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A PROBLEM IN EXPLICATING THE PROBLEM OF MEMORY

The Ohio State University PH.D. 1980

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A PROBLEM IN EXPLICATING THE PROBLEM
OF MEMORY

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University

By
Ute H. St. Clair, B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University

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DEDICATION

I should like to dedicate this work to all my friends who made it possible, but with special gratitude to George Pappas and to Elizabeth Hellinger
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INTRODUCTION

Choosing a title for this thesis has not been an easy task. To label it using the phrase 'the concept of memory' makes it appear that there is but one concept, and that—for the most part—we have a clear idea about what that concept is. However, this thesis is devoted to my contention that even if there is just one concept of memory, it has so many different uses that the philosophical issues it has generated have sometimes become entangled in a confusion over the ambiguous way in which the expression 'memory' and its corresponding verb 'remembering have been applied.

It hardly needs saying that we use expressions referring to some aspect of memory in a variety of contexts. Much has been written about what it means to remember per se, remember suddenly, to reminisce, to "call to mind," and so on. These are phrases we use in ordinary contexts using ordinary language; but, there are also what we might call "technical" contexts in which language using these expressions appears. We need only reflect on the role that memory plays in psychological explanations of both human and nonhuman behavior. Freudian psychoanalysts, for example, treat their patients on the theory that
unresolved conflicts "unconsciously" remembered are the causes of their patients' present neurotic behavior. This behavior is to be altered by making it possible for such patients to remember consciously what these conflicts originally were about, thereby breaking the causal chain resulting in the behavior in question. Other theories in psychology are designed to infer from alleged memory behavior by certain animals something about human memory. Research into the operations of the human brain concerns, in part, the attempt to discover the brain mechanisms said to "constitute" memory. Further, still, we find that computers are said to have memories, and so are calculators. We may wish to say that when calculators are claimed to "remember" a mathematical operation, they are being described in terms of an anthropomorphic metaphor. This may be true, but even if it is, the fact that so many different disciplines use the expressions 'memory' and 'remember' in an apparently sensible way to refer to what appear to be different phenomena is evidence that in these disciplines different definitions of these expressions are used (even if they are not explicitly stipulated).

In a very rough way, I wish to distinguish three uses for the expression 'memory': it seems to me that it is used physically, epistemically, and metaphysically. When 'memory' has a physical definition, I take it that the
definition contains references to something which is "stored" in a material object, and which is capable of being made manifest in the present according to physical principles. In the case of a computer, for example, we say that information is "stored" in its circuits or its chips, and that it is later "retrieved." Here, "storing information" means that the expressions conveying the information have been translated in such a way that they correspond to physical marks that are left either in the circuits or in the molecular structure of the chips, and which marks remain there for some period of time. These marks are literally imprinted according to some predetermined pattern. Later, we are able to achieve a replication of the marks so imprinted, and, since we receive them again in accordance with a known pattern, we are able to translate them back into the original language.

Sometimes, human memory is conceived to be very similar to the memory of a computer. Here, the information is usually thought to be the products of sense perception, the various physical impulses which are transmitted to the brain via the sense organs after they have been appropriately stimulated by physical forces. One way of thinking about how such impulses are "stored" is that they cause a change in the arrangements of certain molecules in the cells of the brain, such that the new arrangement
endures over some period of time. "Retrieving" the information is thought, roughly, to be the process of activating a causal chain from the activity of the changed molecule through the network of nerves to result either in some state of awareness or some physical behavior of the subject.

The operations of the brain which constitute memory in this sense are not well-understood, but their descriptions bear some resemblance to certain philosophical theories of memory. It is in such theories that the expression 'memory' is used either "epistemically" or "metaphysically."

Broadly speaking, when 'memory' is used epistemically, I take it that the term is used in the context of analyses of knowledge, belief, justification, -- states of a rational being, or attributes of what we might call "rational reflection." By "analyses," I mean here elucidations of the conditions under which it is correct to apply the terms 'knowledge,' 'belief,' and 'justification.' Philosophers attempt to provide such analyses in response to general questions such as "what is the nature of rational thought?" and "what is the nature of knowledge?" Included in some of their answers are theories about the sources of knowledge, one of which is sometimes said to be memory. When memory is claimed to be a "source" of knowledge, it seems to me that two different questions have
become confused, namely the question, "what is the source of knowledge when it first occurred?" and "what is the source of the knowledge we presently have?" The first question is usually answered by reference to experience, but the second question is often answered by reference to memory; that is, we are said to know now, because we remember what we came to know in the past.

Philosophers who have described memory in this way have often spoken of memory as "retained" knowledge. Accordingly, they have argued that among the conditions which must be present for it to be correct to say that a person remembers is that the person knows what he remembers. Not only that, but in order to "bridge the gap" between past knowledge and present knowledge, such philosophers have employed the term 'retention' to refer to the endurance of knowledge over time.

Philosophers such as Norman Malcolm, Stanley Munsat, Roger Squires, and E. M. Zemach have argued not only that all memory entails propositional memory (memory that p), but that propositional memory entails propositional knowledge. In their definition of 'memory' they include the component of awareness, and thus rule out "unconscious" memory. Quite clearly, this use of the term memory' is not the same as that which allows its correct application to computers and to most animals.
The three most important issues emerging from holding such a concept of memory are (1) the question of whether or not "the" concept of memory entails the concept of knowledge, (2) the problem of the meaning of the term 'retention,' and (3) the question of whether it is correct to use the expression 'unconscious memory.'

C. M. Martin and Max Deutscher, in opposition to Malcolm, have argued that memory does not entail propositional knowledge, and they have employed as part of their argument two purported counterexamples to Malcolm's definition. The concept of memory they defend is one which not only does not entail knowledge, but it also does not entail awareness. This leaves open a much wider application of the term 'memory' than Malcolm accepts. Not only that, but, contrary to Malcolm, they argue that the concept of retention must be explicated in terms of causal mechanisms, and thus they argue for the concept of the "memory trace" which is to do the work of explaining how something experienced in the past has in some fashion "endured" to be manifested in some fashion in the present.

To point out the difficulties in the dispute outlined, I introduce a similar dispute over the correct definition of the term 'knowledge.' Colin Radford has argued that the "classical definition" of knowledge, according to which knowledge entails belief, is mistaken.
He produces what he takes to be a counterexample to this definition, but the counterexample is assailed by Keith Lehrer and D. M. Armstrong. Both argue that, according to Radford's own requirements for the correct application of 'know' and 'believe,' his example is either one of both knowledge and belief, or one of neither knowledge nor belief. Armstrong holds the former view, because he believes that there can be both "unconscious" knowledge and belief. Lehrer holds the latter view, because he thinks that both knowledge entail awareness. Again, Armstrong accepts a much wider application of the terms in question than does Lehrer.

In this dispute, we are faced with the following questions: (1) does "the" concept of knowledge entail the concept of belief, (2) can there be "unconscious" knowledge and/or "unconscious" belief? The third question concerns a problem which is similar to the problem of whether the concept of retention must be explicated causally: (3) must the concepts of "unconscious" knowledge and belief be explicated causally? Armstrong appears to think that the explication of these concepts requires reference to causal mechanisms, and he, too, makes use of the concept of the "memory trace" to achieve such an explication. Indeed, his characterization of "unconscious" knowledge and belief seems to come to Martin and Deutscher's "unconscious" memory.
I take there to be a principal difference between the two opposing camps in each dispute. Malcolm's view, and those similar to his in requiring awareness—or consciousness—as a necessary condition for the correct application of the term 'remember,' 'know,' and 'believe,' is a view in which these terms are used only in the context of the conscious attitude of a subject toward some proposition or sentence. An alternative way to state my interpretation of Malcolm's position is that he construes the terms in question to be used in intentional contexts, and it is with respect to these contexts that he offers the definitions he does. Further, I take him to hold that in such intentional contexts, when we ask for the meaning of the expressions 'memory,' and 'knowledge,' we are not committed—ipso facto—to a causal explanation of the manifestations of knowledge and memory.

Contrary to Malcolm, I interpret Martin and Deutscher to engage in a different enterprise. It seems to me that they do not intend to define 'memory' as it is used in intentional contexts. Rather, I believe that they define 'memory' as it is used in explanations of the manifestations of memory. It is because they attempt to explain a certain kind of behavior in the absence of the awareness that one remembers that Martin and Deutscher go on to explain the phenomenon of retention by reference to
memory traces which bridge the gap between the initial experience and the later "representation" of it.

It is here that I believe that the expression 'memory' is used metaphysically, I take this to mean that 'memory' is used to refer to some existents (mental or physical) which constitute some part of the world. In this case, it is used to refer to what might be called a "faculty" or a "capacity" of persons (which, however, might be had by other entities, as well). It seems to me that when a philosopher speaks of mediating traces which are causally responsible for some behavior or other, then he articulates a metaphysical position. Indeed, the theory of memory traces, which are usually conceived as structural analogues of what was first experienced, has a long history in the Philosophy of Mind. Aristotle, in De Memoria et Reminiscentia, expresses the view that memories "repli-cating" sense impressions are in some way "stored" in the mind.\(^1\) Similarly, Locke, in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, thinks of memory consisting in the "storage" of ideas of sense.\(^2\) It is not difficult to see that this metaphysical theory of the nature of memory traces—however they are named—has a counterpart in physical, scientific theories already mentioned, and may be supported by such theories.
The first three chapters of this dissertation are designed to describe and critically evaluate the positions according to which memory and knowledge entail the awareness of what is known and remembered, and those positions according to which the contradictory thesis is true. My intention is to bring out that the opposing parties take themselves to be engaged in a dispute over whether the terms 'memory' and 'knowledge' have some particular definition. A better way of stating this is to say that they believe their respective definition of the terms in question to be incompatible. Further, I intend to show that, in fact, the philosophers I refer to are mistaken in thinking that they have a genuine dispute. This is a task which I hope to accomplish in Chapter IV. Finally, I intend to argue in Chapter V that the explanation for the fact that the various positions adduced do not conflict in the ways in which they are claimed to, is that Malcolm and other proponents of his view argue for a definition of 'memory' insofar as it has an epistemic definition, whereas Martin and Deutscher argue for a definition of 'memory' insofar as it has a metaphysical definition. It is a suggestion at the end of these considerations that the epistemic definition and the metaphysical definition of 'memory' need not conflict, but that anyone accepting one or the other for a particular purpose must explicitly state
the definition used. As a result, it would seem that at least some of the disputes over the proper explications of concepts such as memory, knowledge, and belief are dissolved.
Footnotes


CHAPTER I

THE EPISTEMIC ANALYSIS OF MEMORY

A. Malcolm's Position

One of the best-known expositions of an epistemic analysis of memory is that given by Norman Malcolm in a series of articles reprinted in Knowledge and Certainty, entitled "Three Lectures on Memory."¹ What this means is that Malcolm's analysis of memory entails knowing that. More recently, he has amplified his views in Memory and Mind.² Since there are several parts in his analysis, it will be helpful to divide the discussion of his view into separate sections. In this chapter I will provide an exegesis of his analysis and will follow this by a discussion of whether certain other epistemic theorists agree with all or most of his claims. There are some features of Malcolm's work on this topic that are better discussed in the critical sections of later chapters, where I shall show that the points of difference are between his analysis and those of his critics.

In "Three Lectures on Memory," Malcolm urges for the following theses: (1) that Russell's hypothesis about the possibility of the world having sprung into existence
five minutes ago with all our memories intact, is unintel-
ligible, (2) that most, if not all forms of memory entail
that there is "factual memory," and (3) that factual memory
entails knowledge. When (2) and (3) are taken together,
they entail his further thesis that most, if not all,
memory entails knowledge. The aim of my discussion is to
elucidate Malcolm's arguments for the relationship between
memory and knowledge, so that the important theses to con-
sider are (2) and (3). Accordingly, I shall first con-
centrate on his arguments which purport to show that fac-
tual memory is "basic" to the other forms of memory he
defines, namely "perceptual" and "personal" memory; then I
shall lay out the arguments Malcolm uses in the attempt to
show that factual memory entails knowledge.

1. The Relationships Among Perceptual, Personal, and
Factual Memory

Before presenting the details of these theses about
these three forms of memory, Malcolm makes clear that he is
not attempting to provide an analysis of all memory phenom-
ena, but only those which are ordinarily described using
sentences of the general forms, "S remembers x" and "S
remembers that p." He is not attempting to give an analysis
of memory situations that we usually describe in sentences
using expressions such as 'remembering how (where, when),'
'reminiscing,' 'recalling,' 'bringing to mind,' 'suddenly remembering,' and so on. Thus, he does not provide a complete analysis of the concept of memory. At one point, Malcolm does assert that he is prepared to show that all forms of memory, including those described by the locutions just mentioned, depend on factual memory. In Memory and Mind, though, he says that he was mistaken in this, yet gives no account of the exact difficulties which led him to revise his earlier position. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that he still accepts the claims he made in "Three Forms of Memory" that factual memory is entailed by both perceptual and personal memory. Moreover, this claim, as will be seen later, is the springboard for his more important thesis that factual memory (remembering that) entails knowledge (knowing that).

Malcolm's argument that personal and perceptual memory both entail factual memory is couched in several definitions he gives of each kind of memory. The argument, when reconstructed, seems to be this:

1. Necessarily, if S perceptually remembers x, then S personally remembers x.
2. Necessarily, if S perceptually remembers x, then S factually remembers that p.
3. Necessarily, if S personally remembers x, then S factually remembers that p.
therefore,

4. Necessarily, if S perceptually remembers x
   or S personally remembers x, then S factually
   factually remembers that p.

There are some difficulties in showing how Malcolm supports
the premises in this argument. It is not difficult to say
how he argues for premises (1) and (2). However, premise
(3) is one which he needs to make his argument valid, and
one which he seems to accept, but which is not explicitly
stated by him. As a result, I shall first examine his
definitions of personal and perceptual memory, and then
argue that his support for those definitions is also sup­
port for the premise I attribute to him in (3). In the
argument above, 'x' is a variable that ranges over names
of persons, places, or things, or descriptions of them as
well as of events; 'p' is a variable that ranges over
propositions which are, as Malcolm says, "about" those
things named or described by 'x.' The conclusion of this
argument is particularly important, because it is a propo­
sition such as this which is the object of criticism by
C. B. Martin and Max Deutscher, whose views will be
examined in the next chapter.

Malcolm's support for premise (1) takes two forms:
first, he argues that there could be no personal memory, if
there were no personal experience, sometimes in the form of
imagery; second, he tries to establish that if there were no imagery or experience, then there would be no perceptual memory. His support for the second premise also takes two forms: first, he attempts to show that imagery is not required for factual memory, and, second, that if one has perceptual memory, then one is able to describe those images. What this means for the second premise is that while factual memory is entailed by the other two forms of memory (because of the descriptions of images), it itself does not imply them.

Malcolm describes so-called personal memory only in a loose way:

When a person says that he personally remembers so-and-so, he implies that the so-and-so occurred or existed in his lifetime. Another implication would be that he had perceived it or, in some sense, "experienced" the so-and-so. Thus, if someone was contemporaneous with a certain incident but was too young to have had any knowledge of it at the time, he could not be said to personally remember it . . . A third implication of saying that someone personally remembers a certain thing is based on his perception or experience of it.4

What I take Malcolm to claim here is just that when a person S personally remembers something, his memory of it was caused by the direct experience he had of the thing, or event. Thus, if a person truly asserts that he personally remembers his father, he remembers him because he directly experienced his father. This sort of remembering is
distinguished from "nonpersonal" remembering which is not caused by any direct experience of the remembered thing. For example, Malcolm seems to allow as genuine 'remember'-sentences such sentences as "He remembers the fall of the Roman Empire," where 'the fall of the Roman Empire' does not refer to something the subject directly experienced; we shall see this in a passage about perceptual memory cited below. All that his explanation of personal memory, then, comes to is that personal memory is caused by direct experience of the remembered thing. Direct experience, in turn, is construed by Malcolm as at least implying perception. Consequently, he defines personal memory in the following way:

A person B personally remembers something, x, if and only if B previously perceived or experienced x and B's memory of x is based wholly or partly on his previous perception or experience of x.  

To make clear that he wants to avoid giving the impression of having produced a circular definition (since the concept of memory appears both in the analysandum and the analyans), he adds: "This is not a definition of memory, but only of the adverb "personally" as it modifies the verb "remembers."

It must be noted that personal memory, according to Malcolm, is based on perception or experience. At least one thing that he seems to mean here is that the causes of
of personal memory are perception or experience, if they are different. However, he is less clear on whether he means that 'perception' and 'experience' refer to different causes of personal memory, or that these two expressions are synonymous. As I shall explain shortly, either interpretation will make plausible the claim that Malcolm is justified in accepting the third premise of the reconstructed argument. But first, his definition of "perceptual" memory must be examined.

Perceptual memory is defined by Malcolm first in terms of imagery, and later also in terms of personal memory. About the role of imagery in perceptual memory, he says:

It belongs to the concept of perceptual memory that it requires mental imagery. Factual memory, on the other hand, does not require imagery. A person might remember that the house he lived in as a boy had two floors, although he is unable to picture the house in his mind. It is tempting to apply here Russell's famous distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. One might wish to call perceptual memory "memory by acquaintance," and factual memory "memory by description." Remembering the fire that burned down the city hall might be an illustration of the former: remembering that there was a fire of the description, the fire that burned down the city hall, would be an illustration of the latter. In one case one remembers the fire itself: one sees in one's mind some scene or scenes of the fire. In the other case one remembers some fact or facts (some truth or truths) about the fire.
For now it is sufficient to describe how Malcolm argues for the secondary role of perceptual memory, which he takes to depend upon factual memory (a form of memory not requiring imaging). His definition of perceptual memory is this:

We are now in a position to give a definition of perceptual memory. Imagery and personal memory are each necessary conditions. Is their conjunction a sufficient condition? It would appear so. The definition is the following:

"B perceptually remembers x if and only if B personally remembers x and B can form a mental image of x." Let me make some comments about this definition. First, it is not a definition of remembering but only of the adverb "perceptually" as it modifies the word "remembers." Second, what is defined is the notion of a perceptual memory ability, not a notion of a perceptual memory occurrence.8

So far, Malcolm has addressed himself to the question of the relationship between personal and perceptual memory, but he also attempts to show that both forms of memory entail factual memory and are in this sense "dependent" on it. First, he argues that perceptual memory requires factual memory, but not vice versa. Keeping in mind that he has argued that imagery is essential to perceptual memory, we can examine what he says about the role of imaging in factual memory:

When a person has imagery he must be able to give an account of what it is of, if it is of anything. If his account does not correspond to anything that he previously witnessed or experienced, then, his imagery is not an instance of remembering
what he pictures in his mind, but perhaps of imagining or anticipating it. If his account does correspond sufficiently to something he did previously observe or experience to make us say he remembers it, then in the respects in which his account corresponds to it he does have factual memory of it. It appears, therefore, that perceptual memory does logically require factual memory.9

This argument can plausibly be reconstructed in the way I now suggest. It is important to note that I shall attribute to Malcolm premises which he does not explicitly state in the passage cited, but to which he is committed. The structure of his argument is this:

1. A person, S, perceptually remembers something, x, if and only if S can form an image of x.
2. If S has an image of x, then S can correctly describe the image of x.
3. If S can correctly describe the image of x, then X can correctly describe facts learned (obtained) in the past.
4. If S can correctly describe facts learned in the past, then S factually remembers that p (where 'p' is a true sentence which describes those facts).
5. If S perceptually remembers x, then S factually remembers that p.

This appears, at first glance, to be a plausible argument, and it is a plausible reconstruction of Malcolm.
However, the argument is not valid, since there is a missing premise which is best inserted between premises (1) and (2). What seems to be needed is something such as this:

\[ 2_m. \text{ If } S \text{ can form an image of } x, \text{ the } S \text{ has an image of } x. \]

With this new premise, the argument is valid, but there is reason to think that it is not sound, since the added premise is false: each of us is capable of forming images of a myriad of things that are so far in the future that we do not now even imagine them, and so it is certainly not the case that we have images of them now. Similarly, an infant is surely capable of forming, or having, images of the external world which it does not now actually have. There is yet another possibility, however, which makes the argument valid: instead of writing premise (2) as I did, it could be rewritten as the following sentence:

\[ 2_g. \text{ If } S \text{ can form an image of } x, \text{ then } S \text{ can correctly describe the image of } x. \]

Malcolm may be interpreted to be committed to this premise, because he believes that conscious, mental activity is possible only when a person has a language. However, this premise, too, seems false. One need only consider that a person afflicted with a special kind of damage to his language center in the brain is still able to form images
but incapable of describing them. Indeed, we have good reason to think that monkeys can form images, but they cannot describe them, either. Consequently, his argument, even if valid, is unsound.

What remains is to show that whatever Malcolm has attempted to establish with respect to the relationship between perceptual memory and factual memory is what would constitute a similar support for the premise that personal memory also implies factual memory. This is the premise I earlier claimed was missing from the argument he seems to defend. In his definition of personal memory it was plausible to interpret Malcolm as claiming that personal memory is caused by perception, which just is experience. In this case, there seems to be little difference between this kind of memory and perceptual memory. If Malcolm thinks that having images implies having the ability to describe them, then it seems plausible to attribute to him the view that having perceptions (i.e., experiences) implies the ability to describe them, as well. Hence, on this supposition, Malcolm could accept the third premise with as much justification as he had for premise (2). But, if he did not intend to conflate perception and experience, then he can still give a reasonable sense to the problematic premise. What must be made acceptable is the claim that if personal memory is caused by experiences different from perception,
then it still implies factual memory. If images and per­
ceptions are such that having them implies the ability to
describe them correctly, it is hard to see why having
experiences--whatever they are, if they are not percep­
tions--would not also imply the ability to describe them
correctly. Consequently, there is good reason to think
that Malcolm would, or should, accept this third premise,
even though it is assailable in much the same way as was
the second premise.

One last problem that confronts Malcolm in this
context is that he is completely unclear on what sorts of
propositions can replace 'p' in 'S remembers that p.' He
dismisses this issue in just one sentence:

. . . I believe that correctly remembering some­
thing will entail remembering that p, where p is
some true proposition about the remembered thing.11

There are several problems embedded in this quote, but many
of them will be addressed only later, in Chapter IV.
Nevertheless, some preliminary criticisms can be made now.
What is difficult to make clear is what the sense of 'some'
is. One interpretation of the passage above is that it
says that correctly remembering something will entail
remembering that p, where p is any, or every, proposition
about x. On this reading of 'some true proposition,' it
turns out that a person S correctly remembers something, x,
only if S remembers every true proposition about x. But since no one could ever remember each and every true proposition about something, no one would ever remember anything at all, and this is not only obviously false, but Malcolm surely does not accept it. Nearly equally unacceptable is the interpretation of 'some true proposition about x' as 'some one specific proposition about x.' Here it would turn out that a person S correctly remembers x only if he remembers a specific proposition about x. However, if this were acceptable, we would have to specify which proposition it is that a person has to remember to succeed in remembering the thing x, and that, too, is impossible. The last alternative is that 'some true proposition' means 'some true proposition or other.' This seems, on the face of it, a reasonable interpretation, since all that it says is that it is necessary only to remember something true about the thing x in order to be successful in remembering it. Yet, even here, there are difficulties; they will be taken up in a later chapter (Chapter IV).

2. The Relationship Between Factual Memory and Knowledge

In "A Definition of Factual Memory," Malcolm attempts to establish the thesis that necessarily, if a person S remembers that p, then S knows that p. He states his view on the connection between remembering and knowing
in the context of offering a definition of 'factual memory.'

In my second lecture I produced definitions of perceptual and personal memory. As we noted, they are not definitions of memory, but only of the adverbs 'personally' and 'perceptually,' as these modify the verb 'remember.' That they are not definitions of memory is shown by the fact that the verb 'remember' occurs in the definiens of each of those definitions. The definition of factual memory which I shall propose will really be a definition of memory— not of memory in general, but of one use of the verb 'remembers.' In this definition that verb will not occur in the definiens.

The definition is very simple. It is the following: A person, B, remembers that p if and only if B knows that p because he knew that p. It will be convenient to say that this definition is composed of three elements: the present knowledge that p, the previous knowledge that p, and the relationship between the present and the previous knowledge expressed by saying that B knows that p because he previously knew that p. Each element is a logically necessary condition and the conjunction of them is a logically sufficient condition of factual memory.12

Whereas Malcolm's strategy for defending his claims about the relationships obtaining among the three forms of memory was straightforward in that he fairly explicitly announced that he would use the notion of imaging in his arguments, he is not so explicit in the argument now under consideration. In short outline, his support for the thesis that remembering that p entails knowing that p is divided into two major sections: the first section is concerned with showing that whatever is required for genuine
knowledge is required for genuine memory. That is supposed to show, at least, that memory and knowledge are not two different faculties, or capacities, or states, and that it is necessary that all memory that p—sometimes called "propositional memory"—is just knowledge that p. The second section is one in which Malcolm attempts to explicate his contention that memory that p is the retention of knowledge that p, so that according to this, factual memory is just knowledge that has endured through time. The major sub-thesis he defends not only in "A Definition of Factual Memory," but especially in Memory and Mind is that the concept of retention does not require an analysis which makes reference to causal chains which "bridge" the gap between the initial acquisition of a capacity (or disposition) such as knowledge and its later manifestation. A briefer way of stating this is to say that Malcolm thinks that the concept of memory is adequately analyzed without resorting to any causal concepts. As will be brought out later, this view is at variance with the analysis of memory presented by C. B. Martin and Max Deutscher, who think that the causal chains between the past acquisition of some capacity and its present performance must be made explicit in an adequate analysis. In what follows, I shall attempt to lay out the structure of Malcolm's two-part argument.
In the introduction preceding this chapter, it was noted that there is a difference between the thesis that factual memory entails factula knowledge (knowledge that) and the thesis that factual memory is equivalent to retained factual knowledge. Malcolm clearly holds the latter:

I think that here it may be misleading to speak of two elements of knowledge in memory, previous and present knowledge. There are not two pieces of knowledge but one piece. Memory is the retention of knowledge. One knew something and still knows it. The present knowledge in memory is the same as the previous knowledge. In order to argue for this thesis, Malcolm must show that all of the necessary conditions for retained knowledge are also necessary conditions for memory. In addition, he must also show that there are no necessary conditions for memory which are not also necessary for retained knowledge, and vice versa. If both parts of this requirement are met, then every possible case that counts as a case of retained knowledge counts as a case of memory, and if some possible case fails to count as a case of retained knowledge, then it fails to count as a case of memory, as well. As a result, the states of retained knowledge and memory would be shown to be identical. But Malcolm does not merely address himself to the alleged identity of these propositional states; he also wants to argue that the concepts of
retained knowledge and memory are logically equivalent. He is not completely clear on these matters; however, it seems to me that he argues not only for an identity of states, but also an equivalence of concepts.

