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BEYOND THE EXECUTIVE:
UNDERSTANDING CONGRESSIONAL FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University
By
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The Ohio State University
1980

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To Nita, without whose tireless
support and constant encouragement
this work would not have been possible.
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Abstract: This dissertation examines how Congress acts in the foreign policy arena. During the Cold War period, the President and others from the Executive Branch appeared to dominate American foreign policy-making. However,
in the context of the Vietnam experience, Congress seemed to become more assertive in terms of its foreign policy prerogatives. Thus, the relationship between Congress and the Executive Branch over foreign policy now is unclear. This work does not seek to determine if Congress will maintain its new level of foreign policy involvement. Rather, this research is designed to describe and explain why Congress acts as it does in foreign policy.

In order to accomplish this purpose, a conceptual framework is advanced to describe and explain congressional foreign policy behavior. Specific propositions derived from this conceptual framework will be tested by the use of comparative case studies. In this manner, the conceptual framework will be evaluated as a tool for describing and explaining congressional foreign policy behavior.

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

In the study of American foreign policy, the decade of the 1970's was a troubled time. In the wake of the Vietnam War, the process of making foreign policy seemed to be in a transition phase, and a number of questions came to the fore. One set of questions centered on Congress. What is the congressional role in foreign policy-making? Is Congress assertive? Does it challenge the executive branch by undertaking its own initiatives on foreign policy issues? On the other hand, does Congress follow the lead of the executive branch? Does Congress merely play a supportive role providing the authorizations, funds, or programs requested by the administration? Lacking its own information base, does Congress defer to the expertise of the executive branch? Is the truth somewhere between these two extremes? Is Congress more assertive on some issues but passive on others?

At the broader level, questions were raised about the public's role in foreign policy-making. Does the public have a role in this process? If so, what is that role? Do the people follow the lead of the president, providing support upon request? Do citizens challenge the desires of the administration or of Congress? Assuming that the public has a role, how are public inputs channeled into the foreign policy-making process?
Fundamental questions such as these arose in the 1970's due to some confusion over the nature of the policy-making process. Early in the post-World War II period, a dichotomy seemed to develop. In domestic policy-making, there were few rules to guide participation. The president, or high-level officials in his administration, might play a strong role in formulating domestic policies or programs. Individual members of Congress, key committee personnel, or the Congress as a whole could take charge and assume leadership roles. The public could have a great deal of influence here too. Mechanisms for public inputs into the policy-making process could include public opinion polls, the mass media, or activities of interest groups or key opinion leaders in the society.

However, participation in the foreign policy-making process was much more subdued and restricted. Dealing with other nations on important issues seemed to require a different process. The nation needed to speak with one voice. In order to achieve such unity, the idea developed that "politics stops at the water's edge." Both the public and the Congress were expected to rally behind executive branch decisions. When the administration needed something from Congress regarding foreign policy, members were expected to respond in a bipartisan manner. While many in society could be considered experts in domestic policy, few had the information and expertise to claim that title in foreign policy. For that reason, both the public and the Congress were expected to defer to the president's desires. After all, he had the expertise of the State Department, the Defense Department, the intelligence community, and many others in the executive branch on which to draw.
Over time, some analysts began to question this notion of limited participation. Some said an "imperial presidency" was being created, whereby foreign policy decisions were essentially dictated from the White House. Moreover, limited participation was predicated on the assumption that, with all the expertise available to him, the president would not make major mistakes in foreign policy. Such an assumption was invalidated by the failure of the American involvement in Vietnam. Some people began to argue that Vietnam had created a new assertiveness in Congress. Once the president had shown his fallability, members of Congress would no longer meekly defer to his requests. Still others said Congress had never been a junior partner in the foreign policy-making process. Instead, its role had simply been less visible than the executive's.

Due to the confusion and differing interpretations over the congressional role in foreign policy, this research project is designed to seek a better understanding of how Congress produces foreign policy behaviors. A number of different factors will be examined. Issue areas will be explored to see if different issue types lead to patterns of congressional foreign policy behavior. The role of party leaders in Congress will be examined in order to determine to what extent they articulate interests in foreign policy-making. Likewise, the role of committee leaders will be assessed to see the impact of members of Congress with some foreign policy expertise. Domestic inputs will be explored to determine the public's impact on foreign policy, through the avenues of public opinion and the mass media as well as the activities of opinion leaders and interest groups. Further, the level of presidential involvement in the congressional phase of the policy-making process will be closely examined.
Not only will these specified factors be studied, but care will also be taken to become alert to the impact of other factors in the policy process. Many factors could arise due to the different settings or contexts in which decisions are made. In order to systematically address these unspecified factors, the contexts within which decisions occur will be examined in regard to their historic, sequential, and concurrent aspects.

The impact of all these factors will be related to how they shape congressional foreign policy behavior. Do they lead to congressional acceptance of administrative desires, to initiatives by Congress, or to some behavior between these extremes? The relative impact of different factors will be examined as well as the patterns, or lack of patterns, which develop between these factors. In this way, a better understanding of congressional foreign policy behavior should result. A clearer conception of when and why initiatives occur should be possible. Further, the impact of the administration, important groups within Congress, and the public should be clarified.

The importance of this study is due to the importance of foreign policy in general. In an increasingly interdependent world, the classic distinction between foreign and domestic policy becomes harder and harder to identify. Foreign policy decisions have an increasing impact upon many Americans. Gone are the days when foreign policy decisions represented actions by government officials which only sporadically affected American citizens. Such was probably never the case, but for many years the mass public demonstrated little interest in most foreign policy issues (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter, 1964:423-424; Carr, 1958:251-252; Crabb and Holt, 1980:193; Johnson, 1975:80, 139; Milbrath, 1967). By 1980, elements
of the American public care very deeply about foreign policy issues which affect the price and availability of gasoline and heating oil, domestic prices for products made with sugar or grain, the value of American currency and products abroad, the costs and impact of imported goods in the U.S., the employment prospects at major American defense contractors, and the chances of military conflict, military interventions, and a peacetime draft.

Given that the public must ultimately bear the costs of American foreign policy, the role of Congress in such policy-making must be addressed. It is through their representatives and senators in Congress that most Americans have an input into the foreign policy-making process. Congress has always been the actor who pays the financial costs of foreign policy (Carroll, 1958:xi). Further as the overall costs and risks of foreign policy escalate, foreign policy issues are thrust into the domestic political arena and thus before Congress (Cohen, 1967:3). However, the attention paid by analysts to congressional foreign policy behavior has been uneven at best. A review of the literature demonstrates that treatments of the congressional role in foreign policy-making have followed the perceived "realities" of the times.

From the end of World War II until approximately 1973, the President seemed to be the focus of American policy-making. Although there were many actors in the overall foreign policy process, the President was at least the "first among equals." Congress, on the other hand, was just one participant in the process, and not an overwhelmingly significant one at that (Hilsman, 1971:67-78, 118-122; Huntington, 1961:127; Schilling, 1971:38-39; Spanier and Uslaner, 1974:54). Some analysts went further to say that Congress played only a minimal role. Robinson (1962:v) said
"Congress's influence in foreign policy is primarily and increasingly one of legitimating and amending policies initiated by the executive to deal with problems usually identified by the executive..." He went on to say (1962:14-15) that congressional initiatives, when forthcoming at all, tended to deal with less important matters. Finally, Aspin (1973) and Wildavsky (1971) argued that the Congress capitulates to the President on foreign policy issues.

In terms of perceived "realities," external events during this time made the world look like a dangerous place. Members of Congress reacted to Soviet, Chinese, North Korean, and North Vietnamese actions by supporting the executive branch (Koenig, 1975:152). A Cold War consensus developed which decreed communism should be contained. Further, as long as the President seemed successful in containing communism, he should be supported (Bax, 1977:887-888, 891). The Cold War consensus provided few if any incentives for members of Congress to act on foreign policy matters (Manley, 1971:65).

As the presidency seemed to capture the center stage, analysts naturally began to turn more and more to the executive branch in their search for explanations of American foreign policy. The bureaucratic politics school developed in which foreign policy outcomes were seen as the political resultants of bargaining among players positioned hierarchically within the government. Such bargaining followed regularized circuits or action channels. Organizational processes and shared values acted as constraints on the process, outputs, and outcomes. A number of works have developed this model, among them those by Allison (1969;1971), Allison and Halperin (1972), Halperin (1974) and Halperin and Kanter (1973).
While these works generally did include a role for members of Congress in the making of foreign policy, the role was that of a junior player at best. Primary attention was focused on executive branch officials, and subsequent analyses of foreign policy decisions employing this model often overlooked the role of Congress, or of domestic inputs in general, in explaining policy outcomes. This oversight was one of the points mentioned by Art (1973) in his biting critique of the bureaucratic politics model.

The failure of the American military involvement in Vietnam destroyed the Cold War consensus. The disintegration of the consensus provided members of Congress with incentives to act (Lehman, 1974:161-162; Manley, 1971:65-66). A series of events began which cast doubt on the docility of Congress. In 1966, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee criticized the administration's optimism concerning the progress of the Vietnam War and questioned U.S. policy toward China. Also, Senators Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) and Eugene McCarthy (D-Minn.) urged a closer examination of CIA activities. The next year the Foreign Relations Committee held far-reaching hearings on the American role in the world, and the lowest foreign aid bill in history was passed. In 1968, an even lower foreign aid bill was passed. In 1969, the National Commitments Resolution passed the Senate, and the Symington subcommittee on U.S. commitments was created (Johnson, 1975:43-50).

As a new decade began, the executive's "dominance" of Congress became a joke. In 1970, the Senate repealed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and passed the Cooper-Church Amendment which prohibited the use of funds to support U.S. troops in Cambodia. In 1971, Congress refused, for the first
time in the program's history, to pass a foreign aid bill. Moreover, the
Executive Agreements Act passed the following year, and the House Foreign
Affairs Committee failed by one vote to report out a resolution endorsing
an American withdrawal from Indochina by October 1, 1972. In 1973, the
War Powers Resolution passed despite a presidential veto, and President
Nixon was forced by Congress to go along with an August 15, 1973 deadline
for the cessation of all American combat action in Indochina (Johnson,

During and after this period, analysts began to reconsider the notion
of presidential primacy in foreign policy. Some scholars have adopted
mixed views regarding the congressional role in such policy-making.
Sickels (1980:150-151) and Strum (1979:43-48) view the recent congregational
actions as aberrations to the norm. They argue that Congress is still
basically content to leave foreign policy-making to the executive.
Johnson (1971:169) says that congressional foreign policy action will
mainly consist of appropriations and enabling legislation with public
education included from time to time. Bax (1977:881-883) argues that the
actions above were important, but Congress is not ready to challenge the
executive branch across-the-board. Finally, Moe and Teel (1971) say that
the congressional role in foreign policy has never been insignificant; it
has simply been less visible than that of the executive.

Other scholars stress that a real change has occurred in Congress.
Keefe (1980:104) and Schwab (1980:155) say the new assertiveness in
Congress forces a reevaluation of the congressional role in foreign policy.
Crabb and Holt (1980:33, 37) agree that there is a new assertive spirit
in Congress but note that institutional limitations may play havoc with
it. Rieselbach (1979A:401) differs by saying that new developments such as the 1974 Budget Act, the enhanced use of the legislative veto, and an increased information base will help Congress to maintain its assertiveness. Finally, two works go far beyond mere assertiveness in describing the recent changes in Congress. Franck and Weisband (1979:6-8) call these changes a new "revolution" in foreign policy-making, and Lehman (1974:vii) sees these recent changes as a "violent reinstitution of Congressional dominance that seems likely to endure for some time."

The present work proceeds from the belief that Congress has consistently played an important role in postwar foreign policy-making, and what is needed is an understanding of why Congress acts as it does in this area. Chapter II outlines the methodology of the study. Chapter III presents the conceptual framework to be used in examining congressional foreign policy behavior. Chapters IV through XVIII are case studies which serve as the data source. Finally, Chapter XIX reports on the findings and conclusions of this study and suggests future research directions.
CHAPTER II

Methodology

Basic Concepts and Review of Related Research

Before considering congressional foreign policy behavior, some terms need to be defined. "Foreign policy" refers to actions taken by a government which are directed toward an external actor or which have direct or indirect effects upon an external actor. Such actions may either be tangible in that they allocate resources or intangible in that they do not. In terms of direct versus indirect effects, observers can readily agree that direct actions, such as granting aid, deploying troops, sending diplomats abroad, etc., constitute foreign policy behavior. However, indirect actions may also affect external actors. For example, President Johnson was committed to a policy of both guns and butter in the mid-1960's. For this reason, he refused to go along with economists who called for a large tax increase to stem the rising inflation rate, produced by the use of deficit spending to pay the costs of the Vietnam War. His decision to continue deficit spending spurred the surge in worldwide inflation rates in the latter 1960's (Murphy Commission, 1975, V.III:185-195). Johnson's decision had indirect effects on many external actors and can be considered, in retrospect, a foreign policy decision.
Three terms remain to be defined. "Government" refers to those individuals who act in the name of their government. "Congress" refers to those members of Congress who act on foreign policy matters. Finally, "congressional foreign policy behavior" refers to actions taken by Congress pursuant to American foreign policy.

In order to understand such congressional foreign policy behavior, a premium must be placed on not only identifying variables related to congressional outputs but also determining how these variables act and interact in order to produce the outputs. Much of the congressional research has been statistical analyses based on aggregate data, and three examples of such work are examined in order to see the strengths and weaknesses of the approach.

Research done by Miller and Stokes (1967) was undertaken to determine how "representative" a congressional member's vote was of the desires of his or her constituency. Roll call votes were examined across three broad issues: civil rights, social welfare, and foreign policy. They found that congressional votes correlated much more highly with the member's personal attitude and his/her perception of the constituent's attitude than they did with the constituents' actual attitudes. In other words, members of Congress seemed to vote according to what they desired or what they thought their constituents desired, even if the member, in some cases, did not know what his or her constituents wanted.

Two other researchers have also relied on roll call vote analysis to try to explain why members of Congress vote as they do. Kingdon's (1973) study asked members what factors were of major importance in determining their roll call votes. The results, in terms of the number of times each
factor was mentioned as being of major importance and the number of times
the member voted in agreement with that factor or actor, are listed in
Table 1.

Table 1
Kingdon's Decision Making Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor (or Actor)</th>
<th>Major Importance (in percentages)</th>
<th>Member Votes in Agreement with Actor (in percentages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fellow Members</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituency</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Groups</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on these results, Kingdon develops the "consensus mode of decision."
He says that, in non-controversial matters, a member will vote with the
majority of other members. Even in controversial matters, each member
will vote along with the majority, unless three or more actors who serve
as his or her reference points disagree with the majority. These actors
could include the administration, the party leadership, the member's
constituency, relevant interest groups, fellow members, staff personnel,
or the member himself. Kingdon says that this "consensus mode of decision"
operates as long as no more than two relevant actors disagree with the
majority; in doing so, he says that it explains 89% of the controversial
cases and all of the non-controversial ones.

Finally, Clausen (1973) has empirically found clusters of votes
which he says represent the policy dimensions of government management,
social welfare, civil rights and liberties, agricultural assistance, and international involvement. For each policy dimension, each member has a general policy position which is a product of such factors as the member's personal attitudes, constituency attitudes, and presidential influence. Clausen says that by knowing each member's general policy positions, one can explain and predict his votes on the relevant policy dimensions.

The main strength of these three works, at least for our purpose, is: they highlight different factors which act and interact to produce congressional roll call vote behavior. As such, these factors could be seen as independent variables which affect roll call voting. Thus, they provide the analyst with a list of possible independent variables such as members' attitudes, constituents' attitudes, members' perceptions of constituents' attitudes, and the attitudes or actions of fellow members, interest groups, staff, the congressional leadership, and of administrative personnel.

There are also weaknesses to this approach. First, these studies limit their attention to roll call vote behavior. Studies based on roll call votes are a good way to get an economical look at Congress since roll call vote lists provide a ready data source amenable to quantitative analysis. However, roll call voting is only one type of congressional behavior. Some important types of congressional behavior are not represented by votes. For example, oversight and investigation activities may never get beyond the committee or subcommittee level, while they still may have important consequences. A public investigation of foreign policy activities might employ adverse public opinion as a tool against those being investigated and could be seen as a significant congressional
initiative. The Symington subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee studied U.S. security agreements and commitments for two years. One result of the subcommittee's report, and of two years of leaks, was "...to obscure, confuse, and discredit the Executive's foreign policy" (Lehman, 1974:163). Thus the president's image suffered domestically and U.S. relations with the Philippines and Thailand were strained (Lehman, 1974:163). Another example concerns the hearings on the Vietnam War by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1966. At these hearings, the administration's optimistic statements about the war's operation and forecasts of future victory were seriously questioned for the first time (Johnson, 1975:43-44). These hearings mobilized support for the anti-war protests which were to follow, and the resulting unpopularity of the war played a large role in the later congressional decisions which forced the disengagement of American troops in Indochina.

In addition to these overt actions, Congress can have important foreign policy actions which are less visible. Personal communications between members of Congress and the President can play such a role. In 1947, President Truman sought the help of congressional leaders before he publicly proposed his military aid plan for Greece and Turkey. In order to get the support of Senator Vandenburg, and thereby the support of most Republicans, Truman was required to do two things in his public appeal for aid funds. He had to both commit himself, and his prestige as President, to the aid plan and rationalize the program in terms of both the Soviet expansionist tendencies in the eastern Mediterranean area and the possible consequences, for American security interests, of such expansionist tendencies. Truman did so. The short-term result was the approval of Vandenburg,
which led to wide bipartisan approval in Congress. The long-term result was a fixed policy of "containment" of Soviet communism which probably was not a goal of the Truman administration (Hammond, 1969:21-23).

If one weakness of these types of studies is that they are limited only to roll call votes, another is that most of these studies stop when they correlate factors with their dependent variables. As such, most studies measure the covariance between variables. While this is important and necessary, correlations alone do not provide any explanatory mechanism for the relationship (Burrowes, 1972:131-132). The studies by Kingdon (1973) and Clausen (1973) are important because they are exceptions to the general rule. These researchers provide an explanatory rationale which can be applied to their correlational findings, and the explanatory mechanisms are insightful and worthwhile. Their one weakness, however, is that they do not do enough with the factors that: make up a field (Kingdon) or make up reference points for a general policy position (Clausen). Which factors tend to override others in importance? Do certain measures of the factors or certain combinations of factors lead to different output behaviors?

The Comparative Case Study Approach

This research effort is directed to answering these kinds of questions. However, the information necessary to answer such questions exceeds that found in most roll call studies. Such information, if it is anywhere in an economical form, is found in case studies. Yet the conventional wisdom decrees that case studies are unique and thus are non-cumulative in terms of the knowledge gleaned from them. Therefore, the question is posed:
how can case studies be employed to avoid their uniqueness? In other words, can case studies be used in a scientific manner?

The answer to this question is unequivocally "yes!" The comparative case study approach, used carefully, can provide scientifically valid answers to research questions. In Eckstein's (1975:85) words, a "case" is "a phenomenon for which we report and interpret only a single measure on any pertinent variable" (italics in original). He adds that a comparative study is simply the study of numerous cases along the same lines, with a view to reporting and interpreting numerous measures of the same variables of different "individuals." The individuals...can be persons or collectivities, or the same person or collectivity at different points in time, in different contexts, or under different treatments. (italics in original)

Eckstein (1975:80) presents the merits of the approach by saying that case studies are valuable at all stages of theory-building and are of particular value when testing candidate theories, or creating and/or testing theories of macropolitical phenomena. Such macropolitical phenomena include nation-states, party systems, and political cultures. They are phenomena of considerable complexity and/or magnitude. The study of Congress fits well here due to its complexity. Further, Eckstein (1975:108-109) posits that case studies provide a good tool for plausibility probes designed to see if a theoretical construct is worth considering at all. Lijphart (1971:685) agrees by saying:

given the inevitable scarcity of time, energy and financial resources, the intensive comparative analysis of a few cases may be more promising than a more superficial statistical analysis of many cases. In such a situation, the most fruitful approach would be to regard the comparative analysis as the first stage of research, in which hypotheses are carefully formulated, and the statistical analysis as the second stage, in which these hypotheses are tested in as large a sample as possible.
In some ways, this research is a plausibility probe. It tests the validity of the basic conceptual framework.

Other researchers have endorsed the comparative case study method. Jervis (1976) says comparative case studies can not only uncover the explanatory mechanisms behind correlations but also can determine the impacts of different independent variables, particularly when there are interaction effects among the variables. Moreover, Jervis (1976:184) says that "both those who argue that case studies cannot cumulate and those who believe that the distinctiveness of each case defeats understanding by means of comparative analysis are unduly pessimistic." Others who suggest the comparative case study approach are Campbell (1975), Eggen (1954), George (1976), George and Smoke (1974), Holt and Turner (1970), Smoke (1977), Verba (1967), Lucas (1974), Przeworski and Teune (1970), and Russett (1970). Examples of works employing a comparative case study format include Allison (1971); Anderson, Brady, and Bullock (1978); Berkowitz, Bock, and Fucillo (1977); Bloomfield and Leiss (1970); Cox and Jacobson (1974); Crabbe and Holt (1980); Donovan (1974); George, Hall, and Simons (1971); George and Smoke (1974); Gurtov (1974); Holsti (1972); Janis (1972); Smoke (1977); and Young (1968).

There is a general consensus among scholars concerning how a comparative case study should be organized. First, the theoretical construct is developed. Second, a standard set of questions is enumerated which is designed to bring out the information needed by the construct. The same questions are asked in each case. The answers provide the data needed. Similarities and differences are analyzed in order to come up with
"contingent generalizations" about the factors and processes involved (George, 1976; George and Smoke, 1974:95-96; Lucas, 1974:v—vi; Russett, 1970; Verba, 1967).

Overview of the Conceptual Framework

This work will proceed from the basic outline above. The conceptual framework is presented in detail in Chapter III. In short, the framework is cast in a stimulus-response format. A stimulus starts the congressional conversion process and is identified and categorized by assessing the context in which it arises. For this purpose, a contextual filter is advanced. It is composed of an examination of the historical context of the matter at hand, the sequential context leading up to the stimulus, and the concurrent context. The concurrent context focuses on how other issues or matters in the immediate environment interact with the stimulus.

In the conversion process, five independent variables shape the resulting response. The first variable concerns the procedural issue area in which the case falls. There are status, human resources, territorial, and non-human resource cases. The second variable attempts to capture the preferences of party leaders. These preferences are categorized as positive to the administration's position, negative to it, or neutral. The third variable, committee leaders' preferences, does the same for the committees which act in the case. These individuals' preferences are also categorized as positive, negative, or neutral. Public inputs are captured in a constituency pressures variable. These too are categorized as positive, negative, or neutral. The last independent variable, level of presidential involvement, captures the amount of effort expanded by the
president to get Congress to do what he wants. A standard level indicates
the president pushes Congress; a substandard level indicates a lack of
significant presidential pressure.

A congressional foreign policy behavior is the response and, thus, is
the dependent variable in this study. A trichotomy is used to categorize
the foreign policy behavior and each value represents a different position
on a passive-active continuum. No modification behaviors are those in
which Congress gives the administration what it desires. Resistance
behaviors are those in which Congress deviates from administrative desires.
The administration may get more than it requested. However, the more
common expectation here is that Congress gives the administration less
than it wanted. Finally, the congressional foreign policy behavior may
be an initiative. In such cases, Congress acts on its own in foreign
policy matters, rather than reacting to an administrative request.

Case Selection and Procedure

The conceptual framework is examined across a nonrandom sample of
fifteen cases. These cases are:

2. The Spanish Bases Agreement, 1953
3. The Guatemalan Intervention, 1954
4. The Formosa Resolution, 1955
5. The Mutual Security Act, 1957
6. The Bay of Pigs Failure, 1961
7. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1963
10. The Defense Appropriations Bill, 1969
11. The Executive Agreements Act, 1972
12. The War Powers Resolution, 1973
13. The Rejection of the Sugar Act, 1974
14. The Turkish Military Aid Cutoff, 1974
Since the purpose of the case studies is to test the conceptual framework, George's (1976) dictum is followed: cases should be carefully selected to well represent different instances of the undertaking in question and to provide as much variance in the dependent variable as possible. Bearing this in mind, one set of cases was needed which was as equitably distributed as possible over time, the four issue areas, and the dependent variable measures.

The set of cases above falls evenly across time, with five cases from the 1950's, five from the 1960's, and five from the 1970's. In terms of issue areas, there are four status cases, two human resource cases, four territorial cases, and five nonhuman resource cases. Regarding the dependent variable, these cases demonstrate five no modification behaviors, four resistance behaviors, and six initiative behaviors. Tauber distributions reveal that the cases are evenly distributed over time, fall 11.7% short of the ideal distribution across issue areas, and fall 6.7% short of the ideal distribution across the values of the dependent variable. As a result, this set of cases falls short of the ideal distribution on all three combined criteria by only 6.1%.

Thus, this set of cases well represents congressional foreign policy activity in terms of both types of issues addressed and dependent variable measures in the period from 1950 to the present time.

After the contextual filter is examined and the variables are categorized for each case, propositions applicable to the case are explored. Finally, each case study ends with significant aspects of the case being noted for future reference.
CHAPTER II NOTES

1 For other definitions of "foreign policy," see Hermann (1972:70-72).

2 This definition is only slightly different than the one used for "state" by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1969:202).

3 For a much more detailed definition of Congress in its foreign policy role, see Bax (1977:884-886).

4 A Tauber distribution measures the difference between an actual distribution and the ideal distribution, with the results expressed in percentage points off of the ideal. It is computed by the formula:
   \[ T = \frac{1}{2} \sum |P_i - P_j| \]
   where \( P_i \) = the percentage of the total distribution ideally found in each cell, and
   \( P_j \) = the percentage of the total distribution actually found in each cell.

I wish to thank Samuel J. Yeager of the Center for Urban Studies, Wichita State University, for bringing this measure to my attention.

5 Attempts to improve the distribution across either issue areas or dependent variable measures caused maldistributions across the time dimension, resulting in higher percentages off the ideal distribution for the three combined criteria.
CHAPTER III

The Conceptual Framework

When searching for answers to the questions posed in Chapter I, two basic strategies are possible. One could immerse himself in learning about Congress and thereby operate on the assumption that important patterns of behavior will emerge. However, the payoffs of such an inductive approach might be disappointing, since gathering data does not mean it will be correctly interpreted (Harf, Noon, and Thompson, 1976; Hopmann, 1976; Jervis, 1976; Smoke, 1976; Zinnes, 1976). The other strategy is to employ an organizing device to guide one's study. This chapter outlines the conceptual framework used here for this purpose. To begin with, a conceptual framework is a simplification of something more complex. It is a tool to be used to enhance understanding, since looking at all possible influences on human behavior is impossible. The chaos perceived by the analyst, who is trying to see everything, may obscure the most important aspects of the scene. Such problems are magnified when studying an institution made up of 535 human participants. Thus, this conceptual framework highlights five factors, or independent variables, which are considered to be of major importance in describing and explaining congressional foreign policy behavior.
The Conceptual Framework

In its broad outline, the framework consists of a stimulus, a conversion process, and a response. As such, it has its roots in the stimulus-response work done by Holsti, Brody, and North (1969), Cohen and Harris (1975), and others. Here the stimulus does not serve directly as an independent variable but is included to acknowledge that some development activates congressional action in the foreign policy realm.

Following George's (1976) prescription, standardized questions will be asked in each case about each component of the framework. These questions, or coding rules, are part of the methodology for the re-analysis of available case materials. They provide a uniform categorization process whereby existing descriptions can be translated into the appropriate states of the variables or components. The coding rules for the stimulus are listed below.

A. What event, action, phenomenon, etc., initiates the congressional policy making process?

B. What is the nature of the stimulus? What is asked, demanded, etc.?

The Contextual Filter

The stimulus enters the conversion process by passing through a contextual filter. The context within which a stimulus is viewed is important.
As Wildavsky (1962:717-718) says:

The context in which the issue occurs not only helps determine the decision-maker's perception of the facts and values but also the way in which he seeks out, receives, and evaluates this information. Different issue-contexts invoke different decision-making patterns which affect the manner in which the decision-maker goes about trying to solve his problem, and thus influence the final result.

In other words, the given context helps shape perceptions which, in turn, help determine the psychological environment (Sprout and Sprout, 1969) and the definition of the situation (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, 1969; Brady, 1974). The importance of the context is echoed by Cohen and Harris (1975) who argue that analysts should pay particular attention to the historical context in which a specific event is placed, the sequential context in terms of overall commitments and constraints over time that seem relevant to the issue at hand, and the concurrent context - how this event or issue interacts with other events or issues currently facing a decision-maker.

The coding rules follow these definitions and are listed below.

A. What is the historical context? Are there any precedents?
B. What is the sequential context? What patterns of commitments/constraints over time seem relevant?
C. What is the concurrent context? How does this issue interact with other problems, events, or issues facing the decision-makers?

The importance of contextual factors is noted by Lehman (1974:161) who says that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee created the Symington subcommittee on national commitments because these senators felt that they were being left out of important foreign policy decisions by the president. Johnson (1975) also argues that the recent assertiveness of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee can
be traced to the members' dissatisfaction with both the substance of executive branch policies and the way in which the executive branch treated Congress in foreign policy matters. Kozak (1980) notes that as decision contexts change, the incentives for members of Congress to participate in decision-making change. Members always view decisions in light of the context in which they are set. Finally, Rieselbach (1973:183-184) underscores the importance of congressional perceptions when he argues that the President cannot make unlimited requests of Congress, because members are sensitive to the charge of being dominated by the executive branch.

In focusing upon the crucial role of perceptions and the psychological environment, the analyst should not overlook the operational environment. As explained by the Sprouts (1969) and also by Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein (1969), one's perceptions must be of something. Environmental realities exist and they enter into the pattern of decision-making to the extent to which, and in the manner in which, they are perceived by the decision-making actors. While it is easy to note that "reality" is important only to the extent to which it is perceived, the Sprouts (1969:42) note that outputs must be implemented in the "real world," and even unperceived aspects of the operational environment have an effect on decisional outcomes. Consequently, the operational environment becomes an important part of the context because of its possible effects upon both the historical and the sequential contexts for future decision sequences. Thus, the operational failure of the American intervention in Vietnam had a significant effect upon Congress when President Ford asked for military aid to support the pro-Western faction in Angola. Many members of Congress saw the Angolan situation as roughly analogous to that found in Vietnam in the
early 1960's. If American policies had failed in the operational environment of Vietnam, might they also fail in Angola? Here the operational environment figures importantly in how many members of Congress viewed the historical and sequential contexts in the Angolan decision.

The important theme here is that the context in which a stimulus is viewed is quite important and may be easily overlooked. However, contextual considerations are hampered by the fact that many different factors might be important in the contexts of different cases. Rather than try to explicate these factors now, the following procedure will be employed. First, in each case the context will be assessed in regard to the factors which seem to be of prime importance. Second, at the end of the analysis the cases will be reviewed with the hope of finding patterns in the contexts which can be incorporated into future research efforts (see Lasswell, 1968).

**Issue Area**

After passing through this contextual filter, the stimulus is categorized into an issue area. Many students of policy-making have emphasized the importance of issue areas. Rosenau (1967:14) and Wildavsky (1962:730-731) note that different issues motivate different actors and also evoke different motives from these actors than do other issues. Milbrath (1967:248) argues that the ability of interest groups to influence foreign policy varies across issues. In speaking of the importance of issue areas in terms of Congress, we know that the influence of political parties, types of decisional processes, and individual influence varies with the type of issue involved (Froman and Ripley, 1970:128-129; Robinson, 1962:22; Rosenau, 1966:73). Moreover, Sorauf (1963:151) says that the typical member of
Congress will

make no firm commitment to constituency, party, or self. Their demands upon him and their sanctions over him shift from issue to issue.

Kozak (1980) concurs by concluding that issue characteristics are more important in understanding congressional decision-making than are any kind of demographic variables about the member or his/her district.

Different types of issues have differing impacts on Congress. Miller and Stokes (1967:304) find differences across issue types in the degree to which members' attitudes mirror those of their constituents. The correlations are +0.3 for social and welfare issues, +0.6 for civil rights issues, and -0.09 for foreign involvement issues. Froman and Ripley (1970:129) argue that "class" issues provoke sharp differences between the parties while "neutral" ones, those that do not redistribute wealth, cut across the parties. Further, they conclude that party leadership victories are more likely on both procedural rather than substantive issues and low visibility rather than high visibility issues (1970:147). The latter conclusion complements that of Turner (1970) whose data indicate that, from 1921 to 1964, party unity was weaker on controversial issues, those with high visibility. Furthermore, Robinson (1962:68) says his study indicates that high congressional involvement is more likely for nonviolent foreign policy issues than for potentially, or actually, violent ones. Building on this research, Hinckley (1971:141) argues that for both wars and crises the president becomes almost a dominant figure. She adds that as the hostility or violence of the situation decreases, presidential dominance begins to decrease as well (1971:145). In her words (1971:165):

As crisis subsides and information and participation become less restricted...congressional influence becomes stronger. And as it grows, party and constituency loyalties, congressional norms, and the members and chairman of the key committees grow in importance.
Johnson (1975:215) adds one last bit of information. Based upon his interview data, he argues that members of Congress perceive that the voters care about foreign policy only when they see it affecting them directly. When that happens, foreign policy becomes domestic policy, and the patterns of domestic politics emerge. This happens, not only on war involvement issues, but also on four specific economic issues which affect significant constituent groups: agricultural exports, fishing issues, mining issues, and defense spending as it affects statewide employment (Johnson:1975:243).

Given the importance of different issues, some scholars have proposed issue area classifications for use in the study of foreign policy. Some of these efforts concentrate upon the substantive characteristics of the matter at hand. Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein (1969) propose a framework in which decisions are grouped across military-security issues, economic-developmental issues, political-diplomatic issues, and cultural-status issues. Coplin (1971:82-90) sets forth a somewhat similar set of issue areas. He sees national security issues, foreign economic issues, issues involving historical/ideological aspects, and procedural issues. Other works deal with the many substantive issues involved in large data sets. Examples of such studies are those by Shapiro and O'Leary (1974), O'Leary (1976), and Trice (1976;1978). These individuals take note of the issues involved in decision-making sequences in the way these issues signal the topic of debate (Trice, 1976;1978) or the values involved (Shapiro and O'Leary, 1974; O'Leary, 1976). As such, the number of issues increases markedly.

Other proposed issue areas have been based upon commonalities in terms of the procedures involved. Huntington (1961) found that policy-making in
the executive branch can be either legislative or executive in process. Legislative policy-making is marked by a relatively equal power distribution, important goal disagreements, and many possible alternatives. Executive policy-making shows a hierarchical power distribution, undisputed goals and values, and a limited range of options. Lowi (1967) expands the view from the executive branch to include the entire American policy-making system. He sees three issue areas which may relate to foreign policy: those marked by the processes of distributive politics, regulative politics, and highly elitist politics. Also, Lowi sees one issue area, redistributive politics, which applies solely to domestic policy. Zimmerman (1973) argues that all of Lowi's issue areas can be related to foreign policy. Thus, he makes a case for the belief that redistributive politics may mark foreign policy decision-making in the case of unpopular limited wars.

Some procedural issue areas have been proposed by scholars associated with the comparative study of foreign policy. Hermann (1974;1976) proposes two tentative issue area classifications. In the first, he identifies five distinct procedural areas: policy articulation, bargaining and negotiation, evaluation, symbolic resource transfer, and procurement. The second identifies four somewhat broader categories which, he argues, are marked by substantial differences in both the actors involved and/or the procedures used. These categories are crises, internal resource allocation, protracted international negotiations, and policy or program design.

While the procedurally-based issue area categorizations above have been proposed to account for foreign policy-making in any given country, three recent works have been Congress-specific. Lehman (1974) posits four important patterns of executive-congressional interaction in terms of
foreign policy. These are the war process, the treaty process, the investigatory process, and the authorization/appropriation process. Ripley and Franklin (1976:16-17) divide foreign and defense policy into three policy types. The first two build upon the work of Lowi (1967) and Huntington (1961). Structural-distributive policies are marked by logrolling relationships between congressional subcommittees or committees, executive bureaus, and small interest groups. The President's role is minimal and the primary decision-maker is the congressional subcommittee or committee. Strategic-regulatory policies are those which reflect competition and bargaining between executive agencies and a moderate role by the President. The congressional norm is to generally support the President, and the agencies tend to be the primary decision-makers. Finally, their third policy type entails crisis policy-making. As such, the primary actors are ad hoc elites who cooperate with the President who makes the final decision. Congress' role is reduced to post hoc legitimation. Ripley (1978:353) later modifies the framework slightly to encompass structural, strategic, and crisis policy-making. Finally, Kozak (1980) finds five, non-mutually exclusive, issue areas identified by members of Congress. Members perceive nonvisible, complicated, grant aid, routine, and hot issues.

As Rosenau (1966:73) puts it:

the data on issue-areas are too impressive to ignore. Conceptual allowance must be made for them if theorizing in the foreign policy field is to flourish.

A procedural issue area categorization is used here because the characteristics of issues which are most relevant to any grouping of them are process-related, not problem-related (Cohen and Harris, 1975). Also, the issue area classification will serve an analytical purpose, that of grouping
cases for comparative study. As such, the classification scheme should be both mutually exclusive and exhaustive (Hermann, 1972:63). A substantive issue area format might allow: 1) different observers to fit the same case into different issue areas, thus denying the opportunity for systematic comparisons, and 2) the proliferation of new issue areas as new discrete issues come to the fore in the future. Such happenings would weaken the conceptual framework's validity. Hermann and Coate (1978: 4-6) argue that substantive issue areas are easy to identify and to measure but have little theoretical utility. On the other hand, they say procedural issue areas have more theoretical utility but are often harder to operationalize. If clear operational rules are provided, procedural issue areas seem to be the better bet; they can be both mutually exclusive and exhaustive and therefore provide a basis for theorizing.

Procedural issue areas exist when differences in values lead to commonalities in the process of resolving those differences (Rosenau, 1967: 15). The emphasis on common processes or procedures is important. Following Hermann (1978), patterns in processes used to produce an outcome may also lead to patterns in the outcomes themselves. Stated in another way, a certain decision-making process may make certain outcomes either more or less likely.5

The issue area format used here will be that proposed by Rosenau (1966: 81-88).6 His four issue areas are noted in Figure 1.
## Rosenau's Issue Area Format

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEANS</th>
<th>Intangible</th>
<th>Tangible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ENDS</td>
<td>Intangible</td>
<td>Status area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tangible</td>
<td>Territorial area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1**
Rosenau's Issue Area Format

His four cell figure is based on two dichotomies. The values involved in both ends and means are either tangible or intangible. Since such dichotomies are used, the issue area categorization is both exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Rosenau's coding rules are as follows:

1. In terms of ends, if the values represented can be photographed, then they are tangible. If not, they are intangible. Here the decision rule is added that the values are those expressed in Congress when the matter is handled.

2. In terms of means, if money must be expended in order to acquire the values, then they are tangible. If not, they are intangible. A decision rule is added that if funding is a concern of members of Congress, the means are tangible.

The issue area involved thus represents the first independent variable for this study. However, the issue areas here are slightly different than the other independent variables. They denote the expected process by which an outcome will result. As such, they set parameters within which the other variables fluctuate. Cohen and Harris (1975) get right to the heart of this difference. They argue that since the most important aspects of issues are process-related, issues cannot serve as independent variables. Yet the question is not quite that clear-cut. As Hermann (1978) argues, certain processes can make some output types either more or less likely. If the argument can be made that a given issue area tends to result in a
certain class of output behaviors, then regarding the issue area as an
independent variable is more defensible. Due to this reasoning, issue
areas here are called independent variables. Yet one must recognize that
while it may not be possible to relate each issue area to changes in the
dependent variable, this expectation holds for the other independent
variables.

Party Leaders' Preferences

The second independent variable in this study concerns the role of
political parties and their leaders. Researchers have noted that voting
tends to follow party lines (Jewell and Patterson, 1966:417; Polsby, 1976:
118). In fact, party affiliation is the best single predictor of floor
votes (Ripley, 1974:174; Turner, 1970). These findings suggest that
political parties act as reference groups for members of Congress. Parties
can fulfill such a role because Congress is organized along party lines,
friendships tend to be more intra-party than inter-party, leaders' rewards
and sanctions are applied primarily to their own party members, and members
of Congress say they "go along" with their party as much as possible
seem so strong that the only other factor which consistently overrides
them is constituency pressure (Jones, 1970:468-469; Rieselbach, 1970:39-40;
Ripley, 1969:8). Crane (1960) says that the party's role may even be
stronger. He finds in his study of the Wisconsin legislature that when
party and constituency interests overlap, legislators often cite constitui-
tuency pressure as the reason for their votes, even though the party serves
as a more immediate reference group. This phenomenon could also occur in
Congress.
If political parties do act as cue-givers and reference groups, how do they do it? Who gives the party's cues? The answer seems to be the formal leadership within each party. These elected leaders act as each party's chief spokesmen and strategists. They communicate the party's interests to the rank-and-file members (Jewell and Patterson, 1966:152-155). The individuals who make up the leadership include the Speaker of the House, the Majority and Minority floor leaders in each chamber, and the whips and their assistants in each chamber (Carroll, 1975:125; Jewell and Patterson, 1966:152-155; Rieselbach, 1970:40-41).

Some studies have been done on the functions performed by these leaders. They organize the party, schedule the chamber's business, promote attendance for the important floor votes, distribute and collect information, try to persuade members to vote in accordance with their wishes, and maintain a liaison with the president and his advisors (Ripley, 1970:106). Further, the party leadership is most influential at the time of the actual floor vote (Froman and Ripley, 1970:148; Polsby, 1976:119). Moreover, Froman and Ripley (1970:147) conclude that leadership victories are most likely when leadership activity is high, the issue is more procedural and less substantive, the visibility of the issue is low, the visibility of the action is low, there is little counterpressure from the constituencies, and state delegations do not engage in collective bargaining for specific demands.

In this study, the party leaders' preferences variable will be operationalized in terms of the preferences of these elected party leaders. Their activities and comments will be evaluated in each case. Based upon the available information, their collective position will be denoted as being positive to the administration's position, negative to the
administration's position, or neutral, with no discernable position. The coding rules are listed below.

A. Who are the formal party leaders in this case?
B. Does the public record contain preference statements by these individuals on the issues at hand? If not, code as neutral.
C. If so,
   1. Are these preference statements affectively worded? If not then code as neutral.
   2. If affect is indicated,
      a. are both parties' leaders in both chambers expressing unidirectional preferences? If so, code as positive or negative.
      b. are the preferences expressed only by one party's leaders? If so, code their preferences positive or negative.
      c. do Democratic and Republican leaders express countervailing preferences? If so, code the preferences of the majority party.
      d. do the chambers split in their party preferences? If so, code the negative chamber's preferences, since these are the ones which could lead to deviations from administrative desires.

Two assumptions must be clarified in regard to these ordinal measures of the party leaders' preferences variable. First, it is assumed that the administration will have a position in every case. This will be the position advocated by the president. Should he fail to announce a position, the administration's position will be that of the most relevant administration actor who is not overruled by the president. Second, the assumption is made that if the party leadership's position is neutral, then they do not exert influence.

Committee Leaders' Preferences

The next factor important to the understanding of congressional foreign policy behavior concerns the preferences of committee members and leaders. Congress works through its committees. As such, "committee members - and especially senior members - have an enormous influence on the content of
legislation under their committee's jurisdiction" (Tarr, 1976:99). For any issue, the members of the relevant committee become leaders in their chamber (Carroll, 1958:256; Johnson, 1975; Robinson, 1962). Bax (1977:884) goes so far as to say that many congressional decisions are merely ratifications of committee decisions and that committee decisions may be based upon the preferences of a few members who are informed on an issue. As Jewell and Patterson (1966:472) conclude:

Democrats in Congress often look upon the Democratic members of a committee as the party's leaders with regard to the issues handled by that committee; the same is true for Republicans.

In discussing the party leaders' preferences variable above, committee leaders were not included as part of the party leadership. The reason for this decision is that the elected party leaders have very little control over what goes on in committees. The committee leaders tend to run their own affairs. As Ripley (1974:184) puts it, "the committees are only partially and sporadically subject to party and party-leader influence."

Johnson's (1975) interview data also support the notion of the committees' independence from party leaders. He finds that only four percent of the members of the House International Relations Committee feel that their party is an important outside group to consider in terms of policy-making. The equivalent figure for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is nine percent. One final indicator of the relative importance of committees versus one's party is offered by Rieselbach (1970:40). He asserts that if a member of Congress has to choose between loyalty to his committee and loyalty to his party, he will choose in favor of his committee. It is through his committee that he will gain influence in Congress.

It seems clear that the committee structure provides a locus of power apart from the party leadership. Quite often, the committee chairman may
capitalize on this power source. Chairmen often become very powerful within the subject area of the committee (Polsby, 1976:110). Ripley argues that chairmen tend to have more influence than anyone else on the committee in terms of shaping its policy decisions (1975:108). It is readily noted that chairmen have enormous potential power through their capacity to determine what the committee will consider and when, to influence the membership composition of subcommittees, to act as the committees' spokesmen to the public and the executive branch, to lead the floor debate on the committees' bills, and to direct the committees' staff (Carroll, 1975:126; Rieselbach, 1970:40). However, Johnson (1975:114) argues that their potential power is expanded even further by the manner in which they shape the other committee members' goals, perceptions of the environment, strategic premises, and decision-making processes.

To summarize this brief discussion, committee members may become leaders in Congress for those issues with which their committees deal. The chairmen may assume a prominent leadership position on such issues. Committee members, and particularly the chairmen, can serve as cue-givers to the rank-and-file. This view of the committee personnel as cue-givers is supported by the congressional norms of specialization and of reciprocity and accommodation. Members are expected to specialize in the subject area of their committee. Further, they expect other members of Congress to defer to their expertise as they would defer to the expertise of others (Hinkley, 1971:62-64).

To the degree that committee members do act as cue-givers, one can expect that their preferences will influence congressional outcomes. For this variable, the statements and actions of committee personnel, and particularly of the chairman, will be assessed. Their collective
preferences will be recorded within one of these ordinal categories:
positive to the administration's position, negative to the administration's
position, or neutral, with no discernable position. The coding rules for
this variable are listed below.

A. Which committees deal with this case? Who are the members?
B. Does the public record contain statements by these individuals
on the issue at hand?
C. If so,
   1. Do these statements indicate affect? If not, code them as neutral.
   2. If affect is indicated,
      a. are these preference statements, for all relevant commit-
      tee members in both chambers, unidirectional? If so,
      code as positive or negative.
      b. are the preferences expressed by only one committee's
      members? If so, code their preferences.
      c. do the preferences, expressed by House and Senate commit-
      tee members, split? If so, code the preferences that are
      negative.
      d. do the members on the same committee split over their
      preferences? If so, code the preferences of the
      committee chairman and/or of the bloc he leads. The
decision rule is based on the literature which emphasizes
the influence wielded by the committee chairman, both
inside and outside the committee. If the chairman is
neutral, code the preferences of the largest bloc.
      e. do two or more committees in the same chamber deal with
      the same issue and split in their preferences? If so,
      code the preferences of the committee which seems to
      have primary responsibility for the issue at hand. This
      should usually be the committee the matter is referred
to by the presiding officer.

The same assumptions elaborated for the prior variable apply here as well.
First, the administration is always assumed to have a position. Second,
neutral preferences cannot be influential.

Constituency Pressures

The fourth independent variable involves constituency pressures.
Pleasing the folks back home is often given as a reason for congressional
action. For example, both Ripley (1969:8) and Rieselbach (1970:39-40)
argue that the single factor important enough to consistently override the partisan interests of members of Congress is strong constituency pressure. A slight variant is offered by Kozak (1980). He argues that the only factor more important than constituency pressure is the ideological predispositions held by members of Congress, which in turn are often based on constituents' attitudes. However, some researchers argue that foreign policy issues awaken less constituency interest than do domestic ones. Those who suggest that members of Congress are generally free from such pressures in foreign policy include Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1964:423-424), Carroll (1958:251), Johnson (1975:80,139), Milbrath (1967:249), and Miller and Stokes (1967:304,308,314).

To say that constituency pressures are not as influential in foreign policy as in domestic policy does not imply that constituency pressures can be ignored. Rosenau (1967:49) points out that when foreign policy issues significantly affect societal resources or relationships, they can become "domestic" issues and public actors will get involved. If a member of Congress sees that a measure will affect his constituents, he will try to act in accordance with their wishes (Hinckley, 1971:165-166; Jones, 1970:468-469). Milbrath (1967:249-250) provides some guidelines for determining when group influence will be more likely on foreign policy issues. Groups have a greater probability of successfully exerting influence when the issue involves direct and visible rewards or punishments to societal actors, the issue arouses special groups but not the mass public, the issue seems less important to the mass public, and the decision-making process lasts several months or more. More specifically, research indicates that members of Congress do listen to their constituents on issues such as war-making (Hinckley, 1971:155; Johnson, 1975:207). They also react to
constituency pressures on economic issues such as defense spending, agricultural exports, fishery questions, and imported resources and products (Johnson, 1975:243; Taylor, 1975:107). A slightly different economic issue is foreign aid. Members do react to constituency pressures on foreign aid but the reaction is mixed. Often, much of the American public reacts negatively toward foreign aid since they see it as tax dollars spent with no resulting benefit for them (Hinckley, 1971:155). However, some members represent areas of the country where foreign aid is looked on more favorably. These are the urbanized areas of the Northeast, Middle Atlantic, Pacific, and East North Central states (Clausen, 1973:179-180).  

If a member of Congress reacts to perceived or anticipated constituency attitudes, generally this perception or anticipation is based upon the activities of interest groups (Johnson, 1975:207). Both Carroll (1958:252) and Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1964:423-424) agree that general public opinion is often too vague to serve as any real guide to legislators. Milbrath (1967:232) points out that interest groups become important in this regard. They act as intermediaries in the communications process between citizens and their government. Their capability to perform this role is enhanced by the fact that almost every member of Congress belongs to some organization which will try, at some point, to influence foreign policy. Such groups might include veterans and farmers organizations (Carroll, 1958:251-252). Other important groups could include labor unions, business groups, religious groups, professional organizations, and ethnic/cultural groups.  

There is evidence to support the belief that constituency pressure plays a number of roles, ranging from that of no influence to that of overwhelming importance, depending upon the issue and particular circumstances at the time. Here special attention will be paid to the degree to which
members of Congress react to perceived constituency pressures. Such pressures could be manifested in public opinion polls, interest group activity, or the activities of opinion leaders. The same ordinal measurements will be made for this variable as for the two above: positive to the administration's position, negative to it, or neutral, with no discernable position. Coding rules for this variable are listed below.

A. Does the public record contain instances of attempts by interest groups or other nongovernmental actors to pressure Congress in particular directions? If so, code as positive or negative. If not, then code as neutral.

B. Does the public record contain statements by members of Congress in which they emphasize the importance of public opinion poll results for the case at hand? If so, code as positive or negative. If not, code as neutral.

C. Are only a few nongovernmental actors actively involved and the broader public not? If so, code their preferences.

D. Are constituency pressures strong but countervailing? If so, code the preferences of the nongovernmental actors seen as most legitimate for this issue in the eyes of Congress. For example, if groups such as the AFL-CIO, American Legion, etc. are favorable to a new security treaty while groups such as the Women's Strike for Peace are opposed, the preferences of the AFL-CIO, American Legion, etc., are coded. Since these groups are large, established, well-organized, and generally represented in the local constituency, they are more salient to members of Congress.

Measurement of this variable is based on the same two assumptions noted for the previous two independent variables.

Presidential Involvement

The last independent variable deals with the level of presidential involvement in the foreign policy case before Congress. Past research indicates that a strong presidential lead can pull some members of Congress into line. Miller and Stokas (1967:315) find that on foreign policy issues, legislators generally look beyond their local constituents when making up their minds. They tend to look to the president, or administration actors,
for cues. Members of Congress most affected by the president's level of involvement are his partisan comrades. Jewell and Patterson (1966:419, 428), in assessing Congressional Quarterly data from 1949–1964, conclude that when the president takes a firm stand he can expect the support of about three-fourths of his own party and almost one-half of the opposition party members in Congress. Clausen (1973:209–210) reports similar findings. He finds presidential influence to be a powerful factor in the area of international involvement but "only on congressmen of the same party as the president."

Other research examines the president's level of influence with the foreign affairs committees in Congress. Robinson (1962:114) finds that executive proposals are more likely to be reported out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee than are those which arise within the Senate itself. Fenno (1973) finds a similar but more pronounced trend for the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He says that the outside environment of the committee is dominated by the President. He is the most important "outsider" to the committee, and the impact on the committee of the rest of the House membership, interest groups, or party leaders is minimal. In an update of this work, Johnson (1975) examines the president's impact on each committee. While he is still the most important "outsider" to each committee, the situation has changed. The importance of both the rest of the House and the constituencies has risen relative to the president's importance for the Foreign Affairs Committee membership. Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee still see the president as the most important outside influence on their behavior. However, this committee has turned away from support of the president to assertiveness in defending Congress'
foreign policy prerogatives against those of the executive. Thus the picture in the mid-1970's seems to be changing in terms of which direction the committees will turn in regard to strong presidential stances. However, the importance of significant presidential involvement cannot be easily dismissed. As Aspin (1973) says, the politically smart member of Congress will allow the president to lead the nation on tough foreign policy issues since, for such issues, there will be constituents who will want the congressman's head regardless of which side he favors. Aspin says strong presidential leadership will draw most negative domestic consequences toward the presidency and away from Congress.

The presidential involvement variable will be operationalized as a dichotomy. The substandard level of involvement refers to the congressionally targeted activities which could be expected from any president on any foreign policy problem. As such, this ordinal measure includes 1) sending messages to Congress asking for legislation, 2) sending completed drafts of the legislation he desires to Congress, or 3) sending messages that tell how he feels about congressional initiatives (Koenig, 1975:165; O'Connor and Ingersoll, 1975:17-19). A standard level of involvement is one in which a president uses the tools at his disposal to try to persuade members of Congress to support his position (see Neustadt, 1960). Such tools include:

1. sending high administrative officials (Secretaries of State, Defense, etc.) to testify before Congress,
2. personal contacts with congressmen,
3. consideration of congressional interests when presidential appointments are to be made,
4. invitations to important White House functions,
5. presidential appearances in congressional re-election campaigns,
6. help in getting federal projects earmarked for a congressman's district or state, and
7. use of the mass media in order to appeal to the public. Here the president can both create and lead public opinion to support his

The coding rules for presidential involvement are listed below.

A. Does the president engage in any actions designed to influence Congress, or individual congressmen, which go beyond:
   1. sending messages to Congress asking for legislation,
   2. sending completed drafts of the legislation he desires to Congress, or
   3. sending a direct or indirect initial message to Congress telling them how he feels about congressional initiatives?
B. If so, code as standard. If not, code as substandard.

Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior

The dependent variable, congressional foreign policy behavior, represents the congressional response to the original stimulus. Such behavior could be categorized in different ways. One procedure is to look at the forms of behavior, such as legislation, investigation, etc. Another method is to study the detailed substance of the behavior: what did they decide? Who gets what? The method for operationalizing this variable is a variant of the second possibility. By examining substantively what Congress did, congressional outcomes can be categorized relative to what the administration desired. Thus, a trichotomy is proposed here which represents, in general form, a passive-active continuum. The first value for this variable is no modification of the administration's position. Here the congressional output is passive since the administration gets what it wants (although the process which produces a no modification behavior may not be passive at all). The second value represents resistance behaviors. Here, the congressional output is something more or less than the administration had desired. The congressional behavior represents some modification of, or resistance to, the administration's position.10

In each of these two categorizations, the administration initiates the
events leading to the congressional response. The administration acts and Congress reacts. The third value of the dependent variable represents a break in this pattern. Initiative behaviors represent those cases in which the issue is brought up for congressional action by Congress itself. This is the active end of the continuum. Robinson (1962:V,68-69) notes the importance of the initiating of action. He says his data indicate that Congress generally has initiated less and less of its own foreign policy activity while the executive branch has initiated more and more. This phenomenon is important, he says, because the actor who initiates the decision-making process is more likely to get what it wants. This level of success is due to the fact that the initiator defines both the problem and the proposed alternative solutions. The coding rules, listed below, are quite straightforward.

A. Does the administration get what it wants? If so, code it as no modification.
B. Does the congressional output represent more or less than what the administration wanted? Is it a modification or rejection of administration desires? If so, code it as resistance.
C. Is the congressional activity the result of a congressional, rather than an administrative, initiative? If so, code it as an initiative.

A survey of the congressional literature was undertaken in order to see how this dependent variable compares to other congressional/legislative output variables. Few instances were found in which congressional outputs were classified or even discussed in any systematic way. Some studies did mention congressional outputs in terms of lawmaking, representation, education of the public, oversight, appropriations, approval of appointments, etc. (Gross, 1953; Polsby, 1976; Rieselbach, 1973; Ripley, 1975). Jewell and Patterson (1966:24) summarize this line of inquiry by classifying legislative outputs as either decisions, services, information, or other. A
different method of classification was done by Hedlum and Hamm (1978:118-119). In attempting to measure a state assembly's legislative function, they viewed legislative effectiveness across four dimensions: productivity, expeditiousness, efficiency, and adaptiveness.

The output variable to be used here bears little similarity to these legislative approaches. However, there are some similarities to some of the foreign policy literature classification systems. In his work on foreign policy classification, Hermann (1972:60-63) identifies ten different ways used by researchers to classify foreign policies. The dependent variable used here overlaps three of these different types. First, it can be subsumed under the "geographic region/political entity" types since this research deals exclusively with U.S. foreign policy. Secondly, it fits under the rubric of "action properties" because the variable values represent congressional actions. Finally, it also fits under the "relational attributes" category since the congressional actions are measured relative to the administration's position or desires.

This treatment of the dependent variable has some advantages. First, many legislative studies, like other studies in political science, emphasize the process and not the output (Ranney, 1968:3). This research work focuses directly on the output as well as on the process. Changes in congressional outputs are neither forgotten nor ignored. Second, the variables is ordinal in nature since the values represent places on a passive-active dimension (see Hermann, 1972:66-67). Finally, the dependent variable is well-grounded in reality. Research by Aspin (1973), Bax (1977), Carroll (1958), Johnson (1975), Lehman (1974), Manley (1971), and Wilcox (1971) indicates that members of Congress, when dealing with
foreign policy, never lose sight of presidential preferences. The dependent variable takes this factor into account since the congressional output is measured against the administration's preferred position. Also, the way the dependent variable is measured is similar to how Fenno (1966:353) says that members of the House Appropriations Committee evaluate their budget decisions. He says that such members compare budget decisions with both the last year's appropriation and what the agency had requested. This latter point is akin to a congressional evaluation of its output compared to what the administration had requested. For these reasons, the operationalization of the dependent variables is sound.

The basic conceptual framework has now been briefly outlined. It is summarized in Figure 2.
1. Issue Area
   Status
   Human Resources
   Territorial
   Nonhuman Resources

2. Party Leaders' Preferences
   Positive
   Negative
   Neutral

3. Committee Leaders' Preferences
   Positive
   Negative
   Neutral

4. Constituency Pressure
   Positive
   Negative
   Neutral

5. Presidential Involvement
   Substandard
   Standard

6. Congressional
   Foreign Policy
   Behavior
   1. No Modification
   2. Resistance
   3. Initiative

Figure 2. Conceptual Framework
Propositions

The propositions which follow are not hypotheses to be tested in the statistical sense. Instead, they are viewed as vehicles to guide the examination and analysis of cases. As such, they denote the patterns of co-occurrence which are expected. It should be noted that some propositions may contradict others in the same case. This can happen because, in the real world, contradictory patterns of expectations often occur in the same decision-making case. Some factors will favor the administration's position while others may bolster congressional arguments when the two conflict. For example committee leaders, who have long worked with the executive branch in their policy area, may be positive to what an administration wants to do while party leaders may oppose it for partisan reasons. Such contradictory positions cause contradictory propositions to occur in the same instance. These contradictory patterns are helpful in that they may present clues as to the relative potency or influence of the independent variables concerned.

The propositions are also numbered in accordance with the primary variables they address. Propositions beginning with "1" deal with the issue area. Those beginning with "2" deal with party leaders' preferences. Those beginning with "3" deal with committee leaders' preferences. Constituency pressures are addressed by propositions starting with "4". Propositions starting with "5" deal with the level of presidential involvement. With the exception of the issue area propositions, the first proposition will outline the basic thrust of the independent variable as do Propositions 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, and 5.1 below. Follow-up propositions,
such as 2.2, 3.2, and 5.2 below, examine not only the first independent variable but also other variables as well.

