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TRANSCENDENTAL MEDITATION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORIC OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT AS INNOVATION

The Ohio State University

PH.D. 1980

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TRANSCENDENTAL MEDITATION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
RHETORIC OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT AS INNOVATION

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
Arthur Joseph Cara, B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University

1980

Reading Committee:
John J. Makay
James L. Golden
Donald J. Cegala

Approved By

John J. Makay
Adviser
Department of Communication
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to express my deep gratitude to those individuals who gave so generously of their time and interest, and without whom, this dissertation could never have been completed.

To Professor John J. Makay, my academic adviser, teacher, and closest friend. Thank you for educating me to the difference between knowledge and wisdom.

To Professor James L. Golden, whose thoughts and actions made me proud of our profession. Thank you.

To Professor Donald J. Cegala, who always encouraged my interdisciplinary impulse when it would have been easier for him not to. Thank you.

To Ms. Eve Boggs, whose administrative assistance and delightful presence made my association with The Ohio State University more enjoyable. Thank you, Eve.

To Ms. Kay Harris, who typed this manuscript. Thank you for your good humor, reliable skill, admirable perseverance, and a "long-distance" working relationship that I will always remember.

To my friend and research assistant, Susan Elaine Trager. Thank you.

To my friends, Rick Bacon, Ellie Kennedy and Debi Bowers. Thank you for always understanding.

To my parents, Mr. Philip M. Cara and Ms. Adeline Cara, to whom this dissertation is dedicated. Thank you for decades of an even deeper, more precious kind of dedication!
VITA

May 12, 1949. ................................ Born - Brooklyn, New York

1972. ........................................... B.A., The University of Dayton
Dayton, Ohio

1974. ........................................... M.A., The University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina

1972-1974 ................................. Teaching Associate, The University
of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina

1974-1980 ................................. Teaching Associate, The Ohio
State University, Columbus, Ohio

1977. ........................................... Undergraduate, Communication
Adviser, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1980. ........................................... Visiting Lecturer, Muskingum
College, New Concorde, Ohio

1980. ........................................... Assistant Professor, University
of Alabama in Birmingham,
Birmingham, Alabama

FIELD OF STUDY

Major Field: Rhetoric and Communication Theory

Studies in Rhetoric. Dr. John J. Makay, Dr. James L. Golden,
and Dr. William R. Brown

Studies in Communication Theory. Dr. Wallace C. Fotheringham,
Dr. Virginia McDermott, Dr. Donald J. Cegala, Dr. Robert R.
Monaghan, Dr. Neal E. Johnson, and Dr. Robert Nofsinger
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In "New Approaches to the Study of Movements: Defining Movements Rhetorically," Robert S. Cathcart ventilates two major criticisms of the contemporary rhetorical movement theory. His initial concern suggests that contemporary definitions of movements are ill-suited to the formulation of an appropriate theory of the rhetoric of social movements. In this connection, Cathcart commends Leland Griffin's seminal movement research, but repudiates his historical approach for its inability to both analyze an incomplete cycle of collective (movement) behavior, and generate a definition which will tell critics reliably, when a movement is a movement.¹

Secondly, he contends that rhetorical critics' heavy dependence on social scientific research has done much to disallow and militate against recent efforts to establish a rhetorical definition of movements.² In this regard, Cathcart villifies social scientific interpretations of movement theory as negligent in their treatment of the dynamic quality of the larger social system, or what is sometimes called the "evolving status quo."³

Cathcart's foregoing criticisms of historical and social scientific approaches to the rhetoric of social movements are well taken. However, still others emerge that warrant even closer scrutiny. One such criticism bores directly into the rhetorical nature of the
"establishment-conflict" school of thought: the key assumption upon which all historical movement theorists (Griffin and Cathcart included) base their claims.

Griffin and Cathcart, for instance, presume that an establishment-conflict underpinning lies at the seat or foundation of all rhetorical movements, as evidenced by Cathcart's claim that every movement is spawned from "a dialectical tension growing out of a moral conflict." This establishment-conflict assumption has inspired other movement theorists like Charles A. Wilkinson, who, in his definition of rhetorical movements, actually paraphrases Cathcart.

"Movements, rhetorically defined," according to Wilkinson, "are 'languageing strategies by which a significantly vocal part of an established society, experiencing together a sustained dialectical tension growing out of moral (ethical) conflict, agitate to induce cooperation in others, either directly or indirectly, thereby affecting the status quo.'"

Thus, Wilkinson, like many architects of rhetorical movement theory, subscribes to the establishment-conflict view of the rhetoric of social movements, where movements are depicted as grand debates between "aggressor" spokespersons, who seek to uproot the moral fiber of established agencies, and "defendant" orators who struggle, conversely, to maintain the status quo. This conceptualization of rhetorical movements is applicable to some movements, yet uncharacteristic of others. Moreover, narrow and prohibitive interpretations of rhetorical movement theory sharply contrast what Albert J. Croft calls the "creative function" of rhetorical criticism.
In "The Functions of Rhetorical Criticism," Croft reminds us that in addition to historical interpretation and critical evaluation, the rhetorical critic must strive creatively to modify and expand rhetorical criticism. The creative reconstitution and extension of the critical province functions to elevate the ethical practice of rhetorical criticism, according to Croft, by freeing it of critical gimmicks and sophistry. In this regard, a slavish allegiance to critical criteria not only tends to force compromises on both the ethics of the critic, and the "virtuous" nature of rhetoric, but often generates ineffectual classificatory criticism, or what Wayne Brockriede calls "nonargument."  

"My objection to classificatory criticism," Brockriede states, "is that [the critic] uses a category system slavishly, determined to force a concrete rhetorical experience into the confines of a closed system, a system that is closed because the critic will not allow himself to discover or create new categories while in the process of analysis. This use of a classificatory scheme is near the nonargument end of the critical continuum, because it involves no inferential leap (or at best a slight one), little if any rationale, no choice (except the forced choice of whether to toss an instance into one bin or another), not much regulation of uncertainty, and very little risk of confrontation."  

In conjunction with Croft's and Brockriede's respective pleas for more creative and argumentative rhetorical criticism, the recently published report of The National Developmental Project on Rhetoric, has articulated a similar proposal emphasizing the continued expansion of rhetorical criticism. The Project's Committee on the Advancement
The effort should be made to expand the scope of rhetorical criticism to include subjects which have not traditionally fallen within the critic's purview. . . . The rhetorical critic has the freedom to pursue his study of subjects with suasive potential or persuasive effects in whatever setting he may find them, ranging from rock music and put-ons, to architecture and public forums, to ballet and international politics.

Ralph R. Smith and Russel R. Windes generate their "innovational" theory of the rhetoric of social movements both in partial recognition of the new scope of rhetorical studies, and in response to the need for more creative, argumentative, and expansionary alternatives to the restrictive establishment-conflict view of rhetorical movements. "The innovational movement is distinct from the establishment-conflict movement," Smith and Windes maintain. "in that the latter calls for a reconstitution of society's values, its perceptions of worth and its class arrangements; whereas the former acts with the expectation that the changes it demands will not disturb the symbols and constraints of existing values or modify the social hierarchy." 10

In other words, innovationalists allow individuals to live according to those values which prevail, and actually reinforce their axiological continuance in society. Establishment-conflict agents, on the other hand, are in dispute with established values, and seek to supplant them with new values which result in new institutions. The distinction which exists between these two schools of thought becomes more evident as the study unfolds.

However, one case in point is the Transcendental Meditation social movement. The rhetoric expressed by the spokesmen of this social collectivity clearly defies the consistently held assumptions
of the establishment-conflict school of thought. Thus, a preeminent claim of this study, and one of its central arguments at once suggests that the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation social movement, though inconsistent with the establishment-conflict view, is consonant with the Smith-Windes innovational rationale for the rhetoric of social movements.

In this regard, my research seeks to "recast" social scientific interpretations of the rhetoric of social movements, and introduce a new rhetorically coded critical lens from which to view the symbolic reality of the Transcendental Meditation social phenomenon. More specifically, the significance of the study is contingent upon how well it responds to three pivotal questions. First, should rhetorical scholars, as Smith and Windes suggest, recognize, at least in some cases, the rhetoric of innovational social movements, and thus allow innovational criticism to assume a useful place in the embryonic corpus of rhetorical movement literature? Secondly, if the rhetoric of innovational social movements is a legitimate consideration, then does a seemingly innovational social collectivity like the Transcendental Meditation movement, reflect the Smith-Windes critical criteria, and thus function to establish innovational criticism's new foothold in the rhetorical movement literature? Finally, after having argued for the legitimacy of the rhetoric of innovational social movements, as well as allegedly having observed this type of mass persuasion within the context of the Transcendental Meditation movement, does a perceivable need exist to reevaluate rhetorical definitions of social movements (like Cathcart's), in order to make room for fresh
perspectives like innovational rhetorical movement criticism?

In the larger view, the study has implication for the rhetorical critic who may query: What are the ontological, epistemological and axiological dimensions of the rhetoric of social realities like the Transcendental Meditation movement? Do certain configurational dimensions of philosophy spawn specific rhetorical genres of social reality? Why does one rhetorical vision overshadow and exhaust a competing vision? And, as Brown suggests in the essay, "Making Present the Past," how do certain social realities like "university," for instance, assume an objective symbolic existence, apart from, and in addition to, its physical reality as a collection of buildings, professors, students, and the like? Answers to the foregoing questions and these auxiliary concerns will be sought in this study, as the rhetorical theorist lays claim to the relatively untouched province of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement.

Review of the Primary Literature of Rhetorical Movement Criticism.

Two diverse perspectives have emerged from rhetorical movement criticism since 1952 when Leland Griffin's seminal essay, "The Rhetoric of Historical Movements," came to print: (1) the establishment-conflict perspective, and (2) the innovational perspective. The former has set the tone for the majority of rhetorical critics interested in the rhetoric of social movements, and has dominated this area for the last quarter of a century. The innovational perspective, however, is relatively new, and has received far less attention than its establishment-conflict counterpart. A brief overview of the establishment-conflict perspective, and its representative studies, will serve to better place
the evolution of rhetorical movement theory into scholastic context. Then we will proceed to an examination of the Smith-Windes innovational perspective, the central focus of our study.

The Establishment-Conflict Perspective. The establishment-conflict interpretation of the rhetoric of social movements first came to print in Leland Griffin's "The Rhetoric of Historical Movements." In this essay, Griffin views rhetorical movements as grand debates between "aggressor" and "defendant" spokesmen. These debates usually unfold in three critical stages, according to the author: (1) inception, (2) rhetorical crisis, and (3) consummation.

Initially, during the stage of inception, a strain or societal imbalance is experienced by potential members of the historical movement. Witnesses of this imperfection in the social system become aggressor spokesmen, who agitate to create a greater awareness of this "exigence" or societal defect. Next, a dialectical tension mounts, as defendant spokesmen emerge to refute the claims of their aggressor counterpart. This dialectic plunges the debate into a state of rhetorical crisis.

Rhetorical crisis epitomizes ideological division, as aggressor and defendant rhetoricians declame point-counterpoint argumentation. Finally, as emotional heat gives way to intellectual light, the debaters' division is consolidated; and the olive branch of consummation emerges to restore rhetorical equilibrium.

Thus, Griffin's three-stage conceptualization of the rhetoric of social movements is less concerned with the effects that individual speeches have on audiences, and places a more generous interest on the
rhetorical patterns and configurations of public discussion which give impetus to the dynamism of social movements. His essay, "The Rhetorical Structure of the New Left Movement: Part I," for instance, is exemplary of this focus.

Here, Griffin traces the rhetorical evolution of a small band of intellectuals (aggressor spokesmen) who challenge the imperialistic foreign policy of governmental agencies (defendant spokesmen). Though the rhetorical cycle admittedly never moves beyond what Griffin described earlier as the period of inception, patterns of discourse become clearly defined, and a dialectical plunge into rhetorical crisis is clearly imminent.

This dialectical enjoinderment between aggressor and defendant spokesmen strongly typifies the establishment-conflict school of thought. Moreover, it has served to inspire the research of at least six leading architects of rhetorical studies, in seven significantly representative essays in the rhetoric of social movements. These authors and respective publications are Robert S. Cathcart in both "New Approaches to the Study of Movements: Defining Movements Rhetorically," and "Movements: Confrontation As Rhetorical Analysis;" J. Robert Cox's "Perspectives on the Rhetorical Criticism of Movements: Antiwar Dissent 1964-1970;" Herbert Simons' essays "Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory of Persuasion for Social Movements," and with coauthors Chesboro and Orr, "A Movement Perspective on the 1972 Presidential Election;" John Waite Bowers and Donovan Ochs' The Rhetoric of Agitation and Control; and Charles A. Wilkinson's "A Rhetorical Definition of Movements."
Robert S. Cathcart. In "New Approaches to the Study of Movements: Defining Movements Rhetorically," Cathcart contends that in the past rhetorical theorists have relied too heavily on social scientific and historical interpretations of social movements. Social scientists like Smelser, Turner, and Killian, for instance, define movements as "uninstitutionalized collectivities that mobilize for action to implement a program for the reconstitution of social norms or values." Definitions of this type fail to acknowledge the presence of an evolving status quo. Historical interpretations of the rhetoric of social movements are, by the same token, equally confining because they only focus on the "past," and consequently, force criticism to wait until a movement has completed a full cycle of rhetorical evolution.

Cathcart is unable to generate an acceptable rhetorical definition of social movements in this article, but does offer some critical criteria for evaluating movements. Drawing his inspiration from Kenneth Burke's pentadic ratios, he encourages movement theorists to use agency-act and agency-scene ratios in order to isolate "immediate correctives (demands of aggressor rhetoricians)" and "reciprocating acts (counter-demands of defendant spokespersons)." A pentadic approach, Cathcart postulates, enables critics to focus on the "dialectical tension growing out of the moral conflict," and achieve an in-depth rhetorical analysis.

The author's clear commitment to the establishment-conflict interpretation of rhetorical movements surfaces once again in "Movements: Confrontation As Rhetorical Form." This sequel to his "New Approaches to the Study of Movements: Defining Movements Rhetorically," argues that "the true movement is a kind of 'agonistic ritual' whose most
distinguishing form is confrontation." Here, Cathcart shifts his emphasis from the notion of "conflict" to the titular term "confrontation," a game plan reminiscent of Kenneth Burke's defection from "persuasion" to "identification" in the Rhetoric of Motives.

Moreover, he contends that rhetorical movements are variously understood by scholars who often mistake "true" movements for mere adjustments to the existing order. Cathcart calls the former "confrontational" movements, and attributes to its adherents the impious rhetoric of corrosion that is used to reject the mystery which preserves the established order. All other types of collective behavior are, according to Cathcart, "managerial" or "reform" movements which use the rhetoric of piety to preserve the mystery of the established order. He then explains why "confrontation" should be considered the sine qua non of true rhetorical movements. In this regard, Cathcart writes:

The enactment of confrontation gives a movement its identity, its substance and its form. No movement for radical change can be taken seriously without acts of confrontation. The system co-opts all actions which do not question the basic order, and transforms them into system messages. Confrontational rhetoric shouts "Stop!" at the system, saying, "You cannot go on assuming you are the true and correct order; you must see yourself as the evil thing you are."

A focus on "confrontation" then, may be the key to identifying true rhetorical movements. "Confrontation as a rhetorical act," Cathcart confirms, "may be as important in its own way as the rhetorical act of identification."
J. Robert Cox. In "Perspectives on the Rhetorical Criticism of Movements: Antiwar Dissent 1964-1970," Cox adopts Lloyd Bitzer's rhetorical conception of "constraints" to formulate a creative situational approach to the assessment of social movements. He employs artistic constraints (like the modes of proof, delivery, and other creations of the rhetor) and inartistic constraints (such as contracts, testimony, and other materials which are extraneous to the facility of the speaker) in an attempt to highlight those obstacles that spokespersons faced during the Vietnam Peace Movement.

Cox argues, in this connection, that the decision-making process was the constraint that antiwar protestors desperately strove to infiltrate. Once conservative factions failed to make the United States Government abandon its Southeast Asian policy, aggressor spokespersons, according to Cox, geared into a more extreme position in order to influence the government's decision-making policy. Mass protest punctuated the symbolic behavior of change agents as the country became a hotbed of social unrest. Some constituencies, according to Cox, were spearheaded by highly credible intellectuals like Norman Mailer and Arthur Schlesinger, who functioned to legitimize many of the movement's claims. Finally, effective message construction was the last significant artistic constraint that aggressor spokespersons needed to address before their efforts to alter American foreign policy would come to fruition.

Herbert W. Simons. In "Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory of Persuasion for Social Movements," Simons presents a leader-centered interpretation of rhetorical movement theory. The locus of concern for most movement leaders, according to Simons, is the reduction and
resolution of rhetorical problems. Leaders are therefore expected to create structure, sell ideologies, and counter harassment generated by the larger societal structure. The problems they encounter on a daily basis necessitate inconsistency in policy-making, and misdirection on peripheral concerns. Whether these leaders assume a moderate, intermediate, or radical stance, Simons suggests that their success is largely predicated on the leader’s ability to formulate "overarching principles" which reinforce decision-making policy.

Martin Luther King, Jr. "epitomized this approach," to use the words of Simons.16 King possessed the facility to speak to the needs of militants and moderates alike, by merely emphasizing higher principles upon which all men agree. In "Black Power Bends Martin Luther King," Robert L. Scott sets forth an excerpt from one of King’s speeches that is exemplary of this "overarching principle" strategy. He writes:

> What is needed is the realization that power without love is reckless and abusive and love without power is sentimental and anemic. Power at its best is love implementing the demands of justice, and justice at its best is power correcting everything that stands against love.17

Love, power, and justice, though variously understood, are principles that function to strike a central chord in the orchestration of all human behavior. King used them to consolidate Black division, and enhance the ideologies of the civil rights movement. In "A Movement Perspective on the 1972 Presidential Election," Cheseboro, Orr, and Simons depict how George McGovern was less inspired in this regard.

Cheseboro, Orr, and Simons contend that George McGovern lost the 1972 Presidential election because he failed to assume a "centrist" position of leadership. In this regard, moderates who could have been
potential McGovernites, felt that McGovern was too closely identified with the radical concerns of the "New Left" to take him seriously.

Cheseboro, Orr, and Simons claim that it would have been to McGovern's advantage to attack the "New Left," because the strident and uncompromising nature of that movement would have made McGovern appear to be a brakeman holding back an angry tide. But even if McGovern had won, the movement stood to lose when one takes into consideration the fact that politicians must stand in the political center of every ideological scale in order to succeed!

John Waite Bowers and Donovan Ochs. In The Rhetoric of Agitation and Control Bowers and Ochs define rhetoric as the rationale of instrumental symbolic behavior. Aggressor spokespersons employ the rhetoric of agitation through strategical maneuvers like promulgation, consolidation, polarization, and escalation to achieve their goals. Defendant spokespersons, on the other hand, use the rhetoric of control in avoidance, suppression, adjustment, and capitulation, to respond to the claims of aggressor spokespersons.

Rhetorical movements can be divided into two types, according to Bowers and Ochs: (1) those that involve vertical deviance, and (2) movements of lateral deviance. Spokespersons of the former, subscribe to the values that already exist in society, but seek to re-distribute societal power and benefits. Spokespersons of the latter, are anti-establishment, and militate against the values of the status quo.

Martin Luther King's philosophy of "civil disobedience", for example, is consistent with vertical deviance, and Tom Hayden's involvement with the Students for a Democratic Society and Student Mobilization Front
typifies lateral deviance.

Charles A. Wilkinson: The research that constitutes "A Rhetorical Definition of Movements," represents, according to Wilkinson, a direct response to Robert Cathcart's call for a "rhetorical" definition of movements. Tracing the history of rhetorical movement theory from its early origins to the contemporary period, Wilkinson formulates the following rhetorical definition of movements by combining elements of past definitions with Cathcart's research, in addition to generating several theoretical corollaries of his own: "[M]ovements, rhetorically defined, are 'languaging strategies by which a significantly vocal part of an established society, experiencing together a sustained dialectical tension growing out of moral (ethical) conflict, agitate to induce cooperation in others, either directly or indirectly, thereby affecting the status quo.'"¹⁸

The significance of this rhetorical definition pivots on the term "languaging." Wilkinson highlights the strong connection that exists between this conceptualization of "languaging," and the essentially rhetorical nature of movements.

Movements are not "mere motions" of being. They are always acts of man, "the symbol using (making, mis-using) animal," and therefore "languaging" strategies. However, in themselves, because they are "always" languaging strategies, all movements are essentially rhetorical "in nature."¹⁹

Thus, Wilkinson's rhetorical definition of rhetorical movements appears to earmark the proverbial state of the art of the establishment-conflict school of thought. His contribution to the rhetoric of social movements will be addressed at length later on in our study.
In summation then, the research of Griffin, Cathcart, Cox, Simons, Bowers and Ochs, and Wilkinson have served to orient the reader to the major establishment-conflict studies in rhetorical movement criticism. Moreover, the input of other rhetorical theorists will also be introduced as the study progresses.20

The Smith-Windes Innovational Theory. In The Rhetoric of Agitation and Control Bowers and Ochs make an important distinction between two types of agitation which functions to lend clarity to the Smith-Windes interpretation of movement theory. They describe the agitation of "vertical deviance" as occurring when spokespersons adhere to the value system of the establishment, but dispute the distribution of benefits or power within that particular system. The agitation of "lateral deviance," on the other hand, according to Bowers and Ochs, when speakers call into question the values that the societal system upholds. The following examples help to put the foregoing distinction into proper perspective.

Vertical deviance occurs when persons in a subordinate rank attempt to enjoy the privileges and prerogatives of those in superior rank. Thus, the ten-year-old who sneaks behind the garage to smoke is engaging in vertical deviance, as is the four-year-old who drives... despite being too young... .

Lateral deviance occurs in a context in which the values of the non-deviant are rejected. The pot-smoking seventeen-year-old, wearing Benjamin Franklin eyeglasses and an earring, does not share his parents' definition of the good life. Whereas value consensus characterizes vertical deviance, there is a certain kind of value dissensus involved in lateral deviance.21
It is therefore, only the agitation of "lateral deviance" (anarchy) that is consistent with the establishment-conflict interpretation of rhetorical movements discussed earlier. "Collective action is a rhetorical movement," Cathcart argues, "only when it 'cannot be accommodated within the normal movement of the status quo.'" But what may be said of collective action that can be accommodated within the normal movement of the status quo? Does not also a need exist for criticism which recognizes an alternative rhetoric of social movements. One that is more consistent with the strategy of "vertical deviance," where spokesmen unite, not to disrupt established commitments to right action, but rather to sustain or strengthen existing systems of value.

The Smith-Windes' approach to the rhetoric of social movements represents one such response to this need for an alternative mode of rhetorical movement criticism. Its recognition of innovational rhetoric serves to militate against the wanton entrenchment of one way of looking at rhetorical movements, by creating a critical environment where the analyst is no longer forced to pass over examples of mass persuasion which are inconsistent with establishment-conflict criticism. Moreover, innovational criticism is similarly preventive medicine for those unsuspecting critics who might unwittingly distort the true nature of a rhetorical movement in order to accommodate the ascendant critical mode.

Thus, the Smith-Windes' theory of the rhetoric of social movements lodges a plea for a less prohibitive approach to rhetorical movement criticism. Three critical criteria reflect this innovational
The "Facts" dimension of innovational criticism serves to
differentiate the rhetoric of social movements from that of other
forms of collective behavior. Innovational "Values," at least for
now, refer back to our foregoing distinction between lateral and
vertical deviance, applied to the rhetoric of social movements.
Finally, the "Goals" criterion of the Smith-Windes model centers
on the policy or objective of innovational rhetorical movements.

**Facts.** Smith and Windes contend that innovational and establish-
ment-conflict rhetorical movements share four basic facts: (1) a
goal of social change through (2) group action which (3) must fulfill
rhetorical requirements by (4) creating drama. The first two facts
serve to differentiate "movements" from self-expressive or individual
acts of persuasion. The pamphleteering of a single doomsday agent on
a busy Manhattan street corner, for example, is certainly not exemplary
of a rhetorical movement.

The latter two facts invoke rhetoric to (1) modify behavior in
the direction of their goal, (2) respond to the resistance of the
larger structure, and (3) generate drama. A case in point, is the
1968 Peace Movement where aggressor spokespersons coalesced in New
York, Chicago, Washington, D.C., and Berkeley to construct a symbolic
scenario against U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, replete with
heroes, villains, and intermediaries.

**Values.** A focus on societal values underscores the major dissimilarity
which exists between the rhetoric of innovational and establish-
ment-conflict movements. The former, as an exemplar of "vertical deviance,"
modifies institutions by promoting the self-actualization of its exponents, or by reinforcing a continued allegiance to existing values. This view stands in sharp contrast to the establishment-conflict philosophy of "lateral deviance," where the social upheaval of axiological applecarts is deliberately sought so as to spawn new institutions.24

Innovational rhetorical movements may therefore be described as largely "softsell" in their efforts to persuade, and seek the modification of established institutions in ways that are consistent with conventional values. The cattleman who replaces his trusty cutting pony with a more efficient four-wheel drive jeep, for instance, does not wish to extirpate the beef industry, but rather seeks to improve and perpetuate it. Establishment-conflict movements are, conversely, more typical of a "hardsell" campaign, insofar as they militate against the values held by the status quo. The Abolition Movement in our American ante-bellum period, for instance, is exemplary of this latter consideration, where zealous orators would articulate diatribes like the following by abolitionist, William Lloyd Garrison:

"I am aware that many object to the severity of my language; but is there not cause for severity? I will be as harsh as truth and as uncompromising as justice."25

Thus, the symbolic behavior of the anarchist is usually associated with the aim of establishment-conflict spokespersons, who seek ultimately to supplant existing social norms and values. Innovationalists strive, on the other hand, to strengthen and reinforce existing value systems.

Policy. Unlike establishment-conflict aggressor spokespersons who thrive on societal disruption, innovational orators neither seek to call attention to division nor look to infuse themselves with guilt. Instead, they strive to (1) deny the existence of conflict between their proposed innovation and the values of society; (2) emphasize the weakness of traditional institutions and the strength of traditional values; and (3) create a dialectic between the innovational scene and its purpose.

Smith and Windes contend that the least estrangement from established societal values will inevitably lead to a rapid withering away of any innovational movement. Not only must this type of social collectivity eschew conflict with dominant groups in society, but with radical groups as well. Criticism from such groups might evoke controversy, and thus violate the innovational movement's vow to uphold established value systems.

Innovational movements, according to Smith and Windes, must center on the weakness of traditional institutions, and the strength of traditional values. Though innovationalists are committed to the re-assessment of institutions and the exposition of areas that evidence "exigence" or need for modification, discretion is always exercised, for overly strong criticisms could smack of anarchy, and lead to a quick withering away of the movement. 26

If innovational spokesmen are successful in their efforts to deny the existence of conflict between their proposed innovation and societal values, and are equally triumphant in their exposition of the weaknesses of old institutions and the strengths of traditional values, then,
neither a dependent spokesperson, nor a dialectic between opponent orators will occur. Their dramatic imperative, then, must find its source in the creation of a dialectic between the movement's purpose, and some "nonpersonal" agency in the scene. This need is quickly met in the form of a "rhetorical vision."

A rhetorical vision is a symbolic reality that imbues a collectivity of people with a sense of purpose. The Puritans' existence in Colonial New England is exemplary of this social phenomenon. Ernest Bormann explains how a rhetorical vision enabled these early settlers to endure their bucolic lifestyle:

The daily routine of the people was one of back-breaking drudgery. The niceties of life were almost nonexistent; music, the arts, decoration of home or clothing, largely unavailable. A discursive description of the emigration and the daily externals of life would be very grim. But the Puritans of Colonial New England led an internal fantasy life of mighty grandeur and complexity. They participated in a rhetorical vision that saw the migration to the new world as a holy exodus of God's chosen people. The Biblical drama that supported their vision was that of the journey of the Jews from Egypt into Canaan.27

The "personae" in the Puritans' rhetorical vision were impersonal scenic elements rather than personal agents. Nature, hard work, and the like, continually tested the visceral fortitude and moral strength of the Puritan's rhetorical vision. The dramatic agents of innovational movements, unlike establishment-conflict collectivities, are similarly mute, for no aggressor spokesperson will emerge to refute their condemnations.
Our introduction to the Smith-Windes innovational theory of the rhetoric of social movements broadly defines the nature of innovational movements. The criterial dimensions of Facts, Values, and Policy are developed in a more in-depth manner as the study progresses, but for now, this brief preview of the innovational perspective has enabled us to establish both a relationship, and a point of departure with the establishment-conflict interpretation of the rhetoric of social movements. Now we proceed to an introductory examination of the Transcendental Meditation movement.

The Transcendental Meditation Movement. Contrary to popular belief, meditation is not a strictly Eastern discipline, but was developed during different periods in both Eastern and Western cultures. It existed in India in the sixth century B.C., flourished in medieval monasteries, and Mideastern deserts in the fifth to twelfth centuries, in Japan during the tenth century, amid the peoples of eighteenth century Poland and Russia, and in a wide variety of other periods and locales. In fact, the clearest meditation manuals were written in the West, and include The Philokalia (the Greek Orthodox tradition), The Way of Perfection by St. Theresa of Avila, and Evelyn Underhill's Practical Mysticism.28

The arrival of the first Eastern Swami (the Sanskrit word for lord or master) to the United States occurred in 1893. A witty and courageous monk named Vivekananda founded the American Vedanta Society in that same year.29 Interest in Eastern philosophy in general, and meditation in particular remained dormant in the U.S. until the early '60's, except for a minor resurgence after World
War II prompted by the novels of J. D. Salinger, and rudimentary research on the physiological effects of meditation in the '50's by Indian and European physicians.\textsuperscript{30}

However, in 1959 a diminutive Hindu guru arrived in New York City propagating an ancient technique for creating inner peace, which he called "Transcendental Meditation." Not much was known about the mysterious Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, except for a scant biographical sketch of the monk compiled by Time magazine researchers.

He was born in India's Central province some time around 1918 (he refuses to give his age) into the Kshatrzize or warrior caste. In 1940 he took a degree in physics at Allahabad University. He decided however, to seek enlightenment in a less scientific and more orthodox Indian way; he spent 13 years, from 1940 to 1953, with Guru Dev, a swami who left home at the age of nine to seek enlightenment. Guru Dev revived a lost meditation technique that organized in the Vedas, the oldest Hindu writings. According to one legend, Guru Dev charged the Maharishi with a mission: to find a technique that would enable the masses to meditate. The Maharishi hid away in the Himalayas for two years. When he emerged he started the TM movement.\textsuperscript{31}

Despite the Maharishi's wide acceptance abroad, he was not well-received on his initial visit to the United States. Americans stereotyped him as just another pop hero of a fad movement that would eventually go the same route as hula-hoops and DA haircuts. Maharishi responded to such criticisms in an emphatic manner: "It is very hard for people there, I think, to believe that tensions can be removed. They laugh. Who will believe in New York that this is possible?"\textsuperscript{32}

The Beatles' audience with the Maharishi in 1965 sparked a new American interest in Transcendental Meditation. It was a detached interest, however, and had little impact upon the public mind, until
the Beatles released their "Magical Mystery Tour" LP in early December of 1967. The Beatles' Eastern sounds revolutionized American pop music, and established a new "corporate Karma" that could no longer go unrecognized. In songs from this album like "Fool on a Hill," Beatles' Lennon and McCartney sing of a detached observer, a yogin, who meditates and watches the world spin.

Day after day, alone on a hill, the man with a foolish grin is perfectly still. But nobody wants to know him, they can see that he's just a fool, as he never gives an answer. But the fool on the hill sees the sun going down. And the eyes in his head see the world spinning round.33

In "I am the Walrus," the Beatles punctuate the yogin's discourse with vedic thought drawn verbatim from the Bhagavad-Gita (i.e., the Celestial Song of Hindu Theology).

I am he/ as you are he/ as you are me/ and we are all/ together. See how they run/ like pegs from a gun/ see how they fly./ I'm crying. I am the eggman/ they are the eggmen/ I am the walrus."34

The Beatles helped to usher the Transcendental Meditation Movement into the '70's, and in only eight years Transcendental Meditation seems to be on its way to becoming an American pastime. So far, Transcendental Meditation has helped Joe Namath play football, the Philadelphia Phillies play baseball, Peggy Lee and Steve Wonder sing, Tony Curtis act, and Doug Henning do tricks in "The Magic Show." Merv Griffin, a TMer, devoted two shows to its benefits; after the first, the number of new Transcendental Meditation converts doubled across the U.S., from 15,000 a month to 30,000. In New York City, 1,872 people a month take the Transcendental Meditation course. The organization has 380 centers nationwide, owns a printing establishment and
TV station in Los Angeles, and has purchased the old Farsons College in Iowa and renamed it Maharishi International University.35

Some suggest that the Transcendental Meditation movement has overshadowed the semantic province of the McDonald's slogan "you deserve a break today," and invested it with new meaning. While the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi's appearances on television and the college lecture circuit, celebrity endorsement, and program diffusion have undoubtedly contributed to the growth of Transcendental Meditation, six books in particular have been partly responsible for its undaunted acceptance into the American mainline.

Transcendental Meditation by the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi was originally published in 1966 under the title, The Science of Being and Art of Living. The work is primarily an amalgam of Indian learning, teaching, and wisdom that centers on the spirituality of humankind. The Maharishi draws his inspiration from the five-thousand-year-old Hindu gospel known as the Bhagavad-Gita (the Celestial Song of Hindu theology). Known at first to only a few Westerners interested in the esoteric writings on Eastern thought, Transcendental Meditation was the first popular volume to espouse the Transcendental Meditation philosophy.

Nine years after the publication of Transcendental Meditation, a second volume on this technique came to print. The New York Times touted the arrival of TM: Discovering Inner Energy and Overcoming Stress as "a persuasive work with much to recommend it."36 The work was composed by Harold H. Bloomfield, a psychiatrist-Transcendental Meditation teacher, and a team of TM-trained social scientific
co-authors. These Transcendental Meditation advocates amass an impressive battery of experimental research that serves to lend support to the therapeutic value of Transcendental Meditation. It was probably this volume above all others that gave Transcendental Meditation the credibility it needed in order to flourish in the United States.

Free of the web of behavioristic jargon one encounters in *TM: Discovering Inner Energy and Overcoming Stress*, is an imaginative, highly readable publication called the *TM Book*. Its authors, Denniston, McWilliams, and Geller, all teachers of this technique, use entertaining cartoons to sell the Transcendental Meditation line. The direct question and answer format in concert with enjoyable illustrations make the *TM Book* delightfully informative reading.

Patricia Drake Hemingway's *The Transcendental Meditation Primer* is far less ambitious than the Bloomfield volume, but considerably more clinical than the entertaining *TM Book*. Its "gossipy" collection of case histories and personal testimony echo the recurrent theme: "Try it, you'll like it!" Hemingway's research falls noticeably short of rigorous academic standards, and one is never certain that her findings have not been skewed in the direction of the author's expectations.

A reliable researcher, and one of the few critics of Transcendental Meditation is Una Kroll, a British physician. In *The Healing Potential of Transcendental Meditation* Dr. Kroll contends that Transcendental Meditation does relieve stress, but at the same time, calls into question its virtuous nature, the tendency it has to become a
religious experience, and the acritical attitude that Transcendental Meditation adherents seem to adopt.

Finally, in the best tradition of Kroll, is Harvard's Herbert Benson, research cardiologist, and pioneering critic of Transcendental Meditation research. In The Relaxation Response he explains that the "mantra" or Sanskrit word used to induce Transcendental Meditation, is nothing more than a physical phenomenon called "parasympathetic dominance" (calming down). The state can be invoked by any number of techniques, from thinking the number "one" to reciting a simple prayer. Benson appears to think that Transcendental Meditation is less a matter of esoteric Eastern philosophy and more a product of normative human physiology.

In summation, then, Transcendental Meditation, TM: Discovering Inner Energy and Overcoming Stress, The TM Book, The Transcendental Meditation Primer, The Healing Potential of Transcendental Meditation, and The Relaxation Response represent the primary Transcendental Meditation literature that have helped to transform an obscure Himalayan meditative practice into a new American pastime. Other secondary publications have also contributed to the growth of this social movement, and will be cited as our study progresses.

Methods and Procedures

Our study takes two methodological perspectives. The ascendant methodology is rhetorical criticism, because the thrust of our study bears directly on the critical recodification of the Smith-Windes innovational theory of the rhetoric of social movements. Moreover, the critical application of the innovational perspective to the
rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement serves to further point up the psychological preeminence of this first methodological perspective in our research.

In this regard, our study also adopts, in a secondary capacity, the methodological perspective of non-experimental empiricism. Just as the philological studies conducted in Linguistics, for example, are inspired by an empirical, but non-experimental design, our research is similarly classified as quasi-empirical in nature. Here, the critical analysis of data collected from standardized interview questions, administered in a systematic fashion, as well as naturalistic or participatory observations made as a student enrolled in the basic Transcendental Meditation program, serve to set forth this latter methodological classification.

Five research procedures are embodied within the methodological perspectives of rhetorical criticism and non-experimental empiricism. These are: (1) To establish the reliability of the Smith-Windes innovational perspective as a reliable mode of rhetorical criticism; (2) Compose critical constructs from the innovational criteria, and use these constructs to generate interview questions about the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement; (3) Enlist the services of five competent judges to evaluate the critical validity of the interview questions; (4) Conduct interviews with five Transcendental Meditation teachers, and two practitioners of the technique; and (5) Critically recodify the Smith-Windes innovational theory of rhetorical criticism, then apply this criticism to the composite of data collected (i.e., the responses to the interview questions, information drawn from
the Transcendental Meditation literature, and participatory observations made as a student enrolled in the basic Transcendental Meditation program); and use these findings to address the study's research questions.

Reliability. In Foundations of Behavioral Research, Fred C. Kerlinger observes that the primary concern for reliability in behavioral science stems from "the necessity for dependability in measurement." Insofar as both rhetorical criticism and behavioral science strive for precision and consistency, in their respective modes of measurement, the foregoing observation is as relevant to the former consideration, as it is to the latter one.

In this regard, then, it could be argued that the Smith-Windes innovational theory of the rhetoric of social movements is no less concerned with the reliability of measurement in its corresponding mode of rhetorical criticism, than the logical-positivistic techniques of behavioral science. Therefore, the forthcoming discussion argues that the Smith-Windes innovational perspective represents a more reliable index of critical measurement than its establishment-conflict counterpart, when applied to the rhetoric of seemingly innovational social movements, like the Transcendental Meditation movement.

Interview Questions. Three criterial constructs have been created to represent the Smith-Windes innovational theory of the rhetoric of social movements: (1) Facts; (2) Value; and (3) Policy. The innovational criteria were employed to generate the following interview questions:

1. Does Transcendental Meditation ultimately seek to change
society in some way? (Facts - social change).

2. In view of the many Transcendental Meditation lecturers who disseminate information at introductory sessions as well as the Maharishi's individual efforts on the lecture circuit, would you consider such behavior to be indicative of group action? (Facts - group action).

3. What are the intentions of Transcendental Meditation spokes­men at introductory lectures? (Facts - rhetorical requirements).

4. Are the Transcendental Meditation introductory lectures delivered in such a way that the audience perceives alternatives to practicing this technique? (Facts - rhetorical requirements).

5. What role does Transcendental Meditation play in the crisis of modern life? (Facts - drama).

6. Do Transcendental Meditation adherents seek to change or modify the existing values of Western society? If so, how do they intend to do this? (Values).

7. Do Transcendental Meditation advocates deny the existence of conflict between their proposed innovation (Transcendental Medita­tion) and the values of Western society? (Facts - drama) (Values) (Policy).

8. In the past people have sought to minimize stress by psycho­therapy, drugs, hobbies, and other traditional Western institutions. Why should a person choose Transcendental Meditation over these more established methods of reducing stress? (Values) (Policy).

9. Does Transcendental Meditation emphasize or reinforce the strength of traditional Western values? If so, how? (Values) (Policy).
10. Describe how Transcendental Meditation is related to both its immediate aim of minimizing stress, and its long-range goal of happiness. (Policy).

11. Some religious groups suggest that Transcendental Meditation is an Eastern religion, have Transcendental Meditation adherents taken a stand on this issue? (Policy) (Values).

12. Harvard's Herbert Benson and Leon Otis of Arizona State University purport that much of the experimental findings of Transcendental Meditation researchers are inadequate, unsubstantiated, or too preliminary to be conclusive. Have Transcendental Meditation experimentalists addressed themselves to these claims? (Policy).

13. Do Transcendental Meditation teachers reinforce statements made earlier by lecturers at the introductory sessions? (Policy).

Validity. The problem of validity in research is often expressed by the logical-positivistic question, "Are we measuring what we think we are measuring?" In this regard, it is important to the validity of the present study that the thirteen interview questions reflect the Smith-Windes criterial constructs.

Our answer to the question of validity unfolds as five judgments generated by an expert panel of innovational rhetorical critics. After carefully examining the study's interview questions, they unanimously agreed that the questions accurately reflected the critical criteria of the Smith-Windes innovational theory of the rhetoric of social movements. Then, having constructed valid critical representations of innovational content, we proceeded to conduct the interview sessions.
Interviews and Critical Recodification. Forty-nine pages of transcript were typed from seven, thirty to forty-five minute interviews with five Transcendental Meditation teachers and two practitioners of the technique. The interview sessions were conducted from February 28, 1976 to March 5, 1976.

This transcript was then used in concert with information drawn from the Transcendental Meditation literature, and participatory observations made as a student enrolled in the basic Transcendental Meditation program (from February 15 - 16, and March 4 - 8, 1976) in order to generate a representative sample of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement. Finally, a recodified Smith-Winches critical tool was constructed, and applied to this sample in response to the study's research questions.

Briefly then, we said earlier that the establishment-conflict view of the rhetoric of social movements, the school of thought which has dominated rhetorical movement criticism for the last quarter of a century, does not speak to the rhetoric of all social movements. The rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement, for example, clearly defies the most consistently held assumptions of the establishment-conflict perspective.

Though untypical of the rhetoric of establishment-conflict social movements, our study argues that the rhetoric of social phenomenon like the Transcendental Meditation movement is consonant with the Smith-Winches innovational perspective. In this regard, the forthcoming discussion seeks to recast social scientific interpretations of the rhetoric of social movements by introducing a new rhetorically coded
lens from which to view the symbolic reality of the Transcendental Meditation movement. However, the rhetorical significance of our study hinges, more specifically, on how well its chapters respond to three pivotal questions.

Left largely unexamined by rhetorical critics who have traditionally held an uncompromising allegiance to the establishment-conflict perspective, Chapter Two argues, in this connection, for a scholastic re-assessment of the Smith-Windes innovational theory of the rhetoric of social movements. In doing so, it constitutes a broad response to our study's first question, "Should rhetorical scholars, as Smith and Windes suggest, recognize at least in some cases, the rhetoric of innovational social movements, and thus allow innovational criticism to assume a useful place in the embryonic corpus of rhetorical movement literature?"

The answer to this question requires a three-fold examination of: (1) Behavioristic Theory, (2) The Philosophic Foundations of Rhetoric, and (3) A Dramaturgical Perspective. Here, the findings of this examination seek to "recast" the critical lens of the Smith-Windes perspective, and thus re-create a more philosophically viable and therefore critically acceptable theory of innovational criticism.

In this regard, Chapter Three proceeds to apply this recodified critical perspective to an alleged example of the innovational rhetoric of a social movement. More specifically, our critical examination centers on the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement in the United States, and can be depicted as constituting a broad response to our study's second question, "If the rhetoric of innovational social
movements is a legitimate consideration, then does a seemingly innovational social collectivity like the Transcendental Meditation Movement reflect the Smith-Windes critical criteria and thus function to establish innovational criticism's new foothold in the rhetorical movement literature?"

Once again, the answer to this question requires a three-fold application of the critical dimensions established in the recodified Dramaturgical Perspective presented in Chapter Two. Here, the triadic elements of fact, policy, and value, stemming from their respective philosophical causestries of Ontology, Epistemology, and Axiology constitute the dialectical substance of our criticism.

Chapter Four, then, uses the findings of the previous chapters to reformulate Wilkinson's definition of the rhetoric of social movements. In doing so, it seeks an answer to our study's last research question, "After having argued for the legitimacy of the rhetoric of innovational social movements, as well as allegedly having observed this type of mass persuasion within the context of the Transcendental Meditation movement, does a perceivable need exist to re-evaluate rhetorical definitions (like Cathcart's), in order to make room for fresh perspectives like innovational rhetorical movement criticism?"

Finally, Chapter Five summarizes the conclusions reached in the previous chapters. Moreover, it sets forth the implications of these findings for the future of rhetorical movement criticism.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter One


2. Ibid., p. 84.

3. Ibid., p. 85.

4. Ibid., p. 87.


sufficient depth. In this regard, I intend to rework the Smith-Windes theory and generate a more exacting tool of rhetorical analysis:


13. Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950), p. xiv. In this volume Burke features "identification" rather than "persuasion" commenting, "'Persuasion' in the traditional sense...is not an accurate fit for describing the ways in which the members of a group promote social cohesion by acting rhetorically upon themselves and one another. The term 'identification' tends to humanize the conscious and unconscious agreements between men."


15. Ibid., p. 247.


19. Ibid., p. 92.

20. The following doctoral dissertations were read before the review of the primary literature was composed: (1) Charles Wilkinson, "The Rhetoric of Movements: Definition and Methodological Approach, Applied to the Catholic Anti-War Movement in the United States," Diss. Northwestern Univ., 1974.; and (2) James Robert Cox, Jr., "The Rhetorical Structure of Mass Protest: A Criticism of Select Speeches of the Vietnam Antiwar Movement," Diss. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 1973. However, their import for my research was largely articulated in the respective articles of these authors cited earlier, and the dissertations were therefore not directly reviewed. In this regard, other rhetorical movement theses and dissertations reviewed by this writer failed to evidence any direct bearing on the tenor of my research, and were similarly excluded. Moreover, several rhetorical movement articles, not directly cited in the primary review, were read prior to its


23. The distinction being drawn here is similar to the one made by Neil J. Smelser in The Theory of Collective Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1962) between the "norm-oriented movement." The establishment-conflict movement does not perpetuate present values as in the case of the latter.

24. Ralph R. Smith and Russel R. Windes make this distinction on p. 143: "The innovational movement is distinct from the establishment-conflict movement in that the latter calls for a reconstitution of society's values, its perceptions of worth and its class arrangements; whereas the former acts with the expectations that the changes it demands will not disturb the symbols and constraints of existing values or modify the social hierarchy."


26. The idea of "exigence" or situation that is other than it should be, is discussed in Lloyd Bitzer's "The Rhetorical Situation," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 1 (1968), pp. 1-14.


34. Ibid., p. 55.


37. Judith Greene, *Psycholinguistics: Chomsky and Psychology* (Maryland: Penguin Education Ltd., 1972), p. 104. Here I am paraphrasing psycholinguist Judith Greene in an attempt to construe her Humean interpretation of Empiricism where all knowledge is believed to be derived directly through our sense perceptions in a random manner, as opposed to the carefully "controlled" empiricism of the scientific method. In this regard, the data for the research at hand will be collected from the Transcendental Meditation interviews, participation in the Transcendental Meditation program, and exposure to the Transcendental Meditation literature. The analysis of this diversity of data is therefore empirical, but non-experimental in design.


40. The five innovative movement critics consisted of Dr. John J. Makay, who teaches a social movements course, and four doctoral candidates who had enrolled in Professor Makay's course, and thus, were quite familiar with the Smith-Windes Innovative Theory. Those selected were Ronald Springhorn, Sydel Sokowitz, Wayne Ray, and Janet Ruben.

41. The interview sessions were conducted at the following locations using these subjects:

- 1818 West Lane
  - TM teachers - Kathy Sitherling, Robert Argo, Jim Gardiner, and Mike Sugarman

- 150 East Lane
  - TM teacher - Hal Goldstein
  - TM practitioner - Jane Rosenbloom

- Derby Hall (OSU)
  - TM practitioner - Donald J. Cegala
42. Denise Denniston, Peter McWilliams, and Barry Geller, The TM Book (Michigan: Three Rivers Press, 1975), p. 35. Transcendental Meditation is defined in this study as "a simple, natural, effortless process that allows the mind to experience subtler and subtler levels of the thinking process until thinking is transcended and the mind comes into direct contact with the source of thought."
CHAPTER TWO
AN INNOVATIONAL ALTERNATIVE IN
RHETORICAL MOVEMENT CRITICISM

The Smith-Windes innovational theory of the rhetoric of
social movements has not been received uncritically by tradition-
alists. Like fixed brakemen against an angry tide, entrenched ad-
vocates of the establishment-conflict school of thought continue to
disallow and militate against this alternative mode of rhetorical
criticism.

A clear case in point is the commentary which follows. It was
composed by a tradition-bound critic of the rhetoric of social move-
ments in response to a manuscript this writer submitted for publica-
tion in an academic journal. The telling tone of the author’s criti-
cism depicts well the severity of the dilemma faced by innovational
critics. He writes:

One of my main concerns of this manuscript is
the same one I have about the Smith-Windes
article it is based upon. I think both beat
a misidentified straw man to death. Cathcart,
Griffin and others have written about "social
movements" as delineated by social psycholo-
gists. The examples they have studied clearly
fall under the classification of social move-
ments such as defined by Simons. In my opinion
Smith and Windes, and this author are using the
word "movement" in a broad sense, which is fine,
except that they fail to recognize the true na-
ture of what others have written about it. Even
in "innovational" movements, however, I would
suspect the movement meets with some opposition.
If so, it is not very far from the theories
recently explained by Cathcart and Griffin. I would suggest that the author of this manuscript delete the diatribe against Cathcart and Griffin and the effort to establish a theory of innovative movements and get to work on a careful analysis of the TM movement.

An intransigent traditionalism punctuates the grammar of this criticism. Its author first indicts Smith, Windes, and this writer on the speculation that innovationists employ propagandistic gimmicks like the "strawman" technique in order to legitimize innovative criticism. In doing so, he submits the smug implication that establishment-conflict advocates need not resort to sophistry in order to establish the worth of "their" claims.

The critic next advances to an equally suspicious cavil with his suggestion that if social psychologists have not addressed innovative social movements, then it follows logically that examples of this type of social phenomenon are too insignificant to warrant the attention of rhetorical criticism. Moreover, the discovery of an alternative view of the rhetoric of social movements by innovationists is depicted by the author as a "failure" on the part of its discoverers "to recognize the true nature" of traditional rhetorical movement research.

It is transparently clear toward the end of the critique, that his traditional binding has created in the critic an infirm understanding of the Smith-Windes perspective. The authors of innovational theory, for instance, carefully word the distinction which they make between the rhetoric of innovational and establishment-conflict social movements, so that their meaning will not be variously understood.
In this regard, Smith and Windes, knowing full well that infallibility is not a human trait, introduce into their distinction the pivotal term "expectation," to qualify their claim that innovational spokesmen are not met with opposition. The authors include this qualifier in their distinction, in partial recognition of those occasional pockets of opposition which may "unexpectedly" arise on the innovational scene.

Thus, the critic's indictment of innovational theory on the grounds that he "suspects" innovational social movements are occasionally met with opposition, is completely ill-founded in light of the foregoing information. Moreover, it only serves to obviate his inability to apprehend Smith and Windes precautionary measures.

Finally, the critic's unmistakably establishment-conflict bearing comes to full view when he boldly "suggests" that this writer relinquish his commitment to innovational theory, and direct his efforts at a "careful" analysis of the Transcendental Meditation Movement. Thus, submitting the recurrent implication that this writer would do well to opt for a more traditional (establishment-conflict) mode of rhetorical criticism.\(^2\)

The traditional stance of this establishment-conflict critic of the rhetoric of social movements is representative in one sense, and yet unique in another. It is representative in the sense that ideological clashes between traditional and progressive schools of thought are commonplace in scholarship. Indeed, most scholars would agree that a willingness to risk confrontation with one's colleagues is paramount to intellectual ground breaking.\(^3\)
However, the critic's commentary is also unique insofar as it is unrepresentative of rhetorical movement critics who have not in recent years been true to their academic vow to risk confrontation. Blinded by an uncompromising allegiance to the establishment-conflict view of the rhetoric of social movements, the majority of these scholars have categorically elected to ignore the significance of innovational theory in the rhetorical movement literature.

While representatives of the establishment-conflict view continue to publish variations on this established theme, innovational theory remains largely unexamined. In fact, three years have transpired since the Smith-Windes innovational model came to print, and still no writer has formally emerged to dignify its implications for the future of rhetorical studies.

Chapter Two, in this connection, argues for a scholastic re-assessment of the Smith-Windes innovational theory of the rhetoric of social movements. More specifically, it constitutes a broad response to the first pivotal research question of our study, i.e., "Should rhetorical scholars, as Smith and Windes suggest, recognize, at least in some cases, the rhetoric of innovational social movements, and thus allow innovational criticism to assume a useful place in the embryonic corpus of rhetorical movement literature?"

The answer to this question requires a three-fold examination of: (1) Behavioristic Theory; (2) The Philosophic Foundations of Rhetoric; and (3) A Dramaturgical Perspective. Behavioristic Theory, our first concern, describes the influence that behavioral science has had on the rhetorical study of collective behavior, and in doing so,
explains how this influence has contributed to the creation of the establishment-conflict view of the rhetoric of social movements.

The Philosophic Foundations of Rhetoric, the second area of emphasis, explores the ontological, epistemological, and axiological roots of rhetoric, and argues that an innovational interpretation of the rhetoric of certain types of social movements may be better suited to the rhetorical study of collective behavior, than the traditionally-held establishment-conflict school of rhetorical criticism. Moreover, the innovational view is especially more appropriate to the rhetorical study of a social movement when mass "persuasion" is conceived as "cooperation."

Finally, our discussion of The Philosophic Foundations of Rhetoric shifts to an examination of a Dramaturgical Perspective. This last section emerges as a synthesis of our previous discussions of Behavioristic Theory and The Philosophic Foundations of Rhetoric, and uses this research, in concert with some additional findings, in order to "recast" the critical lens of the Smith-Windes innovational theory of the rhetoric of social movements. Here, my aim is to re-create a more philosophically viable, and therefore critically acceptable theory of innovational rhetorical movement criticism.

