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A METACRITIQUE OF KENNETH BURKE'S ONTOLOGICAL, EPISTEMOLOGICAL, AND AXIOLOGICAL DRAMATISTIC SYSTEM: A STUDY OF A TRANSPLANTED PERSPECTIVE

The Ohio State University

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A METACRITIQUE OF KENNETH BURKE'S ONTOLOGICAL,
EPISTEMOLOGICAL, AND AXIOLOGICAL DRAMATISTIC SYSTEM:
A STUDY OF A TRANSPLANTED PERSPECTIVE

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

by

Virginia Henry Fry, B. A., M. A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1982

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Particularly in the last decade rhetorical scholars have begun expressing concern over the eclectic pluralism which has come to characterize rhetorical scholarship.¹ Presently, scholarship is characterized by a plethora of promises and claims from a variety of competing transplanted perspectives. Promising to be the "New Rhetoric" of the 1980's and beyond, Rhetoric as a Way of Knowing, phenomenological and hermeneutical inquiries, symbiotics, the sociology of knowledge, among others, argue for validation as the basis for future scholarship. When contrasted with the perceived limitations of the Neo-Aristotelian critical system, rhetorical scholars tend to view the plurality of rivaling approaches as a positive indication of maturing scholarship. At the same time, the security of the Neo-Aristotelian critical system—in which critical objects and procedures were clearly given—has been displaced by a situation in which all problems and methods seem equally germane and worthy of investigation. The ambiguity of the situation has been captured in the way rhetorical scholars describe the present state. Words like crisis, ferment, chaos, information overload, future shock,

¹An Eclectic Pluralism is a situation in which numerous disparate perspectives, many transplanted from other disciplines (see Appendix B for an explanation of the use of the term discipline), vie for legitimacy as appropriate perspectives from which to conduct future inquiry. Consult Appendix A for an elaborated discussion of eclecticism, pluralism, and monism, and their relevance to this study.
and flux and tension are commonly used when talking about contemporary scholarship.

Instead of convergence in our understanding of the present crisis—termed "a disintegrating tradition" by Scott and Brock—our scholarship is a testimony to divergence. The current milieu is one of varied methods and analyses, of multiplying novel rhetorical meta-theories and macro-theories. Instead of synthesis or integration, we have typically functioned on a response and coping level which contributes more and more assertions of legitimacy and less and less to our understanding of the crisis of a plurality of such claims. So far little effort has been made either to understand old rhetorics in terms of the new or to synthesize and to integrate new rhetorics. Further, we have formulated no clear standard for assessing the potential relevance of old rhetorics to emerging new rhetorics. In order to move toward convergence in our understanding of our disintegrating tradition, we require a systematic consideration of the rhetorical processes by which the New Rhetoric potentiality of transplanted perspectives is advanced and argued for.

This investigation is proposed as such an inquiry. The contemporary crisis in rhetorical scholarship makes it beneficial to consider a re-translation of one of the most significant New Rhetorics, Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic view of man. Though transplanted Burkeian terms and methods have contributed to our pluralistic predicament, no

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systematic criticism has been made of the translation and legitimation of either the Burkeian or other transplanted perspectives. This re-translation study isolates the Burkeian Dramatistic system at two points in time: (1) its initial introduction into the rhetorical scholarship of the 1950's by Marie Hochmuth Nichols and Virginia Holland, and (2) the present quite different intellectual milieu. For the first interpreters of Burke, particular Burkeian terms and methods gained their significance not from their position and coherence within an ontologically, epistemologically, and axiologically meaningful Dramatistic system but rather from their potential use as "correctives" for the perceived inadequacies of the Neo-Aristotelian monistic reliance on the historical method.

Likewise, this re-interpretation is informed by the altered concerns of the existing context. Rather than replicating the earlier effort or advancing another macro-theory or meta-theory, a re-translation is posed as a meta-critical inquiry into the Dramatistic system from which the earlier terms and methods were extracted. While rhetorical scholars previously borrowed particulars from Burke's

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3 The depiction of Neo-Aristotelian criticism as monistic is not intended as denigration, but rather as a description of the Neo-Aristotelian singular dependence on an historical method. Certainly, however, all Neo-Aristotelian critics did not identically utilize that method, for there are significant critical differences among such Neo-Aristotelians as Wichelns, Wrage, and Nichols. Their monism stems from their unquestioned acceptance of an alliance between rhetoric (as subject matter) and history (as method) as the justification for rhetorical scholarship. Subsequent discussions of that point appear throughout Chapters I and II. See also Appendix A for a discussion of the relationship among monism, pluralism and eclecticism as they come to bear on the concerns of this study.
Dramatism, an alternative rendering would strive to identify the whole and place the transplanted perspectives back into their original context, thus seeing them as part of a holistic Dramatistic structure having its own inherent logic and historicity. Are the Burkeian categories of the first translation relevant to rhetorical scholarship in the 1980's and beyond? Can a re-translation, made possible by the altered intellectual climate, suggest alternative interpretations--alternative readings--of Dramatism which may be even more significant for the 1980's and beyond?

Burke himself has issued a challenge to students of Communication which has largely been ignored. Burke calls on Communication scholars to critically investigate the process of uprooting perspectives from one discipline to another. Burke claims that

the student of Communication should evolve an explicit critique concerned with the process of making judgments, of rationalizing these structures . . . , of showing their scope and relevancy to human situations, of verbalizing

4 A re-translation takes as its starting point the revealing of Dramatism as an intellectual system which needs to be understood holistically. Seeing Dramatism holistically would expose Burke's thought as a system whose meaning is more than the sum of a few interdependent key terms (like rhetoric, identification, substance, and so on). To see that system whole requires a reconstitution of Burke's understanding of the historical context which provided the impetus for his creation of Dramatism. Forthcoming is an explanation of this re-translation as a process both of identifying the ontological, epistemological, and axiological meaning of Dramatism and of locating Burke's development of Dramatism within its own historical context as, to paraphrase Burke, a strategic response to a particular historical situation.
the role played by metaphorical migrations (transplanted perspectives) in the interpretative process.5

Much of Burke's work has been a critical attempt to validate Dramatism for migration to varied disciplines. An explicit critique—or a metacritique6—of Dramatism would examine the internal structure of the Dramatistic system, the process of interpreting and extracting particulars from the system for translation, and the ways in which Burke and his legitimizers argue for and validate the Dramatistic perspective as worthy of advancement as a New Rhetoric.

Amidst macro-theories and meta-theories which engender competition and divergence, a metacritical case study of one transplanted perspective strives to provide a basis for potential convergence in our understanding of the rhetorical process through which transplanted perspectives are legitimized as New Rhetorics. A metacritical study is a rhetorical inquiry into the rhetorical process of translation and legitimation. Posed as an explication of one such perspective, the intention is to conduct an inquiry which could provide a basis for subsequent analyses of other transplanted perspectives within rhetorical and communication research. Hopefully, this initial effort will have further heuristic value in addressing the larger question of understanding the process both through which


6 The procedures of a metacritical inquiry will be discussed in Chapter Two.
different disciplines arrive at disparate renderings of the same perspectives and also through which the same discipline, at different points in time, create alternative constructions of the same perspective. As Burke has warned, "the ideal of the inter-disciplinary can serve to deflect our attention from a problem of the intra-disciplinary." Interdisciplinary translation can lead to an intra-disciplinary problem if the process of assimilating transplanted perspectives within disciplines is not examined as a metacritical problem in itself.

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CHAPTER ONE

NEW RHETORICS, AN ECLECTIC ETHIC, AND A CRISIS IN LEGITIMACY

The Abyss Between Past and Modern Rhetoric

In the watershed year of 1965 Edwin Black termed the critical system which had dominated in rhetorical scholarship since Wichelns "Neo-Aristotelian," marking an abyss between past and modern theory and criticism.¹ The Neo-Aristotelian critical system, however, had not been without its critics prior to the mid-sixties. In 1944 Reid asserted that such studies produced mostly second-rate history and very little admirable rhetorical criticism.² Similarly, Redding claimed that rhetorical critics, armed with the historical method, seemed intent on moving farther away from their proper critical object, oratory.³ In 1956 Croft maintained that rhetorical critics,


seemingly content to utilize existing categories, were incapable of engaging in creative rhetorical criticism. The increasing variety of studies applying new critical methods to non-traditional subjects which emerged during the 1960's and 1970's made Neo-Aristotelianism appear even more monistic. The Prospect of Rhetoric seemed to encourage the emerging pluralism. No longer were critics restricted to single speaker effects studies; instead, critics began turning their attention to social movements, mediated communication, and events.

4 Albert J. Croft, "The Functions of Rhetorical Criticism," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 42 (1956), 283-291. Hereafter, this journal is cited as QJS.


6 While it is impossible to cite the variety of studies and the amount of disagreement among critics conducting social movement studies, Suzanne Volmar Riches and Malcolm O. Sillars review piece "The Status of Movement Criticism," Western Journal of Speech Communication, 44 (1980), 275-287 provides extensive footnote references testifying to the diversity of such studies. See also Central States Speech Journal, 31 (1980) in which the entire issue was devoted to articles dealing with social movement studies. Hereafter, these journals are cited as WJSC and CSSJ, respectively.

heretofore regarded as beyond the purview of rhetorical criticism such as gastronomic preferences and multiple murders.  

Questioning the rhetorical value of the criticism produced by the historical method upon which Neo-Aristotelian critics relied directed critics into other disciplines in search of improved critical methods. The result of that search led to the introduction of a plurality of approaches claiming to be the "New Rhetoric." Before Black, under the "New Rhetoric" banner, Marie Hochmuth Nichols argued that the literary critics Kenneth Burke and I. A. Richards promised to provide "rhetoricians with a theory which is better adapted to the learning and thought of modern times than any conception arrived at two thousand years ago for a culture quite different from our own." 


The point being made is not that such studies treat their rhetorical objects non-traditionally, but more importantly that such events can be regarded as rhetorical. See Barry Brummett, "Gastronomic Preference, Synecdoche, and Political Images," QJS, 67 (1981), 138-145; Jeanne Y. Fisher, "A Burkean Analysis of the Rhetorical Dimensions of a Multiple Murder and Suicide," QJS, 60 (1974), 175-189.

At the same time, Nichols claimed that Burkeian "methods and analytical tools" were a way of "draw[ing] us back to the fullest meaning of the art" of rhetoric. Richards' contribution was also methodological; his development of a precise and orderly methodology might be more adapted to the times, Nichols suggested, than the traditional categories of logical, emotional and ethical proof which had so long dominated in scholarship. In providing methodological alternatives to the reified Neo-Aristotelian critical system, Burke and Richards offered "correctives" which promised to return rhetorical criticism to its rightful meaning.

More recently, rhetorical scholars have been exploring the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric. That pursuit has generated two distinct "New Rhetoric" claims: one derives from attempts to articulate the relationship between rhetoric and the logical-empirical philosophical tradition; with roots in the hermeneutical-dialectical tradition, the other endeavors to express the contribution that philosophical tradition makes to our understanding of rhetoric and communication. In part, the former pursuits owe their life to the work of scholars such as Johnstone and McKeon whose ongoing efforts to relate rhetorical and philosophical arguments within an architec-tonic rhetoric have led to an increased understanding of the importance

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10 Marie Hochmuth [Nichols], "Burkeian Criticism," WJSC, 21 (1957), 90; see also Marie Hochmuth [Nichols], "Kenneth Burke and the 'New Rhetoric'," QJS, 38 (1952), 133-144.

11 Marie Hochmuth [Nichols], "I. A. Richards and the 'New Rhetoric'," QJS, 44 (1958), 1-16.

of argument as a means of generating knowledge. If rhetoric functions architectonically, then the proper study of rhetorical scholars is epistemology. Most prominently during the last decade, scholars identifying themselves with Scott's 1967 statement of the epistemic nature of rhetoric ascribe "New Rhetoric" status to Rhetoric As A Way of Knowing. Falling into that category are a diversity of studies which try to articulate an understanding of social knowledge as a rhetorical construct, which try to identify the particular epistemology of a particular speaker or philosopher, and those which


analyze specific knowing communities, such as the scientific research community. 17  

Advancing another "New Rhetoric" are scholars whose orientation to rhetorical theory and criticism evolves from their understanding of the hermeneutical-dialectical philosophical tradition. In that vein, Richard Lanigan argues that contemporary methods of rhetorical criticism primarily "focus upon the structural and stylistic elements of discourse or upon the 'rhetorical situation'" and continue rather than depart from the traditional reliance on audience effects. 18 Lanigan claims that contemporary rhetorical critics approach the "communicative act as an empirical schema of effects primarily reflected in the 'audience' with little concern for the creative import of the speaker and his expression." 19 Inquiries into the "speaker and his expression" which draw a fundamental distinction between empirical and authentic speech provide the fundamental characteristic of this phenomenologically-oriented "New Rhetoric." 20 That theme,


20 Lanigan draws on Heidegger's distinction. Research which focuses on empirical speech identifies conventional expression, expression which is taken-for-granted or which functions at the level
and its importance for the study of rhetorical communication, has been echoed by Stanley Deetz, John Stewart, Richard Gregg, and Michael Hyde, among others. An emerging "New Rhetoric" termed The Philosophy of Communication has been informed by these concerns. Beyond being applicable to rhetoric, this emerging approach also promises to provide a systematic philosophical base from which to inquire into all forms of communicative action. Advocates ground the significance of this New Rhetoric in the inherently reflexive nature of communicative experience. Insofar as communication is both the object of social expectation and interaction maintenance. An illustration would be "Have a nice day." Authentic speech, on the other hand, flows from the authentic experience of being of the speaker, toward the same in the hearer. It points to the ontological being of the communicants, joined together in dialogue.


scrutiny and also the medium of inquiry and expression, theory building and criticism within this orientation is premised on disclosing the inherently reflexive nature of experience.

In addition to the "New Rhetorics" emerging from literary criticism and from interest in the alliance between philosophy and rhetoric, rhetorical scholars have also been influenced by other fields such as linguistics and sociology. In fact, in his compilation of contemporary rhetorical theorists, Richard Johannesen acknowledged the inherently interdisciplinary nature of the contemporary scene, for all six of the theorists noted come from other fields. In a recent article, Gerald Phillips extended that observation to include the whole of communication research. Citing a study by Herman Cohen,


Phillips related that Cohen found "the field essentially derivative, not concerned with issues specific to communication, and generally unoriginal in selecting modes and objects of study." The bulk of our research questions and methods can be viewed as transplanted perspectives, imports from other disciplines which have been assimilated into our research.

For rhetorical scholarship, the abyss between past and modern rhetorical theory and criticism is even wider than a cataloging of the variety of New Rhetorics would indicate. Not only can contemporary scholarship be described as interdisciplinary but also it can be argued that an ethic of the interdisciplinary has displaced the singular historical ethic which dominated at the time Nichols and Holland introduced Burkelian criticism, the first of the successful New Rhetorics, as a "corrective" to the perceived limitations of the historical ethic. By the 1960's, it was clear that the ethic which had displaced the Neo-Aristotelian was not derived from any one other discipline, be it history, literary criticism, philosophy, or some other. Instead, it was an eclectic ethic which had displaced the Neo-Aristotelian monistic ethic.  

More than being simply a method taken up to investigate a particular problem, an ethic has both knowledge-generating (epistemic) and knowledge-legitimizing (axiological) potency. Epistemically, an

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27 Consult Appendix A and Appendix C for clarification of the words ethic, pluralistic, monistic, and eclectic.
ethic operates terministically in directing the researcher's attention toward some problems as worthy of scrutiny and away from others deemed not potentially valuable. Concurrently, an ethic also establishes procedures which are appropriate to the investigation, including the selection of a method suitable to the research task. Thus, an ethic can be thought of as a taken-for-granted normative criterion which guides a research community in the production of knowledge by maintaining a sense of what is appropriate in one's research and in the research of one's colleagues. An ethic has an implicit evaluative component in that it provides a standard for assessing the quality and value of the research produced by the community.

Beyond evaluation, an ethic serves other axiological needs. In that an ethic embodies the values of its adherents, its enactment in the research enterprise provides a sense of stability and community. Knowledge generated by the community is legitimate to the extent that it is upheld by the authority of the ethic. A legitimation crisis can occur if either the ethic becomes questioned and/or if the knowledge generated by the practice of the ethic comes to be assessed as inconsistent with the ideal of the ethic. A crisis in legitimation can be thought of less as one in which new knowledge goals are being developed than as one in which the axiological dimension (the evaluative and legitimizing authority of an ethic) is at a turning point.

28 Consult Appendix C for further elaboration of this employment of the term ethic. A discussion of the importance of the axiological dimension of legitimation will arise again in Chapters Two and Four.
A crisis in research ethic can be correlated with changing conceptions of the value—the worth, the merit, and/or the usefulness—of rhetorical inquiry. Whereas it was a common practice during the 1950's and 1960's to perform an "autopsy" on the Neo-Aristotelian ethic, a marked change can be noted between the two decades, a shift which puts into relief a fundamental alteration in the disciplinary status, and consequently, in the perceived value of rhetorical inquiry. The legitimacy of the Neo-Aristotelian ethic had been challenged in the 1940's and 1960's by scholars such as Reid, Redding, Croft, and Nichols. For those critics, themselves Neo-Aristotelian, the Neo-classic practice linked criticism with the historical method, an association which seemed to produce more bad history than good criticism. While, as Nichols claimed, there is certainly nothing wrong with rhetorical scholarship which undertakes historical research, the effort was to locate a method more suitable than the historical method of the study of oratory. Interestingly, this move can be thought of as being directed toward a particular audience, the historians. Whereas the Neo-Aristotelian monistic ethic featured what the historian could contribute to rhetoric, revisionists like Nichols featured what rhetorical critics could contribute to historical

research. For the latter, a legitimacy of rhetorical criticism was its ability to be of use (value) to historical scholarship. That new featuring was prompted not only by a concern with improving the quality of rhetorical scholarship but also by a need to respond to the historians' lukewarm response to the Brigance and Nichols volumes *A History and Criticism of American Public Address.*

By the 1960's, the "autopsy" of Neo-Aristotelianism had shifted ground: while, as for the 1960's revisionists, the internal audience remained that of the rhetorical scholarly community, the external audience was now comprised of social scientists rather than historians. The message was also unprecedented. While the revisionists of both the 1950's and 1960's queried the value of the Neo-Aristotelian ethic, the latter critics did so by advocating an altogether different ethic and value: the ethic of the eclectic interdisciplinarian whose evaluation of rhetorical scholarship required that it be of value to the social scientist. To illustrate the emergence of this new ethic it is helpful to glance at a symposium entitled "The Uses of Speech Criticism" published in the summer of 1968 in the *Western Journal of*

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To introduce the question of "use" is to implicate a question of and crisis of value. That fact was evident in each contribution, as was the emergence of the new eclectic ethic.

How did the participants address the issue of use? Most apparent in each contribution is the implied correlation between use and value. Each contributor emphasized the value of speech criticism to the social scientist. The assertion of value was linked to the assertion of relevancy: that claim was reinforced via an explicit criticism of the Neo-Aristotelian ethic and its inability to be applicable to changing scholarly concerns. By contrast, contemporary criticism was germane (of value) because of its eclectic ethic.

Hillbruner was most explicit in proclaiming the necessity of "an inter-disciplinary approach": critics could widen their influence if they "were less committed to the critical monism of formal rhetoric." Ericson criticized Neo-Aristotelianism for its "tendency to become involved in historical, rather than rhetorical investigation." In contrast to the monism of the traditional critic's singular trust in the historical method, the contemporary critic makes use of "whatever happens to be most usable" and available. Echoing the value of that critical approach and of the Burkeian approach with which it is often associated, McGuckin asserts that contemporary critics are

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33 Hillbruner, 163, 167; see also Hillbruner's "The Moral Imperative of Criticism," SSCJ, 40 (1975), 228.

34 Ericson, 174, 176.
free to "use whatever there is to use." For McGuckin it is that practice which provides the basis for proclaiming the worth of rhetoric to the social scientist.\textsuperscript{35} Fundamentally, then, each asserts the significance (value) of contemporary rhetoric to the social scientist on the grounds that, unlike the old rhetoric, new rhetorics represent an eclectic ethic which renders rhetorical inquiry of value.

Of course, during this period the disciplinary context for the conduct of rhetorical inquiry was drastically changing. Increasingly, rhetorical theorists/critics found themselves in social-science oriented communication studies departments. Due in part to that change, scholars perceived new demands for relevancy, demands which came from unusual quarters and which required unique legitimations. In her 1959 lecture "Rhetoric, Public Address, and History" Nichols assayed the relationship between history and rhetoric as an intimate connection which had originated in Classical times. The emergence of the social sciences with their new methods of factual research should draw rhetoric and history, the foundation of humane inquiry, closer together rather than apart.\textsuperscript{36} However, while theoretically and conceptually rhetoric's legitimacy was historically tied to the humane disciplines, in the 1960's the emergence of new disciplinary configurations engendered new, often uncomfortable, disciplinary alliances. That rhetorical inquiry increasingly came to be conducted within

\textsuperscript{35} McGuckin, 172.

\textsuperscript{36} Marie Hochmuth Nichols, "Rhetoric, Public Address, and History" in \textit{Rhetoric and Criticism}, pp. 19-33. In the same volume, see "Rhetoric and Public Address as Humane Study," pp. 3-18.
social-scientific oriented departments required a new legitimation
to a new disciplinary neighbor. Often, a denial of the previous
legitimation—the traditional alliance between history and rhetoric—
was asserted, as if clearing the way for an updated legitimation. 37

The position of rhetorical scholarship during the last few decades
can be compared with the status of historical scholarship vis-à-vis
the emerging social sciences earlier in this century. In both cases,
emergence of a social science which directly challenged the former
was experienced. 38 For rhetoric, the problem has been one of

37With the noted exception of Stephen Lucas' "The Schism in Rhe­
torical Scholarship," QJS, 67 (1978), 1-20, few scholars have directed
their attention to an explication of the relationship between rhetoric
and history per se. Yet, much criticism of the Neo-Aristotelian system
has been levied primarily at the critic's reliance on an historical
methodology. A questioning of the value of criticism produced by that
method, is, likewise, a questioning of the Neo-Aristotelian belief in
the alliance between history and rhetoric. See footnotes 2, 3, 4, this
chapter for sources critical of that alliance. Another particularly
critical statement has been made by Klyn in his depiction of Neo-
Aristotelian criticism as "a tyranny of technique," Mark S. Klyn,
"Toward a Pluralistic Rhetorical Criticism," in Thomas R. Nilsen, ed.,
Consult Lucas' article for a further explication of criticisms of the
legitimacy of the rhetoric-history alliance in traditional criticism.

38Concerns with the practice of rhetorical criticism amidst pres­
sure from the social sciences have been expressed by numerous scholars.
Frequently, that concern is expressed either through a criticism of
existing scholarship and/or by advocating better ways of conducting
scholarship. For just a few examples of such concerns see: Gerard A.
Hauser, "Empiricism, Description, and the New Rhetoric," Philosophy
and Rhetoric, 5 (1972), 24-44; Lawrence W. Rosenfield, "Rhetorical
Criticism and an Aristotelian Notion of Process," Communication Mono­
graphs, 33 (1966), 1-16; Lawrence W. Rosenfield, "An Autopsy of the
Rhetorical Tradition," in The Prospect of Rhetoric, Lloyd F. Bitzer
1971), pp. 64-67; Herbert W. Simons, "'Genre-alizing' About Rhetoric:
A Scientific Approach" in Form and Genre: Shaping Rhetorical Action,
Karilyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, eds. (Falls Church,
Va.: SCA), pp. 33-50; Ernest G. Bormann, "Generalizing About Signifi­
cant Form: Science and Humanism Compared and Contrasted" in Form and
maintaining the integrity of rhetorical inquiry within a changed disciplinary context. The emergence of social-scientific oriented communication departments severely challenged the secure position rhetoric had previously held within speech departments, for typically rhetoric and social science appear to be derived from two distinct traditions. Granting those divergent orientations and legitimations, rhetorical scholars have increasingly found themselves in an inferior position within emergent socially scientific departments of communication studies.

In this regard, it is instructive to note that historical scholarship found itself at a similar turning point earlier in this century. The first third of the century was a period of intense change in the research ethic among American historians. In his presidential address to the American Historical Association, George Burton Adams marked the gulf between himself and the Beard-Becker generation. For Adams, history as conceived within a positivist tradition aimed to report the facts of the past. Adams was so certain of the historian's task that he urged his colleagues to be strong in their opposition to their social scientific critics, for "none of the new battle cries should

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sound for us above the call of our first leader, proclaiming the chief
duty of the historian to establish *wie es eigentlich gewesen* . . . .
The field of the historian is, and must long remain, the discovery and
recording of what actually happened."\(^{41}\) Indeed, a representative of
the American Historical Association made a distinction between "real"
historians who "produce histories of . . . general range" and "those
who interpret, but these are called philosophers."\(^{42}\)

By the 1930's that monism had been displaced by the relativism
of Progressive historians like Becker, Beard, Turner, and Parrington.
Charles A. Beard's 1933 address to the American Historical Association
contrasts sharply with Adams' 1908 address. Beard's "Written History
As An Act Of Faith" notes that the selection and arrangement of facts
always takes place in terms of the values and convictions of the func­
tioning historian. Written history, then, becomes a "choice" about
the past made *in terms of* the present from which no historian can
escape.\(^{43}\) Carl Becker shared Beard's view that historical facts are
a creation of thought: "the historical fact is in someone's mind or
it is nowhere."\(^{44}\) Historical facts thus become a cluster of inter­
pretative choices, which together, comprise historical knowledge.

\(^{41}\)Cited in W. Stull Holt, "The Idea of Scientific History in

\(^{42}\)In Waldo C. Leland, "Concerning Catholic Historical Societies,"
*Catholic Historical Review*, 2 (1917), 388.

\(^{43}\)Charles A. Beard, "Written History As An Act Of Faith, American
Historical Review*, 39 (1934), 219-229.

\(^{44}\)Carl Becker, "What are Historical Facts?," *Western Political
Quarterly*, 8 (1955), 331; see also Carl Becker, "Everyman His Own
Such a relativistic ethic was far more than merely a reaction to the monistic ethic of Adam's generation. As the historian John Higham has pointed out, the disciplinary legitimacy of history was being threatened as the influence of the scientific method became felt among the humanities. According to Higham,

the real problem in early twentieth century America was not one of emancipating history from science, but rather the reverse: preventing science from repudiating history. The danger that history faced was the intellectual isolation into which orthodox professors were backing. In large measure, the quarrel between history and social science broke out in the United States because social scientists were deserting history. The argument over the scientific status of scientific history is best understood as an overt explanation of this deeper rift.45

Early in this century, departments of history were not distinct from the concerns of economics, sociology and other social sciences. When splinter groups began to isolate themselves from the rest (notably economics), historians like Adams defended historical scholarship on the grounds of its social scientific challengers by arguing for an understanding of history as a purely scientific investigation.46 By the Progressive era, historians found it necessary not merely to argue for the legitimacy of historical scholarship in the face of the emerging social sciences but also, and just as importantly, to defend historical practice against the orthodox monism of Adams' generation. As Higham explains, the aim was not to dissociate history from science


46 Adams, "History and the Philosophy of History," 223-229. This point is also made by Higham in "The New History."
but rather to re-legitimize historical practice within a changed disciplinary context in order to prevent science from repudiating history.

Similarly, the search for "New Rhetorics" has, in part, been an effort to develop a "New Rhetoric" which could provide a foundation for an updated claim to legitimacy, one which could make rhetoric clearly relevant to social-scientific communication studies. As in the case of history, the import here is not to repudiate science but to prevent science from repudiating--i.e., invalidating--rhetoric. It is important to be viewed as being more than a "pre-scientific" adjunct to the research enterprise. 47 A brief look at three of the most influential of the "New Rhetorics"--the Burkeian, the Epistemic, and the Hermeneutical-Dialectical--substantiates that claim.