The lone exception to this pattern is found with the issue area propositions. Propositions 1.1 and 1.2 below denote the expected patterns for status and nonhuman resource cases, respectively. The only time additional factors are brought in is represented by Proposition 1.1A below.

**Issue Area**

As stated earlier, the procedural issue area variable highlights the type of process generally used to reach a decision in such cases. Different processes used can have important consequences for the resulting output. Certain types of processes make certain outputs more or less likely (Hermann, 1978; Huntington, 1960). Lowi (1967) goes so far as to say that outputs can be predicted if one knows the decisional process used. Thus, one might expect some correspondence between certain issue areas and certain values of the dependent variable.

In turning to these relationships, Rosenau (1966:85-86) makes a series of basic assumptions regarding how processes will evolve within his issue areas. These assumptions are:

1. Actors affected by a decision will be more strongly motivated and active as the tangibility of the means increases. This assumption rests upon the belief that since the costs or benefits are denoted in terms of money, they will be easy for the actors to recognize or anticipate. Thus the stake the affected actors have in the decision is clearer to see.

2. More actors will be affected and active as the tangibility of the ends decreases. Tangible ends (or goals) denote specificity. As ends become less specified and more vague, more actors may feel that their interests may be affected. It is harder for the actors to recognize clearly whether or not they are affected. If so, more actors may get involved initially in order to see if, and to what degree, their interests are at stake.
3. As the tangibility of both ends and means increases, more bargaining can be expected. Tangible ends should have fewer actors involved since there is little uncertainty as to who is involved and to what degree. Tangible means should result in the actors being more aware of the relative costs and benefits to them. Since fewer actors are involved, the ones involved are more active, and the actors have a convertible currency (money) with which to work, more bargaining should result. Everything is specified so compromises should be possible within a small closed circle of affected actors.

4. As the tangibility of both means and ends decreases, less bargaining should result. The reasoning is the reverse of the above. More actors should be involved, it is more difficult for them to calculate to what degree their interests are affected, and no readily convertible currency exists to facilitate compromises.

Bearing these assumptions in mind, three propositions seem to be in order. The first is the status proposition.

**Proposition 1.1** - In status cases, the probabilities of no modification and initiative behaviors increase while the probability of resistance behaviors decreases.

In status cases by definition, the values are not easily divisible and positions are more likely to be dogmatic. For this reason, no modification and initiative behaviors are more likely than resistance behaviors, since the former are extremes on a congressional passive-active continuum and the latter involves at least tacit bargaining. In resistance behaviors, the president and Congress indulge in give-and-take. Congress must not overstep the implied bounds or the president may veto the bill. The president must not push too hard or he may cause increased congressional resistance, perhaps in the form of a legislative veto or an initiative. Such bargaining is made difficult in status cases due to the nature of the values involved and the lack of a bargaining currency in the means. Examples of status cases which resulted in extreme outputs were the U.S. - Soviet Consular Treaty in 1967 and the Pike Committee hearings in 1975. In 1967, President Johnson pushed hard for the
Consular Treaty. The end was enhanced cooperation between the superpowers while the means, in terms of Senate approval of the treaty, required no expenditure of funds. The Senate was sharply split and the positions taken were dogmatic, based on whether or not Senators believed the Soviets could be trusted. Johnson prevailed, the treaty passed, and a no modification output can be recorded. On the other hand, Congress decided in 1975 to set up the Pike Committee to investigate the activities of the CIA. The means did not involve the expenditure of new funds. In this status case, the decision to set up the committee was an initiative by Congress

The second proposition is a variant of the first. It is the status/poor relationship proposition.

Proposition 1.1A - In status cases in which executive branch-congressional relations are poor, the probability of initiative behaviors increases.

Since status cases lean toward either no modification or initiative responses, poor executive branch-congressional relations reduce the incentives to members of Congress to cooperate with the president. Instead, such poor relations will provide incentives for Congress to be more assertive. Both Johnson (1975) and Manley (1971) argue that such poor relations in the context of the Vietnam War period led to increased congressional assertiveness in foreign policy. Status cases such as the National Commitments Resolution of 1969 and the repeal of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in 1970 reveal this initiative pattern resulting from poor executive branch-congressional relations. Thus, for status cases, poor executive branch-congressional relations may cause the output to swing more toward initiatives than would otherwise be the case.
The third proposition is the nonhuman proposition.

Proposition 1.2 - In nonhuman resource cases, the probability of resistance behaviors increases while the probabilities of no modification and initiative behaviors decrease.

Rosenau (earlier) argues that such cases will affect fewer actors since the stakes are drawn more clearly. The specificity of the stakes involved induce the actors to be more active since they know how they are affected. Also, a divisible currency exists. Monetary decisions may induce compromises since differences can be split. More bargaining is expected, and extreme outputs are less likely. Weapons system decisions are relevant here. Prior to President Carter's cancellation of the B-1 bomber program, the B-1 had been debated for several years. President Ford and his congressional supporters wanted the B-1 built to replace the aging B-52's. Opponents said that any manned, penetration bomber was obsolete and thus wanted no funds spent on them. The result was a decision to continue funding the development of prototypes but to delay actual production. Since the Ford administration did not get all that it wanted, this is a resistance behavior. Both sides gave a little.

Without specifying other variables, no clear direction can be seen for either human resource or territorial cases since they involve a mix of tangible and intangible factors. It is possible that in such cases the issue area does not push the output in any given direction. Rather, it could be that here the other variables have greater potential impacts.

Party Leaders' Preferences

Leaving the issue area variable, the other independent variables can push the congressional behaviors in certain directions. The party leaders
Proposition states:

**Proposition 2.1** - When party leaders' preferences are negative to the administration's position, the probability of no modification behaviors decreases while the probabilities of resistance and initiative behaviors increase.

We know that congressmen like to vote with their party and that party leaders give them cues on how to vote (Crane, 1960; Jewell and Patterson, 1966:417-418; Polsby, 1976:118, 121-122; Ripley, 1974:174; Turner, 1970). If party preferences are negative to the administration's position, they act as a disincentive for no modification responses and an incentive for resistance and initiative responses. An example of such a case is the Senate passage of the National Commitments Resolution in 1969. The majority party leadership, as represented by Majority Leader Mansfield, was strongly opposed to the administration's position regarding the necessity of secret commitments to other nations. The resulting Senate output was an initiative. Much the same happened in 1970 with the Senate passage of the Cooper-Church Amendment to limit U.S. military actions in Cambodia. Again the majority party leadership, as represented by both Majority Leader Mansfield and Majority Whip Kennedy, was strongly opposed to the administration's military incursion into Cambodia. The resulting output again was a Senate initiative response. Examples do not cluster solely around the Vietnam experience. In 1919, the Senate refused to approve the Treaty of Versailles. This is an extreme example of a resistance behavior. Although President Wilson initiated the action, the Senate, led by the Republican majority, refused to go along with it. The Republican leaders were solidly against the treaty - especially due to the inclusion of the League of Nations idea.
However, party leaders may give positive cues. If backed up by other positive cues, the chances of no modification behaviors are escalated. The no modification proposition says:

**Proposition 2.2** - When both party and committee leaders' preferences are positive to the administration's position and constituency pressures are either neutral or positive, then the probability of no modification behaviors increases.

The reasoning here is quite straightforward. If both the party leaders and the committee members are giving positive cues to the rank-and-file members of Congress and so long as constituency pressures do not contradict these cues, then no modification behaviors should result. Such behaviors should result regardless of the president's level of involvement because there are no countervailing pressures present. These positive factors are additive and mutually reinforcing. Examples of such cases are the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Space Program expansion in 1961, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, and the Sinai Accord in 1975.

**Committee Leaders' Preferences**

Just as negative party preferences can tip outputs in certain directions, so too can committee preferences. The committee leaders proposition says:

**Proposition 3.1** - When committee leaders' preferences are negative to the administration's position, the probability of no modification behaviors decreases while the probabilities of resistance and initiative behaviors increase.

Committee members, and especially committee chairmen, have a strong role in shaping congressional outputs (Bax, 1977:884; Carroll, 1958:256; Jewell and Patterson, 1966:472; Johnson, 1975; Polsby, 1976:110; Rieselbach, 1970:40; Robinson, 1962; Tarr, 1976:99). If committee members do not like
the administration's position, they are in a prime position to do something about it. For example, Senator Lodge was the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee when it considered the Treaty of Versailles. He strongly opposed the treaty and the Senate resisted this presidential initiative. In 1969, Senators Symington and Fulbright were strongly opposed to the administration's practice of making secret commitments to foreign nations. Since Symington chaired the subcommittee and Fulbright chaired the full committee dealing with this question, it is hardly surprising that the Senate initiated the National Commitments Resolution. This initiative was strongly influenced by Fulbright's strong opposition to the administration's Vietnam policies. Finally, the case of the Pike committee to investigate CIA abuses is relevant here as well. The creation of the Pike committee was an anti-administration initiative by the House of Representatives. However, the final congressional output regarding the CIA represents a resistance behavior. Representative Pike's strong feelings about the criminal actions of the CIA undoubtedly steered the select committee toward an output which criticized both the CIA and the administration's control of it. However, the House as a whole allowed President Ford to determine whether or not to make the committee report public. Thus the House gave a little to strong presidential pressure, resulting in a resistance response. Neither side got all that they wanted.

Considering other variables beyond committee leaders' preferences may enable one to specify when resistance behaviors, rather than initiatives, should occur. The resistance proposition suggests:
Proposition 3.2 - When committee leaders' preferences are negative to the administration's position, constituency pressures are either negative or neutral, and the level of presidential involvement is substandard, the probability of resistance behaviors increases.

If the committee members give negative cues to the rank-and-file members which are not overridden by constituency pressures, and the president does not fight to save his proposal then resistance behaviors should result. Negative cues are all that the rank-and-file get. The tendency toward resistance behaviors will further increase to the extent that it is reinforced by constituency pressures moving from being neutral to negative. An example of such a case is found in 1967. When considering the annual foreign aid bill, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee took a strongly negative stance, slashing the President's proposal at will. This behavior was not counteracted by either a standard presidential role or positive constituency pressure. With no real check on the committee's preferences, the resulting congressional output, even after the conference committee, was the lowest foreign aid bill in history to that point. Further, if negative constituency pressures are strong enough, they may cause committee members to react negatively to the administration's position. In the eyes of some observers, strong pressure from Jewish groups led eight members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to oppose the sale of jet fighters to Egypt and Saudi Arabia in 1978 (Newsweek, May 22, 1978:18-19).

Constituency Pressures

As noted above, negative constituency pressures can also reduce the likelihood of no modification responses. The constituency pressures
proposition states:

**Proposition 4.1** - When constituency pressures are negative to the administration's position, the probability of no modification behaviors decreases while the probabilities of resistance and initiative behaviors increase.

Ripley (1969:8) and Rieselbach (1970:39-40) both say that the single factor consistently strong enough to override party preferences is strong constituency pressures. If the member of Congress perceives that his/her constituents are strongly opposed to something, then the member will generally try to bend to their perceived wishes (Jones, 1970:468-469; Miller and Stokes, 1967:314). Thus, strongly negative constituency pressures will produce incentives for the congressmen to resist or initiate new behaviors (Johnson, 1975). The fact that members of Congress perceived strongly negative constituency pressures in regard to the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War certainly goes a long way in explaining the Cooper-Church Amendment in 1970 (an initiative), the setting of the August 15, 1973 deadline for the removal of American forces from Indochina (an initiative), and the congressional refusal to accede to President Ford's request to send large amounts of military aid to delay the "fall" of the Saigon regime in 1975 (a resistance behavior). Further, the conventional wisdom asserts that these same strongly negative constituency pressures motivated Congress to resist President Ford's request to send military aid to the pro-Western faction in the Angolan civil war in 1975. Congress was reluctant, due to constituency pressures, to get involved in any more civil wars in far-off regions of the world.
Presidential Involvement

The final proposition dealing with the effect of one independent variable upon the dependent variable refers to the level of presidential involvement. The presidential involvement proposition says:

Proposition 5.1 - When the level of presidential involvement is standard, the probability of no modification behaviors increases while the probabilities of resistance and initiative behaviors decrease.

The literature is full of references to the strong role played by the president when he takes a firm stand (Aspin, 1973; Clausen, 1973:209-210; Fenno, 1973; Hilsman, 1971:67-78; Jewell and Patterson, 1966:419,428; Johnson, 1975; Miller and Stokes, 1967:315; Robinson, 1962:114, Wildavsky, 1971). Thus if the president takes a strong position, the literature tells us that Congress will generally go along with his desires. Examples of such no modification responses in the light of strong presidential appeals are found in the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, U.S. participation in the Korean War, and the original passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.

However, presidential pushing may not always work. In fact it can, at times, be counterproductive. To explore this notion, the initiative proposition says:

Proposition 5.2 - When the level of presidential involvement is standard, committee leaders' preferences are negative to the administration's position, and constituency pressures are either negative or neutral, the probability of initiative behaviors increases.

This proposition is based on two assumptions:

1. It is assumed here that the high number of presidential successes, when taking a firm stand, have come in cases in which the committee preferences were either neutral or generally supportive of the president's proposal. This certainly squares with the idea of a Cold War consensus (see Bax, 1977:887-888; Lehman, 1974:162; Manley, 1975:65).
2. When committee preferences are negative to the administration's position, further presidential pushing often becomes counter-productive. Members of Congress, and certainly the members of the committee, may often react against this strong push.

To the extent that these assumptions are valid, the following reasoning holds: if the committee leaders' preferences are negative and are not overridden by positive constituency pressures, a strong presidential push increases the likelihood that Congress will react by becoming more, rather than less assertive. These factors are generally additive. If committee leaders' preferences are negative, presidential pressure alone may not be enough to force the members back into line. The lack of constituent support for the president's position adds no pressure on the members to concede to the administration. In fact, when bolstered by negative constituency pressures, increased presidential pressure could trigger the committee members' desires to fight back. Should this occur, extreme behaviors such as initiatives should be more likely.

Several examples of such cases come to mind. The National Commit-ments Resolution of 1969 was a congressional initiative in the face of a standard presidential role. President Nixon spoke out strongly against it in press conferences and directed the State Department to go on record as opposing the resolution. The committee leaders were negative to the President's position and they did not have to face constituencies supporting him. Another initiative was the formation of the Pike committee to investigate CIA activities. The potential members of the committee, particularly Representative Pike, were negative to the position taken by President Ford. Ford objected strenously to any public investigation of the CIA, arguing that it could harm national security. The public, sensi-tized by news reports of domestic CIA abuses, were not supportive of the
President in any homogenous manner. Thus, the committee was formed and this formation was a congressional initiative.

Summary

This chapter outlines the conceptual framework used to examine congressional foreign policy behavior. The stimulus, upon passing through a contextual filter, enters the conversion process. The independent variables at work in this conversion process are: the procedural issue area, party leaders' preferences, committee leaders' preferences, constituency pressure, and the level of presidential involvement. The resulting congressional foreign policy behavior is the dependent variable of this study. Congressional outputs are trichotomized along a passive-active continuum. As such, the dependent variable values are: no modification of the administration's position, resistance behaviors, and initiatives.

Ten propositions are advanced to explore the validity of the conceptual framework. These are repeated below.

The status proposition (1.1) - In status cases, the probabilities of no modification and initiative behaviors increase while the probability of resistance behaviors decreases.

The status/poor relationship proposition (1.1A) - In status cases in which executive branch-congressional relations are poor, the probability of initiative behaviors increases.

The nonhuman resources proposition (1.2) - In nonhuman resource cases, the probability of resistance behaviors increases while the probabilities of no modification and initiative behaviors decrease.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The party leaders proposition (2.1)</td>
<td>- When party leaders' preferences are negative to the administration's position, the probability of no modification behaviors decreases while the probabilities of resistance and initiative behaviors increase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The no modification proposition (2.2)</td>
<td>- When both party and committee leaders' preferences are positive to the administration's position and constituency pressures are either neutral or positive, then the probability of no modification behaviors increases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The committee leaders proposition (3.1)</td>
<td>- When committee leaders' preferences are negative to the administration's position, the probability of no modification behaviors decreases while the probabilities of resistance and initiative behaviors increase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The resistance proposition (3.2)</td>
<td>- When committee leaders' preferences are negative to the administration's position, constituency pressures are either negative or neutral, and the level of presidential involvement is substandard, the probability of resistance behaviors increases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The constituency pressures proposition (4.1)</td>
<td>- When constituency pressures are negative to the administration's position, the probability of no modification behaviors decreases while the probabilities of resistance and initiative behaviors increase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The presidential involvement proposition (5.1)</td>
<td>- When the level of presidential involvement is standard, the probability of no modification behaviors increases while the probabilities of resistance and initiative behaviors decrease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The initiative proposition (5.2)</td>
<td>- When the level of presidential involvement is standard, committee leaders' preferences are negative to the administration's position, and constituency pressures are either neutral or negative, the probability of initiative behaviors increases.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER III NOTES


2The lone exception is in Proposition 1.1A.

3See Aspin (1973).

4Zimmerman renames Lowi's highly elitist issue area dealing with crises or non-crisis situations with no short-term internal resource allocation. Zimmerman says it denotes the politics of "protection/interaction." Thus it encompasses both the poles of power and of indifference.

5For a substantively-based definition of an issue, see Coplin, Mills, and O'Leary (1973), O'Leary (1976), or Trice (1976,1978). For a substantively-based definition of an issue area, see Shapiro and O'Leary (1974).

6An initial attempt was made to employ Zimmerman's (1973) format. This attempt was abandoned for two reasons. First, Zimmerman argues that distributive and regulative decisions deal exclusively with tangible political goods. He says such decisions do not involve values. This reasoning is faulty, since decisions which deal only with allocations of money ("exclusively tangible"decisions) are based on implicit or explicit value choices. Such choices include which goals to pursue in funding, how the goals are prioritized, etc. Second, his coding rules must be adapted in order for the scheme to fit a congressional format. Modifications in the coding rules, necessary to meet these two objections, result in an operationalization so complex that the scheme loses its face validity in the context of congressional foreign policy behavior.

The issue area categorizations developed for Congress by Ripley (1978: 353) and Ripley and Franklin (1976:16-17) were also rejected. Their structural-distributive and strategic-regulatory issue areas are partially based upon the work of Lowi (1967), as was the Zimmerman piece. As such, they would share the operational problems inherent in the Zimmerman format. While these two areas could handle appropriations and related decisions, all other cases fall in their one remaining issue area, crisis decision-making. It seems that the interactive decisions mentioned by Zimmerman have been omitted, since they are not "crisis" decisions. The scheme does not appear to be exhaustive in its coverage. However, this omission is not a severe drawback for a framework which is primarily heuristic in nature.
Finally, the issue areas proposed by Lehman (1974) were not considered. He also provides a heuristic, not an analytical, device. Nowhere does Lehman claim that his issue areas exhaustively cover all possible congressional foreign policy behaviors. The use of his issue areas could presumably ignore some congressional actions such as "sense of the Senate" resolutions.

*Rosenau himself notes (1966:87 fn.) that the format may not be mutually exclusive since the tangibility of the ends and means may become disputed. It seems, however, that such a dispute would be based, not so much on tangibility grounds, but rather on which values are really addressed by the ends and means. Since learning what values motivate behavior is problematic in any research project, here the analyst will assess the comments made by the participants, and to the best of his ability, sort out what seem to be the operative values. Cohen and Harris (1975) suggest this thinking by arguing that analysts should try to use the decision-makers' definition of the issue.


These regions break down as follows:
Northeast: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts
Middle Atlantic: New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware
Pacific: California, Oregon, Washington, Alaska, Hawaii

A point has been raised regarding these two values of the dependent variable. What if Congress resists but the administration overcomes this resistance — resulting in a no modification behavior? How will this be measured? Here it will be measured as no modification. The reasoning is twofold. First, the important thing to be explained here is the output behavior. If the behavior represents no modification, then it should be so recorded. Second, the purpose of this research is to test the usefulness of the conceptual framework in terms of its explanatory power. Future research can attempt to rectify weaknesses in the framework, and this work should identify those weaknesses.

The reason that only three longer, more multivariate propositions are advanced is that any additional ones would be either untestable with these cases or testable with only one case. The decision was made to exclude these proposition since few, if any, generalizations about them could reasonably be made. However, the research resulting from this dissertation will attempt to explicitly incorporate more complex propositions.
CHAPTER IV

The Japanese Peace Treaty, 1952

In 1952, the United States government concluded a series of international agreements regarding the entire Pacific area. These agreements included a formal Peace Treaty with Japan, a Security Treaty with Japan, an Administrative Agreement to implement the Security Treaty, a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines, a Security Treaty with New Zealand and Australia, and a trilateral fisheries convention between the U.S., Japan, and Canada. Yet the peace agreement with Japan stood out from all the rest. It ended the U.S.-Japanese phase of World War II, and it served as the cornerstone for future American Pacific policy.

The basic provisions of the peace treaty were fairly straightforward. Japan was required to apply for U.N. membership and to endorse both the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Japanese renounced their claim to most territories which were not an immediate part of their home islands. Thus, they lost title to Korea, Formosa, the Pescadores, the Kurile Islands, South Sakhalin Island, the Spratly Islands, and the Paracel Islands. However, they were allowed to retain other such islands such as the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands but agreed not to protest if these islands were later made a trusteeship under U.S. administration. Moreover, the Japanese had to renounce any special rights or interests they had in China.
Beyond territorial matters, the treaty further specified that all Allied forces occupying Japan would be required to leave no later than 90 days after the treaty came into force, except for those forces which were stationed in Japan according to agreements which might be negotiated later. The Japanese were also required to negotiate, with any of the Allied nations which so desired, fishery regulation and conservation agreements for the Pacific area. Any Allied power might demand Japanese reparations, but these payments were to be made solely in the form of Japanese services. The reparations provision included China, which was significant for two reasons: 1) China was not a signatory to the treaty and thus was not legally an Allied Power, and 2) which "China," the Peoples' Republic or Nationalist China, this provision referred to was not specified.

Finally, two procedural matters were included. First, the treaty was to come into force once it was ratified by Japan, the U.S., and five of the following: Australia, Canada, Ceylon, France, Indonesia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom. Second, Japan was free to make a bilateral peace treaty with either of the two "Chinas."

The Truman administration submitted the treaty to the Senate for ratification when it convened in January of 1952. On January 21, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began its hearings on the peace agreement. The four days of hearings were friendly and low-key. John Foster Dulles provided most of the administration testimony since he had been in charge of handling the peace treaty negotiations process. After two days of administration testimony, public witnesses were allowed to testify. On February 5, 1952 the Foreign Relations Committee unanimously reported out
the peace treaty along with the three security treaties mentioned earlier. In their report, at the insistence of Senator Arthur Watkins (R-Utah), they included a two part reservation to the peace treaty. The reservation declared 1) that the treaty did not reduce Allied or Japanese rights to South Sakhalin, the Kuriles and other such territories in favor of the Soviet Union and 2) the treaty did not imply American recognition of the Yalta accords which favored the Soviet Union at Japan's expense. The committee members agreed to the reservation since they saw it as an explanatory device and not as a change in the treaty text.

On March 14, the Senate began five days of floor debate on the peace agreement and the three security treaties. Senators William Jenner (R-Ind.), Margaret Chase Smith (R-Me.), and Everett Dirksen (R-Ill.) proposed reservations to the peace treaty, but they failed. The only reservation which passed the Senate was the "explanatory" one by Watkins previously approved by the Foreign Relations Committee. On March 20, the peace treaty was approved by a 66-10 vote.

The official American notice of ratification was deposited with the U.N. on April 28. Since the prescribed number of other states had already ratified it, the peace treaty went into force. The Japanese regained their sovereignty, and the Japanese-American war in the Pacific ended.
ANALYSIS

I. Stimulus

The stimulus for the Senate ratification process came when the Truman administration formally submitted the treaty to the Senate in January, 1952. The administration wanted the peace treaty approved with no modifications.

II. Contextual Filter

A. Historical Context

The American past has been marked by peace treaties concluded after conflicts; there were treaties with Great Britain in 1783, Tripoli in 1805, Great Britain again in 1815, Algiers in 1816, Mexico in 1848, and Spain in 1899 (Bailey, 1974). However, the one most remembered was the Treaty of Versailles ending World War I. Two vivid "lessons" were learned from that ill-fated treaty: 1) do not ignore the Senate when negotiating if you want to later get a smooth and rapid ratification, and 2) do not impose heavily punitive terms on the defeated nation. Harsh reparations and other such punitive measures were widely acclaimed to have hastened the fall of the Weimar Republic in Germany and to have encouraged the German nationalistic backlash toward those nations seen as oppressors (Bailey, 1974). Dulles seemed to have learned these lessons well since both were strictly obeyed in the Japanese Peace settlement.

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B. Sequential Context

Dulles' obedience to the lessons above were clearly evident in this case. Cohen (1957:12-13) says when Dulles was appointed as a consultant to Secretary of State Acheson in April 1950, he approached the task of handling the peace treaty with two firm convictions. First, the treaty must stress reconciliation and reconstruction, and second, the Congress, and especially the Senate, must be part of the negotiations process. Dulles felt that he had to have Republican as well as Democratic support for the treaty. Therefore, he consulted both foreign affairs committees in Congress and Republican party leaders before taking any major steps or making any crucial decisions in the negotiations.

On June 14, 1950, Dulles went on a two week trip to Japan and Korea with John Allison, the director of the Northeastern Asian Affairs Office at State. His Tokyo meetings with Defense Secretary Louis Johnson; General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; and General Douglas MacArthur, SCAP commander, were framed against the backdrop of the Korean invasion. These talks resulted in an intra-governmental agreement which recognized the necessity of a liberal treaty settlement which would ensure the security of both the U.S. and Japan. The agreement was drawn up as a joint memorandum by the Departments of State and Defense and approved by Truman on September 8. Truman publicly announced the memorandum on September 14 and gave Dulles the authority to initiate formal discussions on a peace settlement with other interested parties. The U.S. government called for a nonpunitive and nonrestrictive treaty which would include the positioning of American bases in Japan. The noncommunist member nations of the U.N. Far East Commission indicated that they believed a settlement along such
lines was possible.

The entry of the Peoples' Republic of China into the Korean War resulted in a delay in the negotiations process. However some momentum was regained on January 10, 1951, when Dulles was named Special Representative of the President, a post with ambassadorial rank. Armed with both this new rank and the responsibility to get the negotiations going, Dulles met with the Far Eastern Subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees. After these discussions, he left for a month-long round of treaty talks with General MacArthur and the governments of Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. When he returned, he drew up a draft of the proposed peace treaty. He discussed the draft with the Senate Far Eastern Subcommittee and then during the next few months, the draft treaty circulated among the interested parties and was revised to meet their objections. The first draft appeared publicly on July 12, 1951. A second draft came out on July 20 and the final draft was released on August 15.

On September 4, 1951, the Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan was convened in San Francisco. Of the 51 participating nations, only the U.S.S.R., Poland, and Czechoslovakia offered amendments to the peace treaty. These amendments were defeated and on September 8 the treaty was signed by 48 states. The three Communist states declined to sign.

Dulles had carefully chosen the American delegation to the conference. The American Delegates were Secretary Acheson, Dulles, and Senators Tom Connally (D-Tex.) and Alexander Wiley (R-Wis.), the chairman and ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations Committee, respectively. The six
Alternate Delegates were all members of Congress, with each political party choosing two senators and one representative. The four senators chosen comprised the entire membership of the Far Eastern Subcommittee of Foreign Relations. They were the Chairman, John Sparkman (D-Ala.), the ranking minority member, H. Alexander Smith (R-N.J.), and Senators Walter George (D-Ga.) and Bourke Hickenlooper (R-Iowa). Finally, there were nine accredited Congressional Observers, five of whom were Republicans.

After the signing, Dulles continued to be mindful of congressional concerns. When he learned that Senators Sparkman and Smith of the Far Eastern Subcommittee were worried how Japan's future action on the "China question" would be received by other members of the Senate, he took them to Japan in December 1951 to consult with Japanese leaders. Sparkman and Smith explained that some of their colleagues would vote against the peace treaty if they believed that Japan would recognize the Peoples' Republic of China. They stressed that they just wanted to make the Japanese aware of this fact and that the official American position was that Japan's choice was to be its own. Premier Yoshida responded to their warning in a personal letter to Dulles written on Christmas Eve. Yoshida said the Japanese government intended to make a bilateral peace treaty with Nationalist China as soon as their sovereignty was regained. Dulles released this letter on January 16, 1952, five days before the Foreign Relations Committee began its hearings on the peace treaty. This letter defused, in advance, much of the potential opposition to the treaty.

Overall, Dulles met with the full Foreign Relations Committee once and with the Far Eastern Subcommittee nine times during the negotiations. His efforts in this regard went a long way toward ensuring bipartisan
congressional support for the peace settlement.

C. Concurrent Context

With the peace settlement being approached in a bipartisan, non-controversial manner, other events at this time grabbed both the headlines and the public's attention. The outbreak of the Korean War affected the peace settlement in two ways. First, it helped convince "many hitherto reluctant people of the need for a rapid settlement with Japan if she were to be brought into an anti-Communist orbit in the Pacific" (Cohen, 1957: 126). For the first time, a sense of urgency was introduced into the negotiations. Second, the events of the war, MacArthur's dismissal, and armistice talks dominated the nation's news and deflected public concern away from the peace settlement.

Domestic news further overshadowed the peace settlement. Senator Estes Kefauver's investigation into organized crime was a big attention-getter in the spring of 1951. Moreover, Senator Joseph McCarthy's hunt for communists in the State Department also captured the public's attention. During the Senate ratification debate, the press was more concerned with General Eisenhower's performance as a write-in candidate in the Minnesota primary than with the treaty ratification.

A look at the floor debate summarizes the impact of other concurrent issues. The fact that governmental concern was focused elsewhere was demonstrated by the length of the debate. The debate on both the peace treaty and the three security treaties lasted for only parts of five days, while the debates on the North Atlantic Treaty and on Greco-Turkish aid in 1947 lasted 12 and 14 days, respectively. Also, much of the criticism expressed by treaty opponents was actually criticism of the Truman
administration, its actors, or of other long-standing concerns. For example, two opponents of the treaty said the following:

Senator Jenner - Mr. Dulles flitted about like a dusty moth and came up with "settlements" of all the problems that vexed him or the State Department...I believe he is the man who recommended Alger Hiss for a job on the International Peace Foundation...I think all Senators know Mr. Dulles, the Wall Street Lawyer.

Senator Capehart - I say that the test of leadership is keeping people out of trouble, not getting them into trouble. The leadership which now asks us to put our stamp of approval on the treaty is the same leadership that has given us the $260,000,000,000 debt and two wars in 6 years' time. It has given us the United Nations and all these other schemes. (quoted in Cohen, 1957:172-174).

Finally, Truman's unpopularity in Congress made it essential for someone other than himself or Secretary of State Acheson to handle the treaty. Congressional-executive relations were in a sorry state. The State Department's integrity was questioned when McCarthy alleged it was filled with communists. For his part, Truman was a lame-duck president in charge of an increasingly unpopular war in Korea. Truman augmented his unpopularity by firing General MacArthur. Many members of Congress denounced this action, and some called for Truman's impeachment (Nathan and Oliver, 1976:174-5). As a result, the administration's relations with Congress were severely strained.

In summary, the failure of the Treaty of Versailles cautioned Dulles to work very hard to get early Senate approval of the peace agreement. Therefore, throughout the sequential period, Dulles tried not only to keep key senators informed but also to make them active participants in the treaty-making process. In addition, concurrent events made the treaty ratification noncontroversial. The Korean War and domestic politics dominated the news and diverted public attention away from the Japanese peace treaty, as did the disassociation of Truman and Acheson from it.
III. Issue Area

This case fell into the status area. Intangible values were repeatedly expressed in regard to the peace treaty. Treaty supporters pointed to the need to formalize our relations with Japan on a firm foundation. This goal was seen as even more crucial following the North Korean invasion. Treaty opponents also used intangible value arguments, such as the "China question," the role of the U.N., and the weakness, in their view, of the Truman administration and its personnel. Since no money was required to advance these goals, the intangible/intangible mix of ends and means indicated that this was a status case.

IV. Party Leaders' Preferences

The preferences of the political parties, as determined by their leaders, were positive to the administration's draft of the peace treaty. Cohen (1957:195) notes that almost all Senate Democrats were solidly behind the administration's peace treaty. The crucial party role would be that of the Republicans, since they were making foreign policy a major battleground of the forthcoming presidential campaign. The Republican party role was complicated by the fact that there was no Minority Leader at this time. Therefore Dulles, himself a prominent Republican, sought to enlist the support of other prominent Republicans. General MacArthur's warm approval of the treaty did much to allay the fears of many Republicans. Dulles also got the backing of Senator Eugene Millikan (R-Colo.). Senator Robert Taft (R-Ohio) was particularly wooed by Dulles since he was chairman of the Republican Policy Committee and a presidential aspirant. He supported the treaty, although not wholeheartedly.
The key to Republican support for the peace treaty was the fact that Dulles had built many Republican viewpoints into it. For example, the anxiety over the "China question," which particularly bothered Senator William Knowland (R-Cal.), was relieved due to the publication of the Yoshida letter. The Yalta attack on the Senate floor was preempted by the Watkins reservation adopted by the Foreign Relations Committee. Finally, the endorsement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was put in the preamble of the treaty. Man conservatives, such as Senator John Bricker (R-Ohio), strongly opposed the declaration since they felt it would supercede the Bill of Rights and cause the U.S. to lose its sovereignty. Putting it in the preamble kept it from being part of the treaty text.

The result of Dulles' work was a positive stance by the Democrats and a generally positive stance by many important Republicans. Since both parties' preferences were favorable, the party leaders' preferences variable was coded as positive to the administration's position.

V. Committee Leaders' Preferences

Committee leaders' preferences were also positive in this case. The Foreign Relations Committee, and particularly its Far Eastern Subcommittee, handled the treaty in the Senate. Cohen (1957:147) notes that the entire membership of the Foreign Relations Committee was solidly behind the peace treaty. They believed that the treaty was urgently needed both to face the communist threat in the Far East and to end the occupation of Japan.
Throughout the negotiations process, Dulles sought to win the support of the committee. As noted earlier, he met with the Far Eastern Subcommittee nine times and the full committee once during the negotiations. These were not merely briefing sessions. The senators could, and did, make suggestions that were incorporated as negotiating positions. Further, both Chairman Connally and ranking minority member Wiley of the full committee, as well as the entire membership of the subcommittee, were members of the U.S. delegation to the signing ceremony in San Francisco. Senator Sparkman, due to Connally's illness, was one of the treaty's signers. Dulles also took Senators Sparkman and Smith to Japan on the trip which resulted in the Yoshida letter. Dulles' efforts paid off. Sparkman and Smith accounted for over 40% of the testimony at the committee hearings. After the committee passed the treaty unanimously and Senators Connally and Wiley introduced the measure on the floor, Sparkman and Smith led the floor debate. Thus, both Democrats and Republicans on the committee were positive to the administration's treaty draft.

VI. Constituency Pressures

Despite a low level of awareness by the general public, constituency pressures were also positive here. In terms of public opinion, an NORC poll in October 1951 reported that 52% of the public felt it was a "good treaty," 3% felt it was poor, 16% had no opinion, and 29% had not heard of it. Another NORC poll in March 1952, the month of the Senate debate, asked people what "good things" the U.S. had done in postwar foreign policy. While 45% mentioned foreign economic aid, only 8% referred to postwar Japanese policy. The mass public simply did not care about the treaty.
Concurrent events diverted the public's attention. The fact that a low-visibility actor like Dulles handled the treaty further dampened public awareness of the treaty.

However, many interest groups testified or made statements at the hearings. Large, broad-based organizations strongly supported the treaty. These included the:

1. National Association of Manufacturers,
2. National Chamber of Commerce,
3. A.F. of L.,
4. C.I.O.,
5. Americans for Democratic Action,
6. National Council of the Churches of Christ,
7. American Legion, and the
8. American Veterans Committee.

Other groups were generally positive to the treaty (as revealed in their statements or actions). These groups included the:

1. Methodist Church,
2. United Lutheran Church,
3. League of Women Voters,
4. General Federation of Women's Clubs,
5. National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs,
6. American Association of University Women,
7. Japanese American Citizens League, and the

The organizations which opposed the treaty were of mixed types. Some economic/business actors opposed it because they feared Japanese competition. These groups included the Intra-Industry Marine Committee, the Pacific Fisheries Conference (although they later supported it once the State Department agreed to get the North Pacific Fisheries Convention negotiated\(^5\)), and the Domestic Sewing Machine Company of New York.
A number of domestic actors opposed the treaty because they did not want Japan to rearm. These included the:

1. American Baptist Convention,
2. Fellowship of Reconciliation,
3. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom,
4. Friends Committee on National Legislation, and the
5. American Peace Crusade.

Other groups opposed the treaty because they felt it did not go far enough. They either did not feel the treaty was sufficiently anti-communist, desired Nationalist China as a signatory, or opposed both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Court of Justice. Such opposing groups included the National Economic Council, the Seattle Chinese Benevolent Association, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and the Women's Patriotic Conference of National Defense.

Cohen (1957:64) contrasts the treaty's supporters with its opponents. He argues that, with the exception of the V.F.W., the opponents were from the political fringes. The far left did not like the treaty because it went too far while the right-wingers said it did not go far enough. Thus, the opposition was based more on ideological grounds than on the peace treaty in-and-of-itself. According to the coding rules, since the interest groups which strongly favored the treaty were large and nationally-based (and thus were more "legitimate"), their preferences were coded. As such, constituency pressures were positive.

VII. Presidential Involvement

The level of presidential involvement in this case was substandard. Truman's association with the treaty was minimal. In order to get broad bipartisan support for the treaty, Truman pulled both himself and
Secretary Acheson out of the picture; he turned the job of guiding the treaty from negotiation through ratification to John Foster Dulles, a Republican foreign policy expert.

VIII. Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior

The congressional output in this case was no modification of the administration's position. The only change imposed by the Senate was the Watkins reservation. In adding that reservation, the Foreign Relations Committee membership stressed that it was not any change in the treaty itself and was merely explanatory in nature. All reservation attempts which would have changed the treaty draft were defeated.

Propositions

To recap the variable measures, this case fell into the status area. Party leaders' preferences, committee leaders' preferences, and constituency pressures were positive. The level of presidential involvement was substandard. Finally, the congressional output was a no modification behavior.

Three propositions were explored here. Both the status proposition (1.1) and the no modification proposition (2.2) were supported. However, the status/poor relationship proposition (1.1A) was not. It says:

In status cases in which executive branch-congressional relations are poor, the probability of initiative behaviors increases.

There is no doubt that inter-branch relations were poor at this time. The lengthening Korean War was making Truman less and less popular with the public. Moreover, members of Congress attacked Truman or members of his administration on two specific fronts. At this time conservatives led by
Senator McCarthy were probing the State Department for the hundreds of communists McCarthy claimed were there. Also, Truman incited Congress by firing General MacArthur. Knowing that his relations with Congress were poor, Truman turned the handling of the treaty over to someone safe, Dulles. By removing himself and the State Department as serious issues in the treaty debate, Truman was able to get a no modification response in spite of his poor relations with Congress. Thus, the fact that this proposition is not supported is understandable in the context of Truman's strategy in the case.

**Significant Aspects**

Poor executive-congressional relations, revealed in the concurrent context, strongly shaped this case. Realizing his low standing with Congress, Truman withdrew from the process by turning the negotiations with Japan and lobbying of the Senate over to John Foster Dulles.

The actions by Dulles in the sequential period helped to assure the Senate's approval of the treaty. By carefully courting both Democrats and Republicans and by working closely with the Foreign Relations Committee and its Far Eastern Subcommittee, he made it very difficult for them to oppose the treaty. By making members of the Foreign Relations Committee delegates to the San Francisco Conference, he further insured that they would work hard for the treaty's ratification since it had become, publicly as well as privately, their responsibility. The decision by Truman to withdraw from the process as well as Dulles' skillful efforts made a no modification outcome much more likely.
1 Unless otherwise specified, the research for this case comes from Cohen (1957).

2 Cohen (1957:23) speculates that the delay between the end of the committee hearing and the start of the floor debate was due to concerns voiced by General Omar Bradley at the hearings. Bradley was afraid that if the peace treaty was ratified before the Administrative Agreement was signed (which regulated the status and activities of American forces in Japan), the U.S. war effort in Korea might be harmed. Although Dulles disagreed with Bradley's fears, the Senate floor debate was not scheduled until after the Administrative Agreement had been signed on February 28.

3 For a list of party leaders, see Congressional Directory (1952:285).

4 For a list of committee members, see Congressional Directory (1952:196).

5 For more details on the Fisheries Convention, see Cohen (1957:253-278).
CHAPTER V

The Spanish Bases Agreement, 1953

On September 26, 1953, the governments of Spain and the U.S. signed an agreement in which Spain provided military bases for American armed forces in return for economic and military aid. This agreement marked a formal shift in American policy toward Spain and was the result of a series of actions in which members of Congress pressured President Truman to act in directions he fundamentally opposed.

The first shot in the congressional campaign against the administration's policy of ignoring Franco's Spain came in 1948. In March of that year, Representative Alvin O'Konski (R-Wis.) introduced a floor amendment to the Economic Cooperation Act. The amendment made Spain a recipient of Marshall Plan aid, and it passed by a vote of 149-52. The later conference committee deleted that amendment, but the fight to change the administration's policy was on.

Senator Pat McCarran (D-Nev.) was not willing to let the administration's anti-Franco position stand unchallenged. On April 27, 1950, he led a movement, supported by 35 other senators, to include Spain in the Marshall Plan with a $50 million loan. However before the Senate acted on the loan, the Korean War erupted. McCarran increased the loan to $100 million. The loan then passed on August 1, 1950 by a vote of 65-15.
Even though Truman denounced the loan, a motion to reconsider it failed and the loan went with the General Appropriations bill to the House-Senate conference committee. There the conferees agreed to the loan but reduced it to $62.5 million. Truman signed the bill on September 6.

To this point, one of the immediate obstacles to closer American-Spanish relations had been a U.N. ban on ambassadors to Spain. The General Assembly repealed the ban on October 31, and many officials in the Truman administration began to press for closer relations. Such officials from the State Department included William Durham from the Spanish desk and George Kennan, Chief of the Policy Planning Staff. From the Defense Department came James Wilson from the Office of International Security Affairs; John Floberg, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy; Naval Secretary Francis Matthews; General Vandenberg, the Air Force Chief of Staff; and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Sherman. The N.S.C. staff contributed Frank Nash and Paul Nitze to the ranks of the in-house dissenters.

These dissenters saw no alternative to the Franco regime in Spain, and they felt that the U.S. government would have to adjust to that fact. Once the ban was repealed and Secretary of State Acheson was convinced that an ambassador needed to be sent, only Truman stood in the way. At a November 2, 1950 press conference, Truman asserted that it would be a "long, long time" before the U.S. sent an ambassador to Spain. The dissenters increased their pressure on him, and on December 27, Truman announced that Stanton Griffis had been chosen as the new ambassador to Spain. Truman was quick to add, however, that sending an ambassador did not mean the government's policy toward Spain was changing.

Nevertheless, some members of Congress wanted a change in policy. If
Truman wanted a *quid pro quo* in return for giving Spain the loan funds Congress had appropriated, Senators McCarran, Harry Cain (R-Wash.) and Styles Bridges (R-N.H.) said U.S. military bases in Spain would fit the need. Further, the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, in their 1951 joint report concerning the Assignment of Ground Forces to Europe, called for the U.S. to more fully utilize both Spain's military and its resources. Such resources presumably included the geographical requirements for military bases.

Due to the prompting given by members of Congress, military officers were able to push harder for a change of policy. One of these advocates was Admiral Sherman. At the end of a July 1951 trip to Spain by Sherman, Truman announced that U.S. policy toward Spain had changed. This change, Truman said, was due to pressure from the Defense Department.

Negotiations on a military base agreement began on March 12, 1952. Congress kept the pressure on the administration by appropriating $100 million for a loan to Spain as part of the Mutual Security Act of 1951. Members of Congress also included Spain in the Mutual Security Act of 1952 by authorizing a $25 million loan. Finally, on September 26, 1953 the Spanish bases agreement was signed. In return for air and naval bases, the U.S. would provide Spain with $141 million for military aid and $85 million for defense support. Thus the goal of getting Spanish bases, for which members of Congress had pushed since 1948, had been achieved.
ANALYSIS

I. Stimulus

This case began in 1948 with the creation of the "Spanish lobby." The Franco regime realized that it desperately needed American aid. Spain's economic problems had begun during its civil war, and the average Spanish worker was twice as poor in 1948 as he had been in 1939. The Spanish government sent to Washington an experienced diplomat, Senor Don Jose Felix de Lequerica, to spearhead the fight for a change in policy. He hired Charles Patrick Clark to represent Spain's interests. Clark had extensive Washington experience, and he was able to mobilize support from different people for different reasons. He created the "Spanish lobby" which was made up of four separate but overlapping groups of actors. These included:

1. the Catholic group - made up of Senators McCarran, Joseph McCarthy (R-Wis.), Representatives O'Konski, Eugene Keogh (D-N.Y.), and others,
2. the extreme anti-communist group - made up of McCarthy and others from the Catholic group,
3. the pro-Spanish bases group - made up of Admirals Conolly, Cassady, Gardner, and Naval Secretaries Sullivan and Matthews,
4. the anti-Truman group - made up of Senators Robert Taft (R-Ohio), Bridges, Owen Brewster (R-Me.), Kenneth McKellar (D-Tenn.), and others.
II. Contextual Filter

A. Historical Context

The history of the Franco regime figured prominently in the American position on aid to Spain. Although other Western European countries had U.S. military bases and received American aid, the fascist background of the Franco regime prevented it from receiving aid for years. President Roosevelt summarized the American position toward Spain by describing Franco's regime as a fascist dictatorship which was more akin to Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy than to the democracies of the free world. Not only did Truman endorse Roosevelt's policy, but he also respected the fears of America's NATO allies who distrusted Franco and wanted Spain kept out of Western European military planning.

B. Sequential Context

Since Truman was unalterably opposed to any dealings with the Franco regime, he welcomed the U.N. ban on ambassadors to Spain. However, a number of factors were coalescing in favor of closer Spanish-American relations. First, in the 1948-1951 period, the primary focus of American foreign policy was changing from one of European economic recovery to the military containment of communism. Truman's own "doctrine" announced in 1947 signalled this shift in policy (Bailey, 1974:796).

This policy shift escalated the importance of military needs. The Navy was enthusiastic about Spanish naval bases from the start. The British had naval bases in Gibraltar, Malta, and Egypt. If the U.S. Navy was to compete with the British in the Mediterranean, it too had to have bases of its own. With this in mind, Navy personnel began pushing for Spanish bases. Admiral Richard Conolly, Commander of U.S. Naval Forces
in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, asked repeatedly between 1947
and 1949 to be allowed to let the fleet make courtesy calls on Spanish
ports. Truman finally relented, and during the September 3-8, 1949, stop
at El Ferrol, Conolly met informally with Franco. The Conolly delegation
included four other admirals; Major General Robert Harper; Air Force Brig-
adier General William Ritchie; and the U.S. Naval Attache in Madrid, Captain
Preston Mercer. Mercer had previously been openly critical of U.S. policy
toward Spain. When Conolly returned from Spain, he reported to Truman that
Franco was ready to cooperate with the U.S. and its allies. Also, in
testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, he argued for the
necessity of naval bases in Spain and stressed Spain's strategic location.

Admiral Sherman, who became Chief of Naval Operations in November
1949, also asked to visit Spain. Admirals Cassady, Carney, and Gardner of
the Sixth Fleet supported his request. The request was denied, but a
second one in 1950 was permitted, but only if Sherman went in civilian
attire on an "unofficial" basis. Sherman's pressure on Truman, along with
the fact that he convinced General Omar Bradley (Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs) that Spanish bases were needed, resulted in Truman consenting to
Sherman's 1951 trip to Spain.

By 1949, the Air Force had also begun pushing for bases in Spain. In
January 1949, Major General William Tunner, who had headed the Berlin air-
lift, made a little-publicized trip to Madrid. After he left there, he met
with Spanish Air Force officials in Wiesbaden. This trip laid the ground-
work for the Air Force's change of strategy regarding Spain. Although
previously the Air Force had been unconcerned about Spain, the situation
had changed by 1949. The basic strategy of relying on RAF bases in
Britain seemed questionable. The use of Spanish bases seemed to offer: 1) better containment of the Soviets, 2) better dispersion of U.S. aircraft, 3) better protection of Europe's flank, and 4) better protection of the Middle East. Although Air Force Secretary Finletter opposed the use of Spanish bases, General Tunner, Air Force Chief of Staff General Vandenberg and others were in favor of the bases.

Military dissatisfaction with the administration's policy would probably not have been forceful enough to change Truman's mind had it not been for the covert and overt aid given by members of Congress. Covert aid was provided mainly by McCarran. Shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War, he called a secret meeting in his office. At the meeting were a number of senators and military personnel who McCarran later refused to name. He opened the meeting by announcing that he planned to escalate his $50 million Spanish loan proposal to $100 million. His future plans were to make Spain a NATO ally and to give the Spanish enough military aid to transform their army into one of the leading military forces in Europe.

The meeting served two purposes. First, McCarran used the military officers to convince the senators of the need for the bases. Second, he encouraged the military opponents of the administration to organize and come out into the open.

McCarran also supported the military's view by attacking the military's opponents in the State Department. He called another meeting in his office in May 1951. Present were Carlisle Humelsine, Deputy Undersecretary of State; Herbert Gaston, Chairman of the Board of the Export-Import Bank; Paul Porter of the Economic Cooperation Administration; and William Durham. In front of Ambassador Lequerica, McCarran castigated the
officials for the weaknesses of the administration's Spanish policy, and he criticized the fact that Spaniards had seen very little of the $62.5 million loan passed the year before. Although his breach of protocol was later denounced in the press, McCarran effectively put those officials on notice as to which direction the wind was blowing on Capitol Hill.

Members of Congress provided overt aid to the military dissidents in two different ways. The first method was the use of the congressional junket. This process started with the September, 1948 trip to Madrid by Senator Chan Gurney (R-S.D.), the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee. After a private meeting with Franco, Gurney told the press that he favored a resumption of normal diplomatic relations with Spain. Moreover, on his return home Gurney pressed his views in private meetings with Secretary of Defense Forrestal, Army Secretary Royall, Navy Secretary Sullivan, and Air Force Secretary Symington.

The fall of 1949 saw a parade of administration opponents taking trips to Madrid. As usual, McCarran led the way. He left on September 14 to discuss his loan with Franco. The next day Truman announced that McCarran was going as a private citizen and certainly did not represent the administration.

Two delegations went to Spain in October. Representative James Murphy (D-N.Y.) led one. After his meeting with Franco, Murphy described him as a "very, very lovely and lovable character" (Lowi, 1963:679). The other delegation was led by Senator Brewster and included Representatives James Richards (D-S.C.), Keogh, Noble Gregory (D-Ky.), and W.R. Poage (D-Tex.).

On November 1, a Senate delegation went to Europe for what was to be
a five-week trip. Spain was on their itinerary. Included on the tour were Senators Dennis Chavez (D-N.M.), John Stennis (D-Miss.), Edward Thye (R-Minn.), Elmer Thomas (D-Okla.), Willis Robertson (D-Va.), and John McClellan (D-Ark.). When they returned, the group announced that diplomatic relations should be resumed and economic aid should be given to Spain.

After these four trips by administration opponents, a group of loyalists from the House Foreign Affairs Committee went to Spain in December. After the trip, a report was issued by Representative Joseph Pfeifer (D-N.Y.). Pfeifer said that any improvement in Spanish-American relations was up to the Spanish people. Further, he said that Spanish officials had been listening to certain members of Congress too much and no individual member could speak for the entire membership. His remarks were supported by Representatives Thomas Gordon (D-Ill.) and Clement Zablocki (D-Wis.).

The Pfeifer trip notwithstanding, these congressional junkets provided public statements critical to the administration policy and supportive of the military's desire for Spanish bases. The other overt method of keeping the military issue on the political agenda was the use of congressional hearings. At such hearings, military officers were asked if, in their military opinion, the U.S. defense posture would be enhanced by having bases in Spain. The answers were uniformly "yes."

In terms of sequential context, members of Congress sought out administrative actors who disagreed with the President's rejection of a closer relationship with Spain. Moreover, these congressmen gave these actors a forum from which to speak. Finally, by continually traveling to
Spain they kept Spanish aid and Spanish bases on the political agenda despite the administration's inaction on the issue.

C. Concurrent Context

A number of other factors contributed to the ultimate change in governmental policy. Although Truman may not have fully shared it, a change was taking place at this time on the domestic political front. Anti-communism was replacing anti-totalitarianism as the hottest issue of the day. Thus to many congressmen, Franco looked like a good ally; he may have been a dictator but he was undoubtedly anti-communist. Moreover, international communist expansion looked more threatening after the "fall" of China, the detonation of the Soviet atomic bomb, and the Korean invasion. These actions appeared provocative, and the perceived need for anti-communist allies was heightened.

However, some administration actors were still strongly opposed to Spain due to the basic totalitarian nature of the regime. Truman felt this way until the end. Acheson shared this opinion until late in 1950. Further, both these men cared about the reaction of the other NATO leaders toward Franco. Those men did not trust the Spanish regime and Truman felt that their wishes should be respected.

Religion was another factor that colored some people's view of either Franco or Spain. Many American Catholics saw Spain in a very sympathetic light since they saw it as a great Catholic nation. However, reports of religious persecution in Spain concerned some American Protestants and Jews. Clark, the leader of the Spanish lobby, worked hard to rebut this charge. He went to Spain in September and October 1949. In a report on
his trip to Truman, Clark indicated he had found no evidence of the persecution of Protestants or Jews. Moreover, Clark cited the report of Max Klein who had been President of the American Chamber of Commerce in Spain for 27 years. Klein said he had not seen any religious persecution in Spain. Many congressmen relied on the findings of Clark and Klein to dispel the rumors of such persecution. However, Truman was not convinced. He told Stanton Griffis, just prior to the announcement of Griffis' ambassadorial appointment in 1950, that Baptists, like himself, were persecuted in Spain.

A final factor that figured prominently in this case was that some congressmen simply did not like Truman or his administration. Thus, if Truman was against Spanish bases, they were for them. Included in this group were Senators Taft, McKellar, Brewster, and Bridges. Two particularly damaging incidents to the administration were the allegations of communist infiltration of the State Department and the firing of General MacArthur. Such matters did not warm the hearts of many congressmen.

Overall, concurrent factors favored the establishment of Spanish bases. The domestic fear of communism made Franco look like a reliable ally since many in Congress saw Spain as "the most zealous anti-Communist nation in Europe" (Lowi, 1963:676). Further, the "fall" of China, the detonation of the Soviet atomic bomb, and the invasion of Korea made America's fear of communism seem realized. NSC-68, which circulated around Washington at this time, proposed that the U.S. rearm itself and increase the Free World's security to meet the Soviet challenge. Thus to many people, American bases in Spain seemed to be a sound bet, especially if Truman did not want them. Further, many Catholics wanted closer U.S.-Spanish relations,
and the Clark-Klein reports went a long way toward convincing many Protestants and Jews that their brethren were protected in Spain. These factors in combination outweighed the repugnance felt by the president, and some others, at the prospect of dealing with Franco. They also outweighed the objections of America's allies who opposed coordinating European security policy with Spain.

III. Issue Area

This case fell into the nonhuman resources area. Members of Congress wanted U.S. air fields and naval bases in Spain. Due to the weakness of the Spanish economy, foreign aid was seen as the means to get these bases. Such a tangible/tangible mix of ends and means made this a nonhuman resources case.

IV. Party Leaders' Preferences

Party leaders' preferences here were negative to the administration's position. The Democratic leadership in Congress had neutral preferences in this case. The only report of any activity on their part in the House concerned the passage of the original $62.5 million loan in 1950. When President Truman strongly urged the full funding of the Point Four program, on whose "coattails" the Spanish loan rode, Majority Leader John McCormack (D-Mass.) did not read Truman's appeal aloud. He merely inserted it into the record. When considering the same loan in the Senate, the Democratic leaders conceded defeat. In defending his decision not to fight against the Spanish loan, Majority Leader Scott Lucas (D-Ill.) said the leadership was beaten and had to admit it.
Although none of the House Republican leadership came out strongly against the administration's policy, some Republicans on the Senate side did. As indicated earlier, both Floor Leaders Taft and Bridges wanted to see American bases in Spain primarily because the president was opposed to them. Republican Whip Leverett Saltonstall (R-Mass.) and Floor Leader Kenneth Wherry (R-Neb.) opposed the administration's position. Their comments indicated that they were very concerned about European security and felt Spain's resources could enhance that security. Since the only strongly-held party positions were the negative feelings expressed by members of the Senate Republican leadership, the party leaders' preferences variable was coded as negative.

V. Committee Leaders' Preferences

Committee leaders' preferences were negative to the administration's position. This case stretched over five years, and thus a number of congressional committees were involved. These included both Appropriations Committees, both Armed Services Committees, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee.\(^4\)

In May 1949, the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee for the State, Justice, and Commerce Departments and the Judiciary began the process of dealing with Spanish aid. When Secretary Acheson appeared to defend State's budget, he was placed in the position of having to justify and defend the administration's Spanish policy. Those committee members strongly opposed to the administration's Spanish policy were Chairman McCarran, McKellar, McClellan, Robertson, Saltonstall, Bridges, Wherry, and Gurney. No preferences were expressed in the public record by the remaining members. Thus, the committee preferences for this Subcommittee
were coded as negative.

In October 1949, the House Armed Services Committee got slightly involved in this case when it heard Admiral Conolly's report on his trip to Spain. The public record contained no statements by the committee's members which endorsed or opposed a policy change. Therefore, this committee's preferences were coded as neutral.

In 1950, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved first the $50 million loan to Spain and later, upon McCarran's urging, raised the amount to $100 million. The public record did not contain any statements by committee members which supported the President's policy toward Spain. On the other hand, ten of the twenty committee members were critical of the President's position. These members included Chairman McKellar, Thomas, Richard Russell (D-Ga.), McCarran, Chavez, McClellan, Bridges, Gurney, Wherry, and Saltonstall. Thus, this committee's preferences were coded as negative.

In 1951, three committees dealt with the administration's Spanish policy. In the Senate, the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees met together to investigate and make recommendations concerning the assignment of American troops to Europe. Again, the public record contained only negative statements or actions by members of the Armed Services Committee. These members were Chairman Russell, Stennis, Bridges, Saltonstall, and Cain. Therefore, this committee's preferences were coded as negative. Only two members from Foreign Relations expressed themselves publicly in this case. Connally was positive to the administration's position while Brewster was negative to it. Since the chairman's response was positive, the committee's preferences were coded as
positive.

The third committee to deal with this issue in 1951 was the Senate Appropriations Committee. In funding the Mutual Security Act of 1951, the committee added another $100 million loan to Spain, and the loan survived the conference committee. Again, no pro-administration voices were heard on the committee but ten critics were found. Those negative to the administration's coolness toward Spain were McKe1lar, Russell, McCarran, Chavez, McClellan, Bridges, Wherry, Saltonstall, Thye and McCarthy. Thus the committee's preferences were coded as negative.

In 1952, four committees became involved in the case. Perhaps realizing what the Senate Appropriations Committee might be planning to do again, the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees pre-empted any pro-Spanish move by adding a $25 million loan to Spain to the Mutual Security Act Authorization Bill. Only three members of the Foreign Affairs Committee expressed preferences in this case. Gordon and Zablocki were positive to the administration's policy toward Spain. However, Chairman Richards had strongly opposed the administration's stand on Spain since his trip to Madrid in 1949. Due to his strong stance, the coding rules dictated that the committee's preferences be coded as negative to the administration's position.

The membership of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1952 had not changed from the previous year (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1952: 27). Again only two members had revealed their preferences publicly. Chairman Connally was positive to the administration's original position and Brewster was opposed to it. Like in 1951, the committee's preferences were coded as positive.
Once these two committees had proposed the authorization of the extra $25 million Spanish loan, the two congressional Appropriations Committees provided the necessary cash. The public record contained no preference statements by the representatives. Therefore, the preferences of the House Appropriations Committee were coded as neutral. The Senate Appropriations Committee still had ten strongly negative voices (McKellar, Russell, McCarran, Chavez, McClellan, Robertson, Bridges, Saltonstall, Thye, and McCarthy) and no strongly positive ones. Accordingly, the committee's preferences were coded as negative to the original administration position.