**Behavioristic Theory**

**Physics Envy.** Modern collective behaviorists who study social movements may have inherited a culturally-induced inadequacy from their magnanimous, but understandably imperfect forebears. This incidence of what some could diagnose as "physics envy" might best be understood as a need on the part of behaviorists to simulate the methods and
expressions of a more established physical science.

The behavioristic "physics envy" seems reminiscent of a kind of scientific "halo effect" that is traceable, at least in theory, to the early influence of physical science on Watsonian Behaviorism. Moreover, its considerable influence over collective behaviorists who study social movements, has in turn, contributed to the wide acceptance of the establishment-conflict view of mass persuasion among rhetorical critics.

The publication of "Psychology As the Behaviorist Sees It," in 1913 introduced John B. Watson's theory of Psychological Behaviorism to the scientific community. The view offered an alternative to the more "introspective" psychologies being practiced at that time in Germany and the United States.

Introspective approaches to psychology centered on a dualistic (soul-body) interpretation of the human condition. The term, "consciousness," for instance, was assigned to that which was implied by the soul. One's consciousness could be apprehended only through introspection, according to introspective psychology, a process that behaviorists believed largely invisible.

Behaviorism, on the other hand, offered a more objective approach to human behavior than introspective psychologies. Its methodology was quantitative, and largely patterned after the observation technique of physical science.

Here, the behavior of an organism was "measured" according to what it reportedly said and did. Using stimulus-response activity as his analytic unit of measurement, the behaviorist was able to predict
and control human behavior in a more exacting physically scientific manner. One social scientific writer observes Behaviorism's naturalistic leaning:

As Watson proposed, behaviorism is based on a principle that eliminates the difficulty in describing psychologically oriented phenomena. Its vocabulary does not include subjective terms, e.g., sensation, desire, perception, emotion. It is a "true nature science."

Watson described the body as an organic machine which is observed for how it works as a whole, not solely in terms of the functioning of its parts. The crux of the behaviorist's purpose: "to substitute natural science in the treatment of the emotionally sick in place of the doubtful and unscientific method of psychoanalysis."5

In this connection, J. P. Chaplin, in his Dictionary of Psychology observes that the influence of Watsonian Behaviorism continues to loom large in the social scientific community. "Watson's system of behaviorism," he writes, "although it remained largely programmatic, had a profound influence on American psychology, which is today strongly behavioristic in its methods...."6

This naturalistic leaning or "physics envy" is not peculiar to psychology. Sociologists trained in quantitative methodologies display a similar orientation. "Sociologists are just being admitted to the scientific community," declares one prominent social investigator, "and like courtiers of feudal times who were often more royalist than the king himself, they sometimes feel themselves to be proper scientists only when doing research by methods used in the physical sciences."7
Behaviorism's "mechanistic imagery" is probably more symptomatic of its "physics" fixation than any other factor. The reason for behaviorists' naturalistic leaning is clear; concretistic expression sounds more "scientific" than mentalistic imagery.

**Mechanistic Imagery.** The prudent behaviorist came quickly to the realization that his professional acceptance into the scientific community required that he first adopt the "mechanistic imagery" relative to the naturalistic expression of physical scientists. In other words, his ability to compete with physical scientists for the spotlight of scientific legitimacy called for the affectation of a more naturalistic vocabulary, i.e., one that featured nonmentalistic, "mechanistic" terms like "process," "gearing," and "homeostasis," rather than nonmechanistic words like "action," "integration," and "order."

However, the initial thrust of the behaviorists' campaign to metaphorically "engineer" their acceptance into the scientific community is immediately lost when the foci of physical and social science are more closely examined. In this regard, the naturalistic methods and expressions of physical science are intended for, and appropriate to, nonmentalistic descriptions of physical motion in time and space. Yet, these naturalistic avenues of expression that work so well for the physical scientist lose much in translation, when applied to the more qualitative, behavioristic concerns of man in society.

Let us take the case of the physical scientist. He is bound by the focus of his discipline to keep the imagery of his definitions qualitatively consistent with the nature of the data they describe.
A mixing of metaphors, so to speak, would become subject to immediate detection.

The physicist, for instance, who depicts the elliptical orbit of an electron as constituting a "performance," commits a qualitative inconsistency in expression. Electrons, as indices of physical motion in time and space, do not "perform," but rather "course" or "revolve." Theirs is not the "action" of an actor in a play, but rather the "motion" of a mute body in time and space.

The behaviorist, like the physicist, is held equally liable, in this regard. It would appear that the social scientist who draws upon the "gearing" and "meshing" imagery of the physical technologist in order to describe the subtleties of say, turn-yielding signals in a communicative exchange, is at a qualitative disadvantage. "Theoretical models, like metaphors," observes one social investigator, "cannot be mixed. The theoretical monsters produced in modern American sociology almost rival the chimeras of antiquity; firebreathing monsters, with a lion's head, a goat's body, and a serpent's tail, have been matched by grotesques with mechanical heads and symbolic bodies."

The creation of theoretical models with mechanical heads and symbolic bodies is symptomatic of behaviorists' mechanistic schizophrenia. This linguistic identity crisis experienced by behaviorists, has clouded particularly their treatment of "communication."

Communication. The majority of behaviorists maintain that words "arise" from the contextual milieu of society, and dispute the claim that symbols "are" the contextual milieu of society. Duncan holds that American sociologists are particularly chauvinistic in this
respect. He observes:

American sociologists simply do not believe how we communicate determines how we relate as social beings. Most sociologists really think of symbols as photographs of some kind of reality "behind" symbols....Class "exists" and "then" is expressed, it does not arise "in" expression.  

Once again, behaviorists' "photographic" approach to "communication," is due, at least in theory, to their mechanistic schizophrenia. Behaviorists have traditionally tried to "reify" expression as a direct consequence of their belief that "communication" contains "substance" only insofar as it communicates the social or psychological reality of something other than itself. 

The social investigator who maintains that "social class," for instance, exists apart from the onomastic function of "communication," has reduced symbolic expression to mere "sign" function, i.e., "symbols" are wrongly construed as mere proxy for the objects they represent. The belief stands in sharp contrast to what Langer presents as the major distinction that exists between the sign and symbol functions of language. She observes:

Symbols are not proxy for their objects, but are "vehicles for the conception of objects." To conceive a thing or a situation is not the same as to "react toward it" overtly, or to be aware of its presence. In talking "about" things we have conceptions of them, not the things themselves; and "it is the conceptions, not the things, that symbols directly 'mean'." The fundamental difference between signs and symbols is this difference of association, and consequently of their "use" by the third party to the meaning function, the subject; signs "announce" their objects to him, whereas symbols "lead him to conceive" their objects.
Langer's distinction between sign and symbol function infuse "communication" with greater social significance. It suggests that the singular sign-based interpretation of symbolic behavior held by behaviorists cannot adequately explain the ways in which symbols create and sustain social integration.

The mechanist, for instance, who sees "communication" solely as an objectivistic "process," is unable to recognize the unique ways in which symbols create social hierarchies by "naming," or generate persuasive images which influence individual and collective world views. Commenting on behaviorists' prohibitive, sign-based interpretation of "communication," Karl R. Wallace observes:

We recognize that students concerned with an art and the creative (or inventive) aspect of making, producing, or doing something find "process" too constractive. The stimulus-response unit appears to have been invented by scientifically minded behaviorists to apply only to behavior that could be observed, measured, and controlled. Their object was description, not explanation. The stimulus-response unit was not designed to explain "how" a particular stimulus produces a particular response, nor "why" it does. For the human being, at least, when a stimulus becomes a stimulus, it has the power to produce movement, in part because of what the respondent brings to it. He interprets it. It is symbolic.

A symbolic interpretation of "communication," where symbols are conceived as "vehicles for the conception of objects," instead of their proxy, reflects Wallace's plea for a less prohibitive view of symbolic behavior. Moreover, it further serves to point up the declaration that, "'How' we communicate, determines 'what' we communicate, just as others argue (and rightly so) that 'what' we communicate determines 'how' we communicate."
SUMMARY

In summary, I have argued that early behaviorists, living under the imposing shadow of an entrenched physical scientific community, developed a professional feeling of inadequacy. "Physics envy," our name for this neurosis, was described as manifested in the need of behaviorists to simulate the methods and expressions of physical science. However, we observed that this need to approximate the "mechanistic imagery" of natural science prove somewhat ill-suited to its purpose, especially when applied to the area of "communication."

The belief on the part of behaviorists that "communication" holds significance only insofar as it creates in its users the social or psychological reality of something other than itself, was shown to be largely ill-founded. This sign-based, "photographic" interpretation of "communication" fails to speak to the painfully clear notion that "how" we communicate determines ultimately "what" is communicated.

I demonstrated that symbols construed as the vehicles for the conception of objects, as opposed to mere proxy, invest "communication" with new social significance. However, despite the efforts of Karl Wallace, George Herbert Mead, Kenneth Burke, Marshall McLuhan, Richard Weaver, I. A. Richards, and others who have done much to sensitize social science to the implications of public symbols, a sign-based, "photographic" interpretation of "communication" continues to saturate the thinking of behaviorists in general, and behaviorists who study social movements in particular.

Social Movement Behaviorists

Much of early Behaviorism is reflected in the research of behaviorists who study social movements. The
latter, for instance, in keeping with the "naturalistic" leaning of
the former, were trained in the physical scientific tradition of ex-
perimental laboratory procedure. "Because many of its investigators
were nurtured in psychological laboratories," observes Sherif, "ex-
perimentation in social psychology has been a prominent activity, even
more so since Murphy, Murphy, and Newcomb's Experimental Social Psychol-
ogy in 1937. The advantages and prestige of laboratory experimentation
have continued to attract social psychologists whatever their academic
origins, and to attract sociologists...."15

In this regard, a similar vote of confidence in laboratory experi-
mentation is cast by Smelser. "The ideal procedure to be followed in
establishing scientific propositions," he writes, "is to create a lab-
oratory situation in which all the relevant variables except one are
held constant, then manipulate this one variable systematically."16

Mass behaviorists Lang and Lang recapitulate Smelser's view.
"The laboratory has two unique advantages," they avow, "it permits
the kind of manipulation and control of individuals and of specific
factors in the total situation necessary for the testing of a hypo-
thesis; it reduces a complex phenomenon to proportions that make
possible also the training of observers, crosschecking their reli-
bility, and developing procedures for observation."17

It is interesting to note, that Sherif, Smelser, and Lang and
Lang, collective behaviorists who reliably endorse experimental lab-
oratory procedure, concomitantly decry the difficulty encountered
when experimental design is practically applied to actual instances
of collective behavior. As a corollary to his previous statement,
Sherif, for example, adds. "While the range of topics investigated in the laboratory has greatly expanded, a growing number of investigators display healthy caution against unqualified reliance solely on the laboratory experiment. It has been noted that some 'crucial variables and relationships cannot be reproduced under laboratory conditions.'" 19

Smelser's opinion, in this regard, parallels Sherif's foregoing claim. "Experimentation." he maintains, "is virtually impossible in the study of collective behavior. Ethical prohibitions prevent investigators from literally creating a panic, and practical difficulties in establishing a genuine panic in a laboratory setting are almost overwhelming." 19

Lang and Lang articulate equally strong reservations about this application of the experimental method to collective behavioristic situations. They write:

"The translation of collective definition, demoralization, etc., into laboratory situations is not exactly easy. Many experimental designs have failed to produce reasonable facsimile of real life conditions. The effects observed in the laboratory seem trivial when compared with the widespread and basic transformations outside the laboratory." 20

Thus, Sherif, Smelser, Lang and Lang, and other students of collective behavior, predisposed to the experimental laboratory procedure and mechanistic leaning of early behaviorists, but discovering that experimental laboratory procedure was largely ill-suited to the "field-like" nature of collective behavioral research, opted to simulate it. Like their early Watsonian predecessors, who used the naturalistic imagery of physical science to translate human "action"
into physical "motion," collective behaviorists similarly use mechanistic imagery to "sound" physically "scientific."

One witnesses countless studies in collective behavior which utilize the nonexperimental (but quite valid) research designs of content analysis, participant observation, analysis of interaction, and several other "field" research methodologies, but continue to speak to the reader in the experimental idiom of physical science. Their persuasive appeal is largely "verisimilitudic," and probably traceable to our previous discussion of early behaviorists' "physics envy." However, the overriding implication of these studies, once again, suggests that collectivists seem of the belief that to talk in mechanistic metaphors constitutes talking "science."

This belief on the part of collectivists who study social movements seems to reflect a confusion. The confusion stems primarily from an inability to differentiate "science" from its "technique." However, before we further develop this idea, a brief look at the metaphorical engineering of several architects of collective theory will help the reader to better understand our case in point.

In this regard, the naturalistic imagery of physical science infuses Sherif's definition of "social psychology." "Social Psychology," he writes, "is the scientific study of the experience and behavior of individuals in relation to social stimulus situations." Here, Sherif uses the phrases "scientific study" and "social stimulus situations," as persuasive appeals. These terms serve to direct attention away from human "action" and toward physical "motion." Sherif's rhetorical maneuver is thus specifically designed to
communicate the imagery of "objective" physical science.

Quarantelli and Dynes display a similar predisposition in their essay, "Two Patterns of Looting." Their usage of the term "patterns" reveals much about their personal expectations of what constitutes legitimate science.

These authors, for instance, use the term "pattern" more to describe the fixed behavior of "man," than the less predictable activity of "men." Their mechanistic interpretation of this term is more appropriate to the physical reality of mosaics or tapestries, and less an index of the human biogram.

Mass behaviorists LaFiere in the "Factors and Processes Affecting Social Interaction," and Turner and Killian in their "Social Movements: Character and Processes," reflect a similar naturalistic bias. Like Sherif, Quarantelli, and Dynes, they deliberately employ evocative terms like "processes" in order to direct the reader's attention away from humanistic "action," and toward the mechanistic imagery of physical scientific "motion."

The list of collectivists who subscribe to this policy seems endless. Etzioni, for example, in his Studies in Social Change, expresses a need for "more potent international machinery." The physical scientific leaning represented by the term "machinery" is both tendentious, and immediately felt.

In this connection, political sociologist Heberle lectures on "the simplicity of stratification" in the farm labor movement, and collective investigator Gusfield sets out to analyze the "structural sources" of protest, reform, and revolt. The mechanistic
underpinnings evoked by their respective interpretations of "stratification" and "structural sources," once again, speak more directly to the physical imagery of natural science than the humanistic concerns of the social scientist.

Lang and Lang's notion of human "dynamics," and Smelser's conception of "structural strain" reflect a more egregious brand of physical chauvinism. The etymology of "dynamics," for instance, is easily traceable to its use by physicists to describe the natural laws of thermodynamics. Moreover, Smelser's conception of "structural strain" borrows heavily from the language of structural geologists, who, in turn, call upon it to define the earth's faulting activity.

Now that I have demonstrated how behaviorists who study social movements use "terministic screens" to metaphorically engineer the imagery of physical science, two important implications may be drawn. The first bores into the nature of "scientific inquiry," and is relative to our previous claim that an inability to differentiate "science" from its "technique" may exist on the part of collective behaviorists. The second implication, however, focuses on "communication," and bears more directly on the entrenchment of the establishment-conflict view of the rhetoric of social movements discussed earlier.

Science and Technique. I have argued that many behaviorists who study social movements employ terministic screens in order to metaphorically engineer the imagery of physical science. Inheriting a predisposition toward the "physics envy" of their predecessors, they similarly sustain a need to establish a "scientific" psychology modeled after the mechanical precision of Newtonian physics.
However, the belief by behaviorists who speak in mechanistic metaphors constitutes talking "science," is somewhat ill-founded. Perhaps, it mirrors an inability to differentiate between "science" and "scientific technique."

In this regard, behaviorists who model their "scientific" psychology after the mechanical precision of Newtonian physics, interpret "science" narrowly. They appear to conceptualize "science" as some idealistic touchstone of absolute truth that social investigators must strive to approximate.

"Science," however, is variously understood. Its exclusive conception as some Platonic Idea which scientists attempt to approximate, is somewhat prohibitive in scope.

"Science" is not the singular application of experimental laboratory procedure, nor is it the metaphorical engineering of naturalistic imagery. "Science is," Hawes observes, "what people who call themselves scientists, and who are accepted by one another as scientists, 'do' in the name of science. How scientists interpret science 'is' science--for all practical purposes."

"Science," then is largely an interpretive enterprise. As such, one particular "technique" cannot be said to represent the entire body of "Science." The statistical design and mathematical imagery of the experimentalist, for instance, contrasts the ethnomethodological chronicling of the cultural anthropologist, but both techniques, however different, reflect legitimate "science."

Behaviorists, then, who employ terministic screens to metaphorically "approximate" physical science, seem to confuse "science"
with one "scientific technique." Moreover, this confusion is compounded by the notion that early behaviorists may have unwittingly modeled their "scientific" approximation after a widely disputed view of physical lore, one that was challenged at about the same time Watsonian Behaviorism was conceived.  

As behaviorist, John B. Watson labored toward the completion of his "scientific" psychology, based on the mechanistic precision of Newtonian physics, revolutionary ideas brought to the fore by Einstein, Bohr, and other "relativists" served to radically alter the traditional views of the physical scientific community. Contrasting the Newtonian "God's eye view" of the physical world, the relativists proffered a "man's eye view" that recognized the probability of contradiction and imprecision in the theoretical universe.  

Their new physical formula brought with it the re-evaluation of physical probabilities and empirical procedures. Scientific observation could no longer be exclusively interpreted as absolute, but only relative, and simultaneously tainted with the act of observing. Consequently, relativists found it comparatively easy to reason away the idea of absolute objectivity, and to also categorically reject the old notion of matter.  

Thus, early and mass behaviorists may have fashioned their "scientific" psychologies after a theoretical perspective that was in the midst of scientific transition at the time of its replication. The mechanistic precision of Newtonian physics, an illusion they continue to metaphorically perpetuate, is largely inconsistent with the more ascendant view of a probabilistic and indeterminate physical
universe.

Perhaps the strong relativistic binding of the physical scientific community might compel behaviorists to re-evaluate their metaphorical stance. "Science" and the "scientific technique" inevitably become confused when the scientific enterprise is narrowly construed as some absolute to be approximated. This confusion, for instance, is reflected in mass behaviorists' treatment of "communication" in social movements.

**Communication in Social Movements.** The concept of "communication" held by behaviorists who study social movements, has been markedly influenced by their predecessors' efforts to riefy expression. Early behaviorists seemed to believe that "communication" contains social significance (or "substance") only insofar as it communicates the social or psychological reality of something other than itself.

This narrow interpretation of symbolic expression reduces its social significance to mere "sign" function, i.e., where symbols are construed as proxy for that which they represent, rather than as vehicles for the conception of objects. LaFiere's description of "communication," for instance, appears to be the ascendant view among behaviorists who study social movements. He observes:

> Communication between human beings is effected by means of symbols. Symbols consist of words and gestures which represent covert feeling-states, such as the word "love" and the coy smile; which represent symbols of objects such as the word "ball;" and which represent abstractions, such as the word "God" and the Fascist salute. It is possible, of course, for limited interaction to occur without communication. Two men fighting in the dark would so interact.33
LaPiere portrays symbols as photographs of a reality that they represent. "Feeling-states" like "love," for instance, are depicted as first existing, then "expressed," without ever considering the possibility that they might arise "in" expression.

The author's "iconic" or photographic interpretation of "communication" reduces its social significance to mere sign-function. Moreover, it points up the existence of a problem that has for years biased behaviorists' treatment of "communication" in social movements.

The problem is reflected by behaviorists' apparent reluctance to assign appropriate coverage to their analyses of "communication." LaPiere's voluminous Collective Behavior, for instance, consigns only nine paragraphs to his sign-based, "photographic" interpretation of "communication." In this regard, Brown's expansive Social Psychology examines symbolic expression in a suspiciously modest twenty-two page assessment.

Lang and Lang's lengthy Collective Dynamics is not unique in this respect. For these authors, "communication" is addressed only as "mass communication," and then presume to negotiate its social significance in a scant forty-two page analysis.

Moreover, their effort to speak to the role of symbols in society is represented in their volume by Turner and Surace's essay, "Zoot-suiters and Mexicans: Symbols in Crowd Behavior." However, these authors similarly portray symbolic expression in a prohibitive light. Just as LaPiere, Brown, Lang and Lang, and Turner and Surace have failed to assign appropriate coverage to their analyses of "communication," the writings of other behaviorists who study social
movements reflect a similar negligence. In King's detailed Social Movements in the United States, for instance, he sparingly depicts in only seven paragraphs, the social significance of symbolic expression.

Quite similarly, Gusfield, in his interminable Protest, Reform, and Revolt, frugally commits to print one article that speaks to the notion of "communication" in this lengthy (thirty-three page essay) reader in social movements. In this regard, Turner and Killian, in Collective Behavior, delineate only a small portion of their weighty text to this concern.

Indeed, Sherif's Social Interaction appears to be one of the few mass behavioristic volumes that genuinely seeks to examine "communication" in an in-depth manner. The majority of research in this area either minimizes the social significance of "communication" by affording it inadequate coverage, or undermines its importance more directly by narrowly interpreting symbolic expression as mere sign-function.

In Collective Behavior Smelser, for instance, only perfunctorily acknowledges the role of "communication" in social movements. He maintains in this regard, that the "generalized belief" is the definitive component of all social action, and merely sees "communication" as the means by which this belief is communicated. Moreover, he lessens the centrality of symbolic expression to his theory of collective behavior with the caveat: "No single form of communication or interaction constitute a defining characteristic of collective behavior."
Once again, Smelser, like many behaviorists narrowly views "communication" as a "photographic" process, whereby a "belief" is thought to first exist before it is expressed. This bias is clearly reflected in LaPiere's definitions of "speech" and "language." "Except when an individual is talking to himself," he writes, "speech serves no other function than that of facilitating social interaction. Language is simply a system of sound patterns which are provided with socially specified meanings."  

LaPiere's portrayal of "speech" as a "facilitator of social interaction," and of "language" as that which is only "provided with socially specified meanings," clearly reflects the behavioristic bias that maintains "what we communicate determines how we communicate." However, this interpretation of "communication," is a prohibitive one, because it fails to recognize the equally valid belief that "how we communicate also determines to a large measure, what we communicate." 

To speak of the former consideration in the absence of the latter, automatically misrepresents the social significance of "communication." In some cases, for instance, "speech," aside from its role as a "facilitator of social interaction," actually "is" the social interaction. "Language," moreover, apart from its function as a "purveyor" of "socially specified meanings," similarly "becomes" those "socially specified meanings." The two linguistic features called "naming" and the "negative" serve to illustrate our case in point. 

The onomastic dimension of "communication" called "naming," for instance, serves to both create and sustain social integration. Graduate students exemplify this feature when they labor through weighty
dissertations in the "name" of "scholarship." Wars are fought in this regard, and a nation's youth often depleted, in the "name" of "freedom." Moreover, the mechanistic imagery of Newtonian physics is similarly proffered by behaviorists in the "name" of "science."

"Naming," then, clearly supports the claim that "how we communicate also determines what is communicated." Perhaps the communicative importance of the "negative" is equally significant in this regard.

Kenneth Burke, for instance, reminds us that everything in nature is positively what it is.\textsuperscript{38} That is to say, that the "negative" condition is one that man, "the symbol-user," creates linguistically. It enables him to better foster social integration by affording the opportunity to say "no" to all those social conditions that he does not say "yes" to.

The "negative," then, represents still another communicative feature that serves to reinforce the social significance of "communication." In this regard, it further demonstrates how symbolic reality can often function to mold and shape social reality.

Thus, the communicative features of "naming" and the "negative" lend support to the notion that sometimes man's symbolic reality "is" his social reality. More succinctly put, "'How' we communicate, determines 'what' we communicate, just as others argue (and rightly so) that 'what' we communicate determines 'how' we communicate."

Irrespective of all evidence to the contrary, mass behaviorists continue to interpret "communication" in a light which undermines its social significance. We witnessed earlier the inadequate coverage
they afforded it in their research. However, this bias of collectivists who study social movements is expressed in even more subtle ways.

In this regard, some social psychologists claim that the central objective of all social movements is a change in the institutions of social order, or the objective character of the established order. However, those amorphous types of social movements that do not purport to change the objective character of the established order, social psychologists refer to as "expressive" social movements. Perhaps the motivation behind the selection of the term "expressive" can never truly be determined, but one theory suggests that its choice reflects a subtle statement of mass behaviorists' prohibitive view of "communication."

In this connection, since all social movements "express" a particular point of view, selecting the term "expressive" to distinguish one type of social collectivity from all of the other varieties reflects a poor choice of words. Or does it?

Taking into consideration our discussion of mass behaviorists' history of bias in the area of "communication," one cannot help but suspect that their choice of the term "expressive" reflects yet another effort on the part of behaviorists to deliberately use "terministic screens" in order to turn the reader's attention toward a social reality and away from a symbolic one. More specifically, perhaps the insertion of the term "expressive," subtly implies that those unconventional social movements whose goal does not represent a change in the objective character of the established order (and are thus
inconsistent with the social "substance" of conventional social collectivities), reflect, like symbolic "expression" or "communication," nonsubstantive manifestations (symbolic representations) of a much deeper, more confounding social reality.

However reasonable, the foregoing argument is, at best, speculative. More tractable is the notion that points up the influence that behaviorists have had on the rhetorical study of social movements. It maintains that rhetorical critics who study the "languaging strategies" of social movements have for years drawn heavily from research compiled by the same behaviorists who have traditionally portrayed "communication" in a prohibitive light.

Rhetorical Critics and Mass Behaviorists

Initially, likening the mass behaviorist to the rhetorical critic smacks of absurdity. After all, the former represents the scientific community—the empirical, behavioral, and experimental. Mass behaviorists read and write their own literature, talk their own language and pursue their own goals.

The rhetorical critic, on the other hand, reflects the literary, aesthetic, and humanistic culture. Unlike the mass behaviorist who seeks understanding by interpreting, analyzing, and evaluating the individual communication transaction.

However, a common interest in the study of social movements has served to bridge their considerable psychological distance. The mass behaviorist who studies social movements centers on their social and psychological reality, while the rhetorical critic, conversely, focuses on their symbolic existence.
Due to their earlier commitment to mass social phenomena (like crowd behavior), collective behaviorists' social movement research has exerted considerable influence over the writings of rhetorical critics. In Chapter One, for instance, Cathcart was credited as saying that rhetorical critics have patterned their definitions of social movements after those generated by behavioristic research.

Yet, still other parallels may be drawn between the interests of mass behaviorists and critics who study the rhetoric of social movements. In fact, some exhibit a direct bearing on the ascendant establishment-conflict view of the rhetoric of social movements.

The "conflict" motif, one such parallel, is a recurrent theme in both the research of mass behaviorists who study social movements, and the critic's literature of rhetorical movements. This concern will be addressed at length as the study unfolds, but for now it might be said that perhaps the more established research of mass behaviorists who study social movements helped to plant the seed of rhetorical critics' "establishment-conflict" binding, in much the same way that it influenced their definitional leanings.

Moreover, it may be further alleged, in this regard, that perhaps rhetorical critics' "conflictive" or "adversarial" interpretation of the rhetoric of social movements is partially due to the influence of behaviorists who have traditionally depicted "persuasion" as "manipulation." The reader is reminded, in this connection, that early and mass behaviorists were nurtured in the tradition of experimental procedure, where studies typically attempt to isolate deterministic relationships among variables. "These studies," one experimentalist
writes, "frequently purport to show the effects that particular manipulations (read causes) produce."  

Perhaps the manipulative procedure which grew out of the experimental training of collective behaviorists who study social movements, eventually found its way to the establishment-conflict view of the rhetoric of mass persuasion. Campbell, for instance, speaks of the influence that behavioristic theory has had on the rhetorical study of "persuasion." She observes:

A primary objection to behavioristic rhetorical theory is that it generates a manipulative view of the persuasive act which views the speaker and auditor as separated, alienated, even in conflict. The persuader is "hidden," suggesting, often indirectly, that he can skillfully move his listener into acquiescence, or that he is the active principle injecting a stimulus into a passive receiver, a clever switchboard operator who can plug in an appropriate message to produce the relatively predictable response he desires. Both speaker and auditor are de-humanized, and the notion of persuasion as an interpersonal, humane, cooperative process is lost.

When mass persuasion is depicted as "manipulation," the rhetoric of social movements is narrowly viewed as representing a grandiose parliamentary debate where aggressor and defendant spokesmen confront one another with an endless array of manipulative diatribes. This portrayal of mass persuasion is consistent with the establishment-conflict school of thought. However, it also fosters a prohibitive interpretation of the rhetoric of social movements. "[T]he establishment-conflict theory," Smith and Windes observe, "is perhaps simplistic because it perceives significant public communication as a grand debate tournament, where critical interest focuses on the dogmatic
pyrotechnics of extremists. Rhetorical theory must recognize alternative social processes.\(^{15}\)

Thus, Smith and Windes generate their innovational view of the rhetoric of social movements in response to this need to recognize alternative social processes. Toward this end, our upcoming discussion of the "Philosophic Foundations of Rhetoric," examines the ontological, epistemological, and axiological roots of rhetorical theory.

In summary, my discussion of Behavioristic Theory has centered on the influence that behavioral science has had on the rhetorical study of mass persuasion, and described how this leaning has contributed to the entrenchment of the establishment-conflict view of the rhetoric of social movements. It was argued, in this regard, that behaviorists who investigate social movements have viewed "communication" in a significantly different light than students of persuasive communication.

This difference in perspective was said to be traceable, at least in theory, to the psychological growing pains experienced by a young behavioral science developing in the well-established professional shadow of the physical scientific community. Confusing physical science with the scientific technique, this "physics envy" was depicted as a need on the part of behaviorists to metaphorically engineer into their own research, methods and expressions which "approximate" the "mechanistic" imagery of the physical scientist. Irrespective of the problems one encounters when "reifying" naturalistic descriptions of physical motion in time and space are applied to the humanistic
behavior of man in society, it was established that this mechanistic outlook of behaviorists has had a decisive effect upon their interpretation of human communication.

In this regard, I cited earlier, that behaviorists had come to the belief that "communication" contains social significance only insofar as it announces the social or psychological reality of something other than itself. Symbolic expression, in other words, has been traditionally depicted by behaviorists as mere sign-function, where symbols are interpreted exclusively as "proxy" for the objects they "represent," instead of as "vehicles for the conception of objects." Thus, the proposition that "how" we communicate determines, to a large measure, "what" we communicate, is left unaddressed by behaviorists.

This failure on the part of behaviorists to speak to the above consideration was used earlier to explain why these investigators of social movements have traditionally assigned less significance to the area of "communication." The scant coverage they afford it in their research, and subtle bias they direct at it in their writings, stand as mute testimony to "communication's" low-priority status among behaviorists. Indeed, it is ironic that those who study social movements should be so inattentive to the symbolic reality that at once, serves to both create and sustain their mechanistic imagery.

Moreover, nurtured in a tradition that is animated by "manipulative" laboratory procedure, and vivified by "confrontational" exemplars of social change, we further established the notion that behaviorists' fascination for establishment-conflict-like social movements is
understandable. In this regard, we also said that it was perhaps equally understandable that rhetorical critics, who have borrowed heavily from the social movement research of behaviorists, should similarly adopt a manipulative, confrontational, (establishment-conflict) view of the rhetoric of social movements.

THE PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS OF RHETORIC

If the proposition is correct that "in our questions lie our principles of analysis," then the upcoming discussion should appropriately begin with the question: "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes, or Who will observe the observers?" For both the answer to this question, and the principle of analysis which follows, are at once "philosophy."

Heretofore, we summon philosophy, not in the cosmetic sense of the voyeur, but rather as a rhetorical problem-solver. Indeed, the historical paths of rhetoric and philosophy have often crossed. But the relevance of philosophy to rhetoric increases significantly in times when rhetoric is perceived as problematical. Johnstone observes, in this regard:

Philosophy is relevant to rhetoric precisely because it examines rhetoric,.. Why does rhetoric need examination? My answer is that such examination becomes imperative when the foundations of the subject pose a problem.

The rhetorical problem to be addressed, is the same one that has given impetus to our research thus far. That is, establishment-conflict rhetorical critics have proffered a prohibitive view of the rhetoric of social movements, one that has served to disallow and militate against the Smith-Windes innovational alternative.
In this regard, the philosophic offices of Ontology, Epistemology, and Axiology are introduced in order to expedite our search for the source of this rhetorical problem. By applying these philosophic canons to the scholastic foundation of rhetorical theory, the forthcoming discussion argues that an innovational interpretation of the rhetoric of social movements may perhaps be better suited (at least in some cases) to the study of mass persuasion than the traditionally-held (establishment-conflict) view, especially when "persuasion" is conceived as "cooperation."

Moreover, the decision to use as principles of analysis, the philosophic offices of Ontology, Epistemology, and Axiology, was inspired by the example set forth in Kenneth Burke's critical writings relative to rhetoric. In his Grammar of Motives, for instance, Burke defines the dialectical substance of his widely recognized pentad (i.e., the act, scene, agent, agency, and purpose) in terms of five philosophic causistries. Each pentadic element reflects the imagery of the philosophic perspective it represents.

Burke's scheme is insightfully patterned after what actually occurs in our everyday experience. It attempts to reveal that our minds, as linguistic products, actually gravitate toward instrumental words which reflect entire symbolic realities.

The dramatist, for instance, who would have us accept the "world as a stage," ultimately seeks to turn our attention to a theatrical motif. Quite similarly, the sailor who tells us that "we're all afloat," transports our perspective to a maritime theme. Our minds, then, are linguistically programmed to elicit in response to
significant symbols, larger symbolic realities.

Burke, in this connection, uses the significant symbols in his pentad in order to "feature" or evoke the reality (or perspective) of their corresponding philosophic causistry. The "act," for instance, is illustrative of the philosophic causistry known as "realism," because "In scholastic realism," Burke observes, "form is the actus, the attainment which realizes the matter." The term "act," in other words, best exemplifies the philosophic causistry of "realism."

Moreover, quoting a number of lexical definitions for "materialism," Burke equates the "scene," with the realization of a materialistic perspective, maintaining, "one gets a materialistic philosophy by the featuring of our term scene... with materialism the circumference of the scene is so narrowed as to involve the reduction of action to motion." Put differently, when the "scene" is controlling, or representative of the dominant perspective, things do not move, they "are" moved.

In this connection, the Baldwin dictionary defines "idealism," Burke's third philosophic causistry, as any theory that maintains the universe to be throughout the work of reason and mind. "Idealistic philosophy," Burke holds, "starts and ends in the featuring of the properties belonging to the term agent."

"Agency," on the other hand, he views as representing a more pragmatic philosophical leaning. "we here seize upon the reference to means," Burke claims, "since we hold that Pragmatist philosophies are generated by the featuring of the term Agency."
Finally, "purpose," his last pentadic symbol, is most closely associated with ultimate ends, according to Burke. "Such references to the 'divine essence,' 'the creative source,'" he writes, "indicate why we would equate mysticism with the featuring of our term Purpose."54

These pentadic elements and their corresponding philosophic causistries are not mutually exclusive, but rather overlap, forming ratios where one element may dominate (control) in one configuration, and recede in yet another. Thus, they serve to help the critic to establish a better bearing as to which pentadic element is controlling the speaker's world view.

The individual, for instance, who views the problem of slums as largely a consequence of man's unwillingness to change his environment, proffers an "idealistic" philosophic perspective. He chooses, in other words, to attribute the problem of slums to the controlling activity of an "agent." The person who, on the other hand, evaluates the same situation as largely a matter of man being victimized by his environment, ventilates a "materialistic" philosophic bearing, and thus portrays the scene as dominant.55

Burke's pentadic elements and their corresponding philosophic causistries, then, make it possible for the rhetorical critic to determine what view of the world a speaker would have his audience accept. Moreover, by revealing the strategic spots at which linguistic ambiguity arises, they serve to help him better understand the choices a speaker commits himself to.

Thus, the example set forth in Burke's scheme inspires our construction of a similar critical tool, one that may be applied to the
rhetoric of social movements. Patterning the dialectical substance of our tool after the critical design displayed in Burke's pentad, our "triad" consists of the three classifications of the argumentative proposition, i.e., "fact," "policy," and "value."56

This "triadic" classification, in turn, was strongly suggested by our previous breakdown into three critical dimensions, the Smith-Windes innovational theory of the rhetoric of social movements. In this regard, the reader will remember, in Chapter One, innovational theory was said to consist of "fact," "policy," and "values." Our new tool now seeks to equate these critical dimensions with the respective argumentative classifications of "fact," "policy," and "value."

Furthermore, as in the case of Burkeian criticism, our triad of significant symbols corresponds with three respective philosophic causistries. Once again representing those philosophic offices discussed earlier, they are: (1) Ontology--"fact," or the philosophic canon which speaks to the notions of existence and nonexistence; (2) Epistemology--"policy," or the philosophic canon which addresses the certainty or uncertainty of knowledge; and (3) Axiology--"value," or the philosophic canon which has as its focus the study of worth and worthlessness.

The relationship which exists between our triad of significant symbols, and their respective philosophic causistries unfolds as the study further develops. Moreover, the critical application of this scheme (as dramaturgical configurations) will similarly be discussed at a later time. Now our discussion of the Philosophic Foundations of
Rhetoric proceeds to an examination of Ontology, the philosophic office which "features" the triadic element of "fact."

**Ontology**

The Ionian fascination in the sixth century B.C. for the process of change, and the transitions from life to death, and death to life, sparked a relentless philosophic search for the "urstoff" or primary substance of change. The ancient luminary Thales, for instance, thought of "urstoff" as synonymous with the rejuvenescence of water. Anaximenes traced the substance of all things to the omnipresence of air. And the famed sage Heraclitus waxed eloquent encomia on the possibilities of fire.

Though these ancient theories about the substance of change appear primitive by contemporary standards, from these rudimentary insights evolved a more sophisticated philosophic "science," one which Aristotle describes in his *Metaphysics*. He observes:

> There is a science that studies being as being and the properties characteristic of it. It is not the same as any one of the so-called special sciences, for none of the others deal with being generally as being. They cut off a piece of it and study the characteristic of that piece of it, as, for instance, the mathematical sciences do. But we are after first principles and ultimate causes and obviously there must be something to which they belong by virtue of its own nature. The men who into the past have looked for the elements of the existing world have looked also for these first principles. Therefore it must be that these elements of being, not incidentally, but because it is being. Hence we too must find the first causes of being as being.57

The "science" described above by Aristotle is Ontology, the philosophic study of "being." It is particularly relevant to our research, insofar as Ontology represents the branch of philosophy
that speaks to the nature and essential characteristics of man. 58

"Persuadability," for instance, reflects the one essentially human characteristic upon which rhetorical critics unanimously agree. In other words, they are "ontologically" bound, so to speak, by the assumption that man is by nature subject to, and capable of persuasion.

However, in "The Ontological Foundations of Rhetorical Theory," Karlyn Kohrs Campbell introduces an ontologically-based problem which tends to disrupt this harmonious view of persuasion held by students of rhetorical studies. "In spite of this common philosophical [ontological] ground," she observes, "explanations of how and why persuasion occurs have produced rhetorical theories which differ from each other in important ways." 59

Three "dominant" theories of rhetoric presume to share the common ontological ground of "persuasion," yet render different interpretations of this presumption. The "rational man" theory, for instance, holds that man is rhetorical because he is rational. "Behavioral" theory, on the other hand, maintains that man is rhetorical because he possesses basic unlearned drives. Finally, "dramaturgical" or "symbolic" theory contends that man is rhetorical because he is a symbol-using organism. 60

In this regard, the forthcoming discussion seeks to establish the claim that the Smith-Windes innovational theory of the rhetoric of social movements represents a viable philosophical alternative to its establishment-conflict counterpart, because it proffers the most significant insights of all three of the foregoing rhetorical theories, whereas the establishment-conflict school of thought fosters only the
less desirable features of the first two. More specifically, we argue that rhetorical critics should recognize, at least in some cases, the rhetoric of innovational social movements, as a viable alternative to the establishment-conflict view, because the former offers an "ontologically" less prohibitive interpretation of mass persuasion.

Initially, the argument unfolds by developing an in-depth analysis of the three "dominant" ontologically-based interpretations of "persuasion." Then the discussion proceeds to an examination of the relationships which exist between these three "dominant" rhetorical theories, and the innovational and establishment-conflict interpretations of the rhetoric of social movements.

The "Rational Man" Theory. The "rational man" theory of rhetoric maintains that man is persuadable because he possesses the faculty of reason. It is an Aristotelian interpretation of the "art of persuasion," insofar that it may be traced to Aristotle's notion that enthymematic reasoning (or appeals to the auditor's sense of logic) represents the primary nature of rhetoric, and all else (or pathetic and ethical appeals) constitute mere "accessories" to that art. In Speaking With An Audience: Communicating Ideas and Attitudes, Makay generates a more contemporary explanation of the "rational man" theory. He observes:

The rational-person approach operates on the assumption that if the speaker musters all the acts and ideas that communicate clarity and truth for him or her, the audience will obviously understand and accept the speaker's message. It assumes that what is unquestionably logical and right for one person (the speaker) ought to be logical and right for anyone exposed to the same information (the
audience), whether or not the psychological characteristics and make-up which affect the thoughts and actions of speaker and audience are the same.  

Like Aristotle, Makay's interpretation of the "rational man" theory presents a "message-effects" portrayal of persuasion. "Persuasion is conceived," in the language of one Fotheringham, "as that body of effects in receivers, relevant and instrumental to source-desired goals, brought about by a process in which messages have been a major determinant of those effects."  

In this regard, Aristotle's Rhetoric proffers "three divisions of oratory" in accordance with the type of effect each genre creates in the prospective hearer. Political oratory, for instance, is futuristic, and ultimately aims at establishing the expediency or harmfulness of a proposed course of action. Forensic or dicanic discourse, on the other hand, is used by legalists who seek to adjudicate the validity of past fact. Finally, ceremonial oratory, according to Aristotle, is used to blame or praise the contemporary state of affairs.  

The Aristotelian "message-effects" focus of the "rational man" theory of rhetoric has much merit in it, and once predominated the thinking of rhetorical scholars. In recent times, however, it has fallen into disfavor. Campbell, one of its detractors, articulates several frequently raised criticisms of this theory.  

Campbell's initial criticism of the "rational man" theory of rhetoric maintains that a rationalistic interpretation of human persuadability reflects a prohibitive view of various persuasive
uses of language. "Sham" or "sophistic" argumentation, for instance, must be automatically dismissed by rationalists because they reside outside of the rationalistic commitment to reason. Moreover, advocates of this theory are literally forced to become overly attentive to rational appeals, which are often indistinguishable from irrational ones. Finally, Campbell holds that a viable and generative ontological interpretation of human persuadability is thwarted by rationalistic theory because rationalists are ethically bound to an unrivaled confidence in the efficacy of rational appeals even when irrational ones prove more effective on some occasions.

Her second criticism calls into question the overriding emphasis which rationalists traditionally have placed on the effects that a discourse has on the immediate audience. Campbell claims that this traditional leaning continues to militate against the need for more creative criticism. Moreover, in this regard, it has always been difficult for critics to differentiate between the immediate effects of a speech, and those which emanate from other influences, like the long-range effects of rhetoric.

The last criticism which Campbell raises against the "rational man" theory of rhetoric is suggestive of a rhetorical "Heisenberg principle." In this connection, Aristotle depicts rhetoric as both the ethical branch of politics, and the use of reason to select one of the alternatives delineated in a dialectic. However, the rationalistic perspective implies, in Campbell's view, that the means by which this rhetorical alternative is to be urged, selected, and supported, are more a matter of philosophy than rhetoric.
The rationalistic view of rhetoric portrays the "art of persuasion" as an impersonator of philosophy, and having no claim of its own to any particular branch of knowledge. To re-state the "Heisenberg principle," as it relates to the rationalistic view of rhetoric: "If the act of observing philosophy and rhetoric destroys rhetoric, then it is clear that there is a fundamental obstacle to the growth of knowledge in that direction."

By way of summary, then, the "rational man" theory of rhetoric maintains that man is persuadable because he possesses the faculty of reason. It is, in this regard, essentially a "message-effects" interpretation of the "art of persuasion," modeled after the one proffered in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

Once the ascendant view in rhetorical studies, it has in recent years fallen into disfavor. Campbell, one detractor of the rationalistic view, set forth several frequently raised criticisms of "rational man" theory. The first maintained that a rationalistic interpretation of human persuadability reflects a prohibitive view of various persuasive uses of language. Her second criticism questioned the heavy emphasis rationalists place on the immediate effects of a discourse. Finally, Campbell's last criticism held that the rationalistic perspective invalidates rhetoric by rendering it indistinguishable from philosophy.

The "rational man" theory of rhetoric is thus exemplary of only one "ontological" explanation of how and why persuasion occurs. "Behavioral theory," on the other hand, fosters a different "Ontology."
Behavioral Theory. A contingency of rhetorical theorists use a behavioral theory of rhetoric to substantiate their ontological explanation of persuasion. Inspired by the pioneering research of John B. Watson, they portray man as persuadable because he is a psycho-physiological organism whose psychological existence is attributable to a pulsating circuitry of "need" and "drive" states. "In other words," Campbell observes, "man is rhetorical because he is an organism with certain innate needs, and persuasion is a process by which these are activated and directed. Rhetoric is defined as all discourse designed to induce belief and action by any means whatever, and persuasion is viewed as the manipulation of innate drives and desires." 66

As in the case of our previous discussion of the "rational man" theory of rhetoric, Campbell, once again, generates several frequently raised criticisms of behavioral theory. The first one, bores directly into the nature of Behaviorism's "determinism-choice" dilemma.

In this regard, it was argued earlier, that behaviorists adhere to the Newtonian notion of universal causality, i.e., where behavior is both determined and predicted from causal factors. The traditional notion of "choice," then, conceived as an organism's freedom to fulfill its own law, does not exist for the behaviorist, who interprets the same phenomenon as largely the result of a stimulus-response situation where an organism's response possibilities are greater than one. 67

This behavioristic view of "choice" is somewhat problematical from a rhetorical standpoint. If the notion of "choice," often depicted as the hallmark of persuasion, does not exist for the behaviorist, then
the idea of "persuasion" must be dismissed with similar conviction. 68

Moreover, any theory which fails to recognize the existence of "persuasion" cannot be called "rhetorical."

However, this "determinism-choice" dilemma is quickly laid to rest by merely interpreting the sense of "choice" that we have about ourselves, as an illusion which necessitates our psychological health. Thus, it enables rhetorical theorists, who affix their Ontology to behavioral theory, to assert, in the language of Campbell, that "persuasion is possible because men have fundamental drives, and because they believe, whether accurately or erroneously, that they can make 'free' choices." 69

Campbell's second criticism of a behavioral theory of rhetoric cannot be explained away as easily as the "determinism-choice" dilemma. This indictment relates back to our earlier discussion of Behavioristic Theory, and maintains that a behavioristic interpretation of rhetoric propagates a "manipulative" view of the persuasive act.

Campbell suggests that rhetoric conceived as such, unfortunately overlooks the essentially "cooperative" or "collaborative" nature of persuasion. "As a consequence," she writes, "such theory tends to ignore an element implicit in the very idea of rhetoric--that men tend to speak to other men, to urge their action in the face of problems which they cannot solve alone, and which require concerted group action for their solution." 70

No less important than this "manipulative" view of persuasion, is Campbell's final criticism of behavioral theory. Here, she holds that a behavioristic interpretation of rhetoric actually threatens the
existence of rhetorical theory as an independent discipline.

Once again, this problem is linked to behaviorists' interpretation of the notion of "choice." If the idea of "choice" is "perceived" or "illusionary." and the headspring of persuasion, largely the consequence of physiological need and drive states, then rhetorical theory might just as well be placed under the heading of "psycho-linguistics."

Summarizing, I have argued that one school of rhetorical theorists found their ontological explanation of persuasion on behavioral theory. This contingency maintains that man is rhetorical because he is an organism with certain innate needs, and persuasion is a process by which these are activated and directed.

Campbell, once again, was depicted as generating several frequently raised criticisms of behavioral theory. The first one spoke to Behaviorism's "determinism-choice" dilemma, and held that "choice" would be better understood from a behavioristic standpoint, if it was construed as an illusion which necessitates our psychological health.

Campbell's second criticism claimed that a behavioristic interpretation of rhetoric overlooks the "cooperative" nature of persuasion, and propagates a "manipulative" view of the persuasive act. Finally, the last argument railed against behavioral theory held that its definitions of "choice" and "persuasion" threaten the existence of rhetorical theory as an independent discipline.

Thus, the "rational man" and behavioral theories of rhetoric represent two dominant explanations of how and why persuasion occurs.
Dramaturgical theory offers a third explanation.

**Dramaturgical Theory.** Dramaturgical theory portrays persuasion as a cooperative enterprise, where source and receiver conjointly apply their respective communicative contexts to symbols, which, in turn, create in them a common meaning. Fotheringham's "meaning arousal" theory represents a suitable backdrop for this third ontological interpretation of human persuadability. This "meaning arousal model," he observes, "rests on the principle that humans, particularly, assign meaning to impinging stimuli and that the meaning given is a major determinant of their subsequent behavior."71

The "meaning arousal" approach is described as "dramaturgical" because the theatrical imagery of "drama" lends itself admirably to the study of the ways in which men use symbols to influence others. A dramaturgical motif, in other words, treats language and thought primarily as modes of action generated by symbol-using organisms who "act" in concert to establish a common meaning; hence persuasion.72 More succinctly put, "wherever there is persuasion, there is rhetoric. And wherever there is 'meaning,' there is persuasion."73

Dramaturgical theorists claim that persuasive discourse enables man to transcend the primitive animal and biological motives which limit the intellectual life of infrahuman organisms. In this regard Campbell observes:

Persuasion is possible because men create meaning, because language itself is a motivating force, and because language may be used both to modify man's basic needs and to influence his symbolically created social and cultural motives. Man is also persuadable because the very notion of language presumes a community of users in which, of necessity,
the usage of each influences the usage and hence the meanings, attitudes, and behaviors, of others.\textsuperscript{74}

A dramaturgical interpretation of rhetoric conceived as such, serves to infuse this ontological explanation of persuasion with two distinct advantages. The first one maintains that a dramaturgical perspective is advantageous because it is sensitive to all the persuasive uses of language. That is to say, no one area of emphasis is given exclusive attention. The effects of a discourse, for instance, are afforded the same weight of concern as say, its internal life, or aesthetic dimension.

Moreover, rhetorical critics who adopt a dramaturgical perspective discover a second, more significant benefit. This ontological view of persuasion encompasses the most attractive features of the foregoing "rational man" and "behavioral" theories of rhetoric, without succumbing to their respective pitfalls.

Dramaturgical theory, for instance, views man's symbol-using ability as reasoned discourse, and does not impute to it the artificial distinctions (of logos, pathos, and ethos) so often used by "rational man" advocates. Moreover, to the dramaturgicalist, the notion of "choice," unlike the case of the behaviorist, is not a perceived illusion, but rather a "rhetorical necessity." It might also be established, in this regard, viewed from the perspective of "drama," persuasion becomes a "cooperative" enterprise, instead of a behavioristic "manipulation."

Perhaps the only intellectually defensible criticism of dramaturgical theory holds that this ontological interpretation of
persuasion depicts the rhetorical province as boundless, and holding sway over every aspect of language. However, heuristic, highly creative sources of rhetorical criticism rarely come in neat, economically-tight packages.

In summation, then, the dramaturgical theory of rhetoric, inspired by a "meaning-arousal" interpretation of persuasion, treats language and thought primarily as modes of action generated by symbol-using organisms who "act" in concert to establish a common meaning; hence persuasion. Such an ontological interpretation of persuasion views discourse as the primary means by which man transcends those primitive animal and biological motives which limit the intellectual life of infrahuman organisms.

Furthermore, it was maintained that a dramaturgical interpretation of rhetoric contains two advantages. The first suggested that a dramaturgical perspective is advantageous because it is sensitive to all the persuasive uses of language. The second benefit held that this ontological view of persuasion is even more meriticious because it encompasses the most attractive features of the rationalistic and behavioral theories of rhetoric, without succumbing to their respective pitfalls.

In this connection, it was established that dramaturgical theory, in contrast to the rationalistic view, portrays man's symbol-using ability as reasoned discourse without alluding to artificial distinction. Moreover, it was said that the dramaturgicalist, unlike the case of the behaviorist, views the related concepts of "choice" and "persuasion" as a "rhetorical necessity" and a "cooperative" enterprise respectively.
Finally, the only criticism of dramaturgical theory held that this ontological view portrayed the rhetorical province as boundless. However, it was established that this broad interpretation of rhetoric is a small price to pay for this theory's creative fecundity.

Thus, the "rational man," behavioral, and dramaturgical theories of rhetoric represent the three dominant ontological explanations of how and why persuasion occurs. Now our discussion proceeds to an examination of the relationships which exist between these three dominant theories, and the innovational and establishment-conflict interpretations of the rhetoric of social movements.

A Prohibitive Establishment-Conflict View

In comparison to the innovational interpretation of the rhetoric of social movements, the establishment-conflict view, reflects a prohibitive ontological interpretation of human persuadability. Whereas the former proffers the most significant insights of all three dominant explanations of how and why persuasion occurs, the establishment-conflict view fosters only the less desirable features of the "rational man" and behavioral theories of rhetoric.

Rationalistic Influences. To discover, for instance, the influence which the "rational man" explanation of human persuadability has had on the establishment-conflict view of the rhetoric of social movements, we can refer back to our review of the literature in Chapter One. Here, several establishment-conflict rhetorical theorists exhibit a strong rationalistic binding.

The rationalistic focus of Griffin's portrayal of rhetorical movements, for instance, is clear. His description of a social
movement's rhetorical development could easily be likened to the logical progression of some grand three-act play.

Griffin, in this regard, depicts the rhetoric of social movements as unfolding into three predictive, logically-linear stages (i.e., inception, rhetorical crisis, and consummation). From this chain of events, a massive debate supposedly springs, where aggressor and defendant spokesmen engage in various patterns of public discussion.

Though Griffin's critical design appears logically-tight, and certainly applicable to the rhetorical development of "some" social movements, it fosters a critical point of view that is perhaps overly presumptuous. As in the case of the "rational man" model of rhetoric, where the rhetor uncritically assumes that all audiences are ruled by their faculty of reason, Griffin's scheme similarly presumes that all rhetorical movements unfold according to the same narrow rule of logical progression. Thus, the analyst who unconditionally accepts Griffin's rationale, frequently becomes less a critic, and more a slave to one prohibitive methodology.

