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THE LANGUAGE OF MORAL EDUCATION:
THE GOAL THAT STUDENTS LEARN MORAL PRINCIPLES

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University

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To My Parents
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Problem

Although many proponents of moral education have made the teaching of principles an important part of the moral-education enterprise, no one has taken care to explicate what might be included in the intent that persons learn principles. This study will focus on two basic questions: 1) What does it mean to say that someone has learned a moral principle? 2) What sorts of things are we willing to count as evidence that someone has learned a moral principle, and given what we will count, what is sufficient to warrant our saying that someone has learned a moral principle? The first question is a conceptual question. The second question is partially conceptual and partially practical, i.e., it has to do with what we are willing to accept as success in learning. The first question is important for two reasons. One reason is to see to what extent such learning exhausts what we intend to accomplish by moral education. The other reason is that a more precise statement of the goal of moral education to teach and learn moral principles should permit us to decide more accurately what needs to be done to attain that goal. The second question brings us to an important problem for the teaching of moral principles and
for the evaluation of moral education programs. This problem of giving a careful account of the learning of principles is undertaken within the framework of a moral education that seeks to develop persons who adopt the moral point of view. We will limit our discussion of moral education programs to the special concerns of some, quite aware that 'moral education' has provided expression for multifarious interests, and that some of these interests overlap with the particular concern of this essay, whereas others are of a different realm.

Focus of Study

A number of moral education proponents argue that the teaching of moral principles is an important part of moral education. This is not only true of proponents of more traditional views of moral education which advocate teaching a single moral doctrine, but also of sophisticated writers who attempt to provide programs informed by and consistent with what we know about ethics, psychology, pedagogy and all other areas related to the endeavors of moral education.

Barry Chazan and Jonas Soltis noted the importance advocates of moral education have put on the teaching of principles. Among the assumptions of moral educators cited by Chazan and Soltis is the following:

A third common assumption of moral philosophy deals with the importance of moral principles to the moral sphere (and hence to moral education). According to this assumption, moral principles constitute an indispensable component of moral life and hence of moral education.¹

Chazan and Soltis explain that this does not mean moral educators
agree either about which principles should be taught or how the principles selected should be taught. Nevertheless, they maintain,

The conventional approach to moral education assumes that the moral principle is at the heart of moral existence and that, consequently, the task of moral education is the transmission and inculcation of such principles.

Whether the transmission of moral principles is the "conventional approach," it is certainly a common approach suggested by many prominent moral philosophers.

In an early essay of what philosophers can contribute to education, and particularly to moral education, William Frankena writes that moral education cannot consist of a long list of specific instructions to our children for all situations into which they may fall. It must consist, rather, in teaching them certain principles or ends by which they may guide their conduct in those situations.

Frankena gives partial argument for this (which we will examine in Chapter Two), but he notes that this is not to settle the issue of how such principles are best taught.

R.M. Hare also assumes the importance of moral principles in education, although he qualifies this by saying:

What has to be passed on is not any specific moral principle, but an understanding of what morality is and a readiness to think in a moral way and act accordingly.

Hare's argument is not that specific moral principles have no place in moral education, but that adequate moral education must go beyond such teaching. He says:

Doubtless it is not possible in practice to pass on the mere form of morality without embodying it
in some content; we cannot teach children the abstract idea of a moral principle as such without teaching them some concrete moral principles.\(^6\)

This last point will be explored further in the second chapter and in Chapter Four. Hare argues further that we do not want children to necessarily adopt our particular principles. We do want them to come to be able to make decisions of principle:

We have already noticed that, although principles have in the end to rest upon decisions of principle, decisions as such cannot be taught, only principles can be taught. It is the powerlessness of the parent to make for his son those many decisions of principle which the son during his future career will make, that gives moral language its characteristic shape. The only instrument which the parent possesses is moral education—the teaching of principles by example and precept, backed up by chastisement and other more up-to-date psychological methods.\(^7\)

In this passage, Hare appears to equate moral education with the "teaching of principles." Of course, to know what he has in mind would require further examination. We will examine part of what he means in Chapter Four.

Psychologists as well as philosophers have viewed the teaching of principles as an important aspect of moral education. Lawrence Kohlberg,\(^8\) for example, places a great deal of importance on "teaching" moral principles. Any careful review of Kohlbergian research and educational programs will indicate considerable emphasis on moral principles.\(^9\) A succinct statement of this view of moral education is found in Kohlberg's argument that a comprehension of moral principles (he equates these with principles of justice) is crucial for enlightened citizenry:
Such an understanding by the majority requires deliberate concern for moral education, since such principles are not understood until one reaches a relatively advanced stage of moral judgment and reasoning.11

Kohlberg states the goal of moral education in terms of stage six moral development. At this stage, one uses stage six principles to solve moral conflict.12

The point to be made thus far is that many moral education scholars are in agreement that moral education includes the teaching of moral principles, even though they may disagree about which moral principles should be taught and how the teaching should proceed. Each of the authors cited here have more to say about what is to count as a moral principle and what is to count as teaching such a principle. However, these scholars have given little attention to what is to count as successful teaching of moral principles, i.e., little attention has been given to the question of what is to count as someone's having learned a moral principle. Without some notion of what counts as such learning, we have little idea of what is to count as success in teaching. To lay the groundwork for such a notion is the major purpose of this study.

We do have some hints from these authors about such learning. These hints come in terms of their elaboration of their particular theories. For example, Hare offers suggestions by elaborating on his view that moral principles are universal and prescriptive. To Hare, if one has learned a moral principle, at least part of what has been learned is the understanding that the principle is universal and prescriptive.13 In the case of Kohlberg, we find some hints when he
discusses moral principles in kantian language. For Kohlberg, if someone becomes morally mature, one uses moral predicates in a way implying universality and impartiality.

Yet these are but hints, and quite general ones at that. We need a carefully developed account of what it means to say that someone has learned a principle. This study will attempt to provide at least a part of such an account. More specifically, we will attempt to answer the following questions:

What does it mean to say that someone has learned a moral principle?

What will we allow as evidence that we will count as sufficient evidence that someone has learned a moral principle?

Several distinctions that are important for the theory and practice of moral education will be made. And although the accounts may fail as exhaustive, the descriptions given will be more precise than those offered by other authors. A more precise statement of the goal of moral education to teach and learn moral principles should permit us to decide more accurately what needs to be done to attain that goal. Precision should permit more realistic appraisals of success by noting what can count as evidence for successful learning of moral principles. This includes the practical problem of what a teacher should count as evidence that a student has learned a principle. Further, we will examine some issues important to philosophical considerations of moral education. Specifically, we will consider what can count as successful learning of moral principles given that such learning is to be commensurate with adopting the moral point of view.
Before we get on with the specific problems for this dissertation, let us consider moral education more broadly conceived. Perhaps this will allow us to see how the above questions fit within the very broad framework of 'moral education'.

Preliminary Remarks

Over the past decade there has been a steady concern for moral education by educational scholars, school teachers, school administrators and the general public. Many have argued that moral education should be a part of the public school program. A perusal of the literature of this discussion of moral education for public schooling reveals that few people are clear about the goals of moral education and about the reasons it should be a part of public schooling. Many advocates of moral education do agree that moral education is a viable means for correcting what they perceive to be an increase in misbehavior on the part of youth and adults, but not all agree about what should be done to remedy this commonly perceived problem. And, not all agree about what counts as being morally educated.

When it is said that there is the desire to make someone morally educated, we know at least that there is an intent to change the person. But in what way is the person to be changed? What counts as being morally educated? This is a question which is to be addressed in Chapter Two of this dissertation. Though there has been some work to clarify this question and to answer it, this work has been lacking in some important details. Some areas have been highlighted so as to answer important questions, but some important questions remain. Of these which remain, some are questions whose answers will
shed light on the practices of teaching. What has been neglected is to address the goal of moral education in terms of what can be learned, for example, the sense in which moral principles can be learned.

In order to get a concise notion of the goal of moral education programs, we must be cognizant of the fact that such programs make recommendations that are meant to have a practical effect on the subsequent actions of their graduates. Programs may, for example, intend to remedy the kinds of action that made Watergate possible or decrease the incidence of juvenile delinquency, or reduce the number of discipline problems in the schools. In short, moral education programs may focus on "improving" behavior or reducing the likelihood of undesirable behavior. But in saying that moral education will serve the end of remedying these kinds of problems, we should be clear on two points.

First, we should notice that programs of moral education cannot guarantee good behavior. We should avoid the uncritical assumption that graduates of an effective moral education program, even if those graduates have learned what the program intends, will be immune from the possibility of morally wrong action. The point should be that a morally educated person will more likely do what is right in situations permitting choice. This minor point should be made so that we avoid thinking of moral education as providing an exhaustive account of and a final solution to the problems of moral behavior.

Second, we should also note another uncritical assumption sometimes held by those who support moral education as a remedy for criminal, delinquent and other such behavior. This assumption is
that the reasons for delinquent behavior are related to moral development, i.e., it is assumed that a person who has proper moral development will not break the law or misbehave in school. This may not be a warranted assumption. In fact, we may expect there to be a close correspondence between morally right action and legally right action only in a just society, and this only after we assume that people have learned their moral lessons well. Since societies are more or less just, we should expect there to be a more or less correspondence, depending on the particular society and the particular action.

We have noted the goal of moral education as being that of increasing the likelihood of persons to do what is right in situations allowing for the possibility of doing either what is right or doing something else. (This should not be taken to mean that there are always only two possible actions to be taken, the right action and the wrong action. No doubt there are frequently situations admitting more than two possible actions and actions admitting of degree). It is, however, misleading to say that the goal of moral education is limited to a concern for improving the actions of persons. It would be more misleading still to assume that any program which had as a goal improving the actions of persons would necessarily be a program of moral education. There can be programs in schools which have such improvement as a goal but which have no interest in moral education. The point here is quite simple. It is that interest in getting persons to do what is right may be necessary but clearly is not sufficient for moral education. Let us examine this point further.
Moral education entails a concern for the moral development of persons. It is by affecting the moral development of persons that the moral educator hopes to improve the likelihood of right actions that a person will have the chance to perform. That moral education has this two-part goal can be seen by considering two alternative methods to achieve the single goal of getting persons to do what is right. We could do this by redesigning the world so that right actions will ensue. Or, we could make persons incapable of doing some set of actions which we take to be the source of many wrongful deeds, perhaps, as was portrayed in *A Clockwork Orange*. But the "utopian vision" of the first alternative has to do with social engineering and not with changing persons. Such social engineering would make moral decisions unnecessary. The second alternative involves changing persons in a way that is not consistent with education. Since such "mind altering" is not education at all, it cannot be moral education. 'Moral action', it shall be argued later, includes reference to moral reasons, vague though that reference may be. Since the goal of moral education includes making persons capable of moral action, it includes making persons capable of moral reasoning. This, in turn, includes getting persons to adopt and use moral principles and, what may be something more, to adopt the moral point of view.

The interest here, then, is moral education contrasted with mere character training, socialization or religious education. Though the results of these enterprises may become part of a moral education program, they lack the one goal which will be assumed unique to moral education; this is the goal to develop persons who are morally
educated. Much has been written about the goal of morally educated persons, however, not all have agreed on what is to count as being "morally educated." For example, some see that as coming to be well versed and committed to religious doctrine. In some cases, 'morally educated' is equated with persons who are God fearing. In other cases, it is equated with persons who dutifully accept the values of their society. Of interest here is the sense of 'morally educated' that parallels the concepts, 'morally autonomous' and 'the moral point of view'. This last sense was reflected by Frankena when he wrote,

moral education includes teaching, learning and espousing, not only a particular morality, but the very art or idea of morality itself.17

This study is not directly interested in teaching and espousing the art and idea of morality so much as we are in learning this art and idea, i.e., we are interested in successful teaching and espousing. Our concern here is not to examine the process or the way by which someone comes to learn such things. Rather, the problem here is that of describing what counts as having learned such things. It is hoped that this description will also shed some light on the teaching, the espousing, and the learning process which may result in coming to learn.

The notion 'art and idea of morality' is not without problems. The 'idea of morality' translates for Frankena into what we have alluded to as 'the moral point of view'. The 'art of morality' includes skills and dispositions we would associate with a person being "morally autonomous." Not only do these notions fail to be entirely clear, they also fail to be entirely distinct. Uncovering
what these concepts mean will bring us to consider problems in moral education that stem from theoretical problems in ethics. Using Frankena's characterization of moral education as a start, Chapter Two is an attempt to clarify the concepts of 'morally autonomous' and 'the moral point of view' and to examine how the two are related. Again, we will not exhaust all that can be said about these notions but will focus on some aspects crucial to learning principles.

Perhaps we should note at this point that learning the art of morality is not to learn some one thing. D.W. Hamlyn has made a similar point about other subject areas:

There is an inclination, I believe, to think that there exists objectively something called, to take one example, mathematics, and that it is the aim of education to bring the learner to confrontation with it. Subjects are, on this account, ideal entities available for contemplation.\(^\text{18}\)

In like manner, we are not assuming that the idea of morality is some block entity for contemplation. Learning the idea of morality is not just to learn some set of statements for contemplation. Again, quoting Hamlyn:

Thus words like 'history,' physics,' and 'mathematics' are not just the names of bodies of knowledge, in the sense of true propositions; they are if anything, the names of approaches to facts of generally different kinds.\(^\text{19}\)

The 'idea of morality' should not be taken as denoting one idea, or as a set of statements or principles. I will assume that it is a short hand way of speaking of the many things included in morality. We will focus on some of the 'things' which are included.

To agree that moral education should be a part of schooling is to agree to very little. This is partly because, broadly conceived,
moral education, even when its goal is limited to something like moral autonomy, has included anything that contributes to the development of moral persons. Included in the list of contributors is socialization, child development in general (e.g., the development of object constancy and permanency, ego development, trust), child development specific to moral development (guilt has been included here), character training, therapy, and more. Which of these is crucial to developing moral autonomy and which should be a part of schooling is a subject for debate. This discussion will speak to more narrow conceptions of 'moral education' that propose enterprises that rely on moral reasoning and argumentation as a means to develop moral persons. The precise nature of this focus should become more apparent as we proceed.

**Strategy**

Discussion of the questions raised will be carried out in the following manner: Chapter Two will present arguments that part of the goal of moral education is to get students to adopt and use principles. This discussion will include a brief assay of 'moral autonomy' and 'the moral point of view' as goals of moral education. Chapter Three will present two major ambiguities in descriptions of the sort, 'a learned principle x'. We will see how these ambiguities are important both for us to determine what such descriptions can mean and for us to consider evidence for success in learning principles. Chapter Four will assay a major ambiguity when it is said that morally educated persons must learn moral principles. In this chapter we will see what problems moral
principles bring to descriptions of the sort discussed in Chapter Three. Finally, Chapter Five will suggest how the distinctions made in this discussion are important to teaching and research in moral education.
CHAPTER NOTES


2. Ibid., page 8-14. A summary of debates over what principles should be taught and how they should be taught is provided in the pages cited. Those issues do not directly concern us.

3. Ibid., page 95.


6. Ibid.


8. There are other psychologists who view teaching principles as important, namely, those who have taken to do further research using Kohlberg's model.

9. I hesitate to use the word 'teaching' to describe what Kohlberg recommends. Perhaps it would be better to call it "plus one Stimulation."


12. Theodore Mischel, "Cognitive Development," p. 212. We should qualify our claims about Kohlberg by noting that the goal of moral education, as Kohlberg sees it, is to facilitate moral development. This does not guarantee that one will be fully developed and reach stage six.

13. We should notice that, for Hare, principles are universal in the sense that they are universalizable and that Hare means something specific by 'universalizability'. We will consider part of what he means in Chapter Four.

14. Some program proponents explicitly claim that their program will serve to reduce crime, misbehavior in schools, etc. Values Clarification, if that can count as an example of a moral education program, offers solution to crime, etc., by arguing that some people misbehave because they are not clear about their values. This program serves to help people clarify their values. One values education project was so bold as to claim that their program would reduce juvenile crime. This program was funded by LEAA.

15. Anthony Burgess, A Clockwork Orange, (New York: W. Norton & Company, 1963). Two doctors had a hand in making Alex, the story's protagonist, incapable of violence. One of them responds to a criticism that they made Alex incapable of moral choice saying:

'These are subtleties,' like smiled Dr. Brodshy. 'We are not concerned with motive, with higher ethics. We are concerned only with cutting down crime--' [sic]

16. That is to say, we will focus on moral education in that includes the bringing of students to rationally discuss and choose moral options. This eliminates some programs that opt only to foster a particular ethical code, though these programs may serve rational, critical programs just as Aristotle suggested they could.


19. Ibid., page 28.
CHAPTER II
THE MORALLY EDUCATED PERSON

Introduction

In the first chapter it was argued that moral education has been taken by some as a viable means to resolve problems of misbehavior among youth. But, as we saw, moral education is not identical with any effort to resolve such problems, since moral education as distinguished here is an enterprise undertaken to develop persons who adopt the moral point of view. In this chapter we will explore some of what is included in learning principles when such learning is part of adopting the moral point of view. Proponents of moral education advocate the successful teaching of moral principles and the moral point of view. We will examine what it means to say that someone has adopted the moral point of view and how that description is related to the learning of moral principles.

We will see that 'the moral point of view' is a troublesome concept, and we will see that it is troublesome in part because there appear to be competing conceptions of the moral point of view. Some philosophers have at least the following in mind: There is a point of view, a way of looking at things, that is distinctively moral. Elaborating on this distinctiveness would seem to require our accepting a particular normative ethical theory. We
should also note that learning moral principles is only part of the goal of moral education.

In order to become more clear about what is conceptually included in this goal of moral education to teach principles and the moral point of view, it would help us to look carefully at past accounts given of that goal. We will take our lead from an account given by William Frankena,\(^1\) supplementing that account where it is helpful to do so. Frankena's essay is one of the earliest works on moral education with this particular goal, and in his discussion he touches upon most issues raised by subsequent authors on the topic.