In 1953, these same four committees again dealt with the Spanish bases issue. The new Eisenhower administration had concluded the bases agreement and had promised the Spanish military and economic aid. The foreign affairs committees authorized the aid package and the Appropriations Committees provided the money. The memberships of the committees looked somewhat different than the previous year since, in the 1952 general election, the Republicans had captured control of the Congress. On the Foreign Affairs Committee, Richards was strongly negative to the Truman administration's policy while Gordon and Zablocki were strongly positive to it. However, since the Republicans had taken control of the committee and representatives of the new Republican administration had signed the bases agreement, it is reasonable to assume that the Republican majority on the committee was negative to the Truman administration's opposition to such an agreement. Therefore, the committee's preferences were coded as negative. On the other hand, no members of the Foreign Relations Committee expressed preferences regarding the bases. Therefore, the committee's preferences were coded as neutral.
In terms of the Appropriations Committees, again the House members expressed no preferences and were coded as neutral. However among their counterparts, Senators Bridges, Saltonstall, Thye, McCarthy, Russell, McCarran, Chavez, McClellan, and Robertson opposed Truman's Spanish policy. Since no committee members expressed themselves publicly in favor of the previous administration's policy, the committee's preferences were coded as negative.

Over the total five year period of this case, congressional committees became involved with the questions of Spanish bases and U.S.-Spanish relations fourteen different times. Four times committees expressed neutral preferences while negative preferences were expressed eight times. Only two committees expressed positive ones. Therefore, the committee preferences variable was coded as negative to the administration's position. Moreover, the key committee role was played by the Senate Appropriations Committee. It was consistently loaded with critics of the Truman administration's policy toward Spain. Further, these senators used their committee's power to keep the Spanish bases issue a current one on the political agenda. They appropriated money for Spain which was opposed by the administration, and they used their committee hearings to press administrative spokesman for a change in policy. Thus their role in this case should not be underestimated.

VI. Constituency Pressures

Constituency pressures were negative to the administration's position on the issue of Spanish bases. No mention was made in the public record of the general public's reaction to the question of Spanish bases.
However, interest group activity was prevalent and unidirectional in its criticism of the administration's Spanish policy. This interest group activity was spearheaded by Clark in his role as the organizer of the Spanish lobby. The purpose of his efforts was to change the administration's policy toward Spain, and he was active in that regard. However, the most important interest group in this case was made up of military officers. To Senators McCarran, McCarthy, Cain, Representative Richards, and others who were concerned about American security, these military officers became "constituents" who were treated as any others would be who had complaints about government policy. The military officers sharply critical of the American policy toward Spain included those from the Navy - Admirals Cassady, Conolly, Gardner, Sherman and Captain Mercer; those from the Air Force - Generals Ritchie, Tunner, and Vandenberg; and General Bradley from the Army. These men wanted a change in administration policy and members of Congress were eager to champion their cause. Thus due to the efforts of the military and of the Spanish lobby, constituency pressures were negative.

VII. Presidential Involvement

The level of presidential involvement was unequivocally standard in this case. Truman was fundamentally and ideologically opposed to dealing with Franco, and this case, in essence, was the story of those who pressured him to change his mind. Truman made a number of public and private statements indicating his opposition to dealings with the Franco regime. In November 1949, he argued that Spain should not get Marshall Plan aid since U.S.-Spanish relations were "not friendly"
(Lowi, 1963:677). When Congress passed the $62.5 million Spanish loan in 1950 Truman publicly denounced it. Truman also withheld his nomination of an ambassador to Spain for as long as he could in 1950. Lowi (1963:691) summarized the situation in saying: "One factor which colors the entire Spanish story is the President's strong opposition to negotiations with Spain." Thus, Truman's strong personal stand against closer U.S.-Spanish relations caused his level of involvement to be coded as standard.

VIII. Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior

The Spanish bases agreement was a congressional initiative. Members of Congress decided in 1948 to try to overcome Truman's objections to closer relations with Spain and they were successful. However, they were greatly aided by actors in the Pentagon and, to a lesser extent, those in the State Department. These executive branch actors may have been able, in time, to get the administration's policy changed by themselves. Yet the process was speeded up by Congress. Again in Lowi's (1963:669) words:

Congress, led by Senator McCarran, brought the entire spectrum of political techniques successfully to bear on the Truman Administration. Large sums of money were voted gratuitously to Spain; strong public pronouncements were registered in favor of Generalissimo Franco and Spain; the spokesmen of the Administration were consistently badgered in public hearings; officers and civilian officials of all branches of the armed services were encouraged in hearings and meetings to publicize the tactical and strategic importance of Spain; and the issue was surcharged with the growing fears of the Communist threat. With the support of key members of the two houses of Congress, the Spanish issue was placed upon the political agenda and was kept there until action was taken.

Therefore, the action in this case was a congressional initiative.
Propositions

To recap the variable measures, the case fell into the nonhuman resources area. Party leaders' preferences, committee leaders' preferences, and constituency pressures were negative to the administration's position. The level of presidential involvement was standard and the output was a congressional initiative.

Six propositions were explored in this case. The party leaders (2.1), committee leaders (3.1), constituency pressures (4.1) and initiative (5.2) propositions were supported. However, the nonhuman resources (1.2) and the presidential involvement (5.1) propositions were not.

Proposition 1.2 says:

In nonhuman resource cases, the probability of resistance behaviors increases while the probabilities of no modification and initiative behaviors decrease.

The failure of this proposition to hold here goes back to the underlying assumption that in such cases, bargaining will occur. However, Truman refused to bargain at all. Therefore, members of Congress took it upon themselves to force a policy shift, and an initiative behavior resulted.

Proposition 5.1 states:

When the level of presidential involvement is standard, the probability of no modification behaviors increases while the probabilities of resistance and initiative behaviors decrease.

This proposition is based upon the "all things being equal" argument, but they were not equal here. By 1950, Truman was the lone hold-out in the face of an impending policy shift. By itself, his standard level of involvement could not overcome the negative party leaders' preferences, committee leaders' preferences, and constituency pressures.
**Significant Aspects**

The noteworthy aspects of this case were twofold. First, a group of congressmen, strongly committed to a policy shift, were able to prevail over their less-committed colleagues. Their congressional victories were aided by their location on crucial committees and in party leadership positions. Moreover, these individuals were able to mobilize executive branch actors to bring about a change in policy. Second, these individuals were sufficiently motivated to maintain their struggles for a long time. The process started in 1948 and ended five years later in 1953. Their efforts finally resulted in a successful initiative behavior and a new phase in Spanish-American relations.


1 Unless otherwise specified, the research for this case comes from Lowi (1963).

2 What Clark did not include in the report was that Klein himself was Catholic and not a Protestant or Jew.

3 For a list of party leaders, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1948:14; 1949:25; 1950:21; 1951:28; 1952:22; 1953:24).

4 For a complete listing of these committees' members, at each time point, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1949:31, 227; 1950: 193; 1951:195; 1952:27-29; 1953:33, 35-36). See also U.S. Senate (1951:ii).
In the early to mid-1950's, the anti-communist hysteria in the United States was in full-swing. When a communist threat was perceived in Central America, the Eisenhower administration reacted strongly. The popularly elected government in Guatemala, led by President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, was overthrown in a military coup organized by the CIA. Members of Congress supported this action by the executive branch.

Congressional support came via two separate mechanisms. The first was the passage of a concurrent resolution which condemned communist activities in the Western Hemisphere. Introduced on June 22, 1954 by Senate Minority Leader Lyndon Johnson (D-Tex.), the resolution declared congressional support for the Caracas Declaration of Solidarity, passed by the OAS on March 28 (New York Times, June 23, 1954:1). The Caracas Declaration had called on all American states to jointly act to oppose any communist expansion into the Western Hemisphere. After amending the concurrent resolution to emphasize the international scope of the communist threat, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously approved it on June 25, 1954. That same day, the full Senate passed the resolution by a vote of 60-1. Both the House Foreign Affairs Committee, by a unanimous vote, and the House floor, by a 372-0 roll call vote, approved the concurrent

The other mechanism, used to express support for the successful coup, was the hearings held by the Subcommittee on Latin America of the House Select Committee on Communist Aggression. Eleven witnesses testified before the subcommittee in September and October, 1954. All the witnesses emphasized the communist activity in Guatemala and said it had seriously threatened both Latin America and the U.S. Those who testified included Guatemalan President Carlos Castillo Armas, who spoke via tape recordings; Leo Carrillo, from the U.S. motion-picture industry; John Erwin, a former newspaperman from Chattanooga, Tennessee; Eugene Fuson, a reporter for the San Diego Union; Donald Jackson (R-Cal.); Raymond Leddy, chief of Central American and Panamanian Affairs, Department of State; Raul Midence, member of the Guatemalan National Committee of Defense Against Communism; William O'Dwyer, former American Ambassador to Mexico; Lionel Otero, General Secretary of the Guatemalan Anti-Communist Student Association; John Peurifoy, former U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala; and Mario Villtoro, a Guatemalan anti-communist student leader (U.S. House of Representatives, 1954).

The testimony of some of these individuals went beyond a mere denunciation of Guatemalan/Central American communism. Peurifoy stressed that, had Guatemala fallen to communists, both the Panama Canal and the Texas oil-fields would have been vulnerable to air attacks. Also, Peurifoy denied that he played any active role in the coup. According to Carrillo and Fuson, Latin America was a fertile breeding ground for communism due to the prevalent "anti-Yanqui" feelings there. Finally, Carrillo, Fuson, Castillo, and O'Dwyer endorsed the need for increased levels of American aid for

The purpose of the subcommittee's report was to document the gravity of the communist threat in Guatemala. As such, the report comprised both transcripts of the oral testimony and photographs which documented alleged communist atrocities and infiltration in Guatemala (U.S. House of Representatives, 1954).

Overall, the congressional activity in this case was totally supportive of the administration's position toward the Arevalo and Arbenz regimes. Johnson's concurrent resolution endorsed the Caracas Declaration upon which overt U.S. punitive actions toward Guatemala had been based, and the subcommittee hearings provided a forum for witnesses to "prove" the severity of the communist threat that had existed in Guatemala prior to the coup.
ANALYSIS

I. Stimulus

The stimulus for these congressional actions was the coup attempt started on June 18, 1954. The "invasion" by the rebels captured headlines and focused American attention on the events in Guatemala.

II. Contextual Filter

A. Historical Context

Both overt and covert American military interventions into the affairs of other countries had occurred before. President Wilson openly sent American military forces into Mexico in 1916-1917. Further, he sent American troops into Russia in 1918 as part of the Allied expedition to topple the new Bolshevik regime. These forces were withdrawn in 1920 (Bailey, 1974). In terms of covert actions, the CIA organized a successful coup attempt in Iran in August 1953. Leaders in the Eisenhower administration had decided that Iranian Premier Mohammed Mossadegh was a threat to Western oil shipments, and consequently he was deposed (Nathan and Oliver, 1976:215-216).

More specific to this case, however, was the past record of the U.S. in the Central American and Caribbean area. In the early part of this century, a number of countries were put in the position of being U.S. quasi-protectorates. These states were Cuba (1901-1934), the Dominican
Republic (1905-1941), Haiti (1914-1934), Nicaragua (1900-1910, 1912-1925, and 1926-1933), and Panama (1903-1936). Further, two countries, while not quasi-protectorates, were subjects of relatively brief American occupations. Honduras was occupied from 1924-1925 and the Mexican port of Vera Cruz was seized by U.S. forces in 1914 (Bailey, 1974:552).

Moreover, the way the problem was defined in this case led to another precedent. By defining the problem in Guatemala as one of "international Communism subverting a regime in the Western Hemisphere," the Monroe Doctrine became a factor. It legitimated a U.S. response to protect American republics from being colonized by a European power (Bailey, 1974:183).

B. Sequential Context

The sequential context in this case was dominated by the actual intervention itself. The intervention was the result of a serious deterioration in U.S.-Guatemalan relations which began in 1944. In October of that year, Guatemala's dictator, General Jorge Ubico, was removed from office. The new regime, led by President Juan Jose Arenal, was committed to a program of domestic reform. The primary target for reforms was the American-owned United Fruit Company, which was both the leading employer and the largest single landowner in the country. Arenal's government angered the company's leaders by abolishing forced labor on its banana plantations, by increasing the minimum wage to 26 cents a day, and by encouraging the creation of labor unions. Perhaps more important in Washington, however, was the fact that Arenal was not zealously anti-communist. While Guatemalan communists were not granted official status as a political party, they were permitted to freely expouse their political
ideas and beliefs.

By 1950, the American reaction to the Arevalo regime had grown more negative. In that year, U.S. Ambassador Richard Patterson denounced the Arevalo regime for its "persecution of American business" (Trice, 1971B:5). When Patterson was implicated in an unsuccessful coup attempt, he was expelled. Arevalo then lost what little support he might have still had in American business circles by proposing a new social security program which would have cost United Fruit approximately $200,000 a year. American reactions to these events in Guatemala took place in both the public and private sectors. In the public sector, Guatemala lost its U.S. military aid and the World Bank refused to give the country any more loans. Privately, both the W.R. Grace Company and Pan American Airways stopped promoting tourism in Guatemala.

If American policy-makers thought Arevalo was bad, his successor was worse. Jacobo Arbenz Guzman was elected President in 1951. He wanted to reduce the inequities in the land tenure system since two percent of the people held 70% of the land. In March 1953, Arbenz announced that the government was expropriating 234,000 acres of uncultivated land from United Fruit. Since its tax statements claimed the land was worth $600,000, United Fruit was entitled to a $600,000 payment for the land. Company officials were outraged and demanded a $15.8 million payment. When Arbenz refused to yield, company officials turned to Secretary of State Dulles. Dulles, who earlier in his career had served as general counsel for United Fruit, argued that according to international law the land was worth exactly $15.8 million and the company should be paid in full. Arbenz refused to pay the larger amount and further refused to submit the issue to
international arbitration as Dulles then suggested. To Arbenz the issue was domestic, not international.

Arbenz sealed his fate by granting communists full legal status as a political party on December 19, 1952 (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1954:286). The following year communists were invited to take part in the coalition government. Arbenz found them very useful since they represented an educated elite which was committed to domestic reforms. Moreover, they had created two mass unions, the National Confederation of Campesinos and the General Confederation of Workers, whose 300,000 members represented almost one-fourth of the adult male population. Arbenz relied heavily on these organizations for political support.

The covert American response to this perceived communist threat in Central America began to take shape after Ambassador Peurifoy was transferred from Greece to Guatemala in November 1953. Less than six weeks after his arrival, Peurifoy felt he had proof of Arbenz's pro-communist sympathies. Eisenhower later revealed a December 19, 1953 memorandum from Peurifoy in which Peurifoy told of a meeting between himself and Arbenz. However, Eisenhower did not publicly reveal the rest of the memo. In it, Peurifoy urged that the Arbenz regime be deposed and replaced with one more favorable to American interests. In January 1954, Peurifoy went to Washington and met with Dulles and Eisenhower. Their talks centered on how to put Peurifoy's recommendations into action.

The CIA began moving quickly. Agents approached Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, who was then in exile but was later to be popularly elected as President of Guatemala. Ydigoras refused to meet their terms and they contacted another exile, Carlos Castillo Armas. Castillo had been a
colonel in the Guatemalan army and was a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff School (Nathan and Oliver, 1976:218). He agreed to the CIA plan. He was to set up his base camp at Tegucigalpa, Honduras. From there he would lead his force of mercenaries into Guatemala when the time came. Air support would be provided by a rebel air force consisting of four P-47 fighters flown by CIA pilots and based at Managua International Airport in Nicaragua (Nathan and Oliver, 1976:218).

In the spring of 1954, the tempo of events increased. The State Department moved against Guatemala in March at the Tenth Inter-American Conference of the OAS in Caracas, Venezuela. The U.S.-sponsored Caracas Declaration was approved with only one dissenting vote, Guatemala's. Moreover, the Guatemalan government's alienation from its neighbors increased after a wave of labor strikes swept through Central America from March to May. The leaders of Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama claimed that Guatemalan communists had caused the strikes. Finally, on May 17, a shipment of 2000 tons of small arms from Czechoslovakia arrived in Guatemala. This communist arms deal was the result of an unofficial American embargo on Western arms sales to the Guatemalan regime. The embargo became official in June 1954 following the arrival of the Czech arms.

During the week prior to the invasion, Guatemalan officials attempted to set up a meeting between Peurifoy and Arbenz in order to reduce the tension between their respective governments. Peurifoy rejected the overture. On June 17, Castillo's forces were flown from Tegucigalpa to the border, and the next day the border was crossed (New York Times, June 18, 1954:7; June 19, 1954:1). The rebel army set up a base camp eight miles inside Guatemala, but the invasion soon reached a stalemate. The battle
shifted to the skies with Castillo's four P-47 fighters flying occasional strafing and bombing missions against Guatemala City. When two were shot down, Eisenhower approved the sale of two P-51 fighters to Nicaragua on June 20. These fighters then entered the conflict (Nathan and Oliver, 1976:218).

The stalemate was broken by Peurifoy. On or around June 25, he met secretly with Guatemalan military leaders. He convinced them that the only way to save the life of Arbenz was for them to take over the government and install a military junta led by a Colonel Diaz. This occurred on June 27. However, Diaz was not sufficiently anti-communist in Peurifoy's eyes (Nathan and Oliver, 1976:218) and he was deposed on June 28 in favor of Colonel Elfego Monzon. Peurifoy then met with Monzon and persuaded him to meet with Castillo in San Salvador. There, guided by Peurifoy, the two men reached an agreement. On July 8, 1954, a new junta was announced which was led by Guatemala's new President Carlos Castillo Armas.

Although many members of Congress may not have known the full extent of the American role in the coup, some certainly did. The Eisenhower administration took pains to keep key congressional leaders posted on the Guatemalan operation prior to the invasion, because both Eisenhower and Dulles knew that if the operation failed, they would need friends on Capitol Hill to defuse the opposition. Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations Thruston Morton was the primary contact man, and he met periodically with key senators to keep them up to date on the operation. Eisenhower himself met with legislative leaders on May 24, 1954 to inform them of the measures being planned in the wake of the Czech arms deal.
The important aspects of the sequential context in this case were twofold. First, the regime change in Guatemala, hailed in the press as an indigenous uprising, was secretly engineered by the U.S. government with the assistance of the governments of both Honduras and Nicaragua. Second, key members of Congress knew the true extent of the U.S. involvement. These congressmen privately supported the administration's plans to intervene. Once the coup attempt began, the congressional support was made public through Johnson's resolution supporting the Caracas Declaration. Moreover, once the regime change had been completed, congressional support was shown in the subcommittee hearings which "documented" the severity of the communist threat which had existed in the Arbenz regime.

C. Concurrent Context

The Guatemalan intervention was just one example of the anti-communist crusade which marked American policy, both at home and abroad, in the early 1950's. Domestically the crusade was led by Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-Wis.) whose influence was at its height when the early decisions for the Guatemala intervention were made.

External events also supported the "stop communism" movement. The "fall of China," the detonation of the Soviet atomic bomb, and the outbreak of the Korean War made the international system appear threatening. The perception that it was "us or them" dictated American policies such as intervention in the Korean conflict, aid to the French in Indochina, and military assistance to Turkey and Pakistan in February 1954. When viewed in the context of these other concurrent events, the American response to the perceived communist threat in Guatemala was practically inevitable. If communist expansion was not to be tolerated in Asia, Europe
or the Middle East, it was all the more unwelcome close to home.

III. Issue Area

This case fell into the territorial area. The goal expressed in this case was to rid the Western Hemisphere of communism. The presence of President Arbenz who appeared to many to be either a communist or a communist-sympathizer, the Guatemalan Labor/Communist Party, and leftist labor unions all served as tangible reminders of the communist threat. Photographs of Guatemalan officials standing on land "stolen" from United Fruit and the arrival of Czech arms further cemented the belief that communism was thriving in Guatemala.

However, the means chosen by Congress to express its support of the administration's policy toward Arbenz were intangible. Passage of a concurrent resolution and the holding of subcommittee hearings did not require the expenditure of new funds. Moreover, the cost of getting rid of Arbenz was of no concern to the Congress. Therefore this mix of a tangible goal with intangible means resulted in the placement of this case in the territorial issue area.

IV. Party Leaders' Preferences

Party leaders' preferences in this case were positive to the administration's position. Among the House leaders, both Speaker Joseph Martin (R-Mass.) and Minority Whip John McCormack (D-Mass.) criticized the activities in Guatemala prior to 1954. They charged that communism was threatening to take over the government there. On the House floor, they both praised the concurrent resolution (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1954:286; New York Times, June 26, 1954:3). They strongly approved of
the administration's policy there since:

1. they strongly supported the resolution,
2. the resolution strongly supported the Caracas Declaration, and
3. the administration had used the Declaration as a means of isolating Guatemala and legitimating future American actions toward the Arbenz regime.

Likewise, bipartisan support was found in the Senate. Minority Leader Johnson introduced the resolution by calling it "an unmistakable warning that we are determined to keep communism out of the Western Hemisphere" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1954:286). Majority Leader William Knowland (R-Cal.) endorsed the resolution on June 23 (New York Times, June 24, 1954:3). No party leaders publicly opposed the administration's actions, the concurrent resolution, or the later House hearings. Therefore, the party leaders' preferences variable was coded as positive.

V. Committee Leaders' Preferences

Committee leaders' preferences in this case were also positive to the administration's position. The first of three committees involved was the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Only three committee members expressed themselves publicly on the issue of Guatemalan communism. Chairman Alexander Wiley (R-Wis.) was one of the advocates of a very hard anticommunist line. As Trice (1971B:22) reports:

The Guatemalan charge d'affaires in Washington walked out on an after-dinner speech made by Senator Wiley, in which the Senator reacted to the arrival of the Czech arms shipment in Guatemala by declaring that it was "part of the master plan of world communism."

Senator Knowland had also strongly endorsed the concurrent resolution. The other member expressing himself was William Langer (R-N.D.). In
explaining his lone vote against the resolution, he argued that, when it came to anti-communism, he took a back seat to no one. However, he voted against the resolution because it had been passed too hurriedly (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1954:286; New York Times, June 29, 1954:6). Thus, the committee preferences were coded as positive to the administration’s position on Guatemala.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee also handled the concurrent resolution. The only public statements by its members came after the resolution had passed. In his October 14, 1954 testimony to the Latin American Subcommittee of the House Select Committee on Communist Aggression, Donald Jackson (R-Cal.) declared that communist forces were trying to overthrow all the governments in Latin America.

Like Jackson, Alvin Bentley (R-Mich.) was strongly opposed to communist activities in Latin America. In his statements as a member of the above subcommittee, Bentley painted the communists as a devious, insidious menace in Guatemala who were part of a larger, global threat. Since such feelings generally do not develop in a short period of time, they presumably were operative when the Foreign Affairs Committee met on the concurrent resolution. Since there were no other opinions expressed, this committee’s preferences were coded as positive to the administration’s position.

The last committee relevant here was the aforementioned Subcommittee on Latin America of the House Select Committee on Communist Aggression. Bentley’s strong stance against communism in Guatemala has already been noted. However, the feelings of Chairman Patrick Hillings (R-Cal.) were even more forceful. On May 20, 1954, he declared that the 2000 tons of
Czech arms were to be used against the Panama Canal, 750 miles to the south of Guatemala. Hillings summed up his feelings in his opening address at the start of the hearings:

The most inspiring event to all of us who have been concerned at the rapid spread of Moscow's influence during the past several years was the recent revolution led by President Carlos Castillo Armas in Guatemala. It is the first clear-cut victory for the West since the battle for Greece.


The third member of the subcommittee, Michael Feighan (D-Ohio), also expressed strong feelings when discussing communist activities. At one point he referred to the Soviet Union as the "Red Colonial Imperial Empire" (U.S. House of Representatives, 1954:32). Like Bentley and Hillings, Feighan was also positive to the administration's position. The preferences of this subcommittee were accordingly coded as positive. Since the preferences of all three committees were positive, the committee leaders' preferences variable was coded as positive for this case.

VI. Constituency Pressures

The constituency pressures in this case were also positive to the administration's position. This support came from general public opinion and especially from the news media. At this point in time, there was, as Trice (1971B:10) put it:

an almost total agreement between the decision-making elite and the American people concerning the existence and nature of a monolithic communist threat, and the duty of the American government to meet the challenges created by the threat.

In other words, general public opinion was poised, ready to support almost any venture associated with anti-communism. Further, United Fruit conducted a massive public relations campaign in the U.S. in order to activate the
American public. Through radio and newspaper spots, United Fruit pressed
home three themes: 1) its activities were good for Guatemala, 2) it de­
served the full $15.8 million for its land, and 3) the Arbenz regime was
gradually falling under communist control.

The nation's newspapers consistently supported the government's claim
that communism was advancing into the Western Hemisphere via Guatemala.
Paul Kennedy of the New York Times began reporting that a communist coup
was likely as soon as Arbenz was installed in office. Columnists such
as Arthur Krock emphasized that Guatemalan communism could spread like
wildfire over all of Central America. Finally, a New York Times editorial
on June 27, 1954 (Part IV:6) was indicative of the tenor of the times.
In supporting Johnson's concurrent resolution, the editorial blasted the
Soviet Union for attempting to establish a foothold in the Western
Hemisphere.

Overall, general public opinion, activated and heightened by both
United Fruit and the American news media, was sharply critical of communist
activity in Guatemala and favored action that would eradicate the problem.
Therefore, the constituency pressures variable was coded as positive to
the administration's position.

VII. Presidential Involvement

The level of presidential involvement in this case was standard.
Not only did Eisenhower direct Dulles and Morton to keep key congressmen
informed about the American response to Arbenz, but he also capped off this
legislative liaison effort with a May 24 meeting with legislative leaders
at which time the American response to the Czech arms shipment was discus­
sed. By meeting personally with members of Congress, he went beyond the
minimal role he could have played. Thus the presidential involvement variable was coded as standard.

VIII. Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior

The congressional output here was a no modification behavior. Both the concurrent resolution and the subcommittee hearings were totally supportive of the administration's policy toward the Arbenz regime. Moreover, the no modification nature of the output was revealed when the Foreign Relations Committee amended, at the request of the administration, the Johnson resolution to emphasize the "international" aspect of the communist threat.

Propositions

In summary, the case fell into the territorial area. Party leaders' preferences, committee leaders' preferences, and constituency pressures were positive to the administration's position. The level of presidential involvement was standard, and the congressional output was a no modification behavior.

With such variable values, two propositions were examined. Both the no modification (2.2) and presidential involvement (5.1) propositions were supported in this case.

Significant Aspects

The concurrent context in this case was of particular importance. The anti-communist feelings held by practically the entire American public not only guaranteed support for a regime change in Guatemala but also may have dictated American policy. The Eisenhower administration surely did
not want to be remembered as the administration that "allowed" communism
to flourish for the first time in the Western Hemisphere. Such a policy
stance may have been viewed as political suicide with the 1956 presi-
dential election yet to be faced.
CHAPTER VI NOTES

1Unless otherwise specified, the research for this case comes from Trice (1971B).

2For a list of party leaders at this time, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1954:14).

3For a list of its members, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1954:19).

4For a list of its members, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1954:22).

5For a list of its members, see U.S. House of Representatives (1954:ii, 1).
CHAPTER VII
The Formosa Resolution, 1955

In 1955, President Eisenhower asked for and received a congressional authorization which gave him free rein to deal with a conflict situation in Asia. He made his request in a January 24 message to Congress. He stressed that Chinese Communists had engaged in "a series of provocative political and military actions, establishing a pattern...the conquest of Formosa" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1955:277). In order to respond to the communist threat, Eisenhower asked for:

1. authorization to use American military forces to protect Formosa and the Pescadores Islands from attack,
2. authorization to extend the use of such American forces to any other territories in the immediate area if he deemed such territories necessary for the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores,
3. authorization to employ any "other measures" which he deemed appropriate for the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, and
4. for such authorization to remain in force until the President informed Congress that the "peace and security of the area is reasonably assured..." (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1955:277).

Thus Eisenhower asked for an open-ended authorization to do whatever he saw fit, for as long as he saw fit, in order to defend the Nationalist Chinese regime.

The resolution was sponsored in the House by the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, James Richards (D-S.C.) (U.S. House, 1956:14). His committee held hearings on the resolution on January 24. In executive session, the committee heard testimony from Secretary of State Dulles and
Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Later that day, the committee passed the resolution by a unanimous vote.

The next day, the resolution was debated on the House floor. Most of the dissent was based on the idea that the resolution was a pseudo-declaration of war. Those attacking the resolution on this basis were Representatives Arthur Winstead (D-Miss.), Chet Holifield (D-Cal.), Graham Barden (D-N.C.), and Clare Hoffman (R-Mich.). Another opponent, Sydney Yates (D-Ill.) argued that the House was acting too hastily. However, the resolution passed by a 410-3 roll call vote (Congressional Record, 1955: 659-683).

On the Senate side, the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees held joint hearings on January 24 and 25 (Congressional Record, 1955: 600-601). Dulles and the Joint Chiefs testified on the objectives of the resolution. On January 26, amendments by Estes Kefauver (D-Tenn.) and Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.) to limit the scope of the resolution were rejected by the committees. Later that day, the committees passed the resolution by a vote of 27-2.

The floor debate in the Senate commenced immediately following the bill's passage by the committees. The three days of debate saw a lively interchange as to what the resolution meant. One group of opponents criticized the resolution which, they argued, called for preventative war on the part of the U.S. Others objected to the resolution's wide geographic scope. However, on January 28, the Senate passed the resolution by an 85-3 roll call vote (Congressional Record, 1955:735-769,813-852,920-995).

On January 29, Eisenhower signed the Formosa Resolution. He called it "a step to preserve peace in the Formosa area" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1955:280).
ANALYSIS

I. Stimulus

The stimulus for congressional action was Eisenhower's January 24, 1955 message. He asked for the resolution's passage in order to protect the National Chinese regime.

II. Contextual Filter

A. Historical Context

Although many members of Congress argued that the President's power as commander-in-chief gave him all the authority he needed to deal with the Formosa situation, precedents existed which might have played a role in Eisenhower's request. A strict interpretation of the Constitution reveals that, without getting prior congressional approval, actions taken by Eisenhower might have led him into murky legal waters. For example, after the American-French hostilities of 1798-1801, the Supreme Court ruled that only Congress could initiate hostilities, and the ruling applied to both general and limited war. Moreover, any presidential action which exceeded congressional authorization was illegal. As to a President's power as commander-in-chief, the members of the Constitutional Convention agreed that such a role was purely military. The object or goal of military actions was something for Congress to decide (Wormuth, 1975:94).
The more pressing political precedent for such action came, however, from the Truman administration. Some members of Congress had charged that Truman had acted too independently in reacting to the communist attack in Korea; Congress had been left out of the decision-making process in that case. Senator Margaret Chase Smith (R-Me.) brought up this point in the Senate debate on the resolution. She argued that the resolution's passage would preclude the after-the-fact criticisms that had plagued Truman on the Korean issue. Truman's experience only five years before may very well have led Eisenhower to force Congress to share with any political rewards or sanctions which could arise from military actions in the Formosa area.

B. Sequential Context

The problem of American policy toward the "two Chinas" had begun in 1949 when Chiang Kai-shek's forces retreated to the island of Formosa in order to escape the communist forces led by Mao Tse-tung. The conservative wing of the Republican party denounced the American policy which had "allowed" China to "fall" to the communists (Spanier, 1977:98).

Thereafter, the "pro-Chiang" contingent in Congress pushed for stronger guarantees of Formosa's pretension, since the Mao regime had consistently declared its policy to retake the island. The Eisenhower administration proved receptive to such requests. In 1953, Eisenhower ordered the Seventh Fleet, which had been patrolling the Formosa Straits since the outbreak of the Korean War, to confine its activities to the prevention of an invasion of Formosa. This order implicitly sanctioned Nationalist Chinese guerrilla attacks on the mainland. When the Peoples' Republic began shelling the offshore islands in 1954, administration
actors perceived that American aid to defend the islands were necessary to bolster Chiang's morale (Spanier, 1977:114). Accordingly, the administration signed a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Chiang Kai-shek regime. When this effort failed to stop the shelling, Eisenhower asked for the right to use U.S. armed forces to defend both Formosa and the offshore islands.

C. Concurrent Context

The world situation looked increasingly threatening to U.S. policy-makers by the mid-1950's. The Soviets had exploded a hydrogen bomb in 1953, and a perceived communist threat in Guatemala had been thwarted in 1954 (Nathan and Oliver, 1976:204). In the same year, the Geneva accords had temporarily stopped the Viet Minh forces in Indochina. In order to combat such communist outbreaks, the Eisenhower administration relied on military defense agreements. The SEATO pact was signed in September 1954 to forstall further communist expansion in the Pacific (Bailey, 1974). Also, the Baghdad Pact, to protect the Middle East, was in the final negotiations stage when Eisenhower asked for the Formosa Resolution (Nathan and Oliver, 1976:243). Thus, concurrent events showed an emphasis on the military containment of further communist expansion. The Formosa Resolution fit nicely into this broader pattern formed by the U.S. containment strategy.

III. Issue Area

This case fell into the territorial area. The values expressed by members of Congress dealt with stopping the communist advance in the Far East. Specifically, the goal of the resolution was to protect the Nationalist regime on Formosa. The presence of Chiang Kai-shek's troops on Formosa, the Pescadores, Quemoy, Matsu, and the Tachen Islands were tangible symbols of the goal of the resolution. However, the means to be used to
achieve this goal were intangible. Eisenhower did not ask for money in this case. Rather, he asked for the advance authority to commit troops. Since this case had a tangible/intangible mix of ends and means, it was coded as a territorial case.

IV. Party Leaders' Preferences

Party preferences, as expressed by the formal party leaders, were positive to the administration's position. In the Senate debate, Minority Leader William Knowland (R-Cal.) argued strongly for the resolution's passage. When the resolution was branded as an endorsement of preventive war, Knowland rejected that idea. On the issue of limiting the resolution to just Formosa and the Pescadores, he argued:

if the Chinese Communists attack us first and commit an act of war, they are certainly not going to expect to have a sanctuary when they reach the three-mile limit (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1955:279).


In the House, again both parties' leaders strongly supported the resolution. Speaker Sam Rayburn (D-Tex.) downplayed the argument that Eisenhower was restricting his future options as commander-in-chief (Congressional Record, 1955:672). Majority Leader John McCormack (D-Mass.) was even more supportive. He called for an overwhelming vote of approval to demonstrate the nation's unity on the question of communist expansion in the Far East. Minority Leader Joseph Martin (R-Mass.) argued that such a display of unity would serve the cause of peace by preventing any communist misperception of American determination to protect Chiang. Again, no party
leaders expressed any negative preferences (Congressional Record, 1955: 659-683). Since leaders of both parties in both chambers strongly supported the resolution, the party leaders' preferences variable was coded as positive.

V. Committee Leaders' Preferences

Committee leaders' preferences were also positive in this case. In the House, the Foreign Affairs Committee handled the resolution. Only two members of the committee had preference statements in the public record. Chairman James Richards (D-S.C.), the resolution's sponsor in the House, defended the resolution in floor debate (Congressional Record, 1955:664). When opponents charged that the bill called for preventive war, Richards rejected that argument. Representative John Vorys (R-Ohio) also defended the bill. In supporting the vagueness of the territorial scope of the resolution, he said such vagueness would "avoid telegraphing our punches and giving any privileged sanctuary" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1955:278). Since no negative preferences were expressed and the chairman had come out publicly for the resolution, the committee leaders' preferences were coded positive.

In the Senate, the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees met jointly on the resolution. Fifteen of these senators made public statements on the resolution. Nine came out strongly in favor of it. The strongly positive group was headed by Chairman Walter George (D-Ga.) who sponsored the resolution in the Senate. He argued against both the charge that the resolution would bring on preventive war and the idea of restricting it to only Formosa and the Pescadores. The others who supported the resolution were Senators George Aiken (R-Vt.), Homer Capehart (R-Ind.), Francis Case (R-S.D.), James Duff (R-Pa.), Knowland, Smith, and Stuart
Symington (D-Mo.). They also rejected the idea that the resolution called for preventive war and endorsed the President's need for the resolution.

The six committee members who opposed the resolution objected to it primarily on the issues of preventive war, the separation of the offshore islands from the Formosa-Pescadores group, or both. These were Senators Ralph Flanders (R-Vt.), Humphrey, Kefauver, Langer, Wayne Morse (D-Ore.), and John Stennis (D-Miss.). Humphrey particularly noted that he did not like Congress being placed in a position in which failure to support Eisenhower would "undermine the President's authority" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1955:278). Thus of the committee members, nine were positive and six were negative. Since the largest group was positive and it was led by Chairman George, its preferences were coded. With both of the House and Senate committees expressing positive preferences, the committee leaders' preferences variable was coded as positive to the administration's position.

VI. Constituency Pressures

Constituency pressures in this case were positive to the administration's position. Constituency pressures were manifested through the mechanisms of both the media and general public opinion. Major American newspapers strongly supported the resolution. The New York Times, in back-to-back editorials, strongly endorsed Eisenhower's message to Congress, praised the House for passing the resolution, and called upon the Senate to follow suit (New York Times, January 25,1955:24; January 26, 1955:24). Other newspapers that strongly backed the resolution through their editorials were the:
Supportive, but less strongly so, were the Baltimore Sun and the Hartford Courant. The only negative stance came from the Chicago Tribune which called the resolution a "blank check" (New York Times, January 25, 1955:6).

The volume of mail received by members of Congress was seen as another indication of strong public support for the President's position. Only Senators Morse, Langer, Herbert Lehman (D-N.Y.), and Symington reported getting large amounts of critical mail, and the first three were all noted opponents of the Formosa Resolution. Other congressmen interpreted the light volume of mail received as a sign of strong public support. As Senator George Smathers (D-Fla.), a proponent of the resolution, put it:

That indicates satisfaction with the President's request. When people are mad or opposed to something there is a shower of protests (New York Times, January 30, 1955:11; January 29, 1955:1).

Due to both the newspaper editorials and the lack of a heavy, critical mail response, most members of Congress perceived that the public strongly supported the resolution. Accordingly, the constituency pressures variable was coded as positive to the administration's position.

VII. Presidential Involvement

The level of presidential involvement was standard in this case. Eisenhower took steps to ensure the success of the resolution in Congress.
He reacted personally when critics charged that the resolution authorized preventive war. On January 27, Eisenhower declared that under the proposed resolution only he could order the initiation of military action. No military officer, including the Nationalist Chinese, could start an action without his approval. The next day he repeated the message that he "delegated to no one" the authority to commit U.S. troops to combat. He further stressed that any use of American troops would be defensive in nature (New York Times, January 29, 1955:1). Since Eisenhower personally tried to weaken congressional opposition, his actions went beyond the minimal level that might otherwise be expected. As such, the presidential involvement variable was coded as standard.

VIII. Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior

The congressional output here was a no modification behavior. The administration submitted the resolution, and it was passed with no amendments. Eisenhower got on January 29 exactly what he had asked for on January 24.

Propositions

In recounting the variable measures, the case fell into the territorial area. Party leaders' preferences, committee leaders' preferences, and constituency pressures were positive to the administration's position. The level of presidential involvement was standard, and a no modification behavior resulted.

Again, the no modification (2.2) and presidential involvement (5.1) propositions were supported. No other propositions were examined.
Significant Aspects

The noteworthy aspects of this case refer to the setting. In an atmosphere still charged with the belief that the communists were the nation's prime enemy, Eisenhower was able to get a blank check authorization from Congress to do as he pleased in the Formosa area. Eisenhower called the situation a crisis, and on such a basis, as Humphrey unhappily remarked, a negative stance was viewed as tying the President's hands on foreign policy matters. Congress was thus placed in a no-win situation; the members either had to agree to an unknown future under the resolution or they had to be willing to take the domestic pressure of undermining the anti-communist credibility of the Eisenhower administration. When placed in such a position, Congress not only gave Eisenhower what he wanted but did it quickly.
CHAPTER VII NOTES

1 Unless otherwise specified, the research for this case comes from Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1955:277-280.

2 For a list of party leaders at this time, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1955:16-17).

3 For a list of its members, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1955:36).

4 For a list of their members, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1955:28-29).
CHAPTER VIII
The Mutual Security Act, 1957

For many years, the passage of the annual foreign aid authorization was seen as a benchmark against which presidential influence in the realm of foreign policy could be measured. In 1957, the Eisenhower administration tried to change the rules of the foreign aid game. The administration's purpose was to loosen the reins of congressional control over foreign aid.¹

The administration's draft legislation was submitted to Congress on May 22. It called for a total request of $3.8 billion. Military aid was to be cut from the previous year while economic aid, administered through a new Development Loan Fund, was to be increased. In addition, military assistance and defense support would be placed within the Defense Department's budget and the Fund would be located in the existing International Cooperation Administration (ICA). More importantly, the draft called for more continuity and flexibility in the foreign aid program. Continuity would be achieved through the ending of annual congressional authorizations for all types of aid except for special assistance. All other types of aid would be given multi-year, continuing authorizations. The draft also called for the new Fund to receive $750 million, in both FY1959 and FY1960, from the Treasury and not from the congressional authorization/appropriation process. Flexibility would be aided since the draft called
for an end to allocations by Congress to specific countries or regions.

The administration's draft of the Mutual Security Act of 1957 did surprisingly well in the Senate. The Foreign Relations Committee began hearings on the bill on May 23 and released their majority report on June 6. The report endorsed the creation of the new Fund and recommended that its funding request be honored in full. It also agreed to the positioning of the Fund within the ICA. However, a few limitations were proposed for the Fund. The report recommended that (1) an interdepartmental Advisory Loan Committee be created which would seek to lessen the Fund's dependency upon ICA Director Hollister and encourage close ties between the Fund and State, (2) the administrator of the Fund be subject to Senate approval, and (3) the new administrator be required to report to both the Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees whenever the Fund took on any operation lasting longer than one year or involving more than $10 million.

The other assistance requests were only marginally cut by the committee. Regarding the issue of continuing authorizations, the majority "split the difference" with the administration. They agreed to the three-year authorization for the Fund, but they refused to recommend continuing authorizations for military assistance, defense support, and technical assistance. In terms of the flexibility argument, the committee added only one item of special assistance. At the insistence of Senator George Smathers (D-Fla.), $25 million was earmarked for Latin America.

After three days of floor debate, the bill was approved by the Senate on June 14 by a 57-35 vote. All amendment attempts on the floor were defeated, and the bill followed the recommendations of the Foreign
Relations Committee's majority report.

The bill's reception in the House was much cooler. The Foreign Affairs Committee held hearings on the bill from May 22 to June 28. The majority report, passed by a vote of 22-6, came on July 9 and followed difficult executive sessions of the committee. The majority recommended various budget cuts from the Senate's version of the bill. Moreover, the majority report narrowed the membership of the advisory committee for the Fund and gave the membership of that committee more power. They were to act as managers of the Fund, with the ability to approve or deny loans.

On July 15, the Mutual Security Act of 1957 went to the House floor. There a full-fledged fight ensued. In passing the bill, three major changes were made. First, the House membership defeated the advance authorization for FY1959 that had been approved by the Senate for military assistance. The vote was an overwhelming 136-31. Second, after the Foreign Affairs Committee had cut $100 million from the Senate's version for defense support, the House went on to cut another $100 million. Finally, perhaps the cruelest blow to the administration's hopes concerned the Development Loan Fund. By a vote of 254-154, the House refused to allow the Fund to borrow any money from the Treasury. The representatives wanted to keep the appropriations power firmly in their own hands.

As Haviland (1958:707) put it, the "last chapter in the decline, if not the utter fall of the authorization bill was written in the conference committee." The budget authorizations were split between the House and Senate versions. The administration's request for $3.8 billion was cut to $3.3 billion. Furthermore, $25 million in special assistance was set aside for Latin America, despite the administration's plea to end such
"earmarking."

Yet, these monetary totals do not tell the whole story. On military assistance and defense support, the House version was upheld in that no advance authorization for FY1959 was allowed. Further, the congressional desire to preclude the transfer of military assistance and defense support to the Defense Department was upheld. The conferees refused to let the Fund borrow money from the Treasury. Instead, the conference report gave the the Fund a $625 million authorization for one additional year, but these funds were to be regular congressional appropriations. The administration's attempt to bypass Congress for much of the Fund's operating capital, and thereby provide continuity, failed. Further, much of the control over the Fund's capital was to be placed in the hands of a Loan Committee who had the power to approve or deny loans. Also, the Loan Committee was to coordinate its actions with the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, which was chaired by Treasury Secretary Humphrey. Although these two committees were made up of administration actors, this move lessened the flexibility that would have been available to the Fund's director under the original administration request. Moreover, the conference report went on to undercut the Fund's possible future by saying that the best method of delivering economic assistance would be to have a government corporation, under the direction of the State Department, handle the economic assistance program. The conferees called for such a corporation to be considered early in the next congressional session.

On August 13, 1957, the Senate approved the conference report by voice vote. The House approved it the next day by a 226-163 vote. This was "the
smallest margin in the ten-year history of the foreign aid program" (Haviland, 1958:709). Shortly following the House vote, President Eisenhower signed the Mutual Security Act of 1957 into law.
ANALYSIS

I. Stimulus

This case started when the administration presented its draft of the Mutual Security Act of 1957 to Congress on May 22, 1957. The Eisenhower administration wanted Congress to pass its version of the bill which, along with setting budget authorizations, would have reduced congressional control over the foreign aid program.

II. Contextual Filter

A. Historical Context

In entering its tenth year, the foreign aid program was firmly established in principle. However, the volume of aid given had fluctuated greatly over time. More aid was authorized in times of international tension. When crises abated, less aid was given. Also, the emphasis on types of aid had changed over time. The primary emphasis had been military, then economic, then military during the early Eisenhower years, and was now switching back to economic. The major recipients of American aid had formerly been European nations but now emphasis was turning to the nations of the third world. Finally, the organizational pattern had varied from decentralized control to centralized control under State, to decentralization after 1948, to centralized control under the Mutual Security and Foreign Operations Administration, and back to centralized control under
State and the ICA. All told, the foreign aid program was run in an ad hoc manner over time, and the administration hoped to provide it with the continuity and flexibility that congressional action seemed to preclude.

B. Sequential Context

Events in 1956 set the stage for the foreign aid fight. The general election had returned Eisenhower to the presidency, and partisanship could be counted on to pull in some Republicans who had never before supported foreign aid. However, this edge was diminished since Democrats had regained control of Congress. Also, the discovery of a large amount of unspent funds in the previous military aid budget alarmed some members of Congress. Liberals saw the funds as "fat" in the military aid budget while conservatives were displeased that the funds had not been spent.

In 1957, the unsettled nature of the foreign aid program, along with the belief that the foreign aid program needed an overhaul, prompted the administration to undertake some special studies. The first report, publicized on March 1, was the Report to the President by the President’s Citizen Advisors on the Mutual Security Program. This blue ribbon panel was chaired by Benjamin Fairless, Chairman of the Board of U.S. Steel. The second report, entitled A New Emphasis on Economic Development Abroad, came out on March 4. This report was the product of the International Development Advisory Board which was chaired by Eric Johnston, President of the Motion Picture Association of America. These two reports supported the administration in that they each called for developmental assistance which was flexible in the short-term and stable in the long-term. Long-term stability and continuity would come from multi-year congressional authorizations instead of annual ones. Also, both reports called for more
loans and less grants and the separation of economic and military aid.

However, these reports differed in some ways. The Fairless report saw foreign aid as a tool to meet "Soviet imperialism," called for two year aid authorizations and suggested that the functions of the ICA be completely merged into the State Department. On the other hand, the Johnston report referred to the need for foreign aid as a means to further progress toward international peace and understanding. It called for three year aid authorizations by Congress and the positioning of the ICA as a separate administrative actor within the State Department.

On Capitol Hill, concern about the foreign aid program had prompted the Senate to create, in July of 1956, a Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program. The Special Committee was chaired by Theodore Green (D-R.I.), the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Its membership included the entire membership of the Foreign Relations Committee as well as the chairmen and ranking minority members of both the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees. During the spring of 1957, the Special Committee heard testimony from Secretary of State Dulles and 47 other individuals. These people included congressmen, representatives of widely-diverse interest groups, and academics.² In March, the Special Committee published 11 studies done in its behalf. Then on May 13, the Special Committee published its own report which had been unanimously adopted. The report endorsed the need for long-range economic assistance, but it rejected the idea of two or three year congressional authorizations.

Instead, the Special Committee called for a government corporation to administer the economic aid program. The funds for this corporation would slowly accumulate through a series of annual congressional appropriations.
Further, if flexibility ruled out specific authorizations to individual regions or countries, then the committee wanted no part of it. The report also rejected the transfer of military assistance programs out of State and into the Defense Department since the membership believed it would cause coordination problems within the overall aid program. Finally, the merger of the ICA within State was endorsed by the report.

Thus in terms of the sequential context, the picture was mixed. The administration had the Fairless and Johnston reports which echoed the major administration themes of flexibility and continuity/stability. In Congress however, prospects were not so bright. While the administration had some likely supporters on this matter, it also had some opponents whose opposition was based on either ideology or partisanship. Further, some of the administration's congressional supporters agreed with the ends that were proposed but disagreed with the means to be utilized.

C. Concurrent Context

A number of factors can be found which served to harm the administration's position. The death of Stalin in 1956 made the international system seem less threatening. Therefore, the number of those who had previously endorsed foreign aid as a means to counter the Soviet threat was somewhat reduced. Further, a growing mood of economic protectionism in the South also dampened the drive for an accelerated foreign aid program.

Within the administration itself, a threat to the program appeared in the person of Treasury Secretary George Humphrey. At this same time, he started an economy crusade in order to cut governmental spending across the board. Humphrey's crusade gave ammunition to the administration's
congressional foes. Conservatives in Congress were concerned by the de-emphasis on military assistance and defense support which Eisenhower proposed. Thus, the economy drive was particularly harmful in their eyes.

To the extent that such conservatives were Southerners, a new factor was introduced. Not only was there a growing feeling of protectionism in the South, but many Southerners were upset over the administration's civil rights policies. Knowing civil rights legislation was coming and they would be strongly pressured, many Southerners used the Mutual Security Act of 1957 as a means for a preemptive attack on the administration. Some Southern congressmen wanted to make full use of this opportunity to slash a program that Eisenhower endorsed.

Finally, questions of "congressional rights" became involved in this case. First, the foreign aid program's chances of approval were hurt in that many congressmen felt that executive-congressional consultation on all matters was unduly low. Further in the midst of the foreign aid bill's passage through Congress, Budget Director Percival Brundage signed an order directing all agencies to restrict their spending in FY1958 so as not to exceed the amount spent in FY1957, regardless of what had been, or would be, authorized and appropriated. Many in Congress, and particularly in the House, believed that their constitutional powers were being usurped. These two factors did not bode well for the administration's foreign aid plan. Together they portrayed the administration as grasping for unilateral control over governmental affairs.

The last matter of importance concerned the members of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. They viewed the administration's goal of transferring military assistance and defense support to
the Defense Department's budget as a means of escaping the control of their subcommittee. Not only did Chairman Otto Passman (D-La.) and others on the subcommittee work to prevent the transfer of these items to the Defense Department's budget, but they were also instrumental in getting the procedural changes made in the conference committee that leaned toward the more restrictive House view. Senator J.W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) argued that the conference committee frequently had to stop its work while the House members conferred with people from the Appropriations Committee; this, Fulbright said, resulted in the emasculation of the authorization bill.

III. Issue Area

This was a human resources case. The values expressed relative to this bill by members of Congress ranged from such general themes as promoting peace or competing with the Soviets to more specific concerns such as preserving congressional powers, preserving subcommittee jurisdiction, and dealing a blow to the Republican President. These are intangible values in that they cannot be photographed. Tangible means were employed since money was necessary for the foreign aid program. With such an intangible/tangible mix of ends and means, the case fell into the human resource area.

IV. Party Leaders' Preferences

Party preferences, as determined by the formal party leaders, were positive to the administration's position in this case. Party leaders went to the defense of the administration's position as much as they could
in their respective chambers. In the Senate, both Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson (D-Tex.) and Minority Leader William Knowland (R-Cal.) played important roles in getting the administration's foreign aid program passed. Haviland (1958:703) notes that the failure on the Senate floor to amend the bill was due in part to the "strong support" given the bill by both of these men. In the House, the mood was much more critical. Minority Leader Joseph Martin (R-Mass.) fought to prevent amendments to the bill but was unsuccessful. Speaker Sam Rayburn (D-Tex.) realizing how strongly the mood was running against the bill, refused to make a speech to prevent any amendments. They felt that a partial gain for the administration was better than no gain at all. Because of their efforts, the party leaders' preferences were coded as positive to the administration's position.

V. Committee Leaders' Preferences

Committee leaders' preferences were also positive in this case. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee dealt with the bill. The committee split into two groups. The larger group was positive to the administration's position. It was composed of Chairman Green, Fulbright, John Sparkman (D-Ala.), Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.), Mansfield, John Kennedy (D-Mass.), Alexander Wiley (R-Wis.), Alexander Smith (R-N.J.), Knowland, George Aiken (R-Vt.), and Homer Capehart (R-Ind.). Those negative to the administration's desires were Wayne Morse (D-Ore.), Russell Long (D-La.), Bourke Hickenlooper (R-Iowa), and William Langer (R-N.D.). The bloc led by Chairman Green was positive, and according to the decision rules, it was the one coded for the committee preferences variable.
In the House, the Foreign Affairs Committee handled the bill. Chairman Thomas Gordon (D-Ill.) led a bloc of 13 representatives who were solidly behind the administration's plan. Besides Gordon, this bloc included A.S.J. Carnahan (D-Mo.), Clement Zablocki (D-Wis.), Brooks Hays (D-Ark.), Barratt O'Hara (D-Ill.), Frank Coffin (D-Me.), John Vorys (R-Ohio), Frances Bolton (R-Ohio), Chester Merrow (R-N.H.), Walter Judd (R-Minn.), James Fulton (R-Pa.), Karl LeCompte (R-Iowa), and Albert Morano (R-Conn.). Five members were generally positive to the administration's desires but wanted to "go slow" in making radical changes in the way foreign aid was handled. The "go slow" group included Edna Kelly (D-N.Y.), Wayne Hays (D-Ohio), Armistead Selden (D-Ala.), Dante Fascell (D-Fla.), and Leonard Farbstein (D-N.Y.). Finally, six members were solidly and strongly opposed to the administration's plans. They included John Pilcher (D-Ga.), L.H. Fountain (D-N.C.), Lawrence Smith (R-Wis.), Marguerite Church (R-Ill.), Ross Adair (R-Ind.), and Alvin Bentley (R-Mich.). Like the Senate committee, the bloc led by the chairman was the one coded according to the rules, and since both committees expressed positive preferences, the committee leaders' preferences variable was coded positive to the administration's position.

VI. Constituency Pressures

Constituency pressures, such as they were in this case, were positive to the broad themes in the administration's position. There was a low level of interest in this issue by the mass public; the opinions found were not strongly held. For example, a Roper poll in March 1957 questioned American attitudes on foreign aid. Its results are listed in Table 2.
Table 2
Roper Poll Results, March 1957

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Aid</th>
<th>(in percents)</th>
<th>Military Aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>should be increased</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>keep at current level</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>cut a little</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>cut drastically</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>stop it</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>don't know</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Haviland, 1958:700)

While these figures indicate that those polled did not agree with the administration's call to increase economic aid, the impact of these results was slight. The results were explained away in a number of ways. First, other surveys disputed these results. Five surveys done for the administration by the National Opinion Research Center indicated that the majority of the public favored foreign aid (New York Times, March 17, 1957:1). Second, witnesses told committee members another story. ICA Director Hollister told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the public did not oppose foreign aid; they were just confused about the use of such monies in the recipient nations (U.S. Senate, 1957B:448). Charles Boyles of the United Christian Youth Movement agreed with the above by telling the House Foreign Affairs Committee that Congress should not equate confusion over details with public opposition to the entire foreign aid program (U.S. House, 1957:255). Before that same committee, Mrs. Theodore Wedel
of the National Council of Churches said opposition to the foreign aid program came from ultraconservatives (U.S. House, 1957:277-278).

On the other hand, there was evidence that interest groups did care about the future of the foreign aid program. Among the principal groups who testified at the Senate hearings were the National Chamber of Commerce, the AFL-CIO, the National Council of Churches, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the League of Women Voters, and Americans for Democratic Action. Of these, only the Farm Bureau wanted to cut all types of aid. All of the others agreed that economic and developmental assistance should be increased or emphasized. All but the Farm Bureau and the Chamber of Commerce supported the administration's plans for continuity and flexibility. Finally, all but the League of Women Voters called for a clearer separation of economic and military aid. "These expressions...added up to a firm endorsement of foreign aid and a strong plea for more long-range technical assistance" (Haviland, 1958:701).

Groups that testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee included the National Council of Churches (again), the Synagogue Council of America, the National Catholic Rural Life Conference, the American Farm Bureau Federation (again), the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, and the American Association of University Women - State of Maine Division. All of these groups strongly endorsed the administration's position except the Farm Bureau (U.S. House of Representatives, 1957). Thus across both committees, the interest groups which testified approved of most, if not all, of the administration's position. Therefore, constituency pressures in this case were positive to the administration's position.
VII. Presidential Involvement

The level of presidential involvement in this case was standard. Eisenhower went beyond the minimalist role he could have followed. For example, on May 9, 1957, Eisenhower invited congressional leaders to the White House to urge them to get the authorization bill passed in spite of Treasury Secretary Humphrey's economy drive. Moreover on May 21, Eisenhower made a televised address to the nation which dealt solely with the need for a new foreign aid program. Finally, the President made a last-ditch appeal for the program. On August 12, the night before the Senate voted on the conference report, Eisenhower invited the leadership of both houses, the chairmen and ranking minority members of the two appropriations committees and the full membership of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations to the White House. He pleaded for both the passage of the authorization bill and the appropriation of the full amount of money involved. He repeated the message the next morning at the regularly scheduled meeting of Republican leaders. By using these techniques, Eisenhower showed how much he wanted the Mutual Security Act of 1957 and thus went beyond the minimal level of involvement he could have followed.

VIII. Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior

The congressional output in this case was a resistance behavior. The administration clearly did not get all that it wanted. The funding levels authorized were considerably less than what the administration had requested. The administration's attempt to separate the military and economic aid budgets was thwarted by Congress. Although the Fund was created, it was not allowed to borrow funds from the Treasury. Thus, the plan for bypassing the annual congressional authorization/appropriation
process failed. Further, the flexibility of the Fund's operation was reduced since the Fund director would have to work closely with both the Loan Committee and the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems. In fact, the conference report even called for Congress to consider scrapping the Fund altogether in the next session in favor of a government corporation. Finally, Congress earmarked funds for Latin American aid, something the White House had opposed. Without continuing authorizations and funding from the Treasury and with both more control over the Development Load Fund and earmarked funds, the increased continuity and flexibility sought by the Eisenhower administration was lost. Congress "resisted" in a big way.

**Propositions**

To summarize the variable measures, this case fell into the human resources area. Party leaders' preferences, committee leaders' preferences, and constituency pressures were positive to the administration's position. Eisenhower's level of involvement was standard, but a resistance behavior was the congressional output.

Two propositions were explored in this case. Both were unsupported. The no modification proposition (2.2) states:

When both party and committee leaders' preferences are positive to the administration's position and constituency pressures are either neutral or positive, then the probability of no modification behaviors increases.

The presidential involvement proposition (5.1) states:

When the level of presidential involvement is standard, the probability of no modification behaviors increases while the probabilities of resistance and initiative behaviors decrease.
Even with all these factors in its favor, the bill's defenders were unable to completely deter the critics' attack on the House floor and in the conference committee.

**Significant Aspects**

The important thing to realize about this case is that it demonstrated something not tapped in the initial phase of the conceptual framework. Here the bill's foes on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, although they constituted a numerical minority, were able to mobilize significant opposition on the House floor. Various arguments attracted representatives to the opposition side. The infringement on subcommittee jurisdiction drew those from the Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. The questions of "congressional rights," whether they involved the right to appropriate funds or the right to be consulted, drew others. The perception that the military assistance budget was unduly inflated further undermined the administration's credibility. This inflated appearance was created by two factors: (1) the administration abruptly reduced the level of military assistance it requested by $500 million even before the committees had studied the bill (this reduction was due to Humphrey's economy drive) and (2) the fact that there were significant unspent funds from the previous military assistance budget. These two facets gave the budget a look of more "fat" and less "muscle." Finally, the opposition was bolstered by other factors such as poor executive-congressional relations, partisanship in a Congress controlled by Democrats, and seemingly unrelated issues like civil rights. These factors aroused enough opposition on the House floor so that positive party leaders'
preferences, committee leaders' preferences, constituency pressures, and a standard level of presidential involvement were overridden in importance. Future versions of the conceptual framework must come to grips with the possibility that in some cases, the enumerated variables may not be enough to explain the congressional output, and these "deviant" cases may require additional explanatory variables taken from contextual factors.
CHAPTER VIII NOTES

1Unless otherwise specified, the research for this case comes from Haviland (1958).