Moreover, Griffin's rationalistic leaning is further evidenced in the essay, "The Rhetorical Structure of the New Left: Part I." The thrust of this article centers on the demands of a small band of "intellectual" aggressor spokesmen who challenge the "policy" of governmental agencies. Perhaps his noticeable preoccupation with the ideas of an "intellectually" elite group of orators, and their clash with governmental rationale ("policy") is less a matter of the author's random selection of a rhetorical movement, and more an index of Griffin's rationalistic perspective.
In this regard, Cox reveals a similar rationalistic focus in the essay, "Perspectives on the Rhetorical Criticism of Movements: Antiwar Dissent 1964-1970." Our earlier discussion of this article established that this author used the rationale of Bitzer's "rhetorical situation" to conduct his analysis of the rhetoric of the Vietnam Peace Movement. Here, Cox argues, once again, that the decision-making process of the U.S. Government represented the key constraint which antiwar protestors needed to infiltrate in order to end the war in Southeast Asia.

In addition to this heavy reliance on Bitzer's "exigence-constraint-audience" rationale, Cox's preoccupation with the immediate effects of individual speeches also serves to illumine his rationalistic bearing. Here, he carefully weighs the importance of speakers, and their messages, according to the extent to which their "effects" helped to shape the governmental decision-making process.

However, "decision-making" may be interpreted in two ways, according to Nobel laureate Herbert Simon. "[O]n the one hand," he observes, "economists assume that people in organizations operate according to preposterously omniscient rationality, and on the other, psychologists assume that people operate almost entirely on emotion."75

Cox, then, in his insistence that the governmental decision-making process was rhetorically molded by the messages of antiwar protestors, opts for Simon's former interpretation of decision-making. And thus, once again, reaffirms his allegiance to a logos-centered, "message-effects" interpretation of persuasion.

For Simons, the rhetorical effectiveness of a social movement leader is directly proportional to his ability to argue persuasively, or "reason" his way from one set of problematical ideas to the choice of another set. As a specialist in the reduction and resolution of rhetorical problems, he is depicted as the consummate rationalist, who must draw heavily from the rhetorical canon of "inventio" in order to generate those "over-arching principles" which best serve to reinforce his decision-making.

Moreover, a similar vote of confidence in a reason-bound interpretation of rhetoric is cast by Simons in "A Movement Perspective on the 1972 Presidential Election." In our previous discussion of this essay, we established that Simons and his co-authors maintained that politicians who seek to wage successful campaigns would do well to assume the rhetorical stance of the "political centrist."

In other words, the speaker should prevent his ideological position from becoming too closely identified with the political platform of an extremist faction. Instead, the politician who hopes to emerge from his campaign triumphant, should seek an ideological position which reflects middle ground, or the political center. Thus the
implication submitted here, once again suggests that political success may, at times, be rhetorically engineered according to the logic of a speaker's stance.

Simons, then, depicts persuasion as a rational enterprise that is largely bound by the sound logic of reasonable men. Hence, his ontological explanation of rhetoric is, once again, unmistakably rationalistic.

Perhaps this particular brand of rhetorical rationalism is nowhere more apparent than in the establishment-conflict research of Bowers and Ochs. In the *Rhetoric of Agitation and Control*, for instance, these authors boldly define "rhetoric" as "the rationale of instrumental symbolic behavior." Their inclusion of the words "rationale" and "instrumental" in this definition, once again, serve to point up the notion that man is persuadable because he is rational.

In "New Approaches to the Study of Movements: Defining Movements Rhetorically," and in a second article entitled, "Movements: Confrontation As Rhetorical Form," Cathcart exhibits a rationalistic leaning which approximates the one described in Bowers and Ochs approach to human persuadability. His first essay, however, establishes only a partially developed backdrop for a rhetorical definition of social movements, one which comes to fruition in Cathcart's second essay, "Movements: Confrontation As Rhetorical Form."

Here, he argues that the "true" rhetorical movement represents a kind of "agonistic ritual" whose most distinguishing form is "confrontation." It is ironic, in this regard, that Cathcart should incongruously elect to adopt Kenneth Burke's socio-psychological
interpretation of rhetoric in order to establish his essentially Aristotelian definition of the rhetoric of social movements.

My forthcoming discussion of dramaturgical theory speaks more directly to Burkeian thought, but for now it may be said that both Aristotle and Burke portray rhetoric as "the art of persuasion." However, each rhetor emphasizes different aspects of that art.

It was established earlier, for instance, that Aristotle's interpretation of rhetoric reflects a "message-effects" focus. He depicts persuasion as a unilateral enterprise, where the source's logical appeals are aimed at that body of effects which inhere in logical receivers; hence the name "rational man" theory of rhetoric.

Burke, on the other hand, is less concerned with rhetorical "effects," than persuasive "identification," which can include a partially unconscious factor in appeal. His interpretation of rhetoric seeks to establish persuasion as a collaborative enterprise where source and receiver come to "meaningful" communication through the "cooperative" use of significant symbols. Burke's theory of persuasion thus points up the "communal" nature of man the "symbol-user," and the "psycho-logical" state of the source-receiver relationship.

Cathcart then, in his insistence to use Burkeian thought to generate a "confrontational" definition of rhetorical movements, perhaps begs the question. The essentially Aristotelian portrait of mass persuasion he proffers, one that strongly suggests an alienated, "confrontational" source-receiver relationship, is ontologically closer to the behavioral explanation of persuasion discussed earlier, than to Burke's dramaturgical view.
Thus, Cathcart's establishment-conflict definition of rhetorical movements reflects a strongly rationalistic explanation of how and why persuasion occurs. It, once again, portrays rhetorical movements as grand confrontations between aggressor and defendant spokesmen who seek to persuade by infiltrating that body of effects which inheres in the other.

In this connection, Wilkinson's essay, "A Rhetorical Definition of Movements," was described earlier, as constituting a response to Cathcart's call for a "rhetorical" definition of social movements. Embodying the rhetorical definition of the latter into his own interpretation of the rhetoric of social movements, he writes, once again: "[Movements] rhetoricallly defined, are 'Langaging strategies by which a significantly vocal part of an established society, experiencing together a sustained dialectical tension growing out of moral (ethical) conflict, agitate to induce cooperation in others, either directly or indirectly, thereby affecting the status quo.'"

Exhibiting the same rationalistic influence found in, and inspired by, Cathcart's "rhetorical" definition of movements, Wilkinson similarly adopts Burke's socio-psychological explanation of persuasion in order to establish his essentially Aristotelian interpretation of the rhetoric of social movements. However, his efforts in this direction, like those of Cathcart earlier, ontologically could be likened to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic! Wilkinson's decision to support his rationalistic explanation of persuasion with a dramaturgical one, as in the case of Cathcart, similarly begs the question.
To summarize briefly, then, our discussion has explored the influence of the "rational man" explanation of human persuadability on the research of the major establishment-conflict theorists discussed in Chapter One. The influence of rationalistic theory on Griffin, for instance, the first theorist discussed, was said to be manifested in his overly presumptuous notion that all rhetorical movements unfold according to the same three-stage rule of logical progression. Moreover, Griffin's additional focus on a small band of "intellectual" spokesmen and their clash with governmental "policy" was taken as perhaps an index of his "inventio-centered" interpretation of mass persuasion.

In this regard, the rationalistic binding of other establishment-conflict theorists was also examined. Cox, for example, was depicted as using Bitzer's "exigence-constraint-audience" rationale in order to weigh the "effects" which speakers and their messages had on the shaping of governmental decision-making policy. His "message-effects" view of governmental decision-making was described as representing a rationalistic interpretation of persuasion.

Simons, on the other hand, evidenced his rationalistic leaning with the argument that the rhetorical effectiveness of a social movement leader is directly proportional to his ability to argue persuasively. In his view this is achieved by generating those "over-arching principles" which best serve to reinforce the leader's decision-making. Moreover, Simons was described as also maintaining, in connection with his "political centrist" theory, that political success may be rhetorically engineered according to the "logic" of a speaker's
ideological "stance."

It was established furthermore, that the research of Bowers and Ochs also reflects rhetorical rationalism. Their inclusion of the words "rationale" and "instrumental" in their definition of "rhetoric" was depicted as pointing up the idea that man is persuadable because he is rational.

Finally, both Cathcart and Wilkinson, were shown to display a similar rationalistic focus in their "rhetorical" definitions of movements. However, both theorists perhaps confused the issue somewhat in their use of the Burkeian socio-psychological (dramaturgical) view of rhetoric to support their essentially Aristotelian explanations of persuasion.

Our discussion has explored the influence of the "rational man" explanation of human persuadability on the research of the major establishment-conflict theorists discussed in Chapter One. Now we proceed to an examination of the influence that behavioral theory has had on the establishment-conflict view of the rhetoric of social movements.

Behavioristic Influences. We established earlier that behavioral theory maintains that man is rhetorical because he is an organism with certain innate needs, and persuasion is a process by which these are activated and directed. Ontological shades of Vance Packard's Hidden Persuaders and People Shapers frequently accompany this particular explanation of human persuadability. "Although skilled manipulators may induce action," Campbell observes in this regard, "such theorizing leaves no place for cooperative action in which individuals
deliberate, understand the implications of their action, and subordinate immediate individual needs to long-term goals for groups, sometimes groups which do not include themselves."

Those establishment-conflict rhetorical theorists who were cited earlier as exhibiting a strong rationalistic binding, also reflect the influence of a behavioralistic explanation of how and why persuasion occurs. Bound by their common commitment to an establishment-conflict interpretation of the rhetoric of social movements, each chooses to portray persuasion in a "manipulative" light, where the source-receiver relationship is depicted as alienated, estranged, and in "conflict."

Griffin's portrayal of rhetorical movements, as grand debates between "aggressor" and "defendant" spokesmen, for instance, epitomizes the behavioralistic explanation of mass persuasion. All but the last phase of his three-stage scheme are suggestive of a "confrontational" source-receiver relationship.

During the initial stage of "inception," a strain or societal imbalance is experienced by potential members of the social movement. The detection of an imperfection in the social system gives rise to "aggressor" spokesmen who agitate to create a greater awareness of this exigence or defect. Next, a dialectical tension ensues, as "defendant" spokesmen emerge to refute the claims of their "aggressor" counterpart. This dialectic then plunges the debate into rhetorical crisis.

Griffin's notion of rhetorical crisis, the second stage of a movement's development, epitomizes ideological division, as "aggressor" and "defendant" rhetoricians declaim point-counterpoint argumentation.
Finally, as emotional heat gives way to intellectual light, the debaters' division is consolidated, and the olive branch of consummation, the last phase of Griffin's scheme, emerges to restore rhetorical equilibrium.

Thus, Griffin's establishment-conflict approach to the rhetoric of social movements reflects the influence of behavioristic theory, as well as the "rational man" explanation of persuasion. A similar impetus is exhibited in Cox's research.

Cox argues that the decision-making process was the constraint that antiwar protestors desperately strove to infiltrate. Once conservative factions failed to make the United States Government abandon its Southeast Asian policy, "aggressor" spokesmen, according to Cox, geared into a more extreme position in order to influence the government's decision-making policy. Mass protest was the call of the day, as the country became a hotbed of social unrest.

Cox's portrayal of mass persuasion then, as in the case of Griffin earlier, is strongly behavioristic. He similarly depicts the source-receiver relationship as militaristic and estranged. Establishment-conflict theorist Simons is similarly influenced in this regard.

Simons describes the role of the social movement leader as one that specializes in deception and manipulation. "Particularly in militant movements, the leader wins and maintains adherents," Simons was previously quoted as saying, "by... the deliberate use of myths, deceptions, etc.... Expected to be sincere and spontaneous, he must handle dilemmas with consummate manipulative skill."
Once again, Simons' description of the leader's role reflects the detached nature of a behavioristic source-receiver relationship. The source must remain apart from his receivers, in this regard, because his constant adaptation to the demands of the movement, and struggle to appear all things to those who give impetus to it, necessitates a detached speaker stance.

This detachment is perhaps nowhere better depicted than in Bowers and Ochs' interpretation of the rhetoric of social movements. In *The Rhetoric of Agitation and Control* their description of the difference in scope which exists in the rhetorical strategies used by agents of agitation and those of control, once again, points up a separation between source and receiver that is characteristic of a behavioral approach to persuasion.

Bowers and Ochs contend, in this regard, that aggressor spokesmen employ the rhetoric of agitation through strategic maneuvers like promulgation, consolidation, polarization, and escalation to achieve their goals. Defendant spokesmen, on the other hand, use the rhetoric of control by using avoidance, suppression, adjustment, and capitulation in order to respond to the claims of aggressor agents.

Bowers and Ochs' aggressor-defendant dichotomy might be better understood as a pre-condition to Cathcart's "confrontation" definition of the rhetoric of social movements. A behavioristic influence infuses his explanation of the division which gives rise to rhetorical movements. Repeating the observation cited in Chapter One, Cathcart states, once again:
The enactment of confrontation gives a movement its identity, its substance and its form. No movement for radical change can be taken seriously without acts of confrontation. The system co-opts all actions which do not question the basic order, and transforms them into system messages. Confrontational rhetoric shouts "Stop!" at the system, saying, "You cannot go on assuming you are the true and correct order; you must see yourself as the evil thing you are."

Cathcart's "confrontational" interpretation of rhetorical movements laid the groundwork for Wilkinson's "rhetorical" definition of social movements. Though the influence of Burkeian thought is evidenced by his inclusion of the word "cooperation," Wilkinson's definition continues to depict a dehumanized, strongly behavioristic view of the persuasive act.

Summarizing then, my discussion has examined the influence of a behavioristic explanation of human persuadability on the research of the major establishment-conflict theorists discussed in Chapter One. Bound by a common commitment to an establishment-conflict interpretation of the rhetoric of social movements, each was depicted as displaying persuasion in a "manipulative" light, whereby the source-receiver relationship was described as alienated, estranged, and in "conflict."

Griffin's portrayal of rhetorical movements, as grand debates between "aggressor" and "defendant" spokesmen, for instance, was described as epitomizing the behavioristic explanation of mass persuasion. Moreover, it was further established that all but the last phase of his three-stage scheme was suggestive of a "confrontational" source-receiver relationship.
In this regard, Cox's essay on the Vietnam Peace Movement, as in the case of Griffin's research, was shown to be strongly behavioristic. It was further established that his view of the rhetoric of social movements also depicted the source-receiver relationship as militaristic and estranged.

Quite similarly, Simons' description of a social movement leader's role was portrayed as equally detached. Once again, the influence of behavioristic theory was taken as the embodiment of a leader's deception and manipulation.

It was further established that the research of Bowers and Ochs fostered the existence of a similar detachment. Here, it was maintained that their description of the difference in scope which exists in the rhetorical strategies used by agents of agitation and those of control, points up a separation between source and receiver which typifies a behavioral approach to persuasion.

Finally, a behavioristic influence was said to infuse Cathcart and Wilkinson's "rhetorical" definition of social movements. Moreover, though both theorists used Burkeian thought to establish their respective definitions, each was described as proffering a manipulative portrayal of the persuasive act.

Thus, our previous discussions of rationalistic and behavioristic explanations of persuasion have examined the influence of these ontological approaches, on the establishment-conflict theorists discussed in Chapter One. Now we proceed to an examination of the influence that dramaturgical theory has had on the Smith-Windes innovative view of the rhetoric of social movements.
A Dramaturgical Approach to the Ontology of the Innovational Perspective

Our previous discussion of Philosophy established a correspondence between the propositional classification of "fact," and the philosophic causistry of Ontology. Here, "fact," at once served to point up both the philosophic canon which speaks to the notions of existence and non-existence, and announce to the reader the corresponding imagery of rhetorical discourse. Moreover, it was stated that our new "triadic" tool required the reader to equate "fact" with the "features" dimension of the Smith-Windes critical perspective.

In this regard, Smith and Windes contend that innovational and establishment-conflict rhetorical movements share four basic "facts" (features): (1) a goal of social change through (2) group action which (3) must fulfill rhetorical requirements by (4) creating drama. The first two "facts" have relevance for our study only insofar as they serve to differentiate the rhetoric of social "movements" from self-expressive or individual discourse. However, the fulfillment of rhetorical requirements, and the creation of drama, the latter two "facts," exhibit a more specific significance for our research because the words "rhetorical" and "drama" hint of a dramaturgical explanation of how and why persuasion occurs.

The reader is reminded, in this connection, of the first two ontological explanations of persuasion discussed. The "rational man" theory of rhetoric established that man is born with the ability to reason, but is not always reasonable. Behavioral theory, on the other hand, held that he often manipulates his fellow men, but cannot truly be characterized as a manipulator. Yet, in his role as a symbol-using
organism, he is inescapably rhetorical.

Therefore, a "symbolic action" or "dramaturgical" explanation of human persuasion speaks more directly to the human biogram's inevitably rhetorical condition. A condition which tends to ennoble the "cooperative" nature of rhetoric, and one that may perhaps be best described by the Burkeian concepts of "identification" and "consubstantiality." 79

"Identification," is the term Kenneth Burke uses to distinguish the "old" or Aristotelian notion of persuasion, from his "new" or dramaturgical perspective. Writing in the Journal of General Education, he confirms this distinction with the observation:

> If I had to sum up in one word the difference between the "old" rhetoric and the "new"...I would reduce it to this: the key term for the "old" rhetoric was "persuasion" and its stress was on deliberate design. The key term for the "new" rhetoric would be "identification," which can include a partially unconscious factor in appeal. 80

With this quantum shift in focus from "persuasion" to "identification," ancient rhetoric is thrust into the twentieth-century. Under this new perspective, the fabrication of "logical" appeals, for instance, once thought by Aristotle to be the touchstones of persuasive discourse, become subordinated to the formulation of "psycho-logical" identification devices. Furthermore, the former unilateral and separative nature of the source-receiver relationship, where the speaker "engineers" the consent of his audience, is replaced with the more humanistic view that "persuasion" is a collaborative transaction, where source and receiver use symbols cooperatively in order to create "meaningful" communication.
The socio-psychological significance of "identification" is better understood by establishing the way in which it rhetorically helps to preserve society's hierarchic order. Citing a passage from C. K. Ogden's edition of Bentham's Theory of Fictions, Burke explains this social role of "identification." He observes:

Instead of Kings or the King--the 'Crown' and the 'Thrown'.
Instead of a Churchman--the 'Church' and sometimes the "Altar."
Instead of Lawyers--the 'Law.'
Instead of Judges, or a Judge--the 'Court.'
Instead of Rich men or the Rich--'Property'....
Instead of the more or less obnoxious individual or individuals, the object presented is a creature of the fancy, by the idea which, as in poetry, the imagination is tickled--a phantom which the individual or class is clothed, is constituted an object of respect and veneration. In the first four cases just mentioned, the nature of the device is comparatively obvious. In the last case, it seems scarcely to have been observed. But perceived or not perceived, such by the speakers in question, has been the motive and efficient cause of the prodigious importance attached by so many to the term "property": as if the value of it were intrinsic, and nothing else had any value: as if man were made for property, not property for man. 81

"Identification's" often unconscious "tickling of the imagination," so lucidly set forth in the Bentham passage, whereby "'things' can become in effect 'infused' with the hierarchal genius of social pageantry owing to the nature of 'terministic screens,'" is largely a consequence of "constubstantiality," according to Burke. 82 This rhetorical process enables completely different symbol-users to participate in, and "identify" with a common symbolic experience, while simultaneously remaining substantially different organisms.
The "consubstantial" experience may be likened to the case of two senators. Each senator, for instance, may possess different points of view which are coincident with individual partisan loyalties. But insofar as both are "politicians," they are "consubstantial" with one another.

The rhetorical implication of "consubstantiality" is socially significant. "A doctrine of 'consubstantiality,'" Burke maintains, "either explicit or implicit, may be necessary to any way of life. For substance in the old philosophies, was an 'act;' and a way of life is an 'acting-together;' and in acting-together, men have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that make them consubstantial."83

A dramaturgical explanation of persuasion, where men "act-together" in symbolic identification, stands in sharp contrast to the more traditional notion of a detached persuader who dehumanizes the persuadee as a thing to be manipulated. In the former explanation of persuasion, for instance, the notion of "choice," considered an "illusionary" percept in behavioral theory, enjoys a new importance because interactants are portrayed as interpretative agents of symbols. Ehninger observes, in this regard:

First, because symbols are conceptions rather than perceptions, they are not tied to "reality" directly, but are dependent upon the intervention of an interpretative agent. As a result of this intervention, they are attitudinal or evaluative as well as reportive; are always the result of more or less conscious choice or selection on the part of the person who entertains them. In addition to announcing what one is talking about, messages compounded of symbols also announce—if ever so subtly—how one feels about the matter in question. Thus man the
symbolizer, in all of his communicative activities, is constantly inducing and being induced; is persuading himself when he addresses himself and persuading others when he addresses them.\(^64\)

This focus on communicative interactants as interpretative agents of symbols, makes a dramaturgical explanation of persuasion a more "communal" or "social" ontological theory of rhetoric than those proffered by rationalistic and behavioristic schools of thought. These latter explanations of why and how persuasion occurs foster a degenerative, antisocial view of rhetoric, whereby the persuader is depicted as "engineering" the consent of a passive persuadee.

Scott has coined the term "pragmatic--subordinate" to describe this manipulative view of rhetoric, and Ehninger's following commentary perhaps best puts it into rhetorical context.\(^65\) He writes:

> Certainly, Watergate and its aftermath, no less than the persistent blandishments of the advertiser, stand as evidence that the sort of manipulative rhetoric Professor Scott calls "pragmatic-subordinate is still very much with us.... Through the long centuries in which man, upon the authority of Aristotle, was defined as a rational being--a being whose essence was assumed to lie on his ability to think and to reason abstractly--rhetoric as the art of symbolic inducement not only was adventitious to his nature, but hostile to it. To undertake to persuade--to seek to bend the beliefs or behavior of another to one's own will--was a dehumanizing process, for both parties concerned. By treating the persuadee not as a "person," but as a "thing" to be manipulated, the persuader also sacrificed his own claim to humanity.\(^66\)

Besides encompassing the most attractive features of the rationalistic and behavioristic approaches to rhetoric discussed earlier, dramaturgical theory restores the "harlot of the arts" to a
respectable "human" enterprise. Since "pragmatic-subordinate" explanations of persuasion cannot make that particular claim, they continue to portray rhetoric in an ontologically prohibitive light. Moreover, it is this ontological distinction which differentiates the rhetoric of establishment-conflict social movements from that of innovational ones.

I argued earlier, in this connection, that the establishment-conflict school of thought reflects a prohibitive ontological interpretation of rhetoric because it fosters only two of the three dominant explanations of how and why persuasion occurs. This claim was then evidenced by using the establishment-conflict research of several rhetorical theorists.

Thus, we witnessed that the ontological success of establishment-conflict rhetorical movements is largely restricted to the "pragmatic-subordinate" persuasion generated by the "conflict" of "aggressor" and "defendant" disputants. Though an esoteric few would argue that a less manipulative rhetoric is used in the recruitment of confederates in the movement's cause, these new enlistees soon become "aggressor" spokesmen who realize that their triumph emerges, in the main, from the quagmire of confrontation, or what Burke more figuratively describes as "the Scramble, the Wrangle of the Market Place, the flurries and flare-ups of the Human Barnyard, the Give and Take, the wavering line of pressure and counterpressure, the Logomachy, the onus of ownership, the Wars of Nerves, the War...."87

The ontological success of innovational rhetorical movements, on the other hand, is not restricted to the "pragmatic-subordinate"
(i.e., rationalistic-behavioristic) persuasion generated by the "conflict" of disputants. Though a product of ideological division, and occasionally experiencing small pockets of conflict along the way, its ontological success arises in "dramaturgical" cooperation, rather than manipulative conflict.

"Aggressor" and "defendant" spokesmen, for instance, do not give impetus to the rhetoric of innovational movements. "If the innovational movement is successful..." Smith and Windes observe, "no defendant spokespersons will emerge, and no dialectic between aggressors and defendants will be possible."89

Instead, the rhetoric of innovational agents grows out of a competition which they create between their purpose, and some "non-personal" element in the innovational scene. In other words, the antagonist in an innovational rhetorical vision, unlike those found in establishment-conflict movements, is mute. Smith and Windes explain:

In an establishment-conflict vision, reference to real agents who hold power and who therefore react by creating their own counter-rhetorical vision in which the aggressor spokesmen are depicted through devil terms. In an innovational movement's vision, the "personae" are impersonal scenic elements which can be condemned for eroding society's values. These elements are mute, for no spokesperson will arise to refute the condemnations.89

The rhetoric of innovational movements, then, need not confront a vocal opposition in order to flourish. For unlike establishment-conflict rhetorical movements, "if significant audiences come to view their scene through the innovational movement's vision, the dramatic imperative of the movement is met."90
Thus, the largely unopposed rhetorical stance of innovational agents lends itself more admirably to a dramaturgical explanation of persuasion than a "pragmatic-subordinate" one. Innovational persuasion finds its dramatic imperative in "cooperation," rather than "confrontation." Its "social" or "communal" rhetoric looks more toward informing individuals, and reinforcing a particular point of view, than challenging and manipulating an audience.

In fact, the dramatic imperative of the rhetoric of innovational movements could be likened to the "epideictic" genre of discourse. Epideictic oratory has as its primary aim, not so much success in disputing a point of view, or convincing a reluctant audience, as the proper ordering of an occasion by the expression of fitting sentiments. This genre of communication is significant, according to Ferelman, "because it increases in us a commitment to the values which make it possible to justify action." However, "commitments to values," rarely produce the type of "measurable" effects which establishment-conflict theorists have been conditioned to look for. Their "rationalistic-behavioristic" lens predisposes them more toward an analysis of a "pragmatic-subordinate" brand of mass persuasion than a less measurable variety. Thus, in the words of Campbell, "a behavioristic focus is likely to ignore discourses which do not produce measurable or observable effects, a criterion for recognition which is problematic...."

Perhaps, then, the dramaturgical explanation of persuasion which innovationalists proffer, might serve to free the rhetorical critic of this problematic criterion of rhetorical "effects."
found freedom would enable him to assess the wide variety of non-
confrontational rhetorical movements formerly left unexamined by
establishment-conflict critics.  

Thus, the Smith-Windes innovational theory of the rhetoric of
social movements represents a viable philosophical alternative to its
establishment-conflict counterpart, because its essentially drama-
turgical focus, proffers the most significant insights of all three
"dominant" explanations of persuasion (i.e., the "rational man,"
behavioral, and dramaturgical approaches to persuasion), whereas the
latter school of thought fosters only the less desirable features of
the first two (or "rational man" and behavioral approaches to per-
suasion). Moreover, rhetorical critics should recognize the rhetoric
of innovational social movements, as a viable alternative to the
establishment-conflict view, because the former offers an "ontologi-
cally" less prohibitive interpretation of mass persuasion than the
latter.

Innovational theory is less prohibitive than the establishment-
conflict view, in still other ways. Our forthcoming discussion of
rhetorical "Epistemology" examines one of those ways.

Epistemology

Now our focus shifts from the ontologically-bound "fact"
of persuasion, to the epistemologically-based "policy" of rhetoric.
Here, we seek to establish the claim that rhetoric is essentially
"epistemic," or a highly delicate "way of knowing," where its success
hinges, to a large measure, upon the quality of the mutual "expect-
ancies" and anticipatory projections of both the rhetor and his or
her hearers. Support for this claim will be primarily drawn from a
broad investigation of Role theory, and the writings of Kenneth Burke, Erving Goffman, George Kelly, Edward Hulett, Stephen Toulmin, and Edward Tolman.

This information, then, will be used, in turn, to foster the notion that rhetorical "expectation" and human persuadability are inextricably bound together, a condition which Smith and Windees recognize in the "policy" distinction of their innovational theory. Moreover, we argue that it is this recognition or sensitivity which makes the innovational perspective a more realistic epistemological alternative to the prohibitive establishment-conflict view of the rhetoric of mass persuasion.

Background. The business of philosophy is an esoteric one. Philosophers do not necessarily collect, catalogue, and squirrel away facts for future use, as in the case of say, the physical scientist. Nor do they broaden their own philosophical landscapes by borrowing from the wisdom of other disciplines, as the social scientist often does. Instead, philosophers usually transcend the particulars of knowledge, and spend their days searching for those common characteristics which all knowledge must have in order to be properly called knowledge. Since infallibility is not a human trait, and people unknowingly assume that certain kinds of experience are instances of knowledge when they are not, philosophy's unique capacity to differentiate between what is knowledge, and what is not, is peculiar only to philosophy.

The office of philosophy which speaks to the nature of knowledge is known as Epistemology. To advance its conclusions, epistemological
inquiry relies more directly on the variable logic of the more or less, as opposed to the categorical logic of the yes and no. Those questions about the nature of knowledge, for instance, which bore into what is not ordinarily amenable to apodictic proof, such as the uncertainty of justice, or perhaps viable courses of future action (or policies), may require an epistemological examination.

Epistemological questions of truth or falsity, then, which cannot be empirically evidenced, must be resolved through "reasoned" discourse. Dialectic, or logical argumentation, then, according to Toulmin, is Epistemology's dramatic imperative. "The proper course for epistemology," he observes, "is neither to embrace nor armour oneself against scepticism, but to moderate one's ambitions and claims to knowledge in any field not that they shall measure up against analytic standards, but that they shall achieve whatever sort of cogency or well-foundedness can relevantly be asked for in that field."95

The Toulmin passage not only serves to point up the use of reasoned discourse to moderate one's claims, but also ennobles the sentiment that evidence of a maturing academic discipline is realized when its members become concerned with the epistemological presuppositions of their intellectual activities.96 Though early signs of an epistemological search may be found in Bryant's 1953 essay, "Rhetoric: Its Functions and Its Scope," this soritical threshold was officially crossed in 1967 when Robert L. Scott advanced an argument that called for viewing rhetoric as "epistemic."97 The perspective he presented, offered a radical departure from traditional writings on the function and scope of rhetoric.
The roots of this tradition can be traced to Plato's phlologic campaign attacking the sophistic rhetoric practiced in ancient Greece. The view of rhetoric he objected to portrayed the "art of persuasion" as that medium by which relative truth (in contrast to philosophical truth) is communicated or made effective. This meant ultimately that the function and scope of rhetoric could be applied only in an ex post facto capacity, after truth had already been determined.

A similar interpretation of rhetoric pervades the scholarship of Aristotle. In the Rhetoric he argues that rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic. To the latter he assigns the greater certainty of the logical syllogism, and to rhetoric, enthymematic probability and the rationale of the contingent. Thus, Aristotelianism consistently portrays rhetoric as a facilitator, but never a discoverer of truth.

This interpretation of rhetoric was also the view adopted by Peter Ramus in the sixteenth century, and embodied in his decision to divorce rhetoric from the offices of invention and arrangement. The eighteenth century teachings of Blair, Campbell, and Whately upheld this decision by arguing that rhetoric should be portrayed as a "manager" of established truths. More recently, Bevilacqua coined the neologism "managerial" rhetoric to classify this eighteenth century school of thought.98

Historically, then, rhetoric had been depicted primarily as a facilitator or "manager" of prior truths, until Scott, inspired by Stephen Toulmin's epistemological approach to argument, announced
that rhetoric constituted a "way of knowing." Corroborated in part, by the supportive argumentation set forth in Brockriede and Ehninger's Decision by Debate, this new definition of rhetoric as "epistemic" appears to be well on its way to becoming the ascendant view among rhetorical scholars. "This notion that rhetorical experience is epistemic and probatory," Arnold observes, "seems to me the most important single contribution of the 'new rhetoric,' for it breaks the grip of this century's mechanical vision of communication as 'motion' rather than human 'action'."

Rieke echoes Arnold's enthusiasm for this fresh rhetorical perspective. Writing with similar conviction, he maintains in this regard:

[R]hetoric is inextricably involved in the generation of knowledge; not merely as a way of knowing, but involved in all ways of knowing. To be more specific, the division of the world into the realm of the absolute and that of the contingent may be rejected totally. All knowledge will be viewed as contingent, and rhetoric, the rationale of the contingent, will be recognized as essential to all knowledge --scientific, humanistic, or whatever.

Rhetoric, construed variously as epistemic and the rationale of the contingent, holds particular importance for the assessment of the rhetoric of social movements. The headspring of the propositional classification of "policy," for instance, is used in cooperation with the philosophic causistry of the epistemic.

In other words, just as the propositional classification of "fact" was used earlier in concert with the philosophic causistry of Ontology, the term "policy" similarly serves at once to denote both the
philosophic canon which speaks to the certainty of knowledge, and
announce to the reader the corresponding imagery of rhetorical
discourse. Moreover, our new "triadic" tool also required the reader to equate "policy" with the "goals" dimension of the Smith-Windes critical perspective.

Smith and Windes, in this connection, set forth a "policy" distinction between the rhetoric of establishment-conflict and innovational social movements, which ultimately functions to differentiate the epistemological stance of the latter from the former. "The innovational movement," they argue, "is distinct from the establishment-conflict movement in that the latter calls for a reconstitution of society's values, its perceptions of worth and its class arrangements; whereas the former acts with the expectation that the changes it demands will not disturb the symbols and constraints of existing values or modify the social hierarchy."102

A perfunctory reading of this "policy" distinction would render it undistinguished, but a more careful examination would alert the attentive reader to the pivotal importance of particularly one word. The word is "expectation," and it appropriately defines the anticipatory nature of rhetoric as the rationale of the contingent or the probable. Any speaking occasion can serve to clarify our case in point.

The rhetor who is about to deliver a message enters into an unspoken contract with his audience. Unlike the poet who is free to fulfill his own law, a spokesperson must concede to a myriad of situational concessions. The subtleties of this contract are legion,
and the success of the forthcoming communicative act hinges, to a large degree, upon the mutual expectancies of both source and receiver.

Arnold, for instance, sets forth an illustration that attempts to re-create the source's expectancies in this unspoken contract between source and receiver. Taking the role of this other he soliloquizes:

For reasons of my own I have decided to stake some of my hopes on you and the judgments you will form in this situation, at this time. I have chosen to speak because I have concluded that I cannot have all of what I want unless you will be influenced by me. I therefore ask you to let me into your thoughts and feelings for a time. I conclude that you shall be the judge of me, of my thoughts, and of whatever feelings I seem to express. I concede that the primary thing that will count between us is the satisfaction you can find in the relationship I evolve with you in the coming minutes. I know that what I seem to be will count as much or more in our relationship than the words I say. I accept personal responsibility for all I say and do and for all my ways, and I concede to you the right to judge me as a person according to what you think of my sayings and doings.103

Arnold's passage, then, lends support to the notion that any communicative act involves a fecundity of tacit understandings which arise from the "seeking" behavior of the rhetor, and the "judging" behavior of the audience. Thus, every rhetorical situation may be depicted as constituting a highly delicate "way of knowing," that is largely determined by the nature of the mutual "expectancies" generated by the source and receiver.
The rhetorical significance of "expectation" looms large in the literature of persuasion. Strong arguments for its centrality to the communicative process can be found in Role Theory, and the research of Kenneth Burke, Erving Goffman, George Kelly, Edward Hulett, Stephen Toulmin, and Edward Tolman.

Role Theory. Though social investigators have been exploring role behavior since the early 1900's, no single theory of this composite of research may be said to exist. "Role Theory" is actually an amalgam of statements which assume the various forms of single hypotheses, sets of logically unrelated hypotheses on the same topic, or sets of logically and topically related hypotheses. In Role Theory: Concepts and Research, for instance, Biddle and Thomas describe the desultory condition of role research. They observe:

The field of role has unfortunately come to be known as "role theory." This implies that there is actually more theory than in fact is the case. The role field exhibits much speculation, and there are certainly hypotheses and theories about particular aspects of the subject, but no one grand "theory." 106

An exhaustive examination of these hypotheses and theories about particular aspects of "Role Theory" is beyond the scope of our present discussion, and those interested in a pervasive overview of the field of role would do well to consult outside references. 105 However, before speaking to the relationship which exists between rhetorical "expectation" and "Role Theory", our primary concern in this section, the two major considerations of "role enactment" and "role-taking" need clarification.
"Role enactment" most closely typifies the theatrical imagery that is usually associated with performing a role in a play. In "Role Theory" it is similarly used to describe the overt social conduct of actors carrying out the roles they portray in their real-life societal scripts. His appropriateness, propriety, and convincingness represent the critical criteria used to judge the actor's "role enactment."

Three additional features complement the criteria above: (1) the number of roles; (2) organismic involvement; and (3) preemptiveness. In "role enactment," the number of roles refers to the actor's range, or how well equipped he is to successfully fulfill society's demands. Organismic involvement, in this regard, seeks to measure the amount of effort expended by an actor while performing various "role enactments." Finally, preemptiveness has to do with the amount of time an actor allocates to the enactment or performance of a given role.

Whereas "role enactment" bears on the overt activity of the actor, "role-taking" focuses on his "inner life." Sarbin and Allen, for instance, maintain that "role-taking" is a cognitive process whereby the actor takes the role of the other. Cottrell and Dymond, quite similarly, define "role-taking" as the empathic capacity or degree of accuracy with which the role of the other is inferred.

However, Cortu's definition of "role-taking" as supplied by Turner offers the most comprehensive explanation. He observes in this regard:
accept the delimited meaning of role-taking proposed by Walter Cortu, which distinguishes the imaginative construction of the other's role (role-taking) from the overt enactment of what one conceives to be one's own appropriate role in a given situation (role-playing) and from the overt enactment of a role as a form of pretense ("role-playing at" a role). Role-taking may proceed from identifying a position to inferring its role and in this manner anticipating the behavior of an individual.\textsuperscript{108}

Cortu's interpretation of "role-taking" holds implication for our original interest in the relationship which exists between rhetorical "expectation" and "Role Theory." This definition maintains that before "role-taking" can occur, the actor must anticipate what the other imagines he is supposedly "expected" to do.

Implicit in the actor's anticipatory imagining of the other's expectancies exists the possibility of persuasion. Turner describes this "suasory" dimension of "role-taking." He writes:

Role taking makes possible both the manipulation of others and adjustment to them, becoming a means to a pre-existing end of some sort. The attitudes and skill of role-taking which were learned in a relationship of identification become divorced from that relationship as it is discovered to be useful in promoting the individual's own purposes.\textsuperscript{109}

Upon reading Turner's passage, the rhetorician is reminded of Bryant's reliable interpretation of the rhetorical function, "as the adjustment of ideas to people and people to ideas."\textsuperscript{110} More importantly, however, his commentary also illustrates that the actor's imagination of the thoughts of the other in "role-taking," simultaneously anticipates and contributes to the rhetorical
susceptibility of that other. Perhaps, then, the actor's role expectancy in "role-taking" may be a necessary pre-condition to effective persuasion.

Thus, the actor's "expectation" in "role-taking" is important to the process of persuasion because it sets forth a predisposition (on the part of the actor) which anticipates and contributes to the manipulation of the other toward some pre-determined end. "The salesman," to use the language of Turner, "who tries to create the impression that he would rather lose the sale than sell a person what he does not want, or the propagandist attempting to appear 'folksy,' and the counselor responding nonevaluatively to his client, are all trying to manipulate the image of themselves held by the other so as to foster their purposes."111

The importance of the actor's "expectation" in the process of persuasion, however, is not peculiar to "Role Theory." It is a recurrent theme in the literature of persuasion, and is addressed, for instance, in the critical principles relative to rhetoric discussed by Kenneth Burke.

Kenneth Burke. In Language As Symbolic Action, Kenneth Burke portrays man as "the symbol-using animal."112 Moreover, he maintains that man uses his symbolic behavior or language to construct a hierarchic world order in which he can live.

Thus, man is inescapably "rhetorical," according to Burke. "[T]he whole range of his activity," he writes, "from a man's inner subconscous conflicts to the highest kind of conscious abstraction, is rhetoric."113
Maintaining further that the human organism's symbolic action is constantly being modified by personal motives, Burke initiated a search for a critical methodology that would enable the critic to discover the meaningful motives which lay hidden beneath the modified language.

He developed a "dramatistic" pentad which views man's symbolic action from five different perspectives. Burke describes his critical tool as "dramatistic" because it invites one to consider the matter of motives in a perspective that, being developed from drama, treats language and thought as modes of action.\(^{115}\)

Once again, the five terms of the dramatistic pentad are: (1) Act. (2) Scene. (3) Agent, (4) Agency, and (5) Purpose. These perspectives are not mutually exclusive, but rather overlap to form pentadic ratios, where one element may dominate (control) in one configuration, and recede in yet another.

Thus, the dramatistic pentad enables the critic to better apprehend human motivation by making it easier for him to sift through the rhetor's symbolic action, and discover which pentadic element is controlling his world view.\(^{115}\) To use the language of Burke, the pentad is used to unmask the rhetor's motives through the "revelation of the strategic spots at which ambiguities necessarily arise in language."\(^{116}\)

The rhetorical imperative behind Burkean pentadic ratios, and the same one that gives rhetorical impetus to the notion of "role-taking" in Role Theory, presupposes the existence of ideological division. This division is evidenced in the latter case, by virtue of the fact that the actor, before reducing the psychological distance
between himself and some designated other, is first required to take, imagine, or impute the role of that other. Burkeian thought, on the other hand, uses the conscious and unconscious appeals of "identification" to achieve the same goal.

"Role-taking" and "identification," then, both aim at the ideological unification of interactants, by having them imaginatively anticipate or expect the cognitive processes of the other. Nomenclature notwithstanding, perhaps these two concepts differ only in scope.

Our earlier discussion of Role Theory, for instance, explained that the actor who "role-takes," imaginatively anticipates the cognitive processes of the other. This explanation, however, leaves the word "imagination" undefined, and is unable to account for the way in which an actor becomes what Burke calls "consubstantial" with the other.

Burke's treatment of "identification," on the other hand, is more developed than Role Theory's explanation of "role-taking." He generates several "identification" strategies which illustrate quite well how the ideological division between the rhetor and his audience is bridged.

The common enemy, political secular prayer, transcendence, merger and division, and figurative language represent several "identification" described by Burke. However, a close examination of only one of these devices will be sufficient to illustrate how "identification" works.

The "common enemy," for instance, is exemplary of an "identification" device that has been used as a rhetorical ploy throughout the history of man's attempt to influence others. King Herod villified
the Christians, Hitler imagined the threat of an international Jewish conspiracy, and cold war politicians in the United States have more recently portrayed Communists as their arch-villains. Burke artfully examines the anatomy of this strategy. He observes:

If a movement must have its Rome, it must also have its devil. For as Russell pointed out years ago, an important ingredient of unity in the Middle Ages (an ingredient that long did its unifying work despite the many factors driving toward disunity) was the symbol of the "common enemy," the Prince of Evil himself. Men who can unite on nothing else can unite on the basis of a foe shared by all.117

The "common enemy" is one of many identification devices that seeks to lessen the psychological division which separates men. We have all experienced feelings of acrimony in the presence of an arch-nemesis, and our emotion memories have little trouble "identifying" with this universal appeal.

The "common enemy," as in the manipulative dimension of "role-taking" discussed earlier, is similarly used to evoke a precise response from a receiver, or persuade. In fact, "identification" techniques like the "common enemy" have been built into the design of persuasive literature throughout the ages. Burke, for instance, comments on the propagandistic dimension of John Milton's Aeropagitica. He notes:

The prose reference is clearly rhetorical. It occurs in a work written with a definite audience [the other] in mind, and for a definite purpose. It was literature for "use." Today, it would be called "propaganda."118
Pursuing further this notion of "literature for use," Burke next bears on the suasory imagery found in Milton's epic work, "Samson Agonistes, A Dramatic Poem." Here, he claims that Milton designed his "literature for use," in order to simultaneously mask and make public his opinion in a historical period of oppressive political censorship.

The allegorical quality of Milton’s poem affords the reader two levels of meaning, according to Burke. The first one, re-creates a seemingly innocuous biblical tale about Samson's martyrdom in the face of the Philistine enemy. However, the second level of meaning boldly communicates Milton’s adamant opposition to an oppressive inquisition. Moreover, these two levels of "identification" strongly suggest a "role" interpretation of "literature for use." Burke observes, in this regard:

Here too, though still more remotely, would be "literature for use:" the poetic reenactment of Samson's role could give pretexts for admitting a motive which, if not so clothed or complicated, if confronted in its simplicity, would have been inadmissible. By dramatic subterfuge, Milton could include what he would have had to exclude if reduced to a conceptually analytic statement.

Put differently, it can be said that Milton "imagined," "identified," or took the role of Samson (the other) in order to satisfy his rhetorical impulse or exigence; then re-enacted it symbolically in verse. Embodied in his persuasive effort was Milton's "expectation" that his dramatic subterfuge could criticize public policy with impunity.
Thus, the rhetorical effectiveness of "literature for use," according to Burke, is largely bound to the rhetor's ability to "expect" or "identify" the role of the other. This reciprocity between rhetorical "expectation" and persuadability is pervasive, and equally applicable to other persuasive contexts. Nowhere does this seem more apparent to me than in the ethnological writings of Erving Goffman.

Erving Goffman. The writings of Erving Goffman bear heavily on the nonverbal dimension of human communication, variously understood as proxemics, micro-sociology, face-to-face-interaction, and human ethology. "Public order," the neologism Goffman affixes to his research, is defined as, "the ground rules and the associative orderings of behavior that pertain to public life—to persons co-mingling and to places and social occasions where face-to-face contact occurs."121

Much in his exhaustive investigation of public order holds implication for the nature of the reciprocity that exists between rhetorical "expectation" and human persuasion. However, Goffman's writings on "face-work" and "demeanor" appear especially relevant to this relationship.

The notion of "face-work," for instance, is largely dependent on certain ritual elements in social interaction where people find themselves in face-to-face or mediated contact with other participants. The individual involved in social encounters of this nature acts out a "line," according to Goffman, or "a pattern of verbal and nonverbal acts by which he expresses his view of the situation and through this his evaluation of the participants, especially."122 Regardless of
intentionality, other participants will assume that this individual has taken a stand, and in order to deal with this impression or image, the individual must consider the impression which others have imputed to him.

The concept of "face," then, is the image that a person claims for himself by the "line" others assume he has taken during an encounter. Moreover, this individual attaches personal feelings to the "face" he adopts, and becomes emotionally close to it. The success of "face-work" hinges, to large measure, upon our foregoing concern of "expectation."

If events, for instance, should establish a "face" for the individual that is better than he expected, then the individual is persuaded to feel good about himself. However, if his expectations are not fulfilled, then this "face" persuades the individual to feel badly or hurt. Soffman explains:

A person may be said to "have" or "be in" or "maintain" face when the line he effectively takes presents an image of him that is internally consistent, that is supported by judgments and evidence conveyed by other participants,... A person may be said to be "in wrong face" when information is brought forth in some way about his social worth which cannot be integrated, even with effort, into the line that is being sustained for him. A person may be said to "be out of face" when he participates in a contact with others without having ready a line of the kind participants in such situations are expected to take.

The persuasive dimension of "face-work" is thus largely a matter of tacit understandings between interactants which involve reciprocal expectancies and anticipatory projections. In certain
communicative contexts, like the ritual "noblese oblige" of polite
society (where those of high social status abstain from embarrassing
lessers), the presence of "expectation" is painfully obvious. How­
ever, in other situations, like the subtle exchange of turn-yielding
signals in spoken interaction, its detection is largely intuitive.

Goffman's appraisal of "demeanor" more closely approximates the
former, more obvious interpretation of "expectation." "Demeanor," he
observes, "[is] that element of the individual's ceremonial behavior
typically conveyed through deportment, dress, and bearing, which
serves to express to those in his immediate presence that he is a
person of certain desirable or undesirable qualities." Applied to
a proprietor-customer interaction, this notion of "demeanor" takes on
more clarity.

Upon walking into a mercantile, for instance, a customer antici­
pates (or "role-takes") the proprietor's expectations of what his
"customer" behavior should be. The proprietor, on the other hand,
simultaneously imagines (or "role-takes") the customer's expectations
of what a "merchant's" behavior should be. Thus, the public "demeanor"
of each actor in the proprietor-customer interaction just discussed, is
largely a matter of transacting or exchanging the mutual expectancies
of the other.

The notion of "expectation" in public order, then, is as important
to one's "demeanor," as it is to the existence of the foregoing concept
of "face-work." Perhaps "persuasion," conceived as the cooperative
dimension of public order, would be unattainable in the absence of
public "expectation." Goffman's illustration of the nurse-patient
relationship can be used to evidence this claim. He writes:

Rules of conduct impinge upon the individual in two general ways: directly as "obligations," establishing how he is morally constrained to conduct himself; indirectly, as "expectations," establishing how others are morally bound to act in regard to him. A nurse, for example, has an obligation to follow medical orders in regard to her patients; she has the expectation, on the other hand, that her patients will pliantly co-operate in allowing her to perform these actions upon them. This pliancy, in turn, can be seen as an obligation of the patients in regard to their nurse, and points up the inter-personal, actor-recipient character of many rules: what is one man's obligation will often be another's expectation.

Goffman's illustration lends support to the claim that "expectation" and "persuasion" are inextricably interwoven. Society, for example, has taught patients to pliantly co-operate with public "demeanor" that is consistent with their "line" of nurse-like expectancies. Thus, the nurse's "demeanor" in nurse-patient "face-work" is never challenged by the patient, and affords the former considerable influence over the latter.

This formidable potential for persuasion, whether in health-care agents, or megalomaniacal politicians, is predicated on the kind of mutual expectancies involved. "Expectation" dictates societal obligations, and to a large degree, the persuasive import of public order.

However, other social investigators have sought to examine the more personal and less public nature of "expectation" in the literature of persuasion. In this regard, the research of George Kelly holds special relevance for our study.
George Kelly. Perhaps the humanistic research of George Kelly speaks more directly to the role of personal "expectation" in rhetorical communication than any of the theories previously discussed. It's unique perspective grew out of Kelly's experiences as an aviation psychologist during World War II.

Kelly observed that individuals display a tendency to think and act in accordance with what past experience has taught them to "expect." People, in other words, literally live in anticipation of events.

Kelly's interpretation of human behavior, then, steers clear of organismic or biologic explanations of man's activities, and prefers instead to liken the behavior of individuals to that of lay scientists, who draw upon previous experience to achieve lives of prediction and control. Though everyone's experience is different, all individuals experience events in the same manner, according to Kelly.

Individuals apprehend the world through a psychological lens of self-imposed constructs. In other words, they mediate events by way of a system of transparent patterns which fits over the reality of each experience.

Kelly calls this ability to screen one's experience, "constructive alternativism," because it points up humankind's unique capacity to alter the way in which it perceives the world. He observes in this regard:

"Our formulation...emphasizes the creative capacity of the living thing to represent the environment, not merely respond to it. Because he can represent his environment, he can place alternative constructions upon it and, indeed, do something about it if
it doesn't suit him. To the living creature, then, the universe is real, but it is not inexorable unless he chooses to construe it that way.128

Kelly's portrayal of human behavior offers individuals an alternative to environmental victimization. Shattering the image of man as a pawn to be manipulated, his theory of "constructive alternativism" maintains that individuals can improve their world experience by either adding to their repertory of constructs, modifying them to fit better, subsuming lesser constructs with superordinate ones, or combinations of all three of these psychological adjustments.

The process of "communication" bears heavily on the success of these psychological adjustments because it affords individuals the opportunity to share constructs with one another, build a repertory, and select the system of constructions that is most accommodative to the psychological well-being of the individual. Robert R. Honaghan notes the centrality of "communication" to the success of "constructive alternativism." "Communication is important to us," he observes, "because we need a clear construction and an extension of ourselves to 'reality'--and a major part of this construction includes another person or persons and their construction of 'reality'."129

As a corollary to Honaghan's claim, it may be added that rhetorical communication operates under the assumption that the construct being communicated will be understood, and acted upon by the auditor. The communicator thus seeks to re-create the attitudes, values, and beliefs of the perceiver, and this reconstruction is largely a consequence of the communicator's personal "expectation."
If the communicator's "expectation" of the receiver's system of construction is incorrect, then the latter will view the communication as nonsensical or meaningless. However, if both share the same system of construction, identification and eventually persuasion will occur.

Thus, "communication" is largely a matter of construing the systems of construction which guide and direct the behavior of others, and this construing or re-creating is based on what previous experience has taught communicators to "expect." Monaghan's graphic interpretation of the communication "consultant-client" interaction below illustrates, quite well, the role which "expectation" plays in the communication of constructs.

Briefly, the diagram seeks to show the way in which a communication consultant might use "constructive alternativism" to help solve a client's communication-related problem. The consultant must first
help his client isolate the pattern of self-expectations which constitute the client's system of construction or world view. In other words, these expectations represent the client's extended relationship with reality, and their communication (extension) might be best understood as a continuous flow of risks exhibiting various levels of probability and predictiveness.

If, for instance, a client's communicative hunch is consistent with his projected outcome, then his expectations are said to be valid, and the client's communicative experience thought to be pleasurable, predictive, and pursued with greater confidence. However, if an inconsistency is evidenced, then the client's expectations are invalid, and he must opt for one of two alternatives.

Monaghan calls the first choice "functional" because the client acknowledges his mistake, and realizes that he must re-create a more appropriate set of constructions based on an equally new set of expectations. This alternative fosters personal competence, communicative accuracy, and what has traditionally been called "learning." The client's communicative behavior may be likened to that of Kelly's earlier analogy of lay scientist.

The second choice, on the other hand, is less desirable because it can result in any number of ingenious reality-avoidance explanations. These "dysfunctional" alternatives distort the client's expectations, and proffer inappropriate, unpredictable communicative behavior.

Thus, Monaghan's application of Kelly's theory of "constructive alternativism" to the communication consultant-client dyad serves to shed additional light on the role of personal "expectation" in the
process of rhetorical communication. Just as our relationships with the surgeon, priest, and legalist reinforce our expectations of good health, dauntless faith, and equality in justice, so too should the role of communication consultant inspire a similar confidence in the ability to communicate effectively.

This confidence once again points up the reciprocity which exists between "expectation" and rhetorical communication. The research of J. Edward Hulett, Jr. still bears more heavily on this recurrent theme in the literature of persuasion.


Mead observed, in this connection, that human behavior appears to be the consequence of three psychological interactants: (1) society, (2) the self, and (3) the mind. Society, for instance, is depicted as that which gives rise to the composite of social functions and role definitions reflected in human behavior. Individuals draw upon this "generalized other," the neologism Mead ascribes to this reservoir of social roles, in order to establish a personal role concept, or sense of "self."

