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CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION IN COUNSELING SUPERVISION

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CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION IN COUNSELING SUPERVISION

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
Linda Gail Schoen, B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1983

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Introduction

Causal attribution appears to be a central factor in the interaction of individuals with each other and with the world around them. In the course of daily living, individuals attempt to understand and form perspectives about people and events, in order to predict and control the world about them. They do this, in part, through attribution. An attribution is "an inference about why an event occurred or about a person's dispositions" (Harvey & Weary, 1981, p. 6). By assigning causality to the environment or to other individuals, people can understand past events and predict future events.

Theories about how individuals perceive and assign causality for the behavior of others sprang from the work of Fritz Heider (1958) in the late 1950's. Heider's "naive analysis of action" or "common-sense psychology" attempted to explain how behavior is perceived and attributed to individuals and was developed from theories of object perception. Heider's work led to the later theoretical positions of Jones and Davis (1965) and Kelley (1967). Jones' and Davis' (1965) theory of "correspondent inferences" focused on when an individual is likely to
attribute another's behavior to dispositional characteristics of that person. Kelley (1967) used an analysis of variance framework to examine how different types of information influence attributions. He extended attribution theory to account for attributions about one's own behavior as well as the behavior of others.

An information-processing model was used by Jones and Nisbett (1972) to explain differences in attributions made by individuals about their own behavior (actors) and by observers of that behavior. They noted that actors tended to attribute their behavior to situational causes, whereas observers were more likely to attribute the same behavior to personal dispositions within the actor. Jones and Nisbett suggested that this tendency is due to differences in the amount and type of information available to actors and observers and to differences in the saliency of the available information. This tendency for differential attributions has been found in various social psychology research settings (Cunningham, Starr, & Kanouse, 1979; Harvey, Arkin, Gleason, & Johnston, 1974; Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, & Marecek, 1973; Sherrod & Farber, 1975; Storms, 1973), yet it has not been widely examined in psychological counseling or within the area of counseling supervision.

In spite of this lack of research, the issues of causality and responsibility are central to counseling and
supervision. How counselors and their supervisors perceive and attribute causality for the counselors' behavior in counseling would appear to have implications for both the content and process of supervision. If one purpose of supervision is to influence change in counselor behavior, the focus of change strategies would be expected to vary according to causal attributions made about that behavior. Conflict may occur in supervision if counselors and their supervisors attribute causality for the counselors' behavior to differing factors, for example, to situational causes or to characteristics of the counselor. As the supervisory relationship appears central to effective supervision (Worthington & Roehlke, 1979), knowledge of possible conflict areas would be beneficial.

One purpose of the present research was to compare the attributions of responsibility made by counselors and their supervisors for typical counselor-client interactions in a counseling interview. Do counselors and their supervisors perceive and attribute responsibility for typical interactions in a counseling interview in the same fashion? It was expected that effects for counselors and supervisors will be similar to the actor-observer effects found in previous attributional research with counselors functioning as actors and supervisors as observers. As noted above, Jones and Nisbett (1972) suggest that the tendency for actors to attribute their behavior to situational causes
and for observers to attribute the behavior to dispositional factors within the actor, is due to differences in the amount and type of information available to actors and observers and to differences in the saliency of the available information. In a counseling interview, the counselor as actor may focus mainly on the client, whereas the supervisor as observer may focus both on the counselor and client. Information about the client may be more salient to the counselor's task, whereas observations about the counselor and the client may be more important to the supervisor. In addition, the counselor possesses more information than the supervisor about how he or she has performed with other clients or with clients like the present one at this point in the counseling relationship. On the other hand, the supervisor may possess more information than the counselor about how other counselors act in a similar situation.

The present study was designed to assess differences in attributions of counselor behavior within counselor-client interactions. Supervisors were asked to observe a counseling interview between a counselor and a confederate client. During the interview, the confederate client initiated three typical types of interactions between counselors and clients. These interactions included client statements that evidenced 1) the revealing of information that the client originally had planned not to disclose, 2) a
lack of understanding, and 3) the attainment of a different perspective. Counselors and supervisors were asked to attribute relative amounts of responsibility to the counselor, to the client, and to other factors for the occurrence of these incidents.

Since previous research has shown that the perception of behavior as positive or negative is related, although somewhat unclearly, to causal attributions (Cunningham, Starr, & Kanouse, 1979; Havey, Arkin, Gleason, & Johnston, 1974; Harvey, Harris, & Barnes, 1975; Stephan, 1975) an attempt was made to monitor how the interview was evaluated. Counselors were asked to compare their behavior in the interview to their behavior in previous interviews. Supervisors were asked to compare the counselors' behavior to that of other counselors of the same experience level.

A second purpose of the present study was to examine the relationship between attributions and supervision. Are discrepancies in the types of attributions made by counselors and their supervisors related to the perception of supervision as being helpful and satisfying? To answer this question, supervisors and counselors were asked to meet for a supervision session following the counseling interview and to respond to measures of helpfulness and satisfaction based on the supervision session.

Differences in the amount of responsibility assigned to the counselor and to the client were expected between
counselors and supervisors. It was hypothesized that, overall, counselors would attribute more responsibility to the client or other situational factors than supervisors and that supervisors would attribute more responsibility to the counselor than do counselors.

As no clear relationship appears in the research literature, no specific hypotheses were proposed concerning the relationship between the evaluations of the interview and the factors to which responsibility was attributed.

Discrepancies between counselors' and their supervisors' ratings of the amount of responsibility attributed to the various factors for the occurrence of the interactions in the counseling interview were expected to be inversely related to satisfaction with supervision and the perception of supervision as being helpful.
Chapter Two

Literature Review

This chapter will provide the theoretical and empirical background for this study. A survey of the literature will be presented which includes attribution theories in general, theory and research pertaining to actor-observer differences in causal attributions, and the application of attribution theories to clinical and counseling psychology.

Attribution theories

Although no monolithic theory exists in the attribution area (Harvey & Weary, 1981), several conceptualizations which form the basis of much empirical work will be presented. Attribution theory, as such, started with Fritz Heider's work (1958) on how individuals perceive and attempt to explain the behavior of others. Most theoretical frameworks have sprung from his analysis and two such conceptualizations, proposed by Jones and Davis (1965) and Kelley (1967) will be examined to provide a broader theoretical basis.

Heider's naive analysis of action. Fritz Heider (1958), one of the earliest theorists in this area, sought
to explain how people perceive, understand and attribute causality for others' behavior. His "common-sense psychology" or "naive analysis of action" framework has provided the basis for the work of later theorists, such as Edward Jones (Jones & Davis, 1965) and Harold Kelley (1967). Heider's attribution theory developed from Brunswick's (1952) work on object perception, which conceptualized the perceptual process as an arc linking two end points, the distal stimulus and the proximal stimulus. The distal stimulus is the object of perception, and the proximal stimulus is the perceived stimulus pattern that represents the object. The distal stimulus is mediated by light and sound waves to form a pattern (the proximal stimulus) which impinges on the sense organs. The proximal stimulus provides cues as to the nature of the underlying distal stimulus, yet a direct correspondence between the stimuli does not need to exist. The perceiver must hypothesize what type of entity most likely produced the given cues and integrate the cues to infer the relatively unchanging object.

Heider (1958) proposed that the perception of others follows similar principles to the perception of impersonal objects. The other person becomes the distal stimulus and the proximal stimulus is the perceptual pattern within the perceiver that leads to an awareness of the other person. The distal stimulus or the other person in person-perception
is mediated by manifestations of the other person's personality (Shaw & Constanzo, 1970). For example, a smiling face and laughter mediate the perception that the person is happy. The proximal stimulus also is actively interpreted against the perceiver's background of past experiences, needs, wishes, and future expectations. Often, ambiguous mediation exists where various underlying factors could give rise to similar manifestations. An example of this, provided by Shaw and Constanzo (1970), is the case of a raised eyebrow which may be the result of dubiousness, amusement, or lack of understanding.

Heider proposed that in perceiving and interpreting the actions of others, "man understands reality by referring transient and variable behavior and events to relatively invariant underlying conditions" (Shaw & Constanzo, 1970, p. 142), i.e. dispositional properties. In this way, the world appears more stable and predictable. The consequence of an action, in general, is seen as depending on a combination of environmental and personal forces. Environmental force is determined by the relevant external factors, for example, task difficulty. Personal force consists of a power factor and a motivational factor. The power factor is influenced mainly by a person's ability ("can" within Heider's terminology), whereas the motivational factor ("trying") is determined by the person's intention and exertion. "Can"
and "trying" are seen as the necessary and sufficient conditions for purposive action.

The intention factor is the central factor in determining personal causality. According to Heider (1958), individuals are held responsible by others for their intentions and exertions but not necessarily for their abilities. Also, in the naive analysis of action, the cause of an event may be attributed somewhat to environmental factors. "Personal responsibility then varies with the relative contribution of environmental factors to the action outcome..." (Heider, 1958, p. 113). Once one attributes the action outcome to the intentions of the person, the personal power factors, the environmental forces, or a combination of these, it is possible to assign responsibility for the outcome.

Within the common-sense psychology framework, people are seen as quasi-scientists who observe and search for cause and effect relationships often, although not always, in a logical and analytical fashion (Harvey & Weary, 1981). Other persons are perceived in a fashion similar to object perception, except the stimulus information is moderated by the perceiver's subjective experience. Causal attributions are formed through the analysis of environmental and personal forces.

