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THE TREATMENT OF KARL MARX IN EARLY AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY:
A FAILURE OF PERSPECTIVE

The Ohio State University

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THE TREATMENT OF KARL MARX IN EARLY AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY: A FAILURE OF PERSPECTIVE

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Patrick Joseph Gurney, B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University

1980

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Although the sociology of sociology has become a relatively organized subfield only within the last two decades, it had precedents much earlier outside of American sociology. Among the earliest works in the "pre-history" of this subfield are *The Holy Family* and *The German Ideology* which were written by Marx and Engels. In these two works the authors endeavored to explain (and critique) the thinking of certain German idealists and in doing so related the work of these idealists to their socio-cultural surroundings. Works in the sociology of sociology in the United States can be located as far back as 1938 when Howard Becker and Harry Elmer Barnes published *Social Thought From Lore to Science*. Two works of this genre were produced in 1943. These are Luther Lee and Jessie Bernard's *Origins of American Sociology* and Robert Nisbet's article "The French Revolution and the Rise of Sociology in France" which appeared in *The American Journal of Sociology*. The Nisbet article was a significant contribution. In his article Nisbet explained what influence the French Revolution had upon the foundations of sociology in France and particularly how the revolution popularized certain ideas which became central concepts of the discipline. Eight years after the publications of the Bernards and Nisbet, Howard Odum (1951) contributed his *American Sociology* to the field.

Within the last twenty years an increasing number of sociologists have become interested in viewing the practices and developments of the
discipline of sociology from a sociological perspective. Essentially, a new subfield of sociology has been created, the sociology of sociology. This new subfield emerged and began to expand as certain works explicitly demonstrated that sociology manifests itself in society.

Particularly, the sociology of sociology has been an American enterprise. This is due, for the most part, to the fact that field differentiation in sociology is rather distinctively American. However, a few works in the sociology of sociology have been performed in Europe. In 1959 Georges Gurvitch wrote "Les Cadres sociaux de la connaissance sociologique" ("The Social Settings of Social Knowledge"). Gurvitch argued that the thrust of sociology was "the wish to make explicit the presuppositions stemming from background social settings, to make explicit the perspectives and orientations suggested by these, and in that way to make manifest the relativity of sociological knowledge . . . ."

Two years later (1961), Leon Bramson published The Political Content of Sociology. His analysis indicates that American sociology arose in a period of rapid social change which influenced its origins and its subsequent development. According to Bramson, the ideas of the early sociologists were produced in a socio-intellectual milieu emphasizing the values of rural simplicity, neighborliness, and a religious concern for the individual.

The sociology of sociology received further impetus when The American Sociologist, an official journal of the American Sociological Association (ASA) began publication in 1965. By his initial call for disciplinary self study and understanding, its first editor, Talcott Parsons, provided an outlet for the sociology of sociology. Subsequent appearance of
articles in the sociology of sociology in an official ASA journal did aid in establishing the claim of this subfield as a legitimate area of intellectual endeavor within sociology.

In the 1970's work in the sociology of sociology appeared even more frequently. In 1970 Alvin Gouldner wrote *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* and Reynolds and Reynolds edited *The Sociology of Sociology*. A year later Edward Tiryakian edited *The Phenomenon of Sociology*. In 1971 Robert Friedrichs's *A Sociology of Sociology* won the Sorokin Award of the American Sociological Association. Certainly, this represents affirmative recognition of the subfield by the existing sociological community. The 1980's should see more work of this genre. Indeed Hinkle's forthcoming *The Founding Theory of American Sociology* indicates that such is the case.

The evolution of the sociology of sociology has developed to the point that its relevant problems can be identified. These relevant problems include studies of the relationship between:

1) sociology's rise and persistence as a profession and discipline and the broader structure of American society;

2) sociology as a discipline-profession and the character of academia;

3) sociology as a discipline and the state of other branches of knowledge, especially biophysical sciences and philosophy on one hand, and social science on the other;

4) certain classes and occupational backgrounds and recruitment into academia in general and certain classes and occupational backgrounds and recruitment into sociology in particular;

5) certain economic structures or professions (by way of providing employment for sociologists) and sociology;

6) dominant social backgrounds of sociologists and major professional tenets of the discipline;
7) sociologists' professional activities and their non-academic and extra-sociological involvements and activities;

8) membership in certain subfields of the discipline and espousal of certain value stances;

9) major or dominant ideas in the discipline and the dominance of certain departments; and

10) dominant ideas in the discipline and dominant values (in American society) and the receptivity, opposition or indifference to ideas of foreign social scientists or sociologists (e.g., Durkheim, Marx or Weber).

The problem addressed in this study will touch on many of the aspects listed above. Attention will be focused specifically upon the last item delineated—the relationship between dominant ideas in the discipline and dominant values (in American society) and the receptivity, opposition or indifference to ideas of foreign social scientists or sociologists (in this case, Karl Marx).
Nature of the Problem

The problem to be studied is Karl Marx and Early American Sociology: A Failure of Perspective. This work falls under the rubric of a sociology of sociology in that it moves in a similar "spirit." That is, it undertakes a historical examination of the relation of the work and claims of a self-defined scientific sociology to its setting. As Albion Woodbury Small said,

"The American Sociological movement was a child of its time. It was not an isolated detached curiosity. It was part of the orderly unfolding of native conditions."

In agreement with Small's statement this study endeavors to examine both the movement (American sociology) and its time (historical context). Thought does not have an independent existence. In fact, Marx would argue that thought is conditioned by the surroundings of the thinkers; or, more specifically, that it is not the consciousness of human beings which determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence which determines their consciousness.

The central problem of this dissertation is to ascertain the nature of the reception accorded Karl Marx in Early American sociology and how this reception can be explained. (What explanation means and how such an explanation will be constructed will be discussed in chapter four.) The study of American sociology from its formal beginnings in the 19th century up to the present time is too Herculean a task to be undertaken in totality at this time. The task simply must be divided into manageable parts. Hopefully, after the first segment is completed in this work, the other portions can be addressed in the future. This is certainly my
intention. In this endeavor the focus of attention will be devoted to early American sociology. By American sociology I mean the sociology which was produced in the United States of America. I apologize for the chauvinism implied in using "American" as the adjectival form of the noun United States, but I am forced to do so, since the "United States" does not have an adjective to represent it as does Spain (Spanish) or Mexico (Mexican). Perhaps this is a reflection of a provincial world view which has historically existed in the United States. In any event, when the term "American" is used, it does not include Canada, Mexico, Latin America or South America.

Early American sociology refers to the sociology produced in the United States in the 25-year span of 1895-1920. The selection of these years, although somewhat arbitrary, is not without reason. The year 1895 marked the beginning of the publication of the first journal devoted exclusively to sociological inquiry, The American Journal of Sociology. For the first time, sociology had a vehicle for the interchange and communication of ideas. Selection of the 1895-1920 time period allows one to follow this interchange through the pages of that journal and to discover how much attention was paid to Marxist ideas, as well as what sort of treatment these ideas were given. Secondly, it was at this time that sociology became a recognized discipline with a more or less distinctive set of courses within the curricula of colleges and universities in the United States. Third, this date roughly coincides with the emergence of the University of Chicago, an institution which was to play a significant part in the development of graduate education generally and, more significantly, a major role in the development of early American
sociology. In addition (as will be pointed out in chapter two) a distinctive set of ideas characterized the discipline during its early period. Furthermore, sociologists exhibited a distinctive source of recruitment (they were primarily from rural-religious backgrounds). The years before 1920 demonstrate a distinctiveness which justifies this delineation as a "period." One can make quite a good case for this period's continual influence on the field up to the present day, but, for the purposes of this study, 1920 will be the last year considered.

Undeniably, the reactions of American sociologists could and should be studied throughout the several periods of the development of the discipline. But inquiry across the full range of the discipline's history is an unmanageable task. Some more circumscribed undertaking is required. The decision to study the reactions of sociologists to Marx and Marxism during the years 1895 to 1920 was made because any meaningful comparisons and any effort to establish (inter-period) continuities (or discontinuities) must ultimately be based on this first period of the discipline.

The year 1920 was selected as the last year to be studied because this was the point at which American sociology entered its first "empirical age." This era witnessed a decline of interest in general theory. Objections were raised to what was called "armchair speculation," a condemnation expressed against what was felt to be the subjectivity and unverifiability of earlier sociology. New methodological techniques were introduced which spawned a movement toward induction and statistics. Much of the impetus for this movement originated in two places, Columbia and the University of Chicago. This era was even less conducive to the entertainment of Marxist ideas than the first; therefore, the cutoff date of 1920 seems somewhat justifiable.
In a forthcoming work concerning the founding theory of early American sociology, Hinkle argues that very basic changes occurred in theory and in the discipline itself after the years 1915-18. He suggests that the position of substantive or ontological theory became secondary to epistemological and methodological concerns. Quantification assumed enhanced prominence as interest in macro social ontological theory declined and its bases were severely challenged.

In this work, the years 1895 and 1920 represent guideposts rather than rigorous boundaries. They will stand as a demarcation of convenience in order to direct the reader's attention. Discussion will not be restricted totally to these years. Events and materials dated prior to 1895 and after 1920 will be entertained if they have a bearing on this period of early American sociology.
Significance of the Problem

Technically speaking, this will be an effort to understand a particular aspect of a sociology of a sociology. It is not a sociology of sociology in the strictest sense because the concern here will not be with all of sociology, but only with the sociology of the United States and only during a delineated period of time, 1895-1920. In essence, the problem involves only a portion of the sociology of sociology. By virtue of its temporal circumscription this study can be more thorough or more exhaustive in contrast to studies of a larger range and scope which forfeit depth of analysis in exchange for breadth of analysis.

Perhaps the basic concern of this dissertation can be more clearly delineated in comparison and in contrast with Donald W. Calhoun's 1950 doctoral dissertation on The Reception of Marxian Sociological Theory by American Academic Sociologists (University of Chicago). Calhoun's study and the present inquiry differ markedly on the following points:

1) Calhoun was concerned only with the reception accorded Marx by American sociologists whereas this study is interested in both the nature of the reaction to Marx and in providing an explanation of that reaction. Calhoun's dissertation is not a work in the sociology of sociology; a fact he freely admits. The purpose of his work is to examine what has been done with Marx and how it was done. Calhoun does not go beyond these two steps; therefore the reasons why the reactions took on the character which they do is left for future investigators. Calhoun declares,

The author does, in fact, view this piece of work as essentially preliminary to the more complex task of
relating its specific subject matter to the historical conditions in which it arose.4

2) Calhoun examines three generations of American sociologists (1890's to World War I, World War to the Depression, the Depression to 1950), whereas the present study is confined to an intensive inquiry into the reactions of the first generation of American sociologists. The first generation includes Ward, Sumner, Small, Giddings, Stuckenberg, Bascom, Ellwood, Cooley and Ross, with Ellwood receiving the most extensive treatment. In addition, Calhoun basically centers on what a sociologist said rather than how much or how little a person said in relation to his/her entire literary or scientific output. For example, if an individual wrote two pages in his/her life concerning Marx, Calhoun discusses the content of the two pages, but not the fact that it is the only two pages in a lifetime of work. In addition, by discussing three generations of sociologists (for a grand total of 70 sociologists), Calhoun's analysis lacks depth.

3) Calhoun seriously neglected periodical literature as a resource, whereas this investigation considers the relevant periodical literature for the entire period. Calhoun's analysis stresses books; however, he does not stress journal articles.

4) Calhoun ignores the nature of socio-historical academic, or even disciplinary contexts, whereas this study takes it point of departure from precisely these contexts.

Thus, this dissertation both expands upon and goes beyond the work of Calhoun and thus aspires to be a significant contribution to the sociology of sociology. In addition, the dissertation provides a partial replication of Calhoun's dissertation.
The Research Enterprise: Data, Methods of Analysis, and Organization of Work

Each of the succeeding chapters has its justification in the very nature of the problem. Because the dissertation is concerned both with ascertaining the nature of early American sociologists' reactions to Marx and with explaining those reactions, chapter two consists of a statement of the contexts of early American sociology. This statement provides both a meaningful orientation to the state of the early discipline and a basis for a subsequent effort to explain the reactions to Marx and Marxism. The study of contexts begins with the changing structure of post Civil War American society. The shift in structure is viewed in relation to another context, the persisting values of American society. The changing structure in relation to these persisting values set up certain problems which were partially resolved by the three other contexts considered—academia, social science and sociology. Facts and figures for each of these contexts was gathered from relevant literature e.g. Hinkle's *Founding Theory of American Sociology* 1881-1915, Hofstadter's *The Age of Reform* and *The American Political Tradition*, Gabriel's *American Values*, Williams' *American Society*, Hofstadter and Hardy's *The Development and Scope of Higher Education in the United States* and Veysey's *The Emergence of the American University* (for a complete listing see the footnotes at the end of chapter two).

Obviously, the nature of the reaction to Marx must be known before any explanation can be attempted. Hence, chapter three delineates the nature of the reactions of early American sociologists to Marx and
Marxism. Initially, however, chapter three deals with several important preliminary issues. It identifies the kinds of sources which provide the data of the reactions—the books and journal articles (especially from the *American Journal of Sociology*) of Lester Frank Ward, William Graham Sumner, Franklin Henry Giddings, Charles A. Ellwood, Charles Horton Cooley, Albion Woodbury Small, Edward Alsworth Ross, William Giles, James E. Hagerty, Shailer Mathes, Paul Monroe, Selig Perlman, John Spargo, and O. Thon. Chapter three is also concerned with criteria for determining whether the reactions were directed to Marxist or non-Marxist socialisms. In this process two methodological difficulties were encountered. First, early sociologists rarely provided footnotation or bibliographic references to Marx or Marx's works. Secondly, biographies of early American sociologists—written as they were in the great man tradition, of historical interpretation (e.g., Cape's *Lester Frank Ward*, Jandy's *Charles Horton Cooley* and Davie's *William Graham Summer*)—afforded few clues as to how well acquainted particular sociologists were with Marx or Marxism. These works tend toward psychologism and an emphasis on the idiosyncratic. Since many of these biographies were written by ex-students, objective analysis is often lacking.

All the persons, except for John Spargo, included in the list above taught sociology at one time or another during their life. All the figures, including Spargo, published in *AJS*. Whether or not all were sociologists is difficult to ascertain because the field of sociology was not as well defined as it is today.

The raw data of the reactions are generalized into the categories of positive, indifferent and negative. Such an approach allows for greater
precision and clarity, although certain difficulties were encountered in the process. An explanation of such problems and their resolution is contained in the third chapter. Since the prevailing reaction to Marx was overwhelmingly negative, a more specific delineation (into six sub-types) is warranted.

Chapter four provides a discussion of the structuralist mode of explanation which is utilized in this dissertation. Before the major tenets of the structuralist argument are delineated, the nature of explanation is contrasted to interpretation as a form of accounting. Thereafter, a structuralist explanation of early American sociologists' rejection of Marx is provided. The data for the explanation are derived from various sources. First, the books, biographies, autobiographies and journal articles of the sociologists are reviewed. The explanation is constructed by examining their statements concerning Marx in relation to their general sociological and political opinions, and in relation to the prevailing values of American society. In addition, academic freedom cases are presented as evidence that certain lines of permissible dissent were drawn for members of the discipline. Anyone who crossed such lines was subjected to negative and often severe sanctions.

The sociologists' reactions to Marx and Marxism are also compared to the general reaction to Marx and Marxism in the post Civil War United States. Social movements and institutionalized patterns of behavior are discussed. These movements and patterns are analyzed and their core elements are delineated. This core helps to provide an explanation of why these movements and patterns were popular and why Marx and Marxism
were not. Chapter two laid the foundation for this explanation by delineating the basic contexts and structures of post Civil War American society. The effects and ramifications of these contexts and structures are utilized to explain the general reaction of American society to social phenomena such as reformism (particularly Populism and Progressivism), Social Darwinism and socialism.

Chapter five provides a summary of the dissertation and offers some conclusions. In addition to a discussion of the findings of this endeavor, the relevance of the study for sociology and for the sociology of sociology is elaborated upon. Finally, other related topics in the sociology of sociology which have not been researched are suggested for future study.
Notes to Chapter 1


3. Roscoe C. Hinkle, The Founding Theory of American Sociology 1881-1915. These concerns were expressed in a manuscript which will soon be published by Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Chapter 2
The Contexts of Early American Sociology

To pose a problem about the early history of American sociology is to demand knowledge of a period of history some seventy-five to one hundred years ago which even an informed layman or professional social scientist or sociologist ordinarily does not possess. Accordingly, this chapter endeavors to provide a preliminary orientation. It develops the major characteristics of the changing nature of American society after the Civil War, the changing character of higher education or academia, and the emergence and differentiation of the social sciences. Finally, it considers the appearance (and major features of) sociology itself in the last decades of the nineteenth century.
A. Changing Structure of Post Civil War

American Society as Context

Post-Civil War American society experienced fundamental and rapid transformations. Before 1860, American society was substantially a small-scale, rural, agrarian, small-town, commercial-handicrafts society based on relatively direct personal relations; whereas afterwards, it increasingly became a large-scale, urban, industrial-capitalist society characterized by increasingly impersonal relations.

Interestingly, these transformations were congruent with the types of changes outlined in Marxist theory and particularly in Marx's views about the development of capitalist political economy. The development of industrial capitalism in the United States entailed the following features: 1) an industrial reserve army or labor pool provided by overseas immigration and domestic rural to urban migration; 2) expansion of the marketplace into an international market (this expansion was aided by improved mechanisms of transportation and communication); 3) concentration of control over the means of production; 4) increase in available surplus capital; and 5) increased misery for the laboring class (slums, poor sanitation, etc.).
American society, after the Civil War, experienced large scale immigration. At the same time industrialization and urbanization were taking place at a rapid pace. As these processes unfolded, markets expanded as the occupational structure became increasingly differentiated. Capitalism took on a corporate nature as socio-economic power became concentrated. Accompanying such developments was a stratification system which became increasingly complex.

Literally millions of immigrants came to the United States in the decades following the Civil War. By the years 1871-80, 2,812,191 immigrants arrived and in 1881-90, this figure increased to 5,246,613. The next decade, 1891-1900, brought 3,687,564. The peak period was 1901-10 with 8,795,386 immigrants coming to the United States, while 1911-20 saw the numbers decline to 5,736,811. In the years 1890-1920 (roughly the period under consideration in this work) 18,217,761 new people arrived in America!

As immigration continued the source changed from Northern and Western to Southern and Eastern Europe. In 1882, Northern and Western European countries contributed 71.3% of the immigrants in contrast to 10.5% from Southern and Eastern European countries. In 25 years this situation was reversed for in 1907 Northern and Western Europe provided 17.7% while 75.5% came from Southern and Eastern Europe. Austria-Hungary, Italy and Russia provided 68.6% of this immigration.

The new immigrants tended to settle in the urban north where employment was most readily available. The 294,000 Italians who arrived

At the same time that this wave of immigration was coming to America, the United States was undergoing other basic changes, one of the most basic of which was industrialization. Manufacturing grew, became centralized, and tended more and more to become part of the urban factory system. As Hinkle reports, industrialization and its specialization of productive activity were facilitated by major technological improvements in agriculture. These improvements, such as the chilled iron plow, improved reaper, and mechanical twinebinder, reduced the number of people necessary for food production and released thousands to travel to the city to work in the factories. The factory system was provided with its primary requirement—a permanent working force. This labor pool would become specialized in order to most efficiently utilize the machinery.

Much of the impetus for increased factory production came from the Civil War. Mechanization and mass production developed rapidly and by 1880 3,000,000 people were employed in machine industry, with 80% working under the factory system. By the turn of the century the United States was the leading industrial power in the world. At this time three of its four major industries were involved in factory production—food processing, textile and clothing manufacture, and iron and steel fabrication.
As industrialization proceeded so did urbanization. Hinkle documents this progress. In the years 1860-1900 the urban proportion of the population doubled from 20% to 40%. By 1910 45.7% of the people lived in cities. In 1910 778 cities in the United States had a population exceeding 8,000. New York's population in 1910 approached 5,000,000 while Chicago doubled its population in 20 years from 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 and Philadelphia grew to about 1,500,000.

As such developments occurred, the marketplace expanded to the national and international level. New and improved mechanisms of transportation and communication were devised. In the 30 years between 1860 and 1890, highway mileage doubled while in the 13 years between 1877 and 1890, railway mileage increased by over 500%. Railroad mergers resulted in a shared monopoly of four companies. The telegraph, telephone and typewriter improved communication as technological advances were made in the industrial and agricultural sector resulting in mass production and increased population density in urban areas.

Hofstadter argues that a communications revolution occurred throughout the world during this period. In 1866 Europe was connected to the United States by submarine cable. A submarine cable was also extended from North to South America in 1874. In 1869 the Suez Canal opened as did the first transcontinental railroad in the United States. In addition, telegraph and telephone communication began to make its way around the world.

