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Mehrdad, Hormoz

POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS AND THE STYLE OF INTERGROUP LEADERSHIP INTERACTIONS: THE CASE OF IRANIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

The Ohio State University

Ph.D. 1980

University Microfilms International

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To my two dear sisters

Saltanat and Farokh
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I wish to thank, as so many have thanked before, the members of my reading committee—Professors Giacomo A. Sani and Goldie A. Shabad for their constructive criticism and suggestions. My greatest debt, however, is to my main adviser, Professor R. William Liddle who not only provided me with helpful suggestions and comments on this dissertation, he was also a constant source of inspiration and encouragement to me throughout my Ph.D. program at the Political Science Department. I thank all of them for both their patience in receiving and their promptness in returning my efforts. I thank them for forcing me to think more and to think again.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Close observation of contemporary Iranian politics discerns a cyclical pattern or a pendulum type movement in which each period of constitutionally ruled government is superseded by a long duration of authoritarian regimes. During the last seventy years, since the Iranian constitutional revolution in 1906, there have been several attempts by the forces of pro-constitutional governments to model Iranian politics on the pattern of Western democratic systems. For instance, they tried to separate the powers of three branches of government (executive, legislative, and judiciary). They formed political parties, legally guaranteed the freedom of the press, expression of ideas and opinions and formation of opposition. They tried it in 1910, 1941, and 1951, but it never worked and each time the constitutional governments failed to survive. Since February 10, 1979, they have been trying it again with the Shah gone and Ayatollah Khomenei, the symbol of national liberation and freedom, at the apex. There are already signs which show that the old pattern of interactions and divisions are emerging and, once more, the system is gradually sliding toward another deadlock, with a tendency among political forces to dominate one another rather than to accommodate each other.
Questions that one may raise are why the constitutional governments could not hold on? Why democratic institutions could not survive? Why did the system behave in the way it did? Certainly, explanations as to what caused these failures varies from scholar to scholar and interpretations are different. But at this point, I would like to stress the view expressed by Almond and Verba who would explain this phenomenon in terms of differences in political orientations and style. Orientations are predispositions to political action and are determined by such factors as traditions, historical memories, motives, norms, emotions, and symbols. To be more specific, it refers to the "Attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system." Thus, one may hypothesize that the failure of pro-constitutional forces in Iran in their attempt to establish a democratic system are primarily due to the absence of the kind of political orientations which are generally supportive of democratic institutions and processes. Or the operating political orientations in Iran are incongruent with democratic norms and processes.

To explain contemporary Iranian politics I have chosen the twin concepts of political orientation and political style for two reasons. First, they contribute to understanding of the nature of relationships between the political culture and the system's performance in Iran and help to explain how progressive political changes might be brought about. Moreover, as two main components of political culture and as universal theoretical formula, these concepts help to explain why broadly similar phenomena across nations produce dissimilar
results. Secondly, a political culture approach enhances our ability to describe and analyze the interactions between the political system and its culture. For instance, it tells us that the citizens' attitudes toward the political system clearly affect the kinds of demands made, the way they are expressed, the responses of the elites, the style of their interaction, the reserves of popular support for the regime—in sum, the orientations which condition the performance of the political system. By distinguishing between behavior and attitudes, we are able to explicate differences in performance across political systems and structures in terms of the culture. Political culture, it should be added, is not divorced from a "culture" in the widest social sense. It is closely related to the cultural values and orientations more generally. However, it focuses attention on the part of culture which bears relevance to politics. Thus, the central importance of the concept of political culture is that it assists us to take our bearing in the study of the political life of a society to describe, analyze and order many significant data, and to raise fruitful questions for thought and research.

It is my premise that the Iranian cultural environment, more or less independently of the current real situation, affects the people's political orientations and style. Although I am primarily concerned to evaluate the Iranian politics in terms of orientations and style, I do not intend to minimize the impact of other factors, e.g., structural, institutional, on political behavior. For instance, Marxists would argue that ideas and emotions together with the
political institutions are merely the consequences of class relationships and the economic structure. Unfortunately, space does not permit anything like a full examination in this study of the relationship between different factors, let us say, between social structure, economic development and political culture. That would be a subject study for a book. However, it does not seem to be unreasonable to assume at least initially that there is a significant connection between social structure and political culture. But on the evidence available it is hard to simply conclude that the social structure conditions political culture to a greater extent than, let us say, the specific historical experience of a people. It is quite possible to find societies of a similar level of economic development and of similar class structures with, nevertheless, striking differences of political culture. For instance, the Soviet Union ranks among the most economically developed nations in the world. The Soviet example hardly supports the hypothesis that economic development and constitutionalism or political competitiveness go hand in hand. The same conclusion applies to Cuba and Venezuela, ranked third and fifth economically, in Latin America. France and Germany also provide evidence which runs counter to the hypothesis that highly educated and industrialized societies provide the most suitable environment for stable democracies. The history of France and Germany in this century particularly the unhappy history of the Weimar Republic and the case of many states in the so-called developing areas which tried hard, rather unsuccessfully, to duplicate
the democratic constitutions, underline the significance of the
beliefs, values and motives of the people working the institutions.
India, Sri Lanka however, have been able to support, more or less, a
democratic political system amidst conditions that place those
countries at the lower end of the economic development scale.
Therefore, some scepticism should be expressed about the malleability
of political culture.

It would be more reasonable to believe that institutional
structures and even overt patterns of political behavior can be changed much more quickly than political cultures, so that a revolutionary change in the political system opens up the possibility of incongruity between the political culture and the political system. Whether the new institutions can then create a "new" political culture or whether the functioning of the new institutions becomes modified or significantly changed by the "old" political culture is an open question, and an important matter for empirical investigation. At any rate, the dimension of time seems to be crucial here.

Concerning the Iranian case, the economic modernization of Iran began immediately, but at a slow pace, after the constitutional revolution in 1906. The process was intensified in 1921-1941, during the Reza Shah's regime and reached its peak in the Seventies during Mohammad Reza Shah's reign. Therefore, despite the economic growth, the Iranian political culture has not undergone any significant change. On the contrary, the three historical cases presented in this study clearly demonstrates the continuation of
traditional interaction in Iranian politics. It should be added that when we refer to the political culture of a society, we are talking about aggregates of individuals. For instance, when we say that the political culture of a society has remained intact in a certain period of time, it does not necessarily mean that all members of that society have not changed. We are talking about the dominant political culture in that society. A dominant political culture is one in which the main elements of its value system is shared by the majority of its population. In other words, there should be a wide-ranging consensus on fundamental beliefs and values within that society.

The purpose of this project is twofold; first, to identify the patterns of political orientations of Iranian individuals towards certain political objects; second, to explicate Iranian political style and its relationship to intergroup leadership interactions.

Numerous articles and books have been written on various aspects of Iranian politics, including political parties, in pre and post-war Iran. But detailed studies on political orientations and Iranian political style are rare, despite the growing awareness of the urgent need for a better understanding of the government and politics in contemporary Iran. Even among those who have tried to deal with such matters, the focus of study has generally been on the whole political system in a parochial manner, their analyses consist of descriptions of Iranian political history rather than scientific study of contemporary political problems. The reasons for the scarcity of such studies are both numerous and understandable. The
lack of reliable and readily available information concerning the attitudinal and organizational details involved is one of the more obvious obstacles. The political atmosphere in general and the traditional tendency in the Iranian society to keep away from political matters, and the prevailing feeling of distrust among both elite and non-elite make it extremely difficult for genuine research. Under such prevailing circumstances I have made the initial attempt, albeit tentative and inconclusive, to investigate some selected aspects of Iranian politics at sub-system levels in the hope of making some meaningful, if tentative, generalizations about the Iranian political system.

The purpose of this brief introduction becomes fourfold: (i) to critically review the concept of "political development" and its distinction from other types of "developments" in the social sciences; (ii) to explicate, rather briefly, the different approaches to political development; (iii) to discuss and elaborate the theoretical framework adopted in this particular study; (iv) to discuss methods and procedures used in this project.

Political Development vs. Other Types of Development

The major question that every student of comparative politics asks himself is, what is "political development"? What is meant by it? What are its goals? And finally why the concept of political development?
Social scientists have used the term in different ways and have emphasized different aspects of human activity. This is probably one reason why the term "development" has been interpreted in many ways and often been used interchangeably. For instance, "political development" interchangeably used with such concepts as "modernization," "political modernization," "economic modernization," "economic development," and even some have equated the term with "Westernization." Robert Heilbronner, for instance, in The Great Ascent, frequently uses such terms as modernization, economic development, and political development and frequently exchanges one for the other without defining them, as though they are the same thing. Guy Hunter in Modernizing Peasant: A Comparative Study in Asia and Africa, has apparently mistaken "economic change" for political development, failing to make any distinction. Sometimes "political modernization" is also used to refer to political development. Polk and Chambers in Beginning of Modernization in the Middle East, have used such diverse factors as "unification of society," "growth of transportation and communication," "growth of production," "growth of new-style armies," "population movement toward the urban areas," "rising level of knowledge," to refer to "Westernization," which they have equated with political development.

Political modernization is different from political development because the former generally refers to the aspect of "demonstration effect" of development, such as adopting a "modern" constitution, instituting some kind of party system or establishment of two houses
of parliament, for example. In other words, political modernization is some sort of what is rightly called "institutional engineering;" while political development is generally understood as an internalized or institutionalized system of related values and beliefs which are commonly supportive of a "democratic" system while ensuring its continuity and stability.

There is also a similar confusion between the use of such concepts of "economic development" and economic modernization," on one hand, and political development on the other. Economic development and modernization, also differ from political development in the sense that the former generally refers to a number of economic traits which are presumed to hang together in a systemic relationship which characterizes the "modern" or "developed economy," just as the evidence demonstrates that there is a cluster of traits that hang together in a systemic relationship that characterizes the "modern" or developed polity. Therefore, even though a close link between polity and other socio-economic and environmental factors may exist, what is important in political development are political aspects and relationships. The following paragraphs will further elaborate on this.

Approaches to Political Development

The concept of political development has been defined in all too great a variety of ways. Broadly speaking, theoretical discussions
concerning the structural implications of political development can be divided into two categories. On one side are those who emphasize the emergence of a permanent, depersonalized and centralized set of institutions, "an organ distinct from the rest of society," engaged in authoritative decision-making and implementations. On the other hand, are those who equate political development with "politicization" or "increased participation or involvement of the citizens in state activities, in power calculations and consequences." These two types of theories do not seem to be irreconcilable, and in fact because of the nature of interaction between the two they are even related, because one process tends toward centralization of authority and the second one tends toward the dispersion or the distribution of participation.

The second set of theories have lately been of great interest to the students of comparative politics. They generally emphasize psychological and cultural aspects of politics. These groups of theories have followed different conceptual frameworks and have emphasized different aspects of individual properties and activities. Generally, they have stressed the desirability of citizen participation and involvement in politics. This is because the modern nation-state, despite the traditional societies, requires and encourages its subjects to adopt a different relation to the government. First and foremost, it wants the subject to know not merely about his local community, his tribe and family, but to be aware of what is going on in the nation as a whole. In contemporary politics the subject
is expected to participate in the process of running the country. The nation does not want a passive citizenry but an active one. The view has also been expressed that participation, when it leads to extremism, jeopardizes the stability of the system. Therefore, participation in a democratic system carries with it a set of "democratic values" and beliefs which constantly maintains the continuity and stability of the system through "peaceful" adoption.

Robert Dahl, for instance, has singled out four types of orientations toward salient elements of the culture which distinguishes democratic systems from non-democratic ones. They are: 1) attitudes to problem-solving: are they pragmatic or rationalistic; 2) attitudes to collective action: are they cooperative or non-cooperative; 3) attitudes to the political system: are they alligiant or alienated; 4) attitudes to other people: are they trustful or mistrustful? Dahl has indicated political culture as a factor explaining different patterns of political opposition in Western democracies.

Lucian Pye has been particularly concerned with the aspects of political culture pertaining to political development in the new states. For Pye the indicators of a nation's political culture include such factors as: the scope of politics; how ends and means are related; the standards for the evaluation of political action; the values that are salient for political action.
In a five nation study of political participation based upon an original sample survey, which included the United States, Britain, Germany, Italy, and Mexico, Almond and Verba found that actual political participation is positively correlated with three types of political orientations. They are: cognitive orientation (knowledge and awareness of the political system); affective orientation (emotional disposition to the system); and evaluative orientation (judgment about the system).13

According to Almond and Verba an individual is considered to be a participant when his orientations toward political objects are all positive. Political objects include such parts of the political system as the executive, legislative, and judiciary, the political parties and pressure groups, political leaders and political symbols, the individual's view of himself, and his views of other citizens. Where the citizens manifest a mixed orientation—perceiving themselves as hardly affecting the system though being affected by it—he is considered to be a subject. Where the individual hardly relates himself to the political system at all and has only a dim awareness and knowledge of it, he is classed as a parochial. According to the authors, no country has a uniform political culture. For instance, the participant role does not replace the subject role or the parochial role; it is added to them.14

Subject and parochial orientations, the authors believe, constitute the dominant political culture in developing areas.
Formulation of theories related to the problem of political development does not stop here. Eckstein's theory of Stable Democracy singles out the importance of authority relations, particularly the degree of harmony between a nation's governmental and social structures, in maintaining stable democracy. According to Eckstein it is the social structures, such as the family, the school, and the political structures, such as the parties and pressure groups, which are "adjacent" to the government and prepare individuals for governmental roles. Congruence between governmental and other structures reduce strains and brings about appropriate expectations for future roles.

It should be stated that basic concepts in Eckstein's conceptual framework are often poorly worked out. Unfortunately, he interchanges legitimacy, effectiveness and longevity to indicate political stability. It is not exactly clear how democratic the government is allowed to be for (according to Eckstein) it is supposed to be in harmony with social structures like the family and school in which relations are inevitably directive and out of tune with democratic patterns.

Empathy, or the ability of people to relate to one another, has been singled out by Daniel Lerner as a major psychological base for the support of complex structures and associations which we associate with a developed system. According to Lerner, members of traditional societies are often unwilling to identify beyond members of their immediate kinship circle. The process of industrialization
and urbanism, particularly the greater exposure to the mass media, break down this traditionalism and broaden their outlooks.

Some scholars have emphasized the institutional aspects of political development. Samuel Huntington in Political Order in Changing Societies writes that in developing states, "The primary problem of politics is the lag in development of political institutions behind social and economic change." It is Huntington's belief that this political gap must be closed. Its elimination will allow the creation of political institutions capable of maintaining political order and stability. For this reason Huntington attempts to investigate what factors inhibit or enhance the type of political change able to close the political gap. Huntington asserts that what he calls institutionalization is the best means for reducing the gap. For when social and economic development outstrip political development, there will exist a large number of individuals desirous of participation in the system yet with no outlet, at least politically, for their participation. Thus, chaos is a serious threat in this type of situation. Institutionalization, however, will provide a means or a channel for such participation. "The level of political institutionalization of any political system," Huntington suggests, "can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and procedures. So also, the level of institutionalization of any particular organization or procedure can be measured by its adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence."
Implicit in Huntington's treatment of political change in traditional politics is the notion that regardless of the level of institutionalization of the political system, certain traditional value systems or, what Almond would call political cultures, are more conducive to political stability than are others. Huntington also acknowledges the importance of culture for the development of a political system. He argues that the persistence of traditional values or cultural patterns would impede the institutionalization of a modernizing political system. In other words, old values will prevent the emergence of new ones. This idea is more fully developed in Huntington's article "The Modernization of Traditional Monarchies." In a review of Huntington's work in the American Political Science Review, A. F. K. Organski talks of Huntington's concern "with the creation of political environments responsive to massively and rapidly changing needs." Political culture is one of the primary components of such a "political environment". Yet although Huntington discusses the inhibitive effects of traditional values or cultural patterns, he scarcely provides anything more than the most abstract explanation of the relationship between culture and the establishment of the types of rationalizing, modern political institutions which he prescribes.

In 1956, Almond introduced a fourfold classification about political systems in the world which included Anglo-American, the Continental European, the pre-industrial, and totalitarian political systems. Two years later, in 1958, Pye classified the political
systems into two categories, "Western" and "non-Western," and identified seventeen "distinctive characteristics" for his non-Western political systems. Although the exact formulation of typologies varies from scholar to scholar, there seems to be wide agreement on the basic characteristics which distinguish the participant from non-participant political cultures. For example, it is widely believed that a so-called "developed" polity is organized according to many distinct and functionally specific (as opposed to diffused) institutions. (The term "institution" has been used in social sciences differently and often with imprecision. Frequently it seems to refer only to the formal, legal arrangements of government. In its broadest sociological sense, however, institution refers to the action-orientation patterns. For instance, reference to the institution of party, interest group, court, family, collective bargaining and so on as sets of action-orientation patterns are illustrations of this usage. Institution also refers to the aspect of internalization of values and beliefs according to which action-orientation patterns flow. In this study, institution refers to both an action-orientation pattern and an internalized system of values and beliefs.) These include political parties, associational interest groups, mass media, and various branches of government with a certain degree of autonomy at sub-system levels. Similarly, political actors act in terms of a number of distinct and functionally specific roles. There are, of course, other additional characteristics which are attributed to a developed polity which include orientations
toward achievement rather than ascription, universalism rather than particularism, and secularism, rationalism, and instrumentalism rather than traditionalism, emotionalism and ideologism.\textsuperscript{24}

It should be stressed at this point that the aforementioned concepts and characteristics we attribute to the participant polity or "modern man" represent the ideal types, not the actual, and are simply used for comparative purposes. However, the major drawback of theoretical works reviewed in this section are their inability to describe in any but the most general terms what is meant by a fully developed polity. The characteristics of a developed political system have frequently borne an extraordinary resemblance to principal features of the Anglo-American political systems, and often in somewhat idealized forms. We need to guard against an overly simple view of cultures being either traditional or modern, the former having a value system stressing qualities of ascription, particularism, and diffuseness, the latter stressing norms of equality or achievement, universalism and specificity. The values, it seems to me, are generally mixed within individuals and within the nations. Richard Rose, for instance, has argued that in Britain, secularization of the political culture has not kept pace with the differentiation of the political institutions and the system's capacity for problem-solving.\textsuperscript{25} Robert Ward has stressed how the role of pre-democratic or feudal elements in the political culture of Japan has assisted the development process in that country.\textsuperscript{26} Thus modernity vs.
traditionalism conceptually seems ambiguous and needs more theoretical refinement. As Binder has stated in the initial essay of *Crises and Sequences in Political Development*, "...There is no well-elaborated theory of what a modern society or a developed society should look like...." As it has often been expressed by social scientists, these theories are certainly not free from cultural biases and cultural bounds. Nonetheless, some of these conceptual frameworks are useful analytical tools without which the comparison of political systems across the countries would be practically impossible. And as long as the social scientists are conscious of weaknesses of these theories they will gradually overcome these problems.

**Theoretical Framework**

As stated earlier, the purpose of this research project is twofold: to identify the patterns of "political orientations" of Iranian individuals toward certain political objects; and to explicate the Iranian "political style" and its relationship to intergroup leadership interactions. To avoid any confusion let me elaborate further on these terms.

**Political Orientation**

Since at least the time of de Tocqueville political scientists have been concerned with what has variously been labeled national
character, temperament, mind, feeling, opinion, instinct, spirit, myth. The term that has more recently found favor is "political culture." Societies have been held to be distinguished by the relative frequency of particular orientations which mark those societies off from other societies. The frequency with which an orientation is formed within a society is important not only for the analysis of societal unity, but also for the comparative analysis of several societies. Shared orientations not only unify, they typify.

In numerous studies of non-Western societies, patterns of orientations have been advanced as important explanatory variables. For instance, Daniel Lerner contends that what distinguishes modern, Western man from traditional man is his "psychic mobility," defined as the capacity of an individual to see the social future as manipulable rather than ordained, and to think of himself as being able to seek out his own version of the better life, rather than passively accepting his heritage. For David C. McClelland the crucial orientation required for economic growth, with implications for political systems, is the "need for achievement." Lucian Pye also calls upon the insights of psychology, arguing that persons in a traditional society experience an "identity crisis." They lack "a firm and reassuring sense of identity," they are "shallow, lacking in substance and commitment." Many leaders have "appeared to be hollow men," distressingly opportunistic and even cynical.

In 1956 Almond, in his article "Comparative Political Systems." wrote that "Every political system is embedded in a particular pattern
of orientations to political action." In 1965, in *Civic Culture*, he further developed the concept of political orientation and defined it as "Attitudes towards the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system." The concept was then broken down into its component parts: cognitions (knowledge and awareness of the political system); affect (emotional disposition to the system); and evaluation (judgment about the system). The aim has been to know what sorts of people are most likely to hold values and beliefs supportive of a constitutional, democratic system of government. The concept of patterned orientations lends itself easily to the description, comparison, and functional explanation of on-going political systems.

**Political Style**

Although seldom defined, the concept "political style" refers to "The way in which the structure performs the function: the general operating rules it manifests." In other words, it refers to the manners in which fundamental political beliefs are applied in politics.

Verba views the content of political belief as an integral part of a political style. But his assumption that a political style refers to both "what men think about politics" and "how they do it" is hardly substantiated. There should be a distinction between what men think and what men do. To explicate the concept a little further I would like to bring into my discussion some of the relevant ideas.
expressed by sociologists.

From a sociological perspective there is a difference between pattern of orientation and pattern of action. Action is a clear and expressive term which subsumes the closely related concepts of behavior and activities. While orientation is intended as a "stylistically manageable shorthand encompassing the various kinds of "in-the-mind" phenomena, such as knowledge, beliefs, values, feelings, attitudes, assumptions, expectations, role perceptions, identifications, and self-image.

When behavior is affected and colored by a particular set of political orientations a particular political style emerges which makes it different from other styles. In other words, attributed characteristics of a particular pattern of behavior is what gives a distinct style to a system and differentiates it from other systems. This is probably why we can often generalize behavior within systems by such statements as Anglo-Americans have a "bargaining" political style, or the French have an "ideological" political style. When the analyst identifies a particular political style he can make sure that there is a pattern of political orientation which underlies it; or when he identifies a pattern of political orientation he can make sure that there is a particular political style reflecting it. It seems that the twin concepts of political style and political orientation are to be seen as two sides of the same coin, even though the analyst's focus is at different times on one side or the other of the coin.
Types of Political Style

Attitudes toward compromise and flexibility to changing circumstances in politics have traditionally been one of the distinctive features upon which students of comparative politics have classified political systems across countries. The assumption has generally been that different political orientations result in different political styles toward "problem-solving" or "conflict resolutions." The problem-solving role of a particular political style means that it should contain principles of procedures, methods, and strategies for thinking about particular problems in the light of general principles of content (see Table 1).

Almond and Powell have identified three types of political style: 1) pragmatic-bargaining; 2) absolute value-oriented; and 3) traditionalistic. Deutsch and, in another instance Verba, have eliminated the third category by incorporating it into the second one.

Doubt has been expressed by some scholars concerning the exhaustiveness of the aforementioned classification. Sartori has criticized the above dichotomy as too simplistic and suggested a third category which he has termed "polarized pluralism" with a centrifugal tendency. This category suggested by Sartori inevitably throws the political units of many Western democracies, which up to now were considered to have fragmented political cultures and ideological political styles, into a different category, that is to
TABLE 1
Political Styles and Consequences: Orientations Toward Problem-Solving

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Pragmatic-Bargaining Style</th>
<th>B. Political Consequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Instrumental</td>
<td>- Presence of tendency to discuss, debate, negotiate and compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Evaluative</td>
<td>- Flexibility and amenability to interpersonal persuasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Open belief system:</td>
<td>- Commitment to and observance of the prevailing &quot;rules of the game&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Positive attitude toward the &quot;nature of man&quot;</td>
<td>- Marginal and evolutionary adjustments preferred over comprehensive change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Low level of distrust in interpersonal relationships</td>
<td>- Pragmatism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Presence of norms limiting the politicization in personal relationships</td>
<td>- Political stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Material environment is less viewed as a zero-sum relationships</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Absolute Value-oriented Style</th>
<th>B. Political Consequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Expressive</td>
<td>- Self-righteousness: absence of a tendency to negotiate and bargain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Evaluation based on comprehensive and explicit principles</td>
<td>- Resistance to interpersonal persuasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Closed belief system:</td>
<td>- Strong tendency to disregard the &quot;rules of the game&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Presence of high level of distrust in interpersonal relationships</td>
<td>- Comprehensive changes is preferred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Negative attitude toward &quot;the nature of man&quot;</td>
<td>- Idealism and theorization preferred over pragmatism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Absence of norms which prevents politicization in interpersonal relationships</td>
<td>- Frequent deadlock and political instability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Material environment is viewed as fixed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
say, "moderate pluralism" with a centripetal drive.

One of the logical conclusions of Sartori's classification is that "ideology" *per se* does not necessarily make a polity polarized. The European cases which fall into Sartori's category of moderate pluralism have fragmented ideologies but the tendency of the systems is centripetal. According to Sartori, what causes a polity to be polarized is not merely ideology but some other factors which he calls "manipulative mechanism," such as the "physical occupation" by a group of the "center" which, according to Sarotir, discourages the very "centrality" of opinion, and creates centrifugal tendencies.38

Samuel Beer in his analysis of British politics implicitly has reached the same conclusion. He argues that despite the ideological stands taken by both British political parties, Conservative and Labour, British politics has enjoyed a stable continuity with no major political disturbance.39 Beer has explained this situation in terms of a British traditional tendency for "experimentation and pragmatism." According to Beer, in British politics "reality" and "existing conditions" at times have always affected the ways in which policies were made and implemented.

Whether or not there should be a dichotomous or multiple classificatory scheme of political style is not only a matter of interpretation and intellectual taste, it is also a matter of empirical question. But what seems relevant to the present study is Sartori's so-called "manipulative" approach which apparently
inclines to explain every event in terms of historical incidence.

To suggest that systems with no political center encourage a bargaining and compromising style (or in Sartori's words, "centripetal tendency"), and those with strong center or multiple weak centers encourage ideological extremism (or "centrifugal tendency"), does not clearly explain why some political systems developed one type of conditions rather than others. For example, why did British politics fail to develop a political center? Or why did Italian politics develop a political center in the first place?

An alternative explanation, is to look beyond the formal institutional structures and official political ideologies and into the general cultural environment and search for those elements of belief systems which are relevant to existing politics. Beliefs and values in one culture may have a depolarizing effect on its political practices, whereas in another culture it may exert a polarizing effect. This may partially explain why the British Conservative Party in the mid-forties, with all its history of political conservatism, peacefully bowed to the public mandate and let the Labour Party, with all its socialistic rhetoric capture the machinery of state.\textsuperscript{40}

I am inclined, therefore, to suggest that the Iranian political style fits neither into a "bargaining-pragmatic" category, nor in either of Sartori's first two categories of "bipolar" and "moderate pluralism." The ideological differences between the contending group leaderships have been so intense in Iranian politics that they
brought about the suspension and eventually the collapse of constitutional arrangements three times in her short modern political history. The Iranian political style, I think, approximates Almond and Powell's "absolute-value oriented" style, which also represents what Sartori may call "multipolar polarized" system. This style, according to its authors, "refuses to compromise the principle of policy for the sake of accommodating diverse interests...it is very rigid and rationalistic." It is this category within which the interaction of Iranian leadership will be explicated in this project.

**Group Leadership and Interactions**

Let us specify some of the main terms involved here. The terms "leader," "leadership" or "group leadership" are often used in the social science literatures but with different meanings and interpretations. The term leader as it is used here refers to an individual who, regardless of his formal or informal status in a given group (such as a newspaper editor, for example, who is not officially the member of a group nonetheless in his editorials strongly opposes or sympathizes with the group's cause and thus influences not only the leaders but the followers as well), exerts influence over certain other individuals not only through the possession of particular resources, skills and experiences, but also through his commitment to a set of political principles and political involvement. Some have even demonstrated that
ideological commitment is the essential ingredient for a leader to emerge since the possession of such resources as wealth, education, or any particular skill and expertise per se is not conducive to political involvement which is vital to the leadership role. The influence possessed by a leader is derived not only from the symbolic identification of his followers with him, but also through the consent of those over whom the leader exerts such influence. The followers, however, are free to accord such support to the leader or withdraw it; otherwise it would be considered as an "imposed" leader seen commonly in the bureaucratic types of organizations with tightly hierarchical systems.

"Group leadership," may be defined as a political unit composed of a number of individual leaders who, at a given time, stand in more or less definite interdependent status or role relationships with one another and generally share some common values and basic political principles which define the ends and means of politics. Body politics often consist of continuous interactions among such group leaderships whose differences and conflicts over alternative politics and priorities for the distribution of resources constitutes the process of government.

By "intergroup interaction" is meant the states of friendship or hostility, cooperation or competition, alliance or enmity between two or more group leaderships. Whenever individuals belonging to a particular group, or the group as a whole, interact with other groups we have an instance of intergroup interaction. Political
intercourse between group leaderships may be full of conflict, cooperation or mutual assistance. It is this area of conflict, in the case of negative relations, or of flaw, in the case of cooperation and alliance, which are consequential for a given polity. Thus, a given political style may have a crucial impact on the extent of cooperation and conflict concerning the intergroup leadership interactions.

Procedures and Methods

As already mentioned, this study is primarily concerned with two aspects of Iranian politics: one is attitudinal, the other, historical. Concerning the second part an effort is made to apply, rather historically, the concept of political style to Iranian intergroup leadership interaction.

Concerning the first part, the object of study is what has been called "micro" politics. It deals with political orientations in a sample which represents a cross-section of the Iranian population. It is the study of political attitudes of individuals who considered themselves, in one way or another, to be the members of the Rastakhiz Party, the only government-authorized political organization in the country. The purpose of studying this sample is to make a statement, rather cautiously, about the existing political orientations in Iran. In fact, my main objective of the survey has been to generate further evidence to support the second part of this
project, that is, the pattern of Iranian political style which is identifiable through a sequence of political events in contemporary Iranian politics.

The national survey of party members set itself a fivefold objective: 1) to identify the patterns of Iranian political cognition; 2) to discover feelings toward government and politics; 3) to identify the patterns of obligation for participation; 4) to identify the patterns of civil or political competence; and 5) to arrive at a perceptual image of the Rastakhiz Party as perceived by its members.

The national survey of party members is based upon 740 interviews carried on in Tehran, the capital city, and four major provincial centers: Rasht (provincial center of Gilan), Ahwaz (provincial center of Khuzestan), Kermanshah (provincial center of Kermanshahan), and Kerman (provincial center of Kerman). The interviewees consisted of 222 elites and 518 nonelites.*

The second part of this project uses an historical method and is based on case studies. It is well accepted that historical explanations are congenial to the sociological perspective for the reason that they do not place the interpretative burden upon "accidents," but rather upon complex political patterns which prevail during certain time periods. Therefore, to study Iranian

*For full details on methodological aspects of national survey see the introductory page of Chapter 3.
political style and intergroup leadership interaction, six periods of Iranian contemporary politics were selected for explication.

The first period begins in 1911 and ends in 1921. The study of the first period includes two phases: the first phase involves a conflict over the issue of the supremacy of Majlis (the Parliament) and Mohammad Ali Shah's challenge to that idea; the second phase involves a conflict over the Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919, which became a matter of intergroup leadership conflict. The failure of group leaderships, from the left to the right, to reach a compromise through peaceful means culminated in 1921 in a political deadlock and eventual elimination of democratic institutions.

The second period begins in 1941 and ends in 1953. This period also consists of two phases. During the first phase political issues which faced the group-leaderships consisted of two related problems; one was the issue of Azarbyjan, a northwestern province demanding a self-administrative rule for the province; the second issue involved an oil concession to the Russians. Both issues became matters of intense conflict among the contending leaderships. Again, the failure of leaders to reach a peaceful settlement finally resulted in a military expedition to Azarbyjan in 1946 and the suspension of constitutional government in Iran which lasted until 1949.

The third period begins in 1951 and ends in 1953. The crucial issue in this period which faced the group leaderships and begged for immediate solution was also composed of two interrelated problems:
one was a dispute over the constitutionality of the Shah's control of Iranian armed forces. The second problem was the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). Both problems became a matter of intergroup leadership conflict. The previous pattern was repeated again. Failure to reach a compromise resulted in a military coup d'état in 1953 and brought the collapse of constitutional government.

Iranian politics after 1953 is marked by two distinct features: one is the monarchical domination of the government and the other is the regime's authoritarianism. The fourt, fifth, and sixth periods which immediately followed the 1953 military coup were periods when genuine opposition to the government was either suppressed or went underground. Iranian politics were played by two forces, the ruling group and the royal opposition. Nonetheless, even these two groups who constituted different segments of the same ruling elite could not co-exist and ran into different problems and deadlocks.

The fourth period begins in 1957 and is characterized by a controlled two-party system. Due to differences between the ruling party and the loyal opposition over the distribution of parliamentary seats and subsequent rigged elections, the first phase of a two-party politics collapsed in late 1962.

The fifth period begins with the second phase of a two-party system in 1963. The second phase also collapsed in 1975 due to political domination of the ruling party over the loyal opposition.
and the virtual elimination of the latter from the political process.

The sixth period began in 1975 and is marked by a move by the monarch toward total political control of the country through the establishment of a one party system—the Rastakhiz Party. During this period, no opposition group, whether loyal or genuine, was permitted to operate. With the beginning of 1977, the one-party system of the Rastakhiz era showed signs of collapse and involved a process of political disintegration and continuous factional splits.

The focus of study will be on political parties as sub-system unit for political analysis. Certainly, parties as political institutions constitute a major aspect of any political system. By studying these institutions one may safely generalize the findings to the whole political system or at least enhance his understanding of the political system.

The historical part of this project uses as its sources of information the type of data which are commonly known as library research and documentation. Historical and contemporary information were collected through public and private sources, relevant scholarly written materials, autobiographies and biographies of public office-holders, and finally newspapers and magazines. Statements made by political figures in different political institutions, or published in the form of news releases and interviews made by the spokesmen for different political groups will also be utilized as sources of information. This research study has nine chapters which discuss the following subject matter:
Chapter 1. This chapter is mainly an introductory note and deals with theoretical as well as methodological aspects of the dissertation.

Chapter 2. This chapter's main objective is to relate contemporary Iranian political behavior to historical experiences and events, and attempt to demonstrate chronologically that the traditional organizational behavior and belief system are in conflict, and somehow inconsistent, with so-called modern political structures and value systems.

Chapter 3. This chapter analyzes some of the findings of a research survey conducted in Tehran and four other major cities of Iran. The aim is to identify certain patterns of the Iranian political orientation toward some selected aspects of political objects. The purpose is generally to generate more evidence to support some of the theoretical and historical assumptions discussed in the second chapter.

Chapter 4. In this chapter the state of the multi-party system in Iran from 1911 to 1921 is examined. The interaction of contesting group leaderships is analyzed and the manner by which the leaders tried to solve the national problems is discussed. The aim is to demonstrate how the uncompromising position taken by group leaderships brought the newly instituted constitutional system to a deadlock which finally resulted in the Reza Shah's military coup.
Chapter 5. In this chapter the second round of Iranian experimentation in multi-partism and constitutionalism is examined. It discusses the style of political interaction among different group leaderships over the national problems during the years between 1941 and 1953. The aim is to present two more cases in order to show how the contesting leaders tried to suppress their opponents by resorting to extra-legal means in solving the national issues in their own favor.

Chapter 6. This chapter examines the monarchical domination over the national politics immediately after the military coup of 1953. During this period, the monarch exercised his idea of a controlled two-party system. The Shah's experimentation of a two-party politics, in two different phases, is discussed and the process by which the idea failed is analyzed.

Chapter 7. In this chapter the Shah's experimentation with a one-party system, The Rastakhiz Party, is examined. It discusses the process by which the party was established and the subsequent events which resulted in the party's disintegration and its final breakdown is also analyzed.