Jones and Davis - Theory of correspondent inferences. Jones' and Davis's theory of inferences (1965) focused on a
perceiver's inferences about what another person is attempting to do by a specific action. Following from Heider's attributional concepts, Jones and Davis conceptualized the process of inferring dispositions or personal characteristics from behavior. From the observations of another's overt behavior, a perceiver evaluates the other's knowledge of the consequences of the behavior and his or her ability, which in turn provides information for inferences about the other's intentions. If the other person was perceived as knowledgeable of the consequences and able to perform a given action, then intention on the part of the other person is inferred. Intentions, then, form the basis for the attribution of dispositions.

A correspondent inference "is an inference about individuals' intentions and dispositions that follows directly from or corresponds to their behaviors" (Harvey & Weary, 1981, p. 12). "Correspondence" has been defined operationally as how confident the attributor or perceiver can be in making inferences.

A number of factors are seen to influence the correspondence of an inference. If a behavior is unexpected or socially undesirable, more information is gained and it is more likely that a correspondent inference will be made. Also, correspondent inferences are more likely to be made when the effects or consequences of a behavior are not
common to alternative behaviors. It is assumed that the produced effect is more desirable to the actor and therefore gives additional information about his or her intentions. Other factors that influence correspondence are the hedonic relevance of the action for the perceiver and the perceived degree of personalism, that is, whether the perceiver sees himself or herself as the intended target of the action. It is more likely that a perceiver will make dispositional attributions to another person, if their behavior is seen to be relevant and personalistic to the perceiver.

Kelley's analysis of variance model of attribution.
Kelley's Analysis of Variance model (Harvey & Weary, 1981; Kelley, 1967; Kelley, 1972; McArthur, 1972) was derived also from Heider's conceptualizations, yet unlike Heider's and Jones' and Davis' works, the concepts in Kelley's model were assumed to apply to self-perceptions in addition to the perception of others. Also, whereas Jones and Davis focused on the conditions in which an actor is seen as the cause of specific effects, Kelley focused more on when individuals make attributions to the environment.

It is proposed that an individual attributes causality for effects to those factors with which the effects covary or correlate, rather than to those factors from which the effects are independent. The most important types of possible causal factors are persons, entities, and times. In making attributions, an individual is seen as using three
types of information that relate to these possible causes: distinctiveness, consistency, and consensus information.

The first type of information which is seen to influence causal attributions is distinctiveness information. This is information about whether the behavior occurs when other entities are present, that is, whether or not the behavior is specific to "that" situation. The second type of information is consistency information. Does the behavior remain consistent across times and modalities? That is, does the behavior occur whenever the entity is present and is it independent of its manner of presentation? The third type of information, consensus information, is gleaned from the observation of others. Is the behavior performed by others in the presence of the entity?

These sources of information, which form the basis on which causal attributions are made, are presented in an analysis of variance model in which the entity, person, and time modalities are orthogonal dimensions (McArthur, 1972). In the case where information can be classified as "high" or "low", (for example, high or low distinctiveness), eight "cells" can be generated that describe the informational aspects of the behavior.

It has been hypothesized that an effect or behavior that is characterized by low distinctiveness, high consistency, and low consensus information is more likely to lead to dispositional causal attributions rather than to
environmental attributions. Stimulus or entity attributions are hypothesized to be made when there is evidence to the high distinctiveness, consistency and consensus of the effect. These predictions have led to empirical investigations, such as the study done by McArthur (1972), yet the specifics of these studies are not considered relevant to the present study.

Two principles that have been important to the theoretical conceptualization of attribution processes were proposed by Kelley. The first is the principle of discounting. The role or importance of a specific cause in producing a given effect may be decreased or discounted if other plausible causes also were present. The second principle is labelled augmentation. When there are multiple plausible causes, some of which are facilitative while others are inhibitory, the reverse of discounting may occur. If for a given effect, both a plausible facilitative cause and a plausible inhibitory cause are in evidence, the facilitative cause will be given more weight in producing the effect than it would if the inhibitory cause were not present (Harvey & Weary, 1981).

Summary. From the early work of Heider to the later conceptualizations of Jones and Davis and Kelley, attribution theories appear to have become more specific and detailed, which allows for their empirical testing. Also, the conceptualizations have progressed from a more Lewinian
view of an individual within a "life space" (Heider, 1958),
to one that focuses more on cognitive processes, specifi­
cally on the analysis of information to produce attributions
(Kelley, 1967). Another progression has been the extension
of theoretical formulations to the perception and attri­
butional processes of one's own behavior, as well as the
behavior of others.

Jones and Nisbett: Actor-observer differences in causal
attributions

Following the progression of attribution theories,
Jones and Nisbett (1972) focused on the differences between
perceiving oneself or another as the cause of an effect due
to informational differences. They proposed that "there is
a pervasive tendency for actors to attribute their actions
to situational requirements, whereas observers tend to
attribute the same actions to stable personal dispositions"
(Jones & Nisbett, 1972, p. 80). This difference in attri­
butions made by actors and observers has been found to
varying degrees by many researchers (Cunningham, Starr, &
Kanouse, 1979; Harvey, Arkin, Gleason, & Johnston, 1974;
Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, & Marecek, 1973; Sherrod & Farber,
1975; Storms, 1973). Jones and Nisbett (1972) explained
this difference within a cognitive or informational proc­
essing framework. They proposed that this effect is due to
differences in the amount and type of information, both
context and historical data, available to actors and
observers and to the differential saliency of the available information.

There are several differences in the context data that an actor and an observer possess. Jones and Nisbett discussed two types of context data; effect data and cause data. Effect data include information about the nature of the act itself, the environmental outcomes of the act, and data about the actor's subjective experience of the act, for example, the experience of pleasure or anger. Cause data include information pertaining to the causal role of the environment (incentives, or task difficulty) and intention data, which include both intent and effort information.

Actors and observers may have equivalent data about the nature of an act and the environmental outcomes, yet differ in the information they possess about the actor's experience of the act. The observer does not have direct knowledge and must interpret information gained from physiognomic and gestural cues. Also, the observer may infer what the actor has experienced from his or her knowledge of what he or she and others may have felt in a similar situation. According to Jones and Nisbett, the actor and observer also have near equal information about the environmental stimuli, yet the intentions of the actor are not directly known by the observer. Therefore, while most of the available context data are similar for the actor and the observer, the
observer does not have direct access to the actor's experience of the act or intentions.

Acts and attributions about them do not occur in isolation from the participants' past experiences. Jones and Nisbett (1972) hypothesized that the actor-observer differences in attributions are due largely to differences in historical data possessed by each participant. In terms of Kelley's theoretical concepts, the observer most likely does not possess information about the distinctiveness or consistency of the actor's behavior. According to Jones and Nisbett:

The actor's knowledge about the variability of his previous conduct - associated, in his mind, with different situational requirements - often preempts the possibility of a dispositional attribution. We suspect that because of the differences in the availability of personal history data, actors and observers evaluate each act along a different scale of comparison. The observer is characteristically normative and nomothetic: He compares the actor with other actors and judges his attributes accordingly. The actor, on the other hand, is more inclined to use an ipsative or idiographic reference scale: This action is judged with reference to his other previous actions rather than the acts of other actors. (Jones & Nisbett, 1972, p. 85).

As well as differences in the amount and type of information available to actors and observers, the information that is available may have differential saliency for each perspective. Jones and Nisbett proposed that the action itself is more salient to the observer than the actor. From the observer's point of view, the action is dynamic and figural against a relatively stable and contextual environment. The actor, on the other hand, needs to focus on the
environmental stimuli that appear to evoke and shape his or her behavior and often cannot afford to focus attention to an extreme degree on his or her behavior.

Jones and Nisbett (1972) furthered their conceptualization by stating that perceptions tend to be thought of as primary qualities, as illustrated by their example that people think that funniness is possessed by a clown. Individuals often view their subjective evaluations as perceptions. While an actor may see his or her behavior as emanating naturally from attractions, restraints, and compulsions in the environment, the observer may see the action as a manifestation of the actor and as something possessed by the actor. In attributing the causality of an action to a personal disposition, an actor has to view his or her knowledge of the environment as subjective evaluations that may not be shared by others and realize that others may act differently in the same situation. To attribute an actor's behavior of the environment, an observer needs to empathize with the actor or imagine the "realness" of the environmental cues for the actor.

A series of studies done by Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, and Maracek (1973) support the hypotheses of Jones and Nisbett. In their first study, thirty-three pairs of college women participated in what they believed was an experiment in decision-making. Within each pair of subjects, one woman was designated randomly as the actor, while
the other woman served as the observer. Two confederate subjects, with the same role as the actor, "participated" at the same time. The actor and the confederates were invited to volunteer their time to serve as weekend hostesses for wives of potential financial backers of a university institute, which presumably was concerned with learning disabilities of disadvantaged children. The amount of money the women would be paid for their time was experimentally varied --either $.50 or $1.50 an hour. The confederate subjects volunteered, with one subject agreeing to donate four hours and the other volunteering twelve hours out of a possible sixteen to eighteen hours. The observer was instructed to watch the "decision-making" of the actor.

After being asked to volunteer, the actor was given a "list of reasons people give for volunteering" and asked how large a part each reason played in making her decision. Importance of each of the six reasons was measured on a 0-8 point scale. The observer filled out the same measures with respect to the actor's decision. Both subjects were asked to estimate how likely it would be that the actor would volunteer to perform a similar task--canvassing for the United Fund. The likelihood of such a behavior was measured on a nine-point scale.

The amount of money offered for volunteering was a major determinant in whether an actor volunteered or not, although it did not influence the number of hours
volunteered. Actors and observers did not realize this incentive for they rated money lower than the desire to help, interest of activities and fun of meeting people as reasons for volunteering.