The first part of the two-part argument Malcolm presents consists of what he takes to be a defense of a definition of knowledge and an argument that all of the necessary conditions comprising knowledge are those of memory, and that anything that counts against something's being an instance of knowledge also counts against its qualifying as memory. He states his requirements for knowledge in this way:

Obviously one necessary condition for the knowledge that p is that p should be true. If p is false then B does not know, and did not know that p; and also B does not remember that p. . . . A second necessary condition for someone's knowing that p may be expressed, roughly, as the condition that he should be sure that p. Being unsure whether p is true counts both against knowing that p and against remembering that p. If a man previously knew that p and now is not sure but does not even believe that p, . . . We should have to admit that at present he does not remember it . . . . A third consideration is that of grounds for being sure that p . . . . If a man's previous knowledge that p had no grounds, then in remembering that p his present knowledge has no grounds.14

The requirement that what is known must be true is uncontroversial. The claim that the truth of p is also a requirement for remembering that p is supported by Malcolm
by drawing the distinction between ostensible memory and genuine memory: according to him, it is a conceptual truth that if one genuinely remembers that p, then p is true; and if p turns out to be false, one has had only the ostensible memory that p. This is not a condition for which Malcolm has been criticized. His opponents accept it as well, so that we need not belabor it further in the exposition of their differences.

Malcolm's second condition is more interesting. He does not require just that a person believe that p in order to know it, but that the person be sure that p. We are not told exactly by Malcolm, what it means for him to say that S must be "sure" that p. However, some of his remarks in the passage above provide a clue to what he seems to have in mind. He says that in order to know, a person at least must believe that p, and even more than that, he must be "sure" that p. Here, he seems to use 'being sure' in the sense of 'feeling sure,' which would suggest awareness of what is believed. This suggests that he thinks of being sure as something like having a conscious conviction that p. In other words, being sure that p appears for Malcolm to be a stronger epistemic attitude than is believing, at least to the extent that the former more clearly reflects the necessity for being aware that p.
Another feature of drawing a distinction between being sure and believing is that Malcolm treats being sure as being sure with at least adequate justification. Malcolm thinks that being sure contains some component over and above merely believing, and that this component makes a justification component redundant. For example, he says that

A third consideration is that of grounds for being sure that p. It has often been supposed that, in addition to being right and being sure, a further thing necessary for knowledge is the possession of grounds, or adequate grounds, or conclusive grounds. I am not convinced that this third feature is a requirement for knowledge, although I admit that not just any true belief is knowledge.17

What this passage expresses, and what the passage below reinforces, is that Malcolm believes that since there are (so he claims) cases in which a person really knows that p, even though he does not have "grounds" for believing that p, it is his being sure that p that is (together with p's being true) sufficient for knowledge. Although Malcolm infers from such cases that knowledge is possible without having grounds or justification for what is asserted to be known, one interpretation which explains his thesis is that he has already built into the notion of being sure the concept of justification.
It is instructive to provide at least an example of the sort of argument he offers:

... sometimes people know in advance about things they do involuntarily. A nervous amateur actor, about to make his first appearance on the stage, might say with conviction, "I know I shall forget my lines." Sure enough, he does forget them. This use of 'know' is entirely natural. Did he have grounds? He could have been relying on some statistics— but that would not be the normal case. We are willing to say that he knew he would forget his lines, yet we do not expect him to have had evidence or grounds.18

Here Malcolm is arguing from a principle such as that the only correct sense of an expression is the "normal" or "ordinary" sense. But, there are many positions about what language tells us to the contrary. A rival philosopher can surely plausibly argue that in the case above, 'know' may be used "normally" or "naturally," but that it is also used mistakenly, that the actor might have said, "I know that I shall forget my lines" in order to express his anxiety, but that he did not therefore truly describe something he knew. This sort of retort is appropriate not only here, but also in response to some of Malcolm's other arguments, as we will see in a later chapter.

Finally, he argues for the relativity of knowledge with respect to the degree of confidence with which we hold what is said to be known. After discussing cases in which the same proposition is held by persons who each have
grounds of different strength for accepting it, he concludes:

The interesting point, if I am right, is that in ordinary discourse we conceive of knowledge as being more or less certain. We grade knowledge in terms of certainty. This grading of knowledge is solely in terms of the strength of the grounds. Grading knowledge as more or less certain is equivalent to grading grounds as more or less conclusive. If this is right, the assumption we are often tempted to make in philosophy, that if someone really knows that p then he must have grounds which make it perfectly certain or perfectly conclusive that p, is shown to be false. Knowledge is not all wool and a yard wide.19

Malcolm regards the justification component as superfluous to an adequate analysis of knowledge. This and his claim that such an analysis requires that one be sure of what is known makes it plausible to conclude that he has collapsed the justification requirement into the requirement of conviction, confidence, or sureness. But, since the two conditions of p's being true and one's being sure that p are for him sufficient for one's knowing that p, one can still ask, how these two conditions differ from true belief, which he does not want to count as equivalent to knowledge. The answer appears to be just that being sure that p is a stronger requirement than just believing that p. Malcolm does not provide any clues for the correct distinguishing characteristics. On the face of it, what he seems to have in mind is what Keith Lehrer has elsewhere
called the conscious conviction that p. However, even this requirement is too weak to be much different from ordinary true belief. Someone could, for example, in 2000 B.C. believe that the center of the Crab Nebula is a pulsar, and believe this with the utmost fervor and conscious conviction. But, on the assumption that in 2000 B.C. the state of astronomy was such that there was no evidence at all for entities such as nebulae and pulsars, it would be incorrect to say that this person knew that the Crab Nebula is at its center a pulsar. The trouble with this interpretation of "sureness" in terms of "conscious conviction" is that the latter is a psychological and not an epistemic or logical concept, and hence not helpful in elucidating "sureness" as an epistemic attitude vis-a-vis some sentence or proposition. Another possible interpretation of the difference between believing that p and being sure that p is that the latter means something like "believing that p and being entitled to believe that p." Being entitled to believe that p, however, seems most plausibly interpreted as having the right to be sure, and that is usually explicated as having adequate grounds for believing that p. Hence, on this interpretation of being sure that p, Malcolm would not have succeeded in avoiding including the possession of adequate grounds in his definition of knowledge.
The main thrust of his examination of the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge is to show that the omission of one of those conditions counts equally against knowing and remembering. The arguments he employs here are, again, arguments about what we would be willing to say about some situation. Furthermore, he argues that even if having adequate justification of even certainty were a requirement for knowledge that p, it would also be a requirement for remembering that p:

Let us try to summarize briefly the place of knowledge in factual memory. If a person remembers that p then he knows that p and he knew it before. Knowing implies being sure . . . There can be and are cases in which people know things without having grounds for being sure. If the previous knowledge was without grounds then the present knowledge is without grounds (if the present knowledge is solely memory). When a man had grounds for his previous knowledge that p, his previous knowledge was more or less certain, depending on the strength of his grounds; and his present knowledge (if it is solely memory) has this same degree of certainty regardless of whether he remembers his grounds.21

So far, Malcolm believes that he has shown that all of the necessary conditions for knowledge are also necessary for memory. But, this alone would not suffice to show that there is an entailment between the two concepts, let alone that they are logically equivalent. What he has to show is that there are no necessary conditions for memory which are not also necessary conditions for knowledge.
He does this by noting that remembering that $p$ is the retained knowing that $p$. Taking retention as a necessary part of memory, and giving some account of that concept, it follows that this account also contains the necessary condition for the retention of knowledge. In "A Definition of Factual Memory" Malcolm is unclear about the definition of 'retention,' but since he states that memory is the retention of knowledge, his comments about the relationship between memory and knowledge (even when they do not explicitly contain references to retention) should be interpreted to include the concept of retention. Malcolm addresses the problem of the relationship between factual memory and knowing that $p$ by explaining the third condition in his earlier definition of memory, which is that if $B$ remembers that $p$, then he knows it now because he knew it in the past. It is the force of 'because' that he concentrates on:

What does it mean to say that $A$ knows that $p$ because he previously knew that $p$? It does not mean that there is a "continuous" or "unbroken" connection between the past knowledge and the present knowledge, even if this were an intelligible notion. I am afraid my explanation of the meaning of "because" will be disappointing. I believe its meaning is essentially negative. This will be brought out by reflecting on one sort of consideration which would disprove the claim that $A$ remembers that $p$ . . . we should call $B$'s present knowledge that $p$ memory, only if we supposed that he would not now know that
p had he not previously known that p. This fits in with the general feature of knowing something on the basis of memory, namely that the present knowledge must be dependent on previous knowledge. As suggested before, when we claim that someone remembers a certain thing, we refer (more or less tacitly) to a previous time, $t_1$, when he knew the thing, and we are claiming that he remembers it from that time. Our claim implies that he has not learned the thing over again since $t_1$. More generally, our claim implies that nothing whatever has occurred at some later time, $t_2$, such that his knowledge "dates" from $t_1$. This general requirement eliminates the possibility that, for example, a brain operation at $t_2$ should have been a sufficient condition of B's present knowledge.22

The final definition of factual memory is thus the following:

A person, B remembers that p from a time, t, if and only if B knows that p, and B knew that p at t, and if B had not known at t that p he would not now know that p.23

Roughly, the point that Malcolm advances here is that in order for a person to be said to remember that p, a reason for its being true that he remembers must be that he previously knew that p. I am using the term 'reason' loosely here, because Malcolm gives no concise formulation of the link between previous and present knowledge. But, examining the passage above, it is plausible to attribute to him the position that whatever the connection between past and present knowledge is, it is not a causal one; indeed, he argues against the causal interpretation of
this connection given by W. von Leyden. Consequently, whatever he can make of the view that memory is a "source" of knowledge, he construes this view not in the sense that we are caused to have knowledge by some reservoir of stored knowledge, but that reference to our past knowledge is part of the justification for our present knowledge claims.

It is one of the important features of the controversy over the correct analysis of memory, how the "gap" between past experience and the present memory of it is to be bridged. We will see later that both Malcolm and some of his critics agree that what bridges the gap is that something has been retained. What they do not agree on is whether or not it is necessary to make reference to causal chains from the past to the present in an adequate analysis, or definition, of the concept of retention. Martin and Deutscher, in particular, have developed a detailed description of what the causal chains from past to present must be like, in order for there to be genuine remembering. But Malcolm, to the contrary, thinks that in the concept of retention there is no forced retention to any causal chains:

It must be admitted that one feels some mystification about my negative interpretation of the words "because" or "source" in our definition of factual memory. It seems mysterious that a man should know that p, having previously known it, unless there is something that comes between his
previous and present knowledge and ties them together. It is probably this feeling that chiefly contributes to von Leyden's view of memory. We feel that there is a gap between the previous and the present knowledge, but at the same time we do not know how to fill in the gap. Should we say that what fills it is some persisting state of the brain of a neural process? Whether or not it makes sense to postulate a specific brain state or neural process persisting between the previous and the present knowledge that p, such a postulation is obviously not required by an analysis of the concept of remembering.

Clearly, the least that Malcolm holds is that the "gap" is bridged by the retention of the knowledge that is at the two ends of the gap, and that it is not necessary for the concept of retention to be explicated, or analyzed, in terms of a process, or in terms of causal connections. In the passage cited above, Malcolm provides very little support for his contention. However, Roger Squires has argued for it, and against the contrary one by Martin and Deutscher.

B. Squires On a Noncausal Analysis of Retention

Roger Squires, in "Memory Unchained," defends the thesis that memory is the retention of knowledge, and that this retention (or retention of any kind) need not be analyzed in terms of causal connections:

The first section is an attempt to show that in describing something as having retained a quality, as having stayed the same in a certain respect, there is no forced reference to causal connections.
Squires examines cases of the retention of both qualities, such as color, and capacities, such as the ability of a toy to squeak after some temporal gap, and then tries to show that just as reference to causes in "describing" the retention of capacities is unnecessary, so it is unnecessary in "describing" cases of remembering. Much of Squires' argument is intertwined with his examples and is thus difficult to sort out. However, it is clear that the starting point for Squires is to examine the two major ways in which to answer the question "Why does S now have C?" This schematic sentence is intended by me to stand for sentences such as "why does Pavarotti now have the ability to sing?" and "why does Gould now have the capacity to manifest his past knowledge of the Goldberg Variations?" Squires contrasts the following two kinds of answers:

1. S now has C now, because it was caused to have C now by something in the past;

2. S now has C now, because S had C in the past.

Interpreting Squires, it might be suggested that (1) and (2) both express what is expressed by the ambiguous sentence

3. If S had not had C in the past, S would not now have C.
This is a sentence exactly parallel to the third condition for remembering that p given by Malcolm, who then goes on to insist that it does not entail anything about any causal connections between the first occurrence of C and its present manifestation. Squires has this to say about initially distinguishing (1) and (2):

Consider the question "What caused the curtains to be indigo?" or "Why are the curtains indigo?" This would normally be a query about what made the curtains indigo in the first place, what produced the color of the cloth. It would be absurd to reply that they were indigo yesterday. A specimen answer would be that an application of purpleweed, whenever it was made, brought about the peculiar color... But is there a sensible question, "What caused them to be indigo now?" to which a sensible answer would be, "They were indigo yesterday?"

In the first case he cites, the question is about why something has acquired a quality or disposition, and the answer to that, so Squires seems to say, requires making reference to what caused the thing to have the quality or disposition. The second case, however, is not a question about the acquisition of a quality, but about whether the quality was suddenly acquired in the present, or retained from the past. The answer to this question, according to Squires, must make reference to whether or not there has been retention of a quality or capacity. Whereas the first case requires reference to causal chains, the second case does not: according to Squires, whenever it is appropriate to answer
the question "why does S now have C?" with a sentence such as "(2) S now has C, because S had C in the past," reference to causal connections are unnecessary:

Such conditionals as "If the strawberries had not been red yesterday, they would not have been red today," however, are significantly different from causal conditions, such as "If the sun had not been shining yesterday, the strawberries would not have been red today." The former indicates indirectly that nothing has happened since yesterday to make the strawberries red. So if they are red today, you may infer that they were red yesterday. It does not assert a causal connection. Rather, it denies that certain kinds of causal explanation are necessary, by correcting the impression that the strawberries had become red since yesterday.

There are many comparable conditionals that are clearly not causal. For example, "If the strawberries had not been red in my garden, they would not have been red in yours." (Both had the same amount of sunlight.) Or "If the curtains had not been indigo in the lounge, they would not have been indigo in the kitchen." (Where you hang they makes no difference to their color.) Or, "If the play had not been well-received in Edinburgh, it would not have been well received in Glasgow (where the audiences are even more philistine). . . ."

Unfortunately, Squires does not say just what exactly it is that makes the obvious causal sort of statement "significantly" different from the contrasting sort. One way to flesh out this position is to consider two contrasting sets of sentences that may bring out more clearly what Squires seems to have had in mind:
1. If X were not a triangle, then X would not have only three sides.
2. If X has only three sides, then X is a triangle.
3. X is a triangle, because X has only three sides.

1'. If Socrates were not a scholar, then he would not be both a gentleman and a scholar.
2'. If Socrates is both a gentleman and a scholar, then he is a scholar.
3'. Socrates is a scholar, because he is both a gentleman and a scholar.

1". If A were not gold, then it would not dissolve in aqua regia.
2". If A dissolves in aqua regia, then A is gold.
3". A is gold, because A dissolves in aqua regia.

In representing these three sets of sentences as illustrations of what I take Squires' unspoken point to be, I do not defend the view that the three counterfactuals at the beginnings of the sets are equivalent to the indicative conditionals following them. My reason for juxtaposing them with truth-functional conditionals is that I take both Squires and Malcolm to be committed to the equivalence of the three sentences in each set. First, both philosophers think that a sentence of the form "S has
C now because S had C before" means a sentence such as "If S had not had C before, S would not now have C." In other words, when Malcolm says that the condition that S knows that p because he knew that p is the condition that if S had not known that p then, S would not now know that p, he is saying that the expression containing 'because' is translatable as a counterfactual.

Controversial though that may be, a second consideration is that 'because,' itself, is ambiguous. When it is discussed in the context of displaying the logical structure of sentences in which 'because' is the main connective, those sentences are translated as implications which are acknowledged to be ambiguous. Thus, I have grouped together sentences containing 'because' as the main connective, the implications translating them, and the counterfactuals claimed by Squires and Malcolm to express the same meanings as the relevant 'because'-sentences.

The differences among the three sets are apparent. In the first set (2) is a sentence in which the consequent follows necessarily, by definition, from the meaning of the expression 'having only three sides' in the antecedent, and so the force of 'because' in (3) might be said to be one of necessity. Thus, since these two sentences are supposed to be equivalent to (1), (1) expresses a necessary connection.
The second set is somewhat different. In (2'), the consequent follows logically from the conjunction forming the antecedent, so 'because' in (3') has logical force, and (1') therefore expresses a logical connection.

It is the third set which provide the "significant" contrast. (2") says that A's dissolving in aqua regia is the cause of our being warranted in asserting that A is gold. It expresses a causal connection between being gold and dissolving in aqua regia, and that is also expressed in (3"). In the latter sentence, then, 'because' has the force of causal connection, and since (1") is supposed to mean what (3") does, it also expresses such a connection.

Applying these distinctions to Squires' remarks, it is plausible to interpret him as holding that since "S has C now, because S had C in the past" does not express a causal connection, it expresses either a necessary or a logical connection. But, none of the sample sentences he has suggested clearly expresses either connection. For example, it is at least not obvious that the following sentence belongs to one or the other category: "If the strawberries had not been red in my garden, then they would not have been red in yours." An easier way to find out what Squires takes to be different about this sort of sentence consider the sentences alleged to be its equivalents.
4. If the strawberries are red in your garden, then they are red in mine.
5. The strawberries are red in my garden because they are red in yours.

If (4) and (5) are interpreted they make little sense, but the intention in examining them is that it is presupposed that they do not express causal connections. The problem then is, what do they express? In (4), the sentences 'they are red in mine' does not necessarily follow from the meaning of the words in 'the strawberries are red in your garden.' Similarly, the former does not follow logically from the latter, either. Nevertheless, if such sentences are sensible as long as they are not read causally, there must be something missing from them, which, if added, would show that there is either a necessary or a logical connection expressed by the full-blown sentence. A clue of what Squires might add is to be found in the ways in which he paraphrases and explains the sentences he has earlier considered to express noncausal connection. For example, he says that the sentence about the curtains' being indigo in the kitchen and in the lounge is sensible in that it expresses the principle that location is irrelevant to the curtains' having a color. Similarly, the sentence about the play's being well-received in Glasgow and Edinburgh
is said by Squires to be sensible, because it really expresses the principle that, in this case, location makes no difference to the play's ability to succeed. Another way to say what these explanations have in common is that the different locations are exactly similar to one another in that they are causally irrelevant to the quality or capacity attributed to the thing in question. Squires claims something like this by asserting that sentences such as the ones examined here implicitly express the proposition that a causal description of why something has the quality or capacity it has is not necessary in circumstances of a certain sort. These circumstances are not, obviously, the ones in which one is interested in finding out how a thing came to have the quality it has. Rather, they seem to be the ones in which one is asking what the justification is for believing that something has a quality in a particular place, or at a particular time, and in which the correct answer is that it is not necessary, as part of one's justification, to refer to location or to time as crucial components in the thing's having its quality at that time or in that place. This is the sort of explanation of noncausal counterfactuals Squires must have intended when he said that "... 'If the strawberries had not been red yesterday, they would not have been red today,' ... does not assert a causal connection. Rather,
it denies that certain kinds of causal explanations are necessary. Taking all this into consideration, I propose that the following sentence schema, properly instantiated, be added to the implications intended to be equivalent to the counterfactuals Squires discusses:

\[(E) \quad \text{\{S has C at time } t \text{ (in place } x) \text{ & S has C at time } t \text{ (in place } x) \text{ iff S has C at } t_1 \text{ (in place } x_1) \}\]

This sentence does not itself constitute a schema for saying the more explicit proposition that a certain causal explanation is not necessary, but it does do the job of making it plausible to interpret the sentences to which it is added as expressing a logical connection. For example, in the case of the strawberries' being red in both gardens, the expanded sentence using an appropriate instantiation of \((E)\) would be

4'. If the strawberries are red in your garden and the strawberries are red in your garden iff they are red in my garden, then the strawberries are red in my garden.

The foregoing examination of "retention" sentences has taken some liberties in that Squires does not explicitly make some of the more technical points that are part of the interpretation of his position. However, he does seem to have to concur that some proposition such as \((E)\) is needed
to make sense of his claim that sentences about retention of qualities and capacities express something other than noncausal connection. Some connection is expressed, and thus the most likely candidate seems to be logical connection, and that can be made explicit only by the addition of some proposition such as (E) to make the inference from antecedent to consequent succeed.

Having produced reasons for accepting the concept of retention as not requiring reference to causal connection, Squires attempts to make the additional point that retention is not identical with continuous possession. Roughly, he describes cases in which, he believes, it is true to say that something has retained a capacity, even though it did not continuously possess it:

In the dry summer we find that teddy has retained his squeak. But during the wet months of the previous winter he could not squeak . . . the appearance of discontinuity may be created in this way. We say that the toy could not squeak in winter and that it could squeak in summer. It is assumed that we are talking about the same ability at different times. So it appears to have survived a temporal gap. But the phrases "in winter" and "in summer" have an ambiguous role. We could take them as qualifying the ability, in which case the ability to squeak in summer would not be the same ability as the ability to squeak in winter. Even in winter the toy could squeak in summer. So there was continuous possession of the retained ability, after all. On the other hand, we could take the phrases as qualifying the time of the claim, the claim being that the toy had the ability to squeak whenever it was pressed.
Continuous possession then fails. But this ability has not been retained, though it could perhaps be restored. Thus, briding the retention gap is a superfluous piece of philosophical engineering.

Whether or not Squires is correct in arguing that something may correctly be said to retain a capacity even though it did not have continuous possession of it is not itself of importance here. What his argument is intended to support is his further claim that memory may correctly be said to be the retention of knowledge, even though there may not be the continuous possession of that knowledge. This is important for his assertion that a causally mediating mechanism is not necessary to bridge the temporal gap between initial learning and the later remembering, and that temporary forgetting is not a problem for the memory theorist (to be handled by the resort to causal connections bridging the forgetting interval).

Finally, Squires claims that memory is retained knowledge and argues that when memory is analyzed as retained knowledge (as opposed to regained, or newly gained knowledge), the analysis does not require reference to causal chains (since the concept of retention does not). Thus, Squires already accepts the thesis that, at least, memory entails knowledge, but he argues in addition to that that the Malcolmian rejection of a causal analysis is
correct. It is illuminating to apply some of the results of examining his earlier "retention" sentences to the sentences Malcolm uses to express the retention of knowledge from a time in the past to now:

. . . A person, B, remembers that p from t, only if it is the case that had B not known that p at t, he would not now know that p. The negative counterfactual conditional statement "If B had not known at t that p, he would not now know that p" does not express a law. It is similar in meaning to such a statement as the following: "If you had not given me a cigar, I should not have one now." This would simply mean that, in fact, no other opportunity of my obtaining a cigar presented itself. Similarly, our negative counterfactual conditional about B's knowledge means that, as a matter of fact, if he had not obtained his knowledge at t he would not have it now . . . Nothing is implied, in either case, about the existence of a causal chain or of a continuous process.31

The sentence that needs to be examined is one having the following form:

5. If B had not had K (the knowledge that p) at t, B would not now have K.

Since it is asserted not to describe a causal connection, and since it was argued earlier that a sentence such as this is plausibly interpreted as expressing a logical connection, a representation of (5) analogous to one used earlier to elucidate a sentence by Squires bears out that connection:
5'. If B has K now, and, B has K now iff B has K at t, then necessarily, B has K at t.

What makes the inference succeed is the sentence that something or someone, B, has a capacity at a time t, if and only if B has it at another time. This is the sentence which Squires has asserted expresses the claim that a causal explanation of why B has the capacity at t and now is unnecessary.

Deborah Rosen, in arguing that an explanation of remembering entails reference to memory traces (causally mediating states connecting past experience and present remembering), says that the distinction between justifying and explaining remembering is a distinction that seems blurred in the controversy over the correct analysis of memory. Not only that, but she also claims that from the thesis that a justification of our beliefs about remembering does not require reference to causal mechanisms, it does not follow that descriptions of causal chains is never required by any analysis of memory:

... [the second front in the contemporary trace debate] is that line of attack designed to show that the justification of a person's claim to remember does not involve reference to a storehouse of memories or to any causal chain of events preceding the remembering. Norman Malcolm, for example, argues that our everyday verifications of whether someone remembers, and thus our concept of remembering,
does not require the postulation of a mediating trace . . . The arguments given for these conclusions are very persuasive. What is not persuasive is any further claim or suggestion that there is therefore a conceptual inadequacy in standard trace theories.

Any move from the justification of memory claims to the inadequacy of trace theories is a mistaken one. The issues are separate ones. It is quite possible that memory traces are causally necessary for remembering although the justification of someone's remembering does not (usually) involve reference to what goes on inside one's head . . . What is needed to clarify and sharpen the memory trace debate is an explicit argument for the memory trace itself which makes clear the minimal assumptions needed. In attempting to provide such an argument, one result is that the issue of justifying ordinary remembering claims does not appear as a minimal assumption. Rather, the argument turns on the thesis that there is no causal action over a spatiotemporal gap.32

Her remarks are important in this context because they point out that defenders of the epistemic analysis of remembering, when they include in their analyses the concept of retention, seem to be engaged in an activity different from that of their opponents, namely the activity of justification rather than explanation. But, to make this clearer, it is first necessary to see that Malcolm and Squires are supported by others, and then to examine those positions opposing them.
C. Munsat's Position

In the preceding sections, Malcolm's argument that propositional (factual) memory entails factual knowledge was discussed and augmented with an explanation of points made by Squires and Rosen which refer to Malcolm's contention that the analysis of factual memory does not require reference to causally mediating states of entities. The critical remarks in these sections were intended to set out in a preliminary way the points of difficulty which will, in later sections, be the focus of attention. Before turning to these difficulties, it is important to note that supporters of Malcolm's position have not generally addressed themselves to the problems that emerge from the discussion of Squires and Rosen. Nevertheless, these supporters do contribute critical material which is helpful in casting Malcolm's view more clearly than it has so far.

