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THE POLITICS OF PROGRAM CHOICE: CLASSROOM TRAINING IN CETA, 1975-1977

The Ohio State University

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THE POLITICS OF PROGRAM CHOICE
CLASSROOM TRAINING IN CETA
1975-1977

Dissertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University

By

William James Lydon

The Ohio State University

1982

Reading Committee
Randall B. Ripley
Lawrence Baum
Donald S. Van Meter

Approved By

Advisor
Department of Political Science
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VITA

February 27, 1946.............. Born in Elyria, Ohio
1968 ........................... Graduated Bowling Green State
University, Bachelor of Arts, Cum
Laude
1973-76 ......................... Departmental Assistantships for
Teaching and Administration
1977.............................. Research Associate, The Mershon
Center, Ohio State University
1982.............................. Dissertation Defense

FIELDS OF STUDY

MAJOR FIELD: American Politics
--Policy
--Executive and Bureaucratic Politics
--Voting Behavior and Electoral Politics
--Legislative Policymaking

MINOR FIELD: Political Theory
--Explantion
--Formal Theory

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Preface

The topic of this dissertation arose from an extensive literature review I conducted to prepare for a dissertation prospectus. That review revealed a chorus of criticism among educators and manpower practitioners decrying the failure of both institutions to join ranks in a serious partnership (as Congress had hoped) to tackle the persistent problems of unemployment and the other related problems of widespread underpreparation for the labor market. Critics uniformly insisted that what was needed was substantially greater commitment to classroom training as a vehicle to impart skills on the pool of unemployed people not easily absorbed in the labor market.

Since public service employment (PSE) and work experience (WE) do very little to impart marketable skills, and since on-the-job training (OJT) contracts are comparatively difficult to develop except in the most prosperous economies, one must be struck by the anomaly that increased use of classroom training for skill development seems to be under utilized that numerous scholars and practitioners feel the need to argue for it in the professional and technical literature. This anomalous state of affairs became then the ignition issue for the prospectus and the resulting dissertation.

A second major point of emphasis developed simultaneously: the need to explain (which is not especially novel in scholarly exercises) why this state of affairs had developed; but also the need to predict, in a sense, so that the analyst might make reasonably reliable prescriptive statements to managers and local program planners as a result of this study.
What became necessary, therefore, was a working model that could serve several objectives. It needed to be able to serve as an organizing device; it needed to provide a structure for an explanatory objective in the dissertation, and it needed to be adaptable so that the analyst could explore concepts and relationships that had interest to managers and could inform decisions and guide planning especially at the local level.

The major portion of the dissertation, particularly Chapters II, III and V, seek to develop a clinical product useful to planners, managers, even policymakers. Chapters VI and VII have taken a much more singleminded focus toward explanation because of necessity: as the analyst disposed of the statistical portions of the dissertation, it became clear that the clinical emphasis would not, in any important way, develop as planned resulting in a clear, relatively unproblematic message to practitioners. The data simply did not support that objective. Hence the second objective became even more important when we moved from the statistical analysis into the field. Because we would not, in the main, be confirming or further developing a clinical product that we teased from the quantitative analysis—most of the propositions and conclusions being far too fragile to stand alone in any prescriptive way—the point of emphasis would naturally come to stress an explanation of two issues: why classroom training had not "caught on" as the literature posited and second why it had been used successfully in some sites, less so in others. That then became the burden of the field work though those field inquiries were tied to the theoretical literature cited in the earlier chapters.
Chapter I Introduction

The research enterprise proposed and described in the pages that follow is concerned with questions of public policy implementation. As an implementation study it will attempt to describe and explain the process by which national policy is translated into public services at the local level. More specifically, the dissertation will seek to account for the varied use of classroom training—both as a manpower tool and as a community of specialized practitioners—in the implementation of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973.

The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act has been characterized by many as "reform" manpower legislation. Emerging from extensive compromise within Congress as well as with the Executive branch, CETA was fashioned to pull together an amazing number of haphazard legislative efforts to provide manpower services to needy clients. Manpower and employment programs were spread throughout the bureaucracy. In addition the Department of Labor, the central agency, once estimated that it presided over nearly 11,000 separate service contracts. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1973, p.352.) Clearly the pre-CETA manpower network was often uncoordinated, inflexible, haphazard and ineffectual because of its ungovernable scope, categorical complications, and more generally because of its unplanned growth. Political scientists have always been interested in organizational issues, and reform legislation has always been a prime focus for their attention though reasons, or the emphasis given some reasons, have changed from time to time. Scholars of public
policy at this time are especially interested in legislation like CETA in part because such reform policy provides opportunities to observe outcomes. Have the sought after reforms occurred? Has the quality of service improved? Is implementation more efficient? Comprehensive reform legislation also creates opportunities to investigate the forces behind its origin and forces that account for its provisions that may yield theoretical explanations of both general and specific utility to the scholar.

That CETA seeks to decentralize aspects of administration, decision-making and responsibility for the manpower needs of clients suggests a number of questions that political scientists have traditionally been concerned about: What are the consequences for policy and people when responsibilities are divided among several levels of government run by actors with different values and different constituencies? Is policy that is implemented closest to the grass roots more sensitive to individual needs? Is it less costly administratively? Is it administered more professionally, with less delay, less paper shuffling. The opportunities to compare the performance of legislation that encourages wide participation within a federal-local partnership to more centrally administered government is another reason why CETA should whet the intellectual appetites of political scientists and other scholars.

CETA encourages a cooperative coalition at local levels among a wide number of actors for one common objective. In this legislation there is ample encouragement for labor economists to work with people in education, health services, social sciences, and management. These varied communities can serve in policymaking capacities, professional
capacities and advisory capacities. Moreover the requirement for lay planning councils also injects an element not common in national legislation. We have, as a consequence, a host of new hypotheses falling into our laps, the thrust of each having to do with the consequences of this widespread participation in public policy. Not only do these provisions suggest much about public policy, decisionmaking theory and public administration, but they are inextricably tied to another central concern of the discipline, classical democratic theory. How are our fundamental principles of democracy affected by policy that encourages this sort of participation? Are efficiency and democracy compatible? Is the common man fit to rule, to advise? Or do the elite theories apply just as forcefully to these efforts to decentralize?

Not all public laws make it possible to address all these issues. The potential from CETA is really only hindered by our curiosity, theoretical and financial resources; the questions that emerge are multitudinous.

This study is entitled The Politics of Program Choice: Classroom Training in CETA, 1975-77. It stems from some of the issues prompted by the legislation itself, but perhaps as important, it will be concerned with issues that emerge from the provisions of the legislation that encourage expanded sets of actors to participate in the policy in capacities other than advisor roles or client roles. My research focus will be narrowed to the community of practitioners and the manpower tools and expertise that those in education contribute to CETA. In the case of classroom training, however, I see that group's involvement as posing some very special complications to decisionmaking, implementation, and the character and quality of the policy outcomes of the Act.
Education has been a public, governmental function for almost 150 years in this country, albeit one typically provided by the local units of government. It has been a service provided by government and financed by public tax funds. It has been managed by elected bodies, and it has performed significant political functions like socialization all along. Providing public education has always been a political activity notwithstanding the myths that shroud it from the realities of the political arena within which it must operate. Though the literature is small at this time, it is clear that a body of theory is emerging that can be loosely called a "politics of education" genre.

To juxtapose two sets of actors—educators and manpower specialists—in a common policy effort, CETA, raises interesting issues for the political scientist, especially given the other circumstances that surround the education community. Congress clearly intended to involve the education community in manpower through CETA. Not only does the title of the legislation suggest this, but the language of the Act explicitly directs it:

...Such program shall include the development and creation of job opportunities and the training, education, and other services needed to enable individuals to secure and retain employment at their maximum capacities. (Hearings, House Committee on Education and Labor, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, p.1)

Congressman Albert Quie, (R., Minn.), an influential member of the House Education and Labor Committee put these concerns into the original hearings on CETA in 1973:

I am just concerned that we wouldn't be unleashing a dual operation here where vocational and technical schools or even private vocational schools existing in close proximity are not util-
ized, but rather, the prime sponsor builds his own. Again, going to what I earlier talked about in a number of places in the country there is more than one political subdivision on 100,000 or more with a labor market area. Now there may be a good vocational program operating in a neighboring political subdivision, but because of a jealous situation that seems to grow so often between political subdivisions, they may then run a duplicative institutional program. What we are really trying to reach out for here was a way to prevent that from happening. We think this is a waste of money duplicating programs. (House Ed. and Labor Hearings 93rd Congress, 1st Session, p.1.)

To avoid unnecessary duplication and cost, the committee emphasized the need for cooperation and coordination both between prime sponsor and education as well as among prime sponsors and education. Furthermore, the five per cent vocational education funds provided in the legislation—regardles of whether this is characterized as token money or not—again emphasizes committee intent concerning the link between manpower and education.

The Act, however, never gets much more specific than this with regard to utilization of education either as a tool or as a set of actors in local decisionmaking. The regulations recommend that local planning councils ought to represent local education interests; however, no bold requirement like the one that specifies that the Employment Service be on the council exists for education. (Federal Register, 40:101, p22688).

This contextual sketch suggests much less than a mandate for prime sponsors to make use of existing public educational agencies in their programs; rather, it is a vague admonishment bolstered, perhaps, by the five per cent vocational education funds. And given the relative freedom to use classroom training almost as much or as little as the prime sponsor chooses, my central task will be to ascertain the scope and
variation of prime sponsor use, and perhaps more importantly to pose explanations to account for these patterns of use. I hope organization and decisionmaking theory will provide some guidance to this end.

A collateral research goal for this dissertation is one that falls under the general heading of "evaluation methodology" and concerns design theory. Critics who found fault with Type I evaluations, ones that were simple impact studies which provided policy planners the unsatisfactory policy choice of "go" or "no go", have been concerned with model designs that incorporate independent variables that in addition to having theoretical import have policy relevance. Bugress summarizes the problem:

With the possible exception of the substantial developments that have occurred in economics, the plain fact remains that political science, sociology, geography and psychology can point to relatively few areas where they have developed engineering models that are appropriate for guiding the design or appraisal of public policy. Hence an acute need exists for the social scientist to explore a conception of the process of policy making as a design problem, i.e., as a process that is not only future oriented but one where the policy maker is constantly and self-consciously searching for levers that can affect the unfolding future. (Burgess, 1974, p.16.)

Implicit in this summation of the design problem is the view that models must meet requirements over and above those of method and theory which we require of all good science; a policy research design must emphasize models the terms of which are susceptible to manipulation or social control. These terms, concepts and variables have been called "clinical concepts" "manipulable variables" "actionables" and "policy variables" to distinguish them from the larger set of concepts which need not be subject to manipulation or sensitive to social control. Recognition of the distinction between the manipulables and nonmanipulables
came early in policy research, but few academic social scientists have taken the issue so seriously as to conduct inquiries into the consequences of the distinction or to theorize much about their use in research, whether it be "pure" or "applied". (Burgess, 1974, 4-10.) The whole issue of social indicators is inextricably tied up in this distinction since developing indicator systems requires the prior isolation of concepts that social engineers can direct or adjust. For serious progress in the area, however, scholars must assume a clinical orientation in their research. And of course some encouragement and impetus for this emphasis exists especially among scholars seeking government support for policy research. Yet many academics do not consider policy research with a clinical orientation among the top priorities within the discipline, hence the paucity of good theory or empirical analysis treating the issue or utilizing the distinction between manipulable variables and nonmanipulables.

But a focus on manipulable variables could lead to important theoretical distinctions in addition to providing workable tools for the policy practitioner. First, such a conscious emphasis should attract attention to new, different micro-level variables that heretofore have not been very salient to many political scientists: in the case of CETA for example quality of staff, level of competition among local service deliverers, quality of evaluation, level and extent of monitoring, nature of planning. Second the clinical emphasis should deemphasize the criterion of per cent variance explained as the measure of the quality of the research findings.

The policy analyst concerned with social engineering or social
intervention needs to know what elements in a policy environment he can effectively adjust to achieve some desirable change in a policy outcome. Thus he may find an independent variable that only explains a small fraction of the variance more important and useful than other nonmanipulable ones that account for most that variance simply because knowledge of the latter may not improve his chances of altering the situation while the statistically less powerful, manipulable variable on the other hand does allow him to exert some control over the social phenomenon he wishes to harness. This orientation, therefore, heightens the importance of concepts that on other criteria (such as per cent variance explained) might be dismissed as trivial. The consequence of this change in emphasis is obvious: sound knowledge concerning these statistically less powerful action variables could facilitate some change at the margins in a policy's implementation with respectable levels of confidence about the impact of such action rather than a fatalistic response to conditions which research not concerned with the manipulable/nonmanipulable distinction would suggest admits of no clear effective intervention. Further, a conscious concern for the distinction between the two sets of variables mentioned above could redirect the social scientist's focus away from conclusions suggestive of social and economic determinism—an inference one must guard against when explanations depend exclusively upon statistically powerful variables like rate of unemployment, race, sex, class or ethnicity.

We find these arguments persuasive enough to make this self-conscious distinction in our tests of hypotheses in the present dissertation; consequently, in this analysis we will classify all
hypothesized, explanatory, independent variables into at least one of three classes: one that admit to no purposive control in the short or long term; ones that appear to be subject to some or low control in the short term, and ones that seem to be more highly manipulable. Such an organizing device, at the very least, should permit two results: an explanatory argument which seeks to account for the dependent phenomenon without regard to clinical utility but perhaps more importantly a parallel product resulting from the diagnostic orientation which, stressing the influence of the manipulable variables, could allow one to prescribe alternative courses of action to the policy maker or local implementor. In other words, putting aside the criterion of percent variance explained and substituting degree of social control as the measure of worth, one might arrive at a smaller, less aesthetically pleasing product which seeks to say something about the likely consequences of conscious changes in the values of variables the policymaker may be able to manipulate. The burden of the clinical, prescriptive emphasis of the dissertation will necessarily be dealt with in the statistical portions of this study, especially in the materials reported in Chapter Five. Our other interest, concern for explanation—completely besides or beyond the clinical concerns—will largely be sought through the field work reported in the case studies of Chapter Six.

The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973

The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973, CETA, (P.L. 93-203) was the first of a series of proposed special revenue-sharing bills transferring control over a large portion of national
SUMMARY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ACT

The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 (P.L. 93-203, as amended) has seven titles:

Title I establishes a program of financial assistance to state and local governments (prime sponsors) for comprehensive manpower services. Prime sponsors are states and counties of 100,000 or more, and any combination of government units in which one member has a population of 100,000 or more. A state may be a prime sponsor for areas not covered by local governments.

The prime sponsor must submit a comprehensive plan acceptable to the Secretary of Labor. The plan must set forth the kinds of programs and services to be offered and give assurances that manpower services will be provided in unemployed, underemployed, and disadvantaged persons need of help.

The sponsor must also set up a planning council representing local interests to serve in an advisory capacity.

The mix and design of services is to be determined by the sponsor, who may continue to fund programs of demonstrated effectiveness or set up new ones.

Eighty percent of the funds authorized under this Title are apportioned in accordance with a formula based on previous levels of funding, unemployment, and low income. The 20 percent not under the formula are to be distributed as follows: 5 percent for special grants for vocational education, 4 percent for state manpower services, and 5 percent to such state or local agencies.

The remaining amount as available at the Secretary's discretion.

State governments must establish a state manpower services council to review the plans of prime sponsors and make recommendations for coordination and for the cooperation of state agencies.

Title II provides funds to hire unemployed and underemployed persons in public service jobs in areas of substantial unemployment. Title III provides for direct federal supervision of manpower programs for Indians, migrant and seasonal farm workers, and special groups, such as youth, offenders, older workers, persons of limited English-speaking ability, and other disadvantaged. This title also gives the Secretary the responsibility for research, evaluation, experimental and demonstration projects, labor market information, and job-bank programs. Title IV continues for Job Corps. Title V establishes a National Manpower Commission. Title VI, added in December 1974 under the Emergency Jobs and Unemployment Assistance Act, authorizes a one-year appropriation of $2.5 billion for a public service employment program for all areas, not just for areas of substantial unemployment. Title VII contains provisions applicable to all programs, such as prohibitions against discrimination and political activity.

(National Academy of Science:1976, p.3.)
funds to state and local authority for flexible use in place of the various categorical national manpower programs. The new law, which took effect in July, 1974, transferred much authority to local officials, prime sponsors—typically city, county and combination jurisdictions of 100,000 population that could receive federal funds and run manpower programs under CETA. A very brief summary of CETA is contained in the Figure One.

Decentralization and decategorization were key, twin goals for CETA '73. But CETA '73 still operated to a very large extent through categorical programs and extensive federal involvement, notwithstanding these goals. For example, of four titles in the 1973 legislation authorizing program, three of the four established special purpose or target group programming. Title II set up public service employment (PSE) for areas of substantial unemployment. Title III authorized programs for migrants, Indians and other special groups. Title IV contained the Job Corps for youth. Title I is the comprehensive services title which should be the main vehicle for decategorizing the manpower system. But decategorization, in large measure, depends upon local prime sponsor choices and behaviors.

And the freedom to choose at the local level is what gives rise to the issues in this dissertation. Prime sponsors, essentially, can provide a limited number of hands-on services to clients under Title I. These include public service employment (PSE), work experience (WE), on-the-job Training (OJT) and classroom training. Some combinations and hybrids have evolved over time, but from 1975 to 1977 the choices were less well developed. Each of these choices has problems, costs
and drawbacks: PSE provides almost no skill training that is transferable to the private setting; work experience too tends to be pre-skill level; OJT contracts are very hard to develop with employers because they must include a promise to hire at the end of the training. These drawbacks to classroom training, which does provide skill training (and other knowledge e.g. English as a second language), is cost and time. It is expensive and time-consuming. Yet most people agree that it does work. This gives rise to the question, "Why is it not widely used?" and the major thrust of this study becomes an explanation for the varied use of classroom training.

The Department of Labor presence, in spite of the explicit goal of decentralization, included a variety of intervention points in local operations in 1975-77. Early in CETA, intervention was chiefly done by regional office personnel through approval of all prime sponsor local plans, other involvement in the administrative process and enforcing and insuring compliance with annually increasing regulations and guidelines.

The manpower planning process under CETA is probably an outgrowth of an earlier development, Cooperative Areas Manpower Systems of the mid-1960's (CAMPS). Planning in this era was essentially only an information exchange with very little effect on decisionmaking. The planning system countenanced under CETA, however, was to be integrated into local governmental infrastructures, and CETA planners, it was hoped, would double as manpower administrators and decisionmakers as well. Public advisory councils (MAC's) which Congress hoped would be the forum and the means for community participation in CETA, were also
mandated for all local prime sponsors. Generally the scope of the MAC's responsibilities were wider than any pre-CETA group's. Membership on these MAC's tended to be the same, and role under CETA remained simply advisory though role and composition to some extent were legitimized by statute and regulations.

Prime sponsors early on set up the local machinery to handle at least the following functions: fiscal accounting, reporting and contract supervision. Some had begun to manage their own recruitment, referral job development and placement services. But many local primes had serious problems. Major obstacles included inexperience at the local level, dealing with program complexity, cumbersome and changing procedures, program interruptions, changes in funding, and new legislation altering ongoing operations in important ways before and shakedown period had run its course.

Primes had been given the authority to contract with organizations best able to deliver services so that there were no presumptive vendors. Yet on the whole primes tended to use program operators and vendors in the jurisdiction with pre-CETA manpower experience. Some primes took advantage of this authority, centralized administrative functions and even began to conduct their own programs. Different strategies generally resulted in different local political clashes. In most cases established ways of doing business were challenged, disrupted, altered or were perceived to be tampered with so that someone generally felt threatened, squeezed, cheated.

**The Dependent Variable**

The dependent phenomenon of prime concern throughout the dissertation is the varied use of classroom training in CETA prime sponsorships.
Table 1.1 Prime Sponsorships by Region, Type and Size of Title I Budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prime Sponsor</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Prgm Size FY 1977 in Millions</th>
<th>Type of Prime Sponsor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>Balance of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell, Mass.</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumberland Co., N.J.</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yonkers, N.Y.</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilmington, Del.</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luzerne Co., Pa.</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham, Al.</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumberland, N.C.</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duluth, Minn.</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>VI</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>Balance of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas, Texas</td>
<td>VI</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Iowa</td>
<td>VII</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denver</td>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacramento/Yolo</td>
<td>IX</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King/Snohomish</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akron, O.</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allen County, O.</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butler County, O.</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton, O.</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cincinnati, O.</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark County, O.</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clermont, O.</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland, O.</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus, O.</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greene County, O.</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton County, O.</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licking/Deleware</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorain, O.</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miami Valley, O.</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast, O.</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toledo, O.</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>Balance of State</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(This is frequently called vocational education to distinguish it from on-the-job training, but for most purposes the two are synonymous.) Measures of its use will be taken from 32 prime sponsor sites for which we have data, the seventeen Ohio prime sponsorships that administered the program in that state, plus 15 other prime sponsorships that administered the program which are distributed among the 10 standard federal regions across the United States. The latter group shared the distinction of having been judged prior to research on a number of criteria as being "illustrative of areas in which management decisions have been consciously linked to the attainment of program goals." (Ripley, 1977, p. 5.) The enumeration of the set of prime sponsors appears in Table 1.1 by region, type and size. This set of prime sponsors should not be interpreted as a sample in the more restrictive sense of the word; it results from the pooling of two distinct and purposive collections, one the entire set of Ohio prime sponsors and another more broadly selected set chosen from the universe of prime sponsors on a number of other criteria. The combined collection, therefore, will be used chiefly for practical reasons: we have fairly extensive data on all 32 sites, and the the purposes of analysis, subsetting the data for descriptive and explanatory inspection in made easier with the increased units of analysis. No claim for increased generalizability or indeed generalizability to the whole set of CETA prime sponsorships is implied or intended as a result of this decision to combine both collections. Hence what this study ultimately exposes or explains can only be inferred as applicable to the 32 sites at hand. Nevertheless, a reasonable case for increased generalizability does exist.¹
What results from this investigation would most probably be comparable to results from more expansive comparative case study approaches.

Varied use of classroom training will be measured in two complementary ways to try to ascertain the prime sponsorship's "free-will effort". We will examine the proportion of each prime sponsor's budget devoted to classroom training. This will include dollars specifically assigned to classroom training as well as that portion of the five per cent vocational education funds allocated to classroom training. Thus budget shares will be one data source for the conceptual indicator; the other is simply the proportion of participants/clients enrolled in classroom training in a prime sponsorship expressed as a per cent of the prime's total number of enrolled Title I participants. But in addition to detailed summaries of prime sponsor effort, we would like to ascertain the nature of any national trend in classroom training use in the program too. Aggregate national data (also reported in budget shares and participant ratios) are available in the Employment and Training Reporter from September, 1974 to the present. Moreover, these data permit us to measure both absolute levels of commitment as well as changes in commitment from year to year. In addition to measuring classroom training commitment as a dependent variable at the national level and among the 32 sites, an important part of the present research will involve interviewing actors within a set of three Ohio prime sponsorships to see if we can account for the variation in levels of prime sponsorship use of classroom training. These three case studies are intended to perform two functions: to fill in what the data leave unanswered or to underscore or confirm the
conclusions implied by the data. (Copies of the interview schedule used in the field are appended to this dissertation as attachments for the interested reader.) The second use for the case studies is to provide informed intelligence and explanations accounting for prime sponsor behavior during this period, especially if it should be the case that statistical portions of this dissertation do not yield unproblematic policy guidance to practitioners for whatever unforeseen reasons.

**Independent Variables**

Formal discussion of the hypothesized relationship between independent and dependent variables will be included in the next chapter, and the theoretical justification for these independent variables will be addressed in some detail at that time. For now, however, it will be enough to sketch in broad strokes a very general classification scheme into which we can group our independent variables. This classification is partly intuitive to the extent that variables are placed in the same category because they share some obvious, functional similarities (for example, they collectively help characterize a prime sponsorship's population or industrial base); the classification is also partly synthetic (i.e., devised for special situation); some elements of the classification have been specified simply to emphasize particular concerns of this dissertation like the distinction between independent variables which are subject to social control and ones which are nonmanipulable. Hence the classification scheme to be described below is not composed of exclusive categories as one might require if he wished to construct an elegant model the validity of which was demonstrated on logical grounds alone; rather, such an arrangement
may be valuable if it encourages the policy scholar to "think causally" (Asher and Van Meter, 1973, mimeo.) that is, constructing simple diagrams (often just box and arrow diagrams) that reflect causal processes and facilitate the clear statement of hypotheses or new insights into the topic of concern. (Asher, Van Meter, 1973.)

These two considerations resulted in three broad classes of independent variables, the complete specification of which will be elaborated later. All hypotheses to be tested are composed of the dependent variable and combinations of independent ones from these three broad classes. The first of these broad groups could be called the "Environmental/Contextual Group". Most of the pertinent variables within this group would be very unsusceptible to manipulation except over the very long run. Hence they would not be classified as policy variables. Some independent variables falling under this heading would include

---Rate of Unemployment

---Racial composition of the work force

---Age of the work force

---Level of Education of the work force

---Percentage disadvantaged in the work force

---Population Density

---Past History of Employment and Training Programs in the Prime

---Pre-CETA Vocational Education base

---Educator Experience Pre-CETA

---Structure of Local Government

---Industrial Mix in the Prime Sponsor

---Local Government Finance

---Availability of Training Facilities

For the most part these determinants are either "finished history" and unalterable except to the extent that the quality of historical data can be improved; or they are environmental features of conditions that do not admit to expeditious manipulation through conscious, systematic
planning and administration. Consequently even if correlations between and item within this class and our dependent variable were strong and therefore enhancing explanation, from the clinical point of view social control and confident prescription in minimal due to the nature of the independent variables. No matter how significant the relationship or how high the correlation here, policy planners will not be able to vary the mix of these features in any precise fashion from one planning period to the next. On the other hand the social theorist may be able to reconstruct or assemble plausible explanations of social choice given the presence or absence of strong associations or correlations between sets of independent and dependent variables among this group of Environmental/Contextual variables.

The second broad group of independent variables to be examined as they relate to the varied use of classroom training are the attitudinal determinants. Attitudes are relatively resistant to change, but most of these are more susceptible to control than are variables in the first group. First, while attitudes are rather resistant to change within the individual, they are, nevertheless, learned predispositions; hence, they are subject to change over longer periods of time. And perhaps more importantly because attitudes do vary within some population, failure to change an individual's attitude does not preclude changing personnel to achieve changes in attitude mix. Of course one cannot engage in this activity willy-nilly or at will nor without regard for established labor policy, thus managerial discretion is both limited and costly. In fact, such constraints may render the practice nearly inoperative in some cases; nevertheless, knowledge of clear
linkage between certain attitudes and an outcome places tools in the hands of the social engineer, albeit weak ones most often. The question of manipulation here is problematic: if attitudes can only be changed by changing personnel, a host of administrative constraints usually limit the application of this procedure significantly.

But what attitudes would, perforce, have any bearing upon the level of commitment to classroom training in a prime sponsorship? Probably attitudes of four sets of manpower actors could be central:

I. Of Classroom Training Service Deliverers
   A. Toward Manpower Programs
   B. Toward Clients
   C. Toward Joint Ventures with non-educators

II. Of Prime Sponsor Staff and Executives
   A. Toward the Education Community
   B. Toward Other Deliverers of Classroom Training
   C. Toward Classroom Training as a Manpower Tool

III. Of MAC members, Political Officials and Community
   A. Toward Education
   B. Toward Other local Vendors
   C. Toward Community Personalities
   D. Toward Manpower Staff/Administrators

IV. Of Other Competing Service Vendors

Data exist from several Ohio State University studies of CETA (Ripley, et al., 1977,1978 .) to characterize the nature of the hypothesized attitudes for some of these actors and to carry out some quantitative comparisons among them. And we will rely on these in our preliminary analysis. But to tap many of these attitudes--especially among schoolmen--we will need to construct questions to pose to respondents through interviews in our case studies since we have only very incomplete data on these attitudes for many of our groups.

A third class of independent variables which we will later hypothesize are associated with variation in the dependent variable is the
Figure 1.1 The General Form of Relationships Among Three Board Classes of Variables To Be Used in the Model of the Policy Process
set of "Operations/Management" variables theory would suggest are related to prime sponsor choice. Many of these are susceptible to some social control over a shorter time frame. The number of independent variables hypothesized to be linked to prime sponsor commitment to classroom training is small when one adds the criterion of manipulability as a requirement. Three broad categories of Operations/Management variables seem important: Those dealing with operating responsibility, those dealing with control and oversight, and those related to decisionmaking. (The complete specification of these constructs will be done later, in Chapter II and III.)

The first of these, "Operating Responsibility" refers generally to prime sponsor preference for contracting the service delivery to subcontractors who provide services to clients for the prime sponsorship consistent with provisions and requirements set down by contracts agreed to by both parties. Our major concern here will be for documenting the variation among prime sponsorships for level and scope of in-house and out-of-house operating responsibility because we will be hypothesizing that this fundamental feature of the delivery system has consequences for the level of prime sponsor use of classroom training itself but also because we think indirect consequences may result from such a preference that also affect the dependent variable: e.g., the nature of the staff, their biases, preferences, their level of politicalization; the nature of competition among potential service deliverers, for example. Figure 1.1 represents the hypothesized relationship we would tend to expect among these classes of variables.
Operating Responsibility can be manipulated though it would be the case that the ease of manipulation would vary from one prime sponsorship to another. In the best of circumstances a determined executive could alter this feature of a delivery system from one budget year to the next (if he could justify the disadvantages of discontinuity) in prime sponsorships with entrenched interests adamantly opposed to a change in the locus of operating responsibility such change would still be feasible though more gradual conversion might be the only effective strategy.

The second, independent Operations/Management cluster we will hypothesize relates to or affects prime sponsor commitment to classroom training we have called "Control and Oversight". This cluster includes such variables as nature and quality of evaluation and monitoring for service deliverer performance, the manner of solicitation for proposals (RFP, informal, formal); sacred cow and halo effects toward service deliverers; presence and absence as well as effectiveness of incentives and sanctions visited upon service vendors. In general we shall be hypothesizing a direct link between control-type variables and commitment to classroom training without the intervening influence of other variables as in the representation of Figure 1.2. This representation of the relationship is incomplete, of course, since Department of Labor regulations propagated temporally prior to prime sponsor control and oversight do affect this aspect of implementation, and Department of Labor regulations can impact differently, depending again on the nature of local leadership, staff and political climate. Thus a more complete presentation might look like the expanded
Figure 1.2 The General Form of Relationship We expect Between the "Control/Oversight" Cluster of Independent Operations/Management Variables Used in the General Policy Process Model.

Figure 1.3 More Complete Representation of Relationship between Control/Oversight Cluster and the Dependent Variable.
representation in Figure 1.3.

Finally we will hypothesize that the nature of decisionmaking will affect the prime sponsor commitment to classroom training. This independent management/operations variable cluster is perhaps the most complex since the theoretical literature is relatively more highly developed here than elsewhere and because decisionmaking has been the subject of much theorizing, many competing conceptualizations and operationalizations of the concepts exist. Basically we will be concerned with who participates in what capacity and two what end. Thus we care about more than just a roster-like summary of participants; we are as concerned about such matters as the nature of these interactions: cooptation, deference, emphasis given lay, professional and public spokesmen; relative importance of political issues v. management concerns v. professional judgment as well as client preferences, for example.

Some of these data have been accumulated to date from extensive interviews with numerous manpower actors. In depth information to augment our present store of data will come from additional site investigations in Ohio designed to elicit greater detail concerning these issues.

This discussion has resulted in a rather simple overarching model, the chief function of which sketches the direction of the research enterprise to be conducted in the apges that follow. Figure 1.4 represents that scheme. In Chapter II we will present a complete specification of independent variables, a list of these hypotheses, operationalizations, the theoretical justification for these hypotheses and specify more completely the methods for measureing these variables.
Figure 1.4 The General Policy Model to Explain the Policy outcome of Varied Use of Classroom Training in the Sample sites.
Though we could never assert that we may generalize about all prime sponsorships in a strict statistical sense; nevertheless, because we chose primes in which we expected broad differences in programs and administration for our national study and because the 17 sites in Ohio obtain from a state which is both large and diverse, the combined collection of sites should vary in many important ways like all prime sponsorships in the country. Finally because we had planned to compare experiences between the two sets of sites, we designed our survey and interview instruments to inquire about common concerns in the same way for both studies. The result has been comparable data among a set of sites that intuitively and empirically reflect the scope of variation we observed nationwide (albeit true that some bias may render the set of 32 sites less than statistically representative of the universe on all imaginable criteria.)

Budget shares can be calculated quite easily by summing vocational education funds plus prime sponsor classroom training funds. However, prime sponsors's five per cent vocational education money can be used for classroom training or related activities tied tightly or loosely to vocational education. Some discretion exists concerning prime sponsor use here. To the extent that we can retrieve the proportions devoted to classroom training we will include it in our summary figure. If this fraction is non-retrievable from aggregate figures, an estimate based on state ratio can be substituted.
Chapter II. Theory and Method

The Dependent Variable.

The dependent variable in this dissertation is prime sponsor use of classroom training in local CETA operations. Prior to each fiscal year and whenever a local CETA office plans a major change in program mix during a program year, prime sponsors must submit planning documents to the Department of Labor. These are of two kinds: one, CETA Program Planning Summaries, which specify planned enrollments by program for a fiscal year; and Budget information summaries which summarize expenditure plans by program for a fiscal year. Both documents contain planning data for six categories of CETA programs. In addition to classroom training they deal with on-the-job training (OJT), public service employment (PSE), work experience (WE), and other activities and services, and the governors' vocational education money and programs. Program mix, a concept encountered in much manpower literature, and here too, henceforth, refers to that particular mix of programs assembled from among the six options enumerated above that will constitute a local CETA program for a specific fiscal year.

Theoretically program mix can vary from programs that rely on all six options to ones that rely on one. More commonly, however,
we encounter local prime sponsors who prefer to assemble local manpower programs from a combination of all six categories.

Classroom training is a programmatic tool involving several sorts of treatments and or activities; it can include training for a specific occupation or it can teach a cluster of skills. It can involve basic and remedial courses. It can include English, especially for those with another native tongue. Classroom training can be provided in class settings, involving a group of participants; or individuals can be referred to public or private training centers with CETA paying necessary costs for "less-than class" instruction. Classroom training can provide specific skills or upgrade basic skills. Individuals receiving classroom training under CETA receive a basic training allowance (minimum wage) and may receive dependent allowances where appropriate. Classroom training is potentially a very flexible tool that can be tailored to meet the particular needs of eligible clients with a variety of disadvantages. And an eligible CETA enrollee may receive classroom training for any occupation area for which there is a demand in the local labor market.

The concept "classroom training" has been operationalized and measured in two ways, in terms of participant levels and budget shares. Both enrollments and expenditures were converted to percentages so that the set of prime sponsors could be compared more easily.

Commitment to classroom training in expenditure terms was computed simply by summing prime sponsor classroom training expenditures plus vocational education expenditures and dividing by Total Title I Accrued expenditures. Prime sponsor commitment to classroom training
in enrollment terms was calculated in similar fashion; it is the sum of prime sponsor classroom training enrollees plus classroom training vocational education over total program participants.

Enrollment and expenditure figures both tap a prime sponsor's commitment to classroom training when juxtaposed against corresponding data for other categories of Title I services. But they tend to tell different stories too. Enrollment data suggest how primes tend to serve clients; expenditure data reveal how they spend their money and the differences are measures of choice and reflect a varying commitment to classroom training.

We will be considering the dependent variable throughout the analysis measured in both budget shares and enrollment levels. The expenditure-derived variable is the least problematic way of getting a handle on prime sponsor commitment. The enrollment derived variable is susceptible to more confusion—double counting, more radical changes in levels from quarter to quarter with changes in absolute levels on enrollees from quarter to quarter more difficult to interpret since they do not necessarily reflect change in commitment but also client flow. But participant levels are very intuitively appealing as a way of contrasting one program with another despite this weakness.

