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JOHN DEWEY: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MORAL EDUCATION

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
The Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
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Dedicated

to my parents,
Jane and Kenneth Freiberg.
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PUBLICATIONS


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Studies in Philosophy. Professor Bernard Rosen.
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CHAPTER ONE

RATIONALE OF THE STUDY

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Every time a political or moral crisis engulfs the nation, sooner or later the ethical deficiencies of public life are related to the prevailing ethics of the community and to the education its citizens have received, or have failed to receive, in school and out. Wherever schools have existed they have been expected to reinforce, supplement, sometimes even to substitute for, the moral education children have acquired at home or church. 1

These comments were written in 1975 as part of the "Preface" to John Dewey's Moral Principles in Education (MPE), and are applicable to our present society's increased and continuing interest in moral education.

Surveys conducted by educational organizations (e.g., "Moral Education's Muddled Mandate," 3) as well as general polls of public opinion 4 show that a top priority for future education is moral education. Despite this collective outcry, however, it is just as clear that exactly what moral education in schools should endorse and how it should be addressed is not agreed upon. There are those who wish their children to learn an established set of moral rules,
such as the Ten Commandments or the Golden Rule. Others, perhaps best typified by Lawrence Kohlberg's Cognitive-Developmental approach, are concerned that students learn principles of justice and appropriate reasoning skills. Still others want the young to be able to identify and accept their individual value scheme through "Values Clarification."

Some common threads can be identified in today's major approaches to moral education which seek to respond to this public outcry. One such commonality is the theoretical reliance upon John Dewey's educational and moral philosophy. Indeed, the two most popular moral education approaches (Kohlberg's Cognitive-Developmental model and Values Clarification) make this patently clear.

The originators of Values Clarification explicitly link their work with that of Dewey:

We started, of course, with the thinking of Dewey, and his belief that humans can reflect about value issues as well as other issues, and that they gain the most from their value-related experiences when they do so. Dewey was after a greater integration "of sense, need, impulse, and action" and reflection on current experiences was the route to that integration (Dewey, 1934).

Similarly,

Some people have asked how our work in values clarification compares with the moral development research of Lawrence Kohlberg and his associates (see Kohlberg, 1973 and 1976). The two approaches seem to us different in some
ways. For example, moral development is rooted in the work of Jean Piaget and research psychology. Values Clarification comes more directly from John Dewey and work of educators. 6

The Cognitive-Developmental approach also has claimed to be fundamentally Deweyan.

The theory of moral psychology we shall use in presenting the facts is basically that of John Dewey, more recently elaborated by Jean Piaget and myself. The moral philosophy of education is also basically that of Dewey as we have elaborated it in terms of contemporary philosophic thought. 7

These statements are representative of the kinds of claims which attempt to link specific approaches to moral education to Dewey. Such claims have sifted down to popular accounts of moral education which seek to speak to the layman. The following appeared in Parents Magazine:

But today's educators rely on two specific approaches to moral education. The more widely used approach is based on the ideas of educator Louis Raths, who built upon the thinking of John Dewey to formulate his system of values clarification. The other approach, based on the theories of Harvard educator/psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg, is known as cognitive moral development. 8

The plethora of such claims, whether aimed at scholars, practitioners, or laymen, support diverse theoretical positions. Yet, it is the same John Dewey who supposedly justifies them all. That Kohlberg, Raths and Simon and others claim to be arguing from a Deweyan perspective is interesting at best, and dangerously contradictory at worst.
For some unknown reason, many contemporary moral education programs appeal to Dewey in their analyses of what constitutes adequate moral education. Evidently, they feel the need to recognize Dewey as an authority on moral education. Unfortunately no single work or small group of Dewey's works present a unified and comprehensive statement of his own position. Nor does there exist any secondary source which is satisfactory in doing so. The result is that contemporary approaches similarly reflect a piecemeal approach. Each proposal capitalizes on a particular portion of Deweyan thought while ignoring other relevant features. For instance, the Values Clarification model of moral education is based exclusively on Dewey's Theory of Valuation (TV). But in the model, Dewey's metaphysics, epistemology, and prescriptions about actual classroom practice have been overlooked. The result is a bastardized attempt at connecting Deweyan theory and practice.

The Values Clarification brand of relativism has no similarity whatsoever, despite its advocates' claims to the contrary, to a Deweyan view. Similarly, the Cognitive-Developmental model of Lawrence Kohlberg has supported its claim to be Deweyan by placing selected aspects of Dewey's psychology and epistemology against a backdrop of Dewey's one brief and somewhat vague account of moral education (MPE). Kohlbergian advocates incorrectly equate their view concerning stages of moral development with that of Dewey.
while simultaneously claiming to be able to encourage such development within a democratically conceived Deweyan environment. The concept of 'democracy', though, is not the same concept for Dewey and Kohlberg. The Kohlbergian model is closer to Dewey's view than is Values Clarification, but still remains very different in significant ways.

Some theorists who write about moral education have chosen to enter through the "back door" in explaining Deweyan moral education. They tell us what Dewey is not, and conclude by suggesting some "key" which, presumably, will unlock the door of understanding. Israela Ettenberg Aron is of this persuasion. She correctly demonstrates that Dewey is not a formalist, and proposes that gaining an understanding of Dewey's ethical theory will provide the necessary information allowing Deweyan theory to become practicable.

In a different vein, Bernard Rosen capitalizes on Dewey's epistemology. Rosen has developed certain procedural skills to help structure classroom discussions about moral issues. This methodology is consistent with a Deweyan view of how moral knowledge is acquired. However, if Rosen means for his methodology to satisfy requirements of Deweyan moral education, writ large, then he has not achieved his goal.
Although Aron and Rosen are on target in their interpretations of Dewey, their suggestions for classroom application of Deweyan theory are incomplete, at least if these suggestions are meant to be representative of Deweyan moral education. In other words, to attempt an explanation of "practice" in light of an incomplete or non-existent analysis of Dewey's "theory" is insufficient for describing or operating within Dewey's expressed moral education framework. This is the point at which other writers have erred in their analyses of Dewey's views on moral education. Those who have claimed to be "Deweyan" or have "used a Deweyan framework" to create or discuss moral education programs either have not treated Dewey's position as a unified, consistent and comprehensive educational theory, or have not openly announced the ways in which their approaches are and are not Deweyan.

Admittedly, Dewey is not the clearest of writers. Nevertheless, unless Hook is only referring to MPE, we beg to differ with his pronouncement in the "Preface" to that work in which he claims that Dewey gives us no specific practical recommendations for moral education. Dewey has said what constitutes adequate moral education, but his view can be reconstructed only by taking his writings on moral education as a collective whole.

Despite claims to the contrary, there does not exist at present any single approach to moral education which is, in
fact, clearly Deweyan. It may turn out that other approaches are more practicable or adequate than Deweyan moral education, but this is a separate issue. Confronting this latter question rests upon antecedently finding out what Dewey's position actually is. It is imperative that a comprehensive analysis of John Dewey's theory and practice of moral education be provided.

To have Dewey "on your side" is definitely in one's favor these days, a fact due both to the growing interest in moral education and the resurgent interest in Deweyan thought.

Jo Ann Boydston and Kathleen Poulos, writing in Checklist of Writings about John Dewey, remark that "in the eighty-six year period covered by the first edition, more than 2,200 studies were written about Dewey and his work, an average of some twenty-five a year. But in the four years from January 1973 to January 1977, well over 300 items appeared, an average of more than 60 a year. However numbers alone do not tell the whole story of the increasing attention paid to Dewey; the quality and extensiveness of the research and writing also continue to grow." 14

Possibly this growing respect for Deweyan thought coupled with the belief that "John Dewey's theoretical argument for human development as the proper aim of education is not practicable,"15 is part of the underlying motive behind the widespread use and reference to Deweyan theory as a basis for much of present moral education theory.
Hook's "Preface" to MPE calls attention to the fact that Dewey does not clearly lay out directives for moral education, although such education, is, for Dewey, both necessary and inescapable.

But how? He [Dewey] does not say. Can it be done by providing models of behavior, finding and celebrating them in history, art, and literature? Can situations be organized in which individuals can test themselves and learn both from their failures and their unwillingness to risk failure? We still do not know. But Dewey's approach does provide us with insights and principles that undoubtedly will enter into any proposed method of overcoming the gap between the well-intentioned commitment to intelligent policies, and their courageous and effective execution. If knowledge is to make a difference in creating a better world or resisting those forces and individuals whose actions would result in a worse world, education must find the ways. 16

And, in fact, educators have attempted to do so.

What would a Deweyan program of moral education actually look like? What would the curriculum entail? What methodology would be appropriate? The answers to these questions and many others are not given direct and specific answers in Dewey's works. Dewey offered, instead, only guidelines and suggested principles which would help make applicable decisions regarding actual classroom practice.

Dewey's concluding paragraphs in MPE demonstrate that this is the case. No directives are given. However, one is left with the sense that the choice remaining to educators
is not whether or not to engage in the practice of moral education. Rather, Dewey assumed that moral education in schools is unavoidable and suggested that educators must decide the contextual specifics of what and how moral education is to be organized.

What we need in education is a genuine faith in the existence of moral principles which are capable of effective application. We believe, so far as the mass of children are concerned, that if we keep at them long enough we can teach reading and writing and figuring. We are practically, even if unconsciously, skeptical as to the possibility of anything like the same assurance in morals. We believe in moral laws and rules, to be sure, but they are in the air. They are something set off by themselves. They are so very "moral" that they have no working contact with the average affairs of every-day life. These moral principles need to be brought down to the ground through their statement in social and in psychological terms. We need to see that moral principles are not arbitrary, that they are not "transcendental;" that the term "moral" does not designate a special region or portion of life. We need to translate the moral into the impulses and habits of the individual.

All the rest is mint, anise, and cumin. The one thing needful is that we recognize that moral principles are real in the same sense in which other forces are real; that they are inherent in community life, and in the working structure of the individual. If we can secure a genuine faith in this fact, we shall have secured the condition which alone is necessary to get from our educational system all the effectiveness there is in it. The teacher who operates in this faith will find every subject, every method of instruction, every
incident of school life pregnant with moral possibility. In taking Dewey's lead and "operating in this faith," theorists and program designers have created various approaches to moral education. In so doing, many rival and contradictory approaches simultaneously claim to be based upon Deweyan theory.

PURPOSE

The general purpose of this study is to provide a detailed account of Dewey's views on the theory and practice of moral education. The aim is to try to arrive at the most explicit portrayal of the role of the school and its constitutive elements in the activity of moral education.

The task of laying out John Dewey's theory and practice of moral education is a complex one. Not only does it involve explaining the relationship of theory to practice, but it also necessitates giving an account of Dewey's theoretical precepts as well as his practical recommendations.

We will examine a number of questions in detail which address these concerns: how does the school interact with the larger community in terms of moral education? What is the significance of certain of Dewey's theoretical concepts for moral education? How does this theoretical base pertain to and support adequate moral education? What is the nature of the enterprise labeled 'moral education'? Who and what
are the roles of the school players in order that moral education is properly carried out? And, what are the inherent limitations, assumptions, and tasks of moral educators? All of these issues, as well as others, will be addressed in the process of analyzing and synthesizing Dewey's view of moral education.

It is well established that "John Dewey was never well or widely understood." Thus, any attempt to provide yet another analysis of Dewey's thought is an anxiety producing affair. One takes the risk of losing the game called "what John Dewey really meant." It is all too possible to find oneself adding to the wealth of misleading and unfortunate material. By recognizing the relevant material on moral education written by Dewey and his contemporaries, the hope is that this will not happen.

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

Dewey wrote most of his works on education/moral education prior to 1920. After that, his interests shifted as he concentrated more heavily on social theory and politics. This presentation of Dewey's theory and practice of moral education is therefore based primarily upon his earlier writings. Any inconsistencies and developmental changes between these two roughly separated periods will be noted as necessary. The primary goal of this work is not to compare Dewey with contemporary approaches to moral education, even though this is where the
problem and tasks for this study were found. Rather, the scope of this study is limited to giving a descriptive account of Deweyan moral education. Its primary focus is not to criticize Dewey per se, although inconsistencies and problems in his overall view will be noted.

Part of the difficulty of explaining Deweyan theory and practice stems from the fact that Dewey wrote an incredible amount of material, much of it overlapping, and he repeats himself to a considerable extent. Moreover, in many of his forty-four major works and 1100+ articles he at least touches on issues which are germane to moral education. An initial problem for this study was to determine which Deweyan literature and works about Dewey to rely on most heavily. Thus, one limitation is that not everything Dewey wrote about education/schooling/morals will be cited and incorporated.

Although most of this literature has been read in the preparation of the study, a number of choices were made about the use of the material. In general, this study relies most heavily upon and is limited to those works of Dewey's dealing explicitly with moral education. In many instances, related works which have a direct bearing on moral education have also been used in an effort to provide a comprehensive analysis and to give the strongest possible case for Dewey's position. However, there are a number of concepts and theoretical positions which need clarification.
Additional Deweyan sources have been consulted in an effort to gain the clearest and most accurate account. Those works which have figured in most importantly in this study are introduced in the section, "Review of the Literature."

In the process of reviewing fundamental Deweyan theoretical notions, the initial tendency was to attempt a fairly detailed analysis of each individual concept or theoretical position which contributes to an account of Deweyan moral education (including, for instance, experience, ends, ends-in-view, means, will, theories of truth and knowledge, and so on.) An attempt has been made to minimize this initial tendency, and to give only as much information and analysis as is necessary to gain an understanding of Dewey's moral education theory.

** METHODOLOGY **

In order to satisfy adequately the goals and facticities mentioned here, it is necessary to choose methodological tools which are consistent both with an overall Deweyan philosophical position and is explanatorily enlightening. A number of such tools will be employed. In general, the philosophical tools of critical analysis are those which provide the best means to achieve the goal of giving a comprehensive account of Deweyan moral education. These include detecting assumptions, presuppositions, ambiguities, noting inconsistencies and gaps in argument, making distinctions, recognizing claims made in the absence of
supporting evidence, identifying programmatic definitions presented in place of reasoned argument, and so on. Since a large part of this study is descriptive, interpretive reading and historical analysis are used throughout. In order to become clear about relevant Deweyan theoretical concepts and positions, conceptual and argument analyses are also utilized.

The reason for using this particular set of methodological tools is to achieve a better understanding of Dewey's theory of moral education. It should be emphasized that the intent of this dissertation is not to argue for or against a Deweyan version of moral education. The analytic tools chosen will enable us to be critical about Dewey's position on moral education without having to choose sides or advocate a particular point of view.

Throughout the study we use initials to stand for many of the books and articles used repeatedly in the text. This shorthand convention aims to make the study easier to read. Most of the initials are introduced when the work is treated in the "Review of the Literature." All initials of books are underlined, and all initials for articles are not underlined. For a list of all of the initials, the reader is referred to the Appendix.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

In order to gain a clear understanding of Dewey's theory and practice of moral education, it was decided to
concentrate most heavily on works written by Dewey specifically on moral education, as well as on works on this topic written by his contemporaries. However, this set of materials is not exhaustive of the literature used in the preparation of this analysis. The works central to this study will be briefly outlined below. They are divided into the following categories: (1) works specifically on moral education written by Dewey; (2) works by Dewey's contemporaries who worked with him in his schooling experiments; (3) works by Dewey written on education/schooling which have bearing on aspects of moral education; (4) Dewey's major works on subjects other than education/schooling/moral education which provide clarification and fundamental theoretical analysis for terms and concepts glossed over in other contexts; and (5) additional works which report, criticize, editorialize or analyze Deweyan moral education.

Dewey's Works on Moral Education

The only book written explicitly on moral education by Dewey, *Moral Principles in Education*, is Dewey's best known and most frequently cited work on moral education. This slender volume, originally published in 1909, outlines Dewey's fundamental beliefs and provides general guidelines to those concerned to educate students morally. What emerges is the recurring Deweyan theme that moral education is both morally conceived education as well as education of
morals. This work emphasizes the theoretical side of Deweyan moral education and contains very little about actual practice.

"Teaching Ethics in The High School" is one of Dewey's earliest articles specifically concerned with moral education. This 1893 piece describes one way in which discussion about ethical relationships can be conducted, and introduces important points which Dewey subsequently develops in other contexts (that studying ethics will not yield moral individuals, that ethics is not a separate abstract area of study, ethics is a practical phase of life, etc.) Dewey discusses how and why the study of ethical relationships should be the measure against which other subject-matter is evaluated. It is significant that this is one of the few contexts in which it is clear that Dewey is talking specifically about post-elementary school education.

"Chaos in Moral Training" is a 1904 article on moral education, in which Dewey argues that the conduct of moral education has been conducted in the most haphazard of manners, stemming from the belief that such learning "comes by nature." He charges that a major reason for this abhorrent situation is the great gap which exists between theory and practice. This rift is then described, and the claim is put forth that educators do not link together legitimate theoretical views with practice.
Dewey believes that educators may understand in theory that an act has real moral worth only when the reasons behind it are recognized. However, in practice, children are seldom taught that there are reasons behind (moral) actions and are seldom, if ever, given experience in searching for and evaluating these reasons.

Any methodology which sees children as irrational while, at the same time, punishing them on moral grounds for the selfsame acts is, according to Dewey, the "height of theoretical absurdity and of practical confusion." Dewey argues that an unfortunate assumption made by educators is that children should know prior to instruction what they ought and ought not do. If this were really the case, there would be no need for formal or informal moral education.

Dewey concludes with a plea to those involved in the moral training of youth that they realize that they do have moral theories. He further suggests that they would do justice both to students and to themselves by acknowledging this fact and testing these moral theories in actual practice.

"Moral Theory and Practice" is one of Dewey's earliest articles (1891). He outlines the constitution of moral theory and the relationship between moral theory and moral practice. Although the article does not speak directly to the subject of moral education, there is much contained in this paper which is relevant to Deweyan moral education.
Dewey equates moral theory both with moral insight and ordinary intelligence, and claims that all acts (excluding those blindly performed) are based upon theory, which is defined as "what is to be done." Dewey talks about theories as rules of action and claims that theory and practice are only separated by degree, not in kind. This, it should be noted, is one of the few contexts in which Dewey explicitly addresses the relationship between moral theory and practice.

"Ethical Principles Underlying Education" (EPUE) is an 1897 version of MPE. Consequently, much of the content is identical to that of the 1909 work. Dewey also introduces themes which emerge more fully in his two China lectures on moral education. Dewey's main point is to separate ethical theory, as it applies to education, into two distinct but not exclusive realms: the social and the psychological. Dewey discusses the ethical responsibility of the school as well as principles regarding methodology and choice of subject-matter. Also outlined are the aims of moral education, and what results would obtain if such education were successful.

"The Moral Significance of the Common School Studies" (1909) was initially delivered to the Northern Illinois Teacher's Association November meeting, at a general session, under the title "Moral and Religious Training in the Public Schools." The article was published in the same
year as was MPE and Dewey intended this article to be understood in the context of MPE. Dewey focuses on the subject-matter present in the common schools, how it had been misused, and how it should be properly employed as subject-matter for positive moral instruction. In general, Dewey argues that it is detrimental to pick out specific moral lessons or individuals of superior character from subject-matter and overtly stress the moral significance for students. This task violates the student's personality, preferences and ability to reason as an individual. Dewey believes that most literature contains its own internal moral content and, if carefully chosen, the material will speak for itself without the teacher choosing a particular moral lesson and highlighting it. Dewey argues that literature has been both overused and misused for moral instruction. In its stead, Dewey places history. He believes that this subject provides the best means for moral learning. He also claims that mathematics and science as method have potential moral worth, if students are made to see their social value.

Two lectures concerned specifically with moral education were presented by Dewey in China in 1920, but were not published until 1973. "Moral Education/The Individual Aspect" is the first of these lectures. Dewey's main point is that knowledge and conduct are interrelated. Only by teaching with this integration in mind can effective
personalities be created. He also claims that the problem of moral education ought to be attacked by devoting attention to those subjects directly concerned with life, rather than to abstract subject-matter.

The second China article, "Moral Education/The Social Aspects," expands many of the principles raised in the first lecture. Dewey reviews the three moral qualities which should be cultivated in each person (open-mindedness, intellectual honesty, and responsibility,) and uses these qualities to demonstrate the oft-repeated Deweyan principle that the aim of education is the same as the social.

Thus, "[w]hatever education facilitates the foundation of social habits, effort, and emotion is moral education." He also claims that the problems of democracy and those of moral education are essentially the same.

"Character Training for Youth," is one of the last articles Dewey wrote explicitly on moral education. In this 1934 piece Dewey defends moral education, speaking to the charge that in some ways schools are unsuccessful in promoting moral education. Dewey answers the accusation by claiming that schools are but one agency for moral education. Since moral education takes place every waking minute of every day without exception, the influence of the school is relatively slight.

Dewey outlines the meaning of character and suggests that moral character is formed rather than taught.
Consequently, in order to ensure that youth are properly educated, the environments in which they spend their time should be conducive to reaching such goals. Dewey asserts that the most powerful factor in shaping character is "the concrete state of social relations and activities," and schools, as noted above, are only one among many of these factors.

In order of importance, for Dewey the four most important changes necessary for improving the quality of character education are: (1) general socio-economic change; (2) parental education regarding rudimentary child psychology; (3) realization and incorporation of the two dominant impulses of youth (activity and collective association); and (4) organization of schools on a social basis. Dewey concludes by proclaiming that separate courses in ethics will have little or no positive effect on the development of character. Schooling ought not be isolated from or concerned with moral issues apart from actual social life.

Works by Deweyan Contemporaries

Two books which provide the greatest amount of material about actual schooling practice, including moral education, are Schools of Tomorrow (ST) and The Dewey School (DS). These works present a concise, authentic picture of Deweyan moral education in action. ST, a 1915 work, contains theoretical analyses (written by Dewey), and accompanying
descriptions of actual schools exhibiting what Dewey advocates theoretically. These school programs are described in detail by Dewey's daughter, Evelyn. They demonstrate how the selected schools have put Deweyan theory into practice and how each school has successfully made this translation in distinct and appropriate ways in the individual contextual circumstances:

We have tried to show what actually happens when schools start out to put into practice each in its own way some of the theories that have been pointed to as the soundest and best ever since Plato, to be then laid politely away as precious portions of our 'intellectual heritage'. 39

DS contains a wealth of description both of theory and of the practice of education/moral education in The University of Chicago Laboratory School, affectionately called "The Dewey School." This work compliments and supports ST, since it is a careful and detailed account of the principles and practices of each level of schooling offered at the Laboratory School. This 1936 work was written by two of the Laboratory School teachers, Anna Camp Edwards and Katherine Camp Mayhew. Although Dewey had little, if any, hand in the writing of this work, it can nonetheless be assumed to be authentic Deweyan theory and practice. The brief introduction is written by Dewey, and his endorsement and unconditional support of the contents are unmistakable.
The account of the Laboratory School contained in these pages that follow is so adequate as to render it unnecessary for me to add anything to what is said about its origin, aims, and methods. 40

"The School and The Practice of Ethics," 41 by Ella Flagg Young, is an illuminating article on some of the theoretical and practical concerns of moral education. Given at the forty-sixth annual National Education Association meeting in 1908, it provides a useful insight into Deweyan moral education.

Young, a colleague of Dewey's, a professor of education and other than his wife the most influential woman in Dewey's world, was hand-picked by Dewey to be the principal of the Chicago Normal School at the time when "The School and The Practice of Ethics" was given. From 1909 until 1915, she served as superintendent of the Chicago school system.

Dewey repeatedly praised and endorsed Young's ideas. He claimed to have relied heavily upon her insightful educational views and followed, rather than led, her in forming his own positions on many aspects of the schooling enterprise. 42 Young wrote widely on education and her work is demonstrably Deweyan. Except for stylistic differences in composition, Young and Dewey make many identical claims and support similar positions.

Young argues in favor of developing the power of ethical judgment in children. She provides concrete examples of how
Like Dewey, she argues in favor of democratically organized schools and "growth" as the ultimate goal of (ethical) education. She also claims that ethical knowledge is not "intuitive" and thus should be taught carefully and through practice, just as is other factual subject matter.

Additional Works by Dewey on Education/Schooling

"The Ethics of Democracy," is one of the first articles Dewey wrote on the concept and nature of democracy. In this 1888 article, Dewey offers a view of democracy as "the one, the ultimate ethical ideal of humanity" which institutions should strive to embody. Many themes are introduced which appear in later writings on education, and specifically on moral education (the relationship of the individual to the social setting, the will of the community, the unity of purpose and interest, and so on). This article is significant for an understanding of Dewey's views on moral education, since in it he establishes his political and social biases toward a particular undergirding framework upon which educational theory and practice should be built.

"Interest in Relation to Training of the Will" (IRTW), written in 1896, is an early version of Dewey's subsequent Interest and Effort in Education. IRTW highlights aspects germain to the development of "will" or "character" (moral training) having to do with the concepts 'interest' and 'effort'. The focus of this article, however, is on these
concepts rather than on moral training. Dewey demonstrates how others' views of interest and effort are operatively harmful to the moral development of children, and discusses certain fallacious dichotomies which have emerged from these theories. Following this critical analysis, Dewey describes the nature of 'interest' and 'effort' and argues for their positive interrelationship. Dewey describes the psychology of interest, discussing the objective as well as the emotional phases, and claims that interest obtains only when there is unity of self and object. Dewey also touches upon interest and effort in relation to desire, impulse, emotion and discipline, which are all important concepts in Deweyan moral education.

"My Pedagogic Creed,"47 (PC) of 1897 is a profoundly revealing statement of Dewey's fundamental beliefs relating to education. He outlines many of his basic notions about the school, discusses its mission in society, and offers specific statements about particular features of the schooling enterprise (such as goals, teacher roles, subject-matter, methodology, and so on). Dewey specifically touches on moral education in this article. His comments on moral education in this article, coupled with the remainder of the contents in the statement of creed, provide a skeletal portrayal of elements necessary in understanding Dewey's views on moral education.
The Child and the Curriculum, (CC) published in 1902, and The School and Society, (SS) published in 1899, are now combined in a single volume despite the fact that each was originally a separate lecture series given by Dewey to describe the Laboratory School to parents for the purpose of raising money. These two lecture series, taken together, provide an informative overview of the activities and governing principles of the Laboratory School. In SS, Dewey introduces the four "instincts" of children (social instinct and expression, instinct of making, instinct of investigation, and artistic instinct) and claims that they are also interests which are natural resources to tap in creating appropriate level educational programs. Dewey uses specific examples of student activities to illustrate general points of emphasis. His statements and examples parallel and confirm the content of Mayhew and Edward's account of the activities and theoretical underpinnings of the Dewey School. Together these works illustrate how school activities are structured to achieve academic, social, moral, and individual student development.

Many of Dewey's articles on the moral aspects of schooling refer to the social nature of the educational enterprise. One article in particular, "The School as Social Centre," 1902, examplifies the degree to which Dewey uses the terms 'social' and 'moral' interchangeably. This article and numerous others could just as accurately
have been titled, "The School as Moral Centre." In this article Dewey offers definitions for 'state', 'society', and 'citizenship'. His formulations of these concepts support his argument that agencies which have historically served as moralizing forces have broken down in modern society. As such, the school community is potentially a vital social and moral force. Dewey claims that modern man lives in an age of applied science, an age in which social, economic, and intellectual conditions change constantly and rapidly. This implies that the education of children must be adapted to coincide with, as well as to recognize, these realities. Similarly, Dewey argues "that recreation is the most overlooked and neglected of all ethical forces" and ought to be used as a positive moral influence in the organization of educational programs.

"Religion and our Schools" is a short article published in 1908 in which Dewey states his position on religion and its place in schools. Much of the content of this article is in the context of the Platonic question, "Can virtue be taught?" By defining knowledge as "the conversion of character to the good," Dewey links his notion of religion with those of knowledge and virtue. Dewey further defines religion as social unification. Understood in this way, "it is a natural expression of human experience" which has an important place, and role to play, in America's democratic schools. But Dewey argues
against teaching religion as dogma since having to choose a particular dogmatic faith or separating children into religious groups in school would be a divisive force working against social unification. Dewey also admits that he may be advocating a position which supports the decline of organized "spiritualism," but he maintains that this is for the best because this position is nevertheless supportive of the religiosity and "spiritual import of experience."  

*Interest and Effort in Education* (IEE), published in 1913, is a lengthier version of IRTW. Dewey expands the focus of moral education to include all of education. Central to Dewey's theory of experience, and more important, to his theory of educational experience, are the concepts 'interest' and 'effort'. Interest is conceived of as unified activity and effort, not as mere strain but as the "peculiar combination of conflicting tendencies." Interest/effort provides the necessary continuity of activity, and is thoroughly analyzed in this work. Dewey ties these concepts to other important educational concepts such as 'growth', 'desire', 'ends', and 'activity'. The content in IEE is important because it is basic to a clear understanding of Deweyan moral education.

*Democracy and Education*\(^{57}\) (DE), published in 1916, is Dewey's lengthy and definitive treatise on education. Most, if not all, of Dewey's fundamental concepts and principles which have a bearing on education are introduced. Although
many of these concepts are more fully developed in other works (e.g., interest, effort, and moral principles) the subject-matter in DE is presented to gain a unified or whole picture of Deweyan education.

Dewey outlines what he takes to be necessary in order that learning be progressive, moral, and democratic. He discusses the nature of important educational concepts such as 'aims', 'subject-matter', 'interest', 'effort', 'development', and 'growth'. Dewey claims that these concepts provide the foundation for establishing educational experiences, which include moral educational experiences.

It is important to mention in passing that DE relies heavily on Dewey's theory of experience, since education is defined in terms of experience. This point will be expanded upon in Chapter Two, in which the relevance of Dewey's theory of experience to education in general, and moral education in particular, will be explicated.

*Experience and Education* (EE) is a concise and mature (1938) statement of Dewey's ideas on education. Traditional and progressive education are compared in order to outline the conditions necessary for realizing adequate educational programs, and many themes and concepts introduced in earlier works are reemphasized. As in DE, experience plays a critical role in Dewey's overall position. He argues that the two principles of continuity and interaction are
critical and necessary criteria of experience and must be included in any viable conception of education.

The section on "Social Control" has important implications for moral education as well as for education in general. Dewey speaks of individual freedom and social control as two equally important aims of education and expounds on the value of using these aims as governing principles.

Dewey's Works Containing Theoretical Background Analysis

Two works written in the last decade of the past century, Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics\(^{59}\) (1891) and The Study of Ethics: A Syllabus\(^{60}\) (1894) provide the first versions of Dewey's ethics. Of particular interest is the treatment of "conduct" and "character" in addition to the introduction and explanation of "the ethical postulate."\(^{61}\) Although sketchy and rudimentary, these two outlines provide an initial glimpse at Dewey's early ethical position and his criticisms of other theorists (Utilitarians, Kantians, and Hedonists). Also evident is the degree to which Dewey is a proponent of the Aristotelean view that moral knowledge/character is acquired through habituation.

"Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality"\(^{62}\) (LCSTM), published in 1903, is a complex and technical article concerning the nature of morality and justifying its categorization as a "science." Throughout the
article Dewey refers to "moral experience" and "the continuity of moral experience." Thus, the contents of this article have important contributions to make toward understanding Dewey's underlying theory of moral experience. First, the contents establish that Dewey has a theory of moral experience, and second, the article provides some insight into what constitutes moral experience.

Ethics (1908) and the revised version is Dewey's main treatise on ethics. Written with James Tufts, this work traces historical developments in ethics as well as outlines fundamental meta-ethical notions (the right, the good, duty, obligation, responsibility, and so on). Dewey is known to have authored section two of this large work. This section was extracted from the revised version and reprinted in 1960 as a separate volume entitled, Theory of Moral Life (TML), with a new introduction by Arnold Isenberg Stanford. TML holds special significance for Dewey's views on moral education since it outlines the nature of moral theory as well as the relevant epistemology of the moral domain, both of which must be taken into account when outlining a Deweyan version of moral education. Dewey also touches on the moral ends toward which men should strive. Hence, TML provides useful theoretical background for Dewey's ethical and epistemological views.

Reconstruction in Philosophy (RP), published in 1920, outlines Dewey's basic version of philosophical
reconstruction. The "basic postulate of the text" is that the subject-matter of philosophy arises out of the stress and strain of life in communities with specific problems varying with contextual and temporal changes in human life. Dewey describes this reconstruction by demonstrating the shortcomings of alternative conceptions of the role and method of philosophy, and shows how this reconstruction will liberate man from the bondage of acting from false conceptions of reason and reality.

Dewey further describes how the reconstruction will effect education, morality, logic, science, experiences, reason, and so on. Dewey reiterates many important points made in DE and MPE which have direct bearing on moral education. For example, growth as the ultimate end of education is confirmed, and he equates the educative process with the moral process, implying that moral education is morally conceived rather than merely the education of morals.

*Human Nature and Conduct* (HNC), is Dewey's 1922 treatise on the nature and importance of human conduct. This work provides many of the fundamental concepts important for understanding moral conduct. Foremost are the roles which habit, impulse, and intelligence play in human affairs. Dewey considered this text to be a contribution to ethics, and it is a central work in understanding the nature and value of Deweyan moral education.
In the "Introduction" Dewey claims that "all conduct is interaction between elements of human nature and the environment, natural and social," and regards the progress of humanity as contingent upon "the establishment of arts of education and social guidance." HNC provides a conceptual framework for creating both the education of morals and morally conceived education.

The Public and Its Problems (PP), published originally in 1927 and reissued in 1946 with an "Afterword," is Dewey's fundamental work on sociology. In it he lays out the nature of the public, society, community, state, and the democratic state. Since in other educational works Dewey states that schools are instruments of the society expected to ensure that knowledge, morality, and the culture of the society are learned, Dewey's analysis in PP cannot be ignored in our explication of Deweyan moral education. Of special interest for this study is his treatment of the relationship between the individual and the group, as well as his analysis of the relationships among community, democracy, and society.

Experience and Nature (EN), published in 1929, is the definitive account of Dewey's metaphysics and is considered to be Dewey's most fundamental and exhaustive philosophical work. It has been claimed that all aspects of Dewey's philosophical views on education can be reduced to his theory of experience, which is outlined in detail in EN.
Whether or not this is in fact the case, any analysis of Dewey's educational theory and practice, including moral education, would be incomplete without considering his theory of experience.

The Sources of a Science of Education\(^\text{78}\) (SSE) is a 1929 work defending and advocating the conception of education as a fully developed science. For Dewey, a science of education holds the method of intelligence supreme for furthering the goals of education: growth and continued education. Dewey conceives of education as an endless circle or spiral "which includes science within itself."\(^\text{79}\) Scientific method, as opposed to substantive material, is argued to be both process and product of the highest value for any design of education. It should be noted that this position is consistent with Dewey's denial that moral education includes the acceptance of established moral rules to guide action. Rather, hypotheses/theories/rules for action must be formed out of the individual needs and circumstances of the problem situation in order to effectively guide action.

The Quest for Certainty\(^\text{80}\) (QC) is Dewey's most complete epistemological account. Also published in 1929, this work is "a study of the relation of knowledge and action."\(^\text{81}\) Dewey speaks about the relationships among theory, practice, knowledge, and action in an effort to expose misconceptions about dualisms or dichotomies basic in traditional views.
The subject-matter of QC is central to an understanding of Dewey's educational views. The nature and role of knowledge must be understood if the contents of educational programs are to coincide with that theory. Similarly, one must understand the nature and interrelationship between theory and practice prior to gaining any reasonable understanding of the relationship between moral educational theory and practice.

*How We Think*[^2] (HWT), initially published in 1910 and significantly revised in 1933, is Dewey's most well known and often quoted treatise on the nature of scientific/reflective thought as it applies to schooling. The work is divided into three major sections[^3] which collectively explain Dewey's view of the nature of scientific method and how and why schools should engage in the process of training children to think reflectively.

HWT is particularly important for our purposes for two reasons. First, the five phase process of reflective thought is carefully and explicitly described in the context of schooling rather than in areas such as sociology, psychology, politics, art, and so on. Second, Dewey repeatedly indicates that reflective thinking is applicable to both intellectual and moral matters.

*A Common Faith*[^4] (CF) is Dewey's 1934 statement on religion. Dewey carefully distinguishes between "religion" and "the religious." The importance of this work rests on a
comprehension of Dewey's view of religion as a set of dogmatic beliefs and practices. Dewey advocates "the emancipation of the religious from religion." The religious attitude Dewey endorses is a belief in "the common and natural relations of mankind." This religious attitude and conviction is separate from metaphysically based religions which, for Dewey, are formed out of cult and superstition.

Hence, Deweyan religion is a faith in the methods of science and intelligent inquiry, and CF is a corrective for accounts of Deweyan moral education which claim that Dewey endorses the teaching of religion as dogma. Often Dewey exhibits a religious attitude toward moral education, but this must not be confused with religion as a body of beliefs and practices.

Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, (LTI) is Dewey's major treatise on the science of inquiry. This 1938 work provides background information and analysis pertinent to the subject/theory of scientific method. Since much of what Dewey advocates for classroom methodology centers on the use and understanding of the method of intelligence, the substance of this work is central to Dewey's views on moral education. Of special interest is the detailed analysis of the nature of a "problem situation." This subject is vital for Deweyan moral education because much of what Dewey
claims to be morally educative begins with the recognition and treatment of problem situations.

Theory of Valuation (TV), published in 1939 for the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, is a thoroughgoing, explicit account of the nature and method of making value judgments. This work is of particular interest for moral education for the following reasons. Part of what Dewey holds to be moral education of children involves the progressive development of the ability to make intelligent moral judgments. In TV, Dewey implicitly equates value judgment with moral judgment even though a useful distinction can be made between moral judgments and some nonmoral judgments. Moreover, TV is Dewey's most concise and detailed account of the epistemology of values, and includes both the nature and process of making reasoned valuations.

Values Clarification advocates cite TV as being the basis and justification for their approach and methodology of moral education. Not only do the Values Clarification proponents misinterpret TV, but they also ignore other Deweyan sources which serve to demonstrate that Deweyan moral education includes far more than learning the process of valuing.
Additional Works Germain to Moral Education by Authors Other than Dewey

Jesse H. Newlon, superintendent of the Denver Public Schools, "was one of the first heads of a large school system to apply extensively the ideas and ideals of John Dewey." Newlon delivered one of a series of papers given to honor Dewey on the occasion of his 70th birthday. By the time of this 1929 celebration, Newlon was a professor of education and Director of the Lincoln School of Teachers College, Columbia University.

Newlon's address, "John Dewey's Influence in the schools," is relevant to this study of Dewey's views on moral education for the following reason. Newlon characterizes "four main principles underlying the Dewey philosophy." These four principles involve: recognizing the nature and needs of the child, recognizing that education is the process of experiencing, recognizing the doctrine of interest and effort, and recognizing the school as a social institution. These principles form part of the basis upon which Newlon claims that "in no field, [than in moral education] in my judgment has Dewey exerted greater influence."

Newlon devotes a major section of his address to how and why Dewey influenced the direction of moral education in schools and provides an account of how Dewey's "doctrine of moral education" influenced religious education. For
these reasons Newlon's article provides a statement of confirmation and parallel analysis to Dewey's own account of moral education.

"John Dewey and Moral Education," by Martin J. Smith, is a 1939 dissertation written to give an exhaustive account of the principles underlying Deweyan moral education.

The following study is an attempt to make clear the philosophical principles underlying John Dewey's moral theory with a special reference to their application in moral education. 98

Unfortunately, this goal is not satisfactorily reached since there is little if any application made to educational practice. Moreover, the recommendations Smith does give cannot be accepted as reasonable due to his underlying negative biases toward a Deweyan position:

Once we have realized the false and insecure bases for morality afforded by a philosophy of experimentalism, we can understand the chaotic state of character education in the public school system of this country. 99

Although in recent years there have been a number of dissertations written on Deweyan moral theory/education, Smith's work is the only one concerned exclusively with Dewey rather than with using Dewey to compare or contrast other contemporary positions on moral development/theory/education. 100

In Education and Morals (1950) John L. Childs expounds the doctrines of progressivism. Writing on morals
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in the spirit of Dewey, Childs endorses the view that "from the standpoint of the education of young, democracy is the most significant pattern of American Life"\textsuperscript{102} and:

that something of enduring worth was contributed by those who conceived education as a process of continuous reconstruction of experiences' that results in the achievement of new meanings and greater powers of control. \textsuperscript{103}

Childs dedicated this work to Dewey and William H. Kilpatrick, but was careful to state that the characterization of "The Moral Nature of Deliberate Education" and "Education and the Values of Democratic Civilization" is entirely his own:

With their consent, I have dedicated this book to John Dewey and William H. Kilpatrick, two former teachers of mine. I have gained much from their teachings, and I am confident that both American democracy and American education are in a stronger position because of their pioneer work in education. Responsibility, however, for the views developed in this book rests solely with me; not even pragmatists can be held responsible for the consequences of their teachings in the minds of those who study with them. \textsuperscript{104}

It might appear that Childs is just being modest in stating his desire to accept responsibility for the book, and that the position is really that of Dewey's. In two letters to Boyd Bode,\textsuperscript{105} however, Dewey dispells any such notion. Dewey criticizes Childs' position and states that his own position is different so much so that Dewey had
difficulty in believing that many persons will take Child's (sic) statements as representing my views while they may induce some to give up their glib 'child centered' (sic) interpretations. 106

Education and Morals is important as background for the kind of overall social scheme and perspective characteristic of progressivism or the experimentalist philosophical position. This work should not be ignored entirely in giving an account of Deweyan moral education, but Childs' claims cannot be taken as representative of a Deweyan view either.

Public Schools and Moral Education. The Influence of Horace Mann, William T. Harris and John Dewey,107 is a 1958 book by Neil Gerard McCluskey, S. J., which was originally written as a doctoral dissertation. The final four chapters provide a useful critical analysis of Dewey's theory and practice of moral education. McCluskey provides a descriptive analysis of Dewey's position on moral education in the schools as well as to form conclusions about the genesis and future directions of moral education from Horace Mann through Dewey. The greatest contribution this work has to offer to our analysis lies in the descriptive portions of the work. Unfortunately, McCluskey suffers from a clerical bias and makes some fundamental mistakes in characterizing the Deweyan view. Most importantly, McCluskey claims that "the words, 'social', 'religious', 'ethical', and 'moral' were used by Dewey interchangeably."108 This leads
McCluskey to equivocate the terms 'values' and 'religious'. McCluskey suggests that when Dewey wrote about moral education, religious education was somehow a part of the enterprise.

McCluskey's final conclusions have to do with blaming Mann, Harris, and Dewey for the demise and the then nonexistence of programs in religious education in public schools. As noted above, when McCluskey presents Deweyan description, much of his analysis is consistent with our present study. Additionally his work is useful for the bibliographic citations, for it is based on a wider range of Deweyan works than other descriptive analyses of Dewey's positions used in our study. However, since only a third of the book is devoted to Dewey, coupled with McCluskey's religious bias, *Public Schools and Moral Education* cannot be taken as giving a definitive account of Deweyan moral education.

*The Moral Writings of John Dewey*, edited by James Gouinlock, is a 1976 edition of selections of Dewey's writings on moral philosophy. Except for the "Introduction," all the selections come from Dewey's major works. Gouinlock chose portions of Deweyan literature which he held to be essential for gaining an understanding of Dewey's moral philosophical position.

It is Gouinlock's "Introduction" that is the most important part of *The Moral Writings of John Dewey* for our
analysis of Dewey's views on moral education, since he provides an accomplished, concise summary of Dewey's major ideas relevant to moral philosophy. Gouinlock successfully brings together the basic Deweyan concepts and principles central to an understanding of Deweyan moral philosophy. His rendition is the best summary description of Dewey's moral philosophical position currently available.

"John Dewey and Moral Education"\textsuperscript{111} is a 1976 article by Maxine Greene. This work offers a brief perspective on some of the important aspects of Deweyan moral education. Greene acknowledges that both Kohlbergians and Values Clarificationists claim to be descendants of Dewey. She presents a brief account of the similarities found in Dewey's position on development and Kohlberg's stage schema, and makes other generalizations about Deweyan moral education. She singles out the concepts of 'willing' and 'choosing' in the process of engaging in moral inquiries as those having most relevance to the problem of moral education,\textsuperscript{112} but does not develop this intricate and potentially confusing claim. In general, Greene's characterization of Dewey's position is on target, but the brevity of the article militates against it being very helpful in this study.

"John Dewey and Character Education,"\textsuperscript{113} by Jeanne Pietig, is a 1976 article outlining the differences between a Deweyan version of moral education and other character
education programs contemporary with Dewey. The distinction drawn between so-called direct and indirect programs in character education and the demonstration made of how Dewey departs from these two perspectives are useful. Pietig stresses the fact that Dewey's comments on moral education were simultaneously recommendations for school and social reform. She does not, however, indicate whether or not Dewey's recommendations for moral education, proffered after his early article "Teaching Ethics in the High School," referred to high school as well as elementary school education. Moreover, Pietig recognizes an important distinction often missed by others. She speaks of Dewey's moral education theory in such a way as to suggest that there is an important distinction to be made between the practice of moral education and the theoretical basis on which the practice rests. This distinction will be clarified and expanded upon in subsequent portions of this study.

Two articles by Isreala Ettenberg Aron, "Moral Philosophy and Moral Education II. The Formalist Tradition and the Deweyan Alternative," and "Moral Education The Formalist Tradition and The Deweyan Alternative," characterize problems stemming from accepting the formalistic tradition in meta-ethics as a basis for creating programs in moral education. In both articles Aron argues that the formalist tradition endorses problematic
dichotomies such as meta-ethics and normative ethics, form and content of moral judgment making, prescription and description, fact and value, ideal and real, and individual and social decision making. As an alternative to creating programs in moral education based upon the formalist tradition, Aron suggests that Deweyan ethical theory be reexamined and considered as a basis for designing moral programs "since it has a great deal to contribute to values education, being strongest in precisely those areas in which the formalist tradition is weakest." 116

Aron presents a concise description of those portions of Dewey's ethical theory which have direct bearing on the exercise of practical deliberation. This, she claims, has the most bearing on creating so-called Deweyan programs in moral education. In the first of the two articles, Aron makes general suggestions about the use of specific curricular materials helpful in enacting a Deweyan version of moral education. In the second article, she provides a more detailed account of which specific materials would be of greatest value and she also specifically characterizes Deweyan moral education as "the teaching of deliberation." 117

Both of these articles contain final sections titled "Limitations of the Deweyan Approach," but Aron's account of the shortcomings is highly misleading. Because she describes Dewey's view exclusively as "moral education"
rather than moral education in addition to morally conceived education, she makes the charge that Dewey's view endorses individual relativism. She completely ignores Dewey's implicit endorsement of moral education as socialization and the view that values and moral judgments are formed, in part, out of a shared community of interests. Like the Kohlbergians and Values Clarification advocates, Aron's articles are based on a piecemeal analysis of Deweyan moral education.

ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

This study is divided into five chapters. This first chapter has outlined the problem and content of the study as well as provided a review of the most relevant literature used in this study of Deweyan moral education. Chapter Two presents the thesis that Dewey has no theory of education but only a theory of experience. From this hypothesis an analysis of Dewey's theory of experience is presented, and the reductionist view is considered in light of the analysis of Dewey's theory of experience. The conclusion is that further analysis of Dewey's formulation of qualities and categories of experience is needed before an evaluation of the adequacy of the reductionist view is made. Hence, the chapter includes a demonstration that Dewey separates different kinds of experience and thus the reductionist view is inadequate for pedagogical reasons. The second chapter ends by distinguishing between educational experience and
mis-educational experience. Chapter Three fleshes out Dewey's theory of morals and moral experience as it applies to the practice of moral education. Chapter Four discusses the relationship between the theory of moral experience and the practice of moral education and presents illustrations of the actual practice of moral education as recommended by Dewey and his colleagues with whom he worked closely. Chapter Five summarizes the major findings of the study, draws conclusions, and makes recommendations for future research related to the theory and practice of Deweyan moral education.
CHAPTER NOTES


2. Ibid.


6. Ibid., p. 296.


10. For one example of Deweyan 'democracy' equated with the Kohlbergian notion of a 'just community', see Lawrence R. Kohlberg, "This Special Section in Perspective," Social Education 40, 4 (April 1976): 213-215.


48


17. Ibid., pp. 57-58.


19. This can be seen merely by reviewing the nature of his writings prior to 1920 and after that time. This 1920 date is a rough estimation of a separation between his earlier writings and those of his later years.


22. Ibid., p. 116.


24. Ibid., p. 97.


27. Ibid., p. 209. Dewey includes a footnote stating this fact: "From this point on, this paper follows the lines of my Moral Principles in Education, pp. 32-43..."


29. Ibid., p. 293.

30. Ibid., p. 288.


32. Ibid., p. 295.

33. Ibid., pp. 298.

34. Ibid., p. 299.


36. Ibid., p. 141.


42. Two examples of Dewey's giving praise and recognizing Ella Flagg Young are "Professor Ella F. Young's Scientific Method in Education (University of Chicago Decennial Publications) is a noteworthy development of this conception, to which I am much indebted." from John Dewey, "The Relation of Theory to Practice in Education," 1904, in Boydston, *John Dewey The Middle Works 1899-1924*, vol. 3, p. 263, and in the "Preface" of John Dewey, *How We Think*, 2nd rev. ed. (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company, 1933), Dewey recognizes and praises Young highly: "It is hardly necessary to enumerate the authors to whom I am indebted. My fundamental indebtedness is to my wife, by whom the ideas of this book were inspired, and through whose work in connection with the Laboratory School, existing in Chicago between 1896 and 1903, the ideas attained such concreteness as comes from embodiment and testing in practice. It is a pleasure also, to acknowledge indebtedness to the intelligence and sympathy of those who cooperated as teachers and supervisors in the conduct of that school, and especially to Mrs. Ella Flagg Young, then a colleague in the University, and now Superintendent of the Schools of Chicago."


44. Ibid., p. 248.


49. Ibid., pp. 43-47.


51. Ibid., p. 91.


53. Ibid., p. 176.

54. Ibid., p. 166.

55. Ibid., p. 170.


61. Ibid., pp. 233-234.


64. Ibid., p. 5 and 39.


69. Ibid., p. v.

70. Ibid., p 183.


72. Ibid., p. 10.

73. Ibid.


75. See for example, *Moral Principles in Education*, p. 7, or "Educational Principles Underlying Education," p. 10 for statements of this sort.


79. Ibid., p. 77.


81. Ibid., title page.

82. Dewey, *How We Think*.


85. Ibid., p. 27.
86. Ibid.


92. Ibid., p. 39.

93. Ibid., p. 40.

94. Ibid., p. 42.

95. Ibid., p. 48.

96. Ibid., p. 49.


98. Ibid., p. 1.

99. Ibid.


102. Ibid., p. vii.

103. Ibid., p. viii.
104. Ibid., p. x.


106. Ibid., p. 1.


108. Ibid., p. 233.


112. Ibid., pp. 19-20.


CHAPTER TWO

THEORY OF EXPERIENCE

INTRODUCTION

Whatever education facilitates the formation of social habits, effort, and emotion is moral education. 1

Moral education of our children is in fact going on all the time, every waking hour of the day and three hundred and sixty-five days a year. Every influence that modifies the disposition and habits, the desires and thoughts of a child is a part of the development of his character....Every experience a child has, especially if his emotions are enlisted, leaves an impress upon character. 2

These comments, although accurate generalizations and summary descriptions of Dewey's portrayal of moral education, are relatively meaningless without an understanding of what he meant by 'education'. Dewey provides

a technical definition of education: It is that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience. 3

Although the above definition is helpful, we are still unable to make cogent sense out of what, for Dewey, would
count as education or an educational experience beyond the point that, apparently, the meaning of education has some very close connection to Dewey's theory of experience. As was suggested in the introductory chapter, gaining an understanding of Dewey's position on the theory and practice of moral education hinges upon first having a clear picture of what counts as an educational experience.

Donald Vandenberg claims that Dewey does not have an educational theory but does have a theory of experience into which his views on education can be reduced. This is debatable, but without question it is a viable interpretation. "At the heart of Dewey's theory is the definition of education as the reconstruction of experience." Vandenberg cites several crucial passages from DE to illustrate that Dewey's explanation and definition of education is equated with the concept of 'growth', and additionally with "the reconstruction of experience." To quote Dewey,

the ideal of growth results in the conception that education is a constant reorganizing or reconstructing of experience. It has all the time an immediate end, and so far as activity is educative, it reaches that end—the direct transformation of the quality of experience. Infancy, youth, adult life,—all stand on the same educative level in the sense that what is really learned at any and every stage of experience constitutes the value of that experience, and in the sense that it is the chief business of life at every point to make living thus contribute to an enrichment of its own perceptible meaning.
Here, Dewey does define education in terms of experience and not the reverse.

Whether or not we confirm Vandenberg's reductionist thesis, it is undeniable that Dewey's theory of experience figures prominently in his philosophic views, writ large. It is noteworthy, for example, that three of his major works include the word 'experience' in the title: *Experience and Nature*, *Experience and Education*, and *Art as Experience*. Dewey is a philosopher of experience, and in *DE* he defines education in terms of experience.

Hence, before we can begin to consider what Dewey's theory of moral education entails, we need to investigate the constitution of Dewey's theory of education. According to Vandenberg, this involves backing up one step and analyzing Dewey's theory of experience. Vandenberg would have us believe that any clear comprehension of Dewey's position and portrayal of education, and of moral education in particular, rests upon having a solid understanding of Dewey's theory of experience. Once we understand Dewey's theory of experience, Vandenberg argues, we will understand the Deweyan theory of education in general, and moral education in particular.

Clearly, there is an important relationship between education, moral education, and Dewey's theory of experience. We see this in Dewey's descriptions of all
aspects of the educational enterprise. He consistently intermingles the terms 'education', 'experience', 'moral education', 'moral experience', and 'reconstruction of experience', and Vandenberg points out many of these passages in his critique. Thus in part, the goal of this chapter is to discover what constitutes this seemingly complicated relationship between education, moral education and experience. Vandenberg provides one kind of explanation, but neither the only one possible, nor the most viable.

If we follow Vandenberg's advice, we should be able to explain Deweyan moral education theory in terms of Dewey's theory of experience. This would make our task of explaining Dewey's theory of moral education neatly packagable, and we would be able to easily summarize Dewey's moral education theory at the end of this chapter. But before we attempt to provide such a summary, we must evaluate the reductionist thesis.

We will begin as Vandenberg suggests--by outlining Dewey's theory of experience, making use of two distinctions; that of the process and product of experience, and that between primary and secondary experience. In this way it should be possible to take a position for or against accepting the reductionist view, and more importantly, to demonstrate how education and moral educational experience differ from Deweyan experience, writ large.
Thus the chapter will begin with a characterization of Dewey's view of reality. Our analysis will continue through the use of the first distinction mentioned: the process and product of experience. This examination will be concerned with outlining Dewey's theory of experience. In this analysis, some of the constitutive elements of this theory will be treated, specifically problematic situations and habits. Next, we will provide an account of reflective thought and follow that with a detailed analysis of the distinction between primary and secondary experience. In so doing, we will focus upon the Deweyan notions of interest, interest and effort, and means, ends, and ends-in-view. At that point we will return to a consideration of the reductionist position in an effort to assess its adequacy. We will demonstrate, by providing further analysis of Dewey's theories of aesthetic experience and religious experience, that accepting the reductionist view ignores important distinctions among separate kinds of experience. We will conclude with an evaluation of the reductionist thesis as it applies to explaining Deweyan moral education and with a discussion of moral educational experience as a particular kind of educational experience.

REALITY

Dewey's theory of experience is firmly grounded in his metaphysical beliefs concerning the nature of reality. Dewey often begins his analyses by attacking dualisms and
philosophical traditions which support what he claims are false dichotomies. ¹⁰ The titles of many of Dewey's works point to his intense desire to argue against dualisms (e.g., Interest and Effort in Education, Democracy and Education, Experience and Nature, and Experience and Education). In education, for example, Dewey argues that existing school programs often capitalize upon dualist positions. ¹¹ They place experience in a place of opposition to nature, or interest opposed to effort. Against this view, Dewey argues that experience and nature, like interest and effort and democracy and education, are continuous with each other. Experience is in and part of nature. Experience is what constitutes nature. Nature is experience. To understand what Dewey means by this, it is helpful to look briefly at the historical context which led Dewey to describe reality, experience, and nature as he does.

Dewey reacted against the views that perception alone constitutes existence and anything not perceived does not exist. Dewey's version of pragmatism (most often called experimentalism) contains a metaphysical component which can best be understood by looking at Dewey's predecessors' views on the nature of reality. Both Charles Sanders Peirce and William James constructed reality by answering the question, "What is real?" Peirce defined reality as the object of truth, and we must recognize that in Peirce's view, these objects are independent of what any individual
person may think them to be. Peirce's definition of reality differs from James' in this respect. Reality is an objective phenomenon, according to Peirce, whereas for James, reality is subjective.¹²

James claimed that reality is the "relation to our emotional and active life" and although James claims that any relation which excites an individual can be real, reality must be sensed in order to be distinguished from those objects which we disbelieve. Thus, each individual can have a separate reality based upon what has been subjectively sensed or perceived.¹³ Like Peirce, James holds that objects comprise reality. The differences between them on the construction and description of reality rest in large part on their theories of truth, which we will turn to shortly. Prior to doing so, we should note that Dewey's metaphysics is an odd creature in that he did not want to describe the real, but rather wanted to give an epistemology of metaphysics.

Dewey changed Peirce's and James' question from, "What is real?" to, "What can we know about reality?" Dewey is not concerned to follow the philosophical tradition which described reality in terms of primary and secondary qualities, monads, atoms, or the like.¹⁴ Dewey believed that the important metaphysical questions and analyses could be adequately treated through epistemology.
Consequently, according to Dewey, what is real (be it scientifically, ethically, aesthetically, or something else) is nothing more than the confirmation of truth through reflective inquiry. Reality is not an object, per se, or something to be possessed. Rather, we become aware of reality through the process of experiencing, or what he called reflective thinking. In this view, when successful regularities warrant belief to be established, then the real has been located.

In briefest formula, "reality" becomes what we wish existence to be, after we have analyzed its defects and decided upon what should remove them; "reality" is what existence would be if our reasonably justified preferences were so completely established in nature as to exhaust and define its entire being and thereby render search and struggle unnecessary. 15

Dewey sought to recognize in his formulation of reality the shortcomings in the theories Peirce and James provided, resulting in a compromise position. Reality is in part Peircean in that it is referred to as a limit of investigation, but also is Jamesean to the degree that warranted assertabilities allow us to define the real in the short run. Dewey believed that there are things in the world but that the world/nature/reality is in a constant state of flux.

We confine ourselves to one outstanding fact: the evidence that the world of empirical things includes the uncertain, unpredictable, uncontrollable, and
hazardous....The world is precarious and perilous. 16

There is, however, continuity in nature which can be discovered through investigation, because there is regularity in the order and relationships among the facts of nature. Nature is neither a predetermined and finished creation, nor a completely unpredictable and arbitrary affair.

Science seizes upon whatever is so uniform as to make the changes of nature rhythmic, and hence predictable. But the contingencies of nature make discovery of these uniformities with a view to prediction needed and possible. Without uniformities, science would be impossible. But if they alone existed, thought and knowledge would be impossible and meaningless. The incomplete and uncertain gives point and application to ascertainment of regular relations and orders. 17

The kind of order and continuity of nature that Dewey judged to be exemplary is the Darwinian theory of evolution. As Darwin hypothesized, there is a predictable and discoverable order of nature which serves to explain and account for seeming change and irregularity. 18

Thus, unlike the Platonic view, Dewey does not claim that there is an "ultimate reality" or that there are "ultimate truths" which are fixed and unchanging. 19 Dewey rejects the existence of universal truths insofar as they are all encompassing and true for all time. Dewey's conception of universality is equated with instrumentality.
The irony of many historic systems of philosophy is that they have so inverted the case. The general, recurrent and extensive has been treated as the worthy and superior kind of Being; the immediate, intensive, transitory, and qualitatively individualized taken to be of importance only when it is imputed to something ordinary, which is all the universal can denotatively mean. In truth, the universal and stable are important because they are the instrumentalities, the efficacious conditions, of the occurrence of the unique, unstable and passing. 20

Because nature is not fixed, knowledge of the world changes in relation to the experiences we have.

Knowledge affords the sole means by which this redirection can be effected. As the latter is brought about, parts of the experienced world have more luminous and organized meaning and their significance is rendered more secure against the gnawing tooth of time. The problem of knowledge is the problem of discovery of methods for carrying on this enterprise of redirection. It is a problem never ended, always in process; one problematic situation is resolved and another takes its place. The constant gain is not in approximation to universal solution but in betterment of methods and enrichment of objects experienced. 21

This does not mean that reality or knowledge about nature cannot be shared. Dewey's formulation of a theory of truth incorporates the necessity of having shared meanings and truths.

Dewey claims that knowledge about reality can be posited in terms of warranted assertability.
I prefer the words "warranted assertability." It is free from ambiguity of these latter terms [belief and knowledge] and it involves reference to inquiry as that which warrants assertion. When knowledge is taken as a general abstract term related to inquiry in the abstract it means "warranted assertability." 22

As noted, Dewey borrowed from both Peirce and James in their constructions of the nature of truth to reach the conclusion that what we can know as truth is not merely a subjective or an objective phenomenon. Peirce's formulation of truth incorporated an absolute fixity of belief. In this view, there are absolute and final truths ideally discoverable through continued investigation. 23 James' view rejected the truth-in-the-long-run position for a truth-in-the-short-run view. Accordingly, James believed that what is true or veridical is only the expedient in our way of thinking. If a conclusion is satisfactory in any individual case, it can be considered true. 24

For Dewey, however, truth is not to be had in either of the above views. Rather, truth is arrived at by the organism interacting with the environment in a transactional manner.

Every living creature, while it is awake, is in constant interaction with its surroundings. It is engaged in a process of give and take, of doing something to objects around it and receiving back something from them—impressions, stimuli. This process of interacting constitutes the framework of experience. We are fitted out with devices that help
us ward off destructive influences, devices that intercept harmful influences and protect us from them. But we also have tendencies that are forward-reaching and out-reaching, that go out to make new contacts, that seek new objects, that strive to vary old objects, that revel, as it were, in experiences for their own sake and so are ceaselessly active in enlarging the range of experience. 25

In other words, reaching satisfactory completions or learning what is true is a process of taking note of immediately had "objective" conditions and engaging in "subjective" investigation and reflection in order to make some sense out of those conditions and connect them with past knowledge gained in this same way. "Satisfaction is not subjective, private or personal: it is conditioned by objective partialities and defections and made real by objective situations and completions." 26 In this manner, an individual is both active and passive, constantly doing and undergoing.

The outline of the common pattern is set by the fact that every experience is the result of interaction between a live creature and some aspect of the world in which he lives. A man does something; he lifts, let us say, a stone. In consequence he undergoes, suffers, something: the weight, strain, texture of the surface of the thing lifted. The properties thus undergone determine further doing. The stone is too heavy or too angular, not solid enough; or else the properties undergone show it is fit for the use for which it is intended. The process continues until a mutual adaption of the self and the object emerges and that particular experience comes to a close. 27
Thus a person shapes reality as much as reality is shaped by him. "Every genuine experience has an active side which changes in some degree the objective conditions under which experiences are had." 28

Dewey thus avoids a confrontation with the "subject versus object" problem in epistemology by positing that they are not opposed at all. Subject and object must and do interact in order to gain knowledge and define reality. In sum, reality is identical with experience.

THEORY OF EXPERIENCE

In his writings, Dewey's analysis of experience is specific and technical, and his use of the concept 'experience' clearly excludes many commonly accepted uses of the term. For example, experience does not mean a noteworthy event or occurrence as in, "What a strange experience." Nor does it mean having certain skills or expertise as in, "What is your experience as a mechanic?" Experience does not signify a summary term for personal history such as, "My experience with wild mushrooms leads me to believe that one ought to leave them alone." Experience also does not mean self-consciousness as in, "I am experiencing an upsetting period in my life." It does not suggest that it is synonymous with knowledge such as, "I know from experience that your statement cannot be true."
Finally, experience is not meant in the Lockean sense of passive receptance of sense data.  

In other words, in ordinary language, 'experience' violates the principle of non-vacuous contrast; it can mean almost anything. Dewey's analysis of experience satisfies this principle. Dewey took an ordinary word and gave it a stipulative-programmatic definition; one which cannot be ignored if an understanding of Dewey's philosophy is desired.

We can begin to understand Dewey's theory of experience by noting two important distinctions employed by Dewey. The first distinction is between process and product, and the second is between primary and secondary experience.

Process and Product

The distinction between process and product is raised in EN by borrowing James' claim that experience is a "double barrelled" word signifying that it includes both what men do and suffer, what they strive for, love, believe and endure, and also how men act and are acted upon, the ways in which they do and suffer, desire and enjoy, see, believe, imagine—in short, process of experiencing.

Experience, then, includes both subject-matter (the what), and processes (the how). But before we go on, it is important to explain how the distinction between primary and secondary experience is connected with the process and product distinction.
The subject-matter of experience is divided into two qualitatively different types: primary experience and secondary experience. It is the process of experience that acts upon the subject-matter of experience enabling primary experience (the raw unrefined data of experience) to be transformed into secondary experience (the refined and meaningful product). Thus, what we notice is that the process of experience is used to reconstruct or transform the raw material (primary experience) into the refined and meaningful product (secondary experience). Therefore, when we talk about the subject-matter of experience, it is ambiguous whether we are referring to primary and/or secondary experience. However, when we speak of the product of experience we are referring to reflective or secondary experience rather than the raw data termed 'primary experience'. Consequently, although we can use these two distinctions (process/product, and primary/secondary) advantageously to make sense of Dewey's theory of experience, we will be unable to separate them completely since they overlap and are importantly enmeshed. Let us return to the analysis of process and product with this point in mind.

The attempt to gain an understanding of both Dewey's process and product sense of experience rests upon giving a full and orderly treatment of the process (how) by which primary experience is changed into meaningful experience,
which in turn re-shapes and re-constructs experience. Specifically, the initial point of consideration is a particular kind of situation; one in which something is judged or regarded as unsettled, dubious, unclear, inconsistent or indeterminate—in short, a problematic situation.

Problematic Situation

Not every concept is worth analysis, but it may be fruitful at this point in our analysis of process and product to introduce Dewey's meaning of a 'problematic situation', since experiencing problematic situations sets the process of experience in motion, and the goal of engaging in the process is to produce reconstructed experience. It is instructive to begin with a treatment of 'situation' and follow by providing the criteria which make a situation problematic. By so doing, we will be able to see that situations are unique and organically whole experiences.

Dewey explains that a situation "is not a single object or set of objects and events." This means that a situation refers to necessarily contextually based phenomena in which the subject who is doing the experiencing and the object of the experience are linked.
in connection with a contextual whole.
This latter is what is called a
"situation." 36

Dewey holds that in real life there are never isolated
singular events. No event can be meaningful disunited from
the world we experience. Every singular occurrence is part
of and continuous with experience. This is another way in
which Dewey defines 'situation'.

To explain how and why each individual situation is
unique, Dewey employs the concept 'quality'. He dispells
the notion that a quality is akin to Locke's primary and
secondary qualities such as, "hard," "red," "round,"
"clear," and so on. 37 When Dewey uses quality to describe a
unique situation, he means qualities which "permeate and
color all the objects and events that are involved in an
experience." 38 The kinds of terms which describe this
concept of quality are "distressing, perplexing, cheerful,
disconsolate." 39 Patently, these qualities are "felt," 40
and conjoin with the contextual elements of the experienced
situation to make each individual situation unique and
unduplicable, even though particular qualities or elements
of the situation may be experienced repeatedly in other
unique situations. Hence, Dewey claims that quality
"constitutes in each situation an individual situation,
indivisible and unduplicable." 41

Individual qualities are duplicable in different
situations, but each situation is uniquely qualitative. For
example, one can feel perplexed or frustrated repeatedly in countless situations. When we miss a plane connection or fail to explain something sufficiently we may use the same quality to express our feelings in each case. However, there will never be identical situations in which there is an exact replication of all of the features of the two highly similar cases. No two missed plane connections or no two instances of inadequate explanation will be identical.

So, situations can obviously be qualitatively satisfying, confusing, perplexing, or any number of other felt qualities. What would be necessary for a situation to be problematic? This is an important question because, as we have mentioned, the process of experiencing begins with the recognition that a situation is problematic.

For Dewey, the meaning of the word 'problem' is specific, and the scope of its application wide. Any situation which is dubious, unsettling, confusing, perplexing, unclear, inconsistent or indeterminate, even in some slight degree, is problematic. Dewey wishes to extend the meaning of the word problem to include whatever—no matter how slight and commonplace in character—perplexes and challenges the mind so that [when] it makes belief at all uncertain, there is a genuine problem...[.] 42

Problematic situations are not things to be avoided. Dewey does not define 'problem' as a mixed word with a negative connotation. To the contrary, problems set investigation in
motion. Problems are to be used advantageously to gain knowledge and reconstruct experience. Without experiencing problematic situations, a person would have little chance to seek the truth through investigation. Hence, the way in which problematic situations are resolved and secondary experiences produced is by the means of the process of experiencing, often called reflective thought.

The function of reflective thought, is therefore, to transform a situation in which there is experienced obscurity, doubt, conflict, disturbance of some sort, into a situation that is clear, coherent, settled, harmonious. 43

Dewey's analysis of reflective thought is characterized as a deliberate five phase process which through practice will become a habitual method of genuine problem solving.44 Reflective thought, variously referred to as scientific inquiry,45 empirical method,46 scientific thinking,47 experimental method,48 and scientific method,49 is a deliberate succession of steps which permits problems, no matter how apparently small or insignificant, to become satisfactorily resolved. "The aim and outcome of thinking in all cases is the transformation of a dubious and perplexing situation into a settled, or determinate, one."50 The purpose of engaging in the process of reflective thinking is to produce refined and meaningful secondary experience. "Empirical method is the only method which can do justice to this inclusive integrity of experience."51
Habits

Understanding Dewey's process of experience rests, in part, on being acquainted with Dewey's notion of habit. It is an initially confusing concept in that its meaning and significance cuts across and is part of both the distinction between the process and product of experience as well as the distinction between primary and secondary experience. Thus before we can fully explicate the details of Dewey's double-barrelled theory of experience, it is necessary to digress from our analysis of reflective thought and introduce the concept of 'habit' and the role it plays in his theory. As will be shown through this analysis and in our subsequent analysis of reflective thought, habits are both the starting and terminal points of investigation (product sense of experience), as well as being part of the actual process of experiencing. Let us therefore consider habit so that we may subsequently lay out Dewey's experimental method.

Dewey's use of habit "is an ability to use natural conditions as means to ends. It is an active control of the environment through control of the organs of action." In this way, habits are part of the actual process of experiencing. "They are active means; means that project themselves, energetic and dominating ways of acting." Significantly, Dewey's process aspect of habit is a dispositional use.
Repetition is in no sense the essence of habit. Tendency to repeat acts is an incident of many habits but not of all. ...The essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to ways or modes of response, not to particular acts except as, under special conditions, these express a way of behaving. Habit means special sensitiveness or accessibility to certain classes of stimuli, standing predilections and aversions, rather than bare recurrence of specific acts. It means will. 55

For Dewey, habit defined as will is a positive-evaluative concept, and Dewey explicitly separates this kind of habit from what we ordinarily call "bad" habits. Dewey claims that the latter are "so severed from reason that they are opposed to the conclusions of conscious deliberation and decision."56 But Dewey does not restrict the range of (good) habits to mere physical manipulations. Habit, for Dewey, means formation of intellectual and emotional disposition as well as an increase in ease, economy, and efficiency of action. Any habit marks an inclination—an active preference and choice for the conditions involved in its exercise. 57

Still referring to the process sense of habit, Dewey compares and contrasts habits "to physiological functions, like breathing, digesting."58 The difference between them lies in the fact that physiological functions are involuntary whereas habits are acquired. But the comparison is useful because in both habits and physiological functions there is an unavoidable working cooperation between the
environment and the organism. Dewey claims that habits "involve the support of environing conditions," they cannot be formed by an individual alone in the world, and it is false to say that habits ought to be social. Habits are in fact social.60

The idea that "habits are in fact social" rests entirely on Dewey's belief that the social environment is the foundation for the development of habits. "Since habits involve the support of environing conditions, a society or some specific group of fellowmen, is always accessory before and after the fact."61 It is an easy move from this contention to the claim that habit acquisition is in no way a neutral process.

To talk about habit acquisition implies that habits are not only processes of acting, but are also products of the experiencing process. As we will see more clearly in our subsequent analysis of reflective thought, habits, as subject-matter, play a vital role in the process of solving problems, in the formation of character, and are central to the theory of experience as well as to what constitutes human character, since previously acquired habits are enlisted in the beginning of investigation and are modified through the process of experiencing. The culmination of experiencing produces habits. These newly acquired habits (either modifications of old habits or entirely new ones) in
turn are used to make sense out of the original problem treated through investigation.

Our individual habits are links in forming the endless chain of humanity. Their significance depends upon the environment inherited from our forerunners, and it is enhanced as we foresee the fruits of our labors in the world in which our successors live. 62

Here, clearly we get a shift in focus of the meaning of 'habit'. Habits, as links, are definitely part of the subject-matter of experience which is changed or "enhanced" by a person interacting with it. Consequently, certain individual habits are invoked at the beginning of investigation and when the process of experiencing (which includes particular habitual modes of action) concludes, these habits are confirmed or modified. This accumulation of individual habits in part arises out of custom and in part is a reaction against it. In this way, we see that habits are a critical part of both the subject-matter as well as the process of experience.

The process of experiencing, as we will subsequently see in the following section on reflective thought, is an endless spiral-like process in which habits function to guide investigation as well as being products of inquiry; habits are acquired and confirmed through their continued use. Importantly, one of the specific habits Dewey claims should be nurtured and encouraged is the habit of using reflective thinking to solve problems.
Reflective Thought

The first step of the process of reflective thinking involves identification and definition of the problem. In part, problems are recognized as such because all persons confront situations with a ready store of prior experiences. "Now, while the suggestion pops into the mind, just what suggestion occurs depends first upon the experience of the person." Even when a child (or grown-up) has a problem, it is wholly futile to urge him to think when he has no prior experiences that involve some of the same conditions.

These prior experiences take the form of habits. We do not approach any problem with a wholly naive or virgin mind; we approach it with certain acquired habitual modes of understanding, with a certain store of previously evolved meanings or at least of experiences from which meanings may be educed.

Habits are dependent upon experiencing which Dewey claims were originally formed out of "instincts."

Our ideas truly depend upon experience, but so do our sensations. And the experience upon which they both depend is the operation of habits—originally of instincts.

Instincts are best understood as "original native tendencies" which Dewey describes through a loose analogy of plant growth in the following manner.

[While we cannot learn or be taught to think, we do have to learn how to think well, especially how to acquire the
general habit of reflecting. Since this habit grows out of original native tendencies, the teacher needs to know something about the nature of the primary capital stock that constitutes the germs out of which alone the habit is to be developed. Unless we know what there is to be laid hold of and used, we work in the dark and waste time and energy. We shall probably do something even worse, striving to impose some unnatural habit from without instead of directing native tendencies toward their own best fruition.

These habits make it possible for persons to recognize a problem as being in some degree inconsistent or unrecognizable within an existing conceptual framework. For instance, most children learn through continued experience (encouragement and correction) how to exhibit appropriate table manners. They develop the habit of using utensils, how to ask for more food politely, how to place the napkin, how to ask to be excused from the table, and so on.

Helen Keller, on the other hand, was not given such experience in her formative years and did not acquire the habit of good manners. When Anne Sullivan began to work with her to improve her behavior at the dinner table, Helen initially did not understand why she was not allowed to eat with her fingers or not use a napkin. Helen did not experience a "problem situation" because she felt no inconsistencies with her habitual modes of behaving at the table. Thus, to have a problem means to experience disequalibria of understanding and ability to act.
Once the problem has been adequately defined and is clearly understood, the second step commences.\textsuperscript{70} At this point relevant information is generated. This involves identifying the observed facts surrounding the problem, anxieties which may accompany the problem, and knowledge already in existence which might contribute to gaining insight into the problem.

A technical term for the observed facts is data. The data form the material that has to be interpreted, accounted for, explained; or, in the case of deliberation as to what to do or how to do it, to be managed and utilized. \textsuperscript{71}

As the facts of the case surface,\textsuperscript{72} the process moves to step three.\textsuperscript{73}

From the obtained body of relevant information (data), hypotheses or possible strategies are generated. "The suggested solutions for the difficulties disclosed by observation form ideas."\textsuperscript{74} At this stage, the hypotheses may or may not be likely possibilities, but the list is created nonetheless. At step four, a particular hypothesis is selected and a "plan of action" is chosen based upon the selected hypothesis.\textsuperscript{75} At this point, the plan of action may cause the problem to be redefined. If so, it may be necessary to return to step one or two, and proceed from there.\textsuperscript{76} However, if the problem remains unchanged, the final step of the scientific method is reached.\textsuperscript{77} This involves testing and verifying the hypothesis through
action. If the initial problem gains meaning—it no longer has the qualities which originally classified it as a problem—then a solution has been reached. The process has yielded successful results. 78

The conclusion (the product) of successful problem solving (the process), then, for Dewey, is effective action which satisfactorily answers and permits control of the initial situation in the sense that it becomes connected to a meaningful collection of past experiences. For example, Dewey offers the following scenario as one which illustrates the relationship of past experiences with the problem at hand in a scientific context.

In washing tumblers in hot soapsuds and placing them mouth downward on a plate, I noticed that bubbles appeared on the outside of the mouth of the tumblers and then went inside. Why? The presence of bubbles suggests air, which I note must come from inside the tumbler. I see that the soapy water on the plate prevents escape of the air save as it may be caught in bubbles. But why should air leave the tumbler? There was no substance entering to force it out. It must have expanded. It expands by increase of heat or by increase of pressure, or by both. Could the air have become heated after the tumbler was taken from the hot suds? Clearly not the air that was already entangled in the water if heated air was the cause, cold air must have entered in transferring the tumblers from the suds to the plate. I test to see whether this supposition is true by taking several more tumblers out. Some I shake so as to make sure of entrapping cold air in them. Some I take out, holding them mouth downward in order to prevent cold air from entering.
Bubbles appear on the outside of every one of the former and on none of the latter. I must be right in my inference. Air from the outside must have been expanded by the heat of the tumbler, which explains the appearance of the bubbles on the outside.

But why do they then go inside? Cold contracts. The tumbler cooled and also the air inside it. Tension was removed, and hence bubbles appeared inside it. To be sure of this, I test by placing a cap of ice on the tumbler while the bubbles are still forming outside. They soon reverse. 79

Arriving at solutions is influenced significantly by the habits one brings to the problem. In the above example the past experiences of the investigator allowed him to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion. Yet, the habits themselves are modified, enriched, or reconfirmed in light of the solution reached through investigation.

We can now characterize the process of experiencing. In pictoral terms, the process of experiencing can be viewed as a spiral: an individual takes note of or becomes interested in some primary or inchoate event, occurrence, or event. Through reflection, thought, investigation and effort, the primary experience gains meaning and continuity with the ready store of experiences possessed by the individual. The primary experience is no longer "loaded with the tangled and complex,"80 but is refined or reconstructed experience; "refined, derived objects of reflection."81 These secondary
experiences serve the purpose of making sense out of the crude macroscopic immediately experienced subject-matter.

Things in their immediacy are unknown and unknowable, not because they are remote or behind some impenetrable veil of sensation of ideas, but because knowledge has no concern with them. 82

However, the result achieved is not a fixed conclusion which remains forever the end of activity and investigation. Rather, when the activity acquires meaning and a resolution is reached, it illustrates rather well how that end changes automatically into a means which will help guide further action and investigation in a never ending process of experiencing. The more experiences we generate, the richer our store of refined habits and knowledge becomes.

Things interacting in certain ways are experience; they are what is experienced. Linked in certain other ways with another natural object—the human organism—they are how things are experienced as well. 83

Development and Modification of Habits, Character, and Conduct

Earlier we noted that Dewey defines habit as will. From this definition of habit, Dewey consistently describes 'character' to be "the interpenetration of habits."84 Or, in other words, "character is the name given to the working interaction of habits,"85 and it is the manifestation of habit which Dewey labels 'conduct'. Like the development of habit,
That conduct is social also means that conduct is moral.
"If an individual were alone in the world, he would form his
habits (assuming the impossible, namely, that he would be
able to form them) in a moral vacuum." It is worth
observing that habit, character, and conduct are thus
intimately related. They are all centrally connected with
moral action. The connection between this, Dewey's theory
of experience, and the experimental method is an important
one. We now turn to a discussion of the connection.

In the attempt to develop a systematic account of
Dewey's theory of experience, we showed that "formation of
ideas as well as their execution depends upon habit." What has not yet been clearly explicated is that "we cannot
change habit directly...[b]ut we can change it indirectly by
modifying conditions...[.]" The conditions that one has
control over reside in the environment. It is through the
process of experiencing that habits, character and conduct
are changed. "To change the working character or will of
another we have to alter objective conditions which enter
into his habits."

For example, a child learns to yell and hit others when
angry or in need of something by observing his parents who
interact with each other by yelling and hitting. The child
develops these "bad" habits because the objective conditions are such that this behavior is encouraged and rewarded in virtue of the fact that the child gets what he wants by yelling and hitting. To change the child's habits includes changing the objective conditions under which the child learns how to behave. Thus, the adults with whom he comes into contact must not yell and hit when angry or in need of something. Instead, fruitful discussion and polite requests should replace the original modes of interaction, and the child must not be encouraged or rewarded by getting what he wants unless he has "asked nicely" or discussed the problem in a civil manner. Gradually, the child will learn new habits which will replace the originally developed ones. By changing the objective conditions in which the child lives, his habits and thus his character will adapt to the new conditions.

This prescription concerning the alteration of objective conditions in modifying habits has serious implications for both the experiences encountered and the process of experiencing for the development of character. Dewey recognizes this as a moral problem. He claims it is moral because it involves the modification of future conditions under which persons will develop either perverse or worthy habits.

The basic characteristic of habit is that every experience enacted and undergone modifies the one who acts and undergoes
while this modification affects, whether we wish it or not, the quality of subsequent experiences. This is, according to Dewey, the way in which habit, character, and conduct change and develop.

Primary and Secondary Experience

It will be recalled that Dewey employed the distinction between primary and secondary experience in his theory of experience. We have employed this distinction continually throughout our previous analysis without explicitly treating the distinction in detail. This distinction between primary and secondary experience rivals in importance the distinction between process and product, and we will presently discuss the distinction at great length, taking pains to deal with the Deweyan concept of interest, his analysis of interest and effort, and the relationship between means, ends, and ends-in-view.

Primary experience. A primary experience may take any number of forms. It may be an event or occurrence, an object or subject, a problem, question, gesture, perplexity, confusion or an idea. Whatever form this primary experience takes, it sets a unique problem to be investigated and solved.

The observer is initially in a passive role of receiving raw unfamiliar data which are, as such, ineffable. But this passivity does not extend so far as the empiricists would claim that a receiver is passive—the mind is not a Lockean
or Rousseauian blank slate upon which raw data are imprinted. Rather, for Dewey, primary experiences are received passively in the sense that a person is bombarded with previously unprocessed, unordered information which as immediately felt has not acquired the status of meaningful, or sensible information.

Interest

Primary experiences are initially recognized because they spark our interest in forming a connection between a particular inchoate experience and past knowledge gained from other refined and ordered experiences we have had.

We can be aware of consequences only because of previous experiences. But in unfamiliar cases, we cannot tell just what the consequences will be unless we go over past experiences in our mind, unless we reflect upon them and by seeing what is similar in them to those now present, go on to form a judgment of what may be expected in the present situation.

We need to consider carefully the Deweyan term 'interest', if we are to understand how the process of experiencing is initiated. Like the concept 'experience', Dewey does not employ interest in a purely ordinary sense. In gross terms, Dewey claims that "interest means the active or moving identity of the self with a certain object." This formulation implies that interest denotes an interactive process between self and object. Dewey further
confirms that interest is a relation in his educational analysis of interest in IRTW.

Genuine interest in education is the accomplishment of the identification, through action, of the self with some object or idea, because of the necessity of that object or idea for the maintenance of self-expression. 97

Unfortunately, Dewey is not entirely consistent in his portrayal of 'interest'. In one context, interest as a relation is not mentioned; rather, "interest means united activity." 98 Still, in another context, 'interest' apparently is a state of mind, or feeling. "[F]eeling, so far as it is taken out of its isolation and put in relation to objects of knowledge or ideals of action, is interest." 99 Indeed Dewey claims that interest is not merely a relation, an activity or a feeling. In fact,

[i]nterest has three factors. First, as feeling, it implies a certain excitation of the self in which there is satisfaction. Secondly, this satisfaction is not in the mere feeling, but in some activity connected with some object. The mere feeling is exhausted in itself. An interest attaches to an object. We are interested in something. This necessarily, for the activity takes us beyond the feeling. 100

It is not clear from Dewey's uses of 'interest' whether he wishes to claim that interest is unified activity, a relationship between the subject and object of interest, and a state of consciousness, or whether he is merely sloppy in failing to make distinctions among the different senses of
'interest', or whether he actually intends 'interest' in this confusing and ambiguous manner.

Moreover, we are not significantly aided by reviewing the analysis of 'interest' in DE. In that work Dewey gives 'interest' at least four meanings. First, it means "the whole state of active development." This could refer to either the activity or the consciousness meaning. Second, it means "the objective results that are foreseen and wanted." This sense of interest apparently has to do with the ends of activity. Third, 'interest' means "the personal emotional inclination." This sense of interest does seem to refer to the state of mind of the subject. Finally, Dewey further confuses by claiming for interest a fourth meaning. "By interest we also mean the point at which our subject touches or engages a man; the point where it influences him." This fourth sense of interest implicitly incorporates Dewey's theory of effort. (More will be said about this shortly.)

Is there anything wrong with this reasoning? Can 'interest' mean any or all of these different things? It is worth observing that Alan White in a thorough analysis of 'interest' argues that there are serious problems with accepting Dewey's eclectic portrayal of 'interest'. At this point we will enlist portions of White's critical analysis of Dewey's theory of interest as it will be of significant
help in making sense of Dewey's use of interest as that which sets the process of experiencing in motion.

White's strategy in making sense of Dewey's theory of 'interest' is to temporarily leave aside Dewey's triadic portrayal of 'interest' and note that in ordinary use 'interest' has a dispositional and an episodic meaning. The former refers to "the idea of having an interest which one is not at the moment manifesting" and the latter is "the idea of taking (or showing) an interest...[.]

Significantly, recognizing these two senses of interest is the key which unlocks the door to understanding what Dewey was getting at when he claims that sparking an interest in a primary experience begins investigation.

White points out quite correctly that in practice Dewey recognized both the dispositional and the episodic senses of interest.

On the one hand, it was a central tenet of his [Dewey's] theory that a child possessed of, indeed almost constituted of, a set of interests which it is the job of a good teacher to arouse in order to get the child to take an interest in or to pay attention to the required features of the lesson....On the other hand, he was always so impressed by the fact that interest is something we can 'take' as to suppose that interests are necessarily active and result in activities, all of which involve paying attention. 107

That the episodic sense of interest "so impressed Dewey" can be understood by noting that
Dewey waivered between saying, in some places, that interest is the same as attention—an identification which he sometimes attributed, quite wrongly, to ordinary use—that it is a necessary condition of attention, so that every instance of attention is due to interest, and that it is a sufficient condition of attention, so that every instance of interest is manifested in attention. 108

White persuasively argues that Dewey's various equations of interest with attention led him to confuse the dispositional and episodic senses of interest which in turn prompted him at times to claim that interest is an activity (episodic) and in other instances that interest is a feeling (dispositional). Where interest can be either episodic or dispositional, attention can only be episodic. 109

With White's help, we recognize that Dewey mistakenly identified interest with attention, and thus was led to confuse the dispositional and episodic senses of interest. But what is the significance of noting his errors? The answer is that without noting this distinction, Dewey's doctrine of interest and effort is liable to be misunderstood. Because, as we will see, 'interest' in the sense which includes 'effort', can only be episodic.

Up to this point, we have been primarily concerned to outline Dewey's various uses and possible meanings of 'interest'. With White's help, we have highlighted the dispositional and episodic senses of the term as well as some of the problems and ambiguities inherent in Dewey's
analysis. We are left to determine the significance of the distinction between dispositional and episodic interest for understanding Dewey's triadic portrayal of interest which includes

an object in which he is interested, a relation of attention between the subject and object and a feeling which the subject has when he gives this attention to this object. 110

Let us now finish this analysis by clarifying this crucial relationship between the subject and the object implicit in Dewey's notion of interest. Spelling out this relationship involves characterizing not only Dewey's doctrine of interest and effort, but also the nature of means, ends, and ends-in-view.

Interest and Effort

Dewey begins his analysis of 'interest' and 'effort' in IEE, IRTW, and DE, by arguing that when theories of interest and effort are espoused, the proponents argue that the two theories are divided. Interest is opposed to effort. To the contrary, Dewey argues that "genuine" or "lively" interest 111 and effort must be viewed as continuous processes within unified activity. What could this mean? We need to look carefully at the concept of 'effort' in order to become clear about what constitutes "genuine" or "lively" interest.
Dewey explicitly rejects a theory of effort which views effort as being mere strain or drudgery. When genuine interest is sparked, "effort arises normally."

The principle laid down shows that effort is significant not as bare effort, or strain, but in connection with carrying forward an activity to its fulfillment: it all depends, as we say upon the end.

Let us leave aside for the moment a consideration of ends, (we will clarify this shortly) and focus upon the process of experiencing referred to above. Dewey recognizes that in completing an activity involving the transformation of primary into secondary experience, there is "mental stress: a peculiar emotional condition of combined desire and aversion." There is desire to culminate the activity and reach a satisfactory conclusion. There is also the obstacle which "arrests or thwarts progress ahead, inhibits action" away from the original desired end. This is aversion.

In every case, the educational significance of effort, its value for an educative growth, resides in its connection with a stimulation of greater thoughtfulness, not in the greater strain it imposes. Educative effort is a sign of the transformation of a comparatively blind activity (whether impulsive or habitual) into a more consciously reflective one.

Clearly, engaging effort makes it possible to change primary experience into secondary experience. It would seem that effort motivates action, and Dewey believes that this
process of experiencing is not without difficulty. Effort is a part of taking or showing an interest in something problematic.

Effort as a mental experience is precisely this peculiar combination of conflicting tendencies—tendencies away from and tendencies towards: dislike and longing. 118

From this definition of 'effort' we can understand how Dewey cannot separate episodic interest from effort, as it is impossible for Deweyan effort to arise normally when interest is not taken or shown.

It is not too much to say that a normal person demands a certain amount of difficulty to surmount in order that he may have a full and vivid sense of what he is about, and hence have a lively interest in what he is doing. 119

Clearly, effort will not "arise normally" if the kind of interest we have is dispositional, and not at the moment being attended to. Dewey can only mean that genuine or lively interest is the kind of interest we take or show. Thus the doctrine of interest and effort does not make sense unless we view interest as episodic.

Genuine interest, in short, simply means that a person has identified himself with, or has found himself in, a certain course of action. Consequently he is identified with whatever objects and forms of skill are involved in the successful prosecution of that course. 120
In other words, we must be actively engaged in the course of action in order to prosecute that course. It is a necessary condition.

It is when episodic interest is sparked that effort emerges in the normal process of experiencing. Without effort, there is no guiding function in the activity; with effort, the aim becomes conscious and there is purpose to the actions of the subject involved in completing the activity. Thus, when episodic interest and effort are interdependent, the ends or goals of the activity direct action.

Means, Ends, and Ends-in-View

We are now left with the task of outlining Dewey's conception of ends and goals which necessarily involves explaining the relationship among the desired ends, the ends actually reached, and the means used to arrive there. Dewey commonly distinguishes between means, ends, and ends-in-view. Ends-in-view are the aims/motives/interest which regulate activity. They are the goals toward which we strive. Ends-in-view are different from mere ends. The former are defined as being consequences actually reached, not those for which we strive. Once ends are achieved, they immediately become means for attaining other ends-in-view, reachable only through the scientific process of inquiry which is completed only with the testing of hypotheses.
An end can only be separated from the means after the conclusion or consummation of an activity. 123

The terms "means" and "end" apply primarily to the position occupied by acts as stages of a single developing activity, and only secondarily to things or objects. The end really means the final stage of an activity, its last or terminal period; the means are the earlier phases, those gone through before the activity reaches its termination. 124

Dewey's relationship of means, ends, and ends-in-view is analogous to the relationship between interest and effort. There is no separation; means and ends, interest and effort, are continuous processes operating within the context of unified activity.

As we have previously indicated, recognizing ends-in-view is an important part of episodic interest and effort, but its formulation is not entirely without conceptual difficulty. At times Dewey equates ends with aims and aims with motives.125 He also equates 'interest' with 'motive'.126 His claim is that to become interested in something means that one becomes motivated to act. White provides numerous concise descriptions in Dewey's works where these equations exist.127 That Dewey makes this connection is unquestionable; whether it makes for confusion is another matter. White attributes Dewey's mistaken equations as follows.
What I think may have misled Dewey into his identification of interests and motives or even into his view that interests always motivate are, first, his equation of interest and desire, second, his assimilation of the dispositional use and the episodic use of 'interest' and, third, his failure to distinguish 'doing something from (or for) interest'—which was his main topic—from 'doing something with interest'.

These are reasonable criticisms of Dewey's position, and White provides adequate support for them. The more one reads White, the more puzzled one becomes over Dewey's doctrine of interest as motive, especially because this sounds very similar to Dewey's claim that effort guides or motivates activity, which we noted earlier.

We cannot ignore the fact that Dewey repeatedly wrote as if interest and motive are interchangeable, and that there are problems in his doing so. But worse, there is no clear-cut way of resolving them. This constraint will mean that the machinery of analysis cannot always be brought into full play in examining Dewey's philosophy, but any complete consideration of Deweyan philosophy will run up against this problem. We can only say that the problem is recognized and will be considered when appropriate.