In The Concept of Memory, Stanley Munsat attempts to give "analyses" of some of the "forms" of memory that Malcolm does not discuss, except in passing. Among these are reminiscing, suddenly remembering, so-called "habit memory," and more. In attempting to clarify such concepts, Munsat criticizes Malcolm's arguments and suggests appropriate changes. What is important here is that the changes
do not concern the question of whether or not knowledge is a necessary condition for memory, or better, they do not have the effect of rejecting the thesis that memory entails knowledge. Instead, Munsat tries to show that Malcolm's conditions for factual knowledge are neither necessary nor sufficient. What makes the definition of factual memory defective, according to Munsat is the time component Malcolm adds to that definition, namely the expression "from a time t."

Munsat's strategy for showing the condition not to be necessary is to construct a counterexample in which the person said to remember that p remembers it, but would have known that p even without remembering it, because someone else (redundantly) tells him that p in the present. This is a case, then, in which Malcolm would be forced to say that if a person were told that p even though he had really retained the knowledge that p, that person could not correctly be said to remember that p. To show that Malcolm's conditions are not sufficient, Munsat constructs a case which meets all the conditions, but which is such that the person S does not remember that p from a time t. Accordingly, he proposes a case in which S learned that p at a time t-1, now knows that p, and would not now know that p if he had not known that p at t. For example, if S had
completely forgotten that p just before \( t \), then he would not now know it. Munsat expresses the case in this way:

Suppose that I once killed a deer while driving, and I did it at a time \( t-1 \) (a time earlier than \( t \)). Let us further suppose that no one ever mentioned this fact to me, nor did I read about it. (Let us also assume that I knew it was a deer and knew that I killed it, at the time). And, finally, suppose that I now know that I killed it. Let us now consider a time \( t \), between \( t-1 \) and the present. What if I had completely forgotten that p between \( t-1 \) and \( t \)? If so, and I never had an opportunity to find out that p, I would not now know it. Hence, I now know that p, I knew that p at \( t \), and if I had not known that p at \( t \) (if I had completely forgotten that p before time \( t \)), I would not now know it. But I do not remember that p from \( t \); rather, I remember it from \( t-1 \). Thus, Malcolm's conditions are not sufficient, for one could meet them without remembering that p from \( t \).\textsuperscript{35}

To avoid such objections, Munsat offers a set of alternative definitions for those forms of memory he thinks are variants of factual memory. Since they are not in question, it suffices to show an example of one in which the time component is intended to improve Malcolm's definition:

a. A person, B, remembers that p \textit{from a time} \( t \) iff:

(i) he knows that p

(ii) he knew that p at \( t \)

(iii) he did not know that p just before \( t \)

(iv) there is no time between \( t \) and now ("now" being when he remembers that p) such that it was true of him that he did not know that p.\textsuperscript{36}
Even though one may wish to quarrel with the definitions Munsat proposes for not only remembering that, but also for some of the other forms of memory he examines, there is no denying that he follows Malcolm closely in his view that remembering entails knowing that. Indeed, he expresses the definition of memory as a subclass of knowing, or, rather, a "way of knowing something":

... if we contrast remembering that p with knowing that p (where what I remember is a fact other than something I did) then the only difference between saying "I know" and saying "I remember" is that if I say that I remember, I am implying that I did not just find out, that I knew it before (as opposed to "Aha, now I know that p."\(^{37}\)

Just as Munsat subjects Malcolm's definition of factual memory—as well as other forms of memory—to criticism, so E. M. Zemach argues that although Malcolm is basically correct in thinking that memory entails knowledge, he is wrong in stating the retention component using the expression "from a time \(t\)" as he does.

D. Zemach's Position

E. M. Zemach, in "A Definition of Memory," has followed Munsat in pointing out the difficulties faced by Malcolm in his definition of factual memory.\(^{38}\) His purpose in this paper is twofold: first, to provide a definition of factual memory which is in substantial agreement with
that of Malcolm, but which avoids its shortcomings; and, second, to argue that all other forms of memory (such as Malcolm's "perceptual" and "personal" memory, remembering how, remembering when, etc.) entail factual memory, but are not themselves entailed by it. It is the former of the two tasks that is important in illustrating the agreement among at least some philosophers that remembering entails knowing.

Zemach, like Munsat, uses counterexamples which purportedly show that Malcolm's definition of factual memory is both too narrow and too wide, that is, that his three conditions are neither sufficient nor necessary. Zemach maintains that the conditions that S knows that p because he knew that p in the past allows, for example, some cases to count as remembering which are such that the person S now knows that p, because he knew it in the past, and informed another person R that p. Later, having completely forgotten that p, he learns that p from R. As a result, S meets all the conditions that Malcolm demands, but Malcolm himself would not count this case as a case of remembering. This is an example designed to show the three conditions to be insufficient.

The sort of counterexample presented by both Zemach and Munsat to show that the definition has at least one unnecessary condition is one in which S knew that p, but forgets it. Later, he peruses a document which informs him
of $p$ once again, and, at the same time, he is suddenly reminded by the document that $p$. Here, $S$ does remember that $p$, even though it is false of him that he knows that $p$ now only because he knew that $p$ in the past (since, upon being informed by the document, he would now know that $p$, anyway).

An additional problem that Zemach sees in Malcolm's definition is that it seems to allow that a person remembers that $p$, even if he does not believe that he remembers. That this is an accurate reading of Malcolm seems to me to be a debatable point, and one that will be central in my later discussion of him. However, at least Zemach thinks that Malcolm is committed to remembering without believing that one remembers, which he not only thinks is an undesirable consequence of the definition, but one which he believes Malcolm himself would not want to accept:

Malcolm's definition requires only that, as a matter of fact, $S$'s present knowledge that $p$ will be due to his past knowledge that $p$, while $S$ may just as well believe that this is not the case, i.e., that $p$ is something he had never known before. For all we know $S$ may believe that he is not remembering anything; that his knowledge that $p$ is not memory knowledge at all. But under these conditions, I believe we would not tend to say that $S$ remembers anything. If I have understood Malcolm correctly, he would not tend to say so, either. I think that he, too, doubts whether it is possible to speak of having "unconscious memories" (e.g., of one's early childhood). But if it is a necessary condition for $S$ to believe that he remembers that $p$ if we are going to say of him that he remembers $p$, then Malcolm's definition is found faulty again.39
Since Zemach agrees with Malcolm on the general character of a correct definition of remembering, he accordingly gives a definition of his own designed to preserve the substance of the Malcolmian definition while adding conditions—and modifying others—to avoid the problems already outlined. Thus, he offers the following as a correct definition of factual memory:

\[ R(S, \text{that } p) \text{ iff } \]
\[ 1. \text{SBT}_p \land \]
\[ 2. \text{SBT}_p \rightarrow \text{SK}_p \land \]
\[ 3. \text{SK}_p \rightarrow \text{SK}_p \text{ in the past, } \land \]
\[ 4. \text{SBKT}_p \text{ in the past} \]

The definition reads as follows: S remembers that p if and only if (1) S believes that p, and (2) if S believes that p then S knows that p, and (3) if S knows that p, then S knew that p in the past, and (4) S believes that he knew that p in the past. Zemach requires that for a person to remember that p, he must at least consciously believe that p. More importantly, the particular belief he must have for it to be a memory belief must be such that in holding it, that person must be completely justified in accepting it, or, as Zemach puts it, "it implies that whoever actually holds it is epistemically entitled to hold it, i.e., if he believes that p he knows," says that it is necessary for S's
remembering that $p$ that $S$ know that $p$ only if he knew that $p$ in the past. This conditional alone would be vulnerable to the sorts of counterexamples Zemach presents to show that the condition can be fulfilled by someone who forgets that $p$ and relearns that $p$, because in the past he told another person that $p$, or wrote that $p$ in a dairy. However, the addition of condition (4) is designed to circumvent such counterexamples. That condition says that a person must believe that he remembers that $p$, if it is to be true of him that he really does remember. The addition of this condition has the effect of defusing all those counterexamples to Malcolm's definition in which a person relearns something he once knew by way of an information source for which he himself was responsible, although he now is not aware of ever having known the thing in question. It also allows us to accept as a case or remembering that of the person who forgets that $p$, but later both is informed of it and suddenly remembers it upon being prompted by the ostensibly new information, since then the person is aware of remembering that $p$.

Zemach, then has incorporated into his definition the requirement that one believe that one knew in the past in an explicit way, whereas Malcolm did not. That the latter is committed to such a requirement will later
be argued in a comparison between epistemic and nonepistemic analyses of factual memory.

A second, but for my purposes here not as important, task that Zemach undertakes is that of supporting Malcolm's contention that all other forms of memory entail factual memory. It should be recalled that when Malcolm presented his definitions of "perceptual" memory and "personal" memory, the definitions themselves did not contain any references to factual memory, and that this was, in part, because he wanted to define only the words 'perceptual' and 'personal,' not 'memory.' It was only later, after arguing from the necessity of being able to describe in propositions (or sentences) one's memory images that Malcolm drew a connection to factual memory. Zemach, however, makes the relationship between remembering \( p \) and remembering \( x \) more explicit by presenting definitions of so-called perceptual memory and personal memory which are nothing more than his previous definition of factual memory augmented by additional conditions:

The fifth condition for "personal" memory is

5a. and \( \text{SKT}p \) in the past through personally observing the event \( E \), described by 'p', or its immediate results (the object 0, which 'p' is about, or its immediate
surroundings) at the time when (E took place)/
(0 was in existence).

The additional condition for "perceptual
memory is

5b. and S can (produce at will)/(identify when
involuntarily produced) a mental image of
(E)/(O).

The combination of 5a and 5b would give us the
necessary and sufficient conditions for something
to be a "personal, perceptual memory."42

Since these definitions are not in contention here, it is
sufficient merely to present them, and to note simply that
by adding these requirements to factual memory, each of
the other two kinds of memory would entail the more "basic"
factual memory, since they "contain" it, according to the
above. Lastly, it should also be pointed out that where
Malcolm supported most of his arguments for the special
status of factual memory with claims about what we would
ordinarily say about an alleged memory situation, Zemach
similarly gives as his only support for his stand on the
role of factual memory and its proper definition assertions
about what he would tend to say under such and such condi-
tions. This is brought out strongly in a passage in which
he attempts to argue that remembering how entails remem-
bering that:
the student who memorized Hamlet's first soliloquy (i.e., remembering how it goes) is supposed to know that x is the first word of this soliloquy, that y is the second, and that x should precede y in a recitation of said monologue. I agree that if the . . . soliloquy reciter is a parrot, we would not say that (it knew) any of the above propositions. But then we would similarly refuse to speak of (its) "remembering" how to perform those tasks. It is, therefore, clear in my mind that how necessarily involves remembering that something is the case, and hence our definition of factual memory will constitute a necessary part of any definition of habit memory.43

It seems quite clear that an opponent to Zemach could plausibly make a case for showing that scientists, for example, or ordinary nonscientists, for that matter, regularly say about entities such as computers, pocket calculators, bees, etc., that they "remember" their programs, how to calculate the cube root of 37, how to describe the direction of the nearest pollen source, etc. For many native speakers of our language, informed or otherwise, there is nothing jarring or bizarre about applying the word 'remember' to some of the tasks performed by such entities. Moreover, quite apart from its seeming reasonable to use 'remember' in these ways, there is still the question left, whether or not it is legitimate to apply that expression to humans who are not aware of remembering. It seems that Zemach is arguing either from different linguistic intuitions or from a different bias.
in favor of one use of the word 'remember.' But, having
different intuitions or a different bias in and of itself
does not constitute an argument, and so Zemach's assertions
about habit memory, at least, go unsupported.

E. Conclusion

The objective of this chapter has been to present
instances of what I have called the "epistemic analysis" of
remembering, which is partly expressed in the thesis that
remembering entails knowing. The three most important
features in the positions examined are (1) that the argu-
ments directed at supporting the contention that remem-
bering is retained knowledge, or at least that remembering
entails knowledge, do not convince; (2) that the position
that genuine remembering requires being aware that one
remembers is also unconvincingly supported by one of the
proponents—indeed, it seems just to be asserted in the
face of what is taken to be an objectionable commitment to
"unconscious" beliefs, or knowledge; (3) that the retention
component linking past learning with present knowledge is
to be explicated noncausally. The purpose of the next
chapter is to present a thesis, mainly articulated by
C. B. Martin and Max Deutscher, that remembering does not
entail knowing. Here, we will see an analysis which does
not require for genuine remembering that one be aware of
remembering, and which does require that the retention of what was learned be explicated by reference to causal chains.
Footnotes

3Malcolm, Norman, op. cit., p. 212n.
4Ibid., pp. 214, 215
5Ibid., p. 215.
6Ibid., p. 215.
7Ibid., p. 208.
8Ibid., p. 219.
9Ibid., p. 214.
10This criticism was suggested to me by George Pappas.
12Ibid., p. 223.
13Ibid., p. 229.
14Ibid., pp. 224-230.
15Ibid., pp. 191-193.
16In particular, see: Martin, C. B., and Deutscher, Max, "Remembering," Philosophical Review, 75 (1966), 161-196.
17Malcolm, Norman, op. cit., p. 225
18Ibid., p. 226.
19Ibid., p. 229.


21Malcolm, Norman, op. cit., p. 231.

22Ibid., pp. 235, 236.

23Ibid., p. 236.

24Ibid., pp. 231-234.

25Ibid., p. 237.


27Ibid., pp. 178, 179.

28Ibid., pp. 181, 182.

29Ibid., p. 181.

30Ibid., pp. 182-184.

31Malcolm, Norman, op. cit., p. 236.


34Ibid., pp. 23-28.


36Ibid., p. 33.

37Ibid., p. 15.

39 Ibid., p. 528.
40 Ibid., p. 529.
41 Ibid., p. 529.
42 Ibid., p. 531.
43 Ibid., p. 531.
CHAPTER II

THE NON-EPISTEMIC ANALYSIS OF MEMORY

A. The Position of Martin and Deutscher

1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, the position articulated by Norman Malcolm was examined and compared with the views held by Stanley Munsat and E. M. Zemach. I took their position to be expressed in an argument having generally the following form:

(MM) 1. It is necessary that if S remembers x,
    (where x is a person, thing, place, or event), then S remembers that p

2. It is necessary that if S remembers that p. then S knows that p

3. Therefore, it is necessary that if S remembers x, then S knows that p.

In the discussion of the contrary analyses opposed to Malcolm's, I shall make reference to the premise, or premises, that the proponents of rival analyses either accept or reject.

C. B. Martin and Max Deutscher, in their article, "Remembering," present the view that knowledge and belief
are not necessary conditions for remembering. I refer to their view as constituting a non-epistemic analysis of memory. Instead, they offer a set of separately necessary and jointly sufficient conditions not including knowledge or belief, but according to which it is necessary that a person be able to "represent" what he remembers as the result of some "operative," causal antecedent:

If someone remembers something, whether it be 'public,' such as a car accident, or 'private,' such as an itch, then the following criteria must be fulfilled:

1. Within certain limits of accuracy, he represents that past thing.

2. If the thing was 'public,' then he observed what he now represents. If the thing was private, then it was his.

3. His past experience of the thing was operative in producing a state or successive states in him finally operative in producing his representation.

The major part of their discussion is devoted to a set of subconditions which are intended to spell out condition 3 in greater detail and with more rigor. These conditions are finally these:

3a. To remember an event, a person must not only represent and have experienced it, but also his experience of it must have been operative in producing a state or successive states in him finally operative in producing his representation.
3b. In those cases where prompting is operative for the representation, his past experience of the thing represented is operative in producing the state (or the set of successive states) in him which is finally operative in producing the representation, in the circumstances in which he is prompted.

3c. The state or set of states produced by the past experience must constitute a structural analogue of the thing remembered to the extent to which he can accurately represent the thing.

All of the conditions in this lengthy definition will be examined, and the most helpful way to do this is to divide that discussion into two parts. First, I shall present Martin and Deutscher's argument that belief and knowledge are not necessary conditions for remembering. This is the negative aspect of their analysis to justify the exclusion of these epistemic concepts from their definition above. Second, I shall present their argument that a causal criterion for memory must be included in the definition of remembering, and that the causal criterion must be of a certain sort. This positive enterprise and the negative one just cited form the main tasks in the analysis of remembering Martin and Deutscher defend.

2. The Thesis that Belief and Knowledge are not Necessary for Remembering

Part of the general strategy Martin and Deutscher employ in denying the Malcolmian position is to generate a
counterexample to deny the conclusion of the argument (MM) above, namely, they want to deny that it is necessary that if S remembers x, then S knows that p. The MM-conclusion can also be reworded to say that it is not possible for S to remember x, and for S not to know that p. So, Martin and Deutscher intend to present a case to show that this is possible. The second part of their strategy is to defend an argument which seems to be the formal version of the counterexample.

Specifically, Martin and Deutscher consider the case of a painter who is asked to paint some imaginary scene that includes a view of a house, a lawn, some trees, etc. After having completed the painting the artist, who believes that he has painted a scene strictly from his imagination in the same way that he would paint a scene depicting fictional characters like unicorns and griffins, showing it to his parents. Much to their surprise, it turns out that the picture is a faithful copy of their son's childhood home, which they left, when he was still very young. Thus, Martin and Deutscher claim that while it is true to say of the artist that he remembers his childhood home—since his remembering it is the best explanation for his correctly "representing" it—it is not true to say of him that he knows that the picture is a picture of his former home. ⁴
In assessing the success of this alleged counterexample, we must bear in mind, what it is a counterexample to: according to Martin and Deutscher, this is supposed to be an example to show that it is false that knowing that p is a necessary condition for remembering x. Strictly speaking, however, it is an example to reject an argument, (MM), in which the truth of the statement that knowledge is a necessary condition for memory is intended to be established by way of establishing a necessary relationship between remembering x, remembering that p, and knowing that p. If the target of the counterexample here is the conclusion of such an argument, then it will be helpful to examine, which of the premises Martin and Deutscher would also take to be false. First, an obvious point should be made: if the counterexample establishes it as true that both the artist remembers x, and does not know that p, then it follows trivially that it is possible that he remembers x, and does not know that p. This is, of course, the contradictory of Malcolm's conclusion (MM3). Given that (MM) is valid, we should then expect Martin and Deutscher to disagree with either of the two premises or both. Premise (MM2) says that it is necessary that if S remembers that p, then S knows that p. Near the beginning of their preliminary remarks, Martin and Deutscher attempt to
clarify their use of the expression 'remember that' by pointing out that in ordinary language, we sometimes use the expression as a way of describing something that we have learned. This, however, is not the only philosophically interesting use of the expression. In addition, they focus on another sense of 'remember that,' namely the sense in which a person "remembers that p" when he knows that p, but lacks some detail in what he knows 'p' describes:

There is, however, a distinction between two radically different types of remembering that p. In the first type, one sufficient reason why a man may be said only to remember that X happened is that he did not experience X happening. Another sufficient reason would be that his representation of the event is not due to his experience of it ... When speaking of this first type of case, we shall say that someone remembers that₁ something ...

In the second type of case, the reason why a man might be said only to remember that something happened is merely that there is a lack of detail in his direct memory. Thus, the second type is quite unlike remembering that₁, where his source of information is not his own past experience of what he recounts. Here we shall speak of his remembering that₂ something.⁵

According to them, 'remember that₁' is used in ordinary language in order to express that we have learned some time in the past that 'p' is true, where 'p' does not describe our own direct experience. Thus, we sometimes use 'remember that₁' in sentences such as "I remember that Cleopatra
was an Egyptian Queen." It would seem, then, that in the case of such a first-person utterance, 'remember that_1' entails at least 'believe that,' and is therefore epistemic.

'Remember that_2' is used, according to Martin and Deutscher, when we remember that p, p describes something that we have directly experienced, but we are unable to reproduce clearly—perhaps by way of images or emotions—the original experience. This expression may occur in sentences such as "I don't remember the party, but I remember that I was driven home by a friend." Again, in the case of a first-person utterance, 'remember that_2' entails at least 'believe that,' and is also epistemic. An important feature of these ways of construing remembering that is that their use of 'remember that_2 p' in the first person, at least, is different in degree, but not in kind, from their use of 'remember x,' where x is something S has personally experienced. As a result, there seem to be at least some conditions under which whatever Martin and Deutscher say about remembering x can be said about remembering that_2 p, as well. If one attends only to the feature of remembering that_2 p which is that of personally remembering that p, then one can see that the two "types" of remembering that exhaust the range of "factual," or
"propositional" memory and should be interpreted to be epistemic.

However, since Martin and Deutscher intend to show that personal memory does not entail belief and knowledge, and that personal memory is either remembering x or remembering that₂ p, it would seem that under certain conditions remembering that₂ p for them also does not entail knowing that p. Consequently, for Martin and Deutscher, there seems to be at least one kind of nonepistemic, factual memory. Accordingly, they disagree with Malcolm (as well as Zemach and Munsat) that (MM2) is true. The first premise of (MM) draws the connection between remembering x and remembering that p. If Martin and Deutscher are right, then neither of these two kinds of memory entails knowledge. Indeed, their artist case is one in which the artist is said to remember x, remember that₂ p (e.g., that the house was next to the hill, that the tree was an elm), but said not to believe and not to know that p.

Martin and Deutscher attempt to support their position with a counterexample illustrating the following argument:

Suppose that:

1. A remembers X, and A holds no belief that he remembers X.
We can easily suppose that, in addition, A is prepared to believe that the past event occurred only if either he believes that he remembers it, or believes that he has been told that it occurred, . . .

That is to say:

2. A holds the belief that X occurred only if either he believes that he remembers X, or believes that he was told that X occurred.

Now A tells some story about his past, and in fact this story is true, although he does not know it. He wonders whether he is remembering the story but, thinking it most implausible, he rejects this possibility. On the same ground, he rejects the idea that he has been told such a story.

This we may set down as:

3. A neither believes that he remembers X, nor believes that he has been told that X occurred.

From 3 and 2 we deduce that A does not hold the belief that X occurred. In conjunction with 1, this allows us to deduce that A does not believe that X occurred, but that he does remember that it did.6

In order to assess this argument and to point out its interesting features, it helps to set it out schematically.

The argument above, then, seems to look like this:

(MD) 1. aRx ∨ aBRx

2. aBx ∨ (aBRx ∨ aBTx)

3. ∨ (aBRx ∨ aBTx)

4. ∨ aBx

5. aRx ∨ aBx

6. (aRx ∨ aBx)
Here 'aRx' means 'a remembers x'; 'aBRx' means 'a believes that he remembers x'; 'aBTx' means 'a believes that he was told that x occurred'; 'aBx' means 'a believes that x occurred.'

The artist case Martin and Deutscher present earlier as a counterexample to the epistemic analysis of remembering might be construed as an illustration of this argument. It was claimed by them that the artist, indeed, remembered his childhood home, but did not believe of himself that he remembered it, since he took himself to be inventing the scene on his canvas. Further, there is some initial plausibility to the premise which says that a, the artist here, believes that the place he just painted was his childhood home only if he believes that he remembers that it was, or if he was told that it was by someone else. But, since in the example the artist neither believed that he was remembering anything about where he used to live, nor believed that he was told at any time that what he later represented was a copy of his former home, he clearly remembered his childhood home, without believing that the place he painted was that home.

3. The Thesis that a Causal Criterion is Necessary

Martin and Deutscher present their argument for the necessity of some causal criterion by supporting first the two conditions preceding the causal one in their
definition. The first requirement for someone's remembering something is that "within certain limits of accuracy, he represents that past thing." They leave vague both the meanings of 'certain limits of accuracy' and 'represents.' It is especially the latter concept that they intentionally present in an undefined way:

We intend the vagueness of the phrase "represents the past." Already in connection with memory without belief, we have described an example in which painting was a case of remembering. At the beginning of the article we suggested that even to swim might be a form of representation.

What we have said about the types of representation is insufficient, and this is a claim rather than an admission, since we want to bring to notice that no philosophical writing on memory has so much as recognized the problem. On anyone's account of memory, it is not enough that someone should have observed or experienced something in the past. He must do something in the present. "What sort of thing must he do in the present, in order to be said to remember?" is a difficult and very general question. It is similar to the question "What sort of thing must a person do to be right or wrong about something?" and requires a full treatment by itself.

There is, then, very little that can be determined about what they take to be an adequate, or full, definition of 'representation.' One thing that it seems one can say about it is that their general description of representing does not rule out, for example, the conjuring up of an image, or the intentional having of some other mental event, whatever it might be. That is to say, it seems
reasonable to suppose that bringing about a mental, memory event counts as representation. Also, the activity of recounting seems to be a candidate for representation. In general, however, representation seems to be interpreted by Martin and Deutscher as a kind of nonmental behavior, since the emphasis for them is on doing something other than merely thinking, if one is said to remember.

The second condition in their definition is that if the remembered thing was public, then the memory of it is due to an earlier perception of it. If, however, the remembered thing was private (such as a feeling), then the memory of it is "personal." All that this condition seems to come to is the distinction Malcolm drew between "perceptual" and "personal" memory, except that in his case, that distinction was more extensively described.

By far the most important condition is (3) and its explanatory clauses:

3. His past experience of the thing was operative in producing a state or successive states in him finally operative in producing his representation

Essentially, it is this condition that spells out the causal criterion for remembering Martin and Deutscher believe to be required in an adequate analysis for remembering. They argue for this condition in two ways: first,
they argue that some causal criterion is required, and, second, they go on to argue that a specific causal criterion is the one that must be used. In order to make the former point, they employ the strategy of attempting to show that the behavior of people who allegedly remember is best explained by the appeal to a special causal chain resulting in the present behavior. To make the latter point, they draw the distinction between necessary and operative conditions, and then claim that the causal condition is operative.