The dependent variable will be measured for each of the 32 prime sponsors for three consecutive fiscal years, fiscal year 75, fiscal year 76 and fiscal year 77. We will be interested in year to year variation among the sites for each year as well as variation among them over the three year period taken together. A reading of
prime sponsor commitment to classroom training will be taken for F.Y. 75, F.Y. 76 and F.Y. 77, and another reading of this commitment for the entire period F.Y. 75 through F.Y. 77. Thus we will compare levels of commitment for all 32 primes in F.Y. 75, then in '76 then in '77; finally, we will look at the variation among them over the more extensive period. But we are interested in more than just trying to explain stop-action, cross-sectional variation among a set of CETA prime sponsors at three or four specified times; we are also interested in accounting for change among these primes between year. Thus we also wish to explain variation among our units of analysis from time 1 to time 2; from 2 to 3, and from 1 to 3. Operationally we do this by calculating different scores—differences between per cent of commitment at time 1 and time 2 and time 3 then correlating these different scores to the elements in the explanatory model.

To address our second research interest—the clinical orientation and prescriptive aspect of the analysis—we will regress a subset of the independent variables in the model on the dependent variable. More particularly, we shall use regression procedures to ascertain the affect of the set of management or manipulable variables upon the dependent phenomenon if our preliminary analysis warrants this next step. In Chapter I we sketched the simple diagram composed of three sets of factors that we believe will help explain program choice among the selected prime sponsors in this study. Essentially what we posit is that these three sets of independent factors and/or conditions separately and in combination work to
explain partially this variation in program choice vis-a-vis classroom training. In a sense, then, this research emphasis stresses the proportion of observed variation in the dependent phenomenon we can explain with variables appropriate theory would suggest may control such a situation. Thus we will examine bivariate relationships at specified times and changes from one time to another.

On the other hand, we have made the distinction early on between concepts social engineers can harness and ones not susceptible to conscious manipulation. We distinguish between these two sets throughout the analysis and therefore we wish—to whatever extent possible—to learn as much as we can about the independent effect of these variables on program choice.

The simplest summary of our hypothesized explanation is represented diagrammatically on page . We need however, to specify more completely and precisely the content of the three broad classes of variables or factors represented with the sketched referenced above. In conjunction with this exercise we will seek to provide theoretical justification for the independent variables in the model and the hypotheses that result from linking independent and dependent variables into statements of relationship. Manpower literature itself suffers from at least two deficiencies: little theory except perhaps empirical summaries that may pass as lower level theory and comparative immaturity as a discipline, by which I mean the breadth and the depth of a manpower literature is embryonic in comparison to other disciplines upon which it has depended for development—public administration and economics. These assumptions have led
the present writer to ground his hypotheses in three traditional areas, organization theory (especially organization change and control), impact and implementation literature, and decision-making and leadership theory.

1. Environmental-Contextual Factors.

Factors we have collectively labeled "Environmental-Contextual" shape and control or limit the setting within which policymakers and bureaucrats may operate as well as limit and control to some extent the effects of a policy's administration and implementation. Under the general rubric of environmental/contextual factors we include a number of economic, social and political conditions that the comparative state politics literature first hypothesized effected policy output and that empirical investigations in recent manpower studies likewise assert have influence over manpower policy action. (see for example: Sharkansky, 1967, 1971; Sharkansky and Hofferbert, 1979; Hofferbert, 1964; Cnudde and McCrone, 1969; Mangum and Snedeker, 1974; Levitan and Mangum, 1969; Levitan and Taggart, 1971; Thurow, 1973.) But perhaps the strongest reason for carefully examining factors I have called here environmental/contextual is because of arguments that one major critical defect of pre-CETA manpower policy and programs was their inability to assemble local manpower programs sensitive and suited to special local needs and conditions. Since CETA permits much more local latitude to respond to local situations, we will be interested in examining to what extent these factors control or affect a prime sponsor's choice to use classroom training either sparingly or rather heavily.
1.a. Rates of Unemployment.

How unemployment is related to prime sponsor choice among Title I program options is, of course, an empirical question. If, however, one seeks guidance from the literature—theoretical or empirical—he can find a good bit of conflicting advice. For example, Mangum and Snedeker recommend, "basic employability training as the best strategy during periods of recession (Mangum, Snedeker, 1974: 73); yet they further assert that during period of economic downturns skill training does not lead to placements so that work experience and public service employment are better options. (Mangum and Snedeker, 1974: 211). Two other manpower scholars, Levitan and Taggart, encourage expanding classroom training during recession (Levitan/Taggart, 1971) while Thurow (1973) suggests just the reverse: classroom training should be discontinued furing recession; instead; job creation should be the main thrust. Levitan and Mangum (1969) argue that skill training (i.e. classroom training) can reduce unemployment only when employers cannot find suitable applicants or when such training results in such an improved worker that the employer expands his present operation. Ripley's study of management decisions (1978: xi) concluded that "The level of unemployment at the local level is only a mild constraint on the options open to the CETA staff and on the level of program performance." We shall be arguing that as unemployment increases locally, it indicates a more general drying up of the local economy's needs, that employers tend to need fewer workers and that manpower bureaucrats will rely more and more on classroom training due to this contracting economic base.
The bureaucrat will find fewer OJT slots, fewer opportunities to sell work experience to employers and so forth because business will be acting conservatively.)

In this uncertain setting, CETA will increase its commitment to classroom training—not because it is the best tool under the circumstances—but because sources for other approaches have dried up. In times of recession then classroom training creates corrals where people can be stored and upgraded at the same time until the local economy seems ready to expand or take certain risks. This argument points, therefore, to a direct and positive link between unemployment and classroom training—as the one rises so does the other, and as one declines so does the other.

**Hypothesis 1.a.** As unemployment rises, prime sponsor commitment to classroom training will also increase.

**1.b. Characterization of the Work Force.**

Both traditional social science research as well as common sense knowledge achieved from experience and observation suggest that certain groups of individuals can better profit from skill training in institutional settings like classrooms more than others. For that reason we want to profile or characterize the labor force of the local economies of the 32 prime sponsors in the study. Useful cutting lines would appear to include racial composition, age, level of education, and percent disadvantaged in the work force; also proportion Spanish speaking, proportion female and white in the local workforce are good cutting lines. The logic of this rationale for these classifications is rather simple: the chronically unemployed
are disproportionately disadvantaged on a number of criteria; and youthful, poorly educated people coming from a family history of poverty and from minority groups tend to be among the chronically unemployed. We would expect local work forces which were heavily composed of young, black disadvantaged and poorly educated people to be very difficult to place both in good times and bad times, of course, more so in times of economic contraction. Hence we would hypothesize that a prime sponsor would have greater need for classroom training as the proportion of these types of people increased or primes with the largest number of blacks, poorly educated, disadvantaged youth would make greater use of classroom training than primes with fewer of these. The problem with characterizing such a work force is the availability of data and its reliability. ESARS data is sketchy and incomplete; Census data at the time of this writing is old and obsolete for most locales.

Hypothesis 1.,b. The blacker, the more poorly educated, the more disadvantaged a local population, the greater the demand for classroom training in a prime sponsorship. Later we specify six separate features of the work force that collectively serve to define this general construct, (See Chapter III). If unemployment can serve as a barometer to the climate of local economies, perhaps one should look for an indicator of economic growth as well.

1.,c. Economic Growth.

Local economic growth admits to a number of ways of defining it and measuring it. One might quite appropriately measure it in terms of housing starts, new classrooms under construction, local
property tax increases, or even gross population growth. The point that needs to be stressed is that how one conceptualizes it depends upon what one's problem or question seems to be. Here, with questions of manpower before us, we believe economic growth is best conceptualized as a ratio comparing the number of people employed in nonagricultural work at two meaningful times in recent history, say the change from 1970 to 1977. This indicator has intuitive appeal for a number of reasons. The gross changes in levels of employment from Time I to Time II does imply growth or contraction in local enterprises as well as growth or decline in demand for products in a local economy (See Levitan and Mangum and Marshall, 1971; Mirengoff and Rindler, 1976). But this observer would argue that most people in the management of manpower policy locally think of classroom training not so much as an instrumental process directly related to placement but as a holding pattern—a limbo, if you will—to corral people during periods of economic decline or stagnation. It allows the manpower bureaucracy to provide some hope to a very hopeless group of people while they wait for the economy to correct itself. Few actually benefit in the intended way from classroom training. Granting this assumption, during times of economic growth or expansion local economies will of course demand more skilled labor, but their labor demands will also be for unskilled—perhaps disproportionately—and local business people given the choice would much prefer OJT to classroom training to meet their skilled labor needs since it provies local business with greater control over the training of individuals and part of these costs are borne by the
public. Assuming the logic of this argument is not seriously flawed, the hypothesis that emerges is the converse of that proposed above:

**Hypothesis 1.c.** As local economies grow, manpower units will use less classroom training as a proportion of Title I programming. (A rather rapidly developing literature criticizing vocational education as "out-of-touch" would support this hypothesis both indirectly and directly; see for example, *Manpower*, April, 1975: 10 and July, 1973: 10; Perry, et al., 1975: 140-141; Clague and Kramer, 30; Borus, ed., 111.)

1. d. **Pre-CETA History and Experience.**

While there may be truth in the aphorism that those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it, there is a school of thought which would argue as tenaciously that unless one has very powerful short term stimuli, all things being equal, he will do things today the way he did them yesterday, and he will resist efforts to change standard ways of doing things. It seems we have ascribed the same practice to our organizations and to decision making both at the level of the individual and to collective and public choice. (See Wildavsky, 1966; Sharkansky, Lindbloom, Simon, 1965; and Downs, 1965 for the theoretical foundation of incrementalism in decision making and organizational tendencies to develop standard operating procedures that harden into law-like operating procedures.) The extension of this general position to the particular policy area of manpower planning and policy formation would imply that manpower practitioners and their organizations--like most public bureaucracies and bureaucrats--are creatures of their past and of habit, that their pre-CETA
experience has made indelible markings on the way they conduct business today. More particularly, if what we seek to explain is why some prime sponsors rely heavily on classroom training and others do not, we need to examine what they did, with whom they worked, what tools they stressed in an earlier day for these links will "condition" how local bureaucrats see the problems of employment under CETA. The theoretical literature would suggest two elements of the Pre-CETA manpower setting as particularly central: what we have called the pre-CETA vocation education base and the experience of the education community with manpower pre-CETA. These two factors are related; the former refers to the level of educational commitment and facilities existing in the locale before CETA as well as how linked these agencies were with those programs. (We can find no suitable measure for it, however.) The second factor—pre-CETA vocational education experience—refers to what interaction, familiarity, participation was evident among vocational educators in early manpower days, pre-CETA.

These factors should be related to present levels of interaction and commitment between the two communities, manpower and education, on an intuitive basis as well as an empirical one. Moreover, the theory referred to above would likewise indicate the usefulness of following this line of inquiry. (For additional theoretical discussion and justification see William A. Niskanen, Jr., 1971; Amitai Etzioni, 1961, 1964; Margulies and Raia, eds., 1972; Dolbeare and Hammond, 1971; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973.) Based upon intuitive, empirical and theoretical grounds we would argue the following proposition:
Hypothesis 1.d. The greater the pre-CETA classroom training commitment to manpower issues and programs, the greater such commitment under CETA, other things being equal. Inquiries into both theoretical constructs can only be done through our case studies in Chapter VI since data do not exist to construct such variables for the sites that constitute the present sample.

1. e. The Structure of Local Government.

The history of manpower reform as well as the birth of CETA (in many ways a compromise between two opposing sects in Congress) hints at the relevance of local politics in its administration. Much of the Congressional maneuvering over manpower policy revolved around what both parties perceived would happen if control were given to local politicians rather than remaining more centralized in Washington as well as whether or not manpower legislation should include an element of public service employment at all. Implicit in these maneuvers, battles and negotiations was the belief that local administration would make indelible marks on the implementation of any manpower program, and that the opposing views or projections cut across party lines more than any other lines of cleavage. (See Davidson, 1972; VanHorn, 1976.)

Decentralization was seen as a mixed blessing; it was a response to critics who pointed to poor policy outcomes because local conditions could not be given adequate attention pre-CETA. On the other hand, members of Congress were suspicious of the grassroots politicians; therefore, architects of the legislation made sure that the Act retained an important central role for the Congress and the Department of Labor.
Congress appropriates funds to each separate title and determines allocation formulas. With some limitations the Secretary of Labor has the power to allocate and disperse discretionary funds. The federal role of overseer and the program review provisions of the act also narrow the discretion of state and local governments. However the major limitation on decentralization is the day to day administrative involvement of the Labor Department.

The Labor Department was charged with implementing the Act. It was responsible for the regulations which set legal limits on the actions of local prime sponsors. It is responsible for the designation of prime sponsors and the review of local plans, and has the power to approve or reject state and local grant applications. In addition, it has the authority to monitor, assess and evaluate individual prime sponsor performance and the total impact of CETA (Snedeker and Snedeker, 1978: 25).

In addition to the formal limits on decentralization and local control written into the Act itself, VanHorn argues that the creation of local manpower advisory councils was yet another way for Congress to curb the discretion of local politicians with regard to CETA (VanHorn, 1976).

We know from recent Congressional scholarship (Clausen, 1973, for example) that in Congress Democrats differ from Republicans over issues related to the government's management of the economy, Democrats favoring governmental intervention Republicans favoring market solutions. If we observe national differences, it should come as no great surprise that similar differences may exist locally. Moreover, local administration can vary from highly partisan arrangements involving elected executives and councilmen with politically heavyhanded administration like that we associate with cities like Chicago and Cleveland to apolitical professional public administrators where partisanship seems absent for all practical purposes.
So while the pure case of apolitical administration may not exist in the real world of our senses, models approach it. And we believe that local governments which must be openly, overtly blatantly political will be forced to respond or react to a large set of demands than will ones which can manage without recourse to heavy-handed politics, relying upon principles of public administration, efficiency and economy as the only standards of good performance.

Hypothesis 1., e. The more overtly political local government is, the less it will use classroom training in its Title I program mix. This assertion needs some justification and clarification: very political units of local government make patronage appointments, and a manpower administrator is just such a position where the practice goes on. Frequently manpower offices are not covered by civil service. Patronage appointments, more than public administration professionals, are wedded to their patrons--elected officials, usually very closely. They should be sensitive to the same issues, issue-publics, pressures and needs as their patron. To get elected, political officials must do more than run the people's business efficiently; they must oil the squeaky wheels, get good publicity, take a lot of credit for positive public accomplishments: heavy reliance on classroom training does not encourage these ends. It (the classroom training) requires a certain amount of surrendering of authority or jurisdiction to a professional group--the educators. Classroom training is a low visibility weapon by virtue of what the activity itself includes as well as by virtue of who conducts it. Elected officials have to share credit for outcomes with the
schools and educators. Moreover, any gratification a participant gets from classroom training tends to be of a deferred type: the gratification from work experience, however, tends to be more immediate; the same with PSE. Politicians cannot get much hay from Classroom training in comparison to work experience and public service employment; the Daleys and the Whites of the nation need publicity, and they need the vehicle at least to argue they personally can take credit for bettering the lot of some disadvantaged groups around election time.

l., f. Industrial Mix in the Prime Sponsorship.

One feature that distinguishes large cities from small rural areas and to some extent suburban communities is the existence of huge enclaves of people of low job skill, low income and low status; and historically the biggest concentration of jobs for the unskilled has been in or near the central cities. Indeed, urban areas have been defined in these terms as well as in terms of population density and industrial concentration. But in dealing with issues of manpower policy it may be helpful to distinguish among urban areas in a very purposive way—in terms of the industrial mix one finds within the urban centers. It goes almost without saying that some cities are surely one industry cities, everyone is employed by some single large firm or works for satellite firms who serve this dominant industry.

In planning a manpower policy or for that matter explaining one from the point of view of an observer, distinguishing among
prime sponsorships in terms of industrial mix may have some benefit. One might expect that the more diverse the industry in a locale, the greater the demand for skilled labor.

**Hypothesis 1.** The more diverse the industry in a locale, the greater the need for skilled workers and therefore the greater the need for classroom training. (Similarly, or perhaps conversely, the more a locale depends upon one industry the less it would need vocational education for skilled training or the less industrial a community the lower its demand for skilled labor meaning the less that locale will need classroom training as a manpower tool.)

Some discussion may support this proposition since neither well developed theory nor much systematic empirical evidence exists to inform the assertion: As a locale moves toward industrialization, it experiences a ripple effect—industry encourages satellite industry. This activity brings families and creates needs and demands for governmental and public services, among them education. The result of this activity in short order is a rather large educational plant, composed of buildings, equipment and the like. It seems too that the more development goes on and industrialization takes over, the more the community can spend on these things. It would seem to follow as well that manpower people, aware of this underutilization, and feelings the squeeze on budgets would seek to fashion some contribution to CETA: and increased use of vocational education and classroom training seems like a logical and intuitively pleasing consequence of these local conditions with the push for rational self interest as part of the driving force.
1., g. Population Density.

The argument in defense of this explanatory factor follows roughly the same line of reasoning as did "industrial mix"; population density is another indicator or factor associated with "degree of urbanization". Most highly urbanized areas are the most densely populated.

If a diverse population in an urban area is highly concentrated, it is efficient to deal with their problems collectively, that is, in a group. Skill training can be done cheaply and efficiently because one, lots of people have the need and two, that areas have the schools and the wherewithall to "treat" them en masse. Manpower planners know this. If OJT contracts are hard to negotiate, then classroom training is a logical alternative.

Hypothesis 1.,g. The denser the population in a given area, the greater the use of classroom training in that area's manpower program.

1., h. Local Finance and Fiscal Condition.

Hypothesis 1., h. The more financially troubled the local government is, the more likely it is to use greater amounts of classroom training in its Title I program mix. One can prop-up the budgets of local school systems and government operations with federal dollars, and the idea looks more and more attractive as one discovers relief is not going to be forthcoming in the short term through increased taxes--income, real estate or others. Schoolmen, who in good times or lean times might turn away from "CETA types" as clients will be more likely to accept them and the money they will bring to the participating district as times get harder and harder locally.
1. i. Availability of Facilities.

It follows logically from a few simple assumptions that in locales where the vocational education base is underutilized one is apt to find a high reliance on classroom training simply because the locale has the flexibility in its education base to respond to manpower needs. Similarly in communities with a high taxed vocational educational education base—overworked, underpaid teachers, inadequate facilities and the like—one would expect to find less use of classroom training as a useful Title I manpower tool.

Hypothesis 1. i. The more underutilized the vo. ed. plant in a community, the greater the pressure to employ it in manpower programs. (This concept can only be investigated very incompletely in the case studies in Chapter VI because no data series can be found which allows us to construct measures of the variable for our working sample of sites.)

1. j. Business Involvement on the MAC.

The final environmental variable we will suggest can affect the level of prime sponsor commitment to classroom training is the level or amount of business involvement in local policymaking. Two possible interpretations might account for this hypothesized relationship. First, of course it will be the case that the relative frequency with which we will encounter prime sponsors enjoying high levels of business involvement will be few. Yet where this is occurring one would expect the business community to champion the cause of further career and vocation education for two reasons: they will profit from a more skillful workforce, on balance, and
perhaps as important it will be seen as even better if this better educated workforce can be promoted at public expense rather than as a cost of doing business. Second, if business can create the impression or illusion that high levels of classroom training are desirable, they can reduce to some extent the pressure on them for OJT. Both of these interpretations assume a central driving force economic self interest, but this seems more realistic than imputing a social conscience or some non-profit motivation to an institution whose prime reason for being is profit to ownership.

Hypothesis 1., j. As levels of business involvement in the policy formation process grow, prime sponsor commitment to classroom training will also increase.

1., k. Client Characteristics.

Among client characteristics, one datum that should predict a prime sponsor's commitment to classroom training would be the relative size of the population with less than a high school education. Such people would benefit from basic education, GED curriculum as well as skill training; and in many cases this training would be necessary for gainful employment especially when competition is keen for all kinds of work during periods of economic depression. Thus, while it does not follow that a person needs a GED to be a bricklayer's helper, it does follow that when economic conditions are such that high school graduates are vying for these positions, people with less than a high school education are at a competitive disadvantage when trying for these jobs; hence, the GED becomes an attractive if not necessary condition for a job. To carry this
logic one step further: if a prime sponsor has a high proportion of its pool of clients who are poorly educated, one would expect that the prime sponsor's manpower program would emphasize classroom training more than another with a much smaller proportion of its client base with less than a high school education.

**Hypothesis 1.** Prime sponsors with proportionately greater numbers of clients with less than a high school education will tend to use greater amounts of classroom training in their Title I programs. (Conversely, in primes where the number with less than a high school education is small, one would expect commitment to classroom training to be relatively small, all other things being equal.)

This concludes the set of environmental/contextual variables we would hypothesize are related or will predict to the dependent variable of concern here. The operationalization and measurement of these concepts will be discussed in the remaining sections of this chapter.

2. **Attitudes of Prime Sponsor Staff, Public Executives and Elected Officials.**

The whole tradition of social science theory and research is predicated upon theories, the building blocks of which are attitudinal and perceptual concepts (Allport, 1954: 43). In fact all behavioral theory and research assumes that a prior condition for rational or conscious behavior is attitude or some set of them. And while there is a great deal of disagreement about what an attitude is, how one best measures it, what can or will cause it to change or align into
"belief systems" or ideologies; it seems fair to say that "...individuals show a remarkable ability to hold their attitudes and opinions discretely, tolerating a great deal of inconsistency and lack of integration." (Hennessy, 1970: 379). Moreover a great deal of inconsistent theory exists about what circumstances and conditions account for attitude change. Hennessy's proposition is a common one

Aside from traumatic conversions of the religious variety—and perhaps not even so dramatic as is alleged in these cases—sudden changes in attitude and opinion probably do not often occur. It is probable too that the more intensely an opinion is held, the less likely it is to change quickly. (Hennessy, 1970: 384)

Most scholars would agree with the above summation, and most would not dispute these: "...political behavior can best be understood in the context of certain attitudes that people hold." (Manheim, 1975: 7) or "An attitude is an predisposition to respond to a particular stimulus in a particular manner." More specifically, Manheim clarifies the Wagner definition with this refinement: "An attitude is basically a set of psychological conditions which make any particular response to a given situation more or less likely than any other response in accordance with the wishes and beliefs of the individual in question." (Manheim, 1975: 8)

In the context of manpower decisionmaking this generalization has an obvious application. Our particular concern here is with the antecedents which account for the fact that some prime sponsors depend upon classroom training much more than others. Any attempt to explain this phenomenon must, of course, consider the influence
of staff—policymakers and powerful interests who can influence policymakers—and the attitudes they held which predispose them to use classroom training over other choices at their disposal.

Since most scholars agree attitude can inform, control and direct behavior, it seems reasonable, therefore, to infer in the present case that variation we observe in prime sponsors with respect to commitment to classroom training has obtained at least in part from belief, preferences and attitudes among relevant local actors.

Attitudes, especially ones that are integrated in belief systems, are slow to change, also ones that fit consistently into the holder's Gestalt are resistant to change. Thus attitudes can be measured and readings of these attitudes should be rather stable in a given staff. But if we wish to explain how a prime sponsor came to devote a certain proportion of its Title I budget to classroom training, several groups of actors probably could be instrumental in the outcome: 1) the staff itself, particularly the planning/policymaking ones; 2) actors in the education field, especially voc ed professionals and administrators; 3) other political and community people who could be in a position to influence policy.

Project-generated data on classroom training as a tool is rather incomplete and spotty. We have good attitude data for staff toward vocational education and classroom training but very little comparable data for the other two groups of actors. With regard to staff attitudes we can probably make some generalizations about their feelings toward their feelings toward vocational education as
an effective Title I tool and staff attitudes toward education as one of several Title I service deliverers. But such data for educators—their attitudes toward manpower, CETA, clients and the like—does not exist. And attitudes of political officials and other significant actors, likewise, is spotty, unsystematic, and incomplete. Thus where attitude data exists for all 32 sites, we will attempt to relate these to the dependent phenomenon. However, attitude data from vocational education professionals and administrators, political officials and community influentials—to the extent that it can be gathered—will have to come from the site visits we will be conducting in connection with this dissertation. The data coming from this exercise will probably be much richer than anything that can be machine processed. On the other hand it will be very site specific, allowing us little latitude with generalization beyond the cases at hand. That, one should recall, is the same problem we face with this study in its entirety hence this shortcoming may not be any more severe than limitations we have already discussed. (In addition to looking at the strength of relationship between attitudes held by our three main groups of actors, we shall also look at the special situations where the attitudes of these three groups agree and the situations where they are in conflict to see if resulting agreement scores predict well to the dependent variable. The details are discussed in Chapter V.)
If we posit that attitudes are related to behaviors or outcomes, we have not actually characterized the nature of these attitudes or the kind of linkage we would expect between attitude and dependent variable. In general, however, the intuitively obvious seems like a good beginning. It makes sense to hypothesize that Hypothesis 2., a. The more positively one assesses classroom training, the more highly one regards it as a tool, a therapy a treatment—and perhaps as importantly—the more widely held this view is, the greater the likelihood that the prime sponsor will use high levels of classroom training in his local manpower program. This is no more than saying that classroom training will be used at some high level if staff and important others have strong positive attitudes toward it as a manpower tool. This hypothesis depends, however, on a very critical ceteris paribus. It assumes 1) that educators agree and are free to cooperate, and 2) it assumes the facilities are there for manpower to use. 3) Finally it assumes clients will agree to the program itself.

This seems to mean that we must research attitudes of the suppliers or potential suppliers—the educators—as well as those in manpower. Thus while manpower actors may favor classroom training and many want to use it, a necessary condition for putting these preferences into operation is some supportive attitudes among educators. There is a good deal of evidence to suggest that these supportive attitudes are not that great or that widespread or that genuine though it does not exist in a form that admits to easy summation or generalization. Moreover, we presently have very
little useful attitude data from educators and even less on other
groups—politicians and community influentials—concerning how they
perceive classroom training and/or institutional skill training
fitting into a local manpower program. To begin the process of
assembling this profile, the present writer will need to sample
attitudes and perceptions very selectively within the selected set
of case study sites. Again, this may not be too debilitating for
the dissertation and what conclusions the study allows me to assert
when one recalls that the dissertation itself is fundamentally an
elaborate case study. Furthermore, the in depth interviews netted
from the sites can come much closer than closed answer questions to
suggesting a rationale behind the presumed widespread sharing of
these attitudes among education professionals.

If we seek now to address the question of shared attitudes
among education professionals as explanatory concepts, some theory
exists to guide us. The public process, almost by definition, is
from time to time conflict laden; we would be interested in discover­
ing what levels of willingness exist within the education establish­
ment to work in their professional capacities in conflict situations.
We would hypothesize, for example, that if classroom training is
not used as much as it might be, the problem could lie with the
education people as easily as with the manpower people. Educators
could eschew situations that are highly politicized for many reasons,
and it seems reasonable to assert that many professionals avoid
political arenas, or venture into them only via their professional
organizations, because they simply do not like to work in that sort
of environment. If educators believe the political context of manpower is an uncomfortable one or a hostile one, this could account for avoidance and naturally low levels of interaction and cooperation so that the resources/tool would be used only sparingly by their own choice or preference.

Hypothesis 2., b. The stronger the aversion toward politics (in all its forms) among educators in a given context, the less likely will be a serious commitment of classroom training to local manpower policy/programs.

Organization theory would suggest that different agencies with different missions and differing structural characteristics sometimes act differently; we think interviews with officials in both camps—education and manpower—could reveal instances of bureaucratic rigidity as well as jealousies that could retard cooperation and affect the use of classroom training in manpower.

The same theoretical literature about attitudes suggests a concept I have called "professional provincialism". By that I mean the prevailing feeling within communities of scholars and practitioners that only we are fit to solve our problems, set our agenda, police our ranks, etc." Again the argument transposed to the education/manpower context might be stated more particularly by asserting that should it be the case, as others have claimed, that classroom training has been underutilized in some places, this outcome might be the result of such a feeling among the members of either group or among the members of both the education community and the manpower community.
Hypothesis 2., c. The more widespread the sense of professional provincialism in a given education or manpower community, the less likely we are to find primes using large amounts of classroom training in their Title I program mix. Checking on evidence of this must be limited to interviewing people in the case study sites. "Professional Provincialism" is a specific instance of the more general example cited in Chapter I: attitudes of educators toward program, clients and organization.

Organization theory tells us that the nature of an agency's clients coupled with the bureaucratic rigidities discussed above can affect outcomes. My working assumption is that most of the education established is not prepared to work with the severely disadvantaged. (Attitudes of educators toward clients.) Furthermore, interviews with vocational education scholars may shed some light on attitudes and perceptions among vocational education policymakers about the severe reshaping that would be necessary in vocational education to deal effectively with CETA types as clients.

Another interesting thesis which has its roots in organization theory too is the argument that agencies do not like to surrender control or authority over a portion of their establishment to other actors or agencies; rather, theory tells us they seek to expand control as they seek to expand their domain. But if education were to become deeply immersed in manpower and CETA just that would have to develop; policy directly affecting education would have to be shaped at least partly by non-education actors. This unwelcomed outcome would not foster good will between the two establishments,
although it might wet the appetites of agencies apt to gain from such a relationship, manpower in this case.

**Hypothesis 2., d.** In cooperative ventures (CETA training programs for example) where one partner (education) agency thinks it will lose control over some of its traditional domain, the agency perceiving the loss will act to frustrate the joint venture or minimize its effect. (This hypothesis rests upon organizational theory to the extent that it treats such matters as power; yet actors in manpower policy have attitudes about control by outsiders, city manpower people for example, and the relationship above must doubtless represent a more specific illustration of the general case outline in Chapter I.)

The net effect, assuming equal self interest on both parts, is inaction at best and operationally very slow acceptance on the part of education of a major commitment to manpower affairs. Interviews would be the only way to ascertain the appropriateness of such an argument; hence, we will not encounter this proposition again until the appropriate probe is discussed in Chapter VI dealing with the findings of the case study.

Still another argument that could go a long way in explaining some aspects of variation in the dependent variable I have called the "Sacred Cow" hypothesis; it too has its basis in organization theory and more particularly in theory about regulated industry. According to the sacred cow hypothesis, education is viewed as operating in a greenhouse environment protected like some industries from competition. The result of this artificial setting is an insulated
establishment, only looking inward, not having to compete as
vigorously for scarce resources, and ultimately encouraging non-
progressive, noninnovative products the way monopolies do.

Moreover, the sacred cow hypothesis would go on to claim that
education in the main has concerned itself with the problems of the
middle class; is conscious only of middle class values and has not,
therefore, become sufficiently prepared to contribute much more than
band-aid therapy to segments of society that manpower must serve.
This might be the hardest link to confirm though I think it is the
most interesting hypothesis of all from a political science point
of view.

For empirical support interview techniques seem like the only
feasible strategy. We are connizant, however, that interviews with
education people for evidence of this attitude are likely to be less
than successful for one would not be eager to admit such a posture
if it is seen as nonegalitarian or undemocratic or elitist. Only
interviews with other policymakers who would have occasion to nego-
tiate with people in education could further confirm the presence
of these attitudes.

Decisionmaking theory and versions of economic theory about self-
interest from whence pluralism emerged suggest another explanatory
mode: who participates in decisions? Our data from the Mershon
Ohio and National Studies (Ripley, et.al., 1977) should help answer
part of this question, but special interview material from the case
studies can inquire about 1) the role of educators in local manpower
decisions; 2) how educators get involved in CETA and; 3) sources of
expertise sought by CETA planners in local decisionmaking.
Regulatory theory suggests some independent variables also; however, these are apt to be difficult ones to nail down. Certification requirements could affect education use especially in institutional settings. The question worth exploring is "Does it lead to a closed shop and shortages of trained people to teach high demand trades, making vocational education in particular stagnant?"

This question is especially difficult because certification requirements as well as their impact will vary from state to state, thus what we find—if anything—might be too system specific for any generalization beyond the borders of Ohio. Furthermore, the amount of systematic empirical work in this area is scant; hence, such an effort will be unaided in the main by findings others have documented.

Related to the notion of certification is the move toward professionalism and/or trade unionism in education. The effect of both developments is the same: to limit the supply of practitioners for the personal advantage of the present practitioners. And obviously the consequence for education (especially vocational education) is pretty clear; only those with credentials huded "suitable" to professional associations or state licensing boards (operated in the main by educators) will be permitted to operate in public schools. This could cut supplies of skilled people in all manner of ways, and the cuts that thus obtain are likely to be made on a conventional middle class bias; not, I need point out, an orientation frequently shared by CETA clients who are often the most disadvantaged in Title I.
Information from earlier CETA research is not sufficient to inform this matter at all. If the issue is researchable at all (given this research orientation and limited resources) it must be explored through questions posed to actors in the three Ohio case studies, which is not itself totally unproblematic. But again we must point out that propositions like these remain very hard to assess due to the great diversity of standards from state to state and our total inability to pull together all that diversity for our present inquiry. Necessarily our probes in this area will be tentative, preliminary; hence, we resist formulating a precise hypothesis as we have elsewhere lest we convey the same status to this question as we do others in this dissertation.

Attitudes, as we pointed out earlier, inform and affect behavior, and just as important, attitudes tend to be tenacious; that is, they tend to endure once an individual has acquired them. This feature of attitudes, their tenaciousness, calls to mind again a central concern of this dissertation: distinguishing among variables in terms of their manipulability.

Because an attitude changes only very slowly in an individual, one might conclude that as a management variable it is not very manipulable and therefore not very useful to the social engineer or even the local administrator or program planner. In general that is probably true. On the other hand, an attitude or set of them may be a critically necessary condition for some policy outcomes. For example, an agency whose mission involves dealing with youth in trouble with the law would need counselors whose attitudes were
supportive and sympathetic toward youth if the agency mission was to intervene and redirect these youth into more acceptable modes of behavior. Even though administrators have little control over attitudes, agency mission depends upon certain attitudes if it is to perform in a desirable fashion. The agency, therefore, seeks to hire people who show evidence of these desired traits or failing here discharges or reassigns personnel who seem not to have the needed attitudes. In other words though attitude may be hard to change, one can affect some control through hiring, firing and reassigning personnel within the limits of legal requirements.

This discussion should point out the need to distinguish very clearly between concepts and variables with great theoretical import, ones with no theoretical import, ones with theoretical import but little manipulability, ones both theoretically important and manipulable, and ones with little theoretical import but great manipulability. And this does not exhaust the logically possible combinations. In general, most contextual/environmental constructs are subject to very little purposive control. The set of attitudinal constructs, while more manipulable, are nevertheless only subject to some suboptimal control in the short term though they may admit to more complete manipulation over a longer time period. The third set of concepts in our policy model includes the greatest amount of variation in levels of manipulability. We turn to a fuller discussion of these concepts next.

3. Operations/Management Variables.

The third broad class of variables critical to the development of our model is the operations/management variables. This group,
unlike the contextual variables and somewhat unlike the attitudinal variables just discussed, tends to include constructs which are either somewhat or more controllable by policymakers and implementors in the short term. The quality of the manpower staff, the quality of the agency's top staff, the nature of operating responsibility, the involvement of the MAC, these are examples of management/operations variables. Others we plan to explore include the prime sponsor's commitment to placement as an operating goal, quality of evaluation and monitoring, the prime's level of openness in decisionmaking and use of focused conflict in management. The prime sponsor use of the Employment Service as a partner in local programming, its use and/or movement toward integrated programs, and management reliance on RFP process generally concludes the set of operations/management variables we plan to test in Chapter IV.

Because the question of manipulability only takes on real importance at this stage of the discussion, it seems efficient to discuss this set of management/operations variables as they fit into the manipulable/nonmanipulable scheme while we argue theoretically for their more general inclusion in the model sketched in Chapter I. Below we draw out a more complete classification on "manipulable" and we classify those variables we have already argued should be included in our model into this typology and we marshall both theoretical and empirical evidence we believe supports the inclusion of the operations/management variables into the model.

The Question of Manipulability.