Secondary experience. This digression into an analysis on the problems with Dewey's concept 'interest' began with noting that when a "lively" (episodic) interest is taken in a problem situation, the process of experiencing (reflective thought) is begun. The goal of engaging in reflective
thinking is to make sense of the primary experience—to transform the problem into a meaningful settled situation; one that is continuous with ordinary experience.

The result or conclusion of successful problem solving (process of experiencing) yields refined or reconstructed experience. This reflected-upon-experience Dewey calls 'secondary experience'.

That the subject-matter of primary experience sets the problems and furnishes the first data of the reflection which constructs the secondary objects is evident; it is also obvious that test and verification of the latter is secured only by return to things of crude or macroscopic experience—the sun, earth, plants and animals of common, every-day life. But just what role do the objects attained in reflection play? Where do they come in? They explain the primary objects, they enable us to grasp them with understanding, instead of just having sense-contact with them. 129

Dewey's descriptive analysis of secondary experience is not nearly as lengthy as is his treatment of primary experience. In fact, secondary experience is characterized by contrasting it with primary experience. Secondary experience is the end product of engaging in the process of experiencing—secondary experience is used to explain or account for primary experience—it is the product of reflection which changes "crude subject-matters in primary experience" into an experience.

This consideration of method may suitably begin with the contrast between gross, macroscopic, crude subject-matters in
primary experience and the refined, derived objects of reflection. The distinction is one between what is experienced as the result of a minimum of incidental reflection and what is experienced in consequence of continued and regulated reflective inquiry. For derived and refined products are experienced only because of the intervention of systematic thinking.

Secondary experiences are so labeled only if they provide meaning and explanation for the primary data which set the process of experiencing in motion. If the results (products) of investigation satisfy the following criteria, then the results are truly what Dewey calls secondary experience.

Does it end in conclusions which, when they are referred back to ordinary life-experiences and their predicaments, render them more significant, more luminous to us, and make our dealings with them more fruitful?...Does it yield the enrichment and increase of power of ordinary things which the results of physical science afford when applied in every-day affairs?

Thus we have run full circle. The raw data of primary experience become the product of secondary experience through the process of experiencing. The relations between the process and product of experience and primary and secondary experience are interdependent. To have an experience implies both that there is some subject-matter of experience as well as the process of experiencing which enables the inchoate (primary) experience to be transformed or reconstructed into secondary experience, refined and rich
with meaning. "In short, the material of refined scientific method is continuous with that of the actual world as it is concretely experienced." 132

As we have noted and demonstrated throughout, it is difficult to explain primary and secondary experience (the subject-matter) apart from the process (operations) of experience. Nevertheless, we have used these two distinctions to explain Dewey's theory of experience. Now we can return to an examination of the reductionist view of Dewey's theory of education in order to reach a conclusion regarding its adequacy.

REDUCTIONIST VIEW REVISITED

Up to this point we have been concerned to lay out the basic elements and concepts of Dewey's theory of experience. As stated in the beginning of this chapter, the goal has been to determine the relationship between Dewey's theory of experience and his theory of education. Now that Dewey's double-barrelled notion of experience has been explicated, we can turn our attention to the relationship between experience and education. Must we accept the reductionist position? To answer this question, let us begin our treatment of the relationship between experience and education through a potentially useful analogy.

In The Concept of Mind, 133 Gilbert Ryle argued that performative knowledge (i.e., knowing how to) is distinct from propositional knowledge (i.e., knowing that). John
Hartland-Swann took issue with Ryle's position and argued that all propositional knowledge can be reduced to performative knowledge. Jane Roland [Martin] entered into the dialogue with her article, "On the Reduction of 'Knowing How'." She reviewed the arguments and proposed that from a pedagogical point of view, even if all propositional knowledge can be reduced to performative knowledge, there still remain important distinctions, especially insofar as teaching strategies are concerned. That is, even if all knowledge is performative, all performative knowledge is not qualitatively or categorically similar. Roland introduced the criterion of practice as a way to distinguish between different kinds of performative knowledge. Thus, she argued that distinctions between different kinds of performative knowledge can be made for pedagogical reasons.

Just as Roland convincingly argued, we may, also. One need not in this context decide categorically whether or not Vandenberg is correct in his conclusion that Dewey does not have an educational theory, he has only a theory of experience, in order to accept that experience is central to Dewey's views on education. Even if the reductionist view turns out to be correct, it may still be necessary to separate out different kinds of experience, because all experience is not qualitatively similar. For instance,
there would be no need to modify 'experience' with adjectives if all experiences were alike.

Support for rejecting the reductionist view is supported by Richard Bernstein.

There is a reason for the adjectival force of the terms "artistic," "esthetic," and "religious." The main thrust of Dewey's theory of experience has been that experience is qualified in multifarious ways. The above adjectives designate distinctive ways in which any experience can be qualified. 137

Bernstein recognizes that all experiences cannot be put into the same category without rendering the term vacuous. It is helpful to quote Dewey in this regard. We note that Dewey holds there to be distinctively aesthetic, scientific, moral and political experiences,138 in addition to educative and mis-educative experiences.139 Dewey speaks of the aesthetic quality of experience,140 the religious quality of experience,141 and the moral quality of experience.142 A single experience, no matter if it has for its subject-matter biology, politics, sociology or something else, can have any or all of the above qualities simultaneously, just as we noted that any single experience can be simultaneously perplexing and distressing. In other words, an experience can have aesthetic, religious, and moral qualities all at once.

We must also note that Dewey offers a distinction that separates the qualities of an experience from distinct
categories of experience. To have aesthetic, religious or moral qualities of experience is not the same as an experience being distinctively aesthetic, religious, or moral. Dewey describes these experiences as being unique and distinguishable kinds of experience, writ large. All of this needs to be demonstrated. Consequently, we have chosen what Dewey takes to be two of many distinct kinds of experience to demonstrate that despite his emphasis on experience in religion and aesthetics, they are not identical kinds of experience. We will also distinguish between the aesthetic and religious quality of experience and distinctively aesthetic and religious experience. This analysis will pave the way for evaluating the reductionist position.

Aesthetic Experience

"Dewey's philosophy is one of experience, and his philosophy of art is one of experience in an emphatic way." Accordingly, there are experiences with an aesthetic quality and there are distinctively aesthetic experiences; those which are dominantly or primarily aesthetic in form. As for the former, every experience which reaches a consummation has aesthetic qualities. Dewey calls this aesthetic in experience "its limited sense," in that the aesthetic quality has to do with the process of reconstructing and completing any kind of experience. "The experience may be one that is harmful to
the world and its consummation undesirable. But it has esthetic quality. Thus having an aesthetic quality means that the experience has reached fulfillment and consummation. In other words, the primary experience has been successfully transformed or wrought into secondary or reflective experience.

By its very nature every experience which reaches consummation is unified. This results because means and ends become amalgamated into a meaningful whole; there is balance and proportion in the material of the experience. This is what Dewey means by unification. The process of experiencing yields a product through "a satisfactory conclusion which resulted from mutual adaption of the self and the object." As discussed earlier, the interactive process permits the subject (self) to modify and be modified by the object (problem, event, object, or whatever), in such a way that if and when the primary experience becomes secondary experience, there is consummation. In Dewey's terms, an experience has taken place, and portions of the qualities which necessarily exist when there has been an experience are aesthetic qualities.

Consequently, all categories of experience will have aesthetic qualities when consummated. Experiences which are dominantly intellectual, practical, or emotional will acquire aesthetic qualities upon consummation. Conversely, any of these types of experiences will be void
of aesthetic quality when consummation is not reached. "There is experience, but so slack and discursive that it is not an experience." 151 In short, a defining feature of an experience is that it has aesthetic quality. 152 "[T]he esthetic is...the clarified and intensified development of traits that belong to every normally complete experience." 153

Dewey claims that the controlling or dominant features of experiences which contain the "limited sense" of the aesthetic have to do with intellectual or practical concerns. A dominantly intellectual experience is one which is governed by an overriding concern to improve the quality and amount of knowledge. All intellectual experiences "are for the sake of knowledge; they serve to test and develop...conceptions and theories." 154 In dominantly practical experiences, "[t]he result desired lies outside of knowledge." In matters of practical deliberation, such as deciding where to go for lunch, or determining to which charity to give a donation, the commitment involved in overt action is much more serious than in "dominantly intellectual experiences." 155 In dominantly practical experience, the object of the experience is to decide what to do.

We can see the foregoing at work in the following example. A biologist experimenting with rats and skin cancer cells may have countless consummatory experiences in his effort to understand and theorize about the reproductive
order of skin cancer cells. These experiences will have
aesthetic qualities but the dominant concern may be either
practical, intellectual, or both. The dominant concern may
be practical: to be able to control and eventually cure skin
cancer. The dominant concern may be intellectual: to learn
the rate of cancer cell growth in rats. "In intellectual
experience, the conclusion has value on its own account." In practical experiences, the conclusion reached should
modify or direct actual practice.

Dewey separates purely aesthetic experience from
aesthetic experience in the "limited sense." The former is
a distinct type of experience different from intellectual or
practical experience which only has an aesthetic quality.

In so far as the development of an
experience is controlled through
reference to these immediately felt
relations of order and fulfillment, that
experience becomes dominantly esthetic in
nature. Experiences which have for their objects the perception of
the relationship between parts and whole and an appreciation
for the unity of the experience are dominantly aesthetic.

In a distinctively esthetic experience,
characteristics that are subdued in other
experiences are dominant; those that are
subordinate are controlling—namely, the
characteristics in virtue of which the
experience is an integrated complete
experience on its own account. Although it is possible for any experience, no matter
the subject—matter, to be purely aesthetic, works of art
(the object of the experience) provide the clearest and best examples of purely aesthetic experience. What would exemplify a purely aesthetic experience? First, an aesthetic experience is not something mysterious or mystical. Similarly it is not something akin to the experience had in Bacchic revelry; that is, a person does not become psychologically lost or totally given over in the experience. When someone has a purely aesthetic experience there is no ulterior motive operating while experiencing an object. In other words, the viewer is not primarily interested in the object for practical or intellectual reasons. For instance, in order for a person to have an aesthetic experience when seeing Picasso's "Guernica," s/he must not be primarily concerned, for example, with the monetary value of the painting. This would mean that the dominating concern was other than to experience aesthetically.

We have mentioned what aesthetic experience is not. Let us characterize an aesthetic experience had by a viewer, rather than the artist again using "Guernica" as the object of the experience.

Picasso's "Guernica" is a work depicting the horrors of war. In part, his intention in painting it was to express a selective and intensified view of death and destruction. The colors, shapes, symbols, and medium were carefully chosen to communicate his vision to viewers. However, since
the painting does not literally "speak," each viewer must look at the painting and interpret it. This act of interpretation is different for each individual because each individual confronts the work with a unique set of past experiences. One person may have been a soldier in Viet Nam, while another never has left her small farm town. Still another person may have experienced the deaths of close relatives due to disease rather than war. Hence, the connotations and connections which each viewer makes with his own past experiences are also unique.

The object of experience, in this case "Guernica," is the medium between the artist and the viewer. Picasso used "Guernica" to communicate something about war. The individual viewer uses "Guernica" in a different manner. S/he gains insight, or appreciates the composition, or becomes emotionally moved, and so on. That experience which the viewer has in the process of interpreting the work, and in so doing appreciate its communicated meaning, is a purely aesthetic experience.

Note that in the characterization, the process of experiencing (interaction of the painting and the viewer) is consistent with all other Deweyan experience; that is, the product (secondary experience) is created out of the interaction between the subject experiencing and the object being experienced.
In sum, we can view Dewey's theory of art as a continuum of fullness of experience. First, there is (raw, unrefined, primary) experience, which when reconstructed through the process of experiencing becomes consummated. A consummated (secondary, refined) experience is an experience; one in which there are aesthetic qualities in the limited sense. Any consummated experience, no matter the subject-matter, contains aesthetic qualities. Aesthetic qualities are therefore a necessary part of secondary/consummated experience. However, for an experience to be purely aesthetic requires additionally that the aesthetic qualities be dominant. Experiences which are primarily appreciated for their unity, proportion, balance, and so on, are aesthetic experiences in the full, and not the limited sense.

Religious Experience

Dewey's theory of religious experience is analogous to his theory of art. He distinguishes between experiences which have a religious quality from those experiences which are "genuinely religious."\(^{160}\) Importantly, to have religious experiences in either sense is different from having aesthetic experiences.

Dewey's characterization of 'religious' as a quality of experience is achieved through a distinction.

The heart of my point, as far as I shall develop it in this first section, is that there is a difference between religion, a
Thus when Dewey refers to the religious quality of experience, he is not referring to any particular religious sect which needs "[f]ixed doctrinal apparatus" to be considered a religion. Nor is he claiming to be characterizing the nature of religion in general. Dewey took great pains to disclaim any association of his views of the religious with 'mystical' or 'supernatural' experience.

Any experience can have religious qualities in the same way that any experience can have aesthetic qualities. "'Religious' as a quality of experience signifies something that may belong to all...experiences." They can acquire religious quality when the individual embodies certain attitudes, and when the experience concludes in a specific manner.

Dewey's conception of 'religious' has to do in part with a particular effect produced by the conclusion of the experience.

The actual religious quality in the experience described is the effect produced, the better adjustment in life and its conditions, not the manner and cause of its production. The effect has to do with a complete and unshakeable faith in disclosing truth. According to Dewey, one must have
faith in the methods of reflective thought in the search for truth. Consequently, "[u]nderstanding and knowledge also enter into a perspective that is religious in quality."  

Any activity pursued in behalf of an ideal end against obstacles and in spite of threats of personal loss because of conviction of its general and enduring value is religious in quality.  

What Dewey means by 'ideal' is crucial to understanding what the religious quality of experience entails. Ideals are not elusive and entirely unreachable aims. "Aims, ideals, do not exist simply in 'mind'; they exist in character, in personality and action."  

The aims and ideals that move us are generated through imagination. But they are not made out of imaginary stuff. They are made out of the hard stuff of the world of physical and social experience.  

In order to explain this conception of the religious quality of experience more fully, Dewey suggests that the term 'religious' be temporarily dropped, and in its place we shall "ask what are the attitudes that lend deep and enduring support to the processes of living[?]" The name of the attitude which can be exchanged for 'religious' is 'accommodation'.  

The two main traits of this attitude, which I should like to call accommodation, are that it affects particular modes of conduct, not the entire self, and that the process is mainly passive.
The second trait is not immediately comprehensible.

Dewey clarifies by pointing out that

while the words "accommodation," "adaptation," and "adjustment" are frequently employed as synonyms, attitudes exist that are so different that for the sake of clear thought they should be discriminated. 173

Dewey realizes that he must distinguish among these three concepts in order to explain what he means by the process being passive. Perhaps the following will help.

When stories are adapted for the stage, or a house is remodeled to reflect the needs of a family, "[i]nstead of accommodating ourselves to conditions, we modify conditions so that they will be accommodated to our wants and purposes."174 In this kind of modification, the individual takes an active part. Dewey calls this the process of adaption, saying that there are other kinds of adjustments we make to the world which are "much more inclusive and deep seated."175 These adjustments do not refer to individual adaptions as in the previous examples but have to do with more general and pervasive concerns.

For instance, the way in which one learns to pursue and acquire knowledge is a continual process of developing better skills which will permit truths to be discovered. One might begin this learning process by appealing exclusively to authorities for knowledge. However, as one grows older, relying upon authority occurs less frequently
as one's methods of investigation are improved. This kind of adaption has implications for conduct much wider in scope and importance than does the kind of modification of a story or a house. Also, the modification of the self to the specific change (e.g., methods of knowledge acquisition) is enduring. Why? Because this kind of adaption includes a note of submission. But it is voluntary, not externally imposed; and as voluntary it is something more than a mere Stoical resolution to endure unperturbed throughout the buffetings of fortune. It is more outgoing, more ready and glad, than the latter attitude, and it is more active than the former. 176

This is what Dewey means by the process being mainly passive. Religion does not precede and cause changes in attitude, such as the attitude taken toward methods of knowledge acquisition. Rather, when attitudes are changed, this is an indication that there has been religious quality involved in the experience.177 We can look back on the effects produced after the experience is consummated, and then recognize that the appropriate attitude of accommodation must have contributed to the result.

Up to this point, we have restricted discussion to the religious quality of experience. What, for Dewey, is a religious experience? By answering this question, we will be able to understand the nature of "genuine" religious experience.178
Knowing what Dewey means by religious experience rests initially on an understanding of the nature of a Deweyan conception of religion. Dewey's religion is one of faith in the methods of science as the sole means of deciding "all questions of fact, existence and intellectual assent." \(^{179}\)

There is but one sure road of access to truth—the road of patient, cooperative inquiry operating by means of observation, experiment, record and controlled reflection. \(^{180}\)

This is Dewey's theory of religion. Thus, a religious experience is one which is emotionally charged to pursue the truth in this way. A religious experience is analogous to a purely aesthetic experience in that the religious qualities dominate above practical, intellectual, aesthetic, or other concerns.

Lives that are consciously inspired by loyalty to such ideals as have been mentioned are still comparatively infrequent to the extent of that comprehensiveness and intensity which arouse an ardor religious in function. \(^{181}\)

These ideals are moral ideals, but the fact that they are moral is not sufficient for there to be religious experience.

The religious is "morality touched by emotion" only when the ends of moral conviction arouse emotions that are not only intense but are actuated and supported by ends so inclusive that they unify the self. \(^{182}\)
This is important because, for Dewey, it is an implicit denial that religious experiences and moral experiences are identical.

Reductionist View: Unsatisfactory

In terms of analyzing the reductionist position, we are left with the conclusion that even if Dewey's religious and aesthetic theories can be shown to be reducible to a theory of experience, the task is not complete. Just as not all performative knowledge is alike, so too not all experiences are alike. In the following quote, we have substituted 'experience' for "knowing ___" to make an important point: logical reductionism is, for practical considerations, inadequate.

Distinguishing something called "aesthetic experience" even if not a logically pure form of experience, may nonetheless serve the educator well as a useful pedagogical distinction with respect to certain objectives of teaching and learning. Logical reductionism is not the only technique for making useful distinctions.

In short, with respect to the possible proliferation of types of experience, we might profitably distinguish between the search for logically basic types of [experience] and pedagogically useful classification of [experience] types, always keeping in mind that, while the logical consideration may give us depth in understanding the type of [experience] we are dealing with, the business of education also has room for practical pedagogical considerations.
In this way, there are "emphatic" differences between aesthetic experiences and religious experiences. Were we to accept the reductionist view, we would not be significantly aided in understanding what is the nature of education and educational experience. Further distinction making would be in order.

Up to this point we have purposefully not touched upon what counts as distinctively educative experience. We have only been concerned to determine whether all experiences can be fruitfully lumped together. Our conclusion is that they cannot be so combined without seriously ignoring significant differences in human thought and action. There are distinctive varieties of experience. Along with aesthetic, religious, and moral experiences, Dewey also distinguishes educational experiences and moral educational experiences. Let us now turn to these. Once we are clear about the nature of educative experiences, we will be in a position to discuss a subset of educative experiences: moral educative experiences.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION

Experience and education cannot be directly equated to each other. For some experiences are mis-educative. Any experience is mis-educative that has the effect of arresting or distorting the growth of further experience. 184

No experience is educative that does not tend both to knowledge of more facts and entertaining of more ideas and to a better, a more orderly arrangement of them. 185
If these quotes are at all descriptive of educative experiences, then Dewey is implicitly demonstrating that the reductionist position misses the point. As we have previously suggested, whether or not Dewey has a distinct theory of education separate from his theory of experience is an interesting theoretical question. However, on pedagogical grounds, that is not the important issue. Rather, what we must determine is whether all experiences are qualitatively similar. As we have shown, this Dewey flatly denies.

There is positive value gained in modifying experience adjectively by labeling it educative or mis-educative in the same way as there is positive value in labeling other categories of experience (aesthetic, religious, moral, and so on). Since we have shown that it is unwise to lump all experiences into the same general category, we must now establish the characteristic features of educative experience, just as we have done for aesthetic and religious experience.

A useful setting to help us examine is the classroom, for there must be some way for the teacher to distinguish between those experiences which have relevance to a child's educational or schooling experience and those which do not.

It thus becomes the office of the educator to select those things within the range of existing experience that have the promise and potentiality of
presenting new problems which by stimulating new ways of observation and judgment will expand the area of further experience. 186

Clearly not all experiences can be labeled educative, if certain experiences must be "selected" from the range of all experience. We would not, for instance, select experiences which taught children how to deal in illicit drugs more efficiently and profitably. Such experiences, according to Dewey, would be mis-educative. 187

Let us see how this works. In EE, Dewey lays out what he takes to be the governing problem for educators. This problem is stated within the context of his theory of experience and the manner in which he couches it further indicates that experiences can be either educative or mis-educative.

[W]e have the problem of discovering the connection which actually exists within experience between the achievements of the past and the issues of the present. ...How shall the young become acquainted with the past in such a way that the acquaintance is a potent agent in appreciation of the living present. 188

Once the problem is recognized, the task remains to select those experiences which are educational. Still, it is not sufficient merely to select educational experiences, for the classroom environment must be modified to house the chosen experiences adequately. The chosen environment determines how well the experience will be connected with other
experiences as well as the worth or quality of particular experiences.

Everything depends upon the quality of the experience which it has... The effect of an experience is not borne on its face. It sets a problem for the educator... Wholly independent of desire or intent, every experience lives on in further experiences. Hence the central problem of an education based upon experience is to select the kind of present experiences that live fruitfully and creatively in subsequent experiences. 189

Merely having experiences which will "live on" in future experiences is not sufficient. Experiences in illicit drug dealing will in fact live on in subsequent cases of drug dealing— one can become more adept at the practice— but the content of the experiences are not of the right kind. Dewey relies on additional qualifications in order to be more selective of the "right kind" of experience.

Dewey identifies two principles which serve "to discriminate between experiences that are worth while educationally and those that are not."190 The first is the principle of continuity:

the principle of continuity of experience means that every experience both takes up something from those which have gone before and modifies in some way the quality of those which come after. 191

The main virtue of this principle is that it calls to our attention Dewey's controversial and often misunderstood metaphorical characterization of education as growth.192
According to Dewey, the only true and unchanging aim in education is growth, or "the cumulative movement of action toward a later result." Here, significantly, Dewey states his definition of education in a way different from that previously given in connection with Vandenberg’s argument. "Education means the enterprise of supplying the conditions which insure growth or the adequacy of life, irrespective of age." For Dewey, the terms 'growth' and 'development' are interchangeable when development is conceived of in the following manner.

Our net conclusion is that life is development, and that developing, growing, is life. Translated into its educational equivalents, that means (i) that the educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end; and that (ii) the educational process is one of continual reorganizing, reconstructing, transforming.

We must not overlook the built in positive evaluative component of Dewey's construction of "continual reorganizing, reconstructing, transforming." If the only necessary criteria for identifying instances of educational growth were change and transformation, then even so-called mis-educative experiences would have to be categorized as educational, in a laudatory manner. Dewey does not hold that reflective experience is evaluatively neutral, for he would hold that the following example of "growth" is not educative growth at all.
We can imagine a group of individuals who engage in thievery as their occupation, secretly meeting to discuss strategy and plot future robberies. Each time they gather the group learns better and more effective means of stealing; they develop their skills at thievery. Moreover, each year the group chooses one young person to induct into the group. This person is taught, through tutoring and practice, how to engage in thievery lucratively. We could even say that this person's development satisfies the first discriminatory principle of continuity. In the case of our developing thief, each experience of thievery "takes up something" from the prior experiences of stealing and modifies future experiences of stealing so that they are more profitable.

Would we call this young person's acquired knowledge and skills "education" in the art of thievery? Is this experience educative? Dewey would deny that this experience is anything other than mis-educative. To find out why, we need to examine the second principle of selection.

The second principle which aids in discriminating between educative and mis-educative experiences is labeled "interaction." The principle of interaction assigns equal rights to both factors in experience—objective and internal conditions. Any normal experience is an interplay of these two sets of conditions. Taken together, or in their interaction, they form what we call a situation. 196
Objective conditions refer to the facts and inescapable realities of the environment in which we live. These are the conditions "which are within the power of the educator to regulate." Examples of objective conditions would be the physical arrangement of the classroom, subject-matter the students encounter, and freedom of movement the children have in the classroom. The internal conditions have to do with the individual himself; those "immediate internal states"—interests, capacities, and other unique characteristics which in combination define personality. There must be a balance of interaction between these two conditions in order to have normal experiences.

Dewey claims that the notions 'interaction' and 'situation' are inseparable. This is the case because Dewey defines 'situation' as "the interplay of these two sets of conditions." (This characterization is consistent with our earlier analysis of 'situation' where we claimed that situations are organically whole phenomena in which subject and object are intimately connected.) In this way, the two discriminatory principles are "intimately connected." "Continuity and interaction in their active union with each other provide the measure of the educative significance and value of an experience."

The reason that these two principles supply the measure for determining significance and value of educative
experiences has to do with the nature of the objective conditions.

The statement that individuals live in a world means, in the concrete, that they live in a series of situations. And when it is said that they live in these situations, the meaning of the word "in" is different from its meaning when it is said that pennies are "in" a pocket or paint is "in" a can. It means, once more, that interaction is going on between an individual and objects and other persons. 204

The key phrase to note is "other persons." Experiences are not, for Dewey *prima facie* worthwhile or valuable unless other individuals' interests and concerns are recognized. Thus, our studious thief's experiences are mis-educative for no other reason than that his actions fail to take into account the concerns and well-being of other individuals.

In summary, "the [educational] process is a continuous spiral." 205 All educational experiences, selected according to the criteria of the two principles of continuity and interaction, are gained through "a continuous process of reconstruction of experience." 206 To facilitate this process, Dewey advocates that students acquire the habit of engaging in reflective thought because it is the best method available of inquiry and investigation—of reconstructing experience. 207

Dewey identifies three attitudes which accompany a well-developed ability to engage in the process of
reflective thinking: open-mindedness, whole-heartedness, and responsibility. 208

The three attitudes that have been mentioned, open-mindedness, whole-hearted or absorbed interest, responsibility in facing consequences, are of themselves personal qualities, traits of character. They are not the only attitudes that are important in order that the habit of thinking in a reflective way may be developed. But the other attitudes that might be set forth are also traits of character, attitudes that, in the proper sense of the word, are moral, since they are traits of personal character that have to be cultivated. We only need to bear in mind that, with respect to the aims of education, no separation can be made between impersonal, abstract principles of logic and moral qualities of character. What is needed is to weave them into unity. 209

Finally, we see the interconnectedness of Dewey's thought. The three attitudes are personal qualities or virtues. They are important in determining the habit of reflective thinking, so basic to Dewey's process of experience. These attributes, along with others, are moral, and they are not exercised without careful nurturance and development. If education rather than mis-education is to take place, careful attention must be given to the moral development of certain attitudes and dispositions. These cannot be expected to bloom without guidance, attention, and careful manipulation of the environment.

And any environment is a chance environment so far as its educative influence is concerned unless it has been deliberately regulated with reference to its educative effect. 210
Dewey argues that schools are "the typical instance of environments framed with express reference to influencing the mental and moral disposition of their members." Not only are they the most typical way to systematize the transmission of knowledge and morality, but schools are also the set agency which can "insure adequate transmission of all its [the community's] resources." Thus we find Dewey legitimizing the schools' responsibility to engage explicitly in the processes and goals of moral education.

It remains to characterize moral experiences and moral educational experiences in order that we can subsequently understand how Dewey proposes in practice to "weave them into unity" in a total educational program.

MORAL EDUCATIVE EXPERIENCE

Our previous discussion suggested that "every subject, every method of instruction, every incident of school life [is] pregnant with moral possibility." However, just as Dewey recognizes that there is educative experience and mis-educative experience, so too not all educative experiences are morally educative. Thus, we need to outline the criteria which serve as discriminatory principles. But before moving directly into an explication of the details of such an analysis, we should establish the groundwork by making certain connections with Dewey's theory of experience explicit. In so doing, moral educational experiences will
be made distinguishable from other kinds of educational experiences.

We have mentioned in passing that Dewey characterizes moral science or ethics as the study of moral conduct. Moral conduct has to do with the individual or psychological side of existence coupled with the social or outward nature of the consequences of action.

It [moral science] has to relate these two sides. It has to study the inner process as determined by the outer conditions or as changing these outer conditions, and the outward behavior or institution as determined by the inner purpose, or as affecting the inner life.

Simply put, character develops through experiencing situations which have as their substance problems focusing upon conduct. "Whatever facilitates the formation of social habits, effort and emotion is moral education." Dewey says that "the problem which becomes of concern to us is that of achieving the aim of morality through the development of knowledge." We can imagine almost any subject-matter being taught in such a way as to militate against students seeing the relationships between knowledge and action. For example, Dewey rails against so-called traditionalists who rely primarily upon rote memorization to help students acquire knowledge.

Children are hushed up when they ask questions; their exploring and investigating activities are inconvenient and hence they are treated
like nuisances; pupils are taught to memorize things so that merely one-track verbal associations are set up instead of varied and flexible connections with things themselves; no plans and projects are provided that compell the student to look ahead and foresee and in the execution of which the accomplishment of one thing sets up new questions and suggests new undertakings. 219

This kind of "learning" is a sterling example of how introducing students to the important relationships between knowledge and action is thwarted. "Our present problem is one of finding a way to pursue knowledge so that it does influence our conduct." 220

In order to facilitate the moral growth of students, teachers have the responsibility for selecting subject-matter and methodology which provide students with the necessary experiences. For instance, Dewey says that historical subject-matter provides numerous opportunities for students to explore past experiences of those who have worked to better humanity. Also, students should not merely memorize facts about the development of the cotton gin or the emancipation of slaves during the War Between the States. There must be "hands on" type of acquaintance with the materials and methods used in past eras. In other words, students should be put into situations containing contextual features which are as authentic as possible to the original historical conditions. This means that students should not have the benefit of present day
discoveries and inventions (including both processes and products of investigation) in working with and understanding an historical problem.

The materials at students' disposal would be comprised of only those objects which would have been available at the time in question. The methods or processes used to modify and comprehend the materials would similarly be those which would have been available in the historical period. Thus, in the historical period of the War Between the States, students would not be permitted to use any methodology not in existence at that time. Students would have to remember that avenues of communication and travel that we take for granted today would not have been an option in the mid-nineteenth century (e.g., telephones, air travel). Similarly, sophisticated scientific tools and technological devices (e.g., computers, calculators, radios, television) could not be enlisted to expedite the manipulation of the materials and solving the recreated historical problem.

Obviously, it would be impossible to relive the War Between the States, or return to the day the cotton gin was invented. Dewey suggests that students should be acquainted with the circumstances in existence at these times and allowed to recreate selected important aspects of these past experiences. For example, students could be allowed to work with freshly picked cotton in an effort to try to separate it from the seeds and hull. Students would then be able to
understand more fully the need and motivation for inventing the cotton gin. Likewise, children could act out particular aspects of the slavery issue to the degree that they become aware of the oppression of the slaves and the circumstances which led up to the Civil War itself.

Clearly, for Dewey, moral experiences are social experiences, and moral problem situations (as the substance of moral educational subject-matter) are social problem situations.

[G]enuine problems are set only by actual social situations which are themselves conflicting and confused....In fine, problems with which inquiry into social subject-matter is concerned must, if they satisfy the conditions of scientific method, (1) grow out of actual social tensions, needs, "troubles"; (2) have their subject-matter determined by the conditions that are material means of bringing about a unified situation, and (3) be related to some hypothesis, which is a plan and policy for existential resolution of the conflicting social situation. 221

Social problem situations come not only from the subject-matter, but they also arise daily out of the life of the school and the interaction of the students as they explore the subject-matter. Teachers, in Dewey's view, would be prudent in capitalizing upon instances and problems where issues of cooperation, sharing, honesty, benevolence, courage and any number of other moral virtues arise.

Just as all subject-matter and methodology are pregnant with moral possibility, it is just as likely that the same
subject-matter and methodology will not contain moral significance. As we have already seen, Dewey claims that individual features of any single situation viewed in isolation from other features will be void of moral import. Only when the situation is viewed as an organic unity, where the contextual features are combined with the intentions of the subjects and consequences of the action, will the experience take on moral quality.

Dewey believes that the teacher ought not choose knowledge which is removed from the ordinary experiences of students because no matter how it is learned, it is not likely to result in personal involvement. Thus, students should be encouraged to see the relevance and importance of historical matters, for instance. The teacher should constantly help students relate the subject-matter to present and future social life.

It is critical to recognize that moral educational experiences are a subset of educational experiences. In order to establish the basis for this claim, we need to provide criteria which will distinguish the former from the latter. It is sufficient for this chapter to mention what these criteria are. We will leave the detailed explanation necessary for comprehending them to Chapter Three, since the criteria are extremely complex.

Both educative experiences and moral educational experiences can be characterized as those ordinary social
experiences which encourage the progressive development of judgment and action of personal decisions in the context of larger social configurations. Like all other kinds of experience, both educative and moral educational experiences begin this evolution with so-called instinctual impulses and desires which are reconstructed through reflection. However, not all educative experiences have moral import. There are two distinguishing features. The first has to do with the consequences perceived and reached. Educative experiences become morally educative experiences when the ends of investigation are moral; that is, the consequences of the experience affect others in their ability to make choices and to act upon them within a social context. Closely related to this criterion is the second distinguishing feature: educative experiences take on moral significance when the experiences involve decisions and actions of moral right and wrong, and good and bad. (In Chapter Three we will see that there are judgments and actions of right, wrong, good, and bad that are non-moral.)

To provide examples and go into any further detail at this point would be to lay out the specifics of the practice of moral education. But we cannot describe the practice of moral education adequately without first understanding the contents of Dewey's theory of morals. We will leave the analysis of the practice of moral education to Chapter Four, as this must be done carefully and comprehensively.
Since the thrust of our efforts is dependent upon identifying distinctively moral educational experiences, the next chapter in this study centers upon explaining the specific content and theory of morals. In this way, we will be able to distinguish between moral, immoral, and non-moral experiences. We do not want to ignore the moral quality of experience. Dewey hoped that the majority of all educational experiences contained a moral quality. But if the task of a teacher is to choose moral educational experiences for the purpose of designing programs in moral education, then we are left to fill in the constitutive elements of Dewey's theory of morals. This constitutes the subject-matter of Chapter Three. Once this is established, we will then be in a better position to present the detail necessary in Dewey's prescriptions for the practice of moral education.

SUMMARY

In this chapter we analyzed Dewey's theory of experience. Our goal, at least in part, was to determine whether or not the reductionist argument concerning the relationship between experience and education is warranted. We viewed this as a preliminary step in locating and separating Dewey's theory of moral education and the practice of moral education.

We concluded that although it is obvious that Dewey created an "education based upon experience," it is not
the case that all experiences are qualitatively similar. To reduce Dewey's educational theory to his general philosophical theory of experience is to generalize far too much. Without making distinctions among different kinds of experiences, we risk losing the many and varied kinds of educational experiences to which students are to be introduced, among them moral educational experiences.
CHAPTER NOTES


5. One might argue, for example, that Dewey's science of education as in John Dewey, The Sources of a Science of Education (New York: Horace Liveright, 1929), is what his theory of education entails. Such a portrayal would reduce his educational views to 'science' rather than 'experience'. Or we could view Dewey's educational theory in the way he himself defines 'theory': as that which has a one-to-one correspondence with practice. See for example John Dewey, "Moral Theory and Practice," 1891, in Jo Ann Boydston, ed., The Early Works of John Dewey 1889-1892, vol. 3 (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969), pp. 93-109. It is also true that scholars speak of Dewey's educational theory, for example, Wayne A. R. Leys, "Dewey's Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy," in Jo Ann Boydston, ed., Guide To The Works of John Dewey (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1970), pp. 131-155, states that "[in] concluding that Dewey's social and political experimentalism took shape as he thought about nations at war, I do not want to deny the importance of Dewey's educational theories in his political philosophy." (pp. 137-138) Those who use the phrase "educational theory" might concede that it is a poorly chosen description or they may in fact provide arguments in favor of the position that Dewey does have an educational theory and the label is therefore not a misnomer.

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9. The first three quotes contained in this second chapter clearly demonstrate how Dewey intermingles and connects the terms 'experience', 'education', 'reconstruction of experience', and 'moral education', almost to the point of total conflation. Add to the above the following portion from John Dewey, "Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality," in Jo Ann Boydston, ed., John Dewey The Middle Works 1899-1924, vol. 3 (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), pp. 3-39, which confuses the issue further by combining 'experience', 'reconstruction transformation of experience' and 'moral/ethical experience'. "The whole discussion implies that the determination of objects as objects, even when involving no conscious reference whatever to conduct, is, after all for the sake of the development of further experience. This further development is change, transformation of existing experience, and thus is active. So far as this development is intentionally directed through the construction of objects as objects, there is not only active experience, but regulated activity, i.e., conduct, behavior, practice. Therefore, all determination of objects as objects (including the sciences which construct physical objects) has reference to change of experience, or experience as activity; and, when this reference passes from abstraction to application (from negative to positive), has reference to conscious control of the nature of the change (i.e., conscious change), and thereby gets ethical significance. This principle may be termed the postulate of continuity of experience. This principle on the one hand protects the integrity of the moral judgment, revealing its supremacy and the corresponding instrumental or auxiliary character of the intellectual judgment (whether physical, psychological, or social); and, upon the other, protects the moral judgment from isolation (i.e., from transcendentalism), bringing it into working relations of reciprocal assistance with all judgments about the subject-matter of experience, even those of the most markedly mechanical and physiological sort." (pp. 38-39) In this summary statement, Dewey speaks of the ethical significance of experience. Throughout this article, 'ethical' and 'moral' are used interchangeably. It just so happens that in the above
quoted context, Dewey does not explicitly mention 'moral experience', but this phrase appears nearly a dozen times to develop his argument in favor of a scientific treatment of morality. The postulate of continuity of experience clearly has moral significance. The interconnectedness of meanings all told is definitely confusing, but cannot be ignored.

10. See for example portions of John Dewey, Experience and Nature, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Dover Publications, 1929) for typical and lengthy examples of the manner in which Dewey criticizes philosophical positions containing or supporting false dichotomies. Chapter One, "Experience and Philosophic Method," (pp. 1a-39) and Chapter Two, "Existence," (pp. 40-77) provide ample evidence of Dewey's strategy. In these chapters alone, Dewey claims that nearly all past schools of philosophic thought endorse false dichotomies. In approximately eighty pages, Dewey manages to attack the Pathagoreans, Heraclitis, Aristotle, Plato, Newton, St. Thomas Aquinas, Roger Bacon, Francis Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Kant, Comte, Hegel, Bergson, Bertrand Russell, and others.

11. It is seldom clear in reading Dewey's arguments against dualisms who he has in mind when he speaks of traditionalists' mistakes. In John Dewey, Experience and Education, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1938) for instance, the arguments given in Chapter One which are proffered to set up his own position, pit traditional against progressive education. In this context Dewey never establishes who in particular are the leaders or advocates of either fallaciously designed "ism." This straw man argument is typical of Dewey's characterizations of false dichotomies.


14. As we will see, Dewey borrowed the terms 'primary' and 'secondary', but he definitely did not want them to be interpreted in a Lockean sense. Not only does his analysis of primary and secondary make this clear, but also his treatment of quality wherein he makes particular reference to Locke and the differences between that view of quality and his own. Throughout much of Dewey's analyses, he mentions historical figures
such as Leibniz and Spinoza, but he uses these people primarily as foils. In *Experience and Nature*, p. 49, for example, Dewey uses this tack to point out his own position on the way the metaphysical pie should be divided. Dewey claims that Aristotle was on the right track in claiming that the world is pluralistic rather than being atomistic or monistic (i.e., a la Bertrand Russell or Leibniz,) or dualistic (i.e., a la Descartes.)


16. Ibid., p. 42.

17. Ibid., p. 160.


23. Peirce's definition of truth is as follows: "The opinion which is fated (Fate means merely that which is sure to come true, and can nohow be avoided... Peirce's note) to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real." Peirce qualifies this formulation and makes it perfectly clear that the Truth is an actual entity toward which all investigation aims. "On the one hand, reality is independent, not necessarily of thought in general, but only of what you or I or any finite number of men may think about it; and that, on the other hand, though the object of the final opinion depends on what that opinion is, yet what that opinion is does not depend on what you or I or any finite number of men thinks. Our perversity and that of others may indefinitely postpone the settlement of opinion; it might even conceivably cause an arbitrary proposition to be universally accepted as long as the
human race should last. Yet even that would not change the nature of the belief, which alone could be the result of investigation carried sufficiently far; and if, after the extinction of our race, another should arise with faculties and disposition for investigation, that true opinion must be the one which they would ultimately come to. 'Truth crushed to earth shall rise again', and the opinion which would finally result from investigation does not depend on how anybody may actually think, but the reality of that which is real does depend upon the real fact that investigation is destined to lead at least, if continued long enough to a belief in it." Peirce, "How To Make Our Ideas Clear," pp. 17-18.

24. James' definition of truth reflects the personal (individual) side of verification; individuals may reasonably and consistently disagree over the truth of something. In James' formulation, two different "truths" about the same thing need not be contradictory. Personal verification is all that is needed to confirm the truth of something. "'Truth', is a property of certain of our ideas; it means their agreement, as falsity means their disagreement with reality....The true, to put it very briefly is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as the right is only the expedient in the way of our behaving....But if there is no reason extant in the universe why they should be doubted, the beliefs are true in the only sense in which anything can be true anyhow: They are practically and concretely true, namely. True in the mystical mongrel sense of an identitatsphilosophic. They need not be; nor is there any intelligible reason why they ever need to be true otherwise than verifiably and practically. It is reality's part to possess its own existence, it is thoughts part to get into 'touch' with it by innumerable paths of verification." From William James, "The Meaning of Truth," in Rorty, Pragmatic Philosophy, pp. 173, 174 and 189.


27. Dewey, Art As Experience, pp. 43-44.


29. I am indebted to Richard Pratte for this analysis of the distinct uses of the concept 'experience'.
30. We are borrowing this terminology from a particular analysis of definition: Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education, 1960. Reprint. (Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas, 1974). To quote Scheffler, a stipulative-programmatic definition is as follows. "A general definition [definitions taken out of the context of professional members of a scientific community and addressed to other audiences than the scientific community] is often simply a stipulation to the effect that a given term is to be understood in a special way for the space of some discourse or throughout several discourses of a certain type; such a definition may be called 'stipulative'. A stipulative definition exhibits some term to be defined and gives notice that it is to be taken as equivalent to some other exhibited term or description, within a particular context." (p. 13) "What is, however, fundamental with regard to all stipulative definitions is that they do not purport to reflect the predefinitional usage of the terms they define [as do descriptive-reportive definitions]." (p. 15) "Where a definition purports to do either of these three things, [first, to propose a definition that now assigns such a term to some new thing may in context be a way of conveying that this new thing ought to be accorded the sort of practical treatment given to things hitherto applied may be a way of conveying that the object in question ought no longer to be treated as the things referred to by the given term have been treated....Third, to propose a definition that assigns the term just exactly to the objects to which it has hitherto applied and to no others, the point at stake may be to defend the propriety of the current practical orientation to such objects and to no others, rather than (or as well as) to mirror predefinitional usage]. It is acting as an expression of a practical program and we shall call it 'programmatic'....A programmatic definition, in effect, may perhaps be said to convey the practical consequence itself, rather than merely to express a premise capable of yielding it under suitable conditions." (pp. 19-20)

31. In later years Dewey realized the confusion he created by stipulating the definition of 'experience' and forming a theory based upon it. He would have substituted the concept 'culture' in its place had he anticipated the results. See for example, Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 121-123, and John Dewey, Freedom and Culture (New York: Capricorn Books, 1939), Chapters One and Two for definitions of 'culture' which are compatible with Dewey's analysis of 'experience'.


33. To alleviate any confusion, at this point we must provide some basic explanation of what constitutes primary and secondary experience and draw an important distinction; that between experience and an experience. Unfortunately, Dewey is not extremely helpful when it comes to offering concrete examples of primary experiences as the "raw unrefined data of experience." Examples of primary experience would be bumping into an object in the dark, seeing for the first time a mute person use sign language, or being lost and thirsty in an unfamiliar environment. All of these examples share a number of features which categorize them as primary experiences. The initial confrontation of the individual with the object, event, or problem is in many ways unsettling; that is, the person has questions or is confused about what object s/he bumped into, what hand movements the person is using and why, and where s/he is and how to quench the felt thirst. This is the subject-matter of primary experience. As soon as reflection begins (process of experience), the object, event, or problem acquires meanings as it is compared and contrasted with past experiences. In other words, the person considers the possible objects s/he might have bumped into, remembers reading about sign language, or runs through the logical and practical possibilities available to find out where s/he is and how s/he can get something to drink. Once these perplexities are eliminated and the person identifies the object, realizes that the person cannot speak and is using sign language to communicate, or finds out where s/he is and obtains something to drink, the experience is no longer primary. When the problem is solved, the experience is reconstructed and is called 'secondary experience'. Dewey calls this consummation of the experience as having had an experience. This distinction between experience and an experience is an important one. We will treat this distinction in more detail as the analysis continues.


35. Ibid., pp. 67-68. Dewey argues that to separate and isolate the object of inquiry from the action a person makes in reference to it is to classify falsely the states of the object as cognitive. Only when object and
action are conjoined is the situation replete of opposition and conflict. "The object or event in question is perceived as part of the environing world, not in and by itself; it is rightly (validly) perceived if and when it acts as and guide in use-enjoyment. We live and act in connection with the existing environment, not in connection with isolated objects, even though a singular thing may be crucially significant in deciding how to respond to total environment." (p. 68)

36. Ibid., p. 66.

37. Ibid., p. 46. Also, see Chapter Eight of John Locke, Of Human Understanding for a detailed account of the nature of primary and secondary qualities. For salient portions of Chapter Eight, see Walter Kaufmann, ed. Philosophic Classics II: Bacon to Kant, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1968), pp. 177-181.


39. Ibid.

40. Dewey often uses the term 'felt' when speaking of the manner in which qualities are recognized. See for example, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 63 for a typical passage. The term means "directly or immediately experienced;" Dewey, How We Think, p. 107. That is, reflection is not a part of the way in which the quality is experienced.


43. Ibid., pp. 100-101.

44. Ibid., pp. 102-118 provides a concise analysis of reflective thought.


46. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 19. Empirical Method is not to be confused with "Purely Empirical Thinking" which does not include having a knowledge of the continuities existing between the facts. Purely Empirical Thinking suggests that only the mere observable facts of the matter are recognized (How We Think, pp. 190-192).


50. Dewey, How We Think, p. 95.


52. See Dewey, How We Think pp. 115-118 for a discussion on past experiences and acquired habits serving to allow inquiry to begin and how it serves to check results and permit future inquiry to be possible.


55. Ibid., p. 42.


57. Ibid., p. 48.


59. Ibid., p. 16.

60. Dewey equates the social with the moral and thus in his chain of arguments, habits become moral entities. See for example sections from Dewey's writings titled "Morality is Social" as quoted in James Gouinlock, ed., The Moral Writings of John Dewey (New York: Hafner Press, 1976), pp. 176-187.