In her advocacy of Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic view of man as the new-found legitimation for rhetorical scholarship, Karlyn Kohrs Campbell argues that a rhetoric based on symbolic interactionism is a more appropriate way of understanding man than either Aristotelianism or behaviorism because the former asserts symbol use as the primary communicative dynamic. 48 That Campbell advocates the Burkeian


48 Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "The Ontological Foundations of Rhetorical Theory," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 3 (1970), 97-108. To minimize confusion, it should be noted that Campbell advocates Burke's symbolic view of man monistically, i.e., as the best approach to understanding human communication. At the same time, it is clear from Campbell's argument that it is an approach which should open up understandings not possible within the constraints of either the rational or behaviorist views. Thus, her advocacy is of a monism which is expected to produce a pluralism. Elsewhere, Campbell has noted that pluralism is the price rhetorical scholars must pay for continued relevancy, Karlyn
symbolic-featuring to demonstrate the weaknesses of both the Aristotelian and the social-scientific behaviorist ontologies points to the changed disciplinary status of rhetoric since the mid-50's when Nichols first argued for Burkeian criticism as The New Rhetoric. Whereas Campbell argues for the superiority of the "symbolic" legitimation over both the Aristotelian and its contemporary rival, for Nichols the effort had been neither to negate the traditional legitimation nor defend it against its behaviorist challenger.

It is clear that Nichols viewed the humanities and the social sciences as dichotomous traditions; she intended to use Burke to re-assert and re-establish the traditional rationale and legitimation of rhetorical investigations. Benefiting from an updated justification the traditional legitimation could then survive challenges from other disciplines within the humanities as well as from the emerging social sciences. On the other hand, though separated by fewer than fifteen years, Campbell's article advocates a symbolic ontology as a third legitimation, distinct from either the traditional or the social scientific. A rhetoric premised on Burkeian symbolism promises to provide a rationale with the potentiality to subsume the other legitimations. That the new-found justification expands the parameters of rhetorical criticism to include all behaviors as being potentially

Kohrs Campbell, "The Nature of Criticism in Rhetorical and Communicative Studies," CSSJ, 30 (1979), 4-13. In addition to Campbell's argument, other critics have advocated symbolic interactionism and/or Dramatism monistically as the meta-theory which should be the basis for future scholarship. See, for example, Stephen W. Littlejohn, "Symbolic Interactionism as an Approach to the Study of Human Communication," QJS, 63 (1977), 84-91. Symbolic interactionism becomes just one of many eclectic perspectives being advocated.
rhetorical is, Campbell argues, the strength of the approach. Scholars must learn to cope with the resulting ambiguity, for expanding the boundaries of what can properly be considered an appropriate object for rhetorical criticism is the price which must be paid for relevancy. 49

Thus, a Burkeian New Rhetoric would forestall a devaluation of the art of rhetorical criticism in a number of ways. Nichols questioned the value of Neo-Aristotelian criticism for its departure from the classical roots of the rhetorical art. In that Burke's expanded definition of rhetoric developed a rationale consistent with both his methodology as well as with the classical justification for rhetoric, a Burkeian New Rhetoric could overcome the Neo-Aristotelian departure from the classical foundation. In returning to its classical grounding, rhetorical criticism could once again—via a Burkeian rhetoric—assert the legitimacy of its inquiry. The audience for that assertion was both internal (including rhetorical critics themselves) as well as external (primarily directed to the historians). The argument was a particularly sound one because, since Nichols claimed that history and rhetoric had been traditionally aligned as the foundation for humane inquiry, a New Rhetoric which could return to those roots would have a strong justificatory power.

For Campbell, a Burkeian rhetoric could assuage a critical turning-point in rhetorical scholarship precisely because it signified a departure from traditional legitimations. The distinctions

49 Ibid, 106.
made by Neo-Aristotelian critics between rhetorical and literary dis­
course and their too narrow understanding of rhetorical context
restricted the types of discourses which could be considered rhetori­
cal, thus constraining the development of a comprehensive rhetorical
theory. Burke's definition of man expands rather than limits, thus
providing a more fruitful foundation for theory construction. It
is the Burkeian rhetoric which can "provide the most productive and
viable ontological base from which to develop a complete and coherent
theory of rhetoric." It

Though both Nichols and Campbell favored a Burkeian approach,
each differently accented its New Rhetoric value. Those varied
emphases were due to the discrepant requirements imposed by the dis­
parate external audiences to whom rhetorical inquiry had to appeal
for legitimation. Nichols' argument for a reassociation between rhe­
toric and history carried with it the authority of the humane tra­
dition. By contrast, Campbell's justification was located in the
assertion that a Burkeian rhetoric concerns itself with theory con­
struction, an emphasis shared by the social sciences. The potency
of that legitimation is upheld by the values of social science rather
than by the humane tradition. Though Campbell appears to depart from
both Aristotelian and behaviorist tenets in her advocacy of Burke,
the argument for a Burkeian New Rhetoric is upheld by a social scienti­
fic value, that of the importance of theory construction.

50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
A similar claim for the epistemic view of Rhetoric As A Way Of Knowing, likewise, is not lost on its proponents. Basing rhetoric on this fundamental premise—that rhetoric is "the process of manipulating symbolic devices for the purpose of gaining one's own or someone else's adherence, which is essential to the very process of coming to know"—means that scholarly investigations into the rhetorical process by which knowledge is generated in knowledge-producing communities (as in science and politics) affirms rhetoric's relevancy to and potentiality for contributing to the research life of that community.\(^{52}\)

Within Communication, researchers have expressed the differences among competing approaches as epistemological in origin. Barnett Pearce has expressed a common sentiment in noting that "the rhetoricians and social scientists in SCA are . . . contrasted in terms of epistemology rather than their reliance upon quantitative data."\(^{53}\) If the

\(^{52}\) Carroll C. Arnold, "Inventio and Pronuntiatio in a New Rhetoric," a paper presented to the Central States Speech Association Convention, April 18, 1972, 4. See also, Gerard A. Hauser, "Searching for a Bright Tomorrow: Graduate Education in Rhetoric During the 1980's," Communication Education, 28 (1979), 259-281.

\(^{53}\) W. Barnett Pearce, "Metatheoretical Concerns in Communication," Communication Quarterly, 25 (1977), 3-18; Gerald M. Phillips, "Science and the Study of Human Communication: An Inquiry From the Other Side of the Two Cultures," Human Communication Research, 7 (1981), 361. While Phillips claims that our differences are both epistemological and methodological, Pearce asserts that they are epistemological rather than methodological. While highlighting epistemology, both depictions fail to deal with the epistemological dimensions inherent in assuming various types of methodologies. For Pearce, epistemology means differing knowledge goals and routes to knowledge. The point he is making regarding the rhetorical and social scientific is that each takes differing epistemological routes to their respective knowledge claims. It is instructive to note that Pearce does not grant rhetoric an epistemetic status in the way Rhetoric As A Way of Knowing scholars claim. The latter maintain that all routes to knowledge are rhetorical, in that rhetoric is the means of generating knowledge inherent in
distinctiveness between the two is their respective epistemologies, then a claim to the epistemic nature of rhetoric clearly makes rhetorical scholarship relevant to social scientific communication research.

Premising their work on questions of knowledge and the epistemic functioning of argument, philosophers such as Toulmin and Perelman have adopted what can be termed an extra-disciplinary or trans-disciplinary vantage. Toulmin claims that "by its very nature, the problem of human understanding—the problem of recognizing the basis of intellectual authority—cannot be encompassed within any single technique or discipline."54 Perelman, too, has attempted to validate the legitimacy of an epistemic rhetorical inquiry (The New Rhetoric) which is capable of showing "in a new perspective all the humanistic disciplines."55 From such a vantage, an epistemic rhetoric could assert its potential as a basis for transdisciplinary inquiry, thus its new legitimacy would not be linked to any one disciplinary configuration.56

seemingly disparate epistemologies. Pearce does not grant that status to rhetoric as primary in all epistemological processes.


56 To my knowledge, this transdisciplinary aspect has not to date provided the basis for any epistemic theoretical or critical scholarship. That point will become salient when the argument turns toward exploring both the transdisciplinary nature of rhetoric and the axiological dimensions of the legitimation process.
Likewise, the New Rhetoric inspired by phenomenology and hermeneutics asserts a new legitimacy for rhetoric, for it describes itself as an inquiry into "rhetoric's primordial function" within the hermeneutical situation. The hermeneutical situation is disclosed through an expression of the ontological significance of interpretation and meaning to human understanding. A rhetoric which claims to have import for increasing rhetorical awareness of the experience of understanding can clearly argue its merit to diverse communicative contexts and situations. Deriving from the same tradition, relatedly, a Philosophy of Communication asserts itself as a science whose end goal is theory construction based on philosophical models. By studying theory construction as a problem in itself, the Philosophy of Communication claims relevancy to the social science research enterprise. The activity of theory construction, so important to the social sciences, can be enhanced through a Philosophy of Communication.

Thus far, it has been possible to identify a plurality of competing transplanted perspectives which argue for themselves as the foundation for a "New Rhetoric." Each promises a wider legitimation for rhetoric than the orthodoxy of Neo-Aristotelianism in that each

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58 Ibid.

carves out for rhetoric a province which makes rhetoric relevant in a social-science disciplinary context. These competing "New Rhetorics" are attempts to reconceptualize—i.e., re-translate—an altered base for future rhetorical studies vis-à-vis a changed disciplinary context. The limitations of Neo-Aristotelianism—a system crystalized into orthodoxy—has been perceived as inadequate to the demands of the new context. Just as Progressives interpreted the orthodoxy of Adams' generation as a scholarship-isolated-from-society deathblow to the survival of professional historians, similar charges of the irrelevancy of orthodox Aristotelian studies are responses to demands for a reconceptualization of the justification and legitimation of rhetorical scholarship brought on by altered disciplinary alliances.

The comparism with history makes it easier to understand the present rhetorical eclectic ethic as being far more than a mere reaction to the perceived monism of the Neo-Aristotelian ethic. Rather, the new eclectic ethic can be viewed less as a direct response to the earlier monistic ethic than as an indicator of what Scott and Brock have termed "the disintegrating tradition." A disintegrating tradition is marked by a crisis in the traditional legitimation of the practice/value of scholarship. The severity of the legitimation crisis which engages rhetorical and historical scholarship arises primarily from the seeming dichotomy between the traditional theoretical/

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conceptual legitimation of humane disciplines and that of an aspiring science of human society. The legitimation crisis which characterizes the disintegrating tradition, then, is less the result of indigenous theoretical conflict or upheaval within rhetorical scholarship per se than of the need, because of new disciplinary demands, to establish theoretical legitimation within a changed disciplinary context.

To better understand the trauma of the schism between the theoretical/conceptual and the disciplinary, it is helpful to note one of Toulmin's discussions in that vein. In his discussion of Kuhn's arguments for paradigmatic change in the sciences, Toulmin highlights this useful distinction between the theoretical/conceptual and the disciplinary. Referring to science, Toulmin argues that when two scientific positions share similar intellectual aims and fall within the scope of the same discipline, the historical transition between them can always be discussed in 'rational' terms, even though their respective supporters have no theoretical concepts in common. Radical incomprehension is inescapable, only when the parties to a dispute have nothing in common even in their disciplinary ambitions. Given the very minimum continuity of disciplinary aims, scientists with totally incongruous theoretical ideas will still, in general, have a basis for comparing the explanatory merits of their respective explanations, and rival paradigms of presuppositions—even though incompatible on the 'theoretical' level—will remain rationally commensurable as alternative ways of tackling a common set of 'disciplinary' tasks.

Understanding the real abyss between past and contemporary rhetorical scholarship, then, involves more than rejecting previous scholarship for the limitations of its rational ontology, monistic ethic, or any

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number of other perceived limitations. More importantly, new disciplinary configurations have created a schism between the theoretical/conceptual tradition which rhetoric shared with other humane disciplines, on the one hand, and the often seemingly incompatible present disciplinary demands, on the other. Future survival seems to be linked with the ability to develop a new legitimation within the changed context so that rhetoric's new disciplinary colleagues can come to view rhetorical inquiry, though theoretically/conceptually distinct, as capable of contributing to the enactment of shared disciplinary goals. Though not typically explicitly identified as such, the new eclectic ethic has been a major phase in that re-legitimation process.

Rosenfield has argued that "the predicament facing modern rhetoric is not one of redefinition, nor even obsolescent of rhetorical theories. It is symptomatic of a disturbance threatening all humanistic inquiry." Rosenfield continues,

Tradition itself has in our time been called into question, if not decisively rejected . . . . No longer is the authority of the past a legitimate guide to institutions. This is not to argue that the past lacks wisdom for the present, but only that we are no longer willing to piously submit to tradition's authority. Hence, the task of modern rhetorical scholarship is broader than simple renovation; it is part of a more general effort to regenerate historico-critical thought. And no conception of rhetoric will be fully adequate which does not account for how our link to tradition has come to be broken at this time.

63Lawrence Rosenfield, "An Autopsy of the Rhetorical Tradition," p. 64.
That such an effort has generally not found its way into rhetorical scholarship leaves rhetorical inquiry in the midst of a legitimation crisis. Instead of reflecting on that severed link with tradition, rhetorical scholars regard in a taken-for-granted way the eclectic ethic as the new legitimation. Given an understanding of the emergence of an eclectic ethic as an attempt to deal with rhetoric's disintegrating tradition, it is now important to shift the ground of discussion to an examination of the intradisciplinary problems engendered by an eclectic ethic which operates beyond our reflection.64

The Intradisciplinary Problem of an Eclectic Ethic

Instead of striving to understand the eclectic ethic as a phase in rhetoric's legitimation crisis, scholars usually view the plurality of competing New Rhetorics engendered by that ethic as the cause of the present uneasiness among rhetorical scholars.65 Such an identification of cause renders pluralism itself the culprit. Interestingly, at the same time, the attitude among rhetorical scholars is one of ambivalence. While most critics applaud the emergence of transplanted perspectives as a welcome contrast to the monism of the Neo-Aristotelian critical system, the plethora of promises and claims from competing approaches has engendered an altogether different problem. Given an ambiguous situation in which transplanted perspectives compete for "New Rhetoric" status, all problems and methods of discussion of what is meant by intradisciplinary problems will follow.

64 A discussion of what is meant by intradisciplinary problems will follow.

65 The reader is asked to refer to Appendix A for a discussion of eclectic pluralism and to Appendix C for a discussion of ethic.
seem equally relevant and worthy of investigation. The historian and philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn has reported a similar inability to differentiate among contrasting claims for significance during periods of profound change within scientific paradigms.\(^{66}\) Rhetorical scholars show their awareness of such a situation within theory and criticism by the way in which they characterize the present situation. Typically the present crisis is viewed as a mixed blessing. In contrast to the "disciplinary senility" of Neo-Aristotelianism, claims Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, today's theory and criticism is evidence of disciplinary "maturity and vigor," of "disciplinary health and growth."\(^{67}\) At the same time, it is easy to become "frightened at the plethora of conflicting opinions" available to critics.\(^{68}\) To express a similar concern, words like ferment, chaos, crisis,

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\(^{66}\) Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962; rpt. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1970). There has been sufficient enough controversy over the term paradigm to make its use confusing rather than clarifying. Thus, citing Kuhn here is intended neither to indicate acceptance of that term nor to suggest that communication is paradigmatic, pre-paradigmatic, or at some other stage of paradigmatic development. Certainly, however, other scholars have addressed themselves to the paradigmatic state of communication. For two illustrations see Charles M. Rossiter, "Models of Paradigmatic Change," *Communication Quarterly*, 25 (1977), 69-73; W. Barnett Pearce, "Metatheoretical Concerns in Communication," *Communication Quarterly*, 25 (1977), 3-6. The relevant point to be made regarding the present discussion is that both Kuhn and this study note a similar confusion (the inability to assign relevance and/or significance) during times of crisis. Kuhn should be taken as support or verification of a crisis in rhetorical scholarship.


\(^{68}\) Ibid, 5.
information overload, future shock, and flux and tension are commonly used by critics when talking about contemporary scholarship. 69

Several factors contribute to that crisis mentality. First, whereas it was a relatively easy task to recognize a piece of Neo-Aristotelian criticism, classifying contemporary rhetorical criticism is a far more difficult task. While a Neo-Aristotelian critic could be confident about how to proceed given a particular critical object, critics have become far less secure with regard both to methodological choice (for they seem to have too many plausible choices) and also as to what constitutes a proper object of criticism. Today rhetorical critics can differ so substantially among themselves that they even disagree on whether all those who claim to be rhetorical critics actually deserve that classification. While an easy explanation for that confusion would be to point to the ambiguity over what constitutes an object and/or method of criticism, a more likely explanation may be the new disciplinary context which finds rhetorical and non-rhetorical studies conducted side by side. Academic departments which encompass both types of scholarship often seem to lack the "distinctiveness" which characterizes other disciplines. Though other disciplines seem to be "distinctive" because we feel we know what

a mathematician, psychologist, historian and so on does,\textsuperscript{70} the rhetorical scholar's struggle for legitimation evidenced by the eclectic ethic has so expanded the parameters of scholarship which claims to be rhetorical that it often seems incongruous with both traditional criticism which was clearly defined and with more recent criticism which goes off in fragmented directions. Eisenstadt's analysis of the development of sociology as a discipline characterized by the gradual emergence of distinct \textit{Problemstellungen} which distinguish it from other disciplines, highlights the disciplinary "distinctiveness" of sociology which developed despite the varied theoretical/conceptual traditions from which it emerged.\textsuperscript{71} In lieu of such a distinctiveness, rhetorical scholarship flounders in ambiguity. While the demarcation between rhetorical and non-rhetorical studies conducted by Neo-Aristotelian critics was perhaps too clear, the eclectic ethic seems to have blurred the boundaries unnecessarily.

Second, the absence of a disciplinary "distinctiveness" is predicated on a marked lack of integration of contrasting approaches. Far from being confident of the ties that bind us together as rhetorical scholars, we are tied to our own favorite approach. For all their respective claims of potential convergence to a critical understanding of rhetorical processes, we are left with lone disparate voices.


\textsuperscript{71}S. N. Eisenstadt, with M. Curelaru, \textit{The Form of Sociology: Paradigms and Crises} (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976), pp. 16-17.
Admittedly, synthesis is a difficult task. Both Cragan and Littlejohn echo the sentiments of many other critics. Cragan claims that "new rhetorics, methods and generic forms have created a pluralism that makes assimilation and synthesis difficult." For Littlejohn, the expression is almost identical: "the tremendous growth in research and theory has created an information overload making integration and synthesis very difficult."

A common way out of the maze is to search for a macro-theory, an effort which Michael Leff has termed "the search for Ariadne's Thread." Instead of synthesis and integration of diverse "New Rhetorics," the effect of that quest is often to add yet another competing claim for legitimacy for yet another macro perspective. Guided by the eclectic ethic, critics multiply new rhetorics. Yet often, the professed tolerance associated with that ethic masks an underlying monism. Both Cragan and Littlejohn join such a search. For Cragan it is Bormann's Dramatistic rhetorical visioning and for Littlejohn it is symbolic interactionism which promises to save us from death by exposure to too many competing perspectives. For


75 See Appendix A for a discussion of Booth's explanation of the way in which eclecticism engenders a pluralism which functions as either a masked monism or as a skepticism.
others, it is Rhetoric As A Way of Knowing, Phenomenology, Semiotics, or some other transplanted perspective. The logic of such an approach is interesting. Given a crisis situation in which the plurality of competing theories and methods confounds the critical endeavor, adding yet another perspective with universal claims to legitimacy seems strange, to say the least. While Leff cautions that we are not to the point in our scholarship where we can claim macro-theory status for any one perspective, the way of reaching such a desirable state is to do more research and theory.\footnote{Ibid, 90-91.} However, the production of more and more research from increasingly diverse perspectives does not, necessarily, result in greater understanding of rhetorical processes.\footnote{Often it seems as if novelty alone is the criterion used to determine the worthiness of a perspective. At the same time, as Dennis Gouran notes, "when novelty becomes a major criterion governing the choice of the dimensions of concepts on which to focus the volume of scholarship may burgeon while the growth of knowledge remains in check," in "Speech Communication: Its Conceptual Foundation and Disciplinary Status," 5.}

Several ways of coping with the present crisis are evident. First, there is an inter-disciplinary search for alternative perspectives which are then advocated as New Rhetorics. That effort can clearly be seen in the advocacy of the three dominant New Rhetorics briefly noted in the previous section as well as in the preceding illustration of rhetorical-vision analysis and symbolic interactionism. Second, there is a tendency both to continue multiplying critical studies based on older critical systems and also to conduct studies which substantiate the value of one newly advocated New Rhetoric. Each coping strategy compounds the eclecticism
and pluralism, thus making the fact of eclecticism and pluralism seem like the cause of that critical state. That critics have had to come to grips with the impact of eclecticism and pluralism is apparent throughout the literature: there are articles on varied ways to define the nature, function and scope of rhetoric, and on reasons why rhetoric should not be defined; there are publications advocating the necessity of a pluralistic approach, and those which argue for a rejuvenated monism. 78

Actually, identifying a plurality of rhetorics with the cause of the present anxiety among rhetorical scholars is so taken for granted that alternative explanations remain beyond our grasp. While the monism of traditional criticism led to criticisms of the quality and potential contribution of such rhetorical scholarship, the eclectic ethic has engendered an altogether different problem. Though it is commonly recognized that the expansion of the parameters of rhetorical scholarship has created an ambiguity in the identification of appropriate objects and methods, the intra-disciplinary problems engendered by such an ethic are actually far more serious than that confusion of object and method. That discussion will follow.

Multiplying rhetorics and arguments over definition which take for granted that eclecticism and pluralism are the cause of the present anxiety actually result in more and more studies and less and less convergence in our understanding of the present crisis. In a sense, eclectic coping strategies actually constrain critical understanding by contributing to the crisis without moving beyond crisis. Given that synthesis and integration are admittedly difficult tasks, we fall back on responding, on coping, rather than convergence in our understanding of the present crisis. The functioning of an eclectic ethic is less cause for alarm than its functioning beyond our reflection. 79

A noted attempt at a reflective convergence is Swanson's study of the epistemology of rhetorical criticism. 80 Most criticism, claims Swanson, is conducted from either the mundane or the critical stances within the natural attitude, and thus generates unreflected knowledge, i.e., knowledge based upon the assumptions and values the critic imposes on the critical object. 81 However, it is also possible to

79 The importance of reflecting on the present cause of crisis is grounded in a belief that it would be possible to better come to grips with crisis and to better find a way beyond crisis if we were able to identify and account for (reflect on) that cause.


81 Swanson derives his view of the natural attitude from Alfred Schutz who articulates this stance as one in which the everyday business of living is taken for granted and assumed to comprise the all of social reality. See Alfred Schutz on Phenomenology and Social Relations: Selected Writing, ed. Helmut R. Wagner (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1970), and Swanson, "A Reflective View," 208-210.
generate knowledge from the less commonly assumed vantage of the reflective attitude. Only reflective knowledge is able to "clearly discern the epistemological commitments of rhetorical critics as a community." That is the knowledge, the point of convergence, for which Swanson strives. However, Swanson's effort to by-pass conceptual and methodological squabbles by taking epistemological similarities as his starting point actually results in a schema for identifying the differences among critics. Thus the crisis in rhetorical scholarship recognized by Swanson is reduced to differing order epistemological construction systems. Instead of achieving his goal of revealing rhetorical criticism as a community-based activity informed by what is held in common by community members, Swanson's reflective effort puts into relief the diverse epistemological perspectives which demonstrate community pluralism and divisiveness.

A reflective understanding of the epistemic dimensions of the critic's generation of knowledge, however, requires more than an articulation of the various epistemological assumptions which unite

Though both the mundane and critical stances assume the natural attitude, they differ primarily in that the critical attitude questions the accuracy of knowledge produced in a specific instance whereas the mundane attitude accepts all knowledge unquestioningly.

82 Swanson, "A Reflective View," 210, derives his understanding of the reflective attitude from Schutz. The reflective attitude requires a "bracketing or setting aside of the objects of critical knowledge" which characterizes the natural attitude in order to arrive at an understanding of the nature of community critical knowledge and the process by which such knowledge is created.

83 Ibid, 208.

84 See footnote 85 for a discussion of Swanson's pluralism.
or divide rhetorical critics. Despite his aims, Swanson functions more within the critical stance within the natural attitude, missing his mark of a reflective attitude which would put into relief the emergence of the very epistemological differences he codifies.  

Though Swanson's reflective effort produces a systematic way of talking about the distinctions among critics, it contributes far less to an understanding of the historical context of critical inquiry—i.e., the tradition within which all rhetorical theorists and critics function regardless of epistemological, theoretical and/or methodological differences.

More important than identifying a system for the classification of pluralism among critics is an effort to inquire into the changed context for rhetorical inquiry, a changed context which marks the real abyss between past and modern rhetorical theory and criticism. Such an inquiry would be an investigation into the changing disciplinary context which places new demands on the theoretical/conceptual legitimation of rhetorical inquiry. Such an investigation opens up the possibility an an attention-switch from viewing pluralism as the

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85 While Swanson certainly believes that all criticism must proceed from within either the mundane or critical stances within the natural attitude, a criticism of criticism should proceed reflectively. It is clear that Swanson views his effort as a reflective criticism of criticism which has put aside the natural attitude. That is made clear in his title, "A Reflective View . . . ." I am arguing that Swanson missed his mark of a reflective inquiry and remains in the community natural attitude which affirms pluralism—the differences among competing approaches to rhetorical criticism. A reflective inquiry could proceed along the lines of this study by inquiring into what is held in common by all rhetorical critics, regardless of their differing acceptances of varied metatheories. A metacritical (see Chapter 2) inquiry examines the context for inquiry and a research ethic which all critics share.
cause of crisis to viewing the present pluralism and eclecticism as an indicator of a legitimation crisis engendered by the demands of an altered disciplinary context. 86

Such an attention-switch would be made possible by a reflective study which would differ from Swanson's both in its emphasis and in its potentiality for convergence. In emphasis, such a study would reflect on the process of interdisciplinary borrowing, a process which is inherent in the functioning of an eclectic ethic. Given an understanding of the eclectic ethic as a response to the demands for a new legitimation for rhetorical inquiry, such a study would also examine the process of legitimizing the borrowed interdisciplinary terms during times when traditional legitimations are in crisis.

One illustration of the potential convergence provided by such a reflective inquiry is offered by Kenneth Burke in his critical comments to the contributors to the Western Journal of Speech Communication symposium previously discussed, "The Uses of Speech Criticism." Burke expresses his concern over the eclectic ethic implicitly expressed by the symposium contributors, and his words sound like a scholarly warning to "beware." Burke speaks of a person from a field outside psychology who enters psychology with an interdisciplinary ethic, i.e., with interdisciplinary borrowing as the real goal. That person is as likely as not, claims Burke, mistakenly

86 For an explication of the use of the term attention-switch see footnote 30, this chapter.

and unknowingly to combine Freud, Adler, and Jung together under the rubric "psychology." Not only does that mistake do grave injustice to the intra-disciplinary distinctions among each in their own discipline, but the "mistake" is also unknowingly translated back into the translator's home discipline. Taking an eclectic ethic for granted makes it all too easy to fall prey to the ideal of the inter-disciplinary as a new legitimation for rhetoric, to the ideal of a pluralism of transplanted perspectives. An inquiry with potential to move toward convergence in our understanding is one which, as Burke claims, recognizes that "the ideal of the inter-disciplinary can serve to deflect our attention from a problem of the intra-disciplinary."  

This study should be viewed as an effort to approach an understanding of the intra-disciplinary component of an eclectic ethic which guides the rhetorical community into inter-disciplinary quests for new methods and topics. In his The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities, Northrop has noted the importance of inquiries which begin with a recognition of the intra-disciplinary character of its investigation.