The old (and perhaps pointless) distinction between "pure" and "applied" research concerned itself with the extent to which a
piece of research had technological implications. Pure research was not by definition unuseful to the problem solver or the engineer. In fact, just the reverse might be the case. Rather, if there is a distinguishing feature to separate pure from applied research, it might be the conscious motivation of the researcher. In the case of the former he has little or no interest in the practical applications of his work. The applied researcher on the other hand, tries to solve problems and puzzles of technique and method presumably to make daily life a little better through technology. All this is by way of analogy: we need to distinguish between research which is theoretically important and research which is less so without getting too embroiled in questions about the philosophy of science. For our purposes we might wish to classify social research into two categories, theoretically oriented research which is predominately discipline-centered and seeks to provide explanations; and clinically oriented research which is problem-centered and seeks to predict and control the empirical world. The two orientations are not as distinct as this classification might suggest, but the emphasis on explanation is one case and control in the other will affect how one goes about his work. If explanation is the goal, palpable concepts that one can manipulate and vary with some degree of precision are less important; if prediction and/or control is the goal, concepts which are manipulable are imperative while their theoretical import is less critical. For example, knowing that party identification is the best predictor of the vote will be of little use to the League of Women Voters volunteer in a get-out-the-
vote drive one week before and election. Party identification is not a very useful concept here though from the point of view of political science as a discipline it is extremely important. To explain voting behavior, party identification is a very good concept because it fits nicely into a theory and because it has some predictive power too. On the other hand, the campaign worker who knows that closing the bars on election day increases Democratic turnout in precinct D, for example, may be all that is needed to win an election.

We stated early on that the clinical approach was one we wanted to emphasize in this dissertation. That, therefore, commits us to the search for concepts and variables that a policymaker can to some extent control. These concepts--manipulables--are not necessarily atheoretical in the sense that they have no place in a comprehensive theory nor help advance a more complete explanation; rather, they may be theoretical but are not usually nomological. Instead, being empirically derived, they may be the parts of empirical or inductive theory based on observation rather than logic. Yet, and this is important, there is no strong requirement that manipulables have a strong theoretical component, especially if they are chiefly seen instrumentally as some way to get at a problem or puzzle.

Clinical variables or management variables however one prefers to refer to them, ought to be distinguished in terms of their level of manipulability. Thus we might suggest a threefold typology, the elements of which would include 1) factors susceptible
of little or no control; 2) factors susceptible of some control and 3) factors over which high levels of control may be achieved.

Each of the independent variables thus far discussed in this chapter can be placed under one of these headings, and the remaining operations/management constructs could be fitted into the typology.

Factors Susceptible of Little or no Control.

1.,a. Unemployment Rates 1.,f. Industrial Mix in the Prime Sponsorship
1.,b. Characteristics of the Work Force 1.,g. Population Density
1.,c. Economic Growth 1.,h. Local Finance/Fiscal
1.,d. Pre-CETA History and Experience
1.,e. Structure of Local Government

The features listed above under the first category have little use as policy instruments at all. On the contrary, they are features of the environment--the givens--against which a policy response must be fashioned. Individually and collectively they define the problem and they must suggest the remedy. Though they tend not to be elements of the remedy themselves. Hence if one were able to say that as unemployment goes up, the use of classroom training goes up; or the correlation between the two was .95 he could not conclude that he will be of help to the policymaker. Knowing this fact would be of little help to the policy maker who wanted to increase commitment to classroom training systemwide because he cannot manipulate unemployment to achieve the corresponding value associated with classroom training. (Note, he might/could manipulate the dependent
variable in response to changes in unemployment, and primes claim they do; but that really is beside the point here.)

It seems reasonable to assert that the same argument would apply as forcefully regarding each of the other variables enumerated under the "no control" category. The most critical difference among these concepts is that some would be relatively invariate over the short term (from the point of view of the local policy manager); hence, the possibility of manipulating the dependent variable in response to changing values of a given independent one would be less likely than with unemployment for example. Nevertheless this group of concepts shares the feature that no matter how completely one may be able to describe or measure or characterize it, he is nevertheless unable to harness it in such a way that he can change values of one to consciously affect values of the dependent variable in a predictable and reliable way.

At the risk of being redundant, however, let me reiterate that because a concept or a variable is not susceptible to control, it should not be taken to imply that it is somehow a bad concept. It may have enormous theoretical import the way concepts in subatomic theory did long before the wherewithal to see, measure or manipulate them was developed.

Factors Subject to Some Control.

This category is by far the most problematic of the three since there is apt to be some difference of opinion as to what constitute "some degree of control". Since an authoritative source to guide these choices is lacking, most of these decisions are based upon
experience and/or observation. Each, therefore, is subject to the weaknesses of the senses, and there is some probability that different judges would disagree among themselves about the classification. Nevertheless, this group differs from the first primarily because the explanatory factors do seem to permit manipulation—either directly or indirectly. Under this class we would include

1.,i. Availability of Facilities 3.,d. Involvement of the MAC
1.,j. Business Involvement 3.,e. Commitment to Placement
1.,k. Client Characteristics 3.,f. Level of Conflict
2.,a-d Attitudes of Important Actors 3.,g. Quality of Evaluation
3.,a. Quality of Top Staff 3.,h. Staff Commitment to Placement
3.,b. Quality of All Staff 1.,d. Pre-CETA Staff Experience

Each of these probably deserves some comment especially ones not discussed heretofore.

1.,i. Availability of Facilities. Classroom training requires classrooms. A prime sponsor can contract for them, rent or lease them, or have them donated. There are a number of ways to acquire classroom, assuming such capital is not used fulltime. Moreover, a staff can vary the intensity and the innovation it expends in going after these facilities. Yet because it is not a free good and because in the main such goods are the domain of another organization—the schools—they can have at best only imperfect control over them. The manpower staff's interest in securing classroom space, then,
in part depends upon the cost associated with the good and the attitude of cooperation within education.

**Hypothesis 1.,i.** Other things being equal, prime sponsorships with greater amounts of available classroom facilities will tend to utilize larger amounts of classroom training in their Title I programs.

**1.,j. Business Involvement.** Our experience over the last four years of CETA has indicated that in general the level of business involvement in CETA has not been great. This is so for many reasons. Nevertheless under most conditions CETA can improve its relations with the business community if it makes a concerted effort to do so. This objective is clearly limited by business's receptivity and CETA's skill in luring them as well as differences of mission between the two organizations.

**Hypothesis 1.,j.** The greater the degree of business involvement in a community's manpower program as a training provider, the less that program will need to rely on classroom training in its Title I program (if for no other reason than because OJT in such places helps fill out the Title I options).

**1.,k. Client Characteristics.** CETA cannot make a black man white or even an unskilled one skilled, but within certain limits it can stack the deck by "creaming". Creaming is a jargon term which means skimming off the best risks among the pool of eligible (and near eligible) applicants to maximize successful performance, this successful performance being stipulated by the Department of Labor for the most part through its use of performance monitoring and
audits. Client characteristics is, of course, a multidimensional construct. A prime sponsor can emphasize one dimension, two or any combination that serves his purpose. Clearly emphasizing bright literate, educable people with salable skills is one choice that will make classroom training desirable. On the other hand, stressing just the opposite (which I have never seen by free will or with enthusiasm) would result in a low priority for some sorts of classroom training while heightening the desirability of work experience and public service employment. Nevertheless conscious manipulation of the client pool depends upon the nature of that client pool itself as well as the local economic conditions, and the regional office surveillance; hence, a CETA staff never has unbridled latitude to do as it may wish.

Hypothesis 1.,k. Those prime sponsors which heavily cream the least disadvantaged clients in their outreach and intake procedures will also be most likely to rely on classroom training and vocational education at a Title I tool.

2.,a-d. Attitudes of Significant Actors.

Attitudes will influence programs and choices as much as (or more than) any other independent factor impinging upon the dependent phenomenon. What, therefore, is it about attitudes that allows them to be manipulated by policymakers even if indirectly? While the possibility to affect significant/dramatic attitude change within an individual is itself unlikely; nevertheless, policymakers have some control through hiring policy and whom they employ to carry out aspects of policy. It is possible for employers to discriminate
among applicants in terms of attitudes at least improving upon chance to some degree that they will hire a person sympathetic toward program goals and mission. Similarly policymakers and administrators can have some indirect influence over counterproductive attitudes or nonsupportive attitudes through its firing policy and procedures as well as through the practice of reassigning, rotating and retiring people who seem not to work well in the organization. These tools, of course, are checked through union contracts, civil service procedures and other safeguards against arbitrary action, but nevertheless an administrator is not helpless when he tries to manipulate staff.

It is the case that individuals often do not have finely developed attitudes on all issues, events, individuals within a policy setting or environment because that setting itself is changing. Where this is the case, an administrator can seek to foster certain attitudes through a number of techniques—in service training, indoctrination, and the like. Hence he can manipulate in another way, through guiding attitude formation.

Again this technique is an imperfect one; hiring, firing and reassigning are controlled through legal limitations. And attitude formation and strengthening techniques must compete with other stimuli impinging upon the pertinent individuals. In general, aspects of this reasoning apply to all three large classes of actors tied up in CETA: CETA professionals, educators and community influentials. But the indirect manipulation of attitudes will be easier among individuals in subordinate status within the manpower organization
than among other significant actors, all other things being equal.

**Hypothesis 1.,d.** The more manpower professionals seek evidence (as a pre-condition of staff hiring, assignment etc.) of proeducation attitudes among staff and manpower volunteers, the more likely policy will reflect these attitudes in Title I program mix.

**3., a and b. Quality of Staff.** The quality of midlevel and top staff is another organizational aspect of policy management that the prime sponsor can manipulate somewhat. This too is an imperfect tool for obvious reasons: quality of assessment mechanisms, competitiveness of jobs, and protectionist legislation which limits hiring, firing and promotion.

**Hypothesis 3., a and b.** Other things being equal, the higher the quality of the CETA staff, the more likely the prime to use classroom training as a manpower tool.

**3.,c. Nature of Operating Responsibility.** The range of options open to a prime sponsor span a continuum from total in-house operation where manpower engages in housekeeping and administrative matters but also provides client services to the other extreme where a prime sponsor delegates or subcontracts nearly all manpower functions save perhaps those involving monitoring, evaluation, letting contracts and auditing. Either extreme has attendant problems associated with it, and a prime sponsor's preferred position—at either end or somewhere in the middle—has consequences for the level of classroom training in the jurisdiction's program mix.
A prime sponsor can be dominated by service deliverers to the absurd possibility of capture and subordination, in which case the service deliverers determine program choice. On the other hand, the prime sponsor may be so highly centralized and or suspicious that it cannot surrender any of its responsibility so it is not only running programs, but it is also policing itself. The prime sponsor has the power to control his operating responsibility to a point. There are limitations: the regulations, the community and its resources, the nature and the skill of the executive as well as the force of local custom. But perhaps the strongest limitation on the degree of manipulability of operating responsibility is the basic impracticality of changing from highly centralized to very decentralized operations on a frequent basis or the natural resistance one finds in a community against abrupt nonincremental change: problems would erupt if a prime sponsor sought radical change from recognized ways of doing things.

Hypothesis 3.c. Prime sponsors that operate more as contract managers, preferring to subcontract service delivery outside, will be more able and more likely to rely on classroom training in their Title I programs than will sites that prefer to run in-house operations.

3.d. Involvement of the MAC. The prime sponsor has some influence over this factor of program operation. Statutorily the MAC has the right to exist and the right to advise--as a collection of lay people. Any other role or responsibility granted the MAC is at the pleasure of the prime sponsor. The MAC can be very useful as a
forum for the manpower administrator or prime sponsor. It can be a political shield; it can be a policymaking body; it can be a public relations vehicle; it can be a smokescreen; it can be a sounding board for community sentiment, or it can be a farce--composed to represent almost any bias a prime sponsor may wish to prosecute or buy off.

But what is the nature of the link between MAC involvement and commitment to classroom training? The logic is certainly debatable, perhaps strained: MAC's tend to represent the community (in a sense, the way a city council or a state legislature is the representative of some community); as spokesmen for the community MAC members will tend to act as advocates for community values and institutions. One of the community's proudest institutions tends to be its schools, hence if the MAC is civic minded, it should be encouraging the use of the schools in manpower programs if for no other reason than to augment local tax efforts vis a vis the schools with federal manpower dollars.

The weakest element of this argument is the assumption that MAC members can rise above self-interest (goals as service deliverers, for example) to act as spokesmen for community institutions like the schools. If this logic has any merit, the link between MAC involvement and prime sponsor commitment to classroom training is rather simple and direct:

Hypothesis 3., d. As MAC involvement increases, prime sponsor commitment to classroom training increases or prime sponsors with
high levels of MAC involvement will have high levels of classroom training in their Title I program mix.

3. e. Commitment to Placement. A prime sponsor has imperfect control over this factor in program choice to the same extent that all organizations have over formulation and priority they give to goal setting. The legislation encourages/requires certain levels of performance, and placement is one; but a manpower unit can seek to maximize other goals as well. Commitment to placement depends upon the shared attitudes of a wide set of actors, and while it seems natural for a manpower unit to seek placement as a goal, one should be mindful that placement goals are difficult goals to achieve in comparison to others. Hence many individuals and prime sponsors as well give lip service to placement as a paramount goal while demonstrating through their behavior or policy actions—enrolling all Title applicants in work experience, for example—that it is not terribly important to them as an organization. A staff cannot, however, assert that henceforth placement shall be our main or most important goal and expect to see placement rates increase. The goal requires the necessary resources locally as well as cooperative attitudes within the manpower system. Again the question must be asked, "How does a systemwide commitment to placement link up with a prime sponsor's commitment to classroom training?"

Hypothesis 3. e. Prime sponsors with strong systemwide commitment to placement will have a greater absolute commitment to classroom training. Or as commitment to training increases, prime sponsor levels of commitment to classroom training will increase. Implicit
in this hypothesis is the assumption that primes see classroom training as directly instrumental in maximizing the goal of placement. If there is a dispute about this instrumental link between classroom training and placement, one would think that the dispute would involve a difference of opinion among practitioners over the efficacy of classroom training vs. on-the-job training; one would not suggest that somehow work experience or PSE was more likely to result in unsubsidized employment (i.e., placements).

It seems problematic, perhaps foolhardy, to engage in argument in a serious way over the superiority of classroom training or OJT as means to maximize the goal of placement. Neither can be considered apart from the individual for whom it is contemplated, the local economy and the motivation of the educator or industrialist offering the service. In the abstract, OJT may appear more solidly linked to a fulltime, unsubsidized position, but only in the abstract—none of these manpower tools has much meaning apart from a very concrete context.

What this rather elaborate disclaimer seems to lead to is that the hypothesis we proposed between placement and classroom training would have to apply as equally to OJT. Granted.

3. f. The Level of Conflict. Two questions demand consideration under this heading. How is "level of conflict" a factor subject to some control by policymakers and/or policy managers and two, how is this independent construct linked/related to our dependent variable? We need to distinguish between unfocused and focused conflict (Ripley, et.al., 1978: 33), the former being unproductive
and unresolvable because it is typically "...petty and unimportant and are often focused on personalities." (Ripley, 33) The focused conflict on the other hand can be productive and lead to the resolution of important issues. It is focused conflict that staff and policymakers can partially manage. And how they do this, of course, depends on the levels of their skills and aptitudes; nevertheless, the techniques would not be far from those used by any good group leader or parliamentarian or chairperson or even an informal leader. And using conflict as a management or decisionmaking device has certain risks associated with it. Conflict may become unmanageable; it may grow out of proportion; it may engender other problems within an organization or a policy system. Thus while an executive might encourage some conflict before he makes certain decisions so that the conflict will result in the proper airing of all points of view and all alternatives; the consequences of this conflict are not wholly predictable and neither are they whole manageable in the sense that one can shut them off the way one would a spichet after he has drawn enough from it.

Assuming, therefore, that a capable administrator uses conflict as a management tool, how, then, is it related to classroom training? First, it seems, we must harken back to our distinction between focused and unfocused conflict. In general, "...conflict of both kinds was not a serious problem in our national sites. CETA was not the subject of either loud or continuous public debate. What conflict did exist tended to center on the funding of service deliverers or related question of the focus of authority for making service
delivererr decisions." (Ripley, 1978) Hence empirically earlier CETA analysis has shown that conflict was within the system and over who should be funded.

**Hypothesis 3., f.** The stronger, more chronic and unmanaged is the conflict over who gets contracts, the more the prime sponsor will rely upon classroom training. The rationale of this statement of relationship is quite simple though, I think, debatable: to check this sort of conflict with the least amount of "after taste" among elements of the manpower system, one attempts to neutralize some of the rancor and schools (apolitical bodies, for the most part; low visibility good guys, with strong community support) are just the sort of organizations that can do this neutralizing, assuming they can be persuaded to take part.

3., g. **Quality of Evaluation.** Monitoring involves supervision over the short term, perhaps the way a school teacher would report grades on a child each six weeks of the school year. Evaluation, on the other hand, is typically conducted over longer program epics—a yearly practice, for example—and to extend the analogy above: evaluation would be more akin to the final report card issued by the school after the final comprehensive exam. It would be a summary judgment on the order of the pass or fail if we draw out our schooling example. Monitoring, as is typically practiced in manpower settings at least, tends to be a series of progress reports, indicating satisfactory movement toward some goal. It is more a set of clerical functions than sophisticated analysis. By design evaluation confronts the difficult question, but it does so with very crude tools (cost-benefit
analysis, zero-based budgeting are at best sledge hammers, certainly fraught with manifold assumptions not everyone will readily grant); hence, to labor in some areas of evaluation is to work in the twilight zone of policy analysis. Good simple monitoring, on the other hand, need be no more controversial than that which an accountant does when he audits.

While Title I regulations require periodic monitoring and evaluation, few primes probably distinguish much between the two; and while many may toss the jargon of evaluation about, few engage in anything more sophisticated than monitoring. Nevertheless prime sponsors must make judgments that ordinarily would result from an evaluation--to deobligate a subcontractor, to increase his funding, reduce it, to reorder a prime's priorities, to step up its emphasis for different segments of the eligible population, to alter its mix of programs. It is the evaluation process that should inform judgments about these kinds of choices. But because evaluation is more art than science in most manpower divisions, it is susceptible to more abuse, misuses and is, therefore, subject to more arbitrary use by those in a position to conduct evaluations. One could argue that this characterization of evaluation makes it at least a very weak management tool. That would be so if the evaluation component of the local prime sponsorship were ethical, professional and insulated from political pressure. For just the reverse could be argued just as forcefully: because good, reliable evaluation is so poorly developed it can be used in many unintended ways, given the relative ignorance of other actors in the system. It could be a very
controllable tool in the hands of someone with less professional concerns. But evaluation can be characterized as "quality" where it is conducted by skillful staff aware of its weaknesses but used in a satisficing fashion—making the most of it with the best available techniques and procedures. An evaluation should confirm what periodic monitoring had been suggesting all along. And completed research (Marvel, 1978) has shown the superiority of OJT over work experience and PSE. Hence evaluation conducted in most satisfactory primes should indicate that classroom training (and OJT) are more effective than other Title I tools. This being the case, the only logical inference is that

Hypothesis 3.g. Where evaluation is quality, classroom training should be high; or, as evaluation improves in quality, a prime sponsor's commitment to classroom training should likewise increase.

3.h. Staff Commitment to Placement. This discussion would be essentially the same as that accompanying "i".

1.d. Pre-CETA Staff Experience. The level of control a policy-maker can exert over this particular aspect of personnel is limited by the availability of such people; that is, persons with manpower experience pre-dating CETA are scarce. Apart from whether one judges this strategy as desirable (there is some thinking that too much old blood adds to an agency's problems) it is nevertheless the case that administrators must search far and wide for seasoned manpower professionals to man local CETA offices.

In general prime sponsors must make due with fewer professional employees than are needed to meet Department of Labor demands
realistically and effectively. That is why this aspect of personnel management is at best an imperfect management tool, one which he can manipulate only up to some point. But granting its relatively low level of control, how, one may ask, does pre-CETA experience affect a prime's present day commitment of resources to classroom training? First, in general, people whose careers in manpower span a decade or more will have moved up the career ladder to a position where they may influence policy, like program mix, for example. Moreover, the seasoned veteran will have a very high probability of having worked under MDTA, CETA's most recent predecessor. MDTA was a training program pure and simple. It did nothing else because it was never designed to tackle problems comprehensively. Most staff with MDTA experience will have a positive attitude toward institutional skill training and classroom training; it was an effective tool for MDTA, given MDTA's goals. It is therefore only a very small leap to the next logical inference: given a staff with MDTA experience and an attitude from MDTA days that classroom training was a good manpower tool, these people in management/policy positions under CETA will be strong advocates for classroom training under CETA. There is no reason, theory or body of empirical evidence I know of to suggest that people are not in the main creatures of habit who tend to generalize from one set of experiences to another set of similar experiences if left to their own devices. Hence I believe this line of reasoning squares rather well with most human behavioral theory with which I am familiar.
Hypothesis 1., d. The more experienced the CETA staff, the more that staff will emphasize classroom training and vocational education in their Title I program recommendations.

3., i. Openness of Decisionmaking. If we think of decisionmaking as ranging from centralized where one person makes decisions without the participation of others to the polar opposite where decision are made in public after extensive debate in a public forum and ultimate choices result from a vote, we have sketched the range of decisionmaking styles. Openness of decisionmaking approaches the more public end of the continuum we have sketched above. In a real sense then the more open, the more public. (There is a tendency in our culture to assume or conclude that open/public is a priori better than closed or centralized; we shall resist making such assertions here.) Nevertheless we will be hypothesizing that the nature of the decisionmaking process will affect program choice. But before we discuss this link, it would be well to talk about "openness of decisionmaking" as a management tool, again an imperfect one.

Closed systems are clearly the most manageable. In fact, at the absurd level where one person makes all decisions in pristine isolation, control is as complete as that individual could want it. The wider one opens the door to an heterogeneous public, the more control becomes difficult because the range of interests, values, goals, biases is widened. Outcomes become less predictable (assuming the chair doesn't have perfect information) because the potential
set of actors/advocates will vary in skills, resources and motivation.

If a prime sponsor allows himself to be directed by the advice or recommendations that emerge from such a forum—A MAC, very pluralistic in composition—how will this affect program choice? Any hypothesis will require a few assumptions: let us assume 1) that the forum is not the creation of the prime sponsor in the sense that he controls them lock stock and barrel, 2) that sectors/advocates are equally interested in outcomes 3) that debate is free and that 4) the prime sponsor accepts the recommendations that come from the MAC.

**Hypothesis 3.i.** Levels of prime sponsor commitment to classroom training will increase with increased openness of decisionmaking. First, in an open forum one cannot squelch easily the facts that OJT and classroom training are seen as the most effective manpower tools (Marvel, 1978, for example) and that datum has to bias a decision toward classroom training and OJT itself, given our assumptions. Second, assuming self-interest among participants and advocates, the schools ought to be in the best situation to acquire a large share of the manpower pot: they tend to be large, visible, well known and respectable; and they have the resources to prosecute their own interests effectively. They have the myth about education—the cure-all—behind them to give their services at least the reputation of being good. This plus the fact that other advocates will be overshadowed by the schools and will be vying for scarce resources among a constellation of small community-based organizations, for example, should effectively weaken their position
vis-a-vis the schools. OIC's do not have the general positive reputation that white, middle-class, culture-reinforcing institutions like schools seem to enjoy. On the other hand, Urban Leagues and OIC's, because of the racial foundations of these organizations, do not have widespread support across the whole population, and other more local organizations tend to be even less visible. The upshot of this discussion, therefore, is that the public schools are the single biggest organization capable of going after and getting CETA dollars should they so desire.

This concludes the subset of factors we have argued are related to program choice and are at the same time subject to some manipulation by the prime sponsor or his professional staff. We will turn now to those remaining factors we have judged are subject to high control and potentially affect the prime sponsor's commitment to classroom training before we conclude the chapter.

Operations/Management Factors Subject to Relatively High Control.

Distinguishing among the intermediate group of factors from the group over which the prime sponsor has relatively high control in such a way that everyone will agree with the placement of a factor into one category rather than another is difficult. And even if this cannot be solved satisfactorily, it may not matter a great deal for it may be the case that factors over which the prime sponsor has low or moderate control have greater impact while factors over which he has high control are far less influential. Hindsight is the only perspective from which to draw this conclusion; thus it could be the case that drawing a distinction between moderate and high manipulability may be only ana-
lytically meaningful. The brief list below constitutes the high control factors we shall look at.

3.,j. Quality of Monitoring
3.,k. Employment Service Role
3.,l. Program Integration
3.,m. Use of the RFP process

3.,j. Quality of Monitoring. Monitoring involves supervision over the short term. It is a series of progress reports indicating satisfactory or unsatisfactory progress against local and Department of Labor imposed criteria. Monitoring asks rather simple questions: is a contractor keeping his books and files properly; is a contractor spending its money according to plan; is it reaching its goals on time. Good simple monitoring need be no more controversial than competent auditing if the monitor is conscious of the political setting within which he labors.

The Department of Labor establishes some criteria that must be examined in monitoring. These standards seem realistic and rational given the professed goals of CETA legislation. And the local prime sponsors can improve on this set of criteria with additional standards and measures of their own. Moreover, prime sponsors can choose to de-emphasize DOL criteria as they go about this activity. The DOL admonishment to engage in "knowledge development" is a good case in point. Hence monitoring is a tool over which a prime has substantial control even if the function can be easily abused or misused.

The link between monitoring and prime sponsor use of classroom training is essentially the same as the one sketched earlier for evalu-
Hypothesis 3.j. The better prime sponsor monitoring, the greater will be prime sponsor use of classroom training.

For the better the monitoring, the more likely the process is to uncover locally what has been documented more widely—that classroom training and OJT are effective. Establishing this should result in its continued growth as a Title I tool, assuming local training does not vary greatly from national norms and that primes have the freedom to act rationally.

3.k. Employment Service Role. CETA regulations mandate a role for the local Employment Service in CETA. By status, the Employment Service must be given a voting seat on the MAC. No other interest is guaranteed such a status in the CETA legislation. This provision is quite another thing from being a presumptive service deliverer however. E.S. need not be given any important contractual responsibilities under CETA. And, indeed, many CETA prime sponsors are openly hostile toward the local employment service office. (See, for example: Ripley, 1978; VanHorn, 1977; Schnedeker and Schnedeker, 1978). Where relations are strained, CETA claims by and large that ES is middle-class biased, is only interested in the numbers game, is the spokesman for business rather than the advocate of the clients whom they are to serve and protect: the typical criticism leveled against most old bureaus and especially regulatory commissions. This is a very widespread characterization of ES within the CETA system; in general it is probably closer to the truth than it is a distortion of it. Hence, a prime sponsor's choice to involve ES very significantly
or to avoid it should suggest a few cautious conclusions about that prime—cautious, because all bets would be off were it the case that ES is used because the particular jurisdiction lacked any alternative agencies to compete for what ES would do. This could be the case in consortia which are heavily rural. Where the area is not characterized by absence of alternatives to ES, however, the "coziness" of the ES, CETA connection could be an indicator of more general conditions. Because ES is often seen as very conservative, conventional, status quo in attitude, business oriented, white and middle-class—like the leadership of the nation's public schools—a prime sponsor which grants ES a centerpiece role in its operation is likely to be moving in this direction itself, or it may be located in a jurisdiction which is itself most notably conservative, business oriented, white, etc., limiting even an advocacy agency with other goals to a very diminished circle of other out-group advocates with whom to do business.

The point is that a prime sponsor is free to determine for itself what role it will grant the local ES. Choosing a big role for ES is likely to have strong secondary consequences for the nature of manpower politics and policy locally for most jurisdictions. And except for the relatively few prime sponsors with no alternatives, this is, of course, a conscious free will decision completely within the control of the prime sponsor. What, then, does this argument imply about the link between an ES role and prime sponsor commitment to classroom training?

First, it should be seen that ES and the public schools should not be seen as competitors. This would seldom if ever be the case. ES is not, in the main, interested in providing classroom training; rather ES
prefers to do the traditional functions of intake, documentation, eligibility verification, job development and referral. It is most comfortable assuming the role of broker between firms and the skilled and semi-skilled job seeker. Local education agencies could do many of these functions if they had the paraprofessional staff to undertake them. Usually they do not. If local education agencies have an interest in manpower, it is as service deliverer of classroom training, assessment or curriculum development. To reiterate a position made earlier: in the vast majority of instances the local prime sponsors have a great deal of discretion as to how much a CETA role to offer the Employment Service. And ES tends to be independent enough itself to be in a position to reject CETA overtures if the nature of the linkage is not seen as favorable to ES.

Hypothesis 3.k. A prime sponsor that relied heavily upon the Employment Service as a partner in local manpower policy would also rely heavily upon classroom training as a Title I tool if not seriously hampered by an absence of alternatives to ES.

Our leap from ES reliance to classroom training reliance is inferential. Both local ES offices and local education agencies are old organizations with strong middle class biases; both serve a clientele somewhat more advantaged than typical CETA eligibles. We are essentially saying that if the local conditions are right to foster a cozy CETA/ES link, they are also right to foster such a link with local educators resulting in heightened use of classroom training as a manpower tool in such a prime sponsorship.

This hypothesis poses a purely empirical question. It is rather straight
forward to ascertain if primes which work closely with ES give disproportionate commitment to classroom training than ones with less cordial and central roles with ES. Here we confront the dilemma of coincidence vs. causality. It will be enough to demonstrate the coincidence. The question of local prime sponsor decisions being determined by a set of middle-class values/biases is way beyond the scope of this dissertation.

3.1. Program Integration. "Program Integration" refers to a condition locally under which services within a particular title or across titles was so designed that a participant in a local CETA program could move from one service to another throughout the set of activities funded by CETA money without confronting institutional and organizational barriers to retard or render impossible that movement. An example of a highly integrated local program would look like this for example: CETA might serve a 16 year old high school drop out initially with a Title III program--YCCIP under which he would learn the most rudimentary things about his deportment on the job as well as what responsibilities he owes to anyone who employes him. Having completed this, the same participant might be transferred to Title I classroom training to learn how to fix small appliances in a skill training course offered in the evening at a community college. When he has completed this the same youth would be enrolled in an OJT slot at a local firm where the company further trains him to their specifications and later employs him full time in an unsubsidized job. Integrated CETA programs permit movement from program to program across Titles. And program integration is a design problem pure and simple. One can have an
integrated program if it is desired locally and if the prime sponsor has
the expertise and cooperation to design and assemble it. In some
ways, then, program integration depends upon the quality of staff
and the nature of local politics. But more than anything it depends
upon the preferences of the local administrators.

Implicit in any notion of program integration are some assumptions
about how various experiences relate to one another. That is, the
designer or planner must have a conception of process and how people
learn to assemble and link together meaningful programs. It would be
unwise to take a gifted participant, put him through classroom training
and make him an LPN over two years, for example, and then enroll him
in work experience; that is a ludicrous, regressive journey. In
general, we would think of a set of interrelated experiences going from
simple to complex or involving first low responsibility and gradually
more responsibility: The move from the Summer Youth Program to the
regular youth programs to Title I classroom training to on-the-job
training to unsubsidized employment, for example. This view is based
upon the premise that people develop gradually and that programs must
be tailored for individuals depending upon their degree of deprivation,
learning capabilities and learning style.

Hypothesis 3.,1. Highly integrated programs would make greater use of
classroom training because integrated programs are by definition and
design predicated upon the same philisophical base as is formal edu-
cation: people progress in a step wise fashion building on earlier
experience. Education, at least classroom training or OJT, assumes
the keystone or coupling role between low level career exploration
orientation, work experience and some meaningful unsubsidized employment. This education can take any number of forms. Because OJT is very hard to develop, classroom training, its nearest competitor, is probably used more than it might otherwise be as an alternative or a substitute to the more attractive OJT.

3. Use of the RFP Process. A prime sponsorship may use an RFP process. And that means that in the selection of service deliverers the prime sponsor informs the public that it seeks "bidders" or "applicants" or potential program agents to submit proposals or plans or abstracts to perform some function for the prime sponsor. The level of specificity and formality and completeness will vary by prime sponsor, but in general an RFP process differs from less formal procedures in that it involves a written plan, some level of specificity and—like an open bidding process in theory at least—the possibility for some healthy competition among potential program agents reacting to the request.

An RFP process implies selection and choice on the basis of merit. That is, selection is not based upon a decision rule like "first come; first serve," or "Those with contracts now, ought to have first crack next time."—some variant of seniority; rather, the raison d'être is to solicit proposals and to choose among a set based upon the plan submitted and a set of goals or criteria—implicit or explicit—the prime can maximize by going for one proposal over another. When a prime does not use an RFP (close to one half do not) there is no sure way to ascertain the selection criteria important in awarding contracts; when a prime uses an RFP it is reasonable to infer that merit is
is important. That being the case, what does use of RFP mean for a prime sponsor's use of classroom training locally. With merit as a central criterion for selection, either classroom training or OJT should be preferred experiences under Title I if that is the prime sponsor is interested in the most effective treatments. And because all local jurisdictions have found OJT contracts exceedingly difficult to write with private firms, classroom training should win at least by default if not simply on its own merits. 

Hypothesis 3. The more a prime relies upon the RFP process to select service subcontractors, the more it will rely upon classroom training—where OJT is scarce—in its Title I mix of programs. 

This completes the three sets of variables that collectively make up the model sketched in Chapter I. Our first line of attack will be bivariate correlational analysis, this partly because of the small "N" size with which we work, but also because of a theoretical position. A general theory of program choice does not exist either deduced logically or tested again and again through consistent empirical analysis; hence, we still labor in a policy area where advancement will have to be achieved through the slow process of increasing the store of empirical propositions, building through accretion empirical theory rather than testing empirical theory against situations in the "real" world. We would like to consider the combined impacts of different variables on program choice—multivariate analysis—but the nature of our data is likely to impose severe limitations on any plan for such analysis.
Chapter III. Concept Operationalization

And Method

Up to this point we have remained for the most part in the domain of theory, trying, as it were, to account for the choice of one hypothesis over another or marshalling evidence or logic to guide us in developing these hypotheses we wish to explore more thoroughly in the remaining parts of this dissertation.

But to comply with the canons of competent research, we need to be as careful as possible to specify how we have defined and interpreted our concepts, particularly the way we measure them in the present research. It is for that reason, therefore, that we will try to specify our concepts concretely here. We begin with the dependent variable.

The Dependent Variable.

Prime Sponsor Commitment to Classroom Training. Our initial interest in program choice emphasized the use of vocational education—that is, specific teaching for a career—in prime sponsorships. And this narrow focus (classroom training includes other things besides career courses; it includes things like GED courses, English as a second language, Adult Basic Education) resulted from a literature review that revealed a chorus of criticism that vocational education was being underutilized in manpower.
After some study a question of practicality intervened and resulted in our present, broader concern for classroom training. When we sought to extract data on vocational education from the Title I data of which it is a part, we discovered that reporting procedures and requirements were such that one could not confidently isolate vocational education from the broader category of classroom training. Moreover, while it is the case that most of the Title I classroom training is used for vocational education -- some estimates for the period place it at over 90 per cent -- variation from the norm is not so randomly distributed among primes to allow us to treat them all alike. Hence an initial interest restricted to vocational education required the practical adjustment of redefining our interest more broadly to "classroom training" though classroom training and vocational education are nearly synonymous for the period under study here. "Prime Sponsor Commitment to Classroom Training" has been operationalized in two ways: in terms of budget shares and percentages of participants in Title I activities.

Title I program and client data is collected by quarter at the local level, and it is reported cumulatively so that anyone can see quite quickly how a prime sponsor is progressing from the first quarter of a fiscal year through the fourth. Monitoring goal achievement therefore, is easy since a prime sponsor specifies its goals ahead of time in a Title I plan. Since we are interested in tracking prime sponsor commitment over three program years, fiscal years 1975, 1976, and 1977; we need data for quarter four -- 6/75; quarter
eight—6/76; and quarter thirteen—9/77. Because data are cumulative, we will get a summary of a fiscal year's performance by using these quarters. The data needed to construct the two measures of prime sponsor commitment came from official Department of Labor documents called "Budget Information Summary" and "Quarterly Progress Reports." Both variables are constructed in the same way. Title I data are recorded in nine categories, only three of which have meaning for our dependent variable. In the first case, measuring commitment in terms of participants, we sum "Classroom training participants" and "Classroom training participants — voc ed" and divide by "Total program participants, prime sponsor and voc ed" which gives us the proportion of Title I participants enrolled in classroom training without double counting. To get a comparable figure for the dependent variable measured in budget shares, we use the corresponding expenditure data from the same three categories and put it over total accrued expenditures. These calculations were made each of the three years mentioned above, and a tabular summary in Chapter IV page shows the range of variation among the sites and over the three program years.