Actors' and observers' judgements on whether the actors would volunteer again were not correlated with each other. Observers of volunteering actors saw the actors as more likely to volunteer again than observers of nonvolunteers. Observers of volunteers also saw the actors as more likely to volunteer again than the actual volunteers saw themselves. Observers of nonvolunteers saw the nonvolunteers as less likely to volunteer again than did the nonvolunteers. A similar pattern was observed when the likelihood of volunteering again was examined as a function of the payment variable.

The authors concluded from this first study that observers tended to make dispositional attributions from the actors' behavior under circumstances in which the actors infer nothing about their general dispositions. What is somewhat surprising, although not directly concerned with the actor-observer effects, is that the range of the means of the estimation of the likelihood of volunteering again across experimental conditions (high/low pay, volunteer/nonvolunteer, actor/observer) was 2.8 to 4.2. On the nine-point scale, 4 was labelled as "neither likely nor unlikely" (Nisbett et al, 1973, p. 156). Although statistically
significant differences were found between actors and observers, few subjects seemed confident in predicting future behavior of the actor. The highest mean rating which occurred for observers of volunteers was only 4.27. Perhaps this was due to factors concerning the experimental situation itself or to differences between the two volunteering tasks.

In the second study, twenty-three male college students were asked to write a brief paragraph about why they liked the girl they dated most regularly and why they had chosen their major field. They were asked also to write a similar paragraph about their best friend's choices. A third paragraph was written on how the subjects thought their best friends would explain the subjects' choices.

The paragraphs were scored as giving either pure entity reasons or as invoking some dispositional characteristic of the actor. Reasons were coded as dispositional if they referred in any way to the person making the choice. In other words, reasons containing both entity and dispositional attributions were coded as dispositional attributions.

When attributing why subjects dated their own girlfriends, twice as many reasons were given that referred to properties of the girl (entity reasons) than to their own dispositional factors, such as needs, wishes, interests, or traits. Subjects as observers gave almost an equal number
of entity and dispositional reasons for why their best friends chose their girlfriends. There was a significant role (self/friend) by type of attribution (entity/dispositional) interaction with subjects tending to give more entity reasons for their own choices.

Although subjects were as likely to give dispositional reasons as entity reasons for choosing their own major, they were four times as likely to explain their best friends' choices by dispositional terms than entity terms. Again, the role by type of attributions interaction was significant and interpretable in a similar fashion. When describing themselves as their friends would see them, a similar pattern emerged. The authors thought that these similarities might have been due to language usage differences emerging from using the first person versus the third person. In a followup study using a list of possible reasons which subjects rated therefore excluding overt language differences, the same pattern was found. For the reasons that were seen as most important in choosing a girlfriend and a major, subjects rated entity-worded reasons higher for themselves than for a friend.

Another study that shows support for Jones' and Nisbett's hypotheses that utilized a different approach than those used by Nisbett et. al. (1973) was conducted by Storms (1973). Storms hypothesized that differences in attributions made by actors and observers were due to different
visual orientations. The actor cannot "see" himself or herself act and may be under temporal restrictions in that the actor may not have time "to contemplate past behavior, monitor present behavior, and plan future behavior all at once" (Storms, 1973, p. 166). Also, in order to behave unself-consciously and maintain control over the immediate situation, the actor may focus on any varying aspects of the environment. The observer usually is visually oriented toward the actor and may see less of the situation than the actor. Also, the observer may not have time to focus on both the actor and the environment. To be able to control and predict the event, the observer may find it more effective to focus on the actor rather than on the situation.

To examine whether attributions could be influenced by changing the visual orientation of actors and observers, Storms used cameras to videotape what the actors and observers would see respectively during a get-acquainted conversation between two "actors". The study was designed with three orientation conditions: 1) no visual reorientation (no videotape), 2) same orientation—in which the videotape was used to repeat the original orientation, and 3) new orientation—in which the videotape was used to reverse the orientation of the actor and the observer. In this last condition, actors saw a tape of themselves from the perspective of the observers, whereas the observers saw a view which focused on the other conversation participant.
which was presumably the orientation of the actors. One-
hundred male college undergraduates participated in thirty
groups of four.

Subjects were asked to describe either their own or the
matched actor's behavior along four dimensions: friend-
liness, talkativeness, nervousness, and dominance. For each
dimension, subjects rated on nine-point scales the amount of
influence personal characteristics and characteristics of
the situation had on causing the behavior. Storms calcu-
lated a Dispositional-Situational index for each subject's
ratings by subtracting the rating for the influence of
characteristics of the situation from the rating of the
influence of personal characteristics summed across the four
dimensions. A high D-S score indicated that relatively more
dispositional attributions and less situational attributions
were made.

Storms (1973) found that in the no-videotape and the
same-orientation conditions, actors made relatively more
situational attributions (and therefore less dispositional
attributions) than did observers. This finding supports the
attributional tendencies predicted by Jones and Nisbett
(1972) and implies that the role of actor or observer is an
important determinant in making attributions. In the new
orientation condition, Storms hypothesized that actors would
make fewer situational and more dispositional attributions
after seeing themselves than subjects not provided with this
information. The reverse predictions were made for observers in the third condition. These hypotheses were supported with the evaluation of situational factors being more strongly influenced by role reversal than dispositional factors.

When actors and observers did not see a videotape of the interaction or saw one that repeated the same visual orientation, the predicted actor-observer attributional differences were found. When the visual orientation was that of the other person, the pattern of attributional differences was reversed, indicating that visual orientation may be an important factor in examining attributions. Storms proposed that the videotape orientation procedure may have affected aspects of both informational availability and information processing. New information about either the situation or the behavior itself may have become available as well as the saliency of the information may have changed. In viewing the new orientation tape, the actors may have acquired a different response set, that is, one of "self-discovery", whereas the observers may have responded from an "empathic" set.

Although this study is very innovative in its design, a criticism can be made about the procedures used to analyze the data. Solomon (1978) stated that there existed little evidence in the literature that he surveyed that a direct inverse relationship exists between the process of making
situational and dispositional attributions. Therefore, the use of the D-S index is questionable and dispositional and situational attributions need to be measured and analyzed separately.

**Influencing factors**

The tendency for actors to attribute causality for their behavior relatively more to situational factors and for observers to attribute the same behavior more to dispositional qualities of the actor appears to be modified by several factors: whether the behavioral consequences are seen as positive or negative; the severity of the consequences; and whether the observer is an "active" or "passive" observer. Although the research examining these variables is not as conclusive as that which supports Jones' and Nisbett's hypotheses, the possible effects of these variables within the present study need to be examined.

**Positive/negative evaluation and severity of outcome.** Several studies have examined the evaluative nature and severity of the outcome on actor-observer differences in attribution (Cunningham, Starr & Kanouse, 1979; Harvey, Arkin, Gleason & Johnston, 1974; Harvey, Harris, & Barnes, 1975; Sherrod & Farber, 1975; Stephan, 1975). In general, actors have been hypothesized to attribute relatively more responsibility to situational factors when the outcome is seen as negative than when a positive outcome is indicated. Actors are assumed to avoid blame in order to maintain
self-esteem. This tendency for actors to attribute causality to factors other than themselves has been hypothesized to be even greater with more severe negative consequences. In situations with positive outcomes, actors have been expected to make relatively more self-attributions. Hypotheses that concern the influence of the evaluative nature of the consequence on observers' attributions tend to be tied to the specific experiments.

Sherrod and Farber (1975) sought to replicate Storms' (1973) results of role "reversal" using a failure situation. Eighty male college students participated in pairs. The actors attempted to complete a task that supposedly measured cognitive complexity while the observers watched the actors' nonverbals in order to predict the actors' success. After receiving fake failure feedback, dispositional and situational attributions were assessed. Actors and observers changed roles and a similar procedure was carried out.

Subjects as actors made fewer self-attributions than subjects functioning as observers. Contrary to predictions, subjects as actors also made lower situational attributional ratings than did observers. The authors did not see this result as necessarily in conflict with Jones' and Nisbett's hypotheses due to the following hypothesis. An additional experimental condition was the presence/absence of a loud distracting tape. In the presence of the
tape, the observers may have overestimated the influence of situational factors on the actors' performance, thereby making relatively more situational attributions than did actors. An interesting result of this study is that differences found between actors' and observers' attributions decreased after subjects switched roles, and subjects who changed from observers to actors modified their attributions more than did subjects who changed from actors to observers. Perhaps more information is gained by becoming an actor than by becoming an observer.

Harvey, Arkin, Gleason, and Johnston (1974) examined the effect of both expected and observed outcome on the causal attributions of actors and observers. Actors performed as "therapists", administering a shortened form of desensitization instructions to a confederate client. The outcome was manipulated to be either positive--the needle on the "auxillary electropolygraph" indicated that the client successfully was relaxed, or negative--the needle indicated that the client was not relaxed. Before "treatment" began, subjects received instructions which stated that the treatment was expected to be successful or not. It was expected that actors would make more self-attributions and fewer situational attributions when the observed outcome was positive than negative regardless of the expectancy instruction condition. Observers were expected to make more actor attributions and relatively fewer situational attributions.
when there was a discrepancy between expected and observed outcomes. Ninety-six college students participated.

The results supported the hypotheses for actors who expected the treatment to be successful. They made slightly more self-attributions when the observed outcome was positive than negative. This was not found for actors who did not expect the treatment to work. The authors proposed that only when the treatment was expected to work was there a threat to the actors' self-esteem, therefore self-enhancing or self-protective attributions would be made only in these conditions. When the observed outcome was contrary to the expected outcome, observers tended to attribute more responsibility to the actor and relatively less responsibility to situational factors than when no discrepancy existed.