There are at least two considerations to which we may attribute the insistence on a causal criterion on the part of Martin and Deutscher. One is that the temporal "gap" between the past acquisition of a skill, capacity, or item of belief or knowledge and its present manifestation must be filled in. The second is that it is important to provide an adequate explanation of a person's present behavior. A causal chain of some sort that temporally connects the past acquisition of what is presently represented fills in that gap, allows us to distinguish between imagining and remembering, forgetting, etc., and also can be used to explain in terms of his memory, why a person presently behaves as he does. These two considerations are intertwined in the arguments Martin and Deutscher
offer in support of the two major theses attributed to them above, namely, that some causal criterion is required, and that it is a specific one. The former thesis is defended by way of three different arguments. The first one proceeds from an example invoking the concept of amnesia, and one which is helpful to cite at length:

A man whom we shall call Kent is in a car accident and sees particular details of it, because of his special position. Later on, Kent is involved in another accident in which he gets a severe blow on the head as a result of which he forgets a certain section of his own history, including the first accident. He can no longer fulfill the first criterion for memory of the first accident. Some time after this second accident, a popular and rather irresponsible hypnotist gives a show. He hypnotizes a large number of people, and suggests to them that they will believe that they had been in a car accident at a certain time and place. The hypnotist has never heard a thing about Kent nor the details about Kent's accident, and it is by sheer coincidence that the time, place, details which he provides are just as they were in Kent's first accident. Kent is one of the group which is hypnotized. The suggestion works and so, after the act is over, Kent satisfies criterion 1 again. He believes firmly that he has been in an accident. The accident as he believes it to be is just like the first one in which he was really involved. All along he had satisfied criterion 2, of course. Thus, while it is clear that he satisfies the first two criteria, it is very doubtful that he remembers.9

In explaining this example and saying that the reason why it is false to say of Kent that he remembers is that his recounting the first accident is not "due" to his having observed it, Martin and Deustscher seem to argue for the
causal criterion in a way such as this: Cases such as the Kent case are completely explainable by appealing to the causal antecedents of the behavior to be explained. Thus, in at least those cases, a causal criterion is necessary for distinguishing remembering from nonremembering. It is, indeed, a justified claim that the Kent case—describing a special case of the temporal "gap" between the first encoding of a memory and the later behavior seeming to result from it—ix explainable by referring to the way in which the causal chain from the first experience (of the accident) to the later recounting of its details is broken in such a way that the recounting has nothing to do with the first experience at all, except that the later description looks just as the description would look, if Kent were consciously to intend to recount an experience he once had. What is in question here is not whether the appeal to the relevant causal connections explains the "gap," but whether such an appeal is required to explain it. It surely seems plausible to say that a theorist such as Squires, supporting a Malcolmian position, can explain why Kent cannot correctly be said to remember that the details of his first accident are such and such by pointing out that Kent, since he has an apparently irreversible amnesia, has simply not retained his knowledge of the details of the accident, and has learned that they are the
relevant details "over again." That he cannot learn what he came to know in the past over again, and now know it only because of the present relearning of it is clearly ruled out by the Malcolmian analysis which does not include a causal criterion. Hence, the Malcolmian analysis of remembering does not fail to explain accurately this case of nonremembering. As a result, Martin and Deutscher must show not that their analysis succeeds where their opponents' fails, but that theirs is a better analysis which does a better job at explaining phenomena such as the one described in the Kent case. Martin and Deutscher, therefore, attempt to establish the claim that a causal component in the analysis of remembering is necessary for it.

Martin and Deutscher do not rest their case for that criterion just on the argument I have attributed to them, but augment it with an additional one which is illustrated by them with a reminder of the artist case earlier described, and a further example:

Consider the example of the painter which we gave earlier. The onlookers were compelled to the conclusion that the painter was remembering something he saw in childhood. It would have been unreasonable for them to think that he would have done what he did if it had not been for some past observation. Criteria 1 and 2 were fulfilled, but this did not by itself establish that it was a case of memory. What finally established it as such was this: the only reasonable explanation of the fact that the painter put details, colors, people and so on into his picture, just as he saw
them only once in his childhood, is that he was remembering that scene from his childhood . . .

To clinch this line of argument, we bring forward one of many similar cases from real life. A person has an apparent recollection of something from early childhood, and wonders whether he really remembers it. His parents may tell him that what he describes did happen, and that he witnessed it, but the discussion of whether he remembers it still goes on. They wonder whether his witnessing the event has any connection with his now giving the story or whether his description can be completely explained by what he heard later. Whether he has been told about it in the meanwhile, how young he was at the time, and whether he has seen things very similar at many other times are all relevant to deciding whether he actually remembers the event. These facts are the same as those which are used to decide whether or not he would have given the story if he had not witnessed the event in childhood. To decide that he would not have done so is to decide that his past witnessing is causally necessary for his present account.

Roughly, their example expresses the following claims:

(1) S would not have given his story, if he had not witnessed the relevant events.

(2) Having witnessed these events is causally necessary for giving the story.

(3) Facts relevant to supporting (1) are the same as those relevant to supporting (2).

By themselves, their position, when stated in this way, is plausible. However, the above statements are confined to the example illustrating them and do not fully express all that Martin and Deutscher are concerned to establish.
Their claim that the person in the example would support his belief that he remembers an event with the same evidence which would support his belief that the witnessing of the event was causally necessary must be seen in conjunction with their concern that some present behavior is best explained by reference to remembering. At least part of their use of remembering as such an explanation includes an attempt to "bridge the gap" between the initial experience and the subsequent behavior which is then explained by alleged remembering. It seems that one can understand the position of Martin and Deutscher more fully, if one reconstructs the three claims above in such a way that an argument emerges that includes not only the concepts of witnessing, causal connection, and evidence, but also the concept of explanation of a particular kind of behavior. Accordingly, the following argument seems to be a plausible version of their position:

1. Facts relevant to the truth of S's remembering completely explains his behavior B (his recounting) are the same as the facts relevant to the truth of the counterfactual C: 'if S had not witnessed event E, then S would not now exhibit behavior b.'

2. These facts are used to decide whether C is true.
3. Hence, deciding that C is true is the **same as**
    deciding that S's past witnessing is causally
    necessary for behavior b' is true.

Scrutinizing this argument, as I have reconstructed it, it becomes apparent that there are difficulties both in seeing its structure and in accepting its statements as true. First, there are identity claims embedded both in the first premise and in the conclusion, and they have to be made clear. Since they are not made clear by Martin and Deutscher, it is reasonable to construe these identity claims in a familiar way, since there is no reason to think that they intended their assertions to invoke some esoteric sense of "same as." I shall attribute to them the position that sentences describing the "facts" relevant to the truth of 'S's remembering completely explains his behavior b' are **logically equivalent** (not merely materially equivalent) to those sentences describing "facts" which are relevant to the truth of the counterfactual C. Similarly, I shall interpret their conclusion to say that a sentence describing that C is true is **logically equivalent** to the sentence that "S's past witnessing is causally necessary for behavior B" is true. Now, one has to decide on the validity of the argument, what missing premises there might be, and which of the statements (if any) is true.
The structure of the argument is made obscure by the fact that the important claims about the role of the S's past witnessing of an event in his remembering that event as the best explanation of his later recounting it are all couched in assertions about facts which are relevant to deciding which of the important claims about S are true. The argument, as it stands, has so few interrelating components, that it looks as though the conclusion bears little relation to the premises. The inference that Martin and Deutscher intended, however, is not so difficult to have an intuitive understanding of, so that it is fruitful to attempt to recast their apparent argument into a form which leaves out references to "relevant facts" and "decising," but which still captures their essential claims. Accordingly, I propose to interpret the argument in the following way:

1. If S had not witnessed event E, then he would not now exhibit behavior $L \equiv S$'s remembering completely explains his behavior B.

2. Thus, if S had not witnessed event E, then he would not now exhibit behavior $L \equiv S$'s past witnessing is causally necessary for behavior B.

Clearly, the conclusion does not follow immediately from one premise. The most plausible, assumed premise that succeeds in effecting the conclusion is:
2'. S's remembering completely explains his
behavior B ≡ S's past witnessing is causally
necessary for behavior B.

The question now to be answered is whether either of the
premises or the conclusion is assailable. If any one of
the statements in contention is at least dubious, then
Martin and Deutscher have not "clinched" the line of argu-
ment designed to show that remembering necessarily is to
be explicated in terms of a causal criterion.

Both premises can be shown to be vulnerable; but, to
show this, I shall make use of some critical remarks
about Malcolm for which I shall not argue here, since
their defense is the subject of the next chapters. There-
fore, I shall just assert that it is a necessary condition
for Malcolm that one be aware of remembering, in order
truly to remember. This is clearly not a necessary con-
dition for Martin and Deutscher. In the light of this
Malcolmiam position, one can assess the two premises above
in the following way: premise 1 says at least that 'if S
had not witnessed event E, then he would not now exhibit
behavior b' entails 'S's remembering completely explains
his behavior B'. The artist case is helpful in illustra-
ting what is at issue. Martin and Deutscher have to say
that its being true that if the artist had not witnessed
his childhood home, he would not have now painted the
scene he did entails its being true that the artist's remembering completely explains his painting the scene; that if the first is true, the second has to be true. In the original counterexample, they did not seem to intend such a strong point, but that is because the necessity of belief in remembering was at issue, not the premise now under discussion. On my interpretation of their view in question now, however, they seem to be committed to it. Malcolm could justifiably respond by agreeing that if the artist had not experienced his home in the past, he would not have painted the present scene. But he could disagree that the artist's remembering completely explains his painting what he did, because since the artist was unaware of remembering his former home, his is not a case of remembering at all. Thus, whatever completely explains his present behavior might be a set of suitably stimulated brain states, for example, but it is certainly not his remembering anything. That such a response can plausibly be made shows that premise 1 is dubious. The same can be shown for premise 1', if one concentrates on the entailment which proceeds in the opposite direction, namely 'S's past witnessing is causally necessary for behavior b' entails 'S's remembering completely explains his behavior B'. Malcolm can agree that the artist's perceiving his childhood home is causally necessary for his new performing the
actions Martin and Deutscher want to explain, but deny, again, that the artist remembers his home, so that his remembering it would not completely explain his now reproducing or "representing" it. So, there is good reason to think that both premises Martin and Deutscher need to "clinch" their case are assailable in plausible ways.

Since the two premises are dubious, the conclusion is dubious as well. Independently of that, there is a problem in their asserting that a counterfactual stating some future consequence of a past experience means the same as, or is equivalent to a statement of a causally necessary connection. However, on the basis of what is now known about the character of counterfactual conditionals, we have no reason to suppose that a conditional of the sort appealed to by Martin and Deutscher is equivalent to a causal statement. Thus, they have not established the necessity of a general causal criterion for remembering.

This criterion is the major subject of their positive analysis, and their failure to establish it as necessary therefore minimizes the importance of their arguments for the specific sort of causal criterion they take to be necessary. I shall, as a consequence, outline their arguments for the causal criterion as an operative condition rather than a necessary one, but it will not be important for the main points I wish later to make about the
dispute between Malcolm and Martin Deutscher to examine those arguments in great detail.

The major question to be answered by the appeal to a causal criterion of remembering seems to be for Martin and Deutscher the question of what insures that the present performance of some behavior is really connected to some past learning. This general and loose way of setting the stage for their discussion can be made more precise by pointing out which cases the causal criterion is intended to rule out as genuine remembering, and which ones it is to follow. The first important requirement they lay down for their causal criterion is that it ought not to say that past experience is sufficient for a present representation:

It might be thought that since we defend the causal criterion we are committed to saying that the past experience is causally necessary for the subsequent representation, since the past experience is clearly never sufficient for it.11

Their Kent case is a case that would be ruled out as remembering on this stipulation, since, in spite of Kent's having had the experience of being involved in an accident, the experience was not sufficient for his later recounting details exactly matching the details of that accident.

The sort of case that Martin and Deutscher wish to rule in as a case of remembering is the one which had been the object of Munsat's criticisms of Malcolm.
Malcolm had insisted that a person can correctly be said to remember that $p$ only when it is the case that if he had not known that $p$ in the past, he would not now know that $p$.

The case that Munsat, as well as Martin and Deutscher here cite as problematic for this condition is one such as this one offered by the latter:

... if a person is about to recount something and someone butts in and tells him about it anyway, then his having observed it himself is not necessary for his recounting it at that time. Yet that does not mean that he does not remember the past event, when he goes on to tell someone about it after being interrupted. Only if he had not recounted what he does, had he not experienced what he did, would his past experience be causally necessary for his present account. Had he not experienced what he did, he still would have recounted the same story, since he would have accepted his trustworthy friend's story. It seems scarcely believable, though, that he should not be remembering the event after his friend had butted in, and be remembering only what his friend told him.12

Since this is the sort of case that counts as remembering even though past experience is not necessary for now representing, Martin and Deutscher propose a causal criterion which is such that it requires much more than that past experience be sufficient for remembering, but less than that it be necessary. Another way of putting their intention is to say that their causal criterion is supposed to succeed in picking out cases in which past experience really is necessary for later representing it,
and cases in which past experience is a cause, but not the only cause of someone's later behaving in a certain way. Since it is, therefore, not enough to define the causal criterion as necessary (because it is not sufficient), Martin and Deutscher interpret the criterion as applying to cases where past experience is an operative condition:

In order to speak of a causal condition which may be necessary or sufficient but need be neither, we introduce the term "operative." A condition may be operative in producing another, even though the result would have been obtained at the same time by another method, had the operative condition not been present.13

This way of formulating the relevant considerations in judging a case to be one of remembering seems to establish what Martin and Deutscher take to be the importance of past experience for present representation. But, according to them, it does not establish that the operative condition which finally produces the behavior to be explained in terms of remembering is such that the causal chain from the experience to its later manifestation remains "unbroken." What this means is that they take it to be a requirement for remembering (as do theorists on memory, in general) that there be an uninterrupted causal chain which links the experience of a person to his present manifestations of it. An uninterrupted causal chain is conceived of here as one which is confined to the person who
remembers, only. Insisting on such a chain rules out the case of a person who came to experience that p, wrote that p into his diary, subsequently forgot it, and relearned that p from reading his diary a long time after. This is the sort of situation in which the forgetting is so complete that the reading of the diary does not suddenly remind the person, and so something is required to distinguish the two cases. In order to do that, Martin and Deutscher investigate the notion of "prompting," which itself is more detailed than it is necessary for my purposes to examine. The essential feature of it is, however, that it is supposed to be added to the general causal criterion in such a way that together they can be used to pick out as genuine cases of remembering only those cases in which there is no causal "gap" between past experience and present behavior, and in which the causal chain is confined to the rememberer only. What bridges the gap and insures the causal continuity in question is, for them, the memory trace:

The problem can be resolved by recourse to the idea of a memory trace. This idea is an indispensable part of our idea of memory. Once we accept the causal model for memory we must also accept the existence of some sort of trace, or structural analogue of what was experienced. Even if someone could overcome the many difficulties of various kinds surrounding the idea of action at a distance, it could not be true to say that someone was remembering an event if his past experience of that event caused him, over a temporal gap, to recount it.14
Clearly, they make at least two contentious claims here, namely that the causal model entails the existence of a memory trace of some sort, and second that it is not possible that a person remembers now, if there is a temporal gap between his past experience and his present manifestation of it. The former is a claim that Malcolm examines and criticizes in Memory and Mind, and the latter is one which Squires attacks in "Memory Unchained." Both criticisms, while they are not central to my major point, will be entertained in a later chapter, so that remarks about them here are inappropriate.

Summarizing the position Martin and Deutscher hold, we can say that they (1) deny that the epistemic analysis is correct. This means that they deny that belief or knowledge are necessary conditions for remembering, and that the conclusion (as well as at least the second premise of Malcolm's argument (MM) is false), (2) that the correct analysis of memory requires a causal criterion, and (3) that the causal criterion is to be construed as one which requires the existence of memory traces which are the structural analogues of past experience. It is primarily the first of these claims which will be examined in the light of the disagreement over it with Malcolm.
B. The Position of Shope

Robert Shope, in "Remembering, Knowledge, and Memory Traces," argues for a position which is partly in sympathy with that of Martin and Deutscher, and partly in sympathy with that of Malcolm. He advances at least these three claims: (1) that Martin and Deutscher have not succeeded in presenting a counterexample to Malcolm's three conditions for remembering, (2) that belief and knowledge are not necessary conditions for remembering, and (3) that the appeal to memory traces is either not necessary or not appropriate for an analysis of memory, or both.

Pointing out that, according to his interpretation of the artist counterexample, Martin and Deutscher have not constructed an effective counterexample, he says:

... They fail to refute Malcolm simply because they have not described a case of remembering that. The painter who is unable to do anything but offer a representation in question, who strongly denies that he saw such a scene, and believes that he never did, cannot be said to remember, for example, that the barn he saw was painted red or to remember that there was ever such a scene. Rather, he has a memory of how the scene looked and that the barn was red, and his painting is a manifestation of such memories. Perhaps, it is also proper to say that in doing a certain portion of the painting he is remembering, for example, how the scene looked, the color of the barn, or the way in which the various objects were related.
This criticism of Martin and Deutscher, however, is not to the point. To see this, one should recall the propositions that Malcolm on the one hand and Martin and Deutscher on the other accept. Malcolm accepts all the following:

1. Necessarily (If $S$ remembers $x$, then $S$ remembers that $p$,) (for some $p$ or other),
2. Necessarily (If $S$ remembers that $p$, then $S$ knows that $p$,)
3. Necessarily (If $S$ remembers $x$, then $S$ knows that $p$,)
4. Necessarily (If $S$ knows that $p$, then $S$ believes that $p$.)

Of these sentences, Martin and Deutscher accept 2, reject 3, seem to accept 4, and are unclear about 1. Shope, however, accepts 2 and 4, and rejects 1 and 3. From this, Shope's remarks can be explained in the following way: he takes Martin and Deutscher to intend to falsify 2, but thinks that they have failed to do that, because, according to him, the artist case is not one of remembering that. His reason for saying this is that a person can remember that $p$ only if he believes that he remembers that $p$:

We cannot say of the painter who does not take himself to be representing the past "He remembers that he saw a scene which looks like this and not like that," nor say of him "He remembers a scene and remembers that it looked like this and not like that."
But, as was argued earlier, Martin and Deutscher think that (at least in the first person) remembering that $p$ does entail knowing that $p$. Thus, in presenting a case of remembering $x$, they are attempting to falsify the premise that remembering $x$ entails remembering that $p$. There seems to be some reason to think that Martin and Deutscher may be forced to admit that the painter example really is also a case of remembering that. But even if Shope were right in his claim that the artist case is not a case of remembering that, this fact alone would not have any detrimental effect on the appropriateness of the counterexample. It is open to Martin and Deutscher to argue that falsifying the conditional, 'if S remembers $x$, then S knows that $p$,' just is to reject the Malcolmian definition, since this conditional is a deductive consequence of two other propositions (1 and 2 above) Malcolm accepts. Shope has thus not established his point about the counterexample.

Nevertheless, Shope argues that the case is a case of remembering $x$, and also that it is not a case of knowing that $p$ (or believing that $p$). His support for this position is rather obscure, because it proceeds from an interpretation of the expression 'remembering' and 'remembers' that is at least contentious, if not false. Before remarking on the distinction he draws between the
two expressions, it is illuminating to see what he himself claims for it:

Martin and Deutscher are correct in using the expression "he is remembering" in this connection, but not in using the expression "he remembers"—a distinction which is obscured by their introductory declaration that their paper is intended "to define what it is to remember" . . . When we say of a person "He is remembering," we are attributing to him what, in a somewhat technical sense, is a process or an activity, something that he is doing. That we can speak of remembering in this sense has been denied by Munsat . . . I agree with E. M. Zemach ("A Definition of Memory") that an analysis of "He remembers that p" the nondispositional sense will involve a stipulation that the person believes that his present knowledge is in certain ways connected with his past . . . But we can correctly say of a man "he is remembering that past experience" even when he takes himself, like our painter, to be representing something purely imaginative.18

In these remarks, Shope points out the distinction between so-called dispositional and occurrent remembering, and claims that Martin and Deutscher have not paid proper attention to this distinction in their counterexample. He seems to think that "remembering" is a process or some sort of behavior which does not entail that one knows that. Opposed to this kind of remembering, the nondispositional sense of 'remembers that' is taken by Shope to entail 'know that' in the sense that one is aware that one knows. Another way of describing Shope's position here is to say that if 'remembering' and 'remembers that' are used non-dispositionally, then they entail knowing that. But, if
these expressions are used dispositionally, then they do not entail knowing that. In order to be justified in such a position, Shope has to accept a particular thesis about belief.

What seems to be at stake in the passage cited above is that remembering is construed by Shope to be a process which is some occurrent representation, or behavior or even mental event, and which does not require the belief that one remembers. But, to remember x or to remember that p is to remember dispositionally at least some of the time. From what Shope later says, remembering dispositionally requires belief that one remembers. It is difficult to understand this position on what the requirements are for it to be true that one remembers x, on the one hand, or remembers that p, on the other. According to the quote cited above, one remembers x occurrently only if one believes that one remembers. Like Malcolm, Shope gives no support for this contention. Rather, it seems to rest entirely on an intuition about the correct use of the expression 'remembers.' Shope's way of construing 'remembers' this way leaves open the reasonable supposition that he thinks that one remembers x dispositionally even if one does not believe that one remembers. According to Shope, there are two ways to use 'remembers x,' dispositionally and occurrently. If it is used dispositionally,
it is used nonepistemically; if it is used occurrently, it is used epistemically. Martin and Deutscher constructed a counterexample which was intended to illustrate the nonepistemic sense of 'remembers x.' According to Shope's line, they should therefore have used 'remembers' dispositionaly. However, they used 'remembers' to refer to a memory occurrence, or event, so they used 'remembers' occurrently. Hence, their counterexample misfied. Whether or not Shope's use of the distinction between occurrent and dispositional is powerful enough to support the distinction between epistemic and nonepistemic remembering is a topic to be discussed in a later section.

For later purposes, it is important also to attend to Shope's argument that the analysis of memory does not require that there be memory traces. Although Shope's treatment of this point is in many ways unclear, the gist of his discussion concerning the role of memory traces in an analysis of memory appears to be this: (1) that there is a difference between giving an analysis of remembering and giving an explanation of it; (2) that the former does not require the concept of knowledge, but only the concept of the capacity for knowledge; and (3) that the latter can, but need not invoke devices such as memory traces. He introduces his support for these contentions in this way:
An assertion that someone remembers something (in either a dispositional or a nondispositional sense), an assertion that someone is remembering something, and an assertion that someone has a memory (in either sense) of something all entail that the person either (1) has retained (a) knowledge or (b) a certain kind of capacity, or (2) has had a sequence of states consisting of such capacities and/or bits of knowledge and belief, where each member in the sequence is dependent in a certain way on previous members. 19

Shope's point is that remembering of any form is to be analyzed either in terms of retention or in terms of some causal chain. What is retained or causally transmitted, however, need not be knowledge or belief, except in the case of "factual memory," or memory that $p$, and occurrently remembering something. Somewhat later, he augments his point by proposing the thesis that whether one chooses to analyze memory in terms of the retention of something, or in terms of some causal sequence depends, on the purpose that such an analysis is to serve. 20 If it is intended to be an analysis of the concept of memory, then noncausal conditions may be necessary conditions for remembering; but, if it is really intended to be an explanation of remembering, then some causal condition is necessary, but need not also include claims about memory traces. For example, he proposes that the "capacity for knowledge" might function as the causal connection between past and present:
We may indeed follow Squires in saying that there must be "cognitive capacities" which connect remembering with the past. But such a capacity need not, as Squires maintains, be knowledge—or even belief. When it is not knowledge or belief, it is a certain capacity for knowledge which logically must be acquired through previous experience (as in seeing something) or by previous thinking (as in figuring out an answer in one's head) or by merely having previous knowledge (as in some cases of amnesia). It is a capacity for knowledge which does not logically require any special type of conditions in order to manifest itself or to develop into actuality (as at the end of amnesia).21

Somewhat later, he addresses what is required for an analysis of memory:

... an analysis includes the notions of coming to know on the basis of previous knowledge and belief, although simpler cases of remembering may only involve a single piece of retained knowledge, or only a retained capacity to know (as at the end of amnesia about an accident which produced it).22

There is no further attempt by Shope to clarify his distinction between an analysis of remembering and an explanation of it. All that it is possible to cite here is that he makes that distinction when he states the goals of his paper, and that he uses it by couching all his arguments against the necessity of memory traces for a causal account of memory in terms of providing a causal explanation.

Accordingly, he writes:

In the final section, I shall discuss the notion of memory traces of the sort described by Martin and Deutscher in analyzing the concept of remembering, one might wish to appeal to the presence of memory traces in an attempt to provide a causal explanation of the present representation...
in speech, images or behavior which is involved in nondispositional remembering. 24

Even though there is in his work some lack of clarity in laying out exactly what he thinks this distinction between analysis and explanation portends for the dispute between those who support an epistemic analysis of memory and those who instead support a nonepistemic analysis, his distinction will later be the subject of some of my critical discussion assessing the root of the dispute in question. It is this matter, rather than the problem of whether memory traces, as opposed to something else, need be invoked in a causal explanation of remembering that is important for my purposes. Consequently, I shall not discuss Shope's examination of that topic, except to say that he takes the problem of the alleged indispensibility of memory traces to be ultimately a scientific problem, not a philosophical one:

... a positive argument for memory traces must be scientific, and not an example of everyday or philosophical reasoning. Philosophy can at best offer a critique and investigation of the concepts, methodology, and argumentation in any such account that science develops. 25

C. Conclusion

The examination of some proponents of both the epistemic and the nonepistemic analyses of "factual"
memory has brought to light a large number of interconnected issues which have not clearly been addressed in the dispute between them. When one assesses the difference between the two camps, one is at first led to think that the only important difference between them is that they happen to accept opposing analyses of remembering that, and that when they disagree over the success of counterexamples and the soundness of their arguments, it is because different theorists have different intuitions with respect to what counts as a genuine case of remembering. I shall argue that, upon closer inspection, it becomes apparent that the distinctions between the two opposing positions have to do not so much with intuitions, but with its being the case that one faction in the debate insists on some pre-analytic requirements, or presuppositions, and the other faction insists on different ones. As a result, neither is successful at "refuting" the analysis of the other, and the choice between them must be supported by an effective argument in favor of one sort of presupposition rather than the other. That the dispute in question centers on this very generally articulated level is the subject of the following chapters.
Footnotes


2Martin, C. B. and Deutscher, Max, op. cit., p. 166.

3Ibid., pp. 173-191.


5Ibid., p. 162.

6Ibid., pp. 168, 169.

7Ibid., pp. 166.

8Ibid., pp. 172-173.

9Ibid., p. 174.

10Ibid., p. 176.

11Ibid., p. 178.

12Ibid., p. 179.

13Ibid., p. 179.

14Ibid., p. 188.


16Ibid., p. 304.

17Ibid., p. 305.

18Ibid., p. 305.