2For a list of these individuals, as well as their testimony, see U.S. Senate (1957).

3For a list of party leaders at this time, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1957:i2).

4For a list of its members, see U.S. Senate (1957:ii).

5For a list of its members, see U.S. House of Representatives (1957:ii).
CHAPTER IX

The Bay of Pigs Failure, 1961

On April 5, 1961, newly-elected President John Kennedy gave the final go-ahead for a plan conceived during the latter days of the Eisenhower presidency. The Bay of Pigs invasion resulted in one of the most ignominious defeats for American foreign policy since the end of the Second World War. The unprecedented failure of this covert operation led Congress to question the quality of decision-making in the executive branch. The relevant executive branch actors were on the spot because members of Congress were looking for someone to blame for the debacle.

The actual invasion began on April 17, 1961. On April 19, the attempt ended in failure with the rebel forces being captured by Castro's troops. As the extent of the American involvement became known, opposition to the operation came to the fore. The first congressional attack came on April 24 when Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) called for a "prompt and thorough overhaul" of the intelligence community (New York Times, April 25, 1961:8). The political situation heated up further on April 27 when Senators Thruston Morton (R-Ky.) called the Cuban intervention a "disastrous" miscalculation on the part of the administration, Gordon Allott (R-Colo.) criticized the operation in a radio and television broadcast to his constituents, and Wayne Morse (D-Ore.) began seeking a briefing on the operation before his American Republics Affairs

Closed hearings before the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees began May 1. Administration spokesmen were called to Capitol Hill to explain the intervention attempt. No details of the House committee's hearings were leaked to the press (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1961:331). However in the Senate, both who was being heard and how their testimony was being received found its way into the newspapers. On May 1, Secretary of State Dean Rusk testified before Morse's subcommittee. He confirmed that the rebels had been trained, financed, and equipped by the U.S. government. However, he said that the administration had no plans to intervene again in Cuba unless the Castro regime engaged in some clear provocation, such as an attack on the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo. Morse was quite relieved to hear that the administration planned no future actions (New York Times, May 2, 1961:1). Adolph Berle, chairman of the State Department's Latin America task force, testified before Morse's subcommittee on May 15 (New York Times, May 16, 1961:15).

Closed hearings were also held by the full Foreign Relations Committee on May 1-3 and May 20. On May 2, CIA Director Allen Dulles and Deputy Director of Operations Richard Bissell gave testimony on the covert operation. After their testimony, press reports indicated growing support for a congressional watchdog committee to oversee intelligence activities (New York Times, May 3, 1961:1). The role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the operation was explained on May 20 by General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman of the JCS (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1961:331).
The hearings ended on May 20. No public report was issued due to the still-officially-secret nature of the American role in the invasion. Congress took no further action regarding the policy failure. Nevertheless, senatorial confidence in the CIA was shaken. Moreover, other executive branch actors were seen to share varying degrees of responsibility for the failure. Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J.W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) blasted the administration for pursuing the action. The only dispute among committee members seemed to be over the role of the JCS. While Morse defended them, Albert Gore (D-Tenn.) said they should be replaced (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1961:331). The failure of the Bay of Pigs operation had given the new Kennedy administration a collective black eye. The quality of the administration's decision-making apparatus for foreign policy issues was suddenly suspect, and this tarnished image would not be fully erased until the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.
ANALYSIS

I. Stimulus

The impetus for congressional action came from the failure of the American-sponsored invasion. By April 19, the invasion had ended unsuccessfully. The cover story denying American complicity in the affair was attacked by Soviet Premier Khrushchev as early as April 18. The full extent of the American role in the failure came out in the New York Times on April 21 (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1961:329-330). The spectacular failure on the part of the U.S. was the stimulus for the congressional hearings.

II. Contextual Filter

A. Historical Context

A number of precedents existed for an American intervention in Cuba. American interventions had been common in Latin America and the Caribbean countries. Interventions of one kind or another had occurred in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua (Bailey, 1974:552). More specifically, American-sponsored coups had been successful in the recent past. The CIA had removed the leftist Premier of Iran, Mohammed Mossadegh, in 1953. Closer to home, the CIA had organized the successful invasion of Guatemala in 1954 which resulted in the ouster of President Arbenz (Nathan and Oliver, 1976:215-219). Like the Guatemalan episode,
since Cuba was perceived as tilting toward the Soviets, the Monroe Doctrine became a factor of importance. As long as the majority of American policy-makers and the public perceived communism as a monolithic force directed from the Kremlin, the Doctrine's prohibition against European colonization in the Western Hemisphere legitimated a U.S. response (Bailey, 1974:183).

Thus ample precedents existed to justify the covert American attempt to topple Castro's regime by means of a CIA-sponsored invasion. Specifically, the events in Guatemala only seven years before seemed to indicate the likelihood of success.

B. Sequential Context

The sequential context was dominated by a steady deterioration in U.S.-Cuban relations which began after Fidel Castro came to power on January 1, 1959. In 1959, Castro spurned an American offer of economic assistance, which State Department personnel saw as an affront. He then began the process of mass trials for Batistianos, many of whom were summarily executed. The American press reported these as "kangaroo courts" which angered Cuban officials, since Batista's regime had engaged in similar practices. Finally, in 1960 Castro nationalized American interests in Cuba. Eisenhower responded by suspending American purchases of Cuban sugar.

Not only did U.S.-Cuban relations cool during this time period, but Soviet-Cuban relations improved. In July 1960, Khrushchev declared that Soviet missiles would protect Cuba from any aggressor. Also in July, shipments of weaponry began to arrive in Cuba from behind the Iron Curtain. By January 1961, Castro had received heavy tanks, 55-and 105-millimeter cannons, mortars, rocket-launchers, automatic weapons, and
anti-tank guns. Finally, Castro went on a long trip through the Soviet bloc from October to December 1960.

These events prompted the CIA to begin planning the intervention. The original plan was to use 500 highly-trained Cuban exiles who would infiltrate Cuba and work with the underground in guerrilla operations. However by mid-1960, the rapid build-up of Soviet arms had given the Castro forces an increased counterinsurgency capability. By August, the CIA began considering dropping the infiltration plan in favor of a conventional invasion with tactical air support flown by Cuban exile pilots. By November 4 the plan had been changed to an invasion format. Eisenhower was not told of the change due to his poor health, his age, and his "lame duck" status (Johnson, 1964:54). From November 1960 to January 1961, the CIA operated with practically no input from superiors. This period of vacuum gave the operation time to develop an organizational and bureaucratic momentum of its own. This momentum was to prove "by springtime to be nearly irresistible and uncontrollable" (Trice, 1971A:7).

The presidential campaign between Vice President Nixon and Senator Kennedy also played a role in the later decision to go ahead with the invasion plan. In September 1960 after the wave of expropriation of U.S. interests in Cuba, Democratic Vice Presidential candidate Lyndon Johnson castigated the outgoing Republican administration for allowing communism to flourish 90 miles from Miami. When this message proved to be popular in the public opinion polls, Kennedy jumped on the bandwagon. As he told audiences, "I wasn't the Vice-President who presided over the Communization of Cuba" (quoted in Lasky, 1963:445). Kennedy's charges hurt, and Nixon was forced to respond. On October 19, Nixon called for an economic,
political, and diplomatic "quarantine" of the Castro regime. The next day Kennedy responded by calling for direct, remedial action. He proposed that Cuban "freedom fighters," both those who had been exiled and those still in Cuba, be assisted and strengthened. Nixon was outraged. He knew that Eisenhower had told Allen Dulles not to withhold any information on the operation from Kennedy. Since Nixon believed that Kennedy had been briefed on the plan, he felt Kennedy's statement had irresponsibly jeopardized the operation. In fact, Dulles had not yet briefed Kennedy on the Cuban operation. Nevertheless, by the end of the campaign Kennedy was linked to a hard line toward Castro. Moreover, any deviation from the hard line could not only threaten his foreign policy, but his domestic proposals could also be subject to an attack from the political right.

After the inauguration, CIA Director Dulles and JCS Chairman General Lemnitzer finally briefed Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and Attorney General Robert Kennedy on the invasion plan. On January 28, President Kennedy held a meeting on the operation. Dulles discussed the plan and listed its merits. Kennedy did not appear completely convinced that the plan would succeed. He asked McNamara to study the military aspects of the operation and Rusk to come up with a plan to isolate Cuba within the OAS. However while these reports were being drawn up, the CIA was allowed to continue its plans for the operation.

In February and March, a number of factors combined to add a sense of urgency to the operation. One of the key assumptions in the CIA invasion plan had been rebel air superiority. However, it was learned that Cuban pilots were being trained to fly MIG jets in Eastern Europe and that MIG's were already being sent to Cuba. Dulles and Bissell agreed that, in order
to be successful, the invasion would have to occur prior to the return of
the pilots. Also, events in Guatemala became important. In February,
President Ydigoras sent Kennedy a letter saying the rebels were ready and
should be used as soon as possible. The rebels' internal disputes had be-
come so bad that some leaders had to be jailed by their CIA supervisors.
Such problems in the training camps caused their "secret" existence to be-
come public knowledge in Central America, and Ydigoras was coming under
mounting domestic and foreign pressure to shut down the camps. Dulles and
Bissell said that, if not swiftly used, the rebels' combat effectiveness
would rapidly decline. The approaching rainy season also lent a sense of
urgency to the operation. Finally if the plan was dropped, the administra-
tion would be faced with the problem of 1500 men telling of how the U.S.
government recruited them to topple the Castro regime.

On April 4, Kennedy held a meeting to discuss the merits of the inva-
sion plan. When Kennedy asked what would happen if the invasion did not
succeed, Dulles and Bissell said the men would move to the Escambray Moun-
tains and join the anti-Castro guerrillas there. Kennedy asked each man
for his objections to the plan. All the administration actors remained
silent, even Rusk, Bundy, and Schlesinger who had voiced objections in
March. However, Senator Fulbright, invited by the President to attend the
meeting, denounced it as both immoral and militarily infeasible. With no
other opposition expressed, the next day Kennedy approved the plan.

On April 10, Kennedy made one last change in the plan. Worried that
the proposed landing at Trinidad might be unduly hazardous due to its
25,000 population, he asked the CIA to propose alternative landing sites.
From these, Kennedy chose the Bay of Pigs due to its sparse population.
Even though the JCS believed that an invasion at the new site held less than a 50-50 chance of success, they did not raise any objections. They did not want to begin a jurisdictional dispute with the CIA at this late date. Further, no one seemed to notice that the change in landing sites made the contingency plan of escaping to the mountains almost impossible. While Trinidad sat at the foothills of the mountains, the Bay of Pigs was separated from them by 80 miles of jungle and swamps (Janis, 1972:26-29).

Once the invasion began on April 17, everything went wrong. Meeting heavy resistance, the rebels could not establish a beachhead. By the 19th, the rebels were surrounded by 20,000 Cuban troops (Janis, 1972:23). The supposedly ineffective Cuban Air Force quickly gained control of the air by using its jet trainers, which had been omitted from intelligence estimates, to shoot down the rebels' B-26's. From the first day, the men on the beach were also subject to bombing and strafing runs by the Cuban jets.

With the situation on the beach rapidly deteriorating, Bissell made a last-ditch appeal to Kennedy on April 18. Bissell argued that the only hope for saving the rebels was to get additional food, ammunition, and supplies to them. Two landing craft could do it but they would have to be protected from Cuban jets by American jets dispatched from the aircraft carrier Boxer, stationed fifty miles away. Rusk attacked the proposal. He argued any use of American jets would proclaim to the world that the U.S. was directly involved. Kennedy then made a compromise decision. He agreed to let the Boxer's jets provide one hour of air cover for the B-26's and the landing craft. This scenario never occurred. The B-26's arrived an hour early and three were promptly shot down. As a result, the Boxer's jets never even took off. By that afternoon, the rebels on
the beach were captured.

The sequential context was marked by the events leading up to the ultimate failure of the intervention. A number of factors contributed to the failure. To begin with, CIA actions were important. First, when the CIA began recruiting exiles, Batistianos were chosen. This decision cut the CIA off from any contacts with the Cuban underground since it was made up of nationalists who opposed both Castro and Batista. When Dulles and Bissell told Kennedy that an invasion would prompt an uprising, they were only guessing. They had no contacts with the underground on which to base this assumption.

A second CIA action which later appeared unjustified concerned the contingency plan. Kennedy apparently found it to be a persuasive factor. Yet the rebel leaders were never told about the contingency plan. In fact, Janis (1972:22-23) argues that the rebels were deliberately misled by the CIA in order to boost their morale. They were told that they constituted only a small part of a larger landing force, that other Cuban exile brigades would make diversionary landings to reduce the resistance they faced, that U.S. Marines were also to make a landing, and that American troops would reinforce them if they were unable to succeed on their own.

A third CIA error concerned the estimates of Castro's military strength. The CIA seriously underestimated Castro's air strength by neglecting to count his T-33 jet trainers as part of the combat-ready air force. The sixteen rebel B-26's were considered adequate to guarantee rebel air superiority. Moreover, Dulles and Bissell characterized the Cuban army as "poorly equipped, poorly trained, riddled with dissension, and unable to cope with even a small-scale invasion" (Janis, 1972:23).
CIA representatives chose to ignore military estimates, by both the State Department and British intelligence, which contradicted their more optimistic ones (Janis, 1972:23).

The avoidance of others' expertise was a fourth error. The CIA jealously guarded its information on the operation and distributed it only on a need-to-know basis. This "clandestine mentality" had far-reaching effects. For example, while the JCS were briefed on the operation, they were told 1) they were not to volunteer any advice, unless asked, as this was not a Pentagon operation, and 2) they could not discuss the operation with their staff officers. The result was to preclude any military expertise in planning an amphibious assault needing both air and sea support. Also, the need-to-know standard precluded discussing the plan with Robert Amory, CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence Research and Estimates. Thus Kennedy received CIA estimates solely from the operations side of the organization. Finally, relevant branches of the State Department were not told the details of the operation. This decision bypassed State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and its Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. Moreover, the Bureau of International Organization Affairs and the USIA were not told any details even though they could have helped with a better cover story.

The CIA's performance was not the only substandard feature in this case. The executive branch decision-making system also performed poorly. Key presidential advisors did not articulate, either forcefully enough or at all, the drawbacks they saw in the CIA plan. The JCS did not think it would work but did not want to fight the CIA. Rusk, Schlesinger, and Bundy had initial objections to the plan but did not press them. Post-mortem discussions revealed that these individuals suppressed their doubts because they perceived that to have raised them in the discussion would have
made them look "soft" or timid (Janis, 1972:40). Also as Janis (1972:41-43) says, both Rusk and Robert Kennedy acted as "mindguards" to suppress negative inputs to the decision-making group. Rusk stopped a memo critical of the operation, written by Chester Bowles, from reaching the President. He also prevented Roger Hilsman, Director of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, from analyzing the assumptions on which the plan was based. Robert Kennedy, on the other hand, harshly criticized Schlesinger for opposing the operation. The President had made his decision, Kennedy told him, and now his advisors needed to support him.

Finally, the President's role could have been performed better. Kennedy did nothing to puncture the "illusion of unanimity" created by a lack of strong, persistent criticism. He took silence from his advisors to mean they agreed with the CIA plan (Janis, 1972:38-39). When doubts were raised, Kennedy did not pursue them. Finally, he did not question the assumptions on which the plan rested. He did not question 1) if an uprising would actually occur, 2) if the U.S. role could be kept secret, 3) if the Cuban Army and Air Force were as weak as they were depicted, or 4) if the brigade could actually reach the Escambray Mountains if necessary. Further, Kennedy did ask Dulles and Bissell if 1500 men would be enough but did not ask upon what evidence their affirmative answer was based (Janis, 1972:42-46).

The failure had many causes. However, two themes underly these individual factors. First, the CIA representatives were over-eager, over-zealous, over-optimistic, and less than candid. Second, the entire decision-making group, including Kennedy, failed to conduct a critical analysis to determine if the CIA plan was sound. Instead, the entire group shared
a sense of "invulnerability" that inhibited such probing analysis (Janis, 1972:36).

C. **Concurrent Context**

Internal and external factors played an important role in shaping the final outcome in the Bay of Pigs episode. The internal context was dominated by the change of administrations. The "newness" of the Kennedy team was reflected in how Kennedy related to his advisors and how they related to each other. In terms of Kennedy's role, he asked the individuals to join the decision-making group based on their organizational roles, with the exception of his brother. Accordingly, CIA and military representatives were looked on as "professionals" and their advice was too-eagerly heeded. Kennedy's preoccupation with roles also narrowed the range of advice he received. As related by Halberstam (1972:71), Labor Secretary Arthur Goldberg reproached Kennedy for not getting a wider range of advice. He criticized Kennedy for not consulting him since he had worked with guerrilla fighters in World War II. Also, he felt Kennedy should have checked with Agriculture Secretary Orville Freeman, a former Marine with amphibious landing experience. Both, Goldberg said, could have told him how difficult the operation would be. Yet due to their governmental roles, they were not consulted. Overall, not only did his advisors do a poor job, but Kennedy also overlooked independent sources of information.

The external context was just as crucial as the internal one. In February 1961, the Soviet Union threatened to intervene in the Congo. In March, the Laotian crisis came to the fore. Kennedy could hardly send American forces to fight communism in Laos and then ignore it in Cuba (Schlesinger, 1965:233-234). The Soviets also halted the Geneva nuclear
disarmament talks in March. Thus, the Soviets appeared to be very busy, and American decision-makers were put in the position of reacting to Soviet moves rather than initiating policy themselves. Consequently, the Bay of Pigs operation may have been seen as an opportunity for the U.S. to act rather than to react.

Overall, the concurrent context did two things. It practically "compelled" the President to act on the problem of Cuba. Events seemed to be happening too fast. An opportunity had arisen in Cuba and a plan existed to deal with it. However, the newness of the administration severely hampered its effectiveness in meeting the challenge posed by Castro. The executive branch actors were not sufficiently familiar with each other to adequately evaluate the operation's real chance of success. The concurrent context pushed Kennedy to approve the plan but also ensured that weaknesses in the plan would go largely undetected.

III. Issue Area

Like the previous Guatemalan intervention, this was a territorial case. The end was to depose Castro. The presence of both him and his regime were tangible referents to the broad goal of "stopping communism in the Western Hemisphere." The means to achieve this goal was to use Cuban exiles to topple him. The expenditure of money was not an issue here. Members of Congress simply wanted to know why Kennedy chose a course of action which failed, as well as revealed the American role behind it. Such a mix of tangible ends and intangible means resulted in this being a territorial case.
IV. Party Leaders' Preferences

Party leaders' preferences were negative to the administration's position on Cuba. While the public record contains no preferences expressed by House leaders, Senate leaders did speak out. Majority Leader Mansfield on two occasions lashed out at the CIA for their part in the failure. On April 24, he called for a "prompt and thorough overhaul" of the intelligence community due to the Bay of Pigs disaster. Further, he and Senator Eugene McCarthy (D-Minn.) desired a "watch dog" committee to oversee CIA activities (New York Times, April 25, 1961:8; May 4, 1961:11).

However while Mansfield was strongly negative to the administration's actions, Minority Leader Everett Dirksen (R-Ill.) may not have been. He opposed the idea of a watch dog committee, but that does not necessarily mean that he supported Kennedy's actions in the fiasco (New York Times, April 25, 1961:8). Since Mansfield's negative stance was clear to see and no other party leaders expressed unambiguous preferences, the party leaders' preferences variable was coded as negative to the administration's position.

V. Committee Leaders' Preferences

Committee leaders' preferences were negative to the administration's policy here. Two committees and one subcommittee held hearings on the Bay of Pigs invasion. In the House, the Foreign Affairs Committee held hearings. None of its members expressed preferences in the public record. As such, their preferences were coded as neutral.

In the Senate, the first body to act on the Bay of Pigs episode was the American Republics Affairs Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations
Committee. Chairman Morse was the only member of the subcommittee to express his personal preferences in this case. He was unhappy about the intervention and relieved to learn that, barring unforeseen provocations, the administration had no plans for future Cuban interventions (New York Times, May 2, 1961:7). Since no other members expressed public preferences, Morse's negative stance was coded for the subcommittee.

Finally, the full Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the invasion. Four committee members expressed preferences in this case, and all were negative to the administration's actions. Chairman Fulbright said the whole operation was a "mistake" and that the responsibility for it was shared by the President, his advisors, the Defense and State Departments, and the CIA (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1961:331). Fulbright thus followed up on his objections first raised in the April 4 meeting. Mansfield had also blasting the CIA's performance in the case, and Gore called for the JCS to be "replaced by new, wiser and abler men" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1961:331). Morse's feelings were noted above. Since no other preferences were heard, the committee's preferences were coded as negative. Since two of the three committee actors opposed the administration's actions, the committee leaders' preferences variable was coded as negative to the administration's position.

VI. Constituency Pressures

Constituency pressures regarding the administration's performance at the Bay of Pigs were also negative. A number of demonstrations were held to indicate public dissatisfaction with the American participation in the operation. Pro-Castro Cubans demonstrated in New York City on April 17,
18, and 19 and in Columbus, Ohio on April 18 (New York Times, April 18, 1961:1; April 19:15; April 21:4). The Fair Play for Cuba Committee also held demonstrations attacking the administration's policy on April 17 and 19. Further, on April 21, the Committee took out a full-page ad in the New York Times which denounced the American intervention (New York Times, April 18:5; April 21:4,23). Also, the Nonviolent Committee for Cuban Independence picketed CIA headquarters in Washington on April 30 and May 13 in order to protest the CIA's involvement in Cuba (New York Times, May 1, 1961: 3; May 14:21).

There were, however, some demonstrations in support of Kennedy's policy toward Cuba. Anti-Castro Cubans demonstrated in New York City and Albany on April 22 and in New York City again on April 27 (New York Times, April 23, 1961:22; April 28:1). However, these supportive demonstrations were neither big enough nor frequent enough to overcome the negative ones. The demonstrations tended to be negative to the administration's actions.

Another avenue of constituency pressures was the use of "open letters" to the President. These were also strongly opposed to the administration's role in the Bay of Pigs affair. On April 17, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, a pacifist group, sent Kennedy a telegram urging him to halt the invasion or to submit American-Cuban problems to mediation. Signers of the telegram included Erich Fromm, C. Wright Mills, Norman Thomas, and others (New York Times, April 18, 1961:1,5). On May 4, Kennedy received an open letter from Norman Thomas and 41 other educators, writers, and religious and labor leaders. They called the invasion a threat to world peace (New York Times, May 5, 1961:9). On May 9, Kennedy received an open letter which criticized American policy toward Cuba and urged the government to stop any future consideration of a repeat attempt. The
letter was signed by 70 professors and writers from Harvard, Boston University, MIT, and Brandeis (New York Times, May 14, 1961:13). In addition, 181 historians signed a letter condemning any future overt or covert interventions in Cuba (New York Times, May 14, 1961:17). Finally, 38 Princeton professors sent Kennedy an open letter on May 15. They criticized the ambiguity that seemed to mark future U.S.-Cuban relations, and they said that the future use of interventions must be ruled out (New York Times, May 16, 1961:15).

The news media also came out strongly against the administration's Cuban policy. The American Society of Newspaper Editors voted 83-41 to oppose any more open American interventions in Cuba (New York Times, April 23, 1961:73). Shortly after the government's role in the invasion was disclosed, 1200 members of the American Newspapers Publishers Association met in New York. Many delegates said the intervention had shocked the nation. While most were supportive of Kennedy's stand to defend the U.S. and the Western Hemisphere, they urged caution when considering "any action that would inflate Latin American opinion against this country" (New York Times, April 24, 1961:1).

The news media also criticized the executive branch decision-making system which approved the CIA plan. James Reston blasted the in-house advisors for failing to highlight the flaws in the proposed invasion while it was still in its planning stages (New York Times, April 28, 1961:30). He later attacked Kennedy for telling lies to the press (New York Times, May 10, 1961:44). The New York Times itself ran three editorials on the operation. The first (April 22, 1961:24) blasted the CIA for its performance but applauded Kennedy for accepting the responsibility for the
failure. The second (April 26, 1961:38) continued the attack on the CIA. It argued that CIA representatives should never be allowed to make policy, and it supported Mansfield's call for closer congressional controls on the CIA. The last one (May 10, 1961:44) also castigated Kennedy for lying to the American people. Thus through syndicated columns and editorials, the negative stance of the news media toward the administration's handling of the operation became clear.

Other opinion leaders took mixed stances on the operation. Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York, after a meeting with Kennedy on April 25, called for "all Americans to stand united behind the President in support of whatever action becomes necessary to defend freedom" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1961:330). Former President Eisenhower seemed to follow Rockefeller's positive stance when he called on the American people to support Kennedy's "efforts to prevent the solidifying of a Communist stronghold" in Cuba. He also warned against starting any "witch hunt" over the matter. However, Eisenhower also said publicly that his administration did not go beyond training and equipping the exiles because of the exiles' lack of organization and leadership (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1961:331). If anyone saw Eisenhower's last comment as a veiled criticism of Kennedy's decision to go forward with the operation, all doubts were removed on May 5 when Ike's private feelings, expressed to Republican leaders, were publicized. He was sharply critical of how Kennedy handled the operation, and he particularly pointed out the weaknesses of the military planning involved (New York Times, May 10, 1961:13). Finally, former Vice President Nixon called the Bay of Pigs operation a major failure of American foreign policy (New York Times, May 10, 1961:1).
Other domestic inputs were of mixed types. Shortly after the failure but prior to full public knowledge of the government's role, a small sampling of letters received at the White House were generally positive. Some even urged another attempt to topple Castro (New York Times, April 22, 1961:7). The Florida Division of the United Spanish War Veterans unanimously endorsed Kennedy's Cuba policy and any future attempts he might make (New York Times, May 17, 1961:5). However, these positive inputs were offset by actions of other organizations. Both the Unitarian Universalist Association and the Americans for Democratic Action passed resolutions condemning the invasion attempt and calling for a more moderate future Cuba policy (New York Times, May 14, 1961:21, 43).

Overall, the administration's supporters were few in number. The administration's performance in this case was scorned in street demonstrations, by the news media, by the former President and Vice President, by liberal organizations such as the ADA and the Unitarian Universalist Association, and in academic and intellectual circles. Accordingly, the constituency pressures variable was coded as negative to the administration's position.

VIII. Presidential Involvement

The level of presidential involvement here was standard. Kennedy personally led a campaign to contain, redirect, or minimize the expected domestic criticism of the failure. The campaign began on April 18 when he briefed Democratic congressional leaders on the situation in Cuba (New York Times, April 19, 1961:1). On April 20, Kennedy made a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors. He did not say
anything about American involvement in the Bay of Pigs invasion, but he
did say there would be no future American interventions without clear
provocation. However, he warned Castro that "our restraint is not in-
exhaustible" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1961:330). Later that day,
Kennedy talked with Nixon for 75 minutes. The next day, Kennedy met with
Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) to talk about the operation. On April
22, Kennedy had an 85 minute meeting with Eisenhower at Camp David and
then announced that General Maxwell Taylor would head a temporary review
board to investigate American intelligence, paramilitary, and guerrilla
warfare capabilities. When Interior Secretary Stewart Udall labeled the
operation as one concocted by the previous administration, Kennedy announ-
ced that he and he alone was responsible for U.S. Cuban policy (Congres-

Kennedy began the second week of his campaign with the April 25th
meeting with Rockefeller. Then on April 27, Kennedy tried to downplay
press criticism of the operation. He asked the members of the American
Newspaper Publishers Association to:

> re-examine their own obligations, consider in their news editing
> policies, the degree and nature of the present danger, and heed
> the duty of self-restraint which danger imposes on us all

Kennedy met the following day with former President Herbert Hoover and
retired General Douglas MacArthur. Finally on May 3, Kennedy created a
new Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board headed by Dr. James Killian.
Killian was the chairman of the Corporation of MIT and had led Eisenhower's
Intelligence Board from 1956 to 1958 (Congressional Quarterly Almanac,
Kennedy's high level of personal involvement was marked by an unusually strenuous campaign to defuse, redirect or dampen criticism of the administration's actions. His campaign overlapped the congressional hearings on the invasion. Since his actions went far beyond a minimalist response to the failure, the presidential involvement variable was coded as standard.

VIII. Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior

The congressional behavior in this case was an initiative. Congressional committees, on their own violation, held closed hearings in order to discover the full extent of the government's role in the invasion and to learn why the attempt failed so miserably. Kennedy did not request such hearings, and he presumably did not welcome them since they opened up administrative personnel to attack.

Propositions

In summary, this was a territorial case. Party leaders' preferences, committee leaders' preferences, and constituency pressures were negative to the administration's actions. Kennedy pursued a standard level of involvement, and an initiative behavior resulted.

Five propositions were examined in this case. The party leaders (2.1), committee leaders (3.1), constituency pressures (4.1), and initiative (5.2) propositions were supported. Only Proposition 5.1 is unsupported. It says:

When the level of presidential involvement is standard, the probability of no modification behaviors increases while the probabilities of resistance and initiative behaviors decrease.

Kennedy's two-week-long personal campaign was not strong enough to override negative party leaders' preferences, committee leaders' preferences,
and constituency pressures. The opposition forces were too strong and the failure too blatant to be overcome by personal presidential appeals.

**Significant Aspects**

The Bay of Pigs invasion was the most severe setback of an American foreign policy action up to that point in the postwar period. Events in the sequential and concurrent contexts, for all practical purposes, dictated Kennedy’s approval of the mission and its resulting failure. In the sequential context, Kennedy's own hard-line campaign rhetoric obligated him to accept the CIA plan due to the potential political costs of inaction. Moreover, the CIA's organizational momentum, developed during the administration change, helped it to ride roughshod over opposition arguments. Finally, the "disposal" problem was crucial. If Kennedy did not approve the plan, how were 1500 Cubans going to be kept quiet?

In terms of the concurrent context, the mounting crises of early 1961 also spurred Kennedy to act. Here was a chance to shape events rather than react to the initiatives of others. However, the timing of the operation jeopardized its chances of success. At this early point in his administration, Kennedy was still dependent upon the "experts" for advice and he trusted their judgements too readily. Further, his emphasis on role-bound advice omitted inputs from Goldberg or Freeman. Both of these men could have given Kennedy another source of expertise on which to draw. Their inputs might have led Kennedy to challenge the rosy picture painted by Dulles and Bissell. Finally, the newness of the decision-making group inhibited the degree of candor necessary to fully examine the proposed invasion plan.
The congressional response to the Bay of Pigs invasion calls to mind a statement by Bax (1977:891). He says Congress can afford to be minimally involved in foreign policy only when two conditions are met:

1. there has to be a high level of consensus in the nation over the general purposes of policy, and
2. the specific means used by the President to achieve these policies have to be generally successful.

The positive acceptance Kennedy received from his campaign attacks on the Cuba problem revealed that a broad portion of the American public was disturbed by the specter of communism in Cuba. The public seemed to want something done about it. Thus, Bax's first condition was met. However, the spectacular failure of the invasion violated the second condition.

If Bax is right, members of Congress may have felt compelled to act. The congressional initiative may have been just as predetermined by events as was Kennedy's acceptance of the CIA plan.
CHAPTER IX NOTES

1 Unless otherwise specified, the research for this case comes from Trice (1971A).

2 For a good comparison of decision-making styles, see Janis (1972) and Allison (1971).

3 See Chapter VI of this work.

4 For a list of party leaders, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1961:24–25).

5 For a list of its members, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1961: 52).

6 For a list of its members, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1961: 43).

7 For a list of its members, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1961: 42).
CHAPTER X

The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1963

From 1958 to 1963, representatives of the U.S., Soviet, and British
governments grappled with the problem of finding a way to limit the testing
of nuclear devices. By 1963, an accord has been reached which prohibited
the testing of such devices underwater, in the atmosphere, or in outer
space. However, the successful Senate ratification of the Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty was not guaranteed. By asking for an affirmative vote, Presi-
dent John Kennedy was asking senators to place some degree of trust in the
Soviets over a vital aspect of American national security. Success would
mean a first step toward detente; failure would leave the superpowers
mired in the Cold War.

Kennedy submitted the treaty to the Senate on August 8, 1963. The
Foreign Relations Committee began its eleven days of hearings on August 12.
Besides its regular members, Chairman J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.)
invited the members of both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to attend the hearings. The first day
the committees heard Secretary of State Dean Rusk praise the treaty. Rusk
argued that it would slow the arms race without changing the balance of
power, it might slow the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and it would
reduce the level of radioactive pollution in the global environment.
The second day of hearings was quite important since Defense Secretary Robert McNamara was scheduled. While committee members expected Rusk to support the treaty, they questioned McNamara to determine what effect the treaty would have on American military security. McNamara's strong endorsement of the treaty impressed many of the senators and may have been the most persuasive testimony heard by the committee. McNamara argued that the treaty's failure would ultimately result in nuclear parity between the superpowers. However, he said its passage would prolong the current American superiority due to the greater level of American technological expertise in underground testing. He concluded by saying that even if the Soviets abrogated the treaty, their transgressions would be detected before any real damage was done. That being the case, McNamara argued, the treaty was in the long-term best interest of the U.S.

When the public hearings ended on August 27, twenty-four witnesses had been heard. Following a short series of closed hearings in which CIA Director John McCone testified, the committee issued its formal report on September 3. By a vote of sixteen to one, the Foreign Relations Committee approved the treaty and requested that the full Senate do likewise. The sole negative vote came from Senator Russell Long (D-La.).

While the Foreign Relations Committee was holding hearings, so was the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. In their closed hearings, the subcommittee's membership was anxious to hear the military and technological arguments regarding the treaty. Military officers and technological experts gave the treaty mixed reviews. The subcommittee issued its report on September 9. In it, the majority concluded that the treaty's provisions entailed serious
military disadvantages for the U.S. While the report did not call for the Senate to reject the treaty, it did note that military factors were among the many other factors which should be considered when individual senators decided how to vote.

Floor debate, although not scheduled until September 9, began four days earlier. Both sides repeated the arguments heard during the committee hearings. As the days passed, one procedural resolution was passed, but no amendments changing the treaty draft were approved. The debate ended on September 24. By an 80-19 vote, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was approved. The Kennedy administration had gotten what it desired from the Senate.
ANALYSIS

I. Stimulus

The formal stimulus for this case came on August 8, 1963, when Kennedy submitted the treaty to the Senate for ratification. However, coding a stimulus was problematic here. On July 26, the day after the treaty was signed, Kennedy addressed the nation on television. In his address he called on the Senate to ratify the treaty promptly. Further, senators knew, with negotiations ongoing during the spring of 1963, that some sort of test ban treaty was likely. Thus, the stimulus coded here is the formal one since concern over such a treaty had been building for months.

II. Contextual Filter

A. Historical Context

Few precedents existed to cope with the problem of nuclear weaponry. The U.S. government had made disarmament and arms control agreements before, but none of these dealt with nuclear arms. Three attempts had been made to deal with the problem of nuclear arms but all had failed. In 1946, the U.S. submitted the Baruch Plan to the U.N. Under it, the American production of nuclear weapons would have stopped and nuclear material would have been transferred to a new body, the International Atomic Development Authority. Further, in 1953 and 1957 nuclear disarmament talks at the U.N. failed. The reason for the failure in all three
cases was the Soviet Union's rejection of international inspection of nuclear facilities (Bailey, 1974:813, 846). Thus, not only had the Soviets scuttled all three previous attempts to deal with the problem of nuclear arms, but their refusal to allow international inspection also served to enhance the American perception that the Soviets could not be trusted.

B. Sequential Context

A new series of U.S.-Soviet arms control and disarmament talks began in 1958. The Eisenhower administration pursued these talks both formally through the U.N. and the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva and informally via letters between Eisenhower and Khrushchev. However, these talks became deadlocked with no real progress being made (Berkowitz, Bock, and Fuccillo, 1977:159).

During his presidential campaign, Kennedy had blasted the Eisenhower administration's lack of progress in this area. He denounced the U.S. position on arms control and disarmament matters as inconsistent and needing a firm direction. Once elected, Kennedy moved to demonstrate his concern about this policy area through his selection of advisors. The appointment of John McCloy, a respected Republican "insider" with years of experience in governmental posts, as his personal advisor on disarmament and arms control showed Kennedy's concern over these issues. Further, his appointee as Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, had been one of the participants in the 1959 Harvard-MIT group which studied the problems involved in test ban negotiations. Finally, Kennedy chose Jerome Weisner as his science advisor. Weisner had previously been the director of the Electronic Laboratory at MIT and was known for
his criticism of past American disarmament and arms control attempts (Berkowitz, Bock and Fuccillo, 1977:159).

However, the new administration fared no better than had its predecessor. Talks up to August 1961 produced no results since the U.S. position still called for international inspections and the Soviets still refused them. The talks suffered a further setback on September 1, 1961, when the Soviets tested a new nuclear device, thereby breaking the unofficial testing ban which had existed since 1958 (Barkowitz, Bock and Fuccillo, 1977:160).

Kennedy's advisors pressed him to also resume testing but he initially resisted. On September 3, he responded to the Soviet test with a joint U.S.-British proposal to end atmospheric testing. The Soviets quickly rejected the proposal and Kennedy reacted by announcing the U.S. would resume underground and laboratory testing. The American position was broadened on April 24, 1962 when Kennedy announced that atmospheric testing would also resume (Berkowitz, Bock, and Fuccillo, 1977:160).

However, the resumption of testing did not halt all movement on the diplomatic front. Talks at Geneva continued until January 1962. Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan continued their talks through July on how to propose a test ban to the Soviets. By the end of July, an ad hoc committee, sponsored by the new Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, had come up with two new proposals. The first was a treaty prohibiting nuclear tests in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space. It avoided past problems because it did not require on-site inspections. The other proposal was a comprehensive ban on all testing. When both of these proposals were submitted at the Geneva talks, the Soviets rejected them.
They particularly criticized the partial test ban approach which they argued, due to its allowance for underground testing, would lead toward a nuclear war and not away from one (Berkowitz, Bock, and Fucillo, 1977:160-161).

In December 1962, the Soviet position began to soften. At the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee meetings in Geneva, the Soviet representative announced that underground tests could be monitored by seismic recording stations either within a nation's own territory or in adjacent nations. Further on December 19, Khrushchev wrote Kennedy that the time had come for a complete test ban. In that regard, he said the Soviets would allow two or three on-site inspections each year. He said he hoped this concession would help Kennedy placate congressional fears over a comprehensive testing ban. Kennedy wrote back on December 28 and said he was pleased with Khrushchev's letter but three inspections per year were inadequate. Still, he said that their differences could be resolved, and he proposed talks between each country's technical experts. These talks began in January 1963 but soon reached an impasse. Khrushchev said he had made as many unilateral concessions to the West as he could. The stalemate continued into June (Berkowitz, Bock, and Fucillo, 1977:161-162).

Some movement, however, was seen on the domestic front at this time. Realizing that a test ban treaty of some type might be forthcoming, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy held hearings from March 5-12, 1963. The witnesses were all representatives of, or researchers being funded by, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Defense Department, or the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In discussing the technical aspects of the American
treaty proposals, the main point drawn from the witnesses was that small underground tests might be indistinguishable from earthquakes. This alarmed some of the committee members. However, the hearings ended with no formal report by the committee.

On May 7, the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee began closed hearings. Prior to the treaty's signing, the subcommittee membership heard from both technical experts and military officers. The technical experts defended the treaty proposals, but William Foster, the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, was forced to admit that he thought military officers were opposed to the treaty proposals. Subsequent military testimony seemed to bear out his fears. General S. W. Betts, U.S. Army and director of the Division of Military Applications of the Atomic Energy Commission, testified that atmospheric testing was needed for national security. Subsequent position papers filed with the subcommittee by Admiral George W. Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations, and General Curtis LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff, argued that the current proposals would impair national security through their limits on nuclear testing.

Although things were not going well in the subcommittee, the administration got a boost in late May. Senator Thomas Dodd (D-Conn.) introduced a resolution with thirty-three co-sponsors which called on the U.S. to submit to the Soviets a test ban treaty outlawing atmospheric and underwater tests. These tests did not require on-site inspections. The resolution did not go beyond introduction, and both Senators Dodd and William Proxmire (D-Wis.) noted that a comprehensive test ban treaty would probably not be approved in the Senate (Berkowitz, Bock, and Fuccillo, 1977:163).
The impasse in negotiations was broken in June 1963. On June 10, Kennedy made a major foreign policy address. In it he called upon the American people to reassess their attitudes toward the Cold War. He said the nuclear threat was man-made and thus could be solved by man. In that regard, he announced that a new round of high-level talks would start shortly in Moscow between U.S., British, and Soviet representatives. The speech received favorable coverage at home and the overseas media strongly endorsed it as a new step toward peace (Berkowitz, Bock, and Fuccillo, 1977:163-164).

On June 12, Kennedy announced the membership of the new negotiating team to be sent to Moscow. It was headed by Averell Harriman, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and former ambassador to Moscow. Harriman's staff was "small and brilliant" (Schlesinger, 1965:905). Its membership consisted of Carl Kaysen (White House staff), John McNaughton (Defense Department), William Tyler (State Department), and Adrian Fisher (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency). Two things were important about the group's membership. First, by appointing Harriman as chief negotiator, Kennedy fulfilled an earlier pledge to Congress that test ban talks would be handled by the State Department rather than by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Second, no military officers were on the negotiating team, and this oversight gave later Senate opponents additional ammunition for their fight against the treaty (Berkowitz, Bock and Fuccillo, 1977:164-165).

On July 2, Khrushchev reacted to Kennedy's June 10 address. He unexpectedly endorsed the plan for a treaty barring atmospheric, underwater, and outer space testing which he had rejected in August of the preceding
year. Trilateral negotiations began in Moscow on July 15 and concluded on
July 25 with the initialing of a "Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in
the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water." Not only did the treaty
ban such tests, but it further banned any test which would spread radio-
activity beyond the testing state's boundaries (Berkowitz, Bock, and

On July 26, Kennedy discussed the treaty in a nationwide television
address and called for its prompt ratification by the Senate. On August 5,
the treaty was formally signed in Moscow. Signing for the U.S. was Secre-
tary of State Rusk. Other members of the U.S. delegation were senators
from the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Joint Atomic Energy Com-
mittees. The Senators included George Aiken (R-Vt.), Leverett Saltonstall
(R-Mass.), J.W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.), John Spark-
man (D-Ala.), and John Pastore (D-R.I.). Senators Everett Dirkson (R-Ill.)
and Bourke Hickenlooper (R-Iowa) were also invited. However, they declined
since they felt their attendance would commit them to the treaty prior to
its Senate debate.

Several aspects of the sequential context deserve special attention.
First, despite his many efforts, Kennedy had no more luck in negotiations
with the Soviets than had his predecessor, until Khrushchev suddenly re-
versed the Soviet's official position against a partial test ban treaty.
Second, Kennedy did try to negate Senate opposition to the treaty by
(1) placing Harriman, from State, in charge of the negotiating team,
(2) by including senators from both parties in the delegation to the sign-
ing ceremony, and (3) by appealing to the public, on June 10 and July 26,
to rally around the negotiations process and the resulting treaty. Kennedy
thus sought to minimize opposition within the Senate, and he also tried to offset that opposition by creating a climate of public opinion favorable to the treaty. However, his failure to include military officers on the negotiating team somewhat played into the hands of his senatorial opponents.

C. Concurrent Context

The negotiations process took place in an environment marked by two changing relationships. East-West relations were improving as relations within the Communist bloc were deteriorating. Although Kennedy tried hard, there was practically no movement in the negotiations until after the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. The Chinese challenged the Soviets' role as the leader of the Communist bloc (Ojha, 1971:111-145). It was in the face of this mounting threat from the Chinese that Khrushchev suddenly reversed his previous policy and made the July 2 statement endorsing the partial test ban concept. The Soviet leader may have hoped either to slow the Chinese nuclear development program by getting them to sign the resulting treaty or to brand the Chinese as "warmongers" if they refused to sign it. Either way, Khrushchev was moderating the threat from the West so that he could turn his attention to the Chinese.

Thus, the concurrent context is important from two perspectives. From the American perspective, the test ban treaty was a further step in the "thawing" of the Cold War which had begun at the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis. From the Soviet perspective, the treaty may have been an expeditious method of reducing tensions with the West so that the Chinese threat could be addressed. Without noting the rapid deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, Khrushchev's sudden shift in favor of the partial test
ban proposal cannot be explained. Settling the test ban issue freed his hands to deal with the Chinese and may also have been a bold move to demonstrate that his commitment to peaceful coexistence was unflinching in the face of Chinese criticism.

III. Issue Area

This case fell into the status area. Members on both sides of the question stressed intangible values. Supporters said the treaty was a way to promote international peace and stability. Opponents questioned the impact the treaty would have on the relationship between the superpowers. Many opponents felt it might destabilize the international system and promote conflict. The means proposed to achieve these values or ends were also intangible since no money was necessary to stop testing. Since the treaty involved both intangible means and ends, it was coded as a status case.

IV. Party Leaders' Preferences

Leaders of both parties were positive to the administration's position concerning the Test Ban Treaty. On the Democratic side, Majority Leader Mansfield's support of the treaty was demonstrated when he strongly attacked Barry Goldwater's (R-Ariz.) assertion that military officers were worried about the treaty. However, Majority Whip Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.) was even stronger in his support of the treaty. As early as 1960, Humphrey had been promoting the "First Step Philosophy." Humphrey (1960: 181) said: "The first step, perhaps, is the hardest, but until we take it we shall never progress toward a security based on the control of armaments
rather than the fear of armaments." Further, his speeches were reprinted and distributed by The Citizens Committee for a Nuclear Test Ban, and he was a member of the American delegation at the treaty signing ceremony. Finally, Humphrey defended the treaty at length in the Senate debate.

The Republican leaders were just as strongly supportive as were the Democrats. Although Minority Leader Dirksen was not an early proponent of the treaty, by the time of the debate his position was clear. In a floor speech, Dirksen said:

I am not a young man...I should not like to have written on my tombstone, "He knew what happened at Hiroshima, but he did not take a first step..." If there be risks, Mr. President, I am willing to assume them for my country. So I support the treaty; and I will vote for the approval of the treaty with no reservations whatsoever (Congressional Record, 16 Sept. 1963, 109:16788-91).

On September 12, the day after Kirksen made the above appeal, Minority Whip Thomas Kuchel (R-Cal.) said: "I hope and pray that when the roll is called the U.S. Senate, by an overwhelming vote, will approve the treaty" (Congressional Record, 13 Sept. 1963, 109:16884-95). Thus Republican, as well as Democratic, Senate leaders strongly endorsed the administration's position on the treaty. Accordingly, the party leaders' preferences variable was coded as positive.

V. Committee Leaders' Preferences

Committee leaders' preferences were also positive in this case. Three full committees and one subcommittee were involved in the treaty's Senate consideration. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was first to deal with the proposals. During the committee's hearings prior to the treaty's signing, the committee was heavily tilted against the administration's position. Senators Richard Russell (D-Ga.), Henry Jackson (D-Wash.)
and Hickenlooper were initially skeptical of the administration's proposals. Others were openly hostile. Representative Craig Hosmer (R-Cal.) attacked the administration's witnesses in the hearings by disrupting the presentation of their prepared statements with caustic questions. He later blasted Kennedy for acting like a test expert in his own right. Finally, Hosmer made a speech to the press entitled "Administration Test Ban Proposals Blueprint for National Suicide." Others who strongly opposed the proposals were Senators Carl Curtis (R-Neb.) and Wallace Bennett (R-Utah). Curtis was afraid any such treaty might soften American "anti-communist" attitudes while Bennett opposed any version which allowed underground testing.

The administration's only friend during the hearings was Chairman John Pastore (D-R.I.). He tried to manipulate the hearings so that administrative witnesses could put their best foot forward. However, his support of the proposals was not enough by itself to overcome the opposition of his colleagues.

However after these hearings, the committee's preferences changed. The committee was asked to sit in on the hearings held by the Foreign Relations Committee. By this point the opposition from Jackson and Hickenlooper had moderated. Kennedy's assurances that safeguards would be taken to preserve national security under the treaty caused these two senators to change their preferences, and both Jackson and Hickenlooper endorsed the treaty. Their endorsements gave Pastore two allies. Aiken was also added to the fold when he joined Pastore in attending the signing ceremony. Since the chairman was strongly supportive of the treaty and he had a supportive bloc to lead, the coding rules specified that the committee's preferences at the time of the Foreign Relation Committee's
hearings be coded as positive.

The next body involved was the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee. Most of the subcommittee's members strongly opposed the treaty in both its proposed forms and in its final form. Chairman John Stennis (D-Miss.) was biased against the treaty when the subcommittee hearings began. Moreover he strongly opposed Dodd's resolution calling for a ban on atmospheric and oceanic testing. Strom Thurmond (D-S.C.) was also strongly opposed to the treaty. Throughout the hearings, he appeared to discount supportive arguments. During the floor debate, he continually inserted into the record editorials and commentaries critical of the treaty. On one day alone, he inserted twenty-three different items which found weak points in the treaty. Goldwater was a more vocal opponent of the treaty. He strongly criticized it both in the subcommittee hearings and on the Senate floor. Finally, Margaret Chase Smith (R-Me.) also came out against the treaty. She said that its disadvantages in the military area outweighed its political advantages.

The treaty's few friends on the subcommittee were Leverett Saltonstall (R-Mass.), Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), and Jackson. Saltonstall was the only member who did not sign the subcommittee's report. He found "its general tenor and its specific findings and conclusions unduly pessimistic" (U.S. Senate, 1963B:14). Saltonstall declared that he supported the treaty and would vote for it. Both Symington and Jackson signed the subcommittee report because they felt the treaty had military disadvantages. However, Symington declared that he would vote for the treaty and Jackson's conversion, to a position of support of the treaty, came during the time of the hearings. Yet these three voices could not overcome the strong
negative tones of the rest of the members. Therefore, the subcommittee was coded as negative.

The Foreign Relations Committee had the primary jurisdiction for the treaty's consideration, and its hearings were the focal point of Senate support for the treaty. The support given to the treaty by Senators Humphrey, Mansfield, Symington, Hickenlooper, and Aiken has been previously noted. Chairman Fulbright was also strongly in favor of the treaty. He was a member of the delegation at the signing ceremony and, once the hearings began, he demonstrated his preferences very clearly. When Professor Robert Strauz-Hupe testified against the treaty, Fulbright challenged his statements in extremely sharp exchanges. Finally, Fulbright managed the treaty on the floor of the Senate. Like Fulbright, John Sparkman (D-Ala.) also strongly supported the treaty. Even before the hearings, Sparkman had been one of the co-sponsors of the Dodd resolution in May. He was also a member of the American delegation at the signing ceremony and he joined Fulbright in blasting Strauz-Hupe in the hearings. Others on the committee who were supportive of the treaty were Dodd, who introduced the May resolution in support of a partial test ban treaty, and Wayne Morse (D-Ore.), Frank Lausche (D-Ohio), and Frank Church (D-Idaho), who were among the Dodd resolution's co-sponsors. None of the committee members publicly spoke out against the treaty. Therefore, the committee's preferences were coded as positive to the administration's position.

The final committee to be considered was the Armed Services Committee. Like the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, it was invited to attend the Foreign Relations Committee hearings. Earlier discussion noted the strongly negative preferences of Chairman Russell and Senators Stennis, Thurmond,
Smith and Goldwater. Those strongly supportive of the treaty were Senators Saltonstall, Claire Engle (D-Cal.), Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii), and Clifford Case (R-N.J.). Saltonstall's strong support for the treaty was shown in the prior subcommittee hearings and in the subcommittee's final report. The others demonstrated their support by being co-sponsors of the Dodd resolution. However since the committee chairman led a strongly negative bloc, that bloc's preferences were coded for the committee.

Thus the committees dealing with the treaty split in their preferences. The Foreign Relations Committee was positive, both the Armed Services Committee and its Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee were negative, and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was split. During its March hearings, it was negative. However by the August hearings with the Foreign Relations Committee, the preferences of the Joint Committee had changed to positive. The coding rules specified that when multiple committees split in their preferences, the preferences of the one with the strongest claim to jurisdiction is coded. Since Foreign Relations traditionally handled treaties, its preferences overrode the others. For that reason, the committee leaders' preferences variable was coded as positive to the administration's position.

IV. **Constituency Pressures**

Constituency pressures were positive to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Strong support came from the general public, important segments of the news media, and interest groups. General public opinion toward a test ban treaty changed over time. After the Soviets resumed their nuclear tests in August 1961, a September 6 AIPO poll reported that 59% of the American public wanted testing resumed as well. However as the momentum increased
in the negotiations in 1963, public opinion rallied behind Kennedy. After his strong public appeal on June 10 for a change in American attitudes toward the Cold War, a Harris poll in early July demonstrated that 47% of the public gave unqualified approval to the negotiations, 20% gave qualified approval, 17% opposed the negotiations, and 10% were unsure of their opinions. Moreover, this shift in public opinion in support of the President's position grew stronger over time. By September 1, 1963, just prior to the Senate ratification debate, the polls had changed dramatically. Table 3 lists the results by that date.

Table 3
Poll Results, September 1, 1963

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poll Results by September 1, 1963</th>
<th>Gallop</th>
<th>Harris</th>
<th>Minnesota</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approved of Treaty</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualified Approval</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposed</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Lepper, 1971:54)

Thus, public opinion was strongest in support of the administration's position immediately before the Senate debate.

The news media took a mixed stand over the issue of nuclear testing. In the 1950's, newspaper editorials were evenly split between those who favored continued testing and those which did. The only "prestige" papers
to support an end to testing were the New York Times and the Washington Post. Most magazine editorials during this time period also favored continued testing. The only mass circulation magazine to favor a test ban was Look while U.S. News and World Report, Time, Life, and Reader's Digest opposed any test ban.

The situation did not radically change during the Kennedy administration. The broad pattern of opposition to a test ban, as reflected in magazine editorials, remained basically the same. Some slight gain in Kennedy's favor may have occurred in newspaper editorials. A private study of 307 newspapers, prepared for Kennedy in late July 1963, revealed that 39% supported the treaty, 14% gave it qualified support, 25% were uncommitted, and 22% were opposed. Not only was a 39% approval rating not that impressive, but Kennedy was never told that some large circulation papers were intentionally omitted from the sample due to their opposition to the treaty. Some of these papers were the Chicago Tribune, the New York News, the Oakland Tribune, and the San Diego Union. Thus the nation's newspapers, as a whole, did not rally around Kennedy's position in the 1960's. Editorial stances in newspapers probably stayed about even as they had in the 1950's.

However in the fall of 1962 and the spring of 1963, one noticeable change did occur. More and more of the nation's syndicated columnists began to support the American position in the negotiations. Most columnists called for a break in the negotiations deadlock in Geneva and thus supported the administration's position.

Overall, the news media exhibited a "two-tiered" effect in this case. On the one hand, most newspapers and mass-circulation magazines opposed the
test ban treaty. However, some of the nation's "prestige" papers including the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch endorsed the test ban treaty. Moreover, some smaller circulation magazines favored the treaty. These were the Saturday Review, the Nation, the Reporter, and the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. Finally, syndicated political columnists began to rally behind the President. So if the mass media opposed the treaty, the media read by the "attentive public" in this case favored it.11

Finally, interest groups as a whole also favored the treaty. Those who testified at the Foreign Relations hearings included representatives of the AFL-CIO, the American Veterans Committee, the Federation of American Scientists, and the Physicians for Social Responsibility. Other groups that worked hard in support of the treaty were the Friends Committee on National Legislation, the United World Federalists, and the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy.

Moreover, the impact of these groups was doubly enhanced because they were well-organized. At Kennedy's urging, Norman Cousins, the editor of Saturday Review, formed the Citizens Committee for a Nuclear Test Ban. The Citizen's Committee acted as an umbrella organization to direct the 30-odd groups which supported the treaty. It hired the advertising agency of Ruder and Finn to handle mass media materials, prepare radio and television spots, and monitor editorial support for the treaty. The firm of Doyle, Dane and Bernbach was used to place full-page advertisements in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. Sanford Persons of the United World Federalists and Sanford Gottlieb of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy worked together to handle the lobbying in Washington while Edward
Gray of the United Auto Workers coordinated labor activities. Overall, the Citizens Committee carefully choreographed public support so that its effectiveness was maximized.

Compared to the Citizens Committee, opposing groups were few in number and unorganized. The opposition came mainly from the Air Force Association, the Liberty Lobby, the Americans for National Security, and the Young Americans for Freedom. Not only were these groups unorganized, but their testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee was so poorly prepared that the committee members did not take it seriously (Berkowitz, Bock, and Fucillo, 1977:171-174). Finally, military objectives to the treaties were mollified by safeguards Kennedy promised to enact.

Thus, strong support for the treaty came from public opinion polls, some of the "prestige" press, syndicated columnists, and over 30 interest groups. Further, the Citizens Committee for a Nuclear Test Ban organized these forces so that the impact of opposing groups paled by comparison. Due to this configuration of public inputs, the constituency pressures variable was coded as positive.

VII. Presidential Involvement

The level of presidential involvement in this case was standard. Kennedy felt the Test Ban Treaty's ratification was the most crucial congressional issue he had yet faced and, in Schlesinger's (1965:910) words, he was "determined to win if it cost him the 1964 election." Therefore Kennedy went "all out" to get the treaty approved (Berkowitz, Bock and Fucillo, 1977:165-167). He made a television and radio appeal for the treaty the day after it was initialed. From that point until the treaty
was approved, he brought up the need for ratification at each of his press conferences. He also personally contacted senators who were uncommitted. Further, he not only sponsored the creation of the Citizens Committee for a Nuclear Test Ban, but he also

advised [this group] which Senators should hear from their constituents, approved their newspaper and TV advertisements, counseled them on their approach to the unconvinced, and suggested particular business and other leaders for them to contact. (Sorensen, 1966:833).

However, the most crucial single action Kennedy took was to undercut the Senate opposition based on the fear that U.S. military strength would drop. In a letter to Mansfield and Dirksen, Kennedy promised four safeguards regarding the treaty. These safeguards were:

1. Underground nuclear testing, which is permitted under the treaty, will be vigorously and diligently carried forward, and the equipment, facilities, personnel and funds necessary for that purpose will be provided.
2. The United States will maintain a posture of readiness to resume testing in the environments prohibited by the present treaty, and it will take all the necessary steps to safeguard our national security in the event that there should be an abrogation or violation of any treaty provision.
3. Our facilities for the detection of possible violations of this treaty will be expanded and improved as required to increase our assurance against clandestine violation by others.
4. This Government will maintain strong weapons laboratories in a vigorous program of weapons development, in order to ensure that the United States will continue to have in the future a strength fully adequate for an effective national defense. (Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1963:669-671).

It was this action by Kennedy which mollified the military and converted many prior Senate opponents into treaty supporters. These safeguards satisfied Senator Jackson, and his support pulled in others which eventually resulted in the large victory margin. Thus Kennedy's constant efforts to secure ratification of the treaty went far beyond a minimalist
response, and his efforts probably made the difference in the Senate approval of the treaty. Accordingly, Kennedy's level of involvement was coded as standard.

VIII. Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior

The Senate response to Kennedy's appeals was a no modification behavior. The Senate did not modify the treaty at all. Senator Russell's reservation was added, but it was a procedural clarification that merely specified that the President could not amend the treaty by executive agreement. The Russell reservation was no modification of the administration's position.

Propositions

In summary, the Test Ban Treaty was a status case. Party leaders' preferences, committee leaders' preferences, and constituency pressures were positive to the administration's position. The level of presidential involvement was standard, and a no modification behavior was the result.

Three propositions were examined in this case. With the above variable values, the status (1.1), no modification (2.2), and presidential involvement (5.1) propositions were supported.

Significant Aspects

Two things stand out in importance in this case. First, concurrent external events played a pivotal role in the negotiations. Kennedy actually had no better luck at striking an agreement with the Soviets than had Eisenhower's negotiators. As a result, the Soviet acceptance of a proposal Khrushchev had already rejected had to be surprising. Khrushchev's
decision to make the agreement was due, not to Kennedy's efforts, but to his own need to reduce tension with the West so that the threat posed by the Chinese could be handled. Kennedy, who had staked his prestige on the negotiations, got lucky.

