MacArthur or his successor Van Fleet could have won if allowed to continue attacks. The right resented the loss of its best issue, and it despised ending the war in a draw, even though that had been the UN's objective from the start. The moderate Republicans, on the other hand, were simply relieved to have the war ended, and supported the truce without complaint.81

The Bricker Amendment was a battle of a different kind. It represented the high water mark of the congressional counterattack on the expansion of presidential power that FDR had accomplished. It was introduced by one of the stalwarts of the Republican right, Senator John W. Bricker
of Ohio. The Bricker Amendment was primarily a visceral response by congressional unilaterals to the loss of prestige and importance Congress had suffered in the previous two decades. It was an obstructionist device which would make the initiation of foreign policy extremely difficult, because while the unilaterals knew that they were too small a minority to win the executive branch, they believed they could obstruct the policies of their enemies in the various state legislatures, which would be empowered to prevent any treaty from becoming the law of the land. Tactically, the Amendment seemed unbeatable because it promised to increase the political power of every body that would have to ratify it, and because the president played no formal role in the amendment process. It did not, however, get out of the Senate. At the end of a year of fruitless bargaining, Eisenhower finally had to oppose it openly, and to get help in the Senate from members of both parties. Even so, it was defeated only because it needed the support of two-thirds of the Senate; it fell just one vote short. The debate dragged on into 1954.82

Eisenhower was able to defeat the Bricker Amendment because he recognized it as a constitutional revolt against the executive branch. In developing a strategy, Eisenhower rejected Dulles's advice to argue that the president's conduct of foreign policy should be free of congressional restraints, because he felt this would have maximized
congressional support for the Amendment. Instead, he contended that "the exigencies of the Cold War required the nation as a whole -- and therefore the president as its spokesman -- to have greater maneuvering room in foreign policy making than the amendment would permit." Consistent with what Greenstein calls Eisenhower's "hidden hand leadership", Eisenhower used intermediaries such as Nixon, Brownell, Treasury Secretary George Humphrey, and Commerce Secretary Sinclair Weeks to intercede with Bricker, so that Eisenhower himself could maintain a conciliatory tone. At length, on January 25, 1954, Eisenhower said publicly that he was "unalterably" opposed to the Bricker Amendment, precipitating the final Senate battle.

From the outset, passage in the Senate seemed likely. The Bricker Amendment had sixty-two sponsors (forty-four Republicans and eighteen Democrats) when introduced in January 1953. It required two-thirds to pass, sixty-four votes if every senator voted. Eugene Millikin and Joe McCarthy, both conservatives who ultimately voted for it, were not among the sponsors. But three of the sponsors, Democrat Willis Smith and Republicans Robert Taft and Charles Tobey, died before voting took place.

Eisenhower's opposition persuaded four moderates, Democrat Warren Magnuson and Republicans John Sherman Cooper, James Duff, and Edward Thye, to oppose the Amendment. Magnuson, Duff, and Thye had been among the original
sponsors. From that point on, the conservatives had a difficult fight. Bricker led the GOP right in supporting administration amendments introduced by Homer Ferguson, William Knowland, and Eugene Millikin that weakened the proposal but made it more likely to succeed. A week later, Bricker introduced another change, aimed at undoing the earlier concessions, but sixteen Republicans, mostly moderates but including Knowland and Millikin, joined liberal Democrats in defeating this attempt.

On February 26, 1954, two-thirds of the Senate, including virtually every conservative, adopted another compromise, a substitute motion by Democrat Walter George which Eisenhower also opposed. The final vote was held shortly afterward. Although the vote to adopt the George substitute passed sixty-one to thirty, four of its supporters, Republican Ralph Flanders and Democrats Lister Hill, Henry Jackson, and Warren Magnuson, now voted against the final measure; they had supported the George substitute only to make the final Amendment, which they opposed, as innocuous as possible. As three other Republicans, Robert Hendrickson, Eugene Millikin, and William Knowland, returned to Bricker's side on the final vote, there was a net shift of one vote, enough to deny passage. The result was a narrow Eisenhower victory, with fifteen Republicans voting against the Bricker Amendment, now including eight who had sponsored it. Perhaps most important, Eisenhower
and his advisors had learned, in the course of opposing the amendment, that they could win battles inside the Senate by making a show of respect for the separation of powers and by aligning the moderate Republicans and the Democrats against the Republican right. 86

By the time the Korean War had been ended and the Bricker Amendment had been defeated, Eisenhower had begun to confront McCarthyism itself. On June 14, 1953, he spoke at Dartmouth. Roy Cohn and G. David Schine had just returned from their destructive tour of American libraries in Europe. Without naming them, Eisenhower urged his audience,

Don't join the book burners. Don't think you are going to conceal faults by concealing evidence that they ever existed....
How will we defeat communism unless we know what it is, and what it teaches, and why does it have such an appeal...?

[W]e have got to fight it with something better, not try to conceal the thinking of our people. They are part of America. And even if they think ideas that are contrary to ours, their right to say them their right to record them, and their right to have them at places where they are accessible to others is unquestioned, or it isn't America. 87

Although this speech we generally reported at the time as an attack on McCarthyism, it was quickly explained away by liberals who insisted that only a frontal assault
on McCarthy himself counted as an attack on McCarthyism. Eisenhower felt otherwise, and said so in his memoirs:

McCarthyism was a much larger issue than McCarthy. This was the truth that I constantly held before me as I listened to the many exhortations that I should "demolish" the senator himself....

Of one thing I was certain: McCarthyism antedated the appearance of Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin and would last longer than the man's power or publicity.

Lashing back at one man, which is easy for a President, was not as important to me as the long-term value of restraint, the due process of law, and the basic rights of free men. That is why I condemned book-burning rather than bandying about the names of the men of the moment who would burn books.®

Far from being a rationale for cowardice, this attack on McCarthyism rather than on McCarthy himself proceeded from Eisenhower's tactical premises. The first was that the problem was a behavior more widespread than one man. The second, which complemented it, was that McCarthy himself drew strength from any kind of publicity which gave him the right to respond with an even greater outrage.

McCarthy never defended himself; he always countered with new charges. Bryce Harlow, an Eisenhower aide, recalled in 1978 that Eisenhower's approach was to deny McCarthy these opportunities. "Joe McCarthy shrivelled up and died," said Harlow,

because he couldn't make contact with Ike, couldn't get Ike into a confrontation. Ike told me half a dozen times, "That damn fool Truman went eyeball-to-eyeball with him. Whenever a President does that with any
individual he raises that individual to the President's level, and Truman was too stupid to understand that."89

Eisenhower realized that it was harder to attack a man without naming him, but he insisted that it was the only effective way to attack McCarthy. It was slow, but it proved thorough.

That the Dartmouth speech was an attack on McCarthy is as clear from reading it now as it was to reporters in 1953. What has obscured this was Eisenhower's own limits in refusing to attack McCarthy by name. At his press conference three days later, reporter Merriman Smith asked the president whether the Dartmouth speech was an attack on McCarthy, as many people thought. Eisenhower did not give a direct answer, but ducked the question, saying, "Now Merriman, you have been around me long enough to know I never talk personalities." To many, it seemed that he was backing off, but he was merely being consistent in his tactics.90

Eisenhower's refusal to attack McCarthy by name was an example of what Fred Greenstein calls his "hidden hand leadership" techniques. Eisenhower concealed his activities as a party leader because visible partisanship would have interfered with bipartisan congressional coalitions needed to pass his programs, and because his efforts to strengthen centrist groups in the party would increase factional conflict in the GOP if they were publicized. But besides this general strategem, there were other
reasons not to attack McCarthy by name. In his first year in the White House, Eisenhower was still prone to believe that the GOP right, even including McCarthy, meant well and would eventually listen to reason. To attack them personally was to forfeit any chance of winning them over, as the New Dealers had done. If he could make them stop their offensive acts, he had no objection to working with them. Indeed, until the Bricker Amendment was defeated, he could not afford to antagonize the whole GOP right. He did not ask the GOP leadership for help in controlling McCarthy, as will be seen in chapter five, until after the Bricker Amendment came to a final vote. The next week, when the Bricker Amendment was safely dead and the GOP congressional leadership had indicated its unwillingness to control McCarthy, Eisenhower could afford to conclude that there was no use "trying to work with guys that aren't for you, and are never going to be.... We just can't work with fellows like McCarthy, Bricker, Jenner, and that bunch."92

As will be demonstrated, even after Eisenhower decided to go after McCarthy in March 1954, he had other reasons for not attacking McCarthy by name as his friends and critics demanded he do. Those who believed the President alone had enough prestige to win a fight with McCarthy thought it would be simple: Ike would merely denounce McCarthy as a liar and a fraud, and the public would stop believing in McCarthy, and that would be that. This was
what Truman and Stevenson and the ADA liberals had done since 1950, and it had not worked for them. It could not work unless the attacker pointed out that the communist issue itself was a fraud, and there was no public figure who had not used it.

But McCarthy's support did not come from the public, it came from conservative Republicans in safe congressional seats who held Eisenhower in no more awe than did McCarthy. Nor was Ike immune to smears. He had had a wartime relationship with Kay Summersby, his British driver, and, as Nixon hinted during his "Checkers" speech, Truman had once ordered the Internal Revenue Service to give Eisenhower special tax breaks on the royalties from his war memoirs. Also, Ike's closest friends during his adult life, especially during and after the war, were millionaires, who sometimes gave him generous gifts, and moderates who belonged to the kinds of groups McCarthy had smeared Democrats for supporting, such as the Institute for Pacific Relations, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the United Council of Churches. None of these were subversive, but McCarthy had tarred other prestigious men for less. Had Eisenhower gone "into the gutter with that man," as he often put it, he would both have raised McCarthy's stature and seen his own diminished. Even if he won, his presidency might well have been crippled, and getting McCarthy was not his only interest. He gave a
higher priority to reducing Cold War tensions. Finally, Eisenhower's prestige was his ultimate weapon; had he gone to the public demanding that they choose between McCarthy and the Bill of Rights, he could not be certain he would not fail, leaving the nation defenseless against the McCarthyites.93

There was another tactical advantage to attacking McCarthy without naming him. McCarthy could not reply without exposing himself. If Eisenhower denounced certain kinds of conduct, without naming anybody in particular, McCarthy could not defend himself or counterattack without identifying himself as the villain Eisenhower had described.

The notion that Eisenhower never attacked McCarthy persists in part because Eisenhower and his staff were careful not to commit anything to writing that would show what he was doing. But written evidence of Eisenhower efforts to avoid written evidence does exist. For example, in November 1953, Eisenhower had a memo circulated "to all Cabinet officers and individuals heading independent agencies of the Executive Department," specifying that "No reply is required." Nothing on the memorandum itself identified it, and it was unsigned. The last item, which was totally unquotable and unattributed, read in its entirety:

"McCarthyism" disapproved of, and should be curbed. The McCarthy-Jenner assault on due process of law and order should be curtailed.
There are too many Congressional investigations which leads to their overemphasis in the press. Had this fallen into unfriendly hands, nothing could have been made of it.

Eisenhower exhibited the same tendency to avoid written evidence in a discussion on March 25, 1954 with Press Secretary James Hagerty. When Hagerty asked whether the president had sent a letter to Senator Karl Mundt about the Army-McCarthy hearings, Eisenhower replied that he had instead phoned Mundt. "If I could trust him," he told Hagerty, "I'd have sent the letter. But you can't trust that fellow." Although Eisenhower was so careful about what went onto paper that he did not trust even his own sentences in writing, he got his message across.

And despite his caution, Eisenhower continued to attack McCarthy's actions during the rest of his first year in office. In June 1953, McCarthy hired J. B. Matthews for his committee staff, perhaps unaware that Matthews had just written an article for the current issue of American Mercury in which he claimed that the largest group supporting the communists in America was composed of Protestant clergy. Hiring Matthews was a mistake that made McCarthy look ridiculous. The National Committee for an Effective Congress (NCEC), which was organizing opposition to McCarthy with the help of another close Eisenhower advisor, Paul Hoffman, president of Studebaker,
quickly spread the word about Matthews to religious leaders, precipitating a telegram of protest to Ike from the National Council of Christians and Jews. It took only a few minutes to get the president's approval of a statement deploiring the Matthews charges and denouncing "generalized and irresponsible attacks that sweepingly condemn the whole of any group of citizens." Presidential aide Sherman Adams commented in his memoirs that Eisenhower's reply created a sensation and McCarthy announced Matthews's resignation within an hour. Adams did not report all he knew. While White House aides, Adams included, were preparing Eisenhower's statement, they learned that McCarthy was about to announce that Matthews had resigned. At the White House's request, Vice President Nixon quickly intercepted and stalled McCarthy until the press had the president's statement and it was too late for McCarthy to make his own. It thus appeared that McCarthy had fired Matthews in response to a dressing-down from Eisenhower.

Throughout the first year of his presidency, Eisenhower worked at calming the fears on which McCarthyism had fed. Again and again, he urged people to master their fears. Questioned about the removal of "suspect" books from government libraries, Eisenhower said, "I think someone got frightened. I don't know why they should. I wouldn't; I will tell you that, I wouldn't." In November he told a press conference that the executive branch was making
steady progress at assuring that no communists remained in
the federal government, adding,

Now, I hope that this whole thing [the issue of
communists in government] will be a matter of
history and of memory by the time the next elec-
tion comes around. I don't believe we can live
in fear of each other forever.101

McCarthy was furious, and attacked the administration
in a television speech on November 24, insisting, "The raw,
harsh, unpleasant fact is that Communism is an issue and it
will be an issue in 1954."102 He then blasted the admini-
stration for not firing John Paton Davies, one of his
early targets in the State Department, for not cutting
off aid to nations that traded with China, and for not
doing enough to secure the release of American prisoners
in Korea.103

Eisenhower replied with two statements on December
second. In one he reiterated his hope and belief that by
"next fall... the public, no longer fearful that Communists
are destructively at work within the government, will wish
to commend the efficiency of this Administration in elim-
inating this menace to the nation's security."104 In the
second statement, Eisenhower singled out McCarthy for a
rebuttal, although he still referred only to "the Junior
Senator from Wisconsin" without naming him. Responding to McCarthy's recent speech, he said,

He attempted to establish himself as the only person to have dealt effectively with Communists in Government. He stated that there were still communists in this Government after ten months of the new Administration, and he implied that unless these were rooted out on his advice and by his methods, this Administration would be as guilty of harboring Communists as the previous Administration.

I believe that the record of action speaks for itself.... [T]his Government [has] released from its employ 1456 individuals whose security was doubtful. This work is continuing.... Against that record of patient, quiet, thorough, and decent investigation and corrective action stands another record. This other record is one of spreading fear, disrupting organizations, damaging American prestige. If results are what he sincerely seeks, again the record speaks for itself.105

Eisenhower's methods of reducing fears about communist infiltration were based on dubious figures and doubtful assumptions. In his 1954 State of the Union address, the figure for security risks removed from the administration had risen to 2200. According to Richard Fried, very few of these dismissals involved charges of disloyalty. Some had even been hired since Eisenhower's inauguration. Leading Democrats disputed the figures and asked for a breakdown from the Civil Service Commission, but none was forthcoming.106

Eisenhower and his advisors had decided to take the same approach to the issue of communists in government that the Truman administration had taken. Neither believed there
was any serious communist infiltration of the government, but neither trusted the public to believe this. Both administrations believed that the communist issue was a lethal weapon that could be countered only by showing concern about infiltration. Like Truman, Eisenhower had no intention of saying that the issue itself was false, because he had used the red smear too. Instead, again like Truman, he concluded that the only way to handle the communist issue was to portray himself as the most effective anticommunist around. So Eisenhower, too, endorsed and legitimized the rumors of communist infiltration so that he could put them to rest. This allowed him to win tactical victories against the Republican right at the cost of legitimizing further the anticommunist paranoia that dominated American politics. 107

By the beginning of 1955, therefore, Eisenhower had eroded the bases of support for McCarthyism in the anti-New Deal coalition that had defeated the Democrats fifteen months earlier. Cutting taxes and price controls had reduced the hostility many people felt toward the federal government. The moderate wing of the Republican party was contented with having power in the administration. Eisenhower's reassuring presence convinced many politicians and voters that the country was in safe hands. The sources of anticommunist paranoia had been undercut by a convincing show of concern about national security, the
dispelling of the Yalta myths, and Taft's support of the Bohlen nomination. Above all, the Korean War was over, and war with Russia seemed less imminent. 108

With these changes, McCarthy was now extremely vulnerable, should he provoke attack, yet he did not seem to know it. At the very time when Senate Republicans needed McCarthy least and were beginning to question whether he might in fact be more of a liability than an asset, McCarthy decided to go after the United States Army. The flush of Republican victory had been replaced by the realization that the party's internal differences could not be ignored while it was in power. McCarthy, whose political survival had always depended upon the congressional Republicans rallying around him, set out on a campaign that would shatter Republican unity and bring the prestigious Eisenhower to seek McCarthy's destruction. The period of Republican triumph was about to end.
NOTES -- CHAPTER FOUR


2. Patterson, Mr. Republican chap. 32; Mayer, "Republican Party" p. 2289; idem., Republican Party, pp. 483-484; Miles, Odyssey pp. 91-92; Taft, Foreign Policy for Americans Divine, 1952-1960, p. 9.


7. See, e.g., *Congressional Record*, March 5, 1948, pp. 2205-2213.

8. Vandenberg Diary, May 9, 1949, Vandenberg Papers.


18. Acheson, Present.


Foster Dulles Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton University; Dulles to Eisenhower, April 25, 1952, ibid.; Miles, Odyssey, pp. 186-188, 193-194; Hughes, Ordeal, pp. 70, 207.

37. Eisenhower, Mandate, pp. 18-21; Eisenhower Diary, January 10, 1952; Mayer, Party, pp. 482-488; idem, "Party", pp. 2288-2292; Burns, Deadlock, pp. 182-186; Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 535-541.