Chapter 8. In this chapter the collapse of the Shahanshahi regime (Monarchical) and the establishment of an Islamic Republic is briefly discussed and another round of multi-partism with reference to the current events is analyzed.
Chapter 9. This is a concluding chapter where the future of Iran's political development with reference to the existing political conditions and alternatives is discussed.
NOTES CHAPTER 1


2. Ibid., p. 12.

3. See Amin Banani, The Modernization of Iran: 1921-1941 (Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1961); also see "Quiet thee now and rest," The Economist, August 28, 1976, pp. 5-47.


14. Ibid., p. 117.


18. Ibid., p. 12.


26. Ibid.


38. Ibid., pp. 302-317.


40. Ibid., pp. 302-317.


42. For definitions of these terms see E. P. Hollandor (ed.), *Leaders, Groups, and Influence.* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1964), particularly see chapter 1.


CHAPTER 2

Political Culture and Political Organization in Iran: An Interpretation

The term "political culture" has been defined in many ways by different scholars, but most definitions seem to include certain common principles. Even though Almond's definition of the concept was groundbreaking, Pye's definition is broader and more serviceable. According to Pye, political culture represents a set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments that help to give order and meaning to the political process. It thus constitutes the psychological and subjective dimensions of politics. The political culture of a nation derives from, among other things, the experiences the individuals have with the political process. Political culture is then the product of both the collective history of the political system and the aggregate life histories of the members of that society.

Emphasis upon political culture should not be taken to imply that other aspects of the political system are not important for the functioning of that system. On the contrary, they are both important and intimately related to the political culture. In the comparative study of political systems across nations it is extremely helpful to go beyond the formal and informal structures of politics,
that is to say, to the ideas and beliefs that affect the ways in which people act within their political institutions. There appears to be general agreement as to the usefulness of the concept in understanding political institutions and processes, particularly its suitableness to the study of developing areas.

Political scientists today generally agree that historical crises and major events of crucial national significance which have taken place in the past have an important bearing upon subsequent periods, and a great impact upon the mental associations that people have about their total environment. Although such events might have taken place far back in a nation's history, their psychological impact may not easily disappear during the subsequent periods. Therefore, the psychological attitudes of the people, which are the result of the past events, may serve as essential reference points in contemporary political conduct.

Iran and Traumatic Experiences of the Past

In the course of her long history, Iran has gone through many tragic events, has experienced numerous alien invasions, and has suffered the domination of different races and cultures throughout most of her social and political history.

During 652 A.D., Iran was totally won by the Arab invaders and went through the process of Islamization with complete obliteration of its language, culture and religion in a very savage and brutal
It is from about 902 that we see scattered forces of Persians such as Saffarids and later Samanids, who began to establish Saffarid and Samanid dynasties of which the latter was purely Persian in origin while the former believed to be Arab in origin, or at least Arab in name. But these dynasties did not last long and soon fell into the hands of Turkish slaves who had filled the court and gradually dominated the court and established the dynasty of Ghaznavids. Afterward, around 12th century, the Mongols and Chingiz Khan's invasion of Iran led to terrible destruction and radical disorganization of the country. The ruin which they brought upon the cities, which they successively conquered with astonishing ease, was appalling; only a few hundred people would succeed in saving themselves from the ensuing massacre. It has been said that some of the cities of Persia still show the consequences of this devastation today. During their long domination of Iran, there was established a state of terror. They massacred hundreds of thousands of people. They ruined and burned the cities, ruthlessly exploited the people and like an earthquake affected the very geography of the country. In this period (1200-1295), political power was held by a pastoral and warrior aristocracy, made up of Mongols, Turks, and Kurds. As a result, Iran and a large area of the Muslim world was ruled for three generations by non-Muslim rulers. It was mostly during this period that mysticism developed as an attitude, perhaps even as some kind of consolation for the hard lot to be endured in
the tangible world. The accounts by some of the astounded and terrified historians of the Mongol invasion convey a certain sense of the imminent end of the world. From then on poetry in Iran became inextricably involved with mysticism and though this gave rise to some of the masterpieces of the literature of the world, to an extent it contributed to the weakening of the robust human and civil virtues.

The history of the long interval between Chingiz Khan's domination and the establishment of the Qajar dynasty in 1736, was one of wars, invasion and destructions; of dynasty rapidly following dynasty. Tamerlane and Timurids replaced the Mongols, Safavids replaced the remnant of Timurids and other autonomous non-Persian Khanates. Then Afghans rushed to the scene; their reign did not last long and were taken over by Afshars, Zands and finally Quajars who successively replaced one another through bloodshed, massacre and destruction of the cities uprooting each other's families and sweeping like a hurricane over the country. For instance, at the end of October 1383, the city of Sabzevar, in the province of Mashhad, together with its well-fortified castle, was destroyed; two thousand men were buried alive in the walls of the new fortresses that Tamberlane built, and hundreds perished under fearful tortures. Everywhere pyramids of corpses and human heads were raised. In his rage against Isfahanis, Tamberlane massacred the inhabitants and 70,000 human heads were piled up to form 120 tall pyramids outside the city walls. Or when the Afghans led by Mir Mahmud invaded Iran
in 1722, occupied the big cities and massacred their inhabitants. Cities such as Isfahan, Shiraz, Qazvin, Yazd, and Tabriz lost over two-thirds of their inhabitants and two thousand villages in Isfahan province alone were completely destroyed. During the Safavids, when Shah Ismail conquered Tabriz in 1501, and formally declared Shiism as the official Persian he practically exterminated those who did not go along with his views on Shiism. It should be remembered that the majority of Persians had Sunni faith before the fifteenth century, and changing to Shiism was a conscious and deliberate policy carried out by the Safavids mainly to thwart the Turkish invaders in the West of Iran who were Sunnite. Forcefully imposing his will on Persians to convert, Shah Ismail said "Whoever should dare to oppose this shall have his head off." His favorite method of killing was to burn his opponents alive. He massacred and burned, dead and alive together, thousands of people and made numerous pyramids of their heads. He even cut off his mother's head just because she was related to the earlier dynasties who were Sunnite. Also Agha Mohammad Khan, the founder of the Qajar dynasty, meted out terrible punishment to the people of Kerman for having given shelter to Lutf Ali Khane Zand, the last Shah of Zands. He ordered 20 thousand pairs of eyes to be presented to him as a punishment, and threatened to blind those who were detailed to carry out the task if they missed a single one. He tortured and massacred thousands of people who were suspected or failed to follow his directions. 4
Generally speaking, the period between the Safavids and the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 can be regarded, at best, as one of incubation, at worse, as one of complete decadence. The psychological impact of these events, in the course of a long period of time, cannot easily be put aside. These historical events have already left their scars on the Iranian political culture and have shaped and molded the Iranian belief system which, in turn, has affected the Iranian attitude toward the nature of man and his orientation toward the political environment. It is not unreasonable to assume that individuals might generalize to politics from their past experiences, their beliefs about non-political elements and other non-political spheres. For instance, in a culture where men's orientation toward nature is essentially one of fatalism and resignation, their orientation toward government is likely to be the same; or in political cultures where the activities of the government are considered in the same class with such natural calamities as earthquakes and storms—to be suffered, but are beyond the individual's control—one would assume that such an attitude would be closely related to a fatalistic attitude toward man's role in relation to nature.

Traditionally, Iranians were very insecure in the political environment and were attitudinally distrustful not only of governments but also suspicious of their fellow citizens. They had generally an attitude of resignation and submission toward political power and authority and this was the only way to secure their life and
property in an unpredictable world.

The Iranian "Primitive Belief" System

Primitive beliefs generally refer to those thoughts, beliefs, ideas and folklores in a culture about the world, nature, man, and relationships which are "given" and are handed down from generation to generation without being questioned.

Milton Rokeach has developed a terminology which organizes belief system along a "central, intermediate and peripheral dimension." In the central region are those primitive beliefs about the nature of the physical world, the self, and generalized others. By intermediate beliefs he means all beliefs about the nature of positive and negative authorities, personal and impersonal, to be relied upon for information and opinions which we cannot or will not gather ourselves. Reliance on such authority may be total or partial, but knowledge of these positive and negative authorities—in both central and intermediate regions of beliefs—will reveal much of the content of the peripheral region. What is left over after the central and intermediate beliefs is the peripheral region, which includes non-primitive beliefs arising from positive and negative authorities.

The evidence is persuasive that the central strata of beliefs are laid down at an earlier age than the intermediate, and the intermediate strata earlier than most of the peripheral.
believed that many important central beliefs are learned during childhood within the family and other socio-political institutions. And since they are learned early, they tend to persist and to be resistant to change. Students of cultural change widely agree, for instance, that a society's early socialized values and beliefs are likely to endure long after less centralized notions have been transformed by contact with another culture, because they are more likely to appear to serve "a continuing need than those learned later in life."7

Certain aspects of primitive beliefs are negatively stressed in the Iranian culture. In a survey conducted in 1975 with 170 Iranians, randomly selected, some interesting findings were reached.8 The survey was primarily designed to identify Iranian orientations toward some aspects of the primitive belief system. The sample consisted of 170 respondents, 10 of which were female. The respondents were in different age groups with different educational backgrounds. Concerning the age, 58 respondents were between 20 to 30; 51 respondents were between 31 and 40; 30 respondents were between 41 and 50; and 31 respondents were between 50 and up. In terms of educational background, 62 were illiterate; 44 had primary, 37 secondary and 27 had university education. The respondents were picked randomly in different parts of Tehran and were interviewed on the spot. The questionnaire was given to the subjects to be filled in and they were free to put their remarks on it,
In response to the question "Do you believe in fate?" the majority of respondents answered positively. Many respondents, particularly those in the middle and older age brackets, believed "God is everywhere, He knows what I am up to. He is omnipresent and watches us all the time. We are under His power. God guides us, punishes us, rewards us and whenever He wishes He takes our lives." Some others said "God has complete control over us. We are not free to decide for ourselves; whatever happens to us we accept whole heartedly, because this is what He wants. This is what we are destined to; We have to accept it whether we want to or not. We have no other choice." Others relied on myths and old stories to justify their points of view. For example, they mentioned kings and princes who became too powerful and tended to disregard God's guidelines in this world, but they failed and were finally destroyed. They said "People are predestined; their fates are written on their foreheads, they are not capable of changing their fate." (see Table 2).

In response to the second question, "Some people believe that true happiness is only possible in the afterwards; do you agree?", the majority of respondents were positive on this question. The answers were rather uniform; "True happiness is hardly obtainable in this world; life is short and it is not worth it to work hard; because you can't take anything with you when you die, why work hard; money and material things are worth nothing, and no one should spoil his life and time for things which are worth nothing."
TABLE 2*

Do you believe in fate?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Illiterate</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>University</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-30</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 and up</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The percentages in Tables 2-7 represent only "Yes" responses.

TABLE 3

Some people believe that true happiness is only possible in the afterward; do you agree with this?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Illiterate</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>University</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-30</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 and up</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The more you get the more you want; there is no end to that. Those who are fighting hard in this dog-eat-dog world are only deceiving themselves and no one else. We are happy with what we have. No one gets happiness in this world; the true happiness is in the other world (see Table 3).

The third question which was put to the respondents was this: "Some people believe that the Devil exists in man; do you agree?". Once again, the majority of respondents' answers were positive. "Satan has lived in us since the time of Adam and Eve," was mentioned by a considerable number of respondents. A great number said, "The Devil interferes with everything we do, so we have to always be on guard." Some of them said "people are jealous and wicked, they could hardly be trusted; they are about you only to get you, to spoil you and eventually to take advantage of you." "You should never tell them what is on your mind, and should not disclose your secrets to them if you have any; they are about to destroy you" (see Table 4).

Negative attitudes toward the nature of man is very common among Iranians. Belief in man's natural wickedness and his devilish characteristics is so common among the people that it constitutes one of the major themes in television and radio dramas. Thus, an Iranian generally feels insecure in his social relationships and is always on guard to thwart real or imaginary threats against himself. Insecurity is not only felt in interpersonal relationships but is also manifested in other areas of Iranian society as well, such as
### TABLE 4

Some people believe that the devil exists in man; do you accept that?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Illiterate</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>University</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-30</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 and up</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 5

Some people believe that with no control from above nobody does his work; do you believe that?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Illiterate</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>University</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-30</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 and up</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Some people believe that if men are given freedom they will destroy one another; do you believe that?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Illiterate</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td></td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-30</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td></td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 and up</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some people believe that all men are created equal; do you believe that?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Illiterate</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td></td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-30</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td></td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 and up</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
architectural style. Max Weber in his study of *The City* has noted the connection between the prevalence of walls in urban areas of the Mediterranean world and a "centuries-long insecurity."\(^1^0\) The existence of walled cities as well as the walled compounds surrounding residences in Iranian cities demonstrates the same phenomenon. Zonis notes that "both Iranian and foreign observers alike tend to lay the blame for these walls on a lack of security defined as a condition of peril, as being exposed to hazards and dangers, and both agree that the danger and personal vulnerability can be attributed to the condition of politics in Iran."\(^1^1\) In its most frequent Iranian usage, referring to safety from physical harm, "walls" and "walled cities" evoke images of marauding nomads, invading Turks or Mongols, or predatory government troops.

Another aspect of the belief system is the Iranian orientation toward the concept of "human equality" and "individual freedom." Traditionally, Iranian society has been viewed as "progression of ranks," the members of each possessing successively more authority than the ranks below. No doubt, all societies can be consistent as the Iranians in drawing the lines so strictly and identifying intersocial ranks as broad social classes, in having those perceptions of the social structure remain so constant over time. The pattern of the social class system in Iran from the Achaemenids (550-330 B.C.), the first of the Iranian national dynasties, to the Qajars (1789-1925) was conceptualized in terms of classes, categories and ranks; they were in pyramid shapes. Each class or rank in turn was
sub-divided into sub-ranks and sub-groups. This is not to say that mobility into the higher levels of political structure was absent in Iranian society. In fact mobility exists but it is difficult at best and by no means common. The possibility for mobility existed but generally to make that possibility a reality was highly difficult. Certainly the shape of stratification in a society should not simply be considered as incidental. It may be indicative of some historical factors and events which have taken place in the past.

It is believed that one of the fundamental factors for stratification phenomena everywhere may have been man's tendency to judge his fellows and himself as more or less worthy in the light of some moral standard. And probably this standard has been subsequently used as a basis for social, economic and political differentiations among a people. Lloyd Fallers, for instance, has elaborately discussed the ways by which attitudes toward equality and inequality of people in a society develops through time and gradually becomes a part of the belief system or ideology of that particular society or culture.

The concept of human equality, whether social or political, is a new phenomenon in Iranian culture. In the pre-Islamic era Iranian social organization had organic characteristics and was based on strict stratification of social groups. During the post Islamic period the traditional Islamic egalitarianism as an ideal, if not always practiced, was emphasized in the Islamic world. But it appears
that the Iranian social structure after the Arab invasion was able to retain most of its distinctive characteristics. "The old Persian aristocracy and landed proprietors did succeed in preserving much of their lot with the conquerors, to whom their services were needful, and their local influence and knowledge indispensable." They preserved not only the pre-Islamic structure but even continuity of personnel. Therefore, in practice the Iranian society has hardly been a community of equals and this experience in the course of time has left its mark on the Iranian social and political ideology.

Negative attitudes toward the "equality of men" is still prevalent in Iranian society. Many Iranians still think that they are not equals. For example, when they were asked to answer this question "Some people believe that men are not created equal; do you agree?", most of the respondents, particularly those over 40, rejected the notion of equality (see Table 7). A considerable number of them used an old Iranian example to demonstrate their point of view. They said even God did not want men to be equal, "As our fingers are unequal, so are men." "It is God's will" said others, "If all men were equal who would clean streets, wash dishes, do the laundry, etc."

"How can we argue that all men are created equal when only one man can be king," said some of them. One respondent specifically noted that he "never considers himself to be the equal of such men as the king;" "The Shah is God's shadow on earth and it is the people's duty to obey him." Some others said "If men were created
equal people would only do what they enjoy doing. Who would do the rest?"

Closely related to the concept of equality is the idea of individual freedom. The concept of individual freedom is generally unknown in Iranian political thought. There is no mention of such phenomenon in the Iranian literature or in governmental theory. Since its long history up to the constitutional revolution of 1906 the country has been ruled by autocratic and despotic kings and individuals. The concept of "freedom," particularly in the political sphere, had no room to flourish. The concept of individual freedom was imported to Iran sometime during the late nineteenth century and those Iranian political theoreticians who became acquainted with the concept have treated it as an alien phenomenon and non-Islamic. For example, Nezam al ulama, an Iranian political theoretician in the early 1900's, wrote that "people are not free to decide for themselves. It is the Shah who is given the right and authority, bestowed upon him by God, to guide the people." According to him, it was the duty of the people to follow the ruler, even if the ruler is brutal and tyrannical, and obey his decisions. The Shah is the shadow of God on earth and only He can take this right from him. People are like sheep who do not know their own good. They always need a shepherd to take care of them. Based on this argument, the Shah is considered the supreme law of the land and the people; this is quite contrary to the Western concept of "divine right" and "natural law." People obtained their rights only in the form of privileges granted by grace
of the Shah. The ideas of another Iranian political theoretician Mohammed Mousavi, was more or less identical to that of Nezam al ulama. Mousavi believed that in giving people freedom, rebellion and chaos will develop and as a consequence public tranquility will vanish. He could hardly imagine sharing power between the ruler and the ruled.

Iranian masses were traditionally unaware of such political values as individual freedom and other values related to the modern democracy in Western political systems. They were obedient subjects who hardly questioned authority. Culturally speaking, the Iranian individual is highly power oriented; and Iranian society is highly authoritarian in nature. People are brought up to expect authority in certain places, and to accept it when placed under it. Most Iranian parents have little tolerance for free will and experimentation on the part of their children. Discipline is the indispensable instrument of Iranian child training because they think it forms and purifies the child's character. Iranians, one way or another, are under authoritarian figures most of their lives; elders, employers, landlords, village headmen, supervision officers, government officials, teachers, and so on. Even in organized work groups, whether formal or informal, authority tends to be highly centralized, with little delegated down from the top and little initiative allowed at lower levels. One of the concomitants of this situation is that heads of sub-offices, on the same levels do not communicate laterally with each other, but only vertically. At the family level the same pattern prevails. For example, the role of a
father as an authority figure in the family is generally aloof and distant. The child is taught to approach his father with ceremonious reverence and submission. This kind of rigid control tends to develop reliance on direction from above.

In the aforementioned sample, I asked the subjects "Some people believe that if men are given freedom they will destroy one another; what do you think?", the responses were generally affirmative. "If men are given freedom human society will turn into a jungle and men turn into beasts," said a young bureaucrat with a high school education. "There should always be some strong man at the top to force these animals to follow the rules and do what is good for them; like a doctor who prescribes bitter medicine to his patients who have to swallow it without questioning for their own good," said a forty-five year old man with a college degree. "People never learn to respect the rights of others; so when they are set free they destroy one another for their own interests," was said by many interviewees (see Table 6).

Another question which was put to the same subjects, and was related to the questions of "equality" and "individual freedom," was the question of "control" from above. The question asked was "Some people believe that if there was no control nobody would do his work; do you agree?" Considering the responses already given to other questions the answers were predictable. The majority of respondents considered the control of "others" a social imperative. Many of the interviewees believed that men should be controlled if they are to
become obedient. Without being controlled nobody does his job. Many of the interviewees mentioned the problem of traffic in Tehran. They said that with so much control from above we are "in the present mess;" what would happen if there was no such control (see Table 5).

Concerning the type of questions used in this interview, I should confess that the nature of questions were highly directive; but it should be remembered that from the kind of responses we received there is no doubt that the interviewees clearly understood the meaning of the questions and answered accordingly. They were quite free to respond in either way. It should also be noted that the subjects were chosen in Tehran and were not representative of the entire Iranian population. The composition of the questions and the manner by which the subjects were chosen leaves the interpretation open to criticism. It was not intended to use this data as scientific findings. The main objective has been to highlight some aspects of the Iranian belief system which I believe were relevant to our discussion of Iranian political action.

The idea of "democracy" as it is defined in the Western democracies today is a new concept in the Iranian political philosophy. It seems that Iranians became familiar with this terminology sometime during the end of the nineteenth century. At the time the vocabulary was used by a limited number of people who had traveled beyond the Irano-Soviet borders or had commercial contacts with the British traders in the Persian Gulf areas.
Some Consequences for Organizations

Organizations exist to facilitate collective activity and effective problem-solving in complex modern societies. By organization is meant a system of coordinated activity and thus a more or less uniform pattern of behavior. Effective collective action requires cooperation and teamwork on the part of members, and mutual trust and confidence among them for the achievement of common goals.

Voluntary political organizations and associations are modern collective structures whose members have voluntarily joined them without being ordered to do so. Therefore, belonging to organizations or attending mass rallies under government orders are not considered a voluntary act.

Successful and effective action on the part of voluntary organizations demands other requirements as well. Among them are the attainment of full citizenship; the existence of a universalistic legal order; and predominance of achievement norms. The first requirement refers to the basic human equality derived from one's full membership in a national political community and embodied in equal formal rights possessed by all citizens. The second requirement refers to the prevalence of universalism over particularistic norms, that is to say, universalism in terms of equality before the law. This means not only equality of treatment in the application and adjudication of law on a rational basis, but
also the equal right to defend and to assert all other rights. The third requirement refers to the predominance of achievement over ascriptive norms in the allocation of roles and other resources.

On the basis of Max Weber's typology, James Bill has characterized the Iranian political system as patrimonial, where the political system is wrapped around the national leaders who are the "ultimate model, guide, innovator, and protector." The Iranian manifestation of the patrimonial type, according to Bill, is distinguished by the highly personal and informal manner in which power is exercised. Therefore, due to its patrimonial nature and traditional characteristics, conditions for effective organizational action is lacking in the Iranian political system.

As was discussed in the previous pages, the Iranian belief system seems to be detrimental to the development of political attitudes congruent with modern political structures. Despite the franchise conferred on the public after the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, people have still retained much of their traditional attitudes, particularly in the area of decision-making. They have hardly internalized the value of human equality which is a fundamental aspect of a developed polity and is generally derived from one's full membership in the political community. They hardly think of themselves as being effective in the process of decision-making and hardly believe themselves to be capable of influencing those in the position of decision-makers. Upward orientation, feeling of distrust in interpersonal relationships, belief in the necessity of human
control and disbelief in individual freedom, have all left their impact on Iranian organizational behavior. In the following paragraphs, the main characteristics of Iranian political organization is identified and briefly discussed.

Elite domination

Political organizations in Iran are predominantly elite dominated structures in which membership has the least role to play. The elite are generally drawn from a narrow segment of Iranian society, command the highest formal and informal positions of power in political organizations; they allocate values of their society in a disproportionately elitist fashion. Political exploitation and manipulation of organized membership is a distinctive feature of the Iranian political elite.\textsuperscript{24}

Recruitment by "Proximity"

In Iranian society, generally speaking, achievement as a means for upward mobility is not a common practice, particularly in the political arena where feeling of distrust prevails among the participants. Loyalty to the leader as a person and his goals is used as a basis for selection. The value of "proximity," that is physical and social proximity to the personal center of power, is more observed than personal achievement.\textsuperscript{25}
Informality of Rules and Regulations

In Iranian organizations, rules and regulations are easily overlooked by both elite and nonelites whenever they may obstruct an important individual or group interest. Rules and regulations are made and specified only because they have learned that any modern organization with a wide membership is required to have rules. Rules are respected when they serve a particular purpose or interest. Traditionally, each segment of the Iranian society had its own particularistic system of unwritten laws and customs. Even up to the constitutional revolution of 1906, the country did not have any system of state law.

Equality before the law is a new phenomena in the Iranian cultural context. We should make a distinction between "equality" as a concept and equality as a "value." Equality as a modern concept, like other aspects of modernity, is easily accepted, and in various forms of laws, regulations and rules, is used in the constitutions of many organizations and associations. But as a value the concept is hardly institutionalized and therefore is easily disregarded and overlooked in practice. This may be one explanation why informal group activity is the most dominant form of group politics in Iran.

Informality of Group Politics

Informal groups, usually referred to as cliques or factions, are culturally considered to be a fundamental aspect of Iranian politics.
It is true that wherever human beings gather, they will develop informal group activities. In the United States, a model of developed democracy, there are numerous obvious manifestations of informal group politics. For instance, in the South and southwest, nonassociational groups are more prevalent. This once led an observer to characterize the state of Louisiana as "the Western most of the Arab states." Thus the question of formality/informality is one of emphasis and degree. In general the American political process places relatively less emphasis upon informal groups and relatively more upon such aggregates as trade unions, legislatures, and political parties.

The most crucial units of interest aggregation and socio-political organizations in Iran remain informal groups. The socio-political system is backed by a gigantic network of informal, personalistic cliques referred to as Dowrehs (circles). Informal group activity in Iran has manifested itself in a variety of ways, from tiny dyads that plug in and out of one another depending upon mutual needs, to enormously complex coalitions of individuals who come together on the basis of kinship and friendship to achieve their goals.

One of the important characteristics of informal group politics is the intense and pervasive spirit of personalism that prevails. The fundamental social and political ties tend to be personal in nature. In moving into a wide variety of informal group circles, the individual strives to broaden his range of personal contacts in
order to gain representation on as many fronts as possible. What determines one's power and influence is not the fact that he holds a certain office or even that that office affords certain opportunities for personal progress, but the extent and success with which he, as an individual, is able to accumulate a wide range of personal ties. In this kind of environment individuals develop great skill in personal maneuverability as they seek their political goals. Decision making is determined by personal "push" and "pull" as is indicated by the Iranian expression parti.

Therefore, a combination of individualism and informality may be considered an important factor partially explaining the ineffectiveness of organizational behavior in Iran.

Absence of Sub-System Autonomy

Organizations within the Iranian political environment do not enjoy autonomy or semi-autonomous status. External forces which are generally composed of government officials and influential individuals having governmental powers at their disposal, are often capable of violating, under different pretexts and circumstances, the integrity and autonomy of organizations. Popular political groups and organizations are suddenly dissolved, powerful and self-reliant Majleses are unexpectedly removed, and outspoken political personalities are easily silenced, jailed and even executed by a simple Farman or decree without due process of law. Political leaders whose views
differ from the governments' official ideologies are ordered to remove themselves from their organizations; and government appointed personalities are assigned to take charge. Organizations belonging to counter-elites are frequently pressured to observe the governments' guidelines and follow their instructions. It is generally these kinds of tactics and political harassments which force the political organizations to go underground.

Certainly the employment of ruling groups of such strategies is based on the assumption that the counter-elites will use the same methods in dealing with their adversaries if they capture control over the machinery of government.

**Splitting**

Another characteristic of Iranian political organization is its frequent splits into different sub-organizations. Reliance on one's ideology and strong positions taken on particular ends and means, among different wing leaders, generally reduces the possibility of reaching a compromise. One explanation for this organizational behavior may be the concentration of power in the hands of one person, usually the leader, who often becomes highly independent and domineering. The leader's position in the organization makes him increasingly sensitive to criticism and intolerent to opposing arguments and views, since he considers himself to be the most competent person in the organization and supreme decision-maker. As
a result, he does not expect to be criticized by the rank and file. Moreover, opposition to the leader's views is often interpreted by him as a conspiracy or a plot to remove him from his leadership position. Consequently, passive resistance against the leader gradually takes shape among the sub-leaders. Also anxiety and tension builds up progressively between the leader and his close associates with a likelihood of a breakdown of communication between them. So when an issue subsequently comes up which demands an urgent solution, confrontation between the opposing factions develops. Unwilling to compromise, the discontented faction(s) claiming to be the true representative of organizational membership splits off and forms a new organization. This is a common organization pattern and is particularly true with Iranian political parties. Since the constitutional revolution, the Iranian political parties have been involved in repeated organizational splits.

I would like to stress the fact that the term "compromise" has a negative connotation in Iranian political culture; it is viewed and believed to be a kind of "sakhto-bakht" which means a dirty deal or betrayal to one's principles. It is one of the greatest sins which a political leader may ever be accused of. To resist a compromise is highly approved and applauded by the Iranians and is considered a courageous act.
Inter and Intra-Organizational Feud

In so-called democratic political systems, group conflicts generally take the form of peaceful competition over resources which in turn affects the process of social change and gradual improvement in public policies. In contrast, in the Iranian political environment the inter and intra-organizational competition generally takes the form of highly bitter and intense rivalry between competing groups and factions which ultimately inclines toward the elimination of competition in the system. Usually feuds generated by the intense drive for power and survival takes on a personal flavor, generally personal insult, which is considered acceptable criticism in both private and public discussions. Debates over public issues and governmental programs consistantly breaks down into exchanges of personal accusations and vilifications. The general tendency is to discredit the rival organizations and even remove them violently from the scene if other options do not produce the "desirable" result. Thus, since the compromise strategy is generally absent, the method which is commonly used in confronting the opposing factions is intimidation, silence, domination and even elimination of one another in the political process.

The aforementioned characteristics attributed to the Iranian political organizations are observable throughout the contemporary Iranian political history. A quick glance at the political events and processes having taken place since the constitutional revolution
in Iran clearly demonstrates these patterns. The three historical cases presented in the following chapters are used as historical evidence to support this argument.

Samuel Huntington argues that "Political community in a complex society...depends upon the strength of the political organizations and procedures in the society. That strength, in turn, depends upon the scope of support for the organizations and procedures and their level of institutionalization." Modern voluntary organizations, such as political parties, are a new phenomenon in the Iranian political culture; they appeared on the Iranian political scene sometime during the early 1900's. They were instituted from above and by a limited number of intellectuals and political activists (who had either been abroad for a short time or had heard about such institutions in western societies) who simply copied the structures and formalities. The Iranians were not yet prepared to absorb such alien phenomenon as voluntary political associations into their political system. The result has often been the failure of these institutions in the Iranian context and their rejection in operation.

According to Huntington, "Institutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability." The Iranian primitive belief system, I would argue, with its concomitant traditional orientations, has so far been a significant impediment to the institutionalization of democratic values essential for stable voluntary associations and political organizations,
NOTES CHAPTER 2


4. For further information on these matters see Morteza Rawandi, *Tarikhe Ejtemaee Iran* (Social History of Iran), Amir-Kabir Publisher, 1976, Vol. 2. Particularly see pages 485, 380, and 381. Also see The History of Iran, by Alessandra Baussani, op cit., pp. 75, 76, 123, 126, 127, 157, 162-3; also see Habib-Alah Shamluee, *Tarikhe Iran: As Mad Ta Pahlavi* (The History of Iran: From Medes to Pahlavi (Safi Ali-Shah Publishers, 1968), p. 277.


8. The survey was used for a paper prepared by this writer, and was delivered to the Shiraz Symposium on "Mass Media in Rapidly Developing Nations," took place in Shiraz, Iran, between May 8-15, 1975. The interviews were conducted by three students of the College of Cinema and Television, an affiliate of National Iranian Radio and Television (NRIT).

9. See Ali Assadi, Content Analysis of Iranian T.V. Serials, published by Public Opinion Research Department, an affiliate of NRIT, May 1973, p. 26. According to these analyses, cheating, deception and fraud was brought up in radio and television stories and T.V. series 100 percent. An honesty, integrity and rectitude 85 percent of the time. The author concluded that honesty and sincerity is a felt need in Iranian society.


13. For a discussion on this see Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran, op cit., pp. 123-125.


18. Mohammad Rezwani argues that the Iranian acquaintance with the Western democracy is older than Napoleonic era. According to him, about the year 1700 or so, Iranian traders in Persian Gulf area, had constant contacts with British merchants who had established a commercial route between England and India. Through this and other contacts, the Iranians became acquainted with the British system of government. See Mohammad Ismail Rezwani, "Ghadimitarin Zekre Domocracy Dar Neweshtejate Farsi" (The Oldest Mention of Democracy in Persian Writings), in Rahnemaye Ketab, Vol. 5, May, 1962, pp. 257-263.


25. For a discussion on this topic see James Bill, "The patterns of elite politics in Iran," op cit., pp. 18-20.


27. Literature on American political system often treats the inter and intra-group conflict as being peaceful because, according to this literature, political crises are avoided due to "give and take" mechanism and "compromise" strategies taken by the leaders. See Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956). Also see Dahl's other book Who Governs?

29. Ibid., p. 12.
CHAPTER 3

Aspects of the Elite-Nonelite Political Orientations

This chapter is designed to identify certain aspects of the Iranian elite and nonelite political orientations toward what Almond and Verba have termed "social and political objects." Orientation, as it is described in the introductory chapter of this project, refers to the internalized aspects of objects and relationships. Political objects are classified as the following: the total political system as a general object; input objects; output objects; and "self" as an object. Political orientations are accordingly classified as "cognitive," "affective" and "evaluative." These concepts intend to imply what knowledge the individual has toward political objects, what are his feelings toward them and what are his opinions and judgments of them; or, how does he perceive of himself as a member of his political system? What knowledge does he have of his rights, powers, obligations and of strategies of access to influence?

The research objectives in this chapter are five-fold: 1) to identify the pattern of Iranian political orientation; 2) to identify feelings toward government and politics; 3) to identify the pattern of obligation for participation; 4) to identify the pattern of civic or political competence; 5) to arrive at a perceptual image of the
Rastakhiz Party as perceived by its members. In other words, the aim is to know how effective the newly established Rastakhiz Party is in the eyes of those who consider themselves to be its members.

The National Survey

This study is based upon 740 interviews carried on in Tehran and four other provincial centers of Rasht (the center of Gilan), Kerman (the center of Kerman province), Ahwaz (the center of Khuzistan province) and Kermanshah (the center of Kermanshahan province), from March to September of 1976.

Of the total sample of 740 interviewed, 518 were the members of non-elite strata and 222 were the members of the elite class. The elite subjects were totally selected from the members of the Rastakhiz Party. They were those who held either the chairmanship of a party chapter (Kanoon) or the deputy chairmen, their secretaries and the faithful members of chapters who attended its meetings regularly. Eighty members of the elite sample were interviewed in the aforementioned provincial centers and the remainder, 142, were interviewed in Tehran. For the sample to be fairly representative of cross-sections of the party members throughout the country, two major steps were taken. First, Tehran was geographically divided into four areas, north, south, east and west; then an equal number of party chapters were selected in each area. Second, the whole country was also geographically divided into four areas of south (Khuzistan), north
(Rasht), east (Kermanshah) and west (Kerman). In each of the provincial centers an equal number of party chapters were selected for interviewing (20 interviewees for each provincial center which amounted to a total of 80 elite subjects).

The nonelite subjects were totally from Tehran, and were selected by the same process we described for the elites; that is, Tehran was divided into four geographic areas in each of which an equal number of people were selected for interviews. But the procedure for interviewing the nonelites drastically differed from the procedure used for the elite. The nonelite sample was not chosen from the party chapters. They were the people in the street; the interviewers in the different sections of each area, approached the subject and after stating his mission requested an interview (if the subject was preoccupied an appointment was made for a more convenient time).

The nonelite subjects were classified into three categories: the non-regulars, who had registered in a party chapter but did not attend its meetings regularly; the aloofs, who never participated in any chapter meetings or its various activities but claimed to be the party's member; and the non-members, who neither considered themselves to be the party's member nor had any idea what the Rastakhiz Party was or knew anything about the party's objectives and activities. The interviewing with the subjects ranged from one and a half to two hours.

The Questionnaire used for the interviews consisted of 37 questions, 8 of which were personal data. Twenty-three of the questions
used in the questionnaire were taken directly from *The Civic Culture.* The reason for doing this was to make the findings more comparable to those of Almond and Verba. However, no attempt is made here to compare the Iranian findings in this study with those of the five-nation study reported in *The Civic Culture* (see Appendix A and B for English and Persian questionnaires).