As mass (factory) production intensified, the division of labor became more complex. With the introduction of the assembly line, occupations became more differentiated and job descriptions more specialized.
The easier legal access to incorporation also facilitated the rise of large-scale industry. Before the Civil War, the only common forms of ownership allowed under the law were single entrepreneurship and partnership. Amassing capital under such circumstances was not easy. This situation changed after the Civil War as laws were passed which facilitated incorporation. At this time states generalized and standardized incorporation requirements and procedures. With incorporation accumulation of capital became much easier as more people were allowed to pool their assets. Relationships were impersonalized as liability was limited exclusively to share holdings. Ownership and management became separated as owners began to hire specialists to perform daily functions and make routine decisions. In addition, the incorporated enterprise as a separate legal personality had an unlimited organizational lifespan (apart from bankruptcy). The advantages of incorporation were manifest. By 1900 two-thirds of all manufacturing was performed by corporations. Thus, a platform was provided for economic expansion as business enlarged into a bureaucratic hierarchical structure.

This era was one of corporate capitalism. In 1901 the world's first billion dollar corporation, United States Steel, was established. During this period competition was stifled as monopolies and mergers were seen as inevitable by proponents as well as critics of big business. A general feeling existed that corporate consolidation led to industrial efficiency and that unrestricted competition was an evil to be gotten rid of. Charles M. Schwab of U. S. Steel argued that, "the larger the output the smaller the cost of production." The assumption was that the concentration and centralization of capital avoided the waste of small-
scale production. Historical economists such as E. Benjamin Andrews, Arthur J. Hadley, Edwin R. A. Seligman and Simon N. Patten accepted, with little empirical analysis, the existence of a trend toward monopoly.9

In the years 1895-1904 thousands of firms disappeared as merger capitalization totalled over a billion dollars. As Kolko points out, from 1895-1920 only eight industries accounted for 77% of the merger capitalizations and 68% of the net firm disappearances. In effect, the mergers were contained in a few dominant industries; e.g., U. S. Steel, which consisted of what had once been 138 different companies.10 In 1899, Standard Oil refined 90% of the nation's oil, effectively establishing control over the industry. In 1911, Standard Oil still maintained control over 80% of the refineries.

Much has been written about the heroic trustbusting of Theodore Roosevelt. The best that can be said of such historical reporting is that it is a "bill of sale," not to be confused with an accurate historical record. What Roosevelt actually accomplished was to provide a firm political base for capitalism. Big business ironically led the struggle for regulation, for it saw incorporation as efficient and unregulated competition as inefficient. The establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 and the passage of the Sherman Act of 1890 did little, if anything, to stand in the way of the concentration and centralization of capital. The Sherman Act was vague and placed emphasis on the intent of the actors rather than on the act itself. Big business could not have had a more imprecise law if it had written the law itself.

The years 1898-1904 were six years of intensive trust formation.
In 1904 alone 318 trusts were formed. The concentration of socio-economic power during these six years is unparalleled in United States history. Incorporated in this period were U. S. Steel, Standard Oil, Consolidated Tobacco, Amalgamated Copper, International Mercantile Marine Company and the American Smelting and Refining Company.\textsuperscript{11} All of this occurred while labor, for the most part, remained passive. Imbued with a vision of a perceived fluid social structure and a feeling that the vote was its political voice, American labor lacked class consciousness. Although the stratification hierarchy became increasingly complex (and also more difficult to ascend), American labor remained disunited. Perlman\textsuperscript{12} locates the reason for such disunity in immigration which, he argues, created a laboring class which was ethnically, linguistically, religiously and culturally heterogeneous.

The infrastructure of change in American social structure presented above operated in an American society containing a super-structure of persistent values (the shared criteria used in evaluating objects, ideas, acts, feelings or events as to their relative desirability, merit or correctness). These values also form part of the context for early American sociology.
Persisting Structure of Values in American Society

In this section four sets of values will be discussed. Each set of values combined to form "an American mind" which provided early American sociology with a set of parameters in which it could operate (and outside of which it was forbidden to venture).

Perhaps the most basic set of American values involved certain notions concerning a divine presence and will and the sanctity of individual life. Freedom of religion was a significant motivating factor in the colonization of what became the United States. Since that period religion has continued to play an important and even central role in the unfolding of American history. In spite of the fact that the United States Constitution established the separation of church and state, a pervasive Protestantism has remained as a part of the core of the American value system. The American belief in a deity provides a foundation for an orderly world. Having been endowed with conscience, human beings can comprehend this world and its eternal truths and principals. This translates, in Ralph Gabriel's words, to "a belief in a fundamental law underlying human life, a law as universal as mankind, a law whose principles provide the cornerstone for the good life."

This notion of a divine presence and will was continually reiterated in the 19th century. In an opinion from the bench in 1823, John Marshall affirmed, "There are principles of abstract justice which the creator of all things has impressed on the mind of his creature man and which are admitted to regulate, in a great degree, the rights of
civilized nations." Despite their numerous differences, Americans have traditionally shared a common belief in a deity.

Another basic tenet of the American value system at the turn of the century is the belief in the sanctity of individual life, ego, or personality. This value, which serves as the base of American individualism, is derived from the Christian notion of the sacredness of the immortal (individual) soul. Translated secularly, the individual is responsible and autonomous. Gabriel writes that the conquest of the West and the establishment of industrialism in the East put a premium upon the individual. Americans have always acted to protect their perceived autonomy of the individual and have always distrusted deterministic formulations of human activity.

American individualism provides a background for a secondary set of American values—equality, freedom, and democracy. The notion of equality has religious origins beginning with the Christian notion that all souls are equal before God. This belief has been translated politically ("All men (sic) are created equal") and legally ("All men (sic) are equal before the law"). Such pronouncements admittedly do not take into account the huge gap which exists between American beliefs and practice.

This notion of equality has been transformed into a set of specific rights and obligations. Williams lists such formally equal civil rights as military service, voting, public education and taxation. These rights are said to guarantee the individual a certain openness of life-space. The American conception of equality is that of equality
of opportunity rather than equality of condition. Such a notion does not condone receiving rewards which are not earned. One should receive what one deserves and what one works for, nothing more. Individual differences are recognized and, indeed, they are cultivated. That this principle of equality is violated is undeniable. America's history of classism, racism and sexism is well documented. Generally, however, such deviations have been rationalized away or have provided targets for social reformers.

Freedom is another value to which Americans have adhered. As Williams notes, this notion of freedom does not signify uncaused behavior; rather, what is meant is that all behavior should be free of external and arbitrary constraints. The demand for freedom has always been for freedom from some restraint; e.g., freedom of the market from government intervention. It is expressed in a series of rights (e.g., the right of private property) rather than duties. Centralized authority is thus expressly rejected as the American notion of freedom places great confidence in the individual to be his or her own master. Democracy is thus a form of government which protects the property rights of the individual. Individuals may do what they please with their property. Such a notion, however, is inconsistent with the notion of equality. Individuals, being the masters of their property, can pass that property on to their offspring. Such a pattern of inheritance sets up a system of structured inequality which actually prevents equality of opportunity. One who inherits a considerable fortune (through no labor of his or her own) is able to dominate someone else in the market place who did not receive such an inheritance, irrespective of each individual's capacities.
and potentialities. Indeed, this practice is allowed to continue for generation upon generation supposedly insuring freedom and yet guaranteeing inequality.

The American form of political democracy is, as a value, designed to protect the individual. The government's role is protect the individual from all unnecessary interference. It is this principle which results in the rejection of aristocracies and monarchies with all their titles, pomp, and circumstance. The individual is to have inalienable rights. These rights are to be protected by a representative government elected by majority rule.

A third set of values, which form part of America's persisting value structure, contains the beneficence of knowledge, optimism and progress, and humanitarianism.

As Williams\textsuperscript{19} suggests, Americans have, and have had for well over a century, a "faith in education." This notion of the beneficence of knowledge is evidenced in the American ideal (Lester Frank Ward exemplified such an ideal) that knowledge can provide the solution to any problem thereby ensuring continual progress. Science and education, as the outcomes of the process of knowledge, are held in high esteem. The United States has created a universal public education system so that each individual can participate in the government (fundamental to democracy is an educated citizenry) and so that each can pursue economic rewards. In theory this is set up to strengthen the individual and thereby make the nation secure. Such thinking has its source in English utilitarianism in which the greater good for the greatest number was to be derived by each person pursuing his or her own self-interest.
Such a pursuit would lead one to compete with others for rewards. Such competition (supposedly being free and open) would insure that better products would be produced for no one would purchase an inferior product. Progress was thus guaranteed.

The period after the Civil War was one in which the ideas of optimism and progress gained broad popular support. As urban industrial life became more secularized, the old Christian pessimism was cast to the side in favor of a more optimistic view of progress. Human life and history began to be viewed in anthropocentric terms rather than in religious ones. With the acquisition of secular knowledge the natural world could be observed and understood.

As Hinkle reports, progress became an intrinsic part of Americans' image of themselves. It provided a rationalization for the developing nationalism and westward territorial expansion. It was fostered by a period of general economic prosperity and expansion. Its fundamental criterion was a generally rising standard of living as people acquired more and more material comforts. Science and technology were the chief means to progress. Education—the means of transmitting science and technology—became highly regarded. Progress, science, technology and education were inextricably interwoven. All four were seen as humanitarian, for they all contributed to the betterment of the human condition.

Humanitarianism was strongly endorsed, but it was seen in terms of gradual reform rather than revolution. Education and science would lead to progress, but they would do so gradually. Progress was to be
achieved, but only by working through the existing system. A justifi-
cation for reform was created. The Christian ideal of brotherhood was
merged with the expansion of higher education.

A fourth set of values, which are closely related to technological-
economic activities includes: private property, activism and work,
efficiency and practicality, exploitability of physical nature, per-
personal achievement—success, and material comforts.

One of the basic characteristics of the American community is the
strength of the institution of private property. This notion is
linked to the other sets of values, especially individualism. Hofstadter
describes America's zeal for private property in The American Political
Tradition.

The sanctity of private property, the right
of the individual to dispose of and invest it . . .
and the natural evolution of self-interest and self-
assertion, within broad legal limits, have been staple
tenets of the central faith in American political
ideologies. You patch it up, but not cripple it with
a plan for common collective action. 22

Throughout their whole history and political tradition Americans
have shared a belief in the rights of property. Underlying this posi-
tion is the philosophy of economic individualism which accepts the
elements of capitalist culture as necessary qualities of human beings.

In addition, the United States possesses a culture which stresses
activity. Its folklore is full of hard work, nose-to-the-grindstone
and rags to riches stories. What is valued is not just any type of
activism and work however. Americans value, as Williams 23 says,
"directed and disciplined activity." Such traits are symbolized by
central figures from 19th century society—the independent farmer and
the small businessperson. The virtue of activism and work in American culture has Calvinist and Puritan overtones.

Closely related to the stress on activism and work is an emphasis on efficiency and practicality. In Williams' words, "Efficient is a word of high praise in a society that has long emphasized adaptability, technological innovation, economic expansion, up-to-dateness, practicality, expediency, getting things done." The rationale behind phenomena such as factories, mechanization and mass production has always been that they are efficient means of production. Such phenomena are also practical given America's craving for material objects.

Efficiency and practicality are evidenced in the position Americans take in relation to their environment. Americans do not romanticize about their physical nature but feel that the environment is to be exploited—efficiently, rationally and practically. Americans in the 18th and 19th century were faced with a frontier which many felt was wild and untamed and in need of subjugation. The value of lands is expressed in how it can be exploited and not for its intrinsic value or beauty. Nature had to be subdued in a disciplined, efficient fashion.

As nature was "conquered" a cult of the "self-made man" arose. Such a nation combined the values of individualism, efficiency and practicality with an exploitive stance in relation to nature. The elements of the "self-made man" were expounded in the 18th century by Benjamin Franklin. The Horatio Alger myth and the "success story" are basic ingredients of Americans' stress on personal achievement and success. The "self-made" captains of industry and business of the late 19th century became heroes. Great stock was put in how hard they worked and
the success they achieved. Their success was held to be an indicator of their moral virtue.

Success was measured by material comfort, i.e., how much money one had. Material comfort is highly approved of and sought after in the United States. A rising standard of living is a symbol which indicates one's success and competence. Pleas to reduce the level of consumption are dismissed with disdain. As standards rise, new wants emerge and once satisfied they come to be expected as if it is one's right to possess them.\textsuperscript{25} A person is rated in terms of his or her possessions, such as a home, furniture or bank account.

These values were current and significant in this era in which American Sociology was emerging. American society was experiencing major transformation by virtue of large scale immigration, industrialization and urbanization. Markets were expanding as capitalism took on a corporate structure and as capital became centralized and concentrated. These infrastructural elements which provided the impetus for change in the social structure also created a significant number of social problems. Many of the immigrants were unskilled and thus became members of the lower class. As cheap labor was exploited in the city, slums became a reality. Slum existence was characterized by inadequate ventilation, sanitary and cooking facilities and poor lighting and water. The surroundings were unhealthy.

Many of the residents required relief as illiteracy and crime compounded their problems.\textsuperscript{26} An understanding of these infrastructural processes was necessary for the solution of these social problems. Yet
the solutions had to be confined within the superstructure of the per­
sisting structure of values in American society. One had to stay
within the basic moral orientation of American society and culture.
Given America's stress on the beneficence of knowledge and the optimism
and humanitarianism which accompanied it, reform was not only viewed
as possible but also as desirable. This reform was to be accomplished
scientifically. It was within such a reformist atmosphere that social
science and sociology arose as part of the expansion of higher education
which was taking place at the time.
B. Changes in Higher Education: The Rise of the University

The changes in American society since the Civil War, which were elaborated upon in the previous sections of this chapter, provided a new context for higher education and the relationship of higher education to society. Within this new context higher education was no longer merely a prestige symbol for small-town agrarian professionals, such as lawyers, ministers and medical doctors. Education shifted in response to industrialism's demands for occupational differentiation and specialization. The religiously focused generalized small college no longer was central to higher education. The more secular practically-oriented and specialized university assumed a dominant role. The corporate character of the age eventually became reflected in a new emphasis on professionalization in many areas of intellectual life.

The main features of emerging higher (university) education reflected a response to the changed nature of American society. These features, which will be examined below, involve curricula, university divisions (engineering, law etc.), faculty, administration and presidents, boards of trustees, endowments and research.

Industrialism and corporate capitalism necessitated a reorientation of education from a classical and religious emphasis to a more secular and practically oriented curriculum. Older private institutions, such as Harvard, were forced to change to meet the demands for social efficiency. As the old ways of discipline and piety were discarded, new private institutions were formed, such as Cornell, Johns Hopkins, Vanderbilt, Tulane, Clark, Stanford and Chicago. In addition, with the passage of
the Morrill Act in 1862, a number of state and public universities were created, including Illinois and Ohio State.
Decline of the Pre-Civil War College

Before the Civil War, American colleges placed a considerable emphasis on what was termed "mental exercise." The accumulation and retention of knowledge was relegated to a place of secondary importance. Each and every course was prescribed by the college, and instruction was accomplished through recitation. The teachers in these colleges were stern, male and religious. Most of them had only a B.A. degree. Colleges were not the large-scale bureaucracies of today; rather, they were small-scale institutions with little outside funding. With respect to the body of knowledge which existed at the time, the curriculum was quite inadequate. New knowledge merely trickled into these institutions, if it got in at all. A huge discrepancy existed between what one learned at these colleges and the knowledge pool which existed in society. Furthermore, graduate schools were non-existent.

The pre-Civil War American college was founded in union with the church. It had strong religious ties which often served as constraints upon all of its facets, especially the curriculum. One may view the college curriculum as a barometer by means of which the cultural pressures which operate upon a school can be measured. The American college curriculum before the Civil War consisted of studies in Latin, Greek, mathematics, logic and moral philosophy. Occasionally Hebrew, elementary physics and astronomy were taught as well.

This system of education operated under three assumptions. First, it was assumed that education was for gentlemen, and the definition of a gentleman appears to have been a white, upper-class male. An education
for a gentleman was to be a classical education. In Veblen's words it was to be "honorifically wasteful," for the time it took to acquire was highly disproportionate to its content and limited usefulness. A second assumption was that knowledge was a fixed quantum of truth. The primary function of education was to instill as much Christian truth into the undergraduate as possible. The culmination of the undergraduate process was a course in moral philosophy which was usually taught by the college president and always to the senior class. Hofstadter mentions that the goal of this course was to summarize, synthesize and justify this fixed quantum of truth. Knowledge was not conceptualized as a progressive endeavor. The third assumption underlying this educational system was that the mind was to be developed by exercising and disciplining it and its faculties. This assumption relies on a faculty psychology which conceived of the human mind as being divided into faculties like memory, reason, imagination, attention, judgement, etc. Mental discipline and training were thought to develop the mind in much the same manner as an athlete trained the body. This assumption led to the continual drilling of students in the classics.

Because of their intellectual conservatism colleges did not thrive. In fact, as Veysey demonstrates, they eventually floundered. As the general population numbers soared, the college population either remained the same or declined. During and after the Civil War there were demands for a new university as the old system was seen as failing to meet the new needs created by industrialism, urbanism and corporate capitalism. Such demands gave rise to the modern university in the United States.
Rise of the Modern University

The modern university in the United States, which had its origins in the years immediately following the Civil War, had taken shape by the year 1910. With increased importance and expansion came geometric increments in enrollment. In 1870, total university enrollment was 67,350. Twenty years later this figure had increased to 156,756 and by 1910, it had jumped to 355,315.29

This "new university" was made possible by newly available surplus capital. Private universities were established from funds given to them by wealthy families, such as the Cornells, Vanderbilts, Tulanes and Rockefellers. In addition, new public institutions arose as a result of the passage of the Morrill Act of 1862. This act, which was the result of a utilitarian push for more efficient agriculture and mechanical technology, provided that every state should receive 30,000 acres of public land for each senator and representative in the United States Congress. Every state was expected to found at least one college within five years. This resulted in many agricultural and mechanical colleges being established.30 These land-grant institutions abandoned the old concepts of mental discipline and gentlemanly Christian education in favor of creating the specialists which were demanded by the economy.

The new system of education had organizational features substantially different from the old college system. These new features are reflected in the curricula, university divisions, faculty, administration and presidents, boards of trustees, endowments, and research.
The new outlook on education produced changes in the curriculum as the elective system was introduced. A more complex and varied curriculum was offered. The students were permitted to choose many of the courses they wanted to take.

The elective system, by requiring less faculty supervision, functioned to free the faculty for more research. The system has been compared to an academic transcription of liberal capitalist thinking.\(^{31}\) It was pluralistic, democratic and competitive. Soon after the introduction of this system it became possible to choose a course in sociology. With the elective system, knowledge became a tool of utility.

As the role of the university enlarged a number of changes were taking place in its structure and functions. New divisions were created within the university, e.g. departments or colleges of agriculture and engineering. The university became a bureaucracy with research results as one of its products. Research became an increasingly important part of the university's endeavors as it came more and more to serve the needs of industrialism and corporation. In addition as the universities developed, graduate education became ever more important. Graduate enrollment rose from 198 students in 1871 to 2,382 students in 1890 to 9,370 students in 1910.\(^{32}\)

As the university became increasingly specialized and professionalized, faculty members began to attain advanced degrees, faculty size increased and new positions for deans were established. Originally many of these faculty members took their degrees in Germany. Before the university process was institutionalized in the United States, many American decided to travel to Germany for graduate training. This
accounts, in large part, for the impact of German scholarship on the American system. One element of this influence was the seminar method of teaching, which was borrowed by the Americans from Germany. Although only 300 American went to Germany to study in the 1860's, by 1890 this number peaked at approximately 2,000. After 1890, the numbers gradually declined as graduate education became more prominent in the United States.\(^{33}\) The Americans were not only attracted by Germany's particular organization of research and scholarship, but also by the intellectual atmosphere. On his return from Germany, Richard Ely, a prominent political economist at the turn of the century, wrote of the effect of the warm humanitarianism and the "ethical view" of German scholars, such as Conrad, Wagner and Knies.\(^{34}\) Veysey\(^{35}\) suggests that the lure of the German university can be attributed to two factors. First, there was the attraction of German laboratories, such as Wundt's at Leipzig. Secondly, and probably more important, the cost of living was fairly low in Germany. It was much cheaper to travel to and study in Germany than in any other European country.

The university increasingly took on the structure of its environment, particularly the business environment. A university administration was established whose responsibilities included management and planning. The university was becoming secularized. The clergy lost their places of moral and intellectual leadership. The power of the clergy faded and they were replaced by bankers, merchants, industrialists and railroad people.

The university presidents also exemplified the secular trend in higher education. The new college president was cosmopolitan. Andrew
D. White, Cornell's first president, as a youth rebelled against being forced into a church college. Daniel Coit Gilman of Johns Hopkins had been a geography professor at Yale, while President Eliot of Harvard was originally a chemistry professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. G. Stanley Hall of Clark University was a psychologist. David S. Jordan of Stanford was a biologist, and F. A. P. Bernard of Columbia was a professor of chemistry and mathematics.36

While Gilman was at Johns Hopkins, T. H. Huxley spoke at the university's launching. In 1886, Harvard abolished compulsory chapel, while Columbia followed suit in 1891. That such things would have occurred when the clergy ran the universities is extremely doubtful.

