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PROLEGOMENON TO A PHENOMENOLOGY OF FILM

The Ohio State University

Ph.D. 1982

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PROLEGOMENON TO A PHENOMENOLOGY
OF FILM

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
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* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1982

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PROLEGOMENON TO A PHENOMENOLOGY
OF FILM

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The Ohio State University, 1982
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The work is a practical application of the phenomenological theories of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger to the study of film aesthetics. The work identifies and describes essential structures of film experience via an eidetic analysis of the aesthetic object of film. As a result of the identification and description of essential strata of film experience, the traditional dichotomous classification of film theory into the Realist and the Formalist views is reconciled. The identification of the stratified structure of the filmic aesthetic object gives a new ground upon which to interpret film theories.

The aesthetic object of film is described not only as an eidetic structure comprised of essential strata but also as a medium of communication. That is, the analysis carried out in the work is not limited to the passive experience of filmic reality but expands in scope to
account for the being-in-the-world of filmic reality (the grounds for the existentiality of filmic reality). The being-in-the-world of filmic reality is a correlate to the existential nature of the human, specifically the film author. And, the communicative role of film art is interpreted by an analysis of the mode of being of the film author. The purpose of this analysis is to uncover the origin of filmic reality.

The work also addresses the topics of phenomenology and education, and, phenomenology and film art education.
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Dedicated to

B.D. Streb
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are many people who have contributed to this work, and I am very thankful for their help. The work was inspired by the teaching of Mojmir Drvota. He taught me to see clearly. It was one of the great fortunes of my life that our paths crossed.

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I am deeply indebted to my family. The love and encouragement of my mother mitigated the innumerable frustrations involved in writing a work of this kind, and it is to her this work is dedicated. My brothers, Lee and Jay, gave me encouragement and advice which made hard times easier.

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CHAPTER I

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

1.0 The Problem:

In recent years many film theorists have taken to calling themselves and other theorists "phenomenologists." The noted French semiotician, Christian Metz, has linked his work to phenomenology. The first chapter of his book, *Film Language*, is entitled "Phenomenological Approaches to Film," and he says therein:

Let us say . . . that structural analysis always assumes, by virtue of an implicit or explicit prior stage, something like a phenomenology of its subject, or, again, that signification (which is constructed and discontinuous) renders explicit what had first been experienced only as a perception (which is continuous and spontaneous).\(^1\)

Also, the formidable French film theorist, Jean Mitry, is said to have made use of a phenomenological method of investigation.\(^2\) Others, such as, Henri Agel, Dudley Andrews, Amédée Ayfre, Patrick Peritore, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty have also suggested that film be studied phenomenologically.
However, despite the popularity of phenomenology, no theorist, save Mitry, has actually used the method to analyze film. And, according to Mitry's critics, his work is more a personal aesthetic than a phenomenological analysis. There is great confusion about what phenomenology is and how to use it. This results in a mélange of theories and proposals for theories which are vague, misleading, and often inaccurate. One of the main reasons for the confusion is that authors often fail to consult the works of the founder of modern phenomenology, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Also, Husserl's works are very difficult to read due to his tortured prose style and due to the subject he investigates, pure consciousness. Husserl's work changed substantially from his early writings, such as Logical Investigations (1900), as he developed his radical transcendental logic upon which his later method of phenomenology is based. A failure to study or a failure to accept Husserl's later writings in which he discovers the World as an absolute field of investigation may cause writers to interpret phenomenology as a type of relativism.

One who is interested in using the phenomenological method is also well advised to study the work of Husserl's best known student, Martin Heidegger.
Heidegger, who greatly influenced Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, was himself greatly influenced by Hegel and Kierkegaard. He was also an accomplished scholar in Greek and Latin and studied Plato and Aristotle. He developed a "hermeneutic" phenomenology which is very helpful when one is investigating something other than pure consciousness. I will discuss it and its relation to Husserl's "reductive" phenomenology later.

The point I want to make here is that a phenomenological analysis of film is long overdue. Such an analysis, even if it is not a complete one, is a necessary and useful undertaking in order to open the field, so to speak, for future investigations. Also, since phenomenological investigation is eidetic (from the Greek eidos = of seeing), such an investigation is capable of "uncovering" meanings which are not discoverable using other methods of inquiry. The reason for this is that phenomenology is a method which allows one to overcome the prejudices of the "natural standpoint." In order to understand these claims, it helps to understand the relation between phenomenology and history. This relation was explicated by Husserl in one of his last published works, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, which was published in part in 1936.
In this work, Husserl speaks in terms reminiscent of Hegel, saying that the historical unfolding of Spirit can best be grasped via phenomenology:

The universality of the absolute spirit embraces all being in an absolute historicity into which nature fits as a product of spirit. It is intentional, which is to say transcendental, phenomenology that sheds light on the subject by virtue of its point of departure and its methods. 4

In other words, like Hegel, Husserl saw his work as the highest point which spirit had attained up to that time. Or, more accurately, Husserl saw his method of investigation as the method best able to show the unfolding of spirit.

It is helpful, in coming to understand the relation of phenomenology and history, to think of history in terms of Plato’s parable of the cave. As you will recall, Plato described human beings as living in an underground den with their legs and necks chained so that they can see only what is in front of them. Above and behind the prisoners is a bright fire, and between them and the fire is a low wall. Outside the mouth of the cave is the bright sun which illuminates everything. There are men, presumably of a higher order, who walk back and forth on the side of the low wall opposite the humans, and these men carry all sorts of vessels, statues, and figures of animals made of wood and stone and other materials. The blazing fire causes shadows
from these things to be projected upon the rear wall of
the cave which the humans face. The humans, unable to
turn around, believe the shadows to be reality. When one
bold prisoner breaks his fetters and stands up and turns
around, he suffers sharp pains; the glare distresses him
and he is unable to see the realities of which in his
former state he saw the shadows. Even as he begins to
adjust to the new sight, he still considers the shadows
to be truer than what he beholds. And, if this former
prisoner is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged
incline to the mouth of the cave, and made to stand in
the bright sun, he would be dazzled and unable to see any
of what is now called reality. And, if after his journey,
the former prisoner would return to his former companions
and try to tell them that the shadows they believe are
real are only images, they might well kill him for his
heresy.5

History in these terms is seen as a process of
awakening. It is the process whereby humans struggle
to free themselves from their chains and make their way
out of the cave and into the sunlight. Phenomenology,
in these terms, and in terms of Husserl's last writings,
is the sum total of the ways of seeing reality. The
phenomenological method is a way of "seeing" the
various forms which reality has taken over time. It
is a way of uncovering meanings:

Immediate "seeing" (Sehen), not merely the sensory seeing of experience, but seeing in general as primordial dator consciousness of any kind whatsoever, is the ultimate source of justification for all rational statements. . . . If we ask why the statement is justified, and ascribe no value to the reply, "I see that it is so," we fall into absurdity, . . . 6

For Husserl, as for Hegel, the unfolding of history is an unfolding of modes of consciousness.

Through the phenomenological method, Husserl was able to thematize the World or "pure consciousness in its own absolute Being." 7 This World is the total field of possible research, and every science has its own object domain within it. In his later writings, Husserl, possibly influenced by Heidegger's work Being and Time (1927), changed his terminology somewhat:

Environing world is a concept that has its place exclusively in the spiritual sphere. That we live in our own particular environing world, to which all our concerns and efforts are directed, points to an event that takes place purely in the spiritual order. Our environing world is a spiritual structure in us and in our historical life. 8

The prejudices of the "natural attitude" which Husserl seeks to overthrow with his phenomenological method are simply ways of seeing which are incapable of thematizing the World.
Life on the level of nature is characterized as a naively direct living immersed in the world, in the world that in a certain sense is constantly there consciously as a universal horizon but is not, merely by that fact, thematic. Thematic is that toward which man's attention is turned.\footnote{9}

According to Husserl, the beginning of the philosophic attitude or focusing of attention on the environing world—as opposed to the mythic or poetical attitude—represents a great revolution in human thought. The history of philosophy is a continuation of this revolution, and through it there is a transformation of previous attitudes, not an elimination of them.

While phenomenology is not incompatible with other methods of investigation, it must be noted that Husserl considered much of the thought that preceded him to be part of a period of naiveté.\footnote{10} He said, "The most general title for this naiveté is objectivism, which is given a structure in the various types of naturalism, wherein the spirit is naturalized."\footnote{11} This creates something of a problem as regards citing as authority works which are not phenomenological. However, such works can be very useful in the early stages of a phenomenological investigation as points of departure. Of course, the works of phenomenologists are very useful as guides to one's seeing. This is especially true when others have investigated the same or similar
matters to those under consideration. In the course of this work, I have drawn upon the thought of other phenomenological investigators when it has helped to clarify a point or when it has helped to keep the investigation on track or when it gave direction.

The goal of a phenomenological study is to uncover the essence of the phenomenon under investigation:

Contingency, which is . . . called matter-of-factness, is limited in the respect that the contingency is correlative to a necessity which does not carry the mere actuality-status of a valid rule of connection obtaining between temporospatial facts, but has the character of essential necessity, and therewith a relation to essential universality. Now when we stated that every fact could be "essentially" other than it is, we were already expressing thereby that it belongs to the meaning of everything contingent that it should have essential being and therewith an Eidos to be apprehended in all its purity; and this Eidos comes under essential truths of varying degrees of universality.  

Therefore, a successful phenomenological investigation would be one that uncovered the essential structure of the phenomenon under investigation. On the surface, it would seem then that one could completely exhaust a given object of investigation. This, however, is not the case, unless one is investigating death in any of its various forms, because a phenomenological investigation is an investigation of both consciousness and its object. As such, the investigation will eventually uncover the "temporality" of the phenomenon. This temporality will
be evidenced by the "horizons" of the phenomenon:

As intentional it [phenomenology] reaches out beyond the isolated subjective processes that are to be analyzed. By explicating their correlative horizons, it brings the highly diverse anonymous processes into the field comprising those that function "constitutively" in relation to the objective sense of the cogitatum in question--that is to say: not only the actual but also the potential subjective processes, which, as such, are "implicit" and "predelineated" in the sense-producing intentionality of the actual ones and which, when discovered, have the evident character of processes that explicate the implicit sense.13

The intentional object (on the side belonging to the cogitatum) plays, for easily understood reasons, the role of "transcendental clue" to the typical infinite multiplicities of possible cogitationes that, in a possible synthesis, bear the intentional object within them (in a manner peculiar to consciousness) as the same meant object. Necessarily the point of departure is the object given "straightforwardly" at the particular time. From it reflection goes back to the mode of consciousness included horizontally in that mode, then to those in which the object might be otherwise intended as the same, within the same unity (ultimately) of a possible conscious life, all the possibilities of which are included in the "ego."14

Some of the main possibilities included in the ego are those involving the experiencing of what is other, especially the experiencing of other people. Husserl did not investigate this topic as fully as his predecessor Hegel or his follower Sartre. However, he did thematize an important aspect of it--intersubjectivity. By virtue of the "other ego" constituted
in consciousness and the intersubjective sphere giving rise to an objective world and a community of monads, there is a transcendental "We":

Stated more precisely: The Objective world as an idea--the ideal correlate of an intersubjective (intersubjectively communalized) experience, which ideally can be and is carried on as constantly harmonious--is essentially related to intersubjectivity (itself constituted as having the ideality of endless openness), whose component particular subjects are equipped with mutually corresponding and harmonious constitutive systems. Consequently the constitution of the world essentially involves a "harmony" of the monads.15

What is being said is that the possibility of communication is given to us by virtue of our finding ourselves in a World with Others who are similarly constructed and who are also conscious beings. Also, our possibilities for communication are open for expansion by constitutive acts of consciousness. Correlative to this, of course, is the possibility that the World will decay or regress.

It is only through the efforts of individual consciousnesses that the horizons of the World are uncovered. These individual human beings in pursuit of their own destinies, their "ownmost possibilities," open new ways of being and communicate them to others. These special individuals who lead "authentic lives" have as a possibility communicating with each other intersubjectively. It is essential to their way of
being to strive to experience the spirit or direction of other's lives; they "see" the essence of the other person. These authentic people are the people responsible for the movement of history. One is guided in "seeing what they saw" by the sediments, i.e., deeds, laws, books, paintings, etc. which they have created.

There are, of course, many grades of communication, but the object of all of them is to know the essence of the other person, to enter into a dialogue whereby both participants' worlds are expanded. What results is "being for others," and the constitution of objectivities. Or, in Hegelian terms, the result is Spirit unfolding itself and coming to know itself as itself.

The purpose of a phenomenological investigation of film is to uncover the essence of film and to see if working in film is a human endeavor. That is, is intersubjective communication possible through film experience?
2.0 The Method:

It is said that the phenomenological method can be adapted to different subject matters. And, this claim has been shown to be true by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka in her book, *Phenomenology and Science*. In this section of the study, I have developed a phenomenological method suitable for the study of film experience. I have drawn heavily from the work of both Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger.

According to Husserl, phenomenological data are taken from "experience" (in an all inclusive sense) and are given by intuition. Empirical intuition, specifically perception, brings the individual object to "givenness" in a primordial way. However, it is merely due to prejudice that this primordial givenness is considered appropriate to sensory objects alone:

Every possible object, or to put it logically, "every subject of possibly true predications," has indeed its own ways, that of predicative thinking above all, of coming under a glance that presents, intuits, meets it eventually in its "bodily selfhood" and "lays hold of" it. Thus essential insight is intuition.

Through this broader interpretation of "intuition," Husserl replaces sensory experience as the only basis for cognition and ground for judgments. The goal of essential insight is to allow the investigator to lay hold of the object of investigation in its purity,
that is, to avoid contingency or "matter-of-factness" and apprehend the object of investigation in its invarient logical structures or its Eidos (Idea). Husserl says the principle of all principles is "whatever presents itself in 'intuition' in primordial form (as it were in its bodily reality) is simply accepted as it gives itself out to be, though only within the limits in which it then presents itself." These "limits" are the structures of the object being investigated, and they are simply described. However, in order to avoid "matter-of-factness" or individual and accidental characteristics which are not essential and invarient, one must overthrow the "natural standpoint" via the "phenomenological reduction" or "epoche." This consists in suspending successively the natural and customary aspects of cognition in order not to have any preconceptions about what is to be discovered. Husserl says:

We put out of action the general thesis which belongs to the natural standpoint, we place in brackets whatever it includes respecting the nature of Being: this entire natural world which is continually "there for us," present to our hand, and will ever remain there, is a "fact-world" of which we continue to be conscious even though it pleases us to put it in brackets. I do not deny then this "world," as though I were a sophist, I do not doubt that it is there as though I were a skeptic; but I use the epoche which completely bars me from using any judgment that concerns spatio-temporal existence.
Consciousness in itself has a being of its own which in its absolute uniqueness of nature remains unaffected by the phenomenological disconnection. It therefore remains over as a "phenomenological residuum," as a region of Being which is in principle unique, and can become . . . the field of a new science—the science of Phenomenology.22

This "residuum" is supposed to be free from the prejudices of the natural standpoint, such as, the factual aspects of the phenomenon, and the preconception that it results from a simple psycho-physiological stimulus-response relationship. The rational structure of the object alone is given, and this structure has "layers" or components which are organized by necessary connections.

In order to understand these "connections," the theory of "intentionality" must be invoked. Simply put the theory of intentionality is that "consciousness is consciousness of something."23 The term "intentionality," as Husserl uses it, comes from the Latin word intenio which means "holding in." Husserl adopted this theory from his teacher Franz Brentano (1838-1917) who said:

Every psychical phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or sometimes the mental) inexistence of an object, and what we should like to call, although not quite unambiguously, the reference to a content, the directedness toward an object (which in this context is not to be understood as something real) or the immanent-object-quality. Each contains something as its object, though not each in the same manner.
This intentional inexistence is peculiar alone to psychical phenomena. No physical phenomenon shows anything like it. And thus we can define psychical phenomena by saying that they are such phenomena as contain objects in themselves by way of intention.24

Husserl's early theory of intentionality took from Brentano's the idea of "directedness toward an object." For him, the acts thus directed were called "intentions" and referred to intentional "objects," i.e., objects that were the targets of intentions. The term "intentionality" so used stood for the relational property of having an intention, or being aimed at it. Husserl was concerned with the investigation of intentional acts, not with distinguishing all psychic phenomena.25

Husserl went on to add more to the theory:

A) Intention "objectivates": This means that intention refers data of the stream of consciousness to the "intentional objects." The intentional objects are given "through" such data, originally called sense data, later hyletic data. Sartre in his book, Imagination, and, later, in his book Transcendence of the Ego, objects to this hyletic data, especially when used in terms of "constitution," because it makes consciousness "opaque" by the addition of an uncalled for mediation between consciousness and its object.26
B) Intention identifies: Intentions allow us to assign a variety of successive data to the same referents or "poles" of meaning. Without such identifying functions there would be nothing but a stream of perceptions, similar but never the same. Intention gives the synthetic function whereby various aspects, perspectives, and stages of an object are focused upon and integrated into identical unities.

C) Intention connects: "Each aspect of an identical object refers to related aspects which form its horizon, as it were. The frontal aspect of a head refers to the lateral aspects (profiles) and, least definitely, to its rear. It gives rise to legitimate expectations for further experiences. . . ."27 These further experiences may or may not be given. At this point, Husserl makes a distinction between acts of mere intention and acts of intuitive fulfillment. The first are acts which blindly refer to intentional objects when we merely think them but have no clear idea of what they are like. The second are acts which "fill" empty intentions with intuitive content as in perception or imagination. This distinction can be illustrated with the difference between merely thinking of an equilateral triangle and imagining one or seeing one in a book. There are also intentions which "promise" fulfillment. These are intentions or symbols or signs.
D) Intention constitutes: Here, intention actually constitutes the intentional object. The object becomes the achievement of the intentional acts. Hence the intentional object is not a pre-existent referent but something which originates in the act. "Constitution" refers to the dynamic way in which an intentional object is built up over time as opposed to a simply static object with a constitution of its own. There is both "passive" and "active" constitution. Passive constitution relies upon the hyle of pre-given objects and remains within the scope of "realist phenomenology." However, "active constitution" synthesizes its object, such as in the constitution of the Ego. All constitutions, Husserl believed, could ultimately be drawn from the transcendental constitution of the Ego, including time consciousness, alter ego, hyletic unities, etc. This would result in transcendental idealism. And, of course, there were many philosophers who would not accept Husserl's position. They preferred eidetic phenomenology to transcendental ideal phenomenology which seemed to them to be something akin to the psychologism that Husserl railed against so strongly in his early works.

According to Husserl, intentionality has two major phases, the "noetic" and the "noematic." The data of
pure intuition, for example, a tree after the phenomenological reduction has occurred, is the noema or meaning. It has the power to orient consciousness to correlative "inner" phases which are noetic:

Such noetic phases include, for instance, the directing of the glance of the pure Ego upon the object "intended" by it in virtue of its gift of meaning, upon that which "it has in its mind as something meant;" further, the apprehension of this object, the steady grasp of it whilst the glance shifts to other objects which have entered within the circle of "conjecture;" likewise the effects of bringing out, relating, apprehending synoptically, presumption, valuation, and so forth.30

It is because consciousness is intentional that there is the experience of a "world of meaning." This world is "lived" on a preconscious level, and it is not thematized in this "natural standpoint." It is via the reduction that the structures of this world (meanings) and the attendant ways of grasping or "letting be seen" (noetic phases) these meanings can be made the absolute field of investigation. What is revealed is the essential categorical nature of the phenomenon under investigation:

Thus . . . every tone in and for itself has an essential nature, and at the limit the universal meaning-essence "tone in general," or rather the acoustic sound in general. . . . Whatever belongs to the essence of the individual can also belong to another individual, and the broadest general- ities of essential being, of the kind we have been indicating through the help of examples, delimit "regions" or "categories" of individuals.31
As the above quote indicates, Husserl, unlike Heidegger or Sartre, was most concerned with the "reflexive attitude" or the being-of-an-object in consciousness and not the prereflexive (prelogical) Being-in-the-World of consciousness.

As Husserl's comments about tone intimate, phenomenology can be useful for studying art. It is sometimes said that contemporary art is characterized by an effort toward eidetic perception. For instance, Fernand Leger's The City presents properties of the city indistinguishable from those of natural perception; nevertheless, the painter has produced something which the closest sensory scrutiny of a particular city would not be able to bring out. The painter is presenting the city in its universality—abstract but still present in every city. Of course, the artist still relies upon ordinary perception. It is the starting point to grasp the universal and a medium to reproduce it. However, if the sensuous were the only aspect of painting, painting would undoubtedly be replaced by photography. But, our concern here is not with painting or with still photography but with film, and film is not wholly sensuous either. However, I wish to postpone a discussion of the characteristics of film until after
an explanation of Husserl's phenomenological description and some caveats.

Husserl gives a sketchy example of the phenomenological description of a blossoming apple tree. First, one turns his attention to the tree. The phenomenological **epoche** is used to "bracket" the world of the natural standpoint. One now asks what can be discovered, on essential lines, in the necessary connection of noetic experiences of perception and pleasure-valuation. Any objective relation between perception and perceived is suspended. Nevertheless, there is an essential relation between pleasure and what pleases that can be grasped on the basis of the reduced experience. The apple tree as a physical object could now catch fire and burn away, and the inquiry would not be affected. The tree does not forfeit any of the content with which it appeared in perception. One must now ask, "What is the perceived as such? What essential structures of consciousness does it harbor?" At this point, one describes his experience of the tree as fully as possible. The resulting description is then edited to remove anything that has slipped in from outside the **epoche**.

It should be noted that apprehensions of essence and correlatively the object apprehended can be given unclearly. Husserl makes certain comments throughout
Ideas which may serve as caveats. I will list them:

--We must then bring to . . . complete clearness what at any time floats before us shifting and unclear and more or less far removed, intuitionally, so that our intuitions of the essence may be given a corresponding value in which the intended essences and essential relations are given to the fullest possible advantage.35

--Apprehension of the essence has its own grades of clearness . . . but for every essence . . . there exists, so to speak, an absolute nearness, in which its giveness is in respect of this graded series absolute, i.e., pure self-giveness.36

--Our distinctions apply further . . . to intuitions of any and every kind, including empty presentations. This would be especially so if we wished to study the essential nature of emptiness and vagueness themselves.37

--We can always bring the data nearer to us even in the zone of obscure apprehension.38

--What is given to us at the moment has a determinable margin, not yet determinate, and possessing its own way of effecting the transition through a process of "unfolding," of separating out into a series of presentations at first; it may be passing once more into obscurity, then emerging once again in the presentational sphere, until it passes into the brightly sphere, until it passes into the brightly lit circle of perfect presentation.39

--It would be going too far to say that all self-evident apprehension of the essence demands that the subsumed particulars in their concrete fullness should be fully clear. It is quite sufficient when grasping essential color and sound, that the exemplifying instances should show a lower grade of clearness.40
Husserl's phenomenology, as has been noted, is rational and reflexive. He is primarily concerned with the being-of-an-object in consciousness, i.e., the way an object appears *eidetically* via pure intuition as a result of reduction. This limits the usefulness of his method, if used without modification, when one is investigating prerefлексive phenomena. The limit is not that we as investigators will make something irrational into something rational but that we will not even be able to have access to certain phenomena because our field of view is not broad enough. Once any phenomenon has been thematized and viewed phenomenologically, its essential structures can be uncovered; however, at this point, consciousness has turned back upon itself and the phenomenon is not "lived" but "re-lived" or objectified. Once the natural standpoint has been overthrown via the reduction, one has made pure consciousness the absolute field of investigation. This asserts the ontological primacy of consciousness, and once one is operating within the limits of this tacit assertion, nothing outside of it can be thematized. The failure here is to account for the
Being of consciousness itself. In order to thematize this Being, it is necessary to "broaden" the theory of intentionality, and this is exactly what Husserl's followers have done, first and foremost Heidegger and then Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. As Merleau-Ponty says:

Through this broadened notion of intentionality, phenomenological "comprehension" is distinguished from traditional "intellection," which is confined to "true and immutable natures," and so phenomenology can become a phenomenology of origins. Whether we are concerned with a thing perceived, a historical event or doctrine, to "understand" is to take in the total intention—not only what these things are for representation . . . but the unique mode of existing expressed in the properties of the pebble, the glass or the piece of wax, in all the thoughts of a philosopher. It is a matter, in the case of each civilization, of finding the Idea in the Hegelian sense, . . . that formula which sums up some unique manner of behavior toward others, towards Nature, time and death: a certain way of patterning the world which the historian should be capable of seizing upon and making his own. These are the dimensions of history. In this context there is not a human word, not a gesture, even one which is the outcome of habit or absent-mindedness, which has not some meaning.42

Heidegger, in his book *Being and Time*, sets out to investigate Being in general, and he discovers that Being (Consciousness) is always "Being-in-the-World"43 which he calls "Dasein" (being there). That is, Being is always being-in-situation. It is this "situation" or the being-of-consciousness-in-the-world which is lost when one achieves the absolute field of consciousness.
in the manner Husserl prescribes.

When I say that the theory of intentionality is broadened, I do not mean to say that it is changed. Consciousness is still "consciousness of something"; however, the emphasis is less on the "thing" and more on the "of." Consciousness has already become reflexive at the stage of "thing consciousness." At the prior prereflexive stage, consciousness is simply "consciousness of." There is as yet no "thing":

What distinguishes intentionality from the Kantian relation to a possible object is that the unity of the world, before being posited by knowledge in a specific act of identification, is "lived" as ready-made of already there. . . . It is a question of recognizing consciousness itself as a project of the world, meant for a world which it neither embraces nor possesses, but towards which it is perpetually directed . . . .

It is at this prereflexive stage that consciousness merely "exists." For one "living" this stage, there is no eidetic essence, but for us investigators, there are basic structures of Being which can be uncovered:

Heidegger assumes that the intentionality of consciousness is prior to man's emergence as an understanding being and to the emergence of a world-for-man as a system of meanings. Thus intentionality is the key factor which together with nature underlies the essentially human world.

This "human world" is a temporal (historical) one where "existence precedes essence":
Heidegger ... is not conceiving intentional consciousness in terms of a set of static rules and laws fixed once and for always for a recurring universe. He assumes at the start that man is involved within a perpetual self-creative process with respect to the world.48

Heidegger's "hermeneutic" phenomenology takes account of the existential aspect of consciousness. This is of importance in the investigation of film experience because film as a sediment of a conscious being's life has itself a mode of being-in-the-world.

Heidegger arrives at his phenomenological method in a different way than Husserl. He derives his method from a detailed analysis of the etymology of the term "phenomenology." The definition which finally results is: "'Phenomenology' means ... to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself."49 However, Heidegger does follow Husserl in saying that phenomenology does not subscribe to any standpoint or represent any direction; for the expression "phenomenology" signifies primarily a methodological conception. The guiding maxim of phenomenology is the phrase "to the things themselves."50

Heidegger arrives at his definition of phenomenology by an analysis of the terms "phenomenon" and "logos."
The term "phenomenon" goes back to the Greek and signifies "that which shows itself in itself, the manifest." Accordingly, "phenomena" are "entities" or that which can be brought into the light of day. The way an entity shows itself often depends on the kind of access one has to it. It may even show itself as something that it is not. In this instance, the showing of itself is "seeming" or "semblance." The two significations given above are structurally interrelated. Only when the meaning of something is such that it makes a pretension of showing itself or "shows itself off" can it show itself as something it is not. That is, the second signification is founded upon the first.

However, "phenomenon" as "showing itself" or as "seeming" is different from "appearing." Heidegger says, "What appears does not show itself; and anything which thus fails to show itself, is also something which can never seem." Such appearances include indications, presentations, symptoms, and symbols, even though they differ among themselves. Heidegger gives an example of symptoms of a disease which in showing themselves "indicate" something which does not show itself. The goal of phenomenology is to "see things as they show themselves" and not be confused by
"appearances" which are "overlappings" or "layerings" tantamount to compound questions:

"Phenomenon," the showing-itself-in-itself, signifies a distinctive way in which something can be encountered. "Appearance," on the other hand, means a reference-relationship which is in an entity itself, and which is such that what does the referring (or announcing) can fulfill its possible function only if it shows itself in itself and is thus a "phenomenon." What is being said here is that one must proceed one layer at a time in a phenomenological investigation. And, what shows itself in "appearance" as prior to the "phenomenon" and as accompanying it, can be brought to show itself (thematically), and it may itself be a phenomenon.

