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POSITIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL
ISSUES IN THREE MAJOR SOVIET JOURNALS:
THE DECADE OF THE 1970s

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
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* * * * *

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INTRODUCTION

This study is designed to examine the positions of Soviet party, government, and academic elites who may have some role in the policy-making process on arms control and, to a limited extent, strategic doctrine. The personnel included in the study are specialists from the academic and political arenas who have been selected by their contributions to publications reflective of two major groups: foreign policy personnel in the party and government and academics connected with the Institute of World Economy and International Relations and the Institute of the USA and Canada.

The findings from the analysis of positions represented in three journals that publish articles by these political and academic elites will be used to examine areas of contention involving Soviet positions on arms policy and the Soviet arms policy process that are found in Western scholarly literature. This is accomplished by comparing the findings of this study with findings or conclusions from previous studies that have been based primarily on military writings and also by comparing the results from this and previous studies with Soviet policy implementation, i.e., negotiated agreements.

This study consists of five chapters: Chapter I builds the theoretical basis for this type of study, reviews previous studies in the area, and presents the areas of contention found in those studies; Chapter II outlines the method of content analysis used here and details how
findings will be used to examine contended areas; Chapters III and IV will present the results of the analysis of each of the groups represented in the literature, i.e., foreign policy personnel from the government and party and research institute analysts; and, Chapter V will compare these findings with those presented in previous analyses, compare the conclusions from this and previous studies with negotiated agreements, and draw conclusions based on the areas of disagreement presented in Chapter I.
CHAPTER I
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The 15 years between 1965 and 1979 have seen the United States and the Soviet Union move toward political detente and a lessening of military tension. However, both these tendencies faltered — perhaps fatally — toward the end of the 1970s. Although there are many possible reasons for the problems which have developed in these two areas, the lack of sufficient knowledge about Soviet positions has certainly exacerbated the situation. This dissertation proposes to examine positions of selected Soviet elites on arms control and disarmament and, it is to be hoped, to improve our knowledge of the process that formulates Soviet arms policy.

In an age when some experts argue that the Soviet Union will have a "preclusive first strike capability" in less than a decade, it has become extremely important to go beyond what have been largely superficial attempts to explain Soviet positions on nuclear armaments, especially arms control and disarmament. In this dissertation qualitative content analysis is used to determine what those have been from 1970 to 1979 with regard to specific aspects of arms control and arms policy such as the SALT agreements. The actual methodology of the type of content analysis used in the study will be fully discussed in Chapter II; however, a modified qualitative content method has been chosen for the analysis because it allows consideration of elements, i.e., context and audience, which are often ignored or slighted by quantification.

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This study will address several questions concerning Soviet elite positions on arms policy involving two basic areas: 1) the extent to which there is solidarity with or deviation from the positions represented by the military; and 2) the extent to which Soviet arms control positions have been stable or have changed over the time period 1970-1979.

One of the many disagreements among those who study Soviet positions on strategic arms limitation is the role played by advisors outside the military to Soviet elites. This dispute involves not only what that role is insofar as their influence over Soviet decision-making is concerned but also if they play any role at all. The position taken here is that a role is played by those advisors in Soviet decision-making. By examining the development of the Western literature, I hope to demonstrate the importance of studying this often neglected or slighted group of Soviet sub-elites. I then, in subsequent chapters, will look at the writings of these sub-elites in an effort to determine what their role is and to reinforce the contention made in this chapter that the role is important.

Many researchers and scholars have described and tried to explain Soviet arms control positions over the past 25 years; nevertheless, the state of the literature on Soviet positions on arms limitation and arms control remains immature and disheartening. Much of the early material is superficial and disparate, and the subsequent expansion in knowledge and information over the years has not led to a cumulative or cohesive body of research.

These deficiencies result, in part, from the failure of researchers in the area to define their topic adequately. In the early literature,
it was treated as an adjunct of Soviet foreign policy that was used for a variety of purposes (from serving as a propaganda tool to isolating the Chinese). However, over the years, it has become synonymous in many authors' work with Soviet strategic doctrine. Arms policy has been treated only rarely as a separate policy entity that both contains elements of and interacts with general Soviet foreign policy and Soviet strategic thought.

Given the strong ties between strategic thought and the weapons systems under negotiation in SALT necessary to make certain aspects of strategic doctrine viable options in crisis situations, the gravitation of research toward strategic doctrine is perhaps a natural phenomenon. However, a passing acquaintance with U.S. arms policy and strategic doctrine and with the interplay between the two in the evolution of U.S. negotiating stances should lead one to question the validity of accepting Soviet strategic doctrine's synonymity with Soviet arms policy. Nevertheless, this seems to be the assumption made by many scholars in the area. These efforts tend to be directed more toward arguing over the interpretation of what the Soviets "really" mean in their strategic doctrine than they are toward determining the extent to which this doctrine validly represents official policy. In other words, disagreement exists over not only what Soviet doctrine says, but also over what it is. As yet no researcher has made a systematic, broad-based attempt to determine the extent to which one can equate strategic doctrine and strategic arms policy.

By reviewing the literature on Soviet arms policy from the early days of SALT I to the present, this and other shortcomings become easily visible. During the 1960s the literature was highly descriptive, focusing
primarily on Soviet actions. However, when SALT came to the fore, researchers began to take a closer look at basic positions and tried to analyze the process by which decisions were made. This approach quickly identified the Soviet military as the key element in the decisionmaking process and focused on the structure of and possible coalitions and cleavages within that group. After the negotiation of SALT I, many researchers carried their focus on the military a step further and began to equate arms policy and strategic doctrine. Finally, as the debates over SALT II began, those who found the preoccupation with strategic doctrine a narrow, restrictive and highly suspect approach tried to refocus attention onto the broader perspective of arms policy making.

**Literature from the SALT I Period**

During the SALT I period (roughly 1969-1975), from the beginning of serious negotiations through the signing of the Vladivostok Accords in 1974, most of the scholarly literature simply described Soviet actions rather than trying to determine Soviet preferences, i.e., positions toward specific weapons systems, views of the capabilities of various weapons, and expectations of how weaponry could be deployed and employed. Of the several books produced during this half decade, most tended to be descriptive accounts of Soviet actions. Their analytical focus was based primarily on SALT as an adjunct of Soviet foreign policy and the determinants of Soviet arms policy were various perceived advantages within the diplomatic arena. Much of this emphasis on foreign policy may be attributed to scholarly reluctance to abandon a familiar area, and much of the reasoning that appeared during the first two or three
years of the 1970s was very similar to that of the 1960s. One possible reason for the reluctance to desert foreign policy is the broad array of explanations for arms control behavior that it is capable of incorporating, including U.S.-Soviet detente and interaction, improved relations with Western Europe, influence in the Third World, and the countering of an "independent" China.

The linkages made between foreign policy and arms control within the literature are somewhat weak. On the whole, there seems to be a general consensus that Soviet actions and policies involving arms control have tended to be influenced by both their propaganda value and their impact on attaining foreign policy goals. The propaganda value of Soviet arms control stances exists for every area of foreign policy behavior mentioned. Originally it was thought that serious arms control negotiations could come only after a lessening of tension between the two major nuclear powers was well underway. However, in retrospect, the willingness of both sides to seriously negotiate their differences over nuclear arms led the way for detente in the mid-1970s. In the instance of improving relations with Western Europe, arms control policy has worked on two planes, that is it has eased tensions between Western Europe and the Soviet Union and it has undermined European confidence in the United States as an ally. The easing of tension is twofold: 1) Soviet willingness to support Mutual Balanced Forced Reductions demonstrated good faith and was a useful "political instrument in the process of East-West detente"; and 2) their readiness to negotiate nuclear arms agreements with the United States made them a somewhat less frightening image in the specter of "hostage Europe." Moreover, the prospect of
possible compromises made by the United States at the negotiating table led the European governments to doubt the wisdom of relying on U.S. capabilities for protection.

The strongest propaganda gains, however, may have been made with the Third World. From the period of Khruschev's General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) proposals in the 1950s, the Third World was probably the most receptive audience. Trying to counter the influence of both the West and Peking, Moscow claimed great-power disarmament would, in all likelihood, lead to the elimination of foreign bases, i.e., bases in Third World territories, and also decrease the coercive power of the "imperialists" by mitigating the qualitative military advantage of the developed countries. Additionally, GCD would put an end to nuclear testing, much of which was being done in or near Third World areas.

Finally, the Soviet Union has used its arms control negotiating stances to improve its position in the world's view vis-a-vis China. By negotiating SALT and the treaties of the 1960s that placed limits on testing and proliferation of nuclear materials, the Soviet Union has attempted to present itself as a sane, reasonable, responsible major power in contrast to a hostile, violent, and threatening China.

Besides propaganda gains, the Soviet Union has used its arms policy to further foreign policy goals. The Soviets have been able to help promote better relations with Third World nations by their willingness to negotiate arms issues. Nevertheless, it may be that Soviet policy toward China was more important. The problems between the Soviets and the Chinese are certainly many-faceted and go well beyond the scope of arms policy issues; yet, the notion of disarmament and the different
positions taken by China and the Soviet Union on disarmament in the late 1950s is often considered to be a contributing factor to the Sino-Soviet split.\textsuperscript{9} Surely by the late 1960s and early 1970s the existence of a hostile China may have played a very important role in Soviet decisionmaking. On one hand, the existence of the Chinese as a threat to Soviet security may have intensified "the desire of Soviet leaders to resolve major world problems of nuclear strategy within the relatively manageable patterns of confrontation between the two superpowers."\textsuperscript{10} On the other hand, fear of Chinese intentions and a valid and growing strategic threat from China would seem to have made the Soviets wary of the possibility of negotiating away some potential advantage over the Chinese in any arms agreements signed with the United States.\textsuperscript{11}

Much of the literature that analyzes the interplay of Soviet arms control positions and foreign policy is at best frustrating. Although logically satisfying, it is often superficial in its treatment of the motivations for Soviet policy. It is also highly conjectural. In general, most of the early literature might be characterized as preliminary descriptive studies, based on scholarly instinct backed by fragmentary evidence in support of assumptions.

As knowledge of the intricacies of strategic arms policy increased and as a negotiated agreement became imminent, the literature dealing with Soviet arms policy and arms control positions became more sophisticated. Scholars began to look not only at the possible motivations behind Soviet policies but also at the policymaking process for strategic arms decisions within the Soviet Union. As early as 1966, Lincoln Bloomfield mentioned the role of foreign policy interest groups in the
removal of Khrushchev; however, he simplistically categorized these groups into those who were for and those who were opposed to disarmament and detente. The roles of these groups were treated somewhat superficially. They were listed merely as elements involved in the power struggle; however, the issues involved in the broad categories of disarmament and detente were never treated in depth.

The best early attempt at combining foreign policy decisionmaking with arms policy is The Soviet Union and Arms Control: A Superpower Dilemma by Roman Kolkowicz, Matthew P. Gallagher, and Benjamin Lambeth. It focuses on the issues involved in arms control, what groups had interests in the issues, who the decisionmakers in the Politburo were, and how these three elements (issues, interests, and decisionmakers) interacted with foreign policy areas like China and Europe. Interest groups were labeled political forces and were broken into two major groups: 1) those who favored the possibility of strategic arms limitation; and 2) those who were opposed to such agreements.

Within these major groups, the authors saw several subgroups. The side favoring agreements was composed of: 1) "economic rationalizers," themselves composed of an unspecified group of top leaders and administrators reportedly headed by Kosygin; 2) scientists and technical experts; and 3) arms control professionals — "the foreign policy specialists in the government and academic bureaucracies who have acquired a professional identification with the arms control issue." The group opposed to strategic arms agreements was also composed of three elements: 1) traditionally conservative and suspicious party ideologues; 2) the industrial managerial bureaucracy based in defense production; and 3) the military establishment.
Five years after Kolkowicz, Gallagher, and Lambeth presented their ideas, Thomas Wolfe contributed his excellent work, *The SALT Experience: Its Impact on U.S. and Soviet Strategic Policy and Decision-making*. This booklength RAND report gives a detailed account of the elements affecting arms negotiations, especially the bureaucratic interactions between various leadership groups, mediating bodies, ministerial bureaucracies and subgroups, and the impact of those interactions on strategic policy issues.15

Yet with the exception of the works mentioned above, most of the literature from the SALT I period focused almost exclusively on the primacy of the military as an influence on arms control policymaking.16 This predilection for the military, in the case of many authors, seems to be a simple extension of their previous work on the Soviet military to include its role in arms policy decision making.

The majority agree that the military is not singleminded in its views and that different branches within the military have different interests. In fact, in a later study, Kolkowicz17 divides a group he labels the military-strategic community into four groups, three of which are based in the military. These groups are the Conservatives, the Technocrats, and the Rationalists. The first group originated in the Stalinist period and believes strongly in traditional methods of warfare. They have been the primary advocates of maintaining a large, standing, conventional military force; and although they are suspicious of deterrence policies and fear becoming too dependent on strategic nuclear technology, they still believe that the defense sector is the most important planning priority. The Technocrats believe in a heavy reliance on
technology for both political and military purposes as well as in the preeminence of strategic technical forces. Nevertheless, they consider standing conventional forces to be relatively unimportant. During the Khrushchev period, these Technocrats dominated Soviet strategic and political policies, but differences between the Conservatives and the Technocrats led to a divided military establishment and limited Soviet flexibility on strategic policy. The Cuban missile crisis discredited both of these groups and allowed for the emergence of a third group referred to by Kolkowicz as the Rationalists. Synthesizing traditional and technocratic ideas, the Rationalists advocated

... firm acceptance of the principle of deterrence ...

... a strong emphasis on the primacy of strategic forces for deterrence; the importance of intensive technological research and development programs; the renewed importance of modernized conventional forces ...

... the need to keep political interference in professional military matters to a minimum; a growing acceptance of the ideas of selective response, based on strategic equality vis-a-vis the United States, and the possession of a wide spectrum of available means for such purposes; the reconsideration of limited war as an acceptable doctrine for a communist state.18

According to Kolkowicz, Soviet strategic policies now tend to adhere to this particular line of thought.19

Kolkowicz also notes the emergence of a group he calls the "Americanologists". This group is linked more closely to the diplomatic, scientific, and government bureaucracy than to the military, and they seem to play "an internal policy role analogous to the Kremlinologists in the U.S."20

Despite his very useful evaluation, Kolkowicz brings this evolution to bear on Soviet arms control policy only by implication except in the
analysis of the Rationalists' support of deterrence theory and selective response. In his subsequent analysis of the role of the military-strategic community in policymaking, he tends to make inferences about similarities between Soviet and American counterparts with little, if any, evidence.

In a 1975 article on arms limitation and the Soviet military, Raymond Garthoff points to some highly varied interests of Soviet military leaders, as have other writers. The two major concerns of the military in general were seen as: 1) military preparedness in case of war; and 2) the pressures of a "tight" economy. The interests of different branches of the military come into play because of the competition for scarce resources with which to support the type of preparedness advocated by each element. Regretfully, his article is highly descriptive and gives little concrete information about the military's role in policymaking. Although he draws no solid conclusions about the role played by the military in the pre-SALT period in the late 1960s, Garthoff describes the Soviet military's predominant attitude as one of

... suspicion both of disarmament and of arms control; suspicion of the United States in general, and in particular what it was up to in proposing SALT; suspicion that arms budgets would be reduced; and suspicion of likely further involvement of Soviet political leaders and political consideration in decisions on military affairs.

In considering the "strategic balance" the author notes that the Soviet military's definition of strategic forces goes beyond that of the United States. Strategic forces include not only intercontinental strategic forces like ICBM's and SLBM's but also include any other U.S. and NATO nuclear forces (forward based systems) that have the capability of striking the USSR.
Although Garthoff claims that the military does not speak with a single voice on SALT, he credits them with the following common principal objectives: 1) no military disadvantage and preferably a Soviet advantage; 2) preservation of maximum leeway for research, development, and deployment programs; 3) the forestalling of extensive ABM deployment by the U.S.; and 4) preservation of the right to maintain offensive and defensive capabilities acquired to counter third country forces.

In an earlier article, Malcolm Mackintosh argues that the military as a group are even more conservative than Garthoff indicates. During the pre-SALT stage, according to Mackintosh, there was opposition from the military to the very concept of strategic arms limitation negotiations.

Douglas Garthoff further refines the arguments concerning varied opinions on arms control inside the military establishment. He notes that arms control impacts unequally on the various branches of the Soviet military and that this fact itself might precipitate intramilitary differences. However, since arms control issues are seen as cutting across both defense and foreign policy, Garthoff also discusses how the role of the military as a group affects both of these policy areas. Political factors involved with both types of policy may include elements that compete with military advice and interests. Garthoff concludes that:

The general impression gained from both logic and what evidence there is points to the military as taking a cautious, conservative viewpoint on arms control, sometimes clearly more so than the political leadership. Presumably differences over particular policies under deliberation -- though rarely if ever political conflict -- occur as a result.
In reviewing Soviet literature that appeared prior to the 1972 SALT I agreement, Samuel Payne found the subject of strategic arms limitation debated in Soviet journals. Generally, the military journals presented hostile views of SALT while the academic journals tended to be more approving. Payne, however, notes more disagreement within the academic publications than within the military ones. The "arms controllers" argued that strategic nuclear superiority was impossible for either side and that even if superiority were possible, one side would still be able to inflict an unacceptable loss on the other. The only possible alternative was a limit on strategic arms.

In direct opposition to this, the "militarists", writing in 1968-1969, argued against arms limitation talks and advocated strengthening the armed forces by continued high military expenditures. The "arms controllers" at the same time were arguing for the need to encourage economic growth and even called for a reduction in expenditures for armaments, arguing that this would allow more economic development.

Vernon Aspaturian focuses on a group he labels the Soviet military-industrial complex. He describes this group as a "coalition of various institutions and groups largely within the ideological, security, and producer demand sectors." The group consists of four distinct parts: 1) the military; 2) the defense industries and related research and development institutions; 3) heavy industry; and 4) conservatives in the party apparatus. As far as arms policy is concerned, the military-industrial complex favors increased Soviet force levels and the preservation of a high level of defense spending as well as continued priority for defense and heavy industry. It appears that this group is somewhat
analogous to the element that Kolkowicz, Gallagher, and Lambeth label as opposed to arms agreements. Aspaturian maintains that this group has agreed to participate in a delicate compromise on policy which supports negotiations for disarmament and arms control in exchange for concessions on some of their own policy views.

On the other hand, David Holloway argues for the possible existence of cross-cutting coalitions.

The Soviet armaments complex should be seen not as a military-industrial complex in the sense of an alignment between military and industrial interests, but rather as a part of a bureaucratic complex in which various groups, coalitions and departments interact and form alliances in the pursuit of particular policies.

Though Holloway tends to share the view of William Odom, that the Soviet bureaucracy is not amenable to interest group activity, he still believes that

... personal cliques and coalitions of cliques take shape in bureaucracies, but they differ generically from interest groups. They cannot formalize themselves and thereby institutionalize the pursuit of an interest ... They cannot openly pronounce their views and recruit new and younger members in order to perpetuate and strengthen their group ... What remains more or less constant — the key factor in social cohesion and the source of roles and norms — is the bureaucratic structure in both its formal and informal aspects.

Although Holloway discusses arms procurement as opposed to arms control policy, his contribution is important because of the stress he places on the necessity of understanding the "structural position" of the armaments bureaucracy in the Soviet political system.

Regardless of whether they are considered as interests or bureaucratic cliques, a large body of literature indicates that there is some degree of differentiation. Lawrence Caldwell divides the military into
"modernists" and "traditionalists", with the modernists favoring heavy emphasis on rocket forces and traditionalists favoring conventional ground forces and heavy industry. The stance taken on arms control negotiations by these two groups is somewhat ambiguous. Those in favor of conventional forces oppose negotiations like SALT, but the modernists do not take a unified stand. Although most tend to believe that the technological impact of the arms race emphasizes deterrence, this belief has not led them to a cohesive position on SALT. One segment of the modernists believes that opportunities to make qualitative changes in the world power balance, i.e., the correlation of forces, might be lost through negotiation. Another segment, however, stresses the necessity of stability in the strategic balance and favors cautious negotiation in order to preserve stability. 35

In a 1975 study, William Odom notes that even though military considerations have a dominant place in Soviet foreign policy decision making, it does not mean that military personnel are essential decision makers or "decision-blockers". Contrary to suggestions made by some of the authors cited previously, Odom cites evidence indicating that the military is more supportive of Brezhnev's detente efforts than are some of the economic bureaucrats. 36

As mentioned previously, one of the best works in the SALT I period is the 1975 RAND Report by Thomas Wolfe. Concentrating on a broad overview of institutions as opposed to a single bureaucracy, he identified several groups that have some degree of interest in SALT. These include the foreign affairs intelligentsia, the scientific intelligentsia, the military, and the elements of the R&D and industrial establishment known as the military-industrial complex. Apart from these institutional
interest groups, Wolfe outlines party and government organizational structures which he characterizes as having four hierarchical levels: 1) the top leadership; 2) mediating bodies between the top leadership and the ministerial bureaucracies; 3) ministries and other agencies such as state committees and the Academy of Science; and 4) the SALT negotiators.  

Although Wolfe is somewhat dubious about purported debates over policy issues, he does not dismiss the possibility completely. Citing a possible controversy over strategic issues in late 1973 and early 1974, Wolfe identified two groups of thought: one represented by writers (many associated with the U.S.A. Institute) who supported the detente policies advocated by Brezhnev; the other composed of a number of military theorists who demonstrated some skepticism about detente and the advisability of relying on SALT to guarantee Soviet security.

Despite many allusions to the possibility that non-military arms policy specialists may assert some influence over policymaking, evaluations of the impact of interest group differences on the formation of Soviet arms policy have been very narrow in scope. In most instances, they limit themselves largely to the military. As Kolkowicz points out, these limitations may be partially due to the fact that the military has been the most visible opponent of arms control talks. Regrettably, the literature involving groups or cliques is probably somewhat speculative since there is a dearth of documentation, although even this varies considerably across the literature. One major exception to this generalization is Lawrence Caldwell's work. Caldwell draws his material from a variety of Soviet sources including Red Star, Communist of the Armed Forces, the Military-Historical Journal, and SSShA.
The narrow perspective of the literature of the SALT I period leaves many unanswered questions about the forces affecting policy formation. There are hints here and there about the impact of the domestic economy on arms control policy, but there is no exhaustive analysis of this issue. There are also questions raised about which forces or elements are involved and how those elements interact with one another. What forces beyond the military, if any, are involved? Do they operate like interest groups or bureaucratic cliques? Are there cleavages that cut across institutions on certain arms control questions? Finally, do divisions exist within the military over arms policy and, if so, what form do they take? As yet there have been no definitive answers to any of these questions. Many of them make up the core of arguments that have appeared in the more recent literature that we will discuss subsequently. Nevertheless, there is at least one observation that can be made concerning the existence of opinions beyond those of the military and the importance of those opinions. Since the most recognizable group in a possible debate over arms control policy is the group which is opposed, according to most commentators, to negotiations themselves, i.e., the "militants" or "militarists", and since negotiations have taken place and some agreements have been reached, it logically follows that the "militants" either lost in a debate over arms policy or were at least forced or induced to compromise their original positions. One is left with the assumption that there were overriding concerns that forced defeat or concessions upon the "militants"; however, there has been no adequate explanation of whether this is true, much less what those concerns might have been or how they influenced the groups involved.
in the policymaking process. Additionally, there has been little beyond speculation on how the policymaking process itself has actually operated.

**Between Vladivostok and SALT II**

The ending of the SALT I period and the negotiation of SALT II precipitated a whole new body of literature concerning Soviet arms policy that focused primarily on strategic assessment and strategic doctrine. Much of the new literature exists because of the heated debates in the United States over Soviet intentions in the negotiating process. As the Soviet Union has approached, equalled, and possibly surpassed the United States in the strategic balance, the literature has focused more and more on questions concerning the comparative strength of the two countries' capabilities, the survivability of the nuclear force of each in the event of nuclear attack, and the proper interpretation of Soviet strategic doctrine. For the purposes of this study, the assessments literature is of only passing importance. The literature on strategic doctrine, however, is extremely important.

It would be convenient if this literature could be divided into two schools of thought concerning Soviet strategic doctrine, yet it would be more accurate to describe the literature as ranging along a continuum from the strident warnings of Soviet duplicity and bellicosity of Richard Pipes to the placating claims of Raymond Garthoff that the Soviets are seeking only security in the framework of deterrence.

Benjamin Lambeth describes this continuum in the following manner:

At the extremes, one finds two opposing views on the significance of Soviet doctrine prevalent in contemporary American strategic discourse. The first view holds that
the essentials of official Soviet thought on deterrence and war are abundantly evident in a large body of translated Soviet military writings which are readily available to any observer willing to take the time to read them. Those of this persuasion argue that the Soviets say what they mean and mean what they say, that their declared views on the importance of being able to fight and win a nuclear war are inseparably linked to their ongoing strategic force improvement program, and that simple prudence requires U.S. decisionmakers to heed Soviet doctrine not only as a valid indicator of underlying Soviet strategic beliefs and expectations, but also as an important baseline from which U.S. strategic force planning should be conducted.

At the opposite end of the spectrum, there is the school of thought which maintains that whatever Soviet military doctrine may superficially say, it should not be taken at face value because it emanates solely from professional military men and, as such, cannot reflect the real beliefs and views of those authoritative civilians on the Politburo who are ultimately responsible for Soviet strategic programs, policies, and behavior. Those espousing this viewpoint maintain that the Soviet weapons acquisition process is not driven primarily by a priori doctrinal imperatives, but by such institutional factors as program momentum, bureaucratic politics, technological determinism, and reactions to perceived external threats, factors which by and large, shape the defense policies of all modern industrial powers, the United States not excluded. Moreover, they assert, the principles of doctrine represent, at best, merely a reflection of desiderata that Soviet military leaders regard as optimum warfare and a wish-list for parochial use in budgetary infighting . . . As exemplified both by the ABM Treaty and the traditional pattern of Soviet circumspection in past crises, this school argues, Soviet political leaders, at bottom, accept mutual deterrence as the only solution to the East-West nuclear dilemma, notwithstanding the militancy and bombast of Soviet doctrinal writings.44

Richard Pipes is perhaps the best known representative of the first school of thought described by Lambeth.45 Pipes takes an extreme view of Soviet military attitudes and he maintains that there has been no real debate over nuclear warfare in the Soviet Union since 1957. Additionally, he argues that Soviet writers have drawn no distinctions between conventional and nuclear war, and that they have not viewed
nuclear war as unthinkable but in fact have extended Clausewitz's argument that war is an extension of politics to even include nuclear war. Arguing that Soviet strategists believe in the ability to win a nuclear war, Pipes maintains that the Soviets advocate a preclusive first strike capability based on counterforce targeting, a high-powered civil defense program, and quantitative superiority. Citing their pride in the recovery they made from the loss of 20 million people in World War II, Pipes also maintains that the Soviet leaders are willing to take the chance of having to absorb a population loss of 30–40 million. Additionally, he believes that both Soviet political and military observers share similar views on these and other arms control issues and that there is no debate on arms control within the policy process.

Another author who is at the same end of the continuum as Pipes is Paul H. Nitze. Although Nitze primarily addresses the question of assessing capabilities, he argues that the Soviets maintain "that a war involving nuclear missiles should and can be an extension of policy." Extending this argument, Nitze equates mutual assured destruction with suicidal war and maintains that suicidal war would not be an extension of policy. He concludes that the Soviets, therefore, have no intention of limiting their capabilities to what would be necessary for deterrence alone. Instead of parity, Nitze argues, the Soviets want a force of true counterforce capability and one which is deployed in such a manner as to make a similar counterforce response by an opponent unattractive if not impossible. Additionally, Nitze insists that the Soviets want to be able to insure the survivability of a sufficient force to hold an enemy's population and industry in jeopardy and to
insure the survivability of their own population. Finally, to achieve this, to keep the other side from striking first, Nitze claims that the Soviets are willing to launch a preemptive attack.

Benjamin Lambeth argues in much the same vein as Nitze when he states that the Soviets "approach their own strategic planning with the thoroughly traditional conviction that . . . the threat of nuclear war persists as a fundamental feature of the international system and obliges the Soviet leadership to take every practical measure to prepare for its eventuality." He maintains that the Soviets are striving for "unilateral assured survivability". Lambeth also enumerates what he alleges to be the key themes in Soviet doctrine: 1) an effective war-fighting capability is the best deterrent; 2) a nuclear war is winnable; 3) a first strike is a decisive condition in winning a nuclear war; 4) restraint is foolhardy and contradicts the intense application of force necessary to defeat the enemy quickly; and 5) although there is no major number for superiority, numbers are important. Although Lambeth argues along the same lines as Pipes and Nitze, he is somewhat more moderate in that he acknowledges that Soviet doctrine serves many purposes beyond the development and deployment of weaponry including serving as a propaganda tool, a morale builder, and a set of bureaucratic rationales. Nevertheless, he sums up his principal arguments as follows:

The essential argument here is that while Soviet military doctrine tells us far less than we need to know about the motive forces behind Soviet behavior (and can be dangerously misleading if read out of context as a "master plan" of Soviet strategic goals), it nonetheless reveals a great deal about the general mind-set of the Soviet leadership regarding the preconditions of deterrence, the technical requirements of maintaining it, and the military responsibilities that would be energized in the event of its catastrophic failure.
Many of the arguments mentioned above have been derived from changing perceptions of Soviet strategic thinking that have come with the realization that the Soviets may not base their strategic assumptions on the same interpretations of deterrence and mutual assured destruction as the United States. Fritz Ermarth argues this when he says,

The most influential factor that has inhibited lucid comparisons of U.S. and Soviet strategic thinking has been the uncritically held assumption that they had to be very similar, or at least converging with time. Many of us have been quite insensitive to the possibility that two very different political systems could deal very differently with what is, in some respects, a common problem.

Although Ermarth recognizes U.S. ethnocentricity, he is not quite able to overcome it in his own analysis. He lists five focal issues of U.S. and Soviet strategic belief systems: 1) the consequences of an all-out strategic nuclear war; 2) the phenomenon of deterrence; 3) stability; 4) distinctions and relationships between intercontinental and regional strategic security concerns; and 5) strategic conflict limitation. And he insists that much can be learned about the belief systems by exploring the treatment of each of these issues by each country. However, he notes that the concepts of stability and conflict limitation are difficult to compare because they are almost unidentifiable in the Soviet literature. Nevertheless, Ermarth reaffirms the ideas of the previous analysts that nuclear war is an extension of politics and that such a war is both survivable and winnable. He explains this tenet of the Soviet strategic belief system, however, within the context of how it relates to the Soviet system as a whole.

But the system decided it had to believe in survival and victory of some form. Not so to believe would mean that the most basic processes of history, on which Soviet ideology and political legitimacy are founded, could be derailed
by the technological works of man and the caprice of
an historically doomed opponent. Moreover, as the
defenders of doctrinal rectitude continued to point out,
failure to believe in the "manageability" of nuclear dis-
aster would lead to pacifism, defeatism, and lassitude
in the Soviet military effort . . . From the Soviet point
of view, nuclear war with a powerful and hostile America
was a real danger. Could the state merely give up on its
traditional responsibilities to defend itself and survive
in that event? 54

Ermarth points out that the Soviets do believe in deterrence and that it
is an essential element of their strategy. He points out, however, that
they have never sacrificed their desire to be able to "manage" a nu-
clear war if deterrence should fail. Finally, Ermarth notes the disagree-
ment over the definition of "strategic" has led to many misconceptions
about Soviet strategic beliefs and that their broader definition leads
them to have a more comprehensive view of the balance of forces.

Addressing what he believes to be the impoverishment of U.S. stra-
tegic thought in the past 15 years, Colin Gray implicitly supported the
argument made by Ermarth that deterrence and winnability are interrelated
elements within the Soviet strategic belief system. Gray argued that
deterrence without an alternative in case of failure is not a strategic
theory but a political theory. 55

Stanley Sienkiewicz's explanations of the differences between
Soviet and American strategic doctrine are similar to Ermarth's although
possibly more moderate. He notes that it would be very difficult for the
Soviets openly to embrace American ideas of mutual assured destruction
because of both the ideological unacceptability of technologically re-
versing the inevitable and the risk of another Khrushchev-like attack on
the Soviet defense budget. These preserves are protected by the military.
Although disavowing that the military is the sole decision making power, Sienkiewicz says that the military does...

frame the defense problem and specify the range within which military solutions are to be sought. To argue that security in the nuclear age is to be found in agreeing to a posture of mutual vulnerability, therefore, is not only doctrinally risky, but at radical variance with all of the traditions and professional instincts of the Soviet defense establishment. This is the basis for the central difference between the American and Soviet approaches to the problem of military security in the nuclear age.\textsuperscript{56}

According to Sienkiewicz, where the U.S. has differentiated between deterrence and defense, the Soviets have not. Deterrence is part of the Soviet military capability, as is the desire to be able to defend themselves against attack by a preemptive strike if deterrence fails.\textsuperscript{57}

At the opposite end of the continuum from Richard Pipes's ideas are the arguments of Raymond Garthoff.\textsuperscript{58} Garthoff summarizes his arguments by saying:

The central conclusion of this analysis is that by the late 1960s, when SALT was launched, and since that time, the Soviet political and military leadership has recognized that under contemporary conditions there is a strategic balance between the two superpowers which provides mutual deterrence; that the nuclear strategic balance is basically stable, but requires continuing military efforts to assure its stability and continuation; and that agreed strategic arms limitations can make a contribution, possibly a significant one, to reducing these otherwise necessary reciprocal military efforts.\textsuperscript{59}

Garthoff maintains that there is a great deal of support for the idea of mutual deterrence among Soviet strategic thinkers. For various reasons, however, they express their support in terms of assured retaliatory capability rather than mutual assured destruction. Like Ermarth and Sienkiewicz, Garthoff sees deterrence as linked to the policy of maintaining the capability to wage war if necessary. He points out that this is very
different from interpreting Soviet desires for both survivability and a war-winning capability as the counterpoint to deterrence.

Garthoff also diametrically opposes the assertion that there has been no debate and no change in Soviet strategic thinking over the last 15 or 20 years. Pipes dates the end of the debate as 1957 while Ermarth asserts that the military gained preeminence in 1964 and that policy has been constant since that time. Garthoff argues that researchers can follow debates and see attitudinal changes in the literature up through the mid-1970s. Additionally, he implies that there are civilian strategies in the Soviet Union who exert influence within strategic decision-making circles.

In an insightful article that appeared in 1981, Dimitri Simes expresses the same beliefs as Raymond Garthoff. He maintains that "contemporary declaratory Soviet policy" asserts that "nuclear war is inherently unwinnable, would lead to the destruction of civilization, and consequently cannot serve any rational political ends." He argues that this position evolved in the Soviet Union over a long period of time and only as the result of much discussion. He also argues that presently the Soviet leaders have "moved toward acceptance of mutual deterrence and a rejection of prior claims that the Soviet Union possesses superior forces capable of assuring victory in a nuclear war." Despite this, there are still some Soviet military writers that advocate the "old nuclear war-winning school of thought," but they are not the top figures in either the military or the party. Instead, they tend to be party ideologues, many of whom are in teaching positions with the Military-Political Academy or political indoctrination personnel in
military institutions. Simes labels them the "military commissars" and asserts that they serve the functions of propaganda and morale building.63

The literature that has appeared in the late 1970s has certainly added a necessary dimension to the study of Soviet attitudes toward arms control. Until the U.S. debate over Soviet strategic doctrine, analyses of Soviet attitudes were largely unfocused. Besides focusing on a number of substantive doctrinal questions such as the role of deterrence in Soviet strategic thinking, the disagreements among Western scholars also have zeroed in on questions like the extent to which the military dominates arms policy decisions in the Soviet Union and to what extent, if any, Soviet policy has changed during the SALT years.

Despite this contribution, much of the later literature leaves one uneasy. While much of the early literature may suffer from relying too heavily on suppositions, the later literature is often guilty of open partisan advocacy. Such advocacy, in and of itself, is compounded by the fact that some of the literature appears to be poorly researched. Only Garthoff and Sienkiewicz provide sufficient validation, i.e., citations, for their arguments, and Garthoff is the only one who relies extensively on primary sources at all, and that supplied by Lambeth and Nitze leaves many questions concerning the reliability of their conclusions. Pipes uses a total of five Soviet sources to support his arguments involving Soviet strategic doctrine while Garthoff relies on multiple sources, both military and non-military, to substantiate his conclusions. Additionally, a comparison of the Pipes and Garthoff articles leads one to suspect that Pipes may have selectively chosen
supportive Soviet sources to build his argument and ignored anything that might have weakened it. This is particularly obvious since Garthoff uses quotations from the same sources as Pipes, especially Sokolovsky's *Military Strategy*, in order to support his opposing arguments.

**Beyond Strategic Doctrine**

The approach taken here varies considerably from those normally included in studies of Soviet strategic doctrine as well as Soviet positions on arms control and disarmament. As outlined above, most studies are based primarily, if not entirely, on the views espoused by Soviet military writers. The reliance on military literature in this area of research is the logical outgrowth of two Western perceptions: 1) that Soviet strategic doctrine is either synonymous with or so closely intertwined with Soviet arms control attitudes that they can and should be treated synonymously; and 2) that the military is the source of strategic doctrine and, therefore, is also the source of arms control attitudes. The fallacy is that those who make these assumptions have never legitimated them by disqualifying other possible inputs into Soviet arms policy. Other sources, largely academic and political in nature, are clearly necessary in order to elaborate past studies which are based primarily on military materials.

Several justifications can be made for this broader approach. Not least among the justifications is the nature of the present regime. Dennis Ross notes that "... the post-Khrushchev period has been characterized by a growing routinization of function, heightened sense of bureaucratic order, greater leadership stability, and general
normalization of the decision-making process. He describes the present regime as "a system where the country's major interests (as embodied in the central institutional actors) meet at the apex of the regime, to be mediated and minimally satisfied." If this is indeed the case, it would imply that, although the military espouses certain ideas and sets certain criteria necessary for the defense and preservation of the Soviet Union, other areas of concern also compete for a limited number of resources. Those that mediate between these competing areas of concern might well seek out alternative sources of both information and advocacy in their attempt to "minimally satisfy" all the elements with which they must deal. Although it is not our purpose here to support such research models as those focusing on institutional interest groups, incrementalism, and decision making by bargaining, the possibility that they may represent the reality of Soviet policy making should not be disregarded out of hand.

A second justification for the approach advocated here is that past studies based on articles, books, and speeches produced by the Soviet military have been inconclusive. As outlined above, there are several Western schools of thought based on research on Soviet military-strategic thought and arms attitudes that fall along a continuum between two diametrically opposed extremes, and it is doubtful that a resolution to the arguments among them will be found in another interpretation of Soviet military thinking. Rather than add another voice to those advocating one position or the other, an approach should be used that examines the opposing interpretations found in the Western literature by comparing them with analyses of nonmilitary writings and speeches.
These sources have been largely ignored by most scholars in the area with the exception of such people as Raymond Garthoff and even he used them on a limited basis, largely in order to counter arguments supporting the single-mindedness of Soviet strategic thinking. Garthoff, Thomas Wolfe and Karl Spielmann offer persuasive arguments for including research on Soviet arms attitudes that goes beyond the military. Spielmann maintains that the defense industry sector of the economy is also intimately involved with arms limitation decision making and though the defense industry may simply be an extension of the military, Spielmann makes a convincing argument that the defense industries have differing interests from those of the military in general. Roman Kolkowicz carries this argument even further by suggesting that there may even be differing groups within the military which advocate different points of view, and that some of these groups cut across institutional boundaries with their inclusion of non-military personnel like defense industry planners.

Thomas Wolfe argues that in the Soviet bureaucratic scheme there are numerous organizations which are in some way concerned with and to some degree able to influence the decision process (see Figure 1). Wolfe points out that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs includes a section under the International Organizations Division called the Disarmament Section that approximates the function of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the United States though it is not an actual counterpart to ACDA. The Disarmament Section, although staffed by arms control specialists, is smaller than ACDA and is in a much more organizationally subordinate position than ACDA. It should be noted that both the head

FIGURE 1

SOVIET ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED WITH SALT
of the Foreign Ministry, A.A. Gromyko, and the Deputy Foreign Minister, V.S. Semenov, have been involved actively in the SALT process. Semenov is the chief Russian negotiator and Gromyko has played a prominent role since the 1974 Vladivostok Agreement. To be sure, it should also be noted, however, that the inputs from the Foreign Affairs Ministry have been largely political and diplomatic in nature and that its representatives have shown a general lack of sophistication concerning strategic and technical problems that have arisen in the negotiations on SALT.  

In addition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both the Institute of the U.S.A. (SShA) and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) have their own Disarmament Sections (see Figure 2). Roman Kolkowicz, writing in 1972, named these two sub-sections of the Academy of Sciences the "Americanologists" and both Garthoff and Kolkowicz acknowledge that these academicians do make inputs into the SALT decision-making process. Kolkowicz describes the role of the "Americanologists" in the following words:

They provide inputs into policy framing and offer policy makers a greater sense of the nuances, complexities, and realities of American politics. They seek to enhance the effectiveness of Soviet policy framing by relating it to certain American values and perceived intentions.

G.A. Arbatov, the Director of SShA, describes their role as a resource arm for the policy makers in the various ministries, the Central Committee, and even the Politburo, and notes that they provide reports much like the working papers found in Western decision-making units. An additional clue to the importance of the academicians may be found in the advancement of both Arbatov (1976) and IMEMO Director N.N. Inozemtsev (1971) to membership in the Central Committee of the CPSU.
FIGURE 2

SOVIET ACADEMIC BODIES CONCERNED WITH SALT

Ross points out that it is highly likely that election to the Central Committee is not only a reflection of an individual's prestige but is also an indicator of the importance of his institutional affiliation. 78

Two recent books enhance the arguments for the incorporation of positions beyond those of the military. Jerry Hough notes the increase of well-trained specialists in the Foreign Ministry and the upsurge of academic institutes in the past three decades. 79 Various new institutes for the training of undergraduates were founded after World War II, including the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). According to Hough, MGIMO has had a close relationship with the Foreign Ministry and "the legendary class of 1949 [including Knozemtsev, Arbatov] produced an unusually high proportion of top advisors of the Brezhnev period." 80 Graduates of MGIMO and the other undergraduate institutes pursue three main career paths: 1) they go directly into the Foreign Ministry or other ministries with international foci; 2) they become zhurnalists-mezhdunarodniki, i.e., international journalists; or 3) they become scholarly researchers.

Many researchers enter one of the institutes under the Academy of Sciences. The most prestigious of these is IMEMO which was established shortly after the Twentieth Party Congress. The head of this new institute was Anushavan A. Arzumanian, a wartime colleague of Brezhnev. Upon his death in 1966, he was succeeded by Nikolai Inozemtsev. By 1974, IMEMO was staffed by 572 research associates and had given birth to a minimum of four independent institutes, including SSHIA. 81 The importance of these institutes and their staffs is described by Hough:

These men . . . were not simply engaging in academic research. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has had little research
staff, and this apparently is also true of the KGB. The Scholarly Community working on contemporary problems — and there are some 2,000 to 3,000 of them in Moscow — are supposed to fill the gap . . . those doing policy-relevant work — and there is great pressure to do so — can spend 25 percent of their time or more on classified work usually called "the director's assignments" [i.e., the institute director]. These assignments, which themselves reflect demands or requests from higher authorities, can range from the preparation of a short informational memorandum to a prediction of future developments in the area of their specialization or even to participation in a group working out different policy options for consideration by the Politburo.82

According to Hough, there also has been some direct coopting of scholars into posts directly involved in policymaking.

Roger Hamburg supports this evaluation of the role of scholars in what he calls the "policy-oriented institutions" like SSHA and IMEMO. These scholars are described as having close ties to foreign policy personnel, and as often being charged with preparing emergency studies for these officials. Additionally, Arbatov and Iznozemtsev often are consulted personally by members of the Politburo, including Brezhnev, for "information, analysis, and recommendations."83

Samuel Payne, in The Soviet Union and SALT84, also argues for the importance of Soviet foreign affairs specialists (represented by foreign affairs journalists and academic specialists) as contributors to Soviet arms policymaking. "The supreme leadership apparently does listen to the advice of Soviet foreign affairs specialists and accept some of it; ideas first expressed in scholarly articles in 1969 and 1970 often appeared in Brezhnev's speeches in 1972 and 1973."85 Payne looks at two groups, the "militarists" and the "arms controllers". He maintains that "Soviet policy toward strategic arms limitation evolves from the interaction of . . . three elements, the arms controllers and the
militarists offering alternative policies and the supreme leadership choosing between them.  Payne also notes that this choice is more likely to be some sort of compromise or synthesis of the two extremes.

There are enough indicators of input from personnel outside the military establishment to warrant further research into the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, other government and party foreign policy specialists, and the "Americanologists" or "arms controllers". One hypothesis that may be drawn from this is that although the Soviet military may have preeminent influence over strategic policymaking, including SALT policy, it does not operate in a vacuum. There are inputs into the process from other elements that, at a minimum, have the potential of influencing the top leadership.

Payne is the only author who has attempted a rigorous examination of both the "militarists" and the "arms controllers" and he maintains that there are two major areas of agreement between these elements: 1) the U.S. Government is hostile to the Soviet Union, prone to aggressiveness, and tends to be dominated by an oligarchy commonly known as the "military-industrial complex"; and 2) the power relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union has changed considerably; i.e., the Soviet Union has become militarily and economically more powerful while the United States has grown weaker in both areas. Nevertheless, within the framework of these two commonly held beliefs, there is still substantial disagreement. The "militarists" tend to have a much darker view of the U.S. and tend to give a much more negative assessment of U.S. actions. According to Payne, the "militarists" as a group express or have expressed the following: 1) up until the SALT I agreement, the U.S. was
more aggressive and hostile to the Soviet Union; 2) from the time of SALT I the U.S. has sought military superiority; 3) U.S. strategic weapons systems under development have a first strike capability; 4) up until 1972, there were no serious differences of opinion in the U.S. ruling elite and that elite as a body was hostile, aggressive, against arms control, and anti-Soviet; 5) the U.S. government is hostile to arms control and is determined to build up a strategic nuclear force regardless of SALT negotiation results and they want to continue the arms race; and 6) because of the nature of the United States ruling elite, nuclear war remains a real possibility and the Soviet Union should be prepared to fight and win, or, at a minimum, be able to survive a nuclear war. In elaborating the last point, Payne says that the militarists assert that the Soviet Union would win a nuclear war, that it is possible to survive a nuclear war, and, at least through the mid-1970s, that preemption was one possible way of surviving and winning such a war. 88

On the other hand, the "arms controllers" have maintained that 1) U.S. defeats and internal crises are driving its leaders to accept detente; 2) neither country can attain nuclear superiority, and it would not be very useful if they did; 3) the development of new weapons threatens SALT; 4) many members of the ruling elite are "sober-minded" and realize that the arms race does not serve U.S. interests (i.e., economic problems, domestic opposition to policies), and SALT I marked the ascendancy of those who are sober-minded; 5) there is strong and steadily increasing popular opposition to the arms race and military spending in the United States, and this can force the ruling elite to change
their policies; and 6) the probability of a deliberate attack by the U.S. is very low, and it is almost impossible to fight and survive a nuclear war.89

Payne also points to the possibility that silence on a topic may be an indicator of dissent in Soviet policy discussions. He notes that prior to the initiation of SALT negotiations there was active opposition to such talks on the part of the "militarists". After the negotiations were underway and throughout the SALT I period (1969-72), however, he notes that "the Soviet military press maintained almost complete silence on the subject of SALT."90 Since SALT I, the "militarists" have endorsed the agreements but temper their endorsement with assessments of the aggressive nature of the Soviet Union's enemies.

As mentioned previously, Dimitri Simes supports the contention that there is an element among Soviet policymakers similar to those that Payne has called the "arms controllers" and that they maintain that nuclear war is unwinnable, nuclear superiority is unachievable, and deterrence is, at a minimum, tolerable. Unlike Payne, he does not see this group as being at the opposite end of the spectrum from the group called the "militarists". Indeed, he points out that there have been a number of what he calls "false dichotomies" that have hampered the analysis of Soviet strategic arms policy and that "polemical and exaggerated notions rather than scholarship have primarily shaped the debate about Soviet national security culture and machinery."91 These dichotomies include: 1) U.S. commitment to MAD as opposed to alleged Soviet desires for a nuclear war-winning capability; 2) the suspicion that the Soviets wish to achieve superiority as opposed to parity; 3) the proposal
that there is a conflict between Soviet "hawks" and "doves"; 4) the disagreement over the type of decision-making model, totalitarian (rational actor) or pluralistic, that applies to the USSR; and, 5) the belief that the Soviet decision-making process is dominated by the military as opposed to the belief that there is a process in which there is tension, and possibly conflict between the military and the civilian leadership.

Simes basically argues that these extremes probably have little relationship to reality. In other words, some sort of synthesis of each of these dichotomies is perhaps more realistic. Examples of this are the issues of "hawks" versus "doves" and military and civilian conflict. As distinct, present-day dichotomies, he claims that they do not exist. Instead, what Simes sees is that there has been a progression of thought across a 15 or 20 year period. For instance, Simes asserts that it is falacious to accept current strategic force postures as a reflection of Soviet attitudes involving strategic policy because it represents decisions made in the 1960s and early 1970s when the war-winning school was dominant. This school, according to Simes, is now composed of the "military commissars" who are "more and more overshadowed by a new orthodoxy closer to the Arbatovs and Milshteins." Simes implicitly, if not explicitly, supports the Garthoff position that there has been a change in Soviet strategic policy over the years and that non-military elements have had considerable impact on the direction of this change.

Such evidence seems to make it even more evident that greater emphasis should now be placed on the study of Soviet academic and diplomatic arms policy specialists. Most obvious is the possible expansion of our understanding of Soviet positions as, for example, the equation
of Soviet strategic doctrine with Soviet arms policy. Only as researchers continue to look at both the writings of the Soviet military and of the arms policy specialists outside the military and then compare them with one another and with both the Soviet policy outputs (i.e., arms procurement, deployment, etc.) and outcomes (i.e., negotiating stances and final agreements) across time will a full picture of Soviet arms policy attitudes begin to develop. The important thing now is not only to determine what the military is saying but also how their opinions are being integrated into the overall arms policy process.

Thus, as our knowledge increases concerning all basic attitudes, it is probable that our knowledge about the Soviet arms policy process will also increase. For example, a very interesting phenomenon appears in the above discussion that gives some insight into this very issue. The existing literature is giving us a strong indication that policy discussions are now taking place among the arms specialists who write for the various specialized journals like Krasnia Zvezda, Kommunist, SSHa, IMEMO, and Foreign Affairs. Speeches, articles and editorials also appear in Pravda and other newspapers and it would seem that a further investigation of writings from a variety of sources should help us determine what the parameters and nuances of the full discussion are. Once we have a better understanding of these parameters, it may increase our knowledge of the limits placed on discussion, the subtleties within the discussion, and the uses of the discussion in policy-making.

By increasing our understanding of the subtleties of the arms policy discussions, we should be able to define the nuances of limited debate in the Soviet Union. This, in turn, should enhance our ability
to differentiate between strategic doctrine and other attitudes on arms control. Also such undertakings should allow for a better comparison of Soviet and American policies, strategic and otherwise. For instance, Soviet analysts outside the military establishment often criticize various U.S. policy positions such as "limited war" and mutual assured destruction. The attacks made on U.S. policy provide much insight into and elaboration of Soviet positions.

An equally important return for our increased knowledge of Soviet discussions should be our understanding of the policy-making uses of those discussions. There are several possibilities that arise regarding the uses of those discussions: 1) the various members of the Soviet leadership may be anywhere from moderately to severely divided over what arms policy they should pursue and thus they may use the discussions to create support for their individual preferences; 2) the leadership may be using it as a means of gathering information and opinions in order to help them in their policymaking; 3) the leadership may be using it to explain a policy already adopted; 4) the sub-elites in the "militarist" and "arms control" groups may be representatives of strong factions that are trying to convince the leadership of the correctness of their convictions; or 5) the sub-elite groups may be using the discussion for a variety of purposes involved with their own groups (i.e., creating a consensus, building morale, aiding implementation). Additionally, several of these uses or purposes may be in operation simultaneously. Without the broad perspective supplied by both military and non-military sources, we will never be able to differentiate among these.
The study of the positions and the roles of arms policy specialists outside the military establishment has been neglected too long. With few exceptions, the study of Soviet arms policy positions has been marked, and possibly severely biased, by a dependency on positions extracted from the military literature. Only in the past two or three years have attempts been made to systematically incorporate the positions of analysts other than those connected with the Soviet military into this area of study. Those attempts have been both fruitful and intellectually titillating. Further endeavors in this area can serve only to enrich our knowledge, refine our ability to assess Soviet capabilities and intentions, increase our ability to suggest policy options to our own leaders and, hopefully, increase our sophistication in our interactions with Soviet leaders and their advisors.

This dissertation is designed to improve our knowledge of Soviet positions as they are represented by analysts and commentators who are directly involved either in government or party foreign policy bureaucracies or affiliated with the two major research institutions, SShA and IMEMO, and to evaluate existing Western analyses in comparison with these positions. Initially we will examine the positions found in International Affairs (an all-union Znaniye Society publication featuring articles by government and party foreign policy personnel), SShA (the journal published by the Institute on the U.S.A. and Canada), and Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia (MEMO) (the journal published by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations). Each source will be used to evaluate differences found in the Western literature. The final chapter will compare the sources with one another,
with Soviet policy, and then a final evaluation of the areas of contention in Western analyses will be made. Some suggestions will also be made about the possible role the positions espoused by the Soviet analysts play in Soviet arms policymaking.

**Points of Dispute Among Western Analysts**

The Western literature from the past two decades provides numerous points of dispute on Soviet arms control positions and arms policy positions. Six specific areas of contention are noted here. This study is not an attempt to definitively resolve any of the debates among Western scholars; however, it is an attempt to increase our understanding of the Soviet arms policy process and the positions taken in the Soviet Union on arms policy. The methodology for accomplishing this is described in the following chapter.

The areas of contention include:

1) whether there have been divisions within the Soviet policymaking system over Soviet arms policy during the decade of the 1970s;

2) whether there have been changes in Soviet arms policy positions across time;

3) whether the Soviets reject deterrence and are determined to achieve a quantitative and qualitative nuclear superiority and a first strike capability designed to enable them to fight and win a nuclear war;

4) whether the Soviet military is the sole source of arms policy positions;

5) whether military positions on strategic doctrine can be taken at face value and equated with Soviet strategic arms control policy and Soviet arms policy;

6) whether Soviet strategic arms policy is intertwined with other foreign policy goals.
In examining these areas of contention it is hoped that not only will we be able to lend support to the views of Western analysts and, at best, possibly refute others, but we may also learn more about the role played by Soviet specialists outside the military establishment in the formation of arms policy.
NOTES


4. These will be discussed in detail later in this paper.


7. Ibid., p. 6.

8. Bloomfield.

9. Ibid., pp. 172-177.

11. Ibid., p. 124.
13. Kolkowicz, et al., p. 11
16. See below nn. 17-36.
18. Ibid., p. 52.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., p. 53.
22. Ibid., p. 22.
27. Ibid., p. 3.
30. Ibid., p. 6.
32. Aspaturian, p. 28.