Scientific inquiry in any field must begin not with some method taken over a priori from some other field, but with the character of its own

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88 Ibid, 182. Burke's criticisms here should not be interpreted as being inconsistent with his own critical axiom of "using all there is to use." Burke follows his own advice, and his work is clearly a testimony to inter-disciplinary borrowing. It is equally certain from Burke's comments that he thinks he borrows from an awareness of the subtle distinctions among and within disciplines whereas rhetorical scholars do not.

89 Ibid, 180.
field and the analysis of those problems. A subject becomes scientific not by beginning with facts, with hypotheses or with some pet method brought in a priori, but by beginning with the peculiar character of its particular problems.

This study should be viewed as such a beginning, since the intra-disciplinary component of an eclectic ethic is implicated in the manner in which inter-disciplinary borrowing takes place.

On that point, Burke warns inter-disciplinary translators in rhetoric that one "must somehow pick and choose among rivals in a field not professionally his own." That Burke was so concerned with the way in which problems of this sort are "solved" by not even being considered is evident in the fact that he took up this same argument again several years later in his Dramatism and Development lectures. Burke indirectly refers to the symposium conference by noting that some years back

I attended a conference at which one speaker proposed that a certain kind of material should be treated by combining insights derived from the sciences of anthropology, psychology, and sociology. But which anthropology, which psychology, which sociology? For instance, the speaker recommended borrowing from Freud and Jung, as though they were quite the same thing, and without reference to the fact that often you would have to choose between them. Since each of these three special sciences is marked by much internal controversy among specialists within that field, on what methodological grounds can someone outside

91 Ibid.
92 Kenneth Burke, Dramatism and Development (Barre, Massachusetts: Clarke Univ. Press with Barre Publishers, 1972), p. 35.
any such particular field justify his choice among rival experts within the field?\textsuperscript{93}

Typically, someone from one discipline is most likely to recognize the disciplinary "distinctiveness" of another discipline without being aware of the intra-disciplinary theoretical/conceptual issues and differences which characterize intra-disciplinary dialogue within that field. The potential problems of an eclectic ethic are compounded because of this difficulty of being aware of the complexity of the theoretical/conceptual and disciplinary context of another discipline. The problem can be simply expressed: because the basis for identifying and selecting the terms and methods to be translated cannot derive from the context in which they arise and exist, the basis for that identification and selection arises from one's own field, from the orientation which the would-be translator brings from his/her own field. "Ordinarily," claims Burke, "the model he is using in his own field dictates his choices from among his rivals in an alien field."\textsuperscript{94} Intra-disciplinary problems can develop within the discipline to which the translation is to be imported unless the translator can argue for a choice on solid methodological grounds. To Burke, such a methodological justification would be an argument made in terms of the translator's own "particular over-all terministic perspective" and "terminology" or grammar.\textsuperscript{95}

Even more basic than the particular "model" or terminology from which the translator approaches another discipline is the natural

\textsuperscript{93}Ibid, pp. 34-35.
\textsuperscript{94}"Comments," 180.
\textsuperscript{95}Dramatism and Development, pp. 35-36.
attitude which exists within the translator's own discipline and which orients the interpreter's efforts in identifying and selecting what is appropriately translatable. Swanson's reflection on epistemological construction systems is an effort to identify epistemological commitments which form the natural attitude of differing rhetorical perspectives. The present use of the term natural attitude points to the functioning of the eclectic ethic which takes for granted the value, the ideal, of the interdisciplinary reflecting neither on the reasons for the emergence of that new value nor on the intra-disciplinary problems which can be masked when that ethic operates beyond our reflection.

Because it is guided by the taken-for-granted eclectic research ethic, inter-disciplinary translation can create an intra-disciplinary problem if the translation process is not open to community reflection. This is particularly true in a community such as the present rhetorical scholarly community in which an interdisciplinary ethic and value constitute the natural attitude. It is important to now turn to a discussion of the scope, rationale and method for such a study.
CHAPTER TWO

RATIONALE AND METHOD

To date, rhetorical scholarship has striven neither to understand old rhetorics in terms of the new nor to synthesize and to integrate emerging rhetorics. In sanctioning an eclectic pluralism, we contribute little to rhetorical understanding either of the legitimation process per se or of why we need so many New Rhetoric contenders. However, if the numerous Rhetorics engendered by an eclectic ethic are viewed as being not only reactions to the limitations of previous critical systems but also as being efforts to re-establish rhetorical investigations within an altered disciplinary context, then a yet-to-be-established point of potential convergence could follow from a systematic consideration of the process of legitimizing new rhetorics.

To such an end, a case study is available in the instance of legitimizing a previously successful New Rhetoric—the Burkeian critical system—during a prior crisis in rhetorical scholarship. Burkeian terms and methods introduced during the 1950's and 1960's as "correctives" to the perceived constraints of Neo-Aristotelian criticism have contributed to the present eclectic pluralism, yet no systematic critical effort has been made to examine the translation and assimilation either of the Burkeian transplant or of other New Rhetorics. By better understanding the process through which Burkeian criticism
has been introduced and legitimized as a viable New Rhetoric it is possible to adumbrate an understanding of the translation now under way in the name of additional eclectic perspectives.

The significant contrasts between the contexts of justification of the 1950's/1960's and the 1970's/1980's arise from the disparate demands of scholarly audiences operating amidst altered disciplinary affiliations. That transition suggests that both the choices made by the first interpreters of Burke in the 1950's, including Marie Hochmuth Nichols and Virginia Holland, and the manner in which they were rationalized flowed from the demands of earlier contingencies. Given the different intellectual milieu now, it can be argued that it is possible and beneficial to strive toward a reflective convergence by attempting a re-translation of one of the most successful New Rhetorics of the 1950's and 1960's, Kenneth Burke's Dramatism. Informed by altered and diverse scholarly concerns, a re-translation could be expected both to identify for translation other aspects of the Burkeian critical system and also to provide markedly different rationalizations for those choices.

A re-translation does not have as its goal proving that the first introduction of Burke was mistaken or misdirected. Instead, this investigation takes as its starting point the differing concerns which inform the translation process at two points in time. Via a systematic

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1To reiterate, an eclectic perspective is one which owes its life to another disciplinary context and which has been imported into rhetorical scholarship. As discussed in Chapter I, the present situation is best characterized by calling attention to the plethora of such approaches now vying for rhetorical birthrights.
consideration of the Burkeian transplanted perspective at two points in time—(1) its initial introduction as a modification of perceived inadequacies in the Neo-Aristotelian critical system, and (2) the present intellectual milieu of newer claims to legitimacy—it is possible to initiate an assessment of the extent to which Burkeian terms and methods translated in the 1950's and 1960's as a New Rhetoric are relevant within the present context of alternative, competing New Rhetorics. Are the Burkeian categories of the first translation relevant to scholarship in the 1980's and beyond? Can a re-translation, made needful by an altered intellectual climate, suggest modified interpretations of Dramatism which may be even more significant for future scholarship?

Evident of the discrepancy between the two periods is the differing emphasis of each Burkeian interpretation. The first translators offered to scholars particular Burkeian terms and methods which seemed to rectify specific deficiencies identified with Neo-Aristotelian criticism. Both the selection of remedial terms and methods and also the way in which they were legitimized as a New Rhetoric derived from a particular scholarly tradition which takes rhetoric as being primary in the Dramatistic system. Operating within that understanding of man as, first and foremost, a rhetorical being, scholars naturally focused on Burke's view of man and of rhetorical processes. In arguing for the assimilation into rhetorical scholarship of that dimension of Burke's critical system, they also took those correctives to be representative of Burke's whole Dramatistic system. Typically, Burkeian rhetorical scholars have not questioned whether rhetoric
is actually as primary within the Dramatistic system as it is in the scholarly rhetorical tradition. Instead, the focus has been on the ability of Burke's definition of man and of rhetoric to expand upon the Neo-Aristotelian view.\(^2\)

For the first translators of Burke, then, particular aspects of Dramatism gained their significance because of their potential locus within a rhetorical understanding rather than, primarily, from their position within the Dramatistic critical system. Rather than replicating that interpretation, this re-translation will be a systematic effort to examine critically the Dramatistic perspective from which the earlier translated terms and methods were extracted. While rhetorical scholars have previously taken key dramatistic particulars as the Dramatistic whole, a re-translation would strive to identify the whole by replacing those particulars into their original context, thus seeing them as part of a holistic Dramatistic structure having its own inherent logic.

At this juncture, it is necessary to speak to the use of the words "whole" and "holistic" since those concepts play a significant role both in the rationale and in the conduct of this re-translation.

\(^2\)Certainly Burke himself takes this as one of his goals. In his "Introduction" to A Rhetoric of Motives (1950; rpt. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1969), p. xiii, Burke articulates his task as one of "reclamation" as well as expansion of the subject "beyond the traditional bounds of rhetoric." See also, Kenneth Burke, "Rhetoric—Old and New," The Journal of Education, 5 (1951), 203. The point being argued is that, though Burke clearly expresses his concern with rhetoric by making rhetoric an essential part of his trilogy (Grammar, Rhetoric, and Symbolic), rhetoric is not necessarily the term of principal significance. In fact, Burke provides evidence suggesting that Grammar is his guiding term. The inter-relationships among each will be explored as a part of Chapter Three.
case study. The effort is **restorative** in that the task is one of re-instanting extracted particulars (key definitions and terms) to their original Dramatistic place and function. In Chapter I there was a brief discussion concerning the importance of thinking of Dramatism as an intellectual system whose holistic meaning is **more than** the sum of key definitions uprooted from the systemic whole. While prior interpretations of Burke have tended to **take as the whole** one or two crucial terms, a re-translated holistic approach aims to disclose the whole via a reconstruction of the meaning key transplanted terms (Burke's definitions of rhetoric and of man, for example) take on when seen within the context of the system which gave rise to them.

Thus, a restorative attempt is contextual in two ways: first, the system provides its own context for the terms which distinguish it from other intellectual wholes, and, second, the system itself bears its own holistic meaning as a system from the relationship it adopts vis-à-vis the environment within which it develops. Burke's discussion of the way in which artistic and critical works are strategies encompassed by situations goes a long way toward explaining this latter sense of the relationship between an intellectual system like Dramatism and the situation which provides the impetus for its creation. A holistic comprehension cannot be gained unless both contextual aspects are confronted. These two aspects are significant in the analysis in Chapter Three.

Significantly, the assertions made by this study regarding the first Burkeian translation differ fundamentally from those made by William Rueckert. In his capacity as editor of *Critical Responses to*
Kenneth Burke, Rueckert comments on the holistic, systematic way in which rhetorical scholars have approached Burke. Commenting on Marie Hochmuth Nichols' influence in translating Burke into speech communication, Rueckert claims that Nichols' 1952 essay "Kenneth Burke and the 'New Rhetoric'"

is representative of the way people in modern rhetoric (speech) have responded to Burke: through his theory of rhetoric, naturally, but in terms of it as the central part of the larger dramatistic system. This means that, unlike many literary critics, they have always tended to see Burke as systematic and whole (which seems to me the proper way to see him).³

By seeing Burke "as systematic and whole," Rueckert means that students of rhetoric "saw almost at once that Burke's system was a system, that it was centered around rhetoric, and that it could provide them with a powerfully and socially meaningful theory and methodology for the analysis and evaluation of speech-acts."⁴ According to Rueckert, rhetorical scholars have typically conducted Burkeian studies which take as their starting point a Dramatistic system whose essential term is rhetoric.

The argument over whether prior interpretations of Burke have been holistic is, fundamentally, grounded in disparate orientations toward Dramatism. In explicating, first, the ways in which Rueckert believes Burke to be accessible, and, second, the manner in which this

³William H. Rueckert, ed., Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1969), pp. 286-287; Marie Hochmuth Nichols, "Kenneth Burke and the 'New Rhetoric'," QJS, 38 (1952), 133-144.

⁴Ibid, p. 308.
study approaches Burke, it will be possible to further develop a rationale for the importance of examining the translation/re-translation of the Burkeian Dramatistic system. Three questions are crucial to such an inquiry: How has Burke's system been translated? What are the alternative means of translation which could support a re-translation? In what ways do differing approaches to translation render different translated content?

How Has Burke's System Been Translated?

Rueckert's claim that rhetorical Burkeian scholars had an holistic understanding of Dramatism because they understood at once that rhetoric and rhetorical processes were at the core of the Dramatistic system adopts, using Rueckert's own distinctions, a philosophical approach to Burke. For Rueckert, two types of Burkeian studies are possible, the one historical, and the other philosophical: the former are chronological, developmental studies which highlight how Burke's work cumulated in the final Dramatistic synthesis; the latter are less concerned with the linear progression of Burke's thought than with revealing the coherence of the Dramatistic system as a system. In other words, whereas an historical study would emphasize Dramatism

It is important to briefly clarify the use of the term translation in this context. Usually, translation refers to the act of systematically conveying expression from one language into another; thus, translation usually points to a text in an original language. The present use of the term—to describe an inter-disciplinary process—strives to understand one instance of selecting and legitimizing within the translator's discipline a term, idea, or method indigenous to another discipline. Underlying this use is the assumption that different disciplinary languages (each having its own conventions and manner of identifying and articulating its problems) cannot always be easily understood by members of other academic communities.
as the end product or result of Burke's life work, a philosophical approach would somehow show the particulars of the system in terms of the system itself. Burke, likewise, has marked a similar distinction between the historical and the philosophical, each being a different languaging-strategy for assessing motives: "... language is involved in shifts between two quite different terministic strategies for the placement of motives (the one narrative, the other of the sort that we get in the formal definitions of philosophy, science, dictionaries)."^7

Of most importance at this point in the discussion is the philosophical type of study to which Rueckert calls attention. Rueckert seems to share Burke's view that a philosophical approach leads to a focus on formal definitions. Rueckert assumes that if rhetorical scholars identify key Burkeian terms—i.e., formal definitions which comprise the system—then that focus expresses their awareness of the Dramatistic system as a system.

Taking rhetoric and the correlative terms identification and consubstantiality as a starting point can provide access to the system. Clearly, that is the path adopted by Marie Nichols, one of the first rhetorical scholars to become convinced of Burke's relevance to rhetorical studies. Nichols' concern was not, primarily, to disclose the entirety of Dramatism but rather to translate those dimensions of the system which could potentially come to bear on 1950's/1960's rhetorical scholarship. Consequently, she engaged in a grammatical

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^6Ibid, pp. vii-viii. Rueckert considers his work historical; none of the philosophical sort are cited.

^7Kenneth Burke, "Comments," WJSC, 32 (1968), 183.
translation focusing on Burke's view of rhetoric in order to demonstrate how that view marked an advancement and refinement of the Aristotelian view.\(^8\) Holland adopted a similar approach.\(^9\) Campbell's later translation identified Burke's formal definition of man as the symbol-using animal as the key to Burke's system, and thus argued for the relevance of that definition over both the Neo-Aristotelian rational definition and also the social-scientific behaviorist definition.\(^10\) Despite the changed disciplinary context for rhetorical inquiry which separated Nichols/Holland from Campbell and despite the audiences to whom each had to legitimize the Burkeian transplant,\(^11\) each argued for selected Dramatistic grammatical components bearing directly on man's rhetorical nature.\(^12\)

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\(^8\) Consult footnote 12, this chapter, for clarification of this use of the term "grammar." Marie Hochmuth Nichols' translation appears in Marie Hochmuth [Nichols], "Kenneth Burke and the 'New Rhetoric'," QJS, 38 (1952), 133-144; Marie Hochmuth [Nichols], "Burkeian Criticism," WJSC, 21 (1957), 89-95; Marie Hochmuth Nichols, Rhetoric and Criticism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1963). See also footnote 2, this chapter, for reference to Burke's view of his task in reformulating the Aristotelian conception of rhetoric. See also Ch. 1 for reference to some of the many criticisms which have been levied against Neo-Aristotelian critical practice. In fact, the ways in which that system has been criticized appears in discussions throughout.


\(^11\) See Chapter One.

\(^12\) The usage of the term grammar in this context derives from Burke's view of philosophical grammars. Referring to Dramatism, Burke calls that system a "labyrinthine city of terminology" (Attitudes
As legitimizers of Burke—i.e., as scholars responsible for the introduction and advocacy of the Burkeian New Rhetoric—Nichols, Holland, and Campbell believed the Burkeian remedy to Neo-Aristotelian critical practice to be grammatical in nature. It is possible, they argued, to improve on that system by adding the Burkeian definition of rhetoric, the Burkeian Pentad, or the Burkeian definition of man. However, the problem with gaining access to Dramatism through terms relating to rhetoric and rhetorical processes is that it remains impossible to know if that construing represents an emphasis which is actually primary within the Dramatistic system. It becomes possible for rhetorical legitimizers of Burke to validate their translation only in terms of their own choice of rhetoric as primary, thus telling us more about rhetorical scholarship than about Dramatism per se.\(^1\)

Once legitimizers had introduced Burkeian remedies, some critics became practitioners of Burkeian rhetorical criticism. Like

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Toward History [1937; rpt. Boston: Beacon Press, 1959], "Introduction," no pagination). That terminology is an intricate inter-locking of numerous formal definitions (man, rhetoric, symbolic, identification, substance, and so on) which, when taken together, comprise the Dramatistic system. A focus on key terms or definitions as a means of gaining access to the Dramatistic whole, then, can be called either a philosophical (based on Rueckert and Burke's descriptions of a philosophical study or languaging-strategy) or a grammatical approach.

\(^{13}\) Each translator argues for Burke's definition of rhetoric and/or of man as essential in expanding upon a too narrow Neo-Aristotelian view. Promises made for acceptance of the Burkeian perspective include its ability to recapture the essence of an Aristotelian notion (Nichols, "Burkeian Criticism," p. 60), its potential to offer contemporary critics "the most productive and viable ontological basis from which to develop a complete and coherent theory of rhetoric" (Campbell, "The Ontological Foundations of Rhetorical Theory," 106), and its contribution in refining the critical skills of rhetorical critics (Holland, "Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Approach in Speech Criticism," "Kenneth Burke's Theory of Communication," and Counterpoint).
legitimizers, practitioners tended to stress Dramatistic grammatical components. At the same time, those critical studies can be distinguished by their diversity. A significant body of Burkeian rhetorical criticism has been devoted to an application of Burke's Pentad to traditional problems of rhetorical criticism. Sharing with the Neo-Aristotelian critic a concern for explicating single rhetor, immediate effects, speaker style and delivery, and the impact of the speaking context on the speaker, Burkeian critics have used the Pentad to illuminate old problems and old speaking contexts. Though such studies employ the Pentadic method as a displacement for the Neo-Aristotelian historical method, at the same time they share the traditional concerns of those earlier critics. Other Burkeian critics, however, have radically altered what can properly be considered an

14 These roles are adapted from Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1962) and William R. Brown, "Ideology as Communication Process," *QJS*, 64 (1978), 123-140. These complementary roles—innovator, practitioner, cumulator—represent the varied interpersonal communicative roles which can be taken in the creation of new paradigms. Though both Kuhn and Brown use the term innovator to characterize the revolutionary role of that group, I have selected the term legitimizer instead. The latter seems to me to better accentuate the role an "innovator" must enact and the position the innovator takes vis-à-vis his/her tradition. In other words, legitimizer seems to capture the critical orientation toward the tradition within which and in whose name the new is advocated. Too, it seems to feature the strategy of introducing the new—legitimizing the new rhetoric as a rationale for the old, for example—and, thus, be more descriptive a term of this role enactment than innovator.

appropriate critical object. In taking into account not merely micro analyses of past speaking situations, but also multiple rhetors, multiple audiences, contemporary events, and diffused effects, some Burkeian critics have widened the parameters of rhetorical criticism by their application of Burke to new problems and new contexts. Among others, such studies include social movements, organizational settings, murders and sex role stereotypes. Some specifically utilize the Pentad, while others focus on Burke's view of rhetoric and on the importance of rhetorical processes in human communication.

A third group of practitioner studies focuses on the translation and/or refinement of a term or term cluster which either has already been translated by legitimizers or which aids in the further explication of terms from the earlier translation. In particular, terms such as form and substance have been the object of critical scrutiny. Occasionally, methods other than the Burkeian Pentad seem to require further delineation, and these, too—as in the cluster agon method—have occupied the attention of rhetorical scholars.


See for example, Carol A. Berthold, "Kenneth Burke's Cluster Agon Method: Its Development and Application," CSSJ, 27 (1976), 300-309; Robert L. Heath, "Kenneth Burke on Form," QJS, 65 (1979), 392-404; Jane Blankenship and Barbara Sweeney, "The 'Energy' of Form," CSSJ,
Despite the diversity among Burkeian critics, practitioners have, nonetheless, tended to "ratify" the value of the legitimizer's translations by focusing on selected grammatical components of Dramatism which seem most useful to the scholarly rhetorical endeavor. Overall, practitioner and legitimizer efforts tend to be enterprises of tracking down the implications of key Burkeian terms for the more primary term, rhetoric and rhetorical processes. The assumption by both legitimizers and practitioners is that access to the Dramatistic system can be gained via a focus on their understanding of Burke's view of rhetoric.

However, whereas Rueckert rightly states that rhetorical legitimizers and practitioners have assumed Burke's system to be rhetorically grounded, recognizing that a system is predicated upon a formal definition of rhetoric is not, necessarily, a comprehension of the systemic whole. In fact, though rhetoric is a significant term within the Dramatistic system, Rhetoric only takes its place along with other members of Burke's Dramatistic triad, Grammar and Symbolic. Each component—Grammar, Rhetoric, and Symbolic—represents different strategies or functions indigenous to the dramatistic nature of language. Despite the importance of the rhetorical and symbolic,

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18 In composing his trilogy, Burke "sought to formulate the basic stratagems which people employ, in endless variation, and consciously or unconsciously, for the outwitting or cajoling of one another." Those strategies or "devices" which are "addressed" to some person or to some advantage pertain to rhetoric, whose nature is best characterized by "observations on parliamentary and diplomatic devices, editorial bias, sales methods and incidents of social sparring;" additionally,
according to Burke, it is the grammatical function which is "logically prior to both the rhetorical and the psychological [Symbolic]." Though there is much overlapping among those three terms, nonetheless, the "central theme" of Dramatism must be taken to be the Grammar. Thus, while it is easy to see why an approach to Burke's system which construes rhetoric and rhetorical processes as the essence of the system could be taken by Rueckert as an appropriate way of comprehending the totality of the Dramatistic system, rhetoric remains only one term, albeit an important one, in Dramatism.

What are the Alternative Means of Translation Which Could Support a Re-Translation?

It is important to find some avenue other than rhetoric which leads into the Dramatistic whole. The problem is one of how to proceed reflexively, i.e., of how to set aside one's own grammar in order to understand Dramatism on its own terms. This section will argue that a re-translation could proceed reflexively and metacritically by those "concerned with modes of expression and appeal in the fine arts, and with purely psychological or psychoanalytical matters" are classified as symbolic; and, finally, "theological, metaphysical, and juridical doctrines offer the best illustration of the concerns we place under the heading of Grammar," A Grammar of Motives (1945; rpt. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1962), pp. xvi-xviii.

Ibid, p. xviii. It should be recalled that this study has linked Burke's concern with the philosophical with a concern with the grammatical. Consult Footnote 12, this chapter. For Burke, the existence of a grammar is a prerequisite to developing a philosophical system; thus grammar is logically prior to the generation of those systems.

Ibid.

For discussion of reflexive and natural attitude see Chapter One, pp. 42-44, footnotes 80-85.
employing the Dramatistic Pentad as an alternative modus operandi. Each will be explored in this section.

Burke himself provides a rationale for using the Pentad to delineate philosophical systems. Focusing on doctrines of materialism, idealism, pragmatism, realism, and mysticism, Burke has determined the essential Pentadic element which best conveys the pivotal element in each. Through his analysis, Burke claims that idealism features the agent; in materialism, the scene puts all other terms into perspective; in pragmatism, agency is most important; purpose is supreme in mysticism, and act dominates in realism. Differing Pentadic depictions give rise to divergent attributions of motives. However, while Burke utilizes the Pentad as an instrument for elucidating other philosophical systems, he fails to articulate reflexively the nature of Dramatism. Though by employing the Pentad he is able to discriminate among other doctrines, his failure to apply his procedures to his own Dramatistic construction leaves that philosophy unfeatured. Nor have rhetorical scholars rushed to take up the task of reflexively understanding the Dramatistic system. Though Pentadic analyses of rhetorical events abound, rhetorical critics have yet to conduct Pentadic analyses of philosophical-symbolical systems.

Yet, since Burke takes drama as his "titular" term, it is important to find some way to discern which Pentadic ratio captures the essence of the dramatistic system in order to know what Burke means by a dramatistic attribution of motives. This is especially important

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22 Grammar, pp. 128-129.
since, for Burke, drama is more than a metaphor or perspective on the world. In fact, drama should be taken as a depiction of the essence of life. Thus, rhetorical scholars purporting to conduct Burkeian analysis need to know what a dramatistic depiction of life means in terms of Burke's overall system.

It is important to explore more fully the basis for maintaining that a Pentadic analysis can allow for an enhanced understanding of Dramatism. Whereas both Rueckert and Burke view a philosophical approach as one which gains access to a symbolic system via its formal grammar, it is likely that an interpreter will be pre-disposed to choose a terminological entry point which is consistent with a prior orientation and not, necessarily, with the terminological emphasis indigenous to the system. This inquiry takes as its goal a critical

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23 Grammar, p. xxii. In a private conversation at the Speech Communication Association Annual Convention, Washington, D.C., 1976, Burke has been reported to have stated that "Life is Drama." More recently, Burke has reiterated his conviction that Life is Drama (Eastern Communication Association, Hartford, Connecticut, 1982). In response to a paper by Bernard Brock in which Brock referred to dramatism as a metaphor, Burke strongly asserted that he meant drama to be taken literally rather than figuratively. More than using the term drama as a convenient and/or heuristic way of talking about life and human motives, Burke intends to call attention to the essence of life as drama. At that time, Burke repeatedly referred to his statement published in the 1968 edition of The International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, v. 7 ("Dramatism," pp. 445-451) in which he maintains that "drama is employed, not as a metaphor but as a fixed form . . . ." Drama, then, is more than a metaphorical figure of speech. For Burke, its employment captures the substance, the essence, of human life.

Because of Burke's acceptance of the Aristotelian notion of entelechy (to be discussed in Chapter Three), his taking of drama as the essence of life means that human life constantly strives toward its most perfect realization/actualization of its essential potentiality. Burke makes much of that "perfecting" motivation in human symbol-users, so, consequently, it is important to understand what he means by his a priori that Life is Drama. Granting entelechy, then, life is ever perfecting its dramatistic essence.
encounter with dramatism, and claims that employment of a dramatistic critical instrument (the Pentad) is an appropriate strategy for ensuring that a would-be translator put aside preconceived ideas concerning what is important in the Burkeian system. The end goal of such an approach would be to identify a system's key terms from within rather than to impose them from outside.

Though to my knowledge rhetorical critics have not produced any translation cases, the interests which inform such a case study are drawn from the current intellectual milieu. The need to confront a rhetorical object on its own terms—minimizing as much as possible the imposition of preconceived notions—has recently been elucidated as an inherent dimension of the rhetorical critical act. Most often that concern has been articulated as an interest both in the critical act as an act of interpretation and also in the relationship between criticizing and theorizing in rhetoric.

Such preoccupations naturally lead in two interrelated directions: (1) to a focus on the critical systems adopted by rhetorical critics, and (2) to a focus on the way in which critical systems and/or theories are legitimized. Both fall within the scope of a re-translation.

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Regarding the first point, this reflexive analysis can be termed metacritical in that it takes Dramatism as a rhetorical object, and with it, the way in which Burkeian criticism has been translated and legitimized as a noted rhetorical critical system. As metacritical concerns, questions of interpretation and justification require an articulation of the being, knowing, and valuing dimensions both of the object of translation and also of the new context of its introduction and assimilation.