Independent Variables

1. Environmental/Contextual

a. Unemployment Rate. The unemployment rate is measured from monthly figures reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. An unemployment rate for each quarter from March 1975 to September, 1977 was calculated by averaging unemployment rates for three months. These unemployment rates for each of the quarters (6/75, 6/76 and 9/77) for the 32 prime
sponsorships have ranges from 3.2 per cent to a high of 14.6 per cent. Standardized data from the BLS are not available for the period before January, 1975.

a.,1. Unemployment Lagged One Quarter. This variation is not a change in concept; it is just an adjustment. It could be argued that any program choice made, let us say at \( T_1 \), will have been made based upon the best available planning data at that time, \( T_1 \). That means that at \( T_1 \)—here let that be Quarter IV or 6/75—a planners' most current employment data will be 3/75 or Quarter III. In other words to adjust for the temporal sequence in planning, we lag the employment data one quarter to simulate the data planners might have at the time of decision.

a.,2. Unemployment Lagged Two Quarters. We also decided to lag this indicator two quarters for precisely the same reason, but here we seek to link unemployment measured two quarters before the measure of classroom training commitment thinking that planners may have to adjust to much slippage as they plan. In other words their planning data—the world being the imperfect place that it is—may be even more out of date than one quarter. A two quarter lag may deal with this possibility though no logic can defend a choice of one, two or three quarter lag.

b., Characteristics of the Work Force. As we pointed out earlier in Chapter II, demographic data to characterize a work force is very problematic. Either it is very incomplete, sketchy and rather unsystematically collected or, as in the case of census data, it is old and likely to be out of date, though being old does not mean that
it is necessarily out of date. Having said this, however, we find, nevertheless, that we must rely upon census data if we wish to use data roughly comparable for each of our sites. In other words, notwithstanding its most obvious problem, census data seems to be the best available from which to get indicators of local labor forces. Other sources have even worse drawbacks: ESARS data and prime sponsor data, for example. From the census we can extract a set of indicators which collectively may serve as a rough characterization of the local labor force our prime sponsors must deal with.

b.,1. Per Cent White. "Per Cent White" is self-explanatory. The variation we observe here across our sites should suggest the nature and scope of the problem a prime sponsor must confront. In general the whiter the population the less disadvantaged and vice versa.

b.,2. Per Cent Unemployed Women. Rather than rely upon per cent women which we know does not vary significantly from one site to another, we can use "Per Cent Unemployed Women" because it does vary, and it taps a dimension of the local labor force that should affect how a manpower program is constituted. "Per cent unemployed women" comes from the 1970 Census Public Use Sample and refers to the per cent of the unemployed pool that is female.

b.,3. Per Cent Unemployed White. This variable also comes from the 1980 Census and refers to the proportion of the work force that is unemployed and white. Statements about the residual—nonwhite—follow as easily from this variable as do ones about whites.
b.,4. Per Cent Economically Disadvantaged, Head of Household.
This indicator, likewise, comes from the 1980 Census Public Use Sample, and it refers to the per cent who are classified as econ­omically disadvantaged but who also head household units rather than being single.

b.,5. Per Cent Disadvantaged Families. This indicator also comes from the 1970 Census and refers to the per cent of families who are economically disadvantaged.

b.,6. Per Cent Spanish Speaking. This indicator too is from the Public Use Sample of the 1970 Census and is self-explanatory.

c. Economic Growth. As we pointed out earlier, we realize that "economic growth" can be defined in a number of ways, and it can be operationalized in several ways as well. How one does either depends upon one's objective. Here economic growth is best operationalized for our purposes as a ratio comparing the number of people employed in nonagricultural work at two meaningful times in recent history; we examine, for example, the change from 1970 to 1975 to draw our conclusions. The indicator is computed from data contained in a Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics source called Employment and Earnings, States and Areas, 1939-75 and supplements.

d. Pre-CETA History and Experience. This variable is one for which we have presently no measures. It is a contextual one that will have to be gotten at through the case studies we propose elsewhere in this dissertation. We will seek insight into this area by asking all our case study respondents questions which probe this historical informa-
tion. For the specific questions posed to all respondents, see the appendix for the interview guide. And more particularly check section "D", questions 1 through 7.

e. Structure of Local Government

A prime sponsor can be a city, a county or a consortium containing several cities, several counties or cities and counties the combination of which collectively amounts to a minimal population of 100,000.

One way to classify local governments is with the schemes used in the County Yearbook and the Municipal Yearbook. These references classify municipalities into five classes in terms of form of government: CM, council-manager; C), commission: MC, mayor-council: RT, representative town meeting, and TM, town meeting. (None of the sites fell into the last two groups so we dropped them.) Counties are divided into three types also by the form of government: CO, commission: CA, council/administratr: and CE, council/elected executive.

![Partisan Continuum of Local Jurisdictions](image)

FIGURE 3.1 The Partisan Continuum of Local Jurisdictions.
Making this first cut is easy for the sites which are not consortia. In the consortia cases, however, we will give them the designation of the most dominant jurisdiction within its limits. Balance-of-State sponsors defy classification; they will be eliminated from this part of the analysis. (This only involves three cases).

We can simplify the resulting six element typology—MC, CO, CM, CO, CA and CE—by collapsing these into three units.

1) CO plus CO County Commission and Municipal Commission
2) MC plus CE Mayor/Council and Council/Elected Official
3) CM plus CA Council/Manager and Council/Administrator

Having created 3 new hybrid categories, we can array them on a dimension or a continuum also. The limits of this dimension would embrace "highly political local government" at one extreme—the Daly model, if you will—and "apolitical management" at the other—something approaching old textbook models of purely professional public administrators on the other extreme.

The continuum above visually represents the scheme; the overlapping colored arrows represent the fact that these classes are not discrete but will overlap or run into one another.

f. Industrial Mix.

This concept had been used in another CETA dissertation (Filipic, 1977, p. 142.) as an explanatory variable. There it was defined as "...the number of people employed in manufacturing divided by total population." This conceptualization, however, seems less attractive here because we really wish to emphasize another connotation of "industrial mix"—the degree of diversity one finds in non-agricultural
persuits in a prime sponsor's local economy. To put it simply: is the local economy one composed of a very wide number of different persuits, or is it a one industry town? A figure that gives the proportion of a work force engaged in manufacturing says nothing about the richness or diversity one finds in the manufacturing sector. The whole town could be involved in making motorcycles on the one extreme; on the other hand, the manufacturing component of a local economy could defy characterization since no one dominates.

Data for this variable have come from "The Current Employment Statistics Program" published in DOL/BLS bulletin 1370-12, Employment and Earnings, States and Areas 1939-75. This volume does an industrial classification of each state and selected areas--cities and counties--in the state based on information from payroll records submitted voluntarily to state agencies by a representative sample of industrial commercial and governmental establishments collectively employing about 32 million workers. This classification is based upon titles recommended by OMB and "The specific industries selected for publication by the state agencies are generally those which best reflect the currently significant economic activities in the state or the area. New series or industry combinations are introduced as shifts occur in the economy."

The data series does a complete statewide profile, indicating the diversity of non-agricultural industry carried on within the state's borders. A similar characterization is done for "selected areas" in each state.

We will infer some conclusions about "industrial mix" and "economic diversity" by counting the number of industry titles identified for
TABLE 3.1. State Variation in Industrial Mix.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>Number of Industrial Titles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>$35^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>$142^b$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. least diverse  
b. most diverse
relevant areas and contrasting them with similar figures among our 32 prime sponsors. Where "significant areas" is not completely congruent with the prime sponsor, we will substitute the nearest area profile within or about the local market of which the prime is a part. For example, Lorain Ohio—not specifically indexed in this data series—is treated as part of the greater Cleveland labor market; Yonkers, N.Y. by Westchester Co., N.Y.

Some examples here will serve to demonstrate the range of variation and therefore the range of diversity. Using the number of industry titles given for each area covered, we find, for example, that states vary very dramatically by this criterion.

The validity of this indicator, of course, depends upon the thoroughness of those responsible for assembling this series, but it seems rather obvious just from a glance at the table below that the variation there certainly conforms with intuitive judgments one is likely to make about the states sampled below.

This same sort of enumeration was done for the cities and counties which make up our set of prime sponsors. Where a prime sponsor consortium was composed of several local jurisdictions, the dominant partner was used as representative. When a prime sponsor was not itself covered in the data series, the nearest and most similar substitute was supplied. Thus Dayton was used in place of Butler Co., Clark Co., and the Miami Valley Consortium; Columbus for Licking-Delaware; Wilkes/Barre for Luzerne Pa., and so forth.

These data have been updated until 1975; hence, they are reasonably current. Moreover, other features of a local economy are apt to change more rapidly than the actual industry mix. Hence we are rather
TABLE 3.2. Industrial Mix: States and Selected Areas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Area or Substitute</th>
<th>Number of Titles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OHIO</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akron</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allen Co.</td>
<td>MD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butler (Dayton)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSW (Canton)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cincinnati</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark Co. (Dayton)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleve/WR</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cols/Frank</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greene Co. (Dayton)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton Co. (Cinci)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-D (Cols.)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorain (Clev)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MV (Dayton)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEO (Youngstown)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWO</td>
<td>MD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toledo/Lucas</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOS</td>
<td>MD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW JERSEY</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumberland N.J. (Camden)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PENNSYLVANIA</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luzerne (W-B)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOS Connec.</td>
<td>MD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell Mass.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLORADO</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denver</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOS ARK</td>
<td>MD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINNESOTA</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duluth</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASHINGTON</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King-sno (Seattle-Everett)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALABAMA</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOWA</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Des Moines</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEXAS</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas Co.</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH CAROLINA</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumberland (Fayette)</td>
<td>MD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALIFORNIA</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-Y (Sacramento)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW YORK</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yonkers (Westchester Co.)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. MD = missing data
b. Range 142 to 14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Density</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akron, O.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Allen Co., O.</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butler Co., O.</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton, O.</td>
<td>5600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cincinatti, O.</td>
<td>5500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clark Co., O.</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland, O.</td>
<td>8900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus, O.</td>
<td>3400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greene Co., O.</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toledo, O.</td>
<td>4600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell Mass</td>
<td>6900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnever Co.</td>
<td>4600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOS ARK</td>
<td>MD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duluth, Mn.</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King Sno</td>
<td>6000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B'ham, Ala</td>
<td>3600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton Co., O.</td>
<td>2186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licking/Deleware Co., O.</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorain Co., O.</td>
<td>3400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miami Valley, O.</td>
<td>5300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast (Youngstown) O.</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOS O. MD</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cumb. N.J.</td>
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<td>Luzurne Pa.</td>
<td>391</td>
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<td>BOS Conn. MD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cent. Iowa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dallas, Tx</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumb. N.C.</td>
<td>2800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sac-Yolo Co.</td>
<td>11100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yonkers, N.Y.</td>
<td>5800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilmington, Del.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
confident that the data and resulting profiles are timely.

g. Population Density.

Population density has here been operationalized as the number of people per square mile within a jurisdiction. These data were readily available in two recent sources, *The County Year Book* and *The Municipal Year Book*.

Again consortia posed some problems. We made the decision in these cases of going with the most dominant partner in the alliance not for convenience but because empirically it looks as if most of the time the smaller jurisdiction in a consortium is dominated by the largest jurisdiction making up the consortium. Averaging the population density would grossly overemphasize the influence of very small consortia members. BOS primes were eliminated from this analysis because they defied classification. Raw Figures are given in the following table.

h.1. Fiscal Condition I.

Fiscal Condition I refers to the financial health of the prime sponsor's local government along several criteria: the occurrence of layoffs of city employees; hiring freezes, cuts in services and budget deficits. Prime sponsors were placed into one of three groups in this variable 1=good; no problems with the above. 2=moderate; minor problems with at least one of the above. 3=poor; serious problems with at least one of the above. We were able to classify each of the 32 sites in this dissertation into the typology.

h.2. Fiscal Condition II.

A second operationalization will also be used; it is based upon prime sponsor bond ratings by Moody Investment Service. The ability to repay bonded debt, therefore, becomes a criterion against which to
Infer economic health, but in using this indicator for fiscal health we need to exercise some caution: a local government may have or maintain a good credit rating because it does cut expenses—laying off city workers, for example—or it may receive a poor rating for employing too many people relative to its revenue. These measurers, therefore, demand cautious interpretation.

Moody ratings place cities and counties into one of nine classes: Aaa, Aa A; Baa, Ba and B; Caa, Ca and C. And these designations run from Aaa, best quality to C, lowest rated class.

Since the lowest rating we encountered among our 32 sites was "Ba", we can eliminate the rest of the classes beneath this point. Hence our scheme and the resulting distribution is as follows:


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aaa</td>
<td>Best</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aa</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Upper Medium</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baa</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba</td>
<td>Speculative</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Balance of state prime sponsors are not rated; they were, therefore, coded as missing data. Multijurisdictional primes were given the average or modal rating among its constituent elements.

1. Availability of Facilities.

We hypothesized that a prime sponsor's use of institutional
vocational education and classroom training would be directly related to the amount of vocational education capital available locally—numbers of buildings, machines vocational education instructors whatever one would prefer to profile or characterize the plant capacity of the voc ed establishment locally. Moreover we asserted that the degree of slack locally would likewise affect the attractiveness of voc ed: if the local voc ed school was being used at capacity all the time, for example, it could not be pressed into service for manpower. If, on the other hand, the plant and human capital were being underutilized then one could make better use of it and on efficiency criteria at least voc ed would become an attractive service. We still believe the hypothesis makes good sense empirically and intuitively, but research to date has not produced the data we need to investigate this proposition systematically. To construct a variable from a concept such as "availability of facilities" we need data, and data that is very disaggregated—collected and reported for jurisdictions as small as school districts. School districts are often smaller than counties and cities, and no available data on local plant size and/or local resources or effort seem to be available at least in any organized volume or data set. This unhappy discovery could be a consequence of a host of conditions not the least of which is the decentralized and autonomous character of public education nationwide. The very predictable outcome of this situation is incomparable data—when it is collected—due to an absence of any global perspective transcending the local or provincial one. In any case, at this time we are unable to acquire school district specific data of a comparable enough nature to allow us
to compare the local vocational education base in each (or most) of the 32 prime sponsorships; if we are to "test" this link, it will have to be done very anecdotally and unsystematically by speaking to people variously involved in education and manpower and inquiring about their understanding of this phenomenon.

j. Business Involvement. By business involvement we mean "...the extent to which the prime sponsor has been able to elicit the interest and participation of businessmen in the CETA program." As part of the Ohio State Management study (Ripley, et al., 1978)a standard portion of each site report dealt with business involvement, and these sections were used collectively to develop a summary measure of business involvement, and those sections were used collectively to develop a summary measure of business involvement ranked from high to low for each of the 15 sites visited in the national study. Using such a classification what resulted was that 5 of the 15 sites were ranked "medium-high", one was ranked medium, three were ranked medium-low and 6 were ranked low in the capacity to involve business in local manpower programming.

We cannot cite here examples of activities we judged to warrant the various designations we cited above: medium-high in Dallas County, Texas on the strength of a job fair bringing CETA clients and employers together; a job development contract to the Chamber of Commerce. Denver was judged medium-high for its organized conferences with CETA staff and local employers and its contract with local firms to do assessment and placement. The other designations were given to sites with less or no interaction with the private-for-profit sector. Data for the Ohio prime sponsors were not available for this variable, hence our analysis here
k. Client Characteristics.

The single most relevant characteristic we have hypothesized is related to the prime sponsor levels of commitment to classroom training is whether the client has less than a high school education.

Since census data do not exist for this concept, the variable is constructed from prime sponsor generated data. The Ohio State CETA studies has data showing the per cent of enrollees who have not completed high school. This is not the same as census data which profiles the area for that proportion of the population with has less than a high school diploma. Prime sponsor enrollment data differs most obviously from census data in that enrollment data comes from the subset of a population who came in off the street. They could differ from the bigger pool in some important ways: motivation, and information for example. This prime sponsor generated data is the only data source to which we have access; we therefore have no other choice. One could argue that a prime sponsor's commitment to classroom training could as easily be based upon who comes in the door as it could on a community profile of the number in a population who lack some minimum of education. In other words we believe these data not only will suffice in place of census data, but given the shortcomings of census data, the prime sponsor data may be as good or better for our present purposes here.

2. Attitudes of Staff, MAC, and Political Officials. We asked staff, MAC members and political officials the following questions: "Without regard to present conditions, We would like you to rank each of these program categories--Classroom training, work experience, on-the-job training and public service employment--in terms of its relative importance to you
in principle." And we also probed, "Given the actual conditions you presently face in this prime sponsorship, how would you rank each of the four Title I program categories in terms of ideal spending priorities ...". These two questions and the answers they elicited represent the sum total of our systematic attitude data concerning the individual's perceived preference for Title I tools in contrast to the others. These data exist for both sets of prime sponsors, the Ohio sites and the 15 national sites. Responses were averaged for staff, MAC and all respondents within each site. Hence what we have are prime sponsor staff averages, prime sponsor MAC averages and an average preference curve for all respondents in the prime sponsor.

Additional attitudinal data will also come from the case studies. We will speak to educators and manpower people expressly about their attitudes about classroom training, the role of education in manpower and their attitudes about CETA clients. Moreover we will present respondents with summaries of findings to date and ask them to comment on their understanding, their interpretation as well as what local gloss they wish to offer. For specific questions, consult the interview guide in the appendix, especially questions A.,2., a. and b; A.,3; A.,4; B.,4 6 and 8; C., 1,3, 4,5,6 and 9.

Having completed our operational discussion of the first two classes of variables, we can now address the remaining operations/management constructs (which also happen to be the ones most high manipulable) in terms of useful measuring criteria. 3.,a. The Quality of Top Staff, and 3.,b. All Staff. These two concepts are measured on the basis of the Ohio State field study team's
judgment. The ratings of very good, good and fair reflect the team's composite judgments about the professional capabilities, experience and qualifications of the professional staff. (Sixteen primes had very good top professional staff; twelve had good top staff and four had fair top staff. Eleven had very good staff overall; fifteen had good, and six had fair staff overall.)

3.3c. Nature of Operating Responsibility. Location of operating responsibility refers to the nature of program operations—whether responsibility for service delivery is primarily retained by the CETA staff or virtually all subcontracted to external deliverers or somewhere in between (mixed). Among the 32 prime sponsors studied, five retained a high degree of operating responsibility; 15 subcontracted for all services, and 12 used a mixed approach.

3.3d. Involvement of the MAC. The involvement of the advisory council (MAC) was judged to fall into one of three levels: those that are both active and influential (11 cases); those that are active but not influential (12 cases); and those that are neither active nor influential (9 cases). The OSU team's judgments were based on the frequency of meetings and the extent to which council recommendations were accepted and implemented by elected officials—the prime sponsors.

3.3e. Commitment to Placement. Systemwide commitment is a composite measure of the importance with which placement was treated as a goal for Title I by each of five groups—staff, political officials, advisory council members, service deliverers and regional office personnel. The primes were placed into those with moderately high overall commitment (6 sites) and those with low overall commitment (9 primes). We were not able to
include the Ohio prime sponsors on this variable because of a lack of data.

Staff commitment is similar to the systemwide commitment measure. The staff commitment variable reflects our judgment about the extent to which placement was articulated and regarded as a serious goal for Title I by the staff. Prime sponsors were grouped into those in which the staff commitment to placement was explicit and strong (13 primes); those where staff commitment was limited (19 primes).

3.f. Level of Conflict. The level of conflict reflects the nature and extent of manpower related disagreement and disputes among different actors in the prime sponsorship. Three groupings emerged—low or no conflict, 15 primes; moderate conflict, 5; and relatively high conflict, 12 primes.

3.g. Quality of Evaluation. The quality of program evaluation was judged on the basis of both quantitative and qualitative aspects of evaluations performed by the staff and the range of service deliverers evaluated. Three categories emerged for this measure: high quality, 4 cases; moderate quality, 12 cases; and low quality, 16 cases.

1.d. Pre-CETA Staff Experience. The level of pre-CETA manpower experience was measured by the number of professional staff who had been involved in manpower prior to CETA. Two groups of prime sponsors emerged: those with less than one quarter of the staff who had pre-CETA manpower experience (20 were in this group) and those with a much greater proportion having pre-CETA manpower experience (12 primes).

3.h. Staff Commitment to placement. Staff commitment reflects team judgment about the extent to which placement was regarded as a serious goal for Title I among the professional staff. Thirteen primes were grouped as strong; and 19 were grouped together as limited in their commitment.
3.1. Openness of Decisionmaking. Refers to the nature of the contributions to Title I decisionmaking process—whether few, several or many different actors or groups of actors had a meaningful role. We have no data on the Ohio sites. The range of values were from very open (5) to closed (1).

We round out our present discussion with an exploration of the remaining policy variables we posit are subject to higher levels of control in the short term; these naturally are all also operations/management constructs by definition.

3.1. Quality of Monitoring. The quality of monitoring refers to the staff supervision of the service deliverers and staff units responsible for program delivery. Prime sponsors were judged to have high, medium or low quality monitoring depending on the nature and extent of monitoring visits and the range of service deliverers visited and monitored. There were ten prime sponsors with high quality monitoring, 13 with medium quality and 8 with low quality. One remained unclassified.

3.1. Employment Service Role. The U.S. Employment Service role in CETA varies widely from prime sponsor to prime sponsor. In some primes (5 to be exact) there was little to no utilization of the ES services. Nine primes rely on the ES for important segments of their Title I programs. Data were not available for the Ohio prime sponsors.

3.1. Program Integration. By program integration is meant the degree to which CETA participants are able to move between different Title I programs or between programs funded under different titles. This type of integration is much more open to staff manipulation and change than is basic administrative integration. No data were collected on the Ohio primes.
3. Prime Sponsor Use of RFP Process. Some observers have argued that one good way of reducing political choices and increasing program performance-oriented choices is to adopt a version of a request-for-proposal (RFP) system for choosing deliverers. Seven of the 15 sites did not use any form of RFP for the entire system; five use a formal RFP for some program components, and one used an informal version for the complete system. The use of RFP was more likely in larger prime sponsorships in terms of population as well as in consortia. Only two of the nine non-consortia used an RFP of any sort. (No Ohio data.)

This completes the process of defining those variables we will rely upon in remaining parts of this study. In Chapter IV, immediately following, we begin our analysis in earnest with a descriptive trend analysis. Then we turn to look longitudinally at changes over the three year period in question. The case studies conducted in Greene County, Licking/Delaware Consortium and Columbus/Franklin Consortium follow. Conclusions and recommendations based on the cases and the statistical analysis serve as the last chapter of this dissertation.
Chapter IV. Trends in the Use of Classroom Training.

National data indicate an increasing trend for prime sponsor commitment to classroom training from Fiscal Year 1975 through Fiscal Year 1977. This trend is clear whether one measures it in terms of client enrollments or dollar allocations. See Tables 4.1 and 4.2.

When we look at the average commitment among the 32 sites in the present study, similar summaries obtain. From Fiscal Year 1975 to Fiscal Year 1977 the sample sites collectively demonstrate an increasing commitment to classroom training measured in terms of client as well as budget shares.

Two cautions are in order however. First, these mean/averages are not, strictly speaking, sample or population means; they are simply summary statistics of the 32 sites investigated here. (And the 32 sites are not a random sample of the universe of CETA prime sponsors Fiscal Year 1975-77). Second, these summary statistics conceal a great deal of variation among the sites under investigation. For example, the range of enrollment percentages in Fiscal Year 1975 varies from a high of 65.3 percent to a low of 4.8 percent in one prime sponsorship. The range in Fiscal Year 1976 is 82.6 percent to 11.2 percent when we look at enrollment figures for the sample sites. And in Fiscal Year 1977 that range reaches from a high of 85.7 percent to a low of 30.2.
Table 4.1. Per Cent Title I Clients Enrolled in Classroom Training and Percent of Title I Money Allocated to Classroom Training, Fiscal Year 1975 to Fiscal Year 1977--Nat'l Averages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Client Enrollment</th>
<th>FY 75</th>
<th>FY 76</th>
<th>FY 77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Commitment</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2 Per Cent of Title I Clients Enrolled in Classroom Training and Per Cent of Title I Money Allocated to Classroom Training Fiscal Year 1975 to Fiscal Year 1977--Sample Means.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Client Enrollments</th>
<th>FY 75</th>
<th>FY 76</th>
<th>FY 77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Commitment</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The same sorts of observations obtain when we look at Financial Commitment, the other measure of the dependent variable. In Fiscal Year 1975 the corresponding range varied from 75.6 per cent of a prime sponsor's Title I money to as little as 9.0 per cent. The Fiscal Year 1976 range was 65.4 per cent to 15.0 and in Fiscal Year 1977 the range of financial commitment among the sites under study was 60.7 per cent to 19.0 per cent.

We would expect to observe the same sorts of wide variation beneath the national averages were these data retrievable; they are not however. (The reasons for this assertion are two: as we discussed in the notes of Chapter I, we have several reasons to believe that the present collection of primes is little different from the collection of all 400 plus primes throughout the country. And two, our experience shows that the wide ranges we see among these data are an artifact of new program planning and administration: as programs mature, there seems to develop limits or tolerances for such values that more and more primes tend to operate within as programs mature—assuming no drastic changes in rules that would disrupt this pattern.)

The most obvious conclusions emerging from a contrast of Table 4.1 and 4.2 are one, that the sample data, like national averages, suggests an increasing trend toward greater commitment to classroom training among our study sites in both enrollment terms and budget shares. Second, levels of commitment in financial terms are quite close to national financial averages. When we contrast enrollment figures for the national collection and our sample sites, however, we observe that in each program year the sample means are slightly larger than
the national averages, especially in most recent years (Fiscal Year 1977). It would be hard to say what about the particular sample sites might account for this higher average commitment at this time.

Nevertheless the data from the 32 sites we have for this study do suggest some interesting patterns within program years as well as across the three years of this study.

We can display the variation in both measures of the dependent variable by arraying scores from the lowest to the highest for each of the program years, Fiscal Years '75, '76, and '77.

Two very simple tables emerge showing the frequency distributions for each fiscal year—one a summary of enrollment frequencies the other a summary of the budget measures. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 on the following page portray these summaries.

We would like to go beyond describing the range and frequencies we observe for the sites over time; we would like to characterize their behavior or performance in such a way that we may speak of the subsets or groups of prime sponsors which are low, moderate and high in the levels of their commitment to classroom training. Because the present data approximate a normal distribution, we may employ a standard deviation score as a measure of dispersion. By calculating a standard deviation for each year, we can classify prime sponsor behavior in terms of the distance its performance or commitment is from some norm (here the sample mean). The table on the next page rearranges and compresses the information on frequencies and range displayed in the previous tables by grouping the data for each
Table 4.3 Range and Frequencies of Prime Sponsor Budget Shares Devoted to Classroom Training FY 75 Through FY 77.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervals</th>
<th>FY 75</th>
<th>FY 76</th>
<th>FY 77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0000-09.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.0-19.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.0-29.9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.0-39.9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.0-49.9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50.0-59.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60.0-69.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70.0-79.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=24 N=31 N=28

\( \bar{X} = 36.6 \) \( \bar{X} = 36.0 \) \( \bar{X} = 40.6 \)

Table 4.4 Range and Frequencies of Prime Sponsor Client Enrollments in Classroom Training, Fiscal Years 75 through 77.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervals</th>
<th>FY 75</th>
<th>FY 76</th>
<th>FY 77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0000-09.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.0-19.9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.0-29.9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.0-39.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.0-49.9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50.0-59.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60.0-69.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70.0-79.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80.0-89.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=29 N=30 N=29

\( \bar{X} = 33.1 \) \( \bar{X} = 37.8 \) \( \bar{X} = 50.5 \)
fiscal year in terms of one standard deviation from the norm—the means of the sample distributions.

Assuming an approximately normal distribution, one could expect about 68 per cent of the observations to fall within the limits of the interval around the mean (in Table 4.5, the middle interval labeled "M"). That middle interval in every case includes each of the sample means we have computed as well as the corresponding national averages summarizing the levels of commitment of all CETA prime sponsors. We have, therefore, chosen to call that interval containing all of the cases less than one standard deviation above and below the sample mean the moderate or average commitment interval. Cases falling within the interval with limits above the middle group we will treat as high commitment; ones with values below the limits of the middle interval we stipulate as low commitment. Based upon budget data, some observations are obvious (by definition of standard deviation): in each fiscal year the middle interval contains a disproportionate share of all the cases. But the relative size of the middle interval—the spread among observations—is becoming smaller over the three year period. The interval we have labeled low in the one which is growing at the greatest rate, but the other extreme, high, is also growing but at a somewhat slower pace than the other category. We shall resist explanation here, however, since our purpose at this stage is merely description. It does seem appropriate, however, to summarize these budget figures succinctly: the trend in Table 4.5 suggests that over this period prime sponsors appear as a group to be moving over time to levels of commitment in later years that during earlier years would have been called extreme.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interval</th>
<th>FY 75</th>
<th>Interval</th>
<th>FY 76</th>
<th>Interval</th>
<th>FY 77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOW (00.0-19.8)</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>LOW (0.0-21.8)</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>LOW (0.0-28.5)</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=3</td>
<td></td>
<td>N=6</td>
<td></td>
<td>N=8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MED (9.8-53.3)</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>MED (21.8-50.1)</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>MED (28.5-52.0)</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=22</td>
<td></td>
<td>N=17</td>
<td></td>
<td>N=14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH (53.3 plus)</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>HIGH (50.2 plus)</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>HIGH (52.0 plus)</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=4</td>
<td></td>
<td>N=6</td>
<td></td>
<td>N=6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\bar{x}=36.6$ $\bar{x}=36$ $\bar{x}=41$

$S=16.7$ $S=14.2$ $S=12$

$N=29$ $N=31$ $N=28$
Table 4.6 arranges enrollment data into low, medium and high categories (as we did with the budget data) again based on distance from the sample mean and in terms of standard deviation criteria. Like our budget share data, and not surprisingly, the moderate or medium category for all program years contains the greatest number of cases. However it is more difficult to discern any clear patterns of growth among these data. Here the medium category appears to be growing albeit less consistently than in the instance of the financial measure of commitment. Both extreme categories indicate so little change from one time to another to warrant any conclusive inferences about the nature of change in these low and high categories.

The contrast between budget measures of commitment and enrollment measures of commitment, especially with regard to the most obvious patterns in the case of the former, suggests a necessary caveat about the two measures: money is a far more manipulable variable than clients. Prime sponsors can exert more control over money than they can over people. Staff decisions about how to spend money can be made more easily than decisions about how many people to enroll in a program because the values of fewer and less diverse people have to be reconciled in budget decisions while client values make enrollment rates much more problematic and less susceptible to control and planning.

Budget shares may tap one dimension of commitment—staff priorities or goals, for example; while enrollment levels may be tapping another dimension of commitment—achievement, popular demand, vendor cooperation, or the correspondence between staff expectations and client demand. The problem may not be that budget measures is a more valid measure of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interval</th>
<th>FY 75</th>
<th>Interval</th>
<th>FY 76</th>
<th>Interval</th>
<th>FY 77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0-17.2)</td>
<td>N=5</td>
<td>(0.0-20.9)</td>
<td>N=5</td>
<td>(0.0-35.2)</td>
<td>N=5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MED</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>65.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(17.2-48.8)</td>
<td>N=18</td>
<td>(20.9-54.6)</td>
<td>N=21</td>
<td>(35.3-65.7)</td>
<td>N=19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(48.9 plus)</td>
<td>N=6</td>
<td>(54.6 plus)</td>
<td>N=5</td>
<td>(65.7 plus)</td>
<td>N=5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\bar{x}=33$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$\bar{x}=38$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$\bar{x}=50$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S=15.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>S=16.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>S=15.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
commitment than enrollment levels. It could be that one is a less
compact measure of commitment the way, for example, a behavioral
measure of party identification—voting—is simpler than an attitudinal
measure of party identification. If we test our hypotheses later on
using both operationalizations of the dependent variable, perhaps we
can arrive at some conclusions about the appropriateness of each. One
may be a better predictor; one may provide more explanatory value.
Though we cannot provide an answer to these questions yet, it seems
nevertheless important to raise the issue now, given the contrasting
distributions we observe in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 using both measures of
commitment.

But descriptions of the levels of commitment and frequencies with­
in a year as well as changes in these percentages from one year to the
next tells us nothing about what prime sponsors are changing. It would
be useful to observe behavior at the level of the individual units affect
the aggregate ratios expressed in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. The summary on
the next page in Table 4.7 reports the relative stability or instabil­
ity of the high, medium and low categories based upon financial
measures of classroom training and enrollment levels as a measure of
this commitment.

Table 4.7 summarizes prime sponsor performance (commitment to
classroom training) over three consecutive years. It does so in
terms of the prime sponsor's financial outlays for classroom training
and the per cent of the clients enrolled in classroom training. Looking
first at the column that summarizes the budget data, we observe that
10 of the 26 prime sponsors (38.4 per cent) were very consistent in
Table 4.7 Stability of Prime Sponsor Commitment to Classroom Training Fiscal Year 75 to 77 in Financial and Enrollment Terms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROW</th>
<th>POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS</th>
<th>FISCAL COMMITMENT</th>
<th>ENROLLMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 High</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 High 1 Medium</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2 High 1 Low</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3 Medium</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2 Medium 1 High</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2 Medium 1 Low</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>3 Low</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2 Low 1 High</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2 Low 1 Medium</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ N=26 \quad N=27 \]

\(^a\)The two columns do not sum to 32 because only prime sponsors for which we had complete data--rates for all three years--were used in the calculations.
their spending behavior for classroom training from Fiscal Year 75 to Fiscal Year 77 (row 7).

Also interesting are the instances of no cases in rows three and eight. These combinations would represent instances of the most erratic spending behavior among the listed combinations, and what those zeros indicate is that no prime sponsors spent at a high level one year and a low level in the following year or a low level at one time followed by a high level in the following year. If spending levels change, they do so somewhat gradually. This observation holds true for both measures of the dependent variable. While it is fairly easy to single out the three categories of highly consistent spending behavior, marking a set of less consistent but not random cases is a bit more difficult. We might want to think of the possible combinations as forming a continuum from most consistent (HHH, MMM, or LLL) to least consistent (LLH, HHL). Having dealt with the least problematic subset, the stable or consistent sites, we must look at the next most consistent set of prime sponsors, ones that evidence some pattern of nonrandom spending behavior over the three years. Given but three time periods, we have really only one choice: to stipulate our moderately consistent or stable set of sites as those that in two of the three years act roughly the same. Because the time slice here is so narrow, we face the danger of inferring pattern or some measure of consistency on a set of points temporally too short to actually allow confident conclusions. (The same criticism exists regarding the consistent sites, but the absence of one deviant case reduces the concern there.) But the complete absence of sites which exhibit random
spending behavior might justify singling out a moderately stable or consistent class. The combinations in Table 4.7 that would constitute this moderately consistent class would be ones in rows 2, 5, 6, and 9. Looking down the fiscal column, we observe 16 sites. Hence the sum of both groups includes all the cases.

Data in the enrollment column yield comparable findings: twelve sites (44.4 per cent) are consistently high medium or low across all three program years, and the remainder (15 sites) account for the rest of the sites, all characterized as moderately consistent.

These data, the classifications we have given them, and the frequencies we observe among them entail at least two kinds of research questions: "Why do prime sponsors spend and enroll at different levels?" and "why are some very consistent in their levels of commitment while some are less so?"