37. Wolfe, p. 25.

38. Ibid., p. 155.


40. Caldwell.

41. Steinbrunner and Garwin; Tsipis, 1974; Tsipis, 1975; and Sherman.


45. Pipes.


47. Ibid., p. 197.


49. Ibid.


51. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

52. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

54. Ibid., p. 144.


57. Ibid., pp. 87-97.


59. Ibid., p. 112.


61. Ibid., p. 86.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid., p. 88.


65. Ibid., p. 268.

66. This is discussed in detail later in this paper.


68. Pipes.


71. Aspaturian.


75. Kolkowicz, p. 52.
76. Ibid.
77. Conversation with G. Arbatov at the University of South Carolina, May 22, 1979.
78. Ross, pp. 265-266.
80. Ibid., p. 119.
81. Ibid., pp. 121-122. IMEMD is a revival of the Old Varga Institute.
85. Ibid., p. 7.
86. Ibid., p. 9.
87. Ibid., pp. 21-28.
88. Ibid., pp. 29-35 and pp. 49-56.
89. Ibid., pp. 36-48 and pp. 57-61.
90. Ibid., p. 64.
91. Simes, pp. 81-82.
92. Ibid., pp. 82-85.
93. Ibid., p. 92.
94. Ibid., p. 88.
CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY

Methodological Problems

As was mentioned in the literature review in the previous chapter there has been little effort made to systematically identify and categorize Soviet positions on either strategic doctrine or arms control policy. Most work seemingly has been based on intuitive opinions formed from an overall impression of what the Soviets are thinking, shaped by an individual's cognitive filters, and supported by evidence gathered from Soviet sources in, at best, an eclectic manner. Although the overall state of the scholarly literature in this area seems to be gradually improving, there is a tremendous amount of territory that still must be covered if we are ever going to progress beyond what have been largely subjective explications of what the Soviets are doing and thinking.

However, it is necessary to issue a caveat on the realm of what is possible in this area, even with systematic research: to understand, or to begin to understand, Soviet positions or Soviet doctrine, it is necessary to rely on Soviet sources; but these sources may be viewed as notoriously unreliable. Basically, there are two tremendous difficulties encountered in using Soviet sources which must be realized and continuously taken into account by the researcher: 1) inherent source-related problems of censorship, nonavailability, and audience-specificity;
and 2) semantic problems involving the use of code words, multiple meanings for certain phrases, and subtle wording differences which indicate different objects.

Soviet journals, magazines, newspapers and speeches are censored. At times speeches are even censored between their presentation and their publication in a Soviet newspaper (as is evident in the contextual differences between transcriptions made by Western monitoring agencies and the printed text of speeches appearing in Pravda). There are both implicit and explicit limits placed on what Soviet officials can say and write. Everything any member of the Soviet elite says is constrained by democratic centralism. Once a decision has been taken by the Politburo, any discussion of the problem is severely limited, possibly to the point of being cut off entirely. There will be much praise and little criticism of the decision; but, even here, there exists the possibility of subtle shadings.

Prior to a policy decision, the debate may be much broader, in some instances demonstrating strong patterns of advocacy and opposition. On some occasions, the leadership will even open up debate on an issue when they want greater input. Nevertheless, debates over policy in the Soviet Union are never as far ranging or diverse as those in many Western societies. Discussions usually take place in specialized journals to which the general public has little or no access and are pitched to specific audiences.

Printed material and speeches are subject to censorship prior to publication or presentation. It is also highly probable that self-censorship exists. Even though individual elites may have the
opportunity or leeway to express their own opinions in some instances, these opinions may be circumscribed because of constraints placed on the individual because of his/her role or his/her perceptions of what is politically acceptable or useful.

In addition to the problem caused by censorship, any scholar relying on Soviet sources is bound to be frustrated and dismayed at the inaccessibility of many sources. Many materials are available only in Russian. To some extent, accessibility is increased by such publications as the Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Reports and The Current Digest of the Soviet Press; however, both publications use synopses and excerpted articles that eliminate some information. Therefore, ideally, one should either rely on the originals or compare translations to the original text to check on the accuracy of the translation and to discover missing sections.

To complicate the matter further, Russian language sources are often difficult to obtain. In many instances, the Soviets limit the circulation of publications to a select body of people within their own population. Additionally, some journals are not open to foreign subscription, and if they are obtained by some government agency in the West, may be classified and therefore unavailable to scholars. The Soviets even have been known to carry their limitations on access to the point of barring Western scholars from using materials which at some time were open and used as the source for a scholarly study.

Another problem with Soviet sources is that they are usually addressed to specific audiences. This influences both the quality of information in a particular publication and the message that publication is
trying to convey. Some journals and newspapers are designed for general and public consumption in the Soviet Union, some for foreign circulation, and some are published for subsets of the Soviet political and military elite. An example of this is the array of publications published for the Soviet military, including: Kommunist of the Armed Forces, Red Star, Military Philosophy, Military History, and Military Thought. These range from magazines designed for the common soldier to a journal written for the highest echelons of the military staff. Red Star, which has a large circulation in the Soviet Union, is fairly accessible to most Westerners and has been for many years. It is one of the most commonly cited sources on Soviet strategic doctrine. Military Thought, on the other hand, is a classified (by the Soviets) military journal with a circulation limited to top military commanders. It has been available in the United States on an unrestricted basis for only a few years. Additionally, it is still classified by the CIA for most of the decade of the 1970s.

Besides the problem with access to and audience-specificity in Soviet sources, there is also a problem with Soviet semantics. Soviet authors do not write in a simple, straightforward style. Not only is their writing clothed in the ideological trappings of Marxism-Leninism, but it is also studded by code words or phrases which serve as shorthand for a whole concept. The most obvious of these is the "correlation of world forces," a code phrase used to designate the change in military, economic and socio-political factors on a worldwide scale in favor of socialism. Many of the code words also are used to obscure the meaning of certain things. It is only rarely that anything is discussed directly,
especially if it involves Soviet national security. There is very little stated explicitly about weapons systems and certainly nothing that can compare to the discussions that appear in U.S. and British journals or even in the newspapers involving the capabilities of either the Soviets or the Americans. Additionally, most discussions take place in the context of analyzing and criticizing U.S. policy positions. This means that writers either may be discussing U.S. policy or indirectly analyzing and criticizing Soviet policy.

Another problem with Soviet sources, although much less troublesome than many of the others, is the subtle differences in the wording of code phrases which all evidently refer to the same concept. For instance, the terms "Socialist cohesion," "Socialist cooperation," "Socialist unity," "Socialist solidarity," "anti-imperialist unity," and "ideological unity" are all synonyms for the "Socialist community."

A more serious semantic problem is the subtle differences one often finds in Soviet code words and phrases. Again an example of this is the "correlation of forces." Used in its broader sense, this term refers to social and economic forces as well as military resources; however, from a military point of view, the "correlation of forces" means:

> ... the aggregate of indices permitting evaluation of the relative strength of friendly and hostile forces by comparative analysis of the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the troop organization, performance data on armament and combat material, and other indices which define the combat capability of the force.3

The use of certain phrases as opposed to other phrases may be telegraphing an alteration in policy. It becomes obvious that researchers on Soviet politics and foreign policy must be extremely sensitive to such subtleties if their work is to be of any value.
From the above discussion of the difficulties encountered when using Soviet materials, it would appear that the future of systematic, rigorous, substantive research based on Soviet materials is bleak. This is not necessarily the case; however, one should be well aware of the difficulties and keep one's expectations about the possibilities of this type of research within the parameters set by the nature of the materials. Although this type of research may be extremely difficult and, at times, tedious to the point of boredom, it is certainly in the realm of the possible as demonstrated by research being done currently by such people as Philip D. Stewart, Elizabeth Kirk and Daniel Papp.⁴

Few students of Soviet politics would argue against the desirability of finding methods for studying Soviet elite attitudes which are both direct and systematic. However, for all practical purposes, the ability of scholars to tap elite attitudes directly does not exist. Although Soviet scholars have increasingly utilized systematic survey research,⁵ it is extremely difficult for Soviet citizens to gain access to a large sample of the Soviet political elite. Such opportunities are simply non-existent for American researchers. At best, isolated, unsystematic interviews are all that may be expected.⁶

Because of the lack of methods of direct measurement like survey research in the study of the Soviet political system, researchers have had to rely extensively on Soviet sources, despite the problems with those sources, as the main source of data on Soviet politics and economics. Except in studies that rely on statistics or figures drawn from Soviet reports, this means that the researcher is probably limited to some form of content analysis as his/her method of data collection.
This raises two questions for the researcher: 1) how can one address and overcome some of the problems with Soviet sources outlined in the above discussion; and 2) how can content analysis best be employed to examine these sources?

One of the most important problems faced by researchers interested in the Soviet Union is censorship. Despite pre-publication censorship in the Soviet Union, differences of viewpoints have been found to exist in the Soviet press and have been well documented over the past 20 years. This would seem to indicate that the writings and speeches of Soviet officials reflect, to some degree, their own views rather than simply expressing official policy. This assertion is strengthened further when elites express mutually contradictory attitudes toward similar objects at the same time.

This, however, raises the question of the importance of these differences given the proposition that Soviet elites probably censor themselves. It would seem that analyses of self-censored material would only yield variations in elite perceptions of approved or useful public images, rather than the actual, individual beliefs and/or attitudes held by elites. The result of role and environmental constraints combined with censorship should be a reduction in differences in expressed attitudes and orientations, a reduction in the saliency of those attitudes, and reduction in any patterned relationship that might occur between background, career, and contextual variables and attitudes. However, as elite views are expressed across time and across a series of articles and are published across different sources, individual attitudes on positions, toward specific problems would, in all likelihood, emerge with some clarity.
Turning to the position that these public writings, while they may reflect attitudinal differences, indicate only those views that are considered by their authors to be useful, it is possible to make the following observations. When Soviet officials, occupying positions of political and administrative responsibility invest scarce time resources in writing, they do so in order to achieve a particular objective, to resolve a specific problem, or to influence a particular group. Since they are held accountable for what they say, Soviet elites probably will reflect their own perceptions of what is politically legitimate or desirable; but at the same time they very likely will be reflecting individual predispositions and preferences based on the totality of their socialization, their prior experience, and their immediate environment as these are mediated through their personality. What will probably be lacking is the range of positions found in less structured societies. For instance, it is highly probable that rather than pro and con arguments over any specific issue researchers may find various shadings of enthusiasm or disdain within a generally positive or negative reaction of all or most elites.

When relying on printed material as an access point to elite positions, it is highly probable that the coverage of individual elites will vary considerably. However, this may serve a useful function. If an individual's rate of publication increases or decreases over time, it may be a reflection of the importance of his position at a given time or it may be an indication that the opinions held by that individual on a specific topic either reinforce or deviates from those of the mainstream of the leadership. An alternative to trying to focus entirely on
individual elites might be to look at groups of elites, i.e., the military, foreign policy specialists, etc. This would allow for several variations. Within a specific group as opposed to the leadership group as a whole, it should be easier to identify both the preeminent elites and the middle-level elites. By identifying groups as well as individuals it opens up the possibility of looking at both intra- and inter-group tensions and agreements. Additionally, examining group attitudes over time may give a more complete picture of variations in individual and collective positions.

The accessibility of Soviet materials will probably continue to complicate the research process for many years to come; however, except for the journals that are classified, several university libraries have extensive collections of Soviet newspapers and journals, as does the Library of Congress. Between the Soviet materials that are published in Russian (e.g., Krasnia Zvezda, Pravda, MEMO), those that are published in (e.g., International Affairs) or translated to (e.g., SSHA) English, and the FBIS Daily Reports and Current Digest of the Soviet Press mentioned earlier, there is enough material available to allow adequate evaluation of many Soviet policy areas as long as we realize that these evaluations will never be definitive.

As far as the problem of audience specificity is concerned, it might be possible to ameliorate the effects of audience specific materials. There are at least two ways in which audience specificity might be taken into account. Using the assumption that the volume of circulation of a publication is inverse to the weight it carries in policy debates, one could devise a numerical ranking of journals according to subject matter. This would allow the researcher to assign greater
importance to arguments or opinions presented in some sources than in others while maintaining a broader data base. The second way by which audience-specificity might be taken into account would be to make judgmental decisions on the relative importance of different types of publications (i.e., military vs. academic) in regard to specific issue areas, while retaining the information in all sources. In other words journals would be weighted by their perceived importance in specific issue areas. The choice of materials used in this study is a variation on this method of dealing with audience specificity. The journals and publications used here were selected on the basis of the logic described in the previous chapter. They represent often ignored elite groups which may have an impact on arms policy decision making in the Soviet Union. They have been selected with the caveat that they are not the definitive sources in the area of arms policy making but that there is enough evidence of their importance to warrant a long overdue examination of the positions expressed in them. Finally, in the area of audience specificity, it is desirable to differentiate between materials prepared for domestic consumption as opposed to foreign consumption to see to what extent, if any, the two types might differ.

The ability to cope with the difficulties presented by Soviet semantics can only come with experience, both individual and collective. More and more work is being done by scholars in the Soviet area to contribute to our lexicon of terminology. This lexicon will never be complete, but the broader it becomes, the greater our understanding of Soviet materials will be. In addition to the steady increase in our communal knowledge as scholars, one must also have a vast amount of individual experience
with Soviet communications before being able to adequately address the subtleties of the literature.

Finally we come to the question of how one collects data from these very constrained sources. The most likely answer is quantitative and/or qualitative content analysis. According to Ole Holsti content analysis is the general approach most suited to the identification of opinions in public documents. Those with large research budgets may be able to undertake something as ambitious as attempting cognitive mapping of elite attitudes or perceptions; while most of those less fortunate will be limited to a small scale, single issue study like the one attempted here.

Some Existing Analyses of Soviet Attitudes and Positions

The first requirement for systematic analysis of substantive issues is the development of a capability for identification and analysis of the policy-relevant perceptions or attitudes of individual Soviet elites or groups of elites. There have been only a few efforts to study the orientations, values, attitudes, and positions of the Soviet elite using some form of quantitative content analysis. Two pioneering efforts sought to compare respectively the basic social values and foreign policy attitudes of a spectrum of Soviet and American elites. Professor Angell divided the elites in both societies into six groups and used content analysis to examine the values of elites within a single society comparatively and to compare the values held by those elites across societies. David Singer used three major publications from each country as a measure of elite articulations in an effort to examine attitudes within a specific policy dimension.
Milton Lodge sought to identify the participatory orientations of a number of Soviet elites, as well as to classify statements on an "ideological-instrumental" continuum. He employed content analysis to examine the development of Soviet elite attitudes after Stalin's death to discover, among other things, the extent to which elites shared a group identity.

Only Singer attempted to look at the attitudes or perceptions of Soviet elites toward general foreign policy topics. Neither Singer, Angell, nor Lodge provided adequate evidence about the range of orientations or attitudes. Again, Singer was the only one who provided any differentiation among the attitudes held by the Party leadership, but he did this only implicitly. Although Singer did not attempt to link any one of the publications to any person or group of persons within the top Soviet leadership, all the publications have direct links to the party-government elite and because there are different attitudes expressed on different foreign policy dimensions, it might be reasonable to assume that these reflect some differentiation among elite attitudes.

All the studies mentioned above failed to define elite perceptions in broad terms. They all examined attitudes toward specific objects rather than looking for patterns of policy perceptions. Additionally, all three studies defined elite perceptions in terms of group attitudes represented by articles from journals or newspapers representative of the group without taking into account any of the problems mentioned earlier. Neither do they attempt to differentiate between individuals in the groups represented by a literary entity to see if there is any variation in attitude within the groups and if any such variation coalesces into a policy perception group independently of institutional
groupings. In other words, they ignored the possibility that an institutional group like the military or the party might have sub-groups within it which may share attitudes with other elites that cut across group boundaries.

Thus, when journals are used to represent the attitudes held by a specific elite group, the resulting analysis may be biased because the researcher may have assumed too much. Studies of the sort mentioned above are based on the premise that journals are reflective of a group view. In other words, the researcher assumes that editorials, which are usually unsigned, reflect attitudes held by the group that it purports to represent. This is a strong assumption to make and should be subjected to some method of validation. The use of unsigned editorials to represent a group attitude or perception might be validated in two ways: 1) by comparing the editorials with articles appearing in the journal to see if there is consistency in the attitudes expressed; and 2) by the use of face validity to see, in the informed opinion of the researcher, if the results of the analysis conform to the attitudes or perceptions expected for any given group.

Content analysis has been used by various other analysts of Soviet politics also. Many of the Kremlinologists have used some variation of qualitative content analysis for their research on Soviet political phenomena; however, their efforts are usually more eclectic than systematic. They use Soviet source materials to trace, for instance, shifts in power structures in the decision-making hierarchy. The efforts of the Kremlinologists are usually very descriptive, tending to focus on the top individuals in the Soviet system and to outline the maneuverings of the power elite. They rarely focus on sub-units of the
decision-making process or try to determine what happens below the top levels, and their research tends to rely more on searching Soviet sources for indicators of the relative power and authority of individuals rather than trying to define broad policy similarities and differences through an exhaustive, systematic examination of available literature.

Other analysts have chosen to do quantitative analysis on a broad scale in an attempt to define the range and boundaries of Soviet attitudes on all policy aspects. A small number of researchers have used quantitative content analysis to look at limited, specific issues. Philip D. Stewart examined controversy over Khrushchev's educational reforms in this way. More recently, Daniel S. Papp looked at the way the Soviet Union views nuclear weapons and the strategic balance between themselves and the United States. Beyond their substantive contribution, these types of research have provided a great deal of information on the strengths of the content analytic method, whether quantitative or qualitative, and on its limitations.

Approach Taken in this Study

The approach taken in this study is an attempt to address many of the problems and limitations noted in the previous pages. The methodology employed here is a qualitative content analysis. Although the analysis is qualitative an effort is made to integrate some of the rigor of quantitative content analysis with the sensitivity of qualitative analysis. According to Irving Janis,

'Content analysis' may be defined as referring to any technique a) for the classification of the sign-vehicles, b) which relies solely upon the judgements (which theoretically, may range from perceptual discriminations
to sheer guesses) of an analyst or group of analysts as to which sign-vehicles fall into which categories, c) on the basis of explicitly formulated rules, d) provided that the analyst's judgments are regarded as the reports of a scientific observer.\textsuperscript{16}

Content analysis requires that the analysis must be objective and systematic, and that it must have generality.\textsuperscript{17} Objectivity implies that all decisions regarding classification of data are guided by clearly stated rules aimed at minimizing the likelihood that the findings of the researcher will be biased by his/her subjective predilections and opinions. Systematic "means that the inclusion and exclusion of content or categories is done according to consistently applied rules."\textsuperscript{18} When a study is done by a systematic method, all evidence, regardless of whether it supports or damages the hypotheses of the researcher, is included in the analysis. Generality is equated with theoretical relevance. A purely descriptive account of the content of communications does not fulfill this requirement of scientific inquiry. It is only when the findings are related to other attributes or characteristics that they take on theoretical meaning.

Such results take on meaning when we compare them with other attributes of the documents, with documents produced by other sources, with characteristics of the persons who produced the documents, or the times in which they lived, or the audience for which they were intended. Stated somewhat differently, a datum about communication content is meaningless until it is related to at least one other datum. The link between these is represented by some form of theory. Thus all content analysis is concerned with comparison, the type of comparison being dictated by the investigator's theory.\textsuperscript{19}

This study is designed to fulfill these basic requirements of scientific inquiry as set forth in the following description of the methodology.

The study has been structured on the belief that quantitative measurement is not sensitive or discriminating enough to thoroughly
explore all the nuances of the type of communication that takes place in the Soviet context. Because of the controlled nature of Soviet communications and the subtleties of Soviet semantics, qualitative analysis is used in this study. Alexander George has used qualitative techniques in propaganda analysis and has found them to be much more sensitive to subtle changes in messages. Whether one considers Soviet communications to be propagandistic (an argument can certainly be made for this opinion, whether the communications are aimed at domestic or foreign audiences) or not, a form of analysis that can accommodate subtlety is an asset. Qualitative analysis is based on the drawing of inferences from the attributes of messages. George argues persuasively that

... except when there is reason to believe that the content features selected as indicators are insensitive to variations in the speaker's strategy, frequency counts may be inappropriate as a means of inferring the speakers attitudes, his state of mind, and the calculations and conditions which have influenced his choice of a communication strategy or goal.21

One of the best arguments for the use of qualitative analysis is that it allows the researcher to use "nonfrequency" as a content indicator for inferential purposes. This allows the researcher to differentiate between occurrence or nonoccurrence of an indicator. The ability to determine whether an indicator is present or absent in a specific case is a possible way of examining dissent from the mainstream or early indications of a possible policy revision.

Another problem area where qualitative analysis may be more helpful than quantitative analysis is the overall context in which indicators appear. Quantitative content analysis only examines pieces of the overall message. Even analysis that is able to measure dimensions of the message may miss vital information because the indicator, or as
Janis calls it, the "sign-vehicle," is only a part of the overall message. Again George makes a cogent argument for a form of analysis that takes this into account.

Awareness of the "whole-part" problem often leads the propaganda analyst to be critical of an important implicit assumption of statistical content analysis, namely that each individual item counted as falling under a designated content category is of equal significance for purposes of inference. Similarly the propaganda analyst is often critical of the assumption that the inferential significance of explicit propositions, themes, or statements is dependent upon the precise frequency of their occurrence. Rather, he may find explicit propositions of significance for purposes of ascertaining the strategy of the propagandist because they occur at all or because they occur in a certain relationship to each other within the communication.22

The materials analyzed here are drawn from three sources: MEMO, SSHA, and International Affairs. The logic behind the use of these sources was explained in the preceding chapter. Initially, all articles, except book reviews, containing any of the cognitive objects listed in Appendix I were to be included. This decision rule was soon altered to include other articles that were found to be relevant despite somewhat esoteric titles like "An Important Factor Behind Positive World Development."23

Originally, an attempt was made to select the materials to be analyzed by author, but the identification of authors proved extremely difficult. At the beginning of this project a tentative list of people who might be of potential importance as authoritative sources in the area of arms control was constructed; however, as research progressed this approach was abandoned in favor of using articles selected by their titles. The reasoning behind this decision was that there was much less likelihood of losing any relevant material through selection by
cognitive object than there would be by author selection. This situation exists because there is no definitive way to designate the people who are Soviet experts on arms policy. Attempts to construct such a list proved extremely unsatisfactory largely because identification of individuals can only be made in a very eclectic manner. The original list included Soviet authorities that had been cited by previous researchers and people who had been identified by this researcher as writers in the area of arms policy. After much thought, it was decided that the use of previously identified authorities might be inherently biased by the fact that, to this researcher's knowledge, they were not selected on a systematic basis. Eventually, the whole idea of trying to select the materials to be analyzed on the basis of authors was discarded in favor of a clearly identifiable, systematic, and hopefully relatively unbiased, decision rule based on subject matter.

To reiterate, the methodological approach used here is qualitative content analysis. This particular approach was chosen because it seems to deal, with varying degrees of effectiveness, with several problems that have been mentioned in this chapter and the previous chapter.

In an initial exploratory study using both qualitative and quantitative techniques, it was found that the focal specificity of this project created validity problems that greatly hampered the quantitative analysis. This arose largely because of the problem of non-frequency of objects that was mentioned earlier in this chapter. Examining the sources used here, it was found that there were some interesting voids over time that would have gone undetected in a quantitative study.
A second factor was that the frequency with which certain cognitive objects were used did not conform to the basic minimum number of observations necessary for meaningful quantitative analysis. Thus, several cognitive objects would have to have been subsumed under broader subheadings in the cognitive object list, which would force the sacrifice of one of the primary objects of this study — the examination of the more minute subtleties and differentiations that may mark disagreements among various Soviet analysts and commentators.

The method of qualitative analysis used here allows us to deal with both of these problems while adhering to certain standards borrowed from what has generally been considered to be the more rigorous approach of quantitative analysis. The most obvious of these is the method of article and speech selection which insures that all materials within a specified range of literature are analyzed rather than only those materials that support the biases of the researcher. The qualitative aspect of the analysis also allows us to deal with semantic problems and the subtle nuances of Soviet communication more effectively. For instance, as was mentioned earlier, very similar terms may have quite different meanings; and this, quite often, is lost in the aggregation techniques used in quantitative analysis. It also enables the researcher to make judgements on the potency, i.e., the strength or weakness of attitudes toward specific cognitive objects. This is accomplished by looking not only at the frequency with which an object is used and how it is modified but also by examining its relationships with other cognitive objects and concepts.
Beyond attempting to be more scientific and more sensitive to elusive indicators, this approach makes the problem of audience specificity somewhat more manageable. The three journals may be arranged along a continuum running from those prepared primarily for Western consumption to those prepared primarily for domestic consumption. *International Affairs* is published in English by the Znaniye Society in Moscow and probably may be judged to be designed primarily for non-domestic consumption. *SShA* is an academic publication that is designed to inform select Soviet citizens and leaders about the U.S. and Canada; however, it has been translated by the Joint Publications Research Service ever since it first appeared in 1971 and has been easily available to Western scholars and policy makers. This might lead the Soviets to pitch the articles in *SShA* more for Western consumption than domestic consumption. *MEMO*, on the other hand, is not available in translation and tends to be more technically or scholarly oriented than *SShA*. It is probably prepared more for an audience of middle-level Soviet policymakers and analysts.

By using this admittedly judgmental evaluation of the properties of each of these publications, this study will also be able to take into account, at least on an elementary basis, the problems of bias caused by audience specificity. By comparing the messages conveyed by each of these publications at any given time, it will allow us to begin to evaluate to what extent the desire to influence the anticipated audience may alter communications.
The Methodology Applied to Arms Policy Analysis

The data collected through the methodology described in this chapter will be used to test the areas of contention that were outlined in Chapter I. This will be done by comparing the conclusions drawn from the data here to those drawn by scholars who have used Soviet military materials to examine the question of Soviet positions on arms limitation and arms control.

This dissertation tries to clarify some of the differences mentioned in Chapter I that exist between Soviet positions on arms control and arms policy and Soviet strategic doctrine. As Samuel Payne points out, the military personnel who write on strategic doctrine are responsible for defending the Soviet Union. Their writings accentuate Soviet war-waging and war-winning capabilities. Their emphasis is on being able to fight and win a nuclear (and/or conventional) war. They are very protective of systems they feel might give them a decisive capability to do this.24

Positions favoring arms control, on the other hand, involve a different set of values. How does one go about minimizing the probability of a nuclear war? What systems can be limited without sacrificing the defense and survivability capabilities if nuclear war does occur?

It is not surprising that these two types of thinking should conflict with one another. Nor is it surprising that the military in their strategic doctrine often appear to be what Payne labels "militarists." The major question addressed here is to ask if there is more to both Soviet doctrine and Soviet arms policy than the "militarist" view. This basic question subsumes all six areas of contention presented at the end of Chapter I. The answer, if there is one, will only emerge
in the final chapter of this study; however, the basis for that answer comes from the data presented and analysed in Chapters III and IV.

As was stated earlier, both of these chapters represent a specific type of source: foreign policy practitioners in the party and government and academicians from research institutes. The choice of specific analysts and commentators was based on the objective criteria of selecting articles according to the use of specific cognitive objects in the titles. These cognitive objects were selected by a somewhat arduous and involved process.

The initial list of cognitive objects was borrowed from the "Soviet Elite Perceptions Codebook" devised by Stewart and Kirk. The codebook was created through the following steps. First, a complete bibliography of material attributed to full and candidate members of the Soviet Politburo during the years between 1965-66 and 1970-76 (the sample and time frame covered by the first phase of the Stewart-Kirk project) was created from the Soviet newspaper and journal indices (letopis gazetnykh and letopis zhurnal'nykh statei). Second, a sample of approximately 25 percent was drawn that represented each individual's total published material, including subjects addressed, occasions and audiences, and the time period covered. Third, each article was read, some in English, some Russian, and some in both languages, by a senior member of the research team, and all cognitive objects relevant to the themes of substantive interest were noted. After organizing all identified cognitive objects in terms of their related issues, the tentative coding list was analyzed again for both the substantive relevance of the objects and the apparent completeness of coverage. The following list is a
revised version of the one that appears in the codebook. We have used only the section of the codebook that dealt with arms policy, arms control, and military and strategic doctrine. Some additions have been made based on the preliminary research done for this study. These are noted in Appendix with asterisks. In instances where titles were indeterminant, as was noted previously in this chapter, articles were included if the subject matter dealt with any of the relevant cognitive objects.

Each source is evaluated over a ten-year period from 1970 through 1979 using five areas of analytical concentration: 1) attitudes toward the U.S. and its policies; 2) the concepts correlation of forces and peaceful coexistence; 3) reactions to U.S. strategic policy; 4) the concepts of parity, equilibrium, nuclear balance and equal security; and 5) positions on arms control, disarmament, and SALT. These categories are organizational tools that reflect broad areas. The terms that were analyzed in this study are organized as cognitive objects under these categorizations in Appendix. The use of specific terms used in each article was noted and recorded in chronological order. This allows us to examine patterns of usage, frequency or non-frequency of use, and subtle changes in usage.

The analysis of the sources examined in Chapters III and IV is used in Chapter V to elaborate on the six areas of contention that are listed in Chapter I involving the possibility of Soviet discussions on policies, change in Soviet positions and opinions on arms policy and related topics, military dominance of arms policy attitudes, the equation of Soviet strategic doctrine with strategic policy and arms policy,
and Soviet views on deterrence and the "winability" of nuclear war. Using the data gathered from the three sources, it is possible to look at the positions and opinions represented in them across time and across sources and compare them with one another and with the conclusions drawn from the military source materials examined by other Western researchers. This enables us to make evaluations of the disagreements of Western analysts discussed in Chapter I.
NOTES


12. For example, Linden, 1966; Tatu, 1970.


18. Ibid., p. 4.

19. Ibid., p. 5.


22. Ibid., pp. 22-23.


CHAPTER III
THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ANALYSIS

International Affairs is published by the Znanye Society but is apparently a vehicle for many government and party foreign policy officials to express their views. Several top foreign ministry officials, including two deputy ministers, and officials involved in other foreign policy areas, such as foreign trade, write for International Affairs. In general, it is considered to be a tool of Soviet propaganda aimed at foreign audiences. Because of this, many foreign policy researchers tend to ignore it as a source; however, if one takes into account the intended use and audience, this journal becomes an interesting starting point for examining Soviet arms policy.

As mentioned in Chapter I, the earlier Western analyses of Soviet arms policy tried to develop an understanding of arms policy portions from a foreign policy perspective, especially noting its interface with other aspects such as overall policy toward the West, the reaction to a perceived Chinese threat, and the advantages that might be gained in the Third World. Looking at an overview of the 1970-79 period in International Affairs, many of these elements are immediately apparent.

Most notable is the marked tendency of almost all the authors to review the Soviet proposals involving general and complete disarmament and virtually all of its possible sub-categories, including: non-proliferation, test bans, European Security, strategic arms limitation, and
biochemical weapons bans. The stance taken is that each of these is an integral part of the ultimate goal of complete disarmament. Each element has inherent value for the whole of mankind but individually each is basically a building block to the higher achievement of total disarmament.

A second obvious element is the hostility directed at China. During most of the period under consideration, the Chinese are depicted as dangerous, hostile war-mongerers who continuously try to block arms control and disarmament agreements or who threaten existing agreements by their non-participation due to blind self-interest. The Chinese are considered to be major allies of reactionary forces in the West opposed to arms control.

An additional element involves the Third World. Soviet arguments condemn both the West and China as imperialists and accuse them of being a dangerous threat to the Third World. They devote much time to criticizing the use of Third World territory for nuclear testing grounds. Moreover, they stress the volatility of arms races and the inherent dynamic of both the ever increasing numbers of sophisticated, dangerous weapons and the impetus that drives more and more countries to acquire these weapons. All of this poses special dangers and problems for the Third World countries, not least of which is the economics of arms races. They iterate again and again the economic advantages that might accrue to underdeveloped countries if the economic costs of weapons development and production were to be invested in humanitarian purposes. The major arms producing countries would not only be able to provide a better socio-economic environment for their own populations, but would also have more to offer the Third World in their economic aid policies.
The Third World countries are reminded also of the problems their developing economies face if they are forced to develop a weapons capability of their own. Finally, the less developed countries are praised for their wisdom, clear thinking, and farsightedness in proposing and supporting arms control and disarmament proposals in international bodies like the United Nations.

An area that is blatantly propagandistic is the effusive praise the commentators give the Soviet Union for its leading role in the struggle for disarmament and arms control. This praise appears in a two-pronged campaign. The analysts praise Soviet policy makers for both their farsighted proposals and their forebearance against Western and Chinese attacks and delaying tactics. They then turn to the world press, in many instances East European or leftist publications, presenting example after example of approval and support for the Soviet position.

The most useful aspects of the analyses found in *International Affairs* involve the commentary on approved arms agreements and the reactions to United States policy statements and planned research, development, and procurement of certain types of weapons systems. The remainder of this chapter will deal with these aspects. The development or modification of the *International Affairs* analysts' attitudes will be examined first. This section will involve broad patterns of change or modification and consistencies. The following section will deal with attitudes toward the United States and this will be followed by a section examining the analysts' evaluation of the correlation of forces or balance of power. The next four topics are drawn from Fritz Ermarth's topics of U.S. and Soviet strategic doctrine discussed in Chapter 1: 1) the consequences of nuclear war; 2) deterrence (and reactions to other U.S.
policies); 3) stability (i.e., balance); and 4) strategic conflict limitation and arms limitation. The final section evaluates the analysts and commentators whose work appears in *International Affairs* in terms of how they fit with the schema outlined in Samuel Payne's description of militarists and arms controllers in the Soviet Union.  

**Development and Modification of the Analyses in International Affairs**

There are a few generalizations that may be made about trends or noticeable fluctuations in *International Affairs* articles touching on arms control and disarmament. Most striking is the lack of commentary during the pre-SALT I period. In comparison with later years, there are a smaller number of articles dealing with the general topic of arms control. Additionally, prior to the agreements of May 1972, little mention was made specifically of the negotiations. From January 1970 to August 1972 there were only three articles that specifically mentioned strategic arms limitation talks. All three briefly touched on the talks. Zimin described the talks as constructive and stressed the "necessity of guaranteeing equal security to both sides" while Shevchenko noted the need for a "businesslike, realistic approach, without attempting to secure one-sided privilege." Teplinsky spoke of the hope the world had for the talks but criticized the U.S. decision to proceed with the deployment of Safeguard ABM as counterproductive.

It was only in August 1972 that the first extensive discussion of SALT appeared. A few issues covered in the SALT negotiations, mainly challenges to the U.S. stance on verification, are touched on in other articles, but are discussed in the context of elements of arms control outside of strategic arms limitation. This same phenomenon appeared
during the Vladivostok and SALT II periods. Direct discussion of strategic arms talks does not occur in any detail beyond praise for their contribution to disarmament and world peace; however, in contrast to the 1970-72 period, issues involved in arms talks are reviewed somewhat more openly. The major vehicle for this more candid discussion is a Soviet critique of U.S. policy positions. Additionally, there appears to be an increased tendency to tie arms questions to Soviet-U.S. detente.

Viewed in their totality, the commentaries in *International Affairs* demonstrate some subtle changes over the 1970-79 period. Not surprisingly, the analysis became progressively more sophisticated over the years. This was due, in large part, to the increasing specificity of the discussion. In the early years of this literature, the analyses of most issues was framed by a discussion of the virtues of arms control and disarmament in general and was handled in an extremely superficial manner. Much of the discussion of specific topics focused primarily on past achievements like the 1963 Test Ban Treaty and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty rather than searching for new directions or broaching current negotiating topics. The later years, from late 1974 or early 1975 through 1979, was marked by a much stronger emphasis on issues involved with bilateral arms negotiations or military security problems between the United States and the Soviet Union. Concomitant with this refocusing was a change from preoccupation with further test-ban agreements, restrictions on biological and chemical weapons, and the reiteration of general disarmament proposals made to the United Nations to a stronger emphasis on specific weapons systems and U.S. strategic doctrine.
Two other themes should also be noted in generalizing about the development of analyses published in *International Affairs*: 1) the economics of the arms race; and 2) the role of the military-industrial complex in U.S. arms policymaking and the perpetuation of the arms race. Throughout the period reviewed, the arms race was viewed as an economic burden; however, the emphasis changed to some extent, from the advantages that might accrue to the world in general and especially to the underdeveloped world if the arms race ceased to the severe financial problems in the United States that could be traced directly, according to the analysts, to heavy military investments. The U.S. military-industrial complex was generally evaluated as a reactionary force that, at best, complicated arms negotiations and, at worst, continued the arms race and fanned international tensions. The changes in treatment of the military-industrial complex can best be viewed as a subtle darkening of shade rather than any pronounced variation. Most notable is the increasing hostility across time to the military-industrial complex as the determining force in the problems encountered in arms negotiations.

An area that appears to be handled with a great deal of consistency over the entire ten-year period is the view the analysts have of the correlation of forces. Throughout the period, the correlation of forces is viewed as having changed in favor of the Soviet Union. The analysts are unanimous on this point. Generally, they see the position of the Soviet Union and the socialist forces steadily improving and the capitalist countries declining. Concomitantly, this promotes the possibility of peaceful coexistence between the two systems. It should be noted that the policies of peaceful coexistence and detente seem to be used almost
 interchangeably in the articles. If the two terms cannot be equated, they are most certainly very similar. This is in line with the Soviet refusal to link policies pursued vis-à-vis non-aligned regions with detente since continued peaceful competition in these areas has always been part of the concept of peaceful coexistence.

In general, *International Affairs* displays the development of steadily increasing sophistication on the part of arms policy analysts. This is demonstrated by continuously broadening specificity involving weapons systems and a more knowledgeable and critical analysis of U.S. policy positions. Additionally, there is a heightened focus on the role of internal or domestic elements and concerns, i.e., economics, the military-industrial complex, and public opinion, in U.S. policy making. Over the ten years there is a general trend away from rhetorical denunciation of U.S. imperialism and toward knowledgeable discussion of U.S. weapons development and strategic policy. This sophistication is very evident in their analysis of U.S. policy during the arms limitation talks.

**Positions on and Opinions of the United States and Its Policies**

Prior to the 1972 SALT agreements, in several instances there was a marked hostility to the United States which generally was described as aggressive, militaristic and obstructionist. The U.S., led by its military-industrial complex, was considered to be responsible for the arms race because of both its strategic policies and its drive for new weapons systems.

In an article by A. Gorokhov, responsibility for the arms race is laid directly on the West and on the United States in particular.
The strategic aims of imperialism — U.S. imperialism above all — have not been modified: they are to stop historic progress, secure a change in the balance of strength in its own favor, combining preparations for direct armed struggle with the tactics of ideological and political subversion, indirect pressure and flanking movements. Hence the arms race spiral and the growth of militarism . . .

Despite this evaluation, Gorokhov notes that there is the possibility of modification due to elements in the West that are taking a more realistic approach to the existing world situation.

B. Teplinsky is openly hostile as he discusses the "global strategy" of the United States.

The U.S. striving to establish world domination and to maintain and build up a system of aggressive military-political blocs and bilateral military agreements inevitably led to a step-up of the conventional and nuclear arms race, and created a threat to world peace and security.

He goes on to charge the military-industrial complex with using the development of the Safeguard ABM and MIRV to trigger a new phase of the arms race.

In a discussion involving the forces responsible for the formulation of U.S. policy, L. Zavialov attacks the dominant role of the military-industrial complex, describing it as the "político-economic nucleus that determines and directs the domestic and foreign policies of the USA."

He charges that militarism is the basic policy of the United States and that it seeks to operate from a position of strength. The policy of "sufficiency" advocated by the Nixon administration is described as being synonymous with the continuation of the arms race.

A. Zimin also criticizes the concept of "sufficiency" as a replacement for "superiority" in U.S. strategic thinking saying that "practical
steps taken . . . provide no evidence that its [the United States'] approach has actually changed." 17 Noting that U.S. Secretary of Defense Laird has urged the U.S. "to undertake a build-up of various kinds of weapons, and first of all strategic weapons," 18 Zimin accuses the United States of continued reliance on military strength as the basis for its foreign policy and of viewing negotiations from the outdated and useless policy of dealing from positions of strength. 19

A former member of the Soviet military, G. Trofimenko, takes a strong stand against the "world reactionary forces directed by U.S. imperialism" 20 when he says,

Militarist hysteria in certain imperialist circles is part and parcel of the anti-communist policy of present-day capitalism . . . . the leaders of the military-industrial complex have been playing an increasingly important role in the elaboration of such policies. 21

Additionally, he charges that the government uses the specter of a "Soviet threat" to convince the American people that "the aggressive policy of U.S. imperialism is . . . a set of purely defensive measures" while it continues the "arms race aimed at preparing for an aggressive war." 22

A. Shevchenko charges that the United States and NATO intend to continue the arms race urged upon them by the "still influential" military-industrial complex. According to the author, this is a move to gain superiority and launch a preemptive strike.

Reactionary military circles in the imperialist countries have pinned their hopes on another round of the arms race for tilting the military-strategic balance in their favour, and to gain a superiority which would breathe life into the bankrupt positions of strength policy. The further improvement of nuclear and missile weapons and the fabrication of new strategic arms systems may produce among the most aggressive circles of imperialism wild illusions about scoring a victory through a surprise strike. 23
In a second article two months later that reviewed the status of arms control and disarmament agreements, Shevchenko notes the continuous efforts of the United States to block arms control measures. He maintains that issues used by the U.S. negotiators to impede arms control negotiations demonstrated "that their primary concern was not disarmament, but the demons of the Pentagon and the military-industrial complex." On the other hand, he acknowledges the seeming realization by "sober-minded and far-sighted Western statesmen" that the influence of the military-industrial complex is excessive, unrealistic and potentially extremely dangerous.

In an unsigned lead article that reported on the contents of the foreign policy program of the 24th Congress of the CPSU, the editors refer several times to what they characterize as the "invariably aggressive nature of imperialism." Focusing on the United States, the editors quote from the resolution passed by the Congress, noting that "especially characteristic of the U.S.A. are its aggressive foreign policy and its rampant militarism, which contains within itself the threat of World War."

Following the same line, Y. Davydov, as one of the many commentators participating in a lengthy analysis of the international issues discussed at the 24th Party Congress, comments on the present stage of development in imperialism in an article titled "The Aggressiveness of Imperialist Foreign Policy." He notes the dominant role of the military-industrial complex in the "system of state-monopoly capitalism," especially the complex in the U.S., and argues that it "determines the reactionary and aggressive nature of the foreign policy line pursued by
a number of imperialist states. Dabydov's judgment of the Western military-industrial complex is indeed quite harsh. His characterization is reflected in the following statements:

The military-industrial complex could not exist without an atmosphere of war hysteria.

Accordingly, the military-industrial complex, putting pressure on its government, directs the policy towards the aggravation of international tensions, the creation of international crisis situations, and the unleashing of local wars.

The military-industrial complex has a stake not only in the production of armaments, but also in their ceaseless qualitative renovation.

... the monopolies continue to regard armed force as the most radical means of safeguarding their interest.

His discussion concludes with the assessment that the aggressive policies of the United States have been a major contributor to national disunity.

During the first half of 1972, the number of articles touching on arms policy declined markedly. These did not discuss strategic arms or the military-industrial complex. Instead they outlined Soviet disarmament proposals before the United Nations and the prohibitions of biological and chemical weapons. As in the past, the U.S. was charged with inhibiting progress in these areas. One article on United States' foreign policy charges that the policy pronouncements of the United States have changed while her tactics have remained the same, and that U.S.-Soviet relations will only be able to improve when the U.S. realizes that both policy statements and tactics must adjust to a "progressive" international situation.

Thus we find that the commentators in *International Affairs* are generally somewhat hostile to the United States, especially to the
ruling circles dominated by the military-industrial complex, prior to the conclusion of the negotiations on SALT I. Additionally, in the months just prior to the May 1972 summit when SALT I and several other agreements were signed, the discussion of arms limitation agreements dropped off considerably. More importantly, the tenor of the articles that did appear changed significantly. Although the United States was still considered a hindering force in the negotiation of disarmament agreements, the articles are generally less vituperative and tend to alter considerably the combative tone used to discuss American leading circles in earlier articles.

With the signing of the SALT I agreement and the Statement of Basic Principles, the position of analysts on the United States became more moderate. After reviewing the history of the arms race and the role of the Soviet Union in the quest for disarmament, V. Viktorov summarized the modified Soviet opinion of the United States.

As for the attitude of the U.S. side with respect to strategic arms limitation, it may be noted that, with the passage of time, its approach to the problem has been substantially modified, with realistic tendencies taking the upper hand and making possible the achievement of a bilateral understanding.35

In an article appearing in the same issue as the Viktorov piece, Y. Nikolayev, who only three months earlier had criticized the United States for obstructing progress in Soviet-American relations, attributes the change in U.S. orientation to the changing international climate and U.S. domestic pressure. In Nikolayev's appraisal,

... it also took growing pressure on the U.S. government from the public and political circles at home... to bring about the present realistic switch of official U.S. policy
towards recognition of the objective realities and towards a constructive approach to specific issues in Soviet-American relations. 6

Thus, the initial reaction to successful SALT negotiations was a slight evaluative shift where the United States moved from an aggressive, imperialist power led by the military-industrial complex bent on preserving the arms race to a realist entity seeking a constructive approach to bilateral relations and encouraged in this by public opinion and elements within the political structure.

The next several years find this theme often repeated. In most instances the realistic forces are depicted as having to continually wage a rear-guard action against more militaristic forces. One commentator, speaking of the importance of the Soviet-U.S. summits, maintains that they occurred "not least of all, as a result of a growing realization within the U.S.A, that its former line towards confrontation was untenable." 37 He continues to point out the existence of opposition to this.

The Soviet-U.S. agreements on strategic arms are regarded everywhere as a victory for a realistic approach to relations between the two countries. There are those in the U.S.A., however, who clearly do not like this turn of events. This was indicated in Summer 1972 ... by the protracted debate in the U.S. Congress over the Interim Agreement. Those forces specialising in stirring up mistrust and hostility between nations sought to delay its entry into force. There calculation was a simple one: by inventing difficulties, the opponents of detente tried to reverse the development in Soviet-U.S. relations. 38

Nevertheless, he finds growing resistance to this opposition in Congress and in public opinion polls. 39

Several months later, Y. Nikolayev discusses the steady development of positive, normalized relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Despite this initial positive assessment, he warns that
there are "fairly influential forces" who "still resist any disarmament measures and seek to prod the country to continue the arms drive." 40

A very explicit account of this situation is presented by Sh. Sanakoyev. He takes note of the changes that are occurring in the U.S. population and among the "ruling circles" in their evaluation of Soviet American relations.

There is also the fact that the situation in the United States is extremely complicated and contradictory. The objective course of world developments has been steadily impelling its leaders to abandon many of the old foreign policy positions in order to take the path of cooperation with the Soviet Union . . . not only in word but in deed. On the other hand, influential forces exist and are active . . . which cannot reconcile themselves to the new tendencies . . . . They stubbornly resist any positive developments between the two countries. 41

These forces not only resist current developments but also want to revive the Cold War and the arms race.

Another commentator, V. Viktorov, makes the existence of realistic forces retroactive. In an article noting the 10th Anniversary of the signing of the Test-Ban Treaty, he says, "A sounder and more realistic approach to the questions pertaining to restrictions of the nuclear arms race had by then prevailed in the United States despite the fairly strong opposition of the military industrial complex." 42

In an article referring to the June 1973 agreement on the prevention of nuclear war titled "An Important Step Toward Strenghtening Peace" M. Kudrin credits the strengthening of the world socialist system with defeating "the cold war strategists, the most bellicose representatives of NATO circles . . . [keeping them from] securing superiority in the
nuclear field for the capitalist world and maintains that

This also explains the historical fact that realistically minded circles in the capitalist countries now advocate repudiation of nuclear war as a means of continuing their policy. That is what made the conclusion of the USSR-USA agreement on preventing nuclear war a reality.

Again, this occurred despite the "rabid advocates of the cold war" who will continue to take every opportunity to maintain the momentum of the Cold War and obstruct the improvement of relations between the two countries.

V. Petrovsky sees this change reflected in the theoretical development of U.S. international relations which he notes has developed "a tendency to revise national priorities in order to cater first for needs at home." Additionally, according to Petrovsky, "clear-sighted American theoreticians appreciate that it is unrealistic to base U.S. foreign policy on ensuring military superiority over the USSR and the use of force against the countries of the socialist community." He also recognizes the modification of attitudes held by the American people who are increasingly opposed to policies based on a position of strength and to the aggressive tendencies of the Pentagon. Nonetheless, he warns that "influential forces" still exist in the U.S. who continue to justify the theoretical relevance of the Cold War.

In an article discussing the basis for further strategic arms negotiations, G. Stakh gives a penetrating analysis of the conflict between realistic and militaristic forces in the United States.

The efforts of both countries, aimed at limiting the race in strategic arms, are supported by the people, most of the political and public leaders, wide circles of scientists and intellectuals and influential business circles in the United States. This reflects the realisation that in this field the interests of the two countries coincide and that the
limitation and then the reduction of strategic weapons can radically consolidate the very foundation for peaceful relations between the USSR and the USA, strengthen the peace and lead to a reduction of the truly astronomical expenditures dictated by the arms race.

Nevertheless, this question . . . evoked many keen disputes and clashes in the United States . . . . A problem of definite importance from the viewpoint of the security of any state is exploited by influential reactionary forces in the USA which are obstinately opposing a normalisation of relations with the USSR and international detente and advocate the continuation and stepping up of the arms race and the spending of additional thousands of millions of dollars for military purposes. They are above all a definite part of the military-industrial complex which unites the groups of monopolies that fully depend on military contracts and also the military circles.

He points to the proposal of new strategic arms systems continuously advocated by the Pentagon, including Trident, B-1 and MaRVed missiles.

Nevertheless, despite the pressures from the military-industrial complex, Stakh sees "realistically-minded U.S. political leaders and experts" dedicated to the idea of equal security for both countries. 51

Izvestia political commentator V. Matveyev reiterates what he calls the "growing division" between these two forces in the U.S. over the whole concept of detente. He equates the opposition forces with the military-industrial complex and warns that "these circles would like to use the process of detente for purposes which have nothing in common with improving the international climate." 53

Although this trend continues in the literature for several years more, it is important to note the refinements that occurred in slightly more than a year in the analyses just reviewed. With the SALT I agreement, analysts turned from a view of an aggressive, manipulative, and obstructionist U.S. policy on arms limitation dictated by the military-industrial complex and designed to preserve and advance the arms race to
a view of a realistic policy based on well thought through evaluations of the situation by sober-minded elements within the U.S. leadership who, although increasing in number, must always be on guard against the subterfuge of the still influential military-industrial complex. Nuances and complexities are incorporated rapidly into the evaluation. The intricacies of U.S. domestic politics are taken into account and the Congressional ties of the military-industrial complex are elaborated.

By mid-1973, the analysts also have moved beyond euphemistic phrases like "sober-minded elements" to broader explanations of the segments within U.S. society that support arms control efforts and oppose the arms race. These include some segments of the administration, some members of Congress, international relations theorists, and large sections of the public. As was mentioned earlier, one analyst includes all of these plus scientists and business circles.  

The tenor of the analysts' evaluations remain much the same throughout the Vladivostok period; however, there are some subtle changes. Sober-minded forces seem to become synonymous with official U.S. policy on Soviet-American relations. Meanwhile, the reactionary right-wing, led by the military-industrial complex, comes under stronger and stronger attack as the euphoria of the SALT I and Vladivostok periods begin to fade. As sober-minded forces are equated with U.S. policy, militarists move from advocates of the arms race to opponents of detente.

This tendency begins to appear relatively early in 1974. Political commentator Matveyev speaks of the "continued struggle," led by "circles of the big bourgeoisie closely connected with the arms race and still making a lot of money out of it," against continued improvement of the
international situation and "above all any progress toward disarmament"
by using propaganda about the Soviet "threat" to sway public opinion.55

He summarizes the situation:

The Soviet-American agreements on the limitation of strategic
weapons which have been signed and those which are being
prepared are being attacked by those in the U.S.A. who have
stubbornly urged the maximum build-up of armaments, and above
all nuclear weapons, so as to continue the aggressive foreign
policy line. Such a line tended to increase the danger of an
outbreak of a world thermonuclear conflict, until the U.S.A.
finally realised that such a policy was fatal to the interests
of the U.S.A. itself and that there was need to do something
to reduce the danger in the only real way: through negotiations
and agreements with the Soviet Union.56

Israelyan follows the same line of thinking when he argues that, despite
the progress that has been made in Soviet-American relations, the "pro-
ponents of the cold war" are creating obstacles to detente and normal-
ization because they fear losing the profits they make out of the arms
race.57

V. Nikitin, in a discussion of peaceful coexistence, maintains
that,

Soviet-U.S. relations today are going through an exceptionally
important and decisive stage. The main content of these
relations is being determined by the need to consolidate their
restructuring on the basis of peaceful coexistence, and to
ensure their development along this path.

To implement this task successfully, it is necessary . . .
that the central line determined in Soviet-U.S. agreements is
observed firmly and without any zigzags and deviations.58

He argues that this is difficult to accomplish because of problems in
the United States that go beyond the "usual verbiage emanating from the
traditional anti-Sovietists" to administration spokesmen, like Defense
Secretary Schlesinger, who want to expand military budgets and implement
new military programs on the basis that "the continuation of the U.S.
military build-up is a necessary foundation for a detente."59
Nikolayev describes the intensification of domestic political conflict over the past year as the responsibility of those opposed to detente.

The enemies of detente have spared no efforts in their attempts to halt or at least slow down the process of international tensions and to obstruct the positive development of Soviet-American relations as one of the most important factors in this process.

The power forces of the U.S. military-industrial complex aim to secure a further sharp rise in the allocation for armaments and, simultaneously, not only to impede progress in Soviet-American cooperation in limiting armaments, but also to effectively prevent by frantically whipping up the arms race the fulfillment [sic] of the agreements already reached.

Nevertheless, Nikolayev acknowledges there is a "considerable reserve of goodwill" and continued broad support for regular Soviet-American summit meetings in U.S. political circles.

A. Karenin seems to take a more positive view as he examines what he calls the third summit, Vladivostok. He notes that the "substantial results" of seeking solutions for the future development of U.S.-Soviet relations on a basis acceptable to both and for the further restraint of strategic weapons was a joint effort. Nevertheless, there is much opposition from "those who seek to retain the obsolete cold war concepts." Despite efforts by the Pentagon and the military-industrial complex to thwart military detente by creating new weapons programs for "bargaining chips" so "that the U.S.A. should be sufficiently strong to negotiate with confidence" (a concept borrowed from the "position of strength" doctrine), "these healthy tendencies were concretely expressed in the U.S. Administration's announcement of going on from the era of confrontation to an era of negotiation, and specifically . . . that the
U.S.A. has recognized the vital need to jointly with the Soviet Union take steps toward limiting strategic arms."  

As negotiation of strategic arms agreements progresses, the Soviet analysts in *International Affairs* continue to bind the success of the negotiations more and more to detente both between the Soviet Union and the United States and within the entire international community. At the same time they make continuous attacks on anti-detente forces including William and James Buckley, Henry Jackson, the pro-Israeli lobby, the military-industrial complex and the press. Despite this increased activity on the part of conservative, reactionary forces, analysts anticipate not only the perseverance but also the strengthening of the current trend toward detente. As one writer puts it, "The task of restructuring the relations between the two largest states — the USSR and the USA — has become feasible through the coinciding interests of the Soviet and American peoples as regards preventing nuclear war and preserving and strengthening peace."  

Y. Nikolayev, one of the commentators who has been openly hostile to the United States earlier, sums up the Vladivostok meeting as showing  

... that the positive trend that has come to prevail in Soviet-American relations is growing stronger and becoming more firmly established, for it meets the objective historical need, the vital interests of the Soviet and American peoples ... that want to live in peace and security. It reflects the awareness of this by sober-thinking political circles and statesmen in the countries of the capitalist world.  