Heidegger goes on to analyze the Greek term "logos" which he finds to mean "discourse." This "discourse" means the letting be seen of something; namely, what the discourse is about; and it does so for the person doing the talking or for persons who are talking with one another. Concrete discourse, therefore, is speaking and is in each case "an utterance in which something is sighted." The "Being-true" of discourse means that one must let the entities spoken of be seen as unhidden; that is, they must be discovered. The "Being-false" of discourse amounts to a covering up or a "putting something in front of something (in such a way as to
let it be seen) and thereby passing it off as something which it is not."56 Such a layering of meanings is a way of covering things up:

When something no longer takes the form of just letting something be seen, but is always harking back to something else to which it points, so that it lets something be seen as something, it thus acquires a synthesis-structure, and with this it takes over the possibility of covering up.57

Heidegger's phenomenology is then a method of describing entities. This method also presupposes that entities are often hidden and need to be uncovered. Heidegger says that "Covered-up-ness" is the counter-concept to phenomenon. He says that phenomena may be covered in the sense that they are still undiscovered, or they may be buried over. In the latter, they had at one time been discovered but have deteriorated to the point of being again covered.

The meaning of an uncovering by phenomenological description lies in interpretation. This interpretation is "hermeneutic" in that one "works out the conditions" of the possibility of the investigation and analyzes the "existentiality of existence."58 That is to say, one may disclose Being as the transcendens and knowledge of transcendental, Heidegger says, "Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of Being) is veritas transcendentalis."59
Heidegger's "hermeneutic" method is intended to be related to or derived from the Greek verb *hermēneuein* which means "to interpret." This word points back to the wingfooted messenger-god Hermes who is associated with the function of transmuting what is beyond human understanding into a form human intelligence can grasp. According to Richard Palmer, in his book *Hermeneutics*, the mediating and message-bringing process of "coming to understand" is implicit in all of the three basic directions of meaning of *hermēneuein*:

These three directions . . . are (1) to express aloud in words, that is, "to say"; (2) to explain, as in explaining a situation; and (3) to translate, as in the translation of a foreign tongue. All three meanings may be expressed in the English verb "to interpret," yet each constitutes an independent and significant meaning of interpretation.

So, all things considered, Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology is a process of uncovering phenomena (entities) by letting them show themselves from themselves in the very way in which they show themselves from themselves. And, this "showing" results from an interpretive discourse about the phenomenon under investigation which is guided by a "seeing" of that phenomenon.

It must be pointed out that Heidegger's insistence upon "letting the phenomena show themselves" is important.
It is analogous to Husserl's primordial dator intuition, and it is necessary to avoid any misconception of Truth. According to Heidegger, Western man's conception of truth is static. The Greek conception of truth as a disclosure which is constantly emerging and receding from man's grasp has been lost. Instead, truth had become a static presence of ideas which are applied either correctly or incorrectly. Truth is a correctness of perception and assertion, not a living experience but a constant, atemporal presentness. This "correspondence" theory of Truth presupposes an ontology which fails to fully explore the Being of a human being. Heidegger sought to show the inadequacy of Western conceptual thinking by a phenomenological investigation of Being which as a hermeneutic analysis of existence is an analysis of Dasein (being there). For Heidegger, "ontology and phenomenology are not two distinct philosophical disciplines among others. . . . Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, and it takes its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein."

Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology of Dasein reveals the Being of Dasein to be "care." Care is grounded in temporality, and the caring of Dasein for its own temporality gives existence its definitely historical character. As was stated in the introduction to this
work, the purpose of the investigation of film is to "see" if intersubjective communication is possible through film experience. Although Heidegger does not use the term "intersubjective communication," his distinction of authentic and inauthentic ways of being for Dasein establishes a ground for communication in that communication is the basis for a historical world and to have a historical world some individuals must live authentically. That is, one must not run and hide in the "They," dispersing oneself and failing to recover one's heritage. Instead, one must live resolutely taking over one's ownmost possibility:

Once one has grasped the finitude of one's existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one--those of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly--and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its fate. This is how we designate Dasein's primordial historizing, which Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen.

The authentic being of Dasein is a historizing way of being. It is, so to speak, a participation in the movement of history. Therefore, the investigation of film as a possible intersubjective experience is an investigation of film as "historical," not in a factual sense but in terms of being an authentic moment in the unfolding of Consciousness to itself. In order to investigate the possibility of film as historical, it was necessary
to make use of Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology as well as Husserl's eidetic phenomenology.

For the following investigation of film experience, I have begun by using Husserl's eidetic phenomenology as explained above. The purpose was to discover the essential structures of film in the field of pure consciousness. When the limit of this method began to show itself, i.e., when the being conscious of film began to give way to the being-in-the-world of film, I recontextualized the investigation. This recontextualization was accomplished by "piercing" the phenomenological reduction and undertaking a hermeneutical analysis of the existentiality of film. This analysis was more similar to the work of Heidegger or Hegel than to Husserl. This recontextualization was not necessary until I investigated the author and his audience as essential structures of film art. In this portion of the investigation, the possibility of the author's historizing himself by film work became an issue. The question then arose, is it possible for the film author to mediate the world and his unique, expressed world using film as a sediment?
3.0 Review of the Major Approaches to Film Theory:

Generally, film theories are categorized as either Realist or Formalist. Simply speaking, the Realists say that the dominant characteristic of film is that it copies reality by virtue of the film image, and it is this capturing of reality which is at the root of any film art. On the other hand, the Formalists say that film can be art only in that it cannot be a perfect copy of reality. Formalists say that the technical limitations of the medium are the bases for its ability to be art.

It has always been a difficult task for film theory teachers to reconcile these two approaches, and, often, students are simply told that it is a matter of preference as to which theoretical approach to believe or to use. Also, film theory teachers often differ on whether to classify Montage as a Formalist theory or whether to treat it as an independent approach. Some even consider it a type of Structuralism because like Structuralism it is concerned with the "linguistic" characteristics of film.

I prefer to classify the various theoretical approaches to film on the bases of their philosophical underpinnings, and, also, on the bases of the essential strata of film which they most explicate. At this
point, it is inappropriate and difficult to discuss the essential strata of film since it is part of the purpose of the study to uncover and describe these structures. However, it is appropriate and important to point out that another part of the purpose of the study is to provide a fundamental description of the phenomenon of film. A phenomenological investigation, of necessity, is an ontological investigation. As such, a phenomenological investigation should subsume other, previous investigations. Of course, the other investigations are not made obsolete. They are simply put into a larger context, and they take on a different significance. In the case of film theory, each of the major approaches seems to address itself to one portion of the film phenomenon which later in this investigation was identified as an essential stratum of film art.

Nevertheless, on the bases of their philosophical underpinnings, it is possible to identify four major approaches to film theorizing not including Phenomenology: Structuralism, Montage, Realism, and Formalism. I have identified these approaches with their most notable proponents, and I have pointed out their philosophical underpinnings in summarizing the approaches. I also indicate which of the essential strata of film a particular theoretical approach most explicates.
Structuralism is a method of research which was begun in Europe. It was intended to bring the rigor of the scientific method into the social sciences. Many of the statistical, mathematical, and "model-building" research methods used today by Americans in the social sciences have their roots in European structural theory. In Europe, the structural method became very popular in the field of linguistics, and it is this "linguistic Structuralism" that has been most frequently applied to the study of film. The people most associated with structural theories of film are the Frenchmen Christian Metz, Roland Barthes, and Jean Mitry; however, some Prague School Structuralists, such as, Roman Jackobson, Jan Mukařovský, and Jiří Veltrusky have also written about film. A brief description of Barthes' and Metz's linguistic approaches serves as an introduction to some concepts and terminology from which in later portions of this paper I found it expedient to borrow.

However, before describing the structural approach to film, let me outline some of the underlying principles of Structuralism which have been recorded by the French anthropologist, Claude Levi-Strauss:
1) Structural linguistics shifts from the study of conscious linguistic phenomena to the study of their unconscious infrastructure.

2) Structuralism does not treat terms as independent entities, taking instead as its basis of analysis the relations between terms.

3) Structuralism introduces the concept of system.

4) Structural linguistics aims at discovering general laws, either by induction or by logical deduction, which give said laws absolute character.

The linguistic theories and terminology which, over time, meshed with the structural approach to research came mainly from the Swiss linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure. He taught at the University of Geneva from 1891 until 1911, and he only wrote about 600 pages during his career, but he was very influential. His proposal for a new science, Semiology, was the impetus for structural linguistic methods being applied to the study of non-linguistic sign systems such as cinema.

De Saussure said of sign systems and his new science:

"Language is a system of signs that express ideas, and is therefore comparable to a system of writing, the alphabet of deaf-mutes, symbolic rites, polite formulas, military signals, etc. But it is the most important of these systems.

A science that studies the life of signs within society is conceivable; it would be a part of social psychology and consequently of general psychology; I shall call it Semiology (from the Greek semeion "sign")."
An innovative and important idea of de Saussure's which is now considered basic to structural linguistics and Semiology is the notion of the double articulation of signs:

Let us first recall two principles that dominate the whole issue: (1) The linguistic entity exists only through the associating of the signifier with the signified [emphasis added] . . . (2) The linguistic entity is not accurately defined until it is delimited, i.e., separated from everything that surrounds it on the phonic chain.69

Each linguistic term is a member, an articulus in which an idea is fixed in a sound and a sound becomes the sign of an idea.

Language can also be compared with a sheet of paper: thought is the front and the sound the back; one cannot cut the front without cutting the back at the same time. . . .70

But the bond between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary.71

Now that I have set out some of the basics of structuralism, I move to a consideration of Roland Barthes' structural theory of the photographic image. Barthes says that the photographic image is not reality but a perfect analogue, and it is this analogical perfection which, to common sense, defines a photograph. He says that the special status of a photograph is that it is a message without a code. That is, it is a continuous (unarticulated) message. In addition to the analogical or denotative meaning of a photograph,
there is a supplementary message or second, coded meaning sometimes also called style, treatment, or convention. So, the denotative meaning of a photograph is the analogical meaning, and the connotative meaning is the coded meaning.72

The photographic paradox, according to Barthes, is the co-existence of two messages, the one without a code (analogical) and the one with a code (connotation). He says that since every sign supposes a code, it is this coded message that a structural theorist should decipher. He goes on to make a distinction between "pure connotation" and "concealed connotation." The former includes photogenia, aestheticism, and syntax. The latter includes pose, special effects, and objects.73 Let me summarize these forms of connotation because it is from such connotation that the possibility of photographic art arises, according to Barthes:

Trick effects--they intervene without warning in the plane of denotation; they utilize the special credibility of the photograph--the exceptional power of denoting. . . . Naturally, signification is only possible to the extent that there is a body of signs, the beginnings of a code. The connoted meanings are often cultural-historical in origin.

Pose--A "historical grammar" of iconographic connotation ought to be taken from painting, theater, associations of ideas, stock metaphors, etc. . . . This "grammar" would allow us to see the meanings that have become associated with various poses and compositions.
Objects—The posing of objects points to meanings associated with objects themselves (e.g. a bookcase = intellectual) . . . . Such objects constitute fine elements of signification: on the one hand they are discontinuous and complete in themselves, a physical qualification of a sign, while on the other they refer to clear, familiar signifieds.

Photogenia—Here, the connoted message is the image itself, "embellished" by techniques of exposure, development, and printing.

Aestheticism—signs within the photographic work or in the way it is presented point back to the work itself and say, in effect, "Look, this is art!"

Syntax—This occurs when several images are put together to form a sequence, as in illustrated magazines or comic strips or films. The signifier of connotation is no longer found in any of the elements in the individual photos, but in the whole chain.74

It is with the connotative meaning which arises from syntax that the film theories of Christian Metz and Sergei Eisenstein are most concerned. I will postpone discussing Eisenstein's theory until later since it is based upon dialectic logic. Christian Metz's theory of film is based upon the linguistic theories of such people as Ferdinand de Saussure, Louis Hjelmslev, and Roman Jackobson. Metz explains the denotation of film in much the same way as Barthes does, and he notes that the film image-sign is always motivated as opposed to the word sign which is arbitrary.75
What this means is that the signifier of a film image-sign looks like and is therefore closely related to the signified. On the other hand, the signifier for a word sign (the graphic symbol) is not at all related to the signified. However, Metz is not greatly concerned with individual images.

Instead, he is concerned with describing a syntax of the cinema on a syntactical and not a morphological basis. Syntagmatic relations are those which exist among actual elements of a statement. Metz identifies eight main syntagmatic types which are used in filmmaking. His explanation of these types is long and technical and requires a foreknowledge of the terms and principles of structural linguistics to be understood. Therefore, I refer the interested reader to Chapter 6 of Metz's book *Film Language*. Even though technical, Metz offers a very good description of the syntasmatic categories in which film art appears. The only limits to the theory derive from the limits of the structural method in accessing the fundamental significations of human reality.

The methods of Structuralism and Phenomenology, especially eidetic phenomenology, have in common the goal of uncovering the basic elements of a phenomenon and the structural relations between these elements.
However, Structuralism is an "objective" method. It requires no reduction and no attempt to arrive at the essence of the object under investigation. The result is that certain "deep" significations cannot become thematic for the gaze of the structuralist. In order to pursue his investigations of structure to the source of structure, i.e., absolute consciousness, the structuralist must become a phenomenologist. For cinema, the structuralist does a good job of analyzing the coded meanings, the syntax, and the spatial and temporal relations among them. However, the author is not considered essential to the work, and the audience is recognized only as the source of a collective consciousness in which significations correspond to those in a film. A work of art is an autonomous whole:

A work of art is not identifiable, as psychological aesthetics would like to think it is, with the state of mind and spirit of its creator or with any of the possible states of mind and spirit induced in its perceiver. . . .78

According to this quotation from "Art as Semiotic Fact" by Jan Mukařovský, the work of art is without essential relation to an author or an audience. Thus, the communicative function of art is lost from sight for the structuralist.
Another major approach to film analysis, Montage, was most propounded by the well-known Russian film director and film theoretician, Sergei Eisenstein (1898-1948). Eisenstein said, "Art is always conflict because it is art's task to make manifest the contradictions of Being." According to Eisenstein, this is true because the nature of art is to be a conflict between natural existence and purposeful initiative. He said that the limit of organic form is Nature, and the limit of rational form is Industry. From such language, it can be seen that Eisenstein strives to keep his theory of art and film in line with Marxian dialectic theory such as that put forth in Fredrick Engels' book *Dialectics and Nature*. As was mentioned above, Eisenstein's theory deals largely with the syntactic nature of film. That is, Eisenstein is mainly concerned with the effects of film editing. The juxtaposition of strips of film of varying lengths and contents, when these strips are projected at approximately 24 frames per second, creates a new and different meaning from that of the strips of film considered individually.

The theory and practice of editing film to produce this synthetic effect is known as "Russian Montage." Although Eisenstein is the best known writer on Russian Montage, he is not the only one. Actually, much
innovative work was done by Eisenstein's teacher Lev Kuleshov. Among the other students of Kuleshov are many famous Russian film directors and film theoreticians, viz., Pudovkin, Barnet, Kalotozov, Parajanov, and Vertov. Kuleshov is famous for having conducted film experiments whereby pieces of film with different contents were spliced together to create "artificial landscapes" and other such effects, now commonplace, then called Kuleshov effects. In the most famous of these experiments, Kuleshov inter-cut one long take of an actor's expressionlessly neutral face together with a bowl of steaming soup, a woman in a coffin, and a child playing with a toy bear. The audience which saw this film projected marveled at the sensitivity of the actor's range.80

Kuleshov was also the first film theorist to speak of the shot as a "shot-sign" and the sequence as like a sentence.81 Eisenstein agreed with Kuleshov that the shot and montage were basic to film art, but he disagreed with Kuleshov's statement that film is built "brick by brick."82 Instead, Eisenstein claimed:

For, in fact, each sequential element is perceived not next to the other, but on top of the other. For the idea (or sensation) of movement arises from the process of superimposing on the retained impression of the object's first position, a newly visible further position of the object.
This is, by the way, the reason for the phenomenon of spatial depth, in the optical superimposition of two planes in stereoscopy. From the superimposition of two elements of the same dimension always arises a new, higher dimension.\textsuperscript{83}

Eisenstein identified and described many types of montage, both within a single image and between edited images. He said that there were five categories of montage: metric, rhythmic, tonal, overall, and intellectual. A brief summary of them follows:

Metric—results from the "absolute lengths of the pieces of film" and the formula-scheme in which they are arranged, a formula like that used in poetry or music. Tension is achieved by shortening the pieces of film while maintaining the original proportions of the formula.

Rhythmic—results when the "lengths of the pieces and the content are given equal consideration." The mathematical formula must yield to the structure of the sequence. Tension is created by violating the formula with "more intense pieces of film in an easily distinguished tempo."

Tonal—is based on the "characteristic emotional sound of the piece" as determined primarily by the lighting, whether the light is a high or low key effect.

Overall—is the "furthest development of tonal montage." It is the conflict between the principle tone and the overtone. It is probably best described as the tone of the entire work.\textsuperscript{84}

Intellectual—is a montage of overtones and emotional sounds of an intellectual sort.
"The gradational quality is here determined by the fact that there is no difference in principle between the motion of a man rocking under the influence of elementary metric montage and the intellectual process within it."85

Eisenstein also identified ten types of montage characteristic of conflict within a shot. This type of montage he called montage of attractions: Graphic, planes, volumes, spatial, light, tempo, montage between matter and viewpoint (camera angle), montage between matter and spatial nature (optical distortion), montage between event and temporal nature (slow and fast motion), and conflict between optical complex and a whole other sphere (sound film).86 These types of montage are easy to understand, and I will not explain them further. However, I do wish to further explain the dialectics of Montage.

Russian Montage is dialectic in that the thesis presented by one piece of film collides with the antithesis presented by the piece of film to which it is juxtaposed. When projected, the result is a synthesis at a new, higher plane of meaning. This dialectic movement as explained by Hegel or his successor Marx is a process in which a starting point is negated--by an act of consciousness for Hegel and by a physical act for Marx--thereby setting up a second position
opposed to it. This second position is in turn negated, i.e., the negation of the negation, so as to reach a third position which is a synthesis of the two preceding in which both are transcended. The thesis and the antithesis are both abolished and at the same time preserved on a higher level. This third phase then figures in turn as the first step in a new dialectical process, leading to a new synthesis and so on.

Realists criticize Montage theory for neglecting the image characteristic of film, i.e., the copying of reality. And, even Metz said, "Eisenstein categorically refused to admit any kind of descriptive realism into the cinema. He would not accept that one could film a scene continuously, and he was full of scorn for what he called . . . "naturalism."87 And, it is true that Montage theory, despite its link with Hegelian logic, never paid much attention to the diachronic. This, no doubt, is due to the materialism of Marx's theories to which Eisenstein's theories are more directly linked than to Hegel's theories. The diachronic or vertical dimension to meaning which is always historical in the sense that it accumulates is largely ignored by Montage theory. Montage addresses itself mainly to the synchronic and seeks to show that film operates by an almost mathematically created structure of collisions.
The meanings created are so calculable that the spectator is forced to experience what the director wants him to experience. The story of a film as an extension of the author or as an inherent structure of film is ignored. For to take into account the story, one is forced to take into account "deep structures" which cannot be explained with the same mechanical precision as purely syntactic juxtaposition of pieces of film.

The story of a film is told in the "flow" of images and in the higher level, multiple spatial and temporal structures of the stratum of represented objects. And, as the Hungarian film theoretician Bela Belazs noted, this requires connections to be discovered by the spectator of the film. Such "connections" are explained later in this study as an intentional relation between the author of the filmic work and his audience. Montage theory fails to account for this connection or for the story layer of film which is its ground.

Christian Metz has noted and critcized this shortcoming of Montage theory. In his semiotic theory, he derives his "Syntagmatic Category of the Image Track" from both signifiers (image signs and their combinations) and signifed (story).
In addition to criticisms of Montage levelled by Realists and Structuralists, some Phenomenologists have also criticized Montage. Henri Agel, a French phenomenologist, in his book, Poétique du Cinéma, says that Eisenstein's Montage represents an analytic, violent approach to life and has created violent norms so that today audiences demand violent content in films as well as violent form.\(^{90}\)

The third major approach to film theorizing is the Realist approach of which the theory of Sigfried Kracauer is an example. Kracauer states as his basic aesthetic principle that "the achievements within a particular medium are all the more satisfying aesthetically if they build from the specific properties of that medium."\(^{91}\) The properties of the film medium, according to Kracauer, are derived from the power of the photographic image to copy material reality, and, he says, "Films come into their own when they record and reveal physical reality."\(^ {92}\) Like another well-known Realist, Andre Bazin, Kracauer rejects the mind control principles of Montage logic, and, instead, concentrates on the ability of the photographic image to provide the spectator with rich, specific, and uncontrolled sensations. Kracauer does not deny the
existence of manipulatory camera and editing techniques, but insists that they are not the basis for the aesthetics of the cinema.93

Kracauer says that film is an extension of photographs, and the properties of these media he calls "affinities" and "appeals." Let me give a brief summary of them—first, the affinities:

**Unstaged Reality**—this is "nature in the raw" as it exists independently of us. It is particularly unstaged if it manifests itself in "ephemeral configurations" which only the camera can capture.94

**Random Events**—photographs must retain an accidental character—as if they were "plucked en route and still quivered with crude existence."95

**Endlessness**—this refers to a photograph's representation of "fragments" and not "wholes." And to the fact that a photo has a frame which is only a "provisional limit" to the contents outside the frame.96

**Indeterminacy**—photographs transmit raw material without defining it.97

Appeals:

**Authenticity**—photographs have an unquestioned documentary function. They are a record of reality.

**Beauty**—photographs stand a chance of being beautiful to the extent to which they comply with the photographic approach—that is, to the extent to which they are realistic.

**Exploration**—photographs fulfill the desire for knowledge; they penetrate the "unknown celestial spaces and recesses of matter."98
Kracauer's theory, as well as most other Realists' theories, is rather simplistic and does not account for the image as a sign or for the higher level "linguistic" meanings of film. The question raised by Realist theories is why is it necessary to funnel "reality" through a medium if it is art just as it is? Also, Realist theories do not account for the work of the author of art or his audience.

The last major approach to film theorizing is the Formalist approach, and the work of Rudolf Arnheim is a good example of it. Arnheim was a student of Max Wertheimer and Wolfgang Kohler, two early gestalt psychologists, and Arnheim considered himself to lean toward Kantian interpretations of what he called "new doctrines." According to Arnheim:

... even the most elementary processes of vision do not produce mechanical recordings of the outer world but organize the sensory raw material creatively according to principles of simplicity, regularity, and balance, which govern the receptor mechanism.

This discovery of the gestalt school fitted the notion that the work of art, too, is not simply an imitation or selective duplication of reality but a translation of observed characteristics into the forms of a given medium.

I undertook to show in detail how the very properties that make photography and film fall short of perfect reproduction can act as the necessary molds of an artistic medium.99
Arnheim contrasts what he calls the basic elements of the film medium with the corresponding characteristics of objective reality. One can see the Kantian influence in Arnheim's theory which, not incorrectly, finds in film certain characteristic formal categories through which film reality is apprehended. Let me summarize these categories:

The Projection of Solids Upon a Plane Surface—the reproduction on film of even a simple object can be done well or badly. Unlike real life, the aspect chosen for presenting an object [say a cube] must be one that gives the characteristics of the object [high and angled camera position for a cube to show at least three sides].

Reduction of Depth—film presents objects in two-dimensions on a flat surface; stereoscopic vision is undone. There is no "constancy of form" in film; a table very near the camera looks very wide at the front and very narrow at the back.

Lighting and the Absence of Color—lighting in film is quite different from ordinary lighting; light is used to create a background for objects. [Arnheim wrote his theory before sound and color film].

Delimitation of the Image and Distance from the Object—in real life our field of vision is unlimited because we can move our eyes and heads. In film it is limited. There is a relationship between the size of the object photographed and the size of the subsequent projection. In other words, there is an "optimum relation between the size of the projected picture and the distance from which it is viewed."
Absence of the Space-Time Continuum—in real life, experience is enacted for everyone in an uninterrupted space and time continuum. There are no jerks or breaks. This is not so in film where editing allows for rapid changes in space and time. Also, the spectator is identified with the camera so when its position changes so does the spectator's.104

Absence of the Nonvisual World of the Senses—in film viewing, the spectator is limited to the use of only his sight. Hence, he can easily be fooled by distorted or odd angled images because he cannot rely upon his other senses to correct what his vision cannot.105

Arnheim wrote his theory of film in the early 1930's in Germany. His idea that the technical limitations of the medium allow for its artistic potential caused him to oppose sound and color film. He thought, and apparently still does, since he claims to have said all he cares to about film, that cinema reached its artistic peak during the silent era (before 1927). As a result, his theories are not well accepted by most young American film students. They object to such Arnheim statements as:

Among the strivings that make human beings create faithful images is the primitive desire to get material objects into one's power by creating them afresh. . . . Apart from rare exceptions, only our modern age has succeeded in approaching this dangerous goal.106

Color invaded the graphic arts as an increased attraction for the eye. Uncivilized man is not as a rule satisfied with black-and-white. Children, peasants and primitive peoples demand the highest degree of bring coloring. It is the primitives of the great cities who congregate before the film screen.107
On the whole, Arnheim's theory is a useful one, but he concentrates so much on how art must differ from ordinary reality that one is left to believe that art is completely formal. One would be hard pressed to find a place for the image or story in Arnheim's theory. It seems, by his standards, the best art would be the least like ordinary reality; it would be a highly controlled absence. This reminds me of what Sartre says of the poet's attitude toward words, "... he considers words as a trap to catch a fleeing reality rather than as indicators which throw him out into the midst of things."\(^{108}\) It seems by analogy that Arnheim's theory takes one too far toward poetry and too far away from the film as concrete image. Certainly, film is no simple copy of material reality, but the "completeness" of the aesthetic object which film provides is essential to it. Arnheim goes against his own maxim of "observing the characteristics of the medium" when he requires that to be art film must say less and not more.\(^{109}\)

Actually, though, Arnheim's violation of his maxim is not too severe. He does observe the characteristics of the medium of film, but he observes mainly one level of film reality—the stratum of visual aspects. This stratum is described in Section 12.5 of the eidetic portion of the investigation.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER I


3. Ibid., p. 176.


7. Ibid., p. 154.

8. Husserl, Crisis, pp. 154-155

9. Ibid., p. 166.

10. Ibid., p. 181.

11. Ibid., p. 181.


14 Ibid., p. 50.

15 Ibid., pp. 107-108.


18 Husserl, Ideas, p. 55.

19 Ibid., p. 53.

20 Ibid., p. 92

21 Ibid., p. 110.

22 Ibid., p. 113.

23 Ibid., p. 257.


25 Ibid., 1:108.


28 Husserl, Meditation, pp. 62-66.

29 Spiegelberg, Movement, 1:146-149.

30 Husserl, Ideas, p. 257.
Ibid., pp. 53-54.

Tymieniecka, Phenomenology, p. 9.

Husserl, Ideas, p. 260.

Ibid., p. 193

Ibid., p. 194

Ibid., p. 194.

Ibid., p. 195.

Ibid., p. 197.

Ibid., p. 197.

Ibid., p. 198.

Ibid., p. 199.


Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 78.

Merleau-Ponty, Perception, p. xvii.

Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 67.

Tymieniecka, Phenomenology, p. 119.


Tymieniecka, Phenomenology, p. 119.

50 Ibid., p. 50.

51 Ibid., p. 51.

52 Ibid., p. 52.

53 Ibid., p. 54.

54 Ibid., p. 55.

55 Ibid., p. 56.

56 Ibid., p. 57.

57 Ibid., p. 57.

58 Ibid., p. 62.

59 Ibid., p. 62.


61 Ibid., pp. 13-14.

62 Ibid., p. 143.


64 Ibid., p. 434.

65 Ibid., p. 435.


69. Ibid., pp. 102-103.

70. Ibid., p. 113.

71. Ibid., p. 71.


73. Ibid., p. 19.

74. Ibid., pp. 21-24.

75. Metz, *Film Language*, p. 108.

76. Ibid., p. 67.

77. Ibid., p. x.


81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

83. Eisenstein, *Film Form*, pp. 49-50.
84 Ibid., pp. 72-84.
85 Ibid., p. 82
86 Ibid., p. 54.
87 Metz, Film Language, p. 33.
89 Metz, Film Language, p. 145.
92 Ibid., p. ix.
93 Ibid., p. 84.
94 Ibid., p. 18.
95 Ibid., p. 19.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid., p. 20.
98 Ibid., pp. 21-22.
99 Rudolf Arnheim, Film as Art (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957), p. 3.
100 Ibid., pp. 9-11.
101 Ibid., pp. 13-14.
102 Ibid., pp. 15-16.