The communication of public images or "significant symbols" affords the "self" the opportunity to interact with "society," according to Mead. These symbols serve in three capacities:
(1) the capacity to use symbolic communication, (2) the "reflexive" capacity to become an object to oneself, i.e., to place oneself in the external environment along with other objects, and respond to oneself in the same fashion as one responds to other objects; and (3) the "empathic" capacity to take the role of the other, or participate in the attitudes and characteristics of another.\textsuperscript{132}

The communicative exchange of "significant symbols" between the "self" and "society" gives rise to a kind of public "mind," the third psychological construct in Mead's theory. This outgrowth of the self-society communication facilitates social integration and generates individual or personal definition. Human communication, then, is at the ideological seat of "social behaviorism" or "symbolic interactionism."

Simultaneously, aware of communication's centrality to Mead's theory, and dissatisfied with socio-psychological theories of human communication (which only gave simplistic S-R explanations of communicative behavior), Hulett developed a symbolic interactionist theory of human communication. "This would be a theory," Hulett maintains, "that begins not with the individual merely responding to an environing social system but with the individual conceived as an entity that is a product of a social system and also an integral part of that system by virtue of the fact that through socialization it has incorporated the structure and dynamics of the social system in itself."\textsuperscript{133}

Hulett holds, furthermore, that a symbolic interactionist model of human communication is advantageous because it contains two
attractive features. He claims, for instance, that such a model presents a "naturalistic" approach to human communication. In other words, the perspective points up the idea that people speak in languages, not in their models, and a "naturalistic" view portrays the communicative act "as a social process," to use the language of Hulett, "in which some of the events take place 'within' and others take place 'between' the individuals involved."\(^{134}\)

A second advantage to be found in a symbolic interactionist interpretation of human communication stems from the notion that such a perspective affords the investigator a more profound understanding of the communicative process. This is largely due to symbolic interactionism's tendency to foster continuity on several planes of thought while simultaneously announcing its own fresh perspective in concert with the recapitulated findings of past research. "The second advantage of the symbolic interactionist model," Hulett confirms, "is that it would posit a single but multilevel system within which the act occurs and would provide a set of hypothetical constructs designed to show the logical interconnections between the consistent events of the act occurring both within and between individuals."\(^{135}\)

Thus, inspired by these advantageous features, Hulett designed, according to symbolic interactionist principles, a general model of communication as a social act. Though a detailed examination of Hulett's model is beyond the scope of our study, the brief overview of his theory which follows bears heavily on our later discussion of the relationship which exists between the "covert rehearsal" phase of his design, and rhetorical "expectation."
In this regard, Hulett calls the first stage of his "Symbolic Interactionist Model of Human Communication," the "motivating stimulus" phase. This symbolic interactionist dimension depicts the dynamic relationship which exists between "Alpha," the source or encoder, and the stimulus object, or any response-inducing property.

The response-inducing property of an object is generated by the responding (acting) organism in the communicative act. More specifically, the source may be said to impute to the environmental stimulus a context of his or her individual choice.

Selection of a particular context instigates "covert rehearsal," the phase of Hulett's model that will be examined more closely later on. In "covert rehearsal," the source composes a series of internalized "trial run" messages which supposedly reflect what he or she expects or anticipates to be most persuasive in Beta's perception.

Hulett draws upon Sears' psychological concept known as "anticipatory response" to describe further this notion of "covert rehearsal." "Alpha develops expectancies with respect to the forthcoming supportive behavior of "Beta," he observes, "expectancies that Beta will perform some action of his own that will produce the environmental change required to enable Alpha to attain his goal and satisfy his anticipatory response."136

The source, upon completion of "covert rehearsal," generates the message he or she expects to be most persuasive or instrumental to his or her purpose. This "instrumental act" or third phase of Hulett's model, constitutes the receiver's "motivating stimulus." Here, the
receiver or Beta seeks to decode the source's message by repeating the same three-stage sequence of events (i.e., the motivating stimulus, covert rehearsal, and the instrumental act) previously performed by Alpha.

Finally, if the expectancies of Alpha and Beta are realized, then the latter's "instrumental act" should generate the appropriate "environmental event" and "goal response" stages sought by the source. The communication theorist would call the successful completion of these last two phases, persuasion! Hulett explains, in this regard:

Alpha's task is to generate and transmit a message that will be accepted as an input by Beta. In turn this input will motivate Beta to perform the process of decoding—of transforming the input symbol pattern into stimuli that will activate the appropriate processes in his own behavior system, with the result that he will change his behavior in the way desired by Alpha. This may be a change of attitude, opinion or value (as in the process of persuasion)....

Thus, the "goal response" phase of this Alpha-Beta transaction may be conceived as an index of the source's persuasive efforts. Moreover, it is the catalytic agent which triggers Beta's "environmental event," and ultimately his or her "goal response," hence completing the communicative act between source and receiver.

Much of Hulett's symbolic interactionist model of human communication holds significance for theory in persuasion. However, his notion of "covert rehearsal" bears particular relevance to our inquiry into rhetorical "expectation."
"Covert rehearsal," the third phase of Hulett's symbolic interactionist model, houses the anticipatory response mechanism in the Alpha-Beta communicative act. The anticipatory response mechanism is important because it represents the source of rhetorical "expectation," and is activated whenever Alpha interprets his or her motivating stimulus input pattern, and organizes the forthcoming response or "instrumental act."

During "covert rehearsal," Alpha formulates his or her communicative offensive, a rhetorical design that speaks to what Goffman described earlier as "public order," i.e., idiosyncratic elements, which stem from the individual's biosocial traits and "the forms of persuasion and permissible methods of inducement appropriate to each situation...," according to Hulett.138

An individual's awareness of social rules, idiosyncratic elements, and forms of persuasion emanates from his or her "internal information source" or "cognitive map." This internalized card catalogue of information supports the individual's self-concept, role function, and knowledge of social norms. During "covert rehearsal," the "behavior generating process" draws upon the person's "cognitive map" to formulate a succession of mental message rehearsals.

In this connection, intrapersonal and interpersonal "feedback loops" help the individual to generate this succession of trial runs. These message rehearsals usually seek to simultaneously imagine or re-create the source's own behavior (as in "role-playing") and anticipate the expected reactions of the receiver (as in "role-taking"). To use the language of T. R. Sarbin, "the person is shifting
perspectives from his own position to that of the other—'vicariously oscillating'—in a process that could be called 'fine tuning', in which feedback information derived from successive readings of the map of social structure and of social role patterns brings the final organization of the forthcoming overt act as close as possible to the desired criterion. ¹³⁹

Both Alpha and Beta or source and receiver transact this "vicarious process of oscillation" during their respective phases of "covert rehearsal" because they are, by nature, divided. It is this estrangement that necessitates persuasive communication.

Hulett perceives this division or estrangement as problematic. "As a general rule," he maintains, "it might be said that Beta rarely arrives at an assessment of the situation that is identical with Alpha's; therefore from the standpoint of both participants, every social act has a problematical element in its predicted outcome."¹⁴⁰ However, the communication theorist might describe this same situation as "rhetorical."

The "rhetorical situation," according to Bitzer, consists of three fundamental concepts: (1) an exigence, (2) artistic and in-artistic constraints, and (3) the audience. Of the first concept in the "rhetorical situation" Bitzer observes, "Any exigence is an imperfection marked by urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing other than it should be."¹⁴¹

This "exigence" or "need" dimension of the "rhetorical situation" is affected by two classes of constraints: (1) "artistic" and (2) "inartistic." The former constraints are managed or manipulated by
the rhetor's "artistic" facility, i.e., the speaker's logos, pathos, and ethos. "Inartistic" constraints, on the other hand, consist of those extraneous interventions which reside outside of the rhetor's direct control.

The nature of the audience bears heavily on the kinds of "inartistic" constraints a rhetor may encounter. Every "rhetorical situation," for instance, is dependent on the presence of a "rhetorical" audience, or one whose members are perceived to be mediators of change and capable of being influenced by discourse.

In this regard, Bitzer's threefold application of the "rhetorical situation," can be used to better understand Hulett's "Symbolic Interactionist Model of Human Communication." The "motivating stimulus" phase of the latter, for instance, could be likened to Bitzer's notion of the rhetorical "exigence."

Here, both rhetor and receiver discover a situation that is other than it should be. Consequently, they respond to this imperfection by generating a message that is most appropriate to the resolution of that problem.

Extending our rhetorical analogy further, Bitzer might consider Hulett's portrayal of the Alpha-Beta interaction, as a study in "artistic" and "inartistic" constraints. The former, for instance, is evidenced as each interactant draws on his or her repertory of logical, ethical, and pathetic appeals during role-playing and role-taking (in their respective phases of "covert rehearsal") in order to re-construct the other's "cognitive map." "Inartistic" constraints, on the other hand, could encompass a host of obstructive influences on
the Alpha-Beta communicative act, ranging from poor acoustics to any number of intervening variables capable of playing havoc with what Hulett described earlier as "feedback loops."

The foregoing comparison draws to a close as we liken Bitzer's conception of the "rhetorical" audience to Hulett's definition of "goal response." According to Hulett, both Alpha and Beta seek persuasion by way of their respective "goal responses."

From the standpoint of the rhetorical theorist, these "goal responses" represent the corresponding rhetorical ends of both rhetor and audience; ends which can only be realized cooperatively. The "goal response" of Alpha, for instance, is met in cooperation with the change agent or "rhetorical" audience known as Beta. Beta, on the other hand, looks to Alpha in order to accomplish the "goal response" which is appropriate to his or her persuasive end.

Persuasion, or the satisfaction of Alpha and Beta's respective "goal responses," is largely contingent upon Alpha and Beta's mutual "expectation" that each will serve cooperatively as the other's change agent or "rhetorical" audience. In this connection, Hulett would argue, from the standpoint of symbolic interactionism, that each agent's "expectation" occurs during "covert rehearsal." Moreover, as a corollary to this claim, Bitzer might add, more rhetorically, that Hulett's notion of "expectation" is derived from the hypothesis that Alpha and Beta achieve persuasion (i.e., their appropriate "goal responses") by cooperatively functioning as a "rhetorical" audience to the other.
FIGURE 1 Block Diagram of a Social Act Between Two Interacting Individuals According to Symbolic Interactionist Principles

Heavy arrows indicate the sequence of events in the act.
Light arrows indicate feedback loops:
a, a': intrapersonal feedback loops
b, b': interpersonal feedback loops

See Figure 2 for detail of covert rehearsal.
**FIGURE 2** The Covert Rehearsal of Either Participant in a Social Act, According to Symbolic Interactionist Principles
Summarizing, Kulett's model of human communication is founded on symbolic interactionism, an approach to human behavior that can be enhanced by rhetorical theory. The ideological division or estrangement, for instance, encountered in Kulett's notion of "the motivating stimulus" phase, as well as his emphasis on the agent's "expectation" or anticipatory mechanism activated during "covert rehearsal," which Kulett sees as "the heart of the entire process," are unmistakably rhetorical features. His "Symbolic Interactionist Model of Human Communication" once again serves to point up the centrality of rhetorical "expectation" to human persuasion, a cause that others have taken up in the literature of persuasion.

Philosophers of language, for example, have found the idea of rhetorical "expectation" particularly intriguing. Perhaps this view is most thoughtfully examined in the philosophical writings of Stephen Toulmin.

Stephen Toulmin. In "Rhetorical Criticism As Argument," Wayne Brockriede observes that rhetorical criticism is "useful" only when it argues, and defines argument as "the process whereby people reason their way from one set of problematic ideas to the choice of another." Moreover, argument is distinguished by six basic features: (1) an inferential leap from existing beliefs to the adoption of a new belief or the reinforcement of an old one; (2) a rationale to support this leap; (3) a choice of two or more competing claims where individuals perceive a limited choice; (4) a regulation of uncertainty to avoid quibbling or debating foregone conclusions; (5) a willingness to risk confrontation with one's peers; and (6)
a common frame of reference.\textsuperscript{143}

The development of these six features in varying degrees represents what Brockriede calls "significant argument." Only "significant argument" can function as useful criticism because it fosters "explanation," the touchstone of critical excellence.\textsuperscript{144}

The headspring of Brockriede's argument may be found in The Uses of Argument by epistemologist and logician Stephen Toulmin. In this volume Toulmin advances a conceptual model of inductive reasoning to critically diagram the dynamic structure of argument.

According to Toulmin, inductive argument consists of at least three essential features, and sometimes as many as six. These argumentative features unfold as: (1) the claim; (2) the data; (3) the warrant; (4) the support for the warrant; (5) the reservations; and (6) the qualifier. A thoughtful examination of Toulmin's theory of argument applied to rhetoric, in this regard, is described by John Hakay.\textsuperscript{145}

For Toulmin, the "claim," for instance, constitutes any idea or conclusion a speaker wants the audience to understand or accept. His interpretation of "data" represents any supporting material a rhetor might present to the audience in order to evidence the "claim."

The speaker's "warrant," on the other hand, is defined as a more general belief than the one associated with "data." Its presence usually implies an inferential leap or gymnastic of the rhetor's mind from "data" to "claim."

In this regard, both "data" and "warrant" can be subdivided into authoritative, motivative, and substantive specific and general beliefs.
Authoritative specific and general beliefs are derived, as the name implies, from an authority to be understood or accepted by an audience. Motivative specific and general beliefs spawn from the intrapersonal (self-satisfaction or personal fulfillment), interpersonal (love, belongingness), physical (biologic), and task-centered (work) needs which motivate individuals. Substantive specific and general beliefs, however, emanate from facts about objects, behavior, and observed events.\textsuperscript{146}

Although these specific and general beliefs of "data" and "warrant" are, in concert with the "claim," explicit in all forms of argument, the same cannot be said of "support for the warrant," the "reservations." and the "qualifier." These latter three features are frequently only implied.

"Support for the warrant," for instance, puts forth information which provides backing for the "warrant." This backing is often inextricably bound to the "reservations," which can serve to alert the audience to conditions that raise questions about the cogency of the "claim." In this connection, the "qualifier" is used to identify the cogency of the claim, thus modifying it in accordance with the perceptions of the audience.\textsuperscript{147}

Thus, the Toulmin model enables the rhetorical critic to critically trace the diagrammatic flow of argument with facility. In figure three we can see a basic illustration of an argument diagrammed by using the Toulmin methodology.
TOULMIN MODEL

DATA
Niagara Falls is eroding at a rate of 1 ft. per 10 years

WARRANT
Only the inculcation of precautionary measures will insure the preservation of this natural monument

RESERVATIONS
Unless the water current shifts and the rate of erosion is minimized

BACKING
We are all familiar with the devastation caused by unbridled water erosion

Figure 3

Figure three applies the Toulmin methodology to a hypothetical question: "Resolved: Should precautionary measures be inculcated in order to insure the preservation of Niagara Falls?" Here, the diagrammatic logic of the Toulmin model first examines the "data" of the speaker's argument.

The speaker's "data" is represented by the substantive fact that Niagara Falls is eroding at the rate of one foot per ten years. From this "specific belief" the speaker next moves inductively to a more "general belief" or "warrant."
The "warrant" or general belief that "Only the inculcation of precautionary measures will insure the preservation of Niagara Falls," must be supported. It is "backed" or evidenced by the substantive fact that "water erosion devastates the land."

Having reasoned his or her way from "data" to "warrant," the rhetor infers the central "claim," i.e., "Precautionary measures must be inculcated in order to preserve Niagara Falls." However, this "claim" can be modified by both the "qualifier" and the "reservations."

The former, for instance, submits that 99% of the geologists consulted supported the claim that "Precautionary measures must be inculcated in order to preserve Niagara Falls," and thus serves to strengthen it. The "reservations," conversely, negate the "claim" by introducing the possibility that "the water may shift to minimize the rate of erosion."

Thus, the Toulmin methodology applied to the hypothetical illustration in figure three tends to point up the idea that each belief or pattern of thought in the inductive flow of argument proceeds incrementally, in a piecemeal fashion, from antecedent information. In other words, the ideological movement of argument is such, that personal experience anticipates the rhetor's knowledge of the "data," the "data" leads to knowledge of the "warrant," and this inductive chain of information produces the arguer's "claim."

The Toulmin model's diagrammatic logic tells much about the nature of rhetorical "knowing." It reveals that before a rhetor can generate effective rhetorical communication, he or she must draw
on personal experiences of the past in order to "anticipate" what
persuasive appeals should be used in his or her message construction.
Moreover, this re-enactment of the past or "role-playing" serves to
support or evidence the rhetor's persuasive projections, as he or
she "role-takes" in order to estimate the nature of his or her
audience's expectancies. "We can expect an audience to accept a
claim," Mudd and Sillars argue in this regard, "only when that claim
is adequately justified. This means the data must be sound and the
warrant must be relevant."  

The Toulmin methodology, conceived as a critical index of sound
and relevant argumentation, serves, once again, to re-state the
epistemological importance of "expectation" to rhetorical "knowing."
The headspring of its experiential design finds its origin in human
"expectation," or what Toulmin has called "estimates of probability."

In "Probability and Expectation," Toulmin draws upon the busi-
ness procedure of insurance companies to illustrate further his
notion of "estimates of probability." He observes:

What it is, we can remind ourselves if we re-
call how an insurance company comes to dis-
tinguish between an estimate of probability
which can reasonably be relied on and a
faulty or incorrect one. If the doctor
lies, or the computer misreads the tables,
or the data themselves are inadequate, then
the estimate which the company will make of
a client's chances of living to the age of
eighty will not be as trustworthy a one as
they think.... When the error comes to
light, they can distinguish between the
client's "real" chance of living to eighty
and their first, faulty estimate. [T]he
light of subsequent events would have been
more trustworthy. Trustworthiness, reli-
ability, these are what distinguish an
"objective" estimate of the chances of an event from a mere expression of confident belief. And it is in ignoring the need for estimates of probability to be "reliable" that the subjectivist (who talks only about degrees of belief) is at fault. What factors are relevant, what kind of classification will in fact prove most reliable, these are things which insurance companies and actuaries can discover only in the course of time, from experience.148

Perhaps the above explanation of Toulmin's predictive use of "estimates of probability" drawn from direct experience or observation (as opposed to subjective belief) seems reminiscent of rhetoric's "managerial" role described earlier. However, this similitude to a post-scientific function is minimized as one observes Toulmin's scientific pre-occupation with rigorous rhetorical standards (i.e., sound data, relevant warrants, and the like), standards founded on the rhetorical "expectation" which infuses his diagrammatic logic.

The Toulmin model of inductive reasoning applied to argument thus registers as yet another critical effort to better understand how we come to "know" through argument. It suggests that argument may best be conceived as the result of a procession of antecedent, debate-like events which occur sequentially in the head.

Earlier, Hulett put forth the "covert rehearsal" phase of his symbolic interactionist model of human communication to evidence the existence of a similar internalized parliament. Psychologist Edward C. Tolman, in this regard, provides additional insight into persuasive communication. Moreover, his research on the "cognitive map" concept can be used to further strengthen our belief in the centrality of rhetorical "expectation" to the communicative process.
Edward C. Tolman. Initially, in *Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men* (1932), and in a latter volume entitled, *Drives Toward War* (1942), Edward C. Tolman developed a theory of learning called "Purposive Behaviorism." His research represented a unique effort to wed to the systematic methodology of behavioral science, the more humanistic principles of Gestalt psychology.

Tolman's theory of "Purposive Behaviorism" grew out of his lifelong study of maze learning in rats. This experimentation produced an axiomatic principle in behavior called the "fundamental law of acquisition." Briefly, Tolman's law maintains that animal maze learning consists of the building-up of sign-Gestalts.

Sign-Gestalts may best be understood as internal or cognitive processes which consist of learned relationships between experimental cues and an animal's expectations. The experimental cues emanate from experimental manipulation, but the animal's expectations is largely a product of its internalized pattern of sign-Gestalts, or what Tolman describes as the animal's "cognitive map." In this connection, he observes:

In the course of learning, something like a field map of the environment gets established in the rat's brain.... The central office is far more like a map control room than it is like an old-fashioned telephone exchange. The stimuli which are allowed in, are not connected by just simple one-to-one switches to the outgoing responses. Rather, the incoming impulses are usually worked over and elaborated in the central control room into a tentative, cognitive-like map of the environment. And it is this tentative map, indicating routes and paths and environmental relationships, which finally determines what responses, if any, the animal will finally release.
Three types of experiments can be used to evidence the existence of this "central control room," according to Tolman: (1) place learning, (2) latent learning, and (3) reward-expectancy learning studies. Place and latent learning experiments hold less implication for our study than the last type, and are discussed here only insofar as they point up the significance of reward-expectancy designs.

Place learning experiments seek to create a situation where the animal learns a maze that contains cues which favor going to the same "place" in the maze, irrespective of whether the animal's response remains the same or not. For example, if the animal began to run the maze from a different direction than it had originally, then it would have to first learn to get to a specific place by making say, a right turn, then back to the same place by making a left turn. Tolman maintains that this type of learning is easier for animals to apprehend than "response learning," because the rat learns to go to different places, but always by making the same directional turn.

Like place learning, latent learning also serves to evidence the validity of Tolman's "cognitive map" concept. This experimental design unfolds initially by having nonhungry animals wander, unrewarded, through a maze for a designated number of time trials. Next, these same animals are made hungry, and given a reward after having negotiated the maze. The findings illustrated that their rapid catching-up to regularly rewarded animals suggests that the rats had been learning incidentally, even though they had not generated responses which led them through the maze.
Tolman’s expectancy-reward studies hold more implication for the centrality of "expectation" to rhetorical "knowing" than does his research on place and latent learning. Though aimed primarily at the authentication of the existence of an internal information source, the design of expectancy-reward experimentation is markedly different from those of place and latent learning research.

In expectancy-reward experiments, animals are taught to negotiate a maze for a highly desirable reward (cheese). When the reward is suddenly switched to a less favorable type of food (bread), the animal’s behavior becomes obviously disturbed. Tolman claims that this disturbance may be interpreted as the animal’s "expectancy" for the more favored food.

If Tolman’s conclusion is correct, then perhaps expectancy-reward findings can be used not only to validate the existence of a similar cognitive source in the human organism, but could provide behavioristic support for the centrality of "expectation" in rhetorical communication. In this regard, the overt (S-C-R) behavior witnessed in expectancy-reward animals, for instance, might be used to lend support to Hulett’s more theoretical premise that the probability of effective communication (i.e., "persuasion" or rhetorical "knowing") is largely a matter of "lining up" source-receiver "expectancies" during "covert rehearsal."

At this point we need to remember that the "covert rehearsal" phase of Hulett’s "Symbolic Interactionist Model of Human Communication," serves to house the "anticipatory response" mechanism in the communicative act between Alpha and Beta (i.e., source and receiver).
Here, once again, the encoder can draw upon his or her "internal information source" or "cognitive map" in order to tentatively construct the "cognitive map" of the receiver.

With this estimate of the receiver's expectancies in mind, the source literally designs his or her persuasive message or "instrumental act." The receiver, on the other hand, may reciprocate by simulating the source's "internal information source," and generating a response or "instrumental act" which reflects his estimation of the source's expectancies.

During this anticipatory process, both source and receiver employ intrapersonal and interpersonal feedback loops in order to oscillate vicariously, or shift perspectives from their own position to that held by the other. We need to also remember that Hulett borrowed Sarbin's notion of "fine tuning" to describe the process whereby source and receiver polish their estimates of the expectancies held by the other.

With this review of Hulett's concept of "covert rehearsal," and the role which source-receiver expectancies play in that phase of the communicative act, the relevance of Tolman's research can be seen. It is abundantly clear, in this regard, that Tolman's expectancy-reward research is, at face, less a commentary on rhetorical communication than it is a contribution to operant conditioning.

However, expectancy-reward studies do point up the possibility of at least the theoretical existence of a relationship between expectancy behavior and the "internal information source" which generates it. Though the exact nature of this expectancy-"internal
information source" liaison is unknown, Kulett's theoretical concept of "covert rehearsal" may be submitted as one plausible explanation.

If, for instance, Tolman's "infrahuman" theory of the relationship that exists between animal expectancy and their "internal information source" can be generalized to "human" behavior, as Hulett, Head, and others argue, then evidence for the psychological reality of an "expectancy generating device" like the "covert rehearsal" phase of the communicative act, is strengthened. Moreover, if "this heart of the communication process," to use the language of Hulett, does have psychological reality, then source-receiver expectancies, the hallmarks of "covert rehearsal," must, by necessity, be assigned new significance in the communicative process.

Thus, the collective research of Tolman and Hulett is complementary. Hulett's notion of "covert rehearsal," for instance, when applied to Tolman's findings, offers a theoretical explanation for the nature of the relationship that exists between expectancy behavior, and its inspirational source. Tolman's expectancy-reward research, on the other hand, provides, at once, plausible behavioristic support for the psychological reality of "covert rehearsal," and the centrality of "expectation" to rhetorical communication.

Edward Tolman's theory of "Purposive Behaviorism" represents the last of several variations on a common theme. As in the case of the investigative efforts of those who have preceded it, once again, it has argued persuasively for the view which portrays rhetorical communication as a "way of knowing" that arises from the "seeking" behavior of the rhetor and the "judging" behavior of his audience. Moreover,
Tolman's findings have also helped to re-state our consistent belief that much of rhetorical Epistemology is inspired by the intrapersonal or internalized activity of source-receiver "expectations."

Here, Tolman's investigation of expectancy-reward learning was used to advance the argument that such a view lends itself admirably to anticipatory nature so recently used by Scott and others to characterize rhetoric as the rationale of the contingent. Expressed consistently in the various codes of role theory, Burkeian criticism, constructive alternativism, public order, symbolic interactionism, inductive reasoning, and behavioral science, Tolman's research has again helped to argue that rhetorical "expectation" lies at the epistemological seat of persuasive communication.

In summation, I have worked to establish the idea that rhetorical "expectation" and human persuadability are inextricably bound together. The insights derived from my assessment of role theory, Burkeian criticism, public order, symbolic interactionism, inductive reasoning, and behavioral science suggest that this reciprocity is a prerequisite to every face-to-face communicative transaction.

However, my appraisal of these investigative efforts cannot be used to determine whether the reciprocity that exists between rhetorical "expectation" and human persuadability translate equally well from a face-to-face (small group or one-to-many) context to a mass movement communicative setting. In this connection, the mass movement research of Smith and Windes can be helpful.

In their essay, "The Innovational Movement: A Rhetorical Theory," Smith and Windes generate a "policy" distinction that functions
ultimately to differentiate between the rhetoric of innovational movements and the languaging strategies of establishment-conflict social movements. Cited earlier, the distinction, in effect, maintains that it is the innovational movement's rhetorical "expectation" that the changes it demands will not disturb the symbols and constraints of the existing social order (unlike the establishment-conflict aim to disrupt the existing social order).153

The authors' inclusion of the pivotal term "expectation" in their "policy" distinction sustains two significant implications. The first suggests that the reciprocity that exists between rhetorical "expectation" and human persuadability translates equally well from a face-to-face context to a communicative setting of an innovational mass movement. The second implication supports the first, insofar as it maintains that it is this accommodative innovational attitude toward the notion of rhetorical "expectation" that may function to establish the Smith-Windes perspective as a more plausible critical alternative to the establishment-conflict view of the rhetoric of social movements.

It may be said, in connection with the first implication, that Smith and Windes advance a view of innovational persuasion that hinges, to a large measure, on the success of three languaging strategies. The first of these stipulates that innovational spokesmen must be careful neither to call attention to division, nor infuse themselves with guilt, or reject the existence of conflict between their proposed innovation and the values of society. Smith and Windes second languaging strategy mandates that innovational adherents must strive to
emphasize the weakness of traditional institutions, and the strength of traditional values. The third innovational strategy maintains that innovational spokesmen must endeavor to create a dialectic between the innovational scene and the purpose of the movement.154

It is compelling to note that each languaging strategy functions to uphold the nonconflictive rhetorical "expectation" declared earlier in the "policy" distinction. If conflict should emerge from the innovational scene, and thus violate the movement's rhetorical "expectation" to circumvent it, the innovational effort will quickly fade.

"The innovational movement," Smith and Windes confirm, "cannot appear to be in conflict with the dominant groups in society, those which must be persuaded to approve the proposed innovation and to work for its general acceptance. An estrangement from the established society would lead to a quick withering of the movement."155

The Smith-Windes "policy" distinction, then, serves to point up, the reciprocity that can exist between rhetorical "expectation" and human persuadability. This is evidenced by the fact that if the three languaging strategies, viewed as the embodiment of the innovational movement, fail to uphold the nonconflictive rhetorical "expectation" proclaimed in the "policy" distinction, then innovational success in persuasion is also likely to fail. It is painfully clear then, that the reciprocity that exists between rhetorical "expectation" and human persuadability can translate equally well from a face-to-face context to the considerably more grand communicative setting of an innovational mass movement.
This accommodative innovational attitude toward the notion of rhetorical "expectation" also aims to establish the Smith-Windes perspective as a plausible critical alternative to the establishment-conflict view of the rhetoric of social movements. It tends to sire the implication that innovational theorists foster a more realistic view of mass persuasion than establishment-conflict architects of rhetorical theory. This implication is evidenced by the way in which each school of thought defines what does not constitute a rhetorical movement.

In this connection, my contention took the stance that it is the innovational movement's rhetorical "expectation" that the changes it demands will not generate conflict by disturbing the symbols and constraints of the existing social order. Smith and Windes, however, also introduce a pragmatic reservation to this rhetorical "expectation." Here we need to remember that this reservation maintains that the innovational movement will quickly wither if major conflict should emerge from the innovational scene.

Implicit in this innovational reservation is a pragmatic classificatory option. The option suggests, that which cannot be categorized as an innovational rhetorical movement might better be classified as an establishment-conflict social movement. It is a pragmatic option because it embraces the ever-present possibility of the "unexpected," or persuasion gone awry, and thus affords the rhetorical analyst critical recourse.

The establishment-conflict view of the rhetoric of social movements offers no such "fail-safe" critical apparatus. If the
establishment-conflict critic, for instance, should encounter the "unexpected" or a nonconflictive social collectivity, then he is hard pressed to switch to an auxiliary critical "movement" scheme. This is largely due to the fact that establishment-conflict adherents do not recognize the rhetoric of nonconflictive social collectivities as "true" rhetorical movements. Robert S. Cathcart explains:

> It is this confrontational [conflictive] aspect—the questioning of the basic values and societal norms—that makes true movements a real threat that cannot be explained away as a temporary malfunction of the system or as the conspiratorial work of a handful of fanatics. Using this notion of confrontational rhetoric as the counterpart of managerial rhetoric, I find that many of the so-called "types" of movements described in recent literature do not appear to be movements at all, but rather adjustments to the existing order.\(^\text{156}\)

Thus, establishment-conflict theorists only recognize a rhetorical movement qua movement if it is consistent with their confrontational or conflictive rhetorical "expectation." Such a critical scheme is pragmatically prohibitive, insofar as it makes no provision for the "unexpected," as in the case of innovational movement criticism.

A purist preoccupation with one "true" or absolute type of rhetorical movement is not only critically prohibitive, but also reflects a naiveté on the part of establishment-conflict theorists. One "true" type of rhetorical movement is as inconceivable as one "true" type of rhetoric.\(^\text{157}\) Rhetorical movement criticism should reflect the same diversity as that which it endeavors to understand. Anything less than this would be in violation of the Project Committee on the Advancement and Refinement of Rhetorical Criticism's quest to
"expand the scope of rhetorical criticism to include subjects which have not traditionally fallen within the critic's purview...."\textsuperscript{158}

In summation, my epistemological analysis of the Smith-Windes innovational "policy" centered largely on the notion of rhetorical "expectation." I argued that the reciprocity that exists between rhetorical "expectation" and human persuadability translates equally well from a face-to-face context to the considerably more grand communicative setting of innovational rhetorical movements. Furthermore, it was maintained that it is this accommodative innovational attitude toward the notion of rhetorical "expectation" that functions to establish the Smith-Windes perspective as a more plausible critical alternative to the establishment-conflict view of the rhetoric of social movements.

\textbf{Axiology}

Values occupy the center of man's cultural stage. They engage him in a continuous dialogue with his behavior, serving to adumbrate conceptions of what is good, and what is not. Though their precise nature is still variously understood by scholars, Henry Nash Smith offers one enlightening explanation.

Smith portrays values as emerging from a cultural "need-value-action" matrix. Economic, social and political needs spawn systems of values, according to this triadic perspective. When imaginatively fused, values find expression in the myth and symbol of literature, religion, ethics, and theoretical ideas. Smith maintains that each of these genres of symbolic expression stimulate and sustain the "action" that serves to satisfy the original economic, social, and political needs that precipitated the scheme.\textsuperscript{159}
This "need-value-action" interpretation has implications for the relationship that exists between human values and the rhetorical process. Smith's scheme, for instance, may be likened to Bitzer's analysis of the "rhetorical situation." Here, we can recall that a rhetor discovers the presence of a societal imperfection (i.e., an exigence or need), and then designs a constraint-conscious persuasive appeal to move his audience to "right" action.

The proposals of both Smith and Bitzer point up a commitment to "right" action that arises from human values. Values serve to energize the rhetorical process. "To make rhetoric a more potent power in generating 'right action,' Eubanks and Baker observe, "it must be related 'directly' to important human values. Rhetoric must become boldly axiological, seeking out and committing itself to a sound system of civilizing values."160

Indeed, an axiological approach to rhetoric is paramount to the study of "the rationale of informative and suasive discourse."161 Here, we use the term "axiology" (from the Greek "axios," or valuable) to mean the philosophical study of value phenomena, and define "values" as conceptions of the desirable which shape human action and commitments. Moreover, "rhetoric," abstracted from its more functional sense, is interpreted as purposive speech having to do with humankind's symbolic universe of value.162

Background. This view of the function of rhetoric as the enhancement of human values bears the sanction of both classical tradition and contemporary thought. Plato's ideal system of rhetoric, for instance, does much to argue for the sanction of classical tradition. The
ancient propagator of the "Good" maintained that the speaker should have "such a high moral purpose in all his work that he will ever be concerned about saying that which is acceptable to God." The myth of the charioteer found in the Phaedrus reinforces his commitment to human values as Plato prepares us to see that the virtuous rhetorician, who is a lover of truth, has a soul of such movement that its dialectical perceptions are consonant with those of a divine mind.

Plato's idealistic rhetoric was no less axiological than Aristotle's pragmatic approach. The scholarly technician of ancient Greece observes at the outset of his Rhetoric that "Rhetoric is a kind of offshoot, on the one hand, of Dialectic, and, on the other, of that study of Ethics which may properly be called 'political'." Furthermore, in Nicomachean Ethics II, Aristotle holds that "choice," the hallmark of persuasion, is also a pre-eminent consideration in the determination of "virtue." "Virtue, then," he avows, "is a state of character concerned with choice, being in a mean which is relative to us, and which is determined by reason or that which the man of practical wisdom would define it." Aristotelian pragmatism held that "virtue" or character values could be determined by reason, just as Isocratic pedagogy maintained that human values could be taught. "The Isocratic orator," Eubanks and Baker establish, "was to be, above all, a student of moral values and duties of the estimable in human conduct." However, the ancient Roman orators were no less concerned about a rhetoric of human values than were their Greek forerunners.
Book II of De Oratore Cicero, in the guise of Antonius, speaks to the notion of the "Good," in the best tradition of his Greek counterparts. "One should try to follow only virtue in pleading a case," he writes, "and never do more harm than good." Allusions to "virtue" or character values lace the Ciceronian commentary, and function to set the stage for the premier ethicist of ancient Rome.

The transition in Rome from Republic to Empire put serious constraints on political oratory, which became more the expression of pre-determined opinion than a form of open debate, but the Senate continued to meet, and the need for good men to speak well was no less great. De Causis Corruptae Eloquentiae (On the Causes of Corrupted Eloquence), Quintilian's last treatise, perhaps best expresses his life-long quest to satisfy this ethical need. Yet, his substantial investment in the realization of a rhetoric of human values is even more succinctly stated in his De Institutione Cratoria (On the Education of the Orator). "An orator cannot praise," Quintilian lyricises, "unless he knows what is honorable, he cannot persuade, unless he knows what is advantageous, he cannot speak in court unless he knows what is just."

Several contemporary oracles of rhetorical theory have kept rhetoric's ancient commitment to inhere in human values. In the axiological forefront is Richard N. Weaver.

Synonymous with the epigram, "language is sermonic," his Ethics of Rhetoric renders an analysis of the Phaedrus that is clearly axiological. Weaver maintains that the noble lover (rhetorician) must be motivated by his intellectual love of the good so as not to devour
the beloved (his receiver), but rather to shape him according to the gods as far as mortal power allows. "The noble lover," to use the language of Weaver, is "aware of axiological systems that have ontic status." 166

Whereas Weaver would have his readers submit to the claim that "language is sermonic," Kenneth Burke argues, similarly, that rhetorical criticism should be "advisory." In this regard, he holds that "the ultimate end of the rhetorical critic is to promote social cohesion and to perfect society." 170 Thus, rhetorical criticism, interpreted as a means to world peace and social unity, tends to infuse Burke's dramaturgical theory with the same axiological consciousness that imbued the rhetoric of his ancient predecessors.

In "Rhetoric and Advising," Karl R. Wallace, once again, attempts to resurrect the classical commitment to a rhetoric of human values. Here, Wallace claims that rhetoric construed as "advising" enables its auditors to make rational choices. He writes:

I am suggesting that the practice of rhetoric could require new light if it were regarded as an art of advising. To regard it thus would maintain an emphasis on logos and ethos. It is the ethicist who uses "advising to describe what man does when he is expressing himself for the purpose of helping others to make rationale choices. 171

Wallace's interpretation of rhetoric as "advising," once again, serves to point up "the art of persuasion's" long-standing liaison with human values. A commitment to "right" action gave impetus to classical systems of Western rhetoric, and continues even today to be the hallmark of purposive speech.
Thus, a focus on human values is paramount to the axiological evaluation of the art of rhetoric. That is to say, that the assessment of the "art of persuasion" must ultimately rely upon the same values which inhere in rhetoric. For centuries, however, rhetorical critics have applied value judgments to public discourse without always justifying these judgments in terms of the human values which spawn them.\textsuperscript{172}

The relationship which exists between human values and rhetorical criticism is noteworthy, because values shed axiological light on the manner in which a critic apprehends his world. In "Rhetorical Criticism: An Alternative Perspective," Linnea Ratcliff states in this regard:

The statements of the critic must be weighed carefully in light of his reasons for making them. The critic can never give proof of his opinion but he will always be held responsible for his reasons. His reasons will be in light of his own values and world view. If his reasons are meaningful, his criticism will be meaningful.\textsuperscript{173}

Here, Ratcliff's commentary is directed primarily at the criticism of individual public address. Her wisdom, however, is equally applicable to the criticism of rhetorical movement.

An axiological assessment of the philosophical first principles of the rhetoric of innovational and establishment-conflict social movements may similarly serve to help the student of rhetorical studies to better understand the world view propagated by each school of thought. Moreover, by refining each type of movement's philosophic view of human values, an axiological appraisal may also function to
clarify the respective loci of meanings and differences in purpose which motivate innovational and establishment-conflict theorists.

The remainder of this section proceeds to an examination of philosophical viewpoints about values, and to the relationships that these viewpoints might have for the rhetoric of innovational and establishment-conflict social movements. In so doing, I argue that the innovational perspective offers an axiological view of the rhetoric of social movements that the establishment-conflict view does not share, and once again, submit the claim that the innovational view of the rhetoric of social movements constitutes a viable alternative to the establishment-conflict perspective.

In this regard, Douglas G. Bock's essay, "Axiology and Rhetorical Criticism: Some Dimensions of the Critical Judgment," generates three philosophic dimensions of the first principles of values which speak to the rhetorical critic. Together they constitute a composite of the leading axiological views. They are the "intuitive" approach, the "subjective" approach and the "objective" approach.\footnote{174}

The Intuitive Approach. The intuitive approach centers on the valuer's reaction to feeling, according to Bock. Intuitionists maintain that values are neither good nor evil, and come from some ideal conception.\footnote{175}

The view approximates what Louis T. Milic, in "Theories of Style and Their Implications for the Teaching of Composition," calls "Crocean aesthetic monism." Any discussion of style in Croce's view is useless and irrelevant," Milic observes, "for the work of art (the composition) is a unified whole, with no seam between meaning and
style. Thus, in the organic view, there is no style at all, only meaning or intuition."

Humankind extends its intellectual vistas through meaning, and the intuitionist applauds rigorous intellectual activity. Bock cites C. C. Quick's observation as epitomizing this view. "[?]he dialectic of value," Quick alleges, "may teach us that the ultimate goodness of the universe can only be appreciated by minds which have exercised the rigorous self-denial of enquiry into the world as though it were never good nor evil.""

Yet, intuition may, in some instances, go beyond conscious intellectualization, and bore into what Michael Polanyi calls the "tacit dimension." Animal reaction, vital preference, unconscious physiological activities, and the like, all exemplify a kind of knowing more than one can tell. Bock draws from the wisdom of John P. Reid's "A Definition of Value," in order to establish his intuitive position. "In Reid's judgment," he writes, "these activities are 'perhaps forever beyond our understanding; but they are realized and enjoyed in moments of immediate pleasure or conscious satisfaction.""

Since many of these value experiences occur at an unconscious level of human understanding, they cannot be replicated. Bock suggests that the intuitionist view is special in this respect, and also emphasizes the relational nature of valuing that arises from the relationship that exists between the object and the act of interest in that object. "This relation occurs in the valuer," he observes, "and may be applied to the critic's relational reactions to a speech. The intuitive notion of values represents a relational way of thinking
Whereas the intuitive approach centers on the relationship that exists between the object and the act of interest in that object, the subjective view focuses exclusively on the valuer. That is to say, the subjectivist maintains that values inhere in the individual.

The Subjective Approach. Bock holds that the subjective idea proceeds from the apparent change in values with no corresponding change in the object. He utilizes the exemplar of an international gold crisis to illustrate this view. Bock hypothesizes that:

Gold is apparently valued not only by individuals, but also by nations. It is valued to the extent that it is a standard against which currency is measured. For a variety of reasons, gold may suddenly become more highly valued on the open market, and more currency is required to purchase a given amount of gold. The change can be attributed either to the increase in value of gold or to the decrease in value of the currency. Either way, the subjectivist would contend, the value of the gold itself did not change, but the individuals who valued it changed and thus the value of gold to them changed.

Applied to discourse, or the rhetoric of social movements, the same argument proceeds from the belief that values are personal projections. They do not inhere in a speech, or in the mass rhetoric of social movements, but rather in the consumer's discourse.

Thus, the subjectivist contends that humankind projects that which is consistent with its world view. "Values become relative to time and occasion," Bock writes, "what is valued today may be rejected tomorrow. The world is interpreted by each person in the light of his particular world view."
One's subjective world view then, related, once again, to Milic's essay on style, approximates his notion of "psychological monism."

To use the language of Milic, this concept, "finds its most common expression in the aphorism that style is the man, [and] may have originally sprung from Plato's conception of the 'vir bonus,' the good man whose goodness would express itself equally in graceful dancing and graceful expression." This view stands in direct contrast to the objective approach.

The Objective Approach. The objective approach maintains that human values take their existence from the world of external objects. Bock borrows from the insight of George H. Belknap's "Objective Value," to further illustrate this view, "[A] theory of value," Belknap observes, "defends the predication of value in propositions where the local subject is an entity in the world of objects."

A preoccupation with the external world best characterizes the position of the objectivist. In his essay, "'Objectivity' in Value Judgments," Philip Blair Rice generates several implications of this preoccupation, which Bock touts as significant to the objective view. The principle directions in which objectivists seek values, according to Rice, are "(1) in the properties of valued objects themselves; (2) in universal validity of the rules which guide conduct; (3) in the universal concepts with an object foundation in reality; (4) in agreement, or the social dimension of valuation; (5) in knowledge of the 'conditions' of value experience."

Rice's objectivistic directions point up the possibility of verifying or checking values and value judgments. Bock holds that
since the objectivist sees values as independent of their subscriber, empirically objective criteria may be introduced in order to test or verify these values against the external world.

In this regard, he presents Lafferty's three criteria as empirically objective standards of judgment. These are, "(1) the effect of enriching our appreciation of values, (2) the tendency of values to sensitize men to other values, and (3) the sharable or communicable quality of values." 166

Lafferty's criteria, according to Bock, thus serve to validate values and value judgments. In the words of Arthur Pape, "To verify a value judgment...means to show on the basis of factual knowledge that the valued object or action has the properties which are 'admitted to be good without proof.'" 187 It also follows, in this regard, that objectivists tend to place a high premium on evidence and inference as axiological processes of validation.

In summary, three major axiological positions have been viewed: the intuitive approach; the subjective approach; and the objective approach. My study now proceeds to an examination of the relationships that these viewpoints have for the rhetoric of innovational and establishment-conflict social movements.

The Axiology of Rhetorical Movements

The axiological perspectives of innovational and establishment-conflict adherents of the rhetoric of social movements are significantly different. Advocates of the former express a more or less philosophically objective approach to human values. While establishment-conflict adherents subscribe, conversely, to intuitive and subjective approaches to the rhetoric
of human values.

The source of these philosophically disparate views is linked, in part, to a difference in the axiological scope of each type of rhetorical perspective. However, before proceeding to an examination of this difference, a brief look at Lasswell's value typology can serve to expedite the forthcoming discussion.

In *Power and Personality*, Harold D. Lasswell generates an enlightening value analysis which holds much implication for the discussion of the axiological scope of the rhetoric of innovational and establishment-conflict social movements. Focusing primarily on the power relationships in the social process, Lasswell's central point is that "'Man' pursues 'Values' through 'Institutions' on 'Resources'." In this regard, he creates the following chart containing eight representative goal-values, and connects each to the institution it represents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>deference values</td>
<td>Power</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Respect</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Affection</td>
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<td>Rectitude</td>
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<tr>
<td>welfare values</td>
<td>Well-being</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Wealth</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enlightenment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Skill</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In a second volume, *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry*, Lasswell and co-author Abraham Kaplan classify these values into two groups: "deference" values and "welfare" values. Power, respect, affection, and rectitude constitute the former classification which consists primarily of axiological considerations involved in the
acts of others and the self. Well-being, wealth, enlightenment, and skill, represent "welfare" values "whose possession to a certain degree is a necessary condition for the maintenance of the physical activity of the person."

In their essay, "Toward An Axiology of Rhetoric," Eubanks and Baker utilize Lasswell's and Kaplan's axiological classifications to establish the idea that "deference" and "welfare" values are important to the democratic life of man. "Deference" values (of power, respect, rectitude, and affection), for instance, are critical to the democratic health of every commonwealth.

The "deference" value of "power," conceived as participation in the decision-making process, is one of the most consistent democratic variables, according to Eubanks and Baker. Citing Lasswell and Kaplan verbatim, Eubanks and Baker write: "'The concept of power is perhaps the most fundamental in political science: the political process is the shaping distribution, and exercise of power (in a wider sense, of all the deference values, or of influence in general)'".

The "deference" value that is often called upon to prevent the abuse of power is known as "rectitude." Our democratic system of jurisprudence is inspired by "rectitude," and it is in this observance of moral uprightness that we make possible a just commonwealth built upon the "rule of law." In this connection, many believe that the cardinal democratic value of "respect," may be used as a social index of "rectitude." The recent Watergate scandal is one case in point. Its co-conspirators abandoned their allegiance to a traditional political morality.
and consequently lost the "respect" of the majority of Americans.

Finally, "affection" or love, the most pervasive "deference" value, bores into every aspect of the human biogram. Observing the humanistic psychology of Abraham Maslow, Eubanks and Baker state, "love is union with somebody outside oneself, 'under the condition of retaining the separateness and integrity of one's own self.'"195

Just as the "deference" values of "power," "rectitude," "respect," and "love" contribute to the spiritual and emotional satisfaction of democratic mean, the "welfare" values of "well-being," "wealth," "enlightenment," and "skill" serve to fortify his physical and psychological life. '"Well-being' refers to 'physical and psychic integrity,'" Eubanks and Baker observe, '"wealth' means 'services of goods and persons accruing to the individual in any way whatever'; 'skill' means 'proficiency in any practice whatever, whether in arts or crafts, trade or profession' and 'enlightenment' refers to 'knowledge, insight, and information concerning personal and cultural relations.'"196

Eubanks and Baker argue that classificatory value typologies like Lasswell's scheme are fundamental to a rhetoric of values keyed to the concept of human dignity, and to the power relations that exist in a democratic polity. Such axiological classifications serve to point up the interpretation of values as "master" conceptions of the desirable which flow through representative "institutions" as "persuasive" communication.

Thus, Weaver's epigram, "language is sermonic" is well-taken, as we listen to the superintendent of schools offer the rhetoric declaring
the "welfare" value of "enlightenment" through the "institution" of education by sounding, "We must educate our youth." Quite similarly, the ERA advocate will register a heartfelt concern for the "deference" value of "respect" through the "institution" of social class distinction, as in the evangelism, "Let us legislate against social discrimination."

Lasswell's value typology helps the student of rhetorical studies to better understand the relationship that exists between values, their institutions, and the rhetorical process. In the words of Eubanks and Baker:

The Lasswell typology may thus be viewed as a framework of "demand" symbols from which are drawn the innumerable value-axioms rhetoricians invoke in the shaping and promulgation of policy. This value typology, or a close approximation of it, would seem inevitable for a rhetoric of commitment. It can supply rhetoric with a sound axiology, and also furnishes a motivational analysis adequate to the planning and conduct of rhetorical discourse.¹⁹⁷

This framework of "demand" symbols is also applicable to our analysis of the rhetoric of social movements. It may be used, in this regard, to explain the difference in axiological scope that exists between the innovational and establishment-conflict perspectives, and thus, serve ultimately to isolate the source of their philosophically disparate points of view.

Lasswell's value typology invokes the theme that "Man" pursues "Values" through "Institutions" on "Resources." The motif serves to highlight the "harmonious" relationship that exists between human values, their institutions, and the rhetoric that flows from these
institutions. Moreover, it depicts persuasive communication as the symbolic embodiment of society's "master" conceptions of the desirable.

Eubanks and Baker use Lasswell's value typology in their essay to argue that all rhetoric emanates from this axiological values-institutions context. The rhetoric of social movements, in this regard, is generated from this same values-institutions setting, but in significantly different ways.

The rhetoric of the establishment-conflict social movement, for instance, flows from Lasswell's axiological context, but is largely repugnant to the "harmonious" relationship that exists between society's "master" conceptions of the desirable (values) and their concomitant institutions. Only "disharmony" can create the conflict which gives impetus to the "dialectical enjoinement" between aggressor establishment-conflict spokesmen, and defendant priests of the established social order. Cathcart describes the significance of "dialectical enjoinement" in social movements. He observes:

It is this reciprocity or dialectical enjoinement in the moral arena which defines movement.... [T]his dialectical form is...an essential attribute without which there is no movement. Aggressor spokesmen will proclaim that the new order, the more perfect order, the desired order, cannot come about through the established agencies of change.... Such proclamation forces defendant spokesmen to produce a counter rhetoric that exposes the agitators as anarchists or devils of destruction. 168

Thus, establishment-conflict rhetoricians must resort to the "disharmonious" pyrotechnics of the extremist. Subtlety and understatement cannot create the opposition that breathes life into the rhetoric of establishment-conflict social movements. Their opposition
emerges from the "division" which aggressor spokesmen generate by subverting those social institutions which best express society's "master" conceptions of the desirable.

The inflammatory rhetoric of establishment-conflict aggressors is unmistakably anarchic, specifically designed to disrupt institutions, and reconstitute social norms and values. The agitator who seeks to undermine the harmonious relationship that exists between the "welfare" value of "enlightenment", for instance, and its concomitant "institution" of education, might articulate the anarchism: "Education is counter-productive to enlightenment because it trades off one slavery for another." In a similar vein, the establishment-conflict saboteur who desires disharmony between the "deference" value of "respect" and its representative "institution" of social class might mouth the subversion: "A sexist, male Legislature cannot legislate against social discrimination."

Griffin's concept of a "period of inception" appears to be a logical progression from the inflammatory rhetoric of establishment-conflict social movements, insofar as it calls attention to the dynamics of disharmony. His interpretation of the "period of inception," where aggressor spokespersons initially intensify misunderstanding in society by creating division, and then invoke a strategy designed to infuse the priests of the existing order with attitudes that impel them to the act of opposition, once again, serves to corroborate our "disharmony" thesis. "As a result of the drama produced by conflict," Smith and Windes confirm, "the movement comes to public notice. Aggressors can then begin to 'convert the impious' and to provoke
In this regard, Simons' social scientific definition of the rhetoric of social movements. A movement is, he writes, "an uninstitutionalized collectivity that mobilizes for action to implement a program for the reconstitution of social norms or values." Once again, Simons' definition serves to point up the recurrent theme that the life of the rhetoric of establishment-conflict social movements hinges on the disharmony that exists between social values and their representative institutions, and its adherents ultimately seek to recast "master" conceptions of the desirable that live through established social institutions. The innovational position, on the other hand, is markedly different.

The rhetoric of innovational social movements embraces the "harmonious" relationship that exists between values and their institutions. "Harmony" between society's "master" conceptions of the desirable, and their representative institutions, is the hallmark of the innovational rhetorical movement, and the touchstone of its nonconfrontational stance. Disharmony would generate conflict, and ultimately lead to what Smith and Windes describe as "a quick withering of the movement."201

Innovational spokesmen introduce a technique to preserve harmony that some might interpret as a contradiction in policy. They strive to emphasize the "weakness" of traditional institutions and the strength of traditional values. This is implemented by focusing primarily on the representative institutions of society's "master" conceptions of the desirable.
Innovationalists must demonstrate that the product of a representative institution is less, rather than more, satisfying than it could be. Smith and Windes explain that the success of this technique hinges, in part, on the subtlety of the criticism exercised. They observe:

Consequently, advocates must criticize institutions and point to areas of critical failure. This is, however, a dangerous game. Strong complaints about institutional arrangements can lead to controversy with the defenders of those institutions. Thus, criticism must be presented subtly, emphasizing that the proposed innovation is an addition to, rather than a substitute for, institutional instruments ready at hand for meeting social needs.

The "subtle" criticism of representative institutions is somewhat problematical. If successful, it preserves axiological harmony while simultaneously removing the dialectical impetus that infuses the rhetoric of social movements with dramatistic life. In other words, if innovational spokespersons are successful in avoiding disharmony between society's "master" conceptions of the desirable and their representative institutions, then no dialectic between aggressor and defendant rhetors will emerge, as in the case of the establishment-conflict situation.