39. Ibid., pp. 55-557; Burns, Deadlock, 186-187; Mayer, Party, pp. 490-491.


42. Ibid., p. 68; Fried, Men Against McCarthy, pp. 237-238.

44. Ibid., pp. 82-83; Mayer, "Republican Party", pp. 2291-2292; idem., Republican Party, pp. 482, 494-495; Patterson, Mr. Republican, p. 580; Alexander, Holding the Line, pp. 23-24.

45. Eisenhower Diary entry March 13, 1951; Fried, McCarthy, pp. 257-259, 272-274; Miles, Odyssey, pp. 210-212; Reeves, McCarthy, pp. 462-463, 476-486, 502-506.

46. Hamby, Beyond the New Deal, p. 382.

47. Clifford, Memorandum for the President, August 4, 1948, George M. Elsey Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

48. Elsey, Random Thoughts, August 26, 1948, Elsey Papers, Truman Library. Also see Elsey, Department of Justice Suggestions, August 5, 1948, ibid.; Spingarn Memorandum for the President, October 15, 1948, Spingarn Papers, Truman Library.

49. Bell to Murphy and notes, November 14, 1950, Elsey Papers, Truman Library.

50. Elsey, Memorandum of Pros and Cons..., June 26, 1950, Elsey Papers, Truman Library.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Spingarn, Memorandum, May 22, 1950, Murphy Papers, Truman Library.

54. Murphy and Spingarn to the President, May 24, 1950, Harry S. Truman Papers, Truman Library.
55. Murphy, Memorandum for the President, November 15, 1950, Murphy Papers, Truman Library.

56. Hoover to President, November 26, 1950, Truman Papers, Truman Library.


59. Burns, Soldier, p. 529.

60. Reeves, McCarthy, p. 456; Fried, "Electoral Politics and 'McCarthyism': The 1950 Campaign" in Griffith and Theoharis, The Specter, pp. 219-222; idem., McCarthy, pp. 250-251; Rogin, Intellectuals, pp. 232-260; Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960), pp. 50-51; Samuel A. Stouffer, Communism Conformity, and Civil Liberties (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955), pp. 59, 66-69, 72, 75-78, 85-87. Souffer explains why other surveys seemed to show greater public concern over the communist issue: when the question was open-ended, suggesting no specific responses, such as "What kind of things do you worry about most?" he found that the "number of people who said that they were worried
about the threat of Communists in the United States or about civil liberties was, even by the most generous interpretation of occasionally "ambiguous responses, less than 1%" (Emphasis in original.) But if the questioner gave the subject a list of possible concerns and asked, "Which one on that whole list seems most important to you?", twelve per cent listed "Communists in the United States". pp. 59, 72. Only when the communist issue was suggested as important did more than one per cent think of it as important.


67. Ibid., p. 2363.

68. Ibid.
69. Ibid., pp. 2364-2376, March 27, 1953, p. 2392.

70. Ibid., pp. 2376-2377.

71. Ibid., pp. 2382-2384.

72. Ibid.

73. Fried, McCarthy, pp. 259-260; Reeves, McCarthy, pp. 486-505; Adams, Firsthand Report, pp. 95, 140-141; White, Taft Story, p. 239.


80. Ibid., p. 30; Alexander, Holding the Line, pp. 46-48; Reeves, McCarthy, p. 505; New York Times, June 19,
1953; Eisenhower Diary entry January 22, 1952, Eisenhower Library.


82. Alexander, Holding the Line, pp. 71-72.

83. Reaffirmation, p. 60.

84. Ibid., pp. 60, 64-65.


86. CR, February 26, 1954.


88. Eisenhower, Mandate, 1:321.


90. Ibid., pp. 424-440.


94. Memorandum for General Carroll and attachment, November 5, 1953, DDED File, Eisenhower Library.


96. American Mercury 77 (July 1953), p. 3.


100. Public Papers, 1953, p. 126.


103. Ibid.


106. Fried, McCarthy, p. 278.


CHAPTER FIVE: THE CONTINUING PROBLEM OF JOE McCARTHY

McCarthyism became an important part of American politics in the early 1950s because it was the only standard to which a sharply divided Republican party could rally. Eisenhower had assumed during his 1952 campaign that the mere election of a Republican president with Republican congressional majorities would deflate McCarthyism, but the ideological differences between the two wings of the party were actually intensified by holding power. When McCarthy and his supporters came to view the Eisenhower administration as no better than Truman's, they renewed the use of McCarthyism as a weapon to hamper a moderate administration. It took Eisenhower a year in office to realize that the problem would have to be faced firmly.

Eisenhower's analysis of the McCarthy problem mirrored his understanding of the party split. He had expected trouble with the Republicans in Congress. Such "misunderstandings", he wrote in his diary on April 1, 1953,

result from the readiness of political legislators to fly into print at every possible opportunity. I repeat, this is especially true because of the fact that for so long a time the Republican party has been opposed to, and often a deadly enemy of, the individual in the White House.\(^1\)
At the end of his first year, he wrote,

Relationships with [the GOP congressional leaders] have on the whole been better than I anticipated.... I was quite well aware of some of the deepseated differences that would separate me...from some of the House and Senate leaders.²

Senator Robert A. Taft had minimized the effects of the party's internal division until his death in July 1953, and a certain momentum followed his death for about six months. The acknowledged leader of the conservative wing of the GOP, Taft was the conservative most inclined towards party responsibility. He had repeatedly kept Senate Republicans behind Eisenhower when they did not want to support his internationalist policies or his moderate or liberal nominees. Taft's influence divided the conservative wing of the party between support for the moderates and harmless opposition -- for example, in the Bohlen nomination. In contrast, the McCarthy censure vote of late 1954 revealed the strongest possible McCarthyite bloc in the Senate, in those who voted or paired against censure. On the Bohlen vote, every McCarthyite who voted against confirming Bohlen was balanced by one who voted with Taft for confirmation. The latter included John M. Butler of Maryland, beneficiary of McCarthy's 1950 assault on Millard Tydings; William Knowland of California, the foremost spokesperson for the China Lobby; and such dogged rightists as Frank Barrett (Wyoming), Guy Gordon (Oregon), Thomas
Kuchel (California), Edward Martin (Pennsylvania), Eugene Millikin (Colorado), William Purcell (Connecticut), and Milton Young (North Dakota).^3

Because Taft was able to divide the GOP right, the problems of McCarthyism and the party split seemed small during most of Eisenhower's first year. "In the House I do not not anticipate a great deal of difficulty," Eisenhower wrote in April 1953,

but in the Senate the record of the past few weeks is encouraging only insofar as the majority of Republicans is concerned. However, if we can win away from the McCarthy-Malone [of Nevada, a diehard rightist] axis about five or six of their members, the splinter group will be reduced to impotence.4

But Taft's death ended that hope, and Eisenhower lamented his loss. Far from being able to continue to win over more of the conservatives, Eisenhower began to lose support from those conservatives he had relied on, such as Knowland, Millikin, Kuchel, and Everett Dirksen. Within a few months of Taft's death the split had re-emerged, highlighted by McCarthy's attacks on the administration. By mid-March, 1954, Eisenhower recognized that the GOP right could not be won over, but would use McCarthyism as a weapon against him. He recognized also that the right did not necessarily believe McCarthy's claims that there were still communists in the administration, but, as he wrote to a friend, McCarthy was supported by a "a reactionary and
recalcitrant splinter group" in the GOP, perhaps only to embarrass the administration.\(^5\)

McCarthy's investigation of the Army was what made Eisenhower realize that the GOP right was an intractable opponent. The president had ignored McCarthy's probes of the Army since their beginning in Oct.\(\_\)er 1953. He had also paid no attention to McCarthy's discovery and interrogation of a communist dentist, Major Irving Peress. But in mid-February McCarthy grilled Peress's commander, General Ralph W. Zwicker, a highly decorated officer who had served in combat under Eisenhower from D-Day to VE Day, and whom Eisenhower had personally commended after the war. During the week that followed, when Secretary of the Army Robert Stevens refused to allow other officers to appear before McCarthy, Stevens was himself berated and made to recant by the junior senator from Wisconsin. By the end of that week, with the entire Army chain of command under fire, Eisenhower lost his patience and began to revise his view of the twin problems of McCarthy and the party split.\(^6\)

The progress of Eisenhower's reassessment of the problem is fairly well documented. Zwicker was humiliated on February 18. The next day Secretary Stevens, following orders Eisenhower gave him at the beginning of the probe, announced that he would not allow other officers to be subjected to similar treatment. Early the next week, McCarthy demanded that Stevens himself testify. Stevens
met with all the committee Republicans except McCarthy, along with Vice President Nixon and Majority Leader Knowland. This group promised Stevens that they would protect future witnesses from abuse if Stevens would allow them to testify, and they warned Stevens against testifying himself. Committee Republicans Mundt and Dirksen then set up the famed "chicken lucheon" between McCarthy and Stevens on Wednesday the 24th, with the hope of reaching a compromise. Stevens did not even inform the white House, but McCarthy surprised him with a hundred reporters, and got a statement from Stevens that sounded like capitulation.7

When Eisenhower learned about the "chicken lucheon," he decided it was time to stop McCarthy. Press Secretary Hagerty's diary details the course Eisenhower took, beginning on the 25th, when he found out about Stevens's apparent surrender. A major White House staff meeting ensued on the matter, at which Senator Dirksen was present. Dirksen agreed to get the Republican committee members to state their confidence in Stevens and to treat further witnesses with respect. Dirksen also promised to push his follow committee members to fire McCarthy's right-hand man Roy Cohn, to prevent McCarthy from holding one man committee meetings, and to limit his subpoena powers severely. But Hagerty noted, apparently later, that "Dirksen couldn't deliver."8
Without a doubt, Eisenhower's initial instinct was to attack only McCarthy. "This guy McCarthy is going to get into trouble over this," he told Hagerty.

I'm not going to take this one lying down.... My friends tell me it won't be long in this Army stuff before McCarthy starts using my name instead of Stevens. He's ambitious. He wants to be President. He's the last guy in the world who'll ever get there, if I have my say.9

Explained Hagerty: "It's his Army and he doesn't like McCarthy's actions at all." Whatever his specific reason, Eisenhower started out simply to rein in on McCarthy.10

Eisenhower's scope was broadened by the responses he got when he called upon the Republican leadership to leash the junior senator. Dirksen's bland assurances led nowhere. GOP Senate leaders showed no real interest in curtaillling their colleague. Many of the Republican Senate leaders were also leading conservatives who had covered for McCarthy before, and they did so this time. He was, after all, their weapon. At the GOP Legislative Leadership Meeting on Monday March 1, Eisenhower asked the leaders for their help. They promised nothing.11 The president was furious at the virtual refusal of the Senate leadership to control McCarthy. Hagerty noted that the next day, Eisenhower repeatedly complained, "What's the use of trying to work with guys that aren't for you, and are never going to be for you?" The Bricker Amendment, a major threat to
Eisenhower's presidency, had just been defeated despite its support by virtually the entire GOP Senate leadership. The president concluded that he would have to take on the conservative wing of the party to get at McCarthy, and he was now prepared to do so. He told Hagerty that he could not work with "fellows like McCarthy, Bricker, Jenner, and that bunch." Three days later he sent every cabinet member a "Personal and Confidential" memo entitled "Treatment of Government Personnel," supporting the need for security checks, but insisting that procedures be characterized by "fairness, justice, and decency," that "each superior, including me" protect subordinates from attacks, and that "No hope of any kind of political advantage, no threat from any source, should lead anyone to forsake these principles of organizational leadership."

Eisenhower's basic tactics against McCarthyism did not change drastically. He did not want to fight McCarthy on an ideological basis because there were so many Republican senators who preferred conservative principles to his own; an open breach with the conservatives would force many to side with McCarthy. Instead, the battle must be waged on the basis of McCarthy's behavior. Believing that McCarthy needed the kind of publicity which a presidential rebuke would create, Eisenhower continued to avoid naming the senator as the object of his attacks. But his objective
changed: he no longer aimed at teaching McCarthy manners, but now sought to end the Wisconsin senator's career.

A weapon for McCarthy's destruction was at hand. In January, John G. Adams, Counselor to Army Secretary Stevens, had met with Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Henry Cabot Lodge, and two White House aides, Sherman Adams and Gerald Morgan, to discuss the McCarthy investigation. Sherman Adams suggested that the Army compile a report on the efforts of McCarthy and Cohn to win special treatment for G. David Schine, who had been drafted. The report was released in March in response to McCarthy's abuse of Zwicker and Stevens, and McCarthy's subcommittee voted to investigate both McCarthy's charges that the Army sheltered communists and the Army's claims that McCarthy had made improper use of his influence in Schine's behalf. The maneuverings of both sides illustrate the division within the GOP. The Army-McCarthy hearings were the White House's primary weapon against McCarthy until late summer, when McCarthy's loss of public support due to the hearings led to his censure.14

Eisenhower had other weapons as well. Fred Greenstein has best detailed Eisenhower's 1954 efforts to isolate McCarthy from the rest of the GOP. In November 1953, McCarthy had demanded and received free television time to answer Truman's charges that McCarthyism was a Republican political device; indeed, McCarthy used that broadcast to
attack the administration for what he considered inadequate anticommunist zeal. Adlai Stevenson claimed in early March 1954 that the GOP was "half McCarthy and half Eisenhower;" the president publicly branded the statement as "nonsense", but quietly saw to it that Nixon, not McCarthy, received television time to respond. Republican Senator Ralph Flanders of Vermont attacked McCarthy on the Senate floor for the meager findings of his investigations: "He goes forth into battle and proudly returns with the scalp of a pink dentist." Eisenhower sent Flanders a congratulatory note the same day. The president denied knowledge of the contents of Flander's speech at his press conference the next day, but his message to Flanders suggests otherwise. "I was very interested," he wrote, "in reading the comments you made in the Senate today. I think America needs to hear from Republican voices like yours."

Because the traditional view is that Eisenhower did little to thwart McCarthy, it should be pointed out here that his "hidden hand" methods and concern for secrecy were designed to give just that impression. Until the Hagerty diary was opened to the public in 1979, there was no cohesive evidence for the case that Eisenhower was intimately and continuously involved in the effort to destroy McCarthy. Such evidence is now available, corroborated by material other than Hagerty's diary.
The correspondence, for example, between Paul Hoffman, the president of Studebaker, columnist Roscoe Drummond, C.D. Jackson (a vice-president of Time-Life, Incorporated, who was Eisenhower's principal wartime and Cold War advisor on psychological warfare), and the president himself in April and May concerned plans for opposing McCarthy. Most of this correspondence was kept in Hoffman's office at the Studebaker Company in South Bend, Indiana.18

Hoffman had sent Eisenhower two letters on April thirtieth, one dealing with one of Eisenhower's social gatherings, and the second containing a plan that Hoffman and Drummond had put together to form "a small group of people, not more than three or four, [to] be invited by the President to develop a careful, constructive, co-ordinated program of ACTION and ADVOCACY" to undercut McCarthy by establishing Eisenhower "in the mind of the whole country as the effective and trusted leader for immobilizing the subversives."19 The plan, written up by Drummond, was sent to Eisenhower with this note from Hoffman:

You will find enclosed in the form of a memorandum my suggestion for combating the "dividers." It is the result of long discussions with [Presidential Appointments Secretary] Tom Stephens and Roscoe Drummond and a rather short talk with C.D. Jackson. If it interests you, you can give the word to Tom Stephens and we will go into action.20
On May 3, Eisenhower gave Hoffman the go-ahead signal in a note that appeared to say nothing:

Tom Stephens will get in touch with you regarding your proposed committee.21

This led to a meeting on May 12, to which Hoffman invited Jackson, commenting, "Tom Stephens is to arrange a place for the meeting which is to be in some spot other than the White House."22

There are other signs that Eisenhower did not consider the White House leakproof during the fight against McCarthy. Hagerty reported his suspicion that some of their legislative liaison personnel were in league with the GOP right. On May 20, the day after Eisenhower announced that he would not allow White House staffers to testify in the Army-McCarthy hearings, the combinations of all four White House safes were ordered changed. A note in the file of Eisenhower's secretary, Ann Whitman, dated May 15, says that three of the safes malfunctioned, an unlikely coincidence, and were cleaned and reset. Since all four were changed five days later, there must have been suspicion of tampering. Eisenhower's preoccupation with security measures explains why so little evidence exists of his direct involvement in efforts to stop McCarthy.23

As discussed earlier, Eisenhower had concluded that McCarthy had to be combatted in the Senate, since he would
continue to be a menace only if the Senate allowed it. Moreover, any moves against McCarthy had to be made by Republican Senators. Minority Leader Lyndon Johnson told a friend, "When the time comes, I'll do what I ought to do." But that time had not yet arrived in early 1954. Later, when McCarthy was on the ropes, the Democrats would gladly take part in finishing him off, but they would insist until then that he was "a Republican problem."

A motion to censure McCarthy was not discussed until mid-July. Between Eisenhower's March 2 decision to oppose the GOP right and the middle of June, the Army-McCarthy hearings held center stage. The administration engaged in additional activities during the same period. In his press conference of March 17, the president linked the issues of national defense, national security, and hysteria in a rambling, calming statement that began as a comment on defense:

Now our most valued, our most costly asset is our young men. Let's don't use any more of them than we have to.

Forty years I was in [the] Army, and I did one thing: study how you can get an infantry platoon out of battle. The most terrible job in warfare is to be a second lieutenant leading a platoon when you are on the battlefield.

If we can do anything to lessen that number -- remember this: we are planning right now the greatest peacetime Army we have ever held, one million men in time of peace.
What are we talking about? It is, I think, there is too much hysteria. You know, the world is suffering from a multiplicity of fears. We fear the men in the Kremlin, we fear what they will do to our friends around them; we are fearing what unwise investigations will do to us here at home as they try to combat subversion or bribery or deceit within.... All of these, with their impact on the human mind makes us act almost hysterically, and you get hysterical reactions.