Stephan (1975) also examined attributions of actors and observers in positive and negative outcome situations. In this study, forty-eight female undergraduates were asked to either help a confederate subject look for a contact lens or observe such an action. They received feedback as to whether the time spent "helping" was more or less than the average student would help. Stephan predicted that actors would respond defensively when attributing causes for behavior that was less than the average by making more environmental attributions than self-attributions. In the "positive" outcome condition, actors were expected to make relatively more self-attributions than environmental
attributions. The reverse attributional pattern was predicted for observers.

Contrary to the hypotheses, Stephan found that both actors and observers made more environmental attributions in the positive feedback condition than in the negative feedback condition. Although statistically nonsignificant, there was a tendency for actors to make more situational attributions than self-attributions in the positive feedback condition than in the negative condition. Stephan accounted for this by suggesting that actors may have made socially desirable modesty attributions in the positive condition. The lack of statistical significance among the results may be due to the use of the D-S index, which also casts some doubt on the significant results that were found.

Cunningham, Starr, and Kanouse (1979) used a novel approach to examine the effects of positive/negative outcomes and the severity of the outcome on attributions. Twenty-four undergraduates were presented with a 64-item instrument that contained a series of one-sentence interpersonal events, for example, "Ted likes you", "You resent Paul", and "Ted trusts Paul". Four positive-negative verb pairs were used in the sentences: like/dislike, admire/resent, trust/distrust, and love/hate. The verbs were modified in their extremity by the qualifiers "somewhat" and "deeply". For each sentence, subjects were asked to rate the likelihood that the situation presented was due to
qualities of the subject of the sentence (the actor), qualities of the object of the sentence (the "active" observer), or to some other reason.

Cunningham, Starr, and Kanouse found that subjects were reluctant to attribute causality to themselves when placed as the subject or object of the sentence for sentences that contained negative verbs than for sentences with positive verbs. Also, in the negative verb condition, subjects attributed less causality to themselves when cast as the actor or active observer than they attributed to others (Ted or Paul) when placed in those roles. With respect to the extremity variable, the authors found that more causality was attributed to the actor by observers for extremely negative events than for moderately positive events. Cunningham, Starr, and Kanouse summarized by stating "persons may be more likely to avoid blame for blameworthy acts than they are to demand praise for praiseworthy acts" (1979, p. 1150).

Although subjects, when cast as actors, made similar attributions to those made by actors in some other studies, the ability to compare this study to others is somewhat questionable due to the artificiality of the "behavior" involved. In this study, no actual behavior was performed and all represented interactions were with hypothesized individuals. Subjects may not have had a vested interest in attributing causality for the "events".
Another study that examined the effects of the severity of the outcome on attributions was done by Harvey, Harris and Barnes (1975). Forty-four male students were assigned randomly to a teacher (actor) role or to an observer role. The teacher was instructed to teach a word-list to a confederate student and to punish mistakes by supposedly administering shock. The severity of the outcome was manipulated by the magnitude of a "stress reading" of the student's stress that fell within a moderate or severe distress category.

In general, observers attributed more responsibility to the actors than did actors and actors attributed more responsibility to other factors than did observers. With more severe consequences, observers held the "teacher" more responsible and actors made fewer self-attributions than did observers and actors in the moderate consequences condition.

It is difficult to draw specific conclusions about the effects of the evaluative nature of the outcome on actors' and observers' attributions due to the varied methods used to examine this variable. Replication is needed before conclusions can be stated with some conviction. In general, the only similar result appears to be that the tendency for actors to make relatively more situational attributions than self-attributions is exaggerated when the outcome of the event is judged to be negative.
Active versus passive observers. An additional factor that appears to influence actor-observer differences is the degree of involvement in the event on the part of the observer. Jones and Nisbett (1972) made a distinction between "active" observers and "passive" observers based on the degree of involvement. Miller and Norman (1975) provided definitions of these two types of observers:

The term active observer refers to any participant in a social interaction situation who, in addition to observing the behavior of the other participants, influences the behavior of the other participants and is himself behaviorally influenced by the other participants. Active observers, therefore, function as both actors and observers. The term passive observer ... refers to an individual who neither influences nor is influenced by the actor he is observing. (p. 503).

Jones and Nisbett (1972) also stated that the actor is often unaware of the presence of the passive observer.

The active observer is hypothesized to focus even more than the passive observer on aspects of the actor's behavior versus the environment. It is necessary for the active observer to be able to understand and predict the behavior of the actor with whom he or she is interacting. It is not as important for a passive observer to do this and often the passive observer can withhold early assessments of the actor until he or she has more information, for example, consensus or distinctiveness data.

Factors other than the heightened saliency of information about the behavior seem to influence active observers to make more dispositional causal attributions.
The active observer is apt to exaggerate the uniqueness of the actor's responses to his or her actions, which he or she sees as standard and unprovocative. As the surrounding environment is seen as being roughly equivalent for both the actor and the active observer, any differences between the actor's behavior and how the active observer behaves tends to be attributed to dispositional causes.

Miller and Norman (1975) hypothesized that these factors would lead to attributional differences between active and passive observers. They hypothesized that actors would make more situational attributions and fewer dispositional attributions than passive observers. Active observers were expected to attribute causality to a greater extent to dispositional factors than were passive observers.

Miller and Norman tested these hypotheses through the use of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. This is a bargaining game in which players can make either competitive or cooperative responses. The specific payoff is dependent on the two players' independent (and unknown to each other) responses.

Forty female college students were designated as either players or nonplayers. The players functioned both as actors, when making attributions about their own behavior, and as active observers, when they attributed causality for their "partners'" choices. The nonplayers functioned as passive observers. The second player (the experimenter)
responded for half of the subjects in a cooperative fashion and for half of the subjects in a competitive way.

Contrary to expectations, players (as actors) saw themselves as more responsible for their "partners'" behavior and saw the game as less responsible for their own behavior than passive observers. Actors also thought that their behavior more accurately reflected their personality and more could be learned about them from their behavior than did passive observers. Miller and Norman used a motivational framework to explain these unexpected results. They hypothesized that it may be important for actors to see themselves as in control of the environment and therefore play down the influence of environmental causes.

Miller and Norman's hypothesis concerning active and passive observer differences was supported. Active observers saw the second player as more causally potent than did passive observers. The second player was seen as more responsible and the game was seen as less responsible for the subject-player's behavior by active observers than passive observers.

This result that active observers tend to attribute more causality to the actor than passive observers was found in the study mentioned above by Cunningham, Starr and Kanouse (1979) that utilized sentences, such as "Ted likes you". Subjects were seen as functioning as active observers
when attributing causality for sentences of the form "Paul ... you". As mentioned before, in this role as well as the actor role, fewer dispositional attributions were made than when subjects were cast as passive observers.

Similar to the research on the influence of the evaluative nature of the outcome on attributions, strong empirical support for theoretical hypotheses is lacking. Again, procedural differences may have led to differing results. Replication and perhaps standardization of methods would prove beneficial. In the Miller and Norman study (1975), individuals acted as both actors and active observers, whereas subjects functioned in all three roles in the Cunningham, Starr, and Kanouse study (1979). It may be more effective to use different individuals for each role so that possible confounds in functioning in more than one role would be reduced. This would be at the expense of some standardization, though, as individual differences may become important.

Summary

Jones and Nisbett (1972) proposed that actors and observers tend to make different causal attributions about the same behavior due to informational differences. Actors tend to attribute more responsibility to situational factors and less to personal dispositions than do observers. It has been hypothesized that this difference in attributional tendencies may be modified by the evaluative nature and the
severity of the behavioral outcome and the varying degree of involvement of the observer.

The strongest empirical support exists for Jones' and Nisbett's primary hypothesis. In general, it appears that actors do tend to attribute causality for their behavior more to situational factors and less to dispositional factors than do observers. The research focusing on factors modifying this difference is not as conclusive and hypothesized effects await further confirmation.

Applications to counseling psychology

Although attribution theory, in general, has been applied to clinical and counseling psychology problems and issues, for example, Seligman's attributional approach to conceptualizing and treating depression (Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, & von Baeyer, 1979) and Strong's recent proposals of the use of reattributional strategies in counseling (Strong, 1982), only a few applications have been made of the actor-observer differences to this area. This section will briefly examine these empirical applications.

Batson (1975) examined whether the attribution of a problem's cause affects a person's decision regarding how to help. If observers tend to attribute causality to dispositional factors, do helpers do this even when clients attribute their problems to environmental factors? Batson proposed that professional helpers are influenced by aspects of the professional observer role that may reinforce this
tendency. First, it is often easier to change the client than to change the situation. Second, it is more serious to miss spotting a troubled individual than it is to suggest that the problem lies within the client when this is not actually the case. Third, professional helpers have more exposure to troubled individuals than social environments and this may give person information more saliency. Fourth, professional helpers often utilize background diagnostic information according to a medical model which locates the symptoms within the person.

Batson (1975) examined the effects of the causal attribution of the problem, professional status, and the availability of diagnostic information, on the type of helping response made by an individual. Twenty professional helpers (seminary students) and twenty nonprofessional helpers participated in a simulated referral agency. He found that helpers (observers) in general tended to attribute the "clients'" behavior to dispositional factors rather than to the social environment. A significant correlation was found between the locus of the problem attribution and the type of institution to which the client was referred. For example, if dispositional attributions were made, the client was more likely referred to an institution that focused on changing the individual rather than the environment. Nonprofessionals tended more to attribute the problem to situational factors and to refer to
agencies that changed societal factors than did professionals. Also, when background diagnostic information was available, helpers made more dispositional attributions than when no information was available.