103 Ibid., pp. 16-29.

104 Ibid., pp. 30-34.

105 Ibid., pp. 31-34.

106 Ibid., p. 157.

107 Ibid., p. 159


109 Arnheim, Film as Art, p. 2.
4.0 Delimitations:

Provisionally, I wished to limit the range of objects to be investigated. If it becomes necessary to change these limits in the course of the investigation, I would not hesitate to do so. I was primarily concerned with the mode of being of the filmic work of art. Even though an eidetic investigation aims at discovering the essential structures of the object under investigation, the structures common to all filmic works in this case, I limited my investigation to those works considered major. Although it is beyond the scope of this work to develop a rationale for it, I assumed, as does Mikel Dufrenne in his book *The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience* that only in light of an idea of an authentic work of art can there be any consideration of inferior grades. I also limited discussion to narrative films. Certainly, there are some portions of the investigation which will apply to the documentary or the experimental film as well as to the narrative film, but a detailed
consideration of such types of film would unduly protract the work and confuse the reader.

The investigation was of the mode of being of narrative film art; however, the investigation was not concerned directly with developing criteria of art or outlining aesthetic values. The investigation began from the point of view of the spectator, but it was not overly concerned with the perception of film art, beyond the fact that it must be perceived. Nor was the investigation concerned with the psychology of the artist, performer, or spectator. The investigation focused on the aesthetic object of narrative film art.

Also, there was no attempt to systematically investigate sound in film; however, the sound dimension in modern film is very important, and it was not altogether ignored.

A prolegomenon such as this study is not intended to be the final and most complete consideration of a subject. This work is intended to be a foundation upon which others can build. Areas of concern in film study which I have delimited for purposes of this work or areas which have been only marginally discussed are certainly not foreclosed from further investigation.
5.0 The Filmic Work of Art and the Aesthetic Object of Film:

It would seem at first glance that the work of art is something real and the aesthetic object something ideal. In this way, the work of art would be a thing and the aesthetic object a representation or signification in consciousness. However, phenomenologically, nothing enjoys an existence which is free from being present in consciousness. The work of art, though, is such that it may be seen as a thing, or, if aesthetically perceived, the aesthetic object can arise from it. This aesthetic perception is an "openness" to the work of art such that all it signifies, all its strata, present themselves. A film may be just a long strip of spooled acetate for the classroom projectionist, but for the teacher and the students, it is an aesthetic object. As I have previously said, I did not intend to investigate perception as such, but it is vital to recognize the importance of perception in the coming into being of the aesthetic object. Whether film is seen as a work of art (material thing) or an aesthetic object depends upon the perception of the viewer. Above all, the work demands an adequate perception for the aesthetic object to arise. If the viewer is more
interested in the girl sitting next to him, if the screen is poorly illuminated, or if the viewer is simply not equal to the work in an intellectual sense, perception will fail to bring out the aesthetic object.

The mode of perception needed to bring out the aesthetic object is what transforms the empirical into the sensuous. The sensuous is the immanent; it is presence. It is the base upon which rests the stratified meanings of the aesthetic object. It is what anchors the aesthetic object in the here and now, and it is only a matter of a shift of attention (noesis) which transforms it into the material of the work of art.¹ The idea of the work of art is thoroughly enmeshed in the sensuous just as the Hegelian idea is enmeshed in the world and in world history. The signs (material) of the work of art always await perception to transform them into the aesthetic object which is a meaningful structure.

Although it is not of major importance, it is still worth noting that the work of art of film is not even a simple material thing as it is for sculpture or painting. There is, in addition to the film base itself, the light image. Certainly it is easy to understand the long strip of acetate with its various coatings as the work of
art, but without being projected as a light image, it is incomplete. Note that the strip of acetate is specially arranged, i.e., it is edited, and this is most apparent when the film is projected. But even when light is being passed through film running at twenty-four (24) frames per second, one can still see only a material thing instead of an aesthetic object. This could happen, for example, if one attended to the light scientifically, seeing only colored particles reflected from a screen.
6.0 Film Art and its Performance:

Just as for Hegel the Idea passed through Nature in order to be realized, often the aesthetic object must be "concretized" to be made manifest.\(^2\) This "concretization" may be done by the spectator himself, as in the case of reading a novel where the reader produces the work in his imagination as he reads. Or, the concretization may be done for the spectator by actors, set designers, and directors as is the case for theater and film. For our purposes, the concretization of the work is different than the embodiment of the work by the author. The two are similar, but the latter is the author's making a sediment of his life experiences in a sign system. The former is a perception and interpretation of the author's sediment by intermediaries between the author and the spectator, or by the spectator himself. Note that film, painting, and sculpture are distinguished from such arts as writing and theater by their having only one concretization. A theatrical work, for example, is concretized every time it is performed. However, a film work is concretized only once. Of course, each scene may be performed many times, but only one master film negative is produced. This master negative is the work's only concretization.
The performance of the work of art gives it a sensuousness which is its base. This production value or bodily quality of the work must come from man as do sounds from a musician, or, more directly as with an actor's pantomime. In cinema, both instances are needed. The cinematographer uses his equipment like a musician uses his instrument, and the actor gives bodily life to the work. The performance of the work reveals its being by helping complete it, and one can have only an inadequate idea of the work otherwise. The performer as concretizer of the work is an essential link, in some arts such as cinema, between the author and the audience. The performer must be faithful to the work of the author in order to reveal it for what it is. The key to the performer's being able to do this is his attunement to intersubjective communication or his subordination to one who has such attunement.

In cinema, there are many performers. The most notable performers are the actors and actresses, but sometimes others such as the cinematographer may function as a performer. For example, when the cinematographer is charged with providing "aspects" of the natural objects in front of his lens which will allow those objects to be seen in the ways the work demands, he is more than just a technician.
Let us, for example, take a cinematographer who is charged with filming a great beauty, let us say, the woman who embodies the very essence of beauty for her era. This cinematographer must choose the lighting, camera angle, film stock, exposure, lens, and camera movement which will allow the essential beauty of the woman to be seen on the final projected image.

Of course, it must be mentioned that the director usually makes many or all of the above choices, and if he does so, the cinematographer cannot rightly be called a performer. This invites the question of just what the director does, and, also, whether he is the author of the filmic work of art or just another performer. I discuss the role of the director in Section 7.0 of the work, but, for the moment, let us say he is the creator of the work, and the aesthetic object resides within him. However, in film, more than most other media, the director-author may relinquish his privileged position to the cinematographer, actor, scenarist, or editor. Or, these people as individuals may take over the role of creator for one or more scenes in the work. Generally, though, the director, as the ultimate authority in the making of the film, allows these "take overs" to occur only as long as they are in line with his conception of the film. He, therefore, remains ultimate creator of the work.
The film actor, however, must be submissive to the work. He must strive to give the work a suitable concertization. The unique role of the film actor, as compared to the stage actor, comes from the film actor's dual significance in film. The film actor gives the work a bodily presence, a making of the general into the specific. But, he also ascends to the general by being transformed into an image which is seen by the entire audience of the work. The film actor becomes in the public consciousness the role he plays. This is why a film actor may become a star overnight.

The performance of the actor, and, indeed, all those who play a role in film production, is crucial because there is no representation or reconcretization of the work. The performance must be adequate to the aesthetic object, or the work as a whole will fail. Of course, some precaution is taken to insure an adequate performance by shooting many "takes" of each scene of the film and then selecting the best one for the final print. In all events though, the work of the film's performers, especially the actors' since it is most visible to the masses, is crucial to the film. Their work achieves a degree of universality in and of itself.
7.0 The Director:

As was said above, the director is usually the creator or author of the filmic work of art. However, since many people collaborate in making film, the argument is often made that film authorship is collective. This seems to be a valid point when one takes into account the roles of the cinematographer, actors, editor, writer, producer, and, in some cases, film boards, film companies, and advisory committees. If, however, one says that film authorship is collective and follows this statement through to its logical conclusion, it stretches so far as to become completely meaningless. And, to say that one or more of the above mentioned individuals or groups takes over a portion of the film thereby becoming author of that portion is not entirely true since the director is still responsible for the work as a whole. But, this brings up the necessity for film of distinguishing between the origination of a part and the authorship of the whole.

The point must be granted though that, in many cases, directors are not really authors but only directors of shooting who work according to tried and proven norms: they are only interested in telling a story, a joke, or arousing an emotion, and many of them cannot even do these things well. For the case where the director works by norms, some authorities say that it is the
script writer who is the author of the film. In this case, the director, like a stage director, simply provides interpretation and staging:

Qui donc alors est l'auteur, le créateur essential? La réponse est assez simple: c'est, du scénariste, du metteur en scène ou du dialoguiste, celui dont la personnalité l'emporte; celui qui a su imposer le plus sûrement sa volonté créatrice. Souvent c'est le metteur en scène, en cela qu'étant maître de l'œuvre, il reprend ou peut reprendre, recomposer et ramener à sa vision personnelle le travail de tous ses collaborateurs, quels qu'ils soient. Mais s'il n'est qu'un artisan consciencieux, s'il a limite son travail à la parfaite exécution technique du programme qu'on lui a soumis, alors inévitablement, c'est le scénariste qui l'emporte.6

Certainly, I agree with what Jean Mitry says in the above quote. However, as you will recall, we are concerned with recognized, major works of film art, not those intended simply to enhance the prestige and fill the pockets of the makers. In most of these major film works, the director performs many roles: He writes the script, directs the actors and the camera, oversees the sets and costuming, and makes all important editing decisions. Clearly, in such situations, the director is the author of the work. But, also, his role is more than just that of an overseer.

We must think of the author as the person whose intentions the film brings into existence. And, when the
director is not given the aesthetic object in advance, as is the stage director, it is surely he who is the author of the film. Unlike the stage director who has the work given to him, abstract and without a body; the film director-author has nothing pregiven. Instead, he must feel his way through the work, and what he feels is a certitude, an assurance of being equal to a desire within him. This desire springs from the author's "inner core," his unique intentionality, his way of being conscious of the world. It is, in a Sartrean sense, his project or his attempt to attain his full stature as a human being. The work progresses by what one can call an "inner logic" which is the result of a peculiarly aesthetic searching, and of a spiritual maturation.

It can be objected that the artist, in this case the film director, as a man is often unequal or even markedly inferior to his work. One may even be surprised upon meeting him that he has created the work. Therefore, it seems we are not concerned with all the details of the author's existence but with his essential being as expressed in his works. It is sometimes said that the creator only lends himself to the work, that he is possessed by a demon who pushes the work out from inside
the creator's unconscious mind. However, I do not like the implication that the creator is not truly related to his work. A better explanation for his apparent inadequacies is that his work is the very best of him, possibly the very best of the world. As a unique project of the author's being, the work may find no support in the everyday world, and, therefore be impossible for the author to maintain in his everyday life. Possibly at some other point in time, the author could truly live his intentions. But, after all, it has never been the province of artists to live their visions of the world; they are simply the harbingers of worlds. It is the saint whose concern it is to live another world in the world of the present.

The author's outward personality, however, gives a coloration to his inner life, and it is largely responsible for his style of art. But it must not be forgotten that underlying any style there is craft. In the beginning stages, all art is craft, and to the extent that craft is taught, it is anonymous. Artistic creation must combine the tradition of craft with the style and inner direction of the author.

I do not want to become bogged down in intricate theories of style, but some consideration of style is
necessary. As a point of departure, I prefer Roland Barthes' conceptual scheme of "language," "style," and "écriture." In this scheme, both language--which in our case is the stock of filmic conventions--and style are bounded systems, neither giving the author access to a zone of free choice.

A language is therefore a horizon, and style a vertical dimension, which together map out for the writer a Nature, since he does not choose either. The language functions negatively, as the initial limit of the possible, style is a Necessity which binds the writer's humour to his form of expression. In the former, he finds a familiar History, in the latter, a familiar personal past. In both cases he deals with a Nature, that is, a familiar repertory of gestures, a gestuary, as it were, in which the energy expended is purely operative, serving here to enumerate, there to transform, but never to appraise or signify a choice.

So, the author's style results largely from outside influences, such as, his talent, his upbringing, his personal experience, his education, etc. This leads to certain tendencies as regards the means of expression he chooses and even the thematic field he favors. For instance, his technique of handling the actors, the picture, and the sound, and so on may be simply matters of style.

It must be mentioned that since these stylistic elements are for the most part contingent, they may be copied, borrowed, or faked. Or, these stylistic elements may
be over emphasized by the author. In either case, the result is a work which is too personal. The work fails to be a symbol of any deeper meaning, that is, there is a failure to communicate anything essential.

Barthes, however, does not leave the artist in a hopeless, eternal recurrence such that no historical movement can take place and such that entropy gradually wipes out all that is. He proposes a middle term, "ecriture," which is inadequately translated into English as "writing," and it is through this writing—what we might call "filmic seeing" or possibly "film-work"—that the artist has access to what Barthes calls "the dream of History."14

Writing . . . is always rooted in something beyond language, it develops like a seed, not like a line, it manifests an essence and holds the threat of a secret, it is an anti-communication, it is intimidating.15

However, even "writing" can become stylized and solidified into various schools or approaches to writing, i.e., Marxist, Naturalist, Revolutionary. On the whole, Barthes sees language as alienating to the project of the author, but he nevertheless holds that literature hastens towards a "dreamed-of language whose freshness, by a kind of ideal anticipation, might portray the perfection of some new Adamic world where language would no longer be alienated."16
Speaking in terms of phenomenology, instead of the structuralism of Barthes, I would have to say that some part of what is called style originates in the habitualities of the author's ego, not from outside forces. If the reader is interested in pursuing this point, he is directed to Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations*. However, it does not concern me enough to pursue it since what we are concerned with is what Barthes, unfortunately, calls "intimidating anti-communication." Such doleful language is to be expected from a structuralist; no doubt, he laments having no access to the phenomenon. I, on the other hand, while recognizing a certain negative element in it, prefer to follow Husserl and call it intersubjective communication. Any fresh, new languages will have their source in such communication.

However, from time to time, somebody will advance the notion that film communication is this fresh, new beginning to which Barthes makes reference. One could make a case for this only if he considered the popularity of film and television as the proper determiner of it. Film and television are not new languages, even though they use signs which are different than word-signs. And, in many cases, these new media have simply taken over the bad uses to which the old media were put.
Semiologists have studied such bad uses of both image based media and word based media, and they call such uses myth making uses. For both images and words, such myths are created when the first order signification is "robbed" by a second-order signification.

At this point, suffice it to say that both word and image based media are capable of multiple signification. In the creation of myth, the entire first signification becomes the signifier for a new signified. The following diagram taken from Barthes book, Mythologies, helps clarify this:

For film, the naive viewer sees only the first level signifier but with the second level or mythic meaning attached. This is particularly easy for photography or film since the masses believe these media always tell the truth. The masses are not aware of the multiple signifying power of these media. For example, this "myth making" is done in almost every advertising film. Let us say we are seeing an advertising film for a soft drink company, and it shows a group of smiling, happy, people engaged in sporting events and "having a great time" while drinking plenty of the company's products. The producers of the film do not want the audience to see only the first level of signification: well-dressed, smiling, healthy, people enjoying athletic contests. But, instead, the producers want the audience to see this first signification attached to and part of a second meaning: In order to be well-dressed, healthy, happy, and part of the community of athletes (a prestigious community in America today), you must drink X brand cola—"X brand cola makes good times happen."

The ability of film, and various other media, to provide multiple meanings is essential to their structure. However, the higher level meanings which these media can embody may be empty myth or new ideas, ways of seeing, ways of feeling, etc. It is up to the
author of the work to decide how the higher level meaning structure of his chosen medium will be used. I believe it is fair to say that the filmmaker, as much as any other author, is faced with a moral choice. If he uses the capacities of the medium to strive for a higher kind of life, he is an authentic author. Otherwise, he is simply a forger. Of course, I am not proposing that all films be classed as works of art or forgeries. There are many gradations in between these extremes, and a notable one is the "master filmwork" which is able to combine expression and entertainment. Nevertheless, on the whole, filmmakers often neglect the capacities of their medium and their responsibility to the audience. In light of the fact that few people read today unless they must, the filmmaker must do more than simply supply entertainment to the masses. The filmmaker is responsible not to lie to the people, not to give them cheap, inauthentic art. The filmmaker has become an important force in the world by virtue of his mastery over a powerful means of mass communication.
8.0 Film and its Audience:

According to Mikel Dufrenne, "it is through the spectator that the work finds its own full reality," but it is just as true that it is only through the work that the spectator finds his own true reality. The first part of the above statement is obviously true given what has been previously said, i.e., the work must be perceived to come into being as the aesthetic object. In other words, the intentional correlates (noesis) to the sensuous (noematic) layer of the work can arise only in consciousness, and it is consciousness that the audience brings to the work. Naturally, this is not just any type of consciousness but what is called "aesthetic consciousness" which, simply put, means that the spectator expects the work to be complex and to have multiple meanings, some of which are unique, but to yield these meanings to him. These unique meanings are opposed by the "everyday" meanings of things which result in things being practical and having a meaning as "use." For along with such meanings as "use" come attendant meanings such as obstinacy, obtrusiveness, obnoxiousness, and frustration.20

The aesthetic object, on the other hand, is an object which will yield to the spectator's view: it
will unfold. It will reveal itself as non-normative. For the spectator, it will serve as an opening to other worlds, possibly the intersubjective world. In a Hegelian sense, the artwork will allow the spectator to experience consciousness as transcendent. It will allow him, as a member of an intersubjective community, to know himself as general and to rise above the matter-of-factness of his situation. However, it must be noted that for the spectator this elevation is only temporary, for at the end of it he will fall back into his situation. But, the spectator's experience will kindle in him a hope and faith that it is possible to rise above one's immediate situation and soar away to heaven, here on earth.

That which is temporary for the audience may be permanent for the work and its author. The author, through his work, comes to know himself as transcendental consciousness. The meanings he creates become generalized by their communication to the audience. The bigger the audience the better because the aesthetic object gains being from the plurality of interpretations which attach themselves to it. It achieves a certain resolution of its double being, a subjective world of the author is born into the objective world.
An obvious objection to the author coming to know himself as universal transcendental consciousness is that he may be dead. However, the author is never completely dead as long as he has an audience. This is one of the prime reasons he may become universal or one could say immortal. But, if he has no audience, the situation is different. If there is no audience, there is no aesthetic object. However, it only takes one person to bring the aesthetic object into being, and after the work is complete, the author could be his own audience. In this case, or in the case of the work having a very limited audience, the work has not fully entered the world. The author may have set himself apart from others but this may not go much beyond psychological exhibitionism. But, if what the author has achieved subjectively is of sufficient depth—if it is truly a revelation of what is—it will eventually find its way into the world. This is the case because the work of art is aimed directly at being born into the world. However, at times it is too radical, and its audience will not accept it but, instead, keeps it waiting outside on the doorstep like a messenger bearing bad news.

The next step here would be to analyze the life of the aesthetic object, but this will have to wait until after the aesthetic object itself has been analyzed.
9.0 The Double Being of Art:

The aesthetic object appears in the world, but it appears as something not of the world. This double being of the aesthetic object was intimated in the previous section by the discourse on the relation between the artist and his audience. This relation can be said to be essential to all art. It is the relation between universal and specific consciousness or between the world and individual man. It has its foundation in the transformation of the Natural into the Reflexive attitude in the sense that this was discussed in Section 1.0 of this work. There could be no such relation until man became hu-man. The "hu" of the word, of course, has come from the Greek "homo" which generally means "the same." The human, unlike the animal, has given himself the possibility of a "same world" or what Husserl called the "environing world." This presupposes some means of bridging the abyss that separates the individual, existential man from his fellows and the community of men. This bridge is the "sign" which has its feet, so to speak, in the common clay of the material world and its head in the world of pure consciousness. Recognizing this dual structure to the sign, the semioticians, notably de Saussure, have identified as the signifier (material) and the
signified (subjectivity) which together are signification or meaning. The possibility of art is based upon the bridging function of the sign:

The nature of the aesthetic object is such that the signification is immanent in the sign, engaging through it in the world or things. If this signification were strictly intelligible and if the sign were an instrument necessary for it but nevertheless indifferent to it, we could separate sign from signification and banish the signification to another world open to understanding but not to perception, that is, a world of ideal objects.

The sign reveals the world as intentional—an individual consciousness of something—and as intersubjective—a general consciousness of something. Implicit in the structure of the sign, as in the structure of the work of art which is based upon it, is the relation of the author to his audience. However, there is a difference between the aesthetic sign and other signs. Otherwise, we could not distinguish a scientific treatise from a work of art. Since both use signs and both seek to communicate, what is the difference? I believe that this has been clarified as the investigation progressed, but there are certain points which can be made now.

The difference between the two types of sign can be seen by considering the work of art as a whole to be a sign and by considering the object of a scientific
treatise, let us say, a hammer, as a sign. These two objects are both intentional in that both indicate a human source and both bear a relation to the world. However, the hammer, as a sign, points outside itself to its usefulness and its relation to other social structures such as architecture, engineering, building trades, etc. And, nobody cares who the author of the hammer may be or what unique qualities the material of the hammer may have as long as it will suffice to pound nails. On the other hand, the work of art as a sign points back to itself and its author. It serves no practical use but instead serves to give pleasure to the perceiver and to engender in him a certain attitude, not toward things alone, but to all reality. In the Hegelian sense, the work of art more perfectly reveals consciousness as the author of its own reality. In a Sartrean sense, it reveals man as the author of his own world. The double being of art comes from the fact that it stands midway between two worlds. As Dufrenne says:

I have my world in the world, and yet my world is nothing but the world. And it is in the same way that we will be able to speak of a world of the aesthetic object. There is nothing but the world, and yet the aesthetic object is pregnant with a world of its own. Thus one realizes the aesthetic object is not in the natural world as other objects are.
One could say that the aesthetic object mediates between the "real world" and other possible worlds. It is these other possible worlds which the authentic artist opens. Also, the art sign points back to its own sensuousness as the source of its existential power.

The work of art "up roots" or "embodies" material from the Natural world to support its own aesthetic world and in so doing this material is given new meaning by being integrated into a world with different structures than the Natural world. When the artist embodies dead material into the art sign, he indicates or the sign indicates something beyond itself and also provides itself with space and time in which to anchor that which is beyond.

Intuitively, we can see that part of the essence of film art is that it provides itself with a special sign which has a peculiar materiality that allows its higher level structures (Idealities) to be "filled in." Or, we could say that film art is a peculiarly unified structure such that it establishes for itself a generous spatial and temporal being. The special sign of film art is the "moving image-sign," and the ways that it organizes space and time have been investigated, often naively, by many film aestheticians. Jean Mitry's
putatively phenomenological investigation is one of the more interesting because he recognized the double meaning of art, and he tried to relate it to what he believed to be the four essential structures of film. Mitry says the four essential structures of film are (1) the double nature of the image, (2) the double nature of the frame, (3) the phi phenomenon, and (4) the montage effect.27 I do not believe that Mitry's four essences are exhaustive for film art, nor do they account for the stratified structure of the filmic aesthetic object. I have discussed where and how the image and the montage effect fit into the essential structure of film art in Chapter Three of this study. However, I will now discuss the frame and the phi phenomenon. It appears that the frame and the phi phenomenon are essential to film; but, to say that film is framed and that it moves may be tantamount to saying that it has its own spatial and temporal modes of being.
10.0 Space of Film:

First, it must be pointed out once again that the aesthetic object of film is a multi-levelled structure. As a result, there is more than one space of film. However, here, I continue with a discussion of the film frame and the phi phenomenon both of which Jean Mitry considers essential to film. It will be seen, that these two elements of film are essential but only to the stratum of image-meaning and specifically to the moving image-sign. Also, it must be mentioned that at this level a discussion of film space is also a discussion of film time.

It is said that Jean Mitry has risen above the Realist v. Formalist debate in cinema aesthetics by showing that the frame in film operates both centripetally and centrifugally. Andre Bazin, a major Realist theorist, claims that the film screen frame functions centrifugally as opposed to the picture (painting) frame which functions centripetally. According to Basin, the film screen frame indicates that the world portrayed inside the frame continues beyond the borders of the frame. The viewer, therefore, believes that if he could somehow climb through the screen he would be in the portrayed world which would not be bounded by the screen. In short, the screen is a window on the world.
On the other hand, the Formalists, notably Rudolf Arnheim, say that it is the inability of film to depict reality which is responsible for its aesthetic appeal. According to him, the screen works to bound or limit reality, and the manipulation of these bounds is useful in creating film effects.29

Let us do some investigating by beginning with what is. The film image we experience is bounded by a frame or screen. The frame's shape may have some intrinsic meanings. For instance, a screen in the ratio 1 to 1.85 may be more comfortable because it is more horizontal than a screen in the ratio of 1 to 1.33. But, regardless of its proportions, the frame in conjunction with the darkness of the theater in which the film is projected creates a background for the aesthetic object, yet, at the same time foregrounds the aesthetic object.30 This existential structure of film—the frame—is necessary or one would dream the aesthetic object of film instead of perceiving it. The frame "anchors" the image in a space, here, and at the same time "announces" the image as now. Note, that this is why Susan Langer's characterization of film as a dream is not altogether accurate. A dream is not anchored in or announced in the world.31 This existential structure, the frame, allows
a way of experiencing what Heidegger calls "letting-lie-forth."\(^\text{32}\) It is a commandeering of a "putting forth" or representation such that the availability of the representation is assured. The frame "fixes in place" one's access to the represented world of the author by giving it a "standing" in this world.\(^\text{33}\) This is the initial spatialization of the image. We can think of it as preceding any function of the frame as a window; however, once the "standing" of the image is established, other spatial characteristics of a higher order come to the fore and the window is beheld. The frame is the organizing space to the image-signs, and it allows them to be grasped "here and now" as indicators of events and entities not here and now.

The double nature of the frame is analogous to the double being of art. Firmly established structures which can be perceived—signifier and frame—act as the ground for holding certain intentional structures—represented objects—of the author's represented world in the fact-world. That is, there is a double meaning to both the frame and the image-sign. This makes for a tension between the two structures. The frame "fixes in place" a place for something to appear. What appears is the image-sign which strives to establish its own
represented space in terms of the frame. However, as each successive image-sign is mechanically pushed out of the frame, the spatial relation between the frame and the image space must change.

Mitry recognized this peculiar relation between the image and the frame which seems to "push" spatioity—as a form which provides stability and perceptual continuity—to a limit whereby it collapses into temporality. He begins by accepting Bazin's position that in painting there is a closed spatial system, one in which lines of force tend to hold the elements of the work together. However, he goes on to say that film presents an open system of organization because there is always a "double play" between the things represented and the representation. What he is speaking about is the relation between the image and the frame whereby the image is organized relative to the frame but not by the frame. He says:

Ce n'est pas en effet la moindre singularité du fait filmique que, du fait de la reproduction du movement, il s'ensuive une sorte de conflit perpétuel entre le réel enregistré qui "tend" a se dégager du cadre qu'on lui impose et le cadre qui, de son côté, "tend" a le fixer dans une forme stable. Il y a là une sorte d' antagonisme entre la spatialisation formelle de l'image et son movement; entre un espace qui cherche son rythme propre, et la durée dans laquelle il s'infléchit—
This perpetual conflict between the frame and the image and their respective spaces is what, for lack of better language, allows for the breakdown of space into time. This conflict is the ground for the illusion of movement in film which is sometimes called the phi phenomenon.
11.0 Time of Film:

Again, it must be noted that the various strata of film have their own peculiar spatial and temporal characteristics. In the previous section, we were discussing the space and time of the frame and the image-sign in regard to the phi phenomenon. I wish to continue with this discussion, but, first, let me establish that there are three broad categories of time in film: (1) is the time of the "moving image-sign"; (2) is the perceived time of the various other strata of film; and (3) is the time of the work as a whole which is usually called the rhythm and tempo of the work. Also, it must be noted that there can be more than one temporal characteristic associated with a particular stratum of film art.