Before we begin to examine hypotheses we want to assess change over time, i.e., prime sponsor stability/instability in yet another way. Here we will assess the change in client levels and budget shares from year to year but based upon categories of variability constructed around a standard deviation for all the units of analysis. The three interval classification—below average variation, average variation, and above average variation—results from the decision to specify the average interval as that interval whose upper and lower limits include the values contained in one standard deviation above and below the grand mean of the difference scores between and among program years. The two residuals, therefore, constitute the high and low extremes. Table 4.8 below displays the variation resulting from the manipulation of the budget data.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervals</th>
<th>F.Y. 75-76</th>
<th>F.Y. 76-77</th>
<th>F.Y. 75-77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Below Average Variation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.00-2.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Variation</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.19-18.79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above Average Variation</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.80 an Up</td>
<td>N=29</td>
<td>N=27</td>
<td>N=26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If we look at the top cells in the F.Y. 75-76 and F.Y. 76-77 columns, we can infer that the number of highly stable prime sponsors is quite small (3 and 5) but is increasing with experience. The corresponding figure at the top of the third column is more difficult to account for since it represents a contrast of the oldest and the most recent decisions. The above average variation row at the bottom of the table implies that a greater number of primes are extremely variable than are extremely stable, and it also suggests that this group is increasing (given the decreasing N across the row). This seems counterintuitive as well as contrary to what one might expect were one to hedge his bets, in the absence of data, on decisionmaking theory in large public bureaucracies. We would expect agencies to become increasingly more stable over time, approaching behavior in conformity with incremental decisionmaking or the conservative actions of mature agencies (see Bernstein, 1955) perhaps the time period here is too short, however, to expect this sort of behavior though. One thing that was going on during this three year period that could affect prime sponsor decisionmaking was a rather consistent reduction in unemployment levels nationwide—reductions from three to eight percent. This phenomenon could free-up resources and grant prime sponsors latitude they would not enjoy under different circumstances. Client data arranged in similar fashion presents a slightly different picture. They are summarized in Table 4.9.

With client data, unlike budget share data, we find a degree of consistency in the table. But while the unstable category in the budget table was larger than the stable, just the reverse occurs
Table 4.9 Levels of Variation in Client Data Over Three Years (Based on Standard Deviation Criteria).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interval</th>
<th>FY 75-76</th>
<th>FY 76-77</th>
<th>FY 75-77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Below Average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0-2.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.84-27.38</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above Average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.4 an Up</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=29    N=28    N=26
here. In this table, a glance at the below average variation row indicates that more prime sponsors evidence stable action than show highly unstable activity. This is a puzzle at least because we would ordinarily expect client enrollment measures to be more volatile than budget shares. These two tables, however, indicate just the reverse. What is interesting about the table, however, is the stability of the size of the cells; the left and the center columns are very stable with respect to size. It is too early to tell, but a host of unplanned or nonmanipulables may be operative here accounting for the consistent shares of the sample sites falling into the intervals broken out in the table.
Chapter V. A Cross-sectional and Longitudinal Analysis of the Policy Model

We are interested in relationships between sets of independent variables, taken individually as well as in combination, at several discrete time periods. For the purpose of this dissertation our inquiry covers three fiscal years, fiscal year 75, 76, and 77. We are also interested in trying to account for changes in values of the dependent variable over time. For the sake of simplicity and to keep the scope of the problems manageable, we would like to investigate cross-sectional relationships of the simplest kinds first. This section, therefore, covers preliminary inquiries for three discrete times, and it will examine these same relationships for all cases taken together; that is, aggregated into one three year period.

Correlational analysis will be done using the SPSS programs, and only relationships achieving at least .10 significance will be considered (see Wesiberg and Bowen, 1977: 204-207 and Blalock, 1972: 159). With .10 as minimal criterion for significant relationships, among those meeting this criterion we will further stipulate that correlation coefficients between .20 and .30 will be thought of as weak relationships; correlations falling between .31 and .50 will be taken as moderate, and any one over .50 will be deemed strong.

We shall turn first to a set of hypotheses based upon simple bivariate relations between environmental/contextual constructs and
the dependent phenomenon. The measure of degree of correspondence between these is summarized in the accompanying table.

If we pair observations on one variable (a prime sponsor commitment to classroom training) with observations on a second variable (unemployment, variously defined here); the correlation coefficients above represent the degree of correspondence or relationship between the two variables at three specified times. We have measured our dependent phenomenon in two ways: in terms of participant levels and in terms of dollars spent. We have likewise taken the liberty of measuring unemployment here in five different ways, each really stressing a different dimension of the phenomenon. The most potent relationships between unemployment and prime sponsor commitment to classroom training are found when prime sponsor commitment is measured in terms of participants and for Fiscal Year 1975. In Fiscal Year 1975, when CETA was just beginning to operate and before unemployment began to climb dramatically, we find a moderately strong relationship when unemployment is measured as a quarter average and when it is lagged one and two quarters. The same is true when we look only at women who are unemployed. When we shift to the subset of the population who are white and unemployed, however, the nature of the relationship is altered. The correlation is negative suggesting that the two variables vary in opposite directions. That is, for example, as unemployment rate goes up for whites, prime sponsor commitment to classroom training diminishes.

That findings is, at first glance, a counterintuitive proposition because, all else being equal, whites tend to be more likely than other
Table 5.1 Correlations Between Selected Environmental/Contextual Variables and A Dollar and Participant Measure of the Dependent Variable for Fiscal Years '75, '76, '77 and all Combined.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variable</th>
<th>Per Cent Classroom Training Participants</th>
<th>Per Cent Education Dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment RateQuarter Average</td>
<td>FY75  FY76 FY77 ALL</td>
<td>FY75  FY76 FY77 ALL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.34  .02 -.15 -.09</td>
<td>.23  -.11 -.02 .02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged One Quarter</td>
<td>.31  -.02 -.21 -.15</td>
<td>.17  -.09 -.09 -.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Two Quarters</td>
<td>.10  -.15 .01</td>
<td>.00  .04 .05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent Unemployed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>.31  .21 .03 .17</td>
<td>.30  .18 .22 .24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent Unemployed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>-.25 -.07 -.09 -.08</td>
<td>-.39 -.15 -.14 -.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Underscored coefficients are one significant at the .10 level.
groups to benefit from classroom training since taken as a group they also have fewer impediments working against success in a classroom. On the other hand, casual acquaintance with some prime sponsor behavior indicates some tendency to increase the use of public service employment (PSE) as a short term solution to white unemployment. And if primes turn to increased reliance on PSE as white unemployment goes up, that might account for this curious negative coefficient.

Whatever strength exists between unemployment and classroom training seems to wash out over time for the same relationships are weaker for Fiscal Year 76 and 77. Moreover, when one disregards the artificial time constraints of fiscal years and treats the whole three year period as one time period, these data indicate no statistically significant relationship except for the instance of "per cent Education Dollars" by "Unemployed Women" and "Per cent Education Dollars" by "Unemployed White" which are, nevertheless, weak.

One should notice almost at once the almost random distribution of negative signs attached to coefficients in this small table. This analyst is at a loss to explain the change of sign we observe from year to year for in no case above is a bivariate relationship consistently negative across all program years though the one between "Per cent Unemployed Women" by "Commitment to Classroom Training" both in terms of dollars and participants does, however, remain positive across all three years of this study. The most facile explanation could be that the assumption underlying correlational analysis of linearity may be inappropriate for these data. Or one set of observations--unemployment data--may be changing radically while the other remains invariate, causing to coefficient to behave in this way.
If one focused on the "all" columns under either operationalization of the dependent phenomenon where "N" size is the aggregate of cases for all three years (resulting in N's of between 80 and 90); the obvious and unavoidable conclusion these data suggest is that, at least for the set of primes under study here and during the period for which we are interested, the correlation coefficients suggest no relationship between unemployment and prime sponsor commitment to Classroom Training except for the special instance of unemployed women and unemployed whites where a very weak positive and negative (respectively) relationship obtains.

Each variable in Table 5.2 refers to the client population a prime sponsor is supposed to serve. Yet only two coefficients meet the .10 criterion we imposed on all bivariate relationships, and these obtain under circumstances of very reduced N size—12 and 34 respectively from 96 possible cases.

Using, for the moment, only our participant measure of prime sponsor commitment to classroom training (the left half of the table), we do observe one obvious, consistent and moderately strong relationship across each of the program years under investigation here. The relationship between the size of a prime sponsor's population with less than a high school's education and a prime's commitment to classroom training is related in a statistically negative way at each time. What is also remarkable is the consistency of the magnitude of the coefficients. The strength of the relationship between the two variables stays between -.36 and -.39 increasing to -.47 for the three
Table 5.2 Correlations Between Selected Environmental/Contextual Variables and a Dollar and Participant Based Measure of the Dependent Variable for Fiscal Years '75, 76, 77 and all combined. (Correlations )

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variable</th>
<th>Per Cent Classroom Training Participants</th>
<th>Per Cent Education Dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FY75 FY76 FY77 All FY75 FY76 FY77 ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare Recipients</td>
<td>.06 .14 .08 .03 -.03 .06 .13 .02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Than High School Education</td>
<td>-.39 -.36 -.39 -.47 -.16 -.07 -.05 -.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent White</td>
<td>-.29 .00 .21 -.03 -.39 -.18 -.17 -.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent Econ. Disadvantaged H.of H.</td>
<td>-.04 -.53 .14 -.12 -.12 -.53 -.22 -.31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent Econ. Disadvantaged Families</td>
<td>.15 -.06 .23 .08 .01 -.11 -.15 -.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent Spanish Speaking</td>
<td>.01 .36 .20 .17 .11 .01 -.24 -.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^aHead of Household
^bFamilies
year epoch. This feature of the policy environment explains about ten per cent of the variance in the dependent phenomenon measured in terms of participants.

To give a substantive meaning to these data one might propose that, in general, where a prime sponsor confronts a large population of poorly educated people among its client pool, the prime sponsor seeks means other than classroom training to solve their employment or employability problems in the short term—work experience in most cases one would expect. Some negative statements can also be made on the basis of these data. The proportion of welfare recipients in a population does not appear to be statistically related to a prime sponsor's commitment to classroom training however one defines it. This seems to be the case for economically disadvantaged and for Spanish speaking. Lack of relationship between per cent Spanish speaking and commitment to classroom training is especially troubling because impediments to employment among Spanish speaking, while they may be multifaceted, cannot but be at least partially traced to problems with communication, especially English. English as a second language is a classroom training activity; hence, the one seems like a necessary condition for all employment except the very most demeaning kinds.

Some logic seems to be violated here, matters of practicality or politics must be dominant: confronted with a significant Spanish population, manpower professionals must enroll clients in work experience or public service jobs rather than schooling either to keep costs down or to enhance the placement rates in the short term. Our data
A third subset of the environmental/contextual variables hypothesized to be related to prime sponsor commitment to classroom training is a collection which individually and collectively serve to characterize the setting within which a manpower policy must take root and develop. One might argue that, like temperature, blood pressure, and pulse in the human organism, these variables seem similar to vital signs signalling the health or status of the organism—here the local setting or the environment.

Neither Level of Conflict nor Fiscal Condition I exhibit significant measures of relationship here in Table 5.3. But the second measure of fiscal health, Fiscal Condition II, which is based on credit ratings, exhibits measures of correlation but with some irregularity across both measures of the dependent variable. The relationship between fiscal health and commitment (disregarding Fiscal Year 77 for the moment) is inverse. Primes in poorer economic health tend to have high levels of commitment while those judged by Moody to be fiscally most sound tend to make lesser commitments to classroom training as a Title I manpower tool by comparison. One might hazard the argument that local governments judged healthy have, by virtue of that characterization, more options at their disposal (which could make classroom training seem less attractive) and/or these fiscally healthy local governments have in general more favorable relations or better reputations with the business/private sector rather than other public agencies like school districts.
Table 5.3 Correlations Between Selected Environmental/Contextual Variables and a Dollar and Participant Based Measure of the Dependent Variables for Fiscal Years '75-77 and all Combined.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variable</th>
<th>Per Cent Classroom Training Participants</th>
<th>Per Cent Education Dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FY75</td>
<td>FY76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Conflict</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Condition I</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Condition II</td>
<td>-.47</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure of Local Government</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Mix</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The coefficients are more consistent for the cases where the dependent variable is measured in dollar terms rather than in client terms. Clearly budget figures are much more manipulable by a prime sponsor staff than are clients; hence, planners can adjust on-paper commitments much more readily to changes in local (or national) economic conditions than they can adjust the flow of people (or demand) up or down. This short term manipulability of the construct "Per cent Education Dollars" might explain why relationships based upon it rather than "Per cent Classroom Training/Vocational Education Participants" are stronger in general.

"Structure of Local Government" seems to have no statistical relationship with commitment to classroom training regardless of how one measures the dependent phenomenon. We hypothesized that some forms of government were by their very nature more political than others, that, for example, government headed by an elected mayor or commissioner who ran in partisan elections would be more political than ones headed by appointed professional public administrators and the degree of politicalization in local administrations would affect choices. The data do not support the argument here. In brief we argued earlier that the more political the local government the less its manpower operation would rely on classroom training. These data do not support this or its converse. If there is a relationship between the two concepts, perhaps it does not approximate a straight line or perhaps the variation among forms of government and degree of politicization among the 32 prime sponsors in this study is not dramatic enough to show up or be sensitive to the statistical techniques used here.
The concept "Industrial Mix" is a short hand name for a construct tapping the amount of variation within a prime's local economy; that is, it distinguishes prime sponsors in terms of the range of different kinds of firms that make up business activity locally from "one horse towns" to very diverse local economies.

When we measure prime sponsor commitment to classroom training in terms of clients or participants, the magnitude of the correlation coefficients and the significance levels they reach suggest no appreciable relationship. When the dependent variable is measured in dollar terms, results are more problematic: each measure reaches or exceeds .20 but only two, F.Y. 76 and ALL, achieve a significance of .10 which we have stipulatively imposed. This means that our results could have occurred merely by chance more frequently than 1 in 10 on two occasions here—F.Y. 75 and F.Y. 77. The weak statistical relationships obtained for F.Y. 76 and ALL, however, are less likely to have occurred by chance, having achieved the .10 significance. But one should, I think, be very cautious about his claims when all he can boast is a very weak statistical relationship between Industrial Mix and Commitment to Classroom Training in two of four cases and then with a specified level of error of .10 and only under the condition that commitment be measured in dollar terms rather than both dollar and client terms.

We hypothesized that prime sponsor commitment to classroom training was also related or associated with several other environmental/contextual variables in addition to the ones we have examined already. Unfortunately we have not been able to find reliable or complete data.
to measure these variables in the fashion we used above; moreover, where data were available, the degree of disaggregation was not specific enough to take measures for each of the prime sponsors in this study.

Among the set of variables for which we have no good data we include "Past History of Employment and Training Programs in the Prime Sponsorship", "Pre-CETA Voc Ed Base", "Experience of Voc Ed Community Pre-CETA" as well as "Local Availability of Facilities". We have constructed questions for the case study interview guide which pose precisely these issues to local respondents, but this information is in no way comparable to the systematic and comprehensive material from the Ripley national study and Ohio study data sets. (Interested readers should consult the appendix especially questions within sections "C" and "D" of the interview guide.) The most obvious deficit here though is that whatever we may accumulate from the case studies will be very site-specific and not generalizable to the set of 32 sites we are looking at in this dissertation. But even this kind of information is better than dropping these questions from the analysis because systematic data do not exist.

Attitudinal Variables and Commitment to Classroom Training

The first four independent variables are perceptions elicited from professional staff. The last two are answers to probes asked of MAC members, serving as a check on three and four. Since both staff and MAC are presumably influenced by the same stimuli—all things being equal—one should expect to find similar sorts of statistical relationships between these preference measures and the dependent phenomenon for both sets of actors, staff and MAC members.
The data in Table 5.4 on the following page are perplexing. Staff commitment to Placement as a goal has no statistical relationship with prime sponsor commitment to classroom training at anytime or for either operationalization of the dependent variable. This is startling because other studies have documented the effectiveness of classroom training as a manpower tool; and staff cannot be ignorant of this general conclusion.

"System Commitment..." is very similar to "Staff Commitment..." conceptually; it aggregates staff commitment with those of the MAC members, political (i.e., elected) officials and service deliverers (i.e., vendors) to give a composite summary of commitment to placement. We would expect to find similar results with staff, perhaps only slightly less strong. But instead we find weak, statistically insignificant correlations here too. Neither the time (we would expect the effects of experience to be operating so that \( r \) would grow over time) nor the way we measure the dependent variable seems to have any consequence.

Staff preference/priority for classroom training as a Title I service likewise is unrelated to prime sponsor commitment to classroom training when they are asked to respond without regard for current economic conditions. This too seems both counterintuitive and contrary to some completed empirical work. Staff preferences and priorities ought to be closely connected with prime sponsor program mix; the matter of choice needs to be associated with temporarily prior attitudes that inform these choices. These data do not support that proposition however. Moreover, when the question is reworded asking staff to
Table 5.4 Correlations Between Selected Staff and MAC Member Attitude Variables and a Dollar and Participant Based Measure of the Dependent Variable for F.Y. 75-77 and All Years Combined.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Per Cent Classroom Training Participants</th>
<th>Per Cent Education Dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FY75 FY76 FY77 ALL FY75 FY76 FY77 FY77 ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Commitment to Placement</td>
<td>.07 -.05 .07 .03 -.03 .05 .05 .05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Mix: Preference for Classroom Training w/out regard to Economic Conditions</td>
<td>.06 .16 -.06 .06 -.18 .08 -.26 -.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System Commitment to Placement</td>
<td>-.21 -.14 -.00 -.20 -.06 -.14 -.18 -.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Mix: Preference for Classroom Training with Regard to Economic Conditions</td>
<td>-.12 -.18 -.16 -.15 -.05 -.02 -.44 -.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Mix: Preference for Classroom Training w/out regard for Economic Conditions MAC Members</td>
<td>.00 .00 -.36 -.12 .02 .11 -.22 .00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Mix: Preference for Classroom Training with Regard for Current Economic Conditions -- MAC Members</td>
<td>.07 .31 .10 .13 .15 .14 -.06 .09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
take into account current economic conditions, the correlation coefficients remain very small and, except for one instance—F.Y. 77, "Per Cent Education Dollars"—fail to meet our .10 significance criterion.

Because MAC members were asked the same question at about the same time and under similar conditions, we concluded that using their responses as a check on staff responses would help to validate our measure. As the table above indicates, those data do not serve such a purpose. MAC member attitudes are just as unrelated to the dependent variable as are staff, and curiously they tend to be related in the opposite direction as the same staff attitudes. These results suggest that perhaps the nature of relationship is more complex.

If before we actually look at the strength of the relationship between staff and MAC preferences regarding classroom training, we control for "Staff/MAC Agreement" and "Relative Influence Staff vs. MAC", we create four separate and distinct subsets: two which specify differences between MAC and Staff Influence over program mix, high staff influence and low staff influence; two representing MAC/Staff agreement scores over classroom training priorities. (See Figure 5.1)

If we filter for MAC and staff influence by subtracting MAC influence scores from staff influence scores, we get difference scores. This process can yield two outcomes: same and different. Positive scores should indicate staff predominance; a negatively signed difference (highly unlikely) would indicate MAC predominance. Refer to Table 5.5. It is a subset of the 32 original prime sponsors under study, those where the staff and the MAC are equal in influence over Title I decisions. Hence the "N" size is reduced from 32 to as few
Figure 5.1 Influence and Priorities Between MAC and Staff and Classroom Training Priorities, Agreement Scores.
Table 5.5 Correlations Between Selected Attitudes and Prime Sponsor Commitment to Classroom Training for Prime Sponsors Where Staff and MAC Influence Over Title I Decisions is Seen as Equal, Fiscal Year 1975 to Fiscal Year 1977.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variable</th>
<th>Prime Commitment Participants</th>
<th>Prime Commitment Dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Staff Priority for Classroom Training without regard for Economic Conditions</strong></td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Staff Priority for Classroom Training under Current Economic Conditions</strong></td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Staff Commitment to Placement</strong></td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>System Commitment to Placement</strong></td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
as 21 cases. Moreover we have not presented the data by fiscal year here but rather we have treated the three years as one short period, aggregating/collapsing all the data points into one large pool so that we could filter without reducing N size too much. We continue to require .10 significance, and a look at Table 5.5 indicates that two attitudes are moderately related to prime sponsor commitment to classroom training (in dollar terms), staff priorities both in the abstract and under specific local economic conditions. The negative sign here indicates a positive relationship rather than an inverse one because of the way the scale was constructed, thus -.39 between "staff priority..." and "Classroom Training Dollars" may be taken to mean that among prime sponsors where staff and MAC are roughly equal in influence over Title I decisions, staff priorities for Classroom Training as a Title I manpower tool, irrespective of specific local economic conditions are directly related to prime sponsor commitment such that where staff prefer classroom training highly, it gets high priority as a Title I manpower tool, at least in terms of dollars committed to it locally. When asked to consider local economic conditions, staff preferences are even more strongly related to prime sponsor commitment, again (naturally) in the same direction. Curiously we discover that there is no relationship between these staff attitudes and commitment when the dependent variable is measured in terms of participants.

Placement attitudes in Table 5.5 suggest no statistical relationship when we filter for staff/MAC influence except the very weak correlation is that where most of the important actors--staff, service deliverers, political officials, MAC--are in agreement about the
importance of placement as a goal locally, we find a corresponding high commitment to classroom training in primes judging by the number of participants enrolled in Title I classroom training. But this statistical relationship is very weak and nonexistent when we measure the dependent variable in dollar terms.

Now we shall turn to the case where staff is preeminent in influence over Title I decisions. These data are presented in Table 5.6 on the next page. The data are, indeed, counter intuitive as well as contradictory of a good deal of empirical work: much research on CETA has indicated that staff are most important actors in manpower decisions locally, for example. Here we have filtered for the case where staff dominate, and we find in contrast to the prior cases where staff and MAC share influence that the correlations are, in all cases, weak or nonexistent and in no instance do they meet our liberal significance requirement. This student cannot offer a substantive explanation which would account for the occurrence of significant moderate relationships under the condition of staff/MAC parity and no relationship when staff dominates; if anything, one would expect the relationship to be stronger under these conditions; yet, as the reader can see, just the opposite occurs.

The second filter is predicated upon the belief that where MAC and staff agree as to the priority the prime sponsor should grant classroom training (i.e., where there is little or no conflict over priorities) the link between selected attitudes and both measures of the dependent variable should be stronger. And conversely, we would likewise hypothesize that where staff and MAC disagree as to the
Table 5.6 Correlations Between Selected Attitudes and Prime Sponsor Commitment to Classroom Training for Prime Sponsors Where Staff Are Preeminent in Influence Over Title I Program Decisions, Fiscal Years 1975 To 1977.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Prime Sponsor Commitment to Classroom Training (Participants)</th>
<th>Prime Sponsor Commitment to Classroom Training (Dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff Priorities for Classroom Training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without Regard to Economic Conditions</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Priorities for Classroom Training</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Regard for Economic Conditions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Commitment to Placement</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System Commitment to Placement</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
priority they give classroom training that relationship should be weaker. Table 5.7 examines these relationships after filtering for those cases where we find substantial agreement.

Table 5.7 looks at the relationship between selected attitudes and prime sponsor commitment to classroom training under the special case/condition where staff and MAC agree over the priority each gives classroom training. The data, however, are indeed troubling for though the coefficients are positive, the relationships are nevertheless inverse, because of the make up of the variables. What all this means, then, is that in prime sponsors where staff and MAC agree on priority, the relationship between commitment to classroom and certain program priorities (attitudes) is negative or inverse.

Recent research (Wichita, 1979; Marvel, 1978) helps make some sense of these otherwise inexplicable findings. Wichita's findings may be the key. He and Marvel to some extent have demonstrated that Commitment to Training is related to "Positive Program Performance". But unfocused conflict is positively related to Commitment to Training probably in a way similar to the diagram in Figure 5.2. The absence of this special kind of conflict--issue conflict or positive conflict--might account for our unexpected inverse relationships in Table 5.7 under the special condition of staff/MAC agreement over priorities.

In Table 5.8 we can see that staff attitudes--priority for training--are weakly related to both measures of the dependent variable in the predicted direction under the condition of disagreement between staff and MAC over the priority each gives classroom training among the Title I options. (The negative signs here indicate a
Table 5.7 Correlations Between Selected Attitudes and Prime Sponsor Commitment to Classroom Training for Those Primes Where MAC and Staff Agree on the Priority They Give Classroom Training, Fiscal Years 1975 to 1977.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Prime Sponsor Commitment in Participant Terms</th>
<th>Prime Sponsor Commitment in Dollar Terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff Priority for Classroom Training without Regard to Economic Conditions</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Priority for Classroom Training With Regard for Economic Conditions</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Commitment to Placement</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System Commitment to Placement</td>
<td>-.63</td>
<td>-.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.8 Correlations Between Selected Attitudes and Prime Sponsor Commitment to Classroom Training for Those Primes Where MAC and Staff Disagree About the Priority They Give Classroom Training, Fiscal Years 1975 to 1977.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Prime Sponsor Commitment in Participant Terms</th>
<th>Prime Sponsor Commitment in Dollar Terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff Priority for Classroom Training without Regard for Economic Conditions</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>-.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Priority for Classroom Training with Regard for Economic Conditions</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>-.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Commitment to Placement</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System Commitment to Placement</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
direct/positive relationship given the makeup of the scales) so that we can say that where MAC and staff differ over priority each gives classroom training, staff preferences for classroom training--both in the abstract and under specific local conditions--is weakly but nevertheless positively related to prime sponsor commitment to classroom training whether one measures this in participant or dollar terms.

Attitudes dealing with placement goals are not related to the level of commitment a prime sponsor gives classroom training. This finding, like some others discussed earlier, flies in the face of other CETA research which has shown that classroom training is more highly related to positive placement rates than any other Title I services.

MANIPULABLE VARIABLES AFFECTING COMMITMENT TO CLASSROOM TRAINING

These variables, 11 in all, represent the most important cluster of independent constructs we have hypothesized affect the dependent variable not because either independently or in combinations they will explain the greatest proportion of the variation in the dependent variable--they will not--but because the variables are such that policymakers and managers can manipulate them more easily than purely theoretical constructs; and it is these, therefore, that show more promise if one hopes to alter policy in the short term to maximize some public choices and goals.

But before these variables can become strong, moderate or weak tools for the manpower policymaker/manager one must establish that a link exists between these manipulables and the dependent phenomenon in question.
Recall that theoretical constructs are judged often in terms of "per cent variance explained" because the value of a theoretical argument employing such constructs is often determined by how well it serves as an explanation and how well it organizes disparate phenomena into some coherent whole. Manipulable constructs can serve the same purpose as more abstract variables, but they need not. Hence the amount of variance each explains may not be a good criterion for evaluating them. Manipulables which explain 5 per cent of the variance may be judged as very good variables just because they can be consciously manipulated. In other words, for the policy manager, before he admits "per cent variance explained" as an evaluation criterion he must first satisfy an even more fundamental prior condition—manipulability. The result becomes "good policy variables are manipulable first of all; best policy variables meet the manipulability criterion but exceed this by explaining "X" amount of the variance in some dependent phenomenon."

Refer to Table 5.9 on the next page.

The first three manipulable constructs hypothesized to be related to prime sponsor commitment to classroom training—staff quality, top staff quality and administrative integration—appear to be unrelated statistically to our measures of prime sponsor commitment. Yet in the case of both variables tapping staff quality, one must pause before dismissing this finding in particular because it simply cannot be the case that gifted staff would not know that classroom training is by-and-large a better Title I tool—on all performance criteria—than most other services save perhaps OJT. It could be taken to mean, however, that a prime sponsor's use of classroom training does
Table 5.9 Correlations Between Selected Manipulable Variables and Two Measures of Prime Sponsor Commitment to Classroom Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Per Cent Classroom Training/ Voc Ed in Dollars</th>
<th>Per Cent Education Participant Terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FY75 FY76 FY77 ALL FY75 FY76 FY77 ALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Staff Quality</td>
<td>-.10 -.02 -.08 -.06 .12 .04 .14 .10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Top Staff</td>
<td>-.12 -.04 .03 -.03 .19 .02 .01 .08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Integra-</td>
<td>.05 .00 .05 .01 .15 .14 .08 .13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Monitoring</td>
<td>-.04 -.18 -.36 -.15 .29 .06 .07 .14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Evaluation</td>
<td>-.43 -.23 -.06 -.21 -.01 -.07 .13 .00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Responsibility</td>
<td>-.17 -.30 -.18 -.21 -.03 -.39 -.26 -.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Involvement</td>
<td>.08 .29 .28 .20 .27 -.14 .07 .07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness of Decision-</td>
<td>-.35 .19 .31 .04 -.33 -.01 -.10 -.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Service Role</td>
<td>-.25 .07 .39 .06 -.15 .18 .18 .03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Integration</td>
<td>.22 .10 -.03 .09 .40 .08 .11 .21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of the RFP Process</td>
<td>-.25 .18 .20 .04 -.11 .36 .40 .17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
not vary by staff quality, that quality staff and inferior staff alike will tend to utilize classroom training in roughly comparable levels. The point the statistic cannot, however, address is the question of motivation or rationale: it could be the case that "good" staff read the literature; know that classroom training is effective and efficient vis-a-vis all other Title I tools and therefore use it in local manpower programs at high levels on these grounds. Similarly, it could be the case that "inferior" staff use classroom training because they believe the "education panacea myth"—that everything can be cured by schooling or because stressing classroom training under Title I is the easiest way to obligate funds: one has to work hard to develop OJT contracts. The point these examples are intended to emphasize is that the data cannot account for subtler questions of rationale or motivation; it simply represents the proposition that prime sponsor commitment to classroom training does not vary by staff quality though staff quality may shade or hide other issues or differences that are related to this characteristic.

Administrative Integration does not itself entail heavy prime sponsor commitment to classroom training; it does suggest such high levels of commitment because administrative integration does entail rational manpower policy locally which itself entails classroom training given the nature of the problems of the chronically unemployed.

If, however, we look at our correlation coefficients for the kind of relationship between administrative integration and commitment to classroom training (measured in terms of participants and dollars) we should be struck by the weak and statistically insignificant data.
There is no palpable relationship; at least none for the 32 sites used in this study.

By law all prime sponsors must engage in monitoring. But of course the quality of it will probably vary with the quality of staff. We would expect prime sponsor commitment to classroom training to vary directly with the quality of monitoring both because good monitoring should reveal the worth of classroom training as a tool but also because staff who do good monitoring probably also subscribe, as a matter of principle, to the proposition that classroom training is by definition a good way to treat unskilled, unemployed people and a worthwhile expenditure of Title I money on the face of it.

First, we see that how we measure the dependent variable affects the relationship (or nonrelationship) between monitoring and commitment; measured in participant terms, the relationship is inverse; measured in dollar terms, it is direct. If we focus on "Per Cent Education Dollars" first, we see that monitoring was weakly associated with classroom training commitment in FY 75 but that in two subsequent years no relationship obtains. It could be the case that staff relied upon monitoring to inform their judgment and choices when the program was new, and other stimuli might not have been too salient, like pressure for politicians and service deliverers. But as CETA developed (FY 76 and 77) other forces overwhelmed the effects of monitoring on choice so that one year later, two years later under new pressure monitoring has become but one element in an ever expanding equation.

If we examine the relationship in terms of participants now instead of budget shares, we find, first of course, that the signs
have changed; but only at one time, FY 77, does it achieve .10 significance. In FY 77 we find a moderate, indirect association between quality of monitoring and commitment to classroom training. The negative sign makes the proposition read that in FY 77 commitment to classroom training is inversely related to quality of monitoring such that as the quality of monitoring improves, commitment to classroom training is reduced across the set of sites here. This is curious and, I submit, counterintuitive. But something that is perhaps more obvious is the makings of pattern across time; from FY 75 through 77 the coefficients are growing until in '77 they have reached what I would call moderate levels.

Nevertheless none of the measures of association between monitoring...and either operationalization of the dependent variable is sufficiently robust to give one much confidence in the relationships.

Quality of evaluation behaves much like monitoring as one would expect, being inversely related to per cent classroom training/voc ed participants. The correlation coefficients for the relationship in FY 77 and FY 76 as well as the three year period are significant at .10 and weak to moderate except for the curious outcome in FY 77. What needs to be stressed here, however, is the fact that to some extent Quality of Evaluation is a variable that turned out not to vary very much: most sites did not engage in evaluation; only a few did. The few exemplary sites probably disproportionately affect the coefficient here making it stronger than it would have been if the concept varied more widely. But when we look at the dollar measure of the dependent variable, the coefficients dry up to nothing.
The substantive meaning one must draw from these data are difficult to accept. Being inverse, they suggest that in FY 75, 76, and "ALL" commitment is inversely related to quality of evaluation which is another way of saying that as the quality of evaluation improves or increases, prime sponsor commitment to classroom training tends to decrease. We would expect these phenomena to behave in the same way all other things being equal.

Operating Responsibility ranges from completely in-house to completely out-of-house. Ignoring the values of the coefficients for the moment, we can interpret the negative signs quite easily first. The negative signed coefficients tell us that as operating responsibility goes toward completely in house, commitment to classroom training decreases. This makes sense since manpower offices cannot, in the main, provide the physical or human resources themselves to run an institutional classroom training program on site. Another way of saying about the same thing is to assert that as operating responsibility become more extra-mural, prime sponsor commitment to classroom training increases; and this proposition makes as much sense, I think, as the first.

If we address now the values of the coefficients we find some weak though interesting data. First, when we measure commitment in terms of participants, the coefficients are mixed and weak. Only in FY 76 do they approach the low side of moderate. But neither in FY 76 nor 77 do they reach our required significance. Yet if we collapse the three separate years into one three year period, the
coefficient achieves .10 and the value over the three year period is weak but nevertheless notable.

When we look at the association a second time with the dependent variable now measured in terms of dollars, we find very similar results. During the first year of CETA we find no relationship between operating responsibility and Per Cent Education Dollars, but we find modest inverse relationships for FY 76 and FY 77. And for the three year period the same sort of weak but notable -.21 obtains.

I think a reasonable policy analyst could, on the basis of these data, suggest to the program manager—if he doesn't already know it—that if he wants to increase the prime sponsor's commitment to classroom training, he should move operating responsibility out into the community. Similarly, keeping it in-house is apt to result in low levels of commitment. But to some extent this advice is obvious; rather this advice may take on significance at the preoperational, planning stage in a program's development when planners could benefit from knowing that there is evidence that increased use of classroom training may be enhanced in more open ended delivery systems like some of those encountered in CETA.

The next manipulable variable, Business Involvement, in local CETA programs, displays rather mixed activity vis-a-vis both measures of the dependent variable. In terms of participants, for example, no relationship obtains after this first program year. In FY 76 and FY 77, however, the correlations—.29 and .28—achieve required significance, and what I would call low-moderate degree of association.
In terms of dollars the coefficients never reached required significance levels and start at low-moderate and go steadily down hill over the time period. The participants may be associated with commitment while dollars are not as hard to explain. It might be easier to explain were we talking about on-the-job training or a coupled innovation like classroom training and OJT.

Openness of Decisionmaking, recall, refers to the extent to which more than one group of actors is involved in decisionmaking. What is especially puzzling about this concept is its behavior: in FY 75 the sign of the coefficient for both measures of the dependent variable is negative, suggesting that the more closed decisionmaking is the better classroom training fares. That, incidently, makes sense both intuitively and empirically. We find, therefore, this sort of arrangement obtaining in the first year of CETA, and the size of the coefficients -.35 and -.33 suggest that the relationship is moderately strong too. However whatever relationship we have here seems to dissipate after the first year regardless of the measure of the dependent variable except for the curious anomaly that occurs in FY 77 where the sign changes from negative to positive and reaching significance as well as a more moderate size-.31. My inclination here is to argue that overall these data suggest that, for good or ill, decisionmaking was probably changed to something less than that now (and even in '76 and '77) and with the growth of more closed decisionmaking, the schools do less well in terms of Title I money and participants.
What is perhaps interesting about the correlation between Employment Service Role in CETA and Commitment... is that the coefficients are both negative in FY 75, suggesting that the weak association is such that the greater the role for ES (Employment Service), the smaller the prime sponsor commitment to classroom training. Ordinarily one familiar with the machinations of manpower politics would hypothesize just the reverse; that is, the greater the role for ES the higher the commitment to classroom training. This assertion makes sense because primes that rely heavily on ES are likely to be ones that are very conservative, conventional and status quo oriented (if not unimaginative) and given that sort of predisposition, using the public schools as a key part of the prime's Title I effort is, of course, a very logical, conservative way to go.