Batson's results are consistent with Jones' and Nisbett's (1972) hypotheses and extend the biasing effect of perspective to that of the role of professional helpers. There appear to be role-related pressures that influence professional helpers to place responsibility for problems and, therefore, change on clients.

A few limitations of this study must be mentioned. First, client information was presented through written and taped material. Attributions may have been different if helpers received information about the problem from an actual individual. This may have produced a more empathic response set and altered attributions. Second, Batson measured both dispositional and situational attributions by a forced-choice question, i.e., either responsibility was placed with the individual or with the environment. More information would have been gained if two separate scales had been used to assess attributions.

A second study that focused on both actors' and observers' attributions within a counseling situation was done by Littrell (1979). Forty-two pre-Masters degree counselor-trainees, who were at a prepracticum level, were divided into groups of three students. They were randomly
assigned to the roles of counselor, client, and observer. After a fifteen minute interview, which the observer watched from behind a one-way mirror, all subjects completed a Behavior Rating Scales Questionnaire. Subjects rated the counselors on six behaviors: eye contact, posture, verbal following, calmness, friendliness, and interest. For each behavior, subjects then rated situational factors, for example, being in the study, the counseling session, the topic of conversation, and the way the client behaved, as the causes of the rated behavior. Dispositional causes, for example, personality traits, character, personal style, attitudes, and moods were rated as well. Six client behaviors: eye contact, posture, smiling, calmness, optimism, and involvement, and causal attributions for the behaviors were rated in a similar fashion. All ratings were done on nine-point Likert-type scales.

Littrell (1979) found that trainee-counselors (as actors) rated their own behaviors as most situationally caused, whereas student-clients (as active observers) rated the counselor behaviors as least situationally caused. These findings support the theoretical hypotheses about actors, and active and passive observers described above.

Contrary to expectation, trainee-counselors (as active observers) rated client behaviors as most situationally caused, whereas student-clients (as actors) rated their own behaviors as least situationally caused. Littrell proposed
that these results may be due to the experimental in-
stuctions for counselors which may have made situational
aspects more salient, whereas the client instructions may
have minimized the importance of these factors.

Passive observer ratings did not statistically differ
from the ratings of actors or active observers. No sig-
nificant differences were found between any perspective on
the dispositional ratings. Being assigned the role of
actor, active observer, or passive observer seemed to in-
fluence mainly the perceptions of situational causes, yet
not the perception of dispositional causes.

The generalizability of these results is limited.
First, no information is given as to the nature of the
"client" problem. It is not clear whether the interview
focused on a presenting problem or if the participants used
the fifteen minutes to "get-acquainted". Second, the use of
prepracticum students prevents generalization of results to
individuals with counseling experience. Level of exper-
ience appears to have some effect on how counselors rate
their own counseling behavior. Barak and LaCrosse (1977)
found that practicum counselors tended to rate themselves
lower on dimensions of expertness, attractiveness, and
trustworthiness, than observers, whereas the opposite result
was found when more experienced counselors were used
(LaCrosse, 1977).
Summary

This chapter provided a theoretical framework for the present study. Attribution theories, in general, propose how individuals perceive and attribute causality for their own behavior and for the behavior of others. Based on the early work of Heider (1958), Jones and Davis (1965), and Kelley (1967), Jones and Nisbett (1972) hypothesized that individuals do not perceive and attribute causality for their own behavior in the same way as do observers of that behavior. Research tends to support the general proposition that actors tend to attribute their behavior to situational causes and less to dispositional causes than do observers within the experimental environments used. It appears that the factors of evaluative nature and severity of the behavioral outcome, and amount of involvement on the observers' part in the interaction influence these differential attributional tendencies, yet specific effects are not yet well supported.

Although attribution theory, in general, has been applied to the counseling setting, relatively few applications have been made of the actor-observer effect. The present study was designed to examine whether actor-observer differences exist within an aspect of the counseling setting--that of direct supervision.

Unlike Littrell's study (1979), a closer approximation to "real" practicum counseling experiences was attempted to
increase the generalizability of the results. Counselors and supervisors were more experienced than Littrell's subjects. A standardized client problem was presented by an individual who was unknown to the subjects, in a manner similar to practicum procedures.

As a secondary aim, this study attempted to answer an extended question. If counselors (actors) and supervisors (observers) have different attributional tendencies, do these discrepant attributions affect their perceptions of a subsequent supervisory interaction?
Chapter Three
Method

Subjects
The sample consisted of twenty counselors and twenty supervisors. There were nine male and eleven female counselors and eight male and twelve female supervisors. Counselors were graduate students in the Counseling Psychology Doctoral program at the Ohio State University who had completed at least two quarters of practicum. Supervisors varied in qualifications. Pre-doctoral supervisors (N=11) were about to begin internships, currently were interns, or had completed their internship training. Nine supervisors were post-doctoral. All supervisors had at least one academic quarter of experience in supervising counselors at this level of training. All participants were volunteers. Counselors and supervisors were paired randomly within scheduling constraints.

Procedure
Subjects participated in supervisor-counselor dyads. Each dyad was told that the research was concerned with counseling and supervisory processes and involved either an initial counseling interview with a client or supervision of
the interview and following that, participation in a supervision session. The counselor and supervisor met with the experimenter who introduced them to each other if they had not yet met. Subjects were told that their participation was voluntary and that they could discontinue at any time. Also they were asked not to put their names on any forms so that their ratings would remain confidential. Each rating form was numbered.

The supervisors were told:

You will be asked to supervise an initial counseling interview and provide supervisory feedback to the counselor. Please observe the interview as you normally would and take supervision notes if that is your usual procedure. The counselor is an advanced practicum student. Do you have any questions?

The counselors were told:

You will be asked to conduct an initial counseling interview lasting thirty minutes. You will be responsible for closing the interview within this time limit (counselors were provided with a watch if they did not have one). You will be supervised by . You will find the client, Sandra, in Room 333. Please introduce yourself and escort the client to Room 352 for the interview. After the interview, please remain in the room as I have some measures I would like you to fill out before you and your supervisor meet for supervision. Do you have any questions?

At this point, the supervisors were taken to an observation room in which there was a tape recorder and video screen by which the interview could be monitored. The counselors spent a few moments looking over a biographical data sheet similar to that used in practicum. (See Appendix A)
The experimenter observed the interview with the supervisor and recorded it on audio tape. Following the interview, the supervisor was escorted to another room and given a supervision form on which to make notes for supervision. Counselors were given forms to fill out about the interview. These forms (see Appendix B) were used as a time-filling procedure so that counselor and client statements could be inserted in the attribution measures. Statements were taken verbatim from the tape recording of the interview.

Subjects were given the attribution measures and the comparison measure and instructed on their use. These were collected when completed, and the counselor was taken to the room where the supervisor was, for the supervisory session. Subjects were told to participate in supervision as if the counselor was to see the client again. After fifteen minutes, the subjects were given the supervision forms to complete. The purpose of the study was then explained and any questions were answered.

Client role

A client role was developed to represent a client appropriate to an advanced counseling practicum. The client was a graduating university senior who was vocationally undecided. The role consisted of detail sufficient for a 30-minute interview. The client confederate was an
undergraduate female senior majoring in psychology. She was unknown to the subjects.

The client confederate was instructed to make the following three statements at appropriate times in the interview: 1) revealing of information—"I wasn't going to tell you this, but ...", 2) lack of understanding—"I don't understand what you mean", and 3) attaining a different perspective—"oh, I've never looked at it that way before". The statements were made in this order in all interviews. The order was standardized as the small sample restricted counterbalancing the order of presentation. The client confederate rehearsed the role with a team of three counselors until the counselors, the investigator, and the client agreed that the client was believable within the role and was consistent across interviews.

Measures

Attribution measure. For each of the three incidents (revealing information, lack of understanding, and attaining a different perspective) in the counseling interview, counselors and their supervisors were asked to describe the incident and attribute responsibility for its occurrence according to the following format:

Do you recall when the counselor (you) said __________________________. The client said __________________________. The counselor
(You) said ______________________. What happened at this point in the interview?

(Response)

1. To what extent is the counselor responsible for what occurred?

   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9

   very little

   very much

2. To what extent is the client responsible for what occurred?

   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9

   very little

   very much

3. To what extent is some factor other than the above two factors responsible? The other factor(s) is (are)________________________.

   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9

   very little

   very much

The third item was included to index other possible factors not perceived to be encompassed by the first two items.

Comparison measure. Counselors were asked to rate on a 9-point Likert scale anchored by "much worse" and "much better" how their performance compared to their performance in past interviews. Supervisors were asked to rate the
counselors' behavior in comparison to other counselors of the same experience level on a similar scale. (See Appendix B)

**Supervision measures.** Following the supervision session, counselors and supervisors were asked to rate the supervision session on 9-point Likert scales with respect to the following items: 1) How helpful was the supervision session?, 2) How satisfied are you with the supervision session?, 3) How similar were the supervisor's/supervisee's perceptions of the interview to your perceptions? The third item was included to index the extent to which differences in attributions are perceived by the members of the counselor-supervisor dyads. All scales were anchored by the adjectives "not very" and "very".

**Hypotheses**

1. It was expected that supervisors would attribute more responsibility to the counselor than would counselors for the three incidents in the counseling interview.