Frankena characterizes the goal of moral education in light of Socrates' conception that it is the problem of teaching virtue. But his first point is that, unlike Socrates, most moral philosophers do not hold that we always do what we think is right. Unconvinced that knowledge is sufficient for action, Frankena characterizes the problem of moral education as having two parts. The first problem is that of "handing on a 'knowledge of good and evil' or 'knowing how to act....'"\(^2\) The second problem is that of "ensuring that our children's conduct will conform to this 'knowledge.'"\(^3\) He describes the goal of moral education in terms of this two part problem.

We should recognize that there is a problem whether we say knowledge is sufficient or not. If we say it is sufficient, then in the absence of proper action we say the person did not know. If we say that knowledge is not sufficient, we simply will not
in the absence of proper action, deny knowledge. The Socratic conception that knowledge is sufficient for action may or may not prove to be trivial.\(^4\) Since part of the goal of moral education is that people act morally, a problem for moral education is not so much that of deciding how to use the word 'knowledge' as to discover what is sufficient for moral action. But, as we will see, this is not without its conceptual difficulties.

**Moral Principles and Moral Education**

Frankena introduces "teaching principles" early in his essay. He writes that we cannot teach "moral knowledge" by offering a "long list of special instructions to our children for all of the situations into which they may fall." We must, he says, teach them "certain principles or ends by which they may guide their conduct in those situations."\(^5\) He argues that these principles may be taught directly, as Moses did by inculcation, or indirectly, by allowing those taught to formulate principles or ends operating in particular cases.

The point of moral instruction is to put the child in the position of being able to decide what he should do in each situation he may come up against; and, for this, it is necessary but not sufficient to teach him the ends or principles involved.

The reason that learning principles is not sufficient is that the student may still lack knowledge required to apply those principles. But let us take each of Frankena's points in turn.

Frankena claims that certain principles or ends must be taught.\(^7\) This is because we cannot give to those being taught an exhaustive list of instructions for all situations which they may encounter.
This is true of non-moral as well as moral situations. For example, a student may be required to decide what should be done in a situation calling for first aid. Although a particular case may be used to teach what should generally be done when someone has a serious laceration, we expect the student to generalize from the particular instructional case to all cases requiring that kind of first aid. We might present a case in which direct pressure to the wound is appropriate and the student the following principle: "When there is bleeding, apply direct pressure to the wound." This principle serves better than giving specific instructions for a specific case, since we cannot be present in future cases to give instructions, and we expect the student, when it is appropriate and even when we are absent, to apply direct pressure to a wound. We find comparable learning in moral education.

In moral education, we expect the student to learn what to do in some future situations by learning principles which state generally what should be done. In moral education as in first aid, specific instructions are insufficient, since we cannot be present in future situations to instruct. This seems to be Frankena's point, although there is an additional point worth making.

Even if we could get students to do what is right in future situations by giving specific instructions to the persons when a moral situation arose, this would not meet the conceptual requirements for 'moral education'. Technology might give us the means to provide such instructions, for example, by planting cassette recorders in the person's ear to give instructions. This would not be an
instance in which one learned, say, that one ought to tell the truth in most instances, since the person would only be heeding the instruction, "Tell the truth." Accepting the principle amounts to more than behaving in accordance with the principle. Take the first-aid example. If someone comes upon a bleeding person and a recording begins, "Apply direct pressure to the wound," we cannot say that the person has learned the principle that direct pressure should be applied to a wound in order to stop bleeding. What we could perhaps say, in this case, is that the person has learned to obey the instructions recorded on the cassette.

**Applying Moral Principles**

Because moral education cannot be a list of instructions, Frankena argues that moral instruction necessarily involves teaching principles: "The point of moral instruction is to put the child in the position to decide what he should do in each situation he may come up against." It is not just that we cannot be there to give specific instructions, but rather that even if our presence could be arranged, the resulting behavior would not count as the result of moral instruction or moral education. Although the teaching of principles is necessary, such instruction, according to Frankena, is not sufficient. In addition we must, "supply him [the student] with the knowledge required to apply the principle or to realize the end in question, or with the ability to acquire this knowledge for himself." Let us examine this matter of applying principles in some detail.
For us to apply a principle, we must know more that merely the statement of the principle. Although this is not a profound point, it is important, and it pertains to the non-moral as well as the moral arena. For example, in basketball a principle for the offense is to move the man against a man-to-man defense and to move the ball against a zone defense. In order to supply a person with "the knowledge required to apply the principle," we must make sure the person knows the different kinds of defense, knows how to identify them properly, and can execute the appropriate offensive maneuvers.

We should note the degree to which someone may know this principle. One may be able to repeat the principle and be able to correct another when it is misstated. For example, one may see that, "move the man against the zone," is a misstatement of the principle. But one can do this without knowing the meaning of 'zone' or 'man-to-man', or without knowing what is intended by 'moving the man' and 'moving the ball'. A more complete understanding of the principle would be one in which the facets of basketball covered by the principle are understood.

Frankena seems to have more in mind that a pedestrian understanding of principles. Given our basketball example, he would seem to have in mind that one can pick out zones from man-to-man as they occur; that is, we should be able to pick them out from the point of a player and not a spectator. But there is more to moral education than the learning of principles and the application of them.10
Moral Reasoning

In addition to getting students to apply principles, Frankena contends that moral education "must involve communicating as early as possible at least some sense of the rationale of our judgments of right and wrong." Frankena does not provide an argument to support this claim, and the claim itself is ambiguous. If we take Frankena to be saying that morally educated persons must come to understand the rationale of moral judgments, he may be saying one of two things. He may mean that moral education should have this understanding as a goal, or he may mean that moral education necessarily has this as a goal. Let us suppose that he means the outcome of successful moral education necessarily includes that students come to understand the rationale of moral judgment. Taken this way, the claim is not merely that morally educated persons should understand the rationale of moral judgment, rather the claim is that they must have learned this rationale to be called morally educated. But why should this be a conceptual requirement? It may be that such understanding is conceptually tied to acting morally.

John Wilson gives one argument for the necessity of moral reasoning to moral education. He bases his argument on the premise that one goal of moral education is that persons act morally. He ties "acting morally" to the rationale of judgments by attending first to 'acting morally' and, then, to 'acting morally'. Let us turn our attention first to 'acting morally' with the emphasis on 'acting'.
Wilson makes the point that moral action is a species of action in which it makes sense to ask for reasons. "If people are to act morally at all, they must act for a reason in this sense: they must not be, so to speak, just pushed around by causes." The contrapositive of this is that where it does not make sense to ask for reasons, it is not a moral act. This is to tie morality to the possibility of reason giving; that is, it makes sense to talk of the notion of justification.

To act morally is not only to act for a reason, but "to act for a reason" in a particular sense. The sense that Wilson has in mind is the sense commonly cited when a distinction is drawn between giving a causal explanation for someone's action and asking someone for his reason for an act. For example, Jones may frequently speak in class. We could give a causal explanation for Jones' behavior bringing facts about Jones' personality, his proclivity to talk, his need for recognition, and so on. This would constitute (provided we allow such psychologizing) a causal explanation of his behavior. We could, instead, ask Jones for his reason(s) for speaking. He might say that there are many things being said in class that are mistaken and he wishes to correct these mistakes. Or, he could say that he is trying to impress Smith by his grandiloquence. Whatever his reasons, they are examples of Wilson's point discussed above. If someone performs a moral action, that person has acted for a reason in the sense that he has a reason which is his reason, and he was not merely pushed around by causes. Wilson has another point to make.
Moral action is also tied to acting morally, with the stress on 'morally'. The adverb 'morally' informs us that the action prompts moral consideration. Using this sense, to say that an action is moral is not to say it is right. We are not using 'moral' in that way. We are using 'moral' to mean that the action is of the type that invites moral consideration. We are talking about actions that are moral rather than actions that are not moral. Moral actions, in this sense of 'moral', can be morally right or wrong; non-moral actions cannot be morally right or wrong.

But when talking about moral actions in this sense we should avoid a further ambiguity. We could be talking about moral actions to describe the context in which the action is done, or we could be describing the person who acts, the agent. Moral actions are those we are willing to describe as being in the sphere of moral consideration though the agent does not recognize this. These may be actions that have good (or bad) consequences or which are someone's duty to perform (or to desist), but are not recognized by the agent as such. For example, we may describe a hospital visit as Jones' duty because he promised Smith he would visit, whereas Jones forgot his promise. The point is that we sometimes describe actions as moral, even though the person acting does not recognize them as such. To describe them as moral in this way is to cite details about the relation of the action to other things, such as, what has happened in the past (as in the case of Jones promising) or what consequences the action might have in the future (promoting Smith's health),
This is not, however, the only sense in which we can speak of moral actions.

We could describe something as a moral action and be making reference to an agent and his reasons. This is what can be meant when someone is described as acting morally. To describe someone as acting morally, in this sense, is to make reference to not only what is done, for example visiting, but to the agent's reasons. If Jones visited Smith because Jones remembered his promise to do so and because Jones believes that the visit most likely will benefit Smith, then we are likely to say Jones acted morally. This is because the visit was made on the basis of reasons having to do with what is moral. We are not likely to say Jones acted morally, if he cared not for Smith's well-being, forgot his promise (or did not care about it) and simply likes to visit people in the hospital.

We could expect Jones to say something about his obligation, his trying to help Smith, or something of that sort.

With Wilson's help we may make the point that moral reasoning is part of what it means to act morally. This is just in the sense that someone has a moral reason for what he does. If we assume that part of what it means to be a morally educated person is to act morally, then, using Wilson's argument, anyone who acts morally has a moral reason for what he does. To some extent, then, they must be able to have moral reasons. But Frankena has more in mind than that a morally educated person must have a moral reason for her action. That is, he means more than just that someone can say
that she visited her friend, because "that is the morally right thing to do." Let us see what else he has in mind.

Levels of Moral Reasoning

Wilson gives us some help in explaining what we intend when we are trying to develop in persons the capacity to act morally. But, as Frankena writes, we should develop in students the ability to make statements about moral issues, that is, to make judgments. Implicit in his argument is that moral education should develop in students the ability to reason about moral issues. Let us see how this ability figures into the ability to make judgments.

Though Frankena argues that we should communicate the rationale of our moral judgments, he is not entirely clear about this requirement. Whereas he waives the requirement that students get full scale philosophic theory, he does not state what degree of theorizing should be introduced as the rationale of our judgments. Frankena wants students to be able to make moral judgments, and, as he points out, our use of moral words opens us up for further discussion of justification. "To make a moral judgment is to claim that it is justified, that a case can be made for it." Frankena argues that because of this, reference to reason must be made in schools when talking about morality, even if criticism and moral philosophy are put off until college. This is a vague reference to when educators should reason with students about moral judgments. Not only is it unclear when, i.e., at what age, it is unclear how far we should take our justification. But let us not focus on the requirement of the educator, let us focus on what we should expect of students
who meet the minimal standards to qualify as morally educated. We will attend not to the teacher who must produce the rationale of moral judgments for the students to follow. Rather, we will attend to the student as she tries to produce her own rationale for the judgments she makes. What do we expect of her?

Let us start with a minor point. To say that something is good, e.g., "That movie was a good movie," to say that an action is obligatory, e.g., "You should pay your debt," and so on, is to invite a request for reasons. If making such claims means that we invite such requests, then for us to understand these claims requires that we understand that such invitations are being made. The point of saying that such invitations are being made is this: When we say such things as, "We ought to do our homework," it makes sense for someone to ask us for reasons to support the claim. Students using moral terms, as they make moral judgments, must understand the sense of someone else asking them for justification. To see why this is so, consider a puzzling case.

A student claims that we ought to do our homework, but the student is unable to give any reason for that claim. Would we question the extent to which the student understood what we said? Suppose when we asked the student why we should do our homework, he stared blankly, just restated what he said, or went on to talk about something else. Did the student merely utter the words? This case is puzzling, because the use of 'ought' suggests that such explication is appropriate. To use that word, and mean what we say, is to make a judgment. And, we cannot make judgments without having criteria,
though the sense in which we must have criteria presents a problem. 18

But let us return to Frankena's point.

Frankena states that to make a moral judgment is to claim that a case can be made for it. This statement is ambiguous in the following way. Someone could claim that a case can be made for a judgment but not mean that he can make the case. Or, someone could mean that he can make the case for the judgment. 19 Only the second seems compatible with Frankena's account of what moral education should accomplish, although he is not entirely clear on this point.

We saw earlier that one goal of moral education is to prepare students to solve the moral problems they come up against. Frankena gives us reason to think that graduates of successful moral education programs should be able to give reasons that are appropriate for moral justification. But he also argues that we cannot expect to hand down "a full-scale philosophical or theological theory of the ultimate grounds of moral obligation." 20 Let us try to decide what he may mean and what would count as an adequate level of justification.

The matter of what level of justification a moral education graduate must give, if we are to call that person morally educated, becomes complex. The student should give reasons which make a case for a moral judgment, without necessarily giving the full case. To get a better idea of the problem here, let us consider some suggestions made by Kurt Baier. Baier writes that determination of what a given person ought to do in a particular situation calls for reasoning of,
great complexity involving the use of various types of propositions as 'premises' from which to move to...the judgment of what to do, and also various procedures for 'testing' the soundness of these premises.\textsuperscript{21}

He describes four types of propositions, two of which he argues that every adult should master. Type one are those which are used to express what is found to be morally acceptable for a person to do in a particular situation. For example, Jones ought to pay Smith for the use of the car; Williams should vote today even though it is raining and he has a cold; Adam should not take the day off. Type two propositions are those used to arrive at judgments of type one propositions. These are more general statements of moral value. For example, we ought to compensate for use of things borrowed; citizens ought to vote; we ought not take days off unless we are sick. Type three propositions are the most general principles and are used to test type two propositions. Baier includes in these the Golden Rule, the principle of utility and the Categorical Imperative. These are the kind of rules that have been described elsewhere as meta-rules.\textsuperscript{22} As meta-rules they permit us to pick out other rules, i.e., they allow us to determine the adequacy of rules which we use directly to determine actual moral situations. Type four propositions are those,

about the nature, function, and rationale of the institution of morality. They are used to explain and justify a person's reliance on the general moral principles or the supreme principle of morality that he in fact relies on.\textsuperscript{23}

Baier gives not examples of this fourth type of proposition. Whatever he may have in mind, we can apply his distinctions to our concern
about the level of justification we expect to qualify someone as morally educated.

Whereas we may find Baier's hierarchy for moral propositions debatable, his general point seems sound, namely, that in moral education we expect persons at least to master moral arguments using type one and type two propositions. If we expect students to become proficient at making moral judgments when particular moral problems arise, and if this requires that one make use of more general moral propositions (Baier's type two), then students should come to master at least moral argumentation that involves propositions of type one and two. Let us expand these points noting that the hierarchy which Baier describes is not without some philosophical difficulty.24

Both Frankena and Baier may be understood better by using a general scheme of arguments in ethics suggested by Bernard Rosen.25 Rosen offers the following scheme:

1. If any x is F, then x is M.
2. This specific x is F.
3. Therefore, x is M.

In this scheme, x is a variable that may have any item as a value, including a person, an action, a group of persons, and so on. Rosen reserves F to stand for non-moral predicates and M to stand for moral predicates. An example of an argument of this form is the following:
1. If any action is an instance of keeping a promise then that action is obligatory.
2. My doing my homework is an instance of keeping a promise. Therefore,
3. My doing my homework is obligatory.

Using the scheme and example above, we may read Frankena as arguing that students of moral education are to become adept at making judgments of the type mentioned in the conclusion of our example; i.e., graduates of moral education should become adept at making judgments of the sort, "I ought to do my homework." Rosen calls such judgments "singular moral judgments." The making of such judgments has the force of claiming that a case can be made for that judgment. The case would be of the form suggested by Rosen's scheme. The student may make a case for the claim by saying, "I promised to do my homework, and promises should be kept."

Baier argues that moral education "should produce in every adult at least mastery of moral argumentation involving propositions of types (i) and (ii)." He is not clear about this being adequate mastery for someone to be called morally educated. But Baier's account of what we would expect of moral education graduates appears to be captured by this scheme in that type one propositions would be singular moral judgments and type two propositions would fill the first sentence of the moral argument scheme. Using an example applied to Baier earlier, we may have the following argument:

1. If any action is an instance of compensating for something borrowed, then that action is obligatory.
2. Jones' paying Smith is an instance of compensating for something borrowed. Therefore,
3. Jones ought to pay Smith.

This is not all that Baier has to say. He proposes other propositions
which permit the testing of type two propositions. Sentence 1 in the above argument would be tested by type three propositions. Let us try one: "If a proposition is one which would pass the test of the Categorical Imperative, then that proposition ought to be applied." Were we to plug this into the scheme suggested by Rosen, we could see how a student might argue for sentence 1 above by using our candidate for a type three proposition. This argument can be represented by the following scheme:

4. If any R has ø, then R is M.
5. This R has ø. _______________
   Therefore,
6. this R is M.

In this scheme, R is a type two proposition, ø is some characteristic considered relevant to the moral status of R, and M is the particular moral status of R. Using the Categorical Imperative as the value of ø and the principle of keeping promises as the value of R, 'R has ø' means "that the principle 'we ought to keep our promises' is a maxim which I can will to become universal law."

Precisely what will be considered as adequate justification for singular moral judgments is dependent upon the particular ethical theory we would find to be acceptable. Likewise, what will consist of justification for principles used will depend on our theory. For example, were one to hold that there is an indirect rule, such as the one represented by sentence 4 above, which permits us to adjudge the applicability of direct rules, such as that represented by sentence 3, then we would expect advocacy of using that rule in justifying singular moral judgments. In turn, we might expect one who
holds such a view to expect graduates of moral education to use such rules. We have not settled the matter of whether a morally educated person must be able to produce the justification or merely say that such a justification could be produced. We should note that for someone to say that such a justification could be produced requires some understanding on the part of the person who says this. Regardless of how we settle this particular issue, we would expect some degree of justification of singular moral judgments from morally educated persons. We would expect that a morally educated person in making singular moral judgments would be ready and able to make some reference to moral principles of the type two proposition variety (sentence 1 of the scheme) or moral principles of the type three variety (sentence 4). We will discuss both of these types of "moral principles" in Chapter Four calling the first "moral rules" and the second "moral principles." Let us summarize our remarks before we proceed.