A concern with the ontological, epistemological and axiological correlates in rhetorical communication further distinguishes recent scholarship. Though interest on being, knowing, and valuing was perhaps evident in the 1950's and 1960's during the first translation of Burke, other issues were more primary. For example, while Campbell advocated Burke on ontological grounds as the most appropriate alternative base for improved criticism, those ontological claims were not aligned with epistemological and axiological dimensions of the Dramatistic system. By taking Burke's definition of man as the symbol-using agent as the ontological grounding of Dramatism, Campbell mistook one terminological component—albeit a significant one—as the ontological foundation of Burke's rhetorical system, and thus of the Dramatistic whole.

27 It is important to make clear that a re-translation of Burke ignores neither the importance of the rhetorical uses of language nor the significance of man's rhetorical experience. The issue here is two-fold. First, in assuming the a priori primacy of the term rhetoric,
During the 1970's, however, epistemology, ontology, and axiology have all become more salient terms, and some scholars have begun attempting to devise ways of correlating them. A significant statement in that regard is Brown's "Making Present the Past: Public Address History," which speaks of historical interpretation as being an act of identifying "the dimensions of being, knowing, and valuing" which characterize Weltanschauungs; such interpretations are related to "symbolic transformations" and make it possible for the rhetorical critic to study the process through which one Weltanschauung gives way to another. Citing P. Albert Duhamel's statement that "the content of the idea 'rhetoric' ... or of the conception of what constitutes effective expression, is dependent upon the epistemology, psychology, and metaphysics of the system in which it occurs," Kathleen Jamieson attempted to tie metaphysical, epistemological, psychological and axiological dimensions of Weltanschauung to the rhetorical choices, the structure of arguments, and the evidence presented in support of it is possible that the first translators imposed their concerns onto the dramatistic grammar, concerns with rhetoric and rhetorical processes which may not have been as central to the dramatistic grammar as they have been in rhetorical scholarship. Second, there is a difference between adopting a rhetorical approach—say, to translation—and asserting that rhetoric is the essence of the system to be translated. The rhetorical approach to re-translation to be explicated shortly, attempts to examine the dramatistic grammar in its own context, imposing as little as possible from the particular grammar of the translator approaching the dramatistic system.


29 Ibid.
the 1968 papal proscription of artificial birth control. Likewise, in 1979 Gerard Hauser stated that, rather than merely being shaped by metaphysical, psychological and epistemological assumptions, rhetoric actually creates those dimensions.

Regarding the second point, the arguments for more and more meta-theories discussed in Chapter One leave unaddressed the way in which critical systems like Dramatism are legitimized as New Rhetorics. Recently, the question of what legitimizes a rhetorical theory has been addressed by several rhetorical scholars. Though from differing perspectives, McKerrow and McGee identify the correspondence between a rhetorical theory and the actual rhetorical practice of the time as a primary criterion for the appeal to legitimacy.

Still, few scholars attend to linking rhetoric and legitimacy. Recently, Francesconi has called attention to the lack of a "developed theory integrating rhetoric and legitimacy," a deficiency which derives from the fact that the concept of legitimacy is typically assumed

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33 Ibid.
rather than made the object of critical reflection. Because of the importance of questions of legitimacy to this re-translation and because Francesconi's study of James Hunt and the Wilmington 10 is an attempt at constructing a rhetorical theory of legitimacy, its understanding of the rhetorical dimension of legitimacy is pertinent.

Francesconi defines legitimacy as "a right or title to exercise authority" and grounds that right in a cooperation between the wielder of authority and the willingness of others to yield to that authority. Due to that cooperative dimension, legitimacy is predicated upon "a rationality of good reasons." Both the capacity to exercise authority and the willingness to defer to specific authoritative persons and/or groups derives from the particular socio-political organization of institutions and persons within a given societal context. That institutional network is upheld and given meaning by a socially-constructed reality of interlocking values and norms, deemed rational by its members. The appeal of legitimacy requires an appeal to that rationality.


35 Ibid.

36 Ibid, 50.

37 Francesconi derives his emphasis on the rational condition for legitimacy from Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, Thomas McCarthy transl. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975).
The basis of that appeal is rooted in rhetoric, and points to the rhetorical dimensions of legitimacy. According to Francesconi,

Rhetoric performs a vital socio-political function by bridging the gap between legitimacy as claimed by those who would exercise authority and legitimacy as believed by those who would obey it. Rhetoric defines and mobilizes the values and beliefs at the heart of this process.

Such a rhetorical theory of legitimacy, then, must account for the epistemological operation of rhetoric as the means through which the rational grounds of legitimacy are created, defined, and activated. Though Francesconi does not explicitly identify his attempts at a rhetorical theory of legitimacy with Rhetoric As A Way of Knowing theorists/critics, his approach to linking rhetoric and legitimacy assumes that the relationship is inherently epistemic.

Efforts at linking rhetoric and legitimacy underscore the significance of context for the generation, application, and legitimation of rhetorical theories and critical schemes. Though inspired by such inquiries, the present attempt differs somewhat from those precursors. While both McKerrow and McGee take rhetorical theory to be a codification of principles and techniques which must represent and/or pertain to the actual rhetorical practice of a given society, a metacritical look at legitimation focuses on the way in which rhetorical theoretical-critical schemata gain academic institutional legitimacy. Such an investigation looks less at whether there is

\[^{38}\text{Ibid, 50.} \text{ Francesconi maintains that "the distinction between legitimacy as believed and as claimed emphasizes the rhetorical dimensions of the term," Ibid.}\]
consistency between a schema and the practice of the larger society (McGee, McKerrow) or whether there is consistency between arguments linking legitimacy claims to societal beliefs (Francesconi) than at the conditions of introduction and justification of new theoretical-critical systems.

It is instructive to clarify such a point of departure by recalling Max Weber's three-part typology of legitimate authority. For Weber, there are three pure types of legitimate authority--the rational, the traditional, and the charismatic. Rational legitimacy grounds its authority in what Francesconi calls the rational order of society, that is, the network of norms, rules, and values upholding societal institutions. Weber explains the appeal of such rationalizations by pointing out the way in which society members believe them to be "legal" and binding. A differing legitimation derives its authority from the power of tradition and from the granting of status to institutions, persons and rationalizations embodying and perpetuating that heritage. Contrasting with both rational and traditional legitimacy, a charismatic authority bestows privilege to persons performing deeds and/or possessing special skills or abilities valued by the society.

Though varied in their emphases, Francesconi, McGee and McKerrow focus on rational legitimacy by calling attention to the binding authority of societal interrelationships, institutions, and the

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rational rules and norms which legitimize them. By contrast, a meta­
critique isolates a turning point in rhetorical scholarship in order
to better understand the conditions which have engendered a crisis in
legitimacy. Ours is a crisis of traditional legitimation. In the past,
rhetorical scholarship has formulated a traditional appeal to the
humane heritage for its justification. The changing disciplinary
context for the academic practice of rhetorical inquiry has severed
those traditional bonds and asserted demands for rhetorical scholars
to participate in the creation of rational bonds of legitimacy which
could unite both rhetorical and social­scientific scholars. As
Rosenfield has asserted, the single most compelling task for contem­
porary scholarship is that of enhancing our understanding of our
severed link to traditional authority. The problem, argues
Rosenfield, is neither one of antiquated theories nor of inconsis­
tency among varied theoretical conceptual schemes and their accounting
for rhetorical practice.

As a breach in our traditional legitimation, ours is a crisis
of values more than a crisis of knowledge. In other words, what has
been challenged by the changed context is the fundamental rationale
for the conduct of rhetorical inquiry irrespective of the peculiarari­
ties identified with any one specific theoretical­critical system's
knowledge claims. The predicament must be delineated vis-à-vis an

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40 This argument has been developed in Chapter One.

41 Lawrence Rosenfield, "An Autopsy of the Rhetorical Tradition"
in The Prospect of Rhetoric, Lloyd F. Bitzer and Edwin Black, eds.
inquiry into the rhetorical process of legitimation as primarily axiological rather than epistemological.

Burke's creation of Dramatism is an especially appropriate focus for such an investigation. Burke explains that Dramatism, which takes action as its starting point contrasts sharply with systems which are grounded in the generation of knowledge. As a terminology for understanding human action, Dramatism is both ethical and moral--i.e., it is an axiological system. While knowledge claims derive from the application of Dramatistic methods and terms, their articulation is in terms of action (conceived dramatistically) rather than in terms of knowledge (conceivedScientistically).^42

Taking Dramatism as a metacritical case, then, may benefit our understanding of our crisis of legitimation by examining a system which explicitly addresses issues of value and justification. The marked contextual nature of such a study is evident both in acknowledging the condition of crisis within rhetorical scholarship and also in recognizing the import of contextual demands on Burke's development of Dramatism. Thus the task is not merely to see Dramatism whole via a reflexive-metacritical analysis but also, then, to examine that system contextually, that is (1) in terms of the context in which Burke developed dramatism, and (2) in terms of the differing translation contexts within the rhetorical scholarly community which make it possible to arrive at different translations of dramatism.

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^42 Burke's contrasting of Dramatism and Scientism as well as the axiological dimensions of Dramatism will be discussed in subsequent chapters.
Burke gives a clue that is especially helpful in thinking contextually. For Burke, artistic and critical works are strategic and stylized in that they are "strategies for the encompassing of situations." Such strategies "size up the situations, name their structure and outstanding ingredients, and name them in a way that contains an attitude towards them." Those strategies have "public content" in that one's choice of strategy derives from the public domain and one's enactment of choice is open to public understanding and interpretation.\footnote{Kenneth Burke, *The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action*, 3rd ed. (1941; rpt. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1967), p. 1.}

A similar approach to the importance of situation or context in giving rise to strategic responses has been recently articulated by Alan Brinton. Brinton identifies "the central normative concept" in Bitzer's view of situation as "appropriateness or fitness, not merely stylistic appropriateness . . . but appropriateness with respect to situation. Rhetorical acts are to be evaluated in terms of the degrees to which they fit the situation. It is for this reason that situation is essential and basic to the theory of rhetoric."\footnote{Alan Brinton, "Situation in the Theory of Rhetoric," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 14 (1981), 238.}

Burke's development of a dramatistic terminology needs to be examined contextually as a strategic response to a particular situation, that is, as an appropriate and fitting response to a perceived situational exigency. Burke's choice of dramatism as well as the choices translators have made carrying over his terms into other
critical systems need to be evaluated in the sense of context just discussed. The alternative means of translation—as a Pentadic analysis of Dramatism itself—is informed by the concerns of the present in rhetorical scholarship. Given the present legitimation crisis, this case study is rationalized as a "fitting" and particularly appropriate endeavor, that is, as a strategic response to a situational exigency. Having identified the Pentadic component(s) which most reveal the center of dramatism, Chapter Three will then discuss that structure in terms of the context which gave rise to development.

In What Ways Do Differing Approaches to Translation Render Different Translated Content?

A translation and a re-translation have been discussed, each approaching Burke from differing vantages: the first from a non-reflexive approach which identified rhetoric as dramatism's key term, the second, a reflexive metacritical approach which will be taken in Chapter Three. Each yields disparate translated categories. The assumption that rhetoric is primary led the first translators of Burke and subsequent Burkeian rhetorical critics to the identification of a Pentadic ratio featuring agent-agency. Operating from an Aristotelian perspective which identified man as the rational agent, rhetorical legitimizers and practitioners located a Burkeian symbol-using agent who is by nature rhetorical; rhetorical discourse through symbol use is the agency through which agents express their rhetorical being. To date, Burkeian rhetorical scholarship, typically, can
best be understood as a displacement of an Aristotelian view with a Burkeian approach which left intact the Aristotelian agent-agency ratio.\(^{45}\)

However, rhetorical scholars cannot claim to know the Pentadic ratio essential to the Dramatistic system by, first, inquiring into the ratio reflected in Burke's rhetorical system. On the contrary, for Burke, the "titular" term which describes his philosophy is dramatism.\(^{46}\) Before there can be an agent with a purpose capable of acting according to some means, there must be a scene in which action can take place. For Burke, the scenic backdrop for action is dramatistic. Dramatistic scenes can only give rise to dramatistic action. This is the case because, for Burke, all the possible relationships among the Pentadic grammatical components must be consistent with a dramatistic scene. The principle of grammatical consistency among Pentadic components can be expressed in the following axiom: the container (scene) must be fit for the contained (action).\(^{47}\)

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\(^{45}\) The argument is not being made that this is, necessarily, the essence of the Aristotelian grammar, for such a claim would require a Pentadic analysis of that system translated from its original language. What is being asserted is that the Aristotelian system, as interpreted and inherited by twentieth-century rhetorical scholars, has incorporated such a dominant ratio (agent-agency) as its principle grammatical essence.

\(^{46}\) *Grammar*, p. xxii.

\(^{47}\) For one explication of this grammatical consistency axiom see *Grammar*, "The Container and Thing Contained," pp. 3-20. This argument is also upheld by the fact that Burke takes drama as the substance/essence of human life, a life which operates according to the principle of entelechy. See footnote 23, this chapter. A thing (say Life is drama) cannot actualize other than consistently with its own nature (i.e., dramatistic scenes/dramatistic actions).
Typically, rhetorical Burkeian scholars have understood scene in a limited sense as the varied context or situation in which the agent-agency ratio is enacted, rather than as the a priori "titular" term (drama) which captures the essence of all scenes, regardless of variance across them. A common rationale for using the Pentad is, of course, that its inherent flexibility allows the critic to arrive at innumerable ratios, depending on context or situation. Thus, the critic is able to see more of the complex contextual inter-relationships than was possible using a traditional methodology.

Starting from Burke's characterization of scene as first and foremost dramatistic, a study from a Pentadic vantage will yield a scene (materialism)-act (realism) ratio which, it will be suggested, better captures the meaning of dramatism than the earlier agent-agency translation. Other evidence supporting that translation will, of course, be provided. Given both Burke's own explication of grammatical consistency between the scene and the act and also his emphasis on dramatism as a philosophy of action, it is significant to understand what his system says about the kinds of action (rhetorical and non-rhetorical) which are possible in a dramatistic scene. To accomplish that task, it will be important to demonstrate that ratio's grounding in a particular ontology, epistemology, and axiology which can be labeled dramatistic. In Chapter Four, there will be a comparison and summary of the differences between the dimensions of being, knowing, and valuing which are arrived at via the Pentadic ratios of each translation. Not only do the differing approaches to Burke's system yield differing Pentadic ratios with differing
dimensions, but also those approaches allow for differing understandings of the context out of which Burke developed his dramatistic strategy. That context will be discussed in the second section of Chapter Three.

**Justification of Study**

Typically, the justification for conducting a study is framed in terms of probable knowledge yields. What knowledge will be produced by the study? Will that knowledge aid other scholars in coping, predicting, or controlling? The justification for this re-translation study has been grounded in the following claim: an enhanced understanding of the rhetorical process through which transplanted perspectives become legitimized among rhetorical theorists and critics potentially provides a point of convergence in our understanding of the present crisis within rhetorical scholarship. We are less in need of more and more New Rhetorics and metatheories than in need of a more thorough metacritical understanding of the process through which transplanted perspectives move through New Rhetoric and then to Old Rhetoric status.

The rhetoric of the future, claims Gerard Hauser, "should examine how humans synthesize and harmonize conflicting views of knowledge and how humans create and set forth principle for acting in action-demanding situations." The present crisis requires action, yet

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without synthesis and integration of what we know about ourselves we often fail to act or we merely respond to the crisis. All too frequently, our actions engender divergence in a situation which begs for convergence. Convergence may be possible if we recognize, with Robert Scott, that for

a community to sustain itself, both through re-affirmation and reform, [it] must be formed of members who will take the responsibility of examining critically the binding forces, the norms, of the community and of recognizing that the traditions accepted and extended entail living consistently with the social demands.49

A systematic consideration of the legitimation process of New Rhetoric claims entails just such an engagement with our traditions. The re-translation process is one in which the new is informed by the old, and vice versa; the new is not a replacement for the old rhetoric, but rather an alternative vantage point from which it is possible to arrive at alternative understandings--re-translations--of the old.

Such an investigation could also contribute to the formulation of an axiological theory of the rhetorical process of legitimation. Theorizing along those lines could provide a metacritical convergence point beyond the presently rivaling Epistemic, Phenomenological-Hermeneutical, and other New Rhetorics. That possibility will be developed in Chapter Four.

A RE-TRANSLATION OF THE ONTOLOGICAL, EPISTEMOLOGICAL, AND AXIOLOGICAL COMPONENTS OF KENNETH BURKE'S DRAMATISM

Despite the abundance of applications of Burkeian terms and methods among rhetorical, literary, and sociological researchers, to name only a few, the meaning of Dramatism remains enigmatic.¹ All too frequently, scholars comment on Burke's labyrinthine complexity, on the twists and turns of his language and of his arguments, making him difficult to grasp whole. While we often conduct Burkeian criticism by selectively employing his categories in order to illuminate the dramatistic dimension of rhetorical and communicative occurrences, typically such criticism operates on the mundane rather than on the metacritical level.³ It is possible to apply a Dramatistic

¹The importance of discriminating between the meaning and the significance of Dramatism will be discussed in this chapter as well as in Chapter Four.

²Consult Chapter Two for a discussion of the way in which this study uses the terminology of a holistic approach.

³See Chapter One for the discussion of Swanson's distinctions among mundane, critical, and reflective criticism. A re-translation is a criticism of a critical system, thus it is metacritical and reflective. Though Swanson asserts that his task is reflective, it is on a metatheoretical rather than on a metacritical level. That emphasis directs Swanson to identify the epistemological differences among various theoretical orientations rather than to articulate the shared value-based research ethic which forms the natural attitude of the scholarly rhetorical community. Required by the current crisis discussed in Chapter One is not the development of a typology of metatheoretical differences among scholars but rather a metacritical

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language without metacritically unravelling the terminological complexity which is the Dramatistic system.

Some have expressed the difficulty of metacriticism (criticism about criticism) as one of how to explicate Burke's system without using Burke's terminology. Putting the problem in that way assumes that the validity of interpretation rests on the degree to which the object of scrutiny intrudes upon the language employed in its delineation. Thus, valid metacriticism of Burke would strive to distance the interpreter from Dramatism by guarding against excessive dependence upon Burke's terminology. However, it can be suggested that it is the intrusion less of the language of the critical object than of the critic's own expectations which influences critical claims.

Hirsch has called attention to the determining role a critic's presumptions play in interpretation. In his *Validity in Interpretation* he speaks of interpretation as a process in which "we construe this meaning instead of that because this meaning belongs to the type of meaning we are interpreting while that does not." A metacriticism of Dramatism which emphasizes the critic's prior orientation will be less concerned with avoiding Burkeian terminology than with developing procedures which take into account the critic's *a priori* orientation.

stance which directs attention toward our natural attitude (presently distinguished by an eclectic ethic) which assumes that macro and/or metatheoretical enterprises significantly contribute to an enhanced understanding of our disintegrating tradition.

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In that one anticipates types of meanings—this or that, as Hirsch claims—expectations can be said to be "generic" which requires a genre-based perspective of interpretation. To clarify and to demonstrate the applicability of that approach to re-translation, it is instructive to point out the impact of generic understanding on the earlier interpretation of Burke. Consistent with the primary position rhetoric occupied in their conception of human communication, Nichols and Holland took Burkeian thought as this (that is, as a contemporary rationale for Classical rhetoric) and not as that (that is, as something else which would conceivably allow rhetoric to play a variate role in Burkeian thought). Beyond assuming that rhetoric is as fundamental to Burke as it is to the rhetorical tradition, Nichols and Holland further ascribed to Burke a meaning of rhetoric which would be congenial with their rhetorical tradition. They did not entertain the possibility that rhetoric could mean a that (something which could not so easily be assimilated by their scholarly tradition) rather than

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Ibid. It is important to discriminate Hirsch's genre-based approach to criticism from genre rhetorical criticism. In the latter, genres are conceived of as typologies of message types. The discerning attributes of rhetorical genres such as Presidential inaugural addresses, funeral orations, and Jeremiads can be correlated with the formal requirements of the rhetorical situations out of which they evolve. Having delineated the elements which comprise several specific genres, it becomes possible for critics to classify messages as this or that type of genre. As in Hirsch's explanation, identification and classification is by type. At the same time, the difference between the two is significant: while rhetorical critics endeavor to categorize rhetorical messages/discourses by type, Hirsch is involved in developing a way of understanding the process of understanding, an effort which requires that attention be directed toward the process of ascribing meaning and significance (each will be discussed subsequently). Whereas genre rhetorical studies are critical, Hirsch's concern is meta-interpretative and metacritical.
the this they discerned. Most frequently, we operate on the mundane level, rarely questioning the likelihood that something could be that rather than the this we have generically designated.

This re-translation proceeds as if it is possible to construe an alternative rendering of Dramatism within a different generic frame. An excellent illustration and explanation of this approach is provided by Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn has coined the expression "an alternative way of reading texts" to articulate his efforts to grasp why Aristotle could have failed to comprehend physical motion when he had been so accurate in his observations of biological and political behavior. According to Kuhn, his conviction that Aristotle was "mistaken" in his views of motion gave way once he recognized that the permanent ingredients of Aristotle's universe, its ontologically primary and indestructible elements, were not material bodies but rather the qualities which, when imposed on some portion of omnipresent neutral matter, constituted an individual material body or substance. Position itself was, however, a quality in Aristotle's physics, and a body that changed its position therefore remained the same body only in the problematic sense that the child is the individual it becomes. In a universe where qualities were primary, motion was necessarily a change-of-state rather than a state. 

Using Hirsch's terminology, Kuhn's generic categorization of the Aristotelian conception of motion was due to his expectation that deviations from modern scientific knowledge were appropriately subsumed under the genre of "mistake." An alternative reading was made.

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possible by a shift in generic frame which permitted Kuhn to arrive at a changed perception of Aristotelian motion.

Relatedly, it is important to note Welleck and Warren's demarcation between a text's "eternal" and "historical" existence. Eternal dimensions are those which provide a text with its own identity, that is, with its own integrity as a unique creation. Its historical life is its accumulated history including varying interpretations of its meaning, sundry criticisms of its value, and so on. Hirsch has spoken of the enduring dimensions of a text as its meaning (which, for Hirsch, is its meaning for its author) and of the historical existence of a text as determinations of its significance which may vary across time. It can be suggested that Kuhn's initial understanding of Aristotelian motion began at the level of significance. In designating the Aristotelian notion as a mistake, Kuhn understood in accordance with modern science which takes the Aristotelian conception of motion to be irrelevant to its pursuits. Once Kuhn developed an altered generic frame, it became possible for him to understand the meaning of Aristotle's view of motion within the Greek world and not merely its significance to modern science.

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9 Hirsch, p. 211, p. 216. Welleck and Warren argue that such terminology allows for "perspectivism" rather than relativism or absolutism. Perspectivism permits the identification of a work of art in reference to "the values of its own time and of all the periods subsequent to its own," Ibid, p. 43. Through an approach which focuses on the eternal and the historical, it is possible to overcome relativism and absolutism (or, in the words of this investigation, pluralism and monism). This point will be developed throughout the rest of this essay.
A reflexive metacriticism endeavors to momentarily put aside the question of significance in favor of arriving at an enunciation of the meaning of Dramatism as a holistic system, having its own unique distinguishing qualities. In the initial stages of re-translation the task is to arrive at a determination of what is constantly and enduringly dramatistic. Earlier translators of Burke have posited a meaning predicated on their expectation of its significance, that is, based on the relationship they perceive it to have vis-à-vis their own generic frame. The methodological problem of a re-translation becomes one of how to "bracket" or put aside the generic presumption that Dramatism must be understood as this rather than that.

Previous discussions have alluded to this difficulty as one of developing procedures for bracketing the natural attitude. Such an approach neither denies the natural attitude nor eliminates questions of significance from critical understanding. Instead, the methodological task is to admit their determining influence in interpretation and to adopt procedures which self-consciously take them into account. Rather than increasing the distance between the translator and the Burkeian system, metacriticism attempts an encounter with what is enduringly and eternally Dramatistic through adopting its terms as a reflective move to get inside the system and its meaning. Rather than striving to avoid employing Burkeian terminology, then, the methodological problem of a re-translation becomes one of how (early in the critical process) to put aside questions of significance which involve making judgements about Dramatism based on factors not necessarily indigenous to the meaning of Dramatism per se.
Before specifying the procedures of this re-translation, it is necessary to address one further point. It could be objected that an approach which treats Dramatism as a text not only is inappropriate but also is more indicative of textual than of rhetorical criticism. Yet, since Dramatism is a compilation of texts through which its meaning is developed and advocated, it seems logical to suggest that a determination of its eternal meaning must involve the critic in an analysis of Dramatism as a text. Further, assessing the textual meaning of Dramatism is an investigation which arises from the need for rhetorical scholars to come to grips with the modern crisis among the humanities discussed in Chapter One. While many acknowledge the weakening bonds of traditional legitimations, few have articulated the need for rhetorical scholars to reflectively inquire into the rhetorical tradition and its present position vis-à-vis that crisis. However, what is "at stake ultimately is the right of any humanistic discipline to claim genuine knowledge. Since all humane studies, as Dilthey observed, are founded upon the interpretation of texts, valid interpretation is crucial to the validity of all subsequent inferences in those studies."^10

As with other humane studies, the validity of rhetorical inquiry and the knowledge it generates is threatened by the impact of the social sciences and their forms of rational legitimations.11 Increasingly, rhetorical theorist/critics have expressed a concern with the

^10 Hirsch, p. viii.

^11 Consult Chapter Two for a discussion of Weber's three forms of pure authority/legitimation and their potential relevance to this investigation.
validity of rhetorical knowledge through their explorations into the relationship between critics and critical objects and the impact of that association on critical claims.12

The spirit of these probes can be captured by Fisher's phrase of "informed innocence" and by Rosenfield's term "appreciation" toward a critical object.13 Though they do not employ this terminology, such searches are for an understanding of the critical process which strives to articulate the integrity of the critical object (its meaning) and its significance to the critic's audience. To argue for the validity of our interpretations requires formulating procedures which encourage a bracketing of questions of significance and of the natural attitude in order to minimize the likelihood that significance will be taken as the meaning of the critical object. The quest is for what Abraham Kaplan has called a "dynamic openness" which admits that valid inquiry is grounded in a struggle to maintain an open mind and not an empty mind.14

12 Though certainly not exhaustive, the following works raise questions which are of crucial concern in this endeavor. See Edwin Black, "A Note on Theory and Practice in Rhetorical Criticism," WJSC, 44 (1980), 331-336; Michael C. Leff, "Interpretation and the Art of the Rhetorical Critic," WJSC, 44 (1980), 337-349.


14 Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963), pp. 68-70. Citing Kaplan here is not intended to suggest his conformity with the views of meaning and significance conveyed in this essay. In fact, Kaplan makes no such distinctions, for he asserts that meaning changes over time. Ibid.
Given such a rationale for a reflective and metacritical method, it is now necessary to articulate the procedures which will implement that method. It is one thing to maintain the gravity of putting aside one's generic natural attitude and quite another to specify the manner in which that is to be accomplished. In the spirit of using Burke to illuminate Burke, two approaches will be intertwined, the one a Pentadic analysis and the other a "master metaphor" analysis. In arguing for Pentadic analyses Burke asserts that its components—Act, Agency, Agent, Scene, Purpose—offer the dramatistic critic a simple yet exhaustive critical vocabulary. As discussed in Chapter Two, Burke views the Pentad as his core grammatical tool, and, since Grammar is antecedent to both Rhetoric and Symbolic, the Pentad must be highly significant, indeed. Consequently, a Pentadic analysis has great potentiality to reveal the meaning Burke held for Dramatism. The case for a "master metaphor" approach will be made subsequently in this chapter. In *Attitudes Toward History* Burke speaks of using "metaphorical analysis" as a literary critical method to unravel the cluster of associations in poems which reveal the internal components of the poet. In like manner, these will be the basis of this metacritical re-translation of the Dramatistic meaning. Not only have both approaches been adopted by Burke in his own criticism but also, according to Burke's testimony, both are essential Dramatistic components.\(^{15}\) Since the meaning of Dramatism is, in large part, what Burke thinks it means, employing terms and methods which he designates as essential is an especially appropriate manner of

\(^{15}\) Though Burke proclaims the import of both the Pentad and metaphorical analysis throughout his work, their most extensive treatment is in *A Grammar of Motives* and *Attitudes Toward History*, respectively.
determining that meaning. At this point, it is sufficient to say that such an approach will allow for an alternative "opening" into Dramatism, via mystery and authority rather than the more common route of man as a symbolic communicator. This is not to imply that man is not a symbolic communicator, but only that a featuring of mystery and authority result in very different understandings of Dramatism and the role Rhetoric plays therein.