2. It was expected that counselors would attribute more responsibility to the client than would supervisors for the three incidents in the counseling interview.

3. It was expected that the amount of discrepancy between supervisor ratings and counselor ratings on the attribution measures would be inversely related to the perception of supervision as helpful and satisfying.
Chapter Four

Results

This chapter will present the analyses of the research data and the results of those analyses. Differences between counselors' and supervisors' ratings of the types of attributions will be examined. Subjects' evaluations of the counselors' performance in the interview will be discussed. Finally, the relationships between the discrepancy variable and the supervision variables and between the supervision variables themselves will be examined.

Attributions made by counselors and supervisors

An examination was made of the attributions made by counselors and supervisors for each of the three incidents initiated by the confederate client. As noted in the last chapter, each incident consisted of a standardized client statement and the counselor statements that immediately preceded and followed the client statement. Subjects were asked to write their perception of what happened at that point in the interview and to what extent the counselor and the client were responsible for what occurred. Ratings were made on nine-point scales.
Within each counselor-supervisor dyad, the content of the supervisor's and the counselor's responses to the question "What happened at this point in the interview?" was scored on a three-point scale for similarity. Content judged by the experimenter to be dissimilar received a score of 1. Content that was judged highly similar received a score of 3. The frequency distribution of scores for the three situations was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation A</th>
<th>Situation B</th>
<th>Situation C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(revealing information)</td>
<td>(lack of understanding)</td>
<td>(attaining a different perspective)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of scores</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scores</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No conclusions can be substantiated by these data due to the subjectivity of the ratings.

A two factor [role (supervisor, counselor), type of attribution (counselor responsibility, client responsibility)] analysis of variance, with both variables being treated as repeated measures, was used to analyze the
attribution ratings made by counselors and supervisors. These analyses were performed by the statistical package BMDP2V.

For the first incident, in which the client said "I wasn't going to tell you this, but ...", a significant main effect was found for the type of attribution ($F_{(1,19)} = 11.79, p<.003$), but not for the role factor. Both supervisors and counselors attributed more responsibility to the client than to the counselor for the occurrence of the situation. The interaction between role and type of attribution was non-significant. The descriptive statistics for the ratings were as follows:

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for First Incident

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Supervisors</th>
<th>Counselors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extent of responsibility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assigned to counselor</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>5.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range</td>
<td>1 - 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S. D.</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of responsibility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assigned to client</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>6.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range</td>
<td>3 - 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S. D.</td>
<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the second incident, in which the client said "I don't understand what you mean", again, there was a significant main effect for the type of attribution made by
subjects \( F_{(1, 19)} = 28.44, p < .0000 \), but not for role.

However, for this incident, counselors and supervisors held the counselor as more responsible than the client for the client's lack of understanding. The interaction was also non-significant. The means, ranges, and standard deviations for these ratings were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Supervisors</th>
<th>Counselors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extent of responsibility assigned to counselor</td>
<td>Mean 7.55</td>
<td>7.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range 6 - 9</td>
<td>4 - 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S. D. .83</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of responsibility assigned to client</td>
<td>Mean 4.80</td>
<td>4.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range 1 - 9</td>
<td>1 - 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S. D. 2.17</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the incident in which the client said "Oh, I've never looked at it that way before", there were significant effects for both the type of attribution made \( F_{(1, 19)} = 8.87, p < .008 \) and for the role X type of attribution interaction \( F_{(1, 19)} = 4.54, p < .046 \). Overall, more responsibility was attributed by supervisors and counselors to the counselors than to the client. The means, ranges, and standard deviations for these variables were as follows:
Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for Third Incident

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Supervisors</th>
<th>Counselors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extent of responsibility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assigned to counselor</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>7.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range</td>
<td>3 - 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S. D.</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of responsibility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assigned to client</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>4.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range</td>
<td>1 - 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S. D.</td>
<td>2.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to understand the interaction effect, matched pair t-tests were used to examine the simple main effects. Supervisor ratings of the extent to which the counselor was responsible were compared to counselor ratings of their own extent of responsibility. The difference between these two sets of ratings was not significantly different from zero ($t = 1.351, df = 19$). The difference between supervisor ratings and counselor ratings was significant ($t = 1.780, df = 19, p < .05$) for the extent of responsibility assigned to the client. As predicted, counselors held the client more responsible than did supervisors. These results parallel those found by Littrell (1979). Figure 1 is a graphic representation of the interaction.
Figure 1

Graphic Representation

of Interaction
The third question of the attribution measure was "To what extent is some factor other than the above two factors responsible? The other factor(s) is (are) ______________". This question allowed for the attribution of responsibility to factors other than the counselor and the client. The responses to this question were assigned by the investigator to categories related to the counselor, the client, the interaction between the counselor and the client, and other factors such as time constraints and societal pressures. Statistical analysis of these data was not feasible due to small cell frequencies. The factors most often listed appeared to imply an interaction between the counselor and the client, such as trust and the developing relationship. Situational factors, such as time constraints, also were listed.

Overall, the hypotheses concerning the actor-observer effects received little support from these results. In only one of the three incidents did counselors attribute more responsibility to the client than did supervisors.

Evaluation of the interview

Subjects were asked to evaluate the counselors' performance in the interview. This was done as an attempt to determine the subjects' evaluation of the interview as positive or negative. Counselors were asked to compare their performance in this interview with their performance in past interviews. Supervisors were asked to compare the
counselors' performance with the performance of other counselors they have seen at the same experience level. All ratings were made on nine-point scales anchored by the terms "much worse" (1) and "much better" (9).

The range of the supervisors' ratings was 4 to 8, whereas the range of the counselor ratings was 3 to 7. The mean of the supervisor ratings was 6.45, with a standard deviation of 1.28. The mean of the counselor ratings was 5.10, with standard deviation of 1.17.

A matched pair t-test was done to evaluate whether the difference between the supervisors' ratings and the counselors' ratings was different from zero. When compared to their matched counselors, supervisors rated the counselors' performance significantly higher than the counselors rated their own performance ($t = 2.93$, $df = 19$, $p < .009$).

Relationship between attributions and perception of supervision

It was hypothesized that the discrepancy between the counselors' and their supervisors' attributions would be inversely related to perceptions of supervision. To the extent that supervisors and counselors differed in their causal attributions about the counseling session, it was expected they would perceive supervision as less helpful and satisfactory.

A discrepancy score was calculated for each counselor-supervisor dyad in the following manner:
\[ \frac{[(A_1 + B_1 + C_1)_{\text{supervisor}} - (A_1 + B_1 + C_1)_{\text{counselor}}] + [(A_2 + B_2 + C_2)_{\text{supervisor}} - (A_2 + B_2 + C_2)_{\text{counselor}}]}{2}. \]

In this equation, \( A, B, \text{ and } C \) stand for the responsibility ratings for the three incidents. The subscripts 1 and 2 represent the type of attribution made by the subjects (1 = attribution to counselor, 2 = attribution to client).

The range of the discrepancy variable was 0.5 to 8.0. This variable had a mean of 2.975 and a standard deviation of 1.73. Multiple regression was used to determine the degree of relationship between the discrepancy score and the supervision measures, namely the supervisors' ratings of helpfulness and satisfaction and the counselors' ratings of these variables. In other words, the question was whether the discrepancy score for each dyad could be predicted from the ratings of helpfulness and satisfaction by counselors or supervisors.

The squared multiple correlation statistic \( R^2 \) was 0.095, indicating that only 9.5\% of the variance observed in the discrepancy variable could be accounted for by the four predictor variables. This percent was not significantly different from zero (\( F_{(4,15)} = .39 \)). The results of this analysis are not particularly reliable, however, due to the small sample in this study (\( N=20 \)).

The simple correlations between the discrepancy variable and the supervision measures also indicate the absence of strong relationships between the discrepancy
variable and the supervision variables. Table 5, on the following page, shows the simple correlations found between these variables.

The range, mean and standard deviation of each of the predictor variables are presented in Table 6.

Table 6
Supervision Variables
Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supervisor</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>helpfulness</td>
<td>3 - 8</td>
<td>5.85</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>satisfaction</td>
<td>3 - 8</td>
<td>6.40</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counselor</td>
<td>helpfulness</td>
<td>6 - 9</td>
<td>7.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>satisfaction</td>
<td>6 - 9</td>
<td>7.75</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relationships between supervision variables

Pearson product-moment correlations were calculated between the supervision variables of helpfulness and satisfaction. As shown by Table 5, a strong positive correlation ($r = .74$, $p < .0002$) was found between the supervisors' ratings of helpfulness and satisfaction with supervision. These two variables also were correlated ($r = .52$, $p < .018$) for the counselors' ratings. Surprisingly,
Table 5
Correlations Between Discrepancy & Supervision Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DSCP</th>
<th>SH</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>CH</th>
<th>CS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DSCP</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.174</td>
<td>.210</td>
<td>-.097</td>
<td>-.222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SH</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.741**</td>
<td>.396</td>
<td>.094</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.291</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.146</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>.524*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DSCP = discrepancy variable
SH = supervisor rating of helpfulness
SS = supervisor rating of satisfaction
CH = counselor rating of helpfulness
CS = counselor rating of satisfaction

* $p < .02$
** $p < .0002$
the supervisors' ratings and the counselors' ratings of supervision were not strongly correlated.