The other element worth remembering here was the degree to which Kennedy used all the forces at his disposal to ensure the Senate's approval of the treaty. His dramatic June 10 speech began to turn public opinion through his creation of the Citizens Committee for a Nuclear Test Ban, and he used it to apply constituency pressure where it could be most effective. He lobbied wavering or uncommitted senators, and he stressed the importance of the treaty in repeated news conferences. Finally, his proposed safeguards defused the opposition of Senator Jackson and swung some crucial conservative votes in favor of the treaty. The point is this: Kennedy dominated the domestic fight for ratification. Even if Khrushchev handed the treaty to the President, Kennedy worked hard and earned his victory in the Senate.
CHAPTER X NOTES

1Unless otherwise specified, the research for this case comes from Lepper (1971).

2The Senators who voted against the treaty were Bennett (R-Utah), H. Byrd (D-Va.), R. Byrd (D-W. Va.), Curtis (R-Neb.), Eastland (D-Miss.), Goldwater (R-Ariz.), Jordan (R-Idaho), Lausche (D-Ohio), Long (D-La.), McClellan (D-Ark.), Mecham (R-N.M.), Robertson (D-Va.), Russell (D-Ga.), Simpson (R-Wyo.), Smith (R-Me.), Stennis (D-Miss.), Talmadge (D-Ga.), Thurmond (D-S.C.), and Tower (R-Tex.).

3Such prior agreements concerned disarmament on the Great Lakes (in 1818) and along the U.S.-Canadian border (in 1971). The Washington Congerence of 1921-1922 resulted in an arms control agreement covering large naval vessels. Finally in 1928-29, the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawed war as an instrument of national policy (Bailey, 1974).


5For a list of these leaders, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1963:24).

6For a list of its members, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1963:59).

7For a list of its members, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1963:41).

8For a list of its members, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1963:42).

9For a list of its members, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1963:41).

10For more information on "prestige papers", see Cohen (1963:139) and Matthews (1954:206).

11For more information on the "attentive public" see Almond (1960).
In 1967, President Lyndon Johnson tried to improve U.S.-Latin American relations by continuing the momentum created by President Kennedy with the Alliance for Progress. Prior to attending a Latin American summit conference in Punta del Este, Uruguay, Johnson asked Congress for an advance authorization for increased foreign aid funds for Latin American countries. He hoped that this authorization would strengthen his hand at the summit meeting. However, the advance authorization never materialized.

On March 13, Johnson made his appeal. He asked Congress for an advance commitment of approximately $1.5 billion in economic aid for Latin America. The money was to finance the creation of a Latin American Common Market. Moreover, some of the funds were to go to the Inter-American Development Bank to provide increased financing for health, education, agricultural, and multinational projects undertaken as a part of the Alliance for Progress (New York Times, March 18, 1967:11).

The request went smoothly through the House of Representatives. Brief hearings on the bill were held on March 14 and 15 by the Foreign Affairs Committee (U.S. House, 1967:iii). Appearing for the administration, Secretary of State Dean Rusk told the committee members that Johnson needed the resolution passed swiftly since the purpose of the bill, beyond that of
helping Latin Americans, was to give the President more diplomatic leverage at the upcoming summit conference (New York Times, March 15, 1967:18). After accepting Rusk's plea, the committee members made one slight change in the bill's text. They strengthened the wording a bit to ensure that the receipt of economic aid would be dependent upon "self-help" efforts by the recipients (New York Times, March 23, 1967:16). The Foreign Affairs Committee then passed the bill by a 24-3 vote (New York Times, March 21, 1967:9).

The bill reached the House floor on March 22 (Congressional Record, 1967:7645). During the debate, one attempt was made to scuttle the bill. The attempt by Edward Derwinski (R-Ill.) to substitute a much weaker version of the bill, like one being sponsored in the Senate by Senator J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), was defeated by a 210-147 vote (Congressional Record, 1967:7681-7682). The House then passed the bill, as recommended by the Foreign Affairs Committee, by a vote of 234-117 (Congressional Record, 1967:7683).

The bill received a cool reception in the Senate. The Foreign Relations Committee held hearings which began with testimony by Secretary Rusk. Rusk again defended Johnson's diplomatic need for the advance authorization of aid and stressed that former President Eisenhower had endorsed the idea of a Latin American Common Market. Although Rusk's testimony seemed to have "gone far in convincing the Senate committee that the administration had no massive future aid requests or hidden plans up its sleeve," Fulbright was not sure (New York Times, March 18, 1967:11). He told Rusk he was considering a substitute resolution which would call on the Senate to give "sympathetic consideration" to implementing the agreements made at the Punta del Este Conference (New York Times, March 18, 1967:11).
As the days went by, Fulbright and others on the committee began to get mad at what they saw as "mounting White House pressure on them" (New York Times, March 21, 1967:9). As their mood darkened, the hearings began to move in directions opposed by the administration. On March 21, Senator Ernest Gruening (D-Alaska) testified for three hours in opposition to the bill. Further, both Senator Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.) and N. R. Danielian of the International Economic Policy Association filed written statements in opposition to the administration's bill (New York Times, March 22, 1967:31). Matters came to a head on April 3 when the Foreign Relations Committee adopted, by a 9-0 vote with four abstentions, a substitute version of the bill. It merely called on Congress to give "due consideration" to any agreements reached at the Punta del Este summit meeting. One unnamed White House official called the substitute "worse than useless" (New York Times, April 4, 1967:1).

As a result, Johnson went to the Latin American summit meeting without the desired advance authorization. Before he left for Punta del Este, Johnson said that he was sure his proposals would pass by two-to-one margins in both houses of Congress, but he realized they would pass only after the summit meeting, and not before (New York Times, April 9, 1967:11). Regardless of the merit of the proposals, Johnson had wanted the authorization before he left, but the Senate would not provide it.
ANALYSIS

I. Stimulus

The stimulus for this case came on March 13, 1967. Johnson asked Congress for the aid authorization in advance of the meeting at Punta del Este.

II. Contextual Filter

A. Historical Context

The historical context was dominated by a pattern of U.S.-Latin American relations which could only be described as paternalistic. Latin American leaders had always been expected to do what the U.S. government requested. Their behavior was conditioned by the application of American sanctions or rewards.

Whenever Latin American leaders strayed too far from the course prescribed for them by the U.S. in their domestic or foreign policies, they could expect American sanctions. Such sanctions could range from reduced levels of American economic and military aid to armed interventions. The leftist regimes of Presidents Arevalo and Arbenz in Guatemala as well as that of Premier Castro in Cuba had experienced reductions in the level of American assistance they received as compared to their right-wing predecessors. Further, American interventions into the domestic affairs of Latin American nations were commonplace. Such interventions had occurred in
Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Panama.  

If the sanctions applied by the U.S. Government were bad, the rewards were not much better. In the period prior to 1962, Latin American nations had consistently received less American aid than had Western European or Asian nations (Berkowitz, Bock and Fuccillo, 1977:201). The lone possible exception was the $90 million in American aid sent to Castillo in Guatemala after he successfully overthrew the Arbenz regime (Nathan and Oliver, 1976:219). Many Latin American leaders resented the fact that they were expected to do the U.S. government's bidding but were concomitantly left out of the American largesse. As a result, U.S.-Latin American relations hid a growing level of resentment beneath a facade of official cordiality. This resentment was openly demonstrated when Vice President Richard Nixon made his "goodwill tour" of Latin America in 1958. Mobs in Lima shouted Nixon down and threw stones at him. Further, in Caracas Nixon and his party were spat upon and mobs attacked his limousine (Bailey, 1974:849). Thus by the end of the Eisenhower administration, U.S.-Latin American relations were becoming increasingly strained.

B. Sequential Context

In order to improve these relations, President John Kennedy proposed the Alliance for Progress in 1961. The formal purpose of the program, projected at a cost of $20 billion in U.S. aid over ten years, was to help Latin American states to address their social needs. However the informal purpose, at least from the American perspective, was to preclude the appeal of future "Castros" (Bailey, 1974:869-870).
Johnson saw his appeal for increased funding for Latin American aid as the necessary second step in the Alliance for Progress. He told the delegates at Punta del Este that the first step, that of getting the Alliance started, had been successful. However, he felt his proposals (such as a Latin American Common Market, etc.) would start the second phase of the Alliance's activity. The proposals were aimed at cutting "to the heart of the problem - the modernization of over protected Latin American industry, under-financed Latin American agriculture and education" (Congress and the Nation, V. II:98-99).

Moreover, U.S.-Latin American relations had deteriorated due to recent American interventions. The abortive attempt at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 and Johnson's dispatch of troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965 presented an increasingly negative American image which the administration hoped to counterbalance (Bailey, 1974:902). As a result, the sequential context was marked by a deterioration of U.S.-Latin American relations which Johnson hoped to arrest at the Punta del Este conference.

C. Concurrent Context

The concurrent context played a crucial role in this case. Relations between the White House and the Foreign Relations Committee had steadily deteriorated since the 1964 passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Johnson had alarmed many of the Senators, particularly Fulbright, Symington, and Mansfield, when he used the vague "blank check" authority of the resolution to sharply escalate the American role in the Vietnam conflict. Feeling that they had been misled, the committee lashed out at the President's Vietnam policy in 1966 and 1967 as well as questioning other American foreign policy commitments. Thus as public opinion began to veer away from predominant support for the administration's Vietnam policy, a not-so-cold-war was developing between the President and the committee.
As a result of this conflict, Fulbright and others on the committee began to worry about Congress being bypassed by the executive in the making of foreign policy. With such a concern, they wanted to curtail the President's desire to act unilaterally. As a result, they were not pleased to find him again hurriedly asking for advance authority to commit the nation to a foreign policy program, thereby denying Congress the opportunity to study the matter in detail.

One final offshoot of this syndrome of intragovernmental conflict was the growing unpopularity of the Vietnam War (which the committee helped to create). With the 1968 elections approaching, a "Senate source" revealed that the administration's Democratic opponents on the committee were anxious to put some distance between themselves and the President (New York Times, April 6, 1967:11). With Johnson becoming increasingly unpopular due to the war, publicly standing up to him became "good politics."

Consequently, the concurrent issue of the Vietnam War heavily influenced the committee's action on the question of Latin American aid. The Foreign Relations Committee was not interested in granting the President vague, advance authority to do anything in foreign policy after being "burned" with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. A "veteran Republic Senator" said that a credibility gap existed in that the committee Democrats no longer trusted the President (New York Times, April 9, 1967:IV, 1).

Finally with the 1968 elections approaching, it was politically desirable to oppose the President. Senator Aiken summed it up by saying that this episode was not a foreign policy matter, it was a "domestic political situation" (New York Times, April 9, 1967:IV,1).
III. Issue Area

This case fell into the human resources area. The ends stressed by members of Congress were intangible ones. The President's supporters stressed the need to improve the general quality of life in Latin America. His opponents retorted that the presidential-congressional imbalance over the control of foreign policy was what needed to be improved. The means to achieve these ends concerned the expenditure of funds. Such an intangible/tangible mix of ends and means resulted in a human resources decision.

IV. Party Leaders' Preferences

Party leaders' preferences were negative to the administration's position on the advance authorization of funds. Leaders of both parties in the Senate expressed preferences in the case. Majority Leader Mansfield came out strongly for the Fulbright resolution. Moreover when pressed to seek an amendment on the floor reinstating the original administration language, Mansfield angrily refused. He argued that the administrative comment calling Fulbright's resolution "worse than useless" was gratuitous and irresponsible, and that comment prevented any further action in the President's behalf (New York Times, April 10, 1967:21). While Mansfield's preferences were strongly negative, Minority Leader Dirksen's were positive. Dirksen said he and other Republicans wanted to reverse the Foreign Relations Committee's decision on the Senate floor, but there just was not enough time before Johnson left for Punta del Este (New York Times, April 7, 1967:17).

Two House leaders expressed their preferences. Majority Leader Carl Albert (D-Okl.) defended the resolution in floor debate by saying:
This House should speedily approve the joint resolution before us giving full support to President Johnson and the American delegation...at the meeting...In Punta del Este, Uruguay... (Congressional Record, 1967:7677).

Minority Leader Gerald Ford (R-Mich.) also praised the resolution on the House floor. He further defended it by arguing that it was not an advance commitment of specific amounts of money (Congressional Record, 1967:7656). With contradictory preferences being expressed between the House and Senate, the negative preferences of the Senate Majority Leader were coded

V. Committee Leaders' Preferences

Committee leaders' preferences were also negative. The Foreign Affairs Committee held hearings in the House. A number of members expressed preferences on the resolution. Chairman Thomas Morgan (D-Pa.) led a large positive bloc. During their hearings, Morgan called on both the committee and the entire Congress to pass the resolution quickly (U.S. House, 1967:51-52). Others who called on the House to back up President Johnson on the aid issue were Paul Findley (R-Ill.), James Fulton (R-Pa.), Cornelius Gallagher (D-N.J.), William Mailliard (R-Cal.), and Robert Taft (R-Ohio) (U.S. House, 1967:33,38,41-42; Congressional Record, 1967:7669-7670). Others like Wayne Hays (D-Ohio), Barratt O'Hara (D-Ill.), and Armistead Seldon (D-Ala.) supported the resolution because they appreciated the idea of presidential consultation prior to an event, rather than after it (U.S. House, 1967:15, 19, 21). Finally, Donald Fraser (D-Minn.) and Edna Kelly (D-N.Y.) supported it because they said Latin Americans needed more U.S. aid (U.S. House, 1967:10-11, 35-36).

Some committee members opposed the resolution. Peter Frelinghuysen (R-N.J.) said the administration was "pointing a gun at the head of Congress" by saying that, should Congress fail to concur, U.S.-Latin American relations
would deteriorate (U.S. House, 1967:18). During their hearings, H.R. Gross (R-Iowa) told Secretary Rusk:

I resent trying to jamb this thing down our throats on an almost overnight basis; I don't like it at all. (U.S. House, 1967:21).

Gross then challenged Rusk to prove the Alliance for Progress was not a failure (U.S. House, 1967:23). Edward Derwinski (R-Ill.) and Vernon Thomson (R-Wis.) joined Gross in filing minority views to the committee report. Their report called the resolution a "blank check as to policy and money" (Congressional Record, 1967:7650-7651). However, the preferences of these four members were overridden by the positive bloc led by Chairman Morgan.

The Foreign Relations Committee handled the administration's request in the Senate. Chairman Fulbright led a large negative bloc on the committee. Although Fulbright said on March 17 that he wanted to help Latin Americans, he warned that the administration was trying to "pressure" Congress and turn it into a "rubber stamp" (U.S. Senate, 1967:20,88). He went on to argue that Congress should not lose any more ground to the executive branch; the administration's resolution was "unnecessary," and he therefore introduced his substitute resolution (U.S. Senate, 1967:47). When questioned about a meeting Johnson had with congressional leaders before requesting the legislation, a meeting unattended by Fulbright, Fulbright replied that the leaders had been briefed, not consulted, by the President (New York Times, March 18, 1967:11). Next on April 3, Fulbright denounced Johnson's request as another "blank check" designed to avoid constitutional appropriations procedures (New York Times, April 4, 1967:1).

The rest of the negative bloc included seven Democrats - Frank Church (Idaho), Albert Gore (Tenn.), Frank Lausche (Ohio), Eugene McCarthy (Minn.),
Claiborne Pell (R.I.), John Sparkman (Ala.), and Stuart Symington (Mo.)—
and three Republicans—Frank Carlson (Kan.), Karl Mundt (S.D.), and John
Williams (Del.). Church, Pell, and Symington argued in the hearings that
such a resolution set a bad precedent. Not only was the resolution seen
as setting an advance commitment, but it could bind Congress prior to
future summit conferences (U.S. Senate, 1967: 76, 83, 135-138). Gore was
more emphatic in his comments. He called the resolution "crude in manner,
erroneous in concept, psychologically wrong and politically counter-
productive" (U.S. Senate, 1967: 127). Carlson said the resolution faced a
big problem in that Latin Americans were afraid to invest in their own
countries (U.S. Senate, 1967: 52). Finally, Lausche, McCarthy, Mundt,
Sparkman, and Williams opposed the hasty manner in which the administration
presented the resolution to Congress (New York Times, April 9, 1967:IV,1).

However, there were some supporters for the President's proposal on
the committee. The pro-administration forces were led by Senator Wayne
Morse (D-Ore.), the chairman of the subcommittee on Latin America and the
bill's sponsor in the Senate (U.S. Senate, 1967:22). He denounced Fulbright's
assertion that the measure attempted to turn the Senate into a rubber stamp.
Morse further said the measure was in no way similar to the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution (U.S. Senate, 1967:92). The other administration supporters on
the committee demonstrated their preferences by endorsing the aims of the
resolution and/or stressing the need to support the President in his attempt
at consultation prior to action. These supporters included John Sherman
Cooper (R-Ky.), Bourke Hickenlooper (R-Iowa), and Aiken (New York Times,
April 6, 1967:11).

However, the strongly negative stance of Fulbright and his ten allies
on the committee overrode these supportive preferences of Morse, et. al.
Thus, the committee's preferences were coded as negative. With contradictory preferences in the House and Senate, the negative Senate preferences were coded for the committee leaders' preferences variable.

VI. Constituency Pressures

Constituency pressures were positive in this case. During the hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, two interest groups inserted statements for the record. Both the League of Women Voters and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce endorsed the resolution and praised its general provisions (U.S. Senate, 1967:158-159). The Council for Latin America, representing over 200 American corporations comprising 85% of U.S. investment in Latin America, also endorsed the resolution (Congressional Record, 1967: 7652-7653). Finally, a New York Times editorial (March 18, 1967:28) wholeheartedly endorsed the President's proposals, praised the Foreign Affairs Committee for approving the resolution, and called on the Senate to do the same.

Two instances of opposing views came to light. On March 21, N.R. Danielian of the International Economic Policy Association filed a written statement with the Foreign Relations Committee opposing the resolution. He argued that the resolution's provisions, if implemented, could damage U.S.-Latin American trade (U.S. Senate, 1967:151-153). Further, the U.S. tuna industry opposed the resolution if it sent aid funds to Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, or Peru. These countries were notorious for seizing American tuna boats (Congressional Record, 1967:7665). Nevertheless, these two negative inputs were not enough to offset the positive ones by the League of Women Voters, the Chamber of Commerce, the Council for Latin America, and the New York Times. Accordingly, the constituency pressures variable was coded as positive.
VII. Presidential Involvement

The level of presidential involvement in this case was standard. The single, most clear-cut example of Johnson's standard involvement occurred prior to his March 13 address to Congress. Before he requested the advance commitment of aid, he invited 40 congressional leaders to the White House where he described what he wanted regarding the Punta del Este conference (New York Times, March 18, 1967:11; U.S. House, 1967:15).

Johnson also put indirect pressure on Congress by heightening the importance he attached to the conference. One method he used to accomplish this purpose was to invite 29 Latin American diplomats to spend the Easter weekend with him and Lady Bird. This weekend gathering was ballyhooed in the press as a buildup for the Punta del Este conference (New York Times, April 1, 1967:25; April 2, 1967:1).

However, the best evidence of Johnson's prodding of Congress came from the targets of the attempt. On March 17, Fulbright warned his colleagues that the administration was trying to "pressure" them (New York Times, March 18, 1967:11). On March 21 it was reported the Fulbright and his supporters on the Foreign Relations Committee were getting mad due to "mounting White House pressure on them" (New York Times, March 21, 1967:9). The next day, Representative Gorss of the Foreign Affairs Committee made similar comments. He argued that the White House was giving his committee the "bum's rush" to get the bill passed. He went on to blast the White House for putting intense pressure on the Congress (New York Times, March 22, 1967:31). Further, agents of the President made a last-ditch appeal to prevent the scuttling of the administration's request. Foreign Relations Committee members were incensed when, immediately prior to their closed session devoted to choosing between the administration's or Fulbright's
language, the President sent over Secretary Rusk and Sol Linowitz to try to change their minds (New York Times, April 5, 1967:1).

The overall effect of this presidential lobby campaign was counter-productive. An "informed source" in the Senate noted that Johnson did not get what he wanted from the Senate because he pushed too hard; he "hit a nerve" (New York Times, April 9, 1967:IV,1). Due to this presidential drive to succeed, the level of presidential involvement was coded as standard.

VIII. Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior

The congressional output in this episode was an initiative behavior. Led by Fulbright, the majority on the committee asserted their own prerogatives by refusing to work within the constraints of Johnson's bill and recommending their own, much weaker, substitute. The committee's action achieved its desired end of not losing further ground to the President. Their success was due to the fact that, after a strong initial campaign to get his version passed, Johnson gave up when the Fulbright resolution was approved by the committee. Thus Johnson was stopped by a Senate initiative.

Propositions

To summarize the variable values, this case was categorized as one dealing with human resources. Both party and committee leaders' preferences were negative to the administration's position while constituency pressures were positive. The level of presidential involvement was standard and the congressional output was an initiative behavior.
This case explored three propositions. The party leaders (2.1) and committee leaders (3.1) propositions were supported, but the presidential involvement (5.1) one was not. It says:

When the level of presidential involvement is standard, the probability of no modification behaviors increases while the probabilities of resistance and initiative behaviors decrease.

The proposition did not hold in this case. With a context dominated by memories of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, the harder the President pushed for this advance authorization, the less likely its Senate passage became. Members of the Foreign Relations Committee dug in their heels and would not budge under the presidential pressure. Instead of a no modification response, the President received an initiative response from the Senate.

Significant Aspects

Poor executive branch-congressional relations in the concurrent context dominated this case. Senate opposition to the administration's Vietnam policy carried over to any foreign policy matter in which the administration asked for anything resembling a "blank check." Thus the advance aid authorization request was a casualty of the mistrust Johnson had generated with his Vietnam decisions. With domestic opposition to the Vietnam War growing, it is not surprising that Johnson's key Senate opponents were Democrats. To whatever extent they were identified with Johnson's policies, these Democrats could suffer at the polls in the 1968 elections. The aid request gave these senators a chance to publicly disassociate themselves with Johnson's foreign policy. Finally, it was unfortunate from Johnson's perspective that so many of his opponents were concentrated on the key committee for this case. Had they been dispersed across the Senate's other committees, Johnson's aid request might well have been approved.
CHAPTER XI NOTES

1 Unless otherwise specified, the research for this case comes from Congress and the Nation (V.I, 1965-1968:98-99).

2 For further information on these events, see Chapter VI and Chapter IX. For details of the 1965 Dominican intervention, see Berkowitz, Bock, and Fuccillo (1977:178-198).

3 For more information on the Foreign Relation Committee's role vis-a-vis the executive branch during this time, see Chapter I.

4 For a list of these leaders, see Congressional Directory (1967:369, 374-375).

5 For a list of its members, see Congressional Directory (1967:270).

6 For a list of its members, see Congressional Directory (1967:257).
In 1969, the new Nixon administration faced a challenge from Capitol Hill over proposed military expenditures. While many individual weapon systems came under critical scrutiny, one of the most hotly contested items was the authorization of funds for the new Safeguard anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system. The Johnson administration's Sentinel ABM system had been the focus of a legislative attack the year before, and its congressional opponents carried their attack over to Nixon's ABM proposal.

On March 14, Nixon announced that he had ordered a new ABM system to be deployed. Whereas Johnson's Sentinel ABM program was designed as a "thin" system, providing defense for cities from a Chinese attack, the Safeguard system was designed to protect U.S. missile silos from either a Chinese or a Soviet attack. While it could ultimately cost $6-$7 billion, Nixon said the system would be deployed in stages dictated by the level of threat faced by the nation. The budget request for the first stage was set at $759.1 million as compared to the $1.8 billion the Johnson administration had sought for the 1969 funding for Sentinel. Also, $12.7 million was requested in order to set up ABM testing facilities at Kwajalein Atoll.

The Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began televised hearings on Safeguard on March 21. When they ended on May 21, administration personnel
and noted scientists had been heard. Hearings before the Armed Services Committee had begun on March 19. After testimony by administration officials and academics, the committee approved the administration request on July 3. On a committee noted for its unanimity, the vote was 10-7.

Floor debate began on July 8. On July 17, a closed session was held to debate Soviet military capabilities and intentions, with each side using classified information to back its claims. The key Senate vote on the ABM system came on August 6. Margaret Chase Smith (R-Me.) introduced two amendments to the military procurement bill. The first called for no funds to be spent on any aspect or component of the Safeguard system. It failed by a 11-89 vote. Her second amendment was a compromise version of the first one. While it too would prevent any funds from being spent on any part of Safeguard, it allowed funds to be used on any other ABM system or other weapons system. It failed on a dramatic 50-50 roll call vote. President of the Senate Spiro Agnew went ahead and voted against the amendment, making the final vote 50-51, but his vote was unnecessary. The 50-50 tie prevented the clear majority needed under Senate rules for passage. An amendment by John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) and Philip Hart (D-Mich.), to restrict Safeguard funds to only research and development, then failed by a 49-51 vote. Nixon's Safeguard request, with its funds intact, was included in the military procurement authorization bill passed by the Senate on September 18.

The authorization process was less controversial in the House. The Armed Services Committee handled the military procurement authorization bill, and on September 26, it reported out the bill by a 36-3 vote. The committee recommended the full $746.4 million requested for Safeguard by
the administration. The only difference from the version passed by the Senate was that the bill did not contain the $12.7 million for the Kwajalein Atoll testing facility. The House had already approved the $12.7 million for it in the military construction authorization bill. Floor debate began on Safeguard on October 2 and the next day, the military procurement authorization bill passed by a 311-44 roll call vote.

Since the House had previously agreed to the Kwajalein Atoll construction funds, the House conferees agreed to the Senate version of the bill. On November 5, the House approved the conference report by voice vote. The next day the Senate approved it by a vote of 58-9. On November 19, Nixon signed the military procurement authorization bill, thereby getting the full funding he desired for the Safeguard AEM.
ANALYSIS

I. Stimulus

Action in this case started when Nixon proposed the Safeguard ABM system on March 14, 1969. His new system carried a price tag of $759.1 million, and he asked Congress to authorize the full amount.

II. Contextual Filter

A. Historical Context

The problem of coping with the Soviet nuclear threat had faced American policy-makers since the detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb in 1949. Vast sums of money were authorized, appropriated, and spent in the search for a credible deterrent in the face of the evolving Soviet nuclear arsenal. In the late 1940's and early 1950's, the increased American deterrent centered around "supercarriers" and bombers, first more B-36's and then B-52's (Congress and the Nation, V.1:254-255, 270).

The executive and congressional economy crusade in the mid-1950's came to an abrupt end in 1957. The Sputnik launch demonstrated that the Soviets had forged ahead of the U.S. in missile technology, and their possession of a workable ICBM put the U.S. at a momentary disadvantage (Congress and the Nation, V.1:294-295). The American response began in 1958 with the production of the Thor and Jupiter IRBM's and the development of the Atlas and Titan ICBM's, as well as the Polaris SLEBM (Congress and the
Nation, V.1:298). In 1959, the first Atlas ICBM was deployed and funds were appropriated for research and development on the B-70 supersonic bomber and the Nike-Zeus anti-missile-missile, an early approach to the ABM concept (Congress and the Nation, V.I:303, V.II:869).

From 1960-1964, the President and Secretary of Defense continued to emphasize the development of the American ICBM force. They resisted strong pressures to concentrate on additional weapons systems. Massive technical problems in the Nike-Zeus program dissuaded them from deploying it even though congressional supporters of Nike-Zeus pushed for the program's expansion. Further, the manned bomber concept also had its supporters in Congress. Members called for more research and development on the B-70, then on the RS-70, and finally, in 1964, on the prototype of the B-1 (Congress and the Nation, V.1:307-329).

Thus, the historical context was marked by the need to provide a sufficient deterrent to the Soviet threat. Throughout this period, Congress demonstrated a tendency to fund the development of multiple weapons systems in excess of the administration's desires. Most relevant here was the congressional urge to promote the Nike missile system which had a crude ABM capability.

B. Sequential Context

In 1966, pressure began to increase in favor of the deployment of an ABM system, and President Johnson requested $417 million for additional research on the Nike-X missile system. However, Congress added $167.9 million to that figure in order to smooth the way for actual production of the Nike-X. In November, a crucial new development was announced by Secretary of Defense McNamara. He said the Soviets were deploying an ABM
system around Moscow. While the earlier Tallin missile system was discounted as merely an anti-aircraft system, the new Galosh system around Moscow demonstrated ABM characteristics similar to the Nike-Zeus (Congress and the Nation, V. II:869).

The Galosh deployment prompted Johnson in early 1967 to ask for standby funds for the production of an ABM system. Congress obliged Johnson by appropriating $421.3 million for research on Nike-X and $291 million for construction of Nike-X facilities (Congress and the Nation, V. II:869).

However differences existed, within both Congress and the Defense Department, over the actual deployment of an ABM system. In the Senate, the Armed Services Committee favored procurement of the Nike-X system if an arms limitation agreement was not forthcoming in the near future. These senators said that consideration should be given to a "thin" ABM system to deter an attack from the Chinese Communists. Their House counterparts favored the immediate deployment of a "thin" ABM system. McNamara argued, before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1967, that an ABM system would be ineffective and a waste of funds. On the other hand, General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told both Armed Services Committees that the JCS believed a defensive system such as the ABM would be an added deterrent to the Soviets (Congress and the Nation, V. II:871).

On September 18, 1967, McNamara announced, following the first detonation of a hydrogen bomb by the Peoples' Republic of China, the U.S. government had decided to deploy a "thin" ABM network aimed at defending the country from a Chinese nuclear attack. McNamara had not retreated from his earlier position against an ABM system. After he dutifully made the
announcement, he added that the decision was made on the basis of a "marginal" threat. Furthermore, he cautioned the nation to resist the temptation to expand the "thin" system into a "thick" one designed to deter the Soviets. He said such a system would provide "no adequate shield at all against Soviet attack" and would provoke the Soviets into further increasing their offensive forces. To the end, McNamara claimed that a strong offensive capability was the best American deterrent to a Soviet attack (Congress and the Nation, V.II:871).

In order to establish the new Sentinel ABM system, the Johnson administration requested $1.2 billion in total ABM funding in 1968. Although Congress ultimately approved the request, the administration had a tough fight. The battle over Sentinel raged from April until October. Administration opponents in the Senate included Cooper, Charles Goodell (R-N.Y.), Albert Gore (D-Tenn.), Hart, Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.), Winston Prouty (R-Vt.), Smith of Maine, Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), and Stephen Young (D-Ohio) (Congress and the Nation, V.II:871). In the House, Jeffery Cohelan (D-Cal.) and Robert Leggett (D-Cal.) tried to stop construction of the Sentinel system (Congress and the Nation, V.II:872).

Even after the congressional approval of its funding, the Sentinel system was not free of controversy. The system was designed to protect cities, but at some sites, the program encountered vigorous citizen opposition. Such opposition was particularly strong in Boston, Chicago, and Seattle. The unpopularity of Sentinel in the cities chosen for defense seemed to be a factor in Nixon's decision to change the system. His Safeguard proposal was designed to protect land-based ICBM's and thus would be located in less densely populated areas (Congress and the Nation, V.II:872).
The sequential context in this case produced factors that worked both for and against the ABM. The pattern of congressional fondness for an ABM system, established in the historical context, was continued in the 1960's. The need for such a system seemed heightened by the discovery of the Soviet Galosh system and the subsequent "ABM gap." The Galosh system prompted the JCS to endorse the need for an American ABM network.

However in the 1960's, the opposition to any ABM system grew. The pivotal person in this regard was McNamara. Throughout 1967, he consistently argued against the creation of an ABM system. He discounted the Galosh system as a monument to the Soviets' "almost religious fanaticism toward the subject of defense" (Congress and the Nation, V.II:871). He maintained that an ABM system could easily be overcome and was a waste of money. Responding to the lead provided by the Defense Secretary, congressional opponents of the Sentinel system became a more organized, vocal minority. Even after these members of Congress failed in their attempts to stop the Sentinel program, the angry cries of affected citizens kept the matter alive. Nixon then changed the prevailing ABM concept from a counter-value strategy to one of counterforce.

C. Concurrent Context

Other issues became involved in the ABM debate, but the one stressed most often was the interrelationship between an ABM decision and the upcoming arms limitation talks. Defense Secretary Laird, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs on March 21, said that the Soviets were developing a first-strike weapon in the huge SS-9 missile. He called the ABM system a needed bargaining chip in the SALT negotiations. The U.S. would dispose of
the ABM if the Soviets would dispose of the SS-9's. If not, the ABM would protect U.S. missile sites from SS-9 attacks.

The administration's claim that Safeguard would aid the SALT process was echoed by both congressional and private actors. The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report recommending the authorization of military funds, stressed Safeguard's importance in the upcoming SALT negotiations. If the U.S. had no ABM system, the report argued, the Soviets would have no reason to limit their own ABM program. The Senate Foreign Relations committee took the opposite view. Noted scientists and academics lined up behind each side, some seeing a need for an ABM system in the SALT talks and others seeing Safeguard as a threat to the talks.

Another concurrent factor which figured prominently in the ABM debate was the current round of domestic inflation. In defending his Safeguard proposal, Nixon said Safeguard was part of his drive to reduce government expenditures to fight inflation. His request for $759.1 million to finance the first phase of the Safeguard program was less than half that requested by Johnson. Like the SALT argument, both congressional supporters and opponents of Safeguard stressed inflation. Supporters said Safeguard was a prudent tactic in the war against inflation. Opponents said that since an ABM was unnecessary, any expenditures for one were inflationary.

In summary, contextual factors played an important role in this case. Historically, Congress had been prone to spending large sums on numerous weapons systems in order to deter the Soviets. The Nike-X ABM was pushed even when not desired by the administration. Yet the sequential context demonstrated a shift in Congress as first a few, and then more, members began to oppose the ABM concept. They questioned whether or not Sentinel
was needed. The same doubts were expressed about the Safeguard system as well as new ones. Not only was the worth of Safeguard questioned, but opponents worried that this "marginal" system might have adverse effects on more important matters, like SALT and inflation. Thus the context demonstrated a marked shift in congressional attitudes which resulted in the suddenly small margin of victory accorded to the administration's 1969 ABM authorization request.

III. Issue Area

This case fell into the nonhuman resources area. The values at stake were tangible since the question was whether or not to deploy the Safeguard system. Thus the presence or absence of the ABM system was photographeable. The means employed were tangible since money was needed to start the deployment process. Since both ends and means were tangible, the ABM authorization represented a nonhuman resources case.

IV. Party Leaders' Preferences

Party leaders' preferences were negative to the administration's position here.2 In the Senate, both Majority Leader Mansfield and Majority Whip Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) opposed the ABM system. Mansfield had opposed Sentinel because he saw the "thin" system as a foundation for a much more expensive "thick" one (Congress and the Nation, V.II:871,873). When the Safeguard system was proposed by the administration, Mansfield joined the opposition forces. Like Mansfield, Kennedy also opposed the ABM concept. Immediately prior to Nixon's announcement of the new system, Kennedy wrote Defense Secretary Laird asking him to immediately suspend
all construction work on Sentinel and to launch a major review of the entire ABM program. While both these Democratic leaders were opposed to the ABM concept, Minority Leader Everett Dirksen (R-Ill.) promised an all-out fight to get the ABM system approved (New York Times, April 26, 1969:17). However, the negative majority preferences overrode his.

In the House, leaders of both political parties strongly endorsed the Safeguard system. The October 2 House debate saw both Speaker John McCormack (D-Mass.), and Minority Leader Gerald Ford (R-Mich.) rising to defend Safeguard from attack by its critics. Ford had been involved earlier in the debate as well. When ABM supporter Alvin O'Konski (R-Wis.) introduced an amendment to delete funds for both procurement and research on the ABM system, Safeguard's opponents claimed the amendment was unduly harsh and was introduced solely to provide a large vote on the system's behalf. Ford all but admitted that such was the motive behind the amendment (Congress and the Nation, V.III:197). With leaders of both parties strongly supporting the Safeguard system, party preferences in the House were coded as positive. Consequently, the chambers split in terms of their party preferences. However, the negative preferences found in the Senate were of primary consideration since they might have led toward some modification of the administration's preferences. Therefore, the party leaders' preferences variable was coded as negative to the administration's position.

V. Committee Leaders' Preferences

Committee leaders' preferences were positive to the administration's position. Three full committees and two subcommittees were involved in
consideration of the Safeguard ABM system. In the Senate, the Armed Services Committee, the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament of the Foreign Relations Committee, and the full Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on Safeguard.¹

On the Armed Services Committee, Chairman John Stennis (D-Miss.) led a bloc which was strongly positive to the Safeguard system. Stennis was impressed by the arguments presented by Defense Department officials. After their testimony, he said he was more confident about the system than he had been before. Moreover when charges were made that CIA and Defense Department estimates differed on the Soviet first-strike capability, he stepped in to present letters from both organizations which, he argued, disproved the charges. Stennis also defended the administration's rate of progress in testing ABM components. Finally, he blasted the opposition's SALT connection by saying:

I have never heard a more absurd way in which to approach negotiations with the Soviets than by announcing in advance that we will remove a big part of bargaining strength from the agenda by not going forward with the ABM program (Congress and the Nation, V.II:870).

Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) also came out strongly in defense of Safeguard. He had been a proponent of the Sentinel system, and now he fully supported Safeguard (Congress and the Nation, V.II:873-874). In the face of the Soviet threat, Jackson argued that any error made should be made on the side of safety. Further, he also concluded that an ABM system and arms negotiations were not incompatible.

Seven other committee members fell within the positive bloc. John Tower (R-Tex.) announced that Safeguard's supporters would not accept any amendments to the committee's recommendations, since they would emasculate
the system. Richard Russell (D-Ga.) also endorsed Safeguard by calling it an asset in arms negotiations and by criticizing the floor amendment attempts by the opposition (Congress and the Nation, V.II:874). Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) fought on the floor to weaken or deflect amendment attempts. George Murphy (R-Cal.) compared opponents' anti-ABM arguments with Chamberlain's behavior at Munich. Others who indicated their favorable response to Safeguard in the course of the committee hearings were Senators Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), Howard Cannon (D-Nev.), and Peter Dom- inick (R-Colo.).

Despite the strong support from these members, Symington led a seven member bloc in opposition to Safeguard. Symington had previously called Sentinel an unnecessary expense, and he felt Safeguard suffered from the same sins (Congress and the Nation, V.II:874). He warned the committee members during their hearings that, if they endorsed Safeguard, the Congress might impose across-the-board cuts in the entire defense budget, since high defense expenditures would preclude other, more necessary programs. Finally, Symington said Safeguard downgraded the American deterrent. If American missiles were launched automatically at the first sign of attack, he said, that threat was a far better deterrent than was the wait-and-see approach inherent in Safeguard.

Other members of the Armed Services Committee echoed Symington's arguments. Smith made her dramatic attempts to cut the ABM authorization on the Senate floor as did Thomas McIntyre (D-N.H.). Young also had attacked Sentinel the year before and continued to attack the arguments made in favor of Safeguard (Congress and the Nation, V.II:871,873). Others who criticized the pro-ABM arguments during the committee's hearings included
Edward Brooke (R-Mass.), Daniel Inouye (D-Ha.), and Richard Schweiker (R-Pa.). The concerted opposition to Safeguard by these senators was noteworthy since the Armed Services Committee had previously been known for its unanimity. However, the opposition bloc was overcome by the nine member supportive bloc. Since the positive bloc was both larger and led by Chairman Stennis, its preferences were coded for the committee.

The next group involved was the International Organization and Disarmament Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Five of its members expressed themselves in this case and all five were strongly negative to the ABM plan. Chairman Gore indicated his preferences on the opening day of his subcommittee's hearings by saying:

[Safeguard is] a weapons system searching for a mission...the program which you [Laird] recommend would further endanger our security; it would make an arms limitation agreement more difficult, if not impossible, to obtain, and thus ultimately could degrade our deterrent (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1969:260).

Another vehement opponent of Safeguard was Senator Cooper. He had led the fight against Sentinel and now he led the anti-Safeguard forces. During the subcommittee's hearings, Cooper refused to be left out in spite of the fact he was hospitalized. Throughout the hearings, he telephoned in his comments and questions. When Safeguard made it to the Senate floor, he and Senator Hart attempted to gut the Safeguard plan. Their amendment to delete all deployment funds for Safeguard failed on August 6 by a 49-51 roll call vote.

The others on the subcommittee strongly opposed to Safeguard were Senators Clifford Case (R-N.J.), Frank Church (D-Idaho), and Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.). These three grilled Laird when he testified before their subcommittee. They questioned Safeguard's deterrent role, Laird's projection
of Soviet strategy, and the relationship between Safeguard and SALT. Moreover, both Pell and Case had been among Sentinel's foes the previous year. Since five of the seven subcommittee members were strongly opposed to Safeguard, the subcommittee's preferences were coded as negative.

The final Senate committee to deal with Safeguard was the Foreign Relations Committee. It held hearings on July 16 and July 30 during which the ABM system came up for discussion. Also, many of the full committee's members had attended some or all of the subcommittee's hearings. The negative preferences of Mansfield, Gore, Church, Symington, Pell, Case, and Cooper have already been noted. Others on the committee who echoed such preferences were Chairman J.W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), George Aiken (R-Vt.), and Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.).

Fulbright had been among the foes of Sentinel in 1968, and he lost no time in attacking Safeguard in 1969. When Laird testified before the Gore subcommittee, Fulbright interrupted Laird's reading of his prepared statement by denouncing Laird's use of a "technique of fear" to "sell" Safeguard. Further, he charged that Laird selectively declassified intelligence reports in order to make the Soviet Union's military forces appear "ten feet tall" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1969:260-261). Fulbright argued that the ABM system was designed to defend an "obsolete" Minuteman ICBM system (Congressional Quarterly Alamanac, 1969:264). Finally, he was forced to apologize to Stennis on the Senate floor for calling ABM supporters "stooges of the military" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1969:271). Aiken and Javits also strongly opposed Safeguard. Both spoke out strongly against Laird's pro-Safeguard arguments. Javits, an early Sentinel opponent, further worried about how Safeguard would complicate the
progress toward a SALT agreement.

Overall, ten of the sixteen committee members expressed negative preferences while none expressed positive ones. Thus the Foreign Relations Committee's preferences were coded as negative. In the Senate, three committee actors expressed preferences. Both the Foreign Relations Committee and its Gore subcommittee were opposed to Safeguard while the Armed Services Committee was positive to it. According to the coding rules, the preferences of the Armed Services Committee overrode the others in importance, because Armed Services was the committee to which the authorization bill was referred.

In the House, the primary committee to handle the ABM authorization was also the Armed Services Committee. Eleven of its members expressed preferences in this case. Six were positive and five were negative. The positive bloc was led by Chairman Mendel Rivers (D-S.C.). He strongly defended the need for an ABM system. He added that Safeguard was both necessary and feasible (Congressional Record, Vol.115, Part 21:27963-27964). He went on to call opponents of the ABM and other weapons systems members of the "bleeding heart society" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1969:286).

Other ABM defenders were Representatives Leslie Arends, (R-Ill.), Melvin Price (D-Ill.), Samuel Stratton (D-N.Y.), Charles Wilson (D-Cal.), and O'Konski. Arends strongly defended Safeguard on the House floor. His position was that Safeguard would add to world stability and order (Congressional Record, Vol.115, Part 21:27966). Price was also an early defender of the ABM concept. His position was: "We cannot wait until the first missile arrives before we start building the ABM" (Congress and the
N atio n , V .II:873). S tr a tto n claim ed in the debate that the opponents were "engaging in demagoguery" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1969:286). Wilson, a strong supporter of Safeguard, sponsored an amendment to cut the procurement funds for the system. ABM opponents claimed his tactic was designed to weaken the opposition by sponsoring a harsh amendment that was sure to fail. O'Konski attempted the same strategy.

The five opponents to Safeguard on the committee were Representatives Leggett, Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), Otis Pike (D-N.Y.), Robert Stafford (R-Vt.), and Charles Whalen (R-Ohio). These men took the unusual step, for the Armed Services Committee, of filing additional views to the committee report on the military authorization bill. In their statements, they stressed that the bill's authorization level was excessive, and that ABM funds should be among those deleted from the bill. Leggett and Pike went on to stress particular faults of the Safeguard plan. Leggett argued that the presence of at least 24,000 American nuclear warheads was a sufficient deterrent to the Soviets in-and-of itself. He also said that many of the Minuteman sites to be protected were out of Soviet missile range anyway. Pike in turn expressed concern over how Safeguard would be controlled. He introduced an amendment, defeated on a 32-86 standing vote, which called for no Safeguard expenditures until Congress was briefed on the system's control and command policy.

None of the other committee members publicly expressed preferences about the ABM. Even though the positive and negative blocs were closely matched in numbers, the positive one was led by Chairman Rivers. Accordingly, positive preferences were coded for the committee. Indirect corroboration for this coding of the committee's preferences came during
the floor debate. The strength of the committee's positive preferences
was demonstrated when Leggett complained about how the committee was run.
He said it was dominated by a "monolithic" bloc led by the chairman
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1969:286). In response, Rivers said
the dissidents had actually used up more of the committee's time than
had the majority and, therefore, no discrimination had taken place.
Ranking minority member Arends then dismissed his complaints as "idle
chatter" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1969:286). Such complaints
by Leggett, and the nonchalant way in which they were dismissed, indicate
that the committee majority was solidly in favor of the ABM.

The other active group in the House was the Foreign Affairs Sub-
committee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments. 5
Although it held hearings on the ABM on March 11, 13, 18, 19, and 24,
one of its members publicly expressed any preferences regarding Safeg-
guard. Therefore, its preferences were coded as neutral. Since the
primary committees in each chamber, the Armed Services Committees in
each case, were positive to the administration's position, the committee
leaders' preferences variable was coded as positive to the administra-
tion's position.

VI. Constituency Pressures

Constituency pressures were also positive to the Safeguard system.
The broad public was not involved in the Safeguard decision, but two
major groups of actors were. First, corporate actors played a strong role.
Important contractors and subcontractors for Safeguard stood to gain a lot
of business if the ABM system was deployed. Corporate lobbyists kept a
low-profile in the case, but Chairman Rivers attested to their input. On
the House floor, Rivers declared he was in favor of the Safeguard system. The reason, he said, was simple. Defense contractors had said that the ABM system was both necessary and feasible. Since, as Rivers said, these corporations were more often right than wrong, he went along with their judgement (Congressional Record, Vol.115, Part 21:27963-27964). The potential contractors and subcontractors for Safeguard were the same ones involved with Sentinel. The prime contractor was Western Electric. Important subcontractors were McDonnell Douglas for the Spartan missile, Martin Marietta for the Sprint missile, Raytheon and General Electric for the radars, and Sperry Rand for data processing equipment. Lesser contractors included General Research Corporation; Hercules, Inc.; Honeywell; Kamen Sciences Corporation; Lear-Seigler; Lockheed; Microwave Associates; Motorola; Philco-Ford; RCA; Sandia Corporation; Texas Instruments; Thiokol Corporation; TRW Systems; and Varian Associates (Congress and the Nation, V.II:870). Representatives of these corporations pushed the House Armed Services Committee, as well as its Senate counterpart, to approve the Safeguard plan.

The other major group involved in this case was important opinion leaders in the missile or defense field. These actors took differing positions on Safeguard. Those who testified against Safeguard included the Federation of American Scientists; former Defense Secretary McNamara; former Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance; Harvard law professor Abram Chayes; former presidential advisors Donald Hornig and James Killian; Wolfgang Panofsky of Stanford University; George Rathjens, formerly of the Institute for Defense Analysis and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; MIT professor J.P. Ruina; Jerome Weisner, former presidential advisor and provost of MIT; and Herbert York, former director of the Defense
Department's Research and Engineering branch. The reasons for their opposition centered around two themes: either Safeguard would not work or it would jeopardize arms limitation talks (Congress and the Nation, V.II: 872-873).

Others in this broad group were positive to the administration's position. Included in this group were Donald Brennan, former president of the Hudson Institute; Daniel Fink, former deputy director of Defense Research and Engineering; Charles Herzfeld, former defense director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency; Gordon MacDonald, vice chancellor for research at the University of California, Santa Barbara; UCLA professor William McMillan; former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze; National Academy of Sciences President Frederick Seitz; Edward Teller, the "father" of the American hydrogen bomb; Eugene Wigner, former Nobel Prize winner for physics; and University of Chicago professor Albert Wohlstetter. These men stressed the deterrent role of Safeguard, the need to "polish" the technology, the feasibility of the technology, or the usefulness of Safeguard as a bargaining chip in arms negotiations.

The testimony given by these opinion leaders was almost evenly balanced, although the position of the Federation of American Scientists may have tipped the scales slightly in favor of Safeguard's opponents. This slight edge was not enough to overcome the strongly positive position taken by the defense contractors. Thus the constituency pressures variable was coded as positive to the administration's position.
VII. Presidential Involvement

The level of presidential involvement in this case was substandard. Nixon's involvement was limited to his March 14 request for the Safeguard authorization.

VIII. Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior

The congressional output in this case was a no modification behavior. Congress authorized the full $759.1 million requested by the administration for Safeguard.

Propositions

To recap the variable values, this was a nonhuman resources case. Party leaders' preferences were negative to the administration's position, but committee leaders' preferences and constituency pressures were positive. The level of presidential involvement was substandard, and a no modification behavior resulted.

Two propositions were examined here and neither was supported. The nonhuman resources proposition (1.2) states:

In nonhuman resource cases, the probability of resistance behaviors increases while the probabilities of no modification and initiative behaviors decrease.

With the no modification behavior found here, the proposition does not hold. The proposition is based on the bargaining expected in nonhuman resource cases. It should be noted that the system's opponents wanted to bargain; they wanted to use their amendments to gain a resistance behavior. The system's supporters refused to yield at all. They took their chances without compromising and managed, although barely, to get exactly
what they wanted.

The party leaders proposition (2.1) says:

When party leaders' preferences are negative to the administration's position, the probability of no modification behaviors decreases while the probabilities of resistance and initiative behaviors increase.

The negative value assigned here was based on a coding rule. Party preferences in the House were positive while those in the Senate were negative. In such cases, the negative ones override the positive ones in terms of coding the variable. However in this case, the negative party preferences in the Senate were not strong enough to override the positive preferences of the House party leadership, both Armed Services Committees, and constituency pressures. Aligned against these positive preferences, a no modification behavior was the ultimate result.

Significant Aspects

Most of the significant aspects of this case revolve around the fact that a resistance behavior did not occur. A number of factors pointed the way toward the expectation of a resistance behavior. In terms of context, although Congress had traditionally favored the ABM concept, a growing anti-ABM movement was manifested within Congress during the Sentinel debate. Further, the inflation issue also provided a rationale for keeping defense expenditures as low as possible while the SALT talks scared others in Congress away from endorsing the ABM. The fact that this was a nonhuman resources case would also have enhanced the expectation of a resistance behavior since such behaviors are more likely in nonhuman resources cases. Moreover, Senate party leaders' preferences were negative, and as such, some
deviations from the administration's desires could be expected in the Senate. The committees also split in the Senate. Finally, Nixon did not rally to Safeguard's defense in the Senate.

So the question is posed: why did a no modification result in the face of all these factors combining to challenge it? Why did the Smith amendment fail? The answer is unusual. Safeguard's supporters took the extremely risky position of refusing to compromise. Safeguard's survival could have been guaranteed through the acceptance of one of the amendments to fund Safeguard's continued research and development. In that way, the battle over deployment could have been postponed until a time when the prospects appeared better. Yet the system's advocates made their stand in 1969, refused to yield to compromises, and saw their wishes become translated into reality by the narrowest of margins in the Senate. The 50-50 and 49-51 votes demonstrated how close the opponents came to achieving a resistance behavior.

One final aspect of the case deserves special mention. Had the no modification proposition (2.2) not included party leaders' preferences, it would have been supported. Further research is needed to determine if positive committee leaders' preferences and constituency pressures are enough to generally lead to no modification behaviors.
1. Unless otherwise specified, the research for this case comes from Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1969:257-292).

2. For a list of party leaders, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1969:23-24).

3. For a list of the members of these committees, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1969:49,51).

4. For a list of its members, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1969:59).

5. For a list of its members, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1969:63).
On April 15, 1969, President Richard Nixon sent to Congress his modifications in the Defense budget requests made by the outgoing Johnson administration. His budget requests, he said, were $2.5 billion lower than those of the Johnson administration. Little did Nixon know, however, that Congress would go on to cut $5.6 billion more from his requests (Congress and the Nation, V. III:198). 1

The first hearings on the defense budget came in June before the Joint Economic Committee's Subcommittee on Government Economy (U.S. Congress, 1969). At the end of the summer, the House Appropriations Committee began its review (U.S. House, 1969). Its report came out on December 3, and the committee recommended cutting Nixon's defense budget by $5.3 billion.

Five days of floor debate were held in the House. One significant amendment was added to the bill by Henry Reuss (D-Wis.). Noting that the Pentagon's publicity and information programs were often propagandistic in nature, Reuss' amendment forbade any such programs unless they were specifically approved by Congress. The amendment passed by voice vote, and the appropriations bill was approved by a 330-33 roll call vote on December 8. In terms of money, the bill was identical to the recommendations made by the Appropriations Committee.
In the Senate, the Appropriations Committee reported out its version of the bill on December 12. Overall, the Senate committee cut $627 million more from the administration's requests than did the House. The appropriations bill came to the Senate floor on December 15. Senators John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) and Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) immediately introduced an amendment to limit American military involvement in Laos and Thailand to the provision of supplies and equipment. J.W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) argued that the Senate should not vote on the bill without knowing the specifics regarding the extent of American involvement in Laos. The bill's floor manager, Allan Ellender (D-La.) said the bill contained $90 million allocated for support of the Royal Laotian Army. This answer was not detailed enough to satisfy Fulbright. The Senate then went into secret session to discuss classified military activities in Laos. When the secret session ended, the Cooper-Mansfield amendment passed on a 80-9 roll call vote.

Amendments to delete funds for the Safeguard ABM authorization and to change the procedures for ship repairs were defeated. A final amendment, by Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo.), to cut the Army's budget for the main battle tank by $10 million passed by voice vote. The appropriations bill then passed by an 85-4 vote.

A conference committee was convened to resolve the differences in the two versions of the bill. Its report was released on December 17. The conferees accommodated Senate desires by including the Senate's version of an unobligated funds clause and the prohibition of U.S. ground combat forces in Laos and Thailand. House desires were upheld in that specific communications electronic data processing programs were deleted as well as
the Pentagon's practice of training helicopter pilots on fixed-wing aircraft prior to their actual helicopter training.

The next day, both the House and Senate approved, by voice vote, the conference version of the bill. On December 29, 1969, President Nixon signed the Defense Department Appropriations Bill into law. By doing so, Nixon accepted the congressionally-imposed cut of $5.6 billion from his April 14, 1969 request. This was the largest military budget cut in 16 years.
ANALYSIS

I. Stimulus

The stimulus for this case came on April 15, 1969 when Nixon sent to Congress his revised version of the FY1970 Defense Department budget. He wanted the budget passed without significant modifications.

II. Contextual Filter

A. Historical Context

Since FY1950, Congress had modified the President's initial military budget requests every year. For the previous 20 fiscal years, Congress had increased military funding over the President's request eight times and cut the funding below the level requested twelve times. Overall, Congress annually cut an average of 1.60% from the President's request for the twenty year period. The cut of $5.6 billion for FY1970, or a cut of 7.49%, not only had general precedents but more specific ones as well. The FY1954 budget was cut $6.4 billion (or 15.59%) while the FY1953 budget was cut $4.78 billion (or 9.30%). In other words, a larger absolute amount had been cut in the FY1954 budget while larger percentage cuts were seen in both the FY1953 and FY1954 defense budgets. Moreover, these large Defense Department budget cuts came in roughly similar situations. In both 1952-53 and 1969, the U.S. was beginning to de-escalate its military involvement in costly limited wars (Korea and Vietnam, respectively).

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Consequently, both general and specific precedents existed for the large congressional cut in the FY1970 Defense budget.

B. Sequential Context

The sequential context centered around the passage of the Defense Department's budget authorization. Many of the specific weapons systems and practices challenged in the present case were also challenged in the prior military procurement authorization bill. The pressure to cut military spending either for its own sake or to help blunt the rising rate of inflation was clearly manifested in Congress. Weapons systems attacked in the authorization bill included the Safeguard ABM, the C-5A cargo airplane, the MIRV program, the Poseidon missile, the Cheyenne helicopter, the Manned Orbiting Laboratory, the main battle tank, the TOW anti-tank missile and the SRAM missile (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1969: 257-286).

Defense Department practices were challenged as well. The procurement process was attacked as one biased toward cost-overruns. The testing and deployment of MIRV components were also challenged. Defense Department research projects came in for harsh criticism. The Department's handling of chemical and biological warfare projects was described as dangerous by congressional critics. Finally, attempts were made to limit the number of American military personnel in Indochina (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1969:257-279).

Not only were many of the points of contention the same in the prior legislation, but the Pentagon's critics were also largely the same. House critics on both the authorization and appropriations bills included Representatives Jonathan Bingham (D-N.Y.), Leggett, Abner Mikva (D-Ill.),

Both the issues in contention and many of the congressional critics remained the same in the authorization and appropriations bills. As a result, the fight over the Defense appropriation levels actually had begun in the sequential context.

C. Concurrent Context

One important concurrent issue important in this case was inflation. Nixon himself said his budget reductions, from the Johnson administration's budget levels, were designed to fight inflation (New York Times, March 24, 1969:1; April 13, 1969:1). Congressional critics who also called for budget reductions to fight inflation included Chairman George Mahon (D-Tex.) of the House Appropriations Committee and Senators Alan Cranston (D-Cal.), Mondale, and Symington (New York Times, August 4, 1969:12; November 5, 1969:28; December 4, 1969:1).

A related concurrent issue involved the relative allocation of governmental resources to foreign and domestic needs. A number of critics called for less money to be spent on the military so that greater resources could be devoted to social needs. These congressional critics included Senators Humphrey, Javits, Kennedy, Mansfield, and Proxmire (New York Times, April 12, 1961:1,44; May 22, 1969:23; June 4, 1969:5; June 8, 1969:68).
The final concurrent factor involved in this case concerns the deteriorating relationship between Congress and the executive branch. Many members of Congress were growing skeptical of executive branch policies including the continuing morass of Vietnam, the ever-expanding scope of global commitments, and the seeming dominance of military policy over the more traditional instrumentalities of foreign policy (New York Times, May 25, 1969:IV,1). Senator Proxmire and Representative William Moorhead (D-Pa.), for example, criticized the administration's lack of scrutiny over military spending. They argued the administration wrote "blank checks" to the military (New York Times, March 17, 1969:15). Others charged that the country's foreign policy was becoming over-militarized by the administration. Both Senators Kennedy and William Saxbe (R-Ohio) endorsed this line of congressional criticism (New York Times, June 2, 1969:19; June 8, 1969: 68).

In summary, the contextual filter was highly important in this case. The historical context provided precedents for large congressional cuts in the military budget. Concurrent factors such as increasing inflation, the lack of consensus over government funding priorities, and growing tension between Congress and the executive branch over the specifics of American foreign policy gave members of Congress incentives to attack the military budget. Finally, the congressional criticism of Defense spending seen in this case was the continuation of the criticism demonstrated in the sequential context.
III. Issue Area

This case fell into the nonhuman resource area. Although some of the values expressed by members of Congress may have had intangible elements (such as external versus internal needs), they all had tangible referents. The size of the standing armed forces and the existence of both weapons systems and research projects were tangible phenomena. They could be photographed. Further, tangible means were used to obtain these values. Money had to be spent to achieve the values represented by the military and its capabilities, and in some instances Congress refused to spend money because it rejected the values represented by the relevant weapons systems, research programs, etc. With such a tangible/tangible mix of ends and means, the case fell into the nonhuman resource category.

IV. Party Leaders' Preferences

Party leaders' preferences were negative to the administration's position here. In the Senate, the Democratic leaders were strongly opposed to the administration's requested levels of military funding. As early as April, Majority Leader Mansfield was leading a bipartisan effort to cut at least $5 billion from the Defense budget. According to Mansfield (New York Times, April 21, 1969:1), Congress needed to "strike a balance between our internal needs and our foreign military needs." One reason he advanced to explain the growing anti-military mood in Congress was the unpopularity of the Vietnam War (New York Times, April 27, 1969:IV,2). Mansfield renewed his call for greater cuts in the Defense Department's budget in August (New York Times, August 31, 1969:3). Once the appropriations bill reached the Senate floor, Mansfield successfully cosponsored
the amendment to prohibit the use of American ground combat forces in Laos and Thailand. Not only did Mansfield react negatively to the administration's proposals, but so did Majority Whip Kennedy. Kennedy used an address at Fordham University as a forum to call for stricter civilian control over the military and the changing of American national priorities from military to domestic ones (New York Times, June 8, 1969:68).

No preference statements were made by Republican leaders in the Senate. Further, neither party's leaders in the House issued preference statements regarding the military budget. Since no other party preferences existed to override those of the Senate Democrats, their negative views were coded for the party leaders' preferences variable.