19Ibid., p. 312.
20 Ibid., p. 316.
21 Ibid., p. 312.
22 Ibid., p. 313.
23 Ibid., p. 303.
24 Ibid., p. 316.
25 Ibid., p. 322.
CHAPTER III

THE CONTROVERSY OVER KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF

A. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to examine a recent dispute over whether or not knowledge entails belief. On the one side of the matter Colin Radford argues that there is no such entailment; on the other side of it Keith Lehrer and D. M. Armstrong argue that there is, but they hold this view for much different reasons. My reason for considering the problems discussed by these philosophers is to show that the major features of the memory-knowledge controversy are found also in the one over knowledge and belief. In large outline, what we shall see is that Lehrer holds a thesis supported by Malcolm about memory. On the other side of the coin, the analysis of memory presented by Martin and Deutscher has its counterpart in the analysis of knowledge presented by Radford. Armstrong alone defends an analysis of knowledge which is unlike those discussed earlier with respect to memory, but which, nevertheless, illustrates both of the most important features of the disputes in question, and which I shall try to clarify after the examination of the relevant views about knowledge.
B. The Problem of the Belief Component in the Analysis

There are at least two related problems involved in the attempt to give a definition of knowledge: (1) the problem of whether it is possible for there to be knowledge without belief, and (2) the problem of whether the KK-thesis—the claim that if one knows that p, then one knows that one knows it—is acceptable. I shall deal with each problem, saying how they are related. However, I shall concentrate more on the first than the second.

1. The Counterexamples by Colin Radford

Just as the epistemic analysis of factual, propositional memory includes the claim that necessarily, if S remembers that p, then S knows that p (where p is the same in each case), so the analysis of knowledge by philosophers such as Ayer, Chisholm, and Lehrer includes the claim that necessarily, if S knows that p, then S believes that p. Moreover, just as the claim about memory has been challenged, so has the claim about knowledge, and in similar ways.

Colin Radford, in his article, "Knowledge--By Examples," presents three alleged counterexamples to the "traditional" view, counterexamples which have the consequence of showing that it is possible that S might know that p, and at the same time not believe that p. The last
example is the most important one. It is one which depends upon a person's having learned that \( p \), then, seeming to have forgotten it, and then later correctly responding to questions about \( p \), while at the same time being at best hesitant about committing himself to the belief that \( p \). In his third example, the problem of belief is couched in the conversation between two persons, Tom and Jean, during the course of which they decide to gamble on their respective abilities to answer correctly certain questions about English history. Jean, a French-Canadian, protests that he has never learned any English history, and will thus lose all the bets. Nevertheless, he finally agrees to the game and proceeds to guess at the answers to the questions directed at him by Tom. In the process of guessing a large number of answers and making several mistakes about them, Jean has still managed to come up with many more correct answers than the laws of probability would attribute to chance. Since this is a surprising result for both Tom and Jean, the latter reflects upon the reason for his success and decides that at some time in the distant past, he might have had a course in Shakespeare in which he must have inadvertently come to know some English history, after all. However, this is just a plausible conjecture for him; indeed, he is still amazed that his guesses were right, since he was
quite ready to suppose that he had uttered only falsehoods. But Radford nevertheless counts Jean's case as a case of Jean's knowing that \( p \), namely, that Elizabeth died in 1603, where Radford makes the claim for knowledge in this case on the ground that Jean performs correctly sufficiently often to preclude the possibility that he might merely be guessing.\(^2\) Moreover, while Jean allegedly knows that \( p \), he seems not to believe that \( p \):

\[ \ldots \text{he was not certain, or sure, or confident that } p. \text{ Indeed, he was fairly certain that his answer to the question was wrong, i.e., that } \neg p, \text{ since he believed it to be a pure guess in a situation where only one of many such guesses could be correct.} \]

If Jean believes his answer to have been wrong, then it is plausible to say that he fails to have the belief that \( p \), in spite of the fact that he is said to know that \( p \).

What is now at issue is not only whether belief is a necessary condition for knowledge, but also what Radford takes to be a necessary condition for belief. His comments about what his example is designed to show suggests such a condition:

So if example 3 is a possible one it shows that neither being sure that \( p \) nor having the right to be sure that \( p \), can be necessary conditions of knowing that \( p \). Indeed, it shows that a man may know that \( p \) even though he is neither sure that \( p \), and indeed fairly sure that \( \neg p \), nor justified in being sure, etc., that \( p \).\(^4\)
In order to understand Radford's concept of belief, the issue of "being sure" demands some attention. Not only that, but his interpretation of "having," or "not having" the right to be sure may shed light on his position. I shall talk about the latter problem first.

Somewhat earlier, Radford claims that it is not only the belief component which is missing, but also the justification component; which he interprets as "having grounds for being sure":

Moreover, though he was not sure that p, Jean would not have had any grounds for being sure—or, at least, as he was not aware of them, i.e., of having learned that p, etc.—he would not have been justified in being sure, etc., that his answer was right, viz., that p, had he been sure.5

Radford's support for his position is so unclear that his view about what is necessary for a person to believe should be interpreted for now in terms of being "aware of one's belief or knowledge" (or of being unaware of it). A rather complicated paragraph suggests this:

Although the quiz reveals that Jean does know some English history, he does not know that he knows any until after Tom has told him that certain of his answers are correct. E.g., when asked, Jean knew the date of James I's death, viz., that p, but he did not know that he knew this. For he did not think that he knew the date of James' death and was indeed quite sure that he did not and that he would therefore have to make a guess at it. Moreover, had he been sure that he knew the date, and yet still sure, as he was, that he had never learned it (and
sure that if he had ever seen or heard or read it, it had left no "impression," had not "registered," etc.), he would certainly have had no right to be sure that he knew the date. But this last point is a complication. Jean was not sure that he knew the date of James' death for he was sure that he did not know it, and, having forgotten that he had learned it, he did not have the right to be sure that he knew this date.6

Radford seems to hold that S is justified in being sure that p only if S is aware of his justification. Since Jean is not aware of his justification for believing that p, he does not have the right to be sure. Again, not "being sure" is also a strike against belief: Jean is said by Radford not to believe that p, because he is not sure that p, and the way in which we can tell that he is not sure is that he is not aware of being sure. "Not being certain," in the sense in which Radford uses it, seems to come to nothing more than just "not being sure." From all this, we can say that the reason for Radford's saying that Jean does not believe that p is that he is not aware that he believes that p (it is an additional feature, according to this exposition of the argument, that Jean is justified in believing that p only if he is aware of being justified in believing it). Radford's argument should be reconstructed in the following way:

(R1) 1. S knows that p
    2. S believes that p only if S is aware of believing that p
3. But S is not aware of believing that p

From 2 and 3 we get

4. S does not believe that p

Conjoining 4 with 1, it follows that

5. S knows that p, and S does not believe that p

More conservatively, 5 entails the denial of the knowledge/belief entailment:

6. It is possible that S knows that p, and that S does not believe that p

This, in Radford's view, constitutes a proof that the "classical" theory of knowledge is false. For purpose of more clearly showing the close similarity between this argument and the earlier one of Martin and Deutscher, I shall rewrite Radford's argument in schematic form:

(R1) 1. skp

L

2. sbp -> sABp

3. ~(sABp)

4. ~(sbp)

5. skp * ~(sbp)

6. ◊ (skp * ~(sbp))

In this schematic argument, the premises should not be understood to make reference to all p, but only to some p.

Far from resting his case with the conclusion that belief is not a necessary condition for knowledge, Radford goes on
to try to show that it is also false that knowing that one knows is a necessary condition of knowledge. This argument is interesting in that it displays quite graphically the object of the criticism which later both Lehrer and Armstrong level against Radford's alleged counterexample. In general outline, Radford tries to demonstrate that, in the example, Jean would have been entitled to say that he knew that $p$ only if he had said so. But, he asserted that he did not know that $p$, and hence did not know that he knew. But, he asserted that he did not know that $p$, and hence did not know that he knew. His argument can be reconstructed in this way, referring again to his counterexample:

(R2) 1. $S$ knows that $p$
2. $S$ knows that he knows that $p$ only if $S$ believes that he knows that $p$
3. but $S$ does not believe that he knows that $p$
4. Thus, $S$ does not know that he knows that $p$
5. $S$ knows that $p$, but does not know that he knows that $p$
6. Therefore, it is not the case that if $S$ knows that $p$, then he knows that he knows that $p$.

or schematically (as in R1):
1. $sKp$

2. $sKKp \supset sBKp$

3. $\neg sBKp$

4. $\neg sKKp$ (from 2 and 3)

5. $sKp \cdot \neg sKKp$ (from 1 and 4)

6. $\neg (sKp \supset sKKp)$ (from 5)

The first premise is just Radford's claim that Jean indeed knows that $p$. The second premise is the one which I take to be the most plausible interpretation in this context of the remarks he offers in support of the denial of the KK-thesis.

... Jean was not sure that he knew the date of James' death for he was sure that he did not know it, and having forgotten that he had learned it, and indeed being quite sure that he had never learned it, he did not have the right to be sure that he knew this date ... he did not think that he knew the date of James' death and was indeed quite sure that he did not and that he would therefore have to make a guess at it ... it is perhaps not merely Jean's not being sure, or his not having the right to be sure, or even his not believing that he has the right to be sure ... that debars him from knowing that he knows any English history, or knowing that he knows ... that $p$. It is rather that (being quite sure that he does not know any) he says that he did not know the answer to any particular question in the quiz even when he did. It is because he gets, or would get the answers to the 'Do you know ...?' questions wrong (and certain of the dates right) that we say that he is not aware, does not realize, i.e., he does not know, that he knows any history.)
The cues to Radford's conception of belief and knowledge are only tenuous in this passage. If one examines the last few lines, one can see that he seems to take 'know' to be synonymous with 'realize,' and 'being aware.' However, it is odd that he should construe 'know' in this way, since Jean's not being aware that Elizabeth died in 1603 did not mean that he did not know. Thus, a more reasonable interpretation of this crucial passage is that Radford takes it to be a necessary condition of knowing that one knows that one be aware that one knows, or, that one realizes that one knows. But, if we recall the first argument, we see that being aware of something and realizing it, was what Radford seemed to count as belief: the reason that I take him to deny that Jean believed that p is that according to Radford, Jean was not aware that p, did not realize that p. It seems, therefore, safe to attribute to Radford that he thinks that Jean knows that he knows that p only if he believes that he knows that p (and he believes that he knows that p only if he is aware of knowing that p). Thus, premise 2 above seems to be the one Radford uses. On this implicit use of 'belief' to refer only to belief of which one is aware, it does turn out that Jean does not believe that he knows, and so it appears that he does not know that he knows. Accordingly, it would turn out that it is not a
necessary condition for knowing that p that one knows that one knows that p.

2. The Dispute Between Radford and Lehrer

In assessing Radford's argument, there are at least three major ways to construct a criticism of it: (1) one can show that Radford has been inconsistent in applying the "criteria" for judging his example to be a case of knowledge but not a case of belief; (2) one can deny that Radford has produced a genuine case of knowledge; and (3) one can deny that, in the example, Jean fails to believe that p, that Elizabeth died in 1603. K. Lehrer takes the first and second lines of attack. Later, we will see that D. M. Armstrong takes the first and third lines. The substance of Lehrer's criticism is that Radford's conclusion in what I have called (R1) is inconsistent with the support he provides for the first premise of that argument, as I have reconstructed it. Lehrer makes his assessment of Radford's claims in the context of a discussion about the KK-thesis, in which discussion he, Lehrer, lists the three theses into which the KK-thesis is seen by him to divide:

The KK-thesis itself is the thesis that if one knows that p, then one knows that one knows, and this, in turn, can be illuminated by considering these three theses:
(i) $\text{LsKp} \supset \text{sBp}$ (if S knows that p, then he believes that p)

(ii) $\text{LsKp} \supset \text{sBKp}$ (if S knows that p, then S believes that he knows that p)

(iii) $\text{LsKp} \supset \text{sKKp}$ (if S knows that p, then he knows that he knows that p)

Using these theses as a reference point, it becomes clear where Lehrer and Radford disagree, and just where the origin of their disagreement lies. According to Lehrer,

There is reason to think that these three theses stand and fall together . . . Here I wish to restrict to showing that the principles cited above do not conflict with epistemic considerations that are alleged counterexamples to the theses in question.

The examples that are supposed to refute both thesis (i) and (iii) are most directly in conflict with (ii). The alleged counterexamples are all cases in which a man avers that he does not know when in fact he does know, and since he is sincere in what he says, the man does not believe that he knows what in fact he does know. Such cases are also alleged to be such that the man does not believe what he knows, and, does not know that he knows what he knows.  

Radford's example is intended to refute all three these. Thesis (i) is the one he concludes to be false in argument (Rl); (ii) similarly turns out false, as I have interpreted the example, since Jean knows that p and fails to believe that he knows that p; and, (iii) is concluded by him to be false in argument R2. Lehrer, in showing Radford to be
mistaken, argues that Radford has been inconsistent, and also that Radford's claim that Jean know that \( p \) is mistaken.

According to Lehrer, what results in Radford's inconsistency is that in the putative counterexample, "conscious" belief is taken to be a necessary condition for the correct application of one epistemic term, namely, 'belief,' but not for the application of the other, namely, 'know.' Lehrer points out that Radford has given no reason for applying epistemic expressions in an asymmetric way, and that ordinarily, we do not. Accordingly, he argues that if "conscious conviction" were a necessary condition for the proper application of the expression 'believe' and 'know,' we would have to say that in the example, Jean does not believe that \( p \)--as Radford says--but, since Jean sincerely denies knowing that \( p \), he also does not know that \( p \). Conversely, if "conscious conviction" is not a necessary condition for the proper application of these expressions, then although we might be entitled to say that Jean knows that \( p \)--since his knowing it best explains his success in getting the answers right--we would, on the same grounds, be entitled to say that Jean also believes that \( p \). Thus, if we are consistent in applying epistemic expressions, we will either opt for "conscious belief" and "conscious knowledge," or for "unconscious belief" and "unconscious
knowledge" as allowable as well; in either case, the
counterexample fails to show that the case in question is
one of knowledge without belief: In speaking both about
the Radford example and a related example by E. J. Lemmon,
Lehrer concludes:

... both the Radford example and the Lemmon
example fail for the same reason. The former
wishes to show that there may be knowledge without
belief, and the latter that there may be knowledge
without knowledge that one knows. But both take
conscious conviction and a readiness to report as
a condition of the application of the epistemic
term they wish to prove not to apply, while
rejecting these as conditions of the epistemic
terms they wish to assume does apply. This is
illegitimate precisely because these epistemic
terms may all be used either as having these
conditions as requirements of application or as
not having them. When we consistently assume
that such conditions are not required for the
terms 'know' and 'believe,' then the alleged
counterexamples fail. II

Of course, these critical remarks are equally
applicable to R2: if we required both that belief and
knowledge must be states of which we are aware, we would
have to say that since Jean does not have the awareness
that he knows that p, he also does not know that p; hence
premise 1 of R2 would be false. Conversely, if we allowed
that we need not be aware of our belief or our knowledge,
then if Jean knows that p—because his knowing that p best
explains his behavior—he can also be said to believe
"unconsciously" that he knows that p. Admittedly, this
latter consequence looks problematic, and I shall argue later that it is, in spite of the fact that Armstrong provides some support for it. Nevertheless, if symmetry is observed in the application of the expressions 'know' and 'believe,' we will have to say something like that.

So far, what Lehrer has attempted to show is that Radford has illegitimately required two different conditions for deciding on whether his case is one of knowledge without belief and knowledge without knowledge that one knows. Thus, he is really saying that Radford is not entitled to accept premises 1 and 2 in both arguments at the same time; this just means that if premise 2 in R1, for example is true, and we observe symmetry, then S does believe that p, but S also does not know that p, and so premise 1 would be false. Similarly, we can construct the converse result, and for each argument Radford uses.

However, showing that Radford has been at least inconsistent does not complete Lehrer's task, because we are still left with a choice between restricting ourselves to aware belief as a necessary condition for knowledge, or allowing belief of which we need not be aware. but "conscious conviction," as he puts it--is the proper component.

My argument is that the man does not know that his answer is correct, because he thinks he is guessing, and yet all the man would have to know in order to know that his answer is correct is that
Elizabeth died in 1603. Since he does not know that his answer is correct, he does not know that Elizabeth died in 1603.

The preceding comments are likely to persuade the already convinced, but experience suggests that they are not likely to convince all. The reason is that I have assumed that knowing that \( p \) and believing that \( p \) require a conscious conviction that \( p \) and an associated readiness to assert that \( p \) in appropriate circumstances. Those with whom I disagree obviously have a different conception of knowledge and belief.\[^{12}\]

Once again, it is helpful to represent his argument in schematic form:

1. \( \sim sKc \)
2. \( sKp \supset sKc \)
3. \( \sim sKp \)

Premise 1 says that \( S \) does not know that the answer (that \( p \)) is correct. Premise 2 says that \( S \)'s knowledge that \( p \) is a sufficient condition for his knowing that his answer that \( p \) is correct. From this, it follows that \( S \) does not know that \( p \).

It is clear that Radford would agree with the first premise, but it is equally clear that his counterexample, if it had worked, would succeed in falsifying premise 2. Jean, according to Radford, is not aware that he knows that \( p \), but is aware that he believes that \( \neg p \) is the correct answer. Since knowledge and belief are ascribed in response to different requirements, there is no reason yet to think that they conflict.
Lehrer has elaborated on his argument more recently in his book *Knowledge*. He argues that Radford's counterexample is such that one can construct from it two arguments which have contradictory conclusions. Then, to resolve this conflict, Lehrer attempts to falsify one of the premises of the argument he attributes to Radford. The two arguments are the latter one and another argument, having a similar structure, by Lehrer:

We have, from one example, elicited contradictory conclusions. Let us look at the arguments side by side. Put schematically, Radford's argument is as follows:

1. Jean knows the correct answer to the question.
2. The correct answer to the question is that Elizabeth died in 1603.
3. If Jean knows the correct answer and the correct answer is that Elizabeth died in 1603, then Jean knows that Elizabeth died in 1603.
4. Jean knows that Elizabeth died in 1603.

The opposing argument is as follows:

1. Jean does not know that his answer is correct.
2. Jean's answer is that Elizabeth died in 1603.
3. If Jean does not know that his answer is correct, and Jean's answer is that Elizabeth died in 1603, then Jean does not know that Elizabeth died in 1603.
Jean does not know that Elizabeth died in 1603. As Lehrer himself says, the second argument appears to be as persuasive as the first one, and he goes on to argue that we need not accept contradictory conclusions about knowledge, because the third premise in Radford's argument is false, therefore failing to establish the truth of his conclusion. The premise in contention is this:

(3) If Jean knows the correct answer and the correct answer is that Elizabeth died in 1603, then Jean knows that Elizabeth died in 1603.

It is worthwhile to cite his counterexample to it, because it demonstrates how the use of 'know' by Radford commits us to accepting cases as instances of knowledge which seem to violate the concept of knowledge even Radford accepts. Lehrer sets up the following example:

Imagine another man, George, who is on a quiz programme and is asked the date of Elizabeth's death. He answers '1603.' You, not having heard the answer, ask me, "Did George know the correct answer?" To this question I could reply in the affirmative. Moreover, it might not matter whether I thought that George was guessing or not. When the quiz-master says, "George, if you know the answer to the question I am about to ask, you will win that 1973 Ford," he does not intend to withhold the Ford if George guesses correctly. On the contrary, in this case to give the correct answer is to know the correct answer . . . Thus George, like Jean, knows the correct answer, that Elizabeth died in 1603.
George knew just as Jean did, even though George was guessing. Though we concede that George knew the correct answer, we should want to insist that he did not know that Elizabeth died in 1603 . . . the preceding argument shows that there are contexts in which it would be acceptable to say that a man knows the correct answer, which is that p, but would be clearly false to say the man knows that p.15

The position in which we find ourselves after examining the dispute between Lehrer and Radford is that Radford, for example, has allowed there to be knowledge of which we are not aware; but he has assumed that we are aware of belief, if there is any belief at all. Lehrer, to the contrary, has assumed that for there to be genuine knowledge and belief, we must be aware of both knowledge and belief. Moreover, he has required this without providing an argument for the claim that it is "illegitimate" to apply 'know' and 'believe' using different assumptions about conscious conviction. In what follows, it will be shown that D. M. Armstrong defends a position allowing knowledge of which we are unaware, but also requiring symmetry in the application of 'know' and 'believe,' such that there might also be genuine belief of which we are not aware, or, "unconscious" belief.

3. The Dispute Between Radford and Armstrong

In presenting Armstrong's criticism of Radford, I shall first attempt to summarize his remarks and then
provide structure for his argument, so that it will be more apparent how his strategy agrees with and differs from that of Lehrer. The bare bones of Armstrong's argument are that (1) the necessary conditions for the correct application of 'know' and belief ought to be the same, (2) those necessary conditions are those Radford accepts for the proper application of 'know'; (3) these necessary conditions must be spelled out to include reference to causal mechanisms such as memory traces; (4) the necessary conditions for the correct application of 'believe' are the ones Radford insists on for 'know,' and some causal mechanisms.

Armstrong, as I have already mentioned, accepts as genuine belief that belief of which we may be unaware. Accordingly, he presents an argument attacking Radford's proposed counterexample as being effective against the classical definition of knowledge by using the strategy of denying that Jean fails to believe that Elizabeth died in 1603. The gist of this argument is that Jean, in Radford's example, while correctly seeming to guess that Elizabeth died in 1603, does know that she died then, but that this is compatible with his intending to guess, and at the same time triggering a degenerated memory trace, such that he unconsciously believes that she died in 1603. Thus, Armstrong appeals to a certain causal theory of remembering
which he thinks saves the classical definition of knowledge from Radford's attack. In setting out his criticism of Radford, Armstrong seems to place himself—along with Radford—into the camp of philosophers who deny the KK-thesis:

Let us assume with Radford that he has described a case where:

(i) A knows that Elizabeth died in 1603. \text{Kap}

If we say this, we must certainly be prepared to go on to say:

(ii) A neither knows nor believes that A knows that Elizabeth died in 1603. \text{\sim KaKap} \& \text{\sim BaKap}

Some philosophers might think that the necessity for saying such things shows that Radford's case is not a case of knowledge. For they would argue, for instance, that if A knows that p, then it is entailed that A knows that he knows that p (Kap \text{\sim} KaKap). But I believe that there is nothing incoherent in asserting (ii).\text{^16}

By accepting (ii) as coherent, and perhaps true in the context of the counterexample, Armstrong sets up his case for unconscious belief, because he takes Kap \text{\sim} KaKap to hold only if awareness of one's belief is a necessary condition for knowledge. He wants, instead, to show that if one accepts that there can be beliefs of which one is unaware, then there might be knowledge of which one is unaware.
Armstrong's line of reasoning thus proceeds in the following way: (1) He claims that Radford may have made a mistake either in (a) fallaciously reasoning from "S believes that not-\(p\)" to "It is not the case that S believes that \(p\)," or (b) not recognizing that "S believes that \(p\)" is compatible with "S believes that not-\(p\)," on the assumption of unconscious belief. The fallacious reasoning in (a) is pointed out in the following passage:

\[\ldots \text{it seems at least very plausible to say that}
\]
\[(iii) A \text{ believes that it is not the case that Elizabeth died in } 1603. \quad \text{Ba} \neg \text{p}\]

The plausibility of (iii) emerges when we consider that the Canadian regards his saying '1603' as the merest guess, and therefore as much more likely to be wrong than right . . . But if somebody believes that \(p\) is just possible, but no more than just possible, then he believes, although he is not certain, that \(\neg p\) is true.

At this point it is easy to think that, provided Radford was right in saying that his case is a case of knowledge, then he is quite certainly right in drawing the conclusion that it is not a case of belief. For it is easy to assume, particularly if we do not give the matter careful attention, that if A believes that it is not the case that \(p\), then it follows that it is not the case that A believes that \(p\). . .

Radford does not reason in this way in the course of his paper. Indeed, I would expect him at the explicit level to deny that it is valid to infer that \(\neg \text{Bap}\) from \(\text{Ba} \neg \text{p}\). But it may be that an unconscious passage from one situation to the other was partially responsible for his confidence in his argument.17
Armstrong's argument concerning the role of unconscious belief will be treated in greater detail shortly. In addition to the argument in (1) above, (2) he goes on to construct cases which are such that (a) Radford would be forced to extend his criterion for ascribing knowledge also to cases of belief; this part of Armstrong's criticism gets at the charge of inconsistency leveled by Lehrer. Finally, (b) the cases provided by Armstrong are supposed to establish that even if Radford had a *prima facie* case of knowledge without belief, his criterion for knowledge would be insufficient to distinguish a case of knowledge from a case of mere true belief. One of the crucial features of this line of reasoning is that Armstrong makes use of memory traces as part of a *causal explanation* of knowledge and belief.

a. Armstrong's Denial of the Claim that Radford's Case is Not a Case of Belief

As was briefly seen earlier, Armstrong reconstructs Radford's assertions about his example in the following ways: (I will use the notation that I have used throughout:

1. $sKp$
2. $\neg sKKp \land \neg sBKp$
3. $sB \land \neg p$
4. $\neg sBp$
The symbolic expressions in this argument are intended to replicate Armstrong's symbolization, using 's' for 'A.' Accordingly, premise (1) says that S (Jean) knows that p. Premise (2) is that S neither knows nor believes that he knows p. Premise (3) says that S believes that not-p. The conclusion (4) is that it is false that S believes that p.