We have got to look at each of those in its proper perspective, to understand what the whole sum total means.26

According to Hagerty, Eisenhower hoped that this speech on fear and another by Brownell on plans to combat subversion would "take [the] red play away from McCarthy and put it back at [a] decent level."27

There was one other problem that the White House had to dispose of before facing McCarthy, the Oppenheimer case. Although no evidence of misconduct on Oppenheimer's part had been found, his wife and several close friends were or had been Communist party members. In April a petition signed by a number of leading scientists in Oppenheimer's behalf reached the White House. According to Hagerty, two fears of White House staffers led to the decision not to reinstate Oppenheimer: should he be reinstated as a result of this position, McCarthy might persecute the petitioners, and he might use the case to "get out from under" the Army-McCarthy situation. Eisenhower was not convinced that Oppenheimer was guilty of anything, but he was not clearly
innocent, so he was an unnecessary liability, and he had to go. 28

The administration's main effort, however, was to keep the Army-McCarthy hearings on track. The Army, on Eisenhower's orders, released its report on McCarthy's misuse of his influence in behalf of Schine on March 11, without warning the Senate Republican leadership. Knowland was furious, but Eisenhower remarked to Hagerty that if the GOP leaders had known beforehand of the report, it would never have reached the press. 29 On March 16, McCarthy's subcommittee voted to hold open hearings to investigate both sets of charges. For most of the next month, McCarthy tried to gain the right to sit in judgment of his own case as a member of his subcommittee. Despite bitter disagreements along the White House staff, Eisenhower declared publicly that such an action would be improper, saying he had made up his mind "that you can't do business with Joe and to hell with any attempt to compromise." Later in the day, to Hagerty, he added, "Listen, I'm not going to compromise ideals and personal beliefs for a few stinking votes. To hell with it." 30 Finally, in a closed-door meeting of McCarthy's subcommittee, McCarthy agreed to be replaced on the subcommittee during the hearings by a person of his choice from the parent committee. He chose one of his stalwarts, GOP Senator Henry C. Dworshak of Idaho. 31
Public hearings began April 22 and lasted through June 17. McCarthy discovered that White House personnel had urged the preparation of Army charges against him and moved to get their testimony. Eisenhower now took Hoffman's earlier suggestion, and refused to allow White House personnel to testify. McCarthy overreached, publicly asking government employees to leak information to him. Meanwhile McCarthy's allies saw the harm he was doing himself on national television and tried to end either the hearings or the televising of them. Eisenhower and Lyndon Johnson would not permit either. 32

The subcommittee that heard the charges by and against McCarthy was temporarily chaired by Karl Mundt of South Dakota, the senator Eisenhower did not trust with written communications. The other Republicans were Dworshak, McCarthy's substitute; Everett Dirksen, who played both the McCarthyite and anti-McCarthyite sides, attending strategy meetings with the White House staff, vainly promising his help in the subcommittee, and yet tricking a colleague into a pro-McCarthy vote during the hearings and ultimately voting against McCarthy's censure; and Charles Potter of Michigan, an administration ally who resented being duped by Dirksen. The Democrats on the subcommittee, carefully selected by Johnson, were John F. Kennedy, Henry M. Jackson, and Stuart Symington, all freshman senators who did not come up for re-election until 1958 and who had
not been in the Senate when McCarthy was at his most intimidating.\textsuperscript{33}

The day before the hearings began, a Gallup poll announced that of nearly eighty per cent of the public who had heard or read about the Army-McCarthy dispute, forty-six per cent believed the Army version and only twenty-three per cent believed McCarthy. In the two months of televised sessions that followed, McCarthy eroded his credibility almost completely. Millions of viewers, who had known no more about McCarthy than what they had read in newspaper accounts, saw his inept and cynical badgering of witnesses day after day. McCarthy's repetitious and incorrect use of points of order became a national joke. He repeatedly berated even his close allies Mudd and Dworshak on television. Finally, when he needlessly smeared an absent colleague of Army lawyer Joseph Welch, the latter responded with the question that went to the heart of the problem of McCarthyism, "Have you no sense of decency...?" At the end of the hearings, forty-five per cent of those surveyed by Gallup disapproved of McCarthy.\textsuperscript{34}

The damage McCarthy did himself extended to the rest of the GOP right wing, which had placed its hopes exclusively on McCarthy. Most Republican conservatives liked Joe. He hurt their enemies, he took the real risks himself (perhaps unaware that he did so), and he had a star quality that most party stalwarts lacked. The
conservatives had largely abandoned the effort to win support for their domestic policies, and had come to rely on symbolic language to rally their supporters and on McCarthy to scare their rivals. They depended increasingly on foreign policy, an area of limited importance to most voters. As moderates of both parties had outmaneuvered them on other foreign policy-related issues, the conservatives clung tenaciously to the loyalty-security aspect. Yet early by 1954, Eisenhower and the other moderates had taken over even this field. The right had run out of winning issues, and put all its efforts into backing McCarthy.

The conservatives boxed themselves. By basing their appeal for public support on a constantly narrowing portion of the issue spectrum, they had only to lose there to be utterly defeated. They let foreign policy go while clinging to the loyalty issue, then let that slip away to embrace its champion. They might have made a case had they attempted to take principled stands on a wide array of issues to weld together the solid minorities supporting them, but they could not win once they had bet everything on individual combat between Eisenhower and McCarthy. All that the GOP right had ever had going for it in foreign policy was public fear and doubt, both of which diminished steadily from 1952 to 1954. By mid-1954, what was left of
that fear was centered on McCarthy. The catalyst, even for many Republicans, was the Army-McCarthy hearings.

McCarthy never understood what it was that kept him alive in the Senate. He was probably foremost among those who believed he had great popular support. Actually, he had survived because he had been a useful tool for an outcast Republican party to use against the Democrats. As such, he had been fondly regarded by both moderate and conservative Republicans. Once they had won power, however, McCarthy could be useful only to those conservatives who had no sense of a broad party unity, who wanted to rule or ruin. For other Republicans -- including most moderates and several conservatives -- neither fondness for Joe nor fear of communist infiltration justified his spoiling attacks on their party's administration. Where once their partisan interest had made them value McCarthy, now that they had power, it made them notice that McCarthy was a liar and a bully who never found any communists. Indeed, during his attack on the Bohlen nomination, McCarthy had warned against party loyalty, and had threatened any Republican who got in his way.35

Thus McCarthy began to lose the support of Republican moderates and conservatives of several kinds after 1952. There were serious anticommunists, such as Senators Ralph Flanders of Vermont and H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey, who came to feel that McCarthy's methods and lack of
results made anticommunism look ridiculous. Flanders believed that if "the junior senator from Wisconsin [were] in the pay of the Communists, he could not have done a better job for them." Similarly, others like Senators James Duff of Pennsylvania and Margaret Chase Smith of Maine felt that McCarthy was destroying the nation and its liberties. Smith and six other GOP senators had signed the "Declaration of Conscience" in 1950, which called for an end to McCarthy's "totalitarian techniques," saying, "We are Republicans, but we are Americans first."

By 1954, some of those who were more partisan were also tiring of McCarthy. Wallace Bennet of Utah was concerned about the rifts caused by the Army-McCarthy case, and John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky congratulated Flanders warmly for his speech of March 9 that warned of the damage McCarthy was doing to the Republican party. The growing split troubled some Republicans; other simply saw McCarthy himself as a liability to Republican candidates in the fall. Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts dreaded having to vote on McCarthy's future before the election, but Homer Ferguson of Michigan feared not to do so. By April first, the Republican National Committee had stopped booking McCarthy to speak for candidates, and those candidates being backed by McCarthy, few as they were, were being defeated in primaries literally from Maine to California. McCarthy had also lost the support of
several Republicans and conservative Democrats for his attacks on their friends or on themselves. Twice he had tried to oust his Wisconsin colleague Alexander Wiley through opposition in primaries, and he had seriously offended Democratic Senator Harry Boyd by attacking Byrd's friend, Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam. 38

Having lost support from his protectors, McCarthy would be in serious trouble once his enemies had found the proper formula for dealing with him. Resolutions to remove him from his committee appeared during the summer, but they were contrary to Senate traditions and threatened to establish a precedent that many senators, especially southern Democrats feared. Lyndon Johnson had worked out a tactic and discussed it with Knowland in the summer of 1953. "If I were Majority Leader," he told Knowland,

I'd appoint a bipartisan select committee, and I'd put on our side the very best men we have, men who are above reproach, the wisest men I know in the Senate and the best judges, and I'd ask 'em to make a study of McCarthy and report to the Senate. With the men I'd pick, the Senate would accept their judgment and that would be the end of it. 39

Knowland was loath to do so. He was an unsure leader, elected after Taft died as a compromise between the moderates and the ultraconservative faction (which included Bridges, McCarthy, Jenner, Bricker, Welker, Malone, and Capehart) which preferred Dirksen. Knowland needed
this group, and he strove constantly to placate it. He also knew that many Republican senators considered McCarthy an important asset for the 1954 election, and did not want to devalue him as such. Yet Knowland often took Johnson's advice. When Senator Flanders finally moved to censure McCarthy on July 31, 1954, Knowland and Johnson agreed to send the censure resolution to a select committee such as Johnson had suggested. The resolution let Vice President Nixon appoint the select committee with the party leaders' advice; together they named six respected but non-controversial conservatives who were not on record for or against McCarthy, and who did not face re-election in 1954.

The chair went to Arthur Watkins of Utah, a serious anticomunist who had told Eisenhower he was annoyed at the conservative GOP Senate leaders because they kept information from presidential briefings to themselves. The other two Republicans were Frank Carlson of Kansas and Francis Case of South Dakota. Carlson was an early Eisenhower backer, but both had sponsored the Bricker Amendment and supported it to the end. The Democrats were John Stennis of Mississippi, Edwin Johnson of Colorado, and Sam Ervin of North Carolina. All were men of impeccable conservative credentials who would give McCarthy what he could not afford: a fair hearing rather than a whitewash. If they voted against him, he could not possibly
portray them as communists or even as communist sympathizers. And because a resolution of censure carried no specific penalties, but rather represented the moral condemnation of a senator's peers, it would not give McCarthy the automatic support of other senators who feared the precedent of stripping a senator of his committees.  

After the Select Committee was set up, Johnson and Knowland agreed to recess the Senate so that the actual vote on censuring McCarthy would not come until after the fall elections. This would free several incumbents from fear of immediate public wrath if they voted for censure. The delay ultimately had two other effects that Johnson may have hoped for. The elections returned the Senate to control of the Democrats, so that McCarthy's lack of utility -- and indeed, his damaging effect -- for his supporters could be demonstrated, and it meant that some of the Republicans who voted on censure would be lame ducks who blamed McCarthy for the losses Republicans had suffered.  

McCarthy's behavior toward the Select Committee won him no friends there. When he found that the committee was not assembled to cover for him, he assailed it as "the unwitting handmaiden" and "involuntary agent" of the communists, and called the censure "a lynching bee." By impugning the loyalty, integrity, and -- some felt because of the term "handmaiden" -- manliness of his judges,
McCarthy added to the evidence against him, and persuaded his six conservative judges that he should be punished. This outburst also bolstered the case that McCarthy brought the Senate into disrepute. If he had kept quiet about the Select Committee, he would have been in enough trouble. But, as it was, he blundered into doing what Lyndon Johnson had long before predicted to Hubert Humphrey. "He can attack people all over this country," Johnson had said, "but when he picks on the conservatives and violates the rules of the Senate, he's through."  

During the debate over censure, Eisenhower had taken steps to weaken the conservative wing and strengthen the moderate wing of his party. The president discussed McCarthy and Dirksen's unreliability with Senator Potter on June 21, immediately after the close of the Army-McCarthy hearings, and with Attorney General Brownell on July 16, the day Flanders introduced his censure resolution. Eisenhower urged Potter not to be influenced by McCarthy, Dirksen, or Mundt, and he gave much the same message to Brownell. "I'm weary of being scared by McCarthy," he told Brownell, and I think unless we get this straightened out, people will think that we are.... If you want to pass along these [loyalty] cases to me, I'll take responsibility...and I'll tell you one thing. McCarthy or anybody like him on the Hill won't be able to do anything about it except try to impeach me, and we'll have one glorious fight on that one."
Eisenhower sought repeatedly to infuriate McCarthy, so that McCarthy would attack him on ground favorable to the president. The tactic worked. McCarthy's foolish request for leaks from government employees in May 1954, for instance, resulted in more damage to him rather than to Eisenhower. McCarthy had made noises in June about investigating the CIA (having been warned off the year before), and Eisenhower told his staff he hoped McCarthy would try it. "The more we can get McCarthy threatening to investigate our Intelligence," said the president, the more public support we are going to get. If there is any way I could trick him into renewing his threat, I would be very happy to do so and then let him have it.45

The direct role, if any, of Eisenhower in the formulation of the select committee strategy and the choice of its members is difficult to establish. Both Eisenhower and Lyndon Johnson were vitally interested in the destruction of McCarthy by mid-1954, and both wanted it done the same way, by leading conservatives in the Senate, without either of them having to appear to take an important role in the outcome. Various sources note that Johnson, with or without House Speaker Sam Rayburn, visited the president regularly at the end of at least one working day per month, entering the White House stealthily through the back door and joining Eisenhower in his private study for a few
drinks and some off-the-record conversation about public matters. These sessions do not always appear on the president's schedule, and it is not clear whether they began in the 83rd Congress or the 84th. Both Johnson and Eisenhower were accustomed to using roundabout methods of communication to preserve secrecy, so they might have had other contacts than such cocktail hours. 46 Or they might have had no contact at all.

Clearly, Johnson selected the Democrats on the Watkins Committee without help. He also probably influenced Knowland's choice of the Republican members. Vice President Nixon, who was formally to make the choices with the help of the two party leaders, probably also advised Knowland, possibly with suggestions from the president. Knowland who met with Eisenhower regularly, and at times alone. They could therefore have discussed possible choices for committee members directly. Eisenhower clearly relied on the support of two of the three Republicans finally selected, Watkins and Carlson. Carlson had an 87% Eisenhower support score, Watkins a 77% score. Further, the very day the Select Committee was named, Eisenhower had an off-the-record meeting with Watkins. No account of the meeting exists, but its timing strongly suggests that the censure of McCarthy was discussed. 47

On August 12, one of Eisenhower's supporters, Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey, met with the president to
try to find a way to avoid further conflict with McCarthy. Eisenhower's schedule listed the meeting as "off-the-record", but notes on the conversation indicate that Smith told the president that he thought a meeting between Eisenhower and McCarthy would be helpful, and that McCarthy "would like very much" to arrange one. Eisenhower's position was difficult. Having decided to press for McCarthy's destruction, he did not need or want to have influential senators like Smith trying to work out a compromise. Yet to refuse to compromise might alienate such a man, who could otherwise be relied upon to conclude from the report of the Select Committee that censure was in order. Eisenhower therefore temporized, saying that the idea was not "cock-eyed," but that anything that came out of such a meeting might be misrepresented. He made a few points against McCarthy that were calculated to impress Smith, adding, "You can't unite any party just merely by two individuals looking at each other and grinning and showing their teeth and shaking hands." Still, he suggested that Smith call him if he thought things had changed enough to make a meeting with McCarthy useful.48

Eisenhower needed to prevent Smith from interfering with McCarthy's censure in a way that did not alienate Smith. The following morning, Secretary Dulles called Smith, who was the second-ranking Republican member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and invited Smith and
his wife to attend the South East Asian Conference in the Philippines for the first half of September. Smith agreed to go, and was immediately preoccupied with preparing for the trip. By the time he returned, the Select Committee had finished taking testimony, and it was too late to find a compromise solution.49

Throughout the summer of 1954, Eisenhower tried to get McCarthy to undertake a self-destructive attack, while working to keep the censure measure on the right track. Through the period of debate over censure in the fall, the president also worked to reshape the GOP along lines more acceptable to most of the nation. He had told Governor Stratton of Illinois in April that the price for president support of Joe Meek, the Republican senatorial candidate in Illinois, was that Meek "not invite McCarthy into [the] state to campaign for him." When Meek hinted he might support McCarthy, Eisenhower insisted that Meek send him a letter in support of the president before Eisenhower would campaign for him at the Illinois State Fair. Meek compiled, realizing, as Hagerty noted, "that he could not get elected without the President's support." Eisenhower gave Meek no further aid, however, and Meek was soundly defeated in November by incumbent Paul Douglas.50

Eisenhower also sought within the party's right wing. Brownell relayed the message to him on June 15 that McCarthy henchman William Jenner was "interested in
becoming an 'Administration' Senator." Despite his disgust for Jenner's earlier attacks on General George Marshall for "treason", Eisenhower responded by angling for both Jenner's support and his apology for the remarks about Marshall. The president met with Jenner and his Indiana colleague Homer Capehart on July 7 to discuss their recommendations for several federal judgeships, which Jenner said would "satisfy all factions and help knit the party in Indiana." Eisenhower took a month before reluctantly approving the Jenner-Capehart nominee. He may have believed that Jenner would respond decently to kind treatment, but if so, he was wrong. Jenner supported McCarthy down the line on censure and remained only faintly loyal to the administration, scoring only 69% support for the president. 51

On September 27 the Select Committee unanimously recommended censure of McCarthy for his "contemptuous" attitude toward the Gillette Subcommittee, which had investigated his behavior in the 1950 Maryland campaign against Millard Tydings, and for his "reprehensible" treatment of General Zwicker. 52

At the outset of the full Senate debate on the censure resolution, on November 29, McCarthy went on the attack again, introducing a motion to allow additional censure motions to be made from the floor, aimed at Flanders, Fulbright, and others who had attacked him. He had stated earlier that he would introduce five, fifteen, or
twenty-five" such resolutions in the form of amendments to the resolution censuring him. This unwise threat against the Senate was ruled out of order by one of his few remaining supporters, President Pro Tempore Styles Bridges. The final vote came on December 3, when sixty-seven senators voted to condemn McCarthy for bringing the Senate into disrepute. Forty-five Democrats -- every Democrat who voted -- voted to condemn. Johnson had refused to make censure a party issue, thus avoiding rallying the Republicans as the Tydings Committee had done. Senator Patrick McCarran of Nevada, a Democrat who was one of McCarthy's strongest backers, had died on September 28, allowing the Democrats to stick together informally on the censure question. The Republicans who voted split evenly, twenty-two conservatives against censure, and twenty-two other for it.