62. Ibid., p. 21.

63. In How We Think, Dewey calls this phase suggestion (p. 107) and in "Analysis of Reflective Thought" he refers to it as the occurrence of a problem. (p. 29)

64. Dewey, How We Think, p. 96.

65. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
66. Ibid., p. 125.


68. Dewey, How We Think, p. 35.

69. Dewey actually uses the terms 'equalibria' and 'disequalibria' in describing the nature of the problem. Here is an example of such usage: "General appeals to a child (or to a grown-up) to think, irrespective of the existence in his own experience of some difficulty that troubles him and disturbs his equalibrium are as futile as advice to lift himself by his bootstraps." (How We Think, p. 15).

70. In How We Think, Dewey calls this phase intellectualization (p. 108) and in "Analysis of Reflective Thought," he refers to it as its specification. (p. 29)

71. Dewey, How We Think, p. 104.

72. Dewey defines "The facts of the case [as] those traits that are used as evidence in reaching a conclusion or forming a decision," How We Think, p. 123.

73. In How We Think, Dewey calls this phase the guiding idea, hypothesis (p. 109) and in "Analysis of Reflective Thought," he refers to it as occurrence of a solving situation, or supposition, hypothesis. (p. 29)

74. Dewey, How We Think, p. 104.

75. In How We Think, Dewey calls this phase reasoning (p. 111) and in "Analysis of Reflective Thought," he refers to it as elaboration of suggestion, or reasoning. (p. 29)

76. As mentioned earlier, the sequence of steps/phases in investigation is not temporally fixed. Dewey reiterates this position in "An Analysis of Reflective Thought," pp. 29-38.

77. In How We Think, Dewey calls this phase testing the hypothesis by action (p. 113) and in "An Analysis of Reflective Thought," he refers to it as experimental testing. (p. 29)

78. See How We Think, pp. 96-97 and pp. 104-105 for further explanation of what proof and successful results entail.
81. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
82. Ibid., p. 86.
83. Ibid., p. 4a.
85. Ibid., p. 40.
86. Ibid., p. 17.
87. Ibid., p. 16.
88. Ibid., p. 30.
89. Ibid., p. 20.
90. Ibid., p. 19.
91. Ibid.
95. There is further reason to understand 'interest'. In John Dewey, "Interest in Relation to Training of the Will," reprinted in Charles A. McMurry, ed., 2nd Supplement to the Herbart Yearbook. Reprint. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1899), Dewey claims that both 'interest' and 'effort' have direct and important bearing on adequate moral training.
100. Ibid.


102. Ibid.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid.


108. Ibid., pp. 36-37.

109. For a lengthy and illuminating analysis of the differences and similarities between 'interest' and 'attention', see White, "Dewey's Theory of Interest," pp. 36-41.

110. Ibid., p. 36.

111. In *Interest and Effort in Education*, Dewey uses the terms 'genuine interest' and 'lively interest' repeatedly. See for example, p. 7 for an example of the former, and p. 52 for an instance of the latter.

112. Ibid., p. 15.


114. Ibid., pp. 48-49.

115. Ibid., p. 49.

116. Ibid.

117. Ibid., p. 58.

118. Ibid.

119. Ibid., p. 52.

120. Ibid., p. 43.
121. Ibid., pp. 52-53.

122. In *How We Think*, Dewey establishes his five step process of reflective thinking. (pp. 102-118) He claims that the sequence of the five phases is not fixed. "The five phases, terminals, or functions of thought, that we have noted do not follow one another in a set order. On the contrary, each step in genuine thinking does something to perfect the formation of a suggestion and promote its change into a leading idea or directive hypothesis. It does something to promote the location and definition of the problem. Each improvement in the idea leads to new observations that yield new facts or data and help the mind judge more accurately the relevancy of facts already at hand. The elaboration of the hypothesis does not wait until the problem has been defined and adequate hypothesis has been arrived at; it may come in at any intermediate time. And as we have just seen, any particular overt test need not be final; it may be introductory to new observations and new suggestions, according to what happens in consequence of it." (p. 115) This implicitly shows the relationship Dewey holds between means and ends. However, when a truth claim is reached, the immediate need to continue investigation disappears. "This control of inference prior to, and on behalf of, belief constitutes proof. To prove a thing means primarily to test it....Not until a thing has been tried--'tried out', in colloquial language--do we know its true worth. Till then it may be pretense, a bluff. But the thing that has come out victorious in a test or trial of strength carries its credentials with it; it is approved, because it has been proved." (pp. 96-97) Intuitively we all know that not all so-called inferences can be overtly tested. In other words, there are beliefs/hypotheses we wish to test which are physically or morally impossible to verify overtly. Dewey recognizes the reality of this problem and distinguishes between testing through action and testing through imagination. "Examination reveals that the testing is of two kinds. Suggested inferences are tested in thought to see whether different elements in the suggestion are coherent with one another. They are also tested, after one has been adopted, by action to see whether the consequences that are anticipated in thought occur in fact." (p. 97) "What is inferred demands a double test: first, the process of forming the idea or supposed solution is checked by constant cross reference to the conditions observed to be actually present; secondly, the idea after it is formed is tested by acting upon it, overtly if possible, otherwise in imagination. The consequences of this action confirm, modify, or refute the idea." (pp. 104-105)


125. See for example, *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 118-122, where he makes such claims as "[a] motive is then that element in the total complex of man's activity which, if it can be sufficiently stimulated, will result in an act having specified consequences....An element in an act viewed as a tendency to produce such and such consequences is a motive....An inchoate activity taken in this forward-looking reference to results, especially results of approbation and condemnation, constitutes a motive." In these passages, the state of motives as consequences is not clear. Does he mean that motives are consequences or that motives are an important factor in reaching consequences? The latter interpretation makes more sense and is consistent with whatever Dewey means by 'interest' as 'motive'. However, later in *Human Nature and Conduct* (p. 231), Dewey characterizes ends in such a way that motives could easily be interpreted as what he means by ends: "Why is it not universally recognized that an end is a device of intelligence in guiding action, instrumental to freeing and harmonizing troubled and divided tendencies?...Ends are, in fact, literally endless, forever coming into existence as new activities occasion new consequences. 'Endless ends' is a way of saying that there are no ends—that is no fixed self-enclosed finalities." See also *Interest and Effort in Education*, p. 63, "The end or object in its vital connection with the person's activities is a motive."

126. Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 321. Motive means "[t]hose interests which form the core of the self and supply the principles by which conduct is to be understood."


128. Ibid., pp. 44-45.


130. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

131. Ibid., p. 7.

132. Ibid., p. 35.


136. Ibid., p. 64.


143. These three categories of experience are not exhaustive of the kinds of experience Dewey recognizes. We could have analyzed political, sociological, or some other kind of experience as being examplary.


146. Ibid., p. 49.

147. Ibid., p. 39.

148. Ibid., p. 49.

149. Ibid., p. 44.

150. A sensitive reader will notice that throughout his works Dewey uses a wealth of different adjectives to modify 'experience'. He uses words that mark off content areas of study (e.g., moral, aesthetic,
religious, political, sociological). He also uses the terms 'intellectual', 'practical', and 'emotional', which apparently modify all of these other areas by referring to the phases of engaging in the process of experiencing. In other words, a political experience which has a political issue for its subject-matter can be dominantly intellectual, practical, or emotional "because of the interest and purpose that initiate and control them." (Art As Experience, p. 55) Even though Dewey claims that experiences can be dominantly intellectual, practical or emotional, he also says that "It is not possible to divide in a vital experience the practical, emotional, and intellectual from one another and to set the properties of one over against the characteristics of the others. The emotional phase binds parts together into a single whole; 'intellectual' simply names the fact that the experience has meaning; 'practical' indicates that the organism is interacting with events and objects which surround it." (Art As Experience, p. 55) This is the extent of the analysis of these three phases of experience in Art As Experience. In A Common Faith, Dewey describes 'emotional experience' more carefully, and in How We Think, there are more extensive clues given about the nature of intellectual and practical experiences.

152. Ibid.
153. Ibid., p. 46.
155. Ibid.
157. Ibid., p. 50
158. Ibid., p. 55.
159. Ibid., p. 105.
161. Ibid., p. 3.
163. Ibid., p. 3.
164. Dewey defines 'mystical experience' as that kind of experience which "is a veridical realization of the direct presence of God [and] does not rest so much upon examination of the facts as it does upon importing into their interpretation a conception that is formed outside of them." (A Common Faith, p. 35) Dewey discusses 'supernatural experience' as that which is associated with a supernatural Being, i.e., God. (A Common Faith, pp. 1-4) Thus supernatural and mystical experience are closely related and not part of Dewey's conception of religion and religious experience.


166. Ibid., p. 14.


168. Ibid., p. 27.

169. Ibid., p. 48.

170. Ibid., p. 49.

171. Ibid., p. 15.

172. Ibid.

173. Ibid.

174. Ibid., p. 16.

175. Ibid.

176. Ibid., pp. 16-17.

177. Ibid., p. 17.

178. Dewey uses 'genuine' to modify religious experience in an analogous way as he used 'purely' to modify aesthetic experience and to separate this kind or category of experience from the quality of experience (limited sense). We must keep this in mind lest we be tempted to be taken in by the magic of words when the word 'genuine' is used. See John Wilson, Language and the Pursuit of Truth (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 32-36 for a discussion on mistakes about words, sometimes called, "word magic."

180. Ibid., p. 32.
181. Ibid., p. 27.
182. Ibid., p. 22.
185. Ibid., p. 82.
186. Ibid., p. 75.
187. Ibid., p. 51.
188. Ibid., p. 21.
189. Ibid., pp. 27-28.
190. Ibid., p. 33.
191. Ibid., p. 35.
192. Dewey's definition and theory of growth has historically been misapplied. The gardening metaphor implies a conception of growth, for example, that has little similarity to Dewey's analysis. Yet, because 'growth' is a concept common to both views, it has been possible to equivocate between Dewey's notion and the concept as suggested through applying the metaphor.
194. Ibid., p. 51.
195. Ibid., pp. 49-50.
197. Ibid., p. 45.
198. Ibid., p. 42.
199. Ibid.
200. Ibid.
201. See pp. 71-74 of this chapter for the analysis of 'situation'.


203. Ibid., p. 45.

204. Ibid., p. 43.

205. Ibid., p. 79.

206. Ibid., p. 87.

207. Dewey, How We Think, pp. 29-30.

208. Ibid., pp. 30-32. Dewey defines these three attitudes as follows: "Open-mindedness. This attitude may be defined as freedom from prejudice, to consider new problems and entertain new ideas." "Whole-heartedness. When anyone is thoroughly interested in some object and cause, he throws himself into it; he does so, as we say, 'heartedly,' or with a whole heart." "Responsibility. To be intellectually responsible is to consider the consequences of a projected step; it means to be willing to adopt those consequences when they follow reasonably from any position already taken. Intellectual responsibility secures integrity; that is to say, consistency and harmony in belief." These attitudes appear again as "open-mindedness, intellectual honesty, and responsibility" in Dewey's two lectures on moral education delivered in China. This is a significant indication that such attitudes are part of a morally and intellectually educated individual.

209. Ibid., pp. 33-34.


211. Ibid.

212. Ibid.


214. Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, p. 3.

215. Ibid., p. 4.

223. Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 79.
CHAPTER THREE

THEORY OF MORAL EXPERIENCE

INTRODUCTION

"Dewey's philosophy is one of experience, and his philosophy of [morals] is one of experience in an emphatic way."¹ In the preceding chapter, we explicated Dewey's theory of experience in an effort to establish that his views on education can be properly characterized as a particular kind of experience. We also suggested that Dewey's theory of moral education hinges upon being able to identify particular moral experiences as the subject-matter of moral education. We concluded that although Dewey's views on education are firmly grounded and understandable in terms of his theory of experience, we cannot leave the analysis of education at this basic level. All experiences are not qualitatively similar, and criteria for distinguishing various kinds of experience can be located and outlined if any meaningful analysis of education and moral education is desired.

We have, however, merely scratched the surface. What needs explaining are the distinguishing features among
experience in general, and various kinds of experience such as aesthetic experience, religious experience, educative experience, mis-educative experience and so on in particular. However, to say that Dewey holds that there are moral experiences separate from other kinds of experience is not to characterize what would count as moral experience. Thus, in order to gain a more thorough understanding of moral experience and to be able to identify and apply the criteria which serve to distinguish moral experience from other kinds of experience, further analysis is needed to tie together the theoretical aspects of Deweyan moral education.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the scope and nature of Dewey's theory of morals. We will characterize moral experience as a special kind of experience, separating moral experiences from aesthetic experience, religious experience, and so on, and identifying the subset of moral experiences which are educative. Once this theory of moral experience is unraveled, the way will be paved in Chapter Four for explaining which and how moral experiences are educative.

MORAL EXPERIENCE

Dewey's theory of moral experience is significantly more complicated than his theories of aesthetic and religious experiences, for he does not provide a systematic account of a theory of morals as experience. This could mean either that Dewey does not have a theory of moral experience or
that he does not have a theory of morals. Fortunately, neither is the case. Consequently, analyzing moral experience involves first demonstrating that Dewey does have a theory of moral experience, and second, characterizing the nature of that type of experience.

As with his theories of art and religion, Dewey does proffer the distinction between the moral quality of experience and moral experience. Since the thrust of this entire study has to do with characterizing those actual moral experiences belonging in legitimate educational settings as moral educative experience, the major tasks of describing the theoretical content of the moral for Dewey will be left to subsequent sections in this chapter. In that context, we will be able to go into the detail necessary to adequately characterize the moral. However, in this section it is enough to show that there is a category of Deweyan moral experience and, like aesthetic and religious experience, Dewey's theory of moral experience is a theory of experience in an emphatic way.

We note that as early as 1891, Dewey uses the phrase "moral experience," and talks about the "[p]ossibility and value of moral experience."² In 1894 he expresses

the fact that moral experience continually demands of every agent that he shape his plans and interests so that they meet the needs of the situations, while it also requires that, through the agent, the situation be so modified as to enable the agent to express himself freely.³
Moreover, Dewey talks about moral experience in both editions of _E_, and in LCSTM posits that there is a "continuity of moral experience."  

Clearly, moral experience is a particular kind of experience for Dewey, and it does exist. The important question remaining is what counts as the subject-matter of moral experience? To answer this question will involve finding out what Dewey means by 'moral'.

Since Dewey uses the terms 'ethics' and 'moral' interchangeably, we can rely upon his description of ethics as also being a description of the moral domain.  

_Ethics as a science is concerned with collecting and classifying the facts of experiences in which judgments of right and wrong are actually embodied or to which they apply._  

In this characterization we see that a theory of morals has to do with a particular set of experiences; those concerned with judgments of right and wrong. However, not all acts containing judgments of right and wrong are moral judgments, for we can talk about the right knife to cut vegetables or the wrong step to take when dancing a waltz. Clearly, these are not moral judgments. Moral judgments have to do with making determinations of right and wrong about matters which affect relationships between people. Thus, morality and moral judgments are not possible for a person alone on a desert island. For Dewey, "[e]very act has potential moral
significance, because it is, through its consequence, part of a larger whole of behavior." Having moral significance is simply another way of saying that an act has moral quality. Moral quality of experience, good or bad, exists when the consequences of the act are considered.

Many acts are done not only without thought of their moral quality but with practically no thoughts of any kind. Yet these acts are preconditions of other acts having significant value. A criminal on his way to commit a crime and a benevolent person on his way to a deed of mercy both have to walk or ride. Such acts, non-moral in isolation, derive moral significance from the ends to which they lead.

Yet, the consequences of an experience are not sufficient to determine the quality of the moral situation.

Common-sense in short never loses sight wholly of the two facts which limit and define a moral situation. One is that consequences fix the moral quality of an act. The other is that upon the whole, or in the long run but not unqualifiedly, consequences are what they are because of the nature of desire and disposition.

In the above passage, Dewey claims that in a moral situation there are two conditions, each necessary and jointly sufficient. In addition to the consequences of acts, "desire and disposition" of the agent must also be considered. (Dewey uses 'desire' and 'disposition' synonymously with 'motive' and 'intention'.) As we will see in subsequent analyses, although Dewey posits that the conditions of intentions and consequences define a moral
situation and that other ethical theories which claim that such definition depends either upon motives or consequences are one-sided,\textsuperscript{13} he provides little analysis of the nature of intentionality while a great amount of space is devoted to characterizing moral consequences.

For example, Dewey's treatment of intentionality throughout \textit{E} is cursory and the role it plays in defining a moral situation and its relationship to the consequences of the action is summed up with the claim, "\textit{We are dealing not with two different things [intentions and consequences] but with two poles of the same thing.}\textsuperscript{14} This claim is reminiscent of Dewey's analysis of the nature of and relationship among means, ends, and ends-in-view. However, noting that intentions and consequences are unified in a similar way as are means and ends is not helpful in making sense of the nature of intentionality. Hence, we must not ignore Dewey's claim that both the consequences reached and the intentions of the agent define the quality of a moral experience, but beyond this, we are left with little analysis which would help pin down the nature and role of intentionality in defining a moral situation.

In the previous chapter the nature of religion and aesthetics was considered in order to distinguish aesthetic from religious experience. Similarly, we must do the same for the nature of morality. This task is a difficult one and since understanding Dewey's theory of morality needs
more than a passing treatment, we will spend the remainder of this chapter outlining the constitutive elements of his moral theory.

In sum, in this section of the chapter, our purpose has only been to demonstrate that Dewey does hold there to be moral experiences. This we have done, and implicitly we have suggested that moral, aesthetic, and religious experiences cannot be easily conflated even though all experiences can acquire moral, aesthetic, or religious qualities even simultaneously. On this note let us turn our attention to Dewey's theory of morals with the goal of characterizing distinctively moral experiences.

INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL

All morality (including immorality) is both individual and social:—individual in its immediate inception and execution, in the desires, choices, dispositions from which conduct proceeds; social in its occasions, material, and consequences. 15

To say that morality is both individual and social is not a very helpful explanation of the nature of morality unless we understand Dewey's programmatic definitions for these two complementary elements. Once we have a firm grasp of the nature of these, we will be in a better position to explain other important elements in Dewey's theory of morals which rely upon the formulation of the individual and the social as basic axioms. Thus, at this point we will digress from Dewey's theory of morality in order to become familiar
with the Deweyan categories of the individual and the social.

Individual

There has been much misinterpretation of Dewey's categories of the individual and the social. At times, he has been accused of being highly relativistic, as if he championed total individualism. He has conversely been labeled a socialist, as if the individual is lost to the group. In terms of his educational views, his doctrines regarding the individual and the social have been sloganized. Phrases such as "democracy in education," "teach the whole child," and "begin with the child's interests," were originally intended to summarize Dewey's position. However, over time and neglectful of the parent doctrines, these phrases have become mere slogans attached to any number of diverse schooling programs, many of which had little, if any, resemblance to Deweyan theory.

According to Dewey, a false dualism is involved—the individual is not in fact subordinate to the group and neither is the group subordinate to the individual. "In fact, both words, individual and social, are hopelessly ambiguous, and the ambiguity will never cease as long as we think in terms of an antithesis." "The antithesis between individual and social ceases to be merely silly. It becomes dangerous."
In his attempt to eradicate the dualism, Dewey posits that there are "two important elements in individuality. First, is the distinctive difference, something that marks off one person from another." Otherwise he is an individual only as a stick of wood is, namely as spatially and numerically separate. Just as no two snowflakes are alike or no two fingerprints, there are no two human individuals who are exactly alike. This is the descriptive sense of individuality.

For Dewey, the second element in individuality is evaluative. We must point out that with the introduction of the evaluative element, Dewey has defined 'individuality' programmatically. We will see in the remainder of the analysis in this chapter that his entire moral theory rests upon a series of programmatic definitions.

The evaluative element in individuality means that "there is not merely difference or distinction, but something unique or unreplaceable in value, an unique difference of value." Dewey claims that alternative conceptions of individuality have not included or have overlooked crucial aspects of the nature of individuality, as he defines it. We can become clearer about the nature of the Deweyan double-barrelled descriptive and evaluative concept of individuality by taking note of the following.

Dewey presents three defining qualities in his concept of individuality by noting three often heard misconceptions.
Dewey thus brings out what he takes to be important defining aspects of individuality by suggesting what individuality is not. First, the meaning of individuality has been confused with "'bumptiousness', or conceit, or self-assertion, or some kind of aggressiveness." This misapprehension of meaning is, for Dewey, in direct opposition to the evaluative aspect of individuality—properly understood, "individuality is a certain way of doing things, thinking things, and feeling things which runs through everything and gives it its peculiar color."  

Underlying this positive evaluative aspect of individuality is another programmatically defined concept: 'equality'. "Equality is not an arithmetical, but an ethical conception." Equality does not mean treating all people, no matter their differences, alike. It does not mean, for instance, that children with physical handicaps should be permitted and encouraged to play outdoor games for which they lack the ability. Equality does not mean that people are physiologically or psychologically equal, but we do mean that every human being who is normal has something so distinctive that no other individual can be substituted for him. Recognizing individual equality in moral terms means that each person "has the same opportunity for developing his capacities and playing his part that others have, although his capacities are quite unlike theirs."
In essence, when Dewey uses the phrase, "has the same opportunity," he intends this to be understood as treating similar people similarly, and different people differently. For example, in Deweyan thought, all physically normal children should be given equal opportunity to play baseball, football and the like, no matter what their sex, race, or creed. However, because of other relevant differences, all children should not be given similar opportunities. Children who are unable to walk ought not be encouraged to play games involving locomotion, but ought to be given opportunities for physical activity which take these relevant differences into account.

To employ a somewhat mechanical analogy, a violet and an oak are equal when one has the same opportunity to develop to the full as a violet which the other has as an oak. 31

Thus, a slave in pre-Civil War years was not treated morally equal to the plantation owner—certain opportunities, such as access to education, adequate housing, job possibilities, and so on were denied the slave. The slave was not given equality of opportunity, for he was not recognized as a valuable individual and was not allowed to develop his full potential.

The second misconception concerning individuality has to do with confusing and reversing the point and focus of claiming someone is an individual. As mentioned earlier,
individuality is not merely some external or physical manifestation of differences.

Individuality is something that is internal and intellectual.
...Individuality is rather a distinctive way in which a person in his feelings and desires approaches any subject matter or any piece of work he has to do. 32

Thus individuals are both physically and intellectually distinctive.

The third misconception has to do with equating individuality with isolation. Of the three misconceptions, this is the most important to recognize because schooling practices will take opposite forms depending upon how the child interacts with fellow students and the classroom environment. For example, the Deweyan slogans mentioned at the beginning of this section have been interpreted such that competition and isolation rather than socialization and cooperation may be encouraged. 33

That children need a certain amount of isolation is recognized by Dewey. 34

But in the main, the best stimulus to the inventiveness and the ingenuity of the child, the calling out of his own individuality, is found when the individual is working with others, where there is a common project, something of interest to them all, but where each has his own part. 35

In moral terms, then, to deny an individual the opportunity to engage in social activity is wrong. Social relations are a fact of humanity. 36 "You cannot define individuality
physically or externally. It is a matter of spirit, of soul, or mind, and the way in which one enters into cooperative relations with others." Individuality can only be defined in terms of the social group. Put differently, an individual develops within a group.

We see that Dewey's theory of morals rests upon the view "that the social environment has intrinsic moral significance; that it enters intimately into the formation and substance of the desires, motives and choices which make up character." This principle, which Dewey takes for granted, implicitly reiterates that individual moral growth only obtains when there is interaction with others. "If social institutions and arrangements are without moral significance then the individual has no moral responsibility with respect to them." Morality cannot develop in a vacuum. There must be other individuals with whom to interact. "The human being is an individual because of and in relations with others." Social

We can now turn to Dewey's notion of the social. It is a more complex notion than is individuality for two reasons. First, it is impossible to explain the social without referring to individuals, and second, not all social arrangements are qualitatively equal.

In addressing the nature of the social, Dewey claims that
A start may be conveniently made by noting that associated or conjoint behavior is a universal characteristic of all existences. 42

Associated activity needs no explanation; things are made that way. 43

We are born organic beings associated with others...[.] 44

In other words, "the human being is an individual because of and in relations with others."45 In this quote we encounter the difficulty of analyzing the social without including the individual. Moreover, Dewey provides a circular argument in support of the claim that association is a fact of humanity.

There is no sense in asking how individuals come to be associated. They exist and operate in association....And if one should go to an outside source to account for it, some logician without an excessive draft upon his ingenuity, would rise to remark that the outsider would have to be connected with the universe in order to account for anything in it. We should still be just where we started with the fact of connection as a fact to be accepted. 46

Significantly, Dewey's analysis of the social rests entirely on this "fact" of the human condition, an assumption that is never questioned.47

In other words, it is a fact that a vast network of relations surrounds the individual: indeed, "surrounds" is too external a term since every individual lives in the network as a part of it. The material of personal reflection and of choice comes to each of us from the customs, traditions, institutions, policies, and plans of these large collective wholes. They are the influences which form his character,
 evoke and confirm his attitudes, and affect at every turn the quality of his happiness and his aspirations. This statement is true not only of the associations of which he is a direct member but also of those which seem external to him; since through commerce, war, and intercommunication the action of one territorial nation affects the members of another, while the standards set by one social group, say that of wealth and prestige, affect the desires and the capabilities of individuals in other groups. 48

Since Dewey holds that associated activity is "primitive," basic and unavoidable, we will not attempt to argue for this fundamental assumption in Deweyan thought. However, Dewey's pronouncement does not necessarily mean that all forms of conjoint or associated behavior are just a matter of "fact." In PP Dewey provides a crucial distinction between mere association and the "truly social."

While associated behavior is, as we have already noted, a universal law, the fact of association does not itself make a society. 49

This passage establishes that although mere association is a "fact" of human existence, higher, more complex and involved social behavior is not.

There is, however, an intelligible question about human association:--Not the question how individuals or singular beings come to be connected, but how they come to be connected in just those ways which give human communities traits so different from those which mark assemblies of electrons, unions of trees in forests, swarms of insects, herds of sheep, and constellations of stars. 50
The constitution of these distinctive traits, their special human forms of association and their relationships among themselves and in reference to the individual, needs to be explicated. In so doing we will gain some understanding about the complexity of the social, we will be in a better position to characterize Dewey's theory of morals, and we will make explicit important normative premises upon which Dewey's prescriptions for the practice of moral education rest.

Society. For Dewey, mere associative behavior is a necessary condition of higher forms of social existence. But what are the more complex social groupings and how are they evaluatively ordered in terms of their adequacy and moral worth? Obviously there are many different kinds and qualities of social relationships and each of us is a member of any number of them. It is also obvious that some of these social arrangements are more complex and morally worthwhile than are others.

They may be gangs, criminal bands; clubs for sport, sociability and eating; scientific and professional organizations; political parties and unions within them; families; religious denominations, business partnerships and corporations; and so on in an endless list. The associations may be local, nation-wide and trans-national. 51

Dewey claims that all of these examples are termed 'societies'. "Society is one word, but many things."52
Since there is no one thing which may be called society, except their indefinite overlapping, there is no unqualified eulogistic connotation adhering to the term "society." Some societies are in the main to be approved; some to be condemned, on account of their consequences upon the character and conduct of those engaged in them and because of their remoter consequences upon others. All of them, like all things human, are mixed in quality; "society" is something to be approached and judged critically and discriminantly. 53

But the fact remains that these are societies; higher forms of social relationships than mere associations. What makes societies, according to Dewey, has to do with the members perceiving the consequences of conjoint activity

and of the distinctive share of each element in producing it. Such perception creates a common interest; that is concern on the part of each in the joint action and in the contribution of each of its members to it. 54

We will elucidate the important aspects of Dewey's hierarchy of the different kinds of societies by reiterating that the fundamental condition which sets mere human association apart from other truly social conditions has to do with the consequences of associated action.

When we consider the difference we at once come upon the fact that consequences of conjoint action take on a new value when they are observed. For notice of the effects of connected action forces men to reflect upon the connection itself; it makes it an object of attention and interest. 55
Evidently, by recognizing the effects of conjoint activity, persons are compelled to reflect and make valuations about those consequences. This reflection is what sets mere associated activity apart from higher order social relations. The consequences of action, reflectively considered, become objects of interest and attention whereas in mere association, no connection is made between action (intentions) and consequences.

Shared interests. Dewey claims that reflection upon consequences becomes the object of attention and interest. What does he mean?, and what is the significance of 'interest' for understanding the hierarchy of social relationships?

In Chapter Two we discussed the concepts of 'interest' and 'attention' at great length. Since these concepts appear in the present context we must note that Dewey can only mean interest in a dispositional sense since he is not merely concerned with catching interest and holding attention for a particular and single time alone, in the sense of "taking (or showing) an interest." Rather, Dewey intends shared interests to be the kind that are continually in existence but that the attention paid to them may not at the moment be manifested. With shared interests, then, the attention taken toward those interests must be continually maintained to perpetuate interests deemed worthy of collective support. But just because we are aware that
such interest is dispositional does not mean that Dewey is suggesting that any dispositional interest should be the object of attention. "Individuals are certainly interested, at times, in having their own way, and their own way may go contrary to the way of others." 59

For instance, there is no question that any individual can have interests which only benefit himself. We do not doubt that having a dispositional interest in becoming wealthy may include stealing or cheating others out of their rightful share of something. Significantly, this particular interest would not be a widely shared interest because it does not take into consideration the interests of other individuals. In fact, the avenue which Dewey advocates for transforming or converting mere association—where individuals have no concept of the consequences of their actions and no awareness of others interests—into "a community of action saturated and regulated by mutual interest in shared meanings [and] consequences..." 60 has to do with enhancing "communication of meanings so that genuinely shared interest in the consequences of interdependent activities may inform desire and effort and thereby direct action." 61

The notion of shared interest is important in understanding the social, for shared interests, often called mutual, common, or a community of interests, are those interests members of a social group hold in common, which
tie them together by virtue of which they are a social
group.

To have the same ideas about things which
others have, to be like-minded with them,
and thus to be really members of a social
group, is therefore to attach the same
meanings to things and to acts which
others attach. Otherwise, there is no
common understanding, and no community
life.... Each views the consequences of
his own acts as having a bearing upon
what others are doing and takes into
account the consequences of their
behavior upon himself, then there is a
common mind; a common intent in behavior.
There is an understanding set up between
the different contributors; and this
common understanding controls the action
of each. 62

This, then, is what is meant by sharing in a community of
interests; of being tied together by mutual concern and
intent of action into a social group. Dewey claims that
individuals ought to be primarily concerned not with
personal interests that conflict with others' interests, but
with shared group interests.

[Individuals] are also interested, and
chiefly interested upon the whole, in
entering into the activities of others
and taking part in conjoint and
cooperative doings. Otherwise, no such
thing as a community would be
possible. 63

We must, however, note the obvious fact that the shared
interests of some social groups may and do conflict with the
interests of other social groups.

Men banded together in a criminal
conspiracy, business aggregations that
prey upon the public while serving it,
political machines held together by the interest of plunder, are included. 64

Thus, some groups are more isolated from other groups expressly because the interests they hold in common do not permit them to interact and cooperate with other social groups.

Community. Before we go further in this analysis of shared interests and society, we must introduce a third related concept: 'community', which has already been mentioned in the discussion both of shared interests and society. Dewey claims that the notions of community and society are distinctive, and sets out to distinguish them.

In DE, Dewey defines 'community' by equating it with 'society':

There is more than a verbal tie between the words common, community, and communication. Men live in a community in virtue of the things which they have in common; and communication is the way in which they come to possess things in common. What they must have in common in order to form a community or society are aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge—a common understanding—like-mindedness as the sociologists say. 65

From this description, there is no clear distinction between 'community' and 'society'. Apparently, in the above, Dewey has fallen victim to his own criticism that in ordinary discourse these terms are used interchangeably. Dewey attempts to demonstrate why they ought not be confused by
claiming that 'society' is ambiguous: this term has both a normative-eulogistic sense and a descriptive sense.66

Ordinarily when we speak of societies as "communities of interest" or "communities of thought and action" this is the eulogistic sense that includes the praiseworthy notion of 'community'. However, Dewey points out that there are societies which ought not be eulogized and morally equated with those social groups we wish to applaud. Organizations such as bands of thieves and politically corrupt groups are of the former type. Thus Dewey programmatically distinguishes between desirable and more morally adequate social groups and groups which are more primitive and morally inadequate.

What are the Deweyan criteria which provide the "measure for [determining] the worth of any given mode of social life[?]"67 In other words, by what standards does Dewey judge whether a social group should be eulogized—whether it should be labeled a 'community' in the praiseworthy sense? Dewey couches these standards in the form of two questions:

How numerous and varied are the interests which are consciously shared? How full and free is the interplay with other forms of association? 68

These two standards are reminiscent of the definition Dewey provides for 'community', in which there is no clear separation from 'society'. In that definition, Dewey claimed that a community is such in virtue of the richness
of interests (aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge) which the members share. This aspect of the meaning of community is merely another way of stating the first condition for determining the worth of a given social group. The second condition (degree of interplay with other forms of association) implicitly recognizes the importance of and dependence upon communication as the means by which social groups progress and become more morally advanced.

In fact, communication is not merely a quality of communities, it is a prerequisite to forming human societies of any form.

Human associations may be ever so organic in origin and firm in operation, but they develop into societies in a human sense only as their consequences, being known, are esteemed and sought for. Even if "society" were as much an organism as some writers have held, it would not on that account be society. Interactions, transactions, occur de facto and the results of interdependence follow. But participation in activities and sharing in results are additive concerns. They demand communication as a prerequisite. 69

Moreover, Dewey's belief in the need for communication among group members of a particular community of interests and among different communities of interests is akin to his faith in the methods of experimental inquiry to reach truth:

And when the emotional force, the mystic force one might say, of communication, of the miracle of shared life and shared experience is spontaneously felt, the hardness and crudeness of contemporary life will be bathed in the light that never was on land or sea. 70
Dewey's deep conviction of the need for communication is unmistakable. Thus, the formulation of his two conditions to measure the worth of societies is not surprising.

To illustrate how these conditions operate and why they are the standards that should provide the measure of worth, Dewey contrasts the life of criminal groups with that of a closely knit family. In the former, the results suggest that although the group has common interests which bind it together, there is little if any interplay with other communities of interest.

[T]he ties which consciously hold the members together are few in number, reducible almost to a common interest in plunder; and that they are of such a nature as to isolate the group from other groups with respect to give and take of the values of life. 71

Whereas, in the kind of family life which illustrates the standard, we find that there are material, intellectual, aesthetic interests in which all participate and that the progress of one member has worth for the experience of other members— it is readily communicable—and that the family is not an isolated whole, but enters intimately into relationships with business groups, with schools, with all the agencies of culture, as well as with other similar groups, and that it plays a due part in the political organization and in return receives support from it. In short, there are many interests consciously communicated and shared; and there are varied and free points of contact with other modes of association. 72
In sum, it is the sharing of interests among members of a particular community of interests and the degree of communication among various social groups which determine the richness and moral adequacy of societies. Moreover, as we have seen, communication is a prerequisite condition of society; societies cannot exist without some degree of communication.

Society exists through a process of transmission quite as much as biological life. This transmission occurs by means of communication of habits of doing, thinking and feeling from the older to the younger. Without this communication of ideals, hopes, expectations, standards, opinions, from those members of society who are passing out of the group life to those who are coming into it, social life would not survive. 73

This passage, in part, serves to justify the existence and continuance of schools, but for our present purposes we include it in this context to point out that the degree and richness of communication determines the qualities and kinds of societies we live in.

Since Dewey claims that individual societies can be more or less morally adequate, it remains for us to outline Dewey's category system or hierarchy of morally adequate social groups. Let us briefly turn to these in order to discover the nature of Dewey's paramount moral social arrangement: democracy.

Mere association and society. We have already discussed the lowest and generic form of association: mere
association. This is, for Dewey, not only a "fact" of human existence, but is also a necessary condition for all other forms of societal relations. As noted,

\[\text{the work of conversion of the physical and organic phase of associated behavior into a community of action saturated and regulated by mutual interest in shared meanings, consequences which are translated into ideas and desired objects by means of symbols, does not occur all at once nor completely.}\ 74

And implicitly these conversions can be more or less adequate according to the two Deweyan conditions for measuring the worth of social groups. Thus, next up on the hierarchy of social relationships is the generic concept of 'society'.

An alphabet is letters, and "society" is individuals in their connections with one another. These modes of conjoint action and their consequences profoundly affect not only the outer habits of singular persons, but their dispositions in emotion, desire, planning and valuing. 75

As we have seen, societies are formed when there is perception of the consequences of a joint activity and of the distinctive share of each element in producing it. Such perception creates a common interest; that is concern on the part of each in the joint action and in the contribution of each of its members to it. 76

Having shared interests sets social groups above mere associative living. However, not all social groups are qualitatively or morally equivalent. In order to locate and identify the features which distinguish morally advanced
social groups from those which are morally inferior, additional analysis of key Deweyan notions is needed.

The public and the state. There are two additional concepts which are closely related to the meaning of 'society' and are considered to be descriptive of the political and technical aspects of societies: the public and the state. When societies emerge, so do publics.

The public consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for. 77

But to say that a public is that body which is affected by the consequences of transactions says little about the nature of the public.

There are many answers to the question: What is the public? Unfortunately many of them are only restatements of the question. Thus we are told that the public is the community as a whole, and a-community-as-a-whole is supposed to be a self-evident and self-explanatory phenomenon. But a community as a whole involves not merely a variety of associative ties which hold persons together in diverse ways, but an organization of all elements by an integrated principle. 78

Are we back where we started? Have we returned to the notion of shared interests as the lone descriptor of all social relations? Importantly, the answer is no. The "integrated principle" mentioned above is both the reason for the creation of states and the unifying element which
gives the public or various publics the means and ability to act. Dewey recognizes that

the public has no hands except those of individual human beings. The essential problem is that of transforming the action of such hands so that it will be animated by regard for social ends. 79

Thus, Dewey introduces the notion of 'state'.

The net import of our discussion is that a state is a distinctive and secondary form of association, having a specifiable work to do and specified organs of operation. 80

States can be corrupt or progressive; and just like groups, they can surround justice or embody injustice. The nature of the state depends upon the "integrative principle" chosen to promote it. In Dewey's view, the most adequate and ethical integrative principle—which is also the highest form of societal organization—is democracy. In it and it alone the interests of the individual are ideally recognized and conjoined with the interests of the community, "for democracy is a name for a life of free and enriching communion." 81

Democracy. Thus the Deweyan concept of 'democracy' brings continuity to and makes sense of the relationship between the individual and the social, and the public and the state. Moreover, as we will see, explicating the concept of 'democracy' brings the discussion of Dewey's theory of morals to the forefront since democracy is an
ethical ideal and in terms of ethical social ideals, it is the highest and ultimate aim.

In conception, at least, democracy approaches most nearly the ideal of all social organization; that in which the individual and society are organic to each other. For this reason democracy, so far as it is really democracy, is the most stable, not the most insecure, of governments. 82

However, it is crucial to recognize that Dewey's formulation of democracy refers not only to a form of government but, additionally, to a way of life.

A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to refer his own actions to that of others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of their activity. 83

Thus in a democracy all of the dispirite elements composing society come together in the most morally justified manner. We see this in the following.

First, as for the relationship of the individual and the group,

[t]he whole lives truly in every member, and there is no longer the appearance of physical aggregation, or continuity. The organism manifests itself as what it truly is, an ideal or spiritual life, a unity of will. If then, society and the individual are really organic to each other, then the individual is society concentrated. 84
This is all very well and good ideally, but how does this actually happen? And why should we accept democracy as the most morally adequate form of conjoint association or living? In other words, why is democracy the answer to achieving a balance of individual and group interests without sacrificing something or making one subordinate to the other? Dewey's answer and justification begins with the statement that

[i]nterest in the social whole of which one is a member necessarily carries with it interest in one's own self. Every member of the group has his own place and work; it is absurd to suppose that this fact is significant in other persons but of little account in one's own case. To suppose that social interest is incompatible with concern for one's own health, learning, advancement, power of judgment, etc., is, literally nonsensical. Since each one of us is a member of social groups and since the latter have no existence apart from the selves who compose them, there can be no effective social interest unless there is at the same time an intelligent regard for our own well-being and development. Indeed, there is a certain primary responsibility placed upon each individual in respect to his own power and growth. No community more backward and ineffective as a community can be imagined than one in which every member neglected his own concerns in order to attend to the affairs of his neighbors. When selfhood is taken for what it is, something existing in relationships to others and not in unreal isolation, independence of judgment, personal insight, integrity and initiative, become indispensable excellencies from the social point of view. 85
We may grant that individual interests and group interests are in most cases interdependent, and to satisfy one includes the satisfaction of the other. But why does democracy permit and encourage this satisfaction of all interests to be achieved better than other forms of social organizations? Dewey's answer rests in part on his portrayal of what a just social order entails.

In a justly organized social order, the very relations which persons bear to one another demand of the one carrying on a line of business the kind of conduct which meets the needs of others, while they also enable him to express and fulfill the capacities of his own being. Services, in other words, would be reciprocal and cooperative in their effect. 86

Obviously, in Dewey's view, democracy is that ideal which constitutes a just social order. But we have yet to provide Dewey's argument for this position. Unfortunately, there is no Deweyan argument, per se. "Democracy is a word of many meanings," 87 and Dewey's justification for holding democracy as the ultimate ethical ideal has to do with his programmatic definition of the concept.

Regarded as an idea, democracy is not an alternative to other principles of associated life. It is the idea of community life itself. 88

Further, Dewey claims that in democracy the moral concepts of 'liberty', 'equality', and 'fraternity' can be most adequately realized, more so than in an aristocracy. 89
Democracy is an ethical idea, incorporate with every man. Democracy and the one, the ultimate, ethical ideals of humanity are to my mind synonyms. The idea of democracy, the ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity, represent a society in which the distinction between the spiritual and the secular has ceased...[.] 90

The reason that liberty, equality, and fraternity are held in such high esteem rests on a further component of Dewey's programmatic meaning of 'democracy'.

In a word, democracy means that personality is the first and final reality. It admits that the full significance of personality can be learned only as it is already presented to him in objective form in society; it admits that the chief stimuli and encouragements to the realization of personality come from society; but it holds, none the less to the fact that personality cannot be procured for any one, however degraded and feeble by any one else, however wise and strong. It holds that the spirit of personality indwells in every individual and that the choice to develop it must proceed from the individual. 91

Thus we see how Dewey uses the concept of democracy to bring together the individual and the social into an organic and mutually beneficial whole. Accordingly, Dewey claims that "the idea that personality is the one thing of permanent and abiding worth, and that in every human individual there lies personality." 92 Consequently, democracy, so defined, offers the best means to achieve social progress (common good) concurrently with personal development.
Democracy as a moral ideal is thus an endeavor to unite two ideas which have historically often worked antagonistically: liberation of individuals on one hand and promotion of a common good on the other. 93

The development of either necessarily depends upon the other.

From the ethical point of view, therefore, it is not too much to say that the democratic ideal poses, rather than solves, the great problem: How to harmonize the development of each individual with the maintenance of a social state in which the activities of one will contribute to the good of all the others. It expresses a postulate in the sense of a demand to be realized: That each individual shall have the opportunity for release, expression, fulfillment, of his distinctive capacities, and that the outcome shall further the establishment of a fund of shared values. Like every true ideal, it signifies something to be done rather than something already given, something ready-made. Because it is something to be accomplished by human planning and arrangement, it involves constant meeting and solving of problems—that is to say, the desired harmony never is brought about in a way which meets and forestalls all future developments. 94

Dewey admits that the greatest problem of democracy is how to achieve the goals stated in his postulate.95 On this score he believes that it is through the creation and development of democratically conceived communities that individuals and social welfare alike will progress and prosper. We see the intimate connection of the individual and the social in the following:
Only when individuals have initiative, independence of judgment, flexibility, fullness of experience, can they act so as to enrich the lives of others and only in this way can a truly common welfare be built up. The other side of this statement, and of the moral criterion, is that individuals are free to develop, to contribute and to share, only as social conditions break down walls of privilege and of monopolistic possession. 96

Dewey recognizes that in order to create such democratic communities, existing communal relations must be duly regarded. In other words, community members, including the leaders of those communities, must strive to realize the democratic ideal by beginning with existing conditions, building upon them, and changing them appropriate to specific and identifiable conditions. Democracy as an ideal, then, is not some utopian goal but is something actually achievable, at least in principle. 97

We cannot set up, out of our heads, something we regard as an ideal society. We must base our conception upon societies which actually exist, in order to have any assurance that our ideal is a practicable one....the ideal cannot simply repeat the traits which are actually found. The problem is to extract the desirable forms of community life which actually exist, and employ them to criticize undesirable features and suggest improvement. 98

In sum, the democratic ideal is identical with the two conditions which measure the moral worth of any mode of social life. Enlarging both the range of common interests and the degree to which there is interaction and cooperation
among separate communities of interest determines how democratically organized a community is.

Wherever there is conjoint activity whose consequences are appreciated as good by all singular persons who take part in it, and where the realization of the good is such as to effect an energetic desire and effort to sustain it in being just because it is a good shared by all, there is in so far a community. The clear consciousness of a communical life in all its implications, constitutes the idea of democracy. 99

In discussing democracy and seeing that it serves to further the interests of the individual and the community, Dewey introduces an important phrase, the common good.

The positive import of "common good" is suggested by the idea of sharing, participating—an idea involved in the very idea of community. Sharing a good or value in a way which makes it social in quality is not identical with dividing up a material thing into physical parts. To partake is to take part, to play a role. It is something active, something which engages the desires and aims of each contributing member. 100

Dewey believes there is "more than a verbal tie between the words common, community, and communication."101 Significantly, this passage points to this important connection: In a democracy, individual community members participate and share common goals and interests. They contribute to bettering their collective lives; their common social interests. This is an active process. As mentioned, this sharing depends upon free and extensive communication.
Thus, through communication a community is able to grow and flourish.

Whenever individual community members appreciate individual goods as also being shared by all and actively participate in sustaining them for the good of all, then there is a community. A community is such in virtue of the goods common to individual members. For Dewey, it is only in a true democracy that all of the related concepts discussed here come together in the most advanced form. In other words, 'community', 'common good', 'communication', and 'shared interests' are implicit in the concept 'democracy'.

In summary, we set out to distinguish the Deweyan notions of the individual and the social, putting aside the task of analyzing Dewey's theory of morals, per se, until this discussion was completed. We saw that gaining an understanding of Dewey's theory of morals depends upon being able to distinguish and characterize the relationship between the individual and the social. Dewey claims that "[m]oral conceptions and processes grow naturally out of the very conditions of human life." Now we have a clearer understanding of what Dewey means by the "very conditions of human life." These conditions include the fact of mere association and the establishment of communities based upon shared interests. All of these elements come together in the highest, most ethical, form in a democratically
constituted state, and since Dewey argues that democracy is an ethical ideal, it is central to his theory of morals. Thus, we can return to an examination of the theory of morals armed to better understand its constitutive elements in terms of the claim that all morality is both individual and social.

**THEORY OF MORALS**

We have observed that morality is both individual and social, but this says nothing about morality, *per se*, except that it necessarily includes both of these reciprocal notions. However, since we now have a better idea about what these two concepts entail, it will be easier to discuss Dewey's theory of morals and demonstrate how and why Dewey's claim that morality is both individual and social is meaningful.

