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THE REVITALIZATION OF HARRISON WEST:
A CASE STUDY IN URBAN POLICY ANALYSIS

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

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* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1982

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CHAPTER I
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

INTRODUCTION

On March 27, 1977 President Jimmy Carter announced his urban policy objectives. A major goal of President Carter's urban policy was to revitalize inner city neighborhoods through a "New Partnership," which was to consist of all levels of government, private enterprise, and neighborhood voluntary associations (U. S. Government, 1978: 2). On June 1, 1978, Patricia Harris, President Carter's appointed Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, announced the awarding of a $2 million Innovative Grant to the City of Columbus, Ohio, for the revitalization of the city's near northside. The purposes of this dissertation are to evaluate the extent to which President Carter's urban policy goal of revitalizing inner-city neighborhoods through a new partnership was carried out in the 1978 Innovative Grant target area, and to evaluate issues that emerged in the Harrison West Neighborhood. Before explaining the methodology used to evaluate the effects of the Innovative Grant, a review of relevant sociological literature is in order.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Sociology began in America out of a concern for social problems associated with industrialization and urbanization. Consequently,
urban sociology has developed into one of the discipline's major sub-fields. Five major sets of models have evolved in urban ecological research. The first three model sets, the classic models, factorial models, and density models, deal with characteristics of urban areas while the other two model sets, residential segregation models and group location models, deal with characteristics of urban groups (Schwirian, 1974: 5).

The classic models consist of three theories of urban growth which came out of the Chicago School of Human Ecology between 1925 and 1945. The concentric zone pattern was identified by Park and Burgess, who argued that "natural areas" could be found in relatively even concentric zones, surrounding a city's urban core (Park and Burgess, 1925). In the sector model, Hoyt argued that land use areas expand from the city's central core in pie shaped sectors, instead of concentric zones (Hoyt, 1936). In the multiple nuclei theory, Harris and Ullman postulated that several focal points of activity eventually grow into each other and compete for urban space (Harris and Ullman, 1945). These three theories have had an enormous impact on the development of urban sociology, and years of testing the models on a variety of cities has led to the conclusion that they are more complementary than opposing (Schwirian, 1974: 7). The complexity of land use patterns that have been identified from the testing of these models has led to the development of the more comprehensive approach of factorial ecology.

Factorial ecology is a statistical procedure closely related to social area analysis. Social area analysis categorizes urban areas
in terms of social characteristics and evaluates changes in area characteristics in relation to the society's extent of economic growth. Factorial ecology does the same thing, but computes more variables—some of which are unique to particular cities. Factorial ecology is more comprehensive than social area analysis. Consequently it is more difficult to make comparisons with the more complex factorial data (Schwirian, 1974: 8).

A third set of models which focus on characteristics of urban areas are the density models. Studies on the residential population densities of large cities have shown consistently that density peaks near the city's center, declines sharply in non-residential areas adjacent to the center, picks up again and gradually declines in the city's fringe areas. Also, the slopes of density curves differ among cities at a given point in time, and among points in time for a given city. Density's decline with distance is a function of the rate at which households are willing to trade residential space, and the cost in time and money of transportation (Schwirian, 1974: 12).

The other two sets of urban ecology models, residential segregation models and group location models, focus on the characteristics of urban groups. Using the index of dissimilarity, studies of residential segregation have supported the following conclusions (Schwirian, 1974: 14): Residential segregation of social status groups is present in cities in many different cultural settings; the degree of residential segregation among social status groups is a function of the extent of social distance between them; social status groups at the top and at the bottom of the social status hierarchy are the most residentially
segregated; social status groups are not uniformly distributed throughout cities; in developed societies the upper status groups are more decentralized while the lower status groups are more centralized; and the status groups that are the most centralized and decentralized are the most residentially segregated. Studies of segregation and centralization also conclude that in America, blacks tend to be more centralized than whites, and that segregation between whites and blacks is not attributable solely to differences in economic status (Schwirian, 1974: 17).

The preoccupation of urban ecologists with urban land use patterns, and residential location of groups, has led to the emergence of the sociology of community, taught in many universities as an independent course. Studies from several subareas of the sociology of community are particularly relevant to this dissertation. These subareas include: The definition of "Neighborhood," neighborhood change; gentrification; why people move; and the nature of neighborhood power.

Louis Wirth defined the "City," in Urbanization as a Way of Life as, "A mosaic of social worlds" (Wirth, 1928: 15). Earlier, Robert Park had published in The City, that:

In the course of time every sector and quarter of the city takes on something of the character and qualities of its inhabitants. Each separate part of the city is inevitably stained with the particular sentiments of its population. The effect of this is to convert what was at first a mere geographic expression into a neighborhood, that is to say a locality with sentiments, traditions, and a history of its own (Park, 1925: 6).

The implication of these early definitions of neighborhoods, was that in the context of an impersonal urban world, neighborhoods provide the
personal face to face "gemeinschaft," relationships which Ferdinand Tonnies had identified as characteristic of rural communities (Berry, 1979: 1). Although these early definitions tended to focus on interaction patterns, the concerns of urban ecologists with planning led to the development of a conception of neighborhoods as defined by urban space. Thus, two major approaches to the definition of neighborhoods exists in the sociology of community literature. One approach is similar to social area analysis, while the other approach centers on interaction patterns.

The social area analysis approach to defining neighborhoods is exemplified by several community researchers who have attempted to test aspects of neighborhoods life-cycle models. Guest (1973, 1974), Haggerty (1971), Birch (1971), and Duncan, et al., (1962) have each used census tract data to test the neighborhood life cycle concept while Hunter (1974) and Schwab (1976) each conducted similar studies employing the idea of "community areas," instead of census tracts (Thompson, 1981: 2). While community planning areas may provide a better method for getting at neighborhood characteristics than census data, the weakness of using this approach is that many cities do not have longitudinal data on these planning areas. Olds (1949), Myers (1954), and Cleaver (1963) have argued that the best overall approach is to use city block data. Alton Thompson has employed the city block data method to study the life cycle paths of Harrison West and other Columbus, Ohio neighborhoods (Thompson, 1981).

While those doing research for planning purposes have tended to define neighborhoods in terms of spacial areas, at least one planner
early on believed that an interactionists or symbolic definition of neighborhoods was better suited for planning purposes. In 1929 Clearance Perry argued for changing the basic unit of city planning from the city block to a more meaningful conception of "neighborhood" (Perry, 1929). The spatial boundaries of the neighborhood would be determined by institutions such as schools, civic centers, and churches, and the purpose of shifting to the neighborhood as a planning unit was to restore some of the sense of community destroyed by urban life (Thompson, 1981: 6).

The idea of defining neighborhoods in terms of interaction or in terms of "symbolic communities," has been alluded to by Glass (1948), Hunter (1974), Schwab (1976) and Suttles (1972). By far the most comprehensive attempt was presented in Suttles' book, The Social Construction of Communities (1972). Suttles argued that the identity of neighborhoods is determined by outsiders, who define an area as a neighborhood, and by the neighborhood residents themselves (Suttles, 1972: 51). Using this method of defining neighborhoods, Suttles identified five major types of neighborhoods:

1. Face Blocks: Not actually constituting a neighborhood, this is a loose network of people interacting on a face to face basis by virtue of sharing a common facility, such as an apartment building or city block.

2. Defended Neighborhoods: These are areas whose identity is based on mutual fear of invasion or protection from invasion (often by delinquent gangs) from surrounding residential areas.

3. The Community of Limited Liability: These communities have an identity based upon the use of common services, such as fire departments.
4. The Expanded Community of Limited Liability: The identity of these neighborhoods is based upon the organization of the larger urban area. An example would be the Near Northside of Columbus, Ohio.

5. Contrived Neighborhoods: These are neighborhoods which have an identity imposed on them by developers. An example relevant to this study is the imposition of "The Renaissance," on Harrison West (Suttles, 1972).

The controversy over whether to define neighborhoods in terms of spatial or interactional aspects originated from the ambiguity with which the early Chicago ecologists used the term, "natural areas." Robert Park wrote:

It is assumed, partly as a result of selection and segregation, and partly in view of the contagious character of cultural patterns, that people living in natural areas of the same general type and subject to the same conditions will display...the same characteristics...The natural areas of the city...constitute...a 'frame of reference,' a conceptual order within which statistical facts gain a new and more general significance! (Park, 1952, pp. 197-198).

For Park, natural areas included both physical and economic characteristics. Zorbaugh, however, viewed natural areas primarily in terms of physical characteristics, such as race and income. Burgess recognized an ecological dimension, a cultural dimension, and a political dimension (Timms, 1971: 7).

Given the ambiguity with which the term "natural areas," was used by its originators, it is not surprising that by the 1940's its usage had come under sharp attack within the field of urban ecology. Alihan (1939), for example, was critical of the notion of natural areas as unplanned units, while Alihan (1939), Hatt (1946), and others attacked the assumption that natural areas are homogeneous.
In summary, the term "neighborhood" was controversial in its inception, and has been difficult to define throughout its evolution. According to McKenzie, "The concept 'neighborhood' has come down to us from a distant past and therefore has connotations which scarcely fit the facts when applied to a patch of life in a modern large city ..." (McKenzie, 1923: 346).

Writings of the early classical ecologists not only produced a spirited debate over how to define neighborhoods, but also yielded a substantial literature on neighborhood change. In the concentric zone theory of Park and Burgess, change was postulated as taking place in a cyclical fashion of invasion and succession, during which one zone's land use population type invades the adjacent zone, succeeds it, and pushes it to the next adjacent zone. The result is a concentric zone pattern of urban growth and expansion. According to Park:

The term "succession" is used...to describe and designate that orderly sequence of changes through which a biotic community passes in the course of its development from a primary and relatively unstable to a relatively perminate or climax stage...in the course of this development, the community moves through a series of more or less clearly defined stages (Park, 1952: 152).

In the sectorial model of urban growth, Hoyt put forth a specific series of hypotheses to account for change (Thomlinson, 1969: 146-147, from Schwirian, 1974: pp. 6-7). These are:

1. High grade residential growth tends to proceed from the given point of origin either along established lines of travel or toward another existing nucleus of building or trade areas.

2. The zone of high rent tends toward high ground when not used by industry.
3. High rent residential areas tend to grow toward the section of the city which has free open space beyond the edges, and away from "dead-end" sections which are prevented from expansion by natural barriers.

4. High rent residential neighborhoods tend to grow toward homes of community leaders.

5. Office building, banks, and stores sometimes pull high priced homes toward them.

6. High-grade residential areas tend to grow near the fastest existing transportation lines.

7. Deluxe apartments tend to be built near the business centers in old established neighborhoods.

8. The growth of high-rent neighborhoods continues in the same direction for a long period of time.

9. High rent neighborhoods do not skip around at random in the process of movement, but tend to follow a definite path in one or more sectors of the city.

10. It is possible for high rent areas to double back or return toward the center of the city.

11. High rent areas tend to be adjoined by medium rent areas, and sharp disjunctions in rental areas are infrequent.

In the multiple nuclei model, change is explained by four factors which account for the emergence of differentiated urban districts.

(Harris and Ullman, 1945: 7-17; from Schwirian, 1974: 7).

1. Certain areas require specialized facilities located in only one or a few sections of the city.

2. Certain like activities profit from adjacent location.

3. Certain unlike activities are antagonistic, therefore they tend to locate in different areas.

4. Certain activities are unable to afford the costs of the most desirable sites.
While each of the three major classical models of urban ecology make attempts at explaining change, all of them focus on macro processes of metropolitan growth. The first attempt to explain micro-level neighborhood change was produced by two economists, Hoover and Vernon, in *Anatomy of Metropolis* (1962). To date, the Hoover-Vernon Neighborhood Life-Cycle model is the most highly publicized and widely tested model of neighborhood change in the sociological literature. Using data from their study of the New York metropolitan area, Hoover and Vernon postulated that neighborhoods evolve through a five stage life-cycle. The evolution of neighborhoods through the life-cycle stages was seen as determined by two opposing forces: The desire to live in spacious areas vs. the desire to be near work and other activities (Hoover and Vernon, 1962: 122). The stages of the neighborhood life-cycle are:

1. **Residential Development:** This stage occurs in the undeveloped areas near the core of the city. Single family dwelling units begin to appear in this area. The land is both spacious and near desired facilities, such as work.

2. **Transition:** After a period of time, the neighborhood's population density begins to increase. The construction of apartments and other multi-unit facilities replaces the construction of single family units.

3. **Down-grading:** This stage is characterized by ageing, ethnic occupancy, and increased population density. The increased population density is housed by overcrowding or converting existing units, rather than by new construction.

4. **Thinning-out:** Population density begins to decline due to the reduction in household size attributed to children growing-up and leaving home. There is a merging of dwelling units, increased vacancy, abandonment, and demolition.
Low-income young ethnics invade the area, replacing higher-income ageing families.

5. Renewal: Public funds are used to demolish obsolete units, which are replaced by medium-income units or commercial development.

Numerous tests have been done to determine the validity of the Hoover-Vernon neighborhood life-cycle model. In general, these tests have supported the concept with various modifications. Walter Firey (1967) has shown that some central Boston neighborhoods have remained indefinitely in the development stage. Duncan et al. (1974) tied the transition of Los Angeles neighborhoods to the overall metropolitan growth rate, and to the ratio of new dwellings to the metropolitan growth rate. Avery Guest (1973) found that in Cleveland, Ohio, population growth was dependent upon the rate of housing construction in the fringe areas, and that neighborhoods constructed before the automobile era sped through transition at a faster rate than neighborhoods constructed during the automobile age. In another study, this one of 13 metropolitan areas, Guest found that status slippage was present, but not as significant as reported by Hoover and Vernon (Guest, 1974: 242). Similarly, Haggerty's study of 8 metropolitan areas supported the notion of an evolutionary process of neighborhood change over time. (Hagerty, 1971). In a study of Chicago neighborhoods, Hunter identified four stages of neighborhood change which were similar to the five stages proposed by Hoover and Vernon. However, in Hunter's model the stages were sequentially ordered in a concentric zone pattern, rather than spatially ordered over time. (Hunter, 1974). Birch identified six stages of neighborhood change in New Haven, Connecticut,
and generally supported the Hoover-Vernon stage concept by showing that neighborhood age declined with distance from the city, and that wealthier families resided in the younger neighborhoods (Birch, 1971). Finally, Schwab tested the Hoover-Vernon model in 32 Cleveland planning areas and found that 24 of the areas were passing through the proposed stages. The other eight areas, however, were classified as stable (Schwab, 1976).

Two unpublished studies conducted by graduate students in the Sociology Department at Ohio State University are especially relevant to this dissertation. In a Master's Thesis test of the relevance of the neighborhood life-cycle concept for two Columbus, Ohio neighborhoods, Edna Berry found that the stages proposed by Hoover and Vernon were applicable to German Village and Victorian Village. In addition to spatial and temporal factors, Berry found that the propensity of neighborhoods to go through a renewal phase is also affected by sentiments (Berry, 1979: 81). Alton Thompson (1981) tested the neighborhood life-cycle concept for twenty Columbus, Ohio neighborhoods in his Ph.D. Dissertation completed during the summer of 1981. His findings about the near Northside neighborhoods of Harrison West, Victorian Village, and the Fifth-King neighborhoods are especially relevant to this study, and are reviewed in the chapter on neighborhood decline.

For many American cities, the post war period was characterized by the flight to the suburbs, aging of the housing stock, and general neighborhood decline. More recently, the effects of efforts by private investors and the government have resulted in what has been called an "urban renaissance," a "return to the city," and "gentrification."
"Gentrification" is a term that originated in attempts to describe the movement of England’s gentry class back to inner-city London. Although the term has been borrowed to describe the return of higher income people to neighborhoods in America’s cities, some have argued that the use of the term is inappropriate. In the first place, America does not have a landed aristocracy which is similar to England’s gentry class. More importantly, it does not appear to be America’s wealthiest people who are moving into renewed neighborhoods.

Several recent studies have explored the true nature of the "gentrification" phenomenon. Hunter has shown that the new residents of renewal neighborhoods are characterized as owner-occupant middle class people who exhibit distinctive new lifestyles and tastes (Hunter, 1979: 471). Cicin-Sain called attention to how new patterns of urban household formation are related to the emergence of alternative lifestyle preferences (Cicin-Sain, 1980: 50). London came to the conclusion that the new inner-city residents are not a "hereditary nobility." What is occurring involves to some extent social mobility without spacial mobility, and the replacement of low-status groups by higher status groups occurs within the city, rather than being a back-to-the-city movement (Hunter, 1979). Goodman argued that, "Back-to-the-city is the demographic misnomer of the decade. Back-to-the-selected-neighborhoods would be a much more accurate label" (Goodman, 1980: 14-15). Goodman’s characterization of the process in terms of "selected" neighborhoods is supported by a study of America’s 20 largest cities by Lipton. Lipton found the process commonly called "gentrification" to be occurring in only 13 of the 20 cities studied, and found the process not to be a
"back-to-the-city" movement (Lipton, 1980).

In a review of available data on the process of gentrification, Alton Thompson sorted out eight commonalities that characterize the neighborhood revitalization phenomena. (Thompson, 1981: 33-35). These are:

(1) Neighborhoods experiencing "gentrification" were typically located near (within two miles) of the central business district (Clay, 1980: 21; Berry, 1979: 18-19; Cicin-Sain, 1980: 53; Lipton, 1980: 48; Fusch, 1980: 156).

(2) Gentrified neighborhoods were those which had received historic designation or those which were physically near designated areas. Distinctive architecture appeared to be a major factor in achieving historical designation or making the area appear to be attractive (Clay, 1980: 22; Berry, 1979: 18-19; Cicin-Sain, 1980: 53; Fusch, 1980: 156-160; Long, 1980: 18; Laska and Spain, 1980: 130; Tournier, 1980: 175; Weiler, 1980: 221).

(3) In most cases, gentrified neighborhoods were old communities, often settled before 1900 (Clay, 1980: 21; Fusch, 1980: 156; Berry, 1979: 25-26; Tournier, 1980: 174; Gale, 1980: 96).

(4) Neighborhoods undergoing revitalization contained good housing stock which, no matter how old, was convertible to upper-income standards (Cicin-Sain, 1980: 53; Long, 1980: 18; Clay, 1980: 22; Gale, 1980: 96).

(5) Gentrified neighborhoods appeared to be located in close proximity to physical beauty, or other focal points of interest such as a park or university (Cicin-Sain, 1980: 53; Berry, 1979: 19; Fusch, 1980: 160).

(6) Gentrified neighborhoods tended to be limited to very small areas that grew over time but rarely exceeded several blocks in size for a single neighborhood (Clay, 1980: 20; Black, 1980: 9).

(7) The residents of gentrified neighborhoods were typically young, white, singles and couples who often did not have children. Their occupations
Gentrification tended to occur in large cities (over 100,000), and in the Northeast and South. (Cicin-Sain, 1980: 53; Toumier, 1980: 173; Chernoff, 1980: 204; Weller, 1980: 220; Laska and Spain, 1980: 116).

To date, the most extensive study of gentrification has been produced by Shirley Laska and Daphne Spain in a book entitled, *Back to the City* (Laska and Spain, 1980). Spain and Laska argue that the most appropriate term to describe the "gentrification" or "back to the city" phenomena is "urban reinvasion." They argue:

> Reinvasion does imply that, in a rather unanticipated reversal of the common pattern (of invasion and succession as described by the classical urban ecologists) upper status groups are replacing lower-status groups in inner-city areas and, in so doing, they are... reclaiming the territory that they once held prior to deterioration (Laska and Spain, 1980: 80).

Laska and Spain also summarize four sets of explanations of urban reinvasion (Laska and Spain, 1980: 82-89). The first set of explanations is called "demographic-ecological," and includes such phenomena as the coming of age of the baby boom generation, the rising age of first marriages, contraception, and declining fertility rates, and the entry of single and married women into the labor force. The second set includes several "sociocultural" explanations. These explanations accept the assumption that beliefs effect human behavior. Possibly, a pro-urban ideology is replacing the pervasive anti-urban ideology, or it has simply become "chic," or "in vogue" to restore an inner city house. Other American values, such as economic success, individuality, materialism, and the expression of self-identity may influence the development of a...
pro-urban ideology. The third set includes explanations of reinvasion that are "political-economic." Two major orientations that fall under this heading are the traditional theories, which emphasize market forces, the law of supply and demand, competition, free enterprise, individualism, etc., and the Marxist approach, which emphasizes intergroup power relationships, social policies that benefit the powerful at the expense of the less powerful, the uneven costs and benefits of neighborhood change, etc. Finally, the "social movements" explanations portray the pro-urban movement as an alternative movement to traditional industrialism. They emphasize the leadership role of elite groups, such as realtors, in "mobilizing" people to move into these neighborhoods, and point to the "counter-movement" nature of existing residents who try to oppose such movements.

Closely related to the literature on neighborhood change is a body of community studies concerning residential mobility. The most comprehensive work in this area is Peter Rossi's *Why Families Move* (1980). In order to control for social class, Rossi interviewed residents of Philadelphia from four types of neighborhoods: high mobility and high socio-economic status; high mobility and low-socio-economic status; low mobility and high socio-economic status; and low mobility and low socio-economic status (Rossi, 1980: 65). From his interviews, Rossi developed a three stage scheme to account for moving. Stage one involves the making of the decision to move. This decision is attributed to either outside forces, such as a job shift or change in marital status, or is made voluntarily. Rossi found that three out of five families moved voluntarily. The most frequently encountered motive for the voluntary move
was dissatisfaction with the amount of space available in the old residence. Next in importance were complaints about the environment, and least in importance was dissatisfaction with costs (Rossi, 1980: 223). Stage two involves the search for a new home. Families in Rossi's study employed a variety of formal and informal sources to locate homes which met their specifications. In stage three, a new house is selected. Rossi found that half of his respondents chose from among several alternatives. Once several homes were found that met the families' general specifications, the most important criteria for making the choice was the cost (Rossi, 1980: 224). While Rossi's study represents the most comprehensive attempt to determine factors influencing the choice to move, other works center around the roles of transportation and communication technologies, the workplace, and segregation patterns.

In 1871, H. Paul Douglas published The Suburban Trend and called attention to two major types of suburbs: Suburbs of production and suburbs of consumption. Douglas' book was followed by a flood of ethnographs on suburbia during the 1940's and 1950's. The most well known of these include Herbert Gans's The Levittowners (1927) and William F. Whyte's The Organization Man (1956). Much of the current literature on suburbs focuses on the characteristics of the metropolis and fringe areas, suburban change, the tendency of suburbs to persist in terms of the neighborhood life-cycle model, and factors contributing to deconcentration. The tendency of a metropolitan area to deconcentrate is generally attributed to three factors: 1. concentration or overcrowding; 2. the ratio of housing to population; and 3. the availability of
transportation. While it is generally accepted that the trolley car and the automobile greatly affected the ability of a metropolis to decentralize, it is also believed that the recent trend toward higher energy costs has contributed to the process of reinvasion. However, Pool (1980) argues that the increased costs of energy will be offset in the future by advances in telecommunications which will enable populations to remain dispersed.

While the availability of transportation and communication technologies has been shown to affect residential location, another important variable is occupation. The pioneering work in this area, "Residential Distribution and Occupational Stratification," was produced by Otis and Beverly Duncan (Duncan and Duncan, 1955). Using their invented measures, the dissimilarity index and the segregation index, Duncan and Duncan demonstrated that in Chicago, there was a correspondence between groups' social distance and spatial distance, and that occupational groups with clearly defined statuses (high and low) tended to be more segregated. The conclusions drawn by Duncan and Duncan have been tested in a variety of American cities and have been generally supported. The most comprehensive of these tests was conducted by Barrie Morgan, who analyzed occupational segregation in 32 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas. Morgan found that a high degree of occupational segregation does exist. However, he also discovered unexplained patterns of reversal between certain occupational groups (Morgan, 1979: 63). Occupational segregation appears to be a factor affecting the choice of location, as does the distance between work and home. Clark and Burt have shown that aspects of the journey to work
are significant in the relocation of households and have produced evidence for the trade-off theory that the tendency for households to move closer to the workplace increases as the distance between work and the original home increases (Clark and Burt, 1980: 59). Another dimension to the issue of the relationship between work and residence has to do with the changing nature of the location of jobs. For example, Pierre De Vise has documented the negative effect on blacks of the suburbanization of occupations in Chicago (De Vise, 1976). The problem of job location and residential segregation by occupation is closely related to the issue of racial and ethnic segregation.

Early models of residential segregation were based upon two assumptions, now generally believed to be erroneous. The first of these assumptions was that segregation was a result of natural forces. This was the Social Darwinist view held by many of the early urban ecologists, such as Park, who developed the concept of "natural areas." This view has been discredited by Marxists who view segregation and other aspects of inequality in society to be the result of power. The second assumption was that ethnic segregation differed from racial segregation in that white ethnic groups eventually became assimilated into America's "melting pot." Recognizing that even later generations of white ethnics retain unique cultural traits, sociologists have replaced the melting pot theory with the theory of cultural pluralism.

Current explanations for racial and ethnic segregation fall into three groups: 1. The de facto economic explanation postulates that racial and ethnic groups are segregated primarily because certain groups tend to share common income characteristics, i.e., blacks tend to live
in segregated neighborhoods because blacks tend to be lower income than whites and therefore can not afford housing in white neighborhoods; 2. The self-selection explanation argues that people tend to voluntarily segregate themselves, because they prefer to live with people who are similar to themselves; 3. The enforced segregation explanation claims that segregation occurs as a result of policies of housing discrimination practiced primarily by real estate people.

Several recent studies shed light on the relative value of these three explanations. In a study of, "Socioeconomic Status and Residential Location Choice," Barry Moriarty found evidence to support the conclusion that economic competition and social choice were factors in the selection of residence. However, in the Lansing, Michigan study, Moriarty found that occupational groups with similar income characteristics still tended to segregate, and he concluded that, "...social distance between families belonging to different classes...is the important factor creating the residential segregation of socioeconomic groups" (Moriarty, 1975: 466). Similarly, Sharon Bleda found ethnic assimilation to be persistent when controlled by status, i.e., status could not account for the ethnic segregation (Bleda, 1970). In a comprehensive study of "Residential Segregation in United States Cities: A Causal Analysis," Marshall and Jiobu attributed segregation to three factors: 1. Black-white status differentials; 2. The absolute and relative size of the black population, with the absolute size being more important; 3. The rate of black population growth compared to the rate of white population growth (Marshall and Jiobu, 1975).
In summation, many factors influence a person's or a family's decision to move. Perceived desire for space and preferential location in relation to work, as well as the desire to live near people of similar socioeconomic characteristics are subjective factors influencing choice of location. These preferences are related in complex patterns to segregation based upon occupation, income, race and ethnicity, to transportation and communication technologies, to discrimination, to population ratios and growth rates, and to other aspects of housing economics.

Another subarea of the sociology of community which is especially relevant to this dissertation concerns the nature of community power. Studies in this area can be divided according to two major research methodologies employed, and two major theoretical biases. In terms of research methodology, early studies tended to be single case studies describing the nature of power in one community, while more recent studies use the comparative method, analyzing the power structure of many communities with characteristics of those communities. Theoretically, community power studies tend to fall into the elitist or pluralist camps. The elitist tend to be sociologists who, assuming a high degree of social stratification in communities, have documented the concentration of power within elite groups in single communities. The pluralists have tended to be political scientists, who have used the comparative method to document that the dispersal of power is correlated with increase in community size (Denison, 1974).

An important factor which characterizes the two competing perspectives on community power is the method used to operationalize the
notion of "power." Sociologists have tended to use either the positional or the reputational methods. In the positional method, individuals holding the greatest number of, and the most influence positions in the community are assumed to be the decision makers. In the reputational method, informers are asked to rank members of the community in terms of their power. Proponents of the pluralism theory have criticized these two methods on the grounds that they presuppose a system of social stratification, then set out to prove that it exists in isolated small communities. Instead, the pluralists have concluded that influence varies from issue to issue, and that power is dispersed in relation to community size.

The first major community power study in sociology was conducted in 1929, then replicated in the mid-1930's. In 1937 Robert and Helen Lynd published *Middletown in Transition* (Lynd and Lynd, 1937). In their comprehensive study of the power structure of Muncie, Indiana, the Lynds employed the positional method and concluded that the community was dominated by a business elite which was in turn dominated by one major family. The positional method was also employed in Hollingshead's *Elmtown's Youth* (Hollingshead, 1949) and more recently in a study of New York City conducted by Sayer and Kaufman (Sayer and Kaufman, 1960).

In 1953 Floyd Hunter published *Community Power Structure*, using the reputational method for the first time. Using the "snowball" or "cobweb" sampling technique, Hunter compiled a list of leaders in Atlanta, Georgia who had received the greatest number of nominations by informants, or whose average ranking exceeded an arbitrary limit.
Hunter concluded that this small list of economic elite were men of "independent decision," who wielded power as the "executors of policy" (Hunter, 1953).

The notion of a small economic elite in control of the community was again verified by Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman in their study, *Small Town in Mass Society* (1958). Vidich and Bensman used a combination of both the positional and reputational methods.

Criticisms of the positional and reputational methods arose within the field of political science, and were best articulated by Robert Dahl of Yale University. Dahl's book, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City* (1960), was the first known attempt to establish an empirically based theory of democratic pluralism (Denison, 1974: 13). Using the "decision method," Dahl defined power in terms of an individual's ability to prevail in the community's decision making process. Dahl concluded that patterns of influence vary according to issues, and that in no case was decision making dominated by "economic notables." In some cases, decision making was dominated by small groups, but this was balanced by politicians' responsibility to voting constituencies. Aaron Wildavsky, a student of Dahl's at Yale, duplicated his study and found the pluralism theory of power applicable to the small town of Oberlin, Ohio (Wildavsky, 1964).

Studies on community power which use the comparative method, instead of isolated communities, have tended to support the theory of pluralism over the elitist theory of power. This may be, however, because the comparative studies tend to look at larger communities. Robert Schultize has documented the existence of what has become known
as "bifurcation," in Ypsilanti, Michigan (Schultze, 1961). Schultze's study supported his hypothesis that as a city grows from an isolated, self-contained entity to an urbanized community, increasingly interrelated in the larger social complex beyond its geographical limits, its sociopolitical power structure changes from a monolithic one dominated by persons possessing great economic power, to a bifurcated structure comprising two power sets—one of the economic dominants and one of the public leaders. Donald Clelland and William H. Form duplicated the study in Lansing, Michigan, and verified the bifurcation hypothesis with some modification. Both studies used the positional and reputational methods of defining power, and both studies had a comparative aspect. Another comparative study which helps to explain why different sized communities exhibit different power structures was conducted by John Walton and entitled, "The Vertical Axis of Community Organization and the Structure of Power" (1967). Walton conducted a secondary analysis of various case studies and found that the extent to which a community becomes inter-dependent with outside institutions, the power structure of that community tends to become more competitive and pluralistic.