Other analysts do not take this "positive trend" for granted. N. Kapchenko points out that these "on-going processes" of detente are not a "certain automatic procedure capable of developing itself." As the
detente process gains strength, so does its counterpart led by the "most reactionary imperialist circles," who are "becoming increasingly stubborn and fierce."^68

This tension between belief in the perseverance of the forces of detente and continued caution concerning the strengthening of "reactionary circles" is reflected in articles appearing throughout the rest of 1975. While noting that "The West is becoming increasingly aware of the fact that the arms race is injurious to the international situation," A. Karenin sees these realistic assessments and tendencies as the "result of an intensive political and ideological struggle."^69 He carries this analysis a step further as he notes that implementation of arms agreements gives "greater impetus to detente" because of the creation of an atmosphere of trust" that promotes advancement in other areas of contention based on mutual advantage."^70

A. Migolatyev argues that despite the emergence of detente as a major international force, the reactionary forces, composed primarily of the military-industrial complex, continue, and even increase, their preparations for war.^71 According to Migolatyev, these militaristic circles hope to gain "military superiority" over the socialist world, but that these tendencies are countered by "sober-minded politicians" who understand the necessity of ending the build up of nuclear weapons systems.^72

G. Trofimenko, an analyst with a military background who has traditionally been hostile to the U.S., mentions the strengths of Soviet-American relations and the continued progress on strategic arms agreements; however, he concentrates primarily on the dangers that are
developing for detente because

. . . hegemonistic ambitions and illusions about an 'omnipotent America' are predominant to this day in certain sectors of the U.S. ruling class. Understandably, these ideas present a major threat to detente and cannot but hinder the evolution of realistic trends in U.S. foreign policy.73

Nevertheless, Trofimenko sees this effort "to win unilateral advantages . . . and to restore the cold war climate" is in opposition to the view of the American majority and that "the U.S. establishment (except the ultra Right-wing extremist forces) now seems to be more or less unanimous in regarding the normalization of U.S.-Soviet relations as a positive development without alternatives."74

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko aptly summarizes the situation in an article reprinted from Kommunist:

The past years have seen a substantial positive change in the Soviet-U.S. relations, in which the tendency toward the easing of tensions and improvement is currently prevalent. Although intricate social trends are at work in the USA and there are influential forces hostile to cooperation with the Soviet Union, there is an awareness among U.S. policy-makers of the fact that constant tension in these relations, fraught with a danger of serious complications, not to speak of a threat of an armed conflict, is at odds with their own interests and that the relations with the USSR can only be based on peaceful coexistence and mutual account of the two powers' security interests.75

This change in Soviet-American relations, characterized by agreement and understanding primarily resulting from summit talks, is largely responsible for general progress in international detente.

The same theme is echoed in the early months of 1976, but with continuously more emphasis on the struggle against reactionary forces. Svetlov reiterates this when he says,

All these changes conducive to peace [agreements, disarmament negotiations, etc.] are not taking place automatically or
haphazardly, but through sharp and strenuous struggle. In the capitalist countries there exist influential forces that oppose relaxation of tension in every possible endeavor to slow down its progress and obstruct its being complemented by military detente, and argue in favour of a continued arms build-up and a return to the cold war.\textsuperscript{76}

He goes on to note that, in the negotiations on military matters, all proposals have met stubborn resistance from the military-industrial complex and require "painstaking efforts."\textsuperscript{77}

I. Glagolev says that proponents of the arms race throw up technical obstacles, like verification, economic problems, and conversion from armaments production to other types; but that the real obstacles are social and political factors such as "the imperialist states' aggressive foreign policy and the existence in them of some circles interested in profits from producing armaments and from exploitation of the resources of other countries, and so on."\textsuperscript{78}

During this period, there is a noticeable decline in the frequency of attacks on the "reactionary elements" possibly because of the U.S. presidential campaign. As Nikolayev describes the situation,

\begin{quote}
. . . international reactionaries have mounted more than one "campaign" against detente and the normalisation of Soviet-American relations. These have usually been started just before summit meetings and the conclusion of major agreements between the USSR and the USA. Just recently, this provocative activity by the enemies of peace has assumed an especially overt character and broad scope. It is now being carried on in the specific atmosphere of the presidential campaign in the United States. . .
\end{quote}

If one looks at the public statements by the U.S. political leaders, including members of the present Administration, over the past few months, the first thing that leaps to the eye is the growing calls for a 'position-of-strength' policy and even sabre-rattling. This is being done despite the fact that the 'position-of-strength' policy, which has proved to be a total fiasco, has been the basic cause of grave reverses and defeats for the USA in international relations. . ."\textsuperscript{79}
The vaguaries of U.S. politics presented the Soviets with a situation, according to Nikolayev, where the major campaign issue became the U.S. posture toward the Soviet Union, i.e., the question of whether their foreign policy had been overly friendly with the USSR. This is a question created by the military-industrial complex in an effort "to maintain and entrench the aggressive foreign-policy line and the arms race connected with it. That is why, making use of its powerful political propaganda machine, it has been trying to prove that the reverses and failures of that policy were allegedly due to the fact that it was not pursued with sufficient firmness." Therefore, the answer is that the policy must be more aggressive.

This change in frequency does not necessarily signal a change in Soviet attitudes; however, it does signal another variation in the pattern of opinion expressed in *International Affairs*. Rather than attacking the military-industrial complex, the analysts attack U.S. strategic doctrine and criticize U.S. weapons systems. Following the change of administration, there is a revival of criticism of right-wing elements; but the major emphasis is on criticizing U.S. doctrine. Additionally, as problems grew with the SALT II treaty, the tenor of the Soviet analysts became increasingly hostile, launching counter-attacks against what they saw as the propaganda campaign against the USSR. Overall, there is a general growth in hostility toward the United States.

The tone is set by an article early in 1977, called "On the Band-Wagon of 'Soviet Menace,'" in which the authors outline the efforts of
"imperialist reactionaries" to counter the further development of detente and describe these efforts as comparable to the "provocative campaigns of the cold-war period."  

The offensive was actually started during the election campaign conducted in the United States throughout 1976. It was then that American reactionary circles, headed by the military-industrial complex, concentrated their fiercest attacks on the policy of detente and started calling for a continuation of the arms race and a further increase in military expenditure, opposed any positive change in U.S. foreign policy and demanded the full preservation of its aggressive imperialist essence.

And reaction, it must be admitted, did gain considerable ground. The Ford Administration buckled under its onslaught and one concession after another to the military. Towards the end of its term of office there was a noticeable departure from their realistic approach to problems of world development. Many members of the Administration, including the most prominent ones, found themselves, willy-nilly, toeing the political line of the reactionary circles that were trying hard to whip up a military psychosis. . .

According to the authors, the main lines of attack by the reactionaries focus on the arguments that detente favors the Soviet Union with no advantages for the U.S. and that there is a growing Soviet military danger created by the unprecedented build-up of all forces well beyond the level necessary for defense. This charge is, of course, refuted while the U.S. reactionaries are charged with the "unscrupulous" interpretation of Soviet foreign and defense policy.

This theme appears again in the lead article, an unsigned editorial, in the June 1977 issue of International Affairs that discusses the March talks between Brezhnev, Gromyko and Vance held in Moscow. After praising the basis of SALT and the advances that have been made and outlining many of the issues considered at the March meeting, the article touches on the apparent duplicity of the U.S. leadership. Referring first to Vance's positive statements in Moscow and Carter's favorable
reaction following the conclusion of the talks, the article attacks the launching of a "clamorous propaganda campaign" on Vance's return to the U.S. noting the enthusiastic support it received from "reactionary circles."  

The same tone exists in an article on disarmament written by V. Israelyan. After criticizing various U.S. proposals on arms control and charging that they are only a cover for promoting the arms race, Israelyan attacks American tactics as well. 

While taking a rigid and unrealistic stand on various aspects of disarmament, the advocates of the arms race seek to blame the impasse in the negotiations on the other side, and then, on the plea of failure which they have themselves provoked, go on to step up the arms drive. All these unseemly methods seriously hamper the cause of military detente so that if very little has still been done in this vital area the blame falls on those who have used the noble aims of disarmament to promote interests which are a far cry from concern about strengthening international peace and security. 

These lines of argument continue throughout 1977 and become more pronounced in 1978 concentrating primarily on the resurgence of the arms race. Lieutenant General P. Zhilin, a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, charges that arms control and disarmament measures have faltered because "certain Western circles are evidently reluctant to get down to practical work in this direction. Spreading a monstrous lie about an ever-present 'Soviet military threat', the reactionary forces use it as an excuse for whipping up tension and pressing the arms drive." 

Noting the "the arms race is gaining impetus," G. Stakh and B. Afanasyev explain that 

The arms race unleashed by imperialism is being stepped up and nourished by influential forces in countries of the
West — by the powerful military-industrial complexes of the United States and NATO countries, reactionary, militaristic circles whose policies are based on their own selfish, egoistic interests. . . .

Lately the opponents of disarmament and detente have stepped up their subversive activities against peace. 89

N. Doronina and D. Nikolayev come almost full circle to the terminology of the early 1970s, laying all the blame for a growing arms race on profit motivated and aggressive imperialists who have failed in their efforts to exploit their scientific and technological potential "to gain a decisive military advantage." 90 Describing the SALT situation in 1977 and early 1978, they say that,

The negotiations were stalled however. Under the pressure . . . by circles favoring an uncontrolled nuclear race, the U.S. administration put forward demands, accepting which actually was to give it unilateral advantages. Besides, many attempts were made to link the agreement with other political issues. 91

A hopeful note is struck in reference to the July 1978 Geneva meeting between Gromyko and Vance where the U.S. "showed a more realistic and balanced approach." 92 Despite this, they summarize the prevailing line in International Affairs in 1978 with this statement: "U.S. policy, however, continues to be influenced by people seeking to torpedo, or at least impede, a new SALT agreement." 93

Thus, the positions on the U.S. expressed over the ten years covered in International Affairs reflect fluctuation that initially sees an aggressive and antagonistic U.S. leadership generally and to arms control policies in particular and determined to continue the arms race because of their domination by the military-industrial complex to the emergence of realistic tendencies on the part of many, by implication a majority, of the leadership in defiance of the arguments of reactionary circles and then back again to language and charges similar to the early
1970s. These charges abated somewhat with the successful negotiation of SALT II but appear again toward the end of 1979 as the agreement's ratification is debated. There is also increased discrimination in the analysis of leadership circles as the Soviet analysts begin to define discrete groups connected with foreign and defense policymaking who have varied opinions. The nuances of these fluctuations and opinions only begin to become clear, however, when put into perspective. The importance attached to the view of the U.S. is influenced by the Soviet's overall world view concerning the correlation of forces and peaceful coexistence. Additionally, the increasing sophistication of the analysis only becomes apparent as we move from general attitudes concerning the U.S. to evaluations of specific elements, i.e., doctrine and weaponry, involved in arms policy decisions. These concerns are addressed in the following sections.

Correlation of Forces and Its Relation to Peaceful Coexistence

Soviet commentators spend a great amount of time discussing the correlation of forces. At times this means the balance of military forces; and, at other times it means the general realignment of economic, social, political and military elements. In either instance, Soviet writers see the correlation of forces as having changed in favor of the USSR. This, in turn, has created an international environment that has brought about conditions amenable to peaceful coexistence. For the Soviet analysts, peaceful coexistence and detente are very similar.

It is not necessary to go into a lengthy discussion of these two concepts, but a brief overview may prove helpful in understanding Soviet positions. The Soviet view of the world situation at the time
SALT I negotiations were taking place is summarized in an International Affairs editorial on the policies presented at the 24th Party Congress.

The period between the two congresses of the CPSU has a special place in the history of present-day international relations. It was marked by a sharp intensification and growth of the historic confrontation between the two socio-economic systems. The further change in the balance of forces in favour of peace, democracy and socialism has been the main and decisive trend of this confrontation, and it has exerted — and continues to exert — a powerful influence on the whole system of international relations. In the past five years, the international positions of imperialism have been markedly weakened, and its chances of influencing the course of world events and the destinies of people have been reduced.

The importance of change in the balance of forces cannot be over-emphasized. From the Soviet perspective, this change has forced the United States into a more realistic world view, thus paving the way for revisions in U.S. foreign policy and especially, arms policy.

In a lengthy article on peaceful coexistence, A. Sovetov emphasizes the importance of this when he argues that "It is in fact the change in the balance of strength that has provided the groundwork for positive changes in the international situation. It is this change that has opened up the prospect for a radical improvement in the overall international political climate." L. Vidyasova confronts this question directly when she states that the "inexorably changing relationship of world forces in favour of socialism, the growing economic and military might of the Soviet Union . . . and the mounting prestige of the USSR . . . have exposed the utopian character of the plans to crush socialism through 'superior strength.'"

M. Kudrin gives what is perhaps the bluntest explication of Soviet views:

Indeed, the real reason for the increasing acceptance of peaceful coexistence between states with differing social
systems in international relations lies, above all, in the growing strength of the world socialist system and the changing relationship of forces in the world in favor of peace, democracy and socialism. . . . That is what made the conclusion of the USSR-USA agreement on preventing nuclear war a reality.\(^{97}\)

Pinpointing the early 1970s, A. Stepanov maintains that the prerequisites for revamping the system of international relations had developed. According to Stepanov,

The emergence of these prerequisites was determined, above all by the continuing change in the world relationship of forces in favor of peace, socialism and democracy; the growing might and influence of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community; their constructive foreign policy; and the vigorous, dynamic and flexible diplomacy pursued by the socialist states.\(^{98}\)

In an article on the correlation of forces, Sh. Sanakoyev says that the international situation's most characteristic feature is "the constantly changing correlation of class and political forces on the world arena in favor of socialism, the steady strengthening of the forces of peace and social progress, on one hand, and the faster rate of disintegration and breakdown of the world, on the other."\(^{99}\) Sanakoyev continues to explain that the Soviet concept of correlation of forces means the correlation of class forces while Western analysts tend to concentrate on economic and military elements.\(^{100}\)

V. Kusnetsov forcefully advocates the Soviet position in an article written in 1975:

The principled and consistent foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government has exerted considerable influence on the revision by the political leaders of capitalist countries of their non-constructive attitude toward peaceful coexistence. As a result of the substantial erosion of the economic, political, military, strategic and diplomatic positions of capitalism, which has taken place in the postwar years, the capitalists have become more tractable. The Soviet Union's
prestige in world politics has increased to such an extent that today there is actually no problem of any significance which could be solved without the Soviet Union or in defiance of its views. 101

This leaves little doubt that this Soviet writer views the Soviet Union as the total equal of all the capitalist countries.

Soviet analysts view the overall situation as the result of the USSR's efforts to restructure international relations. In the evolving order, they see a steady advancement of normalization of relations between socialist and capitalist systems and greater relaxation of tensions. This is largely the result of the tendency of "the balance of forces in the international arena . . . further to tilt in favor of socialism." 102 According to Lebedev, the restructuring of international relations has taken over 20 years and has resulted in the acceptance of the principle of peaceful coexistence by the imperialist countries. Thus, "the changing balance of forces [economic, political and military] between the two social systems in favour of socialism has been the decisive factor determining the acceleration of the fundamental restructuring of international relations." 103

In the late 1970s, as the strains in detente emerge and the SALT II negotiations proceed in a less than expedient manner culminating in an agreement that meets resistance in the U.S., Soviet analysts stress the continued possibility and necessity of peaceful coexistence and the irreversibility of the changed correlation in forces. Kashlev notes the resistance of U.S. forces of imperialism to peaceful coexistence and argues that the "increasingly evident change in the world balance of forces in favour of socialism" has precipitated the emergence of an ideological struggle against socialism as "an inseparable part of
imperialist governments' policy, including their foreign policy. However, he goes on to say that this ideological confrontation need not impede relations based on peaceful coexistence.

A. Sovetov believes detente to be a direct result of a change in the balance of forces — a change that is so far-reaching that it will not be altered by the opponents of detente.

The overall situation has altered a great deal, with the key element here being a radical change in the world balance of forces. It is not only a matter of changes in the balance between the military-economic potentials of the two leading powers belonging to opposite social systems. No one should underestimate the importance of this factor and its real and potential influence on the course of international relations, but the fundamental changes in the world balance of forces are not confined to this. A broad view of the historic contest between the two systems shows that the balance of forces has changed in every major sphere: economic, political, military, ideological, etc. The aggregate influence of all of these factors is directly reflected in the development of present-day international relations.

Petrovsky succinctly reiterates this when he says that "The economic and military might created by the . . . Soviet people has done much to compel the ruling circles in the West to admit that in a nuclear age there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence." The importance of the correlation of forces in the Soviet world view is emphasized over and over in International Affairs. Most important is the concept that military power is not sufficient to preserve peace. According to D. Proektor, "the course of world development which is determined by an aggregation of economic, political, class, social, military and other factors, demonstrates that in our day stability and international security are increasingly guaranteed precisely by this set of relations and not by military strength alone." In turn, the change
in the balance of forces has brought about a situation in which the capitalist forces realise that their security depends on adopting the principle of peaceful coexistence.

Reactions to U.S. Strategic Views

Soviet views of U.S. strategic doctrine are greatly influenced by their orientation toward the correlation of forces. The fact that military strength alone is not enough to guarantee world security would naturally lead Soviet theorists to question such major tenets of U.S. doctrine as massive retaliation, flexible response, sufficiency, mutual assured destruction (MAD), deterrence, and the thinkability (or unthinkability) of war. Generally, they seem to find U.S. doctrine both naive and dangerous.

Describing the history of the nuclear age, L. Zavialov refers to the firm belief of Western political scientists that "the nuclear factor was decisive in international affairs." Zavialov maintains that foreign policy was made dependent on military doctrine because of reliance on the idea of "positions of strength" based on the doctrine of "massive retaliation." The situation that made this possible, however, changed with Soviet acquisition of a nuclear capability and produced a new strategic doctrine in the form of mutual assured destruction. According to Zavialov, the idea of assured destruction and its corollary, deterrence, are theories devised by "armchair theorists" who have failed to acknowledge the framework in which nuclear weapons may be used.

The result is an oversimplified and mechanistic view of the connection between the scientific and technological revolution and international politics, with abstraction of its socio-economic context.
In some areas of the world where the conflicting interests of the powers are especially pronounced, the "critical limits" of escalation obviously cannot be defined so that the nuclear factor only hampers in the working out of a political decision. The concept that subordinates politics to the nuclear factor is untenable, first of all because it regards the adoption of a political decision in a crisis situation only as the result of interaction of external, mainly military factors, whereas in fact policy (including foreign policy) is an expression of the will of various social groups behind which are definite classes, and therefore any political decisions always depended and will continue to depend to a very great extent on the position of these groups and the continually changing relationship between them.

It would also be wrong to present the matter as if the possibility of using nuclear weapons was regarded above all as a means of political pressure, as a threat that no one is actually prepared to put into effect.\textsuperscript{111}

He goes on to quote from Raymond Aron's \textit{Paix et Guerre entre les nations}, "'If nuclear war were literally impossible, how could anyone be deterred by a threat that could not be carried out.'"\textsuperscript{112}

What Zavialov seems to be saying is that the theories of deterrence and mutual assured destruction make military-strategic policy supreme and foreign policy subservient to it. Additionally, it is logically inconsistent in that mutual assured destruction makes the use of nuclear weapons impossible because of their consequences; however, deterrence can only work when one side or the other is deterred from using nuclear weapons because of the possibility of retaliation. If nuclear war is unthinkable, how can unusable weapons be used to deter? He concludes that "the 'nuclear-oriented doctrine' by unjustifiably exaggerating and distorting the true role of the nuclear factor in politics, reflects a highly dangerous trend in present-day international relations."\textsuperscript{113}

The Soviets tend to view most U.S. strategic doctrines promulgated over the years as thwarted efforts to preserve a U.S. advantage in a rapidly changing world. At least one Soviet author believes that the
continued development and production of nuclear and biochemical arms
"now has a more harmful effect on life than ever before."\textsuperscript{114} Noting
that the present world military strategy has resulted in the stock­
piling of weapons to the extent that the "overkill" capacity is estimated
at 15 tons of TNT per capita, he argues that the U.S. is using the
"contest between missiles and anti-missiles" in an attempt to reassert
the positions of strength policy, and that "further improvement of nuclear
and missile weapons, and the fabrication of new strategic arms systems
may produce among the most aggressive circles of imperialism wild illu­
sions about scoring a victory through a surprise attack."\textsuperscript{115} Continuing
his discussion, this author notes that constant improvements of weapons
systems, i.e., MIRV, intensifies the danger of war because improvements
by one side must be met by improvements by the other. Additionally the
increasing use of cybernetics and electronic computers heightens the
possibility of an accidental war because of malfunction or error.

A consideration of the great risk of accidental war and
the vast devastating force of the weapons which would be used
in such a war makes it clear that the arms race has brought mankind to the brink of disaster.
The application of modern scientific achievements to the
service of war have not only brought about a revolution in
military hardware and techniques, strategy and tactics, but
have also had a substantial influence on socio-political
relations.

Nuclear weapons, because of their qualitatively new
features, cannot be regarded as merely another improvement in
the arsenal of war. While they should not be regarded as the
ultimate weapon, there is need to recognize that never before
have new weapons played such a part in political and diplomatic
struggle as nuclear weapons. The atomic bomb has virtually
no military history (its use in the war against Japan was
primarily for political not military purposes), but it has a
rather long and rich political history.\textsuperscript{116}
Again we are made aware of the destructiveness and volatility of nuclear weapons, the efforts of the U.S. to gain an advantage through technological development, the dangers inherent in this effort and the fact that politics and foreign policy have been subsumed within the military doctrine.

Despite Soviet disapproval of what they identify as a propensity on the part of the United States to equate everything in terms of nuclear strength and strategy, they do not deny that nuclear weapons have had a terrific impact. According to Shatalov,

The specific character of modern weapons has, in fact, had a deterrent effect on the forms and methods of the aggressive policy of imperialism itself.

... one thing that U.S. leaders cannot discount is that in the event of a "big war" with the use of modern weapons, it is impossible for one side to secure a truly critical superiority over the other. 117

Although the general tenor of the Shatalov article is aimed at demonstrating the impact of Soviet technological advancement on U.S. capabilities, he also acknowledges the impossibility of either country gaining an advantage over the other.

The Soviets, on the whole, seem to have few illusions about the dangers of nuclear conflict. In two articles that appeared in the October 1973 edition of International Affairs, the authors make their perspectives quite clear. M. Kudrin, discussing the conclusion of an agreement between the U.S. and the USSR on the prevention of nuclear war, states unequivocally that "The very idea of using super-destructive weapons in a war that would kill millions of people and leave many cities and villages in ruins, is profoundly alien to the very essence of the
socialist system and runs counter to the Leninist foreign policy of the Soviet state. \footnote{118}

The second article, by P. Zhilin and Y. Rybkin, discusses the destructiveness of nuclear war and the imminent danger of its occurrence in a world threatened by militarism.

Today militarism is an incomparably greater threat to the world than in the past for the consequences of a nuclear war would be immeasurably more disastrous than the aftermath of the most destructive wars up till now. Available stockpiles are quite sufficient to transform the centers of world civilization into deserts. \footnote{119}

Reviewing U.S. strategic doctrine from the Eisenhower administration up through the early 1970s, they argue that militarists have not altered their objective of destroying socialism even though they have seemingly adapted their strategic vocabulary, moving from "massive retaliation," which is perceived as advocating a preventive nuclear war against the USSR, to the policy of "flexible response." \footnote{120} They identify the "flexible response" position as simply moving "the focus of attention to the use of conventional armaments and the waging of 'small' wars. . . A major nuclear war was postponed to an opportune moment and the accent was placed on the 'flexible' use of a wide variety of forms and means of struggle." \footnote{121} Zhilin and Rybkin interpret the signing of the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war as a major stumbling block for all militarist policy.

N. Kapchenko attacks the concept of local or limited war in the doctrine of "flexible response" when he says that "so-called local wars today present a serious threat to universal peace and cause considerable deterioration in the world situation as a whole." \footnote{122} This situation has
occurred because the new "balance of forces" has forced the imperialists to acknowledge the "possible consequences of nuclear-missile war." Karenin extends this view of "flexible response" to include limited nuclear war in a lengthy discussion of the retargeting issue in U.S. strategic doctrine.

... the doctrine of "retargeting" is currently the subject of lively discussion in the American press. If we speak of the technical content of this doctrine, it amounts to perfecting the capabilities of U.S. strategic offensive for arms strikes at separate targets on the territory of a contemplated enemy. This strategy... allows for more flexibility in making decisions having to do with the use of nuclear weapons.

It is perfectly clear the "re-targeting" is ever so closely related to the theory of "flexible response"... That theory... appeared in the U.S. when the ruling circles realized that there was no prospect in total nuclear aggression but were still unwilling to discard war completely as a means of achieving foreign policy goals... American military ideologists regarded as an acceptable compromise the idea of placing "limits" on war in terms of its objectives, place and methods, as well as on the duration of military operations. The doctrine of "limited war" was advertised as a way out of the impasse of "massive retaliation", which... doomed Washington to a position where it could not take any initiative in the international arena, since in regard to the use of military force it provided for only two options: either all out war or inaction.

... in its general contours the present concept of "re-targeting" does not differ from the former military-theory precepts, although it does have its own nuances. A special place in this doctrine is given to the destruction of enemy military targets, which American ideologists name the strategy of "counterforce", in contrast to that of "assured destruction", which implies a massive nuclear missile strike... a strike against cities as well. ...

... a number of American military theorists and ideologists... show no desire to completely abandon adventurist concepts of preparation for a nuclear war. Proponents of "retargeting" essentially advance the idea that the U.S. must be prepared to wage both limited nuclear wars and a general war...
To back their argument that a strategy of "retargeting" is necessary, American military theorists assert that U.S. capability of waging "limited" nuclear wars, as if [it] increases the effect of "containment" and strengthens international stability. In fact, however, this theory, which preaches the permissibility of using nuclear weapons, tends to wipe out distinctions between ordinary and atomic wars and creates the illusion that wars in which nuclear missiles are used are legitimate.

The drawing of lines of distinction between nuclear wars of various degrees of intensity is an extremely risky kind of equilibristics, for the boundary cannot be other than conditional, mobile and extremely unstable. A once-used nuclear missile weapon starts a chain reaction which — considering the specifics of modern U.S. military technology and the American military and ideological doctrines which envisage the direct participation strategic forces in carrying out the tasks of "limited war" — can turn out to be completely uncontrollable and extremely fast-moving.

Limited nuclear wars are viewed here as being extremely hazardous and destabilizing. This line of thought is reiterated by Svetlov.

The aggressive aims of the militaristic circles, engendered by the cold war, are today expressed in various kinds of belligerent statements. . . about the readiness of the United States to make the first nuclear strike, and in the concept of "limited strategic warfare", which is aimed at legitimizing the use of nuclear weapons in crucial crisis situations and turning these weapons into an effective instrument of political struggle in the international arena. Moreover, the concept "limited nuclear warfare" brings about the stepped-up improvement of nuclear weapons, that is, it is fraught with the danger of triggering a new round in the arms race.

These themes concerning the dangers of U.S. strategic doctrine persist throughout the time period under examination; however, as the Soviets perceive an increasingly hostile situation occurring vis-à-vis the United States during the SALT II phase, their views become more strident. Tomilin, writing in January 1978, stresses the necessity of averting nuclear conflicts when he states, "The use of accumulated nuclear weapons would have the most destructive consequences for the
whole of mankind." He carries his reasoning one step further, arguing that all use of force carries this same potential danger because "technology, including military technology, has today reached a level when the interdependence between various regions becomes ever closer and any local conflict could develop into a global one."

The emphasis shifts noticeably to the dangers of existing and potential weapons systems during middle and late 1978. Sanakoyev argues that international peace is gravely threatened.

The destructive potential of the existing stockpiles, and especially nuclear missile weapons, is now measured in "over-kill", that is, how many times over it is possible to exterminate not only the potential enemy, but also the whole of mankind.

This means that the material preparations for world thermo-nuclear war are in full swing, that extremely dangerous thermo-nuclear and other mass-destruction weapons are being developed or modernized.

Nikolayev believes this presages a new round in the arms race and makes war a distinct possibility. This possibility increases because of new weapons development.

Characteristically, the trend that has emerged in the development of arms and weapons systems is likely, under certain circumstances, to erode the boundary between a nuclear and a conventional war, as is exemplified by the plans for developing and deploying neutron weapons. . . . There is much talk today about the development of weapon systems that would allegedly give the attacker a 'first' strike advantage great enough to disarm the opponent. Finally, efforts are under way to develop weapons that would put the arms race beyond any reasonable control by politicians.

This orientation would seem to reinforce, at least implicitly, Soviet fears over the concepts of local and limited wars. In all these instances, they seem to feel that these are means of justifying strategic concerns of U.S. militarism that are aimed at restoring a policy based
on "positions of strength." In turn, they see this policy as an aggressive move on the part of U.S. policymakers.

In 1979 the Soviet analysts apparently fear that the United States is still operating on the proposition of dealing from "positions of strength" that, at best, leads to a "duality" in the U.S. position. The result is that "on the one hand, they [U.S. policymakers] loudly pledge adherence to the ideas of detente, and, on the other, they play up to the right-wingers, make concessions to the militarists and look nostalgically back to the use of force in international relations."  

This, in turn, leads to an escalation, especially a qualitative escalation, of the arms race. According to Major-General Simonyan, the new approach to U.S. superiority "depends less on a quantitative build-up than on qualitative improvement of strategic and operational-tactical nuclear forces, which enables the USA and NATO... to increase their nuclear potential many times over." Simonyan cites numerous examples, including qualitative improvements of systems that are already in place to increase their delivery capability and the development of both the MX system and cruise missiles. However, he sees the development of the neutron bomb as potentially the most destabilizing of all these developments.

The development of the neutron bomb would, according to Simonyan, "open a new channel in the nuclear arms race and increase the danger of nuclear war." Israelyan believes the decision to manufacture the neutron bomb shows "that the U.S. intends to escalate the arms race." V. Ustinov uses material from an ACDA report to the U.S. Congress (October 24, 1978) not only to demonstrate that the neutron
bomb introduces a new element into the arms race, but to argue that it would also increase the likelihood of nuclear war because "its use could lower the 'nuclear threshold', in other words, encourage the use of nuclear weapons."\textsuperscript{134}

Shestov argues that U.S. hard-liners who favor policies based on "positions of strength" and oppose disarmament and detente have occupied positions of power again in United States government and economic circles. These people are promoting a renewal of the arms race.\textsuperscript{135} Indicative of this is the decision on the neutron bomb and the development of improved missile systems of an offensive nature.

For example, the American MX landbased intercontinental missile could deliver between 7 and 14 independently targetable warheads of 200 kilotons each over thousands of kilometres with an accuracy to within tens of metres. This is a so-called first strike weapon, i.e., a weapon intended to attack the enemy with an aim of destroying his strategic and missile forces.\textsuperscript{136}

With the approach of the signing of SALT II in June 1979, these types of observations diminished and the emphasis shifted more to equal security.

Perhaps the overall view of Soviet analysts concerning U.S. strategic concepts, and concomitant arms policy and arms development, is expressed best by Lieutenant General P. Zhilin:

In their desire to gain military superiority over the Soviet Union, the imperialists have constantly altered the forms and methods of their aggressive preparations. In the 1950s, for instance, the USA and other members of aggressive blocs concentrated on strategic aircraft; in the 1960s on missiles, and in the 1970s on MIRVs. At present, the capitalist world is seeking to give another dangerous twist to the arms spiral by manufacturing the neutron bomb.

It is quite obvious that these lethal weapons of the imperialists have an offensive rather than defensive
purpose, increases international tensions and the danger of war.

To prevent war, one has to fight against it even before it has broken out, laying bare its causes in due time. . . . Now that the states have built great stockpiles of lethal weapons, sufficient to destroy all life on the globe many times over, this has become even more imperative.137

Soviet writers are somewhat reticent about postulating their own strategic views; however, a partial understanding of Soviet strategic doctrine may be extrapolated from their position on U.S. doctrine. In general, they appear to consider deterrence a preferable alternative to war but have little confidence in the way it has been structured by American theorists. This is especially true of the basic tenet of mutual assured destruction which they equate with the doctrine of "massive retaliation." Generally, they seem to feel that there is a failure in the logic of a theory that tries to guarantee nuclear peace using the threat of retaliation by weapons that are "unthinkable." Refinements of U.S. strategy, such as flexible response, counterforce targeting, and local and limited conflict are considered to be very destabilizing. This view is reinforced by U.S. weapon systems known to be under development. The Soviets see such arms as MIRVs and neutron bombs advancing the position of the militarists who would like to see the U.S. gain a first strike capability over the Soviet Union.

There appears to be a degree of ambivalence in the positions expressed in International Affairs over the role nuclear weapons play in international relations. Most of the analysts are critical of what they view as the subjugation of foreign policy to nuclear strategy. This might reinforce the idea expressed by some Western analysts that the Soviets view the possibility of nuclear war from a Clausewitzian
perspective. On the other hand, they become very critical of the idea of limited nuclear war and localized conflicts because these theories might eventually erode the demarcation between conventional and nuclear war. This might lead one to question the belief held by some Western scholars about the willingness of the Soviets to fight a nuclear war as part of an offensive policy, since their fear seems to be that a breaking down of the barrier between the two types of warfare would make nuclear war more likely.

These Soviet analysts also seem to reject the idea that nuclear war is "unthinkable"; however, they do find it unacceptable. This may be nothing more than a simple semantic difficulty, but it appears to be more. There is no doubt that these writers realize the destructive nature of nuclear war and find such destruction unacceptable for any country. Nevertheless, the possibility certainly exists and cannot be ignored, i.e., it is something about which one must think and be prepared for the alternatives; however, it should be prevented if at all possible by whatever methods are available (deterrence, arms control, disarmament, etc.). Despite all these things though, war is still possible, and Soviet commentators believe that this possibility must be thought about and accommodated. Zhilin expresses this succinctly when he states that "Soviet military doctrine, the formation and training of the Soviet Armed Forces hinge on the unity of the Soviet Union's peaceful foreign policy and its readiness to rebuff any aggressor." This view becomes even clearer when one takes into account Soviet positions on parity and strategic arms limitation.
Parity, Equilibrium, Nuclear Balance and Equal Security

As mentioned earlier, Soviet analysts give much credit to a new correlation of forces' responsibility for the changing relationship with the U.S. Although they fault the United States for being too preoccupied with the military aspects of this balance at the expense of changing economic and social forces, this does not mean that they discount the importance of military strength. The idea of parity or nuclear balance plays a fairly prominent role in Soviet discussions of arms limitation; however, usually it is expressed in terms of achieving and maintaining equal security.

Viewing International Affairs sources therein as a whole, there is little discussion of any concept of strategic equality until around the time that SALT I was signed. Following this, there is a lengthy period of time where the concept of equal security often is stressed. In the later years, 1977-79, there seems to be an increase in the use of this idea as the Soviets concentrate more and more on the hostile environment they perceive exists in the United States.

Writing in 1970, Shestov discusses the impact that parity has on the question of arms control and disarmament. He notes that approximate equality exists but argues that parity does not provide an effective deterrent.

The senselessness of continuing the nuclear arms race has now become more obvious than ever. Authoritative scientists and military specialists agree that the nuclear potential of the Soviet Union and the United States is now approximately equal. . . . But nuclear balance does not reliably guarantee the stability of the world. 139

He calls for a balance based on disarmament as the only way of preserving stability.
Although the changing correlation of forces is accentuated often over the next two years, the concepts of parity and equal security only appear after the signing of SALT I. In discussing the situation that created a favorable climate for negotiations, Viktorov places a great deal of emphasis on the U.S. realization that the present balance of forces, the parity that exists, in the world could only lead to talks based on equal security. Noting that the two countries issued a joint communique after concluding the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty that stressed consideration of both's legitimate interests and adherence to the tenet of equal security, Viktorov elaborates on the impact of this approach.

The agreements between the USSR and the USA, which are designed to slowdown the acute rivalry between them in designing and manufacturing weapons... can only help improve relations between the two countries. These agreements, based on the principle of equal security, do not harm either of the parties in the military sense. On the contrary, they help each to strengthen its national security in full conformity with its national interests. Evidence of this also comes from the fact the Soviet-American agreements, even if they do tackle only certain tasks before them, can prevent the pouring of financial and other material resources into the deployment of far flung ABM systems covering the whole territory of a country, or into increasing the number of offensive strategic means covered by the Interim Agreement. This is bound to benefit the peaceful economic development of both states.

In the lead article for the same month, Nikolayev also emphasizes the importance of this concept. "These agreements, while not harming the security of the parties, do not give either any unilateral advantage and are based on the principle of equal security." This theme is reiterated several times over the next two years.
Despite the frequent repetition of this formula, Soviet analysts realize that the situation is not simplistic. This is apparent in V. Matveyev's assertion that

The principle of equality in relation with the Soviet Union is still being attacked by those who urge an anti-communist crusade. They cannot keep their tempers because in its relations with the USSR the U.S. Government now proceeds from recognition of equal security for either party. As long as the arms drive has not been stopped in the world, as long as the world is not guaranteed against crises and conflicts, the USSR will continue to maintain and build up its defense shield, while scrupulously abiding by the agreements that have been concluded and never relaxing its efforts to bring about a fundamental solution of the disarmament problem.  

It is obviously the opinion of Matveyev that, to guarantee one's security, there is no dissonance in both pursuing arms limitations agreements while simultaneously strengthening one's defensive capabilities by whatever is within the bounds of those limitations.

A. Karenin elaborates the Soviet position on parity or equal security in an article that appeared in October 1974.

Scrupulous observance of the principle of equal security and prevention of one-sided advantages, which is fundamental for the negotiations, is an earnest [sic] of success in tackling the problems arising in strategic arms limitation. . . .

Of course, the principle of equal security in limiting strategic offensive weapons cannot be based on an oversimplified approach sometimes taken on by the U.S. press.

The point is that equality of the parties in the number of strategic offensive weapons units (which, in addition, are considered in the limited plane of the three elements: ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-based ballistic missiles and strategic bombers) does not yet amount to equal security. This can be ensured only with an all-round and fair consideration of the whole aggregation of factors characterizing the strategic situation today, and also with an eye to definite changes in the future.

The question of which offensive weapons should be classed as strategic is of fundamental importance, because on this depends the definition of the composition of the
weapons to be limited. For the needs of
the talks they should, quite obviously, be established not
according to the "classic" canons of the above-mentioned
three elements, but on the strength of a most essential
factor, namely, the capability of offensive nuclear weapons
to reach the territory of the other party. In that event
all offensive nuclear weapons, whose geographical location
enables them to reach targets within the boundaries of the
other party, should be regarded as strategic. . . .

Consequently, in working out the terms of limitation,
one must not lose sight of such an essential element of the
strategic situation as the existence of forward-based
nuclear weapons, and corresponding bases on foreign terri-
tories. . . .

One must not lose sight of these factors in seeking
strategic arms limitation on the basis of the principle of
equal security and prevention of unilateral advantages, just
as it is impossible to sidestep the question of the differ-
ent geographical situation of the parties and some other
important aspects of the strategic situation.144

In other words, equality of numbers or even some sort of parity involving
the equalizing of technologies for differences in throwweight and
accuracy is not sufficient as far as the Soviet thinkers are concerned.
Equal security means that each side must be equally protected, i.e.,
the exclusive vulnerabilities of each side must be taken into considera-
tion.

The themes stressing equal security, no unilateral advantage and
the approximation of equality reappear several times over the next two
years but less often than in the previous period. Although parity and
security are mentioned in passing by several analysts, it only appears
to become a key issue again as the Geneva talks on SALT II gain momentum.
In February 1976, Svetlov stressed that any agreements on strategic arms
"are possible only on condition that the principle of equal security is
strictly observed and neither side is allowed to obtain unilateral
advantages."145 Two analysts accentuated this in the middle of 1976.
Krasnov argues that

A point that must be made here is that the practical realization of disarmament measures must not be prejudicial to the security of any country. This is an indispensable condition for progress toward limiting armaments, toward disarmament, and in the question of ending nuclear tests. The task is to find the way for settling the disarmament problem without detriment to the security of any state and with benefit for all.146

In an article that appeared in the same issue of *International Affairs*, Proektor affirms the concept of equal security, but puts it in a broader context.

Historical experience also teaches that if states wish to consolidate international security by means of military detente, there is need reliably to ensure equal security for all. When it comes to real military detente, it must include all the key components of the armed forces, including those which make use of the highest technological achievements. It should also be borne in mind that it is never possible fully to balance out the armed forces that would make them absolutely equal in all their components. That is why acceptable compromises and coordinations on a political basis are inevitable.

The problem of limiting and subsequently also of reducing the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the USA, the two powers with the mightiest military, and, in particular, nuclear potentials, has now become one of the central elements of the military detente.

The improvement in the political climate in relations between the two powers has created favorable conditions for concluding a package of treaties aimed at reducing the danger of war and at curbing the arms race.

The readiness to exert joint efforts in eliminating the danger of war and to limit and ultimately to end the strategic arms race, as written into the Soviet-U.S. documents, has become an important contribution to the military detente and is not only of bilateral but also of global importance.

But progress in this important sector of the struggle for military detente is not easy, because it concerns the formulation of mutually acceptable solutions in a most complicated sphere. There is need to find a common approach to assessing the strategic balance and its components. What is more despite the diversity and complexity of the possible criteria, there is need to abide by the principle of equality and equal security.147
As the climate in East-West relations changed in 1977 and 1978, the discussion of some type of balance turned from the terminology of equal security to that of maintaining the national security. During the period in which SALT II was under consideration, Soviet proposals came under heavy scrutiny and were attacked often by Western analysts and journalists. Sensing a steady increase in hostility, the Soviets defended their proposals. Writing in 1977, Israelyan stated that the most important feature of the Soviet proposals in U.S.-USSR bilateral talks on the limitation of strategic arms

... is that they start from the principle of not inflicting damage to the national security of the parties to any agreement on containing the arms race and on disarmament. The Soviet Union... has always quite naturally assumed that any steps in this field should not and must not damage its own national security, or the security of its allies and friends. It has always been a primary concern of the CPSU and the Soviet Government to strengthen the defense capability of the socialist state in face of any possible military gambles by imperialism. ... The USSR has repeatedly declared that until a disarmament agreement is reached, it will have to maintain its defense capability on the highest level.

But while displaying concern for its own security, the Soviet Union has never sought to damage the security of other countries.\textsuperscript{148}

In an article that appeared a year later during a critical phase of the SALT II negotiations, Levonov refers to "the principle of the undiminished national security of the parties to the agreement" as "one of the key questions" that is particularly significant in arms control and disarmament talks.\textsuperscript{149} Levonov reiterates the responsibility of maintaining the national security interests of the USSR and her allies and of continuing to maintain a military capability at the level required for an adequate defense. Concomitantly, he acknowledges the importance of the same standard being preserved for other parties in bilateral and
multilateral arms talks. He notes that this idea of "undiminished national security" has been a guiding principle "enshrined in a number of international documents as the basis of agreement on disarmament," including those coming out of the Vienna talks on mutual force reductions and the 1972 Moscow summit.

Despite widespread acknowledgement of this principle, "opinions vary on how the interests of national security should be interpreted." According to Levonov, "A guarantee of the national security of a state implies, first and foremost, protection of its independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of its frontiers and non-interference in its internal affairs on whatever pretext." He goes on to state that

... the pursuit of the national security of states is inseparably linked with their defense capability. That is why the Soviet Union has been so determined and persistent in demanding strict adherence to the principle of undiminished national security of the sides at talks on arms limitation and disarmament.

How can the universally recognized principle of undiminished security of states be applied in practice and a common denominator found for practical action in the field of arms limitation and disarmament that would not change the correlation of forces between the participants in the corresponding agreements to the advantage of some and the disadvantage of others? Apparently, it would be based on an objective assessment of the existing balance of world forces, notably its military aspects, and unbiased analysis of the state of armaments and armed forces of the participants in the talks and other states and a realistic approach to the international situation as a whole.

However, Levonov questions the dedication of the U.S. to the principle of maintaining mutual undiminished national security. He discusses what he believes to be the fabrication of the myth of a "Soviet threat" and how it is used to seek a military advantage over the U.S.
It can be said with full certainty that the concept of military superiority is the antipode of the principle of undiminished security of states and a major obstacle to successful advance of the arms limitation and disarmament talks. If progress is to be achieved at the arms limitation talks, the principle of undiminished security of the participants in the talks should be strictly observed. Nevertheless the Western participants in these talks try from time to time to secure agreements that would give them military advantages and superiority over the Soviet Union and its allies. Such attempts have invariably been resolutely rejected and have merely created additional obstacles to reaching agreements. Even so, some people in the West are still not ready to abandon the concept of military superiority which gets them nowhere in talks with the Soviet Union.

The same concept of military superiority underlies another tactical line of the Western states in arms limitation talks. This line consists in seeking the inclusion in the agreements being worked out of the commitments that would impose greater limitations on the Soviet Union and its allies than on the USA and its allies, which would amount to a change in the existing balance of power.

There is an approximate balance of military power between the Soviet Union and the United States. The balance cannot, of course, be weighed on scales and it does not mean that the two sides have exactly the same quality and quantity of all types of armed forces and armaments. Naturally, the military potential of each side has a whole complex of specific factors.

It is often exceedingly difficult to compare even analogous elements of the military potentials of different sides. When the term "balance" is used with reference to the correlation of forces between two states or groups of states, the implication is that the two sides are in an approximately equal military situation as regards military-strategic balance and that neither side possesses military superiority.

The approximate parity mentioned above did not take one day or one year to form. It has been the result of prolonged confrontation between the main military-political blocks formed after the Second World War and the emergence of the socialist and imperialist groups of countries. This balance is an objective reality of today. It is, in effect, universally recognized and is spoken about in the West, including by the most authoritative military and political leaders.

Another broadly recognized principle is that the upsetting of the existing balance of power would adversely affect the whole complex of international relations, would greatly aggravate the international situation and create a threat to peace and universal security.

It is justly noted in this connection that the upsetting of the balance of power would tend to revive the activities of
various militarists and revenge seekers in the West, who would again be tempted to try to resolve the historic confrontation between socialism and capitalism with the help of arms. Many authoritative scholars and sober-minded politicians in the West warn against attempts to upset the existing balance in the course of the disarmament talks.

And yet such attempts are being made by the Western participants. . . .155

As the U.S. and USSR approach an agreement on SALT II and the analysts observe the debate over the agreement develop in the United States, there is again a shift in terminology back to the concept of equal security. Simonyan argues in January 1979 that the security of all countries can only be guaranteed by finding "ways to curb the arms race, to achieve agreements on limiting all types of nuclear weapons as well as conventional weapons, with strict observance of the principle of equal security of sides."156 Shestov reiterates the Soviet stance that solutions can only be achieved by maintaining certain principles as guidelines. These principles include: "undiminished security of any of the sides; mutual and equal commitments; inadmissibility of unilateral military advantages for any side; maintenance of the existence of the existing balance of forces; and non-interference in the internal affairs of states."157

Sanakoyev sees the concept of equal security as one of the main elements of the SALT II agreement. According to him, it represents "a mutually acceptable balance between the interests of both sides based on the principles of equality and equal security."158 He also maintains that critics of the agreement "make shameless demands that are incompatible with the recognition of the equal security of the sides. They are trying to secure unilateral advantages for the United States."159
Thus, we see a progression in the analysis of the concept of parity across the ten-year period. During the early years of the 1970s, the idea of parity is recognized by Soviet commentators as an important step in shaping U.S. realizations about the nature of the modern world, but they generally find the United States overly enthusiastic about its possibilities. In their evaluation, the U.S. believes parity is sufficient for deterrence while they would argue that it is a necessary condition for deterrence but does not achieve that state in and of itself. As they continue in their evaluation of the importance of parity over the years, they go beyond the concept of simple balance to one of equal security that gives neither side a unilateral advantage. As problems develop in the middle 1970s over the provisions of the various arms limitation proposals, the arguments of the Soviet analysts take on a new sophistication in their discussions of what equal security is and how it should be measured. Their basic argument is that equal security means equal defensive capabilities, i.e., equal ability to protect oneself. This includes not only some type of balancing of numbers and technologies but also a balancing or equalizing of geostrategic positions and resources. Toward the end of the SALT II period, the Soviets become very sensitive to U.S. challenges and to an increasingly hostile environment vis-a-vis the United States. They change their arguments from equal security to the maintenance of national security for both sides. This is a definite change in demeanor for the Soviets. Where equal security is more or less a Soviet equivalent of the Western concept of parity, preserving the national security has a different connotation. It is less conciliatory and less open to compromise. It is blatantly stating they
will do nothing that endangers the survival of the Soviet Union in what
they perceive to be a hostile world. By 1979, however, with the re-
newed possibility of a new SALT agreement, the Soviet analysts return
to the concept of equal security. The term national security does not
appear during this period. This might indeed indicate that its conno-
tations are less conciliatory.

Arms Control, Disarmament and SALT

As mentioned previously in this chapter, the Soviets view arms
limitation efforts from the perspective of general and complete disarma-
ment. Any sort of arms control or limitation agreement short of this
is viewed as useful and positive but fails to meet the ultimate goal of
disarmament. This position is stressed often by the analysts in
International Affairs. On the whole, they have a positive view of all
arms control efforts but believe the West, especially Western imperial-
ists, seek to hamper such agreements, or even worse, use them to create
an advantage for themselves. Over the ten years examined here, the
analysts are initially positive but somewhat leery of the U.S. motives
behind efforts made at arms control in the early 1970s, very positive in
the middle years, and somewhat hesitant and increasingly distrustful
of the U.S. in the later years. The conclusion of SALT in 1979 renewed
their optimism, but it is more restrained than in the middle of the
decade.

As SALT I negotiations gained momentum in 1970, Soviet commentators
emphasized the positive positions of the Soviet Union and pointed to
the negative impact U.S. policy has had on possible advances in this
area. During this period, the emphasis is placed distinctly on arms
limitation as an aspect of an eventually broader disarmament effort. Analysts tend to mention SALT in context with broader disarmament measures, usually general and complete disarmament, and they write in glowing terms of other disarmament measures like the non-proliferation treaty and the test-ban treaty. Referring to these two agreements, Zavialov states that "Ever since nuclear weapons were developed, the Soviet Union's policy has been invariably aimed at saving mankind from the threat of nuclear war. A definite barrier has now been erected against the further spread of these dangerous mass destruction weapons." 160

In *International Affairs*, serious discussion of SALT begins to appear toward the end of 1970 and the positive attitude of the Soviet Union is emphasized. According to Shestov,

The Soviet Union absolutely advocates the liquidation of nuclear arsenals. . . Nuclear disarmament is the most urgent problem of the day, and the best and surest way of solving it is through an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the cessation of their production, and the liquidation of all stockpiles. That, however, requires the destruction of nuclear weapons by all the countries possessing them. No country can be expected to agree to destroy its stockpiles while the nuclear sword of its rival hangs suspended over its head.

The Soviet Union has in recent years declared time and again that it is ready for complete nuclear disarmament if the other nuclear powers follow suit. There are other, slower ways of solving the problem of nuclear disarmament. They are designed to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons and narrow down the sphere of their application by means of more easily implemented separate measures, thus creating the conditions for their complete prohibition and destruction. 161

After reviewing the various "separate measures" that have been taken from 1963 to 1970, Shestov unequivocably announces Soviet support for the strategic arms talks. 162
As the talks progress and negotiations become more demanding, the Soviets lay the failure to reach agreement quickly at the feet of the U.S. Nevertheless, they consistently affirm the importance of SALT and argue for continued negotiations. In March of 1971, Shevchenko combines these two elements.

... two approaches to the problem [of disarmament] has been most pronounced from the outset: on one hand, the consistent and purposeful struggle of the USSR and other countries of the socialist community... to put an end to the arms race and carry out disarmament, and on the other, the policy of the imperialist powers, which have been steadily building up their military potential and hampering disarmament in every way. The methods they have used to sabotage the cause of disarmament have included the putting forward of patently unacceptable conditions and reservations, the bringing together in a single package of very different issues or artificially separating closely allied problems, and repudiation of their own proposals once they have been accepted by the Soviet Union. On many occasions, the obstructionist policies of the imperialist powers have brought the talks in to deep impasse, where all hope of success was lost.

As a result, the fundamental problems of disarmament have still to be solved. The arms race goes on. The stockpiles of weapons are being increased and with them the sheaves of papers and documents recording the content of disarmament talks.

Against this background men, especially those who lack experience in politics, may well ask this question: is it possible to reach agreement on disarmament, or even on any substantial limitations of the arms race, or is it merely a waste of time and effort to negotiate on this issue, thereby misleading the peoples?

There is only one answer to this question, an answer which is based on the available experience and which springs from the reality of the nuclear and space age -- the disarmament talks must be continued, with even greater insistence.

... a limitation of the arms race is sure to take the heat out of international tension, make it more difficult to start a world war, and promote plans for peaceful construction in the interests of the nations.163

In an article appearing two months later, Shevchenko reinforces his arguments, referring to disarmament as "a pressing problem that can be solved."164 He refers to the pressure created by "historical
conditions" and the "fundamental realignment of forces" in the world that make disarmament a real possibility. Shevchenko points to the leading role of the Soviets in an effort to find a solution for the problem of disarmament and arms control agreements:

... with due regard to all the existing agreements limiting the arms race, it should be borne in mind that these are but approaches to disarmament, for they either slow down the arms race in some way or are in some way preventive. This must be emphasized for a deeper understanding of the need for concentrated efforts in working towards disarmament. . . .

Once more the emphasis is on nuclear disarmament, that is, banning the use, ending the production and destroying all stockpiles of nuclear weapons under appropriate international control.

At present the USSR and the USA are engaged in bilateral strategic arms limitation talks. The current world situation makes it necessary—for the two powers with the biggest nuclear-missile potential to take steps in that direction now, and if they succeed in reaching an agreement, it will undoubtedly promote world security and universal peace.165

As the SALT I negotiations reached their most difficult period, the last year before a final agreement was reached, discussion of SALT, arms control and disarmament disappears from International Affairs until 1972. There can be no certainty about the rationale behind this development; however, three possible explanations come to mind. The first is that the discussion had been used in the previous two years either to counter anti-SALT arguments in other quarters and to promote the policy alternatives proposed by those supporting the arms talks. The need for this discussion may have ceased because a decision was made and no further discussion was necessary. Second, the leadership had obviously already decided to negotiate SALT, so the pro-SALT arguments in International Affairs may have been an aid to consensus building on the part of the leadership. Or, as a third alternative, discussion may have
ceased for fear that negotiations might fail and advocates would lose face for having supported a faulty policy.

Interestingly, there are what could be characterized as indirect allusions to arms control during the months around May 1972. These involve discussions about banning chemical and biological weapons. This indirect discussion shares two common themes that are important to attitudes on arms control and disarmament: 1) they reiterate the Soviet commitment to disarmament, and 2) they classify chemical, biological and nuclear weapons in the same category of instruments or weapons of mass destruction. 166

Beginning in August of 1972, there is a marked increase in the frequency of articles that are directly or indirectly addressing the SALT agreements. In the initial post-SALT I period these are extremely positive. Y. Nikolayev sets the mood for further discussion in the lead article in the August International Affairs when he says that the Moscow summit and the agreements that were signed "are a new and important contribution" to peaceful coexistence. 167 Reviewing the importance of all the agreements concluded at the Moscow summit and laying especially heavy emphasis on the Basic Principles, Nikolayev only mentions SALT as part of the overall scheme. Although he notes that the strategic arms limitation agreement and the ABM treaty are not disarmament measures, they, however,

... are solely designed to help contain the arms race. But, after all, the latter alone is enough to produce the threat of nuclear missile conflict, to say nothing of the vast resources it consumes. These agreements, while not harming the security of the parties, do not give either any unilateral military advantages and are based on the principle of equal security. At the same time, they reduce the danger of war, help to ease
international tensions and should help to reach agreement on further steps in the sphere of disarmament, as is explicitly stated in the relevant articles of the Treaty and the Interim Agreement. 168

In a second article in the August 1972 edition, Viktorov gives a broader account of the strategic arms limitation agreement. According to Viktorov's summary,

The content and importance of the Soviet-American agreements on limiting strategic defensive and offensive weapons can be correctly understood and assessed only in broad perspective, ranging over the development of modern military techniques and armaments and the correlation of the principle political forces operating in the international arena.