The innovationalist, however, animates the rhetoric of his or her social movement in a different manner than the establishment-conflict counterpart. Unlike establishment-conflict agents, who generate a rhetorical vision consisting of a dialectical enjoinment between "real" aggressor and defendant personae, innovational agents construct a drama that "simulates" a dialectic between their purpose and some "impersonal" element in the innovational scene. "In an
innovational movement's vision," Smith and Windes maintain, "the "personae" are impersonal scenic elements which can be condemned for eroding society's values. These elements are mute, for no spokesmen will arise to refute the condemnations."203

The absence of a defending opposition consisting of "real" agents who militate against innovational orators thus functions to preserve the harmonious relationship that exists between society's "master" conceptions of the desirable and their representative institutions. Institutions, then, can sustain modification without the concomitant reconstitution of society's axiological conception of grace. The view introduces a philosophic approach to the rhetoric of social movements which the establishment-conflict school of thought does not share.

Agents of the rhetoric of innovational social movements express a philosophically "objective" approach to human values. Such a view holds that values take their existence from the world of external objects. In this regard, it was established that innovational spokesmen embrace the harmonious relationship that exists between social values and their representative institutions. They achieve this by emphasizing the weakness of traditional institutions and the strength of traditional values.

Values, then, according to the innovational perspective, are viewed as enduring cultural phenomena that exist immutably "out there" in the external world. Their representative institutions are depicted, on the other hand, as modifiable or more or less susceptible to change.

The objectivistic view of innovationalists may be placed within the context of Rice's aforementioned list of principle directions in
which objectivists seek values. Once again, these principle direc-
tions, according to Rice, exist: (1) in the properties of valued
objects themselves; (2) in the universal validity of the rules which
guide conduct; (3) in the universal concepts with an object founda-
tion in reality; (4) in agreements, or the social dimension of
valuation; and (5) in knowledge of the "conditions" of value ex-
perience.

Innovational agents seek values "in the properties of valued
objects themselves." In this regard, we have witnessed in our
earlier discussion of Lasswell's value typology that innovationalists
pursue values through their representative institutions, and in the
rhetoric that flows from these institutions. Both these represent-
avative institutions and the rhetoric which they inspire, may be con-
strued as the "properties" of society's "master" conceptions of the
desirable (i.e., the valued object). Put differently, they constitute
the traits or quality of values.

This objective quality of innovational values may also be
witnessed, "in the universal validity of rules which guide conduct."
I explained earlier that three rhetorical strategies contribute to
the locus of rules which guide innovational conduct: (1) the denial
of the existence of conflict between their proposed innovation and
the values of society; (2) subtle criticism directed at the weakness
of traditional institutions and the strength of traditional values;
and (3) the creation of a rhetorical vision that generates a dia-
lectic between impersonal scenic elements and the innovational pur-
pose. A commitment to their observance should be recognized as
constituting the universal validity of the rules which guide all innovational conduct.

In this regard, Rice's third principle direction in which objectivists seek values, finds expression in the innovationalist's need to generate a rhetorical vision. This rhetorical drama, or what was depicted earlier as the third rule to guide innovational conduct, also serves to evidence the fact that innovational agents pursue values "in the universal conceptions with an object foundation in reality."

The view holds that values are understood by innovationalists as reflecting universal conceptions of the desirable which inhere in the external world. However, it also fosters the aforementioned notion that their object foundation in reality finds expression in the "impersonal scenic elements which can be condemned for eroding societal values." The nonconfrontational stance of innovational rhetoricians demands that they anchor their axiological foundation in the mute agents of the innovational scene, so as not to encounter defendant spokesmen who arise to refute their condemnations.

It is their nonconfrontational posture that enables innovationalists to be depicted as philosophic objectivists who pursue values "in agreement or the social dimension of valuation." Agreement or harmony between social values and their representative institutions, it was previously illustrated, is the hallmark of the rhetoric of innovational social movements. Disagreement or disharmony would inevitably spawn social criticism, and a quick withering of the movement.
Finally, Lasswell's value typology is invoked, once again, in order to prove that innovational agents seek values "in knowledge of the conditions of value experience." The reader will remember, that Lasswell's value scheme was introduced to provide a better understanding of the axiology that gives rise to the rhetoric of social movements. It was established, in this regard, that innovational social movements flourish in a "harmonious" axiological setting. This "harmonious" context is largely adducive to the successful application of three rhetorical strategies, i.e., the denial of conflict, the subtle criticism of institutions, and the creation of a rhetorical vision. These strategies generate the nonconfrontational, moderately critical "conditions" which stimulate and sustain the axiological harmony of innovational movements, and thus prove that innovational agents seek values "in knowledge of the conditions of value experience.

The objectivistic validity of the innovational value experience may be further established through the application of Lafferty's empirically objective standards of value judgment. These objective standards are: (1) the effect of enriching our appreciation of values; (2) the tendency of values to sensitize men to other values; and (3) the sharable or communicable quality of values.

Lafferty's first objective standard of value judgment, i.e., "the effect of enriching our appreciation of values," is easily satisfied by the innovational view of the rhetoric of social movements. In this regard, I argued that innovational theory constitutes a broad endorsement of society's "master" conceptions of the desirable. Thus, a
sound understanding of innovational rhetoric invariably serves to foster the enrichment of our appreciation of human values.

Moreover, the enrichment of one's appreciation of some human values often creates in individuals, a sensitivity to other values, Lafferty's second objective standard of value judgment. A firm understanding of traditional values is paramount to the success of the rhetoric of innovational social movements. Subtle criticism could not be achieved without this sensitivity to a broad spectrum of social values.

Finally, this broad spectrum of social values represent, from an innovational standpoint, society's conception of grace, or those "master" conceptions of the desirable that the majority of society embraces. Lafferty's last objective standard of value judgment, i.e., "the sharable or communicable quality of values," is thus met by virtue of the fact that innovationalists not only share in society's conception of axiological grace, but actually campaign to strengthen that conception.

In summary, then, adherents of the rhetoric of innovational social movements subscribe to a philosophically objective approach to human values. In so doing, they hold that values take their existence from the world of external objects. This view is significantly different from the philosophically intuitive and subjective approaches of the establishment-conflict school of thought.

It is abundantly clear by this time, that agents of the rhetoric of innovational social movements embrace society's "master" conceptions of the desirable, whereas establishment-conflict adherents seek to
reconstitute social norms and traditional values. The former may call upon tradition to rationalize its axiological position, but the anti-traditional posture of the latter necessitates an alternative course of action.

Establishment-conflict agents escape the axiological tradition that their innovational counterparts embrace, by philosophically creating anew themselves, their world, and their history. They do this by adopting, at least in part, the previously discussed philosophically intuitive approach to human values.

Adamic in nature, and antinomian in scope the philosophically intuitive approach, once again, centers on the valuer's reaction to feeling. Though establishment-conflict agents often champion the rigorous intellectualizing of their cause, a traditionless axiological platform forces them to turn inward their philosophic perspective, and hence propagate on the basis of faith some "ideal" conception of societal grace. "Such persons," to use the language of Griffin, "are moved by an impious dream of a mythic new Order-inspired with new purpose..." 204

Establishment-conflict spokespersons rally around their "impious dream of a mythic new Order." They often become intoxicated with this Edenic world view, and their rhetorical behavior epitomizes Reid's previous intuitivistic description that "these activities are 'perhaps forever beyond our understanding; but they are realized and enjoyed in moments of immediate pleasure or conscious satisfaction.'"

This intuitive reaction to feeling is reflected in the symbolic behavior of establishment-conflict leadership. Simons, for instance,
describes how leaders of social movements use rhetoric to legitimize their personally-held feelings. He observes:

The leader may also need to distort, conceal, exaggerate, etc., in addressing his own supporters. Particularly in militant movements, the leader wins and maintains adherents by saying to them what they cannot say to others or even to themselves. A major rhetorical process, then, consists of legitimizing privately-held feelings by providing social support and rationalization for those feelings.

The intuitive, emotion-based claims of establishment-conflict leaders often appear nonrational, and arising from some unconscious plane of human understanding. Kenneth Keniston describes the quality of this "in-group" rhetoric of establishment-conflict leaders as "surrealistic." "Movement groups," he writes, "frequently exhibit an 'anti-empirical' inability to use facts in order to counter emotion based distortions and impressions; interaction within the group often has a quality of 'surreality.'"

Whereas the axiological intuitive, reaction-to-feeling, approach of establishment-conflict leaders infuses the "in-group" rhetoric of social movements with a "surrealistic" quality, the same approach imbues the "out-group" rhetoric with a more "phlogistic" quality. It was established earlier, in this regard, that the inflammatory vitriol of establishment-conflict rhetoricians is compensatory to the rhetorical "division" that gives impetus to their social movement. That is to say, that their symbolic behavior must first be perceived by the opposition as "the dogmatic pyrotechnics of extremists," before an establishment-conflict social movement is infused with dramatic life.
The establishment-conflict adherents espouse, at least in part, a philosophically intuitive approach to human values. The view grows out of the relationship that exists between their intuitive conception of some axiological ideal and their emotional response to that idealistic value object. Thus, part of the emphasis of the establishment-conflict philosophy is on the relationship that exists between the value object and the act of interest in that object. The view, however, is somewhat different than still another philosophic approach to human values, which also tends to characterize the rhetoric of establishment-conflict social movements.

This philosophic approach to human values is depicted as the subjective view of the rhetoric of social movements, and proceeds from the idea that an apparent change in values may occur in an individual with no corresponding change in the value-object. Values, then, according to this school of thought, are described as primarily the product of our personal projections.

The philosophically subjective approach to human values was exemplified by Bock's foregoing illustration of the gold trade. It was established, in this regard, that the price fluctuation in the value of the gold, as in the case of human values, was more the result of a change in the valuer's perceptions of its worth, than in some actual change in the gold itself.

Establishment-conflict agents, like appraisers of the gold trade, similarly adhere to the subjective approach to human valuers, insofar as they project only those sentiments that are consistent with their world view. Values, then, from an establishment-conflict perspective
can be likened to blank screens that reflect only the establishment-conflict axiological conception of grace. "The dramatic enactment of their rhetoric," Cathcart confirms, "reveals persons who have become so alienated that they reject 'the mystery' and cease to identify with the prevailing hierarchy. They find themselves in a scene of confrontation where they stand alone, divided from the existing order; and inevitably they dream of a new order where there will be salvation and redemption."207

Cathcart's depiction of the establishment-conflict "dramatic enactment" bores into Bock's previous interpretation of the subjective approach to human values. In this view, he writes, "values become relative to time and occasion; what is valued today may be rejected tomorrow." Indeed, the inexorable imbroglio of conflicting demands that contribute to the capricious nature of the rhetoric of establishment-conflict social movements necessitates that its leadership generate a myriad of subjective decisions. "Short of causing disintegration," Simons writes, "the existence of crosspressures enormously complicates the role of the leader, frequently posing difficult choices between ethical and expediential considerations."208

The key to balancing these oxymoronic demands calls for the expression of a personal projection, on the part of the leader, that epitomizes the philosophically subjective approach to human values. "The key, it would appear," Simons alleges, "is the leader's capacity to embody a higher wisdom, a more profound sense of justice; to stand above inconsistencies by articulating overarching principles."209
The axiological virtues of love, power, justice, and the like, though variously understood, are overarching principles which strike a common chord in the orchestration of all human behavior. Used to some extent by spokesmen of all social movements, they are particularly emblematic of the subjectivistic view of establishment-conflict adherents.

Thus, the rhetoric of "over-arching principles" which serve to communicate some transcendent inner vision often typifies the philosophically subjective view of establishment-conflict rhetoricians. The technique enables these agents to successfully project their personal dream of a new societal order, and negotiate the inexorable imbroglio of conflicting demands which besiege the rhetoric of establishment-conflict social movements.

Summarizing, then, I have proceeded to an axiological assessment of the philosophic first principles of the rhetoric of innovational and establishment-conflict social movements. In so doing, three philosophic viewpoints about values have been examined (i.e., the intuitive, subjective, and objective approaches), as well as the relationships that these viewpoints have for the rhetoric of social movements.

Furthermore, adherents of the rhetoric of innovational social movements subscribe to a philosophically objective approach to human values and hold that values take their existence from the world of external objects. Innovationalists were depicted as meeting the criteria generated in Rice's list of principle directions in which objectivists seek values: (1) in the properties of valued objects
themselves; (2) in the universal validity of the rules which guide human conduct; (3) in the universal concepts, with an object foundation in reality; (4) in agreements, or the social dimension of valuation; and (5) in knowledge of the "conditions" of value experience. Moreover, the objectivistic validity of the innovational value experience was further established through the application of Lafferty's empirically objective standards of value judgment: (1) the effect of enriching our appreciation of values; (2) the tendency of values to sensitize men to other values; and (3) the sharable or communicable quality of values.

Whereas innovationalists were depicted as subscribing to a philosophic view that embraces traditional values, the philosophically intuitive axiology held, at least in part, by establishment-conflict rhetoricians was described as sustaining a more or less anti-traditional approach to human values. Adamic in nature, and antinomian in scope, their intuitive axiology was depicted as centering on the valuer's tacit or faithful reaction to feeling. Thus, the propagation of an "ideal" conception of a new societal order, the leadership of social movements using rhetoric to legitimize personally-held feelings, the "surrealistic" quality of "in-group" rhetoric, and the "phlogistic" nature of aggressor discourse, were all shown to contribute to the establishment-conflict philosophically intuitive approach to human values.

In this regard, the philosophically subjective approach to human values was also depicted as characterizing the rhetoric of establishment-conflict social movements. Proceeding from the idea that an
apparent change in values may occur in an individual with no corresponding change in the value-object, the view was described as primarily a product of personal projections. Here, it was argued that establishment-conflict agents assume, at least in part, a philosophically subjective approach to human values by projecting inspired "over-arching principles," and negotiating the inexorable imbroglio of conflicting demands which besiege social movements.

The foregoing axiological assessment of the philosophic first principles of the rhetoric of innovational and establishment-conflict social movements completes our examination of the Philosophic Foundations of Rhetoric. Conclusions drawn from our discussion of this section and Behavioristic Theory will be used in concert with some additional findings, to "recast" the critical lens of the Smith-Winches innovational theory of the rhetoric of social movements.

In doing so, we argue for the re-creation of a more philosophically viable, and therefore critically acceptable innovational theory of rhetorical criticism. However, before proceeding to that task, a brief overview of Chapter Two will serve to help the reader better understand the forthcoming Dramaturgical Perspective.

Initially, it was argued that the establishment-conflict view of the rhetoric of social movements is ascendant in rhetorical movement criticism. Chapter Two, submitting the innovational perspective as a viable alternative to the establishment-conflict school of thought, challenged the latter's ascendancy.

This challenge was embodied in the question: "Should rhetorical scholars, as Smith and Winches suggest, recognize, at least in some
cases, the rhetoric of innovational social movements, and thus allow innovational theory to assume a useful place in the embryonic corpus of rhetorical movement literature?" Chapter Two's response, once again, required a three-fold examination of: (1) Behavioristic Theory; (2) The Philosphic Foundations of Rhetoric; and (3) A Dramaturgical Perspective.

Our discussion of Behavioristic Theory focused on the influence that behavioral science has had on the rhetorical study of mass persuasion, and described how this binding has contributed to the entrenchment of the establishment-conflict view of the rhetoric of social movements. It was argued, in this connection, that behaviorists who study social movements view "communication" in a significantly different light than do students of persuasive communication.

This difference in perspective was said to be traceable, at least in theory, to the psychological growing pains experienced by a young behavioral science developing in the well-established professional shadow of the physical scientific community. Confusing physical science with the scientific technique, this "physics envy" was depicted as a need on the part of behaviorists to metaphorically engineer into their own research, methods and expressions which "approximate" the "mechanistic" imagery of the physical scientist. Irrespective of the problems encountered when naturalistic descriptions of physical motion in time and space are applied to the humanistic activity of man in society, we argued that this mechanistic perspective has had a definite effect upon behaviorists' interpretation of human communication.
It was said earlier, in this connection, that behaviorists subscribe to the social significance of communication only insofar as it announces the social or psychological reality of something other than itself. Symbolic expression, in other words, has been traditionally portrayed as mere sign-function by behaviorists, where symbols are interpreted exclusively as "proxy" for the objects they "represent," instead of as "vehicles for the conception of objects." Thus, the proposition which maintains that "how" we communicate determines, to a large measure, "what" we communicate, has been left unaddressed by behaviorists.

This failure on the part of behaviorists to speak to the above consideration was used earlier to explain why these investigators of social movements have consistently assigned less significance to human communication. The scant coverage they afford it, coupled with the subtle bias shown to punctuate their literature relative to it, stand as mute testimony to the low-priority status that communication has among mass behaviorists. Indeed, it is ironic in this connection, that those who invest so much time in the study of social movements, should be so inattentive to the symbolic reality that serves, at once, to create and sustain the mechanistic imagery they use to apprehend it.

Furthermore, it was argued that behaviorists' preoccupation with "establishment-conflict" social movements could be attributed to their early training in a tradition that is animated by "manipulative" laboratory procedure, and vivified by "confrontational" exemplars of massive social change. Moreover, it was stated that perhaps it is this influence that may explain the reason why rhetorical critics, who
have borrowed heavily from the social movement research generated by behaviorists, should similarly adopt a manipulative, confrontational (establishment-conflict), or behavioristic view of the rhetoric of social movements.

Proceeding from Behavioristic Theory to the Philosphic Foundations of Rhetoric, we argued, once again, that an innovational interpretation of the rhetoric of social movements is better suited, at least in some cases, to the study of the rhetoric of collective behavior than the more traditionally-held (establishment-conflict) view, especially when "persuasion" is conceived as "cooperation." Here, the reader recalls that the philosophic causistries of Ontology, Epistemology, and Axiology were introduced in order to anchor the dialectical substance of their "fact-policy-value" triad.

Bound by the ontological assumption that man is by nature subject to, and capable of persuasion, we endeavored to prove that explanations of "how" and "why" persuasion occurs have produced three rhetorical theories (the rational man, the behavioristic, and dramaturgical) which differ from each other in important ways. We argued, in this connection, that the "rational man" and "behavioristic" rhetorical theories depicted "persuasion" as "manipulative" (pragmatic-subordinate) and portray the persuader as one who seeks to "engineer" the consent of the persuadee. These views contrast that of dramaturgical theory, which maintains that rhetoric should be a "cooperative," (or "communal") humanistic enterprise.

Next, we argued that the first two rhetorical theories (i.e., the rational man and behavioristic views) represent the establishment-
conflict view of the rhetoric of social movements. The dramaturgical
theory, however, was described as being more illustrative of the in­
novational theory of rhetorical movements. We then proceeded to the
conclusion that the "cooperative" dramaturgical theory of persuasion
embraced by innovational theorists of the rhetoric of social movements,
offers the critic an alternative ontological approach to the "manipu­
lative" establishment-conflict view of human persuadability.

Shifting our focus from the ontological-based "fact" of "per­
suasion" to the epistenologically-based "policy" of rhetoric, we
established that rhetoric is essentially "epistemic," i.e., a highly
delicate "way of knowing" where success hinges, to a large measure,
upon the quality of the mutual "expectancies" and anticipatory pro­
jections of both the rhetor and his hearers. Support for the rhetori­
cal significance of "expectation." the reader is reminded, was derived
from a broad investigation of Role Theory, and the research of Kenneth
Burke, Erving Goffman, George Kelly, Edward Hulett, Stephen Toulmin,
and Edward Tolman.

This broad spectrum of research was essentially used to foster
the notion that rhetorical "expectation" and human persuadability are
inextricably bound together. Here, the innovational view of the
rhetoric of social movements was re-introduced to point up the fact
that the Smith-Windes "policy" distinction is sensitive to the re­
ciprocity that exists between rhetorical "expectation" and human per­
suadability. And it was argued, in this connection, that it is this
sensitivity that makes the innovational perspective a more realistic
alternative to the prohibitive establishment-conflict view of the
rhetoric of mass persuasion.

Finally, having proceeded from discussions of rhetorical "fact" and "policy," we moved to an examination of "value," and explored the Axiology of rhetoric conceived as the enhancement of human values. Bearing the dual sanctions of classical and contemporary thought, we explored the philosophic viewpoints which speak to human values (in the form of the intuitive, subjective, and objective rhetorical approaches), and then to the relationship that these viewpoints have for the rhetoric of innovational and establishment-conflict social movements.

Here, it was argued that the innovational perspective offers an axiological view of the rhetoric of social movements that the establishment-conflict school of thought does not share. In this regard, innovationalists were reputed as subscribing to a philosophically objective approach to human values, and maintaining that values take their existence from the world of external objects. Establishment-conflict adherents, on the other hand, were portrayed as embracing philosophically intuitive and subjective approaches to human values.

The former establishment-conflict approach, it was argued, centers on the valuer's tacit or faithful reaction to feeling, whereas the latter focuses on an apparent change in values that occurs in an individual with no corresponding change in the value-object. In this regard, we argued that the innovational view of the rhetoric of social movements constitutes a viable alternative to the establishment-conflict view, at least in some cases, because it contains a philosophic approach to human values that the latter does not share.
Confident that our overview of Behavioristic Theory and ThePhilosophic Foundations of Rhetoric has served to better prepare
the reader for the upcoming discussion, we proceed to an examination
of A Dramaturgical Perspective. The current critical undertaking
is used in concert with the findings of our previous sections to
complete Chapter Two's threefold-examination of the question:
"Should rhetorical scholars, as Smith and Windes suggest, recognize,
at least in some cases, the rhetoric of innovational social move-
ments, and thus allow innovational theory to assume a useful place
in the embryonic corpus of rhetorical movement literature?"

A DRAMATURAL PERSPECTIVE

Our Dramaturgical Perspective brings to the forefront a recodified
critical tool. More specifically, the present perspective represents
a synthesis of our previous discussions of Behavioristic Theory and
The Philosophic Foundations of Rhetoric, and uses this research in
concert with additional findings, in order to "recast" the critical
lens of the Smith-Windes Innovational Theory of the rhetoric of
social movements. Here, our aim is to re-create a more philosophically
viable, and therefore critically acceptable theory of innovational
rhetorical movement criticism.

The recodified critical perspective is "dramaturgical" in two
respects. The first, and more obvious one, proceeds from our pre-
vvious discussion of Ontology, where it was argued that the dramatur-
gical view of persuasion best represents the rhetoric of innovational
social movements. The perspective is also "dramaturgical," insofar
as the "dynamic" movement of the rhetoric of social movements lends
itself admirably to the dramatistic imagery of a dramaturgical
critical interpretation. While commenting on the rhetoric of historical movements, Griffin alludes to this "dynamism," one which gives impetus to patterns of public discussion, as well as to the rhetorical critic's task, in this regard.

The rhetorical component of the movement is dynamic, and has its inception, its development, and its consummation. The student's task is to isolate the rhetorical movement within the matrix of the historical movement; the rhetorical movement is the focus of his study. It is to be isolated, analyzed, evaluated, and described, so that he can say, for the particular historical movement which he investigates: this was the pattern of public discussion, the configuration of discourse, the physiognomy of persuasion, peculiar to the movement. 210

Next, we fuse together the Griffinesque pattern of public discussion, with the Burkeian "dramatism," (where the titular term "dramatistic" used in conjunction with the word "pentad" invites one to treat language and thought as dramaturgical modes of action) to generate a dynamic critical scheme that can be used to isolate innovational languaging strategies and configurations of discourse. Our critical "triad," as in Burke's dramatistic "pentad," displays a similar "dynamism," where one triadic element (i.e., fact, policy, or value) may be dominant or controlling in one configuration, and recessive in another. The fluid perspective complements nicely the dramatistic movement of persuasion, and enables the critic of rhetorical movements to simplify his expansive subject matter, by making it easier to determine which triadic element is controlling the speaker's or speakers' world view.
Our explanation of the dramatistic dynamism of our Dramaturgical Perspective next proceeds to a discussion of the "dispositio" or conceptual arrangement of our critical tool. In this regard, the triadic elements of fact, policy, and value, stemming from their respective philosophic causistries of Ontology, Epistemology, and Axiology, constitute the dialectical substance of our criticism. In this context, they emerge as the critical dimensions of our Dramaturgical Perspective.

Arranged in a linear fashion, the fact-policy-value triad forms three "factorable" columns of rhetorical movement criticism. The category sets in each column correlate or combine to produce two distinct types of rhetorical movement criticism: (1) innovational configurations, and (2) establishment-conflict configurations.

Innovational configurations of rhetorical movement criticism, as the name implies, represent those critical category sets which combine to reflect the rhetoric of innovational social movements. Inspired by the philosophic causistries of Ontology, Epistemology, and Axiology, their critical criteria of fact, policy, and value, unite to form various genres of innovational criticism. Dominant and recessive triadic elements serve to help the critic determine the true nature of the rhetoric of innovational social movements.

The philosophic causistry of Ontology, for instance, centers on innovational configurations of rhetorical "fact," the first critical dimension of our Dramaturgical Perspective. It was established earlier, in this regard, that the rhetoric of both innovational and establishment-conflict social movements shares four "facts" or
persuasive features: (1) a goal of social change through (2) group action which (3) must fulfill rhetorical requirements by (4) creating drama. We demonstrated, however, that the agents of these two schools of thought interpret "persuasion" (particularly "facts" 3 and 4) differently.

Bound by the common ontological assumption that man is by nature subject to, and capable of persuasion, innovationalists were described as possessing a different explanation as to "how" and "why" persuasion occurs than those posed by their establishment-conflict counterpart. The former was depicted as adhering to a dramaturgical interpretation of persuasion, whereas the latter was shown to subscribe to rationalistic and behavioristic conceptions of rhetorical influence. Thus, our ontological dimension of innovational configurations of rhetorical criticism ventilates a dramaturgical interpretation of persuasion because the view best typifies the "social" or "communal" rhetoric of innovational social movements.

To further develop this critical dimension, we allude to Brown's essay, "Making Present The Past: Public Address History." Expressing a temporal interpretation of Ontology, the author holds that the "being" of speakers and audiences is largely bound up in their "time-treatment" of symbols. "Conservative or traditional symbolists define their beings 'in the name of' symbols from the past, carried pristinely to the present or purged--from time to time--of any heresy, Brown writes. Liberal or modern symbolists define their being 'in the name of' symbols from the past carried forward and reinterpreted for present circumstances."211
Brown's temporal interpretation of a symbolic Ontology lends itself admirably to the dramaturgical view of persuasion expressed in our innovational configurations of rhetorical movement criticism. The nonconfrontational, symbolic imagery of "Traditional" and "Modern" modes of thought, in this connection, are consistent with the "cooperative" nature of innovational persuasion. Heretofore, they should be portrayed as ontological category sets, as the definition of the first critical dimension of innovational configurations of rhetorical movement criticism is completed.

Our critical focus shifts from Ontology to Epistemology, as we come to bear on the "policy" of the rhetoric of innovational social movements. The reader recalls in this regard, that earlier we surveyed a broad spectrum of persuasion literature to show that rhetoric conceived as "epistemic" is a highly delicate "way of knowing" where success hinges to a large measure, upon the quality of the mutual "expectancies" and anticipatory projections of the rhetor and his hearers. Submitting the argument that the Smith-Windes "policy" proposal was more sensitive to the reciprocity that exists between rhetorical "expectation" and human persuadability, than its establishment-conflict counterpart, we substantiated the fact that the latter is a more realistic alternative to the former.

The critical reality of the rhetoric of innovational knowing is rooted in "Tradition" and "Science." The Epistemology of the former finds expression in the authoritative revelation of "formal" prescriptions, whereas the Epistemology of "scientific" knowing is inspired by an empirical, cause-effect process. Brown's description of
"traditional" and "scientific" knowing helps us better define these two criteria of our second dimension. In a critical review aimed at DeWitte Holland's *America in Controversy: History of American Public Address*, he observes:

Combining with stances of being are various approaches to knowing, as is clear in John Sulli­van's essay on "Tariff, Slavery, and Politics." As technical economic arguments proved inconclusive, formal prescriptions in the guise of "principles" served as knowledge of causes and effects in the sectional struggle. The latter approach to truth is a "formal" one, then: To know is to know prescriptions together with their forms and usages. The language of such an approach to knowing stresses an "author" (God or society) as revelation via process, such as cause-effect. The "authority" of the Bible for Fundamentalists, as Allen Sager points out in his chapter on Fund­amentalism and Modernism, is at bottom an epistemenological issue.

Just as Brown submits the claim that particular stances of "being" correlate or combine with various approaches to "knowing," and thus produce different genres of public address, we similarly argue that the same system may be used to generate various innova­tional configurations of rhetorical movement criticism. "Tradition" and "Science" conceived as epistemological category sets, for in­stance, lend additional clarity to our "policy" column of innovational critical criteria. These critical standards may be factored into the ontological dimension to produce several genres of innovational movement criticism. The process is further enriched, by introducing still a third innovational column of critical standards.

Largely inspired by a previous discussion of the Axiology of rhetoric, conceived as the enhancement of human values, we create a
"value" dimension of innovational criticism. In this regard, agents of the innovational rhetoric of social movements were described earlier as assuming a philosophically objective approach to human values, and thus maintain that values take their existence from the world of external objects. Since the view is not peculiar to the establishment-conflict school of thought, it may be used in concert with our ontological and epistemological columns to formulate our last critical index of the rhetoric of innovational social movements. Thus, our Dramaturgical Perspective seeks, once again, to "re-cast" the critical lens of the Smith-Windes Innovational Theory of the rhetoric of social movements, and aims ultimately at the creation of a more critically acceptable theory of innovational movement criticism. Inspired by their respective philosophic causistries of Ontology, Epistemology, and Axiology, the dialectical substance of "fact," "policy" and "value" now emerge as distinct critical dimensions whose criteria correlate and combine, forming various innovational configurations of rhetorical criticism. However, these innovational modes of criticism differ markedly from the establishment-conflict configurations of rhetorical criticism.

Establishment-conflict configurations of rhetorical movement criticism may be looked upon as critical indices of what does not represent the rhetoric of innovational social movements. Heavily influenced by the mechanistic world view of behaviorists who study social movements, establishment-conflict critical modes of thought are presented here, so that they may help us better understand their innovational counterpart.
The ontological dimension of establishment-conflict configurations of rhetorical movement criticism, unlike its innovational counterpart, is largely bound by rationalistic and behavioristic interpretations of "persuasion." Exhibiting these two views as critical category sets, establishment-conflict ontology subscribes to a "manipulative" (pragmatic-subordinate) genre of "persuasion," where the rhetor is depicted as "engineering" the consent of his auditors. It is a view of "persuasion" that stands in stark contrast to the "cooperative" dramaturgical philosophy of innovational criticism.

Moreover, whereas the criticism of innovational configurations sets forth "Traditional" and "Modern" ontological category sets, its establishment-conflict counterpart employs "Revolutionary" or "Futuristic" critical criteria. "Revolutionary or futurist symbolists," Brown explains, "declare with Carl Sandburg that the past is a bucket of ashes and set out to create their being 'in the name of' forward-pointing symbols shorn of continuity with the past and related to the present as the already past." Ontologically "new" symbols construed as establishment-conflict standards of rhetorical movement criticism are quite consistent with an epistemologically "Intuitive" dimension of establishment-conflict criticism.

"Traditional" knowing (authority as revelation) and "Scientific" knowing (revelation via process) represent critical indices of innovational configurations of rhetorical movement criticism. The "Intuitive" knowing of establishment-conflict criticism, however, is derived from "personal" revelation or individual feeling, and may
be likened to what Wordsworth called the "inspiration of the poet."

"For all good poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings," he lyricizes, "and though this be true, poems to which any value can be attached were never produced on any variety of subjects who, being possessed of more than usual organic sensibility, had also thought long and deeply."²¹

Wordsworth's advocacy of tempering poetic feeling with deep reflection is epistemologically sound from the standpoint of establishment-conflict criticism. However, the view also lends itself admirably to its axiological critical dimension.

In this regard, it was previously argued that establishment-conflict advocates embrace philosophically intuitive and subjective approaches to human values. The former was described as centering on the valuer's tacit or faithful reaction to feeling, whereas the latter was described as focusing on an apparent change in values that occurs in an individual with no corresponding change in the value-object.

These two philosophic viewpoints, conceived as axiological standards of innovational rhetorical criticism, sharply contrast the philosophically objective approach to values proffered by innovational criticism. This disparity in viewpoints, helps the student of rhetorical movements to better understand the axiological stance of both schools of thought.

The axiological definition of establishment-conflict configurations of rhetorical movement criticism completes our Dramaturgical Perspective. This critical tool will be applied to the Transcendental
Meditation Movement in Chapter Three, an alleged example of innovative persuasion that is relative to our second research question.
"TRANSCENDENTAL MEDITATION: AN INNOVATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORIC OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>&quot;ONTOLOGY&quot; (Fact)</th>
<th>&quot;EPISTEMOLOGY&quot; (Policy)</th>
<th>&quot;AXIOLOGY&quot; (Value)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Dramaturgical</td>
<td>Traditional Symbols</td>
<td>Tradition</td>
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<td>Objective</td>
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<td>Modern Symbols</td>
<td>Science</td>
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"INNOVATIONAL CONFIGURATIONS"

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<tr>
<th>2. Rationalistic</th>
<th>New or Futuristic Symbols</th>
<th>Intuition</th>
<th>Intuitive Subjective</th>
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<td>3. Behavioristic</td>
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**Behaviorism's Influence:**

**a.** Difference in Communicative Perspective

1. Physics Envy - "Reify" (Mechanistic Imagery)
2. Sign-Based Interpretation of Communication
3. Less Attention Paid to Communication
4. Manipulative, Conflictive Foci

"ESTABLISHMENT-CONFLICT CONFIGURATIONS"
Chapter Two

1. This critique was given by an anonymous member of the Central States Speech Journal editorial board, under the editorship of Donovan J. Ochs. The manuscript reviewed was, "Transcendental Meditation: A Rhetorical Movement Study," an essay I submitted for publication in 1976. The critic held some opposition to innovational theory and this was personified somewhat by Herbert Simons in a conversation we had following his appearance at a seminar conducted by John J. Makay in the rhetoric of social movements at Ohio State University, Winter Quarter, 1976. Simons seemed of the opinion that the contribution made to the understanding of social movements by rhetorical theorists was somewhat less inspired than the research generated by behaviorists. Moreover, he suggested that I abandon my effort to conduct an innovational analysis of the Transcendental Meditation Movement. To me, his suggestion seemed somewhat naive in light of the challenge which is apparent in the literature of rhetoric and social movements.


4. Robert S. Cathcart, "Movements: Confrontation As Rhetorical Form," The Southern Speech Communication Journal, 43 (Spring, 1978), pp. 233-247. This essay was added to my Review of the Primary Literature as a late entry. On page 235 Cathcart cites (in footnote form) the Smith-Windes claim that he (Cathcart) in his "New Approaches to the Study of Movements: Defining Movements Rhetorically," fails to differentiate between rhetorical movements and other classes of rhetorical acts. Cathcart's new publication, "Movements: Confrontation As Rhetorical Form," however, constitutes a broad response to this criticism. The author's entire effort is directed at establishing rhetorical movements as "confrontational form." Nowhere in his essay does Cathcart challenge the particulars of innovational theory by name, or even use the term "innovational" to distinguish it from establishment-conflict movements, preferring instead to use the neologism "reform" to describe non-confrontational rhetorical
movements. It may therefore be said, without contradiction, that no writer has emerged to dignify the implication that the Smith-Winck perspective may have on rhetorical studies.


8. Ibid., p. 17. Germane to the "passive voice" (Y is done by X), as opposed to the "active voice" (X does Y).


11. In *Symbols in Society*, Duncan observes that social integration is largely achieved through the process of "naming." Names are used to control many aspects of societal behavior, according to Duncan.


21. "Verisimilitude" is a theatrical term which I take to mean "the appearance of truth."

22. Duncan, Symbols in Society, p. 35.


Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior, p. 47.


In this regard, Burke observes:

"[T]ermimistic screens direct the attention.... Here the kind of deflection I have in mind con­cerns simply the fact that any nomenclature necessarily directs the attention into some channels rather than others. In one sense, this likelihood is painfully obvious. A textbook in physics, for instance, turns the attention in a different direction from a textbook on law or psychology."


33. La Fiere, *Collective Behavior*, pp. 22-23.

34. Nalla Harrell, John Waite Bowers, and Jeffrey F. Bacal, "Another Stab at 'Meaning': Concreteness, Iconicity, and Conventionality," *Speech Monographs*, 40 (August, 1973), p. 201. Here, I'm employing Harrell, Bowers, and Bacal's interpretation of the cognitive "iconicity-arbitrariness" dimension of meaning, where iconicity is construed as "a property of the relationship between concept and symbol..." That is to say, that "an iconic symbol is one which physically resembles its concept. An arbitrary symbol is one which bears no intrinsic similarity to its concept."

35. Sherif evidences an encyclopedic grasp of human communication in his *Social Interaction*, alluding to several sign and symbolic functions of language in society.


37. La Fiere, *Collective Behavior*, p. 23.


41. My survey of the collective behavioristic literature suggests that the notion of "conflict" is unusually topical. The special fascination it holds for the mass behaviorist is clearly reflected in the following research titles:


7. "The Public and Social Conflict," and "Conflict and Separatism," in Collective Behavior by Ralph H. Turner and Lewis M. Killian. It is interesting to further note that Smelser considers "conflict" a subcategory of his theoretical notion of "strain." "Terms like 'inconsistency,' 'conflict,' and 'deprivation,'" he writes in Theory of Collective Behavior, "all can be instances of strain, but each is too specific to cover all types of strain."

42. Herbert Simons is exemplary of rhetorical architects who draw their social movement theory from the research of behaviorists. In his Perspectives On Communication In Social Conflict, he assumes an ideological stance that is consistent with the establishment-conflict interpretation of social movements.


46. Langer, Philosophy In A New Key: A Study In the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art, p. 4.
47. Henry N. Wieman, "The Philosophical Significance of Speech," Central States Speech Journal, (Spring, 1961), p. 170. My definition of "philosophical inquiry" parallels Wieman's: "The distinctive field of inquiry for philosophy is to seek out and to understand those forms of experience which must be present in order to have any human experience whatsoever. For example, philosophy does not seek knowledge in physics or chemistry or psychology, nor the knowledge had by the garbage man or the mother or the friend. Rather it seeks to know those common characteristics which all these instances of knowledge must have in order properly to be called knowledge.... Since people often assume, mistakenly, that certain kinds of experience are instances of knowledge when they are not, this undertaking of philosophy, to make the distinction clear between what is knowledge and what is not knowledge, is very important."


49. Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. 127. Burke explains his notion of "featuring" as follows: "Dramatically, the different philosophic schools are to be distinguished by the fact that each school features one of five terms in developing a vocabulary designed to allow this one term full expression (as regards to its resources and temptations) with the other terms being comparatively slighted or being placed in the perspective of the featured term."

50. Ibid., p. 227.

51. Ibid., p. 31.

52. Ibid., p. 171.

53. Ibid., p. 275.

54. Ibid., p. 287.


56. The attentive reader will note that the "featured" terms (fact, policy, and value) of the three philosophic perspectives represent the classifications of argumentative propositions that have been used in debate since time and memoriam. In fact their remarkable longevity has caused Walter F. Terris, in his essay "The Classification of the Argumentative Proposition," to write, "Probably
the first reason for classifying propositions is that it is always done."


58. Emerson Buchanan, *Aristotle's Theory of Being* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: University of Mississippi Press, 1962), p. 6. Here, Buchanan states that "to be" or "to exist" seems to be "peculiarly the subject of metaphysics or ontology, the science of being."

59. Campbell, "The Ontological Foundations of Rhetorical Theory," p. 97. I am indebted to the research set forth in Dr. Campbell's essay. Her breakdown of the three ontological etiologies of persuasion were especially clarifying.

60. Ibid., p. 97.


64. Aristotle, i,3. 1358b. 32.

65. Kenneth E. Boulding, *The Image* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1975), p. 17. Boulding generates the following interpretation of this principle: "If the act of observation destroys the thing observed, it is clear that there is a fundamental obstacle to the growth of knowledge in that direction."


68. Ibid., p. 75.


70. Ibid., p. 102.

The symbol "Sm" refers to a message-stimulus intentionally directed to a receiver to arouse a desired meaning. In that persuasion is interpersonal, the stimulus is external to the receiver. The message-stimulus is reacted to signally or symbolically. The term "r" refers to such a response. This response is viewed as a mediation process in which a stimulus is used signally or symbolically. The term "N" stands for the meaning, signal or symbol, that results from the "r" response. The letter "s" indicates that the aroused meaning becomes a stimulus for further responses symbolized by "R". The two-way arrows "<->" suggest that the receiver is not only stimulated, but in turn works on the message-stimulus to explore its meaning potential. Similarly, the individual responds "R" to a meaning stimulus "s," and in turn interprets and is affected by that response. The part of the process indicated by "rHs" is enclosed to suggest a central process, one that culminates in a meaning.

74. Ibid., p. 105.
79. Campbell, "The Ontological Foundations of Rhetorical Theory," p. 103. A dramaturgical interpretation of persuasion views rhetoric as "rooted in an essential function of language itself, ...the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols."


82. Ibid., p. 66.


In his essay "Philosophical Origins of George Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric," Speech Monographs, 32 (1965), 7, Vincent Bevilacqua uses the term "managerial" to epitomize eighteenth-century rhetoric generally and quotes Hugh Blair as making the attitudes most clear: "Art cannot go so far, as to supply a speaker with arguments on every cause, and every subject; though it may be of considerable use in assisting him to arrange and express those, which his knowledge of the subject has discovered. For it is one thing to discover reasons that are most proper to convince men, and another, to manage these reasons with the most advantage. The latter is all that rhetoric can pretend to do" ("Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, London, 1838", p. 427).


89. Ibid., p. 144.

90. Ibid., p. 144.
91. In his essay, "A Synoptic View of Systems Of Western Rhetoric," Robert L. Scott actually incorporates the notion of "intentionality" into his definition of rhetoric: "rhetoric is communication characterized by a high degree of intentionality and a high degree of structure, including distinctness of communicative roles; it eventuates in discourse in the public realm of experience rather than the private."


105. The aforementioned volume by Biddle and Thomas, as well as Sarbin and Allen's "Role Theory," in the Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. by G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1952), p. 515, provide an excellent overview of role theory.


107. Ibid., p. 515.


109. Ibid., pp. 319-320.


111. Turner, p. 323.

112. Burke, Language As Symbolic Action, p. 3.


115. David A. Ling, "A Pentadic Analysis of Senator Edward Kennedy's Address to the People of Massachusetts, July 25, 1969," Central States Speech Journal (Summer, 1970), p. 83. Moreover, in their article in Today's Speech (Winter, 1972), "Kenneth Burke's Concept of Motives in Rhetorical Theory," Makay and Crable reject previous conceptions of motive as interrelationship, situation, and purpose, and support Ling's interpretation of motivation by claiming that "the influence of any element of the penta can be considered the primary motivating force in the rhetorical situation, and thus, the featured term in a rhetorical approach."


118. Ibid., p. 528.


120. Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 529. The three words were underlined to highlight the "role" interpretation.


123. Ibid., p. 5.

124. Ibid., p. 6, 8.

125. Ibid., p. 77.

126. Ibid., p. 49.


128. Ibid., p. 8.


130. Ibid., p. 4.


132. Ibid., p. 12.


135. Ibid., p. 8.

136. Ibid., p. 9.

137. Ibid., p. 13.
138. Ibid., p. 22.
139. Ibid., p. 17.
140. Ibid., p. 19.
146. Ibid., pp. 132-133.
151. Hulett cites J. Z. Young's neurophysiological interpretation of the "cognitive map" concept to further evidence its existence.

[T]he presence of some expectation is virtually a constant in science. That one person's expectation about another person's behavior may contribute to a determination of what that behavior will
actually be has been suggested by various theorists. Merton (1948) developed the very appropriate concept of "self-fulfilling prophecy." One prophesies an event and the expectation of the event then changes the behavior of the prophet in such a way as to make the prophesied event more likely. Gordon Allport (1950) applied the concept of interpersonal expectancies to an analysis of the causes of war. Nations expecting to go to war affect the behavior of their opponents-to-be by the behavior which reflects their expectations of armed conflict. Nations that expect to remain out of wars at least sometimes manage to avoid entering into them.


154. Ibid., p. 143.

155. Ibid., p. 143.


157. The reader will recall Robert L. Scott's and Douglas Ehninger's descriptions of "systems" or "types" of Western Rhetoric.


162. Eubanks and Baker, p. 159.

163. Ibid., p. 160.

164. Ibid., p. 160.

167. Cicero DeOratore II. 36.
168. Quintillian De Institutione Oratoria II. XX. 5-8.
173. Ibid., p. 87.
174. Ibid., p. 89.
175. Ibid., p. 89.
177. Bock, p. 89.
178. Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1966), p. 4. Here Polanyi articulates the central theme of the book. "I shall reconsider human knowledge," he writes, "by starting from the fact that 'we know more than we can tell.'"
180. Ibid., p. 90.
181. Ibid., pp. 90-91.
182. Ibid., p. 91.
185. Ibid., p. 91.
186. Ibid., p. 92.
187. Ibid., p. 92.
188. Eubanks and Baker, p. 164.
189. Ibid., p. 164.
190. Ibid., p. 164.
191. Ibid., p. 164.
192. Ibid., p. 164.
193. Ibid., p. 164.
194. Ibid., p. 164.
195. Ibid., p. 164.
196. Ibid., p. 164.
197. Ibid., p. 165.
199. Smith and Windes, p. 141.
201. Smith and Windes, p. 143.
202. Ibid., p. 144.
203. Ibid., p. 144.
206. Ibid., p. 6.

209. Ibid., p. 10.


212. Ibid., p. 238.

213. Ibid., p. 238.

CHAPTER THREE

THE INNOVATIONAL RHETORIC OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL MEDITATION MOVEMENT

In this ease of movement, this harmony, this rhythmic breathing of life into life, I am able to let my mind wander. I absent myself from road and wind and the warm sun. I am free to meditate, to measure the importance of things.

—George Sheehan from Running and Being

In the previous chapter, I offered the claims drawn from my discussions of Behavioristic Theory and The Philosophic Foundations of Rhetoric, in concert with some additional findings, to "recast" the critical lens of the Smith-Windes innovational theory of the rhetoric of social movements. In doing so, I argued for the recreation of a more philosophically viable, and therefore critically acceptable innovational theory of rhetorical criticism.

The forthcoming discussion, in this regard, seeks to apply this recodified critical perspective to an alleged example of the rhetoric of an innovational social movement. More specifically, our critical examination centers on the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation Movement in the United States, and represents a broad response to the following question: "If the rhetoric of innovational social movements is a legitimate consideration, does a seemingly innovational social collectivity like the Transcendental Meditation movement reflect the Smith-Windes critical criteria, and thus function to establish
innovational criticism's new foothold in the rhetorical movement literature?

The answer to this question requires a threefold application of the critical dimensions previously presented in the recodified Dramaturgical Perspective. Thus, the triadic elements of fact, policy, and value, stemming from their respective philosophic causistries of Ontology, Epistemology, and Axiology, once again, constitute the dialectical substance of criticism.

Arranged in a linear fashion, the fact-policy-value scheme can best be conceptualized as unfolding into three factorable columns of critical criteria. These constructs then, correlate or combine to create two distinct modes for criticism of rhetorical movements: (1) innovational configurations, and (2) establishment-conflict configurations.

The former mode, typifies those critical criteria which reflect the rhetoric of innovational social movements. Inspired, once again, by their philosophic causistries of Ontology, Epistemology, and Axiology, these critical dimensions of fact, policy, and value unite, to generate various configurations of innovational persuasion.

Establishment-conflict configurations of the criticism of rhetorical movements, on the other hand, point up those critical indices of mass persuasion which do not reflect the rhetoric of innovational social movements. Moreover, the forthcoming discussion invokes this latter mode only insofar as it serves to better define innovational criticism.

These definitions of innovational and establishment-conflict configurations of rhetorical movement criticism make ready the argument
that the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement is more consistent with the criteria which reflect the former mode of rhetorical criticism. However, before the first critical column of the Dramaturgical Perspective (i.e., Ontology or "fact") is applied to the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement, a synoptic look at the Transcendental Meditation technique, and a personal chronicle of this writer's experience of it as a student enrolled in the basic Transcendental Meditation program, preface the forthcoming critical analysis.

The Transcendental Meditation Technique. Transcendental Meditation is the most popular meditation technique in the Western world, and its founder, Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, the most celebrated Eastern guru. The technique is an updated version of an ancient mantric meditation specifically designed by Maharishi for Western consumption.

In his effort to package and sell Transcendental Meditation to Americans, Maharishi has been uncommonly persuasive. A careful avoidance of potential avenues of mystical estrangement coupled with the consistent endorsement of "scientific" validation, clearly evidence the mark of an astute rhetorician.

In this persuasive campaign to ingratiate to a skeptical American audience, a practice developed for and by Indian Hindus, Maharishi has gracefully side-stepped the orthodox origins of Transcendental Meditation. Preferring instead, to call this technique the "Science of Creative Intelligence," he proffers a bastardized re-statement of Sankaracharya's eighth-century Advait school of Vedic thought.
Sankaracharya's Hindu teachings began to flourish in India at a time when Buddhism had already reached its zenith. His edification stood at the ideological forefront of a religious campaign which sought the spiritual unification of the Atmun (individual soul) with the Brahman (collective spirit).

Under Sankaracharya's etheric guidance, Hinduism weakened Buddhism's traditional foothold in India. As Advait thought flourished, its deep meditative practices variously understood as samadhi, satori, and nirvana, continued to spread throughout India's spiritual community.

Transcendental Meditation, in this connection, finds its origin in these ancient Advait meditative states. As in most Advait schools of thought, it is predicated on the belief that all human suffering results from the spiritual duality which exists between the Atmun (individual soul) and the Brahman (collective spirit). Moreover, Transcendental Meditation similarly recommends the repetition of a "mantra" (i.e., the Sanskrit word for sound) in order to consolidate this duality, and end human suffering.

The *Visuddhimagga*, an oral textbook of Buddhist philosophy and psychology that aspiring monks memorize verbatim, describes the personalized mantra as a means to the seeker's finer levels of thought. However, Maharishi translates its ancient wisdom into a more contemporary Western idiom. "The mantra creates an increasing charm," he observes, "as the mind is allowed to follow its natural tendency to go to a field of greater happiness by entering the subtler states of a thought—that is, the mantra."
The mantra in Transcendental Meditation is variously understood in the United States, and has become somewhat controversial among Western meditators. This is largely due to the way in which Transcendental Meditation is taught.

Transcendental Meditation teachers, for instance, insist that students enrolled in the basic program not reveal the personalized mantra to other people. This practice tends to surround the mantra with unwarranted suspicion, and creates a mystique it has no formal claim to.

In fact, the mantra is not peculiar to Transcendental Meditation, and can be found in many of the ceremonial services of Hindus, like those of the Bhaktis in modern-day India. Vedic history reveals that Sanskrit terms like "shyam" (Lord Krishna, the Hindu godhead) and "Aing" (Divine Mother) produce mantric sounds which are appropriate to special types of persons.

The ancient Saiva Upanishads, for instance, sheds additional light on the significance of the mantra in Vedic thought. This holy book of Hindu edification contains a discourse on the Sanskrit alphabet, consisting of fifty letters, each one representing a mantric virtue. The letter pronounced "umkara" (ū), for example, imputes to a meditator the virtue of strength; "kumkara" (kā), is believed to detoxify the poisons of the spirit; "ghamkara" (gha), affords its user prosperity; and "phamkara" (pha), supposedly invests one with psychic powers.  

In Transcendental Meditation, the meditator uses the mantra to attain effortless concentration while bringing the mind back to the meditative state as it wanders from one-pointedness, or the source of
thought. In other words, the aim of Transcendental Meditation, as in most Advait meditative practices, is to become passively one-pointed. "Transcendental Meditation," Maharishi maintains, in this regard, "involves turning the attention inward towards the subtler levels of thought until the mind transcends the experience of the subtlest state of thought and arrives at the source of thought...."4

The meditator experiences restful alertness at the source of thought. This stillness of the mind or transcendental bliss-consciousness is called "jhana" in the Visuddhimagga. The "jhana" heightens the meditator's waking, dreaming, and sleeping states by alternating his normal day-to-day activity and rest with periods of meditation.

The optimal integration of meditation and normal activity results in the meditative state of "samadhi." The meditator who experiences "samadhi" negotiates a near perfect alignment between his individual soul (Atmum) and the infinite one (Brahman).

Experienced only by advanced students of Transcendental Meditation, this deep meditative state is reported to create an enlightened awareness in the meditator. Maharishi describes this enlightened condition. He writes:

> The enlightened man lives a life of fulfillment. His actions, being free from desire, serve only the need of time. He has no personal interest to gain. He is engaged in fulfilling the cosmic purpose and therefore his actions are guided by nature. This is why he does not have to worry about his needs. His needs are the needs of nature, which takes care of their fulfillment, he being the instrument of the Divine."5

This feeling of oneness with the Divine, or "God consciousness" is one of the most profound states of Transcendental Meditation.
Here the meditator reportedly perceives all things as sacred or as experienced in the constant awareness of God. However, "God consciousness" is a meditative state reserved only for graduates of the "sidhi" or advanced Transcendental Meditation programs, and is rarely even discussed in the basic course.

**Learning the Transcendental Meditation Technique.** The Transcendental Meditation technique is taught in seven steps: (1) The Introductory Lecture; (2) The Preparatory Lecture; (3) The Personal Interview; (4) Personal Instruction; (5) First Day Checking; (6) Second Day Checking; and (7) Third Day Checking. As a participant observer, I, with other students, moved through these stages as part of my research.

(1) **The Introductory Lecture.** The introductory lecture unfolded in five distinct phases. During the initial phase, a small group of Transcendental Meditation aspirants assembled to watch a series of videotaped interviews with well-known athletes who practiced Transcendental Meditation. Each celebrity explained how Transcendental Meditation had enhanced both his/her professional and personal lives.

The videotape was followed with a speech by one of the Transcendental Meditation teachers. In this second phase of the introductory lecture, Bob (he gave only his first name), explained in extemporaneous fashion the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi's interpretation of what Transcendental Meditation both is and is not. The speech lasted for half an hour. He addressed the concepts of energy, intelligence, and happiness as they relate to Transcendental Meditation, and maintained that Transcendental Meditation heightens one's energy, intelligence, and over-all happiness by moving the meditator's mind to a synchronous state (i.e.,...
where both hemispheres of the brain are synchronized, or in tune). This mental "synchrony" reportedly generates a more qualitative existence for the meditator by allowing the bodily electricity to flow more easily.