The method used for the interview is what is known as "administering interview" and structured with some of the questions open-ended in form. Concerning the procedure for interviewing, the questionnaire was held by the interviewers during the interview and was never given to the subjects. The subjects were asked only to respond to the questions which regularly were put forth by the interviewer according to the questionnaire. The interviewer then had to mark down the responses on the questionnaire during the interview.

Fourteen persons conducted the interviews, 13 of which were graduate students at the College of Radio and Television, an affiliate of the National Iranian Radio and Television (NRIT). The other interviewer was a student of dramatic arts, and had a B.A. Degree in Theater from the College of Dramatic Arts at the University of Tehran. All of the interviewers had previous interviewing experiences because of their participation in public surveys and polls conducted for NRIT. Nonetheless, they were further trained at the Iran Communications and Development Institute, concerning the "art of communicating with other people."
Four of the interviewers were sent to the four provincial centers and the remaining ten conducted interviewing in Tehran.

At the end of this brief introduction I would like to discuss several points. First, Almond and Verba’s five-nation study was primarily a nonelite study whereas the present investigation is concerned with both elite/nonelite strata. The main objective is to demonstrate the similarities and differences in political orientations and detect, if possible, the gap which might exist between these two groups. Second, the sample of elites selected for this study is loyal to the Pahlavi regime, and those interviewed were either government employed personnel or political activists within the Rastakhiz Party. It was not intended to interview the members of counter-elites. Third, in this survey I do not purport to test any complex set of theoretical framework or relationships, as was done by Almond-Verba and others, nor do I intend to prove or disprove any theory to be related to the Iranian political culture and behavior. The aim is simply to examine and interpret, rather superficially, some selected aspects of the Iranian political orientations for the main purpose of producing further evidence to support what I have frequently brought up in the previous chapters. I think these findings, however limited, may help us to explain why Iranians failed in three successive democratic eras in contemporary Iran to maintain democratic institutions, and why Iranians were unsuccessful in their internalization and institutionalization of democratic values and norms which, according to the western democratic
analysts, are supportive of democratic systems. The following analysis may answer some of these questions.

I. Patterns of Political Cognition

It has frequently been said that the quality of a people who compose the membership of a collectivity constitute the major factor for maintaining and sustaining an open democratic system. Aspects of a "cognitive" dimension are considered by many students of comparative politics to be one of the significant features of that quality. A "participant" in political affairs is assumed to be aware of and informed about the political system in both its governmental and political aspects; while a "parochial" tends to be unaware, or only dimly aware, of the political system in all its aspects.⁷

To what extent do the members of the Rastakhiz Party, elites as well as nonelites, see their lives as related to the activities of government? To what extent do they perceive government as having an effect on them as individuals? To identify the patterns of the Iranian political cognition, three measures are used. The first is an attempt to discover how much importance is attributed to national government. The second is a measure of awareness of and exposure to politics and public affairs. The third is a measure to examine the degree of information and opinions held.
The Impact of Government

One of the questions asked of all elites and nonelites was designed to discover how much effect they thought the activities of the national government had on their daily life. The question we asked the respondents was "Thinking about the national government, about how much effect do you think its activities, the laws passed and so on, have on your day-to-day life? Do they have a great effect, some effect, or none?" The results are reported in Tables 8 and 9.

A great number of elites see the national government as having great impact on their lives. Seventy-seven percent of chapter chairmen and 72 percent of chapter deputies and secretaries reported that the national government has a great impact on their lives. Members reported less impact of government influence on their daily lives, 55 percent (Table 8). It is important to note that many of our elite respondents, besides holding significant positions in the party organization, were the members of parliament, cabinet and high bureaucratic offices. The chairman of a party chapter in Tehran who was also the member of the Iranian cabinet, during the interviewing, told me "What do you expect? Certainly the government affects my life; is there any other way to escape it?" Another chapter chairman, who was also a member of parliament (Majlis), told me "We have no option, there is no way out."
**TABLE 8**

*Estimated Degree of Impact of National Government on Daily life; by the Elites*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of elite respondents who say national government has:</th>
<th>Chairmen</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Secre.</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great effect</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some effect</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No effect</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 9**

*Estimated Degree of Impact of National Government on Daily Life; by the Nonelites*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of nonelite respondents who say national government has:</th>
<th>Non-regulars</th>
<th>Aloofs</th>
<th>Non-members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great effect</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some effect</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No effect</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Responses given to our question by the nonelites are quite different from those given by the elites. They reported to feel the impact of government on their daily lives less strong. The percentage of those who saw their national government as having impact on their lives is significantly lower than those of the elites. Only 23 percent of non-regulars and 17 and 18 percent of aloofs and non-members attribute a great effect to the national government and perceive it as influencing their lives (Table 9). What is also significant in the nonelite responses is the percentage of those who reported they "Don't know." Twenty-eight percent of non-regulars, 35 percent of aloofs, and 43 percent of non-members have said they don't know. Thus, in terms of political cognition a gap exists between elites and nonelites.

Generally speaking, the figures for the nonelites suggest that a great number of the respondents are unaware of government activities in terms of its output. There is a high incidence of what Almond and Verba have termed "subject" and "parochial" political cultures. Many of respondents who reported the government has impact on their lives used the term "impact" in its negative sense. For instance, a barber told me "What do you think? Certainly the government has an impact on my life. Just look what a mess we are in." There was a high incidence of this sort of responses among those who reported that the government has an impact on them. They might be labeled as "output alienates" because of their negative attitudes toward the output aspects of the government. A respondent told me "The
government is doing what is good for its members and not what will be good for the people." This kind of response was very common among the college students and literate population.

Awareness of Politics

In the first question we tried to determine whether people perceived government as having an effect on their lives. Here we sought to determine whether or not they followed or paid any attention to political and governmental affairs. In other words, the first question was concerned with what might be called "output cognition," while in the second question, which we will put forth shortly, we are concerned with the aspect of "input cognition." This, however superficially, will bring out the dimension of attentiveness to political input. We asked the respondents, "Do you follow the accounts of political and governmental affairs? Would you say you follow them regularly, from time to time, or never?"

The results are summarized in Tables 10 and 11.

As was expected, the nonelites scored much lower on input and output cognition than the elites. Almost 80 percent of elite respondents have reported that they follow the accounts of government and other public affairs regularly; whereas only about 20 percent of nonelites follow the government accounts regularly (Table 11). A great number of nonelites have also reported "Don't know" when asked about the question.
### TABLE 10

Following Accounts of Political and Governmental Affairs; by the Elites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who report they follow account</th>
<th>Chairmen</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Secre.</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regularly</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From time to time</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other-Don't know</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 11

Following Accounts of Political and Governmental Affairs; by the Nonelites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who report they follow account</th>
<th>Non-regulars</th>
<th>Aloofs</th>
<th>Non-members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regularly</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From time to time</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other-Don't know</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When a different measure of political cognition was used the same pattern of orientations for both elites and nonelites appeared. We asked our respondents: "What about newspapers, radio, television or magazines? Do you follow public affairs in newspapers, radio, television or magazines, nearly every day, about once a week, from time to time, or never." The results are computed in Tables 12 and 13.

In terms of exposure to mass media there seems also to be a wide difference between the elites and the nonelites. The elite members are more exposed to the media, printed and electronic, than the nonelites. Almost 60 percent of elites read newspapers every day and listen to the radio and television at least once a day; whereas about 20 percent of the nonelites read newspapers only once a week or follow the public affairs on radio and television once or twice a week (see Tables 12 and 13). It seems that the picture in Tables 12 and 13 coincides with those reported in the discussion of output cognition—that is, the bulk of the respondents, particularly among the elite population, were aware of and evaluated favorably the governmental output. The elites were higher in following political and governmental affairs, whereas the case was hardly true for the nonelites. The elites were higher on output cognition than the nonelites, and were also higher in terms of exposure to political communication. However, a large number of nonelite respondents, particularly among the "aloofs" and the "non-members," reported that they did not read newspapers or listen to radio or watch television
### TABLE 12

Following Reports of Public Affairs in the Various Media; by the Elite*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who follow accounts in</th>
<th>Chairman</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Secretaries</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers every day</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio once a day</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television once a day</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazines weekly or so</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Only the percentage for those who report exposure are reported in Tables 12 and 13.

### TABLE 13

Following Reports of Public Affairs in the Various Media; by the Nonelites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who follow accounts in</th>
<th>Non-regulars</th>
<th>Aloofs</th>
<th>Non-members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers at least weekly</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio once a while</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television once a while</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazines at least weekly</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
because these mediums are under government control and censorship. "There is nothing in them worth reading or watching," a college student told me.

Having Information and Opinions

The aim under this heading is to ascertain the amount of information about government and politics that the respondents actually have. It has frequently been stated that democratic competence is closely related to having valid information about political issues and processes, and to the ability to use information in the analysis of issues and the devising of influence strategies.

Here we used two measures of information: one was based on ability to identify the national leaders of Rastakhiz Party, and the other is based on ability to identify former prime ministers. The question we asked the elite and the nonelites was: "How many party leaders do you know? Name them." The results are reported in Tables 14 and 15.

As expected, the elites demonstrate more ability than the nonelites to name the party leaders. The information gap between the two groups is considerable. As is shown in Table 14, a little over 5 percent of elite respondents, in the four categories, have named only one party leader, whereas over 40 percent of the nonelites have not been able to name more than one leader (Table 15). Also
### TABLE 14

Ability to Name Party Leaders; by the Elites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who could name only</th>
<th>Chairmen</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Secre.</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 15

Ability to Name Party Leaders; by the Nonelites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who could name only</th>
<th>Non-regulars</th>
<th>Aloofs</th>
<th>Non-members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the percentage of those in the nonelite group who have reported "Don't know" is considerably higher from those of the elites. Generally speaking, the high frequency of inability to name the party leaders at the nonelite level is consistent with the high percentage of those nonelites who described themselves as not following politics and governmental affairs.

The second question which was used to estimate the respondents' information about the political system dealt with the ability to name the former prime ministers. The question was "How many former prime ministers do you know? Name them." When this measure was used, the same national patterns were repeated. The results are shown in Tables 16 and 17.

The results summarized in Tables 16 and 17 demonstrate the same information gap which exists between elites and nonelites and we referred to in the previous paragraphs.

Table 17 indicates the nonelite respondents are poorly informed when compared with the elites. Over 35 percent of the nonelite respondents were not able to name any ex-prime ministers compared to only 5 percent of the elites.

Generally speaking, our findings on political cognition indicate the Iranian elites to be cognitively oriented toward the political system in both its output and input aspects. In the other extreme, the nonelite respondents include a large number who are either uniformed or alienated.
### TABLE 16

**Ability to Name Former Prime Ministers; by the Elites**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who could name only</th>
<th>Chairmen</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Secre.</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 17

**Ability to Name Former Prime Ministers; by the Nonelites**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who could name only</th>
<th>Non-regulars</th>
<th>Aloofs</th>
<th>Non-members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
II. Feelings Toward Government and Politics

There is certainly more to political culture than knowledge or cognition. How people feel about their political system is an important aspect of political culture. The state of feeling or political emotion in a country is perhaps the most important test of the legitimacy of its political system.

In this section I shall deal with generalized attitudes toward the system as a whole by using such measures as "system affect," "output affect," and "input effect."

**System affect:** By system affect is meant the feeling which an individual has toward the political system as a whole; that is, toward the nation, its virtues, accomplishments, and the like. This concept will be used here to measure the object of national pride in Iran.

In our interviews respondents, elites as well as nonelites, were asked: "Speaking generally, what are the things about this country that you are most proud of?" Tables 18 and 19 summarize the results.

As reported in Tables 18 and 19, elites and nonelites in great numbers have expressed pride in the country's past, its history, culture, literature, poets and nationality. Forty-five percent of chairmen, 33 percent of deputies, 29 percent of secretaries, and 57 percent of members have expressed pride in the Iranian nationality and its culture (Table 18). Similarly, 28 percent of non-regulars, 30 percent of aloofs, and 41 percent of non-members have said they
### TABLE 18

**Aspects of Nation in Which Respondents Report Pride; by the Elites**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who say they are proud of</th>
<th>Chairmen</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Secre.</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iranian nationality and its culture</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security and freedom</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent developments</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National resources</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 19

**Aspects of Nation in Which Respondents Report Pride; by the Nonelites**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who say they are proud of</th>
<th>Non-regulars</th>
<th>Aloofs</th>
<th>Non-members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iranian nationality and its culture</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poets and literatures</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National resources</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic development</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National security</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
are proud of the Iranian culture, its literature, poets and history (Table 19). What is most striking is the number of responses of "Don't know" given by the nonelites.

What seems to be most significant in elite and nonelite responses is the fact that neither of the two groups have reported any pride of any aspect of the Iranian political system or its institutions. They did not even mention the political system or any of its sub-systems such as the Iranian Constitution, Rastakhiz Party, government, political tradition and so on. Certainly, there have been responses such as pride in "Shahanshah's action" for women's enfranchisement or economic development, but they were hardly political in nature even though their political consequences could not be denied. Respondents' emphasis have generally been placed on non-political objects. One may therefore, conclude that Iranians in the overwhelming majority take no pride in their political system and even the percentage of those who have cited recent economic developments in Iran as something to take pride in is not impressive (almost 30 percent for elites and 8 percent for nonelites; see Tables 18 and 19). To the extent that they have national pride at all, it is in their history, Persian literature and poets, or in the fact of being Iranians. Thus one might cautiously make the statement that a great majority of respondents, elites and nonelites, are alienated from their political system, and they are not affected by it.
By "output affect" is meant the kinds of expectations people have of treatment at the hands of government officials. The feelings that people have toward governmental authorities may be inferred from their expectations of how they will be treated by them. In this section the attitudes people have toward the executive or administrative agencies that enforce laws and regulations that affect them will be studied.

Elite and nonelite respondents were confronted with two hypothetical situations. In the first, they were asked "Suppose there were some question that you had to take to a government office—for example, a tax question or housing regulation. Do you think you would be given equal treatment—I mean, would you be treated as well as anyone else?" or "If you had some trouble with the police—a traffic violation maybe, or were accused of a minor offense—do you think you would be given equal treatment? That is, would you be treated as well as anyone else?" Responses for both elites and nonelites are summarized in Tables 20 and 21.

The patterns that emerged from the responses were of great interest. There was a high incidence of output alienation among elites and nonelite respondents. Almost 85 percent of elites and 87 percent of nonelites reported they did not expect equal treatment by government agencies. The nonelite responses demonstrate more alienation from the governmental agencies than the elites. The
### TABLE 20

Expectation of Treatment by Governmental Bureaucracy and Police; by the Elites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who say</th>
<th>Chairmen</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Secre.</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>bur. pol.</td>
<td>bur. pol.</td>
<td>bur. pol.</td>
<td>bur. pol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They expect equal treat.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They don't expect equal treatment</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 21

Expectation of Treatment by Governmental Bureaucracy and Police; by the Nonelites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who say</th>
<th>Non-regulars</th>
<th>Aloofs</th>
<th>Non-members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>bur. pol.</td>
<td>bur. pol.</td>
<td>bur. pol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They expect equal treatment</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't expect equal treatment</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
finding here is quite consistent with the pattern we observed earlier, where neither of the two groups expressed pride in the Iranian political system and its institutions.

In a related question we asked the respondents to imagine that they were explaining their point of view to a government official(s). Did they expect that they would be listened to attentively and considerately. The idea was to know whether or not our respondents imputed responsiveness to government officials, whether they felt they would be treated with dignity. The actual question we asked the respondents was "If you explained your point of view to the officials, what effect do you think it would have? Would they give your point of view serious consideration, would they pay only a little attention, or would they ignore what you had to say," or "If you explained your point of view to the police, what effect do you think it would have? Would they,...(same choices as before). Tables 22 and 23 report the frequency of expectations of considerate treatment at the hands of government officials and the police.

Tables 22 and 23 show overwhelming proportions at the elite and nonelite levels, reporting a general lack of confidence in the considerateness and responsiveness of bureaucracy and police; certainly, the elite respondents, between 45 to 50 percent, report a little consideration at the hands of police and bureaucracy; whereas between 10 to 15 percent expect to be taken seriously. Nonetheless, the distribution of frequencies for the elite respondents is highly significant, because it clearly shows the kinds of expectations that
### TABLE 22
Amount of Consideration Expected for Point of View from Bureaucracy and Police; by the Elites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who expect</th>
<th>Chairmen</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Secre.</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>bur. pol.</td>
<td>bur. pol.</td>
<td>bur. pol.</td>
<td>bur. pol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious consideration</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little consideration</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be ignored</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 23
Amount of Consideration Expected for Point of View from Bureaucracy and Police; by the Nonelites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who expect</th>
<th>Non-regulars</th>
<th>Aloof</th>
<th>Non-members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>bur. pol.</td>
<td>bur. pol.</td>
<td>bur. pol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious consideration</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little consideration</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be ignored</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
they have from their government and its agencies.

The situation for the nonelite respondents seems to be more striking. Forty-five to 48 percent of non-regulars, 47 to 50 percent of aloofs and 42 percent of non-members have reported that they will be ignored by bureaucracy and the police. Only between 3 to 4 percent believed that they will be received with consideration. Although the expectation of treatment for the elite is a little higher than the nonelites, both groups seem to suffer from political alienation, that is, they do not think that the system is working in the direction of their interests. Both groups seem to have unfavorable expectations at the hands of governmental bureaucracies.

Input Affect: Pattern of Political Communication

In this section, the dimension of feelings about politics, or input affect will be discussed. Here we deal, rather briefly, with the aspect of communication patterns. The emphasis is primarily on direct (fact-to-face) political communication processes among the elite and nonelite respondents. If people are to participate in a democratic political process, they must have the feeling that it is safe to do so, because talking politics with other people implies some sense of safety in political communication. They should not have to assume great risks when they express political opinions, and they should be relatively free about the person to whom they talk. To the extent that these expectations are not present, impulses to
communicate politically are suppressed, and what political communication there is tends to be restricted and covert.

The first measure used to get some idea of freedom of political communications among the respondents was to know the extent to which they reported that they discuss politics. We asked the respondents "What about talking about public affairs to other people? Do you do that nearly every day, once a week, from time to time?" The results are summarized in Tables 24 and 25.

As reported in Table 24, only 40 percent of chapter chairmen, 27 percent of deputies, 31 percent of secretaries, and 18 percent of members talk with other people about politics. The majority of the elite respondents either talk politics once a week, from time to time, or never. And a great number have responded "Don't know." The responses are strikingly significant, because they were all political activists in the Rastakhiz Party and are assumed to participate actively in political discussion and debates with other people.

The majority of nonelite respondents have reported that they "never" discuss politics with other people (Table 25). Only about 8 percent of nonelites, in three categories, have said that they discuss public affairs every day. It is interesting to know that almost the same numbers reported that they do not follow political affairs through the mass media. One might say that in this case, the pattern of direct communication seems to coincide with exposure to political communication in the mass media.
### TABLE 24
Frequency of Talking Politics with Other People; by the Elite

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who report discussing</th>
<th>Chairmen</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Secre.</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Every day</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a week</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From time to time</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 25
Frequency of Talking Politics with Other People; by the Noneslites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who report discussing</th>
<th>Non-regulars</th>
<th>Aloofs</th>
<th>Non-members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Every day</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a week</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From time to time</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In order to find out what restrictions the respondents feel in discussing political matters with others we asked them the following question, "If you wanted to discuss politics, how free or unrestricted would you feel?" We wanted to know how people felt about discussing politics and governmental affairs with others around them, because not everybody is willing to reveal his political preferences and discuss with others what is actually in his mind. Therefore, feelings of distrust and suspicion are always a significant factor in face-to-face political communication. The results are summarized in Tables 26 and 27.

We have already seen that a great number of elite and overwhelming numbers of nonelites do not discuss politics frequently. In response to our latest question we also found that a considerable number of elites and nonelites do not feel free to discuss politics with others. To be sure, 47 percent of chairmen and 35 percent of deputies have said that they do not feel restricted while discussing politics with others. But the percentage of those who reported either some restrictions or were highly restricted is also significant (see Table 26).

Figures for the nonelites are also impressive. Forty-six percent of non-regulars, 55 percent of aloofs, and 53 percent of non-members have reported that they feel highly restricted when discussing politics with others (Table 27). This findings is consistent with earlier findings reported throughout this chapter concerning the nonelites' political orientation. These figures, for both elites and nonelites,
TABLE 26

Feeling of Restrictions in Discussing Political and Governmental Affairs; by the Elites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who report they</th>
<th>Chairmen</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Secre.</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feel free to discuss politics with others</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel some restriction</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel highly restricted</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 27

Feeling of Restrictions in Discussing Political and Governmental Affairs; by the Nonelites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who report they</th>
<th>Non-regulars</th>
<th>Aloofs</th>
<th>Non-members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feel free to discuss politics with others</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel some restriction</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel highly restricted</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
are of great interest, for they suggest the degree of openness of the political communications process in the whole political system.

Another related question was also asked our respondents. The question we put to them read, "If you wanted to discuss political and governmental affairs, would there be some people you definitely wouldn't turn to—that is, people with whom you feel it would be better not to discuss such topics? About how many people would you say there are with whom you would avoid discussing politics?" This question is designed to bring out the feeling of distrust and suspicion in interpersonal relationships. The findings are summarized in Tables 28 and 29.

Here again the same patterns reappeared. Feelings of distrust and suspicion among the members of the elites as well as the nonelites in direct political communications persists. Only 8 percent of chairmen, 8 percent of deputies, 10 percent of secretaries and 5 percent of members have said that they feel free to discuss politics with almost anyone (Table 28). Similarly, among the nonelites, except for the one percent of the aloofs, no respondent felt free to discuss politics with anyone (Table 29). Over 50 percent of elites and almost two-thirds of the nonelites feel seriously restricted and avoid communicating about politics with many or most people. These findings clearly confirm the already existing assumptions of distrust and suspicion which is said to exist within the Iranian political environment.
### TABLE 28

**Number of People the Respondents Turn to for Discussing Political and Governmental Affairs; by the Elites**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who report they discuss it</th>
<th>Chairmen</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Secre.</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With no one</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not with many people</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With few people</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With anyone</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 29

**Number of People the Respondents Turn to for Discussing Political and Governmental Affairs; by the Nonelites**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who report they discuss it</th>
<th>Non-regulars</th>
<th>Aloofs</th>
<th>Non-members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With no one</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not with many people</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With few people</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With anyone</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. The Obligation to Participate

An individual in an open and democratic society is expected to take some part in the formation of decisions, whether at national or local levels. A democracy is characterized by the fact that power over significant authoritative decisions in a society is distributed among the population. Theoretically, therefore, the ordinary man is expected to take an active role in governmental affairs, to be aware of how decisions are made, and to make his views known. In practical terms, we may ask, what is the ordinary man's conception of his role in politics? And more importantly, does he think of himself as capable of influencing and participating in the decisions of his government?

The main objective in this section is, therefore, to illuminate what the elite and the nonelite respondents think of their role in the political process, and to show the differences that might exist between these groups. The question which was put to the respondents dealt with participation in local affairs. Our interest was not only in political participation, but also in any sort of outgoing activity that the individuals might mention. In our first question we wanted to know the extent to which respondents believe they have any sort of obligation to the country. The question asked the respondents read, "We know that the ordinary person has many problems that take his time. In view of this, what part do you think the ordinary person ought to play in local affairs?" Tables 30 and 31 have summarized
TABLE 30
How Active Should the Ordinary Man be in his Local Community? by the Elites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who say the ordinary man should*</th>
<th>Chairmen</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Secre.</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Be active in his community</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only participate passively</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only participate in religious activities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only mind his own business</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*On the basis of responses received the respondents were classified into five categories. First, there were those who believed that the ordinary man should take some active part in his community (this included those who said that the ordinary man should attend meetings, join organizations, and so on); second, there were those who believed that one ought to participate more passively in community activities (for instance, to be interested in local affairs, try to understand them and keep informed, vote, and so on); third, there were those who believed that the ordinary man ought to participate only in religious activities and religious gatherings; fourth, there were those who did not think that the ordinary man has any responsibility that involves him in the affairs of his community (here included the respondents who felt that the ordinary man ought to be interested only in his own business and own personal life, and did not conceive of any role to be played by an individual in his local affairs; and finally there were those who did not know what role the individual ought to play in his community.
As was expected, the majority of elite respondents, particularly those among chairmen and deputies, favored active participation in national and even local affairs. Eighty-two percent of chairmen, 55 percent of deputies, 56 percent of secretaries, and 47 percent of members have stated their approval of active participation in national affairs (Table 30). As one moves from the chairmen to the member respondents the percentages shrink. What is also interesting among the elite respondents is the high percentages of "don't knows." For instance, 30 percent of members, 32 percent of deputies and 24 percent of secretaries have reported "don't know" to the question asked (Table 30). Among the answers given by the nonelites, religious activities occupy the highest position. Thirty-five percent of non-regulars, 38 percent of aloofs and another 38 percent of non-members believed that the ordinary man should participate in local religious activities. Only 18 percent of non-regulars and 12 and 16 percent of aloofs and non-members, respectively, have expressed a preference for the ordinary man's active participation in local affairs (Table 31). Generally speaking, concerning the nonelite responses, there are few who conceive of citizens as active participants. As it was already reported, only a small number of respondents believed that the ordinary man has an obligation to take an active role in his community. They are overwhelmingly passive in their conception of the ordinary man's role in the political process. For instance, "to be interested in local affairs," "try to understand what is going
on and keep informed," or "try to vote regularly," and so on.

But what sorts of community activities did the respondents have in mind when they said that the ordinary man ought to play some part in his local community. To know this, we put forth another, but related, question to our respondents. The question was "What role should the ordinary man play in his local community?" The results are shown in Tables 32 and 33.

The findings, in both tables (32 and 33), are consistent with the pattern of political orientations which have thus far emerged from our analyses. As Tables 32 and 33 show, only a small number of respondents mention partisan activity as the responsibility of the individual to his community. Interestingly, active community participation in a non-governmental sense, such as participation in civic groups and organizations, or informal activity to help the community, is absent in elite and nonelite responses. Instead, the elite members frequently mention taking part in local government bodies, whereas the majority of the nonelite respondents stress a passive role, such as to try to understand what is going on and keep informed, or participating in religious activities and religious meetings. Fifty-two percent of chairmen, 55 percent of deputies, 48 percent of secretaries and 45 percent of chapter members have mentioned taking part in local government activities, whereas 18, 24, 21, and 32 percent, respectively, have taken a rather passive role and mentioned trying to understand and keeping informed (Table 32).
TABLE 32
What Role Should the Ordinary Man Play in his Local Community? by the elites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who choose</th>
<th>Chairmen</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Secre.</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Take part in activities of local government</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take part in activities of political parties</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take part in non-governmental activity and in organizations interested in local affairs</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Try to understand and keep informed</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in religious activities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 33
What Role Should the Ordinary Man Play in his Local Community? by the Nonelites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who choose</th>
<th>Non-regulars</th>
<th>Aloofs</th>
<th>Non-members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Take part in activities of local government</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take part in activities of political parties</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take part in non-governmental activity and in organizations interested in local affairs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Try to understand and keep informed</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in religious activities</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It should be remembered that the elites' stress on participating in local governmental affairs should not necessarily be interpreted as a tendency toward voluntary activities. Because the Iranian elites are highly bureaucratic in approach, their stress here on taking part in local governmental activities seems to be an indication of a tendency for formal governmental activities rather than the informal ones. Besides that, Iranian society lacks a tradition of local self-government. The Iranian politics, economy, education, and so on have always been centralized. Since 1975, the government tried to de-centralize the decision-making process and give more autonomy to the local governments. But the idea seems to have failed and the local institutions have little freedom of action.

Nonelite respondents generally do not think of the individual as having any outgoing responsibility within his local government. As Table 33 indicates, a substantial number of nonelite respondents admitted no sense of local civic obligation. The norms that they accept in relation to their community are certainly not those of the participating citizens. For instance, 39 percent of non-regulars, 40 percent of aloofs, and 45 percent of non-members have reported that they try to understand what is going on and keep informed (Table 33); whereas 37 percent, 38, and 40 percent, respectively, have preferred participation in religious activities. Less than 2 percent of nonelites have inclined toward non-governmental and voluntary type activities.
IV. The Sense of Civic Competence

Democracy is a kind of political system in which ordinary citizens exercise control over elites. In this section we are concerned with the perceptions that individuals, elites and nonelites have about the amount of influence they can exercise over governmental decisions. The influence which we are interested in here is mainly "political influence", and it is generally exercised by groups or individuals over governmental decisions. Almond and Verba have roughly defined the political influence of a group or individual over a governmental decision as equal "to the degree to which governmental officials act to benefit that group or individual."

According to the authors, officials believe that they will risk some deprivation if they do not do so. Individuals who could exert such influence are branded by the authors as "politically competent;" but those who believed they could exert such influence were labeled as "subjectively competent." In this section we are mainly concerned with the latter form of political influence, that is, the perception of the ability to exert political influence.

The perception of the ability to exert political influence is significant even if individuals rarely try to use that influence, or unsuccessful when they do try. Such a belief in the ordinary man's ability to participate may have significant consequences for a political system; the extent that the ordinary citizens in a nation perceive themselves as competent to influence the government affects
their political behavior.

In the process of interviewing we asked the respondents several questions. We attempted to place them in a hypothetical situation so that we could ascertain how they thought they would react. The first question we asked the respondents concerned the national government. The question read, "Suppose a law were being considered by parliament that you considered to be unjust or harmful: 1) What do you think you would do? 2) If you made an effort to change this law, how likely is it that you would succeed?" The summaries of responses are reported in Tables 34 and 35.

Responses as they are reported in Tables 34 and 35 show, once again, the passive attitudes of the respondents, elites and nonelites, vis-a-vis the powers of government. Seventy-nine percent of chapter chairmen, 81 percent of deputies, 80 percent of secretaries, and 75 percent of members have said there is nothing they can do about an unjust government regulation. More than three-quarters of elites we interviewed expressed the opinion that they had no recourse if they found the national government is considering a law they thought unjust; only 21, 19, 20, and 15 percent of chairmen, deputies, secretaries and members, respectively, reported that they can do something about it; and a small percentage of elites have said that they can succeed if they make the effort to change it. On the other hand, over 90 percent of nonelites whom we interviewed reported that there is nothing they can do in such a distress situation. Similarly, over 90 percent of those who said there is nothing they can do to
TABLE 34

What can you do About an Unjust Local or National Regulation; by the Elites

**Part 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Chairmen</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Secre.</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>They can do something</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They cannot do anything</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Part 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Chairmen</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Secre.</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>They can succeed</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They cannot succeed</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 35

What can you do About an Unjust Local or National Regulation: by the Nonelites

**Part 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-regulars</th>
<th>Aloofs</th>
<th>Non-members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>They can do something</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They cannot do anything</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Part 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-regulars</th>
<th>Aloofs</th>
<th>Non-members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>They can succeed</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They cannot succeed</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
change an unjust regulation, also reported that they cannot succeed to change it if they made an effort (Table 35).

In a related, but different, question we attempted to document the kind of "political strategy" the respondents choose in attempting to influence the government. This is very important, because the strategies of influence that individuals would use in connection with the government is highly significant for understanding the nature of his perceived relationship to his government. Furthermore, as Almond and Verba have correctly stated, "The strategy that an individual would use will naturally affect the extent to which his subjective view of his ability to influence represents real influence potential, that is, it represents the sort of activity that has some chance of changing the behavior of the government officials." We asked our respondents, "What citizens would do to try to influence their national government." The strategies of influence that respondents, elites and nonelites, report they would use in connection with the national government are summarized in Tables 36 and 37.

As the responses are summarized in Tables 36 and 37, only a small percentage of respondents report that they can enlist the support of others in their attempts to influence the government. What is most striking is the small percentage of elites, 2 percent for secretaries and 1 percent for members, who feel they cannot call on others to aide them. Moreover, formal organizations such as a political party is highly favored by the elite respondents as a
TABLE 36

What Citizens Would do to Try to Influence Their National Government; by the Elites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What citizens would do</th>
<th>Chairmen</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Secre.</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Try to organize informal groups</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work through political party</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directly contact administrative officials</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Write letter to officials</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through Shahanshahi investigating Commission</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Try to visit political leaders</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote against offending official at the next election</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 37
What Citizens Would do to Try to Influence Their National Government; by the Nonelites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What citizens would do</th>
<th>Non-regulars</th>
<th>Aloofs</th>
<th>Non-members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Try to organize informal groups</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work through political party</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directly contact administrative officials</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Write letters to officials</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through Shahanshahi Investigating Commission</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit political leaders</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
means to affect government behavior. Also personal and individualistic means such as directly contacting the government officials (elective or appointive) is similarly favored by the elites. For instance 48, 37, 29, and 32 percent of chairmen, deputies, secretaries and members, respectively, have reported that they would directly contact the government officials if they were attempting to counteract some unjust regulation being considered by the national government (Table 36). As Table 36 indicates, elite respondents more frequently mention enlisting the support of formal groups than informal groups, such as calling on their neighbors, getting friends and families to support their position or circulating a petition. In fact, there was only a small percentage of elites, 2 percent of secretaries and 1 percent of members, who mentioned the support of informal groups as a political strategy.

In a democratic political system, the belief that cooperation with one's fellow citizens is both a possible and an effective political action represents a highly significant political orientation. We have already mentioned elsewhere (chapter 2) that by their very nature, the Iranians are very individualistic and highly uncooperative. Data presented here give some support to the existing assumption concerning the individualistic nature of Iranian social and political behavior.

Political strategies mentioned by the nonelites generally are similar to those reported by the elites. A great number of nonelite respondents have indicated that they would go to government officials
and governmental agencies in order to counteract an unjust regulation being considered by the government. Forty-five, 51, and 39 percent of non-regulars, aloofs and members, respectively, have reported that they would directly contact the governmental officials (Table 37). Not a single nonelite respondent ever mentioned using informal groups as a means of fighting an unjust government regulation or influencing appointed officials rather than elected officials as the target of their protest. Most importantly, a great number of respondents, when asked how or to whom they could protest, gave no specific answer.

One may conclude, from the data presented in this section, that the majority of our respondents, particularly among the nonelites, demonstrate a high degree of political inefficacy. The elite members also demonstrate a considerable degree of political inefficacy, although better informed. If the government is to be responsive to the demands of citizens, these demands must be aggregated, and the aggregation of interests implies cooperation among men.

V. Perceptual Image of the Rastakhiz Party

The main objective in this section is to arrive at an image of the Rastakhiz Party as perceived by its members. When the Rastakhiz Party was established in 1975, its creators claimed that a new era had begun in Iranian political history, and substantial changes have taken place within the Iranian political system. It was also
frequently said by the party's organizers that the Rastakhiz Party was a different kind of party and was totally unique in the Iranian political environment because, according to them, it was an all-encompassing party belonging to all Iranians and thus was dissimilar to its predecessors.

In order to know exactly what the elites and nonelites thought of the Rastakhiz party, concerning images the members had formed in their minds about it, what their expectations were, and what they thought about the party's ability and effectiveness in dealing with such major national issues as housing, profiteering, inflation and so on, we formulated several questions which we asked our elite and nonelite respondents. The first question which we put to our respondents was "In your opinion, is there any major difference between the performance of the Rastakhiz party and parties before it?" The findings are summarized in Tables 38 and 39.