The conclusion of those studying community power through the comparative method, that different levels of power are related to different types of issues, has resulted in the emergence of a body of literature attempting to classify community power structures. Two of the most notable studies of this kind are, "Community Power and a Typology of Social Issues," by Ernest Barth and Stuart Johnson (1959), and "Power and Community Structure," by Peter Rossi (1960). The Barth
and Johnson study attempted to relate types of social issues to types of leaders and different patterns of decision making. In Rossi's study, two variables—the degree of segregation of political institutions from other institutions and the extent of partisan politics in the decision making arena—were related to four types of power structures which Rossi claimed were evident in the literature. These four power structure types were: 1. a pyramid structure commonly found in small towns where power can be traced to one person or to one small group of people; 2. a caucus rule, where a large group rules through the process of consensus; 3. a polylith, where separate power groups can be identified for different spheres of activity; and 4. an amorphous structure, with no discernable pattern of power (Rossi, 1960: 394-401). Another important publication along these lines was Terry Clark's "Power and Community Structure: Who Governs, Where, and When?" (1967). In this article Clark provided a list of thirty-four propositions which included aspects of community and power that should be included in any comprehensive power/community scheme.

With such a high degree of interest in the nature of community power, it is not surprising that the topic would take on new significance with the development of urban renewal programs, and the emergence of citizen participation requirements. The problem of power, as manifested in citizen participation programs, was anticipated by Amos Hawley in his book, Human Ecology (1950). In Human Ecology, Hawley distinguished between "corporate groups," which are well organized and are able to engage in elaborate and aggressive programs of action, and "categoric groups," which are less organized and only capable of the
simplest kind of collective activity (Hawley, 1953: 210-211). Hawley is also credited with having produced the first actual study of power in relation to urban renewal. In "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success" (1963), Hawley found a positive and significant correlation between concentration of power among managers and the success of urban renewal projects. However, in his operational definition of "success," Hawley failed to address a key issue in urban renewal, which is: Who are the beneficiaries? In addition, Schwirian has pointed to the difficulty faced by renters in attempting to redress grievances in writing that, "...slum landlords are masters at hiding behind jungles of rental agents, amorphous corporate structures, and red tape that serves to discourage even the most dogged attempts to pressure them into fulfilling their legal obligations to maintain decent housing standards" (Schwirian, 1977: 165).

Studies on the effects of citizen participation in government programs are minimal, and of mixed conclusions. Critics claim that the government's requirement of "...maximum feasible participation of the poor..." in programs affecting their lives, has resulted in "...maximum feasible misunderstanding" (Moynihan, 1969). The net result of increased citizen participation has been to increase infighting among neighborhood groups, delay needed programs, encourage tokenism, and foster cooptation of elected leaders (Huttman, 1981: 154). Others, while not denying these negative aspects, argue that citizen participation has built some level of confidence among the poor, and has made them feel that they are participants in community life (Haggstrom, 1964).
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Years of development in the fields of urban ecology and the sociology of community have resulted in an abundance of literature that sheds light on aspects of the revitalization of Harrison West. The purpose of this study, however, is not to test hypotheses from any of these previous studies. Instead, the major objectives of this study are to ascertain the extent to which President Carter's urban policy goal of revitalizing inner-city neighborhoods through a new partnership of government, private enterprise, and neighborhood voluntary associations was realized in the Columbus, Ohio 1978 Innovative Grant target area, and to delineate neighborhood revitalization issues which emerged during the revitalization process. In order to meet these objectives, this dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Chapter I explains the research objectives and research methodology, and reviews relevant sociological literature. Chapter II explores the issue of why neighborhoods decline in the first place, using Harrison West as an example. Chapter III examines the role of private enterprise in the revitalization process by summarizing plans of Battelle Memorial Institute to revitalize the housing stock surrounding its corporate headquarters in Columbus, Ohio. Chapter IV describes how residents in the revitalization area rose up to oppose aspects of Battelle Institute's revitalization plans which affected them adversely. Part I of this chapter is a subjective account of my personal experience as President of the Harrison West Residents' Association. Part II is an account of events which transpired after I resigned as President of the Harrison West Residents' Association during
the summer of 1978. Chapter V examines the evolution and development of federal housing and urban development policy, and describes the process whereby the federal government used grant leverage to force Battelle Institute to alter aspects of its revitalization plan in order to conform to government regulations. Chapter VI summarizes major revitalization issues which emerged during the revitalization process, explains the positions taken by each of the three groups involved, and evaluates the extent to which compromise was and was not reached. The final chapter summarizes issues and events and poses research questions yet unanswered.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The usefulness of this study lies mainly in the area of social policy analysis. Therefore, it is largely qualitative in nature. The reader should be aware that the writer is heavily biased toward the neighborhood's viewpoint, although an effort has been made to represent other viewpoints as fairly as possible. The reader should be especially suspicious of the chapter concerning the role of the neighborhood. Undoubtedly, other people would describe these events differently. For example, part one is excessively long because the writer was directly involved and therefore more knowledgeable about these events. Events that took place in part two may be more significant, however, the writer was not privy to the inside information and this section is shorter. Throughout the chapters, many important events have been omitted for the sake of brevity. It is hoped that the final product captures the gist of what happened as a whole. Also, quotations
are not meant to be exact, but are intended to capture the essence of what was said during certain conversations.

Although this study is largely qualitative, points are supported by reference to several quantitative studies. These include: U. S. Census Data; a 1978 Survey of OMC Tenants; a 1969 City of Columbus Building Condition Survey; statistics cited in the 1978 City of Columbus Innovative Grant Application; a 1979 Master's Degree Thesis by Edna Berry, documenting the life-cycle of Victorian Village; and a 1981 Ph.D. Dissertation by Alton Thompson, documenting the life-cycle stages of Harrison West, Fifth-King, and Victorian Village.

Extensive library research was also employed in this study. The literature review, the analysis of the intent of Gordon Battelle's Will, and the history of federal urban policy sections each required hours of tedious library research.

Visual sociology is currently being developed as a viable qualitative social science research method. Events and aspects of neighborhood change are documented in this study by selections of photographs from several hundred taken between 1977 and 1982 in the Harrison West area.

Participant observation is the primary research method employed in this study. This author moved into the Harrison West neighborhood when it was still a "slum," prior to the announcement of revitalization plans, was an active participant in neighborhood efforts to alter aspects of the revitalization plan, and was a recipient of the innovative grant. Although much of this study relies upon the writer's subjective experiences, numerous open-ended interviews were made between the summer of
1981 and the spring of 1982 to supplement the writer's personal accounts. Those interviewed include: Carol McCabe, President of the Harrison West Resident's Association; Randy Morrison, Director of the Godman Guild Settlement House; Wendy Schweiger, Editor of The Near North News; Tiny Hine; a leader of Neighbors Against Battelle Rezoning; Nancy Yates, leader of the Battelle Area Tenant's Union and Chair of the Innovative Grant Advisory Committee; Pat Grady, Innovative Grant Program Coordinator for the City of Columbus, Ohio; Jim Bowman, Co-chair of the Innovative Grant Advisory Committee. Barry Humphries, President of Olentangy Management Company, City Councilman Jerry Hammond, and Tom Meyer, a neighborhood activist, declined to be interviewed.

Historically, participant observation has been a major research tool in community sociology. Examples include such famous studies as *Urban Villagers* (Gans, 1927), *Middletown* (Lynd and Lynd, 1929), and *The Social Order of the Slum* (Suttles, 1968). These studies often use fictitious names to illustrate to the reader that the individual behavior patterns reported are generalizable to human behavior. After careful consideration and discussion with my reading committee a decision was made to use the real names of people involved in this study. One reason is that the people who participated in these events deserve credit for their efforts; another reason is that it is important to keep the documentation used to verify controversial points authentic. It is hoped that the reader will keep in mind that the individual behaviors described in this study are examples of how personality conflicts, jealousies, personal ambitions, etc. can affect citizen participation in government programs.
SUMMARY

The title of this study, "The Revitalization of Harrison West," is in many ways a misnomer. Actually, parts of three neighborhoods, Victorian Village, Fifth-King, and Harrison West, were within the revitalization target area. Harrison West is unique among the three, for several reasons. First, the 1978 Innovative Grant target area affected a larger proportion of Harrison West than any other neighborhood. Second, of the three neighborhoods involved, Harrison West contains the largest proportion of the lowest income people. Third, residents of Harrison West were the most active in expressing their opposition to aspects of the revitalization plans. Finally, this writer lived in Harrison West and has first hand knowledge of events that took place in that neighborhood.

Every story has more than one side. This study represents the revitalization of Harrison West as this writer experienced it. It is both insightful and limited. Hopefully, it can contribute to the understanding and advancement of the state of the art of urban neighborhood revitalization.
CHAPTER II

NEIGHBORHOOD DECLINE AND HARRISON WEST

the neighborhood lost
four more houses
this month
there was a frame house
at fourth and
the alley
i remember
that last family
pushed out
gas, water, off

sitting on the couch
on the sidewalk
for a couple of days
they moved...
it was a struggle
a fight

between a crane and a bulldozer
cedar shakes poppin'
merrily like roasting...
push
tug
crack
rumble

chestnuts, in the sweep of machine
JAWS

to get that old house down
off to the dump

lumber better than you can buy (at any price)
and light coming right through
walls
dancing dust
beauty
almost made me forget
the destruction
for a moment
a moment
a moment
a giggle

but all that's left
a three story tower
sways and leaning in the breeze
till...

after a breather, a break
scree—ching
clank the
rrrrrrrr... gears gonna have
a bite
a bite
almost a vicious bite
almost i
giggle
giggle at

the tower a skinny, old
man baggy, raggy
clothes hanging down
all around
top hat tilting
remind me
top hat tilting
almost giggling

of the
-----ask him-----
memories
ask HIM
of all the

hot, cold, squalling
in the heat
tender evenings melting
him...her...them
big machines melting
it down
down
don to a big
heap of trash
held for so long
memories
under that lid
until the last

the last soggy gesture
a pile
a pile

of rotten
rain damaged
front porch
wood

spit of the sidewalk like a used
tasted
wasted
wad
of chewed
tobacco

by Joe Kelch

NEIGHBORHOOD DECLINE

Neighborhoods often go through declining phases. Usually decline is associated with aging, population thinning, redlining and/or blockbusting.

Aging is a relatively self-explanatory factor attributing to neighborhood decline. When coupled with lack of maintenance, aging can be devastating to a once viable community. The federal government has recognized this, and has moved housing policy in the direction of maintenance over demolition and renewal. The National Neighborhood Policy Act of 1977, which was passed for the purpose of establishing a commission to study methods of preserving older neighborhoods, de-
housing starts, while many good old homes are needlessly demolished.

The act reads:

We can never know how many of these old homes could have been saved, but the number must be in the hundreds of thousands. And when a unit is lost we lose more than that individual house. There is a blighting effect on the entire neighborhood (U.S.:Congress, 95th Session 1977: 1).

As a neighborhood begins to age and enters into the downgrading stage, its population density begins to increase. The increased population density is typically housed through the overcrowding of units, and by converting single family units into multi-family units. However, the population soon begins to thin, because of several factors. First, children grow up and leave home, while the elderly die off or retire to other areas. Also, the aging process results in demolition of condemned property and a downgrading of housing values. Higher income people move to better neighborhoods while lower income ethnics move in. Lower income people are more likely to be transient renters than permanent neighborhood residents.

"Redlining" refers to the practice of banks refusing to lend home repair monies to people living in declining neighborhoods. From an economic standpoint, such loans are bad risks, because if the borrower defaults on the loan, the lender might be stuck with collateral which is worth less than the amount lended. While redlining is understandable from an economic viewpoint, the social consequence of the practice is that capital that could be used to halt or reverse neighborhood decline is denied to people living in these areas.

"Blockbusting" is a process whereby real estate people increase profits by promoting racist attitudes. Upwardly mobile blacks, for
example, may be willing to pay more than market value for homes in nice white middle class neighborhoods in order to escape slum living. The real estate person sells a home in such a neighborhood to a black, then tells white residents to sell fast because the blacks are moving in and the property values are going to decline. The real estate person makes out both ways—selling property for more than market value to the blacks, and buying property for less than market value from whites.

Not all neighborhoods go through declining phases, but many do. When they do these factors are often involved.

HARRISON WEST

THE RISE AND FALL OF HARRISON WEST

Residential development of Harrison West began during the late nineteenth century as a result of the springing up of a number of industries north of Goodale Street along the Olentangy River up to Third Avenue. The neighborhood emerged as a working class community around these industrial areas because employees had no alternative but to walk to work (Thompson, 1981:93). However, Harrison West came to be bounded by the lower class area known as "Flytown," to the South, and by the higher class neighborhoods of Grandview to the West, Fifth-King on the North, and Victorian Village to the East. Harrison West itself appears to have been predominately a working class area.

The 1970 Census data shows that 82.7% of the housing in the Harrison West area was built prior to 1939, indicating that the neighborhood had gone through the "residential development" stage of the life cycle by the turn of the century.
While it is difficult to differentiate between the neighborhood's "residential development" stage and the "transition stage," evidence indicates that Harrison West began to enter the "downgrading" stage in the 1930's. Aging of the housing stock was accompanied by the infusion of the automobile which enabled middle income people to migrate out and people of lesser means (rural Appalachians) to migrate in. The neighborhood experienced an increase in density levels, a ten percent increase in the number of blacks, more than a hundred percent decline in property values, and a fourteen percent increase in the number of dwelling units without a concomitant increase in the number of structures (Thompson, 1981: 96).

The "thinning-out" stage appears to have begun in the early 1960's about the time Battelle Institute began large scale purchases of property in the area. As indicated by census data, between 1960 and 1970, the neighborhood experienced a drastic drop in the total number of dwelling units, increased overcrowding, a decline in owner-occupancy, a decline in adjusted value of units, and a drop in the number of units per acre.\(^1\)

In an independent study of the life-cycle paths of twenty Columbus, Ohio neighborhoods, Alton Thompson calculated that Harrison West entered the "residential development" stage and the "transition" stage around the turn of the century; that the "downgrading" stage began in the 1930's; that "thinning-out" occurred between 1960 and the mid-1970's; and that the neighborhood began the "early renewal" process in the

\(^1\)Refer to Tables 1-3.

THE ROLE OF ABSENTEE LANDLORDS: The failure of absentee landlords to maintain the property they own is often a factor in neighborhood decline. In this case the situation was somewhat unusual in that one large corporation came to own most of the neighborhood's property.

When Gordon Battelle died in 1923, he left behind a will which allotted a large sum of money for the establishment of Battelle Memorial Institute, a charitable trust to be located in or near Columbus, Ohio, and operated under the laws of Ohio for charitable purposes conducted in the public interest (Court of Common Pleas, Franklin County, Ohio, 1972:3). Gordon Battelle's will specifically provides for Battelle Institute to conduct the following activities:

a) scientific research and scientific development;
b) creative activities of a scientific nature;
c) activities that directly encourage or assist activities of types (a) and (b) above;
d) education for and in connection with the above activities;
e) in furtherance of the above, the reduction to practice, licensing, or other disposal of inventions, discoveries and developments; and
f) the advancement of learning and better education of men and women for employment (Court of Common Pleas, Franklin County, Ohio, 1972:4).

In addition, the purposes of Battelle-controlled activities and affiliates were to be consistent with the purposes of Battelle Memorial Institute, and a Public Interest Test was established to ensure that the corporation's activities were consistent with Gordon Battelle's intent (Court of Common Pleas, Franklin County, Ohio, 1972:4). Since its establishment Battelle Memorial Institute has grown into the largest independent nonprofit contract research and development corporation in
During the mid-nineteen sixties, Battelle Institute began actively purchasing properties surrounding its corporate headquarters in Columbus, Ohio. The intent, at that time, was to eventually demolish the existing units for corporate expansion. Because the houses were scheduled for eventual demolition, Battelle Institute pursued a policy of low rents and minimal maintenance. Many Harrison West residents believe that Battelle's refusal to maintain the properties it owned, and the influx of low income renters which resulted from the cheap rental of substandard units is what turned the neighborhood into a slum. Research evidence indicates that although Battelle's housing policies contributed to the speeding-up of neighborhood decline, Harrison West had already entered into its declining stage at the time Battelle began large-scale property purchases.

Evidence indicates that Battelle's housing policies greatly accelerated the area's blightening trend during the 1960's and 1970's. The 1960 Census data indicates that 35.8% of the housing units in Harrison West were "deteriorated," while only 2.6% were considered to be "dilapidated." By 1978 Battelle owned 328 structures and 114 vacant lots, comprising over 60% of the property in a 28 block, 100 acre area surrounding its corporate headquarters (City of Columbus, 1978: 2). City code enforcement data compiled in 1978 show that by this time, 60% of the area's housing units had minor or major deficiencies (City of Columbus, 1978: 2).

\[2\] See Table 4.
I. BATTELLE OWNED HOUSES, 1977
II. BATTELLE OWNED LOTS, 1977
Furthermore, the average number of housing units per acre drastically dropped in Harrison West from 10.7 in 1960 to 8.4 in 1970, due largely to Battelle's demolition policy. During the same time period the percentage of renter occupancy increased from 63.7% to 73.8% while the vacancy rate remained virtually unchanged. The average value of Harrison West housing units (adjusted for inflation) rose from $7433 in 1950 to $8036 in 1960, but fell to $6775 by 1970.\footnote{See Table 1.}

Battelle Institute's policy of purchasing homes which were already on the decline, then renting them without maintenance, could not have affected the neighborhood in any way but to accelerate the process of decline. From the standpoint of Battelle's Board of Trustees, low rents and minimal repairs on units scheduled for demolition made sense economically, and might even have seemed charitable. To many homeowners in the area, however, Battelle Institute was a powerful block-busting giant. By allowing approximately 60% of the area's units to go without repair, and by facilitating the infusion of the very lowest class of renters, Battelle could effectively pressure homeowners to sell to them at the lowest of costs.

\textbf{THE ROLE OF RENTERS:} Many of the low income renters who moved to Harrison West to take advantage of Battelle Institute's low rent policy contributed directly to the area's decline. While a significant portion of them made reasonable efforts to maintain the units they lived in, others took the attitude that, "The landlord doesn't care..."
III.

LIVING HABITS OF SOME DESPAIRATELY POOR PEOPLE CONTRIBUTE TO NEIGHBORHOOD DECLINE
about this property, so why should I?" When I was President of the Harrison West Society, we set out to solve the neighborhood's social problems; first, by observing the causes of such problems as trash and crime. We learned some interesting facts.

Many of the renters who appeared to be unclean did make good faith efforts to take care of their areas. However, being from rural Appalachia where urban trash disposal facilities are lacking, some did not understand proper trash disposal procedures. For example, some people would put their trash out in unprotected bags several days before the trash collectors were scheduled to come. By the time the trash collectors did come, scavengers of various kinds, including humans, had the bags ripped open and the trash spread all over the neighborhood. Newcomers to the area learned fast that it did no good to even clean one's yard, because the wind would blow more trash into it immediately.

Low income neighborhoods also tend to have a large proportion of sick and elderly residents who are incapable of cleaning up after themselves. Others realize that they are stuck in poverty for life, lose hope, develop a sense of fatalism, and wallow in their trash without making any further effort at improvement.

Children who grow up in poor neighborhoods are often exposed to violence and hostility as a way of life. As their aggressive character develops, they find school alienating and drop out. Boredom and aggression often combine into vandalism, a mild first step in the development of a criminal career. As the young person gets older and takes on more responsibilities, the lack of good employment opportunities
TRASH SCENARIO: IMPROPER DISPOSAL; TRASH SCAVANGERS; HOPELESS SITUATION
due to poor schooling pressures them to take the next easy step into more serious crimes. In Harrison West, young people would often attack and rob old people. Who was committing these crimes was common knowledge throughout the neighborhood, but the criminal justice system failed to make them stop.

When the revitalization of Harrison West began, the Harrison West Society and Battelle Institute took different approaches to the problems caused by low income renters. The Harrison West Society believed that neighborhood revitalization should benefit neighborhood residents by resolving their problems. Battelle's approach was to intentionally displace people they considered to be undesirable so that the physical area would improve in value.

THE ROLE OF HOME OWNERS: Home owners generally tend to take care of their property. Because they own the property, they derive economic gain from proper maintenance, and because they live in the homes, they derive comfort from proper upkeep. Some home owners, especially the elderly, find repair costs difficult to afford, but the problem is not one of incentive.

It did become hard, however, for home owners to maintain pride in their homes in Harrison West when a large portion of the neighborhood began to rapidly decline due to lack of maintenance and the infusion of low income renters with undesirable living styles. As the neighborhood got worse and worse, home owners found themselves selling at reduced prices and moving to better areas. Usually, they sold to Battelle Institute which began renting the house to more low income people. Many home owners resented this blockbusting technique.
CRIME SCENARIO: GROWING UP TOUGH, BORED; MISCHIEF; HARDER STUFF
Perhaps the villain in this incident was the City of Columbus. Code enforcers allowed Battelle to illegally rent substandard homes to desperately poor people, while enforcing code standards on individual private home owners (McCabe, 1981). As early as 1969 a City of Columbus Building Condition Survey pointed out discrepancies in the condition of Battelle-owned and non-Battelle-owned houses in the area (City of Columbus, 1970:21). Table 2 summarizes the growing disparity between values of owner-occupied units and rental units that occurred between 1960 and 1970—the decade Battelle made large scale purchases in the area. Yet the City continued to allow the institution to downgrade the area, turning its head at unsafe rental practices while at the same time pressuring individual home owners to make costly repairs or sell out cheap to the expanding corporation.

Efforts on the part of home owners to fight this kind of injustice were not lacking. The Godman Guild Settlement House, which was originally organized in 1898 and built on Goodale Street, had been torn down in 1959-1960 as a result of the I-670 freeway construction. A new building was built at 321 West Second Avenue and dedicated in 1962. The Godman Guild eventually became the nucleus around which efforts to save Harrison West centered. In 1974 the Harrison West Residents' Association was formed in an attempt by concerned residents to obtain Community Development Block Grant money to help fight neighborhood deterioration. Also, in 1976, concerned residents formed the Near Northside Neighborhood Housing and Development Corporation, a non-
HARRISON WEST HOME OWNERS WORK TO KEEP UP THEIR PROPERTIES WHILE THE CITY
ALLOWS BATTELLE INSTITUTE TO RENT SUBSTANDARD UNITS TO THE POOR
profit company whose purpose was to revitalize the area's housing stock in a manner which would preserve the neighborhood's overall character (Morrison, 1982). These and numerous other neighborhood activities were supported by the Godman Guild during the days of Harrison West's decline. The Guild continues today to serve the Near Northside and provides a meeting place for many Harrison West activities (Rybak, 1978:4).

The extent to which Battelle Institute should be blamed for the decline of Harrison West is a matter of debate. It seems reasonable to this researcher to conclude that Battelle began purchasing homes in a neighborhood which had already entered a declining phase, then greatly accelerated the pace of decline through a policy of minimal repairs, and cheap rent to the poor. While this policy might make sense from an economic standpoint, one must question whether Gordon Battelle would have been proud of the way the institution bearing his name rented unsafe units to disadvantaged people, contributed to the destruction of an entire neighborhood, and pressured residents into selling their homes at unfair prices. The psychological impact which Battelle Institute's housing policies had on the people of the neighborhood might be summarized by this statement, made by a long time Harrison West resident:

Sure, Battelle has had an impact on the neighborhood, but it ain't like everybody thinks. They wouldn't fix up the houses, but the houses was falling down before they bought them. During the Depression, nobody would put nothing into nothing, and during the war they claimed they couldn't find no materials. And they brought the hillbillies in, too, but the turning point there was the 1950's. G.M. and Westinghouse advertised all over Appalachia--they wouldn't give a
Columbus man a job—no way in the world. They went down there and got those people who are hard workers—but you don't sucker these people long. They worked hard for the money and lived high on the hog until they broke down and got smart and went on welfare. But all Battelle did was create insecurity. First they buy it up and run it down; then they fix it up. Take a place that rented for $60 ten years ago. Slap a coat of paint on it and rent it for $160. Get rid of everybody and clean it up—that's progress. Well, you don't feel like fixin' up your place because you don't know what's gonna happen next. It's a loss of security—that's why I'm moving (Interview, 1977).
CHAPTER III

REVITALIZATION: THE ROLE OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

A CHANGE OF PLANS

On November 4, 1974, a ruling made in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, Ohio, greatly altered the plans Battelle Institute's Board of Trustees had for expanding the company's facilities into the area surrounding its corporate headquarters. A lawsuit, filed by Ohio's Attorney General, William J. Brown, alleged that Battelle Institute was not being run in accordance with the Will of Gordon Battelle. The Will reads:

...and whenever at the end of any calendar year the income from the business of said, 'Battelle Memorial Institute' shall result in a profit of over twenty per cent on the principal of this legacy that said Board of Trustees shall distribute, in the name of said 'Battelle Memorial Institute' the amount of such earnings to such charitable institutions, needy enterprises or persons and in such manner and amounts as in their judgment will do the greatest good for humanity...
(Court of Common Pleas, Franklin County, Ohio, 1974: 9).

The complicated ruling which came from Judge Gillie's bench took into account such factors as: the legal definition of charity; the amount of Battelle Institute's pre-1975 legal obligation to outside charities ($80,000,000); and the amount Battelle Institute had already paid to outside charities ($48,046,573). Taking these factors into account, Battelle Institute was obligated to pay an additional $31,953,427 to outside charities in order to meet its pre-1975 obligation.
Judge Gillie made it clear that there was no evidence of self-dealing on the part of Battelle trustees.

With this amount of capital unexpectedly slashed from its operating budget, Battelle suddenly found itself unable to afford its ambitious expansion plans and surrounded by a slum neighborhood which it largely owned and partially created. An announcement was made that Battelle was altering its expansion plans because of "changes in research objectives," and a planning phase ensued, during which Battelle officials considered various new options for dealing with the large amount of neighborhood property they controlled.

**THE OPTIONS**

**A BATTELLE HOUSING LABORATORY:**

Given the nature of Battelle Institute as a research corporation, and society's need for knowledge pertaining to housing problems, it would seem plausible that Battelle might seize this opportunity to study complex problems associated with neighborhood revitalization. In fact, a proposal to create a "Battelle Housing Laboratory" was funded by Battelle and completed in December of 1970. The proposal outlined seven alternative approaches, each of which contained aspects recommended for inclusion in the final structure of the proposed Battelle Housing Laboratory. The seven alternatives are summarized as follows (Battelle Housing Laboratory, undated: 8-11):

(A) The Laboratory Facility Approach. Under this general structure, the Battelle Housing Laboratory would be used to conduct experiments which would produce a quick economic return to the contract sponsor.
(B) The Planned Rehabilitation Approach. This approach differs from approach (A) in that emphasis is on planned rehabilitation rather than on sponsored activities. This approach is based on Battelle funded restoration and maintenance of the neighborhood at an established level of quality.

(C) The Research Approach. As in the cases of approach (A) and (B), the emphasis is placed on the physical renovation of the neighborhood. In contrast, approach (C) stresses the development and application of innovative methods and materials.

(D) The Services Approach. This approach adds to physical revitalization, Battelle or government provided services such as solid-waste removal, transportation, utilities and police patrol.

(E) The Quality of Life Approach. In addition to the services provided by the Services Approach, the Quality of Life Approach includes socially oriented services such as public health nurses, social work services, remedial education, urbanization training, job training, and home maintenance training.

(F) The Transient Approach. This approach recognizes that many of the neighborhood's residents are transient Appalachian migrants in need of specialized services, such as assistance in acclimating.

(G) The National Laboratory Approach. This approach involves extending the use of results from experimentation in the neighborhood to other neighborhoods throughout the nation.

In regards to the list of alternatives provided above, the unnamed author of the Battelle Housing Laboratory report made mention of a memo dated June 4, 1970 to S. L. Fawcett from R. L. Merrill, in which Merrill
stated that the primary objectives of the program were to be:

"to provide an opportunity for a comprehensive research and development approach to neighborhood renewal using technological and managerial innovations and encouraging sponsorship through contract research" (Battelle Housing Laboratory, undated: 1).

In the same memo, six other objectives are discussed. These are:

1. To expand BCL's contacts with the building industry, especially through the development of sponsored programs.

2. To provide an opportunity for close working relationships with the Department of Housing and Urban Development by demonstrating, on a pilot basis, new ideas for neighborhood development.

3. To serve as a "showcase" for the application of Battelle talent to pressing urban and social problems.

4. To improve the physical environment of Battelle Memorial Institute.

5. To develop a positive image as both a good neighbor and a community citizen.

6. To achieve a reasonable economic and social return in relation to our property acquisition program (Battelle Housing Laboratory, undated: 2).

Again, it seems plausible to this writer that a Battelle Housing Laboratory structured along the lines of the seven alternative strategies, and in accordance to the stated organization objectives, would have been in keeping with the intentions of Gordon Battelle's Will. Instead, the Institute's planners set aside this option and considered the housing corporation option, the normal market forces option, and
and the Battelle planned restoration option.

A NON-PROFIT HOUSING CORPORATION

Over the years a group of neighborhood residents and professionals had been meeting at the Godman Guild Settlement House and planning area projects, such as the expenditure of C.D.A. (Community Development Act) funds. Several times they had discussed the need to form a non-profit housing corporation to address the needs of low income residents in the area. However, a lack of federal funds and the refusal of the city to allow C.D.A. funds to be used for this purpose hindered the non-profit corporation from getting off the ground (Near Northside Housing Corporation Task Force, 1976: 9).

Then, in February, 1976, this same group of people met with Battelle officials to discuss the future of Battelle owned housing in the area. Five months later the "Housing Corporation Task Force" presented to Battelle a written proposal outlining two plans under which the Near Northside Neighborhood Housing and Development Corporation would renovate Battelle owned structures while preserving the neighborhood's overall character (Near Northside Housing Corporation Task Force, 1976: 1). The first plan proposed that the housing corporation take over management of all Battelle owned units and to continue renting them to low and moderate income people. Because of the non-profit nature of the corporation, rents would be kept low and used mostly for maintenance and repairs. Under plan two, Battelle would donate ten structures to the non-profit housing corporation, which would rehabilitate them through conventional financing. Capital generated from the sale of the renovated units would be used to purchase more homes in the area, and
to help bring in federally subsidized housing for the poor, elderly, and handicapped. The housing corporation task force proposal ended by calling for the housing corporation and Battelle to join together to become "... the force that makes a decent and healthy living environment a possibility for the new and the old residents of the neighborhood" (Near Northside Housing Corporation Task Force, 1976: 9).

Gordon Battelle probably would not have been displeased if Battelle Institute trustees had opted for either of the housing corporation proposals. However, they did not. From innuendoes made by Battelle officials at various meetings attended by this writer, it appears that the following considerations affected their decision: first, Battelle officials wanted to remain in control of events in the neighborhood so as to ensure that various institution goals, such as corporate expansion, could be achieved; second, Battelle officials wanted to acquire at least a reasonable economic return on the property the institution owned; third, housing corporation members had no track record of success in property management; and fourth, some Battelle planners had no faith in the non-profit method.

NORMAL MARKET FORCES

Another option considered by Battelle planners was to sell the property they controlled on the open market and allow normal market forces to operate. Urban studies research indicates that once a neighborhood enters the stage of decline, it usually goes in one of three directions: it can continue on as a slum, deteriorating even further as more of the housing stock becomes substandard; it can undergo urban renewal, if the government provides capital to replace slum property
with offices, parks, sports arenas, etc.; or it can undergo the process of gentrification or urban reinvasion as a result of private reinvestment (Schwirian, 1981).