The importance of the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation agreements . . . is extremely great. . . . these documents express the intention of the parties to avoid another round in the nuclear missile arms race. The consistent implementation of these agreements will prevent the emergence of newly deployed ABM systems, and this, for its part will materially reduce the incentives for developing improved types of offensive weapons, which are bound to appear when the development of the ABM systems is unchecked, because the urge to constantly improve ABM systems would result in the uncontrolled acceleration of the arms race.

The Soviet-American agreements may serve as a good basis for future negotiations that will help to end the nuclear arms race.169

Viktorov also reiterates the Soviet stance that general and complete disarmament is "the most reliable way of eliminating the dangers."170 Despite this belief, the Soviets view piecemeal agreements as a method by which disarmament might eventually be achieved. Viktorov maintains that the only limitations that the Soviets have placed on negotiating agreements on strategic arms involves the principle of equal security and the avoidance of the acquisition of a unilateral advantage by either party. 171

This line of praising SALT in the context of a major step toward disarmament combined with mild criticism of imperialism's efforts to
block further advances and praise of the Soviet position continues throughout 1973. In March 1973, B. Svetlov describes the SALT agreements as being "among the most important signed in Moscow." He then makes a fairly straightforward expostulation of the general attitude that appears to prevail in *International Affairs*. According to Svetlov, the significance of these agreements lies in that these are the first documents to place material limitations on the most modern and most powerful types of weapons. Their signing constituted another significant step towards ending the arms race and improving the overall international atmosphere. Based on the principle of the equal security of both countries and the impermissibility of any unilateral advantages, the two agreements [ABM and Interim Agreement] set definite limitations on the quantity of the more destructive types of weapons.

The entry into force of the Moscow agreements on antiballistic and offensive strategic arms is an event of great political significance and a source of deep satisfaction for those who want a more firm peace and security for all nations. It is becoming increasingly clearer that concrete positive results are the products of vigorous efforts to eliminate the danger of war and promote disarmament. The strategic arms agreements... help to reduce the risk of armed clashes and, while not eliminating entirely the danger of nuclear-missile war, lessen such a menace. It is of importance that these agreements, which are only a first step, should be carried out honestly and without fail.

While attaching great significance to the Moscow agreements to limit strategic arms, the Soviet Union does not regard them as the final results of its policy. The substance of the Moscow agreements must be consolidated and developed. The Soviet Union believes that one of the main objectives of the current SALT talks in Geneva is to find ways for transforming the Interim Agreement into a permanent one. The Soviet Union continues to believe that further progress in the solution of this urgent problem is possible and desirable.

Nikolayev believes that, in general, "a favorable situation is now shaping up in the sphere of disarmament" that is "opening up much clearer prospects for the continuing negotiations between the USSR and the USA." His colleague, V. Shestov, believes that to preserve this
favorable situation and to achieve a reduction in the danger of war and to enhance disarmament efforts implementation of existing agreements (i.e., SALT, non-proliferation and test-ban) is extremely important. "With the aim of achieving new agreements, the USSR considers it very important to consistently implement the treaties concluded earlier since these serve as the basis for further advance."  

In an article appearing in September 1973, Sanakoyev discusses what he calls "an event of historic importance," the June Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War signed in Washington. This new agreement enhances U.S.-Soviet efforts at negotiating permanent agreements on strategic arms by "extending the limitations both on the quantitative aspect of armaments and on their qualitative improvement." The importance to the Soviets of these types of agreements is summarized by Sanakoyev:

The Moscow and Washington agreements are graphic evidence that the two leading nuclear powers -- the USSR and the USA -- are moving toward a practical solution of the historic and worldwide problem of limiting and ultimately banning nuclear weapons. . . . The signing of these agreements opens up a new stage not only in the struggle for nuclear disarmament. It also opens new horizons and provides new opportunities for intensifying the struggle to consolidate world peace and tackle other acute problems in modern international relations.  

G. Stakh takes a more practical, and somewhat less euphoric, look at the Moscow and Washington agreements. According to Stakh, quantitative and qualitative limitations have become increasingly important because of the expanding intricacy and sophistication of technology and because of efforts by elements in the U.S. who are trying to block any further agreements primarily by attacking current agreements on their verifiability. The increased concern with technological advances and the concern with both qualitative and quantitative limitations makes
achievement of the conclusion of permanent SALT agreements more difficult; however, Stakh still finds the situation, on the whole, to be favorable.

The present stage of the talks, naturally, is of a more intricate nature than the preceding one. This is explained by the intricacy of the military-technical aspects pertaining to both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of strategic arms and the transition from limitation to the subsequent reduction of strategic offensive weapons. The longer-term strategic interests of both states are affected.

The understanding on the basic principles reached between the USSR and the USA is aimed at easing the solution of intricate questions during the talks and eliminating difficulties that may arise.\textsuperscript{179}

Over the next two to three years, 1974-1976, there is generally a supportive, positive approach to SALT that is more concentrated than previously. This is probably reflective of the Vladivostok negotiations. During 1976, the attitudes begin to shift again and become more hostile and distrustful of the U.S. Stepanov sets the tone for this era when he says,

The agreements concluded between the USSR and the USA in 1972-73 -- the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the Interim Agreement Between the USSR and the USA on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, especially, the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War -- demonstrate the real possibilities for achieving a solution of the complicated problems. These are but the first concrete steps toward halting the world arms race and reducing the threat of a world thermonuclear holocaust.\textsuperscript{180}

There are several articles during the first half of 1974 that highlight this same theme.\textsuperscript{181} Israelyan, noting the "new opportunities opening up in the sphere of disarmament," tie disarmament to detente, saying, "The path to peace and mutual understanding between nations cannot be paved by piling weapons."\textsuperscript{182} Placing arms limitation and arms control in the broader framework of peaceful coexistence, Nikitin states that
... the understanding between the USSR and the USA has a bearing not only on general principles governing their relations but also on concrete measures pertaining to a wide range of practical problems. Among these of particular importance are the questions covered by the Treaty Between the USSR and the USA on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement Between the USSR and the USA on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic-Offensive Arms.

The conclusion of these agreements constituted a real contribution to the curbing of [the] arms race, particularly in its major and most dangerous sphere linked with [the] most powerful means of mass destruction. Together with the Agreement Between the USSR and the USA which they augment, the Treaty and the Interim Agreement constitute a major step toward solving the main task of our day — the elimination of the danger of a nuclear missile war.

The achievement of further progress in the limitation of strategic offensive weapons is one of the most important trends in the aggregate complex of Soviet-U.S. relations. In accordance with the established agreement, the Soviet and U.S. delegations are negotiating in Geneva with the aim of working out a more complete agreement which could cover both quantitative limitation and qualitative improvement of the strategic offensive weapons.

Recognizing the obvious complexity of this task, the Soviet Union proceeds from the fact that its solution is quite possible on the basis of the agreed upon principle of equal security and the inadmissibility of unilateral advantages. The experiences acquired in the course of working out the Interim Agreement demonstrated that a simplified approach here is out of the question. The possibility of elaborating our effective formula on the agreement presupposes, in particular, comprehensive consideration of the total complex of factors determining the strategic situation which, by virtue of the existing circumstances, is different for each side.

The improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations undoubtedly create more favourable conditions for progress on a number of specific problems of disarmament.183

As 1974 drew to a close, International Affairs commentators are still stressing the essential nature of arms limitation and emphasizing its relationship to detente. A. Karenin, referring to restraint in the build-up of strategic weapons, notes that "substantial results, which are of fundamental importance for the future development of Soviet-American relations and for backing up the political detente with a military
detente, have been achieved in this difficult and responsible sphere.\textsuperscript{184}

In the following issue, his colleague, V. Israelyan, emphasizes this same point by saying that,

\[
\ldots \text{the steps taken to limit armaments and achieve disarmament in the past few years, such as the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons and the Soviet-American agreements on limiting strategic armaments help to deepen and extend the international detente.}\textsuperscript{185}
\]

In 1975 there appears to be more specific emphasis on SALT. Although the Soviet analysts certainly do not slight other arms control measures like non-proliferation and the United Nations disarmament discussions, SALT seems to occupy a more independent position than it has in the past. One indicator of this increased independence is an increased specificity in individual articles. For instance, articles tend to deal more directly with each aspect of Soviet disarmament proposals rather than grouping them all together as an overall program. Carrying this one step further, there seems to be more emphasis on single focus articles.

This subtle change is obvious in an article by Karenin. He begins by addressing the importance of disarmament.

\[
\text{Disarmament has become a vital and urgent task of our times. One of the results of the scientific and technological revolution has been the creation of the most destructive armaments, immeasurably superior to those used in all preceding wars. A nuclear-missile war would be catastrophic for the whole of mankind.}\textsuperscript{186}
\]

After reviewing the history of arms control and disarmament agreements and Soviet disarmament proposals and activities in the United Nations in the decade prior to SALT I, Karenin notes that the strategic arms limitation talks hold a "special place in Soviet-American relations" and that
the signing of the ABM treaty and the Interim Agreement turned "a new
page in the struggle for disarmament."  

The fact of the matter is that the commitments assumed by
the sides under the above agreements [ABM treaty and Interim
Agreement] envisage limitation of arms comprising the nucleus
of the military might of the two countries. This alone is
without precedent in the world. The achievement of mutually-
acceptable decisions on these issues speaks of the growing
trust between the two sides resulting from the disappearance
of the cold war atmosphere which had once dominated their
relations.

Together with the 1974 Protocol to the ABM Treaty, which
limits still further the permissible anti-missile defenses,
reducing them to a minimum level and procedures regulating
the dismantling and destruction of the anti-missile defense
systems and strategic offensive weapons, the above-mentioned
Soviet-American agreements, on the whole, constitute an
important step on the way to slowing down and then completely
curbing the race in nuclear arms.

In light of the above, the opinion that these agreements
are ineffective and, therefore, fall short of the hopes placed
in them which is sometimes heard in the West, is all the more
unjustified, and those who uphold it are labouring under a
misapprehension.

A major achievement in Soviet-American talks . . . was the
agreement negotiated . . . at . . . Vladivostok . . . . Based on
the principle of equality and equal security, the new agreement,
as distinct from the interim one, will cover a broader range
of weapons. It is also basically important that in addition to
quantitative limitations comprising the foundation of the
interim agreement, the new compact will include qualitative
restrictions.

At this point, a new element is brought into the disarmament equa-
tion -- the prevention of new weapon development. Karenin refers to
the importance of this suggestion made by Brezhnev in June 1975 because
such weapons "could have far more devastating consequences than nuclear
weapons have." Gromyko reinforces this concern in an article ex-
pounding the Soviet peace programme.

Socialism proposes to conclude an international agreement
to prohibit the development and production of new types of
mass destruction weapons and new systems of such weapons.
Experience shows that once a certain type of weapon becomes part of the arsenal of states, it is extremely difficult to remove these weapons from the arsenals.\textsuperscript{190}

Despite this apparent effort to broach new areas in the endeavor for disarmament, the importance of SALT remains. In an article entitled "Disarmament is Socialism's Ideal," V. Israelyan speaks of SALT.

Of exceptional significance for the cause of peace and international security are the 1972-1973 Soviet-American agreements on preventing a nuclear war, limiting anti-ballistic missile systems and some measures to limit offensive strategic armaments. These agreements comprise the most notable achievement in curbing the armaments race since the Second World War. . . . The signing of these agreements marked a practical step toward ridding mankind of the threat of a nuclear war and toward achieving universal and lasting peace.\textsuperscript{191}

This line continues in early 1976. Lebedev speaks of the importance the USSR attaches to drafting a new SALT treaty based on the understandings reached at Vladivostok.\textsuperscript{192} Svetlov also praises the strategic arms limitations talks as being

. . . of exceptional importance not only to the development of Soviet-American relations but also to the cause of peace in general, because strategic nuclear-missile weapons are the most dangerous instruments of war in terms of destructive power. At these talks the Soviet Union invariably comes out in favour of reaching such agreements which would halt the strategic arms race both quantitatively and qualitatively.\textsuperscript{193}

In an article titled, "Military Detente: Primary Task," Proektor refers to military detente as "one of the most acute problems of our day" and argues that "political detente needs to be backed up with a military detente."\textsuperscript{194} He views strategic arms limitation as an integral part of this military detente.

The problem of limiting and subsequently also of reducing the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the USA, the two powers with the mightiest military and . . . nuclear potentials, has now become one of the central elements of the military detente.
The readiness to exert joint efforts in eliminating the danger of war and to limit and ultimately to end the strategic arms race, as written into the Soviet-U.S. documents has become an important contribution to the military detente and is not only of bilateral but also of global importance.

But progress in this important sector of the struggle for military detente is not easy, because it concerns the formulation of mutually acceptable solutions in a most complicated sphere. There is need to find a common approach to assessing the strategic balance and its components. What is more, despite the diversity and complexity of the possible criteria, there is need to abide by the principle of equality and equal security.

The understanding on the basic provisions of a new agreement on limiting strategic offensive arms, reached by the USSR and the USA during the summit meeting in Vladivostok in November 1974, marked a step forward over the 1972 Interim Agreement.

The new understanding covered land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based ballistic missiles equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads, and also means of delivering strategic weapons.

The Vladivostok understanding has made real the containment of the quantitative strategic arms race because it has now become possible to find a way to set the total quantitative ceiling on the basis of an equivalence of forces. Also a provision has been made for the first time for partially limiting the qualitative aspect of the arms race by setting a ceiling on the number of ICBM's armed with MIRV's.

At the same time, it is necessary to note that the USSR, seeking to go beyond the limitation of the existing types of strategic weapons, has repeatedly invited the USA to reach an understanding on the prohibition to develop new and even more destructive weapons.

This lengthy evaluation of the current SALT situation was part of a long article covering many aspects of military detente, including global and regional elements and multilateral and bilateral negotiations. Proektor describes military detente as

an intricate and multifaceted process of transition in military and political relations among states from confrontation to lower tensions, to a reduction in the danger of wars and their prevention, to a limitation of the role of armed forces in international affairs. The basic content of this process must be a quantitative and qualitative restraint of the arms race, a gradual cut-back in armed forces, and eventual achievement of general and complete disarmament.
Mid-1976 sees the International Affairs commentators retreating to their former pattern of generalizations on disarmament. The probable reason behind this change is the difficulty encountered at the negotiating table in Geneva and political developments in the U.S. This conjecture is supported by the way the tone of the analyses changes. First, there are fewer specific references to the strategic arms limitation talks. Second, they spend much more time trying to counter U.S. attacks on such things as verification, unreasonable negotiating stances and purported violations of SALT I. Nevertheless, the analysts definitely remain supportive of arms limitation and arms control.

Verification is an obvious issue in an article on banning nuclear weapons tests by B. Krasnov. The Soviet analysts maintain that verification is possible solely by national technical means (NTM) and that U.S. negotiators, and especially U.S. militarists, are only obstructive in making verification an issue.

As for inspection over observance of disarmament agreements, the time has come to renounce the approaches and criteria of the past, when there was tension, distrust and suspicion between states. Moreover, account [sic] must be taken of the big advance that has been made by science and technology and also of the enormously expanded possibilities of using national technical means of control.197

Throughout the rest of 1976, articles tend to deal primarily with general disarmament, prohibition of new weapons systems, and, especially, reduction of military spending. Little mention is made of strategic arms limitation. Additionally, the general tenor is more hostile to the U.S.

In 1977 and 1978, the trend seems to be toward increasing criticism of a growing arms race that can be attributed directly to elements in the
West. In an article in May 1977, Levonov says that the "most burning issue in the world today is to stop the mounting arms race, which poses a threat to peace, and to go over to disarmament." He continues this argument throughout the article calling for disarmament in the form of the banning of nuclear weapons and noting the importance of NTM as a verifier and the need for blocking the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and reductions in military expenditures.

A more hardline approach is apparent in a series of articles in mid-1977. Both an account of a March press conference by Gromyko and the lead article in June 1977 attacks SALT proposals made by Cyrus Vance during a Moscow visit in March. In the unsigned June article, the authors note the importance of SALT I and the strides that have been made in more than three years of negotiations on SALT II.

It would seem that one final effort remained to be made to bring the matter to its logical conclusion and sign an agreement. And yet the drawing up of an agreement has stalled. American reactionaries, rallied around the military-industrial complex, took advantage of the electoral campaign to launch a massive attack on the policy of detente, making the strategic arms agreement their prime target. The Ford Administration was not only unable to effectively resist the offensive but made serious concessions to the reactionaries, with the result that a new agreement was not signed.

It must be said that President Carter and other members of the present Administration have from the beginning tried to demonstrate an active posture on the question of halting the arms race and promoting disarmament. At the same time, as the new American approach unfolded, it became apparent that the U.S. line could create serious difficulties for advance in this field.

The rest of this article deals directly with the specifics of U.S. proposals charging that they

... ignored a number of factors prejudicial to the security of the USSR, in particular, the American forward-deployed
nuclear systems in Europe and Asia, the U.S. carrier-based aviation, the nuclear possessions of the U.S. allies, etc. The proposed cut of the original ceilings on strategic delivery vehicles would give substantial unilateral advantages to the USA.\textsuperscript{202}

Accordingly, Israelyan hints at duplicity on the part of at least some people involved in the disarmament endeavor. In reference to the leaders of some Western states, he argues that they have tried in the negotiations to put others in a disadvantageous position. Indeed, they have not stopped at trying to use the negotiating table to gain an advantage. According to Israelyan, "While taking a rigid stand on the various aspects of disarmament, the advocates of the arms race seek to blame the impasse in the negotiations on the other side, and then, on the plea of failure which they have themselves provoked, go on to step up the arms drive."\textsuperscript{203}

The beginning of 1978 finds the Soviets slightly more optimistic, again stressing the importance of disarmament and strategic arms limitation. Tomilin states that "the surest way to remove the threat of nuclear war would be to completely eliminate nuclear weapons."\textsuperscript{204} He sees the successful conclusion of the SALT negotiations as an "important contribution to lessening the danger of nuclear war."\textsuperscript{205} The U.S. stance has made the task of the negotiations more difficult. Nevertheless, the Soviets, according to Tomilin, are working diligently to achieve a successful conclusion to the talks. Despite this, the continuous stream of new technological and scientific discoveries virtually make agreements obsolete before they are signed.\textsuperscript{206}

This same theme appears in an article by Stakh and Afanasyev. They maintain that the "agreements concluded in recent years have opened up
the possibility for more radical steps toward disarmament and complete liquidation of the material base of war." Nevertheless, these measures have not served to abate the arms race. Indeed, according to the authors, "the arms race is gaining impetus." Both these authors and Tomilin demonstrate much concern over the development of new weapons systems, especially the neutron bomb.

The same evaluation is made by their colleague V. Levonov. Despite the "high priority" given to bilateral arms talks, the author is concerned about the destabilizing impact of new weapons. "The many years' experience of arms limitation and disarmament negotiations shows that it is far easier to agree to ban the development and production of types and systems of weapons before they have been introduced than to remove them from the arsenals of states once they have been adopted.

The 1978 articles also highlight the Soviet efforts made toward disarmament and arms control. These efforts include proposals concerning: 1) ending the nuclear arms race and reducing, and subsequently liquidating, nuclear stockpiles; 2) limitations and reduction of forces and conventional weapons; 3) prevention of nuclear war; 4) general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests; 5) strengthening of non-proliferation measures; 6) prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons; 7) prohibition of the development of new types of weapons systems (of mass destruction); 8) reduction of military budgets; 9) demilitarization of the sea-bed and ocean floor; and 10) regional military detente and disarmament.

The last article of 1978, prosaically called "Disarmament: A Solution in Sight?", reiterates the major points of concern at a time when it is
becoming apparent that there is growing opposition to a SALT II agree-
ment in the United States. The authors, Doronina and Nikolayev, oppose
the development and production of new types of weapon systems, especially
the neutron bomb; support the use of NTM as a monitoring mechan-
ism; and support non-proliferation measures. The position of
Soviet analysts at the end of 1978 is probably expressed best by these
two authors:

History has put the world before an alternative: either
a lasting peace or, at best, balancing on the brink of war;
either broader cooperation and stronger mutual trust, or
stockpiling of weapons, and growth of fears and suspicion.
Common sense suggests the only sensible choice: the
arms race presenting a deadly danger to the present and fu-
ture generations of the human race, ending it should become
a task for all states and governments, for all peoples on
earth. Achieving a radical turning point in the drive toward
genuine disarmament must be given first priority.

In 1979 the International Affairs analysts pursue many of the same
lines of the two previous years. There is much emphasis placed on the
potential expansion of the arms race fueled by Western decisions on new
and improved systems like the neutron bomb and the MX missile, on the
necessity of equal security and the Soviet Union's maintenance of their
defensive capability in spite of U.S. attempts to regain a unilateral
advantage, and on continued belief in and support of SALT and other dis-
armament measures.

Again, as the signing of SALT II approaches, the pattern of silence
that surrounded SALT I emerges. While the analysts discuss the danger
of nuclear war, balance of forces, the arms race, U.S. strategic policy,
and détente, SALT is mentioned only twice prior to the June signing of
the agreement. Both references speak about SALT in a positive manner and
credit the United States, or forces in the U.S., with creating problems
that have hindered the negotiating process. Citing the USSR's long­
standing advocacy of disarmament based on "the principle of equality and
undiminished security," Simonyan says, "As regards the Soviet-American
talks on limiting strategic offensive arms (SALT), the Soviet Union is
doing all it can to settle outstanding questions on a mutually accept­
able basis and to bring about an early agreement, although it's no
secret that the forces opposing such an agreement are becoming increas­
ingly vocal in the USA."217

In April 1979, Abarenkov, apparently reacting to Western charges
against the Soviet Union, discusses the problems encountered by SALT II.
He accuses the United States of using the negotiations "to gain one­sided advantages and escalate the qualitative arms race." This occurred
partially, from the author's viewpoint, because the U.S. was nearing
the end of the 10-15 year cycle in research, development, and deployment
of its existing systems and was concerned over future strategic planning
and especially because of "a certain hardening of the foreign and also
domestic policies adopted by the new U.S. administration [Carter] under
pressure from the country's reactionary imperialist circles.218 According
to Abarenkov,

From the outset, the new administration acted as if it
was not bound by the Soviet-American agreement reached in
Vladivostok in November 1974, when the basic framework for
the SALT-2 agreement was determined, or by anything that had
been done by way of implementing the Vladivostok accords.219

Noting that the progress of the SALT talks has been "fitful," Abarenkov
maintains that they finally"got on an even keel in the Autumn of 1978."
However, by winter of 1978, allegations were made in the U.S. press con­
cerning Soviet foot-dragging in the negotiations.220 Abarenkov strongly
counters this accusation in the following passage:

Nothing could be farther from the truth...

If anyone had engaged in feet-dragging and bargaining at the negotiations for many years, it was the USA. The US press wrote on this on many occasions and at considerable length. It is quite obvious that the U.S. administration continues in the same vein. The USSR, on the other hand, has sought to sign a new SALT agreement without delay, believing it would mark a major step both towards limiting strategic weapons and developing Soviet-American relations as a whole.221

The next mention of SALT occurs in July, after the signing of the agreement. Although the analysts are enthused over the signing, their concern over its fate is obvious also. In the July article, Petrovsky presents an optimistic Soviet view of the potential of SALT II.

The Soviet Union attaches great significance to reaching an agreement with the USA on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons. The drafting of the new Soviet-American treaty on this question — SALT-II — will create a definite obstacle to the further stockpiling of the most destructive and expensive weapons. The conclusion of the treaty will also continue the USSR initiated process of curbing the arms race. As soon as the SALT-II treaty comes into effect, work should start on a SALT-III agreement, the task of which is to go even further, put a brake on the development of new weapon types, and envisage not just a limitation on the stockpiling of arms, but also a reduction in them.

The object of the negotiations should be to end the production of nuclear arms of all kinds and gradually reduce and eventually eliminate stockpiles. At some stage in the negotiations it would be possible to discuss, for instance, an end to qualitative improvements in nuclear weapons, to the production of fissionable material for military purposes, a gradual reduction in the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the means of delivery, an elimination of nuclear weapons and means of delivery.

The ending of production, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons must be carried out stage by stage, on a mutually acceptable and agreed basis. The measures to be taken at each stage may be agreed between the participants in the negotiations. . . . The existing balance in nuclear power must be maintained throughout the constant reduction in its levels.222
There is a great amount of stress placed upon the mutual benefits of the treaty. Pavlov and Karenin describe the agreement as being "equally beneficial to all." Of especial importance is the establishment of limitations based on the principle of equal security which the authors describe as "a political and legal expression of the strategic parity existing between the USSR and the USA."

Matveyev makes the strongest presentation of this when he says,

The Soviet Union proceeds from the belief that the new Soviet-American SALT-2 Treaty is a carefully balanced document equally meeting the interests of the USSR and the USA. Its full implementation could be the most important act ever toward curbing the arms race.

The International Affairs analysts also address the problem of verification countering what they believe to be obstructionist tactics by opponents of SALT II in the U.S. Matveyev, Pavlov, and Karenin stress the ability of both sides to verify compliance with existing national technical means.

Despite shifts in the tone of the analysts and periods when arms limitation and disarmament go unmentioned, there is an overall consistency to the positions on arms limitation represented in International Affairs. The SALT negotiations are viewed as extremely valuable for a number of reasons: 1) as an element within, what it is hoped will be, a broader move toward overall disarmament; 2) as part of a general military detente; and 3) as an aid in achieving and enhancing political detente. It is viewed as an integral part of the effort to impose quantitative and qualitative restraints on the arms race. The silences are apparently patterned around crucial negotiating periods and may occur for a variety of reasons that have been mentioned earlier. The changes of
tone have much less to do with positions on arms limitation than they have to do with opinions of the United States. Looking strictly at the evaluations of arms limitation policies, the International Affairs commentators are very supportive of negotiations in this area. They advocate the major principles of Soviet disarmament proposals and maintain the accepted line on questions of equivalence such as forward-based systems and questions of verification such as the use of national technical means.

Summary

There are several elements that are quite striking when the articles from International Affairs are reviewed chronologically. These include: propaganda efforts, patterns of silences, patterns of criticism, consistencies in advocated policies, and changes in attitudes both on policies and in perceptions.

It becomes very obvious that there is a fairly strong line of propaganda running through many of the articles. This seems to be aimed primarily at Third World and neutral countries. Over the ten years examined here there is a fair amount of consistency in the propaganda efforts of the Soviets in regard to arms control and disarmament. Disarmament is a policy that has been supported enthusiastically in international forums by neutral countries. The Soviets apparently attempt to exploit this in their continuous references to the peace-loving forces of Socialism and their very verbal support of general and complete disarmament. According to International Affairs, virtually all the major disarmament initiatives have been made by the Soviets and other Socialist countries.
Besides this positive picture of the role of the USSR in world disarmament efforts, the Soviets also use the issues of arms control and disarmament to attack the United States on several grounds. First is the allegation that the U.S. has generally been obstructionist in its negotiating stance, relying on issues like verification problems to block successful negotiation of arms control agreements. Beyond this, the U.S. record of weapons system research and development demonstrates that the United States is not interested in any sort of meaningful agreement that might inhibit these pursuits. Both these elements demonstrate that the U.S. is basically imperialistic and wants, depending on the specific points in time, either to maintain or to reestablish themselves in a position of strength vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

The issue of military expenditures is emphasized also. This is done in a way that leaves little doubt that the Soviets are trying to gain the support of underdeveloped areas. Besides the damage that is purportedly done to the domestic economy of nations investing heavily in the military, the point is made that smaller military expenditures on the part of major economic powers means the possibility of increased aid to Third World economies.

Finally, the Soviets blame many of the problems of world disarmament on the Chinese. There is a seemingly blatant effort to damage the credibility of the People's Republic of China by painting them as an aggrandizing, imperialistic nuclear power that makes it much more difficult to negotiate disarmament and arms control agreements because of their uncooperative stance. The references to Chinese imperialism and
the failure of the Chinese to participate in many of the multilateral arms limitation agreements are quite frequent, especially during the middle 1970s.

Despite these obvious propaganda ploys, there are many useful and valuable discoveries in the ten year examination of *International Affairs*. The most noticeable are the silences that appear from time to time. These silences suggest a pattern. The most obvious period of silence occurred prior to the signing of SALT I; however, there appear to be similar, although briefer, periods before Vladivostok and during late 1976 and early 1977, and again at the time of SALT II. This period corresponds to a very difficult time in the SALT II negotiations. The breakpoint seems to be Cyrus Vance's March 1977 trip to Moscow. All this implies that there is a hiatus in discussing strategic arms limitations issues in *International Affairs* at times when negotiations are particularly difficult. In addition to this, the time period lengthens because of the publication delay caused by censorship.

Possibly of greater significance is that these silences also seem to presage some of the changes that have been discussed earlier in the positions taken by analysts in this journal. We see this in several instances. The opinion of the United States in general follows this pattern most closely. There are definite changes in expressed perceptions concerning the role of the military-industrial complex and the reactionaries in the government in the United States after the silent period before conclusion of SALT I, with the analysts becoming more positive about the U.S. leadership and viewing the military-industrial complex as a still to be feared but declining influence. This remains
fairly stable until the 1976-77 silence on SALT when we find increasingly hostile perceptions of the U.S. leadership and warnings of the reemergence of the military-industrial complex and their reactionary friends. On a lesser scale, we find a similar pattern emerge concerning parity or equal security.

Another obvious trend in the tenor of the International Affairs analyses is the tendency to become more critical of the United States whenever there is a major snag in the negotiations (or with ratification of the negotiated agreement). It is during these times that the U.S. is painted at its most imperialistic and obstructionist. The other element that seems to provoke the most criticism is U.S. strategic doctrine. Virtually every doctrinal pronouncement by the United States elicits a hostile reaction from the Soviet Union. Most strategic doctrine is seen by the Soviets as an effort to reestablish the U.S. in a position of strength. Additionally, most U.S. doctrine is criticized as being either simplistic or illogical.

There also appears to be some growth in Soviet attitudes in the sense that there is increasing openness and sophistication. Over the ten years considered here, there is a trend toward more forthright discussion of issues and less propagandizing. Although there is always an element of propaganda in the discussions, as time progresses, one has a sense that the propaganda aspect becomes more and more secondary and that the discussions are centered around real issues. What is unclear is if the discussions are aimed at a domestic audience, i.e., attempts at countering an adversary's argument or building a policy consensus, or are they aimed at the United States in an effort to convince us that
agreements are being negotiated in good faith? Of course, there is no reason why the discussions may not be serving a dual purpose. This will be discussed in the concluding chapter to this study.

The increased sophistication is demonstrated by two things. First, there is, over time, an effort to tie arms limitation policies into the political detente between the U.S. and the USSR. This is done not so much along the lines of the Western idea of linkage between arms control issues and other issues like trade, but more as a means of enhancing the political aspects of the relationship. Second, there is greater specificity concerning weapons systems and elements involved in the negotiating process the farther we progress into the 1970s. For instance, although the discussions are very generalized, toward the middle and end of the ten years examined here there are more allusions to capabilities of systems, the growing awareness of both quantitative and qualitative elements, and more frequent references to aspects of verifiability and new weapons systems.

Despite the changes, revisions, and refinements that can be found among the International Affairs analyses, there are also several consistencies. The importance of the Soviet Union's enhanced international status due to changes in the correlation of world forces is ever present either explicitly or implicitly. In turn, the analysts leave little doubt that the Soviets will ever do anything to jeopardize this status, especially make any agreements that might jeopardize the security of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, they believe that disarmament can only increase their security as well as that of all mankind. However, this can only be achieved through general and complete disarmament. As
mentioned earlier, every arms limitation agreement, as well as every
test-ban or non-proliferation agreement, is only a piecemeal approach
to this ultimate goal. Over time, strategic arms limitations agreements
come to play an increasingly central role in this attempt at achieving
disarmament.

Finally, the analysts in *International Affairs* wholeheartedly
support the idea of strategic arms limitation. They believe that nuclear
war, because of its destructiveness, is unacceptable. Certain U.S.
theories such as deterrence are found to be acceptable on a qualified
basis. Deterrence is not logical and probably would eventually fail,
but as long as both sides are willing to abide by its principles, it
will work. The qualification is that, when and if it does fail, the
Soviet Union must be ready to protect itself. Nevertheless, efforts at
strategic arms limitation are extremely important. They can only be
improved if it were also possible to negotiate limitations to research
and development as well as deployment.

In evaluating the hypotheses outlined in Chapter I, it appears that
the *International Affairs* analysts generally fall into the category
Payne calls the "arms controllers." However, the Soviet analysts are
not restricted to Payne's categorization, but go beyond that to broach
subjects that are directly tied into arms policy. In some instances,
their writings appear to directly conflict with the Western characteri-
ization of Soviet "militarism" found in the writings of Pipes, Nitze,
Ermažth and Lambeth. For instance, they oppose the idea of limited war.
This conflicts directly with the characterization of the Soviet stance
on war, including nuclear war, as an extension of policy. They oppose
limited nuclear wars because they fear they cannot be controlled. Never­
theless, they do acknowledge that military considerations, including
strategic doctrine, do have a place in foreign policy. They complain,
however, that the United States does not use its military doctrine as
part of its overall policy but allows military policy to dominate its
foreign policy. It is possible that this apparent conflict may arise
because the "militarism" found by some analysts is drawn primarily from
Soviet military writings. This will be discussed more fully in the
concluding chapter.

Soviet positions on strategic arms, as they appear in International
Affairs, do not correspond with the hardline Western analysts like Pipes
and Nitze. The positions expressed by the Soviet analysts make it quite
clear that they believe a nuclear war to be tantamount to total destruc­
tion for all parties involved. They believe deterrence to be a simplis­
tic and illogical approach but, failing the achievement of a major dis­
armament program, much more attractive than a renewed arms race that
continuously would breed new weapons systems. Nevertheless, they do not
trust deterrence but feel that it is necessary to maintain the best
defense system possible within the limits of existing agreements. Addi­
itionally, they believe that nuclear superiority is unattainable by
either the U.S, or the USSR, and that both deterrence and attempts at
further arms limitation agreements can best be served by a type of parity
based on equal security. This concept is centered not in equal numbers
but in equivalence and encompasses such problems as the inclusion of U.S.
forward based systems within the rubric of strategic forces.
Since the goal of general and complete disarmament has not yet been reached, these analysts see the quantitative and qualitative limitations of strategic arms agreements as the only alternative to a full scale arms race that will ultimately result in nuclear war. They find this to be the only reasonable solution. Neither side will allow the other to gain a unilateral advantage that would give them nuclear superiority. The only alternative is to limit nuclear arms without endangering the national security of either party.

The positions found in International Affairs seem to indicate that there has been discussion of arms policy over the years. Although we see no direct confrontation among opposing positions in this single source, assuming that there has been a body of literature that merits the label "militarist", it would have to be concluded that this literature does not fit into that category.

There has definitely been moderation, if not change, in Soviet positions as they are expressed in the journal over the years examined here. The views of U.S. policymakers, parity, U.S.-Soviet relations, and arms limitation have all shown some movement over time. Whether this is indicative of change at the policymaking level will be discussed later.

As described above, the Soviet analysts in International Affairs also definitely incorporate deterrence in their strategic thinking. At this point it is impossible to address the question of how much weight these non-military analysts carry in Soviet policymaking circles; however, this will be discussed in the concluding chapter.
NOTES


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17. Zimin, p. 69.

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127. Ibid., p. 71.
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170. Ibid., p. 17.
171. Ibid.
172. B. Svetlov, p. 27.
177. Ibid.
178. Stakh, p. 11.
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CHAPTER IV
POSITIONS IN JOURNALS OF THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

This chapter examines the views of the institute academicians who write for the two major journals produced by institutes in the Academy of Sciences that deal with the study of the United States and international relations: SSHA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya and Mirovaja ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya (MEMO). Both publications are serious academic publications. SSHA was created specifically to examine all aspects of the U.S. and Canada but focuses primarily on the U.S. with special emphasis on U.S. political and economic life. The MEMO publication focuses on the entire realm of international politics and the international economic situation. Both journals are comparable somewhat to the American journals Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy, although MEMO is slightly more similar in quality.

SSHA appears to be more focused on arms policy questions and the less comprehensive of the two. It also relies at times on a slightly more polemical tone than does MEMO. Indicative of this is that of the MEMO articles selected for this study there were only half the number of unsigned editorials as were found in SSHA that were relevant over the ten years examined. Nevertheless, both journals rely more on documented arguments and scholarly research than on polemics to make their point; and they draw heavily on U.S. sources in their efforts.
As one might expect, the Soviet position is always heralded as being morally correct and progressive while the Western world is bent on furthering its own self-interests; but, beyond this, the articles in both journals largely appear to use the standard formats of academic analyses. It should be noted, however, that MEMO is slightly more sophisticated, especially in its range of topics, possibly because it is the older of the two. It deals with more technical aspects, especially in economic area, and often in a more analytical fashion. Additionally, although both journals are available to U.S. elites and scholars, SShA may embody a greater propagandistic bias aimed at the U.S. audience because it has been routinely translated by the Joint Publications Research Service since it first appeared in 1970.

Development and Modification of the SShA and MEMO Analyses

SShA apparently started out as a predominantly informational publication designed to improve general knowledge of the United States, presumably among academics and other Soviet sub-elites. A monthly feature that, in the early years, was somewhat indicative of this was the geographic and economic description of a state in the U.S. These descriptions were somewhat reminiscent of elementary social science textbooks found in primary and secondary schools in the United States.

Nevertheless, over the ten years included in this study, there has been a subtle change in emphasis as SShA became more analytical and less informational. This is also noticeable in the editorial pattern. The unsigned editorials on arms policy or some related topic tend to contain more rhetoric than logic; however, most of these appear during the first half of the ten year period. This trend is quite pronounced.
There is only one editorial on the subjects under examination here that appeared between the end of 1974 and 1979. This might also reflect a change in policy emphasis.

SShA analysts tend toward detailed descriptions of U.S. weapons systems and strategic policy. The major change over time is that the discussions become more and more technical in their examination of and attacks on particular weapons systems. Additionally, the SShA analysts are interested in the underlying reasons for U.S. policies. They spend much time analyzing policy stances of various political elements and interest groups in the United States and tend to dwell on the impact of the domestic political situation on U.S.-Soviet relations, especially the effect that domestic politics may have on the arms race and disarmament efforts.

The analysts also seem to be oriented somewhat toward the future as they examine the potential impact of both arms negotiations and weapons development. There are some explicit, as well as implicit, discussions of SALT prior to the signing of the SALT I, the Vladivostok Accords, and SALT II. There are even expectations expressed about the importance of SALT III. Nevertheless, there is an interesting pattern of non-discussion prior to each of these agreements. For instance, although SALT is mentioned a few times during 1971 (September is the last time it is mentioned),\(^1\) it is not mentioned again until April 1972.\(^2\) Additionally, the April article is not especially positive in its orientation toward the possibility of the success of strategic arms limitation. Despite strategic arms limitation being labeled as an aspect of what the author depicts as "realistic trends,"\(^3\) he seems to be preparing the ground for the possible failure of negotiations.
The same pattern is even more pronounced in 1978 and 1979. The possibility of a second SALT agreement is not mentioned at all between November 1978 and July 1979. Somewhat the same pattern prevails during the Vladivostok period. Possibly of even more interest is that during these negotiating periods, specific commentary on SALT is limited primarily to either unsigned editorials or to major commentators like Arbatov and Matveyev. This may indicate that an authoritative stamp of approval is being placed on the policy of pursuing arms limitation agreements.

The articles in SSHA consistently deal very specifically with most aspects of U.S. strategic doctrine and weapons systems. This is tied to views about militarism in the United States and the inordinate influence of the military-industrial complex on arms policymaking and U.S. policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in general. However, the understanding of the political intricacies that influence U.S. policies becomes more and more refined over the period 1970-79. For instance, some articles in 1976 discuss the negative impact of the presidential campaign on the detente and disarmament process. The general argument concerning the impact of the elections is that the right and the military-industrial complex have used negative propaganda about the strategic arms agreement to create a situation in which forces and political figures who, from the Soviet point of view, generally have a more realistic grasp of the situation have also adopted negative attitudes.

Concomitant to this are continuous attacks by the SSHA commentators on forces in the United States that talk of "gaps" between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and that build the myth of a "Soviet threat." Although
this is a recurrent theme throughout the period examined here, the analysts' responses change considerably over time from heated denial to detailed explanations of why the myth is perpetuated by groups within the U.S.6

The correlation of forces and peaceful coexistence are two themes that prevail throughout the ten year period. The correlation of economic, military and social forces is seen as having changed in the favor of the Soviets and to have created a situation in which peaceful coexistence is the only path open for the resolution of problems between the United States and the Soviet Union. Detente is apparently a more refined version of peaceful coexistence. While peaceful coexistence is apparently an inevitable occurrence, detente is the diplomatic and political regularization of peaceful coexistence.

As it is often pointed out by SShA analysts, peaceful coexistence is a policy that has been advocated by Soviet leaders since Lenin as the only possible way disparate socio-economic systems can maintain themselves. The alternative would be the eventual elimination of one of them. Accordingly, as the correlation of forces has changed in favor of the socialist systems, the Western capitalist systems have had to abandon their hopes of eliminating the preeminent socialist state, the Soviet Union, and to accede to the inevitability of peaceful coexistence. This has resulted in a concerted diplomatic and political effort by both sides to regularize this into detente by means of various agreements covering virtually all aspects of interaction between the two parties. Strategic arms limitation and other arms control agreements, such as test ban treaties, are only one of the aspects of this whole relationship.
Over the ten years examined here, SShA establishes itself as a major forum for arms policy analysis. Generally, articles have become more detailed over the years. Rather than simple criticisms of or attacks on U.S. strategic thinking, analysts develop lengthy explanations of the problems with U.S. doctrine. Various aspects of arms control are also discussed more explicitly. Probably the most striking aspect is the effort to analyze the forces behind U.S. policy stances. Over the years all of the veins of analysis reflect greater depth and detail while polemical arguments recede into the background.

The analysts in mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia (MEMO) share many characteristics with their colleagues at SShA. Most obvious is that the patterns of non-discussion found in SShA also prevail in MEMO with silences before SALT I and SALT II and a noticeable decrease in the number of articles appearing during the Vladivostok period. The tenor of MEMO is similar also, although generally more hostile to the U.S. They also follow similar patterns of criticism of the U.S. during the middle of the decade. This prevails until the period shortly before SALT II.

Nevertheless, there are several differences between the types of analyses found in the two journals. First, not surprisingly, is that there is a much greater emphasis on the economics of the arms race than is found in SShA. Secondly, most of the discussions in MEMO focus more on the overall international situation including the activities of the United Nations and only occasionally do the analysts focus solely on the United States. This is reflected in the fact that in ten years MEMO produced approximately one-half as many articles involving
arms policy topics or detente as were found in SShA. A third difference is that MEMO analysts differ considerably in the points on which they focus in their analysis of factors that are considered to be part of their overall perspective on arms policy in this study.

Like SShA, there is some variety in the opinions expressed by MEMO analysts; however, most of their articles focus primarily on the positive prospects for and aspects of the control of nuclear weapons, especially strategic weapons. This focus by MEMO analysts is centered much more on the broader issue of disarmament while their colleagues in SShA frequently limit their analysis to bilateral arms control issues between the U.S. and the USSR. MEMO analysts also place more emphasis on the necessity of restricting the arms race and preventing nuclear war. On the whole, they seem to stress arms limitation more than the SShA writers do. MEMO analysts also emphasize the principle of peaceful coexistence and the concept of detente more, especially as the decade progresses. On the other hand, MEMO analysts are much less interested in U.S. strategic policies and weapons systems but do spend much time discussing the military-industrial complex and its efforts to continue the arms race, prevent detente, and frustrate efforts at arms control. Finally, where SShA focuses a fair amount of attention on parity, equality and equal or identical security, these concepts are generally ignored until the middle of the decade by MEMO analysts and are then only mentioned sporadically and generally in conjunction with arms limitation.

In general, MEMO is primarily a scholarly journal whose analysts rely on Western scholarly journals, for instance, Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy; scholarly books; government and institute (i.e.,
SIPRI) reports; and major Western newspapers like the New York Times. This also differs slightly from SShA which uses a wider variety of newspaper sources and several news magazines as well as sources similar to those used by MEMO. As mentioned earlier, MEMO has a broader international focus, often placing arms policy in the context of foreign policy. This is especially apparent in lengthy discourses on Vietnam and the Middle East which tie the arms race to a generally imperialistic foreign policy stance taken by the U.S. MEMO also appears to take a more philosophical or theoretical tone in its articles, stressing principles of international relations like peaceful coexistence and discussing the various elements involved in the development of international relations and relations between the USSR and the United States.

SShA and MEMO Positions on and Opinions of the United States and Its Policies

Throughout the first year of publication, SShA analysts present a slightly hostile and suspicious evaluation of the United States; however, there are some moderating factors. In one of the major articles in the premiere issue, G. Arbatov notes that following World War II the U.S. emerged as the "hegemonic power of the capitalist world and possessor of a monopoly of atomic weapons" and that this "caused the inseparable tie of their foreign policy strategy to the employment of military force." Despite changes in the international situation that altered U.S. hegemony and ended her nuclear monopoly, the United States, according to Arbatov, continued to rely on military force. However, Arbatov argues that the United States has reached a point where reliance on military force is open to question.
A situation has developed in which the preservation and, what is more, the activization of a course directed toward strengthening the military might and international influence of the United States, in the opinion of many sober thinking Americans, even of those who represent ruling circles, is beginning to threaten serious internal complications and the undermining of the foundations of the "national might of the United States." From this follows the deep divergence in the ruling circles themselves, in the very "political elite".9

This picture of the early 1970s as a pivotal point in U.S. attitudes and of policies that are in an extremely precarious position is reinforced by Arbatov's colleagues.10

The general situation is viewed as a potentially major reorientation in U.S. policy that is opposed by the military-industrial complex but supported by other elements in U.S. politics. Those who are part of the military-industrial complex are accused of advocating a continuation of the arms race.11 Echoing Arbatov's evaluation of the historical role of the use of force in U.S. foreign policy, Gromyko says that a "feature of U.S. diplomacy in the fifties and sixties was the broad intrusion of the American military into its sphere of activity."12

The continued aggressive nature of United States' policies are emphasized by two discussants at a SSbA panel on the "Nixon Doctrine." N.N. Arkad'yev acknowledges some moderations of U.S. foreign policy but also argues that

What remains unchanged is the imperialistic, aggressive nature of the U.S. policy; by no means has the major reliance on force as the chief means of attaining foreign-policy goals been annulled; there has been no lessening of the attempt on the part of the American ruling circles to undermine the unity of the socialist community, to discredit communism, or to carry out ideological subversion.13

His colleague, V.V. Zhurkin, argues that the basis of "crisis" policy in the United States is "the use of force, primarily military force, in
various forms.” He maintains that Washington has developed three basic types of force use:

The first type is the demonstration of force in order to frighten, to intimidate, for purposes of blackmail, or sometimes also as a bluff.

The second type is represented by comparatively brief actions, more or less clearly limited in time, which are carried out with the active use of armed forces.

And, finally, the third type is represented by prolonged combat actions, which in actuality, constitute what the American theoreticians of military policy call limited wars.

The role of the use of force in U.S. foreign policy is indicative of the influence of the military-industrial complex in U.S. political circles. According to one analyst, over the decade of the 1960s, the influence of this complex has grown and this is reflected in the "marked increase in the number of representatives or supporters of the military-industrial complex in the upper political strata." This grouping shares common interests and goals. According to G.N. Tsagolov, these shared interests include:

... an increase in the share of the national budget earmarked for military purposes -- the creation and retention on a permanent basis of a war economy and wartime business conditions. Tension and world conflict play into the hands of the military-state-monopoly bourgeoisie, this grouping is a most reactionary and dangerous force.

This has made the U.S. military-industrial complex the chief proponent of the arms race. B.G. Dostupov maintains that it "has now been transformed into a force vitally interested in the arms race as the source of its existence and enrichment.”

Despite the roles of the military-industrial complex and the use of force in U.S. foreign policy, there are events and forces that impel moderation of U.S. policies and the possibility of improved circumstances
between the Soviet Union and the United States. These are characterized by the development within the United States of what Arbatov has characterized as "sober thinking forces". This characterization is a recurrent theme in SShA articles throughout 1970 and into 1971.

These "sober thinking forces" want to restrain the arms race. According to Larianov, there exists in the early 1970s "an impressive opposition, which embraces not only the U.S. public's progressive strata but also representatives of the 'loyal' opposition in U.S. ruling circles, [which] opposes the further buildup of strategic arms."

Tsagolov elaborates on the composition of the "loyal" opposition:

Within the American Congress, especially the Senate, there are many who actively oppose an increase in military expenditures and the continuation of the arms race, and their ranks have recently swelled. This reflects the obvious fact among the general public, there is a general struggle unfolding against this military-state-monopoly grouping, and many representatives of the ruling circles are even speaking out in opposition to its increasing influence.

At the same time, it is completely obvious that by no means all scientists and employees go along with the military-state-monopoly group. Especially clear evidence of this is the protest by many scientific representatives in universities against militarization of the economy, particularly in its scientific sphere, and against the government's aggressive foreign policy course. Among those in favor of arms limitations can be seen even the names of a number of former government advisors on military-technical problems, specifically such names as Weisner, York, Kistiakowsky, and Rathjens.

The struggle between these two groups, one advocating the continuation of the arms race and the other opposing it and promoting arms negotiations, is a recurrent theme throughout the 1970s in SShA. Depending on the state of strategic arms limitations agreements at any given time, either one of the groups is characterized as being ascendant.

In the months preceding the 1972 Summit, writers in SShA appear hopeful but wary in their view of the outcome of the struggle between
the two groups. They are especially critical of the use of what they view as a fabricated "Soviet threat" by the proponents of a continued arms race that is used to create a hostile environment for Soviet-American relations. The outcome of the May 1972 Summit is considered to be a significant step in "improving the political climate in the world and creating a stable peace," but it must continuously be guarded from threats by regressive or reactionary circles in the West.

Although the next few years are viewed by the SSPhA analysts as a period when the group advocating a more realistic foreign policy and supporting improved relations with the Soviet Union is in the more dominant position, they also caution the reader about the continuous, active opposition of hostile forces. However, toward the end of 1974, the analysis of the struggle between these two forces reflects what is perceived to be a return to a hardening of the U.S. line. This view of the domestic forces is reinforced by the rhetoric of the U.S. Presidential race, and the renewed allegations of a "Soviet threat." This situation persists through 1977 into 1978 with the United States being blamed for delaying progress on SALT negotiations, continuing the arms race, and being responsible for the stagnation of Soviet-American relations. Some analysts even express fear over a return to the cold war. Nevertheless, in mid-1978, there appears to be some sign of hope for the revitalization of the normalization process in Soviet-American relations according to some SSPhA commentators, but these hopes tend to be guarded with the analysts continuing to warn of strong opposition to detente in the U.S.
Interestingly enough there is no discussion of this or any subject related to strategic arms limitation for the next seven months. When discussion of the topic resumes in July 1979, the focus is on the importance of the new strategic arms agreement; however, the problems encountered prior to the agreement and the potential dangers to its future are described in an unsigned, lead article in SShA in July.

The intrigues of the opponents of detente seriously delayed progress in many directions, including the sphere of arms limitation. Under pressure from the "hawks" the American side virtually formed the intention of foisting on its partner in the talks conditions which amounted to the desire to insure American military-strategic superiority, and therefore to violate the parity which had become established and recognized by both sides, thereby setting in motion a new spiral in the arms race. That is why, after the agreement in principle in Vladivostok in November 1974, the SALT II talks lasted another 4.5 years and the new treaty was only signed two years after the expiry of SALT I...

Although the opponents of detente and arms limitation did not succeed in wrecking the signing of the SALT II treaty, they have not renounced their attempts to render null and void the accord which has been reached. Judging by reports from Washington, such attempts could take various forms, including that of introducing unilateral "amendments" to the treaty, so as to wreck its ratification by the Senate.³⁶

This passage not only summarizes the role of the "hawks" in trying to block agreements but also echoes a general tone that is prevalent in SShA articles throughout the second half of the 1970s — the failure to reach an arms limitation agreement lies with the United States. Throughout the rest of 1979, SShA analysts continue to focus on what has turned into a major political battle between the proponents and opponents of detente and strategic arms limitation in the United States.

In general, the SShA analysts may be described as having a positive but wary opinion of the United States. They appreciate the extremely complicated circumstances surrounding policy debates in the U.S. and
spend much of their time analyzing the elements involved. Over the years, they have moved from viewing the U.S. from a slightly negative perspective to a guardedly positive one; but, toward the end of the decade, there is a gradual but relatively continual return to negativism.

Underlying the Soviet view of this struggle presented in SShA is an attack on the trends that are seen to be developing in U.S. strategic thinking. Few opinions about the United States, except for those about the military-industrial complex and its "more realistic" opponents, appear in articles by SShA analysts. Most of the articles center on either strategic arms limitation or U.S. strategic policy. Despite the fact that opinions about the U.S. are an implicit part of these topics, they are not dealt with here but in separate sections of this chapter.

One of the striking things about the SShA analysts' presentation of their positions on the United States is that those positions are so closely tied to other elements. One of these is the necessity of stopping the arms race, a goal they see as often being thwarted by the United States or some groups in the U.S. Another is the importance and irreversibility of the changing correlation of world forces.

It was noted earlier that MEMO analysts spend much less time discussing the United States and its policies, especially strategic policies and weapons development. References to strategic policies, when they appear, usually are tied to other elements like the analysts' general opinions toward the United States or their positions on the arms race and arms control. Nevertheless, some positions on U.S. strategic policies are apparent in these other elements and will be discussed with them.
During the early 1970s the initial tone taken toward the United States was guardedly hostile, focusing primarily on the militaristic aspects of U.S. policies. There was much emphasis placed on the arms race and the role of the military-industrial complex in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy and the promotion of the arms race. This was portrayed as characteristic of U.S. militarism and was manifested in U.S. imperialism and aggression in the Third World, especially Vietnam. Nevertheless, from the middle through the end of 1971, this characterization became more moderate. The last several articles of 1971 reflected much concern for the possibilities of alleviating the arms race and a more moderate perspective on the United States.

The first issue of MEMO in 1970 carried an article by Solodovnik which somewhat set the tone for the next year and a half. He charged that there was "increased interpenetration" of military and political strategy in the policies of imperialist states that has led to an ideology of "militaristic anticommunism." Militarism's influence is reflected in the use of the threat of nuclear and conventional wars as an "international club" by imperialist states and especially by the U.S. Solodovnik argued that the militaristic policies and the resources needed to implement those policies do not match. Therefore, U.S. policies are unrealistic.

A few months later, Bugrov discussed what he described as the system of state-monopoly capitalism in the United States. The military-industrial complex is a component of this system. Indeed, the military-industrial complex is the vital link between the state and the monopolies (corporations) because it is through the Pentagon that millions
of dollars are distributed to the monopolies by means of orders for military goods. Bugrov charged that "the Clickish interests of the military-industrial complex's unrestrained militarism try to identify themselves with the national interest." The combining of the ties between the monopolies and the military-industrial complex inside the Pentagon with the complex's identification with the national interest leads to extensive military expenditures.

In June 1971, Faramazian made arguments similar to those of Solodovnik and Bugrov. He stated that "Imperialism and militarism are inseparable one from the other," and described the military-industrial complex as a union of military-industrial companies, military circles, and government bureaucrats which tries to aggravate the arms race through militaristic propaganda. On the other hand, this same issue of MEMO also signalled a shift in perspective. The lead article was the first to promote a softer line that focused on disarmament and detente.