Seven senators did not vote on the resolution, including McCarthy himself. Bricker and Capehart were paired in opposition to censure with Democrats Gore of Tennessee and Smathers of Florida, who were paired for. All four were absent. Also absent was Alexander Wiley, McCarthy's fellow Wisconsinite, a conservative Republican but an internationalist who despised and covertly fought McCarthy. Wiley had called Secretary of State Dulles the first of November to plead that he be spared from voting by having himself sent as a delegate to a conference in Rio
de Janiero that would be held at the same time. Wiley, with many of the same supporters in Wisconsin as McCarthy, feared alienating them. Democrat George Samthers, whose election in 1950 owed much to his use of McCarthyite tactics against his incumbent opponent, was selected by Johnson to attend the conference in Rio, and the final decision to send Capehart as the third was made only after Capehart had told Dulles that he intended to oppose censure. The remaining absentee was John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts, who was later criticized for missing the vote. In fact, Kennedy was at the time still hospitalized after surgery that had nearly killed him a month before. It has been suggested that Kennedy could have paired with another senator to record his feelings on McCarthy, but the only senators available for pairing were McCarthy himself and his uneasy colleague Wiley. McCarthy's position as defendant made it impossible for him to vote, and Wiley was most eager to avoid taking a stand.

Among the senators who voted, definite patterns emerged. No senator who can reasonably be considered a moderate voted against censure. Using Reichard's "Eisenhower Support" scores for Republican senators, the average support score for Republicans voting to censure McCarthy was 78.8%, that of Republicans opposing censure 72.3%. This small difference seems more significant when
it is realized that only three senators in the 83rd Congress had scores lower than 50%, and even McCarthy's was 52%. 57
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<td>Postwar</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush, Conn.</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>New England</td>
<td>Freshman</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payne, Me.</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>New England</td>
<td>Freshman</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flanders, Vt.</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>Plains</td>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlson, Kans.</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>Mid-Atlantic</td>
<td>New Deal</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowland, Cal.</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>WW II</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millikin, Colo.</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>WW II</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saltonstall, Mass.</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>New England</td>
<td>WW II</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hendrickson, N.J.</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>Mid-Atlantic</td>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuchel, Cal.</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Freshman</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purtell, Conn.</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>New England</td>
<td>Freshman</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beall, Md.</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>Mid-Atlantic</td>
<td>Freshman</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordell, Ore.</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>WW II</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges, N.H.</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>New England</td>
<td>New Deal</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bennett, Utah</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferguson, Mich.</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>North Central</td>
<td>WW II</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ives, N.Y.</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>Mid-Atlantic</td>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dirksen, Ill.</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>North Central</td>
<td>New Deal</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aiken, Vt.</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>New England</td>
<td>WW II</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hickenlooper, Iowa</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>Plains</td>
<td>WW II</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potter, Mich</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>North Central</td>
<td>Freshman</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrett, Wyo.</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Freshman</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Smith, Me.</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>New England</td>
<td>WW II</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watkins, Utah</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butler, Md.</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>Mid-Atlantic</td>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin, Pa.</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>Mid-Atlantic</td>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schoeppe, Kans.</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>Plains</td>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooper, Ky.</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>Border</td>
<td>Freshman</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thye, Minn.</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>North Central</td>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenner, Ind.</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Freshman</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiley, Wis.</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>North Central</td>
<td>New Deal</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case, S. Dak.</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>Plains</td>
<td>WW II</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capelhart, Ind.</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>North Central</td>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bricker, Ohio</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>New Deal</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dworschak, Idaho</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>North Central</td>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welker, Idaho</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williams, Del.</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>Mid-Atlantic</td>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mundt, S. Dak.</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>Plains</td>
<td>New Deal</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malone, Nev.</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCarthy, Wis.</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>North Central</td>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young, N. Dak.</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>Plains</td>
<td>WW II</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langer, N. Dak.</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>Plains</td>
<td>WW II</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Support for Eisenhower and support for censure were moderately related. This accords well with political observations at the time. Although Eisenhower had avoided a direct confrontation with McCarthy, had never castigated him by name in public, and had claimed no interest in censure because it was "Senate business," most political observers in Washington in 1954 believed that Eisenhower supported the censure of McCarthy and had taken some steps in behalf of it. Indeed, Eisenhower had ordered Hagerty to secretly inform "key people" in radio, television, and print journalism of the president's angry opposition to McCarthy. It is not unreasonable or surprising therefore that the senators who voted to censure McCarthy tended to be better supporters of the president than were those who voted against censure. 59
The weakest relationship was between the senators' periods of entry into the Senate and their votes on censure, although there was some relationship. Two-thirds of the GOP senators who had been fighting the New Deal in the Senate since before the war stood by McCarthy. These were the bitterest foes of liberalism, and had fought the Democrats on a wide array of issues. This was progressively less true for the World War II and postwar entrants, who were much more likely to follow Vandenberg's leadership in supporting the administration foreign policy. As for the freshmen, three of the four who opposed censure had been supported in their election bids by McCarthy and may be presumed to have believed they owed him support. The fourth, Thomas Kuchel of California, was the newest, having been appointed to replace Nixon in 1953; he was strongly influenced by his fellow Californian Knowland. Overall, however, the period of entry relationships are the weakest. Except for those who entered under the New Deal, they are fairly evenly split.\(^60\)
Figure 19. Relationships between regions and vote on censure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Per cent favoring censure</th>
<th>Per cent against censure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New England</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Atlantic</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Central</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plains</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the distribution of the GOP split, and its reinforcement by regional cultures, it is not surprising to find that the strongest relationship is between region and vote on censure. The farther west the senator's region, the less likely the senator was to support censuring McCarthy. Eastern Republicans tended to find him disgraceful, but midwestern and western Republicans generally did not. (This similarity between these regional relationships and those relating Eisenhower support scores to vote on censure results from the high relationships between region and support for the president's programs: easterners were more likely to back Eisenhower than midwesterners or westerners). Twelve Republicans from eastern states voted for censure, while only four from these regions voted against it. In the midwest, however, the pattern was reversed: five North Central and Plains Republicans supported censure, seven opposed it. All four Republicans who did not vote (McCarthy, wiley, Capenhart, and Bicker) were from North
Central states, and it should be noted that at least three of them were opposed to censure, so the figure for the mid­west should be five for censure, ten against. The vote in the West was two Republicans for censure, nine against, reflecting the postwar growth of conservatism in that region.61

It must be noted, however, that the West was also re­presented by nine Democrats and one independent, all of whom supported censure, just as the four Democrats from the midwest did. This highlights the pattern of the GOP split: the moderate wing was strongest in the northeast, where the Democrats were also strong and competitive. McCarthy had become repugnant to those areas, and most of the GOP sena­tors from there needed to oppose McCarthy. This was also true of the uppermost North Central states, Minnesota and Michigan; Minnesota was becoming Democratic (and had been liberal for decades), and Michigan had an increasingly dom­inant Democratic core around Detroit. In the rest of the midwest, the Democrats offered little competition, and the Republicans were very conservative, seeing little fault in McCarthy's actions either before or after the 1952 election. The strength of the western Democrats had little to do with the urban liberalism of the New Deal, and the Republicans of this region were freer to compete politically without having to become moderate; there were moderate Republicans from the west, but most western Republicans remained as
unreconstructed as their midwestern allies. McCarthy's base of support since 1950, the Republican elites of the midwest and the west struck with him in the censure vote. 62

Some examination of the behavior of individual Republicans senators illustrate how the party split affected the vote on the censure resolution, as well as explaining some of the apparently deviant votes cast. The pro-censure votes of moderates like H. Alexander Smith, John Sherman Cooper, and Prescott Bush need no elaboration, but several conservative midwesterners also voted for censure. Their reasons varied. Charles Potter of Michigan had been treated badly by the McCarthyites during the Army-McCarthy hearings. Homer Ferguson of Michigan, a conservative Republican, nonetheless had feared that McCarthy would cost him re-election that year, and he had been defeated. Robert Hendricksen had seen McCarthyites nearly cost his Republican successor the fall election, and he had been a victim of McCarthy's mistreatment as a member of the Gillette Subcommittee. Conservatives Frank Carlson of Kansas and Francis Case of South Dakota, members of the Select Committee, had had to examine the case closely; once they had recommended censure, they could hardly vote against it. 63

The vote of Senator Hazel Abel resulted from an anomaly. Both senators from Nebraska had died in 1954.
State election laws required that the November elections select a new senator for a full six-year term (Roman Hruska won that, and was appointed to the vacant seat in time to vote against censure.) Another senator was elected for four years, beginning in January 1955 (This was conservative Representative Carl Curtis, who would surely have opposed censure had he been able to take the seat in November.) Nebraska voters had also been required to elect a senator for what remained of Hugh Butler's term in 1954. So from November 8 to the end of 1954, one of the senators from Nebraska was Hazel Abel, who visited Eisenhower two days after voting for McCarthy's censure to ask his permission to organize an "Eisenhower for President" club in Nebraska. The other midwesterner who supported censure was Edward Thye of Minnesota, a liberal who had signed the "Declaration of Conscience" against McCarthy in 1950.

The two western Republicans who supported censure were Arthur Watkins of Utah, who had chaired the Select Committee and had been infuriated by McCarthy's personal abuse toward him from that, and his fellow Utahn Wallace Bennet, who had used the red smear freely in his 1950 campaign. Bennett had refused to take sides until Watkins was attacked, but he then introduced an amendment adding a charge to the censure resolution for abuse of the Watkins Committee. All of the six midwesterners and two westerners who voted to censure McCarthy thus had special reasons to do so.
Although the more sparsely-populated states of the Northeast were also fairly conservative Republican territory, only Styles Bridges among the six Republican senators from Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont voted against censure. Bridges was an old and embittered foe of the New Deal elected in 1936, who replaced Taft as the leader of the Senate Republican conservatives. His colleague from New Hampshire, Norris Cotton, who voted for censure, had just been elected and appointed early to his Senate seat, and was a close friend and longtime ally of former Governor Sherman Adams. Margaret Chase Smith of Maine had drawn up the first Republican attack on McCarthy, the "Declaration of Conscience," and her partner Frederick Payne was a staunch Eisenhower supporter with a 90% score. Ralph Flanders of Vermont was sufficiently concerned about civil liberties to attack McCarthy in the Senate throughout 1954, and had authored the original censure motion. His colleague George Aiken, a firm moderate, also favored censure.67

The transformation of the Republican right, for which McCarthy had been the catalyst, was leaving the northeastern conservatives behind. Anticommunism had been used as a mere tool by economic conservatives in their opposition to the New Deal. In New England and upstate New York, fiscal conservatives were beginning to mellow (with a few exceptions such as Bridges) in their opposition to all federal spending as Eisenhower won them over to what he explained
as modest but necessary expenditures and to internationalist foreign policies. An attachment to civil liberties had always been part of the political culture of the northeast; indeed, much of the Republican opposition to Roosevelt there was couched in terms of his alleged abuses of power. In the political culture of the midwest and the west, which had provided the Radical Republicans of the Civil War era and the Populists later in the nineteenth century, concern for a procedural niceties was never as great. It was in the midwest and the west that anticommunism transformed the GOP right by becoming more than a mere device. Here anticommunism supplanted economic conservatism as the sine qua non of conservatism. The two tenets were seldom at odds, except in defense appropriations, but from the late 1940s or early 1950s onward, unwavering opposition to communism or anything that seemed "communistic" became more important than fiscal caution.\(^6\) This split in conservative Republican ranks was evident when most eastern conservatives voted to censure McCarthy and most western and midwestern conservatives voted against censure.

The remaining regional deviance is not hard to account for. John Marshal Butler of Maryland and William Purtell of Connecticut were both creatures of McCarthy, men elected to the Senate by McCarthy's campaigns to defeat his enemies in the Democratic party, Millard Tydings in Maryland in 1950 and William Benton in Connecticut in 1952. Purtell lost his
bid for re-election in 1958 without McCarthy there to help him; Butler eked out a second term in 1956 with 53% of the vote. And Edward Martin of Pennsylvania, seventy-five years old when he voted against McCarthy's censure, was a deeply conservative man whose support score for Eisenhower was an unimpressive 75%, low for the northeast. On the other hand, Eisenhower's candidacy had not helped Martin, who got 59.9% of the vote in 1946 but only 51.9% in 1952, compared to 52.7% for Eisenhower. Put simply. Purtell, Butler, and Martin were men for whom moderate politics held less promise than rightist politics. Like Bridges, they had special reasons to vote against censure.69

Eisenhower tried to use the 1954 elections to begin remaking the GOP into a party that was fiscally conservative but internationalist. Rather than try openly to purge uncooperative conservatives, Eisenhower decided to reward those who had supported him by endorsing only them. This effort to reshape the GOP reinforced his campaign to end McCarthyism. On July 29, he discussed strategy with Nixon, stressing his concern that the vice president avoid "castigation" of the Democrats over foreign policy. He pointed out the administration's need for Democratic support in Congress, and declared McCarthy's use of the phrase "twenty years of treason" to describe the Roosevelt and Truman administrations "an indefensible statement." He was surely aware that Nixon had used the same phrase. Nixon generally
agreed to attack only individual Democrats for treason, not the whole party.  

Meanwhile, Eisenhower circulated a letter to his "political experts" from U.N. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, who had become one of his closest political advisors. Eisenhower's cover memo warned that the letter was to be considered "on a very secret basis." Lodge's letter protested against a proposal for Eisenhower to campaign actively for GOP candidates. "The 1954 campaign," wrote Lodge, 

should not be regarded as a national election. It must not become a vote of confidence in you. There are too many other factors which make it unfair to you and misleading to the public to seek to do so.

The statement... that a Democratic vote is a vote against President Eisenhower and his program is not necessarily true -- if the Democrat agrees to support the program. How... can you have an "umbrella of the popularity of the President and his program over all candidates" when some candidates, such as Meek, refuse to endorse the program?  

Lodge's suggestion that the election of certain Democrats would be better for the administration's program than the election of certain Republicans went beyond Eisenhower's intention to support only moderate Republicans, but it interested him enough that he circulated it secretly. The president began building bridges to the Democrats. He sent Sherman Adams a memo noting that Wingate Lucas, a Texas
Democrat who had been "a fairly consistent supporter of the Administration" in the House, had been defeated for renomination by an opponent who "used some of the sorriest type of vilifying literature." Eisenhower asked Adams to keep Lucas in mind "the first time we have a vacancy requiring the appointment of a Democrat."72

At no time did Eisenhower attempt conducting a purge of his own party. Rather, he was selective about his endorsements. Sherman Adams later explained that Eisenhower felt that he should not become personally involved in state and congressional district issues.73 The president himself wrote to economic advisor Gabriel Hauge that

If the Right Wing really recaptures the Republican Party, there simply isn't going to be any Republican influence in this country within a matter of a few years. A new Party will be inevitable....

Having said all this, I shall, of course, continue to do everything that I believe is really helpful in order to get back a Republican (by which I mean, an enlightened Republican) Congress.74

Especially after the elections gave control of both houses of Congress back to the Democrats, Eisenhower and his aides made a great deal of claims that he performed a massive campaign feat in behalf of his party in 1954. Eisenhower's memoirs stress his belief in party responsibility, and mention that he travelled over ten thousand miles and gave "nearly forty speeches, including some that were non-political." Adams also contended that his
efforts had actually prevented "a much more decisive Demo-
cratic triumph." But it is quite clear that he campaigned
only in behalf of Republicans who had supported him strongly.
Eleven incumbent GOP senators faced the voters in 1954, and
the president campaigned for only two, Cooper of Kentucky
and Ferguson of Michigan, who had Eisenhower support scores
of 73% and 83% respectively. Ferguson was above the median
score of 80%, and Cooper was a solid opponent of McCarthy.
Both lost. Although Eisenhower campaigned in Pennsylvania
in behalf of the GOP gubernatorial candidate, there was no
senate seat up. The president toured New York in behalf of
Senator Irving Ives (83% Eisenhower support score), who was
running for governor; New York also had no senate contest.
Eisenhower's remaining campaign appearances were in behalf
of three moderate Republican representatives who were run-
ning for seats in the Senate: George Bender of Ohio (89%
Eisenhower support score), Clifford Case of New Jersey
(79%), and Herbert Warburton of Delaware (87%). (The
median Eisenhower support score in the House was 71%.)
Three of these campaign forays were to keep Republican-held
Senate seats in the hands of Eisenhower supporters; the
other two attempted to take Senate seats from the Democrats
and give them to proven Eisenhower backers from the House.
Both gubernatorial efforts aimed at putting moderates into
governorships in states that were important to the moderate
wing of the GOP; had Ives won, he could have named his
successor, but both gubernatorial candidates were defeated. Eisenhower did not support any other senatorial or gubernatorial candidates. He also supported no incumbent GOP candidates to the House of Representatives, although he did allow himself to be photographed with seventeen non-incumbent House candidates "who because they promised to support my program had won the approval of the Citizens for Eisenhower." 75

The election cost the Republicans control of Congress. Four Senate GOP incumbents lost: Ferguson, Cooper, Guy Cordon of Oregon, and Ernest Brown, who had been appointed to finish Pat McCarran's term. New GOP senators were elected in Colorado, Iowa, New Jersey, New Hampshire, and Ohio.