As business management and planning increased in importance, the board of trustees also became secularized. Positions on the board became filled by wealthy capitalists rather than religious leaders. The university, like a business, was to be efficient.

The endowments which the university received also facilitated seminars. The faculty was now called upon by the university to do research and publish. These faculty members would gather their graduate students in a seminar in order to discuss the practical problems of the period. As the university adopted a more and more practical role, it, in turn, expanded the role of its faculty. The faculty's tasks were differentiated and specialized, and in order to accomplish their tasks graduate students were utilized. Increased funding made such graduate seminars possible.

The new organizational features of the university reflected the business world which surrounded it. As money came into the university
from wealthy business persons, the university adopted a business model of operation. Within such an environment any critique of American institutions was severely limited. As the university came to rely on business capital it began to appeal to business interests. Such appeals did not include criticism of the capitalist enterprise from within its walls. The image of the university became something to protect. As the university sought to ensure its public respect, it engaged in public relations campaigns. In effect, the university wanted to develop a reputation as a citadel of respectability. Such a stance would not alienate the business world and thus the funds would neither be curtailed nor eliminated.

It was in this setting that social science and sociology emerged. Social science associations developed at the same time as the changes in higher education discussed in this section occurred. These associations were subject to the same influences and constraints as were operating on higher education.
C. The Rise of Social Science

Reflecting a concern with humanitarian reform and science, social science has both academic and non-academic antecedents. It is linked both with moral philosophy in academia and with reform activity outside academia before the Civil War. Following the Civil War the reform movement appeared in four principle forms. First, it appeared in a religious form guided by the settlement house movement, the social gospel movement and Christian Socialism. The reform movement's other three forms were more secularly oriented. One of these secular forms had its basis in political organizations. Farmers and skilled and semi-skilled workers, who were among the first to suffer because of economic expansion and centralization, joined together in organizations such as the Grangers (or Patrons of Husbandry) and the Knights of Labor. Farmers combined to win more favorable interest rates, while labor fought for factory inspection, better working conditions, and a better wage. The two remaining secular forms of the reform movement had their bases in 1) literature and journalism; e.g., muckraking, and 2) organized relief, charities, philanthropy and academic social science.

Following the Civil War the academic and non-academic antecedents of modern social science were united to some extent in social science associations. The beginnings of social science associations have been thoroughly researched by Mary Furner. She reports that the process can be traced back at least as far as 1851. In this year, Massachusetts established a Board of Alien Commissioners in order to deal with the rising tide of immigration, which they felt often resulted in problems...
of illness, indigence, poverty, and crime. Shortly thereafter, various separate relief agencies began to proliferate. This proliferation continued until 1862 when Samuel Gridley Howe proposed the creation of a Board of State Charities to coordinate the activities of these separate agencies.

Stemming from the Board of State Charities and from the more general concern for social amelioration, the American Social Science Association (ASSA) was created in 1865. This association was founded on the belief that a problem could be solved once the proper data had been gathered. Essentially, knowledge was conceptualized as power. This association concerned itself with what it saw as poor people's problems—sanitation, relief, employment, education, crime and insanity. Concern was with combining advocacy (reform) and objectivity (the proper information). It was basically a lay organization set up to meet the problems of an increasingly urban world. From 1865 to 1885, the ASSA alone represented the diverse interests of American social science. It was governed by two distinct impulses—the urge to reform and the quest for knowledge. The association remained active from 1865 until 1909 when it lost its vitality because of the rise of professional academic social science. With considerable justification, the ASSA can be said to be the parent of such professional organizations as the American Historical Association (1884), the American Economic Association (1885), the American Psychological Association (1892) and the American Sociological Society (1905).

As Haskell describes it, many ASSA members were motivated by profoundly conservative impulses. They wished to defend cherished
traditional values. The ASSA tried to defend authority, to institutionalize sound opinion and to properly guide the concerned. It was neither a mass nor a proletarian movement, but rather, it was an instrument of conservative piecemeal reform which gave a platform to the college educated gentry of the late 19th century United States. Emerging in an atmosphere of moral uncertainty, to which Darwinism and the historical criticism of the Bible contributed substantially, it was not only a movement of lay amateurs, but it was also basically a group of middle and upper-class people attempting to deal with what they saw as lower-class problems. (In Furner's words, "ASSA competence was a product of individual character and class privilege, not esoteric knowledge or technical skill beyond the reach of the laymen."^{40}) ASSA also provided a vehicle for the dissemination of work in social science, the *Journal of Social Science*, which was its annual publication.

Much of ASSA's leadership came from Frank Sanborn who was its secretary for more than 30 years. Sanborn's dislike of formalism and formal organization was imparted to the ASSA. This lack of formality led, in part, to the organization's demise. Sanborn was also instrumental in bringing social science to the university, since he frequently gave lectures at Cornell in the mid-1880's.

In Furner's *Advocacy and Objectivity*,^{41} the ASSA is depicted as having lost out to an academic elite who came to dominate the study of society. Amateur social science declined as academic professionalism grew. ASSA lacked cohesion and a clearly defined constituency. As professionalization advanced, objectivity was demanded. Faith in the new scientific method was proclaimed. The new professionals adopted
the conservatism of their predecessors as a move was made to so-called technical expertise. Social science academics maintained that social science should be practiced by professionals only; i.e., only those who possessed formal graduate training. These academics quickly developed a professional subculture, complete with sophisticated concepts of a technical vocabulary which required special knowledge. This subculture also included a network of communication carried through their own journals. Gradually, the ASSA was pushed aside and virtually eliminated by its more professional competition.

Among the many professional organizations to which the ASSA gave rise was the American Economic Association (AEA) formed in 1885. Economics thus became differentiated from general social science. Oberschall describes the AEA as the result of a confrontation between older advocates of laissez-faire and younger, ethically committed and melioristically-oriented German-trained economists who were critical of the status-quo and frequently sympathized with labor, the farmer and the consumer. One of the leaders of the new AEA was German-trained Richard Ely. Ely was opposed by the old-guard, laissez-faire economists, including William Graham Sumner. Sumner and his friends attempted to discredit the new economics calling it, among other things, unscientific. Interestingly, Sumner tried to keep the struggle out of the papers and within academics only. In fact, as Furner points out, Sumner quietly wanted to purge the discipline of all "irresponsible elements." In turn, Ely wanted to eliminate the "Sumner crowd" from the profession, and he helped set up the AEA in order to do so. Essentially then, one group, the AEA, advocated reform, while the older guard stood for laissez-faire.
D. The Emergence of Sociology as a Discipline and Profession

Interestingly, the ideological rift revealed in economics with the founding of the American Economics Association by no means disappeared during the next two decades and, indeed, was apparently important in the eventual differentiation and emergence of sociology and the American Sociological Society (later Association). Initially excluded, conservative and laissez-faire economists gradually affiliated with the AEA until by the late 1890s and early 1900s the reform-oriented members again felt threatened and became restive in the association. Although it is true that not all early sociologists were academics or if academic, economists, many of them had been and also were members of the American Economics Association. (Small's article on "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States" argues that the ASS broke from the AEA because the latter neglected the fundamental issue of probing into the deeper nature of society, its resources, and its needs.) The organization of sociology and sociologists was first raised as a possibility by C. W. A. Veditz of George Washington University in 1905 and considered at a rump session of the AEA meetings of that year. The ASS held its first meeting at Providence, Rhode Island, on December 27-29, 1906. It continued to meet with the AEA, the AHA, and the American Statistical Association until at least 1920.

Significantly, the character of the men who were ASS's official leaders (i.e., its presidents) also reflect in a sense the peculiar association of lay and academic, practical-instrumental and abstract-intellectual interests involved in sociology itself. Like the American
Social Science Association which was its ultimate derivation, the ASS represented a peculiar blend of concerns with practical, concrete social reform or amelioration, especially with urban social conditions envisaged as problems, and the adoption of a(n ostensibly) scientific stance towards (American) society as the context of such problems. Every one of the early presidents of the ASS was an academic: Lester Frank Ward (though only later in his life), William Graham Sumner, Franklin Henry Giddings, Albion Woodbury Small, Edward Alsworth Ross, Charles Horton Cooley, Frank Blackmar, James Q. Dealey, Charles A. Ellwood, John M. Gillette, Edward Cary Hayes, George E. Howard, Albert Galloway Keller, James P. Lichtenberger, W. I. Thomas, George E. Vincent, and Ulysses G. Weatherly. (And in a broad sense they all testify to the fact that the rise of sociology to prominence at the end of the 19th and the early part of the 20th century was due to sociology's association with higher education.) Nevertheless, the writings of such early sociologists reflected a pervasive concern with social activism and the various segments of the broader humanitarian reform movement (its more religious sector as represented by the social gospel and Christian socialist developments, its more secular segments of literary social criticism and muckraking journalism, more specifically oriented economic-occupational and political organizations, and the charities, philanthropic relief, and social science sectors).

Admittedly, efforts at classification of the courses of early sociology did not always fully reveal the import of the social reform interest, e.g., Bernard's 1909 survey of the teaching of sociology. Early volumes of the American Journal of Sociology, which originated in 1895 in the
University of Chicago's Department of Sociology, do bespeak the pre-occupation with social problems and reform. For instance, the AJS, during its first years of publication, contained a considerable proportion of articles (approximately 25%) devoted to corrections and charities. (In fact, members of Hull House in Chicago were frequent contributors to the journal.) In addition, a conspicuous amount of space was devoted to Christian and biblical sociology.

Indeed, religion appears to have been fairly important in the social backgrounds of early sociologists as represented by the presidents of the American Sociological Society just listed (above). Hinkle and Hinkle document this point.

. . . Lester F. Ward's maternal grandfather and Franklin H. Giddings' and William I. Thomas' fathers had been ministers; William G. Sumner, Albion W. Small, George E. Vincent, Edward C. Hayes, James P. Lichtenberger, Ulysses G. Weatherly and John L. Gillin had themselves had earlier ministerial careers.45

These men grew to maturity at a time when Protestantism still dominated the religious and ethical life of the country.

The vast majority of these early sociologists also came from small town and rural environments. Hinkle and Hinkle write, "Of the nineteen presidents of the American Sociological Society who had been born prior to 1880, who had completed their graduate studies before 1910, and who achieved some prominence before 1920, not one had experienced a typically urban childhood."46

This recurrent combination of a rural background with religious upbringing and/or training provided a major part of the framework within which a large number of early American sociologists grounded their in-
interpretations of contemporary social problems.

The only exception to an otherwise complete rural, religious background was Charles Horton Cooley. Cooley's upbringing was more urban than his contemporaries. Cooley was an upper-class son of a Michigan Supreme Court justice. In addition religion or religious training does not appear to have been a major factor for Cooley or his family.

However, it is also evident that early sociologists were not religious in the fundamentalist sense of that term. Their earlier convictions had become compatible with a strong espousal of naturalism and science.

Early sociologists were enthusiastically devoted to developing their field as a science because they believed that as a science their discipline could contribute to progress in America. In particular, it could do so by aiding in the solution of the so-called social problems in which the earlier social science movement had had such a profound interest. But in order to intervene effectively in the affairs of society—for that is what such social problems solutions would require—they held that a broad scientific knowledge of the very nature of society itself was required. And except for Summer, early sociologists were melioristic interventionists. Reform could be effective only if it were based on science, i.e., scientific knowledge, which in turn presupposed a naturalistic view of social phenomena.

Characteristically, early sociologists did conceive of social phenomena as part of nature and thus as subject to natural laws. According to Giddings, sociology was to discover the causes of social phenomena and demonstrate the existence and operation of laws of social
phenomena. Sumner and Keller declared that the regularities of social forces constitute natural laws because 1) they come into action whenever conditions are fulfilled which are established in the nature of things, and 2) they follow an unchangeable sequence in all times and places for all human beings. Small wrote that sociology endeavors to formulate laws of present and past correlation and sequence.

Consistent with this endeavor to make sociology a science capable of formulating (natural) laws of social phenomena, most sociologists adhered to a basically positivistic methodological stance. Positivism, which claims that the methods, procedures, and techniques of the physical and biological sciences should become the basis for the study of social phenomena, was most wholeheartedly endorsed by Giddings. He argued that science involved a common method of observation, classification and inductive generalization through statistics. Sociology was to be concerned with the common, recurrent and persistent features of social life. Sumner and Keller also viewed science as containing a common method of observation, comparison and generalization. Small urged that sociology attempt to explain the universal in social relations.

Cooley, although he accepted naturalism, did not commit himself to a positivist methodological stance. Instead, Cooley maintained an explicit humanistic methodological stance. He remarked that the social sciences could not circumscribe and test themselves by the canons of physical and psychological science. Cooley believed that certain aspects of human conduct were not directly accessible to observation, since people act from inner motives which are not open to direct obser-
vation. Cooley rejected the notion of science as direct observation and direct measurement. For Cooley, positivism was inapplicable to the human social domain.

Early American sociology was characterized not only by certain epistemological and methodological positions, but also by certain major substantive (or social ontological) commitments and assumptions, whose nature must be identified if the prevailing attitudes toward Marx and Marxism are to become understandable and explicable. Perhaps most basic is the evolutionary naturalism of early American sociology (and sociologists). Its general tenets held that:

1) social phenomena can be explained naturalistically rather than supernaturalistically.

2) social phenomena can be accounted for in terms of other more basic phenomena and of which social phenomena gradually arise. This notion involves a conception of the genetic filiation of phenomena, each rising from some more general and basic level.

3) social phenomena, social structure and social change are adaptations to the conditions of existence. (This aspect reflects Darwinism and Spencerian influence.)

In the general view of evolutionary naturalism, it is most important that social phenomena constitute a domain in nature and most especially a sphere or realm of appropriate forces—the social forces. Indeed, the concept of social forces which predominated in early American sociology, is an acknowledgement to sociology's indebtedness to the natural sciences, particularly physics and biology with their
notions of physical and organic forces. Social forces were the analogues of those forces studied by the natural sciences. Social forces were to be studied naturalistically and scientifically, in such a way as to reveal regularities or laws. These forces were the basic wants, needs, instincts, interests, feelings, sentiments, wishes, desires, or motives of humankind. The doctrine of social forces was the core notion in early sociologists' efforts to deal with the fundamental substantive problems of social or societal origins, structure, and change.

In addition, evolutionary naturalism also involves the incorporation of certain of the basic views of Darwin and Spencer in the study of social phenomena. Stated simply, human association was explained by all the early sociologists as an effective adaptation to the conditions of existence. Social structure and social change were said to depend on the nature of the conditions of existence. Society originated and persisted because it facilitated survival. Yet societies were seen as the outcome of an evolution which permits individuals to operate voluntaristically. The group or society is an outcome of choice on the parts of its individual members (voluntaristic nominalism).

Within the overall context of evolutionary naturalism three subsidiary orientations of early American sociology can be identified. 54

1) behavioristic - materialism
2) interactionistic - idealism
3) intermediate position.

At the outset it must be stated that early American sociologists were social dualists ontologically. Social reality was based on matter and mind. Identifying subsidiary orientations must be stated in
terms of this prevailing social dualism.

The behavioristic - materialist position was adopted by Sumner and Keller. External, objective, observable behavior takes precedence over internal, subjective, nonobservable consciousness. Sumner and Keller conceived social phenomena as consisting of collective, mass or multi-individual behaviors; e.g., folkways and mores.

Behavior was envisaged as having its use and persistence essentially as a form of matter, matter in motion, force, or forces-in-motion. Behavior was regarded as a relatively immediate response to a biopsychic human nature or force in relation to the other types of forces which are characteristic of the objects in the environment.

The interactionistic - idealist position is represented by Small, Cooley and Ross. Social reality is construed as having its source primarily in the mind, soul, or consciousness. Priority is given to the internal, subjective, and nonobservable. As with behavioristic - materialism, this position views structure and change as involving conflict. This conflict, however, is not phrased within a Darwinian perspective, but rather within a broader dialectical scheme. Conflict does not deteriorate into struggle as there is always a potential for rational consensus via choice. Choice or individual autonomy (voluntarism) is never undermined.

A more intermediate position between behavioristic - materialism and interactionistic - idealism is represented by Ward and Giddings. Both men viewed the social as being derived from the physical or material realm; however, both viewed the social as decisively psychic. Each emphasized conflict as the behavioristic - materialists did, how-
ever their formulations (like the interactionist-idealists) allowed for a more complex interplay of processes which affect structure and change. Both construed structure and change as involving the exercise of freedom and choice. Indeed, all three orientations adhere to the position of voluntaristic nominalism which endorses the individual's freedom of choice.

Most early American sociologists adopted an individualistic conception of society, the nature of which depends on the consciousness and wills of a plurality of individuals—as opposed to the emergence of a new sui generis reality through interaction or association. In fact, this voluntaristic nominalism is perhaps the most persistent feature of American sociology. It is described as:

...the assumption that the structure of all social groups is the consequence of the aggregate of all its separate, component individuals and that social phenomena ultimately derive from the motivations of those knowing, feeling, and willing individuals.55

Ross, Small and Cooley are illustrative. Ross argued that society must be conceptualized as a consensus of minds, from which the separate loci of awareness do not disappear. For Ross, society was "a kind of fiction." Society was not a being but just people in their collective capacity.56 Similarly, Small conceived the group as a combination of persons, a collection of individuals who interact with one another. In this interaction the autonomous individual is regarded as the center of choice, evaluation or judgement. All social action has its source in the separate wills of independent, concrete individuals.57 Finally, Cooley held that society is not "a thing by itself," and "that it is artificial to consider
society apart from individuals." Society, for Cooley, is thus a large number of individuals. 58

Conclusion

Because the era in which American sociology first arose and reacted to Marx and Socialism is considerably removed in the past and thus at best only fragmentarily known today, this chapter has examined the various major contexts within which the discipline of sociology emerged in the late nineteenth century U. S. Thus, the chapter simultaneously provides a background orientation to the first of the two major problems of the dissertation and contributes data potentially useful to the resolution of the second.

Following the Civil War, the structure of American society was significantly altered by the impact of immigration, urbanization and industrialization. (Interestingly, these modifications were congruent with the types of change outlined in Marxist theory.) In the years 1890 to 1920 (roughly the time period under consideration), some eighteen million new immigrants—especially from Eastern and Southern Europe—arrived in the United States. Most of them settled in the urban north and provided the pool of manpower required for the expansion of industry. They formed part of (what Marx had termed) the industrial reserve army for capitalism—a force which was further enlarged by virtue of the technological improvements in agriculture that compelled farmworkers to seek employment away from the farm.

Industrialization and urbanization were, of course, associated with
immigration. Factory production assumed increased importance as mechanization and mass production developed rapidly. By the turn of the century, the United States had become one of the leading industrial powers in the world. And by 1910 approximately forty per cent of the American population had come to live in cities.

Concurrently, capitalist industry enlarged and (became) concentrated. The invention of new and improved means of transportation and communication facilitated expansion of the market permitting American products to compete nationally and internationally. State laws generalized and standardized the requirements for incorporation and, accordingly, the corporation became more accessible legally as a form of enterprise (in addition to the single entrepreneurship and partnership). The post-Civil War period thus became an era of increasingly concentrated and centralized corporate capitalism as thousands of firms disappeared and merger capitalization totalled over a billion dollars.

Such infrastructural changes in American society occurred in relation to a superstructure of persisting values which conjointly defined certain social conditions and problems and provided the framework for their solutions. The circumstances of the urban poor became the core of (what are now termed) "social problems." Appropriate solutions could be formulated only in terms which did not substantially question or violate private property, formal political democracy, the sanctity of the individual (and related individualism), and gradualist reformism.

Significantly, social science and sociology arose out of a distinctive movement seeking to combine a commitment to science and a devotion
to social reform. The broad effort at social reform was itself a reflection of the linkage of (the values of) optimism about the future (or progress), the beneficence of knowledge (as expressed in science), and humanitarianism as a stance toward the unfortunate. But sociology itself emerged in the U. S. as part of the developing structure of the post-Civil War university.

The rise of the university, as the dominant system of higher education, occurred as surplus capital became available. The university became increasingly specialized and professionalized in response to the structure of its environment, particularly the business environment.

American sociology from its beginnings, was a professional and university phenomenon. Growing out of a more amateur social science association, part of which was incorporated in higher education, early American sociology grew with and benefitted from the post Civil War rise of the modern university. The rural and religious backgrounds of the early American sociologists are reflected in the sociologies which they developed (scientism and evolutionary naturalism were conspicuous features). By virtue of the organizational characteristics of higher education, within which sociology operated, sociologists were deterred from articulating basic critiques of American institutions.
Notes to Chapter 2

1. The following figures were taken from the first section of the second chapter of Roscoe C. Hinkle's forthcoming *The Founding Theory of American Sociology 1881-1915*.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.


9. Ibid., p. 15.

10. Ibid., p. 19.


15. Ibid., p. 11.


17. Ibid., p. 415.
18. Ibid., p. 417.
21. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 401.
25. Ibid., p. 409.
30. Ibid., pp. 40-49.
31. Ibid., pp. 50-55.
32. Ibid., p. 64.
34. Ibid., p. 584.


44. Its organization is described in an official report in the *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 21, 6 (May, 1916), pp. 774-776.