As reported in Tables 38 and 39, there is a wide difference between the elite and the nonelite respondents in terms of their conceptions of the Rastakhiz party's performance. Sixty, 62, 56, and 54 percent of chairmen, deputies, secretaries and members, respectively, reported that there are major differences between the performance of Rastakhiz party and the parties before it. This was, of course, expected because of the very fact that many of the elite respondents, except for the members, were leaders of party chapters. Nonetheless, over 40 percent of the elite respondents have either reported there is some difference, no difference or "don't know"
### TABLE 38

Differences in Performance Between the Rastakhiz Party and the Parties Before it; by the Elite

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who say there is</th>
<th>Chairmen</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Secre.</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lots of difference</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some difference</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No difference</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 39

Differences in Performance Between the Rastakhiz Party and The Parties Before it; by the Nonelites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who say there is</th>
<th>Non-regulars</th>
<th>Aloofs</th>
<th>Non-members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lots of difference</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some difference</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No difference</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the other extreme, a large number of the nonelite respondents have reported that they did not see any difference between the performance of the Rastakhiz party and the parties before it. Thirty-five, 31, and 39 percent of non-regulars, aloofs and non-members believed that there is no difference between the Rastakhiz and those before it (Table 39). Only 17, 21, and 14 percent of them believed that there were many differences between the performance of the Rastakhiz party and the parties before it. Also, the percentage of "don't knows" for the nonelites is considerably higher.

Many of the nonelite respondents identified the Rastakhiz party with the government and "political establishment." This may be a partial explanation why the Rastakhiz party was not able, as the parties before it, to develop an effective relationship with its political environment.

In a different question, we asked the respondents "Do you think decisions taken in the party chapters will be taken into consideration by the party leaders?" The purpose of asking this question was mainly to know whether our respondents thought of themselves as having a useful function in the party's decision-making and in its policy formation process; because, according to the party and government leaders, all Iranians were considered to be Rastakhiz members and were supposed to have a share in its decision-making process. The results are shown in Tables 40 and 41.
### TABLE 40

Are the Decisions Made by the Party Chapters Taken into Consideration by the Party Leaders? by the Elites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who say party leaders give</th>
<th>Chairmen</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Secre.</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lots of consideration</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some consideration</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No consideration</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 41

Are the Decisions Made by the Party Chapters Taken into Consideration by the Party Leaders? by the Nonelites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who say party leaders give</th>
<th>Non-regulars</th>
<th>Aloofs</th>
<th>Non-members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lots of consideration</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some consideration</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No consideration</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Findings presented in Tables 40 and 41 are highly interesting. Almost 50 percent of chapter chairmen and their deputies did not think that decisions taken in their chapters are given serious consideration by the party leader, whereas only 31 and 35 percent of secretaries and members reported that decisions taken by the party chapters are not taken into consideration. Responses given by the nonelites are also striking. Thirty-eight, 41 and 42 percent of non-regulars, aloofs, and non-members, respectively, have expressed the view that the party leaders give no consideration to the decisions taken by the party chapters (Table 41). The percentage of "don't knows" for the nonelite respondents is also high. For instance, 31, 36, and 31 percent of non-regulars, aloofs and non-members were not able to express any opinion (Table 41). The findings here are not inconsistent with those reported for the elites and nonelites in previous sections.

In order to make our point of view clearer we asked the related, but different, question: "in your opinion, do the ordinary members of the party have any influence on the decisions made by the party?" The results are summarized in Tables 42 and 43.

As reported in Tables 42 and 43, the familiar pattern of alienation and disaffection seems to persist. A little over one-half of the chairmen and deputies believe that the ordinary party members have a great influence on decisions made in the Rastakhiz Party; whereas more than one-half of the secretaries and chapter's members do not believe so (Table 42). Almost a quarter of elite
TABLE 42

Do the Ordinary Members of the RP Have any Influence on the Decisions made by the Party? by the Elites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who say the members have</th>
<th>Chairmen</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Secre.</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lots of influence</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some influence</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No influence</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 43

Do the Ordinary Members of the RP Have any Influence on the Decisions made by the Party? by the Nonelites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who say the members have</th>
<th>Non-regulars</th>
<th>Aloofs</th>
<th>Non-members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lots of influence</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some influence</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No influence</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
respondents believe that the ordinary members have some influence on the party's decisions; whereas between 10 to 15 percent have reported that the ordinary members have no influence on the decisions made by the party. The picture for the nonelite respondents is more striking. Almost 50 percent of the nonelites interviewed did not believe that the ordinary members have any influence on decisions taken by the party (Table 43). The percentage of "don't knows" for the nonelites is also high. For example, over 30 percent of the nonelites did not know whether they had any influence on the decisions made by the party or not (Table 43).

To be more blunt, we asked the question differently. We asked our elite and nonelite respondents, "Do you think that the major decisions in the party are made by the party leaders?" Certainly the nature of the question is a little directive in the sense that it might lead the interviewee in the interviewing. But if the respondent was strong in his beliefs, the leading nature of the question we put to him would probably have had no significant effect. The results are shown in Tables 44 and 45,

As shown in Tables 44 and 45, the earlier patterns we observed in the elite and nonelite responses are repeated here. They seem to be highly consistant in their responses. Here again, over 50 percent of the elite respondents believed that the major decisions in the Rastakhiz party are made by the party leaders, whereas 30 percent of elites did not think so (Table 44). Also, a great majority of the nonelite respondents believed that the major decisions
### TABLE 44
Are the Major Decisions in the RP made by the Party Leaders?
by the Elites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who say</th>
<th>Chairmen</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Secre.</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 45
Are the Major Decisions in the RP made by the Party Leaders?
by the Nonelites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who say</th>
<th>Non-regulars</th>
<th>Aloofs</th>
<th>Non-members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
within the party are made by the leaders. Between 68 and 71 percent of the nonelites have said that the decisions are made by the party leaders (Table 45).

To know whether the respondents felt any political restriction or control in the party chapters when discussing daily problems or expressing views on national issues, we asked them the following question, "How freely do you think the participants in the party chapters put forth their ideas and views related to daily national issues and problems?" The responses are summarized in Tables 46 and 47.

Based on the responses shown in Table 46, the majority of elite respondents in all categories, except for the members, have reported that they discuss national problems in party chapters and exchange views freely and with no restrictions. For instance, 75 and 74 percent of chairmen and deputies have said they did not have any problem expressing their views in the chapters; whereas 62 percent of secretaries and 42 percent of members thought so (Table 46). The nonelites, on the other extreme, felt more restricted in expressing their views than the elites. For instance, 41, 47, and 42 percent of non-regulars, aloofs and non-members, respectively, have said that they did not feel free to express their personal views openly in the party chapter (Table 47).

The last two questions which we asked the interviewees to answer were related to actual national problems facing the Iranians during 1976 (and persisting to the present time) with no solution in sight.
TABLE 46
How Freely do the Participants in the Party Chapter Express Their Views on National Issues? by the Elites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who express their ideas</th>
<th>Chairmen</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Secre.</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quite freely</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less freely</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not freely</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 47
How Freely do the Participants in the Party Chapter Express Their Views on National Issues? by the Nonelites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who express their ideas</th>
<th>Non-regulars</th>
<th>Aloofs</th>
<th>Non-members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quite freely</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less freely</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not freely</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first major problem was housing and the second problem involved profiteering and rising prices.

Beginning with 1974, the country witnessed severe dislocations on the housing market and the construction industry. High demand and a great deal of fluid capital fueled a construction boom. But the boom, in turn, led to rapid inflation in housing prices and housing costs. Prices for materials and construction workers were running out of control. The Rastakhiz government hastily appointed a top level committee to deal with housing policy strategies. Seven cabinet members and five other top officials, including the Governor of the Central Bank and presidents of several other banks, were the members of this committee. Also the Rastakhiz party called for a party Commission which was charged with examining the housing problem and current landlord-tenant disputes. The Rastakhiz party's Commission submitted a series of reports on the housing situation but never came up with any effective and workable recommendation on the housing problem. And up to this moment the housing problem shows no signs of declining.

The issue of profiteering and rising prices since 1974 has turned into one of the significant problems on the national scene. Anti-profiteering campaigns have become a national goal, with the government, the Rastakhiz party, and consumer groups all campaigning for equitable pricing in its own particular style. Everybody has agreed that profiteering should be condemned and that an end should be made "to all forms of exploitation of man by man." The campaign
was considered so important that it constituted a revolutionary principle by the Rastakhiz party. Thus, as it was described, the Rastakhiz party had faced a number of important tests on major national issues.

Considering these major problems, we wanted to know what expectations members of the Rastakhiz had of the party. What did they think about the party's ability in terms of problem-solving, and how did they appraise the party's effectiveness in dealing with such major national issues. In these areas of national concern we formulated two questions which we asked our respondents to answer. The first question dealt with the issue of profiteering and prices and read, "In your opinion, how effective has the role of the Rastakhiz party been so far in its campaign against inflated prices and profiteering?" The results are summarized in Tables 48 and 49.

As the results in Tables 48 and 49 indicate, neither of the two groups, elites and nonelites, has indicated any faith in the Rastakhiz party's effectiveness in its campaign against rising prices and profiteering. A high percentage of elites, 53, 58, 65, and 68 percent of chairmen, deputies, secretaries and members, respectively, have reported no effectiveness in the Party's campaign against profiteering. (Table 48). The nonelite respondents have similarly expressed disbelief in the Rastakhiz Party's effectiveness in this campaign. Fifty-three, 58, and 54 percent of non-regulars, aloofs, and non-members, respectively, have reported that the role
### TABLE 48

How Effective is the Role of RP in its Campaign Against Rising Prices and Profiteering? by the Elites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who say the role has been very</th>
<th>Chairmen</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Secre.</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very effective</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less effective</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not effective</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 49

How Effective is the Role of RP in its Campaign Against Rising Prices and Profiteering? by the Noneilites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who say the role has been very</th>
<th>Non-regulars</th>
<th>Aloofs</th>
<th>Non-members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very effective</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less effective</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not effective</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of the Rastakhiz party's campaign against rising prices and profiteering has been ineffective (Table 49).

The last question which we put to our respondents concerned the housing problem in Iran. We asked them "Do you think the RP's efforts to find a solution to the existing landlord-tenant situation will eventually result in a satisfactory conclusion?" The results are summarized in Tables 50 and 51.

As Tables 50 and 51 indicate, the pattern of responses for both elites and nonelites is similar to the earlier ones in this section. Great numbers of elites and nonelites have reported no faith in the Rastakhiz party to find a solution to the housing problem. Almost two-thirds of the respondents in both groups have reported that the Rastakhiz party has not been successful and is not effective enough to solve such major national problems as housing (Table 50). Also, over 80 percent of the nonelites have said that the party's efforts to bring the landlord-tenant dispute to a satisfactory conclusion is not going to succeed (Table 51).

One explanation for the negative attitudes of elites and nonelites toward the ability of the Rastakhiz party to solve the existing national problems might have been the "spillover" effect from the pre-Rastakhiz era to the post-Rastakhiz period. A great number of national political leaders who were in charge of the national political affairs in the previous period were also able to retain their political posts and influence in the Rastakhiz era. This might partially explain why the majority of elite and nonelite
### TABLE 50

**Will the Efforts of the RP to Solve the Housing Problem be Successful? by the Elites**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who say it will be</th>
<th>Chairmen</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Secre.</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Successful</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsuccessful</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 51

**Will the Efforts of the RP to Solve the Housing Problem be Successful? by the Nonelites**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who say it will be</th>
<th>Non-regulars</th>
<th>Aloofs</th>
<th>Non-members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Successful</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsuccessful</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
respondents did not expect any real solution to the existing national problems; they did not experience any real change in the existing political structure. In other words, the Rastakhiz party, in the eyes of those who joined it, was not much different from its predecessors. The question, then, is why did the present members join the party if they knew in advance that nothing was going to change. The answer may be the fact that people, particularly those in the government bureaucracy, did not join the party voluntarily (see chapter 7). They might have suffered different kinds of deprivation if they had done otherwise.

In this chapter, we made an attempt to identify certain aspects of the Iranian elite and nonelite's political orientations toward certain numbers of political objects. From this short analysis, the following brief conclusion is reached: neither the elites nor the nonelites seems to have developed any strong feeling of attachment to the existing political system or its sub-structures. It also seems that neither of the two groups is committed to the existing political structures and institutions. Political alienation seems to be widespread among the members of elites as well as the nonelites; neither group considers the governmental-bureaucratic structures to be operating in the direction of their interests. Strong feeling of distrust and suspicion prevail in political communication among elites and the nonelites, and this is a phenomenon which has been a part of Iranian political culture going far back in Iranian history (see chapter 2). Both groups seem to be
rather inefficacious, because neither of the two groups feels capable of influencing government behavior or decisions. Even though the percentage of elites who are politically efficacious is much higher than the nonelites, the majority in both groups feel impotent vis-a-vis the government. The government seems to be a superimposed structure and omnipresent in the eyes of those we interviewed. However, there is a wide gap in political orientation between elites and nonelites. The elites are better informed, more committed and politically more efficacious than the nonelites. Nonetheless, on the basis of data presented in this chapter, one might cautiously conclude that in our interviews, both the elite and the nonelite respondents have failed to develop the kind of political orientation which is congruent with modern political structures.
NOTES CHAPTER 3


4. Ibid., p. 15.

5. See Almond and Verba, pp. 45-84, 117-169.

6. Ibid., p. 45.

7. Ibid., p. 136. As the authors themselves have pointed out, this model of "political influence" is a sheer oversimplification. If one were studying the "real" influence situation, one would have to complicate things a little further. And since no attempt is made here to study the real situation, such complications were not considered to be necessary.

8. Ibid., p. 146.

CHAPTER 4

The Rise and Fall of Political Parties in Iran: Interactions and Deadlocks

In this chapter, the chronological development of political parties in Iran will be discussed. The emphasis will be primarily on the style of interaction between the leadership of different political groups and between the groups and the government as well. The aim is to show the bargaining, strategies and the pattern of problem-solving in the course of group interaction. The period chosen for discussion is the duration between 1907-1921, that is, the time between the constitutional revolution and the Reza Shah's military takeover in 1921.

Historical Background Preceding the Constitutional Revolution

In 1794 a malevolent eunuch named Agha Mohammad Khan brutally overthrew the Zand dynasty and established suzerainty over Iran. Thus was founded the Qajar dynasty, which lasted one hundred and thirty fateful years. It was during this period that Western influences penetrated beyond ambassadorial and court circles and began to be felt in the life of the nation. Agha Mohammad was a cruel and shriveled-up young man whose psychological vindictiveness was
perhaps caused by the fact that he had been castrated at the age of five. In 1797 he was assassinated by his own associates.

His nephew and successor, Fath-Ali Shah (1799-1834), whose only claim to fame was an unusually long beard and a progeny of some 2,000 princes and princesses, had most of his uncle's bad traits. Almost from the beginning he was called upon to make decisions on national and international problems for which he was not prepared. When Fath-Ali Shah died at the age of 68 Mohammad, the son of Abbas Mirza, the Crown Prince who had died a year earlier, acceded to the throne.

Mohammad Shah spent most of his 13 years as king trying to strengthen his position in the country. He ordered the death of the very able Abol Gasem Qaem Magham, and gave the office to his tutor Haji Mirza Aghasi, whose superstitions, ignorance, fanaticism, and avarice ruined the country even more. Besides the socio-economic devastation and dislocation brought about by Mohammad Shah and his predecessors the country also suffered, during their rule, many defeats and lost vast territories to foreign invaders, particularly the Russians.

Mohammad Shah died in 1848 and his son, Naser al-Din, who was then 16 years old, ascended the throne. Naser al-Din Shah was one of the better Qajar kings, but during the 50 years of his reign did not leave much of a constructive legacy. The story might have been different had he not, like his father, ordered the death of his grand vazir, Mirza Taghi Khan Amir Kabir, who was, without doubt, the
most able individual in Iran who reached that high office in the nineteenth century.

During the Naser al-Din Shah's reign, Iran gradually developed the apparatus of a nation-state while at the same time the country was brought under the cultural and economic shadow of the West. Many tensions and stresses manifested themselves during this period of change. Demands for change, particularly for political reform, were ever increasing. Certainly, the cry for political change came from many different sources; from intellectuals, merchant classes and the clergy.

One of those whose call for reform within the Muslim community was most clearly expressed and which received the greatest response was Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, known as Assadabadi. Jamal al-Din's influence on the Muslim intellectual community was considerable, and his agitation had both an immediate and a long-range political effect. He advocated the unity of the Muslim world to counterbalance the western civilization.

The long-range results of Seyyid Jamal al-Din's activity are diffuse and difficult to assess, but it could probably be said that because of his demands that the government consult the community he did as much as any man to plant the seed that eventually grew into the creation of a parliament (the Persian Majlis). He was a publicist and, as such, he continually demanded the right to be consulted. The state refused, but those were demands that lived after him and developed. The immediate effects
of his agitation are easier to see. It was by more than chance that his friends and supporters were so active in the movement that brought about the cancellation of the Tobacco Concession.

The Tobacco Concession of 1890 gave the British a monopoly for the production, sale, and export of all tobacco in Iran. In return, the Shah was to receive an annual payment of £15,000 plus one-fourth of the profits. In a country where a large majority of men and women smoked, such an antagonism could not be ignored. The people could not understand why they had to buy from the British the tobacco which they themselves had grown. The ulama took the side of the people and asked the government to cancel the concession. Naser al-Din Shah responded by imprisoning the opponents of the concession. The controversy dragged on until early December 1891, when the respected Shi'a Mujtahid, Haji Mirza Hassan Shirazi, issued a Fatwa from his residence in Samarra, Iraq, making it unlawful for Iranians to smoke until the concession was withdrawn. Iranians began to stop smoking in late November. The pressure eventually caused the revocation and cancellation of the Concession in December, 1891. It is significant that the pattern of opposition to the government which was first called into being as opposition to the Tobacco Concession eventually culminated into a constitutional movement.

Four years later, one of Jamal al-Din's followers, Mirza Reza Kermani, the son of a clergyman from Kerman, assassinated Naser al-Din Shah on May 1, 1896. Immediately after the assassination,
Mozaffar al-Din Shah, the Crown Prince, acceded to the throne. Mozaffar al-Din Shah was 43 years old and rather sickly. He brought with him, as most new sovereigns do, the hope of better things to come. In the new Shah's case, this was in part reinforced by his actions before his accession to the throne, while he was governor of Azarbyjan (in Qajar Persia, Tabriz was the traditional seat of the governship of the Crown Princes). He had allowed somewhat more freedom in his province and had himself received the newspaper Ghanoon of Mirza Malkum Khan, which was known for its reforming biases.

Mozaffar al-Din Shah retired the previous government of Amin al-Sultan and installed his own ministers. Most of the members of the new cabinet were men of liberal inclination who were better acquainted with the standards of government then prevailing in the West. However, since opposition forces insisted on broader and deeper reforms, the new government was not very popular.

The principal attempt of the new government to produce ready cash was its endeavor to raise a European loan, and when negotiations failed, the government fell in the summer of 1898. The Russian loan which followed the return of Amin al-Sultan to the government was itself followed by Muzaffer al-Din Shah's first trip to Europe in the spring of 1900. A second trip followed another Russian loan in 1902. Concerning the country's critical economic conditions these trips caused a great national uproar and wide opposition against the government.
The year 1903 was marred by signs of underlying political and social unrest which continued throughout the following years. The agitations were not only directed against Amin al-Sultan's treatment of religious leaders but they were also directed against the Belgian, British and Russian authorities who were running and administrating some of the governmental departments. Eventually, in 1903, the opposition succeeded and the government of Amin al-Sultan, the most powerful man in Iran after the Shah, resigned and was replaced by Ayn al-Dowleh, a grandson of Fath Ali Shah, as prime minister.

By the end of 1905 a great deal of popular and clerical discontent was manifest throughout the country. More important, the Ayn al-Dowleh had been in government for almost two years and intrigue against him had had time to find both shape and consistency. All of these forces culminated in late 1905 in a major outburst of popular dissatisfaction, the object of which was to unseat Ayn al-Dowleh. The immediate cause of the outburst was the punishment of several merchants in the bazaar for having instigated the public. As a result, the bazaar was closed in protest against the government and the merchants took sanctuary from the government, in the mosques. Those who took sanctuary were mainly merchants, clergy, intellectuals, bureaucrats and a considerable section of the public. The demands lodged against the government were demands for "justice." They included the removal of a number of ministers, among them Ayne al-Dowleh as well as Ala al-Dowleh, the governor
of Tehran, who had ordered the punishment. But there was also a
new twist. The demand for justice had taken a new meaning. Justice
was to be insured by the creation of an "Adalat Khaneh" (House of
Justice) which was to include members of the clergy, merchants, and
landlords. In January, 1906, the Shah finally gave in and officially
received the protesters' representatives. The result was the birth
of a "council" to be represented by these groups.

The council which was called as a result of the compromise of
January 1906, proved too radical to accomplish anything constructive.
As a result, the reform movement, as it had become by this time,
was gradually groping its way to more comprehensive demands. The
goal seems to have been forming throughout the spring of 1906, and
in the minds of the leaders of the revolt may be called the gradual
realization of a need to institutionalize their role in the
government in the form of a representative assembly. Only a year
before, the opposition had not included among their objectives
such a thing as a representative assembly. This was revolutionary
in that it would bring to an end the absolutism of the Qajars.

During the first week in July the agitation increased
perceptively as the opposition tried to get the movement to move on
its premises to grant changes and to get rid of corrupt ministers,
especially the prime minister, Ayn al-Dowleh. The government
responded by exiling a number of the clergy to Ghom. In a skirmish
which followed between the troops and the crowd a clergyman was
killed. The opposition now had a martyr, and it made the most of it
in the days that followed. During this time, the government asked the opposition to formulate its demands. No agreement could be reached and further incidents occurred. With the arrests of many prominent leaders, such as Sheikh Mohammad Vaiz, the movement took a more hostile turn between July 11 and 15, 1906.

In early August, public pressure brought the end of the Ayn al-Dowleh's government and the granting of the demands for the establishment of a representative assembly (Majlis). In the weeks that followed there is some evidence that the Shah attempted to bring the Ayn al-Dowleh back and to reduce considerably the promises he had granted. By the end of August, the Shah had gone so far as to bring the Ayn al-Dowleh back to his country seat near Tehran and was refusing to sign the already written document which established the Majlis. Consequently, a new uprising took place on September 8, 1906, which forced the government to grant the concession. The Shah signed the already prepared script for assembly on September 17, 1906, and elections were held in early October.

The Majlis met as soon as the members from Tehran were elected. It opened officially on October 7, 1906, and began considering, as its first goal of business, the writing of a constitution. The Constitution was finally signed by Muzaffer al-Din Shah, his son Mohammad Ali Mirza, and the prime minister on December 30, 1906, and presented to the Majlis on January 1, 1907. The Shah died eight days later.
The relationship between the monarch and the Majlis, on one hand, and between the Majlis and the administration, on the other hand, has ever since been one of conflict and scuffle; a conflict which was never solved peacefully.

First Phase, 1907-1921: Party Politics and Centrifugal Forces

As we noted, the successful challenge to Qajar absolutism eventually pressed the constitution on an ailing Mozaffer al-Din Shah in 1906. This success was possible due to a political alliance among: 1) the ulama, a rising nationalist elite whose elements were composed mostly of Western educated individuals, and who were highly dissatisfied with increasing Western influence in the country (their interests were apparently threatened with the grant of numerous concessions to foreigners which seemed to have robbed them of their traditional sources of revenues); 2) the merchants; 3) the intellectuals. The ulama were more influential in this movement because they provided the necessary mass support for the alien political idea of "constitutional democracy;" while the merchant class contributed the funds and the intellectuals gave the movement ideological shape and direction.

As soon as the constitutional revolution achieved its goal and a parliamentary system was established, a favorable condition was set for all sorts of social and political activities, including the emergence of political groupings.
The first class of political parties which emerged on the Iranian political scene during this time was of parliamentary nature, that is, the party of "like-minded" deputies drawn together for tactical advantage. By the inauguration of the first Majlis in 1906, two blocs of deputies had loosely coalesced: the Social Revolutionaries (Ejtemaee-youne Enghelabiyoun), led by an intelligensia committed to Western style social and political reforms; and the Social Moderates (Etedaliyoune Ejtemaiyoun), who were spokesman for traditionalist elements, including the clergy, and who were largely satisfied with checking absolute monarchy. In the middle were numerous groups of deputies who were either supporting the monarch and fighting the groups on the left, or advocating either side depending on the nature of issues at hand.

Social Revolutionaries and their allies on the left stood for the secularization of the state and separation of powers. They were demanding freedom of expression, assembly, freedom of the press, extension of social justice, land reform and taxing the rich. But the most important issue they were demanding was the nature of the Shah's role within the constitutional system. They wanted limitation of the Shah's power on the basis of the constitution. Social Moderates, on the other hand, stood for conservative values and forcefully opposed the plan for the secularization of the state. They were also against the distribution of land among the peasant population. It was considered un-Islamic to distribute private properties. The right faction of the Social
Moderates was pro-Shah, and since the success of revolutionary forces was still in the air the pro-monarch elements could not defend the Shah and his policies in the Majlis. In order to silence the opposite side, it resorted to a different tactic. They spread the rumor that the Social Revolutionaries planned to change the Iranian society and base it on foreign models, and accused them of working against the Islamic foundations. By doing this they tried to intimidate the anti-monarch forces and provoke the public in favor of the Court.

The early domination of parliamentary elections by semi-feudal proprietors quickly dimmed any possibility that the two parties might expand their competition beyond the Majlis. Stable and popular parties were also made improbable by continuous royal intervention and suspicions. This did not mean that extra-parliamentary organizations did not exist in the larger society. In fact it seems that both parties tried to establish political organizations during this period but with little success. For instance, Social Revolutionaries established societies and different political clubs in Tehran, Mashhad, Rasht, Tabriz and Isfahan, and had liaison with their parliamentary factions. But they were not articulated and generally lacked cohesion and coordination. For example, in Rasht, the center of Gilan province, the Social Revolutionaries, despite direct order from their parliamentary leadership became highly aggressive and began forcing the landlords off their lands, distributing them among the landless peasants without due process;
and resisted the frequent government orders to halt the action. The situation was repeated in Mazandaran, another northern province, and the move was affecting other parts of the country as well. The Monarch, the Social Moderates and the conservative clergy, in and out of Majlis, were highly concerned with the direction the course of events was taking. Thus, a political contest was gradually taking shape between the conflicting forces. It was a real test for the newly instituted parliamentary system.

It is generally a common belief among the Iranian historians that Mohammad Ali Shah, who succeeded to the throne in 1907 after the death of his father Muzaffer al-Din Shah, was never loyal to the constitutional government; he was always looking for an opportunity to eliminate the constitutionalists and return the country to its pre-constitutional state. Mohammad Ali Shah seems to have intended to short-circuit the revolutionary movement by depriving it of its most influential leaders. Thus, he worked very closely with and accorded all honors to the leading clergy, while the Majlis itself was largely ignored. For instance, the leading clergy were invited to the coronation and given places of honor while no invitation was issued to the Majlis. However, on many occasions the Shah assured the parliamentarians of his full support and even took an oath in Majlis not to betray the constitution and to be loyal to its principles; but his subsequent actions proved otherwise. 10

The Majlis considered itself to be the center of "national will" and regarded its decisions to be final. Thus, even though
the distribution of powers was clearly stipulated in the constitution, there was nonetheless a constant conflict over the issue of "who represented the nation." There were three authoritative bodies in Tebran, each of which reserved the right to act independently:

1) The royal court, especially the Shah, admitted that a Majlis and a constitution were necessary but saw only chaos and frustration in the current situation, and therefore, demanded that Majlis should not interfere with his decisions; 2) the Majlis, which acted both as a legislature and as a court of appeals through which complaints against the other branches of government could be lodged; and 3) the ministries, which were charged with actually running the country. What was important in this chain of authority was the behavior of the Majlis itself. The division within the Majlis was causing a diminution of its own power and prestige. Moreover, the inflexibility of the Majlis was making the administration of the country virtually impossible.

The difference between the Shah and the Constitutionalists came to the surface when on April 26, 1907, the Shah removed Moshir al-Dowleh, the prime minister, from office and appointed one of his supporters, Amin al-Sultan, as a premier. The new prime minister strongly relied on Social Moderates in the Majlis for support, particularly the conservative faction of ulama, and skillfully exploited the existing factionalism in the Shah's favor. In order to exploit the differences of opinions within the Majlis and deepen the existing political cleavage, Amin al-Sultan brought up the issue
of secularization of the state and stressed the "illegitimacy" of the idea, and concluded that such a concept is in direct conflict with the principles of Islam.¹¹ By discussing such an issue openly he was partially successful in bringing a great number of clergy to the Shah's side.¹² That part of the clergy with liberal inclinations stayed with the Majlis, while those who were unable to reconcile the innovation of secularism, including a place for members of other religions or the traditional role of the Shariiât, broke away. The split came into the open in February, 1907, when some of the clergy began to preach against the adoption of Western laws. The most important religious leader involved in this early break-away group was Sheikh Fazlullah Nuri, who was eventually to be hanged in July, 1909. It was impossible for this traditionalist group to keep silent or maintain neutrality, however, and it soon joined the Shah in opposition to the constitutionalists.

The appointment of Amin al-Sultan as premier by Mohammad Ali Shah was considered by the Majlis unconstitutional, and thus aroused resentment and apprehension in and out of that political body. Amin al-Sultan's political record in the past and his close association with the Shah, and particularly his speech in the Majlis which was interpreted as anti-constitutionalist, alarmed not only the Social Revolutionaries but also a considerable number of Social Moderates. The leftists, highly suspicious of the Shah, began to organize their forces. Numerous secret societies and conspiratorial meetings were formed and arranged whose aim were to agitate the
public against the court and "corrupt ulama." Political tension was building up and there was no communication between opposing factions to calm down the crisis. On August 31, 1907, when Amin al-Sultan was stepping out of Majlis, he was assassinated by an unidentified person, allegedly a member of the Social Revolutionary Party.

Reaction to the incident was instantaneous on both sides. Led by the monarch, the court immediately besieged its forces including retinue, servants, workers, guards, court's personnel, and a number of troops and army men who gathered in Toopkhaneh Square in the center of the city. In a vengeful and antagonistic gesture they shouted and sloganed against the constitutionalists and revolutionaries, beat the members of opposition in the streets, shot the bystanders and looted the area. Afterward, the Shah demanded the immediate arrest of the assassin(s) whom he claimed to be members of opposition parties.

Also on the other side, the leaders of the Social Revolutionary party and other anti-monarch forces did not remain idle. They organized many demonstrations and meetings in Tehran and other cities against the court, particularly the Shah, calling him a "traitor" and "puppet". They also proposed the abolition of monarchism and the establishment of a republic system in Iran. Meanwhile, a number of secret societies came into being as a result of rising tension between the Majlis and the Shah, and both sides began terrorizing the cities by shooting their political opponents.
The assassination of so prominent a figure as the Amin al-Sultan temporarily shifted the power in favor of Majlis and away from the court and bureaucracy. Repeated assassinations by the secret societies of pro-Shah elements throughout the country led the Shah's supporters to fear any action which might place them in opposition to the Majlis. This was particularly important at this time because such opposition could be immediately translated into partisanship for the Shah, and a particularly strong movement to depose the Shah grew out of the intrigues of late September and October.

On November 13, 1907, the Shah visited the Majlis and swore allegiance to it. He has sworn before, but this was the first time he had appeared there in person. This seems to have been a conciliating gesture on the part of the Shah to appease the Majlis and let the tension die down. But the hostility which had died down somewhat after the Shah's visit soon flared up again. It was heightened by the attempt of the Majlis to cut the budget for the Shah's civil list. On November 28, 1907, the Shah sent a message to the assembly asking that it refrain from interfering in the administration and restrict its activities to a legislative function. The Majlis replied that it had no intention of taking over the administration. Therefore, it seems that the Shah's initiative to go to the Majlis and break the ice did not work; so the situation remained stalemate for a while. But agitation against the Shah grew worse and resulted eventually in open hostilities between the
Majlis and the Shah. Clearly the Shah attempted to counter the agitation with agitation of his own, and just as clearly he was met by opposition from several sources. His support seems to have come largely from the army units under the control of the Amir Bahador Jang, from the section of the clergy which had long since broken with the Majlis, and from his private retainers who were brought into the city after the affair began. The opposition centered around the Majlis, of course, and seems to have consisted of the reforming clergy and their allies, the Social Revolutionary Party, a number of secret societies, and a part of the Qajar family which had separated itself from the Shah in late September. A comparison of forces shows that the opposition had the upper hand. Thus many of the Shah's close associates, particularly some of the aging members of the Qajar's family, such as Azud al-Mulk and the Shua al-Salteneh, tried to convince him of the necessity of cooperating with the constitutional movement. As a result, the Shah did little to interfere with the operation of either the government or the Majlis for a while.

Tension reached its peak on February 28, 1908, when an attempt was made on the Shah's life. Mohammad Ali Shah escaped the danger but several of his associates were either killed or injured. The Shah forcefully demanded the arrest of those who were responsible for the assassination plot. And since he suspected that the Majlis might be sympathetic to the plotters and thus have no interest to act swiftly, the Shah proceeded personally. He summoned both the
Chief of Police and the Minister of Interior to his palace and gave them instructions on how to go about arresting the plotters. The Shah was very suspicious that the Majlis deputies were behind the plot. And this was probably one reason why he insisted on leading the investigating team.

The Majlis was extremely indignant with the Shah's meddling with law. Based on the provisions of the constitution, ministers and other government officials are responsible only to the Majlis and not to the Shah. Therefore, Mohammad Ali Shah's direct involvement with the case was considered by deputies to be in contempt of the law. To establish its authority, the Majlis fired both the Chief of Tehran Police and the Minister of Interior for failing to act properly.

However, the Shah's investigating team continued its search for the murderers, overlooking the Majlis's resentment of this. Eventually, the search team identified and arrested eight people who were claimed to be the main links in the plot to kill the king. But the Majlis immediately brought about their release because those who made the arrest did not have "a warrant from the minister of justice." The issue was not settled but the existing suspicion between the political poles was further deepened.

The Shah was certain that everyone was plotting against him, and he was right. But then, nearly everyone was sure the Shah was not to be trusted, and they were right, too. On June 2, 1908, a delegation headed by the prime minister visited the Shah. They
demanded that the Shah should get rid of those in his court who were known for their opposition to the constitutional government. The Shah apparently acquiesced. His subsequent actions demonstrate that he did not. He was extremely dissatisfied with the way the government was running and highly disturbed by the fact that his role within the political system was reduced to "practically nothing."

On June 23, 1908, Mohammad Ali Shah, intolerant of the constitutionalists and political restrictions imposed on him by the Majlis, resorted to a military coup d'état. The coup resulted in the victory of the Shah's forces. In Tehran the Majlis was dispersed and the members who had most consistently demanded reform or who had most actively plotted against the Shah were either arrested or took asylum in one of the foreign legations. In the weeks that followed, the Shah consolidated his position by constituting a government in agreement with his own point of view and personally loyal to him. He also continued to build up the military force and brought various of his supporters who had been exiled in the preceding months back to the capital. While the coup removed the Shah's opposition in Tehran, it also gave him full responsibility for solving Iran's many problems. Moreover, it gave him the responsibility without the support of much of the bureaucracy which had created the revolution. For the time being the machinery of government was taken up by the Shah's courtiers who were appointed to various ministries. At the same time, political activities
were forbidden, publication of the press was banned and martial law was imposed on the capital city. On June 23, the Shah ordered the bombardment of the Majlis building in which several deputies and bystanders were either killed or injured. With the military occupation of Tehran, the Shah dominated his opponents and by doing this he assumed complete political power. As we have seen, in less than two years the political pendulum moved to absolutism again and the newly established parliamentary government came to a complete halt.