On balance, then, in 1954 the GOP lost one Senate seat, eighteen House seats, and nine governorships. 76 Arch-conservative editor William Loeb telegraphed the president to demand his resignation, complaining, "If it had been planned that way, no one could have done a more successful job than you in wrecking the Republican party." 77

Eisenhower had not "planned" that defeat. He was sorely disappointed that Ferguson, Cooper and Warburton lost, although the simultaneous defeat of Meek in Illinois and of incumbents Cordon of Oregon and Brown of Nevada may have caused him less regret. Those conservatives who won did so without Eisenhower's help. 78 Loeb was probably not entirely mistaken about Eisenhower's hopes for the election,
though. On election day the president had confided to his friend, General Gruenther, that his work "for the next two years will be difficult, no matter who wins." 79

Eisenhower had been willing in 1954 to see conservative GOP seats lost if the party could gain seats for moderates. This feeling seems to have increased over time, as he came to recognize he received more support from Democrat majorities than from those of his own party. Arthur Larson reports that in March 1958, the president told him, "Frankly, I don't care too much about the congressional elections." 80

After the 1954 elections, Eisenhower pressed forward with plans to strengthen the GOP's moderate wing. On November 20, he discussed politics with his old friend General Lucius Clay. Eisenhower noted in his diary that he had gone along with Clay's proposals "that the Republican Party must be completely reformed and revitalized into an 'Eisenhower Republican Party'," although he disliked that name as immodest and implying his ongoing leadership. Far from "appeasing or reasoning with the dyed-in-the-wool reactionary fringe," Eisenhower wrote,

we should completely ignore it and when necessary, repudiate it. I refer to the kind of thinking that is represented by Robert Wood [the old isolationist head of Sears, Roebuck and Company], Fred Hartley [the coauthor of the Taft-Hartley Act, who had run unsuccessfully as a McCarthyite spoiler against GOP moderate Clifford Case in the New Jersey primary that spring], several of our old
generals, two of whom are my classmates, [Senator George] Malone, McCarthy, and [Colonel Robert] Bertie ["] McCormick [publisher of the Chicago Tribune]. The political strength these people could generate could not elect a man who was committed to giving away twenty-dollar gold pieces to every citizen in the United States for every day of the calendar year.81

On December 1 Eisenhower met with Paul Hoffman. The anonymous recorder of the meeting wrote,

Apparently they were talking about possible successors to the Presidency. President said the Republican party ought to have the slogan, "Forward, America." Its title ought to be "Progressive Republicans."82

Since at this point Eisenhower hoped not to run for re-election, discussion of remaking the party necessarily also touched on who else might be its standard-bearer. Thus part of the discussion with Paul Hoffman was indeed an analysis of possible successors to Eisenhower, the same list he wrote on December 8 to his friend Swede Hazlett: Assistant Defense Secretary Robert Anderson, Herbert Hoover, Jr. (although Eisenhower recognized that it "would be a little harder because of his name"), Nixon, Brownell, and Representative Charles Halleck.83 Eisenhower saw all of them as worthy heirs, but all were also prominent politicians as well, who be useful for rebuilding the GOP. Eisenhower thought the Republican right might well respond to his efforts by forming a splinter party, leaving him free to reconstruct a moderate Republican party.84
In that meeting with Hoffman, Eisenhower also discussed who should head the National Committee. The president preferred Walter Williams, who was active in Citizens for Eisenhower in 1951-1952 and then served as Under Secretary of Commerce, and Mary Lord, another Eisenhower campaign activist who then represented the United States on the United Nations Human Rights Commission. Hoffman, however, defended Leonard Hall, the present chairman, as a good politician, and Eisenhower agreed that replacing Hall would look like the president blamed him for the election results, and would leave him with problems with the remaining National Committee members.85

Eisenhower's close associates discussed changing the GOP to fit the needs of the administration too. In early December, the White House legislative liaison team was unhappy with a remark that might offend Knowland. "So what!!" commented Hagerty.

Knowland can work with us if he chooses. If not, we will work with other more liberal and pro-Eisenhower members of the Senate once the session starts.86

Hagerty noted that Eisenhower agreed, and was going to try to get the party "to become more pro-Eisenhower and let the Right Wing go where it may."87

Another Eisenhower confidant who took part in discussions about reshaping the GOP was New York Herald-Tribune
publisher William E. Robinson. On December 6, Robinson met at the White House with Sherman Adams, Tom Stephens and Hagerty to discuss reorganization efforts. The same day, Eisenhower showed Hagerty a list of guests for one of his stag dinners, this one to be "purely a political dinner" for "all pro-Eisenhower people." Eisenhower suggested that publication of the guest list would "cause some lifting of eyebrows," to which Hagerty replied that reporters would probably realize that this was going to be the start of Eisenhower's campaign to revitalize the GOP. "That's fine," Eisenhower responded. "Let's serve notice right then that we mean business and are going ahead."88

Eisenhower described his plans to a friend in Early December. Noting that McCarthy seemed very little chastened by his censure, Eisenhower commented that his plan for converting as many Democrats as possible, winning independents, and maximizing votes was

a necessary one even if McCarthy and his cohorts should succeed in breaking off a fairly good hunk of Republican strength. If we could get every Republican committed as a Moderate Conservative, the Party would grow so rapidly that within a few years it would dominate American politics.89

Eisenhower's hopes for reshaping the politics of the Republican party never got very far. The primary obstacle was the one that spawned the GOP split in the first place:
the conservatives were a problem not merely because they were individually pugnacious or foolish, but because they were backed by voters who generally approved of their actions. Eisenhower and his colleagues knew this, and Hagerty noted in his diary why the president could not do as many columnists suggested and read McCarthy out of the GOP:

He was elected by the people of Wisconsin and they are the only people who can unseat him. You have to take this thing slowly by degrees and that is just what we are doing.90

Reshaping the politics of the party would remain a slow, and not very fruitful, effort. Eisenhower told Arthur Larson that he was trying to remake the GOP. "[I]t can't be done all at once," he explained.

You've got all these old mossbacks who think all we should do is cut taxes, balance the budget, smash the labor unions, and destroy Social Security.

By the end of 1954, Eisenhower had won most of the eastern conservatives away from the increasingly McCarthyite GOP right. But having attacked the rest of the right, he had reduced his slim chances of winning its support. Most of them had been Republicans long before he was, and they did not leave the GOP to form a splinter party.

They remained an isolated faction within the GOP. Their attacks on the Democrats for "treason" had lessened
their ability to form coalitions with southern Democrats except on occasions, as a blocking maneuver for something important. During the 83rd Congress the southern Democrats in the Senate got a taste of what it meant to be without committee chairmanships, and they were never again so inclined to make public attacks on their own party in league with rightist Republicans as they had been under Truman. The attacks the conservative Republicans had made on their own administration had alienated GOP moderates and a few conservatives as well. The bulk of the party's right was, by the end of the year, isolated from potential coalition partners within Congress. Its reputation had been hurt by its investment in McCarthyism, and it had abandoned what political capital it had in other areas. Eisenhower's break with the GOP right over McCarthyism had led not to a formal breakup of the Republican party, but to a de facto one. Unable to increase the strength of the moderate wing of his party, Eisenhower would rely on a functional centrist party, a coalition of moderate Republicans and Democrats led by the moderate Lyndon Johnson and Sam Rayburn. Only when the Democrats followed too liberal a policy would the president court his own conservative wing to thwart them. Otherwise, the conservative Republicans found themselves returned to impotence.
1. Eisenhower Diary entry April 1, 1953, Eisenhower Library.

2. Ibid., January 18, 1954.


4. Eisenhower Diary, April 1, 1953.


8. Hagerty Diary, February 25, 1954. Also see Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 324, 331; Reeves, McCarthy, pp. 551-559.


10. Ibid.


15. Robert Wright, "Ike and Joe: Eisenhower's White House and the Demise of Joseph McCarthy", unpublished senior thesis, May 18, 1979, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, pp. 54-57; Wright's is the most detailed account to date of Eisenhower's moves against McCarthy. Also see Greenstein, chap. 5; Bayley, McCarthy and the Press, pp. 190-191; Press conference, March 10, 1954.
16 CR, March 9, 1954.

17. Eisenhower to Flanders, March 9, 1954, Eisenhower Papers, emphasis mine.


20. Ibid.


27. Hagerty Diary, March 27, 1954.
37. Congressional Record, June 1, 1950, pp. 78-94-78-95.


43. Hagerty Diary, June 21, 1954.


47. Evans and Novak, Johnson, pp. 83-94; Griffith, Politics of Fear, p. 295; Miller, Lyndon, pp. 171-172; Reeves, McCarthy, p. 645; Reichard, Reaffirmation, pp. 204-205; President's Appointments, August 5, 1954, Ann C. Whitman File, Eisenhower Library.


49. Dulles to Wiley, 9:50 AM August 13, 1954, Eisenhower Library - John Foster Dulles File, Princeton; Dulles to Smith, 9:56 AM August 13, 1954, ibid. In any case, Eisenhower's response and the Dulles call had what must have been the desired effect on Smith. Certain he could effect a compromise on the morning of his meeting with Eisenhower, his only hint of the meeting in his next diary entry was the sentence. "I am rather confused and need quiet and guidance re everything." He quickly adopted Nixon's advice that the proposed Eisenhower-McCarthy meeting not be held until after the Select Committee had reported, then flew to spend the remaining time before the trip to Asia with his family in Denver. He returned to find McCarthy recommended for censure, and left the issue
alone until he voted for censure on December 2. Smith Diary, August 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20.


51. Interview with Attorney General, Whitman Diary; Memorandum of Conference, June 22, 1954, ibid.; untitled memorandum, August 2, 1954, Whitman File; Reichard, Reaffirmation, p. 204.


54. Ibid., pp. 312-313.


57. Reichard, Reaffirmation, pp. 204-210.

58. Ibid., CR December 3, 1954. Figures 2-4 are drawn from the data in Figure 1.

59. Hagerty Diary, May 108, 28, 1954 and December 9, 1954; also see Roscoe Drummond column, December 1, 1954, NYHT; Rovere, Affairs of State, p. 367. Walter Winchell, a McCarthy backer, was certain enough of Eisenhower's role to ask Hagerty to intercede with Ike on McCarthy's behalf. James Reston of New York Times, however, insisted that Eisenhower had not "taken on" McCarthy personally. Hagerty Diary, December 8, 1954.

60. Reeves, McCarthy, p. 456; CQ, Politics in America, p. 108.

61. Griffith, Politics of Fear, pp. 312-313.


65. Fenton, Midwest Politics, p. 86.


69. Conversation between the President and the Vice President, Whitman Diary, June 29, 1954. Also see Griffith, *Politics of Fear*, p. 306.

70. Memorandum for Governor Adams, August 2, 1954, Whitman File; Lodge to Eisenhower, July 30, 1954, ibid. They were both classified "Secret" until January 25, 1980.

71. Memorandum for Governor Adams, August 9, 1954, Eisenhower papers.


74. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 436-437; Reichard, Reaffirmation, pp. 204-210.

75. CQ Politics of America, pp. 20-21.

76. Loeb to Eisenhower, November 3, 1954, President's Personal File, Eisenhower Papers.

77. CQ, Politics, p. 109. Also see Eisenhower Diary,

78. Eisenhower to Gruenther, November 2, 1954.

79. Larson, Eisenhower, p. 35.

80. Eisenhower Diary, November 20, 1954.


82. Ibid., Eisenhower to Hazlett, December 8, 1954.

83. Hagerty Diary, December 7, 1954.


86. Ibid., December 1, 1954.

87. Ibid., December 6, 1954; Eisenhower to Roberts, December 7, 1954.

88. Ibid.

89. Hagerty Diary, December 9, 1954.

Dwight D. Eisenhower's object in becoming president had been to reduce the domestic and international tensions that divided his country. In his first two years in office, he had ended the war in Korea, secured the censure of Joe McCarthy, and led the moderate congressional wing of the Republican party to abandon the GOP right and form a centrist coalition with like-minded Democrats in both houses. His unwillingness to campaign for incumbent Republican conservatives had cost his party its congressional majorities, but this merely furthered the centrist shift. He had taken office at a time when the two parties were poles apart, the Democrats predominantly -- but ineffectually -- liberal, and the Republicans agreed that the policies of their antagonists were destroying the nation. By December 1954, the nation's politics were stuck at dead center, where they would remain until after 1958, when the Democrats began preparing for the 1960 presidential election.

Having begun the depolarization of the American political system, Eisenhower still had two major objectives: to complete the isolation of McCarthy and the Republican right wing, and to stabilize the Cold War before it could flare into a global catastrophe. These were interrelated
in that reduction of Cold War tensions would require the importance of the GOP right; likewise, reducing the importance of the Cold War would further undercut the conservative cause. From the end of 1954 through the end of 1956, Eisenhower would pursue these twin aims. By 1957, he had achieved success: McCarthy was dying, his supporters were in total disarray, and the Cold War was so stable that it had become an institution.

It was not immediately clear that McCarthy's censure had ruined him. It cost him none of his formal powers or privileges, and amounted to nothing more than moral condemnation by his fellow senators. He might have escaped even that had he been willing to apologize to several senators whom he had abused. The same pugnacity that made him refuse to apologize led him to keep up his attempts to goad Eisenhower into a public quarrel. The two major events of late 1954 -- the defeat of the Republicans in the congressional elections and the censure of McCarthy -- diminished McCarthy's influence and prestige in the Senate by demonstrating his vulnerability. The Democrats' victory, rather than the discipline of the Senate, removed McCarthy from his committee and subcommittee chairmanships. Defenseless thereafter, he lacked the sense to lie low or flee.

Eisenhower and his staff by no means assumed the censure had rendered the junior senator from Wisconsin
harmless. The week before the censure vote, Senate Majority Leader William Knowland proposed that the US break relations with the Soviet Union and blockade China. Eisenhower and Press Secretary James Hagerty agreed that "McCarthy would also jump into this as soon as the censure vote was finished," and they made plans to cope with this possibility. Eisenhower wrote his friend Cliff Roberts on December 7 to express concern about further mischief from the junior senator, commenting that "McCarthy is operating at the old stand." He informed Roberts of plans he was making in case "McCarthy and his cohorts should succeed in breaking off a fairly good hunk of Republican strength." 

In fact, McCarthy was unable to resume business "at the old stand," because Eisenhower kept him off balance for the next few months. McCarthy responded to the president's commendation of the Watkins Committee by publicly repudiating his support for Eisenhower in 1952. Even Knowland felt compelled to denounce McCarthy for that. Eisenhower had Hagerty respond by referring reporters to the president's recent tough statement on foreign affairs and by giving the latest figures from the Attorney General on "security risks" released from federal employment. Then Ike ordered McCarthy removed from the White House guest list, consigning him to social exile. The following February, the president appointed George E. C. Hayes, the lawyer who had defended Annie Lee Moss, one of
McCarthy's last targets, to the District of Columbia Public Utilities Commission, remarking, "If they construe this as another slap at McCarthy, so much the better."\(^3\)

By March 1955, the combination of the censure, the loss of his chairmanships, and his ostracism had reduced McCarthy to the status he had feared most: he was no longer newsworthy. The White House no longer bothered to slap at him. "[A]ll of us on the staff," Hagerty noted in his diary,

including the president, will make it a point not to have any comment whatsoever on anything McCarthy says or does. We have relegated him to the back pages of the papers and he knows he is not news any more. Consequently, he is desperately trying to stir up anything he can to cause him to become once again a controversial subject, particularly between himself and the White House.... If we continue this sort of silent treatment, he will blow his top and sink still lower in political importance.\(^4\)

Eisenhower had insisted all along to his friends among the major publishers and journalists that the press had built McCarthy up. By the end of 1954, the papers stopped giving McCarthy the attention that he had received earlier. The early coverage had received derived in part from the notion that a United States senator could not be a mere charlatan. By 1955, McCarthy himself had exploded that myth. After censure, he was the nation's only second-class senator. Still, he kept asking a reporter friend why an attack that was news in 1950 was not news in 1955.\(^5\)
By May, even White House staffers who had defended McCarthy were treating him coldly. Throughout the spring, he had tried to gain news coverage by demanding action on American fliers held by communist China. On May 18, he wrote to the president complaining that his letter of two months earlier had been treated routinely. This time the White House did not bother to reply.

Having been plunged from political stardom to national invisibility was not perhaps as bad for McCarthy as losing the attention of his colleagues in the Senate. He had been censured in large part because the moderate Republicans and a few Republican conservatives had come to view him as a liability. His unrepentant vindictiveness during and after the censure fight gave most of his remaining friends in the Senate the same outlook. McCarthy did not take it well. Thomas C. Reeves reports that

Joe was deeply hurt when colleagues began to turn their backs on him, leave the Senate floor when he rose to speak, and make excuses to be elsewhere when he joined them as lunch.

He retreated into heavy drinking and began missing Senate proceedings. He had a staffer poll Republican leaders about his chances to wrest the presidential nomination from Eisenhower in 1956 (he confided to William F. Buckley that he would swing his votes to nominate Knowland), and was shocked to learn that only three per cent of them
would back him openly. Even that figure was probably high, given that the poll was conducted by a known McCarthy subordinate. 

McCarthy's isolation increased. He played no role in the national elections in 1956. His offer to campaign for all GOP candidates in Wisconsin in 1956 was accepted by only one candidate, and at that appearance the Republican gubernatorial nominee sent last minute regrets and did not arrive. That summer, McCarthy began to enter the hospital periodically for alcohol detoxification. He soon suffered delirium tremens, and he responded to doctors' warnings that drinking was killing him by drinking even more. "No matter where I go," he told a friend, "they look on me with contempt. I can't take it any more." In March 1957, he told another friend that he was ready to die; on May second, he succumbed. The death certificate read "hepatitis, acute, cause unknown." Those of McCarthy's critics who had dismissed his censure as a mere slap on the wrist had been mistaken. 