As was seen in the preceding quote, Armstrong questions Radford's inference to the conclusion, and cites as one reason for casting doubt on it his belief that under some circumstances it is not irrational to hold contradictory beliefs:

It is clearly invalid to infer from \( \neg B_aP \) to \( B_a \neg p \), for \( \neg B_a p \) may be true because A has no opinion about p one way or the other. But superficial reflection may incline one to think that \( B_a \neg p \) entails \( \neg B_a p \). . . The simultaneous holding of contradictory beliefs, \( B_a \neg p \) and \( B_a p \) is not a contradictory state of affairs. . . It seems obvious that it is possible for a person to hold contradictory beliefs simultaneously . . . in the case envisaged by Radford there seems [to be no] objection to the logical possibility (which is all I am arguing for at the present) that the case involves the possession of contradictory beliefs. For it is clear that one of the beliefs—the belief that Elizabeth did die in 1603—would have to be one that its possessor was not aware of holding. And surely there could be no objection to an unconsciously held belief contradicting a consciously held one? 18

Essentially, then what Armstrong points out is that Radford's conclusion does not follow from the premise that Jean is aware of believing that it is false that Elizabeth
died in 1603, and that this is due to the fact as Armstrong sees it, that the belief of which Jean is aware is compatible with his being unaware of holding the contradictory belief. Armstrong supports his commitment to allowing belief without the awareness that one believes and his correlative commitment with respect to knowledge in this passage:

Some philosophers would reject the notion of beliefs that we were unaware of having. But I think they would be wrong in this and, more to the point, Radford must surely allow the possibility of such beliefs. For his own putative case of knowledge, if it is a case of knowledge at all, is a case where its possessor is unaware of having the knowledge. It would be extraordinarily arbitrary of Radford to allow the possibility of unconscious knowledge, yet deny the possibility of unconscious belief.19

As Armstrong himself concedes, his criticism does not yet get at the inconsistency of Radford's case in the way in which it was pointed out by Lehrer. To bring out that inconsistency, Armstrong constructs three cases of putative knowledge and belief (both true and false), which he takes to be parallel in important ways to Radford's case. There are two claims that these cases are supposed to support: (1) they are supposed to show that Radford is wrong in restricting his acceptance of "lack of awareness" to knowledge only, and (2) that even if this were not a problem, it would still be the case that the necessary
condition Radford requires in picking out his case as a case of knowledge would be insufficient to distinguish a case of knowledge from a case of true belief, because he does not complete his analysis of knowledge and belief with a causal explanation.

b. Armstrong's Cases Showing Radford's Claim to be Inconsistent and Insufficient

The cases Armstrong proposes to support his thesis in (1) above are contrasted by him with what he takes to be the "ordinary" cases of knowledge, and false belief. As will become clear shortly, they all share in certain important features:

Case 2: This is a case which not only describes the correct performance of a person S upon being asked to answer a question to which the correct response is p; it also makes explicit the causal mechanism as the result of which S comes to assert that p. For contrast, Armstrong also describes the ordinary case of knowledge:

(a) Knowledge (ordinary case):
   1. S learns that p
   2. S retains the memory trace that p
3. S is aware that p, and asserts that
   p, and asserts that he believes that
   he knows that p.\textsuperscript{20}

(b) Knowledge (Radford's case):

1. S learns that p
2. S retains only a degenerate trace
   that p
3. S is thus not aware that p and intends
   to guess that p
4. S manifests behavior which is best
   explained by reference to his knowing
   that p.\textsuperscript{21}

**Case 3:** This case is one in which

The subject is asked the usual question,
and, as it seems to him, "simply guesses"
1306. In fact he had in the past been
 taught the correct date, and this teaching,
 and then the memory trace that was produced
 by this teaching, was causally responsible
 for his picking the date he picked. Unfor-
 tunately, however, the memory trace degener-
 ated over the course of time, and although
 it was originally encoded '1603,' came to
 encode '1306.'\textsuperscript{22}
To contrast this case with what Armstrong takes to be the ordinary case of false belief, he sets up his case in the following way:

(a) false belief (ordinary case):
1. S learns that p
2. S retains a degenerate trace that q
3. S is aware that q, and asserts that q, and asserts that he believes that q.23

(b) false belief (Radford-style case):
1. S learns that p
2. S retains a degenerate trace that q
3. The memory trace is further muddled, so that S is thus not aware that q, and intends to guess that q.24

So far, cases 2 and 3 are exactly parallel in spelling out both the responses and the causal mechanisms responsible for those responses. However, we can see that the ordinary cases are related to the extraordinary ones in such a way, that if case 2b describes s genuine case of knowledge, then we seem to be entitled to add to case 3b a condition like the one Radford added to 2b in order to count it as knowledge: we can say that:

4. S manifests behavior which is best explained by reference to his falsely believing that q.
The point that Armstrong is defending here is that if knowledge as the best explanation of behavior counts as a good reason for ascribing knowledge in case 2b above, then there is no obvious reason why false belief as the best explanation for certain behavior cannot count as just as good a reason for ascribing false belief in case 3b. Another way of putting Armstrong's point is that Radford seems to have left himself with no method for distinguishing guessing from asserting a false belief, where "guessing" seems not to require a belief in what is guessed.

Armstrong is willing to allow for at least the possibility that there is a way to show that what counts as a necessary condition for ascribing knowledge need not be the same as what counts as a necessary condition for belief; however, he thinks that it is more likely than not that Radford would not be able to establish such a condition:

Radford might be able to demonstrate, or make plausible, that there is some difference between knowledge and belief such that, while his case is a case of unconscious knowledge, my case is not a case of unconscious false belief. As already indicated, he might argue that unconscious knowledge is an intelligible notion but unconscious belief is not. But such a contention seems to have no plausibility—as opposed to the contention that neither unconscious knowledge nor unconscious belief are possible, which I think to be false, but to be an arguable position. Putting the matter at its lowest, Radford will have to bring forward quite
further considerations, in addition to his ingenious case, to show that he is entitled to deny that my case is a case of false belief.²⁵

At this point, Armstrong has managed to show that Radford has used the two epistemic expressions in question in an asymmetric way, but he still has to establish the second part of his argument, namely that Radford's ascribing knowledge (and belief, if he were consistent) on the basis of what would be the best explanation for some observable behavior is insufficient for the purpose of distinguishing genuine knowledge from mere true belief. Thus, case 4 is established to duplicate all the observable conditions which obtain in case 2b—which was called by Radford a case of knowledge—with the exception that the causal mechanism is changed in such a way as to preclude the new case from counting as an instance of knowledge:

Case 4: The subject is asked the question and, as it seems to him, 'simply' guesses 1603. In fact, he had in the past been taught this date. Unfortunately, however, although the teacher said '1603,' the subject took it as '1306.' Fortunately, however, the memory trace degenerated over the course of time, and, although it originally encoded '1306,' came to encode '1603.' It was this
degenerate trace that caused the subject to say '1603.' 26

From this example, we can see that it has the following features:

1. S learns that p, but encodes that q
2. S retains the degenerate trace that p
3. the trace further degenerates, so that S is not aware that p, and intends to guess that p.

So far, all the features that are accessible to an outside observer (who can check on the fact that S learned that p, but not that something went wrong with S's memory trace) are parallel to the ones accessible to an observer in Radford's case. But on the basis of those features, Radford felt compelled to ascribe knowledge in order to account for them; on the basis of the features in case 4, he should thus feel equally compelled to ascribe knowledge for the same reason. However, case 4 is not a case of knowledge on anyone's definition, but merely a case of true belief. Hence, Radford seems unable to draw the distinction in such a situation between knowledge and true belief.

As I understand Armstrong's line, he has approached Radford's argument with a good deal of sympathy, but has pointed out ways in which that argument goes astray.
Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that a position which Armstrong would be willing to argue for would be one which preserves the feature of ascribing knowledge on the basis of providing the best explanation, but which extends this way of talking about knowledge to belief, as well. In addition, Armstrong would augment such a position with some causal account in order to provide sufficient reason for ascribing "unconscious" belief and knowledge. In the cases cited, he loosely cases his description of causal chains in terms of memory traces, echoing Martin and Deutscher. He would then hold a position much different from that which Lehrer would hold.

In the following chapter, I shall show how the two views are different and how an examination of their difference will provide us with a way of making essentially the same claim about the dispute over what the relationship between remembering and knowing is.
Footnotes


2 Ibid., p. 4.

3 Ibid., p. 4.

4 Ibid., p. 4.

5 Ibid., p. 4.

6 Ibid., p. 6.

7 Ibid., p. 6.


9 Ibid., p. 137.

10 Ibid., p. 137.

11 Ibid., p. 137.

12 Ibid., p. 135.


14 Ibid., p. 56.

15 Ibid., pp. 57, 58.


17 Ibid., p. 27.

18 Ibid., pp. 27, 28.

19 Ibid., p. 20.
20 Ibid., p. 30
21 Ibid., p. 30.
22 Ibid., pp. 30, 31.
23 Ibid., p. 31
24 Ibid., p. 31.
25 Ibid., p. 31.
26 Ibid., p. 32.
A. Introduction

In the material preceding this chapter, the disputes centered largely on a disagreement over whether the counterexamples intended to refute one position or the other were successful. Moreover, the decisions about the force of these counterexamples were supported largely by the intuitions one or the other philosopher had about what counts as a genuine case of remembering, knowing, and believing. Clearly, not everyone discussed shared the same intuitions, so that it is natural to expect that each of them would respond differently, and often plausibly, to counterexamples that depended in some sense on importantly different intuitions. This is only a very general statement of the character of the controversy over the proper analysis of remembering and knowing. To make it clearer, I shall first present ways in which the opposing camps might respond to each other's charges, and then offer an interpretation of what lies at the core of the dispute among them, namely an interpretation which makes use of a methodological device as well as a philosophical
distinction. The device is that of examining the ways in which certain sentences about remembering, knowing, and believing have sometimes been said to be "analyzed," and the distinction is that between so-called "conscious" and "unconscious" belief (knowledge, or memory). My aim here is to suggest that such an interpretation not only clarifies the sometimes obscure lines of reasoning one encounters in writings on the relevant topics, but also serves as a clue to some important problems embedded in these disputes—problems which have not received the attention they deserve. Among them are not only the problem about which analysis of memory or knowledge is "correct," but also those about what sorts of concepts different philosophers take themselves to be analyzing, when they say that they offer an analysis of knowledge or memory; whether or not they believe that they should apply all the expressions of interest here—'know,' 'remember,' and 'believe' in the same way; and, finally, whether or not a correct analysis of the concept of memory requires a causal explanation, and if so, of what sort is should be.

B. Preliminary Responses to the Counterexamples

There are two general defensive moves that are open to proponents of the view about memory held by Malcolm and Munsat. They either agree that Martin and Deutscher
have constructed a genuine case of memory and deny that they have succeeded in showing that the person who remembers does not also know and believe, or they deny that their case is one of remembering and also admit that Martin and Deutscher are correct in denying that the case is one of knowing. Malcolm and Munsat might plausibly respond to Martin and Deutscher, for example, by arguing that although the artist in their example remembered his childhood home, he also remembered that certain details of that home were correct, and so knew that they were real—for the artist to have depicted the relationships obtaining among the various components of the painting, he had to have known in some way that the house, for example, was in front of a hill, that the tree was to the left of the house, and so forth. In other words, the criticism might be that in order for the painter to exhibit some structured behavior which had its origins in his experience, he had to remember in some way—unconsciously, perhaps—that all the above items were related to one another, even though at the time that he manifested the behavior in question, he was not aware of the fact that the components of the picture had to fit together in that way in order to be a copy of his former home. Thus, the counterexample would fail.
However, according to Martin and Deutscher, what is required for the painter to know that the scene he depicted had certain features is that he be aware of knowing it. But they claim that the artist does not even believe that his painting represents any real features; hence, according to them, he is not aware of having even a true belief about the house, and thus has no genuine knowledge.

Malcolm and Munsat still have another avenue available for avoiding the force of the counterexample: they can agree that the artist really does not know that the house is his former home, having specific characteristics, but attempt to show that he also does not genuinely remember his childhood home, because he was not aware of remembering it. Reflecting on these considerations, one is justified in inferring that awareness that one remembers x, or remembers that p, is the focus of the dispute, as described above.

Just as it is tempting for a proponent of the Malcolmian position to rebut the Martin and Deutscher counterexample in the ways suggested, so it is natural for him to pursue a similar course in the case of responding to the counterexample by Radford to the classical definition of knowledge. A philosopher such as Lehrer could
plausibly respond to that example—as, indeed, he does—by agreeing with Radford that his English history case is not one of belief, but denying that the case is one of genuine knowing: he simply insists that in order to know anything, one has to have the conscious conviction, or at least the awareness that it is the case. Again, that such awareness is necessary even for knowledge seems to be the basic issue, even though the counterexample leads us to think that the problem Radford tackles is that of the inclusion of the belief component in the definition of knowledge. It seems that the counterexample does not do an adequate job of pointing the way to a resolution of the more fundamental concern about "awareness" or "conscious conviction."

Lehrer's attempt to avoid Radford's case is not the only one. Armstrong also sets out to defuse the weight of the counterexample, but he does so in a way contrary to that used by Lehrer. He responds by admitting that Radford has succeeded in constructing a genuine case of knowledge, but he claims that the case is also one of belief. One way of paraphrasing what Armstrong actually says is to suggest that Jean, in order to exhibit the structured behavior he did (in the face of the odds against his correctly answering English history questions), had to
have believed in some way that, for example, Elizabeth died in 1603. Of course, such a suggestion hinges on ones accepting unconscious belief, or belief that one is unaware of, as genuine belief; but this is just what Radford denies. Hence, although Armstrong, and also Lehrer, might escape Radford's counterexample if they could make a good case for what they seem to think is necessary and/or sufficient for genuine belief, it is not yet clear that they havesucceeded. Similarly, Radford must make a convincing case for allowing only conscious belief, and thus the controversy has arrived at a stalemate.

But it is not only the apparent difficulty over the acceptability of so-called "unconscious" knowledge, memory, and belief that obscures the analyses offered of these concepts; also, an additional problem cuts across this one. It is the problem of whether or not it is in any sense necessary that the terms 'remember,' 'know,' and 'belief' be applied in the same ways, or that the same necessary conditions be present for the correct application of all of them. There is no questionbut that Malcolm, Munsat, Zemach, Armstrong, and Lehrer, at least, either implicitly or explicitly accept some view about the "symmetry" of the application of these terms. Contrary to them, Martin and Deutscher, Shope, and Radford accept it that there need be no such symmetry, that some terms may
be applied in one way, and that others may be applied in another way. Both the problem of symmetry and the problem about awareness need, therefore, to be more closely examined. To do this, I shall address myself to these two major issues in turn, in the context of using sentences about remembering and knowing as guides. By examining such sentences, I shall first discuss how some philosophers have thought they should be analyzed, and I shall use their attempts both as contrasts, and as aids to my own remarks.

C. Interpreting the Disputes

1. Analyzing Sentences about Remembering, Knowing, and Believing

a. Two Different Ways to Analyze Language

Sometimes, philosophers say that they analyze the concept of x and then proceed to "analyze" sentences which are about x. Malcolm, for example, couches his analysis of memory in what he seems to think is an analysis of sentences about memory. More specifically, he intends to analyze that sort of memory which is described in sentences such as "S remembers x" where x is a thing, person, event, etc., and "S remembers that p" where 'p' is a proposition. At times, in discussions about what we can properly be said to remember, there is controversy over what kind of proposition can correctly replace p in the
latter sentence schema. Munsat, for example, thinks that counterfactual conditionals cannot, and others have thought that propositions expressing future events cannot be candidates for 'p'. But, in some way the language used to describe remembering places and events and propositions or sentences about them is examined at least in part to find some clue to the correct analysis of remembering.

Since such examination weaves through so much of the discussion about this point, it is instructive to see that "analyzing" sentences about remembering (and knowing or believing) fares no better than do the counterexamples discussed earlier in adjudicating between the two major, opposing views, but it does place into sharper focus, what the source of the troubles between the competing analyses of memory and knowledge is.

One of the issues important in considering the role of so-called "linguistic analyses" is that of whether or not such analyses are appropriate to the task in question. What this means, roughly, is whether or not it is possible to derive an answer about whether remembering entails knowledge (or knowledge entails belief) by examining the structure of language. To say it differently, the question will be whether or not we can find out from examining certain sentences about memory, knowledge, and belief, anything about whether or not the concepts
expressed in such sentences necessarily include one or the other of them. To bring out what I have to say about one way to approach an analysis designed to clarify such matters, it is useful to consider briefly (for purposes of contrast) an attempt made by Zeno Vendler who argues for a view similar to Radford's, namely that knowledge does not require belief.¹

Vendler argues for this position in his work *Res Cogitans*. By attempting to establish his major thesis that a dualist theory of mind is true, the line of argument he takes is that of showing (1) that both the surface and deep structures of knowledge and belief-sentences are different (in the sense that some grammatical constructions using 'know' turn out to be ungrammatically illogical, if 'belief' replaces 'know' in them), and (2) that this difference reflects a difference in the "objective" and "subjective" natures of persons. I shall attend only to the position stated in (1).

Vendler shares with others who have attempted a linguistic analysis for the purpose of solving philosophical problems the principle that the structure of language provides at least a clue to the structure of some portion of the world, in this case the world of memory and knowledge. So, it is not here that we see the way in which Vendler's enterprise is crucially different from what I
shall later describe. Rather, it is his strict attention to syntactical features of the language that marks him out as different. One example of how he approaches knowledge and belief sentences is to list the sorts of grammatical constructions correct for sentences about knowledge, and similar ones that do not turn out to be correct for sentences about belief:

(1) I know what he lost.
(2) I believe what he lost.

Whereas (1) is grammatical, (2) is not, and it is this fact that leads Vendler to say at least that there is some important difference about the two propositional attitudes expressed by the different logical constructions. What is noteworthy here is that it is of no direct importance whether or not these sentences ever apply to anything in the world. Stated differently, Vendler does not proceed with his analysis by attempting to find instances in which either construction truly describes anything in the world; it is not a semantic feature of knowledge- and belief-sentences that he considers, but a syntactic, a structural feature. It seems clear—and this I shall discuss shortly—that in order to find out if certain sentences truly describe anything, one must have some belief about the states of affairs those sentences are said to be about. Thus, an analysis of language whose aim it is to distinguish
among different expressions on the basis of distinguishing the states of affairs to which they apply from those to which they do not, depends on what is believed about the world, or at least the appropriate sector of it. Moreover, since there may be divergences among the beliefs that we have about the world, it is not surprising to see that we may then disagree on how an analysis of the language in question should proceed. Vendler's approach does not have this drawback, since no belief about whether or not an expression truly applies makes a difference to the question of what the correct logical structure of the expression is.

However, in the context of constructing counterexamples to an analysis of memory or knowledge, some philosophers have argued in part by analyzing sentences about knowing and believing in such a way as to stress not their syntactic features, but their semantic ones. This is so, because what is at issue is whether or not it is true to say in one and the same situation that a person both remembers and knows (or that he both knows and believes). In the following section, I shall argue that such an analysis already presupposes important beliefs about what accounts as remembering and knowing, even though these beliefs are said to be supported by the analysis.
b. The "Semantic" Analysis of 'Remember' and 'Know' language

In the course of attempting to clarify the issues embedded in the theories under construction, I shall make use of schematic sentences such as 'S remembers that p,' and say that they "entail" (or do not "entail") other such sentences. A preliminary question that might be asked is what it means for sentence schemata to "entail" other sentence schemata.

Such a question arises from noting that entailment--whatever it is taken to be--makes sense only with respect to sentences which have a truth value. Sentence schemata, however, can be considered to be something like propositional functions in which there occur only variables, or else "dummy" letters, taking the place of some actual names or propositions. However, propositional functions do not have truth value. Thus, it might be objected that just as they cannot, therefore, entail anything, neither can sentence schemata entail other such schemata. To reply to such an objection, one should point out that in the standard predicate calculus, for example, there is a way of allowing propositional functions to behave as though they were propositions. Here, we allow logical rules to hold with respect to propositional functions as long as these rules would hold with respect to all propositions which are
substitution instances of these functions by way of replacing variables with constants. Thus, a propositional function 'P' entails another function 'Q' if and only if every substitution instance of 'P' with respect to some constant entails a substitution instance of 'Q' with respect to the same constant. Applying these considerations to sentence schemata, we say that a sentence schema 'S' entails a sentence schema 'T' if and only if every substitution instance of 'S' with respect to some individual constant entails a substitution instance of 'T' with respect to the same individual constant. What I mean here by 'individual constant' is the replacement of the schematic letters, 'S,' 'x,' and 'p' (as in 'S remembers that p' or 'S remembers x') with names of persons, objects, places, or events, definite descriptions, sentences, or propositions. Accordingly, the schema 'S remembers that p' entails the schema 'S knows that p' if and only if—for example—'John remembers that the outermost planet is Pluto' entails 'John knows that the outermost planet is Pluto.'

2. The Distinction Between "Conscious" and "Unconscious" Belief Affecting the Analyses of Knowledge and Memory

In what follows, I shall draw first a conclusion between so-called "conscious" belief and so-called
"unconscious" belief, and show that such a distinction can also be made to differentiate between the two major ways in which also 'know' and 'remember' have been used by the philosophers under scrutiny here. It is not my aim to provide a strict and technical definition of these two different sorts of states. What I mean is just that I shall not provide both necessary and sufficient conditions for correctly applying the expressions. There have been many ways in which "conscious belief," "unconscious belief," "unconscious memory," etc., have been described, some of which would be of little use for the task I have set myself. The philosophers I discuss here may or may not accept a variety of such characterizations of knowledge, memory and belief in other contexts, but I shall show later that it is important in this discussion that I attend to one single feature which functions as a sufficient condition for using the expressions as they do, recognizing that there may be others, as well.

In order to come to a characterization of conscious and unconscious belief, it helps to use an example as a guide. Suppose that a person S behaves in such a way that the best explanation for his actions is that he believes that there are monsters in his closet. Suppose also that he is completely unaware of holding this belief (this parallels the artist case). Upon being told that the
belief in monsters is the best explanation for his behavior, S is prepared to assert 'I believe that there are monsters in my closet,' since he, too, accepts this as a good explanation of his strange behavior. He can do this even though he still is not immediately and intimately aware of accepting that belief, after introspecting, for example, and "discovering" that he held it. Indeed, in saying of himself that he believes that there are monsters in his closet, he is in much the same position as he would be, if he were to assert of someone else that he acted because of such a belief. In attributing to a third person a belief, S normally could not resort to introspection, but has to rely on some external evidence. Much in the same way, he has to rely on external evidence or external testimony to attribute a belief to himself of which he was unaware. Another way of describing the position in which S finds himself here is to say that he indirectly believes of himself that he has the belief about monsters by inferring it only from the trusted testimony of an authority. Another way in which he might have discovered that he believes in frightening creatures in his closet is to infer it from his behavior, in an attempt to find his own explanation of why he behaves as he does.

But suppose that S directly believed that p, believed that there are monsters in his closet: if S
believed$_2$ that $p$, then he would be justified in believing that he held this belief even without learning that he did by inferring it from his behavior or being told that he believed it. I shall use 'believes$_1$' to express what is expressed by 'unconsciously believes.' Similarly, I shall use 'believes$_2$' to express what is expressed by 'consciously believes.' This way of differentiating between conscious and unconscious belief makes it plausible to hold that it is possible for a rational person to have contradictory beliefs. Such a person could, without accepting a contradiction in an obvious, deliberate way, consciously believe that $p$, while at the same time unconsciously believe that not-$p$. These considerations support a minimal characterization of the two sorts of belief in terms of the conditions informally introduced. One should note that the definition of 'belief' itself is not at stake here, but that only the adjectives 'conscious' and 'unconscious' are at issue. Accordingly, conscious knowing, believing and remembering will be similarly characterized, as will unconscious knowing, believing, and remembering. When I use the expression 'directly,' as in 'directly knows,' for example, I intend to say about this kind of knowing that a person $S$ directly knows that he believes that $p$, only if the evidence which is necessary to justify his claim that he believes that $p$ is introspective.
However, if a person only indirectly knows that he believes that \( p \), then the evidence which is necessary to justify his claim that he believes that \( p \) is the same sort of evidence which would justify \( S \) in ascribing belief to a third person.

I propose, then, the following characterization of the relevant concepts:

a. \( S \) directly knows that he believes that \( p \) = \( S \) consciously believes that \( p \).

b. \( S \) unconsciously believes that \( p \) = \( S \) only indirectly knows that he believes that \( p \).

The force of 'only indirectly' in condition (b) is to rule out as unconscious belief the case in which \( S \) directly knows that he believes that \( p \), and in addition happens to encounter someone who tells him that he, \( S \), believes that \( p \). In such a case, \( S \) might be said to know indirectly that he holds the belief that \( p \), but he does not know it solely that way; here, it would be incorrect to say that \( S \) held the unconscious belief that \( p \), simply because one part of his evidence that he knows that he believes that \( p \) is an irrelevant inference.

In a similar way, one might draw a distinction between conscious and unconscious knowledge

a'. \( S \) directly knows that he knows that \( p \) = \( S \) consciously knows that \( p \).
b'. S **unconsciously** knows that \( p \Rightarrow S \) only indirectly knows that he knows that \( p \)

For conscious and unconscious remembering, the conditions would parallel those above:

a". S directly knows that he remembers that \( p \Rightarrow S \) **consciously** remembers that \( p \).

b". S **unconsciously** remembers that \( p \Rightarrow S \) only indirectly knows that he remembers that \( p \).

An apparent problem with these conditions is that they give the impression that they result in circular definitions. For example, if someone thought that the definition of knowledge required conscious belief, then if belief required knowing that one believed, the concept of knowledge would illegitimately appear in both the analysans and the analysandum. However, since I am offering characterizations of 'conscious' and 'unconscious,' these characterizations are not circular.

Another apparent difficulty with the distinction I draw between conscious and unconscious memory, knowledge, and belief is that it seems, on first reflection, to be the same as the distinction between what is often called "dispositional" and "occurrent" memory, knowledge, and belief. However, the two categories are not the same.
"Occurrent" belief, for example, is usually characterized as a mental act, and has its counterparts in so-called "episodic" knowledge and memory. Contrasted with this is "dispositional" belief, or "nonepisodic" belief, which is a disposition that may manifest itself in an occurrent belief episode, but need not. Because dispositional belief is such that one can have it when one is not presently aware of it, it is tempting to infer that dispositional belief is just unconscious belief. But, dispositional belief as generally conceived is dispositional only because it is a belief that one does not always actively entertain, but which is such that one directly knows that one holds it. It is at this moment that the belief ceases to be dispositional and becomes occurrent. Here, it is correct to say that both dispositional and occurrent belief are sometimes conscious. Conversely, a case can be made for the thesis that even unconscious belief, as I have introduced it, may be either dispositional or occurrent: if "representing" in the structured way Martin and Deutscher require and describe is the way in which unconscious belief manifests itself, then when there is such a representation (plus all the appropriate causal chains resulting in it), the unconscious belief is occurrent. This just means that there is an episode of the sort of belief of which the subject knows only
indirectly that he accepts. However, if this unconscious belief is not represented at some particular time, it is dispositional. For example, the artist in Martin and Deutscher's counterexample may be said to hold dispositional ally the unconscious belief that the painting resembles his former home before he represents that belief by doing something.

The important features of the memory/knowledge/belief controversies have not so much to do with the differences among occurrent and dispositional beliefs, or episodic and nonepisodic memory (a distinction that Stanley Munsat describes in great detail). Rather, as I have already suggested, they have to do with the divergence between views insisting on conscious knowledge and belief—and even such memory—and those views which ascribe unconscious memories, and even unconscious knowledge and belief.