What does Dewey mean by 'moral' or 'moral theory'? He could answer this question either by giving the necessary conditions for morality or by naming those things which would be contained in the set of things labeled "morals." Dewey uses neither of these strategies to characterize moral theory. Rather, he uses the genetic approach, tracing historical developments in ethical theory to criticize existing theoretical positions and to argue for his own.

In approaching the study of ethics we shall employ the comparative and genetic methods. We cannot assume that our own morality is the only type that needs to be considered....When we deal with any
process of life it is found to be a great aid for understanding present conditions if we trace the history of the process and see how present conditions have come about. 103

For our present purposes, it is not necessary to recreate Dewey's historical analysis in order to outline his moral theory, since we are not interested in showing how he came to hold his views. We are only concerned to characterize what Dewey's moral theory entails. Thus, we will begin by characterizing the nature of moral theory, describing its constitutive elements and how these elements fit together in a systematic way.

Ethics, [is] that branch of the theory of conduct which is concerned with the formation and use of judgments of right and wrong, and with intellectual, emotional, and executive, or overt phenomena, which are associated with such judgments, either as antecedents or consequents....The terms moral philosophy, moral science, and morals have also been used to designate the same subject of inquiry. 104

The above account is useful as a reminder that, for Dewey, 'ethics' and 'morals' are names for the same kind of theory. Thus, we need not be confused by thinking that 'ethics' and 'morals' describe separate domains. For Dewey, the labels are used interchangeably.

Before we characterize the elements of Dewey's theory of morals in detail, it is instructive to give the general characterization of moral theory and to explain the function "a working theory of morals" serves.105
What, then, is moral theory? It is all one with moral insight, and moral insight is the recognition of the relationships in hand. This is a very tame and prosaic conception. It makes moral insight, and therefore moral theory, consist simply in the every-day workings of the same ordinary intelligence that measures dry-goods, drives nails, sells wheat, and invents the telephone. 106

There is in the above an implicit rejection of a split between the subject-matter and methods of moral intelligence from scientific or practical intelligence. Rather, Dewey holds that both the subject-matter of morality and the methodology which should be used to deal with moral problems are the same as the subject-matter and methods of scientific and practical matters. In subsequent analysis we will characterize this rejection in detail. For the present, it is important only to recognize that moral theory serves the same practical purposes as do scientific theories; both help guide intelligent action.

Moral theory can (i) generalize the types of moral conflicts which arise, thus enabling a perplexed and doubtful individual to clarify his own particular problem by placing it in a larger context; it can (ii) state the leading ways in which such problems have been intellectually dealt with by those who have thought upon such matters; it can (iii) render personal reflection more systematic and enlightened, suggesting alternatives that might otherwise be overlooked, and stimulating greater consistency in judgment. 107

Ethical postulate. Dewey's moral theory underwent important developmental changes as his general philosophical
views developed. An early version of moral theory contain "the ethical postulate," which Dewey considered to be basic to his ethics.

Unless, then, we are to extend our ethical theory to inquire into the possibility and value of moral experience, unless, that is, we are to make an excursion into the metaphysics of ethics, we have here reached our foundation. The ethical postulate, the presupposition involved in conduct, is this:

In the realization of individuality there is found also the needed realization of some community of persons of which the individual is a member; and, conversely, the agent who duly satisfies the community in which he shares, by that same conduct satisfies himself.

However, a later version of the postulate drops the reference to metaphysics for its verification, but he refused to give up "moral practice makes this postulate." In other words, "The postulate is verified by being acted upon. The proof is experimental." The later version defines conduct from the standpoint of the action, which includes both agent and his scene of action, we see that

The conduct required truly to express an agent is, at the same time, the conduct required to maintain the situation in which he is placed; while conversely, the conduct that truly meets the situation is that which furthers the agent.

In Dewey's TML, published over forty years later, the ethical postulate, as such, is dropped all together.
Instead, what we find is the postulate transformed into "a demand to be realized." Employed in this sense, the postulate was accounted for in our previous analysis of the individual and the social. Recall that the demand to be realized has to do with harmonizing the development of the individual and the social. Thus, Dewey backed down from his original view that the relationship between the individual and the social, which he claims is a fact of humanity, is a postulate, to the position that the relationship wherein the individual and the social are conjoined most adequately (in a democracy) is a demand to be realized.

The position presented in TML may be considered to be Dewey's mature characterization of moral theory, but to ignore his earlier views is a mistake. The importance of recognizing the earlier versions is threefold. First, the postulates are contemporary with most of Dewey's early writings on moral education. Thus, the theoretical check-points of his practical recommendations for moral education are these earlier works. Second, the postulates foreshadow some critical and continuing strains of thought in Dewey's mature view of ethical theory. These are that experimental method should be used to arrive at justified moral judgments, and that the individual situation with its unique contextual features must be used as relevant data when solving moral problems. Finally, psychological (individual) ethics and social (community) ethics are distinguishable but
necessarily conjoined in a theory of reflective morality. These elements have an important bearing on the following portrayal of Dewey's mature ethical position, and will be explained in detail in the remainder of this chapter.

Reflective morality. Dewey claims that "moral theory cannot emerge when there is a positive belief as to what is right and what is wrong, for then there is no occasion for reflection." Dewey labels his version of moral theory "reflective morality," and contrasts reflective and customary morality as the difference between a moral theory which searches for answers (reflective) and one that provides answers, namely "definite precepts, rules, definitive injunctions and prohibitions." Dewey rails against 'customary morality' as being an advanced and laudatory form of moral theory.

[I]nasmuch as the agencies by which the group controls its members are largely those of custom, the morality may also be called "customary morality."...It is "ethical" or "moral" in the sense of conforming to the ethos or mores of the group. Customary morality thus refers to that body of traditions and socially evolved mores which provides given answers to moral questions or problems. According to Dewey, this is not what is meant by moral theory.

For what is called moral theory is but a more conscious and systematic raising of the question which occupies the mind of any one who in the fact of moral conflict and doubt seeks a way out through
reflection. In short, moral theory is but an extension of what is involved in all reflective morality. 117

We see that, for Dewey, the essence of moral theory is reflective morality. Moral theory, by definition, cannot be customary since there are no ready-made solutions to moral problems. There can be no such body of customs, traditions, or mores which can legitimately be labeled theory in a Deweyan sense. 118

The conclusion follows from the very nature of reflective morality; the attempt to set up ready-made conclusions contradicts the very nature of reflective morality. 119

We begin to further comprehend Dewey's claim that morality is both individual and social when we recognize that "[n]o [moral] theory can operate in a vacuum." 120 What Dewey means by this is that it is a contradiction to say that an individual can be moral or immoral in complete isolation from the larger social context. A corollary to this is that character or personality (the individual aspects of the human moral condition) are continuous with and can only develop within the larger social setting.

Moral development, in the training given by others and in the education one secures for oneself, consists in becoming aware that our acts are connected with one another; thereby an ideal of conduct is substituted for the blind and thoughtful performance of isolated acts. 121
Dewey holds that customary morality tends to neglect or blur the connection between character and action; the essence of reflective morals is that it is conscious of the existence of a persistent self and of the part it plays in what is externally done. 122

These views concerning the interrelationship of the individual and the social are the given "facts" in Deweyan moral theory. As such, they are basic since his theoretical formulation of morality depends upon their acceptance. Moreover, Dewey's analysis of reflective moral theory underscores this point since he claims that reflective morality is composed of two distinguishable yet necessarily conjoined aspects: psychological ethics and social ethics.

Psychological and Social Ethics

Psychological and social ethics together comprise reflective morality. Knowing the nature of these two aspects of moral theory aids in understanding the nature and significance of reflective morality and why morality is both individual and social. Psychological and social ethics are necessarily cooperative and intertwined, and one cannot exist without the other.

In short, the contention is not in the least that our will, the body of our desires and purposes, is subservient to social conditions, but that the latter are incorporated into our attitudes, and our attitudes into social conditions, to such an extent that to maintain one is to maintain the other, to change one is to change the other. 123
Dewey argues that moral life has these two obvious interactive aspects. "Moral life is called out or stimulated by certain necessities of individual and social existence." 124

Dewey claims that moral life has to do with "a life of purpose." Leading a moral life implies that "thought and feeling, ideals and motives, valuation and choice..." 125 are all operative. These qualities which indicate that one is leading a life of purpose are concerns of individual conduct. "[T]hese are processes to be studied by psychological methods." 126

Psychological ethics is concerned with tracing in the individual the origin and growth of the moral consciousness, that is, of judgments of right and wrong, feelings of obligation, emotions of remorse, shame, of desire for approbation; of various habits of action which are in accord with the judgment of right, or the virtues; with the possibility and nature, from the standpoint of the psychical structure of the individual, of free, or voluntary, action. It gathers and organizes psychological data bearing upon the nature of intention, and motive; desire, effort and choice; judgments of approbation and disapprobation; emotions of sympathy, pity in relation to the impulse of self-preservation and the formation and reformation of habit in its effect upon character, etc. In other words, it treats behavior as an expression of certain psychical elements and groupings, or associations; psychological analysis. 127

But an account of personal conduct alone cannot adequately provide principles for a working theory of
reflective morality, since a working theory of morals

has to study the inner processes as
determined by the outer conditions or as
changing these conditions and the outward
behavior or institution as determined by
the inner purpose, or as affecting the
inner life. 128

Thus Dewey combines psychological ethics with social
ethics. Dewey hypothesizes

that social conditions enter integrally
and intrinsically into the formation of
character, that is, the make-up of
desires, purposes, judgments of approval
and disapproval. 129

Hence, there must also be social ethics.

[S]ociological ethics deal with the
habits, practices, ideas, beliefs,
expectations, institutions, etc. actually
found in history or in contemporary life,
in different races, peoples, grades of
culture, etc. which are outgrowths of
judgments of the moral worth of actions
on which operate as causes in developing
such judgments. 130

The social side of ethics draws from custom and tradition
but is not restricted to it. In other words, custom
provides solutions or ways that moral problems have been
answered in the past. At times these answers are reasonable
and ought to be used in the solving of an existing moral
problem. However, in other situations custom ought to be
abandoned and new solutions applied which are not consistent
with past custom or tradition.

Understanding how moral problems should be solved has to
do with comprehending the nature and distinction between
customary and reflective morality, how ethics is both psychological and social, and why moral theory can only be reflective. Since all individual actions potentially have moral significance, because of the effect those actions have on others' choice and ability to act, it is incumbent upon individuals to consider and reflect upon their actions in terms of the existing larger social context.

In order to live entirely within the confines of customary morality, one must merely accept custom without question or reflection or else inconsistencies emerge in the superimposition of the actual problem and the outdated custom. 131

Reflection tries to reverse the order: it wants to discover what should be esteemed so that approbation will follow what is decided to be worth approving, instead of designating virtues on the basis of what happens to be especially looked up to and rewarded in a particular society. 132

If custom or tradition alone is used to arrive at solutions to moral problems, then no reflection is necessary and individuals can make decisions and act without considering the existing social context. In other words, in customary morality, ethics is not equally psychological and social; that is, individual decisions and actions are not reflected upon in terms of the existing social context. Customary morality champions the psychological side of ethics since moral problems are not questioned and reflected upon in terms of existing social conditions. Thus,
appealing merely to custom rules out reflection as a means to arrive at justifiable moral solutions.

Obviously, Dewey advocates that arriving at justified moral decisions can only be done reflectively. This process of reflecting upon moral matters cannot be an inflexible affair because the social context is not a static and fixed arrangement. It is constantly changing; being constructed and reconstructed through the process of experiencing. Custom alone cannot be adequate in meeting changing conditions because the speed at which that body of convictions and conclusions of tradition change does not keep pace with the speed at which social forces change. Thus, what we conclude is that only in reflective morality can psychological and social aspects of ethics be adequately balanced to arrive at justified moral judgments.

Data of ethics. Since appealing entirely to customary morality for answers or solutions to moral problems is necessarily ruled out, where does one look for help in solving moral problems? Is the nature of reflective morality purely speculative in a nonempirical manner? In other words, is there information available which can be enlisted or appealed to in order that reasonable and justifiable moral decisions can be made? Dewey's answer is clear. "Moral as well as physical theory requires a body of dependable data, and a set of intelligible working hypotheses." 133
These data are not in any way intuitive or metaphysical. The data are what other disciplines use in judgment making, be it in science, politics, sociology, etc. Dewey identifies four general areas where the data can be gathered. The first area has to do with the subject-matter and conclusions of customary morality.

A genuinely reflective morals will look upon all the codes as possible data; it will consider the conditions under which they arose; the methods which consciously determined their formation and acceptance; it will inquire into their applicability in present conditions. It will neither insist dogmatically upon some of them, nor idly throw them all away as of no significance. It will treat them as a storehouse of information and possible indications of what is now right and good. 134

The second area is closely aligned with the codes and convictions of custom and tradition. This body

is the more consciously elaborated material of legal history, judicial decisions, and legislative activity.... Informal material of the same sort abounds in biographies, especially of those who have been selected as the great moral teachers of the race. 135

The third area of data comes from the sciences themselves.

A resource which mankind was late in utilizing and which it has hardly as yet begun to draw upon adequately is found in the various sciences, especially those closest to man, such as biology, physiology, hygiene and medicine, psychology and psychiatry, as well as statistics, sociology, economics, and politics. 136
Finally, Dewey advocates that those who endeavor into the realm of moral problem solving consider how past theorists have addressed and would have solved moral problems.

Then there is the body of definitely theoretical methods and conclusions which characterize European history for the last two thousand years, to say nothing of the doctrines of Asiatic thinkers for a still longer period. The proper inference to be drawn is not that we should make a mechanical compromise or an eclectic combination of the different theories, but that each great system of moral thought brings to light some point of view from which the facts of our own situations are to be looked at and studied. Theories afford us at least a set of questions with which we may approach and challenge present conditions. 137

Together, these four general categories comprise the relevant subject-matter which is to be conjoined with the particular features of the moral problem at issue. An example may help to make this clear.

Let us say that the moral situation we face is whether or not to keep a promise to help a friend move furniture at a certain time on Monday afternoon or to break that promise in order to visit a very sick relative who has unexpectedly been admitted to the hospital. According to Dewey, being able to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion includes exploring two major divisions of data. The first is to learn and outline the particular or contextual facts of the case. Such data would include determining when the hospital visiting hours are, the deadline for the friend to have the
furniture moved, the feasibility of meeting both obligations, the relative consequences of choosing one rather than the other, and so on.

The second division of data is what Dewey calls "the body of dependable data." This includes the four general categories previously mentioned. In other words, in addition to identifying the particular contextual features of the situation, one ought also review the codes of custom (e.g., which would be more important in the eyes of the community); legal hypotheses and conclusions (e.g., where does one's legal responsibility enter into the decision); scientific information (e.g., the physical and psychological condition of the sick relative); and explore and consider how others would come to a conclusion in this matter (e.g., considering how a Kantian, a Pragmatist, or some other would come to a conclusion).

These four categories of possible relevant data provide the substance for making moral decisions. But what of methodology? How are these data to be handled such that the conclusions reached are not arbitrary? A clue to the answer to this question is found in examining the modifier Dewey uses to describe his theory of morals: reflective.

Experimental method. According to Dewey, the most serious and immediate problem of morals is to locate a methodology which will be used in judging social conditions.
If this positive contention concerning the intimate connection of social conditions [with psychological concerns] is admitted, the immediate problem of theory is the question of what criterion is to be used in judging social conditions as they exist at any time.... the method by which the criterion should be employed, namely, [is]...experimental. That statement concerns the form of the criterion rather than its content or substance. It indicates what has just been intimated, that is should be a generalization from the experience of the past; a generalization which does not, however, merely repeat or restate in a literal fashion the experience of the past, but is stated in such a way that it will serve as an intellectual instrument of survey and criticisms and will point out the direction in which efforts at change and betterment should move. It indicates that the generalization should be a hypothesis, not a dogma; something to be tried and tested, confirmed and revised in future practice; having a constant point of growth instead of being closed. 138

In this context, Dewey insists that the criterion which judges social conditions should be experimental. This is not merely a criterion but is in fact the methodology which judges social conditions. In Chapter Two we noted that Dewey uses a variety of expressions to describe the same preferred method or process of thinking. 139 In the above he uses 'experimental', but we could substitute it for 'reflective' without loss of meaning. Thus, it is not mere coincidence that both Dewey's theory of morals and his favored method of thinking are labeled 'reflective', 140 since 'reflective' and 'experimental' can be interchanged.
An experimental method in social morality acknowledges existing conditions to the full; it insists upon facing them intellectually, that is by way of observation and record; it also recognizes that criticisms and plans of betterment are mere indulgences unless they are based upon taking existing conditions into account. But as experimental, it recognizes that these conditions are not fixed and final; that they are both means of change and something to be changed by intelligently directed action. Our position is that past experience enables us to state a criterion of judgment which is sufficiently definite to be usable and sufficiently flexible to lead to its own reinterpretation as experience progresses. 141

It is important to note that except for the initial reference to social morality in the above passage, this could just as easily have been said about any other kind of experience. Dewey claims that in reflective morality, the experimental method looks to past experience not for authoritative rules, but as the indispensable source of suggestions to be worked over in thought. It has respect to intelligence, not as supplying final truths and rigid rules, but as the organ of putting past experience into the form in which it is useful in the future, and projecting the plans which are to be experimentally tried out. 142

We have already noted where one finds the relevant data which form the subject-matter of ethical decision making. This is a concrete factual matter in the same way that scientific, political, sociological, or some other kinds of data are concrete factual material. These data are used to
form hypotheses which guide the formulation of moral decisions.

As we saw in the analysis of Dewey's general theory of experience, no state of affairs is ever fixed or final. Hence his faith in and continued reliance upon reflective method to reach singular satisfactory conclusions or acquire secondary experiences.

Dewey argues that adopting the reflective method in a theory of morals is required if in fact morality is reflective rather than customary.

To some persons it may seem an academic matter whether their attitude and the method they follow in judging the ethical values of social institutions, customs, and traditions, be experimental or dogmatic and closed; whether they proceed by study of consequences, of the working of condition, or by an attempt to dispose of all questions by reference to preformed absolute standards. There is, however, no opening for application of scientific method in social morals unless the former procedure is adopted. There is at least a presumption that the development of methods of objective and impartial inquiry in social affairs would be as significant there as it has proved in physical matters. The alternative to organic inquiry is reliance upon prejudice, partisanship, upon tradition accepted without questioning, upon the varying pressures of immediate circumstance. Adoption of an experimental course of judgment would work virtually a moral revolution in social judgments and practice. It would eliminate the chief causes of intolerance, persecution, fanaticism, and the use of differences of opinion to create class wars. It is for such reasons as these that it is claimed that,
at the present time, the question of method to be used in judging existing customs and policies proposed is of greater moral significance than the particular conclusion reached in connection with any one controversy. 143

Without doubt, then, we see that Dewey's formulation of a reflective morality and the methodology inherent in that theory is consistent with Dewey's overall philosophical theory of experience. Method or process, rather than the substance of morals, remains constant and supreme, just as it does in his general theory of experience. Dewey is not concerned with providing fixed answers to guide action in any sphere. Rather, his concern is to identify principles or standards for judging. This is the case for any kind of theory, including moral theory. "To give a scientific account of judgments about conduct, means to find the principles which are the basis of these judgments."144

Finding such principles or standards forms a central problem for a reflective theory of morals.

The problem of reflective morality and hence of theory is to lay bare the standard or criterion implicit in current social approbation and reproach. In general, they agree that what men like and praise are acts and motives that tend to serve others, while those acts and motives which are condemned are those which bring harm instead of benefit to others. Reflective morality makes this principle of popular moral judgments conscious, and one to be rationally adopted and exercised. 145
The experimental or reflective method allows these standards or principles to be identified and tested in a rational manner. In fact, Dewey claims that locating and acting upon such principles is the key to leading an intelligent and moral life.

If we can discern ethical principles these ought to give some guidance for the unsolved problems of life which continually present themselves for decision. Whatever may be true for other sciences it would seem that ethics at least ought to have some practical value. "In this theater of man's life it is reserved for God and the angels to be lookers on." Man must act; and he must act well or ill, rightly or wrongly. If he has reflected, has considered his conduct in the light of the general principles of human order and progress, he ought to be able to act more intelligently and freely, to achieve the satisfaction that always attends on scientific as compared with uncritical or rule-of-thumb practice. Socrates gave the classic statement for the study of conduct when he said, "A life unexamined, uncritically, is not worthy of man." 146

Rules and principles. But what is the nature of ethical principles? What are we searching for? To be consistent with his philosophical position, these cannot be fixed, dogmatic rules of action. They cannot tell us specifically what to do in particular situations because Dewey recognizes that such values at times conflict.

If values did not get in one another's way, if, that is, the realization of one desire were not incompatible with that of another, there would be no need of reflection. 147
Dewey claims that the nature of making moral decisions (choosing between conflicting values) does not have to do with choosing between something judged to be good and something else known to be bad.

The struggle is not between a good which is clear to him and something else which attracts him but which he knows to be wrong. It is between values each of which is an undoubted good in its place but which now get in each other's way. 148

Thus the task of moral theory is, as mentioned previously, to locate principles which provide guidance to decision making.

Dewey is careful to distinguish between the concepts 'principle' and 'rule'.

Now a genuine principle differs from a rule in two ways: (a) A principle evolves in connection with the course of experience, being a generalized statement of what sort of consequences and values tend to be realized in certain kinds of situations; a rule is taken as something ready-made and fixed. (b) A principle is primarily intellectual, a method and scheme for judging, and is practical secondarily because of what it discloses; a rule is practical. 149

This distinction between principles and rules is not meant to record an ordinary language distinction. Rather, it reflects a stipulation on Dewey's part.

Of course, the word "rule" is often used to designate a principle—as in the case of the phrase "Golden Rule." We are speaking not of the words, but of their underlying ideas. 150
Basic to Dewey's distinction is the proffering of the intellectual as the central feature which characterizes and highlights the nature of true moral principles. Rules are practical; they are habitual ways of doing things. But principles are intellectual; they are the final methods used in judging suggested courses of action... whereas the object of moral principles is to supply standpoints and methods which will enable the individual to make for himself an analysis of the elements of good and evil in the particular situation in which he finds himself. No genuine moral principle prescribes a specific course of action; rules, like cooking recipes, may tell just what to do and how to do it. A moral principle, such as that of chastity, of justice, of the Golden Rule, gives the agent a basis for looking at and examining a particular question that comes up. It holds before him certain possible aspects of the act; it warns him against taking a short or partial view of the act; It economizes his thinking by supplying him with the main heads by reference to which to consider the bearings of his desires and purposes; it guides him in his thinking by suggesting to him the important considerations for which he should be on the lookout. 151

Dewey's conclusion is that

[a] moral principle, then, is not a command to act or forbear acting in a given way; it is a tool for analyzing a special situation, the right or wrong being determined by the situation in its entirety, and not by the rule as such. 152

In the foregoing, we are reminded of the analysis of 'situation' in Chapter Two. There we noted what is meant by a situation being organic or, in the above terms, "in its
entirety." In fact, it is the accumulation of experiences acquired through diverse situations which form moral principles.

It is clear that the various situations in which a person is called to deliberate and judge have common elements, and that values found in them resemble one another. It is also obvious that general ideas are a great aid in judging particular cases. If different situations were wholly unlike one another, nothing could be learned from one which would be of any avail in any other. But having like points, experience carries over from one to another, and experience is intellectually cumulative. Out of resembling experiences general ideas develop; through language, instruction, and tradition this gathering together of experiences of value into generalized points of view is extended to take in a whole people and a race. Through intercommunication the experience of the entire human race is to some extent pooled and crystallized in general ideas. These constitute principles. We bring them with us to deliberation on particular situations. 153

Again, we see the interconnectedness of Dewey's thought. Through the process of experiencing, generalized principles (often called 'summary rules' in contemporary moral theory) evolve, which, in turn, become the means for dealing with subsequent situations. In this way, the individual and the social scene are conjoined. And as we noted in Chapter Two, the experimental or reflective method can only be public; There is no scientific inquiry which can be conducted outside of the social sphere. So too with morality.
Character may be individual, but conduct is necessarily social.

The conclusion is that conduct and character are strictly correlative. Continuity, consistency, throughout a series of acts is the expression of the enduring unity of attitudes and habits. Deeds hang together because they proceed from a single and stable self. 154

The essence of reflective morality is, then, that the individual or psychological aspects of character are brought together in the social world of conduct, and both potentially provide mutual benefit for the other. Not surprisingly, it is in a democracy that the greatest degree of mutual benefit or common good will be realized.

The Right and The Good

In order to make reasonable sense out of the Deweyan phrase "the common good," we must first discuss the nature of the Deweyan 'moral good' and its relationship to the 'moral right'. All moral theorists include meta-ethical treatment of these two notions, and Dewey is no exception.

The moral good. Dewey distinguishes natural goods from moral goods in the following way.

There is a contrast between the natural goods—those which appeal to immediate desire—and the moral good, that which is approved after reflection. But the difference is not absolute and inherent. The moral good is some natural good which is sustained and developed through consideration of it in its relations; the natural enjoyment which conflicts with the moral good is that which accompanies some desire which persists because it is
allowed to sway action by itself, apart from the connections which reflection would bring to light. 155

However, locating such moral goods is not a one time, once and for all, process. Similarly, there are no two qualitatively identical goods.

In quality, the good is never twice alike. It never copies itself. It is new every morning, fresh every evening. It is unique in its every presentation. For it marks the resolution of a distinctive complication of competing habits and impulses which can never repeat itself. 156

If goods are never identical and cannot be located once and for all, what constitutes "the good" which must be continually sought? Significantly, Dewey's formulation of the good is characterized in terms of experience.

Good consists in the meaning that is experienced to belong to an activity when conflict and entanglement of various incompatible impulses and habits terminate in a unified orderly release in action. 157

Implicitly, then, goods are equivalent to secondary experiences. Just as no two experiences are identical, so also for goods. Thus, reflective morality can only help locate goods in particular and individual situations.

The business of reflection in determining the true good cannot be done once for all, as, for instance, making out a table of values arranged in a hierarchical order of higher and lower. It needs to be done, and done over and over and over again, in terms of the conditions of concrete situations as they arise. In short, the need for reflection and insight is perpetually recurring. 158
As we have seen in the analysis of moral principles and rules, the process of locating goods does not yield goods which are only useful in those individual situations. Rather, they form a collective body of experiences which are used in making future determinations. Like the formation of summary rules or principles, they are not fixed or a priori existent.

Goods, then, are determined and identified through the continual process of reflection in individual situations. Thus a "good" in one situation may not be a "good" in another. For example, in the situation of deciding whether to spend time studying for an important final or going to a movie, the former might be considered the good in that particular situation. But when the choice is between studying and helping to put out a dormitory fire, then the latter might be judged the good.

Obviously, then, goods often conflict. They also can conflict with determining what is right.

The fact that the idea or principle of Right has such a natural basis and inevitable role does not, however, signify that it will not conflict with what an individual judges to be his good and his end, nor does it guarantee the rightfulness of all claims and demands that are put forth in its name. 159

However, to say that rights and goods conflict says nothing about the nature of 'right'.
The moral right. Dewey's theory of rights "expresses the way in which the good of a number of persons, held together by intrinsic ties, becomes efficacious in the regulation of the members of a community." Importantly, rights or obligations necessarily refer to special relationships persons have with one another; relationships such as that between a parent and his child, or a senator and her constituents.

If we generalize such instances, we reach the conclusion that Right, law, duty, arise from the relations which human beings intimately sustain to one another, and that their authoritative force springs from the very nature of the relation that binds people together. 161

Shared interests, as we have noted, are what bind people together.

According to Dewey, in the area of morals, rights are not more basic than are goods and vice versa. 162 Rather, the two are independent conceptions.

Regarding the notion that the right is the means to the good, it may be said that it is certainly desirable that acts which are deemed right should in fact be contributory to good. But this consideration does not do away with the fact that the concept of Rightness, in many cases, is independent of the concept of satisfaction and good. When a parent says "this is right and therefore you should do it," it is to be hoped that the performance of the act will actually conduce to some good. But as an idea, "right" introduces an element which is quite outside that of the good. 163
Yet even though the good and the right are independent, they
do come together in the notion of "common good" because

the true significance of "the greatest
good of the greatest number" is that
social conditions should be such that all
individuals can exercise their own
initiative in a social medium which will
develop their personal capacities and
reward their efforts. That is, it is
concerned with providing the objective
political, economic, and social
conditions which will enable the greatest
possible number because of their own
endeavors to have a full and generous
share in the values of living. 164

Pursuing this kind of good necessarily includes recognizing
particular rights or obligations arising out of any number
of special relationships. In so doing, shared interests
develop. Since shared interests are what bind people
together, individuals have an unavoidable social stake, a
basic survival need in supporting them. 165 This is what
Dewey means by "the greatest good for the greatest number."
Pursuit of the common good is achieved by recognizing
individual interests in the context of the larger social
setting. Thus, in practice, moral goods and moral rights
are joined, for this is what composes the common good. The
'common good', programmatically defined, means that
individuals are provided the widest and freest social
conditions in which to act while simultaneously bettering
the conditions of the same social group.

Another way of making the same point is that the two
necessary conditions which define a moral experience are
operative; that is, both the intentions of the individual and the perceived consequences of his action are considered in a reflective moral situation because goods and rights arise out of dynamic social configurations.

In its general features, the traits of a reflective moral situation have long been clear; doubts and disputes arise chiefly as to the relation which they bear to one another. The formula was well stated by Aristotle. The doer of the moral deed must have a certain "state of mind" in doing it. First, he must know what he is doing; secondly, he must choose it, choose it for itself, and thirdly, the act must be the expression of a formed and stable character. In other words, the act must be voluntary; that is, it must manifest a choice, and for full morality at least, the choice must be an expression of the general tenor and set of personality. It must involve awareness of what one is about; a fact which in the concrete signifies that there must be a purpose, an aim, an end in view, something for the sake of which the particular act is done. 166

In summary, the subject-matter of Dewey's reflective theory of morals "deals with conduct, in so far as this is considered as right or wrong, good or bad." Good and right, as we have noted, are logically independent concepts, but are related practically. Put differently, both goods and rights are determined by individual social situations in which individuals must know what they are doing and choose to act in accordance with communities of interest such that both the individual and the social group benefit from those actions. This is no different from a description of Deweyan
democracy, since in a democratically organized community, individuals as well as the social group grow and prosper in the highest degree possible.

THEORY OF MORAL EXPERIENCE

We began this chapter by claiming that Dewey's theory of moral experience is an emphatic kind of experience. Now it remains to summarize why this claim is correct.

It will be recalled that in our explication of Dewey's theory of experience in Chapter Two, we employed the two distinctions between the process and product of experience, and between primary and secondary experience. Additionally, we characterized the nature of aesthetic experience and religious experience in order to show how both are experience but still emphatic kinds of experience. In order to characterize the moral quality of experience and moral experiences we will need to use these same distinctions and one additional distinction with which we will begin.

Moral quality of experience. We begin by drawing a major distinction which Dewey employs between moral/immoral acts and those which are considered non-moral/a-moral acts. According to Dewey, in general, those acts or experiences having moral/immoral rather than non-moral/a-moral quality are those which are not isolated from other experiences—acts derive moral worth from the ends to which they lead. In other words, when the consequences of the act are taken into account, the act takes on moral quality.
But it is not enough merely to say that any consequence which is considered makes an act moral or immoral, for as we saw quite clearly in our analysis of experience, writ large, and aesthetic and religious experiences in particular, they all have to do with the consequences of action.\textsuperscript{170}

With regard to experience in general, the perceived consequences, or ends-in-view, direct or motivate action. The consummated experience has the consequence of producing secondary or reconstructed experience. Similarly, aesthetic and religious experiences involve consequences. In the former, the realization and appreciation of a sense of balance and proportion constitute the substance of the consequence. As for the latter, the consummation includes and embodies a strong conviction or faith in the methods of science as the means to locate truth.

The consequences which Dewey holds to be central to moral experiences are morally good or bad, and right or wrong consequences rather than consequences which are concerned with aesthetic appreciation of balance and proportion or a strong faith in the methods of science which lead to truth. Neither aesthetic nor religious experience necessarily contains moral consequences. Moral consequences are those consequences which affect the choice making and action taking abilities of other individuals.

Thus, although all kinds of consummated experiences yield as consequences what Dewey calls 'secondary' or
'reconstructed' experience, the type of consequence (secondary experience) is different in accordance with the different kind of experience. To have had an experience, whether aesthetic, religious, moral or some other kind, it is necessary to have reached consummation; that is, reached satisfactory consequences. This is a necessary condition for all categories of experience. It is possible for an aesthetic experience or a religious experience concurrently to have moral quality or moral consequences, but it is not necessary. In order to have moral significance, the substance of the consequence of any kind of experience must affect the moral choice making and action taking of others.

Moral experience. But, as we noted earlier, Dewey claims that moral/immoral consequences alone do not define or determine moral experiences. Although the substance of the consequences identifies whether or not an experience has moral/immoral quality, these consequences alone are not sufficient data to determine the moral worth of the experience. As mentioned previously, Dewey holds that the agent's intentions/motives must also be considered when determining the actual amount of moral good of an experience. Dewey claims that the two conditions which define a moral situation are the consequences of the action and the intentions of the agent. In other words, to have a moral experience necessarily includes the two conditions:
the realization of the moral consequences of the action, and evaluation of the intentions of the agent.

In effect, what we see is that Dewey uses the language of morals to describe his notions of means, ends, and ends-in-view. As discussed previously, in Dewey's general theory of experience, means, ends, and ends-in-view are continuous rather than separate elements: ends-in-view are perceived and means are chosen and used to reach those ends-in-view. Once an end has been reached, it immediately becomes a means for further investigation and transformation of experience. So too with Dewey's theory of moral experience. Let us see how this works.

When one experiences a moral problem, disequalibrium is felt, and ordinarily one desires to resolve the situation. The process of experiencing (experimental/reflective method) is engaged in order to reach solutions/ends. The results (ends) of such moral experience yield summary rules (principles) which are the means used to solve subsequent moral problems. The methodology for solving moral problems is thus identical with the methodology used to transform any primary experience into a settled secondary experience. The procedure is repeated on countless occasions as the need arises. Thus, we understand Dewey's claim that there is continuity of moral experience, just as there is continuity of all experience.
Principles and habits. Similarly, building up one's store of moral principles is equivalent to building up one's store of habits. They both function in the same way; they are used as means (accumulation and confirmation of past experiences) to change future moral problem situations (primary experience) into settled and satisfactory situations.

Individual and social morality. A condition which distinguishes reflective morality from aesthetics or from the religious is that morality is individual and social. That is, in an aesthetic experience, there is interaction between the artist or viewer, and the object of the aesthetic experience, but, there is no requirement that this interaction in any way include the larger social context. Similarly, in a religious experience, there is interaction between the individual and the object of the religious experience, but, there is no need that the larger social context be included in the experience. In other words, both aesthetic and religious experiences can be personal; no one other than the individual who had the experience need be involved in any way of the transformation of the primary into the secondary experience. This is substantially different in moral experiences, for they necessarily include the individual and the social. We have spent considerable time and effort in this chapter characterizing these two categories and their relationships. In terms of moral
experience, we now know that there cannot be moral actions in isolation from the larger social context. Persons and acts take on moral quality or acquire moral worth only in connection with the social context.

This idea of conduct as a serial whole solves the problem of morally indifferent acts. Every act has potential moral significance, because it is, through its consequences, part of a larger whole of behavior. A person starts to open a window because he feels the need of air—no act could be more "natural," more morally indifferent in appearance. But he remembers that his associate is an invalid and sensitive to drafts. He now sees his act in two different lights, possessed of two different values, and he has to make a choice. The potential moral import of a seemingly insignificant act has come home to him. Or, wishing to take exercise, there are two routes open to him. Ordinarily it would be a mere matter of personal taste which he would choose. But he recalls that the more pleasing of the two is longer, and that if he went that way he might be unable to keep an appointment of importance. He now has to place his act in a larger context of continuity and determine which ulterior consequence he prizes most: personal pleasure or meeting the needs of another. Thus while there is no single act which must under all circumstances have conscious moral quality, there is no act, since it is a part of conduct, which may not have definitive moral significance. There is no hard and fast line between the morally indifferent and the morally significant....For all acts are so tied together that any one of them may have to be judged as an expression of character. On the other hand, there is no act which may not, under some circumstances, be morally indifferent, for at the time there may be no need for consideration of its relation to character. There is no better evidence
This characterization exemplifies the requirements for a moral situation, reasons why the situation is potentially moral, and the process by which moral problem situations are resolved. First, to have a moral situation requires the two oft mentioned conditions: that individual actions (intentions) be considered in light of the social consequences of that action. Second, until individual actions are placed in a social context, they will be morally indifferent. As Dewey mentions, every action has potential social significance, and hence every act has potential moral significance. Third, the process by which moral problem situations are resolved is through the experimental or reflective method in which the problem is recognized as moral, and the steps of reflective thinking are enlisted to reach a solution. Thus, in all three of these points, we notice Dewey's concern to conjoin and intertwine the individual and social aspects of morality.

Since Dewey often equates the moral with the social, both implicitly and explicitly, we see how and why he takes such pains to characterize the nature of various kinds of social groupings and their relative moral worth. Except for mere associative behavior, all social groups necessarily have moral significance. Moral experience can only occur within social settings in the sense that a public is
affected by the consequences of the moral action. The relative moral worth of communities is determined by how great and varied are the common interests and the degree to which the social group interacts with other communities of interest.

Dewey thus posits two conditions which measure the moral worth of a social group: the amount of shared interests which communities have, and the amount of interplay among separable communities of interest. These conditions determine the degree to which the community is morally advanced. In a democracy, the potential is greatest for advancing both individual as well as social interests. In this way, democracy is both an ethical ideal and a social ideal.

SUMMARY

This chapter contains an analysis of the scope and nature of Dewey's theory of morals, building upon the analysis in Chapter Two in an effort to formulate the remainder of the theoretical underpinnings of the practice of moral education. To do this involved laying out Dewey's basic substantive tenets, postulates, principles and assumptions. When added to the general theory of experience, these assumptions provide the necessary links to explaining the theoretical side of moral education.

To gain an understanding of Dewey's theory of morals we came to grips with an important distinction which Dewey
relies upon throughout his analysis and used as a means of characterizing Dewey's position. The distinction is between the individual and the social. Understanding this distinction and how Dewey formulates these two cooperative but separate notions is the key to making sense of Dewey's theory of morals.

This distinction is employed by Dewey from the earliest formulations of his ethical theory and continues to appear in his mature views. This distinction also has import for the classroom practice of moral education. Consequently, as the analysis continued, we took great care, as does Dewey, to use this distinction as the means through which the theory of morals was presented.

The first section in this chapter established that Dewey does have a category called moral experience. This was followed by a lengthy treatment of Dewey's key notions of the individual and the social. This analysis contained a discussion of society, shared interests, community and communication as well as the different forms of collective association, public and the state, and ended with a characterization of Dewey's notion of democracy. What followed was a characterization of the Deweyan theory of morals. This analysis began with a characterization of psychological and social ethics and contained a discussion of the nature and role of moral principles and rules, a discussion of moral judgment making, and concluded with an
analysis of the nature and role of the moral good and the moral right and how they interrelate. Finally, we concluded with a discussion of the moral quality of experience and a characterization of moral experience as being a distinguishable kind of experience.

Now that we have characterized moral experience and have a better sense of how an experience can acquire moral quality, we can outline how Dewey translates the theory of moral experience into the practice of moral education as well as the actual practice of moral education.
CHAPTER NOTES


5. See for example the opening paragraphs in John Dewey and James Tufts, Ethics, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1932), pp. 3-4, where he purposefully equates 'ethics' and 'moral' and 'moral life'.


7. In "Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality," pp. 33-34, Dewey carefully explains that morality is social; moral judgments have to do with the consequences that effect the lives of individuals.


10. Ibid., p. 178.


13. Ibid., pp. 184-185.


16. In Richard Pratte, *Contemporary Theories of Education* (Scranton, PA: Intext Educational Publishers--College Division, 1971), pp. 130-133, an evaluation of experimentalism is provided. In that context, Pratte quotes Richard Hofstadter and mentions others who have criticized Dewey for supposedly championing individualism to the detriment of social concerns, and vice versa. "Hofstadter does not make the mistake of some critics who, never having read Dewey, attribute to him the turning of schools into nurseries or playgrounds, the turning out of black-jacketed, booted slobs, and the divesting of school authorities of any power they had. Such criticism is irresponsible." p. 131.

17. We can see how misinterpretations occur by looking at sections from A. H. Johnson, ed., *The Wit and Wisdom of John Dewey* (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1949), in which Johnson extracts portions from Dewey's writings out of context: "What the best and wisest parent wants for his own child, that must the community want for of its children." p. 110 (from John Dewey's *School and Society*, p. 19). And, "No government of experts in which the masses do not have the chance to inform the experts as to their needs can be anything but an oligarchy managed in the interests of the few. And the enlightenment must proceed in ways which force the administrative specialists to take account of the needs. The world has suffered more from leaders and authorities than from the masses." p. 98 (from John Dewey's *The Public and Its Problems*, p. 208). In William W. Brickman, "Dewey's Social and Political Commentary," in Boydston, *Guide to the Works of John Dewey*, pp. 220-224, Dewey's interest in and concern for social reform is highlighted. In that context, Brickman notes Dewey's interest in Jane Addams' Hull House where he had contact and exchanged ideas with radical socialist and communist reformers. Although Dewey himself disavowed any affiliation with communism, he did get involved with social reform movements (e.g., labor unions, Populist movement, unemployment concerns, etc.) which implicitly aligned him more closely with socialist rather than capitalist interests. S. Morris Eames, in "Dewey's Theory of
Valuation," in Boydston, Guide to the Works of John Dewey, p. 195, suggests that critics have also aligned Dewey with socialist concerns: "Critics of Dewey's theory maintain that he has no ground for holding to the 'intrinsic worth' of individuals, or that he has any reason for treating other human beings as equals. This criticism is made in spite of Dewey's long history of emphasizing the importance of the individual, or driving home the idea, perhaps more than any other philosopher in the twentieth century, that social arrangements—political, economic, educational—must be judged in terms of the effects upon the individual." In Jo Ann Boydston and Kathleen Poulos, Checklist of Writings About John Dewey, 1887-1973 (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1974), p. 206, the following entry suggest that some form of "social relativism" exists in Deweyan theory. "De Camargo, Candido Procopio Ferrara. 'Social Relativism and the Philosophy of John Dewey.' Master's Thesis, Columbia University, 1956."

Also, in the concluding chapter of Martin J. Smith, "John Dewey and Moral Education" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Munich, 1936), p. 1, the following erroneous assessment is proffered for the relationship between the individual and the social. "It is through a lack of consistent philosophy that the social phase of education or the place of manual work in the school—two ideas so suggestive and valuable in themselves have been overemphasized. A balanced philosophy would have brought out the ethical nature of man more clearly and the importance of individual personality as distinct from the social aspect of human nature." In Contemporary Theories of Education, Pratte offers the following comments. "Perhaps Dewey somewhat overvalued the social side of learning. However, Hofstader and others are in error when they contend that Dewey argued that all learning has to be overtly shared or, put differently, must be social learning." p. 131. In Pratte's concluding remarks, he recognizes that Deweyan experimentalism was misapplied in part expressly because translators of Deweyan theory did not comprehend the actual relationship between the individual and the social. "[T]housands of teachers did learn to verbalize the terminology of the problem-solving method, came to espouse the notion of freedom in education, but true implementation of these goals was impossible in the hands of poorly prepared teachers and administrators. Furthermore, experimentalism's lack of general acceptance and growth is attributable in part to its conversion to a faith or rigid ideology by many educators. By so doing, Dewey's ideas and principles were converted into a fixed subject-matter of ready-
made and easily digestible rules by those who wished to have the 'right' method of training teachers." p. 133.

18. This characterization of Deweyan educational sloganizing is based upon Israel Scheffler's analysis in The Language of Education, 1960. Reprint. (Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas, 1974), pp. 36-46. In that chapter, Scheffler uses Dewey as a clear example of the nature of slogans: "The example of John Dewey's educational influence is instructive. His systematic, careful, and qualified statements soon were translated into striking fragments serving as slogans for the new progressive tendencies in American education. Dewey himself criticized the uses to which some of his ideas were put [Experience and Nature], and his criticisms had the effect of inviting reconsideration and reflection. He was, after all, the acknowledged intellectual leader of the movement. Increasingly, however, progressive slogans have taken on a life of their own. They have been defended as literal statements and attacked as such. Critics, in particular, have often begun by attributing the literal defects of progressive slogans to Dewey's parent doctrines and gone on to imply that the progressive movement has thereby been shown unworthy in its aims and operation." pp. 37-38. This phenomenon is evident in numerous contexts. In Peter Scharf, "Moral Development and Democratic Schooling," Theory Into Practice: Moral Development 16, 2 (April 1977): 89-96, Scharf notes how this has occurred with the Deweyan concept 'democracy': "The Deweyan democratic ideal grew into an ideology which, for a short period, offered the (albeit) minority educational faith that, in our society, democratic ideals should be incorporated into the structure of the classroom and school. The precise meaning of such an effort to democratize the school has to this day remained elusive. Three plausible interpretations are frequently offered to describe the modern embodiment of Deweyite educational progressivism. A most degenerate interpretation has, of course, been the 'free school' movement. This movement has interpreted Dewey's democratic ideal in terms of granting the child maximum independence and choice....A second interpretation has been the evolution of the community-based school concept....A third interpretation of Deweyite democratic education has emphasized self-government of the school involving an ongoing dialogue between teachers, students, and administrators." p. 90. In The Wit and Wisdom of John Dewey, Johnson extracts short excerpts from Dewey's writings which contain key theoretical notions.
However, in so quoting, the reader is left entirely to his own devices to interpret them. For instance the following quotes from Dewey's Educational Essays and Schools of Tomorrow, respectively, contain the notion of the 'whole learner'. It is easy to understand how slogans emerge from committing the fallacy of accent; that is, lifting such passages out of context. "A method is ethically defective that, while giving the child a glibness in the mechanical facility of reading leaves him at the mercy of suggestion and chance environment to decide whether he reads the 'yellow journal,' the trashy novel, or the literature which inspires and makes more valid his whole life." (Dewey, p. 153), p. 104. "This does not means that the textbook must disappear, but that its function is changed. It becomes a guide for the public by which he may economize time and mistakes. The teacher and the book are no longer the only instructors; the hands, the eyes, the ears, in fact the whole body, become sources of information, while teacher and textbook become respectively the starter and the tester." (Dewey, p. 74), p. 111. Similarly in Boydston and Poulos, Checklist of the Writings of John Dewey, p. 240, there is an entry the title of which emphasizes the pervasive use of the 'whole' or 'total' learner: "Reiger, Anthony Eton. 'John Dewey and the Total Learner.' Doctoral dissertation, United States International University, 1971." In Johnson, The Wit and Wisdom of John Dewey, p. 30, Johnson briefly characterizes in his own words Dewey's doctrine of interest in a very misleading fashion: "A child should be encouraged to study what interests him and in a fashion which seems natural. This rules out the common pedagogical procedure of attempting to arouse interest in a subject matter by artificially linking it with pleasurable experiences."