52. These general tenets have been delineated by Roscoe Hinkle and can be found in his forthcoming work, *The Founding Theory of American Sociology 1881-1915*.


54. *Ibid.*, 113-120. Much of the following discussion relies on data contained in these pages.


57. *Ibid*.

Chapter 3

The Character of the Reactions of Early American Sociologists to Karl Marx

This chapter provides the basic data for addressing the central problem of the dissertation. But before the data on early sociologists' reactions to Marx can be examined, several important preliminary issues must be confronted. First, it is necessary to identify the kinds of sources for the data of the reactions. Second, the paucity of footnotes and bibliographical references in the writings of the early sociologists requires that advance consideration be given to the determination of whether the socialism in question is Marxist as opposed to non-Marxist. Third, it is useful to have some initial indication of the significance of the concern with Marx and Marxist socialism in early American sociology as disclosed by the extent and frequency of appropriate references. And finally, it is imperative to develop and legitimate some method for generalizing the presentation of the actual reactions. For this purpose, a system of categorization is offered and justified.
A. Some Preliminary Issues and Considerations

As indicated in the first chapter, the sources of the early sociologists' reactions to Marx (which are relatively accessible) are contained in publications (both books and periodicals) from the past. Many of them are the works of the early presidents of the American Sociological Society: Ward, Sumner, Giddings, Ellwood, Cooley, Ross, and Small. (The reasoning behind their selection was explained in Chapter One.) Their articles in the American Journal of Sociology and their contributions in the Publications of the American Sociological Society are also considered. Curiously, many historians of sociology, for whatever reasons, seem to ignore the American Journal of Sociology, even though it was the only professional means of communication available during the time period of this study.

However, the study of the reactions of early American sociologists to Marx and Marxian Socialism is not confined only to the works of these seven sociologists. Articles, reviews, or notes of anyone—whether self-identified or professionally identified as a sociologist or not—are included in this inquiry. Each of the twenty-five volumes appearing in the time period of 1895 to 1920 has been consulted. Besides the work of the seven sociologists already identified, the work of the following has also been included: William Giles, James E. Hagerty, Shailer Mathews, Paul Monroe, Selig Perlman, John Spargo and O. Thon.

A second preliminary problem arises in connection with the identification of reactions to Marx or Marxian Socialism. Because early American sociologists rarely provided footnote or bibliographical references in their writings and because non-Marxist Socialisms had existed in American society, it becomes difficult to determine whether Marxist or non-Marxist
Socialisms are being addressed. Without adequate references it is diffi-
cult to decide what is a reaction to Marx and Marxian socialism and what
is a reaction to a socialism which derives from a non-Marxist source, such
as the Christian socialism of Richard Ely or the single tax socialism of
Henry George. A review of the literature shows that in a number of cases
this problem is minimized because Marx is explicitly identified. In most
cases this does not mean that one of Marx's works was mentioned, for this
was rare; rather, it generally means that he was referred to by name.
However, there were a few cases in which some of Marx's work was referred
to as well as his name being mentioned. A good example of this latter
instance is Ellwood's article entitled, "Marx's Economic Determinism in
the Light of Modern Psychology." Yet such examples are rare. The much
more common occurrence is that in which Marx is merely referred to by
name without any source being mentioned. This is exemplified by Franklin
Henry Giddings' *Democracy and Empire* in which Marx's work is referred to
as ponderous, although no specific work is cited.

There are other clearcut cases in the literature. However, in these
instances the early American sociologists were addressing a socialism of
the non-Marxist variety. An example of this non-Marxist socialism is
Christian socialism. Christian socialism was a movement centered origi-
nally in New England. It espouses social cooperation through spiritual
forces which emphasized personality over all material conditions and the
effectiveness of other than economic motives. Like Marxian socialism,
the goal of Christian Socialism was a collectivist society, however, the
methods needed to achieve this goal were significantly different. The
notions of class struggle and materialism were rejected.
socialists proposed to accomplish their goals through love and providence. Their emphasis was entirely spiritual rather than materialistic. Christian socialists claimed that the processual mechanism of social change lay outside of history and that life had a purpose. Marx, on the other hand, located this mechanism completely within history; purpose was to be discarded as irrelevant and non-existent. An example of an explicit reference to Christian socialism is Paul Monroe's discussion of it in the first volume of AJS.3

Finally, there are those cases in which socialism is mentioned but there is no explicit reference to Marx nor to any other particular type of socialism. In these instances reliance must be placed on indirect indicators such as whether or not Marxist categories, terminology or phraseology are utilized (e.g., proletariat, bourgeoisie, class, class struggle, contradiction, concentration, exploitation, surplus value, etc.). If Marxist parlance is used, one can conclude, with some degree of certainty, that the topic or the source of the passage was Marx. Admittedly there are several points in the data in which no determination can be made as to whether Marx is being considered or not. Yet in most cases a conclusion can be reached. Indeed, I assert that in the vast majority of cases, when socialism was being discussed (and Marx was not mentioned by name) Marx and Marxism were being indirectly addressed. The writings of William Graham Sumner provide substantiation for this point. Although Sumner, like Marx, was an ontological materialist who accepted the notion that the social rests upon an economic material base, he can be classified as decidedly non-Marxist. Such a stance, I believe, is illustrated in his writing even though he wrote on socialism in general and never men-
tioned Marx by name. In his essay, "What is the Proletariat," which was published in The Independent (October 28, 1886), Sumner wrote that the "bourgeoisie has no application to American society." I conclude here that Sumner was attempting to refute Marx. In the article and in the title, explicit reference is made to Marxian terminology. The article contains no terms from the conceptual apparatus of Christian socialism, such as Jesus, cooperation or providence. Giddings' essay "Absolute Communism" also makes reference to Marx without explicitly naming him. It appears that Giddings was taking issue with the Marxist notion of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" when he wrote that if the proletariat came to rule, men of inferior ability would have taken control.

In the presentation which follows in this chapter, it will be shown that a prevailing view of Marx was that he was an economic determinist who had an economic interpretation of history. Often when someone was arguing against this economic interpretation, Marx was specifically mentioned. In fact, he was the only person explicitly identified with such a position. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that when an early American sociologist, such as Ellwood or Cooley, critiques the "economic interpretation of history" a critique of Marx is also being offered even though he may not be mentioned by name.

Of course, a clear distinction cannot be made in each and every case. However, it is the conclusion of this author that in the majority, perhaps the overwhelming majority, of cases references to socialism or socialistic ideas were also references to Marx and Marxist ideas.

Third, it is useful to have some initial indication of the significance of the concern with Marx and Marxist socialism in early American sociology.
as disclosed by the extent and frequency of appropriate references. Put simply, the discussions of Marx and socialism occupy only a very small place in the publications of early sociology. Marx was rarely mentioned and his literature was even more rarely cited. And even when he was specifically mentioned, his ideas were given very brief consideration.

Previous researchers indicate a virtual or complete absence of references by Ward to Marx or Marxist literature. Scott maintains that Ward referred to Marx by name only once in his voluminous writings. Calhoun argues that Ward never cited any of the Marxian literature. My research substantiates Calhoun's assertion; however, I did locate one more reference to Marx's name than Scott did. Ward, in all of his writings, never provided any proof in the form of a footnote or bibliographical citation that he had read Marx. He referred to him by name only twice. Thus, Ward all but ignored Marx's work in his writings.

Although the central topic of several of Sumner's works was socialism, he provided little proof that he had ever read any socialist literature. Calhoun maintains that Sumner never cited any of Marx's writings. Actually, his literature contains one citation of Marxist literature, but it is a brief passing citation of Das Kapital. Sumner did not make any references to Marx by name in his writings.

Giddings' references to Marx were rare. In all of his writings, he referred to Marx only six times. Giddings' text Studies in the Theory of Human Society contains three references to Marx; two of them are quite brief and the third is a little more extensive. His Civilization and Society contains one brief reference to Marx as does Inductive Sociology and Democracy and Empire. No other works by Giddings contain any refer-
ences to Marx. In addition, Giddings never cited any of Marx's work nor did he ever list Marx in a bibliography.

In contrast to Giddings, Ellwood did make reference to Marxian literature. Ellwood's work includes references to the *Communist Manifesto*, *Critique of Political Economy* and to the letters of Frederick Engels. Ellwood, who studied under Small, Schmoller and Wagner, is labelled by Calhoun as early American sociology's most systematic critic of Marx. Calhoun has remarked about Ellwood that his anti-Marxist bias, doubtless fortified by a religious and later a pacifist bent, led him to do critical work which gives evidence of thorough familiarity with the sources. References to Marx can be found scattered throughout Ellwood's work, particularly in his articles in *AJS*.

Unlike Ellwood, Cooley's work contains no references to any of Marx's writings. Except for a couple of allusions to Marx in his texts Cooley's work has little in common with Marxist thought. Similarly Ross' comments on Marx are few and far between and, as will be shown later, the few references he does make to Marx are generally sarcastic and stereotypic in tone.

Small evidenced at least some familiarity with Marx. He commented on Marx at greater length in his *AJS* articles than he did in his texts. His references to Marx in both articles and texts, however, are infrequent. In *General Sociology*, he briefly alludes to Marx twice. Other brief references to Marx can be found in *An Introduction to the Study of Society* (once), *Origins of Sociology* (twice) and *Adam Smith and Modern Sociology* (three times). As I have said, Small's references to Marx in *AJS* are more frequent (but still infrequent) and not as brief. In addition, he refers
to socialism more often in AJS than in his books, having reviewed several socialist works. I could not ascertain exactly whom Small includes in "the socialists," because he mentions that he knows not all socialists agree with Marx. In fact, he encourages them not to be revolutionists. Also, Small once referred to Proudhon although there is no evidence to suggest that he ever read him. Small is the only figure I uncovered who taught a course specifically on Marx. A few others taught courses on socialism but none of them offered a course specifically on Marx.

Generally speaking references to Marx within books, PASS, and AJS during the years 1895 to 1920 can best be described as very infrequent. PASS, which began publication in 1907, was actually a publication of some of the papers and discussions of the annual meetings of ASS. I did not find any reference to Marx's writings in the first 15 volumes. In volume 14, I found Marx's name for the first time. This volume covered the 1919 ASS meeting in Chicago. Here, Selig Perlman referred to Marx once in the presentation of his paper, "Bolshevism and Democracy."

Relative to other concerns and topics listed in its pages, the same statement can also be made for AJS: it has very little concerning Marx in its pages. I have commented on the few references in AJS in discussing the sociologies of Ward, Sumner, Giddings, Ellwood, Cooley, Ross and Small. Although AJS rarely contained any references to Marx and socialism, the same cannot be said of religion. Within the pages of the first 25 volumes of AJS, an immense amount of space is devoted to religion. The Bible is footnoted and cited much more than all of Marx's work combined. In the first two volumes alone, Shailer Mathews authored eight articles on "Christian Sociology."
I could not discern any shift in the emphasis of early American sociology over time. That is to say, there appears to be no appreciable difference in the frequency of quoting or referring to Marx's ideas during the time period of this study. The years 1915 to 1920 evidence just as little reaction to Marx's ideas as the years 1895 to 1900 do.

Finally, one last problem remains to be confronted before the actual reactions can be examined. It involves the presentation of the reactions, for the mode of presentation can render them more or less meaningful or meaningless. If the reactions appear as a series of discrete statements of separate, individual sociologists, they will likely seem less meaningful rather than more meaningful. Consequently, some means for typifying and thus generalizing the (presentation of the) reactions appears desirable. In turn, such a typology of reactions can presumably facilitate the development of explanation which is to be undertaken in the next chapter.

Perhaps the simplest and least distorting expedient is to classify the raw data of reactions as positive, indifferent, and negative. Admittedly, such categorization may seem somewhat arbitrary. But by allocating the raw data to such categories, it becomes possible to ascertain with greater precision the amount and tone of the response which early American sociology displayed to Marx and his views. Generalization of the reception of Marx's ideas does become possible.

Although such an approach will allow for greater analytical clarity, it will also present a methodological problem. Some reactions are positive and negative at the same time. For instance, Albion Small in "Socialism in the Light of Social Science" praised Marx's candor, courage and intellect and then stated that he did not think Marx added one single
formula to social science. In "coding" this reaction I would divide it in half, putting part of it in the positive category (the praise of Marx's candor etc.) and part of it in the negative category (Marx did not add a single formula to social science). Yet, by taking this action, I am breaking up Small's thought. Overall, I feel the precision and clarity gained by such an exercise outweighs its disadvantages and thus justifies its utilization.

For the purpose of this study, a positive reaction is considered to be any reaction which: 1) is in agreement with Marx's stated ideas; or 2) appears to approve of Marx's view of social reality or his thinking in general.

It is difficult to provide an example of the positive reaction to Marx, for such responses are quite rare in early American sociology. The example previously taken from Small's writings will be used. In complimenting Marx on his courage, candor and intellect, Small is making a positive reference to Marx and to his thinking in general. Thus such a response would be classified as positive.

An indifferent response is one which neither approves nor rejects, agrees nor disagrees with Marx. It is a neutral statement concerning Marx, presented in a non-distorted manner, which does not attempt to make a qualitative judgement one way or the other. An example of an indifferent response can be found in Giddings' Inductive Sociology in which he merely indicates that Marx is concerned with cause. Giddings is correct here in stating that Marx was concerned with cause; yet in this passage, Giddings makes no attempt to either substantiate or refute Marx's views on the topic of causality.
A negative reaction will be considered to be any reaction which:
1) is in disagreement with Marx; or 2) rejects and/or attempts to refute Marx's view of social reality or his thinking in general.

The negative reaction is unquestionably the modal response. The overwhelming number of reactions to Marx are in this category. Such a reaction is illustrated by George Herbert Mead's presentation of Marx delivered in his review of LeBon's *The Psychology of Socialism*.

It is evident at once where socialism comes in. It is a late gospel according to Marx, by which a bridge is laid between the race impulse and the demand for individual life and gratification. The promise of revenge upon the hated rich, the equalization of fortunes that is to bring comfort and gratification in this world, if not in the next, reconciles the crowd and the disaffected man to immediate life. It is a new religion—but a dangerous one; for its realization is laid in this world and calls for the torch, the guillotine, and the dagger.24

Such a response is negative for it is disapproving (Marxism is labelled a "religion" and is referred to as "dangerous"); and it is set forth in a tone which suggests disagreement.

Although three analytical categories are provided in order to classify early American sociology's reactions to Marx, this should not obscure the fact that, for the most part, Marx was ignored. Comments concerning Marx and his thinking are relatively infrequent in the time period under study. Thus what is being categorized is actually a very small part of the work of early American sociologists.
B. Specifications of the Content of Reactions

With the use of the analytical scheme it becomes possible to identify the specific content of the reactions (positive, indifferent and negative). The positive reactions will be presented first, followed by the indifferent and then the negative ones.

Since so few positive comments or reactions were made in reference to socialism and Marx it is difficult, if not impossible, to sub-categorize them any further into any possible problem or issue—areas with which they may be linked. At times Small responded favorably to Marx, but it is difficult to present his position because his comments were inconsistent and paradoxical. His reaction to Marx and socialism was a mixture of damnation and praise of socialism; at times he heaped praise on socialism; at other times, he criticized it; and yet on still other occasions he both praised and criticized. In an AJS review of three socialist works published by C. H. Kerr and Company—Capitalism and Laborer and Modern Socialism by John Spargo, Socialism, Positive and Negative by Robert Pives LaMonte, and The Right to be Lazy by Paul Lafargue (Marx's son-in-law)—Small admits to "being warm" toward socialists and adds that he does not have to apologize for feeling this way. However, I must add this is the only positive thing he wrote because the rest of his review is quite critical.

There are other instances in which Small praised socialism. He credited socialism with paving the way for sociology. He also continually praised the socialists' zeal for reform, which he referred to as "the most wholesome ferment in modern society." Small (along with Vincent) wrote that sociology was the synthesis of the thesis of conventionality and the
antithesis of socialism.  

It must be reiterated that throughout Small's work, he seemed to compliment and criticize socialism at the same time. In "Socialism in the Light of Social Science" Small argued that the socialists were seriously intent on solving the problems of the day, but he then added that they attacked such problems with more zeal than discretion.

Small's attitude toward Marx was just as ambivalent as his attitude towards socialism in general. Although Small did not consider Marx to be a sociologist or a scientist, he hailed him as "one of the really great thinkers in the history of social science." Small argued that Marx was a victim of a conspiracy to distort and destroy his influence.

... his repute thus far has been that of every challenger of tradition. All the conventional, the world over, from the multitude of intellectual nonentities to thinkers whose failure to acknowledge in him more than a peer has seriously impeached their candor, have implicitly conspired to smother his influence by all the means known to obscuration. From outlawry to averted glances, every device of repression and misrepresentation has been employed against him. Up to the present time the appellate court of the world's sober second thought has not given him as fair a hearing as it has granted to Judas Iscariot ... men in dignified academic positions still refrain in public from giving Marx his due.

A figure who was disposed to present Marx in a more favorable light was John Spargo. Spargo pointed out that not all socialists should be considered Marxists, for some socialists considered Das Kapital a bible, which like all bibles was much quoted and little read. In other words, Marx was not a prophet, only a human who developed theories of political economy. Spargo also asserted that Marx was not a monistic, mechanistic materialist, a label no doubt abetted by his overzealous "followers."
Spargo maintained that Americans carried the notion of Marx as an economic fatalist to the most absurd lengths. He said that such a conception was "grotesquely stupid." Indeed, he said, it was a conception with which Marx himself would never have agreed.

The reactions which can be characterized as indifferent to Marx are even fewer in number than those which can be classified as positive. I have already mentioned one such indifferent reaction—that of Giddings' reference to Marx as contributing to the analysis of cause. Again, the number of identifiable reactions to Marx which can be labelled indifferent are too few to permit further sub-categorizations.

The only other indifferent reaction I could locate was Small's listing of the main planks of the Communist Manifesto in AJS. The planks were:

"1. Expropriation of land-owners and application of land rents to state expenses.
2. Rapid rate of progressive taxation.
3. Abolition of inheritance.
4. Confiscation of all property of all expatriates and rebels.
5. Centralization of credit in the hands of the state, by means of a national bank with state-owned capital and complete monopoly.
6. Centralization of the transporting system in the hands of the state.
7. Multiplication of national factories, instruments of production, and improvement of land not now under cultivation by a community plan.
8. Compulsory labor for all, with organization of industrial armies, especially for agriculture.
9. Merging of agriculture and manufacture, with aim at gradual re-
moval of the difference between city and country.

10. Public and gratuitous education of all children; abolition of factory labor in its present form. Combination of education with material production etc." 33

Such a listing leaves little doubt that Small read the Manifesto.

Unquestionably, the overwhelming majority of reactions to Marx fall into the negative category. These negative reactions can be sub-categorized into six sub-classifications: 1) Marx as unscientific; 2) Marx as a determinist; 3) Marx in error concerning class and class struggle; 4) Marx as dismissing the psychological realms; 5) Marx destroying individualism; and 6) Marx as attacking private property.
Scientific Inadequacy of Marx

Socialism and Marx were viewed by early American sociologists as scientifically inadequate. Quoting Samuel Chugerman, Ward's biographer, Calhoun\textsuperscript{34} points out that Ward "believed his sociology was irreconcilable with Marxism." Ward felt that Marx was a politician, not a scientist, and therefore, not a sociologist. In addition, Ward\textsuperscript{35} wrote that the arguments of socialism were not conclusive, consisting primarily of pure theory and a priori deduction. In \textit{Outlines of Sociology}, Ward\textsuperscript{36} argued that the social forces of the "collective mind" should be controlled scientifically in what he termed a sociocracy which was different from both socialism and individualism. Individualism, to Ward, created artificial inequalities, whereas socialism sought to create artificial equalities.

Sumner's views on socialism were even more severe. Although he never mentioned Marx by name, Sumner was never reticent about expressing his disapproval of socialism in general. During the 1870's, 1880's and early 1890's, Sumner attacked reformism, protectionism, socialism and interventionism in journals and lectures. His journal articles included "What Social Classes Owe to Each Other" (1883), "The Forgotten Man" (1883) and "The Absurd Effort to Make the World Over" (1894).

Sumner did not oppose socialism theoretically, but argued against it rhetorically and delivered a bastardized version of it in the process. He appears to have identified science with the description and explanation of natural law and natural order. He contended\textsuperscript{37} that socialists failed to realize that the social order was fixed by natural laws. In failing to appreciate what was natural, Sumner believed socialists created schemes which were anti-social and anti-civilizing. He argued that socialism could
never exist in the United States because it failed to realize that "man" competes with "man" in this country. He further added that socialists failed to see that society cannot be blamed for the burdens of the individual and that the fittest are those who successfully contend with such burdens.

Similarly, Ellwood argued that Marx and in particular his "materialistic conception of history," could not stand the test of severe scientific scrutiny. Thus, Marx and Marxism were labelled as unscientific. Ellwood wrote that the disproof of Marx could be found in the ethnographic and historical record. He believed Marx had no scientific warrant whatsoever.

Although Small occasionally reacted positively to Marx and Marxians, he was generally negative, some of whose ostensible bases were scientific inadequacy. He impugned socialism because it "phenomenally overestimates" the human power to forecast, has both scientific and neurotic sides, attacks problems with too much zeal, is insufficiently dispassionate (i.e., is overwhelmingly negative and insufficiently positive), and because it assumes what it should try to prove.