The isolation and decline of the Republican right after 1954 paralleled McCarthy's, as might have been expected from their nearly total dependence on him. Just as McCarthy was branded by his misdeeds, so was the conservative wing of the GOP stigmatized for supporting him. Like him, the conservatives lost their committee and subcommittee chairs -- and thus their ability to obstruct
presidential programs -- when the Democrats took control of Congress. Actually, the conservatives lost more than their leadership of committees. When control passed to the Democrats, under the skillful leadership of Lyndon Johnson, the GOP right also lost control of the Senate agenda. Nor was the loss of the committee chairs a small matter. Pro-McCarthy Republicans had chaired the Appropriations, Banking and Currency, Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Finance, Government Operations, Interior and Insular Affairs, Judiciary, Public Works, and Rules and Administration Committees, as well as the important subcommittees on Investigations and Internal Security. (They had also controlled the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee, the Republican Committee on Committees, and the Republican Personnel Committee, which they continued to do after their 1954 losses.) Johnson would inflict defeats on the weakened conservative bloc for the next six years, rendering it as isolated and ineffectual as McCarthy had become in his decline. 10

On all the important votes in the Senate in 1955 and 1956, the right wing of the Republican party was either fragmented or forced to support Eisenhower. Indeed, the censure resolution drove the first wedge into conservative ranks, with such stalwarts as Wallace Bennett of Utah, Francis Case of South Dakota, and Arthur Watkins of Utah
voting against their fellow conservatives, and Bricker, Capehart, and Wiley avoiding the vote.

The next major vote was on the Formosa Resolution in January 1955. The China Lobby and the other vociferous anticommunists could hardly oppose an augmentation of the president's power to let him defend the Nationalist regime. The only quibble raised by a rightist was that of George Malone of Nevada, whose objection was that "the only potential enemy mentioned in the joint resolution is Red China;" he actually asked whether Eisenhower would defend the island against an invasion by "Red Russia." Yet Malone voted for the resolution. Of the Republicans who opposed censure, only William Langer, the last of the old Progressive isolationists, voted against it. The only other opposition came from Democrats Herbert Lehman and independent Wayne Morse. The final vote was eighty-five to three, with the eight absent senators all having announced their support as well. Eisenhower's first foreign policy test after the censure of McCarthy was on an issue of virtual national unanimity.11

There followed a series of much less unanimous votes. Reciprocal trade came up for renewal in May 1955 and was passed seventy-five to thirteen, with a provision that made it the longest extension of reciprocal trade since the war. Fourteen Republicans who had opposed censure voted for the measure, seven against. The Republicans
were united initially on the public housing bill in early June. Eisenhower agreed with Homer Capehart that the construction of 135,000 new units was too much. Capehart expected an easy victory for his amendment to reduce the figure by 100,000 units, since most Republicans disliked the idea of public housing but felt compelled by constituent pressure to support some such measure, and most southern Democrats were totally inimical to public housing programs of any size, because they promoted integration.

Capehart failed to check with the southern bloc, and did not know until the amendment was voted down that Johnson had persuaded the southerners to oppose both figures -- 35,000 or 135,000 units. The southern bloc, together with all the remaining Democrats and seven northern Republicans, defeated the amendment. On the final vote, including the higher figure, many Republicans who had tried to decrease the size of the bill felt they dare not oppose a public housing measure, and it carried. Two Republicans who opposed censure voted with the Democrats to defeat the amendment, and ten anti-censure Republicans, including McCarthy, voted for the measure on the final vote. Capehart had fumbled, and a chance to reunite the party on a major vote was lost. 12

Two weeks later, another opportunity to display unity arose for Senate Republicans. As Eisenhower prepared to go to a Big Four meeting at Geneva with British, French, and
Soviet leaders, Styles Bridges warned against appeasement. McCarthy, reaching for headlines, introduced a resolution to put the Senate on record opposing Eisenhower's participation in Geneva Conference. Eisenhower and Knowland wanted to kill the measure in the Foreign Relations Committee, but Johnson seized the opportunity to embarrass the Republicans over McCarthy. A Republican attempt to kill the resolution in committee was defeated in a straight party vote, and the measure was brought to the Senate floor the next day so the Democrats could defeat it. The debate was acrimonious. McCarthy charged that the president and the Senate were giving comfort to the communists, drawing a sharp response from Capehart. "The Senator from Wisconsin," he said,

should not try to indicate those of us who voted to uphold his hand. He should not attempt to beat out our brains. I, myself, am a fairly good fighter, and I do not like to have my brains beaten out.13

Capehart claimed -- correctly -- that Johnson was having "a field day with something that should have been thrown in the trash can," and Knowland argued that it should have been defeated in committee. McCarthy finally asked permission to withdraw his resolution, but the Democrats objected to that and forced it to a vote. It was, of course, defeated, 74 to 4 (McCarthy, Jenner, Langer, and Malone voted for it), with fifteen senators not voting.
Of the "nays," eighteen had opposed censure. Johnson had pressed McCarthy's supporters into a vote that J. William Fulbright characterized as "a further confirmation of the vote to condemn Senator McCarthy last December." Both the debate and the final vote suggest that the fuss over McCarthy's resolution hurt the GOP right almost as much as it hurt McCarthy.¹⁴

Again in 1955 the conservative Republicans introduced the Bricker Amendment, slightly reworded. They insisted on their rewording, even though the changes were insignificant. The measure still had a great deal of support in the Senate, and it passed the Judiciary Committee eleven to two. Eisenhower opposed it publicly on April 4. Although it had been reported out of committee, Lyndon Johnson kept it from coming up on the Senate floor for the rest of the session, and it died.¹⁵

Three other votes in early 1956 and 1957 show the continued fragmentation of the Republican right after McCarthy's censure. When Paul Hoffman, a close Eisenhower advisor who had played a major role in the opposition to McCarthy, was nominated to serve on the American delegation to the United Nations, he was confirmed by a Senate vote of sixty-four to twenty-two, with ten abstentions. Seven McCarthy defenders voted to confirm Hoffman, while fifteen voted against, and another (Welker) was "necessarily absent." Then in April 1957, the Senate was
routinely asked to confirm a promotion list which included General Ralph Zwicker. His only offense against the right had been that he served as the catalyst for McCarthy's ultimate censure. (In fact, far from concealing communists, Zwicker had been the source who informed McCarthy of the existence of the leftwing dentist, Major Irving Peress, at his installation.) Only McCarthy and Malone voted against confirming Zwicker's promotion. Six other McCarthy defenders cast no vote, however; Bridges and Goldwater were "necessarily absent," Bricker, Jenner, and Schoeppel were "detained on official business," and Langer was ill. Thirteen of McCarthy's defenders, unwilling to carry this vendetta any further, voted to confirm Zwicker.16

One other divisive vote for the conservative wing had come the month before, over the Mideast Resolution, another expansion of presidential power to use money and military force to protect beleaguered allies. The resolution did less to unify the Republicans in Congress than the Formosa Resolution of a year before, perhaps only because there was no pressure group comparable to the China Lobby for the mideast. What conservative opposition there was centered on the expansion of executive power. Carl Curtis offered an unsuccessful amendment that would terminate the resolution's authority on February 1, 1961, less than two weeks after the next president could be expected to take office. "We do not know," Curtis warned, "who the next
President will be." Republican defenders of the resolution were more concerned to give the president whatever he needed to oppose the spread of communism. Torn between their hatred of communism and their resentment of Eisenhower, only three of McCarthy's defenders voted against the measure (Jenner, Malone, and McCarthy himself). William Langer, who had voted against the Formosa Resolution, was again absent due to illness, but he announced his agreement with Jenner, Malone and McCarthy. The other seventeen surviving McCarthy defenders voted with the majority to pass the resolution.  

The votes in the Senate on these major pieces of legislation provide further evidence of the transformation of the Republican right. As the fundamentalist anticommunism of the McCarthyites supplanted fiscal conservatism as the organizing principle of the GOP right, Eisenhower won most northeastern GOP conservatives away from the fold. The New Englanders had been the most internationalist of the conservatives, and most of them grew less fiscally cautious under Eisenhower's patient explanations of economic necessity. Eisenhower also converted many Republicans of the Mid-Atlantic region to internationalism in 1953 and 1954, along with a few westerners and midwesterners. It was especially in the east that Eisenhower won Republicans away from the right wing of his party. On the Formosa Resolution, the Reciprocal Trade Act, the Housing Act,
the McCarthy Resolution, and the Mideast Resolution, not a single GOP senator from east of the Appalachian chain voted with Eisenhower's conservative opponents. On the Hoffman confirmation and the Zwicker promotion, Styles Bridges was the only easterner to vote no. 18

Survival itself came to be a problem for the McCarthy group. Even though they had tended to come from the safest Republican states, seven of the twenty-two who voted against censure lost their next election campaign, while three others chose not to run again. McCarthy died before his term expired, his seat going to a Democrat in a special election. John M. Butler and Homer Capehart were re-elected in 1956, but defeated in 1962. McCarthyism was not, of course, the only factor in these defeats, but the impotence of the GOP right following the censure played a major part. 19

While Eisenhower worked to isolate the Republican right from the centrist coalition of GOP moderates and Democrats that he built after 1954, he also strove to defuse the Cold War. Although many historians have assumed from Eisenhower's rhetoric that he was an inveterate Cold Warrior, it is clear that before he entered politics he had worried that the Cold War would get out of hand. At Potsdam in 1945, he had told Secretary of State Henry Stimson that the atom bomb was "horrible and destructive," and that he saw no need to use it against Japan. In his
retirement address as Army Chief of Staff in 1948, Eisenhower said that he did not believe war with Russia was inevitable, that he was "certain" that the Soviet Union was "in no position to fight a global war," and that it did not want one, adding,

You can be sure that until her differential of strength becomes such as to lead her to think that she might win quickly, Russia won't start any war deliberately.20

Eisenhower's postwar writings are full of concerns that some unspecified nation, perhaps even his own, would blunder into war.

This is not to suggest that Eisenhower thought there would be no problems with Russia after World War II. He felt that there were greater differences -- and thus greater potentials for friction -- between the Soviets and the American than elsewhere. "Russia, he wrote in 1946,

... is so anxious to spread communism that propaganda, money, agents, and, where close to her borders, even force are used to see that communism gets into the saddle.21

He added that "without using the same methods," the democracies should "support countries that want to remain free." He did not expect the inevitable conflict with the USSR to be military. Rather, he anticipated a period of serious economic, political, and diplomatic conflict -- "propaganda,
money, agents, and where close to her borders, even force" -- that embodied some potential for blundering into war. Eisenhower did not seem concerned about a recurrence of the kind of global military aggression that Germany and Japan had launched, probably because he thought the Russians were neither reckless nor desperate enough to try it in the nuclear age.  

He was more worried about political and economic conflict. In 1952, after reviewing a draft of the Dulles article on "liberation" and "massive retaliation," Eisenhower wrote Dulles to comment. "There is only one point, he said, that bothered me.... It is this: What should we do if Soviet political aggression chips away at exposed portions of the free world? So far as our resulting economic situation is concerned, such an eventuality would be just as bad for us as if the area had been captured by force. To my mind, this is where the case for the theory of "retaliation" breaks down."

Dulles, clearly nonplussed, replied, "You put your finger on a weak point in my presentation. I shall try to cover it in a revision...." Soviet political and economic competition, not armed aggression, was what Eisenhower considered the real threat to the West, and neither the Truman administration nor the Republican right seemed to know it.

During the series of crises that had formed the Cold War from 1945 to 1955, the possibility of a third world...
war affected the moves of major policymakers. Once policy options began to be selected as if they were preliminary moves leading to war, the possibility that they might not lead to war became secondary. American responses to Soviet moves began to weigh the importance of holding onto vital territory against the risk of being bogged down in the wrong place. Foreign countries were assessed primarily as potential allies; military options became a standard consideration in the State Department.25

The apparent likelihood of global war had increased in 1948, with the communist coups in eastern Europe and the Berlin blockade, and it increased even more from 1950 to 1953, during the Korean War. The combat deaths of American soldiers had aroused public fury as mere diplomatic moves could not. With the fall of Nationalist China, the presumably monolithic communist juggernaut seemed to have undergone incredibly rapid and sinister growth. By 1953 both sides had atomic bombs and were at war in Korea. Global nuclear war seemed inevitable and imminent. The waiting frayed people's nerves.26

From 1953 to 1955, Eisenhower aimed at reducing the imminence of global war. He began by using the occasion of Stalin's death in 1953 to scrap the belligerent "captive nations" resolution, instead expressing his hopes for peace. Stalin's successors did likewise. Although he had to use nuclear threats to do it, Eisenhower got a
truce in Korea and ended the war without either side winning. He would accept the existence of the communist bloc rather than go to war to destroy it. This was very far from the speeches of conservative Republicans like Jenner, who claimed that the USSR was on the brink of collapse and the United States should help finish it off.²⁷

In 1954, even as he was trying to usurp McCarthy's mantle as the most anticommunist political leader in the country, Eisenhower went to great lengths to avoid going to war in Indochina. It is clear that he believed it important that Indochina not fall to the communists, both for strategic reasons and because of the political damage that its "loss" would inflict on him. On the other hand, he was convinced that French colonialism was doomed. For the US to support French imperialism, he believed, would put it on the losing side. Furthermore, Eisenhower did not want to employ American ground troops in Indochina because he felt that the "jungles of Indochina would have swallowed up division after division of United States troops." If there were any way that American aid could preserve a non-communist Indochina, he thought, it was dependent on ending French colonialism. Before the French defeat, he urged France to announce independence, and after it he sent advisors, feeling that the French withdrawal let them go in with clean hands.²⁸
Eisenhower, as has been seen above, was certainly capable of being duplicitous, but his statements on Indochina seem as likely to have been ambivalent. He was vitally concerned with keeping Indochina from the communists, and he wanted desperately to avoid sending American troops. He made both concerns public, not always simultaneously. As he expressed his desire to do something to forestall a communist victory, he set preconditions for American involvement:

1. the French must promise independence;
2. the British and other, preferably Asian, allies must agree to act jointly with the United States under American leadership; and
3. Congress must give prior approval for American military operations.

Eisenhower knew these preconditions could not be met. France had made it very clear that its interest in sending troops to Indochina had been to retain it as a colony. France could have given Indochina its independence without any expenditure in troops and money had it wished to do so. Britain feared provoking a global war, and was greatly relieved to see the Korean War end. The British were not interested in preserving the French empire or following the United States into another drawn-out war in Asia.29

Nor was there any likelihood that Congress would either declare war over Indochina or authorize free use
of American forces without such a declaration. Not even the most out-spoken anticommunists on the Hill wanted intervention in Indochina. Although important administration figures like Dulles and Nixon urged Eisenhower in the secrecy of NSC meetings to bomb communist forces around Dien Bien Phu, Republicans in Congress were united in opposing American intervention. "We want no American forces sent to Southeast Asia," Jenner had told the Senate,

We want no carefully contrived emergencies by which we shall be forced to consent in haste to the sending of troops to Vietnam or Thailand.30

McCarthy had likewise proclaimed,

Now, I do not want to send any American troops into China or Poland. But I do propose that we give the anti-Communist forces in those countries necessary aid when the opportunity presents itself.31

The Democrats were no more permissive. John Stennis of Mississippi charged, "Step by step and day by day we are coming nearer to a fighting part in the war in Indochina."32 Eisenhower denied this. "No one," he said, could be more bitterly opposed to ever getting the United States involved in a hot war in that region than I am: consequently, every move that I authorize is calculated, so far as humans can do it, to make certain that it does not happen.33
It did not happen under Eisenhower. Having expressed his desire to do something in such a way that Congress, the British, and the French felt constrained to block him, Eisenhower could stay out of Indochina without taking the kind of sole responsibility for what followed that Truman took when he singlehandedly cut off congressionally-authorized aid to Nationalist China. Indeed, with the French defeated by the communists, Eisenhower still managed to get a solution at the Geneva Conference that left half of Vietnam, and the new nations of Laos and Cambodia as well, out of communist hands.34

More importantly, after 1954 Eisenhower understood that neither the public nor anyone in American politics advocated war, in the absence of direct military aggression, to prevent the loss of a minor country to the communist sphere. Until then he had wondered whether the GOP right wanted war -- it seemed so often to be the only possible explanation of what they said. In November 1954, he sent Dulles a "Personal and Confidential" memo regarding a Knowland speech critical of administration policy. Knowland seemed to Eisenhower to be implying preventive war. "Do you suppose," he wondered,

Knowland would actually carry his thesis to the logical conclusion of presenting a resolution to the Congress aiming at the initiation of such a conflict? Of course I don't believe this for a second -- but I do wish that people who imply
bitter criticism of an existing policy would assume the responsibility of proposing definite alternatives.35

Nine days later, Eisenhower had a private meeting with Knowland, in which he made certain that Knowland did not mean to advocate military action. The president told Knowland bluntly that termination of diplomatic relations, which Knowland had suggested, would be a step toward war. "If you do that," he said, "then the next question is, are you ready to attack? Well, I am not ready to attack."

Knowland replied that he did not want to take the president's time to discuss it.36

Neither Knowland nor the other conservative Republicans wanted to call for war. They preferred "bitter criticism" to "proposing definite alternatives." To them, the logical conclusion of their criticism was not war but political victory over their opponents. Such criticism worked best against the Democrats, who could be charged with softness toward communism if they did not intervene militarily, or with creating "another Democrat war" if they did, but the conservatives had no reason to avoid using this criticism against their moderate Republican rivals. Knowland's diatribes implied war to Eisenhower, but not to Knowland. Six weeks later Eisenhower wrote in his diary about Knowland, "In his case there seems to be no final answer to the question 'How stupid can you get?'"37
Eisenhower's conclusion that nobody would advocate war as a "tougher" alternative to his policies gave him considerable latitude in his efforts to stabilize the Cold War in 1955 and 1956. A crisis had been brewing in the Formosa Straits since the summer of 1954, as communist China threatened to finish off its revolution by taking Formosa and the off-shore islands. Eisenhower kept the Seventh Fleet in their way. Communist shelling of minor islands led to the signing of a joint defense treaty between the Nationalists and the United States that obligated the US to come to Chiang Kai-shek's aid if the communists attacked Formosa or the nearby Pescadores. Not all the islands held by the Nationalists were covered by the treaty, however, and one was seized by the communists. Eisenhower sent Congress the Formosa Resolution in January 1955, and it was quickly adopted, giving him complete authority for whatever actions he deemed necessary to defend Formosa and the Pescadores. (The resolution was passed in the Senate, as discussed above, eighty-three to three. The House vote was 410-3.)