A third supervision measure was assessed—the evaluation of similarity between the counselor's and the supervisor's perceptions of the interview. Counselors and supervisors were asked to respond on a nine-point scale to the following question: How similar were the supervisor's/supervisee's perceptions of the interview to your perceptions? This was used to examine whether subjects were aware of any discrepancies in perceptions and attributions. The range of the supervisor ratings of this variable was 3 to 9. The mean was 6.35 and the standard deviation was 1.69. The range of the counselor ratings was 4 to 9. The counselor ratings of similarity had a mean of 6.95 and a standard deviation of 1.28.

Pearson product-moment correlations were calculated to measure the degree of relationship between actual discrepancy, the supervisors' perceptions of similarity, and the counselors' ratings of similar perceptions. None of the correlations between these three variables was significant. Surprisingly, supervisor and counselor perceptions were not correlated.

Summary

Overall, the hypotheses concerning actor-observer effects received little support. Only in one of the three incidents did counselors rate the client as more responsible
for the event than did supervisors. Supervisors and counselors did not differ in how much responsibility they attributed to the counselor. The hypothesized inverse relationship between the discrepancy variable and the supervision variables was not found. Relationships were found between the supervisors' ratings of helpfulness and satisfaction and between the counselors' ratings of these variables.
This chapter will summarize the study and its results. The hypotheses will be restated and the results will be discussed in light of these. Limitations of this study and areas in need of further research will be identified.

The intent of this study was to determine whether actor-observer attributional differences exist within counseling supervision. It was expected that counselors and their supervisors would attribute responsibility differently for three incidents in an interview the counselors had with a confederate client. It was hypothesized that supervisors (as observers) would attribute more responsibility for the incidents to the counselors than would counselors. Alternatively, it was expected that counselors (as actors) would attribute more responsibility to the client than would supervisors.

A secondary purpose of this study was to examine the relationship of attributional differences between supervisors and counselors to their perceptions of supervision as helpful and satisfactory. It was expected that attri-
butional discrepancy would be inversely related to the measures of helpfulness and satisfaction.

Twenty counselor-supervisor dyads participated in an analogue of counseling and supervision procedures. Counselors conducted a thirty minute initial interview with a confederate client. Supervisors directly observed the interview through a closed-circuit television system. The client made three standardized statements that evidenced revealing of information, lack of understanding, and attaining a different perspective. These statements along with the counselors' statements that immediately preceded and followed the client statement formed the stimulus incidents for which supervisors and counselors were asked to attribute responsibility. The extent of responsibility assigned to the counselor and to the client was assessed on separate scales after the interview. Subjects also were asked to evaluate the counselors' performance in the interview. Supervisors and counselors met for a fifteen minute supervision session. Following this session, subjects responded to measures of helpfulness and satisfaction with supervision, as well as to a question that indexed subjects' evaluation of the similarity of perceptions of the interview between the counselor and the supervisor.

It was found that for only one of the three incidents did supervisors' and counselors' attributions differ. In the first two incidents, counselors and supervisors made
similar attributions. In the first incident, where the client revealed information, subjects saw the client as being more responsible than the counselor for the event. Alternatively, in the second incident, when the client stated that she did not understand, subjects assigned more responsibility to the counselor than to the client for the interaction. In the last incident, in which the client made a statement that evidenced a different perspective, counselors attributed more responsibility to the client than did supervisors ($t = 1.8$, $df = 19$, $p < .05$), although the two groups did not differ in the amount of responsibility assigned to the counselor.

Overall, the hypotheses concerning actor-observer attributional differences received little support. Several factors could account for the lack of expected differences. First, because the supervisors have experienced practicum training themselves, they may have responded from an empathic set, which may have influenced supervisor attributions. Jones and Nisbett (1972) hypothesized that "the more the observer is set to empathize with the actor, the more similar their attributional perspectives will be" (p. 87). Second, due to the counselors' advanced practicum training level, they may have been more aware of their behavior and the impact it had on the client than most actors in previous studies of attribution. The issue of responsibility is one that often is discussed in practicum
and perhaps counselors are more discerning than other actors as to what is "their" responsibility and what is not.

It is of interest that both supervisors and counselors responded similarly in the first two incidents. Perhaps, within counseling, there are events that counselors and supervisors normatively accept as consequences of counselor behavior and dispositions, such as a client evidencing lack of understanding or attaining a different perspective. On the other hand, counselors normatively may deny responsibility for other events, such as the client revealing information in an initial interview. This would relate to Batson's (1975) findings that the professional role itself may have an impact on attributions of the cause of a client's problem. The similarity between supervisor and counselor attributions is consistent with the results of Littrell (1979). In his study, observers' attributional ratings also did not differ from counselors' ratings.

These results point to the importance of the event for which responsibility is assigned. In designing this study, the statements were chosen because it was thought that their occurrence could be causally attributed to either the counselor or to the client. For example, the statement "I don't understand" could be seen as a function of the counselor's lack of clarity or of the client's failure to follow, due to ignorance or defensiveness. The responses to the open-ended attributional question, "What happened at
this point in the interview", suggest that some subjects did see the incident as defensive behavior on the client's part, although most subjects saw the counselor's lack of clarity as the cause.

Evaluation. Overall, supervisors rated the counselors' performance higher than counselors rated their own performance in the interview ($t = 2.93, df = 19, p<.009$). Although the counselors' mean rating (5.10) was lower than that of the supervisors (6.45), counselors, on the whole, rated their performance slightly above the midpoint between the extremes of "much worse" and "much better". This suggests the counselors saw their performance as an average representation of their counseling behavior. It would have been interesting to examine statistically if any relationships existed between subjects' evaluations of the interview and their attributional ratings. Statistical tests for these relationships were not performed due to the number of tests already performed and the risk of inflating the overall alpha level, especially with the relatively small sample size. In addition, even though a significant difference existed between the two groups' performance ratings, the mean ratings differed only by 1.35 points on the nine-point scale and both mean ratings were on the "positive" end of the scale. Thus it seems probable that the difference may have had little impact on attributional ratings.
Supervisor. A secondary hypothesis of this study was that the amount of discrepancy between supervisor ratings and counselor ratings on the attribution measures would be inversely related to the perception of supervision as helpful and satisfactory. The discrepancy variable was not found to be related significantly to the supervision measures of helpfulness and satisfaction. Neither was the discrepancy variable found to be related to the subjects' evaluation of the similarity of perceptions between supervisor and counselor. Perhaps, even if a supervisor and a counselor made differing causal attributions, these were not discussed or perceived in the supervision session. This might have been a function of the limited time spent in supervision or due to the fact that this was an initial supervision session. Perhaps issues of responsibility are discussed later in the developing supervisory relationship.

Surprisingly, supervisors' ratings of similarity of perceptions were not found to be significantly correlated with counselors' ratings of similarity. So perhaps, it does not become obvious to the participants at this stage in the supervisory relationship whether their views are discrepant or similar.

The supervisors' ratings of helpfulness and satisfaction with supervision were positively correlated ($r = .74, p < .0002$) and the counselors' ratings of these two variables also were correlated ($r = .52, p < .018$). The more
that a subject perceived supervision as helpful, the more likely he or she was to perceive it as satisfactory. For each of the supervision variables, though, supervisors' ratings and counselors' ratings were not significantly correlated. Supervisors used the same range of responses for both helpfulness and satisfaction (3-8). Counselors used a smaller and more "positive" range than that used by supervisors (6-9). On examining the ranges, means, and standard deviations of these four distributions, it appears that subjects responded more similarly to their group on the two measures than to their dyad partners. Perhaps supervisors and counselors as a function of their roles in supervision have different standards by which they evaluate these supervision variables and respond within either a "supervisor" or a "supervisee" response set.

Limitations

One limitation in this study that influences the statistical analyses that were performed is the relatively small sample size. For tests that utilized the dyad as the unit of analysis, the sample size was twenty. This limited both the number of analyses that could be performed and the power of the tests that were done. This problem is common to research that focuses on supervision or counseling processes, due to the limited availability of counselors and supervisors for research. It was deemed more important to use a somewhat limited sample, though, than to use a non-
counseling population and risk losing generalizability to the population of interest.

Another possible limitation concerns the relative ambiguity of the stimulus event. In previous actor-observer research, the behavior or event that was to be attributed has been clearly defined, such as the act of volunteering or not volunteering (Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, & Maracek, 1973), or the sequence of responses between two players in the Prisoner's Dilemma game (Miller & Norman, 1975). In the present study, the stimulus event was defined by a set of three statements—a counselor statement, a client statement, and a counselor statement. Subjects had to interpret for themselves what actually occurred during this interaction, yet this allowed any differences in perceptions between counselors and supervisors to emerge and, perhaps, to give rise to differing attributions based on those perceptions. The link between perception and attribution dates back to early theoretical formulations in that Heider's attributional model (1958) arose from models of stimulus perception.

Along with stimulus ambiguity, there may have been perspective ambiguity. Subjects attributed responsibility for the interaction of two individuals and not just for the behavior of one actor. Counselors may have functioned as both actors and active observers by attributing responsibility for both their own behavior and for the client's
behavior. According to the literature (Cunningham, Starr, & Kanouse, 1979; Harvey, Arkin, Gleason, & Johnston, 1974; Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Sherrod & Farber, 1975; Storms, 1973), counselors, when functioning as actors, would have been expected to attribute relatively less responsibility to themselves and more to the client than would supervisors. This tendency to attribute responsibility to the client would be exaggerated when counselors functioned as active observers of the client's behavior (Jones & Nisbett, 1972).

In order to understand better on whom the counselors were focusing when making attributions of responsibility, the investigator categorized the subjects' open-ended responses concerning what occurred during the interactions as focusing on the counselor, the client, or the interaction between the counselor and the client. Out of sixty counselor responses, twenty-two were judged to be focused on the counselor, fourteen focused on the client, and twenty-four focused on the interaction of the two participants. It appears that the majority of counselors functioned as either actors or as both actors and active observers rather than solely as active observers.