It is easy to see in this example how Dewey's theory of interest became bastardized through simplistic portrayals of his theory in the form of catchy phrases. Pratte's comments quoted in the preceding two notes are also applicable in this discussion of slogans and Deweyan theory.

19. Based on these kinds of misconceptions about the relationship between the individual and the social, Deweyan theory at times has been accused of endorsing programs which are totally based upon serving what interests children rather than what is in their interest. Similarly, Dewey has been labeled a socialist as if he had no concern at all for individual growth. His writings prove neither of these to be the case.


24. In Chapter Two, p. 69, we initially introduced Israel Scheffler's analysis of programmatic definitions. That important characterization is found in note 30, p. 140 of this study.


26. Ibid., p. 158.

27. Ibid.


31. Ibid., p. 385.


33. Ibid., p. 164.

34. Ibid., p. 163.

35. Ibid., pp. 163-164.


39. Ibid., p. 378.

40. There are many examples in Dewey's works which make this point. See for example, *Ethics*, pp. 190 and 403;

41. Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, p. 248.
44. Ibid., p. 154.
45. Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, p. 248.
47. Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, p. 313.
48. Ibid., pp. 351-352.
49. Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 188.
50. Ibid., pp. 23-24.
51. Ibid., pp. 69-70.
54. Ibid., p. 188.
55. Ibid., p. 24.
56. Ibid., p. 70.
61. Ibid.
63. Ibid., p. 24.
64. Ibid., p. 82.
65. Ibid., p. 4.
66. Ibid., p. 82.
67. Ibid., p. 83.
68. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid., p. 3.
75. Ibid., p. 69.
76. Ibid., p. 188.
77. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
78. Ibid., p. 63.
79. Ibid., p. 82.
80. Ibid., p. 71.
81. Ibid., p. 184.
86. Ibid., p. 332.
88. Ibid., p. 148.
90. Ibid., p. 248.
91. Ibid., p. 244.
92. Ibid.
94. Ibid., pp. 388-389.
95. Ibid., p. 389.
96. Ibid., p. 386.
100. Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, p. 383.
102. Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, p. 343.
103. Ibid., p. 5.
105. Ibid.
107. Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, p. 91.
109. Ibid., p. 322.
110. Ibid.
112. Ibid., pp. 233-234.
114. Ibid., p. 173.
115. Ibid., p. 175.
116. Ibid., p. 45.
118. Ibid., pp. 175-176.
119. Ibid., p. 176.
120. Ibid., p. 190.
121. Ibid., p. 179.
122. Ibid., p. 183.
123. Ibid., p. 379.
124. Ibid., p. 4.
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid.
129. Ibid., p. 380.
131. Dewey does not mean that just because something is an established custom or tradition that it is *prima facie* outdated. In fact, many customs and traditions ought to be confirmed repeatedly and perpetuated through communal living.
133. Ibid., p. 190.
134. Ibid., p. 191.
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid., pp. 191-192.
137. Ibid., pp. 192-193.
138. Ibid., p. 380-381.
139. See p. 75 of Chapter Two.
140. In Chapter Two we mentioned that Dewey interchanges the words 'reflective', 'scientific', and 'experimental' as descriptors for 'method'. Consequently, when we say that Dewey's reflective theory of morals and his reflective method of thinking both use 'reflective' we must also make the point that nothing is lost if we say that the method is the experimental method or the scientific method. The point to be made goes beyond a simple exchange of the one word 'reflective'. We mean to point out the similarity of concepts and of the process of acquiring information.
141. Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, p. 382.
142. Ibid., p. 381.
143. Ibid., pp. 275-276.
144. Ibid., p. 4.
145. Ibid., pp. 195-196.
146. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
147. Ibid., p. 228.
149. Ibid., pp. 304-305.
150. Ibid., p. 309.
151. Ibid.
152. Ibid.
153. Ibid., p. 304.
154. Ibid., p. 183.
155. Ibid., p. 224.
159. Ibid., p. 249.
160. Ibid.
161. Ibid., pp. 237-238.
162. Ibid., p. 232.
163. Ibid., p. 234.
164. Ibid., p. 276.
165. Earlier in the analysis of this chapter (pp. 169-182) we recognized Dewey's claim that the social is a fact and basic need of humanity.
167. Ibid., p. 3.
173. Ibid., pp. 179-180.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE PRACTICE OF MORAL EDUCATION

INTRODUCTION

It will be recalled that Chapter Three concluded with a summary of the theory of moral experience, and in that context we indicated that two tasks remain for this study. First, the necessary connections between Dewey's theory of moral experience and the practice of moral education must be made explicit, and second, the specific recommendations for and descriptions of the practice of moral education must be described in detail. In this chapter we will take up both tasks. Initially we will be concerned with how Dewey translates his theoretical construction of moral experience into the actual concrete practice of moral education. This is important for at least two reasons. First, unless these connections are made explicit, it will not be prima facie obvious how Dewey's theory of moral experience is translated into the actual practice of moral education. Second, we need to make these connections to show that what Dewey in fact advocates for the practice of moral education is consistently supported by, and significantly related to, his
theory of moral experience. We will demonstrate that the connection between the theory of moral experience and the practice of moral education is not merely ad hoc, but rather is consistent with Dewey's entire philosophic framework.

The discussion in Chapter Four will rely heavily upon the descriptions of Deweyan concepts and the distinctions made in previous chapters. We will use and refer to the distinctions between the individual and the social, process and product, primary and secondary experience, as well as the concepts 'interest', 'habit', 'impulse', 'instinct', 'character', 'conduct', and so on. Moreover, two additional Deweyan distinctions will be introduced—direct and indirect instruction, and ideas about morality and moral ideas—these distinctions are crucial to explicating the subject-matter of the present chapter.

We turn now to a discussion of Dewey's programmatic definitions of 'theory' and 'practice' and the relationship between them.

THEORY AND PRACTICE

As we have already discussed at great length in Chapter Two, it may be the case that Dewey has no so-called "theory of education." However, we cannot ignore the fact that Dewey does use the terms 'theory' and 'practice' in presenting his philosophical position. For example, many titles of his works, especially in the area of morals,
contain the term 'theory' (i.e., "Moral Theory and Practice," TML, TV, and LTI).

In order to make sense out of Dewey's theory and practice regarding moral education, it is necessary to examine his position of the nature and relationship between theory and practice. By so doing, his theory of moral experience will be connected with his recommendations for the practice of moral education.

The primary concern is this: what is the relationship between theory and practice? For Dewey, the answer to this question is not problematic, for he claims that theory and practice cannot be separated.

Theory separated from concrete doing and making is empty and futile; practice then becomes an immediate seizure of opportunities and enjoyments which conditions afford without the direction which theory--knowledge and ideas--has the power to supply. The problem of the relation of theory and practice is not a problem of theory alone; it is that, but it is also the most practical problem of life. For it is the question of how intelligence may inform action, and how action may bear the fruit of increased insight into meaning: a clear view of the values that are worth while and of the means by which they are to be made secure in experienced objects.

In this view, the traditional separation between theory and practice, like all traditionally opposed dualisms (i.e., experience and nature, mind and body, interest and effort, and so on) is unwarranted.
All of these separations culminate in one between knowing and doing, theory and practice, between mind as the end and spirit of action and the body as its organ and means. We shall not repeat what has been said about the source of this dualism in the division of society into a class laboring with their muscles for material sustenance and a class which, relieved from economic pressure devotes itself to the arts of expression and social direction. Nor is it necessary to speak again of the educational evils which spring from the separation. We shall be content to summarize the forces which tend to make the untenability of this conception obvious and to replace it by the idea of continuity.

What Dewey is saying is, we assume, that a continuity not a separation marks off all forms of theorizing and practice—be it moral theory and practice, educational theory and practice, scientific theory and practice, etc. However, Dewey does describe theory, for purposes of analysis, in distinct ways from practice. "Theory is the cross-section of the given state of action in order to know the conduct that should be; practice is the realization of the idea thus gained; it is theory in action."3

Dewey uses the term 'theory' both to refer to the abstract metaphysical/epistemological/axiological construction of his philosophical position, and to refer to specific hypotheses which must be confirmed or refuted through actual testing. In Chapters Two and Three we used the term 'theory' in the first sense, that is, as "subject-matter." However, when Dewey says that theory is continuous...
with practice it is in the second sense that his use of the term 'theory' must be understood. When Dewey uses 'theory' in this second sense, the only reasonable way he sees of separating theory and practice is to conceive of theory as the idea and practice as the executed hypothesis. In other words, prior to the actual outcome, the hypothesis or idea is theoretical. Once it is executed successfully, the theory gains credence. Theory and practice are thus interdependent.

This account implies that theory is any hypothesis of the same sort Dewey means when he describes the nature of an hypothesis in the context of scientific method. If this is the case, then we have a better clue about the connection between the theory of moral experience and the practice of moral education. The relationship is one of empirical contingency, and it is the scientific method which provides the means to connect theory and practice.

Action is at the heart of ideas. The experimental practice of knowing, when taken to supply the pattern of philosophic doctrine of mind and its organs, eliminates the age-old separation of theory and practice. It discloses that knowing is itself a kind of action, the only one which progressively and securely clothes natural existence with realized meanings, for the outcome of experienced objects which are begot by operations which define thinking, take into themselves, as part of their own funded and incorporated meaning, the relation to other things disclosed by thinking.
It is thus the scientific or reflective method that links theory and practice. More importantly, Dewey claims that it is this method which not only necessarily makes theory continuous with practice, but also improves and refines theory or knowledge itself.

We have seen how the opposition between knowing and doing, theory and practice, has been abandoned in the actual enterprise of scientific inquiry, how knowing goes forward by means of doing. We have seen how the cognitive quest for absolute certainty by purely mental means has been surrendered in behalf of search for a security, having a high degree of probability, by means of preliminary active regulation of conditions. We have considered some of the definite steps by which security has come to attach to regulation of change rather than absolute certainty to the unchangeable. We have noted how in consequence of this transformation the standard of judgment has been transferred from antecedents to consequents, from inert dependence upon the past to intentional construction of a future. 6

Accordingly, this second sense of theory is not a predetermined or intuitive set of metaphysical, epistemological, or axiological beliefs. 7 In fact, if theory must continue to be associated with unconnected precepts, then theory, as Dewey defines it, would need to be renamed. 8 Rather, theory, kept in check by practice, is the concrete evidence which directs and confirms action.

If there can be no practical separation between theory and practice, how are we to make sense of the continuity between the theory of moral experience and the practice of
moral education? In other words, what serves to make the theory of moral experience practicable?

According to Dewey, we know that practice is the test of theory; practice confirms or denies the validity of the theory. Thus, practice is that which justifies or gives currency to theory. Hence, the theory of moral experience must be put into practice in order to test its adequacy; in order to make practice intelligently directed rather than being blindly or impulsively implemented. 

To remain consistent with Dewey's analysis of the second sense of 'theory' and practice, it must be the reflective method which is the means for testing out the hypotheses of the theory of moral experience through practice. The reflective method is the process through which hypotheses are tested. However, although the method is a concrete procedure which processes hypotheses, it provides no initial substantive guidance. In other words, the scientific method does not tell us which hypotheses to test. This is done through the implementation of Dewey's "principles of selection," "necessary conditions," "measures of evaluation," and so on.

Throughout the analyses and descriptions of this study we have presented numerous "principles of selection," "necessary conditions," "measures of evaluation," and the like which set the parameters for identifying in practice the theoretically presented Deweyan concepts. For instance,
we have established that although there is the theory of experience, there are emphatic kinds of experience: there are educative and mis-educative experiences; there are moral and a-moral experiences; there are aesthetic and religious experiences, etc. We were able to distinguish among these distinct kinds of experience by introducing Dewey's "principles of selection," or "necessary conditions," or "distinguishing features" for their existence. So too with 'democracy'. Dewey outlines principles to be followed, and necessary conditions which must obtain in order for there to be actual instances of democracy. By following these principles in practice and establishing the necessary conditions, it is possible to identify or create democratic communities. In other words, it is the principles and the necessary conditions of democracy, or the distinguishing features or necessary conditions of educative or aesthetic experience and so on, which guide the identification in practice of these concepts, and it is the experimental method which tests their validity.

The translation of the theory of moral experience into the practice of moral education is accomplished in the same way. By following the theoretical principles of selection, distinguishing features, necessary conditions, and so on, and thus choosing hypotheses of what would count as appropriate subject-matter, goals, methods etc., theory
(hypotheses) can be tested in practice. The scientific method processes those identified hypotheses.

We can now turn to a discussion of Dewey's implementation of his theory of experience. Before we outline the specifics of the practice of moral education, however, we must offer a disclaimer. We have already noted that Dewey, as a process philosopher, can provide nothing more than principles which guide the practice of moral education without contradicting his own position. If we grant that Dewey is consistent in his total philosophic view, how does he provide specific recommendations for practice? He does so through illustration; through describing actual examples of moral education practices in schools he approves. Consequently, in the following portrayal of the constitutive elements, we must remember that Dewey's implicit recommendations regarding them is not that they are to be applied to present school contexts, but rather that they are to be reflected upon as should all hypotheses, and tested out with or without changes as the particular circumstances warrant.

Thus, specific elements and recommendations for the practice of moral education can be presented. However, Dewey would not advocate that these particular specifics (or any others) should be replicated, anywhere or at any time. The world is in a constant state of flux, and individual (schooling) contextual circumstances similarly continue to
change. Since individual problem situations, as one form of the subject-matter of moral education, are as unique and individual as they have always been, it is not adequate merely to replicate specific recommendations for the practice of moral education from Dewey's era to the present. However, the fact remains that a Deweyan school (The University of Chicago Laboratory School)\textsuperscript{10} did carry on moral education and did so in an effort to test his theory of moral experience. The specific elements of the practice of moral education which we will presently outline are those which actually occurred under Dewey's careful supervision. In this way Dewey told us what programs in moral education look like, and it is to these that we will now turn.

Nature and Scope of Moral Education

Throughout we have stressed Dewey's formulation of moral education in its widest sense. "Whatever education facilitates the formation of social habits, effort, and emotion is moral education."\textsuperscript{11} Now it remains to proceed from this vague and general characterization to delineate the parameters of this definition by making some necessary connections among Dewey's claims.

First, Dewey believes "that education must be conceived as a continuing reconstruction of experience; that the process and the goal of education are one and the same thing."\textsuperscript{12} Taken in conjunction with the claim that morality is "the final and ultimate end of education..."\textsuperscript{13}, it is
clear that morality, or moral education, is both the process and goal of education. We cannot ignore Dewey's claim that "the aim of education is social; now we are saying that it is moral. But there isn't any contradiction...[here for] the moral aim of education is identical with the social aim." Although this claim will be treated in greater detail later in this chapter, it has import for gaining a more detailed understanding of the nature of the enterprise of moral education, since for Dewey, moral education is synonymous with social education. Constructed in this way, we can see why Dewey claims that

[m]oral education of our children is in fact going on all the time every waking hour of the day and three hundred and sixty-five days a year. Every influence that modifies the disposition and habits, the desires and thoughts of a child is part of the development of his character. 15

It is imperative to recognize that in Dewey's discussions of the enterprise of moral education and the enterprise of character training these activities are identical. Either phrase describes the same process.

In Chapter Three, we demonstrated that character referred to individual personality, although conduct is social. "It is a commonplace to say that this development of character is the ultimate end of all school work." Dewey also claims that "moral education...is universally recognized as the ultimate and final end of the educative
process." Taken together, these two claims suggest that character development is what constitutes the substance and goals of moral education. However, we need to know specifically how Dewey defines 'character' and what he claims are the tests which will determine whether or not moral character has in fact been developed.

Force, efficiency in execution, or overt action, is the necessary constituent of character. In our moral books and lectures we may lay all the stress upon good intentions, etc. But we know practically that the kind of character we hope to build up through our education is one which not only has good intentions, but which insists upon carrying them out. Any other character is wishy-washy; it is goody, not good. The individual must have the power to stand up and count for something in the actual conflicts of life. He must have initiative, insistence, persistence, courage, and industry. He must, in a word, have all that goes under a term, "force of character." 18

We can see clearly in the above description the consistency of Dewey's definition of "force of character" with Dewey's view of the nature of moral experience. Moral experiences are identified or defined by two necessary conditions: consideration of consequences of the action and a concern with the intentions of the agent. In Chapter Three, we saw that the two necessary conditions defining moral experience are consideration of the intentions of the agent and the consequences of the action. Evidently the ability to have a moral experience is what it means to have
"force of character" since force of character means that one has good intentions and the courage to carry them out. Dewey thus programmatically defines 'character' in such a way that any individual who has force of character is capable of having moral experiences, whereas someone who does not have force of character cannot have moral experiences, since consideration of intentions and consequences are necessary conditions of both.

Having "force of character," however, does not mean that one acts without regard for the larger social context. In other words, since it is necessary to take into account both intentions and consequences of acting, it is required that the contextual features be considered. We saw this in Chapter Three when we used Dewey's example of whether or not to open a window. In that illustration, the individual making the decision had to weigh the consequences of his action in light of the fact that an invalid who was also in the room might become chilled.

Dewey's definition of 'character' makes this point very clear.

In general, character means power of social agency, organized capacity of social functioning. It means, as already suggested, social insight or intelligence, social executive power, and social interest or responsiveness. Stated in psychological terms, it means that there must be a training of the primary impulses and instincts, which organize them into habits which are reliable means of action.
Having a morally developed character means that one habitually takes into account the larger social context so that one’s impulsive action is not blind, but is "socially responsive."

In Chapter Two, we discussed the relationship between impulses, instincts and habits. Here again, we find the same relationship. Habits develop out of native instincts and impulses.

All conduct springs ultimately and radically out of native instincts and impulses. We must know what these instincts and impulses are, and what they are at each particular stage of the child’s development, in order to know what to appeal to and what to build upon. Neglect of this principle may give a mechanical imitation of moral conduct, but the imitation will be ethically dead because it is external and has its center without not within the individual.

We mentioned in passing in the "Review of the Literature" in Chapter One that Dewey identifies and roughly classifies "the impulses which are available in the school...under four heads."

Dewey claims that the "social instinct of the children as shown in conversation, personal intercourse, and communication...is the simplest form of social expression of the child." The three other instincts are "the instinct of making--the constructive impulse," the instinct of investigation which grows out of the first two instincts, and finally, the expressive or artistic instinct. Dewey claims that these are all
"natural resources" which are additionally interests waiting to be tapped or aroused. We will see in subsequent sections of this chapter how these impulses and interests offer direction for determining appropriate subject-matter and methodology for all schooling which includes moral education.

The goal of (moral) education, then, is the formation of character.

Character means all the desires, purposes, and habits that influence conduct. The mind of an individual, his ideas and beliefs, are part of character, for thought enters into the formation of desires and aims.

Implicitly, Dewey claims that an effective moral personality or fully developed character considers both the moral consequences of his actions and does so not from whim or mere impulse, but from habitual and reflected upon motives. This is compatible with the preceding discussion of the necessary conditions both of a moral experience and of force of character. Also, as we saw in Chapter Two, habits are acquired through the process of experiencing; 'habit' is a moral term since habits are social. An individual cannot develop habits in isolation from the larger social context. Thus, moral education is a tripartite affair:

Without knowledge, which enables him to anticipate the consequences of his action within the framework of his society, the individual cannot effectuate his ideas
into action. But knowledge itself, in the absence of supporting emotion, does not provide the dynamics of action. Knowledge conjoined with emotion, can enhance the desire for action, and product strong social sympathy and loyalty. But action involves effort, so the conjoined knowledge and emotion must be activated by effort if we are to do those things that we think should be done. 32

Developing characters who embody this trio of qualities is not something which can be accomplished by seeking only moral development.

Moral habits. As is true for all cognitive elements in Dewey's philosophical position (i.e., 'situation', 'experience', 'society', and so on,) "[t]he child is an organic whole, intellectually, socially, and morally, as well as physically." 33 This suggests that moral development does not merely pertain to moral development, but also to social, intellectual and physical development. For Dewey, it is impossible to have one without the others, and we know that in the training of moral character, it is imperative that educators know the developmental processes of the child.

When moral education is thus viewed as a combination of social, intellectual, moral and physical development, we see why the three attitudes which accompany a well-developed ability to engage in the process of reflective thinking (open-mindedness, whole-heartedness, and responsibility)
If habits are to be cultivated substantially rather than superficially, they must develop with relation to the students' reflection and desires, for only those habits which are formed on the basis of reflection and desire are indications of truly moral behavior. The intellectual habits involving reflection and desires fall into three categories: open-mindedness, intellectual honesty, and responsibility.

When we first introduced these three categories of habits, we stated only that they are moral as well as intellectual. It remains to provide Dewey's programmatic definitions of them in order to understand why there is this conflation.

Open-mindedness is the antithesis of prejudice, pride and selfishness; it means accepting all truth even when this means that one's own ideas and preconceptions must be altered or abandoned, or even when this requires that one forego some personal advantage.

Dewey claims that being open-minded is not merely an intellectual habit but "is also a matter of moral behavior, or of morality." because respecting others' opinions and interests depends upon the ability to objectively evaluate a situation. "In other words, open-mindedness means being reasonable."

The second category, like open-mindedness, is both intellectual and moral. Intellectual honesty is programatically defined as
something more than the ordinary, everyday honesty with which we are all familiar and which we all recognize as a moral quality. This is the idea that we are honest if we don't tell lies, cheat, or steal. But intellectual honesty means more than this; it means recognizing the value of facts, no matter where they point or lead; it means freely admitting that you have made a mistake; it means giving proper credit, even to an enemy when he has done something right. 40

The reason why intellectual honesty is labeled a moral attitude can be seen more clearly by recognizing a contrary case, what Dewey claims to be intellectual dishonesty.

Attempting to cover up or discount facts, surrendering to one's own prejudices and preconceptions, confusing right and wrong, twisting facts around in order to save face, concealing or denying one's faults and mistakes—all these are examples of intellectual dishonesty. 41

Defined this way, to be intellectually honest requires that one think reflectively, for not to consider facts in this manner is to be intellectually dishonest.

The third attitude or category is what Dewey calls "responsibility." This last definition includes two sorts of things: sometimes we refer to being reliable and prompt; at other times we are talking about making every effort to overcome difficulties, about being willing to accept the consequences of what we do, and about finishing whatever we undertake, without giving up or backing out. The habit of responsibility is both moral and intellectual....Responsibility means finishing a course of action of which the consequences are foreseen, whether these consequences be advantageous or otherwise, pleasurable or painful.
Because this calculation of possible consequences is an intellectual activity, responsibility is a matter of knowledge; because it is the acceptance of the obligation to carry a task through, it is also a matter of morality. 42

Again we see the importance and interdependence of being responsible and acting after careful and systematic reflection. One cannot be responsible unless there has been careful consideration of intentions and consequences, and one has the force of character to carry the decision into action. This, for Dewey, is responsible action.

According to Dewey's three programmatic definitions, these qualities cannot be either intellectual or moral since in practice there is no division between intellectual and moral habits; so defined, they are one and the same. One cannot in practice act responsibly, be open-minded or be intellectually honest, unless intentions and consequences are both considered. As we have seen, these are the two necessary conditions both of having a moral experience and for having force of character. Reflective thinking is, then, the means to consider both intentions and consequences, and is thus common to both intellectual and moral concerns. This is why these three kinds of habits are both intellectual and moral.

From this characterization of habits, we can see why Dewey believes that formation of character does not occur
only when there is overt and explicit instruction in morality.

In short, formation of character is going on all the time; it cannot be confined to special occasions. Every experience a child has especially if his emotions are enlisted, leaves an impress upon character. 43

Without question, formation of character and habits is a result of experiencing, and experiencing does not only occur in classrooms. We saw this clearly in Chapter Two. Thus, Dewey consistently posits that "schools are only one among many factors..." having an influence upon the formation of character. 44 Therefore, we must

realize that at best the schools can be but one agency among the very many that are active in forming character. Compared with other influences that shape desire and purpose, the influence of the school is neither constant nor intense. 45

The formation of character, through moral education, is not something that can easily be turned on or off at will, since it is an enterprise which includes all social forces.

The friends and associates of the growing boy and girl, what goes on upon the playground and in the street, the newspapers, magazines, and books they read, the parties and movies they attend, the presence or absence of regular responsibilities in the home, the attitude of parents to each other, the general atmosphere of the household—all of these things are operating pretty constantly. And their effect is all the greater because they work unconsciously when the young are not thinking of morals at all. Even the best conscious
instruction is effective in the degree in which it harmonizes with the cumulative result of all these unconscious forces. 46

From this Dewey concludes that character "is formed rather than something that can be taught as geography and arithmetic are taught."47 This portrayal is suggestive of the Aristotelian view of the way in which moral characters are formed. In other words, becoming moral is not the result merely of learning moral rules and abiding by them. Rather, it is the process of social habituation or acquisition. In Dewey's words, it is the process of developing moral habits or moral ideas rather than being the process of learning ideas about morality.

Since the school is only one institution among many having a part to play in influencing the formation of character, and only "has the children under its influence five hours a day, for not more than two hundred days a year"48, what part can schools realistically play in furthering the goals of (moral) education? Dewey answers this question. He claims "that...[the schools'] shaping influences will be most helpful when it falls in line with social forces operating outside the schools."49

Cultivating the three intellectual/moral habits is in fact an important, if not the most important, goal of moral education. Thus a serious problem posed for moral education is how to achieve "the aim of morality through the
development of knowledge[?]." In the second China lecture, Dewey expands upon this problem:

The practical aspect of our problem is to devise methods by which the school subjects of language, literature, arithmetic, history, geography, physics, chemistry, and so on, can be taught so that students, instead of merely memorizing them mechanically, can appreciate the social and moral significance of what they learn. 51

To solve this problem involves identifying appropriate subject-matter and teaching methodology.

Direct and indirect moral instruction. At this point in the discussion the distinction between direct and indirect instruction will be introduced, since it has practical implications for solving the problem stated above. Dewey asserts that

[t]he business of the educator—whether parent or teacher—is to see to it that the greatest possible number of ideas acquired by children and youth are acquired in such a vital way that they become moving ideas, motive-forces in the guidance of conduct. This demand and this opportunity make the moral purpose universal and dominant in all instruction—whateovver the topic. 52

To achieve this goal, he claims that

the influence of direct moral instruction, even at its best, is comparatively small in amount and slight in influence, when the whole field of moral growth through education is taken into account. This larger field of indirect and vital moral education, the development of character through all the agencies, instrumentalities, and materials of school life, is, therefore, the subject of our present study. 53
This distinction between direct and indirect moral instruction is initially confusing, for in ordinary language it would seem to be a contradiction to say "indirect instruction" since instruction implies some purposeful, overt proffering of knowledge. This distinction is central to Dewey's position in choosing appropriate moral subject-matter and teaching methodology and thus we must make this distinction intelligible.

Dewey provides some help with these two notions in DE. It would appear that what he means by direct instruction is what is ordinarily thought of as teaching subject-matter "lessons" by lecturing, discussing, questioning, and so on where the student is merely a passive receiver of information. If this is what direct instruction means, then for Dewey it is to be minimized in favor of more vital "indirect" means.

That education is not an affair of "telling" and being told, but an active and constructive process, is a principle almost as generally violated in practice as conceded in theory. Is not this deplorable situation due to the fact that the doctrine is itself merely told? It is preached; it is lectured; it is written about. But its enactment into practice requires that the school environment be equipped with agencies for doing, with tools and physical materials, to an extent rarely attained. It requires that methods of instruction and administration be modified to allow and to secure direct and continuous occupations with things. Not that the use of language as an educational
resource should lessen; but that its use should be more vital and fruitful by having its normal connection with shared activities. "These things ought ye to have done, and not to have left the others undone." And for the school "these things" mean equipment with the instrumentalities of cooperative or joint activity. 54

Implicit in the above is the view that the school community in total has important morally instructive influences. Today, this might be labeled (non-pejoratively) "the hidden curriculum," but Dewey speaks of this indirect means as the "corporate life" of the school in which the necessarily existent social influences have a far greater role in developing character than does direct and conscious instruction.

The moral and social influence which the members of the student body exert upon each other is far more potent for good in the long run than any device that teachers can set up and keep going; and the presence or absence of this influence must go back largely to home influences and surroundings....May we remind you that a school has a corporate life of its own; that, whether for good or bad, it is itself a genuine social institution--a community. The influences which center in and radiate from this corporate social life are infinitely more important with respect to the moral development of your children than is simply class-room instruction in the abstract. May I close with an exhortation to bear in mind the fundamental importance to yourselves and to your children, as well as to the School, of the maintenance of the right sort of social aims and spirit throughout the school as a whole. 55
We may conclude from these characterizations that Dewey's "direct instruction" refers to students passively receiving instruction from teachers about matters abstracted from their present experience. Whereas, "indirect instruction" has to do with all aspects of school life, not merely the overt (direct) instruction they receive in subject-matter.

While books and conversation can do much, these agencies are usually relied upon too exclusively. Schools require for their full efficiency more opportunity for conjoint activities in which those instructed take part, so that they may acquire a social sense of their own powers and of the materials and appliances used. 56

This distinction between direct and indirect instruction is thus an important one, since the development of moral character is believed to be more likely realized through indirect means. Direct moral instruction, according to this distinction, takes the form of "school programmes, the school courses of study, and...any place set apart for instruction in ethics or for 'moral teaching,'"57 and is the kind of moral instruction thought to be inferior to indirect means.

Indirect moral instruction, on the other hand, includes most of the elements of school life: the influence of the teacher's character, the school atmosphere and ideals; interaction among students, among students and teachers, and among students and the environment; the methods of teaching,
and the subject-matter taught. This is, for Dewey, the most vital kind of moral education.

Moral ideas and ideas about morality. Understanding the significance of the distinction between direct and indirect moral education is fundamental to comprehending a second distinction which Dewey establishes in the opening paragraphs of *MPE*. "'Moral ideas' are ideas of any sort whatsoever which take affect in conduct and improve it, make it better than it otherwise would be." In contrast, "ideas about morality" may be morally indifferent or immoral or moral. There is nothing in the nature of ideas about morality, of information about honesty or purity or kindness which automatically transmutes such ideas into good character or good conduct.

Dewey's distinction between moral ideas and ideas about morality is supportive of his view that indirect means of instruction are more efficacious than are direct means.

Simply stated, through indirect moral instruction teachers will be better able to help children and youth acquire moral ideas; those ideas which are vital and dynamic forces in guiding conduct. On the other hand, when moral learning is gained through lecturing in ethics or the like, the guarantee of moral learning is, at best, only that students will acquire ideas about morality; that is, they will gain propositional rather than dispositional moral knowledge.
However, Dewey does not say categorically that there ought to be no direct instruction in ethics and ideas about morality, but if the tasks of moral education are as he outlines them, then merely providing direct instruction in ethics would not be the most efficient or effective way to achieve the goal of developing good moral characters.

As we have seen, a well developed moral character is defined as having "force of character"; one who is capable of consummating moral experiences; one who is open-minded, intellectually honest and responsible. In practice, these conditions necessitate careful and systematic thought and action. Moral ideas will not be consummated until they are acted upon. This is what it means for one to partake in reflective rather than customary morality. Since every act is potentially moral, it is not sufficient for teachers to instruct children in ideas about morality, for then students will come to view morality as something which is separate from other aspects of community life rather than being a vital and necessarily existing part of community life. According to Dewey, the best way to encourage moral character development of the latter variety is by encouraging students to engage in moral experiences, and since moral experiences are social experiences, engaging in community life will provide plentiful and adequate opportunity to engage in reflective morality. This is meaningful and positive moral education.
What is important to recognize in the foregoing is that adequate moral education (i.e., indirect instruction with the goal of getting students to acquire moral ideas) is no longer a specific subject having particular and identifiable curriculum and methodology. Rather, "every subject, every method of instruction, every incident of school life [is] pregnant with moral possibility." In taking this position, Dewey does not mean that no consideration need go into determining appropriate subject-matter and teaching methodology. Just because everything is "pregnant" with moral potential does not mean that the potential will necessarily surface. This is crucial. Teachers must know what subject-matter to choose and how to teach it such that the moral worth of the material surfaces. In other words, the knowledge obtained by students may be non-moral ideas rather than moral ideas, unless teachers are conscious of the inherent moral potential contained in the subject-matter and know what teaching methodology adequately capitalizes upon it.

For instance, Dewey believes that if students are taught historical subject-matter as a body of facts (dates and names) to be memorized, there will be no occasion for them to consider or become aware of the individual personalities and social forces which interacted and caused social/moral history. The same holds true for language arts skills (i.e., reading, writing, speaking, and listening). They are
not mere mechanical devices which when employed properly are ends in themselves. Rather, language skills are the means for communication. The better one is able to use them, the better one is able to partake of and participate in community life. Thus, they are actually social/moral skills rather than being mere mechanical skills devoid of social significance.

Action and judgment. Implicit in and central to Dewey's portrayal of a morally effective character is the view that action is a necessary component of morality.

Mere knowledge of what the right is, in the abstract, mere intentions of following the right in general, however praiseworthy in themselves, are never a substitute for this power of trained judgment. Action is always in the concrete...We can imagine a person with most excellent judgment, who yet does not act upon his judgment. There must not only be force to insure effort in execution against obstacles, but there must also be a delicate personal responsiveness,—there must be emotional reaction. 64

There is an unmistakable similarity between this characterization of action and judgment and Dewey's view of the relationship between theory and practice. Judgment, like theory, is empty and unimportant until, like practice, it has been translated into concrete action.

This relationship between action and judgment makes sense when we note Dewey's meaning of a 'moral act'. This can best be understood by recalling that the process of
reflective thinking contains a fifth phase: the testing of the hypothesis in action which functions to unify or consummate the experience. Only through action does the moral situation, or act, acquire currency and legitimacy. Only after consummation does the moral experience become a unified act. In fact, acting is a necessary part of having "the power of trained judgment" for, according to Dewey, trained judgment includes acting upon the chosen hypothesis. To develop or train individuals who have a fully developed power of trained judgment:

involves training on both the intellectual and emotional side. On the intellectual side we have judgment—what is ordinarily called good sense. The difference between mere knowledge, or information, and judgment is that the former is simply held, not used; judgment is knowledge directed with reference to the accompaniment of ends.

We see the similarity between this view of judgment and what is involved in acquiring the habit of reflective thinking. In Dewey's position, if an individual has acquired the habit of reflective thinking, it means that s/he has acquired the power of trained judgment. Dewey carefully defined "power of trained judgment", and "habit of reflective thinking" so that the labels are interchangeable. In other words, for Dewey, if one has developed the power of trained judgment, it means that one necessarily has acquired the moral and intellectual habits of open-mindedness, intellectual
honesty, and responsibility. They are all programmatically defined to be interdependent.

Moral education in schools. Given the previous discussion and given that the purpose of this study in Deweyan moral education implicitly refers to moral education in schools, we need to find out how schools can capitalize upon those few hours children are in attendance. Dewey recognizes that the schools' main business is teaching subject-matter and promoting the acquisition of certain skills, reading, writing, figuring, that from the childrens' standpoint have little to do with... 67 character formation. As we hinted at previously and will see subsequently, there is a very real sense in which this kind of skill acquisition is moral education, but this is not the primary "subject-matter" or goal of what Dewey means by moral education in schools. However, as we have mentioned, Dewey also claims that "moral education...is universally recognized as the ultimate and final end of the educative process.68 How can the main business of schools be to teach subject-matter and skills while the ultimate aim is moral education?

Educational situation. These two claims are not incompatible, and the remainder of this analysis will be devoted to presenting the constitutive elements of the schools' role in moral education which will demonstrate their compatibility. This involves explaining the general
school atmosphere as well as the atmosphere and physical arrangement of the classroom. It is also necessary to identify in detail the goals of moral education, the teacher's role and necessary qualifications, the developmental process of the student, the appropriate subject-matter as well as describing the methodology which best serves to achieve the goals of moral education and to acquaint the students with the chosen subject-matter. In short, the task involves analyzing a moral "educational situation," within the context of schooling.

Jonas F. Soltis claims that

the proper application of the term "educational situation" requires these elements:
- $S$, a teacher;
- $P$, a pupil;
- $x$, something to be learned; and
- $Y$, the educational point of the enterprise. 69

According to Soltis, when these elements are put together in a "relational schema," $S$ teaches $Px$ so that $Y$ emerges as a useful way to view the intentional activity of teaching wherein subject-matter is used as a vehicle to achieve educational goals. 70 If we add the phrase, "...under the auspices of the school" 71 to Soltis' teaching schema, we get a very useful formula which accurately represents the elements and concerns which Dewey addresses in his portrayal of moral education within schools. This formulation allows us to portray Dewey's view of moral education both as the
education of morals (S teaches Px so that Y...) and as morally conceived education (moral formulation of the teaching schema ...under the auspices of the school). With the amended schema of an educational situation in mind, we now turn to explicating these elements in Dewey's moral educational situation in schools.

The Goals of Moral Education

Up to this point we have repeatedly alluded to the goals of Deweyan moral education in the process of outlining other subject-matter relevant to this study. However, to pin down the import and substance of these goals with more clarity, a useful distinction will be introduced: goals as desired results (product goals) and goals as principles of procedure or restrictions on manner (process goals). Goals as desired results can be generalized as "product goals."

A common sense way of talking about goals is that of seeing goals as desired or planned results....In this sense schooling practices and procedures are generally seen as means intended to produce the end of goal attainment. This kind of goal can be general or specific and can be described as either final or as immediate. For example, the former type (final product goal) for Dewey would consist of creating democratic citizens, whereas the latter type (immediate goal) would be getting children to learn to use the scientific method.
Process goals, on the other hand, do not refer to desired or hoped for results, but describe "principles to be followed or restrictions to be honored in our educational procedures no matter what the desired results." Whereas product goals clearly have to do with Soltis' "Y" element in the educational situation schema, Pratte suggests that process goals have to do with the "teaches" portion.

For example, the T (teacher) teaches in terms of certain "principles of procedure" (ethical concerns and constraints). The principles of procedure are presuppositions of worthwhile activities of teaching. For example, some principles of procedure which guide a teacher might include (1) there must be a respect for evidence and a ban on distorting it; (2) there must be a willingness to admit one is mistaken; (3) there must be non-interference with students who wish to put forth objectives; (4) there must be respect for students as a source of argument and a absence of personal invective and contempt for what they say because of who they are; and (5) to learn is not just to learn facts and to understand, it is also to learn to participate in a public form of life governed by such principles of procedure....Thus in the schema "T teaches S[P]x, so that y" we see that the "teaches" element allows us to focus on the PROCESS GOALS of schooling. These process goals are the principles of procedure, restrictions on manner, ethical constraints, humanistic concerns, or whatever, that are commonly insisted upon because someone holds that they are necessary "worthwhile" schooling. 75

With this distinction between product and process goals of schooling understood, we can return to a discussion of the goals of Deweyan moral education. We will take care to
recognize and categorize Dewey's goals in light of this important distinction.

Product goals. It cannot be emphasized enough that the ultimate (product) goal of Deweyan moral education is identical with the social aim of education. Another way of stating this is to say that the ultimate goal of education is consistent with and supportive of democracy. As we saw, this means that both individual growth and social progress are equally served. Implicit in this portrayal is that moral education is both individual and social, and to form morally educated characters who can operate successfully in a necessarily social world is Dewey's foremost desired goal. Recognizing the significance of this goal, however stated, (i.e., to develop democratic citizens, to develop morally effective characters, to develop individuals with force of character, and so on) is paramount because the formulation of Deweyan moral education in schools rests upon striving to achieve this goal.

The primary business of the school is to train children in cooperative and mutually helpful living, to foster in them the consciousness of interdependence, and to help them practically in making adjustments that will carry this spirit into overt deeds. 76

Thus the goal of forming moral characters is identical with forming intelligent socialized individuals, where 'socialized' refers to the ability to participate fruitfully
in community life. In effect, there is no difference between this characterization of the primary business of the school and that of a democracy for, as we saw earlier, the aims and problems of moral education are identical with those of a democracy. 77 Dewey thus takes it for granted that we all admit that, so far as our common school system of education is concerned, the main business must be to prepare the boys and girls and young men and young women who come to these schools to be good citizens, in the broadest sense. These pupils must be prepared to be members of communities, recognizing the ties that bind them to all other members of the community, recognizing the responsibility they have to contribute to the upbuilding of the life of the community. I shall assume this as axiomatic. 78

Since this is "axiomatic," it is reasonable to assume that Dewey's earlier quoted statement that subject-matter and skill acquisition as the main business of the school is consistent with and not contrary to this alternative way of stating the main business of the school. To show that Dewey is consistent it is necessary to look briefly at his portrayal of a "useful citizen." This does not mean merely that individuals perform moral deeds and are politically aware and active. Obviously, Dewey's "useful citizen" functions in a democracy, but there are additional requirements:

A really useful citizen is one who can enjoy life and employ his leisure time in a socially profitable way. He is a person who has capacity for appreciation
of art, science, history, and literature for their own sake. 79

From this portrayal of a "useful citizen" Dewey claims that part of the product goals of schooling have to do with encouraging such capacities. In fact, the schools have an obligation to do so.

The school has not performed its social duty or met its social responsibility until it has equipped the youth of our land for more profitable enjoyment and appreciation of leisure time than is now shown by a great portion of the community. 80

In Dewey's view, the schools' role in achieving this aim is moral, and for this reason should be part of the social purpose of the school.

I am, as you see, discussing the moral aspect of the problem of amusement, taking that word in the broadest sense. I am speaking of the enjoyment and best use of the free or leisure time of the entire community. It seems that this should occupy an important place in the social purpose of the school. 81

We see importantly that Dewey states the schools' goals in terms of "social purpose." But since the social and the moral are interchangeable, this is also a moral purpose of the school.

Forming good citizens, so defined, involves the acquisition of certain traits, qualities, or habits, as discussed previously. This tack includes the cultivation of the intellectual and moral habits of "open-mindedness, intellectual honesty, and responsibility."82 These are the
three categories, or qualities, comprising the identifiable traits which are specific product goals of moral education. For when someone exhibits these traits habitually, he will also be disposed to reason and act morally—he will have force of character and be able to engage in reflective morality. Significantly, these habits are not intellectual or moral. They are both, since being moral or "morally effective" entails consideration of consequences, and, therefore, reasoning. Thus, we can begin to see why teaching skill acquisition and subject-matter knowledge as the "main business of the school" is part of what constitutes the practice of moral education: one will not be morally effective without communication skills and knowledge about community life. Hence, preparing future citizens as the main business of the school includes teaching them social skills and subject-matter knowledge.

In essence, the general and primary product goal of moral education is schools can be stated in the form of a problem:

[T]he main problem of moral education is to develop individuality in such ways as will enhance the individual's social sympathy, as will dispose him to subordinate his own advantage to the interests of social welfare, and as will develop a feeling of identification with and loyalty to the society of which he is a member. 83

Simply put, the goal of moral education is to develop individuals to the fullest potential while simultaneously
improving the common will of the society.\textsuperscript{84} "[T]he ideal of education as a freeing of individual capacity in a progressive growth direct to social aims..."\textsuperscript{85} is Dewey's governing product goal of moral education.

The supplying of every available aid to this process [development of individual capacities and social group] constitutes the function of any system of moral education, for Dr. Dewey's conception of education is identical with moral education thus conceived. \textsuperscript{86}

And as we have seen, the goals and problems of moral education are identical with those of democracy. Dewey claims that:

[m]oral education has deep and pervasive implications, especially when we look at it from the point of view of the philosophical problem of the relationship of the individual and society....When we look at the matter, we can see that the problem of moral education is essentially the same as that of democracy. Let us see what this means. We know that there are two aspects to democracy: on the one hand each individual must have the opportunity to develop his potentialities to the fullest, regardless of the status he occupies; and on the other hand the common will of the society must be realized. Another way of saying the same thing is that each person must develop his individuality to the end that he can be a useful member of his society and make his contribution to the realization of the aims of the society of which he is a part. The common will of the society takes precedence over individual preference; but at the same time, this society is composed of individual persons who recognize their responsibility and who are willing to subordinate their individual interests to the common good. Thus, just as the individual and society
are two aspects of a single process in democracy, they are also two aspects of a single process in moral education. 87

In the foregoing, Dewey claims that the processes and goals of democracy are identical with the processes and goals of moral education. Since Dewey holds democracy to be the highest ethical ideal, he is consistent in portraying the ultimate goal of moral education in the same terms: development of individual potential concurrently with progression of social welfare.

Process goals. Soltis and Pratte argue that once the product goals of schooling are identified, then it is possible to identify that subject-matter, methodology and schooling atmosphere which most adequately meet these goals. 88 Therefore,

[w]hen general goals are explicated properly, they can 'guide' educational practices in the sense that particular practices either do or do not produce the evidence that the goal has been or is being attained. 89

It is for this reason that we have labored at great length to explicate the Deweyan product goals of moral education; they are what guide decisions about practice. Implicitly, this is how Dewey treats his portrayal of the most adequate form of moral education: "[I]f the goal of an institution is a social goal, then the means to the achievement of that goal must be social also." 90 This social goal is importantly double-barrelled. We have already seen how this
goal functions as a desired result or product goal. It also functions as a process goal, since for Dewey one cannot educate for social goals without engaging in social activities.

Thus, Dewey could mean either that education must be morally conceived, that is, a moral quality must permeate every aspect of the schooling enterprise—that the process goals are morally determined—or, he could mean that the social/moral product goal refers to educating students in morals. Significantly, Dewey views moral education as involving both these concerns. In other words, moral education is concurrently morally conceived education and the education of morals. Achieving both the process and product goals of moral education is the function of the school.

The school is primarily a social institution.... Much of present education fails because it neglects this fundamental principle of the school as a form of community life.... Moral education centres about this conception of the school as a mode of social life, that the best and deepest moral training is precisely that which one gets through having to enter into proper relations with others in a unity of work and thought. 91

An ambiguity between the process and product goals of 'moral education' is apparent in the above. Does Dewey mean that the school as a social institution is a desired result to be achieved? Or, does he mean that this is a principle of
procedure to be followed no matter what desired results obtain? Significantly, he means to include both of them. For Dewey, it is impossible to conceive of process goals without product goals, and vice versa, since each is a necessary condition for moral education.

From this conception we also see how this ambiguity between the process and product goals of moral education yields a double-barrelled concern: to form morally adequate programs, and to create programs for moral education.

The moral aim of education can be realized only when the social function of all school subjects is recognized...the social and moral aim of education can be achieved only through the integration of teaching methods, the guidance program and school administration. 92

In other words, achieving the social and moral aim of education rests on identifying appropriate subject-matter and methodology, and creating a total school atmosphere which is conducive to achieving the double-barrelled goal. Let us turn to the latter first, and we will deal with the other two in subsequent sections. In the Laboratory School, the first factor in bringing about the desired coordination was the establishment of the school as a form of community life. It was thought that education could prepare the youth for future social life only when the school was itself a cooperative society on a small scale. 93

In other words, in the Laboratory School, educators sought to achieve the product goals (preparing the youth for future
social life) while not violating any process goals (a cooperative society) in order to create a democratically organized community.