Mohammad Ali Shah's Short Dictatorship

Mohammad Ali Shah's success over his enemies only lasted a year, from June 1908 to June 1909. Fear of the Shah's absolute rule and his complete domination of the political process eventually forced the moderate groups, particularly the clergy, to join force with the Social Revolutionaries into a united front against the Shah. Secret committees and societies were formed everywhere in the country, particularly in Tabriz, Rasht and Mashhad. In Tabriz an open resistance against the Shah developed. There the constitutionalists gradually expanded their rather meager holdings to include, by the end of September, the entire town. Of course, coherent opposition in the provinces to the Shah's new government did not develop outside of that at Tabriz until the end of the year. Then the main centers of the growing opposition were Mashhad and
Isfahan. Elsewhere there was a state of virtual anarchy, or, to be precise, the predominance of local authority. At Isfahan the movement captured sufficient strength to take over the town completely and in the end to direct an attack against the central government itself. The Shah's inability to put down the revolution in Tabriz was a continuing embarrassment, and the success of the revolts at Isfahan and Mashhad brought further revolt. At Rasht, on the Caspian coast, an intrigue between the Sepahdare Azam who had only shortly before commanded troops of the Shah at Tabriz, and a group of local constitutionalists resulted in a coup in early February. The local governor was killed and the constitutionalists quickly chose the Sepahdar Azam, who arrived a day or so later, to be the new governor. At this point, the Shah, who seemed to have been wavering between a policy of conciliation and one of repression, chose to attempt to put down this rebellion as he had tried to put down the others.

Due to mounting pressures, Mohammad Ali Shah was forced to grant a reinstatement of the constitution in the middle of May. Accordingly, the Shah formed a cabinet which was to write a new electoral law. The Shah's action stabilized the situation for a month. From the middle of May to the middle of June neither side made a move, and positive work toward a compromise seemed to have begun. Then in the middle of June the leaders of the Bakhtiari tribe, who were partners in this compromise, suddenly withdrew. Shortly afterward, the Bakhtiari forces began the march on Tehran.
The forces of Sepahdare Azam, which had remained stationary between Rasht and Ghazvin, also began to move forward. In July the two forces joined, slipped around the Shah's army, and took over the capital city.

Mohammad Ali Shah, realizing the weakness of his power base, forwarded a conciliatory note to the leaders of the opposition and declared his allegiance and loyalty to the constitution. The constitutionalists ignored the note and demanded the surrender of the Shah and his forces. On July 15, 1909, the Shah's forces were totally defeated and Tehran was once again in the control of the forces loyal to the Majlis. The Shah fled to the Russian consulate in Tehran. In November 1909, the second Majlis deposed Mohammad Ali Shah and placed on the throne his teenage son, Ahmad Mirza, then 12 years old (1909-1925).

Swing Back to the Democratic Game

When the Shah abdicated on July 16, 1909, the government fell into the hands of the leading men in Tehran. Thus, a more favorable atmosphere was created in the country for the activities of political parties. Political groups in the second Majlis, in terms of organization and ideology, were more articulated. They ranged from the far left to the far right.

The most important group on the left was Ferghye Democrat (Democratic faction) which had 21 deputies in the assembly; this
party played the role of minority. The main group on the right was the faction of Etedaliyoun (the Moderates) which played the role of majority and had 48 deputies as its members. In between there were a number of small factions who were numerically insignificant but politically very important. They were: Etefagh Wa Taraghi (Alliance and Progress) with four members; Taraghi Khahnn (the Progressives) with six members; and Eslahiyoun Ejtemaiyoun (the Socialist Reformers) with three members.

The Democrat Party was the most organized group in the Majlis. In fact, it was the extension of the Social Revolutionary party in the first assembly. It was accused of being socialistic and, therefore, anti-Islamic. The party had two wings in the Majlis; the left wing was represented by Hassen Taghi Zadeh, a deputy from Tabriz, who was a member of the Majlis since 1907. This faction stood for the secularization of the state and advocated the modernization of Iran on the Western models. The right wing, which had the support of a greater number of democrats, was more conservative and was led by Wahid al-Molke Sheibany, a deputy from Tehran. This wing generally cooperated with the liberal clergy in the Majlis and voted on some issues along with the Moderates.

Etedaliyoun party was a conglomeration of different small groups whose members did not share the same ideology, but they had some common features. They all were against the secularization of the state; they were against modernization on Western lines; they supported gradual social change; they stood for supremacy of
doctrine of Islam in the management of the state. In terms of a social base, the members of the Etedaliyoun party were for the most part big landlords, the Qajar princes, the tribal chiefs and high ranking ulama.

Both parties tried to extend their activities beyond the Majlis, and organizationally emulated the model of European parties. Etedaliyouns were elitist in orientation and were not concerned about the bulk of the membership, whereas the Democrats stressed the participation of lower classes both in the cities and rural areas. For instance, the Democratic party had more than 100 party cells in Tehran alone, each of which had more than 20 members. It also organized party branches in most of the big cities, particularly in the central and northern parts of the country. The party dispatched a great number of activists throughout the country to inform people about the political situation in Tehran in order to attract them to the Democratic party. But generally neither of the two parties were able to develop effective organizations for articulation and aggregation of interests at the national level. Consequently the Majlis, as before, remained the center of political power and decision-making.

Movement Toward Another Deadlock

With the abdication of Mohammad Ali Shah, the Majlis seemed to have achieved its supremacy within the political system as it was
stated by the framers of the constitution. It seemed that one of
the main barriers for the operation of a genuine political democracy
had been removed. But subsequent events clearly demonstrated that
this assumption was not totally true because the expectation that
the system was on its way to constitutionalism did not last long,
and the "wish" did not come true.

Soon political feuds between the Shah and the Majlis gave way
to the feud between partners as soon as the monarch fled the country.
The second Majlis had become the center of these conflicts. The
Democrats led by Taghi Zadeh, and the Etedaliyoun headed by
Ayatollah Seyed Abdolah Behbahani, turned the Majlis into
accusations and counter accusations. Each side regarded the other
side as the "enemy of the people." They charged each other with
treachery, subversion, irreligiousness and foreign agentry.

The government had already presented its program of reform to
the Majlis on November 30, 1909. The primary objects of the
government included such items as educational reform, land reform,
tax and financial reform and administration and police reforms. These issues were generally ignored in the Majlis debates; instead
the deputies scuffled with one another over such problems as
secularization of the state and educational reform, whether it
should be Islamic or Western. This was the same controversy which
preoccupied the first Majlis all along.

Social and economic reforms, as they were promised by
constitutionalists, never materialized, because none of the political
groups was ready to compromise its position. Control of the
government alternately changed between the two main political
parties without being capable of bringing about any real change.
While in power the party's prime object seemed to have been
mainly to discredit the rival party, destroy its organization,
even to eliminate it as a major political force. For instance,
when Mirza Hassan Khan Mostofi al-Mamalek, a Democrat, became
prime minister in 1911 his main task was to eliminate the conservative
group of Mojahedins (the soldiers of the holy). Mojahedin was a
group with religious orientation who, in cooperation with Democrats
and Etedalious, actively fought against Mohammad Ali Shah, but
later turned anti-Democrat. In his campaign against the Mojahedines,
Mostofi al-Mamalek ordered the complete pacification of its
organization, during which many people were killed, arrested and
injured. One of those who was shot was Satar Khan, the champion
of anti-dictatorship from Tabriz who was considered to be a
significant factor in the ex-Shah's defeat. Conversely, when
Mohammad Vali Khan Sepahdar, an Etedali, became prime minister at
the end of 1911, he did the same thing and used the same tactics
against the Democrats.

During the second Majlis, destructive rivalries and inter and
intra-party conflicts continued for some time with no remedy in
sight. Political and socio-economic problems had remained unsolved,
and the Majlis had lost not only its effectiveness as a viable
political force, but it was also blocking the operation of the
government. It seemed that the system was headed toward another major deadlock.

The Democratic organization out of Majlis, dissatisfied with the time-killing strategy of its leadership in the assembly and furious over delayed reforms, decided to act independently. The Democrats charged their leadership in the Majlis as being soft on "reactionary clergy," big landlords, and Qajar bureaucrats. They claimed these reactionary groups were actively plotting against the Iranian revolution and purposely blocking an over-due change in the country. They even accused the right wing of the Democratic faction in the Majlis of a secret collusion with the Etedaliyouns. Therefore Amou Oghli, the leader of a faction of Mojaheddin, affiliated with the Democratic party, split from the party and went underground. Amou Oghli's main objective was to "pacify" the traitors who were responsible for the parliamentary deadlock. As a reaction to Amou Oghli's decision, the Mojahedines on the right, an affiliate of the Etedaliyoun party, formed their own secret societies with the aim of killing the democrats, the socialists and all irreligious people who were betraying Islam.

Beginning in 1912, a series of political assassinations took place in Tehran and other major cities which robbed the nation of many of its distinguished political personalities. As a result, chaos and terror became widespread throughout the country. The central government was virtually impotent and seemed to have lost its control. The nation was on the verge of disintegration.
In less than four years the country had twenty-five governments, some of them lasting less than a month. Uncompromising positions taken by different political groups drove the constitutional system toward another deadlock.

In January 1912, forced by the course of events, Naser al-Mulk, the regent, relieved Najafgholi Khane Bakhtiari, the Prime Minister, from his post, dissolved the second Majlis, banned all sorts of political activities, arrested party leaders and deported a great number of journalists. The regent assumed total political power in his own hand and ruled the country for almost three years. It was after the First World War that the political situation began to change in Iran when the political pendulum once again moved toward parliamentary democracy.

Back to Constitutional Government

As was mentioned before, Naser al-Mulk, the regent, in the absence of the Majlis, ruled the country for four consecutive years, and was the major decision-maker in the government. In July 1914, Ahmad Shad reached the age of maturity and was formally coronated as the Shah of Iran. Ahmad Shah, in order to appease the opposition and remove the scars of four years of authoritarian government of Naser al-Mulk, relieved the regent from all his responsibilities and forced him to leave the country. This action was interpreted as a sign of good will on the part of the young
monarch. He also ordered political prisoners to be released and political parties to resume their activities. Also the press was freed and the ban on all sorts of political activity was lifted. Elections for the third Majlis which had carefully begun at the end of Naser al-Mulk era was completed shortly after his departure and the assembly was inaugurated by Ahmad Shah in August, 1914.

Distribution of seats among political groups in the third Majlis was as follows: Democrats 31 seats, Etedalysions 29 seats, Independents 20 seats, and Hay-ate Elmiyeh (a religious group) 14 seats. Democrats had a plurality of seats in the Majlis. So the Democratic party, with support given by a small fraction of liberal Etedalis, was able to form the government. In the third Majlis, the leadership of the Democrats rested in the hands of Soleyman Mirza Eskandari and Etedalis were led by Seyed Mohammad Sadeghe Tabatabai and Seyed Hassan Modares.

When the third Majlis began its business the First World War was already in progress and was having its effects on Iran. Sensing the threat of Tsarist Russia from the north and the British threat from the south of the country, political parties took a more conciliatory approach toward political issues which had previously torn the country apart. The third Majlis was generally concerned with such trivial issues as the formal structure of the taxing department, the post office, tobacco production, conscription and so on. Group cooperation in the Majlis resulted
in the passage of a series of laws and regulations in the afore-
mentioned areas.\(^43\) The political situation in Iran generally
remained unchanged until the last months of 1917 when political
events took a rather more serious turn.\(^44\)

The Russian Revolution of 1917 and also the subsiding tension
of war-time conditions in Iran turned the political atmosphere
back to normal. The October Revolution gave a considerable momentum
to political parties, particularly those on the left, who believed
the course of history eventually had turned to their side.\(^45\) As
a result, political movements, from the extreme left to the extreme
right, suddenly reappeared on the political scene; and secret
societies who were forced into silence in the past few years
resumed activities in favor of both left and right parties.

The life of the third Majlis was only 11 months and 10 days.
It was forced to close down under big power pressures in late
1915. The fourth Majlis was convened in November 1918, after a
series of conflicts which took place between the government
authorities, on one hand, and political groups, on the other.
As with its predecessors, the fourth Majlis was also the center of
political gravity, and this was what the governments did not like
about it. Because of bitter experiences of the past, the governments
were highly reluctant to work with the Majlis and share power with
it. This was probably one reason why the government officials
tried, in one way or the other, to postpone elections for the
fourth Majlis or at least to prevent the election of "undesirable"
elements to the Majlis.

The number of political parties in the fourth Majlis was considerably increased. They also differed among themselves in terms of ideology and organization. Thus, the fourth Majlis had less unity of purpose. It was extremely difficult to bring the deputies in the Majlis together to decide on a particular bill. The ideological division in the fourth Majlis seemed to be a reflection of Iranian society at the time. It was very chaotic. Political factions in the fourth Majlis were composed of: Etehade Shargh (the United East), Ghiami (Insurrection), Tajadod (Renaissance), Takamol (Evolution), and the Iran Now (the New Iran). The Democrat and Etedalyiouin parties remained the most significant groups in the national politics and their leaderships alternately formed the government.

It should be noted that in the middle of 1917, political parties extended their activities further beyond the framework of Majlis politics. Political parties received considerable attention in the larger society. Political parties played a more significant role during this period through organizing the masses, giving protest demonstrations, forcing the governments either to resign or to come into power. Political organizations out of the Majlis also tried, now and then, to pressure the leaderships in the Majlis or government to take proper stands or make proper decisions on particular issues.
At the close of 1917, political parties on the national scene were as follows: on the left were the forces of the Democratic party and its affiliates such as Mojahedines. Next to the Democratic party was the Socialist party. The Socialist party was an offspring of the Democratic party which split from that party at the beginning of 1917. Socialists stood for genuine socio-economic change and identified themselves with the Bolshevik party of Soviet Union. The party was led by Mirza Soleyman Eskandari, the leader of the democratic faction in the second and third Majlises. Eskandari broke off with the democrats on the ground that the party's leadership had subverted the party and established close ties with the "reactionary" Etedalyioyns. As the leader of the Democratic faction in the third Majlis, Eskandari had always been critical of the party's leadership. He repeatedly accused his party's leadership of unjustified moderation toward the imperial court and the clergy, and believed that the party was responsible for the failure of reform measures in the Majlis. The Socialist party was also anti-clerical and demanded land reform in the country.

Further to the left of democrats and socialists, were three smaller parties. They were Etehade Islam (The Unity of Islam), Democratic party of Azerbyjan, and the Democratic party of Gilan. Before 1917 these parties were active within the Democratic party,
And except for the Etehade Islam, the other two parties were the provincial branches of Democratic Party in Azarbyjan and Gilan. But after the sweeping revolution in neighboring Russia in 1917, these parties had moved further to the left and practically chose to be autonomous of the Democratic party in the capital.47

To the right on the continuum was the Etedalyioun party and its affiliated Mojahedins. This party had two wings: the right and the left. The right wing was composed mainly of big landlords, the members of the Qajar court and upper class moslem clergy. They resisted any real structural change which might threaten their socio-economic positions. The left wing of the Etedalyions took a more moderate approach. It supported piecemeal changes which, its leaders believed, were more congruent with the Islamic principles of Shariiat.48 Conservatives were not well organized and, as in pre-revolutionary days, they were generally in charge of most of the government positions. Its members were either premiers, cabinet members, Majlis deputies, or occupied higher bureaucratic positions.49 They had a great stake in the preservation of existing structures and institutions. And as in the case of the left, the group leadership on the right was not unanimous on social, political and economic reforms. They even disagreed among themselves on the proper role to be played by the monarch, Majlis, and the cabinet within the political system. For instance, a fraction of its leaders thought that Ahmad Shah was an incapable and incompetent figure and considered him a "coward."50
Even some democrats who had previously fought against the dictatorship of Mohammad Ali Shah had changed their mind about the monarch's role in the political system and were convinced that a democratically oriented king such as Ahmad Shah was not good for the country. So they were demanding a stronger role for the Shah.\textsuperscript{51}

The center parties were generally weak and uninfluential. They were mostly active in the Majlis. The most important among them were the Eslah Talaban (Party of Reformers) and Mostaghelyioun (the Independents). They generally lacked clear ideologies. They were mostly a conglomeration of political personalities who were journalists, businessmen, and preachers. They believed in moderation in politics.\textsuperscript{52} They used to cooperate with both the democrats and etedalyiouns depending on the nature of the issues. For example, when an issue involved protection of the constitution or opposition to foreign imperialism, they sided with the left. And when the issue was one of modernization of the educational system or the secularization of the state, they sided with the right. In other words, they played a contradictory role which contributed much to the stability of the status quo.\textsuperscript{53}

During the fourth Majlis, the supremacy of the assembly over other political structures was well established. Conflict between monarch and the Majlis, which constituted a hot issue in the past, was no longer relevant. Ahmad Shah tried to be a constitutional monarch and carefully observed the principles of the constitution. He was the first Shah in Iranian history who did not interfere
with political processes, except in the cases where provision for his function was legally provided. His words always were, "I am not responsible." He could never forget what the constitutionalists did to his father Mohammad Ali Shah. He was highly cautious about people around him and was extremely careful not to give any evidence to anybody that could be used against him. This may be one reason why he was considered by many as too "soft" and too "feeble."

Political conditions for genuine constitutional government were thus provided for in the country. There were a multitude of newspapers and magazines in the country. Etedalioun party, for instance, published 10 newspapers and magazines, daily and weekly. Fifteen journals and newspapers were published by the Democratic party and 10 were published by other smaller parties. Of course, there were many other journals and newspapers which were not related to the parties. For instance, a group of individuals who called themselves "Independents" had 15 publications in Tehran alone.

Instead of providing the public with accurate information and informing it of what was going on in the country, these papers spent much energy and time abusing political figures; and by agitating different publics against the governmental officials aggravated the already existing chaos and disorganization. Also the ideological difference among the leaderships and their inflexibility on the nature of reforms to be undertaken culminated
in one of the most unstable periods in contemporary Iranian politics. From 1917 to 1922 Iran had 11 prime ministers who formed 28 different cabinets, some of them lasting less than a month. Political parties in the fourth Majlis spent much of their time in accusations and counter-accusations. Arguing and quarreling had become routine. Alliances were frequently formed to obstruct the passage of reform bills. The state was on the edge of financial bankruptcy and the country was in deep foreign debt. No decision could be made and the state was heading toward another deadlock.

It should be remembered that during the Fourth Majlis, public demand for socio-economic and political reform was much louder than at any other time since the constitutional revolution. Cry for reform was even louder in such provinces as Gilan, Mazanderan, Azarbyjan and Khorasan. Democrats and the socialists in these provinces were giving up their hope for any assistance from the central government. They were increasingly pushed into a corner by the local people to exert more pressure on central authorities to do something about reform. With no response forthcoming from the central government, the provincial parties increasingly were driven toward extremism. The moderate democrats were gradually losing ground to the communists whose agitators and activists, after the success of bolshevik revolution, were very active among the peasants and local worker unions. Local political organizations, particularly in the northern provinces, were becoming more and more
under the control of extremists.

The surprising success of the leftists to bring the public over to their side created a panic among the moderates and the conservatives in both parties, democrats and etedalyouns. Instead of trying to find an alternative solution for immediate reform, the prime minister, Vossugh al-Dowleh, a democrat, hastily and quite secretly concluded the now-discarded Anglo-Iranian Treaty of June 1919, according to which the Iranian government received financial and military assistance from Great Britain in order to neutralize the pressure from the left.60

Reaction to the agreement was swift and immediate. Beginning with the conclusion of the agreement, a sequence of tragic events swept the country which eventually placed Iran under the dictatorial regime of Colonel Reza Mir Pange who ruled the country for three decades.

A Prelude to Reza Khan's Military Coup d'etat

The Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919 caused immense confusion and disorganization in the Iranian political system. The ever-present toleration, patience and orderly discussions suddenly gave way to disorderly conduct. Anti-government demonstrations and protests became widespread all over the country; and street mobs took things into their own hands. Extra-legal activities were the normal daily business. The democratic rules of the game which were
re-established at the beginning of Ahmad Shah's reign once again were disregarded by political groups. It seemed that another round of battle had already begun.

Political parties in the center and the left considered the Treaty as a total "sell out" of Iran by the "ruling-class." A great segment of clergy who were known for their anti-British sentiments joined the extremists. Vossough al-Dowleh responded with an iron hand. Opposition leaders, including many journalists and political activists, were either imprisoned or deported. Due to their ideological differences and inflexibility, the opposition forces could not provide a united leadership against the Vossough al-Dowleh's government. In fact, on many fronts they were fighting one another rather than combining their forces against the government. As a consequence, the centrifugal forces once again became dominant and the constitutional government was put to another test.

Reaction to Vossough al-Dowleh's government took many forms. In this section I would like to discuss three anti-central government movements which had rebellious natures and are considered to be the major ones. They were: the Jangali Movement in the provinces of Gilan and Mazanderan; Khyiabani Movement in Azarbyjan; and the Colonel Pessyan Movement in Khorasan. Certainly, there were many other rebellions in other parts of the country against the central government, but since they were of limited scope and are generally regarded as "personality cults" with no particular
ideology, they are not discussed here.63

The Jangali Movement in Gilan and Mazanderan

Jangali movement has been one of the major revolts against the central government which was precipitated by the Anglo-Iranian Treaty. Also it is considered to be the first major peasant uprising in Iranian history. The movement was led by a revolutionary zealot called Mirza Kuchek Khane Jangali.64 His major goal was to "destroy the corrupt ruling class in Tehran," "save the inviolability of the constitution," and "bring prosperity to the Iranians."65

Concerning his past record, Kuchek Khan was very active in the constitutional revolution, and fought against the Qajar's establishment along with Etedalyious. During 1915, along with several other Moslem fanatics he organized the movement of Etehade Islam with the aim to bring all Moslem countries under one Islamic empire, in order to challenge the Western "materialism" and "imperialism."66 But later, Kuchek Khan found that the Itehade Islam was too soft on the ruling class. So he split with the group and established his own organization, that is, the Jangali movement. Kuchek Khan had concluded that the only way to change the existing condition was to resort to an armed struggle against the establishment. He, therefore, set up his headquarters in the jungles of Gilan province and armed his followers with whatever weapons he could harness. The Jangali forces harassed and chased
the government forces and convoys on the roads and in the countryside. He received remarkable support from indigenous populations, particularly from the peasant class.

Although Kuchek Khan considered his movement to be revolutionary and his main goal to change the existing power structure, nonetheless the composition of his movement did not seem to be revolutionary. In late 1918, two major groups emerged out of Jangali movement. One was represented by the upper class bourgeoisie, the landlords and clergy. Although it advocated reforming the state by limiting the Shah's power and feudalist domination, it did not conceive of any drastic change in the socio-political order. The other group consisted of petty bourgeoisie and badly paid seasonal agricultural workers. It was the peasants and the agricultural laborers who formed the fighting force of the movement. Nonetheless the movement had bourgeoisie-nationalist and pan-Islamic characteristics. And this was the main impediment to Jangalis' decisive action. At any rate, in a short time the Kuchek Khan's movement spread all over Gilan and Mazanderan provinces.

Besides the Jangali movement, there was another political group in the northern provinces which was called the Edalat Committee (Justice Committee), whose activities in those areas had begun sometime during 1916. Its leader was Javad Zadeh, later to be known as Pishevari, a native of Khalkhal in Azarbyijan. Later the group changed its name to Hezbe Komoniste Persia (The Communist Party of Persia). The group had a party organ called
Beyraghe Edalat (Banner of Justice), a paper directed at workers and "freedom fighters." Shortly afterward, the party published a new weekly paper called Horiyat (Freedom).

The Komunist party advocated the unity of the workers, aid to the poor and unity with the workers of the world. The party also opposed the monarchy, the clergy, and the privileged aristocracy. The party had close contact with the left-wing elements within the Jangali movement, such as Khalou Ghorban and Ehsanollah Khan, two of Khuchek Khan's close associates. Both groups, before the Anglo-Iranian treaty of 1919, had close ties with the Democratic party in the capital.

After the Anglo-Iranian treaty, new alliances and counter-alliances took place. The national Democratic party split into two factions, left and right. The leftists opposed the treaty and demanded its immediate abrogation. The right wing approved the treaty and supported the Vossough al-Dowleh's government. But the party's branches in the northern part of the country, broke off with the national organization and accused both wings of treachery.

In May 1920, an alliance emerged among three northern political groups which was called "The National United Front." These groups were the disaffected democrats, the Jangalis and the Komunist party. The Front's objectives were: 1) to engage in a struggle against foreign imperialism and its supporters, the ruling clique of feudal aristocracy and the entire bourgeoisie;
2) the overthrow of monarchy; and 3) the liquidation of all unjust agreements concluded between the Iranian government and foreign powers. Subsequently the Front, by a coup d'état which took place on June 4, 1920, captured local power and proclaimed the establishment of the Gilan Republic.

Shortly after the establishment of the republic, political differences developed among the Front's leaders. There were two main issues upon which they could not agree. The first was whether to limit the revolution to the newly established republic and postpone the liberation of remaining parts of the country to a later date, or to use the available resources and invade the capital city, Tehran. The second issue was whether the Republic should develop on a pluralistic model or a socialist model.

The leaders of Komunist party, particularly Javad Zadeh, and the left wing members of Jangali movement, Khalou Gorban and Ehsanollah Khan, insisted on an immediate march to Tehran, while the Kuchek Khan's faction believed that the Republic was still young and shaky, and an invasion of the capital city might be disastrous. Also, Kuchek Khan insisted that the Republic should be based on pluralism, whereas the left was strongly supporting socialism. Another issue which contributed to further factionalism within the Front was the issue of whether to confiscate the land and property and distribute them among the peasants or not.
The government's negotiation with Kuchek Khan, the leader of the Front, to settle the differences between the Republic and central government was not welcomed by the leftists. In fact, this negotiation aroused many suspicions among Front leaders. Even Kuchek Khan was later accused of half-hearted decisions and endless compromises with the central government, whereas there was no evidence to support such a compromise. Surprisingly, on July 31, the leftist faction of Jangli movement, led by Ehsanollah and Javad Zadeh, suddenly resorted to a military takeover of Rasht, the capital of the Republic, while forming a council called The National Committee For the Liberation of Iran.

Now Kuchek Khan was considered by the new leaders as the main enemy of the Republic. The Republic was also purged from Kuchek Khan's supporters. Kuchek Khan himself was also removed from all of his political positions. Kuchek Khan similarly took all of his followers and sympathizers back to the jungles. To bring the factions together once more the leaders reached different compromises and signed many documents. But the promises were never honored. Subsequently, in a sequence of plots and conspiracies of one group against another, most of the factional leaders were either shot, hanged or kidnapped by rival groups. These events, in turn, weakened the Republic itself which gave the best opportunity to the reactionary and corrupt elements in the central government to rally their forces and crush the movement. For the time being, let us set aside the Kuchek Khan's
movement and briefly discuss the Khiabani's uprising in Azarbyjan.

The Khiabani Uprising in Azarbyjan

Khiabani's movement against the central government, particularly against the Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919, approximately coincided with Kuchek Khan's revolt in Gilan. Khiabani had been one of the mojahedines in the constitutional movement and a deputy from Tabriz in the first and the second Majlis. He was regarded as an ideologically convinced democrat and patriot, and worked closely with the left wing democrats in the Majlis.

Khiabani's experiences in Tehran, particularly those while he served in the parliament, left him no doubt that the privileged classes of pre-constitutional Qajars had deeply penetrated the post-revolutionary political structures. This deeply bothered him because he thought so many sacrifices had been made by the revolutionaries to destroy the absolutism and eliminate its elements. The Qajars were everywhere after the revolution and mostly in sensitive governmental positions. Khiabani was particularly disturbed by the Majlis' daily operation. He believed that these Majlises were not what people fought for. The members of Majlis, Khiabani believed, were concerned primarily with their own self-interest. They never discussed the real issues of the people. Also Khiabani did not think the central government, elected by these kinds of assemblies, would be serious enough to
bring about any real change. Yet Khiabani was caught in the same dilemma that faced Kuchek Khan in Gilan. Could the government of Vossough al-Dowleh, the main link in the Anglo-Iranian Treaty, be considered a legitimate government of Iran? Khiabani thought Vossough al-Dowleh was a British agent. And as such, he could not be trusted. Khiabani's differences with Vossough al-Dowleh went back to the years immediately following 1911. During the second Majlis when Vossough al-Dowleh, then foreign minister in Samsam al-Saltaneh's cabinet, pressured the deputies either to accept the government's foreign policies or to face the closure of the assembly, Khiabani, then a deputy in the Majlis, was one of those representatives who shouted against Vossough al-Dowleh and called him a "traitor." At the same time, Khiabani called on the public to join him against the "corrupt" central government. Shortly after, the government issued a warrant for Khiabani's arrest which caused him to escape from Tehran and to Tabriz. Since then Khiabani opposed practically every Iranian government in which Vossough al-Dowleh was a member. Similarly, Vossough al-Dowleh became Khiabani's arch enemy and by political intrigues prevented him from being elected to the third and fourth Majlis. And predicting a major opposition to his treaty of 1919, Vossough al-Dowleh closed down the Democratic party in Azarbyjan and ordered its leaders to be arrested.
In reaction to Vossough al-Dowleh, Khiabani did not keep silent. On April 10, 1919, his followers occupied the city of Tabriz and openly broke off with the central government over the treaty. He also split from the Democratic party in Tehran and accused its leaders of complicity with corrupt government. He created his own brand of party which was called the Fergheye Democrat. At the same time, Khiabani's forces disarmed the government forces in Tabriz, jailing most government officials except those who took his side. The revolt soon spread to the other cities of Azarbujan.

Khiabani, being a political activist and a Mojahid, possessed an oratorical talent. In addressing mass meetings in different cities, he demanded a basic transformation of political structures and called for the immediate resignation of Vossough al-Dowleh's government and the abrogation of the 1919 treaty. He also demanded political freedom, an end to government corruption and more educational and economic opportunities for the provinces. He even asked for republicanism to replace the monarchical system. Calling his power domain in Azarbyjan "Azadestan" (The Land of Freedom), he refused to negotiate with the central government, even when the Vossough al-Dowleh's government had fallen and been replaced by Moshir al-Dowleh as premier.

Negotiations between Khiabani and the central government never produced desirable results. To bring the Khiabani's movement to its knees Vossough al-Dowleh, prior to his resignation in July
1920, appointed three people who were among the worst adversaries of Khianbani, to the government posts in Azarbyjan. Vossough al-Dowleh's decision not only failed to contribute to the improvement of the situation, it aggravated the existing crises. Khiaabani refused to accept the officials and simultaneously tightened his grip over the province.

there did not seem to be any hope for a settlement. Communication was totally broken. Rationality and pragmatism had given way to emotionalism and rhetoric. Both sides accused each other of being the "foreign agent" and demanded total surrender. While rejecting the government's label of being a "separatist," Khiaabani claimed that his main objective of resorting to revolt was to ensure Iran's "independence," "to protect the constitution," and bring about "prosperity" for the country. He said that Azarbyjan was an integral part of Iran, and its inhabitants were proud of being Iranians. He frequently stated that the Azarbyjan revolution was a starting point, and his aim was to extend the revolution from there to all over the country.

In July 1920, Vossough al-Dowleh resigned and Moshir al-Dowleh took over as prime minister. The new premier referred to the Anglo-Iranian treaty of 1919 as a "dead treaty," and publicly announced that his government was about to formally reject it. But Khiaabani still declined to compromise. Similarly, factional leaders within the Khiaabani movement did not prove too cooperative.
The left wing of the Fergheye Democrat was pushing Khiabani to follow the Kuchek Khan's model in Gilan by allying itself with the socialists and communists. But due to his religious background, Khiabani strongly resisted alliance with the leftists. He not only opposed cooperation with the leftists but also disapproved and later even condemned the Socialist Republic of Gilan.89 Factionalism within the movement eventually weakened it and provided favorable conditions for the forces of the central government to move in.

Colonel Taghi Khan's Revolt in Khorasan

The issue of the Anglo-Iranian Treaty and the subsequent revolts of Kuchek Khan, Khiabani and others which developed as a result of that agreement, gave an opportunity to Colonel Taghi Khane Pessian to take advantage of the situation and assume power in Khorasan.

It should be remembered that the province of Khorasan and its principal city, Mashhad, were never leading actors in the constitutional movement. Since Mashhad was the most important religious center in Iran, clerical influence had been strong there. Why the Mashhad clergy should have been under reactionary influence while their brothers in Tehran and other cities were under liberal control can be explained in part by the religious establishment's huge landholdings in Korasan (owghaffs). With large numbers of
villages under their control, the clerical administrators of the properties were likely to adopt the landowner point of view and to influence, in turn, the clergy of Mashhad. Certainly there have been and are liberal clerical leaders in Mashhad, but the overall record is on the reactionary side.  

Khorasan during 1919, as any other province in Iran, had suffered at the hands of greedy governors. The conservative influence in Khorasan and the central government's failure to play an effective role in resolving the area's problems had created a deep discontent among the liberals, particularly among the leadership of the Democratic Party of Khorasan. The major task of government officials in the province was to collect taxes, suppress "undesirable" activities and keep peace in the area. Therefore, the local leaders of the Democratic party were highly dissatisfied with the manner in which things were run by the central government, and were always looking for an opportunity to strike back.

Shortly before Colonel Pessian's revolt, Ahmad Ghavam was the Governor of Khorasan. Ghavam was not a popular political figure and had an authoritarian style. For instance, during his governorship he disregarded the constitutional provisions for individual rights and individual expression. He closed down many of Khorasan's daily newspapers and arrested and jailed their editors. Ghavam's attitude toward the Democratic Party was one of antagonism, and he took every opportunity to restrict its
activity. Therefore, the Gilan and Azarbayjan episodes gave hope to Khorasan's democrats to follow suit.

When Colonel Taghi Khan was appointed as the Commander of the Khorasan Gendarmerie by the central government, the first thing he did was to purge the department from graft and corruption. As any other government institution at that time, the Khorasan Gendarmerie was infiltrated by family connections and was influenced by local notables and landed aristocracy. His major goal was to modernize and specialize the gendarmerie of Khorasan, not only in terms of its structure but also in terms of its functions.

Colonel Taghi Khan considered himself a Democrat. Before his appointment to the Khorasan Gendarmerie, he had affiliation with the Democratic Party in Tehran and was sympathetic to their cause. He shared the view with other left wing democrats that the central government in Tehran was incurable, and that the anti-constitutional elements had deeply penetrated the entire political system in Tehran. Ahmad Ghavam, the Governor, was considered one of those elements whom Colonel Taghi Khan believed was never loyal to the Iranian constitutional system. He could not trust the governor and had frequent clashes with him over different issues which concerned the management of provincial affairs. Similarly, the Colonel's tight control of Khorasan's gendarmerie and its purge of Governor Ghavam's hired elements had aroused the governor's suspicion about the Colonel's real intentions. As a result, each party was waiting for the right opportunity to dominate
Taghi Khan had an impressive record as an Iranian nationalist. During World War I he had distinguished himself fighting alongside other Iranian nationalists at Kermanshah. The Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919 had badly hurt his nationalistic feelings because he could not understand why the Iranian army should operate under the supervision of British officers. And when he realized that many of the prominent Democratic Party leadership in Tehran had supported the Vossough al-Dowleh's government, he was bitterly disappointed. Afterward, when he was appointed as commander of the Khorasan gendarmerie, and subsequently during his governorship of the province, he broke off with the Democratic Party in Tehran and organized his own brand of democratic party in Khorasan.

In 1921, due to some political changes in Tehran, Ghavam was summoned to the capital. When he resisted the order, Colonel Taghi Khan was asked to arrest him and dispatch the governor to Tehran. The Colonel executed the order and then became acting governor. Ghavam bitterly resented his arrest, especially since the arresting officer, Taghi Khan, had had the effrontery to make such a record for himself as governor of Khorasan as to deglamorize Ghavam's own achievements.