In brief, Small contended that Marx did not add "to social science a single formula which will be final in the terms in which he expressed it." Small's list of the primary concepts of sociology in his eight-part AJS article on "The Scope of Sociology" contains no mention of any Marxist terms such as proletariat, bourgeoisie, crisis, contradiction, class and class struggle. His "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States" also fails to refer in any way to Karl Marx. But he does single-out "the Marxians ... as dogmatic in their interpretation of all phenomena
as economic.\textsuperscript{43}

O. Thon rejected outright the notion of Marx as being scientific preferring to see Marx as a politician. In an \textit{AJS} article translated by Small entitled "The Present Status of Sociology in Germany," Thon describes Marx in unredeemingly negative terms:

\ldots for a person of somewhat delicate sensibility it is inordinately disgusting (sic) to see a purely theoretical question treated from the standpoint of a political party. The circumstances that Karl Marx was the author of this theory cannot be a sufficient ground in the minds of the upright scientific investigator for rejecting it without further thought, nor on the other hand, for establishing it as a dictum to which, according to the party programme, unlimited obedience must be paid. Philosophical theorems are more changeable and flexible than party programmes; they also give rise to less hatred and bitterness \ldots \textsuperscript{44}
Marx as a Mechanist and a Determinist

A second category of negative reactions to Marx is his interpretation as mechanistic, monistic and deterministic. Ross's obituary of Ward illustrates this reaction.

While many policies that are called 'socialistic' find their justification of Ward's philosophy of progress, he was no Marxist. He was quite as profound and original as Marx, and offered a more satisfying sociology. He declined to recognize changes in the technique of production as a prime motor of progress, nor was he willing to stress class struggle as Marx did. While attaching great importance to economic factors in history, he was no historical materialist. To him, not the better distribution of wealth, but the better distribution of knowledge is a first essential to social betterment. He insisted that unless the masses be lifted to a much higher plane of intelligence, human exploitation cast out in one form will creep back under another form...

Giddings also rejected the "Marxian materialistic interpretation," arguing that in endeavoring to account for everything by the functioning of property it makes mistaken and extravagant claims. In Giddings' estimation Marx was "the founder of a dogma as rigid as Calvin's Institutes."

Ellwood alleges that "the fallacy in the reasoning of Marx and those who uphold the materialistic conception of history is due to the over-abstraction of the economic from all other phases of the social life process." Interpretation of social life "in terms of any one of its phases or in terms of a single set of causes" is invalid and therefore an "economic interpretation of history" has "no scientific warrant."

Indeed, it has been in part because "Karl Marx and other students of economic conditions" have already given "undue prominence to economic factors, and perhaps even subordinate other factors altogether,"
that sociology arose "as a protest." Ellwood contended that Marx (and Hegel) was "quite out of accord" with the contemporary knowledge of human nature and human society accusing him of being fatalistic, absolutistic, revolutionary and one-sided.

Like Ellwood, Cooley construed Marxian socialism as an "economic determinism which looks upon the production of wealth and the competition for it as the process of which everything is the result." In contrast Cooley insists that he cannot see that the getting of food, or whatever else the economic activities may be defined to be, is any more the logical basis of existence than the ideal activities...

History is not a tangled skein which you may straighten out by getting hold of the right end and following it with sufficient persistence. It has no straightness, no merely lineal continuity... In the organic world—that is to say in real life—each function is a center from which causes radiate and to which they converge.

Small's negative treatment of Marx's historical materialism began in the first article of the first volume of _AJS_. In "The Era of Sociology," Small endorses Benjamin Kidd's reference to:

... Marx's view of modern society, and the theory of surplus value on which it is based... a view so utterly out of proportion, so evidently only partially true, and so clearly demonstrative at every point of the author's ignorance of the method of action in human society... that it can hardly have any prominent place.

0. Thon also dismissed Marx's historical materialism in _AJS_. In reference to the historical materialist dictum that it is not consciousness that determines the mode of existence, but the mode of existence which determines consciousness, Thon remarked, "The absurdity of this proposition is too evident too (sic) require proof." He also added, "It is not to be denied that historical materialism, with its stereotyped monism and its
soulless barrenness, is much less able to sustain criticism than its counterpart idealism, with its abundance of psychical motives and viewpoints. Thon contended that Marx's historical materialism was just plain wrong.

The fundamental principle of historical materialism—that economics is the basis upon which law erects itself as superstructure—is false. Economics and law are inseparably connected with each other, like substance and form... Karl Marx's picture of the foundation and the superstructure is consequently faulty.
Marx in Error Concerning Class and Class Struggle

Another basic disagreement early American sociologists had with Karl Marx revolved around the concepts of class, class conflict and class bipolarization. Unlike Marx, Ward maintained high hopes and a high regard for the middle class and its potential for bringing about constructive social change. He opposed schemes which divided society into only two major classes, feeling that the community depended on the middle element between the dichotomized classes. For Ward, the relationship to the means of production was not the ultimately determining factor in one's life; rather, it was the amount and type of education one possessed. This necessitated a redistribution of educational opportunities and resources, not a redistribution of wealth, for the latter would inevitably follow the former. Marx was thus incorrect in not locating the root of social conflict in the inequitable distribution of education.

In his essay, "Absolute Communism," Giddings wrote that if the proletariat came to rule, men of inferior ability would have to take control. Giddings deplored working class movements, insisting that any effort to improve the lot of the working class would upset "natural development." Democracy and Empire warns that in the absence of leadership by the nation's natural elite, the mass may lead the nation to socialism or communism, which he characterized as dangerous.

In Giddings' view, the primacy of class consciousness is to be repudiated. The allegiance to the nation is greater than that to any sub-group. Indeed, class consciousness is constrained by a larger consciousness of kind.

Ellwood also disagreed with the Marxian notion of class struggle.
Such conflict is the exceptional rather than the usual and predominant mode of behavior. Marx's error is not recognizing that society should and does rest on cooperation.

Like other Christian socialists and Christian sociologists, Paul Monroe separated himself from Marx. He characterized Marx as having an ill-conceived notion of class relations because cooperation had been repudiated.

Ross also objected to Marx's notion of class, class struggle and their implications. He objected to Marx's plan for a "classless, strifeless future under a collectivist regime" as an unrealistic utopia. Ross's position seemed to argue for too many disagreements within each class and too many agreements across classes to posit class struggle as "absolute" and unlimited "aggression" between two opposing "interest groups." Furthermore, he argues that "the proletariat has neither the will nor the strength to fight against the system." In addition, he insists in Social Control that even though the state in almost every instance began with one group suppressing another as an instrument of the ruling class, it has become increasingly directed by the common will.

For his part, Small holds that for Marx "the scientific investigator" the sharp distinction between the laboring class and the capitalist class "was the most fatal mistake." Although Marx was correct in asserting the significance of class conflict as part of the formulation of "the primary sociological generalization of the universality of social conflict," he was in error in ignoring "the equally primary parallel generalization of the universality of cooperation."

Selig Perlman's disagreement with Marx is in contrast to Ross, who
had objected to Marx for overemphasizing the strength of the proletariat. Perlman contended that Marx overrated the ability of the bourgeoisie to resist the revolution. He cited Russia as evidence for the bourgeoisie's submission without a fight.67

William Giles66 develops a number of criticisms of Marx in his article on "Social Discontent and the Labor Troubles," including implications following from the trend in the alleged differential holdings of the several classes. In particular, Giles took issue with the socialist claim that the rich were becoming richer and the poor poorer. He cited against these claims Carroll D. Wright's The Elements of Practical Sociology, in which Wright had argued that although the rich were growing richer, many people were becoming rich and the poor's economic circumstances improving.

George Herbert Mead reacts negatively to Marx arguing that socialism, called by Mead "the late gospel according to Marx," promises "revenge upon the hated rich." Mead is apparently uncomfortable with Marx's notion of class conflict saying that he establishes a new religion, which is "dangerous" for "its realization is laid in this world and calls for the torch, the guillotine, and the dagger."69
Marx as Failing to Consider the Psychological Realm

A fourth dimension utilized by early American sociologists to critique Marx was their perception that he lacked a psychological component in his writing. This was part of the reason that Ward felt sociology was irreconcilable with Marxism. He felt that sociology should have a psychological base, something which Marxism failed to provide.

Giddings' sociology evidenced a preoccupation with nonmaterialist psychological factors. He felt that items such as ideas, beliefs and feelings were more fundamental to the social process. Different from Marx, he believed social change had to be explained in terms of mental evolution. In addition, he argued that the economic explanation of war was inadequate because it omitted psychological factors, such as restlessness and adventuresomeness. He implied that materialists, Marx especially, do not consider the psychological factor. Giddings argued in Civilization and Society that the psychological aspect of human struggle is the most important.

Opposing Marx's stress on what he termed "the economic," Ellwood argued that emphasis should be on the psychological. This is illustrated in Ellwood's "Marx's Economic Determinism in the Light of Modern Psychology." Ellwood claims that there could be no doubt that Marx believed biological and psychological factors are mediated and ultimately determined by economic processes. But such a conception falls apart when one examines modern psychology which Ellwood held rejects the view that "economic stimuli" determine the response to all other stimuli.

Modern psychology, Ellwood contended, left Marx without any scientific foundation. It was Tarde's concept of imitation which Ellwood felt
Marx and the other economic interpreters of history "ignored," and thus their reasoning was fallacious. In addition, Ellwood contended that Marx ignored other psychological factors such as sympathy and pugnacity. In fact, he concluded that "the materialistic conception of history" was the offspring of psychological ignorance. No evidence supporting such a conception will stand the test of severe scientific scrutiny. For Ellwood, "the historical process is not fundamentally an economic process, but is rather a socio-psychological, that is, a sociological process." 75

In addition to accusing Marx of dismissing idealism, Thon objected to Marx's ignoring the psychological component of social life. Thon's objection to Marx stems from his contention "that materialism . . . is the least of all competent to comprehend history, because it does not approach the investigation of history with the whole equipment of psychology." 76
Marx as a Threat to Individualism

Closely associated with the criticism that Marx lacked a psychological component is the assertion that both Marx and socialism were threats to individualism.

Ross\textsuperscript{77} defined socialism as the antithesis of individualism, which he praised throughout his writing. Ross wanted to get rid of bad capitalism (monopoly capitalism), so that only good capitalism would remain. Socialism would not rid the world of bad capitalism, but would only result in making private capitalism public capitalism. In addition, it would overwhelm the individual. Ross\textsuperscript{78} maintained that the problem was not capitalism but monopoly. Instead of blaming individualism, the socialists should focus attention upon the corporation. Furthermore, he accused the socialists of holding views at variance with human nature.

At the 1919 ASS meeting in Chicago, James E. Hagerty\textsuperscript{79} presented a paper entitled "Democracy and Socialism" in which he argued that socialism would make the individual a tool of the state. He went on to argue that such destruction of individualism was contrary to the practices of democracy.
Marx as Attacking Private Property

Allied with the traditional American emphasis on individualism is the institution of private property, an institution which early American sociologists perceived Marx to be attacking.

In his essay "The Challenge of Facts," which was written in the 1880's, and which was originally titled "Socialism," Sumner wrote that "private property is in accordance with the natural conditions of the struggle for existence." To Sumner, competition was the law of nature. Nature remained neutral, submitting to those who most energetically and resolutely assailed it, granting its rewards to the fittest. To help the down-trodden was unnatural and violated the most primal of laws. The socialist committed the utmost folly in denouncing capital for everyone benefitted from it.

In Small's viewpoint property should neither be abolished nor deified. Thus one of the most objectionable features about socialism for Small was its attack on the "institution of private property . . ., inheritance and bequest . . ." Small also objected to Marx's solutions to the problems engendered by the institution of private property. Although Small held that in "essentials Marx was nearer to a correct diagnosis of the evils of our present property system than the wisdom of this world has yet been willing to admit," Small contended that Marx's "plan for correcting the evils is neither the only conceivable alternative nor the most convincing one."
Conclusion

This chapter provided the basic data for addressing the first of the two central problems of the dissertation. Discussions of Marx and socialism represent a very small portion of early American sociological literature. Marx was seldom mentioned and his work was even more rarely cited. When Marx was referred to his ideas tended to be given very brief attention and to elicit negative reactions. These reactions were patterned along six basic dimensions.

First, early American sociologists regarded socialism and Marx as scientifically inadequate. In their view, Marx was not a scientist but a political propagandist who was too extreme for the United States. Socialism was condemned for being pure theory and an a priori deduction and antithetical to the laws of nature. Furthermore, its materialism was said to be clearly refuted by the historical record. At times socialism was rejected for being overzealous and neurotic. It was judged to be inordinately disgusting—if not repulsive.

Secondly, early figures in American sociology objected to Marx for having a simplistic, mechanistic model which overlooked ideas, nationalism, democracy and religion and thus failed to appreciate the complexities of social reality. Marx was accused of attempting to account for all social phenomena through the functioning of property. Thus, he was conceived to be rigid, extravagant and dogmatic. He was accused of being a monist whose "economic interpretations of history" had no scientific warrant. In their view, he was fatalistic, absolutistic, revolutionary and one-sided. They asserted that Marx's position was based on ignorance, ab-
surdity and soulless barrenness. Essentially and simply, Marx was just plain wrong.

Third, although most early American sociologists agreed with Marx that classes existed, they disagreed with him over the nature of interaction between classes. They rejected Marx's perceived class dichotomy as being too simplistic. He overemphasized class conflict and failed to recognize that society rests upon a foundation of cooperation.

A fourth criticism of Marx's work was its failure to acknowledge the psychological component of social life. Early sociologists held that their discipline should have a psychological base, something which Marxism failed to provide. In their judgement, modern psychology denied Marx any scientific foundation.

Fifth, Marx and his ideas represented a serious threat to American individualism. For early sociologists, socialism was the antithesis of individualism and was inimical to the practice of democracy.

Finally, they were seriously alarmed by Marx's attack on the institution of private property. It was dangerous for it directly threatened the basic foundation of the prevailing social order.

Thus, the rejection of Marx followed along six dimensions. The next chapter will be an explanation of this rejection.
Notes to Chapter 3


16. Ibid., p. 124.
42. *AJS* vol. 5, 3, 4, 5; vol. 6, 1, 2, 3, 4; and vol. 8, 2.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., p. 45.
57. Ibid., p. 579.
58. Ibid., p. 587.
65. Ibid., p. 402.


Chapter 4
An Explanation of the Reactions to Marx and Marxist Socialism

A. Introduction

With the character of the reactions of early sociologists to Marx and Marxian socialism now known, it becomes necessary to provide an account or explanation of these reactions, which constitutes the second major objective of this dissertation. But such an endeavor cannot be undertaken without recognition that explanation itself has become problematic. Etymologically, explanation means taking out the folds or making something level or even; i.e., intelligible or comprehensible. However, in the last two decades or so, explanation in sociology has acquired a technical meaning as one form of rendering of accounts in contrast to interpretation-understanding. Explanation has become associated with a particular view of epistemology and methodology just as interpretation-understanding has become linked with a contrasting notion of epistemology and methodology.¹

Explanation² is associated with a position which assumes that sociology should and must utilize the methods developed in the natural or biophysical sciences. By adopting such a view, sociology becomes part of a more general rubric of science which includes biology, chemistry and most importantly physics. Human social reality is con-
strued as being an extension of nature: therefore social reality is a part of nature and subject to natural laws. These laws are invariant. They describe ahistorical universal regularities.

The form of such an accounting is modelled after the type of explanations developed in physics. Linkages are empirically established between and among concepts to form propositions. Because the concepts do refer to certain empirical phenomena and relations among such phenomena, the propositions so formed do entail statements of tendency, probability, or determination.\(^3\) Statements of tendency stipulate and list antecedents and their conditions in order to state the tendency of a certain outcome. Probabilistic statements are ones where given certain antecedents you can state the probability of the consequences. In deterministic statements an independent variable or set of independent variables provides sufficient and necessary conditions for the dependent variable. Deterministic statements are often divided into statements of cause (A causes B) or statements of functions (A serves a certain function for B). Theory formation involves the logical interconnection of these propositions. Thus, the form of accounting is deductive in that it explains social phenomena by subsuming them under more and more general or universal laws. The result is the formation of a hypothetical-deductive or deductive-nomological system.

Explanation and prediction are assumed to be mutually congruent and mutually expected. Prediction is a logical inference of explanation because the result of explanation is a deductive system. The
deductive system is a set of general propositions from which more specific predictions are made. Prediction proceeds from the general to the specific.

Manifestly, the view of explanation just outlined is associated with a positivistic methodology and an empiricist epistemology. Because social phenomena are regarded as part of nature, the study of social phenomena is alleged to proceed with the use of a method or methodology which is common to all of nature. Objectivity and the application of statistical procedures are indispensable. The ideal formulation of an explanation involves mathematical symbols. Ultimately, all knowledge is held to be the result of sense experience (i.e., an empiricist epistemology is accepted). Thus, the view of explanation is unmistakably associated with a positivist methodology, an empiricist epistemology and the espousal of the doctrine of the unity of all the sciences (and for which physics tends to be the model discipline).

In contrast to explanation, interpretation (or understanding) is much more teleological and subjective placing considerable emphasis upon intersubjective meaning and intentionality. Humankind is held to possess a mind, spirit, or soul which distinguishes its members from other animals and from the objects of study of other disciplines. Human beings are conceived to be free, active, purposively-oriented actors who cannot be investigated with the analytical, deductive approach of positivism. Humans must be studied by a humanistic
methodology--by resort to empathy and in a cultural context. Culture is itself an objectification of the human mind or spirit and forms an interrelated whole differing from nature because human social reality is not a part of the natural order.

Interpretive accounts, in contrast to those of explanation, maintain that reality and especially interpersonal reality cannot be understood without transformation (the process of interpretation). Indeed, social reality, therefore, can never be known directly but requires some degree of prior conception which results in subsequent selective apprehension and interpretation. Social action is conceived to be subjective, meaningful and conscious. Accordingly, the aims of the social and natural sciences are dissimilar with different objects of study, and different epistemological and methodological approaches.

Interpretation is the subjective process by which the meaning of cultural phenomena are understood within a cultural whole. This position contrasts with the natural or biophysical sciences which emphasize externality and assume universality. Meaning is always constrained within the context. Taken to its extreme this position denies that knowledge can be other than knowledge of the particular.

The approach adopted in this dissertation differs substantially from both explanation and interpretation as just outlined though it may be more like the former than the latter. Thus, the "explanation" contained in the following pages, unlike traditional explanations, recognizes the utility of history and thus rejects the ahistoricism of positivism. Like interpretive accounts, the view of "explanation"
domly or haphazardly arranged; they appear to have an operating effi-
cacy as wholes, systems, or structures. The individual may not
(at the time) be reflexively aware that his/her behavior and thought
patterns are being constrained. However, such structures are dis-
cernible through historical investigations.

These three structures (or contexts) combine to form a constrained
system which impinged upon early American sociology. The structure of
American middle class values and the institution of private property
and the professional ideology of social science and sociology were
reinforced by the structure of mechanisms of social control in academia
particularly in sociology. Clearly if middle class values, private
property and the professional ideology were endorsed, Karl Marx could
not be accepted. But if someone rejected middle class values, private
property and the professional ideology, his (or her) deviance would
be deterred or punished through academia's mechanism of social control.
adopted here is extremely suspicious of attempts to establish a common method for all sciences; it recognizes that the human species is somewhat distinctive. However, social reality does exhibit patterns and regularities (similar to the phenomena studied by the natural and biophysical sciences). Yet, the approach assumed here only concedes that regularities in time exist, but does not deny the possibility of trans-historical regularities. Universalism is an empirical question, rather than a presupposition (which is the case for positivism). Essentially, a position of historical specificity is adopted.

The structural explanation employed here holds that social reality can be objectively discerned without regard to the subjective orientations of individual actors. Such an approach is necessitated by the macrosociological nature of the inquiry. The discrete, idiosyncratic intentions of early American sociologists simply are not relevant. By contrast, certain structures or patterns can and do impinge upon social actors and limit, direct and constrain their actions without these actors being immediately conscious of such impingement. Certain contexts or structures were studied through their historical antecedent conditions (in chapter two) rather than subjective intentions of individuals. The structures are 1) American middle class values and the institution of private property; 2) the professional ideology of social science and sociology; and 3) mechanisms of social control in academia particularly in sociology. (Manifestly, the aspects of the various milieu as presented in chapter two are not ran-
B. Sociologists' Rejection of Marx

In actuality, the broader values undergirding American sociologists' rejection of Marx and Marxism can be divided into two relatively distinctive sets. One seems to be more comprehensive, communal, and more or less religious in its derivation. The other is somewhat more restricted, middle-class in character, associational, and secular in its outlook.