Despite this first indication that there might be some moderation of attitudes in MEMO, the next several articles still focused on the more militaristic aspect of U.S. policies. One author argues that changes in U.S. strategic policies based on "peace principles" are simply an effort to carry on the attack against socialism from a position more advantageous to the United States. In another article, Mil'shteyn takes a dim view of the apparent shift in U.S. doctrine. It is all aimed, according to Mil'shteyn, at the main goal — "to secure the building of the United States of America's policies of imperialistic aggression." This estimation is reinforced by figures presented in the same issue by Faramazian on military expenditures by Western countries.
The perspective presented in MEMO changed to a more positive one over the next several years. Analyses of the composition and pre-eminence of the military-industrial complex gave way to references to the complex's opposition to the developments in the improvement of Soviet-American relations. The developmental history of U.S. policies is also reviewed at length. However, after SALT I was signed, analysts began to describe the circumstances that had brought about the acceptance of better relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Zhurkin gave a concise account of the new situation a few months after the May 1972 summit.

Definitive and highly significant changes have occurred in the approach of ruling U.S. circles, influential parts of which have applied a more realistic appraisal to present international conditions and expressed readiness to begin the line of steps promoting detente. Naturally, that struggle between representatives of diverse tendencies in the USA will continue farther, but undoubtedly, the position of supporters of the normalization of the international situation for some time past will be consolidated, especially as a result of the Soviet-American negotiations.47

This is the general view presented over the next several years; however, as early as 1973, problems began to arise and analysts took note that efforts were being made in the U.S. to revive the Cold War. 48

By the end of 1974, the Pentagon and other reactionary U.S. forces had begun to have a negative effect on the normalization process. Kal-iadin mentioned this in an article that appeared the same month as the Vladivostok meeting. The impact of reactionary forces is reflected in the "militaristic propaganda" of the "threat of war with the USSR,"49 and the unrealistic opposition to military detente and disarmament promoted by these reactionary, anticommmunist groups. 50 The position of U.S.
reactionaries evident in the doctrines, like nuclear war, and the new weapons systems that are promoted by the Pentagon. 51

With the agreements that came out of the Vladivostok meeting, MEMO analysts again assert that realistic tendencies are prevailing within U.S. ruling circles. 52 However, this is mixed with a growing uneasiness over the maneuvers of reactionary forces and warnings about the dangers of turning away from the path of normalizing Soviet-American relations. 53 Over the next four years the wariness of reactionary circles in the United States increases at a fairly steady rate. This is evident in both the increase in the number of references to the U.S. or Western military-industrial complex and in the growing number of references to military doctrine and weapons systems. It is also evident in the occurrence of cue words such as "nuclear catastrophe," "arms race," "equality," and "Soviet threat."

One of the recurrent themes of this period is that the Cold War is being revived by elements in the United States. Primakov refers to "circles of imperialist reaction" who want to "continue to think in the categories of the 'cold war' trying to destabilize the strategic balance." 54 An unsigned article in December 1975 noted that there are two intense influences on the formation of foreign policy in the U.S. -- those antagonistic to detente and improved Soviet-American relations and those realistic thinking leaders who support normalization. 55 This view of a bifurcated influence on U.S. policy persisted for some time.

By the middle of 1976, this perspective becomes much more important because of the apparent impact the "reactionary" forces are having in the United States. According to Svetlov, the "forces of militarism and
reaction" have resorted to promoting the "myth" of a "Soviet threat." This myth is used by military circles to continue the arms race through the development of new systems like Trident and the B-1 bomber.

At the end of 1976, this negative perspective became more pronounced. Faramazian notes that the history of the arms race has been marked by the "myth" of the "Soviet Threat" and that this myth has been perpetuated because of various so-called "gaps." He argues that recently military circles in the U.S. have exploited the "false thesis of the 'dangerous gap' with the Soviet Union 'in general military expenditures' and the 'building up of military power.'" This is the result, according to these circles, of Soviet efforts to achieve "military superiority" over the West. These fabrications, in turn, are used by the aggressive forces in the U.S. to promote the building up of military power and the continuation of the arms race. Moreover, they are part of an effort to return to the time of the Cold War.

This same theme appears over and over again in 1977 and 1978.

The range of forces involved in the process of detente are too broad for them to be homogenous. Side by side with the sincere, fervent supporters of it, there are those who have hesitated, having doubts. Clearly, in light of such an arrangement of things in the treatment of detente, there are (and it is even inevitable) various opinions provoking discussions.

However, there are also enough influential circles, who have come out openly against detente. They are trying very hard in their efforts to wreck this beneficial process, changing it back to the 'cold war,' to undisguised anti-Soviet anti-communism.

Special emphasis is given by the enemies of detente to the exaggeration of the myth of a so-called "Soviet Threat."

This propaganda, which in the last months has reached huge proportions, especially in the USA, is used by them on one side to intimidate public opinion to get new billions in weapons, and on the other -- not to allow the implementation of constructive measures in the region of restraining the arms race, tying together beforehand the hands of the new U.S. administration.
As Kelin points out, there are those in the United States who oppose the course chosen by reactionary circles. Although the articles appearing in MEMO during this period demonstrate a great deal of concern over the developments brought about by reactionary forces in the United States, most also imply that other forces are possibly having an ameliorative effect on the situation. This is apparent in an article by Razmerov. He described the efforts of the reactionary, militaristic, military-industrial complex of imperialism in trying to block detente, return to the Cold War, and accelerate the arms race; however, he also acknowledged that there are those in the ruling circles who see detente as the best way to strengthen peace and promote universal security.63

Most of these discussions emphasized the danger to the world if the efforts of the reactionary circles persist. A new spiral in the arms race would, as Simonyan said, bring the world to the "brink of nuclear catastrophe."64 Similar references to the danger of nuclear catastrophe and the threat of nuclear war appear several times between 1975 and the end of 1978.65

In the last article of 1978, Simonyan is very critical of the direction U.S. policy has taken in the late 1970s. This discussion has a fairly strident, almost threatening tone to it and is especially critical of U.S. strategic doctrine. His starting point is the article by Richard Pipes that appeared in Commentary in June 1977. Without answering Pipes's charges, he made them appear absurd by implication. Simonyan also found the policies emanating from this type of thinking absurd,66 Simonyan maintained that the United States is the "center of aggressive strategy"67 and that the arms race is the responsibility of
All of this is evident in such things as the development of new weapons systems, especially types like neutron weapons; the creation of new doctrines like "realistic deterrence," "limited nuclear war," and a return to the concepts of "counterforce" in U.S. military strategy; and, finally, in the appearance of groups like the Committee for the Present Danger.

Discussions of this sort almost cease after 1978; however, following the signing of SALT II, there are references to efforts by what Zhurkin calls the "war circles" in the United States to defeat the ratification of the SALT II agreement. In this article Zhurkin foresaw Senate ratification as a difficult task because the forces opposed to detente had consolidated their forces.

The MEMO analysts displayed a pattern somewhat similar to that found in SSHa in their attitudes toward the United States. Most attitudes are policy oriented and react to conditions the analysts perceive to be developing in the United States. Thus, as the U.S. appears conciliatory during the SALT I era, perceptions of MEMO analysts reflect a similar orientation. However, as the U.S. policymaking apparatus began to fall prey to internal debates over strategy and orientations toward further arms limitation agreements, the writers in MEMO became more hostile to reactionary elements in U.S. policy circles. This was a relative trend from 1974 through 1979 except for brief periods in conjunction with the Vladivostok and SALT II agreements. There was even very similar treatment of the phenomenon that appeared in the U.S. called the "Soviet threat."
There is one slight variation in MEMO analyses as compared to those in SShA. The MEMO articles are slightly more negative in their orientations toward the United States. This apparently is a function of the breadth of the MEMO articles. They deal with several aspects of world politics and discuss these from an international perspective; therefore, there are many more frequent references to such things as U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the U.S. relationship with Israel.

On the other hand, MEMO analysts, like others examined here, tend to view the United States as a nation undergoing an extensive period of reassessment and reorientation. This has come about due to the U.S.'s belated and hesitant acceptance of the correlation of forces that exists in the modern world.

Correlation of Forces and Its Relation to Peaceful Coexistence in SShA and MEMO

The concept correlation of forces is seen as having changed in the favor of the Soviet Union and to be continuing to change away from the United States. It is a term that is used with increasing frequency into 1976 and then apparently falls into disuse. The correlation of forces, as it is used in SShA, is a phrase referring to a realignment of military, economic, social, and political forces in the world in favor of socialism. Analysts in SShA tend to favor the phrase "balance of forces" when referring to the realignment of military capability in the post-World War II period. The realignment of military, economic, political and social forces is crucial because the changed correlation of forces has brought about, according to SShA, the realization of the long-advocated policy of peaceful coexistence.
...all this does not detract from the significance of what has been achieved, the positive changes which are taking place in the world or the increasingly broad assertion in international relations of the principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems.

The general change in the alignment of forces in the international arena in favor of the forces of peace and social progress undoubtedly lies at the bottom of those changes.\textsuperscript{75}

This has all led directly to efforts to control the arms race.

This link between peaceful coexistence and arms control in the form of disarmament is described in the first issue of SShA.

For the Soviet Union, the course of disarmament, including various political measures, is the traditional policy, a policy which follows from the unchanging foreign policy line on peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems and which arises from the basic principles and vital interests of our country.\textsuperscript{76}

Nevertheless, the term is mentioned only sporadically until May of 1972, after which it is used with increased frequency. Peaceful coexistence is believed by the analysts to be growing stronger and to be an alternative to war as a way of dealing with the differences between different types of systems.

We note with satisfaction that the policy of peaceful coexistence in international relations is increasingly gaining the upper hand as time passes.

There is no need to emphasize once again that the struggle of ideologies by no means weakens the very ideal of peaceful coexistence. Differences concerning the best ways of society's social and economic organization do not entail a military clash as a logical conclusion.\textsuperscript{77}

An aspect of the increasing strength of peaceful coexistence is embodied in one of the agreements of 1972, the "Basic Principles of Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States" that was signed along with the strategic arms limitation agreement and the ABM treaty in May 1972 and which, according to Arbatov, "include the principle of
peaceful coexistence.\textsuperscript{78} Despite the strength demonstrated by peaceful
coexistence, the writers in SShA warn that there are limits on the
spheres to which it is applicable. Peaceful coexistence means that
military confrontations can be avoided and scientific, cultural, economic,
and educational cooperation can take place but "it must not be forgotten
that peaceful coexistence does not extend to the field of ideological
struggle."\textsuperscript{79}

G. Arbatov stresses this limitation on peaceful coexistence in an
article on the influence of the scientific-technical revolution on
U.S. foreign policy.

As has been noted, the movement which is currently taking
place away from cold war toward the establishment of the
principles of peaceful coexistence in relations between states
with different social systems does not and cannot mean an end
to the historically inevitable class struggle between capitalism
and socialism but is leading the historically inevitable class
struggle into nonmilitary spheres, to the increased significance
of nonmilitary "strength factors." Moreover, if the trends
toward relaxation are preserved and further developed -- a
great deal must, of course, change in the nature and forms of
the struggle in the above-mentioned spheres. . . .\textsuperscript{80}

Arbatov proceeds to discuss the extensive impact scientific and technolog­
ical developments have had on U.S. foreign policy. He notes that
these developments create strains between old alliances and make the
U.S. more dependent on regions of the world that are more likely to be
part of the changing correlation of forces. Arbatov then moves on to
Soviet-American relations.

. . . on the question of how the growing influence of the scien­
tific and technical revolution on U.S. foreign policy could be
reflected in its relations with the Soviet Union. . . it seems
necessary to dwell primarily on those changes which the very
transition from the cold war to peaceful coexistence could and
should make to relations between states with different social
systems.

Of course, the sphere of the changes can be understood
narrowly -- merely as the U.S. ruling circles' recognition
of the new correlation of forces in the world, the suicidal nature of attempts to unleash war against the USSR, and hence the need to shift the stress onto other bridgeheads of the struggle. Even this in itself is a major positive change because it lessens the danger of war and creates broader possibilities for strengthening peace.

But if it is merely a question of just this change, this does not yet signify the surmounting of the cold war and the relaxation of all positive possibilities inherent in the idea of peaceful coexistence. The latter, of course, does not and cannot mean the cessation of the class struggle between capitalism and socialism. But genuine peaceful coexistence is something more than the simple absence of war, and this is clearly shown by the peace program drawn up by the 24th party congress and the practical policy pursued by the Soviet Union on its basis.

And if the process of changes which have now embraced international relations leaves all this untouched, leading only to a limitation in the sphere of armed struggle, this will in no way signify an end to the cold war — it too was waged chiefly on nonmilitary bridgeheads. Something greater is necessary in order to be finished with it and really consolidate detente and the normalization of the situation. Also necessary is the renunciation of those forms and methods of a struggle which were established during the cold war.

If it is a question of the bridgehead of ideology, then this should mean the renunciation of the propaganda of war and hatred of other countries, slander, and various subversive methods. The inevitable struggle for people's minds will then be waged in form and by methods which will not harm peaceful coexistence and the normal processes of normalization of the international situation.

If it is a greater question of an economic bridgehead, this must mean a transition to such forms of economic competition which would not only not exclude but would advance broad international cooperation on the basic principles of advantage and cooperation strengthening peaceful relations among states.

These are the changes for which Soviet foreign policy is fighting. The question is whether the capitalist countries, particularly the United States will make these changes.

Although the term peaceful coexistence had come into frequent use by the middle 1970s, a similar term, detente, was used sparingly. It is impossible to tell whether this was due to the fact that peaceful coexistence was a Soviet concept, used for several decades prior to the Soviet-American detente, that analysts were reluctant to abandon for another term or if this was because there were some subtle semantic
differences between the two that analysts were attempting to preserve.
The general impression from the SSHA articles of the early 1970s is that there is a different tone about the two concepts. Detente apparently is perceived as being more closely linked with military issues (strategic arms, mutual force reductions, limiting the use of force) under consideration in negotiations over Soviet-American relations while at the same time it is perceived as implying a more inclusive relaxation of tensions than the Soviets find acceptable. Peaceful coexistence, on the other hand, means the avoidance of the use of force to resolve conflicts and cooperation over a broad range of scientific, cultural, and economic issues. However, it does not mean that tensions will not or should not exist between the two countries. Indeed, especially in the ideological sphere, they will persist.

Only in the mid-1970s do the SSHA commentators appear to use the two terms in a more symbiotic manner. Discussing some of the problems that hinder the movement toward detente, Trofimenko argues that part of the problem arises from different, even conflictual, understandings of the concept of peaceful coexistence. At this point, the analysts seem to broaden the definition of detente to fit more closely with the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence. This is apparent in an article by Arbatov. In a discussion of the impact of the shift from cold war to detente and what that meant in terms of the reorientations necessary for the parties involved, he maintains that the only difficult question for the Soviets in approaching detente is whether or not the West, the U.S. and its allies, can be trusted. This arises, according to Arbatov, because of the constant hostility of the West to the Soviet Union since
the revolution. Nevertheless, the Soviets are able to accept the idea of detente more easily because of their general perspective. The West must undergo "an agonizing reappraisal of values" to accept detente. But if one talks about the Soviet world outlook, the Soviet view of the world, detente did not necessitate the scrapping of that. Peaceful coexistence with capitalism has been the most important principle -- the doctrine, as it were -- of Soviet foreign policy since Lenin's time. For the Soviet Union the course aimed at detente, peaceful coexistence, and the broadening of international cooperation is not a tactical maneuver but one of the basic principles of its policy -- a policy stemming from its fundamental objectives and interests, which require stable peace and the concentration of forces, funds, and resources on the ambitious tasks of the further development of Soviet society.84

Another article states that the "progress of the USSR and United States from confrontation to relations of peaceful coexistence and cooperation has been defined as the process of detente."85 While chiding the U.S. for having to borrow a term for the process from the French, the article continues to reinforce the interconnection of the concepts of peaceful coexistence and detente. "There are now few people even among those skeptical toward detente who would question that something has changed as a result of the formal assumption of commitments by the USSR and the United States to peaceful coexistence and cooperation."86 Peaceful coexistence and/or detente are referred to often in the middle 1970s and, again and again, their importance is reaffirmed. An editorial in July 1974 speaks of this in the context of the third summit in late June and early July in Moscow.

... Soviet and U.S. leaders, taking their first meeting as a point of departure, examined most important questions relating to bilateral relations and the international situation as a whole and signed a number of new agreements developing detente in Soviet-U.S. relations on a long term basis. The results of the
Moscow meeting thereby made an important contribution to the cause of strengthening detente throughout the world and making it irreversible.²⁷

It quickly becomes evident that this claim of irreversibility by SSStA may be more than the dynamics of history. It may be fear of the alternative.

Virtually as they are singing the praises of detente and peaceful coexistence, the SSStA analysts also begin to fight a rearguard action to defend them against threats they see arising in the West. Much of this takes place in the context of presenting the alternative to these two policies. Mil'shteyn and Semeyko describe the situation quite bluntly.

Of course, this reassessment [of the possibility] of the use of force as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy has taken place under conditions of complex struggle and in the conflict of contradictory approaches. Nevertheless, the U.S. leading circles' recognition of the need to prevent a general nuclear catastrophe, having become one of the main preconditions of contemporary international detente, has been a very important condition of the recognition in the West of another fact — the only alternative to nuclear destruction can be peaceful coexistence.

It is perfectly understandable what tremendous significance for the conservation of peace on our planet attaches to the assertion of the inadmissibility of a nuclear conflict and the vital importance of peaceful coexistence as the principles of the foreign policy of states and primarily of the two main nuclear powers. . . .³⁸

The authors fear the emergence of groups in the U.S. that do not adhere to the principles of peaceful coexistence or the existing agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States but wish to broaden the "usability of nuclear weapons."³⁹ They argue that the better . . . path is the path of detente, a radical improvement in the international situation, arms limitation, disarmament, and the assertion of the principles of peaceful coexistence and cooperation among states to their full extent. This is the only reliable way of creating strong and truly unshakeable guarantees of peace. This is the magnetic force, and the Soviet Union is a firm advocate of this path.⁰
N.D. Turkatenko takes a similar view. He argues that the principles of peaceful coexistence are "producing increasingly tangible results every year." This has not occurred without opposition, however, but in spite of it.

Despite all the difficulties and complexities of the problems inherent in contemporary international relations, despite the intrigues of the enemies of peace and detente and despite the assertions of the pessimists and the skeptics to the effect that detente is exhausted when it has barely begun, the political realities of the present day steadily continue to be determined by the constant factor of the changed correlation of forces in the world. The principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different socioeconomic systems and the development between them of businesslike, mutually advantageous relations and cooperation, which even until recently were rejected by capitalist countries' ruling circles as 'dangerous' or at any rate 'impracticable,' have now not only won truly worldwide recognition, but have indeed become the fundamental trend in international political life.

Yu. F. Oleshchuk also describes the groups in the U.S. hindering the process of detente. He maintains that these groups are advancing the proposition of "limited detente," which he also characterizes as a "contradictory and essentially frail surrogate of peaceful coexistence." This has all come about because of the hindering groups -- having failed to "refute the need for detente. . .[they] wish to reduce it." Nevertheless, Oleshchuk argues that rather than "reducing detente to some kind of 'acceptable minimum,'" that "a stable peace and genuine security are the only real basis for resolution of urgent problems" and this "can be achieved only through active implementation of the principles of peaceful coexistence in their undistorted, unabbreviated form."

Toward the end of 1975, the attacks in SShA on groups opposing detente became more harsh. This occurred in response to charges from those groups that detente was a one-sided affair of benefit only to the
Soviet Union. This response first became apparent in an article by Valentin Berezhkov in which he explained why detente was so complex but was also so important and advantageous for both sides.

Detente is not something final, but a kind of transitional period from a past system of relations characterized by exacerbation of international tension and constant danger of armed conflict toward completely new mutual relations wherein war will be eliminated once and for all from the life of human society. Detente is not an exacerbation of conflict situations but, on the contrary, an easing of them via political understandings.

The present historical period is particularly complex and contradictory also because essentially for the first time in history mankind is making a serious attempt to build relations between states on a completely new foundation. For centuries various state formations have made it their main aim to build up force in order to fight other countries. The periods of peace were only a brief respite between wars which were essentially only a continuation of the same policy but by other, violent means.

It was only when, as a result of the elimination by the Soviet Union of the United States' nuclear monopoly and as a result of the tremendous economic successes of the whole socialist community and also of a number of other factors on the international and domestic planes, the U.S. ruling circles had to recognize their parity in the military sphere with the Soviet Union that the capitalist countries'leaders finally came to understand the hopelessness and even the suicidal nature of their former policy line... . .

The fact that universal war can no longer be regarded as a means of policy because of the destructiveness of the weapons which each of the sides possesses has made it possible to elaborate new norms of the relations among states. And we can state with satisfaction that these new norms have been determined on the basis of Lenin's principle of peaceful coexistence among different social systems — a principle which the Soviet Union has invariably supported. But this by no means signifies that only the Soviet side gains from the recognition of peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems. Peaceful relations are advantageous to all the peoples. The principle of peaceful coexistence has now been laid down in many binding official documents... and in political declarations. It was also reflected in a basic document of such importance as the "Basic Principles..."
Those who now oppose detente in the United States frequently allege that the USSR has violated the provisions of the 'Basic Principles of the Relations between the USSR and the United States.' The supporters of arguments of this kind... refer to the international events of recent times, particularly the Vietnamese people's victory, the overthrow of the fascist regime in Portugal, the growth in the influence of the left forces in Italy, the complications which have emerged in U.S. relations with Turkey and Greece and so forth. All this is presented as the result of "Soviet actions" undertaken to the detriment of the United States. It goes without saying that edifices of this kind have no real foundation.

In general the pronouncements that detente is supposedly advantageous only to the Soviet side do not stand serious criticism although they can mislead ill-informed people and those of a prejudiced turn of mind. Unfortunately, this fairytale is still in the armory of many American politicians, propagandists, political theorists and press organs, although it has been totally disproved by the facts and repeatedly criticized by many top U.S. politicians. It looks as if certain circles are making special use of the distorted interpretation of detente in order to impede the further process of normalizing the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.96

Berezhkov subtly accomplishes several things in this discussion. He implicitly attacks the enemies of detente on several points. They misunderstand exactly what detente is in that they see it as an end in itself when it is actually, in Berezhkov's view, a passageway to a totally new configuration in international relations. Referring to Clausewitz's maxim about war and politics, he implies that this new pattern would eschew war as an alternative in international politics. The phrasing of this argument hints that opponents of detente advocate war as a policy alternative while, at the same time, it refutes a charge that is often leveled at the Soviets. Many Western writers accuse Soviet theoreticians of following Clausewitz and using war as an extension of politics. Berezhkov argues that war, if and when it occurs, is part of policy not a temporary aberration. However, he goes on to argue that
modern weapons developments preclude war as a possible policy alternative. Finally, he maintains that the enemies of detente are misrepresenting it as having a bias in favor of the Soviet Union.

M.V. Valerianov, in the lead article of the January issue, also attacks the enemies of detente when he argues that the United States, "having in the main accepted the principle of peaceful coexistence... however, is sustaining it insufficiently consistently." He goes on to say that "rightwing conservative forces of the main U.S. bourgeois parties and those under the influence of the mass information media are bitterly attacking this policy."

Several months later Berezhkov maintains that despite the conditions that have made the international situation turn to peaceful coexistence and detente, there is "bitter maliciousness" toward the detente process based on charges of one-sided advantages for the Soviet Union. He lays the blame for the frequency of these types of charges on the rhetoric of the presidential race in the United States. Berezhkov also asserts the unwavering support of the Soviet Union for detente.

Iur'yev speaks of several different groups who have developed the myth of a "Soviet threat" to further their own ends. One of these groups is composed of those officials, journalists, and academics whose careers have been built on anticommunism and who, as the "principle" opponents of the normalization of relations, use this myth combined with charges of Soviet efforts to attain a one-sided advantage and violations of the principles of various agreements in a way designed to damage detente.

Podlesny discusses the internal political struggle taking place in the United States over what is the proper approach to detente and peaceful
coexistence and argues that there is a strong force on one side of the struggle that repudiates the principles of peaceful coexistence and makes demands of a political and ideological character unacceptable to the Soviet Union. 103

The plight of the policy of peaceful coexistence is seen to have worsened after late 1976 because of the formation of the "Committee on the Present Danger" in November of that year. Ernst Henry writes about the composition and the aims of this committee in June 1978. 104 He maintains that the committee has only one goal: "to impede the improvement of Soviet-American relations and to prevent the further progress of international detente," 105 and to plot against the policy of peaceful coexistence. 106 After enumerating the members and supporters of the "Committee on the Present Danger," Henry evaluates the threat it poses to detente.

In recent months this organization has waged an even more intense campaign against detente. This has apparently been caused by the fear that new practical possibilities for the improvement of Soviet-American relations exist. For example, CPD leaders said at a meeting of the American Foreign Policy Association in March of this year that there was no possibility of military detente between the USSR and the United States. At the same meeting, they demanded that the U.S. Government immediately begin the production of the neutron bomb.

The people backing the Committee on the Present Danger believe that they are quite strong. As we have already said, they do have resources and contacts, and both of these can even be called abundant. Nonetheless, if we look at the international situation as a whole, the forces supporting detente are still incomparably stronger than its enemies. 107

This seems to indicate that there are some grave doubts about the future of detente in the United States. Henry, unlike other SSA analysts, looks at support outside America rather than looking at only the elements
supporting detente inside the United States. This indicates heightened concern for the survivability of detente between the Soviet Union and the United States.

This appraisal is reinforced by Berezhkov in November 1978. According to him,

Detente has proved its vital power. It is supported by the broadest public circles throughout the world. Realistically minded Americans also realize full well that the detente policy is of substantial benefit to the United States too. The changes in Washington's policy which have lately been observed and its deviation from the line toward understanding with the Soviet Union are provoking growing uneasiness both in the United States itself and also in countries allied to the United States...

It is to be hoped that responsible politicians in Washington will realize the danger presented by the course toward exacerbation of relations both for all countries interested in peaceful development and also for the United States, and that they will adhere to the proven principled [sic] of peaceful coexistence, equitable relations and mutually advantageous cooperation for the purpose of deepening detente and consolidating peace and disarmament.108

Berezhkov's evaluation indicates that the future of detente is very uncertain. As a reflection of this, other SShA analysts over the next year turn from stressing the necessity of detente and peaceful coexistence to the more pressing matter of preserving the SALT II agreements.

Over the ten years discussed here, the SShA commentators moved from heralding the changed correlation of forces to establishing the link between that change and the necessity of U.S. acceptance of the principles of peaceful coexistence. The validity of peaceful coexistence was established in May 1972 with the signing of the Basic Principles.

After this, the term detente slowly made its appearance but seemed to be implicitly different from peaceful coexistence. Only in 1974 was the
symbiosis between these two concepts established; and, by 1976, the terms were used almost interchangeably. However, by this point, the future success of peaceful coexistence and detente were seriously questioned and the SSHA analysts turned to defending those concepts as the only possible alternatives in the nuclear age. By the end of the decade, SSHA analysts became more concerned with trying to protect the substantive achievements of peaceful coexistence like the SALT II agreement than with protecting the concept itself. This was reflected in the extreme rareness of reference to either peaceful coexistence or detente in 1978 and 1979. Some of the efforts by SSHA commentators to preserve the gains made by the policy of peaceful coexistence and substantive products of that policy were apparent in their analysis of U.S. strategic doctrine and their reactions to arms control agreements such as SALT I and SALT II.

MEMO analysts spend less time establishing the relationship between the correlation of forces and peaceful coexistence than do some of the other commentators examined in this study. They are also less interested in how these two concepts move from being goals to reality. In 1970, the MEMO analysts seem to accept them as the order of things in international relations without the need of establishing their history or their relation with one another.

Solodovnik indicated this in January 1970 when he said that "attempts to restore the old correlation of forces go against history." This situation is perceived to be a frustration for the United States, especially the U.S. military-industrial complex. One analyst describes this frustration early in the decade as follows: "In the international
arena, reactionary aspirations of the complex collide with a new correlation of forces unfavorable for imperialism in the modern world."^{110}

As time passes, the correlation of forces is alternatively seen as precipitating a reaction that wishes to alter the correlation so that the United States will again be in a "position of strength" vis-a-vis the Soviet Union or as creating the conditions under which the West, especially the United States, must accept changes that will promote world peace.^{111} Kobrin summarized the effect of the correlation of forces in which he emphasized the irreversibility of the situation. "In our time, in the presence of the current correlation of forces between peaceful socialism and peaceful capitalism, no efforts by imperialistic circles can stop the progressive movement of history."^{112}

The correlation of forces, of course, leads to the establishment of the principle of peaceful coexistence as the basis for international relations in the modern world. MEMO analysts begin to use the concept of peaceful coexistence fairly consistently at the time SALT I was signed.^{113} At this same point, the term military detente began to appear in relation to the negotiations concerning arms limitation and disarmament.^{114} Within the next year, from juxtaposing peaceful coexistence and military detente, the MEMO analysts move to linking the two together and referring simply to detente.^{115} The relationship that emerges between these two in MEMO is quite interesting. Detente is a condition while peaceful coexistence is the principle upon which the elements of detente, like arms limitation agreements, are based. Peaceful coexistence creates the situation that enables countries with different socio-economic systems to enter into various cooperative relationships
and mutual agreements based on the trust that comes from belief in and adherence to a common principle. It is the underlying element in disarmament and arms limitation negotiations. Detente is the condition that exists when agreements are put into effect. From this perspective, it is easy for the MEMO analysts to view the situation in international relations in a fairly dichotomous way—detente on one hand, Cold War on the other. Those who oppose detente, by definition, promote a return to the Cold War. Carrying this dichotomy one step farther, the MEMO analysts view the acceptance of the principle of peaceful coexistence as the way to prevent nuclear war while the rejection of this principle means an increased risk of war. Most of the MEMO articles between July 1973 and July 1978 take this type of perspective on peaceful coexistence.

Interestingly, in early 1975, the term correlation of forces reappears as an important feature of detente in MEMO articles. Although the term had been used sporadically between 1972 and 1975, it apparently achieved a renewed status in 1975. This renewal at first seems to be used as a reminder, in the wake of Vladivostok, that this correlation of forces was the original catalyst for improved relations; however, in 1976, use of this phrase becomes part of an effort to reassert the futility of any attempt to alter this correlation. Kelin made it quite clear that the present correlation of forces was considered to be a basic, unchangeable constant of international relations that resulted from inevitable historical progress. "At the foundation of the fundamental change in the correlation of forces in the world, there occurred a profound reorientation of all systems of international relations."
This included the change from Cold War to detente and the "moving aside" of the threat of world nuclear war.

Generally, MEMO analysts present a fairly consistent perspective on the correlation of forces, peaceful coexistence, and detente. These three concepts are linked together in a natural progression resulting in a world situation that reduces the risk of war. To turn away from peaceful coexistence and detente and to try to change the correlation of forces is to revive the Cold War and renew the risk of a world nuclear war. Concomitant to the new correlation of forces and peaceful coexistence in the 1970s was the concept of some sort of military balance or equality. For the MEMO analysts, this results in increased international security.

SShA Reactions to U.S. Strategic Views

The writers in SShA give extensive attention to U.S. strategic policy. Their analysis is generally detailed and designed to undermine the premises of U.S. strategic doctrine. SShA commentators evaluate specific aspects of doctrine such as deterrence, flexible response, and sufficiency. They also give detailed accounts of U.S. weapons systems like Safeguard, MIRV, and Trident. Their analysis embodies severe criticism of any continuation of the arms race and outright denunciation of the use of force in international politics.

Generally, there is a great deal of distrust of U.S. strategic doctrine demonstrated among the SShA analysts. They tend to view every revision of U.S. policy as simply a new permutation of an old theme -- conducting foreign policy from a position of strength. This is obvious in Arbatov's January 1970 article on U.S. foreign policy. Arbatov refers
first to the doctrine of "flexible response" that appeared in 1961 to replace the doctrine of "massive retaliation." This new doctrine relied on limited or local wars. The first criticism Arbatov offers on this policy is that "In the classical style of imperialist policy, the point of departure in the searches for new solutions remained reliance on military force." Despite the praise of some authors for this new doctrine as "a sign of a change to realism," Arbatov argues that in reality "organically inherent to it is adventurism which was also peculiar to the former foreign policy doctrines of the United States." He goes on to argue that the new doctrine actually did not replace but only supplemented the old doctrine. Evidence of this is provided by the buildup in conventional arms in the U.S. and the "largest spurt in all the postwar years" in the deployment of strategic forces in the early 1960s.

Such a trend in military construction in essence by no means contradicts the doctrine of 'flexible response'. If we think for a moment, it is unthinkable in its very mechanics without a large nuclear missile arsenal, without blackmail which is organically included, and adventuristic actions. Not to mention the system of 'escalation' of conflicts which has been worked out in detail, the last rung of which nevertheless remains world war, the very possibility of waging 'local' wars and broad operations of a political nature connected with bluff, intimidation, and balancing on the edge of thermonuclear war. These elements of the policy of 'flexible response' are also called upon to assure immunity to the instigators of 'local' and 'police wars.'

Arbatov also criticizes the concept of "local" wars because of their inherent instability. According to him, this new policy created a situation in which not only may nuclear war start directly between two nuclear powers, but it also may grow out of "limited" wars because there is no guarantee of control over these wars.
The threat of world thermonuclear war today consists not only of the danger that some madman may 'press the button'. This threat is in the very policy of 'local' military adventures, nuclear blackmail, the unrestrained arms race, and uncere­monious interference in the affairs of other countries. Such a policy of and by itself is capable of directing the develop­ment of international relations into a channel where it will no longer be possible to maintain control over events.\(^6\)

Beyond this is the U.S. attempt to maintain or regain, depending on the specific point in time "superiority" or at least "sufficiency" vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.\(^7\) This theme, with variations, is repeated many times over the next several years, and it is all seen as contributing to the spiraling of a very dangerous tendency, the arms race.

One commentary labels the decade of the 1960s as having developed "the most intensive, most dangerous, and most expensive race in history for the production and amassing of weapons of mass destruction."\(^8\) This trend is not expected to reverse itself in the 1970s either.

In this respect, the 1970s are inheriting a difficult problem from the 1960s. And we are speaking not only of the fact of stockpiling tremendous reserves of lethal weapons itself. Even more dangerous, perhaps, is the fact that the internal logic of the arms race development has led, at the end of the 1960s, to the point at which a steep new spiraling is beginning.

Experts have shown in abundant detail what this spiral could mean. In their evaluation, the next round in the arms race will be marked by the expansion of new weapon systems -- primarily, the antiballistic missile (ABM) and multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) systems. In the opinion of the experts, this threatens the strategic situation with additional 'destabilizing' conditions. To put it simply, the threat of thermonuclear war is increasing.\(^9\)

Another analyst goes on to explain exactly how this spiraling arms race occurred. ABMs were created to overcome the threat of ICBMs, "the mono­poly position of a weapon against which there is no defense."\(^0\) This, in turn, precipitated the development of MIRV systems that would make
the ABM system vulnerable. The result is that the equilibrium of mutual assured destruction is upset by this. ABM systems would "limit" the amount of damage by nuclear attack to an "acceptable" level, thus making the prospect of attacking the enemy more appealing because the results would be less harmful. However, if one or both sides have an ABM system, the opposing side develops something with which they can overcome the advantage of ABM, for instance, MIRVs. Thus, the creation of a dense ABM system becomes the stimulus for a new cycle of the arms race and the competition of offensive and defensive weapons systems.\textsuperscript{131}

The arms race has had its own peculiar dialectic.

Finally, it is necessary to take into consideration the peculiar capability of the arms race to develop according to its internal laws based on the dialectical unity of means of offense and defense. In answer to each new system of offensive weapons an appropriate means of defense is unavoidably created, after which the elaboration of new, more effective means of offense begins and thus this process moves along an endless and ascending spiral.\textsuperscript{133}

The development of the arms race has also been dominated by two aspects. . . quantitative (accumulation of weapons reserves) and qualitative (elaboration of new systems of weapons and improvement of existing models). For a long time the quantitative aspect remained first and foremost, but the basic factor limiting the accumulation of arms was the admissible level of military expenditures by the state. The concept of "too much" in relation to weapons reserves was considered devoid of practical meaning.

The development of nuclear missiles overturned former concepts and led to the fundamentally new position where the largest industrial states of the world could accumulate strategic weapons reserves in comparatively short periods, quite adequate for enemy 'overkills.' Under such conditions the qualitative development of arms and the substitution of some systems of weapons by others technically more improved come to the fore. In this connection even the arms race increasingly acquires a chiefly qualitative nature.\textsuperscript{134}

These explications of the arms race were made by Dostupov to introduce a lengthy discussion of U.S. weapons systems development outlining the
basics of MIRV and the projected deployment of the Minuteman III ICBMs, Poseidon and Polaris SLEMs, B-52, B-1 and FB-111 strategic bombers, and prospective systems such as ULMs, cruise missiles, and Safeguard. He also projected that in the mid-seventies the U.S. would change the emphasis of U.S. strategic forces from ground-based to sea- and air-based systems.

Trofimenko, an analyst who often appears somewhat hostile to the United States, connects the arms race to U.S. strategic doctrine when he discusses the two policies that have been pursued by the U.S. — massive retaliation and flexible response.

On the one hand, the U.S. leaders have always striven to utilize an unrestricted arms race to create for the United States the notorious position of 'absolute strength,' by gaining which, they could attempt to resolve the 'who-whom' question through a preventive 'disarming' strike against the USSR. . . .

On the other hand, since throughout the entire postwar period they have not once been fully and finally confident that they would ultimately succeed in creating a position of 'absolute strength,' the U.S. leaders have begun to make statements about the prospects of the 'destruction of world citizenship' in the event of total war between the United States and the USSR. Here they have switched to attempts to impose on the Soviet Union some abstract 'rules of the game,' some rules of 'conduct' in conflict which would create certain [izvestnyy] guarantees that the United States would succeed (through various types of previously agreed limitations) in avoiding suicidal consequences for the United States should it unleash a major armed adventure.

Trofimenko views these military-political policies as part of a four-part continuum or progression with links to one another. The first is "containment," the second is "massive retaliation," the third is "flexible response," and the fourth is the Nixon administration policy of "sufficiency." "Flexible response," a doctrine devised during the Kennedy administration and prevailing as strategic policy through the 1960s, was designed to limit conflict. Trofimenko argues that another
doctrine of the 1960s, "mutual deterrence" or mutual assured destruction fits into the same category.137

In an attempt to bring a certain element of stability into the explosive arms race situation created by the United States R. McNamara advanced the concept of U.S. and USSR 'mutual deterrence' by posing the threat of an 'annihilating counter-strike.' However, this concept was not a conscious divergence by Washington to less belligerent positions but stemmed from a belated recognition of its inability to destroy the Soviet strategic forces by a preventive strike.138

With a new administration in the White House in 1968, the Soviets were confronted with a new policy labeled "sufficiency." However, the new administration was also reluctant, according to the Secretary of Defense, to state a policy on strategic weapons and thus define this concept so as not to prejudice negotiations on strategic arms limitation. Nevertheless, Trofimenko found that the statements and actions of the United States did not appear to support one another concerning the possible biasing of arms negotiations. For that matter, actions concerning development and deployment of U.S. weapons systems demonstrated to Trofimenko that some strategic policy decisions had already been made whether the policy had been explicated or not.

Despite Mr. Laird's [U.S. Secretary of Defense] intention not to hinder the progress of the Soviet-American talks by adopting 'fundamental decisions' regarding strategic weaponry, certain important decisions have, as facts show, already been adopted. (The question is one, in particular, of the accelerated deployment of the 'Safeguard' antimissile defense system; the construction of the new 'Minuteman-3' and 'Poseidon' missiles armed with a MIRV system; the introduction into production of the B-1 type bombers and new types of 'air to ground'missiles to be used by bombers; the activation of design work on a new generation of intercontinental missiles launched from land or from underwater; the reconstruction of underground silos for 'Minuteman-3' missiles meant to increase the protection afforded these missiles to make the silos suitable for future types of missiles; and a number of other decisions regarding military building in the United States.) These decisions to a considerable extent outline and predetermine the direction of the development
of American strategy for the seventies. In the face of this, the postponement of a public declaration of the new U.S. strategic line alters little in real fundamental terms.\textsuperscript{139}

SShA analysts repeatedly attack U.S. ABM and MIRV systems because of the danger they represent to the "cause of peace" and their effect on the arms race. One of these commentators, B.L. Teplinsky, gives a detailed interpretation of the development of the MIRV system. He first attempts to answer the question of the intended purpose of the MIRV program.

Defense Secretary Laird... in trying to justify the colossal expenditures on strategic armaments assert[s] that the Soviet Union is allegedly 'creating forces for a preemptive strike' and that the MIRV program is supposedly the answer to the Soviet ABM system. However, none other than the senior scientific advisor to the defense secretary, John Foster, has acknowledged that from the very start, the MIRV concept has as its intention 'the increasing of our (that is the United States') ability to hit a target on center rather than overcoming an ABM system.' Neither is there any greater foundation for the other version, according to which the ABM system is being developed in order to safeguard Minuteman launch sites, since the Soviet Union allegedly plans to destroy them with a 'first strike.'\textsuperscript{140}

Teplinsky explains this inconsistency by attacking the motives of the United States as they are embodied in Defense Secretary Laird's stance.

The fact also draws attention to itself that the present American defense secretary has been well known from the very start of his political activity as a most ardent advocate of the concept of nuclear 'supremacy' over the Soviet Union. As the New York Times pointed out soon after Laird's arrival in the Pentagon, the Defense Department and the CIA, at the end of April 1969, presented a report to the National Security Council in which a larger increase in strategic offensive forces was proposed in order 'to outstrip the Soviet Union and be in a state to launch a sudden attack at any time.' (The New York Times, 1 May 1969, p. 1).\textsuperscript{141}

As Teplinsky points out, this contradicts U.S. policy formulated in the 1960s under other administrations and the logic behind that policy.
... one may recall, that under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson an analytical comparison of the strategic nuclear might of the Soviet Union and the United States was conducted and it brought realistically thinking American military theorists to the conclusion that under the existing alignment of nuclear missile forces, neither one side nor the other could launch a sudden attack without the risk of receiving a crushing retaliatory strike. Former U.S. Defense Secretary R. McNamara announced in his time that both sides would strive to create 'a second strike capability,' that is, the ability to withstand a sudden nuclear attack and preserve sufficient might to inflict unacceptable losses on the enemy with a retaliatory strike. In the final analysis, McNamara came to the conclusion that the Soviet Union, just like the United States, possessed 'a genuine and authentic second strike capability' and that it was 'precisely this mutual capability which gives us both the stronger of all possible motives to avoid a nuclear war.'

However, the realization of the MIRV program which is starting brings to mind the thought that perhaps the United States is trying to achieve the problematic capability to deliver a 'first strike'. ... the several times over increase in the number of nuclear warheads which can be delivered to their targets with the same number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, forces one to suppose that, although President Nixon has proclaimed the concept of nuclear 'sufficiency,' under it may be hidden all the time that same long familiar concept of nuclear 'supremacy'.

The 'new' tendencies in the building of the U.S. Armed Forces which have been examined show that in the final analysis they can lead to an even steeper spiral in the strategic arms race.

The MIRV program was also attacked by M.V. Belousov in September 1972. In an article that begins by labeling the decision to pursue the development of the MIRV system "one of the most dangerous steps" in the buildup of strategic weapons, Belousov detailed the operation of multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles and pointed out that ground and sea deployment of this system presupposes a sharp increase in U.S. nuclear missile potential. It is clear from a number of public statements by U.S. Defense Secretary M. Laird and other Defense Department officials that they consider MIRV warheads to be a promising means of destroying enemy ground launching installations, that is as a means of delivering a 'first strike.'
Thus, the development and buildup of the Pentagon's missiles equipped with MIRV warheads is leading to an intensification of the danger of nuclear missile war and is impeding the solution of the strategic armaments problem.\textsuperscript{145}

V.V. Larionov made a similar argument about the MIRV system in November 1971.\textsuperscript{146} He also attacked the "safeguard" ABM system because of its destabilizing effect.\textsuperscript{147}

Evidently, however, this view of the United States' malevolent intentions is moderated as SALT I negotiations become more intense. Articles in SShA more and more stress the dangers of the arms race and the need for disarmament. In an article that also appeared in November 1971, Arbatov discusses the interests held in common by the U.S. and the USSR that provide the underlying motivation for normalization of relations between the two.

The main one of these problems is the prevention of a world thermonuclear war. It is hardly necessary to prove that such a war would be a catastrophe for all the world's peoples...  

The complexity of the situation is determined by the fact that the threat of thermonuclear war does not lie solely in the fact that it will be consciously planned... There is also another threat, less noticeable and therefore perhaps more serious: While not consciously wanting a world thermonuclear war, states can become entangled in serious conflicts whose escalation will get out of control and make war inevitable at a certain moment. Such a danger can be averted solely along the path of radically improving the international atmosphere.

... the problem of limiting and terminating the arms race is an important sphere of common interest for the American and Soviet peoples... Solving this problem is politically important since the arms race has in itself become one of the most dangerous sources of tension and of the threat of war.\textsuperscript{148}

Arbatov also stresses the economic significance of ending the arms race. Quoting a USACDA report that sets current total world-wide annual military expenditures in excess of 200 billion dollars, he says, "This enormous expenditure is an extremely heavy burden on the shoulders of
the people which impedes the solution of many urgent economic and social problems. Arbatov also touches on the advantages to both states of the possibility of "the extension of trade and economic and scientific and technical cooperation."

This "softening" of the SSHA analysts' perspective is also reflected in a December 1971 article by Trofimenko. In this article he takes a new look at the policy of "flexible response" and the newly announced Nixon Administration policy of "realistic deterrence." In an earlier article, as noted above, Trofimenko described his perception that U.S. strategic policy had progressed through four stages. He implied that although the stages did incorporate some policy changes that they also masked a basic underlying consistency that actually perpetuated the most pernicious aspects of U.S. policy.

In this new article, Trofimenko first stresses the constraints placed on policy change by the momentum of previous strategic decisions.

Under modern conditions another factor, which reduces the possibility of implementing radical and rapid changes in strategy, has an increasingly strong effect. It is a question, first, of the enormous cost of the basic nucleus of the armed forces of larger states -- strategic weapons systems -- and, second, the length of the cycle from 'the conception of an idea to the combat deployment of a system,' which is connected with the exceptional complexity of the above-mentioned systems. By virtue of this, the U.S. military-political strategy is embodied not only in the already developed strategic armaments but also in those systems which still do not actually exist 'in the flesh,' that is, in metal, and which will become realities only in several years time. But they have already been ordered, and industry is working on them. Therefore, a fundamental change in theory, so radical that some of the previous systems would become unnecessary, is virtually impossible under the conditions of a capitalist economy.

This is why no subsequent U.S. strategy can signify a cardinal break with a previous one, particularly at the initial stage of a new strategic course. Above all, it is advanced as a declaration of what is desired and as a definition of the long-term prospects of building the armed forces and
armaments and of methods of utilizing them in a new manner, but
under condition when the former strategy is still operating.
Thus, the existing weapons systems were created according to the
recipes of former strategy, but their gradual buildup created
the precondition for a transition from quantity to quality, and
this new quality exerts an influence on the development of stra-
tegic thinking. . . . 152

This explanation also implicitly refutes the above-mentioned arguments
made by Teplinsky, Larionov, and Belousov that U.S. weapons systems are
predicated on developing "superiority" and possibly a "first strike"
capability. 153

As far as Trofimenko's revised evaluation of the relationship of
"flexible response" to the Nixon Administration's strategic policy is
concerned, he maintains that the policy of "realistic deterrence" con-
forms with the old policy involving nuclear strategy but changes the
concept of limited or local wars. The result of this new policy formu-
lation in Trofimenko's estimation is "realistic" only in the sense that
it acknowledges the futility of Vietnam-like involvements. 154

Trofimenko also revises slightly the standard evaluation of the
underlying reasoning for the particular direction the development U.S.
strategic policy has taken.

. . . Kennedy's administration. . . virtually admitted the impos-
sibility of using a big war as a means of policy, regarding the
strategic nuclear missile potential as a means of restraining the other side from inflicting the first strike against the
United States.

But since, in reality, it was a question all these years
not of restraining the USSR from attacking the United States
but, on the contrary, of the USSR restraining U.S. imperialism
from unleashing a big thermonuclear war, the U.S. concept of
'deterrence' signifies, in fact, a recognition that the Soviet
Union possesses such strategic strength which effectively
restrains the United States from direct use of its nuclear
missile arsenal against the USSR. This is how the situation of
the well-known nuclear balance between the USSR and the United
States arose, which is characterized. . . by the word 'deter-
rence.' Recognizing the colossal destructive nature of a central
nuclear missile conflict and the reality of nuclear or strategic parity, the 'realistic deterrence' strategy officially proceeds from U.S. reluctance to be the initiator of unleashing such a conflict and stipulates only the U.S. right and resolve to inflict a counterstrike in the event of an attack on itself. 155

The intention of this policy change, according to Trofimenko, is to provide the U.S. with a way of waging war "without danger for the United States." 156 The net result is that "the 'realism' of the new strategy is reduced to modifications of imperialist strategy and to attempts to combine certain 'realities' which cannot be combined, while keeping unchanged its expansionist foreign policy aims and philosophy of force." 157

In February 1972, Arbatov restates his position of several months earlier on the importance of preventing thermonuclear war and ending the arms race. Discussing the spheres of coinciding interests of the U.S. and the USSR, he states "The most important of them is the sphere of preventing a world thermonuclear war. It's hardly necessary to prove that such a war would be a disaster for all of the peoples of the world. . . ." 158 One of the possible causes for thermonuclear war is the arms race. Thus, preventing a continuation of the arms race is another area of interest to the two countries.

. . . the problem of limiting and halting the arms race is an important sphere of common interest for the American and Soviet peoples, as it is for all of the peoples of the world. The solution of this problem is important politically, for the arms race has in and of itself become one of the most dangerous sources of tension and for threat of war. 159

Arbatov also attacks the high level of military expenditures partially on the grounds that they undermine the well-being of U.S. citizens; moreover, he notes that "the main paradox consists in the fact that it has not been possible to buy national security with this money. On
the contrary, with an increase in military expenditures and with an intensification of the arms race it has been decreasing.\textsuperscript{160}

The signing of the strategic arms limitation agreement and the ABM Treaty in May 1972 apparently largely curtailed extensive discussion of U.S. weapons systems and strategic policies for approximately a year and a half. References related to either of these were limited largely to references to the arms race and the necessity of preventing a nuclear war. These references to the prevention of nuclear war were framed in such a way that the attitude of the analysts toward the U.S. appeared to be more positive. This subtle change is evident in a 1972 editorial that states:

Both sides attach great importance to preventing situations liable to cause a dangerous deterioration in their relations. Proceeding from this, they will do everything possible to avoid military confrontations and prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. Both sides believe that the improvement and mutually advantageous development of Soviet-U.S. relations in all spheres, including the economic, scientific and technical fields, will be in keeping with their common objectives.\textsuperscript{161}

Thus, emphasis turns from SShA commentators promoting the importance of preventing nuclear war to proclaiming this prevention of war as an accepted tenet of both the U.S. and the USSR's policies.

Despite this, not all SShA analysts held a benign view of U.S. intentions after the signing of SALT I. G.A. Trofimenko, a commentator who often appears more suspicious of the United States than some of his colleagues, reviews the policies of the 1960s arguing that the U.S. was attempting to achieve a "position of strength" in which it would have the capability to execute a preemptive first strike. It was the pursuit of such a policy that made the U.S. the "pioneer of the arms race" since "at the time the United States was whipping up the strategic arms race,
the Soviet Union naturally had to take measures to safeguard its defense capability." Trofimenko acknowledges the reorientation that brought about the 1972 agreements but proceeds to warn of the fragility of relations between the U.S. and the USSR.

Everybody displaying a serious and businesslike approach to the task of further improving Soviet-American relations and developing peaceful cooperation between the two countries cannot be unaware that the situation which has taken shape since the Moscow talks — a situation favorable to progress in this direction — is extremely delicate and requires careful nurturing of the shoots of trust and mutual understanding planted in Moscow.

It is obvious that, without formally violating the letter of the Moscow accords, the general spirit of understanding reached can be violated by unilateral actions in such a cardinal and unequivocal manner that the effectiveness of this very understanding is called into question.

Although Trofimenko supports the notion of SALT I and other efforts to improve Soviet-American relations, his view of the situation is much more wary and negative than those displayed earlier in 1972 by Arbatov and in SSHa editorials. Over the next year there are few articles that specifically reflect the point of view of SSHa analysts concerning U.S. strategic policy or related aspects of preventing nuclear war and curbing the arms race, although some do review the historical perspective that set the stage for the 1972 agreements. However, with the occurrence of a new summit in 1973 and the signing of the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, SSHa again emphasizes these topics. The editorial that heralded the new agreement also presented U.S. intentions in a positive light.

By proclaiming the purpose of their policy to be the elimination of the danger of nuclear war and of the employment of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union and the United States obligated themselves to act to preclude the occurrence of nuclear war between themselves and also between either one of them and other countries.
Closely connected to this obligation on their part is their agreement to refrain in general from the threat of using force. . .

The American side has also displayed an understanding that peace and international cooperation are not only a requirement but also the only alternative, the Americans have joined their efforts with those of the Soviet side in order to solidify the indicated change in Soviet-American relations. The leaders of the countries which possess all the modern kinds of weapons have a real understanding of the dangerous impasse which could result from continuing the arms race.164

Nevertheless, regardless of whether the orientation of the analysts is one marked by suspicion and hostility or one that views U.S. policy from a more positive perspective, there is always an underlying theme: U.S. strategic policy has fallen victim to forces beyond its control. These forces are partially tied to the overall correlation of forces discussed earlier; but, more particularly, they are influenced by the rapidly changing scientific and technical realms. Arbatov focuses on this in an article that appeared in October 1973.

The growth of the defensive strength of the USSR. . . cancelled out plans which had been built on U.S. 'decisive military supremacy,' and on the possibility of using military force against the socialist countries with impunity, or with blackmailing them with this force. And, although U.S. political leaders and theoreticians continued to build their calculations on U.S. 'military supremacy,' frantically adapting their military and political doctrines to the new balance of forces, this could not, however, alter the main factor: it had become increasingly obvious since the end of the fifties, even in the United States itself, that a nuclear war unleashed by it was equivalent to suicide. It became increasingly difficult to translate military force into political influence, that is, into the thing for the sake of which it had ultimately been created.

But this was by no means the only unexpected consequence of the scientific and technical revolution for imperialism. Another important consequence of it was that the terrible threat which had emerged as a result of the appearance of mass destruction weapons -- a threat to the existence of all peoples -- made the broadest masses realize the enormous force of self-preservation which to an unprecedented extent, intensified anti-war feelings in all countries, including the United States.165
Thus, the scientific and technological advances that had helped create U.S. power and influenced the policies that pursued enhancement of that power also brought about the conditions that created an equally powerful rival while at the same time creating a hostile environment for the exercise of that power.