Moral atmosphere of the school. Since Dewey contends that the school is primarily a social institution, *ipso facto* the school is also therefore a moral institution.

Education being a social process, the school is simply that form of community life in which all those agencies are concentrated that will be most effective in bringing the child to share in the inherited resources of the race, and to use his own powers for social ends. 94

This is what morally conceived education involves: the creation of a schooling atmosphere or community which recognizes the dual aspects (psychological and social) of the educational process in a way "that neither can be subordinated to the other, or neglected..."[.]95 This is a crucial principle of procedure: the individual must never be sacrificed in the process of achieving product goals, and vice versa. Morally conceived education thus weaves these two logically distinct yet practically indivisible aspects into a unified whole.

[The psychological and social sides are organically related and...education cannot be regarded as a compromise between the two or a superimposition of one upon the other. 96]

Not to regard education in this manner is to devise schooling programs which are not morally conceived. In
other words, this important principle of procedure would be violated.

The difference between education which is moral and that which is not lies in the fact that in the former the knowledge, the ability, and the emotion of the individual are emphasized at the same time that they are directed to the development of social sympathy. 97

Education and schooling morally conceived "is a process of living and not a preparation for future living." 98

[T]he school, as an institution, should simplify existing social life; should reduce it as it were, to an embryonic form...as such simplified social life, the school life should grow gradually out of home life; that is should take up and continue the activities with which the child is already familiar in the home. 99

This too is morally conceived education. Schooling practices and subject-matter must be chosen in accordance with this second principle of procedure which holds that school activities must simplify and grow out of experiences with which the child is already familiar. It is also the best means to develop morally educated individuals; to reach the outlined product goals. Dewey argues that the less the school is isolated from social life in general, the more effective will be its work in the formation of character. 100

Spirit of the school. In order that the school represent in embryonic form actual social configurations, it is necessary that specific requirements obtain. The first
has to do with what might be termed the "spirit in which the school is run."

As regards the spirit of the school, the chief object is to secure a free and informal community life in which each child will feel that he has a share and his own work to do. This is made the chief motive toward what are ordinarily termed order and discipline. It is believed that the only genuine order and discipline are those which proceed from the child's own respect for the work which he has to do and his consciousness of the rights of others who are, with himself, taking part in this work.... emphasis in the school upon various forms of practical and constructive activity gives ample opportunity for appealing to the child's social sense and to his regard for thorough and honest work. 101

In this we see that the principle of procedure regarding respect for the individual to participate freely in community life also points to a concern for recognizing the child's natural instincts and impulses.102

A child is not born with faculties to be unfolded, but with special impulses of action to be developed through their use in preserving and perfecting life in the social and physical conditions under which it goes. 103

Thus, this so-called "spirit" must pervade the entire school atmosphere and its programs. This forms another process goal. Securing genuine order and discipline rests upon creating a physical atmosphere in which there exists shared activities and cooperation among participants rather than competition between individual students. This is another way of stating that individuals develop morally to the
degree they participate in shared activity. Through such participation both intellectual and moral aims are served.

The intellectual and moral discipline, the total atmosphere, is to be permeated with the idea that the school is to the child and to the teacher the social institution in which they live, and that it is not a means to some outside end. 104

Implicitly, a "total atmosphere" contains moral quality: it satisfies all of Dewey's process goals of education.

In the above characterization of "spirit" of the school, the emphasis is clearly on providing real life opportunities; those in which the child is encouraged to make connections between his home life and the life of the larger community. This includes gaining meaning about existing activities in which one is engaged. To do this, Dewey believes that "school life should grow gradually out of the home life; that is should take up and continue the activities with which the child is already familiar in the home." 105

The school conceived itself as an institution intermediate between the home and the larger school organization of the community, growing naturally out of the one and into the other. All activity having to do with such basic and continuing needs of life as shelter, clothing, and food became the central focus of a developing curriculum. With this unifying factor, all life, whether of the home, school, or larger community, was seen as one and the same continuous, changing social life. 106
This is another principle of procedure: school activities must always be continuous with previous experiences children have had at home. Obviously, in the above, Dewey is commenting on the beginning of a child's life in school. By stating that the school is intermediate or interstitial between home and the larger society, Dewey implies here and in numerous contexts,¹⁰⁷ that gradually, the child is to be acquainted with more abstract, complex and unfamiliar knowledge. Significantly, however, except in very few cases,¹⁰⁸ Dewey's writings on education in general, and moral education in particular, are descriptive and prescriptive of elementary education. This fact must not be ignored, especially since a significant portion of contemporary approaches in moral education claiming to be Deweyan are designed for junior and senior high school students. We also must keep this in mind as the analysis continues in order that the descriptions of the elements in the schooling schema be placed in the proper context.

Since in principle the school is to be a natural outgrowth of home life, we are not surprised to find that Dewey's University of Chicago Laboratory School was set up to embody this ideal. Here we are provided with less abstract and more detailed descriptive illustrations of actual school practice.

A common center was found for the Laboratory School in the idea of the school-house as a home in which the
activities of social or community life were carried on. The ideal was so to use and guide the child's interest in his home, his natural environment, and in himself that he should gain social and scientifically sound notions of the functions of persons in the home. 109

Implicit in this statement is the product goal of providing social activities which encouraged both individual growth and social awareness. Dewey organized the school as a selected social environment that was to set the children free by giving continuity and direction to their activities....the ideal of education [is] as a freeing of individual capacity in a progressive growth directed to social aims...[.] 110

Dewey's Laboratory School exemplified in practice what is embodied in his theory of moral experience with regard to the nature and methods of developing moral characters. Since morality is both individual and social, the school atmosphere and programs embodied and exhibited this fact. In other words, in the Laboratory School, by maintaining awareness of the product goals and not violating any process goals, the school atmosphere and programs were appropriately delineated:

Since the integration of the individual and the social is impossible except when the individual lives in close association with others in the constant free give and take of experiences, it seemed that education could prepare the young for the future social life only when the school was itself a cooperative society on a small scale. Therefore, the first factor in bringing about the desired coordination of these occupations was the
establishment of the school itself as a form of community life. 111

As a form of community life, the school "spirit" reflected cooperation rather than competition. "In such a school, cooperation must replace competition, and the efforts of each must align, not vie, with one another in a search for a common end." 112 Implicitly, the common end is achieving the goals of democracy.

Reaching a common goal depends upon students engaging in shared activity which necessitates wide and free amounts of communication, since these are the two conditions which determine the degree to which a community is democratically conceived.

The school was a minature social group where study and growth were incident to shared activity. Its playgrounds, shops, work rooms, and laboratories not only directed the natural active tendencies of these young people but work in them involved intercourse, communication, and cooperation. 113

As we saw in Chapters Two and Three, it is through communication that communities of interest and common goods emerge. This is also how the goals of democracy are served, and this is the main business of the school.

Physical arrangement of the school. Providing a moral atmosphere and "spirit" within the school includes arranging the physical school plant in such a way that the theories, principles, and goals of education are supported.
Educative schooling must furnish a social and intellectual as well as a physical environment in which the child may become increasingly familiar with all kinds of relationships and be trained to consider them so far as is necessary in his individual and experimental activities. 114

Accordingly, schooling is educative which does provide all three of these forms of environment. This characterization is consistent with "the moral trinity of the school,"115 wherein one resource open to educators is "the life of the school as a social institution in itself...",116 which includes the physical arrangement of the school and its classrooms.

In the Laboratory School the physical plant helped to provide a moral atmosphere and governing "spirit":

As expressed in recent letters from one of the teachers, the result was "a home-like atmosphere in which the children worked. Not that the school-room suggested a home, but the spirit of physical and mental freedom between the children and their surroundings (in which the teacher was only distinguishable by her size) made a really living atmosphere."117

Creating "a really living atmosphere" included carefully arranging individual classrooms.

The physical set-up of the classrooms of the Laboratory School with their movable chairs helped to make each period a social occasion. In all classes teacher and children started off the day's work with a face-to-face discussion of cooperative plans for individual and group activity. 118
This description of movable chairs is more than an interesting characteristic of the Laboratory School. In ST, this classroom arrangement is repeatedly mentioned as if to stress the necessity of having movable furniture in order that students have freedom of movement. In Fairhope, Alabama, for instance, "[t]here are not cramping desks, the pupil may sit where or how he pleases, or even move from place to place if he does not disturb his fellows." Similarly in the elementary school of the University of Missouri at Columbia,

[t]he school building has few rooms and these are connected by large folding doors. At least two and usually three grades work in the same room, and the pupils are allowed freedom to move about and talk to each other as long as they do not disturb their classmates.

Having freedom of movement in the classroom was seen by Dewey to be a necessary part of a morally executed schooling program.

Theory of experience and creating moral atmosphere. Implicit in the portrayal of the moral atmosphere of the school is Dewey's theory of experience. In the descriptions of moral/social and physical arrangements of actual school practice, certain product and process goals surface: cooperation, shared activity, interaction, individual growth, democratic environment, continuity, communication, and community. These goals are not only consistent within
Deweyan moral theory, but are identical to the goals which are central to his theory of experience in general.

Earlier in this chapter we discussed how Dewey's theory of moral experience and practice of moral education are related. We claimed that the practice of moral education is the proving ground for the theory of moral experience. This is not merely a reasonable hypothesis, for the authors of DS state explicitly that the entire school program, which includes the "spirit", moral atmosphere, physical plant arrangement, as well as the subject-matter and methodology, was firmly grounded in the Deweyan theory of experience. The following statement by Edwards and Mayhew is significant since through our own analyses we arrived at the same conclusion independent of these statements in DS:

[T]he philosophy upon which the work of the school was to be based may be concluded with...the earlier theory as that was developed by the experiences gained in the school itself. "All learning is from experience." This formula is an old one. Its special significance in this particular connection is derived from the conception of the act as the unit of experience, and the act in its full development as a connection between doing and undergoing, which when the connection is perceived, supplies the meaning to the act. 121

This "doing and undergoing" is descriptive of the process of experiencing; that is, changing primary experience into reconstructed or secondary experience. We may correctly interpret the "act" as the unit of experience as being
equivalent to what Dewey has previously labeled a 'situation'. The analysis of "act" and that of a "situation" are identical, and it is that unit of experience which provides guidance for the determination of both subject-matter and teaching methodology.

Two conclusions important for education follow: (1) Experience is primarily an active-passing affair; it is not primarily cognitive. But (2) the measure of the value of an experience lies in the perception of the relationships or continuities to which it leads. 122

Since education, writ large, in a very real sense is also moral education, these two conclusions are applicable to identifying morally educative subject-matter as well as determining teaching and learning methodology. But before turning to these two critical areas of concern for moral education, let us turn first to a discussion of the role, qualities, and skills required of the teacher in a Deweyan program of moral education, since it is the teacher who in large part makes these decisions.

The Teacher

According to Dewey, the role of the teacher is determined by the same underlying theory and goals as are all other aspects of the schooling enterprise.

The teacher's place and work in the school is to be interpreted from this same basis. [The idea of the school as a form of social life.] The teacher is not in the school to impose certain ideas or to form certain habits in the child, but is there as a member of the community to
select the influences which shall affect
the child and to assist him in properly
responding to those influences. 123

This reiterates that the teacher should be concerned with
using "indirect" rather than "direct" means of instructing.

Although the teacher is just another member of the
school community, there are certain relevant differences
between students and teachers which determine their roles
and responsibilities. One relevant difference has to do
with the age and experience difference between student and
teacher. Teachers, it is assumed, have greater experience
and thus more knowledge about both subject-matter and
methods of interpreting it. The teacher's job in the
Laboratory School was to assist students in maturing both
individually and socially (product goals).

The teacher's part in this coming-to-
maturity process is that of interpreter
and guide as the child reenacts,
rediscover, and reconstructs his
experience from day to day. The teacher
sets the stage for the moving drama of
the child's life, supplies the necessary
properties when needed, and directs the
action both toward the immediate goal of
the child and also toward the direction
of that far-away end which is clear in
her mind but as yet unseen by the
child. 124

Teaching thus involved helping students identify and reach
both immediate and final product goals. It is precisely the
fact that teachers have more knowledge and experience that
enable them to identify the final goals more clearly than
students.
The process of helping children mature in the classroom is equivalent to saying that they become effective moral beings in the full sense of the phrase. "Effective morality is a tripartite matter, involving knowledge, emotion, and ability." Implicitly, this means that individual capacities are improved in the context of the social group. To achieve this includes development of intellectual, emotional, and physical powers.

"Effective morality" could be exchanged for Dewey's phrase, "force of character." To have "force of character" or be "morally effective" means that one is capable of consummating moral experiences, which, as we have repeatedly mentioned, means engaging in reflective morality. To learn to do so dispositionally requires that one partake in social life and thus necessarily confront moral problem situations (primary experiences) which need resolution. Having ideas about morality is insufficient for making morally effective individuals because to be morally effective means dispositionally to act upon moral ideas. Ideas about morality do not, according to Dewey, manifest themselves in action. Viewed in this way, adequate moral education in schools must use the means at its disposal, without violating process goals, to educate for effective morality.

Teachers have a significant role to play in this affair. The teacher is variously referred to as "guide," "interpreter," "director," and "leader." The teacher is not
to impose upon children by employing traditional ("direct") teaching methodology. This would be a violation of the process goals of moral education, specifically those relating to providing indirect moral instruction and educating for acquisition of moral ideas. Hence, non-traditional teaching methods had to be devised in the Laboratory School.

In leaving behind the traditional methods of imposition from above, it was not easy for teachers to hit at once upon proper methods of leadership in cooperative activities. 126

It is understandable that it was not a simple matter for teachers to find "proper methods of leadership" since the requirements for properly implementing "indirect instruction" are not at all obvious. However, teachers were given great latitude in determining what subject-matter to present and how to deal with it.

General suggestions were made by directors, and of course the spirit of the school, its emphasis upon the connection of learning with active work, almost automatically controlled judgment as to what projects were suitable and what were not. But within these limits, the development of concrete material and of methods of dealing with it was wholly in the hands of the teachers. 127

In other words, both process and product goals were honored to help teachers choose appropriate subject-matter and methodology.
Thus, in the Laboratory School, teachers were not slaves to the material or puppets of school administrators. They were viewed as professional educators, capable of making important decisions.

Teachers were trained experts in the various sciences, in mathematics, in the languages, and in the industrial and artistic activities. These teachers had been chosen because of a background of life experience which had bred in them attitudes of adaptability, open-mindedness, honesty, fresh enthusiasm, and above all respect for the growing personality of a child and his need of freedom, under guidance, to exercise his developing powers. 128

In essence, these teachers embodied a moral "force of character," or so it would seem. As trained experts, however, their role was neither to provide ready-made answers to questions nor to present the results of past experiencing (i.e., knowledge) without letting the students reconstruct the experience for themselves. This would mean violating an important process goal—no imposition from above. Rather, the teacher functioned as a director or facilitator of learning.

Each classroom was a social laboratory—a place to experiment with ideas which carried social import. The children tested the efficiency of their ideas by dramatic action. The teacher was stage director, furnishing the necessary data..., and when ideas were slack, prompting with suggestion as to ways and means or helping with her greater knowledge of technique. 129
Balancing the amount of effort expended by children so that they were properly challenged yet not frustrated was among the responsibilities of the teacher.

A large part of the art of teaching is to give thinking its proper role as "a very present help in time of trouble" without letting the child become confused or discouraged by too large problems. 130

Simultaneous with meeting this charge was the responsibility to provide the appropriate materials and skills which enabled children to meet their desired ends in self-initiated activities. 131 Although Dewey believed in the process goal that students' activities must be self-initiated, 132

[n]othing, however, seemed more absurd than to suppose that there was no middle term between leaving a child to his own unguided fancies and likes and controlling his activities by a formal succession of dictated directions. Neither was it thought that the teacher should not suggest anything to the child until he has consciously expressed a want in that direction. On the contrary, it was believed that a sympathetic teacher is quite likely to know more clearly than the child himself what his own instincts are and mean. Such a teacher can discriminate between the use of imitation and suggestion so external and unreal to the child as to be thoroughly non-psychological, and use so justified through organic relation to the child's own activities as to fit in naturally and inevitably as instruments to help a child carry out his own wishes and ideas. 133

In other words, the task of the teacher was to encourage and develop dispositional student interests and to allow them to
experience the effort which normally surfaces through pursuing well defined and chosen interests.

Thus, the teacher's role was that of a guide both to the student and to the subject-matter.

All along the way the function of the teacher was to assist and further, by direction and anticipation, to remove the too difficult elements of the situations such as search for material and too detailed preparation of material. At the same time she must see to it that the way was not made too plain, that there was enough hindrance to his plan to stimulate his faculties of resourcefulness and judgment in directing the choice of ways or means so that the meaning of his plays, his games, his activities continually grew. 134

The teacher's job was to spark student interest, and encourage the process of experiencing by helping children process primary experiences. The teacher's greater experience would help see to it that the effort expended was not mere force or strife but reflective thinking carried to completion.

To this point it has only been implied how all of these responsibilities and qualifications of the teacher relate specifically to moral education. Characteristically, Dewey sloughs off this crucial connection by making it sound overly simple and therefore unnecessary to treat explicitly:

[T]he teacher's business is simply to determine, on the basis of larger experience and riper wisdom, how the discipline of life shall come to the child. 135
In this characterization, it is "as if" the teacher is an all-knowing, all-experienced individual who has the capability to translate theory, principles and goals into concrete practice. Dewey makes it seem "as if" bringing the force of character or "discipline of life" to the student is a simple task naturally falling within the capabilities of the teacher. Dewey does claim, however, that this "discipline of life," or stated differently, "discipline of the school should proceed from the life of the school as a whole and not directly from the teacher." Confusing as this may seem, we can conclude that as a guide the teacher had a most significant role to play in the process of inducting students into existing community life.

From this portrayal, it would appear that the teacher's role is so taken for granted as to be minimal in moral education. Not so. When we recall that social education is moral education, teachers are in a very real and important sense moral or social educators.

I do not know just what a social worker is (although I have recently seen some definitions), but whatever he is, teachers should say "We are it." They should say "We are more it than is any other class in the community," in the really fundamental work of improving the health and culture of the community, and in spreading liberty and justice and happiness throughout it. If that is the business of social workers, then the teachers ought to be challengers over all other elements in the community, professional and unprofessional, in claiming to be the leaders in social work.
Thus, it is implied that the development of character or moral education which results from participation in community life is helped or hindered in schools by teachers. This gives teachers great responsibility in the enterprise of moral education.

The development of character and the management of what is ordinarily called discipline, were to be as far as possible, the outgrowth of a shared community life in which teachers were guides and leaders. 138

In order for teachers to guide, lead, or direct activities adequately in this mission, they not only had to have a firm grasp of their subject-matter knowledge, but they also had to understand the particular stages of child development. Dewey argues that such knowledge aids them significantly in knowing how to present subject-matter so that it contains the appropriate amount of challenge (effort), and which subject-matter will best facilitate the enculturation or socialization process. Teachers must realize that

a child can no more enter into or understand the present social organization without experiencing the simpler stages of living than he can appreciate a musical symphony without having shared in the simpler forms of music. 139

Thus we turn to a discussion of the development process of the student in an effort to gain this necessary understanding.
The Student

The characteristics of the student cannot be ignored in this analysis of Deweyan moral education. In fact, it is imperative that the individual or psychological aspects of moral development (i.e. the realities of student development) be understood since "the only true education comes through the stimulation of the child's powers by the demands of the social situations in which he finds himself."140 Educators must have a firm knowledge of the stages of child development, if they hope to stimulate the child's powers in positive directions.

Since, according to Dewey, a child's vocation is "growth,"141 and since the job of the teacher, among other things, is to facilitate such growth, we can understand how and why misleading slogans regarding "child centered education" emerged. "Start with the child," "teach the whole child," or "begin with the child's interests" did not literally mean that these were the considerations which were determined prior to identifying goals, subject-matter, and methodology. As previously indicated, these slogans are not representative of the way in which Dewey's schooling programs were conceptualized or implemented in practice. However, these slogans do point to the importance placed on understanding the developmental process of children, since the child's ability to assimilate knowledge is dependent
upon her developmental stage, which, according to Dewey, is very similar to psychological tendencies.

[T]he powers with which children assimilate subject-matter are outgrowths of native instincts and reactions, tendencies much more akin to hunger, thirst, reaching, handling, moving about than to separate independent faculties of theoretical knowing. 142

Knowledge of such developmental processes is of vital importance in creating or devising appropriate moral education experiences within the schooling environment since moral educational experiences are to be outgrowths of the child's present and familiar experience.

Since "growth" is the ultimate Deweyan product goal of schooling, it stands to reason that, "[t]he primary condition of growth is immaturity." 143 Dewey does not intend this statement to be analytically trivial. This condition does not represent a lack, but instead suggests that

immaturity means the possibility of growth, [and] we are not referring to absence of powers which may exist at a later time; we express a force positively present—the ability to develop. 144

From this fundamental position, Dewey outlines the stages of the process of child development upon which schooling practices are based. Without taking these into consideration, it is not either economical or educationally worthwhile to devise curricula and methodology which will aid the education process.
For instance, Dewey insisted that the curriculum of the Laboratory School be based on a recognition of "stages of child growth," or "psychological order of development," and as early as 1898, he outlined these stages in "The University Elementary school, General Outline of Scheme of Work." Moreover, Edwards and Mayhew claim that Dewey's principle of child development formed "the basis of the subsequent organization and administration of The School, both as to the more permanent groupings of the children and the choice of its subject-matter and method. Dewey established a scheme of growth containing three distinct levels of attainment, each separated by "transition" stages. Significantly, these stages correspond only to the years a child spends in elementary school. The stages "pass into one another so gradually that the children are not made conscious of the changes." In addition, "[t]hese [stages] were never sharply defined, but merged into and overlapped one another." We turn now to a brief characterization of these three stages in order that the subsequent portrayal of subject-matter and methodology can be understood in the context of these levels of child development.

**Stages of child development.** The first stage begins when the child is four or five and extends until approximately eight or eight and a half. This primary stage characteristically is recognized by a child's desire to
engage in "direct social and outgoing modes of action, with doing and telling."\textsuperscript{150} Children at this stage intimately connect school life with home and neighborhood life. Children make little attempt to reflect upon matters of interest or work at intellectual or technical matters. This stage implicitly represents the four instinctual tendencies or impulses of children.\textsuperscript{151} We see this a bit more clearly as Dewey outlines specifics of this first stage of development.

Dewey held that "play is the child's natural avenue for expression."\textsuperscript{152} Play was not entirely seen as "free" or "undirected play," but rather should be used to the advantage of the teacher whose job it is to capitalize upon the knowledge and experience already known by the children about home and neighborhood life, and to guide the childrens' activities so that they are able to explore and enlarge their experiences. "Play is neither purely psychical, nor purely physical, but involves the expression of imagination through movement, with a social end in view."\textsuperscript{153} Dewey also believed that at this first stage, children have a "natural social interest in other children normal to his age."\textsuperscript{154}

The specific educational goals for this first stage (and transition stage leading up to the second stage,) are closely associated with what is viewed to be the child's stage of development. Children are born with "natural
desires to do and to make." As the children engaged in schooling activities they gradually learned control; how to suppress their initial immediate impulse to act. "He schooled himself to wait, to think, and plan a bit before acting." At this stage the children were introduced to the scientific method, and became familiar with delaying immediate action in keeping with the methodology. They learned to identify problems, reflect upon them and then act, rather than acting before thinking reflectively.

The children also learned how to function more productively in a (necessarily) social environment. Forming these kinds of habits were the subject-matter and goals appropriate to the first stage of growth. This is another way of saying that process and product goals overlapped and were considered in combination when curricular determinations were made.

Our chief aim has been to help each child in Group I to gain control of himself and the few simple materials at hand. In reality this is the beginning of his mastery of the whole material world. The environment is new to each, likewise the social relations. It took some time to become accustomed to both in order to adjust to both. As a group, they have begun to recognize to some extent each other's rights and to feel a certain amount of responsibility for keeping the whole kindergarten in good condition. 157

In other words, through reflective thinking in general, the children became aware of intentions and consequences of
their actions in the context of the social/moral school community.

The transition stage which links stage one with stage two (ages six and seven,) is still characterized by the child's interest in play. However, as he reaches the end of this transition phase, he is much more interested in developing "reflected upon ideas" before expressing ideas immediately and impulsively.

Social institutions interest him, persons using and controlling their environment in getting food, clothing, shelter, and gradually, comfort and satisfaction. Life is still a unity to him. Facts and skills are interesting and worth while only as they help in his activities. It makes no difference whether the occupations he is reliving are those of the present time in the forests of Michigan or those of primitive man or of Greek and Roman days. His interest is in carrying on his play. 158

The end of the first stage is marked by the dawning psychological consciousness of a relation between the means and the ends [which] suggests that the interest of the child at this age are ready to extend to persons in situations different from his own. 159

In the first four years of a child's schooling experience, then, he moves from an egocentric position to one which incorporates those around him. That is, his interests change from being immediate and personal to being more distant and interpersonal. A growing desire to search for answers to questions about the how and why leads to a desire
to learn about and master rudimentary intellectual skills which would aid in the solution of problems. In effect, the children were led to appreciate the method of reflective thinking and the skills of communication.

The second major stage of growth begins approximately at the age of eight and lasts until the child reaches the age of ten. At this stage, children are ready to increase and perfect their intellectual skills. "At about eight years of age they are ready for and feel the need of getting skill in the use of tools and knowledge of the rules and techniques of work."160

Hence...emphasis is put upon securing ability to read, write, handle numbers, etc., not in themselves, but as necessary helps and adjuncts in relation to the more direct modes of experience. 161

In discussing the product goals of moral education, we have implied that choosing subject-matter was a function of its social utility. Now we see that this is not the only criterion. The child's level of development must also be considered.

Just like the first stage of development, the goals of this level of child development are intermeshed with the particular characteristics of the child's level of growth. For instance, it has been suggested that children are interested in, and are psychologically and physically ready to learn about, the relationship of means to ends; that is, how and what to do or use in securing particular results.
The child needs to know what the ends in fact are in order to determine which means will best facilitate the reaching of the goals.

The prime psychological necessity is that the child see and feel the end as his end, the need as his need, and thus have an inherent and impelling motive from within for making the analysis and mastering the rules of procedure. 162

In other words, the child has to experience genuine interest rather than merely being attentive. According to Dewey, without continually stressing this aspect, the child will lose interest and thus lose sight of the need for resolution and completion.

At this second stage, "children of this age are not yet able to apply easily any large generalization or abstraction." 163 This refers both to subject-matter and rules of procedure (i.e., skills.) Hence, in order to encourage the developmental process, whatever the child encounters at school must repeatedly be brought into his/her present world of experience, and gradually be introduced to other more abstract connections.

In the Laboratory School, at this second stage, "there was great inequality in the ability of the group in using the tools of communication." 164 Group discussions at this level thus served the dual purpose of encouraging those who needed the practice in the art of communication and of fostering the ability to listen and reflect upon others'
ideas. Since children in this second stage are ready to appreciate the ideas of others and can sit attentively during class time, group discussions are both possible and educationally sound.

Toward the close of the year the children in this group had gained in power to hold problems before their minds. They could keep themselves from action for longer and longer periods in order to consider that action in the light of possible consequences. Ends were more often not just the overcoming of practical difficulties, but something to be found out in order to reach further ends, and in reaching them the child himself learned control and direct his own acts and images. 165

It would seem that the children were becoming aware that both intentions and consequences of acts were necessary to consider in solving problems. In terms of solving moral problems, it will be recalled, these are the two necessary conditions of moral experiences. Also, implicit in the above is that children of this age became more familiar with the process of experiencing. In other words, through the scientific method they learned the relationship between means and ends, and how ends become means for solving future problems. (This is identical with saying that they were learning to appreciate how to change primary experience into reconstructed meaningful secondary experience.)

The transition period one year immediately before the movement into the third stage of growth is marked by a heightened interest and increased appreciation for "the
test-and-see-for-yourself [scientific] method" as a tool able to help in directing their own individual actions.

As this belief deepened and became apparent, each child felt himself freed more and more from the necessity of guidance from without and tasted of the true freedom resulting from inner direction and control. 167

The third stage of development is characterized by the child's ability to entertain "a certain amount of specialization without danger of isolation or artificiality." In other words, as the children grew older, knowledge which was somewhat removed and abstracted from their immediate experience could be presented without a loss of interest. This third stage occurs when a child is approximately thirteen years old and lasts only for a year or so. In this third period of growth,

[the skill thus acquired is utilized in application to definite problems of investigation and reflection, leading on to recognition of the significance and necessity of generalizations. 169

When this point is reached at about the age of fourteen or fifteen, the child enters into an entirely separate stage of growth—the level which begins his/her secondary school education.

We cannot conclude from this portrayal of Deweyan child development that there are only three stages of child growth. He does not characterize any stage either prior or subsequent to elementary school age. What we can reasonably
conclude is that decisions regarding choice of subject-matter and methodology in the Laboratory School were based, in large part, on these three identifiable periods. Thus, teachers needed to have substantial familiarity with these stages since they had primary responsibility for choosing both appropriate subject-matter and teaching methodology. This point is documented in the following:

"Mr. Dewey had the greatest real faith of any educator I have known in the classroom teacher's judgment as to what children can and should do" was the opinion of George W. Myers. 170

At this point, let us turn to a discussion of the appropriate subject-matter for moral education to which the teachers felt the children "can and should" be acquainted.

The Subject-Matter of Moral Education

Dewey repeatedly claimed that any subject-matter is "pregnant with moral potential." But any subject is devoid of moral content unless it is organized and chosen from the individual student's point of view (process goal).

The subject-matter of the curriculum, however important, however judiciously selected, is empty of conclusive moral content until it is made over into terms of the individual's own activities, habits, and desires. 172

It ought not be concluded that Dewey endorses the making of such decisions from the standpoint of an injudicious relativism. That is, Dewey does not mean that subject-matter should be chosen merely in terms of each individual
student's interests. Rather, the material is to be chosen by a criterion of selection which recognizes the larger social context as basic. The criterion is that a "study is to be considered as a means of bringing the child to realize the social scene of action." This is equivalent to Soltis and Pratte's view that once the product goal (Y) is selected, subject-matter (x) which facilitates the achievement of the goal can be selected. "The social scene of action" (Y) demands that subject-matter (x) must be connected with community life rather than being taught as if studies were separated from it.

According to Dewey, this criterion of selection is based upon three independent values:

- one of culture, another of information, and another of discipline. In reality, these refer only to three phases of social interpretation. Information is genuine or educative only in so far as it presents definite images and conceptions of materials placed in a context of social life. Discipline is genuinely educative only as it represents a reaction of information into the individual's own powers so that he brings them under control for social ends. Culture, if it is to be genuinely educative and not an external polish or factitious varnish represents the vital union of information and discipline. It marks the socialization of the individual in his outlook upon life.

The interrelationship of these three values is not so obvious. But if we recall that Dewey defines 'culture' as the sum total of all human experience, we see how Dewey...
implicitly uses the theory of experience to direct and unify the selection of school subject-matter.

The two principles are that the subject-matter of the studies represents the results of past human social struggles and achievements, and that mind—the capacities of knowing by which the subject-matter is laid hold of and digested—is a manifestation of primary impulses in their efforts to master the environments. 175

Thus, social life (i.e., culture) is omnipresent when information is chosen and shared in school. Schooling, then, will help the individual develop his/her own character in line with the culture. 176

This principle of selection is wrapped up in Dewey's definition of subject-matter as a 'study'. With 'study' so defined, Dewey assumes that there will then be positive ethical significance. "[T]he general principle [is] that when a study is taught as a mode of understanding social life it has positive ethical import."177 Underlying this principle is Dewey's theory of experience. "In fact, these subjects have to do with the same ultimate reality, namely, the conscious experience of man."178

"Studies" are of moral value in the degree in which they enable the pupil sympathetically and imaginatively to appreciate the social scene in which he is a partaker...[.] 179

We can thus comprehend Dewey's view of the subject-matter of moral education as being no different from the ultimate reality or experience of man. That is to say, the
subject-matter or study of the school is identical with the subject-matter of life in general: the experience of man.

On the surface there is a lot unsaid and not argued for in this simply stated equation of subject-matter and the experience of man. However, the analysis in Chapter Two concerning Dewey's theory of experience can help us here. According to Dewey, experience is both substance (product) and method (process) as well as being qualitatively different depending upon the familiarity one has with the material or problem. In other words, an experience can be primary or secondary. Thus, when Dewey claims that the subject-matter of education is the experience of man, he means 'experience' in the same sense in which he means 'experience' in EN, EE, AE, CF, DE, or any other work in which he analyzes 'experience', namely, experience is a double-barreled concept which includes both process (method) and product (substance). To interpret "the experience of man" in any other way is to misinterpret or misunderstand Dewey's position.

Consequently, when Dewey advocates that students be presented with subject-matter, he means that students should be inducted into the existing culture by participating in it. This is the essence of moral education, for Dewey posits that "[a]part from participation in social life, the school has no moral end nor aim." In other words, to abstract subject-matter from the surrounding social context
is to remove the substance and goals of education from the realm of the experience of man. The latter would not be moral education insofar as it treats subject-matter as being different from experience rather than being identical with it.

Now it remains to demonstrate how particular school subject-matter serves the goals of Dewyan moral education. Dewey expressed these concerns in the form of a series of questions to which our subsequent discussions will be directed:

- Why should we expect the subject-matter of school studies to have any moral value? How can bodies of knowledge, or information, get transmuted into character? Have we any right to suppose that the miracle of changing facts, ideas, artistic products into the fibre of personal endeavor can be wrought? 181

Dewey's general response to these questions is that it is possible to expect school studies to contain and to exhibit moral significance. To achieve this result is a matter of choosing subject-matter according to its social utility; that is, subject-matter representing the results of human achievement (i.e., culture), which children come to know through an effort to master the environment. 182 Dewey claims that because subjects like art, natural science and mathematics have evolved expressly through human activities, they are full of moral meaning. 183
These general statements indicate the source both of failure and of success in using subject-matter as a means of moral nurture. When studies are treated as just so many studies to be learned by pure intellectual faculties of memory, thought, etc., the moral outcome is insecure and accidental. When they are treated as human achievements, appealing to tendencies in childhood which are aiming however unconsciously and partially at similar achievements, the moral connection is positive and direct. 184

Obviously, when subject-matter is perceived as human achievement, it must be viewed as social, yet this point cannot be over emphasized with respect to moral learning. In the Laboratory School, "[t]o those who taught and those who learned, what was social came to mean that which was ethical or moral." 185 This connection came about because

[i]t was an essential part of the conception of proper subject-matter that studies must be assimilated not as mere items of information, but as organic parts of present needs and aims, which in turn are social. Translated into concrete material, this principle meant in effect that from the standpoint of the adult the axis of the course of the study was the development of civilization; while from the standpoint of those who learned, it was a movement of life and thought dramatically and imaginatively reenacted by themselves. 186

Subject-matter, therefore, was not viewed as specific bodies of factual material to be absorbed or assimilated by students, but as part of the social world of experience which the students should examine and reenact themselves through reflective thinking. In this way, those facts or
those bodies of knowledge which were learned contained both intellectual and moral significance, and the connection was direct.

Facts of knowledge are enlarged in significance, are seen in their human as well as their physical, technical or economic aspects. Little by little the social becomes identified with the moral interest. 187

Dewey goes so far as to say that it is the subject-matter which sets the tone for determining other critical aspects of social or moral education.

The subject-matter used in school life decides both the general atmosphere of the school and the methods of instruction and discipline which rule. A barren "course of study," that is to say, a meagre and narrow field of school activities cannot possibly lend itself to the development of a vital social spirit or to methods that appeal to sympathy and cooperation instead of absorption, exclusiveness, and competition. 188

Thus, in the Laboratory School curricular decisions were arrived at after careful thought. Not only was the "social scene of action" and the experience of man used as a standard, but also the primacy of knowledge was considered in conjunction with the child's developmental level interests.

In planning the scheme of the school's curriculum, those responsible tried to consider the choice of its activities from the point of view of the needs of its common life. It endeavored, therefore, to place essentials first and refinements second. The things which are socially most fundamental, which had to
do with the experience shared by most of those in the school and society in general, were regarded as the most essential; those which represented the needs of specialized groups and technical pursuits were of secondary importance. 189

The curriculum was thus devised from the standpoint of the child's experience and present knowledge about fundamental human social needs. With this in mind, the curricular planners in the Laboratory School viewed

[the pressing problem with respect to "subject-matter" was accordingly to find those things in the direct present experience of the young which were the roots out of which would grow more elaborate technical, and organized knowledge in later years. 190

Again we see certain themes emerging. Not only is the subject-matter chosen from the standpoint of child development and social utility, but it is also chosen by considering moving from the concrete present experience of the child to more abstract and technical kinds and uses of knowledge.

The subject-matter which was found to satisfy these requirements better than all others for the youngest children just beginning their school experience was that which was directly related to home life and the activities they were familiar within their family experience. It is to these we now turn.

Home life, occupations, and manual training. Dewey argued that certain occupations of American living provided
the best initial means to foster and preserve "the investigative attitude and the creative ability of the growing child in socially directed action." These were "cooking, sewing, carpentry, and all principal manual-training activities". More than any other series of activities, these were seen as the best activities through which to encourage cooperation, respect for fellow students, and personal responsibility, as well as being a material starting point for the assimilation of knowledge and skills.

The emphasis in the school upon construction and so-called manual work is due largely to the fact that such occupations connect themselves easily and naturally with the child's everyday environment. They create natural motives for the acquiring of information and the mastery of related methods through the problems which they introduce.

Significantly, these activities are consistent with the process and product goals of moral education previously discussed. These goals, which include providing shared and cooperative activities, encouraging communication among students, promoting a democratic community, increasing shared interests, and so on, also satisfy the four natural impulses and instincts which Dewey establishes as principles and natural tendencies of child development. These principles can also be understood as process goals since they serve to inculcate positive social attitudes in children (cooperation, communication, democracy, etc.).
Further, they support the interstitial function of the school since they are natural outgrowths of the school as an extension of the home.

Cooking, more than any other subject-matter, was for Dewey the best of all school activities; providing the richest amount of challenge and continuity to achieve intellectual, social/moral, and physical growth. Children initially learned to use the experimental method through cooking. Cooking for each other they learned responsibility, cooperation, and social awareness. Cooking also served as a vehicle for more abstract scientific and social subject-matter. Dewey believed that by initiating children into such activities as cooking, sewing, carpentry and other manual training activities, social/moral life in the Laboratory School would be most adequately preserved.

Language arts. As mentioned, the first natural instinct of children is the language instinct; the instinct to communicate and express themselves socially. Language arts in the Laboratory School (i.e., reading, writing, conversing, listening) were taught with this instinct constantly in mind. Children did not learn to read or write without understanding the social utility and need for such skills, and whatever subject-matter they explored necessitated the use of language arts skills.
What each one did was never fully appreciated until it was passed on to others, and what one received from others frequently had to be tested to be approved. Language was useful. One must write as well as speak, and read as well as listen in order to share more widely and in turn profit by such sharing. 198

Thus, in the Laboratory School language skills were stressed, but never without putting them in a social context, for without linking the skills with their social utility, product goals would not be furthered and process goals would be violated. When deficiencies were recognized by teachers as well as by the students themselves, extra time was devoted to improving these fundamental skills. 199

We have previously seen that Dewey claimed a function of the school is to teach such fundamental skills. Significantly, Dewey saw these skills as social skills, and the need for children to learn them as social—as a means to realizing better social/moral living. Unless children understand the important connection between knowledge of the skills and their social use, and are taught these language arts skills as means rather than ends in themselves, Dewey saw no moral significance in learning them. Additionally, unless these skills are taught as means, the conflation of Dewey's statements about the main business of the school (i.e., subject-matter and skill assimilation, and development of good citizens) will be contradictory. When taught as means
to further social goals, the main business of the school can be explained either way without contradiction.

Metaphorically, the school was a "social laboratory," ripe for the use and advancement of all language arts skills.

Its playgrounds, shops, work rooms and laboratories not only directed the material active tendencies of these young people but work in them involved intercourse, communication, and cooperation. Language was constantly used to give or get ideas about joint work, and the children quite naturally came to regard the right descriptive words as the best means of getting or giving social direction to a joint endeavor. Their vocabulary, therefore, was built up on conjunction with their use of the physical means. Mental concepts included thing or process and word or words to describe each. The children, therefore, could talk or write of what they did with comparative ease and could read of what others had accomplished along similar lines with more comprehension than most children of this age.

In keeping with this goal of furthering the social aspects of language, even the literature itself must have substantive moral worth.

In the early years, serious limitations attend the use of reading matter. The child's capacity to take in ideas through eye-symbols is so slight that "literature" is apt to be puerile intellectually, and the best of intentions to point a moral do not make up for triviality and paucity of ideas. For this reason the ear is the natural channel, but there is danger that even oral stories and poems be made up on the basis of success in catching momentary
attention and arousing signs of excitement. It is not a matter of accident that classic stories, as nearly as possible in their classic form, are more valuable than stories or poems composed for children. They are classics because they have passed through the medium of successive generations and have been proved true to the essentials of human experience. Their endurance is the stamp of their sterling, their genuine nature, while things written for children are mostly only paper money, even if not counterfeit. 202

Implicit in this discussion of the moral substance of literature is Dewey's principle that indirect moral learning is far more significant than direct or overt treatment of moral lessons. This is why classics are more suited to moral subject-matter than are books written expressly for children. Classics have stood the test of time in large part because they embody moral concerns realistically and artistically, whereas children's literature is too often neither realistic nor artistic. Such "counterfeit" children's literature proffers ideas about morality, whereas classical literature embodies the social/moral condition and thus portrays moral ideas in believable settings.

In addition to the so-called classics, Dewey believed that well-written biographies provide worthy literature, for in biographies children are acquainted with the reality that "it is individuals who are important, not abstract forces and courses..." 203 in the historical progression of man. This is entirely consistent with Dewey's view of reality and
culture as being the accumulation of human experience rather than being some pre-existent or pre-determined state of affairs. Reality is what we can know and such knowledge is acquired through human doing and undergoing. It is an interactive process between natural forces and man. Thus, without man actively engaging in the process of experience, there will be no cultural change positive or negative. Humanity must be an active force and thus it is individuals who are important rather than mere abstract forces in the historical progression.

It is possible to use biographies so that they become a collection of mere stories, interesting, possibly, to the point of sensationalism, but yet bringing the child no nearer to comprehension of social life. This happens when the individual who is the hero of the tale is isolated from his social environment; when the child is not brought to feel the social situations which evoked his acts and the social progress to which his deeds contributed. If biography is presented as a dramatic summary of social needs and achievements, if the child's imagination pictures social defects and problems that clamored for the man and the ways in which the individual met the emergency then the biography is an organ of social study. 204

The study of biography, as individual accounts of human progress, is thus also very much a part of the study of history and social studies.

History and social studies. In numerous contexts Dewey argues that history as subject-matter is the best means through which children are enculturated. 205 The rationale
for this is identical to that of the worth of biography: history is the study of human progress. According to Dewey, history has been taught in various ways. Most commonly, it is taught as a body of detached and unrelated facts to be memorized and recited. "If history be regarded as just the record of the past, it is hard to see any grounds for claiming that it should play any large role in the curriculum of elementary education." Taught in this way, history will have no moral significance. This is because of the social purposes of the school. In Deweyan education this social/moral purpose always holds prominence. To acquire such moral/social significance requires that history be related to and connected with the present social scene. "History must be presented, not as an accumulation of results or effects, a mere statement of what happened, but as a forceful acting thing." Thus,

[e]verything depends, then upon history being treated from a social standpoint; as manifesting the agencies which have influenced social development, and as presenting the typical institutions in which human experience naturally assumes form. 208

This is the rationale behind using historical subject-matter throughout a child's schooling to further the goals of social/moral awareness, and thus, growth. Dewey tells us,

[h]istory, rather than literature, represents doubtless the most effective conscious tool [for moral value]...Even here it must be remembered, however, that conscious attention should be directed
When teachers capitalize on the "subject-matter itself," the connection with genuine moral learning is potentially great. Dewey means that teachers should refrain from using history to teach individual moral/social lessons directly by singling out particular events which are thought to contain individual moral truths.

As we have repeatedly mentioned, direct teaching of moral truths or lessons is believed to have little if any positive effect on conduct. Since history is a record of social/moral progress, there is no need to select individual episodes out of the larger historical picture, since it is the historical process taken as a whole which has moral significance. History, then, best acquaints children with processes of human development, since this kind of knowledge
is what will serve them most adequately in life outside the school.

Consequently, social studies, the study of social life, and geography, the study of the environment in which social groups reside, were viewed as the basic subject-matter of education in the Laboratory School. Children learned about basic life needs and survival methods in an historical context, always pointing out social ramifications and implications: the intentions and consequences of the agents and their actions.

Mathematics. The study of number, like the use of literature, history, geography, language arts skills, etc., was viewed as social subject-matter. Mathematics, taught in the context of other activities, pointed out its social utility.

Always, at whatever stage, number was taught not as number but as a means through which some activity undertaken on its own account, was rendered more orderly and effective. In this way it afforded insight into the ways in which man actually employ numerical relations in social life. 210

For instance, in cooking and carpentry children learned about measurement and computation. They priced materials and learned both about economics and budgeting. Dewey recognizes that it is a "radical mistake ...[to treat] number as if it were an end in itself, instead of the means of accomplishing some end."211 Thus, mathematics, as all
other subject-matter areas, should be taught as a means to achieve socially determined ends. This is how a potentially abstract and unrelated subject-matter area acquires social/moral significance.

Science. The moral significance of science as both subject-matter and method is substantial. In the Laboratory School,

scariflc subject-matter, both as method and as an organized body of tested facts and concepts, was regarded as the child's means (in experimental play) to a constant process of discovering and accomplishment in all areas of his experience. This is but another name for learning. 212

It is also but another name for moral learning, since acquiring the habit of reflective thinking is a social/moral as well as an intellectual disposition. More will be said shortly about scientific method as morally significant teaching methodology.

Additional moral subject-matter. Dewey explicitly mentions the arts (fine and performing) as being unquestionable sources of moral subject-matter. Since art provides the purest form of consummation through creative and imaginative expression, Dewey argues for the inclusion of art (process and product) in any well-rounded morally significant school program.

Also given explicit endorsement is physical activity (sports, play, games) as worthwhile moral subject-matter.
Through such activities children learn to work together, cooperate and promote a positive social spirit. However, not simply any form of physical activity was included in the programs at the Laboratory School.

Reference was given to those physical activities which gave additional control over the child's whole organism through enlisting his social interest in the end or purpose of the activity whether climbing a ladder, walking a beam gracefully, or playing a game well. The ulterior purpose of the teacher, however, was the development in the child of 'control, skill, quick thinking, and social attitudes.'

We see that for Dewey, the main purpose in selecting any subject-matter, including physical activity, is always the social attitudes, utility, and motives. The fundamental purpose in making curricular decisions was, therefore, always moral, since any subject-matter which is chosen and taught with this purpose in mind is moral subject-matter.

Young people who have been trained in all subjects to look for social bearings will also be educated to see the causes of present evils. They will be equipped from the sheer force of what they have learned to see new possibilities and the means of actualizing them. They will be indoctrinated in its deeper sense without having had the doctrines forced upon them.