Drawing both on the importance of a metacritical inquiry and also on Burke's use of the Dramatistic Pentad to explicate the ratio implicit in other systems, this section will engage in a Pentadic and metaphorical analysis of Dramatism itself as a reflexive move which employs Burkeian terminology to illuminate Dramatism. Having conducted that analysis, the re-translated ratio of scene (materialism)-act (realism) will be discussed in terms of such Dramatistic correlates of being, knowing, and valuing which are implicated by that essential ratio. It will be argued that the meaning of Dramatism can best be understood as Burke's strategic response to a particular situation. Since the suggestion is that reflective procedures will render a translation closer to the original meaning, it will be important to keep in mind throughout the bearing this re-translation has particularly on our understanding of the relationship between Rhetoric and Symbolic so important to Burke.

A Pentadic Analysis of Dramatism

Perhaps more than any other term, identification has most frequently been isolated by rhetorical scholars to depict their translation of Burke's view of rhetoric. Burke himself asserts its significance by using that term to sum up the difference between a traditional view of
rhetoric ("the old rhetoric") and "the new rhetoric." Burke claims that "the key term for the old rhetoric was 'persuasion' and its stress was upon deliberate design. The key term for the 'new' rhetoric would be identification, which can include a partially unconscious factor in appeal." An "accessory" to the traditional view is needed because "the classical notion of clear persuasive intent is not an accurate fit for describing the ways in which the members of a group promote social cohesion by acting rhetorically upon themselves and one another." Those actions are acts of identification, the key to the New Rhetoric. Rhetorical scholars have translated Burke's reconceptualization of the Aristotelian view of rhetoric to mean that rhetorical AGENTS can be both rational and irrational, having conscious as well as unconscious motives and PURPOSES for their rhetorical ACTS. Given an unconscious factor in persuasion, it is important to examine the knowing as well as unknowing selection and use of AGENCIES for persuasive appeal.

At first glance, Burke's own criticism "The Rhetoric of Hitler's 'Battle'" seems to confirm an agent-agency emphasis. In maintaining that Hitler "evolved his 'cure-all' in response to inner necessities, Burke stresses the function of personality and individual motivation in persuasion." At the same time, the purpose of Burke's criticism of Hitler is "to forestall the concocting of a similar medicine in America."
Primarily, the emphasis is not on the number of potential Hitlers popu-
lating America but rather on the similarity between the two scenes which
make it likely that a similar cure-all would be as willingly accepted.
In that Hitler brought to life ingredients already present in the scene,
he moved from the realm of "'pure' paranoia, where the sufferer develops
a wholly private structure of interpretations" to the public arena of
Rhetoric rather than Symbolic. That rhetorical process of "materializ-
ing" an inner motivation into public communication was accomplished by
a materialization of religious patterns of thought which saw the Jew as
the international devil, the Aryan blood stream as the materialization
of the superior Aryan race, and Munich as "the materialization of his
unifying panacea." Burke correlates the effectiveness of the

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20 Ibid, pp. 213-214. In A Rhetoric of Motives, Burke contrasts the
differing concerns of Rhetoric and Symbolic. A Symbolic focus is on
individuals "in their own uniqueness, hence outside the realm of conflict.
For individual universes, as such, do not compete. Each merely is, being
its own self-sufficient realm of discourse." According to the "rules of
Symbolic, the individual is treated merely as a self-subsistent unit pro-
claiming its peculiar nature." Considerations of actual conflicts with
others are categorized as Rhetoric. From a rhetorical standpoint, "the
victim of a neurotic conflict is torn by parliamentary wrangling; he is
heckled like Hitler within . . . . Rhetorically, the neurotic's every
attempt to legislate for his own conduct is disorganized by rival fac-
tions within his own dissociated self. Yet, considered Symbolically,
the same victim is technically 'at peace,' in the sense that his identity
is like a unified, mutually adjusted set of terms. For even antagonistic
terms, confronting each other as parry and thrust, can be said to 'coop-
erate' in the building of an over-all form," pp. 22-23. When it is
necessary to discern those differences, this essay will capitalize
Rhetoric and Symbolic. When the word "symbolic" is used to denote
Burke's definition of man and the symbolic nature of all human communi-
cation, symbolic will not be capitalized. It is important to keep those
distinctions in mind throughout, and they are especially relevant in the
case of Burke's view of Hitler in that Burke wrote "The Rhetoric" and
not "The Symbolic" of Hitler's Battle.

21 Ibid, notably p. 194, p. 203, p. 205, and p. 219. Burke repeat-
edly uses the word "materialization" to describe the persuasive appeal
of Nazism. Another statement which illuminates Burke's view of the
materialization of the religious pattern with the weakening of the religious bond by the emergence of modern "capitalistic materialism." \(^{22}\) The similarity between Germany and America resides in the susceptibility of each to those forms of materialization due their respective capitalistic materialistic structures.

Whereas the previous interpretation of Burke conceives of the unconscious dimensions of identification as a human property which finds its expression through the use of persuasive agencies, Burke's treatment of Hitler reinforces the public rather than the private as the proper purview of Rhetoric. \(^{23}\) That emphasis is grounded in Burke's view of identification and consubstantiality. Identification incorporates the concept of consubstantiality; for Burke identification is more a rhetorical act than a human attribute. In a Burkeian sense, the establishment of consubstantiality through identification process of materialization is found in his explanation of artistic creation. In *Counter-Statement* (1931, rpt. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1968), Burke speaks of the "channelization" of a private emotion into a symbol. Symbols serve "as a formula for our experiences, charming us by finding some more or less simple principle underlying our emotional complexities. For the symbol here affects us like the medicine for an ill," p. 31. In his criticism of Hitler, Burke refers to Hitler as a poet (p. 206, p. 215) and to his poetry as medicine (p. 191, and elsewhere throughout). The issues concerning the materialism in Burke's thought will continue to be raised throughout this chapter. See particularly this chapter, footnote 100.

\(^{22}\) *Ibid*, p. 194.

\(^{23}\) Again it is important to point out the important distinctions between Symbolic (the private realm of personal motives) and Rhetoric (the public realm of conflict and division between individuals and classes, groups and nations). See footnote 20 and 32, this chapter. See also *A Rhetoric of Motives*, pp. 27-28, and passages repeatedly throughout *The Rhetoric*.
constitutes a rhetorical ACT. Burke notes that A can never be B; yet, to the extent that "their interests are joined, A is identified with B. Or he [A] may identify himself with B even when their interests are not joined, if he assumes that they are, or is persuaded to believe so." Identification is an ACT because, Burke notes, "substance in the old philosophies was an act . . . ." Through identification the substance of A and B becomes consubstantial. Consubstantiality then is an "acting-together," a shared participation which is necessary to the maintenance of a way of life.24

Hitler's persuasive success was less the result of his internal motivation than it was accountable to the German scene out of which the anti-Semitic message was constructed and to which it addressed its appeal. Burke speaks of the way in which the Nazi materialization of religious forms offered

a noneconomic interpretation of economic ills. As such, it served with maximum efficiency in deflecting the attention from the economic factors involved in modern conflict; hence by attacking 'Jew finance' instead of finance, it could stimulate an enthusiastic movement that left 'Aryan' finance in control.25

Through that identification, any "bad" features of capitalism could be projected onto the Jewish "devil," thereby preserving intact the system of capitalism.26 Thus, maintaining the capitalistic system


25"The Rhetoric of Hitler's 'Battle'," p. 204.

through an acting-together against its threat from the Jewish devil became the rhetorical objective.

Rhetorical action is, first and foremost, social action in the sense that it must depend on the material forms of expression available within a given social order. Another way of saying this is that, unlike Symbolic which focuses on the unique individual's internal motivation, rhetoric concerns itself with the public domain and, therefore, with the actual communicative constraints and possibilities which exist within a particular system. Rhetoric is concerned with the rhetorical ACT which, regardless of one's internal motivation, functions to establish consubstantiality between and among different economic and/or social classes. The "interests" of A and B that are joined are the economic and social interests indigenous to the respective classes to which each belongs, and as such are public, a point to be developed further along in this chapter.

Two examples will now be presented of the functioning of Rhetoric (through identification) to establish consubstantiality. A discussion of the way in which they illustrate the paramount importance of scene in rhetorical communication will follow. Burke utilizes the instance of a shepherd whose role of guarding the sheep suggests "concern only [for] their good;" in fact, though, his guardian function implicates him in their slaughter as well. In a Burkeian sense, an unconscious terministic screen is operative, for

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27 A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 27-28. Consult numerous previous references in this chapter discussing the distinction between Rhetoric and Symbolic.
a total stress upon the autonomy of the pastoral specialization here functions rhetorically as a mode of expression whereby we are encouraged to overlook the full implications of his office.28

Because the shepherd participates in the interests of the slaughter as much as in those of the sheep, he unconsciously contributes to stabilizing and advancing the system of raising sheep for market, and thus he is an excellent illustration of the "ways in which we spontaneously, intuitively, even unconscious persuade ourselves" to identify "with family, nation, political or cultural cause, church and so on."29

Burke supplements that example with a brief discussion of two college students who, though they are present during the same lecture, will integrate the subject matter in different ways, incorporating what they hear into the particulars of their own experience. At the same time, their mutual presence as students in a college classroom "is a roundabout way of identification with a privileged class" by participating in an activity which promises "'belonging'" to an advantaged group.30

Both illustrations touch on the realms of Rhetoric and Symbolic. To the extent that both the shepherd and the students exist autonomously in their respective roles, integrating their experiences

28Kenneth Burke, Language As Symbolic Action, pp. 301-302. See also A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 27.

29Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, pp. 301-302; see also, ch. 3, "Terministic Screens" which are responsible for "directing the attention," p. 49.

within their own internal motivation structure, their activities can be considered Symbolic. However, regardless of the disparate unconscious motivations of each, those activities function in the rhetorical arena when they engender identification with some other social or economic class. Autonomy is Symbolic, belonging is Rhetorical.

Persuasion is the means by which a society's way of life is created and perpetuated. For Burke, "a way of life" is "an acting-together" (a consubstantiality) of disparate individuals belonging to differing classes. To be consubstantial is to be "joint participants in common principles." Those common principles are the economic and social structure within which the individual acts. While Symbolic acts are autonomous, having little to do with social and economic principles, it is these principles which have import for the role of Rhetoric in communication.

The claim is that rhetoric arises from a scene whose characteristics can be delineated in terms of conflict and division. It is

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31 Ibid.

32 Ibid. Earlier translations of Burke have failed to distinguish between Rhetoric and Symbolic, and, have often treated them synonymously. Taking Burke's view of man as the symbol-using animal as primary, can easily lead to an assumption that all communication (including rhetorical communication) is properly considered symbolically, as the act of a symbol-using animal. Certainly, rhetorical communication is a particular use of language by a symbol-using animal and, for that reason, is in its broadest sense symbolic. However, The Symbolic has a purview distinct from The Rhetoric, though both are made possible by Burke's definition of man as a symbol-user. Still, each points to fundamentally different levels of analysis—the one individual and private, the other social and public.

33 A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 21-22.

34 Ibid.
that SCENE which makes rhetoric necessary, for rhetorical action is predicated upon conflict and division among social and economic classes. If estrangement among classes did not exist, communication would be "natural," "spontaneous" and symbolic rather than, "as it now is, partly embodied in material conditions and partly frustrated by those same conditions." For Burke, Rhetoric is the means of establishing consubstantiality among classes, momentarily merging disparate individuals/classes into a shared identity of common principles. As a consubstantial acting-together, Rhetoric ensures that the divisions which distinguish the society's way of life be perpetuated.

As joint participants in common social principles, Rhetorical AGENTS derive their Rhetorical nature from the requirements of the SCENE in which they find themselves rather than, primarily, from their Symbolic being.

Identification and consubstantiality are rhetorical ACTS upon a SCENE which both create and perpetuate scenic order. The question naturally arises regarding what kind of scene would require such on-going reinforcement from repeated acts of identification? Though the term mystery has received little attention from Burkeian scholars who typically emphasize identifying with an audience through persuasive use of rhetorical appeals, it is with that concept that the Dramatistic SCENE can most appropriately be described. Before

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35 Ibid. Put another way, communication would be Symbolic, flowing naturally and spontaneously from the individual, rather than it is now--primarily rhetorical necessitated by conflict and division. For Burke, the material conditions are the realities of differences among individuals and classes evidenced by property, differences which are solidified in hierarchy. These material conditions constrain Symbolic, and give rise to Rhetoric.
continuing to explore mystery and the manner in which Burke develops that scenic term, it is necessary to (1) review three articles by scholars which take mystery as a guiding concept, and (2) discuss the seemingly paradoxical relationship between a scene simultaneously depicted as materialistic and mysterious.

Few scholars have commented on Burke's use of the term mystery much less used that concept to illuminate Dramatism. Noted exceptions include the study conducted by Tompkins, et al., in which mystery was delineated as a construct which could be tested in an organizational context; Smith's application of hierarchical mystifications to clarify Erikson's sex role theory; and Woodward's exploration of mystery as a means of maintaining cultural control in a colonial setting. 36

Tompkins, et al., isolated mystery in the hopes of successfully diverting organizational research from its atheoretical path. If such Burkeian terms as hierarchy, order, mystery, and identification could yield fruitful information about organizations, then it might be possible to develop a Burkeian theory of communication in organizations based on those terms. 37 Smith's exposure of "a social hierarchy that is based upon sex roles and supported by the mysteries of sex

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37 Tompkins, et al., 135.
and science" was accomplished in the hopes of increasing critical awareness of all forms of hierarchies. Woodward's goal also was directed toward future critics of social mystifications. Given the social control function of hierarchy, it is important for critics to consider the "victims of mystifications" as the most accurate indicator of the degree of mystification present in any social and economic structure.

Following Burke in linking mystery, hierarchy and authority with the maintenance of control by the social and economic privileged, each sees mystery operating in diverse contexts. Nonetheless, like other critics before them, their intention in appropriating a particular Burkeian term was to enlist its service in theorizing or in criticizing about rhetoric and communication. Though their research has contributed to an awareness of a cluster of terms previously neglected by scholars (hierarchy, authority, mystery, order), the intent of their application constrained them from treating mystery reflexively to illuminate Burke's system.

Before proceeding with that reflexive task, it is necessary to discuss briefly the seeming paradox of the assertion that a scene can be both material and mysterious. Actually, the three works just discussed provide a clue. Each treats mystery as embodied in a hierarchy of class and roles, a hierarchy which, as long as it remains unexposed, perpetuates its own existence. Each member remains securely lodged

\[38^{38}\text{Smith, 27 and 30.}\]
\[39^{39}\text{Woodward, 303.}\]
at a given level, as long as the mystery which binds together the hierarchy continues unquestioned and intact. Hierarchy is the material embodiment of the fact of mystery. Mystery is the condition of estrangement, of conflict and division, which exists among humans. Its origin (and continuation) parallels the introduction into the world of the moral negative ("Thou Shalt Not"), an event which coincides with the acquisition of language. Its contemporary manifestation, so important to a capitalistic way of life, is property. Property is a "scenic word" which suggests the numerous ways in which identities are formed "in terms of property" and the inevitable "turmoil and discord" which such identifications incur. The identifications which individuals form with property result in the diverse coalitions which correspond to differing hierarchical classes. It is the moral negative which restrains the questioning of the mystery which ensures the perpetuation of the hierarchy: Thou Shalt Not disobey the authority of the symbols which uphold the hierarchy. That authority is embedded in the mystery.

Though this has been merely a brief introduction to mystery as the hierarchical incarnation of estrangement among humans, it suggests that, for Burke, the role of mystery in society is symbiotic more than paradoxical. It is now important to explore more completely Burke's emphasis on mystery and the authority of the mystery as a means of perpetuating the scene, and the purpose of rhetoric in that endeavor.

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\[40\] A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 24 and p. 45. Property is used by Burke to include goods, services, position, status, citizenship, reputation, acquaintanceship, and love, p. 24.
The suggestion is that a Dramatistic perspective conceives of Rhetoric as a means of maintaining a scene (as an instrument of permanence) more than as an instrument of change. This shift in emphasis is one which takes the dramatistic meaning of rhetoric to be that (a mode of continuation) rather than the this (a vehicle for change) of previous interpretations. Held by earlier translators of Burke, the latter notion derives from an emphasis on Burke's "master metaphor" of man as a symbolic communicator. However, Burke has also proclaimed that the authority of mystery guides his inquiry. Though he argues for both as his primary point of departure, each engenders disparate "readings" of the meaning of Dramatism. In approaching Dramatism via the uncommon route of mystery and authority, it is possible to arrive at a modified meaning of rhetoric's role in a world conceived dramatistically. In order to develop that alternative generic frame, it is necessary to examine the significance of the master metaphor and of metaphorical analysis in Burkeian thought. Because such an analysis is directly relevant to a Pentadic investigation, it will be necessary to keep that relationship in mind in the ensuing pages.

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41 Burke repeatedly associates mystery with authority and allegiance to authority, claiming that these provide his analytical point of departure. That starting point allows him to accomplish his task of linking "technical" and "social" criticism. See, for example, Attitudes Toward History, p. 331.
Analysis via the mystery dramatistic master metaphor and its relationship to a scene-act pentadic ratio

In his *Attitudes Toward History* Burke characterizes "Heads I Win, Tails you Lose" as a pivotal term which functions as "a device whereby, if things turn out one way, your system accounts for them—and if they turn out the opposite way, your system also accounts for them." The philosopher's "proper game is Cards-face-up-on-the-table," a game in which the way each thinker uses the "Heads I Win, Tails You Lose" formula is made apparent. An analysis which would isolate when the device is being used would, according to Burke, focus on the philosopher's "master metaphor," for therein can be determined that thinker's distinction between essence and existence.42

How this formula would work as a tool of analysis is clarified by Burke. Given the example of capitalism whose essence is competition, certain non-competitive attributes can also be distinguished, attributes which are cooperative. Those aspects which can be isolated which do not confirm one's choice of the thing's essence, are considered aspects of existence and are labeled "'accidents'" of existence. How is a thing's essence determined? According to Burke,

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42 *Attitudes Toward History*, 2nd. revised ed., 1959 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1937), pp. 260-263 and pp. 252-254. For Burke, essence is not an "ultimate" term which names the actual composition of a thing. In that sense, it is not Scientistic (see subsequent discussion, this chapter) for it does not claim that the essence declared for a thing simultaneously depicts its material make-up. Instead, essence is a vote or choice, a decision, for example, to call man a machine or an organism or to claim that life is drama. Once that choice is made, one acts as if the name one has given to a thing, in fact, captures the material essence of the thing. Always there will be aspects which do not fit one's choice; those aspects, instead of invalidating that choice, are labeled accidents of existence.
it is a "'moral choice'" (or an "'act of will'"): it is, in effect, a vote. In the sense that one's master metaphor is a moral choice which determines one's choice of essence, of what it means to be human, an examination of the master metaphor is the best place to begin revealing a philosopher's "Heads I Win, Tails You Lose" argument structure.

Burke claims that his master metaphor is his moral choice of "'man as a [symbolic] communicant'." More specifically, man is distinguished from other animals (who also communicate) because he is the symbol-using (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal inventor of the negative (or moralized by the negative) separated from his natural condition by instruments of his own making goaded by the spirit of hierarchy (or moved by the sense of order) and rotten with perfection. 45

This uniquely symbolic nature of "man as a 'communicant'" rounds out Burke's master metaphor—or choice of man's essence—to read: man is the "symbolic communicant." According to the rule of the "Heads I Win, Tails You Lose" game, all aspects of man's essence which cannot be termed communicative in that symbolic sense must, necessarily, be labeled "accidents" of existence.

43 Ibid.
44 Ibid, p. 262.
45 Kenneth Burke, Language As Symbolic Action, ch. 1 (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1966), pp. 3–24, in which that view is advanced. Elsewhere, Burke indicates his addition of the "symbolic" to his earlier definition of man as "communicant" was "more trim than 'communicant', my earlier usage," personal letter from Kenneth Burke to the author, December 4, 1979.
While in the past rhetorical scholars have typically relied on Burke's master metaphor of the symbol user for access to the dramatistic meaning of rhetoric, aspects of that metaphor which might suggest another interpretation have been treated as extraneous, or in Burkeian terminology, accidents of existence. At the same time, Burke has identified another perspective, that of mystery and authority, as the starting point for his critical system.\(^46\) An approach via the uncommon route of mystery and authority should be taken as a way of establishing what Burke has called a perspective by incongruity in which one seemingly opposite perspective is used to illuminate another.\(^47\) Since the task of re-translation is to arrive at an alternative generic understanding of the meaning of Dramatism, a meaning which will be articulated in terms of its essential Pentadic ratio, it is useful to follow up on Burke's utilization of perspective by incongruity to establish the existence of new relationships among terms thereby arriving at new meanings. Via this alternative entry into Dramatism, it will be possible to enhance our understanding of the symbolic communicant metaphor for such an approach will enable us to focus on what we have previously treated as incidental to that

\(^46\) See footnote 41, this chapter.

\(^47\) It should be remembered that Burke speaks of metaphors as perspectives, and argues that perspective can be "substituted" for the word metaphor without loss of meaning, *A Grammar of Motive*, p. 503 and throughout that chapter. In *Permanence and Change* (1954; New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965), Burke devotes an entire chapter (3, "Perspective As Metaphor") to that relationship, which he calls "Perspective by Incongruity," pp. 89-96. See *Attitudes Toward History*, particularly pp. 308-314, for more on Perspective by Incongruity. Simply, it is a way of increasing understanding of one thing by rotating the direction of attention.
metaphor. Such a perspective engenders a modified construction of the meaning of Dramatism.

Burke's principal discussion of mystery is contained in his *A Rhetoric of Motives*. Using both Marx and Carlyle as bases for argument, Burke isolates "the presence of a 'mystifying condition' in social inequality" which is capable of "elicit[ing] 'God-fearing' attitudes toward agents and agencies which are not 'divine'." The essence of social relationships is mystery (this is Burke's choice of the essence of relationships) and the mystery is capable of maintaining itself by agents and agencies which serve the mystery. That proposition is developed along two lines of argument. First, Burke moves from noting that there is mystification in social inequality to maintaining that mystery is the essence of the social SCENE as well as of social relationships. In that sense a mystery is not a mere descriptive scenic term but rather a depiction of the essence (see footnote 41, this chapter) of social relationships and of the hierarchy in which they are embodied. These equal scene. For Burke, "mystery is equated with class distinction," but classes represent more than mere socio-economic differences, for classes are essentially different "'kinds'" of people.

Mystery, then, is Burke's moral choice of the SCENE'S essence. Its material embodiment is in hierarchy. The social arrangement of different kinds of beings is hierarchical. The hierarchy is "a ladder

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48 *A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. 123.
of authority that extends from 'lower' to 'higher'" and which corresponds to a "set of social ratings." Though members on different levels of hierarchy are "mysteries to each other," they are "goaded by the spirit of hierarchy" or "moved by a sense of order" to maintain the hierarchical order of which they are a part. The purpose of the ladder becomes maintaining the socio-political hierarchy; this is both a moral and social striving akin to the Platonic notion of "dialectical 'ascent'."

Recalling that to be "consubstantial" is to be "joint participants in common principles," helps one to understand the Dramatic significance of each of the Pentadic elements. The essence of the scene is mystery; mystery reveals itself in hierarchy. Such a SCENE is possible only if you place within it different kinds of beings (AGENTS) who are in some way motivated to preserve the essence of the scene and its inherent principles of mystery from which those different AGENTS derive. Of course, some instruments or means (AGENCIES) must be available through which those different kinds of AGENTS can ACT rhetorically to preserve the SCENE.

So, for Burke, "mystery arises at the point where different kinds of beings are in communication." Though there must be "strangeness"

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50 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, p. 374.
51 Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, p. 15.
53 Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 21-22.
54 This is, again, compatible with Burke's grammatical consistency axiom discussed in Chapter Two, pp. 77-78, and footnote 47.
55 Ibid, p. 115.
among the agents of the mystery, "the estranged must also be thought of as in some way capable of communion." Herein lies the connection between AGENT and AGENCY within the Burkeian Dramatistic view: since "man is the symbol using animal," symbol use becomes the AGENCY for preserving the SCENE, and thus the vehicle through which the rhetorical acts of identification and consubstantiality are accomplished. Those key points require elaboration.

For Burke, humans are (1) symbol-users and mis-users, who are (2) estranged from others and from their natural perfect condition in nature, and who are (3) motivated by obedience to the reigning symbols of authority which uphold the hierarchical embodiment of their estrangement. To examine each of those dimensions of symbol use and mis-use, it is important to clarify what Burke means by perfection, a task which introduces his use of the Aristotelian notion of entelechy. Burke explains this concept in terms of beginnings and endings, and the way in which what is present in the origin of something (a tree, a stone, a novel, a human) can be identified as the potential of that thing to become like itself. That process is one by which a thing, say a man, completes himself by realizing his original nature. In that way, he becomes perfect. Each, claims Burke, "aims at the perfection natural to its kind," and in so doing can be said to "be moved by this principle of entelechy," and, thus,

56 Ibid.
57 Burke, Language As Symbolic Action, p. 2.
"rotten with perfection." This is called the "principle of perfection" or "the entelechical principle." 58

Relating this principle to Burke's conception of the origin of language provides a foundation for the claim that symbol mis-use is antithetical to man's nature. Prior to the emergence of language there were no negatives; everything was simply as it was. A state of "is not" did not exist, for "whatever 'is not' here is positively somewhere else; or, if it does not exist, then other things occupy all places where it 'is not'." 59 Growing out of that condition of perfection was what Burke calls "Behaviorist Pre-Language" which consists of grunts, moans, and such, as the human's early response—biological and sensory reactions—to that natural state. Likewise, those responses were initially affirmative in that they typically communicated positive states of "Fire," "Food," and so on. 60 At some point in the development of language, a "qualitative leap" was accomplished between the behavioral linguistic confirmation of a particular state of nature and the emergence of the moral negative of Thou Shalt Not.

In fact, however, each functions similarly to affirm a human condition: the behaviorist emphasis of "it is not here" actually says "it is there" or "some other thing is here," and in its capacity

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58 *Language As Symbolic Action*, pp. 16-19.
59 "A Dramatistic View of the Origin of Language and Postscripts on the Negative" in *Language As Symbolic Action*, p. 419.
as "pre-language" it acknowledges the presence of fire, danger, and hunger; the dramatistic emphasis of "Thou Shalt Not" translates as "Say Yes" to a given situation. In that regard, the moral negative functions as a command: Obey.

Despite Burke's featuring of the negative, its function is affirmation. Why? The answer lies in the entelechical principle of perfection and in the fact that, prior to pre-language, all was motion; everything simply existed as it was in itself, as perfect unto itself. Language's introduction of negativity—the possibility of NO—into that world, disrupted that perfection. Yet, humans existed prior to language in a state of affirmation. Language both created conflict and also provided the means by which conflict could be transcended and a state of perfection (the absence of division) can be regained. Those means are Rhetorical acts of affirmation.

It is important to note that, for Burke, nature is perfect hierarchical order. Since language can be equated with man's fall from perfect nature, the closest man will ever come to regaining his natural condition (completing himself according to the entelechical principle which emphasizes the fruitful completion of origins) is through appropriate symbol use—i.e., use which allows the author-ity of symbols to remain intact, thus preserving the hierarchical

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order (social and economic) which they sustain. Thus language use
(originating in the negative) is a means by which the privileged
within the hierarchy maintain control; the negative is a control
mechanism. Mis-use of a symbol is an act which says "NO" both
to one's hierarchical order, and also, consequently, to one's nature.