By late 1973, the analysts and commentators began to look toward the second stage of strategic arms limitation. Concomitantly, their interests are focused primarily on areas that will be examined in subsequent sections of this study. Nevertheless, they do not lose sight of the developments that led to the initial agreements nor the potential threats to future accords. Attitudes on U.S. strategic doctrine maintain what might be termed a holding-pattern during this period with even the more hostile writers only rehashing previous accounts of U.S. policy changes and eschewing attacks on U.S. motives. 166

This equilibrium was disturbed in the Spring of 1974 by the reaction in SShA to a perceived policy change in U.S. strategic doctrine -- references by some American elites to "broadening the 'usability' of nuclear weapons by modifying strategy and backing this up with technical improvements" and to the interest of U.S. Defense Secretary Schlesinger and the Pentagon in returning "to the 'counterforce' concept."167 The usually amenable Georgiy Arbatov takes on an antagonistic air in a lengthy discussion of the history behind recent pronouncements. Referring to Robert McNamara's proposal that Soviet-American relations be subject to certain "rules of the game,"

The path of the formulation of rules which would have made it possible to wage a military clash, including a big nuclear missile conflict, in the manner of a duel between gentlemen which would not have threatened to destroy what McNamara called the structure of American society. In specific terms, the then
defense secretary pictured these rules as the so-called counterforce strategy intended to direct the war in a safer channel for the United States, given — and this was the main thing — the balance of nuclear forces at that time which promised unilateral advantages for the United States (on condition of course, that these 'rules of the game' were accepted by the other side). (Note 1: The counterforce strategy is a concept for utilizing U.S. strategic forces against enemy strategic forces aimed at inflicting a preemptive strike making it impossible for the other side to inflict a counterstrike. McNamara himself subsequently abandoned this concept, primarily because this sort of preemptive strike does not achieve its objective since a section of the strategic forces grouping sufficient to inflict a crushing counterstrike remains unharmed. It also becomes obvious that once a nuclear war has been started, it would not be possible to keep it at the level of counterforce strikes and prevent its developing into a general nuclear conflict.)

There is little point in dwelling now on the degree of realism of that strategy in general. However, I would like to stress the main conceptual-philosophical flaw, as it were, of U.S. political thinking at the time — a flaw not restricted to the proposals made by McNamara, whose views merely mirrored certain general delusions. I am referring to the fact that in this new strategic situation — a situation fraught with such great risks — attempts were made to seek an answer to these risks within the context of the old policies — not by preventing military conflict but by fitting it into a framework which was more or less safe for the United States. If you think about it, this was typical of the entire 'flexible response' strategy, which attempted to establish 'safe' rules — for the United States — for waging war both at the level of a big strategic conflict (the 'counterforce' concept) and also at the level of a local 'small war' (the 'counterinsurgency war' concept). As is now obvious to everybody, this approach proved simply useless in the first instance (although happily it never had to be tested in practice) as it merely spurred on the arms race and led in the second instance to the tragedy of the Vietnam War.

It was only as it amassed this burdensome historical experience that U.S. policy started to switch from attempts to formulate 'rules of confrontation' offering safety to the United States to a readiness to seek and work out mutually acceptable 'rules of coexistence.' This question was placed imperiously on the agenda by life itself, primarily for the simple reason that in the nuclear age there are no acceptable alternatives to peaceful coexistence and, consequently, detente and the normalization of Soviet-U.S. relations.

There is a proverb about generals always preparing for past wars. Unfortunately, this also often happens to politicians, and they too approach new problems with yesterday's criteria and solutions.
This is evidently what happened to the United States after World War II. Its choice of the wrong road was also facilitated by the truly revolutionary changes that had occurred in military affairs. The emergence of nuclear weapons had made available a tremendous new force which could apparently be used as the basis for easily implementing the most impudent political plans with impunity.

But by a twist of history the thing that has appeared to be the acme, the supreme achievement in the development of military strength, turned out to mean growing impotence for military strength as an instrument of policy. For the United States was unable to hold onto its monopoly on these super-powerful new types of arms: the growth of the Soviet Union's defense might have wrecked those hopes, and the new balance of forces also changed in the situation in international relations. The result was the emergence of a paradoxical situation: The more U.S. military might increased, the clearer it becomes that the limits to the rational utilization of that might without threatening the fundamental national interests were steadily narrowing. It was not easy to accept this: To a great extent the history of U.S. military and political thought in the last 10-15 years has been a story of quests to which military strength can be utilized. These quests are still not at an end even today.168

Despite this and the attempted redirection perceived to be taking place, military force as a basis for policy was seen as losing out to the "new realities of the nuclear age."169 Arbatov proceeds from this to stress the common interests of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Primary among these is the prevention of nuclear war.

Something else that is sometimes less obvious is how much still needs to be done to create really durable guarantees of peace, really 100 percent guarantees, since just one breakdown would be enough to cause a catastrophe capable of reducing to nothing all the efforts exerted over many years. At present and obviously in the foreseeable future too the main threat of war is not necessarily linked with the possibility of someone deliberately planning a war and pressing the button at the appointed time. The suicidal nature of such an act has become obvious enough in our time. Nevertheless, the threat of the emergence of situations capable of leading to war is quite real; such situations are quite possible in a world crammed with weapons in the event of the exacerbation of international tension or of conflicts smoldering in various areas.170
Arbatov states that simply realizing the necessity of preventing the start of a war and even the formalization of agreements designed to prevent such an occurrence are not enough to bring about lasting peace by themselves. To accomplish this "requires a great deal both in the field of a substantial improvement of the entire international situation and of the liquidation of existing crises and conflicts and the prevention of potential ones and also in the field of further improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations and an increase in mutual trust."\textsuperscript{171}

Arbatov also argues that the U.S. and the USSR have a second "undoubted" common interest. It is "being able to allocate a more substantial proportion of their forces, resources and means to the resolution of domestic tasks."\textsuperscript{172} Improved relations between the two countries would help bring this to realization because of the concomitant limitation of the arms race and other reduced "foreign political expenditures."\textsuperscript{173}

It must be said that until recently both countries were in different positions in this respect. The Soviet Union has always displayed such interest and has always stated frankly that it would prefer to spend on creative tasks within the country every ruble currently eaten up by arms. But even now there are quite influential circles in the United States -- I have in mind the circles that the late President Eisenhower christened the military industrial complex -- with a vital interest in the arms race. And until recently the belief that the United States could support an almost unbridled arms race was an almost universal conviction. Considerable numbers of Americans saw the arms race as an instrument for preventing economic slumps and depressions in their country and also hoped that the military competition thus imposed on the Soviet Union would undermine the life forces of the Soviet economy.

Now the situation has started to change, and not only because the gamble on undermining the Soviet economy has failed. It has also started to become increasingly obvious that colossal military expenditure in no way stimulates prosperity in the United States but, on the contrary, has a destructive effect on the U.S. economy. And as far as one can judge, this fact is being recognized increasingly broadly in the United States.\textsuperscript{174}
There is a final area of common interest between the Soviet Union and the United States noted by Arbatov — scientific, economic, technical, and cultural cooperation. One of the most striking things about Arbatov's entire analysis is that, unlike previous discussions, he presents nuclear war as suicidal for both countries. In the past the danger of nuclear war for and the suicidal nature of that war for the U.S. were emphasized, but the assured destruction of the USSR as well has only been implied previously, not stated explicitly as it is here. Also this is the first time in SSHA that an analyst states the direct interest of the Soviet Union in the possibility of being able to re-allocate resources that otherwise would be expended on the military.

Despite the 1974 Vladivostok agreements, SSHA analysts Milshteyn and Semeyko criticize the United States because of "a certain inconsistency and dangerous zig-zags which contradict the positions which have already been asserted and which have become one of the bases of detente." The reason for this inconsistency is that forces opposed to detente are exerting influence on the "formation of official policy" over questions concerning the use of nuclear weapons. The authors review the development of U.S. strategic doctrine and then launch into a lengthy indictment of current strategic thinking among some people in the United States.

Now, in the new political situation, the aim of preventing nuclear war is regarded as of paramount importance in many statements and documents. At the same time, attempts continue to be made in military theories (which are incidentally, reflected in a number of military building programs) to seek out ways of and opportunities for broadening the spectrum of the 'usability' of nuclear weapons. In the thinking of many Pentagon theoreticians, this spectrum could extend from limited nuclear strikes against selected military targets to a massive and essentially unlimited exchange.
In the past, whereas limited uses of nuclear might were in fact officially sanctioned, this was only the case in distant theaters of military actions. The 'epicenter' so to speak, of nuclear war with its devastating consequences for the United States, was removed as far as possible away from U.S. territory. Now, however, attempts are being made also to 'legitimize' limited strikes against targets actually located on the national territories of the two major nuclear powers. This is based once again on 'humane' considerations — not as an alternative to the prevention of nuclear war but as an alternative to world nuclear conflict in the event of this becoming inevitable in any event. Other arguments are also adduced in favor of extending the sphere of use of nuclear weapons. This would, it is said, help to avoid nuclear blackmail and strengthen the possibility of 'containment.'

The Pentagon tries to prove here that such innovations in military doctrine are technically possible through the creation of high-accuracy nuclear warheads, which expand the range of forms and methods by which nuclear war can be waged. . . .

Thus, the circle is closed. Definite attempts are made to return to 10-year-old concepts and to apply them under the new conditions on the pretext that a 'limited strategic war' under modern conditions is 'more advantageous' and that it is supposedly aimed at preventing a universal nuclear disaster and limiting its scale in every possible way.

J. Schlesinger maintains that readiness to wage war in all its possible spectrums should strengthen deterrence. . . . 'Assured destruction'. . . can no longer serve as the sole mainstay in the 'deterrence' of a potential enemy. Coming to replace it, are the concepts of 'limited strategic wars'. . . .

Of course, the concept of 'nuclear deterrence' which presupposes the existence of giant nuclear forces capable of 'certain destruction,' is not an ideal solution of the problem of peace and of preventing nuclear conflict. But it is a question of whether to move from this conflict, which reflected, according to the widespread opinion, the real state of affairs at a certain stage. One path is the path of detente, a radical improvement in the international situation, arms limitation, disarmament, and the assertion of the principle of peaceful coexistence. . . .

. . . the facts indicate that another path also has quite a few supporters (sometimes very influential ones) in the United States — to seek a way out of the current situation of 'nuclear restraint' by broadening the usability of nuclear weapons and finding methods which could supposedly prevent the disastrous consequences of nuclear conflict. However, the possibility of unleashing a 'small' and 'painless' nuclear missile skirmish and keeping it within safe limits is a myth which in no way corresponds to the realities of nuclear war.

The unrealistic and, what is more, dangerous nature of the new 'select targets strategy' advanced by the Pentagon, which proposes hitting, above all, military and not civilian targets
and objects, is obvious. Its authors maintain that this strategy would be capable of preventing general unlimited war. But on what is this confidence founded? Even having begun by inflicting strikes on several selected military targets, such a conflict will not develop in accordance with the 'rules of the game' now being drawn up in the Pentagon offices but will most likely develop quickly into a general war which does not lend itself to 'flexible response'. In addition, taking into account the tremendous destructive might of nuclear weapons it is hard to imagine an application for them which would damage only military targets without hitting nearby cities. This is why attempts to introduce this sort of 'rules of the game' are not only unsound but also highly dangerous to the cause of peace.

In a word, unbiased analysis indicates that the quest for ways of making 'limited' use of nuclear weapons both strategically and tactically is fraught with dangerous consequences. And it contradicts in principle the idea of preventing nuclear war, which has already gone into international agreements in the form of definite pledges, including the Soviet-U.S. agreement on preventing nuclear war. Not only does this doctrine of "limited strategic wars" run counter to the goal of preventing nuclear war, but it also confounds attempts to limit strategic arms. This happens because the new doctrine of destroying military targets encourages the arms race.

The introduction of military sites among the primary targets of nuclear weapons justifies the demand to increase the number of warheads, all the more so since anything one pleases can be classed as such targets. What is more, the destruction of small military sites will inevitably require the creation of highly accurate nuclear attack facilities, that is, their continuous qualitative improvement. And this is nothing more than the arms race in its most complex and, perhaps, most dangerous --- QUALITATIVE --- sphere.

Considerable progress in further improvement of basic nuclear missile systems, particularly by increasing the quantity and yield of individual warheads in conjunction with raising their accuracy can give rise to a fear that it is a question of attempts to acquire the capability for a massive 'counterforce' strike, which is neutralizing to one extent or another. And this, even before such capability is acquired, will call forth a corresponding reaction, giving a new impetus to the arms race, let alone the fact that such a trend of military building will engender new suspicions regarding the other side's intentions and will affect the overall political situation.
Milshteyn and Semeyko find the contradictions in U.S. statements and actions toward detente and arms limitation on the one hand and its statements and actions supporting its revised strategic doctrine on the other very disconcerting. They are concerned that the new doctrine implicitly abrogates some of the existing agreements between the U.S. and the USSR. Additionally, they fear the new doctrine not only moves the two countries in a direction opposite to detente and arms control but also moves them away from the imperfect but workable status quo of nuclear deterrence toward a destabilized situation where the U.S. might attempt a preemptive first strike. This, in turn, potentially creates a new round in the arms race both because of increasing the qualitative capability of weapons systems to make such an action possible and because of the necessity for the opposing side to counter this new threat with an increase in its own systems. It should be noted here that although there were several articles published during 1974, including the Mil'shteyn and Semeyko piece, that attacked the turn the U.S. strategic thinking had taken, there were also several articles supporting developments in Soviet-American relations like the Vladivostok meeting.

Nevertheless, beginning in 1975, the SSHA commentators appear to be reacting more and more to what they perceive to be a decidedly more hostile environment in the United States. Their articles seem more and more often to be written from a defensive approach, countering perceived attacks from various quarters in the United States and other capitalist states. They do this by applauding occurrences in the international realm of which they approve, like detente and arms control, and countering the arguments of their detractors, often labeling their accusations
as propaganda efforts. They also attempt to impune the arguments of their detractors by answering some accusations by counteraccusations and logic and others by asserting that the enemies of detente are going against the majority body of thought. Additionally, they continue to stress the necessity of preventing nuclear war.\footnote{179}

Valerianov touches on some of these concerns in an article criticizing the opponents of detente. Assessing the situation between the U.S. and USSR as it stands at the beginning of 1976, he maintains, "The threat of a military confrontation has been moved aside. The people of both countries have acquired greater confidence in the fact that they will not be subjected to the catastrophe of war."\footnote{180} Nevertheless, there are those who "exert their negative influence" on U.S. policy and make it necessary for the Soviet Union to take appropriate measures to protect itself against the consequences of that influence.

If one turns... to the official military-strategic doctrines of the United States, on careful examination it can be seen that they still provide for a multitude of varieties of conducting military actions. They include both total nuclear war and war with the so-called limited use of nuclear weapons, in which connection there are incessant attempts to seek out possibilities for expanding the spectrum of the application of such weapons, and various forms of armed intervention in the affairs of other countries for struggle against revolutionary-liberation movements or the implementation of other repressive military-political acts.

These doctrines contradict the very idea of the inadmissibility of war and the idea of the relaxation of international tension and of peaceful coexistence, whose aim is to eliminate any possibility of war and not to attempt to legalize it, in whatever form. All this naturally makes it incumbent upon the USSR to maintain its defense capability at the proper level.\footnote{181}

This is not to deny that there is an"historically inevitable competition" between the United States and the USSR that will always influence their relations with one another. However, it is the policy of both the CPSU
and the Soviet state, according to Valerianov, "that this process should not grow into armed conflicts, into the use of the threat of force and into the senseless waste of material resources and also that it should not conceal the opportunities for mutually advantageous equal cooperation in these spheres where they objectively exist." 182

Georgiyev pursues this same basic line of thought when he expresses concern over all the efforts being made to "twist the true sense of detente." 183 He also criticizes those who see one-sided advantages in detente for the socialist countries and who try to find discrepancies between Soviet support for detente and their support of national-revolutionary struggles and who accuse the Soviet Union of betraying the hopes of detente. The root of the criticism, according to Georgiyev, is that the Soviet Union has refused to sacrifice its ideology or political principles in the name of detente. 184 Finally he notes the existence of influential forces in the United States who are opposed to detente and stresses the necessity for continued struggle against these forces so that detente will remain "irreversible." 185

Iu'ryev takes a slightly different approach in an article attacking what he calls the myth of a "Soviet Threat." He is quite vehement in his denunciation of this myth, claiming that it is far-fetched, imaginary, and based on fabricated evidence. He proceeds to point out that there are influential circles in the U.S. and Western Europe that find such a myth advantageous and are interested in its reemergence and exaggeration. To support this, he enumerates five groups who benefit from the perpetuation of such a myth: 1) militarist circles in the U.S. who want larger military budgets; 2) American corporations that produce
weapons systems: 3) officials, "Sovietologists," and journalists who have built their careers on being anticommunists; 4) circles in the U.S. and Western Europe who fear the demise of NATO; and 5) those who use it to draw attention from domestic problems during the U.S. presidential campaign. He concludes that these circles want to injure detente and "to return the world to the time of the 'cold war,' [and] to a new turn to the arms race." This effort comes from a myth . . . that is a distorted representation of reality, being distorted from ignorance or lack of information. At present as for the case of enunciation it comes out as an ill-intentioned distortion with the goal of throwing the world back, leading it from the answer to a really vitally important problem to the side of prolonging a destructive and expensive political confrontation.

This line of argument prevails over the next two years to one degree or another. Only in the period immediately prior to and following the signing of SALT II in 1979 is there a thaw in the criticism aimed at U.S. policies. It is necessary to note again that all of this takes place in an atmosphere, created by the SShA analysts, that is positively oriented toward detente. However, the analysts are, to say the least, disconcerted by occurrences they see taking place in the United States.

Reviewing the signing of the "Basic Principles" a month before its fifth anniversary, Berezhkov reasserts a common argument that the normalization of relations between the U.S. and the USSR is of tremendous significance for the two countries themselves as well as the rest of the world because an armed clash between the two powers "could lead to fatal consequences for the entire world." Following this plea concerning the prevention of war, Berezhkov turns away from the usual tactic of defending the Soviet Union against charges of the one-sidedness
of detente. Instead, he stresses the mutual benefits to be gained and maintains that both countries adhere to the objectives contained in the "Basic Principles." "Both sides have acknowledged that attempts to obtain one-sided advantages directly or indirectly at the expense of the other side are incompatible with the aforementioned objectives." He proceeds to deny charges of a "Soviet threat" and states, "The Soviet Union has never threatened anyone and has not intended and does not intend to attack anyone.”

On the other hand, Berezhkov also severely criticizes the efforts from within the United States to damage the processes of detente and strategic arms limitation by a propaganda campaign which uses the charges mentioned above concerning a "Soviet threat" and the accusation that the USSR is using these processes to establish a one-sided advantage.

Stories have been spread that detente is allegedly a one-way street from which the Soviet Union alone gains. Meanwhile it is perfectly obvious that the specific agreements and accords which have been reached in the course of this process became possible only through the mutual consent of the sides and consequently could not fail to accord with the interests of all the participants in the negotiations. It is also important that detente in general has reduced the danger of armed conflict and that, considering the devastating nature of modern weapons of mass destruction, detente benefits all peoples equally. . . .

The theories on the possibility and the permissibility of a 'limited nuclear war' between the United States and the USSR which have arisen in the United States essentially contain an attack on detente. The advocates of these theories try to accustom the U.S. public to the idea that a nuclear conflict, if it is waged 'according to the rules,' is not at all terrible. Without even mentioning the adventurist nature of such propaganda, it must be seen that its supporters are thus proceeding from the premise that nothing has changed in mutual relations between states since the era of confrontation. It emerges that, despite the adoption of the 'Basic Principles of Relations' by the USSR and the United States, the solution by force of problems which arise is allowed as before, and in addition with the use of nuclear weapons, albeit on a limited scale!
In their spirit and letter the "Basic Principles of Relations" between the Soviet Union and the United States signify the sides' readiness to seek fundamentally new approaches in international affairs and oblige them not to resort to force or the threat of force. Therefore discussions on the permissibility of 'limited nuclear war' signify flagrant disregard of this very important principle of interstate relations in the present era. In addition, theories of a 'limited nuclear conflict' flagrantly contradict the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war.

Concern over U.S. policies and distrust of its motives increased through 1977. This is evident in an article which appeared in October concerning military budgets. Its author, Baranovsky, criticizes the increased size of U.S. military budgets. This new level of funding not only perpetuates the arms race "but also raises it to a qualitatively new level." This is demonstrated by decisions to produce cruise missiles and develop the neutron bomb. Decisions such as these not only continue the arms race but implicitly enhance the prospect of using force in international relations.

J. Carter's administration, despite the Soviet-U.S. talks on the limitation of strategic offensive arms which are being held, has introduced a new destabilizing element into the existing strategic balance... by taking the decision to create a fourth component of the strategic forces -- cruise missiles...

As a result of the equipping of Minuteman-3 missiles with MD-12A type warheads and of the deployment of Trident and missiles with MIRVed warheads, the quantity of strategic nuclear material which can be delivered against targets in a single strike will be considerably increased. The enhancement of the accuracy of missiles and the creation of maneuverable warheads is envisaged. This means that the United States...is seeking, as before, to enhance the likely effectiveness of a nuclear strike. President J. Carter stressed that the United States has never renounced the possibility of making a nuclear first strike.

Baronovsky ends his presentation with a plea to end the arms race.

By late 1977, Soviet analysts are obviously on the offensive against the hostility they perceive in the United States. Where previously
they have been defending the Soviet Union against charges from some groups in the U.S. that it had gained a one-sided advantage through detente, they turn to the attack and reverse the charges. Berezhkov notes that recently Soviet-American relations have worsened. "If you look hard at the situation you are bound to see that the main reason for the subsequent stagnation in Soviet-American relations was the fact that Washington violated these principles [of peaceful coexistence] by attempting to gain one-sided advantages to the detriment of the interests and security of the Soviet Union."196

Berezhkov continues by charging that there has been a three-pronged effort by anti-Soviet, "right-wing and reactionary elements in U.S. ruling circles" to discredit the Soviet Union.197 These forces first asserted that

...all you had to do was to exert 'pressure' — and Moscow would make concessions that Washington wanted because the Soviet Union is allegedly experiencing great difficulties and is desperately interested in economic and scientific and technical ties with the West. Therefore, the United States should build up its military might to buttress its demands to the USSR.198

Their second accusation was that the Soviet Union posed a "threat" to the United States and "that it has sharply increased its defense potential and is seeking to gain an advantage over the United States."199 To meet this supposed challenge, the U.S. has been "compelled" to renew the arms race. Berezhkov also points out the contradiction between these two charges. "But this did not embarrass the organizers of the anti-Soviet campaign in the slightest since in both cases the aim was the same: to justify the unprecedented military budget and spur on the development of new weapons systems."200 The final prong of the anti-Soviet campaign was the U.S. human rights policy which Berezhkov maintains was designed
"to cast aspersions on domestic systems in the Soviet Union, to discredit the socialist system, and to create preconditions for interference in the internal affairs of socialist countries." Berezhkov dismisses all of these as "senseless." He proceeds to reaffirm the USSR's disinterest in attacking anyone and notes that the new Soviet constitution contains a provision that concerns the preservation of peace. Despite this, Berezhkov maintains that "attempts are still being repeated to secure one-sided advantages over the USSR to the detriment of its security and national interests," and that this is why the two countries have been unable to conclude a new strategic arms agreement.

This line prevails in SSHA articles throughout 1978 as well. Trofimenko refers to these developments as "recurrences of the cold war." Some of the analysts continue to focus on the groups behind American attacks, but others again focus primarily on U.S. strategic doctrine and its impact on Soviet-American relations.

Larionov discusses doctrine in relation to discussions occurring in the West about the question of the "nuclear threshold." He notes that this topic only developed after the Soviet Union ended the U.S. nuclear monopoly. Prior to that, it was a non-issue because the U.S. did not "plan any other type of war in Europe than all out nuclear war." Larionov maintains that when the U.S. lost its monopoly, it began a "feverish search for a 'rational' strategy which would exclude the possibility of retaliatory strikes on U.S. territory and simultaneously increase the 'utility' value of American military strength in general and its nuclear potential in particular. . . ." Larionov disputes this entire concept when he states that
...real security...will not be achieved through the lowering and erosion of the 'nuclear threshold' or through the substantiation of the permissibility and, sometimes (with tactical provisions), expediency of so-called limited nuclear war, but through unconditional condemnation and prohibition of this kind of warfare and through curbing of the arms race, which has overwhelmed the world and is taking increasingly threatening forms.

V.P. Abarenkov attacks the "myth of a Soviet threat" again. Like other SSHA analysts he disavows Soviet intentions of pursuing a military advantage and objects to the image of the Soviet Union presented by some Western sources.

Top-level Soviet leaders have repeatedly announced clearly and precisely that the USSR does not intend to strive for military superiority, that it is not preparing to deliver the first nuclear strike and that, in general, it does not intend to attack anyone. Nonetheless, throughout the postwar period, American propaganda has spread the myth of the 'Soviet threat.' This blasphemous accusation has been leveled against a people who paid with the lives of 20 million of their sons and daughters to put an end to aggression and save the people of Europe from fascism, and who are now engaged in peaceful construction of their own country. This blasphemous pretext has been used and is now being used in the United States whenever it is necessary to push high defense budgets through the legislative bodies and receive advance funds for the development and manufacture of new, even more refined and fatal weapons of mass destruction. Like two-faced januses, some military figures are able -- depending on their audience -- to describe the horrors of the 'imminent Soviet threat,' and literally on the next day, with no concern for even elementary logic, to brag about the military strength of the United States and its superiority to the USSR.

In another article in the same edition, V.V. Zhurkin described "the modern version" of the "Soviet threat" as having a "special clarify...reminiscent of the Cold War" and which reappears annually with discussions of new military budgets. Zhurkin also discusses what he calls the "imaginary 'gaps'" that have been created in whatever "part of the arms race it was necessary for the Pentagon to speed up." He goes on to
say that "Previously, this was the 'bomber gap' and the 'missile gap.' Today it is the 'throw-weight gap' (strategic nuclear warheads) and the civil defense gap." Then there are also people, the "military academic complex," who are responsible for finding "new" Soviet threats.

Thus, an assessment is already underway about the possibility of developing a campaign on the 'nuclear submarine gap' at the end of the 70's and beginning of the 80's; the date — 1968 — has already been determined when the rate of introduction for the new Trident strategic submarine will supposedly lag behind the requirement created by the retirement of the obsolescent Polaris and Poseidon submarines. This recurring myth about the recurring, imaginary gap can easily be used to steer the appropriate programs through Congress and to speed up development of new elements for the submarine component of the U.S. Triad of strategic offensive forces.

At the end of the year Petrovsky discusses the "national security" doctrine of the United States in which there is "a direct relationship between military might and foreign policy proceeding on the basis that military interests take priority over political interests." The changing correlation of forces in the world has contributed to a considerable evolution in the U.S. attitude toward the use of force in its foreign policy. Over the years this has progressed through various phases of strategic doctrine; however, in its modern formulation, it still relies on some form of military superiority.

The strategy of 'realistic deterrence' and the formulas of 'sufficiency' and 'parity' as criteria governing the level of U.S. strategic arms, which appeared during the reappraisal of the 'national security' doctrine, although muffling the thesis of absolute military superiority, nevertheless stressed the significance of technical military superiority.

The main ideological and theoretical basis for assertions on the inevitability of the primacy of strength in the 'national security' doctrine is...the concept of the 'equilibrium of fear' ('balance of terror').
The theorists of the 'balance of terror' assert that the creation of nuclear and other types of weapons — the 'total means' of mass destruction and annihilation of practically unlimited force — automatically places a limit on the possibility of their being used by states in the struggle against each other and thereby allegedly precludes the danger of war. In such arguments by bourgeois ideologists the existence of the 'big bomb' is a self-sufficient factor capable of insuring peace in any conditions and making war impossible.

The logical consequence of the false supposition that the balance of terror is a guarantee of peace is the assertion that the arms race need not necessarily lead to war, that many rounds in the arms race 'evaporate' without serious consequences and that a tangible result of it is a strengthening of national security.

The falsity of such reasonings is obvious. Despite extensive military measures in recent years the United States has not only failed to obtain guarantees of victory in the event of a nuclear war, but on the contrary each new spiral in the arms race launched increased international tension and the threat of war and made its probable result even more catastrophic. 

Articles for the last year of the decade do not dwell on U.S. doctrine but on SALT and its problems. So this article by Petrovsky is the last that deals in any depth with U.S. strategic thinking. The article is somewhat revisionist in its approach — possibly a reflection of the mounting distrust of the Soviets for the United States which has become evident over the last several years of the 1970s. Although Petrovsky agrees with opinions in SSHA analyses that "mutual assured destruction" or the "balance of terror" is an effort to deal with a changing world situation where the U.S. has lost its military superiority, he believes that it is not as clear-cut a difference in comparison with the opinions of some of the analysts of the middle 1970s; however, there is the subtle implication that there is more duplicity behind U.S. strategic doctrine than is apparent in earlier commentaries in SSHA.
The general position of SShA analysts toward U.S. strategic doctrine over the decade of the 1970s has been, not surprisingly, one of varying degrees of hostility. SShA analysts tend to reject virtually all aspects of U.S. strategic doctrine except mutual assured destruction which most find to be a tolerable, but ultimately probably unworkable, arrangement. They all blame the arms race on the United States and reject the use of force and the waging of war as legitimate methods in the nuclear age. Nevertheless, there has been a somewhat circular progression of the opinions expressed by SShA analysts. During the first year of publication, most analysts had a rather negative view of U.S. policy. However, by November of 1971, there was some modification of this opinion.

In 1970 and early 1971, the dominant themes criticized continued reliance on military force with its permutations like the dangerous and volatile "local" and "limited" wars aspect of "flexible response" and continued development of new and destabilizing weapons systems like ABM and MIRV. There is also much criticism of the inconsistency between the unexplained new strategic approach of "sufficiency" announced by the Nixon administration and the continued development and deployment of new weapons systems that feed the arms race. Nevertheless, as negotiations on SALT I progress, opinions alter in 1971 with a growing emphasis on the mutual, common interests of both the U.S. and the USSR -- mainly the prevention of war and the limiting of the arms race. Indicative of the apparent tension among the SSHA analysts themselves over this topic is that both sides are presented in the same issue in November 1971. Further evidence of shifting positions comes with Trofimenko's
analysis of the new Nixon administration policy of "realistic deter-
rence" that partially explains the inconsistencies criticized earlier as
the conflict between new policies and the momentum of old policies.
It is also significant that both Arbatov and Trofimenko express some-
what different, more positively oriented positions than they had a
year earlier.

With the signing of SALT in May 1972, the discussions of weapons
systems and U.S. strategic policy ceased for a time and emphasis was
placed on preventing nuclear war and eventually terminating the arms
race. However, this period was also marked by warnings of the fragility
of the agreements and of the forces working against their success. Thus,
there is a tug of war between the SSA analysts who are optimistic over
the direction Soviet-American relations have taken and those who fear that
optimism may be premature and possibly misplaced. There is also the
underlying theme during the 1972-73 period that U.S. policy had fallen
victim, from the Soviet perspective, to the positive changes occurring
in the world — the changed correlation of forces — and that U.S.
acquiescence in such areas as SALT was the result of a readjustment to
a more realistic evaluation of the world.

Optimism begins to wane somewhat in 1974 because of a perceived
return by the U.S. policymakers to a "counterforce" doctrine, but the
analysts generally tend to hold to the belief that military force can no
longer be a basis for policy. They also emphasize again and again the
suicidal nature of nuclear war and the danger posed by the arms race but
stress that the prevention of war will take much work and many changes.
Nevertheless, from 1974 on there is a continuous, although slow and some-
times uncertain, return to the hostility of the early 1970s.
The opinions expressed by SShA analysts reflect several other elements involved with their opinions of U.S. strategic doctrine. One of the more interesting of these is the reaction to accusations by some U.S. circles concerning a "Soviet threat" and the one-sidedness of detente. At first they are very defensive about these charges but later they defend themselves against these attacks by lodging similar charges against the United States. The "Soviet threat" is a myth devised by various groups, primarily elements of the military-industrial complex, who use fabrications of Soviet strength and intentions to further their own ambitions and fuel the arms race. Accusations about the one-sidedness of detente are refuted; and, at times, the U.S. is accused of trying to establish one-sided advantages for themselves in the military strategic sphere.

Another element is the frequent references to the costs of the arms race. Most of these refer to U.S. military budgets and their impact on the U.S. domestic economic situation; however, a few of these references are cast in general, neutral terms and one or two even refer specifically to the U.S. and the USSR and to the possibility of reinvesting resources freed by detente in social programs.

A third element of interest is that many of the analysts believe that the U.S. military establishment is attempting to establish a "first strike" capability. Concomitantly, there are several commentators who denounce war and disavow any intention on the part of the Soviet Union of attacking or planning to attack anyone. Finally, several SShA writers believe nuclear war to be catastrophic or suicidal. In a manner similar to the discussions of the economic impact of military budgets,
most of the analysts speak of the suicidal or catastrophic nature of nuclear war for mankind in general or the U.S. specifically. Occasionally, as with the budget question, some commentators phrase their thoughts in a neutral manner that implies inclusion of the Soviet Union; and, in one instance, an analyst refers to both the U.S. and the Soviet Union in terms of the suicidal results of nuclear war. Most of these elements are heavily influenced by nuclear parity or equality. To fully understand the Soviet view on U.S. strategic doctrine, it is also necessary to understand their perspective on parity.

Parity, Equality and Equal Security in SShA and MEMO

One of the essential elements in the correlation of world forces that brings about the acceptance of peaceful coexistence is the new balance of military forces in the world in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Terms such as equality, parity, and balance of forces appear with some frequency in SShA from early in the decade until its end and are viewed as being an important aspect in the improvement of relations between the U.S. and the USSR. Nevertheless these inferences are often tied to accusations that the United States wishes to change this balance in their favor. This distrust leads SShA analysts to stress such ideas as identical or equal security as a conceptual companion to parity.

Although the concept of parity or equality is implied in earlier articles, the term parity first appears in an article by Trofimenko in October 1970; however, the first actual discussion of parity's implications does not occur until February 1971. In a SShA panel discussion, N.N. Arkad'yev speaks of the degree to which Nixon was "forced
to adapt American foreign policy to the changing ratio of forces in the world.\textsuperscript{219}

Despite the ideological hostility toward the Soviet Union, Nixon, his closest advisors, and even the military upper echelon, albeit with obvious lack of eagerness, must take into consideration what they call the 'nuclear parity' between the USSR and the United States. This of course does not mean the renunciation of attempts on the part of the American military to change to its advantage or to 'replay' the strategic ratios of forces between the Soviet Union and the United States.\textsuperscript{220}

Several months later in an article that previewed the discussions of the next several months on arms limitations, the author introduced the idea of equal security where neither side would have a unilateral advantage in the strategic area. This commentator notes that the principle of equal security also was accepted verbally by the United States. Nevertheless, he argues that the U.S. "very frequently acts at variance with the fundamental principle of observance of the conditions of equal security."\textsuperscript{221} Two examples of the variation of the United States from the principle of equal security, according to the author, are: 1) the use of the "imaginary 'Soviet threat'" to exert pressure for increased allocations for military expenditures; and 2) the idea that talks with the Soviet Union can best take place from a "position of strength."\textsuperscript{222}

This analyst concludes his argument for equal security with the following statements:

The powers which possess nuclear arsenals bear the chief responsibility for averting the threat of worldwide nuclear catastrophe and they must achieve this through joint efforts. It is clear to all that disarmament, all the more so, nuclear disarmament, cannot be implemented unilaterally. Here also the principle of equal security must be observed in the strictest way.\textsuperscript{223}
The analysts in SShA perceive the United States as having a difficult time dealing with the concept of strategic parity during the early 1970s. Several analysts speak of the problems the United States has in attempting to reconcile themselves with parity or equality with the Soviet Union. Trofimenko speaks of the U.S. policy of "realistic deterrence" as designed to enable the U.S. to avoid this reconciliation.

Finally, proceeding from the formal recognition of the strategic equality and parity of the United States and USSR, this strategy nonetheless does not want to come to terms with the fact of this equality and is aimed at searching for crafty, devious ways to nonetheless achieve for the United States some military advantages compared with the USSR.

Thus, the first two years of the decade saw a mixture of attitudes concerning parity. SShA analysts stress its importance and revel in the fact that it has come about through the efforts of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, they disapprove of the responses it has provoked in the United States. The general opinion is that the U.S. acknowledges the condition of strategic parity but appears unable to accept it. So the U.S. keeps trying to conceive policies that will again place them in a position of strength. This leads the Soviet analysts to hotly defend the necessity of equal security. Stressing Brezhnev's insistence on the principle of equal security as an integral part of any understanding, just prior to the May 1972 agreement Matvayev argues that observance of the principle of equality is also basic for the entire sphere of Soviet-U.S. relations. The importance of adhering to this principle is stressed often by SShA analysts following the 1972 agreements.
Trofimenko believes in the importance of these principles of equality and equal security. He also emphasizes the problems incurred in the negotiations to determine exactly what constitutes equal security.

The Soviet-U.S. SALT accords convincingly confirmed that constructive results in Soviet-American mutual relations can be achieved solely given the strictest observance of the principle of equal security for the sides. . . The principle of equal security that only formed the basic platform for the accords reached in strategic arms limitation but was also incorporated as a supremely important principle in the document 'The Basic Principles of Mutual Relations Between the USSR and the United States. . .'

The concrete implementation of the principle of equal security in the SALT accords was not such an easy task. Because of the difference in the size of U.S. and Soviet territory, the size of the countries' populations, their geographical location, and the principles and nature of strategic building, it was necessary to find accords on strategic arms making each of the sides confident that in the limiting its arms it would not be losing out to the other.

Taking account of all these so-called 'asymmetries' in the position of the United States and the USSR, in the deployment of their strategic forces and in the balance of those strategic arms unaffected by the limitations (particularly intercontinental bombers), the principle of equal security was implemented in such a way that direct one-to-one ratios were not established for the arms covered by the limitations.227

Early the next year Georgiyev and Kolosov present an optimistic view of what they call a "New Phase of Soviet-American Relations."

From their perspective, the importance of equality and equal security cannot be over estimated.

Clear recognition of the principle of the parties' equality and equal security and renunciation of the use of threat of force were a necessary precondition for relations for peace to be maintained and strengthened between the USSR and the United States. It was only on this basis that the Moscow meeting could and did take place and that the documents adopted at it became possible. In other words, the results of the Soviet-U.S. talks showed that the United States had been forced to renounce attempts to talk to the Soviet Union 'from a position of strength' and to shift to a dialog [sic] with it from positions of equality.
Recognition of the fact that attempts to obtain unilateral advantages at the other side's expense are incompatible with the set aims is an important factor supplementing these commitments. 228

The optimism of Georgiyev and Kolanov, however, is short-lived. In October of the same year, Arbatov writes of the contradictions between various U.S. elements and changes that despite their signing of the Moscow agreements that they are still trying to obtain an advantage that would make the use of force a feasible alternative.

Hence, too, arise the many obvious contradictions in U.S. policy in which the official acknowledgement of the principle of identical security and the renunciation of attempts to achieve military superiority (and this principle contained in the document 'Basic Principles of Mutual Relations Between the USSR and the United States' signed in Moscow in May 1972, and in a number of other agreements) are combined with continuing attempts to force ahead the arms race in spheres which do not yet fall under restriction in accordance with the Soviet-U.S. agreements. Many representatives of the U.S. ruling circles have so far not abandoned their hope that future achievements of a military-technical nature will still be able, ... to turn back the course of events, providing the United States with the opportunity to make effective use of military force as the main instrument of U.S. foreign policy. 229

Thus, despite U.S. participation in the agreements, identical or equal security may be threatened by U.S. actions and Arbatov urges watchfulness. According to him, "this also shows once again how important it is for the other countries, particularly the socialist countries, to continue to maintain great vigilance." 230

SShA writers continuously express their concern over the maintenance of equality and equal security. A few months later, Mil'shteyn and Semeyko explain the reasons equal security was necessary and remains so.
The 'basic principles' reaffirm the principles of the sides' identical security and the rejection of attempts to obtain one-sided advantages, which would be incompatible with the strengthening of relations of peace between the USSR and the United States. This created the necessary preconditions for agreeing on the absolute and relative sizes of strategic offensive forces. In the age of nuclear weapons the principle of identical (or equal) security can be the only acceptable one, since the desire to insure supremacy would make the achievement of long-term and stable agreements impossible and would inevitably engender an arms race which would be senseless, given the existence of the vast nuclear stocks already accumulated.231

These two analysts argue that identical security and concomitantly, although only implicitly, parity were prerequisites for strategic arms limitations agreements. Additionally, although again more implicitly than explicitly, identical security is the only basis for normalization of Soviet-American relations and any effort to establish a one-sided advantage would both tremendously damage these relations and reignite the arms race between the two countries. Finally, identical security is an essential condition for future negotiations. Recognition of the interests of the sides' security, based on the principle of equality and rejection of the use or threat of force, constitutes a necessary precondition for the successful holding of talks.232

Mil'shteyn and Semeyko also address an aspect of equality and identical security that has been one of the most difficult things to resolve in negotiations -- the problems of quantitative vs. qualitative differences and the "geographic asymmetry" of the Soviet Union and the United States. According to the authors, the cold war years produced an "action-reaction" principle in the arms race with each side matching the other development for development and system for system. This is complicated by additional factors.
However, because of the sides' different political, strategic and economic factors and scientific and technical solutions, the development of strategic forces could not have identical directions and forms. As a result of this, by the beginning of the seventies the sides possessed strategic offensive forces which naturally could not coincide in their quantitative and qualitative characteristics. As people point out in the United States, this places the solution of the problem of their mutually acceptable limitation under more complex conditions.

'Geographic asymmetry,' a number of whose aspects... were engendered by the former terms in international relations, is also important. On the one hand, it lies in the different nature of the so-called strike targets (military targets, industrial, populated, and administrative centers, and so forth), their number, size, distribution density, relative importance and so forth. Strategic analysts in the United States believe that this requires the sides' possession of strategic strike facilities differing in their capabilities. But, on the other hand, the USSR and the United States have dissimilar conditions for the basing of their strategic forces. The Soviet Union...does not have military bases on foreign territories close to U.S. territory, whereas the United States possesses numerous military bases in Europe and Asia. According to a number of U.S. evaluations, this can increase the strategic potential of the United States and enable it to be used against the USSR in the event of war, if it has not been successfully averted, not only nuclear facilities with an intercontinental radius of operation but also so-called forward forces -- above all, aircraft based at foreign surface airports and on aircraft carriers. The resultant disproportion places the sides under different conditions.

On the whole, the asymmetry problem is exceptionally complex, even if it is examined separately. It is perfectly clear that its solution can be found only with mutual regard for each other's interests, taking the principle of identical security into account.

Another problem is the commensurability of the quantitative limitations on strategic offensive arms considered comprehensively. Its essence lies in the selection of the proportions of quantitative limitation which would take comprehensive account of the qualitative limitation characteristic of various types of weapons. The 'quantity-quality' problem is linked in U.S. investigations to the need to establish more stable nuclear parity between the United States and the USSR compared with that which had been established, according to U.S. ideas, by the beginning of the seventies.233

These aspects of asymmetry and qualitative-quantitative differences are reflected in discussions seen to be occurring in the U.S. between
representatives of the "right wing" who "oversimplified the entire com-
plexity of the problem of insuring identical security, making parity in
the sphere of the USSR's and the United States' strategic forces only
numerical equality" and the "more realistic" moderates who advanced a
proposal that "would take into account the aggregate of quantitative and
qualitative factors rather than just quantitative factors." Mil'shteyn and Semeyko describe this second approach as one which showed
"obvious support for the principle of equal security."

As the time for the meeting at Vladivostok approached the impor-
tance of equal security and inadmissibility of a one-sided advantage
were stressed more and more often. Trofimenko mentions both aspects in
the context of previous agreements and the necessity of equal security
as a prerequisite for normalization of Soviet-American relations. Kolosov stresses the importance of these two elements for new agree-
ments when he states that the "main factor. . .is to be guided by the
only principle of insuring the identical security of the sides and of
barring one-sided military advantages." The emphasis on equal secu-
ritv takes on a more ominous tone in the middle of 1974 in response to
charges of a "Soviet threat" and to actions that are perceived as
"accelerating the arms race." Arbatov refers to equal security as a
"right" and insists on the "impermissibility of attempts to derive one-
sided benefits or advantages."

In an editorial which appeared in June 1974, the author argues in
favor of the importance of improved, normalized relations between the
U.S. and the Soviet Union. However, he sees forces within the United
States who "would like to utilize detente only as a specific tool of... the cold war." The author maintains that these forces:

... seem to forget that the cardinal and fundamental conditions distinguishing the situation of mutually acknowledged peaceful coexistence from the period of confrontation is precisely that the parties in cooperation refrain from seeking to gain unilateral advantages or impose their opinions on the other side and that questions are settled, whether they relate to strategic arms or to shipping, on the basis of equality and this demands compromises which take into account the interests, wishes and traditions of each side and, even if it is a question of doing so, their prejudices.

The agreements concluded by the Soviet Union and the United States stipulate equality of commitments and equality in advantages gained as a result of their implementation. In the sphere of strategic arms, this means the principle of equal security for the sides and avoiding one-sided advantages.241

Two months before the Vladivostok meeting, Trofimenko emphasizes that equal security for both sides was the "main principle" for the first SALT agreement and the ABM Treaty. Trofimenko elaborates on exactly what adherence to this principle of equal security entails.

According to this principle, the establishment of an equivalence of the strategic balance must be carried out merely by means of numerical equality of both offensive and defensive strategic weapons on both sides, but must also take into account the existence of so-called 'strategic asymmetries' (related to factors of a geographical, demographic or technical nature, etc.). This makes it possible to fix the essential parity of the balance of strategic arsenals of both sides, while permitting certain possible numerical inequalities in certain individual systems of strategic weapons.242

Following the meeting in November, SSHA analysts hail the reaffirmation of the principles of equality and equal security.243

Specific references to equality and equal security in relation to arms agreements decrease over the next two or three years except for passing references to the importance of the continuation of these principles. Warnings about the necessity of neither side attempting to
obtain one-sided advantages give way to charges that the United States, or forces within the United States, are trying to establish a unilateral advantage over the Soviet Union. This was at first perceived to be an artifact of the presidential campaign of 1976; but, since what had been perceived as campaign rhetoric did not subside after the election, SSbA analysts feared a basic change in the direction of U.S. policy toward detente. Most of the analysis during this period focuses on criticism of nuclear war, the arms race, and U.S. strategic policy with references to equal security limited to verbal reinforcement of the principles embodied in the 1972 agreements.

This situation shifts as negotiations on SALT II progress. In an article that appeared in December 1977, Berezhkov refers to the slippage that occurred during the presidential campaign. He finds this combined with perceived attempts by the United States to acquire unilateral advantages over the USSR to be the major obstacles to further agreements. Despite this, the Soviet Union is willing to pursue future agreements but only under certain circumstances. According to Berezhkov, "The Soviet country is prepared to have dealings with other countries and to reach agreement with them on specific problems solely on the basis of complete equality and the observance of the sides' interests." 244

The subject does not arise again until May 1978 when Israelyan discusses disarmament in broad terms in conjunction with a scheduled UN conference on the subject. He stresses the "nondetriment" of participants and the concept of "balance."

Many multilateral and bilateral documents adopted recently stress that measures to curb the arms race and expand disarmament must be based on the principle of nondetriment to any of the
sides participating in the agreements. In particular, this principle is fundamental to the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Experience confirms that if any of the participants in the talks try to infringe upon it, the talks will fail. On the other hand, when this principle is observed the talks are generally successful and the resulting agreements are effective and viable. The principle of 'balance,' i.e., the refusal to allow military advantages for some countries at any stage of disarmament, also enjoys considerable support.245

Both the Berezhkov and Israelyan articles state explicitly that the Soviets will not be party to any agreement that is not based on equality.

The SSHA articles over the next six months slight the questions of equality and equal security in favor of commenting on U.S. policies. It is only in November 1978, in the last one of the last two articles on arms control to appear in SSHA prior to the SALT II agreement, that the importance of equality and the equal security is reemphasized. Berezhkov believes that the agreements reached in Vladivostok four years earlier "can serve as an example of an approach which considers both sides' security interests and which is based on the principle of equality." However, this agreement was subverted by the United States in an effort to revise it in favor of the U.S. "Unfortunately a prolonged pause subsequently occurred in Soviet-U.S. Relations, reasons for which lie in the desire of the new U.S. Administration to deviate from the agreed provisions: above all from the principle of equality and mutual security and from the principle of noninterference in international affairs."247

In the months immediately following the signing of SALT II the principles of equality and identical security again emerge. An editorial in July 1979 describes the agreement as being "built on the principle of equality and identical security." Two months later an article by A.A. Platonov details the importance of these concepts to the SALT II
agreements. Initially the talks had stumbled over these concepts as a result of "the desire of certain U.S. circles to depart from the principle of equality and identical security and to secure advantages at the other sides' expense. This accounts for the uneven pace of the talks and their occasional downright protraction."  

The Soviet-American summit meeting in Vienna demonstrated the tenacity of the policy of easing international tension and the first fulness [sic] of joint efforts to limit strategic arms on the basis of the principle of the sides' equality and identical security and while maintaining the strategic parity that has evolved between the USSR and the United States. In this context, special significance is attached to the provision recorded in the Soviet-American joint communique of 16 June 1979 that neither side seeks, or will in the future seek, military superiority, since this could only lead to dangerous instability, giving rise to a higher level of armaments and not contributing to the security of either side. The SALT II treaty is aimed at implementing this provision. 

This is the last mention of equality and/or identical security during the time period under examination here. 

During 1970 and 1971, the terms parity and equality slowly started appearing in articles in SShA and reflected the perception that the U.S., however reluctantly, had begun to accept the existence of strategic parity between the Soviet Union and the United States. Additionally, there are efforts taking place within the United States to elevate U.S. capability to a "position of strength." Nevertheless, parity persists and is the basis for negotiations on strategic weapons. Parity and equal security become an integral part of the SALT agreements and the Basic Principles. 

The analysts recognize this as an extremely difficult task since equality or parity was achieved by diverse development of the two countries' strategic systems that resulted in a rough equivalence in
capabilities but great diversity in the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the two sides' weapons systems. This also was complicated by asymmetries in the geography, population, and, implicitly, the strategic doctrine of the two countries.

After the first SALT agreement, the SShA analysts usually begin to refer to the "principle of equality and equal security," linking parity and equal security together as two elements of the same concepts. Prior to this, the terms had proximal implications in their usage but were not considered to be virtually equivalent. Both of these become essential to the preservation and extension of strategic arms agreements and to Soviet-American relations in general.

At the same time distrust for U.S. support of these concepts grows due to the debates taking place in the United States. One thing that is specifically noted as unrealistic are the attempts by some to define parity as equal numbers, ignoring the various asymmetries that make this impossible.

Concern over the maintenance of equality and equal security apparently increased over the next two years as we see the Soviet analysts prior to Vladivostok beginning to emphasize not only equality and equal or identical security but also the necessity of preventing the achievement of any sort of one-sided advantage. After Vladivostok, arguments supporting these concepts fade only to be revived briefly in 1977-78 as negotiations on SALT II become more substantial. With the signing of SALT II, the terms equality and equal security reappear briefly. They are loudly praised. In addition, much emphasis is placed on the importance of protecting the principles of equality and identical security.
and of preventing any attempts to achieve a unilateral advantage that would lead to military superiority.

Although the existence of equality and equal security, especially in the area of nuclear weapons, has been a focal point for many analysts as they have examined the arms agreements negotiated in the 1970s, this is not the case with MEMO commentators. MEMO authors often speak of the increase in universal or international security due to the establishment of the principle of peaceful coexistence and the efforts made to control arms; however, references to equality, parity and equal security are sparse.

These concepts only appear in MEMO in the middle of 1974 when Zhurkin used the American term "strategic parity." In this instance Zhurkin was describing the situation which had led the United States to accept the changed correlation of forces, so, even in this case, parity refers to U.S. perceptions, not to those of the Soviets.

Additionally, it is only at the end of 1974 that MEMO analysts began to talk of the principle of identical security. Prior to this references to security were in general terms of improved international relations and decreased risk of war. This is especially interesting because it more or less coincided with the meeting at Vladivostok. However, only one other author mentions the principle of identical security in discussions about Soviet-American agreements. In reference to the ABM Treaty and SALT I, G. Trofimenko says, "Both agreements, founded on the principle of identical security and rejection of the attainment of a one-sided advantage, served as a ponderable investment
in making the limitation of the arms race and the stabilization of the military balance workable."253

The principle of equality also first appears in this article by Trofimenko. He discusses the difficulty of maintaining equality in arms limitation because of the differences in the development of U.S. and Soviet weapons systems. This maintenance is especially difficult given the build-up of new systems that is perceived to be taking place in the United States at the time Trofimenko wrote this particular article. According to him, this made the Vladivostok agreements surprising.

It is clear from this innumeration [of U.S. systems] that circumstances were not favorable for finding a mutually acceptable decision in accordance with the security interests of both sides founded on the principle of equality. Thus it was a big surprise for the Western view when the fact registered that, in the main, there was rapid progress on an understanding on this cardinal question at Vladivostok.254

The term equality does not reappear until the middle of 1977, again in the context of the Vladivostok agreements. According to Nikonov, these agreements "which embodied the principle of equality and equal security of the sides, provided a workable limitation of the strategic arms race and did not give anyone a one-sided advantage in its place."255 Similar references appear in an article by Razmerov a year later.256 Nikonov's statement may very well have been a reaction to the proposals placed before the Soviets by a new U.S. administration. The final MEMO reference to these principles came with the conclusion of SALT II. "An important role in guaranteeing SALT-II...resulted from our principle of equality and identical security as the basis for strategic stabilization in terms of which the acquisition by one side of military superiority over the other side is inadmissible."257
Most MEMO analysts are more concerned with international security than with any type of equality. The few references to equality and equal security are tied primarily to the Vladivostok agreements and the SALT II agreements which were the outgrowth of Vladivostok. It is interesting that these references stress the inadmissibility of a one-sided advantage and the workability of the limitations specified under the agreements.

Arms Control, Disarmament, and SALT in SShA and MEMO

Obviously, parity and equal security are viewed as prerequisites for arms control and are so strongly linked to any views of arms control agreements that it is artificial to separate the two. Arms control also is viewed by the SShA analysts as being integrally connected to many other aspects, especially detente. Additionally, arms control agreements would help to curb the pernicious and potentially catastrophic arms race. It is also only one aspect of the larger picture that would include not only the control of arms but also general disarmament.

In SShA arms control, regardless of what form it may take, generally is perceived as a positive development which promotes peace and counters efforts to continue and extend the arms race. Although there is some mention of limiting arms in the early issues of SShA, consistent references to SALT do not occur until 1971. Prior to this, discussions focused primarily on the arms race and weapons development, the correlation of forces, peaceful coexistence, detente, U.S. strategic policy, and forces within the United States which either supported detente and its corollaries or were in opposition.
Once SALT, and concomitantly the ABM treaty, becomes a viable topic, it usually is discussed either in terms of the events that brought about strategic arms talks or from the aspect of elements which are or might be detrimental to these talks. The overall view of SALT is a positive and forwardlooking one. Once one agreement is concluded, the next is planned and anticipated. Throughout the strategic arms limitation period from 1970 until after the signing of SALT, there are also passing references to other types of arms control agreements including: test-ban, nuclear proliferation, prevention of nuclear war, general and complete disarmament, and disarmament proposals before the U.N. Finally, SSHa analysts view the "Basic Principles of Relations," which was signed at the same time as SALT I, and the ABM Treaty, to be an important corollary to the first SALT agreement or any agreements following the initial one.

Arms limitation is mentioned in an unsigned article in the first issue of SSHa. This article heralds the preliminary meeting of delegations from the Soviet Union and the United States at the end of 1969 to discuss limiting strategic arms. This occurred, according to the analyst, virtually on the eve of a new round of the arms race — a race that would be "marked by the expansion of new weapons systems." These new systems, especially ABM and MIRV, would have an "additional" destabilizing effect on the arms race. "To put it simply," according to this analyst, "the threat of thermonuclear war is increasing." The article proceeds to review some of the previous problems but emphasizes that "the main thing is that a dialogue between the USSR and the United States on such an important current problem as limiting the
strategic arms race has begun." The author also points out that the Soviet Union has consistently supported "the course of disarmament" including partial measures like talks on strategic arms. On the other hand, in the author's view, the U.S. has pursued a policy that is the reverse of this and that has been the main reason behind the perpetuation of the arms race.