Eisenhower could sound as belligerent as he felt necessary without worrying that he would be stampeded into making his word good. He told a press conference on March 16, in response to a reporter's question, that the US would use nuclear weapons should a general war break out in Asia. This statement, at the height of the communist buildup, was made more credible by Nationalist Chinese
possession of artillery capable of firing atomic projectiles (although they did not have the projectiles.) As a tacit compromise, Eisenhower pressured Chiang into removing his forces from the indefensible Tachen Islands, but made clear that Quemoy, Matsu, the Pescadores, and Formosa were considered vital and would be defended. In April, at the Bandung Conference of Asian and African nations, Chou En-lai intimated that China was willing to negotiate over the Straits. The crisis died down. Dulles believed there had been a fifty per cent chance of war breaking out, and later cited this as a successful example of brinksmanship, along with the ending of the Korean War and the possibility of intervention in Indochina. German Adams disagreed, however, later noting that he doubted that Eisenhower was as close to the brink of war as Dulles claimed. "The President knew," Adams wrote,

that the American people had no appetite for another prolonged war in Southeast Asia. He was determined not to become involved without the support of Congress....

Intentional lack of specificity seemed the key to Eisenhower's approach. In a long letter written on February 1, 1955 to his friend General Alfred Gruenther, the Commander of NATO, Eisenhower delineated his options in the
Straits crisis and explained the problem attaching to each. He concluded,

You have probably read the Resolution passed by the Congress, at my request. The wording, as to areas outside Formosa and the Pescadores, is vague. In view of what I have just said, you can understand why this is so.40

Between Eisenhower's general statements about using nuclear weapons in a war in Asia and the vagueness of his intentions as embodied in the Formosa Resolution, the PRC was left uncertain whether any action it might take would be a worthwhile risk. It took no action.

Eisenhower's true thoughts on the dangers of war were clearly stated in his letter to Gruenther. "Whatever is now to happen," he said,

I know that nothing could be worse than global war. I do not believe that Russia wants war at this time -- in fact, I do not believe that if we became engaged in a rather bitter fight along the coast of China, Russia would want to intervene with her own forces. She would, of course, pour supplies into China in the effort to exhaust us and certainly would exploit the opportunity to separate us from our major allies. But I am convinced that Russia does not want, at this moment, to experiment with means of defense against the bombing that we could conduct against her mainland.... [S]he would probably be in a considerable dilemma if we got into a real shooting war with China. It would not be an easy decision for the men in the Kremlin, in my opinion.41

If nobody in American politics including Eisenhower wanted war, and neither did America's allies nor the Russians and
their allies, then war was avoidable. What was required was for the leaders of the major powers to understand that this was so.

Thus in early 1955, Eisenhower decided, against the advice of Dulles, to endorse Winston Churchill's call for a "Summit" meeting of the Big Four powers in Geneva, the conference that prompted McCarthy's self-defeating resolution. Several hopeful signs appeared before the conference. In May the major powers signed a treaty that ended the ten-year occupation of Austria. Soviet and western troops were removed, and Austria became a neutral, independent nation for the first time since 1934. That same month, Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin visited Yugoslavia to apologize for Stalin's behavior toward Tito after the war. And at the UN Subcommittee on Disarmament in London, Soviet envoy Jacob Malik offered to accept the 1954 Anglo-French proposal on inspection as a step toward total disarmament. 42

But Eisenhower was not yet ready for disarmament. Still distrustful of the Russians, he countered at Geneva with his "Open Skies" proposal, calling for ground and aerial surveillance to confirm compliance. When Khrushchev called Eisenhower's plan "a very transparent espionage device," disarmament talks went no further. Yet the widely-publicized "Spirit of Geneva" represented something real: the mutual understanding of the leaders of the major nations
that there were limits of sanity beyond which none would go without being pushed. Considering the atmosphere during the first ten years of the Cold War, this mutual understanding was no small feat. It brought stability to the Cold War.43

This mutual understanding may have been all that spared the world from catastrophe in 1956. Certainly enough went wrong to have provoked war otherwise. In April, Khrushchev made a secret speech at the Soviet Party Congress denouncing the crimes of the Stalin era. The communist world quickly went into shock. Outraged by Khrushchev's disclosures, and eager to see how far the Russians were willing to de-Stalinize, the peoples of several communist bloc nations began testing the Soviet leadership.44

In the spring, Mao Tse-tung launched his own liberalization effort, the "Hundred Flowers" campaign. Mao invited criticism of communist errors, and was met by such a deluge of criticism that he hastily suppressed those who had come forward with their complaints. Likewise, unrest in Poland brought important concessions from the Soviets. In July, the American-backed premier of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, refused to hold elections to reunify Vietnam as called for in the 1954 Geneva accords, knowing he would lose.45 Simultaneously, American and British cancellation of funding for Egypt's Aswan Dam led Gamal Abdel
Nasser to nationalize the Suez Canal as an alternate revenue source, precipitating yet another crisis.46

These events had surprisingly little impact on the American elections. The Republicans did little red-baiting, as McCarthy had already become a political corpse and McCarthyism a liability. Vice President Nixon, perhaps chastened both by McCarthy's fall and by his belief that Eisenhower had tried to dump him as a running mate, obeyed Eisenhower's instructions to forgo attacks on the Democrats and instead praise the Eisenhower program. Those suggestions of "softness" that did appear came from the Democratic candidate Adlai Stevenson, who alternated between his calls for ending the draft and halting American H-bomb tests and his accusations that the administration had lost half of Indochina and allowed the communists a foothold in the Mideast. None of these caught the popular imagination.47

The most serious crises of 1956 took place simultaneously in late October and early November, during the peak of the American election campaign. In Hungary, a student uprising flared into a national revolt, deposing a puppet regime and forcing Soviet troops to withdraw from the capitol. Eisenhower feared that the Soviet leaders would become desperate, and on October 29 ordered Ambassador Bohlen to transmit a message to Khrushchev and his fellow
Soviet leaders, specifically including Marshal Zhukov. "The U. S. has no ulterior purpose," he cabled,
in desiring the independence of the satellite countries.... We do not look upon these nations as potential military allies. We see them as friends and as part of a new and friendly and no longer divided Europe. We are confident that their independence, if promptly accorded, will contribute immensely to stabilize peace throughout all of Europe, West and East.48

The Soviets shortly announced that they would withdraw their troops from Hungary as soon as the Hungarian government thought it necessary. It remains unclear whether the Soviets lied about withdrawing or changed their minds, but they did not withdraw.49

That same day, October 29, Israel, apparently acting alone but actually as a part of a joint Israeli-British-French plan, attacked Egyptian positions in the Sinai peninsula. The next day Britain and France delivered an ultimatum: Egypt and Israel must agree within twelve hours to evacuate the Suez Canal, or an Anglo-French force would seize it to keep it open. As they had planned with Israel that there would be no such agreement, they could count on going ahead. They had carefully kept the US from finding out about their plans. Two days later, the Anglo-French task force bombed several Egyptian airfields, cities, and ports, and landed paratroops near the canal. Eisenhower, who was trying to reduce international tensions and to persuade the western nations that colonialism was a lost and
unpopular cause, was furious. So was the British Labor Party. Even before the Anglo-French troops landed, the House of Commons had given Anthony Eden's government a lukewarm 270-218 vote of confidence.  

On November 1, the new Hungarian government informed the Soviet ambassador that it was withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact, proclaiming neutrality, and asking the UN to defend it. To the Soviet leadership, this was the equivalent of "losing China." The Eisenhower administration denounced the Soviets before the United Nations over Hungary, while siding with the USSR in the UN against Britain and France over the Mideast. The strategy met with mixed success. The UN and American diplomacy forced the British and French to pull out of the Suez, but on November 4 the Soviet Army, using two hundred thousand soldiers and four thousand tanks, crushed the Hungarian revolt. Eisenhower sympathized with the Hungarians, but said he could do nothing, since the best troops of his allies were tied up in Egypt and there was no access to Hungary that did not violate the territory of a communist or neutral country.

Two days later, Americans voted. Eisenhower won a resounding re-election, with the largest popular vote in history. Outside the deep South, Stevenson won only Missouri. Eisenhower got 437 electoral votes, Stevenson seventy-three. This contrasted sharply with the other contests. The GOP lost two House seats, held even in the
Senate, and forfeited a single governorship. Eisenhower, still recovering from his 1955 heart attack and surgery for ileitis in the summer, did little campaigning in his own behalf. His memoirs make no claims to have campaigned for other GOP candidates, and the last two weeks of the campaign were taken up by management of international crises. However justified his policy of benign neglect toward his political responsibilities he did not suggest that he was disappointed not to have the Republicans retake control of Congress.

If the election confirmed anything, it was the success of Eisenhower's depolarization efforts. For the first time since the victory of Zachary Taylor in 1848, the country elected a president while giving neither house of Congress to his party. Control of the Senate remained with Lyndon Johnson, and the House was still run by his counterpart Sam Rayburn. The national vote was for the status quo: not only was there little change of balance in governorships and in the House (and no change of balance in the presidency or the Senate), only four incumbent senators were defeated, a Democrat and three Republicans. These were McCarthyite Herman Welker of Idaho and moderates George Bender of Ohio and James Duff of Pennsylvania. In thirty-two Senate contests, twenty-nine incumbents ran and twenty-five were elected. For GOP incumbents, it seemed to matter little whether they were conservatives or moderates. The
voters were not inclined to change things. The Eisenhower administration and its bipartisan coalition of congressional moderates had won voter approval to continue to centrist course. 53

Eisenhower had correctly gauged the right's unwillingness to call for war. The case of Hungary might reasonably have been expected to arouse more anticommunist fury from the GOP right than the fall of China: rather than a weak dictatorship losing its hold on its people, a nation had risen against Soviet rule and thrown it off, only to be crushed while the US did nothing. Yet the right was quiet. The Hungarian revolt had not aroused its fervor. The government brought to power by the rising in Budapest was led by Imre Nagy, who was popular because he was a less hardline communist than the man he replaced. Hungarian rightists had called for Nagy to resign, and some wanted Cardinal Mindszenty to take charge. Anti-Soviet or not, the new Hungarian government had many faults from a conservative viewpoint. 54

The GOP right did and said nothing to help the new Hungarian regime survive. As in Korea and Indochina, the right was unwilling to call for armed American intervention. Non-interventionism was still part of the make-up of some senior conservatives, such as Knowland, who asked Eisenhower at the height of the two crises to assure him that he would not "let the British drag us into another one of their
wars." The conservatives were willing to denounce any administration that "lost" a country to communism, but they were not yet ready to send American troops. Nor did they support governments that were not devoutly conservative.55

There were other reasons for Republican conservatives to say nothing when the Soviets crushed the Hungarian revolt. Congress was not in session; many senators and most representatives were busy campaigning. The Soviet onslaught was over in less than two days, too quickly for speeches. It came in the last two days of the election campaign. Not even the GOP right would denounce its own standard bearer before the votes were counted. Afterwards it was pointless. The GOP right in Congress was silent during the uprising and its suppression. A month later the National Review called for an end to dealing with the Russian and Hungarian governments, but that was as far as the right's outcry went.56

There had been no call for action from the right, nor any contemplated by the administration. Eisenhower had pleaded the inaccessibility of Hungary. Others blamed Britain and France. Dulles feared that any move by the West would threaten Poland's recent gains. The real reason for Eisenhower's unwillingness to do more lay in his approach to stabilizing the Cold War. He told Hughes he had always thought "Foster was a bit too optimistic about changes or upheavals" in eastern Europe. He knew that the
Soviet leaders were "both furious and scared" by the forces they had unleashed with de-Stalinization, a state of mind he considered "the most dangerous possible." Not only did Eisenhower assume that any military intervention in Hungary would quickly lead to global war, he essentially recognized that tacit spheres of influence were necessary for relieving Cold War tensions. As he had said in 1953, "We never have, we never will, propose or suggest that the Soviet Union surrender what is rightfully theirs." Whether or not he thought Hungary was "rightfully theirs," he did think the Soviet leaders were entitled to assurance that the US would not interfere when serious Soviet interests were involved. In his memoirs, Eisenhower wondered what would have been recommendation to the Congress and the American people had Hungary been accessible by sea or through the territory of allies who might have agreed to react positively to the tragic fate of the Hungarian people.

But his answer was probably the same as he gave to another related hypothetical question:

If the Soviets had moved into Hungary with no Suez problem preoccupying all Western Europe, would the reaction of the West have been more intense? ...[M]y own answer has always been negative.

The events of 1956 precipitated both the Sino-Soviet split and the formation of the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957. The Mideast Resolution, proposed by the administration in
January 1957 and adopted by Congress two months later, backed up the Eisenhower Doctrine by authorizing Eisenhower to spend up to $200 million in economic and military aid to preserve "the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East," and to use American troops to support any country in the region threatened by "overt armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism."

Besides potentially freeing the president from congressional footdragging (or prodding), it implicitly recognized the existence of both Soviet and American spheres of interest. As discussed above, what little opposition the Mideast Resolution had in Congress came from its open-endedness. 60

Although relations between the US and the USSR remained decidedly hostile, the diplomacy that resulted from Eisenhower's efforts in 1956 was essentially similar to that before the rise of Nazi Germany. Both parties understood certain tacit rules, foremost among them that outright military attack on either major power or on minor nations in either sphere of interests would precipitate a major war. Short of that, political, diplomatic, and economic measures designed to influence rival nations were permissible, as was espionage. Thus the diplomacy of the institutionalized Cold War could evolve toward normal prewar foreign relations.

Thus, the Cold War became an institution, more stable than volatile, a part of the normal social and political
world environment. For a decade, the Cold War had been a series of crises that threatened to lead to total war. Now, imperceptibly, a new pattern had been created of crises that did not threaten to turn into total destruction; crises had become routine. For some, an institutionalized -- almost ritualized -- Cold War was less frustrating than an active Cold War. After World War II the public and both parties had repudiated isolationism, believing that foreign events influenced their own well-being. No longer was it possible to resort to war to end intolerable situations, nor could such situations be ignored as they had been between 1919 and 1939. To have so much power, and yet be unable to use it, and to face such a threat, and not be able to eliminate it, produced the great tensions that made McCarthyism possible. The bitterness of outcast Republicans was reinforced by the public's frustration and impotence.

By reducing the 'Cold War to an institution -- that is, by conducting a charade war in which the most horrifying threats could be made yet never had to be carried out -- Eisenhower made the tension bearable. A degree of "doublethink", or ambivalence, was a vital component; relief from these tensions came only to people whose simultaneously believed that the intolerable acts of the other side would not be tolerated indefinitely and that no nuclear holocaust would occur. There was no psychological balm in believing only one or the other, because believing
only one or the other required one to accept the unaccept­able as a corollary. The nuclear threat had to be abso­lutely believable, as described by the honest, simple Ike or by the cold, arrogant Dulles. Both men seemed to take the threat of communist aggression seriously, and Eisenhower was equally credible when he promised restraint.

The institutionalized Cold War was not simply a decep­tion. Each side took a stance that combined hyperbole with hypothetical defense policy, and the bad feeling continued. In the United States there would be no acceptance or toler­ation of communism, however restrained official policy might be at any given moment. Fears of total war faded, however; presidential advisor such as C.D. Jackson and Emmet John Hughes, who still wanted to win the Cold War, quit in disgust when they realized that Eisenhower was more interested in stabilizing it. Given the very real differences in the aims of the two superpowers and the increased hostility both felt after a decade of the Cold War, there was no way to simply end it. Eisenhower was content to have stabilized the conflict so that he and his successors could work to reduce the tensions that fed it.61

The institutionalization of the Cold War made the last foreign policy differences between the Republican uni­lateralists and internationalists considerably less im­portant. Intraparty animosities over foreign policy no
longer demanded resolution; they could be allowed to smolder. Henceforth both could vent their spleen against communism without fear that they would be responsible for anything. The internationalists could now express their concern for other countries without fear of war. They could portray foreign aid as tough-minded, long-term anticommunism rather than fiscal generosity. They also had the international organizations they believed in, such as the UN, NATO, and SEATO. As Cold Warriors, they did not have to fear changes of being soft on communism. The Democrats got these benefits as well.

The unilateralists found the institutionalized Cold War very much to their liking too. They had not wanted real war, and they no longer needed to worry that the internationalist organizations favored by their rivals would draw the country into war. They were also guaranteed that the American government would remain anticommunist in its foreign and domestic policy. Furthermore, the permanence of the Cold War would preserve the Republican right, as its best issue was, in effect, to be legitimated by Eisenhower and every succeeding president.
NOTES -- CHAPTER SIX


8. Ibid., pp. 665-667.


12. Ibid., May 4 and June 7, 1955; Miller, Lyndon, pp. 178-179; Evans and Novak, LBJ, pp. 150-151.
16. CR, June 20, 1956 and March 5, 1957.
17. CR, July 20, 1956 and March 5, 1957; Reeves, McCarthy, p. 538; Evans and Novak, LBJ, pp. 174-181. Also see Adams, Firsthand Report, pp. 271-272; Public Papers of the Presidents, 1957, pp. 7, 12-13.
18. CR, January 29, May 4, and June 7, 1955; June 22 and July 20, 1956; and April 1, 1957. Also see Reichard, Reaffirmation, pp. 88-95.
23. Eisenhower to Dulles, April 15, 1952, Dulles Papers, Princeton.


32. Ewald, Eisenhower the President, p. 107.

33. Ibid.

34. Truman, Years, p. 113; Miles, Odyssey, pp. 116-117; Hammond, Cold War, pp. 57-58; Alexander, Holding the Line, pp. 80-82.


37. Eisenhower Diary, January 10, 1953.

38. Eisenhower, Mandate, chap. 19; Alexander, Holding the Line, pp. 87-89.

39. Adams, Firsthand Report, p. 118. Also see ibid., p. 117; Alexander, Holding the Line, pp. 87-90.


41. Ibid.


43. Alexander, Holding the Line, pp. 96-97; Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War, pp. 116-123.

44. Ibid., pp. 99, 178; Mosley, Dulles, pp. 406-407.

Cold War, p. 193; Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, p. 184.