In addition to the uncertainty about what reasons should count as adequate justification of singular moral judgments, Frankena's understandable reluctance to require "full-scale" justification from students leaves us with a vague notion about what we should expect of morally educated persons. Again, we should be reminded that what will count as a "full-scale" justification is dependent upon the particular ethical theory we endorse. Whatever theory we endorse, given most theories, each is sufficiently complex for us to imagine that levels of competency apply to descriptions of persons making moral judgments. We would not expect people to be equally competent at
giving justification. But what level is adequate for someone to be called "morally educated?" To get more clear about this problem of competence, let us consider a related point made by Israel Scheffler.

Scheffler makes the point that we do not and should not expect students to learn subjects to the point that a specialist in the field of that subject knows the subject. For example, we expect students to come to know certain historical facts. For them to know these things, the student must in addition to their believing them be able to give evidence for what they believe. The distinction which we should make between the student and the historian is the degree to which we expect the student to be able to justify what he believes and the degree to which we expect the historian to justify what he believes. The extent to which there is a difference will depend on such things as the age, maturity, and so on, of the student.

The same point can be made about moral justification. We would expect a child to give some evidence for moral statements but not to the extent that a moral philosopher gives justification. We must, however, distinguish the person who, without question, uses rules to justify singular moral judgments and the person who has some understanding of the rules. This can be likened to distinguishing between the person who merely utters reasons for a statement, memorizing them just as the statement being supported by the reasons was memorized, and the person who gives reasons and understands them as reasons. In other areas, e.g., mathematics and science, we do not expect a child to know the complete justification of statements for
us to say that the student knows what is being taught. 28 We do expect the child to have some understanding of the nature of justification. This is true in mathematics, science, and history. We do not expect the child to give the proof for a mathematical statement that a mathematician would give. We do expect a child to give the right answer and to give the extent of proof commensurate with his ability. We should note that in these areas students do misunderstand the nature of justification, and this partially because they are only given partial proofs and explanations. The point is to give them partial explanations, noting that they are partial and that they are nonetheless objective. This point relates to the ambiguity noted earlier between giving justification and saying that justification can be given by someone. The point is that it is not a matter of one or the other. Frequently, we give partial justification and assume that a full account could be given.

Perhaps the distinction to be made for moral education is as follows. Although we do not expect a morally educated person to give the kind of "full-scale" justification for singular moral judgments that we expect of a moral philosopher, we expect such persons to have some understanding of the nature of such justification. Whether a "full-scale" justification would have the hierarchical look that Baier suggests it would or it takes some other form, we would expect a morally educated person to know something about the nature of such complete justifications. Part of knowing this is realizing that the justifications that we do give for our singular moral judgments are partial and objective. They are not
objective in the sense that they cannot be wrong and that we cannot be mistaken, but they are objective in the sense that it makes sense to give reasons and evidence to support them. We will take this problem of justification up again in slightly different form in Chapter Four.

**Creativeness in Problem Solving**

In addition to learning a stock of principles, learning how to apply them, and coming to see the justification of judgments we make, Frankena argues that a morally educated person must have something more to solve moral problems. He writes that we "must also prepare the younger generation for a certain creativeness or originality in solving moral problems." Frankena is concerned with situations in which principles do not help us or are insufficient to resolve moral problems even when relevant factual information is taken into consideration. What he has in mind is unclear.

Frankena may be concerned about conflicts between or among principles, i.e., conflicts which bring two or more principles into competition. We know that there are cases in which obeying one principle results in violating another. For example, we may hold both to the principle that we ought to keep our promises and to the principle that we ought to help people in need. Suppose we are on our way to keep a date with someone when a friend calls asking for our help. How are we to decide which principle takes precedence? Frankena mentions that there may be another principle which allows us to pick which one should be obeyed, but such is not always the case. When it is not the case, we must prepare students to deal with such cases.
To remedy such a problem we must take into consideration the nature of the friend's need of help and the nature of our prior engagement. We must weigh relevant factors in each case and decide, perhaps based on some overriding principle, such as, promote the greatest good. But Frankena seems to have something else in mind when he writes, "We must somehow give them the ability to decide what to do when the answer does not follow from the principles learned together with relevant factual information." It is hard to imagine what Frankena has in mind here, but let us consider the kind of problem he may be considering.

It is not clear that what Frankena has in mind would not be part of what it is to understand the rationale of "principles." It is, after all, part of having such understanding that we realize that for any principle there may be a counter-example. Clearly, for someone to understand moral rules (moral principles of the sort captured by statement 1 of the scheme above), one must understand that they have counter-examples. In coming to understand the nature of most principles, we must come to understand how counter-examples function and, thus, how principles admit of exceptions. To help students reach such understanding, we can start out by teaching students how counter-examples function with moral principles they have learned. We can give students practice in using counter-examples. Although we cannot foresee each counter-example which may create problems for otherwise simple or unproblematic application of principles, we can give some sense of how to circumvent problems which do not permit easy application of a principle. Let us focus on this last point
and be reminded that our primary interest is in how this can be stated in terms of goals.

Taking a non-moral example, we can see that when a principle does not apply in a particular case we have other reasons which justify our waiving the principle that normally applies. A typical highway rule is that we should not pass on the yellow line. There are instances, however, which would cause a hazard were we to stick to the rule. If there is a slow moving vehicle, we may suspend the rule. Notice what is involved in such suspension. We have a counter-example to the rule which has its own rationale, namely: yellow lines mark areas in which passing is hazardous. Noting the hazards, blind curves, intersecting roads, heavily populated areas, we may suspend the rule which is meant to apply when traffic is moving steadily and at a speed close to the speed limit. Once we take into account the relevant factors, the slowness of the vehicle, the visibility to oncoming traffic, and the presence of pedestrians, we can justifiably suspend the principle. All of this requires that we understand the rationale of principles in general and the rationale of the highway rule in particular.

Taking into account counter-examples may take creativeness and imagination in some instances, but other than our providing students the opportunity to make such suspension of rules and principles, it is hard to see how we could better prepare them to deal with problematic cases. Justified suspension of a principle requires that we understand the rationale of the principle, that we have taken relevant factors into consideration, and that we have good reason for
suspension. We may find that we have, in suspending one principle, taken refuge in another principle. Some would argue that we must take such refuge. Rule theorists hold to this. Act theorists on the other hand, argue that ultimate appeal to principles is unnecessary. What is said here is not intended as an endorsement of either view, although we will take up some of the debate about the nature of moral principles in Chapter Four. Let us note now that the place of moral principles in moral reasoning and in descriptions of the sort, 'a learned moral principle p', is unclear.

Let us conclude this section by reiterating that Frankena mentions the need for students to be able to abandon learned principles when they fail to serve their intended purpose. The notion of abandoning principles, or revising them, need not offer any special problems. We want, for example, students to avoid making sweeping generalizations, whether this is with moral principles or non-moral principles.

The Moral Point of View

To Frankena, implicit in preparing persons in the ways discussed above is "that of rearing autonomous moral agents." Frankena writes,

> It seems clear that morality is a guide to life of a peculiar sort in that it allows the individual to be, indeed insists on his being, self-governed in the sense, not only of determining what he is going to do, but of determining what it is that he should do.

We are cautioned not to take this to mean that morality is merely a matter of choosing without concern for some sense of outside
restraint. Morality is not a matter for individual preference. In teaching moral rules and principles, the point is to teach,

a sense of the Way or Point of View which is involved in morality, and to prepare its pupils to stay self-reliantly within this Way even when the map we have been using turns out to be unclear or inaccurate.\textsuperscript{34}

To be clear about Frankena's remarks we should attempt to determine what he means by, "morality is a guide to life of a particular sort," and in what sense morality either allows or requires individuals to be self-governed. Becoming clear about this is not an easy matter, for Frankena tries to tie several points into one. Let us take each point separately while also noting how the various points overlap.

Frankena translates autonomy into being self-governed. Unfortunately, the notion of being self-governed seems no more clear than the notion of autonomy. To say that a person is self-governed may mean that he is independent of anyone's rule, i.e., there is no person who has control over him. In this sense, when it comes to morality, we would say that everyone is necessarily self-governed in that each must be capable of action. Again, this is to say only that it is necessary that no one controls the person who is self-governed such that he could not do other than another decides. This is a crucial point to moral education, since it is crucial to the notions of making moral decisions, being moral and acting morally.

Suppose one only acted as another wished and because another wished. That person either will not have reasons for his action,
in the case that he is compelled by another, say by hypnotism, or will have as a sole reason for acting that so-and-so commanded it. In either case, even if what is done is a morally right thing to do, it is not, in an important sense, a moral act. Examples may help. Jones saves Smith's life. Jones is hypnotized to do it. Whereas it is the right thing to do (let us assume that it is), Jones did it and he could not do otherwise, since he was hypnotized. Strictly speaking, it was not an act of Jones, since he had no intention whatsoever. It would be inappropriate for us to ask Jones why he did it. Suppose, instead of being hypnotized, Jones did it because Miller said to, i.e., the only reason he did it was because Miller said he should. As we saw earlier, this would not be an example of acting morally. If we do something just because someone wants us to, this is not, on the face of it, a moral reason. This is not to say that we should not accept advice from others. Although it does remind us that when we do appeal to authorities we should accept the authority's word because we expect the authority to know what is right. We should not think that what he says is right just because he says so.

We should notice that being self-governed could mean that one needs to no outside control. If it did mean this, we could not expect one to be bound by the conclusions of moral reasoning. We do, for example, expect a person obligated to pay a debt to be, in some sense, governed by that obligation. The sense in which we would expect one to be self-governed is the sense in which one makes judgments on the basis of sound moral reasoning, not allowing himself
to be swayed from the dictates of such reasoning by irrelevant factors. We do not, for example, want students to succumb to peer pressure and decide that something is right just because of the goading of friends. We want students to recognize that appeals to fear, pity, etc., are not relevant to moral arguments.

Being governed by moral obligation requires that we not be interfered with when making moral judgments. But there is another sense of being self-governed. This is the sense in which one is able to act on decisions. Examples of this would be someone who can follow a doctor's order to diet, someone who studies and resists going to a party, and someone who keeps a promise when there are reasons of convenience not to. We will say more about this in a moment.

In addition to becoming self-governed in the senses we have discussed, Frankena also argues that in moral education we must get students to adopt "the moral way." He is not entirely clear about what this might entail. We get a hint, though, when he writes that morality is a guide to life of a particular sort. We could imagine this to mean that he is talking about the moral way as compared to the immoral way. He could, however, be contrasting the moral way with the amoral way, for example, with nihilism. Moral education would have little to say for the nihilist, even though a nihilist may be a thoughtful person. This is because a nihilist, as an amoralist, refuses to use moral language. There may be a special problem for moral education when it attempts to persuade an amoralist to the moral point of view, but we will not explore that special
problem. The moral way may be conceived as including what has been said so far about objectivity and as excluding such things as relativism, subjectivism, and hence, all versions of those two. Frankena may have in mind something similar to Hare's prescriptivity and universalizability, but to say this would be to attribute to Frankena a particular theoretical stance.

We have discussed the ability to reason about moral matters as a requirement of one's being morally educated. We have also seen that the extent to which one is required to justify one's moral judgments is much like the criteria applied in other, non-moral areas. In addition to having an ability to reason about moral matters, we have the requirement that a morally educated person adopt morality as a "way of life" sometimes called the moral point of view. The moral point of view includes at least the notion that morality has an objective side. No doubt it includes much more, for example, that relativistic and subjectivistic viewpoints are incompatible with the moral point of view. But to make this point and to say more about what is included in the concept of 'the moral point of view' would mean endorsing a particular normative ethical theory. Whereas making such an endorsement is necessary to making decisions about what should be included as adopting the moral point of view, let us not undertake the responsibility of choosing and supporting a particular ethical theory here.37

Moral Action

A morally educated person, in addition to having the above specified abilities, has dispositions which lead him "both to ask
what the right is and to act accordingly. Other than to sort these "dispositions" in terms of "first-order" habits, such as honesty and veracity, and more general "second-order" habits, such as, conscientiousness, integrity, and moral alertness, Frankena offers little explanation about the nature of these dispositions. An important distinction is made between the disposition of asking what is the right thing to do and the disposition of doing what is determined to be right. Since someone could have all of the skills discussed earlier and neither ask the pertinent question nor do what is decided, these dispositions are important, especially in light of the fact that moral education is to make a difference in the way people act and not just think. But what are the details of this distinction?

Let us begin by noticing some problems with the disposition of asking what is the right thing to do, for this disposition carries with it several complications. One complication is that we do not simply want people to be disposed to ask such questions; we want them to be interested in the answer. Whereas our earlier consideration of moral questions was cast in terms that can be likened to the disinterest of scholarly activity, we may now see that a morally educated person, as contrasted with a scholar of ethical theory, must have something more than a disinterest in the answer to any particular moral question.

To explain what causes persons to be interested in questions of morality is not an easy matter. It is complicated by the fact that there are competing views to explain such interest. For example, some have described our interest in moral questions in terms of
moral problems, problems we try to solve. Our interest in solving moral problems, on this account, has been compared to an attempt to quench thirst. However this is characterized, we would expect a morally educated person to be interested in moral problems and to ask moral questions while being interested in the answer. Although we would expect most people to be interested in moral problems, it is possible for someone not to be interested in them. For example, we might expect most adults to be troubled by a situation in which one person killed another without obvious good cause, but, again, some may not find this situation problematic. Situations such as these cause consternation in most of us. And there are less extreme examples. When we witness an adult treating an infant roughly, we wonder what is going on. We want to know details. We wonder whether or not the child is being mistreated. If someone showed no interest in such matters, we would find that unusual. The point is that interest, such as we have described, seems essential to asking what is the right thing in these situations. This is not to deny that there are persons who do not have this characteristic interest, but where such interest is lacking we seem to have grounds to deny that the person is morally educated. But an additional point bears mentioning. Whereas this characteristic interest, however it is explained, is part of the description of a morally educated person, it may be a prerequisite of moral education rather than an outcome of it.

The foregoing argument needs at least one qualification. Although our examples above are ones in which persons with minimal moral sensitivity will be disposed to ask questions of what is right, we need
to make the following point. Whereas some situations easily provoke us to ask such questions, others which warrant such questions do not. This can be explained in terms of a problem for education, i.e., one part of moral education may well be a kind of increased sensitivity to moral situations. Some situations escape our attention because we lack the knowledge or skill that would allow us to recognize them as moral situations. For example, a teacher may sometimes deride or ridicule students in classroom contexts not because that teacher intends any moral offense, but because he mistakenly regards such action as good-natured humor. Though this is done in "good fun," such treatment of students may be psychologically damaging. That such actions may have this effect may not occur to the teacher who lacks the information and skill needed to see such action as morally questionable.

Let us turn to the other disposition Frankena mentions. What does it mean to say that one has the disposition to act according to the answers of what is right? It could mean that the person is disposed to act from her decisions, or it could mean only that she acts in accordance with her decisions. The second meaning is troublesome because it seems to allow the possibility that one's decisions and one's actions are unconnected. Some have argued, for example John Wilson, that only the first meaning constitutes moral action. Frankena seems to allow the second. In speaking of devices to motivate someone to do what is good, Frankena writes,

They are all ways of making it to an individual's interest to do what is or is regarded as right by
some sort of ad hoc action, and while it is clear that morality would like to make its way without them, it is not easy to see how moral education and guidance can get along without anything of the sort.45

Let us take care with Frankena's remarks. He appears to be mixing his concern for means to achieve morally educated persons with the intent to develop persons who are "self-governed." We may wish to develop persons who act from their decisions, but such development may require that we use other motivating devices to get them to do what is right, for example, reasons in addition to moral reasons. Eventually, though, we should hope that those educated would come to see the moral reason as sufficient reason for action. Frankena appears to agree with this, for he later argues that whatever methods are used in developing the disposition to act in accordance with learned decisions of what is right, the final goal of such methods, if they are to be included as part of moral education, "must be to dispose the individual to follow this way in spite of contrary temptations, conflicts of duty, or novel situations."46

The point of emphasizing that one ought to act from a decision, and not merely act in accordance with a decision, seems to be that the action is, in some sense, entailed by the decision and that one should act because it is the right thing to do. This is to assume that there is some connection between the decision and the action. To act in accordance with, but not from, a decision allows for the possibility that someone do just what happens to be right; this would not be an instance of acting morally, as we have discussed 'acting morally'.
There are some important problems lurking here. We need to recognize that there can be other factors which affect the connection between decision and action, things that get in the way of successfully acting from decisions. Wilson labeled the ability to overcome those problems that might arise 'Krat'. 'Krat' denotes the ability "to live up to one's moral or prudential principles." Don Cochrane, using Fred Newman's terminology, speaks of "environmental competencies" which, he says, include being able to speak in public, to organize activities, etc. These are abilities required to accomplish some things in a democratic society. The point is that in order to do some things, we must be able to successfully do others. These prerequisite activities may be as complex as organizing for group action or as simple as dialing the telephone for help.

There are yet other things which may stand in the way of acting from decisions made. Frankena has some in mind when he speaks in Aristotelian terms of producing "the habits of justice and temperance." Wilson discusses these other needed qualities in terms of 'prudence' and 'mental health'. Cochrane speaks of "psychological resources." He writes,

One might know what one ought to do and have the skills and abilities to act appropriately, yet still be unable to act for a lack of the psychological resources needed to initiate and sustain moral action.

Cochrane's psychological requirements include: (1) a good self-concept, (2) the capacity to withstand peer and authority pressures, (3) courage, (4) perseverance, and (5) the capacity to delay gratification. Even in the absence of further explanation, we may notice
two things about these requirements. First, each may be a pre-
requisite to being morally educated. Second, each may be enhanced
by education and thus be considered a proper part of a program of
moral education. Whether a program of moral education can enhance
these requirements or not is, in part, an empirical question.