Bob's general discussion of Transcendental Meditation provided a point of departure for Peter's more focused lecture on the scientific dimension of this technique. This second message centered primarily on the scientific validity of Transcendental Meditation.

Perhaps argumentum ad populum best describes Peter's skillful reportage in the third phase of the introductory lecture. His lecture was specifically designed for an intelligent, but lay audience. Though occasionally referring to sophisticated visual aids (scientific charts) to help him expand on explanations of Transcendental Meditation's effectiveness, his monosyllabic commentary was for the most part easy to comprehend. He made an effort to avoid intricate explanations and technical language.

Peter discussed how Transcendental Meditation has been scientifically proven to help people in ways ranging from increasing the growth of intelligence to curing insomnia. Though his style of exposition was decidedly more figurative than scientific, his lecture heavily emphasized the "scientific" authenticity of Transcendental Meditation.

Following Peter's lecture on the scientific validity of Transcendental Meditation, John, a third Transcendental Meditation teacher in attendance, spoke about the social dimension of this technique. John described how Transcendental Meditation could effectively be integrated into our daily social routine. He cited a number of case
studies where Transcendental Meditation had been shown to stimulate job performance, increase creativity, encourage self-actualization, and promote a better over-all psychological existence for meditators.

Finally, in the fifth or last phase of the introductory lecture, Bob, the first Transcendental Meditation spokesman to speak, returned to stipulate the three requirements of all prospective students who are about to enroll in the basic Transcendental Meditation program. The first one required that students must attend all seven sessions -- both of the first two lectures, the interview, and most importantly, all four consecutive sessions of instruction. Moreover, 15 - 20 minutes must be set aside, twice a day by the meditator for the regular practice of the Transcendental Meditation technique.

The second requirement Bob addressed concerned the course fee. Each student was required to pay an enrollment fee of $110; but the price varies significantly according to where the instruction is offered. Denniston and McWilliams, authors of The TM Book, observe in this regard:

As of 1975, the course fee in the USA is $125 per person. Couples, and their children under 15, may all start together for $200. The fee for college students is $65, for high school students $55, and for junior high school students $35. Children between four and ten are asked to bring two weeks' allowance.7

The last requirement Bob stipulated called for a 15-day drug abstinence prior to taking the seven sessions. Students about to enroll in the basic course were thus instructed to abstain from any non-prescription "recreational" drugs for fifteen days prior to personal instruction. "Recreational" drugs meant marijuana, LSD, amphetamines,
barbituates, narcotics, and anything else that a physician had not prescribed for personal use. 8

A brief question-and-answer session followed Bob's statement of these requirements. Before the 2½ hour introductory lecture came to a close, those present who wished to enroll in the basic course were asked to report back to the same place on the following evening.

(2) The Preparatory Lecture. Only two members of an original audience of about twenty returned the following evening to listen to the preparatory lecture. John, the Transcendental Meditation teacher who had spoken to the social dimension of Transcendental Meditation the night before, returned alone on this occasion to speak about the nature of Transcendental Meditation, as it relates to the anatomy of thought.

The preem of John's lecture began with a didactic analogy which likened the practice of Transcendental Meditation to the ascent of a bubble of thought in the ocean of the meditator's mind. He maintained, in this regard, that undeveloped thoughts, like tiny bubbles on the ocean's floor, gradually develop into complete ideas as they rise to the conscious mind. John held, moreover, that the very process of thinking tends to expedite this mental activity.

Transcendental Meditation, however, re-directs the mind's attention away from its involvement with fully developed thought, engaging it instead, in less and less elaborate levels of thought. John explained that this involvement with the quieter levels of the mind at the source of thought creates in the meditator a more pleasurable and satisfying awareness. With this explanation of the
relationship which exists between thought development and Transcendental Meditation, he proceeded to examine the concepts of "concentration" and "contemplation."

"Concentration," defined as focused thought, and "contemplation" or accelerated mental activity, have little bearing on the mechanics of Transcendental Meditation, according to John. Sound, introduced in the form of a mantra, undermines their significance by disengaging the mind from the thinking process, of which "concentration" and "contemplation" are a part, and turning the attention toward the stillness of the mind or more quiet levels of mental activity.

John's 45-minute lecture ended with a brief question-and-answer session. Then, this writer was asked to wait outside of the room, while he conducted the first personal interview.

(3) The Personal Interview. The prospective student of Transcendental Meditation officially contracts to take the remainder of the basic course during the personal interview session. Shortly after engaging in a friendly conversation with John about my reasons for wanting to learn Transcendental Meditation, this writer was instructed to bring with him to the Transcendental Meditation center the course fee, a half dozen flowers, three varieties of fruit, and a new white handkerchief.

These "gifts" were said to be pre-requisites to the Pujah, a preliminary ceremony commemorating Guru Dev, Maharishi Mahesh Yogi's spiritual teacher. This Vedic rite-de-passage ritual precedes the personal instruction step.
(4) **Personal Instruction.** Rick, my personalized instructor, was assigned to me at the outset of the Pujah. A meticulously-groomed man of about thirty, who possessed a flare for figurative language (such as "TM is the cadillac of life") and European-cut suits, Rick's genuine display of alacrity and good humor made me feel remarkably at ease, as I mentally prepared myself for the Pujah.

The ceremony was conducted in a small cubicle-like room. Sandalwood incense burned on an antisceptically-chaste altar at one end of it, and two chairs occupied the remainder. A pious portrait of Guru Dev cast a watchful eye over one side of the altar, and a chalice-like goblet with a candle inside lay adjacent to it.

As my teacher lit the candle, he instructed me to place the fruit on the handkerchief in front of the altar. While standing patiently off to one side, Rick, hands clasped in prayer, began to chant a Sanskrit liturgy.

The ceremony continued as Rick, still chanting, blessed each flower individually, and then arranged the six tastefully before the altar. After approximately fifteen minutes of prayer the personalized mantra was conferred on me.

Rick instructed me to repeat the mantric sound to myself for three ten-minute intervals. At the end of each interval, he inquired as to whether I had experienced a noticeable quietude or stillness of the mind. We talked about this first meditation, and agreed to reconvene the following day for the first day checking session.

(5) **First Day Checking.** The first day checking session was conducted in a group consisting of fifteen student meditators and four
Transcendental Meditation teachers. Two 20-minute intervals of meditation were practiced at this meeting, one at the beginning of the session, and one at the end.

After the first meditation, each member of the group was asked to discuss his or her meditative experience. This discussion was followed by a brief question-and-answer period, and the second meditation.

The first day checking session lasted approximately two hours. All in attendance agreed to reassemble the following evening for the second day checking.

(6) Second Day Checking. The second day checking, as in the case of the first day checking session, consisted of a 20-minute meditation, a brief discussion of each person’s meditative experience, and a group question-and-answer period.

However, unlike the first day checking session, a collaborative lecture on the effects that Transcendental Meditation has on the meditator’s mind and body, was delivered by the four Transcendental Meditation teachers in attendance. Their talk bore heavily on the way in which meditators use Transcendental Meditation to negotiate mental and physical stress.

The teachers maintained, in this regard, that the body’s build-up of stress was partially due to an overloading of the central nervous system. Thought release or mental activity represents both the cause and cure for the build-up of this backlog of stress in individuals, according to the Transcendental Meditation spokespersons.
They held that stress accompanies the development of every thought as it rises from the subconscious to the conscious mind. It tends to accumulate, when the mind's attention centers on these developing thoughts as they ascend to the conscious mind. Stress is released, however, only when the mind's attention is taught to disengage from these developing thoughts, and fixate on the subconscious mind or source of thought.

Transcendental Meditation, in this connection, was said to foster the latter condition, by simultaneously allowing thoughts to ascend to the conscious mind, while bringing the attention back to the mind's stress-free source of thought. In other words, Transcendental Meditation works in outward and inward strokes, to use the language of the Transcendental Meditation teachers. The activity of the former, relieves the body and mind of stress, while the inward strokes serve to bring the mind's attention back to its stress-free origin. The diagram below graphically illustrates Transcendental Meditation's stroking activity.

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Conscious Thought
(Stress Release)

Outward Stroke    "mind" Stroke

Source of Thought
(Stress-Free)

"Body"
(Backlog of Stress)
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The Transcendental Meditation teachers' collaborative lecture was, as in the case of the second day checking, followed by a group meditation. All present, once again, agreed to reconvene the next day for the third day checking.

(7) Third Day Checking. This last step of the basic course, as in the previous two days of checking, consisted of a 20-minute meditation, a question-and-answer session, and a brief discussion of each individual's meditative experience. Moreover, it included a collaborative lecture entitled, "Invincibility: A Vision of the Goal of Full Development of Life."

Perhaps the significance of this address is best summed by a passage which appeared in the Age of Enlightenment News.

Maharishi explained that the sign of the invincibility of a nation will be found in "the integration value of harmony in the country. Invincibility will be in the power of good, in the power of love, the power of harmony, and the power of friendly people. It will be in the ability to disallow the birth of any enemy--the country's ability to create only friends. This comes from the rising level of coherence and harmony in world consciousness generated by those who practice the Transcendental Meditation...programs."

In this regard, the Transcendental Meditation teachers assured the group members that the international growth and acceptance of Transcendental Meditation would foster a universal brotherhood. This new fraternity of man would be represented by countries who experience the rise of invincibility through the greater harmony and coherence in their national consciousness.

At the close of this final stage of checking, the teachers encouraged the group members to "drop-in" on a monthly basis for
periodic spot-checking. The basic course had ended!

The foregoing examination of the Transcendental Meditation technique and personal chronicle, have served to better prepare the reader for the forthcoming critical analysis of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement. We now proceed to a threefold application of our recodified Dramaturgical Perspective.

Here, once again, the triadic elements of fact, policy, and value, stemming from their respective philosophic causistries of Ontology, Epistemology, and Axiology, are re-introduced to represent the dialectical substance of the Dramaturgical Perspective. When these three factorable columns of critical criteria are applied to the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement, they should correlate and combine to generate various "innovational configurations" of rhetorical movement criticism. The creation of this critical mode will, in turn, help respond to the question: "If the rhetoric of innovational social movements is a legitimate consideration, then does a seemingly innovational social collectivity like the Transcendental Meditation movement reflect the Smith-Windes critical criteria, and thus function to establish innovational criticism's new foothold in the rhetorical movement literature?"12

Innovational Configurations of the Rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation Movement.

Ontology. The philosophic causistry of Ontology centers on innovational configurations of rhetorical "fact," the first critical dimension of our Dramaturgical Perspective. It was earlier established, in this regard, that the rhetoric of both innovational and establishment-conflict social movements shares four "facts" or persuasive
features: (1) a goal of social change through (2) group action which (3) must fulfill rhetorical requirements by (4) creating drama. However, we demonstrated that the agents of these two schools of thought interpret "persuasion" (particularly "facts" 3 and 4) in different ways.

Bound by the common ontological assumption that man is by nature subject to, and capable of persuasion, innovationalists were portrayed as possessing a different explanation as to "how" and "why" persuasion occurs, than those reasons posed by their establishment-conflict counterpart. The former was described as adhering to a dramaturgical interpretation of persuasion, whereas the latter was shown to subscribe to rationalistic and behavioristic conceptions of rhetorical influence. Thus, our ontological dimension of innovational configurations of rhetorical criticism ventilates a dramaturgical interpretation of persuasion, because the view best typifies the "social" or "communal" rhetoric of innovational social movements.

Moreover, to further develop this critical dimension, we alluded to Brown's essay, "Making Present The Past: Public Address History." Expressing a temporal interpretation of Ontology, Brown held that the "being" of speakers and audiences is largely bound up in their "time-treatment" of symbols. He suggested in this regard, that conservative or traditional symbolists define their beings "in the name of" symbols from the past, carried pristinely to the present, whereas liberal or modern symbolists define their being "in the name of" symbols from the past carried forward and reinterpreted for the present circumstances.
Finally, I argued that Brown's temporal interpretation of a symbolic Ontology seeks a dramaturgical explanation of persuasion because the rhetorical imagery of "Traditional" and "Modern" modes of thought is consistent with the "cooperative" nature of innovational persuasion. This imagery was used, in turn, to further define the ontological category sets of "Traditional" and "Modern" symbols, thereby completing the first column of innovational criticism in our Dramaturgical Perspective.

**Ontological Application.**

**Facts.** Innovational and establishment-conflict models of the rhetoric of social movements share four basic persuasive features or facts: (1) a goal of social change through (2) group action which (3) must fulfill rhetorical requirements by (4) creating drama. Each of these unfolds within the ontological context of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement.

In this connection, the persuasive nature of the Transcendental Meditation movement strongly suggests a goal of social change. Though its message addresses the personal fulfillment of the individual practitioner, the Transcendental Meditation technique's infiltration into the American mainline reflects significant social change. Transcendental Meditation adherents, for instance, claim that their technique has been used to decrease crime, enhance human sexuality, prevent drug abuse, and help the human condition on every plane of experience. Reluctant testimony by nonmeditators like novelist Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. lend support to Transcendental Meditation's social influence. He writes:
My wife and eighteen-year-old daughter are hooked. They've both been initiated. They meditate several times a day. Nothing pisses them off anymore. They glow like bass drums with lights inside.

Vonnegut's affirmation of Transcendental Meditation's social significance is multiplied ad infinitum in *Ti: Discovering Inner Energy and Overcoming Stress*. Here psychiatrist-Transcendental Meditation teacher Harold Bloomfield et al. cite numerous examples depicting the ways in which Transcendental Meditation induces social change. Improving our system of education, America's largest industry, represents one of Transcendental Meditation's many social applications. Bloomfield observes:

> Because America's education is our central agency for human development, the TK program may have its greatest social impact through application in our schools. In the search for new methods of making learning meaningful, college and secondary school educators have begun incorporating credit courses on the practice, theory, and implications of the TK program in their curriculums.

In this connection, when the five Transcendental Meditation teachers I interviewed were asked, "Does Transcendental Meditation ultimately seek to change society in some way?", each responded with a categorical "yes." The response elicited from Transcendental Meditation teacher Hal Goldstein, for instance, seemed representative. He states:

> Yes. Maharishi Yogi, founder of the Science of Creative Intelligence and Transcendental Meditation, has recently declared a new time for man which he has called the Dawn of the Age of Enlightenment, and it's a time in which individuals are functioning in harmony with nature. This is a systematic procedure for individuals to live more of the value of life, to live the greater value of life, the full value of life; and if a number of those individuals,
even a small percentage of those individuals in
the world meditate and grow in this value of
life, there will be a change in all society and
in all the world.16

life, there will be a change in all society and

group action, the second persuasive feature of innovational and
establishment-conflict rhetorical movements. Mass communication
evidences particular relevance in bringing about the "Age of
Enlightenment" through group action.

The audio-visual allure of videotape, for instance, has been
used to expedite the training programs of Transcendental Meditation
teachers. One media critic observes in this regard:

Video-tape is a major instrument in TM's teacher-
training course, which already has turned out more
than 6,300 American meditation teachers and a
worldwide total of 8,600. At one time, the
Maharishi conducted all teaching courses in per-
son, but in the late 1950's he announced his
decision to 'multiply myself' so that many more
teachers could be trained. Video turned out to
be the perfect multiplier. The Maharishi still
does the teaching, but most of it now comes from
the screen, although he gives all teachers their
final lessons in person.17

Video-cassette players may expedite Transcendental Meditation
teacher-training courses, but television is the medium through
which the Transcendental Meditation movement seeks to achieve the
"Age of Enlightenment." Of this, Maharishi Mahesh Yogi is certain.

Endorsing the virtues of television, he explains:

We are following the principle of "the highest
first" in terms of communication. Television
is the most effective means to communicate
because people can see what they hear. Com-
munication is more meaningful when conveyed
by television than by words without the
speaker in view. The knowledge and experience
that can go out over television can be good
enough to bring the "Age of Enlightenment."18
Philosopher turned mass communicationist, Maharishi envisions television as central to his World Plan, where video-trained Transcendental Meditation teachers use this medium to diffuse their Vedic message via group action. Psychiatrist-Transcendental Meditation teacher Bloomfield addresses the logic of Maharishi's persuasive design.

The World Plan may be understood initially as a teacher-training program but also as encompassing the structure to make the TM program and SCI (Science of Creative Intelligence) available to every individual on earth. Maharishi estimates that one teacher of SCI for every 1,000 people will be sufficient to insure the universal availability of the TM program.19

This network of Transcendental Meditation centers will circumcribe the globe to better satisfy the last two persuasive features of the rhetoric social movements, i.e., by fulfilling rhetorical requirements and creating drama. However, the innovational interpretation of their Ontology is not consistent with the perspective held by establishment-conflict advocates.

Bound by the common ontological assumption that man is by nature subject to, and capable of persuasion (in an attempt to fulfill rhetorical requirements), innovationalists were depicted earlier as possessing different explanations of "how" and "why" persuasion occurs than those advanced by establishment-conflict agents. The former was characterized as an adherent of dramaturgical persuasion, while the latter typified rationalistic and behavioristic (or pragmatic-subordinate) conceptions of rhetorical influence.
Once again, the dramaturgical explanation of persuasion offered a "communal" or "social" ontological perspective. Rationalistic and behavioristic explanations of rhetoric, however, fostered a degenerative, antisocial view of persuasion where the persuader is depicted as "engineering" the consent of a passive persuadee.

Innovational persuasion finds its dramatic imperative in "cooperation," rather than "confrontation." Its "social" or "communal" rhetoric looks more toward informing individuals, and reinforcing a particular point of view, than challenging and manipulating an audience (as in establishment-conflict persuasion).

The dramaturgical fulfillment of rhetorical requirements makes the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement unmistakably innovational. This can be witnessed in its "time-treatment" of symbols.

Traditional Symbols.

Alluding to Brown's essay, "Making Present The Past: Public Address History," we maintained earlier that the "being" of speakers and audiences is largely bound up in their "time-treatment" of symbols. Conservative or traditional symbolists define their beings "in the name of" symbols from the past, and represent, in part, "innovational configurations" of rhetoric in our Dramaturgical Perspective. These symbols from the past were said to have been pristinely carried forward to the present, and virtually unchanged.

The most noteworthy traditional symbols of the Transcendental Meditation movement bear heavily on the Transcendental Meditation technique's orthodox origins. One case in point is the Puja.
The Puja, once again, is a preliminary ceremony commemorating Guru Dev, Kahareshi Mahesh Yogi's spiritual teacher. It is the Vedic rite-de-passage ritual which precedes the personal instruction phase of the seven step course.

Each student is asked to bring a half dozen flowers, three varieties of fruit, and a new white handkerchief to this invocation. These "gifts" are actually traditional symbols representing life, homage, and purity of devotion respectively. 

"[They are an expression]... of gratitude to the tradition of masters where the meditation came from," according to Transcendental Meditation teacher Hal Goldstein.

This "tradition of masters" of which Goldstein speaks may be traced to Sankaracharya's eighth-century Advait school of Vedic thought, or orthodox Hinduism, India's principal religion. Contrary to the instructors' claims that Transcendental Meditation is not an Eastern religion, the Puja is characteristically religious in nature from the presence of its conspicuous altar to the chanting of a Sanskrit liturgy—the traditional language of Hinduism. When asked about the religiousity of the Puja, Transcendental Meditation practitioner Donald Cegala observed:

Oh sure, it was an altar. There was no question in my mind that it was comparable to an altar with the candles and the whole thing. It was very clearly a religious ceremony. Even though I didn't understand a damn thing he said [in Sanskrit], but before they got rid of the Latin that's spoken in the Catholic Church, neither did most Catholics in this country understand what was going on.
The altar and Sanskrit liturgy described above are ancient symbols from the past that have been carried to the present unchanged. In the language of Transcendental Meditation teacher Kathy Sitherling, "TK comes from a very ancient tradition in India called the Vedic tradition, which is thousands of years old." 23

The Puja well represents the Vedic tradition. In fact, some purport that this Vedic invocation is Transcendental Meditation's link with classical Hinduism. In a letter addressed to Scripps-Howard, Religion Writer George R. Plagenz, one such claimant reports:

Enclosed is a copy of the initiation ceremony which is mandatory for TK membership. You will notice that the Hindu Godhead Brahman (in the form of Guru Dev) is bowed down to as the "creative impulse of cosmic life."
The three manifestations of Brahman (Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva—the three major deities of classical Hinduism) are not only invoked, but are also bowed down to as part of the ceremony. Unfortunately, the ceremony is chanted in the Sanskrit language so the initiate has no idea of what is being said. 24

A pamphlet published by the Spiritual Counterfeits Project lends further support to the claim that the Puja is a religious ceremony.

The publication reads:

In all three phases, the content of the Puja illustrates TK's inseparable connection with the ceremonial practices of classical Hinduism. A major function of the Puja is to establish and preserve the link between the individual meditator and Maharishi's tradition of Hinduism.... In fact, it is in the initiation ceremony that the "worshipful response" of subjective attitude manifests itself in terms of concrete and formalized action; it is here that the religious substrate of TK "crops out" in its most obvious form. 25

The Puja may be the traditional symbol that enables the religious substrate of Transcendental Meditation to "crop out" in its most obvious form, but the social substrate of the Transcendental Meditation instructors' dress communicates a more subtle, but no less ineffective
brand of persuasion. Maharishi's staff use the often subliminal allure of "synchronics" (or the way in which a culture coordinates garment and body) to better fulfill the rhetorical requirements of the Transcendental Meditation movement.\(^26\)

Transcendental Meditation instructors, for instance, are attired in conservative Western dress so as not to give the nonverbal impression that Transcendental Meditation is an Eastern cult or religion. Transcendental Meditation teacher Mike Sugarman summed up well Transcendental Meditation's allegiance to traditional Western dress with the observation: "It's obvious that we're all not running around in robes...."\(^27\)

Moreover, this adherence to the symbolism of traditional Western dress can also be witnessed in the Transcendental Meditation literature. Denniston, McWilliams, and Geller write in their *The TM Book*:

> No special clothing. No funny clothes? No. How about sandals? Some TM people wear sandals. And some wear sneakers, or Hush Puppies, or Guccis. We get all kinds. People who enjoy the TM program grow to express their own individuality, and this is reflected in their life style, self-expression, and, of course, their clothing.\(^28\)

"Sneakers," "Hush Puppies," "Guccis," and the like, well represent the American mainline in footwear. They are, at least in this context, the traditional symbols which Denniston, McWilliams, and Geller employ to better legitimize Transcendental Meditation's clear commitment to society's conception of grace.

Traditional terministic screens are perceived as non-threatening because they direct the attention to the security of convention. Knowledge of the past makes predicting the future less risky which, in turn, reinforces the expectation of consistent behavior and creating
in the hearer a feeling of greater psychological control.\textsuperscript{25}

The rhetorical architects of the Transcendental Meditation movement utilize still other symbols to impart psychological control. Here, the rhetorical requirements of the movement are met further by using "modern" symbols.

\textbf{Modern Symbols.}

Modern symbolists also seek reinforcement in the security of the convention. Unlike traditional symbolists, however, they define their being "in the name of" symbols from the past carried forward and reinterpreted for present circumstances, according to Brown.\textsuperscript{30}

Preeminent among the modern symbols of the Transcendental Meditation movement are the terms "creative intelligence" and "science." Both enable Transcendental Meditation symbolists to more effectively reinterpret the past for present circumstances.

In an article published in \textit{Time} one writer asks, "Is 'Creative Intelligence' simply another name for God?"\textsuperscript{31} Adapted to our purpose the question might be re-stated as, "Is 'Creative Intelligence' simply another name for Transcendental Meditation?"

One answer to this re-stated question suggests an unequivocal "yes." The phrase "creative intelligence" represents a twentieth-century interpretation of Transcendental Meditation's ancient connection with Hinduism. It is, both in fact and figuratively, the modern "god" term for the Transcendental Meditation movement.

In this regard, John E. Patton, a Roman Catholic attorney, comments on the factual dimension of Transcendental Meditation's "god" term. "The TK literature," he observes, "replaces God with the
phrase 'Creative Intelligence,' [and is] a synonym for Hinduism's pantheistic deity."

Yet, despite Patton's claim that "creative intelligence" is a synonym for the Hindi godhead, Brahman, this orthodox connection is never made clear in the Transcendental Meditation literature. For example, in a booklet entitled Alliance for Knowledge both "creative" and "intelligence" are defined by Maharishi who steers noticeably clear of their orthodox origins. He writes:

CREATIVE--Creative means having and displaying creativity. Creativity is the cause of change present everywhere at all times. When active it generates new expressions enriching to life, progressive and evolutionary in nature.

INTELLIGENCE--Intelligence is a basic quality of existence exemplified in the purpose and order of change.

CREATIVE INTELLIGENCE--The single and branching flow of energy (creativity) and directedness (intelligence) is called creative intelligence,33

The preceding definitions of Transcendental Meditation are at once befogged and confused with abstract language. But despite their fuzzymindedness, it is clear that no mention of Hinduism or Vedic thought is apparent. Moreover, little to no emphasis on Transcendental Meditation's orthodox origins may be found elsewhere in the Transcendental Meditation literature.

Jack Forem, author of Transcendental Meditation: Maharishi Mahesh Yogi and the Science of Creative Intelligence, for instance, similarly fails to recognize the Hindi substrate of the phrase "creative intelligence." "[T]ranscendental meditation," Forem maintains, "enables the student to experience directly the source of creative intelligence within himself, and apply it to all aspects of his life."34
Indeed, the only critic to question the etymology of "creative intelligence," Patton notwithstanding, is geodesic polymath, R. Buckminster Fuller. Though less concerned with Transcendental Meditation's Vedic past, Fuller directs his criticism at Maharishi's decision to select the term "creative" over "inventive" to appropriately describe "intelligence;" a decision he found to be in contradiction with physical lore.35

Modern symbols of the Transcendental Meditation movement like "creative intelligence" well exhibit their ontological time-treatment. Reinterpreted for present circumstances, yet carried forward in the name of symbols from the past, they are a strange amalgam of old and new.

The effect is rhetorical. Transcendental Meditation depicted as "creative intelligence" turns the attention to the certainty of the present, and places all else in psychological relief.

Wearing the cloak of modernism, yet simultaneously tied to the yoke of tradition, "creative intelligence" makes Transcendental Meditation less a source of Hindu mystical estrangement, and more a matter of twentieth-century "know-how." These modern symbols, in other words, speak to modern man in a modern voice, the voice he has learned to understand.

Modern man respects "creativity" and "intelligence," and Transcendental Meditation symbolists have learned to manage this respect to their best advantage. Despite this management, the most heavily relied-on modern symbol in the Transcendental Meditation movement is "science." For if modern man is respectful of "creativity" and
"intelligence," he is worshipful of the modern symbolism which surrounds "science."

"Science" has become the symbolic turnstyle which much of our modern thought revolves. "We are a scientific civilization," observes social commentator Jacob Bronowski, "that means, a civilization in which knowledge and integrity are crucial."

Modern symbolists of the Transcendental Meditation movement, subscribe to "argumentum ad vercudiam" in their effort to capitalize on "science's" powerful hold on the public mind. "Argumentum ad vercudiam, shows itself when the speaker offers proof for his or her position by making an appeal to authority, to a 'name,' or to an institution, according to Samovar and Hills. If the authority is legitimately connected to the subject, we have a valid use of expert opinion."

In the mid-sixties, Mahatma and his initiators decided to use "argumentum ad vercudiam" in order to transform the ancient Hindi technique of Transcendental Meditation into the more socially acceptable "science of creative intelligence." Imputing new names to old ideas cannot only make a difference, but "is" the difference, according to Time magazine. Its editor writes in this regard:

'TK was going nowhere till the Maharishi in 1967-68 decided to "camouflage" it as a secular "science" in order to qualify for taxpayer funds and reach a wider following. Since then TK has become the McDonald's of meditation, attracting hundreds of thousands of initiates."

This effort to "camouflage" Transcendental Meditation as a secular "science" runs like a thread throughout the rhetorical fabric of the Transcendental Meditation movement. The introductory
lectures, for instance, are presented with technical visual aids and numerous allusions to the "scientific" validity of Transcendental Meditation. Recounting his early experiences as a student enrolled in the basic course, social scientist Donald Cegala recalls:

If you were to do a content analysis of those first two lectures, I would venture to guess that a word that occurs far more frequently than obviously articles, etc. is "scientific." They just pound that in that this is scientific, and they throw all kinds of data at you which they themselves do not understand, which is fairly obvious to me. They do not understand the methods by which the data were collected but 90% of the audience doesn't either, they're even more in the dark about it, and so the TM instructor in the first two days can become, if they're clever enough, a very credible source by making reference to scientific data.... As long as it was scientific, then it was all right. No one ever questioned.39

Cegala's claim that Transcendental Meditation initiators couch their rhetoric in the secular guise of "science" is evident in the commentary of Transcendental Meditation teacher Kathy Sitherling. When asked if Transcendental Meditation was an Eastern religion she maintained:

Religion is based on belief or faith. We see Transcendental Meditation as a "science." It is called the Transcendental Meditation Technique. It is a technique which is very systematic and automatic; therefore we say scientific.40

The scientific nature of Transcendental Meditation is more cleverly upheld by Transcendental Meditation teacher Jim Gardiner. Likening the technique to the scientific principles discovered by DaVinci, Newton, and Einstein, Gardiner observes:

Many people are aware in the eastern culture of India that the technique itself is very scientific --it's a very specific mental technique.... So in much the same way, people argue that since it comes
from the East, it must be Eastern and religious. In that sense we could say that perhaps Newton or Einstein, these various people who discovered very basic principles, various laws of nature, various --the law of gravity. Leonardo DaVinci--their discoveries are very universal. Gravity applies in Japan the same way it applies in Alaska. TM is a very universal technique in the same way.41

Cardiner's "argumentum ad vercudiam" statement once again reinforces the message that Transcendental Meditation is the modern symbol of a forward-looking "science." However, nowhere is this message more eloquently expressed than in a 1976 newsletter published by the International Meditation Society. The article entitled, "SCI: the First Science," reads:

SCI [Science of Creative Intelligence] is a new First Science uniquely appropriate to the needs and language of our age, standing before all other fields of knowledge and unifying them in a natural and coherent way. Moreover, it is a field of knowledge that is a fountainhead of stability, growth, and creative achievement for individual life--a source of true and total personal fulfillment.42

As a corollary to the International Meditation Society's vote of confidence in this "First Science" Denniston, McWilliams and Geller write in their TM Book:

The TM technique is a great scientific discovery. There's nothing unscientific or mystical about enlightenment. Scientific research has shown that enlightenment is a very specific, permanent state of enjoyment.43

Called "pseudo-scientific gobbledygook" by some, imputing the modern symbolism of "science" to an ancient meditative practice has brought Transcendental Meditation to over 10,000 Columbus area residents and 2 million people worldwide.44 Maharishi and his exponents have exhibited a "time-treatment" of symbols that continues
to exert Transcendental Meditation's psychological hold on the public mind.

The rhetorical design of the Transcendental Meditation movement, then, is less bound up in the "time-treatment" of traditional than modern symbols. The former fulfills rhetorical requirements by turning the auditor's attention to the symbols of what "was," while the latter seeks persuasion by turning the hearer's attention to the symbolism of what "is,"

Unlike the "revolutionary" or "futuristic" symbolists who "declare with Carl Sandburg that the past is a bucket of ashes and set out to create their being 'in the name of' forward-pointing symbols shorn of continuity with the past," the traditional and modern symbolists of the Transcendental Meditation movement seek an ongoing relationship with both past and present. In other words, their symbols enjoy a "cooperative" correspondence with both past and present symbolism.

This "cooperative" correspondence reflects the dramaturgical explanation of Transcendental Meditation symbolists' innovational persuasion. A dramaturgical explanation of persuasion, where men "act-together" in symbolic indentification, stands in sharp contrast to the establishment-conflict ("pragmatic subordinate") brand adhered to by revolutionary or futuristic symbolists.

It is compelling to note that this ontological distinction cannot be detected in the first two "facts" or persuasive features of the rhetoric of social movements, i.e., (1) a goal of social change through (2) group action. However, in their effort to
fulfill rhetorical requirements, the third "fact" or persuasive feature of rhetorical movements, the ontological distinction between innovational and establishment-conflict symbolists comes to full view.

As witnessed in our foregoing analysis of the Transcendental Meditation movement, the former fulfills rhetorical requirements through the innovational time-treatment of traditional and modern symbols, those which enjoy a cooperative correspondence with both the present and the past. Establishment-conflict symbolists, on the other hand, fulfill rhetorical requirements by invoking revolutionary or futuristic symbols, symbolism which enjoys no such correspondence. This ontological distinction is the same one which differentiates the dramaturgical explanation of innovational persuasion from the pragmatic subordinate (rationalistic-behavioral) explanation of establishment-conflict rhetorical influence.

Moreover, symbolists of these two schools of thought differ markedly in the ways in which each creates drama, the fourth and last "fact" or persuasive feature of the rhetoric of social movements. And this difference bears heavily on the way in which each manages the "policy," "goals," or Epistemology of its rhetorical design.

Epistemology. Our critical focus shifts from Ontology to Epistemology, as we come to bear on the "policy" of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement. Earlier we surveyed a broad spectrum of persuasion literature to argue that rhetoric conceived as "epistemic" is a highly delicate "way of knowing" where success
hinges to a large measure, upon the quality of mutual "expectancies" and anticipatory projections held by both the rhetor and his hearers. Submitting the argument that the Smith-Windes' "policy" proposal was more sensitive to the reciprocity that exists between rhetorical "expectation" and human persuadability than its establishment-conflict counterpart, it was argued that the latter poses a less realistic alternative.

Cited earlier, this "policy" distinction maintains that it is the innovational movement's rhetorical "expectation" that the changes it demands will not disturb the symbols and constraints of the existing social order (unlike the establishment-conflict aim to disrupt the existing social order). This "policy" distinction is pivotal to innovational persuasion which hinges, to a large measure, on the successful fulfillment of three languaging strategies.

The first of these stipulates that innovational spokesmen must be careful neither to call attention to division, nor infuse themselves with guilt, and deny the existence of conflict between their proposed innovation and the values of society. Smith and Windes' second languaging strategy maintains that innovational adherents must strive to emphasize the weakness of traditional institutions, and the strength of traditional values. The last innovational strategy avers that its symbolists must endeavor to create a dialectic between the innovational scene and the purpose of the movement.
Once again, each languaging strategy upholds the nonconflictive rhetorical "expectation" declared earlier in the Smith-Windes' "policy" distinction. If major conflict should emerge from the innovational scene, and thus violate the movement's rhetorical "expectation" to circumvent it, the innovational effort quickly fades.46

In our former discussion of the Dramaturgical Perspective, we argued that the critical reality of this innovational "policy" distinction is rooted in both "Tradition" and "Science." The Epistemology of the former finds expression in the authoritative revelation of "formal" prescriptions, whereas the Epistemology of "scientific" knowing springs from an empirical, cause-effect process. Brown's description of "traditional" and "scientific" knowing helped to better define these two criteria in the second critical column of our dramaturgical perspective.

In a critical review aimed at DeWitte Holland's America in Controversy: History of American Public Address, he observes:

Combining with stances of being are various approaches to knowing, as is clear in John Sullivan's essay on "Tariff, Slavery, and Politics." As technical [scientific] economic arguments proved inconclusive, formal [traditional] prescriptions in the guise of "principles" served as knowledge of causes and effects in the sectional struggle. The latter approach to truth is a "formal" one, then: To know is to know prescriptions together with their forms and usages. The language of such an approach to knowing stresses an "author" (God or society) as revelation via process, such as cause-effect. The "authority" of the Bible for Fundamentalists, as Allen Sager points out in his chapter on Fundamentalism and Modernism, is at bottom an epistemological issue.49
Just as Brown submits the claim that particular stances of "being" correlate or combine with various approaches to "knowing" to produce different genres of public address, we similarly argue that the same system of analysis may be used to generate various innovational configurations of rhetorical movement criticism. "Tradition" and "Science" conceived as epistemological category sets, are now applied to the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement as critical standards of innovational persuasion. Factored into our foregoing ontological analysis, these critical standards should reveal the Transcendental Meditation movement's unique genre of rhetorical influence.

Epistemological Application.

Policy. Cited earlier, the Smith-Windes' "policy" distinction maintains, once again, that it is the innovational movement's rhetorical "expectation" that the changes it demands will not disturb the symbols and constraints of the existing social order (unlike the establishment-conflict aim to disrupt the existing social order). This policy distinction is dependent on the successful fulfillment of three languaging strategies: (1) deny the existence of conflict between their proposed innovation and the values of society, (2) emphasize the weakness of traditional institutions and the strength of traditional values, and (3) create a dialectic between the innovational scene and the purpose of the movement. Each of these unfolds within the epistemological context of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement.


Language Strategy ii. In keeping with the ideology of innovationalists' first languaging stratagem, Maharishi Mahesh Yogi and his disciples insist that the Transcendental Meditation technique is not in conflict with existing societal values. The movement's stand on religion is one case in point.

Critics of the Transcendental Meditation movement have suggested, for instance, that the Transcendental Meditation technique's Vedic origins are inconsistent with the beliefs of Western Christianity. Chronicling Maharishi's response to such claims, New York Times Magazine correspondent Barney Leffert observes:

Zen? Nothing doing. Mysticism? The Maharishi adherents deny that it is. The Maharishi even denies that his teaching constitutes a religion. When an American news magazine wanted to do a story on him recently, the Maharishi agreed but asked that the article not be run under "Religion."50

Moreover, Transcendental Meditation symbolists have published the endorsements of Western clergymen to dispel all criticism of the movement's nonchristian message. The Reverend Leo James Hoar, a Catholic priest, commended the Transcendental Meditation technique for its ability to minimize stress, and found it in no way to interfere with his religious beliefs. Reverend Hoar writes:

As a Catholic priest and Director of two schools, I am very much in need of some way to alleviate the pressures of daily responsibilities. Upon hearing of the program offered by the Students' International Meditation Society three years ago, my immediate reaction was that this was another fad or religious sect, and therefore obviously not useful in my life. However, upon learning more about Transcendental Meditation, the technique offered by SIMS, I realized that it in no way conflicted with my religion or belief in God, but actually complemented it.51
In this regard, both the Transcendental Meditation teachers
and practitioners I interviewed seemed in agreement with Reverend
Hoar's testimony. Transcendental Meditation teacher Hal Goldstein,
for instance, responded:

"No, there is no conflict. Because one of the
reasons that Transcendental Meditation is not
being practiced for the most part in the East,
it is brought from the East, but there is a
great deal of ignorance there, and people
think that to live a whole life, to live a
spiritual life or a full life, one has to
withdraw from the world. This is not at all
what we are saying. This is a technique for
action, this is a technique so that you can
enjoy the day to day life and make it really
fruitful. So, it's not only not in conflict
with Western society and Western thought; but
if you look in the roots of Western thought,
if you read Plato, if you read any of the
great thinkers in Western thought, you find
the same themes..."52

Quite similarly, when Transcendental Meditation practitioner
Jane Rosenbloom was asked if Transcendental Meditation advocates
deny the existence of conflict between their proposed innovation,
Transcendental Meditation, and the values of Western society, her
response paralleled the one Goldstein advanced. "I don't think it
stresses any conflict, Rosenbloom volunteered. I think that what
it does do is bring about perhaps an awareness of that conflict and
a way of dealing with that conflict, but I don't think it creates
some kind of chasm between both."53

The experience of Transcendental Meditation practitioner Donald
Cegala lends further support to the Goldstein and Rosenbloom comen-
taries. Cegala, a Ph.D.-trained persuasion theorist, analyzes:
Yes, in fact, this is related for example, to questions about religion and this sort of thing. There were a couple of people who were very, I would say, at least in comparison with myself, religious there and were raising some questions about Transcendental Meditation as a religious experience, and how can I justify this as a Christian. Blah, blah, blah. And the responses to those kinds of questions were very, very clear that no, no this is not in any shape, form or manner designed to conflict with your values about religion or anything of that nature.54

Summing up the foregoing commentaries addressing the conflictive nature of Transcendental Meditation, the observation advanced by Ike Sugarman seems representative. Transcendental Meditation instructor Sugarman exhorts:

Yes, can I comment and say that that is a slightly loaded question because it assumes that there is conflict, but as far as I can see there is no conflict. Again, it all depends on how you perceive the whole situation, but if we see Transcendental Meditation solely as a technique to enable an individual to live more and more on his own—all the values he considers important in his own life so there’s no conflict there....55

The Transcendental Meditation literature continues to corroborate the nonconflictive posture propogated by both teachers and students of the technique. "There is no need to change in any way to start the Transcendental Meditation program, write Denniston, McWilliams, and Geller in their Ti. Book. There are no pleasures you must abandon, nor any new traditions you must uphold."56

The majority of Transcendental Meditation spokespersons, all of its literature, and many critics of the technique agree that the Transcendental Meditation movement is not in conflict with traditional
Western values. Indeed, it is both the oral and written distribution of this 
language strategy that fuels the movement's dramatic 
imperative. No less important to the innovational energy of 
Transcendental Meditation is the need to center on the weakness 
of traditional institutions and the strength of traditional values.

**Language Strategy #2.** To further realize the innovational move-
ment's rhetorical "expectation" that the changes it demands will 
not disturb the symbols and constraints of the existing social 
order, Transcendental Meditation symbolists strive to emphasize 
the weakness of traditional institutions and the strength of tradi-
tional values. The latter notion will be addressed in our forth-
coming discussion of Axiology, but our present analysis explores 
the ways in which Transcendental Meditation innovationalists 
emphasize the weakness of traditional institutions.

In Chapter One it was said that Transcendental Meditation helped 
Joe Namath play football, the Philadelphia Phillies play baseball, 
Peggy Lee and Steve Wonder sing, Tony Curtis act, and Louie Henning 
do tricks in the "Magic Show." From sports and entertainment to 
psychiatry and religion—whatever institution it is, Transcendental 
Meditation, according to its advocates, can either improve or replace 
it.

The story of Donald Levitan, a Manhattan architect, offers one 
case in point. After undergoing ten years of moderately successful 
psychotherapy, Levitan discovered Transcendental Meditation. Today 
he testifies, "Transcendental Meditation does what psychiatry, in a 
much longer time and at a much greater expense, tries to do—and
Levitan's experience appears representative of countless case studies which describe Transcendental meditation's unique ability to eliminate the negative and accentuate the positive. Pointing up psychoanalysis' or psychotherapy's inability to percolate down to the more subtle levels of consciousness, Transcendental meditation teacher Kathy Sitherling maintains:

The difference between Transcendental meditation and psychoanalysis or psychotherapy is that in psychoanalysis, from my understanding of it, one thinks about his problems and talks about his problems and this practice tends to keep the mind on the normal conscious thinking level, the surface conscious thinking level, the 5% to 10% surface level of the conscious mind psychologists say we use today. During Transcendental meditation one experiences a thought at the normal conscious thinking level, the surface level, this 5% - 10% psychologists say we use; and then one begins to experience a thought at finer more subtle refined levels of development until one experiences the subtlest level of thought and goes beyond thought itself to the very source of thought within each individual, the reservoir of creative intelligence beyond thought within each individual. Thus Transcendental meditation not only gives one the direct experience of the surface level of the mind--the 5% to 10% level of the mind psychologists say we use, but it gives an individual the experience of the depth of the thought process within himself.\(^5\)

Transcendental meditation then, according to Sitherling, can tap levels of thought that are beyond the reach of psychiatry. Moreover, she goes on further to say that the consistent practice of this technique may even preclude the use of prescribed drugs.
These drugs which are prescribed by psychiatrists are usually found under the category of, from my experience I suppose, tranquilizers which have the effect of calming the individual... It has been found that Transcendental Meditation gives deep rest to both mind and body. Thus through the practice of Transcendental Meditation there is no need for drugs.

Prescribed drugs doled out by physicians can be both costly and potentially dangerous. Transcendental Meditation practitioner Donald Cegala maintains in this regard, that Transcendental Meditation is not only less expensive than traditional psychiatric treatment, but may in some cases be likened to napping. He observes:

As far as like psychotherapy, for the person who is not obviously extreme, it's cheaper. I don't think Transcendental Meditation is going to help a paranoid schizophrenic or somebody who is out on the fringe someplace. As far as drugs are concerned, to the extent that any drug is some kind of foreign substance in your body and therefore could cause you some harm in some way, to the extent that you can get a similar kind of reduction in stress or relaxation from Transcendental Meditation, I suppose in some ways it's purer in that sense. I think Esther Cegala gets the same sorts of benefits that myself or someone else might from Transcendental Meditation by napping.

Drugless and inexpensive in a time when "naturalistic" approaches to health care compete with the American preoccupation with spiralling inflation, the charm of Transcendental Meditation, according to some, lay in the fact that it is a psychological technique which yields noticeably effective physiological results. When asked why an individual should choose Transcendental Meditation over psychotherapy, drugs, hobbies, and other established methods of reducing stress, Transcendental Meditation teacher Jim Gardiner responded:
These other established methods of reducing stress have been found to be effective to certain degrees to giving relaxation and to allow the individual to take his mind from other areas of concern—to sort out their thinking so to speak, but they don't have so much to do with refinement of the physiology, with gaining a deeper level of rest, allowing the system to very "naturally" eliminate those deeper levels of fatigue and tension in the body. So Transcendental Meditation differs mainly in that it is a more effective way in gaining deep rest and its been found that the many benefits that come from Transcendental Meditation are simply due to this level of working on the physiology....

Allowing the system to very "naturally" eliminate those deeper levels of fatigue and tension in the body tends to imbue traditional institutions with a new significance, according to Transcendental Meditation symbolists. "There doesn't seem to be anything for intelligent people to grab onto in many of the traditions," argues Transcendental Meditation spokesperson Hal Goldstein.

Religion, one of our oldest institutions, bears particular relevance in this respect. Goldstein holds that Transcendental Meditation can invest every faith with new importance. "People find," he avows, "that if they have any religious sentiment, they find that their religion, whether it's Christianity, Judaism, whatever their religion happens to be, that all of a sudden they find the more universal values in that religion. They find that there's something very great in that religion that's been lost pretty much now in modern days."

Rediscovering what Goldstein calls "the more universal values" is pivotal to the life of the Transcendental Meditation movement. Placing greater ideational weight on the rediscovery of traditional
values enables its spokespersons to subtly criticize traditional institutions without incurring conflict. Traditional institutions like religion, psychiatry, sports, and entertainment may be re-evaluated with impunity as long as the values upon which they rest are supported.

Indeed, it is this nonconfrontational posture which differentiates the innovational drama of the Transcendental Meditation movement from that of its establishment-conflict counterpart. This difference in dramatic imperative can be better seen in the way in which the former creates a dialectic between the innovational scene and its purpose.

Languaging Strategy #3. If innovational symbolists are successful in their efforts to deny the existence of conflict between their proposed innovation and societal values, as well as in their efforts to emphasize the weakness of traditional institutions and the strength of traditional values, then neither a defendant spokesperson, nor a dialectic between aggressors and defendants will emerge. Drama then, the rhetorical impulse of any social movement, must be generated by creating a dialectic between the movement's purpose and some nonpersonal element in the scene. This drama is achieved by creating a "rhetorical vision."

In Chapter One we maintained that a rhetorical vision is a symbolic reality that imbues a collectivity of people with a sense of purpose. Ernest Bormann explains how this social phenomenon enabled the Puritans in Colonial New England to endure their bucolic lifestyle. He writes:
The daily routine of the people was one of back-breaking drudgery. The niceties of life were almost nonexistent; music, the arts, decoration of home or clothing, largely unavailable. A discursive description of the emigration and the daily externals of life would be very grim. But the Puritans of colonial New England led an internal fantasy life of mighty grandeur and complexity. They participated in a rhetorical vision that saw the migration to the new world as a holy exodus of God's chosen people. The Biblical drama that supported their vision was that of the journey of the Jews from Egypt into Canaan.

The "personae" in the Puritans' rhetorical vision were impersonal scenic elements rather than personal agents. Nature, hard work, and the like continually tested the visceral fortitude and moral strength of the Puritans' rhetorical vision. Thus, the dramatic agents of innovational visions, unlike those of establishment-conflict movements, are often mute, for no aggressor spokesperson will emerge to refute their condemnation.

In their effort to construct a rhetorical vision which seeks the creation of a dialectic between the innovational scene and its purpose, Transcendental Meditation spokespersons focus on the impersonal agent Western medicine calls "stress." Challenging this psycho-physiological phenomenon in much the same manner that the Puritans inveighed against the mute forces of nature, the Transcendental Meditation movement's preoccupation with "stress" is most convincingly observed in the titles of two books on the subject.

Formerly entitled The Science of Being and the Art of Living, to better give emphasis to the centrality of "stress" in the Transcendental Meditation World Plan, its author Maharishi Mahesh Yogi
later called his volume, *Transcendental Meditation: Uncover Inner Reserves of Energy—Reduce Stress and Tension*. Moreover, in the best-selling publication, *TK: Discovering Inner Energy and Overcoming Stress*, authors Harold K. Bloomfield et al. not only include "stress" as a titular term, but also conscript Hans Selye, director of the Université de Montréal Stress Clinic, to write the foreword.

Perhaps nowhere in the Transcendental Meditation literature is this mute antagonist better defined than in the latter volume. In a chapter called "The Crisis of Modern Life," psychiatrist-Transcendental Meditation teacher Bloomfield observes:

The medical term for excessive wear and tear upon the body is stress. When a person is subjected to continuous change, his body must respond to this demanding circumstance. In adapting to circumstances which challenge his faculties, an individual reacts biochemically and physiologically. Repeated exposure to excessive stress without sufficient rest to restore depleted bodily resources triggers a process of deterioration which undermines every aspect of a person's experience.

Bloomfield is by no means alone in his effort to alert individuals to the hazards of stress. *Today's Health* staff writer Terri Schultz, demonstrates a similar concern. He maintains:

You've heard the phrase "Don't get excited—your blood pressure will go up!" In today's environment it's difficult not to get upset. The major cause of death is heart disease, and many feel that younger and younger people are having heart attacks. If the environment causes harmful physiological changes, a useful therapy might be in controlling ourselves and our reactions to our stressful environments.
Since some professions are more susceptible to the hazards of stress than others, their members can well appreciate the importance of Bloomfield and Schultz's warnings. Senza Sordino, the official publication of the International Conference of Symphony and Opera Musicians, is particularly representative of professionals who are sensitive to stress. One such professional, Nina Falk, violist with the Baltimore Symphony, writing in Senza Sordino, observes:

The stresses and tensions all musicians encounter were well delineated in the last issue of Senza Sordino as great physical and psychological demands. Mentioned were performing difficult passages, high emotional response, great concentration, pre-concert situations, public exposure, unclear baton signals, long rests, including many individual factors such as temperature or poor lighting which could compound the situation. However, obvious as they are, no solution was offered.

The frustration depicted in Falk's eloquent description of the stressful conditions endured by musicians is by no means peculiar to musicianship. It is not only inescapably part of living in modern society, but the aspect upon which Transcendental Meditation spokespersons consistently center to better create a dialectic between the innovational scene and their purpose.

This languaging strategy is patently clear in the commentary of Transcendental Meditation teacher Kathy Sitherling. She skillfully draws upon the stressful conditions of living in a modern society to lay the groundwork for a rhetorical vision that will later fuel her innovational purpose. "The crisis of modern life," Sitherling exhorts, "is that technology has carried our civilization to a great stage of advancement, however, suffering continues to be present and
man continues to be dissatisfied mentally, physically, and environmentally. In spite of the technological advancements, man continues to suffer and there is stress and strain in his life."

To paraphrase Sitherling, life is a struggle and "stress," an inevitable by-product of life's struggle. Fellow Transcendental Meditation teacher Jim Gardiner agrees, and sets forth an innovational scene that unmistakably earmarks his allegiance to the movement's rhetorical vision. "In this age of increasing technology, increasing responsibility, increasing demands upon the individual," he avers, "there needs to be some means of, we could say, eliminating the pressures from the individual. There needs to be some means of eliminating stress, fatigue, and tension."

Having successfully laid the groundwork for their rhetorical vision, Gardiner and Sitherling deftly volunteer their solution to the stress of modern society, while simultaneously igniting a dialectic between the innovational scene and their purpose. "Transcendental Meditation," Sitherling suggests, "gives deep rest to both the mind and the body, thus releasing this deep stress in the nervous system so man can express more of his innate potential."

Expanding on Sitherling's statement, Transcendental Meditation teacher Gardiner continues to describe what some have touted as "an invitation to instant bliss," observing:

The benefit of Transcendental Meditation comes from continued practice of meditation in the morning and evening. From this daily elimination of stress and fatigue from the system and from this we could say that our ability to experience, to appreciate, to evaluate various situations, to comprehend various situations is improved so that we say that a normally
functioning nervous system is one that is stress-free. This was the intended use of the nervous system to be normally functioning and so Kaharishi refers to a normally functioning nervous system as being one that is stress-free and this is what we call enlightenment.\textsuperscript{71}

Put more succinctly, Eloomfield offers a scientific explanation of Transcendental Meditative enlightenment in \textit{TK: Discovering Inner Energy and Overcoming Stress}. "This book," he argues, "describes a method of achieving growth by reducing accumulated stress, increasing the body's resistance to stress and fostering a state of psycho-physiological integration. Drawing on a broad base of scientific research, we will argue that a specific technique, that of Transcendental Meditation (TK), is uniquely useful in reducing stress and unfolding a person's full measure of energy, intelligence and satisfaction."\textsuperscript{72}

Perhaps nowhere is the purpose of the Transcendental Meditation movement more eloquently expressed than in the words of its founder, Maharishi Mahesh Yogi. Describing his technique, Maharishi lyricizes:

\begin{quote}
Life need not be the painful struggle it is commonly represented to be. We are meant to be happy, and here is a way for everybody; a way which involves no austere discipline, no break with normal life and tradition, and which gives fuller and deeper meaning to all experience.\textsuperscript{73}
\end{quote}

Maharishi's description of the Transcendental Meditation technique brings the rhetorical vision of his movement to full view. Though small pockets of conflict may arise from some peripheral concerns, the dramatic imperative or primary thrust of the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement resides in the "expectation"
that the changes it demands will not disturb the symbols and constraints of the existing social order (unlike the establishment-conflict aim to disrupt the existing order).