49. Ibid., p. 179; Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 79; Mosley, Dulles, pp. 452-453.


51. Ibid., pp. 84, 88-89; Alexander, Holding the Line, pp. 177, 179-181; Mosley, Dulles, pp. 453-454; Ewald, Eisenhower the President, p. 211.


CONCLUSIONS

Anticommunism became the focal point in American politics in the early fifties because it was the only issue that could unite a defeated and fragmented Republican party. For the GOP right, it had been a weapon for ending the New Deal and salvaging conservative economics. But anticommunism soon took over the GOP right, becoming its defining issue rather than a tool for securing its economic policies. This reduced the ranks of the conservatives, as Eisenhower won fiscal conservatives over to his position and away from McCarthyism. The defeat of McCarthy and the right isolated them from power, and allowed Eisenhower to institutionalize the Cold War to keep it from exploding. This meant that anticommunism would be denied the final victory, the destruction of the USSR.

But with a permanent Cold War, the veto power over American foreign policy that McCarthyism had given the right was made virtually permanent as well. As long as the political figures of the McCarthy era remained in positions of importance, dominated by fears of careers ruined by charges of softness on communism, any administration would have to pursue foreign policies and support foreign leaders acceptable to the right. People had been destroyed for portraying Mao Tse-tung as an "agrarian reformer," and nobody who has survived would take a chance on a "left-of-center intellectual" like Juan Bosch of the Dominican
Republic, a "neutralist" like Souvanna Phouma of Laos, or a "socialist" like Salvadore Allende of Chile. The wing of the minority party that was least sympathetic to foreigners would decide which foreign leaders had the best chance of opposing communism in other nations. The conservative veto in foreign affairs produced few American victories.¹

The right's veto developed from the fundamental misunderstanding shared by most of McCarthy's contemporaries about the nature and political effect of his power. Opponents of McCarthy ranging from Eisenhower to the Americans for Democratic Action believed that McCarthyism was a mass-based phenomenon rooted in the ignorance and anti-intellectualism of the American people -- a force that could be released again any time anybody appeared insufficiently ferocious toward communism. For a generation of politicians, McCarthyism was a great trauma. Truth seemed to be no defense against spurious charges of disloyalty; no one who survived the era was likely to forget it.²

Still, evidence has existed since the 1950 election that McCarthyism was fairly ineffective as a political weapon. Although McCarthy was widely believed to have been a major factor in that election, he influenced no campaign decisively, and the communist issue was decisive in no more than one or two campaigns; the Republican victory in 1950 was not as impressive as any other off-year
results after 1934. Most of the candidates McCarthy backed won, but there was no clear correlation. His fame increased when he got a frightened Truman administration and later an overcautious Eisenhower administration to dump some employees he had branded. When several McCarthy-endorsed candidates were elected in 1952, although it was very clear that Eisenhower had helped the ticket a great deal, McCarthy and the communist issue were given much credit. His subsequent defeat and collapse were not attributed to the good sense of the American people but to his own personal shortcomings and the cleverness of his enemies. What power the communist issue had was actually derived from the vindictiveness of conservatives in positions of power in both parties, and from timid appeasement by liberals in positions of power in both parties.

Like isolationism, the communist issue was a device that had its greatest popular influence on Republicans and won few converts. And as a weapon for political infighting between elections, the communist issue was so abusive that it precluded necessary compromises. Yet virtually every political figure of the McCarthy period used it. Republican conservatives used it on members of both parties. Truman, Acheson, and leading Democratic senators during the early Cold War were fond of describing the Republican conservatives as "going along with the Kremlin" by hampering their policies. Later, Eisenhower
endorsed the notion that the Democrats had "invited" the
Korean War, and carried out a deliberate distortion of the
figures relating to security risks separated from the gov­
ernment. Nixon, McCarthy, and dozen of others built their
careers on the red smear. John F. Kennedy made political
capital of "exposing" leftist labor leaders, and Lyndon
Johnson helped block Truman's nomination of Leland Olds
for the Federal Power Commission by charging that the "line"
he followed resembled the Communist party line. Two very
liberal Democrats, Paul Douglas and Hubert Humphrey, even
wrote a bill -- with assistance from the American Civil
Liberties Union -- to permit concentration camps for sus­
picious persons. When Robert Taft denounced his 1950
senatorial opponent, Joseph Ferguson, for being supported
by an organization (the CIO) which "still uses Communist
techniques," Ferguson responded by showing people a photo
of Taft and communist leader Earl Browder together. Still,
implying that Taft was a communist was no sillier than
claiming that Truman, Acheson, and Helen Gahagan Douglas
were communists.5

The communist issue was as detrimental to the people
who used it as to their targets. It may have given McCarthy
a second Senate term, but that term killed him. The panic­
stricken members of Congress who voted for the 1950 Inter­
nal Security Act fared far worse than the few brave souls
who opposed it. Although it lent temporary unity to the
GOP in 1952, the communist issue soon deepened the party rift, weakening the conservatives, paralyzing the moderates, and damaging the whole party's reputation. It cost more than it was worth, yet it seemed a safe and easy way to beat an opponent. Like free liquor, the communist issue was something politicians found hard to turn down.  

The Cold War was institutionalized because few wanted war and nobody wanted to argue against hostility to the Soviet Union. Eisenhower and Johnson found a way to defeat McCarthy and stop his worst outrages that was effective and yet avoided confronting any of the issues. They were willing to expose McCarthy as a fraudulent anticommunist, but not to cast doubt on whether communism really needed to be opposed. Most Democrats were furious that McCarthy and his backers treated Democrats like communists, but they themselves voted to put communists in concentration camps, fire them from jobs they may have filled adequately, and break what little political strength they had in the United States. Nor was any political figure willing to say that any move of the Soviet Union was justified. Because McCarthyism had been defeated through affirming the premises of the Cold War, these premises were further legitimized and could not be renounced.  

Eisenhower and every successive president attempted, as did Soviet leaders, to further undo the Cold War, but all were hampered by their own legitimation of the conflict
and the hostility they continued to feed. Nobody could reach a position of major political power on either side in the Cold War without endorsing the Cold War itself, and nobody who had reached such a position through such endorsements could be trusted by the other side. No leader so wrapped up in the Cold War could hope to explain to the public or to other politicians how there could be a basis for friendly relations without admitting to exaggeration or claiming that preposterous changes had occurred on the other side.  

The internal split in the Republican party acquired a life of its own as it developed. What had been little more than a difference in tactics in the 1934 election had by 1948 turned into two party coalitions under a single banner, each with its own leaders, outlooks, and programs. Eisenhower's hope to unite the party into what he viewed as a modern conservative party failed by 1954. He had then hoped to rid the GOP of the diehards, but he gave up on that, too, by the time his second term began. Although he found the makeshift coalition of GOP moderates and the Democrats much to his liking, unless he had a large Republican congressional bloc, the Democrats would be able to run this moderate coalition. In the late 1950s a second wave New Deal realignment swept the far northern states, particularly Oregon, Montana, North Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Maine. Republicans,
most of them conservative, were replaced by Democrats, most
of them liberal. Eisenhower had little success in pulling
Republicans away from bedrock conservatism; when they let
go, they seemed to go farther left than he had in mind.
His "hidden hand methods" were ill-suited to ideological
persuasion, and he simply gave up on all but the most rudi-
mentary efforts to remake the party. 8

Still, he had accomplished something useful. Eisenhower
had aimed, in April of 1953, to win "five or six" senators
away from "the McCarthy-Malone axis" of untraconservatives.
For more than a year after Taft's death, he found this im-
possible. But by late 1954, the Republicans of the north-
east were beginning to abandon the fundamentalist anti-
communism of the McCarthyites. 9

Republicans from the Mid-Atlantic states had generally
been moderates on fiscal issues, but many of them had long
records as unilateralists. Eisenhower was able to convert
many of these in both houses to internationalism. Although
these moderates has agreed with GOP conservatives on very
little, they had supported McCarthyite charges against the
Democrats, believing them politically expedient. Eisenhower
made them see otherwise, using McCarthy himself as a foil.
By late 1954 most of these Mid-Atlantic Republicans, from
Delaware to Massachusetts, were ready to shift to a position
that retained their fiscal moderation and their conversion
to internationalism, but scrapped McCarthyism. 10
A similar shift was taking place among the conservatives of the upper New England states. Most of them -- including even ultraconservative Styles Bridges of New Hampshire -- had long records as internationalists, but they were fiercely opposed to the New Deal and its economic experiments. They, too, had embraced McCarthyism as an expedient, although several found his tactics hard to reconcile with their interest in civil liberties. As Eisenhower persuaded most of the upper New England GOP conservatives to support him, he was able to play on their internationalism and their support for the Bill of Rights. His economic position was not much less conservative than their own, and demographic change was making their constituencies constantly more urban and less conservative. Most of them found it fairly easy to moderate their economics a bit, remain internationalist, and rid themselves of McCarthy.11

Eisenhower, in short, did not end the Republican split, nor did he rid the party of its conservatives. What he did was pull the most moderate conservatives (from upper New England) and the most conservative moderates (from the remainder of the eastern seaboard) together into a similar ideological grouping, perhaps best described as being the newest and most conservative portion of the GOP's moderate
wing. This essentially moved the dividing line between GOP moderates and the GOP right farther to the right. (See Figure 20.)

Figure 20: The Easterners Shift

Prior to the shift, the GOP split may be shown thus:

Moderate Wing  Conservative Wing

The Eastern Conservatives
Other Republican factional groupings

After the shift, the GOP split has changed slightly:

Moderate Wing  Conservative Wing

The Eastern Moderates
Other Republican factional groupings

The Eastern conservatives have become moderates by moving slightly toward the political center while the moderate wing moved rightward to include them.
This small shift did not broaden the party's small portion of the ideological spectrum. The most "leftward leaning" members of the GOP were still those in the administration, such as Henry Cabot Lodge, Harold Stassen, and Nelson Rockefeller. Nor did this small shift give Eisenhower enough strength to try to replace Knowland as Minority Leader with somebody more to the President's liking. But it did disrupt control the GOP in Congress by the conservative wing of the party. Knowland spent his last four years in the Senate trying to unite Republicans from both wings rather than allowing Bridges, McCarthy, and Jenner to dictate to a weak moderate bloc as they had done during the 83rd Congress.

McCarthyism had transformed the Republican right. From 1932 to 1950, the conservative wing of the GOP had been defined by its outright opposition to the New Deal. The attempt of conservative Republicans to form a large coalition by espousing isolationism had failed because isolationism appealed to almost nobody other than conservative Republicans. From 1945 to 1950, conservative Republicans had scored a few successes, fewer than they believed, by accusing the Democrats of softness toward communism but their main theme had remained opposition to government spending. Finding Dewey as unpalatable as Truman in 1948, they had lost their congressional majority along with the GOP's predisential hopes. Fiscal
conservatism remained a minority political aim, and Republican hopes of improving their strength through debate over foreign policy had not yet borne fruit.\textsuperscript{12} McCarthyism arrived more or less simultaneously with the collapse of public support for the Truman administration. Its domestic programs were stalled, and its loudly-trumpeted ability to prevent war came to nothing in Korea. Republicans using the red smear won election after election, although it now seems clear that most of them would have won without it. McCarthyism was the only way to a GOP victory, it seemed, and it was almost uniformly adopted in 1952. A public vitally concerned about corruption and an interminable war more or less ignored the red-baiting of both parties and voted for the candidate who promised to end the war. Eisenhower was elected with slim majorities, and the Republican right believed it had found the key to victory in the red smear.\textsuperscript{13}

When McCarthy attacked the Eisenhower administration and Eisenhower weaned the eastern conservatives away from the McCarthyites, the GOP right was reduced to a small core of bitter anticommunists. The communist issue, on which the right had placed all its hopes, was now more important to most conservatives than Hoover's economic policies. One of the objectives of the McCarthyite strategy had been to win the support of eastern European ethnics and Catholics, many of whom were in both groups.
Although most Catholics remained Democrats, the "new right" of the middle fifties did attract a Catholic influx to whom anticommunism was crucial; many had even supported the New Deal. Some of the old Protestant fiscal conservatives complained that they were being pushed aside by anticommunist Catholics and Jews who did not understand what conservatism was really about. As economic conservatism was subordinated to anticommunism, the right became militaristic, increasingly fascinated by hardware, as evidenced by Barry Goldwater's self-destructive quip about nuclear warheads that he would "like to lob one into the Kremlin men's room."^14

The two issues, fiscal conservatism and hard-line anticommunism, have coexisted since then in the GOP right. Goldwater added a third in his 1964 campaign, when he carefully enunciated a strictconstitutionalist view on civil rights that won him southern support. It was significant that the one important politician to become a Republican in support of Goldwater was Senator Strom Thurmond, the 1948 Dixiecrat standard bearer, because Goldwater's vote in 1964 resembled Thurmond's in 1948 more than it did any previous GOP voting pattern. Goldwater won every state that Thurmond had carried (Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and South Carolina), plus Georgia and his home state of Arizona. Far from expanding the Republican coalition, Goldwater's hip-shooting anticommunism and his appeals --
whether deliberate or merely functional — to segregation caused great numbers of Republicans to either stay home or vote for other candidates. He won seven million fewer votes than Nixon in 1960, and inspired nine million more Democratic votes than Kennedy had received. The GOP had a net loss of one Senate seat and thirty-seven House seats. It was ironic that the two wings of the party had debated for decades over electoral strategies, with the moderates insisting on reaching centerward to disgruntled Democrats and the conservatives preferring to maximize the Republican vote; when Goldwater reached rightward toward Democratic defectors, he minimized the Republican vote.15

The GOP split has persisted since then, but both wings have learned that they need each other. Nixon, defeated for president in 1960 and for governor in 1962, had become a member of the moderate wing during his years of co-optation by Eisenhower. Yet his campaigning for Goldwater in 1964 won him conservative gratitude, and his 1968 candidacy bridged the gap, as he strove successfully to unite both wings behind him. "Barry Goldwater found out," he told William F. Buckley in 1967, "that you can't win an important election with only the right wing behind you... But I found out in 1962 that you can't win an election without the right wing."16 By refusing to quit the war in Vietnam, Nixon kept the support of the anticommunist right even through his overtures to communist China, and a united
GOP was merely the core of his resounding 1972 re-election. Even so, The Democrats remained the majority party, keeping control of both houses of Congress from 1954 to 1980, and losing presidential contests only when the Democratic party was in great disarray. Republican presidential victories have resulted from efforts in such times to obscure rather than clarify the candidate's positions. Thus Nixon was elected in 1968 running on a "secret plan" which did not exist, aimed at ending the Vietnam war, and he was re-elected while distorting the positions of his opponents. Ronald Reagan's pollster Richard Wirthlin has written that when the Reagan campaign staff realized how great an ideological gap existed between Reagan and most Republicans -- let alone most voters -- they decided he must change the perceptions of the gap or find issues and themes on which there was no gap. The last Republican presidential candidate to try to clarify Republican positions was Barry Goldwater, who proved that the nation was far less conservative than he had believed.  

The Republican split has been less bitter superficially since the conservatives learned in 1964 that the vast conservative electorate they had believed in was imaginary. Although there are individual Republican rightists who hold very old grudges, collectively they appear to have taken Goldwater's advice to "grow-up" and stop boycotting GOP moderates. The death, defeat, and
retirement of most of the original leaders of the two GOP wings has probably facilitated party unity, as they have been replaced by younger conservatives and moderates with fewer scores to settle. 18

The moderate wing of the Republican party has undergone little change since 1940. Its positions on issues have adapted to change as have those of the Democrats, and the GOP moderates remain a substitute for the Democrats when the latter are too muddled to win elections. Thus the moderate wing has enjoyed four presidential terms since 1952 under Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford, and they have not been left out of the Reagan administration.

The conservatives have learned to adapt since 1964. That election was a cathartic shock. Many Goldwater supporters, even on election night, thought their hero would be elected. Having found that they really represented a smaller segment of the American populace than they had thought, they have learned to find and emphasize those issues on which there is wider consensus. Once they made the compromises necessary to win the support of southern segregationists, they found it easier to accept GOP moderates as well. The informal adoption of the "eleventh commandment" ("Thou shalt not speak ill of another Republican,") has been a useful tactic for allowing Republican unity. The GOP is still the minority party, but it seems that the US is in a period of party de-alignment, in which
attachment to the Democratic majority is declining. This, too, has helped Republicans to spend less time blaming each other for failures.¹⁹

The GOP split has become less crippling, but it has not gone away. It is reasonable to suggest that Gerald Ford would have won in 1976 had not some conservatives stayed at home. Ronald Reagan's victorious 1980 coalition has proven very volatile. Jimmy Carter was unable to attract discontented GOP moderates, and the moderates have been given some cabinet and subcabinet posts, but those in Congress have been restive. On the right are several factions that found it easier to unite in opposition to the Democrats than to agree on priorities once in power, a familiar Republican difficulty. Fiscal conservatives like David Stockman have tried to cut defense spending, while anti-communist hardliners like Casper Weinberger demand an ever-larger military outlay. The newest members of the conservative coalition, the religious right, have found that Reagan has offered them little other than symbolic gestures. And there are signs of hostility between these factions, such as Barry Goldwater's remark that some of the religious rightists threaten freedom and need "a kick in the ass." The Republican rift still runs close to the surface.²⁰
CONCLUSION FOOTNOTES


4. Ibid., chap. 4 and pp. 168-171, 247-253; Reeves, McCarthy, pp. 453-457.


8. Mayer, Party, pp. 513-514; Sundquist, Dynamics, chap. 11. Also see Chapter 5 of this work.

9. Eisenhower Diary, April 1, 1953. Also see chap. 4.

10. Reichard, Reaffirmation, pp. 88-95. Also see chap. 6.

11. Ibid.

12. Miles, Odyssey, pp. 219-238. Also see chap. 3.


15. Ibid., pp. 350-357; Kessel, Goldwater Coalition, pp. 130, 179-183.

Also see Miles, *Odyssey*, pp. 302-310.


18. Ibid., p. 148.


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