The first reflects the fact that the lives of many Americans still were concerned with and committed to a more or less personally-conceived deity who was regarded as the source of order in the universe. As indicated above, the backgrounds of early American sociologists often bespoke this centrality of a belief in divine providence and in religion. Many sociologists had had earlier ministerial careers or their fathers and/or grandfathers had had such careers. Marx's hostility toward religious belief and practice was in direct opposition to the dominant trend in the U. S. Giles, for instance, declared that Marx wanted to make war on all prevailing religion as well as on the state and patriotism. According to Giles, Marx held that the idea of God was the keystone of perverted civilization and that the true root of liberty and equality was atheism.

For some, and especially for Christian sociologists, a belief in God signified the existence of a spiritual father and the brotherhood of men. Consequently, concert, harmony, and cooperation were the norm for human interrelationships. Understandably, Marx's emphasis on conflict and especially the categoricality of class antagonism was unaccept-
able. In Paul Monroe's view, Marx's repudiation of cooperation led to an ill-conceived notion of class relations. And the Christian sociologist Shailer Matthews also asked "what sort of kingdom would Christ have established whose evangels was a political economy and whose new age was set forth in a programme." Small, whose close relations with religion are a matter of record, sharply attacked Bolshevism after World War I for its efforts to institutionalize class conflict and for what he regarded as its intolerance, brutality, and ruthlessness. But it was Small's student Ellwood who offered the most extended effort to reject Marx's notion of class struggle. He objected to Marx's view that conflict was the norm. Instead, Ellwood argued, class conflict is the exceptional and not the usual and predominant mode of behavior. Human societies have existed in and through coordination and cooperation. Unrestricted conflict was always something relatively abnormal within a human group.

Admittedly, Ross does endeavor to develop somewhat more secular arguments against the unqualified significance of class conflict. He insisted that the presence of internal disagreements (within a class) and external agreements (outside), the recognition of resemblance in community and common culture, the paramountcy of the will to resist as against the will to aggress, the possibility of war or other international crises are too great to give class conflict pre-eminent importance. In addition, the operation of common religious, moral, or political ideas, the continuous growth of competitive ideology, the extension of education, the ebb and flow of prosperity and the democratization of the state tend to restrain class conflict.
But perhaps most of early American sociologists' opposition to Marx seems to have derived from their endorsement of and commitment to a set of more dominant, secular, and middle-class values. Although individualism can and may have its valuational underpinnings in religion (a case can also be made that it is a superstructural offspring of a capitalist infrastructure), as in the assumption that Providence is ultimately the source of individual differences, in the provision of differential talents (as in "The Parable of the Talents" in the New Testament), early sociologists began directly with the more secular assumption of biopsychic individual differences and thus with alleged individual inequality. Ward's insistence on the recognition of natural inequalities in sociocracy does stem from his belief in and acceptance of individual differences. Sumner was, if anything, even more committed to the significance of biopsychic individual differences, which are expressed in the basic class divisions of society. Giddings adopted similar views about the importance of individual differences and they, in turn, are similarly reflected in his notion of basic structural divisions in societies. Thus, his plutocracy is a natural elite constituted of an aggregate of alert and effective individuals who are superior by virtue of their biopsychic characteristics and who are, accordingly, the leaders of any society. In Giddings' view, the success of democracies depends on the recognition and rule of their pre-eminent protocrats. He was aware that his notion of biopsychic differences—inequalities was intrinsically at variance with Marx's position on the bases of inequality.

Interestingly, too, competition—especially occupational and
economic competition—is the basic medium by which individual superiority and success are registered. Undeniably, some of the early sociologists had assumed that interpersonal strife and conflict had been characteristic of earlier forms or stages of society. But they argued that in modern society the direct personalized expressions of violence had been replaced by impersonal occupation-economic competition through which personal superiority was expressed. But they unmistakably disapproved of Marx's articulate call for organized social conflict.

Significantly, many of these early sociologists also accepted private property as the necessary beneficent reward for individual success reflecting biopsychic individual differences or inequalities. Ward characterized private property as a "super-preserving force" (of society) and as "the supreme passion of mankind." Sumner's position also endorsed the legitimacy of and social necessity for private property. And although Small admitted that private property had its dangerous effects in modern society, he insisted that "the institution of private property" should no more be abolished than "private individuality . . . be suppressed."

Finally, all of these more secularly inclined sociologists supported capitalism itself. Giddings not only offered arguments for capitalism but provided apologies for its expansion, as in his Democracy and Empire. Small urged only that means be designed to reduce corporate selfishness, but not that capitalism itself be abandoned. Ross also sought the elimination of "bad" capitalism (i.e., monopoly capitalism) so that only "good" capitalism would remain. He contended that socialism would not rid the world of "bad" capitalism but would only transfer
enterprise from the private to the public domain.

Not only did the rejection of Marx reflect the espousal of the prevailingly middle-class values of American society but it also manifested the character of many of the basic intellectual assumptions and commitments of early American sociology itself. Marx and Marxism were indicted in terms of their notion of science, an opposition to monocausality or determinism, an insistence on the special relevance of the psychic or psychological domain in the explanation of social phenomena, and particularly an adherence to what might be termed the centrality of choice or voluntarism in human social conduct or behavior. Undeniably, it is true that their opposition to Marx does not fully reflect the character of their prevalent positivism (re their conception of science), their preoccupation with social problems as obstacles to social progress, the importance of their interest in social origins and genesis, or the implications of their social evolutionary or social progress notions of social change.

Whether entirely accurate or not, sociologists conspicuously endeavored to invoke the commitment to science to buttress rejection of Marx and Marxism. Ward, Sumner, Small, and Ellwood are all involved in this effort. Ward\textsuperscript{15} endeavored to derive the development of a sociocratic state of society from his use of science, which he believed would require the recognition of natural inequalities but not the artificial equalities created by socialism. He regarded Marx and socialism as irreconcilable with science. Sumner\textsuperscript{16} identified science with explanations of natural (social) order. In advocating the creation of unnatural elements (e.g., government intervention), Marx and Marxism placed them-
selves outside of the bounds of science. Seeking to create an elite of scientists-advisors to guide the scientific formation of policy in the United States and to provide a rational and scientific basis for social reform (akin to the German Verein fur Sozialpolitik), Small also came to regard Marx as unscientific. Too negative and undisciplined and too inclined to assume what it should try to prove, socialism for Small was unscientific. Finally, Ellwood held that the data of both ethnography and history provided an intellectual bar before which Marx and his formulations were scientifically discredited. Indeed, materialism itself was unscientific.

Interestingly, early sociologists also endeavored to associate a pluralistic, multicausational, and multidimensional notion of nature with science and scientificity. They objected to monism, monocausality, and monodimensionality because they regarded such views as intrinsically deterministic. Giddings, Cooley, Thon, and Ellwood all express objection to Marx from this perspective. Giddings asserts that Marx was a determinist who tried to account for everything by the function of property. Marx was rigid and extravagant in his claims. Cooley also objects to Marx's "economic determinism which looks upon the production of wealth and the competition for it as the process of which everything else is the result." The monism or monocausality which Cooley attributed to Marx was incompatible with his own espousal of organicism or a functional pluralism. Thon also rejects Marx's historical materialism, among other reasons, for its "stereotyped monism and its soleness barrenness."

It was Ellwood who pursued most extensively the advocacy of a multi-
dimensional approach, which he claimed would recognize the interdependence of all social life. In adopting this approach—which he called the doctrine of social interdependence—it becomes just as reasonable to argue that the religious and intellectual phases of social life determine the economic as to claim that the methods of production and distribution determine the political, moral, religious, and other phases of social life. Ellwood thus advocates a synthetic view which incorporates many different factors such as the geographical, the racial, the political, the religious, and the educational as well as the economic. Ellwood urged socialists to free themselves from the needless incubus of the materialistic conception of history. In Ellwood's view, the salvation of socialism depends on its becoming a general program of social reform involving all perspectives and not simply a program for industrial revolution.

But what the objections to Marx in terms of its alleged monism or monocausality are most insistent about is what they construe as Marx's ignoring of the subjective, psychic, psychological, or conscious component in human social conduct or behavior. Giddings insisted on the relevancy of a subjective or psychic aspect as incorporated in his "consciousness of kind" and concerted volition. Thon's objections to Marx were clearly associated with his own espousal of "idealism, with its abundance of psychical motives and viewpoints." Marx and materialism had mistakenly eliminated psychology from the investigation of history. According to Thon, "the history of humanity must be humanly explained; that is, psychologically." Cooley's rejection of Marx seems to involve a similar position. His contrast between "economic
activities" and "ideal activities" in the context of his denial of the validity of Marx's arguments is actually a clue to his broader commitment to a social (or sociological) idealism. As such, Cooley believed that social reality exists at the level of (interpersonal) consciousness and refers to a variety of social phenomena in terms of idealistic views (social organization as "social mind," the self as a "looking-glass self," etc.). Understandably, Jandy reports that Cooley as an idealist (from a wealthy conservative background) was both uninterested in and distrustful of socialism.

Ellwood's arguments against Marx, which entails an adoption of what he terms a synthetic conception of the interdependence of social factors, are especially linked to a necessity to include a psychological component. Ellwood's article on "Marx's Economic Determinism in the Light of Modern Psychology" is an attempt to counteract what he regarded as an exclusive economic interpretation of history with the principles of psychology. In spite of what Marx's "latest apologists" were presenting, Marx—in Ellwood's view—was an economic determinist. Ellwood quoted the Critique of Political Economy as alleging that the method of production of the material life determines the social, political, and spiritual process in general. In actuality, Ellwood's synthetic interpretation of social evolution is to entail a concern with "original biological and psychological factors" rather than with "economic, . . . political or religious elements . . .".

However, it is curious that sociologists' endorsement of a pluralistic, multicausalational, synthetic viewpoint with the necessity to include a concern with the domain of the subjective, psychic, or conscious is
not fully articulated to specify adherence of choice or voluntarism as opposed to Marx. They do condemn Marx's monism and determinism. Yet, it is also true that such sociologists as Giddings, Ross, Small, Cooley, and Ellwood were unmistakably committed to the cruciality of voluntarism in human social conduct. Giddings' "concerted volition," Ross's and Small's social volition, and Cooley's "public will" (as based on valuation) are notions which are explicitly based on the operation of choice. Perhaps, early sociologists regarded their objection to determinism as sufficiently implying voluntarism. But whatever the explanation, the point remains that the final linkage between existence of the psychic and the exercise of choice seems to have been more implicit than explicit.

Yet, American sociologists' rejection of Marx and Marxism seems to have been sanctioned by much more than a mere recognition of the opposition and antagonism they represented to the values of America and its middle classes and to the basic commitments of the discipline itself. To speak favorably of Marx and Marxism was to place oneself beyond the pale of intellectual and social respectability and to invite public condemnation. The very word "Socialist" was an opprobrious epithet and an indictment of intellectual heresy, as the behavior of sociologists' colleagues in economics indicated. In a review of Ely's The Labor Movement in America, Henry Farnum, a colleague and disciple of Sumner, asserted that Ely was guilty of bias, faulty research, foolish gullibility, and outrageous partisanship. Farnum further accused labor organizations of violence and intimidation, of the practice of arson, and of condoning the murder of the police. (Interestingly, Farnum never even bothered to substantiate any of these charges.) And Farnum
concluded by endeavoring to damn Ely by labelling him a socialist. Evidently, a person's reputation could be tarnished by calling him or her a socialist.

But name-calling was only part of a much larger system of social controls which could be invoked against expressions of dissent and unorthodox views. The persistence of sociology as an intellectual discipline was dependent on its place as a university department whose members were subject to a control system exercised by chairpersons, deans, presidents, and boards of trustees. The ascendancy of American industry was ultimately reflected in the character of the boards of trustees and the administrations of both the newer private and the (reconstituted) state universities. Clergymen gradually disappeared and were replaced by bankers, merchants, industrialists, and railroad magnates on the boards of trustees. The concern of administrators for funds for maintenance or expansion of academic programs and/or research and their preoccupation with utility and with respect from the influential and reputable quarters of society tended to orient the atmosphere of, if not, indeed, the actual policy, of the university toward the status quo and conformity with the status quo. (Indeed, public relations personnel were hired and public relations departments were established as public respect was sought.)

However, it was the actual occurrence of a number of incidents in the 1880s and 1890s involving academic freedom which graphically spelled out the limits of permissible dissent within the emerging social science professions. Sociologists could not fail to notice the punitive implications. Historians, economists, and sociologists figured in these
cases, e.g., Henry Carter Adams, Richard T. Ely, Edward T. Bemis, John R. Commons, and Edward Alsworth Ross, as the targets of action on the one hand, and Albion W. Small as an administrator of policy, on the other (in a few instances). The precise issue might vary but it always fell within some point on the spectrum of "radicalist" accusation; e.g., defense of the position of labor, writing books on or association with socialists, espousal of public ownership of utilities, a speech defending Karl Marx, advocacy of free silver or the denunciation of exploitation of Orientals.

The events began in the mid-1880's when Cornell fired Henry Carter Adams for annoying a rich contributor by delivering a pro-labor speech. A few years later, Richard Ely became embroiled in a dispute with the University of Wisconsin's Board of Regents. Ely was a veteran of such wars, having done battle (and lost) with the old guard of American economics. Furner provides a thorough analysis. Apparently Ely had published two book-length studies of socialism and, in addition, formed the American Institute for Christian Socialism, a group devoted to a Christian way of life, with John Commons and Reverend George Herron. Herron's interpretation of communism was rather interesting for he equated communism with Christianity (Small was to warn Ely of the danger of associating with Herron). Oliver Wells, a member of the Wisconsin Board of Regents, got wind of this association, labelled Ely an anarchist and called for his dismissal. After an investigation by the university, Ely was eventually cleared; that is, he proved to the satisfaction of those in authority that he, in fact, was not an anarchist. If he had not done so, he would have been fired. Ely's old
friends in the AEA failed to come to his assistance.

Ely apparently learned his lesson with respect to the perils of radicalism. After his trial, his pronouncements became decidedly conservative, and he attempted to appear more "scholarly" and "professional" as he retreated into the domain of rural economics. He learned his lesson so well that he eventually became president of the American Economics Association (AEA).

Edward W. Bemis did not fare as well as Ely. Bemis, an Ely student, had academic interests in the public ownership of basic utilities and the right of labor to organize and strike. The atmosphere of the Bemis case was not favorable to pro-labor interests. The setting for the dispute was Chicago which was still recovering from several violent labor-management clashes such as the Pullman strike. Sympathy with the labor movement was tantamount to subversion. In the academic milieu, marginal utility theory was growing. This theory emphasized demand, not labor, as the sole determinant of value. It contained the claim that a market economy operated under impartial regulations, a position taken from the pages of classical political economy. Change was not necessary as things were just fine the way they were. The academic setting was the prestigious University of Chicago, which was called, by some of its contemporaries, a "gas trust" university. Bemis favored the municipal ownership of utilities, especially gas works. The head of the Chicago economics department was J. Laurence Laughlin, a resolutely conservative economist. Laughlin had no use for Bemis and assigned him to the extension division for most of his teaching load. Bemis' activities led Harper, in January 1894, to inform him that he
was unacceptable as a member of the Chicago faculty. Since Bemis was tenured, Harper urged him to resign, but Bemis refused. Publicly Harper said that Bemis was being discharged for incompetence. At a time when Thorstein Veblen was being denied permission to offer a course on socialism, Bemis gave in and announced that he would resign. He was under intense pressure to do so. One newspaper declared that he had been scalped by monopoly. Bemis was not a radical and Harper knew this, but the wealthy capitalists' demands on the board of trustees were an overriding factor. Even though Harper had told Bemis in writing that his teaching was up to par, he now maintained that Bemis lacked the tools of the trade.

Many people expected Small to come to Bemis' aid. Both men were Ely students, and both were products of an evangelical background. Unfortunately for Bemis, Small equivocated. Small, as a university employee, tried to keep the matter private and out of the papers. He informed Bemis that he agreed with his thinking but added that to speak out on such a matter was not scientific. This advice was somewhat hypocritical on Small's part since he often wrote that a scientist has an obligation to engage in reform and to address the issues of the day. When the affair became public, Small rushed to defend the University. He and Nathaniel Butler, the head of the extension division, released a statement declaring that Bemis was incompetent. The evidence did not support this contention at all. One of the reasons Bemis was hired away from Vanderbilt was because of his reputation as an excellent teacher. The real issue seemed to be that Bemis was costing the University donations. His mistake seemed to be his visible pro-labor
and anti-monopoly stance. Interestingly, although Ely, too, had felt
the sting of such an incident, his support for his student can best be
described as lukewarm. Ely had indeed learned his lesson.

As a result of this affair, Bemis experienced considerable diffi-
culty in finding work. He finally took a position at Kansas State
Agricultural College. He lasted two years and then was let go, even
though he had gained a reputation for impartiality in his teaching.
He never again held an academic position.

John R. Commons lost several jobs because of his controversial
views, among which was that an economist had a professional responsi-
bility to be an advocate. Commons, a devoutly religious man, held
that religion was a guide to reform and, together with Ely, formed
the Institute of Christian Sociology in 1893. Ely saved Commons by
offering him a position at the University at Wisconsin. Before this,
Commons had bounced from job to job, always being haunted by his
activist label. While he was teaching at Syracuse University, he gave
a speech praising Karl Marx and his stand on labor. For such an action
he was fired.29 Chancellor James Roscoe Day explained that potentially
important donors held back funds until Commons was removed. He warned
Commons that college presidents had agreed recently not to hire radi-
cals. Commons declared that he had learned the value of silence.
Unlike Bemis, Commons took his punishment quietly and eventually became
permanently situated at Wisconsin.

What Furner30 labels as the lines of permissible dissent were
being drawn. If a person spoke out, he/she had to do so within politi-
cal limits. One could not oppose capitalism, but could advocate free-
silver, such as was the case with President E. B. Andrews of Brown. Although Andrews' advocacy created quite a stir, his concerns were legitimate in that his suggestions would not significantly alter the status quo. Thus, Andrews kept his position.

Early on in his career, Edward Alsworth Ross learned about the boundaries of dissent. Ross may have been involved in the most famous of all the academic freedom cases. Actually, Ross did not question the structure of the prevailing order, but he created such a fuss that Stanford was forced to get rid of him. Ross locked horns with Jane L. Stanford over his advocacy of free-silver. This stance led Ms. Stanford to totally ban all political activity by Stanford professors. Later, Ross' racist remarks concerning "coolie immigration" also enraged Ms. Stanford, for her deceased husband had made a fortune exploiting such labor, and Ms. Stanford had a "soft spot in her heart" for orientals. She pressured Stanford president, David S. Jordan, into firing Ross, arguing that he appealed to the "socialist element" which she felt was so dangerous to the hearts and souls of students. Eventually, Ross resigned, but his career was too well established at the time to be severely damaged. He toned down his remarks considerably after this and a few years later, settled down at the University of Wisconsin, where he spent the rest of his career, retiring in 1937 and living until 1951.

In spite of the eccentricity of Ms. Stanford, who accused Ross of exciting the evil passions, offending God and playing into the hands of the low and vile socialist, this case is illustrative of the conservatism of the universities at the turn of the century. Rule number one
seemed to be to save the endowment. A double standard existed: one
could be political, but, at the same time, one had to practice the
"right" politics. All academic freedom was weighed against this stand-
dard.

Furner sums up the lesson that was learned.

For other social scientists a clear lesson emerged:
Avoid radicalism. Avoid socialism. Avoid excessive
publicity and refrain from public advocacy. When
trouble strikes, unless there is certain assurance
of massive support, accept your fate in austere and
dignified silence. Above all, maintain a reputation
for scientific objectivity.33

The university was business-like and success-oriented. Veysey34
maintains that it was a middle-class agency of social control whose
primary responsibility was to be the custodian of popular values.

Having developed a system of external control by boards of trustees
composed of clergy, businesspeople and lawyers, the most conservative
elements in the community, Sweezy35 notes that American colleges and
universities have been consistently hostile, since their inception, to
all forms of unorthodox thinking. And this hostility, he points out,
is most evident in the social sciences. The conservatism and timidity
of American colleges and universities have been tremendously important
in minimizing the influence of socialist ideas in the United States.
Rarely have social ideas been fairly or even intelligently presented
as part of the academic curriculum. And radical or leftist social
scientists have virtually been barred from academic careers. Sweezy
maintains that American capitalism has developed a high degree of per-
fection in this type of control.

Entering the university curriculum at a time of the expansion of
higher education and strict surveillance by business-dominated administra­
tions and boards of trustees, sociologists could scarcely be dis­
passionate about Marx or Marxism. They operated within ideological
limits. Indeed, Dusky Lee Smith has characterized early American
sociology itself as the sociology of corporate capitalism and as itself
an element of capitalism's ideological superstructure. Sociology could
not entertain alternatives (e.g., Marxism) because it was bound to pre­
sent capitalism as the good life. Within these ideological parameters
a professional ideology was established, an ideology which further con­
strained the limits of inquiry for early American sociology.
C. Congruence of Sociologists' Rejection of Marx-Marxism with General Rejection of Marx-Marxism in Post Civil War United States

What is perhaps of greatest significance is the impressive congruence between the structural and valuational components basic to sociologists' rejection of Marx and Marxism, on the one hand, and those involved in broader acceptance of social movements espousing Social Darwinism and socio-political reformism and the general rejection of socialism in the U. S., on the other. In particular, many of the same values involved in sociologists' rejection of Marx and Marxism were also important in the broader rejection of Marx and Marxism in American society and in the acceptance and success of social reform and Social Darwinism, however curious the latter may seem. Put simply, the adherence to private property, the unquestioned centrality of the individual (as the core of individualism), the pervasive belief in a deity and in religion (or at times in natural science), and a commitment to a notion of social progress have been significant in the social success (or failure) in each one of the three movements.
Acceptance of Social Reformism

The post Civil War era in the United States was a period of rapid social change. Life in the United States became increasingly urbanized and industrialized. Along with these rapid transformations, social problems arose. Social life became impersonalized as marked differentials of economic and political power appeared. As more and more immigrants settled in the United States urban slums were created. Muckraking became a practice of some journalists, and social protest movements developed in answer to these problems. The social protest movements which arose included Grangers, Greenbackers, Single-tax proponents, and especially, Populists and Progressives.