VI. Committee Leaders' Preferences

Committee leaders' preferences were also negative to the administration's position in this case. The Appropriations Committees handled the bill in each chamber.

Of the 13 members of the House Appropriations Committee who expressed preferences, 11 were strongly opposed to part or all of the Defense Department's budget request. The strongly negative bloc was led by Chairman Mahon. He indicated his preferences as early as May 20 when he called for a $192.9 billion ceiling on all government expenditures. Chairman L. Mendel Rivers (D-S.C.) of the House Armed Services Committee protested that such a ceiling would increase efforts to cut the military budget. Mahon replied by saying the public was losing its confidence in the military because of the military's "mistakes" (New York Times, May 21, 1969:1). Mahon's attitude hardened as time went by. On August 13, he
announced that he planned to cut the Defense budget by at least $5 billion. He gave three reasons for his decision: the need to reduce government spending in order to fight inflation, the military's "inefficient management practices," and public outcry at the level of military spending. On that same day, a Gallup Poll had been released indicating that 52% of the American public believed too much money was being spent on the military. Mahon thereafter spent a considerable amount of time with Defense Secretary Laird planning where to make the budget cuts (Congress and the Nation, V. III:200).

Besides Mahon, the committee's critics of military spending were also led by Representative Sidney Yates (D-Ill.). Not only did he sign the minority report criticizing the appropriation of funds for the Safeguard ABM system, he also introduced a floor amendment to have those funds deleted. After the attempt failed, he introduced a second amendment to delete funds for the Army's TOW anti-tank missile. This amendment was also defeated. The other nine committee opponents expressed their preferences by signing the minority report which criticized the funding of the ABM system. They were Representatives Edward Boland (D-Mass.), Cohelan, Silvio Conte (R-Mass.), Frank Evans (D-Colo.), Robert Giaimo (D-Conn.), Clarence Long (D-Md.), David Obey (D-Wis.), Donald Riegle (R-Mich.), and Howard Robison (R-N.Y.).

The only two committee members to strongly defend the administration's position were Representatives Robert Sikes (D-Fla.) and John Rhodes (R-Ariz.). In the hearings, Sikes was supportive of the military (U.S. House, Part 2, 1969:9-46). On the floor, he charged that U.S. military power was endangered by the budget cuts. Rhodes also defended the
administration's requests on the House floor, and he praised Laird for being so cooperative in terms of determining where cuts should come. Finally, Rhodes argued much of the money cut from the Defense Department's budget could not have been cut except for the success of the administration's program of "Vietnamization" in the Indochina war.

These two supporters aside, the main bloc on the committee was strongly opposed to the administration's request. Since it was led by Chairman Mahon, its preferences were the ones coded for the House.

A number of members of the Senate Appropriations Committee expressed preferences regarding the budget. A negative bloc was led by Chairman Richard Russell (D-Ga.). He opposed waste in the budget and found two items particularly displeasing: the rapidly escalating costs of weapons systems and the loss of, or damage to, naval ships due to negligence (U.S. Senate, 1969, Part 3:20, 35-40). Proxmire agreed with Russell's concern over waste. In March, he called for reductions in Defense spending due to "waste in military methods of procurement, poor performance by contractors, and frequent 'overruns' of estimated costs" (New York Times, March 17, 1969:15). In June, Proxmire convened his Subcommittee on Government Economy of the Joint Economic Committee to determine how military spending could be reduced to meet social needs (U.S. Congress, 1969). Finally on August 30, he urged Congress to cut military spending by $10 billion (New York Times, August 31, 1969:3). Allen Ellender (D-La.) also questioned the need for higher and higher military spending (U.S. Senate, 1969, Part 1:191). Both Warren Magnuson (D-Wash.) and John McClellan (D-Ark.) criticized the expenditure of funds if there was no gain in national security as a result (U.S. Senate, 1969, Part 1:248,522,527-528,581). Smith's strong opposition centered around the funding of the Safeguard ABM:
system. She unsuccessfully tried to delete Safeguard's funding on the Senate floor. Finally, Mansfield's strong opposition to the military's budget requests has already been noted.

The other three committee members who expressed preferences were Karl Mundt (R-S.D.), John Stennis (D-Miss.), and Gale McGee (D-Wyo.). Mundt denied the charge that the military-industrial complex made large profits from procurement contracts on new weapons systems (U.S. Senate, 1969, Part 1:182). The other two both strongly defended the administration's position. While Stennis opposed waste and inefficiency in the Defense Department, he favored the continuation of the Department's major weapons programs. Further, in viewing the extreme cuts some members of Congress advocated, he said such cuts would be "tantamount to a partial unilateral disarmament" (New York Times, May 25, 1969:20; September 4, 1969:1). For his part, McGee opposed Senate efforts to curtail the administration's use of combat forces in Indochina by unsuccessfully trying to table the Cooper-Mansfield amendment. However, the preferences of those three men were overridden by the larger negative bloc led by Chairman Russell.

The only other committee actor involved in the appropriations question was the Subcommittee on Government Economy of the Joint Economic Committee. Proxmire's opposition to the administration's position was noted above. He attacked military spending and said military needs were unnecessarily overriding domestic needs (U.S. Congress, 1969:2, 28-29). Senator Charles Percy (R-Ill.) echoed Proxmire's charge, adding that he wanted to see more money for food and education (U.S. Congress, 1969:17, 39). Both Representative Martha Griffiths (D-Mich.) and Senator Len Jordan (R-Idaho) criticized the Defense Department's procurement practices and the frequency of cost
overruns (U.S. Congress, 1969:42-45,403-405). Finally, both Senator Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) and Representative William Moorhead (D-Pa.) stressed the role played by military spending in the increasing inflation rate. Symington said government spending had to be cut to fight inflation, and he wanted the military's position cut (U.S. Congress, 1969:34-35; New York Times, March 17, 1969:15; August 4, 1969:12). Moorhead went further by saying that military spending was one of the few controllable costs in the budget. He argued it should and could be cut to fight inflation (U.S. Congress, 1969:41).

Only one of the subcommittee's members defended the administration. Representative Barber Conable (R-N.Y.) defended the Nixon administration's domestic record and its need for military funds (U.S. Congress, 1969:160-162,285). His defense of the administration was swamped in the sea of negative voices led by Chairman Proxmire. Overall, three committee actors dealt with the appropriations bill. Since all three demonstrated negative preferences, the committee leaders' preferences variable was coded as negative to the administration's position.

VI. Constituency Pressures

Constituency pressures were negative toward the requested levels of military spending. Broad public opinion appeared to be a factor when it was reported that 52% of the American people, as sampled in a Gallup Poll, felt that military spending was too high. Chairman Mahon specifically referred to this poll when he announced at least $5 billion would be cut from the budget. This anti-military bias seemed strongest among young adults. On June 18, twenty-two young Republican House members told President Nixon that huge military expenditures were a primary cause of student alienation in the country (New York Times, June 19, 1969:31).
The news media became involved here as well. For example, the *New York Times* continually attacked the Defense Department's budget. In editorials on January 16 and March 19, 1969, the *Times* called for Defense Department expenditures to be drastically cut. Not only would such cuts help in the war on inflation, but the editorials claimed they would also free some additional funds needed for social and urban programs (*New York Times*, January 16, 1969:40; March 19, 1969:46).

A number of opinion leaders also spoke out sharply against the administration's budget proposals. A March conference designed to coordinate congressional opposition to the defense budget featured a number of speakers who stressed that the U.S. was becoming a "national security state." These speakers included John Kenneth Galbraith of Harvard; George Kistiakowski of Harvard; Hans Morgenthau of the University of Chicago; Marcus Raskin, co-director of the Institute for Policy Studies; Charles Schultze, former Budget Director; and Herbert York, former director of Defense research under the Eisenhower administration (*New York Times*, March 29, 1969:13; May 18, 1969:1).

Pressure from notable individuals continued in the spring and summer. In April, Brigadier General Hugh Hester, U.S. Army-Retired, wrote a letter to the *New York Times* in which he said the increased emphasis on military spending would result in U.S. "aggression" overseas and more civil disorders at home (*New York Times*, April 28, 1969:40). In June, two former members of the Johnson administration testified before the Proxmire subcommittee. Both Joseph Califano, a White House aide, and Stewart Udall, Interior Secretary, called for a new emphasis on funding social needs rather than military ones. Their argument was enhanced in August by Bruce Russett of Yale. In a letter to the *New York Times*, he argued that his
research demonstrated that social expenditures were negatively correlated with military spending. Thus he argued, an administration could not have both guns and butter. Russett went on to remove any doubts about his preferences by lashing out at both the ABM and new strategic spending (New York Times, June 7, 1969:11; August 3, 1969:IV,11).

In addition, some interest groups were active in this case. The most active group was the Urban Coalition, led by John Gardner. Gardner made his initial call for reduced military spending on May 5. He said urban programs needed greater funding. On June 25 the Urban Coalition Action Council, chaired by Gardner, called for a $5-10 billion Defense Department cut in order to meet social needs. Gardner repeated the same theme again on October 25 (New York Times, May 6, 1969:16; June 26, 1969:18; October 26, 1969:19). Other interest groups demanding lower military spending and more social programs included Business Executives for Vietnam Peace, the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, the United Church of Christ, a New York City coalition of over 200 women's organizations, an ecumenical group sponsored by the National Catholic Conference on Interracial Justice, and the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (U.S. Senate, 1969, Part 1:920,943-951; U.S. House, 1969, Part 6:883-884,923-30; New York Times, June 17, 1969:37; November 27, 1969:41; December 13, 1969:1).

Only two interest groups endorsed the administration's budget requests. They were the American Legion and the Reserve Officers Association of the U.S. (U.S. Senate, 1969, Part 1:903-907; U.S. House, 1969, Part 6:907-920). However, these positive inputs were swamped by the negative ones noted above. As a result, the constituency pressures variable was coded negative to the administration's position.
VII. Presidential Involvement

The level of presidential involvement was standard in this case. Nixon did more than just ask Congress to appropriate the money for the Defense Department. In early March, even before he made his requests known to Congress, he lobbied business leaders for their support on the upcoming military budget (New York Times, March 24, 1969:1). During the summer, Nixon lashed out at the growing number of opponents he faced on Capitol Hill by calling them "new isolationists" (New York Times, June 5, 1969:1). His counterattack became more specific in July. He charged that, if members of Congress were really concerned with fighting inflation, they would cut unnecessary expenditures in agricultural and school aid programs as well as hiking postal rates (New York Times, July 23, 1969:1). Nixon's final tactic came in October when he pledged to voluntarily hold down Defense Department expenditures (New York Times, October 19, 1969:1). Nixon's strong public role in defending his military budget requests led to coding the presidential involvement variable as standard.

VIII. Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior

The congressional output here was a resistance behavior. Congress gave Nixon less than what he requested, $5.6 billion less. This budget cut was the largest for the Defense Department since FY1954.

Propositions

In terms of the variable values, this was a nonhuman resources case. Party leaders' preferences, committee leaders' preferences, and
constituency pressures were negative to the administration's position. Nixon's level of involvement was standard, and a resistance behavior was the congressional output.

With such variable values, the nonhuman resources (1.2), party leaders (2.1), committee leaders (3.1), and constituency pressures (4.1) propositions were supported. The presidential involvement (5.1) and initiative (5.2) propositions were unsupported. Proposition 5.1 says:

When the level of presidential involvement is standard, the probability of no modification behaviors increases while the probabilities of resistance and initiative behaviors decrease.

Proposition 5.2 says:

When committee preferences are negative to the administration's position, constituency pressures are either neutral or negative, and the level of presidential involvement is standard, the probability of initiative behaviors increases.

Nixon's standard level of involvement, as manifested by his statements designed to weaken or divert congressional calls for further military cuts, was not powerful enough to override the negative feelings of the committee and constituency actors, not to mention those of the party leaders as well. A resistance behavior thus contradicted the expectations represented in both propositions. Regarding Proposition 5.2 however, the behavior was in the correct direction. Although it was not the expected initiative behavior, the resistance put up by Congress was strong.

Significant Aspects

There are several points worth remembering about this case. First, contextual factors played a large role. Precedents existed for a large cut in the military budget, concurrent issues such as inflation and the
deteriorating relations between Congress and the executive branch provided incentives for Congress not to give in to executive branch desires, and the congressional opposition had carried over from the authorization bill. Second, the President's counterattack was not intense enough to provoke an initiative behavior as suggested in Proposition 5.2. It could be that initiative behaviors are even less likely in nonhuman resource cases than originally presumed. In other words, additional research is needed to determine if the nonhuman resource proposition (1.2) needs to be clarified by making initiative behaviors unexpected in such cases.
CHAPTER XIII NOTES

1 Unless otherwise specified, the research for this case comes from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1969:454-463.

2 The Budget Estimates (administration requests) and Appropriation figures come from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1969:455). The percentage change figures were computed from the first two figures. It is important to note that these figures represent the initial Defense Department requests made by each administration and the resulting congressional response. As such, these totals do not include supplemental appropriations. However, since our purpose is to examine the initial budget request for FY1970 and the resulting congressional output, these figures are comparable to our needs.

3 For a list of these party leaders, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1969:23-24).

4 No preference statements were found for these individuals. Sources checked were the Congressional Record (1969), the New York Times, the U.S. Congress (1969), U.S. House (1969), and U.S. Senate (1969).

5 For a list of their members, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1969:47,58).

6 For a list of its members, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1969:73).
CHAPTER XIV
The Executive Agreements Act, 1972

In the wake of the Vietnam War, many members of Congress became disenchanted with the executive branch's handling of foreign policy. One specific area of concern was the growing reliance on executive agreements, rather than treaties, as a vehicle for foreign policy behavior. Worried that they were being bypassed in foreign policy-making, members of Congress acted in the early 1970's to ensure their knowledge of future executive agreements.¹

On February 4, 1971, Senator Clifford Case (R-N.J.) introduced a bill designed to prevent any future slipping of Congress' role regarding such agreements. His bill, Senate 596, stated that the Secretary of State must inform Congress of the text of any executive agreement within 60 days of its execution.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the bill on October 20 and 21 (U.S. Senate, 1971). Administration spokesmen argued that the bill was not necessary. They proposed that "practical arrangements" could be worked out to inform Congress of agreements without resorting to new legislation (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972:620).

On January 19, 1972, the Foreign Relations Committee reported out Senate 596. Case's original version was amended in committee to prevent a President from withholding sensitive national security agreements from
A section was added which said that if the President believed public knowledge of the agreement would endanger national security, the agreement would be sent to both the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees on a classified basis. The committee unanimously approved the bill as amended. The bill sailed through Senate debate without any opposition, and was passed by an 81-0 roll call vote on February 16.

Moreover, Senate 596 was not the only legislation introduced to deal with executive agreements. On April 11, 1972, Senator Sam Ervin (D-N.C.) introduced Senate 3475. This bill went further than did Senate 596. While Senate 3475 included all the points in Senate 596, it added two new elements. First, it defined executive agreements. Second, and more importantly, it included a provision for congressional disapproval of such agreements. Under the provision, if both houses passed a concurrent resolution rejecting the executive agreement within 60 days of its transmittal to Congress, then the agreement would be null and void. The Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Committee held intermittent hearings on the bill from April 24 until May 19 (U.S. Senate, 1972).

In the hearings, administration spokesmen strongly attacked the idea of congressional approval. John Stevenson, State's legal advisor, summarized the administration's position on May 18 by saying

On the practical side, the bill would seriously hamper the ability of the President to resolve international differences by agreement...The ability to make firm agreements with immediate binding effect is frequently of critical importance in obtaining and formalizing concessions from other governments...From a constitutional point of view...there are some agreements...solely within the President's authority...and with which Congress may not constitutionally interfere (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972:160).
After May 19 the subcommittee hearings adjourned, and the Senate took no further action on Senate 3475. As a result, the focus of congressional attention on this issue switched back to Senate 596.

House consideration of the bill did not occur until the summer. The Foreign Affairs Committee reported out Senate 596, without amendments, on August 3. The full House approved the bill on August 14 by voice vote under suspension of the rules. Such a procedure meant that a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting had to agree for the bill to pass. With that vote, the bill went to the President's desk and subsequently became law.
ANALYSIS

I. Stimulus

This case formally began on February 4, 1971 when Senator Case introduced Senate 596. He argued that Congress could not play its proper role in foreign policy-making without being aware of international agreements made by Presidents.

II. Contextual Filter

A. Historical Context

The controversy over congressional knowledge of executive agreements was not a new one. The matter had arisen in the 1950's as members of Congress began to worry about the increasing use of executive agreements rather than treaties. In 1953 and 1954, the Senate considered a constitutional amendment proposed by Senator John Bricker (R-Ohio). His proposed amendment had two parts. First, it called for treaties to be approved by both houses of Congress and not just by the Senate. Second, under its provisions executive agreements would have to be approved by the entire Congress as well. In 1954, the constitutional amendment failed, by a margin of one vote, to get the necessary two-thirds majority in the Senate.

The severe restrictions in the Bricker amendment prompted Senators Homer Ferguson (R-Mich.) and William Knowland (R-Cal.) to introduce a milder version in 1954. Their bill called for the text of all executive agreements to be submitted to the Senate within 30 days. The Eisenhower
administration had two strong objections to the Ferguson-Knowland bill. Administration spokesmen said the 30 day period was too short and no regulations were established to protect the secrecy of classified information.

Two years later, Knowland introduced a new version of the bill. To meet the administration's objections, the time period for submission was doubled to 60 days and classified agreements would be reported only to the Foreign Relations Committee, rather than to the full Senate. Knowland's bill was reported out by the Foreign Relations Committee on July 5, 1956. On July 11, the full Senate passed the Knowland bill by a unanimous vote. However, the bill died when the House failed to act.

Thus, historical precedents existed for measures designed to increase congressional knowledge of executive agreements. In fact, J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, referred to the Ferguson and Knowland proposals when his committee opened its hearings on the bill (U.S. Senate, 1971:1). Moreover, the 1956 Knowland bill was very similar to Senate 596 passed in 1972. The only difference between the two bills was that while the earlier one limited knowledge of executive agreements to the Senate, the 1972 bill presented that knowledge to both houses of Congress.

B. Sequential Context

The sequential context was dominated by the activities of the Symington subcommittee. Officially known as the special Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, the Symington subcommittee held hearings in 1969 and 1970. Its final report, released on December 21, 1970, was highly critical of the secrecy shrouding the details of U.S. military bases and commitments overseas.
Due to the administration's withholding of information regarding such issues, the report said, "the public was kept ill informed" (Congress and the Nation, V.III:866). The report went on to recommend regularly scheduled hearings at which government and nongovernment witnesses would provide, to appropriate committees, full and complete information regarding security agreements and foreign commitments. In particular, the report went on to specifically criticize either the extent or the nature of secret U.S. commitments to Ethiopia, Korea, Laos, the Philippines, Spain, and Taiwan as well as the secrecy surrounding the overseas deployment of tactical nuclear weapons (Congress and the Nation, V.III:866-868).

The sequential context was quite important in this case. The Symington subcommittee hearings demonstrated to many senators how little they actually knew about existing executive agreements. Moreover, this lack of congressional awareness was even more significant due to the fact that, as of January 1, 1972, the U.S. was a signatory to 4,359 executive agreements as compared to 947 treaties. This revelation only worsened the already poor relations between Congress and the Nixon White House. As such, the Executive Agreements Act was a natural outgrowth of the sequential context.

C. Concurrent Context

Overall congressional-executive relations were rapidly deteriorating in 1972. A number of factors were important in this regard. In terms of foreign policy, Nixon faced increasing opposition on the Vietnam War issue. He had pledged to end the war in his 1968 campaign. Four years later, no peace agreement had been signed, and the American public was war-weary. Coupled with revelations of the secret commitments to foreign
nations mentioned above, many members of Congress were alarmed at the direction of American foreign policy.

Nixon faced problems in domestic policy as well. Many members of Congress were opposed to Nixon's policy of impounding funds for social programs of which he disapproved. Some on Capitol Hill saw this practice as a severe threat to Congress' authorization/appropriations function. Moreover, the political ramifications of a bungled burglary on June 17, at the Watergate headquarters of the Democratic National Committee, began to attract public attention over the course of the summer. Ties were found between the suspects and Nixon's re-election campaign (Bernstein and Woodward, 1974).

Bringing both Nixon's foreign and domestic problems to the fore was the general election of 1972. To Democratic congressmen in general and some Republicans in particular, criticizing the administration became good politics in 1972. Many campaigning for re-election to Congress found that standing up to the President was viewed favorably in their home district or state. So as the election approached, poor congressional-executive relations hurt the administration's chances of preventing the passage of the Executive Agreements Act.

III. Issue Area

This case fell into the status area. Members of Congress were concerned with protecting their role in foreign policy-making against further encroachments by the executive branch. This intangible value was pursued with intangible means. Congress wanted to set up a new procedure ensuring their knowledge of agreements made by the executive branch. No expenditures were related to this new procedure. Due to the intangible/intangible
mix of ends and means, the case was coded as falling into the status area.

IV. Party Leaders' Preferences

Party leaders' preferences were negative to the administration's position of protecting executive agreements from Congress' purview. In the Senate, Majority Leader Mike Mansfield's (D-Mont.) position regarding the administration's attempt to dominate foreign policy-making was clearly displayed. Mansfield summarized his position on June 19, 1972 when he asked "Are we lackeys of the Executive branch or are we members of the Senate with separate constitutional responsibilities?" (New York Times, June 20, 1972:1).

Other Senate leaders presumably opposed the administration since they quickly called up Senate 596 for floor debate by referring to it as "noncontroversial legislation" which could fill a gap in the legislative schedule (New York Times, February 17, 1972:1).

No House leaders expressed preferences regarding Senate 596. Since no positive party preferences existed to compete with those of the Senate leaders, their negative preferences were coded.

V. Committee Leaders' Preferences

Committee leaders' preferences were also negative to the administration's position. Two committees and one subcommittee dealt with the executive agreements issue in 1971 and 1972. The first was the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Seven members of the committee expressed preferences regarding executive agreements. The strongly negative positions taken by Senators Case (the bill's sponsor) and Mansfield have
already been noted. Two others who spoke out strongly were Chairman J.W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) and Senator Stuart Symington (D-Mo.). Fulbright blasted the Nixon administration during the Senate debate for making commitments to North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Bahrain which, he said, should be in the form of treaties rather than executive agreements. He said that the Constitution did not give the President the power to make such secret agreements. Finally, Fulbright endorsed both Senate 596 and Senate 3475 on April 24, 1972 in testimony before the Ervin subcommittee, and he added that the congressional approval provision of Senate 3475 should be strengthened. Also testifying before the Ervin subcommittee on April 25, Symington summarized his subcommittee's findings regarding secret commitments by saying that, whether it meant to or not, the administration was preventing Congress from playing its proper foreign policy role. Three others who endorsed the Case bill during the committee's hearings were Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.), Gale McGee (D-Wyo.), and John Sparkman (D-Ala.) (U.S. Senate, 1971:13,32,80-81,91). Since all of the committee members who spoke out strongly opposed the administration's position of relying on executive agreements which were subsequently not revealed to Congress, the committee's preferences were coded as negative.

The second body to study the use of executive agreements was the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Separation of Powers. In opening his subcommittee's hearings on April 24, Chairman Ervin said the administration was using executive agreements, rather than treaties, to bypass the Senate. Ervin went on to argue that simply because Congress had allowed the President to do this in the past did not make the practice constitutional (U.S. Senate, 1972:1-7). Ervin was joined in his opposition to the administration's position by Charles Mathias (R-Md.). He wholeheartedly endorsed
Case's bill (Congressional Record, 1972:4094). On the other hand, Edward Gurney (R-Fla.) strongly defended the administration during the subcommittee hearings. He argued that Congress had "ample opportunity" to have a real role in foreign policy under the status quo. He said appropriations and oversight activities gave Congress plenty of power over the use of executive agreements (U.S. Senate, 1972:243-244). Due to the negative preferences of Chairman Ervin and Mathias, however, Gurney's positive preferences were overridden.

The final committee involved in this case was the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Four committee members expressed clear preferences in this case. Representatives Bradford Morse (R-Mass.), Clement Zablocki (D-Pa.), Dante Fascell (D-Fla.) and Paul Findley (R-Ill.) all strongly opposed the administration's use of executive agreements. Morse introduced Senate 596 in the House. Zablocki argued during floor debate that Congress had to know about such agreements. He went on to call the administration's policy of secrecy "a distortion of our constitutional system" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972:621). Fascell echoed Zablocki's arguments. Finally, Findley defended the bill's provisions by arguing that the foreign affairs committees could be trusted with classified information. Since no other members expressed preferences, the negative preferences of these four men were coded. Thus, all three committee actors demonstrated negative preferences in this case. Accordingly, the committee leaders' preferences variable was coded as negative.
VI. Constituency Pressures

Constituency pressures in this case were negative to the administration's position. Constituency pressures were demonstrated neither through general public opinion nor through interest group activity. Since the case involved a struggle for status between Congress and the executive branch, the domestic pressure came from opinion leaders, academics or those individuals who had formerly been government officials. The main vehicle for these inputs came during the hearings of the Ervin subcommittee.

Eleven individuals testified before the subcommittee. Seven of them expressed negative preferences by endorsing the congressional attempt to reassert its rights regarding the issue of executive agreements. These individuals included Clark Clifford, former Secretary of Defense; Richard Falk, professor of international law at Princeton; Arthur Goldberg, former Supreme Court Justice and United Nations Ambassador; H. Field Haviland, director of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; William Jackson, assistant professor of political science at Davidson College; Alfred Kelley, history professor at Wayne State University; and Alan Swan, professor of constitutional history at the University of Chicago (U.S. Senate, 1972).

Of the remaining four witnesses, two endorsed the administration's control of executive agreements and two expressed mixed preferences. John Moore, law professor at the University of Virginia, called Senate 3475 "both unconstitutional and unwise...it would encroach on the independent authority of the President" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972: 160). Nicholas Katzenbach, former Attorney General and Under Secretary of State, argued that a stronger congressional role in foreign policy would make American foreign policy "less active and somewhat less responsive"
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972:160). The other two witnesses both found fault with Senate 3475. James Robinson, President of Macalester College, endorsed the congressional aim of playing a larger role in foreign policy but said Senate 3475 would not advance that aim. Adrian Fisher, dean of the Georgetown University Law Center and former Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, argued that the bill would not work for the many instances in which a President acts on the basis of authority delegated to him by Congress (U.S. Senate, 1972).

Two opinion leaders also testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 1971. Both Ruhl Bartlett, from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and Alexander Bickel of the Yale Law School endorsed the Case bill (U.S. Senate, 1971:23,25). Overall, the testimony of such opinion leaders was negative to the administration's position. Therefore, the constituency pressures variable was coded as negative.

VII. Presidential Involvement

The level of presidential involvement in this case was substandard. Nixon made no personal statements on the issue of congressional knowledge of executive agreements. The administration's preferences were indicated by State, Defense, and Justice Department personnel. Throughout the case, these spokesman opposed Senate 3475 due to its provision allowing for congressional approval of executive agreements. However, they dropped their initial opposition to Senate 596 after the Senate approved it 81-0. Since Nixon did not work to get Senate 596 defeated, the level of presidential involvement was coded as substandard.
VIII. Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior

The congressional output in this case was an initiative behavior. Senator Case introduced Senate 596 to deal with problems revealed in the Symington subcommittee hearings. Thus, the administration was placed in the position of reacting to congressional actions rather than vice-versa.

Propositions

This was a status case. Party leaders' preferences, committee leaders' preferences, and constituency pressures were negative to the administration's position. The level of presidential involvement was substandard, and an initiative behavior was the output. With such variable values, five of the six propositions explored in the case were supported. These were the status (1.1), status/poor relationship (1.1A), party leaders (2.1), committee leaders (3.1), and constituency pressures (4.1) propositions.

Only the resistance proposition (3.2) was unsupported. It says:

When committee leaders' preferences are negative to the administration's position, constituency pressures are either negative or neutral, and the level of presidential involvement is substandard, the probability of resistance behaviors increases.

Here, all the independent variables were in the right direction, yet an initiative behavior was the output. However, this result was not surprising. The status proposition (1.1) indicates that, for status cases, the congressional choice was between no modification and initiative behaviors, resistance behaviors are not expected for such cases. Therefore, perhaps the resistance proposition (3.2) should be changed to take note of the assumption that status cases generally do not lead to resistance behaviors. For status cases, the conditions in Proposition 3.2 should lead to initiatives.
Significant Aspects

In summary, the most important aspects of this case revolve around the contextual filter and the issue area. There were precedents for such a congressional attempt in the historical context and both the sequential and concurrent context revealed a deterioration in executive branch-congressional relations. Further, since status cases are assumed to lead to either no modification or initiative behaviors, the contextual events pushed the output toward an initiative. Finally, the concurrent election campaign events drew public attention away from the issue of executive agreements so that Congress had the freedom to act.

As a result, the case tends to support some of the findings in the congressional literature. For example, it supports the findings of Froman and Ripley (1970:147) that party leadership victories are most likely when leadership activity is high, the issue is more procedural and less substantive, the visibility of the issue is low, the visibility of action is low, there is little counterpressure from the constituencies, and state delegations do not engage in collective bargaining for specific demands. Moreover, this case squares with Robinson's conclusion that congressional initiatives are most likely on procedural issues (Robinson, 1962:14-15).

In terms of the propositions, the resistance proposition (3.2) may need modification when applied to status cases. Future attention should be devoted to adjusting propositions when contradictions such as these are found.
CHAPTER XIV NOTES

1 Unless otherwise specified, the research for this case comes from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972:158-160, 619-621.

2 For a list of party leaders, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1971:10;1972:26).

3 For a list of its members, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1972:261).

4 For a list of its members, see Congressional Index (1971-72:1915).

5 For a list of its members, see Congressional Directory (1972:290).
CHAPTER XV

The War Powers Resolution, 1973

During the waning days of the Vietnam War, American forces were often attacked by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces who then fled across the border into Cambodia. There the troops would regroup, be resupplied, and then come forth again to attack the Americans. In order to deal with this problem, President Richard Nixon ordered American troops across the border on April 30, 1970. The mission of the combined American and South Vietnamese forces was to attack the enemy in their sanctuary, capture their supplies, and disrupt their staging areas (Bailey, 1974:924).

Nixon's order to invade a neutral country demonstrated to many on Capitol Hill just how far removed they were from the locus of decision-making where combat actions were concerned (Reveley, 1975:94). The President's critics in Congress were appalled to learn that the governments of South Vietnam and Cambodia had known about the attack in advance, whereas Congress had not even been informed. Even the incursion's congressional supporters were offended by the President's failure to at least brief congressional leaders on the upcoming action (Frye, 1975:203-204).

Spurred by the events in Cambodia, Representative Dante Fascell (D-Fla.) introduced a war powers resolution on May 13, 1970. His bill, House Resolution 17598 (hereafter HR 17598), prevented the President from committing forces unless there was a declaration of war, the U.S. was under
attack, or a treaty provision was being enforced. If the President used any of the three alternatives mentioned, he was required to inform Congress within 24 hours. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1970:968). The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments held intermittent hearings from June through August on the bill. On July 1, John Stevenson, State's legal advisor, said the bill would arbitrarily limit the President's actions pursuant to his constitutional role as commander-in-chief (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1970:969).

The subcommittee ended its hearings on August 5, and the full Foreign Affairs Committee took up the resolution. On September 30, the committee reported out a substitute resolution. The new resolution, House Joint Resolution 1355 (hereafter HJ Res 1355), called on the President to consult with Congress prior to sending American forces into combat. If the President sent troops without consulting Congress, the bill required that he promptly give Congress a full report on the need for his action (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1970:971).

HJ Res 1355 came before the House floor on November 16 under a suspension of the rules. After a brief debate, the resolution passed without amendments by a 288-39 roll call vote. The resolution then went to the Senate where no action was taken (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1970:971).

In 1971, the House again took up the issue of war-making powers. On January 22, Representative Clement Zablocki (D-Wis.) reintroduced HJ Res 1355 as HJ Res 1. Zablocki made one change from the prior version of the bill. Where HJ Res 1355 had called on the President to consult with Congress "whenever feasible" prior to sending forces into combat, HJ Res 1
dropped the "whenever feasible" phrase. Thus, the new resolution was more stringent than its predecessor (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1971: 380).

Zablocki's Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments held hearings on HJ Res 1, as well as on eleven other related bills, on June 1 and June 2. The Zablocki subcommittee sent the war powers measure back to the full Foreign Affairs Committee. On July 27, the committee unanimously reported out HJ Res 1. In their report, the committee defended the resolution by arguing that, under it, the President would have been required to justify to Congress the escalation of ground troops in Vietnam in 1962, Laotian bombing in the 1960's, and the Cambodian incursion (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1971:380-381). On August 2, HJ Res 1 went to the House floor. No one seriously opposed the resolution, which was approved by voice vote under suspension of the rules.

Like the previous year, the Senate did not act on HJ Res 1. In 1972 however, the Foreign Relations Committee did report out a war powers bill. Senate 2956, cosponsored by Senators Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.), William Spong (D-Va.), John Stennis (D-Miss.), and Herman Talmadge (D-Ga.), was unanimously passed on February 9, 1972 (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972: 843,845,847). The bill said without a declaration of war, the President could commit forces to actual or imminent hostilities only to repel an attack on the U.S. or American forces, to protect the lives of American citizens and nationals, or when specifically authorized by Congress. Once forces were so committed, the President had to report promptly to Congress. If Congress desired, specific authorization could then be passed to permit American forces to continue their action. Without congressional
authorization, American forces had to be withdrawn by the end of 30 days. Moreover, Congress could end a commitment, before the 30 day period expired, by either an act or joint resolution. Finally, the bill was not retroactive to actions ongoing at its time of passage (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972:843-844).

Floor debate on the bill was held March 29-30, April 4-7, and April 10-13, 1972. In order to respond to the opposition, Javits introduced three perfecting amendments which were accepted en bloc by a 59-0 roll call vote on April 5. The amendments specified the President's authority to protect U.S. citizens and nationals on the high seas and allowed American military officers to continue their participation on the headquarters staffs of NATO, the United Nations forces in Korea, and the U.S.-Canadian North American Air Defense Command (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972:846). Further, the amendments gave the President the authority to continue military action past the 30 day limit if necessary to protect the troops while disengaging or if, due to an attack, Congress was not able to convene to consider the President's request (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972:846). The debate ended on April 13 when S 2956 passed by a 68-16 roll call vote (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972:842).

When the House Foreign Affairs Committee took up S 2956, they promptly changed it. When it was reported out of the committee on August 3, the Senate's provisions for S 2956 were gone. In their place, the House committee had substituted provisions which were both much less restrictive to the President and strikingly similar to the provisions of HJ Res 1. The bill was approved by the House on August 14 by a vote of 344-13. However, S 2956 died in conference (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972:842,851).
Congressional differences were finally resolved in 1973. Beginning on March 7, the Zablocki subcommittee held new hearings on the war-powers issue. On May 2, the subcommittee approved HJ Res 542 by a vote of 8-1. This resolution was more severe than the previous HJ Res 1. Whereas HJ Res 1 had only required the President to report his actions to Congress, HJ Res 542 said that, without a declaration of war, the President could commit U.S. forces to combat for only 120 days unless Congress approved of the action. Moreover, the bill added that Congress could force a halt in such operations before the 120 day limit had expired if both houses passed concurrent resolutions to that effect.

The full Foreign Affairs Committee passed HJ Res 542 on June 7 by a 30-4 vote. The only change in the bill was an amendment proposed by Lester Wolff (D-N.Y.). His amendment, approved by a 21-10 vote, made the resolution apply to all current hostilities.

The floor debate on HJ Res 542 ran from June 25 to 27, and also on July 18. Only two amendments were successfully attached to the committee's version of the bill. An amendment by Peter Frelinghuysen (R-N.J.) which removed current hostilities from the resolution's coverage, passed on July 18 by a 70-45 standing vote. Second, an amendment to toughen the bill further was also passed on July 18. The amendment by Bob Eckhardt (D-Tex.), removing a provision which had allowed the President to determine when an emergency situation existed, passed by a standing 49-41 vote. With these amendments out of the way, the House went on to pass HJ Res 542 on July 18 by a vote of 244-170.

In the Senate, another war powers measure was being considered. The War Powers Act (S 440) was sponsored by Senators Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo.),
Javits, and Stennis and cosponsored by 58 others. It was identical to S 2956 passed by the Senate the previous year and was approved on a 15-0 vote by the Foreign Relations Committee on May 17. Debate on S 440 began on July 18. It ended on July 20 with a successful amendment to the bill by Eagleton. His proposal to make the bill go into effect immediately upon enactment passed by voice vote. The Senate went on to pass S 440 by a 72-18 roll call vote. After it passed, the Senate substituted its language for that in HJ Res 542 and passed their new version of HJ Res 542.

The House-Senate conferees filed their report on HJ Res 542 on October 4, 1973. Their version of the bill said the President could commit troops to real or imminent hostilities only when war had been declared, under specific congressional authorization, or when American forces or possessions had been attacked or faced attack. While the bill urged the President to consult with Congress prior to action whenever possible, it gave him 48 hours to report to Congress should prior consultation not be possible. If Congress did not authorize the President's action, he had 60 days to remove the troops. Further, he could ask for a 30 day extension to remove the troops safely, but Congress had the final decision on an extension. Finally, the bill allowed Congress to terminate the President's action at any time, when not sanctioned by a declaration of war or congressional authorization, by passage of a concurrent resolution to that effect.

On October 10, the Senate approved the conference version by a vote of 75-20. The House followed two days later with a 238-123 vote. On October 24, President Nixon vetoed the resolution. He particularly objected to two aspects: the 60 day limit on unauthorized troop commitments and the
use of concurrent resolutions to force a military disengagement.

The movement for an override vote began quickly. In the House, the two opposing sides were clearly drawn. The key to a successful override appeared to be the votes of fifteen liberal members who had earlier voted against or paired against the resolution. These members were Bella Abzug (D-N.Y.), William Clay (D-Mo.), John Conyers (D-Mich.), John Culver (D-Iowa), Robert Drinan (D-Mass.), Bob Eckhardt (D-Tex.), William Green (D-Pa.), Ken Hechler (D-W.Va.), Elizabeth Holtzman (D-N.Y.), John Moss (D-Cal.), Paul McCloskey (R-Cal.), Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), Edward Patten (D-N.J.), Edward Roybal (D-Cal.), and Louis Stokes (D-Ohio). These members had opposed HJ Res 542, because they believed it gave the President greater war-making powers than did the Constitution.

The lobbying effort paid off. On November 7, the House overrode Nixon's veto by a 284-135 vote which was just four votes over the needed two-thirds majority. Eight of the above (Abzug, Clay, Drinan, Hechler, Holtzman, McCloskey, Patten and Stokes) voted to override. Their votes provided the needed majority. Four hours after the House had voted to override, the Senate did as well. By a vote of 75-18, the War Powers Resolution became law in spite of the President's veto.
ANALYSIS

I. Stimulus

The stimulus for this case was the 1970 Cambodian incursion. Alarmed at how far the President would go without notifying Congress, some members began the effort to reassert what they saw as their constitutional rights in terms of war-making (Frye, 1975:203-204; Reveley, 1975:94).

II. Contextual Filter

A. Historical Context

Early precedents showed that Congress had the dominant role in war powers. For example at the constitutional convention, the framers placed war and peace decisions in the hands of Congress. Congress had the authority to declare war, provide for the common defense, raise and support an army and navy, and undertake other necessary and proper actions in order to carry out these functions. The President's powers, on the other hand, were instrumental in nature. He was commander-in-chief and the government's principal representative in foreign affairs. Moreover, the writers of the Constitution rejected the idea of the executive or Senate having war powers alone. These powers, they said, belonged to the whole Congress (Frye, 1975:177-179).

A number of early precedents further emphasized the preeminence of Congress regarding war powers. In 1798, President John Adams wanted to
fight the French navy. He was counseled by Alexander Hamilton, one of the proponents of a strong executive branch, to wait for specific congressional authorization, and he waited. Precedents continued in the 1800's. In 1801, Chief Justice John Marshall ruled that the war powers belonged to Congress and not to the President. Furthermore in the 1840's, President Polk's precipitation of the Mexican War caused an uproar in Congress. The House of Representatives approved a resolution which said, in part, that "the war was unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by the President" (Frye, 1975:180-181). Therefore, the early period of the nation's history demonstrated the preeminence of Congress in regards to war powers.

B. Sequential Context

As Frye (1975:182) says, the "serious divergence" between these early constitutional precedents and executive practice began in the twentieth century. Modern presidents utilized their power derived from the Supreme Court's 1863 Prize Cases ruling which said that the President had the "power to wage defensive war against invasion or rebellion" and that the President was the "sole judge of when a defensive war had been thrust upon the United States" (Frye, 1975:181).

Armed with the ruling, a number of Presidents took military actions without congressional authorization or consultation. Such actions included:

1. Wilson's decision to arm merchant ships prior to the U.S. declaration of war in World War I;
2. Roosevelt's decisions in 1940 and 1941 to:
   A. send lend-lease destroyers to Great Britain,
   B. send American troops to relieve British troops in Iceland, and,
   C. make undeclared war on German submarines in the Atlantic;
3. Truman's decision to send troops to Korea in 1950;
4. Kennedy's decision to send U.S.-supported troops to invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961; and
5. Kennedy's decision to blockade Cuba in 1962, even though he had thirteen days in which consultation could have taken place (Frye, 1975:183-192).

Not only did Presidents attempt to bypass Congress, they also tried to get prior congressional approval for actions not yet taken. The Eisenhower administration used this approach with the Formosa Resolution in 1955 and the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1958 (Bailey, 1974:844). However, the use of such resolutions reach its zenith with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in 1964. Many members of Congress perceived the resolution as a response to an isolated incident. They did not realize that President Johnson would use the resolution as the device to legitimate the heavy and sustained bombing of North Vietnam. In response to later congressional criticism of the war, Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach called the Tonkin Gulf Resolution the "functional equivalent" of a declaration of war (Frye, 1975:183-192).

In the latter 1960's some members of Congress began the process of reasserting their rights in terms of both foreign policy-making and war powers in particular. The Foreign Relations Committee publicly critiqued the U.S. role in the Vietnam War in 1966. The next year, Senator Fulbright introduced a national commitments resolution and the Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the total U.S. role in world affairs. In 1969, the National Commitments Resolution passed the Senate and the Symington subcommittee on U.S. commitments was established (Johnson, 1975:43-50).

Overall, the sequential context was marked by two movements. On the one hand, Presidents in the twentieth century became more and more likely to use military force either without consulting Congress or without revealing the full extent of their plans. Due to this trend, some members
of Congress began a movement to reassert their constitutional rights. They wanted to regain the control over war-making which Congress had enjoyed in earlier times.

C. Concurrent Context

A number of concurrent events in the 1970-1973 period revealed a steady deterioration of congressional-executive relations which induced members of Congress to act regarding war powers. To start, domestic opposition to the war in Vietnam was growing. As it grew, opposition spilled over into the area of American military ties with other states.

Regarding such ties, the findings of the Symington subcommittee on national commitments were important. Many secret military commitments were unearthed by this panel, and some heretofore supporters of the administration were shocked to discover the extent of American military ties overseas (Frye, 1975:205). When Congress tried to learn more about the administration's military policies, members often ran into a "stonewall" process. For example, the administration, citing executive privilege, refused to let the Foreign Relations Committee see its long-range, five year military assistance plan. When the committee members turned to Henry Kissinger for information, he refused to testify before them (Frye, 1975:203-204).

If these administration actions were not enough to convince members of Congress that the administration was being unduly secretive about its policies, the final proof appeared as the Watergate revelations unfolded. The charges that the Watergate burglary's planning occurred in the White House, that key administration officials were involved in a possible cover-up, and that the CIA might have been involved startled the nation (Bernstein and Woodward, 1974).
In Congress, the effects of Watergate were numerous. First, those who already suspected the administration's foreign policy dealings saw the Watergate scandal as corroborating evidence for their suspicions. Second, some of those members of Congress who had previously defended the administration began to question their support of it. Finally, as the Watergate issue expanded, the administration grew politically weaker and weaker. Consequently, many members of Congress became bolder in their attack on the administration. Such an analysis came from two supporters of the administration. William Mailliard (R-Cal.) said Watergate created a favorable climate for the war powers bill (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1973:906). John Tower (R-Tex.) was more explicit. On November 7, he called on Americans not to be so blinded by Watergate that they crippled the foreign policy-making power of future Presidents.

Actions by the administration provided incentives for Congress to act on its own in the realm of foreign policy. Thus members of Congress continued the pattern of assertiveness they had begun in the sequential period. In 1970, the Senate repealed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and passed the Cooper-Church Amendment which prohibited the use of funds for U.S. troop activities in Cambodia (Johnson, 1975, 43-50). The next year, Congress set numerical ceilings on U.S. armed forces and refused, for the first time since the program's inception, to pass a foreign aid bill (Frye, 1975:207; Johnson, 1975:43-50). In 1972, Congress passed the Executive Agreements Act (see Chapter XIV). Moreover, the House Foreign Affairs Committee failed by one vote to report out a resolution calling for a U.S. withdrawal from Indochina by October 1, 1972 (Johnson, 1975:43-50). Finally, 1973 was marked by another congressional initiative in addition to
the War Powers Resolution. Congress forced Nixon to agree to a compromise which set August 15, 1973 as the deadline by which all U.S. combat activities in Indochina must end (Johnson, 1975:43-50).

In summary, the context played a highly important role in this case. Historical precedents existed to ensure Congress a strong role in war-making decisions. The sequential context revealed both a growing executive dominance of such decisions in the twentieth century and a late-starting movement in Congress to reverse that trend. Finally, the concurrent context showed both an administration whose actions provided openings for its congressional critics and a growing proportion of the congressional membership who were willing to take advantage of such openings, due to their lack of faith in the administration.

III. Issue Area

This case fell into the status area. The end desired by members of Congress was an enhancement of their role, vis-a-vis the executive, in war-making decisions. The means to achieve this goal involved only a change in procedures. Such an intangible/intangible mix of ends and means resulted in the case being coded as a status case.

IV. Party Leaders' Preferences

Party leaders' preferences were negative to the administration's position here. In the Senate, four party leaders took public stands on the issue of executive dominance in the war-making field. All these leaders were strongly opposed to the administration's position. Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) defended S 2956 in 1972 when some members on the Senate floor wanted to send it to the Judiciary Committee. Mansfield
opposed such an action because it would mean the bill was being sent "to
the graveyard" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972:844). Mansfield
summarized his position by calling on the Senate not to "bow down" to
the President (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972:848). At the same
time, Majority Whip Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.) also revealed his preferences.
He said:

...the actual power to initiate war...has, practically speaking,
shifted since World War II from Congress to the Executive. This
power of Congress must be reasserted in no uncertain terms...
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972:847).

On the other side in the Senate, Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R-Pa.)
also disapproved of the administration's desire to concentrate war-making
powers in its own hands. After hearing the 1971 testimony before the
Foreign Relations Committee, Scott declared: "The time has come when
Congress will not be denied the right to participate, in accordance with
the Constitution, in the whole enormous business of how wars are begun"
(R-Mich.) also abandoned the cause of the Republican administration. Dur­
ing the 1973 debate on S 440, Griffin said he supported the bill despite
his belief that a veto was inevitable.

In the House, the two party leaders who expressed preferences split
along party lines. Majority Leader Thomas O'Neill (D-Mass.) blasted the
administration by saying the President consulted with foreign leaders but
would not consult with Congress. Minority Leader Gerald Ford (R-Mich.),
on the other hand, defended the administration by pointing out the defects
of S 440. He castigated the members over the provision which allowed
Congress to end a commitment by failing to vote to condone it. He said
members should "have the guts and the will to stand up and vote instead
of saying 'you cannot do it' by doing nothing" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1973:909). Even though party preferences in the House were evenly split, Senate party preferences were uniformly negative. As a result, the party leaders' preferences variable was coded as negative.

V. Committee Leaders' Preferences

Committee leaders' preferences were negative to the administration's position. Throughout the four year history of this case, two committees and one subcommittee were involved in the process of regulating the executive's use of force. In the Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee was involved in 1971, 1972, and 1973. Three committee members expressed preferences in this case. Eleven on them strongly opposed the growing dominance of the executive in war-making decisions. Chairman Fulbright led the negative bloc. He endorsed the intent of S 2956 but he felt it was deficient. He wanted it to apply to the current conflict in Indochina, and he was afraid that it might actually broaden the executive's powers (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972:843-844,848-849). Fulbright expressed the latter fear about S 440 as well.

One of the strongest opponents of the administration on the committee was Javits. In 1971, he introduced a war powers bill by arguing that it was needed to prevent future Vietnams (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1971:382). In 1972, Javits cosponsored S 2956, and in 1973 he was the chief sponsor of S 440.

Nine other members also opposed the administration in this case. The opposition of Senators Mansfield, Scott, and Griffin was noted earlier. George Aiken (R-Vt.) introduced a motion to table S 2956 and then voted
against it. A strong supporter of the bill, he wanted to determine the strength of the pro-bill forces (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972: 847). John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) also strongly favored S 2956, but, like Fulbright, he also wanted it applied to the Indochina war (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972:843). Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.) urged Nixon not to veto the final version of the War Powers Resolution. He argued that: "If vetoed, all of the pious words about bipartisanship and shared power will be lost in a presidential pronouncement reinforcing the concept of unchecked powers" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1973:916). The others who strongly supported the legislation included Edmund Muskie (D-Me.) (who managed S 440 on the floor in 1973), Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.) (who cosponsored S 731 in 1971), and Spong (who cosponsored S 2956 in 1972) (Congressional Quarterly Almanacs, 1971:382; 1972:845; 1973:914).

The only other committee member expressing a preference was Gale McGee (D-Wyo.). He favored the need to slow the growth of executive power regarding war-making, but he cautioned Congress to go slow and be careful (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972:843,845,847). Thus, the committee members expressed eleven strongly negative preferences as well as one who was negative, but not strongly so. Accordingly, the committee's preferences were coded as negative to the administration's position.

The second committee to deal with this case was the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Ten of the committee's members expressed preferences. Two of them led the rest in their opposition to executive dominance of war-making. One was ranking majority member Zablocki. He was the floor manager of HJ Res 1355 in 1970 (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1970:971). He reintroduced a more stringent version of the bill, HJ Res 1, in 1971 and
led the move in 1972 to substitute the language of HJ Res 1 for that in S 2956 (Congressional Quarterly Almanacs, 1971:380; 1972:842). Zablocki demonstrated his preferences during the 1973 debate on the final version of the War Power Resolution when he called on House members to utilize "the historic opportunity to reassert [their] constitutionally mandated obligation in the area of war powers" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1973:906).

The other primary committee leader in this case was Representative Fascell. He started the congressional action by introducing the first version of a war powers bill, HR 17598, immediately after the Cambodian incursion in May 1970. Fascell defended his bill by saying: "The purpose of this proposal is to make certain that any future war will come only after a maximum amount of serious deliberation of the issue of war or peace by the Congress..." (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1970:968). Fascell continued his strong support of war powers bills in 1971, 1972, and 1973 (Congressional Quarterly Almanacs, 1971:380; 1972:851; 1973:910).

Four of the other committee members also strongly disapproved of the executive's actions regarding war-powers. Jonathan Bingham (D-N.Y.) favored the intent of HR 17598 in 1970 but felt the bill could be improved. Accordingly, he introduced his own war powers resolution, HR 18539 (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1970:969). The next year, Bingham introduced HJ Res 669 which would have made the unauthorized use of force by the President illegal (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1971:380). Paul Findley (R-Ill.) also opposed the administration. Regarding the use of force, Findley said: "Congress must be brought into the decision-making process at a point sufficiently early to influence the eventual outcome of the
decision" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1970:970). For his part, James Fulton (R-Pa.) defended HJ Res 1355 in 1970 by saying it rightly placed the responsibility for the use of force upon both Congress and the President rather than on the President alone (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1970:971). Finally, Wolff opposed the administration. He wanted to see HJ Res 542 applied to the Indochina war.

While the six committee members above were strongly opposed to the administration's position, two had mixed views. Both John Buchanan (R-Ala.) and Charles Whalen (R-Ohio) opposed the presidential use of force but felt the reliance on concurrent resolutions went too far. Both spearheaded Republican attempts to get regular resolutions substituted for concurrent ones in HJ Res 542. Their amendments to do so failed.

The last two committee members to express preferences were strong administration supporters. During floor debate on HJ Res 542, Frelinghuysen blasted the use of concurrent resolutions while Mailliard added that the bill was too restrictive to the President. Moreover, these two were the only conferees who refused to sign the conference report on HJ Res 542. When asked why, Frelinghuysen called the bill "an attempt to shackle the President" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1973:910,916). Since six committee members expressed strongly negative views, two expressed mixed views, and only two expressed positive views, the committee's preferences were coded as negative to the administration's position.

The last committee actor to handle the war powers question was the National Security Policy and Scientific Developments Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee. It held hearings on war powers legislation in 1970, 1971, and 1973. Only four subcommittee members expressed preferences
in this case. The negative preferences of Zablocki, Bingham, Findley, and Fulton have already been noted. Therefore, the subcommittee's preferences were coded as negative. Since all three committee actors expressed negative preferences, the committee leaders' preferences variable was coded as negative to the administration's position.

VI. Constituency Pressures

Constituency pressures were perceived by members of Congress to be negative to the administration's position in this case. Such pressures were manifested by the general public, opinion leaders in the foreign policy or national security areas, and some interest groups. Public pressures initially were mixed. The nation's campuses erupted following the Cambodian incursion. The result of the turmoil was the death of four students at Kent State and the temporary closing of many schools across the country. Other elements of the public supported the incursion; 57% of the public rallied behind the President's use of force according to a May 10, 1970 Gallup poll (Bailey, 1974:924).

However, the President's general support dropped over time while the anti-war movement maintained its strength until the American phase of the war ended in 1973. The Watergate revelations in 1973 further contributed to Nixon's loss of support. The consistent opposition to the war combined with increasing public disaffection for the Nixon administration was interpreted by many members of Congress as support for their efforts to curb the presidential use of force.

The most direct evidence of constituency pressure came through the congressional testimony of professionals in the foreign policy/national
security fields. The testimony of these opinion leaders revealed that strong supporters of the administration were in the minority. Only three individuals strongly supported the administration's control of the use of force. McGeorge Bundy, former special assistant for national security affairs; James Burns, professor of government at Williams College; and John Moore, law professor at the University of Virginia, agreed in 1970 that war powers legislation would unduly restrict the President in foreign policy (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1970:968). The next year, Moore went on to argue that the proposals before Congress were of "doubtful constitutionality" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1971:382).

One witness in 1971 testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with a message generally supportive of administration desires. George Ball, former Under Secretary of State, refused to endorse the proposals before the Senate. Instead, he urged the senators to establish a more flexible working relationship with the administration (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1971:383).

Moving away from support of the administration, one congressional witness offered a mildly negative stance toward the administration's position. Although former Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach did not believe a general war powers bill would achieve its goals, he argued the administration should be warned that congressional wishes could not be ignored (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1970:970).

Seven individuals came out strongly against the presidential dominance of war-making. The most interesting testimony came in 1971 from Bundy who reversed his stand from the year before. In defending S 731, he said:
The Congress can and should put appropriate conditions on any authorization of limited hostilities. The constitutional power to declare war clearly includes the power to put limits on any hostilities that are authorized. This is what we have not properly understood in the past... (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1971:382).

Six others strongly condemned the executive's domination of war-making and called on Congress to reassert its constitutional prerogatives. These included:

1. Alexander Bickel, law professor at Yale;
2. Henry Steele Commager, history professor at Amherst College;
3. Alfred Kelly, history professor at Wayne State University;
4. Richard Morris, history professor at Columbia University;
5. George Reedy, former advisor to President Johnson and currently at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; and

Thus the largest bloc among opinion leaders was made up of those strongly opposed to the administration's position. Moreover, the positive bloc lost one-third of its strength when Bundy switched to the support of congressional war powers initiatives. Therefore, the impact of the opinion leaders was coded as negative.

Interest groups became involved in this case when Nixon vetoed the War Powers Resolution. A number of groups conducted a vigorous lobby effort, coordinated by the Americans for Democratic Action, in 1973 to persuade fifteen House liberals to vote to override the veto. In summary, since general public opinion was perceived to be negative to the administration's position, and since both opinion leaders and interest groups were strongly negative in their preferences, the constituency pressures
variable was coded as negative to the administration's position.

VII. Presidential Involvement

The level of presidential involvement in this case was standard.

Nixon argued:

...limiting the President's war powers, whoever is President of the United States, would be a very great mistake...We live in times when situations can change so fast internationally that to wait until the Senate acts before a President can act might be that we acted too late (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972:842-843).

Nixon's involvement peaked in 1973. On June 26 he sent a telegram to House Minority Leader Ford who read it into debate. The letter said Nixon was "unalterably opposed" to HJ Res 542 and would veto it if passed in its present form (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1973:909). When it passed, Nixon vetoed it. In his October 24 veto message, Nixon called the resolution "both unconstitutional and dangerous to the best interests of our nation" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1973:907). Nixon's two year campaign to stop the bill and his subsequent veto of it made his level of involvement standard in this case.

VIII. Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior

This case was a congressional initiative. The stimulus provided by the Cambodian incursion led to the introduction of HJ Res 17598 by Representative Fascell. Congress then worked on war powers legislation for four years. Throughout the process, the administration was the target, rather than the initiator, of the action.
Propositions

The War Powers Resolution was a status case. Party leaders' preferences, committee leaders' preferences, and constituency pressures were negative to the administration's position. Nixon's level of involvement was standard, and an initiative behavior was the congressional output.

With such variable values, six of the seven propositions were supported. These supported included the status (1.1), status/poor relationship (1.1A), party leaders (2.1), committee leaders (3.1), constituency pressures (4.1), and initiative (5.2) propositions. The only unsupported one was the presidential involvement proposition (5.1). It states:

When the level of presidential involvement is standard, the probability of no modification behaviors increases while the probabilities of resistance and initiative behaviors decrease.

Here Nixon's firm personal stand and subsequent veto were not strong enough to override the contrary influence of the other variables.

Significant Aspects

In retrospect, two points must be made about this case. The first concerns the doggedness and determination shown by members of Congress. Members kept plugging away for four years trying to get a war powers bill on which they could agree. This congressional determination was consistently opposed by the administration. The administration tried in the first two years to "buy off" the congressmen with offers of a "closer relationship" or a "working partnership." When those proved unattractive, the administration turned to threats of a veto. When the veto was employed, Congress had the cohesiveness to override it. It was the first successful override vote for the 93rd Congress.
However, this bill might not have been possible without the incentives supplied by the Nixon administration. The events and actions noted in the sequential and concurrent contexts were of unmistakable importance. The Vietnam War, the Cambodian incursion, secret commitments, the refusal of Kissinger and the NSC to give information to Congress, and ultimately Watergate acted as incentives for members of Congress to try to check what more and more of them saw as the centralization of information and power in the White House. Without the poor relations caused by a continued string of events, it is unlikely that the congressional movement which started in 1970 could have produced the War Powers Resolution of 1973.
CHAPTER XV NOTES

1 Unless otherwise specified, the research for this case comes from Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1973:905-917.


3 For a list of its members, see Congressional Directory (1971:254; 1972:261) and Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1973:54).


5 For a list of its members, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1970: 54; 1973:69) and Congressional Index (1971-1972:3411).
CHAPTER XVI

The Rejection of the Sugar Act, 1974

In 1974, the forty-year-old sugar program died when Congress refused its extension. The periodic renewal of the sugar program had been fairly noncontroversial in the past. Yet as the domestic price of sugar increased in the early 1970's, this routine program became the subject of mounting criticism. The program affected U.S. sugar prices since it set subsidies for American sugar producers as well as quotas for both domestic and foreign sugar suppliers.

In February 1974, the administration sent to the House Agriculture Committee its recommended guidelines for the Sugar Act renewal. In general terms, the guidelines said the administration would favor a three-year extension of the act which provided greater price flexibility than had been evident in the past. Specifically, the administration called for Congress to write the legislation but to be sure it included a country-quota system, minimal changes in the quota allocation formula, and no change in the Cuban reserve quota (Pastor, 1975:223,226).

The House Agriculture Committee held hearings on the renewal of the sugar program from February through March 1974 (U.S. House, 1974). During this period, the committee agreed to make only minimal changes in the quota allocation formula. The specific formula chosen by the committee was one developed jointly by the Economic and Business Affairs Bureau of the State.
Department and the committee staff. The new formula based each country's sugar quota solely on its performance in meeting its quotas for 1972 and 1973. The committee further agreed to State Department requests to exempt three countries from the quota levels otherwise imposed by the formula. State wanted the Thai quota increased in order to fulfill a previous State Department pledge to the Thais (Pastor, 1975:226). The West Indies quota was to be protected against reduction in order to foster closer ties between the U.S. and Caribbean states. Finally, the Venezuelan quota was also to be protected against reduction since a serious drought had hurt their sugar production in 1973 (Pastor, 1975:227).