Had Battelle planners opted to dump the corporation's slum property on the open market, it is very likely that the neighborhood would have gradually been restored by private developers. In the first place, private restoration efforts were already underway in nearby Victorian Village. More importantly, Harrison West represented an ideal target area for reinvestment. Many of the deteriorated homes were once architecturally beautiful, and were potentially rehabilitatable. In addition, the neighborhood is conveniently located near downtown, near freeway entrances, and near numerous important institutions such as Ohio State University, Doctor's Hospital, and Battelle Institute. Somebody stood to incur sizeable economic gain from reinvestment in the area.

**BATTELLE SUPERVISED NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION**

Given the facts known about the situation, one can speculate as to why Battelle Trustees chose to remain in control of the neighborhood's revitalization process. Had they opted to dump the corporation's housing on the open market, either the neighborhood surrounding Battelle headquarters would have remained a slum, or, more likely, private investors would have gradually revitalized the area. In addition to enabling the corporation to incur a reasonable economic gain from the area's revitalization, the Battelle supervised revitalization plan would insure that Battelle officials remained in control of events, and that Battelle goals, such as corporate expansion, could be achieved.
In order to facilitate their plan to directly supervise the area's revitalization, Battelle officials took two important steps. First, a Seattle-based consulting firm, Naramore, Bain, Brady & Johnason, was contracted to formulate an overall improvement plan for the area. Secondly, Battelle Institute established a wholly owned subsidiary, Olentangy Management Company, to manage redevelopment and sale of its properties. In August, 1977, after one year of planning by Olentangy Management Company, the consultant, and the City of Columbus, the "Neighborhood Development Plan and Implementation Program" was released to the public (City of Columbus, 1978: 3).

The "Neighborhood Development Plan and Implementation Program" outlined a ten-year redevelopment process which was to take place in two phases. The document also identified four basic objectives of the program. These were:

-Create viable neighborhood units within the study area.
-Provide adequate expansion area for Battelle with improved access and entry image.
-Involve citizens in the planning process, and
-Participate with the City of Columbus and other government agencies to implement programs supportive of revitalization of the neighborhood.(Naramore, Bain, Brady & Johnason, 1977: 1).

**PHASE ONE**

Phase I included the following project areas and related activities (Naramore, Bain, Brady & Johnason, 1977: 1-7):

**KING AVENUE/OSU.** In anticipation of the expansion needs of the Ohio State University Medical School, all properties between
Ninth Avenue and Ohio State University would be divested without rehabilitation.

**BATTELLE EXPANSION.** The area east of Perry Avenue would be used for Battelle expansion. To improve access to Battelle and the neighborhood, this area would serve primarily as Battelle's Visitor Entrance, and Belmont Boulevard would be extended between King Avenue and Fifth Avenue to replace Perry Street and to provide a buffer between the corporation and the neighborhood.

**CIRCLE PARK/NEEL AVENUE.** Battelle owned homes in this area would receive energy oriented exterior rehabilitation and sold with an emphasis on home ownership. Fourteen to sixteen homes in the Perry Street expansion area would be moved to vacant lots in this area and rehabilitated. The first homes to be restored along Seventh Avenue would be set-up as a demonstration project to show the area's potential for revitalization. The area would be rezoned to reflect lower density single-family development. In conjunction with the city, changes would be made in traffic patterns through the opening up of Belmont Boulevard and the closing off of Pennsylvania Avenue and Michigan Avenue, and needed improvements would be made in terms of alleys, parking access, fencing, garbage enclosures, lighting, and landscaping. Also, mini parks would be constructed at the ends of the newly closed streets, and the existing traffic circles would be relandscaped to provide additional parking space.
HARRISON AVENUE/ PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE. Battelle owned houses in this area would receive energy oriented exterior rehabilitation and sold with an emphasis on home ownership. Vacant lots would be infilled with a limited number of houses removed from other areas, newly constructed single-family units, and with suplexes and townhouses. A cul-de-sac would close off traffic at the intersection of Fifth Avenue and Harrison Avenue, and a neighborhood park would be located on Fourth Avenue between Michigan Avenue and Pennsylvania Avenue. An area on Harrison Avenue between Fourth and Fifth would be set up as a demonstration project to show the area’s potential for revitalization. Visual improvements would be made to Third Avenue, and street, alley, and landscaping improvements would be conducted.

PHASE TWO

Plans for Phase Two were deliberately left vague until future market demand could be assessed. However, anticipated activities for this phase included the following projects (Maramore, Bain, Brady and Johnson, 1977: 7):

- Expansion of Battelle south of Fifth Avenue.
- Rehabilitation and sale of existing structures.
- Infill with townhouses and apartments.
- Provision of commercial development according to market demand.
- Improvements to King Avenue, Fifth Avenue and other streets.
Construction of a bike/pedestrian system along the Olentangy River.

Code enforcement and maintenance programs.

This revitalization program, which advertisers labeled the "Renaissance," was to become the largest housing restoration project ever attempted in the United States. Most of Battelle's 328 structures would receive energy oriented exterior rehabilitation including repaired or replaced roofs, sealing, tuck pointing and sand blasting of bricks, exterior carpentry work, painting, insulation, storm windows and doors, and fencing, while the entire neighborhood would receive landscaping, and street and alley repairs (Columbus Monthly, 1979: Inside cover). Olentangy Management Company would restore some of the units in entirety, and set them up as demonstration projects. Most of the units would only be restored on the exterior, leaving the interior to the creative sweat-equity of the buyers. By restoring all of the units on the exterior, Battelle could insure buyers that the neighborhood's overall quality would improve.

Battelle would also, through Olentangy Management Company, take certain steps to deal with the adverse effects of neighborhood revitalization, such as the displacement of low income residents. To begin with, the Renaissance would be phased in over a ten year period to avoid the impact of massive displacement. More importantly, tenants would be given first option to buy, whenever feasible, and Olentangy Management Company would use its resources to secure government funds, such as an Innovative Grant, which would provide interior rehabilitation grants for tenant buyers, and relocation assistance for displaced residents. In addition, Battelle Institute would donate four houses to the
VII.
BATTLE/OMC REVITALIZATION PLAN: CONTRACTED EXTERIOR RESTORATION
Near Northside Neighborhood Housing and Development Corporation in order to help the non-profit organization establish a track record in the area of low-income housing. Finally, Olentangy Management Company would work with John Sandefer, the nation's largest Section Eight Housing developer, to bring low-income housing to the area.

To Battelle Institute's Board of Trustees, the Neighborhood Development Plan formulated by Olentangy Management Company and the consulting firm of Naramore, Bain, Brady & Johnson must have seemed ideal. In addition to being a worthwhile business venture, the Renaissance program would enable the institute to achieve its expansion goals, upgrade the area surrounding its corporate headquarters, provide some employees with a nice place to live, and allow current low-income residents to remain as an identifiable segment of the newly revitalized neighborhood. The end product would be the creation of an ideal mixed-income neighborhood. The plan made sense from an economic standpoint, while, in keeping with the spirit of the intent of Gordon Battelle's Will, the program seemed to be generous and humane.

Yet, in the public eye, Battelle's treatment of the neighborhood would come to be seen as less than charitable. Who was responsible for the ugly stories in the press? What program changes would HUD officials insist upon in order to meet pre-established government regulations? Would government regulations keep the public/private partnership from being worthwhile from the viewpoint of private enterprise?
CHAPTER IV
REVITALIZATION: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

INTRODUCTION

The Great Depression of the 1930's marked the beginning of a new era in American politics. The theory that under laissez-faire policy the economy would provide the most good for the most people was no longer defendable. America had business, labor, and consumer demand—the three entities that Adam Smith claimed produced wealth, but the economy was not functioning adequately. For the first time in history, the American government began designing policies aimed at interfering in private markets and shaping the quality of American life (Glaab and Brown, 1976:272).

The government's interference in the housing market began with experimental attempts to help Americans become home owners, and gradually evolved into a comprehensive urban policy. Early in the depression, President Hoover responded to the rapidly growing foreclosure rate by establishing twelve Federal Loan Home Banks. The purpose of these banks was to promote the building of new homes by lending funds to private mortgage institutions. The Hoover Administration also was responsible for the establishment of city zoning laws and uniform building codes. It was not until the coming of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, however, that the government's housing programs became tied into a comprehensive urban policy.
Like President Hoover, President Roosevelt's housing policy was designed to help make Americans into home owners. Initially, Roosevelt tried to do this in 1933 by establishing the Home Owner's Loan Corporation, whose purpose was to refinance home loans for longer periods of time and at lower interest rates. An even greater attempt at making Americans home owners came in the form of the National Housing Act of 1934. This law established the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation and the Federal Housing Authority (F.H.A.). The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation insured investments made by private building-and-loan and savings-and-loan associations, while the Federal Housing Authority insured private loans made to low and moderate income home buyers. Under the F.H.A. program, qualified buyers could obtain mortgages with reduced downpayments, reduced interest rates, and with the mortgage, insurance, taxes, and closing costs all incorporated into one monthly payment. Also, because of the extended length of repayment, monthly payments were lower, and homes became affordable to a wider range of people.

President Roosevelt's housing policies eventually became tied into a more comprehensive urban policy. This housing and urban development policy included the declaration of eminent domain and purchase of slum property at, "fair market value," slum clearance, and the construction of low income public housing projects. Originally, this policy was enacted on an experimental basis in the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. Under the Public Works Administration, a Housing Division
was created and given the power to declare eminent domain and supervise slum clearance and the construction of public housing. In 1935, a Federal Court ruled that the Housing Division was abusing the power of eminent domain, and the government was forced to manage slum clearance through local public authorities (L.P.A.s).

The responsibility of implementing urban renewal programs was shifted from the Housing Division of the Public Works Administration to the Department of Interior in the National Housing Act of 1937. This law implemented on a mass scale the slum clearance and public housing programs that were tried experimentally under the National Industrial Recovery Act. Under the new law, low income people were protected by the "Equivalent Elimination" clause. This stated that for every family displaced by slum clearance, one unit of public housing had to be built (Glaab and Brown, 1976:276). This way, low income people would not be adversely affected by the loss of low income housing caused by urban renewal.

Another aspect of President Roosevelt's urban policy was to encourage suburban growth. This was done by providing funds for experimental "greenbelt" communities, and by manipulating the F.H.A. and Veteran Administration loans in such a way as to encourage the movement to the suburbs.

During Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal Administration, the framework for America's federal urban policy was established. Working through local public authorities, the government would use its constitutionally derived power of eminent domain to condemn property in blighted areas and force owners to sell at fair market value. The
land would then be cleared, and sold to private developers for renewal. The displaced poor would be relocated in public housing projects, and home ownership and suburban growth would be encouraged. Although scholars disagree over who benefitted the most from these programs, what is significant is that laissez-faire growth was replaced by comprehensive urban planning.

HARRY TRUMAN

In spite of strong opposition from private enterprise, President Truman managed to pass the National Housing Act of 1949. This act has turned out to be both controversial and contradictory. The most significant aspect of the law is that it established as a goal of the U.S. Government, the providing of a suitable living environment for every American family. The law reads:

The Congress hereby declares that the general welfare and security of the nation, and the health and living standards of its people, require housing production and related community development sufficient to remedy the serious housing shortage, and the elimination of substandard and other inadequate housing through the clearance of slums and blighted areas, and the realization as soon as possible of the goal of a decent and suitable living environment for every American family (U.S. Congress, 95th Session, 2d, Part I, 1978).

What was controversial about this law was that it established the goal of the government providing every American family with a suitable living environment during the cold war, anti-communism, McCarthy era. The establishment of such a goal is a direct step towards socialism, and it is surprising that it could have been passed during this time.
What was contradictory about the law was that while it established the goal of providing every American family with a suitable home, the equivalent elimination provision of the National Housing Act of 1937 was not carried over. As a result, low income people displaced by urban renewal projects found it even harder to find a suitable home, because low income housing was not being replaced as it was being taken off the market (Glaab and Brown, 1976:281).

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

As a response to criticism that the federal government's urban policy was benefitting the rich at the expense of the poor, President Eisenhower made several revisions in the National Housing Act of 1949 through passage of the National Housing Act of 1954 (Glaab and Brown, 1976:283). First, the 1954 law attempted to speed-up slum clearance by increasing the proportion of federal urban grants that could be used for renewal of non-residential areas. Second, the law substituted the term "urban renewal" for "urban development," to signify a new approach of restoring deteriorated property, instead of destroying it for new development. Third, all urban renewal projects were required to present a "Workable Program" for community development. The Workable Program initiated some new aspects of community development including: zoning and land-use plans; building codes; relocation assistance for displaced families and businesses; and a citizen participation program.

The changes initiated by the Eisenhower Administration represented positive steps in the evolution of federal urban policy, but they were not enough to stop the wave of criticism against urban renewal which
emerged in the late 1950's. At this time urban renewal came under sharp attack from the very liberal coalition that had been responsible for its development. Instead of helping the poor, as they had intended it to do, urban renewal was destroying the viably functioning neighborhoods of low income people for the benefit of landlords, contractors, developers, bankers, and real estate companies. The poor were being forced from their neighborhoods and left homeless, or clustered into high-rise government housing projects which were becoming institutionalized slums. The federal government had spent thirty years and billions of dollars for the net effect of reducing the supply of housing available to low income people (Moynihan, 1971:161).

KENNEDY AND JOHNSON

By pooling the support of liberals, organized labor, and active minorities, the Democratic Party was able to gain control of the federal bureaucracy during the 1960's. Urban programs conceived under President Kennedy's New Frontier and carried out under President Johnson's Great Society were designed to deal with the criticisms that were emerging about the government's urban policy helping the rich at the expense of the poor.

The most notable change in urban policy that came about during the Kennedy-Johnson years was the establishment of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, whose Director was given cabinet-level status in the executive branch of the federal government. The Declaration of Policy section of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 reads:
The Congress affirms the National Goal of the Housing Act of 1949 of, "A decent home and suitable living environment for every American family."

The Congress finds that this goal has not been fully realized for many of the nation's lower-income families; That this is a matter of grave national concern; And that there exists in the public and private sectors of the economy the resources and capabilities necessary for the realization of this goal.

The Congress declares that in the administration of those housing programs authorized by this act which are designed to assist families with incomes so low that they would not otherwise decently house themselves, and of other government programs designed to assist in the provision of housing for such families, the highest priority and emphasis should be given to meeting the housing needs of these families and for which the National Housing Goal has not become a reality; There should be the fullest practicable utilization of private enterprise and of individual self-help techniques (U.S. Congress, 95th Session 2d, Part I, 1978:3).

As stated by this law, the purpose of establishing the Department of Housing and Urban Development was to assist low income families in achieving the National Housing Goal of 1949. To do this, several major changes in federal housing policy were instituted. To begin with, a one-line statement in Section 23 of the 1949 law authorized public housing authorities to contract with private developers whenever necessary. The 1968 law firmly established that efforts to achieve the National Housing Goal would be done through a public/private partnership. In addition, the 1949 law provided assistance to the building in the form of the Annual Contributions Contract which the Treasury Department paid to housing authorities, while the 1968 law shifted the assistance to the person, who then paid the housing authority. Also, the old law provided a disincentive to work in that people who rose into
higher income brackets suddenly found themselves no longer eligible for public housing. Under the 1968 law, these same people qualified for Section 235 and Section 236 home ownership programs. Finally, in order to promote the concept of self-help, several new government agencies, including VISTA and Head Start, were established, and in 1968 the Model Cities program created greenbelt-type suburban towns with housing and social service programs.

NIXON-FORD

Richard Nixon's urban policy initiatives were embodied in the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, signed by Gerald Ford. The Act begins by reaffirming the National Housing Goal of 1949, then it goes on to say:

The Congress further finds that policies designed to contribute to the achievement of the National Housing Goal have not directed sufficient attention and resources to the preservation of existing housing and neighborhoods; that the deterioration and abandonment of housing for the nation's lower-income families has accelerated and contributed to disintegration and has partially negated the progress toward achieving the National Housing Goal, which has primarily been through new housing construction.

The Congress declares that if the National Housing Goal is to be achieved, a greater effort must be made to encourage the preservation of existing housing and neighborhoods through such measures as housing preservation, moderate rehabilitation, and improvement in housing management and maintenance, in conjunction with provision of adequate municipal services (U.S. Congress 95th Session 2d, Part I, 1978:3).

Under Nixon's plan, a greater effort would be made to preserve existing housing and neighborhoods. Community Development Block Grants
would be issued to cities to redistribute to local neighborhoods and used for a variety of purposes, including low interest loans and grants for housing rehabilitation. Preservation would also be facilitated by the establishment of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, which would establish regulations making it difficult for private owners to tear down structures for redevelopment in areas designated as historic sites. The Urban Homesteading program also began.

The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 also replaced the Section 23 public housing program with Section 8 housing. Under the Section 8 program, the government would give landlords rehabilitation grants, and subsidize portions of low income peoples' rents. Section 8 housing would be spread throughout the metropolis, replacing highrise institutional slums.

Another aspect of the 1974 Community Development Act was the establishment of Innovative Grants. Under this program, HUD would allot grants for projects that would "advance the state of the art of urban reinvestment" (Federal Register, 1977: 58984).

JIMMY CARTER

On March 27, 1978, President Jimmy Carter announced a new comprehensive urban policy. This urban policy was declared to be a "new partnership" between all levels of government, private enterprise, and the neighborhoods (The White House, 1978:1). President Carter hoped to stimulate neighborhood involvement in community redevelopment through actions taken in six general policy areas:
1. **URBAN VOLUNTEER CORPS**: This program was to be administered through ACTION volunteers, who would be used to strengthen neighborhood organizations, and was to be supported by a modest fund for volunteer revitalization projects.

2. **THE COMMUNITY ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM**: Also to be administered by ACTION volunteers, and supported by Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (L.E.A.A.) funds, this program would coordinate efforts of community groups, city officials, and criminal justice representatives.

3. **THE NEIGHBORHOOD SELF-HELP DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM**: This was to be administered by H.U.D.'s new Office of Neighborhoods, which was to provide nationally $15 million for support of neighborhood voluntary organizations.


5. **COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CREDIT UNIONS**: Funds administered through the Community Services Administration and regulated by the National Credit Union Administration would assist credit unions in investing in neighborhoods where they operate.


Although Carter's urban policy emphasized neighborhood revitalization, it did not ignore development of the inner-city. The Administration was responsible for the creation of Urban Development Block Grants (U.D.A.G. Grants), to be awarded to cities for the development of their urban cores. It is clear, however, that Carter's urban policy placed a priority on neighborhood development, and that the neighborhoods themselves were supposed to participate in the revitalization process. In
some cases the city governments were to be completely bypassed as the federal government worked directly with neighborhood organizations (The White House, undated:2). The role neighborhoods were supposed to play in their own revitalization is reflected in a Carter Administration document which states:

Now is the time for the neighborhood movement to seize the opportunity which (Carter's) urban policy affords it, and catapult neighborhoods into a priority position in the structure of American government. The urban policy should be seen as a challenge to neighborhood organizations to take their rightful role in the revitalization of our urban areas and in the governance of urban areas (The White House, undated:2).

It was the reflection of this new partnership between the federal government, private enterprise, and the neighborhoods that led to the Carter Administration's awarding of a $2 million Innovative Grant to the City of Columbus, Ohio in June of 1978.

RONALD REAGAN

The election of Ronald Reagan to the Presidency in 1978 represented not only a lack of faith in the leadership style of President Carter, but also a growing feeling among the public that the government had gone too far in the spending of tax-payers' money on wasteful programs. Reagan's election has resulted in a drastic reduction in federal spending and regulation, but it has not been a complete return to the pre-New Deal policies of laissez-faire economics.

In the realm of urban policy, the Reagan Administration has combined a number of grants previously awarded for a variety of purposes, and awarded them to cities to be used at their discretion.
Ironically, the Reagan Administration has taken credit for instituting an urban policy with greater local control over federal dollars (Denton, 1981:A-16). Actually, the Reagan plan will result in less citizen participation. Presidents Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford each took steps to increase the level of citizen participation in their urban programs, while President Carter took the greatest step of all in bypassing the cities and working directly with the neighborhoods. President Reagan's policy shifts control of federal dollars from the neighborhoods, a source closer to the people, and returns it to the cities. In addition, cities will be less obligated to help the poor by spending federal dollars within the guidelines of government regulations (Denton, 1981:A-16).

President Reagan's urban policy also calls for the creation of urban enterprise zones to promote business activity in depressed urban centers, and to replace the Section 8 Housing Program with a direct voucher subsidy to low income people. In effect, this new program subsidizes people instead of housing units and provides the poor with a wider range of housing choices.

SUMMATION

In the past fifty years, America has developed an urban policy which has undergone many major changes. Prior to President Roosevelt's New Deal legislation, the federal government took a laissez-faire economics approach to the problems of housing and urban development. When this failed, the government began subsidizing private enterprise with grants awarded to cities but used within the guidelines of federal regulations. Because the federal money ended up helping private
enterprise instead of the poor, efforts were made to increase local control through citizen participation programs. President Carter attempted to maximize citizen participation by dealing directly with neighborhood groups, while President Reagan has shifted control of federal grants back to the cities and lifted regulations pertaining to their use.

The major criticisms of the "no strings attached" grants from Washington are that the cities can use the money to plug gaps in their budgets, and that the high income neighborhoods and wealthy business interests which control city councils will be the chief beneficiaries of federal dollars aimed at helping the poor (Denton, 1981:A-16). With less citizen participation and less government regulation, it is less likely that HUD's money will be used as Congress intended with "maximum feasible priority," for the benefit of low and moderate income people (Denton, 1981:A-16).

THE 1978 INNOVATIVE GRANT

In 1978 the Carter Administration allotted five million dollars nationwide for innovative grants. Ninety-six cities applied for the grant money, but only two grants were awarded. The City of Portland, Oregon was awarded one half of one million dollars and the City of Columbus, Ohio was awarded two million dollars. None of the remaining money was allocated.

Patricia Harris, President Carter's appointed Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, must have been aware of the potential political ramifications of awarding such a large portion of
the innovative grant money to a city with a Republican mayor. Tom Moody, however, appeared to be a responsible mayor in that he had been elected President of the National Council of Mayors. More importantly, the Innovative Grant Application submitted by the City of Columbus appeared to be an ideal manifestation of President Carter's proposed urban policy objectives. An innovative grant award to the City of Columbus would solidify a new partnership between private enterprise, the government, and the neighborhood undergoing revitalization.

The government and private enterprise would be partners in the revitalization project because Olentangy Management Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Battelle Memorial Institute, promised that, "A private commitment of twelve million dollars will be made if the corresponding support from the public sector can be demonstrated" (City of Columbus, 1978:1). The innovative grant budget proposal divided revitalization expenditures between those to be supported by the grant, and those to be financed by Battelle. Battelle Institute had been involved in large scale HUD projects before, and had established political connections in HUD's hierarchy.

The neighborhood would also be a part of the new partnership to revitalize the Near Northside of Columbus, Ohio. The innovative grant

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1 A statement to this effect was made by Rand Howard, Director of HUD's Columbus office, at a meeting at the Godman Guild on July 19, 1978. A description of this meeting can be found on page of this study.

2 A copy of the original budget proposal can be found
proposal outlined an extensive citizen participation plan and listed sixteen neighborhood voluntary associations which had participated in the revitalization planning process (City of Columbus, 1978:16). Although HUD directors were aware of some local discontent being expressed in the press, Olentangy Management Company had brought to Washington a group of elected neighborhood representatives who expressed support for the grant.

The Innovative Grant Application which the City of Columbus submitted also provided a list of goals and objectives which were in keeping with the intent of HUD policy. These goals and objectives were (City of Columbus, 1978:6):

1. To provide the necessary support for the partnership between public, private and citizen groups already underway, with each partner sharing in the responsibilities and benefits of the program.
2. To reduce the dislocation of existing tenants by increasing opportunities to purchase present residences or other residential properties within the neighborhood.
3. To reduce the hardships of displacement through relocation assistance and services.
4. To minimize the demolition of low and moderate income housing resources through the removal and rehabilitation of selected structures.
5. To provide for fulfilling the public responsibilities for the necessary infrastructure improvements including boulevard construction, park development and alley improvements.
6. To promote reinvestment in this otherwise declining neighborhood through the above activities.

In summation, the innovative grant claimed to solidify an ongoing process of communication between a large private developer, a city, and a conglomeration of neighborhood voluntary associations.
Accompanying the City of Columbus's Innovative Grant Application was a letter signed by Mayor Tom Moody and Department of Development Director Jack Huddle which verified that the overall impact of this new partnership would be of benefit to the neighborhood's current low and moderate income residents. In part, the letter stated:

The innovative grant will be used to support a public/private partnership for the revitalization of the Near North/University neighborhood and to reduce tenant displacement and gentrification (City of Columbus, 1978: opening page).

With the innovative grant being used primarily to reduce the displacement of low and moderate income residents, it would seem that the neighborhood would welcome it. The awarding of the grant, however, divided the neighborhood and triggered protests. Was the neighborhood really against Battelle, or was it as Battelle supporters claimed: protests were being led by a small group of radicals? What was the role of the neighborhood in its own redevelopment?

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3 A copy of this letter may be found on page 203.
Sometime in 1973, a group of Near Northside residents in Columbus, Ohio met at the Godman Guild Settlement house to discuss the establishment of a neighborhood organization which would qualify as a recipient of 1974 Community Development Block Grant Funds. As a result of this meeting the Harrison West Resident's Association, or Harrison West Society, was formed. The neighborhood residents who initially formed the Harrison West Society were deeply concerned about the deteriorated state of their neighborhood. Many of them had resigned themselves to the fact that their neighborhood would be destroyed in favor of expansion by Battelle Institute, and they were concerned about the consequences of Battelle's expansion for the neighborhood's low income residents. (Morrison, 1982).

In 1975 Carol McCabe led a group of residents to Battelle's Corporate Headquarters to complain about the way in which the corporation's rental agencies were circumventing requests for repairs. They did not expect to prevent Battelle's expansion, nor did they expect major repairs to be made on houses that were scheduled for demolition. Their concern was that the neighborhood's housing stock was in such bad shape that unsafe units were being rented to desperately poor families. They told Battelle officials that they wanted repairs germane to health
and safety to be attended to, and came away from the meeting feeling that, "...we had been listened to, but that was about it." There was no noticeable change in Battelle's policy (McCabe, 1981).

I moved to Harrison Avenue during the winter of 1975 in order to attend graduate school at Ohio State University. When I moved into the neighborhood I immediately became aware of the animosity felt throughout the area against Battelle Institute. Renters disliked Battelle because it was difficult to get them to make repairs on unsafe units. Home owners disliked Battelle because of the way the corporation was lowering housing values and pressuring them to sell. Everett Clemmons, owner of J&J Grill, told me how Battelle's intrusion into the neighborhood had hurt business on West Third Avenue. Everyone resented the run down houses and lots full of trash and weeds that made the neighborhood look so ugly. People would say things like, "They're supposed to be a charitable trust and look at them--a slum landlord!"

I also became aware that neighborhood organizing efforts were divided into two camps. One group, led by Carol McCabe, seemed to be more tolerant of Battelle, resigned to the fact that Battelle would destroy the neighborhood, and dedicated to doing what they could to help low income people adjust to the situation. The McCabe group had formed the Harper Valley Mother's Club, a low income buying center, had lobbied at city council meetings, and was forming a non-profit housing corporation. Another group was led by Joe Kelch and Debbie Willaman. This group was younger, less established in the neighborhood, and took more of a hard line opposition approach to Battelle. This group was
determined to try to save the neighborhood through self-help programs. Their slogan was, "The neighborhood has the resources to revitalize itself." Joe would show movies to children on Saturday mornings and Debbie organized the neighborhood to convert vacant lots into gardens. Together, they sponsored trips to the grocery store for elderly people. In deference to the two neighborhood efforts, the Harrison West Society appointed Carol McCabe and Joe Kelch as equal co-chairpersons.

In 1975 the annual Harrison West Labor Day Party was held on vacant Battelle lots on Harrison Avenue. Jim Kennedy organized the Eason and Canterbury children to clean the trash off the lots, and three truckloads of debris were hauled to the junkyard. Jerry Cotterill obtained sod to build a volleyball court, and a firepit was constructed for baking chicken. We had quite a party.

In the spring of 1976 Debbie’s garden project had grown to such proportions that Joe borrowed a tractor and went from lot to lot plowing up the dirt. Also, that spring, Bill Larkin, a Harrison Avenue home owner, shocked the neighborhood by holding a televised news conference to protest Battelle’s demolition of houses in the neighborhood. Somebody was finally pointing the finger at Battelle.

Carol’s community programs, the organizing efforts of Joe and Debbie, and Bill’s news conference raised the consciousness of the neighborhood so much that the 1976 Harrison West Labor Day Party was a major neighborhood event. As before, we had chicken, beer, and volleyball. In addition, horseshoe pits were constructed and a performing stage was built. The Townsend Brothers, a neighborhood bluegrass band, alternated performances all weekend with Turkeys-in-the-Straw, a campus area folk group. "Harrison West Labor Day" T-shirts were
silk-screened, and people came from all over the Near Northside, the campus area, and from other areas of Columbus and Delaware. The Harrison West Labor Day Party had become a neighborhood celebration.

During the fall of 1976 and on through the summer of 1977, anti-Battelle sentiment and activities grew with the increasing realization that Battelle was making new plans for the neighborhood. During this time I did not personally get involved. I had no interest in community organizing, and intensely disliked the thought of being obligated to attend regular meetings. I spent much of my time concentrating on schoolwork.

On the night of August 17, 1977, I heard a great uproar from the apartment downstairs where Debbie lived. I went down to see what was going on and discovered a house full of angry people who had just attended a meeting during which Battelle officials had announced their new plans for the neighborhood. Their interpretation was that Battelle's plans called for rehabilitating the houses they had let run-down, thus driving prices up and low income residents out and selling for a profit to higher income outsiders. News of these plans quickly spread through the neighborhood. I still did not get involved.

Several days later I was at my home talking to Jim Kennedy when there was a knock at the door. In the door was Jim Hall, a candidate for the Democratic nomination for Congress. Hall was looking for Kennedy to ask him to challenge Mike Stinziano for the office of State Representative. Rumor had it that when Stinziano was asked to help the neighborhood fight Battelle's housing policies, he had indicated that he would be a fool to take on a powerful corporation like Battelle for a
neighborhood with such a low voter turnout. Instead, Stinziano moved into a Battelle house, purchased it, and became listed as a Battelle "tenant-buyer." Hall felt that the neighborhood revitalization issue would be a good one for Kennedy to challenge Stinziano on. Kennedy was not interested in running for State Representative, but I impulsively decided to do it.

When Jim Hall left, I discussed with Jim Kennedy the feasibility of me running for State Representative. Kennedy told me that if I wanted to run for State Representative, I should first run for Chairman of the Harrison West Resident's Association. Joe Kelch, who had been pushing for the revitalization of the neighborhood through a sweat-equity program, had become discouraged at the announcement of the new Battelle plan, and had resigned as co-chairperson of the Harrison West Society. Since this position was vacant, Kennedy felt I should run for it before trying to become State Representative.

I thought about Kennedy's suggestion for several days, and then decided against it. I did not believe I should waste my time running for Chairman of the Harrison West Society when what I really wanted to be was State Representative.