At the core of these protest movements were some of the basic elements of the American way of life; e.g., private property, individualism, religiosity, progress and democracy. This core was embodied in the two strongest protest or reform movements of the time—Populism and Progressivism.

Despite the call for reform, America's high esteem for the institution of private property stood firm. In fact, along with other structures, it appears that it influenced the reform program. Reform was set within limits—the boundaries of private property. Populists sought to protect the holdings and way of life of the small independent farmer. The politics of this movement were petty-capitalist. The 1890's was a period of popular agrarian revolt; a revolt created, in part, by a scarcity of labor and, in part, by an international decline in farm prices. All of this occurred even though land was readily
available.

Hofstadter states that

Populism was an effort on the part of a few important segments of a highly heterogenous capitalistic agriculture to restore profits in the face of much exploitation and under unfavorable market and price conditions.

Progressives, although they advocated the regulation of corporations and especially trusts, did not include an attack on property as part of their appeal. The major tenet of Progressivism was the regulation of trusts. The movement received its impetus from the massive incorporation which surrounded it. In the six years between 1898 and 1904, 75% of the trusts and 80% of the capital in trusts were created. There were 318 trusts created in 1904 alone. This six-year period witnessed the incorporation of United States Steel, Standard Oil, Consolidated Tobacco, Amalgamated Copper, International Mercantile Marine Company and the American Smelting and Refining Company.

Closely affiliated with the notion of private property was the significance of the individual and individualism for Populism and Progressivism. Curti argues that underlying all these protests was a feeling of individual rights. The property rights of the individual were never under attack. The only thing attacked was the alleged unfair behavior of corporations. The protest movement was essentially middle-class in character as reformers operated within the existing framework. Even the single tax proposals of Henry George, which were delineated in his Progress and Poverty (1879), were designed to preserve an individualistic society. This single tax, which was to be placed on all increments in the value of land, was designed to bring about a
society envisioned by George's hero, Thomas Jefferson. The state, according to the Jeffersonian plan, was to be merely a police and tax-collecting agency. Essentially, it severely limited the role of a central government. Such a situation created a difficult position for Marxism, but not for Progressivism and Populism, both of which reflected American individualism.

Populism grew in an environment in which the farmer was visualized as a sort of yeoman hero, a myth innocently naive of commercial realities. This tradition can be traced back to the Jeffersonian period in which the farmer was glorified as independent and self-sufficient. This tradition lived on in spite of the fact that its heroes had been cast aside by the advance of commercial agriculture. It resulted in a peculiar farmer's psychology which was Protestant and bourgeois. Yet, because of the concentration of capital and the increasing demand for expensive machinery in farming, the old ideals of self-sufficiency and self-reliance became obsolete. The Populists wanted the government to help them recreate an age which had passed; an agrarian age whose recollections they romanticized.

Whereas Populism was rural and provincial, Progressivism was urban and nationwide. Progressivism was a movement of the petit-bourgeois to restore economic individualism. Its goals were profoundly individualistic. It was a movement which concentrated on urban problems, such as social welfare, consumerism and municipal reform. Compared to Populism, Progressivism was more of an intellectual and middle-class movement. This sentiment of middle class reformism actually took place in a period of sustained and general prosperity. Hofstadter uses
a survey done by Alfred D. Chandler to substantiate his claim that Progressives were overwhelmingly urban, middle-class, native-born, Protestant, professional and college graduates. Chandler surveyed the backgrounds and careers of 260 Progressive Party leaders. He found the following distribution: business, 95; lawyers, 75; editors, 36; other professionals (college professors, authors, social workers, etc., 55.

Progressives (as Chandler’s survey indicates) as well as Populists were apparently distinguishably and distinctively Protestant. Their Protestant religious beliefs reinforced the prevailing individualism and also provided a justification for the strict adherence to private property. In addition, the centrality of religious beliefs to these reform movements served to keep these movements at the level of melioration rather than large-scale structural transformation.

Both Progressivism and Populism wanted to insure continual progress in American society through the use of government intervention. However, programs for progress for Populism and Progressivism apparently differed. Populists wanted to return to the days of non-commercialized agriculture and craft production. For instance, the Populist presidential candidate in 1892, General James B. Weaver, in his book A Call to Action (1892) offered no plans for the future. The contents of the book expressed disdain for the corporation and sorrow about the course of history. In addition, Populists wanted to expose what they perceived as a conspiracy to dominate the rural sector. Progressives, on the other hand, wanted to expose public corruption and initiate reform to correct such practices. The goal of the Progressive movement was not large-scale
social structural alteration. The movement was not directed toward
achieving radical change; rather, its goals were much more modest.
Progressives viewed themselves as leaders in a process of moderate,
deliberate social change. In this quest, they argued that they knew
the pulse of "the people;" a knowledge which qualified them for such
a leadership role. They admitted that "the people" have a tendency to
be extreme, but they cautioned that the wealthy do also. In view of
this, they set themselves up as a buffer which could monitor and con­
structively direct both extremes, thereby insuring progress. Progress,
for Progressives, did not necessitate change in the existing framework.
They wanted to implement democratic political procedures and reforms
such as the extension of civil service, secret balloting, direct
election of senators, abolition of the electoral college and direct
primaries.

Both movements expressed a commitment to extend and promote demo­
cracy. Much of the strength of the Populist movement derived from the
anxiety certain sections of the population felt because of the rapid
decline of rural America. The Populists desired a recreation of the
personalized relations which characterized the rural past. They appealed
to what Hofstadter labels "the American tradition of democracy" which
was formed on the farm and in small villages. The central ideas of this
tradition were founded in rural sentiments and rural metaphors, i.e.,
"grass-roots democracy." \(^{41}\) Progressives also wanted to promote demo­
cracy, but instead of returning to the basics of the past they urged
a variety of municipal, state and federal political reforms (see above).

Each movement possessed a certain peculiarity of appeal. There is
much folklore about Populism. However, it can be said that it was a practical movement which insisted that the United States government intervene to rectify the problems created by industrialism. Its advocates argued that a conspiracy was being hatched to dominate the rural sector. It was a movement with a considerable share of provincialism, anti-Semitism and nationalism. It was also nativistic, opposing immigration for fear that the integrity of the "stock" would be destroyed. Although Populists advocated the primacy of money (free silver), most of their vision was directed toward the past, not the future. They feared the future for in it they saw the conspiracy of the international money powers who were leading the nation and the world to impending doom. They claimed that the world was divided into farmer and banker (not bourgeoisie and proletariat), Anglo-Saxons and Jews.

The appeal of Progressivism was quite different. The growth of unions threatened the Progressives who felt squeezed between those whom they perceived to be above them and below them. The Progressive impulse was also stirred by the uncontrolled growth of cities and the problems associated with such growth; e.g., slums. For instance, the population of Chicago more than doubled between 1880 and 1890. Another irritant to Progressives was immigration, a phenomenon which brought their nativistic sentiments to the surface. This nativism is illustrated in the writings of Edward Alsworth Ross's The Old World in the New (1914). In this work, Ross accused immigrants of selling votes, debasing education and having a coarse peasant philosophy of sex.

It seems paradoxical that while opposing the high bourgeoisie, the Progressives also demeaned the immigrant, who was almost always pro-
letariat. Indeed, by alienating the immigrant, the Progressives lost a considerable amount of possible support. Yet, Progressives saw themselves as buffers between two extremes, and, as middle-class professional intellectuals, they tended to look down upon the immigrants with disdain.

Like the Populists before them, the Progressives were short on remedies. The major achievement of the Progressive era was exposure, which was accomplished mostly through muck-raking efforts in journalism. Like the Populists, the Progressives were caught in a bind. They wanted change, but not too much change. They wanted to regulate monopolies, but they wanted to do so within the capitalist framework. The Progressives repudiated the claim of the socialists who demanded major structural change. The Progressives were convinced that changes could occur while capitalism was maintained. They held private property too dearly to think otherwise. Socialism, which was seen as a threat, actually encouraged the Progressives to persist in their attempts to construct change within the capitalist system. Socialism had the ironic effect of strengthening a bourgeois movement; a movement which, like socialism, opposed big business but also opposed the power of collectivized labor.

Although there were a few utopian schemes in the United States, such as the establishment of 33 Fourierist colonies and George Ripley's Brook Farm Phalanx, reformism in the United States tended to desire a preservation of the existing order and not its dialectical transcendence. Oberschall comments that the reform movement during the progressive era "was pursued by respectable, old, American, Protestant, middle and upper-class groups . . . "42
Kolko goes one step further, saying that the reform movement was not only tied into the structure but was conservative in nature as well. Kolko offers a reinterpretation of the years 1900-16 which have been labelled by others, especially Hofstadter, as Progressive. Kolko argues that this was a conservative era in which business controlled politics, government intervened to save the economy, and reformers tried to preserve the capitalist order.

The reformism which existed in the United States at the time when sociology was being institutionalized did not provide a congenial atmosphere for the writings of Karl Marx. This reform can best be described as liberal humanitarianism. It was a reform which did not threaten the existence of private property. It had a rhetoric couched in the terms of individualism and free will.
The success of Social Darwinism in America is illustrated by the fact that Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer were more popular in the United States than they were in their own country, England. Indeed, Darwin received an honorary membership in the American Philosophical Society in 1869, ten years before his own university, Cambridge, awarded him an honorary degree. People such as Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes proclaimed Darwin a great thinker, doubting that any other English writer ever had such an effect on the world.

Much of the influence of Social Darwinism came from the pen of Herbert Spencer, who also had considerable influence on early American sociology. Charles Horton Cooley proclaimed that Spencer was the reason that many people took up sociology in the late 19th century. Spencer's influence cannot be overestimated. By 1903 sales of his books totalled 368,755. It was he who coined the term "survival of the fittest" in his 1852 article entitled, "A Theory of Population Deduced from the General Law of Animal Fertility." It is safe to say that Spencer was no Marxist. He was an ontological nominalist and political ultra-conservative who repudiated governmental interference. A laissez-faire advocate, he maintained not only that the "unfit" are eliminated, but also that they should be eliminated, saying that such is nature's law. He opposed the poor laws and he even stood against the state's protecting the mentally deficient from medical quackery.

The United States provided a welcome audience for Spencer and Social Darwinism. Hofstadter makes this point explicitly:
With its rapid expansion, exploitative methods, its desperate competition, and its peremptory rejection of failure, post-bellum America was like a vast human caricature of the Darwinian struggle for existence and survival of the fittest. Successful business entrepreneurs apparently accepted almost by instinct the Darwinian terminology which seemed to portray the conditions of their existence.5

The nation was provided with a secular justification of its development. Railroad magnates such as Chauncey Depew and James J. Hill could be found making speeches filled with Darwinian concepts such as "superiority," "survival of the fittest," "adaptation," and "struggle." John D. Rockefeller argued that big business consisted of the fittest carrying out the work of God. Yet, no one could top Andrew Carnegie who liked Spencer's work so much that he followed Spencer, became his intimate friend and lavished gifts upon him. When Spencer came to the United States in the 1880's, banquets were held in his honor.

Social Darwinism also had political implications. Its message was fully endorsed by Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt encouraged the nation not to be isolated or unwarlike lest it perish. He exhorted his country to be "adventurous" (his notion of adventure seems tinted with jingoism). One can, with considerable justification, accuse the United States of conducting a foreign policy at the turn of the century of racism and imperialism. The leaders at the time maintained thinly veiled Darwinist notions of Anglo-Saxon superiority. Between the years 1898 and 1902 the United States:

1) fought a war with Spain;
2) obtained the Philippines;
3) annexed the Hawaiian Islands;
4) helped partition Samoa;  
5) fought against the Boxer Rebellion in China;  
6) militarily intervened in the Philippines.

It appears that some notion of being the fittest lurked behind these actions. Senator Albert T. Beveridge (quoted in Hofstadter) declared before the Senate in 1899 that God prepared the English speaking Teutonic people to be masters and to bring order where chaos existed. He interpreted this to mean that the United States had the divine right of unilateral intervention, a responsibility which Theodore Roosevelt argued the country could not deny. Jack London reinforced such beliefs and actions by writing of the "yellow peril" (a notion not lost, as we have seen above, on Edward Alsworth Ross).

Although Social Darwinism declined in its popularity at the turn of the century, it did not die altogether. Its reappearance can be noted in the eugenics movement of 1900-15 which was led by Darwin's cousin, Francis Galton. This movement, called a fad by Hofstadter, had enough strength to foster the establishment of an American Genetics Association in 1913. This association evolved out of a eugenics subsection of the American Breeders' Association (1903). In 1910, Cold Springs Harbor was created by a group of eugenists. It served as a eugenics record office, a laboratory and a propaganda center.

The core of Social Darwinism contained five basic elements: private property, individualism, competition, science and progress. Private property, for the Social Darwinist, was the reward of those who succeeded and had thus proven their fitness. The more property one possessed the more this was seen as proof of one's adaptability. Similarly,
American individualism was endorsed. The possession of property was indicative of the fact that an individual possessed unusual qualities or talents. These gifts allowed one to make better adaptations to life and thus survive and prosper.

Competition was also explicitly endorsed. Competition was the struggle for existence. This struggle was a test which measured one's fitness (i.e., survival of the fittest). Competition was regarded as natural law, and the accumulation of huge fortunes was justified by the concept of natural selection. The proletariat's position in such a scheme was not the way Marx pictured it. Essentially, Social Darwinism condemned the proletariat to its position. The Social Darwinist proclaimed that the proletariat got what it deserved because of its unfit nature; that is, such people had been selected out in the struggle for existence, for only the fittest survive. Candidly, oppression was justified in such terms.

Science, especially biology, was also a central tenet of Social Darwinism. It was science, rather than religion, which provided Social Darwinism with a system of beliefs. Science provided a secular justification for the ruthless competition and the massive accumulation of capital which was taking place in the United States. It argued not only that the fit are eliminated but also (according to science) that they should be eliminated.

Social Darwinism offered a reassuring theory of progress. Progress was guaranteed. This notion was based on the achievements of those who adapt (survive) because of differential talents. In essence, inequality was justified. Yet, this progress could continue only if there was no
government interference (laissez-faire) and no reform.

Social Darwinism was quick to catch on in the United States because it fit in with the dominant business mood of the country. It contained popular catchwords such as "struggle for existence" and "survival of the fittest." It supported the idea that all sound development must proceed slowly and unhurriedly. It could be used by any laissez-faire advocate who opposed social reform. In an era of rugged individualism it appealed to many not just because it justified ruthless competition, but also because of its anti-sentimental tone.

Social Darwinism was popularized in Edward L. Youman's *Popular Science Monthly* which began publication in 1872, twelve years after *Origin of the Species* was published in the United States. It quickly became fashionable essentially because it fit in with the scenario of America at the time. It provided the country with a reassuring theory of progress as well as providing intellectuals with a macro theory to explain social reality.
Rejection of Socialism in the United States

Socialism was not a major part of American politics or the American labor movement in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In spite of the high development of capitalism, there was little socialism to speak of. Socialism's strongest proponents were intellectuals and German immigrants whose efforts met with overwhelming failure. The reasons for this lack of success are varied, but basically they revolve around several issues. Fundamentally, Marx and socialism experienced difficulty in the United States on four levels:

1) collective ownership
2) notion of the good of the whole
3) hostility to religious values
4) notion of revolution.

Complementing these points were several supplementary factors, such as the pragmatism of the American labor movement and the fortuitous coincidence of the increase in political power of the Socialist Party and the occurrence of World War I. In effect, a conservative defense was established against any efforts on behalf of Marxism or socialism.

Probably the most basic element involved in the failure of socialism in the United States was the notion of collective ownership of the (major) means of production. Such a notion contradicted a fundamental tenet of American life—the sanctity of private property. This also ran against the grain of American individualism which held that an individual has a right to enjoy what he or she has gained. Socialism was perceived as advocating the good of the whole (collectivism), as opposed to the good
of the individual.

Post Civil War America provided a congenial atmosphere for individualism. In the United States following the Civil War, rapid economic expansion provided considerable opportunity for many individuals to move upward occupationally. In addition, American society had an absence of formal institutionalized status limitations; e.g., the untouchables in India. In such an environment Horatio Alger myths of the self-made man flourished. It is interesting to note that the hero of the Horatio Alger stories was a middle-class person whose success always derived from a stroke of luck rather than from hard work. \(^{46}\) Rags to riches stories helped to smooth over the fact that small businesses could no longer compete with corporations. They served to preserve a tradition which was no longer viable, if it ever was. These stories also provided bromides such as, "If at first you don't succeed . . ." and "Where there's a will . . ." that could be used to affirm the advantages a person had under capitalism.

The American dream seems to have been very strong during this era. Its notion of a classless society in which everyone could make it if he or she tried pervaded every aspect of life in the United States. Even when socialism found its way into print, it was forced into a framework of individualism; a framework in which no Marxist could recognize it. Sidney Hook\(^{47}\) offers a provocative analysis of why socialism has not been more successful in the United States. Hook wonders why, in spite of the reasonableness of the socialist argument, socialist writings have made little headway, especially with the working-class of the United States. He locates the explanation in the social psychological
plane, saying that Americanism is itself a kind of surrogate socialism. While socialism promised a classless society, Americanism claimed it already had one. Americanism boasted that the United States was the land of opportunity and equality, where the standard of living was continually on the rise, and no limitations on its rise existed. At every point socialism promised something which America supposedly already delivered. In addition, the absence of a feudal past and aristocratic traditions in conjunction with democratic public manners denying the propriety of inequalitarian public behavior (slavery was a glaring exception) also served to construct an image that the benefits promised by socialism already existed in America.

The vast ethnic heterogeneity of the labor force in the United States after the Civil War made organization and unity difficult to achieve. The labor force was never "stable." It was continually enlarged by immigrants who often spoke a different language and had a difference culture. Such differences stood in the way of the development of revolutionary class consciousness.

Socialism was also viewed as being hostile to the religious values held by most Americans. Unlike Europe, the United States did not (and does not) have any widespread anti-clericalism. Even among those in the United States who were not affiliated with religious groups there was no articulated opposition to religious values. Socialism was perceived as being antithetical to the conception of a deity.

Americans distanced themselves from socialism because of what they perceived to be appeal for a violent revolutionary conflict which would result in total societal reconstruction. They opted instead for gradual,
partial or "piecemeal" peaceful change through social reform. The availability of the vote may also have had a cooptive influence, especially on labor.

Complementing this "core" of the American rejection of socialism were several ancillary factors. Socialism received a severe setback when the pragmatic anti-socialist Samuel Gompers became head of the AFL, after the socialists nearly took control of the union in 1893. As spokesperson for the AFL, Gompers was able to drown out the protests of socialist labor leaders, such as Daniel de Leon, Lucien Sanial and Eugene Debs.

The structure of labor relations during this period contributed to the strong adherence of Americans to individualism. Labor must be considered against the background of the strength of the institution of private property which was so firm in the United States (and still is today). When one speaks of labor in the United States, one must remember, first and foremost, that one is talking of labor situated in the heart of the world capitalist enterprise whose basic characteristic is private property, individually owned and controlled. Relatively speaking, collectivism in American labor was much weaker than in European countries, such as England and France; countries with different conceptions of distribution, labor relations and management.

Predominantly, American labor, from its first rumblings in the late 19th century to the present day, has been trade unionist and individualist. The predominant issue for the American worker has always been distribution; i.e., wage, salary or health-care benefits. It is extremely rare that control or management of the productive apparatus ever becomes
an issue. Class conflict is thus limited, constrained and institutionalized. The issues do not become macro or ideological. The primary issue is an hourly wage. There almost never was or is a discussion of control of the surplus. What has resulted is stable passive unionism. By recognizing the fundamental nature of the United States, the AFL achieved dominance in the 1890's, as its rival, the Knights of Labor, disappeared. Perlman points out that the AFL survived because "it recognized the virtually unalterable conservatism of the American community as regards private property and private initiative in economic life." The "left wing" of America's labor once attempted to take control of the leadership of the AFL but failed. The institution of private property remained unmolested.

Socialism's brightest moment came in 1912 when it captured 6% of the vote and elected one socialist congressional representative. However, that was the year in which the pragmatist Woodrow Wilson was elected. In his New Freedom program, Wilson created the Department of Labor, which satisfied a good number of dissidents. He then installed William Wilson, a UMW official in the position of Secretary of Labor. Wilson coopted the reform elements of the Socialist's Party and this process culminated in the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914, which Gompers labelled the "Magna Carta of Labor."