Now, let us return to a consideration of the image-sign and the frame. We saw in the previous section that there is a tension between the spaces of the two structures. And, as the space represented by each discrete image-sign organizes and collapses around the structure of the frame, a continuity is established, i.e., a "here and now" of the space of the image. It could be said that there is an identity of space and time at this level. Heidegger, basing his work on that of Hegel, has given some thought to this issue of the identity of space and time. It will be helpful to make reference to this
work, and, as Heidegger says space itself makes the transition to time:

Space "is" time; that is, time is the "truth" of space. If space is thought dialectically in that which it is, then according to Hegel this Being of space unveils itself as time.37

According to Heidegger, space is an abstract multiplicity of points. These points are differentiable in it, but they do not destroy its unity. Any point is a negation of space but does not lift itself out of space. It is a negation in the sphere of "Being-outside itself"; it is an empty move. But, this negation for itself is "punctuality."38 That is, an arising within of an outside itself when reflected or negated again is an entity "point" which is an actuality—a now. The "now here" is the condition of the possibility of an arising and also of other arisings:

Time, as the negative unity of Being-outside-of-itself, is likewise something simply abstract, ideal. It is that Being which, in that it is, is not, and which, in that it is not, is: it is intuited becoming.39

In terms of the experience of seeing film images in time (motion), each image strives to establish itself "punctually" within a frame, and, as we have seen, this arising is a negation of a "having been." Also, we have
seen, as part of the double meaning of both the frame and the image there is the indication of a "beyond." That is, there is what Heidegger called an "intuited becoming," a stretching out from the now, an expectation of a future. This future is expected by the perceiver and guaranteed by the mechanical process which changes the individual images. Thus, the stasis of the frame and the individual images gives way to a temporalization upon which higher level structures can be based. We saw that it is part of the double being of the frame to "stand" forth in the world, that is, to be static. The individual still image is also static in that, according to Barthes, it does not involve a consciousness of being-there but an awareness of a having-been there.40 But, when this stasis is broken by the protention supplied by the signifying--pointing to a beyond--function of the image-sign and by the collapse of the space of one moving image into the next, there is established temporal continuity and a here and now of the image-signs. As Heidegger says, "The Being of time is the 'now.' Time ... is the transition which does not get thought but which simply tends itself in the sequence of 'nows.'"41

This temporalization of the space of the film frame and film image is very important. It is the basis
for experiencing the signifieds of the image signs as "now." It helps allow the direct, present tense perception of the analogous meanings of the image-signs. This "lived" experience of the image-sign meanings is a prereflexive, intentional experience. It is a direct consciousness of something, and it requires the spectator in order to occur. And, since the image meanings unfold in the now, they are passively perceived by the spectator who finds himself "engaged by" or identifying with the moving image meanings. Such a direct engagement of the perceiver to the perceived is what caused Pudovkin to say that film forces the spectator to see what the director wants him to see. And, it is also the basis for statements such as Erwin Panofsky's in which he said: "Aesthetically, he [spectator] is in permanent motion as his eye identifies itself with the lens of the camera which permanently shifts in distance and direction."
NOTES FOR CHAPTER II


3 Mojmir Drvota, The Constituents of Film Theory (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1973), p. 73.

4 Ibid., p. 74.

5 Ibid., p. 80.

6 Who therefore then is the author, the essential creator? The answer is simple enough: it is the scene writer, the director or the dialogue writer, the one whose personal character carries it off, the one who has best been able to impose his creative will upon it. Often it is the director, in that being the master of the work, he retakes or can retake, recompose and bring back again to his personal vision the work of his collaborators, whatever it is. But if he is only a conscientious artisan, if he has limited his work to the perfect execution of a technical design which someone submits to him, then inevitably, it is the scene writer who carries it off. Jean Mitry, Esthétique et psychologie du cinéma (Paris: Editions Universitaire, 1963), 1:32-33.

7 Dufrenne, Phenomenology, p. 30.

8 Drvota, Film Theory, p. 77.

9 Dufrenne, Phenomenology, p. 31.

10 Ibid., p. 32.
11 Ibid., p. 103.
13 Ibid., p. 13.
14 Ibid., p. 87.
15 Ibid., p. 20.
16 Ibid., p. 88
18 Ibid.
19 Dufrenne, Phenomenology, p. 46.
21 Drvota, Film Theory, p. 80.
22 Dufrenne, Phenomenology, p. 148.
26 Dufrenne, Phenomenology, p. 149.


33 Ibid.

34 Mitry, Esthetique, p. 197.


36 It is not in effect the least singularity of the filmic fact, of the fact of the reproduction of movement, that it results from a sort of perpetual conflict between the reality recorded which "tends" to free itself from the frame that one imposes on it and the frame which, of its own, "tends" to fix it in a stable form. There is there a sort of antagonism between formal spatialization of the image and its movement; between a space which looks for its own rhythm, and the duration of which it is inflected—between that which is perceived as a form and that which is intended and comprises some thing (or event). From this point of view, which is also the point of view of geometry, the filmic image, in its lines always moves and fluctuates is, relative to the frame, as a clump of transformation by relation to an invariant. Ibid., p. 199.
37 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 481.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid., p. 482.


41 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 483.

CHAPTER III
EIDETIC ANALYSIS

12.0 Eidetic Analysis of the Being of the Aesthetic Object of Film:

The essential structure of the filmic work of art is that it is a formation constructed of several heterogeneous strata. These strata differ from one another in (1) their characteristic material and their peculiar qualities arising therefrom; and (2) their roles with respect to the other strata and the work as a whole. It must be noted that this stratified structure is not peculiar to film alone, but it is also characteristic of other arts. In fact, Roman Ingarden, the Polish phenomenologist, was one of the first theorists to recognize this. In his book, The Literary Work of Art, Ingarden identifies the essential structures of the literary work to be: (1) the stratum of word sounds and phonetic formations; (2) the stratum of meaning units; (3) the stratum of manifold schematized aspects; and (4) the stratum of represented objectivities.\(^1\) He also hints that there may be another "special stratum" which "cuts across" the others and has its foundation...
in them—a stratum of aesthetic value qualities and the polyphony that is created in them.²

Ingarden devotes a few pages of his book to a discussion of film which he calls a "borderline case" of literature.³ In this section, Ingarden says that film has no stratum of phonetic formations or units of meaning. And, according to him, it is not the number of strata that differentiates film from literature but the fact that film is "exclusively the stratum of visual aspects and not the stratum of meaning units."⁴

In other words, here the sole constituting "material" is the reconstituted visual aspects, and they perform their constituting function by effecting the appearance of corresponding objectivities. . . . Things and people are given to us in the happenings quasi-perceptually, "from the outside" . . .⁵

This emphasis of film on visual aspects is supposed to shift the center of gravity of psychic existence with the result being that cinema foregrounds emotions, feelings, passions, and other types of primitiveness.⁶

Ingarden was on the right track in recognizing that the film image does not operate in the same way as the word; however, his book was published in 1931, and he did not mention sound film. In addition, one may, as the French semioticians such as Barthes have done, speak of the film image as a special type of sign which has both uncoded and coded meaning. In doing so, one is
rightly saying that film has a stratum of image-meaning. Taking this as our starting point, we can intuit the essential structure of film to be as represented in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Strata of the Aesthetic Object of Film
12.1 Image-Meaning:

As was pointed out in the references made to de Saussure's contributions to linguistics, the sign is composed of two parts: the signifier and the signified. However, in a word-sign, the material of the sign is totally indifferent to the object it signifies. There is no relationship whatsoever between the word "house," as black marks on white paper and a house as a complex physical and social entity. The source of the association between the black marks and the physical and social entity is custom which is strengthened by habit. As de Saussure said, "The bond between the [word] signifier and the signified is arbitrary."\(^7\)

But the relationship between the material (signifier) of the image-sign and its object is very different; the two resemble each other; there is a relation of analogy. When we look at a photograph or a film of a person, we do not see only a jumble of lines and colors but a quasi-person. Such image-sign consciousness is positional. That is, every consciousness posits its object but each in its own way, and image-sign consciousness is perceptual, and along with the perception, there is an act of belief or a positional act. This act can posit its object as non-existent, absent, existing
elsewhere, or it can "neutralize itself" and not posit its object as existing.  

A mental-image as opposed to an image-sign is non-positional. It does not believe in its object as existing, etc. Also, unlike the image-sign which is perceptual and, thus, passive, the mental-image is actively constituted. It produces and holds onto its object as an image. As Sartre says, "This is a sort of indefinable counterpart to the fact that the object occurs as a nothingness." Mental-image consciousness is spontaneous and, in a sense, floats; it feels itself consciousness through and through.  

However, the image-sign is "anchored" by its signifier and, in the case of film, by the frame. The image-sign, as Roland Barthes has said, is an analogue; it is a message without a code. It is a continuous and unarticulated message. At this denotative level, the image-sign is simply perceived, and it becomes part of a projective synthesis which aims at the object of the image-sign. Let us say we are looking at a film about George Washington. Even though Washington is dead, it is he that our intention is directed toward; his powdered wig, and his wooden false teeth. Washington is posited as absent but the impression of him is present.
Here, we again encounter the double being of art. The image-sign performs a double function simultaneously. On the one hand, it refers to Washington who has long ago turned to dust and derives its meaning from this source; but, on the other hand, it acts directly on the feelings because of the analogical quality of it—it looks like Washington. Sartre says that this double function is magical. As he says, one does not think of the image at all but instead of its object. It is only for a reflexive consciousness that the image-sign and Washington are two distinct objects. The image-sign is a form of consciousness in which Washington appears to one as absent, but the image delivers Washington, even though he is not here. This is a "fulfilled" type of consciousness, unlike the mental-image or the word-sign which are constituted by empty intentions.

In dealing with signs, we are dealing with complete consciousnesses, that is, with complex structures which intend certain objects. Different types of consciousnesses and their doxic modalities are given by different types of signs. In perception, an object appears only in a series of profiles or projections. For instance, a cube is certainly present to one who looks at it;
however, he can only see three sides at a time. The cube, as any perceptual object, must be learned; it must be explored. The object itself is the synthesis of all possible experiences of it, and its perception is a phenomenon of an infinity of aspects. As Sartre says, "We must make a tour of objects." This "touring" is exactly what the image-sign opens for us as a possibility. As we saw in Sections 10.0 and 11.0, the perceptual space of the moving image-sign first unfolds in the here and now.

The word-sign and the sound-sign operate differently. Such signs do not fulfill their intentions in such a way that there can be perception of their objects. Instead, they point to the objects themselves as concepts. A concept is a type of knowledge which is conscious of itself and places itself at the center of its object; it has a unity. And, when one thinks of a cube as a concrete concept, one can grasp all of its six sides and eight angles at once. There is no need to go "touring," or to wait for the object to unfold.

The mental-image is a mediatory form of consciousness, between the concept and perception. One learns nothing from the mental-image. It is organized like objects which do produce knowledge, but it is complete upon appearance. No matter how long one looks at a
mental image, one can never find anything in it but what one puts there. For example, try to count the number of stitches on a baseball that you imagine. It is impossible to count them all, even though you know they are there and can see them.

Part of the magic of the image-sign is that it allows us to perceive and thus to know what is otherwise unknowable. It allows an existential status (spatialization and temporalization) of the mental image. It opens the possibility of communicating one's dreams. As Susan Langer said in her book, *Feeling and Form*, "Cinema is 'like' dream in the mode of its presentation: it creates a virtual present, an order of direct apparition." Note, that in previous sections, I have said how cinema is not like a dream. But, one of the dominant characteristics of the dream is that the dreamer is always the center of it. And, in film, such a center is also established. The identification of the spectator with the camera (and the director who controls it), sets up a center as in the dream mode. In terms of phenomenological theory, the moving image-signs set up an intentional relation of "consciousness is consciousness of something."
The formal relation established between the camera and the objects it "sees" is like the relation of consciousness to the something it "sees." And what is experienced is prereflexive consciousness; it is sensation. That is, what is seen is not generalized; no concept is formed; an immediate relation to "things" is lived. Maurice Merleau-Ponty makes this point in his essay, "The Film and the New Psychology":

This is why the movies can be so gripping in their presentation of man: they do not give us his thoughts, as novels have done for so long, but his conduct or behavior. They directly present to us that special way of being in the world, of dealing with things and other people, which we can see in the sign language of gesture and gaze and which clearly defines each person we know.14
12.2 Coded Image-Meaning and Grammatical Meaning:

Taking our clue for opening the discussion from what presents itself to us in film experience, we see that meaning in film is not restricted to only analogous meaning. Even though the image-sign per se has no general or conceptual meaning, that is not to say that certain types of images have not become associated with concepts in the social consciousness by persistent use. For example, a cowboy wearing a white hat has become associated with the general concept "good guy." In addition, image-signs juxtaposed to each other do give rise to meanings and structural forms like those of a language. Roland Barthes has explained how image-signs can act like word-signs in the production of myth, and, of course, Christian Metz and Sergei Eisenstein have had much to say about the grammatical forms of film which result from juxtaposed images.  

In other words, it is possible to speak of film as having a vertical and a horizontal dimension of image-meaning. This way of thinking about a sign system was introduced by de Saussure, and he called the horizontal dimension synchronic linguistics and the vertical dimension diachronic linguistics. For the most part, both the vertical and the horizontal
dimensions of meaning in film have developed through usage and become accepted forms of filmmaking. However, in the beginning of filmmaking, the horizontal was already established by the technical aspects of recording and projecting the film images. That is, the images are lined up and shown one after the other. In the Lumière brothers films, such as, *Arrival of a Train at the Station*, there was only this basic horizontal level limited by the total number of frames exposed during the running of the camera. However, it did not take long for the possibilities of the horizontal dimension to be exploited. D. W. Griffith, in America, and Lev Kuleshov, in Russia, are usually credited with being the predominant innovators in editing technique in the early part of this century. The grammar, or technique of editing, developed so fast that Eisenstein and others have been able to base their theories of film upon it.

Barthes calls the supplementary message of image-signs a "style" or "convention" which he likens to the connotation of a word. I have already given a summary of Barthes' theory in Section 3.0, and it may be useful for the reader to refer to it again. The point I want to make here is that the supplementary message—with the exception of what Barthes calls "syntax"—is attached to the analogical message, and both
analogical and supplementary messages relate to the vertical dimension of film meaning. Since Barthes does not make the distinction between vertical and horizontal meaning in the same way that I do, he lumps "syntax" in with the other connotated meanings. I grant that it is a coded meaning, but, unlike other coded meanings it is not related to what de Saussure calls the diachronic.

According to de Saussure, there is no direct relation between the vertical and horizontal dimensions of a language:

A diachronic fact is an independent event; the particular synchronic consequence that may stem from it are wholly unrelated to it. Diachronic facts are not even directed toward changing the system. Speakers did not wish to pass from one system of relations to another; modification does not affect the arrangement but rather its elements... Certain elements are altered without regard for the solidarity that binds them to the whole. It is as if one of the planets that revolve around the sun changed its dimensions and weight: this isolated event would entail general consequences and would throw the whole system out of equilibrium.17

The relation is, according to the above quote, indirect but yet potent. For film, it is not clear at this point what the relation is between the vertical and the horizontal dimensions; however, it must be investigated further in order to uncover the full significance of the moving image-sign. The meaning of the moving image-
Husserl, in his study entitled The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, presents some findings as well as diagrams which will help in guiding our investigation. Here, Husserl is investigating tone contexts as dynamic units of meaning since they emerge gradually in time. This type of context, he says, is opposed to the static unit, such as denomination, whose meaning is given all at once. He differentiates the consciousness of the past into successive phases in order to see how an entire temporal object is perceived as a unity despite its continuous flow (see Figure 3). At any given moment in the duration of a temporal object, only one of its phases is actually present, and it immediately starts receding into the past, to be replaced by the next phase. However, the elapsed phases are still retained by the perceiver. The perceiver is conscious of all of the phases of the given object up to any given phase—the temporal object persists. Retention unites the present phase with those that have elapsed, but the present continually modifies the past phases as they slip further into the past.
OE Series of now-points
OE' Sinking-down [Herabsinken]
EE' Continuum of phases (now-point with horizon of the past)
E→ Series of nows which possibly will be filled with other Objects

Fig. 3. Husserl's Diagram of Time Signs.
Note, in the top diagram of Figure Three, that $Q$ is the starting point of the temporal object, and $E$ is its final point. $P$ is any "now" phase, and the horizontal line $OE$ represents the series (total) of such phases, and the diagonal lines represent their elapsing into the past. The vertical lines indicate the direction of retention and the continuum of the phases which Husserl calls the "horizon of the past." The prime added to the letters indicates the modification of the individual phases as they sink into the past:

Every actual now of consciousness, however, is subject to the law of modification. The now changes continuously from retention to retention. There results, therefore, a stable continuum which is such that every subsequent point is a retention for every earlier one. . . . Each subsequent retention, rather, is not merely a continuous modification arising from the primal impression but a continuous modification of the same beginning point.

In addition to the modifications in meaning which Husserl is referring to above, there is another modification which we may call "temporal erosion." That is, none of the diagrams in this section can be read as continuing to infinity. The build-up of retentions that occurs as one experiences the duration of the temporal object is limited ultimately by pure nothingness, a nothingness into which everything eventually slips. The preceding diagrams and those to follow
should be useful aids to thinking about the temporally constituted, higher level meanings of the moving image-sign of film, regardless of their limits.

The second of Husserl's diagrams in which he indicates a series of nows which possibly will be filled with other objects gives us a clue to how editing (montage) may be explained. However, before discussing new meanings (higher level meanings) which are created by editing, I have expanded on Husserl's theory by drawing upon the work of Jiří Veltrus ký and Jan Mukařovský. Veltrus ký, in his article, "Construction of Semantic Contexts," claims that Husserl's description is onesided as applied to language systems because it fails to sufficiently account for static units. This criticism is also appropriate as regards film since there are, as we have seen, static characteristics to both the individual image-signs and to the frame. And, also, editing (whether based upon the story or something else) creates sequences of image-signs which taken en masse act like static units. That is, there is a diachronic character to the moving image-sign as it "sinks down" in time.
Veltrusky prefers Mukarovsky's model and theory which stresses the dialectic relation between the static and dynamic:

\[ a - b - c - d - e - f \]
\[ a \quad b \quad c \quad d \quad e \]
\[ a \quad b \quad c \quad d \]
\[ a \quad b \quad c \]
\[ a \quad b \]
\[ a \]


Mukarovsky speaks of the following three principles of semantic construction: (1) the unity of sense of the entire context; (2) the accumulation of meanings; and (3) the oscillation between the semantic statics and dynamics. The unity of sense imposes itself upon the viewer as soon as he begins to perceive a series of now points. Although the series remains merely potential until the entire context is given, the viewer tries to grasp the total sense of it. That is, he projects the total series, although that which has yet to be given can be grasped only as an empty intention. The
accumulation of meanings refers to the context as a continuous succession of meanings, irrespective of syntactical links, etc., such that these units are perceived against the background of all those which preceded. The horizontal is the succession of units while the vertical is the accumulated background. Of course, we must remember that the meaning units along the vertical are modified as they sink further away. The oscillation between the semantic statics and the contexts springs from the interdependence of the context and the background meanings upon which it comes to light. The associations of the static units put pressure on the direction in which the semantic intention of the context points. According to Mukařovský, the vertical even strives to free itself completely from the horizontal. 22

Having discussed the moving image-sign and the theories applicable to the linguistic formations based upon it, I am ready to provide a diagram of my own which is suited to aid in an explanation of the phenomenon of moving image-sign meaning and the higher level linguistic meanings which arise therefrom (see Figure 5 on the next page).
Fig. 5. Temporality of Moving Image-Signs
In the diagram presented, the upper case letters represent the image-signs and their analogical meanings. The lower case letters of the same type face as the upper case letters and located directly below the upper case letters indicate the coded meanings which accompany the image-signs. Each different set of letters (one upper case and one lower case) represents one image-sign, i.e., one framed image. Of course, there may be more than one coded meaning accompanying one image-sign; however, each image-sign has only one analogical meaning—that of the represented objects as seen through the schematized aspect of the image-sign.

I have previously discussed the spatial and temporal instability which leads to the phi phenomenon. This movement of the image-signs, in terms of the diagram, is represented by the "flowing-off" of the series of now points along the horizontal line $OE\rightarrow$ and also by the "sinking-down" of the now points along the diagonal lines. The dialectic tension between the "flowing-off" and the "sinking-down" gives rise to the "moving meaning" of the film image-signs. A key factor in the experience of the "moving meaning" of film is that, unlike the reading experience, the experience of the moving image-signs is passive. That is, the mechanical
movement of the image-signs at twenty-four (24) frames per second sets-up a temporal and spatial tension which allows for the perceptual (passive) retention of moving image meanings. The sinking-down effect of time at the perceptual level—the immediately experienced now—creates a modified meaning to the series as it flows off in each passing image-sign. Also, it should be noted that the coded messages of each image-sign are more likely to "free" themselves from the dialectic struggle and establish a new and independent meaning because they, in a sense, are more conceptual and less tied to the image-signs themselves. That is, they are less motivated than analogical meanings. The meanings of the coded messages reside—their relation to the sign is found—in what Mukařovský calls the "collective awareness" of the society. It would seem that Ingarden's claim that there is no strata of meanings in film is not completely correct.

I have used the term "sequence of nows" to refer to the points along the lines $OP$, $P\rightarrow$, $P\rightarrow E\rightarrow$, because of the obvious similarity to the term "sequence" as generally used in film jargon. These different sequences begin and end where there are "cuts" in the
film—in other words, where the meanings of the image-signs are much different from those which preceded them. And, this is generally the case where editing of the film has changed the visual aspect of the represented objects or the objects themselves have been replaced with other objects; there is then established a new type of dialectic tension. This type of tension is the basis for the theory of Montage with all its various categories. On Figure 5, this new sequence or montage effect is represented by the juxtaposition of two groups of letters in different type faces (A B C D E and A B C D E). Note how the first sequence, as it sinks-down, continues to modify the static meaning of the new nows of the new sequence: Here, the sequence OP continues to modify the sequence PP.

As one easily sees from Figure 5, there is a double (if not a multiple) intentionality involved with the experience of film. On the one hand, there is the "flowing-off" of the image-signs, as individual now points, and the "sinking-down" of these now points which creates the background for the new now—that is, there is a flow of and an accumulation of meanings over time.
As Husserl says:

Every actual now creates a new temporal point because it creates a new object, or rather a new object-point which is held fast in the flux of modifications as one and the same individual object-point. . . . As a phenomenon moves into the past, the now acquires the character of a past now. It remains the same now, however. Only in relation to the momentarily actual and temporally new now does it stand forth as past.24

On the other hand, there is a syntax which results from the viewer's striving for a unity of context which is continually shattered by the juxtaposition of incongruous meaning sequences (montage) only to be reestablished by protention: a synthesis resulting from sublimating what has occurred to what one expects to occur. As Husserl says, "Retention is at one with this. . . . further-consciousness."25

I intuit that this double intentionality operates dialectically. The unity of the intention tends to disintegrate in the oscillation between the vertical and horizontal meanings. In order to maintain retention, a new retentional intention is required which acts as a retention of the retention and synthesizes the opposed meaning at a higher level. Husserl gives an example of such a retention:
[We] must take into account that retention of a retention has intentionality not only with reference to what is immediately retained but also with reference to what is retained in the retaining of the second level and finally with reference to the primal datum, which here is thoroughly objectified. . . . A still better analogy can be drawn from the way in which a memory of A not only makes us conscious of the memory but also makes us conscious of A as that which is remembered in the memory.26

It is this multiple retentional intention which gives rise to the possibility of various levels of consciousness arising out of the same temporal object. In the case of film, as we have seen, there is an image-sign consciousness which gives rise to "moving image meanings," and there is a syntactical consciousness which gives rise to "montage meaning." In addition, as indicated in Figure 2, there is a consciousness of a level of visual aspects and a level of represented objects.

However, before discussing these last two levels, I wish to note that the above discussion of the image-sign and its meaning tends to counter what other theorists have said regarding the basic unit of film. Bazin, of course, favors the image-sign as the basic unit of film.27 Kuleshov said that the "shot-sign" is
the basic unit of film and that films are built "brick
by brick" by juxtaposing these units.\textsuperscript{28} Eisenstein,
for the most part, agreed with Kuleshov, but he was wise
enough to realize that there is more than just the
horizontal dimension to filmic meaning (see Section 3.0).
Christian Metz says that the smallest filmic unit is
the sentence.\textsuperscript{29} Metz arrives at his conclusion by
reviewing the findings of such structural linguists
as Roman Jackobson et al., who have favored large
signifying units.\textsuperscript{30} Metz says that cinema is like
language but the difference is that "the sentences of
verbal language eventually break down into words,
whereas, in the cinema, they do not: A film may be
segmented into large units (shots), but these shots
are not reducible (in Jackobson's sense) into small,
basic, and specific units."\textsuperscript{31}

As we have seen, there are meaning structures
which precede the shot. Metz may argue that the
"moving meanings" of the image-sign are too unstable
to be significant until they compose a shot (a sequence
such as OP in Figure 5). However, just because
there is at this level an unstable intention which
does not stabilize until a retention of a retention,
does not preclude this as a meaningful structure. It is simply a meaning structure which cannot be cognized; it is simply experienced as a flow. Metz's theory of "syntagmatic analysis of the image track" begins with the shot and proceeds to subsume it under various more general syntagmatic forms which derive, not only from montage, but from the narrative. For us, the narrative cannot arise before the represented objects upon which they are based. Note, though, that Metz's large syntagmatic forms, based as they are on structures constituted during the historical development of narrative cinema, are more descriptions of norms than of essential structures. These forms do, however, give guidance to one's "retention of retention" such that it advances the narrative. In other words, the forms are norms based on "story telling" which are noetic and guide one's experience of film meaning at the higher levels, i.e., represented objects.
12.3 Color:

Color, like sound, is not essential to film, but it is essential to modern film. The use of color enhances the meanings which film is capable of embodying. Color may be used to create either coded or uncoded meanings. Generally, color filming is used to enhance the uncoded or analogical meanings of the images. Even though color film does not necessarily faithfully record the color of an object photographed, its use does strengthen the analogical bond between the signifier and the signified of the image-sign since most objects are colored. Of course, a filmmaker may produce colors which do not closely resemble the colors of the objects photographed. This may be done purposefully, accidentally, or negligently.

When it is done purposefully, color is being used as a coded meaning. That is, the filmmaker is attempting to foreground the color and use it as a sign itself. The filmmaker may want the color to be perceived on the prereflexive level to evoke a mood or on the synesthetic level to evoke some peculiar effect. Or, the filmmaker may want the color to evoke a meaning associated with it in the social consciousness. Many of these coded meanings of color are traditional in painting and other arts, and they are easily appropriated by film. Some colors
evoke involuntary responses from us based upon our psycho-physical constitution. It is these types of uses of color that a filmmaker may use purposefully to evoke a response which for the spectator is prereflexive.

Of course, color which strengthens the analogical meaning of the image-sign is also perceived prereflexively. In this case, the filmmaker may use the color to purposefully strengthen such meanings, or he may use the color negligently. When I say negligently, I mean that the filmmaker may not really pay attention to the colors produced by his film stock. He may have chosen to use color film simply because it is the norm, and people expect it. He expects the color rendering of the objects photographed to be similar to the color of the real objects, but he does not care about the degree or direction of variation, as long as it is not too great.

Color used accidentally, as far as I am concerned, may be purposeful or purposeless. If the filmmaker is experimenting with color, he may want some strange color to be produced but have no idea what it will be. Or, a strange color may be produced by purposeless accident as when the film is exposed by a light leak in the camera. It is rare for accidental color to appear in a feature film since they are not usually experiments
in color rendering and since takes which are accidentally exposed are not used in the final print. However, it is quite usual for color to be used negligently. Many film directors do not pay much attention to the colors of their images. This is unfortunate since the meaning of film may be enhanced by purposeful use of color. An example is the film *Red Desert* by the Italian film director Michelangelo Antonioni.
12.4 States of Affairs:

The manifold relationships and interrelationships of the image-signs and sequences give rise to states of affairs or "situations." That is, through acts of retention which involve "broader" intentions, ontic connections of a synthetic nature are made, and higher level meanings result. In this way, the meanings constitute a segment of a still largely undetermined world which, however, is established in accord with its ontic type and the type of its essence. The boundaries of this segment are never very sharply drawn. It is as if a beam of light were illuminating a part of a region, the remainder of which disappears in an indeterminate cloud but is still there in its indeterminacy.

These states of affairs are the situations in which the represented objects of the work appear. As has previously been stated, the image-sign is first perceived prereflexively, and this gives the states of affairs of the filmic work, compared to a literary work, for example, an existential quality. On the other hand, there are similarities between the states of affairs of the filmic work and the literary work at the reflexive level of perception.
The point at which one begins to reflect upon the experience presented in a filmic work is usually the point of the arising of the represented objects. In terms of the experience itself, this seems simultaneous with the flowing off of the image-signs; however, for the purposes of analysis, it is a higher level occurrence which we may think of as being somewhat delayed. In literary works reflection, initially, takes the form of judgments upon the states of affairs given by sentences. The sentence itself, having the form subject, copula, predicate, begs for a judgment to be made. The reader asks himself whether what is predicated of the subject of the sentence is conceivably true of it.