The next few weeks were filled with wild speculation about me running for State Representative. I obtained maps of my district and launched an investigation into Mike Stinziano. What I found out was that Stinziano had not been a bad State Representative. In fact, he had sponsored many bills that benefitted low income people. It also became apparent that I could not beat Stinziano, but I decided to run anyway—for two reasons. First, by running on the revitalization issue,
I could expose Battelle's evil doings to the public. Second, by running against Stinziano and losing, I could get my name known in the public arena and possibly set myself up to run for another office. I believed that being a sociologist would help me, and planned to stress that there are too many lawyers and politicians in politics.

The formal announcement of my candidacy was set for the 1977 Harrison West Labor Day celebration. As in the previous years we had volleyball, chicken, beer, T-shirts, and bands, only this year the event was even larger. The party itself lasted for a solid week and friends came not only from Columbus, but also from far-away places like Nashville, New York, and Milwaukee. When the television crews arrived for my speech, I took the crowd on a tour of the neighborhood, pointing out substandard Battelle owned units and illegally kept lots. Then, I announced that I was seeking the services of a lawyer to file a law suit against Battelle on behalf of the neighborhood.

"I question the legality," I announced, "of Battelle Institute meeting its legal obligation to charity by donating funds to the symphony and to fine arts groups, while making a profit from its slum housing at the expense of low income residents."

In order to rally support for my candidacy and our law suit, I visited several important local people. Most notably, I met with State Senator Michael Schwartzwalder and with Attorney General William Brown.

"NO! NO! NO! NO! NO!" Senator Schwartzwalder exclaimed, when I told him of our intention to file a lawsuit against Battelle. "That is not the way to do it. What you do is fight and argue, and lobby and present your views in a legitimate fashion until they come to
want to compromise with you. Battelle owns the courts around here and if you file a law suit against them, they will win and you will get nothing out of it."

When I asked Attorney General William Brown if his office would give us legal help in fighting Battelle, his answer was, "No." Brown said, "Even if you could prove that Battelle's policies were hurting poor people, I could not help you. Battelle is obligated by law to give a portion of its profits to charity, but this does not mean that they have to be charitable in the way that they make their money. My job is to enforce the law—not what is right or wrong. The reality of the situation is that laws are based on technicality—not morality. Besides, my office has launched an investigation into the situation and discovered that Battelle has the support of the neighborhood. I have been told that you and your friends are just a bunch of radicals, left over from the sixties."

Brown told me as proof that the neighborhood supported Battelle's revitalization plan, Battelle officials had told him they have the support of Carol McCabe, Chair of the Harrison West Society.

Brown said, "You do not have a leg to stand on as long as the neighborhood's representative body supports Battelle."

I also sought legal advice from two other sources: from Chuck Thompson's legal clinic at Ohio State University; and from my brother, Michael Rose, who is an attorney. Thompson informed me that according to legal definition, "charity," does not have to benefit poor people. My brother read excerpts from Gordon Battelle's Will and told me that Attorney General Brown's contention that Battelle Institute does not
have to be charitable in the way it makes money is not entirely true. According to the Will of Gordon Battelle, the Institute must make its money in such a way that meets a public interest test specified in the Will. Mike and Chuck agreed that proving Battelle Institute was violating the public interest test would be a complicated matter, and that we would probably lose unless we had a strong case. Both lawyers recommended that we follow Senator Schwartwalder's advice and keep the issue in the press until a compromise could be reached.

My discussions with these people set me to thinking: Neighborhood organizations such as the Harrison West Society are typically run by home owners. The home owners of Harrison West used to hate Battelle because of the way the corporation was driving down prices and pressuring them to sell. However, now that Battelle was going to revitalize the area and drive the low income people out, the home owners suddenly liked them. After all, the value of property owned by individual home owners stood to increase as the value of Battelle's property increased. It was true, however, as Attorney General Brown had stated: we did not have a leg to stand on as long as the neighborhood's representative body supported Battelle. Jim Kennedy had been right when he advised me to run for Chair of the Harrison West Society. With 80% of the neighborhood being renters, we could easily take over the organization and exercise power through legitimate channels.

Throughout the next few weeks it became more and more evident that the Battelle people would counter our opposition to their plans by claiming to have the support of Carol McCabe and the Harrison West Society. Everywhere we went we heard Battelle's contention that the
neighborhood really supported Battelle, and that those of us opposed to Battelle were a bunch of radicals. We decided to watch McCabe's behavior very closely to determine if she really did support Battelle. An opportunity to watch her in operation arose on September 17, 1977, when Barry Humphries, President of Olentangy Management Company, made a presentation to the Harrison West Society.

There was standing room only at the Godman Guild as Barry Humphries gave his presentation. He was a large, handsome, clean-cut man, with a suave personality befitting a corporation president. The audience sat patiently for the longest time as he stood in front pointing his stick at his map, and making comments most of us had already heard.

Suddenly, a voice from the crowd blurted out, "Enough! What about the people? We want to know what's going to happen to the people!" Contagion swept the crowd as people screamed out questions, and Carol McCabe, who was chairing the meeting, demanded order. When order was restored, McCabe admonished the group for being rude to the guest speaker, and required that no one speak unless recognized by the chair. Humphries answered the initial question by saying that current tenants would be given first option to buy.

"You know the people of this neighborhood can not afford down-payments on renovated homes," someone alleged without being recognized. "Your first option to buy is meaningless, chump!"

McCabe again had to restore order.

"Olentangy Management Company will also work to bring federal aid to the area, and will cooperate with a Section Eight developer to bring low income housing to the neighborhood," Humphries said.
Someone asked, "How many Section Eight units will be brought in?"

Humphries answered, "We plan to produce 26 units. Our goal is to create a mixed income neighborhood."

A murmur went through the audience. Twenty-six units in one building owned by John Sanderfur was to be Battelle's token contribution to the low income people of Harrison West.

Then, Virginia Panament, a low income elderly woman, stood up with tears in her eyes and desperation in her voice and said, "I can't afford to move! What am I to do? Tell me, Mr. Humphries, what am I to do?"

Humphries was visibly shaken by this, but all he could do was say, "Next question, please."

In response to an accusation that his company was responsible for downgrading the neighborhood, Humphries said that his company was not Battelle. The neighborhood did not let him get away with it, however. We all knew that Olentangy Management Company was a wholly owned subsidiary of Battelle.

Next, one of the Godman Guild VISTA workers said, "What are all of you people complaining about? This man has come here to clean up this neighborhood. This place is nothing but a slum!"

I have never seen a crowd as ready to tar and feather someone and run him out on a rail. A great roar went up, and through the noise people could be heard screaming things like, "This ain't no slum, buddy, this is my neighborhood," and "If you don't like it, get the hell out!"

When the meeting came to a close Carol McCabe chastised us for being rude to the speaker, and it became apparent to us that her sympathies were with Battelle.
Except for that September meeting, I spent from August through December in seclusion, studying for my Ph.D. General Examinations. During this time, Olentangy Management Company officially took over the management of Battelle owned property from Kohr & Royer and Osgood rental agencies. One of the first things the new management company did was to institute a round of rent increases throughout the neighborhood.

That fall I took three day-long written exams, and on December 12, 1977, I had just passed my two hour oral exam. I was standing in the hallway of my house thinking about what a long, lonesome, haul it had been, when Debbie appeared at the top of the stairs. She congratulated me, hugged me, and offered to take me to dinner to celebrate. It was a great feeling to share that moment with somebody, and after that night Debbie and I began to spend a lot of time together.

When my exams were over, I again became involved in neighborhood activities, as well as political organizing on a city-wide scale. A woman named Virginia Matchett read about our anti-Battelle activities in the paper and invited me to attend a meeting of people from all over the city who were angry about development planned for their neighborhoods. We named our organization PROD—People Resisting Objectionable Development. A dignified woman named Helen Gross was elected President of PROD, and I was elected Vice President. Our plan was for PROD to act as an umbrella organization, lending support to local groups resisting objectionable development in their neighborhoods.

The first project PROD got involved in was the lending of support to CAGER—Citizens Against Glen Echo Rezoning. The Ohio National Bank which controlled the Glen Echo Ravine was pushing City Council to rezone
the area from residential to commercial, so that the ravine could be converted into a Super-Kroger Store. Residents had formed CAGER in opposition to the rezoning, and were pushing to turn the ravine into a park.

At the City Council hearing on the Glen Echo Rezoning, the chamber was packed with neighborhood groups such as PROD and CAGER who were opposed to the rezoning, and one small group of investors who stood to make a profit from the rezoning. With City Council members Jerry Hammond and Pam Conrad professing to be "neighborhood representatives," I felt sure that City Council would reject the rezoning request. To my surprise, City Council voted five to one in favor of the rezoning. Only Dr. John Rosemond supported the neighborhoods.

The fight to save the Glen Echo Ravine was not over, however. Eight thousand, three hundred fifty one voter signatures had to be collected within thirty days in order to get the issue on a referendum ballot. CAGER collected sixteen thousand six hundred sixty five signatures, and that November the voters of the City of Columbus overturned the Glen Echo Rezoning by a two to one margin.

A lot of time was also spent that winter in organizing a coop. I became involved with the coop because of my involvement with Debbie, but Debbie and I were not the only ones getting closer. We were joined by people from the 16th Avenue Coop, residents of the Near Northside, and by numerous new friends from all over Columbus and Delaware.

I will never forget the long hard hours we put into getting the coop into operation. A building was located on the corner of West Third and Michigan Avenues, and we named our organization, "The Third
Avenue Community Coop," to signify that we were more than just a food store. Truckloads of trash had to be removed from the building before we could begin scraping the walls and ceilings, then everything was painted. A sign was painted over the front door, and shelves and coolers were hauled in from various donors. Most of us had regular jobs, so work was done on weekends and late at night. Often Debbie and I would be the last to leave. One of my fondest memories is of a night we walked home in the snow, arm in arm. Debbie kept slipping on the ice, her feet shooting straight up in the air. She would hold herself up by clinging to my arm, and several times we fell together. We laughed so hard.

Much of our talk during this time concerned what to do about Carol McCabe using her position as Chair of the Harrison West Society to support Battelle's plans. Some people wanted to demand immediate elections and boot her out, but after talking it over we decided upon a compromise approach.

One afternoon in late January, 1978, Debbie and I met with Carol McCabe and Randy Morrison, the Director of the Godman Guild. I opened the meeting by stating that since Joe Kelch had resigned as co-chair of the Harrison West Society, we did not feel that the renter's view was adequately being represented. The renters had gotten together to discuss the problem, and we were asking Carol to appoint me to take Joe's place. Carol said that she would think about our request and call me to let me know her answer.

When we came out of the room, Debbie said to me angrily, "Don't you ever again say you are taking Joe Kelch's place. Nobody could take Joe's place."
Several days later Carol called me and said that since I had not previously been involved in neighborhood affairs, she could not appoint me to the empty co-chair position. She would, however, agree to appoint me as vice president with her remaining as president. I immediately rejected this proposition, because with Carol as president and me as vice president, Battelle could still claim to have the support of the Harrison West Society. I told Carol that if she did not appoint me as an equal co-chair at the next Harrison West meeting, we would demand an immediate election and boot her out altogether.

The next Harrison West Society meeting was filled with anticipation as everyone wondered what Carol would do. Craftily, she placed the appointment of a new co-chair at the end of the meeting's agenda. When the time finally came she announced,

"I have selected someone to fill the vacancy created by Joe Kelch's absence. The new co-chairperson is a Battelle renter who has worked in the neighborhood for a number of years. The new co-chairperson is...."

I closed my eyes in anticipation of hearing my name.

"...Mary Funk."

"Mary Funk? Who the hell is Mary Funk?" I opened my eyes to see Gil Rickets congratulating a woman sitting at the end of the table. The rest of us sat for a few seconds in disbelief. Finally, Jerry broke the ice by walking over to Carol, shaking her hand, and saying,

"Congratulations for choosing not to work with us. Enjoy your last month as head of the Harrison West Society."

After the meeting we gathered at J&J's Grill. We were angry and taken aback by Carol's surprise move. Jesse Hinkle, the bartender, told me that he had never seen me putting beer down so fast. I was putting
the beer down fast. I was drinking fast because I knew that there was going to be a showdown between me and Carol McCabe, and as I was working over the pinball machine I could see out of the corner of my eye that Debbie was talking it over with Tom Meyer.

I had heard of Tom Meyer early on. He was a Near Northside resident who was leading opposition to the routing of I-670 through low income neighborhoods. He had worked on Ted Celeste's campaign for governor, and more recently had been hired by Randy Morrison to be the Godman Guild's liaison to Harrison West. I knew right away that Tom had more than just a friendship interest in Debbie. Although we do not like each other much, we got along that night well enough to decide that at the next Harrison West Society meeting, we would demand an immediate election.

At the next Harrison West Society meeting, Carol agreed to hold a new election, but insisted that before the election could be held, we would have to hold a special meeting to decide upon certain election issues. One key issue that had to be decided was whether the organization would continue with co-chairpersons, or change back to a president-vice president structure. Voting eligibility was another key issue. We all agreed to meet in two weeks to decide these issues.

During the next two weeks, our side spent a lot of time discussing how we wanted to vote on various election issues. We were determined to push for a president-vice president structure, because with McCabe as an equal co-chairperson, Battelle could still claim to have the support of the organization. However, Ron Rybec, a city employee, said to me one day,
"If you beat McCabe, I hope you will not run her out all-together. She has been an important person in the neighborhood for a number of years. It would be a shame if she did not continue in some capacity."

Heeding Ron's advice, we decided upon pushing for the following plan: I would run for president of the Harrison West Society against McCabe. The loser would become vice president. This way, we could beat McCabe and prove that Battelle did not own neighborhood support, yet allow her to retain some pride. What we feared, however, was that Carol would bring enough people to the special meeting to push through an equal co-chair structure.

On the night of the special election issues meeting, both Carol and I gathered as many people as we could to vote our way. Early in the meeting, Debbie challenged Carol on a procedural matter, and Carol's side won by one vote. I turned to Jerry and told him to go anywhere and bring us two more voters. Then, I stalled-off a vote on the structure issue until I saw Jerry come in with two people. Evidently, McCabe underestimated the work being done at the coop, because she agreed that non-residents should be allowed to vote, if they have worked in the neighborhood for two months. In return, we agreed to let absentee landlords vote. Much to my surprise, however, when the structure vote was taken, almost everyone voted for the president-vice president structure. The McCabe people wanted the power question settled too. When the meeting was over, it had been decided that I would run against Carol for president, with the loser becoming vice president. Also on my ticket, Julie Straub and Ralph Fleshman would run against Carol's friend, Erma Smith, for two Near Northside Council Seats, and Debbie would run against Penny Nichols for Treasurer. Mary Funk would
The following Friday, we learned of the City of Columbus's application to the Department of Housing and Urban Development for a two million dollar innovative grant. We learned about it only because the City found out that HUD would not accept the application unless it was preceded by a public hearing. The application deadline was the next Wednesday, and City Council member Jerry Hammond scheduled an emergency public hearing for Monday. This gave the neighborhood the rest of Friday, Saturday, and Sunday to study the grant and devise inputs. To make matters worse, the City was hit by a terrible winter blizzard, and many important people could not attend the hastily called meeting on Friday night at Marsha Morehead's house.

Those of us who did meet at Marsha's house were very angry. We were angry not only because the neighborhood had not been consulted in the process of designing the grant, but also because the Innovative Grant Application listed sixteen organizations which the City claimed had "...participated in the planning of the Near North/University Neighborhood Revitalization Program" (City of Columbus, 1977: 16). Many of us were members of those organizations, and we openly opposed major aspects of the revitalization program. More importantly, none of us had even heard of the innovative grant until that very day.

While opposition to the grant was strong, the meeting was also characterized by diversity and confusion. Marsha argued that as a private developer, Battelle could do as it wished with the property it owned. If, however, the federal government got involved, HUD would make Battelle take steps to deal with the problem of displacement.
Ralph Fleshman, who had begun studying HUD regulations, said, "That's right. HUD has strict citizen participation requirements. If a HUD grant were involved, and if we win the Harrison West elections, Battelle would be forced to listen to us."

"Don't be ridiculous," Tom Meyer said, "Battelle and HUD are like this." Tom held up two crossed fingers to signify the relationship between Battelle and HUD.

While this kind of conversation was taking place, the telephone rang, and Marsha left the room to answer it. When she returned she told us that Barry Humphries had just called to see how our meeting was going. Barry told her to warn us that if we do not support the innovative grant, Battelle may choose to dump the houses on the open market and show us exactly what private enterprise can do to the poor.

This threat angered us so much that we decided to go to the City Council hearing on Monday and oppose the grant. We also decided to write directly to HUD and expose the fact that citizens were not properly consulted in the drawing up of the Innovative Grant Application.¹

At the City Council Hearing on Monday, citizen after citizen denounced the innovative grant: The unbalanced proportion that would benefit Battelle at the expense of the neighborhood; the undesired location of the park; the use of taxpayers' money for the expansion of a corporation; the lack of proper citizen participation in the grant's formulation. When all was said and done, Jerry Hammond struck $79,000 for gazeboes in the traffic circles from the grant, allotted $200,000

¹See pages 207-211.
for a non-profit housing corporation, and shifted $17,000 from the mobile tool library to relocation assistance. All other aspects of the grant were left exactly as Battelle wanted them: A public hearing had been held.

Prior to the Harrison West election, Barry Humphries took a group of people to Washington in an attempt to prove to HUD that the innovative grant had neighborhood support. The group included Carol McCabe, Mike Stinziano, Mike Schwartzwalder, Randy Morrison, Jerry Hammond, Mayor Tom Moddy, and Pete McQuain, President of the Fifth-King Group. We believed that the taking of this group to Washington was a shrewd maneuver, since neighborhood opposition was strong, and we were in the process of ousting McCabe. When the group returned from Washington, they had an interesting story to tell. First, Senator Metzenbaum had become interested in the innovative grant and was sending his liaison, Steve Pruitt, to hold a public hearing. Second, HUD had heard our objections to the grant and had told the group that the capital improvements portion was too controversial. Only the tenant assistance portion was still under consideration.

In the meantime, I devised a flyer to advertise my candidacy for president of Harrison West. At the top of the flyer was the inscription, SAVE OUR NEIGHBORHOOD. Under this inscription was a list of things I would do, if elected. Some of these included: negotiating with Battelle for a revitalization plan which would reduce displacement; obtaining the unused Michigan Avenue School for a community center; and attempting to unify the various neighborhood factions. At the bottom of the flyer was a list of my qualifications, and visual images

\[2\text{See page 230.}\]
of various neighborhood landmarks, such as the coop and the volleyball court.

From taking my flyer door to door, I developed a new conception of the respect Carol McCabe commanded in the neighborhood. Many residents readily agreed to vote for me when I explained to them that I was running in opposition to Battelle's treatment of the neighborhood. However, when they discovered that I was running against Carol McCabe they balked. Over and over again I was told of the years of untiring, unpaid service Carol had given the neighborhood. Many people refused to believe that she supported Battelle at all. By the day of the election, I was beginning to wonder if McCabe was beatable, and to think that maybe she actually deserved to win.

On election day I went to the Godman Guild to cast my ballot, and met Wendy Schweiger, a new Guild employee who was helping to monitor the election. Afterwards, I began to contemplate the implications of the election: If Carol won, Battelle would have a mandate and be able to claim neighborhood support for its revitalization plan. If I won the neighborhood would have spoken out against Battelle, and I would have a lot of work to do in devising constructive inputs to change the program.

That night, Carol chaired the Harrison West meeting while a committee counted ballots in another room. Debbie and Tom walked in together—both wearing roses. About halfway through the meeting, Gil Rickets, who was helping to count ballots, went to the front of the room and whispered something into Carol's ear. Debbie and I smiled at each other across the room, because the expression on Gil's face told
us we were ahead. About an hour later, the ballot committee entered the room, and Ken Molli announced the results.

"The next Harrison West President is...Norman Rose."

There were gasps of sorrow from the McCabe people, and shouts of joy from our side. Even though I had only beaten McCabe by seven votes (112-105) the other people on my ticket had won by wide margins: It was a clean sweep for the anti-Battelle forces!

The very first thing I did as the newly elected president of Harrison West was to arrange a meeting with Barry Humphries. When I entered Humphries office, he introduced me to Olentangy Management Company's financial officer, Jim Anderson. Humphries, Anderson, and I had a brief conversation during which I was asked to support the innovative grant at Senator Metzenbaum's public hearing.

"Why should the president of Harrison West support the grant?" I asked. "Most of Harrison West is in the Phase II area, while the grant only offers tenant assistance to people in Phase I." We suspected that Phase II had been excluded from the grant boundaries because Battelle planned commercial development in that area.

Humphries said, "To my knowledge there is nothing in the grant application which limits tenant assistance to Phase I. Jim, do you know of any restrictions limiting the grant to Phase I?"

"None that I know of," Anderson answered.

I came out of the meeting feeling that both Humphries and Anderson were likable people.

That same night, I received a telephone call from Carol McCabe, who also urged me to support the grant at the Metzenbaum hearing.
"There is no longer any reason to oppose the grant," Carol said, "since HUD has stated that only the tenant assistance portion is under consideration."

Based upon the assurances that Harrison West would be included in the grant boundaries, and that the capital improvements portion of the grant was no longer under consideration, I went to the Metzenbaum public hearing with a greatly toned-down statement about the grant. Instead of condemning the capital improvements portion, as I had intended to do, I instead stressed that the neighborhood needed the tenant assistance. Two months later, on June 1, 1978, we were shocked to learn that HUD had awarded the entire innovative grant to the City of Columbus—both the capital improvements section and the tenant assistance section were approved.³

Even before being elected President of the Harrison West Society, I had begun to contemplate the goals of my tenure in office. The idea of running for State Representative had gradually given way to a desire to help turn Harrison West into an ideal low income neighborhood.⁴ To do this, we would first have to convince Battelle to alter its revitalization program in such a way as to avoid displacement. Then, the Harrison West Society would devise various self-help programs which would enable the neighborhood to solve its pressing social problems. These programs could be administered through offices established in the

³As an example of how neighborhood people reversed opposition to the grant based on the belief that the capital improvements section was not being considered, see pages 207-208.

⁴See letter on pages 204-205 and resolution on page 225.
Michigan Avenue School. I also believed that if we presented our ideas in a constructive manner, Battelle would be willing to support them with a grant from the Battelle Charities Foundation. Such a grant would satisfy critics who believed that Battelle was treating the neighborhood less than charitably.

The first step in attempting to alter the revitalization plan was to have the Harrison West Society pass a series of resolutions establishing the neighborhood's official position on revitalization. The formulation of these resolutions was done through the Harrison West Housing Council. When Carol McCabe had been president of the Harrison West Society, homeowners had often complained that too much of the organization's agenda was being taken up with Battelle issues. To resolve this problem, the Harrison West Housing Council had been established for the purpose of presenting Battelle-related issues to the general meeting. I was a member of the Housing Council, and Debbie was the Chair. At my suggestion, the Housing Council began compiling a list of complaints against Battelle and organizing them into a series of resolutions. The Housing Council agreed to present the resolutions for approval at the April Harrison West Society meeting--my first meeting to preside over as president.

I also came up with an idea which I believed was a brilliant plan to unify the various neighborhood factions. Every month several hundred Harrison West flyers had to be folded and mailed. If we had an Executive Board meeting a week before each monthly meeting, we could fold the flyers and hash out various issues on an informal basis. All of the association's elected officers agreed to attend these monthly Executive Board meetings.
A couple of days before our first Executive Board meeting, I received a call from Grant Hilliker on behalf of the First Community Church. The Urban Alternatives Group of the First Community Church was planning to sponsor a series of seminars on the Battelle revitalization problem. His group hoped to get all interested parties together to discuss the issues and formulate possible compromise solutions. The Godman Guild had been invited to conduct a neighborhood tour, and various people from Battelle and Olentangy Management Company were to give speeches. As president of the Harrison West Society, I was invited to attend.

I said to Grant, "Mr. Hilliker, it appears to me that your seminar is indicative of exactly what is wrong with the Battelle revitalization program—the lack of citizen participation. Everyone has been invited to participate in the seminar except the neighborhood's representative government. We, the Harrison West Society, have only been invited to attend."

Mr. Hilliker told me that this was a non-intentional oversight on his part, and agreed that the Harrison West Society should do more than just attend. He suggested that I, as president of Harrison West, should conduct the neighborhood tour in place of the Godman Guild.

The next day I learned that the Godman Guild had assigned the neighborhood tour to Tom Meyer. I was already angry at Tom, because when the Executive Board held its first meeting, he did not have the flyers printed for us to fold. Printing the flyers was part of his Godman Guild job, but because he was new to the job, and because I was a new president, our timing was such that I had not given him
the stencil in time. Consequently, the Executive Board meeting had to be postponed.

When the Executive Board did meet, Debbie was a little late because of a coop meeting she had to attend. The rest of us were sitting around the big conference table at the Godman Guild when she arrived. She was visibly angry when she entered the room, and while taking off her coat she turned to me and said,

"You've got a lot of nerve trying to steal the neighborhood tour from the Godman Guild."

I said to Debbie, in front of all those people, "Come on. The only reason you want the Godman Guild to do the tour is because TOM MEYER IS TRYING TO GET IN YOUR PANTS!"

Debbie stormed out of the room while the rest of the group looked at me in disbelief. No one said anything for the rest of the night. The Harrison West flyers got folded, but the harmony I had hoped to create at the Executive Board meetings was destroyed by my own words.

Later that week, Grant, Tom, Wendy, and myself met at the Godman Guild to discuss who would lead the tour. Grant opened the meeting by saying,

"All right, we have all come here to decide who will conduct the neighborhood tour. Who wants to make a suggestion?"

Tom said, "Since I'm the only one here qualified to do it, I accept."

Prior to the meeting I had already decided to give in and let Tom do the tour. I was sorry for the comment I made to Debbie, and, after all, Tom was on our side. Besides, a president's job is to dole out
responsibilities, not to do things himself. Tom's attitude, however, made me very angry. Tom had the tour, and Tom had the girl. He did not need to 'twist' the knife.

I was still fuming about this a few days later, when I chaired my first Harrison West meeting. Just prior to the meeting I said to Debbie, "Are you ready?"

"Am I ready for what?" Debbie asked.

"Are you ready to present the Housing Council Resolutions to the Harrison West Society?" I answered.

Debbie said, "Why no, I have no plans to do this."

I was shocked. We had worked the resolutions out at Housing Council meetings, and the Housing Council had asked for a spot on the agenda to present them for a vote. I had assumed that Debbie would present them, since she was the Housing Council Chair. Debbie argued, however, that I had not asked her to make the presentation, and she was not prepared to do so.

Several important matters were accomplished at the April Harrison West Society meeting. Among them, we established a committee to investigate the possibility of obtaining the Michigan Avenue school; we discussed the possibility of establishing a goal of working to resolve the neighborhood's pressing social problems; and we made a request that the Godman Guild obtain funds to hire a grantsperson. When the Housing Council came up on the agenda, I announced that the Housing Council was not prepared to present the resolutions, and that this would have to be postponed until the next month's meeting. Someone suggested that having an official neighborhood position was so important, that we should hold a special meeting in two weeks just for the purpose of voting on the resolutions.
We all agreed to meet in two weeks, and Debbie agreed to chair the meeting.

On April 18, 1978 the Harrison West Society met to vote on a series of resolutions which were to be the neighborhood's official position on revitalization. Just prior to the meeting, Debbie told me that she had been so busy with coop activities that she was not prepared to chair the meeting. I was angered, but had anticipated this and was prepared to chair the meeting myself.

To my delight, a neighborhood position was passed that night. Although some resolutions had to be reworded in order to suit the McCabe people, the document which we passed was accepted by the full consensus of the Harrison West Society. The resolutions called on Battelle to cease from selling neighborhood property to outside developers, to cease from practicing policies that discourage low income people from renting in the neighborhood, to sell homes to current residents, "as-is," and to allow the neighborhood to renovate property through sweat equity. It also requested that Battelle not expand into neighborhood territory, that it drop plans for commercial development of residential areas, and that the park be built on existing open space.

Many of us celebrated the passage of the neighborhood position that night at J&J Grill. When I mentioned to Jim Kennedy that I was angry about Debbie not chairing the meeting, Kennedy said,

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5See page 221-224.

6Under the process of consensus, a resolution can not pass if any member votes against it.
"Stop your belly-aching. Everyone knows you are jealous of Tom Meyer."

At that point, I would not have admitted to being jealous of Tom Meyer, but I was hurt by the fact that Debbie had not initiated any interaction between us in several weeks. I left Kennedy and walked to the back of the bar where Bill and Aeolus were sitting at a table near the pinball machine. Three red-neck looking characters were playing the pinball machine, and as I sat down I said,

"I'm sick of so-called 'liberated women' who make men initiate everything. I think women should take an equal part in a relationship. Instead, they demand equality while acting inferior."

"Hey Buddy!" I heard a voice say. "You sound like a queer."

I looked up to see one of the red-necks standing over me. "Well, I ain't no queer," I said.

"I said you are a queer," he said, slapping my glasses off of my face.

I must have been punched in the face about three times before I even got out of my chair. I wrestled in college, so once on my feet I picked the assailant up in a fireman's carry and we both came smashing down on top of the pinball machine. As I was getting up, his two friends began working me over. I curled up in a ball on the floor, receiving hits and kicks.

When the blows finally stopped, I jumped up to a maze of confusion. Gary Wallace was busting through the crowd yelling,

"The next one who hits my friend deals with me!" Bill was standing against the wall with a terrified look on his face, and Aeolus was
wiping blood from his. Kennedy was running down from the far end of the bar, and Everett was throwing the red-necks out the door.

I arrived home that night in a state of high anxiety and confusion. Debbie met me on the porch, and I said some things to her I will not repeat in this paper. It made her feel bad, but it did not stop her from soaking my wounds.

The next day I grudgingly typed the passed Harrison West resolutions on a ditto, ran off several copies, and mailed them to important people. I sent copies to local politicians, to HUD officials, and to Sherwood Fawcett, President of Battelle Institute. Fawcett sent me an immediate reply thanking me for informing him of the neighborhood's view, and telling me that Barry Humphries would be getting in touch with me soon.7

Humphries did get in touch with me soon, and I took Jim Kennedy to meet with him and Jim Anderson to discuss the official neighborhood position. The four of us went over each of the resolutions and expressed our views.

Concerning a sweat-equity program, Humphries said that if the houses were sold to residents "as-is," there would be no guarantee that they would be repaired. I told him that many residents were professional builders, that there was rehabilitation money available from the government, and that a requirement to bring the houses up to code could be written into contracts.

---7See page 213.---
Concerning Battelle expansion, Humphries said, "You don't think an important corporation like Battelle has a right to meet its expansion needs, do you?"

"Not when they infringe upon the rights of other private property owners," I said.

From our discussions, it became apparent to me that expansion was going to be Battelle's "bottom-line." I also got the impression that they might compromise on the sweat-equity issue in return for a compromise on expansion. There was total disagreement, however, on the issue of commercial development. Humphries told me that commercial development would help the neighborhood and reminded me of the way local stores raised prices during the winter blizzard. I told Humphries that the coop and local stores could handle the neighborhood's needs, and that the neighborhood would never consent to commercial development by outsiders.

When the meeting ended, Humphries asked me to produce a, "Sweat-Equity Report," and show him how it would work. I agreed to do it. In return he promised to respond to the Harrison West Society resolutions in writing.