On May 17 by a vote of 30-5, the committee reported out a bill, HR 14747, to amend and extend the Sugar Act until December 31, 1979. The bill divided the domestic sugar market between domestic suppliers and 31 foreign nations. Domestic suppliers were guaranteed a share of the domestic market which could range from 6,685,000 tons to 8,000,000 tons. As such, the guaranteed share of the market for domestic suppliers, based upon a consumption estimate of 12 million tons, ranged from 55.7% to 66.6%. The remaining share of the domestic market was to be supplied by thirty Latin American, Asian, and African States.

The bill also recommended changes in both the extent and the manner in which subsidies and prices were manipulated. First, the government subsidy to farmers was reduced. The bill called for no farm to receive more than $9,400 a year in sugar subsidies. While this provision sharply reduced government subsidy payments to farmers from past levels, another provision offset its impact. When domestic sugar prices increased beyond a specified target price, processors would be required to pass a proportional amount of
their increased revenues back to the farmers. In this way market forces would reward farmers as well as processors. Finally, when the domestic price of sugar fell 4% or more below the target price, the Agriculture Secretary would be required to reduce foreign quotas so that domestic producers would not be badly hurt by foreign competition. Conversely, when domestic prices rose above the target price, foreign suppliers would be pressed to supply the full extent of their quota to the American market, thereby reducing the price-increase spiral.

The bill was debated on the House floor on June 5, 1974. For the first time in the program's history, the bill had an open rule which allowed amendment attempts on the floor (Congressional Record, 1974:17835). Three labor amendments, which had been rejected during the Agriculture Committee's consideration of the bill, were approved by the House over the strong opposition of Agriculture Chairman W.R. Poage (D-Tex.). The first, sponsored by William Ford (D-Mich.), required the Agriculture Secretary to consider workers' productivity and the cost of traveling from sugar area to sugar area when fixing minimum wages for sugar workers. Ford's amendment passed by a 244-143 recorded vote (Congressional Record, 1974:17864-17868). The second amendment, sponsored by James O'Hara (D-Mich.), required producers who paid field workers at piece rates to ensure that the piece rates guaranteed the workers an income at least equal to the hourly minimum wage as determined by the Agriculture Secretary. This amendment passed on a 233-151 recorded vote (Congressional Record, 1974:17868-17870). The final labor amendment, again sponsored by Ford, required employers to provide accident insurance for their workers. It passed by voice vote (Congressional Record, 1974:17872).
After the labor amendments passed, Paul Findley (R-Ill.) sponsored an amendment to cut off subsidy payments to producers when the domestic price of sugar rose 10% above the program's target price. After a 25% figure was substituted for the 10% one by John Zwach (R-Minn.), the amendment passed by voice vote (Congressional Record, 1974:17873-17876). Findley then introduced an amendment to guarantee that the bill's labor provisions were still valid after such subsidy payments were suspended. This amendment passed by voice vote as well (Congressional Record, 1974:17876). Bob Bergland (D-Minn.) then introduced an amendment which eliminated the "pricing corridor" mechanism used by the Agriculture Secretary when adjusting country quotas in order to approach the target price. Bergland's amendment, a substitute for a more stringent version sponsored by Dawson Mathis (D-Ga.), passed on a 27-4 standing vote.

When the final vote was held, the extension of the Sugar Act failed by a 175-209 recorded vote (Congressional Record, 1974:17880). The defeat of the bill was unexpected, as was the size of the negative bloc (Pastor, 1975:229). After the House defeated it, the Senate refused to act on the bill. Therefore, the Sugar Act expired on December 31, 1974.

The Latin American reaction to the program's demise was strongly negative. Latin American states, whose economies were significantly affected by the potential loss of their share of the American market, saw the defeat as a contradiction of a promise made earlier by Secretary of State Kissinger. In February 1974 at a meeting of Latin American Foreign Ministers in Mexico, Kissinger had promised that the U.S. government would support increased U.S.-Latin American trade (Pastor, 1975:221). In the eyes of many Latin American leaders, Congress had repudiated the administration's goal of closer U.S.-Latin American relations (Pastor, 1975).
I. Stimulus

The stimulus for this case was the approaching expiration of the Sugar Act. This general stimulus was operationalized in February 1974 when the administration's Sugar Study Group sent its recommendations for the program's extension to the House Agriculture Committee.

II. Contextual Filter

A. Historical Context

The U.S. government had long been involved with sugar issues. In 1789, sugar tariffs provided a significant amount of the federal government's total revenues. Moreover from 1789 until 1934, the government used both tariffs and bounties to protect the American sugar industry from foreign competition. In 1934, the Jones-Costigan Act set up the first foreign quota system. That act was superceded in 1937 by the Sugar Act which set up the basic outlines of the existing sugar program.

The net results of the sugar program favored both American and foreign producers. Domestic producers were helped through subsidies and a protected share of the market. Further, the program encouraged foreign producers to export sugar to the U.S. since the price of sugar on the American market was more stable, and normally higher, than the world market price. Thus in the 1950's and 1960's, foreign governments competed
with each other for larger quotas, and thus larger shares, of the profitable American sugar market.

One brief interruption in the program occurred in early 1964. Public outcries began when the domestic price of sugar began to rise. The criticism divided the sugar producers and Congress did not pass an extension. When the price fell in late 1964, the extension was passed (Pastor, 1975: 223 fn).

B. Sequential Context

A number of factors in the sequential context figured prominently in the sugar program's ultimate demise. One such factor revolved around foreign competition for sugar quotas. When the program was renewed in 1971, the foreign competition was so forceful that critics of the program began to argue that foreign governments were exerting too much influence on the House Agriculture Committee (Congressional Record, 1974:17837). Moreover, the critics said such influence was hidden in closed committee sessions and protected by rules of debate which did not allow floor amendments to the Sugar Act. One result of this attack was the decision to allow floor amendments in 1974. The consequences of this decision were startling. Many traditional supporters of the sugar program actually voted against it in 1974. Many of these members of Congress were in favor of the bill until the three labor amendments were added. For example, "four out of five Colorado Congressmen representing sugar beet districts voted against the Act just because of these provisions" (Pastor, 1975:229).

However, a more important consideration in the bill's unexpected defeat concerned the domestic price of sugar. In the past, industry representatives played a large role in pushing through extensions of the program while consumers and industrial users of sugar played minor roles. The
deviations in this pattern had come when sugar prices increased sharply and aroused consumers and industrial users (Pastor, 1975:223). Consequently, the rapid increase in the domestic price of sugar, which began in 1973, provided the incentive for critics of the sugar program to mobilize.

In the face of such potential threats to the program the administration should have taken a united stand in order to help the extension bill through Congress. However, events in the sequential time period revealed that the administration was badly divided over the future of the sugar program. The Agriculture Department faced a serious internal split over the future of the program. Agriculture Secretary Butz was unequivocably and unalterably opposed to it, a fact which he could not hide from the House Agriculture Committee (U.S. House, 1974:12-13). As a strong believer in the free market system, Butz opposed both subsidies at home and quotas abroad. Both, in his view, were obstacles to free enterprise (Pastor, 1975:223-224). While Butz and his political subordinates were totally against the program, most of the career personnel at the Department were in favor of it. These Agriculture personnel saw the program as necessary for the protection and expansion of the domestic sugar industry in the face of foreign competition. They saw the political appointees in the Department as "inflexible" or "single-minded" regarding the program, if not actually ignorant of its workings. As one career civil servant put it:

They never learned—or else refused to recognize—the essential difference between sugar [an import] and soybeans [an export] " (quoted in Pastor, 1975:224).

The split within the Agriculture Department had negative consequences for the program's extension. For example, on January 11, 1974, Secretary Butz announced that he was raising the U.S. sugar consumption estimates by
500,000 tons, and he would allow the extra amount to be filled by foreign suppliers on a first-come-first-served basis. Butz said by increasing the domestic supply of sugar, domestic sugar prices should fall. However, sugar experts, both inside and outside the Agriculture Department, recognized that further bidding on a tight world market could only drive the price of sugar up. Many experts believed Butz did this deliberately to give ammunition to the sugar program's critics (Pastor, 1975:228).

The sequential context played an important role in this case. With consumers and industrial users up in arms over rising sugar prices, with an embattled congressional committee agreeing to allow floor amendments for the first time, and with an important administration actor ready to bolt from the administration's official position, perhaps the bill's failure should not have been so unexpected.

C. Concurrent Context

Concurrent events and concerns played two roles regarding the renewal of the sugar program. To begin with, the Nixon administration needed the passage of the Sugar Act since the program interacted with other foreign policy issues. The failure to renew the program would endanger current negotiations with the Philippines over military bases and investments, as well as reduce the ability of less efficient Caribbean producers to compete for shares of the U.S. sugar market. The latter eventuality could prove hazardous for other American interests in Latin America, such as the need for Jamaican and Guyanan bauxite (Pastor, 1975:225-227). Moreover, the loss of the program would sour U.S.-Latin American relations in general, and the new U.S.-Latin American dialogue started by Kissinger at the Foreign Ministers Conference in February, could die

Also, a more specific linkage was present. Senators Russell Long (D-La.) and Wallace Bennett (R-Utah), the Chairman and ranking minority member of the Finance Committee (respectively), warned Nixon in early February that if the administration did not push for an extension of the sugar program they would have a hard time reporting out a trade bill for 1974. Thus they held the trade bill hostage in return for administrative support of the Sugar Act's extension.

Concurrent events not only acted as incentives for administration action, but they also served as constraints to effective action on the program's behalf. The administration was constrained by the fact that an important executive branch actor bolted away from the administration's official position. Butz's opposition to the sugar program was well-known, and he and other Agriculture Department officials lobbied against the bill in Congress. Agriculture personnel lobbied House Republicans to vote against the Act. "The result was that 121 Republicans voted against the Act while only 47 voted for it" (Pastor, 1975:229). The Department's opposition came from two sources. The Department's top political leaders saw the bill as contrary to their free market ideology whereas rank-and-file personnel, who generally supported the program, probably worked for its demise due to the bill's labor provisions.

Another constraint kept the administration from both monitoring its personnel regarding the Sugar Act extension and presenting a stronger defense of the program. In the spring of 1974, the Nixon presidency was faced with the mounting Watergate scandal and the pace of the deterioration in Congressional-executive relations increased. The House Judiciary
Committee began its impeachment hearings at approximately the same time that the administration was choosing its position on the sugar program (Edwards, 1979:321). Nixon was counseled by William Timmons, the White House Congressional Liaison, to favor an extension based on whatever modifications Congress cared to make in the basic sugar program. Timmons told Nixon he could ill-afford to alienate conservative members of Congress on the impeachment issue by doing something rash with the sugar program (Pastor, 1975:226). Further, as the President's political fortunes sank due to Watergate, it became easier for members of Congress to oppose anything the administration wanted.

Finally, 1974 was a congressional election year. Members of the House were up for re-election, and the Watergate scandals provided the incentive for members to oppose the administration. Representatives were looking for ways to put distance between themselves and the administration due to Nixon's sinking popularity. Also, to the extent that important constituent groups did not like the program the upcoming election ensured that representatives heeded their concerns. Thus concurrent events made the passage of the Sugar Act both necessary and yet difficult for the administration.

In summary, contextual factors played a significant role. Historically, the program was an established one which generally was easily extended. The only time the program ran into trouble came when sugar prices were as high as they had been in 1964. Thus the 1964 episode provided a precedent for a congressional refusal to pass the bill. In the sequential period, the price of sugar was climbing and administration actors were arguing whether or not to continue the program. Moreover, the Agriculture Department's leadership was opposed to the program. Finally, concurrent events
and concerns made the administration want to get the extension passed but limited its ability to do so. Poor congressional–executive relations further hurt the administration’s chances of success.

III. Issue Area

This case fell into the nonhuman resources area. The values expressed by members of Congress were tangible ones. Supporters of the program were motivated by a desire to protect the existence of the American sugar industry while opponents wanted to see lower sugar prices. The means were tangible as well. The setting of both the target price and the quotas would help determine the price of sugar domestically. Thus, monetary concerns were at the center of the case.

IV. Party Leaders’ Preferences

Party leaders’ preferences were positive in this case. Only one party leader expressed preferences in this case. On the House floor, Majority Leader Thomas O’Neill (D-Mass.) defended the program in general and the Venezuelan quota in particular when it was attacked by some members unhappy with rising oil prices (Congressional Record, 1974:17852). Since no other party leaders expressed publicly their preferences, the party leaders’ preferences variable was coded as positive.

V. Committee Leaders’ Preferences

Committee leaders’ preferences were positive to the administration’s position. Two committees became involved in this case. The primary one was the House Agriculture Committee. Thirteen committee members expressed preferences in this case. The largest bloc, led by Chairman W.R. Poage
(D-Tex.), was positive toward the sugar program. Poage was solidly in favor of the program's extension (U.S. House, 1974:1). He managed the bill in floor debate and compared the failure to pass the bill with the problems the U.S. was having with imported oil. He contended that without the sugar program, the country would become dependent on high-priced foreign sugar. Moreover, the future availability of that foreign sugar was uncertain. During the debate, Poage defended the existing program and especially defended the South African quota. He further objected to the attachment of the labor provisions on the floor.

The other six committee members strongly positive to the program were Representatives Bergland, Spark Matsunaga (D-Ha.), Steven Symms (R-Idaho), William Wampler (R-Va.), and John Zwach (R-Minn.). In committee, Bergland defended the need for the program (U.S. House, 1974:19-20). On the House floor, he called for the country to become self-sufficient in sugar production so that American sugar policies would not be dictated from Havana. Matsunaga was afraid that, without the program, not only would sugar prices rise, but American producers would get out of the sugar business. Later in the year, he pointed out that sugar prices "skyrocketed" the day after the bill's defeat (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1974:230). Symms, for his part, tried to get the bill's labor provisions deleted on the floor. Wampler strongly defended the bill in debate (Congressional Record, 1974:17839-17840). Finally, Zwach argued that the domestic sugar industry needed government protection to ensure capital investment (U.S. House, 1974:18-19) He also warned that the bill's demise would lead to an international sugar cartel.

By the time of the floor debate, there was a four-man negative bloc from the committee. It was led by Peter Peyser (R-N.Y.) who saw himself as
a spokesman for the sugar consumer (Pastor, 1975:228). He charged that sugar corporations were making windfall profits, that the Russians and Arabs were manipulating the international sugar market, and that the program would not work in a time of high demand. Moreover, Peyser opposed subsidies when prices were so high and called for giving "the free economy a chance to work" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1974:230). Finally, he tried to stop the "pass through" of profits and to limit the bill's extension period through floor amendments.

The other three committee members strongly negative to the bill were Representatives LaMar Baker (R-Tenn.), Findley, and Edward Young (R-S.C.). Baker, a signer of the minority committee report, said he could not support the bill since it was insensitive to consumers' needs. Findley, another minority report signer, argued that subsidy payments were wrong when the sugar price was so high. He introduced an amendment to cut off such subsidies when the price went 10% above the target price and another to protect the bill's labor standards. He also opposed the processing tax on sugar which was passed on to consumers (U.S. House, 1974:37). Finally, Young seriously questioned the need both for country-by-country quotas and for domestic subsidies. However, since the positive bloc was the largest and was led by the Chairman, its views predominated. Therefore, the committee's preferences were coded as positive.

Although the bill never got to the Senate, the Senate Finance Committee became indirectly involved. The Chairman and ranking minority member, Senators Long and Bennett (respectively), pressured the administration to continue the sugar program. When Butz bid for more sugar on the international market in January 1974, Long and Bennett were outraged. They saw
Butz's move as a bold stroke against the program and sent a message to the White House which praised the program and denounced Butz's action (Pastor, 1975:228). Further, just prior to Nixon's decision to pursue an extension of the act, they informed the White House that, should an extension request not be forthcoming, the Trade Act would not pass through their committee. Consequently, since both committees dealing with the Sugar Act expressed positive preferences, the committee leaders' preferences variable was coded as positive to the administration's position.

VI. Constituency Pressure

Constituency pressures were negative to the administration's position in this case. The main mechanism for expressing such pressures was the activity of interest groups. The positive bloc was made of sugar industry spokesmen. Actors whose representatives lobbied Congress on the bill's behalf were the American Farm Bureau Federation, the California and Hawaiian Sugar Company, the National Sugar Beet Growers Federation, and the U.S. Cane Sugar Refiners Association. These domestic actors both supported the basic program and attacked the addition of the labor amendments.

The opponents of the program were a stronger and more diversified coalition. This coalition was composed of consumer groups, led by the Consumer Federation of America; large industrial sugar users such as the Association of Retail Bakers of America, Coca Cola, and the National Confectioners Association; and groups strongly opposed to past labor practices in the sugar industry. The last group included the AFL-CIO, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, and the U.S. Catholic Conference.
Common information bound the opponents together. A work entitled *The Sugar Program: Large Costs and Small Benefits*, by D. Gale Johnson, a conservative economics professor from the University of Chicago, was published in the spring of 1974. The monograph, a bitter attack on the sugar program, was widely circulated in Washington. The negative bloc found in it the theoretical and statistical arguments to be used against the program.

The size and diversity of the opponents, as well as the credibility of their arguments, proved too strong for many members of Congress to resist. The negative bloc dominated the input from domestic groups and, accordingly, the constituency pressures variable was coded as negative.

VII. *Presidential Involvement*

The level of presidential involvement was substandard in this case. Nixon spent five-to-ten minutes deciding to pursue the program's extension; then his involvement ended (Pastor, 1975:226). Since Nixon did nothing beyond making the decision to request an extension, the level of presidential involvement was substandard.

VIII. *Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior*

The congressional response in this case was a resistance behavior. The administration had both foreign and domestic reasons for wanting the bill's extension, but Congress refused to pass it.
Propositions

The extension of the Sugar Act was a nonhuman resource case. Party leaders' preferences were positive, committee leaders' preferences were positive, and constituency pressures were negative. Nixon's level of involvement was substandard, and a resistance behavior was the result. With such variable values, the nonhuman resources proposition (1.2) and the constituency pressures proposition (4.1) were supported.

Significant Aspects

Without the high price of sugar in 1973 and 1974, the extension of the Sugar Act would probably have passed. Such was the conclusion by Pastor (1975:229) who argued:

The final defeat of the program can be attributed to three major causes: (1) the emergence of a strong consumer and industrial user lobby; (2) failure by the sugar industry to present a united front; and (3) equivocation by the Administration. The first two were ultimately determined by the high price of sugar, which made the former groups angry and the latter group complacent.

However, the impact of the rise in sugar prices in the sequential and concurrent periods was augmented by other factors. The historical context played an important role by providing a precedent in 1964 for the congressional refusal to pass the extension in 1974. Further, poor executive branch-congressional relations brought out additional congressional critics, weakened the administration's ability to defend itself, and allowed the Agriculture Department to get away with lobbying against the bill's extension. Finally, the administration either did not, or could not, monitor the debate closely enough to prevent the addition of the labor amendments which caused the defection of many of the bill's traditional supporters.
CHAPTER XVI NOTES

1 Unless otherwise specified, the research for this case comes from Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1974:225-230.

2 For a list of party leaders, see Congressional Directory (1974:414-415, 419-420).

3 For a list of its members, see Congressional Directory (1974:286), Congressional Index (1973-1974:3113), and Pastor (1975:228).

4 For a list of its members, see Congressional Directory (1974:286).
CHAPTER XVII
The Turkish Military Aid Cutoff, 1974

In July 1974, Turkish military forces invaded the island of Cyprus. The fact that U.S.-supplied arms were used by Turkey in the invasion angered some members of Congress, who soon found an opportunity to express their outrage. Congress had not yet passed a general appropriations bill in 1974, and the government's agencies and departments, as well as the foreign aid program, were due to run out of funds on September 30. Realizing that a major appropriations bill could not be completed before members of Congress took their pre-election recess, the congressional leadership tried to rush through an emergency continuing appropriations bill which would fund the government's activities until Congress came back after the general election of 1974. Turkey's congressional opponents decided to try to attach a military aid ban as a rider to the emergency funding bill.

When the emergency appropriations bill got to the House floor on September 24, Representatives Pierre du Pont (R-Del.) and Benjamin Rosenthal (D-N.Y.) proposed the amendment. It would end all military aid to Turkey until the President informed Congress that "substantial progress" had been made regarding the negotiations in Cyprus (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1974:548). The du Pont-Rosenthal amendment was overwhelmingly approved by a 307-90 vote. After other amendment attempts, the House
passed the emergency funding bill, with the du Pont-Rosenthal amendment intact, by a 374-26 vote.

Taking note of what had occurred in the House, the Senate Appropriations Committee attempted to prevent such a floor amendment in its chamber. The committee members added a provision to their recommended version of the emergency funding bill which empowered the President to cut off military aid when a nation did not act in good faith. Senator Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo.) proposed a more stringent amendment to immediately cut off all military aid to Turkey which was adopted on September 30 by a 57-20 vote. The Senate went on to pass the entire bill by a 72-16 vote the next day.

At this point, President Ford said that if the bill which came out of the conference committee contained the Eagleton amendment, or one like it, he would veto it. Ford stressed the need for maximum flexibility on the part of the administration in order to help bring about a settlement in Cyprus.

When the conferees released their report on October 3, their plan of action was clear. The House conferees had agreed to introduce a motion calling for the President to make continued military assistance conditional on sincere efforts by Turkey to reach an agreement regarding the Cyprus situation. Once the motion passed the House, the Senate conferees were to get their colleagues to agree with the House language.

However, the conferees' strategy did not work. On October 7, the House members rejected the conference proposal by a 69-291 vote. The House then passed, by voice vote, a Rosenthal substitute which again called for a cessation of military aid to Turkey until "substantial progress" was made in the negotiations (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1974:551).
When the bill came before the Senate on October 9, Appropriations Chairman John McClellan (D-Ark.) asked the Senate to approve the House language regarding Turkish military aid. McClellan made it clear that he felt the amendment to cut off the aid was unwise, but he argued that Congress had to pass the emergency funding bill. The House language was approved by a 62-16 vote and the funding bill was ready for President Ford's consideration.

Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) tried to make a last-minute change later that same day. He sponsored a joint resolution which would have allowed Ford to delay the aid cutoff until December 15 if he believed the delay would help the negotiations. His resolution was adopted by a 40-35 vote in the Senate. Two days later on October 11, the House refused to go along with Mansfield's change. Although the party leadership endorsed it, the opponents said the Mansfield resolution would allow U.S. laws to be broken for an additional 60 days. The resolution failed on a 171-187 vote.

Carrying out his earlier pledge, Ford vetoed the bill on October 14. The House tried to override the veto on October 15 but failed to reach the two-thirds majority by 16 votes. As soon as the override attempt failed, the House Appropriations Committee reported out a new emergency funding bill. It was identical with the one vetoed, except that the mandatory Turkish aid cutoff was replaced by the language of the Mansfield resolution. The next day Rosenthal introduced a new Turkish aid cutoff amendment. The new version required President Ford to cut off military aid to Turkey before December 10 if, before that time, the Turkish government shipped more military supplies or equipment to Cyprus. The House members approved
Rosenthal's amendment by a 194-144 vote. The House then approved the emergency funding bill by a 287-30 vote.

Within hours of the House passage of the funding bill, the Senate took it up. Mansfield and Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R-Pa.) tried to get the Rosenthal amendment deleted, but their amendment attempt failed by a 27-40 vote. The Senate then passed the bill, in the same form as the House version, by a vote of 45-23.

On October 17, Ford again vetoed the funding bill. As soon as his veto message was received, the House tried to override the veto. Again the House failed, but the margin of victory for the President was slim. The 161-83 House vote missed the needed two-thirds majority by only two votes. Realizing that the President's support was weakening, House Minority Leader John J. Rhodes (R-Ariz.) telephoned Ford after the unsuccessful override attempt. In order to get the emergency funding bill passed, Rhodes pressed Ford to accept a third version of the bill. This version also banned aid to Turkey. However, there was a proviso which said Ford could postpone the ban until December 10, 1974 if the Turks did not violate the cease-fire, ship additional troops, or ship American-supplied planes, guns, tanks, ammunition, etc. to Cyprus. Ford "reluctantly agreed" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1974:553). The House then passed the bill on a 191-33 vote, and the Senate approved it by voice vote.

The final result was that, in order to get the emergency funding bill, President Ford was forced to accept the cutoff of military aid to Turkey. Ford was unable to stop Congress from adding the aid cutoff to the funding bill.
ANALYSIS

I. Stimulus

The stimulus for this case came on September 24, 1974 when Representatives du Pont and Rosenthal attached their floor amendment to the emergency funding bill. They wanted U.S. shipments of military aid to Turkey stopped until "substantial progress" had been made in the Greco-Turkish negotiations over Cyprus.

II. Contextual Filter

A. Historical Context

American support for Greeks in Greco-Turkish conflicts dated back to the earliest days of the nation's history. As related by Bailey, (1974:181):

in 1821, the Greeks had revolted against Turkish tyranny. The enthusiasm for their cause which speedily sprang up in America had numerous roots. The Greek's were imitating America's revolutionary blow for liberty; they were challenging the despotic policies of the Holy Alliance; they were Christians battling against Moslem infidels; and they were the "classical creditors" of the Western Civilization. The so-called "Greek fever" was further heightened by atrocity stories: the Turks reputedly collected bushels of Greek ears. Pro-Greek enthusiasm also took the form of sermons, orations, balls, mass meetings, resolutions in Congress, and the solicitation of funds.

Later American-Turkish relations were tenuous at best. Turkish regimes were perceived to be uncooperative, if not hostile, to American interests. For example, in 1895 and 1896, many Americans were outraged by
reports of Turkish massacres of Armenians, and a group of Baptist ministers called for the U.S. to declare war against the Turks in order to save the Armenian people (Bailey, 1974:444, 455). In World War I, Turkey had been an ally of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria (Bailey, 1974:563). Finally, Turkey had to be strongly pressured in 1945 to drop its neutral stance and declare war on Germany (Bailey, 1974:757).

Only the communist threat in the early days of the Cold War caused American and Turkish interests to dovetail. Threatened by the Soviets in 1947, the Turks were sent American military and economic aid, and in 1951, Turkey became a NATO member (Bailey, 1974:796-797, 800, 810). Beyond anticommunism, the two states had few mutual interests. Thus, the historical context was dominated by both a demonstrated American coolness toward Turkey (except where the Soviets were concerned) and an American tilt toward Greece in Greco-Turkish disputes.

B. Sequential Context

The roots of this case began in July, 1974 when Turkish forces invaded Cyprus. The invasion followed the overthrow of the Makarios regime and its replacement with a pro-Greek regime (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1974:515). Although Greek Cypriots outnumbered their Turkish counterparts four to one, the Turkish military forces captured and held 40% of the island (Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch, July 19, 1978:A-6).

The first evidence of congressional displeasure toward Turkey came on another issue altogether. On August 5, the House of Representatives voted to cut off all aid to Turkey if the Turkish government did not reinstitute its ban on poppy growing (New York Times, August 6, 1974:36). Representative Lester Wolff (D-N.Y.), the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Narcotics Control, later renewed the
call for an end to Turkish aid due to the poppy issue. He charged that State Department personnel were trying to sabotage his attempt to get all American aid to Turkey cut off (New York Times, September 14, 1974:24).

However, most of Turkey's congressional opponents stressed the aggressive nature of Turkey's invasion. Specifically, they charged that American military aid was designed for defense, and thus the use of such arms and material for aggressive purposes violated the terms of the Foreign Assistance Act. By August 22, the mutterings from Capitol Hill began to have an impact. On that day, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger reportedly said that he had not ordered any study to see if arms to Greece and Turkey was consistent with the terms of the Foreign Assistance Act (New York Times, August 23, 1974:4).

The first public remark regarding Turkey's invasion came on August 28, 1974. In a telegram to President Ford, Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) called for "all further military and economic assistance to Turkey be held in abeyance until there has been a proper withdrawal of Turkish forces from Cyprus" (New York Times, August 29, 1974:12).

From that point on, pressure began to build in Congress for punitive actions against Turkey. On September 5, Senator Eagleton lashed out at Ford's policy of continuing military aid to Turkey. Eagleton said on the Senate floor that Ford's advisors had not told the President that such continued aid was illegal (New York Times, September 6, 1974:5).

 Representative Rosenthal entered the fray on September 11 and 12. Rosenthal, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, was in Greece at the time. On September 11 he told Greek Premier
Caramanlis that a move to cut American aid to Turkey was likely to succeed (New York Times, September 12, 1974:14). The next day in an Athens news conference, Rosenthal called for an arms embargo to Turkey until the Turks withdrew from Cyprus, massive humanitarian aid to the citizens of Cyprus, and long-term economic aid to Greece (New York Times, September 13, 1974:7).

On September 19, Senators Eagleton and Adlai E. Stevenson (D-Ill.) successfully persuaded their colleagues to pass a sense-of-the-Senate resolution which urged Ford to cut off military aid to Turkey. It was approved on a 64-27 vote. Responding to this action, Ford sent Secretary of State Kissinger to brief the Senate Democratic Caucus on the administration's position. Kissinger admitted that the preponderant view among State Department lawyers was that continued aid to a country like Turkey, who used that aid aggressively, was a violation of U.S. military aid laws. However, he asked the senators not to cut off Turkey's military aid (New York Times, September 18, 1974:7; September 20, 1974:4). His position was that such a cutoff would strengthen the Turkish resolve not to concede any points in the U.S.-sponsored negotiations.

Thus, the sequential context started with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. From August to mid-September, congressional pressure steadily mounted to cut off Turkish aid. For some members of Congress like Representative Wolff, the reason concerned the linkage between Turkish poppies and American military aid, and they wanted the aid stopped.

C. Concurrent Context

Concurrent factors were of great significance in this case. The two most important factors interacted with each other. On the one hand, the appropriations needed to run the government were going to expire on
September 30, 1974. On the other, Congress was due to go into recess on October 11 prior to the 1974 general election. Congressional opponents of Turkish aid were counting on the administration's need for the funding bill when they attached their rider to it. The administration, for its part, was counting on the congressional urge to go home and campaign. Ford hoped that, faced with vetoes, congressmen would give in to his desires and drop the cutoff amendment so that they could go home. However, Congress was willing to cut into its recess rather than yield to his desires (New York Times, October 20, 1974:IV,2).

Two concurrent factors constantly brought up by the administration to support its position dealt with the impact of such an aid cutoff to both the Cyprus negotiations and the broader NATO alliance. First, Kissinger and Ford consistently maintained that an actual cutoff of aid to Turkey would cause the Turks to harden their negotiating position. Second, both Kissinger and Ford stressed that such a serious deterioration in U.S.-Turkish relations would weaken NATO by weakening the eastern end of the Mediterranean. However, these lines of argument proved unsuccessful with Congress.

The administration's emphasis on national security concerns led to the final concurrent factor. According to Leslie Gelb (New York Times, October 12, 1974:3), Kissinger at one point in the case said national security requirements were more important than the fact that Turkey appeared to have violated U.S. laws. This statement, said Gelb, "incensed" many members of Congress and prompted them to remain steadfast in their desire to stop Turkey's military aid.
Consequently, concurrent factors played a strong role. Kissinger and Ford used the negotiations and NATO connections to press their side of the argument. However, Kissinger's insistence that national security requirements were more important than American laws proved counterproductive. Finally, the need for an emergency funding bill before the congressional recess put pressure on both Congress and the President to resolve the issue. They did. Ford gave in to an eventual arms cutoff.

III. Issue Area

This case fell into the nonhuman resources area. The goals expressed by members of Congress were tangible ones. They wanted military aid to Turkey stopped and Turkish forces withdrawn from Cyprus. The means were tangible as well since they revolved around the allocation of funds. Congress wanted no more funds spent to provide military equipment to Turkey. Such a tangible/tangible mix of ends and means resulted in the coding of the case as a nonhuman resources one.

IV. Party Leaders' Preferences

Party leaders' preferences were positive to the administration's position here. Three Senate leaders expressed preferences in this case, and all three were positive to the administration's position. Majority Leader Mansfield criticized the cutoff attempt by saying it was a simplistic answer to a complex problem. Later, Mansfield tried to weaken the cutoff by delaying it until December 10 after his attempt to delete the amendment from the funding bill failed. Minority Leader Scott also unsuccessfully tried to get the amendment dropped. When that move failed, he worked with
Mansfield to delay its implementation. Scott said the cutoff amendment lowered the image of the Senate by making its members look "impetuous... and hot-headed" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1974:550). Finally, Minority Whip Robert Griffin (R-Mich.) tried to avert the amendment by stressing the administration's objections and warning of a veto.

In the House, two leaders expressed positive preferences as well. Speaker Carl Albert (D-Oкла.) opposed the original cutoff amendment to the funding bill. He called on his colleagues not to upset the negotiations. Minority Leader John Rhodes (R-Ariz.) also opposed the cutoff amendment in floor debate. However, when he realized another veto could be overridden, he convinced Ford to go along with the cutoff in order to spare the administration additional embarrassment. Since no other elected party leaders expressed preferences, the party leaders' preferences variable was coded as positive.

V. Committee Leaders' Preferences

Committee leaders' preferences were negative to the administration's position here. Four committees were involved in the case, two formally and two informally. The two appropriations committees were formally involved since the cutoff attempt was made as a rider to an appropriations bill. However, both foreign relations committees were informally involved as well. The attempt to stop such military aid would normally have been considered first by these committees when they dealt with the annual foreign aid authorizations. Since the action here was in the form of floor amendments and due to the shortness of available time, these committees did not get a chance to formally consider the cutoff attempt. However, their members were active in the floor debate and so the committees' preferences
can be ascertained.

Beginning with the Senate, six members of the Appropriations Committee expressed preferences regarding the military aid cutoff. Chairman McClellan led a three man bloc which was positive to the administration's position. He urged his Senate colleagues, over and over, not to add controversial amendments to the emergency funding bill because he did not want it to be vetoed. Mansfield's positive stance was noted earlier. The final member of the bloc was Gale McGee (D-Wyo.). He claimed too many senators were trying to be the Secretary of State.

The three-man negative bloc was led by Eagleton. As early as September 5, he said further aid to Turkey was illegal (New York Times, September 6, 1974:5). He later remarked:

Are we to stand blandly by and permit a law...to be specifically ignored by President Ford and our omniscient "father-knows-best" secretary of state? (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1974:550).

The other two committee members who expressed negative preferences were John Pastore (D-R.I.) and Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.). Pastore said the time had come for the U.S. to stop arming both sides in a military conflict. Hatfield also was strongly opposed to the administration's position. He refused to sign the conference report on the emergency funding bill, because conferees included a Turkish aid provision which was weaker than those already passed by both the House and Senate. Overall, although both blocs were composed of three members, the positive bloc's preferences were coded for the Senate Appropriations Committee since it was led by Chairman McClellan.

The other Senate committee informally involved, was the Foreign Relations Committee. Only positive preferences were expressed by this
committee's members. The strongly positive stances taken by Mansfield, McGee, Scott, and Griffin have already been noted and were the only preferences expressed. Therefore, the Foreign Relations Committee's preferences were coded as positive to the administration's position.

In the House as in the Senate, the Appropriations Committee handled the emergency funding bill. Only one member of the committee expressed his preferences in this case. Chairman George Mahon (D-Tex.) was positive to the administration's position. Like his counterpart Chairman McClellan, Mahon realized that the Turkish aid cutoff might be proposed as a floor amendment, and he urged the House members not to add anything which might result in a veto. After the conference committee's weak substitute for the Turkish aid cutoff was proposed, Mahon strongly defended it and asked his colleagues to accept it until they reconvened after the recess. Finally, Mahon castigated his colleagues for proposing the amendment on October 15. He said with 40,000 men on Cyprus, Turkey had to resupply them. Therefore, the amendment was bound to be violated. Due to Mahon's positive stance, the committee's preferences were coded as positive to the administration's position.

The last committee involved, albeit informally, was the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Four of its members spoke out regarding the cutoff of military aid to Turkey, and all were negative to the administration's position. Representative Rosenthal led the committee's negative bloc. He called for an arms embargo as early as September 12 (New York Times, September 13, 1974:7). When he offered the first cutoff amendment on the House floor, Rosenthal said the cutoff would force the Turks to negotiate, thereby lessening tension in both the eastern Mediterranean and NATO.
Representative du Pont was Rosenthal's cosponsor of the military aid cutoff amendment. Representative Wolff, for his part, wanted aid cut off for a different reason. He opposed the Turkish regime's policy of allowing poppies to be grown (New York Times, September 14, 1974:24). Finally, H.R. Gross (R-Iowa) twice tried to get aid cut off not only to Turkey but also to Greece. Since no other committee members expressed preferences, the negative preferences expressed by the four above were coded for the committee.

While both the Senate committees expressed positive preferences, the situation in the House was different. On the strength of the chairman's preferences alone, the Appropriations Committee's preferences were coded as positive. However, the Foreign Affairs Committee, which would have first handled such legislation had the time been available, expressed strongly negative preferences. For the House as a whole, preferences of the Foreign Affairs Committee were coded since: (1) they would have handled such a bill first under normal circumstances, and (2) the competing preferences were based on the views of only one individual who expressed himself during the debate. Further, since the House and Senate split in their preferences, the negative House preferences were coded for the committee leaders' preferences variable.

VI. Constituency Pressures

Constituency pressures were also negative to the administration's position in this case. The only evidence of such pressures revolved around the activities of the pro-Greek interest groups. These groups used both demonstrations and lobbying activity on Capitol Hill to get the cutoff
amendment passed. To begin with, two anti-Turkish demonstrations were held. The first was in Seattle and was sponsored by a group called Citizens for Cyprus. Their demonstration prompted Senator Jackson to ask Ford to cut off all further military aid to Turkey until the Turkish forces withdrew from Cyprus (New York Times, August 29, 1974:12). The other demonstration was much larger. On September 18, Ford went to New York to address the United Nation's General Assembly. Six hundred pro-Greek demonstrators arrived and shouted for an embargo on arms to Turkey. The demonstration was co-sponsored by the Cyprus Federation of America and the Hellenic Societies of America.

However, the pro-Greek groups were most effective when lobbying members of Congress in Washington. The overall lobby campaign was coordinated by the Order of AHEPA, the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association. One of the most crucial aspects of the lobby campaign was that the lobbyists stressed, over and over again, that continued military aid to Turkey was illegal (New York Times, October 12, 1974:3). This argument proved very effective in Congress.

According to a Leslie Gelb column (New York Times, October 12, 1974:3), the victory of the cutoff amendment was made possible by three factors:

1. Secretary Kissinger's diminished influence in Congress, as well as a generally inept lobby campaign on the part of the administrators,
2. a very effective pro-Greek lobby, and
3. the absence of a pro-Turkish lobby.

The absence of a pro-Turkish lobby inevitably increased the influence of the pro-Greek one. Yet there were other reasons for the strength of the pro-Greek lobby. First, although they were a small group of about three million, Greek Americans both knew and cared "passionately" about the
embargo (Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch, July 19, 1978:A-6). Not only were they an aroused group, but Greek Americans were also well-organized. The Greek Orthodox Church served as a force to bind Greek Americans together and to supervise their activities according to the directives from the Order of AHEPA (Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch, July 19, 1978:A-6). With no other interest groups involved, the negative preferences of the pro-Greek groups were coded for the constituency pressures variable.

VII. Presidential Involvement

The level of presidential involvement in this case was standard. Ford's actions went far beyond a minimalist role. On October 2, Ford threatened to veto the emergency funding bill by saying:

if the Eagleton amendment or similar language is adopted by the Congress, the United States will have lost its negotiation flexibility and influence (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1974:549).

He later called the Rosenthal amendment "misguided and extremely harmful" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1974:552). He vetoed the bill twice, and after his second veto, he again criticized the amendment. He said that, had it been passed, the U.S. would have had to drop out of the negotiations. Further, he declared that the amendment would not have helped the people of Cyprus. As a result of his vetoes and the strongly-worded messages Ford sent to Congress, the level of presidential involvement was coded as standard.
VIII. Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior

The addition of the Turkish military aid cutoff amendment to the emergency funding bill was a congressional initiative. Members of Congress wanted the military aid stopped. Since Ford did not agree, members of Congress stopped it themselves.

Propositions

This case fell into the nonhuman resources area. Party leaders' preferences were positive to the administration's position, but committee leaders' preferences and constituency pressures were negative. The level of presidential involvement was standard, and an initiative behavior was the output.

With these variable values, three of the five propositions tested were supported. These were the committee leaders (3.1), the constituency pressures (4.1), and the initiative (3.2) propositions. The nonhuman resources proposition (1.2) was not supported. It says:

In nonhuman resource cases, the probability of resistance behaviors increases while the probabilities of no modification and initiative behaviors decrease.

This proposition is based on the assumption that bargaining will take place between the affected actors. However, it takes two sides to bargain. Since there were no pro-Turkish interest groups, the pro-Greek ones (and their congressional allies) stood fast. They stuck to their demands and won a congressional initiative.

The presidential involvement proposition (5.1) was unsupported as well. It states:

When the level of presidential involvement is standard, the probability of no modification behaviors increases while the probabilities of resistance and initiative behaviors decrease.
This proposition is based on the assumption that "all other things are equal." Here, all other things were not equal. Constituency pressures and preferences expressed by members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee were strongly negative. Ford's strong personal stand, even with the help of the elected party leaders, was not strong enough to turn the congressional tide running against his preferences.

**Significant Aspects**

Contextual factors played a large role in this case. Had Turkey not invaded Cyprus in the sequential time period, this case would not have occurred. Since it did, the historical American affinity for Greece, and lack of sympathy for Turkish policies, played into the hands of the pro-Greek forces.

It was the emergence of the united pro-Greek lobby, however, that swung this case in the final analysis. The importance of both their strong role and the lack of a pro-Turkish lobby cannot be minimized.

Moreover, concurrent factors aided the pro-Greek cause. The emergency funding bill needed to be passed. Just as important, the members of Congress wanted to get the bill passed so they could go home to campaign for re-election. As a result, the conditions were auspicious for a floor amendment attempt.

One final point needs to be made regarding the lack of a pro-Turkish lobby. Since the nonhuman resources proposition (1.2) was written on the assumption that there would be two sides to every occasion for decision, perhaps it should be modified to account for one-sided issues. For example, if only one side is represented through constituency in nonhuman resource
cases, then perhaps the resulting congressional behavior will be that which the constituency group desires, either an initiative or a no modification behavior.
CHAPTER XVII NOTES

1 Unless otherwise specified, the research for this case comes from Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1974:547-553.

2 For a list of party leaders, see Congressional Directory (1974:414-415, 419-420).

3 For a list of its members, see Congressional Directory (1974:259).

4 For a list of its members, see Congressional Directory (1974:265).

5 For a list of its members, see Congressional Directory (1974:287).

6 For a list of its members, see Congressional Directory (1974:293).
CHAPTER XVIII
The Panama Canal Treaties, 1978

On September 7, 1977, President Jimmy Carter and General Omar Torrijos Herrera signed two Panama Canal treaties. In doing so, Carter began the toughest round of executive-congressional interaction to that point in his presidency. Carter staked his prestige as President on getting both the Panama Canal Treaty and the Neutrality Treaty passed by the Senate. In the end, he squeaked by with one vote to spare. Although the Senate changed the treaties from the drafts signed by the two leaders, Carter still saw their passage as essential to his presidency.

The Panama Canal Treaty provided for the transfer of control of the Canal and Canal Zone from the U.S. to Panama on January 1, 2000. Prior to that date, the Canal would be run by a new Panama Canal Commission, composed of both U.S. and Panamanian citizens. Panama would receive a minimum of $50 million per year from Canal tolls and, should the Canal show a profit, Panama could receive up to an additional $10 million in annual revenues.

The Neutrality Treaty was much simpler. It declared that the Canal would be permanently neutral in the future. After 1999, it said that only Panama could operate the Canal or put military bases in the Zone. Finally, it specified that American and Panamanian warships would be "entitled to transit the canal expeditiously" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1978: 340).
The day after the treaties were signed, hearings began before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Separation of Powers. The key issue revolved around the disposition of government property, i.e., could the Senate do it alone or was House action also needed? Witnesses Ronald Reagan, former governor of California, and Representative Daniel Flood (D-Pa.) argued that the administration was attempting to dispose of property illegally by avoiding House action.

On September 26, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began 15 days of hearings which ran intermittently until January 26, 1978 (Farnsworth, 1979:21). During this period, two important discrepancies appeared between the American and Panamanian interpretations on the Neutrality Treaty. The administration believed the U.S. had the right to intervene to defend the Canal and Torrijos disagreed. Second, the administration felt the right of American warships to transit the Canal "expeditiously" meant that they could move to the head of the line. The Torrijos regime said it meant such warships would not be unduly detained. These discrepancies were resolved in the "Statement of Understanding" signed by Carter and Torrijos and sent to the Foreign Relations Committee on October 14. Panama agreed to let U.S. warships go to the head of the line, if necessary, and also agreed that both nations had the right to defend the Canal's neutrality. However, that right did not mean the U.S. could intervene in the "internal affairs" of Panama (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1978: 384).
The two treaties were ratified in Panama on October 23, lending strength to the administration's contention that any changes in the treaty drafts could force new negotiations. However in late January, the Foreign Relations Committee incorporated the "Statement of Understanding" into the Neutrality Treaty text before sending both treaties to the floor.

Floor debate was held on the treaties intermittently from February 8 until April 18. A number of "killer amendments" were proposed but all were defeated. During this time period, it became apparent that the administration did not quite have the 67 votes necessary for approval. Some uncommitted senators wanted concessions in return for their votes. In the period from March 6-10, administration officials met with Georgia's Democratic Senators Sam Nunn and Herman Talmadge. They wanted a condition added which stipulated that nothing in the Neutrality Treaty prevented the U.S. from making a future agreement with Panama to allow U.S. troops to stay in the Zone past December 31, 1999. The administration agreed to the condition, since it did not change the treaty terms and since Panama's right would be protected. As the condition read, no U.S. troops could stay without Panamanian permission (Farnsworth, 1979:69).

On March 14, Nunn and Talmadge announced their lukewarm support for the treaties. As soon as their position became known, Senator John Heinz (R-Pa.) said he too would vote for the treaties. His support had been dependent upon the negotiations between Nunn, Talmadge, and the administration.

Another key Senator was Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.). In a March 15 meeting, Carter agreed not to oppose DeConcini's condition which said both
the U.S. and Panama had the unilateral right to use whatever actions necessary to reopen the Canal, should it be closed or its operation impaired in the future. The condition specifically included the use of force "in Panama" if necessary (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1978:393; Farnsworth, 1979:70).

With this agreement made, DeConcini announced his support for the Neutrality Treaty. On March 15, Senators Russell Long (D-La.) and Edward Brooke (R-Mass.) also declared their support. Their announcements brought the projected affirmative vote total to 65, two short of the 67 needed.

On March 16, the final debate was held on the Neutrality Treaty. The Nunn/Talmadge condition was passed by a vote of 82-16. The DeConcini condition was then approved by a 75-23 vote. At that point, Senators Henry Bellmon (R-Okla.) and Paul Hatfield (D-Mont.) joined the ranks of the treaty supporters. The Senate then approved the Neutrality Treaty by a vote of 68-32. The vote of Howard Cannon (D-Nev.) gave the supporters one more vote than necessary to pass the treaty. The only successful amendments to the treaty were the leadership amendments which incorporated the "Statement of Understanding" into the treaty. They had been overwhelmingly approved on March 10 and 13.

On March 17, debate on the Panama Canal Treaty began. An important reservation was proposed by the Senate bipartisan leadership and cosponsored by DeConcini. Realizing the turmoil caused in Panama by the DeConcini condition, the new reservation was designed to clarify the situation. It noted that any American action, taken pursuant to the DeConcini condition, would be directed solely at keeping the Canal open, thus implying no American
right to intervene in Panamanian affairs. The reservation passed on a 73-27 vote.

On April 18, the Senate approved the Panama Canal Treaty by a 68-32 vote. The vote was identical to the one cast for the Neutrality Treaty. Thus, Carter got both treaties approved, but each had been changed from what he had originally desired.
ANALYSIS

I. Stimulus

This case was brought about by the September 7, 1977 signing of the two treaties by Presidents Carter and Torrijos. Carter wanted both treaties approved by the Senate.

II. Contextual Filter

A. Historical Context

American interest in a transportation route across Panama had a long history. American attempts to find routes across Panama had begun in the early 1830's. In 1902, Congress passed the Spooner Act. It called on the U.S. to build a canal across Panama if the Columbian government, which then controlled the area, would allow the U.S. to control the strip of land necessary for such a canal. In 1903, a U.S.-Columbian treaty to that effect was negotiated and approved by the Senate. However, the Columbian government denounced it.

Following this rejection, Panama revolted on November 3, 1903 and declared its independence. President Theodore Roosevelt recognized the new government on November 6, and twelve days later the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty was signed. It gave the U.S. both the ten-mile-wide Canal Zone "in perpetuity" and total control over the Zone. In return, the U.S. paid Panama $10 million plus $250,000 per year. The Panamanian government
approved the treaty on December 2, 1903 while the Senate approved it on February 23, 1904. The U.S. then began the process of building the Canal, which was completed in 1914 at a cumulative cost of $387 million.

As far as many Americans were concerned, the U.S. had a solid claim to both the Canal and the Zone. Americans had built the Canal and bought the Zone. They were American possessions.

Other historical factors important to this case revolved around the use of the treaties themselves. One of the most prevalent arguments voiced by Senate opponents concerned the role of the House. These critics argued that no U.S. property could be disposed of without House approval. Therefore the treaties, they argued, had to pass the House as well. However, precedents existed for the disposition of such property by treaty alone. As Herbert Hansell, legal advisor to the State Department, pointed out in Senate testimony, property had changed hands in treaties with Spain in 1819, with Great Britain in 1842 and 1846, and with Mexico in 1933 and 1970. The House played no role in those cases (Farnsworth, 1979:7).

A negative precedent which became important resulted from the "lessons" learned from the Senate rejection of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 (Bailey, 1974:621-624). It was widely-perceived that the ability of the President to commit the nation to a course of action by use of a treaty had been damaged by the Versailles experience. Senators Long, Nunn, and Talmadge stressed this factor. They said one of the reasons for their support of the treaties was the loss of credibility the U.S. would suffer overseas should the treaties be rejected by the Senate.

A final negative precedent occurred in 1947. The Senate took up consideration of a treaty which dealt with the Rio Harto base in Panama.
While it was under consideration, the Panamanian government rejected it. The Senate was thus placed in the embarrassing position of being stuck with a treaty that the other party had scrapped. Due to this, senators insisted that Panama have its plebiscite before the Senate considered them (Farnsworth, 1979:54).

In summary, the historical context provided ammunition to both sides. Opponents said the treaties were unnecessary since the U.S. clearly owned the Canal and Zone. They said the House had to be involved. Finally, they insisted that Panama approve the treaties first. As a result, if they could subsequently get the wording changed, the treaties might be unacceptable to Panama.

Supporters found some strong arguments here also. Precedents existed to keep the House out of the process. Moreover, the specter of a President, crippled in terms of overseas influence, could be raised by mentioning the Versailles precedent. Some senators who were no friends of the treaties were apparently persuaded to some degree by this argument.

B. Sequential Context

One aspect of the sequential context concerned the state of U.S.-Panamanian relations. As time went by, Panamanians became dissatisfied with the arrangements concerning both the Canal and the American control of the Zone. The treaty was revised twice, in 1936 and 1955, in order to give Panama higher annual payments from Canal tolls. Tensions continued to mount until riots broke out in the Zone in 1964. Panama reacted by breaking diplomatic relations with the U.S.

President Lyndon Johnson announced the beginning of negotiations for a new treaty. By 1967, three treaties had been drafted, but congressional
opposition was so intense that Johnson refused to submit any of them to the Senate. Moreover when General Torrijos came to power in 1968, his regime rejected all three drafts.

Talks resumed in 1970. Progress increased after Ellsworth Bunker was named chief U.S. negotiator in 1973. The next year, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Foreign Minister Juan Tack signed an eight point agreement which specified the basis of future negotiations.

Upon taking office in 1974, President Gerald Ford continued his predecessor's quest for a new treaty. However, Ford's pro-treaty policy came under heavy attack in 1976. His Republican opponent, Ronald Reagan, made the Panama Canal issue a central one to his campaign. Reagan's position was clear-cut: "We bought it, we paid for it, we built it and we intend to keep it" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1978:382). Largely due to Reagan's emphasis, the proposed treaty became a controversial campaign issue, and a large segment of the American public appeared strongly opposed to any loss of American control of the Canal or Canal Zone.

President Carter took action regarding the Canal soon after he assumed office. In February 1977, he appointed Sol Linowitz as Bunker's co-negotiator (Farnsworth, 1979:1). By May, it was apparent that the Carter administration was planning no House role in the approval of the treaties. Consequently, a suit was brought against the government by William Drummond, a Canal Zone resident, who was supported by Representatives Flood, Larry McDonald (D-Ga.), and Gene Snyder (R-Ky.) as well as Senators Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), James McClure (R-Idaho), and Strom Thurman (R-S.C.). They sought a restraining order to halt treaty negotiations unless the House was involved in approving a treaty. In July, the Supreme Court refused to
reverse a lower court's dismissal of the case by agreeing that the case was not ripe for review (Farnsworth, 1979:5).

Treaty opponents then moved their activity to the Senate. In July, the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Separation of Powers began hearings on the role of the House. Opposition witnesses, led by Washington attorney George Leonard, cited court cases to prove that the House had to play a role when property was involved. The administration's defenders, led by State's legal advisor Hansell, argued that both the Constitution and past practice legitimated the administration's position (Farnsworth, 1979:4-9).

Overlapping the subcommittee's hearings were those held by the Panama Canal Subcommittee of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. The purpose of its hearings was to establish the economic and military value of the Canal. Administration witnesses testified that the Canal was important but not vital to the American economy. Military officers also testified that the Canal and Zone were no longer vital U.S. possessions (Farnsworth, 1979:9-14).

One final House subcommittee was briefly involved in the case. The International Relations Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs held a very short hearing prior to the signing of the treaties. However, nothing noteworthy resulted from their involvement (Farnsworth, 1979:15).

The final days of the sequential period were marked by senators trying to familiarize themselves with the Canal, the Zone, and the Torrijos regime. Many senators visited Panama personally. Almost all of the Foreign Relations Committee members went there as did others. By February 1978, 42 senators had visited Panama (Farnsworth, 1979:50).
Public opinion was one incentive for senators to visit Panama. In the period prior to the signing ceremony, public opinion polls were running strongly against a new treaty. The public was opposed to a new treaty by a three to one margin. Senators said their mail was running heavily against any new treaties, and some feared for their re-election should they vote to give away the Canal or Zone (Farnsworth, 1979:17). For an issue on which the administration had placed such emphasis, the prospects for success looked gloomy.

In summary, the sequential context was highly important. Rising tensions in Panama had pressured prior administrations to tackle the problem. It was not until the Carter administration that the final push was made. The most important aspect of the sequential context was the apparently widespread American opposition to the treaties. Despite endorsements by Carter, Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger, the JCS, George Meany, and other influentials, the tide still ran against the treaties. With public opinion so opposed, the administration was starting an uphill battle.

C. Concurrent Context

Concurrent factors fell into two broad classifications in this case. First, there were a number of arguments made to bolster the opposition viewpoint. The Torrijos regime was branded as a corrupt dictatorship which could not be trusted. Second, the support of the JCS was challenged. Administration opponents charged that the active-duty military had to support the treaties (Farnsworth, 1979:27,29). Finally, Carter's critics compared the treaties with his other military "blunders" such as the cancellation of the B-1 bomber, the refusal to deploy neutron bombs, and the decision to pull troops from South Korea. However, the treaties' critics
were never able to muster a groundswell of opposition in the Senate by the use of such arguments.

The second group of concurrent factors included those issues which intervened in the timing and passage of the treaties. In terms of timing, Majority Leader Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.) announced on August 17, 1977 that the treaty debate would be delayed until after the first of the year. The reason for the delay was the fact that the energy bill was scheduled ahead of the treaties and had not yet been debated. However, Byrd also noted that the public opinion polls were running strongly against the treaties. An additional delay would give the administration extra time to reverse that trend (Farnsworth, 1979:16).

Other concurrent factors which may have played a role were those which concerned the price the Congress or the administration had to pay in return for individual senators' support. Senator James Abourezk (D-S.D.) said on April 13, 1978 that he would not vote for the treaties unless House and Senate conferees on the energy and natural gas deregulation bills stopped meeting behind closed doors. He later said White House spokesmen promised to recommend that the conferees operate in public session, and Abourezk then voted for the treaties.

The other example of such influence trading concerned Talmadge. He traded his reluctant support for the treaties in return for administration support of his farm legislation (Franck and Weisband, 1979:278).

Overall, contextual events played a strong role here. The historical context provided precedents for both supporters and opponents of the treaties. The sequential context provided the incentive for a new set of treaties with Panama. At the same time, there appeared to be significant
opposition to the treaties from both the Congress and the American public. Finally, the concurrent context figured prominently since the Carter administration made deals with Abourezk and Talmadge. These deals provided the necessary margin for Senate passage.

III. Issue Area

This case fell into the territorial area. The ends expressed by Congress were tangible ones. Both supporters and opponents wanted the Canal secure for future American use. The means to be used, however, were intangible. Although financial arrangements were specified in the treaties, Congress was not being asked to appropriate funds since any funds going to Panama would come from toll revenues. Such a tangible/intangible mix of ends and means made this a territorial case.

IV. Party Leaders' Preferences

Party leaders' preferences were positive here.2 The actions of Majority Leader Byrd, Minority Leader Howard Baker (R-Tenn.), and Majority Whip Alan Cranston (D-Cal.) can be considered together. They were strongly in favor of the treaties, but they realized that, to be successful, the treaties would have to be changed. They introduced the leadership amendments which incorporated the "Statement of Understanding" into the text of the Neutrality Treaty. They also sponsored the reservation to the Panama Canal Treaty which clarified the DeConcini condition, in order to allay Panamanian fears concerning its meaning. Finally, although they lobbied against them, they allowed senators to propose floor amendments, so that their colleagues could tell the folks back home that they tried to change
the treaties. These men worked hard to get the treaties approved.

The last member of the party leadership, Minority Whip Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), opposed the treaties. He introduced an amendment which would have allowed the U.S. to keep its military bases in the Zone after the year 2000 if the U.S. was then at war. Passage of such an amendment would have crippled, if not killed, the Neutrality Treaty. As such, his position was coded as negative. Since three of the four party leaders expressed positive preferences and two of those three were the Majority and Minority Leaders, the party leaders' preferences variable was coded as positive.

V. Committee Leaders' Preferences

Committee leaders' preferences were positive to the administration's position in this case. Three Senate committees and two House subcommittees held hearings related to the treaties. However, the most important hearings were those held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The preferences expressed by members of this committee were overwhelmingly in favor of the treaties. Chairman John Sparkman (D-Ala.) led a bloc of eight members who had strongly positive preferences. Sparkman himself was active on the Senate floor in defending the treaties (Farnsworth, 1979:66).

Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.) was one of the earliest committee supporters of the treaties. He announced at the start of the hearings that he endorsed both treaties. Moreover, he said he hoped the hearings could reverse the unfavorable public attitude toward them (Farnsworth, 1979:23).

Frank Church (D-Idaho) also pushed hard for the treaties. He was a floor manager for the treaties, and he summarized his position by saying:
A vote against this treaty represents a vain attempt to preserve the past. It represents a futile effort to perpetuate an American colony in Panama against the wishes of the Panamanian people... (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1978:380).

During the debate, Church was assisted by Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.), the other floor manager, Baker, Joseph Biden (D-Del.), Clifford Case (R-N.J.), Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.), and James Pearson (R-Kan.). Two others from the committee who announced their support of the treaties were Richard Stone (D-Fla.) and Charles Percy (R-Ill.).

One committee member was unalterably opposed to the treaties. Prior to the committee hearings, Robert Griffin (R-Mich.) announced that he opposed the treaties. However, the strength of his opposition was not apparent until he started questioning witnesses. He challenged Ambassador Linowitz's credentials because his appointment had expired and then he called for a national plebiscite on the treaties. Next, he asked for new negotiations (Farnsworth, 1979: 21, 26-27, 66, 76). Griffin felt the treaties represented, in his words, "... a dangerous step, a gamble for the United States..." (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1978:380). However Griffin's stand could not override the favorable stance of the eleven-man bloc led by Chairman Sparkman. Therefore, the committee's preferences were coded as positive.