Summary

In this chapter we have sought an answer to the question:
What does it mean to say that someone is morally educated? We have
considered arguments for what is to be included in such descriptions
from the standpoint that being morally educated includes accepting
"the moral point of view." We have focused on the following aspects:
1) To say that someone is morally educated is to say that the person
has adopted and uses moral principles. 2) Such persons have the
knowledge to use principles. This includes knowing relevant facts
and having relevant skills to the application of moral principles.
3) A morally educated person understands the rationale of moral
judgments. The extent to which such a person must understand this
rationale is vague. 4) A morally educated person is able to solve
problems which require decisions not readily solvable with prin-
ciples taught. This was a requirement difficult to state in precise
terms. 5) A morally educated person adopts the moral point of view.
This includes independence of moral judgment. Of course, what is
relevant is, to some extent, theory dependent. Also included in
adopting the moral point of view is adopting "the moral way."
This concept is not entirely clear. 6) Morally educated persons ask
moral questions when such questions are appropriate and they are
interested in the answer. 7) Morally educated persons act morally. To describe someone as morally educated is not just to mention the things the person says. It is to mention what the person does in addition to what he or she says.
CHAPTER NOTES


2. Ibid., p. 302.

3. Ibid.

4. Whether we want to include doing the good as part of the meaning of 'Knowing the good' or not, one problem for moral education is that of getting students to do the good.


6. Ibid.

7. We should recognize that the word 'principle' is ambiguous in important ways. It may include such uncommon notions as rules, maxims, codes, etc. We will speak to this directly in Chapter Four. For now, there is no harm in using 'principle'.


9. Ibid.

10. We should note that the learning of a principle may require skills and dispositions that may have to be learned in order to learn the principle.

11. Ibid., p. 306.


13. Notice that visiting, too, makes reference to the intentions of the person visiting. But we wish to distinguish visiting that is not acting morally from visiting that is.

14. We must take care what we use to distinguish acting morally from just acting. Were we to find that Jones visited because he thought it would benefit him, we may say far from acting morally, he acted selfishly. But this would mean that we are
excluding egoistic theories from possible moral consideration. Whereas we are doing that, we should note that this means we have narrowed what we are allowing as part of morality, perhaps because we have a theory up our sleeve. We are narrowing what we will permit to be called acting morally by limiting what we are allowing to count as moral reasons.


16. Ibid.

17. R.M. Hare discussed this point in terms of 'supervenient' properties. For a more complete discussion of our point, see his, The Language of Morals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969) p. 80.

18. To what extent someone must be able to produce the criteria for judgment is unclear. But if the person could present no criteria, we would balk at calling his statement a judgment. The person may be only stating his preferences.


24. For an introduction to the debate about the use of moral rules and principles see Rosen, Strategies of Ethics.


28. Scheffler's point is that we base our knowledge-attribution claim about students on standards which we establish for our students.

30. Ibid.

31. For extended discussion of act theories contrasted with rule theories, see Rosen, Strategies.


33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., p. 308.

35. We should be reminded of points made earlier taken from Wilson.

36. A point of this distinction is that someone may decide that he should follow his doctor's orders yet be unable to do that. This is not a problem of persuasion, it is a problem of failing to do what we think we ought to do.

37. We should keep in mind that were we to give a complete account of what we want someone to accept when he accepts the moral point of view, we would be forced to say more about what is being accepted and that means expanding a particular normative theory.


39. This is just to remind us that we are interested in moral education that develops someone who is successful in that she acts on the basis of her decisions. We emphasized the importance of moral actions in Chapter One.

40. A complication that we will not discuss is that having the disposition to ask what is right includes asking this at the appropriate time. This means not missing those situations in which moral problems should occur to us and not thinking that there is a moral problem at every turn. We should be morally alert while not seeing every human encounter as being morally problematic.


42. This is not to ignore a distinction between 'interest' of the dispositional sort and 'interest' of the occasional sort.
'Interest' of the occasional sort is not sufficient for someone to be morally educated and 'interest' of the dispositional sort does not mean one is interested on every occasion.

43. There are others which we see as moral problems even though they are not, because we are ignorant of facts which would allow us to see that they are not. Nineteenth century missionaries saw polygamous relationships as morally wrong because they did not see the importance of such relationships in the culture.

44. We should not assume that the kind of problem represented by our example of the derisive teacher is easily remedied. His recognition that such "teasing" may be harmful to students may not be sufficient for him to stop such teasing. We will say something about breaking bad habits in Chapter Five.


46. Ibid., p. 311.

47. Wilson et al., Introduction to Moral Education, p. 194.


CHAPTER III
PRINCIPLES LEARNED

Introduction

In this chapter we consider the special problems the concept 'to learn' brings to descriptions of the sort, "person a learned principle p." By paying close attention to some of the ambiguities of the concept 'to learn', we will note how descriptions using that concept can be misleading in ways important to the task of moral education.

One important part of developing morally educated persons is that these persons come to adopt and use moral principles. As we have seen, to describe someone as having adopted a principle is a complicated description. This description may include the more illusive attribution that someone has taken up the moral point of view, or that one has come to understand the idea and art of morality. But let us concede, at least for the time being, that adopting the moral point of view, and coming to understand the idea and art of morality is notoriously troublesome and may be a goal in addition to adopting and using principles. Let us focus our attention on descriptions of persons having learned principles.

To say that someone has learned a principle is to say something that is complex and that can be misleading. If one of our goals of moral education is to get people to learn principles, and if this
statement of the goal is misleading in respects important to the
tasks and goals of moral education, then we should take care not to
be mislead. In this chapter we will see that assertions such as
"Jones learned that promises should be kept," can be taken four
ways. Furthermore, we will see that only one reading of such
descriptions is close to the goal of moral education as expounded
in Chapter Two. Finally, we will see that the ambiguity of descrip-
tions stem from the fact that what someone says is a sine qua non
of learning principles, but it is not sufficient for every sense of
such descriptions. Hence, if we rely only on "verbal behavior" to
determine success in learning, we may be mislead. (We will
eventually see that these problems with such descriptions are im-
portant for many moral education programs).

'To Learn'

We will be using the verb 'to learn' in the success sense. A
commonly made distinction is that 'to learn' can be used to describe
a person's state of knowing or being, or it can be used to describe
an activity someone is engaged in or a process one is undergoing.
Examples of the first sense of 'to learn' include: Jones learned the
tango; Smith learned how to play baseball this summer; Wilson learned
the secret for a good pizza crust. In each of these, we may say, the
person has come to know something. In order to explain the use of
'learn' in each of these examples, writers have used the analogue of
success. We can say that Jones has succeeded in learning the tango;
he has danced it. Smith has succeeded in learning to play baseball;
he has played. Wilson has succeeded in learning the secret; he has found it out.

Trying but not succeeding, on this analogy for learning, can still be called learning. But it differs from the sense of success described in the examples above. Suppose Jones is taking tango lessons. Whereas it does not follow that he can dance the tango, we could say, without misusing 'to learn', that Jones is learning the tango. In similar fashion we could say that Smith is learning to play baseball. And, we could say that Wilson is learning the secret for a good pizza crust in the sense that he is researching the ingredient or step that makes good crust. Learning in the sense of trying but not succeeding suggests that there is one activity going on, an activity with a particular aim. It is sometimes used to refer to a process that has a specified culmination, viz., the product of successful learning. Sometimes it is described metaphorically as a process, referring to activities of persons. Sometimes it is characterized literally to be a process. This is when learning is taken to refer to some psychological process of the mind. We need not take this up at this point. We will, at present, take 'to learn' only in the success sense to describe the goals of moral education we have mentioned.

**Learning Principles**

Recall that Frankena offers as one of the goals of moral education that people come to adopt and use principles. Our present consideration is to what extent this is something which can be learned. Our interest for the time being is to consider the extent
to which this goal can be translated into statements about learning.

We have seen that morally educated persons have come to accept certain principles and are able to apply these principles appropriately.1 The verb 'to learn' has already been introduced into this discussion. There seems to be little controversy in saying that a student learned that direct pressure ought to be applied to stop bleeding, that she learned that one ought to move the ball against a zone defense, or that he learned that one ought to vote. We can make these and other statements like them to describe someone who has learned principles, but many complications arise.

Some of these complications arise because we use the verb 'to learn'. One complication comes because 'learning' entails something about how the learning came about.2 At least some things are ruled out, for example, what we learn is not just the result of physical maturation. Another complication arises which is partly remedied when we note the first complication and it arises even though we limit 'learning' to human learning. This is because 'to learn' is ambiguous even in the success sense. Furthermore, each disambiguated sense is vague.

'To learn' has at least three uses, 'to learn that', 'to learn how to' and 'to learn to'.3 We may say Jones learned that Columbus discovered America. This is quite distinct from learning a skill or coming to have a character trait. Describing Smith as having learned how to ride a bicycle is not to say that he has learned some information, nor is it to mention his penchants. And, to say Wilson learned
to speak softly is not to say he has, thereby, learned how to do anything or learned that something is the case.

Since we are here concerned with describing someone as having come to accept some principles and apply them appropriately, we will begin by concentrating on locutions using 'to learn that'. We will, I believe, find that these locutions are vague and require special attention if we are to avoid some problems important to moral education.

Let us begin by considering a list of principles which may be learned:

1. The soup spoon should be placed to the right of the teaspoon.
2. Proper signals should be given before passing an automobile.
3. We should brush our teeth after every meal.
4. Citizens should vote.
5. Seatbelts should be worn while riding in an automobile.
6. Veracity is a virtue.
7. Promises should be kept.

Each of these may be prefaced with the locution 'learned that' without creating any logical puzzle. We could say: Jones learned that the soup spoon should be placed to the right of the teaspoon; Smith learned that proper signals should be given before passing; Wilson learned that we should brush our teeth after every meal; and so on. Each is ambiguous and vague in similar ways and some present problems important to moral education.
Active and Non-active Learning

We can consider one problem common to each use by looking at a discussion offered by I. Scheffler. Scheffler discusses what he calls an active and a non-active sense of learning. His discussion is a good start for a point important to this discussion, namely that the non-active sense of learning is ambiguous and vague in a way that is important for moral education. Two senses of a non-active sense of 'to learn' will help us characterize an apparent discrepancy between thought and action. Depending on what characterization of this apparent discrepancy we find most adequate, we may characterize the problem of developing intellectual and moral virtue. Let us now turn to Scheffler's discussion of the "verbalist fallacy."

Scheffler makes a distinction pertaining to successful teaching when it comes to the teaching of norms. He describes two senses of 'teaching', one called the active sense and another the non-active sense. While these distinct characterizations are different ways of talking, Scheffler contends that both permit adequate characterization of an important problem in moral education. The problem is that of assuming that one has acquired "the norm or pattern of action referred to" by a norm-stating sentence from the fact that one has learned the norm in what Scheffler calls the non-active sense. This problem gets stated and makes sense only when both the notion of a non-active sense of 'learning' and the active sense of 'learning' are made explicit. This is no easy matter.
The non-active sense of 'learning', as we have said, involves pointing to a distinction only appropriate to norm-stating sentences. But, as Scheffler sees it, this sense is likened to what is true about learning fact-stating sentences. Let's stick to his examples. We ask what a teacher is teaching, and we get as an answer that he is teaching that Columbus discovered America. What is being taught, according to Scheffler, is that Columbus discovered America. What he goes on to talk about in regard to teaching this sort of thing is not anything about Columbus and America but something about the sentence, 'Columbus discovered America'. He calls any sentence such as this a fact-stating sentence. A fact-stating sentence is different from a norm-stating sentence, for example, 'One ought to pay one's debts'. We have fact-stating sentences contrasted with norm-stating sentences in order to note an ambiguity of norm-stating; norm-stating sentences are misleading, and we must be cautious.

In order to nail down the difference between the two sorts of sentences, Scheffler says that,

Norm-stating sentences...are...those that lend themselves to a peculiar ambiguity when they are used to fill the blank in contexts of the form 'Y has learned that...'  

He goes on to explain the ambiguity.

To say that Mary learned that one ought to pay one's debts can be taken to mean that Mary has acquired the norm of paying her debts. This is what Scheffler seems to have in mind when he speaks of the active sense of having learned, that is to say, the active sense of the description of Mary as having learned that one ought to repay
debts. As he writes,

> evidence that a schoolboy had defiantly refused to return the money he admits having borrowed would, on the present interpretation, show that he had not learned that he ought to pay his debts.9

This could be presented conditionally. If Mary has learned in the active sense that one ought to pay debts, then Mary pays debts she incurs.

On the non-active account, one can describe Mary as having learned that one ought to pay debts but deny that the conditional regarding her general manner of acting is true. In short, one can describe Mary as having learned that one ought to pay debts, and describe Mary as having welched on a debt. Scheffler notes that this just goes to show that with some persons there is an inconsistency between what they believe and what they do. We will see later that it could be simply a difference between what one says and what one does, not what one believes.

The important point of Scheffler’s remarks is that the expression "learning that..." when followed by a norm-stating sentence is ambiguous. Of course he has to say more than just that, since he stated earlier that a norm-stating sentence is just that sort which comes with a problem of ambiguity. He does go on to say something about fact-stating sentences when following 'learning that' locutions.

Recall that fact-stating sentences are those such as "Columbus discovered America." These do not admit to the active sense and non-active distinction, since there is no active sense of a description using 'learning that' which is followed by a fact-stating sentence,
this according to Scheffler.

...whereas Jones' learning that honesty is the best policy is often taken to imply his learning to be honest and whereas also, his learning that he ought to pay his debts is often taken to imply his acquiring the tendency to pay his debts. Smith's learning that Columbus discovered America is never taken to imply his learning to be Columbus, or to be America, or to be similar to either, or to acquire the tendency to discover America. The ambiguity does not arise because the active interpretation cannot here be carried through.

There is something to what Scheffler says, but something more needs to be said; otherwise, we will be mislead.

The purpose of pointing out the distinction between descriptions of persons learning, when what is being learned is expressed by a fact-stating sentence and when a norm-stating sentence is used, is to address a problem that can occur in moral education. The problem is that of taking evidence that someone has learned something in the non-active sense as evidence that they have learned in the active sense.

What is important, Scheffler notes, is that attention be given to the two senses of 'learning that...' and that these senses be kept in mind as one considers what is to count as successful teaching when teaching someone a norm-stating sentence. Translated we get the following possible error pointed out to us by Scheffler. We may teach someone that one ought to pay one's debts and intend only that the person learn that one ought to pay one's debts in the non-active sense. In this case we can succeed in what we intend without that person acquiring a habit of paying his debts. We could, instead, teach with the intent that the person acquire such habits; this is
the active sense. Scheffler's warning is that success in the first
does not guarantee success in the latter. But he parenthetically
says something more important then this, and he misses something.

What he misses is that evidence of success in the active sense
need not guarantee success in the non-active sense unless what would
count as evidence for the non-active sense is also taken into account
for success in the active. What counts as success in the non-active?

He says parenthetically,

we have gathered acknowledged evidence for such
success of the sorts generally presumed adequate
for B statements [T teaches X that Y] with fact-
staking components, that is, we have questioned
Y [student] under controlled conditions, presented
various statements for him to judge, gotten him
to express inferences related to the component
question...  

Scheffler seems to be pointing out these things which would be im-
portant to determine the extent to which someone understands some-
thing, or perhaps, and this may be different, knows something. As
with fact-stating sentences, we would say that someone has learned
that Columbus discovered America, if that person would see various
implications of that statement. Implications could include that
someone else did not discover it first, that Columbus was an
explorer, and so on. If we wish to determine whether or not the
person knows, it would be appropriate to determine to what extent
he has reasons for what has been learned.

If we go on to apply this account of fact-stating sentences to
norm-stating sentences we would make similar observations. We would,
for example, with the person who learns that one ought to pay debts,
expect him to find welching unacceptable, to criticize the avoidance of creditors, to know what counts as a debt and so on. If the person, furthermore, knows that one ought to pay debts, we would expect that person to be able to give evidence for such a view.

Now to the original point. Evidence for an active learning of norm-stating sentences that takes into consideration only the person's having acquired a pattern of behaving without those things mentioned as pertaining to the non-active sense may not be adequate for the claim that the person has learned that one ought to pay debts. Both sorts of evidence are necessary for the claim of active learning when it comes to norm-stating sentences.¹³

'Learning That' in the Non-active Sense

From Scheffler's discussion it is not clear what he has in mind for non-active learning; that is, it is not clear what would count as learning that one ought to pay debts when one has not acquired the habit of paying debts. Because this is not clear, it is not obvious that we can distinguish between someone who has learned that one ought to pay debts in the active sense and someone who has learned to pay debts or someone who has the habit of paying debts. Bringing clarity to this matter will be important for this discussion, since we wish to get at the relation of adopting the moral point of view, thinking about ethical issues and engaging in the justification of moral statements to acting in behalf of moral judgments. In order to get a better sense of the non-active sense of 'learning', let us consider possible analyses of 'to learn' in that sense.
First, let us remember that we are talking about learning in the sense that one has succeeded in learning. In this sense to say that someone has learned something is not to say that they are now doing something. To say that Jones learned that one ought to brush after every meal is not to say that he is now brushing. The point we wish to explore is what sense it can make to say he has learned this and never brushes, or almost never brushes. Second, it does not make sense to say that one is now engaged in the activity of learning. Whereas in the sense of learning which describes some activity we can say Jones is busy learning, we cannot say that he is busy learning in the sense of 'to learn' now under consideration. Let us consider some of the typical earmarks which we use to say of someone that he has learned. These are the kinds of things teachers use to count as evidence that someone has learned.

Let us start by taking an example in which someone has learned that Columbus discovered America. Commonly, teachers take a student's response, "Columbus discovered America," as sufficient for the claim that the student learned that Columbus discovered America. Suppose we were to then say that sentence A, 'Jones learned that Columbus discovered America', is conceptually equivalent to sentence B, 'Jones at time $T_1$ said, "Columbus discovered America."' This analysis of sentence (A) is unacceptable because it includes as learning some things we would wish to exclude and excludes what we would wish to include. On this analysis we would include a child's mouthing the words in proper order as an instance that the child learned that Columbus discovered America. Such examples of parroting
are not what we mean when we say someone has learned Columbus discovered America.\textsuperscript{16} It may mean the child learned how to say 'Columbus discovered America'. Furthermore, we would exclude from "learning" persons who cannot speak, persons who said the same thing in another way, e.g., America was discovered by Columbus, and persons who may substitute some equivalent expression for any one of the words in the sentence, 'Columbus discovered America', for example, instead of Columbus one could say the great Fifteenth Century navigator who asked the King of Spain for money. Since we may wish to include any of these cases, our analysis of 'to learn' must be altered to permit such inclusion. Let us try a translation Scheffler has offered for belief:\textsuperscript{17} C) Jones is disposed to respond affirmatively to some sentence which is a close translation of "Columbus discovered America." This translation has several advantages over the first. It includes mutants, non-English speakers and alternative expressions. But there are several difficulties with this translation. Scheffler has argued that the analysis of belief into terms of being disposed to answer a question in a particular way fails both on the interpretation that means the person has the capacity to respond thusly and on the interpretation that the person has the tendency to respond. Let us see how this applies to an analysis of 'to learn'.