Then came the crisis. At the very height of Taghi Khan's popularity, due to some unpredictable political changes in Tehran, Ghavam became Prime Minister in Tehran and immediately ordered the Colonel to surrender his position and return to Tehran, At
the urging of the gendarmery and with the overwhelming support of
the Democratic Party in Khorasan the Colonel refused. For Taghi
Khan the recall order was a gross injustice and a personal affront.
There is little support, however, for the opinion of those who saw
in this movement an expression of sentiment for autonomy or separation
on the part of Taghi Khan.93

Colonel Taghi Khan not only refused to follow the central
government's order, but through his manner of running provincial
affairs, left the impression that he was heading toward Khorasan's
policy of self government. It seems Ghavam's government was
purposefully reinforcing this impression by resorting to a
propaganda campaign against him. But the Colonel, on various
occasions, denied the charges against him and stated that his main
objective was the prosperity of Iran and its independance from the
big powers.94

There were several negotiations which took place between the
Colonel and government representatives in Khorasan which led to
no conclusions.95 Taghi Khan's subsequent actions, arresting the
General Commander of the Iranian Gendarmery and his associates
whose main mission was a fact-finding tour in the area, tended to
aggravate the situation.96 Besides that, Taghi Khan was extremely
distrustful of the central government, particularly its Prime
Minister.97

In the campaign to bring Taghi Khan to heel, Ghavam first used
the old technique of inciting a tribal force against him, this time
the Ghouchan tribe. Failing in this venture, he sent Samsam al-Saltaneh's Bakhtiaris. Afterwards, Cossacks were sent to Khorasan to reinforce the Bakhtiaris. Besides that, political differences between the Colonel and several of his associates further weakened the movement and put the central government in a better position to bring Taghi Khan to his knees.

Political chaos and disorganization which was brought about by a series of conflicts, on the one hand, between the central government and insurgent groups, and on the other, between the groups themselves, had driven the country into a state of complete anarchy. The central government was virtually incapable of enforcing its authority. The system had run into a major deadlock. As a result, on February 21, 1921, the weak and vacillating government in Tehran was overthrown by a coup d'etat led by Colonel Reza Khan, the Commander of the Iranian Cossack Brigade.

At the time, the Gilan Republic which was in control of the Caspian provinces for about a year and a half, from the spring of 1920 till the fall of 1921, was already at the brink of civil strife. In its later stages internal dissensions had broken out within its ranks, owing to differences between Kuchek Khan, who was always something of a moderate, and the leftist elements. This schism led eventually in October, 1921, to the arrest and execution of Heidar Khan Amou Oghli, one of the leaders of the left-wing Democratic party in Gilan. In September 1921, the Iranian Army, aware of differences among the leaders of Gilan Republic, moved
into the Gilan province. By October the movement of Kuchek Khan was brought to an end. Kuchek himself was captured and executed; his head was brought to Tehran.

Khyiabani's movement had the same fate as Kuchek Khan's. By the middle of September, the Iranian Cossack Brigade had dispersed the forces of Fergheye Domocrat Azarbyjan. Khyiabani himself was killed and his movement was forcefully suppressed.

Colonel Taghi Khan's revolt in Khorasn had no better destiny than the other two. With the assistance of tribal chiefs the forces of the central government were able to destroy the Taghi Khan's movement and disperse his forces. Taghi Khan was killed in the fight.

On assuming the monarchy in December, 1925, Reza Shah banned all political parties. He even expressed his dislike for a monopolistic government party to be used as an instrument of political education and control. Instead he relied on personal authority, enforced by his army, to build toward an "integrated industrialized society." But to maintain an illusion of popular consent, the Majlis was preserved, its deputies carefully screened for loyalty by the central and provincial officials. With Reza Shah's coup d'état, the Persian political system once more swung to the traditional pattern of government.

As described earlier, in less than two decades, from 1906 to 1921, the Iranian constitutional system was deadlocked for three times. The Majlis could not trust the government and, as a
result, frequently obstructed its operation. There was a tendency on the part of the Majlis to monopolize national power. Similarly, the governments were distrustful of the Majlises and most of its decisions were made in secrecy. The governments rarely discussed their true intentions with the assemblies and scarcely put their programs in a straightforward manner before the assemblies. This contributed to further distrust and suspicion between the two political bodies.

From a different point of view, factionalism within the Majlis, and between the Majlis and its wider environment, also contributed to the system's instability. Factions, within and between parliamentary parties, did not trust one another. They frequently accused one another of being foreign agents and working for an alien government(s). This in turn would result in the Majlis' inaction and indecision which ultimately would affect the administration's daily operations.

The absence of cooperation in inter and intra-party organizations also further complicated the situation. Every individual and every group, within and without the Majlis, thought of himself (or themselves) to be right, and other individuals and groups were necessarily wrong. This type of thinking has two consequences: further factionalism and continuous organizational splits; and making the probability of any sort of compromise virtually impossible. The art of compromise requires the political actors within a system to communicate with one another with the sole
purpose of reducing the tension and reaching a solution. Whereas in the Iranian case, the aim of political actors seems to have been to dominate one another rather than to save the system by reaching a constructive compromise. To compromise means to sell out one's principles.
NOTES CHAPTER 4

1. For the influence of Western civilization on Iran see Amin Banani, The Modernization of Iran, op cit.; also see Yahya Armajani, Middle East: Past and Present (Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1970), pp. 162-171 and 251-263; also see Robert A. McDaniel, The Shuster Mission and the Persian Constitutional Revolution. (Minneapolis, Minnesota, Bibliotheca Islamica, 1974).


7. See Fereydoun Adamiyat, Fekre Domocracy Dar Nehzate Mashroutiate Iran, op cit., p. 75.

8. Ibid., p. 19.

9. Ibid., pp. 74-76.

11. For a discussion on this topic see Ismail Raien, Haydar Khane Amou-Oghli (Raien Publishers, 1972), p. 57.

12. Uluma in this period played a double role; one was "reactionary" and the other was considered a "progressive" role. When the issue was one of limitation on Monarch's powers, the Uluma sided with the left. When the issue was one of secularization, it sided with the ruling groups.

13. For a discussion on secret societies during this period see Ismail Raien, Haydar Khane Amou-Oghli, op cit., p. 18; also see Ali Asghar Shamain, Iran Dar Dowreye Saltanate Qajar (Iran during Qajar Dynasty) (Ebne Sina Publishers, 1964), pp. 392-402.

14. Ibid., p. 396. It was believed that Seyed Hassan Taghi Zadeh, the leader of Social Revolutionary faction in the Majlis and Haydar Khane Amou-Oghli, the party's another leader out of the Majlis, knew beforehand about the assassination plot. See Ismail Raien, Haydar Khane..., p. 395.

15. Ibid., p. 80.


17. Ibid. See footnote on p. 75.

18. Ibid., pp. 75-76.

19. Ibid., p. 83

20. Ibid., p. 87.

21. The members of Social Revolutionary Party whose names were implicated in the plot, were Malak al-Motakalamin, Seyed Jamal al-Din Vaez, Sour Esrafil, Mohammad Reza Mossayat, Hakim al-Mulk, Taghizadeh, Abdolrahim Khalkhali, and Jalil Ardabili. Some of these people were also the members of National Revolutionary Committee which had a close connection with Social Revolutionary Party. See Ali-Asghare Shamain, Iran Dar Dowreyeh Saltanate Qajar, op cit., p. 401.

23. For a brief discussion of this tragical event see Ali Asghare Shamin, *Iran Dar Dowreyeh...*, *op cit.*, pp. 416-420.

24. Some believe that one of the reasons for Bakhtiaris' withdrawal from Mohammad Ali Shah's camp, was because the Bakhtiar leaders were promised by the constitutionalists to have the control of Isfahan province if the Bakhtiaris sided with them against the Mohammad Ali Shah's forces. See Feraydoun Adamiyat, *Fekre Democracy...*, *op cit.*, pp. 130-131.


32. Mojahedins were divided into two groups; one group was pro-Democratic party, and was headed by Haydar Khane Amouoghli, an activist since the constitutional revolution. The second group was a pro-Etedalyioun party faction, and was headed by Satar Khan, one of Mohammad Ali Shah's arch enemy from Tabriz. For further description on Mojahedins and their factionalism see Feraydoun Adamiyat, *Fekre Democracy...*, *op cit.*, p. 144.

33. For a further account on these events see Ismail Raien, *Haydar Khane Amouoghli*, *op cit.*, p. 179.

34. The most active and well-known leaders of Democratic Party out of Majlis were: Hossein Gholi Navab, Mohammad Reza Mossavat, Sheikh Mohammad Khiabani, Heidar Khane Amouoghliou, Rassoul Zadeh, Jalil Ardabili, Mirza Mohammad Nejat, Mirza Mohammad Ghazvini, Mirza Mohammad Ali Tarbiyat, Sheikh Ismail and a few others. For a complete list of Democratic leaders see Mehdi Malek-Zadeh, *Tarikhe Enghelabe Mashrouttyiate Iran* (The History of Iranian Constitutional Revolution) (Ebne Sina Publishers, 1953),
35. See Ismail Raien, Haydar Khane..., op cit., pp. 170-175.

36. When Satar Khan, the leader of right-wing Mojahedin was wounded, he was replaced by Sardar Yahya Moez al-Sultane Rashti. During this time, the right-wing Mojahedin were about 900 devotees; while the Amouoghli's Mojahedin were about 300. See Feraydoun Adamiyat, Fekre Domocracy..., op cit., p. 144.

37. Many political leaders and political activists were assassinated during this time, the most important personalities among them were, Ayatollah Behbahani, the leader of Etedaliyoun in the Majlis. Mirza Hassan Khane Amin al-Mulk, another Etedali leader. Taghizadeh, the leader of Democratic faction in the Majlis was deported from the country; he was replaced by Soleiman Mirza Eskandari.

38. For a brief account of centrifugal forces, rebellions and their aims, see Ali Asghare Shamim, Iran Dar Dowreye..., op cit., pp. 441-445.

39. For a further information on these events see Habib Alahe Shamlouee, Tarikhe Iran: As Mad Ta Pahlavi, op cit., pp. 867-868.

40. Ali Asghare Shamin, Iran Dar Dowrey..., op cit., p. 453.

41. Ibid., p. 453,

42. The life-time of the Third Majlis, was only 11 months and 10 days. It was forced to close down under pressures from invading troops, mostly British and Russian.

43. Habib Alah Shamlouee, Tarikhe Iran: As Mad Ta..., op cit., p. 871.

44. Qajar's Shahs heavily relied on Tsarist Russians for support. Thus, when the Communists took charge of that country, the political situation in Iran was affected by events in Russia. The Qajars did not receive any support from the Russians, while the revolutionaries, particularly those in border areas, were psychologically boosted.

45. Malek al-Shoaraye Bahar has referred to the October Revolution as a miracle and to Lenin as "liberator" and "savior" of Iran and Iranian people. Malek al-Shoara was one of the prominent leaders of Democratic Party. See Mohammad Taghi Bahar, Tarikhe Mokhtasare Ahzabe Siasi Iran: Engheraze Ghajarieh (A Short History of Political Parties in Iran:
The Fall of Qajars), Tehran, 1942, pp. 466-467.

46. By "left" it is meant, all those groups who wanted a change in the structure of existing system. At the time, both the Democrats and the Socialists demanded such a change. For the ideologies of these parties see Ali Gharavi Nouri, Hezbe Domocrate Iran..., op cit., pp. 66-73.


48. See Mohammad Taghi Bahar, Tarikhe Mokhtasare..., op cit., pages 29, 130, 133.


50. See Mohammad Taghi Bahar, op cit., passim.

51. Bahar was one of the influential leaders of Democratic Party. On many occasions he had criticized the young monarch for not being involved in political process. Ibid., passim.

52. Ibid., pp. 130-134.


54. Ali Asghare Shamin, Iran Dar Dowreye..., op cit., p. 476 (footnote).

55. Ibid., p. 476.

56. See the Project of Communications and Cultural Industries of Iran. Iran Communications and Development Institute (1977), pp. 27-29.

57. Ibid., pp. 31-33.


59. Habib Alah Shamlouee, Tarikhe Iran: As Mad..., op cit., p. 880.
60. For the detailed text of the Treaty, see N. Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia..., op cit., Chapter 1.

61. Ali Asghar Shamin, Iran Dar Dowrey..., op cit., p. 484.

62. Ibid., pp. 484-485.

63. The uprising of Simitghous in Kurdistan and Kermanshahan, the Sheikh Khazal in Khouzestan province were of this kind. For further information see A. A. Shamim, Iran Dar Dowrey..., op cit., p. 462. Also see Ali Azari, Ghiyam Sheikh Mohammad Khiaabani (Khiaabani's Revoit), (Fath Ali Shah Publishers, 1967), pp. 52-54; also see Habib Shamlouee, As Mad Ta Pahlavi, op cit., p. 888.

64. Since most of Kuchek Khan's campaign took place in jungles of Gilan so his movement was called the Jangali movement.


66. Ibid., p. 22.


68. Ibid., p. 12.

69. Ibid., p. 28.

70. Ibid., p. 12.

71. The leaders of the Democratic Party in Gilan were Haydar Khan Amououghli and Dr. Heshmat.


73. Ibid., p. 22.

74. Ibid., pp. 23-24.


77. Ibid., pp. 36-41.
78. Ebrahim Fakraee, Sardar Jangal, op cit., Chapter 11.

79. See Khiabani's speeches in Tabriz, prior to the Anglo-Iranian Treaty. These speeches are collected by Ali Azari, Ghyiame Sheikh Mohammad Khiabani..., op cit., pp. 62-90.


82. Ibid., p. 164.

83. Lenczowski, George, Russia and the West in Iran: A Study in Big Power Rivalry. (Cornell University Press, 1949), Chapter 3.

84. Ibid., p. 61.

85. These groups were: Ain al-Dowleh, the Governor; Amin al-Mulk, Deputy Governor; and Marzban, executive secretary to the Governor's office. See ali Azari, Ghyi'am Sheikh Mohammad..., op cit., p. 263.

86. Ibid., pp. 361, 367, and 377.

87. Ibid., p. 156.

88. Ibid., p. 411.

89. George Lenczowski, Russia and the West..., op cit., p. 62.

90. For more information on this episode see Richard Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, op cit., pp. 106-110.


92. Ibid., pp. 179-183 and 184-188.


94. Ibid., pp. 257-261.

95. Ibid., pp. 232-234 and 288-289.

96. Ibid., pp. 235-240.

97. Ibid.
CHAPTER 5

The Rise and Fall of Political Parties in Iran: Interactions and Deadlocks

When Reza Khan established himself as the dominant political personality in the country in 1925, he deposed the Qajars. But unlike Ataturk in Turkey, he did not establish a republic.¹ A year later he made himself king, founding a new dynasty, the Pahlavis. Between then and his deposition in 1941 Reza Shah, as he then became known, established the first centralized state in modern Iran. He built a modern army, which he used to enforce government control over the whole country. All those who resisted him were crushed. He established the first ministerial system, developed educational, health and transport systems and, after 1934, began to encourage a small industrialization program. Despite the many differences, the state established by Reza Shah in Iran also bore many similarities to that being built by Turkey’s new leader Ataturk. On the other hand, Reza Shah’s endeavours were seriously limited: he made no attempt to alter agrarian relations in Iran and his capacity to develop the economy was thereby reduced by the low internal revenues available to him; the revenues from oil were also meager and made up at most 25 percent of his government's income.² The state he created provided the context
for the later capitalist development of Iran but it was incapable itself of initiating the major changes required in this direction.

Reza Khan's rule was terminated in June 1941 by the Allied forces. He went into exile shortly thereafter, and his son, Mohammad Riza, then aged twenty-two, became Shah. The Allied invasion almost destroyed the Pahlavi state. Liberties not enjoyed since 1921 were restored: trade unions, a free press, rival political parties all thrived. The new governments which took office after 1941, were, more or less, committed to democracy—a natural reaction against the former authoritarianism. Political parties which suddenly sprung onto the political scene had practically no past and no tradition upon which they could rely; the Tudeh party was an exception. True, as was stated in the previous sections, various political parties existed between 1906 and 1921, but that was a generation ago; discontinuity which occurred in the system as a result of Reza Khan's coup, and which lasted for almost two decades, wiped out any political experiences that people might have obtained before Reza Khan's takeover. In 1941, political life had to begin anew.

The urge toward some form of political expression was strong. The number of parties formed in 1942 and 1943 which appeared on the political horizon of Tehran exceeded fifteen. Political feuds among parties and personalities began from the beginning. From the start, the internal situation was marked by growing instability and constant shifting of forces. And eventually, despite
the government's pledges of democracy, the political process evolved in such a way as to bring the system to another deadlock.

Second Phase, 1941-1952: Party Politics and Centrifugal Forces

As was mentioned earlier, after 1941 a large number of parties appeared on the political scene, most of them taking patriotic and nationalist names, publishing newspapers, seeking representation in the Majlis, and agitating publicly. But generally speaking, from the beginning four main political forces were discernable: the Court, the traditional elite, the Tudeh party and its front organizations, and an assortment of liberal and religious nationalists, later organized into the National Front (Jebheye Melli).

The Court was represented by Mohammad Reza Shah, and his political base was mainly the Iranian armed forces and whatever popular support the Shah could personally muster. The Shah recognized in the armed forces his main autonomous base of power, and with the exception of a few passing challenges from within and without the armed forces, the alliance of the Court and the army has been a significant political force since 1925.

The traditional Iranian elite was composed of heterogeneous, overlapping elements: the powerful landlords, the Qajar princes, the tribal chiefs, and some prominent members of the Iranian civil and military bureaucracy who had been co-opted into the elite.
In the face of the revolutionary threat from below and the possibility of another prolonged period of royal domination, the traditional elite acted with some political cohesiveness during this period. However, the elements of this group did not share a common view toward the Court and were weakened by some factionalism among its components. The result was a pattern of shifting alliances between the court and different factions of the elite. One of the results of this shifting of alliances was the successive changes of governments.

On the left side of the continuum were the Communists, the liberal nationalists, and religious groups. These groups were challenging the status quo. The communists were represented by the Tudeh party and a variety of front organizations. It was the only political party that had a coherent doctrine and organizational network. In a relatively short time, the party achieved the status of a mass political organization by appealing to Iran's working and middle classes, establishing an extensive network of party cadres in the provinces, and undertaking vast programs of political propaganda and agitation.

In its official programs the Tudeh party avoided giving the impression that it might have revolutionary aims; and it did not call itself communist. It demanded neither the nationalization of private property nor the collectivization of land. On the contrary, its platform included all the essential features of traditional liberalism, exactly as did the other Iranian parties.
It demanded the formation of a democratic government representing the broad strata of the population; implemntation of the Constitutional provisions related to political liberties and human rights; the abolition of Reza Shah's anti-democratic laws, notably the June 1937 act prohibiting communist and anti-monarchical parties; the distribution among the peasants of state lands and large holdings; and recognition of trade unions and the right of collective bargaining. The one factor that might distinguish this program from that of other political parties was its stress on the welfare of the workers and of the peasantry.

Shortly after the Tudeh's establishment, a network of local branches was spread in major cities throughout the entire country, particularly in the northern and southern provinces. The party press was also established. Gradually the party's appeal was broadened. The middle and working classes were increasingly drawn by its hopeful slogans. "Bread, Health, and Education for All" became the rallying cry for the party throught its extensive media of communication. In early 1943 the party established contact with the editors of more than twenty publications of a liberal-democratic line with the idea of framing a uniform editorial policy. It would take the form of a "Freedom Front" dedicated to two main struggles: 1) against the restoration of dictatorship and its collaborators, and 2) against fascism.

The thought quickly caught on, and the Freedom Front spread to the major provinces, embracing a total of thirty-five newspapers
and which resulted in the emergence of a political polarization that lasted until 1946. Also by 1942 the Tudeh Party had gathered most of the local trade-unions into its Central United Council of Trade Unions. The United Council claimed a membership of 200,000 by the end of 1945 and 400,000 by the end of 1946. Political control of the union by the Tudeh party was assured by the presence of the leading members of the Tudeh party's Central Committee on the union's executive committee. Naturally the Tudeh party heavily exploited the union and its labor organizations in political matters when it was threatened by the government or the parties on the right.

The nationalist forces represented a wide ideological spectrum and found their organizational expression in an assortment of short-lived political parties that ranged from the right to the left. Some of these parties were led by well-known politicians and primarily served their political ambitions; others had a wider base of support but were not attractive and lacked political power. Many of them, after their initial activities in 1941, had either ceased to exist or suspended their activities by 1944. Many of them were replaced by others. Some splits and fusion took place. But generally the year 1944 was one of considerable political crystallization. In that year the most important parties were the Tudeh, Eradeye Melli (National Will party), Mihan (Country), Iran, Mardom (People), Socialist, and Adalat (Justice) parties.
Until 1943, the Tudeh party steadily grew in strength and influence, and the government seemed unable to counter what was supposed to be a serious threat to the political stability of the country. If communist influence was to be met with effective countermeasures, an anti-communist political party was needed. Therefore, the Vatan (Fatherland) party was created by Seyyed Zia al-Din Tabatabai in 1943. Its press organ was first Karavan and later Ra'di Emruz. After more than a year Vatan changed its name to Eradeye Melli, which was officially inaugurated as a new party in January, 1945. Zia al-Din was a right-wing politician and the co-sponsor of Reza Shah's coup d'etat in 1921.

The Eradeye Melli Party, which was set up for the express purpose of combating the Tudeh, attempted to copy the Tudeh party in all of its external characteristics, right down to its nationalistic propaganda. Its program also reflected all the characteristics of liberal progressivism. But aside from those points common to most of the political parties, Eradeye Melli advocated a few more unusual policies. These were: stronger defense of the political and economic independence of Iran; friendly treatment of the tribes; defense of Islam; introduction of religious teaching into school programs; and a foreign policy of eternal neutrality for Iran.

Zia al-Din did not make a secret of his anti-communist feelings. Instead of accusing the Western powers of interference in Iran's affairs, the Eradeye Melli party accused the Tudeh of being an
instrument of the Soviets. His press organs waged a relentless struggle against the Tudeh, accusing it of treason, subversive activities, antireligious propaganda, violence, and sabotage. The Tudeh party in turn considered Seyed Zia al-Din and his Eradeye Melli party the agent of imperialist, particularly the British, and thus waged an effective campaign against him and other pro-British politicians. The Eradeye Melli Party, however, was too closely identified with the court, and derived its main strength from alliance with the clergy, merchants, landowners, and tribes.

Eradeye Melli Party was not a nationalist party despite its publications in which it tried to represent itself as a nationalist group. Also in practice, if not in theory, it did not stand for drastic economic and social change. Therefore, ideologically the Eradeye Melli should be considered on the right side of the continuum within the Iranian political spectrum.

Between the Tudeh party and its political allies on the left, and the Eradeye Melli and its supporters on the right, there stood several centrist parties with nationalistic aspirations, the most important one among them being the Iran Party. Some of them, such as Mihan party, had nationalist character which rendered it hostile to any foreign influences in Iran. The Iran party and the Socialist party had a leaning towards the left, whereas others, such as Mardom and Adalat parties, were more inclined toward the right.
The Iran Party was one of the most important parties in the center and played a significant role in the political events of the country during the period between 1942 and 1953. The Iran Party was composed mostly of liberal and intellectuals of strong nationalistic persuasions. The party had been founded in 1943 with the slogan of "work, justice, and freedom." At the beginning it was purely an Engineer Association and its membership was confined to the government engineers from many different departments. But at a later date, at the suggestion of nonengineers, especially Allahyar Saleh, the association became the Iran Party. In the early years of its activity the party did not seek a mass following. Instead, its leaders cultivated officials within the government and persuaded many of them to subscribe to the principles of the party.

The Iran party was not an aggregative party, but a group of intellectuals and modernists bent on a program of radical-reform and modernization. Their ideas included economic development and land distribution, a combination of a vague form of socialism and Islam, and development of a democratic form of government. The party's other concern was to break down the traditional barriers to their own acquiring of positions of greater authority. The party, however, did not represent a broad popular group; but it stood out as a valuable political ally, though never a potential ruling party.
The Iranian political scene during the period between 1941 to 1953 was filled with an atmosphere of violence and hostility among the different leaderships. These leaders, on both the left and right, were fighting in all fronts for political power. To achieve their respective political goals, they heaped abuse upon their rivals and upon the governments currently in office. Street demonstrations, riots, and even assassinations of opposition members were the ordinary political means for exerting pressure on rival groups and decision-makers in government. Notwithstanding, the programs of most of these groups generally resembled one another, and their main objective was to bring economic development to the country. Nevertheless, in practice they were not cooperative but highly individualistic; each group strived independently to obtain power and impose its goals on other groups which was in turn blocked by its opponents. The final consequences were disappointment and frustration among the conflicting leaderships which eventually plunged the country once again into anarchy and chaos.

Chronologically speaking, the evolution of political events between the years 1942 to 1953 consists of two phases, each revealing the familiar pattern described in the earlier chapters. The first period immediately followed the abdication and lasted until about 1946. During this period two problems became the subject of inter-group leadership conflict, both of which were interrelated. One was the issue of oil concessions to the Russians, and the second was the issue of self-administrative control for Azarbyjan.
and Kurdistan. In the second phase, that is the period between
1946 and 1953, two issues became a matter of inter-group conflict;
one was the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC)
and the other was the issue of the Shah's control over the Iranian
armed forces. The first period resulted in political stalemate
and the second culminated in the Iranian army's coup d'etat against
Dr. Mossadegh's government.

Re-opening the Old Wounds: The First Phase, 1942-1946

In 1944, the Russian government showed an interest for an oil
concession covering Iran's five northern provinces. The Tudeh
party brought unprecedented pressure on the government of Mohammad
Saed to force negotiation on the proposed concession. But the
government under pressure from the right led by Zia al-Din Tabatabai
and the nationalist groups in the Majlis led by Dr. Mohammad
Mossadigh refused to take action. To further pressure the
government the Tudeh party and Freedom Front sponsored impressive
demonstrations in the capital and major cities.¹⁶ Walkouts and
sitdown strikes occurred repeatedly in important industrial cities
as well as in the capital, where armed workers actually assumed
control of some major factories.¹⁷ The forces of the left began
a vigorous campaign to overthrow the government. A huge mass
demonstration took place by the Tudeh and its allies in Parliament
square and demanded Saed's dismissal.¹⁸ Eventually, Saed's
government became a victim of social unrest and resigned on November 8, 1944. The Tudeh faction in the Majlis and its supporters were looking for the best man to head the government.

Concerning the distribution of political forces in the Fourteenth Majlis, based on the turnout of 1943-44 parliamentary elections, the Tudeh party was able to secure eight seats in the Majlis. Tudeh deputies, in contrast to all the rest of the Majlis, behaved in a disciplined way and were the best organized parliamentary group. Unlike the others, its real strength was its unprecedented degree of cohesion and discipline. And this in turn, enabled them to dominate the debates in the Majlis. There were other small circles of individuals who, because of different political reasons, sympathized with the Tudeh faction in the parliament and supported the party on some of the major issues. Together they were about thirty deputies, most of them from the northern provinces, and with the Tudeh party they constituted a left-center coalition in the Majlis. During the early days of the Fourteenth Majlis, the conservative elements were not well organized. There were some forms of grouping such as Etefagh (Unity), Melli (National), Mihan (Fatherland), Iran, Democratic and Independent who called themselves parliamentary parties. But these were not stable groups in that their membership was highly fluid. Evidence of concrete programs that would indicate political differences was totally lacking. However, in the course of 1944 when the oil issue came up, political cleavage between the Tudeh party and the
conservative elements of the Majlis became more acute and better crystallized. Therefore, in August, 1944, the parliamentary factions Azadi (Freedom), Mihan (Fatherland), and Etehad (National Union) formed a common bloc in order to form a stable majority. This bloc was estimated to comprise eighty deputies. The new bloc did not publish any program, but one could assume that its members represented conservative elements. Right wing conservative and nationalist groups of Zia al-Din Tabatabai did not join the bloc, although some of Zia's partisans belonged to each of the above-mentioned blocs. Together with the Zia al-Din faction these groups constituted a center right coalition in the Fourteenth Majlis.

There was another prominent political group in the Majlis led by Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh who called themselves Mellyioun and sometimes Jebheye Melli (Nationalist or National Front). Politically it was not a compact group but its members shared some common views on several issues. For instance, they stood for the nationalization of the oil industry in Iran, demanded electoral reform, and considered themselves strict constitutionalists. They believed the Shah in a constitutional system should reign, not govern; and they were for restrictions on the monarch's power. As a center group, Jebheye Melli aligned itself with the left when the issue was political democracy, constitutionalism, and human rights. When the issue was one of giving oil concessions to the Russians, Jebheye Melli stood against the Tudeh and its allies, and cooperated with the rightist groups in the Majlis. Generally speaking, on the
oil issue Jebhey Melli factions in the Majlis fought vigorously against both the Tudeh and the Eradeye Melli. However, the group was more sympathetic to the left than to the right, and frequently found itself fighting in the same front with the left against the existing establishment, rather than in the rightist camp. Therefore, despite their ideological differences, Jebheye Melli and the Tudeh frequently found themselves in the same voting bloc and constituted the minority, whereas the coalition of center-right constituted the parliamentary majority. This division of forces roughly demonstrates that the Majlis in the main was represented by conservative elements, essentially the rightists and affluent nationalists, who were generally reluctant to approve of any radical changes in the country.

When the Saed government resigned in November under the Tudeh pressure, a new political alignment emerged in the Majlis. The progressive and nationalist elements sided with the right and the independents. The right was planning to form a new government under Zia al-Din Tabatabai, the leader of Eradeye Melli party. The Tudeh party and its allies supported Reza Gholi Bayat who was politically uncommitted. Since Tabatabai was notorious for his alleged pro-British stand, the progressive and nationalist elements withdrew from the right and together with the left they concentrated their support behind Bayat. As a result, Bayat formed his government in January, 1945. The Bayat cabinet, which was considered an interim cabinet, only to appease the left, could not
take any action on the oil issue and so fell in mid-April 1945, after a vote of no confidence that was unsuccessfully opposed by the eight Tudeh members and 37 other deputies out of a total of 90 deputies present. The fall of Bayat's cabinet gave hope to the conservative coalition in the Majlis to bring Tabatabai's name for premiership to the fore again. Suspicions of the right and center politicians, the Tudeh group lined up with the progressive and anti-British elements led by Dr. Mossadegh to oppose the nomination of Tabatabai, whom they regarded as a symbol of reaction and an advocate for the restoration of the pre-World War II regime. The struggle against Tabatabai had a nationalistic emphasis which permitted the party to receive the support of most of the newly elected deputies of nationalist and progressive persuasion who roughly represented the left-of-center faction of the Majlis. They charged that the Right led by Tabatabai had plotted to seize power, with the aim of establishing a dictatorship and doing away with leftist parties.

In this atmosphere of tension Dr. Mossadegh introduced a bill in the Majlis that would make it a punishable crime for any cabinet minister to enter into negotiation or to grant oil concessions to foreigners without a previous approval of the parliament. It should be mentioned that Mossadegh supported the policy of what he called "negative equilibrium." At the time of introducing the bill, he stated that "the Iranian nation wants a political equilibrium which will be in the interests of the country, and that will be a
negative equilibrium." This meant that Iran should grant no concessions and no favors to any foreign powers. The bill was quickly passed against the opposition of the Tudeh party. The party, on the other hand, developed the thesis of "positive equilibrium" which sought to restore a balance between Great Britain and the Soviet Union by matching whatever privileges the former enjoyed with the granting of similar favors to the latter. Moreover, the Tudeh party argued that the oil concession of Iran's northern region to the Soviet Union would help the industrialization of a major part of the country and bring about the ultimate economic emancipation of the people. Conservative coalitions on the right, whose political views were generally represented by Tabatabai, had a different perspective. They were traditionally suspicious and distrustful of the Soviet Union's policy in Iran, and therefore, strongly opposed any oil concession to the Russians; but they were extremely lenient on Western powers, particularly the British, who were operating the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in the southern region of the country.

The fall of the Bayat cabinet in April 1945 marked the beginning of radical politics in Iran. Even though the conservatives failed to seat Tabatabai as Prime Minister, they were successful in installing Mohsen Sadr, a conservative politician, as Prime Minister. With Sadr's premiership, the government swung to the right and as a result the left was provoked to a more extremist program. Besides that, the Majlis' approval of Mossadegh's "no concession"
bill made it highly difficult for any government, irrespective of who headed the cabinet, to reach a compromise among the conflicting parties without parliament's consent. The result was the country's most acute crisis in the post-war era. As the right and left moved further and further apart, they returned to a policy of an open offensive, reminiscent of 1917-1921.

The Tudeh party intensified its activity in the Caspian province and in Tehran, Isfahan, and Khuzistan, stopping short of an actual armed attempt to seize power. It charged the Sadr government and the army of drawing up the plans for the systematic annihilation of the Tudeh party and trade union organizations.\(^{27}\)

In August 1945 government troops occupied the headquarters of the Tudeh party organizations in the capital city; its newspapers were suspended and orders issued for its branches in provincial towns to be disbanded. Some of its leaders were beaten up.\(^{28}\)

Charging the right with complicity with British imperialism and suspecting a conspiracy by the conservatives, the Tudeh leaderships in Gilan, Mazanderan, and Azarbyjan, who were generally more militant than its national leadership, responded by occupying the major towns, factories, government offices and police stations. By the fall of 1945 the north of Iran was firmly in the control of the Tudeh party.\(^{29}\)
A Prelude to Insurrection: A Split in the Tudeh Party

The anti-communist measures taken by the central government against the left, and the inability of the Tudeh party to launch an effective counter attack against the conservative forces, eventually pushed the Tudeh leadership in Azarbyjan and Kurdistan to take more radical action. Remembering the broken promises of the "Tehran establishment" to the people of the north and the northwest during the 1917-21 crises, and frustrated by the failure of Tehran authorities to initiate reforms, and furious at the government's rejection of the Soviet's recent request of oil concessions which they believed might have been essential to the area's development, and above all, rejection of Pishevari's credentials in the Majlis as an Azarbyjanis representative from Tabriz, left no doubt for the Tudeh leadership in these areas that Tehran was not going to listen to their long delayed grievances.

On September 2, 1945, Pishevari broke off his relation with the national organization of the Tudeh party in Tehran, and changed the name of the Tudeh party in the northwest area to the Democratic Party of Azarbyjan. In other words, Pishevari forced the dissolution of Tudeh's provincial branches and their absorption into his new Democratic party. This was done without prior negotiation with the Tudeh party's Central Committee in Tehran. He described the Tudeh party in Azarbyjan as a worn out, disreputable organization, whose years of struggle had failed to produce any tangible results.
He also criticized the Tudeh's Central Committee as having lost its revolutionary fervor. On November 4 the attempt to seize power by force of arms throughout the province began.

Pishevari's Democratic party at the end of the summer of 1945 issued a manifesto containing ten articles about the party's goals. It called for liberal and progressive reforms of a social and economic character typical of parties organized in post-war Iran. Pishevari's emphasis in this manifesto was largely on internal autonomy for Azarbyjan province and a larger Azarbyjan delegation in the Majlis. The idea of any independent Azarbyjan was never stressed and demand for autonomy was to be carried on within the framework of Iran's sovereignty. The Party's supporters were told that they were in the vanguard of a crusade against the national Iranian government and were to restore a democratic, patriotic rule in Tehran. Even those sections of the population who were attracted by reform measures initiated by the Pishevari government had no interest in separation and were told that the Democrats were actually working in the interests of Iran.

Simultaneously with the events in Tabriz, a Kurdish uprising took place in Western Azarbyjan. Historically minded Iranians, who are very much aware of the intimate connections between their own and Kurdish history, insist that the past demonstrates that all Kurds, not only those in Iran, are really Iranians.

Since the Iranian constitutional revolution and also before and after World War I, people in Kurdistan frequently demanded that
the central government undertake badly needed reforms and economic development in their province. But these reforms never came about and nothing materialized. The political change which took place in Iran after Reza Shah's abdication and the establishment of political democracy in the country gave the Kurds an opportunity to organize themselves and thus exert pressures on the central government to take their long accumulated grievances more seriously. But the radicalization of some Kurdish segments within the movement, and subsequent interactions between the national government and provincial leadership eventually drove the Kurdish movement to further political extremism. During the post-World War II period there was a great deal of dissatisfaction with the central government in Kurdistan province, and frequent demands were made for better social and economic conditions and more locally controlled provincial government.