During the weekend of April 29, 30, and 31, 1978, a large group of Harrison West people journeyed to Philadelphia to attend a meeting of the National Association of Neighborhoods (NAN). Milton Kottler, president of NAN, had organized several impressive seminars on neighborhood problems, and had established a national committee on displacement. One such seminar was conducted by two middle-level HUD bureaucrats. When Tom Meyer questioned them about aspects of the innovative
grant that would contribute to displacement, in Harrison West, one of them said,

"HUD is very much aware of your neighborhood's objections to the innovative grant recently awarded to the City of Columbus, Ohio. However, what you have got to understand is that Battelle Institute has high-level political connections in HUD. In the long run, this will count more than neighborhood objections."

Prior to the NAN conference, Tom's relationship with Debbie had been kept pretty much a secret. It became official, however, when the two of them drove their own car to the NAN conference and rented a hotel room, instead of riding on the Godman Guild bus and sleeping in the basement of a church with the rest of us. Several of us were annoyed by this. However, Tom smoothed things over with me when he reserved a seat for me next to him at a luncheon and told me that he wanted to know how he, as a Godman Guild employee, could be of help to me, as President of Harrison West.

At this point I was very angry at Tom, because for the second month in a row my Executive Board meeting had to be postponed because he did not run off the Harrison West flyers in time. To settle the matter, Tom and I agreed on a specific date for me to give him the stencil every month, and a specific date for him to have the finished flyers ready to be folded.

After returning from the NAN conference in Philadelphia, most of us were ready to get back to work in our own neighborhood. At the May 2nd meeting of the Harrison West Society, we decided what goals we wanted to accomplish, and divided the work into specific tasks. Jerry Cotterill agreed to chair the Spring clean-up committee, and Rick Tully
reported that he had met with Mike Stinziano, who had agreed to help us try to obtain the Michigan Avenue School. Ken Molli agreed to write a report proving to the city that we were an ideal neighborhood to be declared a Neighborhood Strategy Area for Section Eight Housing, and Ralph Fleshman reported on a list of grants that were available to the neighborhood once we incorporated ourselves. As treasurer, Debbie agreed to look into getting the Harrison West Society incorporated. We also decided to establish a Harrison West Commission, similar to the German Village Commission. Finally, we passed a resolution declaring our three year goal to be to solve the neighborhood's social problems.

During the first month that I served as Harrison West president, animosity between Debbie and Tom and myself grew to intense, almost unbearable proportions. I blamed them for failing to support me in relation to the Harrison West Society, and they blamed me for disrupting activities of the coop.

After spending the entire winter working to get the building into operation, The Third Avenue Community Coop held its Grand Opening on March 8, 1978. I personally recruited several low income families and persuaded them to come to the Grand Opening. Literally hundreds of people passed through the coop on opening day, and that night we held a square dance. The Townsends were scheduled to perform, but when the time came they did not show. One group of people went looking for them,

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8 Such a commission could have helped to save the neighborhood's housing stock because builders have to get approval from them for demolition and construction.

9 See page 225.
while another went searching for Turkeys-in-the-Straw. The group that searched for the Townsends found that while they had been practicing that day, they had drunk too much whiskey and passed-out. After being revived with coffee, the Townsends joined Turkeys-in-the-Straw and several other musicians who had agreed to fill in. It was quite a sight: all those fiddles, banjos, mandolins, and guitars scattered on the floor while the rest of us danced until daylight.

After recovering from the celebration, I went around to see the people I had tried to recruit into the coop. Most of them had the same response: They would say, "Yea, I went to the coop on opening day, and I'll tell you what. It ain't nothing but a bunch of hippies selling health food."

This observation was not inaccurate. The coop stock committee had stocked our shelves with typical coop supplies: honey instead of sugar; health bars instead of candy bars; esoteric and expensive brands of soaps, shampoos, and toothpaste. One prospective member said to me,

"Do you expect me to pay for water in a bottle, when I can get it free from the spigot?"

In addition to the nature of the coop's stock, some prospective members were turned-off by the coop's apparent political leanings. The bulletin board was filled with posters deploring profit, criticizing Battelle, opposing nuclear energy, etc. It seemed as if one needed to be a far-left liberal to really fit in.

When I brought the stock issue up at a coop meeting, I was told that the purpose of the coop was to provide the neighborhood with an alternative. Others of us believed the purpose of the coop was to
supply a low income neighborhood with inexpensive food. The coop split into two distinct factions over this issue.

Debbie, who had been elected the coop's first paid coordinator, tried to play both ends against the middle and made some enemies when she responded to our pressure and put white sugar on the shelf. The line, however, was drawn over the issue of pop.

One of the families I tried to recruit into the coop told me that they would join if the coop would sell pop. I wrote, "Pop," on the coop stock request form, but none ever appeared. Eventually, I wrote in big letters, "POP-COKU-PEPSI." Soon after, the stock committee purchased an expensive brand of, "natural, unsweetened cola." At the next coop meeting, I told the group that if we could not get real pop because of nutritional reasons, then we would have to take coffee and marijuana rolling papers off of the shelf. One member described coop meetings as, "the worst confrontation between Leos and Scorpios I have ever seen."

The animosity Tom and Debbie felt toward me for disrupting coop activities, and the animosity I felt toward them for the way they handled Harrison West activities, clashed again in an incident that took place in mid-May, 1978. Someone called a meeting at Julie Straub's house to plan a strategy for dealing with Olentangy Management Company's planned tour of Renaissance Homes. I arrived at the meeting to discover the group painting anti-Battelle signs, which they planned to post throughout the neighborhood for tour-takers to see. I objected to this, and argued that we should not engage in any anti-Battelle activity until we received a formal written response to the Harrison West Resolutions.
Tom said, "Don't be naive, Norman. Do you really think that they plan to honor the Harrison West Resolutions after ignoring neighborhood input for so long? Do you think that if they intended to honor the Harrison West Resolutions, they would be promoting this price hype they call, 'Renaissance'?" I refused to take part in overt anti-Battelle activity, until I received a written response to the Harrison West Resolutions. Gradually, however, I witnessed enough cases of unnecessary displacement to come to realize that Tom was right.

One example of such a case was Juanita Zarbaugh. Juanita had lived in her house for more than twelve years, had always paid her rent, and had always been a good neighbor. When her husband died, she fell on hard times. At first, she received a monthly check from the Veterans Administration, but this was drastically reduced when the V.A. learned that she had a job. Because of health problems, Juanita was unable to continue her job, but could not get welfare, because it was on record that she was getting V.A. checks. While the government was taking time to figure out what Juanita was really getting, she was living on less than two hundred dollars per month. At the same time, Olentangy Management Company took over management of her Battelle-owned house, and immediately raised her rent.

While walking through the neighborhood one day I discovered this crippled elderly woman attempting to load her possessions into a car. Upon questioning her, I learned that she had been evicted by Olentangy Management Company for failing to pay her rent. That Saturday, a massive fund raiser was held on the volleyball court for Juanita and I went on television to denounce Battelle's displacement
policies. We raised five hundred ninety dollars. Five hundred fifty was given to Olentangy Management Company to pay Juanita's back rent, and the remaining forty dollars was given to the Battelle Area Tenant's Organization (BATO).

BATO was an organization formed at the initiation of members of the Columbus Tenant's Union. BATO members had agreed that the organization should not have elected leaders, and Olentangy Management Company used the organization's lack of formal structure as an excuse to not negotiate with it. This, in spite of the fact that BATO was listed on the Innovative Grant Application as an organization that had participated in formulating revitalization plans for the Near Northside.

Informally, much of BATO's leadership came from Nancy Yates and Julie Straub. For example, they were responsible for organizing a protest to the eviction of John Skoog. In spite of Olentangy Management Company's promised first option to buy for tenants, Skoog was evicted so that an outside developer could renovate his house and display it as a model home.

Juanita Zarbaugh and John Skoog were just two of many residents who were needlessly displaced during the spring of 1978. New policies initiated by Olentangy Management Company, such as discriminatory rental agreements, increased rents, evictions, and harassment, resulted in a mass exodus of residents during this time.\textsuperscript{10} In addition, the city, after allowing Battelle to rent substandard units for numerous years, suddenly began to appear at people's doors with condemnation

\textsuperscript{10} For a discussion of the impact of these policies see pages 147-157.
XI.
IMAGES OF
DISPLACEMENT
notices. During the Spring of 1978 I personally interviewed more than thirty households as they packed to leave the neighborhood. Almost all of them expressed animosity toward a new policy imposed upon them by Olentangy Management Company or the City. These new policies were clear violations of the Harrison West Resolutions and of the intent of the innovative grant.

As I naively waited for a formal response to the Harrison West Resolutions, neighborhood opposition to displacement policies intensified on other fronts. When Olentangy Management Company had announced that they would not accept cash payment for rent, BATO had opposed the new policy and forced a compromise whereby renters without checking accounts could pay in cash at a nearby bank. This achievement gave BATO enough credibility to facilitate a large following. BATO then began advising tenants on renters' rights. For example, when Olentangy Management Company first began telling people to "get out immediately," many residents believed this order was binding, and moved. BATO informed renters that under Ohio's tenant-landlord law, a landlord must get a thirty day court order to force an eviction. Jerry Freidman, a Near Northside resident, attended BATO meetings and gave the organization legal advice, while Jim McNamara offered legal assistance to residents who wished to fight eviction. In addition to these efforts, information about meetings and advice for fighting displacement was delivered to neighborhood residents through the Near North News, a publication edited by Wendy Schweiger and distributed by the Godman Guild. Also, State Senator Michael Schwartzwalder and mayoral candidate Bill Boyland began publically speaking out against displacement caused by the City and Battelle.
By the end of May I had witnessed enough cases of intentional displacement to realize that the Harrison West Resolutions would not be honored by Battelle or the city. I had been holding out for a compromise, and my reluctance to participate in anti-Battelle activity had led to the perception among my supporters that I had been co-opted. I still had one bargaining chip, however—HUD's citizen participation requirements for the innovative grant.

At the June meeting of the Harrison West Society Executive Board, I was prepared to discuss with the group a strategy for dealing with HUD. It had been announced that HUD was finally sending someone to Columbus to meet with neighborhood leaders in regards to the innovative grant. When I arrived at the Godman Guild for the meeting, I was shocked to learn that for the third month in a row, the Harrison West flyers had not been printed. I cancelled the meeting, went into Randy Morrison's office and blasted him about the incompetency of his Godman Guild staff.

The next afternoon I received a telephone call from Tom Mayer. Tom told me that he was coming over with a six-pack of beer and we were going to talk things over.

Tom and I sat on my porch and discussed a lot of bad feelings that had developed between us. Tom reminded me that the June Harrison West Society meeting was being postponed for one week because of a local election. He had assumed that the Executive Board meeting would also be postponed for one week, and that was why he had not prepared the flyer. During our discussion we also spoke of our respective relationships with Debbie. I told Tom that there was no "love triangle"
issue between us—I had become interested in Gretchen Weiss.

By the time we finished that six-pack, Tom and I had put a lot of things behind us. When we shook hands I felt, for the first time, that we could work together and that we were on the road to becoming friends.

The next day, Tom was fired from his job at the Godman Guild. I knew right away that this would constitute irreparable damage and contribute further to factionalism in Harrison West.

The increasing factionalism within the neighborhood was exemplified by the nature of the June meeting of the Harrison West Society. Other than Carol, many important McCabe people did not show up. Neither Tom nor Debbie were there, and many of my supporters who blamed me for getting Tom fired and disrupting the coop did not come. What used to be a large, dynamic group had dwindled down to a loyal few. In the absence of so many important people, significant business could not be carried out. I announced that John Sandborn, a HUD representative, was coming to Columbus to meet with neighborhood representatives, then adjourned the meeting.

When I arrived at home that night, Debbie was standing in the yard. She handed me a note and sadly walked away. In the note, Debbie said that she was resigning as treasurer of the Harrison West Society. I might have resigned myself at that point, except for the fact that a HUD representative was coming to hear the neighborhood's view.

I first met John Sanborne at a City Council Innovative Grant Public Hearing. At this hearing, Jerry Hammond reviewed various aspects of the grant and both Battelle and the neighborhood got the
opportunity to present their viewpoints. When the issue of the grant boundaries came up, Hammond expressed surprise that the boundaries were at issue, and asked Barry Humphries to explain.

Humphries said, "It has been my understanding that the tenant assistance would only apply to the Phase I area."

As usual, Hammond accepted the view of private enterprise over the view of the neighborhood, and Harrison West became excluded from the grant.

By this time, it was no surprise to me that OMC would take a position detrimental to the low income people in the area, or that City Council would support them. What did surprise me was the stand taken by HUD's representative.

On July 19, 1978, John Sandbome met with representatives of the Near Northside neighborhoods. Each neighborhood was allowed to bring two representatives. Ralph and I represented Harrison West.

Mr. Sandbome began the meeting by stating that in HUD's view, local organizations such as the Harrison West Society did not represent the neighborhood.

"The neighborhood's position," he said, "is expressed by City Council."

Walt Benedict, the City's innovative grant representative, then gave an opening statement in which he said, "'Citizen participation' does not mean that the citizens can make changes in government programs. It merely means that the citizens are afforded the opportunity to express their views."
Sandbome also stated that, "Normal citizen participation regulations do not apply to innovative grants."

I was immediately upset by these comments, because the neighborhood was counting on HUD's citizen participation requirements to force the City and Battelle to negotiate with us. Instead, HUD was siding with Battelle, and, unbelievably, giving Jerry Hammond the authority to formulate the neighborhood's point of view!

When opening statements were finished, Ralph told Sandbome that we wanted HUD to withhold the innovative grant from the City until Battelle agreed to take steps to reduce displacement. Mr. Sandbome said that this request was "impossible."

I said, "If you will not withhold the innovative grant until they agree to reduce displacement, will you at least just tell them that some of their policies are wrong. For example, you could tell them that it does not make sense to destroy the neighborhood's volleyball court, then tear down houses right around the corner to build a park. They consider us to be a bunch of radicals, but they might listen if HUD told them the same thing."

"HUD can not get involved in these local issues," Mr. Sandbome said.

I smashed my fist down on the table and said, "I can not believe that you are going to give away TWO MILLION DOLLARS and not concern yourself with the ISSUES!"

Sandbome said, "Look! The innovative grant has been awarded. This can not be changed now. However, if you want to make changes in the grant you can do it through city council. Your city council can
change up to ten percent of the grant without HUD's permission, and more than ten percent with HUD's permission. If you want to make changes in the grant you will have to go through city council."

A few days later there was another innovative grant public hearing. Jerry Hammond opened the hearing by saying that before leaving town, Mr. Sandborne had told him that city council can make no changes in the innovative grant. This did not surprise me, because by now I had come to realize that no matter how the neighborhood expressed its view, it would be circumvented.

The four months I served as president of the Harrison West Society had resulted in total failure. I had failed to get the neighborhood's point of view incorporated into the revitalization plan, had failed to make reconciliations with the McCabe people, and most of all, had driven away my own supporters and friends. By the end of July I was exhausted from the pace of constant meetings and distraught over the turn of events. With Battelle and the City initiating policies of intentional displacement and HUD supporting them, with the McCabe people still against me and my friends permanently alienated, I gave up and resigned as president of Harrison West.

Shortly after I resigned as President of Harrison West, I had a discussion with Joe Kelch, who had once resigned from that position himself. Joe told me, "Don't worry. No one is indispensable. The fight to save the neighborhood will go on with or without you." Other people were calling me a quitter to my face, and talking among themselves about how I never did really care about the people I represented:
I had used them to promote myself as a political candidate and to get information for my doctor's dissertation. These cruel comments contributed to my already highly developed sense of failure, and I found myself withdrawing more and more into isolation.

It seemed that things had hit an all-time low. It got worse. Debbie's dog, Chana, was poisoned, and not long after my dog, Mathieu, was hit by a car and killed. Then, several of us became victims of the newest onslaught of Battelle/QMC evictions. OMC Vice President Dave Armbrist told me that, "Battelle planners have decided that you are not the kind of people they desire in the new neighborhood." Jim McNamara, a lawyer who handled several Battelle/QMC eviction cases, agreed to represent us in court for practically no fee, but in the end we lost. I found myself out of the neighborhood, along with many others.

It seemed at one point that the only thing going well was the coop. Jackie McKee, chair of the coop stock committee, came up with an idea to settle arguments concerning our stock. Jackee proposed that any legal item be allowed in the coop, but if someone objected to an item for nutritional or political reasons, they could place a sign over that item. This way we could allow people to choose their foods while educating them at the same time. Not long after the coop voted to accept Jackie's proposal, an arsonist burned our coop down.

The burning of the coop was the final blow to my desire to be involved in neighborhood activities. I remember all of us standing in the cold watching black metallic smoke pour from the door. The thought of doing all that work over again with so much animosity between us
XII. COOP MEETING ROOM—AFTER THE FIRE
was repulsive. There were a few more coop meetings during which we discussed rehabbing the building or finding another place, but fewer and fewer people showed up at each successive meeting and the Third Avenue Community Coop faded into non-existence. In one short year I had lost my friends, my dog, my home, the Harrison West presidency, and the Coop. I wanted to be alone.

Joe Kelch had been right: The fight to save the neighborhood went on without me. Carol McCabe took over the Harrison West presidency and used the position to speak out against Battelle/OMC displacement policies, the demolition of housing, Battelle expansion and commercial development, and to fight for a neighborhood park. As it became more and more obvious that legitimate channels would not work, some residents began using more radical methods. There were parties and yard sales during Renaissance Tours to let prospective buyers know that they were not welcome, and tour-takers were given "Buyer-Beware" posters warning them of defects in Battelle renovated homes and informing them of better deals elsewhere. Advertising signs were vandalized, tires were slashed, and bottle-rockets were aimed at Battelle/OMC officials.

On one occasion Gretchen and I were eating at Costello's when a group of angry neighborhood residents came in after a City Council meeting. They were angry because, in their view, they had been betrayed by certain City Council members. Olentangy Management Company had requested rezoning of three tracts of land near Vermont Avenue

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11 See Appendix, 5 pages 237-241.
XIII. GREETINGS FOR RENAISSANCE TOURS
for Battelle expansion and parking. City Council had earlier approved the rezoning of one of the land tracts, but the other two were meeting strong resistance from organized neighborhood groups. As a compromise, some Council members had agreed to vote against the rezoning of one of the tracts if the neighborhood would drop opposition to the rezoning of the other. The neighborhood had agreed, but at the City Council meeting that night the rezoning of one tract was approved while the other was approved and tabled. Neighborhood residents were so angry over this breach of trust that many of them were threatening to resign from their various offices. The next day the paper quoted City Councilwoman Pam Conrad as saying that the vote represented a compromise between the neighborhood and Battelle!

I used to wonder why people continued to go to those meetings when it was obvious that their views were being circumvented and that they would never get the changes in the revitalization program they were seeking. Little did I know that many important changes had already been made, and more were yet to come.

The innovative grant, which was approved by the City in October of 1978, had never arrived at Mayor Moody's desk. Instead, HUD had informed the City that the grant was being held up pending further information on displacement.

When Joe Rutter, a neighborhood resident, had moved to Detroit, he had made contact with an organization called the "Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs." Gino Baroni, the Center's director, had authorized a study of the Columbus, Ohio innovative grant target area, and this study concluded that the grant benefitted Battelle more than
neighborhood residents. Later, Baroni was appointed the director of HUD's Office of Neighborhoods, and for the first time Harrison West had a friend in HUD. In addition, the Godman Guild had conducted a study documenting the neighborhood's displacement and had lobbied heavily in HUD for innovative grant changes. These factors, along with visits to Washington by Bill Larkin and Tom Mayer, persuaded HUD's Under-Secretary Robert Embry to conduct his own investigation. Instead of sending the innovative grant contract to Mayor Moody to be signed, Embry sent Robert Agus to Columbus to inform the City that HUD needed assurances that there would be one hundred twenty-five to one hundred fifty tenant buyers, and added a stipulation that these tenant buyers must meet Section Eight income requirements.

As a response, the city implemented a carefully orchestrated effort to keep from losing the innovative grant. Jerry Hammond informed neighborhood leaders that it was imperative that no one criticize the grant until the contract was signed. He argued that once the grant arrived, it could be restructured to address problems, but if it was criticized now, the City would lose it altogether. Meanwhile, Walt Benedict was authorized to establish the Innovative Grant Citizens' Advisory Committee, which was required by grant regulations and which would help convince HUD that neighborhood problems were being worked out. Also, the City passed a resolution stating that the tenant assistance portion of the grant would be released six months prior to the release of money for capital improvements.

Before HUD and the city could come to accommodations over the displacement issue, the U.S. Department of the Interior overruled
HUD and ordered that innovative grant money not be released until historic preservation issues were settled. The National Advisory Council on Historic Preservation and the Ohio Historical Preservation Office had recommended that a large segment of the Near Northside of Columbus be declared "historic." The innovative grant target area was included in the proposed historic district, although Battelle/OMC had lobbied to have it excluded. If the grant target area were considered historic, it would make it more difficult for Battelle/OMC to tear down houses. Specifically, the historic designation hindered Battelle's Perry Street expansion plans.

The stalemate which ensured lasted for almost the entire year of 1979: The Godman Guild and Near Northside Housing Corporation kept pressuring HUD to force changes that would end displacement; HUD refused to release the grant unless the city could assure that there would be an adequate number of tenant buyers; the historic preservationists opposed Battelle expansion and housing demolition; and Battelle needed the grant for expansion but kept on rehabbing houses, raising rents, and evicting people—leaving less possibilities for getting the required number of tenant buyers. The situation was further exacerbated by the fact that those getting displaced could not receive the innovative grant tenant assistance.

This dilemma was solvable with the infusion of new blood into the situation. Pat Grady replaced Walt Benedict as the City's Innovative Grant Program Director, Alan Isbitz became director of the Near Northside Housing Corporation, and Rand Howard began assuming an active role as liaison between Columbus and HUD's Washington headquarters.
These people seemed to be able to work together and eventually a compromise was reached and implemented.

The changes in the innovative grant which were approved during the summer of 1979 represented a negotiated settlement accommodating the interests of various parties involved.\textsuperscript{12} In order to make the housing program plausible, Section 8 income requirements were raised to the Section 235 level, and in recognition of the need to increase tenant assistance, money was diverted from the Perry Street expansion project and Fourth Avenue Park budget and added to the Relocation Assistance and Housing Rehabilitation sections. The increased money for tenant assistance reflected the increasing importance of the role which the housing corporation was playing in fighting displacement (Grady, 1981). Some neighborhood residents objected to taking money from the neighborhood's park in order to help the City and Battelle keep their commitment to tenant buyers, but a firm promise was made that in the long run the neighborhood would get the 2.5 acre park allocated in the original innovative grant proposal. Finally, the historic boundaries were established with Battelle/QMC scaling down the Perry Street expansion project somewhat and agreeing to preserve eight houses by moving them to vacant lots and to submit development plans for review by preservation groups. In November of 1979, HUD released the first innovative grant dollars—tenant assistance only.

The neighborhood, however, would not let the grant administrators off the hook. During the delays in implementing the tenant assistance

\textsuperscript{12} See table 7, page 196.
portion of the grant, Battelle/OMC had aggressively pushed forward with the Renaissance Program—raising the purchasing costs of houses, raising rents, and evicting undesirables. The neighborhood would not let it be forgotten that there were not enough original residents around to receive the grant, and even though the Godman Guild and Housing Corporation had participated in the mid-summer compromises, they still refused to play ball until a viable housing program was established. Residents who had been displaced could now receive their four hundred dollars in relocation assistance (months after being displaced), but HUD would not release the capital improvements money until the City could assure that there would be an adequate number of tenant buyers.

This stalemate dragged on through 1980, until HUD informed the City that they must reach a solution by March 12 or lose the grant. The City entertained the idea of dropping the innovative grant program altogether, but HUD also informed them that their ability to administer the innovative grant would be seen in Washington as an indication of whether or not the City of Columbus was capable of administering a twelve million dollar Urban Development Action Grant for Capitol Square South. The City was now under intense pressure, and a deadline, for solving the innovative grant tenant buyer problem.

The major push to negotiate a settlement came from Jerry Hammond. Hammond gathered representatives from the key factions to analyze the situation. Battelle/OMC still wanted the capital improvements portions of the grant—especially the Perry Street expansion money; the City needed to make the grant work to preserve its reputation as a
grant administrator and not endanger their chances of receiving the
twelve million dollars in UDAG funds; and the Godman Guild and Near
Northside Housing Corporation were demanding a viable housing program
which would enable low to moderate income residents to become home
owners. Privy to the negotiations were Alan Isbitz, Steve Buckenroth,
Harrison Smith, Jim Anderson, Barry Humphries, Gloria Snyder, Pat
Grady, Steve McClary, Harry Henning, and Rand Howard. Jerry Hammond
locked the group into a room and told them not to come out until a
settlement was reached.

On March 12, 1980, the day of the deadline for reaching a settle­
ment, members of the negotiating group signed the "Memorandum of
Agreement." This memorandum, which was later supplemented with two
additional documents, is analyzed in chapter VI of this study. Key
aspects of the agreement included: Battelle/OMC would freeze prices
and sell one hundred twenty houses to the city and the Housing Cor­
poration "as-is." These houses would be sold to residents and rehabili­
tated through a sweat-equity program; assistance given to tenant buyers
increased from $7,500 to $10,000 and this amount could be used for the
down-payment on the home; additional monies, such as three percent
C.D.A. funds, would be provided by the City for housing rehabilitation
loans; innovative grant boundaries were extended to provide a wider
range of people the opportunity to receive the grant; and the capital
improvements portion of the grant was approved for release.

As it turned out, the neighborhood finally got the sweat-equity
program it fought for. However, by the time it was finally approved,
so many residents had been displaced that the innovative grant
boundaries had to be changed in order to find enough tenant buyers. The Godman Guild sent Wendy Schweiger out to contact as many of the displaced people as could be found and inform them of their new opportunity to purchase. Many of these people were settled elsewhere and chose, for various reasons, not to come back. Many, including myself, Tom and Debbie, did come back, and HUD was satisfied that the opportunity was available for those who really did want to make Harrison West their home. However, the neighborhood's fight against Battelle was far from over.

One of the few successful grass roots efforts to fight Battelle/OMC policies was the OMC Tenants Organization, which was formed by Tiny Hine and Kathy Johnston to oppose rent increases. Previous Battelle supporters, such as Mary Funk and Penny Nichols, became outraged when their rents were increased, and joined this organization. By exposing the conditions of units subjected to rent increases to the press, and by refusing in unison to pay the increases, this group managed to get either a reduction of rent increases or substantial repairs for virtually all of the group's core members. This same core group, supported by Harrison West President Carol McCabe and backed by Randy Morrison's Godman Guild, also formed an organization called NABR—Neighbors Against Battelle Rezoning. NABR successfully fought an attempt by Battelle/OMC to construct a large shopping center on West Fifth Avenue.

NABR was actually formed in May of 1979 after one hundred and twenty five residents turned up at a Development Commission meeting to speak out against rezoning 5.6 acres of land for Battelle commercial
development. In spite of this turn-out, and unanimous rejection of the plan by more than one hundred Harrison West Society members, the Development Commission voted 7-0 in favor of recommending the rezoning to City Council. That night, NABR was formed. Sandy Sterret and Pat Williams chaired the group, with Jack Burgess as secretary-treasurer. Randy Morrison, Tiny Hine, Carol McCabe, Mary Funk, and Penny Nichols served as staff members for the organization which eventually accumulated over two hundred supporters and a weekly core attendance of about forty (Hine, 1982).

A major strategy of NABR was to gather support from other neighborhood groups. The Columbus Coalition of Neighborhoods, a city-wide coalition of sixteen neighborhood organizations, voted unanimously to support NABR, while CAGER, the organization which had successfully defeated the Glen Echo Ravine Rezoning, promised to help launch another city-wide petition drive to get the issue on the ballot if the City Council approved of the rezoning. Suddenly, Council members indebted to and sympathetic towards Battelle/OMC found themselves threatened by a powerful counter-force. Three days before City Council was scheduled to vote on the issue, Olentangy Management Company announced that it was withdrawing the rezoning request because plans had just been announced to build a Super-Kroger store on High Street. While CMC pretended to not want to interfere with High Street development, there was a widespread feeling that Barry Humphries knew he did not have the support in City Council.

The neighborhood's feeling of victory turned out to be short-lived. That week, Olentangy Management Company requested from the City,
and received, twenty-nine demolition permits, for fifty six units, and evicted more than forty families from the proposed shopping center site.

Meanwhile, negotiations continued in regard to the area west of Perry, where Battelle wanted to expand its corporate headquarters. Having concentrated their efforts on saving the shopping center area, and believing that west of Perry was a lost cause, neighborhood groups settled for a compromise which would allow Battelle/CMC to destroy one hundred thirty-six units and displace one hundred four families. In return, the families were given one year to move and the four hundred dollar innovative grant relocation money was supplemented by eight hundred dollars from the Olentangy Management Company. Even in the process of agreeing not to oppose Battelle/CMC policy, the neighborhood found itself tricked. When asked to agree to the rezoning of the land west of Perry to C-2, neighborhood leaders had been told that the change would allow Battelle to build offices. The neighborhood agreed to this, but what was approved at City Council was a variance which would allow Battelle to build laboratories (Gregory, 1981: 3).

With the houses and families west of Perry Street and in the proposed shopping area now lost from the neighborhood, and with Battelle/CMC preparing to press again for their commercial rezoning, the neighborhood, on January 24, 1982, held a "Death of a Neighborhood" funeral march. Carrying an empty coffin, neighbors marched through Harrison West and congregated, for the first time, on the doorsteps of Battelle Memorial Institute. Byron Brandon of the Bradley Street Coalition offered a eulogy for the neighborhood.
DEATH
OF A NEIGHBORHOOD

Come join neighborhood residents and NABR at the funeral march and service being held for the dead and dying areas of the near northside.

When: Saturday, January 24, 1981 — 2:00 p.m.

Where: Mourners will meet at 321 W. 2nd Avenue. The funeral march will proceed from there and the funeral service will immediately follow.

Cause of Death: Displacement, Demolition, lack of Alternative housing.
The neighborhood was not quite dead. NABR leafletted twenty thousand homes in the Columbus area, organized the High Street Business Association to oppose the rezoning, solicited the support of Black groups, and lobbied with City Council members to vote against the shopping center. With so many city-wide neighborhood groups, prominent Blacks, and High Street businesses actively opposing the shopping center, Battelle supporters on City Council found themselves in a political dilemma.

Battelle/CMC was not lacking in strategy either. In an attempt to pacify the High Street businesses, a new scaled down version of the shopping center was proposed. Also, having displaced so many of the neighborhood’s residents and replaced them with friendlier people, CMC was able to form its own neighborhood organization called RCR--Residents for Community Revitalization. RCR was chaired by Dan Johnson, and supported primarily by new residents who viewed the purchase of their homes as an investment.

The January 18, 1982 City Council meeting was one of the few times I came out to support a neighborhood cause since resigning as Harrison West president. The City Council chamber was packed full of hundreds of people. NABR people held signs critical of Battelle housing policies while RCR people wore yellow construction hats to symbolize their support for development. Five speakers were allowed from each side, and tensions between the two groups were high. I was sure the neighborhood was going to lose again, and could not help thinking about the coop, volleyball court, and Harper Valley Mother’s Club, as a speaker told City Council that the rezoning was necessary because the
neighborhood needed a place for people to meet.