'To learn that' cannot be translated into capacities. Consider an example in which one has the capacity to respond affirmatively to some translation of "Columbus discovered America." Someone asks, "Did Columbus discover America?" Another person responds, "Yes." As we have seen this does not mean the person has learned Columbus
discovered America. More crucial is that this manner of translating (A) is weaker since the person need not respond but merely have the capacity to respond. Just as one has the capacity to respond affirmatively to this question, one has the capacity to respond negatively. We would not want to conclude that the person has learned both that Columbus discovered America and that he did not discover America. Or, we could ask, "Is it true that Columbus did not discover America?" and get an affirmative response. The crucial point is that, whereas we can say many persons have the capacity to say many things, and they have the capacity to respond affirmatively to many things, it does not mean they have learned those things. This is not to say that such utterances and responses are not important in education for our determination of learning, because they are important. It is just to say that these responses cannot be taken to be identical with learning. They may not be good evidence. How does one decide? We need something more.

And, 'learning that' cannot be translated into tendencies.

Suppose, then, we now take the disposition to affirm or produce the relevant sentence not as a mere capacity but as an active tendency or positive propensity to make the appropriate verbal response under questioning.19

Having learned that Columbus discovered America, we expect Jones not only to have the capacity to respond, but to have the tendency to respond. There are at least two crucial problems with this. First, one may have such a tendency and never respond, for example, because one is timid or has constant fear of being wrong. Since, in cases such as these, we could not base our claim that someone has this
tendency on evidence of what one usually does, we would need to know more about the nature of the tendency to respond. That is to say, typically we say that one has a tendency to do something but never, or seldom, does it, we would be required to give some explanation for that and some evidence for the claim.20

Second, we must distinguish between:

i) J learned that x

and

ii) J learned to respond affirmatively to x

Were we to adopt (C) without qualification, we may confuse instances of (i) with (ii). Suppose Jones gave an affirmative response whenever he was asked, "Did Columbus discover America?" It is possible to train Jones to respond so without his having learned that Columbus discovered America. Such responses would be taken as evidence for Jones' learning, but that does not mean that to say he has learned is just to say he will respond as predicted. Missing from this simple way of putting the analysis is some notion of understanding. In other words, someone could learn to respond without any understanding of what it means to say, "Columbus discovered America."

But "understanding" is not an easy concept to grapple with.21 Perhaps it will be sufficient just to make the point in terms of (C). If (C) can fail to permit adequate distinction of (i) to (ii), we may remedy this by expanding the responses we should expect of someone to qualify for (i) and permit distinction from (ii). Suppose instead of (C) we require that someone be disposed to respond appropriately to related questions. Imagine the following dialogue:
"Lief Erickson discovered America."
"He did not."
"Columbus was born in 1929."
"No"
"America is now called Australia."
"No"
"Actually, Columbus discovered some islands in the Caribbean for Spain."
"Yes"

We have encountered a difficulty which in many ways is similar to what we encounter when we try to test for learning. When testing for learning we, in effect, formulate a hypothesis of the form: If a learned x, then a will respond x-wise. There are two problems with this way of characterizing learning. If we consider possible outcomes using this we get two characterizations:

A) \( L_{ax} \rightarrow R_{ax_1} \)

\[
\begin{array}{c}
R_{ax_1} \\
\hline
L_{ax}
\end{array}
\]

B) \( L_{ax} \rightarrow R_{ax_1} \)

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{not } R_{ax_1} \\
\hline
\text{not } L_{ax}
\end{array}
\]

(A): Allowing \( x_1 \) to denote one response among many that may indicate "a learned x," we should note that (A) is a fallacious argument. The only way we can conclude \( L_{ax} \) is to assume that responding \( x_1 \) is also sufficient for \( L_{ax} \).

(B): (B) is valid, but, as we have seen, the conditional premise is not always true especially when limited to verbal responses.

Suppose we view the response in terms of a disposition discussed by Scheffler.

The broader dispositional view comes to this:
A belief is a cluster of dispositions to do various things under various associated
circumstances. The things done include responses and actions of many sorts and are not restricted to verbal affirmations. None of these dispositions is strictly necessary, or sufficient, for the belief in question. What is required is that a sufficient number of these clustered dispositions be present. Thus verbal dispositions, in particular, occupy no privileged position vis-a-vis belief.22

We can, without much altering, apply Scheffler's remarks to learning. To say that someone has learned that something is the case is to say that the person is disposed to do, and not just to say, certain kinds of things, which (if said or done) are singly neither necessary nor sufficient. An important point is that there be a quorum of actions, verbal or otherwise, taken by the person who has learned in appropriate circumstances. To get a clearer notion of this rendition of 'to learn' utilizing Scheffler's point, we should consider the technical notion of "disposition."

It may be helpful to use Scheffler's discussion of belief a bit more. In his discussion he rejects a verbalist theory of belief in favor of belief as broadly dispositional. Let us use his discussion to explicate the difficult notion that propositional learning entails some understanding of what is learned.

The concept of 'disposition' is here extended beyond that of "the habit of the nerves in consequence of which the smell of a peach will make the mouth water"23 to include a wider range of behavior, even behavior of a more or less conscious sort. For our purpose of characterizing learning, we can view dispositions as tendencies to act in characteristic ways in certain situations.24 But to say that the action taken in some specified situation is a
disposition that indicates learning requires that we have more to say than just details about the situation and details of the action taken. We need, in addition, to say something about the person's intentions, beliefs, fears, etc.

In this way when we say that Jones has learned that Columbus discovered America, we are not just saying that we would respond to some English sentence expressing that fact. We are saying that he would do something like that and many other things were he to have particular beliefs and goals. For example, were he to have the belief that one ought to give honest responses to questions, were he to have as a goal not deceiving a particular person, he would, in the context of being asked what he learned today when today's lesson was that Columbus discovered America, answer the question, "And who did you learn discovered America?" by saying, "Columbus." Were he to have other goals, for example, deception, he might have said something else. The point is that in establishing that Jones learned that Columbus discovered America, we would have to take these other kinds of things into consideration. When we describe someone as having learned something, we typically assume the kinds of beliefs, goals, etc., which make an affirmative response sufficient evidence for our claim.

This concern for the variety of disposition becomes more important when we try to distinguish between (i) 'Jones learned x' and (ii) 'Jones learned to respond affirmatively to x'. We would expect that there be a variety of responses in (i) which would be absent from (ii). This variety of response, verbal and otherwise, would
allow us to distinguish the two cases.

There is one further point worth mentioning that bears on our discussion of the goal of moral education. The extent to which one is capable of responding to questions, following things which are said, and producing statements about what is learned, provides evidence concerning the extent which one understands the proposition which is learned. Whereas we are willing to describe a child as having learned that Columbus discovered America and mean only that the child can distinguish that statement from others and Columbus from other explorers and first-discovery imposters, we may describe a normal adult as having learned this only if he knows this means Columbus laid claim to some Caribbean Islands for the King of Spain. That is, we would most likely expect an adult to understand the claim more fully.

But a further, interesting complication surfaces when we consider the extent to which one understands what has been learned. To say that Jones learned that Columbus discovered America may be to say two quite distinct things. We may be saying that Jones has learned that historians argue that Columbus discovered America even though Jones does not believe it or withholds judgment as to whether or not Columbus did discover America. Or, we may be describing Jones as believing that Columbus discovered America.26 This is a crucial issue for moral education in the learning of principles that gets to the heart of the matter of adherence to principles which are learned.

Before we explore this further complication, let us recap our problem missed Scheffler's analysis of the non-active sense of
'learning'. What was needed was a sense of 'learning' in the non-active sense that permitted us a more complete account of that sense which avoided confusion with parroting and other capacities and tendencies which look like learning. What Scheffler failed to give us in this analysis of 'learning' was provided embryonically by him in his analysis of 'belief'. With our more complete analysis of non-active learning we can now get a better notion of an active sense of 'learn that' which allows us to distinguish a corollary use of 'learn to' for norm-stating sentences.

For example, we can now distinguish the person who learned that one ought to vote from one who learned to vote. The first requires some mention of the person's disposition regarding the claim, "one ought to vote." The second need not include this further consideration. With the second, one may have the habit of voting without having learned that one ought to vote.

**Learning and Believing**

The distinction between pedagogical and reportive learning may be seen more strikingly by considering an example in which someone is indifferent to a principle he has learned. Consider Smith who has learned that the soup spoon should be placed to the right of the teaspoon. Whereas we would not say that Smith has learned that rule of table etiquette were he only to parrot the words expressing the principle, we could describe him as having learned it even though he does not believe it to be a good rule, that is, a rule he would follow or avow. Crucial to moral education may be that persons come to learn certain principles in the sense that they avow to such
principles. If the goal of moral education is learning which entails belief in what is learned, and not all learning entails belief in what is learned, then we should note this distinction.

Consider the example of Jones learning that there was a twelve car pile-up on the freeway at 7:30 on Monday morning. Taking this in the reportive sense, we may more accurately say that Jones read that there was an accident. In terms of learning we could say Jones learned that the newspaper reported the accident. Jones may have evidence for what he learned and believes, but this evidence can be of two possible sorts. He may have evidence for the claim that the newspaper reported the accident, and not evidence for the accident. He may have evidence for the accident, i.e., the evidence the newspaper provided. If he only has evidence that the newspaper reported this, has he evidence for the accident? Insofar as a newspaper report can be taken as evidence for something, he has evidence. He has evidence even if the newspaper merely reported the accident without details, photographs, etc. Suppose there are photographs, quotes from eyewitnesses, and hospital reports of injured persons. In this case Jones may have strong evidence that there was an accident. Has he, thereby, learned that there was an accident? He could say that he learned only that the newspaper presented statements, showed photographs, etc. In short, he could say he does not believe there was an accident. We would not, in this case, say he learned there was an accident. The point is that he may have evidence which would count as evidence for the accident, but he may see it only as what is reported by the newspaper. His
having evidence does not guarantee he has learned that there was an accident in the sense that he believes there was an accident.

This same point can be made in a classroom context. To say a student has evidence which would support a claim, such as, Columbus discovered America, does not mean the student believes that Columbus discovered America. In the reportive sense, to say Jones learned that Columbus discovered America is to say he learned historian's arguments or the professions of teachers. In other words, to say that Jones learned that Columbus discovered America may be elliptical for saying he learned that historians argue that Columbus discovered America.

The elliptical sense of having learned that Columbus discovered America may, too, include a claim about evidence a person has. To say that Jones learned that historians argue that Columbus discovered America is to say at least that Jones believes that historians argue Columbus discovered America. We may be saying, in addition, that the student has evidence for this claim. He may have evidence that historians argue this claim without having their evidence for the claim, although he might have their evidence.

The striking point is that a student may learn that teachers, historians, moral leaders, and so on, argue for moral principles, and this student may even learn the arguments for these principles, without believing these principles. One may learn that one ought to vote, but learn this only in the reportive sense. And, given that one may learn such principles along with their justifications in the reportive sense, the only difference between learning them in the
reportive sense and learning them in the pedagogical sense may be that in the first case the arguments are not seen by the student as compelling, whereas in the second case, they are seen as compelling.

As teachers we should avoid taking our knowledge that students have evidence for claims, perhaps based on their willingness to state evidence, as sufficient evidence that they believe those claims. A student who has learned in the pedagogical sense that Columbus discovered America, and who has evidence for this claim, sees the evidence as evidence that Columbus discovered America. A student who has learned in the reportive sense that Columbus discovered America, and who has evidence for the claim Columbus discovered America, does not see the evidence as evidence for the claim. The former student, and not the latter, believes that Columbus discovered America. The latter student may either disbelieve or withhold belief.

In moral education, as in other areas of education, one task may be to get students to see the evidence that we present them as evidence for the claims we want them to learn. Only then may we have succeeded in their learning in the pedagogical sense. We will take this up again in Chapter Five.

The Active/Non-Active and Pedagogical/Reportive Senses

The distinction between pedagogical learning and reportive learning is important in understanding possible differences between learning in the non-active sense, since the differences may overlap. Someone may learn in the non-active sense, because he has learned in the reportive sense. If a student learns only that teachers believe
voting is important, we might expect the student not to acquire the habit of voting. We should note, though, that he may acquire the habit of voting just because teachers believe it is important. Someone may learn in the active sense, because he has learned in the pedagogical sense. But we should also note that it is possible for a student to believe a principle without having acquired the habit expressed by that principle. In other words, whereas non-active learning may sometimes be explained by noting that the student does not believe what is learned, other times students do learn in the pedagogical sense but not in the active sense. And, even though active learning occurs because there is pedagogical learning, active learning could occur when there is only reportive learning. Important for moral education is that we establish in which sense students are expected to learn. Each sense is possible with regards to any principle. For example, with the principle, "citizens ought to vote," a student may:

1) learn (in the non-active, reportive sense) that citizens ought to vote.

2) learn (in the non-active, pedagogical sense) that citizens ought to vote.

3) learn (in the active, reportive sense) that citizens ought to vote.

4) learn (in the active, pedagogical sense) that citizens ought to vote.

Each sense requires special consideration, if we are to determine in what sense a student has learned. A major problem for teaching and moral education is that what evidence for (1) may be taken as evidence
for (2), (3), or (4). In like manner, we may mistakenly assume we have evidence for (4) when we are warranted only in assuming (2) or (3).
CHAPTER NOTES

1. We are here assuming that part of what it means to be morally educated is to accept certain principles and to be able to apply them to certain situations. This was argued for in Chapter Two.


3. For a discussion of these distinctions see, Thomas Green, The Activities of Teaching (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971) pp. 121-134. Green's analysis is not entirely compatible with these distinctions as he includes 'learning how to' as part of the meaning of 'learning to' and he has other senses of 'to learn' not mentioned here. Israel Scheffler makes these distinctions, though he discusses them as 'successful teaching'. See I. Scheffler, The Language of Education (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1960) pp. 76-101.

4. We can restrict our concern to 'learn that' since neither the locution 'learn how to' nor 'learn to' make sense as possible candidates when talking about the learning of principles. Using one example principle, it is odd to say, "Jones learned how to we ought not to lie," or "Smith learned to promises ought to be kept."

5. Our use of 'principle' remains as loose as Frankena's use. What we have to say here pertains to all sorts of things that might get called "principles" including rules, maxims, codes, etc. We can, for now, ignore the distinctions made in Chapter Two between moral principles and moral rules.

6. Scheffler, Language. Though Scheffler cast this distinction in terms of 'to teach', he was talking about successful teaching. Since successful teaching, as he discussed it, entails successful learning, part of what he says pertains to the success sense of 'to learn'. The distinctions we will draw for Scheffler pertain to the success sense of 'to learn'.

7. Ibid., p. 76.

8. Ibid., p. 79.

9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 80.

11. Ibid., p. 83.

12. I hesitate to substitute 'understand' or 'knowing', since it is possible that someone understands what it means to say that Columbus discovered America and even come to believe that about Columbus, without having evidence and thus, without knowing.

13. An important point merely mentioned by Scheffler is a point for teaching and is central to moral education. This has to do with what we are willing to count as successful learning and what we are willing to do to get that kind of success. We will speak directly to this in Chapter Five.

14. This vagueness of 'to learn' is important, since we find many cases of people who come to accept principles without generally acting from them. Take, for example, the person who has quit smoking a hundred times.

15. This is an acceptable example to make the point about learning principles, since we are not now discussing the aspect of learning principles which has to do with norm acquisition. We will be able to apply the point made with the statement, 'Columbus discovered America', to statements of principle.


19. Scheffler, Conditions, p. 79.

20. This point about needing some evidence for the claim is similar to the point made by Richard Taylor that we could not say that a paralyzed man is trying to do something. If he were completely paralyzed, we would have no evidence of his even trying. See, Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose (New York: Humanities Press, 1973) pp. 82-85.

21. We can at least limit our discussion of 'understanding' of the sense in which someone understands that something is the case. We may limit it further to something akin to Hamlyn's notion that


25. 'Intention' can be construed in many ways, for example, as mental episodes or complex behaviors themselves dispositions. That does not matter here.

26. Green, Activities of Teaching, p. 126. Here Green introduces the pedagogical sense of 'learning'.

27. To say that Jones does not believe x does not mean he disbelieves x, it could mean he withheld belief.
CHAPTER IV
MORAL RULES AND MORAL PRINCIPLES

Introduction

In this chapter we will explore the senses in which a person may be said to understand a moral principle. Our remarks thus far about the learning of principles apply to rules, maxims, codes, etc. We now need to explore any special problems moral principles bring to descriptions using 'to learn that'. This is to bring to our attention an important aspect of moral education; namely, that a person must have some minimal level of understanding of moral principles to qualify as morally educated. Although the problem of a minimal level of justification of singular moral judgments was discussed in Chapter Two, this was not brought directly to bear on the problem of describing someone as having learned a moral principle. Furthermore, philosophers have given special consideration to the problem of what it means to say that someone understands a moral principle.

We will focus on the suggestions of R.S. Peters and R.M. Hare. Each suggests that there are two kinds of moral principles. Since these principles appear to be the two described in Chapter Two as "moral rules" (Baier's type two propositions) and "moral principles" (Baier's type three), we will use the same descriptions in this chapter. Peters and Hare suggest that for someone to have learned
moral rules and to understand them to a degree sufficient for understanding morality (we might say, sufficient to qualify them as morally educated), the person must have some understanding of moral principles. But, whereas Peters suggests that we learn moral principles as we have learned moral rules, i.e., learn them in the pedagogical sense, Hare does not appear to endorse the learning of moral principles in this way.

We will begin this chapter by considering one example of someone who has learned a moral principle but not to a level of understanding consistent with having adopted the moral point of view. Then we will consider a rather extended discussion of Peter's suggestions about what would constitute an acceptable level of understanding. Finally, we will consider one alternative to Peter's view, an alternative suggested by Hare.