Of course, human beings are capable of "no" saying. The point,
however, is that they have an ethical obligation grounded in the moral
negative and the entelechical principle to complete their nature by
an act of affirmation. Burke further validates that point in his
discussion in *Attitudes Toward History* of frames of acceptance and
of frames of rejection. All acts of rejection are actually acts
of acceptance. Put another way, a challenge to a symbolic authority
is made possible only through acceptance of a higher authority, thus
preserving the principle nature of man as "Yes."

If it is possible to disobey reigning symbols of authority by
creating higher powers—thus sustaining one's affirmative nature—
what impact does this have on the argument being made that human beings
have an obligation to affirm the reigning authoritative symbols of
their hierarchy? It should be recalled that hierarchical levels are
occupied by different kinds of beings, and, consistent with the
principle of perfection, each must complete itself by acting in

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64 *Language As Symbolic Action*, p. 13.
65 *Attitudes Toward History*, pp. 3-106, though the whole book
is about such frames of acceptance.
66 *A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. 115.
accordance with its nature. That prescribes that disparate hierarchical beings are capable of assuming variate roles which correspond to their level of participation in the hierarchy. While rhetoric enables each to transcend its own level by merging into higher symbols with which multiple levels can identify, only artistic creators (poets, philosophers, artists) are capable of creating new symbols of merger which, in time, will give rise to new hierarchical authorities. That act of creation is a Symbolic more than a Rhetorical act. It is, likewise, an act consistent with the entelechical principle and also with the creator's own level of performance within the hierarchy.

Since certain levels of hierarchy perform different functions/tasks within the hierarchy (tasks which are appropriate for their KIND), such producers of new symbols of transcendence are completing themselves while simultaneously affirming the tasks assigned to them by their hierarchy. Persons at other levels of the hierarchy most typically function Rhetorically vis-à-vis their hierarchy, affirming existing symbols of authority and mystery; Symbolic action is reserved to the advanced level of creative artists who, consistent with their nature, are capable of bringing to life new symbols of merger and transcendence.

Since persons are motivated to uphold their nature by ratifying hierarchy and mystery, Burke isolates piety as the value most important to that endeavor. In Permanence and Change Burke explains piety and its opposite, impiety; both are correlates of obedience and disobedience. Being pious is using symbols with propriety; it is a knowledge of how one should behave and behaving in that appropriate fashion.
Impiety is symbol misusing; it is, also, behaving against one's nature which is to obey; it is "No saying" to an order. Only by behaving piously can man be free, for he must, in accordance with his nature, negate any desire to act impiously toward the order. In other words, man's language provides him with the negative, but in order to be at peace with himself, he must opt for obedience (which is a fact of nature) rather than the negative (which was artificially introduced through language).

Thus, used appropriately, symbols function to govern and preserve the mystery of the hierarchical order. Mystery is the condition of strangeness among classes, a condition embodied in hierarchy. Transcendence is momentarily achieved through identification with a shared symbol. Symbols which effectively serve as mergers in that way, take on an authority for their ability to uphold the hierarchy by deflecting attention from the actual conditions of estrangement (mystery) which the hierarchy embodies.

Man yearns to conform to order through the agency of symbols because only by such acts can the divisions among agents be momentarily transcended. The power of symbols to transcend conflict and

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division is rooted in the enigmatic dimension of symbols: that is, symbols are an especially effective means of maintaining social mystery because they both demonstrate and conceal the implications of the mystery they uphold.

Rhetorically considered, the acceptance of the 'enigma' as an element in a symbol's persuasiveness has led us to note the place of 'magic' or 'mystery' both as a passive reflection of class culture and as an active way of maintaining social cohesion.

Used Rhetorically, symbols function both actively and passively: actively, in that their use is a mode of action which creates identification with a class higher in the hierarchy, and passively, in that different symbols are taken to be reflective of different classes. Symbols exist as reflections (passively) of differences, but are capable of being employed (actively) in rhetorical acts of identification. In that use, symbols become the Rhetorical agencies by which Rhetorical agents preserve the hierarchical order (scene) in which they participate.

For Burke, symbols include such items as clothes and medals which are used to identify a "belonging" to a particular class. In A Rhetoric of Motives Burke stresses, with Carlyle, the social power of clothes as persuasive rhetorical agencies which maintain social order. Each social class has its own manner of dressing and of identifying itself to those of its own class as well as to those above and below in the order. Clothes become symbolic agencies and

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thus persuasive rhetoric which functions to create identification with the common principles of each class and each level of order. Rhetoric, then, presents "real divisions [among classes of different kinds of people] in terms that deny [those] divisions."\(^70\) As Burke maintains, "even a materially dispossessed individual may 'own' privilege vicariously by adopting the 'style' (or 'insignia') of some privileged class."\(^71\)

Communal participation in symbol systems transcends individual and class differences between disparate kinds of agents and divergent principles because attention and allegiance is directed toward the symbol not the symbol-bearer. In that sense, Rhetoric functions neither as an instrument to change an hierarchical order nor as an agency through which individuals (in their Symbolic uniqueness) confront each other in dialogue. Consubstantiality is not a joining of two Symbolic selves but a momentary deflection of attention toward a symbol. Thus, identification occurs toward symbols (as rhetorical agencies) rather than towards persons (or rhetorical agents).\(^72\)

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\(^70\) Ibid., p. 45.

\(^71\) Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 3rd. ed.; 1973), 309; see also, Attitudes Toward History, p. 184: "Even in the 'best possible of worlds' . . . there will be many factors stimulating men to the construction of symbolic mergers. Even if you remove the class issue in its acute forms, you still have a disparate world that must be ritualistically integrated."

Whereas identification toward each individual in that person's uniqueness would be a Symbolic act, a Rhetorical Act, according to Burke, necessarily acknowledges the hierarchical individual rather than the autonomous individual. In accepting common symbols, different kinds of agents act as joint participants in the common principles or properties of the agencies with which they communicate. Duncan has expressed this by pointing to the fact that one salutes the uniform—the enigma of class and station—not the man. Likewise, claims Duncan, "We address the office, not the individual." Because symbols are enigmatic, they alone can become the ideal "third principle" through which "differences between 'two-ness'" can become merged in a "principle of . . . 'homogeneity'". Divisiveness among individuals and groups is subsumed through allegiance to shared symbols, those enigmatic agencies of the mystery which are capable of eliciting allegiance from disparate classes.

In Attitudes Toward History Burke notes that "since the transcendence of conflicts is . . . contrived by purely symbolic mergers, the actual conflicts may remain." Harnessing the conflict may require "a repetition of purificatory rituals" whereby the ritual itself functions magically (Rhetorically) to maintain the social order, and thus the mystery. Rituals are Rhetorical acts of identification

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74 Burke's discussion of Kant's Transcendental Dialectic in A Grammar of Motives, p. 404.
75 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, pp. 180-183; see also, Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, p. 294, for his discussion of ritual functions which purge unclean elements from society.
and consubstantiality which function to preserve the scenic order of mystery by, momentarily transcending real societal decision. Hugh Duncan, the noted Burkeian sociologist, presents a discussion of the Trobriand tribe rituals. Rituals were essential for the regulation of every facet of life, from fertility to the food supply. In fact, "without magical language the group could not act because it would have no common and binding symbols which would make the organization of action possible."^{76}

It is that "organization for action" which is the prime requirement for the perpetuation of the scene. Given their essence of mystery, Dramatistic scenes encourage public Rhetorical acts of permanence. Because Rhetoric allows the scene's participants to momentarily transcend the condition of their estrangement,^{77} Rhetorical acts are the means through which order is maintained and the scene is continued. In that Rhetoric is the mode of address between the individual and the community, it is a dramatic dialectic between society's articulation of the appropriate way of acting-together


^{77}Earlier in this chapter there was a discussion of Burke's notion of the way in which beings in disparate hierarchical levels transcend their differences through merger in symbols which permit them to direct their attention away from their contrasting lots. Still, their eternal separation from each other remains intact. The divisions are real and material which provides one basis for claiming that Burke's dominant Pentadic term is scene (materialism). Recently a rhetorical critic, has noted the material grounding of Burke's rhetoric. "With the single exception of Kenneth Burke, no one I know of has attempted formally to advance a material theory of rhetoric," Michael Calvin McGee, "A Materialist's Conception of Rhetoric" in Ray E. McKe nervous, ed., *Explorations in Rhetoric: Studies in Honor of Douglas Ehninger* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1982), p. 25.
and the individual's constant struggle to convince himself to identify (and thus be true to his compliant nature) his interests with the larger social unit.

This substance of rhetoric as ongoing address has been summarized by Burke:

Such considerations make us alert to the ingredient of rhetoric in all socialization, considered as a moralizing process. The individual person, striving to form himself in accordance with the communicative norms that match the cooperative ways of his society, is by the same token concerned with the rhetoric of identification. To act upon himself persuasively, he must variously resort to images and ideas that are formative. Education ("indoctrination") exerts such pressure upon him from without; he completes the process from within. If he does not somehow act to tell himself (as his own audience) what the various brands of rhetorician have told him, his persuasion is not complete. Only those voices from without are effective which can speak in the language of a voice within.  

Rhetorical acts are rituals performed by diverse beings who agree not to notice that, in a dramatistic sense, they are doomed to eternal estrangement. Merger through the hierarchy's symbols is an ongoing Rhetorical process of mutual address between the individual in his

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78 A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 39. Hugh Duncan, the noted Dramaturgical sociologist, has expressed a strikingly similar notion: "... expressive forms, as used in address by individuals, are a kind of exhortation by the individual to form himself in accordance with the communicative norms that seem to produce the cooperative ways of the group .... In this sense we are always talking to ourselves. Through formative ideas and images we seek to persuade ourselves to be what society wants us to be. But we must complete the process within ourselves. When we cannot act, for whatever reason, to tell ourselves (as audiences to ourselves) what the various kinds of rhetoric in our society have tried to tell us, persuasion is not complete. For it is only when voices from without speak in the language of a voice within that persuasion is complete," Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Communication and Social Order (New York: Bedminster Press, 1962), p. 290.
autonomy and the society in its need for order. The elements of Rhetorical acts are public materials, that is, the symbols of power and allegiance which support the hierarchy. When these public materials are incorporated into the private world of the individual and become effective inducements to community allegiance, the communication is Rhetorical. Often, as Burke has noted, such acts are unconscious, spontaneous, and intuitive.

Earlier in this chapter a rationale was developed for using Burkeian terms and methods to discriminate between the meaning and the significance of Dramatism. It was argued that such an approach would provide an alternative "opening" into Dramatism via mystery and authority rather than the more common starting point of man as a symbolic communicator. Rather than implying that man is not a symbolic communicator, the featuring of mystery and authority results in a discernment among particular types of symbolic linguistic functions—Grammar, Rhetoric, Symbolic—which provide for an enhanced understanding of the meaning of Dramatism. Specifically, from such a reflexive metacriticism would ensue an alternative understanding of the operation of Rhetoric in a dramatistic world. The claim was made that the design of the system could be captured through the essential Pentadic ratio (scene-act) through which Burke expresses what is eternally and enduringly dramatistic. Within that modified perspective, though "pure persuasion" can never totally match the voices from without (and individuals remain autonomous and isolated in their own Symbolicity), the significant Rhetorical moments (ACTS) of the Burkeian drama are those of transcendence when individuals simultaneously affirm their own perfect nature and hierarchical order. By Burke's own reasoning process, all else must be considered "'accident'.'
This shift from an Agent-Agency to a Scene-Act emphasis has permitted us to discern the different meanings Burke holds for Rhetoric and Symbolic. Though both employ symbols which are open and available (i.e., public), they do so toward different ends: Rhetoric as an acting-together (a merger of private and public) to uphold societal order and permanence, and Symbolic which assimilates public symbols for the private use of the individual. An alternative generic understanding has flowed from this reconstitution of the meaningful essence of Dramatism as a scene-act ratio, for the scene's substance is a mystery which requires ritualistic Rhetorical acts for its continuation.

Such an approach has allowed the articulation of a new generic understanding of the Dramatistic meaning of Rhetoric. To complete the re-translation task of arriving at an holistic view of Dramatism, it is now necessary to identify the being, knowing, and valuing components which are implicated by that modified understanding. Since it has been asserted that the meaning of Dramatism is, in large part, associated with the meaning it holds for its creator, it will be important to round out this section with a discussion of Burke's explanation for why he developed the Dramatistic system. Finally, in Chapter Four there will be a discussion of the significance for rhetorical scholarship of this altered generic understanding.

The Ontological, Epistemological, and Axiological Components of a Scene-Act Ratio

Before discussing the being, knowing, and valuing dimensions of Burke's Dramatism, it is significant to note the extent to which those who derive the rationale for their research from Burke's Dramatism deny
that those elements are inherent in Dramatism. Such researchers typi-
cally refer to themselves as Dramatists and to their orientation as
Dramaturgical. In *Life As Theatre*, editors Brissett and Edgley state
that the intention of Dramaturgy is description rather than explanation.\textsuperscript{79}
Since Dramatists do not explicate causal relationships, Dramatism cannot
be said to be an epistemological system. Coombs and Manfield reinforce
the descriptive basis of Dramaturgical analysis.

As it stands now, the dramaturgical perspective as
'image' constitutes a description of human activity;
if it is to achieve the status of explanation, it
must be placed in an intellectual framework that
specifies its assumptions.

Coombs and Mansfield further maintain that Dramatism has not achieved
ontological status because it has not yet been explicated as a coherent
explanation-system based on clear beliefs about being and acting in the
world.\textsuperscript{80} The assumption here seems to be that, in order to constitute
an ontology, a system must be explicated epistemologically, i.e., as a
schema which generates knowledge about humans and their world. Ontolog-
ical assertions would then likely be open to evaluation, thus acquiring
an existence in a world of values.

On the other hand, contemporary rhetorical critics have demonstrated
that all symbolic constructions of the world—and this includes Dramatism
—are rhetorical schemas which can be explicated in terms of the rela-
tionship which exists among their being, knowing, and valuing elements.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{79}D. Brissett and C. Edgley, *Life as Theater: A Dramaturgical

\textsuperscript{80}J. E. Coombs and M. W. Mansfield, *Drama in Life: The Uses of Com-

\textsuperscript{81}The critical works associated with that focus have been previously
cited and discussed. Consult Chapter Two.
The challenge for the rhetorical critic is to articulate the meaning of the system by scrutinizing the way in which those dimensions combine to distinguish Dramatism from other systems. This section will further explore the scene-act meaning of Dramatism through a discussion of its ontological, epistemological, and axiological dimensions. By placing Dramatism within an intellectual framework which permits the articulation of its assumptions, such an investigation would advance in the direction for which Coombs and Mansfield implicitly call.

In *Permanence and Change* Burke seems to downplay Dramatism's knowledge-generating capabilities. Burke explains that his terms "begin in theories of action rather than in theories of knowledge." As was discussed regarding the dramatistic origin of language, Burke divides the world into Scientists/Behaviorists and Dramatists. The former produce biological knowledge, knowledge of the humans' sensory functioning, in short, knowledge of motion devoid of any reference to the humans' symboling capacity. The Scientistic epistemology is constrained, claims Burke, in that it fails to acknowledge that experiments "with organisms that do not use language cannot tell us anything essential about the distinctive motives of a species that does use language." That way of knowing can do no more than make statements about motion, leaving unaddressed the larger questions of human action.

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Those larger questions exist in the realm of evaluation rather than in the world of experimental knowledge, and thus must be explored philosophically. Questions of action implicate the subject of motives and require a dramatistic vocabulary of "ought and ought not, with attendant vocabulary of praiseworthy and blameworthy." Dramatistic terminology is self-consciously moralizing and hortatory.

Given Burke's view of a Dramatistic vocabulary—indeed, of all language—as existing in the realm of values, it seems clear that Burke advocates Dramatism as being principally an axiological system. That point requires further elaboration in terms of its relevance to a Scene-Act Dramatistic meaning.

The fact that Dramatism raises questions of human action and motives makes it a system existing in the realm of values rather than Scientistic facts and motion. Yet, is is important to identify the values comprising that axiological structure. In other words, what are dramatistic values? As has been noted in the prior section, since scenic stability is greatly prized in a dramatistic world, acts of maintenance and permanence are the moral obligation of human actors. Socialization is "a moralizing process" through which individuals

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84 A Grammar of Motives, p. xxiii.

85 Quotation from "Introduction" to Attitudes Toward History, no pagination.

86 To support that point, consult Burke's essays "A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language" and "Terministic Screens," both printed in Language As Symbolic Action, pp. 419-479, and pp. 44-62, respectively. See also, Attitudes Toward History, throughout that work.
internalize an ethical obligation to take as their own the symbols which uphold societal order. Piety and obedience are acts of permanence and are valued over impiety and disobedience. Each reveals the degree to which "pure persuasion" (socialization) has been successful.

As acts which perpetuate scenes, Rhetorical acts are actions of legitimation. This further substantiates the prior claim that dramatism is an axiological system, in that issues of legitimation implicate questions of value and of authority. With a dramatistic world, Rhetorical acts are acts of permanence (legitimizing the values of the existing authorities of mystery) rather than instruments of change (which could engender a crisis in value, in authority, and in legitimation). Yet while Burke sees Rhetorical acts as principally legitimizing and axiological, rhetorical scholars have increasingly tended to place primary stress on the epistemic dimensions of rhetoric, viewing rhetoric as a creator of new knowledge more than as a means of legitimation. The few scholars who have explored the relationship between rhetoric and legitimation have focused either on a speaker's success at legitimizing a specific platform or on questions relating to the association between rhetorical theory development and rhetorical practice. Typically, such studies have been efforts to evaluate both

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87 A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 39.
89 That point was developed in more detail in Chapter Two.
the formulation and the success of arguments in generating knowledge and/or belief.

Yet, this study has asserted that axiological questions are presently more primary than epistemic concerns. In Chapter One much of the discussion centered on the severed bonds of legitimacy more as a crisis in value than in knowledge, one in which the traditional means of justifying rhetorical inquiry (the authority of the old legitimation, as discussed by Rosenfield) is challenged by a new authority. Burke's emphasis on Rhetorical acts as legitimizing could provide an alternative generic focus which could transfer attention from rhetoric as being epistemologically relevant to its axiological function as acts of legitimation. At this juncture, it is important to insert two clarifying comments. First, arguing for a move toward an axiological focus does not, necessarily, lead to a rejection of all epistemic rhetorical functioning; rather, the concern is with the extent to which Rhetoric As A Way of Knowing scholars have treated all rhetoric as epistemic. In a recent convention paper presentation, Weimer noted that while all knowing is rhetorical, all rhetoric is not, consequently, epistemic. Given the present turning point in rhetorical scholarship, such a shift in focus opens up the possibility of a renewed evaluation of both the ontological and axiological components of rhetorical communication. Second, it is possible to take Burke's emphasis on values and

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91 Walter B. Weimer, "Why All Knowing is Rhetorical," a paper presented to the SCA convention, Louisville, November 1982, on the Program "New Directions in Rhetorical Epistemology."
legitimation as a necessary component of any contemporary theorizing about rhetoric without totally accepting all of his Dramatistic assumptions and values. The marked scenic similarity between Burke's perception of Scientism and modern rhetorical scholarship supports the argument that ours is likewise a crisis of value more than of knowledge. At the same time, while Burke instructs us as to the need for a value assessment and response to crisis, whether we accept his action response to crisis (Dramatism) is a separate question. Some of those issues will be discussed both in the next section and also in the final chapter when Burke's development of Dramatism is discussed as a response to a similar legitimation crisis.

Dramatism's valuing component is derived from Burke's understanding of the human ontological condition. The primal connection among persons is via the negative command "Thou Shalt Not." Since that command should be taken as affirmative and primary, the implications for action are clear: when man behaves impiously, he goes against his perfect being, and his primary connectedness to others. Yet, severed from a state of perfect nature by the linguistic "no," man's being is dually grounded in fact and value, in his biological and in his ethical nature. Prior to the introduction of language man existed in perfect harmony with nature. In that original condition man was Symbolic, purely himself in tune with nature. Language's emergence simultaneously destroyed

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92 This point provides the focus for Burke's essay "A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language." It should be noted that this enunciation of Dramatistic ontology differs significantly in its implications from the emphasis which characterized Campbell's valuing of the Burkeian symbolistic perspective. An exploration of such generic differences will be discussed in the final chapter.
man's unity with nature and brought into existence the Rhetorical function of language. Thus, Rhetoric provides a linguistic means of recreating a semblance of that primal prelinguistic natural world.

Though the Burkeian schema is principally axiological, nonetheless it operates epistemically as a critical methodology in making dramatistic claims. Certainly, as Burke notes with his emphasis on "terministic screens" and the way in which words both direct and deflect attention, there is a suggestion of the epistemic functioning of dramatistic words. Thus, it is tempting to refer to present epistemic rhetorical scholars to ask what kind of knowledge does dramatism generate? Yet, taking Dramatism as primary and as this discussion's point of departure, it is important to stress once again that Rhetoric plays an axiological more than an epistemic role in that system. This point will be explored subsequently.

The forthcoming section will explore Burke's view of Dramatism less as a creator of knowledge than as a critique of Scientistic knowledge. He makes the point throughout his work that Dramatism should be contrasted with Scientism as different value-laden terminologies for construing the world. While the previous discussion allowed for both the identification of a new pentadic ratio and also the articulation of a modified perception of the dramatistic meaning of Rhetoric, the following unit will allow us to complete the re-translated meaning by focusing on the way in which Dramatism (as Burke's ACT) can best be understood as a strategy encompassing the Scientistic SCENE. It is as critique that Burke explains the meaning of Dramatism.
The Meaning of Dramatism as a Critique of a Scientistic Scene

There are various ways in which the situation out of which Burke developed Dramatism could be discussed. One likely approach would be to locate Burke's work as a literary critic alongside that of his colleagues with the intention of discerning between them. Since both Marxism and Freudism have influenced his thinking, it should also be possible to trace the influence of those two ideologies on Dramatism's formulation. That latter effort would be similar to the historical approach discussed earlier. Each would identify one of the significant contexts for Burke's work, and would attempt to arrive at its meaning vis-à-vis those contexts.

Recalling the distinction outlined earlier between meaning and significance, it can be suggested that the above investigations are more likely to signify the relationship Dramatism has to diverse settings than the meaning Burke holds for his system. As conceptualized in this scrutiny, arriving at the re-translated meaning of Dramatism is a three-fold process of (1) articulating its essential scene-act pentadic component, (2) displaying the ontological, epistemological, and axiological dimensions implicit in that ratio, and (3) conducting a scene-act analysis of Burke's formulation of Dramatism. Throughout, the claim has been that a determination of the meaning of Dramatism will flow from employing Burkeian terminology which allows the interpreter to momentarily put aside questions of

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93 See Chapter Two for the distinctions made by Reuckert and Burke between the historical and the philosophical.
significance. This section will now follow through with that third stage.

Beginning with the re-translated Scene-Act understanding, this section will argue that Burke conceptualized Dramatism (his ACT) as a strategic response to Scientism (SCENE).\textsuperscript{94} In a definitive Dramatistic statement, Burke explains that

the concept of scene can be widened or narrowed (conceived of in terms of varying "scope" or circumference). Thus, an agent's behavior ("act") might be thought of as taking place against a polytheistic background; or the over-all scene may be thought of as grounded in one god; or the circumference of the situation can be narrowed to naturalistic limits, as in Darwinism; or it can be localized in such terms as "Western civilization," "Elizabethanism," "capitalism," "D day," "10 Downing Street," "on this train ride," and so on, endlessly. Any change in circumference in terms of which an act is viewed implies a corresponding change in one's view

\textsuperscript{94}This terminology is similar to Burke's explication of imaginative and critical works as "strategies for the encompassing of situations. Those strategies size up the situation, name their structure in a way that contains an attitude toward them," The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{95}Kenneth Burke, "Dramatism" from The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, v. 7 (1966). Though the claim is that Scientism is the dominant modern scene, it is not true that science has always dominated or will always be supreme. In fact, Burke claims that, though Science is now supreme, two previous systems have existed in the past, magic and religion. Though elements of each still survive in the present SCENE, their authority and control has been displaced by Scientism. See discussion throughout Permanence and Change, particularly pp. 59-66. In fact, Burke intends Dramatism as a "corrective philosophy" which will provide an alternative to the previous scenes, see Ibid, p. 58, and Permanence and Change, pp. 61-65.
To contrast this approach with the possible contextual studies previously mentioned, it is instructive to think of the Scientistic scene as macroscopic (a broad adoption of the term) and of disciplinary context as microscopic (a contraction of the term); the Scientistic backdrop encompasses numerous specialized settings (including the academic) which, despite their particular variations, can be classified as part of the dominant Scientistic scene. A narrow emphasis on the literary disciplinary context or on the historical antecedents to Burkeian thought can deflect attention from the scenic impulse which accounts for Burke's development of Dramatism, confusing significance with a quest for meaning.

Such a perspective lends itself to a particular treatment of the impact of the literary disciplinary context on Burke's intellectual development. Despite his participation in that context, his literary criticism is an advocacy of Dramatism. Though it is true that his scrutiny of texts is inherently dramatistic, it is not possible to argue that Dramatism is designed merely for use as a literary method. Because it is the meaning of the Dramatistic system and not its significance vis-à-vis diverse contexts which provides the impetus for this section, it is important to be concerned only with the literary discipline to the extent to which it can illuminate the Dramatistic whole.

In fact, Burke depicts Dramatism as a system which is unshackled by specialized disciplinary concerns. Throughout his work Burke repeatedly argues for the realm of Dramatism (of action, of value, of motive, of purpose) as being a more appropriate way of talking about man than Scientism (of motion, of fact, of sensory stimuli).
Since the attitudes embodied in the latter terminology tell us little about a language-using species, Burke found it necessary to develop a counter-vocabulary which would convey different attitudes toward linguistic communication. According to Burke, the Dramatistic terminology is a trans-disciplinary critical language which should be assumed by all who wish to adopt an alternative to the behaviorist/scientistic attitude toward human communication. Thus, though Dramatism arose within the context of literary criticism, it is presented as a trans-disciplinary "labyrinthine city of terminology" which should not be confined to any one discipline.

Required at this point is an explanation of the seeming paradox of conducting an inter-disciplinary inquiry into an intellectual schema which argues its trans-disciplinary nature. Given the earlier generic orientation toward Burke as a literary critic who reclaimed rhetoric for modern times, it has been easy for rhetorical scholars to overlook the transdisciplinary nature of the Dramatistic language, and, consequently, its action components as a critical response to a Scientistic scene. Expressed in Hirsch's this and that terminology, earlier rhetorical interpretations have taken the Burkeian system as this: as a contemporary rationale for Aristotelian rhetoric developed by a literary critic. In time of needed reclamation, they borrowed from a discipline (literature) with which they perceived an affinity.

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96 Burke's contrasting of Dramatistic action and Scientistic motion has recently been treated in the text.


98 In the past, rhetorical theorists/critics have tended to align their concerns with those of both history and literature, often seeing a close beneficial association of interests and goals. When the
When Dramatism is conceptualized as arising from a particular context (literary) rather than scene (Scientism), Burkeian criticism will be assumed to be inter-disciplinary. Earlier interpreters took the Burkeian justification of rhetoric as a contribution made to rhetorical knowledge by another discipline, thus engaging in an inter-disciplinary translation of that knowledge. A study of that process must be an investigation of inter-disciplinary interpretation in that the generic frame which guided that first Burkeian translation was inter-disciplinary. An altered generic understanding has been made possible by the re-translated scene-act Dramatistic meaning. Employing that scene-act perspective to illuminate Burke's construction of Dramatism allows for a focus on the essence of Dramatism as critique. Taking Dramatism as an illustration, one of the distinguishing marks of critique is the trans-disciplinary nature of its critical action. The conclusion that the meaning of Dramatism is as trans-disciplinary critique has been made possible through an investigation which arose out of the need to inquire into a translation process which has been assumed to be inter-disciplinary.