Supervisors may have functioned as observers of both the counselor and the client. Although the supervisors were focused visually more on the counselor than the client, in that more of the counselor was visible than the client through the video system, unlike Storms' (1973) experimental
set-up, the client was visible to some extent to the super­visors. Storms found the expected actor-observer differ­ences when the observers saw only the actor. When observers in Storms' study were shown a tape of the actors' orien­tation, that is, a view of the other participant in the conversation, their attributions became more similar to those of the actors. Perhaps, in the present study, overall actor-observer differences were not found due to the fact that supervisors' visual orientation was more similar to that of the counselors than in Storms' study. Supervisors' responses to the question "What happened at this point in the interview" indicate they did focus on the client as well as on the counselor. Twenty-one responses were judged to be focused solely on counselor behavior, nine focused on client behavior, and thirty focused on the interaction between the counselor and the client. It appears that, similar to counselors, the majority of supervisors focused either on the counselor alone or on the interaction between the counselor and the client. Supervisors may have responded to the attributional measures as two indices of dispositional attributions rather than a dispositional index that focused on the counselor and a situational index that focused on the client as was intended. In this case, one would still expect supervisors to hold the counselors more responsible than would counselors, although one might not expect the hypothesized difference between counselors and supervisors
on the measure of client responsibility. The results do not support this. In fact, in the third incident, the hypothesis that counselors would attribute more responsibility to the client than would supervisors was supported. Still, it seems that further research in which the stimulus event and the subjects' roles are more clearly defined would be beneficial.

Another limitation concerns the standardization across the twenty interviews. Although the content and order of the client statements were standardized across interviews, the context in which the statements were made varied to some extent. To examine the supervisory aspect of counseling, it becomes procedurally difficult to standardize the stimulus event across interviews without losing the "realism" of the situation. A taped stimulus that depicts a counselor-client interaction would limit actor information. At best, one could only instruct "counselor" subjects to imagine themselves in the place of the taped counselor.

As with all analogue studies, the generalizability to actual counseling and supervisory processes is limited somewhat. This study was designed to approximate practicum as closely as possible. This was done by using a confederate client unknown to the subjects, by having the client present a problem often encountered in practicum, by providing the counselors with background information on the client similar to that used in practicum, by using a
practicum/supervision setting and by instructing subjects to behave as if the interview was being done within practicum. An indication of the "realness" of the study was the energy and effort shown in supervision. The majority of dyads did not complete their supervisory discussion within the time allotted and had to be interrupted. Also, reports from the subjects about the experience indicated that meaningful supervision had taken place and that something was gained from the experience.

An initial concern was whether the client role was believable and whether the three statements would appear "planted". Comments of the subjects during debriefing overwhelmingly confirmed that the client was believeable in her role. Also, very few subjects suspected that the statements had been planted and then only upon seeing the attributional measures and not during the interview.

Summary and further research

Counselors and supervisors appeared to attribute responsibility for three counselor-client incidents in a similar fashion. The lack of actor-observer attributional differences may be due to methodological problems or to the specific situation and populations involved. Further research that overcomes the limitations mentioned above might help explain why overall actor-observer differences were not found in this study.
It appears that discrepancies and similarities in perceptions of the interview may not be perceived by counselors and supervisors or communicated within supervision. This may be a function of the limited supervision time or of the initial stage of the supervisory relationship. Also, although a subject that thought supervision was helpful was likely to perceive it as satisfactory, counselor ratings and supervisor ratings of these variables were not related. It would be interesting to examine if these differences in the perception of supervision and the counseling interview become apparent to supervisory participants in the same way and at the same time.

Another avenue of research concerns the attributions of counselors and supervisors over time. As supervisors gain more knowledge of the behavior of the counselor, do attributional tendencies change? According to Jones' and Nisbett's terms (1972), the supervisor would have more effect and historical data available as the supervisory relationship progressed. Also, in a follow-up study done by Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, and Maracek (1973), it was found that subjects were less willing to assign traits to a friend as a function of the length of time subjects had known the friend.

Although the hypotheses in this study received little support, research designed in light of its limitations that applies attributional theories to the counseling area and in
particular, to supervision, may be useful. Attributions are central to the processes of counseling and supervision. By blending the two fields of social psychology and counseling psychology, perhaps more knowledge will be gained in both fields.
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Stephan, W. G. Actor vs observer: Attributions to behavior with positive or negative outcomes and empathy for the other role. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 1975, 11, 205-214.


Appendix A. Biographical Data Sheet

Please Return to:

The Ohio State University
Department of Psychology
Student Consultation Service
Room 333 Arps Hall
1945 North High Street
Columbus, Ohio 43210

Full Name Sandra G. Wright Age 20 Sex F
Marital Status Single No. of children -
OSU Address 220 E. 13th Ave., Apt. E Phone 299-6803
Home Address 29 E. Main St., Xenia Phone

High School Attended Xenia Year Graduated 1978
No. in your class 200
High School course: (circle) college prep., general,
commercial, vocat. shop, vocat. agr., technical,
other: ____________________________________________

Other schools attended since high school _______________________

Qtr. you first entered OSU Autumn Quarter, 1978
No. of quarters at OSU 11 Pt. Hr. Ratio 3.4
College Arts & Sciences Major Anthropology

Present vocational plans? __________________________________________
Type of housing: (circle) at home, res. hall, fraternity/sorority, rooming house, apartment other: ___________

Activities of organizations Softball - intramurals

Present employment Receptionist - O.S.U.

Hours per wk. 20 hrs.

Major interests Softball, singing, tap dance

Honors

General health: (circle) excellent, good, fair, poor

Reason for requesting counseling Don't know what I want to do when I graduate

Have you previously received counseling or psychotherapy? (circle) yes no

Are you now seeing another counselor or therapist? (circle) yes no

Important Work Experience:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JOB</th>
<th>Inclusive Dates</th>
<th>Part or Full Time</th>
<th>Liked or Disliked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Receptionist - Records - OSU</td>
<td>Aut'81-Now</td>
<td>Part</td>
<td>So-so</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio Union - candy counter</td>
<td>1980-1981</td>
<td>Part</td>
<td>Liked</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Family Data: Fill out for all members of your family, including yourself. Circle your own rank among the children.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Living</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Living at Home</th>
<th>No. of Yrs. of Schooling</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Father</td>
<td>Yes No</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Yes No</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>employee sodium plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother</td>
<td>Yes No</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Yes No</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>housewife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Child</td>
<td>Yes No</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Yes No</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Child</td>
<td>Yes No</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Yes No</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Child</td>
<td>Yes No</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Yes No</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Child</td>
<td>Yes No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>student</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Date: ______________________

If you have any questions about this, please discuss it with your counselor.
RELEASE FORM

The Student Consultation Service is a training center for Counseling Psychologists. For this reason your counseling interviews, though confidential, will be recorded and observed, and your counselor supervised by the staff of the Consultation Service. This staff includes graduate students associated with the Student Consultation Service and the supervisory faculty.

Counseling interviews at the Consultation Service are conducted on an appointment basis. The Consultation Service does not provide emergency care.

Your signature below will indicate your acceptance of these conditions for your counseling.

Sandra F. Wright

N.B. If you have any questions about this form, please discuss it with your counselor.

Sandra J. Schwen
Witness
Appendix B. Forms and Measures

COUNSELING INTERVIEW REPORT

Name of Client ___________________________ File No. ______
Counseling Interview Number ______________ Date: ______
Name of Counselor: __________ Name of Supervisor ______

(In the space below, summarize and remark on this counseling interview under the following suggested headings:
A. Client's Reason(s) for the Counseling Interview;
B. Summary of the Content of the Counseling Interview;
C. Techniques Employed; D. Counselor's Impressions;
E. Counselor's Prognosis and Recommendations or Plan.)
SUPERVISORY SUMMARY REPORT

Name of Client ____________________________________________________________

Interview Number __________________ Date __________________

Name of Counselor ________________ Supervisor ______

Comments:
Supervisor Form

Do you recall when:
The counselor said ____________________________

The client said ____________________________

The counselor said ____________________________

What happened at this point in the interview?

1. To what extent is the counselor responsible for what occurred? (Please circle the appropriate number).

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
   very  little  very much

2. To what extent is the client responsible for what occurred?

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
   very  little  very much

3. To what extent is some factor other than the above two factors responsible? The other factor(s) is (are) ____________________________

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
   very  little  very much
Counselor Form

Do you recall when:
You said __________________________________________
_________________________________________________
The client said ______________________________________
_________________________________________________
You said __________________________________________
_________________________________________________

What happened at this point in the interview?

1. To what extent are you responsible for what occurred? (Please circle the appropriate number).

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
   very little very much

2. To what extent is the client responsible for what occurred?

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
   very little very much

3. To what extent is some factor other than the above two factors responsible? The other factor(s) is (are)

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
   very little very much
Supervisor Form

How does the counselor's performance in this interview compare to the performance of other counselors of the same experience level that you have supervised in the past?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
much worse
much better
Counselor Form

How does your performance in this interview compare to your performance in past interviews?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
much worse  much better
Supervision Form

1. How helpful was the supervision session?
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
   not very helpful
   very helpful

2. How satisfied are you with the supervision session?
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
   not very satisfied
   very satisfied

3. How similar were the supervisor's/supervisee's perceptions of the interview to your perceptions?
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
   not very similar
   very similar