An Unacceptable Level of Understanding

Let us begin by considering a sense of 'a learned principle p' when the learning does not constitute a's having learned the moral point of view. This sense can be illustrated in the following example. A child has come to believe that we ought not to lie. The child can give no reason to support that principle, nor does he believe there are exceptions to the principle. The child understands this principle in the sense that he can pick out many instances of lying, both when he lies and when others lie, and he says these actions are wrong. We might even say the child tells the truth most of the time and believes he should even when he does not tell the truth, though this is not essential for our point. Our point is
that this child lacks some important understanding of the moral content of the principle, "we ought not to lie." It was suggested in Chapter Two that the morally educated ought to be able to give some justification of moral judgments, including the ability to give some justification for principles such as the one above. Furthermore, we would expect a morally educated person to understand that there are exceptions to moral principles, of the type two proposition variety.

From this example we may see that although believing the principle may be a necessary condition for saying that the person has learned a moral principle, belief is not sufficient for one to be morally educated. We need to examine further the notion of belief in moral principles for us to get a better idea of 'learning' that includes understanding of the moral point of view. R.S. Peters argues that the mere acceptance of principles by someone is not sufficient as the goal of education, and he gives us clues that the mere acceptance of moral principles is not sufficient as the goal of moral education either. Let us turn to Peters' suggestions.

Accepting Principles as Valid

R.S. Peters argues that part of what it means to be educated, is that people accept certain principles as binding. But he suggests that this is not sufficient.

Children, in what Piaget calls the "transcendental" stage, accept rules as binding all right; they accept their guiding function in regard to their own conduct. But it takes quite a time to develop the notion that rules can be valid or invalid. Validity is a property of rules. There is also a type of human act which those capable of the legislative functions can exhibit, namely accepting the rules as valid.¹
Peters suggests that there is a sense in which people "accept" the guiding function of principles that is not like "accepting rules as valid" and that only the latter way of accepting principles counts as education. Before we consider what this means to moral education, let us consider the sense in which principles guide and the sense in which they are valid. Since we would expect a morally educated person to accept principles as guides because they are valid, both notions appear to be important.

We must take care to avoid some strange notions which some may attach to "principles as guides." Principles are not guides in the sense that we are directed by them as, say, a radio controlled object is guided. Nor are they guides in the sense that we merely take directions from them, as we do sometimes with tour guides. As was suggested in Chapter Two, when we use principles, we are required to apply them and act from them; principles neither apply themselves nor cause us to act. We must decide when to apply principles and when to act from them. The problem, of course, is to determine both how all of this deciding works and what we as judges need so that we can decide.

Peters states that there is a type of human act which is the act of accepting principles as valid. If this is what we want morally educated persons to do, we would expect moral educators to want students to accept those principles as valid that are in fact valid. But what does this mean? In order to answer this question we must explain the sense in which moral principles can be valid.
Typically 'valid' is used either to describe propositions as true or arguments as being good ones. In ordinary language we hear it said that so and so's point is valid. This can be said only to mean that we accept it as true or that it may be true. Peters cannot mean this sense of 'valid', since we can accept a statement as valid in this sense and mean only that we think it's true. In the passage above, Peters is contrasting this sort of acceptance with another sense of acceptance, viz., the sense of accepting something as valid because it is valid.

This sense of acceptance may be something like accepting a valid argument as valid. This argument is valid:

Today is Monday. For if yesterday was Sunday, then today is Monday. And, yesterday was Sunday.

To accept this argument as valid is to accept it as having the argument form, modus ponens. Recognizing this as an argument of the form modus ponens is a complicated activity. For us to make such a recognition requires that we know what 'modus ponens' means and that the standard English sentences above constitute an argument of that form. Let us assume that Peters has this kind of thing in mind when he suggests that people should accept principles as valid.

This leaves us with the word 'valid' as used to describe arguments. Although 'valid' is used in formal logic to describe deductive argument forms, this is not the case in ordinary language where we find 'valid' to mean 'good argument'. We should note that Peters must reject the common, broad sense of 'valid' that means 'good argument', since we may use valid in this sense and only mean to say
we find the argument acceptable. But how can principles be valid in the sense that deductive arguments are valid? They are not arguments. They may be viewed as enthymemes, but that view would require us to determine the unstated parts of the argument.

Peters follows a line of reasoning, which he says was first suggested by Kant, by arguing that a rational basis for moral principles is provided by a form of argument. He writes that the validity of this form of argument would account for how people can be convinced about moral principles, even though they cannot state how moral principles can be justified, "for basically this form of justification of principles consists in probing behind them in order to make explicit what they implicitly presuppose." Given this line of thought, when we use moral principles, a form of justification is presupposed. We will consider what this may mean to the learning of moral principles but it is not clear in what sense a form of justification is presupposed. Peters argues that Kant provided us with a specific answer to what is presupposed, namely, the categorical imperative. But Peters points out that we have found his particular answer unconvincing.

Peters offers what he calls a revised form of the argument,

It has been assumed that a differentiated form of discourse has emerged which has the practical function of guiding people's behavior by the giving of reasons. Men make use of it when they ask what they ought or ought not to do and when they judge things good and bad.

He wants to consider what any person must presuppose when engaged in
such discourse, e.g., when we are concerned to determine what we ought to do.

Peters makes the case that when we make moral judgments there are presuppositions having to do with the point of a form of discourse. He writes,

If it could be shown that certain principles are necessary for a form of discourse to have meaning, to be applied or to have point, then this would be a very strong argument for the justification of the principles in question. They would show what anyone must be committed to who uses it seriously.6

Peters claims that someone could say that he is not committed to these presuppositions but that would entail his not using this form of discourse. But Peters argues that we cannot give up this form of discourse as we can, say astrology. He might have added other "forms of discourse" that can be given up easily, for example, the discourse of games. Peters argues that to give up moral discourse amounts to a,

refusal to talk or think about what ought to be done, which would constitute an abdication from a form of thought into which all in our society are initiated in varying degrees. No adducing of reasons for the guidance of conduct would be permissible thereafter.7

A moral skeptic could not attempt to find a rational basis for his view since that would mean taking seriously questions about moral obligation and such questions presupposed the form of discourse being denied.8

What Peters has in mind by principles that give moral discourse its points fits closely with what was described in Chapter Two as
reasoning to the level of type three propositions. Suppose that to justify a particular moral judgment, e.g., Jones ought not to lie to her friend about such and such, we use a moral rule "it is wrong to lie." This can be stated using the scheme introduced in Chapter Two:

1. If $x$ is $F$, then $x$ is $M$.
2. This $x$ is $F$
3. Therefore, this $x$ is $M$.

In this scheme $x$ is action, $F$ is 'an instance of lying', and $M$ is 'morally wrong'. The particular instance is that of Jones lying to her friend about such and such. Peters appears to proffer the use of moral principles arguing that they give sense to moral rules, which are represented by sentence 1 in the scheme. On this account, if a moral rule has some other characteristic, say, it passes the test of the categorical imperative, then it can be used to justify the singular moral judgment, represented by 3. Let us recall the scheme introduced in Chapter Two.

4. If $R$ is $\emptyset$, then $R$ is $M$
5. This $R$ is $\emptyset$
6. Therefore, this $R$ is $M$

In this scheme $R$ is the particular moral rule of sentence 1, $\emptyset$ is whatever characteristic $R$ has, e.g., passes Kant's categorical imperative, and $M$ stands for moral applicability or means that the rule is a moral one.

If we suppose Peters has in mind something like what is characterized in the above schema, then we may note something of importance of moral education and the learning of principles. When Peters says
that people should learn moral principles, then he seems to mean that they must learn both moral rules and moral principles. Having learned both moral rules and principles is a necessary condition for someone to be able to adequately justify singular moral judgments and to understand morality sufficiently to be called morally educated. Let us see whether or not Peters really means this.

In one place Peters argues,

My concern is for the development of an autonomous type of character who follows rules in a rational discriminating manner, and who also has character. To do this a man must subscribe to some higher order principles which will enable him both to apply rules intelligently in light of relevant differences in circumstances and to revise rules from time to time in light of changes in circumstances and in empirical knowledge about the consequences of their application.

Let us consider Peters apparent argument noting some of its difficulties. We will focus on two difficulties. One problem is that it is not clear in what sense principles are necessary and presupposed, and it is unclear why a morally educated person must subscribe to higher-order principles. Does this mean a morally educated person should learn such principles in the pedagogical and active sense? A second problem is that it is difficult to say in a precise way what principles are presupposed and necessary. If we expect someone to learn such principles, we are required to state these principles propositionally. Let us start with the second difficulty.

Candidates for Moral Principles

If we agree that the adequate learning of moral rules requires the learning of moral principles, then we must deliver the moral
principles. This is especially true, if we expect morally educated persons to learn such principles as we discussed 'to learn' in Chapter Three. The moral principle must be stated in propositional form, if it is to be part of locutions of the type, 'to learn that'. Some have attempted to formulate such principles, notably, Kant, Peters and Baier. There are many reasons for their insistence that such principles can be formulated. But let us note three points regarding the enterprise of formulating moral principles. First, moral philosophers have had some degree of difficulty in formulating principles that escape philosophical difficulty. Some formulations appear to be tautological and therefore, free of moral content. When formulations are at their worst we get principles of the following sort: "It is always wrong to cause unnecessary suffering." If we take 'unnecessary suffering' to mean 'suffering beyond what is morally permissible', then the principle is analytic. We are told only that it is wrong to cause wrongful suffering.

A second point for us to notice is that principles that are not tautological appear to admit of exceptions. If there are no principles that avoid exceptions, then there are none that are necessary in the sense of being necessary truths. However principles are necessary, it is not in the sense of necessary truths. Immanuel Kant, for example, offered the categorical imperative as a principle by which we may test our maxims, i.e., those rules we find ourselves wanting to act on. One version of the categorical imperative is: "I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim
become a universal law.\textsuperscript{11} Although part of the problem with the categorical imperative is knowing what it means for a maxim to become universal law, let us try one contender for what that might mean. Let us turn to Kant who writes,

Suppose I seek, however, to learn in the quickest way and yet unerringly how to solve the problem 'Does a lying promise accord with duty?' I have then to ask myself 'Should I really be content that my maxim (the maxim of getting out of a difficulty by a false promise) should hold as a universal law (one valid both for myself and others)? And could I really say to myself that everyone may make a false promise if he finds himself in a difficulty from which he can extricate himself in no other way? I then become aware at once that I can indeed will to lie, but I can by no means will a universal law of lying; for by such a law there could properly be no promises at all, since it would be futile to profess a will for future action to others who would not believe my profession or who, if they did so over-hastily would pay me back in like coin; and consequently my maxim, as soon as it was made a universal law, would be bound to annul itself.\textsuperscript{12}

Kant argues that the moral rule, "One should make a false promise when he finds himself in difficulty," cannot be willed to become universal law, because in so doing the rule would annul itself. It is unclear why this is so. We might suppose that if everyone lied to alleviate a difficult situation, then that would be wrong. But so would it be wrong, if everyone took a bath at exactly 8:15 a.m. EST. If everyone did this, the strain on the water system could be disastrous. But it is not wrong that some of us take baths at 8:15 a.m. EST. Furthermore, it would seem that sometimes it is justifiable to lie. If we suppose that it is sometimes justifiable to lie, then the problem is stating when it is permissible to lie, i.e., stating the sort of circumstances which would allow us to
universalize lying. This includes the problems of stating the circumstances that permit lying, stating the circumstances that do not, and stating this in precise terms. That is to say, if universalizing a rule, when it is used in a particular situation, means that we would be willing to apply it in any situations that are similar, then we are forced to state in what respects those situations would be relevantly similar. This, so it seems, is a difficult thing to do. And, it is crucial information not supplied by principles like the categorical imperative. Without such criteria the categorical imperative would seem to lead us to condemn some actions that are morally neutral.\textsuperscript{13}

But principles may be necessary in the sense that it would be inconsistent to deny the principles and at the same time affirm something else. Peters may be saying that there are principles which are necessary to moral discourse in this sense: To engage in moral discourse, e.g., to make moral judgments, while denying certain higher-order moral principles would be a contradiction. Though the law of contradiction\textsuperscript{14} seems to be necessary to rational discourse, as it helps to distinguish rational discourse from mere babble, it is not clear that there are moral principles that relate to moral discussion in that way. Although we may cite the law of contradiction as a principle we all assume when we argue for or against particular points of view, it is not a presupposition that distinguishes the form of discourse which is morality from other rational forms of discourse. It seems that Peters has some other principle or principles in mind.

We may suppose there are principles necessary to moral discourse
as constituitive rules, such as the rules of a game, bring an activity into existence. Constituitive rules make some actions possible. When playing chess it is possible to move King's Pawn (KP) to King's Pawn Four (KP4). This is a possible move in chess because the rules of chess make it possible. This is to say that outside the context of chess, there would be no such action. In this sense, the rules of chess are necessary for the action of moving KP to KP4. If there were no King's Pawn or no such move as KP to KP4, there would be no such thing as someone moving KP to KP4. It would be a contradiction to say someone made such a move and that there is no such thing as making such a move. It is difficult to make this fit as an analogue to moral discourse and moral action. And if there were moral principles that functioned as constituitive rules, they would not be authorized as are rules of chess. Nor can they be looked up in a rule book as we can rules of chess.

There is a sense in which "principles" are necessary in that it would be inconsistent to employ a moral rule and deny something else. If we say that we ought not to lie to our friend in such and such circumstance, then it would seem inconsistent to say both that we ought not to lie to our friend and that it is not wrong to lie in some other circumstance, when the other circumstance described is just the kind where with our friend we said it was wrong to lie. The point is that in employing a moral rule, such as, "we should not lie," to a particular case, it would seem that, even though we do not state all of the conditions which makes its employ correct, we are presupposing them. And, were we to state all of the conditions, we
would have a more complete moral rule that would recommend obligations in other circumstances. The inconsistency here would be that of applying a moral rule in circumstance A but not in circumstance B when they are similar in all morally relevant respects. The only difference is that in A the rule was not detailed so as to include B, even though the details were presupposed. But Peters seems to have in mind something other than a detailed moral rule.

The third point regarding the search for moral principles is that it is not clear how they figure into learning moral rules, understanding such rules and using them. Are moral principles to be learned, understood and used much the same as moral rules should be? Or are moral principles learned in some other sense? Let us turn to this problem.

**Higher-Order Principles and Learning**

Recall that Peters' concern is the development of persons who follow rules in a rational discriminating manner. He argues that if we are to follow rules in this manner, we must subscribe to some "higher-order" principles and these principles will enable us to apply rules intelligently. Peters offers "impartiality" and "consideration of interests" as the most important higher-order principles. He argues that these principles are presupposed whenever we attempt to justify rules of practical discourse. These principles, according to Peters, provide us with a general criterion of relevance "for justifying particular rules and for making exceptions in particular cases." We have noted that Peters expects morally educated persons to be able to apply rules and to be able to make exceptions to rules, to revise
old rules and to make new ones in new circumstances. "To do this he must both be introduced to the basic rules of his community and to the higher level principles which enable him to exercise a legislative function." From this we may suppose that the two schema presented earlier accurately represent Peters' proposals. They are that we should teach moral rules (sentence 1 of the schema) and that we should teach higher-order principles (sentence 4 of the schema) to enable students to apply moral rules correctly. But this interpretation must be qualified, if it is to be consistent with something else Peters argues.

In noting that the higher-order principles are frequently criticized as too formal and as not providing a guide to action, Peters argues that they are not guides to action. He writes,

Moral rules are those subjective maxims which stand up to the tests formulated in the categorical imperative and can thus be accepted as objective principles. They are not intended as deductions from these procedural principles any more than scientific laws are deductions from the verification principle. Their virtue is that they are formal.

Peters argues that these principles make explicit the criteria used in deciding what principles ought to be adopted. Again, quoting Peters,

Such criteria in our view, indicate the sort of principles that would be obviously immoral. But they perform little more than this rather negative function. To ask much more of moral criteria would be to demand that the necessary condition of man's autonomy should be abandoned.

Peters' point can be made in the following way. The higher-order principles provide criteria for our moral rules in that they provide
necessary conditions for the rules we hold as moral. If our rules do not meet these criteria, then they are not adequate moral rules. This can be formulated disjunctively, either our moral rule is not adequate or it meets the criteria. Nothing follows from the fact that it meets the criteria, only from the fact that it does not meet the criteria.

Peters seems to be right about a matter important to moral justification. When we say it is wrong to lie to our friend, that judgment should not be changed just because someone else is in place of the particular person who is our friend. This seems to be what Peters means when he mentions impartiality. If our judgment changes when someone else is in place of the particular person, we should expect some reason for that. That is, just because Smith is the friend now in place of Jones, who was the friend of the original judgment, that in itself is not good reason to change the judgment. Such a change is a kind of special pleading, and it would not be warranted, because it is an instance of applying one principle to one case but not to another when there are no relevant reasons for the difference. But we should notice that the requirement that relevant reasons be given for such differential treatment is not an uniquely moral principle. That is to say, when we say that rules ought to be applied consistently and ought to be waived only when relevant circumstances permit or require it, we are making a point of logic. Peters' point that we should be impartial can be construed as a logical point because taken as a warning against special pleading, the principle of impartiality applies whenever we are applying principles,
whether they are moral or not moral. Let us consider two other problems with Peters' arguments by considering some alternative accounts.

**Alternative Accounts**

Let us begin by noticing, as we did above, that moral principles of one kind are necessary for moral discourse though they are not principles to which someone must actively subscribe. That is to say, there may be principles that are entailed by the judgments we make which, were we to be completely insightful, we would say we hold to them. But these are not the kind of principles to which Peters alludes. And just because they are entailed, i.e., they are the logical consequence of what we decide in particular cases, we do not, thereby, subscribe to them in any standard sense of 'subscribe'. We may even be surprised to find what our decisions entail, in that sense of entail. People are frequently surprised in this way, as might be a pacifist who finds that his view, in some circumstances, commits him to tolerating mass murder.