In the summer of 1943 in Mehabad, an important urban center in the Kurdish area of Iran, a secret Kurdish society, the Kumeleh, was formed. Simultaneously with the events in Tabriz, a Kurdish uprising took place in Kurdestan on December 15, 1945, which its leaders in later days organized into the Democratic Party of Kurdistan. In the same year, Ghazi Mohammad, a leftist element within the movement, accepted the leadership of the Democratic party. He immediately incorporated in the party's programs demands for land and social reforms.
Secret and open negotiations between the local and national leaderships did not produce any desired results and the communication line was finally broken down between the parties. As a consequence, in early 1946, Ghazi Mohammad issued a proclamation announcing the virtual independence of the Iranian Kurdistan, and pledged resistance to the central government. Also following a negotiation between Pishevari and Ghazi Mohammad, a treaty was signed on April 23, 1946 between the two parties which provided for military alliance and common diplomatic action toward the central government.

The political situation seemed to be highly critical and sensitive. Neither of the parties seemed to be ready for a compromise. While the Azarbyjan insurrection was underway, near the end of October, the government of Mohsen Sadr resigned and it was replaced by a moderate center cabinet under Ebrahim Hakimi with the declared intention of reversing some of the previous cabinet’s anti-communist measures.

The new government made a desperate effort to halt the insurrection in both Azarbyjan and Kurdistan. Therefore, Morteza Gholi Bayat, the former prime minister of the left-of-center coalition, was chosen by the new government as a chief negotiator in this dispute and was sent to Tabriz at the head of a peace mission. No development was achieved, because the Democratic party persistently demanded internal self-administrative control and recognition of local government by the central authorities, which the government would not concede to on the grounds of "the
implied change in the Iranian constitutional system from a unitary to a federal type. 36

Briefly, the attitude of the various factions of the Majlis toward the insurrections in Azarbyjan and Kurdestan were as follows: the group leadership on the right in cooperation with all of the conservative elements led by Zia al-Din Tabatabai uncompromisingly resisted the demands made by the extreme left, that is, oil concessions to the Russians and self-administrative control for the north and northwestern provinces. They were determined to establish the authority of the central government over these provinces by any means, but were waiting for the right opportunity. The group leadership of the center, nationalists and liberals, led by Dr. Mossadegh, who were well aware of the long accumulated grievances of the Azarbyjanis and Kurdish people, supported a compromise but basically did not go along with the demands as they were proposed by far-left leadership. The Tudeh group, representing the left, supported the demands made by the Democratic parties of Azarbyjan and Kurdistan, despite their high-handed treatment by their leaders of the Tudeh party in those provinces.

Once the moderate center became convinced that Hakimi's cabinet could not win the confidence of the left, a new left-of-center coalition was formed to vote Ahmad Chavam al-Salteneh into power in January, 1946. Ahmad Chavam was a shrewed manipulator, able to balance off a variety of competing forces.
As a result of delicate negotiations, an interim agreement was reached between the Tabriz revolutionary regime and the central government in the form of fifteen-points signed on June 13, 1946. Under the agreement, the central government sought to satisfy the demand of the Tabriz regime within the framework of the constitution. In order to further appease the insurgents and momentarily bring the left under government control, three members of the Tudeh party were included in the cabinet. On August 1, for the first time, a coalition cabinet was formed in Tehran with the participation of three Tudeh party members, one from the liberal-nationalist Iran party, and one representing the independent left. Ghavam apparently believed that in inviting the Tudeh party to join the cabinet he would be effectively blocking its customary role as opposition leader, at which it had been very successful.

The leaning of the government to the left strongly antagonized the center-right and other political groups on the right. To neutralize pressures from the center and right-of-center, the rightists press was suppressed; the Will party and its affiliated organizations across the country were disbanded, and Zia al-Din its leader was arrested and imprisoned. Following the crackdown on the right on June 30 Ghavam announced the formation of a new political party which was called the Democratic Party of Iran. The party was created to compete mainly with the left. The Democratic party was exclusively composed of pro-Ghavam and non-Tudeh elements. Ghavam's goal was to destroy both the Tudeh and the National Will
parties. Also he seemed to be determined to break the hold of the Tudeh party on the trade unions as a means to control the growing labor unrest in the country. The new party was also supposed to play a major role in the forthcoming elections to the Fifteenth Majlis. Using the vast resources of the government, the new party soon assumed gigantic proportions, embracing a cross-section of every class, from labor to the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy.

Although the party was doomed to a short life, it was, at least for a year, a thorn in the side of both the Tudeh and the Fergheye Domocrate Azarbyjan. Ghavam's suspected intention from creating the Democratic party had antagonized the Tudeh, driving it into open opposition. But the Tudeh Party's expectation from the pending parliamentary election for the Fifteenth Majlis, which had to be completed by November 1946, influenced the party to take a rather conciliatory stand.

Emerging Confrontation and the Collapse of Coalition Government

The government's move toward the left and its reliance on the leftist forces brought a sharp reaction from the right. In the first week of September a Bakhtiyari plot with the aim of overthrowing the Ghavam's government was reported in Isfahan, and on September 23 an open tribal rebellion broke out in the Fars province. A coalition of Ghashghais, Bakhtiyaris, and several minor tribes from
Fars, Khusistan, and the Gulf coast was formed under the leadership of Nasir Khan Ghashghai. It demanded the ousting of Tudeh ministers from the cabinet, local self-government for the southern provinces, and an increase in parliamentary representation. The rebels captured the cities of Bushehr, Abadeh, Kazeroun, Bandar Amir, and besieged Shiraz. The revolt even spread to Kerman, where an influential local leader, former deputy Ghobadian, joined the insurrectionists. In Fars the tribes created a revolutionary junta called Sedun and named their rebellion a National Movement. Their cause was supported by the Moslem clergy of the south.

A petition signed by a number of prominent religious leaders reached the government, demanding elimination of the Tudeh from the cabinet and public life. Nasir Khan, the leader of the insurgents, presented a twenty-four hour ultimatum to the government, unwilling to compromise. On October 17, Ghavam resigned, together with other members of the government, and in the new cabinet that he formed immediately afterwards the three Tudeh ministers were not included.

The bitterness of this setback grew, as the government followed up a drastic reversal of policy toward the Tudeh and other political groups on the left. The new cabinet also demonstrated its unwillingness to tolerate labor agitation as an instrument of pressure on the government. For instance, a strike by a Tudeh-sponsored union on November 14, 1946, was severely put down and provided an excuse for the wholesale arrest of hundreds of trade union and party members across the country.
The Tudeh party during this period also ran into a serious internal conflict and factionalism. By joining the government the Tudeh party had sharpened the already noticeable split in its own rank and file. It seemed to be the familiar line up, the radical left versus the moderate leadership. The left wing of the intelligensia condemned the participation on ideological and tactical grounds and warned that such a move had nullified the party's revolutionary aspects and had damaged its image. There were also others, such as Khalil Maleki one of the prominent leaders of the Tudeh party since 1935, who believed that by joining the Ghavam's coalition government the party confirmed the impression of being an instrument of Soviet diplomacy. Besides that, they argued, identification with the ruling class helped to undermine the party's image as champion of the oppressed people. These differences which developed within the party not only weakened the party's political position vis-a-vis the government and other political groups on the right, but also prepared the situation for a split which occurred in 1947.

Sharply reducing the political influence of the leftist political parties, the Premier magnified the chances of his Democratic party in the upcoming elections for the Fifteenth Majlis. Ghavam made it clear that the elections would not be held unless the central government were in the position to supervise them all over the country, including Azarbyjan and Kurdistan. This was certainly a shrewd policy on the part of the Prime Minister, because
it meant the introduction of the Iranian Army into both Azarbyjan and Kurdistan and the challenging of the status quo in those provinces. To strengthen his hand he ordered the arrest of hundreds of leading Tudeh activists in Tehran.

In early December 1946, preparations were completed for a march into Azarbyjan in accordance with the cabinet decree for "supervising an orderly election." On December 12, the Iranian Army entered Tabriz and within a few days insurrection in Azarbyjan and Kurdistan had ended.

When government troops had crossed the Azarbyjan border, Pishevari issued a call to resistance, promising an unrelenting fight. But apart from a few minor skirmishes, the Azarbyjan Democrats were unable to put a stop to the central army's advance. Democrat leaders, including the governor of Tabriz, were arrested and many were shot to death as a result of this confrontation. Also Ghazi Mohammad, the President of the Kurdish Republic, and his brother Sadrak Ghazi were caught and, after a trial, shot. In Tehran severe measures were taken by the government against the Tudeh, whose headquarters were raided and a great number of its members thrown in jail. The triumph of the government was complete. With the Tudeh party reduced to impotence and many opposition leaders out of sight, the right seemed to be politically dominant, and in a better position than before to decide on the issue of oil concessions to the Russians.
The parliamentary elections which had begun on January 11, 1947, were concluded in most districts by February; and in the middle of August the Fifteenth Majlis was finally inaugurated. Chavam's Democratic party won a substantial majority of seats. Dr. Mossadegh and his followers, who had taken the initiative as a major opposition force after the Tudeh's demise, won twenty-five seats. The Tudeh won two seats. With this arrangement, the Majlis on October 22, 1947, rejected any agreement for oil concessions to the Russians.

The Left Strikes Back: The Second Phase, 1947-1953

As mentioned earlier, during the period between 1946 and 1953, two issues became a matter of intergroup conflict; one was the nationalization of AIOC and the other was the issue of constitutional power of the Shahanshah and his control of the Iranian armed forces. The conflict which gradually developed on these two issues between the left, led by the National Front and the Tudeh party, and the right led by the Court and political groups on its side, culminated in the event of June 1953, which changed the nature of the Iranian political system ever since.

The left insisted that since the oil concession to the Soviet Union was refused there was no reason why Great Britain should hold a major oil concession in the south. Therefore, they brought forth the nationalization issue of AIOC. But before we get into
this issue let us point out several events, rather briefly, which took place between 1947 and 1949. This short period witnessed several political changes within the Iranian political context that turned the balance of power in favor of the political front of the right and center-right.

- In early February 1949, an attempt was made on the life of the Shah, while he was attending Charter Day ceremonies at Tehran University. The government at once outlawed the Tudeh party and the Labor United Council and prohibited anti-government and anti-monarchist political activity. In a lengthy statement in the Majlis, the government produced documents to prove the assailant's membership in the Tudeh party. The Majlis approved the government's policy statement immediately. Shortly thereafter, martial law was proclaimed and large scale arrests of party and union leaders began. The Tudeh newspapers were suspended and their headquarters in Tehran and elsewhere were raided. These measures drove the party and its affiliates underground.

- Following the unsuccessful attempt on the life of the Shah, the government made a serious effort to stabilize the regime by consolidating government authority and by passing a series of restrictive measures designed to ensure the continued suppression of the outlawed organizations of the left. In pursuance of the first aim a Constituent Assembly formed in March-April, 1949 substantially increased the Shah's power and authorized the introduction of bicameralism as a check on the power of the Majlis.
This amendment provided for a 60 member Senate, one-half of whom were elected and the other half appointed by the Shah, who was also vested with the right to dissolve parliament. The Senate has a right of veto over bills enacted by the Majlis which serves the purpose of blocking the "inappropriate" legislation passed by the Majlis. A related change involved the selection of prime ministers. In the post-Reza Shah period until 1949, the selection of a prime minister was based on a system in which the deputies discussed the merits of various candidates, then voted on the candidates and sent the name of the individual who had received the most votes to the Shah for his royal appointment. But beginning in 1949, the Shah began to act independently in naming individuals to the post, as he did in the case of General Razmare. So these changes terminated the Majlis' monopoly on legislation and cut down its control over the cabinet.

- The loss of Azarbyjan and Kurdistan was a bitter blow to the leftist groups, particularly the Tudeh party. It created an internal crisis in the party which became so acute that critics openly demanded the resignation of the party leadership. As a result, several splits occurred within the party. One was led by Khalil Maleki, a prominent leader of the party, who with a great number of his followers, defected from the party and established the Socialist League of Iran. Besides Maleki, there were several other splinter groups, the most important among them centered around Anvar Khamei who later established his own political
organization known as The Society of Liberation of Deed and Thought. Khamei had been a member of Dr. Erani's Marxist circle since the thirties. These and other defections within the party during 1949 further weakened the strength of Tudeh party in Iranian politics.

- In the summer of 1949, shortly before the end of its term, the 15th Majlis was given the draft of a Supplementary agreement with the AIOC. Although this draft included better terms than the 1933 concession, it fell short of satisfying Iran's demands for substantially increased oil royalties and participation in the management of the industry.

The Old Pattern is Repeated

With the injection of the oil issue into Iranian political and parliamentary life, the 15th Majlis, which was at the end of its life, acquired a new line up in which a small minority of four deputies, enjoying the tacit support of a much larger segment of the membership, turned the issue into a major political controversy. The new opposition group, called the National Front and led by Dr. Mossadegh, concentrated its campaign on an opposition to the supplementary oil agreement and a tacit objection to the augmentation of the authority of the sovereign and the executive branch of the government.
The sensitivity of the oil problem and the emotional manner by which it was handled by the minority group in the Majlis immediately aroused public interest in the issue, and gradually rallied a large majority of the middle class population to struggle against British political and economic influence. The passionate involvement of the public in the issue also compelled the relaxation of repressive measures against political freedom, and from this the Tudeh, still the best organized political force, tended to benefit the most; that is, it was able to regroup some of its scattered forces.

Generally speaking, the lineup of political forces during the period between 1949-1953 were as follows: on the left were the forces of the outlawed Tudeh party who, despite the legal restrictions on its activities, was nonetheless capable of a resurgence using front organization tactics. The sudden rise of the National Front in late 1949 offered the party a new lease on life. The party immediately formed numerous front organizations, which included Peace Partisans, Democratic Youth, National Society Against Colonialism, Democratic Women of Iran, Society Against Illiteracy, and Society to Defend the Rights of Villagers; scores of newspapers were published by these organizations. In addition, the Tudeh party newspapers, Mardom (People), Razm (Combat), and Zafar (Triumph), were clandestinely printed.

The Tudeh took the most extreme position on the oil issue. From the beginning the Tudeh's Central Committee called for a
complete liquidation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the nationalization of the country's oil resources, the expulsion of all foreign advisers from the country, and flatly rejected any negotiation with Britain and America on this issue.\textsuperscript{46}

At the center of the political spectrum was the National Front. The Front encompassed a broad alliance of the Iranian social strata, representing several distinct elements in terms of goals and social composition. At the center of the Front was Dr. Mossadegh himself and several of his loyal followers, mainly from the Iran party. Their primary goal was the nationalization of AIOC and liberation from British influence, thereby consolidating national independence. Related to this goal was some conception of a democratic and constitutional system of government and social reforms thought to be obtainable only after the elimination of British political and economic influence. The political center represented by Dr. Mossadegh and his close associates was remarkably weak in terms of organizational structure.

The most influential group in the center was the Iran Party. In other words, the Iran Party constituted the political center of the National Front. To the left of the Iran Party stood the Toilers party headed by Dr. Mozaafar Baghai.\textsuperscript{47} The Toilers party was in many respects a traditional type party and contained in its membership and leadership elements of the old and the new in Iranian group politics. The party itself was a coalition of Marxist, but anti-Soviet, intellectuals and of socialist but undemocratic labor
organizers. The former group, led by Khalil Malaki, was much less flexible ideologically and was destined eventually to split away from the Toilers party and to form a Titoist party—The Third Force (Nirouye Sevom). The Toilers party also had patriotic appeal, holding promise of mobilizing the masses in an important national struggle.

The center-right of the National Front was to be found in the traditionalist-religious organizations. They were somehow influenced and led by Seyid Abol Ghassem Kashani and Shamse Ghanatabadi. The most important groups among them were Fedaiyan Islam and Mojahedin Islam. Fedaiyan Islam was a small group of religious fanatics, numbering at most a few thousand. Theologically, it sought a return to the caliphate, in which the secular and sectarian would blend into one compound. It contained a great number of religious students but also had lay followers. Its general goal was at once nationalist and religious. As nationalists they were against foreign powers and their interests in Iran. They also identified imperialism with Western social practices. As fundamentalists they sought strict application of the letter of Shiite law. The Fedaiyan opposed the ruling dynasty, as well as the politicians, and they practiced assassination. Fedaiyan Islam was attached to the National Front through the person of Kashani. They accepted the support of Kashani briefly, but their opposition to traditional leadership, as well as their political intractability, led to a split. The Mojahedin were a competitive group, almost a
splinter group, controlled by Chanatabadi and Kashani. It was a Majlis delegation of religious leaders and was generally regarded as the parliamentary instrument of Kashani.

Kashani was one of the most influential religious leaders among the supporters of Dr. Mossadegh. He had a type of political organization that could at a moment's notice mobilize a large mob of uncomprehending illiterates, religious students and particularly the Bazaris. Kashani's ability to bring out the crowd in favor of Mossadegh, and rally the Bazar leaders and his loyal mullahs behind him was the Kashani's major contribution to the National Front's success. For Kashani, there was no distinction between the spiritual and the temporal, while for Mossadegh it was the otherway. The only real basis of the Mossadegh-Kashani alliance was their common political and economic views concerning the AIOC in Iran.

The right wing of the National Front was mainly composed of nationalist-extremist groups who were clearly influenced by European fascism. These groups came under the general heading of Pan-Iranism, of which there were a number of varieties; the Sumka Party, the Pan-Iranist Party, the Arya Party, and others. Publications produced by these groups during the Mossadegh period demonstrate conclusively that the anti-Semitism, anti-capitalism, anti-communism, and the widely imperialistic claims of these groups bore a resemblance to Hitlerism dogma. They had no clear political policies. Their main activities revolved around fighting the
members of the Tudeh Party in the streets, criticizing Mossadegh, and defying the police. Many of these groups had connections with highly influential conservative political circles and cooperated with the retired army officers groups. These groups attracted adherents chiefly from the middle and lower-middle class, particularly secondary school students. In these groups party unity was always strained by internal struggles for power and external attempts at manipulation. And all of them suffered frequent splits, each splinter group claiming to be the authentic party.

Besides these groups on the conservative right of Mossadegh's followers there were other elements such as large merchants, landowners, and senior military officers, whose number at the beginning was substantial, but gradually decreased as time went on.

Forces opposed to Mossadegh and his national and international policies, a large section of which remained silent and even supported some of his policies but later came out into the open against him, included most of the Court, the landowners, the big merchants, the senior officers of the armed forces, and the right-wing clerical leaders.

Mossadegh's Ascent to Power: The Re-establishment of the Democratic Game

The constitutional changes of 1948-9 which substantially increased the Shah's power and introduced bicameralism as a check
on the power of the unicameral Majlis, aroused a deep concern among the centrist and leftist circles. They feared that these changes might be a prelude to the degeneration of parliamentary government into an authoritarian regime reminiscent of Reza Shah's rule. Most importantly, they were apprehensive about the draft of the supplementary agreement with the AIOC which they feared might be ratified by the Majlis under the existing political atmosphere. To counteract this situation, the left and the center pooled forces and tried by different means to turn the course of events to their own advantage.

On October 14, 1949, some twenty men headed by Dr. Mossadegh presented a petition to the Shah demanding a free election for the Sixteenth Majlis. They indicated that they would take asylum, within the palace grounds until they had received a royal reply satisfactory to them. Later the group withdrew with no result, while issuing declarations condemning the ruling circles, the government and even attacking the attitude of the Shah.

When the elections for the 16th Majlis were held, a number of supporters of Mossadegh were chosen who formed a faction which called itself Vatan (Homeland), and was the forerunner of the formal establishment of the National Front within and without the Majlis. In June 1950, before this Majlis, Mossadegh presented a bill to annul the decisions of the Constituent Assembly of May, 1949, which had amended the constitution to enable the Shah to dissolve the Parliament. In his speeches he also insisted that
the Majlis' should demand its privilege of giving a vote of preference to a candidate for the premiership prior to any such appointment by the Shah. However the bill failed to pass.

Finally, in October 1950, the government submitted the Supplementary Agreement, which had been signed the previous July by its representatives and those of AIOC, to the Majlis. Dr. Mossadegh read to the Majlis a statement opposing the agreement with the AIOC and added that the bill does not serve the interests of the Iranian nation. The agreement was at once referred to the Majlis' Special Oil Committee. Mossadegh was the chairman of this committee, whose members ideologically differed from one another. In December the committee did not reject the Agreement but reported that it did not give adequate protection to the interests of Iran. Dissatisfied with the report Mossadegh, on February 19, 1951, set up his own Special Oil Committee with a proposal for the nationalization of AIOC. At the same time, political parties, the Tudeh and different wings of National Front, conducted demonstrations in front of the Majlis in favor of the proposal. This situation put heavy pressure on the government.

On March 3, 1951. Prime Minister Ali Razmara presented a report to the Special Oil Committee of the Majlis which later was made public. Razmara denounced nationalization as impractical. He believed that Iran did not have the technicians to produce and refine the oil nor the tanker fleet and marketing facilities to dispose of it. Dr. Mossadegh had insistently been opposed to
Razmara since he had taken office the previous July. He had attacked the "coup d'état-like" nature of his government and stated that the National Front would not accept a government brought to power by the instigation of foreigners and through dishonest plots. The members of the National Front will be honored if they sacrifice their lives in order to preserve national and religious traditions, the Constitution, and democracy."

On March 7, 1951, the Premier, Razmara, fell before the bullets of a member of Fedaiyan Islam, Khalil Tahmasebi. A few days later, while the conservative royalist Hossein Ala was prime minister, a bill calling for nationalization of the oil industry was rushed through the Majlis. The bill was passed by the Majlis on March 15 and by the Senate on March 20. It is very interesting that the landowners were overwhelmingly predominant in the Sixteenth Majlis, and Mossadegh and his supporters numbered only a handful of the total membership. Yet when Premier Ali Rasmara was assassinated in 1951, the landowner deputies reacted just as their predecessors had done at the time of the Atabak's assassination. Fearful of reprisal, they bowed to the existing political pressure and voted unanimously for nationalization of the oil industry and overwhelmingly for the premiership of Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh (April 20, 1951).

One might hypothesize that in Iranian politics, the opposing group leadership become more cooperative as the political regime with which they interact becomes less democratic. The reversal of this hypothesis might also hold true, that is, resistance to
cooperation and compromise increases as the regime with which the leadership interacts becomes more democratic. This was the pattern we observed in the previous cases and was repeated in Mossadegh's period. Less than a month from the time Mossadegh became prime minister, differences of opinion developed between the left and the center, and later within the components of the National Front itself.

The group leadership of the left considered the nationalization of the oil industry the first step, and believed that the National Front government should extend its campaign for economic and political liberation and go beyond this step. It demanded, among other things, the legalization of the Tudeh Party, the rejection of foreign aid, the expulsion of the U.S. military missions, a close cooperation with the "Camp of peace and democracy," drastic socio-economic reforms, and later demanded the overthrow of "feudalistice monarchical regime." The left was also suspicious of Dr. Mossadegh's government and its relations with foreign powers. The Tudeh party seemed to be convinced that the nationalization project was essentially an American plot and was merely serving the imperialist interest through exploitation of the appeal of nationalization slogans. Therefore, when the National Front's government accepted the American offer of mediation, the Tudeh organized massive anti-government demonstrations in Tehran and waged a series of strikes across the country, on July 14, 1951, against America's special envoy, Averel Harriman, in which hundreds of
people were either killed or wounded. The left feared that Harriman's mediation might lead to conciliation with the West and a final solution of the oil problem.

The growing political strength of the left was threatening the existing power structure. The conservative right feared that the government's indifference to this problem might endanger the existing political regime. They launched a series of attacks, both within and without the Majlis, against the government's attitude towards the Tudeh party and its activities. The right wing of the National Front, such as Pan-Iranists, Sumkas, and a fraction of the Toilers party guided by Dr. Baghai, were also sympathetic to the right. Supported by the military and police force these groups were capable of disrupting the public meetings and demonstrations set up by the left. Each group accused the other of being a foreign agent. Their daily confrontations had seriously hampered the process of government. Incapable of solving the oil issue, Mossadegh was under systematic attack from the right to step down. The opposition to Mossadegh's government came mainly from the Majlis and the Senate, which successfully resisted and even obstructed the meetings of both houses.

Meanwhile the 16th Majlis, still scuffling with the oil issue, was approaching the end of its session. To secure a greater majority in the Majlis and at the same time to eliminate those deputies who were attacking the government, elections for the Seventeenth Majlis were held early in 1952, somewhat ahead of the required time. Mossadegh was determined that the Seventeenth Majlis election should be free. Convinced that the people supported him, he saw little reason to fear
a popular verdict. However, shortly after, the elections were suspended after 69 of the 136 seats in the Majlis had been filled. The major cause of the suspension was the conviction that candidates representing the conservative and royalist opposition to the National Front would win the remaining constituencies and tip the balance of the membership in their favor.

It should be remembered that there were a number of districts in Iran which were in military zones and under the control of the army; and the army in Iran reported directly to the Shah. Mossadegh was convinced that many of his opponents who were elected to the Majlis, had their elections engineered by the army. By putting off the remainder of the elections Mossadegh had not extricated himself. Only twenty-five of the sixty-nine elected deputies were to prove totally reliable for the National Front, and close to a majority were from the beginning privately opposed to Mossadegh.

In the face of effective opposition of the Conservative Right, Mossadegh's attempt to transform popular support into actual political power through a general election had fallen short of its goals. The conservatives, though deprived of their control of the formal machinery of government, were still firmly entrenched in power and maintained control of the court, the army, and the landed aristocracy.
Experience in the electoral process of the previous months, during which the army had shown considerable allegiance to the Court, had convinced Mossadegh of the indispensability of its control by the government. As a result, Mossadegh intended to establish governmental authority over the army, traditionally under the Shah's control. Also in order to escape the parliamentary obstructionism of his opponents, who frequently blocked his socio-economic legislation, Mossadegh demanded a plenary power enabling him to rule by decree and to adopt reform measures in time of economic crisis.

Mossadegh's demands were hailed by the group leadership of the left, who took the opportunity to attack its arch-enemy, the Court. The group leadership of the right, suspicious of a center-left "conspiracy" to dominate the Majlis and the Army, and apprehensive concerning the probability of replacing monarchism with that of republicanism, strongly rejected Mossadegh's demands. The Shah's objection to the second move and the Majlis' initially unfavorable reaction to the first prompted Mossadegh to resign, forcing a showdown with the opposition. His replacement by a new prime minister, Ahmad Ghavam, led to a serious political crisis. A tactical alliance of all forces opposed to the conservative right and the Court emerged to force the resignation of Ghavam and the reinstatement of Dr. Mossadegh. The three-day bloody uprising that
brought this about cost many lives on all sides.\textsuperscript{58}

Immediately before the July uprising, the leadership of the left, based on a very calculated policy, issued a manifesto, while accusing the Shah and other members of the Court of treachery, made a strong bid for the formation of a united front against the imperialists and their lackies in Iran. The idea was readily accepted by the National Front's center and center-left. Even Mullah Kashani publicly announced his approval for the formation of the proposed front.\textsuperscript{59} The only component of the National Front that demonstrated apprehension about this proposal was the Baghai's faction in the Toilers' Party, which, despite its active role in the July 21 uprising, strongly rejected the bid and called it a communist plot to infiltrate the National Front.

As mentioned earlier, the army was the key to the situation. Mossadegh immediately after his temporary triumph over the conservative right, set about the task of bringing the army under the control of the prime minister and his cabinet. He made changes in the higher military command and in the assignment of army units in an effort to insure that the army would be directly responsible to him as minister of defense rather than to the Shah as its commander-in-chief. Mossadegh also appointed a "Committee of Eight" deputies who could make proposals as to the proper constitutional role of the Court. This Committee recommended that the Shah accept a limited constitutional role and that the control of all armed forces be vested in the cabinet.\textsuperscript{60} In November, the Majlis also
passed a bill providing for the dissolution of the newly inaugurated Second Senate, a body that was conservative in nature.

**National Front Disintegrates**

The June uprising was a clear victory for Mossadegh. Dr. Mossadegh was successful in forcing the Shah not only to surrender to his demand for the control of the army, but to Mossadegh's demand for plenary power enabling him to rule by decree. However, surrender to the National Front did not indicate that the conservative right and other opposition groups had yielded their unconditional resignation to Mossadegh's continued rule. Rather, it seemed that the conservative retreat was mainly a tactical one partly necessitated by the fear of a premature alienation of the still wide public support for the Front and its cause. They seemed to be waiting for a suitable opportunity to strike back; and later developments within the National Front provided this opportunity.

Controversy within the National Front on such issues as the Front's tacit acceptance of the Tudeh's demand for the formation of a united front against the conservative forces, constitutional interpretation of the Shah's power over the armed forces, the government's objection to the Shah's land reform program, the new thesis of "oil-less economy," the extension of the prime minister's plenary power for another year and, finally, the
controversial issue of dissolution of the paralyzed Majlis through a referendum, culminated in a series of splits in the National Front. The first sign of quarrel appeared within the religious wing of the Front. Navab Safavi, the leader of Fedaiyan Islam broke off with Kashani and made him their primary propaganda target. Fedaiyan antagonism with Kashani could be explained on ideological grounds. They were uneasy about Kashani's tactics and changing political roles which were unacceptable to Fedaiyan. In other words, the absolutism of the Fedaiyan doctrine made the political Kashani a national target. Fedaiyan opposition to the National Front and their threat to kill everyone who would betray the Islamic principles created apprehension within political circles which in turn contributed to already existing political tension.

By far the most critical of the splits occurred when Kashani broke openly and angrily with Mossadegh in January 1953. Kashani's strength had always been with the lower-middle class, which traditionally responded to religious leadership. It should be remembered that the only real basis of the Mossadegh-Kashani alliance lay in their having common enemies. Both regarded the Razmara government and most of its predecessors in postwar Iran as little more than instruments of an unholy British-landowner alliance. Beyond this agreement, their values and aspirations differed far more fundamentally. Kashani was uneasy about Mossadegh's secular policies, and even favored the repeal of all of the secular laws
in Iran. For him legislation was permissible so long as it conformed with the Islamic Shariat. The liberal wing of Mossadegh's coalition was aware of the divergence between their own and Kashani's aim for Iran. As the organ of the Iran Party editorialized, "we are in turn threatened by the possibility of military dictatorship and the rule of the clergy." Besides that, Mossadegh never consulted Kashani on major policy making and this was another factor which affected Kashani's relationship with the Front. Kashani's defection weakened the religious elements within the National Front coalition. Shams Chantabadi, the leader of Mojahedin Islam in the Majlis, also sided with Kashani.

The next to break openly with the National Front was Dr. Mozafar Baghail, the leader of the Toilers Party. His break was far more serious for the National Front than that of Kashani's had been. Baghail was one of the outstanding leaders within the National Front coalition and, in fact, regarded himself as Mossadegh's heir. But he was very emotional and at the same time ambitious. Baghail claimed as his reason for the break Mossadegh's soft policy towards the Tudeh. As he began to split with Mossadegh, a group of Toilers Party intellectuals led by Khalil Maleki left him and formed a new and loyal Mossadeghist party, the Third Force.

Another split within the National Front coalition occurred when Hossein Maki, one of Mossadegh's close associates, broke off from the movement. Maki was a historian and a political activist. He regarded himself as the Mossadegh government's expert on the oil
question and, after the Tehran election, as Mossadegh's heir-apparent. Maki, who was no match intellectually, socially, or politically for many of his rivals, found himself being relegated more and more to the background. Eventually his disaffection came into the open, and in early 1953 the public became aware of his split with the National Front. Maki was later being accused of secret collaboration with the British. Baghai and Kashani were accused with the same charge.

Also from the Iran Party, a personal-ideological splinter group developed, forming a separate new party called the Mardom-Iran party. The split arose out of personality differences, but it had certain ideological overtones too. Some of the rank and file were disappointed by the failure of the party leadership to act independently of Mossadegh's lead. It should be added that while the party leaders formed Mossadegh's most loyal support, Mossadegh himself was more concerned with benefiting from the cooperation of individual leaders, in traditional style, and not in building the party as a basis of popular organization.

Ideologically, the Mardom-Iran party claimed to insist on a more Islamic interpretation of democratic socialism, as applied to Iran. In addition, younger leaders who shared the general goals of the Iran party strongly differed with the party leadership in their view of strategy and tactics and wanted a larger voice in policy determination. These issues came to the front in late 1952, when Mohammad Nakhshab, one of the founders of the Mardom-Iran, left the
party, taking with him up to 50 percent of the party.

The right wing of the National Front coalition, such as the Sumka and other political groups who had gathered under the umbrella of Pan-Iranist parties, also went through frequent splits, some of which joined the anti-Mossadegh forces.

The continuous defections and splits not only tipped the balance against the National Front, but their repeated clashes contributed to social unrest and political chaos.

By early 1953, many groups and influential individuals who had flocked to join the National Front were gradually taking independent and personalistic approaches. Some merely withdrew from politics, while others became vocal opponents of Mossadegh's government. Some were motivated by disappointment over lack of recognition of their services and of political rewards, other disapproved of the absence of a constructive program, while others objected to the measures taken by Dr. Mossadegh to concentrate all authority in his hands. The deterioration of Mossadegh's relations with the West and the prolonged oil dispute further weakened Mossadegh's government perceptibly. The aristocratic right was gaining heart, and its leader, General Fazlolah Zahedi, was engaged in open intrigue. Also, an increasing number of clerical leaders persuaded by Mullah Kashani and Sayyed Abdollah Behbahani were opposing Mossadegh's government. Ayatollah Behbahani presided over a fairly extensive religious-political organization in southern Tehran.
Now the National Front, with the withdrawal of Kashani, Baghai, and Maki, was a tighter more homogeneous and probably potentially stronger organization; but because of their representation in the Majlis the three defectors seemed to be a thorn in Mossadegh's side. The Court was obviously in collaboration with the opposition, but the Court proper was little threat. The left, particularly the Tudeh, was making a strong bid for collaboration with Mossadeghists, but the latter had severely rebuffed the Tudeh. The general officers in the army were less than enthusiastic about Mossadegh's government, and an energetic group of retired officers led by General Zahedi was openly antagonistic. It should be emphasized that, even though only a minority of deputies joined in the defection, Baghai, Kashani, and Maki, and their allies were able to give the timid landowner opposition the type of affirmative leadership that was needed to mobilize the anti-Mossadegh forces.

The role of the Majlis to be played in this political interaction seemed to be very significant for Mossadegh. The opposition knew that with control of the military, Mossadegh could consolidate his power. Were the "Committee of Eight" report ever to be voted on, the opposition thought, the docile landowner deputies would certainly support Mossadegh. Consequently the opposition tactic was to prevent the gathering of a quorum of deputies. At each crucial moment a group of opposition deputies would suddenly leave town under different pretexts and excuses.
As time passed it became obvious that the impasse could only be broken by extra-legal means. For a time it appeared that the answer lay in completing the elections, and this time the election officials would make certain that only National Front supporters could be elected. However, since the approval of a quorum of Majlis deputies was necessary before the credentials of a newly elected deputy could be accepted, a handful of deputies was able to block the seating of the new deputies just as they had blocked the approval of the "Committee of Eight" recommendations.

The situation was highly aggravated when on April 21, 1953, Mossadegh's loyal and energetic police chief, Mohammad Afshartus, disappeared after telling Mossadegh of a mysterious rendezvous he was making. A few days later his body was discovered. An investigation soon implicated Baghai, General Zahedi and his associates, a leading merchant, and a son of Mulla Kashani.

In order to intimidate the opposition to surrender, thousands of Mossadegh's supporters rushed into the streets, shouting and demonstrating against the opposition and demanded the approval of Mossadegh's policies by the Majlis. From the other side, on June 18, Kashani, the Speaker of the Majlis along with Baghai and others, accused the government of acting in defiance of the Constitution and of staging demonstrations in order to terrorize those opposed to his government. As a result, on July 1, after a hard fought campaign between Mossadegh and Kashani forces for the election of Majlis' speaker, Mossadegh's candidate, Dr. Abdolah Moazami, was
chosen in Kashani's place. But the Majlis still resisted
Mossadegh's demands and did not demonstrate any sign of cooperation.