In speaking of a sentence such as, "My fountain pen is lying on the desk," which may appear in a work of art, Ingarden makes a distinction between affirmative propositions and judicative propositions:

If we were to compare the declarative sentences appearing in a literary work with, for example, those of a scientific work, we would immediately observe that, despite the same form and despite at times also a seemingly identical content, they are essentially different: those appearing in a scientific work are genuine judgments in a logical sense [judicative propositions], in which something is seriously asserted and which not only lay claim to truth but are true or false, while those appearing in a literary work are not . . . nor can they be considered to be seriously intended assertive propositions or judgments.
If we were to understand the sentence "My fountain pen is lying on the desk" first in the sense of an affirmative proposition and should subsequently change it into a judicative proposition, we would notice first of all that the directional factor of the nominal expression "my fountain pen," which at first is directed at the corresponding purely intentional object, refers, in the judicative proposition, beyond this object, as it were, to a real object. . . . Through this reference of the intentional directional factor, the entire purely intentional state of affairs developed by the meaning content of the sentence is applied to the real fountain pen, and, what is more, it is treated as a state of affairs that is contained in the pen's ontic range. . . . At the same time, the predicate of the judicative proposition acquires, along with the function of the verbal development which it performs in the pure affirmative proposition, yet a second function, which is the direct discharge of the judgment, and one by which the state of affairs . . . is set in the given ontic sphere as truly existing. Above all, in both these functions— in the transportation into the given (real, ideal, etc.) ontic sphere and in the existential setting— there is based . . . the "claim to truth" of the judgment.33

Ingarden goes on to say that there are two types of states of affairs, which correspond to the two types of propositions: the purely intentional and the objectively existing. In the purely intentional, there is an absence of an existential setting which corresponds with "objective reality." There is, instead, a correspondence or noncorrespondence with an existential setting which is immanent and essential to consciousness.
There is an absence of any claim to truth and a "suspension" of the intentional state of affairs. In the objectively existing, there is a correspondence or noncorrespondence with the existential setting furnished by the objective world. The proposition is judged true or false based upon the correspondence.

According to Ingarden, between the extremes of these two types of propositions, there is a modified assertive proposition of a "quasi-judgmental character." It is this quasi-judgmental proposition which is used in a literary work of art. Therefore, when we read that Mr. X has murdered his mistress, we know very well that the statement is not to be taken seriously. Yet, there is still something asserted in the statement. Ingarden goes on to say that the individual propositions are given in such a way that the states of affairs they project are not matched with any determinate individual state of affairs truly existing in any given time and place but only with a general type of states of affairs and objects that would be possible in a given milieu. However, the states of affairs (or objects) are, by virtue of a proper matching with the general type of objectivities possible, transposed into reality.
Of course, this reality is not the existential reality of everyday life but the special reality of the work of art. But, to strengthen the appearance of everyday reality, the states of affairs presented are often related to objectively existing states of affairs. For instance, the use in a novel of the setting Paris, France, which is an existing place is such a relation.\textsuperscript{36}

In filmic works, the relation of the states of affairs to objective reality is very strong since the states of affairs are based upon the \textit{analogous meanings} of the image signs. The states of affairs of film are always bound to an objectively existing situation. Of course, this situation may be "manufactured" in the studio, but it, nevertheless, objectively exists. The "moving meanings of the image-signs" of film always supply specifics, not general types. However, general meanings are given also, but they are a result of coded meanings or higher level formations of the represented objects.

In the public consciousness, and, indeed, in the minds of many actors, directors, etc. who are not given to thinking, there is a confusion about the "claim to truth" of filmic meanings. The strong "\textit{existential bond}" of the film image-sign to that which it projects has fostered a myth that films must be
"realistic." Actually, films cannot help but be realistic, although the stories represented need not be at all realistic. At the level of the states of affairs (situations) in film, there is always the strength of the "I see this thing given" which tends to force the doxic mode of "real and "existing" to accompany the filmic meanings.

However, at the level of the represented objects (story), there is a type of quasi-judgmental attitude taken up by the viewer. Also, the viewer's knowledge of the fact that he is seeing a film often works from the outside, so to speak, to cut-off a complete affirmation that what he sees is "real." Along these lines, it is worth noting, although it is beyond the scope of this work to pursue it, that in certain types of film, i.e., documentary and cinema vérité, coded meanings are used to reinforce the "claim to truth" of the filmic meanings. This has been shown by films such as David Holtzman's Diary (1970) which is an entirely planned and scripted work but purports to show a young filmmaker's spontaneous and unrehearsed footage edited into a diary. The careful use of "documentary signs" completely fools the naive viewer. He believes he is seeing a documentary film until the credits for scripting and acting roll at the end of the film.
12.5 Visual Aspects:

The states of affairs are not the only preparatory stratum for the appearance of represented objects. The stratum of visual (and sound) aspects is also of great importance. As an aside, it is worth mentioning that represented objects may be of the "external world" or the "internal world." In the first instance, they would be people, places, things, etc., and in the second instance, they would be states of mind, character traits, etc. Modern sound cinema, of course, may easily represent any of these objects, but to discuss the nature of the stratum of aspects it is best to speak of the way "things" are perceived.

During the perception of a "thing," one experiences constantly changing "aspects" or perspectives of one and the same thing. For instance, if one perceives a spherical object, it is seen one side at a time; there is always a hidden side. In addition, the aspects in which an object is presented become a continuous manifold of aspects which are constantly merging, one aspect into another. Even though aspects and their manifolds are not totally "subjective" since, as Husserl said, particular objects only present themselves through particular and identifiable aspects, there is a continuous reference to a "me," the perceiver. This relativity
of the experienced aspect to the perceiver shows itself mainly in its essential dependence on the behavior of the perceiver. For example, if the perceiver closes his eyes, the flowing continuum of aspects is short-circuited and reduced to non-existence. Also, the willful directing of the perceiver's attention upon a certain aspect of the object to the exclusion of all others may also short-circuit the flow.

In film, visual aspects are generally provided by the direction of the camera (angles, dollies, pans, tilts, etc.) and by the editing, but the viewer may make his own alterations to a limited degree by moving about the theater or by attending to only one part of the picture and sound images. Also, a viewer must utilize an appropriate intentional act to "catch" an aspect without changing it. A continuous manifold of aspects is dependent on the perceiver but is also subject to internal transformations based on its own particular time structure. That is, an aspect given "now" is dependent upon prior aspects much in the same way as lower level strata are retained both vertically and horizontally in time.
Aspects are different from the content they present. For example, a red ball is spherical but no aspect in which it is presented is itself spherical, nor does it contain sphericity in its content—it contains a "red disk" with a reference to sphericity. This is even more clear if one perceives a ring or a steering wheel. In these cases, the aspects show their contents as ellipses, yet with a reference to sphericity.

These differences between the aspects of an object and their contents brings to mind Rudolf Arnheim's film theory since Arnheim says the art of film is to show objects as other than they are in real life. By showing various novel aspects of objects, the filmmaker can do what Arnheim prescribes. Arnheim's theory deals mainly with this aspect stratum of film, but Arnheim failed to see that manipulation of this stratum is neither the only nor the essential means to producing film art.

It is through aspects that we apprehend what Ingarden calls "fulfilled" and "unfulfilled" qualities of objects. For example, when we see the anterior side of a red ball as full determinate, its posterior side is co-given but as unfulfilled. This special character of "unfulfilledness" can appear in the content of an aspect only because there are other aspects of
the same sphere, aspects which "fill" the posterior side. Aspects which co-give a determinate but "hidden side" of a thing can be false. For example, one can perceive a red rubber ball from one side and then walk around it and find that the other side has a large hole in it. Ingarden says that such instances of disappointment or surprise are good evidence that there is an unfulfilled co-given aspect.\textsuperscript{42} Also, in film, such unfulfilled aspects can be surprisingly filled-in as when the camera dollies behind a partially opened door to reveal a mugger hiding there with knife raised.

In film, the aspect stratum may be used to create certain tropes similar to those used in poetry. For instance, a particular illumination or camera angle which shows only a woman's leg may by \textit{synecdoche} include her whole body. Or a particular noise, such as a dog barking or a motor rumbling, may present a dog or an automobile in an unfulfilled manner.\textsuperscript{43} Often, both the degree and kind of unfulfilledness are very different from the content of the aspect. For instance, the smoothness of glass or the softness of silk may be seen, and, yet, there is no opportunity for tactile verification. This is a type of \textit{metonymy}. It is worth noting that Arnheim devotes a section of his book to
this type of unfulfilledness. Its title is "Artistic Use of the Absence of Nonvisual Sense Experiences."\textsuperscript{44}

The most significant function of aspects is that, through them, represented objects can be made to appear in a manner predetermined by the work itself.\textsuperscript{45} So, again, we see that Arnheim was not incorrect in stressing the role of aspects in the production of film art, and Pudovkin has good grounds for saying that film forces the viewer to see as the film director wants him to see.\textsuperscript{46} If there were limited aspects to a film—there must be at least one which is supplied by the camera position—for instance, if the camera simply recorded an event without ever changing position, the represented objects would appear "flat" and lifeless. But, then again, even when the camera does not move, such as in the Lumiere brothers' film, \textit{Arrival of a Train at the Station}, the moving meaning of the image-signs provides a continuum of aspects. Actually, one of the main characteristics of film is that it is rich in visual (and sound) aspects. However, this great potential for richness of aspects makes it important that the "right" aspects are chosen by the director or cameraman, for each aspect "holds in readiness" other unfulfilled aspects.
This, of course, is due to the retentional accumulation of meaning of the temporal unfolding of film meaning and to the way determined aspects make reference to "unfulfilled" aspects.

The choice of an "incorrect" aspect, like the choice of a "wrong" word in literature, can derail the flow of meanings because the temporal unfolding of aspects, as previously intimated, has a protentional character. That is, there is a reference of any "now aspect" to the future as well as the past. There is a future reference to certain characteristic aspects of an object, and if this future is not actualized in accordance with expectations, the object may be modified to the extent that it is not recognizable to the viewer. However, it must be pointed out that the aspects fulfill the determining function of represented objects only secondarily. The represented object is primarily determined by the intentionality of the units of meaning and corresponding states of affairs by virtue of their representative functions.  

Also, the entire work may assume various characteristics of style based upon the nature of the predominate aspects. In representing the psychic state of a hero, visual, acoustic, and other aspects may be used which
are all taken from a certain viewpoint, or there may be various combinations ranging to multiple simultaneous points of view. Such multiple views could be produced by a rapid montage sequence with radically varying camera angles and illuminations along with similarly recorded and edited sound which could be contrapuntal (sound which does not support the meaning of the visual images). This jumbling of aspects may produce a unique aesthetic charm, an impressionistic effect. The aspect (formative) possibilities of film images, which are well listed by Arnheim, make it possible for film to present an entirely new visage to the world.⁴⁹
12.6 Represented Objects:

The stratum of the represented objects is the best known of all the strata. It is often the only stratum to be apprehended thematically by the viewer since it is usually the first stratum to come to one's attention upon experiencing the work. Represented objects are primarily derived from intentional objects which are signified by the moving image-signs, and they are united into a uniform ontic sphere as a result of the interconnections of states of affairs and aspects. The peculiarities of the stratum of represented objects are generally overlooked because the average viewer is only concerned with the material makeup of the contents of the objects that come into view. He tends to transfer the characteristics of objects in the real world to those represented by the work.

The term "represented objects" is to be understood very broadly. It refers to objects of both the "external world" and the "internal world," for example, things, persons, occurrences, and, states of mind, character traits, mental acts, or anything else projected, regardless of the traditional category or material essence. It is quite usual for objects of different ontic types to be included in one work of art. For example,
a mathematician, as a person, lives and works in the real world; however, certain mathematical objects with which he deals are "ideal." The mathematician and the objects with which he deals could be represented in one film.

Represented objects appear in their own space and time, and, as was mentioned in the preceding section, they have a quasi-judgmental character. That is, objects whose type of existence is "real existence"—people, animals, houses, etc.—appear in the work in the character of reality; however, this reality is not to be fully identified with the ontic character of truly existing real objects. As Ingarden says, "In represented objectivities there is only an external habitus of reality, which does not intend to be taken seriously. . . ." Especially in film, represented objects have a very strong bond with external reality via the nature of the moving image-sign, and the viewer may overlook the quasi-judgmental character of the objects and consider them to be real.

It may be better in speaking of the represented objects of film to use the term quasi-existential character instead of Ingarden's quasi-judgmental character, for, as has been noted, film experience is
more a "seeing" than it is a "judging." Since a film is not constructed of sentences, there is no underlying judgmental form in the way its meaning unfolds. On the contrary, one takes film experience as an "I see this thing" given at the level of sense certainty. As Sartre said in speaking of imaginative knowledge, "It is a consciousness which seeks to transcend itself, to posit the relation as an outside. But not in affirming its truth; in which case we would have only a judgment. But in positing its content as existing through a certain bulkiness of the real which serves as its representative." What Sartre says here also applies to the experience of the film image. Both sound and picture images tend to posit their objects as existing outside in the real world but not in a judgmental way. Rather, it is the "richness" of the analogous meaning of the moving image-signs which "fill" the content of the signs' intentions with the characteristics of existential reality such that one makes a "tour" of the represented objects.
12.7 Represented Space:

There is a unique space which belongs essentially to the represented world of the work. This space refers to "real world" space in which "things" are given to primary perception. However, it is not the same space since it is both limited and unlimited at the same time. For example, consider a room represented in a film, the space of the room is bounded by the walls of the room (or by the frame) but, nevertheless, there is space experienced outside this boundary. In fact, action essential to the story of the film may take place in this space as when the hero is dragged outside the room and beaten by villains. On the other hand, it would be false to say that this space is determined by corresponding units of meaning. This represented space outside the walls of the room is there only because it is the essence of space in general not to have any discontinuity. Because of the impossibility of spatial discontinuity, the space outside the room is corepresented with the space inside the room which is fully determined. Thus, when the director of a film transports us from place Y to place Z without showing the distance in between, this seam is not positively determined but only corepresented by virtue of the
impossibility of spatial discontinuity in the space of the "real world" after which the space of the represented world is modeled. It can be experienced that represented space is filled with gaps or seams which Ingarden calls "spots of indeterminacy."\textsuperscript{55} Thus, represented space cannot be incorporated into perceptual, real world space. Even though represented objects "pretend" to be found in specific locations in real space, they are not so located. If they were, one could, so to speak, walk back and forth between represented space and real world space.

As indicated above, the space of the stratum of represented objects is akin to perceptual space. In so being, it has a center of orientation or a "zero point" as Husserl called it.\textsuperscript{56} This zero point corresponds to the "I" or the orientational center of the perceiving subject. Therefore, it can be seen that represented space is not abstract, geometric, or objective. Represented space is always found within a represented world, i.e., it is unique to the level of represented objects. In the case of film narrated in the first person, one experiences the narrator as "telling a "story," and the zero point shifts to the "I" of the represented narrator. This is similar to what Ingarden calls the "boxing" of states of affairs or represented objects.\textsuperscript{57}
That is, one situation is "read" only through another. In this case, the zero point of the spectator operates "through" that of the represented narrator. Such a "boxing" or "double relation" of the zero point is usual in the experience of film. The lens of the camera tends to establish a center of orientation which the spectator easily takes over such that "it is I [the spectator] who wanders through the represented world." Yet, the fact that the spectator cannot freely choose which objects in the represented world to look at tends to disintegrate this "viewer center" of orientation and establish as the center of orientation an unseen master who directs the spectator to look at certain things. Thus, there is an inherent ambiguity of the zero point in film.

This ambiguity is compounded by the addition of a sound track to film since the space of the represented objects of sound images also has a zero point. And, the zero point of sound may be of the "boxed" structure just as the zero point of the represented space of the visual images. In addition, the zero point of sound may be used contrapuntally to the zero point of the images. For instance, we may hear two or more people talking in a crowded room, possibly a restaurant, and see pictures of a long, empty road through a blazing desert. Also, there
may be established even another spatial localization, if, for example, the people are talking about a trip they took to a South American rain forest. What we have here is an interplay between the spatial localizations of the strata of represented objects of picture v. sound, a contrapuntal interplay. This is one of the unique aesthetic possibilities of modern sound film. The problem presented by the "boxing" of centers of orientation within strata and by the contrapuntal use of centers of orientation between strata is which center or centers are dominant? I shall leave it to others to investigate the possibilities.58

Finally, it is possible to disperse the centers of orientation among a number of people who are all taking part in the same event in the same place. If in the process, the perspectives of the people do not agree, there occurs a nonconformity in the represented world. Such a possibility can result in a very interesting and pleasing aesthetic effect such as in Alain Renais' film Last Year at Marienbad (1963). Or, if done accidentally or incompetently, it can result in a faulty represented world, i.e., one which loses its quasi-existential status and becomes an empty and impotent imagination—a bad story.
12.8 Represented Time:

The time of represented objects is neither the "objective" time of the real world or the "subjective" time of an absolute conscious subject. It is clear that represented objects are in time because they are projected as consecutive or simultaneous. However, it is important to realize that this time has nothing to do with the time it took the director to construct the film or the time it takes the spectator to watch it. In fact, the time of represented objects is an analogue or modification of subjective time. In subjective time, each "now" has an irreducible coloration as a result of the fact that something determinate occurs in it, and it follows a "past present" which has its own characteristic coloration, and it precedes a "future present" which is only accessible by means of expectation. This is quite different from objective time or real world time which is mathematically determinable at any given point. As an analogue of subjective time, the time of the represented world also has its own coloration based upon what has occurred in "past nows" and what is expected in the future. It may help the reader to refer to Figure 5, although he must remember that Figure 5 relates to the time of image-signs and not represented
objects; however, there is a similarity in the way both "flow-off."

In real life subjective time, as opposed to the analogous subjective time of represented objects, the "now" has a decided advantage over the past and the future. In this time, each "now phase" points out a pronounced actuality in the sense of a being actualized. Nothing that is experienced as a real objectivity can exist without passing through the now phase. The now phase is the determiner of what is past, and of the future to the extent that not every possible future is fulfilled. Only those futures which pass through the now phase can be said to be the real future. For objectivities which, according to their essence, cannot have a now phase, there can be no past or future—for example, ideal objects, ideas, and essences.

Since the time which belongs to the represented quasi-existential world of the work is analogous to real subjective time, there is in this world a past, present, and future. However, the represented objects do not pass through a now phase and become actualized in a true sense. The actualization they undergo has its source in both the mechanical movement of the framed image-signs and in the spectator's contributing
his own actuality to the objects represented in "fulfilling" the intentions signified by the image-signs.

For literature, according to Ingarden, this contribution of the perceiver results in a leveling of all represented time moments. This leveling is akin to what happens in real subjective time when "now moments" already belong to the past. Ingarden says:

The time-filling events are never represented in all their phases, regardless of whether it is a single event, constituting a whole, or a plurality of successive events. Neither an individual, isolated sentence nor a manifold of interconnected sentences can develop states of affairs which could effect this.

What Ingarden is referring to in the above quote is the fact that real subjective time as a "now phase" shows no gaps; it is a continuous medium. However, once the "nows" are "past nows," one's limited ability to recall all of them creates "gaps." In a literary work of art, the "gaps" or indeterminacies occur even in the now phase because it is impossible for the literary work to "fill" the time phases with enough "content" to prevent gaps.

However, there is an important distinction to be made here between literature and film. It involves a difference between intentional levels of time phases.
In a literary work, the basic unit of meaning is the word, and it is not actualized until the reader lends it his own time. However, in film, there is a moving image-sign with motivated or analogous meaning and a quasi-existential character. As a result, film is capable of "filling" its time phases to the extent that it appears there is a continuous, seamless time, like real world time. It is only at the higher, syntactical, levels that film has noticeable seams or gaps. For example, using moving pictures and moving sound (not dialogue), there is no way to say, as there is in literature, "... and years later Mr. X found himself . . . ." In film, this "years later" must be shown directly as a present. Of course, dialogue or pictures of words (titles) may be used to accomplish this, but such uses are more options than necessities for film. In other words, the distinction being made is between the fulfilledness of temporal moments at the level of the basic meaning units of a work and the fulfilledness of temporal moments at higher levels. The lower levels for film and literature respectively are image-signs v. words. The higher levels are shots and sequences v. sentences, paragraphs, and chapters.
Film is capable of a similar indeterminacy to literature at the higher, syntactic levels, but at the lower level, it is capable of a determinacy which literature cannot approach.

The distinction between higher and lower strata of film is also of significance as regards the center of orientation (zero point) of represented time. As previously discussed, the quasi-existential character of film is such that the lower level meanings are experienced as particularly "filled" nows. At this level, the camera establishes a center of orientation for time which is identical to that for space, and it refers to both the viewer and to a "hidden master." However, at the higher level of represented objects, the center of orientation may be "shifted" to various characters or even to things. This shift is most easily accomplished when the stratum of the represented objects of sound is used to "direct" the center of orientation of the represented objects of the picture by a concurrence of spatial locale. For example, this is the case when we hear a particular character talking and at the same time see his lips moving, or when we hear a character describe what we are seeing. The space and time of the represented objects of the image, and the space and time
of the represented objects of the sound may either reinforce each other or counter each other.

However, for the zero point of time, there is a further distinction to be made; it is between the location of time and the center of time. We experience the time of a certain character (location) as always now; however, that now may be centered in the past, present, or future. To understand this, it is necessary to consult Husserl's time investigation of how a living person experiences the past. Obviously, a person is the center (location) of time in that it is his time (subjective time) that is experienced. However, he may experience his time as past, present, or future—but always now. That is, one can step back into a specific moment of his past (remembering), but he must still remain in the present while doing so. It may be better to say that one "reaches out" for the past and makes it present. As both Husserl and Ingarden mention, this "reaching out" for the past implies a "perspectival foreshortening" in that the further in the past an event lies, the less distant it may seem to be. This rearrangement of subjective time is a familiar experience to everyone. For example, an event of one's childhood may be much less distant in
terms of the ease of "reaching" it and making it present
again than an event which occurred only last year.
But, some events slip out of one's grasp altogether
and can be reached only as empty intentions of the
past.

Note, the grasping of the past in film involves
the use of a seam, or, alternatively, the use of
dialogue or pictures of words (titles). There is no
other way to separate the cinematic experience of the
present from the "making the past present" which a
living subject accomplishes by an operation of
consciousness. That is, the appearance of continuous
space and time which film projects must be broken
somehow in order to signal the appearance of the past
as present. In connection with making this break, a
variety of coded image-signs have been developed:

 Fade to black = a long break in time.
 Long dissolve = fairly long break in time.
 Short dissolve = fairly short break in time.
 Cut = short break, no break, or simultaneous events.
 Pull of Focus = dream sequence.

Of course, the meanings of these signs change from time
to time depending upon norms of filmmaking. Also, the
meaning of any particular sign is largely determined by
the context in which it is used.
Once the possibility of showing the "past as present" is established by using an appropriate sign, various combinations of temporal location and temporal centering may be invoked which are peculiar to the time of the stratum of represented objects of film. Of course, some of these combinations result from possible interplays between the time of the represented objects of the picture and the time of the represented objects of the sound. However, I will restrict my consideration of the matter to pictures alone. There is the possibility of a double temporal orientation. This can occur when a series of events is given as if it were located and centered "with a character in the now," and then, suddenly, the center of time is shifted such that what is taking place is seen as something long existing that is being remembered from a much later time. For example, this can be the case when a scene from a character's past is playing out right in front of that character's eyes, such as was done in Woody Allen's film Annie Hall (1978). Another type of double temporal orientation is more frequent in film, and this is the "simultaneous existence" which is experienced when watching an inter-cut "chase scene." In this instance, the center of time remains in the now,
but the viewer experiences consecutive events as if they were occurring simultaneously. Both the location and the center of time shift back and forth between different spaces. It is as if the viewer were in two or more different places at the same time. This type of temporal orientation has been standard in film since D. W. Griffith's *The Birth of a Nation* (1915).

Of course, the time of the represented objects can be left exclusively in the present with no double orientation and with the spatial and temporal seams minimized. This is usually done in the documentary film. In addition, such films also use certain coded signs to strengthen the effect, such as, grainy film, shaky camera, poorly exposed film, shifting focus, long sequences, non-actors, unrehearsed events, etc. If sound is used, it is usually "sinc sound" or "voice-over" narration in the first person. In both instances, the time of the sound enhances the present time of the pictures.
As has been previously mentioned, the naive viewer usually apprehends only the represented objects of the work of art. These viewers desire only to find out something about the represented world of the work. If now devolves upon me to inquire whether this something is limited to the plot of the story or whether there is something more involved. It is apparent that the lower strata of the work are present primarily for the purpose of representing objects. But, the stratum of represented objects, the focal point of the work, seems to have no other function than to simply be. If this is the case, then it would seem the purpose of the represented objects and, indeed, the whole work, is to be an object of appreciation, to be beautiful.

Beauty, in terms of this investigation, is a harmonious interconnection of strata which yields a perfect, yet imaginary world, the world of the represented objects. The differences between real world space and time, and the space and time of the represented world allow for this perfection. The represented world is complete in itself and often wholly consistent with itself. This perfect world, for the discursive arts, has a characteristic internal movement or plot:
explication, collision, acceleration, peripetia, climax, and denouement. This structure of movement which would be a parabolic curve if represented graphically, is quite different from the movement many people experience in their conscious lives, a movement which simply flows on in a senseless gray haze.

If the only purpose of the work of art is to be beautiful, the spectator is left simply to contemplate its Beauty. If this is the end purpose of a work of art, it is a melancholy end, for, as Sartre says, aesthetic contemplation is an "induced dream." Art is then a willed escape, and the creation of art is more an act of resignation than an act of triumph, as popular opinion would have it be. Sartre gives voice to the limits of aesthetic contemplation in a passage on beauty:

Beauty is a value applicable only to the imaginary and which means the negation of the world in its essential structure. . . . The object at once appears to be in back of itself, becomes untouchable, it is beyond our reach; and hence arises a sort of sad disinterest in it. It is in this sense that we may say that a great beauty in a woman kills the desire for her. . . . To desire her we must forget she is beautiful, because desire is a plunge into the heart of existence, into what is most contingent and most absurd.
The question still arises, is art only an end in itself, or is there something more involved? Is art in anyway a manifestation of desire, and if so, whose desire and for what?

There is some evidence of a desire associated with art, just as there is evidence of something more than the experience of meaningless, gray haze associated with everyday life. This evidence comes from experience. When one watches a film, reads a book, looks at a painting, etc., one may experience something extraordinary. Likewise, in everyday life, there are moments experienced when an indescribable atmosphere envelopes one, and whether these moments are frightening or enchanting, their shining splendor pierces the gray haze and makes life bearable. According to Ingarden, such moments are:

Metaphysical qualities (essences) . . . which reveal themselves from time to time . . . and, whether we wish it or not, a secret longing for their concrete revelation lives in us and drives us in all our affairs and days. Their revelation constitutes the summit and the very depths of existence. . . . In their unique form, they do not allow purely rational determination, and they cannot be "grasped" (as, for example, one "grasps" a mathematical theorem). Instead, they merely allow themselves to be. . . almost "ecstatically" seen in the determinate situations in which they are realized.68
Ingarden goes on to say that the most important function of the represented objects is to exhibit metaphysical qualities. If this is the case, it can be seen that the desire associated with a work of art is the desire that the work reveal metaphysical qualities to the perceiver.

Art, since it is not entirely real, is particularly suited to manifesting metaphysical qualities. The differences between real space and time and the space and time of the represented objects allows the freedom necessary for the artist to create situations and events in which metaphysical qualities can be manifested. For example, in film the death of a valiant father on a far-off battle field can be shown simultaneously with his wife's giving birth to a strong, healthy son back in the homeland. In real life, the significance of the juxtaposition of these two events would be lost due to the impossibility of experiencing them together. Of course, different types of art may have different abilities to manifest different types of metaphysical qualities. No doubt, the quasi-judgmental character of the literary work is best suited to the revelation of ideal qualities such as "the godly" or "the angelic";
whereas, the quasi-existential character of film is best suited to the revelation of personal qualities such as "the heroic" or "the wicked." I am not attempting to create any hard and fast categories as to which metaphysical qualities are best manifested by the various art forms. Such an attempt is beyond the scope of this inquiry, and, in any event, may be a fruitless endeavor.