As the reader can see quite easily, of course, -.35 in FY 75 suggests the reverse. Note, however, that in FY 77—in terms of participants if not dollars—that the correlation assumes the predicted direction (sign) and same order of magnitude as in FY 75. But why a role for ES would covary with participant levels but not with budget shares is itself difficult to explain. This is especially so when one recalls that most often ES thinks of its clients as the job-ready rather than those without marketable skills. If they serve the skilled more than the unskilled there is no reason to expect levels of commitment to classroom training to be related to ES role unless—as I suggested earlier—both decisions—the one to use ES as well as the one to emphasize classroom training—stem from the same underlying philosophy or predisposition.
Program Integration implies cross fertilization among CETA titles as well as a logic or plan underlying program design. Program Integration has been an important goal of CETA from the earliest days (we are told). The logic underlying program integration in part involves the capacity to design services so that a participant can be dealt with individually and, where necessary, be enrolled in a series of services which will make him employable. Integrated programs will rely on classroom training very heavily because the chronically unemployed typically lack skills but often they also lack fundamentals necessary to acquire skills. If a prime sponsor is actually serving the needy rather than "creaming", integrated programs will almost by definition require heavy commitment to classroom training unless local industry can assume not only skill training but basic education. This has been most unlikely.

Turning now to Table 5.9 we observe regarding Program Integration that the correlation coefficients only achieve .10 significance and moderate levels during the first fiscal year of the program. If we find this moderate relation in FY 75, the question follows "why does it disappear in the following years for the most part?" We can only theorize: when programs are new, managers seek to operate them "close to the book" in some regards. Perhaps, if we follow this logic a bit further, in year one of CETA many prime sponsors operated integrated programs either by design or by accident. Then with program maturity and attendant complications and pressures it could be the case that primes moved away from integrated programs by first making administrative alterations that compartmentalized much of the program--separating PSE from Title I for example. It would be difficult if not impossible, however, to ascertain
how widespread this phenomenon was/is short of evaluating each site again for evidence of this development.

THE LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS

We have tried to account for variation across a set of prime sponsors so far by examining sets of independent constructs at stipulated times. That has been the major burden of this chapter thus far. Now we turn to the proposed longitudinal analysis, and before we actually display our time series data and begin our analysis some preliminary remarks seem warranted.

First, no reason, theoretical or otherwise, exists to suggest that prime sponsors will vary in behavior at a given time (say T₁) in any appreciably different way than they would from one time (T₁) to another (T₂). In other words, we would not expect to observe palpable differences in behavior from the effects of a change in the unemployment rate on a set of primes from T₁ to T₂ any more than we would find across the same set at one time T₁. Or to put it yet another way: the effects of any "facilitator" or "barrier" should be the same whether we examine it from case to case or from time to time. (For a statistical justification of this assumption see Wichita, 1979, Chapter II, pp. 22-3.)

This discussion does, however, ignore one rather important phenomenon. And that phenomenon is the raison d'être for the remainder of this analysis, the time series section. It is generally believed, and a good deal of empirical evidence exists to support the proposition, that organizations (and staff) mature, acquire experience, even learn as they grow older (Bernstein, 1955). Actually organizations act as though these things happen to them; to be less anthropomorphic, the
individuals who make up these organizations seem to undergo these changes. And given that collections of people—organizations—do mature, it seems at least possible that how organizations behave and change their behaviors can result as much learning, growth, maturation as from responses to other changed stimuli like the unemployment rate, changes in the level of conflict, a change in local administration. We will be arguing, therefore, that we can test what we found in the cross-sectional analysis above by looking at time series data. In fact, we will be arguing that if we observe significant differences between correlations generated for the cross-sectional analysis and those generated longitudinally, it may be attributable to organizational growth, i.e., maturation, or learning, however you wish to characterize it. We shall not be really proposing any new hypotheses now—except the implied one about learning—rather we shall be actually submitting our theory and our earlier findings to yet another test. If, for example, we find no relationship between unemployment rate and prime sponsor commitment to classroom training at any of three times, but we find a moderate correlation between the two constructs when we look at their changes from Quarter IV to Quarter XIII, we can probably safely assume that this difference has occurred as a result of some sort of institutional learning or maturation. We can make this kind of comparison for several periods as well: the change period from Quarter IV to VIII; from Quarter VIII to XIII; and from Quarter IV to XIII. The period from Quarter IV to XIII will be our first comparison; it will represent our basic comparison. Then we will look back at the others for an additional check if that seems warranted from our first inspection of the Quarter IV to XIII period.
Though we will, in a very real sense here, be testing a new hypothesis—the ones based upon growth, learning organizational maturation—it will, nevertheless, be best that we follow roughly the same format and "model" we used in the cross-sectional part of this analysis; that is, we shall continue to organize our inquiry around the three broad classes of independent variables sketched in our box diagram: environmental/contextual variables, attitudinal variables, and operations/management variables the majority of which also happen to be the ones most susceptible to conscious manipulation.

**Environmental/Contextual Constructs**

Our examination of a set of unemployment data in the first part of our cross-sectional analysis yielded rather weak and mixed findings. See Table 4.1. Yet if we examine the correlation between Unemployment rate (variously operationalized as above) and the CHANGE in commitment to classroom training from Quarter IV to Quarter XIII, three program years, we find some rather interesting results. Now refer to Table 5.10. First, the longitudinal approach "improves" upon the cross-sectional in the consistency of the signs (from the analyst's point of view at least) for each of the correlations. That they are all negative makes it easier to form a proposition, and in the case of quarterly unemployment data as well as lagged data, these negatively signed correlations imply that as unemployment increases across our set of sites, prime sponsor commitment to classroom training—measured in both dollars and participants—diminishes. This is so for the Quarter average as well as both lagged measures. Moreover, these correlations are quite large by comparison with other findings thus
Table 5.10 Correlations For Selected Environmental/Contextual Variables and a Dollar and Participant Based Measure of the Dependent Variable for the Time Period Quarter IV through XIII.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variable</th>
<th>Change From Quarter IV to Quarter XIII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commitment in Participant Terms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate Quarter Average</td>
<td>-.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate Lagged 1 Quarter</td>
<td>-.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate Lagged 2 Quarters</td>
<td>-.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent Unemployed Women</td>
<td>-.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent Unemployed White</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
far. Significance far exceeds the .10 we have specified as minimal; hence, we can probably have some confidence in the proposition that organizations and/or their staff have learned better over time how to deal with the changing unemployment rate.

Classroom training is a rather long-term treatment in comparison with other CETA programs. During periods of increasing unemployment local CETA staff may be pressured strenuously to emphasize short-term programs like work experience (WE) and/or PSE as "quick fixes" to combat these rising indicators. Classroom training, however, is expensive and time consuming so we should not be surprised—and the time series data in Table 5.10 support this—that primes would react almost politically themselves, going for the cosmetic treatment for its quick appearance of success rather than working as heavily with classroom training the effects of which may require some months—six to a year—to begin surfacing.

These data, then, imply that staff behavior is a response to changing conditions, and more importantly, that responses are enforced by experiences and learning from past performances—successes and failures.

The rest of the table is more problematic or at least more troublesome to explain. The negative correlation (−.22 between Per Cent Unemployed Women and Change in Classroom Training Participants from Quarter IV to XIII) remains weak and statistically insignificant (by our .1 criterion) regardless of how we measure the dependent variable. These correlations do not appear to be much larger than any of the correlations between the same independent and dependent variables at
our three time periods used in the cross-sectional analysis which would suggest some sort of institutional learning.

Per Cent Unemployed White shows no relationship between that variable and either measure of the dependent variable for the period Quarter IV to XIII. We cannot infer anything about learning, therefore, from these data. The longitudinal analysis conducted on other contextual variables—-welfare eligibles, the young and poorly educated, economically disadvantaged, Spanish Speaking, for example—compare with the results from the cross-sectional analysis we conducted on the same relationships earlier (See Table 5.2). If we Compare Table 5.11 on the next page with Table 5.2, we observe no difference in correlation strength between Welfare Recipients by Commitment to Classroom Training over time and at discrete points during that period. In other words, the lack of relationship between Welfare Recipients and Commitment to Classroom Training remains consistent over the three year period. We pointed out earlier that

Table 5.11 Correlations For Selected Environmental/Contextual Variables and a Dollar and Participant Measures of the Dependent Variable for the Period Quarter IV to Quarter XIII.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Change From Quarter IV to Quarter XIII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commitment (Participants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare Recipients</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Than High School Ed.</td>
<td>-.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent White</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent Economically Disadvantaged Head of House.</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent Disadvantaged Families</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent Spanish Speaking</td>
<td>-.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
there is a moderately strong correlations between Less than High School Education and Commitment to Classroom Training measured in terms of participants, and we theorized that "when a prime sponsor confronts a large population of poorly educated people among its client pool, the prime seeks means other than classroom training to solve their employment or employability problems in the short term..." The correlation between the same concepts here with our time series data remains at about the same levels of strength as obtained between variables measured at each point of our cross-sectional analysis suggesting that what is going on is rather consistent across the three year period and that behavior is not really changing as a result of institutional growth or learning. Rather primes seem to be behaving rather consistently here.

Earlier in the cross-sectional analysis we had said—with respect to the next set of contextual variables—that the data there, we thought, suggested no relationship (See Table 5.3) between Level of Conflict and Commitment to Classroom Training. Looking at the time series data below for the same sets of constructs, we see the participant measure of the dependent variable and conflict is $r^2 = .16$ and that is not statistically significant; the corresponding correlation for the dollar measure is even weaker at .07.

The data in Table 5.12 suggest no support for any of our propositions about staff or organizational maturation or learning since obviously they mirror very closely our cross-sectional data.

Fiscal Condition I in the cross-sectional analysis failed to meet our rather facile significance criterion of .10. The participant data had hinted at a growing inverse relationship between Fiscal Condition I and
Table 5.12 Correlations Between Selected Environmental/Contextual Variables and A Dollar and Participant Based Measure of the Dependent Variable for Fiscal Year 75, 76 and 77 As Well as All three Combined.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Change From Quarter IV to Quarter XIII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commitment (Participants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Conflict</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Condition I</td>
<td>-.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Condition II</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure of Local Gov't</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Mix</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>-.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Commitment to Classroom Training measured in terms of participants such that as local governments felt more of the squeeze, prime sponsors tended not to emphasize classroom training as much in their policy plans. The same phenomenon was not, however, hinted at when the dependent variable is measured in dollar terms. Table 5.12 above adds to the confusion more than it serves to eliminate obfuscation. These data also suggest that the nature of relationship between the constructs is inverse, but they fail to meet our .10 significance criterion. In any case it is probably fair and accurate to conclude that while the data may not be used to support our learning hypothesis, they do not serve to disconfirm either.

The data generated earlier (Table 5.3) represents the degree of relationship between Fiscal Condition II and the dependent variable and was among the strongest. The time series data for the period Quarter III to Quarter XIII are not as high, failing even to meet our .10 significance threshold. Moreover, the correlations do not suggest that the manpower staffs or organizations behave as though they had been learning or maturing over that period and were changing mix decisions in response to changing fiscal conditions.

Our cross-sectional data suggest no statistical relationship between Prime Sponsor Commitment and Structure of Local Government; here in Table 5.13 the correlation between Structure of Local Government and Prime Sponsor Commitment in participant terms suggests no relationship. But when we measure commitment in dollar terms over the same period, the resulting correlation now becomes .30. Not only does this figure far exceed most of the corresponding cross-sectional data in Table 5.3 but the sign of the coefficient has also gone from negative to positive in
the time series case. What may we conclude from this contrast? First, while Structure of Local Government could change, over this short period, it probably did not (moreover we only measure it once); what changes occur in the relationship between Structure and Commitment is due to changes in participant levels. If one thinks of local government as a barrier to certain manpower practices—here, enrolling participants in classroom training where political officials might not see the immediate political payoffs—staff may have ascertained one, how to use classroom training in spite of political resistance or two, they may have been more successful in selling it to elected officials. There seems to be no way to establish the validity of this argument within the parameters of the present study however.

Industrial Mix, the next of our environmental/contextual variables in the longitudinal portion of this chapter, seems to show no statistical relationship to either changing participant levels in classroom training or changing budget shares over the period. Earlier (Table 5.3) we noted a pattern of weak albeit significant correlations between Industrial Mix and Education Dollars over time, an inverse one. The meaning of this had been taken to be that dollar commitment to classroom training was low in industrially diverse primes and tends to be associated with greater commitment in the less diverse communities. That view remains unaltered. But our time series data does not permit us to move beyond this weak generalization.

The peculiar case of Population Density likewise poses difficult interpretative problems. Earlier we found scant evidence of relationship between population density and a prime's commitment to classroom training—we found a modest, inverse relationship between population
density and commitment to classroom training measured in participant terms for Fiscal Year 77 and a very modest direct relationship in Fiscal Year 75 when we measure the dependent phenomenon in dollar terms. Now as we examine the time series data for the same relationship, the correlation between Population Density and classroom Training commitment (participant terms) over the period IV to XIII is inverse and quite a bit stronger.

First, the sign of the coefficient suggests a relationship contrary to our logic; that is, the negative sign indicates an inverse relationship such that as the value of one increases the other diminishes. And we may take that to suggest, I think, that primes with very densely populated jurisdictions will be less likely to use large doses of classroom training in the local program mix while sparcely populated areas will tend to do just the reverse. The -.44 correlation in Table 5.12 is, of course, larger than any coefficient measuring degree of relationship between population density and commitment to classroom training (measured in participant terms) so that we may, I think, infer that local CETA staffs have been learning how to live with the barrier. That is to say in primes with high population density, professional staff have continued to rely on treatments other than classroom training (perhaps against pressure to do otherwise) while those in sparcely populated jurisdictions have continued to use classroom training measurably more within the local program mix. Table 5.13 on the following page arrays the longitudinal data for the period Quarter IV to Quarter XIII. Quick inspection reveals no significant correlations save Program Mix: Classroom Training under Current Economic Conditions by Commitment Dollars, -.48 which is probably a function of N size 10 and therefore not a statistic we want to put too much confidence in. It seems reasonable, even inescapable, that here we have no evidence of
Table 5.13 Correlations Between Selected Attitudinal Variables and a Dollar and Participant Measure of the Dependent Variable for the Period Quarter IV to XIII.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Changes from Quarter Four to Quarter Thirteen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commitment (Participants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Commitment to Placement</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System Commitment to Placement</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Mix: Classroom Training without Regard for Economic Conditions</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Mix: Classroom Training Given Current Economic Conditions</td>
<td>-.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Mix: Classroom Training without Regard for Economic Conditions (MAC Member Attitude)</td>
<td>-.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Mix: Classroom Training Given Current Economic Conditions (MAC Member Attitude)</td>
<td>-.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
organizational or staff maturation reflecting itself in behavior we can capture in any of the bivariate relationships summarized above; moreover, no evidence exists to suggest staff's adaptive behavior—learning, perhaps—that results from treating these attitudes as barriers that can be finessed or short-circuited.

The reader should now inspect the data arrayed in Table 5.14 on the next page. In the longitudinal analysis covering change from Quarter III to Quarter XIII the sign of the correlation between Quality of Evaluation and Commitment in participant terms has changed sign going from inverse in our cross-section analysis to direct here. No other relationship makes this sort of transformation when we switch perspective. We are simply unable to offer a plausible explanation to account for this phenomenon since checking the data for mechanical error solved nothing.

The Openness of Decisionmaking variable earlier had suggested some mixed conclusions: in Fiscal Year 75 for example we observed, "the sign of the coefficient for both measures of the dependent variable is negative, suggesting that the more closed decisionmaking is the better classroom training fares." We argued there in the face of the curious sign change in Fiscal Year 77 that from experience it made sense to suppose that "...decisionmaking was probably more open when CETA had just started; this openness was probably changed to something less than that now...and with the growth of a more closed decisionmaking system the schools do less well in terms of Title I money and participants."

Since we need only concern ourselves here with the participant side of the table, the Openness of Decisionmaking variable achieving significance only with that operationalization of the concept, we may, I think,
Table 5. 14 Correlations Between Selected Manipulable Variables and A Dollar And Participant Measure of the Dependent Variable for the Period Quarter IV to Quarter XIII inclusive.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Changes From Quarter IV To Quarter XIII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commitment (Participants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Staff Quality</td>
<td>-.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Top Staff</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Integration</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Monitoring</td>
<td>-.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Evaluation</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Responsibility</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Involvement</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness of Decisionmaking</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Service Role</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Integration</td>
<td>-.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of RFP</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
argue that the slightly larger coefficient for the relationship over time obtains as a result of the phenomenon we hypothesized earlier i.e., staff or local organizations have learned to deal over time with barriers or facilitators and classroom training had fared well as decisionmaking has become less open over time.

Earlier Employment Service Role posed difficult interpretive problems; when we move to the comparable data from our longitudinal analysis, our findings remain as baffling. First, if we recall the cross-sectional data again, the inverse relation only obtains in both operationalizations of the dependent variable in Fiscal Year 75. We should point out also that the .36 correlation between E.S. Role and Commitment for Quarter III to XIII is not unique either. If we look at shorter periods of change—Quarter IV to VIII or VIII to XIII—we find other direct relationships. (See Table 5.15) These data help establish that we are dealing with a relationship that is indeed direct. What the .36 for the period III to XIII means to us is that E.S. Role is associated modestly to higher levels of classroom training commitment in local prime sponsorships when measured in client terms; moreover, the pattern of the data would suggest that this relationship seems to be moving more that way over time.

The last manipulable variable which achieves statistical significance in our times series section of the analysis is Program Integration. Here the signs suggest that the two—Program Integration and the Budget-based measure of Commitment—vary inversely such that over time (three years) integrated programs would tend to predict to a lessor role for classroom training ceteris paribus. That the size of the correlation is greater than the size of similar correlations for the relationships at three times in the crosssectional part of this study could again be
Table 5.15 Correlations Between Employment Service Role and Per Cent Change in Participants for Three Periods: Qtr IV to VIII; VIII to XIII and IV to XIII.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variable</th>
<th>Per Cent Change</th>
<th>Per Cent Change</th>
<th>Per Cent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV to VIII</td>
<td>VIII to XIII</td>
<td>IV to XIII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Service</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role in CETA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
taken, I think, to suggest that staff or the organization are learning to deal with the perceived absence of this particular phenomenon locally.

Summary of Findings From Both the Cross-sectional and Longitudinal Parts of This Analysis

Expected Relationships.

This section seeks to summarize all the expected relationships that were confirmed by the analysis.

We found a weak, negative relationship between Per Cent Unemployed White and Commitment to Classroom Training.

The relationship between size of a prime sponsor's population with less than a high school education and a prime sponsor's commitment to classroom training is related in a statistically inverse way at each time point. The relationship is consistently moderate to high-moderate.

The relationship between Fiscal Condition II and Commitment to Classroom Training is generally negative. (Primes in poor economic health tend to have higher levels of commitment to classroom training while those judged by Moody Inc. to be fiscally most sound tend to make lower commitments.)

The -.44 correlation between Population Density and Commitment from Quarter Three to Thirteen is larger than any coefficient in our longitudinal analysis representing degree of relationship in participant terms. We may infer, I think, that over time staff have been learning how to live with the contextual barrier.

Staff attitudes are weakly related to both measures of the dependent variable in the predicted direction under the condition of disagreement between staff and MAC over the priority each gives classroom training.
The same is true under the special instance where respondents are asked to take into account local economic conditions. And this weak but significant relationship holds for both measures of commitment.

Among prime sponsors where staff and MAC are roughly equal in influence over Title I decisions, staff priorities for classroom training—regardless of special local economic conditions—is directly related to prime sponsor commitment at least in dollar terms locally.

Under the special instance where local economic conditions are taken into account, staff preferences are even more strongly related to prime sponsor commitment.

As local decisionmaking becomes more restricted, prime sponsor commitment to classroom training also diminishes. This is so for both participants and budget measures of commitment.

Unexpected Findings.

This section seeks to report instances where our hypothesized relations were not borne out by the data and analysis. We also report findings here that went counter to our expectations.

The proportion of welfare recipients in a local population does not appear to be statistically related to a prime sponsor's commitment to classroom training however one define it. The same holds for Economically Disadvantaged and Spanish Speaking.

We found no statistically significant relationship among our sites between Level of Conflict and Commitment to Classroom Training.

No obvious relationship seems to exist between Fiscal Condition I and Commitment to Classroom Training among our sites during the period under study.
Structure of Local Government seems to have no statistical relationship with Commitment to Classroom Training regardless of how one measures the dependent phenomenon.

We observe no differences between Welfare Receipients and Commitment in either the cross-sectional or the longitudinal approaches, and based upon our stated assumptions concluded that over time the data did not support any learning theory or organizational maturation theory for dealing with policy and program impediments.

The same conclusions followed when we examined time series and cross-sectional data for Less than High School Education, Level of Conflict, Fiscal Condition I and Fiscal Condition II: no clear evidence that staff have, overtime, somehow learned to deal with these barriers in designing local programs among our research sites.

Our view about Industrial mix remains unaltered from the cross-sectional to the longitudinal sections. We cannot move beyond our initial comments: a weak relationship at two of four times and only when the dependent variable is defined in dollar terms.

Staff commitment to placement as a goal has no statistical relationship with prime sponsor commitment to classroom training at any time for any measure of the dependent variable.

System Commitment to Placement, a very similar concept to Staff Commitment demonstrates only a weak statistically insignificant correlation coefficient too. Neither the time at which nor the way we measure the dependent variable seems to be of any consequence.

Our data also suggest that staff preference for classroom training as a Title I service is unrelated to prime sponsor commitment when staff
are asked to respond without regard to current economic conditions.

We found no relationship between MAC member attitudes and Commit­
ment to Classroom Training either.

When we filtered for the cases where staff dominated with respect

to influence the correlations are, in all cases, weak or nonexistent and

in no instance do they meet our significance requirement.

Attitudes dealing with placement goals are not related to level of

commitment a prime gives classroom training among our research sites.

On the basis of our data, staff quality, top staff quality, and

administrative integration appear to be unrelated statistically to prime

sponsor commitment among our sites. (Or a prime's use of classroom

training does not vary by staff quality; both good and poorer staffs will

tend to utilize classroom training in roughly comparable levels but for

different reasons.)

If a pattern is developing over time between Quality of Monitoring

and Commitment it seems to be inverse such that in the absence of good

evidence presumably generated through monitoring, prime sponsors lac­

ting the good data use classroom training presumably based upon com­

mon sense or tradition—Schooling is ipso facto good.

Approximately the same findings for Evaluation; that is, what rel­

ationships occur seem to be inverse. Again we have taken that to mean

that where evaluation is not well done, primes lacking good data, fall

back on the old classroom training component because both tradition

and common sense indicate it is the way to go.

Quality of Evaluation as a useful independent variable yields

little additional insight in prime sponsor behavior or preference over
Mixed Results.

The data from the longitudinal analysis, having in general improved upon the cross-sectional data interpreted earlier, we judged that we had indirect evidence to suggest the presence of some learning within the organization and/or among staff regarding how to handle the problem of local unemployment rates over time. This artifact—larger coefficients for the period Quarter III to Quarter XIII—holds only for the simple measures of unemployment; we do not find similar phenomena associated with the more specific measures involving per cent white or female unemployed.

Also one should be autious about claims when all he can demonstrate is a very weak statistical relationship between Industrial Mix and Commitment in two of four cases and with our specified level of error at .10 for these fragile findings only obtain when we measure commitment in dollar terms.

We observed earlier "...where most important actors—staff, political officials, service deliverers and MAC members—are in agreement about the importace of placement as a goal, we find a correspondingly high commitment to classroom training in primes judging by the number of participants enrolled in Title I Classroom Training. But this relationship is very weak and/or nonexistent when we measure the dependent variable in dollar terms.

During the first year of CETA we find no relationship between Operating Responsibility and Dollar Commitment. But we find a modest, inverse relationship in Fiscal Year 76 and Fiscal Year 77; and for the three years taken collectively we also find such a weak inverse relation
ship, -.21.

No relationship between Business Involvement and our participant measure of commitment in year one; in year two and three it changes to low-moderate (.29 and .28). No significant measures of association obtain when we measure the dependent variable in dollar terms however.

Data describing the relationship between E.S. Role and Commitment is ambiguous. It never becomes stronger than the .35 range (which is OK itself), but it changes sign almost randomly, and this change of sign defies interpretation.

If Program Integration and Commitment are related, our data only document it during the first year of CETA and that is quite weak moreover.

Openness of Decisionmaking seems to have an effect on program choice over time though the increased size of the coefficient representing the relationship from Quarter III to Quarter XIII is greater than any of the cross-sectional coefficients. The change must be attributable to the dependent variable since we do not measure the independent variable more than once. Nevertheless, it could be argued that staff have learned to deal with (or live with) this local condition; at least the larger coefficient permits us to assert this possibility.

The pattern of data characterizing the relationship between ES Role and Commitment suggests that the relationship seems to be coming ever so slightly stronger over time; and that suggests further, I think, the plausibility of our learning hypotheses put forth earlier.

Program Integration also acts in such a way in the longitudinal analysis so as not be disconfirm the learning argument put forth at the beginning of this section.
Chapter VI. Looking Behind the Data: Three Cases

The chief reason for including a set of case studies in this dissertation is to provide the means for asking specially tailored questions about program choice that have been asked in earlier, completed CETA field work. But fielding additional inquiries focused only on my primary research issues becomes my problem alone, and that limits what can be done a great deal. The twin constraints of time and money translated into the decision on my part to limit my field work to three prime sponsorships within one day's travel of Columbus, Ohio. And since I believe that the 32 sites used in the major portion of this study fairly accurately portray the range of variation among the 470-plus CETA prime sponsorships, I sought to select three sites that maximized the variation among possible sites on a number of important features. These choices became the Columbus/Franklin County Consortium, the Licking/Delaware County Consortium, and Greene County CETA. Each has features that justifies its inclusion.

First, Columbus is a large, urban community located in the center of the state. The consortium serves 552 square miles. As of 1976 it was the 18th fastest growing county in the U.S. Columbus/Franklin County Consortium includes three cities of over 25,000 people: Columbus, Upper Arlington and Whitehall. The 1978 population of Franklin County was 879,028—a 5.5 per cent growth since the 1970 census. No single industrial sector dominates the economy of the area and Franklin County is therefore less susceptible to the instability of seasonal and cyclical
employment fluctuations than other large cities and counties in the state. The largest employer in the county is the state with 17,800 employees. Second is the state university with 16,231 and the Federal government is third with 12,100. The county is 13 per cent black. Sixty five per cent of the population reside in Columbus with just 14 per cent residing in unincorporated areas. The county is economically dominated by Columbus whose principle industries include transportation equipment, nonelectrical machinery, electrical machinery, fabricated metals, food printing and publishing, primary metals and tone-clay glass.

Greene County, during the period of our inquiries, had a population of 125,000 people. Blacks make up 6.7 per cent of that number. Forty-six per cent of the population live in the county’s principle cities of Fairborn and Xenia with 9 per cent living in villages and towns and 45 per cent living in unincorporated areas. Greene is rural and a small town county. Over 45 per cent of the work force commutes to other counties for jobs. The major local employer is an air force base.

Greene has some light manufacturing and considerable agriculture, especially hogs. The two principle towns are in the 25,000 to 35,000 range in size.

Between these two extremes is our third site, the Licking Delaware Consortium. The licking/Delaware Consortium is composed of two county governments. Licking is dominated by the city of Newark, the county seat. Newark is a community of 25,000 with light manufacturing, retail printing, and agrobusiness as chief economic activity. Licking County is 4 per cent black while Newark is 8 per cent black. Apart from the county seat Licking is predominately rural with agriculture--especially with small farms--the major livelihood in the unincorporated areas.
Delaware County is very similar to Licking County. The county seat is the little city of Delaware with a 1970 population of 18,000. Delaware is the center of a rural county whose main pursuit is agriculture especially corn, soybeans, cattle and horses. It is fast taking on the character of a bedroom district tied very closely to Columbus. CETA was essentially managed by a staff in Newark in 1975 to 1977. Accountability to Delaware was achieved through sign off on plans and grants by county commissioners and through formal liaison with elected officials.

While these three sites in no sense capture all the differences one might like to sample, they adequately reflect differences among jurisdictions enough so that we are apt to capture those features of program choice—which we have any chance of measuring with these research techniques—likely to be affected by size, industrial dominance population characteristics and local history.

Our inquiries dealt with four broad areas, A. Accounting for Local Data and Decisions, B. Decisionmaking in the Early Years of CETA, C. the Organization, Personnel, Practices and Procedures of the Education Domain, D. The Pre-CETA Program History of the Area. We were also concerned about our respondent's background to the extent that those features allow insight into particular interpretations of local developments.

Our best attempt at determining the explanation for varied use of classroom training was the statistical portions of this study, treating as they did 32 different sites of varied composition. One cannot explain variation in commitment on the strength of three Ohio sites; hence, our objective here is scaled down. Chapter Six which follows
looks for understanding of three particular situations. Based upon personal experience accumulated from numerous earlier site visits, the present venture seeks to test the analyst's sense of how things happen by posing his understanding to practitioners through an interview protocol.

A. Local Data and Decisions simply seeks to enlarge on the results detailed in Chapter III, the trend analysis, through the eyes of local actors as they describe and account for summary measures of prime sponsor commitment to classroom training in their jurisdictions. B. Decisionmaking in the Early Years of CETA, assumes that who is involved and how determines prime sponsor commitment. This section draws heavily on pluralistic models and ideas. C. The Organizational probes assumes that institutional features can shape actors and responses and is, therefore, also a conscious effort to apply these organizational interpretations to choice mechanisms used locally. Implicit in the last section, like the second, is the assumption of incrementalism that the old ways of doing things tend to be carried over to new situations, shaping and affecting responses in these new areas.

A. Local Data and Decisions.

Columbus and Franklin Co.

The Columbus data for classroom training as a proportion of Title I in the early years of CETA were not typical (see the appendix). The 70.8 per cent Columbus figure far exceeds national data and national trends, yet we found no shortage of explanations for these data.

All noneducators agreed that the prime sponsor initially went very heavily with classroom training because of prior program history. What had been operating—particularly the Columbus Public School's Skill Center—was judged to be the best bet in an atmosphere of some
uncertainty. But in some ways to stop with the proposition that Columbus went heavily with classroom training because classroom training was the corner stone of earlier forerunners of CETA doesn't really advance our understanding much. Most respondents had interesting explanations to shore up this conclusion. One Columbus respondent pointed out the absence of alternative service deliverers as an explanation—no competition. Another pointed out that the state voc ed division had sign off rights to the money and would not support institutions other than the local skill center for the voc ed money. Another explanation offered was that the skill center—the prime beneficiary—was well wired politically and could call on political support were its interests taken lightly.

Respondents pointed out that there had been early thinking that the new primes should seek new blood in a new manpower policy under CETA, but they also pointed out that many people were cautioning the new CETA director to go slow, to use the "tried-and-true" at least in the short term.

Columbus and six other major cities in Ohio were a step further along in local vocational development having had skill centers set up and operating in these cities with MDTA dollars. Because these facilities were up and going, Columbus had pressures other cities not a part of the original seven had to use what had been set up just a few years earlier.

The pressures of incremental adaptation seemed to be very, very strong in the early development of Title I program mix to judge from what local actors recall in Columbus. Moreover, since there was a perceived absence of effective alternatives, the exigencies of time probably put pressure on professional staff to obligate and spend the money. The skill center became a safe bet.
Curiously in Columbus all educator respondents—administrators at CPS as well as skill center staff—asserted that it was performance, pure and simple that netted the schools the early CETA dollars and contracts.

Public school officials argued that theirs "...were the best programs to start with" and—in keeping with what the noneducators had said—they pointed out too "...that we were ready". Other variations of the performance explanation included the assertion that the city got the "best buy" with CPS, that they got more. That the state superintendent's prestige added to CPS's status. But most common were assertions like the skill center could not be beaten on placements or completions.

Public school respondents do not like to characterize the matter of choice as political. They claim merit is the single most important criterion. If it is so that argument is not as salient in the other sectors of the Columbus decisionmaking groups.

In Greene County the trend in spending conforms with national trend data, i.e., it is increasing, but in absolute terms it is a much higher proportion of the Title I budget going to classroom training than the "average" site.

Greene County—a rural setting—probably typifies what many small primes confronted in the early days: a shortage of service providers under any set of local mix decisions.

Local CETA professionals in Greene County pointed to several features of the local environment as playing a part in the relatively high commitment to classroom training in the county: like Columbus, the absence of alternatives. There simply weren't many vendors to choose among. Moreover, a number argued that CETA regulations emphasized "going with what
was there"—which in Greene County was the OIC. Greene County CETA staff pointed out that they needed time to determine first hand what the community's needs were, that going heavily with the OIC in 1976 gave them a year to acquire some experience.

But the controlling variable in this rural setting must be the absence of alternative deliverers. Greene had the OIC in 1976, and that is about all. In 1977 the area joint vocational high school had opened so there was some competition for the same services—classroom training—but still little among services.

Greene County had no MDTA skill center. Transportation was a problem isolating the area from Dayton, the nearest large city. The OIC was already in funding trouble in 1976 local respondents said; moreover, the OIC's ability to deliver any selection of courses was severely limited so it was just a matter of time before CETA went from the OIC to the JVS for classroom training. JVS was more economical. It provided the option of less-than-class size training which OIC could not do.

In Greene County the question became OIC v. JVS. Local geography and economy ruled out OJT because Greene County itself could not sustain a large OJT program, and the poor infrastructure linking Greene County to Dayton tied people to the rural home setting. (This is changing today, respondents told me.)

Local educators in Greene County were less emphatic about merit as the criterion that accounted for the large prime sponsor commitment to classroom training. They pointed out the disadvantages the OIC seemed unable to surmount and admitted that within this context JVS was the only game in town notwithstanding its obvious advantages of choice, cost, convenience and status which OIC could not hope to meet.
All seemed to agree that at least in the early days of CETA in Greene County politics had very little to do with program choice. In fact the fiscal respondent pointed out that Greene County had used Title I PSE somewhat at start-up, but by year two and three they had begun to eliminate it from Title I. This exorcism of PSE resulted in the increased participation rates in classroom training the data reveal. Moreover the prime's ability to make up the administrative costs of Title I from other titles in the local CETA operation, reduced the unit cost of classroom training over the early years as well until they surpassed the economies of scale at JVS.

The situation in the Licking/Delaware Consortium was substantially different from both Columbus and Greene County according to local accounts for the period.

As far as participants go Licking/Delaware comes closest of all three sites to national norms for classroom training participants over the three year period, but in terms of expenditures its costs were much less.

Why the more modest initial dependence on classroom training in Licking/Delaware, one might ask? Under early CETA, Licking/Delaware professional staff had to confront a rather well developed, well wired in-place categorical program which indicated a go-slow strategy if change were contemplated. That meant contracting with the CAP agencies in Licking/Delaware for Title I programs.

The CAP agencies were not interested in classroom training or vocational training in any standard sense of the term. They were work experience vendors. So, respondents pointed out, much of the Title I program became a work experience program.
The prime also claimed that in the first year of CETA they encountered very little pressure from the voc ed people for a role in CETA so it was easier to deal with the CAP agencies.

All sites tended to go with what was in place: in Columbus it was the services a MDTA Skill Center could deliver; in Greene County what OIC and later JVS could deliver. In Licking/Delaware we find the same inertia but in favor of the CAPS whose forte was work experience, and this in a context devoid of countervailing pressure from school people at least for the first year of CETA.

All sites stressed the legitimation of this strategy by the CETA regulations admonishing local primes to use what was in place if they showed demonstrated effectiveness.

All sites stressed the need to move away from established vendors and approaches gradually. All sites expressed a view that uncertainty dictated a "conventional" first and second year. Also universally credited as important to early program mix questions was the absence of service vendor competition for the most part. Limited choice, uncertainty, established preferences seemed to link, suggesting a conventional, incremental decision based very little on hard performance or effectiveness criteria. In general noneducators with very few exceptions stressed the institution's track record and their state of readiness as prime explanations. Where the schools eschewed involvement--OSU Newark, for example--the explanation was framed in terms depicting the manpower community as dictating terms in an area where they had no business, no experience. OSUN, for example, admitted the clientele was hard to serve, but that is as close as they would come to saying they didn't want
to deal with these people and that is why they daponed a go slow, almost reticent attitude toward a role in manpower programs.