Just prior to the meeting, Mayor Moody had called together the Republican City Council members to tell them to vote for the rezoning. Republicans Boly and Cain, as well as Democrat Mentle, did vote for the rezoning, but Dorothy Teater was a "lone writer" Republican and voted against. The newest Black Democrat on Council, Ben Espy, voted against, leaving it up to Jerry Hammond to continue his support of Battelle/OMC in defiance of the neighborhoods, or to vote against and force a tie breaking vote from City Council president, M. D. Portman, a Democrat.

Hammond, who often precedes his Council votes with a disclaimer, kept the audience in suspense. In a long-winded speech, Hammond said that he felt neighborhood animosity against Battelle was unwarranted and made it clear that his vote had nothing to do with neighborhood opposition. Hammond voted "no" because he believed the shopping center would bring too much extra traffic into the area.

M. D. Portman did not keep us in suspense. Immediately after Hammond cast his vote, Portman tersely said, "I vote no."

There was no great upsurge from the audience. Instead, everyone sat stunned for a few moments, then began trickling out in disbelief. In the hallway I heard one of the people who had spoken in favor of the rezoning say bitterly to Barry Humphries,

"We'll show them how much traffic we can bring to the area."

Humphries, himself, seemed dazed, but diplomatically kept his composure.
Later that night there was a massive celebration at the North Fork Cafe. There was talk of trying to persuade Battelle to use the open space they had created for the shopping center as the promised park site, but we all knew that there would be no negotiations, and that the space would be used to build expensive condominiums. Knowing this did not dim our spirit of celebration. After hundreds of meetings, thousands of hours of unpaid work, and enduring years of constant defeat, the neighborhood had finally beaten Battelle at City Hall.
CHAPTER VI
NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION ISSUES

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines revitalization issues which emerged during the revitalization of Harrison West, and which are relevant to other neighborhoods undergoing similar restoration. Arguments made by Battelle/OMC, by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and by representatives of the neighborhood are presented. The writer is biased toward the neighborhood perspective, and the attempt to present other viewpoints was hampered by the reluctance of key people to be interviewed. Arguments presented were ones made at various meetings, during various conversations, and in interviews. The key issues analyzed are: the joint public/private partnership; citizen participation; displacement and relocation; land use; and preservation. Evaluation of the extent to which compromise was eventually reached is provided.

A PUBLIC/PRIVATE VENTURE

In a free enterprise economy, such as we have in the United States, the federal government's efforts to help the poor have often been through joint public/private ventures. The logic behind such ventures is that since private enterprise has a right to maximize profits, and since the exercise of such right often results in public harm, the
government should subsidize industry as a reward for forfeiting some profit to promote the public good. The federal government's attempts to help the poor realize the national housing goal have often been through such public/private ventures, and a major criticism of urban renewal has been that it has helped developers and bankers more than the poor.

In regards to Harrison West, a major issue raised by the neighborhood was, "Who should benefit from neighborhood revitalization sponsored by a charitable trust and supported by a two-million dollar grant from a government agency created to help the poor?" It was argued that Battelle Institute should not be treated as any normal for-profit real estate company, because the Institute is legally obligated to give much of its profits to charity, and it must earn its money in such a way as promotes the public interest.

Many aspects of the innovative grant originally benefitted Battelle at the expense of the neighborhood. For example, the largest allotment in the grant budget ($594,200) was for Battelle's expansion over Perry Street—an expansion opposed by the neighborhood. Also, the capital improvements portion of the grant benefitted Battelle in that the Institute could charge neighborhood residents higher prices for their homes once the improvements were implemented. This was true not only for innovative grant capital improvements, but also of other government improvements such as the C.D.A. Block Grant alley improvements. In the case of the C.D.A. alley improvements, Battelle/CMC promised that these would not be taken into account during appraisals, but a secret copy of an appraisal was obtained which clearly showed that anticipated
alley improvements were in fact figured into appraisals.

Battelle officials believed that even though they were obligated to give a portion of their profits to charity, they were justified in, and even obligated to run the corporation in accordance with sound business principles. In addition, Gordon Battelle's Will states that certain "non-business income," including real estate operations, is exempt from the charitable obligation (Court of Common Pleas, 1974:14). From the point of view of Battelle officials, the Institute had every reason to expect to be treated as a for-profit corporation in terms of the public/private partnership.

From HUD's point of view, Battelle should have been treated as a for-profit corporation and the Institute's share of the innovative grant was justified by concessions the industry promised to make which were designed to promote public goals. Most importantly, the Institute agreed to cooperate with HUD so that tenants who would otherwise be displaced could remain in the neighborhood. Such cooperation included offering tenants first option to buy, and donating houses to the neighborhood's non-profit housing corporation. In addition, the Institute agreed to remove houses from Perry Street, instead of demolishing them. Finally, HUD's contribution to Battelle was to be offset by interior rehabilitation grants awarded to tenant buyers ($700,000), by funding to support the non-profit housing corporation ($200,000), by home maintenance support ($30,000), and by relocation assistance ($67,000).

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1 See letter on page 206.
Since Battelle Institute was treated by the government as any for-profit corporation, and since this revitalization project was claimed to be a "prototype for institutional divestiture for other communities" (City of Columbus, 1978:1), this study will examine whether or not the concessions made by the corporation justified the benefits received. Key issues are Battelle/OMC's efforts to prevent displacement, and the handling of citizen participation. These are two issues which HUD has developed definite guidelines for, and which the Innovative Grant Application claimed Battelle complied with.

Before discussing these issues, one important point should be made: Not until the signing of the Memorandum of Agreement on March 12, 1980 (almost two years after the innovative grant was awarded) was there anything even resembling a contract between the corporation and the government, outlining the legal responsibilities of each in regards to the public/private partnership.

**DISPLACEMENT AND RELOCATION**

The major justification for awarding the innovative grant to the City of Columbus was that it would be used to reduce displacement and gentrification. In return for government subsidy of corporate expansion and for the economic gain incurred from publically financed capital improvements, Battelle Institute was to cooperate with the innovative grant process, offer tenants first opportunity to purchase their homes, and assist in relocating displaced tenants into suitable housing. At issue are two controversial points: first, was the opportunity for tenants to remain in the neighborhood maximized, or did only
a token few manage to stay; second, how adequate was relocation assistance?

Estimates into the magnitude and causes of displacement vary between two extremes. Neighborhood groups estimated that as of January, 1981, more than 750 residents were already needlessly displaced (Hine, 1982). Battelle/OMC, however, argues that it is impossible to calculate displacement because of the neighborhood’s unusually high normal turnover rate. This observer believes that the area’s displacement can be attributed to the following factors: normal turnover; price increases; rent increases; harassment; and eviction.

NORMAL TURNOVER

The 1970 census supports the contention that the innovative grant target area did have a higher normal turnover rate than the City of Columbus as a whole. However, a "Survey of OMC Tenants," conducted by Olentangy Management Company, shows that of four hundred forty two residents surveyed (eighty five tenants were not contacted), thirty one percent had lived in their homes for five years or longer, and forty three percent had lived in the same neighborhood prior to moving into their current homes (Olentangy Management Company, 1978:2,3). In addition, forty three percent of the respondents said that they moved into the neighborhood because they had friends or relatives living nearby, or because it was close to work (Olentangy Management Company, 1978:2,3). For these people, the neighborhood hardly constituted a "cheap hotel,"
as Battelle/OMC spokespersons sometimes claimed. In the 1978 survey, sixty-nine percent said they had no plans to move (Olentangy Management Company, 1978:2).

While a certain amount of displacement can be attributed to the area's unusually high turnover rate, evidence shows that a substantial number of tenants had long standing personal ties to the neighborhood. It was not the displacement of the transients that angered neighborhood leaders, but the needless displacement of long-time residents because of price increases, rent increases, harassment, and eviction.

**PRICE INCREASES**

The great dilemma in revitalization has always been that as the neighborhood improves, housing costs increase and residents find themselves priced out. We believed that neighborhoods being revitalized through joint public/private partnerships should improve in such a way as to benefit the existing residents.

Under the Battelle/OMC plan, all owned units were to be renovated on the exterior so as to insure that the neighborhood as a whole improved. Buyers were to be allowed to renovate their homes on the interior with sweat-equity, and tenant buyers were to receive interior rehabilitation grants from HUD. The problem with this plan was that since tenants could only purchase homes after the exterior work was done, and after capital improvements were made, the corporation benefitted from the increased value of the homes while existing tenants found themselves unable to afford the down payments or mortgages on the homes.
Under the neighborhood's plan, tenants would have been allowed to buy their homes "as-is," at deteriorated values, and renovate the entire buildings with sweat-equity. At first, Battelle/OMC refused to go along with the neighborhood's plan, arguing that there was no guarantee that a tenant buyer would be able to renovate the building. We believed this argument to be false, because many tenants were professional carpenters by trade, and because there was money available for them to get materials. In fact, Battelle/OMC was responsible for preventing Harrison West from becoming a C.D.A. target area, which would have enabled residents to get materials through C.D.A. Block Grants. In terms of quality, there is reason to believe that a person working on his/her own home will do a better job than an outside contractor who has an economic incentive to cut corners. In fact, the quality of work done by outside contractors in comparison to work being done by owners became a major issue. Even if the work was good, no self-respecting carpenter would allow an outsider to renovate his/her home, then pay an increased price to buy it.

Of course, not everyone in the neighborhood had the skill required to renovate their own home. Many did, however, and the neighborhood fought for a sweat-equity program for them. A compromise was eventually reached over this issue, but the timing of it was such that many people had already been displaced.

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2See story on page 163.
RENT INCREASES

In spite of the publically made commitment to help reduce displacement, one of the first things Olentangy Management Company did after taking over management of Battelle owned properties in the Fall of 1977 was to raise rents. Although the first round of rent increases was small, two factors contributed to displacement: First, many residents were of such low income that even small increases affected them adversely; secondly, many residents had lived in Battelle houses for years without getting repairs, and their sudden rent increases were seen as unjust and as a method of pressuring them to leave.

Tenants responded to the first rent increase by either moving, or by sending to Olentangy Management Company a list of code violations to be repaired. Ohio tenant landlord law prohibits a landlord from raising a tenant's rent upon request for repair of a code violation, so Olentangy Management Company responded by instituting another round of rent increases on everybody. This vicious cycle continued through the years, with residents requesting more and more repairs, and Olentangy Management Company raising rents on the whole neighborhood due to increases in overall maintenance costs. Each time the rents were raised, more residents found themselves unable to stay in the area. At one point Olentangy Management Company offered to alleviate the situation by considering a reduction of rent increases on a case by case basis. The result of this policy was the accusation that OMC was trying to coopt neighborhood leaders by agreeing to reduce their rent increases while retaining the increases on other neighborhood people.
HARASSMENT

Under the heading of "harassment" is included a wide variety of activities ranging from new rental policies that discourage low income renters to outright being badgered by OMC officials.

The onslaught of new rental policies initiated by Olentangy Management Company bore a direct relationship on the desire and ability of low income residents to stay in the neighborhood. In addition to higher rents, OMC initiated such policies as disallowing people to pay rent in cash; complicated rental agreements; requiring deposits on new leases; and requiring renters' insurance. OMC argued that these were standard real estate practices. Neighborhood leaders argued that these were not the real estate practices the people of the neighborhood were used to, and that it was improper to initiate them at this time if displacement was to be avoided.

Even worse than the initiating of these new rental policies was an intentional effort on the part of Olentangy Management Company to intimidate undesirable residents into moving. Much of this activity occurred during the spring of 1978, and much of the dirty work was done by Olentangy Management Company Vice President David Armbrist. As President of the Harrison West Society, I often discussed particular cases with Armbrist, who displayed an open contempt and misunderstanding for low income people and their problems. On one occasion, Armbrist ordered a sickly woman to be out of her house in two weeks,
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CULTURE OR JUNK?
because she was "such a bad housekeeper." The woman lived knee deep in trash, but in my opinion, was physically incapable of taking care of herself.³ On another occasion, Armbrist ordered a man to clean-up the "junk" in his yard, or be out by the end of the month. The "junk" which the man had to clean-up was the tools and tool cabinets he used to make a living by repairing lawnmowers.⁴ Many of these people were ignorant of the fact that a landlord must get a thirty day court notice to evict a tenant. Believing that Armbrist's order to vacate immediately was binding, they left. After the Battelle Area Tenant's Union was established, some people became informed of their rights in regards to eviction procedure.

The harassment of people considered to be undesirable exemplifies the different approaches to revitalization taken by Battelle/CMC and the neighborhood. The Battelle/CMC approach involved fixing-up the houses and kicking out the undesirables, while taking measures to enable a chosen few to stay. The neighborhood approach involved maximizing the opportunity for all residents to stay, while helping those in need to solve their problems.

EVICITION

Many residents who withstood Olentangy Management Company's rent increases, new rental policies, and harassment found themselves the victims of legal eviction. Although a private property owner does not need a reason to evict a tenant, some tenants were told that they

³Photographs of this woman's home can be seen on page 43.
⁴See photographs on page 153.
were not the kind of people Battelle wanted in the new neighborhood. 5
It seemed incredible to those of us who lived in the neighborhood that
after all those years of refusing to repair their buildings and of
maintaining lots full of trash and weeds, that Battelle representatives
would now be evicting people for having trash in their yards. In addi­tion,
many residents were evicted for failure to pay rent or rent in­
creases after the rents were raised by CMC.

Probably the largest portion of evictions were of people who stood
in the way of various Battelle projects. There were evictions of people
due to Battelle expansion over Vermont Street, and Battelle expansion
over Perry Street; there were evictions of people who lived in the pro­
posed commercial development area; and there were evictions of people
who lived in homes that Olentangy Management Company decided to use as
demonstration models. All of these people were denied the promised
first opportunity to buy, and were displaced in favor of projects which
were vehemently opposed by the neighborhood. Time and time again the
neighborhood organized itself to fight these evictions only to have
their opposition ignored by HUD officials and to see the city approve
of the Battelle requested zoning changes, evictions, and demolition
permits.

At the same time Battelle/CMC was making efforts to displace un­
desirable residents from the neighborhood, the city suddenly reversed
its long-standing policy of allowing Battelle to rent substandard
homes and began enforcing building codes. Claiming that the codes

5See story on page 127.
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DISPLACEMENT VICTIMS
were being enforced equally throughout the city, code enforcement officials began issuing repair orders to Olentangy Management Company, forcing CMC to close the houses down (Schweiger, 1978:1). In some cases, the city ruled the house condemned and ordered the families to vacate immediately.

The institution of rent increases, strict rental policies, harassment, eviction, and code enforcement should not have taken place at a time when the City and Battelle were receiving a two million dollar grant from HUD to reduce displacement.

**RELOCATION AND RELOCATION ASSISTANCE**

Three important questions are relevant to the relocation issue: First, was the amount of low-income housing which was destroyed or converted to higher income housing replaced by government subsidized housing?; second, were the low income people of the neighborhood who were displaced relocated into low income housing in the neighborhood?; and third, was relocation assistance sufficient?

In regards to the first two questions, there was an effort to bring government subsidized housing to the neighborhood. At first, Battelle/CMC planned to work with John Sanderfur to bring twenty-six units of Section Eight housing to Harrison West, and four houses were donated to the Near Northside Neighborhood Housing and Development Corporation. At this point, however, the number of government subsidized houses brought into the neighborhood was not even close to the number of houses destroyed and/or converted to higher income housing.

One thing I did accomplish as president of the Harrison West Society was to get Harrison West declared a Neighborhood Strategy Area
to receive more Section Eight housing. Most of the credit for this accomplishment belongs to Ken Molli. I was told in city council hearings that in spite of our obvious need, Harrison West could not be a Neighborhood Strategy Area because the housing in the neighborhood was not the type most economically convertible to the Section Eight program. Molli obtained a list of the housing qualities HUD considered best for conversion to Section Eight, and prepared a report of all the housing in Harrison West which met HUD's criteria. As a result of Molli's report, Harrison West was included in the Neighborhood Strategy Area. Subsequently, and because of the compromises reached in the Memorandum of Agreement, a larger number of Section Eight houses were built in Harrison West. However, it is not generally believed by neighborhood leaders that the overall number of government subsidized housing matched the number of low income housing destroyed and/or converted to higher income housing (Isbitz, 1982; McCabe, 1981; Morrison, 1982, Hine, 1982, and Yates, 1982). Furthermore, it is generally believed that very few of the low income people of Harrison West were relocated in the newly built Harrison West Section Eight housing. Instead, low income renters came in from outside. The neighborhood houses, later sold "as is" and rehabilitated through the sweat equity program, enabled a number of low income people to remain in the area. However, at the same time, innovative grant boundaries were extended, enabling non-residents to benefit from the program.

In regards to the third question, it should be pointed out that during the time the largest number of residents were displaced, the relocation assistance program was not in effect. At first, only the
smallest portion of the innovative grant budget ($67,000) was allotted for relocation assistance, and most of this was allocated for staffing. Those who did receive part of it did so as a form of payoff, months after they moved, rather than as assistance to help them relocate. Furthermore, the amount of red tape that had to be cut through, the number of forms that had to be filled out, and the numerous procedures that had to be followed, made getting the relocation assistance too complicated for even a person of moderate education. It was nearly not worth it.

After the Memorandum of Agreement compromise was reached, the City expanded its relocation program, more money was allotted for relocation assistance, and Olentangy Management Company established its own relocation office with Marsha Morehead as its director. Residents in the west of Perry Street area received up to $1200.00 to help them move.

The total effect of these efforts is a matter for empirical study.

**SUMMARY**

Concerning the issues of displacement and relocation, this observer has drawn the following conclusions:

1. While the neighborhood experienced an unusually high normal turnover rate, an unknown amount of unnecessary displacement was caused by price increases, rent increases, harassment, and eviction.

2. The amount of housing available to low and moderate income people was decreased due to demolition and renovation. Some of this was replaced with Section Eight housing and offset by housing donated or sold "as-is" to the housing corporation and the city.

3. Due to delays of implementing the innovative grant program, much of the neighborhood's displacement took place before the relocation assistance took
effect. A large portion of tenants either did not receive assistance, or received it long after they had moved. Consequently, opportunity for residents to relocate within the neighborhood was not maximized.

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

The idea that citizens should participate in making decisions concerning the future of their neighborhood gradually developed in federal urban policy and reached a peak under President Carter. One of the most important contributions of the Carter Administration to federal urban policy was the inclusion of the neighborhood in a "New Partnership," to revitalize depressed areas. In fact, the largest portion of 1978 innovative grant money was allocated to Columbus, Ohio, because this revitalization program was supposed to exemplify President Carter's new partnership. This study will examine citizen participation in the 1978 Columbus, Ohio innovative grant target area by evaluating the nature of neighborhood input during two phases. Phase I is the planning process, and Phase II is the implementation process.

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION DURING THE PLANNING PROCESS

The neighborhood itself was not a participant in the formulation of the neighborhood revitalization program, as the Innovative Grant Application contended. The Innovative Grant Application even went so far as to claim that the revitalization plan was developed by a "consensus" between Battelle, the City, and neighborhood groups, and it listed sixteen neighborhood organizations which it said "...participated in the planning of the...revitalization program" (City of Columbus, 1978:3,16). On the contrary, established neighborhood
leaders were not even aware of the Innovative Grant Application until just a few days before the application deadline. When the City learned that HUD would not accept the application without a public hearing, a meeting was hastily called during the weekend of the blizzard of 1977. Those of us who could attend the meeting were given three short days to examine the program and offer our "input" at City Council's emergency public hearing on Monday. In addition, many of the organizations listed formally opposed major aspects of the revitalization plan.

Officials in the Department of Housing and Urban Development had plenty of notice that there was widespread discontent in the neighborhood in regards to the revitalization plan which the innovative grant was supporting. Leaders of organizations that were listed in the grant application as participants in formulating the plan sent letters to HUD informing them that this was not so, and the neighborhood leadership went on record at numerous hearings objecting to specific aspects of the grant. HUD never once answered letters from the neighborhood groups, but instead established liaisons with Battelle and the City. Objections to the innovative grant were countered by the claim that the plan had the support of the Harrison West Society, the neighborhood's representative government, and that the opposition consisted of a few radicals. However, prior to the awarding of the innovative grant, opponents used the democratic process to take over the Harrison West Society and sent to HUD a document passed by

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6 See description on page 100.

7 See Appendix 3, pages 207-211.
consensus, calling for changes in the revitalization plan. For a while, HUD quieted objections to the grant by announcing that the controversial capital improvements portion was no longer being considered, but in the Spring of 1978 the entire Innovative Grant Application was approved.

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION DURING THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

When HUD finally did send a representative to talk to neighborhood leaders—after the grant was approved—it was to inform us that they considered City Council, and not the Harrison West Society, to represent the neighborhood on policy issues. The City, in turn, took the position that "citizen participation" means that the citizens have a chance to voice their opinion. It does not mean they can influence policy.

HUD's policy of using City Council as the representative of the neighborhood's point of view was a big mistake. Battelle critics had expended a lot of energy to win the Harrison West elections and express their views through use of the Democratic process, and a major aspect of President Carter's urban policy was to include such organizations as equal partners in decision making. Before the elections, when the organization was more friendly towards Battelle, it had been considered the voice of the neighborhood. Now that the critics had won the elections, the organization was no longer seen as the neighborhood's representative—City Council was. In Columbus, City Council members are

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8 The document can be found in Appendix 4, page 221.
9 See story on pages 124-125.
elected at large instead of by neighborhoods. As a result, there were no City Council members from any of the neighborhoods affected by the innovative grant. Jerry Hammond, the City Council member responsible for innovative grant affairs, was clearly in Battelle's hip pocket.

One example of how Councilman Jerry Hammond handled disputes between the neighborhood and Battelle should suffice to illustrate the point that he did not represent the neighborhood. Early on, an issue emerged as to whether or not Harrison West would be included as a target area for 1978 Community Development Block Grants. Harrison West had previously been a C.D.A. target area and wanted to use 1978 C.D.A. money for sweat equity rehabilitation grants and loans. Ken Molli prepared a report showing that according to HUD criteria, Harrison West was an ideal neighborhood to receive the 1978 block grants. When Carol McCabe and I went to discuss the issue with Jerry Hammond, we were told, "It doesn't matter if Harrison West is an ideal neighborhood or not. I will not approve of Harrison West being a target area as long as the major developer (Battelle/CMC) in the area disapproves."

HUD's policy of recognizing city council as the neighborhood's representative effectively left the neighborhood without representation until the establishment of the Innovative Grant Advisory Committee, shortly after the grant was awarded. During the early part of its existence the committee spent much of its time arguing about who should be on it. Representatives who were seen as too anti-Battelle were weeded out, and neighborhoods which were barely affected by the grant, such as Victorian Village, were given equal representation with neighborhoods that were greatly affected by the grant, such as Harrison West. Once
the members became established, they achieved mixed results in incorporating neighborhood views into the revitalization plan. According to Jim Bowman, the committee's co-chairperson, the group's existence prevented Battelle/OMC from totally dominating policy changes, curtailed City Council, and improved the role of the housing corporation (Bowman, 1982). Nancy Yates, the committee's other co-chairperson, described the role of the group by using such terms as "token," and "rubberstamp" (Yates, 1982). Both committee members admitted that the group was ineffective in instituting any major policy changes.

SUMMARY

The participation of the neighborhood as an equal partner in revitalization was supposed to be the hallmark of President Carter's urban policy and the 1978 innovative grant, awarded to Columbus, Ohio, was supposed to exemplify this. Instead, real citizen participation was circumvented by Battelle Institute's lack of respect for the democratic process, and HUD's use of City Council as the neighborhood's representative.

Battelle's strategy, from beginning to end, was to discredit anybody who did not agree with their goals, and to project those who did support their goals as the real representatives of the neighborhood. At first, Carol McCabe and the Harrison West Society was claimed as the neighborhood's representative and critics were branded as "radicals." When the "radicals" used the Democratic process to win the Harrison West elections, it did not make any difference. Even Bob Doan, a president of the Victorian Village
Society who was angered when the Victorian Village Society voted against rezoning for Battelle's shopping center, told City Council that these organizations did not represent the neighborhood's "real people." The "real people," of course, were those who danced to their tune. Toward the end, enough anti-Battelle neighborhood residents had been displaced from the area, and enough pro-Battelle new residents had moved in that Battelle was able to form its own pro-Battelle neighborhood organization. Battelle's Residents for Community Revitalization (RCR) was claimed to represent the neighborhood's "real people," while long established organizations such as the Harrison West Society and the grass-roots people in Neighbors Against Battelle Rezoning (NABR) were branded as "troublemakers."

The continual claim by Battelle/CMC that opponents were radicals deserves a bit of attention. It is true that there were radicals among the neighborhood. As president of the Harrison West Society I had to reject numerous suggestions that I do such things as lead protest marches against Battelle's corporate headquarters or throw a pie in Barry Humphries' face. Some people jumped on the anti-Battelle bandwagon because they were opposed to capitalism and wanted to defeat what they believed was a corrupt corporation exploiting the poor for profit. For some, radical efforts to fight displacement policies were used only after legitimate efforts failed, while for others, hostility ran so deep that compromise or forgiveness was never an option. In spite of these people, the neighborhood had a very legitimate viewpoint which was expressed through proper Democratic channels. Battelle/CMC intentionally circumvented the legitimate neighborhood input in favor
of their own goals, and HUD facilitated this process by ignoring the neighborhood's input in favor of input from a city council guided by a pro-business bias.

HUD officials should have known from experience that corporate groups like Battelle Institute have much more power in city councils than do low income neighborhoods, and that the city actually has a vested interest aligned with the corporation in that displacement and gentrification improves a city's tax base. In the long run, HUD did force Battelle and the City to make many of the changes in the revitalization plan which the neighborhood had been asking for. These changes, however, were the result of negotiations among various bureaucrats working to meet their own goals, and were not the result of citizen input. By the time the government negotiated these changes, a large number of people had already been displaced.

The goal of real effective citizen participation from the neighborhood represents a great failure of the 1978 innovative grant program, from the viewpoint of the residents of Harrison West.

**LAND USE**

Numerous land use issues developed during the revitalization of Harrison West. This study will focus on three major issues: corporate expansion; commercial development; and the building of a park.

**CORPORATE EXPANSION**

Battelle Memorial Institute has grown from a single building located on King Avenue to a multi-building facility stretching from
XVII.
BATTÉLLE EXPANSION
King Avenue on the north to Vermont Street on the south, and from the
Olentangy River on the west to Belmont Boulevard on the east. Early
1900 photographs of Battelle Institute clearly show their initial
single building to be surrounded by residential development. Battelle's
seemingly endless encroachment over the neighborhood is an emotional
issue, especially for those who have experienced this process over the
years. An elderly man once bitterly recounted to me how during his
childhood, the city sold to Battelle the neighborhood's ball diamonds,
and one by one, a little at a time, Battelle turned every one of those
ball diamonds into a parking lot.

At issue is the extent to which a powerful, well financed private
owner has the right to take away property privately owned by individuals.
So far, the power of eminent domain has not been used in Harrison West,
but as is often the case with urban renewal projects, the destruction of
the rest of the neighborhood eventually forces the last hold-outs to
sell. When the city allowed Battelle Institute to rent substandard
units while enforcing code standards on private home owners, many indi-
viduals got the message that the sooner they sold, the better off they
would be. Many of the last hold-outs have found themselves to be among
the last remaining units on their block, and owners of land which has
been devalued and which Battelle Institute will no doubt eventually get.
The resentment created within the neighborhood by Battelle's expansion
is exemplified by a woman who telephone me while I was president of
the Harrison West Society. She was old and dying, and determined not to
let Battelle Institute get her house. Finally, she found a buyer--she
had sold her house to Olentangy Management Company.
Battelle Institute, on the other hand, is an important institution with legitimate growth needs. What makes their expansion needs even more critical is a stipulation in the Will of Gordon Battelle that Battelle Institute must keep its corporate headquarters in the vicinity of Columbus, Ohio (Court of Common Pleas, 1974:8,9).

Both the Harrison West Society and the Fifth-King Group strongly opposed Battelle's expansion into their territories. In addition, some good suggestions, such as a request that they build multi-level parking garages, could have reduced their need for more land. In the end, however, Battelle got what it wanted in terms of expansion territory while the neighborhood lost numerous residents and houses.

COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT

It is not true, as some have argued, that a private owner has a right to do anything he wishes with his property. Zoning laws were established to protect people from undesirable development, and for this reason, Battelle Institute needed to get a change in zoning status from residential to commercial in order to build their desired shopping center. Some of the arguments in favor of the zoning change were not without merit. Shopping center supporters made the following points:

1. It is a long distance from the neighborhood to the neighborhood's two major shopping centers—Thurber Village and the new High Street Super Kroger store. It is especially difficult for elderly people to travel this distance, particularly during the winter.

2. Local delicatessens charge unusually high prices, and have been known to raise prices even further during emergencies such as winter blizzards. "Competitive shopping" would be good for the consumer.
3. Rental units would not be lost if the new center included a number of rental units.

4. The final version of the center represented a compromise in that it was greatly scaled down in terms of size.

5. There was a visible amount of neighborhood support for the center.

6. The center would be more than just a shopping mall. It would be a "neighborhood center" for people living in the area.

Underneath these arguments was a hidden motive not brought up by anyone at City Council hearings: The Will of Gordon Battelle states that certain "non-business income," including real estate ventures, are exempt from the charitable obligation. (Court of Common Pleas, 1974:14). In other words, the shopping center is one of the few ways Battelle Institute can make a profit and not have to give a large portion of it to charity.

Opponents to the zoning change made these arguments:

1. A large shopping center would destroy neighborhood businesses which have adequately served the neighborhood for years.

2. The center's rental units would not benefit the neighborhood because they would be rented at costs out of reach for current neighborhood residents.

3. The proposed center would expose their children to increased levels of traffic, and the entire neighborhood to more crime.

4. Even the scaled down version of the center was too large (63,000 square feet) to be considered a neighborhood center. It would undoubtedly attract a large number of outsiders and harm small businesses on High Street.

5. Battelle/QMC had already destroyed the neighborhood centers created by neighborhood residents, such as the volleyball court and Harper Valley Mother's Club.
6. People supporting the zoning change tended to be new residents who Battelle had brought in, and who tended to look upon their property as an investment. Opponents tended to be long time residents who looked upon the neighborhood as home. In addition, every neighborhood residents' association in the area voted against the zoning change.

The City Council meeting during which the zoning change proposal was decided was an occasion for comic relief. There were the Battelle developers, who had destroyed the neighborhood's meeting places and who did not live in the neighborhood, insisting that the neighborhood needed this center, while the real motive was Battelle's desire to create income producing property free of the charitable obligation. On the other side was a well-organized opposition arguing for keeping the area residential, while underneath it all they were motivated by a long standing hatred for anything Battelle Institute tried to do in the area. Caught in the middle were the City Council members, torn between the City's debt to Battelle, their allegiance to the High Street businesses, and their own knowledge that they had so far given Battelle everything it wanted over neighborhood opposition.