3. Proposed "Analyses" of Sentences Containing 'Remember,' 'know,' and 'Believe'

Before showing the responses of various philosophers to this problem of the proper analysis of the epistemic terms in question, some clarification is required. First, it seems nearly impossible to construct an acceptable answer without having a concise idea of what 'p' in "S knows that p" (or, in "S believes that p") is to stand for.
One apparently handy way to dispel this difficulty is to consult one of the theorists holding the view that the two sentence schemata just introduced are related through a one-way entailment. Malcolm seems most approachable here, because he has addressed himself to the problem at least briefly. Unfortunately, however, all that he does say on the matter is that "S remembers x": entails "S knows that p," where 'p' is "about" x (strictly speaking, what he says is that "S remembers x" entails "S remembers that p" where 'p' is about x. But, since according to him "S remembers that p"—which expresses "factual" memory—entails "S knows that p," it is safe to attribute to him the function of 'p' as I have stated it).

There seem to be several candidates for 'p'. One of them is the proposition that what S represents is x. For example, when the artist case is described in the sentence

(a) S remembers his childhood home,

the appropriate "knows that"-sentence would then be

(b) S knows that what he, S, represents is his childhood home.

It might be objected to this suggestion that the expression "what he represents is his childhood home" is really not about the childhood home, since it does not describe the home itself, does not state anything about the
characteristics of the home. It seems, though, that such a reading of 'about' is excessively narrow. The expression here at least describes a relationship that obtains between the home and some other object. In any case, 'represents' is the expression used by Martin and Deutscher to refer to something a person must do in order truly to remember. They deliberately leave open the question of whether what the remember does is only some overt, bodily behavior, or whether it might also be some mental operation. Though Martin and Deutscher might accept this interpretation of 'p', Malcolm and Munsat might not, since they do not employ the concept of representation.

Perhaps a more acceptable candidate for 'p', however, is some proposition or other describing x. An example might be this: in the artist example, we might say (a) above, and then show—in some way—that there is at least one proposition, e.g., that the home was painted shocking-pink, that the artist knew to be true. According to such an interpretation, the entailment, more clearly depicted, looks like this:

(a) S remembers his childhood home entails

(c) S knows that his childhood home was painted shocking pink.
Applying this to Malcolm, we might amend what he says about the entailment in question by the requirement that "S remembers x" entails "S knows that p" as long as 'p' is some true description of x or other. On the face of it, this seems to be essentially the restatement of what Malcolm has already asserted, and it does have some initial plausibility. If the artist knows only that his childhood home had a wood-burning fireplace (having been traumatized by it forever), it would be true that he remembered his childhood home—he would not remember it very well, but he would remember it, all the same. It must be kept in mind here that what is asserted in Malcolm's definitions of memory is that it is a necessary condition for someone's remembering a thing or event, etc., that he knows at least one true proposition describing that thing, or event, or whatever. It seems also that it is not necessary that the proposition required be a specific one.

What is interesting to consider is the question of whether or not the two possible candidates for 'p', sentences such as (a) and (c), have something in common, perhaps some proposition which they both "share," or "presuppose," or one that has to be true if either one is true; that is, is there some proposition which is entailed by any one 'p', no matter its exact content? The most obvious candidate for such a proposition would seem to be
that the x described in 'p' exists, or is real. So, if one were interested in choosing the most conservative replacement for 'p' in MS knows that p," a good one appears to be "x exists." The problem with this proposed replacement is that a counterexample to it would be that any statement to the effect that S knows that some proposition about a fictional entity is true would then entail that S knows that the entity exists.

A more serious obstacle to understanding what it means for 'p' to be "about" x is presented by the possibility of admitting counterfactuals as correct replacements for 'p'. There has been some argument against such a possibility, but that argument does not clearly convince. Stanley Munsat, for example, believes that counterfactual conditionals may not correctly replace 'p' in "S remembers that p," but that 'p' in "S knows that p" may be a counterfactual. His reasoning is sketchy and is reflected largely in this paragraph:

It seems to me that any memory statement of the form "I remember that" followed by a counterfactual is nonsensical, or perhaps better, a misuse of the term "remember." For example, I do not think we can understand statements like I remember that if we had offered him more money, he would have stayed," or, "I remember that if the doctor had arrived on time, he would have lived." Yet surely I may know that he would have stayed if we offered him more money; I may have known it at the time the offer was made (he told me), and supposing he died after he told me, and had not told anyone else, if I had
not known it then, I would not know it now. But I could not understand the statement "I remember that if we had offered him more money, he would have stayed."^2

Perhaps one way of getting at the uneasiness Munsat feels is to interpret him as holding that counterfactuals are not propositions, that they do not state anything, and that they therefore cannot be the proper objects of propositional memory. But this interpretation makes it difficult to understand why there is no obvious problem in correctly asserting a sentence of the form "S knows that p" where 'p' is a contrary-to-fact conditional. For example, there is nothing implausible about truly attributing to someone that he knows that if he were seven feet tall, he would be taller than his six feet tall brother. This is the sort of knowledge that is often called "propositional" knowledge, and it would seem here that what is good enough for it is good enough for propositional memory.

All these considerations about what sort of proposition or sentence correctly replaces 'p' in the sentence schemata "S remembers that p," "S knows that p," and "S believes that p" are intended to point out that there is no clear agreement about what 'p' stands for. At least what the theorists examined here seem to agree on is that 'p' be some sentence/proposition, or other (not a specific one) that is about the relevant x. But, we must keep in
mind that the notion of "aboutness" has not received much attention, if any, in discussions about the alleged entailments.

However, what I shall try to show in the concluding chapter is that at least some of the difficulties afflicting the task of establishing or repudiating those entailments are obviated by the fact that what the disputes are really over is not primarily a problem about whether or not the entailments are there to be "discovered" by an analysis of 'remember'-language, or 'know'-language, but about some antecedent (pre-analytic) beliefs about the proper use/application of the terms under discussion.
Footnotes


CHAPTER V

RE-EXAMINING THE CONCEPT OF MEMORY

A. The Problem of Symmetry

Throughout the past chapters, it was found that competing analyses of memory and knowledge manifested similar and intertwined problems. A large part of resolving just what the difficulties are was the critical examination of how the opposing parties left unsaid some of the most important components of their views. Two unstated beliefs, or commitments, are those concerning the symmetry of applying certain terms and the question of whether or not to admit unconscious belief, knowledge and memory as genuine. They are, as we have seen, interwoven and present us, therefore, with the task of attempting to untangle the various related problems each presents. To do this, both of the problems just mentioned will be examined in turn, with the understanding that sometimes both must be considered at the same time. A helpful way to see the direction the examination of these difficulties should take is to consider in some detail an illuminating passage in Malcolm's "Three Lectures on Memory," one which contains, in capsule form, nearly all the topics that need scrutiny before a
clear understanding of the competing analyses here can be achieved.

In the section in which Malcolm discusses whether or not so-called "personal" memory requires factual memory, Malcolm considers as a problematic objection a hypothetical case in which someone appears to have what we might call "unconscious" memory which is personal (because it is of something he really experienced), but such that he does not remember that (not factual memory)--or at least does not appear to:

More difficult would be the case in which the person had imagery of something he had previously experienced but did not know he had experienced it. Suppose he had recurring imagery of an episode which he thought to be merely imaginary, but the episode strikingly fitted a real episode. Suppose he says, for example, that sometimes he sees very clearly in his mind three men in black masks who seize him and carry him to a green automobile. Let us suppose that he was kidnapped when a small boy, by three men in black masks who had a green automobile. Perhaps because of the terror of the experience he no longer remembers having been kidnapped. Here we might be inclined to say, on the one hand, he does not remember that he was kidnapped, on the other, he has perceptual memory of the kidnapping.

Would this example show that perception memory is independent of factual memory? I think not. The main difficulty here is whether it is right to say that he remembers the kidnapping. There are opposing inclinations here and I believe that it is neither clearly right to say he remembers it nor clearly right to say he does not. On the one hand there is the recurring imagery which corresponds strikingly with the real happening. On the other hand, he does not remember that he was
kidnapped: he does not even believe it. These facts pull in opposite directions and I believe there is no right answer. But insofar as the character of his imagery inclines us to say that he remembers the three men in black masks, the green car, and so forth, it inclines us also to say that he remembers that there were three men in black masks, who put him in a green car, and so forth. To the same degree that we are pulled toward saying that he has perceptual memory of the incident we are also drawn toward saying that he has factual memory of it.

One striking thing about this passage is that Malcolm endorses in it, virtually without supporting argument, not merely the thesis that necessarily, if S remembers x, then S remembers that p, but also a version of what I have loosely called the "symmetry" thesis. It emerges in a fashion such as this: whatever are the necessary conditions for the correct application of 'personally remembers' are also the necessary conditions for the correct application of 'factually remembers.' His reasons for accepting the thesis in this context are that, although there are "different inclinations" that "pull" us in opposite directions, whatever those directions are, they pull symmetrically, or "to the same degree"; what these inclinations "pull" us toward is "saying" that someone has personal and factual memory, or that he has neither. This passage has probably been dismissed not only because of its metaphorical language, but also because of Malcolm's habit of arguing from the question of what we (whoever 'we' is
supposed to refer to) would be willing to say about an object, an event or circumstance, and so on. However, I should like to interpret the quotation above in a somewhat different light, so that his view comes more interestingly to the fore.

At first blush, the charge that he has merely assumed symmetry is one that is easily levelled also against others, such as Armstrong and Lehrer; the former criticized Radford's acceptance of asymmetry by saying:

... Radford must surely allow the possibility of such "unconscious" beliefs. For his own putative case of knowledge, if it is a case of knowledge at all, is a case where its possessor is unaware of having the knowledge. It would be extraordinarily arbitrary of Radford to allow the possibility of unconscious knowledge, yet deny the possibility of unconscious belief.²

Lehrer, in a sense, is even more pithy on this topic than is Armstrong:

... these epistemic terms may all be used either as having these conditions as requirements of application or as not having them. When we consistently assume that such conditions are not required for 'know' and 'believe,' then the alleged counterexamples fail.³

It is puzzling that each of these philosophers appears to run roughshod over what is, on reflection, a principle that is certainly not obvious, namely the one that Lehrer explicitly lays down that all the terms--'know'
and 'believe' for him and Armstrong, and 'know,' 'remember,' 'remember that' for Malcolm and Zemach—must have the same conditions for application. Their unsupported insistence on symmetry is surely open to easy objections, even without the temptation to construct apparent counterexamples to it. For example, one might respond to Malcolm's assessment of the kidnapping case by noting that he is just factually mistaken in claiming that we are "pulled" in some direction or other in applying the expressions 'remember' and 'remember that': after all, Martin and Deutscher, both native English speakers, are not pulled toward applying those expressions in the same way, and neither is Radford so "pulled." So, if we take Malcolm to make a strictly linguistic and factual claim, then that claim is easily shown to be false. Lehrer might be countered by pointing out to him that it is trivially true that if 'know' and 'believe' are applied according to the same necessary conditions, then Radford's counterexample fails--part of the point of that counterexample (as I tried to show earlier) was that Radford implicitly advocated using different requirements for the use of 'know' than those for the use of 'believe.' Armstrong's comments follow Lehrer's in that he thinks that if Radford refused to accept the same requirements for each of the terms in question, he would do so only arbitrarily. That
Armstrong and Lehrer's insistence on symmetry might itself be arbitrary seems to be a reasonable suggestion here. However, in order to make sense out of the matter, we should consider the likelihood that none of these philosophers has been guilty of strictly arbitrary pronouncements that begged the question against each other's views. When one is arbitrary, one acts entirely without reasons; Malcolm and his critics (as well as his supporters), however, have acted not without reasons, but with reasons left unspoken. If Malcolm's comments on the kidnapping case are examined more closely, those reasons may emerge.

Perhaps the best way to tackle the quote at the beginning of the section is to pay some attention to a troublespot in Malcolm's reasoning that was pointed out in Chapter I, which deals more exhaustively with his position. This troublespot is his use of what we would be "inclined to say" in some circumstance or other. This mode of arguing for something has often been critically examined elsewhere, but it is still useful to look at it again. One thing that Malcolm might have in mind when he supports a position in this way is to make a factual claim about the way in which people really use an expression. Here, we conjure up the image of taking a sort of "poll," as a field linguist might, of how a native population generally uses a common expression. It seems clear that, in the case
Ill of 'remember,' an average speaker of the English language not only uses the word much more widely than does Malcolm, but also that he changes the way in which he uses it over time. One need only to reflect on the fact that two decades ago it was novel to say that computers "remember," but now common to say so, and that it is now—among certain segments of the population—becoming increasingly more acceptable to say that plants remember. So, surely Malcolm means something rather more than that people really do use 'remember' and 'remember that' in the scene he describes, since it is just the caprice of fashion that makes it plausible to suppose that a native speaker might easily use the one expression in one way, and use the other in a different way. It is, of course, true that Malcolm sometimes explicitly argues as though he were a field linguist, but I think that though he often speaks about what we "would say" in some situation, the problem of symmetry is one that he discusses from the viewpoint of what we would be justified in saying about memory and knowledge. It seems to me, therefore, to come closer to Malcolm's intentions to construe him as making a non-empirical claim about the use of 'remember.' To explain this assertion, it is useful, if tedious, to examine more closely some key expressions found in the quote presented earlier, and then to show how the interpretation I propose
is a framework for discussing the major problems of interest here.

When Malcolm describes the kidnapping case, he says that we are inclined to say that S remembers the kidnapping, and also inclined to say that he does not remember that he was kidnaped. He also claims that there is a difficulty in deciding whether it is "right" to say that S remembers the kidnapping at all, that it might be "right," instead, to say that S was experiencing something other than a memory event. If we reject the interpretation of his language according to which "inclination to say p" means something like "automatic response by a native speaker to say p," then we ought to consider that "inclination" means something like "warrant to assert p," or some such expression. What I mean to suggest is that when Malcolm claims that "we" are inclined to say 'p', he really wants to claim that under certain conditions, we, who are in a position to reflect upon such matters with some technical expertise, are justified in asserting 'p'. Interpreted in this way, his remarks cease appearing to be factually, and obviously false--indeed, they begin to look provocative. They would then have the force of expressing the thesis that we may be justified (on some grounds yet to be revealed) in saying of S in the example that he remembers the kidnapping, and justified (on some other grounds,
perhaps) in saying of S that he does not remember that he was kidnapped. That he probably has such an interpretation in mind is supported by his use of "it is right to say" in the same context in which he uses "we are inclined to say"—by 'right' he seems not to mean 'culturally' or 'socio-linguistically acceptable,' but something like "epistemically justified." Thus, his claim that we are inclined to say both that S remembers the kidnapping and that S does not remember that he was kidnapped is best understood as the admission, or at least the suggestion, that there are good reasons for believing that either statement about the case (or both) is true. He does not explicitly tell us why he thinks this is so, but it is fruitful to venture another interpretation: his reason for thinking it plausible to apply the expression 'remember' (as in 'S remembers x) is that the imagery of S so closely matches the actual past event. If we bring to mind what Martin and Deutscher have to say about their counterexample, we can see that Malcolm's description of the relationship between image and event is as crucial a component of his own example as it is of theirs. That is, since the outside observer knows that there is such a close match, he is justified in applying the expression 'remember' to S, just as the outside observer is justified in applying to the artist the same expression as the best
explanation for the close match between the picture and what he had experienced in the past. So, Malcolm entertains the possibility of applying 'remember' in a way essentially like that used by his critics. On the other hand, Malcolm's belief that we are also "inclined," i.e., justified, in saying that S does not remember that p is supported by him in a way not only reminiscent of Martin and Deutscher, but also of Lehrer, all of whom agree that in order to know that p, a person has at least to believe that p, and to believe it with conscious conviction (or, be willing and justified to assert "sincerely" that he believes it). Since, for Malcolm, remembering that p entails knowing that p, what applies to knowing also applies to remembering, and so we see him making a similar point when he says about S that "... he does not remember that he was kidnapped: he does not even believe it."4

In the preceding paragraph I attempted to show that there is an interpretation of Malcolm according to which he already anticipates objections such as some of those presented by Martin and Deutscher, namely that there are, as a matter of fact, opposing "inclinations" (i.e., justifications, good reasons) for attributing 'remember' and 'remember that' according to different "rules" or requiring different necessary conditions for the correct use of these expressions. Now, one must attend to at least two other
expressions that illuminate Malcolm's appreciation of what is troublesome about constructing an adequate analysis of the concept of memory. First, he broaches the problem of symmetry by saying that "we are pulled in the same degree toward saying that S remembers x as we are pulled toward saying that S remembers that p." On the other hand, "to the same degree that we are pulled toward saying that S does not remember x, we are also pulled toward saying that S does not remember that p." Paraphrased, what this means is that those reasons justifying the proposition that S remembers x are the same as the reasons justifying the proposition that S remembers that p. Now, we are entitled to ask, what the reasons are that justify our asserting those propositions, and which ones are the correct ones. Malcolm's answer is instructive: once we recognize that symmetry obtains, "... it is neither clearly right to say he remembers it (p) nor clearly right to say that he does not ... these facts pull in opposite directions and I believe there is no right answer." The expression at issue here is 'clearly right.' It seems puzzling—perhaps even needlessly noncommittal—for Malcolm to claim that it is not clearly right to decide which of the two opposing uses of these propositions to call "correct" or "true," especially, if we take his apparently linguistic talk about our inclination to say one thing or the other as
nothing more than a lexicographic assertion: either native usage demands that we accept the one set or it demands that we accept the other. It surely cannot be the case, (on the assumption of symmetry) that neither use is correct. Thus, Malcolm is better interpreted as holding the view, badly articulated though it may be, that one must argue for accepting or rejecting that set of 'remember'-sentences above that implies memory of which one is not aware. That is to say, Malcolm here suggests that there are reasons, or a justification for allowing the expression 'remember' to range over unconscious memory or for restricting it to referring only to conscious memory. Accordingly, even though he himself does not give such reasons in this passage, he clearly does not regard the dual problems of symmetrically applying 'remember' (justifiably) and then choosing which of two symmetries to accept as having obvious responses. Indeed, in a later section in his lectures on factual memory, he attempts to provide the appropriate arguments.

If the interpretation I propose above is plausible, then we may suppose that Lehrer, too, has rather more in mind than that he arbitrarily accepts a principle about the symmetrical application of 'know' and 'believe' as obvious; to see this, we must make the effort to cull from his other claims an explanation for his stand. Not only
that, but my interpretation adds force to my critical remark that Martin and Deutscher are mistaken in believing that someone like Malcolm could rationally regard the premises of their argument inconsistent only if he merely assumed that 'A remembers x' entails that A believes that x occurred. If someone merely assumed or presupposed that remembering entails believing, I would take that to mean that the question of whether or not the entailment holds is for this reason not a matter of giving evidence other than some argument that the conditions under which it is correct to say that someone remembers are sufficient for it to be correct to say that he believes. Thus, it seems plausible to attribute to Martin and Deutscher the view that they believe that one can regard their premises as inconsistent only if one assumes symmetry in the application of the relevant terms. Indeed, this interpretation, even the bare example that is its object, shed an odd light on the efforts of Martin and Deutscher to refute Malcolm with an alleged counterexample virtually identical to the example Malcolm himself entertains as a possible, but, according to him, problematic objection—problematic, if his assessment of it is construed in the way I have proposed. That I have done so with good reason will be supported by considering the matters that follow.
First, however, it is important to examine again the distinction between conscious and unconscious belief, knowledge, and memory, because what needs to be said about it is part and parcel of a full examination of the problem of symmetry.

B. The 'Conscious/Unconscious' Distinction

Above I said that there are obvious parallels between Malcolm's hypothetical objection and the counterexample Martin and Deutscher offer. One would think that in order to refute Malcolm, the appropriate strategy would be to show that he had not adequately dismissed the objection; a strategy that does not seem productive is merely to restate another version of the same proposed counterexample. Nevertheless, Martin and Deutscher—in attempting to deal with views such as those of Malcolm, Munsat, and Zemach—do something very much like that. So, one question that one might ask is, why Martin and Deutscher proceeded as they did, if they did not simply blunder. To answer the question, a short comparison of the two examples is in order. One of the similarities of the two cases is that we are justified in saying of both the artist and the kidnap victim that they are doing something, or experiencing something, about which we as observers know that it "strikingly fits" something real. It is this close fit that is (or
seems to be) the justification for the propositions that the artist remembers his former home, and that the kidnap victim remembers his abduction. That is, in each case, that the person remembers something is (or seems to be) the best explanation for the fit. However, in both cases, the person is not aware that what he experiences or does reflects something real; we know this, because the subject does not consciously accept the proposition that his present experience is of something real and part of his history. What I mean here is just that if the episode in each case is one of memory at all, it is not of conscious memory or conscious knowledge; for Malcolm on the one hand, and Martin and Deutscher on the other, this disqualifies either case as being one of propositional memory or knowledge. So, the two similarities here are that for both parties, in order for there to be genuine knowledge (and belief) it has to be conscious, and that in a provisional way, Malcolm agrees with Martin and Deutscher in applying the word 'remember' in response to the question of the best explanation for a certain phenomenon.

The major dissimilarity between the two examples (apart from Malcolm's rejecting his as a successful counter-example) is that the phenomena to be explained are different. In the case of the artist, what requires explanation
is a peculiar kind of behavior and its close fit with something real, which fit is recognized by external observers, but not by the person exhibiting the behavior. However, in Malcolm's example it is not behavior that seems to need explanation, but some mental phenomena: images that fit something real, as determined again by an external observer. Perhaps a more useful way to put this is to say that Malcolm tries to construct a possible explanation for some part of a person's consciousness.

The problem that Malcolm sees in this case is that since the subject is not aware of remembering— or better, does not know that he remembers— there is a defect in the subject's consciousness. It is because of this defect that Malcolm suggests disqualifying the case as one of memory. But given that in having the images and being able to describe them, the subject experiences some event of consciousness, it cannot be merely consciousness that Malcolm's analysis is partially intended to explicate, define, or explain— the additional concern to be analyzed must be the one whose absence constitutes the perceived defect in analyzing the case as one of genuine memory. Thus, an understanding of this additional component that seems so crucial to Malcolm should provide the key to a plausible interpretation of his analysis and also to the analyses "competing" with his.
Here, the best one can achieve is a plausible hypothesis explaining why Malcolm argues as he does, one which "fills in" the gaps in his analysis. It seems that a crucial component of Malcolm's "counterexample" is that although the images his subject experiences are conscious events, they do not form part of the network of experiences whose descriptions the subject is in a position to use in justifying other propositions. What I mean is something like this: if S were prompted to justify his belief that \( p \), his justification would not include any proposition \( q \), such that \( q \) is about those images. In stating the matter in a counterfactual way, I recognize that if one argued from what a person would appeal to in order to justify a belief, one would be compelled to make clear the content of the appropriate contrary-to-fact conditional, and this is an admittedly difficult task. But, it is not my purpose to argue for such a statement; it is my purpose to construct an adequate explanation inferred from the suggestion that Malcolm has implicitly in mind--has assumed--namely, a counterfactual of the sort proposed as a necessary condition for the correct application of the term 'remember.' Malcolm, as I interpret him, analyzes the concept of memory such that 'remember' is restricted to apply at least to a conscious phenomenon, and additionally to what is epistemically available to a person as part of
his network of justification. To extrapolate from Malcolm's remarks about the correct use of the relevant epistemic expressions, I would say that the boundaries of his analysis of memory are drawn by his asking a question such as: "what proposition p would a person S appeal to in order to justify his belief that q (in a specific context)"? In the case of a person's consciously remembering that p, that proposition 'p' would be one to which S could appeal to (without extraordinary prompting) in order to support or justify his belief that q. Asking such a question rules out accepting unconscious memory (in this "justification" context), because an unconsciously remembered proposition would be one which S could not appeal to (without extraordinary prompting) in order to support some other proposition. Accordingly, the readiness of S to appeal to 'p' (where 'p' is a descriptive sentence about something in S's memory) in order to justify his belief that q (where 'q' is any sentence) is for Malcolm a necessary condition for the correct application of 'remember.'

Against this conception of a necessary condition in the analysis of the concept of memory, we are confronted with that of Martin and Deutscher. As has been pointed out before, they do not restrict the application of 'remember' to conscious memory, but allow it to range over unconscious memory, too. Quite explicitly, they use the word 'remember'
in answers to the question: "what is the best explanation of behavior B (in some context)?" It seems clear that this question is much different from the question about the readiness to use a proposition as part of a justification asked by Malcolm. Of course, it may sometimes be correct to say in answer to the question for a "best explanation" that what best explains some behavior B is that the subject S consciously remembers something or that something is the case. But, what is important to understand is that the "best explanation" does not have to include reference to any conscious states.

However we construe the notion of "best explanation" we are justified in concluding that the inclusion of unconscious memory in the concept of memory, for Martin and Deutscher, is the result of their asking for a "best explanation" of a certain kind of behavior. Asking for the "best explanation" does not necessitate an answer in terms of unconscious memory; it is simply an answer Martin and Deutscher give to the exclusion of some other answer.

The most important point made in the last few passages is that the disagreement over the possibility of unconscious memory (and also unconscious knowledge and belief) has its origin in a disagreement over what sort of question to ask whose answer importantly makes use of the concept of memory (or knowledge or belief). In the works
discussed, when the question asks for what proposition a person would appeal to as part of an epistemic justification for another belief, the answer allows only conscious memory to be the referent of 'remember'; but, when the question asks for the best explanation for some behavior, unconscious memory is not ruled out as a referent of that term. The fact that each proponent of the competing analyses makes use of a different question when confronted with the same hypothetical situation (or actual situation) is good evidence that each has a different concept of memory that he then attempts to analyze. So, for Malcolm, it seems that the concept he uses in his discussion of factual memory is an "epistemic justification" concept, EJ, and for Martin and Deutscher, in their attempt to counter Malcolm, et al., it seems that they regard the concept of memory as a behavior-explaining concept, BE. In describing their views, I am asserting that they employ two different concepts of memory. An objection to this is that the concept of memory may be seen as functioning both as part of epistemic justification and as a "best explanation" of behavior. Accordingly, the concept of memory may be said to have two "aspects," or two "uses" and still be just one concept. For purposes of my later discussion, however, it is not important whether there is one concept as opposed to two. Rather, I wish to concentrate on the
fact that the two "aspects" or "uses" have not been sufficiently disentangled and that they imply different concepts of belief. Not only that, but I shall also later argue that the "two" concepts of memory are not mutually exclusive.