However, in general, I think it is possible to draw a distinction between film art and other types of art based upon the quasi-existential character of film. That is, the ability of film to "fill" its represented world enables it to concretize and reveal metaphysical qualities with much more force than is possible in other art forms. Of course, as was implied above, it may be that some metaphysical qualities are better or more forcefully experienced when they are less determined. However, on the whole, the differences in determiniteness of the metaphysical qualities are significant. It is such a difference in determiniteness that separates the experience of metaphysical qualities in everyday life from the experience of metaphysical qualities in art. It is the irreal or imaginational aspect of art that leads to a deficiency of the metaphysical qualities presented by the represented objects.
Ingarden credits this deficiency of the metaphysical qualities presented by the work of art with allowing the viewer to be enraptured by the qualities without being truly afflicted, depressed, or endangered:

Their [metaphysical qualities ] ontic heteronomy . . . enables us to contemplate them relatively calmly, since in this concretization they do not have the richness and power that they attain in a full realization. No matter how much we are "gripped," "enraptured," and perhaps even transported beyond the level of everyday life by the metaphysical qualities in an aesthetically modified viewing of them, their actual unreality, the fact that they are concretized only to the extent required for their manifestation, still allows a certain calmness in apprehending them and a distance . . . .

The desired metaphysical qualities may be experienced through art but only at a distance. This distance is maintained because art is not real, or, as Sartre said, it is an induced dream. That is, the occurrence of metaphysical qualities in art is not contingent. Such an occurrence is controlled and contrived, and, as such, the desire for such an experience is assured of fulfillment. Thus, this desire of the audience of art is only a quasi-desire. It is not the same Desire which Sartre speaks of as plunging one into the heart of existence. Through art, the experience of metaphysical qualities is presented to one as already objectified.
It seems that from the point of view of the perceiver of art, there is no way to ascertain or assure that art has any import in the real world. We are again faced with the possibility that art, including film art, exists only for entertainment and contemplation. It is not to be taken seriously because it is incapable of anything but making us feel good about our bad situation. As Fellini seems to say in a scene in his film City of Women (1981), film experience is no more than a form of masturbation, a way of dangling in front of ourselves what we wish to be real so that we can feel as though we had attained it, when, in fact, we have attained only a momentary and imaginational image.

In order to see the import of the work of art, filmic or otherwise, in the real world, it is necessary to focus on the author of the work and what he communicates to his audience. Now, the term "communicate" assumes that the viewer will receive something from the work, and we have already seen that most viewers are only interested in entertainment. However, it is possible that a work of art may communicate something more than mere entertainment. It may be that there is a type of original communication which art is the medium for expressing and which a viewer adequate to the work may glean from it. And, even though the desire
for metaphysical experience may be only a quasi-desire, it points to a genuine Desire which everyone seeks to have fulfilled in the real world. That is, everyone seeks to experience consciousness as transcendent, and everyone seeks to be in touch with the source of the world. Is it true that the viewer of film can only experience this transcendence secondarily, and only the author experiences transcendence through the work? This would seem to be the case at first glance, but the double being of art gives a clue to a relationship between individual and general consciousness through which a perspicacious viewer may be given a possibility of his own.

Let me more carefully phrase and order the questions posed above and explain the shift in investigatorial technique that is required to investigate them: First, can the filmic work of art communicate something? Second, can there be a communication of something original? And, third, can filmwork be an authentic way of being-in-the-world? In order to investigate these questions, it is necessary to recon-textualize the investigation. It is necessary to employ a hermeneutic as opposed to an eidetic phenomenology.
Heretofore, the aesthetic object of film has been investigated as an eidetically reduced object, and, as such only the essential structures of this object as it appears to pure consciousness were of concern. We did not lose sight of the fact that the aesthetic object of film requires an author or that it requires an audience. Or, that the aesthetic object functions to communicate something. But, the preceding discussion of these issues has not been of sufficient depth to answer the questions posed above. Therefore, the investigation has been continued in pursuit of answers to these questions.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER III


2 Ibid., p. 31.

3 Ibid., pp. 323-327.

4 Ibid., p. 324.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., p. 325.


9 Ibid., p. 18.

10 Ibid., p. 32.

11 Ibid., p. 9.

12 Ibid., p. 10.


16 de Saussure, *Course*, pp. 80-82.

17 Ibid., pp. 84-85.


19 Ibid., pp. 50-51.


21 Ibid., p. 136.

22 Ibid., p. 137.


25 Ibid., p. 106.

26 Ibid., pp. 107-108.


30 Ibid., p. 85.

31 Ibid., p. 88.


33 Ibid., pp. 161-162.

34 Ibid., p. 167.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid., p. 170.

37 Ibid., p. 256.

38 Ibid., p. 257.

39 Ibid., p. 258.


41 Ingarden, *Literary Work*, p. 258.

42 Ibid., p. 259.


44 Arnheim, *Film as Art*, p. 102.


48 Ibid., p. 280.

49 Arnheim, *Film as Art*, pp. 127-132.


51 Ibid., p. 220.

52 Ibid., p. 221.


54 Drvota, *Film Theory*, p. 31.


56 Ibid., p. 230.

57 Ibid., p. 232.

58 Ibid., p. 230.

59 Ibid., p. 233.

60 Ibid., p. 236.

61 Ibid., p. 237.

63 Ingarden, *Literary Work*, p. 239.

64 Ibid., p. 240.


67 Ibid., pp. 281-282.


69 Ibid., p. 293.

70 Ibid., p. 294.
13.0 Hermeneutic Analysis of the Being of the Filmic Work of Art in the World:

In this part of the investigation, we are concerned with the filmic work as it exists in the world. The term "filmic work of art" is used here to include the aesthetic object of film as previously described. However, the material elements of the work such as film stock, pigments, etc., and the structure of the filmmaking industry are not of concern. The "world" is the Environing World which Husserl describes in his book Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy.¹ It is composed of a community of subjects (monads) in time and space and the structures of meaning created by them.

The goal of this part of the investigation is to uncover the structures of filmic communication and to determine whether original communication is possible as a result of them. In the foregoing eidetic investigation, we uncovered the essential structures of the aesthetic object of film considered as an autonomous structure. Of course, there was little doubt that this structure
was devised to communicate. This was intimated by the structure's being composed of signs and by the "double being" of works of art in general, as was described in section 9.0. However, the limits of the eidetic method, as explained in Section 2.0 of this work, made it difficult to describe the communicative process itself since this is a phenomenon of the world. We found at the end of Chapter Three that we could not find for sure that the filmic work of art did not end in an empty imagination with little existential significance. Our narrow reduction of the phenomenon of the aesthetic object of film prevented a thorough description of structures not properly within our gaze. Under the method being used in this part of the investigation, we may consider the author and his audience as essential elements to the work and attempt to uncover the essential relation between them.

We shall take as our point of departure the work of art itself which is obviously the mediating factor between the author and his audience and which we discovered was a multi-layered sign system with spatial and temporal characteristics of its own. These unique spatial and temporal structures are necessary in order to allow the artist to overcome the bounds of everyday life. Art
has its source in a negating act of consciousness which undoes the fact-world. That is, art begins with pure imagination or pure ideation which then seeks embodiment. In this work, I am primarily concerned with art which has its source in imagination and in its attendant magical consciousnesses. The special temporal and spatial characteristics of art allow for the embodiment of the artist's inner consciousness. As Hegel notes when speaking of the consciousness of the primitive artist (artificer), art starts from a separation of body and soul or a separation of Spirit's oneness which implicitly contains an opposition of individuality and universality. The artist, at first, struggles in his inner, hidden reality. Art, at this stage, is anti-nature and anti-law in that it is consciousness' attempt to experience itself as free and self-contained.

However, the attempt can end only in an empty, one-sided universality since it lacks embodiment. In order to lay hold of consciousness as actual, the artist must find a form of individuality for it. And, in the earliest attempts at art work, the artist does this by finding his internal vision objectified in nature. Later, artists made this find in animal life, and still later, in hieroglyphic symbols. Then,
in attempting to give his inner reality its own space, the artist embodies it in sculpture, a spatialized hieroglyph. Note, that all of the embodiments mentioned so far have the character of a thing. They are static and fail to contain the movement of consciousness which is the source and certainty of the artist's inner act. As such, these embodiments are only shells and have no immediate presence of their own. The artist's reality tends to collapse back upon itself, and the artist's purpose in embodying his reality falls short.

It is not until the artist can embody his reality in a language that it can be set free and have an immediate presence of its own. Language more perfectly mediates what Hegel calls the split between body and soul. As Hegel says, language is the form in which spirit finds existence:

Language is self-consciousness existing for others; it is self-consciousness which as such is there immediately present, and which in its individuality is universal. Language is self separating itself from itself, which as the pure ego identical with ego becomes an object to itself, which at once maintains itself in this actual self, and at the same time fuses directly with others and their self-consciousness.⁴

What the language of conscience contains is the self knowing itself as existential reality. This alone is what that language expresses, and this expression is the true realization of "doing," of action, and is the validation of the act [of consciousness].⁵
When the artist has learned to express his inner vision in the languages of body movement and speaking, there can be theater. Theater art has the space of the actor's body and the spontaneous temporality of his words.

Despite the more perfect embodiment of the artist's reality made possible by theater, there is a sacrifice which has to be made. The artist must sacrifice some of the magic of his original, personal act of consciousness because the theatrical presentation of his work is tied to the here and now of objective space and time more than he would like. This can be partially overcome by resorting to the written work, but here too there is a sacrifice; the work suffers from a loss of space. In a written work, time can be manipulated with ease, but space remains "unfilled."

It is not until the advent of the cinema that the artist's work can achieve an embodiment equal to that offered by theater and still retain the magical ability to transcend the barriers of ordinary space and time.

The unique space and time of film was discussed previously, and at this point in the investigation, it is clear that film work is a special stage of artistic activity. Cinema subsumes previous art forms by being
able to approximate the experiences offered by (1) presentational art (nature, hieroglyphs, painting, photography); (2) spatial art (sculpture, theater); and (3) discursive art (literature, theater, music). Cinema offers the perceiver an immediate experience of "otherness" without a sacrifice of the personal, magical qualities of that otherness. Cinema offers the artist a high fidelity mediator of one reality to another reality, a fine medium of communication. However, the full implications of this communication remain to be seen, and we will miss something of the nature of art and film art if we do not more fully investigate it. In order to do this, we have started at the very root of the matter: the grounds for human communication.
14.0 Grounds for Communication:

Using the hermeneutic method of investigation, it is possible to include within the work of art the author and the audience, two essential elements to the work's being-in-the-world. In this portion of the investigation, I have brought to light some of the essential bases of artistic communication. I have also uncovered some of the bases for human communication in general; however, this was only incidental to my main task of investigating artistic communication.

In the initial stages of this portion of the investigation, I made use of many terms and concepts derived from the work of Martin Heidegger, especially his work Being and Time. It is well beyond the scope of this investigation to fully explain Heidegger's terms and concepts. This would require repeating much of Heidegger's work. I have explained what I borrowed from him as best I can and referred the reader to the relevant portions of his work by use of footnotes. In addition, I believe the reader can refine his understanding of the terms I borrow from Heidegger as he proceeds in reading the remainder of the paper.
14.1 Being-in-the-World of the Author:

Initially, I will consider the author as simply a person, not yet an author. Everyone finds himself being-in-the-world. He exists here and now and is an entity which he himself is, i.e., "mineness" belongs to him. The compound expression "being-in-the-world" is to be taken as a unitary whole; nevertheless, it has constitutive structures which when taken separately aid in understanding the whole. Included in the term are the following elemental structures: (1) the ontological structure of the environing world as such; (2) the being of one such that he is an entity which has being-in-the-world as its way of being; (3) the being of one such that he is in the world in the sense of dwelling alongside it and being absorbed in it. One also has a facticity in the sense that he can understand himself as bound up in his destiny with the being of those other entities which he encounters in his own world. These encountered entities include those "things" which are present-to-hand, and, also, other people who can be recognized as alter egos and experienced in various degrees of clarity. The fact that one can experience that "I am in a world," shows that he can be in various possible ways of comporting himself toward entities
which he is along-side. The statement "I am in a world" stems from a correction of Descartes famous statement "cogito ergo sum" such that the "sum" comes first. The emphasis is on the "being" and not on the "thinking." One finds oneself situated in a world in which there are possibilities of action and reaction on a prereflexive level. This new emphasis is the result of phenomenological time studies in which it was discovered that to know oneself reflexively is to know oneself as past; it is a making present of the past. This means that in the present, others may know one contemporaneously and so more clearly than one knows oneself. However, the main point is that one is in the world with various possibilities for comporting oneself.

One has the possibilities of comporting oneself in two fundamental ways: authentically or inauthentically. These two basic modes of being are more fully explained in Section 15.0. For now let me say that if one comports himself in such ways as: having to do with something, producing something, attending to something, looking after something, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining, or investigating, one is being concerned. If one comports oneself in such ways as: leaving undone, neglecting,
renouncing, taking a rest, one is deficiently concerned. In that one has as a possibility being disclosed to himself he reveals himself as care.\textsuperscript{12} That is, since one has the possibility of comporting himself in concerned ways, he is revealed to himself as a caring being; this way of being is the basis for authenticity. However, one may also comport himself by being absorbed in idle talk; ambiguity; inattention; or fascination with other, fellow-beings.\textsuperscript{13} These modes of being, according to Heidegger, may be called "falling" or "losing oneself in the they."\textsuperscript{14} This "fallenness" is the predominate mode of being-in-the-world. It is inauthentic life because it is to neglect one's ownmost possibilities. It has as its source a "fleeing in the face of death."\textsuperscript{15}

We have taken as our clue to investigating the grounds for communication the author's being-in-the-world. But, let us continue, for a while longer, to speak of the author as just a person naively comporting himself in the world. He comports himself alongside various objects which he experiences in the present, and most notable among the objects he encounters are other people. It is via this encounter with others that one finds that what is his (mineness) also includes what is other. It has been pointed out by Descartes
and other notable philosophers and it is given in experience that one may know oneself, i.e., one may reflect upon his being-in-the-world. However, as phenomenological time studies have made clear, this reflexive knowledge is a making present of what is just past; it is to know oneself as the past. Having the potential for knowing ourselves in this way, we know ourselves far better than anyone else can know us. However, in another sense, the contrary is true. As Schutz says, "In so far as each of us can experience the other's thoughts and acts in the vivid present whereas either can grasp his own only as a past by way of reflection, I know more of the other and he knows more of me than either of us knows of his own stream of consciousness."16 As a result of this, one participates in a vivid and contemporaneous being-in-the-world-for-others which is the basis of the constitution of the sphere of the "We." However, the constitution of this sphere is a process fraught with peril.

Our clue in proceeding is that there is a tension between "my world" and the "Other's world." This tension arises from the Other's having a knowable presence but an unknowable past (retention) and future (protention) for me, and from the obverse: for the Other, it is only my presence which is knowable. Furthermore,
it is only under the gaze of the Other that I experience "mineness" as limited, i.e., as contingent and factual. If it were not for the Other's objectification of me, if I were the only one in the world, I would not truly be in the world. The world would be totally mine as in a dream or as if I were the god who created it. Nothing would stand against me; everything which fell under my gaze would be mine. I would be identical with the world and so would not need or have "mineness." Thus, it can be argued, as Hegel does, that the Other is a necessary condition to self-consciousness. It is the limit which the Other places on consciousness which spurs consciousness to know itself.

Note, that above we are not concerned with the presence of the Other as merely a body. If he were only a body, one could dismiss him as a "thing" and not have to be concerned with him as more than a mere appearance. He could not affect the world, and he could not rob from me what is mine. But, in as much as he can know me for what I am, he has power over me. He can make me ashamed of the way I be.

It is this spurring of consciousness to realize what is its own (mineness) which motivate's one's concern for the Other. That is, initially, this concern is a concern for the loss of the self, and it motivates one
to attempt to retake that which is lost. The first primitive attempts at "retaking" that part of one's self which the Other "robs" from one--the self as master of the now, as master of direct and prereflexive consciousness of what is--were most likely attempts to destroy the Other.\textsuperscript{19} The Other's power to rob me of what is mine may be dealt with by simply abolishing it. This, of course, is a futile endeavor since it is impractical because of the sheer number of Others and the chance of retribution, and since it means the destruction of what is mine along with the destruction of the Other.

Yet another approach to "retaking" is to attempt to "capture" the Other. In this approach, one attempts to take over the entire being of the Other and assume responsibility for him. This type of concern for the Other is at the heart of the master-slave relation, and it is an attempt to subsume the destiny of the Other to one's own destiny. In this way, the master believes that he will not lose himself since what is taken from him will be taken to what is already is. The slave lives the truth of the master, and the slave can be no more than the master. Of course, as Hegel has pointed out, this master-slave relation is bound to fail when it occurs to the slave that the master needs him.\textsuperscript{20}
When the slave rebels which he will eventually always do, the master's scheme collapses.

A more advanced and less volatile attempt to retake one's self is the attempt to "know the Other for what he is." This is an attempt to know the Other's retentions and protentions and in so doing to minimize or mitigate his power by knowing a priori his possibilities for offensive action. This, of course, is a deficient grade of concern like the other attempts at "retaking" which have been mentioned; but it is a thesis which can be improved and expanded by being made reciprocal. However, at this level of one-sided knowledge, there is an attempt to limit the Other's possibilities by categorizing him. It involves the "magical" power of naming, and it is one of the motives to the establishment of a pecking order, caste system, or occupational status system. Note, though, that when the thesis of "know the Other for what he is" becomes expanded by being made reciprocal, we have arrived at another, and possibly the most important, ground for communication, sharing or reciprocal knowledge.

But, before proceeding to investigate reciprocal knowledge which is the basis for higher level communication and higher level concern, it was worth considering some of the basic modes of one-sided knowledge of the Other or deficient concern for the Other.
14.2 Deficiently Concerned Being:

The thesis of "knowing the Other for what he is" may be invoked even in deficient modes of concern; however, in this case there is always an element of "bad faith" involved. As Sartre says, "bad faith" consciousness of this type comports itself such that it is the "nihilation of a possibility which another human reality projects as its possibility." This "bad faith" attempt to know the Other arises in the world as a "no." The slave, for instance, first apprehends the master as a prohibitive force, a "no" which can be foisted upon him. It would seem that deficient concern is a disaffirmance of the Other, but, in fact, it is simply a back handed way of affirming him. As was mentioned above, the master needs the slave or he could not be master. The master lies to the slave and to himself in order to profit from the "ontological duality between myself and myself in the eyes of the Other." It is only from oneself that one hides the truth of the affirmance of the Other.

In further investigating deficiently concerned being, let us consider a situation in which a person is hoeing a garden. An unobserved Observer who is conscious from the Natural Standpoint encounters this Other as simply a body, and he interprets changes in
this body in terms of his own lived experience, not the Other's. The Observer takes in the scene in front of him in a polythetic synthesis upon which he reflects monothetically. He arranges what he sees into the total context of his experience. If he can, he will attempt to name what he sees. However, if the activities he observes are outside his experience or zones of relevancy, he may not be able to name or understand their significance. He will not be able to form or make judgments upon the activities which he observes. However, he will see by the actions of the Other's body that these actions are part of that body's project, i.e., the actions are motivated. His first attempts at interpreting the Other will be based upon his own lived experience. First, he may try to imagine himself doing similar acts. Or, second, he could attempt to recall in detail how he once did similar acts. Finally, if the Observer finds no significance to this point, he may attempt to infer a motive for the acts of the Other by selecting one of his own motives and asking himself whether the acts observed would further that motive. The Observer will probably be able to give significance to the Other's acts in this way, but there may be no relation to the true project of the Other.
Note, that in a situation like the one described above, since the Observer is unnoticed, it could be asserted that he has lost nothing of himself to the Other, and, therefore, has no motive for attributing a consciousness like his own to the Other. However, once he sees the Other's actions are motivated by some project and not wholly accidental, he feels himself endangered. This is true not only because the Other may see him and make him part of some project, possibly a hostile one, but also because the purposive acts of the Other indicate a significance (meaning structure) of which the Observer may already be an unwitting part. Let us assume for a moment that our Observer is an American Indian who has come upon a lone Other in a garden on the outskirts of a small agrarian settlement in about the year 1760 in what is today Ohio. The Observer, if he does not see the futility of it, may kill the Other right then and there. This preemptive act would seem to quell the threat of the Observer's losing himself, but instead it will open the door wider to what the Observer feared since the significance of the life of the Other may well overflow the Observer (and his tribe) in the form of retribution.
The limit to the benefit of one-sided violence, namely that it may become two-sided, is a deterrent to one's remaining at the level of deficient concern. The theme of "knowing the Other for what he is" comes more to the fore as the ability to make and interpret signs develops. In the situation presented, the Observer had only the natural signs of bodily action to work with, but such signs point directly to the Other as a conscious being if one chooses to heed them. This is especially true of signs (of any type) perceived by an unobserved observer because such signs are not likely to be made in bad faith. As was discussed in reference to Figure 1 in Section 7.0 of this paper, signs may be used in bad faith.

At least part of the reason some critics and theorists have attributed "freshness" and "spontaneity" to the moving image-sign is that it presents objectivities which are seen by one as though one were an unobserved observer. Film image-signs always appear to have been made in good faith. Of course, this requires the spectator to overlook that film image-signs are "expressive signs" used explicitly to communicate. Such expressive signs as the film image-sign, even though they may represent other "natural signs" such as a
character's bodily movements, are not necessarily made in good faith. The question which remains to be answered is why someone would use an expressive sign in good faith? In answering this question, it will be necessary to investigate concerned being.
14.3 Concerned Being:

In considering why one would make or use a sign in good faith, it must be pointed out that a "we" relationship is co-given to being-in-the-world. As we have seen, this "we" relationship may be apprehended with less than perfect clarity by deficiently concerned Beings. The reality of the Other is his conscious project, and his capacity for having such a project. This capacity arises from one's being-in-time, i.e., from one's being what he is not and his not being what he is.\(^{23}\) One's reality and the Other's reality stem from both having possibilities of doing and having something other than they are doing and having at any given moment. The doing and having of the one affects the doing and having of the Other and vice versa.

Ultimately, the project of every existent consciousness is to apprehend itself as the foundation of the World; it desires to possess the world.\(^{24}\) But this is no simple desire. One wishes to possess in the sense of having and also in the sense of being the source of the world. That is, one wishes to be universal and particular at the same time. One desires to be the source of the world and have it emanate from one by a continuous act of creation, and, at the same time, be outside oneself possessing what is created. However,
one cannot accomplish this, or even approximate it, without already being outside oneself. If one were an absolute creator, everything one created would be only oneself. Of course, as has already been seen, one is outside oneself in that one is the Other; however, this means that one cannot continue to deny the Other and have any chance of realizing his project of being a creator. It follows that one must recognize the reciprocal nature of being-in-the-world in order to be oneself-in-the-world. The author is one who recognizes this reciprocal nature.

The "good faith" creation and use of signs is a mode of being-in-the-world whereby one recognizes his project is for the Other as well as for himself. One allows himself and his project to be clearly seen by the Other in order to realize it as his own, as his creation which exists independently of him. This may be furthered by the Other's reciprocation. That is, the Other's project as well, if it is a good faith effort, cannot exclude one and what is one's. Communication is based upon a good faith recognition of one's being-in-the-world-for-the-Other.

Some theorists have said that communication is an intersubjective time-process by which two fluxes of
inner time, that of the speaker and that of the listener, become synchronous.\textsuperscript{25} This communication is of a higher level where it is reciprocal as in a dialogue. Of course, there is an underlying reciprocity in the situation where there is a speaker and listener in fixed roles since they have tacitly recognized the subjectivity of one another. Nevertheless, we must make a distinction here: The dialogue is a higher form of communication since it presupposes the possibilities of (1) equivalent inner depths of the participants; and (2) expansion of these inner realities. In the situation where there is only a speaker and a passive listener, we have a situation characteristic of art communication, i.e., an author and his audience. The relation between the speaker and the listener in this situation presupposes that the speaker (artist) is "deeper" than the members of his audience. The author can give more to the audience than they can give to him it would seem. However, we will see later, the audience does give a great deal to the author and his work.

Whether we speak of a dialectic or an artistic type communication, the aim of the good faith communicator is to make himself transparent to his audience such that each member of the audience can stand at the
"zero point" of the communicator. That is, the per-
ceiver seeks to thematize the mode of being of the com-
municator in order to attempt to share with him objects
of consciousness in represented spaces and times. The
perceiver is guided in this project by the expressive
signs used by the communicator.

Certainly, some types of signs may be better than
others in pointing to certain types of communicative
intent (meaning). The task of finding whether the
multi-layered sign system which is film can communicate
something original remains. No answer can yet be given
because we must find out whether the source of the
communication, the author, can be original.

However, it can now be seen that communication is
possible and the grounds for it can be summarized as:
(1) one's being-in-the-world with others; (2) one's
recognition of the Other as having power over one;
(3) one's attempting to know the Other for what he is
and vice versa by making and using signs; (4) one's
making oneself transparent to the Other and vice versa
by the good faith use of expressive signs.
15.0 The Author of Art as an Authentic Being-in-the World:

It appears on the surface that an author is a special kind of person. Let us inquire as to what makes him different from other people. Most people be-in-the-world in what Heidegger called the "they" way. They evade choosing any particular way of being or any particular project of the self. People living in this way live for the moment. They make no attempt to realize themselves as complete temporal beings, but, instead, exist as dispersed in the sense that they make no effort to collect their pasts or project themselves into the future as anything particular. Living in the "they" is to live passively being concerned mainly with the present moment and being concerned with what may be gotten, not what may be achieved. People living in the "they" way are directionless since they make no efforts to see their situations for what they are. They do not see themselves as instrumental to anything which may be called destiny or history. They must look to others for direction; however, They do not look explicitly to others for this would be to recognize their inauthenticity. Instead, they look indirectly to others via societal norms.
It is not my purpose here to propose some simplistic dual categories of being-in-the world. It is contrary to experience to say that there are only authentic and inauthentic people. However, it is accurate to say that they are only authentic and inauthentic modes of being. Of course, people can shift rapidly from one to the other. For instance, a person who has been living authentically may be "worn down" and so "fall" into the "they way," and, later, he might resurrect himself or he might not. The point to be garnered is that at any given time, most people exist in the "they way." This is to be expected since falling into the "they way" is a fleeing in the face of one's death. To stand resolutely in the face of death is to bear a great burden. One usually shirks this burden, until, at the moment of death, it cannot be escaped.

One who stands resolutely in the face of his death is one who comes back to himself in the sense that he seeks to take over his heritage, and he is one who goes out from himself in that he seeks to be himself in the future. In other words, one who is living authentically seeks to take over his history and to project it into the future in order to live it out in the future. This "living-it-out," however, requires acts
or deeds, i.e., one must constantly choose himself as that which he wants to be and act accordingly. It is through his existential acts that one is a particular being-in-the-world, and it is through his acts that others may know him as an authentic being. These acts are the sediments or signs of his way of being. These signs may be made with the express desire to communicate, or they may be marks, i.e., they may be what was seen or felt of one's being-in-the-world by others. It is as a result of such deeds that we can say that a great man "left his mark on history." Karl Jaspers has pointed out that some of the most influential men who ever lived—Jesus, Socrates, and Buddha—did not write or otherwise consciously record anything; they simply were what they were.29

Communication, though, in light of authentic being takes on a heretofore unopened significance. However, before pursuing it, let me point out that communication, as it has been previously described, is an integral part of authentic being. One's resolute pursuit of his own-most possibility is a being-in-the-world-for-others as much as it is a being-in-the-world-for-oneself. One's own destiny is being factual, and others are affected by the acts, and others may know one by his acts, especially if such acts
involve the good faith use of expressive signs. In using such signs, an authentic Being makes his authenticity transparent such that it can be easily seen by others. One can communicate what one is, and it is what an authentic Being is that gives new significance to what communication is.

As we have seen, being authentic is being futural, i.e., it is a projection of oneself into the future. But, this is done in such a way that there is also a "throwing back" upon one's situation or history of being-there in the world. Thus, the finitude of "having-been" is gathered up and cast forward as a continuing possible mode of being. And, this "having-been" as an authentic being-in-the-world is a being-for-others, and it is a continuation of the being-for-others that has been. Such temporal continuity is historical, and it presupposes an openness of the past to the present.30

It presupposes a transcendental communication, i.e., a communication which transcends the life of any one person. This is the new significance of communication; Communication between authentic beings may be transcendental communication. It is this transcendental communication which is largely responsible for any movement to history. It allows for "being genuinely historical," as opposed to simply "being from the past"
or "being dead." It is this type of communication which is responsible for what is known as the "history of thought" or the "history of art," etc. since these histories are carried on and expanded by authentic acts. Transcendental communication is the basis for progressive historical creation or the continuing process of uncovering what is. To the modern mind, this continuing process of communication can probably be seen most clearly in the history of science since "being scientific" has had a widespread effect.31

Let us now turn our attention to the mode of being of the art-author. An author is concerned with creating. That is to say, he is concerned with being the source of concrete existence which embodies his inner reality. He seeks to make an object of which he is the source in that the object exists only through him as though by a constantly renewed emanation. However, as we have seen, the object the author creates must also be independent of him in order to be experiential as his; otherwise, it would be incorporated in him like a gourmet meal after the cook ingests it; it is the cook's but it is indistinguishable from him. In order to have this double relation of his work to himself, the author must act to embody what is his in something that is not his. As has been noted, the author may make this
embodiment in various natural materials; in other people, as in the case of orally transmitted myths or dramas; or in various sign systems such as music, words, paintings, photographs, or films.