The neighborhood's victory over Battelle on this issue is credited to the leaders of NABR, who had cleverly outmaneuvered the Battelle/CMC people in the political arena. ¹⁰

THE BUILDING OF A PARK

The park issue is a perfect example of what happens when outside planners attempt to develop a neighborhood without proper input from

¹⁰ See story on pages 137-143.
the neighborhood residents. Originally, the innovative grant budget alloted $178,500 for the building of a park on Fourth Avenue. This location happened to be one of the most densely populated areas of the neighborhood, and would have forced the displacement of numerous people as well as the destruction of several fine buildings. At the same time, Battelle/CMC destroyed the volleyball court facilities that the neighborhood had built up and used for recreational purposes and inserted new homes on the lots.

The selection of Fourth Avenue as the park site resulted in a major conflict between neighborhood factions. Some wanted the park while others thought it more important to preserve buildings and avoid displacement. Eventually, the controversial site was dropped, and money alloted for the park in the innovative grant was shifted to the tenant assistance portion of the grant. This angered many people, because in order to meet the grant's obligations to tenants, money was shifted from the park portion of the grant instead of from the portion of the grant that benefitted Battelle. The City, however, promised that a park will be built whenever an appropriate site is located.

The park remains a controversial issue at the time of this writing. Many residents had hoped that the 5.6 acres which were cleared for commercial development would become the new park site, but Battelle's determination to use neighborhood land as income producing property and resentment over losing the rezoning issue make it likely that condominiums will be built on this site. It has been reported that Congressman Chalmers P. Wylie attempted to persuade Battelle officials to allow the park to be built on the proposed commercial development.
site, but Sherwood Fawcett told Wylie that this was "none of his business" (Hine, 1982).

When money was taken from the innovative grant park budget in 1979, the City made a firm commitment to the neighborhood for the park. However, instead of the original 2.5 acre park, the City is now proposing a 2.5 lot mini park. The Harrison West Society has voted to accept the mini park, rather than turn it down, but a resolution was passed making it clear that the neighborhood considers the park commitment unfulfilled.

**Preservation**

The first time I ever learned that a place called "Battelle Memorial Institute" existed was when I moved to Columbus in 1974. There was an issue in the press then concerning Battelle's intent to destroy the old railroad building in order to erect the Ohio Center. Various preservation groups were fighting to save the building as an historical monument. One morning the paper announced that there was no longer an issue to be discussed. During the night Battelle had moved in the bulldozers and destroyed the building. As a "compromise," the building's front entrance was saved, and it now stands in Sensenbrenner Park near the Nationwide Building.

A similar incident occurred in Harrison West. It was discovered that Elsie Janice, a World War I troop entertainer, was born in a house

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11 See page 134.

12 See page 228.
XVII.

MICHIGAN AVE. SCHOOL CONVERTED TO SECTION 8 HOUSING; DENNISON PLACE PRESERVATION FOR THE AFFLUENT
located on West Fifth Avenue. Carol McCabe came up with a plan to convert the house into an Appalachian museum, and went to Olentangy Management Company to ask them not to demolish it until this possibility could be explored. A high ranking Olentangy Management Company official told McCabe, "Don't worry about it. This is Friday and nothing could possibly happen before Monday." On Saturday morning Carol heard a bulldozer and ran down the street to find the house being demolished. Carol pleaded with the bulldozer driver to stop until she could call Olentangy Management Company, but she was told, "I have orders to get this building down immediately."

Many of the neighborhood's important landmarks were destroyed by Battelle/OMC during the revitalization process. Two of the most notable of these are the Harper Valley Mother's Club and the volleyball court. The Harper Valley Mother's Club was a low income buying center which had served various neighborhood needs, and functioned as a meeting place since 1966. The volleyball court was built more recently, but was truly an example of neighborhood people trying to build up their neighborhood. Many truckloads of trash were hauled off of the vacant Battelle lots, grass was cut, sod was placed, a horseshoe pit was dug, and a stage was constructed--all at the expense of and by the labor of neighborhood people. The volleyball court area served as a center for numerous parties, festivals, fund raisers and informal gatherings during its short existence. After Battelle/OMC destroyed the volleyball court to build new houses, demolished the Harper Valley Mother's Club, and infilled many lots that had been used by the neighborhood as gardens, they had the nerve to claim that the neighborhood needed a shopping
IXX. RENAISSANCE INFILL HOUSING
center because there was no place for the people to meet. One would think that with the millions of dollars the corporation gave to charity, it could have donated, or at least sold, these important areas to the neighborhood.

Another preservation issue has to do with demolition of old houses versus restoration. Battelle/OMC has made the claim that some of the houses were in such bad shape that it was cheaper to tear them down and infill the lots with new houses than to restore them. This might be true, from a business standpoint. That is, Battelle/OMC could make more money by demolition and infill. However, from the standpoint of architectural preservation and from the standpoint of avoiding displacement, sweat-equity restoration made more sense. The Near Northside Neighborhood Housing and Development Corporation as well as some residents took some of the worst houses in the neighborhood and restored them. Furthermore, many residents feel that the new infill housing is not in keeping with the neighborhood's architecture. This, of course, is a matter of opinion, but no one from the neighborhood was consulted about the architectural design of the infill units.

In addition to the large number of houses demolished in favor of more expensive infill units, there was a large number of houses lost to Battelle projects, such as their eastward expansion, their southern expansion, and their proposed commercial development area. At this time it is impossible to calculate the number of homes Battelle/OMC has demolished in the neighborhood since the awarding of the innovative grant. The number has not been small, however, and this process is still going on.
XX.

PLACES WE'LL MISS
As a sort of compromise, Battelle/CMC did agree to save some houses from the Perry Street area by moving them. This was not a suitable solution to the neighborhood, because the houses were restored so well that they became way beyond the financial reach of the low income people who once inhabited them. Six houses were set up in a courtyard display on West Fifth Avenue, and money was charged just to look at them. On one hand, the neighborhood managed to save these houses; on the other hand, it was not for the benefit of anyone living in the neighborhood.

Historic preservationists are not natural allies with low income neighborhoods. Preservation and restoration of historic sites often price low income people out of their neighborhoods. In the case of Harrison West, historic preservationists did contribute to the innovative grant controversy which resulted in the Memorandum of Agreement Compromise.13

**COMPROMISE**

Since the official awarding of the innovative grant in October, 1978, two major budget revisions have been implemented.14 The first budget revision was approved in June of 1979, and reflected the growing recognition of the need to increase tenant assistance, and to support the Near Northside Neighborhood Housing and Development Corporation. In this budget revision, $287,500 was reallocated from the

13 See story pages 132-136.
14 See page 196.
interior rehabilitation portion of the grant to the housing corporation, and $118,500 was taken from the Perry Street Relocation project ($67,000) and the Fourth Avenue Park ($51,500) for increased relocation assistance.

The second major budget revision was the result of negotiations which led to the Memorandum of Agreement signed on March 12, 1980. Budget changes from this agreement resulted in the shifting of $375,000 worth of funds from the Fourth Avenue Park ($90,000), Third Avenue improvements ($233,400), and relocation assistance ($51,500) portions of the grant to the housing corporation and interior rehabilitation grants sections.

Factors leading to the Memorandum of Agreement and the two supplemental amendments have already been discussed in Chapter V, Part II of this dissertation. This chapter will focus on the merits of the actual changes that took place. Although numerous aspects of these changes are subject to analysis, the major changes which resulted include:

1. Olentangy Management Company agreed to hold seventy-nine properties to be sold as-is for a tenant-buyer sweat-equity program. Thirty-one properties were to be sold to the Near North Housing Corporation and forty-eight properties were to be sold to the City of Columbus.

2. Through a complicated procedure, sale prices of the seventy-nine units were to be determined and frozen at September, 1980 values.

3. Innovative grant interior rehabilitation grants were increased from $7,500 to $10,000. More importantly, the $10,000 could be used as a purchase down-payment, instead of for interior rehabilitation.

4. The City was to provide CETA workers, and $415,000 worth of three percent interest Section 312.

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15 See pages 135-136.
rehabilitation loans for rehabilitation costs, as well as overhead costs for the housing corporation.

5. Innovative grant boundaries were revised.

6. Both the City and Olentangy Management Company were to undertake greater efforts to assist in identifying relocation housing resources and in providing necessary relocation services and assistance to displaced households.

7. The City made a firm commitment to the Perry Street expansion project by agreeing to resolve environmental issues with the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation and the Ohio Historic Preservation Office, by agreeing to assist in the identification and relocation of an additional three structures from the proposed right-of-way, and by agreeing to the use, if necessary, of the City's acquisition authority or the power of eminent domain.

Contained in these changes are many of the aspects of tenant assistance which the neighborhood had been fighting for from the beginning. The costs of the homes tenants were to buy were frozen, and tenants were able to purchase them as-is and totally rehabilitate them with sweat-equity. At the same time, Battelle/OMC got assurances that the City and housing corporation would see to it that the houses did get rehabilitated. The amount of assistance each tenant home buyer received was increased, and this money could be used as a down payment, while three percent loan money was obtained for sweat equity rehabilitation. Harrison West became included in the innovative grant boundaries, and relocation assistance for displaced families was greatly improved. Most of all, a contract was actually signed outlining in writing the specific obligations of each party in the public/private partnership.

Many neighborhood people do not consider these changes to be a legitimate compromise—and for good reasons. To begin with, the
SWEAT EQUITY REVITALIZATION: CITY LOTTERY TOUR; HOUSING CORPORATION C.E.T.A. CREW: INDIVIDUAL EFFORTS
Memorandum of Agreement is an agreement worked out between Battelle/OMC, the City, and the housing corporation, under pressure from HUD. Whereas President Carter's policy was supposed to create a new partnership with the neighborhood taking an equal role in decision making, not one neighborhood representative signed the Memorandum of Agreement, or was privy to the negotiations which led up to it. Even though many of the concessions the neighborhood worked for were incorporated into the agreement, these concessions did not come when or because the neighborhood requested them. Instead, they came because HUD determined that the original innovative grant goal of one-hundred twenty to one hundred fifty tenant buyers was not being accomplished. The original goals established by the grant were created by Battelle and the City, without proper neighborhood input. In other words, these concessions were forced upon Battelle and the City by HUD in order to meet the original tenant buyer goal established by Battelle and the City. HUD had to insist upon meeting this goal in order to justify taxpayer subsidy of Battelle expansion. Worst of all, Battelle/OMC housing policy had already resulted in the displacement of so many residents, that HUD was forced to change the eligibility requirements in order to get enough tenant buyers to justify the grant. At first, only Battelle tenants living in Phase I were eligible for the tenant assistance, but because so many people were displaced from Phase I, the boundary was extended into Phase II. Eventually, in order to get the required number of tenant buyers, HUD extended eligibility to any low-moderate income person living in any house anywhere on the entire Near Northside! Even so, it is still questionable at this time whether there will be enough
tenant buyers to justify the grant. Regardless, a large portion of those who did receive the grants are not the people the grant was originally intended for.

In some ways the final program which emerged from all the fighting does represent a suitable compromise. Even though no elected neighborhood representatives participated in formulating the Memorandum of Agreement, many established neighborhood leaders are on the housing corporation and Godman Guild boards, and many of the changes incorporated into the agreement represent changes the Harrison West Society fought for. It is true that many residents were needlessly displaced prior to these changes, but most families on the Godman Guild displacement list were contacted and informed of their new opportunity to move back into the neighborhood as homeowners. Many did move back, many others did not.

When conflicting groups agree to compromise, it usually means each gets some, but not all, of what it originally wanted. In this case, the neighborhood got its sweat-equity program and Battelle got its corporate expansion. However, because of the timing of the agreement in conjunction with displacement, many of the neighborhood's original residents were not beneficiaries of compromise.
CONCLUSION

The revitalization of Harrison West is a classic case of urban conflict. While the city and private developers held a vested interest in promoting gentrification, neighborhood organizations used federal grant regulations to force policy changes aimed at reducing displacement. The results are mixed: Many people who should have benefitted from revitalization sponsored by a charitable trust and the Department of Housing and Urban Development were needlessly displaced, while many people who would have been displaced under ordinary circumstances were able to remain in the neighborhood.

The attitude toward revitalization taken by Battelle/CMC officials is best exemplified by a letter addressed to Barry Humphries from Richard Green, President of a research group called "Urban Dynamics." Urban Dynamics, Inc., was contracted to provide Olentangy Management Company with advice about various revitalization issues, and evidently, a disgruntled CMC employee stole the letter from Barry Humphries' mailbox and sent it to State Senator Michael Schwartzwalder. Among other things, Urban Dynamics advised Olentangy Management Company to: continue piecemeal demolition in expansion areas so as to isolate remaining private home owners; pull out all stops to prevent Vermont Street from being included in the historical district; and use the Michigan Avenue School area for elderly and handicapped housing so as to provide a buffer between Phase I and Phase II and to
maximize Battelle's public relations. The letter specifically states, "Under no circumstances should family low-income housing be allowed as it will defeat market upgrading..." (Green, 1978).

In the opinion of this writer, these policies, which were detrimental to the residents of Harrison West, did not derive from evil intentions on the part of Battelle, OMC, or city officials. Instead, these people viewed revitalization from an economic standpoint and believed that in comparison to what they could have done, they were being charitable and generous.

By contrast, people in the neighborhood felt the negative consequences of Battelle, OMC, and city policy and viewed issues from a social standpoint. Few of us, however, have reason to be totally proud of the way we handled ourselves during these events. We approached the situation from a position of uncompromising hostility, and eventually turned this hatred upon ourselves.

In my opinion, the result of this episode represents an excellent model for revitalization: Private enterprise is subsidized by the government in return for concessions which minimize displacement. Battelle got its expansion and capital improvements while the neighborhood got its sweat equity program. In terms of Harrison West, the program has mixed results. More of our neighbors and important sites could have been saved if real citizen participation had been part of revitalization from the beginning.

This study has been a qualitative summary of the revitalization process and analysis of issues. No attempt has been made to quantitatively measure the effect of policies on the neighborhood. If such
an attempt were to be made, I would recommend the inclusion of the following issues:

1. How many houses were demolished in the grant target area, and for what reasons?

2. How many demolished homes were replaced, and to what extent were replacement units affordable to neighborhood residents?

3. To what extent were new government subsidized units occupied by displaced neighborhood residents?

4. How many people were displaced, and for what specific reasons?

5. How effective was relocation assistance and services?

6. What are the demographic characteristics of new residents in comparison with the demographic characteristics of displaced residents?

7. How many renters and home owners were able to remain in the neighborhood who would have otherwise been displaced?

8. To what extent were innovative grant recipients long term neighborhood residents, and what proportion of them would not have qualified for the grant under its original regulations?

The revitalization of Harrison West was a dramatic event in the lives of all who experienced it. Our friends who were permanently displaced will never be forgotten. For those of us who remain, it is still not too late to make the neighborhood our home.
APPENDICES
### TABLE I
Population, Housing and Density Characteristics for Harrison West

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<td>Percent Black</td>
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#### Housing and Density Characteristics

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<tr>
<td>Percent renter-occupied</td>
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<td>60.1</td>
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<td>Percent vacant</td>
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<td>*Adjusted value</td>
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<td>(8036)</td>
<td>(6775)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average rental value of units</td>
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<td>(39.89)</td>
<td>(59.26)</td>
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<td>Average number of persons per unit</td>
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<td>Percent of units that lack adequate plumbing</td>
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<td>Percent of neighborhood blocks occupied by non-whites</td>
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<td>Percent of units built 1899 or before</td>
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<td>Percent of units built between 1900-1919</td>
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<td>Percent of units built between 1920-1929</td>
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<td>Percent of units built between 1930-1939</td>
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Source: Thompson, 1981.
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### Table 3

Similarity Between the Neighborhoods
and the City of Columbus: Quality Indexes

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TABLE 4
Quality of Housing Units for the City of Columbus and Selected Neighborhoods, 1960

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<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>Deteriorated Units</th>
<th>Dilapidated Units</th>
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<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
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<td>Columbus</td>
<td>24168</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;The Bottoms&quot;</td>
<td>3245</td>
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<td>Hilltop</td>
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<td>Clintonville</td>
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<td>Reeb-Hosack</td>
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<th>Zone</th>
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<th>Total Buildings</th>
<th>Total %</th>
<th>Standard %</th>
<th>Minor Deficiency %</th>
<th>Major Deficiency %</th>
<th>Sub-Standard %</th>
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<td>% Owned by Battelle by Condition Category</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>59.7%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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Source: City of Columbus Building Condition Survey.
## TABLE 6
### Original Innovative Grant Budget

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<td><strong>Exterior Housing Rehabilitation</strong></td>
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<td>OMC (239 Units)</td>
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<td>Other: Private (240 Units)</td>
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<td>Owner - Non-assisted</td>
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<tr>
<td>Owner - Assisted</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Moving Costs of Housing</strong></td>
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<td>OMC (16 Units)</td>
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<td><strong>Land Donation</strong></td>
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<td>OMC - Boulevard</td>
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<td>OMC - Park</td>
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<td><strong>Infrastructure Improvements</strong></td>
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<td>Alley Improvements</td>
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<td>Boulevard*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Circle/Mini-Parks*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Third Avenue Improvements*</td>
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<td><strong>Other Assistance</strong></td>
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<td>OMC - Professional Design Fees</td>
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<td>Home Maintenance Support*</td>
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<td>Placement Services*</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDBG Support</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL BUDGET</strong></td>
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<td>Private</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public (CDBG, Innovative Grant, Local)</td>
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*Contingent on Innovative Grant Approval

Source: City of Columbus, 1977.
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<tr>
<td>Circle/Mini-Parks</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>1,006,100</td>
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<td>2,003,100</td>
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APPENDIX: B MAPS
Map 3

CENSUS TRACTS IN RELATION TO

THE NEIGHBORHOOD

Source: Near Northside Housing Task Force.
Map 4

DEVELOPMENT PLAN AND PROGRAM

The following map shows the areas included in each phase and the specific project areas included in Phase One:

- King Avenue/OSS
- Battelle Expansion
- Circle Park/Neil Avenue
- Harrison Avenue/Pennsylvania Avenue

A number of program activities will take place throughout the study area. These include: increased code enforcement and maintenance activity; increased maintenance of streets, alleys, and storm drainage.

January 23, 1978

Mr. Howard Ball, Director  
Office of Policy Planning  
Community Planning and Development Division  
U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development  
451 Seventh Street, S.W. Room 7158  
Washington, D.C. 20410

Dear Mr. Ball:

I am pleased to submit for your consideration the accompanying Innovative Grant proposal for the City of Columbus, Ohio.

The Innovative Grant will be used to support a public/private partnership for the revitalization of the Near North/University Neighborhood and to reduce tenant displacement and gentrification. I believe you will find the proposal responsive to the desires of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, as announced in the Federal Register of November 14, 1977.

Specifically, the Columbus Innovative Grant will advance the state of the art in urban reinvestment and will reduce the isolation of income groups within the Near North/University area. The Innovative Grant will permit the City of Columbus to participate in the privately initiated revitalization program in a manner which will promote the economic diversity of the project area and reduce the dislocation of existing lower income tenants.

I appreciate the opportunity to submit this proposal for Innovative Grant consideration. Please do not hesitate to request any further information that may be necessary during the review process.

Sincerely,

TOM MOODY, MAYOR  
N. JACK HUDDLE, DIRECTOR  
DEPARTMENT OF DEVELOPMENT
Dear Dr. Fawcett,

Please believe me when I say to you that it is not my purpose to discredit Battelle Institute, an organization which I hold a lot of respect for. The things I have said publicly about Battelle: that Battelle has been inconsiderate toward the people of our neighborhood; that Battelle hired rental agencies which avoided proper repairs on our houses; that Battelle's housing policies have resulted in the needless destruction of valuable houses; that Battelle's failure to maintain its properties has blighted our neighborhood; that Battelle had to be taken to court and forced to meet the charitable stipulations of Gordon Battelle's will; that Battelle seems more interested in profit than humanity; are not ideas I have invented, but things I have heard people talking about ever since I moved to this neighborhood.

Battelle is now in danger of receiving an additional stigma for making a profit from poor people's homes; reducing the supply of low-income housing; destroying the character of a viable neighborhood; and displacing Blacks, Appalachians and old people. This is not the kind of public image Battelle Institute wants or deserves.

Simply by making a few changes in your renovation plan, you could completely turn around the Institute's negative image. What I am asking you to consider is to turn Harrison West into an urban laboratory and study problems associated with improving low-income neighborhoods. By implementing a rent equity plan the institute would still get the money from the houses, but the low-income people of our neighborhood would be able to buy their houses by continuing to pay the current monthly rent payments which they can afford. By cutting out some of the cosmetic improvements such as expensive marks and gardens, and instead finding funds for an efficient garbage disposal system, an educational program, home insulation, etc., Battelle could teach a low-income neighborhood...
how to live efficiently. In addition, renovation projects could be designed to employ the people of our neighborhood and to teach roofing, painting, and carpentry skills to our youth.

In short, Harrison West could become a model low-income neighborhood and the knowledge we gain from the experiment would be of value to every city in the country as well as the world. I do not believe Battelle Institute could do a greater service to humanity than to discover how to operate energy efficient low-income neighborhoods.

Please do not get the impression that we are asking for a hand-out. All we are asking for is the opportunity to help ourselves and to share what we learn with other neighborhoods. This would result in perpetuating Battelle Institute's image as an organization serving humanity, make Columbus a model city—the first city to create an energy efficient low-income neighborhood, and help solve one of our society's greatest social problems.

I hope you will not let the negative feelings that some Battelle people have toward the community I am speaking up for to interfere with your decision to do what you believe is right in this situation.

Sincerely,

Norman Rose
November 7, 1977

Mr. Norman Rose
1219 Harrison Avenue
Columbus, Ohio 43201

Dear Mr. Rose:

Thank you for your letter and your suggestions on development of the area surrounding the Institute.

I want to assure you that all of the possibilities you present, and many others as well, were considered. Olentangy Management Company worked with highly respected neighborhood planners in devising the most responsible plan it could for revitalizing the neighborhood. The planning process involved numerous neighborhood organizations, The Ohio State University, local hospitals, and City agencies and officials in face-to-face discussions and group meetings. The execution of the plan will require a great deal of cooperation from these various groups and, as you may know, OMC is vigorously pursuing Federal and City financing programs, many of which could benefit low income groups.

I want to emphasize that any suggestion that Battelle Memorial Institute is "making a profit from poor people's homes" is unfair. While Battelle is a nonprofit organization, it must, as a matter of law, be as business-like in its conduct as any other organization. In establishing the Olentangy Management Company, the objective was to stabilize the neighborhood and not to maximize profit. At best, the hope was and is to recover the investment in the homes being placed on the market. And, indeed, at the present time, projections indicate that the investment may not be recovered.

I am confident that Olentangy Management Company, in conjunction with neighborhood groups, has developed a responsible plan. We hope that you can join in support of these efforts.

Very truly yours,

S. L. Fawcett
President
March 1, 1978

Bill Sanborn
Acting Director
Innovative Grants Program
U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development
451 Seventh, S.W.
Washington D.C.

Dear Mr. Sanborn:

The enclosed resolution was adopted by the Fifth to King Section at its meeting on Tuesday, February 21, 1978. The resolution addresses the Innovative Grant Proposal submitted by the Columbus Department of Development on January 27 and currently under consideration by your department.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me. I can be reached before 5:00 p.m. at (614) 466-5364 and evenings at (614) 421-7178. Thank you for your attention.

Sincerely,

Marsha L. Moorehead
Vice President
Fifth to King Section

cc: Tom Moody, Mayor
cc: Jerry Hammond, City Councilman
cc: Jack Huddle, Director of Development
cc: Mike Schwarzwalder, State Senator
cc: Mike Stinziano, State Representative
cc: Barry Humphries, President, Olentangy Mgmt. Co.
cc: Karen Schwarzwalder, University Area Commission
cc: Pete McWane, President, Fifth to King Section
cc: Randy Morrison, Godman Guild
RESOLUTION

WHEREAS the Innovative Grant Proposal was prepared by the Department of Development without concern for or adherence to the legislated requirements for community involvement; and

WHEREAS Federal officials have advised us that the proposal, if approved, would have very little, if any, flexibility in the development of the project;

WHEREAS we are opposed to several elements of the capital improvements portion of the proposal; and

WHEREAS there are no assurances that the $700,000 for housing assistance grants will be operable and further that there are no assurances that an adequate market exists in the neighborhood;

WHEREAS our neighborhood group was not consulted in the development of the application

THEREFORE, as the neighborhood most affected by the proposal, the Fifth to King Section opposes the Innovative Grant as applied for, and urges HUD disapproval.

Adopted by Fifth to King Section
February 21, 1978
William E. Sanborn
Acting Director, Innovative Grants
U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development
451 Seventh Street, S.W.
Washington D.C. 20410

Dear Mr. Sanborn:

This is a follow-up to our original letter of February 22 regarding the Innovative Grant Proposal submitted by the Columbus Department of Community Development.

I am pleased to inform you that the Fifth to King Neighborhood Group voted by an overwhelming majority to retract the original letter which expressed opposition to the proposal. Following lengthy discussion, the group voted to support the proposal in light of the following developments:

- Recent discussions to cut all or major parts of the capital improvements;
- Assurance of flexibility to assure community involvement; and,
- Support of our city officials for the grant and for the concepts of community involvement.

It is our intent to work cooperatively with the city and other interested parties to assure that continued redevelopment of our neighborhood is in the best interests of its residents.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Pete McWane
President

cc: U.S. Senator Howard Metzenbaum
cc: Mayor Tom Moody
cc: Councilman Jerry Hammond
cc: Senator Mike Schwarzwalder
cc: Representative Mike Stinziano
cc: Jack Huddle, Development Department
cc: Barry Humphries, Olentangy Management
cc: Karen Schwarzwalder, U.D.O.
c: Randy Morrison, Godman Guild
February 24, 1978

Mr. William Sanborn  
Acting Director, Innovative Grants  
Housing & Urban Development  
451 7th S. W.  
Washington, D.C.  20410

Dear Mr. Sanborn:

As you probably know, the City of Columbus, Ohio and the Dept. of Development have applied for a $2 million innovative grant, in conjunction with Battelle Memorial Institute (BMI) and its' management company, Olentangy Management Corp. (OMC).

We are residents of the Harrison West neighborhood, part of which lies in the innovative grant target area, and there are a few items concerning the development of this proposal that have caused much concern for many residents, and we would like you and your department to take these items into consideration when reviewing the proposal.

1) The Process: According to the regulations, 2 public hearings were to be held prior to the application, in order to let the public have a chance to participate, offer input and suggest viable alternatives.

The process in this grant was sorely ignored. Public hearings were not even considered until a group of residents heard, quite by accident, of the grant, and went to City Council to ask for their help in allowing us the proper process. City Council was caught by surprise - they had received the grant for their consideration within the week it was to be brought before them for endorsement.

Councilpersons Jerry Hammond and Pam Conrad, on the development committee, were very accommodating and helpful, and offered to help salvage the "process" by having a public hearing the next evening in our neighborhood. This attempt at "process" was appreciated, and in spite of the short notice and near-blizzard conditions, a large number of people turned out. Judging from the confusion, concern and controversy expressed at the meeting, perhaps it would have been more timely for participation to have occurred when it was intended - during the initial developmental phase of the proposal. Instead, due to the deadline, we were left with a "take it or leave it" choice rather than endorsing a well-rounded, thoughtfully prepared proposal.

2) Substance: If the process had been followed, perhaps the substance would have been clearer and more helpful to our neighborhood. There are many questions on the implementation of the grant which remain unanswered, and the growing problem of low-income displacement did not seem to be adequately handled.
We understand that there is about $700,000 earmarked for "housing assistance" and $1.2 million for Battelle expansion and capital improvements. The housing assistance, though badly needed, seemed sketchy, and there were serious questions raised as to whether the money could be utilized in our neighborhood, since it involves (to the best of our understanding) increasing the amount of the mortgage, which would necessarily raise the monthly payment - perhaps out of the range of an average low-income resident.

We recognise the benefits of mixed-income neighborhoods, and feel our neighborhood has a good mix - both in ethnicity and income - but question the fairness of mixing low income areas, without moving the displaced people into high-income areas.

Considering the capital improvement portion of the grant, nearly every item could cause displacement: removing housing for a Boulevard, when an adequate street already exists; making a park in one of the most densely housed areas of Harrison West, and turning the vacant lots which the neighborhood already uses as parks, into housing - all to be paid for by Community Development money, instead of by the Institute who will benefit, through increased property values.

There are many minor points which are questionable, too, which you may want to pursue after reviewing the proposal, but we felt it important to let your department know some background and major points of contention, for fairness in deciding the acceptability of this proposal.

We also would like to have the name of "Harrison West Housing Council" removed from page 16 of the proposal, since we did not knowingly participate in any phase of the development of it, and were completely surprised to find our name there. We further reserve opinion on the proposal until such time that these current discrepancies are resolved.

The Housing Council obviously feels that citizen participation and process were not followed, and for future reference we would like to know what H.U.D. feels is adequate participation.

Thank you for your time, we hope in the future that communication between the federal and local levels can be more in a supportive rather than questioning vein.

Sincerely,

Debbie Willaman, chairperson
Harrison West Housing Council

cc: Carol McCabe, Harrison West
    Randy Morrison, Godman Guild
    Pam Conrad, City Council
    Mayor Tom Moody
    Senator Michael Schwartzwalder
    Senator Howard Metzenbaum
    Barry Humphries, CMC
APRIL 24, 1978

Norman Rose
1219 Harrison Ave.
Columbus, Ohio 43201

Sherwood Fawcett, President
Battelle Memorial Institute
505 King Ave.
Columbus, Ohio

Dear Mr. Fawcett:

We all must be very tired of the negative press stories concerning Battelle Institute's plans to revitalize Near Northside neighborhoods. We have been outspoken in the press because we have gotten the feeling that Battelle Planners are indifferent to the neighborhood's point of view. I hope you realize that we are not just a bunch of radical trouble makers, but that there is widespread discontent concerning what is going on.

On April 18, 1978 there was a special meeting of the Harrison West Society, the neighborhood's representative government. The meeting was held so that the neighborhood could come to grips with what it is we do not like about the revitalization program. Each of the resolutions in the enclosed handout was passed by consensus, with no objections. I believe that in the long run, how Battelle responds to the neighborhood's concerns will be a measure of how good the revitalization program was.

Wouldn't it be nice if future press stories could report that the neighborhood and Battelle worked out their differences? Will you please negotiate with us on these issues?

Sincerely,

Norman Rose
April 27, 1978

Mr. Norman Rose
1219 Harrison Avenue
Columbus, OH 43201

Dear Mr. Rose:

This is to acknowledge your letter of April 24.

We appreciate the time you have taken to bring to our attention your views and those of the Harrison West Society concerning the Olentangy Management Company's efforts to upgrade property it controls. Inasmuch as the Company has the complete responsibility for this improvement program, I am passing your letter along to Mr. Barry Humphries, President of OMC. I feel confident you will be hearing from him soon.

Very truly yours,

[Signature]

S. L. Fawcett
President

SLF:rm1
April 24, 1978

Norman Rose
1219 Harrison Ave.
Columbus, Ohio 43201

Mr. Barry Humphries, President
Olentangy Management Company
1255 Neil Ave.
Columbus, Ohio 43201

Dear Barry:

As you know, one of the criteria for a good revitalization program is neighborhood participation in the planning and implementation process. There are many people in the neighborhood who feel that real neighborhood participation in the planning for the revitalization of our neighborhood has been circumvented, and as a result the Harrison West Society, the neighborhood's representative government, has formalized a document outlining the changes we would like to see implemented in the OMC Master Plan. On the overall, these changes are designed to preserve the character of our neighborhood by maximizing neighborhood participation in the implementation of revitalization itself.