The following month, an article by G.A. Aleshin criticizes an article by Jeremy Stone which appeared the previous month (January 1970) in *Foreign Affairs*. According to the author, Stone advocates reduction of U.S. expenditures on weapons systems as a unilateral effort to break the "action-reaction" spiral of the strategic arms race. This could be done regardless of what might occur at the arms talks. This becomes interesting here because of what Aleshin perceives to be Stone's inclination "to disparage somewhat the significance of the talks, in particular the possible consequences of their failure." Aleshin goes on to argue that:

...such failure not only would signify maintaining the present, extremely dangerous tempos of the arms race under conditions which have developed and also could intensify them. Unjustified skepticism with respect to the importance and prospects of the talks could lead to a situation where the persons on whom their course depends directly will feel free from responsibility.

This series of sentences certainly views the talks from a positive perspective. Also of interest is that they are phrased in such a way as to appear as a serious and deliberate effort to urge someone to be cautious in their responses to the talks.

Despite these preliminary positive responses to the initial meetings on strategic arms limitation, concern quickly develops because of the
conflicting signals perceived as coming from the U.S. administration. This is generated largely because of new military budget requests in the United States. Khlebnikov charges that "Despite the talks that have been begun the United States is speeding up the arms race." Other references to the arms talks take a similar tone. For example, Tsagalov refers to the talks in what can be described as a passing manner in the context of indicting the U.S. military-industrial complex's influence in Washington. Nevertheless, the SALT talks have become a confounding factor in the determination of U.S. policy. According to Trofimenko, the talks' eventual result "is one of the factors which introduce an element of indefiniteness into American strategy."

Substantive discussions of SALT resume in the middle of 1971 with an unsigned article that focuses on "New Soviet Initiatives." This article stresses the importance of the strategic arms talks and argues that they are a central feature of Soviet arms proposals. The United States, on the other hand, continues to try to attain a "position of strength" from which to conduct negotiations with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, talks, whether they are bilateral or multilateral, on arms control are essential. "The powers which possess nuclear arsenals bear the chief responsibility for averting the threat of a worldwide nuclear catastrophe and they must achieve this through joint efforts. It is clear to all that disarmament, all the more so, nuclear disarmament, cannot be implemented unilaterally." Finally, the author anticipates the continuation of the SALT talks which had resumed in June, noting that there are plans for the conclusion of an ABM agreement as well as plans for an agreement on certain measures to limit strategic offensive arms.
Several months later Arbatov discusses the question of arms limitation talks both specifically and in the broader context of disarmament.

...the problem of limiting and terminating the arms race is an important sphere of common interest for the American and Soviet peoples and for all the peoples of the world. Solving the problem is particularly important since the arms race has in itself become one of the most dangerous sources of tension and of the threat of war. . . .

The USSR has frequently expressed readiness to limit and completely terminate the arms race and has submitted a number of proposals. . . .

But the conditions are now riper than ever for switching to serious measures for arms race limitation and disarmament.

The United States and the USSR are holding tasks [sic] on these questions -- both bilateral talks connected with strategic arms limitation, and multilateral talks. We should like to hope that the forthcoming Soviet-American contacts will promote the success of these talks and the widening of the range of questions on which agreement can be reached. The Soviet Union approaches disarmament questions on the basis of a principled line which is founded on the belief that these political aims are becoming increasingly achievable in our era.269

Arbatov emphasizes the importance of the bilateral talks on strategic arms and expresses fairly high hopes for their success.

These few representations of positive attitudes toward arms limitation are somewhat lost in the myriad of articles dealing with the United States' attempts to achieve a "position of strength." Again, as in 1970, arms limitation is mentioned in this context and is presented as something the U.S. has had to accept more by default than by choice. This attitude is expressed by Trofimenko in December 1971.

Realizing to a certain degree the endlessness and consequently the hopelessness of the nuclear arms race, the U.S. leaders, by the very fact of the talks with the USSR on strategic arms limitation are now obliged, if only in concept, to agree with the need for setting a certain 'ceiling' on strategic armaments. All this cannot but show the unsoundness of the hints made by the Pentagon leaders about the possibility
of unrestrained U.S. use of military force in the contemporary
epoch.270

In February 1972 Arbatov looks at arms limitation in the context
of the arms race and the importance of limiting that race to help pre­
vent nuclear war. Returning to one of his common themes, Arbatov dis­
cusses spheres of common interest between the United States and the USSR.
According to him:

The most important of them is the sphere of preventing a
world thermonuclear war. It is hardly necessary to prove that
such a war would be a disaster for all of the peoples of the
world. . .

A realistic understanding of this problem long ago began
to clear a road for itself. However, it may be noted with
regret that this is still far from providing a complete
solution to the problem of preventing a new war. The diffi­
culty of the situation exists in the fact that a world nuclear
war can begin not only as a result of its being intentionally
unleashed, but as the result of the gradual growth of one or
another conflict which may at some moment go out of control.
This danger can only be prevented through a radical improve­
ment of the international situation.

One country has repeatedly come forward with peaceful ini­
tiatives aimed at accomplishing this kind of improvement of
the international situation. It is this goal which is pursued
by the extensive peace program which was put forward by the 24th
congress of the CPSU.

Further, the problem of limiting and halting the arms race
is an important sphere of common interest for the American and
Soviet peoples, as it is for all of the peoples of the world.
The solution of this problem is important politically, for the
arms race has in and of itself become one of the most dangerous
sources of tension and for the threat of war.

The USSR has repeatedly stressed its readiness to limit
and completely halt the arms race and has made a number of pro­
posals, including some to the United States. Is the United
States prepared to give positive consideration to these pro­
posals and to make its contributions to limiting the arms race
and to disarmament?271

Arbatov's answer to the question is mixed. He notes that there are forces
within the U.S. opposed to arms limitations and disarmament. He also
demonstrates concern over the proportion of the U.S. budget earmarked for military expenditures. Nevertheless, Arbatov believes that "today more than ever the conditions have matured for moving to serious measures to limit the arms race and to disarm." He also expresses hope for "the success of these negotiations and an expansion of the range of questions on which agreement may be reached."

Discussing the often contrary elements of U.S. foreign policy trends, the author of an April 1972 article notes that the more "realistic" of these trends has led the U.S. to be a party to a number of international agreements since the Nixon administration came to power, including the seabed and bacteriological warfare treaties and the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin. The U.S. and Soviet governments also commenced talks on limiting strategic arms. The author proceeds to note that:

The Soviet Union invariably advocates an end to the arms race -- an arms race thrust upon the world by American imperialism which has been poisoning the international situation and Soviet-U.S. relations during the entire postwar period. Together with the problem of limiting strategic arms, the USSR constantly advances and places before the U.S. Government a broader circle of tasks connected with general and complete disarmament.

Here the author stresses the consistency of Soviet policy, and he emphasizes the disparity perceived to exist between the imperialist policies of the U.S. and the peaceful aims of the Soviet Union with the policy of general and complete disarmament.

The final mention of the arms limitation talks prior to the signing of SALT I appeared in May 1972. In reference to the strategic arms talks, Matveyev states that "The favorable outcome of these negotiations would avoid a new round in the missile arms race and the release of considerable funds for constructive purpose. The Soviet leaders have repeatedly
declared that our country is striving for positive results from these negotiations." This expresses one of the major themes on arms control in SSHA prior to the signing of SALT I, the avoidance of a renewed arms race. It also voices the often repeated support for positive outcomes in strategic arms limitations negotiations. The mention of the possibility of diverting funds from military expenditures is mentioned also in the specific context of SALT. Other themes stressed during this period include reducing the possibility of nuclear war (usually because of slowing or stopping the arms race) and the positive measures that have been achieved in the field of arms control. Nevertheless, there is also much concern over the seriousness with which the U.S. approaches the negotiations. Overall, the attitude represented in SSHA on SALT is positive.

The next mention of SALT comes in July 1972 in an editorial that reinforces the importance of arms control in the themes expressed earlier in SSHA, especially ending the arms race and preventing nuclear war.

These principles are reflected in the whole series of diverse agreements concluded during the Moscow meetings. The treaty on the limitation of ABM systems and the interim agreement on some measures in the sphere of the limitation of strategic offensive armaments are designed to facilitate the curbing of the arms race engendering the danger of a nuclear conflict. These are supremely important documents which facilitate a reduction in the threat of nuclear war and the curbing of the arms race and which open up prospects for progress toward universal disarmament.

The author, or authors, end this editorial with a statement of the broad approval of the Soviet state and party organs for the Soviet-American negotiations and with an expression of belief in the improvement of the world political climate.
The next few years reflect a positive view of strategic arms limitation but also a wary and watchful attitude toward forces in the U.S. opposed to SALT. This is apparent as early as August 1972. In an article by Arbatov, primary emphasis is placed on the "Basic Principles," especially the mutuality and equality underlying all agreements between the two countries. From this, Arbatov moves to a lengthy discussion of the central importance of the arms agreements signed in May 1972.

It is necessary to dwell in particular on the agreement that was reached concerning limitation of strategic arms, both as defensive and offensive arms. The treaty and the interim agreement...are far from the first documents consolidating agreement pertaining to certain limitations in the sphere of modern weapons of mass destruction. It is possible to refer to a treaty signed ten years ago about the partial prohibition of nuclear testing, treaties prohibiting the distribution of such weapons on the bottom of oceans and seas, in the Antarctic, in space, etc. Without belittling the value of these documents it is, however, necessary to take stock of the fact that they touch only on secondary or peripheral questions dealing with the limitation of the arms race.

The treaty and interim agreement signed in Moscow, on the contrary, introduce limitations in the arms race along the most important, truly central directions. If we take into account peculiarities inherent in the contemporary strategic situation it is then necessary to conclude that the Soviet-American agreement...could prevent a major new step in the arms race spiral, which would have probably been inevitable otherwise.

It is true, skeptics might say that the agreements...do not mean disarmament, they merely provide for a limitation and then only a quantitative limitation and not a qualitative one in the strategic arms race...Still this does not diminish in the least the vast significance of the agreement that was reached. For the first time in the history of Soviet-American relations it deals with the very core of the military might of both countries — systems of weapons that form its basis. At the same time it is necessary not to close one's eyes to the fact that we are talking about systems of weapons which are aimed at each other, which were created for the purpose of destroying the other side. Not too long ago not only an agreement but even negotiations themselves concerning these questions would have seemed inconceivable between two countries which regard each other as the main potential enemy. These negotiations are of a highly delicate nature, touching on the very essence of national security, to say nothing of the tremendous technical difficulties involved in the discussion of these questions.
Consideration of all these aspects of the problem leaves no room for skepticism. We are speaking about a serious achievement, in essence about a breakthrough in a highly important sphere concerning the limitation of arms, about normalization of relations between the USSR and the U.S. and consolidation of peace and international security. The fact that the agreement... about the limitation of strategic arms is only the first step is another question. It is such even in form; the agreement about certain measures in the field of the limitation of aggressive strategic weapons is temporary. It was concluded for a period of five years and stipulates continuation of negotiations. It is, however, an important and big first step which not only yields perceptible results, but creates more favorable conditions and grounds for subsequent major steps in many directions of the struggle for a limitation of the arms race and disarmament.278

Despite the positive orientation of Arbatov toward strategic arms agreements, he is very sensitive to developments in the United States and their potential impact on current and future agreements and Soviet-American relations in general. Here he refers to the "frantic campaign launched in the United States by extreme rightist groups against the agreements signed in Moscow."279 Although these forces were frustrated in their attempt to prevent the SALT agreements, they "may attempt to neutralize its meaning affecting the course of its practical implementation."280 Arbatov concludes by attacking the commentators who persist in trying to assess who won and who lost in the SALT negotiations.

The unsubstantiated nature of such an approach is self-evident. World politics is not an exciting card game in which one wins an exact amount which another loses. Completely different situations are quite possible when all parties win. Actually this is the only realistic situation in world politics.281

The benefits of SALT to the U.S. includes prevention of nuclear war, decreased military expenditures, and the development of international cooperation. The agreements also benefit the Soviet Union.

Results of the Soviet-American negotiations at the same time meet the interests of the Soviet people, our national and
state interests. There is hardly another nation which knows what war is like better than the Soviet people, and therefore understands the value of peace very well. The Soviet people gained in another area as well: normalization of relations with the U.S., limitation of the arms race, and expansion of collaboration -- all this will create more favorable conditions for the building of communism in our country, acceleration of economic development, and the achievement of new and greater success in the implementation of the party policy into life aimed at an improvement in the welfare of the Soviet people.282

This clearly states a fear of losses resulting from nuclear war and the desire for more extensive investment in the non-military segment of the domestic economy.

In September, Trofimenko also writes about the SALT agreements, referring to them as "one of the most important" documents signed at the May 1972 summit.283 He echoes Arbatov concerning the historical importance of these agreements as the first of their kind.

Not only the terms of these agreements are unique -- terms which impose considerable limitations on the further creation and deployment of strategic arms in the United States and the USSR; the fact that an understanding has been successfully reached in this sphere for the first time in international practices is in itself an event of worldwide significance. By limiting in a definite manner the quantitative growth of arsenals of strategic nuclear missile weapons of the world's two biggest powers in the economic and military-technical respect, the Moscow agreements thereby help to create conditions for the formulation and realization of further measures to limit the arms race and advance toward the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament.284

Trofimenko also gives a detailed analysis of ABM treaty and the interim agreement on strategic offensive arms and the use of "national technical control facilities" to monitor adherence to the provisions of the accords. He then rates the steps that have been taken to implement the agreements. Nevertheless, Trofimenko, like his colleague Arbatov, is aware of the delicate nature of the agreements and the relative ease with
which they implicitly might be abrogated. He also points out that the possibility of war has not been irradicated. This warning is contained in a phrase about Soviet resolve regarding national defense that would appear to be targeted at the United States except for the last two sentences.

While recognizing the colossal significance of the Soviet-U.S. agreements on strategic armaments for strengthening peace and allaying the threat of nuclear war, at the same time one must not fail to see that strategic arms limitation by itself still does not remove the danger of such a war. So long as this danger exists, the Soviet Union has taken and will take necessary measures to insure its security and the security of its allies. This circumstance is taken into account by the Moscow agreements. They do not weaken to the slightest degree the defense capability of the USSR and its allies. 285

The last two sentences quoted here sound more like a reassurance than a threat. This might imply that either some domestic target, or possibly the Soviet Union's allies, need reassurance about the implications of SALT. Whether this message is for domestic or foreign consumption or not, little doubt is left of Soviet resolve to maintain the capability of defending the country and the socialist community.

Despite opposition in the United States to the developments in Soviet-American relations, by March 1973, some SSHA analysts are heralding the new phase "in Soviet-U.S. relations and looking toward further developments. Georgiyev and Kolosov discuss the importance of the SALT accords in relation to possible consequences if these agreements did not exist and to the possible advancements that may be made in this area in the future.

The establishment of definite quantitative limits to these weapons systems was to avert a new escalation in the strategic arms race which, in the absence of such an agreement, would inevitably lead to a considerably further growth of military expenditures together with an intensification of the danger of an outbreak of nuclear missile warfare.
Thus, the Soviet-U.S. agreement on limiting antimissile and offensive strategic facilities are documents whose real significance must be estimated not only by their specific content but also by the possible consequences which would ensue in the absence of these agreements.

Moreover, the Soviet side does not intend to rest on what has been achieved in its talks with the United States on limiting strategic arms. One of the goals of the continuing Soviet-U.S. talks on these questions is to find ways of turning the present provisional agreement on offensive arms into a permanent one.286

One of the positive results of this "new phase" is the conclusion of the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War in the summer of 1973.287

At the end of 1973, Mil'shteyn and Semeyko emphasized the present and future significance of the SALT agreements and the 1973 agreement on nuclear war. They also emphasized the importance of the "Basic Principles" for providing the parameters for the future directions of arms limitations negotiations and examined the implications for the next phase of the negotiations -- moving from limitations to reduction of strategic arms.

The aims of the second stage, as the 'basic principles' point out, consist of the more complete quantitative and qualitative limitation of strategic offensive arms and their subsequent reduction. The task is set of determining definitely and for the long term a mutually agreed number for the two sides' offensive arms a number which would take into account the interests of their equal security. This is a difficult task if one takes into account the fact that under conditions of scientific and technical progress and the quantitative aspect of strategic arms is linked more closely than ever before with their qualitative aspect. And the fact that the USSR and the United States have now agreed to examine simultaneously also complex questions of qualitative limitations signifies not only the broadening of the range of questions under discussion but also a serious and exceptionally important advance in the talks group of problems.

In accordance with the agreement reached, measures must also be elaborated for a subsequent reduction in strategic arms. The transition from arms limitation to their reduction would symbolize the beginning of general disarmament.288
In early 1974 the next stage of SALT was approaching as the Summit at Vladivostok drew near and Trofimenko anticipated this. He discussed the role of the previous agreements on strategic arms and the agreement on preventing nuclear war had played in preserving peace and easing tensions. However, Trofimenko noted that all sorts of circumstances could lead to war and that the important task would be to provide for all these possible circumstances.

The Russian word 'razryadka' itself literally means 'taking the charge out of a weapon.' Incidentally, the French word 'detente,' which corresponds to this word and is widely used in English also had the original meaning of slackening the bow string on a crossbow. Thus the very etymology of these words once again emphasizes the obvious fact that political detente should ultimately be augmented with, accompanied by, and dependent on military detente. Only when the modern 'powder kegs' containing tens of billions of tons of explosives in TNT equivalent are liquidated will mankind be able to rest assured that nothing threatens the edifice of peace which is being built, and this presupposes the implementation of radical and far-reaching measures to reduce armaments and armed forces, and to achieve disarmament.

As is well known, the existing Soviet-U.S. agreements on strategic arms have imposed two types of limitations on the two countries' strategic forces — quantitative and qualitative. The quantitative limitations amount to a mutual accord on the maximum numbers of combat ICBM's, SLBM's, ABM's which each side may have. At the same time, a wide range of parameters is covered by qualitative limitations. It is particularly a question of the articles of the treaty limiting ABM systems which establish quite definite qualitative limitations on radars, interceptor missiles, and launchers of the ABM's themselves.

As far as qualitative limitations on strategic offensive weapons systems are concerned, in accordance with Article 2 of the interim agreement, the sides undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBM's and also older-type ICBM's into launchers for heavy CBM's. In addition, there is also an agreed understanding concerning the limits of possible changes of certain qualitative parameters during the modification of missiles.

All these provisions open the possibility of formulating further quantitative and qualitative limitations on strategic offensive forces in accordance with 'the basic principles of
talks on the further limitation of strategic arms... signed during the summit talks... in June 1973. This document directly stresses that attempts to gain unilateral advantages directly or indirectly would be incompatible with the strengthening of relations of peace between the United States and USSR.

It is important only to note that, given the desire and a constructive approach, formulas can be found which are mutually satisfactory to both sides and which insure the symmetry or equilibrium of their security, despite the existence of so-called strategic asymmetries connected with territorial and economic-geographical differences, a certain difference in types of armaments, and so forth.289

This position is succinctly reinforced by Arbatov in May 1974. He notes that both the ABM and interim agreements leave much to be desired as for stopping the arms race or even seriously limiting it. He concludes that

...if other steps do not follow in the near future, those on which the leaders of the two countries agreed in principle last year [June 1973 summit] -- the elaboration of the agreement on fuller measures for limitation of strategic offensive weapons and for their gradual reduction and the adopting of measures to restrict the qualitative improvement of weapons -- the arms race will continue and possibly even grow.290

This subtly shifts from an optimistic view of the future to one that becomes more insistent -- stressing that quick action is necessary in this area unless the sides wish to risk a revival of the arms race.

During the summer of 1974, SSHA encouragement for further action in the realm of strategic arms limitation heightens. A June editorial stresses the importance of agreements on strategic arms limitations and the prevention of nuclear war that have resulted from the previous summits and anticipates similar results from the Vladivostok meeting.291 Another editorial in July emphasizes the "vital importance" of arms control agreements.292 The same general theme appears in an August editorial as well.293 These editorials contain the last major
substantive comments about SALT until after the November 1974 meeting in Vladivostok.

Despite the agreements reached at Vladivostok, Soviet-American relations had already begun to deteriorate. The signs of this appeared shortly after the 1972 agreements, and, by 1975, this deterioration is occurring more rapidly. The approach taken by SShA analysts to SALT reflects this condition. Although the analysts remain supportive of SALT, it becomes much less of a focal issue than in the past. In many ways, it becomes almost an adjunct to Soviet attacks on right-wing circles and the defense of Soviet intentions. This is an underlying element even in an article which focused on arms control and disarmament that appeared in January 1975.

The struggle for the cessation of the arms race and for disarmament is one of the most important directions of the Soviet state's foreign policy activity. The USSR does not at all wage this struggle in accordance with any circumstances or temporary, tactical consideration. . . .

These agreements [SALT] can be regarded as a further important development of the successes which have been achieved in the last decade in the sphere of restraining the arms race and of disarmament largely thanks to the persistent and consistent efforts of the Soviet Union. . . At the same time they represent a new qualitative step forward since they concern the most modern and most destructive types of weapons. And while they are important measures for restraining the arms race, they open up opportunities for further advancement along the path to mankind's ultimate deliverance from the threat of nuclear missile war. . . .

Another indicator of this change in emphasis on strategic arms limitation is that there are several articles that deal almost entirely with how arms limitation is being dealt with in the United States — especially with Senate debates.

Although support of SALT persists over the next two and a half years it is surrounded by pessimism and almost a tone of resignation. In
the lead article in *SSH* in January 1976, Valerianov reviews the past. One of the main achievements has been, "in light of the aim set by the Soviet state -- eliminating the danger of war and creating reliable political and material guarantees of the impermissability of war," the SALT agreements. Nevertheless, the hostile forces in the United States have "already definitely harmed Soviet-American relations." This tenor persists for some time.

Berezhkov both attacks elements opposed to the normalization of Soviet-American relations and implicitly promotes SALT as the alternative to the arms race in an early 1977 article.

One frequently hears the opinion that although in the past there were no weapons of mass destruction, many wars even then caused civilizations to perish and whole peoples to be annihilated. Past eras allegedly also knew many 'treaties on permanent peace' and pledged 'never to resort to arms.' Therefore, it is said, the agreements concluded recently, although the states party to them take them perfectly seriously, may not be permanent . . . . The danger of the destruction of a particular country or group of countries will be simply ignored by a government embarking on the path of war, as has frequently occurred in the past. From this it is concluded that no special reliance should be placed on treaties and agreements, but that security should be sought in the intensification of armed might. A vicious circle is thus formed which essentially perpetuates the arms race.

There is one important flaw in such arguments. These authors close their eyes to the fact that, whereas in previous eras whole peoples were sometimes exterminated and great civilizations perished as a result of wars, at that time the aggressor, having prepared his attack well, could count on his country having a chance of surviving, even after a very destructive war, in the event of victory. In our age there is no such chance. The entire course of recent events shows that the insuring of security now can be achieved not by stockpiling arms, however sophisticated they may be; that is, not by technical but by political means. . . .

He makes it quite clear that the continuation of the arms race and the possibility of war in the nuclear age would be disastrous for mankind
and that only negotiated agreements aimed at controlling arms will be successful in preserving a national security, and even its survival.

The analysts in SSHA virtually do not mention SALT again until about one year before the SALT II agreement was signed. Then the articles stress both the necessity of such agreements and the basic requisites for their success. In August Abarenkov makes statements supporting a new agreement based on equivalence. In the same issue, Zhurkin maintains that the promotion of new arms limitations agreements is central to Soviet policy. Toward the end of 1978, Petrovsky argues the importance of disarmament, as well as any specific agreements that lead to this final goal.

No mention is made of any type of arms control, arms limitation, or disarmament measures until after the signing of the SALT II agreement in 1979. In the lead article of the July 1979 issue of SSHA the author reviews the progress of arms limitation through SALT II.

The firm, and at the time calm position of the Soviet Union, which observed the SALT I agreement strictly and adhered consistently to the Vladivostok agreement, and the sober approach displayed by influential U.S. circles made it possible to bring the talks on to the sole realistic path: toward the quest for mutually acceptable solutions on the basis of the principle of equality and identical security. The outcome of this course and of the readiness displayed by the sides to make reasonable compromises was the SALT II treaty.

Even in this first article after the signing, the author stresses compromise and Soviet observance of SALT I, two themes that are focal points as SALT II encounters opposition in the United States.

Platanov emphasizes that SALT II is aimed at preventing either side from achieving military superiority and refers to the agreement as a "tremendous step forward in the sphere of arms limitation" in comparison to the 1972 agreement. After reviewing the provisions of the new
agreement, he attempts to counter charges being used in debates in the U.S. that the agreement is one-sided and unenforceable because of poor means of verification. He argues that the treaty is equally advantageous because it "eases the danger of nuclear war," but his main emphasis is on verification. He asserts that the national technical means of verification that are guaranteed in the treaty are sufficient for the enforcement of the treaty.

It should be borne in mind that an interest in monitoring observance of the established limitations is no one's monopoly. Both the USSR and the United States are equally interested in strict control, and the verification system provided for under the SALT II treaty, which is based on monitoring by national technical means, insures the sides' confidence in observance of the treaty's provisions and, thus, the additional stability and viability of this document.

He concludes his arguments by enforcing the positive aspects of SALT II in the spheres of maintaining the stability of the strategic situation and preventing the escalation of the arms race while at the same time laying the groundwork for the further reduction and eventual limitation of the threat of nuclear war.

SShA articles for the remainder of 1979 continue to stress the importance of SALT II but focus primarily on the debates over its ratification in the U.S. Senate. The final article of 1979 dealing with arms limitation advocated the total banning of nuclear weapons tests, but it also emphasized the importance of SALT II in the overall picture of limiting the nuclear arms race.

Prior to SALT I, the SShA analysts generally express almost unanimous support for arms limitation agreements but are very distrustful of the United States because of its alleged efforts to reestablish strategic superiority. Nonetheless, they appear to believe that, in the main, the
United States has been forced to accept the necessity of curbing the arms race and is, therefore, ready to negotiate seriously on the question of nuclear arms limitation.

During the post SALT I period, analysts continue to stress the importance of arms limitation as a means of defusing the arms race which would in turn prevent a catastrophic nuclear war. Despite the importance attached to such agreements by the SSHA analysts, they continue to be distrustful of the U.S. because of debate within the U.S. and because of U.S. policy decisions, especially in the area of arms expenditures. Nevertheless, they view arms limitation as an on-going project that needs to be extended continuously by further agreements.

After 1974 the SSHA analysts become more assertive in their arguments along this line. This is apparently a reaction to the negative attitude that appears to be growing in the U.S. With the approach of the SALT II agreement in 1978 and following its signing in 1979, the SSHA commentators continue to argue the importance of the agreements while at the same time trying to answer fears expressed in the U.S. concerning unilateral advantages and verification. They also emphasize the overall importance of disarmament.

Many MEMO analysts express support for arms limitation measures, but the degree of that support varies. During the first year and a half of the decade, there are no references to arms control and arms limitation. This may be an indication that writers discussing arms policy topics were opposed to arms limitation, or it may mean that they were hesitant about voicing support for a position supporting arms control policies. Since there is not even any general reference to disarmament,
which is a policy position dating back to the middle 1950s, it may very well mean that analysts in the first year and a half were indeed opposed to arms control.

Arms control and arms limitation do finally appear as topics of discussion in MEMO in the middle of 1971. However, even after arms limitation topics first appear in MEMO, there is some evidence that not all MEMO analysts are in agreement. Although all MEMO analysts who discuss arms limitation topics speak favorably of arms control measures, there are several articles that do not discuss arms control at all and are very hostile toward the U.S. This combination may indicate hostility to the concept of arms limitation agreements.

In June 1971, Gavrilov supported disarmament as a means of stopping the arms race, an arms race that might possibly end in a new world war. However, in the same issue of MEMO another analyst examined the problems of the arms race and attacked U.S. military-strategic policy and the role that policy played in the arms race without ever mentioning arms control or disarmament as a possible solution to the danger of the arms race. Two months later, MEMO published two articles that made no mention of arms limitation but severely criticized U.S. policy. Mil'shteyn attacked various aspects of U.S. strategic policy while Paramazian criticized the arms race and the weapons systems under development in the U.S.

It was not until October that Shestov came out strongly in favor of disarmament and negotiations on disarmament topics. He favored the liquidation of nuclear weapons and argued that a continued arms race could result in nuclear catastrophe.
In modern world conditions, the problem of disarmament could not help occupying one of the central places. Its special significance is explained by the character and scale of this gigantic danger, which combined with the arms race in the world, creates a threat to all mankind. It is not difficult to see that radical solutions to the problem of disarmament would open the shortest route to the prevention of a world thermonuclear catastrophe.316

In the same issue, Kobrin supported disarmament but dwelt primarily on the problems posed for it by elements in the U.S. who wished to continue the arms race.317

Following the signing of SALT I, most MEMO analysts supported negotiations and efforts to further arms control agreements. Many cite the dangers of failing to restrain the arms race, especially the danger of the possibility of nuclear war. They also examine the systems to be controlled on a much more explicit basis after SALT I.318

By early 1973, emphasis was placed on the agreement on "Basic Principles" as well as the ABM and SALT agreements.319 Despite the importance placed on these agreements, the author, Marinin, saw growing efforts among elements in U.S. ruling circles to maintain the arms race and revive the Cold War.320 The other two articles that appeared in 1973 were also supportive of arms limitation agreements. Both the unsigned articles which appeared in July and November stress the importance of preventing nuclear war, stopping the arms race, and either limiting strategic weapons or achieving disarmament.321 The limiting of strategic weapons helps to decrease the risk of war.322

Due to strategic decisions made in the U.S., MEMO analysts became more concerned over the threat posed to world peace by a revived arms race in 1974. Karavayev expressed this concern when he described the
potential threat of nuclear war created by an arms race revived by the possible development and deployment of the Trident and B-1 systems in the U.S. Referring to these decisions and their impact on the proposed military budget in the U.S., Karavayev stated, "The main point of it is the expansion of the range of purposes of strategic nuclear weapons. Not to go into the details of these new concepts, but it must be said that they are not going to reduce the threat of nuclear war at all but will function in the opposite direction." 323

Several months later, Zhurkin noted that U.S. strategic policy poses a threat to peace efforts because, if arms control efforts fail, even a "local war" could lead to a nuclear war between the U.S. and USSR. 324 Zhurkin also expressed the need for both quantitative and qualitative weapons limitation. 325 Kaliadin expressed similar views concerning the necessity of qualitative limitations on strategic weapons. 326 He also stressed the threat of nuclear war posed by the failure of military detente. "Reactionary forces trying actively to counteract the process of detente are threatening the world by creating the danger of war." 327

In 1975, more and more emphasis was placed on the necessity of preventing nuclear war. If efforts to prevent such a war fail, according to Tomashevskii, it would result in a nuclear missile catastrophe. 328 Tomashevskii also praised Vladivostok as a legitimate step in extending strategic arms limitation. 329 He concluded his article by stressing the possibility of war if disarmament is not continued and stated that there is "no alternative to peaceful coexistence in the nuclear epoch." 330

Trofimenko shares Tomashevskii's opinion of the Vladivostok meeting and the consequences of nuclear war.
The question of war and peace occupies a central place in relations between the USSR and the USA. This is natural for they represent the most important states of opposite social systems and possess the most powerful arsenals of contemporary weapons. Their cooperation in pursuit of preventing war generates, therefore, a very significant new aspect of a constructive tie between them. In the joint communique resulting from the Vladivostok meeting are measures for the elimination of the threat of war and the stopping of the arms race which characterize a pivotal trend in Soviet-American relations. This estimate is by no means accidental. In contemporary conditions, nuclear war would be a catastrophe on a global scale with possible tragic consequences that have no analogue in the history of mankind.\(^{331}\)

The importance of arms limitation is a major theme throughout the rest of 1975 and into 1976. Primakov makes a strong argument for reduction in weapons and for disarmament.\(^{332}\) He praises the Vladivostok agreements and anticipates their eventual codification in SALT II.\(^{333}\) Primakov also advocates limits on quantitative and qualitative weapons systems. The failure of attempts to limit and reduce the arms race, according to Primakov, increases the threat of war. The occurrence of such a war would be a nuclear catastrophe.\(^{334}\)

Two months later, Khesin continues to argue the importance of limiting nuclear and offensive strategic weapons and moving toward disarmament; however, he demonstrates concern over the growing influence of reactionary forces in the U.S. and the apparent return to the Cold War.\(^{335}\) This fear is strongly echoed by Tomashevskii six months later when he talks of the efforts by ruling bourgeoisie circles to return to the cold war and the threat this poses for a new world war.\(^{336}\) Nuclear war can only be prevented by limiting strategic weapons and promoting detente.\(^{337}\)

This perspective prevails among most MEMO analysts until SALT II is signed. Most of them stress the resurgence of reactionary forces in
the U.S., the renewed danger of war, and the necessity of strategic arms limitations. However, the rise of reactionary forces in the U.S. evidently allows some analysts to turn away from stressing strategic arms limitation. Despite criticizing U.S. policies, Svetlov, Inozemtzev, and Ivanov are still arguing in favor of strategic arms limitation and disarmament and continue to stress the risk of thermonuclear war posed by a continued arms race in 1976. On the other hand, Bykov makes no mention of arms limitation during a lengthy attack on the U.S. and the arms race. In a similar article, Faramazian strongly attacks the arms race and the U.S. but only mentions arms control in a single reference to the need to limit military arsenals.

This particular emphasis persists to some extent until SALT II. Although Tomilin speaks of the importance of disarmament and praises past arms agreements, the following month an article by Kelin focuses primarily on attempts to revive the Cold War at the expense of detente by the fabrication in the U.S. of a myth about the "Soviet Threat". Although he does not mention anything about arms control or disarmament, Kelin does believe that thermonuclear conflict would be a catastrophe.

In the second half of 1977, MEMO analysts return to placing greater stress on disarmament. The first article in this group deals with Soviet disarmament proposals made before the U.N. General Assembly. A month later, Nikonov makes a lengthy appeal for "detente in the military region." He advocates the limitation of both quantitative and qualitative offensive weapons.

Without comprehensively accounting for delicate military-political aspects of the problem of stopping the arms race and disarmament, it would be impossible to work out, in the course
of negotiations, mutually acceptable, concrete quantitative and qualitative criteria, it is necessary to decide highly important questions, for example, comparisons of the military might of the states or its separate components, agreement on a general approach to the appraisal of so-called 'strategic asymmetries,' the working out of the principles and concrete methods of control over implementation to achieve agreement and decisions of many other problems of military-political character. 346

Throughout most of 1978, MEMO analysts continue to argue in favor of limiting strategic and other types of weapons but always in the context of attacks on the U.S. military-industrial complex and their advocacy of a continued arms race. 347 Only in November 1978, however, is a strong argument made for limiting strategic nuclear weapons and for support of the strategic arms talks. 348 Simonyan argues that,

Today there is no problem in the world more important and urgent than the control of the arms race, slackening the danger of war. The question is thus: either the world follows the path of deepening detente, renunciation of the use of force, along the path of disarmament, or it will be drawn into a new, still more dangerous stage of the arms race and will find itself on the brink of nuclear catastrophe. 349

Simonyan's article is the only one that mentions strategic arms limitation until after SALT II is signed.

After the signing of SALT II, Zhurkin heralds the new agreement as the "most important arms agreement since the Second World War." 350 He praises the limitations placed on qualitative systems 351 but fears that the struggle over the provisions of SALT in the U.S. may hamper its ratification. 352

Over the decade, there is relatively consistent support by most analysts in MEMO for arms control, although mention of the Soviet-American strategic arms negotiations is only sporadic. Nevertheless, there are indications that some MEMO analysts may not be supportive of arms limitation agreements. Regardless of the degree of support expressed by
MEMO analysts, they tend to be hostile toward and distrustful of the U.S. One thing is quite obvious, however; the supporters of arms control find it to be the only alternative to the arms race and the threat of a nuclear war.

Summary

Both SShA and MEMO analysts are critical of U.S. strategic and foreign policies. SShA focuses more directly on strategic issues, while MEMO is more interested in broader foreign policy issues. Analysts in both journals are extremely critical of the U.S. military-industrial complex and spend a great deal of time analyzing the composition and policies of this group. However, after relations began to improve, both groups of analysts show greater sensitivity to the pluralism in U.S. policy circles. SShA is more extensive in its analysis of this pluralism and turns to a pluralistic focus earlier than does MEMO.

MEMO's tendency to trail behind SShA is also apparent in its handling of equality and equal security and arms control in general. The MEMO analysts seem to place much less importance on equality and equal security than do the SShA analysts who believe these principles to be pivotal issues in successful relations between the U.S. and USSR.

Although there is some mention of most issues involved with arms control and perspectives on strategic doctrine in both journals, SShA's treatment is generally much more extensive. This is true in regard to weapons systems, strategic concepts like limited war and flexible response, and the utility of war as a policy tool. It is also true about issues tied directly into the negotiation of arms limitation agreements. SShA analysts give a much lengthier analysis of the importance of qualitative
limitations and the problem of strategic asymmetries. Analysts in both journals also oppose the arms race because of its expense and its potential destructiveness; however, SShA analysts are generally more concerned with the destructive nature of nuclear war. SShA commentators also support the American concept of deterrence although they consider it to be an imperfect approach.

Both journals also seem to reflect changing perspectives over the decade. This is more obvious in SShA, partially because of the number of articles. Nevertheless, the lateness of MEMO in including some topics like equal security may also be indicative of some sort of change on its part. Not surprisingly, the most obvious change is in the area of opinions and attitudes vis-a-vis the United States and its foreign and strategic policy. In many ways, the understanding we have of Soviet strategic views held by experts in academic institutes is from their reactions to U.S. strategic doctrine. SShA and MEMO analysts have very negative reactions to many U.S. policies such as flexible response and limited nuclear war. The SShA analysts are especially vocal in their objections on the basis that any conventional war, but more particularly, any nuclear attack, no matter how limited in scope, runs the risk of escalation into an all out nuclear war. SShA analysts also condemn the idea of a first strike, partially on the grounds that any attack risks nuclear war. However, most of their reaction to the idea of a first strike is based on the concept of superiority. They believe that strategic superiority for either side is unattainable because neither side will allow the other to gain the advantage. The result of any attempt to establish superiority fuels the arms race and increases the likelihood
of a nuclear war. Additionally, some of the analysts who discuss this possibility believe that the type of superiority necessary to make a first strike feasible probably does not exist.

Another area that seems to reflect some change, again especially in SShA, is the issue of quantitative and qualitative limitations. Early in the decade, there is a great deal of criticism of ABMs and MIRVs; however, prior to the meeting in Vladivostok, SShA analysts change to advocating a broader perspective where they argue for qualitative limitations in general rather than limits on particular systems.

Both SShA and MEMO generally support arms control measures and other elements of detente between the USSR and the United States. Nevertheless, there are analysts in both journals who may be opposed, or at least unsupportive of arms control and disarmament measures. Although none of these analysts ever attack efforts made to control strategic arms, they share extremely hostile attitudes toward the United States and often avoid not only arms control issues but also other issues that seem to be tied to positive perspectives on arms control like the destructiveness of nuclear war and the necessity of equal security.

As far as propaganda is concerned, the analyses in both journals are probably used for some propaganda purposes. From the tenor of the articles in SShA, it may be that the analysts are attempting to influence elites and sub-elites in the United States. MEMO analysts seem to be tailoring their articles for a foreign audience, especially the Third World. However, there are subtle cues in the language used by the analysts, especially those in SShA, that indicate that their arguments may also be designed for domestic consumption.
Finally, in regard to the areas of disagreement outlined in Chapter I, it would appear that many of the analysts, again especially in SSMD, discuss various aspects of arms policy that contradict the picture of Soviet arms policy presented by Western analysts like Pipes, Ermażth and Nitze. There are statements in the Soviet literature that refute war as an extension of policy, support the basic idea behind mutual assured destruction, refute ideas like limited nuclear war, and indicate a disavowal of the desire for an ability to win a nuclear war. The extent to which these contradictions are reflected in the actual arms politics and negotiating stances of the Soviet Union are discussed in the concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER V
POSSIBLE ROLES PLAYED BY ANALYSTS FROM SELECTED JOURNALS
IN ARMS POLICYMAKING IN THE SOVIET UNION

In the first chapter of this study, several areas of disagreement were outlined that were drawn from conflicting views of Soviet positions on arms control and arms limitation. This formed the framework for the basic premise examined here: positions of personnel outside the military bureaucracy play some role in the arms policymaking process in the USSR. This statement is made with two major caveats: 1) the conclusions drawn are, to varying degrees, suppositions and were never intended to be definitive; and 2) the major influence on arms policy, especially in the area of strategic doctrine and arms acquisitions and deployment, is the Soviet military.

Nevertheless, foreign policy specialists from the government and party and specialists from institutes of the Academy of Sciences apparently do exercise some influence over arms policymaking, especially in the area of arms control. This concluding chapter will look at the role(s) played by these elites. To accomplish this we will first examine the similarities and differences found in the writings of the analysts that were discussed in the two previous chapters in the arms policy field, while at the same time we will try to place these commentators' writings in a broader context than simply that of arms negotiations by looking
at the overall pattern of Soviet-American relations during this period. The second thing we will look at is how the positions taken by these Soviet analysts differ or correspond with the military perspective as it is presented in Western analyses and outlined in Chapter I. Finally, we will compare both the military perspective and that found in the three journals used in this study with Soviet negotiating stances and the negotiated agreements in an effort to determine their apparent relationships.

Although this study focuses on arms policy and directly related topics, the articles in which positions are manifested and the environment in which the negotiations took place did not occur in a vacuum. It is quite obvious that the analysts are responsive to direct Soviet-American interaction such as the summit meetings and to more indirect influences like changes in U.S. strategic doctrine and the U.S. political climate. However, analysts also formulate their evaluations and arguments in the context of other events like developments in the Middle East and Africa and U.S. and Soviet relations with third parties. Positions expressed by analysts in the journals examined here tend to be responsive to all these influences.

Another element that also comes into play here is the audience for which the analyst is writing. Indeed, much more would be known about policy-making roles in the Soviet Union if we could easily define the audiences for which various analysts write. However, the targets of the attitudes expressed in the explanations and arguments of foreign policy and institute analysts are not easily discernible. The contention here
is that there are potentially multiple audiences and therefore multiple roles for any group of analysts. This may mean that at any given time, an analyst may be trying to fill several roles. For instance, he may be trying to convey some message to U.S. decision makers while at the same time trying to address the concerns of Soviet allies or trying to influence or reassure some element in the policy process in the Soviet Union.

In addition to the influence the international environment and Soviet-American relations may have on an analyst, he or she also may be influenced by other factors. In most instances, authors have a basic set of beliefs or assumptions based on their training and experience. These also may be conditioned by professional affiliations, i.e., people responsible for protecting the Soviet Union might be expected to look at arms policy from a somewhat different perspective than people responsible for analyzing U.S. politics or economics or people responsible for implementing Soviet foreign policy decisions.

Besides their belief systems, assumptions, or orientations, the positions advocated by policy analysts are also shaped by whatever element(s) they are trying to present and by the audience to whom they are talking. In this vein, there are numerous potential audiences for explications of arms policy positions: U.S. elites; U.S. sub-elites, i.e., academics, bureaucrats, etc., who may be involved in the policy process; third country elites or sub-elites, including Third World revolutionaries, Chinese leaders, non-ruling communist parties, other Western elites, and Eastern European elites; colleagues in the Soviet Union; Soviet sub-elites outside the analyst's field of expertise;
Soviet elites at top policymaking levels; and possibly some Soviet citizens. Additionally, the purposes for targeting a given audience may vary. In some instances it may be for propaganda purposes, at other times it may be to educate, to reinforce some behavior or attitude, or to reassure.

The complexities faced in attempting to interpret this almost nightmarish tangle are among the reasons for the tentative, suppositional nature of the results presented here. When one considers that the positions found in *International Affairs*, SSHA, and MEMO reflect background differences, reactions to U.S. strategic policy, reactions to U.S. foreign policy, reactions to the U.S. domestic political environment, reactions to the status of the SALT negotiations, differences in audiences, and differences in the intended purpose of a message, it becomes easy to understand the difficulty in assessing the precise positions expressed by individual analysts and the role those positions may play in helping to formulate, or possibly helping to implement, Soviet arms policy.

Despite these many qualifications, the sources examined here provide much information and an even greater number of provocative clues to numerous questions. Are Soviet positions and/or orientations subject to modification over time? Are there differences in the positions and opinions found among Soviet analysts? To whom are these analysts talking? How do the Soviets feel about mutual assured destruction? A first strike? The winability of a nuclear war? Parity? Are they in favor of arms limitation or simply trying to turn the arms talks to
their own advantage? The next three sections of this chapter should help illuminate some potential answers to these questions.

**Similarities and Differences Among**

**International Affairs, SShA, and MEMO**

During the early 1970s, the Soviets were uncertain about the possibility of revising their relationship with the United States. It was a period when the U.S. Vietnam involvement was beginning to come to an end largely from domestic pressure. The long years of the Cold War seemed to be drawing to a close.

Faced with these changes, the Soviet analysts and commentators were somewhat unsure of what approach to advocate in future relations with the United States. The earliest articles in all three journals reflected this uncertainty, vocalizing hearty distrust of the U.S. *International Affairs* analysts were the most hostile toward the United States, laying the blame for the arms race on U.S. strategic policy and on the development of new U.S. weapons systems that were perceived to be basically offensive and destabilizing in nature. Two systems that were found to be particularly pernicious by Soviet commentators were ABM and MIRV. These were viewed as symbolic of a country whose policymaking has been dominated by the military-industrial complex bent on aggressive, imperialistic policies based on military superiority.

Both SShA and MEMO were less hostile than was *International Affairs*, although there were elements of hostility and suspicion in both publications in the pre-SALT I period. These publications also placed a great deal of emphasis on U.S. responsibility for the arms race, but they both differentiated much more between the total group that composed
U.S. policymaking circles and the sub-group of the military-industrial complex. SShA and MEMO took somewhat divergent but fairly sophisticated views of the military-industrial complex as a phenomenon in U.S. foreign policymaking.

Despite this sophistication, MEMO analysts were generally much more reticent in expressing opinions about the U.S., and there were very few articles in 1970 and 1971 that provided much illumination of their opinions. Nevertheless, a clear picture of an intricate network dominated by military-industrial interests that identified strongly with their perceptions of the national interest emerges. Because this resulted in a predominantly militaristic perspective, according to Soviet analysts, policies resulted that were imperialistic, relying on heavy military expenditures. This line of argument prevailed until the signing of SALT I.

On the other hand, even in the very first issue in 1970, SShA analysts acknowledged the existence of deep divisions within U.S. policy circles. All through the first two years of the decade, SShA analysts emphasized that the aggressiveness of the military reflected in U.S. foreign policy was being challenged by "sober thinking forces." Neither International Affairs nor MEMO emphasized this counterforce of "sober thinking forces" on U.S. policies until after the signing of SALT I.

Thus, in the pre-SALT I period were three journals of varying degrees of sophistication presenting with respect to American policymaking somewhat divergent views. Both International Affairs and MEMO were overtly hostile to the U.S., stressing the preeminent role of the
military-industrial complex in U.S. foreign policymaking and the dangers created by the militarization of foreign policy. The articles that appeared in these two journals also emphasized the role the U.S. had assumed throughout the world and the impact this had on other nations, especially the Third World. United States policies were presented as aggressive and imperialistic. U.S. involvement in Vietnam and U.S. support of Israel were offered as evidence of this. From the tenor of the articles in these two journals, it is probable that the messages presented were intended primarily for third parties, especially Third World elites and ruling and non-ruling communist parties.

SShA analysts, on the other hand, generally perceived the U.S. foreign policymaking forces to be in a transitional period in which the military-industrial complex was being challenged by forces that were more realistic. The primary focus was on the subtleties and intricacies of U.S. politics, including not only bureaucratic politics but also the impact of public and sub-elite opinion. From the tenor of these SShA articles, it is hard to determine who their audience may be. Most of these groups and individuals who appear to be the targets of International Affairs and MEMO may be excluded. It is also fairly obvious that SShA analysts were consciously trying to influence some group(s) in the United States, most probably U.S. sub-elites; however, there are also indicators that justify a relatively strong suspicion that they may have also been attempting to influence people involved in their own foreign policymaking process.

This is certainly a gross oversimplification of the types of audiences for which the various analysts are writing, but it is the
general pattern which emerges for this early period. Over the rest of the decade, the pattern becomes less clear. SSHA continued to give the appearance of addressing both foreign and domestic audiences; however, Memo and International Affairs appeared to be much more eclectic, addressing a multiplicity of messages to numerous audiences.

Another indicator that helps to support the contention that analysts were addressing a domestic audience, or possibly audiences, as well as one or more foreign audiences is the apparent difference of opinion among individual analysts. Although the breadth of these differences was highly circumscribed, differences did apparently exist. These disagreements are identifiable by the presence or absence of certain cognitive objects. These will be discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter.

Following the SALT I period perceptions of the U.S. expressed by analysts in all three journals seemed to more or less coincide. The analysts in International Affairs and Memo began to stress the emergence of "realistic" and "sober thinking" forces in the United States, echoing several of the articles that appeared in SSHA during the pre-SALT period. Nevertheless, all three journals reflected some anxiety over the strength maintained by the military-industrial complex and expressed concern that these forces might again become ascendant in U.S. foreign policymaking.

By mid-1974, perceptions of the U.S. in all three journals seemed to be more pessimistic. This was probably a reflection of Soviet disconcertion over events in the Middle East where the United States had seemingly improved its position as an influence in the region, continually improving U.S.-Chinese relations, and the potential impact of
Watergate on Soviet-American relations. However, the greatest influence on the Soviet Union was the Jackson-Vanick Amendment which created unacceptable conditions for most favored nation status for the USSR. The Watergate element was also important because of the highly personalized nature of the process of detente based on summits between Nixon and Brezhnev, as well as meetings between their lieutenants, Kissinger and Gromyko.

Some of these fears were allayed by the Vladivostok meeting in November 1974; however, the hostility increased again in 1975 and 1976. This is partially in reaction to U.S. hostility resulting from Soviet (and Cuban) involvement in Angola. Additionally, the 1976 Presidential campaign in the United States focused more and more on the perceived costs of detente to the United States, thereby exacerbating U.S. hostility toward the Soviet Union. Not only were Soviet actions in Africa under fire and the costs of detente being questioned, but the Soviet Union was also being attacked on the grounds of her domestic policies concerning dissidents. These policies affronted U.S. sensitivities on human rights issues and led to the allegation that the USSR was in violation of the Helsinki Agreements. Finally, there was increasing activity in the United States on the part of people who wanted a more hardline approach to arms negotiations and defense capabilities. The penultimate example of this activity, from the Soviet perspective, was the creation of the "Committee on the Present Danger" in 1976. The results of the 1976 election only served to exacerbate Soviet perceptions of increased hostility from the U.S. and fears that the accommodations
and agreements that had resulted from improved Soviet-American relations might be endangered by this increased hostility.

The actions of the Carter Administration in its first year in office tended to reinforce Soviet fears. The first formal high-level contact between the new administration and the Soviet leadership, a meeting between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev in March 1977 came close to being a disaster. Basic premises that the Soviets believed to be settled negotiating points worked out at the Vladivostok meeting were unilaterally abrogated by the Carter Administration. It took three more top level meetings in May and September 1977 and July 1978 to return negotiations on strategic arms to a more or less even keel. In the meantime, the events which had occurred in the interim between 1975 and 1978 had greatly damaged the fabric of detente, switching the focus of Soviet-American relations from a precarious interlacing of mutually beneficial agreements in many areas, including technology, commerce, culture, education, and medicine, in addition to strategic arms to a relationship that relied heavily on strategic arms negotiations and that was eroding rather rapidly in other areas.

The manifestations of Soviet positions found in International Affairs, SShA, and MEMO during the post-Vladivostok period shed a great deal of light on Soviet reactions during this period and the predispositions of at least some Soviet sub-elites concerning the future of Soviet-American relations. International Affairs analysts focused much of their attention on the positive results at Vladivostok, the strength of "realistic forces" in the United States, and the positive impact this
had in regard to detente. During the 1976-77 period, concern over the influence of "reactionary" forces in the United States increased and the U.S. was charged with creating obstacles for further arms agreements. There was also growing concern over the "myth" being perpetuated in the U.S. of a "Soviet threat," and charges that the Soviet Union was attempting to attain a one-sided advantage and the impact these developments were having on Soviet-American relations. Articles appearing in 1978 reflected some renewed optimism on the part of Soviet analysts; however, "reactionary" forces were still seen as becoming increasingly stronger foes of efforts to improve relations between the U.S. and USSR. For a brief period in 1979 after SALT II, there was a short period of euphoria, but this soon gave way to renewed concern over the efforts by "reactionary" forces to block ratification of the agreement.

The same types of attitudes about the U.S. also persist in articles featured in SSHA. Here the analysts again stressed the resurgence of "hawkish" elements in the U.S. and the dilatory impact this has had on the successful negotiation of arms limitation agreements. The same pattern that appeared in International Affairs also is found in SSHA. There was a fairly steady increase of apprehensiveness bordering on mistrust from 1975 into 1978 and then a period of optimism tinged with deep anxiety about the anti-SALT forces in the U.S. from the middle of 1978 through the middle of 1979. A similar, although a slightly more hostile perspective was presented in the MEMO articles. All three journals tended to change their focus more to U.S. strategic policy as Soviet-America relations worsened across the decade.
It is hard to determine which of the potential audiences are being addressed during the post-SALT I period; however, the International Affairs articles appear to have been focused most directly at a U.S. audience and used a tone that seemed to be somewhat cajoling in their efforts to promote their position. As far as the overall general attitude toward the United States is concerned, articles in all three journals tended to reflect the Soviet official perspective, responding to events in a way that was supportive of the Soviet leadership. A good example of this is the response to the first meeting between Vance and Gromyko. At this point, the articles in these journals tended to take on a tone of indignance similar to that emanating from Soviet government circles. Despite this rather cohesive reaction to the U.S. as far as the opinions found in the three journals, there are some variations in positions on related areas.

One of these related areas is the interplay of the concept correlation of forces with the policies of peaceful coexistence and detente. The analysts who write for International Affairs have stressed the breadth of the correlation of forces, emphasizing that the state of international relations can no longer be determined solely by military might and that this has led even the "capitalist forces" to realize that international relations must be based on peaceful coexistence. Analysts in International Affairs also tended to use the term peaceful coexistence as opposed to detente. Detente was used more often to refer to the military sphere than to the overall lessening of tension in Soviet-American relations.
**SShA** analysts take a different approach on this issue. During the first half of the decade, the concept correlation of forces and the underlying premises for the policy of peaceful coexistence were very important ones for these analysts because they were directly tied to efforts to control the arms race. In this period, peaceful coexistence was seen as a force in international relations that was gaining strength as an alternative to the arms race and the threat of war. Peaceful coexistence was seen as a means of resolving the tensions between the two different socio-economic systems that had been generated in the Cold War period. Within the concept of peaceful coexistence, there was room to accommodate the Western idea of detente, despite the Soviet perception that it focused too narrowly on the military element in Soviet-American relations. This was in contrast to peaceful coexistence which included many more elements beyond the military and had the advantage of allowing for the continuation of competition between the two countries. By the middle of the decade, these two concepts had achieved a symbiotic relationship and eventually became interchangeable in many ways. Judging by their statements, it also appears that some analysts writing for **SShA** had what might be called a vested interest in the perseverance of these concepts in relations between the U.S. and the USSR.

During the middle 1970s, more and more emphasis was placed on the role played by peaceful coexistence and detente in preventing nuclear war and discouraging the "usability" of nuclear weapons. In late 1975 and early 1976, analysts in **SShA** carried this even farther by specifically arguing that war was no longer a policy alternative because of the destructiveness of modern weapons; therefore, relations between states
must be based on some policy that lowered the probability of war occurring while still allowing for competition between states. When hostility between the U.S. and the Soviet Union increased in 1976 and 1977, the SShA analysts defended detente and peaceful coexistence from charges that they were creating a one-sided advantage for the Soviet Union. By 1978 and 1979, however, these analysts were more concerned with preserving substantive gains that had been made under the auspices of peaceful coexistence and detente, like SALT I and SALT II, than with defending the concepts themselves.