Moreover, this rhetorical "expectation" is contingent upon the successful completion of the three following languaging strategies: (1) denying the existence of conflict between its proposed innovation and the values of society, (2) emphasizing the weakness of traditional institutions and the strength of traditional values, and (3) creating a dialectic between the innovational scene and its purpose. Each languaging strategy has been shown to successfully unfold within the epistemological context of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement.

However, the critical reality of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement seeks additional explanation in the epistemological nature of innovational knowing. Rooted in both "Tradition" and "Science," the Epistemology of the former finds expression in the authoritative revelation of "formal" prescriptions, whereas the latter reveals itself in the causality of empiricism.

Tradition. The epistemological substrate of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement finds partial expression in "Tradition." This tradition unfolds into what Brown calls "principles," "an author" and "authority." Expanding on these in a critical review aimed at DeWitte Holland's America in Controversy: History of American Public Address, he observes:

Combining with stances of being are various approaches to knowing, as is clear in John Sullivan's essay on "Tariff, Slavery, and Politics." As technical [scientific] economic arguments proved inconclusive, formal
Just as "formal" or "traditional" prescriptions in the guise of "principles" served as knowledge of causes and effects in the sectional struggle of the War-Between-The-States, according to Brown, a similar dependence on tradition in the guise of "principles" is witnessed in the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement. One case in point is a speech delivered by Prince Giovanni Alliata De Montereale, M.P. (Italy) to the World Parliament Association in Paris. As the means by which all nations can achieve national harmony and international peace Prince De Montereale offers, "The main principle of Maharishi Mahesh Yogi's simple system of deep meditation for expansion of the conscious mind. Maharishi explains his principle of expansion of the conscious mind by the analogy of a wave on the sea."75

Implicit in Prince De Montereale's rhetoric is a traditional prescription in the guise of a "principle." From the standpoint of Epistemology he is submitting the claim that to know Transcendental Meditation in both theory and practice, is to know the means by which all nations can achieve national harmony and international peace.
Put differently, this "principle" is actually a plea for a traditional prescription in the form of a solution, Transcendental Meditation. The language of such an approach to knowing stresses an "author;" in this case the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi.

According to one legend, Guru Dev, Maharishi Mahesh Yogi's spiritual teacher, charged the maharishi with a mission: to find a technique that would enable the masses to meditate. The maharishi isolated himself in the Himalayas for two years to develop this technique. Upon returning, he started the Transcendental Meditation movement.74

As both founder of the Science of Creative Intelligence, and leader of the Transcendental Meditation movement, Maharishi Mahesh Yogi's "authorship" remains undisputed in the minds of teachers and students of Transcendental Meditation. "Maharishi Yogi, founder of the Science of Creative Intelligence and Transcendental Meditation," Transcendental Meditation teacher Hal Goldstein observes, "has recently declared a new time for man which he has called the Dawn of the Age of Enlightenment...."75

In this regard, Maharishi's authorship is especially recognized in the United States. This recognition, for instance, is expressed in a speech delivered by the Honorable W. J. Murphy, State Representative, 31st District of Illinois. "I have had the privilege of introducing and passing a House Resolution through the General Assembly of the State of Illinois," Representative Murphy maintains, "lauding Maharishi Mahesh Yogi for bringing back to the world, and the United States in particular, the art of Transcendental Meditation, as taught
by his program called the Science of Creative Intelligence."  

Maharishi's authorship, bears heavily on the notion of  
"authority." Just as Brown suggests that the traditional (or  
formal) approach to knowing of Fundamentalists found expression  
in the "authority" of the Bible, the tradition-bound Epistemology  
of Maharishi Mahesh Yogi (and his followers) seeks expression in  
the "authority" of the Bhagavad-Gita. 

The Bhagavad-Gita is a five-thousand-year-old gospel of Hindu  
theology revealing the essence of the Upanishads, the soul-accom­  
plishing divine revelations contained in the most advanced chapters  
of Vedic wisdom. Hindu holy men, including Maharishi Mahesh Yogi,  
have for millenia, drawn from the tradition-bound "authority" of  
this glorious dialogue between Lord Krishna and Arjuna, for spiritual  
guidance. 

Though he has authored a little-known translation and commentary  
on the Bhagavad-Gita, Maharishi is understandably loathe to draw  
attention to its "authority" for fear it may stirrup criticism of  
Transcendental Meditation's religiosity. This can be witnessed  
further in his Transcendental Meditation, formerly titled: The  
Science of Being and the Art of Living. While Maharishi steers  
oticeably clear of the Bhagavad-Gita in his essentially metaphysical  
analysis of Transcendental Meditation, his publisher provides a brief  
expiration of its significance as "Appendix E."

It is compelling to note as a corollary to this, the Maharishi  
and the Transcendental Meditation teachers I spoke with as both  
interviewer and enrollee in the basic course, never made the
connection between Transcendental Meditation and the Bhagavad-Gita. However, implicit in their rhetoric lay the tradition-bound "authority" of this ancient gospel.32

To summarize, the epistemological substrate of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement finds partial expression in the authoritative revelation of "formal" prescriptions, or "Tradition;" unfolding as "principles," "an author," and "authority." However, it finds somewhat less epistemological expression in the technical arguments of "Science."

Science. Our earlier discussion of Ontology revealed that the modern symbolists of the Transcendental Meditation movement subscribe to "argumentum ad vercundiam" in their effort to capitalize on "science's" powerfully persuasive public image. We noted furthermore that this rhetorical strategy is evidenced when the speaker offers his or her position by making an appeal to authority, to a "name" (i.e. "science"); hence creating expert opinion. Moreover, we said that Maharishi and his initiators used "argumentum ad vercundiam" in the mid-sixties to symbolically camouflage Transcendental Meditation as a secular "science," thus making the ancient Hindi technique more acceptable to modern society.

This ontological "time-treatment" of symbols ultimately saw Transcendental Meditation become the "science of creative intelligence." It is compelling to note, in this connection, that while Transcendental Meditation symbolists cling fiercely to the ontic symbolism of "Science" to persuade, their epistemological stance relies less on the technical arguments normally associated with "Science" as a
Recalling Brown's earlier description of "Science" as "technical arguments" in the form of "knowledge of causes and effects," technical argumentation is untypical of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement.\(^3\) This may be due, in part, to the Transcendental Meditation teachers' level of scientific sophistication.

Though punctuating their discourse with endless variations on the "scientific" nature and validity of Transcendental Meditation, the teachers I listened to were not schooled in the scientific method. Dr. Donald Cegala, a teacher of quantitative methodology at The Ohio State University, raised a similar criticism while enrolled as a Transcendental Meditation student in the basic course. "They just pound that in that this is scientific," Cegala observes, "and they throw all kinds of data at you which they themselves do not understand, which is fairly obvious to me. They do not understand the methods by which the data were collected..."\(^4\)

Since the majority of those enrolled in the basic course are equally unsophisticated in scientific methodology, "not understanding the methods by which data are collected," is pardonable. Less forgivable, however, is the fact that some teachers of this technique are egregiously unfamiliar with the scientific literature of Transcendental Meditation.

When asked, for example, if Transcendental Meditation experimentalists have addressed the claims of Harvard's Herbert Benson and Leon Otis of Arizona State University, who report that much of the researches are inadequate, unsubstantiated, or too preliminary to be conclusive,
Transcendental Meditation teacher Mike Sugarman quipped, "That's a funny question, because I don't know very much about what Benson and Otis have said, and I don't know anything about all the experiments that are being done on Transcendental Meditation." Moreover, in a last effort to project scientific knowledgeability he adds, "There's a new scientific results booklet that's about to come out, and I think it will have a lot of questions answered in those terms."86

The scientific results booklet of which Sugarman speaks is a publication entitled, *Alliance for Knowledge*. In a chapter called, "Validations: Objective Validation Of SCI As The Solution To All Problems," an overview of the scientific research on Transcendental Meditation is presented.

Forty-eight scientific charts are examined in this chapter which showcases the experimental findings on the effects of Transcendental Meditation ranging from the physiological levels of rest it reportedly induces to the psychological gains in increased job satisfaction Transcendental Meditation has been found to create in meditators. Though the language of these charts and findings is technical, no discussion of experimental design or scientific procedure accompanies this research.

This insensitivity to scientific detail is a genuine source of curiosity, until upon reading further, one witnesses a comprehensive review of these scientific charts and experimental findings, expressed in the non-technical language for the benefit of the public. By then it is abundantly clear that Transcendental Meditation symbolists are
less concerned with the scientific process of causes and effects as "a way of knowing," than with the ontological management of persuasively (argumentum ad vercundiam), "scientific" symbol systems.

This notion comes to full view in the introduction to "Validations: Objective Validation Of SCI As The Solution To All Problems," where Transcendental Meditation publicists openly admit to expressing the benefits of Transcendental Meditation in both the technical language of science, regardless of the inadequacy of its description, and the non-technical language of the public, because the former best represents the language of our time. They write:

In the commentaries which accompany each chart, we have expressed the results in technical language and then interpreted it in non-technical language for the benefit of the public. Scientific research may never be able to fully express the holistic value of Transcendental Meditation and its power to transform the individual's level of life. Yet, science is the language of our time, and now that some of the effects of Transcendental Meditation have been validated in an objective and repeatable way the beneficial nature of the practice has been clearly established.

"Science" may well be "the language of our time," but its technical style is uncharacteristic of the grammar expressed in the statements of Transcendental Meditation spokespersons. Devoid of the logically-linear precision of empirical semiology, their language is analogic, literary, and almost poetic in style.

Note Laharishi's eloquent description of the way in which Transcendental Meditation instigates the unfoldment of the mind's latent faculties. Displaying the non-technical touch of the poet, he analogizes:
When a man takes a dive into a pond, he passes through the surface levels of water to the deeper levels, reaches the bottom, and comes up. The practice of diving makes the man familiar with all the levels of the water, and as the familiarity with the deeper levels grows, the diver is able to remain longer at the bottom of the pond. When by practice of Transcendental meditation the mind becomes familiar with transcendental pure consciousness... then the mind gains the ability to work from any level of consciousness.

Khararishi's influence pervades the elecution of his disciples. Like apples not falling far from the tree, their analogic commentary exhibits a similar commitment to belles-lettres. Describing the way in which Transcendental meditation amplifies individual avenues of experience, for instance, Transcendental meditation teacher Hal Goldstein maintains, "There's a simple analogy, that if you want a tree to grow, you water the root, and then the whole tree grows. It's the same thing with meditation."

Often seeming like bad poetry in the guise of science, analogies of this nature saturate the speech of Transcendental meditation symbolists. Moreover, their frequent allusions to the "scientific" or "systematic" nature of Transcendental meditation are often volunteered more as a matter for the vehicle of metaphor than empirical inquiry.

Subscribing stubbornly to the ontic symbolism of "Science" to persuade, the epistemological stance of Transcendental meditation spokespersons is ironically "unscientific." Lacking the scientific sophistication appropriate to technical argumentation, their brand of persuasion is less a matter of observing causality as "a way of knowing," than the ontological management of persuasively "scientific"
symbols.

To summarize our discussion of Epistemology then, we initially came to bear on the "policy" of rhetoric by presenting a broad survey of persuasion literature. This diverse spectrum of research set forth the idea that rhetoric conceived as "epistemic" represents a highly delicate "way of knowing," where success hinges to a large measure, upon the quality of mutual "expectancies" and anticipatory projections held by both the rhetor and his hearers.

In this connection, submitting the argument that the Smith-Windes "policy" distinction is more sensitive to the reciprocity which exists between rhetorical "expectation" and human persuadability than that posed by its establishment-conflict counterpart, we maintained that the latter represents a less realistic approach to the rhetoric of social movements. Their "policy" distinction held, once again, that it is the innovational movement's rhetorical "expectation" that the changes it demands will not disturb the symbols and constraints of the existing social order (unlike the establishment-conflict aim to disrupt the existing social order).

Moreover, the Smith-Windes "policy" distinction was said to be dependent upon the successful fulfillment of the three following languaging strategies: (1) to deny the existence of conflict between their proposed innovation and the values of society, (2) to emphasize the weakness of traditional institutions and the strength of traditional values, and (3) to create a dialectic between the innovational scene and the purpose of the movement. Each of these was shown to successfully unfold within the epistemological context (or policy) of
Furthermore, we argued that the critical reality of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement seeks additional explanation in the epistemological nature of innovational knowing. Rooted in both "Tradition" and "Science," the Epistemology of the former was said to find expression in the authoritative revelation of "formal" prescriptions; unfolding as "principles," "an author," and "authority." The latter, however, was shown to seek revelation in the empirical causality technical argumentation.

Finally, while displaying a rhetoric untypical of the "Intuitive" knowing which represents establishment-conflict configurations of rhetorical criticism, the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement was described as representative of "Traditional," and to a lesser extent, "Scientific" modes of innovational criteria. Additional representation, in this regard, inheres within the relationship that exists between the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement, and a philosophically objective approach to human Axiology.

**Axiology.** Proceeding from our earlier discussions of ontological "fact" and epistemological "policy," we now move to an examination of the axiological "value" of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement. Conceived as the enhancement of human values, and bearing the dual sanctions of both classical and contemporary thought, our previous analysis of Axiology addressed the philosophic viewpoints which speak to human values (in the form of intuitive, subjective, and objective rhetorical approaches), and to the relationship that these viewpoints have for the rhetoric of innovational and establishment-conflict social movements.
In this connection, we argued that the innovational perspective offers an axiological view of the rhetoric of social movements that the establishment-conflict school of thought does not share, maintaining that values take their existence from the enduring world of external objects, the former was said to subscribe to a philosophically objective approach to human values, whereas establishment-conflict advocates were portrayed as embracing philosophically intuitive or subjective approaches to human values.

Intuitive and subjective approaches to human values were depicted respectively as centering on the valuer's tacit or faithful reaction to feeling, and on an apparent change in the values which occurs in an individual with no corresponding change in the value-object. Sharply contrasting the objectivist notion that values take their existence from the enduring world of external objects, we argued that the innovational view of the rhetoric of social movements constitutes a viable alternative to the establishment-conflict position, at least in some cases, because it contains a philosophic approach to human values that the latter does not share.

Proceeding briefly to Lasswell's value typology where this difference in axiological scope found expression in the claim that, "'Lan' pursues 'Values' through 'Institutions' on 'Resources'," it was further suggested that the objectivist view of innovationalists (depicting values as enduring cultural phenomena which exist immutably "out there" in the external world) could be placed within the context of Rice's list of principle directions in which objectivists seek values. Defined as critical indices of innovational objectivity,
Rice's list unfolded as the five following directions: (1) in the properties of the valued objects themselves; (2) in the universal validity of the rules which guide conduct; (3) in the universal concepts with an object foundation in reality; (4) in agreements, or the social dimension of valuation; and (5) in knowledge of the "conditions" of value experience.

Finally, Rice's objectivistic validation of the innovational value experience found further expression in the application of Lafferty's empirically objective standards of value judgment. These objective standards were set forth as the three following judgments: (1) the effect of enriching our appreciation of values; (2) the tendency of values to sensitize men to other values; and the sharable or communable quality of values.

We have reviewed our earlier discussion of the Axiology of the innovational rhetoric of social movements. Using Rice's five principle directions in which objectivists seek values, as well as Lafferty's three objective standards of value judgment, we now proceed to an axiological analysis of the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement.

**Axiological Application.**

**Value.** Rice maintains that objectivists seek values in the five following principle directions: (1) in the properties of valued objects themselves; (2) in the universal validity of the rules which guide conduct; (3) in the universal concepts with an object foundation in reality; (4) in agreements, or the social dimension of valuation; and (5) in the knowledge of the "conditions" of value experience. Each
of these principle directions unfolds within the axiological context of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement.

**Principle Direction i.** The innovational agents of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement objectively seek values "in the properties of valued objects themselves." Our earlier discussion of Lasswell's value typology, for instance, argued that innovationalists pursue values through their representative institutions, and in the rhetoric which flows from these institutions. Thus, society's institutions can be depicted as representing the "properties" of society's "master" conceptions of the desirable (i.e., its values or valued objects).

Moreover, recounting Lasswell's claim that, "'I.an' pursues 'Values' through 'Institutions' on 'Resources,'" we once again set forth the Lasswell value typology described earlier in Chapter Two. Its eight representative goal-values and their respective institutions appear below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>deference values</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect</td>
<td>Social Class Distinctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affection</td>
<td>Family, Friendship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rectitude</td>
<td>Church, Home</td>
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<tr>
<td>welfare values</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Well-being</td>
<td>Hospital, Clinic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>Business</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enlightenment</td>
<td>Research, Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skill</td>
<td>Occupations</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In Chapter Two, Lasswell's value typology was classified into two groups: "deference" values and "welfare" values. The former classification was said to consist of power, respect, affection, rectitude, and those values addressing the acts of others in
relation to the self. "Welfare" values, on the other hand, were described as well-being, wealth, enlightenment, skill, and those values "whose possession to a certain degree is a necessary condition for the maintenance of the physical activity of the person."

Both "deference" and "welfare" values figure prominently within the axiological scope of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement. Though often unleashing subtle criticism aimed at the weaknesses of their respective institutions, as philosophical objectivists, Transcendental Meditation symbolists' faith in traditional values will not allow them to vehemently inveigh against institutions ("as properties of valued objects"). Maharishi Mahesh Yogi's interpretation of the "deference" value called "power," and its respective institution of "government" provides one case in point.

Maharishi Mahesh Yogi founded the World Government of the Age of Enlightenment on January 12, 1976. Disdaining the supervisory duties of most governmental institutions, the World Government is a non-political, non-religious body that does not usurp any of the functions of existing governments, nor does it replace them in any way.

Despite the World Government's ostensible indifference to "power," its commitment to this "deference" value is unmistakable, according to Maharishi Mahesh Yogi. He observes:

The World Government has come into being to raise the level of world consciousness, create an ideal society, and bring invincibility to every nation. The philosophy that upholds the structure, activity, and achievements of the World Government is centered in the truth that consciousness is the prime mover of life and the administrator of all action, and that anyone who develops in himself the full potential of consciousness enjoys a natural authority over the whole field of action.
and achievement. With the knowledge that action from silence is more powerful than action performed from the surface level of life, the people of every nation are rising to help their governments to become more successful...

Subscribing to the objectivist definition of values as enduring cultural phenomena, Maharishi depicts "power," variously understood as "invincibility" or "natural authority," as the World Government's plan to raise the collective consciousness of all nations. Moreover, he sets forth this "property of the valued object," as the realization of the "deference" value called "power."

"Social class distinctions" are addressed as properties of "respect" in the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement in much the same way as the World Government and its international plan are depicted by Transcendental Meditation symbolists as properties of the "deference" value of "power." Michael Murphy, for instance, a Transcendental Meditation teacher who is also the president of the Esalon Institute at Big Sur, California, describes that way in which the Transcendental Meditation movement affords "respect" for the institution of social class distinction. He writes:

In another respect, the social implications this quest holds for young people may be more readily appreciated by their elders. Whereas hippies tried to create a whole new social system, post-hippie practices such as meditation aim at enlarging each individual's own internal horizons. Meditators have no special urge to "drop out" of conventional society.

Unencumbered by the boundaries of age and social class, Transcendental Meditation spokesmen seek the reinforcement of those societal values which strike a central chord in the orchestration
of all human behavior. Often appealing to the institutions of family and friendship, for example, the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement addresses the "deference" value of "affection."

Psychiatrist-Transcendental Meditation teacher Harold E. Bloomfield et al. enumerate countless case studies describing how Transcendental Meditation has helped individuals to better realize this enduring cultural phenomenon called "affection." Recounting the improved condition of interpersonal relationships experienced by psychologist Terry Lesh after he learned the Transcendental Meditation technique, the authors write:

Since practicing the Transcendental Meditation technique the last two years, I have become much more spontaneous and in touch with my feelings. All of my relationships have improved. My wife notes that I don't throw temper tantrums and that our sex life has improved. I feel more authentic, more human with my patients, but at the same time have more respect for my work as a therapist. I laugh and smile a lot more in the office and at home.65

Just as rewarding relationships with one's family and friends inspire "affection" as an enduring value, the "deference" value of "rectitude" finds expression in the church, home, and those institutions concerned with the observance of society's moral uprightness is our system of jurisprudence.

The problem of maintaining law and order, for example, is easily resolved according to Transcendental Meditation spokesmen. Appealing to the societal value of "rectitude," they assert in the World Government News:
The real answer to the problem of law and order is to create a situation in which every individual in society spontaneously ceases to violate natural law, thus eliminating negativity from the collective atmosphere. The task of rehabilitation in this collective sense has become easier since 1974 when the Laharishi Effect was discovered. It was found that just one percent of the population in any society can reduce criminality and other negative trends by regularly practicing the Transcendental Meditation technique.

Proponents of Transcendental Meditation purport that their technique speaks to the physical "well-being" of society as well as its moral uprightness. Finding expression in health care institutions, this "welfare" value of physical "well-being" is a major concern of Transcendental Meditation spokespersons. Depicting Transcendental Meditation as a preventive medicine, they observe:

In the Age of Enlightenment, the emphasis is on prevention of disease by training the individual to stop making mistakes against nature. The doctor's role is no longer one of treating people who are already ill in hospitals. His role is to prevent people from falling sick. He can easily do this by encouraging them to practice the Transcendental Meditation technique. Hospitals are the jails where violators against the laws of nature are confined.

The logical extension of physical "well-being" is the "welfare" value of economic well-being or "wealth." Described earlier by Eubanks and Baker as the "services of goods and persons accruing to the individual in any way whatever," advocates of the Transcendental Meditation movement prophetically recommend their technique as the key to unlocking the floodgates of international prosperity. In an article entitled, "Economics," the editor of the World
Government News writes, in this connection:

The World Government of the Age of Enlightenment's pilot program to create invincibility and nodal provinces in 108 countries is designed to demonstrate that the Maharishi Effect, triggered by the practice of the Transcendental Meditation technique, can bring fruitful creativity and lasting prosperity to any region and to the nation as a whole. Such a prosperous and creative nation will find that there is nothing worth coveting in other nations, and peace will at last reign in international affairs. The laudable goals of economics will be fulfilled and economists will rejoice on the level of supreme achievement.

Those nations who enjoy "wealth" and economic stability can afford to better educate their peoples. The "welfare" value of "enlightenment" inspires man's quest for knowledge, insight, and education.

Indeed, Maharishi and his disciples frequently center on this "welfare" value. Writing in the Age of Enlightenment News, they maintain:

The lack of experience and understanding of consciousness as the ground state of knowledge has blighted education for generations and resulted in the transformation of humans into weak problem and suffering-ridden beings. The lack has now been removed by Maharishi, whose sole aim is to restore the royal majesty which is every human being's birthright, and to create a new world, characterized by wisdom, enlightenment, and invincibility.

"Enlightenment" improves human proficiency. The "welfare" value of "skill," for instance, finds expression in occupational proficiency. In his Alliance for Knowledge, Maharishi's researchers describe how Transcendental Meditation has improved workers' lives,
ranging from job performance to management-labor relations.100

Personally addressing the occupation-related benefits of practicing Transcendental Meditation, Maharishi observes:

Transcendental Meditation is the only way to create a strong and healthy body and mind working in perfect co-ordination. So we invite people from all walks of life—scientists, doctors, engineers, artists, politicians, professional people, factory workers, planners, housewives, students, retired people, economists, lawyers, and judges—we invite everyone to quickly adopt our program and create enlightenment on the personal level, and invincibility and an ideal society for the nation.101

Seeking its realization through the institution of occupational proficiency, our discussion of the "welfare" value of "skill," concludes our examination of the ways in which the innovational agents of the Transcendental Meditation movement objectively pursue "deference" and "welfare" values "in the properties of valued objects themselves." Now we proceed from Rice's first principle direction to principle direction #2: objectivists seek values "in the universal validity of the rules which guide conduct."

Principle Direction #2. The innovational agents of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement pursue values "in the universal validity of the rules which guide conduct." It was explained earlier, in this connection, that three rhetorical strategies contribute to the locus of rules which guide innovational conduct, according to Smith and Windes.
These three rhetorical strategies were described as: (1) the denial of the existence of conflict between their proposed innovation and the values of society; (2) subtle criticism directed at the weakness of traditional institutions and the strength of traditional values; and (3) the creation of a rhetorical vision that generates a dialectic between impersonal scenic elements and the innovational purpose. Functioning in concert with each other to uphold the "policy" distinction which maintains that it is the innovational movement's rhetorical "expectation" that the changes it demands will not disturb the symbols and constraints of the existing social order (unlike the establishment-conflict aim to disrupt the social order), Transcendental Meditation spokesperson's commitment to the observance of the foregoing strategies was depicted earlier as constituting the universal validity of the rules which guide all innovational conduct.

Corroborated in part by our previous discussion of the Epistemology of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement, as well as in our more recent analysis of Rice's first principle direction, it is abundantly clear that Transcendental Meditation symbolists recognize that digression from the rules which guide their innovational conduct would destroy their dramatic imperative. Recognition of these rules (or rhetorical strategies) which guide innovational conduct, for instance, can be witnessed in Maharishi Mahesh Yogi's discussion of "Politics" in the World Government News. He observes:
Even when government leaders and politicians are sincere men, they cannot prevent a crisis in politics because their vision is limited by the low level of the nation's collective consciousness, and because the right is missing. We cannot put the blame on anyone. Government is an innocent mirror of collective consciousness. When individual citizens are incoherent and disorderly they produce negative tendencies which accumulate in the environment. Through Transcendental Meditation the...individual raises the quality of collective consciousness. As a result, without resorting to any illegitimate means, he succeeds in changing the government... the society becomes ideal and the nation is invincible because it cannot be harmed by any disturbing influence from outside.102

Implicit in the Maharishi's commentary lay his commitment to the foregoing rules which guide innovational conduct. He denies, for instance, that his proposed innovation, Transcendental Meditation, conflicts with society's conception of what constitutes legitimacy by volunteering, "Through Transcendental Meditation the...individual raises the quality of collective consciousness. As a result, without resorting to any illegitimate means, he succeeds in changing the government...." Put differently, Transcendental Meditation does not conflict with the "deference" value of "rectitude" or the moral uprightness of society.

Continuing his discussion, Maharishi next directs his criticism at the "crisis in politics." Paradoxically faulting and exonerating our governmental system in the same breath, he maintains that, "Government is an innocent mirror of collective consciousness." In doing so, Maharishi subtly criticizes the weakness of a traditional institution like government, without rejecting its corresponding "deference" value of "power."
Finally, Maharishi creates a rhetorical vision by generating a dialectic between "the negative tendencies which accumulate in the environment" and his innovational purpose, Transcendental Meditation. Offering Transcendental Meditation as the solution to the "low level of the nation's collective consciousness" which produces these "negative tendencies," Maharishi gives the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement its dramatic imperative.

Our examination of Maharishi Mahesh Yogi's discussion of "Politics" lends further support to the notion that the innovational agents of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement objectively seek values "in the universal validity of the rules which guide conduct." Now we proceed to a discussion of principle direction 3: objectivists seek values "in the universal concepts with an object foundation in reality."

**Principle Direction #3.** The innovational agents of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement objectively pursue values "in the universal concepts with an object foundation in reality."

This third principle direction in which objectivists seek values finds expression in the innovationalist need to generate a rhetorical vision.

Maintaining earlier that values are understood by innovationalists as reflections of universal conceptions of the desirable which inhere in the external world, we argued that the object foundation in reality of these values finds expression in the "impersonal scenic elements which can be condemned for eroding societal values." Moreover, this nonconfrontational stance of innovational rhetoricians demands that
they anchor their axiological foundation in the mute agents of the innovational scene, so as not to encounter defendant spokesmen who could arise to refute their condemnations.

This nonconfrontational stance, for instance, was adopted earlier by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi. In his previously cited discussion of "Politics," Maharishi created a rhetorical vision by generating a dialectic between "the negative tendencies which accumulate in the environment," and his innovational purpose, Transcendental Meditation. By cleverly placing the blame for our "political crisis" on the impersonal scenic elements that he describes as "negative tendencies," Maharishi managed to subtly criticize the weakness of a traditional institution like government, without rejecting its corresponding "deference" value of "power."

Since no spokesperson will arise to refute Maharishi's condemnation of these impersonal elements in the form of "negative tendencies which accumulate in the environment," a rhetorical opposition consisting of defendant spokespersons will never develop. Confrontation then, becomes an impossibility in the absence of a rhetorical opposition.

Thus, Maharishi and his disciples pursue values "in the universal conceptions with an object foundation in reality." It is this principle direction which enables them to affect their non-confrontational posture, one that bears heavily on Rice's fourth principle direction: objectivists pursue values "in agreements or in the social dimension of valuation."
Principle Direction 64. The innovational agents of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement objectively pursue values "in agreements or in the social dimension of valuation." Agreement or harmony between social values and their representative institutions, it was previously illustrated, is the hallmark of the rhetoric of innovational social movements. Disagreement or disharmony would inevitably instigate social criticism, conflict, and a quick withering away of innovational social collectivities.

The Transcendental Meditation movement is an international experiment in world-wide cooperation that pursues values "in agreements or in the social dimension of valuation." "Every individual of this generation," writes Maharishi Mahesh Yogi in his Alliance for knowledge, "is cordially invited to examine this proposed alliance for knowledge and start action to develop the full potential of his own life and inspire his family and community to do the same and thereby contribute to a world-wide cooperative effort to eliminate the age-old problems of mankind in this generation."¹⁰³

Maharishi's eloquence captures the enduring vitality and character of every "deference" and "welfare" value which inhere within the institutions of every culture. Pursuing these values and their representative institutions "in agreements or in the social dimension of valuation," he suggests, "ensures their place in the harmonious unity of nature of which global unity is the human expression."¹⁰⁴ However, Transcendental Meditation symbolists also seek values "in knowledge of the conditions of value experience;" Rice's last principle direction.
Principle Direction #5. The innovational agents of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement objectively pursue values "in the knowledge of the 'conditions' of value experience." Here, Lasswell's value typology described earlier is invoked, once again, to provide a better understanding of the axiology that gives rise to the innovational rhetoric of social movements.

It was previously argued, in this regard, that innovational social movements flourish in a "harmonious" axiological setting. Moreover, this "harmonious" context, in light of our earlier discussion of Rice's second principle direction, was said to be largely adductive to the successful fulfillment of three rhetorical strategies, i.e., the denial of conflict, the subtle criticism of institutions, and the creation of a rhetorical vision. These strategies were depicted earlier as laying the groundwork for the nonconfrontational, moderately critical "conditions" which both stimulate and sustain the axiological harmony that typifies the innovational rhetoric of social collectivities like the Transcendental Meditation movement.

Moreover, in our previous discussions of Rice's second and fourth principle directions, we enumerated many examples exhibiting the ways in which Transcendental Meditation spokespersons seek values "in the knowledge of the 'conditions' of value experience." Thus, only one supplementary example need be advanced as a corollary to these.
The nonconfrontational posture of Transcendental Meditation symbolists, for instance, is paramount to the "conditions" of the value experience, or life of the movement. The following commentary advanced by Transcendental Meditation teacher Kathy Sitherling not only evidences a clear commitment to those "conditions" (or rhetorical strategies) which reflect this nonconfrontational posture, but seems representative of the response elicited from every Transcendental Meditation teacher interviewed. Sitherling observes:

One can practice Transcendental Meditation without any change in lifestyle or religious beliefs or philosophical outlook. There is no conflict between practicing Transcendental Meditation and one's culture. The practice of Transcendental Meditation allows a person to strengthen himself and his actions and thereby strengthen his own culture.104

This final passage illustrating the way in which Transcendental Meditation symbolists seek value "in knowledge of the conditions of value experience," concludes our discussion of Rice's list of principle directions in which objectivists pursue values. However, other measures of philosophic objectivity may also be applied to the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement.

The objectivistic validity of this innovational value experience may be further assessed through the application of Lafferty's empirically objective standards of value judgment. These objective standards are: (1) the effect of enriching our appreciation of values; (2) the tendency of values to sensitize men to other values; and (3) the sharable or communicable quality of values. Each of these objective standards unfolds within the axiological context of the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement.
Objective Standard #1. Lafferty's first objective standard of value judgment, i.e., "the effect of enriching our appreciation of values," inheres within the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement. Endorsements of society's "master" conceptions of the desirable (or values) literally saturate the language of Transcendental Meditation symbolists.

In an article entitled, "Enlightenment," one editor for the Age of Enlightenment News writes, in this connection, "Of special importance is the development of the universal value of such virtues as friendliness and compassion. These are normal adjuncts of enlightenment and naturally develop from the practice of Transcendental Meditation."105

As by-products or "properties" of the "deference" value earlier described by Lasswell as "affection," the development of "friendship" and "compassion" reflects the clear commitment of Transcendental Meditation spokespersons to "enrich our appreciation of values."

This desire to "enrich our appreciation of values," comes to full view in the words of Transcendental Meditation teacher Robert Argo. When asked if Transcendental Meditation adherents seek to change or modify the existing values of Western society, Argo responded: "Cultural values are a very important part in any society, and Transcendental Meditation doesn't seek to change these values, but to enhance them, or to give people a deeper appreciation of their cultural values, because these cultural values are very important for culturing the life of an individual, for insuring his most rapid growth. So rather than change these values, we want each individual to have a heightened appreciation of them and want to strengthen these
values of each culture in every part of the world."\textsuperscript{106}

Thus, remaining harmoniously in tune with society's axiological vision, the philosophic objectivists of the Transcendental Meditation movement, as witnessed in Argo's commentary, seek only to heighten appreciation for society's enduring cultural values. This heightened appreciation often reveals "the tendency of values to sensitize men to other values."

**Objective Standard #2.** In the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement can be found "the tendency of values to sensitize men to other values; Lafferty's second objective standard of value judgment. A firm understanding of traditional values is paramount to the success of Transcendental Meditation spokes-persons, who could not manufacture subtle criticism in the absence of this sensitivity.

Likening Transcendental Meditation to the growth-potential of fertilizer, Transcendental Meditation teacher Jim Cardiner sees as inherent in the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement this "tendency of values to sensitize men to other values." He observes:

> Not necessarily changing values, just allowing those values that have been held to become reality. It's not changing the Western society values of education and work, of the development of the individual as far as economic aspirations. It's not changing those values at all, it's just adding some. As I was saying before, some fertilizer, some additional thing that would really allow for that growth to take place....\textsuperscript{107}
The claims of fellow Transcendental Meditation teacher, Mike Sugarman, lend additional weight to Gardiner's foregoing observation. Suggesting that Transcendental Meditation helps individuals to rediscover traditional values, he describes how this technique enabled him and others to revert back to their own religious traditions. He avers:

It's just an automatic thing that people will rediscover or stay with those traditions, if the traditions are life supporting and are culturally valuable to this culture. I know myself and I know many, many people who have experienced sort of a reverting back to their own religious traditions. People who maybe just sort of left whatever tradition they were involved in as soon as they got into high school or college or anything like that and there's now a book being written on the Transcendental Meditation technique and religion that has a section that's devoted to the experience of people who have been coming back to their religious traditions.¹⁰⁸

Thus, the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement makes men more sensitive to other values through the process of rediscovery. Moreover, it is "the sharable and communicable quality of values" that makes this rediscovery among Transcendental Meditation symbolists possible.

**Objective Standard #3.** In their campaign to strengthen society's conception of axiological grace, the rhetorical architects of the Transcendental Meditation movement pursue "the sharable or communicable quality of values." Transcendental Meditation teacher Hal Goldstein, for instance, speaks indirectly to the "deference" value of "rectitude" as institutionalized religion, while addressing the universal nature of Transcendental Meditation. "People find," he
ocrates, "that if they have any religious sentiment, they find that their religion, whether it's Christianity, Judaism, whatever their religion happens to be, that all of a sudden they find the more universal values in that religion."109

In this regard, fellow Transcendental Meditation teacher Mike Sugarman depicts this sharable or "universal" quality which inheres in values as a kind of cross-cultural integrity. Moreover, he advances Transcendental Meditation as the means by which this quality can be preserved. He observes:

Maharishi has often spoken about something called cultural integrity and cultural integrity is, what that phrase implies, just a culture that is thriving, is one whose values obviously are important and life supporting and good values, we could say. Now what Transcendental Meditation purports to accomplish in terms of cultural values is that it wants to strengthen all of the life supporting values of any culture and this is accomplished by enabling individuals to live more and more in harmony with themselves and with other people and in harmony with cultural traditions and those cultural values that are important and that are good.110

Thus, "the sharable or communicable quality of values," inheres within Transcendental Meditation's commitment to cultural integrity, according to Sugarman. Indeed, cross-cultural integrity may be the axiological substrate of Maharishi Mahesh Yogi's quest to create international harmony.

We have completed our axiological analysis of the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement. This analysis argued that Transcendental Meditation symbolists subscribe to a philosophically objective approach to human values, and thus maintain
that human values represent enduring cultural phenomena which take
their existence from the external world.

To lend support to this claim we introduced, as measures of
philosophic objectivity, the critical criteria presented in Rice's
list of principle directions in which objectivists seek values, and
those found in Lafferty's empirically objective standards of value
judgment.

The former critical application argued that the rhetoric of the
Transcendental Meditation movement is consistent with Rice's list of
principle directions in which objectivists seek values, i.e., (1) in
the properties of valued objects themselves; (2) in the universal
validity of the rules which guide human conduct; (3) in the universal
concepts, with an object foundation in reality; (4) in agreements, or
the social dimension of valuation; and (5) in the knowledge of the
"conditions" of value experience. Witnessing the successful five-
fold critical application of Rice's criteria to the innovational
rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement, we proceeded next
to Lafferty's empirically objective standards of value judgment.

Unfolding as: (1) the effect of enriching our appreciation of
values; (2) the tendency of values to sensitize men to other values;
and (3) the sharable or communicable quality of values, Lafferty's
standards were similarly applied, as critical measures of philosophic
objectivity, to the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Medi-
tation movement. Thus, observing the successful critical application
of these criteria, in concert with our foregoing application of Rice's
principle directions, we concluded that Transcendental Meditation
symbolists seek an objective approach to humans; a view not shared by establishment-conflict spokespersons.

To briefly summarize the foregoing discussion, it may be said that with the completion of our axiological application, the criteria in the last critical column of our Dramaturgical Perspective have been addressed. Constructed from the conclusions drawn from our discussions of Behavioristic Theory and The Philosophic Foundations of Rhetoric, in concert with some additional findings, this Dramaturgical Perspective "recasts" the critical lens of the Smith-Windes innovational theory of the rhetoric of social movements. Moreover, in doing so, it seeks the re-creation of a more philosophically viable, and therefore critically acceptable innovational theory of rhetorical criticism.

In our effort to apply this recodified critical perspective to an alleged example of the rhetoric of an innovational social movement, our critical examination centered on the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement in the United States. In this connection, our analysis sought to answer the question, "If the rhetoric of innovational social collectivities like the Transcendental Meditation movement reflect the Smith-Windes critical criteria, and thus function to establish innovational criticism's new foothold in the rhetorical movement literature?"

The answer to this question found expression in the threefold application of our Dramaturgical Perspective to the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement. Thus, the triadic elements of "fact," "policy," and "value" stemming from
their respective philosophic causistries of Ontology, Epistemology, and Axiology, constituted the dialectical substance of our criticism.

Arranged in a linear fashion, the fact-policy-value scheme was earlier conceptualized as unfolding into three factorable columns of critical criteria (as shown in the chart on page 200). These constructs were said to correlate or combine, creating two distinct modes for criticism of rhetorical movements: (1) innovational configurations, and (2) establishment-conflict configurations.

The former mode was depicted as consistent with those critical criteria which reflect the rhetoric of innovational social movements. Inspired, once again, by their respective philosophic causistries of Ontology, Epistemology, and Axiology, these critical dimensions of fact, policy, and value were said to unite, thus generating various configurations of innovational persuasion.

Establishment-conflict configurations of the criticism of rhetorical movements, on the other hand, were portrayed as critical indices of mass persuasion which do not reflect the rhetoric of innovational social movements. Moreover, since our critical analysis centers on the rhetoric of an innovational social movement, it is important to spotlight the notion that this latter mode of rhetorical criticism was invoked only insofar as it served to better define innovational criticism.

Thus, our forthcoming analysis centers exclusively on innovational criticism. Confident that the limitations of the impending examination have been stipulated, we now proceed to a critical analysis of the innovational configurations of the rhetoric of the Transcendental
Meditation movement.

The Innovational Configurations of the Rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation Movement. Surveying the Dramaturgical Perspective chart (on page 200), we observe above the baseline three factorable columns of critical criteria, the triadic elements of fact, policy, and value, stemming from their respective philosophic causistries of Ontology, Epistemology, and Axiology represent the dialectical substance of innovational configurations of rhetorical movement criticism.

In this connection, four innovational configurations or combinations of rhetorical movement criticism emerge when the critical criteria of each factorable column are correlated. These innovational configurations unfold as: (1) Traditional Symbols (fact)-Tradition (policy)-Objective (value); (2) Traditional Symbols (fact)-Science (policy)-Objective (value); (3) Modern Symbols (fact)-Science (policy)-Objective (value); and (4) Modern Symbols (fact)-Tradition (policy)-Objective (value).

Drawing from our earlier ontological, epistemological, and axiological critical analyses of the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement, we maintain that the first three innovational configurations of rhetorical movement criticism presented, constitute critically "weak" standards of the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement. Moreover, we further argue, in this connection, that only the last innovational configuration represents a critically "sound" measure of Transcendental Meditation symbolists' innovational brand of mass persuasion. We now proceed to an examination of these four innovational
configurations of rhetoric movement criticism.

Innovational Configuration #1: Traditional Symbols (fact)-Tradition (policy)-Objective (value).

Traditional Symbols (fact). Our ontological analysis of the "Traditional Symbols" of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement maintained that the most noteworthy of these takes the form of the Puja, a preliminary ceremony ostensibly conducted to commemorate Guru Dev, Maharishi Mahesh Yogi's spiritual teacher. Though Transcendental Meditation spokespersons insist that the Puja is simply a secular invocation of gratitude, we argued earlier that the Puja represents a Hindu religious service, and through it, the religious substrate of Transcendental Meditation "crops out!"

Paradoxically then, Transcendental Meditation symbolists define the being of the Puja "in the name of" a symbol from the past, but deny that "Traditional Symbol" a claim to its ancient orthodox origins. In other words, Transcendental Meditation spokespersons proffer a tradition which their symbolism denies.

Its finding minor expression in a nonverbal appeal to American "synchronics," notwithstanding, the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement is not significantly bound by the ontological "time-treatment" of "Traditional Symbols." Transcendental Meditation symbolists rather, rely more consistently on a less traditional Ontology to affect their brand of mass persuasion, one that will be later addressed as the critical criterion of "Science."
Tradition (policy). Our epistemological analysis of "Tradition" maintained that the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement finds expression in the authoritative revelation of "formal" prescriptions. Unfolding as "principles," "an author," and "authority," we argued that these three constructs are consistent with the Transcendental Meditation principle, Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, and the Bhagavad-Gita respectively.

Thus, the critical construct of "Tradition," conceived as "a way of knowing," well represents the epistemological substrate of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement. Less representative of Transcendental Meditation symbolists' Epistemology is "Science."

Objective (value). Our axiological analysis of the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement argued that Transcendental Meditation symbolists subscribe to a philosophically "Objective" approach to human values, and thus maintain that human values represent enduring cultural phenomena which take their existence from the external world.

To lend support to this claim we introduced, as measures of philosophic objectivity, the critical criteria presented in Rice's list of principle directions in which objectivists seek values, and those found in Lafferty's empirically objective standards of value judgment. The former critical application argued that the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement is consistent with Rice's list of principle directions in which objectivists seek values, i.e., (1) in the properties of valued objects themselves; (2) in the
universal validity of the rules which guide human conduct; (3) in the universal concepts, with an object foundation in reality; (4) in agreements, or the social dimension of valuation; and (5) in the knowledge of the "conditions" of value experience.

Witnessing the successful five-fold critical application of Rice's criteria to the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement, we proceeded next to Lafferty's empirically objective standards of value judgment. Unfolding as: (1) the effect of enriching our appreciation of values; (2) the tendency of values to sensitize men to other values; and (3) the sharable or communi-cable quality of values, Lafferty's standards were similarly applied, as critical measures of philosophic objectivity, to the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement. Thus, observing the successful critical application of these criteria, in concert with our foregoing analysis of Rice's principle directions, we concluded that Transcendental Meditation symbolists seek philosophically objective approach to human values.

Evaluation of Innovational Configuration #1. According to those arguments set forth in our ontological, epistemological, and axio-

universal validity of the rules which guide human conduct; (3) in the universal concepts, with an object foundation in reality; (4) in agreements, or the social dimension of valuation; and (5) in the knowledge of the "conditions" of value experience.

Witnessing the successful five-fold critical application of Rice's criteria to the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement, we proceeded next to Lafferty's empirically objective standards of value judgment. Unfolding as: (1) the effect of enriching our appreciation of values; (2) the tendency of values to sensitize men to other values; and (3) the sharable or communi-cable quality of values, Lafferty's standards were similarly applied, as critical measures of philosophic objectivity, to the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement. Thus, observing the successful critical application of these criteria, in concert with our foregoing analysis of Rice's principle directions, we concluded that Transcendental Meditation symbolists seek philosophically objective approach to human values.

Evaluation of Innovational Configuration #1. According to those arguments set forth in our ontological, epistemological, and axio-

universal validity of the rules which guide human conduct; (3) in the universal concepts, with an object foundation in reality; (4) in agreements, or the social dimension of valuation; and (5) in the knowledge of the "conditions" of value experience.

Witnessing the successful five-fold critical application of Rice's criteria to the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement, we proceeded next to Lafferty's empirically objective standards of value judgment. Unfolding as: (1) the effect of enriching our appreciation of values; (2) the tendency of values to sensitize men to other values; and (3) the sharable or communi-cable quality of values, Lafferty's standards were similarly applied, as critical measures of philosophic objectivity, to the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement. Thus, observing the successful critical application of these criteria, in concert with our foregoing analysis of Rice's principle directions, we concluded that Transcendental Meditation symbolists seek philosophically objective approach to human values.

Evaluation of Innovational Configuration #1. According to those arguments set forth in our ontological, epistemological, and axio-

universal validity of the rules which guide human conduct; (3) in the universal concepts, with an object foundation in reality; (4) in agreements, or the social dimension of valuation; and (5) in the knowledge of the "conditions" of value experience.
(i.e., Traditional Symbols (fact)), does not.

Innovational Configuration #2: Traditional Symbols (fact)-Science (policy)-Objective (value).

Traditional Symbols (fact). See the explanation presented in our discussion of Innovational Configuration #1.

Science (policy). Our epistemological analysis of "Science" maintained that the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement seeks revelation in the empirical causality of technical argumentation. However, despite their frequent allusions to the "scientific" or "systematic" nature of the Transcendental Meditation technique, Transcendental Meditation symbolists were depicted earlier as volunteering these technical terms more as matters of metaphor than empirical design.

Moreover, we argued, in this regard, that the epistemological stance of Transcendental Meditation spokespersons is ironically "unscientific." Lacking the scientific sophistication appropriate to technical argumentation, we held that the innovational brand of rhetoric is less a matter of observing causality as "a way of knowing," than the ontological management of persuasively "scientific" symbols.

Objective (value). See the explanation presented in our discussion of Innovational Configuration #1.

Evaluation of Innovational Configuration #2. According to those arguments set forth in our ontological, epistemological, and axiological critical analyses of Transcendental Meditation symbolists' innovational brand of persuasion, this second rhetorical configuration
also represents a critically "weak" measure of the innovational
rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement. Although the
last critical criterion (i.e., Objective (value)) of this configura-
tion well represents the innovational rhetoric of Transcendental
Meditation spokespersons, the first two critical criteria (i.e.,
Traditional Symbols (fact)-Science (policy)), do not.

Innovational Configuration #3: Modern Symbols (fact)-Science (policy)
-Objective (value).

Modern Symbols (fact). Our ontological analysis of the "Modern Sym-
bols" of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement main-
tained that Transcendental Meditation spokespersons rely most heavily
on the "Modern Symbol" of "science." In their effort to transform
the ancient Hindi technique of Transcendental Meditation into the
more socially acceptable "science of creative intelligence," we argued
that Transcendental Meditation symbolists subscribe to "argumentum
ad vercundiam."

Using this rhetorical technique to "camouflage" Transcendental
Meditation as a secular "science" was earlier depicted as both an
effort on the part of Transcendental Meditation spokespersons to
legitimize their technique, as well as, the tendency for modern sym-
bolists to define their being "in the name of" symbols from the past
carried forward and reinterpreted for present circumstances.

Thus, the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation
movement is significantly bound by the ontological "time-treatment" of
"Modern Symbols." Indeed, they are the ontological substrate Trans-
cendental Meditation symbolists' innovational brand of mass persuasion.
Science (policy). See the explanation presented in our discussion of Innovational Configuration #2.

Objective (value). See the explanation presented in our discussion of Innovational Configuration #1.

Evaluation of Innovational Configuration #2. According to those arguments set forth in our ontological, epistemological, and axiological critical analyses of Transcendental Meditation symbolists' innovational brand of persuasion, this third rhetorical configuration also represents a critically "weak" measure of the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement. Although the first and third critical criteria (i.e., Modern Symbols (fact)-Objective (value)) of this configuration well represent the innovational rhetoric of Transcendental Meditation spokespersons, the second critical criterion (i.e., Science (policy)), does not.

Innovational Configuration #4: Modern Symbols (fact)-Tradition (policy)-Objective (value).

Modern Symbols (fact). See the explanation presented in our discussion of Innovational Configuration #3.

Tradition (policy). See the explanation presented in our discussion of Innovational Configuration #1.

Objective (value). See the explanation presented in our discussion of Innovational Configuration #1.

Evaluation of Innovational Configuration #4. For those arguments set forth in our ontological, epistemological and axiological critical analyses of Transcendental Meditation symbolists' innovational brand
of persuasion, this last rhetorical configuration represents the
most critically "sound" measure of the innovational rhetoric of
the Transcendental Meditation movement. All three critical criteria
(i.e., Modern Symbols (fact) - Tradition (policy) - Objective (value))
well represent the innovational rhetoric of Transcendental Meditation
spokespersons.

Reviewing the contents of Chapter Three, it may be said that our
critical analysis sought to apply the Dramaturgical Perspective (or
recodified critical lens of the Smith-Windes innovational theory of
the rhetoric of social movements) to the alleged innovational rhetoric
of the Transcendental Meditation movement in the United States. The
analysis represented a broad response to the following question: "If
the rhetoric of innovational social movements is a legitimate consider-
ation, then does a seemingly innovational social collectivity like the
Transcendental Meditation movement reflect the Smith-Windes critical
criteria, and thus function to establish innovational criticism's new
foothold in the rhetorical movement literature?"

Prefaced by a synoptic look at the Transcendental Meditation tech-
nique, and a personal chronicle of this writer's experience of it as a
student enrolled in the basic Transcendental Meditation program, the
answer to the foregoing question found expression in the threefold
application of our Dramaturgical Perspective to the innovational rhe-
toric of the Transcendental Meditation movement.

Unfolding into three factorable columns of critical criteria, these
constructs were correlated or combined, creating innovational and
establishment-conflict modes for the criticism of rhetorical movements.
Centering exclusively on the former mode, these ontological, epistemological, and axiological columns of critical criteria were variously applied to the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement.

In this regard, our ontological critical application centered on the four persuasive features or "facts" which both innovational and establishment-conflict models of the rhetoric of social movements share, i.e., (1) a goal of social change through (2) group action which (3) must fulfill rhetorical requirements by (4) creating drama. It was then argued that each of these unfold within the ontological context of the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement.

Continuing our ontological analysis, we next came to bear on the "Traditional" and "Modern Symbols" of the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement. We maintained here that the ontological design of Transcendental Meditation symbolists is less bound up in the "time-treatment" of the former than the latter.

Shifting our critical focus from Ontology to Epistemology, we proceeded to a discussion of the "policy" of rhetoric. Here, we presented a broad spectrum of persuasion literature to put forth the notion that rhetoric conceived as "epistemic" represents a highly delicate "way of knowing," where success hinges to a large measure, upon the quality of mutual "expectancies" and anticipatory projections held by both the rhetor and his hearers.

Moreover, submitting the argument that the Smith-Windes "policy" distinction is more sensitive to the reciprocity which exists between rhetorical "expectation" and human persuadability than that posed by
its establishment-conflict counterpart, we maintained that the latter represents a less realistic approach to the rhetoric of social movements. This "policy" distinction, once again, states that it is the innovational movement's rhetorical "expectation" that the changes it demands will not disturb the symbols and constraints of the existing social order (unlike the establishment-conflict aim to disrupt the existing social order).

In this regard, the Smith-Windes "policy" distinction was said to be dependent upon the successful fulfillment of the three following languaging strategies: (1) to deny the existence of conflict between their proposed innovation and the values of society, (2) to emphasize the weakness of traditional institutions and the strength of traditional values, and (3) to create a dialectic between the innovational scene and the purpose of the movement. Each of these was depicted as successfully unfolding within the epistemological context (or policy) of the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement.

We argued furthermore, that the critical reality of the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement seeks additional explanation in the epistemological nature of innovational knowing. Rooted in the formal prescriptions of "Tradition," and unfolding as "principles," "an author," and "authority," the Epistemology of Transcendental Meditation symbolists was depicted as considerably less bound up in the technical arguments of "Science."

Proceeding from our discussion of Epistemology to an examination of Axiology, our axiological critical application argued that Transcendental Meditation symbolists subscribe to a philosophically objective
approach to human values, and thus maintain that human values represent enduring cultural phenomena which take their existence from the external world.

To lend support to this claim we introduced, as measures of philosophic objectivity, the critical criteria presented in Rice's list of principle directions in which objectivists seek values, and those found in Lafferty's empirically objective standards of value judgment. The former critical application argued that the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement is consistent with Rice's list of principle directions in which objectivists seek values, i.e., (1) in the properties of valued objects themselves; (2) in the universal validity of the rules which guide human conduct; (3) in the universal concepts, with an object foundation in reality; (4) in agreements, or the social dimension of valuation; and (5) in the knowledge of the "conditions" of value experience.