It is now important to detail Burke's application of Dramatism as critique. Evidence of Dramatism as a critique (Act) of Scientism (scene) pervades Burke's work, including his criticism of Hitler, his counter-statement against the New Literary critics, and his historical methodological monism came to be questioned, it seemed natural to seek assistance from another discipline which was perceived closely aligned. See Herbert A. Wichelns, "The Literary Criticism of Oratory," The Rhetorical Idiom: Essays in Rhetoric, Oratory, and Drama, ed. Donald C. Bryant (Ithaca, New York, 1958) for one statement of the link between rhetoric and literature.
rejuvenation of rhetoric. Despite their diversity, Burke located each within a broad Scientistic scene compelling a Dramatistic response. In order to further delineate the meaning of Dramatism, it is instructive to look briefly at each.

Two illustrations from Burke's criticism of Hitler will suffice to demonstrate the way in which Burke linked Hitler's rhetorical effectiveness with a Scientistic line of thinking. Hitler's characterization of the superior Aryan blood line was "a burlesque of contemporary neo-positivism's ideal of meaning, which insists upon a material reference" for its meaning. Additionally, Hitler's thought was "a bastardized modernism, along the lines of naturalistic, materialistic 'science'." The language of "burlesque" and "bastardized" which links Hitler's persuasive appeal with modern Science functions to positively identify evil with evil. By Burke's own logic, Hitler and Science have become consubstantial, linked by a language which makes them participants in common principles and attitudes.


100 It is possible that Burke's depiction of Scientism as a materialism might appear paradoxical with the SCENE (materialism) component which emerges from this re-translation. The issue is not one of whether or not each can be said to possess materialistic elements but is one of the way in which non-materialistic aspects are treated in terms of one's materialism. Burke sees Scientism as a monistic reduction of variety to one, that one being the material world of motion. Dramatism glories in variety, in paradox, in the multiple forms of human symboling which cannot be reduced to the Scientistic material world of motion. At the same time, Burke's system features the scene (materialism). Burke's materialism, unlike the Scientism which he opposes, is a kind of inverted idealism in that social and economic systems are real, but not ends in themselves: they are embodiments of human motivation and ideal forms which cannot be understood in terms of the embodiments alone. Material forms do not contain within themselves their own impulse to
Likewise, among literary critics Burke also lines up against manifestations of Scientism in criticism. The latter finds its expression in the works of critics who act as if literature is the construction of a unique object which conveys its own special truth. Scientism in criticism leads to a conceptualization of poetry as a unique genre and to a focus on the internal workings of a poem as a matter-of-fact (rather than a matter of action, see below) literary analysis. Such thinking isolates poetry and other literature from

ACT nor can they give an accounting of their life. It is a materialism created by symbol-users, a materialism of institutions and economic and social institutions, not a material world of motion detached from the human symboling creator, which provides the scene for human action.

Nonetheless, despite the vast differences sketched by Burke between Dramatism and Scientism, Dramatism has some grounding in a Scientistic brand of materialism. Two pieces of evidence from Burke's work will suffice to substantiate that claim. First, though Burke's insistence on the dramatistic origin of language features man's symboling nature, symbol-use is an outgrowth of what Burke calls "pre-language" which is a strictly biological reaction to the world. See his "A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language" in Language as Symbolic Action, particularly pp. 425-428. Second, in the second edition of The Philosophy of Literary Form Burke bemoans that he has been mis-interpreted regarding views of reality. Burke claims that "the greater my stress upon the role of symbolism in human behavior (and mis-behavior!), the greater has been my realization of the inexorable fact that, as regards the realm of the empirical, one cannot live by the word for bread alone. And though the thing bread is tinged by the realm of symbolic action, its empirical nature is grounded in the realm of non-symbolic, or extra-symbolic motion." Additionally, claims Burke, "Over the years I become more and more convinced: Only by knowing wholly about our ways with symbols can we become piously equipped to ask, not only in wonder but in great fear, just what may be the inexorable laws of non-symbolic motion which our symbolizing so often 'transcends,' sometimes to our 'spiritual' gain and sometimes to our great detriment." (Both quotations from the 1966 second edition of The Philosophy of Literary Form).

their milieu and from the audience to whom they must appeal. Appropriately, Hart Crane includes Burke in a list of critics (including Northrop Frye, Lionel Trilling, Edmund Wilson, and others) who draw positive analogies between poetry, viewed in terms of its content of meanings, and the various other modes—not all of them verbal strictly—of objectifying the conceptions and impulses of the mind, and hence of ordering experiences symbolically, which have been set over against science and discursive logic, in the speculations of the past half-century, as so many pre-logical or extra-logical types of 'language'.

Burke refuses to accept a view of poetry either as a precursor of logical thought or as an inferior mode of thought, preferring instead to argue for it as one of many forms of symboling available to humans as symbol-users.

In that regard, Burke's interests find their expression in a concern with what poetry does—which leads him into articulating the relationship between poet and reader—rather than in what it is or in how it is constructed. That concern is paramount in his Counter-Statement which, Burke tells his readers, should be viewed as a more or less covert attack upon certain critical assumptions of the day, fostered by those who mistake biography for life and usually

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102 Burke's literary criticism can be viewed as a response to the overly Scientistic criticism of such critics as Allen Tate, John Crowe Ransome and Robert P. Warren. For numerous critical responses from literary circles to Burke's criticism see the excellent compilation by William Rueckert, ed., Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1969).


Insist that one write a book as though he were ordering groceries. For the conveying of information about politics, burglaries, trade markets, new comets, and outraged husbands, our newspapers have a satisfactorily developed technique. Following that line of thinking, Burke contrasts criticism based upon a psychology of information with a Burkeian criticism founded upon a psychology of the audience. In concerning itself with the way in which art accomplishes its appeal by acting on an audience, the latter makes works of art active and responsive in terms of an audience. By contrast, a psychology of information leads to a focus on the internal structure of a work (formalist concerns) rather than its action on an audience. A dramatistic literary criticism sees literature as a mode of action, as a strategy encompassing its situation, rather than in a Scientistic sense as an object to be delineated matter-of-factly. Such an attempt can be viewed as Burke's means of re-asserting the legitimacy of all symbolic action in the face of a Scientism which values only its own mode.

Similarly, Burke's re-definition of rhetoric was presented as a means of saving the concept of rhetoric from social-scientific

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106 "Psychology and Form" in Counter-Statement, pp. 29-44.
107 See Burke's "Formalist Criticism: Its Principles and Limits" in Language as Symbolic Action, pp. 480-506. In The Philosophy of Literary Form Burke maintains that his interest is not as a "reporter who would inform about a work's subject, plot, background, the relationships among its characters, etc. "Instead, he expresses a concern "with the general problems" of act-scene relationships as they relate to formal structure, p. xvii.
108 The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 1.
cooptation. In *A Rhetoric of Motives* Burke claims that the effort of *The Rhetoric* is to "rediscover rhetorical elements that had become obscured when rhetoric as a term fell into disuse" with the rise of such disciplines as psychology, sociology, and anthropology. In that each has actually usurped some key rhetorical concerns, the term rhetoric is left fragmented and ineffective. By featuring the unconscious dimensions inherent in persuasion, Burke intends to re-assert the validity of rhetoric as a proper way of inquiring into human motives.

By focusing on Burke (AGENT) and his definitions and Pentadic method (AGENCY), earlier rhetorical interpretations of Burke have missed seeing Dramatism as a strategic ACT brought on by the dominance of a Scientistic scene. That SCENE demands an appropriate ACTION and action requires a vocabulary which will convey the appropriate attitude toward the scene. Thus, Burke constructed Dramatism as an ACT appropriate to a SCENE.

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109 *A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. xiii.

110 *Attitudes Toward History*, p. 4, though this view is to be found throughout his work.

111 Recently Alan Brinton discussed the importance of the concept of situation in rhetorical theory. Drawing on Bitzer's earlier piece "The Rhetorical Situation," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 1 (1968), 1-14, Brinton isolates the rhetorical obligation to perform a "fitting" and "appropriate" response to a situation as the central concept for a theory of situation and its relevance to rhetorical theory. Rhetorical acts are grounded in situation, and it is the situation which sets the parameters for those action possibilities. Put another way, situation (scene) not the rhetorical actor establish what an appropriate or fitting response would be in that instance. The actor has an obligation, embedded in situation, to perform that action. Alan Brinton, "Situation in the Theory of Rhetoric," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 14 (1981), 234-248.
Chapter One discussed the need for action on the part of rhetorical scholars, but not merely any action. What is required is an appropriate response to the legitimation crisis which presently encompasses rhetorical inquiry. In that Burke concerned himself with a similar crisis scene brought on by the challenge to humane inquiry from Scientism, and, in that Dramatism is presented as a trans-disciplinary answer to that crisis, rhetorical scholars could greatly benefit from an altered understanding of dramatism with its SCENE-ACT featuring. Such considerations take priority in the final chapter when the discussion will turn toward assessing the significance of this re-constituted Dramatistic meaning.
In the second chapter, three questions were designated as crucial to this case study: How has Burke's system been translated? What are the alternative means of translation which could support a re-translation? and, In what ways do different approaches to translation render different translated choices (content)? In recapitulating each, this final chapter will be a synopsis of the altered generic reading of Dramatism presented through this metacritical analysis. Additionally, this chapter is an evaluation of the significance of that changed meaning; given the requirements of the present for rhetorical inquiry to establish new legitimations, the potential value of this investigation to both rhetorical scholars and their new-found social-scientific colleagues needs to be assessed. Finally, this essay closes with a discussion of the inherent limitations of this project.

Discussion: Summary and Implications

This study argued that both the first translators of Burke as well as the rhetorical practitioners whose work ratified that interpretation imposed upon Dramatism their own genre of understanding. Though the Burkeian "New Rhetoric" was expected to rectify the
inadequacies of the Neo-Aristotelian critical practice, in fact they construed an agent-agency essence which preserved the traditional conception of the role of rhetorical processes in human communication. Theirs was a mundane translation which mistook their determination of the significance of Burkeian definitions and critical instruments for the meaning of the Dramatistic whole.

By contrast, this reflective and metacritical approach has revealed a scene-act Burkeian meaning. The discussion in the preceding section which identified that primary ratio highlighted the Dramatistic depiction of the scenic term mystery and of the Rhetorical acts which arise within such scenes. Once identified, that essential ratio was employed to explore the full meaning of Dramatism by an examination of the Scientistic scene which contains Burke's act of constructing his trans-disciplinary Dramatistic terminology.

Each interpretation gives rise to disparate renderings not only of the nature of Dramatistic being, knowing, and valuing but also of the relationship among those components which distinguishes the Dramatistic Weltanschauung. Relatedly, each implicates disparate functionings for rhetoric in communication and in society. The earlier focus on Burke's definition of the symbol-using animal took the ontological grounding of Dramatism to be the rhetorical nature of the human being. Though Campbell has noted the import of distinctions between a rational and a symbolic ontological system,¹ nonetheless, each is grounded in a particular definition of the human communicator

according to the properties or attributes which distinguish the rhetorical animal from non-linguist beings. Thus, their translation of the primacy of the agent's ontological rhetorical nature continued the Neo-Aristotelian pentadic emphasis.  

The valuing component of that earlier interpretation was expressed through a focus on the ethical use of symbolic agencies to accomplish the specific persuasive goals of the rhetor. That axiological perspective tends to lead to microscopic inquiries dealing with specific occurrences rather than macroscopic inquiries into the role of values in a world deemed to be dramatistically meaningful.

This is another way of saying that rhetorical scholars tend to adopt an agent focus which directs their attention toward the specific rhetorical actions of the rhetor, the speaker's adaptation to specific audiences, and/or the microscopic historical context of the rhetorical action being studied. In Chapter Three a similar contrast was drawn between narrow and broad notions of the concept of scene. A narrow focus gives rise to axiological concerns with a rhetor's ethical intentions and with means and ends in specific instances of persuasion. By contrast, a Burkeian Dramatistic analysis (based on this re-translation) necessitates a macroscopic approach to a world in which rhetoric legitimizes the values of the scenic drama of mystery.

As was the case with values, the earlier translators were unconcerned with assessing the epistemological dimensions of the Dramatistic system per se. Though they acknowledge, with Burke, that words

\[2\] Consult Chapter Two for that discussion. This point will appear later in this section.
function epistemically as terministic screens, what that means vis-à-vis a Dramatistic scene is not made an issue. However, rhetorical scholars have rationalized the use of Burke's terms and methods in their own critical studies by arguing for them as being epistemologically superior both to the previously used historical methodology and also to other definitions of man and of rhetoric. The flexibility of Burkeian criticism is based on the command to use all there is to use; it is argued that such criticism allows critics to know more about their critical object, and thus, to make larger and more valid critical claims.

In summation, an agent-agency translation epitomized a unique relationship among being, knowing, and valuing elements which conveyed more about the way in which the earlier interpreters thought Burke to be significant than it does about the meaning of the Dramatistic Weltanschauung. What was of worth to them was the epistemological power of Burkeian criticism to allow a wider purview of legitimate rhetorical critical objects. In fact, legitimizers and practitioners alike widely acknowledged that the Burkeian system contributed to rhetorical criticism because of its production of a pluralism of method and object which contrasted with the monism of traditional scholars. However, despite that apparent deviation, it can be suggested that the generic frame of the earlier translators directed them to interpret Burke as a this which was largely compatible with the Neo-Aristotelian understanding of rhetoric and of the human rhetorical impulse. Operating from the assumption that being could be expressed by defining the essential qualities indigenous to
human nature, Campbell has contrasted Aristotelian and Burkeian ontologies. Yet, uniting the two genres was the assumption that noting the attributes or properties of the human demarcated the components of a system. Additionally, Campbell argued for the Burkeian depiction of human nature for its epistemological power to permit improved theory construction and more valid knowledge claims. Its primary worth was as an epistemological instrument which permitted rhetorical scholarship to update its contemporary rationale and potential worth to new audiences. The Nichols/Holland interpretation of Burke was conscious of that continuity with their traditional conception.  

By contrast, this re-translation has identified a scene-act ratio which purports to make statements about that relationship which are more true to a holistic Dramatistic meaning. Before a more comprehensive treatment, it is clarifying to sketch the Burkeian ontological, epistemological, and axiological vision. For Burke, the being of man is more a condition of existence than a definition. The ontological condition of the human communicator flows from his emergence out of a perfect state of unity with nature into a scene depicted by conflict, division, and mystery. Having been severed from harmony by the acquisition of language, the human must rely on the Rhetorical function of language which permits the momentary symbolic transcendence

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3 This point was detailed in several earlier discussions dealing with the first introduction of Burke. At this point it is only necessary to add that Holland argued for that continuity in her delineation of the similarities between Burke and Aristotle in Counterpoint: Kenneth Burke and Aristotle's Theories of Rhetoric (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959).
of estrangement. Axiologically, Rhetorical acts are ritualistic acts which perpetuate scenic order, a dramatistic value, by being agencies of permanence more than agencies of change. Burke developed the Dramatic terminology as a critical epistemic instrument capable of generating statements about human values and motives which were consistent with his generic understanding of the ontological human condition. It is now worthwhile to detail each in terms of a holistic Dramatism meaning.

Chapter Two explored the relationship between Burke's view of the origin of language and the birth of the axiological negative, a linguistic phenomenon which gives rise to the rhetorical function of language. The birth of the negative linguistic command "Thou Shalt Not" marked the human disengagement from ontological unity and the dawn of ontological discord. This transition is what Burke essays through his conception of the dramatistic origin of language. Being in discord is a peculiarly human plight which requires a corresponding set of values capable of permitting human adaptation and survival.

Human symboling provides the means for erecting complex symbolic constructions capable of eliciting respect, allegiance, and obedience from their human creators. The life of symbolic systems is prolonged through the authority and power of their significant symbols to maintain stability and order. Prior discussions have dealt with Burke's view of the transcendent power of symbols to merge disjunctive hierarchical levels, a joining which is symbolically reminiscent of the natural pre-linguistic ontological state which Burke says is a perfect hierarchical order. Language sundered the human from that original perfection while simultaneously providing the means of symbolically
recreating that harmony. Accordingly, while symbols clearly are compensatory to division among humans, these same devices are responsible for engendering that ontological linguistic breach from perfect natural order.

The dramatistic connection between the ontological and the axiological is made vis-à-vis Burke's notion of the human obligation to affirm the scenic order of his society by repeated professions of allegiance to the symbols which legitimize that order. A Dramatistic valuing praises piety over impiety, obedience over disobedience. Of fundamental importance is an obligation to "keep the secret" of the hierarchical communicative relationships (i.e., the forms of relationships) which maintain the dramatistic mystery of the scene. For Burke, rhetorical acts are dramatistic acts of legitimation; they are axiological. As with the earlier agent-agency translation, there is a strongly ethical dimension afforded rhetoric, yet each actually conceives of the axiological dimension of rhetoric in significantly variant ways.

The obvious counterclaim is that any value of obedience and piety must include within its conception the possibility of

Likewise, for the dramatist Erving Goffman, the fundamental unit of interaction within dramatistic scenes is the obligation to assert a "face" and to engage in "face-work" which protects the face of self and of other. For Goffman's articulation of that obligation see his The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1959), and Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1967). The way in which that dramatistic obligation engenders and legitimizes speech acts has been articulated in V. Fry and M. Schaefermeyer, "Functional Obligation: A Re-Evaluation of Regulative and Constitutive Rules in Speech Act Theory," Speech Communication Association Convention Paper, 1980.
disobedience and impiety. Even if it can be argued that obedience and piety are more Dramatically meritorious than their opposites, since human agents are capable of symbol misuse there must be at least some instances in which impiety is likely and/or appropriate. There are several ways to respond to that objection. First, following Burke's own argumentative reasoning, once the meaning of a system has been determined, all that does not fall within its designated purview must be considered as an "accident" of existence. Put another way, though it is conceivable that a specific instance of disobedience could be located, nonetheless, it remains only that—a single accident of existence rather than an exception which demands re-evaluation of one's determination of essence. Thus, through an application of the Burkeian "Heads I Win, Tails You Lose" argumentative form, neither contradiction nor inconsistency can invalidate the selected systemic essence.

At the same time, such an argument seems coyly to discuss a legitimate concern, thus avoiding addressing the seriousness of the question. It is likely that the axiological expectations of an agent-agency focus would give rise to a generic understanding of a Burkeian rhetoric as the ethical means of symbolically modifying evil and/or immoral states (as in the instance of Germans who employed every available rhetorical means to struggle against Hitler and the Nazi evil).

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5 See Chapter Three for the argument which correlates disobedience, impiety and symbol misuse.

6 Consult Chapter Three for Burke's distinction between essence and existence as well as for an explanation of his "Heads I Win, Tails You Lose" argument mode.
Our altered scene-act meaning has permitted us to discern Burke's contrasting meanings for Rhetoric and Symbolic, a distinction which is axiologically relevant. Though both functions of language are made possible by the human capability to use symbols, the valuing components of Rhetorical action are piety and obedience whereas the valuing dimensions of Symbolic allow for impiety and symbol misuse. Though impiety may have its Rhetorical ingredient, dramatistically it should be understood as essentially Symbolic.

Such a claim cannot be made in passing, for it points toward a fundamentally disparate view of rhetoric which characterizes the two translations. Despite the fact that Symbolic inevitably contains a Rhetorical ingredient, it can be argued that Burke sees his own work as primarily Symbolic impious discourse. While Rhetoric is, as Burke claims, discourse addressed to some advantage, Symbolic is a purer form. Rhetoric concerns itself with the spontaneous, intuitive ways in which rhetorical agents not only mold themselves in accordance with the forms of communication which dominate in their particular hierarchy but also act to perpetuate and to legitimize that scenic order. For Burke, then, Rhetoric is ancillary to permanence far more than to change. It is cooperative public communication required to symbolically harmonize the scene.

Certainly the possibility of impropriety is implied by the conception of a symbol user and misuser. At the same time, misuse as an indication of disobedience can only give rise to another order with
its own requirements for compliance.\(^7\) Impious discourse is not primarily a genre of Rhetorical action but is, rather, a species of Symbolic action reserved to the philosopher-poet-artist-critics who can create symbolic "corrective philosophies" capable of establishing its own regulative "Thou Shalt Nots."\(^8\) Securely stuck in their lower hierarchical levels, other beings have little access to the inventiveness of the realm of ideas and so must act as agents of the hierarchy in a Rhetorical rather than in a Symbolic way.

In its role as a critique of Scientism, Dramatism clearly presents such a "corrective philosophy." Yet, even philosopher-poet-artist-critics experience guilt over their Symbolic impieties, for they share with all symbol users an origin out of the same ontological conditions. Deriving from that primal state is a moral obligation to maintain the mystery of the scene making rhetorical acts value-laden cooperative acts of legitimation. The values of obedience and piety to the symbolic authorities which uphold hierarchical mystery have been discussed. When enacted, those values legitimize the scene which gives rise to them.

\(^7\)The way in which one order comes to displace another has been developed by Leland Griffin in his articulation of Burke's Dramatistic structure of order-victimage-kill-guilt-redemption-order as an approach to the rhetoric of social movements. Griffin specifically notes the dramatistic process by which the stasis of one order is, ultimately, replaced by a new stasis. Leland Griffin, "A Dramatistic Theory of the Rhetoric of Movements" in Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, William Reuckert, ed. (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1969), pp. 456-478.

\(^8\)For one of Burke's discussions of "corrective philosophies" and their ability to function as symbolic instruments of change (rather than as rhetorical instruments of permanence), see his Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose (1954: rpt. New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965), pp. 61-65.
To further illustrate the significant way in which this meaning contrasts with prior interpretations it is useful to note Holland's understanding of Burke which asserts that all humans, as symbol users, are rhetorical critics capable of operating as agents of change within their world. While that view is consistent with a traditional notion of rhetoric, it is also seemingly congenial with Burke's statement in *Permanence and Change* that "All Living Things Are Critics." Yet, what Burke is saying in that context is that all things (even non-linguistic creatures) are capable of responding to signs, a purely biological function on the level of non-purposive motion. Only humans are capable of intentional purposive symbolic action. This argument takes that Burkeian axiom and draws finer distinctions between Rhetoric and Symbolic. Though both are unique kinds of symbolic action, this re-translated Dramatistic meaning requires discerning between them.

As Symbolic impious discourse, the Dramatistic corrective operates as a critique of Scientism. In presenting a terminological instrument which is superior to the Scientistic vocabulary in the assessment of human motives, Burke is concerned with action rather than with knowledge, and thus, with values more than with epistemology. However, the generic frame of earlier translators took the Burkeian critical system to be epistemologically significant for the theoretical and critical knowledge it could generate. While that primary epistemic

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10 *Permanence and Change*, p. 5.
focus acknowledged the instrumental significance of Dramatism as a rhetorical critical tool, it overlooked the meaning of Dramatism as being itself a Symbolic action of critique. Though as critique Dramatism generates knowledge statements about diverse modes of symbolic action (Grammatical, Rhetorical, and Symbolic), its locus of meaning is as an axiological system which concerns itself with legitimation, authority, and values. As such, Dramatism as critique advocates itself as an alternative value within a Scientistic scene. At this point it is important to reiterate that the above contrasting Dramatic meanings have emerged through following three lines of questioning: How has Burke's system been translated? What are the alternative means of translation which could support a retranslation? and, In what ways do different approaches to translation render different translated content? Such questioning has been essential to the process of determining the holistic meaning of Dramatism and the function of Rhetoric within that system. Each meaning has been articulated in terms of disparate being, knowing, and valuing components.

Though it is impossible in this case study to fully develop all of the ramifications of this retranslated meaning, in order to more fully understand its potential significance to rhetorical scholarship it is useful to illuminate an important theme which has been implied in the prior discussions of meaning.

Implicit in the two disparate renderings of Dramatism is a radically varied "theory of symbolism" and, relatedly, of history. That contrast gives rise to the varied depictions of the functioning of rhetoric. Whereas the agent-agency translation proceeds from what
can be called a psychological theory of symbolism, this retranslated scene-act ratio is grounded in a sociological conception of symbols. A psychological view tends to conceive of symbols as mediators or agencies which transmit individual intentions and/or objectives to a target audience. According to that perspective, available in a speaker's environment are varied linguistic tools/vehicles (i.e., symbols) from which a speaker must select those which are most likely to be rhetorically effective. The selection is made in accordance with the speaker's skill in assessing the nature of the rhetorical objective/intention, the orientation of the specific audience toward the speaker's goals, and the probable receptiveness of that audience toward specific symbols which are available. Implicit in that perspective is an orientation toward history which takes as primary the historical milieu of the speaker and the speaker's biography. As noted previously, such an orientation tends to produce micro-historical studies.

By contrast, a scene-act theory of symbolism takes as primary the grounding of all symbolic possibilities in the Dramatistic history of language. Thus, symbol use is less a result of the skill of any one speaker in selecting from varied symbol possibilities than it is a condition imposed upon humans by virtue of their nature as symbol-users. Through their acquisition of language, all humans are necessarily subject to the moral linguistic command "Thou Shalt Not." As already noted in several prior discussions, the Dramatistic nature of Rhetoric as legitimizing of a society's symbols and values derives from that moral nature of language. Though different scenic orders
throughout history may vary in terms of their most sacred and authoritative symbols, what is historically enduring is the linguistic Rhetorical function of legitimizing symbolic orders. Consequently, this theory of symbolism tends to produce macro-historical studies which delineate the ways in which Burke's three linguistic functions—Grammar, Rhetoric, and Symbolic—find their fulfillment at various historical moments.

Another way of talking about this issue is to note that Burke's theory of symbolism leads to a psychology of the audience rather than a psychology of the speaker implicit in the agent-agency interpretation. However, a psychology of the audience does not mean merely that a speaker must be especially knowledgeable of techniques of audience adeptation. In fact, given Burke's theory of symbolism and Rhetoric's operation as legitimizing, traditional designations such as speaker, message, and audience become blurred. What is Dramatically important is not determining the nature of change in an audience resulting from a speaker's rhetorical skill but rather examining the nature of Rhetoric as an ongoing mutual process of legitimizing address through which speaker/self and audience/society repeatedly reaffirm their allegiance toward shared symbols of authority. We are, thus, simultaneously speaker and audience in a participatory Rhetoric of affirmation. It is that linguistic function of Rhetoric, derived from the nature of the Dramatistic origin of language, which Rhetorically and historically binds all human communicators.

Despite the apparent disparity between these two perspectives on rhetoric, symbols and history, this essay would argue that the humane
tradition of rhetorical scholarship need not view this retranslated meaning of Dramatism as antithetical or as a devaluation of the prior translation. Because this essay takes the meaning of rhetoric to be far more than mere definition, the integrity of rhetorical inquiry cannot be invalidated by contrasting and/or varying definitions or perspectives on rhetoric. Neither of the two Burkeian translations present the final value or worth of Burkeian scholarship to rhetorical theory and criticism. Instead, both must be understood historically within the conditions for rhetorical inquiry which have allowed for altered readings of the same philosophical system.

In like manner, the fact that such figures as Aristotle, Quintillian, Ramus, and Perelman articulate varied views of rhetoric does not mean that one must decide who is right and accept only one perspective as properly rhetorical. What is enduringly rhetorical is a tradition of scholarship which, at various points in time, continues to inquire into an activity and practice termed rhetorical. Though both the historical conditions for that inquiry and the views presented concerning rhetoric vary decidedly across time, continuity of inquiry provides both the historical continuity and fluidity of the rhetorical scholarly tradition. That heritage has and can continue to endure seemingly antithetical interpretations.

At the same time, what is most important is to assess the value or contribution of this particular scene-act interpretation of Rhetoric to scholarly practice at this point in time. Such a discussion requires a turn from an emphasis on meaning to an assessment of the significance of that Dramatistic meaning as a Symbolic impious
critique. An argument for the value of that meaning must be grounded in the similarities of scenes between Burke's development of Dramatism and the present context for rhetorical scholarship. Also, the issue of whether those similar scenes give rise to a need for identical action will be discussed.