In some respects, SShA and MEMO shared similar perspectives on the correlation of forces and peaceful coexistence. MEMO analysts started from the position that a positive correlation of forces and the concept of peaceful coexistence were established facts in international relations. There was some difference of opinion between MEMO analysts over whether the U.S. was trying to change the existing correlation of forces or, instead, was faced with an irreversible situation. MEMO analysts believed that peaceful coexistence was based on this correlation. Additionally, these analysts linked peaceful coexistence to detente earlier than do the analysts in the other two journals. In the analysis by MEMO writers, peaceful coexistence created a basis for cooperation between different socio-economic systems while detente was the implementation phase of agreements that resulted from this cooperation. As Soviet-American relations deteriorated in 1978, MEMO articles emphasized that the existing correlation of forces was the base for a new era in international relations that replaced the period of the Cold War and established the obsolescence of the threat of nuclear war.
As far as intended audiences are concerned, on the issue of peaceful coexistence it might be surmised that *International Affairs* analysts were simply attempting to establish the credentials for improved Soviet-American relations with some audiences in the U.S. and with third parties like Eastern Europe, the Third World, and non-ruling Communist parties. However, the intent of *SShA* and *MEMO* analysts is more difficult to gauge. As before, there is some indication in the tone of the discussions in *SShA* that some of the presentations may have been aimed at domestic elites and sub-elites as well as their U.S. counterparts. This seems to be true especially of the discussions on the usability of nuclear weapons and the obsolescence of nuclear war. This may also be the case regarding the arguments made in defense of detente and peaceful coexistence and advocating the importance of the substantive agreements that had been based on these concepts. *MEMO* analysts may also have had a hidden agenda in their discussions about the correlation of forces and peaceful coexistence. Despite whatever foreign audiences they may be addressing, an argument can be made that the points emphasized in 1976 focusing on the correlation of forces as the base for a new era in international relations may have been aimed at domestic sub-elites as well. Nevertheless, the overall tenor of the discussion in *MEMO* across the decade would seem to indicate that the primary audience for expressed attitudes on peaceful coexistence and the correlation of forces was in the West.

An essential element of any arms policy is the perception of the opponent's strategic doctrine. All three journals examined here placed some degree of emphasis in their analyses on this topic. Indeed, it
is not only important that the perceptions found these journals help to clarify positions concerning U.S. strategic policy, but they also help to elucidate opinions about elements like the winability of nuclear war and deterrence that are part of the analysts' perspectives on strategic doctrine generally.

There are several threads of thought that emerge from the various analyses of strategic doctrine. To varying degrees, there was a fair amount of hostility toward most elements of U.S. strategic doctrine and, concomitantly, decisions on the development and deployment of U.S. weapons systems. In general, most of the various configurations taken by U.S. strategic doctrine were seen as efforts, depending on the specific point in time, to maintain or reestablish U.S. strategic superiority. Additionally, most strategic decisions, especially many decisions on weapons systems appeared, from the analysts' perspectives, to have been aimed at a preemptive or neutralizing first strike capability on the part of the United States.

Nevertheless, there are several specific positions that are apparent in the journals examined here, especially SShA, that are worthy of note. One of these is the opinions about mutual assured destruction and deterrence. Soviet analysts tended to view these major assumptions underlying U.S. strategic policy as rather naive and illogical conceptualizations. Nevertheless, they accepted them as the best alternative given the nature of strategic arms competition. However, Soviet analysts had little faith in the ability of deterrence to persevere in the long run. Given the inevitability, from this perspective, of the breakdown of this concept, Soviet analysts also advocated continued readiness of Soviet
defensive capabilities. The general premise appeared to be that since deterrence seemed to work, it should be supported; however, when it eventually failed, the Soviet Union should not find itself in a position where it could not defend itself, i.e., fight and hopefully survive a nuclear war.

This perspective on deterrence led Soviet analysts to certain other conclusions. One was that this very delicately balanced mechanism known as deterrence was extremely vulnerable. For instance, they found U.S. ideas over the years concerning the utility of local wars, limited wars outside the territory of either major nuclear power (whether those wars are conventional or nuclear), and limited or contained nuclear strikes inside the home territory of either the U.S. or USSR as artificial and dangerous distinctions. They feared that any war, especially one where nuclear weapons were used, would escalate into all-out nuclear war. At least some Soviet analysts expressed the belief that this escalation could not be controlled.

They also criticized the idea of preemptive first strikes on the basis that such use of nuclear weapons had a high probability of failure because there was little guarantee that such a strike would have the degree of success necessary to destroy the other side's retaliatory capability. This also implicitly supports the contention that Soviet analysts who are not part of the military bureaucracy support the idea of deterrence since they believe in the survivability of a second strike capability. Additionally, given the nature of nuclear weapons and the fact that they existed in such numbers and strength, the chances of either side surviving a nuclear war was fairly slim in the view of
several analysts. This is, of course, a gross oversimplification of the positions found in *International Affairs*, *SShA*, and *MEMO* concerning the questions of survivability and winability in the event of a nuclear war. In fact, there were a variety of assessments concerning these questions ranging from the "suicidal nature" of nuclear war for the U.S. to the "catastrophic nature" of nuclear war for both countries.

Additionally, some Soviet analysts, evidently in response to charges from U.S. critics that Soviet strategic doctrine was based on a war-winning perspective that relied on a first strike, stressed that the Soviet Union had no intention of attacking anyone. This opinion was explicitly expressed in *SShA* a few times during a period when Soviet doctrine was coming under especially intense attack. However, it appeared in the context of responding to U.S. allegations rather than as part of the perspective on strategic doctrine. On the other hand, there were consistent references to the need to reach some agreement on the non-use of force in international relations.

Analysts in all three journals also took a very hard line on the arms race. They uniformly argued that a continued arms race greatly increased the threat of nuclear war. Much of the thrust of their arguments against the arms race was based on the futility of either side's attempts to achieve superiority or a one-sided advantage over the other. Most of these arguments were couched in terms critical of the U.S. for its attempts to either preserve or reestablish strategic superiority over the Soviet Union; however, implicitly, and in some instances explicitly, the arguments applied to both the United States and the USSR. They argued that neither side would allow any advantage by the other to
persist but, instead, would meet any new weapons development with another that would neutralize the advantage, thus creating a spiraling of the arms race. Additionally, the technological revolution had increased the importance of the arms race because qualitative escalations were much more dangerous than quantitative ones.

The issue of qualitative improvements was a very serious one to the Soviet analysts. They saw qualitative weapons developments as potentially more destabilizing than quantitative ones were. Eventually, qualitative improvements might lead to a situation where a preemptive strike or a nuclear war would be used because such action would take advantage of a short-term inequality thereby short-circuiting the seesaw effect of the arms race and allowing one side or the other to sustain the advantage. Nevertheless, all the analysts who discussed the arms race from this perspective leave the impression that any attempt to truncate the arms race in such a fashion would not result in the neutralization of the enemy but in nuclear war.

Concomitant to the belief that the arms race was the chief danger to peace was the attitude expressed by analysts in all three journals that the United States was responsible for the arms race. U.S. pursuit of new weapons systems like ABMs and MIRVs forces the Soviet Union into the position of having to develop their own systems to meet the challenge of U.S. weapons development.

An interesting sidelight to discussions of new weapons systems was that there were some indications that careful attention to the handling of these discussions might help to illuminate Soviet sensitivity to negotiations on certain types of systems. The Soviet analysts were
apparently prone to attacking weapons systems which they feared would leave Soviet defenses most vulnerable. For instance, during the early part of the decade, there were what might almost be termed vitriolic attacks on certain U.S. systems like MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs; however, by 1973, when the Soviet "heavies" were being deployed, such discussions took on a much more conciliatory tone. Indeed, in the mid-1970s, the Soviet analysts began more and more to talk about the escalative danger of qualitative developments and linked this, at least implicitly, to the need to negotiate qualitative strategic reductions. The importance of this will become more apparent shortly. During 1976-1978, the same reaction occurred in regard to neutron bombs, cruise missiles, Trident submarines, and the B-1 bomber. This is in contrast to the failure to discuss established U.S. systems where equivalent systems had already been developed in the Soviet Union.

These qualitative weapons development surges of the United States combined with changes in strategic doctrine such as advocating limited war, a concept which was thought to be unsound by Soviet analysts because of the danger of escalation, and counterforce targeting, a move which was viewed as an attempt to prepare for a preemptive strike, resulted in a cyclical reaction pattern on the part of Soviet analysts over the decade. There is a strong indication that, in this area, the analysts were very responsive, in the sense that they reacted to U.S. policy. Prior to SALT I there were very strong indictments of U.S. doctrine, especially in regard to development and deployment decisions. Following the 1972 agreements, there was still a good deal of criticism but it was much more low key than earlier. In 1975 the criticism
became more severe, especially in response to Schlesinger's pronouncements concerning "counterforce" strategy. After this, Soviet attacks on U.S. strategic policy became increasingly severe in all three journals. Although each of the journals under consideration here contain some analyses of U.S. strategic doctrine, SShA does the most extensive job.

There can be little doubt that the primary audiences at which these analyses were aimed were in the United States. There does seem to have been some effort to target what may be described as the "informed public" but most of the discussions are probably aimed at sub-elites in the U.S. policymaking arena. Although there are elements of propagandizing present, especially in MEMO and International Affairs, there seems to have been only a minimum effort made to address third parties. The most interesting element, and the most elusive, is how much, if any, of these analyses were written for domestic consumption. Again we are faced with the extreme subtleties that may indicate who were the potential targets of articles written for Soviet journals. The only evidence we have is that analysts did, at times, write in neutral terms, refusing to identify a particular aspect as a phenomenon peculiar to the U.S. In a few rare instances, we also find analysts referring to both the U.S. and the USSR. An instance of this is the references made to the catastrophic results of nuclear war.

It is apparent that several analysts were quite outspoken in their views on the dangers inherent in the perpetuation of the arms race, the futility of attempts to gain one-sided advantages, the unfeasibility of a preemptive first strike, the dangers attached to the use of nuclear weapons in any format, and the foolhardiness of any illusions that
nuclear war is survivable and by implication the foolhardiness in any belief that nuclear war is "winable". The implications of all this will be discussed in more detail in the next section of this chapter; however, if we accept some Western analysts' arguments that the Soviet military are preparing to fight and win a nuclear war and that this is apparent in Soviet military literature, we have two alternative methods of evaluating the non-military literature. It is either all written from the duplicitous perspective of trying to camouflage or obfuscate the Soviet Union's real intentions, or it represents a body of opinions at odds with Soviet military thought.\footnote{1}

Another important element of the Soviet positions toward any type of arms policy is the positions concerning strategic equality or parity. Foremost among these is whether these concepts are legitimate in the view of Soviet analysts. The best way to address this question of legitimacy is to understand the Soviet analysts' conceptualization of equality.

The Western term parity was rarely used by Soviet analysts included in this study, possibly because it has connotations that made the Soviets uncomfortable. Those analysts writing in International Affairs did acknowledge the U.S. position that parity existed and that it was a necessary condition for pursuing a policy of deterrence. Their colleagues in SS\textit{A} argued that it was a condition that had been accepted grudgingly by the United States and one which the U.S. would like to change.

Both journals quickly established the concepts of equal or identical security as the appropriate way of looking at parity. This shifted the
emphasis from strategic parity or numerical equality to the idea that equivalent numbers were less important than equivalent defensive capabilities. This means that all agreements must conform to the goal of limiting arms in such a way as to not endanger the security of either side. The peculiar vulnerabilities of each side made the simple calculating of equal numbers impossible. This argument was carried on rather forcefully in 1973 when the strategic asymmetries of the two sides became a key concern, especially in the eyes of SShA analysts. Probably, one of the most important aspects of this concept of equal security was the unacceptibility of either side being able to gain a unilateral advantage.

After Vladivostok references to equality and equal security dropped off precipitously; however, *International Affairs* began to stress the concept of preserving the national security of the two countries, especially that of the Soviet Union. This is interesting because national security was apparently a more inclusive term that went beyond equivalence in strategic weapons to include the inviolability of internal affairs and the preservation of alliance systems. Equality and equal security reappeared with the signing of SALT II. In this particular instance, analysts reiterated the importance of these concepts as the basis of agreements which did not give one-sided advantages to either party.

Again, the question of to whom these references are aimed is not simply answered. Primarily, it would appear to be U.S. policymakers; however, the emphasis on security may also have been designed to allay fears of Soviet policymakers as well. This especially may be the case
in instances where representatives of the military have argued, possibly privately, against arms control agreements on the basis that they weakened Soviet defensive might. References to national security are more likely to be aimed at Soviet allies and possibly some domestic elements, but since this terminology only appears in *International Affairs*, it is more probable that the audience is in Eastern Europe. Interestingly, *MEMO* only makes what may be characterized as perfunctory references to equality and equal security.

The concept of equal security has been an integral part of Soviet attitudes on arms control and disarmament. It is only on the basis of equal security that any efforts at arms control and disarmament are possible, and it is on this basis that most of the analysts in *International Affairs*, *SShA*, and *MEMO* support arms limitations negotiations.

Before SALT I this support appeared gradually. The analysts in *International Affairs* in the early 1970s were very supportive of disarmament in general and of any partial measures that might prepare the way for disarmament, while *SShA* analysts tended to focus their support more specifically on bilateral talks on strategic arms because, if successful, they might alleviate the threat of nuclear war. Although some *SShA* analysts were open proponents of SALT, advocacy on the part of *International Affairs* was muted. Their focus on general disarmament questions tended to indicate a concomitant interest in bilateral arms limitation. *MEMO* analysts approached SALT in much the same way as did their *SShA* counterparts; however, there are some indications that there were differences of opinion among them on the SALT issue. Although such differences may also exist in *International Affairs* and *SShA*, they were much more
apparent in MEMO. In general, SALT did not become a real topical focus, however, until 1971, and by then support seemed relatively cohesive among most analysts. This support was focused primarily on the need to stop the arms race.

As noted earlier, there was a brief flurry of praise for the concept of strategic arms limitation and then a period of silence until after the first SALT agreement was signed. Following the signing of SALT I, strategic arms limitation was mentioned much more frequently and from an extremely positive perspective. *International Affairs* analysts focused on placing SALT in its proper perspective as a measure to contain the arms race not as a disarmament measure. Strategic arms limitation agreements also were identified as essential in efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear war. Collateral elements were also stressed in articles appearing in *International Affairs* where analysts emphasized the importance of equal security in the agreements and the necessity of implementing the agreements honestly. The 1972 SALT agreement was seen also only as a first step that paved the way for more extensive agreements.

*SShA* analysts shared the *International Affairs* perspective that SALT I facilitated curtailment of the arms race thus reducing the risk of nuclear war and created opportunities for further progress toward disarmament. Since the primary focus of *SShA* was the study of the United States, it was not surprising that analysts in the journal not only emphasized the elements working in favor of improved Soviet-American relations including the conclusion of a strategic arms limitation agreement; but that they also took note of forces that were opposed to these developments. Thus, it was not unusual for *SShA* analysts to disparage
efforts by the opposition, especially that in the U.S., to frustrate positive developments. There also seemed to be an effort by SSHA analysts to "sell" the SALT agreements. They stressed that negotiations of this type were not a win or lose proposition but were mutually advantageous to both parties. It was also noted that the agreements in no way weakened Soviet defensive capabilities. Although some of these "selling" efforts may have been aimed abroad, there was apparently an effort to reassure some domestic audience as well.

*MEMO* analysts in the post-SALT I period took an approach that is similar to that of International Affairs analysts. They emphasized the importance of strategic arms agreements in restraining the arms race and preventing nuclear war. *MEMO*’s discussions also became more technical after SALT I was signed.

In 1973, all three journals demonstrated positive orientations toward further efforts along these lines. Indicative of this was the support expressed for the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. All three journals also began to discuss the directions which future agreements might take. Primary among these was the necessity to actually begin reducing nuclear arms. From the Soviet perspective, this meant moving from quantitative limits to qualitative limits. Qualitative limitations meant that agreements would move beyond simply numerical limits on types of launchers to the qualitative aspects of what types of payloads those launchers carry, for instance, limitations on MIRVed systems. SSHA and International Affairs first advocated this in late 1973. *MEMO* finally began to echo their perspective in the middle of 1974. An interesting aspect of this was that Soviet analysts
only began to discuss qualitative limits after the Soviets had begun to deploy MIRVed "heavies." This is indicative of the strong sense one gets from Soviet analysts that negotiations are only possible on the basis of equal security.

From the middle of 1974 through the middle of 1976, the analysts in *International Affairs* reiterated the need to carry out qualitative limitations and apparently felt that major efforts were being made in this area. *SShA* analysts also intensified their advocacy of extending the agreements already in force during this period. *MEMO* reflected the urgency and intensity present in the other two journals with an increase in its emphasis on limiting strategic arms, extending these limits into the qualitative realm, and furthering attempts to prevent nuclear war.

Like the positions and orientations concerning the United States and equal security, Soviet attitudes on SALT finally fell prey to the deterioration of Soviet-American relations by the middle of 1976. This is not to imply that Soviet analysts no longer supported SALT; however, references to the SALT process decreased while at the same time the tone of those references became more defensive. Most references focused on the adequacy of verification by national means and on arguments defending SALT against charges that the agreements favored one side over the other. *International Affairs* at first switched its emphasis to general disarmament and the need to reduce military spending but moved on to attack what was perceived as renewed arms race efforts by the West. This largely grew out of occurrences in the U.S. during the 1976 presidential campaign and the positions taken by the new U.S. Administration in 1977. In *SShA* references to SALT virtually ceased during this period.
Instead, emphasis was placed on the dangers of the arms race. The argument was made that people who advocated security through greater armed might failed to realize that given the nature of modern weapons a war would leave no victors. Much the same pattern that appeared in *International Affairs* was also found in *MEMO*. Emphasis was placed on the dangers of the arms race, especially as it increased the likelihood of nuclear war.

In 1978, the journals returned to actively promoting more extensive strategic arms limitation agreements. They also castigated the United States for its responsibility in delaying the successful conclusion of a second SALT agreement. Additionally, new weapons systems were criticized and proposals were renewed that such systems should fall within the purview of arms control before they were developed and deployed. Both *International Affairs* and *MEMO* were stronger advocates of strategic arms limitation during 1978 than was *SShA* (see Table 1).

Between the end of 1978 and the signing of SALT II, the journals were silent on the issue as they were before SALT I was signed. After the signing, all three journals stressed the extreme importance of the agreement for reducing the arms race and decreasing the threat of nuclear war. They also emphasized the mutual benefits of the treaty, its basis in the principle of equal security, and the adequacy of the prescribed verification techniques.

Throughout the entire SALT negotiating period, it appears that all three journals may have been addressing at least two primary audiences: policymakers in the U.S., and elements in the policy process in the Soviet Union. That some of the discussions were aimed at the United
### TABLE 1

**DISTRIBUTION OF JOURNAL ARTICLES BY YEAR**

**ACCORDING TO THEIR ORIENTATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL**

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#### Notes
- **IA**: Indicates the number of articles favoring arms control, *+* indicates no articles in that category.
- **SShA**: Shows the number of articles opposing arms control, *+* indicates no articles in that category.
- **MEMO**: Represents the number of articles with neutral or mixed views, *+* indicates no articles in that category.

**Legend**
- **IA**: Indicates the number of articles favoring arms control.
- **SShA**: Shows the number of articles opposing arms control.
- **MEMO**: Represents the number of articles with neutral or mixed views.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>SShA</th>
<th>MEMO</th>
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<td>00</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
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<td>+</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>MX</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>+</td>
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</tr>
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<td>8</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
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<td>0 = 28 (31.5%)</td>
<td>0 = 28 (36.4%)</td>
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<td>+ = 47 (54%)</td>
<td>+ = 41 (53.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>88 (100%)</td>
<td>77 (100%)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

- no mention of arms control topics combined with a hostile orientation toward the U.S.

0 neutral, no mention of arms control topics

+ positive references to arms control
States is fairly obvious; however, there are several indicators that some of their discussions may have been aimed closer to home. One instance of this is the apparent SSHA efforts to "sell" SALT I. There also may have been a domestic audience in mind when the analysts began urging qualitative limits as well as quantitative ones in 1973 and 1974 and for their urgency about the importance of new arms agreements in 1975 and early 1976. It is also possible that arguments urging the curtailment of the arms race because of its contribution to the danger of nuclear war may have been aimed at domestic elements as well as elements in the U.S. The strongest indicator, however, that there may be a domestic audience for the discussion in International Affairs, SSHA and MEMO is the emphasis that is given to equal security and the reassurances that the agreements have not adversely affected the defensive capability of the Soviet Union. There is little reason, especially during the SALT II period, to direct such a message toward the U.S.

Another indicator that these journals may indeed be a forum in which Soviet domestic sources air some of their opinions and concerns over strategic arms limitation agreements is the diversity of attitudes in the journals. Although the overall tenor of all three journals is supportive, at times even enthusiastic, over SALT, there were some dissenting voices. There is certainly not the wide range of opinions and the open debate found in similar sources in the United States, but there does appear to be some variation. Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate this. Although there was no one writing in the three journals examined here who overtly opposed SALT, there were people who did not mention arms limitation, disarmament, or detente. This silence on these subjects was
combined with an attitude toward the U.S. that was fairly hostile and had an antagonistic tone. These elements combined may be an indicator of unvoiced opposition. Their tone is certainly different from that of the articles that are overtly supportive of SALT and/or disarmament. 

Over the ten years discussed here, we do see generally consistent patterns emerging among the three journals. The majority of analysts supported strategic arms limitation agreements and efforts directed toward disarmament (see Table 2), displayed some anxiety about the trustworthiness of the United States, manifested a great deal of concern over most elements of U.S. strategic doctrine, demonstrated some grudging support for deterrence, adamantly argued against a continued arms race and the development of new weapons systems, advocated qualitative controls over armaments, and feared that a nuclear war would be a catastrophe for mankind. We also find some evidence that these attitudes are not presented simply as propaganda ploys but may also have played some role in the domestic policy process.

Military Views Versus Positions Found in International Affairs, SSHA and MEMO: Is There a Difference?

In the first chapter of this study, we drew six statements concerning areas of disagreement by Western analysts from the evaluations of Soviet arms policy and strategic doctrine by those analysts. Most of those analyses relied heavily on Soviet military attitudes. Many of them also judged Soviet policy and doctrine harshly and largely denigrated Soviet sincerity in the pursuit of arms control and disarmament. They argued that the Soviet Union's policies were based on an unchanging doctrine promulgated solely by the military that advocated a counterforce
### TABLE 2

**ANALYSTS' ARTICLES AND THEIR ORIENTATION TOWARD ARMS LIMITATION**

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<th>International Affairs</th>
<th>SShA</th>
<th>MEMO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>4/79+</td>
<td>8/78+</td>
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<td>Aleshin, A.G.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alexeyev, G.</td>
<td>2/73+, 3/75+, 9/76+</td>
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<td>5/70, 9/71</td>
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<td>9/73, 6/76, 4/77+, 12/77+, 11/78+</td>
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<td>6/71-, 8/71-, 12/76-</td>
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<td>7/71-, 5/77-</td>
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<td>3/73+, 8/76</td>
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+ designates a positive attitude on strategic arms limitation
- represents no mention of strategic arms limitation combined with a hostile attitude toward the U.S.
strategy predicated on the ability to fight and win, or at least survive, a nuclear war. A smaller number of Western writers argued that this was not the case. Instead, they believe that there are voices, some military and some outside military establishment, advocating various stances on strategic arms policy and that they do not believe in the winability of nuclear war. Additionally they believe that Soviet arms policy attitudes change across time. The real point of debate, however, is whether or not the Soviet Union can be depended upon to negotiate and implement strategic arms limitation agreements in good faith. Those analysts who take a negative, distrustful point of view vis-a-vis Soviet strategic doctrine are implicitly arguing against strategic arms agreements with the Soviets.

In order to illuminate some of the points made by various elements among Western analysts we will now examine the areas of contention outlined in Chapter I in light of the findings from sources analyzed here. The first statement involves the possibility of opinion variations. These variations will be referred to, for simplicity's sake, as divisions. The issue is whether there have been divisions over Soviet arms policy during the last decade. These divisions are difficult to tap because of the many features in Soviet society which proscribe the open debates familiar to Western analysts. Subjects are open for discussion on a limited basis and the range of that discussion is much narrower than in a more open society. The censorship system also imposes a limited vocabulary on discussants by allowing them to use only terminology which is politically acceptable. The system also severely curtails the data
and documentation which is available for use in even a semi-public forum. Therefore, any variation between points of view may be expected to be only very slight.

The findings in this study support the Western analysts, Garthoff and Payne for example, who argue that there are divisions over arms policy in the Soviet Union. Even if we make the assumption, for argument's sake, that the Soviet military speaks with a single voice and that it advocates fighting a nuclear war based on developing a first strike capability, we see numerous instances in the literature that are in opposition to this. Shevchenko, Shatalov, Zhilin, Rybkin, Karenin, Sanakoyev, Stepanov, Arbatov, Berezhkov, Petrovsky, and Tomashevskii all speak out against nuclear war and Berezhkov explicitly attacks the principle of a first strike.

To carry this one step farther, it is possible to detect some indications of disagreement even within the sources used in this study. This is especially true on SALT in the early 1970s. In Tables 1 and 2 we see that both articles supporting SALT and those remaining silent on SALT and generally hostile to the U.S. appear in these journals. During the pre-SALT I period, the instance of the appearance of both types of articles are fairly common. This is especially striking in MEMO where favorable articles appear in one issue and potentially unfavorable articles appear in the next. There are even instances, in the June 1971 issue of MEMO and the August issue of International Affairs, where both types of articles appear together. After the conclusion of SALT I, the incidence of articles which do not mention SALT but at the same time attack the United States, especially in the area of strategic doctrine, decreases.
Another indicator that signals the possible existence of divisions over arms policy in the Soviet Union is again based on the acceptance by some of the premise that the military, as a group, advocates a war fighting policy. Nevertheless, several of the analysts included in this study are presently or formerly military personnel. Included among these are: Ye. Rubkin (Colonel), M.A. Mil'shteyn (General-Lieutenant, retired), L.S. Semeyko (Colonel, retired), P. Zhilin (General-Lieutenant), and R.G. Simonyan (General-Major). Although these analysts share a military background, they do not write from a single perspective. Additionally, Rybkin, Zhilin, and Simonyan deviate rather obviously from the policies purportedly advocated by the military. This is especially true in regard to their attitudes toward the consequences of a nuclear war.  

At this point, it is necessary to mention that many Western analysts would dismiss this entire discussion on the basis that the differences noted, at least in the literature that is designed primarily for a civilian audience, are not manifestations of policy discussions but are positions taken for propaganda purposes. There is no way of definitively disproving these contentions. Undoubtedly, there is a large element of propaganda in these articles. The same argument also may be made about all material published by the Soviets, including that written by the military. Additionally, as noted in the previous section of this chapter, there are subtle indicators in the literature that suggest that many groups may be the intended audience of these articles, including Soviet domestic groups.
This brings us to the second issue in this study: whether there have been changes in Soviet arms positions across time. In Chapter I it was demonstrated that some analysts, Richard Pipes for example, expressed the belief that there has been no change in Soviet attitudes since the 1950s while others, for instance, Garthoff, Payne, and Simes, have argued that there have been modifications in Soviet positions in the arms policy area over the last two decades. This study supports the contention of the latter group. There have been modifications by Soviet analysts in their assessments of the U.S., their perceptions concerning detente and peaceful coexistence, their assessments of weapons systems (the change in emphasis to qualitative limits for example), their perceptions of equal security, and their reactions to strategic arms limitation. Nevertheless, the changes are very subtle in some instances and most of the indicators included here are only indirect indicators of positions on strategic policy. Additionally, some of the changes found are evidently in response to inputs from the U.S. in the sense that they are apparently reactions to changes in U.S. policy. On the other hand, however, it is interesting that there seems to be some change by individuals across the decade (see Table 1). Some of these are undoubtedly response to outside stimuli, but others appear to be reflections of opinion modification across time. Trofimenko may be an example of this type of change.

The third issue directly addresses positions on strategic doctrine: whether the Soviets reject deterrence in any form and are determined to achieve a quantitative superiority and a first strike capability designed to enable them to fight and win a nuclear war. This position
is expounded by Pipes and Nitze⁹ while Garthoff and Payne¹⁰ are the principle proponents of the opposite view. Again the findings here support Garthoff and Payne. There are several instances, especially in International Affairs and SSHI,¹¹ where the analysts give grudging credence to policies of deterrence like mutual assured destruction (MAD); however, their support is based largely on the pragmatic position that it seems to work rather than on any commitment to the philosophical soundness of such policies. Nevertheless, they tend to argue that negotiated strategic arms agreements ultimately resulting in disarmament are highly preferable to a policy based on a precarious balance which, if it ever fails, may well result in a world catastrophe. Additionally, they leave little doubt that they find deterrence so fragile that the Soviet Union should be prepared to pursue another policy if and when deterrence fails.

In general, the analysts examined here also show little faith in any policy predicated on fighting and surviving, much less winning, a nuclear war. This is evident in much of their writing. First, they have little faith in the concept of controlled nuclear confrontation.¹² Instead, there is the often expressed belief that once nuclear weapons are used, the result would be all out nuclear war. Second, they doubt that a first strike capability is feasible. Indeed, several authors express the belief that neither side would allow the other to achieve the advantage necessary to make such a strike feasible; and, even if it were, modern weapons systems and technology are such that the other side might still survive intact enough to be able to retaliate.¹³ Third, they believe a nuclear war would be so destructive that, even if one side
survived the other, that there would be no victor. There is also evidence that, contrary to Richard Pipes’s evaluation, there are people in the USSR who do not believe war is an extension of policy in the Clausewitzian sense.\textsuperscript{14}


The fourth and fifth issues addressed in this study deal with the role personnel outside the military establishment play in the arms policy process in the Soviet Union. There is no way in which we can definitively determine what that role is. At best, we can make postulations that are unverifiable because there is so little known about the Soviet policy process, especially in an area that includes defense policy, that our findings cannot be confirmed; however, we may be able to lend some strength to the arguments made by other analysts.

The fourth issue in contention is: whether the Soviet military is the sole source of Soviet arms attitudes. This contention is drawn for Pipes and Ermarto.\textsuperscript{15} The opposite view comes from the writings of Garthoff, Wolfe, Payne, and Simes.\textsuperscript{16} In Chapter I it was noted that there were indications in the late 1960s that the military, or at least some of the military, were opposed to strategic arms negotiations.\textsuperscript{17} This contention is supported by Samuel Payne’s study on Soviet attitudes about SALT.\textsuperscript{18} Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has negotiated three agreements on strategic arms, including the ABM treaty. If the military was opposed to negotiations, who supported taking part in the negotiations?

Several analysts, Payne foremost among them, have suggested that this military versus non-military dichotomy of the Soviet policymaking
Indeed, this is probably highly likely; however, there were, nevertheless, powerful elements opposed to negotiations. On the other hand, this study demonstrates that there were also elements that were supportive of SALT. All three sources used here show strong support for SALT by 1971, and SSHA featured analysts supportive of strategic arms negotiations beginning with its first issue in January 1970.

Beyond this simplistic pro and con attitude on SALT in general, there are differences over some of the basic elements of SALT about which we may at least speculate. Specifically, these include ABMs, MIRVs and forward-based systems. Because there is virtually no discussion of Soviet weapons systems in Soviet publications, there is no nice, clear juxtaposition of views on these systems; but it would logically follow that the military position would be to develop, preserve and possibly even extend systems such as MIRVed missiles. This especially should be true since the Soviet missiles are of such a size that they possess very large throw-weights. Combining these into the MLBM (modern large ballistic missiles or " heavies"), allows the Soviets the advantage of more deliverable warheads of greater megatonage. This in turn potentially gives them the technological edge that might make a first strike potentially feasible which, according to Western analysts, is essential for a war winning posture. Therefore, positions in opposition to such weapons logically would be in opposition to the military; however, we have no way of knowing this for sure. However, the Soviet Union did develop ABM and MIRVed systems, so one would assume they were advocated by some element of the policymaking groups. On the other hand, there is
evidence that people writing for the publications examined here opposed such systems.

During the SALT I negotiations, the primary elements under discussion were to be ABMs and quantitative limitations on ICBMs. Specifics about numerical limits on ICBMs are not discussed in the non-military sources; however, both ABMs and MIRVed systems are. Analysts, especially those writing for SSN, are generally opposed to both because of their effect on the arms race. This is intriguing for two reasons. The first of these is that the Soviets had been opposed to discussing ABMs as part of any arms limitation negotiations at Glassboro, New Jersey in 1967. By November 1969, they had become interested in including this system in the negotiations. There may be many reasons for the Soviets changing their position on ABM. Certainly, by that time they were willing to include ABMs in negotiations. They no longer felt that such negotiations might leave them at a disadvantage, in contrast with what they could have believed two years earlier. Regardless of what the reasons behind the Soviet decision to negotiate on the ABM systems may have been, there were people arguing against ABMs in the early 1970s and it may have been that they opposed them earlier than this. Of course, the most obvious reason for their opposition to ABMs in the early 1970s would be to support a negotiating posture that had already been determined; however, their concomitant opposition to MIRVs seems to belie this argument.

At the same time that these analysts were opposing ABMs, they were also attacking MIRVs. According to John Newhouse, this was not part of the Soviet negotiating stance during the early part of SALT I. In
fact, negotiations on qualitative developments, like MIRV, during SALT I would have threatened to leave the Soviets in a technologically inferior strategic position vis-a-vis the U.S., and in 1970 the Soviets were opposed to any ban on production or deployment of MIRVs. Regardless of this, some Soviet analysts were opposed to MIRVed systems. Indeed, some of their arguments resembled those taking place in the U.S. concerning the destabilizing effects MIRVs were having on the arms race. So it may be that, rather than echoing accepted policy, the analysts opposed to MIRVs were trying to create greater understanding about the nature and danger of the arms race because of the links between defensive and offensive systems.

After SALT I and the ABM Treaty were signed, MIRVed systems were still under attack. However, by the middle of 1973 the emphasis shifted to the necessity of extending limits to qualitative systems. The need for qualitative limitations is an argument that appears often through the rest of the decade. Again, the timing of the arguments for qualitative limits is of interest. It corresponds with Soviet deployment of MIRVed "heavies." This achievement did much to put the Soviets on a technological as well as numerical par with the U.S. MIRVed Soviet missiles meant that the Soviet systems were closer to equaling those of the United States. Although they still lacked the accuracy of U.S. MIRVed systems, Soviet missiles were more destructive because they had a larger throw-weight. This created an environment in which negotiated limits on qualitative elements would not lock the Soviets into a technologically inferior position. So the time was ripe for advocating qualitative limits.
An even more intriguing aspect of this shift is that it may be that non-military analysts were advocating not only the limitation of MIRVed systems but also other qualitative aspects, for instance, throw-weights. The extensiveness of the qualitative limitations advocated by non-military writers can only be a matter of speculation; however, their opposition to MIRVs is quite evident. In this instance, a stronger link can be established between non-military attitudes and negotiating stances. Although accounts of negotiations in the early stages of SALT II reflect Soviet intransigence on the subject of MIRVed systems, by November 1974, the Soviets were willing to agree to limits on those systems.

Another instance where there may be some link between arguments made by non-military analysts and a Soviet negotiating position concerns forward-based systems (FBS). Admittedly, Soviet analysts normally do not talk about forward-based systems except to chastise the United States over their existence. The general policy stance in the Soviet Union has been to attack the forward-based systems of the U.S. However, in 1973 and 1974, Soviet analysts do discuss strategic asymmetries and geographic asymmetries. This discussion implicitly emphasizes that U.S. forward-based systems have strategic counterparts in the USSR. One element of these asymmetries is that isolation of the U.S. from and proximity of the Soviet Union to enemy nuclear weapons has created differences in their perspectives. The Soviets are faced with the threat of U.S. forward-based systems and a Chinese nuclear capability. This made them vulnerable to a type of attack which was of no concern
to the U.S., especially in the period when research and deployment on current systems were being made. The Soviets, lacking FBS of their own, created a strategic weapons system, MIRVed MLBMs, that helped offset what they perceived to be a U.S. advantage. In the early 1970s, before this system was in place, FBS was a prime target in attempts to increase Soviet security. It was also something that the United States was unwilling to classify as part of their strategic capability, thus removing it from the purview of strategic arms negotiations. Again, it is impossible to gauge how much, if any, influence discussions by non-military analysts about asymmetries had on the Soviet position; however, following the Vladivostok meeting, a trade-off of asymmetries took place with the signing of an aide-memoire that allowed Soviet retention of heavy ICBMs in return for U.S. retention of their forward-based systems. That these were analysts advocating, at least implicitly, sensitivity to the asymmetry question during a period when FBS was generally under attack and that the asymmetries were then accommodated in the SALT process may be an indicator of the ability of people outside the military establishment to influence policy or negotiating stances.

There is also evidence that the agreements reached at Vladivostok had some opposition within the Soviet Union. According to Strobe Talbot, one of the underlying reasons that the Soviets reacted so adversely to what they considered to be attempts by the Carter Administration in 1977 to scrap the Vladivostok agreement was the potential political costs for Brezhnev. When Cyrus Vance visited Moscow in March of that year, he brought with him a set of proposals that both would have revised the agreement on MIRVed systems and reopened heavy ICBMs as a topic of
This brought about a sharp rebuff from Brezhnev and Gromyko. The impact of these proposals was quite severe.

'What are you trying to do—kill SALT?' asked one Soviet official in private conversation with his American counterpart. Gromyko's deputy, Georgy Kornienko took Paul Warnke aside and admonished him, 'You shouldn't have disregarded the fact that Brezhnev had to spill political blood to get the Vladivostok accords.' Kornienko said that the Soviet leader had been especially incensed by the American attempt to cut the heavy missile force and by the across-the-board 2,500-kilometer range limit on cruise missiles.

This both demonstrates Soviet policy stances have been aligned on occasion with positions taken by analysts other than military analysts, and reinforces arguments made earlier in this chapter that there are divisions of opinion among Soviet elites and sub-elites within the policy process. In the remainder of the decade there are no easily recognizable policy suggestions made by the journal analysts. However, the fact that, by the end of the SALT II negotiations, these analysts were advocating a third round of arms limitation agreements may be a policy suggestion itself.

The fifth issue is a corollary to the fourth: whether Soviet strategic doctrine can be taken at face value and equated with Soviet strategic arms control policy. This question arises because of the propensity of some Western analysts to equate Soviet strategic doctrine with Soviet strategic arms policy while other Western analysts believe that they are separate policy areas. We have offered evidence here that there are voices in the Soviet Union which are contrary to the typical perspective associated with Soviet strategic doctrine as interpreted by many Western analysts. These alternative Soviet spokesmen vary from this strategic doctrine perspective in such areas as: 1) the
alleged adherence of that doctrine to Clausewitzian principles pro-
claiming war as an extension of policy; 2) the feasibility of a first
strike; 3) the acceptance of deterrence theory in the form of MAD; and
4) the consequences of nuclear war. Support for the different set of
views held by some Soviet analysts is reinforced by the work of Robert
Arnett. He found that, in the area of doctrinal questions concerning
the utility of nuclear war as an instrument of policy, the possibility
of victory in a nuclear war and the consequences of a nuclear war,
Soviet spokesmen do not support nuclear war as a policy tool nor do they
believe victory possible or the consequences acceptable. 30

What Soviet spokesmen have been saying about nuclear war does
not support the claims of various Western analysts who argue
that the Soviets believe they can win and survive a nuclear war —
especially the notion that they can survive such a war with
fewer losses than they incurred in World War II. The Soviet
usage of the dictum 'war is a continuation of politics' is
a basic tenet of Marxist-Leninist theory explaining the causes
of war. Soviet statements proclaiming that victory is possible
in such a war seem to tell us little about actual Soviet thinking
on the subject. This conclusion is based upon the fact that
these statements are necessary to keep up morale and are required
by Marxist-Leninist ideology. In addition, these declarations
about victory are contradicted by their statements made on
the usefulness of war as a practical instrument of policy, and
by their estimates of the probable consequences of such a con-

flict.

Soviet spokesmen in publications written for internal
consumption contend that nuclear war cannot serve as a practical
instrument of policy and they continually talk about the dire
consequences of such a war. Spokesmen at all levels, in different
forums, generally agree that nuclear war would cause unprece-
dented damage. Thus, the Soviets seem to be acutely aware
of the destructive capability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and
there seems to be little doubt that the U.S. has the capability
to inflict unacceptable damages upon the Soviet Union.31

Arnett also found that these views, especially on the consequences of
nuclear war, often prevail at the Politburo level. Among other things,
Arnett notes Brezhnev's recognition of the reality of MAD. 32
There is also some indication that positions expressed by some analysts concerning certain weapons systems and potentially even the whole concept of strategic arms limitations were in opposition to others within the policy process. If this is indeed the case, analysts often have been in accord with the interests that prevailed in the formulation of policy. At best they may have helped in the shaping of policy. Given the positions taken in Soviet strategic doctrine, as it has been interpreted by several Western analysts, on war as an extension of policy, on the acceptance of deterrence, and on the consequences of a nuclear war, the support of Politburo members for concepts that differ from that doctrine and coincide with some of the views expressed by analysts examined here would indicate that strategic doctrine presented by the military and Soviet strategic arms policies are not necessarily identical and should not be treated as though they are.

This brings us to the sixth and final issue which is: whether Soviet strategic arms policy is intertwined with other foreign policy goals. If Soviet strategic arms policy is essentially an area of policy solely controlled by military strategic decision makers, Soviet arms policy is an independent policy area concerned only with the security and war fighting capability of the Soviet state. If it is intertwined with other foreign policy goals, it is open to influence from non-military decision makers. It would appear that Soviet strategic arms policy is part of broader Soviet foreign policy goals. The previous discussions of influences on arms policies suggest that there are considerations that go beyond military policy, especially in the area of detente and in domestic economic and foreign aid policies. Although
this link may be attacked as tenuous, it is obvious that some analysts certainly think that arms policy should be part of broader foreign policy concerns. This is evident from several opinions found in the journals. These opinions include: 1) the emphasis on linking military detente with peaceful coexistence; 2) the belief that the correlation of forces goes beyond a balance of military strength to include social, political, and economic forces; 3) the arguments that resources invested in the arms race might be put to better use elsewhere, both at home and abroad; 4) the linking of strategic arms limitation to broader bilateral and multilateral disarmament proposals; 5) the discussions of the mutual advantages of cooperation between the U.S. and USSR beyond arms control; and 6) the belief that modern weapons systems are so destructive that conflict must be resolved by political rather than military means.

The Role of Arms Policy Positions Found in International Affairs, SShA, and Memo

Because we are limited to indirect measures in the study of Soviet policymaking, it is impossible to give a definitive answer to the question of how the positions and opinions of personnel outside the military establishment are integrated into the arms policy process in the Soviet Union or, indeed, to know if they are integrated at all. Evidence has been presented above which indicates that these analysts in the Soviet Union may have some influence in this policy area. Again, this cannot go beyond well-informed and logical conjecture. Even with the support given this conjecture by the appearance of positions in negotiating
stances that had been advocated earlier in journal articles, there is no proof that these positions originated with the analysts advocating them. Those analysts may only be presenting positions held by some of the elites at high decision making levels. However, this does indicate that the analysts, at a minimum, articulate arms policy issues. Additionally, this articulation may provide a forum for circumscribed debates within the journals themselves and almost certainly provides a vehicle by which views that appear to be in some opposition to traditional military attitudes are voiced.

From the tenor of many of the articles, another potential role seems to exist for these analysts in the policy implementation phase of Soviet arms policy. This is the role of concensus-builder. It well may be that this is the aim of articles presenting positive views of SALT and Soviet-American cooperation. This may also be the function of the many negative references to the arms race. Given the purported strength of the military, and concomitantly heavy industry, in the Soviet policy process, it is interesting that attacks on the arms race are usually tied either to the economic benefits that would accrue if the arms race did not exist or to the dangerous consequences that would result from the use of these accumulated arms. The possibility that concensus-building is one of the roles played by non-military analysts is reinforced by the efforts to "sell" SALT at a time when it seemed to be doomed by the deterioration of Soviet-American relations. Since the Soviet Government was committed to arms limitation negotiation and detente but there are indications that there had been some opposition to these policies, building and maintaining a concensus on the importance of SALT and
detente might have been an extremely important function as many of the advantages of such policies began to disappear with the deterioration of Soviet-American relations. This may also have been the motive behind the stress placed on elements like the inadmissibility of a unilateral advantage, the importance of equal security, and the maintenance of Soviet defensive capabilities. It may be that SALT provoked the same type of criticism in the Soviet Union that it did in the United States and that frequent references to the importance given to security concerns in the negotiations was to counter this criticism and allay fears both in the Soviet Union itself and among its East European allies.

Non-military analysts may have another policy implementation role as purveyors of propaganda concerning Soviet arms policy. Many articles, especially in the early 1970s in *International Affairs* and *MEMO*, use arms policy, especially weapons developments, to portray the United States as an aggressive, imperialistic war-monger. This message seems to be aimed at the Third World as does the opposite picture of the Soviet Union as a nation continually striving for peace and the good of mankind. This is almost certainly part of the underlying reason for the emphasis on general and complete disarmament in these journals.

Another role that may fall into the policy implementation category is that of facilitator. It may be that non-military analysts are part of an effort to help create and maintain a dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union. Quite often this also is labelled as propaganda largely because messages are couched in terms that are an attack on U.S. strategic policy; however, a careful reading of the
journals suggests that these analysts are trying to communicate with elites and sub-elites in the U.S. about Soviet preferences in arms control negotiations. This might certainly be the case with strategic weapons. Attacks on ABMs coincided with a willingness to negotiate on these systems. Discussions of qualitative limitations and strategic asymmetries preceded movement on negotiations on limiting MIRVs and exchanging ICBMs. On the negative side, intransigence on subjects such as equal security may indicate that there is extreme sensitivity to any threat to defensive capabilities. The possibility that this is indeed a facilitating role played by the non-military analysts is reinforced by the very reactive nature of the journals. Occurrences in the U.S. and changes in U.S. policy stances that have negative connotations for the Soviets usually provoke an almost immediate, usually hostile reaction in these journals. On the other hand, positive developments, like the appearance of "sober minded" forces in U.S. policy circles, are reinforced.

It is highly probable that, to some extent, these analysts are involved in all the roles discussed here, including some level of input into policy making in the Soviet Union. Regretfully, the non-military analysts and their roles in Soviet policy decisions and policy implementation have too often been ignored or disregarded by Western analysts. Their writings, at a minimum, help to illuminate aspects of Soviet arms policy. It is apparent that relying on military attitudes alone presents Western analysts with a distorted view of Soviet arms policy and that a better understanding is gained by combining both military and elements
from outside the military establishment in an analysis. At best, greater attention to these commentators might give Western analysts, whether they are involved in the policy process or scholarly research, greater insight into Soviet perspectives on arms policy and arms control. For the policymaker, this would potentially create a greater sensitivity to the most fruitful avenues to pursue in future negotiations and a better understanding of the potential implications of Soviet strategic doctrine. For the scholar, this provides new avenues of research in attempts to gain a better understanding of Soviet policies and, eventually, may lead to a better understanding of the process by which policies are formulated.
NOTES

1. Although this is an overstatement of the differences concerning the purpose behind Soviet writings, Richard Pipes does imply that analysts outside the military establishment are writing primarily for propaganda purposes; therefore, their analyses do not provide an accurate picture of Soviet policy intentions. On the other hand, Western analysts like Raymond Garthoff and Thomas Wolfe would argue that such analyses provide a valuable new dimension to understanding Soviet arms policy.

2. See pp. 283-285 above.


4. See pp. 20-26 above.

5. See pp. 26-29 and pp. 36-40 above.

6. Ibid.


8. Payne, p. 50.

9. See pp. 20-26 above.

10. See pp. 26-29 and pp. 36-40 above.

11. See pp. 110-121 and pp. 210-246 above.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.


15. See pp. 20-26 above.
16. See pp. 26-29 and pp. 36-40 above.
17. See p. 15 above.
19. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 183.
22. Ibid., p. 165.
23. Ibid., pp. 166-192.
27. Talbot, p. 63.
28. Ibid., pp. 46-73.
29. Ibid., p. 73.
32. Arnett, pp. 177-178.
APPENDIX

COGNITIVE OBJECTS

Peaceful Coexistence and Correlation of Forces

Correlation of forces
Changing nature of, fundamental alteration of
Balance of power, balance of forces
Ideological, moral, social, political, economic:
advantages, superiority of East (over West)
Superiority, advantages of socialism, of the socialist system,
superiority of communism, communism
Spheres of influence [non-specific]
[Relationships]

[Relations between the two systems]
The socialist-capitalist struggle, rivalry, the contradictory
nature of the two opposite socio-economic systems in the
world
Implacability toward bourgeois ideology, impossibility
of ideological reconciliation
Ideological struggle
Cold war
Economic competition
Vigilance [general, military]
Anti-socialist behavior by the West
[Attempts by West (and U.S.) to get socialist countries
to oppose one another, encouragement by West
(and U.S.) of dissension within the Communist move-
ment] driving a wedge between socialist countries,
states
The peaceful evolution (of the Socialist states) toward
the "so-called" free world, revisionism as the main
form of socialist disintegration [promoted by the
West]
Slackness among socialists
"Liberalization" of Soviet society, softening of socialist
society

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Anti-socialist propaganda, bourgeois propaganda
Imperialist subversion, subversive actions (by imperialists)
"Deideologicalization," convergence [promoted by the West]
Departure from the cold war, peaceful competition
Peaceful coexistence, rapprochement, new opportunities with Western countries
Principles of peaceful coexistence
    Inviolability of borders, territorial integrity, viable frontiers
    Non-interference in state's internal affairs
    Sovereignty, sovereign equality, principles of sovereign equality
    Reciprocity in relations, mutual relations
Translation of principles into policy
Cooperation (with the West) (in Europe)
Goodwill (toward the West), detente (with the West), easing of tensions (with the West), peaceful cooperation, political detente, relaxation of tensions (with the West), trust (of the West), peaceful ties (with the West, between states, in Europe)

Attitudes towards United States

Economic detente (with the West)
    The economic irreversibility of detente
Credits
Trade
Most favored nation (MFN) status
The international division of labor, the broadening cooperative sphere
Joint projects
Compensation agreements on a comparative basis
Economic relations, contacts, cooperation, ties

[Barriers to economic detente] Raising unacceptable conditions to economic detente]
    Policies that link economics with interference in Soviet (internal) affairs
    Jackson-Vanik amendment
    Stevenson amendment

[Barriers to political detente]
    Opponents of detente
    (U.S.)abandonment of the word "detente," "peace through strength"
    U.S. support of Soviet dissidents
    Counterintelligence, espionage, U.S. intelligence in the military, West stealing USSR state secrets

U.S./USSR relations
    Agreements, treaties (other)
    Contacts, exchanges
Sports
Tourist
Cultural
Professional
Business
Youth
Technology transfer, transfer of technology
Anti-Sovietism in U.S.
U.S.-Peking policy
Basic principles (of US/USSR relations)
(US) violations of principles
(US) acceptance of principles
(US) violations of 1972 agreements
(US) acceptance of 1972 agreements

Equal Security

Security [International Security/Military]
Use of force (limitation of)
Avoidance of military clash, reduction of military tensions
Non-use of force
Exclusion of threat of force, non-use of threat of force, renunciation (of use) of force
Illegality of war as a way of settling disputes
Avoidance of war, nuclear war
War, military conflict, armed conflict, (armed) hostilities
Danger of, threat of, risk of, probability of war
Danger of, threat of, risk of, probability of nuclear war,
nuclear missile war, nuclear destruction
Nuclear blackmail, atomic blackmail
Use of (strategic) nuclear weapons
Civilian war losses
Military preparation(s)

Strategic Arms Policy and Arms Control

Nuclear weapons, *weapons of mass destruction
Spread of nuclear weapons
Stockpiling nuclear weapons
*Specific systems (ABM, MIRV, etc.)
Military technology
Arms control, arms limitation, arms reductions -- nuclear
Limitations on production of nuclear weapons
Offensive nuclear
Any specific system, MIRV, MARV, Trident, MX, B-1, etc.
Defensive (ABM) nuclear
Qualitative nuclear
Quantitative nuclear
Limitations on stockpiling
Limitations on testing
Universal test ban
Complete test ban, complete ban on all nuclear tests
Complete weapons test ban, complete ban on all weapons tests(nuclear)
Cease testing more powerful weapons
Ocean bottom, sea bed, test limitations

Verification
On site inspection
National technical means of verification
The voluntary principle (of on site inspection)

[Other arms limitations and disarmament concepts]
Creation of nuclear free zones
Prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction

Negotiations
SALT, strategic arms limitation talks
U.S., Western, their position
Soviet, our position, position of the fraternal socialist countries, Pact position
Agreements
SALT I agreement
SALT II agreement
Vladivostok accords, memorandum, understanding
The spirit of Vladivostok, the atmosphere of Vladivostok
Summit conferences, Nixon's visits, Ford's visit, Brezhnev's (1973) visit
Dartmouth, Pugwash conferences, etc.

*Soviet-American relations

Limitation on nuclear proliferation, dissemination
Nuclear non-proliferation treaty
London suppliers club, group
NPT review conference

Disarmament
(Our, Soviet disarmament) proposals
Verification, implementation of
Dependable security systems
Dependable monitoring systems
Mechanisms to elaborate and implement concrete measures
National means of verification
On-site inspections

Soviet, Warsaw Pact defense capabilities, defensive might, defense capacities
Soviet security, national interest, defense of the Socialist motherland
Potential defense capabilities
Soviet troops combat readiness
[General capabilities]
Capabilities to fight nuclear war
Capabilities to rebuff aggression or react to crisis
Correlation of forces

Parity, Equilibrium

Military strategy
[References to] Lenin
[References to] Clausewitz
War as an extension, continuation of politics
(Soviet) military superiority, (military strategic)
- nuclear superiority
Nuclear war
Military balance, nuclear balance, balance
Military parity, nuclear parity (with the West)
* Military might
Military costs, development [general]
- Defense expenditures
- Defense burden
- Defense production
- Defense production efficiency
- Manpower costs
- Costs of new weapons (technology)

Development of the Armed Forces
- Of the Army, land forces
- Of the Navy
- Of the Air Force
- Of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Troops
- Of the National Aerospace Defense, air defense forces, troops

Soviet Armed Forces
- Army, land forces
- Navy
- Air Force
- Strategic Rocket Forces, Troops
- National Aerospace Defense, air defense forces, troops

Development of weapons, systems
- Strategic weapons
- Strategic forces
- Strategic offensive
- Strategic defensive
- Civil Defense

U.S. Strategic Doctrine
U.S., NATO, Western defense capabilities, capacities
- Budget, defense spending, defense burden
- Military-industrial complex, *militarism

Military strategy
- McNamara doctrine (flexible response)
- Schlesinger doctrine (selective counterforce strikes)
Superiority, *supremacy, position of force
Thinkability, feasibility, utility of nuclear war
Parity, equality, *balance
*First strike capability
**"Realistic deterrence" (Laird)
*Sufficiency
MAD, *guaranteed destruction
Development of [weapons, systems, technology]
Strategic weapons
   Any specific weapon, i.e., Trident, MIRV,
   ULMs, cruise missiles, etc.
Strategic forces
Strategic offensive
Strategic defensive, *ABM, Safeguard
Civil Defense
Air forces
Naval forces
Forward based systems
Mass destruction

Arms race
Nuclear arms race, *strategic arms race

* Nixon, Ford, Carter

* Soviet Initiatives, Proposals
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