Witnessing the successful five-fold critical application of Rice's criteria to the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement, we proceeded next to Lafferty's empirically objective standards of value judgment. Unfolding as: (1) the effect of enriching our appreciation of values; (2) the tendency of values to sensitize men to other values; and (3) the sharable or communicable quality of values, Lafferty's standards were similarly applied as critical measures of philosophic objectivity, to the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement. Thus, observing the successful critical application of these criteria, in concert with our foregoing analysis of Rice's principle directions, we
concluded that Transcendental Meditation symbolists seek a philosophically objective approach to human values.

Finally, we maintained that four innovational configurations of rhetorical movement criticism emerge when the three columns of critical criteria in our Dramaturgical Perspective are correlated. These were depicted as: (1) Traditional Symbols (fact)-Tradition (policy)-Objective (value); (2) Traditional Symbols (fact)-Science (policy)-Objective (value); (3) Modern Symbols (fact)-Science (policy)-Objective (value); and (4) Modern Symbols (fact)-Tradition (policy)-Objective (value).

Using arguments generated from our ontological, epistemological, and axiological critical analyses of the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement, we held that the first three innovational configurations of rhetorical movement criticism presented, constitute critically "weak" standards of the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement. Moreover, we argued, in this connection, that only the last innovational configuration represents a critically "sound" measure of Transcendental Meditation symbolists' innovational brand of mass persuasion.

Thus, Chapter Three constitutes a broad response to our original question, i.e., "If the rhetoric of innovational social movements is a legitimate consideration, then does a seemingly innovational social collectivity like the Transcendental Meditation movement reflect the Smith-Windes critical criteria, and thus function to establish innovational criticism's new foothold in the rhetorical movement literature?" Warranting a categorical "yes," the answer to this question unfolds
specifically as Innovational Configuration #4: Modern Symbols (fact)-Tradition (policy)-Objective (value).
FOOTNOTES

Chapter Three


2. Ibid., p. 69.

3. Ibid., p. 70.

4. Ibid., p. 70-71.

5. Ibid., p. 73.

6. The introductory and preparatory lectures were both held at 7:30 p.m. in the Ohio Union on the respective days of February 15 and 16 (1978).


8. Ibid., p. 179.

9. The personal instruction session and the consecutive first through third days of checking were all held at 7:30 p.m. in the Transcendental Meditation Center at 1818 West Lane, on their respective days ranging from March 4, 1978 through March 7, 1978.

10. I am bound by an allegiance to my Transcendental Meditation teacher, never to divulge my mantric word.


12. I equate the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation Movement with the composite of my research data, i.e., the responses to the interview questions, information drawn from the Transcendental Meditation literature, and personal observations made as a Transcendental Meditation program participant.
13. William Hedgepeth, "Non-Drug Turn-On Hits Campus," Look 32 (February 6, 1968), p. 66. Here the author recapitulates Laharishi's interpretation of Transcendental Meditation's goal: "the integration of Being and Thought and Action, in order to have a fully integrated life, in order for every man to live more effectively in his field of thought and action."


18. Ibid., p. 16.

19. Harold K. Bloomfield et al., p. 244.


22. Transcript, p. 15.

23. Ibid., p. 22.


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Ms. Paprocki continues to write:

One former TM instructor, very familiar with the Puja, is Vale Hamilton of California. In "The Meditators" by Douglas Shah, Vale tells of her experience as a SIMS instructor (SIMS—Students' International Meditation Society, the wing of TM organized for high school and college students). Vale relates, "I was immensely perturbed by the deception aspect of TM instruction .. In the guise of a relaxing technique, as an instructor I had to withhold information from the students I was teaching, and then when they were sucked in, I involved them in the religious aspects of TM. The mantra and the Hindu initiation ceremony really bothered me. They were not only religious, but were misrepresented as a 'Creative Intelligence Science' and a mental technique."
25. Spiritual Counterfeits Project. "An English Translation of Transcendental Meditation's Initiatory Puja," P.O. Box 4309, Berkeley, Ca. 94704

26. "Synchronies" is the name Professor Paul D. Brandes (of the University of North Carolina) coined to describe the nonverbal category set which addresses the way that cultures coordinate garment and body. Also see: Susan Edmiston, "My Search to Find Happiness in 40 Minutes a Day," Redbook, 140 (January, 1973), p. 74. Describing her experience at the Transcendental Meditation introductory lectures Edmiston writes: "In further experience with SIMS I was to find that male speakers always wore jackets and ties and the female speakers always wore dresses, presumably in an effort to make themselves and their product as acceptable as possible to mainstream Westerners."

27. Transcript, p. 44.


32. Ibid., p. 34.


35. Harold Bloomfield et al., p. 17.


38. "Tempest over TH:," p. 34.
40. Ibid., p. 24.
41. Transcript, p. 30.
43. Denise Denniston, Peter McWilliams, and Barry Geller, pp. 12, 164.
47. Ibid., p. 143.
48. Ibid., p. 143.
51. Reverend Leo J. Hoar, Director of Notre Dame High School, Springfield, Massachusetts, to The Student International Meditation Society, 7 January 1974.
52. Transcript, p. 3.
53. Ibid., p. 10.
54. Ibid., p. 16.
55. Ibid., p. 44.
56. Denise Denniston, Peter McWilliams, and Barry Geller, p. 33.
58. Transcript, p. 22.
59. Ibid., p. 23.
60. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
61. Ibid., p. 36.
62. Ibid., p. 5.
63. Ibid., p. 5.
65. Harold E. Bloomfield et al., p. 29.
66. Terri Schultz, "What Science is Discovering About the Potential Benefits of Meditation," Today's Health 50 (April, 1972), pp. 37, 64.
68. Transcript, p. 21.
69. Ibid., p. 33.
70. Ibid., p. 21.
71. Ibid., p. 37.
72. Harold K. Bloomfield et al., p. 31.
76. Transcript, p. 1.
77. Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, Alliance for Knowledge, p. 63.
81. The Spiritual Counterfeits Project, discussed in our ontological analysis, sets forth the connection that exists between Transcendental Meditation's Puja and the Bhagavad-Gita.


84. Ibid., p. 47.

85. Ibid., p. 46.

86. Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, Alliance for Knowledge, p. 28.


88. Transcript, p. 5.


91. Ibid., p. 92.


93. Barney Leffert, p. 50.

94. Harold N. Bloomfield et al., p. 167-168.


103. Ibid., p. 90.
104. Transcript, p. 21.


106. Transcript, p. 28.

107. Ibid., p. 34.

108. Ibid., p. 45.

109. Ibid., p. 5.

110. Ibid., pp. 42-43.
CHAPTER FOUR

A RE-EVALUATION OF RHETORICAL MOVEMENT DEFINITIONS

The classical orator is usually heroic; he puts the stamp of his personality on his speech, he imposes his will on others. In contrast, the role of the speaker is much less emphasized in the rhetoric of India or China, where harmony rather than victory is often the goal. The classical orator is a fighter in a lonely contest.1

—George A. Kennedy

This chapter unfolds as a corollary to Chapter Three. In doing so, it charges critics who are bound by the establishment-conflict school of thought with the task of re-evaluating their rhetorical stance. More specifically, Chapter Four seeks an answer to the following question: "After having argued for the legitimacy of the rhetoric of innovational social movements, as well as allegedly having observed this type of mass persuasion within the context of the Transcendental Meditation movement, does a perceivable need exist to re-evaluate rhetorical definitions (like Cathcart's), in order to make room for fresh perspectives like innovational rhetorical movement criticism?"

Chapter Four explores this question in a three-fold discussion that argues for the re-evaluation of rhetorical movement definitions. This discussion unfolds as: (1) The Prohibitive Nature of Rhetorical Movement Definitions; (2) Recasting Rhetorical Movement Definitions; and (3) The Establishment-Conflict Configurations of a Rhetorical
Movement Model. Our argument begins with a discussion of the prohibitive nature of rhetorical movement definitions.

The Prohibitive Nature of Rhetorical Movement Definitions. Our Review of the Primary Literature of Rhetorical Movement Criticism in Chapter One revealed that two diverse perspectives have emerged from rhetorical movement criticism since 1952 when Leland Griffin's seminal essay, "The Rhetoric of Historical Movements," came to print: (1) the establishment-conflict perspective, and (2) the innovational perspective. The former was depicted as having set the tone for the majority of rhetorical critics who are interested in the rhetoric of social movements, and has subsequently dominated this study for the last quarter of a century. The innovational perspective, however, was portrayed as a relatively new interest of rhetorical critics, and has consequently received far less attention than its establishment-conflict counterpart.

Having described these two perspectives on rhetorical movement criticism, we proceeded next to a brief overview of the establishment-conflict perspective and its representative studies. In this connection, the research of Griffin, Cathcart, Cox, Simons, Bowers and Ochs, and Wilkinson served to better place the evolution of rhetorical movement criticism into scholastic context.

Pre-eminent among these studies is the research of Robert S. Cathcart. His scholarship is particularly significant because it best represents the prohibitive nature of rhetorical movement definitions advanced by establishment-conflict theorists.
Recounting our earlier discussion of Cathcart's research, it was maintained that in "New Approaches to the Study of Movements: Defining Movements Rhetorically," he contends that in the past rhetorical theorists have relied too heavily on social scientific and historical interpretations of social movements. Social scientists like Smelser, Turner, and Killian, for instance, define movements as "uninstitutionalized collectivities that mobilize for action to implement a program for the reconstitution of social norms or values."

Definitions of this type fail to acknowledge the presence of an evolving status quo, according to Cathcart. Moreover, he sees historical interpretations of the rhetoric of social movements are, by the same token, equally confining because they only focus on the "past," and consequently, force criticism to wait until a movement has completed a full cycle of rhetorical evolution.

Our review continues with the recognition that Cathcart is unable to generate an acceptable rhetorical definition of social movements in this article, but does offer some critical criteria for evaluating movements. Drawing his inspiration from Kenneth Burke's pentadic ratios, he encourages movement theorists to use agency-act and agency-scene ratios in order to isolate "immediate correctives (or demands of aggressor rhetoricians)" and "reciprocating acts (or counter-demands of defendant spokespersons)." Defining these two aspects of his critical system no further, Cathcart postulates that a pentadic approach enables critics to focus on the "dialectical tension growing out of the moral conflict," and thus achieve an in-depth rhetorical analysis.
In this regard, we argued earlier that Cathcart's clear commitment to the establishment-conflict interpretation of rhetorical movements comes to full view in "Movements: Confrontation As Rhetorical Form." This sequel to his "New Approaches to the Study of Movements: Defining Movements Rhetorically," argues that "the true movement is a kind of 'agonistic ritual' whose most distinguishing form is confrontation." In a game plan reminiscent of Kenneth Burke's defection from "persuasion" to "identification" in the Rhetoric of Motives, here Cathcart shifts his emphasis from the notion of "conflict" to the titular term "confrontation."

Observing, moreover, that it is his contention that rhetorical movements are variously understood by scholars who often mistake "true" movements for mere adjustments to the existing order, Cathcart calls the former "confrontational" movements, and attributes to its adherents the impious rhetoric of corrosion that is used to reject the mystery which preserves the established order. All other types of collective behavior are, according to Cathcart, "managerial" or "reform" movements which dispense the rhetoric of piety to preserve the mystery of the established order.

Explaining why "confrontation" should be considered the sine qua non of true rhetorical movements, Cathcart writes:

The enactment of confrontation gives a movement its identity, its substance and its form. No movement for radical change can be taken seriously without acts of confrontation. The system co-opts all actions which do not question the basic order, and transforms them into system messages. Confrontational rhetoric shouts "Stop!" at the system, saying, "You cannot go on assuming you are the true and correct order; you must see yourself as the evil thing you are."
Summarizing his position, we maintained that Cathcart sees "confrontation" as the key to identify true rhetorical movements. "Confrontation as a rhetorical act," he confirms, "may be as important in its own way as the rhetorical act of identification."

Having re-examined Chapter One's foregoing analysis of this author's research, we now argue that Cathcart's definition of rhetorical movements represents a prohibitive view of the rhetoric of social movements. More specifically, our argument unfolds as five criticisms. The first four were raised earlier in our foregoing discussions of Behavioristic Theory and The Philosophic Foundations of Rhetoric, but the last criticism is developed in the present discussion.

Criticism #1. The first criticism found expression in our previous discussion of Behavioristic Theory. Here we argued that behaviorists' preoccupation with "establishment-conflict" social movements could be attributed to their early training in a tradition that is animated by "manipulative" laboratory procedure, and vivified by "confrontational" exemplars of mass social change. Moreover, it was stated that perhaps it is this influence that may explain the reason why rhetorical critics, who have in the past borrowed heavily from the social movement research generated by behaviorists, should similarly adopt a "manipulative," "confrontational" (establishment-conflict), or "behavioristic" view of the rhetoric of social movements.

In this connection, Cathcart's definition of rhetorical movements reflects a clear commitment to this "confrontational" view of the rhetoric of social movements. Recounting this definition, once again, his "confrontational" stance comes to full view. "The true movement,"
Cathcart observes, "is a kind of 'agonistic ritual' whose most distinguishing form is confrontation."

Though the notion of "confrontation" is implicit in the writings of most critics who study the rhetoric of social movements (as in research of Leland Griffin), Cathcart's definition represents the first effort to use the concept of "confrontation" as an index of what constitutes a "true" rhetorical movement. Those scholars who, for instance, seek rhetorical movement definitions in the absence of "confrontation," make the mistake of confusing "true" movements with mere adjustments to the existing order, according to Cathcart.

Thus, Cathcart sets forth a prohibitive view of the rhetoric of social movements. The view is prohibitive because it prohibits "nonconfrontational" rhetoric the classification of "rhetorical movement."

In other words, the notion of "confrontation," is to Cathcart's definition of rhetorical movements, what the concept of "identification" is to Kenneth Burke's understanding of persuasion. A "true" rhetorical movement must be "confrontational," according to Cathcart, in much the same manner that Burke's interpretation of "Identification" distinguishes persuasion.

Moreover, bearing the pioneering influence of collective behaviorists' "confrontational" focus, Cathcart defines the "nonconfrontational" rhetoric of similar social collectivities as mere adjustments to the existing order. This establishment-conflict binding suggests a second criticism of Cathcart.
Criticism #2. Proceeding from Behavioristic Theory to the Philosophic Foundations of Rhetoric, we endeavored to prove that ontological explanations of "how" and "why" persuasion occurs have produced three rhetorical theories (the rational man, the behavioral, and the dramaturgical) which differ from each other in important ways. We argued, in this connection, that the "rational man" and "behavioral" rhetorical theories depict "persuasion" as "manipulative" (pragmatic-subordinate), and portray the persuader as one who seeks to "engineer" the consent of the persuadee. In contrast to these ontological views, dramaturgical theory was portrayed as representing a "cooperative" or "communal" view of persuasion.

In this connection, Cathcart's ontological brand of persuasion was depicted earlier as embracing both rationalistic and behavioristic interpretations of the rhetoric of social movements. Our discussion of the former ontological interpretation maintained that Cathcart paradoxically adopts Kenneth Burke's socio-psychological interpretation of rhetoric to establish his essentially Aristotelian (rationalistic) definition of the rhetoric of social movements.

Expanding on the nature of this paradox, we held that both Aristotle and Burke portray rhetoric as "the art of persuasion," but each emphasizes different aspects of that art. The former's interpretation of rhetoric, for instance, was described as taking a "message-effects" focus, where the source's logical appeals are aimed at that body of effects which inhere in logical receivers; hence the name "rational man" theory of rhetoric.
Burke, on the other hand, was portrayed as less concerned with rhetorical "effects," than persuasive "identification," which can include a partially unconscious persuasive appeal. His "inventio-centered" brand of persuasion was depicted as seeking "meaningful" communication through the "cooperative" use of significant symbols, thus giving emphasis to the "communal" nature of man the "symbol-user," and the "psycho-logical" condition of the source-receiver relationship.

Finally, Cathcart's insistence to use Burkeian thought to justify his "confrontational" definition of rhetorical movements was depicted as Cathcart's effort to beg the question. Here, we said that the essentially Aristotelian (or rationalistic) portrait of mass persuasion he proffers, one that strongly suggests an alienated, "confrontational" source-receiver relationship, is ontologically closer to a behavioral explanation of persuasion than it is to Burke's dramaturgical view.

Our foregoing discussion addressing Criticism #1 argued for the presence of a strong behavioral influence which infuses Cathcart's explanation of rhetorical movement. In this regard, suffice it to say that this behavioral influence looms large in the writings of establishment-conflict critics.

Thus Cathcart's definition of rhetorical movements reflects a prohibitive ontological interpretation of persuasion because it fosters only two of the three dominant explanations of how and why persuasion occurs. The ontological success of establishment-conflict movements, then, according to Cathcart, is restricted to the
"pragmatic-subordinate" (or rationalistic-behavioristic) generated by the "conflict" of "aggressor" and "defendant" disputants.

The ontological success of innovational rhetorical movements, on the other hand, is not restricted to the "pragmatic-subordinate" persuasion generated by the "conflict" of disputants. Though a product of ideological division, and occasionally experiencing "unexpected" pockets of conflict along the way, its ontological success arise in "dramaturgical" cooperation, rather than manipulative conflict. Moreover, this notion of "expectation" brings us to the third criticism of Cathcart's definition of rhetorical movements.

Criticism #3. Our foregoing epistemological analysis of the Smith-Windes innovational "policy" centered largely on the notion of rhetorical "expectation." We argued, in this connection, that the reciprocity that exists between rhetorical "expectation" and human persuadability translates equally well from a face-to-face context to the considerably more grand communicative setting of innovational rhetorical movements. Furthermore, it was maintained that it is this accommodative innovational attitude toward the notion of rhetorical "expectation" that functions to establish the Smith-Windes perspective as a more plausible critical alternative to the establishment-conflict view of the rhetoric of social movement.

Moreover, we argued that inherent in this accommodative attitude toward rhetorical "expectation" lay the implication that innovational theorists foster a more realistic view of mass persuasion than establishment-conflict architects of rhetorical theory. This implication was depicted as being evidenced by the way in which each school of
thought defines what does not constitute a rhetorical movement.

In this connection, our contention took the position that it is the innovational movement's rhetorical "expectation" that the changes it demands will not generate conflict by disturbing the symbols and constraints of the existing order. Smith and Windes, however, were cited as introducing a pragmatic reservation to this rhetorical "expectation," i.e., that the innovational movement will quickly wither if major conflict should emerge from the innovational scene.

We held, in this regard, that implicit in this reservation is a pragmatic classificatory option. The option suggests, that which cannot be categorized as an innovational rhetorical movement, might better be classified as an establishment-conflict social movement. It is a pragmatic option because it embraces the ever-present possibility of the "unexpected," or persuasion gone awry, and thus affords the rhetorical analyst critical recourse.

We maintained furthermore, that the establishment-conflict view of the rhetoric of social movements offers no such "fail-safe" critical apparatus. If the establishment-conflict critic, for instance, should encounter the "unexpected" or a nonconflictive social collectivity, then he is hard pressed to switch to an auxiliary mode of rhetorical movement criticism.

This absence of critical recourse was believed to be relative to a prohibitive establishment-conflict focus. One that fails to recognize the rhetoric of nonconflictive social collectivities as "true" rhetorical movements. Robert S. Cathcart explains:
It is this confrontational [conflictive] aspect — the questioning of the basic values and societal norms—that makes true movements a real threat that cannot be explained away as a temporary malfunction of the system or as the conspiratorial work of a handful of fanatics. Using this notion of confrontational rhetoric as the counterpart of managerial rhetoric, I find that many of the so-called "types" of movements described in recent literature do not appear to be movements at all, but rather adjustments to the existing order.

Evaluating Cathcart's commentary, it was suggested that establishment-conflict theorists only recognize a rhetorical movement qua movement when it is consistent with their confrontational rhetorical "expectation." Such a critical scheme was deemed pragmatically prohibitive, insofar as it makes no provision for the "unexpected," as in the case of innovational movement criticism.

Moreover, a purist preoccupation with one "true" or absolute type of rhetorical movement was not only depicted as critically prohibitive, but also reflects a naiveté on the part of establishment-conflict theorists. Here, we argued that one "true" type of rhetorical movement is as inconceivable as one "true" type of rhetoric.

Finally, it was volunteered that rhetorical movement criticism should reflect the same diversity as that which it endeavors to understand. Anything less than this would be in violation of the Project Committee on the Advancement and Refinement of Rhetorical Criticism's quest to "expand the scope of rhetorical criticism to include subjects which have not traditionally fallen within the critic's purview...."

Critics of the establishment-conflict school of thought must learn to re-evaluate the axiological substrate of their criticism. An axiological re-evaluation bears heavily on our fourth criticism of
Cathcart's position.

Criticism #4. Our examination of human values explored the Axiology of rhetoric conceived as the enhancement of human values. Bearing the dual sanctions of classical and contemporary thought, we discussed the philosophic viewpoints which speak to human values (in the form of the intuitive, subjective, and objective rhetorical approaches), and the relationship that these have for the rhetoric of innovational and establishment-conflict social movements.

Here, we argued that the innovational perspective offers an axiological view of the rhetoric of social movements that the establishment-conflict school of thought does not share. In this regard, the former was reputed to subscribe to a philosophically objective approach to human values, maintaining that values take their existence from the world of external objects. Establishment-conflict adherents, on the other hand, were portrayed as embracing philosophically intuitive and subjective approaches to human values.

The former establishment-conflict approach, it was argued, centers on the valuer's tacit or faithful reaction to feeling, whereas the latter focuses on an apparent change in values that occurs in an individual with no corresponding change in the value-object. In this regard, we argued furthermore, that the innovational view of the rhetoric of social movements constitutes a viable alternative to the establishment-conflict view, at least in some cases, because it contains a philosophic approach to human values (i.e., the objective approach) that the latter does not share.
The philosophically objective approach to human values underlies the agents' of the rhetoric of innovational social movements efforts to embrace society's "master" conceptions of the desirable, whereas the philosophically intuitive and subjective approaches compels establishment-conflict adherents to seek the reconstitution of social norms and traditional values. In other words, the former may call upon tradition to rationalize its axiological position, but the anti-traditional posture of the latter necessitates a break with traditional values.

Thus, the rhetoric of the establishment-conflict movement was depicted as repugnant to the "harmonious" relationship that exists between society's "master" conceptions of the desirable (or traditional values) and their concomitant institutions. Only "disharmony" can create the conflict which gives impetus to the "dialectical enjoiment" between aggressor establishment-conflict spokespersons, and defendant priests of the established social order.

Here, Cathcart's description of "dialectical enjoiment" was introduced. He observes:

It is this reciprocity or dialectical enjoiment in the moral arena which defines movements.... This dialectical form is...an essential attribute without which there is no movement. Aggressor spokesmen will proclaim that the new order, the more perfect order, the desired order, cannot come about through established agencies of change.... Such proclamation forces defendant spokesmen to produce a counter rhetoric that exposes the agitators as anarchists or devils of destruction.
In acknowledgement of Cathcart's commentary, we held that establishment-conflict rhetoricians must resort to the "disharmonious" pyrotechnics of the extremist. Subtlety and understatement cannot create the vocal opposition needed to breathe life into the rhetoric of establishment-conflict social movements, according to Cathcart.

Described earlier as consistent with a subjective approach to human values (where an apparent change in values may occur in an individual with no corresponding change in the value object), the "disharmonious" pyrotechnics of the extremist came to full view, in Cathcart's notion of "rejecting the mystery of the prevailing hierarchy." "The dramatic enactment of their rhetoric," he writes, "reveals persons who have become so alienated that they reject 'the mystery' and cease to identify with the prevailing hierarchy. They find themselves in a scene of confrontation where they stand alone, divided from the existing order; and inevitably they dream of a new order where there will be salvation and redemption."

Thus, "rejecting the mystery," "confrontation," "alienation," "division," and the like, represent the language that Cathcart uses to express his establishment-conflict position. This position is inclusive of the philosophically intuitive and subjective approaches to human values, but inappropriate to the objective approach of innovationalists.

Intolerant of traditional values, and subscribing to the "disharmonious" pyrotechnics of the extremist, Cathcart presents an axiologically prohibitive view of the rhetoric of social movements.
It is this prohibitive posture that brings us to our final criticism.

Criticism #5. The first four criticisms raised in our discussions of Behavioristic Theory and The Philosophic Foundations of Rhetoric, argued that Cathcart's definition of rhetorical movements represents a behavioristically, ontologically, epistemologically, and axiologically prohibitive view of the rhetoric of social movements. Our last criticism develops a similar argument, one that approximates the criticism set forth by Charles A. Wilkinson.

In "A Rhetorical Definition of Movements," Wilkinson writes in this regard, "Unfortunately, Cathcart's article [i.e., "New Approaches to the Study of Movements: Defining Movements Rhetorically"], though quite intentionally, ends where it should begin." Consequently, Cathcart responded to Wilkinson's criticism by writing a sequel to this first publication entitled, "Movements: Confrontation As Rhetorical Form."

In this connection, our last critical argument maintains that Wilkinson's criticism of Cathcart's first publication applies equally well to his sequel, i.e., "Movements: Confrontation as Rhetorical Form." More specifically, we argue that Cathcart's rhetorical movement definition, "that the true movement is a kind of 'agonistic ritual' whose most distinguishing form is confrontation," represents a prohibitive view of the rhetoric of social movements because "it ends where it should begin."

The development of this critical argument unfolds in the forthcoming examination of "Recasting Rhetorical Movement Definitions."

However, a necessary review of our Dramaturgical Perspective prefaces
that development.

Recasting Rhetorical Movement Definitions. Chapter Two saw the "re-casting" of the Smith-Windes critical lens before innovational criticism could be effectively applied to the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement. The decision to recodify innovational theory was prompted by a critique composed by a tradition-bound critic who maintained that innovational theory was ill-suited to rhetorical movement criticism.

constructed from the conclusions drawn from our discussions of Behavioristic Theory and The Philosphic Foundations of Rhetoric, in concert with some additional findings, this process of recodification developed into our Dramaturgical Perspective. This perspective sought the re-creation of a more philosophically viable and therefore critically acceptable innovational theory of rhetorical criticism.

Thus, from the ill-defined theoretical principles set forth in the Smith-Windes theory, the triadic elements of "fact," "policy," and "value" were developed. Stemming from their respective philosophic causistries of Ontology, Epistemology and Axiology, they constituted the dialectical substance of our criticism.

Arranged in a linear fashion, the fact-policy-value scheme was earlier conceptualized as unfolding into three factorable columns of critical criteria (as shown in the chart on page 200). These constructs were said to correlate or combine, creating two distinct modes for the criticism of rhetorical movements: (1) innovational configurations, and (2) establishment-conflict configurations.
Centering exclusively on the former mode, innovational configurations were depicted as consistent with those critical criteria which reflect the rhetoric of innovational movements. Inspired, once again, by their respective philosophic causistries of Ontology, Epistemology, and Axiology, these critical dimensions were said to unite, thus generating various configurations of innovational criticism.

In this connection, four innovational configurations or combinations of rhetorical movement criticism emerged when the critical criteria of each factorable column was correlated. These innovational configurations unfolded as: (1) Traditional Symbols (fact)-Tradition (policy)-Objective (value); (2) Traditional Symbols (fact)-Science (policy)-Objective (value); (3) Modern Symbols (fact)-Science (policy)-Objective (value); and (4) Modern Symbols (fact)-Tradition (policy)-Objective (value).

Drawing from our earlier ontological, epistemological, and axiological critical analyses of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement, we argued that the first three innovational configurations of rhetorical movement criticism presented, constitute "weak" standards of the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement. Moreover, we maintained furthermore, that only the last innovational configuration represents a critically "sound" measure of Transcendental Meditation symbolists' innovational brand of mass persuasion.

Thus, it is compelling to note that these four innovational configurations of our Dramaturgical Perspective variously represent the systems or genres of innovational persuasion which characterize
different types of rhetorical movements. Whereas innovational configuration #4 represents a critically "sound" measure of the Transcendental Meditation movement's rhetorical design, innovational configuration #2 might well represent the innovational persuasion of the Tupperware movement. In this regard, innovational configuration #3 could well reflect the rhetoric of the Evangelism or "Born Again" movement, and innovational configuration #1, the Gray Panther's unique brand of mass persuasion.

Recasting the rhetorical movement definitions like the Smith-Windes innovational perspective allows analysts of the rhetoric of social movements, critical recourse. They become more sensitive to the various systems of innovational rhetoric, and this sensitivity makes for a more open, less prohibitive critical impulse.

This sensitivity is not reflected in Cathcart's foregoing definition of rhetorical movements. His definition represents a prohibitive view of the rhetoric of social movements because "it ends where it should begin,"

In other words, Cathcart generates a definition of rhetorical movements that is more sensitive to what does not constitute rhetorical movements than what does constitute rhetorical movements. The "distinguishing form of confrontation," for instance, tells the critic of rhetorical movements little about the various systems or configurations of establishment-conflict rhetorical movement criticism which reflect true rhetorical movements.

Cathcart's definition of rhetorical movements in concert with a critical system of establishment-conflict configurations for the criticism of rhetorical movements like the one described in our
Dramaturgical Perspective would prove to be a more productive, less prohibitive measure of rhetorical movements. Such a system would begin where his definition of rhetorical movements now ends!

Establishment-Conflict Configurations for the Rhetoric of Social Movements.

Establishment-Conflict Configuration #1: New or Futuristic Symbols (fact)-Intuition (policy)-Intuitive (value).

New or Futuristic Symbols (fact). The ontological dimension of the establishment-conflict configurations for rhetorical movement criticism, unlike its innovational counterpart, is largely bound by rationalistic and behavioristic interpretations of "persuasion." Exhibiting these two views as critical category sets, establishment-conflict Ontology subscribes to a "manipulative" (pragmatic-subordinate) genre of "persuasion," where the rhetor is depicted as "engineering" the consent of his auditors. It is a view of "persuasion" that stands in stark contrast to the "cooperative" dramaturgical philosophy of innovational criticism.

Moreover, whereas the criticism of innovational configurations sets forth "Traditional" and "Modern" ontological category sets, its establishment-conflict counterpart employs "Revolutionary" or "Futuristic" critical criteria. "Revolutionary or futurist symbolists," Brown explains, "declare with Carl Sandburg that the past is a bucket of ashes and set out to create their being 'in the name of' forward-pointing symbols shorn of continuity with the past and related to the present as the past."
Intuition (policy). The "Intuitive" knowing of establishment-conflict criticism is derived from "personal" revelation or individual feeling, and may be likened to what Wordsworth called the "inspiration of the poet."

Intuitive (value). Centers on the valuer's tacit or faithful reaction to feeling.

Establishment-Conflict Configuration #2: New or Futuristic Symbols (fact)-Intuition (policy)-Subjective (value).

New or Futuristic Symbols (fact). See the explanation presented in our discussion of Establishment-Conflict Configuration #1.

Intuition (policy). See the explanation presented in our discussion of Establishment-Conflict Configuration #1.

Subjective (value). Focuses on an apparent change in values that occurs in an individual with no apparent change in the value-object.

These Establishment-Conflict Configurations for the Rhetoric of Social Movements reflect Chapter Four's effort to answer the question: "After having argued for the legitimacy of the rhetoric of innovational social movements, as well as allegedly having observed this type of mass persuasion within the context of the Transcendental Meditation movement, does a perceivable need exist to re-evaluate rhetorical definitions (like Cathcart's), in order to make room for fresh perspectives like the innovational rhetorical movement criticism?"

Chapter Four explored this question in a three-fold discussion which argued for the re-evaluation of rhetorical movement definitions. This discussion unfolded as (1) The Prohibitive Nature of Rhetorical
Movement Definitions; (2) Recasting Rhetorical Movement Definitions; and (3) The Establishment-Conflict Configurations of a Rhetorical Movement Model.

Our discussion of the Prohibitive Nature of Rhetorical Movement Definitions isolated the scholarship of Robert S. Cathcart as best representing the prohibitive nature of rhetorical movement definitions advanced by establishment-conflict theorists. This argument unfolded as five criticisms.

The first four criticisms were raised earlier in our foregoing discussions of Behavioristic Theory and The Philisophic Foundations of Rhetoric. These maintained that Cathcart's representative definition of rhetorical movements is behavioristically, ontologically, epistemologically, and axiologically prohibitive.

The fifth and last criticism argued that Cathcart's rhetorical movement definition represents a prohibitive view of the rhetoric of social movements in addition to the four previous criticisms of it, because "it ends where it should begin." Here, our innovational Dramaturgical Perspective was introduced under the heading of "Recasting Rhetorical Movement Definitions" to demonstrate that this establishment-conflict definition was unable to provide the analyst of rhetorical movements with critical recourse.

Finally, two establishment-conflict configurations for the rhetoric of social movements were generated. Each served to expand on the critical province of Cathcart's prohibitive definition.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter Four


2. Ibid., p. 10. It is compelling to note that the "rational man" interpretation of persuasion, as an "effects-centered" approach to rhetoric, is consistent with Kennedy's analysis of the Greco-Roman civilization. He observes:

Achilles, the hero of the Iliad, was taught by Phoenix to be a speaker of words and a doer of deeds (Iliad 9.443). These are the two great areas of distinction for the Homeric hero, and Achilles and Odysseus excel at both. Because the Homeric poems were the textbook out of which the Greeks and later the Romans, learned to read, and were venerated almost as the bibles of the culture, the attitude toward speech in the Iliad strongly influenced the conception of the orator in Greco-Roman civilization.


5. Ibid., p. 233
CONCLUSION

Our Introduction defined the purpose of this study as seeking to "recast" social scientific interpretations of the rhetoric of social movements, and introduce a new rhetorically coded lens from which to view the symbolic reality of the Transcendental Meditation social phenomenon. More specifically, the significance of this research is contingent upon how well it responds to the three following questions:

(1) "Should rhetorical scholars, as Smith and Windes suggest, recognize, at least in some cases, the rhetoric of innovational social movements, and thus allow innovational criticism to assume a useful place in the embryonic corpus of rhetorical movement literature?"

(2) "If the rhetoric of innovational social movements is a legitimate consideration, then does a seemingly innovational social collectivity like the Transcendental Meditation movement, reflect the Smith-Windes critical criteria, and thus function to establish innovational criticism's new foothold in the rhetorical movement literature?"

(3) "After having argued for the legitimacy of the rhetoric of innovational social movements, as well as allegedly having observed this type of mass persuasion within the context of the Transcendental Meditation movement, does a perceivable need exist to re-evaluate rhetorical definitions of social movements (like Cathcart's), in order to make room for fresh perspectives like innovational rhetorical
movement criticism?"

Moreover, in the larger view, the study was depicted as holding implication for the rhetorical critic who may query: "What are the ontological, epistemological, and axiological dimensions of the rhetoric of social realities like the Transcendental Meditation movement?" "Why does one rhetorical vision overshadow and exhaust a competing vision?" And, as Brown suggests in the essay, "Making Present the Past," "how do certain social realities like 'university,' for instance, assume an objective symbolic existence, apart from, and in addition to, its physical reality as a collection of buildings, professors, students, and the like?"

The answers to the first three questions unfold within the developmental contexts of Chapters Two, Three, and Four, respectively. Each represents a broad response to its corresponding question.

Chapter Two. Initially, it was argued that the establishment-conflict view of the rhetoric of social movements is ascendant in rhetorical movement criticism. Chapter Two, submitting the innovational perspective as a viable alternative to the establishment-conflict school of thought, challenged the latter's ascendency.

This challenge was embodied in the question: "Should rhetorical scholars, as Smith and Windes suggest, recognize, at least in some cases, the rhetoric of innovational social movements, and thus allow innovational theory to assume a useful place in the embryonic corpus of rhetorical movement literature?" Chapter Two's response, once again, required a three-fold examination of: (1) Behavioristic Theory; (2) The Philosophic Foundations of Rhetoric; and (3) A
Dramaturgical Perspective.

Our discussion of Behavioristic Theory focused on the influence that behavioral science has had on the rhetorical study of mass persuasion, and described how this binding has contributed to the entrenchment of the establishment-conflict view of the rhetoric of social movements. It was argued, in this connection, that behaviorists who study social movements view "communication" in a significantly different light than do students of persuasive communication.

This difference in perspective was said to be traceable, at least in theory, to the psychological growing pains experienced by a young behavioral science developing in the well-established professional shadow of the physical scientific community. Confusing physical science with the scientific technique, this "physics envy" was depicted as a need on the part of behaviorists to metaphorically engineer into their own research, methods and expressions which "approximate" the "mechanistic" imagery of the physical scientist. Irrespective of the problems encountered when naturalistic descriptions of physical motion in time and space are applied to the humanistic activity of man in society, we argued that this mechanistic perspective has had a definite effect upon behaviorists' interpretation of human communication.

It was said earlier, in this connection, that behaviorists subscribe to the social significance of communication only insofar as it announces the social or psychological reality of something other than itself. Symbolic expression, in other words, has been traditionally portrayed as mere sign-function by behaviorists, where symbols are
interpreted exclusively as "proxy" for the objects they "represent," instead of as "vehicles for the conception of objects." Thus, the proposition which maintains that "how" we communicate determines to a large measure, "what" we communicate, has been left unaddressed by behaviorists who study social movements.

This failure on the part of behaviorists to speak to the above consideration was used earlier to explain why these investigators of social movements have consistently assigned less significance to human communication. The scant coverage they afford it, coupled with the subtle bias shown to punctuate literature relative to it, stand as mute testimony to the low-priority status that communication has developed among mass behaviorists. Indeed, it is ironic, in this connection, that those who invest so much time in the study of social movements, should be so inattentive to the symbolic reality that serves, at once, to create and sustain the same mechanistic imagery they use to apprehend it.

Furthermore, it was argued that behaviorists' preoccupation with establishment-conflict social movements is perhaps attributable to their early training in a tradition that is animated by "manipulative" laboratory procedure, and vivified by "confrontational" exemplars of massive social change. Moreover, it was stated that perhaps it is this influence that may explain the reason why rhetorical critics, who have borrowed heavily from the social movement research generated by behaviorists, should similarly adopt a manipulative, confrontational (establishment-conflict), or behavioristic view of the rhetoric of social movements.
Proceeding from Behavioristic Theory to the Philosophic Foundations of Rhetoric, we argued, once again, that an innovational interpretation of the rhetoric of social movements is better suited, at least in some cases, to the study of the rhetoric of social collectivities than the more traditionally-held (establishment-conflict)view, especially when "persuasion" is conceived as "cooperation." Here, the reader recalls that the philosophic causistries of Ontology, Epistemology, and Axiology were introduced in order to anchor the dialectical substance of their "fact-policy-value" triad.

Bound by the ontological assumption that man is by nature subject to, and capable of persuasion, we endeavored to prove that explanations of "how" and "why" persuasion occurs have produced three rhetorical theories (i.e., "the rational man," "behavioristic," and "dramaturgical") which differ from each other in important ways. We argued, in this connection, that the "rational man" and "behavioristic" rhetorical theories depicted "persuasion" as "manipulative" (pragmatic-subordinate) and portray the persuader as one who seeks to "engineer" the consent of the persuadee. These views contrast that held by dramaturgical theory, which maintains that rhetoric should be a "cooperative," (or "communal") humanistic enterprise.

Next, we argued that the first two rhetorical theories (i.e., the "rational man" and "behavioristic" views) represent the establishment-conflict view of the rhetoric of social movements. Dramaturgical theory, however, was described as being more illustrative of the innovational theory of rhetorical movements. We then proceeded to the conclusion that the "cooperative" dramaturgical theory of persuasion embraced by innovational theorists of the rhetoric of social
movements, offers the critic an alternative ontological approach to the "manipulative" establishment-conflict view of human persuadability.

Shifting our focus from the ontologically-based "fact" of "persuasion" to the epistemologically-based "policy" of rhetoric, we maintained that rhetoric is essentially "epistemic," i.e., a highly delicate "way of knowing" where success hinges, to a large measure, upon the quality of the mutual "expectancies" and anticipatory projections of both the rhetor and his hearers. Support for the rhetorical significance of "expectation," the reader recalls, was derived from a broad investigation of Role Theory, and the research generated by Kenneth Burke, Erving Goffman, George Kelly, Edward Hulett, Stephen Toulmin, and Edward Tolman.

This broad spectrum of research was essentially used to foster the notion that rhetorical "expectation" and human persuadability are inextricably bound together. Here, the innovational view of the rhetoric of social movements was re-introduced to point up the fact that the Smith-Windes "policy" distinction is sensitive to the reciprocity that exists between rhetorical "expectation" and human persuadability. It was argued, in this connection, that it is this sensitivity which makes the innovational perspective a more realistic alternative to the prohibitive establishment-conflict view of the rhetoric of mass persuasion.

Finally, having proceeded from discussions of rhetorical "fact" and "policy," we moved to an examination of "value," and thus explored the Axiology of rhetoric conceived as the enhancement of human values. Bearing the dual sanctions of classical and contemporary thought, we
explored the philosophic viewpoints which speak to human values (unfolding as the intuitive, subjective, and objective rhetorical approaches), and then to the relationship that these viewpoints which speak to human values have for the rhetoric of innovational and establishment-conflict social movements.

Here, it was argued that the innovational perspective offers an axiological view of the rhetoric of social movements that the establishment-conflict school of thought does not share. In this regard, that innovationalists were reputed as subscribing to a philosophically objective approach to human values, and maintaining that values take their existence from the world of external objects. Establishment-conflict adherents, on the other hand, were portrayed as embracing philosophically intuitive and subjective approaches to human values.

The former establishment-conflict approach, it was argued, centers on the valuer's tacit or faithful reaction to feeling, whereas the latter focuses on an apparent change in the values that occurs in an individual with no corresponding change in the value-object. In this regard, we maintained that the innovational view of the rhetoric of social movements constitutes a viable alternative to the establishment-conflict view, at least in some cases, because it contains a philosophic approach to human values that the latter does not share.

Confident that our overview of Behavioristic Theory and The Philosophic Foundations of Rhetoric served to better prepare the reader, we proceeded to the construction of a Dramaturgical Perspective, thus completing Chapter Two's three-fold examination of the question: "Should rhetorical scholars, as Smith and Windes
suggest, recognize, at least in some cases, the rhetoric of innovational social movements, and thus allow innovational theory to assume a useful place in the embryonic corpus of rhetorical movement literature?"

Our Dramaturgical Perspective brought to the forefront a recodified critical tool of analysis. More specifically, it was depicted as representing a synthesis of our previous discussions of Behavioristic Theory and The Philosophic Foundations of Rhetoric, and used this research in concert with additional findings, in order to "re-cast" the critical lens of the Smith-Windes Innovational Theory of the rhetoric of social movements. Here, we sought the re-creation of a more philosophically viable, and therefore critically acceptable theory of innovational rhetorical movement criticism (depicted graphically on page 200) that could be applied to Chapter Three's analysis of the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement in the United States.

Chapter Three. Reviewing the contents of Chapter Three, it may be said that our critical analysis sought to apply the Dramaturgical Perspective (or recodified critical lens of the Smith-Windes innovational theory of the rhetoric of social movements) to the alleged innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement in the United States. The analysis represented a broad response to the following question: "If the rhetoric of innovational social movements is a legitimate consideration, then does a seemingly innovational social collectivity like the Transcendental Meditation movement reflect the Smith-Windes critical criteria, and thus function to establish
innovational criticism's new foothold in the rhetorical movement literature?"

Prefaced by a synoptic look at the Transcendental Meditation technique, and a personal chronicle of this writer's experience of it as a student enrolled in the basic Transcendental Meditation program, the answer to the foregoing question found expression in the three-fold application of our Dramaturgical Perspective to the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement.

Unfolding into three factorable columns of critical criteria, these constructs were correlated or combined, creating innovational and establishment-conflict modes for the criticism of rhetorical movements. Centering exclusively on the former mode, these ontological, epistemological, and axiological columns of critical criteria were variously applied to the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement.

In this regard, our ontological critical application focused on the four persuasive features or "facts" which both innovational and establishment-conflict models of the rhetoric of social movements share, i.e., (1) a goal of social change through (2) group action which (3) must fulfill rhetorical requirements by (4) creating drama. It was then argued that each of these unfold within the ontological context of the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement.

Continuing our ontological analysis, we next came to bear on the "Traditional" and "Modern Symbols" of the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement. We maintained here that the
ontological design of Transcendental Meditation symbolists is less bound up in the "time-treatment" of the former than the latter.

Shifting our critical focus from Ontology to Epistemology, we proceeded to a discussion of the "policy" of rhetoric. Here, we presented a broad spectrum of persuasion literature to put forth the notion that rhetoric conceived as "epistemic" represents a highly delicate "way of knowing," where success hinges to a large measure, upon the quality of mutual "expectancies" and anticipatory projections held by both the rhetor and his hearers.

Moreover, submitting the argument that the Smith-Windes "policy" distinction is more sensitive to the reciprocity which exists between rhetorical "expectation" and human persuadability than that posed by its establishment-conflict counterpart, we maintained that the latter represents a less realistic approach to the rhetoric of social movements. This "policy" distinction, once again, states that it is the innovational movement's rhetorical "expectation" that the changes it demands will not disturb the symbols and constraints of the existing social order (unlike the establishment-conflict aim to disrupt the existing social order).

In this regard, the Smith-Windes "policy" distinction was said to be dependent upon the successful fulfillment of the three following languaging strategies: (1) to deny the existence of conflict between their proposed innovation and the values of society, (2) to emphasize the weakness of traditional institutions and the strength of traditional values, and (3) to create a dialectic between the innovational scene and the purpose of the movement. Each of these was
depicted as successfully unfolding within the epistemological context (or policy) of the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement.

We argued furthermore, that the critical reality of the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement seeks additional explanation in the epistemological nature of innovational knowing. Rooted in the formal prescriptions of "Tradition," and unfolding as "principles," "an author," and "authority;" the Epistemology of Transcendental Meditation symbolists was depicted as considerably less bound up in the technical arguments of "Science."

Proceeding from our discussion of Epistemology to an examination of Axiology, our axiological critical application argued that Transcendental Meditation symbolists subscribe to a philosophically objective approach to human values, and thus maintain that human values represent enduring cultural phenomena which take their existence from the external world.

To lend support to this claim we introduced, as measures of philosophic objectivity, the critical criteria presented in Rice's list of principle directions in which objectivists seek values, and those found in Lafferty's empirically objective standards of value judgment. The former critical application argued that the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement is consistent with Rice's list of principle directions in which objectivists seek values, i.e., (1) in the properties of valued objects themselves; (2) in the universal validity of the rules which guide human conduct; (3) in the universal concepts, with an object foundation in reality; (4) in
agreements, or the social dimension of valuation; and (5) in the knowledge of the "conditions" of value experience.

Witnessing the successful five-fold critical application of Rice's criteria to the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement, we proceeded next to Lafferty's empirically objective standards of value judgment. Unfolding as: (1) the effect of enriching our appreciation of values; (2) the tendency of values to sensitize men to other values; and (3) the sharable or communicable quality of values, Lafferty's standards were similarly applied as critical measures of philosophic objectivity, to the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement. Thus, observing the successful critical application of these criteria, in concert with our foregoing analysis of Rice's principle directions, we concluded that Transcendental Meditation symbolists seek a philosophically objective approach to human values.

Finally, we maintained that four innovational configurations of rhetorical movement criticism emerge when the three columns of critical criteria in our Dramaturgical Perspective are correlated. These were developed as: (1) Traditional Symbols (fact)-Tradition (policy)-Objective (value); (2) Traditional Symbols (fact)-Science (policy)-Objective (value); (3) Modern Symbols (fact)-Science (policy)-Objective (value); and (4) Modern Symbols (fact)-Tradition (policy)-Objective (value).

Using arguments generated from our ontological, epistemological, and axiological critical analyses of the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement, we held that the first three
innovational configurations of rhetorical movement criticism presented, constitute critically "weak" standards of the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement. Moreover, we argued, in this connection, that only the last innovational configuration represents a critically "sound" measure of Transcendental Meditation symbolists' innovational brand of mass persuasion.

Thus, Chapter Three constitutes a broad response to our original question, i.e., "If the rhetoric of innovational social movements is a legitimate consideration, then does a seemingly innovational social collectivity like the Transcendental Meditation movement reflect the Smith-Windes critical criteria, and thus function to establish innovational criticism's new foothold in the rhetorical movement literature?" Warranting a categorical "yes," the answer to this question unfolds specifically as Innovational Configuration #4: Modern Symbols (fact)-Tradition (policy)-Objective (value). Chapter Four, in this regard, sets forth establishment-conflict configurations for the criticism of rhetorical movements.

Chapter Four. Chapter Four was described earlier as a corollary to Chapter Three. More specifically, it seeks an answer to the following question: "After having argued for the legitimacy of the rhetoric of innovational social movements, as well as allegedly having observed this type of mass persuasion within the context of the Transcendental Meditation movement, does a perceivable need exist to re-evaluate rhetorical definitions (like Cathcart's), in order to make room for fresh perspectives like innovational rhetorical movement criticism?"
This question is explored in a three-fold discussion which argues for the re-evaluation of rhetorical movement definitions. The discussion unfolds as (1) The Prohibitive Nature of Rhetorical Movement Definitions; (2) Recasting Rhetorical Movement Definitions; and (3) The Establishment-Conflict Configurations of a Rhetorical Movement Model.

Initially, our discussion of the Prohibitive Nature of Rhetorical Movement Definitions isolates the scholarship of Robert S. Cathcart as best representing the prohibitive nature of rhetorical movement definitions advanced by establishment-conflict theorists. This argument unfolds as five criticisms.

The first four criticisms were raised earlier in our foregoing discussions of Behavioristic Theory and The Philosophic Foundations of Rhetoric. These maintained that Cathcart's representative definition of rhetorical movements is behavioristically, ontologically, epistemologically, and axiologically prohibitive.

Moreover, the fifth and final criticism argues that Cathcart's rhetorical movement definition represents a prohibitive view of the rhetoric of social movements, in addition to the four previous criticisms of it, because it ends where it should begin. Here our innovational Dramaturgical Perspective is re-introduced, under the heading of "Recasting Rhetorical Movement Definitions," to demonstrate that this establishment-conflict definition is unable to provide the analyst of rhetorical movements with critical recourse.

Finally, Chapter Four generates two establishment-conflict configurations for the rhetoric of social movements. Each served to expand on the critical province of Cathcart's prohibitive definition.
Thus, Chapters Two, Three and Four represent broad responses to the three following questions: (1) "Should rhetorical scholars, as Smith and Windes suggest, recognize, at least in some cases, the rhetoric of innovational social movements, and thus allow innovational criticism to assume a useful place in the embryonic corpus of rhetorical movement literature?"; (2) If the rhetoric of innovational social movements is a legitimate consideration, then does a seemingly innovational social collectivity like the Transcendental Meditation movement, reflect the Smith-Windes critical criteria, and thus function to establish innovational criticism's new foothold in the rhetorical movement literature?"; and (3) "After having argued for the legitimacy of the rhetoric of innovational social movements, as well as allegedly having observed this type of mass persuasion within the context of the Transcendental Meditation movement, does a perceivable need exist to re-evaluate rhetorical definitions of social movements (like Cathcart's), in order to make room for fresh perspectives like innovational rhetorical movement criticism?"

In the larger view, the present study holds additional implications for the rhetorical study of social movements. These unfold as immediate and far-reaching implications.

**Immediate Implications.** Several claims may be advanced in response to the rhetorical critic who may query: "What are the ontological, epistemological, and axiological dimensions of the rhetoric of social realities like the Transcendental Meditation movement?" or "Why does one rhetorical vision overshadow and exhaust a competing vision?"
And, as Brown suggests in the essay, "Making Present the Past," "how do certain social realities like 'university,' for instance, assume an objective symbolic existence, apart from, and in addition to, its physical reality as a collection of buildings, professors, students, and the like?" The innovational configurations of rhetorical movement criticism generated in Chapter Three, for example, bear heavily on the foregoing concerns.

Innovational Configuration #4: Modern Symbols (fact)-Tradition (policy)-Objective (value), bore particular relevance, in this regard. Representing the ontological, epistemological, and axiological dimensions of Modern Symbols (fact), Tradition (policy), and Objective (value), we argued that this innovational configuration of rhetorical movement reflects the most "sound" measure of the innovational rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement in the United States!

Moreover, in response to the question: "Why does one rhetorical vision overshadow and exhaust a competing vision?," we maintain that some systems or configurations of rhetoric are more appropriate to the ontological, epistemological, and axiological demands of persuasion than are others. Innovational Configuration #4, for instance, may well represent the correct formula for Transcendental Meditation symbolists' innovational brand of mass persuasion, but it may be ill-suited to the ontological, epistemological, and axiological substrate of either another rhetorical movement or the competing rhetorical vision of a vocal opposition.

Finally, Brown draws upon Alfred North Whitehead's notion of "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness" to ask: "how do certain social realities like 'university,' for instance, assume an objective
symbolic existence, apart from, and in addition to, its physical reality as a collection of buildings, professors, students and the like?" Surveying our Dramaturgical Perspective, we maintain, in this connection, that symbolists interpret events according to systems of being, knowing, and valuing.

"Being," for instance, may be ascendant in one context, and yet recessive in another. In this regard, the "Modern Symbol" of "Science" proved to be ascendant in the Modern Symbol (fact)-Tradition (policy)-Objective (value) innovational configuration representing the rhetoric of the Transcendental Meditation movement.

Thus, we speak of the "power of the presidency," "the prestige of the university," and "the law" as symbolic or ontological realities, apart from, and in addition to, their physical manifestations. Indeed, it is this very same "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" or a process of "naming" that transforms low I.Q. scores into "underachievers." 1

Far-Reaching Implications,

(1) After rhetorical critics had been conducting Neo-Aristotelian critical analyses of speeches for fifty years, Edwin Black's Rhetorical Criticism (1965) argued that not only was Neo-Aristotelian criticism ill-suited to the analysis of certain types of speeches, but also maintained that Aristotle never intended his rhetorical tenets to be used as critical indices of public address. Quite similarly, the establishment-conflict theory of the rhetoric of social movements has been the ascendant mode of rhetorical movement criticism for more than a quarter of a century. The Smith-Windes theory of the rhetoric of social movements, however, provides critical recourse for those social movements
which do not reflect establishment-conflict criteria.

(2) Rhetorical movement criticism might prove more useful if it became less an instrument of historiography, and more a tool of rhetorical recodification. Studying the persuasive influences of symbol systems would nicely complement history "by making present the past," according to Brown.

(3) Observing the influence that social psychology has had on the rhetorical study of social movements, rhetorical and communication theorists would do well to develop an interdisciplinary critical impulse so as to become more sensitive to the influence of other disciplines on their research.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter Five

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