In addition to the above committee, the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Separation of Powers held hearings on the treaties. With the exception of Byrd, all the subcommittee members strongly opposed the treaties.

Chairman James Allen (D-Ala.) took a back seat to no one in his strident opposition to the treaties. He led the move to try to get the House of Representatives involved in the treaty approval process, charged that
the news media was biased in favor of the treaties, and unsuccessfully proposed a number of killer amendments (Farnsworth, 1979:4-9, 18, 31-34, 59, 63-66, 73). Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) tried as well to kill the treaties. He tried to stop consideration of the treaties through court action, he argued against them in debate, and he proposed killer amendments to negate their effects (Farnsworth, 1979:5, 66, 72-73). The other two, James Eastland (D-Miss.) and William Scott (R-Va.), were also active in the floor debate. They consistently took positions against the treaties (Farnsworth, 1979:4, 31).

The final Senate committee involved here was the Armed Services Committee. It held brief hearings on the military aspects of the treaties. Eleven members of the committee expressed preferences in this case. Eight of these members strongly opposed the treaties.

Perhaps the strongest committee opponent of the treaties was Thurmond. He had earlier sponsored a resolution which objected to any new treaties with Panama and had tried to stop the negotiations through court action. Moreover, Thurmond was the lead-off opposition witness to testify before the Foreign Relations Committee. In his remarks there, he castigated the Torrijos regime and its policies, raised the specter of future Soviet or Cuban "adventurism" in Panama prior to 2000, and defended the American right, as he saw it, to continue business as usual in Panama (Farnsworth, 1979:4-5, 31-33).

Helms also put up a spirited battle against the treaties. Like Thurmond, Helms had tried to stop the treaties through court action. Helms also testified against the treaties before both the Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation of Powers and the Foreign Relations Committee.
Finally, during floor debate, he tried to get killer amendments passed (Farnsworth, 1979:5, 9, 31, 61, 66, 73).

Six other committee members either testified against the treaties in the Foreign Relations Committee hearings or provided opposition on the floor. These members included Chairman John Stennis (D-Miss.), Harry Byrd (Ind. D-Va.), John Tower (R-Tex.), Barry Goldwater, Scott and Dewey Bartlett (R-Okla.) (Farnsworth, 1979: 31, 55, 66, 69).

Two committee members expressed positive preferences. Nunn declared his reluctant support for the Neutrality Treaty on March 14. The other, Senator Hatfield, declared his support only after the DeConcini condition was approved. Due to both the size of the strongly negative bloc and the fact it was led by Chairman Stennis, its preferences overrode the others on the committee. Accordingly, the preferences of the Armed Services Committee were coded as negative to the treaties.

Two House subcommittees held brief hearings on the treaties as well. The first was the Panama Canal Subcommittee of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. Three members expressed their preferences and all strongly opposed the treaties. Robert Leggett (D-Cal.) opposed relinquishing the Canal due to its economic worth. Gene Snyder (R-Ky.) tried to get the negotiations stopped by court order. Robert Dornan (R-Cal.), for his part, agreed with Leggett. The Canal was worth too much, he said, from either an economic or military standpoint, for the U.S. to give it up (Farnsworth, 1979:5, 12, 15). Since no other members expressed preferences, the negative ones of these three men were coded for the subcommittee.
The other House subcommittee involved was the Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee of the International Relations Committee. With only one brief hearing on the treaties, none of these representatives expressed personal preferences (Farnsworth, 1979:15). Therefore, the subcommittee's preferences were coded as neutral.

Thus, of the five committee actors involved in this case, one had positive preferences, one had neutral ones, and the other three had negative ones. However, the positive ones came from the Foreign Relations Committee. Since it had primary jurisdiction for the treaties, the coding rules specify that its preferences override all others. As a result, the committee leaders' preferences variable was coded as positive to the administration's position.

VI. Constituency Pressures

Constituency pressures were perceived to be negative in this case. Domestic activity fell into three categories: general public opinion, interest group activity, and the endorsements or testimony of opinion leaders. When the treaties were signed, administration actors realized they faced an uphill fight. Public opinion polls at that time showed the American people disapproved of the treaties by a three to one margin. However in early 1978, the margin between supporters and opponents in the polls began closing, although the American people still generally disapproved of the treaties (Farnsworth, 1979:17,60). Due to this, the conventional wisdom in Washington at this time was that the ratification vote was going to be very close.
The strongly negative public opinion was due to a strong, well-financed campaign by interest groups opposed to the treaties. Two major groups helped coordinate this effort. The Emergency Coalition to Save the Panama Canal was one such umbrella group. It was created due to the efforts of the American Conservative Union. Other groups working with it included the Conservative Caucus, the American Security Council, the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress and STOP ERA. The other coordinating body was the Committee to Save the Panama Canal. It worked closely with Senator Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.), Representative Philip Crane (R-Ill.), and conservative fund-raiser Richard Viguerie. The committee included some of the same groups as before. However, it also included groups such as Citizens for the Republic, Young Republicans, the National Conservative Political Action Committee, and the Council for National Defense.

Among these coalitions, two interest groups stood out from the rest. The American Conservative Union sent out 1.8 million pieces of mail to raise money and to call on citizens to show their opposition by writing their congressmen. Moreover, the ACU produced a thirty minute television program which appeared in 150 cities and ran newspaper ads in 30 cities. Finally, Gary Jarmin, ACU legislative director, testified against the treaties before the Foreign Relations Committee on October 11. He said many Latin American leaders feared eventual control of the Canal by a pro-Cuban regime. The Conservative Caucus was active in mobilizing public opinion. It sent out two million mailings as well as radio and television "spots" to 500 stations.
A number of interest group representatives testified against the treaties before the Foreign Relations Committee. Representatives of Canal Zone Civic Councils claimed there was widespread opposition to the treaties in Panama and that Torrijos could not be trusted. The U.S. Labor Party opposed the treaties because, in their view, the treaties limited Panamanian sovereignty. Others who testified against the treaties included the American Council for World Freedom, the Canal Zone Non-Profit Public Information Corporation, the Liberty Lobby, and the Young Americans for Freedom (Farnsworth, 1979:37-40).

Two groups testified before the House International Relations Inter-American Subcommittee. William Rogers of the American Legion called upon the government not to give away "strategic territory which... it ... may have to fight to regain" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1978:383). Dr. John Wasylik, the commander of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, went further to call the treaties a "slow motion act of strategic self-mutilation" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1978:383).

The final element of negative constituency pressure came from opinion leaders. Hanson Baldwin, a retired military affairs writer for the New York Times, wrote a very influential article, "The Panama Canal: Sovereignty and Security," which appeared in the American Enterprise Institute Defense Review. In the work, he argued that the Canal was of strategic importance to the U.S. and said the treaties marked another retreat in American foreign policy. He claimed the U.S. was acting due to a sense of guilt. Finally, he dismissed Latin American support for the treaty as cosmetic and disbelieved Torrijos' threats to attack the Canal. Baldwin's article was introduced into the record of the Foreign Relations
hearings and was constantly cited by opposition forces (Farnsworth, 1979:27-28).

Other opinion leaders attacked the treaties as well. Four retired admirals, George Anderson, Arleigh Burke, Robert Carney, and Thomas Moorer, stressed the Canal's strategic value. Richard Falk of Princeton University attacked the treaties because he felt they infringed on Panamanian sovereignty. Former Congressman Hamilton Fish opposed the treaties due to their failure, in his eyes, to protect the Canal and Zone from communist activity (Farnsworth, 1979:40,45). Finally former Governor Reagan claimed the U.S. was giving up territory it rightfully owned and which would be taken over by a future Soviet/Cuban puppet regime.

After a slow start, supporters of the treaties began to appear. A number of interest groups came forward to endorse the treaties. An umbrella group, the Committee of Americans for the Canal Treaties (COACT), was created as an administration initiative but was financed by private contributions (Farnsworth, 1979:48). The purpose of COACT was to organize existing treaty supporters, to develop grass-roots support, and to run a speaker's bureau.

An additional pro-treaties umbrella group was the Committee for Ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties. It printed and mailed a booklet stressing the need for the treaties and sent speakers to build support in crucial states such as Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas. The Committee was organized by New Directions, a liberal foreign policy interest group. Other organizations belonging to the Committee were the Americans for Democratic Action, the AFL-CIO, the Democratic National Committee, the United Auto Workers, and the Washington
Office on Latin America.

New Directions itself played a strong role in the treaty fight. Led by its chairperson Margaret Mead, the group mailed letters to 1.1 million Americans. Groups which helped underwrite the mailing included the Communication Workers of America, the Democratic National Committee, Occidental Petroleum, and the United States Steel Workers.

Business, as well as labor, groups also strongly supported the treaties. Perhaps the most important business group was the Council of the Americas, an organization composed of representatives of over 220 U.S. corporations which comprised 90% of American investment in Latin America. Appearing before the Panama Canal Subcommittee of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, William Rogers, President of the Council and former Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, stressed the American business viewpoint. He said the approval of the treaties would safeguard existing American investments in Latin America and enhance the likelihood of new ones (Farnsworth 1979:14-15). The American Institute of Merchant Shipping and the Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America endorsed Rogers' testimony (Farnsworth, 1979:46-47).

Religious groups also endorsed the treaties. During the Foreign Relations Committee hearings, representatives of the Church of the Brethren, the National Council of Churches, the Synagogue Council of America, and the U.S. Catholic Conference testified in support of the treaties (Farnsworth, 1979:39).

Just as some opinion leaders had opposed the treaties, others supported them. Former President Ford endorsed them as did former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and Dean Rusk. Retired military officers
such as General Maxwell Taylor, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, former CNO, supported the treaties. Two others
endorsed the treaties as well. One was Abraham Lowenthal, the director of
the Latin American program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center.
The other was David McCullough, the author of *Path Between the Seas*
(Farnsworth, 1979: 16, 28, 37, 41, 45).

As a result of this late flurry of treaty support, the public opinion
polls began to improve. On February 1, 1978, a Gallup poll reported that,
for the first time, more Americans supported the treaties than opposed
them. The numbers were 45% in favor and 42% opposed.

In summary, the constituency pressures were countervailing. The
public, interest groups, and opinion leaders divided into roughly equal
camps regarding the treaties. The coding rules stipulate that a choice
must be made based on the legitimacy of the actors involved. Since actors
with legitimate interests were found on both sides of this issue, another
factor becomes important. Timing was crucial here. When the treaties were
signed, the public strongly opposed them and the opposition groups were
already well-organized and active. Members of Congress realized that
most Americans strongly disapproved of the administration's treaties.
Since the senators talked of public pressures as being against the treaties,
the constituency pressures variable was coded as negative to the
administration's position.

VI. Presidential Involvement

The level of presidential involvement in this case was *standard.*

On August 8, 1977, Carter sent telegrams to every member of Congress
telling them that a treaty was forthcoming (Farnsworth, 1979:1). When the treaties became imperiled due to differing U.S. and Panamanian interpretations, Carter called Torrijos to Washington where on October 14, they released the "Statement of Understanding."

Once over that hurdle, Carter exhorted COACT members to go spread the gospel across the land (Farnsworth, 1979:48). Later, Carter carried his message directly to the American people. On February 1, he conducted his first televised "fireside chat." In it, he defended the treaties and called for Americans to support them. Finally as it became apparent that he did not have the needed 67 votes, Carter intensified his efforts. He called uncommitted senators and met with them in the Oval Office. However, Carter's most important move came on March 15. On that date, he met with Senator DeConcini and agreed to the latter's condition. The condition helped pull in vital votes. By taking such a strong personal stand, Carter helped to ensure the successful Senate passage of the treaties. Accordingly, the presidential involvement was coded as standard.

VIII. Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior

The approval of the treaties was a resistance behavior. The administration wanted the treaties approved both quickly and with no amendments. It achieved neither goal. Senator Byrd slowed down consideration of the treaties so that domestic opposition could be countered. Further, the party leadership sponsored amendments which incorporated the Carter-Torrijos "Statement of Understanding" into the Neutrality Treaty. Even though this addition helped the treaty's passage, the State Department opposed amendments as a bad precedent. Finally, the party leadership
modified the DeConcini condition after Carter had agreed to it. For all these reasons, the dependent variable was a resistance behavior.

Propositions

This case fell into the territorial area. Party and committee leaders' preferences were positive, but constituency pressures were seen as negative to the administration's position. Carter's level of involvement was standard, and a resistance behavior was produced.

Two propositions were examined. The constituency pressures proposition (4.1) was supported, but the presidential involvement one (5.1) was not. It says:

When the level of presidential involvement is standard, the probability of no modification behaviors increases while the probabilities of resistance and initiative behaviors decrease.

Carter's standard involvement did not lead to a no modification response, but it did help ensure that the treaties would be passed in some reasonably acceptable form.

Significant Aspects

Three aspects stood out in this case. Had Carter not gotten so involved and had the administration not relented on some key points, the treaties probably would have either been killed or would have been so altered that they would have been unacceptable to Panama. Thus, Carter's role was very important.

However, the role of the party leadership was crucial. Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1978:379) called the passage of the treaties"...a victory for the Senate leadership." The party leaders strongly supported
the idea of the treaties, but they pressured the administration into making the changes necessary to secure passage. Further, they changed the DeConcini condition without checking with Carter. In the Senate, Byrd, Baker, and Cranston made all the difference in the world.

Another item which stood out concerned committee leaders' preferences. Since the Foreign Relations Committee had primary jurisdiction, the coding rules could not pick up the strongly negative views expressed by other committees. Since these members of Congress served as a focal point for the administration's opponents, their desires should be included in future research attempts.

Finally, constituency pressures played an interesting role here. Although they were evenly balanced by the time of the debate, one does not get that impression from the statements and actions of the senators. A number of them acted as if no late charge had been made by the administration. They were very worried about how the public would react to a positive vote.
CHAPTER XVIII NOTES

1 Unless otherwise specified, the research for this case comes from Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1978:379-397).

2 For a list of party leaders, see Congressional Index (1977-1978: 10301).

3 For a list of its members, see Congressional Index (1977-1978:12058).

4 For a list of its members, see Congressional Index (1977-1978:12060; Farnsworth, 1979:4).

5 For a list of its members, see Congressional Index (1977-1978:12053).

6 For a list of its members, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1977: 77).

7 For a list of its members, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1977: 73).
CHAPTER XIX

Summary and Conclusions

Summary

In the post-Vietnam period, Congress as an institution has demonstrated a new assertiveness in the area of foreign policy. With an increasing role for Congress in foreign policy-making, doubts abound as to the continued validity of past generalizations regarding its role. In order to better understand how and why Congress produces foreign policy behaviors, a conceptual framework has been advanced. The framework is cast in a stimulus-response format. A stimulus starts the congressional conversion process and is identified and categorized by assessing the context in which it arises. For this purpose, a contextual filter is advanced. It is composed of an examination of the historical context of the matter at hand, the sequential context leading up to the stimulus, and the concurrent context. The concurrent context focuses on how other issues or matters in the immediate environment interact with the stimulus.

In the conversion process, five independent variables shape the resulting response. The first variable concerns the procedural issue area in which the case falls. There are status, human resources, territorial, and nonhuman resource cases. The second variable attempts to capture the preferences of party leaders. These preferences are categorized as positive to the administration's position, negative to it, or neutral. The
third variable, committee leaders' preferences, does the same for the committees which act in the case. These individuals' preferences are also categorized as positive, negative, or neutral. Public inputs are captured in a constituency pressures variable. These too are categorized as positive, negative, or neutral. The last independent variable, level of presidential involvement, captures the amount of effort expended by the president to get Congress to do what he wants. A standard level indicates the president pushes Congress; a substandard level indicates a lack of significant presidential pressure.

A congressional foreign policy behavior is the response and, thus, is the dependent variable in this study. A trichotomy is used to categorize the foreign policy behavior, and each value represents a different position on a passive-active continuum. No modification behaviors are those in which Congress gives the administration what it desires. Resistance behaviors are those in which Congress deviates from administrative desires. The administration may get more than it requested. However, the more common expectation here is that Congress gives the administration less than it wanted. Finally, the congressional foreign policy behavior may be an initiative. In such cases, Congress acts on its own in foreign policy matters, rather than reacting to an administrative request.

This framework is examined by studying fifteen cases. One set of cases was needed which varied as much as possible over time during the post-World War II period, across the four issue areas, and across the three dependent variable measures. The cases chosen to make up this set are:
1. The Japanese Peace Treaty, 1952,
2. The Spanish Bases Agreement, 1953,
3. The Guatemalan Intervention, 1954,
4. The Formosa Resolution, 1955,
5. The Mutual Security Act, 1957,
6. The Bay of Pigs Failure, 1961,
7. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1963
8. The Advance Latin American Aid Authorization, 1967,
9. The ABM Authorization, 1969,
10. The Defense Appropriations Bill, 1969,
11. The Executive Agreements Act, 1972,
12. The War Powers Resolution, 1973,
13. The Rejection of the Sugar Act, 1974,
14. The Turkish Military Aid Cutoff, 1974, and

Table 4 summarizes the measures for the independent variables, one contextual factor (congressional-executive relations), and the dependent variable for each case.
Table 4. Summary of Variables and Selected Contextual Factors for Each Case

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S=Status; HR=Human Resource; T=Territorial; NHR=Nonhuman Resource; C-E Rel's=Congressional-Exec. Relations; PLP=Party Leaders' Preferences; CLP=Committee Leaders' Preferences; CP=Constituency Pressures; PI=Presidential Involvement; CFPB=Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior; N=negative; P=Positive; Sub=substandard; Std=Standard; NH=No modification; R=Resistance; and I=Initiative.
FINDINGS

Several methods can be employed to indicate what has been learned as a result of this project. One method is to examine the propositions to determine how well their expectations were met. The propositions are repeated below.

The status proposition (1.1) - In status cases, the probabilities of no modification and initiative behaviors increase while the probability of resistance behaviors decreases.

The status/poor relationship proposition (1.1A) - In status cases in which executive branch-congressional relations are poor, the probability of initiative behaviors increases.

The nonhuman resources proposition (1.2) - In nonhuman resource cases, the probability of resistance behaviors increases while the probabilities of no modification and initiative behaviors decrease.

The party leaders proposition (2.1) - When party leaders' preferences are negative to the administration's position, the probability of no modification behaviors decreases while the probabilities of resistance and initiative behaviors increase.

The no modification position (2.2) - When both party and committee leaders' preferences are positive to the administration's position and constituency pressures are either neutral or positive, then the probability of no modification behaviors increases.

The committee leaders proposition (3.1) - When committee leaders' preferences are negative to the administration's position, the probability of no modification behaviors decreases while the probabilities of resistance and initiative behaviors increase.
When committee leaders' preferences are negative to the administration's position, constituency pressures are either negative or neutral, and the level of presidential involvement is substandard, the probability of resistance behaviors increases.

When constituency pressures are negative to the administration's position, the probability of no modification behaviors decreases while the probabilities of resistance and initiative behaviors increase.

When the level of presidential involvement is standard, the probability of no modification behaviors increases while the probabilities of resistance and initiative behaviors decrease.

When the level of presidential involvement is standard, committee leaders' preferences are negative to the administration's position, and constituency pressures are either neutral or negative, the probability of initiative behaviors increases.

Table 5 reports the propositions either supported or unsupported for each case.
Table 5. Proposition Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>1.1</th>
<th>1.1A</th>
<th>1.2</th>
<th>2.1</th>
<th>2.2</th>
<th>3.1</th>
<th>3.2</th>
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<th>5.1</th>
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<td>U</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>U</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

S=supported
U=unsupported
The findings in Table 5 indicate that the expectations, generated by the development of the conceptual framework, were largely borne out. Overall, the propositions were supported in over two-thirds of the instances. Thus for these cases:

1. It appears that status cases tend to result in extreme behaviors (1.1). Members of Congress seem to act in status cases by either agreeing to the administration's position or responding with initiatives of their own.

2. For those status cases in which members assess their general relationship with the executive branch as poor, initiatives are more likely (1.1A).

3. Congressional behaviors tend to be more assertive when party leaders' preferences, committee leaders' preferences, or constituency pressures are negative to the administration's position (2.1, 3.1, 4.1). Such an increase in assertiveness is indicated by the proclivity toward resistance and initiative behaviors.

4. Less assertive behaviors, such as no modification behaviors, tend to result when both party and committee leaders endorse the administration's position, and constituency pressures are either neutral or supportive of the administration (2.2).

5. Initiatives tend to arise when the president pushes in spite of negative committee leader preferences and neutral or negative constituency pressures (5.2).

However, some initial expectations were not met. Across these cases:

1. Nonhuman resources cases did not demonstrate a tendency toward resistance behaviors (1.2). In three of the five nonhuman resource cases, bargaining did not take place, and two initiatives and one no modification behavior resulted. (See Table 5).

2. Resistance behaviors further did not result when a) committee leaders' preferences were negative to the administration's position, b) constituency pressures were either negative or neutral, and c) presidential involvement was minimal (3.2).

3. When viewed alone, strong presidential pressure was not enough to guarantee that Congress would accede to the president's desires (5.1). In only three of eleven cases was a standard level of presidential involvement followed by a congressional no modification behavior.
However, negative findings just mentioned do not necessarily weaken the entire conceptual framework. While the lack of explanation for resistance behaviors is regrettable, the performance of the presidential involvement proposition (5.1) deserves closer examination. In Chapter III, the possibility of contradictory expectations in the same case was noted. Occasionally, different factors push in different directions in the same case. The initiative proposition (5.2) represents a special case within the larger set of cases demonstrating a presidential push. In the four instances in which the initiative proposition is supported, the presidential involvement proposition (5.1), which calls for no modification behaviors, must fall by the wayside. In these cases, the presidential push is expected to be overridden by the impact of other variables. Consequently if these four unsupported instances of the presidential involvement proposition are removed from overall consideration, the expectations derived from the framework are supported over three-fourths of the time.

Another method of highlighting findings is to look for patterns, or the lack of them, among the factors under consideration. The first group of factors considered in each of these cases were contextual factors. The historical context in these cases encapsulated a number of past precedents which helped to shape congressional actions. For example, congressional support for both prior interventions abroad and major, new weapons systems at home helped produce no modification behaviors in the Guatemalan and ABM cases. Prior congressional practices helped produce the resistance behaviors found in the Mutual Security Act, the Defense Appropriation bill, and the Sugar Act failure. Previously Congress had defended its foreign aid appropriations procedures from executive attack and had asserted its
right to increase or decrease foreign aid funds. Likewise, Congress had previously cut Defense Department appropriations, especially after unpopular wars. Further, the congressional decision not to renew the sugar program in 1964 made a similar decision in 1974 more likely. Finally, congressional concerns over executive agreements in the 1950's and a much stronger position regarding war powers in earlier years made these congressional initiatives easier to pass in the 1970's.

Similar to past precedents is the tendency of an administration to avoid or repeat prior mistakes in dealing with Congress. Bearing in mind the difficulties over the Treaty of Versailles, Dulles was careful to court the bipartisan leaders in the Senate. Remembering the criticism Truman received for acting unilaterally in sending American troops into the Korean War, Eisenhower asked Congress for prior authorization to defend Formosa and the offshore islands. Understanding the public's reluctance to have Sentinel ABM sites in urban areas, Nixon changed the ABM strategy to one of defending missile sites in largely rural areas. The resulting congressional outputs in the Japanese Peace Treaty, Formosa Resolution, and Safeguard ABM cases were no modification behaviors.

On the other hand, presidents and other administration actors from time to time repeat mistakes when dealing with Congress and are penalized for it. While in the process of using the Tonkin Gulf Resolution to escalate the American involvement in the Vietnam War, Johnson asked Congress for an open-ended authorization of aid to Latin America. Amid the furor of public and congressional opposition to what some saw as an illegal war in Vietnam, Nixon continued to claim a preponderant role for the executive in war-making. Finally in the same year that Nixon was driven from office due to the Watergate scandal, Secretary of State Kissinger opposed the cut-off
of aid to Turkey by asserting that national security in this case took precedence over national law. With such contextual factors in mind, it seems little wonder that Congress produced initiatives opposed to administration desires in the Latin American Aid, War Powers, and Turkish Aid cutoff cases.

A similar aspect of the sequential context is the extent to which new government policy is made in order to correct deficiencies in prior government policies or policy-making. For example, the congressional hearings following the Bay of Pigs intervention were conducted to determine how and why the invasion attempt failed. In fact, much of the congressional concern was addressed to the quality of executive branch decision-making. The congressional attack on the Defense budget in 1969 came from two fronts. Former Defense Department supporters in Congress attacked the Pentagon's management practices which led to cost overruns, duplication of effort, and "gold-plated" weapons systems. Defense critics, for their part, charged the country was becoming a "national security state" in which domestic needs were consistently overlooked. The Executive Agreements Act followed the disclosure of agreements to countries which were kept secret from most in Congress. The War Powers Resolution followed the debacle of Vietnam. The Sugar Act was rejected when the sugar program failed to protect consumers from exorbitantly high prices. Turkish military aid was cut off by Congress when the administration refused to do it. In these cases, resistance and initiative behaviors were abetted by shortcomings in existing executive branch policies or procedures.

An interesting twist to this argument is found in the Panama Canal Treaties case. Here the administration sought to correct the deficiencies in past policy toward Panama. The Carter administration's task was to
overcome the inertia in Congress, and among the public, to keep things as they were. The administration was unable to convince enough senators, or enough of the public, that the existing policy was shortsighted to prevent some Senate changes in the treaties which emphasized American rights.

While the sequential context may include factors which work against the administration, another factor often works for it. In all eight cases in which the primary committee endorsed the administration's position, the majority on those committees walked into their hearings already favoring the administration's position. Administration actors had lined up valuable support by courting the key committees, during the sequential time period, in the Japanese Peace Treaty, Guatemalan intervention, Mutual Security Act, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and Panama Canal treaties cases. In the other three cases, the committee majorities needed no administrative coaxing. They had their own reasons for supporting the administration. In the Formosa Resolution case, the domestic climate practically ensured their acceptance of a move against "communist aggression." In the ABM case, the majorities on the Armed Services committees had favored Sentinel and were generally in favor of new weapons systems which could serve as bargaining chips with the Soviets. In the Sugar Act case, the House Agriculture Committee was strongly in favor of the existing sugar program. Thus in over one half of these cases, representing all four issue areas, the administration began the congressional phase of the policy-making process with important committees already on its side.

Moreover, such positive committee preferences, established prior to congressional action in a given case, may at times be augmented by other factors. In looking at these same eight cases, the Japanese Peace Treaty,
Guatemalan intervention, and Nuclear Test Ban Treaty cases reveal both party leaders and constituent groups who were also mobilized in favor of the administration's position prior to congressional action. Administration actors were largely responsible for creating both party and domestic support in the Japanese case, party support in the Guatemalan case, and domestic support in the Test Ban case.

Independent of executive branch action, prior support existed in others of these eight cases. The anti-communist domestic climate provided ready public support in the Guatemalan and Formosa cases. The administration was helped, in securing the support of party leaders in the Test Ban case, by the presence of Humphrey as Majority Whip. He had pressed for arms control agreements for several years. Finally, the presence of a large number of defense contractors, who would be able to provide new jobs due to their role in the Safeguard ABM case, helped ensure positive public support for the program. The fact that five of these eight cases under discussion resulted in no modification behaviors should not be too surprising given the sequential context which shaped them.

The concurrent context also reveals differing patterns. In five cases, concurrent events or actions tipped the scales in the administration's favor. Despite the poor relations between Capitol Hill and the White House, mentioned by members of Congress themselves, the Korean War added a sense of urgency to the ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty. The poor relationship between the branches of government were made almost moot by Truman's decision to turn over the treaty's handling to Dulles. Domestic anti-communism and perceived communist bloc activity eased the process of obtaining congressional support in the Guatemalan and Formosan cases. The Sino-Soviet split enhanced the ratification of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
Finally, the energy bill delay and separate deals struck between the administration and Senators Abourezk and Talmadge provided the margin for Senate approval of the Panama Canal treaties.

This set of cases however, concurrent events and issues seem more likely to work against the administration and to threaten the identity of interests often created between the administration and key congressional committees. With the exception of the Japanese Peace Treaty, every other case in which members of Congress characterized their overall relations with the executive branch as "poor" resulted in resistance or initiative behaviors. Such poor relations led to resistance behaviors in the Mutual Security Act, Defense Appropriations Bill, and Sugar Act cases. Further, deteriorating relations between the branches helped to produce the initiatives found in the Latin American aid, Executive Agreements Act, and War Powers Resolution cases.

In three cases in which members of Congress did not assess their overall relationship with the executive branch as poor, concurrent factors still worked to the detriment of the administration. Anti-communism, the pull of Catholicism, and anti-Truman partisanship helped overcome Truman's opposition to a Spanish Base Agreement. Crises in the Congo and Laos combined with weaknesses in Kennedy's decision-making structure to help lead to the acceptance of a plan to invade Cuba which had few chances of success. Weakened by Kissinger's assertion that national security overrode national law, the Ford administration was forced to accept the congressionally-imposed cutoff of aid to Turkey in order to get the continuing appropriations needed to fund the government. These findings suggest that concurrent factors seem more likely to threaten the administration's position than to aid it.
Another set of patterns which deserve attention are those between the issue area and the other variables of the framework. Table 6 examines the mix of independent variables for each measure of the dependent variable. The table indicates that the issue areas do not form any regular patterns with the other independent variables. More importantly, there seems to be little "fit" between the issue areas and the dependent variable. Table 7 examines the four issues areas across the three dependent variable measures. The table supports the status proposition (1.1) which calls for extreme congressional responses in status cases. The other three issue areas, however, form no patterns across the dependent variable measures.

However, Table 6 does note some clear patterns across the other independent variables for each measure of the dependent variable. No modification behaviors tend to result when party leaders' preferences, committee leaders' preferences, and constituency pressures are positive to the administration's position. Such a finding is hardly surprising. Everything is going the president's way. What may seem unusual to some, however, is the role played by the president. Table 6 seems to suggest that the level of presidential involvement is not crucial. In three of these cases presidents pushed, and in two cases they did not.

A closer examination of the cases involved clarifies the impact of the president. In the three cases in which presidents pushed, their standard level of involvement clearly played a strong role in the resulting congressional response. In the Guatemalan intervention, Eisenhower and his subordinates courted the congressional leadership. They were briefed on the threat represented by the leftist regimes in Guatemala and they were kept up to date on American actions targeted toward Guatemala.
Table 6. Independent Variables by Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Area</th>
<th>Party Leaders' Preferences</th>
<th>Committee Leaders' Preferences</th>
<th>Constituency Pressures</th>
<th>Presidential Involvement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Modification</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>S - 2</td>
<td>Positive - 4</td>
<td>Positive - 5</td>
<td>Positive-5</td>
<td>Substandard-2</td>
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<td>Negative-0</td>
<td>Standard -3</td>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

S=Status, HR=Human Resources; T=Territorial; NHR=Nonhuman Resources
The establishment of the new, U.S.-supported regime, could hardly have been a surprise to these men in Congress. In the other two cases, the role played by the president swung momentum to his side. Ike called the Formusa situation a "crisis" and, by his defense of his request, defused the arguments of those who felt war would result from the resolution. Kennedy's dramatic June 10 address rallied the public behind the Test Ban treaty, and his assurances to maintain a high level of military preparedness won over other potential critics. Without the strong role of the president, these three cases could have resulted in outputs undesired by the administration.

Looking at Table 6, resistance behaviors appear to present a clear pattern. The table indicates they occur when party leaders' preferences are positive, committee leaders' preferences are negative, and the president pushes for what he wants. This appearance is deceiving. A closer examination demonstrates that for two of the cases with a standard level of presidential involvement, the party and committee variables do
not conflict. In the Mutual Security Act both party and committee leaders' preferences were positive, while both were negative in the Defense appropriations case. The only thing close to a pattern occurs in the Sugar Act and Panama Canal cases. While the former had a substandard level of presidential involvement and the latter had a standard one, both reveal positive committee leaders' preferences being challenged by negative constituency pressures. In each of these cases, the negative constituency pressures carried the day and resistance behaviors resulted.

Initiative behaviors, on the other hand, show a clear pattern. As noted by both Table 6 and the initiative proposition (5.2), initiatives seem to result when party and committee leaders' preferences are negative, constituency pressures are negative, and the president pushes for what he wants. In the lone case when constituency pressures were positive, the Latin American aid case, these pressures were not intense at all. Four domestic actors favored the aid while two opposed it. In the Executive Agreements case where the level of presidential involvement was substandard, everything else was going against the administration. Relations between the branches were poor. Party leaders, committee leaders, and constituency groups were opposed to the administration's defense of secret agreements. Finally, it was a status case in which either no modification or initiative behaviors were likely. The negative factors above ruled out a no modification response so an initiative occurred despite Nixon's lack of pressure on Congress.

Moving beyond the operationalized variables, some broader concepts reveal patterns. For example, the party leaders' preferences variable attempts to measure partisanship. Another way to examine partisanship is to identify, as Democrats or Republicans, those members of Congress who
made preference statements in each case. Table 8 summarizes the role of partisanship for each case across the three measures of the dependent variable. For cases resulting in no modification behaviors, the president was supported by approximately three-fourths of his own party members and over one-half of the opposition party. In the four cases which led to resistance behaviors, presidents were supported by approximately one-third of their own party members and by almost one-half of the opposition party members. In these cases, the president's own party members were quicker to fault him than was the opposition party. Finally, normalcy returned with initiatives. Almost one-third of the president's party supported him while less than one-fourth of the opposition party did.
Table 8. Partisanship by Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior For Each Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Democrats (by percentage)</th>
<th>Republicans (by percentage)</th>
<th>President's Party</th>
<th>Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Peace Treaty</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>No Modification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemalan Intervention</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formosa Resolution</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Test Ban Treaty</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABM Authorization</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual Security Act</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>Resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Appropriations</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar Act</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama Canal Treaties</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Bases</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bay of Pigs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American Aid</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Agreements Act</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Powers Resolution</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Aid</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D=Democrat
R=Republican
The role of congressional committee activity also deserves some attention. In four cases, secondary committees gave negative cues to the rank-and-file while the committees with primary jurisdiction gave positive cues. In the Mutual Security Act and Panama Canal treaties cases, these countervailing preferences helped lead to resistance behaviors. The secondary committees helped legitimate floor opposition. The same almost happened in the ABM case. The floor vote in the Senate missed producing a resistance behavior by one vote. The lone instance in which such negative secondary committee preferences are unequivocably overridden is found in the Nuclear Test Ban case. Kennedy's assurances to the Senate Armed Services Committee to safeguard the nation's level of military preparedness largely diminished the impact of the committee members' arguments against the treaty.

Finally, the role of the public can be considered. When the public supports the administration's position, one would expect a tendency toward no modification behaviors. Such was the case in the Japanese Peace Treaty, Guatemalan, Formosan, Nuclear Test Ban, and ABM cases. In only the Mutual Security Act and Latin American aid cases did public support for the administration co-occur with resistance or initiative behaviors. In both these cases, constituency pressures were positive in direction but were very low in intensity. Strongly-held public support was not evident in these cases. On the other hand in every case in which constituency pressures were negative, resistance or initiative behaviors were produced.¹

One final way to ascertain what has been found in this study is to examine the relative potency of the variables. In Chapter III, the issue area measures were described as setting the boundaries within which the
other variables fluctuate. Therefore, different patterns of variable
potencies could be possible as issue areas change. The following discus-
sion will briefly note the relative impact of the variables for each case,
and the rank orders will then be summarized.

The four status cases are the Japanese Peace Treaty, Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty, Executive Agreements Act, and the War Powers Resolution. In
the Japanese case, Dulles’ success at wooing the committee leaders had a
fundamental impact. While less important than committee leaders,
party leaders also helped ease the peace treaty’s passage. Positive con-
stituency pressures were of low intensity, and Truman played no role at
all. In the Test Ban case, Kennedy’s efforts were the decisive factor.
He swung public opinion behind the treaty and neutralized opposition
arguments about weakening the nation’s security. Once that was achieved,
both party and committee leaders were equally influential in following his
lead. The Executive Agreements Act was largely a creation of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. Once its members became active, party leaders
were swayed. A generally passive but supportive public aided their efforts
and Nixon did not fight them. The War Powers Resolution was a product of
public dissatisfaction with the Vietnam War. The large elements of the
public who criticized the administration’s use of force, particularly in
Cambodia, gave the foreign affairs committees the opening they desired to
pursue such legislation. Party leaders helped the committees, and Nixon’s
objections were eventually overridden.

There were two human resource cases here. In the Mutual Security Act
case, the most important factor was not tapped by the framework. This
resistance behavior was shaped by a movement on the House floor. Members
upset with the administration’s record of dealing with Congress in general
and those who opposed its upcoming civil rights proposals united under the leadership of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations.

These members forced both foreign affairs committees to concede a number of points. Beyond these committee members, party leaders played a reduced role, as did constituency pressures and Eisenhower. In the Latin American aid case, the Foreign Relations Committee led the attack on the administration's proposal. Party leaders tried to deter the committee members as did the president and administration spokesmen. Constituency pressures were supportive of the administration but were too low in intensity to have much effect.

On the other hand, domestic pressures played a stronger role in territorial cases. The Guatemalan intervention was strongly shaped by United Fruit's ability to take its claims against the Guatemalan regime to the U.S. government and to the American people. Sensitized by the company's arguments and not willing to bear the charge of having "allowed" communism to flourish in the Western Hemisphere, the administration both carried out the intervention and let the congressional leadership in on the developments. Party and committee leaders joined in supporting the administration. In the Formosa Resolution case, Eisenhower called the far east situation a "crisis" and angrily attacked members of Congress who called the resolution a declaration of preventive war. In light of the anti-communist consensus among the public, again both party and committee leaders reacted by endorsing the president's request.

In the Bay of Pigs case, strongly negative constituency pressures prompted committee leaders to review the administration's performance. Party leaders followed the committees' lead, and Kennedy's attempt to minimize the damage did not stop the congressional hearings. The
congressional perception of strongly negative constituency pressures caused the Senate to balk at routinely approving the Panama Canal treaties. While Carter's appeals and concessions surely helped win the treaties' passage, it was the party leaders who knew what had to be done to get the treaties through the Senate. They did what they felt necessary, at times without telling Carter, to get the treaties approved in some form.

The remaining cases involved nonhuman resources. Similar patterns were found in the Spanish Bases and ABM cases. In each, the committee leaders were the primary agents for pushing Congress to act. Constituent groups aided their efforts; the military pushed in the former case and defense contractors pushed in the latter. Party leaders played a subordinate role of supporting the wishes of the committees. Finally, the president's influence was not very influential. Truman's objections to Spanish bases were worn down by the Senate Appropriations Committee. Nixon, on the other hand, did little after requesting the funding for Safeguard. The Armed Services Committees handled the matter.

In the final three cases, similar rank order patterns were again found. In the Defense appropriations, Sugar Act, and Turkish aid cases, constituency pressures carried the day. Public outcries over defense spending and cost overruns prompted the Appropriations Committees to cut the budget. Strong domestic dissatisfaction over escalating sugar prices, combined with opposition by some producers to the act's new pro-labor provisions, prompted House members to reject the sugar program. For their part, Greek-Americans put organized pressure on Congress to halt aid to Turkey after the invasion of Cyprus. In the sugar case, both committee and party leaders tried equally to save the program but were ineffective. Nixon did not even try. In the other two cases, committee leaders carried
out constituents' demands and were somewhat aided by party leaders. In both the Defense and Turkish cases, presidents opposed the congressional action but to no avail.

Table 9 summarizes the above discussion. The variables are ranked in descending order. Numbers are assigned on an ordinal basis, with "1" being the most potent variable and "4" being the least potent in explaining the congressional output. As mentioned above, the rank orders are grouped by issue area.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Areas</th>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Variable Potencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japanese Peace Treaty</strong></td>
<td>CLP</td>
<td>PLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nuclear Test Ban Treaty</strong></td>
<td>PI</td>
<td>CP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Executive Agreements Act</strong></td>
<td>CLP</td>
<td>PLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>War Powers Resolution</strong></td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>CLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Resources</strong></td>
<td>Mutual Security Act</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Latin American Aid</td>
<td>CLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Territorial</strong></td>
<td>Guatemalan Intervention</td>
<td>CP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Formosa Resolution</td>
<td>PI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bay of Pigs Intervention</td>
<td>CP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Panama Canal Treaties</td>
<td>CP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nonhuman Resources</strong></td>
<td>Spanish Bases Agreement</td>
<td>CLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ABN Authorization</td>
<td>CLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defense Appropriations</td>
<td>CP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sugar Act</td>
<td>CP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkish Aid Cutoff</td>
<td>CP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* House floor movement  
CLP= Committee Leaders' Preferences  
PLP= Party Leaders' Preferences  
CP = Constituency Pressure  
PI = Presidential Involvement  

Differences exist as to when one variable is a more important explanatory tool than another. To clarify these patterns, the numbers assigned to each variable in Table 9 can be averaged, both for each issue area and over all the cases. The averaged rankings only indicate that, for the set of cases under consideration, variables with lower averages are somewhat more potent in explaining congressional foreign policy behavior than are variables with higher averages. These numbers mean nothing other than a way to differentiate variable potencies for the fifteen cases studied.
Table 10. Average Rank Orders of Variable Potencies by Issue Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Areas</th>
<th>Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonhuman Resources</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>1.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table indicates that, in the status cases here, the preferences of committee leaders are the most influential variable in explaining the congressional output. They are followed, in descending order, by constituency pressures, party leaders' preferences, and finally the level of presidential involvement.

The two human resource cases present a slightly different ordering. Again, understanding committee leaders' preferences is most important. However, party leaders are next in influence. The importance of the president's role is less than that of the party leaders, and constituency pressures are least influential in explaining the congressional foreign policy behavior.

The pattern of relative rankings switches dramatically for territorial cases. In these four cases, constituency pressures are most influential. The president plays a stronger role than do party leaders. However, committee leaders' preferences, which are most important in the status and human resource cases, are of least importance in understanding
congressional outputs in the territorial cases.

As in the territorial cases, constituency pressures are of key importance in nonhuman resource cases. However, they are followed closely by the preferences of the committee leaders. The preferences of party leaders have less impact. The president's impact in these nonhuman resource cases is of least importance in explaining the resulting congressional foreign policy behavior.

Overall, the key variables for explaining congressional foreign policy behavior in these cases are constituency pressures and committee leaders' preferences. They finish in a virtual tie in terms of their overall explanatory power. The preferences of party leaders have less of an impact. Finally across all of these cases, the president's level of involvement has the least amount of influence in determining the final congressional output.
CONCLUSIONS

A number of conclusions can be drawn from this research project. To begin with, the overall conceptual framework survives this initial examination. When applied to a sample of cases chosen to represent the wide range of both the different types of decisions that members of Congress handle and the different congressional outputs available, the framework demonstrates considerable promise as a tool for understanding congressional foreign policy behavior.

However, two specific weaknesses exist within the framework. To begin with, the issue area categorization does not provide much help to the analyst in explaining the dependent variable. Only status cases form any pattern with the dependent variable. They tend to result in extreme behaviors. Congress may give the president exactly what he wants or its members may forge their own way by initiating their own policies. Despite this one highlight, human resource, territorial, and nonhuman resource cases fail to point the way toward any pattern of foreign policy behaviors.

In general terms, the cases which fall into each issue area have some similar characteristics. Status cases deal with the status of the U.S. relative to other nations or the status of one branch of the government relative to the other. Human resource cases involve improving the quality of life. Territorial cases focus on American efforts to develop, by a variety of means, a more harmonious relationship with important foreign
nations. Finally, nonhuman resource cases deal with "things" - bases, missiles, bullets, or sugar. However, the similarities between these cases exist at the broadest level. These issue areas fail because they are too broad. Within the broad scope of concerns denoted by a given issue area, no sense of the controversial is found.

What makes a case controversial seems to be uncovered by an examination of the context. An administration which repeats prior mistakes in dealing with Congress will generate some controversy. Governmental policies that fail generate controversy. Such policies may be executive-based such as the Bay of Pigs fiasco, or they may be joint executive-congressional policies such as the sugar program. They may also be a mixture of the two, in which administrations take action and Congress supports them, as was the case in Vietnam. Finally when the overall congressional-executive relationship is characterized as "poor" by many members of Congress, the president is in trouble. In such circumstances, anything he does may generate controversy. Members of Congress may attack his policy requests because they disagree with them, because they disagree with other administration policies and actions, or because standing up to the president is simply "good politics." The latter is often the case in even-numbered years when members of Congress are up for election.

Besides missing the controversiality in the issue areas, the framework has one other weakness. It does not account for resistance behaviors. The problem again is one of breadth. The category of resistance behaviors, as operationalized here, is simply too broad. Resistance behaviors can range from modifications in the president's requests, as was found in the Mutual Security Act and Panama Canal treaties cases, to the outright rejection found in the Sugar Act case. These cases are quite different and
do not belong in the same dependent variable category.

Beyond the analytical aspects of the conceptual framework, this project was designed to point the way toward answering some basic questions about the making of American foreign policy. Due to the nonrandom sample of cases used, the following answers or conclusions may be somewhat tentative at this stage of the research.

One broad set of questions revolves around Congress' role in foreign policy. Is Congress passive and supportive of the administration? Does it challenge the administration, asserting its own prerogatives and ideas? Does the truth lie in between these extremes? The answer, of course, is that Congress plays all of these roles.

Congress at times accedes to the president's request. This tends to occur when both party and committee leaders favor the president's request and their collective preferences are not overridden by contrary demands by constituents. The process by which such behaviors arise may range from being very passive, as was the case in the Guatemalan intervention, to very contentious as in the ABM case. In cases like the Japanese Peace Treaty, the party and committee leaders do what the president wants with little pressure from him. However in some cases, only a strong presidential push can bring these actors into line with his desires.

In Chapter III, it was assumed that the variable measures, which combined to produce no modification behaviors, would interact in a mutually reinforcing, additive manner. Such was the case in the Japanese Peace Treaty, Guatemalan intervention, and ABM cases. However, the Formosa Resolution and Nuclear Test Ban Treaty cases reveal a causal pattern. In the former, Eisenhower's definition of the situation as a "crisis," along with his urgent request for very prompt action, put party and committee
leaders in a position where they could ill-afford to deny his request.
Moreover, his strong attacks on those who said the resolution called for
preventive war limited further congressional opposition. Eisenhower's
actions pulled Congress into line, and members had little choice but to
accede to his request.

Much the same occurred in the Nuclear Test Ban case. Kennedy rallied
public support behind his position. He then used that public support to
pressure senators to go along with him. He finally removed the military
arguments that had been used against the treaty by promising to safeguard
the nation's security and to maintain its nuclear testing capabilities.
Like Eisenhower above, Kennedy played a causal role. He pushed and pulled
many potential Senate critics into a position where they could ill-afford
to oppose the treaty. In sum, while the variables that produce no modifi-
cation behaviors may at times be mutually reinforcing, the president may
also play a causal role, by creating conditions whereby Congress political-
ly cannot oppose his desires.

Contextual factors can also aid the president here. If presidents
have won similar victories with Congress before, their task is made a bit
easier. Congressional fondness for new weapons systems in general and
an ABM system in particular helped carry the day in the Safeguard case.
More often however, presidents are the beneficiaries of the good relations
between key congressional committees and administration agents which have
been carefully nurtured over months or years. This identity of interests
helps explain presidential successes in cases like the Japanese Peace and
Nuclear Test Ban Treaties, as well as the Safeguard ABM authorization.

Sometimes Congress balks at giving the president what he wants. This
seems to occur when the identity of interests between the administration and
key committees is challenged by other actors. In both the Sugar Act and Panama Canal cases, significant elements of the public objected to the policy decisions desired by both the president and the committees with primary jurisdiction. In the Mutual Security Act, as well as in the Panama Canal case again, secondary committee actors refused to accept the lead of the primary committees and battled in hearing rooms and on the chamber floor to change the direction in which the decision was heading. Those other committees charged that the rights and prerogatives of Congress were being endangered.

Finally, Congress will from time to time chart its own course in foreign policy. In general, it appears that congressional initiatives will be forthcoming when the president strongly pushed Congress, and his desires face strong counterpressure from party leaders, committee leaders, and domestic actors. More specifically, initiatives seem to result when status cases arise in an atmosphere tainted by poor executive-congressional relations.

The state of executive-congressional relations deserves a final note. The analysis of the concurrent context demonstrates that when the president runs afoul of Congress on many issues over a short period of time, he should probably spend his time mending his political fences rather than presenting major new proposals. Admittedly, the timing of congressional action is often beyond the president's control, but in almost every case in which such poor relations were found, the president lost to varying degrees.

As was noted in Chapter III, initiatives seem to occur when a number of negative factors co-occur and they reinforce each other. Poor relations between the branches, combined with sharp policy differences, created the
negative situations which spawned congressional initiatives in the Spanish bases, Executive Agreements, and War Powers cases. The spectacular failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion created a negative climate in which few members of Congress desired to support the president. While these cases demonstrate mutually reinforcing processes, the other two display causal patterns. In the Latin American aid case, only a slim majority on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee stood between Johnson and the commitment he desired. Had Johnson played a more circumspect role, he might have been able to reassure them of the purity of his intentions, and an advance authorization might have been possible. However, he pushed them too hard and too much, and the committee's Democrats refused to back down. Instead they became more assertive. Here Johnson caused his proposal to fail.

In the Turkish aid case, the pro-Greek lobby played a causal role. In a well-orchestrated campaign of demonstrations and persuasive lobbying techniques, these groups mobilized both rank-and-file members of both chambers as well as many members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Without a pro-Turkish lobby to counteract them, the pro-Greek groups carried the day and caused the cutoff to be mandated. Thus while at times initiatives occur when many negative factors combine in a mutually reinforcing spiral that seems impervious to break, at other times the actions of one group or actor may cause Congress to follow their lead.

Consequently, tentative answers were found to the questions of how strong or influential a role different actors played. Across all fifteen cases, domestic pressures and the preferences of members of the key committees play the strongest role. The preferences of party leaders is of secondary importance in understanding congressional foreign policy behavior. Finally, the president's role appears to be less than expected.
The president ranks last in overall importance.

This aggregate view masks some important differences. Committee leaders appear to dominate status and human resource cases. In fact, constituency pressures rank last in human resource cases. On the other hand, constituency pressures appear to be of primary importance in territorial and nonhuman resource cases. In the former cases, the preferences of committee leaders have the least impact.

The president's impact is also somewhat stronger than is indicated by the overall rankings. While the impact of the president is least important in status and nonhuman resource cases, in other cases he plays a more decisive role. In territorial cases the president has his strongest impact. Only constituency pressures outrank his influence in such cases, and his actions can lead to supportive stances by party and committee leaders. Further in human resource cases, the president's role seems more influential than that of domestic actors, yet it is outdistanced by the preferences of committee and party leaders in explanatory power. Thus while overall patterns can be discerned for the impact of the variables, considerable changes in these relative impacts seem to occur for different types of issues.

At the broader level, questions were asked about the public's role in foreign policy-making. Does the public have a role? If so, is it passive or assertive? How do public inputs get channeled into the policy-making process?

The conclusion, that constituency pressures vie with the preferences of committee leaders as being the most important factors in explaining congressional foreign policy-making, indicates that the public can play a very strong role in American foreign policy-making. This role may be
totally supportive of the president, as in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty or the Guatemalan intervention. On the other hand, the public may rally against the administration's position and play a decisive role, as is found in the War Powers Resolution, the Bay of Pigs intervention, the Sugar Act, and the Turkish aid cutoff cases. The only safe conclusion, perhaps, is that it is never safe to underestimate the role the public can play.

One must remember that foreign policy-making is an inherently "political" process. Politics do not stop at the water's edge, and public preferences are injected into the policy-making process in any number of ways. The mass public is represented in public opinion surveys, and these polls, if one looks at the Nuclear Test Ban and Defense Appropriations cases, can be decisive in their impact. Interest groups get involved through lobbying, testimony, demonstrations, letter writing campaigns, and newspaper, television and radio advertising. The news media itself gets involved through newspaper editorials. Finally, opinion leaders testify before congressional committees, write pamphlets, send letters-to-the-editor of widely-read newspapers, and send "open letters" to the president. It appears that most, if not all, of the traditional avenues of constituency input into domestic policy-making are also found in foreign policy-making.

This domestic input is significant. It has long been argued that foreign policy is dominated by relatively closed elites.² To the extent that policy is made secretly within the executive branch, that statement may be true. Carroll (1958) is right, however, when he says that sooner or later the administration will need authorizations, appropriations, or general support from Congress. At that point, the public can play a strong
role. Eventually even the most elitist-inspired policies tend to be accepted, modified, or rejected by the people through their representatives on Capitol Hill. Thus from the long view, foreign policy-making appears to be much more "democratic" than Donovan (1974), Kolko (1971), or Mills (1956) would lead one to believe.

In sum, this project builds upon, and goes beyond, some of the earlier works in this area. At the broadest level, some of Robinson's (1962) conclusions seem no longer valid. He is correct when he argues that much congressional activity centers around amending or legitimating executive decisions. However, his arguments that Congress can be important only on procedural issues and that congressional initiatives, when forthcoming at all, tend to deal with less important matters seem to be seriously weakened. It is true that many of the congressional arguments which shaped the outputs in the Mutual Security Act were procedural in nature. But the modification of the administration's position in the Defense appropriations and Panama Canal cases were substantive in nature. In the former, the military budget was slashed, while in the latter American rights regarding the Panama Canal were clarified. Further, the outright rejection of the sugar program significantly damaged U.S.-Latin American relations.

Robinson's conclusion regarding congressional initiatives also deserves a closer look. The Spanish Bases Agreement projected a stronger military role for the U.S. in the Mediterranean. The Bay of Pigs hearings damaged the credibility of Kennedy's decision making process and probably led to its improvement. The Executive Agreements Act and War Powers Resolution restricted the president's freedom of action as commander-in-chief. Finally, the Turkish aid cutoff hurt U.S.-Turkish relations while it
Weakened the eastern flank of NATO. These initiatives did not involve minor matters.

In terms of more specific concerns, different parts of the conceptual framework deserve a brief note. Wildavsky (1962) is correct when he says that contextual factors are important, and this work has shed new light on when and how contextual factors become important. In terms of the party leadership, Froman and Ripley (1970) are correct in saying their victories generally come on procedural, low visibility issues. However, these leaders occasionally stick their necks out on important, visible issues, as they did in the Panama Canal case. The contention by Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1964), Milbrath (1967), and Miller and Stokes (1967) that constituency pressures play only a small role in foreign policy-making seems to be shaken. Constituency pressures seem to play a primary role, especially in territorial and nonhuman resource cases.

Finally, much has been learned about the president's role in this process. The statements by Aspin (1973) and Wildavsky (1971), that presidents tend to get what they want in foreign policy, seem too simplistic. Overall, the president's impact appears to be less than that of domestic actors, key committee leaders, and even party leaders. However, presidents appear significantly stronger, although not dominant, in territorial and human resource cases. Finally, the partisanship arguments by Jewell and Patterson (1966) can tentatively be extended. Their contention, that presidents who push get support from both three-quarters of their own party members and half of the opposition party, seems to hold only for cases resulting in no modification behaviors. These cases indicate that when Congress resists, presidents get more vocal support from the opposition although both parties' support levels drop below one-half. Lastly,
initiatives seem to produce vocal support for the president's position from only one-third of his own party and less than one-fourth of the opposition.
FUTURE RESEARCH

In this work, the selection of a nonrandom sample of cases was dictated by the desire to fully represent the phenomena grouped under the rubric of "congressional foreign policy behavior." Such a practice is useful in general and is particularly appropriate when conducting the first test of a new conceptual framework. However, the weakness of such an approach is two-fold. Due to both the small number of cases examined and the nonrandom nature of their selection, the conclusions are somewhat tentative.

In order to remedy that shortcoming, the next phase of this research project will entail a much larger study. Using the Congressional Quarterly Almanac as a data source, each foreign and defense policy case in the period from 1946 through 1978 will be listed. The list will be considered the population of congressional foreign policy behaviors for that time period. A random sample drawn from the population will be analyzed through the use of nonparametric statistics. The purpose of this research project will be twofold: to further test the existing conceptual framework and to introduce new variables and propositions.

The issue area variable presents a problem. Rosenau's issue areas do not help in explaining foreign policy behavior. Yet issue areas are important since the relative potencies of variables seem to vary across them. Several alternatives thus exist. Rosenau's issue areas could be modified in some way to incorporate controversy, another format could be
adopted from the literature or a completely new format could be developed. Whatever the path chosen, the issue area variable needs polishing.

The dependent variable must be changed as well. Resistance behaviors should be split into two categories, modification and rejection behaviors. These are clearly different in terms of their assertiveness quotient. Such a new dependent variable format should enable greater success at understanding congressional behaviors which fall in the middle ranges of the passive-active continuum.

Given the importance of constituency pressures indicated in these cases, further attention should be devoted to them. For example, the existing constituency variable could be augmented with another which measures constituency activity. Such activity could be classified as low or high. Such a variable would allow two questions to be addressed: is constituency activity increasing over time (due to increased interdependence and a heightened awareness of foreign policy impact), and how do different levels of activity interact with the policy stances of positive, neutral, and negative? Are there patterns in such interactions?

Another new variable concerns committee preferences. A number of committee actors may be involved in any given case. That fact is no problem if the preferences of all the committees are similar. However, in four cases the committees with primary jurisdiction for the matter had positive preferences while other committees involved had negative ones. According to the coding rules, the preferences of the committees with primary jurisdiction were coded. However, these other committee actors served as important cue-givers to members of Congress. They helped legitimize the views of those who did not wish to accept the positive preferences of the committee with primary jurisdiction. As a result, in the Mutual
Security Act and Panama Canal Treaties cases, resistance behaviors were produced. Since currently these committee views are lost, a new variable is needed to capture them. The next phase of the research will rename the existing committee preferences as "primary committee preferences" and a new variable, "secondary committee preferences," will be added. A new proposition could be added which says that when primary and secondary committee preferences are countervailing, the probability of modification behaviors increases.

An additional executive branch variable could be added to cope with agencies which defect from the administration's position. The need for unidirectional executive branch lobbying has long been evident (Carroll, 1958:36-37; Crabb and Holt, 1980:196-198; Rieselbach, 1973:184-185). Yet in both the Spanish bases and Sugar Act cases, relevant administration actors joined congressional forces to thwart the administration's desires. Such occurrences may become even more likely in the future as problems become more complex and more administration actors become involved with each one (Brady, 1978:181; Franck and Weisband, 1979:270-274). A new proposition could be tested which says when relevant executive branch actors express negative preferences toward the administration's position, the probability of no modification behaviors decreases.

An examination of contextual factors suggests a number of other variables. Two revolve around the notion of past precedents. It could be argued that future congressional action will probably mirror prior congressional action on similar issues. Thus, past no modification behaviors could lead to present no modification behaviors in similar cases. The Guatemalan and ABM cases bear this out while, due to its lack of success, the Bay of Pigs case does not. Past modification and rejection behaviors
could lead to present ones as seen in the Mutual Security Act, the Defense appropriation bill, and the Sugar Act failure. Finally, past initiatives could lead to new ones in similar cases as was evidenced in the Executive Agreements Act and the War Powers Resolution.

The other variable based on precedents concerns the proclivity of the administration to repeat past mistakes when dealing with Congress. Avoiding such mistakes could enhance the probability of no modification behaviors as was seen in the Japanese Peace Treaty, the Formosa Resolution, and the ABM authorization. However, an administration which fails to learn from past mistakes courts disaster. Thus the request for an advance open-ended congressional authorization in the Latin American aid case, the claim of executive branch "dominance" over Congress regarding war-powers, and the assertion that national security took precedence over national law regarding Turkish military aid contributed to congressional initiatives in those cases.

Finally, the overall state of executive branch-congressional relations needs to be incorporated as one or a series of variables. When Congress and the president begin feuding over a number of issues at the same time or when many members of Congress say the president is trying to gain unilateral control over governmental policy-making, the administration faces an uphill battle. More assertive behaviors should be the result.

By studying a larger sample of cases, randomly drawn from a larger population, the second phase in this research project will address several important questions. It will serve to double-check the conclusions drawn on the basis of the research presented here. Further, both additional variables and new propositions can be tested. In this manner, the question of what happens when there are many variables with disparate values
can be addressed. Such questions were not testable here due to the small number of both variables and cases examined.
CHAPTER XIX NOTES

1 These eight cases included the Spanish Bases, Bay of Pigs, Defense Appropriations, Executive Agreements, War Powers, Sugar Act, Turkish aid, and Panama Canal cases.

2 See Donovan (1974), Kölko (1971), or Mills (1956) for examples of such works.


4 These cases are the Mutual Security Act, the Test Ban Treaty, the ABM authorization, and the Panama Canal Treaties.
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