A., 1. Contrasting National Trends with Local Levels of Commitment.

Licking/Delaware

Licking/Delaware respondents correctly pointed out that their prime closely mirrored the national trend but at lower absolute levels. A local CETA administrator believes that the influx of PSE money in 1976 and 1977 gave primes plenty of money for jobs. And the increased PSE reduced the need for work experience. With reduced work experience and increased PSE primes had lots of Title I money to spend on classroom training or OJT. In Licking/Delaware that flexibility simply translated into increased classroom training since OJT was much harder to secure.

Educators harkened back to the performance argument again: "Everyone was discovering the value of education v. OJT over time" or "More return for every dollar spent on education..." This position coupled with the argument that employers preferred to hire a classroom graduate over a work experience or OJT graduate because classroom training's added structure was how local educators tended to explain local and national trends over the three years. Educators also volunteered that at least in Licking/Delaware OJT was not very high quality in the early years of CETA which made classroom training look attractive, but they did allow that it has become much better in more recent years.

Greene County CETA

Greene County eliminated PSE from Title I in 1976 and 1977 creating slack that could be funneled into classroom training and OJT. No other accounts were presented.
Columbus and Franklin Co.

The obvious fact that Columbus and Franklin County was moving in the opposite direction from the national trend emerged quickly. Columbus's effort to reduce the share of Title I going to classroom training resulted from an influential and powerful administrator's personal war with voc ed whose condescending attitude toward CETA threatened his power and status in the early days. This account did not discount the clash of race and other issues though it pointed out that hostility abated in Columbus as time passed. The impact of race may have been mitigated in Columbus by the fact that Columbus had a MDTA skill center which promoted vocational education programs in manpower before CETA emerged from Congress. Having this pre-CETA advantage may have reduced the effects of race, values and goals that could have been salient in more pristine relations.

Inquiries at three sites did not produce any contradictions about local actions or preferences. Yet two competing interpretations persist: the noneducators point to factors like the influx of public service employment dollars taking much of the financial pressure off Title I and consequently making classroom training—the costly, more long-term solution or tool—look more attractive given the large infusion of PSE dollars.

This argument, it seems to me, has the widest application. And this is so for a few very simple reasons. All primes (so far as I know) got a large amount of PSE money—amounts dwarfing the Title I allocations. Second, classroom training, no matter where it is used, is costly and takes time. Both these features, PSE funds and the financial and temporal costs of classroom training, make it somewhat less attractive when elected
officials need to see quick, visible results. With PSE to produce these quick, visible results, primes could afford to enroll youth especially in training programs, the heat for a short term solution having been reduced with Title II and VI moneys.

Educators never volunteer this sort of explanation. Performance is the explanatory variable. I believe this is inadequate.

Finally, the Columbus case, which at least early on is explained by racial conflict and personalities, certainly supports one hypothesis put forth earlier in this dissertation, namely that where the schools do not engage willingly in manpower programs, it is because of their protected status, and apolitical middle class bias against action agencies whose mission it is to salvage the clientele with whom the schools have failed. But, of course, one big city like Columbus does not become the instance that allows us to generalize to all big cities. Yet I believe the logic is compelling if not empirically "proven".

A., 2. Lobbying in Local Decisionmaking.

This researcher found almost universally among his respondents a total absence of perception of lobbying for classroom training programs during decisionmaking in the early days of CETA. This surprised the present writer a great deal. Both the non-educators and the educators gave similar answers, and in general these were invariable across sites: lobbying did not take place. Two exceptions to this otherwise blanket conclusion emerged from the case studies. A particular city councilman pressed the interests of a local CBO vigorously before the planning council and in private; though this was a finding about lobbying in general; it was not advocacy for classroom training per se. And state voc ed made it clear in all three sites they were entitled to the six per cent money
and that they had to sign off on any decision regarding the use of that money. The state took a very strict interpretation about where that money could be spent. Their position which seems to be unchallenged in Ohio was that the six percent money had to go to voe classroom training, not to ancillary or nonclassroom uses like research, transportation or to proprietary schools for classes.

A. 3. The Role of Education in Local Decisions.

For the period of interest in this dissertation, most local respondents from all sites were quite sure that local education units had no visible, important role and took little interest in manpower policy or planning. This was the modal response though it was not unanimous.

Columbus/Franklin Co

In Columbus the salient role was played by the state who pushed hard for the skill centers whenever it could and used the voe money as a lever to try for more. But insiders agreed that neither the county nor the city education people were important in early CETA decisions about classroom training in Title I either because they did not have the resources—people especially—or the sophistication to get involved. No one advanced the theory that they consciously eschewed involvement because of the political nature of such a venture or because of an unspoken attitude which worked to restrict interaction with "lesser" organizations serving lower classes of people.

Greene County CETA

In Greene County widespread nonresponse among noneducators was the pattern. That is, manpower and social services people reemphasized the sense of community and the noncompetitiveness of local politics in Greene County which they claim grew out of the community's shared
experience recovering from a devastating tornado in Xenia. Most pointed out that the state made its presence known but not in a frequent or harsh way, expressing concern about use of the voc ed moneys; but their's was not an obstrusive role most respondents said.

The educators were a bit more critical. Two educators stated that in the early days CETA relied on local education for both local leadership and the hands on training in the prime sponsorship, but that all that has changed over time. Now, they added, "CETA believes they know as much as the educators do."

Licking/Delaware Consortium

Professional staff in Licking/Delaware generally characterized the state as helpful and/or supportive; seldom troublesome. In matters of negotiation with local education agencies (LEA's) the state sometimes acted like a buffer. (OSUN always sought to recover additional administrative costs to programs that the prime sponsor thought they should not accept: development costs and risk costs should things not turn out as well as planned.) But local schools, i.e., city, county and parochial generally had no involvement in manpower planning even though one public executive claimed she "...spent over a yeartalking CETA to school boards with little success..." One staffer did point out that Licking County schools were represented in early planning, but not formally or institutionally; this involvement was simply, she said, based upon personal relationships between two people—friendship.

Educators confessed that soon after CETA began they decided (OSUN and the joint vocational school) that they did not want to compete among themselves for CETA money. "We decided we wouldn't bid against each other." That sort of decision, of course, required education policymakers
makers to attend to manpower policy to some extent, even if it reduced
the amount of interaction among actors and eliminated any "market" in-
fluence over vendors responding to CETA. What seems to have obtained,
then, is a kind of collusion either to keep the cost of education ser-
vice up or do reduce the amount of bargaining/politicking that might
have to occur if CETA were able to deal with several bidders. (These
costs could be both financial and nonfinancial. Schools might want to
realize the highest price for their service, but they might prize a
noncompetitive atmosphere even more.)

Because Ohio State, Newark has recently (March '81) admitted that
it has taken the position that they do not want any CETA money, "We won't
take any CETA money; its just hassles!" it may be fair to conclude that
the second rationale—reducing bargaining/politicking—may have been the
governing motive even back in the early days. (The actors for the most
part remain the same.)

If there is a common feeling among respondents about the role of
education in early manpower policy, it is that one, the state role was very
limited and supportive, consisting principally of making sure voc ed set-
a-side dollars were spent on classroom training in the public school
system. The state also seemed interested in convincing some Ohio primes
to spend above the six per cent voc ed money, and in isolated cases the
state seems willing to act as an intermediary or buffer between CETA and
local education administrators when disputes arise over the proper allo-
cation of costs for development, planning and start-up.

The second obvious finding the field research disclosed was the
near unanimous belief among respondents that local school systems and
districts played virtually no role in redistributive decisionmaking though it was not the case that primes sought to exclude them. There is some scant evidence—from educators themselves—that they sought to avoid competing among themselves for CETA contracts though we will never be able to argue generalizability from the narrow field work that yielded that datum.

B. Early CETA-Era Decisionmaking.

The concerns in this section are twofold: ascertaining the influence of education and educators in early manpower advisory meetings and finding out how prime sponsors dealt with educators who attended and participated in these meetings. A number of secondary issues fall under each of these broader concerns.

If we go back to early CETA regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor, we discover that the only agency required to be on the new Manpower Advisory Councils (MAC's) was the local Employment Service (ES). Other agencies were suggested and recommended, but prime sponsors were not required in the early years to assemble a MAC that necessarily reflected certain interests in certain proportions say the way PIC's—Private Industry Councils—reflect the business interests and the private sector today.

All three prime sponsorships reported including educators on their MAC's in the early years of CETA. Licking/Delaware respondents pointed out that the MAC was dominated by educators in the early years. This was due to the rural character of the two principle counties in the consortium. In fact, the Licking/Delaware educators may have been the only group who knew anything about the whole federal funding process, locals
recalled. They were the only "naturals".

In Greene County the situation was similar. In the early days the council was chaired by an educator, and it continues to be today. Educators on the MAC also sat on the youth council and now sit on the PIC so they have influence and entree to all local manpower decisionmaking. Moreover, the education participation in Greene County was chiefly vocational. Local academic school people did not participate as school representatives though former school people may have participated in other capacities: CBO's staff and the like.

The MAC in Columbus from 1975 to 1977 had two seats occupied by school people from the Columbus Public School's Adult Education Division. Participation was irregular, CPS officials generally viewing those meetings as a waste of time.

B., 1. The Origins of MAC Membership.

If decisions are affected by who participates, and the level of local commitment to classroom training would likely be an agenda item for most MACs, it seemed important to determine how educators got on the MAC. Drafted representatives would be less likely to be strong advocates for important school roles in service delivery; certainly less so than enlistees since that act almost assumes some sort of advocacy role. The field research indicates all members across all sites were asked by the prime sponsor to serve on the MAC. No educator, by his own admission, ever asked to be appointed on his or her own volition.

Greene Co. CETA

In Greene County the prime sponsor sought representatives from voced, two area colleges, and the local high schools. But the area superintendent acted as a coordinator with the local schools since his
school dealt with each as the sole provider of voc ed services to all the area schools.

**Licking/Delaware Consrt.**

A Licking/Delaware educator chaired the MAC/ETAC from 1975 until 1978. And professional staff stated flatly, "No one who asked to be on the council, have we said 'no' to." The superintendent of one of the local voc ed high schools was a MAC member for a number of years.

**Columbus/Franklin County**

In Columbus the CETA director personally asked CPS officials to join the MAC. One was active; the other was not. CPS educators sat on the MAC for two years when the prime sponsor decided subcontractors should be excluded. (CPS has always been one of the city's major contractors, and even today ETAC meetings are conducted at the Adult Education Center so that officials can still keep very close contact while being excluded officially as big contractors.) One educator who agreed to serve on the MAC volunteered this judgement, "It was a worthless body. No agenda. Poor Leadership. Just a coffee klatsch."

**B. Bias, Attitude, and Institutional Position at Proceedings.**

Prime sponsor commitment to classroom training would naturally follow from both membership of the decisionmaking body and those predispositions that favor one choice (or set of choices) from another. Not surprisingly responses and the tone of responses in the field seemed to differ more along educator v. noneducator lines than by prime sponsorship.

**The Noneducator Position**

The field research produced a rather unflattering characterization of the education establishment in manpower policy. Noneducators generally pointed to a sense of the basic inferiority and undesirability of the
CETA client, for example

   Education automatically assumed the CETA client is a lesser calibre than their real students. For that reason we avoided labeling/identifying CETA people in the less-than-class situations. When they were discovered, they got a different kind of treatment.

   Yet schools seemed frustrated when it comes to coming up with ways to deal with the problem. There really would be no need for CETA if schools did the job right initially. We have a class of mavericks, outcasts and slow learners, and we ask, "develop a class for us"; they have a very difficult time doing this, and it's hard not to appear threatening and controversial when you approach them.

The noneducators discerned an unwillingness to adapt the standard education model to the CETA clientele. Instead they behave and spoke as if they believed these people should be bent to fit the voc ed/tech school model appropriate for the majority of the school clientele.

Finally we observed a sense that educators were out to milk CETA for as much as possible and perhaps even more unfortunately, we observed a general sense among noneducators that professional educators know it all—that they know what is best for everyone: themselves, CETA, the CETA clientele and the business sector.

   **Education Position**

   Educators as a group tended to appear a bit condescending with respect to the class of client delivered to their doorstep via CETA. They likewise seemed to see themselves as superior to CETA staff (which may have been the case). Some gave the impression that while training should be the center piece of CETA, there were significant problems with CETA clients which CETA was quick to minimize or deny or ignore.
Educators seemed to think that the matter of providing for the needs of these clients beyond the provision of training was CETA's and that the educator had no obligation to provide for any support from their scarce resources. If Voc Ed is to train these people with all their problems, then CETA has to supply the support or pay them—voc ed—the extra costs for supplying these additional services.

Some people seemed to believe they could work better if training of adults were handled completely within the education bureaucracy, that CETA and manpower were political and being political they were somehow less desirable than service deliverers completely under the jurisdiction of the state department of education or the division of adult education or vocational education. Of course we met others who did not fit this image.

B. Style and the Nature of the Education/Manpower Partnership.

Because the policy process is a complex one, and because decision-making can be very subtle as well as straight-forward, how the manpower establishment chose to deal with another agency—education, here—could have important consequences for any partnership and the role of classroom training in a manpower program. (If manpower consciously chose to create a policy environment so inhospitable to education that working together was impossible, it would be silly to point to education and argue they eschew a role in CETA.) We sought therefore to ask all our respondents in a very direct way whether a given prime sponsor "...[had] a strategy for dealing with education and educators over the years?" We also asked respondents whether they thought such a strategy had changed over time. It was important during the field research to press this
issue with all respondents since, the reader may recall, we argued earlier that decisionmaking strategies would account for variation in the use of vocational education/classroom training. We hypothesized, for example, that the more voc ed was involved, the greater the role of classroom training in Title I programming, and conversely the smaller the part played by the educators, the less the service would show up in Title I program mix. We had no data to get at this proposition from our earlier CETA research, so the point of this question in the field now takes on added importance.

Ohio case studies indicate that early prime sponsor strategy had been "dictatorial" in a few cases, placating in others. But nowhere was there an absence of mistrust; relations were generally formal; both sides were cautious of the other. Also, again speaking very generally, relations seemed to improve over time. Primes have reduced the sense of control over the relationship, an atmosphere of less suspicion seems to permeate, and day to day relations seem less formal. Coincidental with this relaxation in interaction between manpower and education has come the gradual increase in the role of classroom training and voc ed in Title I. And if this change in tone and strategy is not a sufficient condition for increased classroom training in CETA, it probably must be a necessary condition at least. Our summary above, however, camouflages a great deal of local variation about the sense of strategy.

Greene County CETA

In Greene County the prime's strategy for dealing with voc ed has changed very little. One could fairly say it has gone from good to fair and back and forth over the years as issues came and went. Greene County
Ceta needed the JVS people from the first, and they probably always will. Both have acted as equals and both respect the other, recognizing, however, that each must answer to a different master and that this creates some tension from time to time. The smalltown rural nature of the prime reifies this supportive style. Greene may differ from other sites in one important way: as the CETA staff becomes more professional and experienced and as CETA becomes more institutionalized, the CETA staff appears to be treating the schools more as vendors and/or equals now, and this probably bothers school people who were accustomed to special status before.

**Columbus/Franklin Co.**

Columbus officials generally revealed contempt for the public schools when conceptualized as manpower partners. They argued that CPS people were out of tune with the labor market, were only interested in providing pre-packaged training that called for no major planning or development on their part. Staff pointed out cases where CPS had prepared classes of LPN's who couldn't be licensed in Ohio because state law required a high school diploma, a fact CPS didn't realize. Similiarly CETA pointed out to CPS classes in food services where graduates couldn't be employed because minors couldn't "wait tables" in establishments serving liquor, another fact CPS hadn't checked before they set up the course.

Staff also pointed out that CPS typically would never inconvenience themselves nor would they provide CETA services at rates the school board paid. This all adds up to the impression at CETA that the relationship with CETA had been one-sided, selfish, not client-oriented and characterized by gouging on CPS's part. The city tends to treat them this way even today if we accept the staff portrayal. (In fairness one staffer painted
a very complimentary picture of CPS, but I believe that view is at odds with empirical reality.)

School officials did not admit to this characterization nor did they admit to shabby treatment which one might expect if CETA staff did indeed treat them shabbily.

School people pointed out lack of trust, and skinflint attitudes about costs and salaries as well as a tendency to have all agreements in writing plus a tendency to go to the top when problems developed. They added, however, that all this has eased if it hasn't disappeared. They did not suggest CETA treated them with contempt.

School people were anxious to point out that CETA was always acting as if they knew what was best for the students, and CPS guards the "fiction very strenuously that they and only they have the revealed truth about what works in the education process. They always bulk at CETA's efforts to dictate terms. (I do not think the schools are held accountable for their behavior as CETA is by the Department of Labor so they have trouble seeing the need for CETA's demands.)

Licking/Delaware Cnsrt.

CETA staff in Licking/Delaware characterized their strategy for dealing with education as placating in the early days to supplicant, almost pleading with them more recently.

Demand for voc ed services so outstrips the supply in the areas that school officials can assume as unavailable posture with impunity. I was unable to elicit meaningful responses for educators on this question; "It didn't compute!" is the only explanation I can suggest for their unresponsiveness. I would submit that the question, "What has been the prime sponsor's strategy for dealing with education..." simply had no meaning or it
imputed calculations on CETA's part they wouldn't admit.

The State

Perhaps the most complete and most interesting response came from State Voc Ed respondents who, incidently, seemed the most politically savvy of all education respondents. This respondent was the only educator I encountered who--while he didn't absolve CETA from transgressions--admitted that politics played a part in the program, that perhaps it had to, and suggested education had failed in at least one way: in leadership from the top down where the United States Office of Education continues to resist a policy response to programs like CETA that can guide locals in their response and actions with local prime sponsors.

If we call this the "state response", we should note some obvious points within it: the state asserts it, not CETA, is cognizant of industry needs. That is an area of disagreement of major consequence with CETA. CETA claims that education ignores business demands. The two illustrations were used in Columbus to make precisely that point (the nurses and the waitresses). The state talks about "education"; it refuses to consider some lesser thing--training, for example, which CETA and others would love to define as something less, something more like a bare-bones, short term response to local business demands given the character of the residual work force realistically available to fill this demand. The state and most educators I spoke with resist this conceptualization. It is like Detroit's long term refusal to accept that people need small, efficient cars. They have too much invested in the status quo--the full sized auto--to consider a small efficient one until an outsider responds to that market and captures it in very short order.
In a way, then, because education has been protected from competition, these market responses have not been allowed to develop, and neither CETA nor the potential client has been able to affect an in-house conversion. What is peculiar though, given this state view, is that one, either locals have not perceived CETA as treating them especially poorly or that local educators, due to some perverse sense of decorum, felt it necessary to deny poor treatment to me to preserve the illusion that there is no conflict. There is conflict; moreover, much of it is latent. It could be much, much more intense if it were led and focused; my interviews convinced me of that.

I believe at this point that the decentralized nature of CETA administration and the generally decentralized nature of much of public education allows a fragile, uneasy peace between principles where there could be much hostility because the chief actors are also neighbors, citizens of the same community, go to the same churches, and so forth. Philosophically and politically though I believe the two groups tend to be very, very different however.

B. 4. Local Support of Vocational Education in Manpower.

The field research conducted in Ohio found no appreciable differences in perception by area or by actor. Most, and this included educators and CETA staff, were not aware of any salient critic or champion of the education people except education, of course, "tooting its own horn". I was surprised by this "non-finding". In Columbus we learned about one powerful CETA policymaker's guerilla warfare against CPS, but that anomaly is just that; it seems to have no wider application or significance.

Only the state officials at voc ed differed from local respondents.
State people were explicit, "Yes, prime sponsors were generally criti-
cal, and minority groups were generally slanted toward either OJT or
a job." This was the type of response I had anticipated before going
into the field, but I did not encounter it except at the state. (It would
be very difficult to prove, and certainly beyond the scope of this paper,
but I still maintain that educators tend to discount, and under report
incidents of critical treatment and conflict, that this is somehow al-
ways bad. But, if we relied on what the school people claimed, there
was no palpable effort to limit classroom training or voc ed in local
decisionmaking.)

How this sentiment registered with the state but not with the
locals is difficult to reconcile unless we are witnessing a "little
groups or neighbors" phenomenon in local MAC's that is less effective
at the state level. Or we might be witnessing what I earlier noted:
state people seem more atuned to political subtleties while local school
folk seem loathe to admit to conflict, criticism and the like.

Our field research in Greene, Columbus/Franklin County and Licking
Delaware reveal in general participation of education in local manpower
programs has been conceptualized by education administrators as a pos-
sible way to augment, enhance, supplement local efforts. It has not
been seen as a partnership involving an ante of dollars from education
to help finance an effort shared with another public agency. Indeed,
when OSU, Newark discovered that Licking/Delaware would actually ques-
tion administrative charges, development cost, and ask for a hardnosed
accounting of dollars, officials decided to drop out. Educators even
conspired to avoid bidding against each other on RFP's in Licking/Del-
aware.
The generalization about little or no financial support holds up well for two of the three sites, Greene and Licking/Delaware. But Columbus posed interpretive problems. The City of Columbus and CPS more specifically had been unable to increase funding of public schools through tax increases since 1968, so by 1975 CPS was already in a bit of a financial bind. But we encountered conflicting assessments within the city's manpower department about the extent of CPS's in-kind contributions. Half the CETA staff claimed CPS made virtually no free will contribution of any significance; the other half pointed to very, very modest in-kind contributions the withholding of which could only be seen as niggardly and as evidence of ill will toward the program. Most pointed out that what largess the City got from education came from the state or from the division of adult education. None, they were careful to point out, came from the Columbus Board of Education. This in-kind contribution, they say, consisted chiefly of curriculum, counseling, and a learning lab. Local school officials expanded upon this assessment a bit: they pointed to self-improvement centers, programs for special needs, the handicapped, plus spillover from the adult education programs begun in Columbus in 1965. (Most of these programs and contributions were from state funds and programs, not from local free will contributions.)

What struck this student as at least as interesting as CPS's failure to support CETA in any significant way was CPS's apparent unwillingness to really support its adult education program with local funds. The public schools, at least in Columbus, have a very traditional notion of mission and clientele, getting kids through school, K through 12, on one strictly linear model. This concludes our field inquiries
into early CETA-era decisionmaking with respect to classroom training in Title I program mix. Some summing up follows.

Has our field inquiries helped confirm or deny our original hypothesis based on decisionmaking theory? On the strength of the three cases, a preliminary answer is yes. Education was adequately represented on early MAC's. In some cases they dominated. Where education representatives were absent, it was usually at their own pleasure: OSUN, for example, withdrew because the MAC was viewed as a poor organization.

In all cases education representatives were on the MAC's at the request of CETA. No MAC sought to limit education representation at least among the three cases.

If education exhibits an institutional attitude toward CETA and CETA clientele in the period under question, it differed from the one they had toward their traditional client groups and partners. Schools considered CETA clients as problems, treated CETA enrollees differently if clients were identified as being from CETA. Schools sought to provide services already developed to CETA for a fee; they were reticent to develop specific curricula tailored to CETA or CETA clients. Schools knew only too well that this clientele was a collection of their failures, and this created a defensive posture from the first days of interaction.

Prime sponsor strategy for dealing with education over the years has been varied. It ranged from placating supplicant to purely professional to suspicious and hostile though on balance CETA has been professional, formal, businesslike, treating education like any other
subcontractor or service vendor. That stance has been interpreted as "critical" by educators who seem typically unaccustomed to dealing with criticism, strict financial accountability and performance contracting, standard tools of the trade elsewhere in public bureaucracy.

Most respondents could not point to specific critics or detractors who sought to minimize the role of classroom training or voc ed in CETA programs, while many people pointed out that education did a very good job of promoting itself and its preformance. And some CETA staff were quick to say that CETA primes needed the schools desperately especially in the early days when no one was expert in manpower.

Finally our inquiries show that the public schools did not, in any important way, make significant local free will financial contributions to the early CETA/Education partnership. Some sites may have benefitted from token in-kind contributions, but most in-kind commitments came from sources other than locally generated ones. I would conclude that the education establishment had ample opportunity to influence, participate, contribute to local programs, policy and the like to the extent that local policy boards, MAC's, were influential. That is, educators were not, by and large, systematically kept out or discouraged from policy participation. If they failed to have influence or to participate, they must share a great deal of the blame themselves.


We have hypothesized, as many others have, that man and his institutions tend to be creatures of habit, that other things being equal, we stick with the "tried and true", eschewing major changes of course or abrupt shifts of emphasis except when compelling pressure or obvious failure suggests or
demands we must. In the present instance, like the incrementalists, we posited that educators who historically were somewhat involved in manpower, adult education or local decisionmaking on advisory councils will be much more likely to support positively or participate actively in a new CETA program by virtue of their prior experience predisposing them in that direction. Further, of the three sites in which we did field work, we would expect more from Columbus than from either of the others because of the skill center's having been located here prior to CETA.

C.,1. History as a Predictor of More Recent School/CETA Relations.

**Columbus and Franklin Co.**

Columbus and Franklin County respondents agreed that the present relationship between CETA and education is based upon MDTA participation. The CPS's were "the major part of the local manpower system under MDTA and EOA". So dealing with manpower was not a new thing to all school people as CETA unfolded though some caution is needed as we portray the breadth of the early linkages. When we talk about pre-CETA and early CETA linkages between education and manpower we are actually talking about one link: the bond between E.S. (the employment service) and the skill center, or more generally manpower and local adult education. There were 17 superintendents and almost as many lay policy boards in the county, but really only CPS's division of adult education had any early pre-CETA connection or involvement in manpower. Also State Vocational Education pushed its interests locally, but there seem to have been no other links among county jurisdictions or among school boards. When locals say, "We built on that relationship" they aren't really lying. The early relationships were few, fragile and some would say at root, parasitic; and if we examine what we had in the mid-seventies and now in the early eighties,
we find that the scope of activity hasn't widened much: adult education remains the principle agent CETA deals with, the rest of the system being content to leave the dubious venture right there.

Licking/Delaware Cos.

The early situation in Licking/Delaware is perplexing. There were two currents of opinion. One claimed links were absent; the other claimed linkages have always been there and have gotten better over time.

Those who claim no links point to two causes: funding in the early days was "terribly fragmented" and ES was not very interested. Both these conditions could, I believe, explain such a condition, but neither suggests how we deal with the contradictory finding also widely held that early links were there and have been improving. My conversations with staff and school people suggest that notwithstanding this assessment, the present posture of OSUN and vocational education toward CETA would imply at the very least that linkages appear to be deteriorating. But I am simply unable to refute the assertion that early links were significant. Certainly we could not build a case that argues that present day relations between CETA and the education community are healthy, growing and improving; and much of this results from a long line of relations predating CETA. The situation in Licking/Delaware today seems weak, deteriorating, verging on hostile one sometimes suspects. Field research in Licking/Delaware did little to strengthen our incremental hypotheses at least in terms of answers to the questions posed.

Greene County CETA

Greene County, like Licking/Delaware, does not square closely to the incremental arguments about policy development. Pre-CETA and early CETA the OIC had the lion's share of classroom training in the county. The
Vocational school opened in 1976 and gradually displaced OIC over the next few years. A history of pre-CETA relations and links did not pave the way for a very active and involved role for vocational education in CETA in Greene County. (Though the opening of the JVS may have been just the "extraordinary event" that theorists use to explain those rare occasions when incrementalism isn't operative. That logic could salvage the incremental argument for Greene County if one were determined to do so.) Nevertheless in Greene County the JVS became the sole classroom training provider because local high schools were not interested and JVS proved it could deliver the best classroom training at the lowest price.

As a predictor of present levels of participation, a prime's history of manpower/education links seems to be a very unsatisfactory construct. But we assert this on very thin evidence. In Columbus early links are followed by very narrow and limited links today. That does square with the incremental view. In Licking/Delaware mixed responses leave us doubtful about the actual state of affairs. I tend to side with those who claim the weak links. That being the case, we find a similar condition today which, like Columbus, at least does not contradict incremental theory. Nevertheless a current of opinion in Licking/Delaware argues for strong early links though they do not elaborate the specifics. If that is a true characterization, it is followed by deteriorating bonds now—a clear enough counter instance to the hypothesis we sought to argue.

Finally Greene County's case of no ties formal or informal with educational institutions followed by ever increasing links after the creation of the JVS suggests that incrementalism simply does not apply in some cases. Here where OIC, a community based organization, is gradually displaced by JVS, we seem to have happened upon a situation the
particulars of which are controlled by personalities, the absence of many alternative vendors, plus the clear effects of performance--the JVS was readily able to show the economies of scale and the ability to offer greater course selection than OIC could ever develop. Modes of decision making or tendencies to prefer marginal adjustments and adaptations to the status quo seem simply inappropriate as an explanation. I certainly go beyond the data, and the data here are very thin, with this assertion, yet experience informs it: though we don't have a wealth of empirical evidence, I suspect we will find a similar condition like the one discovered in Greene County at other rural, small town dominated jurisdictions other things being equal. I would submit that the "friends and neighbors" environment as well as the paucity of policy choices in such settings dictate another approach toward public policymaking, maybe more like the town meeting models of "fictional" New England. But that too is an issue better developed elsewhere.

If the historical relationship between education and manpower does not improve our account of the varied use of classroom training, could the communities' idle plant account for the fact that some jurisdictions invest heavily in classroom training while others do not. That is, will we find that those prime sponsors that devote large portions of their Title I budget to classroom training are also communities whose school systems are clearly underutilized or inadequately funded with local tax dollars to operate at maximum levels of production?

C.2. The Local Economy and Community Dependence on CETA.

Licking/Delaware

Responses in Licking/Delaware indicated curious variation: within
within the consortium we found one city with some excess plant/services and the other major partner with near saturation.

In Delaware the vocational education establishment was consistently underenrolled in two areas, building maintenance and food services. CETA staff told us school people were willing to deal with CETA on these areas because they did want to increase enrollments. Curiously both school people and the CETA staff agreed a community demand for people to do these jobs existed. But the slots went unfilled. CETA claimed it placed them in a curious position: for the most part they couldn't pry slots from the schools, but they also tended not to push training in these areas because of the low skill, low pay associated with them.

In Licking/Delaware the JVS and other institutions serving adults were filled up. This condition has prevailed in the county for years, limiting CETA access from the first. The words of a local educator warrant repeating:

In Licking County it [the JVS] has been filled to saturation. There's not much left over for CETA programs. The JVS isn't able to help CETA out even at night now.

We had 10,000 adults in the JVS, COTC and OSUN in the adult and night programs. We couldn't do it. Plus CETA clients are largely undesirable in comparison with other students. Moreover CETA doesn't want to pay administrative service costs on their programs. That's a very sore point with us...

This condition of very limited access squares with the trend data we presented on Licking/Delaware. It has the lowest enrollment and expenditure data of the three sites and the data are slightly below national averages as well. It would seem, therefore, that we may have good reason to suspect that conditions of saturation with local school systems limit the amount of classroom training a prime can include in its Title I program. But we
also see that where slack exists, schools seem willing to negotiate though popular demand for the slots as well as CETA bias against low skill low wage employment may make much of this inconsequential. Whatever the nature of the link between slack school plant and classroom training mix in local Title I program, in Licking/Delaware even today the only classroom training with the JVS is conducted on a very small scale and off site, i.e., in other county owned buildings. What that means, therefore, is that JVS in Licking/Delaware has become simply a pass through for CETA dollars rather than a committed service provider.

Greene County CETA

Greene County, like Licking County, was full during the day from the first day JVS opened its doors. But unlike Licking County, Greene County had truly interested school people who actually wanted to extend the mission of JVS. One CETA staffer put it this way:

The school was full during the day. So our courses were just in the evening. But Voc Ed was interested from the start and set up courses for us, and we enhanced their adult education department. But in Greene County the Voc Ed efforts were not just out for the money. They were interested in being of concrete help to the CETA people who could be served. And we were honest when we discussed matters with the administration. We put it all on the table.

This particular respondent—knowing or not—may have struck on the distinguishing feature of Greene County's symbiotic relationship between the schools and CETA: "But in Greene County the Voc Ed efforts were not just out for the money." In the case of Greene, which could have claimed no room as Licking did, an individual exerted personalized leadership bringing the JVS into the policy area because of his own values.

So little plant slack at JVS may serve as a convenient excuse to justify nonparticipation as some would argue occurred in Licking County,
but saturation is not so insurmountible a problem as to completely rule out a role of adult education in CETA when school officials are personally committed to expanding the mission of vocational education as Greene Co. demonstrates quite well.

**Columbus and Franklin Co.**

In 1977 CETA did a survey of vocational education facilities and plant to determine once and for all whether there was a shortage of people slots and plant, but no one could recall what the study concluded. The impetus for the study was the prevalent view that some shortage or saturation existed which limited the extent to which CPS and others could respond to CETA needs. At the time that was the hue and cry, but no one could bring any data to bear.

CPS officials both at the Board of Education and at the skill center have unanimously maintained that the school plant has been jammed as long as anyone can remember. But the call for the study suggests that people were using the full argument pre-1977, and CPS, notwithstanding the outcome, continues to call things jammed today. What this impression or actual state of affairs has meant for the capital city is that adult education is conducted at the Starling Street Skill Center, Bellows and North Skill Center, not at the four vocational high schools. And adult education, by and large, is funded by nonlocal funds—some state money, some federal dollars and lots of CETA dollars. Local officials have successfully used the full argument to keep adult education out of the secondary schools in the city and to justify little or no local financial support for whatever adult education takes place in the city.

Though my systematic and tenacious efforts to uncover any data series
profiling either locally or at other levels the actual state of affairs of public education in terms of gross plant use produced virtually nothing, the argument continues to be used for a variety of reasons that schools are unable to respond to nonmainstream conceptualizations of the education mission. And no one is able to challenge this position for lack of data, even though the lack of data never seems to stop school people form using that excuse to justify their stand toward CETA.

What our field inquiries have revealed about the economic argument that CETA will be able to purchase more classroom training when public schools have excess plant is that interview techniques are not the best way to determine plant use in local schools. It is easy to say that "we're filled" as a justification for little participation or as a ploy to make it easy for public schools to respond as freely or as tightly as individual administrator bias will allow; and in the absence of empirical data on used space, plant, personnel, and the like it is well-ney impossible to effectively counter such arguments. These data, and much more, ought to be systematically collected for state and local policymakers on a regular basis. It remains a datum for which we have no reliable measure; therefore, it can only remain as a logical hypothesis that cannot be evaluated empirically, at least not in Ohio today.

C., 3. The Perceptions of Classroom Training as a Manpower Tool.

Among all respondents and across all sites the response was nearly unanimous: the modal opinion was that classroom training was a very effective manpower tool, second only to on-the-job training. Lacking variability the concept cannot be used here as an explanation for prime sponsors' varied use of classroom training. But this widespread view shared by
Snedeker and Snedeker (1978) suggests that one needs to know if careful comparison studies of effectiveness—on whatever criteria one might offer—have been done to confirm this commonly held assumption. These data did not exist during 1975-77.

Most of the literature of the seventies claimed classroom training and OJT were the most successful tools in the CETA arsenal. But that is chiefly based upon placement rates. Cost, entry wage rate, retention are just a few criteria which ordinarily were not included in these summary judgments. In fact, most of the rankings offered by respondents were just calls from the sidelines, i.e., assessments based upon casual evaluation. More rigorous evaluations have only really begun lately. But the main point is local actors give classroom training high marks. They believe it is good. That should weigh heavily in decisions about program mix. It probably does. But while good marks for classroom training doubtless affect demand for the services; the same assessment does not mean an adequate supply will be forthcoming. Moreover, the whole question about the appropriateness of the classroom training experience goes largely unexplored for the range of potential target groups eligible for CETA; that is, given the differences among classes of people and altered labor markets which are spawning increased unemployment, what solutions are best for the manifold groups of displaced and unemployed people? Empirical literature cannot at this time hope to serve as a guide to practitioners.