**Evaluation: Contributions and Limitations**

While this chapter has focused on the various meanings which can be ascribed to the Burkeian system, it is now essential to turn to issues related to evaluating the significance of this re-translated meaning. In so doing, it is important to assess both this study's potential contribution and also its inherent limitations. In that discussion, it will be necessary to evaluate the claim made in earlier chapters that a re-translation could provide a potential point of convergence, an avenue out of the present well-documented crisis in rhetorical scholarship. An assessment will be made regarding whether there is any basis in this modified rendering of Dramatism which could provide a rationale for arguing for the re-introduction of Dramatism into rhetorical scholarship. Closing out this investigation will be a brief section sketching the inherent limitations of this case study.

**Contributions of the Study**

Since the "of value" dimension must include an assessment of the worth of this study in terms of the particular audience(s) to whom it
is addressed, it is important to review the discussion in Chapter One and in Appendix B concerning the position of rhetoric vis-à-vis the social sciences and the impact of that position on rhetoric's future. This study has located rhetoric as a field of inquiry within an emerging communication studies discipline. Increasingly, rhetorical scholarship is being practiced in socially-scientific oriented departments presenting a persistent challenge for rhetorical scholars to justify their inquiry in the terms of a social scientific research ethic and value. Given that field status and the new audience to whom scholars must address their research, the essential concern of contemporary rhetorical scholarship must be with re-establishing within an altered disciplinary context the integrity of its traditional legitimation. Because the arbitrators of that updated justification include both rhetorical and communication scholars, this re-translation case study is necessarily addressed to both.

Chapter One as well as Appendices A and C both portrayed the eclectic ethic as a response to those new disciplinary requirements and also evaluated its failure to enhance an understanding of our crisis or to effect a call for appropriate action. Our eclectic pluralism is either no more than a barely disguised monism or leads to skepticism about the validity of all inquiry. Duncan has critiqued such approaches by asserting that "monistic and eclectic models of communication tell us little about the integrative function of rhetoric in society." Similarly, under the guise of
pluralism, monistic and eclectic ethics often persist thus prolonging our penchant to confuse a symptom with a cause of crisis. Duncan advocates Burke's Dramatism as a means of analyzing "how symbolic expressions work both as symbolic expressions, and as charters for action in society." Yet, rather than formulating any blueprint for action, we typically act as unreflective agents of the eclectic ethic.

Rhetorical scholarship demands an alternative program for action which permits us to move toward a convergence in our understanding of our disintegrating tradition. Borrowing Duncan's words, our action must be integrative rather than disjunctive. The discussion in Chapter One argued that it is important for rhetorical inquiry to be considered as more than merely pre-scientific and auxiliary to more valued social scientific research enterprises. As mentioned earlier Campbell's advocacy of a Burkeian rhetoric provides a testimony to our shared value of theory construction. The crisis in historical scholarship earlier in this century evidenced a similar defense of historical inquiry by arguing its foundation on a social scientific research ethic and value. The defensive reactions of Adams' generation forced subsequent generations to strive to prevent science from invalidating

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12 Ibid.
the integrity of historical inquiry. As rhetorical scholars, we too, require more than an appropriation of the ethic and value of the social sciences.

The survival of rhetorical scholarship as a humane inquiry is better served through formulating an alternative ethic and value, one which establishes more continuity with the traditional rhetorical legitimation rather than a breach with that heritage which occurs when a contemporary rationale is constructed according to the standards of a social scientific ethic and value. In a discussion in Chapter One dealing with Toulmin's explanation of the role of theoretical/conceptual and rational components in establishing disciplinary cohesiveness, the argument was offered that we must recognize the disparate origins of the humanities and of the social sciences. Those disparate traditions are akin to differing genres for construing the world, which allow for events and objects to be construed as this rather than as that. We negate those legitimate differences when we justify our inquiry in terms of a social scientific rational legitimation.

But what is our alternative to monism, skepticism and eclecticism? Can this case study of the meaning of Dramatism serve as a first step in the move toward convergence through the formulation of a new ethic? This re-translation has identified Burke's dramatistic location of himself within a Scientistic scene. Because of the scenic similarities between rhetoric's position vis-à-vis the social sciences and Burke's posture toward Scientism, it is potentially useful to examine whether Burke's critical action in that scene has validity for
providing a future action-framework for rhetorical scholars. We have seen that Burke deemed the mode of critique as the action most likely to ensure the integrity of humane inquiry within a dominant social scientific scene. His charter for action, then, was his symbolic expression of Dramatism, and the enduring meaning of Dramatism becomes critique, i.e., a critical action which is fundamentally axiological and transdisciplinary. Should we adopt a similar mode of action using our field status as a platform from which to assert the legitimacy of a traditional value legitimation through affirming the positive value of the humanities as trans-disciplinary? In order to argue this study's answer to such a question, it is important to look again at the issues surrounding the inter-disciplinary and the trans-disciplinary. It will be suggested that the alternative rendering of Dramatism as a trans-disciplinary system essentially concerned with valuing allows us to move beyond the competing pluralities discussed in Chapter One toward a new legitimation addressed to ourselves as well as to our social science colleagues.

Assuming the validity of the practice of individual disciplines to stake out knowledge parameters in order to distinguish their research from other enterprises, social scientific disciplines (and this is where rhetoric is now located as a field of inquiry within one such department) must confront the issue of inter-disciplinary translation. As long as rhetorical scholars assume an eclectic ethic they ratify the practice of discrete disciplines to establish their own epistemic claims. In so doing, they act on a narrow conception of scene/context which tends toward a focus on the various particular
individual disciplinary contexts and their knowledge-generating enterprises.

That epistemic perspective has been adopted by Rhetoric As A Way of Knowing rhetorical theorist/critics as well as by theorists such as Toulmin and Perelman. The latter theorists have articulated a trans-disciplinary epistemic vantage. Toulmin's inquiries into the nature and process of human understanding have prompted him to argue the futility of asserting that any one discipline has priority concerning questions of the foundation of intellectual authority and its relationship to understanding. Similarly, Perelman has advocated a trans-disciplinary epistemology as a New Rhetoric which could provide an orientation capable of arranging all the various humane disciplines into one newly legitimized coalition. Each advocates an Epistemic trans-disciplinary vantage from which humane scholars could assert their legitimacy to disciplines with theoretical/conceptual contrasting traditions. The arguments made by Epistemic scholars for why an epistemic point of departure is a solid new legitimation appear in Chapter One. Still, none to my knowledge have specifically advanced Toulmin and Perelman's trans-disciplinary perspective.

The focus of such scholars which conceives of arguments as epistemic structures has led to an emphasis on the role of argument in the generation and legitimation of symbolic systems within diverse knowing contexts. The New Rhetoric of Perelman and others emphasizes

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13 That argument is central in Toulmin's Human Understanding.

gaining the adherence of the minds of both particular and universal audiences, adherence being the acceptance of an audience of the claims of the argument. Yet, since we know from other researchers that the epistemic dimension is only one component of symbolic systems, it is possible to argue that investigating the context for knowledge generation and legitimation should also properly consider the relationship of being and valuing components in order to complete an understanding of the knowledge-generating activity.15

Burke's scene-act ratio encourages a focus which allows for combining those components, thus moving us closer to a full understanding of such activities. Beginning with a scene-act orientation, it is possible to conceive of arguments less as epistemic structures than as ACTS arising out of specific situations which must appeal for legitimacy to those situations in terms of their appropriateness or fitness as responses to those situations. Put another way, an altered focus arising out of this re-translation could approach the legitimation of arguments less as generators of symbolic truths than as appeals to the principal symbolic authorities in the scene which give rise to the need for such arguments.

How can an orientation which associates epistemic and axiological dimensions provide a way out of the Tower of Babel now characterizing rhetorical scholarship? The suggestion is that such a trans-disciplinary perspective has the potentiality to be, borrowing Duncan's term, an integrative one which provides us with an appropriate

15Refer to Chapter Two, pp. 68-69.
mode of critical action. It is important to elaborate on the rationale for that assertion. When we strive to justify our scholarship through an eclectic ethic, we accept the essentially inter-disciplinary nature of the social-scientific academic scene. The academic institutionalization of knowledge claims into discrete disciplines establishes epistemic parameters within which guardians of specialized knowledge go about the task of generating new knowledge claims. Communication between those epistemic boundaries takes the form of inter-disciplinary translation, a process of selecting and transmitting knowledge across disciplinary borders.

It has been easy, given our dominant epistemic focus to remain on the micro-disciplinary level by taking as a priori the distinctiveness of individual disciplinary knowledge claims. A macro-focus would lend itself to the task of articulating what the various disciplinary claims to knowledge of sociology, psychology, communication, and so on share which allow them to be classified as the social sciences. The emphasis is on what is held in common rather than on what is divisive between unique institutionalized knowledges. Such an inquiry would contrast the valued nature of the social sciences and humanities as different genres of construing the world. Such an inquiry would concern itself with questions of legitimation which arise when the two genres of understanding find themselves in communication.

That fact of the institutionalization of distinct disciplinary claims to knowledge among the social sciences creates a need for a trans-disciplinary vantage which can articulate the macro scene in which micro events occur. Given its unique position as a field of
humane inquiry within a social scientific discipline, rhetoric is in a special position to identify itself with such a critical inquiry. At this point in the academic institutionalization of the social sciences and the humanities the relationship between those two genres of understanding is not well depicted by the various terminologies which refer to "the two cultures." Due to the disciplinary configurations which force cooperation our position can no longer be thought of as antithetical. Borrowing a recent article title which advanced an argument for humane inquiry by referring to itself as a message from "the other side" of the two cultures, it can be argued that it is much more appropriate to think of the position of rhetorical humane inquiry as inside rather than the "other side" of the communicative sciences.

It is possible that our position as a field of inquiry inside a social scientific scene presents an ideal position from which to effect the critical act of critique. Given increased rhetorical critical attention to macro-scenic questions of values and legitimation, it is possible that we might be able to significantly contribute to developing a philosophy of the humanities which is capable of reflexively articulating the relationship between the social sciences and the humanities which exists at this historical moment. As Verne has maintained, while "the philosophy of science and the sciences has become a definite field of philosophical inquiry; a counterpart to this, a philosophy of the humanities, has not developed."16 In that

a philosophy of the humanities must take into account the position
humane inquiry has recently assumed vis-à-vis the social sciences,
it is by necessity a reflexive or metacritical posture; due to
the present crisis among the humanities derived from rational demands
for justification it must be a valued inquiry into legitimation and
the nature of acts of legitimation.

A reflexive and metacritical ethic entails that rhetoric scholars
balance an intra-disciplinary self-reflective posture toward their
field status with a trans-disciplinary vantage which asserts rhetoric's
proper role as an inquiry into acts of legitimation. Such a task
requires recognition of axiological issues, not to the exclusion of
epistemological issues, but rather as the conditions which make epis-
temological questions intelligible.

Earlier this study opened up the possibility that such a per­spective could contribute to an understanding of the plethora of
competing New Rhetorics presently vying for recognition. Adopting
a critical or metacritical ethic, as suggested, means that critics
inquire into the process of the assimilation and legitimation of New
Rhetorics rather than taking as their primary task advocacy of one
or more macro-theories. Similarly, such a perspective could be worth­
while to our social scientific colleagues. Since, as has been sug­
gested, communication among social scientific disciplines takes the
form of an inter-disciplinary translation, metacritical issues advanced
by rhetorical scholars concerning the meaning and the significance of
perspectives to be translated could be of great worth not only to rhe­
torical scholars in their efforts to evaluate the competing claims
engendered by the rhetorical eclectic ethic but also to social science communication researchers in their endeavors to establish their academic status to the other social science disciplines. Relatedly, in Chapter One the character of communication research was depicted as derivative, often relying on concepts and methods borrowed from the more established disciplines of psychology, sociology, political science, and so on. Like rhetorical scholars, communication researchers find themselves in a legitimation crisis brought on by the demand to justify the distinctiveness and worth of their scholarly contribution to other social science disciplines. In a manner similar to that practiced by rhetorical scholars, they often proceed by adopting the terms, methods, and questions deemed of value in other academic settings. In so doing, they may follow a logic similar to that of rhetorical Burkeian translators who mistook significance for meaning. The possibility of convergence resides in the adoption of a metacritical perspective which requires viewing potential transplants in their own context of inquiry (as responses to their own particular scenes), and only then as significant to the context of rhetorical communication scholarship.

This re-translation of Burke has taken a metacritical approach—a metacritical act—as its response to our legitimation crisis. Such acts suggest the value of exploring a critical ethic or metacritical ethic as an appropriate response to our legitimation crisis. In fact, perhaps it can be argued that crises give rise to critical ethics, to reflexive questioning of the shifting values which characterize the crisis. Subsequent work with Burke's system might yield more about his strategies of critique and of legitimation which might be of great
value to rhetorical scholarship, given the similarity of contexts of crisis in which each functions. Additionally, it might be possible to develop a genre of critique. By examining other acts of critique—such as Philosophical Hermeneutics—we could arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the being, knowing, and valuing dimensions of the act of critique.

Once again it is instructive to employ Toulmin's explanation of the importance of establishing shared rational bonds in lieu of overlapping theoretical/conceptual orientations. Typically, shared methods, epistemologies, and values lead to consensus in disciplinary goals. This study has argued for the recognition of the distinctions between the humanities and the social sciences as two disparate genres of understanding. When representatives of each find themselves sharing the same departmental affiliation, the typical reaction may be to deny the differences or to reduce them to rational concerns making them variations in methodology, in terminology, in research object and so on. This study has argued both for the acknowledgment of the distinctiveness of the two genres and also for the effort to move toward an articulation of that difference. Our survival as an academic discipline depends not so much on the efforts of rhetorical scholars to adopt the rational bonds which provide consensus among our social scientific colleagues but rather on our enunciation of the integrity of a reflective and metacritical position.
Limitations of this re-translation study

Limitations are inherent in any case study. They typically coalesce around the extent to which a single case can be argued for as representative, as a basis from which to generalize to other instances of translation across other disciplines. This study cannot claim to be capable of eliciting a set of propositions, or stages appropriate to the process of inter-disciplinary translation. Further, some might argue that no new theory emerges from this study. What we have, instead, is the articulation of a necessary and appropriate stance (metacritical) from which to conduct future inquiry. It should be remembered, though, that the aim of this re-translation case study was not, principally, to provide a basis for generalizing to other instances of interdisciplinary translation, particularly outside rhetorical scholarship, but rather to focus on the intra-disciplinary. Additionally, the argument in earlier chapters was on the level of criticizing the efforts of other theorist/critics to advocate meta/macro theories as New Rhetorics. By a systematic inquiry into the process of successfully legitimizing the Burkeian critical system as a viable New Rhetoric, it was hoped to establish a point beyond crisis from which to then inquire into the axiological process of legitimation now under way in the name of new competing rhetorics.

Nonetheless, this effort should be viewed as an initial case which requires subsequent inquiries into the introduction and legitimation of other rhetorical/communication transplants. Of potential interest would be examinations of successful and unsuccessful transplants in
terms of the extent to which similar contexts of legitimation lead to
more frequent acceptance within transplanted contexts.

Another limitation of this study is, simultaneously, one of its
strengths. In this section it has been discussed that the initial
conception of the problem of translation, in particular regarding the
Burkeian transplant, as epistemic, has, given way to one which empha­
sizes the fundamental importance of the axiological process of legi­
timation. Had this emphasis been clarified at the outset rather than
toward the end of the study, as a result of the process of re­
translation, perhaps the project would have unfolded differently.
Here at the end, I sense the entelechical principle lurking about
ensuring in one way or another continuity from beginning to end and
from end to beginning.
APPENDIX A

Since the terms "pluralism," "monism," and "eclecticism" are employed throughout, it is important to clarify their use. Referring to disparate conceptions of the universe, pluralism and monism have roots in philosophical inquiry. For a pluralist, the universe is comprised of many things or of many different kinds of things; for the monist, the reverse is true: the universe is a single entity or is composed of one kind of thing or of one substance. Chaim Perelman has referred to the latter as "ontological monism."\(^1\) The problem with ontological monism is that it is often simultaneously an axiological monism which requires that all conflicts be resolved in one way, thus reducing differences to one. Furthermore, asserts Perelman, "Ontological and Axiological monism will most often be associated with a methodological monism according to which there is but one method to follow to reach the truth."\(^2\) Perelman suspends questions concerning both the ultimate nature of the universe and also the final solution to human problems in favor of a methodological


\(^{2}\) Ibid, pp. 62-63.
pluralism grounded in his New Rhetoric which emphasizes the role of argument in gaining the adherence of a universal audience.3

Within the domain of literary criticism, Wayne Booth has endeavored to develop a pluralism which would be tolerant of methodological-critical diversity.4 Booth has applied "pluralism" and "monism" to characterize contrasting approaches to literary criticism. Though Booth acknowledges the philosophical meaning of those terms, like Perelman, he is less interested in "conceptions of the world's ultimate nature" than he is in learning about the way or ways critics have of "working on the world."5 Booth's aim led him to categorize approaches to understanding among literary critics by the pluralist or monist attitudes embodied in their respective critical orientations. In addition to pluralism and monism, Booth's typology also included eclecticism and skepticism, and the often fine distinctions among all four terms.

Of particular relevance is Booth's explication of monism, pluralism, and eclecticism as differing modes of critical inquiry. Booth's monist argues the correctness of one interpretation of a literary work. Upon close examination of seeming interpretative diversity, the monist will proceed to demonstrate the correctness of a singular explanation which had been masked by apparent diversity.


5Ibid, pp. 24-25 (emphasis original).
By contrast, the eclectic critic assumes that all interpretations are collages of truth and falsity, often arrived at through critical modes indigenous to non-literary pursuits. Eclectism seems to necessarily result in pluralism in that knowledge derived from numerous sources is allowed. By denying the pluralism created by an eclectic approach, the monist affirms the single unified nature of one proper interpretation.

Whereas eclectic criticism seems always to lead to pluralism—a pluralism which this study will call eclectic pluralism—often that pluralism is more like a monism or a skepticism. In fact, Booth is concerned with the existence among literary critics of a professed pluralism (a tolerance for the legitimacy of multiple interpretations) which belies either an underlying monism or which results in skepticism. Booth claims that

the pluralist who believes in a harmony that allows each mode to be totally translated into the terms of some one supreme mode is saying that truth is in some sense one, while the pluralist who believes that a plurality of modes is required because each of them reveals truths that are essentially hidden from the others is saying that truth is in some irreducible sense not one.\(^6\)

Booth maintains that the pluralistic monist "will look for the one correct metaperspective; but since he will manufacture a single umbrella, however commodious, he will then proceed as a monist."\(^7\).

There is another type of pluralist whose pluralism leads to the

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\(^6\)Ibid, p. 28.

\(^7\)Ibid, p. 34.
skeptics' assertion that because no distinctions can be made among varying claims nothing can be known with any certainty. The latter renders critical understanding impossible.

Booth has described a crisis in pluralism (which includes the types of pluralism discussed above) among literary critics as Babel. This Babel is characterized by the endless assertions of each pluralistic mode that it either provides the critic with the legitimate interpretative stance or that no orientation can produce critical knowledge, a position which renders the search for critical understanding arbitrary. Booth seeks convergence out of the "confusion of tongues" vis-à-vis a genuine pluralism which does not, in practice, become either a monism or a skepticism. "We are probing instead," claims Booth, "the possibility of a full embrace of more than one critical method without reducing pluralities to one (a supreme monism), or multiplying them to a vague or meaningless infinity, or cancelling them out to zero." 8

It is possible to see how Booth adapts pluralism and monism (terms by which philosophers refer to the composition of the world) as a way of talking about the manner in which literary critics operate as literary critics. Likewise, it would be possible to conduct a rhetorical inquiry which follows Booth's application of those terms in order to categorize various rhetorical critical approaches—Neo-Aristotelian, psychological, anthropological, linguistic, philosophical, and so on. That inquiry would examine

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the ways in which each, having been classified according to Booth's typology, render dissimilar knowledge of rhetorical objects.

Despite the interesting possibilities of that type of inquiry, this analysis enlists the terms monism, pluralism, and eclecticism to a different end, that of an explication of the abyss between traditional and modern rhetorical criticism as the displacement of a methodological monism by an eclecticism. More than merely a depiction of the present critical state, eclecticism (a situation in which a variety of transplanted perspectives compete for New Rhetoric status) is an indication of an altered research ethic among rhetorical critics (See Appendix C for a discussion of the term ethic). Whereas the traditional ethic typically identified with Neo-Aristotelian criticism was methodologically monist, the ethic of the modern rhetorical critic is eclectically pluralistic. Like the pluralism among literary critics, this eclectic pluralism is often either a masked monism (an advocacy of one perspective, be it symbolic interactionism, symbiotics, Rhetoric as Epistemic, or some other) or a skepticism concerning the ability of rhetorical criticism to produce knowledge.

Thus, rather than cataloguing the differences among competing New Rhetorics and the knowledge each generates, a more fruitful inquiry is an investigation into the shift in the research ethic (see Appendix C) which guides rhetorical inquiry. Like Booth's metacriticism, the task is to establish a metacritical position which is more likely than the current eclectic pluralism to render what Booth calls a fair and just reading or critical understanding.  

We would then have a pluralism which is not just methodological, but, borrowing Perelman's words, axiological as well.
APPENDIX B

Often the terms "field" and "discipline" are used interchangeably; at other times, when there seems to be some inherent distinctions in use, they remain imprecise and ambiguous. According to The American Heritage Dictionary, a field is an area of academic interest or specialization, as in a field of endeavor; it is a topic or subject area. The same source defines a discipline as a branch of knowledge or of teaching. Those definitions suggest that a discipline is a systematization of a field(s) into an identifiable body of knowledge and of teaching, as in academic departments such as history, sociology, psychology, and so on. In that sense, if history could be considered a discipline, then a field within that discipline would be Russian History, Far Eastern History, or some other specialization. Discipline, then, is the term having the widest parameters since field can be considered as a subset of discipline.

Given that distinction, because academic departments of communication exist within universities, it is plausible to argue that Communication Departments are disciplines just as surely as are other departments. Just as other departments are distinguished by numerous specialized fields, so, too, are Communication Departments. By way of illustration, the latter include rhetorical, mass media, small group, interpersonal, and organizational researchers who work as colleagues, sharing the same disciplinary affiliation (academic
institutionalization), though their fields of specialization are distinct.

There are those, however, who maintain that communication is a field of inquiry rather than a discipline. Both Daniel Bell and Stephen Toulmin have described communication inquiry as a field of endeavor marked by questions concerning the nature of communication and of communication problems. As a field, communication inquiry has yet to achieve the status of a discipline. It is interesting to note the reversal of the dictionary parameters regarding fields and disciplines. Whereas that source leads to thinking about fields as subsets of disciplines, Bell and Toulmin conceive the purview of field to be wider than the knowledge and teaching which characterize a particular discipline. At the same time, a disciplinary status is superior to the status awarded a mere field of inquiry.

This study uses "discipline" in discussions pertaining to the "changed or changing disciplinary context" for rhetorical scholarship. In that sense, "discipline" designates the institutional setting or context for the practice of rhetorical inquiry (a field of communicative inquiry). The point is made that the emergence of departments of communication (which typically include social-scientific as well as rhetorical scholars) is displacing the older disciplinary affiliations among primarily non-quantitative

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1 During a lecture at Ohio State University, Fall 1970, Bell termed communication "a field of interest." The Toulmin reference is reported from a private conversation taking place in Minneapolis, SCA 1978, between Toulmin and William Brown. Toulmin spoke of the purpose of communication as one of synthesizing knowledge from other fields.
scholars in speech departments. In disciplines where its numerous fields of inquiry are viewed as having similar intellectual and/or theoretical roots and goals, such a state would not engender a loss of confidence. Yet, that change has contributed to a crisis in the practice of rhetorical inquiry in that, functioning as a field of inquiry within a disciplinary context which is often questioning of the value of its inquiry, rhetoric and social-scientific scholars appear alien to each other in every respect except their shared disciplinary (departmental) affiliation. This point will receive attention in Chapters One and Four.
APPENDIX C

It is instructive to clarify the relationship between research ethic and research value by exploring the following claim: a changing research ethic among rhetorical critics can be correlated with altering perceptions of the value of rhetorical inquiry. At the base of all critical evaluation is a belief in the worth/merit and/or usefulness (the value) of one's critical inquiry. That judgment of value is typically made in terms of something else, that is, in terms of something which is not of value or which is of lesser value. Issues pertaining to the value of rhetorical criticism, then, must be concerned with such questions as "In what way is rhetorical criticism valuable?" and "To whom is it of value?" Justifications of value are always rhetorical, i.e., always addressed to an audience which is the final arbitrator (evaluator) of the value of one's research.

Normally taken for granted, when claims concerning the value of rhetorical inquiry surface within the rhetorical scholarly community, they do so as a response to a crisis of value. This can arise, as this investigation asserts, because of the changed context for rhetorical inquiry which demands that critics justify the value of their scholarship to new audiences. The argument developed in Chapter One is concerned with the necessity for modern criticism to establish its legitimacy to a social-scientific audience. With the emergence of socially-scientific oriented departments of communication, rhetorical
critics often find themselves pursuing their scholarly activities within environments unconvinced of the value of their inquiry to its pursuits. Given the different audience to whom its value must be legitimized, rhetorical criticism finds itself searching for a way to assert the legitimacy of its inquiry (its value) on new grounds.

The need to articulate a new foundation for the evaluation of rhetorical scholarship has led critics to the acceptance of an *eclectic research ethic* (See Appendix A for a discussion of the terms eclecticism, pluralism, and monism). In Chapter One the development of that ethic as a displacement of a Neo-Aristotelian monistic ethic is correlated with the changing value of and the need for a new legitimation for rhetorical criticism. Thinking of an ethic as a normative criterion which guides critical inquiry and which allows a critic to define appropriate procedures for dealing with those topics highlights the differences in procedures and topics between a Neo-Aristotelian ethic which can be termed monistic and the present eclectic ethic. Since a research ethic is predicated upon acceptance of the value of one's inquiry, it can be thought of as a standard or as a measure of one's perception of the worth of one's scholarly activity and of the audience to whom it is of value.

Like a research value, a research ethic is typically taken for granted within scholarly communities. In that sense an ethic comprises the "natural attitude" of an academic community, a point further developed in the text. Speaking specifically of the scientific community, Kuhn has argued the importance of values in creation of a commonality among scientists. In fact, values are
one of the four components Kuhn identifies as comprising the disciplinary matrix of the scientific research enterprise.\(^1\) Kuhn maintains that values not rules provide the scientist with "the criteria of choice" among competing explanations. Except during crises, values and procedural rules are more integrating than conflicting, the one reinforcing the strength of the other. Without crisis, neither are questioned by the community. If rules prove inadequate to a given task, as they do during times of profound change, scientists will choose in accordance with values.\(^2\)

Kuhn conceptualizes values as anchors which allow for continued research during times of paradigmatic crisis.\(^3\) By contrast, this study isolates a crisis of value as prior to a crisis in research ethic. The differing concern is both with the way in which rhetorical criticism can be said to be of value—recognized as legitimate inquiry—rather than with the values (like consistency, accuracy, correspondence of theory to practice, and so on) accepted by critics, and also with the manner in which research ethics correlate with the of value dimension of rhetorical inquiry.

\(^1\)Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd enlarged ed. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 182-187. For Kuhn, a disciplinary matrix has four primary components: (1) symbolic generalizations (or conventions) which can readily be expressed formally and logically; (2) metaphysical dimensions which are the permissible and appropriate analogies and metaphors, including, claims Kuhn, the purely heuristic as well as the purely ontological; (3) values which provide a sense of community; and (4) exemplars which identify problems and solutions appropriate to those problems.


\(^3\)Consult footnote 66, Chapter One.
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