However, it is essential to the artist not only that he seeks to have his work embodied but that his work is at first a negation of what is, i.e., an imagination or idea which is uniquely the artist's. It is the mode of being of the artist to make his unique vision of the world into his explicit theme or project with which he attempts to enter a double relation as explained above. Generally, an artist is an authentic Being since his project is to realize himself as an ekstatic unity, i.e., a unity of his past, present, and future. The artist seeks to realize himself in the future on the basis of his past, and his process of creation is a process of discovery. If the artist, as a resolute investigator, pursues his investigations beyond what we can call in Freudian terms the "childishness of the Id," he will eventually uncover something of general significance. If he is a talented maker of signs, he will be able to give it adequate embodiment. When one chooses to be an art-author, one chooses to be concerned; one chooses to make a good faith communication of his way of being.
Of course, not all people called authors live authentically. For example, the so-called "author" of pornography has as his explicit theme lying, i.e., presenting himself and his acts as authentic when, in fact, he exists in the "they way." True pornography has its origin in deficient modes of being. It is an attempt by its author and the members of his audience through him to be master of the world as its supreme commander, without at all recognizing the reality of others. The pornographic consciousness is usurpious, not creative. The dominant theme of pornography and its author is to be a master of others without recognizing them as real. The author of pornography has no project of his own but presents the "fallenness" of the "they" as if it were a project. This is done by the bad faith use of signs to create myths (see Figure 1).

The authentic author does not lie; however, he may communicate what is true but of little general significance. This may be the case if he has recently become authentic or if he remains for an inordinate time struggling with ordinary meanings. The key factor in the level of communication of which the art-author is capable is the degree to which he has "made the world his own." As we have seen, an authentic Being is historical in that he seeks to "gather-up" his past
and he is historicizing in that he seeks to project himself into the future which he then makes his own.\textsuperscript{33} This "gathering-up," in other terms is a "possession" or "taking over" of meanings. Also, the authentic Being seeks to "uncover" meanings.

When I speak about "taking over" or "uncovering" meaning, I am speaking about intersubjective meaning or regions thereof. According to Husserl's phenomenology, intersubjectivity is the principle by which all reality is constituted, including all objective realities.\textsuperscript{34} Husserl speaks of material and formal ontological regions as indexes pointing to transcendental systems of evidence. He is here referring to formal-logical categories and also to "regions of objects" such as are subsumed under the headings Objective World, Man, Human Community, Culture, etc.\textsuperscript{35} He calls for an "uncovering of the intentionality implicit in the experience of (regions) as a transcendental process, a matter of explicating systematically the predelineative horizons by a conversion into possible fulfilling evidence, and then incessantly explicating . . . the new horizons that indeed incessantly arise within the old."\textsuperscript{36} An authentic art-author, therefore, as much as an authentic philosopher or scientist, is original in as much as
he succeeds in "uncovering" meaning, either at the ontological level or the levels of regions or categories of Being.

In the case of the artist, as opposed to the philosopher or scientist, this "taking over" is usually done on a prereflexive level. The artist feels meanings rather than thinks them. That is not to say that artists do not think, but thinking is not essential to art. And, generally, the thinking done by the artist is by way of intuition and not conception, and the intuitions are not always brought into clear focus. The artist's "discovering" is usually a process of awakening of the sensibilities rather than the cognitive capacities.

Nevertheless, the artist is no less in possession of the truth than the philosopher. Truth here has nothing to do with the correspondence of a mental category to external reality. Heidegger says:

With all our correct representations we would get nowhere, we could not even presuppose that there is already manifest something to which we can conform ourselves, unless the unconcealedness of beings had already exposed us to, placed us in that lighted realm in which every being stands for us and from which it withdraws.37

The truth which the artist possesses and conveys is that his work corresponds to a necessity within him, i.e., his inner vision. The artist opens areas of concern
for himself and for others. He is being true when he makes a good faith effort to communicate what he discovers. What he discovers is true when it installs in the world a "spaciousness, i.e., it holds open and sets up a world within the World."\(^{38}\) Also, the artist's work must be true with respect to itself. It must be "finished" and discourage any notion of correction or erasure. It answers all questions that it raises. However, the answers are not addressed to the understanding but to the sensibilities. In Kantian terms, as modified to include feeling or prereflexive consciousness, the work of art grounds an affective a priori.\(^{39}\)

According to Mikel Dufrenne, the Kantian a priori can be modified such that a subject may relate to an object on at least three planes: First, at the level of presence, through what Merleau-Ponty calls the corporeal a priori, whereby the world as experienced by the lived body is outlined. Second, at the level of representation through the a priori which determine objective knowledge. This is the Kantian rational a priori. Third, at the level of feeling, through the affective a priori, which opens a world felt and lived by a deep self in the first person.\(^{40}\) Art operates to "open" and "hold open," mainly through the affective a priori, the possibility of experiencing the expressed world of the art-author.
The significance of the reality which the artist opens via his work depends upon the degree to which he has "taken over" the world or a region thereof. The artist must "take over" as well as "open" meanings: otherwise, his work will lack general significance and historical bases. Thus, using the term "grasped" to include both "taking over" and "opening," I shall propose several broad categories of art: If the artist "grasps" a dominant mode of concerned being-in-the-world for an era, I shall call his art period art. It will have a fairly long life (the life of the work of art is discussed in Section 17.0.) If the artist manages to "grasp" an essential mode of being-in-the-world, I shall call his art world art, and it will have an indefinite life. If the artist manages to "grasp" a new and fundamental way of "seeing," I shall call his art original art, and it will also have an indefinite life. I should also mention art which "grasps" the dominant mode of normative life, not decadent life, for a particular time. This is what I shall call popular art, and it may have a very short life. It does not require an authentic artist; however, it may be the work of a particular artist.
The meanings which the artist "grasps" are made experiencable by others. But, here, we are required to question the role of the others in "bringing to life" the aesthetic object. As was pointed out in Section 8.0 of this work, the role of the audience is essential to the mode of being of the aesthetic object. As Dufrenne says, "It is through the spectator that the work finds its own full reality."41

Dufrenne describes aesthetic perception as having three stages: presence, representation, and reflection. These stages are said to be parallel to three elements of the aesthetic object: the sensuous, the represented object, and the expressed world.42 Dufrenne's tripartite scheme for describing perception with its parallelism to elements of the aesthetic object is appropriate for this investigation also; however, the terminology and the descriptions of terms will be somewhat different here. In terms of this investigation, the levels of aesthetic perception are presence, possession, and communication, and these stages parallel the sensuousness of the moving image-sign, the spatial and temporal characteristics of the strata of the aesthetic object, and the expressed world of the author.
The aesthetic object is the apotheosis of the sensuous. It is present to one not as something which is thought about with detachment but as something that concerns one directly. It is a prereflexive consciousness which resonates within one and moves one. This first level of perception is a demand which one responds to bodily. Meaning is read directly from the object of perception which for film is the image-sign. Dufrenne explains this "direct reading" in terms of a Gestalt formula which physically presents a union of signifier and signified which would ordinarily be a higher level synthetic act of consciousness. When the art sign is understood as a Gestalt formula, it can be seen that the work of art involves a "corporeal complicity" between the creator and the spectator. The artist physically builds part of the meaning of his art-sign, the sensuous meaning, and the spectator physically responds to this sensuousness.

In most art forms, the signs are produced by the hands of the artist, and all that is in the art has thus passed into it through the artist's body. Note that there is nothing worse than a so-called artwork which is contrived and stiff due to a deficient physical relation between it and its creator. Imagine the effect of a musician's not being able to properly
manipulate the instrument which he tries to play. The "play" is missing from the music; it lacks the air of spontaneity, enthusiasm, and genuineness which come from feeling the music in one's body.

In the case of film, the signs are not made with the artist's hands in quite the same way as with most other arts. The film artist does physically manipulate his camera, microphone, etc., but his signs are also largely constructed by impersonal mechanical and chemical processes which supply the Gestalt formula which is the analogical meaning of the signs. Of course, anyone who has worked in a darkroom knows that there is a bodily feel to even a photochemical process. Also, we must not neglect the bodily nature of acting or of constructing sets and staging. So, apparently, there are different levels of embodiment for film art: (1) the acting and physical construction of the sets and costumes; (2) the physical manipulation of the cinematographic recording equipment, i.e., lights, camera, microphone, sound recorder, etc.; (3) the physical manipulation of the film development process, special effects processes, and film printing machines.

Ideally, the film author, the director, should do all acts of embodiment listed above. However, this is
impractical. Realistically, it can only be hoped that the director is sufficiently experienced with the filmmaking processes that he can vicariously feel them in those who actually carry them out. This type of feeling is a sympathetic feeling based upon one's knowing the processes and being able to imagine oneself doing them through another person such that one can direct that other person. Such a skill is indispensable to the true film author. He must not only have the imaginative powers to inwardly create the work, but he must also have the imaginative power to embody it through the bodies of others and through machines and chemical processes. This requires a combination of the very oldest and most fundamental human skill of "fellow feeling" with the modern skill of "machine feeling."

However, a work of art is not made for the body alone. The pure physical presence of the work is pointless, and the sensations one encounters in it are diffused and have unstable meanings unless they are possessed. Dufrenne calls this second level of perception representation, and he uses Sartre's explanation of imagination and Kant's explanation of a priori forms to describe how the presence of the work of art is represented to consciousness such that it can be
known. No doubt this is a good way to explain this level of aesthetic perception, but in order not to become mired in the debate between Kantian and phenomenological theories of perception, I have described this step by using terms similar to those which I have used thus far in the paper.

In order to carry on the perception of the aesthetic object, the perceiver must make the sensations presented his own. That is, he must possess the spatial and temporal dimensions embodied in the work. He must identify with the meanings "held open" by the work. In the case of film, this possession establishes an identity of the spectator with the director in the "I see this thing" mode of consciousness which film invites. However, this action of possession is "broader" than what is called representation. The spectator animates the aesthetic object with the spatial and temporal relation which it requires before any reflection occurs. The work, in a sense, borrows the space and time of the perceiver and organizes it according to the spatial and temporal requirements of the various strata. This action of possession extends through both pre-reflexive and reflexive levels of consciousness of the perceiver.
It is at the reflexive level of consciousness that the perceiver can be said to possess knowledge of the aesthetic object. At this level, the perceiver can think about the represented objects or other strata of the work as though they were his own original experiences. However, it requires a still higher act of consciousness to experience the aesthetic object as communicating: at the same time one's own and the Other's (author's) object. This third level of perception of the aesthetic object requires another act of reflection such that the project of the author and one's own project are experienced as coterminous. At this stage of perception, the project of the author is "taken over" and becomes also the project of the spectator. The spectator experiences the expressed world of the author explicitly as a world within the World.

Until now, I have discussed perception of the aesthetic object as involving only one spectator. However, the aesthetic object of film, as well as the aesthetic objects of some other arts, almost always is seen by a mass audience. It was said in Section 8.0 of this work, that the aesthetic object gains "being" from the plurality of interpretations which attach to it when it is seen by a large audience. The basis of this
statement is that through the communicative function of the work of art, the expressed world of the author is grounded in the social world. Of course, as we saw when investigating authentic authorship, the work was from the beginning as much for the Other as for the artist. However, because an authentic work of art is "aimed" at others does not mean that the others will accept it. The spectator's inattention to the work, his refusal to accept it as a communication, or his acceptance of it as something other than the author intended are the sources of power of the perceiver over the work. The audience is an essential element of the work. The work cannot come into full being without an audience, and the members of the audience jointly and severally have power over the work. Assuming that a work is art, the spectator's inattention to it, or his refusal to accept it have two main causes: (1) the spectator cuts short his process of perception; or (2) the spectator perceives according to the aesthetic norms of the society in which he lives.

For example, the inattentive spectator is one who refuses to acknowledge or "make contact" with the sensuousness of the work of art. This spectator simply refuses to allow himself to experience the work on any level. In fact, he may physically turn away from
it or otherwise refuse to look at it. Also, a spectator may cut short his process of perception before the higher levels (communication) are reached. In this way, the work of art exists solely for his pleasure on the basis of his possessing its spatial and temporal structures, and the author and his originality are denied. This denial can be said to be an act of "bad faith" since the author is affirmed by the pleasure the perceiver obtains from the author's artwork but denied by the perceiver's failure to take the work as an intersubjective communication. Here, the spectator acts like a voracious consumer who believes that the work is "just there" for him in the same way as objects of nature or mass manufactured goods. The "work nature" of the work is denied, and so, the author, too, is denied.

Also, the spectator may fail to reach the level of communicative perception not as a result of "bad faith" but because he or she is not adequate to the work. In this case, the spectator is a person who is not able to grasp all the meanings which the work embodies. The spectator may be ignorant of such meanings, or he may be too dull or insensitive to grasp them, or the meanings may not be relevant to him. A spectator who is ignorant of the meanings of the work
may simply not have been exposed to them. Often, through education, such a spectator can be sensitized to whatever it is he lacks with regard to perceiving the work more fully. If the meanings of the work of art are not relevant to the spectator, education will not help since the spectator willfully chooses not to "open" himself to such meanings. Often this is the case with people who are intelligent but refuse to take the time or expend the effort to be concerned about certain categories or regions of meaning. These people are often specialists or technicians in certain fields who do not take note of other areas of human endeavor. In as much as these people do not have time for or take much note of art, their experiences of it are guided by the norms of the society in which they live.

This brings us to the second major reason why a spectator may be inattentive to or refuse to accept a work of art: the spectator perceives according to the aesthetic norms of the society in which he lives. "Collective awareness" or "normative awareness" is a social fact. A norm can be defined as a generally accepted system of cultural order and concern such as a language system, a religious system, a political system, etc. Such systems are realities even though they cannot be perceived by the senses. They are
revealed by their exerting influence on empirical reality. As a general statistical principle, this influence is characterized by what is often called the principle of central tendency. A norm tends to centralize beliefs, practices, behaviors, customs, etc. But norms, although they strive for universal validity, never achieve the force of natural law. If a norm achieved universal validity, it would cease to be a norm and become a natural law which is adhered to out of necessity. A norm is subject to and based upon a fundamental dialectical antinomy between universal validity and mere regulative or orientational potential. Different types of norms tend more toward one side of the pole than the other. For example, a judicial norm tends toward absolute validity; it is stable and changes slowly. On the other hand, the aesthetic norm tends to be a mere background for constant violation; it is very unstable and changes rapidly.

For most people, the aesthetic norms of the society serve as guides in determining what is art and whether it is "good" or "bad" art. That is, the aesthetic norm, like other norms, sets values. A value, for our purposes, is the ability of something to assist in the attainment of some goal. The collective valuations of individuals set the normative
value which, for the aesthetic norm, is aesthetic pleasure. Just what type of aesthetic pleasure the society considers normal is determined by the goals of the society. Harsh critics of present day American culture, such as Marxists, say that the type of aesthetic pleasure which most Americans have as their goal is titillation of the senses. Of course, Marxist critics also say that the goals of most Americans are programmed by capitalist masters who seek to dominate the masses. The role of the aesthetic norm in this "capitalist" plan is to confuse the masses and keep low their sense of purpose and esteem by glutting their senses with eroticism and propaganda. In as much as such criticism is untrue, it is untrue because in America artists are free to put whatever meanings they want into their art, and spectators are free to draw out of it as much as is in it, or as much as they want, or as much as they are able. As we have seen in this investigation, an authentic artist can put a great deal into his art. Can the masses be kept from cutting short their perception of authentic artworks thus denying the full value of the art?

If there is an affirmative answer, it is that normative expectations of aesthetic pleasure must be elevated by a process of education. One of the great
importances of education, including aesthetic education, is the maintenance of norms and the upgrading of norms. It is the responsibility of educators to show their students what art can be. The knowledge and experience which educators present to their students is passed on, usually informally, to the families and friends and associates of the students and on through the societal structure. The demand for authentic art should spur its production.

However, artists cannot wait for educators to create a market for their art. Artists are responsible for aesthetic norms also, and they should not produce art which they know is aimed at normative tastes whether to make money or to make a name for themselves. But artistic responsibility cannot be legislated. No rule of law could make artists responsible. For, artistic responsibility stems from the characteristic mode of being of the artist: He is concerned with grasping the World and embodying it for himself and for others. He freely chooses as his theme his own inner world and its relation to the Environing World. His responsibility is to be true to his chosen path and to reveal what he finds in good faith.

Film artists have a big problem though compared to most other artists. Films cost millions of dollars, and
unless a filmmaker is independently wealthy, he may not be able to fulfill his artistic potential. Feature films are almost always commercial undertakings, and the goal is not to make art but to make money. Films can be seen by mass audience, and so, they can generate a lot of revenue. Investors in film projects want as much revenue as possible to cover their big production costs and to make big profits. In order to realize the biggest audience, the investors pressure the filmmakers to aim at the lowest common denominator in aesthetic values. The result of this money making strategy is that there is a constant downward pressure on the aesthetic norms of cinema. Audiences are given trash, and eventually this is reflected in normative values.
The term "life" is used in reference to the aesthetic object of film or other arts in much the same way that it is used to refer to people. That is, there are analogies between the life of the aesthetic object and the life of a person, but, of course, there is no perfect identity. I am not speaking here of the relation between the aesthetic object and its author, save for the author's creating the work and so giving it life. The life of the aesthetic object is a social phenomenon. We may speak of the aesthetic object as having "life" in that it exists in time, in this case objective or clock time, as an uninterrupted identity, yet, it also reacts to forces working upon it. One of the reasons that it is not alive in the same way as a person is alive is that it reacts to forces only passively. That is not to say that perceivers of the aesthetic object are not affected by it; they are. But, the aesthetic object cannot affect itself or change its own elements or structure. For such changes it needs the author, and he or she is finished with it.

Whatever changes the aesthetic object undergoes, happen from the outside, since only the author is the source of the inside, and these changes may shorten or
lengthen the life of the work. These changes tend to
propel the work through what may be called a life cycle.
The life of the aesthetic object shows phases similar
to the phases of youth, maturity, and old age which
characterize a person's life. Of course, there is only
a structural similarity. In the first phase of the life
of the aesthetic object, it may not be very widely
accepted by its audience. This is because it cannot be
understood in terms of the norms of the society of that
time. Only perceivers who do not operate normatively
will accept the work because only they will be open to
it and understand it. Naturally, I am not referring to
subnormal people but to the more exceptional people in
the society. And, it is these exceptional people who
most influence norms, especially aesthetic norms.
They are the "opinion leaders" and the "trend setters."
In addition to their receptiveness and thoughtfulness,
they are likely to hold high status positions in the
society such that they have the power and the means to
affect the lives of others; this power can help change
norms. In the second phase of the life of the aesthetic
object, it gains maturity which results from its being
accepted by a larger audience. This results from the
inevitable shift in societal and aesthetic norms for
which the work may be partially responsible. In this
stage, the work receives many and adequate concretizations, or, in the case of film, it has a large audience. Finally, in the last stage of the life of the aesthetic object, the work becomes less popular. It is concretized less, and it is concretized and perceived less and less adequately. Spectators no longer understand or respond to the work.

This dying of aesthetic object is largely due to the constant shift in societal norms. The work eventually becomes seen as stilted, hackneyed, slow paced, prosaic, or even comical. Note, there may be a certain charm in this aging. Consider the popularity today of films made in the 1930's and 1940's. Such a resurrection of the aesthetic object is not unusual, but it usually does not occur until the work is old enough not to be considered at all modern. Of course some works, those which were referred to above as "world" or "original" remain popular and adequately concretized and perceived once they have fully entered the world. However, even for such works as these, continuing existence is not absolutely assured. Ultimately, they are subject to the same contingencies as the world itself. That is, acts of man such as destruction by nuclear war or acts of God such as destruction by floods,
earthquakes, plagues, etc. could destroy even immortal works by destroying their material bases or their audiences. In the case of more ordinary works, old age or destruction usually occurs as a joint or several result of three factors: (1) changes in the sign system in which the work is embodied; (2) changes in the concretizations of the work; or (3) changes in the societal or aesthetic norms through which the work is perceived.

The first factor can be seen to be the reason why works written in what are now dead languages may be dead or almost dead themselves. It is impossible to gain access to the meanings the author embodied because the signs he used are not known or used anymore. This type of change is less likely to affect works such as film, photography, painting, sculpture, etc. which rely heavily upon ordinary, unlearned perception. However, in the case of written works, it is quite likely to occur, and it can only be prevented by a translation of the work into a more modern language. If nobody exists who can decipher the original language, the work will die. However, if the material part of the work remains extant, there is always a chance the work could be resurrected by a linguist capable of reconstructing the original language.
In works such as theatrical works which receive a new concretization each time the work is performed, there may be changes from one concretization to the next which are continued out of ignorance or tradition. These changes may come about through interpretations by actors or directors, or by accident. In the case of literature, such changes could occur by one reader telling another how he apprehends the work and that reader telling another and so on. It could happen faster if one very influential reader such as a literary critic espoused a particular concretization. A critic could also greatly influence how a play was concretized. A critic can do nothing about how a film is concretized, except possibly influence its re-editing. However, a critic can greatly influence how the work is perceived by the audience.

This brings us to a consideration of how the life of the aesthetic object may be affected by changes in the societal and aesthetic norms through which the work is perceived by most of its audience. As a result of shifts in the aesthetic norms, the perceiver may not pay attention to the work or he may not consider it to be art or he may not accept it as the author intended it. It is also possible that shifts in the signifiers
of certain signs used in the work will make it difficult or impossible for a perceiver to grasp the meanings the author sought to embody. In such a case, the spectator is left too free to choose the meaning he believes to be appropriate, and this meaning may be detrimental to the overall meaning of the work. It is impossible to say in general the degree of change that would cause a work to be ruined. It is rare to be able to make a large change in a signifier without an attendant change in the signified. It is well known that one can often change a sentence or two in a literary work or change the way a scene in a film is shot or edited without the whole work being destroyed. On the other hand, sometimes these small changes will destroy the whole work. Bela Belaszi gives an example in his book *Theory of Film*. Sergei Eisenstein's film *Battleship Potemkin* was re-edited for showing in a Scandinavian country. Only one scene was moved, but its removal made the rebellion of the ship's crew appear to be unjustified. The whole meaning of the film was destroyed.48

More likely than a shift in the use of signifiers is a shift in the attendant signified because of a shift in societal or aesthetic norms. In cases where the shift is marked, the work must be translated, but, again, it is impossible to say when the work will be
destroyed as a whole. It is well known that some works of art have continued to be adequately perceived without translation for many years. This is likely to be the case with visual art forms such as film, photography, or painting since they rely mainly upon ordinary perception of material or of Gestalts therein. However, these art forms like others also rely upon higher level reflexive acts of perception whereby knowledge is a part of perception. And, often, what people know is drawn from societal norms. Thus, if the norms change markedly, the perception of the work may be inadequate.

In regard to the resurrection of the aesthetic object which was mentioned above, it can occur because of adequate translations of the old work into a modern sign system, or it may occur because the aesthetic norms or societal norms shift such that "old things" are looked upon favorably. Sometimes when this happens, the work is not really adequately perceived, but the audience finds it an amusing game to try to guess what the work means. Or, in the case of film, it is often amusing to see how people and things looked and behaved in standard situations in prior times. However, without extensive historical insight or extensive annotations, it is unlikely that one could even approximate the experience which the work evoked in the spectators of
the time of the work's maturity. Even with insight or annotations, a work which was never more than "popular" in its maturity will not evoke much of a response, save sometimes a comic one, from spectators who see it well after its heyday. This is because the meanings which the author of the work embodied in it were based upon the norms of the time of the work's creation and when those norms change, the work can no longer be experienced as it was when it was created. However, "world" or "original" works of art embody essential meanings which humans will be able to respond to in all times. But, no work is made solely of essential meanings, and those meanings in an immortal work which are based upon norms will not be open to future generations.

As regards the life of the aesthetic object of film as opposed to the life of the aesthetic object of other art forms, it is clear that ordinarily the aesthetic object of film has a very short life cycle. The one concretization of the filmic work achieves maturity within a few weeks or a few months of its release, and it is rare that a film is available for viewing in commercial movie houses as little as six months after its release. The rapid maturation of the work is enhanced, if not partially created, by the high volume of advertising which the film receives.
even before it is released. The goal of the film's makers and investors is to have the film accepted as a mature work as soon as possible. In this way, large audiences and large ticket receipts will be had rapidly. In recent times, the period of the work's maturity is extended by its re-release on television, cable television, and video cassettes.

As was previously mentioned, changes in the sign system which the author used to embody the work do not affect film since many of the meanings of the image-sign require only ordinary perception which does not change markedly through time. However, the linguistic sound-signs used may change, or the work may be shown in a foreign country. In such cases, the life of the work may be shortened, unless a suitable translation is made by dubbing a new sound track.

There are no changes in the concretization of the work once it is completed, with a few exceptions. The director may make some minor editing changes in order to better achieve his intended meaning, but this does not shorten the life of the work. However, editing changes ordered by the producers in order to make the film appeal to the presumed tastes of the masses often deteriorate the work. Similar to these changes are
editing changes made by television stations which broadcast the work. In this case, the changes usually involve the insertion of commercials and the deletion of material thought to be offensive to public tastes and morals. The masses have become so used to television commercials that they are not noticed, and often the so-called immoral scenes cut by television stations are not essential to the work anyway, but they could be. The last major exception to a film's having only one concretization is the "remake" of the film.

Films are usually remade because they were very popular and made a lot of money when they were originally released. The remakes usually fail both artistically and at the box office. This is to be expected. The film was usually adequately concretized when it was originally made. It may even have had an author, but it cannot have another author and remain the same work. Therefore, the producers must have it directed by a craftsman and not an artist. This craftsman may do an adequate job of technical directing, but he is unlikely to be able to adequately translate the work, even if it is translatable, and he is not allowed or capable of making it his own work. In addition, the work probably is untranslatable since it was a "popular" work, and the norms it was based upon have
inevitably changed. Even the work of advertisers and press agents will not make the film popular again.

However, a film critic, as opposed to an advertiser or press agent, functions like a good film teacher. Even though the critic has no influence over how a filmic work is concretized, he or she does have an effect upon how the work is perceived by its audience. The critic, like the teacher, is an intermediary between the work and its audience or potential audience. The critic helps educate the audience about the film so that the members of the audience will be better able to derive from the film the full experience it holds open. The work of a good film critic is more than just rating films in the same way that restaurants or hotels are rated. The work of the critic of authentic film art is to act as a guide who shows the audience the way to see the film such that its deep significances unfold. Because the film art means more than the individual members of the audience are capable of grasping without help, there is a demand for people who can give such help. In some instances the demand is filled by the film teacher and in others it is filled by the film critic. It is essential to the role of both the teacher and the critic to provide "bridges"
over which audience members can move from their worlds to the world of the filmic work of art. Or, more accurately, this providing of bridges is "showing" and not a "building" of bridges. The work's author builds, and the critic or teacher blazes a trail to what the author has built.

Finally, the life of the aesthetic object of film is very much affected by changes in societal and aesthetic norms. As was previously mentioned, most people perceive normatively; therefore, when norms shift, these people cannot grasp meanings which they may have firmly adhered to not long before. Instead, they will attach new significance to the same object. For instance, today in America, it is de rigueur to approve of the "womens' movement," and certain films, often of the Western genre, that are no more than ten or fifteen years old are scoffed at because they portray women in "traditional" roles. When these films were originally released, only exceptional individuals would have been able to see the meanings in the films which today everybody derides as if to say, "That wasn't me who approved those awful thoughts and behaviors; someone else was responsible." When societal norms change rapidly and markedly, the life of the aesthetic object of film may be shortened markedly.
18.0 The Author of Film Art as an Authentic Being-in-the-World:

The preceding investigation has shown us that the art author may live authentically; however, it remains to be seen whether the film author can live authentically. That is to say, can the authoring of film works be an authentic way of being-in-the-world? Provisionally, I would have to answer affirmatively. It is important at this point that the reader review Section 7.0 which deals with the director of filmworks. Much of what was said in that section is also relevant here.