Perhaps higher-order principles are needed for us to understand moral rules. It seems reasonable that, unless we recognize the logical consequences of the moral rules we use, as when they are applied to cases other than the ones we apply them to, we fail to fully understand these rules. But to say this is different from saying that we understand our moral rules only if we come to understand some higher-order principles. In the first place, the higher-order principles that Peters talks about are different from moral rules as we have distinguished them. Second, to understand moral
rules is just to understand the logical extension of them. To understand the logical extension of them is to recognize how they would be applied to other circumstances. Third, to argue that we need some other principle for us to understand moral rules, whether these "principles" are merely logical extensions of moral rules or manifestly different from moral rules, is not to argue that we must have learned them in the pedagogical sense for us to adequately use moral judgments. Let us consider what is involved in the notion of "recognizing the extension of our moral rules." Then, let us consider what is needed for us to adequately use rules in making singular moral judgments.

Imagine a pacifist who argues that it is wrong to take the life of another person. If he takes this as a categorical rule, he would be forced, by his own argument, to say that we ought not to stop a sniper who is randomly killing passersby, if stopping the sniper means killing him. Suppose the pacifist is surprised by this as a consequence of his belief. He may not have seen the full implications of his belief. This case is interesting for us, since it suggests that we do not always recognize that our moral rules, when they go unqualified, lead us to consequences we may not want to accept. This is just because we do not completely understand the implications of rules we accept. But that does not mean that we have no understanding of these rules. To understand something is not an all or nothing sort of thing. There is such a thing as partial understanding. To describe someone as understanding a moral rule does not mean she recognizes all the implications of that rule, for example, as it may be applied to future
circumstances. Sometimes we see the implications of the rules we adopt and sometimes we do not. Many times we do not recognize the need for qualifying moral rules, until we come upon a troubling case. Whereas we want morally educated persons to recognize the implications of the moral rules each adopts, we need not take this to mean that each fully recognizes all the implications. It is still not clear that the sense of "understanding" we have just discussed means that a morally educated person must learn, in the propositional sense of 'to learn that', higher-order moral principles.

R.M. Hare has argued extensively that moral principles have implications because they employ moral words. The word 'ought' entails universalizability. One thing Hare means by this is that when we say some action is obligatory in one particular situation, we commit ourselves to particular consequences in another possible situation. Let us use an example he gives to illustrate what he means.21

Person A owes person B money, and B owes C money. B considers whether A ought to be put in debtor's prison, since A is delinquent in paying B and cannot pay. B argues that A ought to be put in prison. In so arguing B is committed to saying that, should he be delinquent in paying C and unable to pay, he (B) ought to be put in prison. Though there is more to Hare's argument than this, we can see the force of his point that "moral judgments are not tied to individual people as agents; they are tied to features of individuals and their situations."22 This is to say that when we say that something is (or is not) obligatory we are committed to doing something or other, because certain things are true of us and our situation. We are
citing features that we and the situation have, and it is those features that make us obligated. We are not just pleading a case for our advantage. We are not merely saying that we would be served or benefited. For example, B could say that A ought to go to prison but B should not, even though both are in the same predicament of owing money and being unable to pay. Were B to say this and mean only that he would like A to be imprisoned but he would not want to be, B would be misusing the word 'ought'. This kind of talk would be inconsistent with moral language, since B's particular preferences are irrelevant to the obligations directed toward A and B.

Part of making someone understand moral rules must, on this account, include getting that person to understand the sort of distinction just cited. This understanding is independent of understanding higher-order moral principles of the sort Peters suggests. We can say that for someone to understand a moral rule, that person must be able to distinguish moral claims from preference claims. To say that some action is morally obligatory is to say it is obligatory for any person who has the relevant traits to make it so. The substitution of persons does not mean anything for the moral claim, so long as, in substituting persons, each has all the traits that were relevant for making the original moral judgment and none have traits that are relevant to change the original judgment.

There are other things that must be understood by someone for that person to understand moral rules. For example, it is important that we be able to distinguish moral obligation from legal obligation. To say that something is morally obligatory is not to say that it is
legally obligatory. For us to understand this distinction, we must, among other things, recognize that legal obligations are limited to legal jurisdictions and moral obligations are not so limited.

Though understanding the distinctions between matters of moral obligation and matters of preference, and between moral obligation and legal obligation is not sufficient for understanding moral rules, these are distinctions we must understand, if we are to understand rules as moral rules. To say that we ought to vote is not to comment on the legal status of voting. If someone argues that we ought not to lie, this does not mean he assumes that telling the truth will benefit him in some way and that if it did not benefit him he would lie. To understand these rules as moral is to understand these distinctions.

We should notice one further point. We can use 'ought', and other moral terms, as moral terms without being able to state in any precise form what the word 'ought' means. The fact that we understand it may be reflected in the way we use the word. We may have a student who uses moral language in accordance with the distinctions cited. It does not follow from this that the student has learned these distinctions in the sense discussed in Chapter Three. That is to say, a student may use 'ought' so as not to confuse moral and legal obligation and so as not to confuse his preferences with what he is morally obliged to do. This does not mean he has learned, in the pedagogical active sense, that moral obligation and legal obligation are distinct and that statements of preference are not conceptually equivalent to statements of obligation. This is also true in
the learning of non-moral terms. We learn to use many terms adequately without learning to explain the conditions for their use.

But this point deserves one more. We may find that having students learn, in the pedagogical and active sense, distinctions such as those just mentioned serves their learning rules as moral rules. We need only note that sometimes it does and sometimes it does not. Whether in any given case it is one or the other is an empirical question.

It remains to consider one more way in which higher-order moral principles may be thought to be needed for the learning of moral rules. The Adequate Use of Moral Principles

The learning of moral rules includes using them to adjudicate instances in which we must make singular moral judgments. Peters, Frankena, and others, have noted that this includes learning when it is appropriate to suspend moral rules. This means that we must be able to note exceptions to the rules we hold. Peters argues that higher-order principles are helpful in that they permit us to do such things as revise principles (we called them moral rules) in special circumstances. Let us just make the point that we can generate exceptions to rules without the aid of higher-order moral principles. Let us begin by considering the misuse of rules as if they had no exceptions by comparing this use to the mistake of sweeping generalization.

A sweeping generalization is an instance in which a general rule that is meant to apply to most cases, but not to all cases, is used as if it applied to all cases. The general rule is, thereby, used
incorrectly. For example, the United Dairy Farmers advertised that we should drink milk. Were we to use this as a rule that applied to all persons, even those who are allergic to milk, we would be mistaken. What do we need to avoid this mistake? We may have another rule, "People allergic to milk should not drink milk." We could invoke the "principle" that seems to be presupposed by the milk rule, viz., "we should do that which is healthful." But we need not have learned this principle in order to recognize that the advocacy of milk drinking does not apply to some person, Jones, who is allergic to milk. Although such a principle is entailed when we cite an exception, we could recognize the exception without having had learned the principle. This is not to say that such principles will never be helpful in recognizing exceptions. They might be, but this is an empirical question.

Moral rules can be misused in a fashion similar to the rule about milk. For example, we may judge that we ought to tell the truth in situations in which we need not tell the truth or should not, because we over extend the rule that we ought not to lie. Although it is generally wrong to lie, it is not morally wrong to tell a party host that we enjoyed the party even when we had a miserable time. We could, no doubt, imagine a case in which we are morally obligated not to tell the truth and deceive someone. The point is that we can do this without having learned another principle. If we need not have learned another principle, then we need not have learned a higher-order principle.
Peters seems to recognize that moral principles are not necessary for us to have in mind when we adjudicate moral issues. He shows that we can make justified singular moral judgments without having learned them in the pedagogical sense. He shows this when he writes,

Suppose a man is wondering whether gambling is wrong and, in thinking about this, he takes account of the misery caused to the families of gamblers he has known. This shows that he accepts the principle of considering people's interests, for he is sensitized to the suffering caused by gambling.... He may or may not be able to formulate it and to defend it against criticism.... Rather it depends on whether a man is sensitized to some considerations and not to others.23

Peters is arguing that this person accepts the principles that we ought to consider people's interests, even though he cannot state the principle, argue for it, and we might emphasize, neither has he the principle in mind when he argues that gambling is wrong. Now, we may say that the person has in some sense learned the principle that we ought to consider the interest of others, but this is not the sense described here as the pedagogical or reportive sense because it need not ever reach the stage of propositional formulation.
CHAPTER NOTES


2. An enthymeme is an incomplete argument, i.e., an argument with a premise that is unstated. Descartes Cogito may serve as an example. "I think, therefore I am," may be missing the premise "For anything that thinks, it exists."


4. This is not to say that Kant was entirely wrong. Obviously, Peters seems to think Kant had something.

5. Peters, Ethics, p. 43.

6. Ibid., p. 44.

7. Ibid.

8. Peters argues that we do find some things obligatory, good, etc., and since we do, we would be unwilling to give up moral discourse. See R.S. Peters, "Concrete Principles and the Rational Passions," in Moral Education (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970) edited by N.F. and T.R. Sizer, pp. 32-33.


10. Marcus Singer, "Moral Rules and Principles," in Essays in Moral Philosophy edited by A.I. Melden, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958) p. 170. Singer offers this principle as one of five moral principles, and although he elaborates on this principle (p. 173), it is not clear that he escapes the charge of triviality.


12. Ibid., pp. 70-71.
13. There are other problems with the categorical imperative. For example, it would seem to permit actions that are morally wrong. It does not help to determine the moral status of killing by someone who has unique features. If we limit our maxim to apply to persons with those features, then that maxim would pass the categorical imperative.

14. Most simply stated the law of contradiction is the principle that something cannot be both true and false at the same time; i.e., statements of the form 'p and not-p' are not possible.

15. This is part of what Hare means by "universalizability." If we call one object Red, then some other object like the first in that it has the characteristic of the first that led us to call the first red should also be labelled red. See R.M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) pp. 7-14.


17. Ibid., p. 47.


19. Ibid., p. 51.

20. Special pleading is the fallacy of applying one standard to judge one case and another standard to judge another case when there is no difference between the two cases which warrant applying different standards. For example, one may describe the dialogue of men as "talk" but the dialogue of women as "jabber", when there is no difference in the sort of thing being discussed.


22. R.M. Hare, "Language and Moral Education," in New Essays in Philosophy of Education, edited by Glenn Langford and D.J. O'Connor (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 166. We should note that in our example we are assuming that there are no differences between A and B relevant to warrant our saying that B ought not to be put in prison, though A ought to be. In other words, B assumes that failing to pay the debt in question and being unable to make payment are together sufficient for putting A in debtor's prison and we are assuming that there are no extenuating circumstance to excuse B.

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

We began this study by framing a problem of stating precisely the goals of moral education in terms of two questions: 1) What does it mean to say that someone has learned a moral principle? 2) What sorts of things are we willing to count as evidence that someone has learned a moral principle and given what we will count, what is sufficient to warrant our saying that someone has learned a moral principle? In this chapter we will summarize the points that have been made and speak directly to the first question. Then, we will consider the second question in light of our summary remarks to make several points important for the activities of teaching and for empirical research in moral education.

Summary Remarks

In Chapter One we focused this study on those programs of moral education which intend to develop morally educated persons. This study was further limited by the two questions restated above. Our goal was to state more clearly the goal that students learn moral principles when such learning is part of having adopted the moral point of view.

Chapter Two sought an answer to the question: What does it mean to say that someone is morally educated? We considered arguments
for what is to be included in such descriptions from the standpoint that being morally educated includes accepting "the moral point of view." We focused on the following aspects: 1) To say that someone is morally educated is to say that the person has adopted and uses moral principles. 2) Such persons have the knowledge to use principles. This included knowing relevant facts and having relevant skills to the application of moral principles. 3) A morally educated person understands the rationale of moral judgments. The extent to which such a person must understand this rationale was left unstated. 4) A morally educated person is able to solve problems which require decisions not readily solvable with principles taught. This was a requirement difficult to state in precise terms. 5) A morally educated person adopts the moral point of view. This includes independence of moral judgment. Of course, what is relevant is, to some extent, theory dependent. Also included in adopting the moral point of view is adopting "the moral way." We noted that this concept is not entirely clear. 6) Morally educated persons ask moral questions when such questions are appropriate and they are interested in the answer. 7) Morally educated persons act morally. To describe someone as morally educated is not just to mention the things the person says. It is to mention what the person does in addition to what he or she says.

In Chapter Three we distinguished two ways in which a description of the sort 'a learned that principle x' is ambiguous. One ambiguity, the reportive-pedagogical distinction, hinges on what persons believe. The other ambiguity, the non-active contrasted
with the active sense of 'to learn', requires attention to the notion of 'acting according to a norm'. It appears that only the pedagogical and active sense of 'to learn' captures the goal of moral education, as that goal was explicated in Chapter Two. If we suppose that we want someone to learn, for example, that promises ought to be kept, we want that person to believe that promises ought to be kept and we want the person to keep his promises. There is much more to the goal of moral education than this, but this is at least part of the goal. And, as we saw in Chapter Four, not just any manner of accepting a moral principle is compatible with the goal of moral education that persons adopt the moral point of view. Let us sort out these major points so that we can then show their significance to teaching and research.

To say "a learned that principle x" is to say something ambiguous because we may mean one of the following four things:

1. Person a learned (non-active, reportive sense) that x. In this sense of 'to learn' someone has come to understand that x, though she does not believe it nor has she "incorporated the norm" expressed by x. For example, if someone learned that we ought to pay our taxes in this sense of 'to learn', she does not believe that we ought to pay our taxes, nor does she pay taxes. This is not to say that there is a correlation between the fact of non-belief and non-action, but there could be. And, we might assume that not believing we should do something would have something to do with our not doing it. We should keep in mind that this person must have some understanding of the principle, if we are to say she has learned it and
is not merely parroting the words, i.e., she may only be uttering
the words. The level of understanding she has of the principle
raises yet another point.

2. Person a learned (active, reportive sense) that x. This
sense differs from the first only because the person acts according
to the norm. The reason for acting in accordance with the norm, if
there is one, may have something to do with having learned the
principle. For example, though a child does not believe the principle,
"we ought to do homework," he may do the homework just because he
believes the teacher thinks we ought to do it.

3. Person a learned (non-active, pedagogical sense) that x. In
this sense the person believes the principle learned. That is to say,
she accepts the principle, even though she does not act in accordance
with it. For example, even though this person believes that we ought
to vote, she does not vote. There are many explanations for this
kind of inconsistency between belief and action. The discrepancy
between belief and action is important to moral education that seeks
to affect moral action. Whether the cause for inaction is a problem
for education or not is largely an empirical question. (We noted
some of the problems of acting on belief in Chapter Two). But this
problem of failing to act on belief is not the same as the problem
of not believing. What it takes to get someone to believe a principle
who understands a principle but does not believe the principle poses
further problems for moral education. These problems are different
from those of helping persons translate their beliefs into action.
4. Person a learned (active and pedagogical sense) that x. In addition to believing the principle, this person acts in accordance with the principle. This does not necessarily mean that the person acts from the principle, i.e., because he accepts it. Someone may, for example, come to believe that we ought not to lie and not lie. He may have decided that he ought not to lie and based on the decision does not lie. Or, he may have had the habit of telling the truth, a habit which does not rest on his acceptance of the principle. This is a distinction with a difference, although both come under descriptions of the sort here discussed. It is not clear how important this distinction is to the goal of moral education, although one point is important. Even when someone has learned that we ought not to lie, and does not lie, we would expect that it is possible for him to do otherwise than to tell the truth. Specifically, in cases in which the morally right thing to do would be to lie, we would want that person to be willing and able to lie, i.e., to depart from his typical way of acting.1

In Chapter Four, we noted that each sense of 'to learn' entails some degree of understanding. If we describe someone as having learned a principle, that person has some understanding of the principle learned. But the extent to which we expect a morally educated person to understand a principle learned is unclear. If we wish to make precise the goal that students come to learn moral principles, then we must decide what degree of understanding we expect our students to have. This is no easy decision, and it is not easy in
part because it is difficult to say what counts as complete understanding. In the literature of ethical theory there are competing views of what constitutes complete understanding of moral principles. We have drawn from the writing of some so that we may become more specific about what we should expect of morally educated persons. Following the suggestions of R.S. Peters, we might conclude that a morally educated person should learn moral rules and moral principles. (This is in keeping with the distinction between rules and principles stated in Chapter Two.) But though it appears that Peters recommends that moral rules be learned in the pedagogical and active sense, it is not clear that he has in mind that moral principles be learned in the same sense. We argued that the kinds of distinctions described by Peters and Hare as "moral principles" should be learned at least in the sense that moral rules are understood and used in accordance with those distinctions made explicit by those principles. We noted the analogue of learning how to use language.

Another ambiguity arises for the claim that people should learn moral principles, if they are to be morally educated. This could be taken to mean that they should learn moral rules, that they should learn moral principles, or that they should learn both. Whatever the suggestion, it then behooves us to ask, "In what sense of 'to learn'?" To answer this question we may start once again at Chapter Three. Before considering some specific suggestions for teaching and research, let us turn to the question of what we should count as sufficient evidence for principles learned by focusing on
one of the major points of this study.

The Morally Educated Person and The Moral Philosopher

In Chapter Two we noted that a morally educated person is someone who understands the rationale of moral judgments. The extent to which someone should understand this rationale was left open for us to decide. Furthermore, it was noted that there is a difference between following a statement of justification and being able to produce such justification. As educators, we need to decide what we want our students to be able to do. As Scheffler pointed out in his discussion of 'knowledge',

...the notion of adequacy involves standards, which are normally applied more strictly in some cases more approximately in others, thus giving rise to multiple interpretations of knowing.2

It was implied in this discussion that as teachers we should make distinctions among what we would count as a child understanding a moral justification, what we would count as a morally educated person understanding moral justification, and what might be called the "full-blown" justification of a moral philosopher. Making each distinction requires that we establish some set of standards. Let us make this point a bit more precise and draw some conclusions.

In Chapter Four, after a good deal of searching, we found that for someone to understand moral rules sufficiently to be morally educated, he or she must understand something about moral language and distinctions pertinent to what is sometimes described as the moral point of such rules. Although Peters in one place seemed to advocate that the morally educated should learn moral principles
in the sense of 'learn that', which we argued would require stating such principles propositionally, in another place Peters is not so demanding. It was argued that we need not require a morally educated person to learn moral principles in this sense for him or her to have adequate understanding of moral rules. But we should expect such a person to understand moral rules as having exceptions, as being in some sense objective, as being distinct from such things as legal statute, as possibly distinct from an individual's preferences, etc. This understanding should also be reflected in the way we use moral rules to adjudicate moral problems. Though we fail to say what is sufficient for understanding moral rules, we have stated some of the necessary conditions for such understanding.