World War I put the final blow to the socialist movement. Some socialists supported the war while others, such as William Walling, supported Wilson's reelection effort. Gompers threw the total support of the AFL behind the war. The United States government also helped foster the decline of socialism. Max Eastman, editor of Masses, was
indicted under the Espionage Act. Curiously, he soon changed his stance from opposition to support of the war. Bell reports that the government continued its crackdown throughout the war. The Espionage Act which originally forbade obstruction of recruitment and insubordination in the armed forces was broadened drastically in 1918 to include profane, scurrilous and abusive language about the government and the constitution. The Post Office was given the power to remove from the mail all materials violating the Act. This effectively shut down the Socialist Press by eliminating its First Amendment rights. Bell lists the following closings:

1) American Socialist
2) Milwaukee Leader
3) New York Call
4) Jewish Daily Forward
5) Masses
6) Social Revolution
7) International Socialist Review

Socialism was, in effect, being censored and removed from the environment. Such actions certainly would put a damper on any influence Marx could have had.

The Espionage Act was an effective tool utilized by the United States government to eradicate socialism. It was used to indict almost every major Socialist Party official. Approximately 2,000 were brought to trial on charges stemming from the application of that Act. In essence, the demand for national unity justified and permitted legislative and court action against expressions of dissidence.
Socialism was resisted by what Curti\textsuperscript{52} labels "the conservative defense" which is best epitomized by a quote from William Graham Sumner:

An air of contentment and enthusiastic cheerfulness characterizes the thought and temper of the American people. The growing strength of socialism and of reform ideology had not materially shaken the traditionally individualistic and optimistic faith of the great mass of the American people.\textsuperscript{53}

An atmosphere existed which explicitly rejected Marx and socialism.

Any attempt to alter existing conditions had to remain within the boundaries of the prevailing capitalist system.

\textbf{Conclusion}

An attempt to account for the nature of the (overwhelmingly negative) reactions to Marx and Marxian socialism presupposes some conception of what is involved in any account. Accordingly, it became important initially to review the major features of the two forms of accounting, explanation and interpretation-understanding, and the distinctive associated modes of epistemology and methodology. Explanation is a hypothetico-deductive or deductive-nomological form of account which tends to be formulated in ahistorical, universalistic, and objective terms. It is based on an empiricist epistemology and a positivistic methodology. By contrast, interpretation-understanding is subjective, intentional, and teleological, and requires the use of empathy within a more or less limited socio-historical context. It is based on an idealist epistemology and a humanistic methodology.

Although the form of accounting adopted in this dissertation does
embody features of the two major forms, it also differs from both. A structuralist explanation, as the position is identified, is substantially objective and historical. It does not assert the ahistorical universalism so characteristic of explanatory accounts and it excludes the subjective intentionality so typical of interpretative accounts.

Now the form of account of sociologists' rejection of Marx and Marxian Socialism is not only substantially explanatory but also structural. Early sociologists' negative reactions were revealed above to be part of or expressive of certain larger wholes, systems, or structures. Their rejections of Marx were thus couched in terms of certain constellations of basic American values (which are also fundamentally middle-class and which seem to have a degree of congruence or unity) and certain tenets of their own professional ideology as sociologists (which also seem to have a degree of congruence or unity). But in addition academia itself had developed a social control system that allowed punitive sanctions (ultimately entailing dismissal) to be imposed on any professors whose public conduct seemed to question the sanctity of basic middle class values such as the espousal of Marxism might have seemed to entail. (Manifestly, the aspects of the various milieux as presented in chapter two are not randomly or haphazardly arranged; they appear to have an operating efficacy as wholes, systems, or structures.) But three of such milieux seem to have a crucial importance in the development of an explanation, a structuralist explanation, for early American sociologists' rejection of Marx and Marxism.

Thus, the very nature of the repudiation of Marx and his ideas clearly reveals that American sociologists' recognized the incompatibility
between the basic values of American society and certain ideas they associated with Marx. They accepted the significance of religion and the belief in a personal Deity, the centrality of the individual (and an associated individualism), the right of private property, inter-class cooperation (although others such as Sumner and Giddings stress competition), and progress as entailing reform.

Equally significant were sociologists' commitment to a professional ideology which seemed to be at variance with Marx's views. This ideology involved commitments to reformism, scientism, voluntarism and evolutionary naturalism.

But it is also evident that sociologists' repudiation of Marx was based on more than mere logical incompatibility between what his views seemed to entail and what the character of the basic values of their own society and their own professional ideology demanded. Sociologists were professionally part of a college-university system the governing structure (boards of trustees and administrations ranging from presidents down to departmental chairs or heads) of which demanded adherence to middle class values both outside and inside the classroom. The academic freedom cases of Ely, Ross, and Bemis in particular served as very tangible reminders of what might occur if the boundaries of permissible dissent were violated.

It is also important that the bases on which early sociologists rejected Marx were also the bases in terms of which American more broadly accepted. Progressivism, Social Reformism and even Social Darwinism and more broadly rejected socialism in the United States. Thus, the
explanation advanced for sociologists' repudiation of Marx is congruent with the acceptance (or rejection) of certain broader social movements in then contemporary American society.
Notes to Chapter 4

1. The difference between explanation and understanding and its relevance to my problem was first suggested by Gisela J. Hinkle.


27. Ibid., pp. 143-161.

28. Ibid., pp. 165-198.
30. Ibid., p. 205.
31. Ibid., pp. 229-259.
38. Ibid., pp. 58, 59.
40. R. Hofstadter, Op. Cit., p. 145N. Hofstadter utilizes Alfred D. Chandler's "The Origins of Progressive Leadership" in Elting Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Vol. 8 (Cambridge, 1954), pp. 1462-65. The reader will also note that the figures add to 261, not 260. I was unable to determine whether this was an error in calculation or in editing.
41. Ibid., p. 7.


44. The following discussion relies heavily on Richard Hofstadter's Social Darwinism and American Thought (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1944).

45. Ibid., p. 44.


50. Ibid., p. 315.
51. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
This inquiry has been a case study in the sociology of sociology. The central problem of this dissertation was to ascertain the nature of the reception accorded Karl Marx in early American sociology and how this reception may be explained. The years 1895-1920 represent the beginning years of early American sociology. Roughly, this time period extends from the year when AJS was established (and the sociology department of the University of Chicago was emerging) to the beginning of American sociology's first "empirical age."

The organization of the dissertation follows from the basic nature of the problem. Chapter three was a presentation of the character of the reactions of early American sociologists to Karl Marx. Chapter four consisted of an explanation of the reactions to Marx and Marxist socialism. Chapter two was a consideration of the contexts of early American sociology. The rationale for chapter two was twofold. Since the problem of the dissertation is historical, this chapter served as a contextual orientation to the era in which the problem was set. Secondly, it provided a foundation for the explanation of the reactions contained in chapter four.

Of the four milieux analyzed in chapter two, the first concerns the changing structure of post-Civil War American society. Following the Civil War, millions of immigrants came to the United States. In

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the years 1890-1920, 18,217,761 people arrived in America from other countries. Most of these new immigrants settled in the urban north. These immigrants combined with the thousands of new urban residents who travelled to the city from farms to find work (having been displaced by improvements in agricultural production) and provided a labor pool for manufacturing which was growing rapidly. Indeed, by the year 1900 the United States was the leading industrial power in the world. Accompanying the dual processes of immigration and industrialization was the continual urbanization of America. Because of these various developments the market place expanded to the national and international level. This process was facilitated by the passage of various incorporation laws which made the accumulation of capital easier as investors could now pool their assets. In addition, liability was limited to shareholdings. More importantly, the corporation by virtue of its legal status acquired a life of its own and (barring bankruptcy) could persist indefinitely beyond the life-spans of any of its shareholders.

Essentially, American sociology arose as the United States economy became one of corporate capitalism. Thousands of firms disappeared at the turn of the century as merger capitulations resulted in the concentration and centralization of capital. The formation of trusts and monopolies occurred as labor passively witnessed the process.

The infrastructure of change in the American social structure took place within a superstructure of persistent values; values which also form part of the context of early American sociology. Four basic sets of values were discussed in chapter two. These values provided a framework within which solutions to the social problems created by the infra-
structural transformations e.g. slums, crime and poor sanitation, were sought. In addition, early American sociology was provided with a set of parameters which demarcated the range of valid inquiry (critiques of American social structure and institutions lay outside of this range). Another context for early American sociology was provided by (changes in) higher education. The university system was created in the United States in response to the demands of industrialism and corporate capitalism. Within this university system, professional sociology emerged (from a more amateurish social science). Like the solution to the problems created by changes in the infrastructure, the contexts of higher education, social science and sociology operated within well-defined limits.

Early American sociologists grounded their interpretations of social phenomena within a framework formed, for the most part, by their backgrounds (which combined rural living with firm religious teaching). Fundamentally, these early sociologists were committed to science, naturalism and positivism.

Chapter three provided the basic data for addressing the central problem of the dissertation—the character of the reactions of early American sociologists to Karl Marx. Marx was rarely mentioned and his literature was even more rarely cited by early American sociologists. Even when he was referred to, the references were very brief. Ward referred to Marx only twice by name in all of his voluminous writings, never providing a footnote or bibliographical citation to any of Marx's work. Sumner never referred to Marx by name and his literature contains but one citation of Marx's work—a brief allusion to Das
Kapital. Similarly, references to Marx and his literature by Giddings, Ross and Cooley were few and far between. Ellwood and Small provided the most extensive comments on Marx and his work, although such comments represent a very small portion of their total writings. Generally speaking, references to Marx within books, the Publications of the American Sociological Society (PASS), and the American Journal of Sociology (AJS) during the years 1895-1920 can best be described as very infrequent. Indeed, much more space was devoted to religion in early American sociology than to Marx.

The references to Marx were categorized as positive, indifferent and negative. But, the overwhelming majority of the reactions to Marx were negative. In turn, these reactions were classifiable into six types.

First, early American sociologists regarded Marx as scientifically inadequate. In their view he was a political propagandist who was at odds with the laws of nature. They argued that materialism was contradicted by the historical record.

Secondly, early figures in American sociology depicted Marx as simplistic and mechanistic. They contended that he failed to consider ideas, religion, nationalism and democracy. His perceived "economic interpretation of history" ignored the complexities of social life.

Third, Marx's division of the social structure into a dichotomy of classes met with disapproval. Although the early American sociologists conceded that classes exist, they repudiated Marx's notion that the relationship between classes was characterized by conflict. Instead, they stressed that the foundation of society was cooperation.
A fourth criticism of Marx's work was its failure to recognize the psychological aspect of social reality. Essentially, early sociologists held that sociology should have a psychological base. Since Marx did not make psychology an integral part of his work he was denied any claim to being scientific.

Fifth, Marx and his ideas were seen as representing a dangerous threat to American individualism. Indeed Marx and socialism were construed to be antithetical to individualism (and democracy as well).

Sixth, Marx's opposition to the institution of private property created considerable consternation. Such a notion was threatening because it questioned the basis of the prevailing social order.

Chapter four provided an explanation of the reactions to Marx and Marxist socialism. A structuralist approach was utilized as the reactions to Marx were visualized in relation to various contexts or structures in the environment of early American sociology. These contexts or structures impinged upon early American sociology, limiting and constraining the range and scope of its inquiry. These structures were first presented in chapter two (which laid the foundation for chapter four). Academia, social science, sociology, the changing structure of post Civil War American society and the persistent values of American society constitute such structures as well as serving as a setting for early American sociology. The structuralist approach provided a clear and systematic method for explaining the reactions. The mode of accounting utilized in chapter four was explanation (in contrast to interpretation-understanding). Explanation is a hypothetico-deductive form of account which is formulated in ahistorical, universalistic,
and objective terms. It has its base in an empiricist epistemology and a positivistic methodology. By contrast, interpretation-understanding is subjective and teleological. It has its base in an idealist epistemology and a humanistic methodology.

The form of accounting adopted in this dissertation while embodying features of the two major forms, also differed from both. The position adhered to was objective and historical. It did not assert the ahistorical universalism characteristic of explanation and it excluded the subjective intentionality typical of interpretive accounts.

Early American sociology, as a form of knowledge production, was shaped and constrained by the prevailing social formation. This social formation or global structure is composed of individual structures, such as the economy, higher education, social science, sociology and the persistent value structure of American society. This global structure or totality is essentially a structure of structures. Determination is seen as complex and multiple. The role of the subject is seen as subordinate. Since these structures precluded any basic critique of American institutions, Karl Marx and Marxism were defined as being beyond the parameters of valid inquiry for sociology. (The foundation for this explanation was set forth in chapter two.)

The rejection of Marx reflected the beliefs, values and ideas of American society in general. One of the reasons Marx was rejected was because of his perceived negative stance on religion. The comments of Giles, Monroe, Matthews and Small are illustrative of this reaction. In addition, sociologists such as Small, Ellwood and Ross repudiated Marx because of his emphasis on conflict in social life (at the expense
of cooperation).

Even more of the opposition of American sociologists to Marx stems from adherence to a set of dominant, secular, middle-class values, e.g., individualism, competition, and natural law. In addition, the early sociologists accepted and defended private property, a position in diametric opposition to Marx. In essence, they all supported capitalism. Giddings not only offered his support to capitalism, but also argued for its expansion.

The rejection of Marx also reflected the basic intellectual assumptions and commitments of early American sociology itself. These commitments included scientism, an opposition to determinism, psychologism, voluntarism and positivism.

The opposition to Marx was reinforced by restrictions on academic freedom. If one was labelled "a socialist" one's career was placed in serious jeopardy. Consequently many early social scientists and sociologists became quite cautious as to what they said, wrote or taught. If one stepped beyond the boundaries of permissible dissent, severe sanctions were applied, e.g., Adams, Ely, Commons, Bemis and Ross. The control of the board of trustees by the most conservative elements in the community made certain lessons manifest. One should avoid radicalism, socialism and public advocacy, but at all times adhere to the notion of scientific objectivity. These academic freedom cases functioned to ensure compliance. The result was that early American sociology was practiced without reference to either Marx or socialism.

The rejection of Marx-Marxism by early American sociologists was congruent with and indeed involved the same reasons as the general re-
jection of Marx-Marxism in the post Civil War United States. The core of this rejection included an adherence to private property, individualism, religiosity and optimism and progress. These elements were the major reasons why social reformism (particularly Populism and Progressivism) and Social Darwinism were accepted while socialism was rejected. If change was to occur, it would have to occur within limits. The parameters or limits were set by the various structures outlined (not by the motives, intentions, or wills or any individuals). Marx did not lie within these parameters. Given the assumptions of early American sociology and American society, Marx was inevitably rejected.
Implications of the Study

As this study indicates, Karl Marx had little, if any, effect on early American sociology. The absence of such an effect was not the result of value neutrality or discipline-wide objectivity. The reason for such an absence lies in the unreflective assumption of the coincidence of fact and value. Indeed, one task which the sociology of sociology performs for the general discipline of sociology is the investigation of its central tenets, e.g., value neutrality. Despite protests to the contrary by many present day and early American sociologists, it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate value and judgement.

The structures which impinged upon early American sociology served as a form of ideological social control. They performed a prohibitive function, defining certain ideas or ideologies as being beyond the domain of sociology (as a science). Marx was thus rejected. Yet, it seems that such a rejection has continued. Certainly many of the structures discussed in relation to early American sociology still exist. Private property is still highly regarded and the economy remains a corporate capitalist one. The boards of trustees of the universities still reflect the most conservative elements of their communities. The basic values of Americans have persisted since the turn of the century—individualism, religiosity, freedom, democracy, optimism, progress, beneficence of knowledge, etc. In essence, the basic structure of modern American society is quite similar to the basic structure which existed when American sociology was taking shape. Indeed, sociology is now,
as it was then, almost exclusively a university enterprise. Given
this situation, one should not expect a dissimilar reaction to Marx.
However, this is certainly an empirical question to be answered in
future inquiries. Yet, some preliminary questions or hypotheses can
be suggested.

Following the period of this study, American sociology began to
focus on a more micro level. It entered its first empirical period
which lasted until the depression when social action theory emerged
which posited that a theoretical convergence existed upon which American
sociology could build. Although this convergence included Durkheim,
Pareto and Weber, Marx's name was conspicuously absent. Later elements
of social action theory were displaced while others were incorporated
into the framework of structural functionalism which remained dominant
until the 1960's. At this time it encountered criticism which sub­
stantially undermined its tenability. In all of these periods, evidence
of any significant Marxist influence is lacking. Such a lack of in­
fluence seems to exist even to the present day as new fields of theoreti­
cal endeavor such as ethnomethodology become more popular. The new
fields of study appear to express assumptions similar to the ones
expressed by early American sociology, e.g., individualism and volun­
tarism. Private property and corporate capitalism still remain largely
unchallenged (as if they were beyond the boundaries of valid inquiry).
Again, more empirical study is needed to determine if these preliminary
hypotheses are valid, but this present study indicates that such hypo­
theses are at least plausible.

It does seem curious that a figure such as Karl Marx who has had
such an intellectual and political effect on the world has received so little attention. As Isaiah Berlin wrote, "No thinker in the nineteenth century has had so direct, deliberate, and powerful an influence upon mankind as Karl Marx."\(^1\) Karl Marx certainly does warrant study by American sociology.

This inquiry also has implications for understanding the structure of the discipline. This understanding can be accomplished most readily by combining this study with others which have examined the relationship between dominant ideas in the discipline and dominant societal values and the reception of foreign sociologists. Of particular interest here is Hinkle's "Durkheim in American Sociology."\(^2\) Although Hinkle's article covers three time periods (1890-1917, 1918-1929, 1930-1939), the present concern will be basically with the first period, 1890-1917, for this roughly overlaps with the years covered in this dissertation.

Interestingly, Hinkle found that in the years 1890-1917 Emile Durkheim was generally disregarded. Of his major studies only The Division of Labor and The Elementary Forms of Religious Life were reviewed in the AJS. Although Durkheim was a foreign editor of AJS, he never contributed an article.\(^3\) The reaction to Durkheim was generally negative (as was the case with Marx). The basic objection was to Durkheim's social realism which was viewed as metaphysical. In addition, his realist stance was criticized for disregarding volition and demeaning and destroying the role of the individual in social causation. Such objections reflect early American sociology's commitment to individualism, nominalism and voluntarism.\(^4\) Interestingly, these factors were also influential in early American sociology's rejection of
Marx. Marx did, however, come under heavier criticism for, unlike Durkheim, his stances were seen as being irreligious and firmly against the institution of private property. Nevertheless, the conclusions of both studies support each other. That is, any figure who appeared to be in opposition to American individualism, voluntarism and nominalism (in Marx's case private property and religion as well) was rejected by early American sociology. Hinkle's analysis of the two succeeding periods (1918-1929, 1930-39) suggests that such factors continued to be influential in the reception of Durkheim which indicates that these elements have considerable continuity beyond early American sociology. An analysis of the reception of Marx in these time periods could be very revealing. Quite possibly a deep structure which has existed since the beginnings of American sociology continues to constrain inquiry.

Both of these studies concern the rejection of a particular individual (Marx or Durkheim) by American sociology. It would be interesting to contrast such studies with the investigation of why a particular foreign figure was favorably accepted by early American sociology. For instance, Georg Simmel seems to have been received positively. Simmel had several of his articles translated by Small for AJ/S. In addition, his ideas did not meet with the same rejection as those of Marx or Durkheim.

Another foreign figure who has been positively received by American sociology is Max Weber. Although little was known about Weber by early American sociologists, since 1930 his influence on American sociology has been evident in the study of social organization as well as sociological theory. Perhaps his emphasis on Protestantism
(as an independent variable) or his stress on subjective meaning and volition have been factors in his positive reception.

For these studies a structural approach is suggested. Such an approach allows one to avoid the pitfalls of psychologism. Relations between structures assume a higher priority than relations between individuals. Essentially a series of structures form a global totality which limits the range of variation. This global formation establishes probability rather than rigidly or mechanistically determining. Often this structure contains a hidden logic which cannot be grasped at the level of mere appearance therefore one must probe beyond this level into the deep structure. Marx did this when he uncovered the true nature of capital-labor relations. Although the relationship between capital and labor, on the surface, appears to be egalitarian and voluntary its internal structure (or hidden logic) is actually coercive (the worker is forced to sell his or her labor as a commodity on the market). Clearly a social realist position is involved. Also, the structuralism suggested here is not the type which Levi-Strauss employs but rather of the type which Marx and Durkheim utilized. Macro structures are used without reference to such things as binary codes of human cognition. Individual motives, feelings, and drives are of secondary importance. This study, for instance, benefitted by concentrating on the economy, higher education and values rather than the individual motivations of the early sociologists e.g. Small or Giddings. Hopefully, this study has contributed to such an approach.
Notes to Chapter 5


3. Ibid., p. 267.

4. Ibid., p. 271.
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Small, Albion. "The Scope of Sociology." *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 5, 3, 4, 5; Vol. 6, 1, 2, 3, 4; and Vol. 8, 2.