The question of whether the authoring of film art can be an authentic way of being-in-the-world, requires that we focus on the meanings that the author can embody in film. We already know that an art-author is an authentic being. It remains to be seen whether film as a medium can function as an art medium, i.e., does it allow the artist-director to embody his inner vision, or does it substantially limit the author such that he cannot "take over" or "uncover" anything of general significance or essential nature? For example, the author of crossword puzzles is undoubtedly so limited in what he can communicate by the capacities of his medium that this medium cannot function as a sediment of his authentic being, if, indeed, he is authentic.
In other words, we are asking whether film art can "imitate" the being of the authentic director such that it can act as a sediment or faithful record of his way of being. This requires that film be able to embody all of the meanings in the expressed world of the author-director. These meanings are a range of meanings starting with those based upon man's physical being-in-the-world-alongside-of-things and extending to meanings based upon man's being a conscious being who is conscious of himself, i.e., objects of reflexive consciousness. We discovered, in the eidetic portion of this analysis, that film can embody such a range of meanings. They are communicated as a polysignificant unity. That is, all of the strata which make up the aesthetic object of film are experienced together as one synthetic unity of meaning through the stratum of represented objects. This polysignificant unity depends upon the interconnections of the qualities of the strata of the whole work.

Above, I said that we need to ask whether film art can "imitate" the being-in-the-world of the author. This term "imitate" is taken from Aristotle's Poetics where he said that art, specifically tragedy, is an "imitation, not of men, but of an action and of life . . . and its end is a mode of action, not a quality."
We can reconcile our use of the term "imitate" with Aristotle's if we see that the source of the "act" of which he speaks is the authentic author whose life or "being" is communicated through his art. The authentic author is a temporal relation of his "self" to himself in that the self departs from itself in order to return to itself. This process is the ground for the constitution of an "I" in a sort of interior distance where the self establishes itself as itself. The artwork is the product of the artist's striving to realize himself as himself; it is the world which the artist creates for himself to be himself. It is a step in the artist's constitution of his "I." This "I" is the organic totality which is the artist, and the artwork is a sediment of the artist's striving to complete this organic totality. In that the work is independent of him, he can succeed in his striving for completion. In that the work communicates, it "imitates" the action of the artist. It establishes the relation of the artist to his audience, specific to general consciousness, as an organic unity. The end of the work of art is to reveal the mode of action of the human as the mediator of realities and the creator of organic unities.
In these terms, the work must make clear the "I" of the author, and, in a sense, it must reverberate with the spaces, times, and meanings which the author has "taken over" and "uncovered." Even though the filmwork opens itself to the spectator in such a way that the spectator may easily identify with the author-director, it is the "I" of the director which is presented. In this respect film art and its spectator can be described in similar terms to those used by Alfred Schutz to describe music and its listener: There is a quasi-simultaneity between the stream of consciousness of the performer and the listener. The performer and listener are "tuned in" to one another, and they are living together in the same flux and are growing old together for the duration of the music. And, the duration of the music, as for the duration of film, is not simply measured by the clock time in which it plays out but also in the polysignificant unity of the times and spaces of the strata of the work as a whole. Thus, the social relationship of the performer and listener like that of the director and spectator is founded upon the experience of living simultaneously in several dimensions of space and time.50
The question remains whether the range of meanings made communicable by film, as a synthetic unity, or as separate categories, will yield upon investigation anything of any general or essential significance, i.e., are these meanings horizons or horizontal (limited). Possibly, this question can be answered by describing what an authentic young film director will investigate as he develops his ability to "see." Initially, the young director may point his camera at natural objects like leaves blowing in the wind or great picturesque landscapes. When he has copied all that he wants, he will turn his attention and his camera to the events occurring before him, especially the events occurring on the faces of people. He will seek to investigate and record the actions of people in real life or staged real life who are expressing themselves as a result of being-in-situation. It is the prereflexive experience of joy, fear, rage, and so on which the director seeks to "open" by aiming his camera at the face or body of the actor. Some phenomenologists have said that seeing the face of one who is afraid is to see fear itself in the world. We see here that the director has accessed the temporality of natural events, and the "being-in-the situation" of man or what some phenomenologists have called man's being "thrown" into the world and
abandoned there.\textsuperscript{52} Other phenomenologists, notably Sartre, have said that one's emotional reaction to a bad situation is an invocation of a magical action in order to escape.\textsuperscript{53} From here it is only a short step for the perspicacious director to become interested in magical consciousness per se. Of course, the spatial and temporal characteristics of the strata of represented objects of film will allow the director to embody much of what he discovers about magical consciousness and everything he discovers about man's being-in-situation. Film, because of its \textit{quasiexistential character} is probably one of the best media for recording investigations of the sphere of meaning called "thrownness" by Heidegger. And, this is a sphere with open horizons. In other words, without much inquiry, we find a region of meaning which film is particularly adept at embodying which presents an open horizon. This "open horizon" assures that the investigative possibilities of film will not be rapidly exhausted such that authentic artists would have to turn to other media to realize their artistic potential. It also assures that an authentic film author will be able to discover things of general or essential significance. A film author is not limited in what he can "take over" or "uncover" or communicate as is the author of crossword puzzles.
It has not taken much probing to see that an authentic artist can realize his full artistic potential by working in film. The communicative capacities of film are such that the "mode of action" of the authentic artist can be realized thereby, and the types of meanings which can be investigated using filmic "seeing" are of sufficient depth that significant discoveries can be made, i.e., open horizons are accessible to filmic "seeing." It would be possible, I believe, to explicate other areas or categories of meaning which are susceptible to filmic investigation. It is of note that Sergei Eisenstein seriously proposed filming Karl Marx's major philosophical work *Das Kapital*. However, I will leave this work to other investigators. I am satisfied that the communication of the expressed world of the authentic film director is most forceful when it involves an investigation of those objects which film has as its essential nature to communicate. We have seen that this range of objects is broad and may even include philosophical idealities; however, the objects best represented by film are those relating to man's "being-in-situation" or his "thrownness." The authentic film director can go furthest with his communication when he is constituting by it, for himself, and so also for
others, new ways of seeing and hearing the modes of conscious comportment of the self in the world.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER IV


3 Ibid., p. 706.

4 Ibid., pp. 660-661.

5 Ibid., p. 661.


7 Ibid., p. 79.

8 Ibid., p. 82.


10 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 254.

11 Schutz, Relations, p. 166.

12 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 237.

13 Ibid., 220.

14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 330.

16 Schutz, Relations, p. 167.

17 Hegel, Mind, p. 229.


19 Hegel, Mind, p. 232.

20 Ibid., p. 227.

21 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 86.

22 Ibid., p. 89.

23 Ibid., p. 735.

24 Ibid., p. 762.

25 Schutz, Relations, p. 205.

26 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 220.

27 Ibid., p. 443.

28 Ibid., p. 296.


30 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 437.

31 For a description of "being scientific" see Schutz, Relations, p. 258.
32 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 421.

33 Ibid., p. 427.


36 Ibid., p. 64.


38 Ibid., p. 673


40 Ibid., p. 445.

41 Dufrenne, Phenomenology, p. 44.

42 Ibid., p. 333.

43 Ibid., p. 336.

44 Ibid., p. 340.


50 Schutz, Relations, p. 213.


52 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 174.

19.0 **Phenomenology and Education:**

In recent years various educators and art educators have espoused phenomenology as a method for analyzing education or art. However, many of their works are characterized by a lack of concern for phenomenological method, and this lack of concern often results in their works being confusing or superficial. These writers rarely, if ever, follow Husserl's exhaustive works on phenomenological method, but, instead, they simply describe whatever they want and mix in some phenomenological terminology. This terminology is usually taken from the works of Husserl's successors. David Denton, Leroy Troutner, and F. David Martin borrow from Heidegger; Maxine Greene uses Heidegger, Sartre, Kierkegaard and various novelists; Donald Vandenberg makes use of Strasser; and Eugene Kaelin, probably the best known American theorist of phenomenology of aesthetics, relies heavily upon the works of Merleau-Ponty. Generally, American phenomenologists writing
about education or art tend to emphasize the experiential nature of whatever they write about and not its essential structure. I do not mean to condemn the work of the above mentioned or any other American phenomenologists. These writers often address important issues and make use of many of the basic ideas of phenomenology. However, they often do not investigate thoroughly enough for fear of unduly abstracting the "lived experience" of what they describe. Also, they sometimes fail to stick to describing what they set out to describe. I have illustrated some of the points I have made by criticizing an excerpt taken from "That Mode of Being called Teaching," by David Denton.

Mr. Denton starts his article by saying, "By looking unflinchingly at that which is called teaching --that is, without averting one's gaze from substantive answers, explanatory theories, or analyses of uses--one can see a hole of nothingness bounded by the arc of intentionality, a hole both mysterious and bright."

The phrase "hole of nothingness," as far as I can tell, has no relation to the term "Nothingness" as used by Sartre. On the contrary, Denton seems to use it for its poetic sound. This is a mistake. The poetic sounding terms used by Sartre and Heidegger are not used gratuitously. They were coined by necessity in
order to speak of matters for which there were no terms or for matters where the standard terms presupposed an approach contrary to phenomenology.

Unfortunately, some phenomenologists have adopted the technical language of Heidegger and Sartre without needing to do so, and, often, they do not define it explicitly, or implicitly by consistent and pervasive use within their texts, or, by citing the works of the authors from whom they draw the terms. Denton's use of the term "arc of intentionality" is a case in point. It is drawn from the work of Merleau-Ponty who uses it to mean a "unifying principle of consciousness," but Denton supplies no citation and no explanation. It is not at all clear what he means.

Further on in his article, Denton attempts to characterize the "mode of being of teaching" by a reference to what he calls phenomenological experiences of the classroom:

Johnny blurted out that he didn't have enough room, that everyone was crowding him. Kathryn at the end of a class yesterday, exclaimed, "The period 's over already? This morning, I walked in on a most heated, passionate discussion of the responsibility for last week's snafu: Ralph, Kent or the group? At the end of the day, "big John" frequently tells me that I like someone else better than him. Little Lynne, voicing nothing, touches me in the hall. Elaine is obviously infatuated with me, hovering about, telling me of her family, dressing like me, and talking of becoming a teacher
herself. And, "Devilish Dave" is always countering me with, "I thought you were saying something else." And Fred, my most cooperative student, suddenly, for no apparent reason, said no to the whole task.

Johnny's concern was with what might be called lived-space or the space-for-him. Kathryn was expressing her experience of time, which had little to do with the schedule in the principal's office. Ralph, Kent, and the group were engaged in determining responsibility in reference not to rules, but to creation and initiation of activity. "Big John," Little Lynne, Elaine, and "Devilish Dave" were all expressing the erotic, the sexuality of our world. And, Fred, that most cooperative student who said no, was expressing the very existential grounds of freedom, his ability to stop the flow of the determined to open new possibilities for himself, and thereby, our world.

It is not clear what all this has to do with the "mode of being called teaching." It is a description of everyday classroom events. One must give credit to the author for understanding that a phenomenology is descriptive, but he fails to uncover essential structures of teaching or to open to view anything below the surface of the phenomena he describes. Instead, he merely uses phenomenological or existential terminology to explain the behaviors of his students. What does this have to do with the mode of being of the teacher? Not much, Denton fails to focus on the phenomenon he wishes to describe--teaching--because he fails to adopt a proper phenomenological method for his investigation.
The events he describes do not necessarily have anything to do with phenomenology. For instance, Kathryn's experience of time is not phenomenological just because Husserl investigated time consciousness. Her experience may be completely normative. And, Fred was making a decision which closes off certain possibilities and opens up others, but he does not close the world, nor does he open any possibilities for the world. Fred's act is an everyday occurrence, and it has little or no significance for the world in general. All things considered, Denton seems to be describing the world of the student more than the mode of being of the teacher. However, a phenomenological investigation of the "mode of being of the teacher" would be a very useful and instructive work. And, before making any conclusions about the foregoing investigation of film art, a rudimentary investigation on this topic is necessary. I have employed the hermeneutical method as outlined in Section 2.0 of this work. However, I made no effort to exhaust the topic investigation but only to open certain lines of investigation enough to be of use in speaking about aesthetic education.

I began the investigation by asking "What is the mode of being of the teacher? What must he or she be?"
First, he must be something which the student is not. The teacher would have nothing to impart to the student otherwise. Generally, it is said that a teacher should know more than the student. This is usually insured today by the fact that the teacher has already taken the course of study which the student wishes to take. Of course, if this is all that separates the student from the teacher, the student could benefit as much from a book as from sitting in a classroom.

The teacher must be more than just a mere record keeper of the facts of a particular discipline. The teacher must be the discipline and embody the spirit of the discipline. That is, the teacher must have "taken over" the way of seeing which opens to view the objects in the field of study which the teacher teaches. The teacher must have made this field of study his own. He must live it and work in it. In doing so, the teacher "holds open" this area of human conscious activity. Hegel discusses this "holding open" in somewhat different terms in his book, *Phenomenology of the Mind*, under the topic of societal "condition of right or legal status." The contingency of the individual is removed by his becoming a focal unity of the whole order of the society. It is said that the past is
kept alive in books, but it is really kept alive only by individuals who read the books and "take over" the meanings embodied therein. Thus, there is kept alive the "world" of the mathematician, the chemist, the lawyer, the dancer, the draftsman, etc. Alfred Schutz describes some of these worlds under the topic of "transcendences and multiple realities" in his book on social relations.5

We see that the teacher is more than the student. The teacher knows more, has experienced more, and has "taken over" and "made his own" an area of conscious activity upon which the society is founded, i.e., the teacher has legal personality. However, the teacher does not hold himself apart from the student. Instead, the teacher is concerned with the student. The teacher is concerned that the student become something which he is not. Why? It is because the teacher has made himself different from a student precisely in order to maintain a way of being--chemistry, history, music, etc.--such that the way of being will remain open for the student to take. Ultimately, the mode of being of the teacher is to recognize and act upon the fact that any mode of being is a mode of being for others, as well as for oneself. The teacher is one who recognizes
intuitively or rationally that the world is twofold. Martin Buber, in his book, *I and Thou*, describes this twofold nature of the world in terms which are more applicable here than the terms used in the foregoing description of communication; however, "being-in-the-world" and "being-in-the-world-for-others" are the bases of Buber's description:

The world is twofold for man in accordance with his twofold attitude.
The attitude of man is twofold in accordance with the two basic words he can speak.
The basic words are not single words but word pairs.
One basic word is the word pair I-You.
The other basic word is the word pair I-It; but this basic word is not changed when He or She takes the place of it.
Thus the I of man is also twofold.
For the I of the basic word I-You is different from that in the basic word I-It.6

I require a You to become; becoming I, I say You.7

The teacher in recognizing the twofold nature of the world has taken as his theme the sacrifice of what he is so that what he is may continue to be. That is, the teacher must not commune only with his peers, but he must commune with the students. The teacher must sacrifice the differences between himself and the students in order to open himself to the students such that they can see what he is and so undertake becoming that way themselves. Of course, the student does not have to accept the teacher. The student has power to accept
or reject the teacher's communication just as the per-
ceiver may accept or reject the work of the artist. And,
there are many grades of teaching and teachers. Cer-
tainly, many teachers are no more than presenters of fact,
but it is of no use to consider such teachers when our
purpose is to uncover the essence of teaching, not its
deficient forms.

In sacrificing his legal personality in order to
communicate with the student, the teacher opens the
I-You relation which Buber described. The teacher shows
himself to the students as being not unlike them in
that he had to strive and must still continue to strive
to "become." The teacher enters a dialogue with the
student which is carried on at many levels, not just on
the verbal or intellectual level. It is this dialogue
and some of its aspects that Denton is trying to
describe in his article. The teacher trades experience
with his students; he touches them and they touch him
in many ways. This of course does not mean that he
physically touches the students, but it is a possibility.
For instance, physical touching for the purpose of
teaching discipline is often tolerated in schools.
However, other forms of touching are discouraged. The
reasons for such discouraging are beyond the scope of
this investigation, but in as much as there is
such discouraging, it indicates an underlying background for it. The background is, as the ancient Greeks knew, that teaching is related to sexuality. The term "sexuality" is not used here to mean physical sexuality but instead to refer to the seeding action of the teacher. The teacher must "touch" the student in order to plant the seed of desire for possessing the world through the mode of consciousness--mathematics, languages, athletics, etc.--which the teacher has as his way of consciousness. The teacher seeks to plant the seed and then help it grow--help the student become--by drawing out of the student the student's own possibilities for being. It is this "drawing out" which is at the base of the Socratic dialogue. And, it is through such a dialogue that the student is shown different modes of thinking or feeling or acting.

Once the teacher has planted the seed though, he must guide the student to levels of consciousness higher than the student is presently capable of realizing alone. This the teacher does by again asserting himself as different from the student. The teacher again asserts himself as what the student is not. The teacher presents to the student that mode of being which the student must take over. However, to the student it appears that the teacher is "holding something against" him. And,
indeed, the teacher is doing just that but only so that the student may take it over. There is always a background of concern to this "holding against" such that the I-You relation is present like a safety net. If the student fails to make the leap to a new way of being, he does not come away with less than he had when he undertook the project, as a result of being abandoned by the teacher and also failing to fulfill his desire. Instead, the student is caught by the teacher so that he does not fall, and the teacher prepares another trail for the student to follow to the same object of knowledge.

Of course, the student's perception that the teacher has turned against him is somewhat accurate. The teacher does change the relation from the I-You to the I-It relation momentarily. The teacher hopes the student will make the leap so that the I-You relation can be reestablished at a new level. But, as Buber says, "the You becomes an object among objects, possibly the noblest one and yet one of them, assigned its measure and boundary. . . . Every You in the world is doomed by its nature to become a thing or at least to enter into thinghood again and again." The art in teaching is to be able to manipulate the delicate
teacher-student dialectic so that the student constantly becomes by overcoming or "taking over" the obstacles put in front of him, yet one must be careful not to "hold too much against" the student or completely turn away from him. There is always the danger he could fall. It is not necessary to protect the student from failure altogether, but he should not be lied to. That is, one should not begin a process of genuine communication with him if one is going to abandon him before he has achieved anything and so leave him worse off than he was to start.

In order to manage the teacher-student dialectic, the teacher must be able to "read," i.e., to sense how much to ask of the student, and to sense when the student is successful and when the student is not successful in learning what he desires to learn. The teacher must be concerned with the becoming of the student; otherwise, he is no teacher at all. Someone who is only interested in demonstrating to the student how much he knows is not a teacher. Such a person fails to make the necessary sacrifice in order to "touch" the student and communicate with him. Such a person is limited to presenting facts. This, of course, may be quite adequate for the student who is studying certain topics such as law, science, or mathematics solely to
master the technical skills involved. Technique requires no special insight. A technique is a procedure for accomplishing an end whereby the end is reduced to a formula which anybody can carry out. A student may learn it by simply memorizing it. There is no need to understand it. There is no need to become something more than one already is mentally. One need only learn a set of maneuvers and perform them in the right order.

Art, although it may be presented as a technical matter, cannot be adequately taught as mere technique. If such an approach is taken, one is limited to speaking about the material bases for the work but none of its higher strata. This would be to rob art of its essence. That is, one who approaches art in this fashion can not experience the expressed world of the author with its unique space and time which is made possible through the polysignificant unity of the work. The student, thus, needs access to the higher levels of the work in order to derive from the work all that is in the work. The role of the teacher is to act as a guide to the student and an intermediary between the student and the artist's work. The teacher is the link between the student and the work. The work, of course,
may embody many meanings of many different levels. In order to open these meanings to the student, they must be accessible to the teacher. If the teacher is not adequate to the work, he or she can do little more than present facts and leave it to the students to experience the work as they will.

Some phenomenologists in speaking of art have said that there is no "right way" of experiencing art. For instance, Martin Heidegger, in his article "The Origin of the Work of Art," says that traditionally in Western thought an entity or thing perceived has been defined as "the bearer of its characteristic traits," or the "unity of a multiplicity of sense perceptions," or the "synthesis of matter and form." All of these definitions are right, but "rightness" is secondary to the truth of art, and the work of art cannot be approached as being right or wrong. As Heidegger says:

With all our right representations or correct ideas we would obviously get nowhere, we could not even presuppose that there already is something toward which we can direct ourselves, unless the unconcealment of that which is had already set us out into, or exposed us to, that illuminated realm in which everything that is stands for us and out of which it withdraws itself.

The truth of the work of art is in the art, and it can be gotten out of the art by perceiving it. A child's experience of the work, whatever it may be, is
neither right nor wrong. But, certainly, there may be more in the art than the child derives from it. Phenomenologists like Jerry Smoke, who condemn all pre-conceived evaluative criteria for art, have been struck as though by lightning with the notion of the validity of one's personal experience of art, regardless of what that experience is. As Mr. Smoke says:

Deciding what was a good or bad work of art was really a matter of human existence and freedom of choice. If the audience chose to allow themselves to identify with a painting, this was so much the better, but the choice was not to be based on some external criterion of good or bad. The painting was chosen either as an expression which the viewer held and identified with or did not hold and could not see as related to his personal being.

Smoke bases his work on the theories of Eugene Kaelin who bases his work on the theories of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Therefore, both Kaelin and Smoke use Merleau-Ponty's preachings about prereflective, lived experience to justify a de-emphasis of categorical thinking as regards the art experience. But, based upon the preceding investigation of film in which it was discovered that the author is essential to the work, Smoke's and Kaelin's positions can be seen to be one-sided.

A particular spectator's experience of a work of art may be valid, but it may also fail to reach
the essence of the work which, as we have seen, involves the authentic project of the artist-author. Or, just as likely, especially in the case of children's perceptions, the spectator may see that the artist has a project but not be able to gain complete access to it because certain lower level meanings are not open to him. This might be the case where a child viewing Picasso's *Guernica* saw that the author was taking a very personal stand against destruction, but the child did not know anything about modern warfare, the Spanish Civil War, or the place that the mathematic-geometric form has in the history of modern art and the history of the scientific age. Certainly, whatever the child experienced in viewing the work is valid but it can not be wholly adequate, and, here, one who derives more from the work might be able to benefit the child. Such a person might well be expected to be the teacher since it is the teacher's mode of being to give the student the benefits of his keener insight and experience.

One could say that the teacher's experience of the work is "deeper" than the child's. Eugene Kaelin speaks of "second-level" categories or "depth" in describing aesthetic categories. Kaelin makes use of such categories to uncover deep significations in the work. And, although Kaelin does not specifically
describe the role of the art educator, it can be inferred from his writings that the art educator would be one who described the artwork to the student by means of the "second-level" categories which would appear to the teacher and not to the student. The teacher would be attempting to establish the context of the work so that the student could gain "depth" in his own experience of the work. As Kaelin says:

All concepts applicable to the context are in fact grounded by an interpretation of the context in which they inhere. In any genuine phenomenological description of a representational art-work, then, we have two functional determinants of the artistic context: the surface "spread" of sensuous organization and an emergent order of signification, which I prefer to call "depth."\(^{13}\)

However, based upon the preceding description of the mode of being of the teacher, I disagree with the idea that the teacher should simply describe the "deep signification" of the work to the students. The teacher should engage the students in a dialogue whereby he attempts to motivate the student to "deepen" his own experience of the work. What the teacher does is to open for the student new ways of seeing, ways which do not violate the significations of the artwork but which extend them in depth. However, the student must "take over" these significations for himself; the teacher cannot do it for him.
In order for the teacher to do the things I have described him as doing, we must conclude that certain practical teaching arrangements would be preferred to others. First, the teacher must be present for the student. Ideally, there would be only the teacher and one student; however, this is impossible in most teaching institutions, but the class should be kept small if at all possible. In this way, the teacher-student dialectic will be given a chance to operate. If a work of art is being taught, it should be present. If a film cannot be seen, it is a waste of time to teach about it. Only one work of art should be discussed during one class session. Or if this cannot be done, the teacher should at least spend a long time on one artwork, discussing it with the students until its meanings are exhausted or until an "open horizon" is all that remains. The teacher should also spend some time explaining the essential structure of art, basing his explanation on investigations such as the foregoing investigation of film.
20.0 Phenomenology and Film Art Education:

To understand the effect of phenomenology on film art education, one must understand that phenomenology has a tripartite significance: Phenomenology is a method of inquiry; phenomenology is a theory of reality; and phenomenology is a way of being.

Considered as a method of inquiry, phenomenology has the effect of providing the film art educator with a means of investigation which will allow him to uncover the significance of individual works of film art. He can use phenomenology in the classroom as his guide to leading his students to understanding a particular film. That is, in connection with his essential role as manager of the teacher-student dialogue, the teacher may use the phenomenological method as his own guide in how to proceed. The teacher could do this by making his own phenomenological investigation of a film and then lead his students through it. Or, the teacher could have each student make such an investigation and then help them to refine what they have done.

Considered as a theory of filmic reality, phenomenology is embodied in works like this one. The teacher should take account of this study and other phenomenological investigations in teaching students the essential nature of film reality, and the relation of
film reality to the world. Formerly, the film art educator had to resort to either the "Realist" or the "formalist" theories of film art. If he presented only one approach, it was an incomplete explanation, and, if he presented both approaches, it was confusing to the student. After having read this investigation, the film art educator may make use of the works of theorists from both schools by showing the students what portion of the essential structure of film these works explicate. One of the major effects of phenomenology as a theory is to provide a deep fundamental explanation of the significance of the object investigated. The theory seeks to uncover the ontological bases for the object investigated. Using, and I hope expanding upon, the foregoing phenomenological investigation of film, the film art teacher and the student of film art may more clearly see the place of film art in human reality. Phenomenological theory aids one in understanding a phenomenon such as film art by showing its essential structure and the grounds upon which it arises. Such an understanding helps orient the student to the authentic artistic possibilities of film art, and, as a result, the student may be able to make a fuller use of the medium of film, or, at least, he will
increase the size of the audience for film art because he will expect more from film than he did formerly. His expectations will help create a demand for film art, and his heightened awareness will help shift societal and aesthetic norms in favor of film as art.

Phenomenology, considered as a way of being, would have the effect of orienting the student toward the authentic life of the investigator, i.e., one who seeks to advance his understanding of the world and his possibilities in it by a life of investigation and communication. This aspect of phenomenology is more appropriate for the graduate student or the teacher himself than the child or undergraduate student. Both the graduate student of film and the teacher of film must take as their way of being working to uncover and understand the significance of the realm of human conscious activity which has as its object domain filmwork. The teacher of film art must "hold open" this realm of activity, just as teachers of "traditional" fields of study have done for so long.

There are also some practical demands on teachers who use phenomenology in film art education. Teachers, of course, must be acquainted with phenomenological literature, and use it as a source of information for
the classroom. Also, teachers must be careful to select films for classroom study which have authors and which embody fundamental meanings. In order to facilitate such selection, I have listed a few films which I have used in the classroom when demonstrating the use of phenomenological method. The following list is not meant to be exhaustive but only to give guidance in selecting films. Note, though, that in proportion to the total number of filmworks produced in the history of film only a very few have had an authentic author and have dealt with fundamental human issues.

Of course, one can do a phenomenological analysis of inferior films, but the focus of this paper has been on film art. There is no reason to shift that emphasis here. The following films may be put to good use by the teacher of film art; however, it will remain the task of future investigators to analyze these films phenomenologically: Birth of a Nation by D. W. Griffith (1915); Battleship Postemkin by Sergei Eisenstein (1925); Napoleon by Able Gance (1926); The Passion of Joan of Arc by Carl Dreyer (1932); Modern Times by Charlie Chaplin (1936); Citizen Kane by Orson Welles (1941); Rashomon by Akira Kurosawa (1951); La Strada by Fredrico Fellini (1954); The Seventh Seal by Ingmar Bergman (1956);
Breathless by Jean Luc Goddard (1959); Jules and Jim by Francois Truffaut (1961); Last Year at Marienbad by Alain Resnais (1961); Viridiana by Louis Bunuel (1961); Eight and a Half by Fredrico Fellini (1963); The Silence by Ingmar Bergman (1963); Red Desert by Michelangelo Antonioni (1964); Woman in the Dunes by H. Teshigahara (1964); Persona by Ingmar Bergson (1966); 2001 by Stanley Kubrick (1968); Last Tango in Paris by Bernardo Bertolucci (1972); Manhattan by Woody Allen (1978).
NOTES FOR CHAPTER V


7. Ibid., p. 62.

8. Ibid., pp. 68-69.


10. Ibid., p. 667.


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**Articles**