Peters writes that the formulation of moral principles "is necessary, if one intends to embark on some moral philosophy in the attempt to justify principles." Here Peters clearly distinguishes the interest of developing a moral theory from other interests. So, although our friend, who is troubled by the effects that gambling has on the welfare of the gambler's family, shows us his concern for the interests of others, our friend need not be able to formulate this interest in terms of a principle. We can distinguish our friend's understanding of the moral rule, "it is wrong to gamble," from how other people understand it by the kinds of reasons he gives. In addition to a concern for the interest of others, we would want him to avoid tailoring his judgments to his own position; nor would we want him to think gambling is wrong in all cases. We would expect our friend to heed to similar considerations when
applying other moral rules, e.g., "it is wrong to lie," and "we ought to keep our promises." Further, we would expect him to understand that the kinds of considerations relevant to some cases are not, thereby, relevant to all. There are cases in which legal considerations are important for making moral judgments. For example, we might reasonably argue that Heinz should not steal the drug because of the certainty of his getting caught and the effects that would have on him. But just as legal considerations are relevant to some cases, and not to others, the interests of others may or may not be important to the cases we encounter. Since the interests of others is not always of prime importance in settling moral problems, that too must wait for case-by-case consideration.

But just because moral principles do not always aid us in adjudicating particular moral problems, that does not mean there is never any sense in trying to formulate such principles. Peters argues,

And why should a moral theory be judged by its capacity to enable the individual to answer the question, 'What ought I do now,' as distinct from the question 'What, in general, are there reasons for doing?'

There is no reason why a moral theory cannot attempt to generate the criteria by which we make our moral judgments, i.e., the criteria we recognize that we use, as well as, the criteria we only presuppose. Of course, part of the problem of generating specific criteria was pointed out in Chapter Four. A question to be raised here is whether or not we want to saddle the morally educated person with the responsibility of attempting to generate the criteria,
recognized or presupposed. Do we want the morally educated person to be able to answer the question, "What ought I do now?" or do we want such persons to be able to consider the criteria that are presupposed when they answer those questions?

It would appear that we may be working our way into a bifurcation. It may not just be one or the other. We may want them to do both or some third or fourth thing. But we should again notice that the second question is fraught with difficulty. Kurt Baier noted that moral philosophers agree on little when it involves moral principles. Suppose that the search for general, specifiable criteria that apply whenever we make moral judgments is a fruitless activity. Were we to take this tack, not only would we not recommend morally educated persons to make the search, we would puzzle at moral philosophers for making it.

However we decide the matter over the quest for general moral criteria, we should keep in mind our earlier point that we do not expect the formulation of principles in other areas, e.g., language, even when we expect some fairly sophisticated judgments to be made. We may, to use one example from language, want teachers to understand the distinctions we made in Chapter Three about the word 'to learn', but this does not mean they must be able to formulate criteria sufficient to account for any use of that word. We did not attempt to do that here, nor would that attempt succeed here. But we may be hopeful that some important distinctions were made, even though a complete theory of 'learning' was not provided.
If what we have said is correct, being a moral philosopher is not necessary for being morally educated. This might come as a relief to us all. We may also notice that being a moral philosopher is not sufficient for being morally educated either. Part of the reason for this is that a moral philosopher may lack some of the characteristics necessary to be morally educated, mentioned in Chapter Two, that are in addition to having the ability to reason about morals.

This is not to say that the work of moral philosophy is unimportant to moral education. Quite the contrary is true. The kinds of distinctions which we have suggested are important for moral understanding are not typically made in our daily lives. Making such distinctions as those suggested by moral philosophers, and making them in a way that can be understood by students, is one of the most important tasks for any teacher who wants to have a part in the moral education of students. Another distinction should be made before we turn to discuss how this study may be of help to teaching.

**Principles and Character Traits**

Sometimes when it is argued that people should learn moral principles it is meant only that certain character traits should be acquired. In this sense, when it is said that Smith learned the principle of honesty, it is meant that Smith is honest or that he has learned to be honest. This does not necessarily mean that he has learned that one ought to be honest. We should notice the difference between saying that someone has acquired certain character
traits and saying that someone has learned a moral principle in the sense of 'to learn that'. Smith may be honest, trustworthy, and courageous, even though he has not learned any moral principles in the sense we have discussed in Chapter Three and Four. This distinction between acquiring character traits and learning moral principles is important for a couple of reasons.

We should take care to examine what is meant when it is said that people should learn moral principles. If we take those who advocate the teaching of moral principles to mean only that certain character traits be fostered, then many of the considerations having to do with the formulation of moral rules and principles, the justification of such rules and principles, and the use of them in making singular moral judgments would be out of place. If having the habit of truth telling were sufficient to constitute the learning of the moral principle, "we ought to tell the truth," then it would not be necessary to discuss the teaching of moral principles in the manner discussed by Frankena, et al.

Those who advocate the development of morally educated persons have more in mind than the fostering of character traits when they advocate the teaching of moral principles. They want students to do more than simply acquire such habits as truth-telling and promise-keeping. And, though such habits as truth-telling may play an important part in being morally educated, there are times when we would want our students to resist such inclinations as telling the truth. For them to know when it is appropriate to resist their
inclinations requires more than that they acquire such character traits as honesty. Knowing when to depart from such habits requires that students learn the moral rules along with the qualifications of these rules.

Having focused our attention on the learning of moral principles, we run the risk of overstating the case for the teaching and learning of principles. We should keep in mind that the teaching of rules and principles is not the sole interest of moral education, though such teaching is an important part of moral education just as the teaching of principles is an important part of education not specifically concerned with morality. Insofar as the goal of moral education includes getting students to act morally in addition to getting them to behave morally, the teaching of moral rules is an important part of moral education.

Suggestions for Teaching

Let us begin by emphasizing that if moral education as we have been discussing it is to be part of public schooling, the curriculum should reflect this interest. If we want our students to learn moral rules along with the distinctions appropriate for making singular moral judgments and for using moral language correctly, then the curriculum of the schools should include discussion of these rules and distinctions. This would include not only the possible addition of material to the existing curriculum but the revision of that curriculum when it is inconsistent with the moral point of view. For example, material which places matters of taste on the same
footing as matters of value and obligation should be revised. This is not to say that materials which express a particular moral judgment different from our own should be "revised." The revisions suggested here are the kind that promote the discussion of moral opinions; they are not the kind that preclude the possibility of such discussion.

Now let us be reminded of a problem for teaching that was introduced in Chapter Three as the "verbalist fallacy." As suggested by Israel Scheffler it is the mistake in teaching of assuming that evidence which may be sufficient for the claim that someone learned in the non-active sense is also sufficient for the claim that the person has learned in the active sense. The point is that our students may have learned a principle without having acquired the norm which is expressed by that principle. In short, it would make sense say, "Jones learned that we ought not to smoke and Jones smokes."

There is yet another kind of verbalist fallacy. This is to assume that evidence sufficient for the claim that someone has learned in the reportive sense is sufficient for the claim that the person has learned in the pedagogical sense. Our student may have learned a principle in the sense of having some understanding of it, but she does not believe the principle. What she believes may be that the teacher says, "It is wrong to cheat." Cases of this sort are not odd, especially if we consider the disinterest that a moral philosopher may have in moral rules. But this does suggest that as teachers we should be more cautious in what we allow as evidence
for learning. Furthermore, it suggests that we must be more selective in what we choose to do as we try to get students to learn principles.

When teaching we may be trying to get a student to learn a rule much in the way of trying to get him to learn the mores of some ancient civilization. This way of teaching rules may be no more than pointing out their application and serviciability to some social group. We do not expect our student to believe these rules nor do we want him to act in accordance with these rules. But this is not the sort of learning we want as we teach moral rules. We want students to believe the moral rules we teach. Getting some of our students to believe some of the rules may offer no major obstacles. In fact, a major problem for most of us may not be that of getting students to believe certain moral rules. A major problem may be getting students to believe these rules in a way that suggests they also understand the important qualifications that come with moral rules. Included in this problem is the problem of helping students to see that there are exceptions to the rules they have already learned without their rejecting these rules altogether.9

It is difficult to know what to say about teaching students who do not accept some moral rules prior to moral education. Writing on the topic of teaching, Thomas F. Green speaks to the problem of getting students to accept principles, i.e., to find them binding. He writes,

We have asked what is the act of regarding a rule or principle as valid. Part of what is
involved is participation in some human activity
to which the principles are germane.\textsuperscript{10}

Green gives us examples of dancing and adhering to the principles
governing dancing practices, of doing science and adhering to prin­
ciples of science, and of skating and accepting its principles.

Quoting Green,

\begin{quote}
One reason why so many students do not regard
the cannons of inquiry as binding upon them is
that they have never resolved to become parti­
cipants in the community of inquirers. They
have a non-participating policy.\textsuperscript{11}
\end{quote}

It is not clear that Green's comments help us to resolve our problem
of getting students to accept moral rules. If we have a student
who has a "non-participating policy" in morality, then we may have
a problem beyond the scope of teaching.\textsuperscript{12} But if students seem to
have a "non-participating policy" in morality, they may have a
"participating policy" in something else that would allow us to
get them to become moral participators.

But belief is not sufficient for action, at least in the sense
that someone can believe that we should vote and yet does not vote.
We can get someone to believe that she should visit her parents on
holidays without her ever making the visits. She may lack some of
the other ingredients that allow her to act on the basis of her
beliefs. These "ingredients" were discussed in Chapter Two where
we noted that some of this concern for action is a problem for
Teaching and some is not.

There are many things that get in the way of such action. We
may have other beliefs that conflict with the belief receiving our
attention. A child may fail to do what the teacher says, not because he does not believe he ought to obey the teacher, but because he also believes that he should live up to his friend's expectations. This reminds us that failure to act in a particular case is not grounds for us to say that a student does not believe something or other. We should also be reminded that in teaching with the intent to change belief, beliefs do not exist in isolation. As teachers we should recognize the sorts of problems related to conflicts of beliefs.

We may lack habits of right action or have habits that get in the way of right action. For example, some of us find principles of good grammar compelling, and even though we know what they are, we fail to speak properly because we have not acquired habits of good speech. We may know that it is harmful for us to eat midnight snacks, but lacking the habit of eating a hardy breakfast and a good lunch, we find the pangs late at night too much to bear. Just as we sometimes find that the habits we have acquired have basis in acceptable moral rules, we may find that we lack other habits recommended by yet other rules we learn. In such cases we may have to develop new habits.

Suggestions for Research

Let us consider three points for moral education research. First, we have argued that part of the goal of moral education is to have students come to understand such things as the distinctions between matters of preference and matters of value. A morally educated person was described as having some understanding of this distinction
and others. It would seem that if we want students to understand such distinctions, then part of teaching would include the discussion of these distinctions. This teaching may be accomplished just by pointing these distinctions out and explaining them to our students. Of course, what serves best to get students to learn these points of moral discourse is largely an empirical question. But the distinction themselves are points having to do with the logic of morality. The difference between legal statute and moral rules is one having to do with the difference between what is relevant to confirming each of the rules. A child has learned this distinction, if he can, for example, distinguish between saying that a male's failing to register for the draft on this eighteenth birthday is illegal and saying that failing to do so is morally wrong. We might say he has learned the difference, if he can cite what factors would be relevant for supporting each statement. It would seem that we would want to effectively teach our students such distinctions by presenting them with examples of these distinctions and by taking our students through the steps of verification. This is an empirical guess. At what age a child is likely to have a significant understanding of such distinctions is also an empirical question to be answered by our trying to teach these distinctions.

The second point is that we should not be too surprised to find a discrepancy between what people say and what they do, as when someone says it is wrong to cheat but nevertheless cheats. This is not a new point, but this discussion should suggest to us some
possible explanations for that "apparent" discrepancy between thought and action.\textsuperscript{16} It was argued that evidence for what we say is not always sufficient as evidence for what we believe or do. From our discussion of 'to learn' we can see that what people say is not always sufficient evidence for us to attribute particular beliefs to them. And evidence that is sufficient to attribute belief is not always sufficient to predict how they are likely to act in certain situations. For us to make accurate belief attributions, we would need more than what they are likely to say; we need to know what they are likely to do in certain situations. But this is not to say they will act in accordance with their beliefs in any straightforward way. This is just because there are many things that get in the way of that. If we want our research to be accurate reports, we must take account of the complexity of our thought and belief dispositions. This is our final point.

In Chapter Three we were offered a dispositional account of 'to learn that'. This account suggests that a single response to a question about what is learned may not be adequate evidence for the claim that someone has learned.\textsuperscript{17} If someone has learned that we should keep our promises, we might expect him to give an affirmative response to the claim that we ought to keep our promises. But to take such a response as sufficient evidence for the claim that he understands the rule may be to overlook some important considerations. For example, he may have only learned to respond to the question, "Should we keep promises?" Furthermore, he may lack sufficient understanding to count as having adequately learned the rule as a
moral rule, i.e., he may not see the moral implications of the rule. We would have to devise more elaborate tests than merely asking him the question "Should we keep our promises?" We would need to consider his response to a variety of questions and perhaps to situations involving promise keeping, if we are to determine the extent of his understanding.

Furthermore, evidence that is sufficient for understanding is not, thereby, evidence sufficient for belief. We need to know enough about the student to distinguish the student's "giving us what we want to hear" from a "genuine" response. This too requires that we know something about the student's beliefs, intentions, etc., in addition to the particular belief we are trying to determine. For example, a student may agree in a particular case that someone should report a vagabond to the authorities. Having had the children read a story about a hobo who had robbed a local merchant, we may ask the children to tell us whether or not they think the story's child-protagonist should have reported the hobo to the authorities. We may take a particular response that the child should have done so as evidence that our student believes the child in the story should have done so. But other facts about our student may serve to disconfirm this conclusion. Suppose she believes we should not report anyone to the police, because the police are not to be trusted. If we know our student believes this, then her particular assertion about the child in the story may only show us that she is willing to give us the answers we seek. The point is that we must take into consideration more than a particular response to a particular question, since
We should also note that a negative response to a question about promises, whether verbal or otherwise, need not warrant our assuming that our student does not believe that we ought to keep promises. The broadly dispositional view requires that we do more than to take a single response as adequate for the verification of learning and belief claims. We can rely on such testing only when we know many other things about our students in addition to their particular responses to particular moral questions. We need to know something about their beliefs, propensities, habits, etc., to allow us to properly interpret their particular responses to "moral tests."
1. For a schema of these four senses of 'to learn that' recall page 79 of this dissertation.


4. The point being made here is that, contrary to what Lawrence Kohlberg may argue, one may offer the legal status of an action as a moral reason for an action. The fact that stealing a drug to save the life of another is illegal may be relevant to the consideration of whether or not that action is morally right. In making the moral consideration we would want to consider the moral relevance of breaking a law. The fact that someone offers the legality of an action as a reason for or against an action does not, by itself, tell us how it is being offered. We would have to find this out.


9. This, it seems to me, is an extremely important empirical question for moral education. We want students to recognize that moral rules have exceptions. We do not want our students to abandon their moral teaching altogether, at least not in most cases. By introducing students to "counter-examples" to their cherished moral beliefs, we may be paving the way for their accepting a kind of moral anarchy. They may go to the extreme of rejecting their moral beliefs entirely. Several questions arise, two of which are: 1) Is there an age too early for dealing with exceptions to standard moral rules? 2) Is there a good way to introduce people to exceptions to moral rules without their being led to moral anarchy? It would seem that we should at least remind our students that there are important objections to moral skepticism and relativism, at least to the sophomoric kind they would likely imagine.


11. Ibid.

12. This is an interesting and complex question because the answer to it will, in large part, depend upon what we are willing to count as 'teaching'.

13. The best discussion of this point that I know is in, Thomas F. Green, The Activities of Teaching, (New York: McGraw-Hill, Book Company, 1971), pp. 41-55. Using a metaphor of belief "systems" Green introduces many notions of importance to teaching and the beliefs of students. For example, he points out that someone may reject a belief because he understands it to be incompatible with other things he believes, whether or not the beliefs are logically incompatible. A child may believe that the interests of his friends are incompatible with his teacher's requests, when they are not. Students sometimes find the rejection of ethical relativism to be incompatible with the acceptance of cultural relativism, when it is not.

14. Sometimes we find that we have habits which coincide with right action. I have the habit of double checking my arithmetic whenever I write a check and enter it in my checkbook. This is a habit which accords with a "principle" of good bookkeeping. I also lack habits which I have recently come to believe would be good ones to have. For example, it would be good to eat breakfast every morning. That is a difficult habit to acquire.

15. A major point to be made is that part of the goal of moral education is to be determined by taking a good look at what we know about morality. Hamlyn spoke to a similar point when he wrote,

...in considering how education should proceed one should start not only from a knowledge of the concepts which a
child already has but also from a knowledge of the goal to be attained in teaching a young child elementary arithmetic, the salient facts of an historical period, or the rudiments of English grammar? Until the questions of this sort are answered it is impossible to say how we should proceed or in what order concepts should be invoked. It has, in sum, to be decided what is the goal of any given inquiry.

Part of Hamlyn's point is that what we expect to achieve when we teach x must be determined, in part, by looking at what counts as x. If we want to succeed in teaching someone Classics, part of our concern will be to find what is true about Classics. For his complete argument, see, D. W. Hamlyn, "The Logical and Psychological Aspects of Learning," in The Philosophy of Education, ed. R. S. Peters (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 195-232.


17. Keep in mind that the single response of a person need not be verbal. In any case we should need to know more about the respondent that his single response at a particular time, if we are to conclude anything about what he has actively and pedagogically learned. We may note that Lawrence Kohlberg, for one, gets around the problem of a single verbal response by getting more than one response and by making a claim about the nature of our thinking. Responses are viewed as being characteristic of a particular "stage" and stages define "structured wholes" which are total ways of thinking. The responses are indicative of an "underlying thought-organization." One source of his argument can be found in Kohlberg, "From Is To Ought," pp. 151-235.
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