Being trained to see the social bearings, as we have mentioned, meant being trained to see the moral bearings. This is the product goal of Deweyan (moral) education.
We have not discussed the means or teaching methodology which best facilitates the achievement of the product goal of Deweyan moral education. However, implicit in much of the description to this point are the methodologies deemed useful, efficient, and proper for the teaching of the chosen subject-matter. It remains now to make explicit the nature of these procedures.

The Methods for Moral Instruction

As with every other aspect of moral education in Deweyan schools, the methodology used by teachers to teach subject-matter and the skills had important social implications. Students rarely, if ever, memorized and recited material as an end in itself. Since the subject-matter was social in nature, so too were the methods for teaching and learning it. "It grew clear that if the goal of an institution is a social goal, then the means to the achievement of that goal must be social also."

In the Laboratory School appropriate teaching and learning methodology was chosen in accordance with a so-called problem, which, as stated below, implicated both product and process goals.

The problem of instruction was to help the child discover for himself the steps that intervene between his present experience and these organized and classified bodies of facts known as chemistry, physics, history, geography, etc. Subject-matter was not thought of as something fixed and ready-made in itself, outside the child's experience;
nor was the child's experience thought of as hard and fast, but as something fluent, embryonic, vital. 217

The product goal for students was to be able to use acquired knowledge as a means to deal with their evolving experience. The process goal had to do with allowing the student to "discover for himself" the appropriate skills and methods necessary to make connections and sense out of his present experience without violating his stage of development.

Experimental method. The methodology considered most conducive to achieving these goals, and thus moral/social learning, was the scientific or reflective method of thinking. With it, the children learned both how to manipulate facts and solve problems, and also that problem solving and knowledge acquisition was a social and therefore a moral affair.

But always the value of individual experience and experimentation, whether by child or teacher furnished the necessary drive to further experimentation. The work which was definitely labeled scientific experimentation was always selected because of its social nature. The children's natural interest was thus made the spring-board to experimental action. 218

Natural interest alone is insufficient for initiating experimentation. Early in Chapter Two we introduced Dewey's "problematic situation."219 In that context, we noted that recognizing problematic situations, as primary experiences, set the process of experiencing in motion. With regard to
choice and use of the experimental method in the classroom, the fundamental position that problematic situations are preconditions of subject-matter, furnishing the beginnings of investigation, was never abandoned.

The new is not new because it is new physical or intellectual material. Unless the lessons suggest a problem, a difficulty, it is not psychologically new. Would there be any obstacle, some effort on the child's part? 220

Problems are the material which set investigation in motion, and the experimental method was to be used to solve these problems.

Since everything in the Laboratory School had to be chosen and taught from the standpoint of the child's experience, moral/social education began from recognizing moral problem situations within the child's experience. In the Laboratory School, the reflective method was used by teachers in classroom discussions.221 Children experimented with problems and pursued them in all subject-matter (historical, scientific, manual arts, occupations, etc.). The experimental method was used to examine decisions and actions of historical and literary figures. In this manner, moral issues were explored. Discussions were never conducted about abstract ethical matters out of the context of the subject-matter. Not until high school was this form of moral instruction considered a productive use of classroom time.222
In addition to capitalizing upon the potential wealth of moral problem situations arising out of the overt curriculum, moral problem solving employing the reflective method of thinking was used with students on problematic situations as they occurred in actual school life.

According to Dewey, every situation is potentially moral, hence there is no need to manufacture hypothetical moral situations. Using real situations permits real practice, and real situations are found in the overt subject-matter, such as issues surrounding slavery during the Civil War. And, importantly, they are found in the ordinary social relations of the school community.

For instance, a Deweyan teacher would be alert to moral/social issues if s/he were to notice a small group of students arguing over who should be first to use a particular colored crayon. The sensitive teacher would approach the group of children and help them recognize and explore the nature of their problem, allowing them to suggest various avenues of resolution. This instance is a moral problematic situation arising out of the actual social relations among students. Through the teacher's recognition of it, and use of the experimental method, s/he has helped the children practice resolving the moral/social issue.

The experimental method, therefore, was not merely a means through which problems were processed, but learning it was also part of the goal of moral education. As we have
seen previously, a desired result of moral education in schools was to foster the "power of trained judgment" in children. To do this amounted to developing the habit of reflective thinking.

Processes of instruction are unified in the degree in which they center in the production of good habits of thinking. While we may speak, without error, of the method of thought, the important thing is that thinking is the method of an educative experience. The essentials of method are therefore identical with the essentials of reflection. They are first that the pupil have a genuine situation of experience—that there be a continuous activity in which he is interested for its own sake; secondly, that a genuine problem develop within this situation as a stimulus to thought; third, that he possess the information and make the observations needed to deal with it; fourth, that suggested solutions occur to him which he shall be responsible for developing in an orderly way; fifth, that he have opportunity and occasion to test his ideas by application, to make their meaning clear and to discover for himself their validity. 223

Thus, it was through the employment of the experimental method by teachers and students that primary experiences could be transformed into meaningful reconstructed experience, which in turn would guide further investigation. The teacher's role and purpose in using and teaching the experimental method was significant.

It is of great importance in such teaching that the teacher keep her twofold purpose constantly in view: (1) to provide the child with opportunity to develop and use, thereby learning, great scientific truths, and (2) to preserve,
through use, the child's instructive spirit of inquiry, to build in his mind a concept of scientific method as a practical tool and thereby guide him into the experimental, the scientific habit of mind. 224

In sum, the experimental method was both a fundamental teaching methodology as well as being the most important socially useful skill students could learn.

Class meetings and all-school assemblies. Another vitally useful means to foster social/moral learning was through cooperative decision making and knowledge sharing. There were daily class meetings in which children shared objects and ideas ("Show and Tell"), planned the day's activities, and solved problems as a group.

An important aspect of this conditioning process by means of the school's daily practices was to aid each child in forming a habit of thinking before doing in all of his various enterprises. The daily classroom procedure began with a face-to-face discussion of the work of the day and its relation to that of the previous period. The new problem was then faced, analyzed, and possible plans and resources for its solution suggested by members of the group. The children soon grew to like this method. It gave both individual and group a sense of power to be intelligent, to know what they wanted to do before they did it, and to realize the reasons why one plan was preferred to another. It also enlisted their best effort to prove the validity of their judgment by testing the plan in action. Each member of the group thus acquired a habit of observing, criticizing, and integrating values in thought, in order that they should guide the action that would integrate them in fact. The value of thus provisioning
consequences of action before they became fixed as fact was emphasized in the school's philosophy. The social implication is evident. The conscious direction of his actions toward considered social ends became an unfailing index of the child's progress toward maturity. 225

Through these daily classroom meetings, students had additional opportunity to practice problem solving and cooperative socializing. As in all problem solving employing the reflective method of thinking, the payoff was being able to act more intelligently and fruitfully in community life.

These same goals were pursued by conducting all-school assemblies in which all but the very youngest children participated.

The assembly, in which the whole school except the kindergarten came together occurred once a week and varied in length from twenty minutes to half-an-hour. It was regarded as a natural outgrowth of the school activities and had both a social and a cultural aim. It afforded opportunity for pupils to share interesting information and to build up habits, emotions, and attitudes which gave social value to information and to artistic expression. It also helped the children learn the art of cooperation, develop initiative, and assume responsibility. It stimulated clear thinking and expression and cultivated the desire to give entertainments of artistic value. 226

It was through these assemblies that children were able to practice being social, that is, participating as individuals in their social school community.
Developing communication skills. The specific social skills of communication were taught not only through group use of the experimental method and classroom and school meetings, but also through an extensive amount of play activities. Outdoor physical activities promoted social intercourse, but play was not restricted to this form of activity. There was an extensive use of story telling and dramatic portrayals as methods for reconstructing or recreating past social life experiences and hypothesizing about other avenues of decision making and action taking.

The youngest children, for the most part, acted out their songs and stories, getting a clearer idea of them and a greater sympathy with the characters. 227

In general, these methods capitalized upon the social nature of investigation and learning. Whenever possible, children were encouraged to "learn by doing."228 In other words, they manipulated materials and explored facts by "hands on" procedures. In the Laboratory School, the children came to know this approach as the "test and prove method."229 That is, children were encouraged to explore subject-matter and problems for themselves rather than repeating or imitating solutions as proposed by others.

Summary: the practice of moral education. In this chapter we used analyses from previous chapters and presented the constitutive elements of a Deweyan moral educational situation in order to discuss various elements
of a well-developed practice of moral education. We began
with a summary of the nature and scope of the enterprise of
moral education. This was followed by a discussion of the
goals of moral education. In that context it was noted that
Deweyan moral education contains product goals as well as
process goals.

Once the dual goals of Deweyan moral education were
explicated, it was possible to provide concrete
illustrations of the practice of moral education in schools.
This was done by discussing the moral atmosphere of the
school and the physical arrangement of the classroom. Next
we discussed the qualifications and skills required of the
teacher, the developmental process of the elementary aged
student, the subject-matter of moral education, and
concluded with a discussion of the appropriate moral
education teaching and learning methodology.

It was useful to employ Soltis' relational schema of an
educational situation to organize the material in this
chapter. However, it was difficult to present one element
of the schema without referring to the other components.
All of the components are intimately and inseparably
connected, since each individual element is formulated by
satisfying what Dewey calls the "social purposes in
education."

In using this tack we were able to show that "moral
education" for Dewey is a double-barrelled affair: it is
both morally conceived education and the education of morals. The former refers to satisfying outlined process goals and creating the school as a social (democratic) community in which there is wide and free shared activity and communication. The atmosphere must be such that individual student's moral growth is concurrently nurtured with social/moral progress. The latter refers to the product goals of Deweyan moral education. "The education of morals" is not, however, prima facie descriptive of the desired results of Deweyan moral education, since Dewey is not interested in having children acquire ideas about morality.

Dewey's foremost product goal is, as attested throughout his works, stated variously as to develop morally effective characters; or to develop democratic or useful citizens; or to form individuals who have force of character; or to develop individuals who have a trained power of judgment or who have the qualities of open-mindedness, intellectual honesty and responsibility. However labeled, this goal is the same, because what is common to all the above is the intent to develop intelligent individuals who are able to function productively in a necessarily social (moral) world. This product goal is, moreover, identical with the social purposes of education. This, then, is the moral responsibility of the school.
The moral responsibility of the school, and of those who conduct it, is to society. The school is fundamentally an institution erected by society to do a certain specific work, -- to exercise a certain specific function in maintaining the life and advancing the welfare of society. 230

This statement is very similar to the earlier version in EPUC which states the "ethical responsibility of the school" is to educate for social intelligence in a changing society."231

Finally, it is clear that Deweyan education in general, if adequately implemented, is also Deweyan moral education, for the process and product goals are the same in both: Deweyan education is social education and social education is moral education.

In this way we understand Dewey's claim that moral education is identical with social education and thus when schooling process goals are satisfied, the school atmosphere will be most conducive to yielding the product goals of moral education. Dewey claims that this is the case because it is not direct, but rather indirect, instruction in morals which facilitates moral learning most adequately. Indirect instruction encourages and permits students to engage in reflective morality and thus provides them the opportunity to consummate moral experiences (that is, to test moral ideas or hypotheses through action).
Conclusion: Dewey's moral principles in education. In Chapter One we mentioned Sidney Hook's claim from the "Preface" to *MPE*. He claims that Dewey only presents "insights and principles" for designing moral education in schools, but does not tell us exactly how to design moral education programs. Indeed the title of Dewey's important work is *Moral Principles in Education*, but it must not be concluded that these principles are all Dewey presents to guide implementation of practice. We have spent this chapter offering actual examples of moral education practice in schools of which Dewey explicitly approved. That is, by looking beyond *MPE* to the narratives in *DS* and *ST*, we found illustrations of specific subject-matter and methodology as well as detailed descriptions of the goals, total school atmosphere, qualifications required of the teacher, and developmental processes of the child. These illustrations of actual practice, as we have seen, provide far more information about the detail of Deweyan moral education practice than Hook would lead us to believe Dewey provides.

Therefore, at least two questions remain unanswered. First, can we make reasonable sense of Hook's claim that Dewey presents only principles and insights for creating moral education? And, second, how are we to interpret the contents of *MPE*, since in that work Dewey does offer little if any detailed illustration about the practice of moral
education? These two questions are significantly related. We will take up the latter first.

Dewey did not intend MPE to be a definitive treatise describing the practice of moral education, but rather to be a summarization of practice. What he offered was a set of principles, or summary rules, which have been arrived at by actual testing of the theory of moral experience through the practice of moral education. In this way, MPE offers those principles, or good general rules, which appear to be guidelines for determining the adequacy of any actual classroom program in moral education, past, present, or future. This interpretation renders the content of MPE virtually timeless, for Dewey has provided a more or less fixed framework of substantive principles or rules against which the specifics of practice can be aligned and judged.

This view of MPE is taken because it is consistent with Dewey's formulation of and relationship between theory and practice, since by completing the reflective method through action, the ends reached become means for further testing. In Chapter Three we demonstrated that the relationship between means and ends in Dewey's general theory of experience is identical with the process of solving moral problems. We showed that the central problem for Dewey's theory of reflective morals is to locate principles arrived at through experimentation. These principles can provide guidance for judging future moral situations. In effect,
this is what **MPE** represents: a set of principles, arrived at through experimentation, which are the means for guiding and judging future attempts to create moral education in schools.

Viewed in this way, Dewey cannot in the context of **MPE** be seen as offering anything more concrete than principles and insights for the practice of moral education and be consistent with his theory of experience in general and moral experience in particular. Dewey is a process philosopher, and to provide fixed practice is incompatible with his philosophical bent.

Principles, in a Deweyan analysis, are not predetermined standards providing a decisive rule for a particular practice or set of practices. It is only after experimentation that a hypothesis "proves itself," and after numerous such trials, becomes a summary rule or principle to be followed, not as a fixed standard, but as a warranted principle that may in some circumstances yield to a competing consideration. Dewey never wished to report his moral principles in terms of a fixed code of standards, for in doing so morality and moral education would merely be a matter of principle (intention) and not of reflective morality (intention and consequences).

Put differently, Dewey's portrayal of the nature of reality, his double-barreled view of experience, and the belief that growth is the only constant end toward which
individuals should strive, does not allow specific directives to be given. So too with his theory of moral experience. Not once does he provide a fixed content of morality. Rather, he offers flexible processes in the form of conditions for determining moral content. In other words, Dewey cannot in MPE, or in any other work, outline anything more than summary rules or principles to guide any and all proposed classroom practices which aim to help each individual adequately meet the challenges of continual change. We are only given principles to guide further sought after ends-in-view. Hence, MPE represents Dewey's principles or results of actual experimentation of moral education which are meant to be used to guide further experimentation/implementation of moral education in schools. If Dewey offered specific recommendations for practice, he would be both inconsistent with his general philosophical position, and probably outdated before his recommendations reached the reading public.

This does not mean that Dewey made no choices about the specifics of practice—we saw otherwise in the analysis in this chapter. However, what it does mean is that Dewey is consistent throughout his portrayals of his theory of experience, theory of moral experience, and his suggestions for moral education practice.

We are now in a position to answer the first question: Can we make reasonable sense of Hook's claim in MPE that
Dewey provides only principles and insights for creating moral education?

Hook correctly recognizes that in MPE only principles and the like are proffered, but we should not take this claim to mean that Dewey's moral principles were arrived at independent of actual practice. Rather, they should be seen as the result or summary of practice. Hook leaves this important issue untouched thus implying that Dewey never details specifics of actual practice. Hook implies this by ending the "Preface" to MPE with a question and an answer:

But how [is the practice of moral education to be achieved]? He does not say. Can it be done by providing models of behavior, finding and celebrating them in history, art and literature? Can situations be organized in which individuals can test themselves and learn both from their failures and their unwillingness to risk failure? We still do not know. 235

From MPE we do not know, but by looking beyond this work we can refute Hook: Dewey does tell us how to use subject-matter, which subject-matter and methodology to choose, how to create moral situations, and how students can become morally effective through reconstructing experience. In short, Dewey does tell us how the practice of moral education is to be engaged in. His "moral principles in education" are the summarization of practice rather than simply abstract guides to practice.
SUMMARY

In order to adequately explicate the connections between Dewey's theory of moral experience and the practice of moral education, it was necessary to examine numerous illustrations of Dewey's specific recommendations for the practice of moral education. This examination of specific pedagogical recommendations constituted the major portion of this chapter.

The chapter was organized as follows. First, we provided a brief discussion of Dewey's formulation of 'theory' and 'practice' and established that he believes separating theory from practice is specious; it creates a false dichotomy which has greatly crippled previous attempts to make theory practicable. In so doing, we presented the ambiguities inherent in talking about 'theory' and suggested the sense in which we have been using it in the previous three chapters, and how theory must be understood to make sense of translating the theory of moral experience into the practice of moral education. We showed that Dewey holds the scientific method to be the means through which the latter is accomplished.

We then moved to a treatment of the practice of moral education in an effort to show how this translation of theory into practice is achieved. We organized our treatment of the practice of moral education in much the same way as does Dewey throughout his analyses of moral
education. We began by reviewing the nature and scope of the enterprise of moral education. This served to pull together the analyses in the previous chapters and set up the kind of illustration of moral education needed to show how Dewey's theory of moral experience operates in the practice of moral education. In doing so, we showed that schools are only one means to morally educate, and we examined the various additional means Dewey claimed have a significant role in developing moral characters.

Since we focused on the aspects of moral education specifically pertaining to schools, a brief description of the necessary elements of an educational situation were presented. This served the dual purpose of organizing the remainder of the analysis and allowed us to capture the basics of Dewey's portrayal of the practice of moral education.

This was followed by a discussion of the goals of moral education, which were grounded in the analysis provided in previous chapters. Next followed a discussion of the moral atmosphere of the school and of the classroom. These sections contained little apparent description of concrete practice except as the goals and school atmosphere outlined were the guiding aims for Dewey's University of Chicago Laboratory School. Also, in the analysis of an "educational situation" it became clear that any particular decision about practice can be made only after the goals are
carefully identified and outlined, since otherwise the choices about practice are arbitrary.

After these sections were presented, the analysis continued with presentations of Dewey's view of the role of the teacher, the student, the subject-matter of moral education and finally, the appropriate teaching methodology for moral education. These sections served to illustrate the details of concrete practice. At this point we summarized the practice of Deweyan moral education.

The chapter concluded by reintroducing Sidney Hook's claim from the "Preface" of MPE that Dewey provides nothing more concrete than principles to guide the implementation of moral education in schools. We argued that Hook's claim is misleading since Dewey did provide illustrations in contexts other than MPE of the practice of moral education. Additionally, we suggested that the principles are not criteria which Dewey proffered to guide the determination and implementation of practice, per se, rather they function as summary rules resulting from experimentally testing the theory of moral experience in practice. In essence, the principles are summary rules; good general rules to follow which have proven themselves as worthwhile after actual testing in school practice.

Thus it is in this chapter that we looked beyond Dewey's own writings and relied in addition upon those with whom he worked very closely in his educational experiments, those
whom he supported, and those whose writings he explicitly endorsed.

In the next and final chapter we will conclude this study by reviewing the nature, scope and limitations, methodology, sources, and chapter summaries of this work. We will also cite major findings, draw conclusions, and make recommendations for future research.
CHAPTER NOTES


4. Ibid., p. 290.


6. Ibid., p. 290.

7. I am relying upon the analysis of an educational theory as presented in Richard Pratte, "More on Educational Slogans: A Possibly Effective Model for Analyzing Slogan Systems," in Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society (Champaign, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, 1979), pp. 120-130, in which the theoretical base of a theory is categorized as being metaphysical, epistemological, and axiological components.


9. Ibid., p. 245.


21. Ibid., p. 27.


23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., p. 44.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., p. 47.

28. We must assume that Dewey means 'interest' in a dispositional sense; a latent interest which must be sparked.
29. Dewey, "Character Training for Youth."

30. Ibid.

31. In Chapter Three, p. 159, we showed that 'motives' for Dewey are the same as 'intentions' or 'desires'.


34. See the section on "The Relation between Experience and Education," pp. 117-126 in Chapter Two where these three attitudes are initially mentioned. In that context we noted that the attitudes surface again in Dewey's treatment of moral education.


36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., p. 290.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., p. 291.


44. Ibid., p. 141.

45. Ibid., p. 139.

46. Ibid., pp. 139-140.

47. Ibid., p. 140.

48. Ibid., p. 139.

49. Ibid., p. 142.


53. Ibid., p. 4.


58. Ibid., p. 4.

59. Ibid., p. 1.

60. Ibid.

61. The term 'vital' in this context functions much the same way as does 'lively' in the descriptions of (episodic) interest.


63. Ibid., p. 1. Non-moral ideas "[a]re such ideas and pieces of information as leave conduct uninfluenced for either the better or the worse."

64. Ibid., pp. 51-52.

65. See Mayhew and Edwards, The Dewey School, pp. 455-459, for a detailed treatment of 'moral act' as unified and consumated activity.


70. Ibid., pp. 37-38.


73. Ibid., p. 40.

74. Ibid., p. 42.

75. Richard Pratte, "SCHEMA: T teaches S x, so that y" unpublished mimeographed class handout, Education 641.76.


79. Ibid., p. 88.

80. Ibid., p. 89.

81. Ibid., p. 90.


84. Ibid., p. 299.


86. Ibid., p. 458.


90. Ibid., p. 428.


95. Ibid., p. 85.

96. Ibid.


99. Ibid.


102. See above, pp. 256-257.


110. Ibid., p. 461.

111. Ibid., p. 5.

112. Ibid., p. 365.

113. Ibid., pp. 234-235.

114. Ibid., p. 22.


116. Ibid.


118. Ibid., p. 429.


120. Ibid., p. 42.


122. Ibid., p. 477.


127. Ibid., p. 367.

128. Ibid., pp. 401-402.

129. Ibid., pp. 274-275.

130. Ibid., p. 275.
131. Ibid., p. 379.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid., p. 62.
134. Ibid., p. 94.
136. Ibid.
139. Ibid., p. 254.
141. Dewey claims that there are two important "psychological principles of growth" with which the particular stages of individual growth coincide. Both principles have direct and crucial bearing on the determinations of appropriate subject-matter and methodology for all schooling, including moral education. See Mayhew and Edwards, The Dewey School, pp. 250-251.
144. Ibid.
146. Ibid., p. 53.
147. Ibid.
148. Ibid.
149. Ibid., pp. 52-53.
150. Ibid., p. 53.

151. See above, pp. 255-256.


153. Ibid.

154. Ibid., p. 63.

155. Ibid., p. 72.

156. Ibid.

157. Ibid., p. 70.

158. Ibid., p. 96.

159. Ibid., p. 97.

160. Ibid., p. 141.

161. Ibid., p. 53.

162. Ibid., p. 144.

163. Ibid., p. 151.

164. Ibid., p. 167.

165. Ibid., p. 199.

166. Ibid., p. 203.

167. Ibid., pp. 203-204.

168. Ibid., p. 45.

169. Ibid., p. 54.

170. Ibid., p. 366.


172. Ibid., p. 51.

173. Ibid., p. 31.

174. Ibid., p. 32.

176. We must take the previous analysis of the individual and the social, and democracy into account lest we think that Dewey is advocating that some form of indoctrination be brought into the classroom. In fact, indoctrination, both in a process and product sense, is necessarily ruled out in a Deweyan view.

178. Ibid., p. 33.

182. Ibid.
183. Ibid.
184. Ibid., p. 206.
186. Ibid., p. 470.
187. Ibid., p. 255.
190. Ibid., pp. 468-469.
191. Ibid., p. 18.
192. Ibid.
193. Ibid., p. 33.
194. See above, pp. 255-256.
196. Ibid., p. 51.
197. Ibid., pp. 290-291.
198. Ibid., p. 115.
199. Ibid., p. 167.
200. Ibid., p. 274.
201. Ibid., pp. 234-235.
207. Ibid., p. 151.
209. Ibid., pp. 208-209.
211. Ibid., p. 212.
212. Ibid., p. 277.
213. Ibid., p. 259.
215. See Mayhew and Edwards, The Dewey School, p. 167, for a description of the use of drill in the classroom and why it was used to improve skill deficiencies.
216. Ibid., p. 428.
217. Ibid., pp. 251-252.

218. Ibid., pp. 275-276.


221. See Ibid., pp. 176-177, 290-291, and 303 for discussions of how the scientific method was used in learning cooking and social studies.

222. See Dewey, "Teaching Ethics in the High School," for a justification for waiting to bring in such abstract ethical discussions until these years.


225. Ibid., pp. 423-424.

226. Ibid., p. 392.

227. Ibid., p. 350.

228. Dewey and Dewey, Schools of Tomorrow, p. 52.


233. See Chapter Three, pp. 205-224.

234. We are assuming that Dewey intended Moral Principles in Education not to be a report or description of practice, as was The Child and the Curriculum and The School and Society, but as a discussion of the moral principles which should be lived by in creating educational programs concerned with moral education. If we view Moral Principles in Education in this way, then Dewey is not to be faulted for neglecting to describe the specifics of practice in Moral Principles in
Education. Rather, Dewey is to be commended for providing a dozen or more clearly outlined standards or principles for evaluating the adequacy of practice.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will contain a restatement of the rationale of the study, its scope and limitations, the methodology employed, the sources consulted, a summary of the chapters, as well as the major findings, conclusions, summary remarks, and recommendations for further research.

RATIONALE

At the outset of this study, it was noted that a common phenomenon in contemporary popular moral education literature is a theoretical reliance upon John Dewey's philosophy. We noted that the two most popular approaches (i.e., Kohlberg's Cognitive-Developmental approach to moral education, and Simon, Raths, and Kirchenbaums' Values Clarification program) claim to be fundamentally Deweyan. That the Cognitive-Developmental approach and Values Clarification are incompatible is well known. The incompatibilities of the two approaches rest upon the identification of different goals which in turn lead to the formation of highly divergent approaches to implementing
moral education programs. Kohlberg's theory of moral development is based on a Kantian-Rawlsian theory of justice, and premises that individuals both do and should develop in a sequential manner toward a particular conception of justice. On the other hand, Values Clarification endorses individual relativism in terms of student identification of values. Unlike the Cognitive-Developmental model, the Values Clarification approach maintains that an individual's personal value scheme, whatever it contains, should be clarified and confirmed, and denies the legitimacy of any single general goal of justice. Whereas the Cognitive-Developmental model is fundamentally developmental, the Values Clarification approach is not. Kohlberg's scheme is based on a particular theory of justice as the zenith of moral development, while the Values Clarification approach has to do with development only in the loose sense that an individual develops (i.e., clarifies and acts upon) his/her personal set of values.

Obviously, the Cognitive-Developmental model and the Values Clarification approach are manifested in distinct ways in the classroom. Not only are the methodology and subject-matter different in the two approaches, but the function of the teacher in facilitating the goals of these distinct approaches differs as well. In Values Clarification, the teacher is a passive force in the process of individual student values clarification, while in the
Cognitive-Developmental model, it is the teacher's job to facilitate classroom discussion and encourage students to consider alternate and more sophisticated modes of reasoning.

In Chapter One, we demonstrated that these distinct views claim to be based upon Deweyan theory. The rationale for this study has been to provide a definitive account of Dewey's theory and practice of moral education which would serve to determine the degree to which these views and others are, in fact, within (or not within) the Deweyan tradition. Without a comprehensive analysis of Dewey's theory and practice of moral education, Values Clarificationists, Kohlbergians and others are likely to continue to claim that their approaches are based on Deweyan theory, while critics will be hampered in their efforts to dispute such claims. In short, the purpose of this study has been to provide such a clarifying and comprehensive account of the theory and practice of Deweyan moral education in order to fill the existing void without attempting to delineate in each approach that which is or is not properly Deweyan. That is a task for another study.

Scope and Limitations of the Study

In the first chapter, we noted that although the rationale and task for this study arose from an awareness of the claims proffered by co-existing and incompatible approaches to moral education to be Deweyan, the primary
goal of this work was not to compare Deweyan moral education with these contemporary approaches. Rather, this study was limited to providing a descriptive account of the theory and practice of Deweyan moral education. Additionally, the primary focus was not to criticize Dewey per se except as inconsistencies, ambiguities, and vague claims arise in providing a descriptive account of Dewey's position.

A second limitation of this study was that numerous complex theoretical notions pertaining to Dewey's position have had to be introduced in order to provide a thoroughgoing analysis. Many of these concepts deserve far more detailed treatment than they have been given here, but since such detailed treatments were not necessary for the analysis of Dewey's theory and practice of moral education, they were not pursued.

A third limitation arises as a result of Dewey's verbosity. Since Dewey wrote numerous books and articles in which he substantially repeated himself, it has been impossible to include each and every source in this study, although most of the pertinent literature was reviewed in depth during the preparation for this study.

The final limitation of this study is more accurately described as a point of information: since Dewey wrote most of his works on moral education prior to 1920, the portrayal of moral education is primarily restricted to this earlier period of his professional life. However, many of his
later, mature works are relevant to this study and we have been careful to note changes and inconsistencies in his earlier and more mature writings.

**SOURCES**

In "The Review of the Literature" in Chapter One, we noted the five general categories of primary and secondary sources which were used in the preparation of this study. These categories are (1) Dewey's works on moral education; (2) works by Deweyan contemporaries; (3) additional works by Dewey on education/schooling; (4) Dewey's works containing theoretical background analysis; and (5) additional works germane to moral education by authors other than Dewey. The first four categories pertain explicitly to our analysis of the theory and practice of Deweyan moral education, while the last category contains those works which represent previous attempts to present analyses of Deweyan moral education.

**SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS**

Chapter One, "Rationale of the Study," presented a statement of the problem and purpose of the study. In this introductory chapter, the scope and limitations of the study were outlined, the methodology used in the study described, and an annotated review of the relevant literature presented. The chapter ended with a description of the organization of the entire study.
Chapter Two, "Theory of Experience," contained an analysis of Dewey's general theory of experience, the purpose of which was to determine whether Dewey's views on education can be reduced to his general theory of experience. The conclusion was that there are emphatic differences among different kinds of experience, and to reduce all education, including moral education, to experience in general is inadequate. However, gaining an understanding of Dewey's theory of experience was determined to have direct bearing on comprehending the theory behind the practice of moral education, in that moral experience is a specific emphatic kind of experience the substance of which forms the subject-matter of moral educational experience.

Chapter Three, "Theory of Moral Experience," contained the remainder of the theoretical analysis pertaining to and supporting the enterprise of moral education. This chapter presented Dewey's theory of moral experience by describing Dewey's double-barrelled reflective theory of morals: psychological and social ethics. This analysis of Dewey's theory of moral experience ended with a presentation of the theory underlying the practice of moral education.

Chapter Four, "The Practice of Moral Education," served the dual purpose of connecting the theory of moral experience with the practice of moral education and presenting descriptions and illustrations of Deweyan moral
education as practiced under his direction and care. First, a brief examination of Dewey's definitions of 'theory' and 'practice' were provided. Next, illustrations of actual recommendations and specifics of the practice of moral education as conceived by Dewey were presented and organized according to the constitutive elements of an educational situation. The chapter ended with a discussion of Sidney Hook's claim that Dewey does not provide details of practice but only principles and insights to guide practice. In that context we confirmed that Dewey's moral principles in education are summary rules arrived at through actual testing of the theory of moral experience in school practice. In this chapter, in addition to Dewey's own works, we relied upon writings by colleagues of Dewey's who described his schooling experiments.

METHODOLOGY

The methodological tools used in this study were selected with the goals and tasks of the study in mind. The methodology had to be consistent with Dewey's general philosophical position, and had to be explanatorily enlightening as well. Hence, the tools of critical analysis were chosen, including conceptual analysis, language analysis, and argument analysis. The specific methodological tools made use of making distinctions, detecting assumptions, presuppositions, ambiguities, noting inconsistencies and lucunae in argument, recognizing claims
made in the absence of supporting evidence, identifying programmatic definitions presented in the place of reasoned argument, and so on.

Since this study was in large part descriptive, interpretive reading on our part and on the part of critics, as well as historical analysis, were used throughout. This particular set of tools permitted a critical awareness of Dewey's views without having to choose sides or advocate a particular point of view.

MAJOR FINDINGS

1. The Deweyan conception of "moral education" is double-barreled in a significant way. For Dewey, this label describes both morally conceived education and the education of morals. In the former, this has to do with creating a total moral/social school program. This means creating a democratically organized and operated school program which includes the proper physical arrangement of the school plant as well as the subject-matter and methodology chosen. The latter sense refers to the education of students for the purpose of developing moral characters. This means nurturing in children the attitudes of open-mindedness, intellectual responsibility and responsibility, as well as the ability to engage in the method of reflective thinking.

2. The practice of Deweyan moral education is firmly based upon Dewey's theory of experience in general and his
theory of moral experience in particular. Morally educative activities are not arbitrarily chosen activities but are moral experiences which are an emphatic kind of experience.

3. Dewey's characterization of the nature, goals, and specific elements of the practice of moral education is restricted to elementary education except where it is specifically stated that high school moral education applies. Elementary and high school moral education are significantly different enterprises due to developmental differences between the ages and the relative ability to assimilate abstract knowledge.

4. The school is not the most significant means to morally educate and thus is only one institution among many (i.e., home, church, community organizations, etc.) which, as conceived by Dewey, have a decisive role to play in moral education.

5. Moral characters are best developed through indirect means of education. Thus, in elementary school, separate subject-matter with time set aside for the education of morals is inimical to a Deweyan program of moral character education. Separate courses of study in morals or ethics per se have little, if any, effect on moral character development.

6. Deweyan moral education could be labeled "character education" or "civic education" if in fact 'character' or 'civic' was interpreted in Deweyan terms. Similarly, manual
training is in a very real sense a component of moral education, but religious education, as in the education of religious dogma, is not (and could not be) part of Deweyan moral education.

7. For Dewey, moral education, democracy, and reflective morality are both individual and social in nature. In each case, the individual and the social are intertwined, but in no instance does one become subordinate to the other.

8. The goals of Deweyan moral education are thus twofold: the freeing and developing of individual capacities and powers of thought and action, and the advancement of social welfare or human progression.

9. The foremost product goal of Deweyan moral education is variously labeled as the development of democratically useful citizens, the development of morally effective characters, the development of persons who have the power of trained judgment, and the development of persons with force of character. All of these labels describe the same goal: the development of individuals who can function successfully in a necessarily social world. To achieve this goal requires that individuals acquire the habit of reflective thinking and embody the qualities of open-mindedness, intellectual honesty, and responsibility.

10. The intellectual habits of open-mindedness, intellectual honesty, and responsibility are equivalent to
the moral qualities of the same names. When one exhibits the trained power of judgment or acquired the habit of reflective thinking, it is sufficient to claim that the intellectual/moral qualities are also acquired.

11. Dewey implicitly characterizes schooling as educative. Although he recognizes that there are mis-educative experiences, these have no place in schooling programs. Thus, there is no such thing as a mis-educative experience which is moral since only educative experiences are legitimate parts of school programs. However, Dewey does not recognize the possibility that there are educative experiences which are immoral.

12. Moral education, for Dewey, is equivalent to "social education." That is, moral education is in a very real sense socialization (the induction of the child into the existing culture or experience of man) as well as being the development of individual character and conduct.

13. By looking beyond Dewey's own works and including those by his colleagues who describe his schooling experiments, one can describe the constitutive elements of Deweyan moral education practice. That is, by providing illustrations of specific examples of Deweyan moral education practice in schools, it is possible to set up a "conceptual test" of Dewey's theory of moral experience. This approach is typically Deweyan and allowed us to make
the connections between the theory of moral experience and the practice of moral education.

14. Dewey's moral principles in education function as summary rules arrived at after actual testing of hypotheses in practice. They are general rules which provide guidelines for translating Dewey's theory of moral experience into the practice of moral education, since they summarize the results of Dewey's experiments in implementing moral education in schools.

15. It would appear that any contemporary program in moral education that claims to be within the Deweyan tradition or claims to be exemplary of Deweyan moral education, must deal with both product and process goals of moral education and utilize the moral/social organization of the school, a primary concern in Deweyan moral education, if it is to pass the tests of being Deweyan moral education.

CONCLUSIONS

In Chapter Four we concluded that Dewey's moral principles in education are summary rules—principles which have been warranted through practice. Dewey's moral principles, as presented in MPE, can easily be divided into categories analogous to the constitutive elements of an educational situation (S teaches Px so that Y) as outlined in Chapter Four. In MPE, for instance, Dewey provides examples of principles that fall into the following categories: those promoting social welfare and those
promoting individual development (product goals), those
determining subject-matter (x), those choosing teaching
methodology (process goals), those referring to teacher
qualification (S), and those summarizing student
capabilities (P).

We have shown that as a process philosopher Dewey cannot
offer direct rules for classroom practice and remain
consistent with his own philosophical bent. Neither can he
provide an exhaustive set of moral principles in education,
for, similarly, to do so would not be consistent with his
pragmatic, anti-formalist stance. However, as we have seen,
Dewey does provide far more than mere principles for the
practice of moral education. He has given us his theory of
moral experience, and he has left us with the practice of
moral education in the University of Chicago Laboratory
School. Dewey's own conclusions about adequate moral
education practice do take the form of representative
principles and so may our conclusions. Dewey's moral
principles in education are in effect singular moral
judgments which are summary rules (principles) arrived at
through normative argument.

In keeping with the Deweyan tradition and phrasing the
conclusions of this study in Deweyan terms, we offer the
following principles which have proven themselves in the
process of comparing the theory of moral experience with the
practice of moral education. These principles can be
divided by treating them in terms of process and product goals. It must be stressed that they are principles, not direct rules; they are guidelines rather than demands. This does not mean that they are all equally basic. As we will see, some of the principles serve to support others.

Product goals. We conclude that the paramount product goal of Deweyan moral education is democratic living or a democracy. All other hoped for product goals can be subsumed and understood under this ultimate goal. Only in a democracy are both individual growth and social interests supported and encouraged.

But promoting individual growth is an important product goal in its own right, since it is a necessary condition for a democracy. Individuals need to develop by acquiring a set of habits which permit them to make intelligent decisions in a necessarily social world. The qualities of open-mindedness, intellectual honesty, and responsibility are those which obtain in individuals who are morally effective. Being morally effective means to be a useful citizen; one who has force of character. The product goal of promoting individual growth includes encouraging habituation of these qualities, for in a democracy nothing less will suffice to make a useful citizen: one who is able to function successfully in conjoint community life.

In addition to promoting individual growth, social well-being or progress must be pursued in a democracy. This
product goal is just as important as the goal of encouraging individual growth. A school community in which there is wide and free communication and activity is the manifestation of this social product goal. Hopefully, students will increase the amount of shared interests and foster a wider, deeper sense of interdependence among adult community members.

Achieving the product goals of democracy, individual growth, and social progress depends upon two additional product goals of a pre-conditional, and more concrete and immediate nature. First, students should acquire the habit of reflective thinking (that is, they should be able to use the scientific method with ease and facility). Second, students should be adept at using a full range of communication skills. They should be able readers, writers, listeners, and speakers.

Process goals. Like the product goals of Deweyan moral education, the process goals can be understood in terms of democracy: all process goals must concurrently foster individual growth and social interests. In order to achieve the product goals subsumed under the label 'democracy', we conclude that there are a number of important process goals which cannot be violated. First, the physical and social school arrangement should nurture a community in the full sense of the term. In other words, students should partake in activities in which cooperation rather than competition...
is required. Students should be encouraged to communicate fully and freely, and to do this requires that they be allowed to move about freely in the classroom and the school itself.

Moreover, students must be encouraged and permitted to reconstruct experience themselves. There must not be imposition of subject-matter and goals by teachers. Students must learn to examine problems by solving them rather than by being given ready-made solutions to problems.

These process and product goals of moral education function to guide selection of appropriate subject-matter, teaching methodology, and qualified teachers. Thus, choosing subject-matter is a matter of identifying material which is continuous with student experience and represents real social problems. Similarly, teaching methodology must be conducive to encouraging social intercourse among students and individual and group problem solving. Teachers who are unwilling to give up traditional means of instruction (i.e., imposition from above) in exchange for cooperative means of instruction will not be qualified to teach in a Deweyan program of moral education. Similarly, the teacher must be patient and willing to work side by side with students in solving problems as a guide or facilitator rather than as an autocratic leader.
SUMMARY REMARKS

Analyzing Dewey's theory and practice of moral education has been a lengthy and complex affair. It involved examining Dewey's views on education in general, which are intimately related to his theory of experience. It has been shown that Dewey has an internally consistent (if not complex) theory of moral experience upon which his practical recommendations for moral education in schools were based.

1. We conclude that Dewey's theory and practice of moral education must be interpreted in terms of his general double-barreled theory of experience. This distinction provides both the process and product senses of experience and is descriptive of his theory of moral experience, which in turn provides the procedures (process) and substance (product) of moral education.

Even if one begins to examine Dewey's theory and practice of moral education by looking at his practical recommendations, the same conclusion is reached. For example, in MPE, DS, ST, and his two lectures in China one encounters the same concepts: democracy, individual and social, experience, community, communication, shared interests, reflective thinking, habits, impulses and character. These concepts are consistently defined and their definitions are found throughout all of his major theoretical works. In order to make sense of practice, it is necessary to determine their meanings and inter-
connectedness, and this involves going back to Dewey's theoretical works on experience and moral theory. In essence, no matter where one begins to analyze Dewey's theory and practice of moral education, an examination of his theory of experience is necessary.

2. We conclude that Deweyan moral education is an emphatic kind of education, best characterized by the distinction between morally conceived education and the education of morally effective characters. The former is merely Deweyan education in general, for unless Deweyan education is morally conceived it will not be adequate education representative and supportive of Deweyan democracy. The latter is, as Dewey portrays it, the foremost product goal of morally conceived education. Since Deweyan education is social education, and social education is moral education, this foremost product goal (democracy) is intellectual, and moral, and to educate for social purposes is equivalent to saying that education is for moral purposes: to form or develop characters who have force of character and can thus function successfully in a necessarily social world. This requires the intellectual/moral qualities of open-mindedness, intellectual honesty, responsibility, and the habit of reflective thinking.

3. We conclude that attempts at implementation of Deweyan moral education in present society will not be easily achieved. There are at least two reasons for this.
First, the role, skills and qualifications required of the teacher in Deweyan moral education are unrealistic. Not only must the teacher be an expert in many subject-matter areas, but s/he must also have a firm knowledge of child development. Additionally, s/he must be extremely patient and willing to let students "learn by doing"—learning by recreating or reconstructing experience which may not be the most efficient means to get students to learn curricular material. S/he must also be sensitive to moral problems and be able to capitalize upon them without resorting to preaching or lecturing about correct moral answers. S/he must also be willing to abandon set lesson plans and short term objectives to accommodate student interests and activities. These latter qualifications lead to the second general reason why Deweyan moral education would be difficult to implement.

Although Dewey believes that contextual circumstances continually change, he also believes that (moral) education is the reconstruction of experience and that children should learn this through experiencing problematic situations themselves. As schools are presently organized, it would be difficult to set up schools as "embryonic democratic communities." The neighborhood or community school, as Dewey views, it is not existent in most urban and suburban areas. Children are bussed to and from school and thus come from diverse home backgrounds and experiences. Added to
this are the state and federal competency requirements that function in many cases as foremost product goals. Administrators and teachers alike feel compelled to use the most efficient means to realize these objectives, and this involves setting curriculum and adhering to strict schedules and testing for learning achievement. Abandoning such regulations in exchange for a Deweyan approach to subject-matter and skill learning would not be a popular or easy decision to make.

4. A tentative conclusion of this study is that the claims of Kohlbergians and Values Clarificationists alike that they are based on Deweyan theory are suspect. Values Clarificationists, for instance, base their moral education program solely on Dewey's TV which only plays at best a secondary role in Deweyan moral education. Dewey never mentions or alludes to the process or steps of valuing in any work related to moral education. Additionally, in a Values Clarification program, the teacher is to serve a passive role, never evaluating students clarified values; s/he needs to know little if anything about child development or moral problems.

Further, the foremost product goals are dramatically opposed in the two programs. For Dewey, the ultimate end of (moral) education is the formation of intelligent and morally effective individuals who can function successfully in democratic society. This involves sensitivity to
individual intentions and consequences of action in the context of the social group. On the other hand, the governing aim in Values Clarification is that individuals clarify their own value scheme. Values may legitimately conflict with the interests of the larger social group and this is allowed and implicitly justified in a Values Clarification approach.

The Cognitive-Developmental approach to moral development and moral education, like Values Clarification, has claimed to be Deweyan but differs from Dewey in important ways. Both Kohlberg and Dewey view child development as being an important part of moral development/education. However, the two psychological accounts are different. Kohlberg's schema of three levels and six stages describes personal development from early childhood to adult maturity. Dewey, on the other hand, has three levels but they begin at age four or five, and end at age fourteen. Additionally, Kohlbergian and Deweyan product goals are distinct. Kohlberg's zenith of moral development is for persons to solve moral dilemmas from the standpoint of the Kantian-Rawlsian theory of justice. Dewey holds no substantive principles of justice as such, as the goal of moral development/education.

Kohlbergian and Deweyan methods of instruction are similarly distinct. For Kohlberg, moral dilemma discussions removed from the overt curriculur with the teacher as
facilitator/discussion leader are recommended. Dewey advocates that there be no abstracted moral discussions per se.

Both Values Clarificationists and Kohlbergians suggest that time be set aside from other school subject-matter for treatment of values clarification or moral dilemma discussion. Dewey believes that the positive effect of this tack is minimal since moral learning is acquired through dynamic inter-personal school activities.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY

1. Comprehensive critiques of the claims made by Values Clarificationists, Kohlbergians and any others who claim to be Deweyan must be undertaken. In the context of this study we have only been able to suggest the general areas of difference between Values Clarification, Kohlberg's Cognitive-Developmental approach and Dewey's approach to moral education. This comparison needs to be explicated in detail and particular points of similarity and difference made explicit.

2. No attempt was made in the context of this study to assess the philosophical adequacy of Dewey's theory and practice of moral education in any terms other than its internal consistency. This task needs to be undertaken. This would involve assessing its adequacy both in and outside the context of contemporary American society. In so doing, Dewey's position needs to be compared with other
contemporary approaches (e.g., Values Clarification, Cognitive-Development) to assess its comparative adequacy for moral development/education in contemporary American classroom settings.

3. Empirical studies should also be conducted. Based upon the descriptive portrayal of Deweyan moral education practice presented in this study, it would be worth examining present schooling practice to see if any Deweyan moral education exists at present and if so, assess its adequacy. If there seem to be no existing Deweyan approaches, it would be worth creating an experimental school community with the expressed purpose of furthering the goals of Deweyan social/moral education. The value of identifying and/or creating Deweyan approaches to moral education rests on the Deweyan principle that for theory to be warranted it must be implemented in practice.
CHAPTER NOTES

1. For a typical example of the realization that Values Clarification and the Cognitive-Developmental approach are distinct and incompatible, see Don Cochrane, "Moral Education—A Prolegomenon" Theory Into Practice: Moral Education 14, 4 (October 1975): 236-246.

2. Ibid.
### APPENDIX

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