C. 4. The Issues of Control, Accountability and Professionalism.

Nearly everyone agreed these matters were of some concern to educators in the early days of CETA. Variation occurred in responses which sought to characterize the centrality of this matter in decisionmaking and especially decisions made by educators over the degree of involvement with
CETA they would countenance.

State officials probably represent a fairly accurate summary of responses gathered from educators in the three field sites, and I suspect this state perspective probably captures the sentiment of most educators across the country,

Yes, we had turf flareups. Education looked at what they (the educators) developed as education programs. But prime sponsors thought they (the educators) developed their (CETA) programs. They (CETA) came in requiring evaluation, monitoring, this and that, interrupting training, anything because these are their classes. This was a barrier. We were not opposed to their coming into the schools, but they didn't arrange this in advance or consider how their absence (the students) might disrupt some planned activity. Most of this has been worked out now.

On evaluation by CETA the state view seems like a very good proxy for individual positions voiced at the local level.

You always have evaluation. But with non-educators doing it, they look at it differently. Being an outsider is one of the problems. The structure of the evaluation is different from education's. Under CETA they do individual evaluation of individuals. That is much greater...allowances...more of a portfolio on each trainee than we do K through 12 or adult. With the sic per cent money...we continue to work on this. We tell local voc ed people, we tell them, "you must provide this information."

Since there is almost no variation in educators' positions on this matter, there is no call to look to concurrent variation on the dependent variable at least not crosssectionally. But because almost all the educators agreed that these tensions have systematically abated over time, it could be useful to look at the change in funding and enrollments from 1975 to 1977 since presumably as these attitudes and behaviors lesson we should be able to see an increase in values of the dependent variable, ceteris paribus.
That the trend data move in the predicted direction in all the cases under study adds support to our theorizing earlier. That state of affairs should not be surprising; the logic is compelling: as animosity and suspicion subside between two reluctant partners, cooperation and participation ought to improve other things being equal. The empirical data here do not challenge that proposition in the abstract or in the simple empirical world of nose counts. Moreover, that educators in Greene County typically made the least of the tension between the two institutions in this shotgun marriage and that the Greene County data epitomize the predicted values of the dependent variable gives us added confidence in our otherwise bald assertion that indeed there is some reasonable evidence supporting our hypothesis albeit propped up on the strength of three sites.

The positions uttered by noneducators did not, on balance, contradict the schoolmen; rather, they tended to paint a more favorable picture of CETA's "reasonableness" under this fragile relation and perhaps a more vivid if not hyperbolic rendition of education's reluctance to "submit" to Department of Labor/Prime Sponsor supervision and control.

Everyone told us what we knew before: schoolmen's attitudes toward any sort of outside control and supervision may not have been so vehement as to completely choke out the possibility of a coupled task, yet it was sufficiently salient to limit the degree of involvement as least early on, and all involved personnel in the present field sites tended to support this assertion. If one were, therefore, determined to engineer some sort of joint public attack on serious, persistent social pathology which resides within the domain of two rather suspicious (perhaps jealous) institutions, he ought to take very careful note of the high probability of this
sort of friction and design an implementation plan which includes the means and the time to permit some trust to develop between the erstwhile autonomous institutions. That being impossible, for whatever reasons, he ought to be prepared for a rather lengthy period of suspicious adjustment which could translate into suboptimal production from the new partnership until the trust can develop in the doing.

C. 5. Historical Commitment to the Disadvantaged.

Columbus/Franklin Co. and Licking/Delaware

We were unable to determine for Greene County the extent to which the local school officials and local schools as an institution had sought historically to serve the disadvantaged segments of that local community, but both Columbus and Licking/Delaware yielded similar results; hence, we deal with both summarily here.

CETA people and elected officials tended to believe that if we limited the local commitment to include only local responses which involved some support with local funds, then local schools and local education decision-makers have not made a serious free will commitment to serving the disadvantaged people. One CETA staff person excused this lack of action by saying

Columbus Public Schools can always argue "no money" and get away with it. You get into a trade off: the kids v. young adults, that is people between 18 and 21—even 16 and 21! There are no services to this group which are not federally funded...

No one among our respondents could summon an example of commitment to the disadvantaged that did not depend \textit{in toto} on nonlocal funding support.

We must be careful in interpreting these findings. It would be too easy to leap to the facile conclusion that the absence of behavioral
evidence—local funds in the strict sense—is proof positive that institutional education has no genuine interest in serving disadvantaged CETA clientele. This may be true, but responses here do not come close to documenting that state of affairs if for no other reason than because the variation in state law defining or limiting the obligation of school funds among the 50 states is indeed very, very complex and varied itself. Moreover, Ohio due to a number of peculiarities—political, economic and historical—has been very niggardly in its funding of primary, secondary and vocational education over the recent history of the state. That creates an atmosphere and attitude of scarcity and no school system in the state has actually been funded at levels to allow them to be generous to the adults. To do so in such a setting is literally to take from the traditional consumers of Ohio public education—school children—the conventional in school population. We cannot know how local decisionmakers would act under conditions of relative plenty. It may be fair to assert that given the modal response in two of our field sites, that there seems to be some tendency under conditions of local financial scarcity for school people to give adult service low priority. And that perhaps is as much as we dare claim: when we ask educators and manpower people in Ohio (where funding of education is decidedly lean) what sort of local, free will support the schools have given the manpower mission, we observe almost no evidence of financial support when we limit our inquiry to local funds. Unfortunately, if we look at attitudes expressed by school people, at the history of involvement of public schools in community problems like employment and training, at roles on planning councils, we can not ignore the pattern. On balance it seems the scale leans toward the negative side
more than toward dead center or the positive. (Thus one cannot dis-
miss, I believe, the arguments that CETA has not been offering class-
room training at rates this public would consume possibly because the
education response, supply, has been decidedly weak.)

Lest our interpretations accounting for the suboptimal contribution
of education in local manpower policy depend upon some mistaken notion
that it results from the simple bias of the collective preferences of
schoolmen, we sought to determine whether peculiarities in the manner of
funding education in Ohio might contribute to the apparent reticence of
education and manpower to work closely together. Issues of certification
for example, make it difficult for education to respond freely or quickly
to consumer demand or business demand. Moreover, laws protecting educa-
tors from dismissal due to changes in the make up of the state’s economy,
say from an agricultural to a more mixed economy, also limit what school
people can do: a school board cannot fire a vocational agriculture instruc-
tor when the proportion of people involved in agriculture comes down, for
example. Clearly there are numerous constraints on system response which
one can think of before he even consults the law. One CETA official gave
this possibility some thought; she remarked

Again I return to the different planning cycles as a
key feature. Plus the state has a very cumbersome
system of accounting and reporting on six per cent
money. Some kind of centralized funding and adminis-
tration on the local level would facilitate working
together. Going through the State just takes too
long for everyone.

Many people have been decrying the incongruence of the businessman's
planning cycle, the standard school year September to June, the Federal
fiscal year, the state fiscal calendar. This respondent probably hit
upon a very important barrier that needs to be reduced if any effort at cooperation can be pulled off in timely, effective fashion.

The second point, likewise, is an old one: under our system of checks and balances, limited government, and shared responsibility we create interdependent units which, to guard the public interest however that is defined, set up elaborate, rigid systems of accountability which harden into ends themselves.

C., 6. The Classroom Model and Different Types of People.

If respondents found classroom training more appropriate for certain types of people, we were hoping our research might evoke several interpretations; but in general respondents all interpreted the question in the same way. Typically we did not find clear cut differences between educators and CETA staff though we did encounter contradictions and variations of emphasis.

In general the schools do view their service as fixed, expecting CETA somehow to send them people who can deal with this fixed treatment. They do not view the client as the "given" to whom the schools must adapt. Whether they must view the matter that way is another question, and it call into question the philosophical underpinning of education (public education) which we cannot go into here. But apart from the "correctness" of the schools' "fixed" response, I believe it is fair to say that that posture does limit the school's ability to be responsive to CETA demands. One CETA staffer observed

Voc Ed is effective when the client is ready. Therefore you need very good testing and assessment before placement. We also need pre-training. And the colleges and universities in the area seem like the best vendor for that service.

Even under CETA auspices schools seem to insist on a standard article as
their client. Maybe they know their own limits, but the clear implication coming through the majority of expressed opinions among school people in the Ohio sites is that success is completely defined in terms if the schools' batting average, and of course maybe CETA and the Department of Labor through their own incentive systems created that though the dropout expulsion, suspension records of standard high schools could suggest the attitude existed long before CETA contracts. Perhaps the CETA staffer hit on a better solution than going to the local schools: seek the "braver" practitioners, the college faculties and departments to provide services to highly disadvantaged clientele. That decision doubtless opens numerous other problems that relying on the local schools does not, proximity as just one obvious type of problem, as well as less visible academic and research agendas (which may not square with CETA's or the client's). Whatever the solution, most respondents agreed that classroom training and voc ed is not for everyone.

D. The Pre-CETA Program History of the Field Sites.

As we argued elsewhere, the rationale for inquiry about policy and practices pre-CETA is based upon an implicit incrementalist bias underlying much of our theoretical approach to explanation. Most of the probes and responses building the bulk of this section have been framed earlier into incremental hypotheses.

Licking/Delaware

We learned that in Licking County and in Delaware County in the days and years before CETA both counties had virtually no classroom training as a manpower tool. Work experience was the sole tool used, and it was provided under contract from the local CAP agencies. When CETA came on the scene, the new administration encountered resistance and problems
because they sought to alter this state of affairs by changing the exclusive use of work experience to a mix of services. There was then no clear tradition of classroom training in Licking or Delaware counties, and curiously the primes' mid-seventies record, while roughly similar to the national trend data, remained a grudgingly difficult service to get from local vendors. We are not saying here that "history" is the "cause" for more recent reticence from the voc ed community to provide classroom training to CETA. Rather we are saying one, demand for classroom training is very high in the primes. And high demand for the inschool population plus the absence of a clear community tradition of using classroom training as a weapon to combat unemployment among the out-of-school population have worked together to continue that pattern for the out-of-school population in the area.

**Columbus and Franklin County**

All the old timers at CETA agreed that CETA became a copy of the manifold programs that predated the Act in Columbus. Some local officials were adamant that many CETA decisionmakers were anxious to dump everything that was in place at CETA's inception. But those who advised caution seem to have won out. Early CETA officials chose, after much debate, to distribute the new Title I largess in rough proportion to the perennial status quo until they were able to independently determine what served their objectives best. So the in-place collection of services became the model for early CETA Title I mix. This included a substantial commitment to classroom training which had been under way at the MDTA skill center since 1962.

**Greene County CETA**

Greene County relied exclusively on the OIC to deal with the problems of manpower before CETA. The OIC was the only agency in the areas, and its
sole solution to the stubborn problems of unemployment was classroom training. CETA pointed out that the area has a long tradition of relying on classroom training to solve problems. We can see that after Greene formed its own prime sponsorship in 1976 that tradition continued in 1976 and 1977 and not surprisingly it persists into the '80's.

**D.1. Making Local Manpower Policy.**

In Greene County respondents tended to agree that the OIC stepped in and filled a vacuum. Since it was the "only game in town", it assumed all manpower programs. Its own expertise was slim. Classroom training was all it claimed to do. And as we learned it didn't do that too well since the JVS assumed all classroom training in two years once it became operative.

People in Licking/Delaware told me that before CETA manpower policy was not set locally. The CAP and OBES made decisions. There was no coordination between operations and no policy per se. Hence what passed as a policy response was assembled in centralized, closed settings.

In Columbus it appears that the largest, wealthiest, most prestigious organizations made decisions with little or no challenge. These were the CPS and the OBES. It also seems that any opposition was fragmented and therefore no effective challenge before CETA and the innovation of the manpower advisory council. Manpower was not an important, controversial matter salient to the public at the time so the decisions about how to manage these problems were not decided in public forums or with wide public participation beyond the views of a few elected school board members.

What we seem to be finding, which is no news to anyone familiar with evolution of manpower policy in this country, is that before CETA manpower
was not a local policy issue subject to community control and debate. It was not a policy area in the strict sense at all since CETA was a first attempt to pull the disperate pieces of a manpower morass into some integrated fabric that might become a policy.

How issues of employment and training got handled is shrouded to most local informants now. Most know what decisions were made and were not made in their communities and they weren't made in public forums. Early decisions were reached in private or at least out of view of the "wider" public. That is, elected officials were not involved in manpower decisionmaking and were not held responsible for those decisions at election time. Rather, less public, less visible people—career bureaucrats—decided without the give and take of pluralistic participation what would be done with federal dollars earmarked for jobs and training programs.

In general the lesson of the 60's did not rub off on the policy makers of the 70's, at least not at the grassroots level. With very few exceptions no lessons were taught to local officials about the problems of manpower. What predispositions, biases, preferences and corporate reservoir of knowledge existed, tended to reside—pre CETA—outside local communities with officials who were virtually invisible or of little interest to most of the public.

In Greene County and Licking/Delaware consortium the role of local organizations in decisionmaking was very limited. Only a CBO like the OIC had any regular role. In Columbus, due to the importance of the MDTA influence, CPS had a rather satisfactory relationship with OBES and the State Vocational Education officials. The Urban League and a handful of CBO's participated to some extent, but CPS was a major force due
to its management of the MDTA skill center.

Generally it seems that in Ohio we find weak or little involve-
ment of public school systems except in the seven MDTA skill center cities. 
This seems likely for the reasons stated above and for at least one ad-
ditional reason: until state government launched a statewide campaign to 
construct joint vocational high schools throughout the state, most public 
schools systems were either too hard pressed to serve the in-school popu-
lation to be able to attend to any out of school clientele. That ap-
ppears to be the case with Greene, Licking and Delaware counties.

Since most people suggested that manpower policy per se probably 
didn't exist at the grassroots i.e. towns and cities before CETA, the 
role played by education would doubtless have to consist chiefly as that 
of service deliverer rather than policymaker or architect. Yet because 
no single agency evaluated schools on performance even as regularly or as 
systematically as now occurs, all assessments must be seat of the pants, 
at least so far as non-educators are concerned. In Ohio, lacking a long 
and strong history of vocational training pre-CETA, we must say that res-
ponse had to be very limited almost by necessity. There was very little 
excess plant, resources, personnel, generosity to go around. There was 
well nigh no leadership to exert strong persistent focused pressure on 
the schools to participate, and as we have seen, schoolmen had all the 
excuses imaginable to justify at least an ambivalent attitude toward what 
they saw as a response well beyond their traditional mission. The schools 
in doing little or nothing (except in skill center sites) probably did as 
much as we had any right to expect from them. Indeed creating CETA and 
the five per cent money was clearly one formal act recognizing the paucity
of vocational education involvement and the popular desire for more as this new program developed and unfolded in 400-plus communities across the country.
Chapter VII. Summary and Conclusions

In this last chapter we plan to summarize and assess all the evidence collected throughout the study; comment on the validation of our model; draw some conclusions based upon the research per se, and step beyond the immediate project at hand to some general observations and prescriptions that are clearly based on the research yet perhaps go one step beyond it.

If the "amount of variance explained" is inappropriate in the present instance as the criterion to use for assessing the value of our findings, then we think the analyst must look at the total reservoir of evidence to make an evaluation of these findings. A checklist showing graphically the combined contributions of a set of research foci on hypothesized relationships plus the analyst's informed judgment may be instructive to policymakers and others who have some interest in the issues broached here. We want to perform this needed integrative exercise of balancing the evidence we have pulled together through a variety of sources and means through a comprehensive table summarizing three main pieces of evidence. One conceptualization of this task thinks of the job as weighing first the available literature and logical support for our hypotheses; second adding to it the contribution of the statistical analysis and third weighing the strength of the evidence from the field inquiries specifically for this dissertation into one set of summary judgments.
Table 7.1 Comprehensive Summary of Research Findings with Assessment of Overall Support for Research Hypotheses Based on Three Interrelated Sources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Literature and Logical Support</th>
<th>Mershon Study Support</th>
<th>Field Study Support</th>
<th>Summary and Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rate of Unemployment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character of the work force</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Growth</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-CETA History and Experience</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure of Local Government</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Mix</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Finance and Fiscal Condition</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of Facilities</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Involvement I</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Client Characteristics</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classroom Training and Voc Ed Service Deliverer Attitudes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Sponsor Staff and Executive Attitudes</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC, Political Official Attitudes</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business Involvement II</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Client Characteristics</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Literature and Logical Support</td>
<td>Mershon Study Support</td>
<td>Field Study Support</td>
<td>Summary And Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
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<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Attitudes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Staff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Operating Responsibility</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement of MAC</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals: Commitment to Placement</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Conflict</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Evaluation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-CETA Staff Experience</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness of Decision making</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Monitoring</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Weak</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employment Service Role</td>
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<td>?</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Strong</td>
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<tr>
<td>Program Integration</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of RFP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*We designated strong as 3.0–2.5; medium as 2.4–2.0, and weak as 1–1.5*
For each of the constructs listed and evaluated below, we have elsewhere explicitly stated the nature of the relationship we expected between the independent variable and the dependent variable. In each column is a subjective rating of the degree of support we believe we have found for each proposition from all sources of evidence we examined over the course of this inquiry. Our final judgment is couched in these terms: strong, medium weak and none or indeterminate; and we have assigned an ordinal designation of strong=3, medium=2, weak=1, none=0 for quick summation. The results are tabulated on the next page, and the summary assessment appears in the right-most column.

Admittedly these conclusions are very subjective, very crudely calculated and make no allowance for weight among variables or among the three support sources. Yet people everyday have to make judgments and decisions often on less systematic and rigorous information than that which I have assembled here. What may we say with respect to the validation of our most important "model" in Chapter One. We sketched our thinking the way Figure 7.1 suggests. While we did not specifically investigate statistically the link between nonmanipulable and manipulable variables per se, the preponderance of evidence we did collect and the views we weighed add support to the model depicted in Figure 7.1. The amount of classroom training a prime sponsor devotes to its Title I attack on unemployment and skill development is affected by both manipulable and nonmanipulable variables though we cannot say very much about the separate effects of both sets of variables from our work here.

Among the generally nonmanipulable variables that seem to be very influential with matters of local choice regarding classroom training is attitude, especially those of staff and educators. Also most of the
Figure 7.1 A policy Model to Account for the Varied Use of Classroom Training among a set of CETA Prime Sponsors, 1975-77.
variables that fit neatly into incremental interpretations of decision-making appear to be among the stronger determinants of spending levels and enrollments in classroom training. The historical constructs: pre-CETA voc ed base, pre-CETA history in employment and training and the like are of course nonmanipulable and doubtless effect in important ways attitudes that today do weigh heavily, consciously and unconsciously, on local decisions. We found that overall the evidence suggests that the availability of facilities--notwithstanding problems of operationalization attendant with the concept--and client characteristics seem to be related to the dependent phenomenon in the hypothesized direction. Thus environment, context, and history are not unimportant matters in accounting for choice in local prime sponsors. And that environment, context, and history interact with attitudes held by people in power goes almost without saying just as they also affect the manner in which institutions administer and implement policy at the hands-on levels. It is important, I think, to be honest here about the limitations of our research orientation. Neither the present, predominate methodology nor the available resources are sufficient to speak to the independent influences of each component we theorized would predict to the dependent variable. In many cases we were unable to find empirical support, and where we can, we are almost always unable to disentangle the interactive effects of policy variables on nonpolicy variables. That alas is another problem with solo exercises like this one: individuals with very limited time and money can do very little to attack a problem with all the force known to the discipline on their own. The results are sometimes discouraging. And the solution is to continue to theorize without "nosecounting" or to seek other sources of funds which can significantly extend the time necessary to
complete a dissertation.

But even if we grant that we cannot be more precise about the independent effects of context, environment and history and attitudes on prime sponsor use of classroom training, are there things we can say about some of the variables posited to be controlling in the case of the dependent variable and within the confines of environment, history and the like? Surely and most generally we can say that the present study presents very little hard evidence of impact for the organizational/structural variables—as operationalized here—on variation in the dependent phenomenon both crosssectionally and longitudinally over our brief historical perspective. This is not to say, naturally, that quality of staff for example, has no relationship to dollars spent on classroom training or enrollments, but only that given our measure for 32 sites at one particular point in history the covariation (or lack of it) between such constructs and measures of the dependent variable was not statistically significant enough to comfortably assert that such "artifacts" or coincidences were any more likely than chance happenings. In other words, often times the presence of relationship did not/may not have blossomed in the data available because the data as such and as much as anything else were too "thin" (being asked to say too much) to capture the subtle goings on with statistically demanding strength. (Thirty-two cases may be more akin to a comparative case study approach per se than it is like other survey approaches with much larger "N"'s.)

Most of our sets of manipulable constructs yielded weak statistical evidence of relationship at best; more often we found no statistical evidence of relationship at all or confused sets of correlations (where signs
change from year to year with no apparent reason.) We encountered nu-
merous puzzles where sets of correlations produced no clarification even
after making the most obvious checks for tabulation and transcription
error. This was especially the case as we sought to explain change from

Yet Involvement of the MAC, Centrality of Placement as a Goal, Level
of Conflict, Pre-CETA Staff Experience, Openness of Decisionmaking, for
example, appear to show promise as policy variables that may be manipulated
to affect specific outcomes with regard to program mix, specifically prime
sponsor use of classroom training—or more specifically yet—prime sponsor
preference for voc ed as a manpower tool.

Analyst Conclusions

The relationship between training vendors and manpower is not a
natural one nor is it simply complimentary. If policymakers, leaders or
citizens want to forge such a partnership significant effort must be ex-
pended.

1. The five per cent vocational education set aside money was in-
sufficient inducement to encourage schools to do very much toward building
links with manpower agencies.

2. In Ohio educational finance has been so inadequate for so long that
local school districts have done very little to promote any tradition of
adult education with their own resources. This lack of tradition reifies
the very narrow conception of mission among school administrators. Yet
this tradition needs to be stimulated to foster ways of thinking in edu-
cation which will allow proposals for nontraditional partnerships to grow.

3. Many school people see CETA clients as undesirable, the financial
incentives to enroll them insufficient, and the social problems attendant with this clientele too severe for their resources, personnel and methods.

4. Schools resent manpower officials dictating the terms of service contracts, evaluation and monitoring. This did severely affect early intercourse between schools and CETA. And it continues though both have learned how to finesse the most irritating aspects.

5. Schools have been unaccountable to the public except on their own terms, and they fear failure if they seek to perform against someone else's standards.

6. Schools in Ohio seem unwilling to create tailored curricula for the disadvantaged CETA client. This could result from two obvious conditions: they do not know what this group needs or they have not been given sufficient incentive to develop new courses or to challenge cherished ways of doing things.

7. Educators eschew the politics that surrounds manpower programs. If the State Department of Education issued the very same directives CETA RFP's include, most local administrators would move more readily and generously to respond.

8. Many CETA staffers are ex-educators yet they, probably as much as anyone, criticize the education system for its myopia and selfishness. What is important here is the fact that educators can be converted. Those attitudes can change. Change is involved too: many respondents reported they only saw the problem differently when they went to work for CETA. This suggests that the problem of attitude change or behavioral modification can be influenced even in the short term.
9. Education in many ways is incestuous. Educators only know educators, their own discipline and the reigning orthodoxy. There is very little in the system, the training of educators, the scholarly or popular research to challenge seriously the reigning paradigm.

10. CETA clients in large numbers have failed in school. Many do not want to go back even in the adult education division. Schools see these clients as failures, not their failures, not an indictment of them. This should not signal the need for less classroom training but rather the possibility of alternative education as the vehicle or means of improving the services when the traditional institutions are slow to respond.

11. All educators and manpower practitioners believe that classroom training and vocational education are the best tools to use as solutions for most CETA client needs. Whether this is so or not, may be irrelevant. Given that it is so viewed, almost as an article of faith, policymakers have to work with this phenomenon in the short term.

These observations represent a subjective sketch of the real world. Some propositions are controversial; some suggest their own solution. For some a solution, given the state of affairs posited in the proposition, is less clear. What follows is a set of suggestions one might consider if he sought to achieve two overarching goals: one, a more visible, effective partnership between the two communities—education and manpower, and two, increasing the share of CETA dollars going to classroom training and numbers of clients enrolled in classroom training and vocational ed. (Some of the suggestions are clearly more doable than others.)

To foster improved relations between education and manpower in an
employment and training partnership under CETA or any national manpower policy, policymakers, politicians, social engineers should consider

a. doing whatever they can to place courageous, intelligent, professionals in charge of adult education in local school systems. Too often these slots are filled with the least able in education's old boy network.

b. encouraging research in curriculum for nonmainstream students at the university level. Part of the problem is that education doesn't know how to serve these people or, just as bad, they stipulate that it is not their problem once they bounce the failing student on the street.

c. creating nonthreatening forums and other experiences to promote interaction for educators and employment practitioners and business/human resource people. For most school people their first and only experience outside education was as subcontractor to CETA which almost by design placed them on the defensive.

d. encouraging schoolmen and manpower people to do joint proposal writing.

e. electing school board people who are committed to adult education.

f. getting the problem recognized as a community problem worth addressing locally and debating it carefully.

g. going after private sector sponsors to provide neutral turf--space, resources etc--that employment and education folks can jointly use during idle time to train under a well developed partnership.

h. reducing institutional barriers that discourage movement across domains e.g., certification that has no basis in practice or different fiscal years and budget cycles.
i. working toward a uniform planning cycle, common accounting practices so that common and convenient excuses not to cooperate disappear or become indefensible.

j. experimenting with vouchers as a way to make CETA clients attractive to school systems.

k. considering the use of alternative schools as service deliverers.

Finally we had hoped at the outset of this project to be able to list a set of specific policy variables that policymakers and practitioners could use—turn on, turn off, increase, diminish—to affect some desirable outcome (generally here, encourage greater use of classroom training as a manpower tool). But what we have learned thus far, really more as a byproduct of this exercise than because of it in the first instance, is that it is indeed difficult to isolate very discrete "ingredients" or components or "parts" say the way an appliance repair man does when he attempts to correct a malfunctioning machine, which are readily manageable from quarter to quarter, from fiscal year to fiscal year or from election to election. Even if we could say "you increase the likelihood of growth in the classroom training budget as a proportion of total Title I funds as you increase the number of democratic educators in the MAC" we would be assuming, even under the best conditions, that history and learning, for example, are not transforming all the other variables not in the "equation" dramatically as we make the pronouncement. The ability of people to adapt is very important. We theorized, for example, that competition among local school officials for CETA contracts would improve CETA's ability to deliver classroom training services. We found that local schoolmen at least implicitly recognized the effects of this competition, and they agreed among themselves not to bid against each other
on CETA contracts. So to say that a prime sponsor director who can use competition—perhaps by RFP'ing far and wide—to increase supplies of classroom training is to pronounce a strategy as if the constellation of other latent variables will remain in abeyance. And of course the smaller the "market" or "policy space" the less likely this sort of thing becomes.

What all this leads to is a bit of post hoc theorizing in the wake of my discovery that few of my hypothesized policy variables appear to impact: namely, that the very variables that are most manipulable to the policymaker and the practitioners (especially at the grassroots) are also the very components other actors in the game can manipulate. If Mayor Jones can control the openness of decisionmaking, Superintendent Smith can fail to participate, appear infrequently, assign a critical program coordinator to represent the school. If Director Smith can round up a group of needy youth who profess interest in auto body repair, the superintendent or principal can claim, "no room!" since reliable data on these sorts of things rarely exist. The point here is not to say this sort of work is useless, but rather to argue that policy settings are so charged with action that it is difficult to make reliable statements about the functional relationship between two variables without ceteris paribus disclaimers about all other variables not in the equation; and that is alright for theoretical work, but it is very unsettling for applied work seeking to guide decisionmaking.

Moreover, when the unit of analysis can be a community or a prime sponsorship, the behavior of one anomalous individual—the zealot, the shyster, the saint whose actions stand in stark contrast to more "common" individuals—can have the same effect in case studies as an
extreme value in a small data set can on a gamma coefficient; it can distort appreciably the value of that coefficient so that it really is a poor summary of the remaining points in the distribution. This is a severe problem for very small scale, single shot solo missions like the present project: I can not easily devalue the views or behavior of anomalous respondents to arrive at a more accurate portrayal of some more modal state of affairs since a single perspective at a single time is scarcely enough exposure for careful discrimination.

I find myself in the very uncomfortable position here—not unlike those liberals who wrung their hands when the Coleman Report couldn't demonstrate statistically that additional dollars and hardware is related to improved performance in the classroom—of being forced to assert some very general, almost platitude-like statements instead of clear, sharp instruction that sound like precepts or guides for action. The platitude-like statements would really sound like these: "When all is said and done, after all, it is the quality of the leaders and managers who run your programs that is most important: one unselfish school superintendent can transform an otherwise unremarkable prime sponsor into a sterling vanguard. Just as one bullheaded fool can effect the opposite in spite of everyone's good intentions if he has enough power." Similarly, erstwhile enemies friendly competitors, critics, arch rivals can all become partners who are able to compliment each other in some common effort if a way can be found to force/persuade them to come together, talk, and continue doing so until they surmount the fear, ignorance and other impediments to cooperation.
This study indicates, I think rather well, that there is no "quick fix" to the problem manpower critics have pointed out about the lack of cooperation and joint action between the schools and CETA. I cannot confidently recommend that policymakers alter the legislation, for example, to make the vocational education set aside ten per cent, or stipulate that the MAC (ETAC) be at least 50 per cent schoolmen, or require that prime sponsors adopt the same planning cycle as boards of education. These adaptations are very manipulable and nonabstract. But our methods were not able to demonstrate with a specific degree of confidence that they may impact on budget decisions or enrollment plans. Rather, the in depth interviews used to augment statistical portions of this project suggest those guides enumerated "a" through "k", and they represent my best judgment for improving the school and work links in manpower policy.
Appendix A
March 19, 1981

Mr. Phillip Houston, Administrator
Greene County CETA
220 East Church Street
Xenia, Ohio 45385

Dear Mr. Houston:

I am a research associate at the Mershon Center of the Ohio State University. We at Mershon have been variously involved in CETA research since 1975 through a series of research grants from the Employment and Training Administration of the U. S. Department of Labor.

Presently we are investigating a number of issues concerning early CETA program mix under the old CETA Title 1, specifically how prime sponsors spent their Title 1 money during FY 75, 76 and 77.

We have the statistical data on budget shares and participants already; what we need is the insight of planners, policymakers and others that explains decision-making back in those early days of CETA.

What I would like to do is interview CETA professionals who were on staff during this time. But I also need to compile a list of people who were involved in program planning but were not professional staff, especially involved education professionals and elected political officials.

The purpose of this letter then is to solicit first your approval to schedule appointments with relevant professional staff and second to ask your help in compiling a list of professionals who may no longer be on staff but would be knowledgeable about this period; and finally to get from you or your staff a list of other persons involved in decisionmaking at that time, especially people from education and elected officials.

These interviews should take no longer than one hour. The statements and remarks will be treated as confidential. No remarks will be attributed to specific individuals either in writing or in any other form.

Having said that, let me conclude by saying that I shall follow up on this letter with a phone call to you after you have had time to consider my request. Perhaps you will have some ideas or suggestions, and certainly I can record any conditions or recommendations you may want me to follow during interviewing.

Thank you.

William J. Lydon
Research Associate

Programs of Research and Education in National Security, Leadership and Public Policy
Appendix B

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A. Local Data and Decisions.

1. Can you try to account for the local Title I data, if we go back to the early days of CETA? For example, why did local program mix take the proportions it did locally from FY 75 to FY 77?

2. The role of vocational education had been steadily growing in CETA over the early years of the program both in terms of participants and in dollar terms too. Nationally it took these proportions between FY 75 and FY 77.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vocational Education, as a Percent of Title I Participants and Expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Thinking back to earlier days in CETA, why do you suppose this was happening?

b. Why did it take the shape it did here in ____________?

3. Again, going back to FY 75, 76 and 77, from your recollection when local staff decided issues about the mix of Title I programs, what factors would you say weighed in the decision about the role of classroom training in the overall Title I program?

4. In the early days of CETA, who lobbied for classroom training? Did anyone push to reduce the role or importance of classroom training in the prime sponsor's Title I program? Did advocates for classroom training push, lobby very hard back then?

5. If we think back again to the early years of CETA (FY 75 to FY 77) can you recall what role, if any, the state department of education took in decisions about funding classroom training under Title I programs? How about the county? The local school board?


1. Can you recall how educators fitted into the Manpower Advisory Councils in the early years of CETA? Was local education represented? Adequately?

2. Can you recall how these educators got on the Council? For example, did they seek membership or did the prime sponsor seek them out?

3. Who might be a good spokesman for the educators' point of view back then?
4. Can you describe, characterize or evaluate the formal position education, as an institution, took with respect to CETA clientele? the proper place for classroom training/vocational education in CETA and manpower programs again back in the earlier days of CETA?

5. What has been the prime sponsor's strategy for dealing with education and educators over the years? How has it changed?

6. How important has the Educational Community been in Manpower decision-making especially with respect to the old Title I programs? Has this changed much?

7. Can you recall who among the professional CETA staff, elected officials, MAC members may have been champions for education in CETA programs? Back in FY 75 - 77 were there any serious detractors or critics of education in CETA, Title I?

8. Can you point to any evidence to show that public education was committed to serving people in CETA back in FY 75, 76 and 77? What about private schools? What about for-profit schools?


1. In your judgment how well linked had the education community been to manpower and CETA in the earlier days of CETA here? Has this changed? What have been the reasons for change?

2. Do you have any knowledge of the availability of vocational education or classroom training facilities in the area during the period FY 75 - 77? In other words, can you recall the extent to which schools back then may have had excess plant or underutilized resources that could have been pressed into CETA service? Do you have any suggestion how we might get a handle on such a condition back then?

3. How high do you and other professionals in manpower regard classroom training and vocational education as a manpower tool? Has your attitude changed over time? On what is your judgment based?

4. Again looking back to FY 75, can you recall from your own experience whether and to what extent professional educators were willing to work with (along side) manpower professionals? In your judgment, would issues of who controls matters of turf and the like be important explanations in accounting for interaction between manpower in education? Think, if you will, about these issues in today's light but also back several years to FY 75 too.

5. From your experience could you comment upon the willingness of professional educators to be evaluated, directed, and accountable to non-educators, say the way they might need to be as subcontractors under a CETA title? Was any of this salient in local decision-making under Title I back in FY 75 - 77? Does it enter into the local politics of program choice today?
6. Can you point to any evidence now or in the recent past that would indicate a strong local commitment on the part of the vocational education (or public education) establishment to serve the very disadvantaged?

7. Can you think of any peculiarities in the manner of education funding in Ohio or locally that might work against a real school/manpower partnership in solving problems of unemployment, etc.?

8. From your experience how has the part played by public education in local manpower policy changed since CETA began?

9. How successful had classroom training and vocational education been as a manpower tool in this community? How does it compare to other services or programs?

10. Who does vocational education serve? Whom can it serve well?

11. Historically how important had Skill Centers and Adult Education been in this community before the days of CETA?

12. How is CETA linked with public education? What links were present or forged with public education during the era FY 75 - 77?

D. Prime Sponsor's Pre-CETA Experience.

1. Can you recall, or do you know someone who knows, what had been this community's programmatic emphasis back in old MDTA, CHAMPS, CEP days? What kinds of programs were most common?

2. Again, back in MDTA, CHAMPS, CEP days, do you know why local manpower programs took the shape they did here? Who were the contractors and service vendors for manpower services before CETA?

3. Who made policy for manpower before CETA in this community?

4. What do you recall as the strong points of this community's MDTA programs? Weaknesses? Any theory to account for this?

5. What was the role of public education in pre-CETA manpower programming and policy?

6. What was the prevailing attitude of manpower professionals pre-CETA toward classroom training and public schools as service deliverers.

7. Could you briefly sum-up or evaluate the contributions of formal education in manpower policy pre-CETA?

E.D. Respondent's Background.

1. How long have you been with this prime sponsor? In what capacities?
2. What is your background and prior experience which you brought with you to this job? (Training, education, experience).

3. Any other pre-CETA background which helps you to shape your view of present problems and solutions for local manpower policy?

4. What did you do in this prime sponsor during the period FY 75 - 77?

5. Could you suggest persons either in CETA or in education whose experience with manpower encompasses this period of time (FY 75 - 77) that I might profitably interview for additional insight into policy during those years?


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