I would like to invite you to respond to these ideas in writing, and to discuss your responses in person with Harrison West Society members. If you will agree to discuss these issues with us in a straightforward manner, I will make every effort as President of the Harrison West Society to keep the conversations on a constructive level.

I believe the time has come for the neighborhood and OMC to come to terms with each other so that the revitalization of Harrison West can go forward in a positive manner. Since this document is the official position of the neighborhood, your willingness to settle these issues with us will, in the long run, be an indication of neighborhood participation. I hope the neighborhood's views will be incorporated into your Master Plan.

Sincerely,

Norman Rose
May 3, 1978

Norris Rusc
1219 Harrison Avenue
Columbus, Ohio 43201

Dear Norman:

We received your letter of April 24, 1978 and the recommended changes to the OMC Master Plan. I would like to meet with you to review the proposals, and suggest the dates of Monday, May 15th or Tuesday, May 16, at a time mutually convenient. Please let me know if these dates are open and a time that would be convenient for you.

I am looking forward to meeting with you to discuss your letter.

Sincerely,

Barry K. Humphries
President

/signature
May 5, 1978

Norman Rose  
1210 Harrison Ave.  
Columbus, Ohio 43201

Mr. Robert Embry  
Office of Neighborhood Development  
Dept. of Housing and Urban Development  
1075 Connecticut St.  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Embry:

On April 15, 1978 the Harrison West Society passed a series of requests for changes in Battelle Institute's Master Plan to revitalize our neighborhood. As you know, the displacement of low and moderate income people from their homes is a major social problem in U.S. cities. The changes we are asking for are designed to minimize displacement by maximizing the neighborhood's participation in its own development.

We are calling your attention to these requests because the City of Columbus recently applied for an Innovative Grant from HUD. We believe that the housing assistance portion of the Innovative Grant complements the neighborhood's goal of revitalization with minimal displacement.

It is our understanding that President Carter's new urban policy calls for a union between private enterprise, the federal government, and the neighborhoods. If the neighborhood's requests were joined with the Battelle Master Plan and the Innovative Grant, then our neighborhood would be an ideal model of the President's urban policy. We believe a revitalization program would be truly innovative if it minimized displacement and helped the neighborhood help itself.

Sincerely,

Norman Rose  
President of the Harrison West Society
May 19, 1978

The Honorable John H. Glenn
Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Glenn:

Senator Howard Metzenbaum has been contacted relative to the Olentangy Management Company's plans to renovate and revitalize the Harrison West neighborhood in Columbus, Ohio. Our information has it that the plan, if implemented, would displace large numbers of working class Appalachian families.

I have toured the Harrison West neighborhood and have met with Norman Rose, the new president of the Harrison West Society. My talks with Norman Rose and my tour of the neighborhood has convinced me that there is an ongoing effort within the Harrison West Community to upgrade the living standards of the current residents. These efforts to revitalize the community will have been futile if the housing stock is renovated in such a way as to displace the current residents. Displacement is a common social problem for urban Appalachians.

The Housing Assistance portion of the Innovative Grant would help to reduce displacement. This is a unique opportunity for the Federal Government, a private corporation, and the neighborhood to unite behind a revitalization program that rebuilds a neighborhood rather than displacing its residents.

If we can be of any assistance to your office on this question, please contact us. Thank you for taking the time to read this letter.

Sincerely yours,

Michael E. Maloney
Executive Director

MEM/mrd
May 26, 1978

TO: Olentangy Management Company, Barry Humphries, Pres.
Harrison West Society, Norman Rose, President
Fifth to King Association, Pearson McWane, President
NECKO, Bruce Badger, President
Near Northside Neighborhood Council, Pearson McWane, President
Near Northside Neighborhood Housing and Development Corporation, Kenneth Molli, President
Columbus City Council, M. D. Portman, President
Columbus Development Department, Jack Huddle, Director
Victorian Village Society, Robert Doane, President

Throughout April and into May, the Seminar "Neighborhood in Question" has been studying and discussing various aspects of housing rehabilitation on the Near Northside, with special emphasis on the areas west of Neil Avenue from Third Avenue to the Ohio State University campus.

The series was initiated by First Community Church as part of its adult education program. The Urban Alternatives Group was engaged to plan and organize the seminar in cooperation with the staff of Godman Guild and other neighborhood organizations. Presentations were planned to acquaint participants with issues in the area, such as the problem of low and moderate income residential displacement, but with a planned outcome other than that produced by the seminar members.

Participation in the seminar was well balanced. More than 40 people attended the "kick-off" forum preceding it and half of them continued in the five-week seminar. They were joined by more than 30 others and of these 50 people, 28 (exclusive of staffs) came to two or more sessions of the seminar. Attendance at each of the five sessions averaged more than 20 people. Neither the area residents nor members of First Community Church predominated.

At the close of the seminar it was decided to forward to all interested organizations these main ideas that seemed to offer promise of resolving some aspects of the displacement issue:

1. The Columbus City Council and Administration need a coordinated means, such as a task force, for assuming and carrying out a firm commitment to reduce the negative impact of low and moderate income displacement in the area studied,

2. Residents and others interested in the area west of Victorian Village on the Near Northside might consider asking City Council to adopt an ordinance establishing an Area Commission.
3. To promote a creative approach to investment from leading institutions the same parties, possibly combining with others, might consider asking the national Urban Reinvestment Task Force to sponsor a Neighborhood Housing Services project in this area.

4. To facilitate neighborhood employment and rehabilitation by occupants, the Near Northside Housing and Development Corporation and/or private organizations might set up one-to-one training programs, with or without public subsidies, for those rehabilitating houses purchased in "as is" condition.

5. To promote tenant purchases, Olentangy Management Company might consider using its equity position to initiate a program of loans and/or deferred repayment on such houses.

6. To help meet low income housing needs, Olentangy Management Company might develop strategies to maximize retention of low income rental units.

7. To help meet moderate income needs, Olentangy Management Company and other property owners might consider converting their largest properties partly to mixed professional-residential uses (subject to neighborhood control in which lower-floor uses would help hold down upper-floor residential costs and further conversions to higher income uses would be avoided).

8. All parties might consider concentrating other future efforts on the area south of Fifth Avenue, where development patterns are less well established and sales of properties "as is", Section 8 subsidized rentals and similar strategies may be more easily applied than elsewhere.

9. To assist residents in getting access to needed human and other resources, First Community Church and others might consider being involved in a "talent pool" of business and professional advisers available to neighborhood organizations.

We would be glad to have comments from the addressees on any of the foregoing points that can be developed further.

Sincerely yours,

John Cairns
First Community Church

Grant Hilliker
The Urban Alternatives Group

Encls.
"Neighborhood in Question" Program
List of Participants
APPENDIX: D HARRISON WEST RESOLUTIONS
Since the economic depression of the 1930's the federal government has spent billions of dollars on urban renewal projects which have destroyed viably functioning neighborhoods, displaced low-income people from their homes, and reduced the supply of housing available to low and moderate income people. We believe that Olentangy Management Company's Master Plan to revitalize Northside Neighborhoods suffers from the same faults as these urban renewal programs. Because of Battelle Institute's unique structure as a research corporation and a charitable trust, we respectfully request that Olentangy Management Company's Master Plan be revised so as to preserve the overall character of our neighborhood. We define our neighborhood in terms of the following components:

1. The Residential Sector: This includes the people living in the neighborhood along with their demographic characteristics.
2. The Ecological Sector: This includes open spaces, zoning composition, and housing stock.
3. The Organizational Character: This includes businesses, churches, and other civic organizations.

We emphasize that we are not asking for a hand-out, but for the preservation of our neighborhood by maximizing the neighborhood's participation in its own development. Specifically, we ask for the following changes in the OMC Master Plan:
CHANGES TO PRESERVE THE NEIGHBORHOOD'S RESIDENTIAL CHARACTER

1. We call upon Battelle Institute to drop plans to mix our neighborhood by providing homes for BNI, OSU, Doctor's Hospital and University Hospital staff, or any other higher income groups.

2. We ask that Olentangy Management Company honor its publicly announced promise to give current residents first option to buy.

3. We ask that all houses in both phase I and phase II be sold as is, prior to renovation, at current values, and prior to the initiation of additional capital improvements. In return, we pledge to actively seek public and private funds for housing rehabilitation.

4. We further ask that all houses which are not purchased by current neighborhood residents be offered for sale to the Near Northside Housing and Development Corporation.

5. If Battelle Institute were interested in promoting neighborhood revitalization, the following programs would be appreciated:

   A. A rent equity plan whereby rent would be put in escrow and used by the tenant as a down payment on a home loan. Emphasize that such a program would not be costly to Battelle in that the amount in question could be added to the purchasing price of the home.

   B. Materials could be purchased for tenant buyers who wish to renovate their homes through sweat-equity. The cost of these materials could then be added to the selling price of the house.

   C. A larger donation to and continued cooperation with the Near Northside Housing and Development Corporation.

   D. The matching of federal funds in housing assistance to low and moderate income residents.

6. We request that improvements to the neighborhood be redesigned to be more practical and less cosmetic. Such cosmetic renovations include gazeboes, cul-de-sacs, the closing and/or rerouting of streets, expensive decorations on housing exteriors, replacing only visible porch surfaces, and roofing over rotten wood. Such "improvements" serve no practical functions and cost the neighborhood in the long run through rent increases and higher buying costs.

7. We call upon OMC to cease selling properties in the neighborhood to outside speculators, and to stop using neighborhood housing as "demonstration areas" to outside developers. Instead, we ask that OMC honor its commitment to offer properties to residents of the neighborhood first, and to establish a priority list for relocating displaced residents in the neighborhood. Furthermore, we ask that long time residents be given first priority to relocate in the neighborhood, and that all Harrison West residents be given priority to relocate in the neighborhood over outsiders. To insure neighborhood relocation, we ask that no properties be sold to outsiders until the relocation of all Harrison West residents is resolved.
8. We request that appraisals of all houses be made immediately by an independent certified appraiser, that the value of repairs to houses made by renters be subtracted from the selling price, and that tenants be notified immediately of their buying status.

9. We request that plans which require the removal or destruction of homes or other buildings in the neighborhood be dropped. These expensive home moving projects inevitably are paid for by the public sector, OMC renters, and OMC tenant buyers. Examples include the building of a park on 4th Ave., the closing off of 4th Ave. at Michigan and Pennsylvania, the closing off of Harrison Ave. for a cul-de-sac, the moving of houses from Vermont and Perry for Battelle Expansion, the extension of Belmond Blvd., and the removal or destruction of homes in phase II for commercial development.

10. We request that OMC cease from rental practices which discourage low income people from renting in the neighborhood. These include:

1) Requiring renter's insurance for a lease
2) Requiring deposits upon application for a rental property
3) Complicated rental agreements
4) Renovating the interiors of vacant houses which raises rents and is a violation of OMC's publicly stated policy
5) Raising rents based on rents in other neighborhoods
6) Raising rents on properties which have code violations and have not been repaired by OMC
7) Raising rent values by not renting vacant properties
8) Discouraging cash payment for rent

CHANGES TO PRESERVE THE NEIGHBORHOOD'S ECOLOGICAL CHARACTER

1. We request that plans for a neighborhood park be revised to eliminate the necessity of removing houses or other structures. Instead, we propose that the neighborhood be permitted to build a park on existing open spaces.

2. We request that Battelle Institute not expand into neighborhood territory on Vermont Street. Such expansion would result in the removal or destruction of valuable housing stock, destroy an historical district, and encroach upon the special composition of our neighborhood.

CHANGES TO PRESERVE THE NEIGHBORHOOD'S ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTER

1. We request that OMC discourage commercial development of residentially zoned areas of our neighborhood.
We share Battelle Institute's goal of neighborhood revitalization. Neighborhood revitalization means more than simply upgrading the housing stock—it also means upgrading social services so as to effectively deal with human social problems. Many people are committed to the upgrading of Harrison West, but we feel our efforts will have been futile if the housing stock is renovated in such a way as to displace our residents. We believe the above changes in the C'U Master Plan will facilitate neighborhood revitalization with minimal displacement. Overall, the changes are designed to preserve the character of the neighborhood by maximizing neighborhood participation in its own development instead of having the neighborhood renovated by outsiders who charge us for it. We hope Battelle Memorial Institute will join us in our efforts to upgrade and save our neighborhood.

The above resolutions were passed by consensus at a special meeting of the Harrison West Society April 18, 1978.

President Norman Fox
Housing Council Chair Debie Wilkerson
On May 2, 1978 the Harrison West Society established the following long term goals:

To revitalize the housing stock with minimal displacement
To obtain the Michigan Ave. School for a community center.
To define the demographic characteristics of the neighborhood
To make gains in solving the following social problems:
- Crime
- Nutrition
- Health Care
- Legal Care
- Employment
- Education
- Garbage Collection and Other City Services
- Special Problems of the Elderly, Handicapped and Other Population Groups

Our overall strategy will be to use the rest of this year to define the nature of these problems in our neighborhood, and to map out solutions. The second year will be used to pool together social service agencies, voluntary organizations, Churches, private funds, and public funds to help implement the solutions we work out. By the third year we hope to have made significant progress toward solving these social problems in our neighborhood.
March 15, 1979

Mr. Steve Hewitt, President
NECK
320 King Avenue
Columbus, Ohio 43201

At the March meeting of the Harrison West Society the following statement was adopted expressing opposition to the proposed re-zoning on the southside of W. Fifth Avenue at least until a total parking plan is made public.

The Harrison West Society opposes the re-zoning of 10 parcels of land along the southside of W. Fifth Avenue between Perry Street and Michigan Avenue which will result in the demolition of residential property by Battelle/WMC. Decent affordable opportunities for relocation of longtime, low and moderate income residents are scarce and without them, further displacement is certain to occur.

Because the strip of land adjacent to W. Fifth north on Vermont is already re-zoned for parking, the re-zoning of W. Fifth will certainly result in the eventual demolition of residences on Vermont as well. The Harrison West Society has always opposed demolition in our area and needs a comprehensive plan to properly evaluate Battelle/WMC's impact on our neighborhood.

I hope this information will be of interest to you.

Sincerely,

Carol McCabe
President

cc: Senior Schwarzwalder
c: Nancy Reechie
RESOLUTION OF THE HARRISON WEST SOCIETY
PASSED UNANIMOUSLY JANUARY 2, 1980

Whereas the displacement in the Battelle/OMC Phase I area has been nearly 80%, and

Whereas Harrison West is a neighborhood of low and moderate income families which should be preserved,

The Harrison West Society opposes any plans by Battelle/OMC for clearance in the Harrison West neighborhood and calls upon the City of Columbus to work for stabilization of existing residents.

The specific recommendations for development in the Harrison West area are:

1. NO MORE DISPLACEMENT
2. No demolition in Harrison West in order to save houses for current residents.
3. No new commercial construction in Harrison West
4. Help current residents buy and fix up their homes
5. Residents must help plan and must approve any parks
6. Harrison West residents must have a say in any development plans for their area
7. Parks should be built on existing open space
8. Battelle/OMC should operate in a manner consistent with the settlement of the Gordon Battelle will and other laws governing charitable organizations
9. The City of Columbus should follow the guidelines established by the Federal Government in spending the Innovative Grant
10. Any new construction on existing open spaces should be single or double occupancy residences for low income people
11. Battelle should not purchase any more properties in the Harrison West area
We recommend that Harrison West Society accept the park proposed by the City - Department of Development - in partial fulfillment of the City's promise to replace park space lost to the community as a result of the Innovative Grant.

We further recommend that the balance of the promised $177,000 be used to expand or modify the available recreational facilities within the community so that the needs of all ages within the community are served, and to bring the level of recreational opportunities to no less than that which was available prior to the Innovative Grant.
APPENDIX E: NEIGHBORHOOD FLYERS
Save our neighborhood

Our neighborhood is undergoing change. Battelle Institute is involved. City Council is involved, and the federal government is involved. I am running for the Presidency of the Harrison West Society because I believe the neighborhood needs someone to speak up for the people living here. If elected, these are the things I will say:

1. Battelle Institute, not the people living here, is responsible for Blighting Harrison West. Battelle's failure to maintain its properties has been harmful to both neighborhood residents and businesses.

2. I will speak out against any plans intentionally designed to displace our neighborhood's residents or businesses so that higher income people from Battelle and Ohio State University may move in.

3. Current renters who wish to buy their homes should be allowed to do their own renovation, if capable, and tenant buyers should not be charged for improvements they have made to the property.

4. On behalf of the neighborhood, I will oppose the construction of a park on 4th Ave., which will require the destruction of the Michigan Ave. School and the removal of 14 homes. Instead, I will negotiate for a park to be built on one of the neighborhood's natural open spaces, and try to acquire the use of the Michigan Ave. School for a community center.

5. In general, I will bargain for Battelle to renovate the neighborhood in keeping with its overall character by allowing the neighborhood to participate in its own development.

QUALIFICATIONS

* Partly Raised, Whitley County, Kentucky
* Eagle Scout
* All Ohio-Confrence Wrestling Champion
* Finishing Doctor's Degree in Sociology at Ohio State University
* Trustee, Third Avenue Community Co-op
* Neighborhood Resident

You may vote from 10 - 7 PM March 7 (Tuesday) at the Godman Guild 321 W 2nd Ave
Vote Tuesday
1 - 7 PM
At the Godman Build.
321 W. 2nd Ave

President - Norman Rose
Secretary - Mary Funk
Treasurer - Debbie Willaman
M.M. Council - Ralph Fleshman and Julie Straub

We are united to improve the neighborhood
without displacement of residents or businesses

If you need a ride to the polls call 291-5801
Norman Rose - candidate for President of Harrison West

Harrison West is made up of a variety of people. We have Italians, Appalachians, Blacks and other ethnic groups. We have elderly, handicapped, disabled, students and a variety of occupations. I am in favor of renovating the neighborhood in keeping with its overall character. I will work to prevent Battelle Institute from forcing current residents to leave the neighborhood, through unfair rent increases, and try to involve the whole neighborhood in solving crime, hunger, health care, and other social problems.

Debbie Willaman - candidate for Treasurer of Harrison West

I am a life-long resident of Columbus, and have lived in this neighborhood for 3 years. Since then I have done a great deal with the Harrison West neighborhood organization. As Chairperson of the Harrison West Housing Council, I have represented our community in dealing with the City Council, Department of Development, and other government agencies.

I care about this community and particularly about the people who live here. I've met with government officials about grants and loans for our neighborhood. I always tell them that we want programs that will help the people who already live here be able to stay here and live in dignity.

I am an experienced treasurer. Over the past several months I have served as treasurer and trustee for the 3rd Avenue Community Co-op which is bringing quality food at a reasonable price into the neighborhood. I have helped this organization grow from a dream into a reality in 3 short months. Likewise, I can help Harrison West Residents Assoc. be a vital organization that serves the people of this community.

Ralph Fleshman - candidate for Near North Council

I am a resident of Harrison West and a 1st generation Columbus citizen from Appalachian stock. My family and I have lived in Columbus for over 50 years. Cultural heritage and struggles for a better education have made me aware that our neighborhood problems (concerning rent, etc.) are the same as other neighborhood problems all over the city. CONFUSION AND LACK OF COMMUNICATION DESTROY SELF-RESPECT, SELF RELIANCE AND COOPERATION AMONG US.

As a real representative of Harrison West, I would increase the flow of critically needed information about community developments and services to and from our neighborhood. By seriously working together we can find simple answers to problems common to us all.

I am a Vietnam Era Veteran of the late 60's and am very aware of local and National government activities. I've been active in creating the 3rd Avenue Community Co-op and am also a trustee. Your vote will help.

Julie Straub - candidate for Near North Council

A life-time resident of Columbus, I have been teaching school for 9 years. My "roots" in the neighborhood go back as far as my two great-great grandfathers, who built homes on Buttles Ave. and on 2nd Ave.

Since residing in the neighborhood as an OMC resident, I have been involved and concerned with the needs and problems of our residents. I have worked with CDA, attended City Council meetings many times, and am a trustee of the 3rd Avenue Community Coop. I actively support the neighborhood in its revitalization - without - displacement efforts. Please vote for me as your representative to Near North Council.
VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE

****LET'S UNITE****NOT FIGHT********

TUESDAY MARCH 7th is a very important day for this neighborhood and its future. Harrison West Society elections will be held to elect those who will represent you and your family and neighbors. Harrison West will be doing with the neighborhood, federal grants, and the ability to meet human needs are some of the things that are major concerns in this election. If you are concerned about the future of this neighborhood and concerned over who will be representing you to the Federal Government, the City of Columbus, and OMC (Centennial Management Company), we urge you to consider some of the important facts below before you vote on March 7th.

Carol McCabe, a resident for 25 years, in running for President of Harrison West. She has been a co-chairperson of the group for the last 2 years and has been involved in the establishment of the Harper Valley Mothers Club. She is also a Codorn Guild Board member, on the board of the National Association of Neighborhoods, has attended their conferences in New York, Pittsburgh and Chicago, has been a block parent, attended the International Women's Year Conference in Houston, and a neighborhood representative to the Parent's Advisory Council of the Columbus Public Schools.

Carol was an original member of the Near Northside Neighborhood Council representing the Michigan Avenue Section, and in currently involved in preventing displacement, finding housing assistance funding, working for CDA money and is on the panel of the School Age Children Ready Contests. Carol's family of seven children all grew up in this neighborhood, and her husband was born and raised in their present house. One child in the service, one has graduated from OSU in Social Work (Now working with the Welfare Department), one works in the area and the other four are still in school.

Mary Funk, Penny Nichols, and Irma Smith have each lived here to 15 years and are running for Secretary, Treasurer, and Representative to the Near Northside Neighborhood Council. They know better than most the concerns and needs of you and your neighbors. All three are OMC tenants, and know what it means to rent your home.

The opposition against these experienced long-term residents have made names for themselves as doing nothing but fighting and arguing. They have insulted neighborhood and City of Columbus leaders and "can't work with OMC/Brutelle" and many long-time residents.

The opponent has expressed opposition to the proposed $2 million federal innovative grant and has wanted Harrison West's name taken off the grant proposal. If approved in Washington, this program would provide 25,000 grants for low/moderate income families to purchase their homes. The opponent was actively worked against this proposal. His opposition could mean that you or your neighbor would be unable to receive these grants, which may mean the difference between buying your home or being displaced.

(continued on back side)
The people running against Carol McCabe want to run your neighborhood and tell you how it should look and who should live here and who shouldn't. If you want Harrison West represented by experienced, long-term residents, listed below who support Carol McCabe, Mary Funk, Penny Nichols and Irma Smith:

- Opal Cooper - who has lived in this neighborhood for 15 years
- Mary Towns - who has lived in this neighborhood for 20 years
- Shirley Elkins - who has lived in this neighborhood for 20 years
- Dorothy Thompson - who has lived in this neighborhood for 25 years
- Barbara Bailey - who has lived in this neighborhood for 10 years
- Anna Brown - who has lived in this neighborhood for 60 years
- Priscilla Archie - who has lived in this neighborhood for 7 years

VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE!

VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE FOR:
- Carol McCabe for President
- Mary Funk for Secretary
- Penny Nichols for Treasurer
- Irma Smith for Near Northside Neighborhood Council Representative

VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE: Everyone 16 years old and older, that lives, works or owns in Harrison West is able to vote. MAKE YOUR VOTE COUNT.

VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE VOTE AT: Godman Guild
321 W. Second Avenue
1 P.M. to 7 P.M.

Thank you for reading, your concerned friends and neighbors.

VOTE!
VOTE!
VOTE!
VOTE!

> MARCH 7
1:00 PM - 7:00 PM
JOIN OUR FUN RAISING FUNDRAISER
THURSDAY, MAY 25, 6 PM
AT THE HARRISON WEST VOLLEYBALL COURT
NEAR W. 5TH AND HARRISON

Janet Bergman has been a good neighbor for 15 years. Due to the death of her husband and the stringency of the welfare system, the rent of her home increased. She is now barely able to make ends meet, and she needs help with both the rent and the food. Homeless, unless we come up with her bail, she will either be arrested and go to jail, or she will be evicted by her landlord, Pueblo and Southwester, Inc. We need to stand up for our neighbors and show Southwester, Inc., and the state that we do not want our neighbors displaced. You could be the next to go.

BRING FOOD, MUSIC, FRIENDS AND A DONATION
Come to the volleyball court on Harrison Ave. this Saturday, June 3 for food, drink and fun in support of your neighborhood.

Leaders from your neighborhood organizations and tenant union will be there to answer your questions and help you with your housing and tenant problems.

CED is "showing off" our neighborhood to outsiders this weekend. Let's show them that we like our neighborhood and we want to stay here.

Come after 12 noon -- bring food and donations -- support YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD !!!
The Other Side of The Renaissance Coin

For the last 15 years Battelle Memorial Institute has owned and managed over 300 of our homes in the Near North Side. Throughout these years, Battelle has allowed these properties to deteriorate to such a degree that families have been living in dangerous and sub-standard living conditions.

Why have we stayed? Because these are our homes, and knowing that Battelle didn’t care, spent our time, money and energy to fix our homes. Now Battelle has a sales plan for the neighborhood that would displace many of our low to moderate income residents with wealthy people.

We have worked for many months with Olentangy Management Company to attempt to have our voices heard. We have developed plans that would allow for sweat equity and other alternatives. We have spent many hours working for new federal monies for the neighborhood. But at this point in time, our homes are being sold to developers and not to residents. OMC’s renovations, which are “cosmetic,” are raising the market values sky high.

We like our neighborhood, and we want to stay. We need your support. For further information, contact Battelle Area Tenants' Organization, 291-4711.

We worked for every neighborhood improvement! Federal money is here because we are! All we need is our promised chance to use it! We CAN DO IT!

Revitalization through an already vital community not speculation.

Join US!
Welcome to the Near Northside. Battelle has spent thousands for media to get you here and convince you to buy their property. BUT, before you do, there are some things you ought to know about the Renaissance project.....

• Battelle properties are highly overpriced - there are plenty of similar homes elsewhere in the Near Northside with more reasonable prices. Look east of Neil or south of Fifth, for instance. In fact certain areas have a flood of 3% home improvement money which is not available in the Renaissance area. SHOP, COMPARE, and SEE FOR YOURSELF!

• Battelle's expensive exterior rehab (so-called '9 day wonders') has not held up, according to recent purchasers. Leaky roofs, peeling paint, unsealed brick, improper installation of windows, and shoddy workmanship are common complaints.

• The interiors of these homes contain thousands of dollars of code violations. Termites, cockroaches, rodents, and dangerously faulty furnaces and electrical systems are chronic problems caused by years of neglect.

• Don't count on promised public improvements such as street and alley repairs. These projects are now on hold and may never be completed because of Battelle/OMC's broken promises to tenants and the Federal Government.

• The quiet neighborhood atmosphere will soon change when Battelle begins demolition of over 100 homes for parking lots, shopping plazas, and multi-family apartments.

• Since Battelle began its housing squeeze, crime has been a major problem. Arson, rape, day-time burglaries, and vandalism are on the rise.
No wonder taxpayers are revolting against government subsidized programs such as the "Renaissance" project! Battelle is rapidly forcing out tenants (by whatever means necessary) in advance of the federal Tenants Assistance funds which were granted.

Over the last year, many neighbors have been displaced by improper maintenance, two unjustified rent increases, "model" houses, broken promises, and harassment. As for tenants who survived these tactics and still want to remain in the neighborhood, Battelle has initiated wholesale evictions. Families who want to stay have been getting no cooperation from OMC (Battelle's agent) and the promised "option-to-buy" is a farce. In spite of its public promises, OMC is hell-bent on depopulating the neighborhood before help is available.

Meanwhile, the City is playing deaf, dumb, and blind to OMC's increased displacement policy and the Development Dept. is dragging its feet on the proposed Tenants Assistance program. Although Northsiders have repeatedly informed the City about non-cooperation from Battelle, a "public/private partnership" is alleged.

What is the nature of this partnership? How can the public partner offer Tenants Assistance while the private partner makes sure there are no tenants left to assist? Who will be the ultimate beneficiaries of the 2 million federal tax dollars? Will this become another subsidized ripoff? For answers to these questions, call Councilman Jerry Harmon at 222-7380 and Mayor Tom Moody at 222-7671.
THE TEN BROKEN PROMISES OF BATTELLE/OMC

There is another side of the RENAISSANCE story. It's about the dozens of families who have been needlessly displaced by every dirty trick possible - including three unjustified rent increases, harassment, retaliatory evictions, sex discrimination, unsafe conditions, and over-pricing. Most of these families had the desire, and many the means, to stay in their neighborhood.

The ironic aspect of this project is the enormous tax subsidy, which has worked against its original purpose - to improve the neighborhood, for the people who already lived here. In order to get these funds, Battelle/OMC made a series of promises, now broken and listed below. If you are concerned about this problem, call CITY COUNCIL at 222-7380 and let them know. Thank you.

* * * *

1. WE WILL GIVE 90-95% OF OUR TENANTS THE FIRST OPTION TO BUY.
2. THERE WILL BE 125-150 TENANT BUYERS IN PHASE 1.
3. TENANTS WHO CANNOT AFFORD THEIR HOUSE WILL BE GIVEN A 2ND CHANCE TO PURCHASE ANOTHER PROPERTY.
4. WE WILL NOT EVICT TENANTS FOR NO REASON.
5. WHEN TENANTS DO NOT PURCHASE, WE WILL DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO CONVINCE THE NEW OWNER TO KEEP THE TENANTS.
6. WE WILL OFFER CURRENT TENANTS LONG-TERM LEASES
7. SALES WILL BE PRIMARILY FOR OWNER-OCCUPANCY, INCLUDING DOUBLES.
8. POLICIES ON CHILDREN AND PETS, FOR CURRENT TENANTS, WILL CARRY-OVER FROM PREVIOUS LEASES.
9. WE WILL DONATE 4 HOUSES TO NEAR NORTH HOUSING INC.
10. WE WILL MOVE 8 HOUSES AT OUR OWN EXPENSE, AT THE COST OF $407,000 PER HOUSE.

$20,000
$30,000
$40,000
We're not asking for more

**HUD Money**

We can live without it, because...

- $595,000 is being used to subsidize key elements of the Battelle Expansion and Renaissance project — a project which is demolishing over 100 houses and displacing about 400 low-and-moderate income families.

- $249,000 is being used for the Battelle parking and expansion project. Eminent Domain may be used to create additional surface lots and private institutional landscaping.

- $248,000 is being used for the Renaissance Street and Alley Improvements project upon which sky-high appraisals have been based.

- $197,500 is being used to pay for Battelle's overpriced and inflationary sales program.

- Comes from the taxpayers, so the next time Columbus wants to use public funds for "innovative" projects like these, thanks but no thanks — we can live without them.

— Mr. Neighborhoods report.
The Third Avenue Community Co-op, received from Norman Rose, the amount of twenty dollars to be used in the members' behalf, according to the bylaws of the Co-op, and to be refunded only upon termination of membership.

Signed:
The Third Ave Community Co-op
by J. U. Will, Trustee
of January 15, 1912.
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