Having said this about the controversy over the correct analysis of the concept of remembering, it is a much simpler task to show that the controversy over the correct analysis of knowledge is explained in terms of a similar sort of disagreement. There is no doubt but that Radford and Armstrong use the question for the "best explanation" in order to arrive at an answer employing the expression 'know.' This allows them to accept unconscious knowledge as genuine, and gives us good reason to think that they both take the concept of knowing to be a behavior-explaining concept. However, Lehrer explicitly asks a version of the question for "what a person would appeal to as part of an epistemic justification" to answer in a way that restricts his use of 'know' only to conscious knowledge, and which also gives us good reason for attributing to him the concept of knowledge which is an "epistemic justification" concept.

It requires little reflection to see that all the various knowledge analyses fall into the one conceptual structure or the other, and so it is profitable once again
to map all the views in question with respect to them:

(1) Malcolm, Munsat, and Zemach all accept the "epistemic justification concept," EJ, of both memory and knowledge.

(2) Although no one cited has been attributed the view, someone like Armstrong might accept the "behavior-explaining" concept, BE, of both memory and knowledge.

(3) Lehrer assumes the "epistemic justification" concept of both knowledge and belief.

(4) Armstrong accepts the "behavior-explaining" concept of both knowledge and belief.

(5) Martin and Deutscher assume the "behavior-explaining" concept of memory, but the "epistemic justification" concept of knowledge.

(6) Radford has the "behavior-explaining" concept of knowledge, but the "epistemic justification" concept of belief.

Positions 1-4 are all symmetric ones, whereas 5 and 6 are not. We have thus arrived again at the point where the issue of symmetry weaves into the critical examination at hand. When these positions are evaluated, two questions naturally come to mind, viz., "what is the reason (or justification) for assuming one concept over
another?" and "what is the justification for using concepts in a symmetric way?" Answering them, or at least attempting to, helps to flesh out my explanation of how I see the dispute here to have gone wrong.

C. The Ambiguity of the Concepts of Memory, Knowledge, and Belief

The first question I introduce, again, is one that asks what the justification is for preferring one concept (or aspect of a concept) over the other. In the case of the memory/knowledge controversy, we ask what the reasons might be that lead Malcolm to assume the EJ concept and what the reasons are for Martin and Deutscher's assuming the behavior-explaining concept of memory. One possible response is that there are no reasons for the different choices, although there might be an explanation. Their choosing as they do is just the result of their having different intuitions about which circumstances must obtain for the expressions 'remember' and 'know' to apply correctly, the reply continues. One who defends such an explanation may have in mind what sometimes happens when two philosophers disagree about the effectiveness of a counterexample even after they agree on all their presuppositions—in those cases, they often attribute the divergence of their judgments on having different intuitions
about the use of a crucial term, because there seems to be no rational, defensible way to adjudicate such a disagreement. Sometimes, it does seem that well-informed speakers of a language have somewhat different reactions to the same expression, and we normally accept cases of diverging uses as those few borderline cases that an otherwise effective analysis of a concept or definition need not handle. What is more problematic here is whether or not this is the sort of disagreement we face in the case of providing an analysis of memory such as Martin and Deutscher's on the one hand, and Malcolm's on the other. Their disagreement does not rest just on a relatively minor dissimilarity in linguistic intuitions; rather, it rests on a difference that shows itself not only in an obvious difference in the sort of phenomena each analysis recognizes as genuine memory phenomena, but also in a crucial disagreement over the structure of the proposed analysis, viz., whether or not it should be a causal one. A better explanation of why each faction settled on the concept it did is that each believes that the expressions 'remember' and 'know' are actually used by well-informed speakers of English as he himself uses them. On this interpretation, their disagreement would be the result of a factual disagreement, and thus our critical task would in part amount to providing evidence that one or the other claim was really true.
Perhaps Malcolm and his critics would be willing to agree that it is such a factually assessment of language use that supports their choice of concepts, but there is very little clear evidence that enables the critic to advance more than the possibility. Nevertheless, it is revealing to assume that the heart of their dispute is a factual one, and to see what the consequences for their analysis would be.

First, Malcolm might just be factually mistaken in thinking that we use 'remember' and 'know' only to express EJ concepts. Then, we would have to find a method for showing his view to be false, and that method seems just to be an empirical one of discovering from an expert linguistic what the prevailing use of those terms is. However, his critics do not approach him in this way. Instead, Martin and Deutscher make use of their counterexample—but its use does not clearly get at a solution of an empirical question, though it might get at the solution of a conceptual question.

Second, it might be that instead of holding a view about the use of expressions, Malcolm, Martin and Deutscher really hold diverging beliefs about what kinds of concepts remembering, knowing, and believing are, and that the point of their analyses is not so much to clarify the concepts, or to give the necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of the appropriate expressions, but to argue that the
concepts are either EJ concepts or behavior-explaining concepts. It is not easy to see how they would argue for such conclusions, but it is safe to say that the method of counterexample again is not helpful here, since using one already presupposes having decided that a concept is of the one sort or the other.

What this means for the memory controversy is that if it was Martin and Deutscher's aim to support their contention that the concept of remembering is a behavior-explaining concept, then they begged the question not only in constructing their counterexample as they did (since they presupposed that concept in it), but also were mistaken in their assertion that their argument (MD) begged no questions and did not make any assumptions about an analysis of memory. On this interpretation of their aim, their claim for a "presuppositionless" analysis is plainly wrong. Similarly, Malcolm and his supporters are also not justified in believing themselves to hold a "presuppositionless" analysis, since they do not argue in favor of their assumption of memory as an EJ concept.

Having described ways in which contrary choices of concepts may have been made, it seems that we are left with only the most tenuous explanation of them, if we insist that those choices were the result of more than caprice. Martin and Deutscher, Radford, and even Lehrer provide no
helpful clues, but Malcolm does. Perhaps the most revealing words in the quote with which this chapter began are these: "... I believe there is no right answer." What would impel Malcolm to admit to an impasse here? I believe that the answer is that he seriously entertains the position that the concept of remembering sometimes functions as a behavior-explaining (BE) concept, and sometimes as an EJ concept; given that this is so, it is not surprising that philosophers have given a different analysis for them, according to which analysis certain cases that count as remembering under the one concept do not count as remembering under the other. So, a plausible interpretation of what Malcolm is up to is that he produces an analysis of remembering in so far as it is an EJ concept. Correlatively, it is plausible to interpret Martin and Deutscher's work by saying that they have produced an analysis of remembering in so far as it is a behavior-explaining concept. In this way, their two analyses do not genuinely conflict, in that they need not be about the very same phenomena--it is now at least possible to accept both at the same time, as long as we recognize the context for which each concept is appropriate. Similarly, Lehrer's remarks are susceptible to a revision according to which his view parallels that of Malcolm, and
according to which he may be said to analyze knowing in so far as it is an EU concept: whereas Radford's analysis is best interpreted as an analysis of knowing in so far as it is a BE concept. Here again, the way is clear to accepting both sorts of analyses at the same time.

In the last few paragraphs, I attempted to support the suggestion that the rival theorists in the problem over memory and knowledge not only analyzed much different concepts, or aspects of one concept, but that there might be reasons for their having chosen the concepts they did. The conclusion of these considerations was that both kinds of analyses might be true at the same time, as long as it is made clear which concept, or which aspect of it, is being analyzed. The implication of this contention is, of course, that the belief that the two rival parties had a genuine disagreement of the sort they envisioned is false. However, in spite of the fact that there seems to be no substantive problem about choosing the "correct" concept of memory, knowing, and believing, there seems, nevertheless, to be a problem about whether the application of the appropriate expressions ought to be symmetrical, or not.

D. Symmetry Revisited

Among all the arguments supporting the various views considered, perhaps the most puzzling is the
purported argument in favor of symmetry that Lehrer and Malcolm present. Essentially, what they both say is that the expressions 'remember' and 'know' on the one hand, and 'know' and 'believe' on the other, "must" be used in the same way, or that if we are "drawn" to using one expression in one way, then we are "drawn" to using the other expression in the same way. We have already seen that not only are such assertions not really arguments, but they are also metaphorical and unclear. What they seem to come to is something like this: if we choose to analyze the concept of knowing insofar as it is an EJ concept, and we want to find out if it entails believing, then we must at least be careful to distinguish cases of "best explanation" believing from "EJ" believing. If we do, then we will recognize that an example such as the one constructed by Radford misfires against our analysis, and that we then have to understand that EJ knowing does not entail BE believing, so that our task is further refined. Correlatively, if we choose to analyze the concept of BE knowing, then Radford's example has the function only of making it graphic that BE knowing does not entail EJ believing, and then we are left with the problem of whether or not BE knowing entails BE believing. But, simply stating that we "must" use all the expressions at issue in the same way does not answer that question, and neither Lehrer nor
Malcolm tells us how to go about answering it. The only philosopher discussed who attempts to support his stand in favor of symmetry is Armstrong. Hence, one should review his "memory trace" cases to see if something can be extracted from them that will help in making sense of what appears to be an arbitrary acceptance of symmetry by some, and an arbitrary rejection of it by others.

1. Armstrong on Symmetry

In a previous chapter, I outlined the argument by D. M. Armstrong which concluded that Radford's alleged counterexample failed on at least two counts. At that time, what was most important to consider was the way in which Armstrong's critical remarks could also affect the controversy over analyzing the concept of memory. One natural source for such a reason is Armstrong's attempt to show that the terms in contention in Radford's example have been applied differently in an "extraordinarily arbitrary" way, because had Radford paid attention to the causal analysis of his own example, he would have noticed that by applying the terms as he did, he would not be able to provide an adequate analysis of knowledge and belief, because he would not be able (using his method for applying 'know' and 'believe') to distinguish between genuine knowledge and mere true belief. It seemed, on initial
examination, that the charge of arbitrary asymmetry levelled against Radford was crucially connected to the argument for augmenting his sketchy analysis of knowledge without belief with some reference to causal connections. To put Armstrong's argument crudely, it seems that what he wanted to establish was the conclusion that if only Radford had completed his counterexample with the sort of causal description Martin and Deutscher proposed, then he would have seen that this newly completed analysis required the symmetrical use of 'know' and 'believe.' If this argument succeeded, we would finally be in a position to propose a reason for insisting on symmetry, namely that a causal analysis of knowledge and memory is correct and that it entails symmetry. Lehrer would be vindicated, and Martin and Deutscher shown to be mistaken. Finally, Malcolm's cryptic claim that if we are compelled to accept unconscious memory, then we are also compelled to accept unconscious knowledge (and similarly for conscious memory and knowledge) would turn out to be the expression of more than unreflective inclination.

Unfortunately, if we examine the structure of Armstrong's plea for a causal analysis of knowledge, and even extend it to a causal analysis of memory, we will find that the claim that the analyses in question require causal descriptions is independent of the claim that the analyses
require the symmetric application of the terms 'remember,' 'know,' and 'believe'; that is, nothing about symmetry follows from the alleged necessity of referring to causal connections in the analyses of memory and knowledge.

To see this, we must again take a look at the various cases of knowledge and belief described by Armstrong. These cases were briefly presented in Chapter III; they must now be cited somewhat more extensively. Armstrong begins his discussion of the role of memory traces in the analysis of belief and knowledge by describing a case of genuine guessing in order to contrast it with Radford's case of apparent guessing (which is intended to demonstrate genuine knowledge):

**Case 1:** A person who is currently quite ignorant of English history is asked to guess the date of Queen Elizabeth. He picks 1603. He was once taught this date, but this teaching, and the memory trace that was produced by the teaching, was causally irrelevant to the bringing about of his current successful performance . . .

Here, the subject neither knows nor believes that Elizabeth died in 1603. He performed the speech-act of guessing . . .
His other cases divide into two different sorts: first, he describes the distinction between knowledge of which we are aware, and knowledge of which we are not aware. The distinction here is made graphic in that conscious knowledge is said to require at least a causal chain from the initial "learning" of the proposition known to the behavior best explained by reference to the subject's knowing and to his awareness that he know it:

Consider also the .. . ordinary case of knowledge. The subject is taught '1603,' an unmuddled memory trace is formed, and, as a happy result, the subject knows and believes that Elizabeth died in 1603, and knows and believes that he knows this. His reply to the question may be 'I know the answer: 1603.'

Unconscious knowledge, on the other hand, is made graphic by a causal chain that stretches from the initial learning to the eventual behavior best explained by the claim that he knows the proposition learned, but which causal chain does not also include the awareness that he knows. It is not only the distinction between what is consciously and unconsciously known that is important in these examples, but also the fact that in both examples the "gap" between the initial experience and the later behavior is bridged by a series of causal connections leading directly from the first "encoding" of what is known to its later manifestation:
Case 2: The subject is again asked the same question, and, as it seems to him, 'simply guesses' 1603. But in fact he was once taught this date (as he later recollects), and this teaching, and the memory trace that was produced by the teaching, were causally responsible for his picking this date rather than any other.¹²

The second set of examples is designed to show that Radford's method of picking out the cases of knowledge and belief is insufficient for distinguishing knowledge from mere true belief. The important feature of the examples is that the causal chain from the initial encoding to the resulting behavior is only indirect. What this means here is that a proposition p, upon being encoded, accidentally is encoded as the proposition q, which then degenerates to the proposition p; consequently, the subject actually learns that p, and later, by the accident of degeneration, manifests that behavior apparently best explained by reference to his knowing that p (because his apparent knowing that p is the final cause of the behavior). What Armstrong wants to establish is that this latter case is not a case of genuine knowledge, because it is only by accidental degeneration of what initially might have qualified as a false belief that the subject exhibited that
behavior which he would have also exhibited if the causal chain to the behavior had proceeded nondefectively from the initial experience:

Case 4: The subject is asked the question and, as it seems to him, 'simply guesses' 1603. In fact, he had in the past been taught this date. Unfortunately, however, although the teacher said '1603' the subject took it in as '1306.' Fortunately, however, the memory-trace degenerated over the course of time, and although it originally encoded '1306' came to encode '1603'.

Clearly, this cannot be a case of knowledge. That is why I think Radford was wrong in thinking, as he seems to think, that Case 2 is inevitably a case of knowledge. For in Case 4 all the conditions mentioned in Case 2 are repeated—but with additions that make it clearly not a case of knowledge. Nevertheless, is not the case a case of (mere) true belief? Many philosophers would deny that any belief was invoked, true or false. But if Radford thinks that Case 2 is a case of knowledge, must he not, for the same reasons as those given in discussing Case 3, accept Case 4 as a case of (mere) true belief?13
Of course, Radford does not consider any causal chains at all, but appeals only to publicly observable phenomena (namely the prompting and the verbal responses) in order to apply the expression 'know.' This fact is used by Armstrong to construct Case 3 mentioned by him above:

**Case 3:** The subject is asked the usual question, and, as it seems to him, 'simply guesses' 1306.

In fact, he had in the past been taught the correct date, and this teaching, and then the memory-trace that was produced by this teaching, were causally responsible for his picking the date he picked. Unfortunately, however, the memory-trace degenerated over the course of time and, although it originally encoded '1603,' came to encode '1306.'

What Armstrong argues here is that if Radford does not refer to memory traces in his analysis of knowledge, then he cannot distinguish between knowledge and true belief. But, if he did refer to memory traces to be able to make this distinction, then he would be forced to admit that cases of genuine knowledge analyzed in terms of memory traces are also cases of belief (since, according to Armstrong, the subject would be ready to assert both 'I know that p' and 'I believe that p').
However, even if Armstrong is right in thinking that an analysis of unconscious knowledge must contain as a necessary part some requirement that certain causal chains obtain, that particular point has nothing to do with establishing the claim that Radford, in picking out cases of knowledge in one way, is committed to picking out cases of belief in the same way.

What I mean is something like this: it might be true that Radford can distinguish between knowledge and true belief only by invoking a certain kind of causal chain, if the knowing in question is unconscious. But, there is no obvious reason why Radford is then also committed to accepting the concept of unconscious belief. The problem of the causal chain is only a problem about the possibility of mistakenly calling a case one of knowledge, when it really is one of true belief; it is not a problem about being forced to recognize that a certain causal chain that constitutes knowledge ipso facto also constitutes belief.

To spell this out in greater detail, we can say that Radford could accept the necessity of completing his analysis of knowledge with the causal descriptions Armstrong proposes, but deny that unconscious knowledge described via a nondefective causal chain constitutes belief, since belief requires a nondefective chain plus awareness. We can make similar points about memory and
knowledge. The cases under consideration work not only to describe conscious and unconscious knowledge, but also conscious and unconscious memory. Here, too, it is argued by Martin and Deutscher that a causal description is necessary to distinguish between genuine memory and only "seeming to remember." The "gap" that the causal description fills in this case would not only span the learning-manifestation gap, but also a temporal gap. However, just because we need to separate the method of applying 'remember' from the question of what the best explanation for behavior is, we are not forced to accept the thesis that knowledge has exactly the same sort of analysis. The conclusion of all these considerations is that examining the causal chains Armstrong proposes tells us something only about how to construct an adequate analysis of memory, knowledge, or belief in so far as each is a behavior-explaining concept. It does not also provide us with any compelling reasons to accept the behavior-explaining version of one concept just because we already accepted that version of another concept. Hence, the attempt to uncover some hidden justification for insisting on symmetry by examining the cases described by Armstrong fails, and we are left with the conclusion that the two opposing camps can argue only for the analyses of the concepts of memory and knowledge in so far as they are either BE concepts or
EJ concepts, but they have no arguments that show that we are forced to accept one version of those concepts over the other. We seem to be left with just the assumption of each faction that the concept they are analyzing is the concept.

2. Solution to the Problem of Symmetry

The way out of this circumstance of appearing to argue against each other's analyses while actually assuming that one concept is correct, and thereby begging the question against the other, is to recognize that the concepts of knowledge, memory and belief are ambiguous at least between their conscious and unconscious varieties, and that the analysis of one or the other kind must first make clear that it is an analysis of memory, for example, with respect to its being an EJ concept, or that it is an analysis of memory with respect to its being a BE concept.

What I mean by the recommendation just made is this: it seems clear that all three concepts under discussion are ambiguous in that in certain contexts they function as BE concepts, and in other contexts they function as EJ concepts. For example, the concept of memory is a behavior-explaining concept in scholarly fields such as psychology and biology, in which the behavior of animals, for example, is often labelled as 'remembering.' Recently, even the concept of behavior has undergone some modification
in the field of computer science, in which the concept of memory describes the "behavior" of nonliving objects such as computers and calculators.

What I advocate is that when we give an analysis of memory, we first make explicit that the concept we are adopting is the one that functions, for example, in fields such as the ones mentioned, in which it is observable behavior of some kind as well as certain causal chains that are among the constituents of an adequate description of the concept. Alternatively, we can see from perusing the history of epistemology that remembering, knowing, and believing are also concepts in what we might call the "theory of consciousness," or, perhaps, concepts in intentional contexts. Here, it does not seem to be behavior which requires explanation, or any causal chains that are of primary importance, but, rather the objects of consciousness, whatever they may be.

E. Implications of Treating Two Kinds of Concepts of Memory Differently

The implications of making such choices of contexts (and concepts) touch on problems in philosophical analysis that cannot be ignored, if progress is to be made in it.
1. Choice of Concepts Must be Defended

The first implication is that in order to have clearly in mind what an adequate analysis of the concept of memory and knowledge should look like, philosophers must first argue that the particular concept they adopt for purposes of the analysis functions as they say it does in a certain context. Arguing this point may come to something more than simply offering empirical evidence that the concept is really used that way in the designated context, especially if there is confusion there over what concept, in fact, operates. For example, psychologists use the concept of memory, in particular, not only when they offer theories about human beings but also when they conduct investigations into nonhuman behavior. In the course of their research, it is not always apparent, whether or not they use the concept "remembering" in a behavior-explaining way, or, rather, in the sense in which it is used for justifying the truth of propositions. Thus, their descriptions of the behavior of nonhumanoid animals have sometimes been dismissed as being viciously anthropomorphic. A philosopher attempting to elucidate the concept really used in the province of psychology would then be faced with having to disentangle one version of the concept from the other, and that may be more than just investigating the actual language used by psychologists.
2. The Kind of Analysis Must "Match" the Concept Analyzed

More importantly for philosophy, however, is that the recognition that there are different concepts of memory, or knowledge, or belief, not only clarifies my claim that the allegedly competing analyses are not genuine rivals in the same contexts, but it also opens up for further discussion the metaphilosophical question of whether it is the case that a certain kind of analysis is appropriate to one concept, whereas another sort of analysis is appropriate to a different version of the concept. More specifically, some of the issues concerning the adequacy of noncausal analyses versus causal ones are not so much debatable through the use of counterexamples as they are through an examination of the relevance of a causal analysis to one kind of concept or the other.

What I mean is this: in the analyses of Malcolm and Lehrer, most notably, there is a distinct turn away from including among the necessary conditions for the definition of memory and knowledge any causal conditions at all. Indeed, Malcolm explicitly rejects the notion that such causal conditions are needed, or even have a place in his analysis:
We feel that there is a "gap" between the previous and the present knowledge, but at the same time we do not know how to fill the gap. Should we say that what fills it is some persisting state of the brain or neural process? Whether or not it makes sense to postulate a specific brain state or neural process persisting between the previous and the present knowledge that p, such a postulation is obviously not required by an analysis of the concept of remembering . . . nor can we fill the gap with a continuous process of thinking about what is remembered. People could not, continuously and simultaneously think of all the things they remember. If we resorted to "unconscious thoughts" in order to bridge the gap, we should then be in a difficulty about the criterion we should use for the existence of those unconscious thoughts . . . this feeling of the mysteriousness of memory, unless we assume a persisting state or process between the previous and the present knowledge, provides one metaphysical aspect of the topic of memory I believe this feeling explains why it is so commonly taken for granted by philosophers, psychologists, and physiologists, that there is a "process" of retention . . . . My own guess would be that our strong desire for a mechanism (either physical or mental) of memory arises from an abhorrence of the notion of action from a distance.  

Malcolm addresses these sentences to the problem of elucidating the sense of the expression "S knows that p because he knew that p previously." He had earlier insisted that the 'because' in that phrase is not a causal one, but did not explain exactly what sort of 'becuase' he had in mind. But, taking Squires' construal of it together with a clue that Malcolm leaves in the passage above, we can see that the latter believes that the worry about having to complete the "gap" is one that springs from confusing the
metaphysical with the epistemological aspects of the concept of memory. Looking at how the distinction is drawn in the context of defining the concept of knowledge helps to see how it might be drawn with respect to memory.

On the one hand, we might argue that the concept of knowledge requires something like "completely justified true belief." In different words, we might say that the concept of knowledge is such that the expression 'knowledge' is correctly applied only if the expression completely 'justified true belief' is correctly applied. Further, in order to spell out under what conditions we are "completely" justified, we could say that we are so justified only if our knowledge is based on some indefeasible items of our body of knowledge. **Something** like this would suffice to make clear what is meant by having knowledge rather than an accidentally true belief. The important thing is that this clarification does not require that we also specify what these items are. If we argue that the most minimal, or most "basic" items of knowledge are ideas, or sensa, or self-presenting states, we describe the metaphysical support of our epistemological analysis. Another way to get at what I am trying to say is to point out that two philosophers might agree on the analysis of the concept of knowledge as completely justified belief, but disagree on
what the metaphysical entities are which constitute the propositional state called "knowledge."

It seems clear that Malcolm makes a point very similar to mine. He attempts to distinguish between an analysis of the concept of memory on the one hand and an analysis of the state of memory on the other where 'analysis' has a different meaning in each one. The first he takes to be an epistemological enterprise, and the latter he takes to be a metaphysical one. It is in the context of the latter that he thinks that the appeal to causal mechanisms is appropriate, whereas it is not in the context of the former. This is just the sort of distinction that Squires is best interpreted to be making: that the notion of retention is also ambiguous between the epistemological sense and the metaphysical sense; further D. Rosen's argument in response to Squires' is compatible with what I claim for Malcolm, because she points out that an analysis of the concept of retention, though it does not require an appeal to causal connections, is not incompatible with it, either. I take her to say at least implicitly that a causal analysis of the concept of retention and a noncausal one are (at least in principle) not incompatible with one another.

As I have outlined it above, the distinction between epistemological analyses of memory and knowledge and
metaphysical ones parallels my earlier distinction between those two concepts as being either "behavior explaining" or "epistemically justifying" ones. Now, another way to restate my earlier claim that the two opposing camps are analyzing different concepts, or "doing" different kinds of things—and so do not genuinely compete—is to say that one faction engages in epistemological analysis and the other in metaphysical analysis. It is not hard to see that in this light, their alleged dispute is not over what they thought it was, and their methods of arguing against each other therefore misapplied.

The implications here branch out widely, but they are beyond the scope of this thesis. First, it would profit the state of both metaphysics and epistemology to have it made clearer, what it means to give an analysis of something; an analysis of metaphysics may have little in common with one in epistemology in that certain components of it may be inappropriate to the other. Not only that, but there has, as we have seen, been great confusion over when one is giving one kind of analysis as opposed to the other. Second, before philosophers attempt to argue for the analysis of some concept such as those discussed, they need to make it plausible that the concept they defend really is an epistemological one or a metaphysical behavior-explaining
one. For example, whereas Martin and Deutscher can point to a well entrenched tradition of treating memory as a behavior-explaining concept, Radford does not seem to be in that happy position when he treats knowledge as such a concept. Similarly, it is also not obvious that the concept of belief is a behavior-explaining concept.

Third, when philosophers insist that the concepts of memory, knowledge and belief are behavior-explaining, or when they insist on the contrary, they appear to accept something rather more than just that the concepts in question are ambiguous. Rather, they seem to have some more widely-ranging conception of what the province of conceptual analysis is. On the one hand, we have Martin and Deutscher, as well as Armstrong—also Radford to a degree—who do not include as an important part of their analyses the component of reflection, or introspection. Malcolm and Lehrer, on the other side, do regard this as crucial for their work, or else we would not find them adamant about a person's being aware of what he remembers, knows and believes. The explanation of this divergence of views needs yet to be produced.
Footnotes


4 Malcom, Norman, op. cit., p. 214.


6 Malcom, Norman, op. cit., p. 214.

7 Ibid., p. 214.

8 Chapter III, pp. 14-22.

9 Ibid., pp. 19-21.


11 Ibid., p. 31.

12 Ibid., p. 30.

13 Ibid., p. 32.

14 Ibid., p. 31.

15 Malcom, Norman, op. cit., pp. 237, 238.
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