Mossadegh could no longer doubt the critical nature of his
situation; thus the appeal of extra-constitutional measures became
stronger. He exhausted all legal alternatives and proposed that a
referendum should be held in which the people could endorse his
policy and permit him to call for new elections without the Shah's
concurrency. First, however, he asked his supporters in the Majlis
to resign in order to destroy forever the present quorum. Twenty-
seven deputies resigned on July 14, and by July 17 fifty-two had
resigned.\textsuperscript{68} Their resignations meant that the Majlis could no
longer conduct business, since it could not muster a quorum.
Although this action left Dr. Mossadegh free to govern by decree,
he did not seem to be satisfied. On July 27 Mossadegh addressed
the nation by radio, charging that the presence in the Majlis of
depuies opposed to him made it the center of anti-government
subversion, and appealed to the people to vote for its dissolution.
His speech followed a decree of July 25, which provided for a
referendum on the question of whether or not the Majlis should be
dissolved. Opposition attacked this decree on the grounds that
it was unconstitutional and placed a boycott on the referendum.
The referendum was held on August 3-15, 1953. The final vote was
2,043,389 to 1,207 in Mossadegh's favor.\textsuperscript{69} For a man who had
carried his idealism to the ultimate degree in refusing to interfere
in the early Seventeenth Majlis elections, Mossadegh had gone a long
way toward accepting dictatorial control.\textsuperscript{70}

According to the constitutional amendment of 1949, only the Shah has the right to dissolve the Majlis; therefore, Mossadegh's referendum was considered unconstitutional by the conservative right and the Shah. The referendum had dashed any hope which might have existed for a Shah-Mossadegh conciliation. Therefore, after the referendum, the relationship between the prime minister and the Shah over the legality of the referendum became extremely strained. Consequently, on August 13, the Shah issued two imperial decrees: one dismissed Dr. Mossadegh and the other named General Fazlollah Zahedi, then in hiding, as prime minister. Mossadegh resisted his dismissal and charged the Court and the army with an attempted coup d'état. A showdown was precipitated by the unsuccessful attempt to replace the prime minister. The Shah's flight as a result of the initial failure of this attempt plunged the country into what was essentially a revolutionary state.

The leadership of the National Front was divided on the kind of policy to be taken following the Shah's departure. Mossadegh and his more responsible advisors floundered in indecision while the more extremist elements of the Front, led by Foreign Minister Hossein Fatemi, demanded the Shah's abdication and proclamation of a republic, since the sovereign had left. Another segment contemplated a new referendum to effect proposed changes in the monarchical system. The moderate tendencies in the Front opposed the more revolutionary demands.\textsuperscript{71} It was the latter group who tried
to pressure Mossadegh to stop the Tudeh's mobs and demonstrations in Tehran and other cities. The Tudeh mobs were roaming Tehran and other cities raising red flags and pulling down statutes of Reza Shah. Some witnesses even asserted that in Gilan the Tudeh had taken over the government. Confronted with Tudeh lawlessness and suspicious of its cooperative attitude toward his government, particularly in view of the recent developments in the country, on the evening of August 18, Mossadegh struck. Tudeh mobs were ordered to disperse, and those refusing were either beaten or arrested. But it was too late. The country was already in a state of chaos and political disorganization. Disintegration of the country and breakdown of government authority was apparent. The centrifugal forces had once more become dominant. On August 19, 1953, the army led by General Zahedi struck, and by overthrowing Dr. Mossadegh's government another era of Iranian politics began.

The behavioral pattern by different group leaderships observed so far in this chapter gives a further support to the argument, made at the beginning of this report, that the political style of group leadership and predisposition for domination rather than compromise and gradual adjustment, is a significant factor in the Iranian democratic deadlock and an important impediment to the development of democratic institutions.

As was described, at the time of national crises, political actors generally become polarized and lean toward extreme positions which, in turn, makes any compromise difficult if not impossible.
Tendency for compromise among contending group leaderships was remarkably absent during the Azarbyjan and Kurdestan crises in 1945. The same thing is true with the oil issue and the manner by which contesting political actors were trying to solve the problem.

Since Mossadegh was aware of having the support of a great number of the population he had no intention of giving in to the Shah. He wanted to strip the Shah of all his powers overnight, disregarding the fact that traditionally the Shahs in Iran always enjoyed such power, and he would not be capable of doing it at once. Similarly, the Shah suspecting Mossadegh and thinking he was involved in a nation-wide "conspiracy" to eliminate the Pahlavi dynasty, resisted Mossadegh's demand for taking over the army. Mossadegh and his associates really believed that the Shah was the agent of Britain and America. The Shah and his high ranking advisers similarly were convinced that international communism was behind Mossadegh's program for the nationalization of foreign oil companies. Therefore, domination over other political groups and elimination of rivals, as a traditional political means, was the only alternative to solve the issues at hand. The course of political events from 1941 to 1953 is very similar to that which occurred between 1908 and 1921. Only the political actors were different.

Moreover, a tendency among the leadership of political groups to resort to extra-legal means to silence and suppress one's opponents was remarkably common. As was illustrated earlier, the
legal-constitutional codes which generally define the "rules of the game" within which political action should take place, were generally overlooked by political groups. This also supports the argument that democratic rules which are specifically stressed in the Iranian constitution of 1906 are not yet internalized by the political actors. Probably the institutionalization of such rules requires more time, and until then the political style of Iranians, I think, will continue to impede the stability of democratic systems.
NOTES CHAPTER 5

1. In fact Reza Khan and a great number of elite were interested in establishing a republican system in Iran. But the feelings were quickly suppressed by the reactionary Moslem clergy.


3. Around 1930, a group of Western educated Iranians to indoctrinate the intelligensia in Marxist-Leninist ideology, came together and established the Communist Party of Iran. The main activity of this group was concentrated on the publication of newspapers and journals; one of the most important journals the party published was, The Theoretical Journal of Donya (Universe), which was published under the editorship of Dr. Taghi Erani. Erani was the leader of the Communist party. He was educated in Germany and had a Ph.D. in physics from the University of Berlin. The party's activity was successfully curtailed by the government's anti-communist law of June 1937, according to which many communists were sent to jails. On April, 1937, Dr. Erani and fifty-two of the most prominent members of his group were arrested and charged with conspiracy to overthrow the government by violating the Anti-Communist Act of 1937. The imprisonment of the Erani group marked the end of open communist activity in Iran.

When the group was released from prison in 1941, its members formed the nucleus of the Tudeh Party. Erani himself died in prison hospital on February 4, 1940, allegedly because of the deliberate negligence of hospital authorities. For further information on the historical background of the Tudeh Party, see Sepehr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran, op cit., particularly see the first chapter.

4. The National Front was a loose amalgamation of individuals and groups, who were attracted to the personality and prestige of the late Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, an ardent nationalist. The Front formally came into being in October, 1949, when
a number of like-minded individuals gathered at the home of Dr. Mossadegh to consider, how they could exert influence and pressure for a free election for the upcoming Sixteenth Majlis. Drawing up a petition addressed to the Shah, which called his attention to the prevailing mismanagement of the elections and the public dissatisfaction with this situation. Consequently, on October 14, Dr. Mossadegh and his followers, including many of Iran's outstanding intellectuals, took sanctuary in the Imperial Court in order to protest the election. Since then the group took the name of Jebheye Melli (The National Front).

5. For a brief account concerning political forces in 1941-46, see Majid Tehranian. Iran: A Political Profile (1974), Tehran, pp. 10-13.

6. For a further information on the programs and goals of the Tudeh Party, see Sepehr Zabih, The Communist..., op cit., pp. 75-77; also see George Lenczowski, op cit., p. 225.

7. Sepehr Zabih, op cit., p. 78.

8. Ibid., p. 78.


10. The Tudeh Party resorted to many labor strikes and demonstrations against the governments and their policies, using the labor unions and organizations as instruments. For instance, a strike in Tehran by the Construction union engaged in government public work projects in 1942-1943; a strike by the municipal workers in Tehran in 1944; strikes by textile workers in Tehran, textile and leather workers in Azarbyjan, and textile workers in Mazanderan in 1943-44; a mass strike of 20,000 textile workers in Isfahan in the fall of 1944; a series of successive strikes in the oil industry in Kermanshah in 1945, in Abadan and Azarbyjan oil fields in May 1946, and finally, the largest and the most successful in terms of participation, in Abadan, in July 14, 1946. See Sepehr Zabih, op cit., p. 154.

11. For a further information on Seyyid Zia al-Din's political party, see George Lenczowski, op cit., pp. 242-247.

12. For the political program of Eradeye Melli Party, see George Lenczowski, op cit., p. 243.

13. Ibid., p. 244.

15. For a short account concerning the platforms of these parties see George Lenczowski, *op cit.* , pp. 325-327 (Appendix).

16. For a short description on Freedom Front see p. 77 of this research. The Tudeh Party had also several kinds of front organizations who participated in many of the Party's street demonstrations and public meetings. The most important front organizations affiliated with the Tudeh party were: Peace Partisans; Democratic Youth; National Society Against Colonialism; Democratic Women of Iran; Society Against Illiteracy; Society to Defend the Right of Villagers and many others. Also scores of newspapers were published by these front organizations. For further information see Donald N. Wilber. *Contemporary Iran.* (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1963), pp. 133-147.


18. Tudeh Party's organs published critical editorials against the government and demanded Saed's immediate resignation. See the party's organs Rahbar, October 26, 1944; also see Zafar, October 27, 1944.


24. Donald N. Wilber, *Contemporary Iran, op cit.* , p. 84.


26. These views were advanced in an editorial in the party's organ. See Rahbar, October 11, 1945.


30. Among those elected from Azarbyjan for the Fourteenth Majlis were Jafar Pishevari and Khoee. Claiming alleged irregularities in their election, a right wing coalition in the Majlis rejected their electoral credentials. This matter infuriated the Tudeh party, particularly its branches in Azarbyjan. See George Lenczowski, op cit., p. 224. Also see Sepehr Zabih, op cit., pp. 78-80.


32. For these demands see Sepehr Zabih, op cit., pp. 99-102.

33. Ibid., p. 99.

34. Najafgholi Pessian. Marg Bad Bazgasht Ham Bad (There were both death and retreat), Tehran, 1949, pp. 20, 61-63.

35. For a full description of this episode see Archie Roosevelt Jr., "Kurdish Republic of Mehabad," in Middle East Journal (July, 1947).


37. Ibid., p. 110.

38. The Tudeh's ministers in the government were: Iraj Eskandari (the minister of economy), Dr. Feraydoun Keshavarz (the minister of education), and Dr. Mohammad Yazdi (the minister of health). See Ettelaat, August 1, 1946.

39. For a detailed description of Ghavam's Democratic Party, see Leonard Binder. Iran: Political Development in..., op cit., pp. 206-209; also see a summary of the party's program appeared in Journal de Tehran, July 1, 1946.

40. By 1944, there were four major independent union centers in Tehran which were led by the Tudeh elements. In May, 1944, the Tudeh organizers brought about the unification of four independent unions in a new organization called the United Central Council of the United Trade Unions of Iranian Workers, which was referred to as the United Council. By the summer of 1945, the United Council was the major nationwide union in Iran that claimed a membership of 200,000 by the end of 1945, and of 400,000 by the end of 1946. The Tudeh Party politically exploited its exclusive control of the United Council, when the party was threatened by the government or by the parties of the right. The party managed, often successfully, numerous labor strikes
and street demonstrations against the government. These strikes and demonstrations often led to bloody confrontation with the police and the army, particularly in the big industrial cities of Iran. For further information on this see Sepehr Zabih, *Communist Movement...*, op cit., pp. 149-161.

41. Ibid., p. 115.

42. For a detailed description on these events see George Lenczowski, op cit., p. 305.

43. There are no reliable statistics on casualties but, Eskandari mentions the execution of the officers who had defected from the Iranian army, and Y. Azima, a member of the Azarbyjan cabinet, who "with his twenty-six comrades-in-arms appeared before the firing squad," see Eskandari "Histoire de Parti Toudeh," Moyen Orient, No. 17, 8. Another source says there were 800 communist casualties in riots before the Iranian troops arrived; still another source puts the total casualties at 1,500 dead and wounded. All these sources are quoted in Sepehr Zabih, *The Communist Movement...*, op cit., p. 117.

44. For further information on these changes see, Helen Miller Davis, *Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of the States in the Near and Middle East*. Also see, Donald Wilber. *Contemporary Iran*, op cit., pp. 110-112.

45. For a detailed account on the Tudeh's internal crises, defections and splits, see Sepehr Zabih, op cit., pp. 124-141.

46. For more detail on this see Donald Wilber. *The Contemporary Iran*, op cit., p. 94.

47. Dr. Baghai emerged as a political figure, during the government of Ahmad Chavam. In those days, Baghai was invited by Chavam to establish a branch of Democratic Party in Kerman. He worked in Kerman for a year, and was later rewarded with a seat in that constituency for the 15th Majlis. Shortly after, Baghai split with Chavam but was unable to win over a substantial part of the party's organization. In preparation for the elections to the 16th Majlis, Baghai organized his supporters into the Organization for Supervising the Freedom of Election as a safeguard against the government's fabrication of returns. When Mossadegh became Prime Minister in 1950, Baghai converted his various organizations into the Toilers Party of Iran, carrying on an anti-communist tradition begun with Gahvam, seeking to attract the oil workers at least with slogans. Baghai
wished to achieve power through cooperation and bargaining with existing and even traditional leaders and groups. He was highly emotional and intolerant politician.

48. Kashani was a member of a religious hierarchy who claimed that he was hostile to any foreign forces that threatened the interest and independence of Iran. He was against many modernizing measures taken by Reza Shah which, he thought, were undermining the authority of the Moslem clergy. In 1942, a few months after the Allied forces occupied Iran, the British arrested Kashani as an alleged collaborator with the German fifth column in the country, and he was detained until 1945. When Ghashem became prime minister in early 1946, Kashani was again arrested and forced to reside in the town of Ghazvin until the end of 1947. In February 1949, Kashani was again arrested for his alleged connection with the would-be assassin of the Shah, and as a result, he was sent into exile in Lebanon. In June 1950, Kashani was allowed to return to Tehran and take his seat in the Majlis to which he had been elected while in Lebanon.

49. Leonard Binder, op cit., p. 218.

50. Donald Wilber. Contemporary Iran, op cit., p. 87.

51. Before his appointment as a premier General Ali Rasmara was the army's chief-of-staff. In that position, he was then being accused of engineering and rigging the elections for the 16th Majlis, particularly in the rural areas in favor of the court. Razmara also played an important role in the Azarbyjan affair and the army's expedition to Tabriz. See Richard Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, op cit., pp. 128, 209, and 210.

52. Donald Wilber. Contemporary Iran, op cit., p. 88.


54. See Mardom, the Tudeh Party's clandestine newspaper, July 7, 1951. Also see another party's paper, Besouye Ayandeh, February 1, 1951.

55. Some opposition papers frequently cited the experience of Edward Benes, the Czechoslovakian premier after World War II, to warn Mossadegh against permitting his government to be used as a ladder for the communists to capture the power. See Shahed, Baghai's party organ, December 4, 1951.
56. See newspapers Farman, Tolou, and Atash during 1951. These papers represented mostly the views of conservative right.

57. Elections in Zanjan, Meshkin Shahr, Yazd, and even Tabriz thought to be rigged by the army. For a discussion on this issue see, Richard Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, op cit., pp. 274-276.

58. See the extensive dispatches on the July's uprising and other political developments related to this event by Sepehr Azbik in The Times (London), July 23-24, 1952.

59. In a statement to the press, Kashani gave an affirmative answer to a question by Rahim Namvar, the editor of Shahbazi, the leading organ of the Tudeh front organization, about his readiness to cooperate with that organization "for the annihilation of Premier Ghavam." Kayhan, July 20, 1952.


61. See the issues of Zelzeleh, the organ of Fedaiyan Islam, 1951-1953.

62. In the late 1952, a youthful member of Fedaiyan Islam, shot and seriously wounded Dr. Hossein Fatemi, a prominent leader of the National Front and Mossadegh's Foreign Minister. Fatemi was also the chief editor of Bakhtar Emrouz, the organ of the National Front.


64. In the elections for the 17th Majlis, Hossein Maki was the receipient of the highest vote from Tehran.


66. Ibid., April 21, 1953, 18:2.

67. Afshartous was murdered in the house of Hossein Khatibi, a Baghai henchman. Ibid., April 22, 1953, 11:1; April 27, 1953, 1:5; April 28, 1953, 5:1; April 29, 1953, 7:7.

68. Ibid., July 15, 1953, 11:1; July 17, 1953, 4:5.

69. Ibid., August 14, 1953, 1:8. It should be added that voting in this referendum was not secret. The pro-Mossadegh and anti-Mossadegh election boxes were placed in different parts of the city or town, so that there would be not doubt as to the identity of the anti-Mossadeghist,
70. Dr. Mossadegh was determined that the 17th Majlis elections should be free. Since the early returns from the election were disappointing to the National Front leadership, and since elections were traditionally staggered in Iran, some of the Mossadegh's close associates proposed him to abrogate some of the elections and hold new ones. But Mossadegh strongly resisted and his support could not be listed. See Richard Cottam. Nationalism in Iran, op cit., pp. 101, 274-276.


CHAPTER 6

Monarchical Domination: A Move Toward Controlled Two-Party System

The Shah's victory over Mossadegh, a centrist, and the leftists in August 19, 1953, was a drastic swing from the constitutional democracy to an authoritarian government. This change demonstrated once more the inability of opposing group leaderships in Iran to find a common ground, under constitutional arrangements, to settle their differences without causing the system to become deadlocked. Resistance to compromise among the conflicting forces under Mossadegh was so pronounced that none of the parties in the conflict were prepared to reevaluate its position in order to save the constitutional system. Instead, each party aimed to dominate the others by surprise and by extra-constitutional means. The result was a constitutional deadlock which brought the final domination of the Shah over his opponents. With the left and centrist liberals out of the scene, the conservative forces went through a process of consolidating and stabilizing their political bases.

One of the major devices used by the regime for its consolidation was the advent of a controlled two party system. It is the objective in this section to discuss, chronologically, the purpose of creating the two-party system, the system's actual operation, and its final failure. The period under discussion includes two phases: the first
phase embraces the duration between the overthrow of Mossadegh's government in 1953 until the dissolution of the Mardom and Melliyoun parties in 1963; the second phase begins with the establishment of the Iran Nowin party in 1964 until the establishment of the Rastakhiz Party in 1975.

First Phase—Stabilization of the System: 1953-1963

The Shah continuously increased his control over Iranian society beginning in 1954. From the start political parties were banned, suppressive press laws were decreed and censorship was instituted. The State Security and Intelligence Organization (SAVAK) was created and the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces was remarkably strengthened. The Senate was reconvened, which gave the Shah more control over the legislature. With these newly created capabilities, the Shah moved to eliminate the support and popularity once enjoyed by his most serious opponents, Mossadegh and the Tudeh party.

Mossadegh was tried and found guilty of high treason. His foreign minister, Hossein Fatemi, was convicted of the same offense and executed. Simultaneously, efforts were made to strip socio-political and religious groups of their autonomous power bases. Before Mossadegh's fall these groups were more than symbols, they were volatile political forces that could often be moved but not controlled. One of the important groups which the governments of
Iran tried unceasingly to bring under control was the clergy. It should be remembered that during the Reza Shah's reign an attempt was made to regulate religious training and modernization of religious affairs. Some efforts were made toward the secularization of the state and modernization of both religion and government. Reza Shah's reforms were encountered with strong resistance by the clergy, but the opposition was mercilessly suppressed. Reza Shah's abdication in 1941 brought numerous changes. In the post-Reza Shah period the clergy raised its voice and demanded, among other things, the control of the educational system, of waghfs (religious endowments), and wanted a voice in the legal system. Also after 1941, a number of fundamentalist religious movements appeared, and some of the uluma joined erratically or selectively with the parties, the cliques, the Court and outstanding political personalities.

Following Mossadegh's fall the Shah redoubled his efforts at modernizing, controlling, and even depoliticizing the religious institutions. Generally, an effort was made to contain the activities of religious circles within the government's regulations. But opposition to the Shah's intention continued, particularly in Ghom, the influential theological center, and other significant religious environments such as Mashhad, Shiraz and Isfahan which were regarded as the bastion of resistance to the Shah's policies.

Another influential group which the government of Iran since the 1953 coup tried to strip it of its autonomy was the labor
movement. Following the events of 1953, registration with the Ministry of Labor became the formal basis of legitimacy for the labor unions. Therefore, in case of a minor difficulty, recognition could be withdrawn by a simple administrative maneuver. Registration was thought to be a device by which the government could easily subject a labor union to regulative government control. Control was sought in another contradictory provision of the Labor Law, which required that in each workshop or factory a worker's representative be elected. Occasionally these representatives were union leaders, but more often they were handpicked by management. Presently, labor unions are simply manipulated by management, by political parties, or by the government, or, when they strike, they are suppressed by force. When there is a strike, the news almost immediately comes to the attention of the cabinet and the security organization. "The minister of labor is the most impotent of the ministers, and security is the most important governmental preoccupation. It is the minister of interior who has much more to say and do about the strike. The police, and perhaps the army, will be called upon to maintain order, and, failing a rapid settlement, they will compel the workers to return to their jobs."  

Faculty, student, and youth organizations which were active during Mossadegh's administration did not escape the government's control and supervision after 1953. Today students have few organizations of their own. Since 1954, student groups have been
closely supervised and tightly controlled by the government, and presently there are no groups formed without security organization investigation and permission. Many student organizations formed in universities and colleges after 1953 generally had the support of government officials behind it. It is generally believed that the students themselves have all but boycotted the existing government supported organizations. There is hardly an Iranian institution of higher learning that has a student council or government. The major explanation for this situation seems to be the government's persistence in supervising and controlling the activities of these organizations. The manner in which student affairs have been handled has contributed much to student apathy and resentment. In order to establish order on university campuses police, paratroopers, and the Security Organization openly and frequently could move into the universities. The situation of youth organizations became even more baren. For instance, in 1957 there were thirty-three organizations that dealt with affairs of youth and, with the possible exception of three minority-religious-ethnic societies, they were highly ineffective, generally because of the belief that they were run by the government and supervised by security organizations.5

Opposition Moves Underground

The government's effort seemed to be entirely concentrated in the direction of demobilization and depoliticization of the
opposition. Its control and restrictions on political life steadily narrowed the area of action for any opposition group in the country. Confronted with restrictive and hostile measures, the opposition leaderships moved reluctantly into underground positions.

Under this unfavorable condition the elements of the National Front—the Iran Party, the Third Force, Pan-Iranist Party (Forouhar faction), the tiny People of Iran Party, even the moderate supporters of the Tudeh party—regrouped themselves under the umbrella of what was called the National Resistance Movement (NRM). Also a number of Mossadegh's staunchest lieutenants, who escaped to Europe and the United States, established a branch of NRM abroad and began anti-Shah activity. The NRM was able to organize occasional demonstrations abroad against the Iranian government policies concerning oil and human rights issues.

The NRM turned more radical than the National Front. It is a loosely knit organization which struggles to issue leaflets asserting its loyalty to Dr. Mossadegh and strives to bring the National Front to power. Initially, members of the Iran party dominated the NRM, particularly its central committee. But in late September 1957, when a number of its most active members were arrested and the effectiveness of the organization declined, it was taken over by a group of younger men who were not veterans of the 1951-53 period. The movement held the conviction that the Shah should reign and not rule. Its peak activity was reached
during 1957, when the movement issued a paper, *The Road of Mossadegh*.

In the 1961 parliamentary elections, when Allahyar Saleh, the leader of the *Iran* party participated in the election campaign and was elected to the Majlis from Kashan, the NRM divided. Engineer Mehdi Bazargan, one of the Front's active leaders since early 1951, and one of Mossadegh's close associates, resigned in protest from the NRM's Central Committee, announced the formation of a new political grouping, The Nehzate Azadi Iran (Freedom Movement of Iran), and was promptly recognized by the majority of political factions within the National Front. From its platform and founding members, it was clear that the Freedom Movement represented a radicalization of the National Front. The Freedom Movement, like NRM, was itself a coalition of activists—bazarris, religious leaders, and students—as opposed to Iran's party intellectuals led by Saleh.

Another group which resorted to active underground opposition against the regime within the country and abroad was the Tudeh and its allies.

The Tudeh Party also went through a soul-searching operation and analysis of its own errors of what happened in the last days of Mossadegh's government, and tried accordingly to regroup its dependable elements in order to attract all opponents of the existing regime into a popular front. In one of the writings by its leaders, the Tudeh claimed that "The counterrevolution of 1953 had been a tragedy for our country which temporarily reversed
the course of its history by nullifying the gains of our people
and strengthening the domination of reaction and imperialism."8
The Tudeh tried to relate the setback of progressive forces, vis-
a-vis the conservative right, to the absence of mutual trust and
the lack of cooperation between the Tudeh and other groups on the
left, on the one hand, and the National Front, on the other, for
which both were to be blamed.9

The Tudeh party also attempted to bring harmony between
its activities and the Azarbyjan Democratic Party, which had
maintained its separate identity after its insurrection in 1946.
Later they agreed on a common political strategy with the aim
"to overthrow the imperialist regime and its agents, securing
political economic independence, and eradicating the feudal
landlord-serf relations through the overthrow of the present
reactionary government."10

Conditions for political activity were not only repressive
for the National Front and other political groups opposed to the
regime, but became highly unfavorable for other groups and
influential political personalities who previously had relentlessly
fought against the Mossadegh government along the conservative
right during 1953 and were also partly responsible for his
overthrow. For instance, Hossein Maki withdrew from politics and
Mozaffar Baghai and Seyed Abolghassem Kashani were not trusted
by Zahedi's government. Apparently Zahedi regarded them as rivals.
He exiled Baghai to Baluchestan and sharply curtailed Kashani's
activities in Tehran. In the case of Kashani, it was rather obvious that he could not remain with a government that reestablished close relations with the British. It seemed that the political atmosphere in the country was such that it had brought the opponents of the existing regime together once more.

Throughout the years between 1953-57, internal stability was high and the government employed means of continuing martial law and strict control over the press met with little opposition. General Zahedi had dealt with the leftist opposition very harshly but failed to challenge the perogatives of the right. In fact he not only failed to enlist the support of any group within the National Front behind his government, he also found himself limited in support to members of the oligarchy.

In April 1955, General Zahedi resigned as prime minister, with the general feeling that his energy and courage had not been successfully applied to fundamental domestic reforms. After Zahedi’s removal, His Majesty concentrated political power in his own hand. After suppressing the dangerous left he now turned his attention to the right. He steadily reduced their political power, the Majlis, the cabinet, and the top bureaucracy increasingly conformed to the Shah's line of political action in such a way that few men in the post-Zahedi era had any independent power.
The Establishment of a Two-party System: The Regrouping of the Centripetal Forces

The monarch generally considered multi-party politics very unsuitable for Iran, particularly taking into consideration the bitter experiences which the country went through during the periods of 1910-21, 1941-46, and particularly the period between 1949-53. Having suppressed the forces of the left, and considerably reduced the power of the right, now the Shah was ready to put his new political initiative, the idea of a two-party system, into effect.

In 1957 His Majesty called for the formation of a liberal and a conservative party, both of which would give loyal support to the regime. The Shah regarded these parties as bringing to Iran the beginnings of a two-party system which would, in the future, provide a stable foundation for the Shahanshahi regime. The liberal party was called the Mardom Party (People's party) and was led by Amir Assadollah Alam, one of Iran's great landowners. The conservative party was called the Meliyoun Party (Nationalist party) and was led by Dr. Manouchehr Eghbal. And in April 1957, the Shah named Dr. Eghbal, the leader of Meliyoun party, as prime minister. Eghbal's appointment marked a period in which the ruler took charge of the operation of the government. Eghbal did not hesitate to inform the Majlis that he was the servant of the Shah.
Certainly the Shah's aim was to create a rival or competitive party system where one of the parties would play the role of majority (Mellyium in this case) and the other play the role of minority or royal opposition (Mardom party). The purpose was to develop the two-party system common to the United Kingdom and Europe, in which the party receiving the larger number of votes forms the government and the other acts as a critical, yet loyal, opposition. The Mardom party may have been regarded by the Shah as His Majesty's Loyal Opposition, but articulate Iranians were aware that a genuine opposition existed semi-overtly. However, the Shah was aware of the local feeling that these parties had been imposed from the top, but was convinced that in time they would strike firm roots throughout the country.

The idea of establishing a two-party system grew out of the desire to permit renewed public political activity while retaining control. The matter was discussed during the Hossein Ala ministry. Ala was not sympathetic with the idea, but Alam, then Minister of Interior, was in favor, as was Eghbal, then Court Minister. Ala thought it was too early to permit party activity, Alam agreed to lead the opposition party, and some say that Eghbal favored a one-party system. Shortly after the Ala Government resigned, however, Alam and fifteen of his friends announced the founding of the Mardom Party, and the Mellyium Party was formed by Eghbal. Eghbal's criticism of the opposition was much more severe than the Mardom's criticism of the government. The opposition rarely
opposed, and the majority claimed credits only for implementing the Shah's program.

Both parties started newspapers and began to build party organizations at Tehran and in the provinces, while many individuals were given not-too-gentle hints that they should join one or the other party. Obviously, the Mellyioun party was to give wholehearted support to the government of Dr. Eghbal, while the Mardom party was to strike off on a path of liberalism, in the conviction that if liberalism was what the electorate desired it would take over from the Mellyioun in the next election for the Majlis.

The two party leaders were almost absolute leaders of their organizations. Leaders of both parties admitted that opportunistic ambition was the sole reason for membership, although failure to win benefits from the government led some groups to become affiliated with the opposition. Consequently, those who had satisfactory positions tended to join the Mellyioun party in order to keep those positions or to move ahead. Those without satisfactory positions, or those who had an exaggerated opinion of Alam's chances for premiership, tended to join the Mardom party. It was further understood by all that no one would succeed to the prime ministry without the Shah's approval, so there was no struggle over party leadership. It was clear that Alam had built an organization that was loyal to the prime minister.
Both parties claimed to have ideologies, but these ideologies were reduced to a few principles and a vague program. The programs and principles of both parties were similar: independence, constitutional monarchy, Islam, legal reform, expansion of educational facilities, private ownership, improvement of the status of labor, civil service reform, and so on. The Mardom party also favored equal rights for women in all fields and the distribution of land to the peasants.14

Outwardly, the two parties were also similar. Each was built up from small local cells through local, provincial, and national committees. Each was to be governed by a biennial congress. Each party had a set of organization committees and another set of policy committees.

By 1960, the Shah's domination of the government was so all-embracing that Dr. Eghbal, the prime minister, announced to the Majlis that he could not take a position on an issue because he had not received imperial instructions.15 Although there is little reason to question the Shah's sincerity concerning the idea of two-party politics, he seemed to be unwilling to grant the two parties the independence of choice both in leadership and policy that would have permitted their growth into genuine parties.
The Fiasco of Two-Party Politics in Operation

The first test of the relative strength and effectiveness of the two-party system came in August 1960, with the elections for the Twentieth Majlis. Both parties ran into immediate difficulties, since many more of their important members were willing and eager to run for the Majlis than there were constituencies. Moreover, the Shah's attempt to experiment in controlled democracy, i.e., the creation and direction of a two-party system in 1957, seemed to be a demonstrable failure. For as the election campaigns wore on, the party candidates also took their roles seriously and began unrestrained attacks on their opposition. When the election results were in, they were greeted with an uproar, as though the heated campaign had not been held.

Rumor in Tehran had it that Mellyioun had been allotted two seats for each seat given Mardom, and as the returns began coming in this appeared indeed to be the case. Prime Minister Eghbal's Mellyioun-party won 104 seats in the Majlis, Alam's Mardom party captured fifty seats, and the independents received but three seats.

Yet the Majlis' elections of 1960 came in a year of growing political turmoil, culminating in the resurgence of old and active opposition groups against the regime. In July 1960, some of the best known leaders of the National Front came out into the open and called for a free election. Several men, particularly those of the
Mardom party, disappointed by their failure to be selected by the government took the promise of electoral freedom seriously and were furious. Dr. Baghai, Makki, and Ali Amini, on independent tickets, also joined the attack. The attack was generally focused on Prime Minister Eghbal, who was described as a "traitor" by these men. The attack was so successful that the other opposition leaders adopted it, and the Shah was compelled to drop Eghbal as Prime Minister and annul the election returns.

When the Shah cancelled the first elections and brought in Jafar Sharif Emami, once a partisan to Mossadegh's premiership, hopes for a massive liberalization of political life were inflated. Sharif Emami undoubtedly regarded himself as a liberal element, and his appointment seemed to be an appeal by the Shah to the dissatisfied sector within the Iranian political system. The Shah may have expected that this appointment would have some effect on existing discontent, but the result was the opposite. Under Sharif Emami, security control was considerably relaxed, and the liberalizing trend picked up momentum. But instead of resulting in increased popularity for the regime, this relaxation permitted long inactive forces to stir. Life returned to the politically minded university students, and the National Front and other opposition elements became increasingly bold. In the case of the National Front it went so far as to schedule a press conference to demand the holding of new and free elections. But the government argued that although the elections were going to
be free, "traitors" could not be permitted to run. Despite all the odds, the outlawed National Front held a public congress on May 16, 1961, and strongly demanded new and free elections. All opposition groups, from the center to the left rallied their forces behind this slogan.\(^1\)

The elections were repeated in 1961. The second election witnessed even more unrestrained campaigning. A number of politicians, many of whom had been rejected by the Mellyioun and Mardom, declared as independents.

The results of the second election were more assuring. The Mellyioun led with sixty-nine seats, the Mardom had sixty-four. With neither party holding a majority, the votes of the thirty-two independents also elected was to be decisive. And among the thirty-two was the name of Allahyar Saleh, the leader of the Iran party. With Saleh's election, a resurgent Front began to operate. A convention was held, a platform issued, and a new central committee elected. It organized public meetings, demonstrated at the university, protested the second election as fraudulent, and again went so far as to call for a public strike against the government. It also opened a headquarters and began to register members. Symbolizing their resurgence, the Front called a mass meeting for July 21 to commemorate the return to the power of Dr. Mossadegh on that date in 1952. The government forbade the meeting but the Front went ahead with its plans. As a result, a great number of National Front leaders and followers were arrested.
It seemed that the Imami's appeals to the National Front did not produce a positive response.

It should be mentioned that Saleh's election to the Majlis was a great risk for both the government and Saleh. As leader of the Iran party, Saleh had strong rivals in the National Freedom Movement who probably would advance the idea that Saleh did not differ from other opportunists who had agreed to the government terms. In order to fight this view, Saleh would have no alternative but to take an intransigently strong stand inside the Majlis. Therefore, student and teacher demonstrations continued, and social disorder persisted. Gradually public expressions of dissatisfaction multiplied and culminated in an incident in which two teachers among a large group demonstrating for higher wages were shot and killed. This seemed to be the end of the political road for Sharif Emami's government.

The Shah seemed to have failed in a major effort to attract support by liberalizing the political atmosphere of the country. Had such relaxation of control been accompanied by a major reapproachment effort with the National Front leaders, there would have been the possibility of success.

On May 5, 1961, the Shah took action which marked the beginning of a new pattern of his sovereignty. He chose Dr. Ali Amini as Prime Minister, an individual of competence who had no close relations with the Shah and who, the ruler knew, would not be subservient to royal manipulation. Dr. Amini insisted, and the Shah
seemed to have agreed, that his government was to execute the policies advocated by the ruler, but it was also to make its own decisions and be directly accountable for its success and failure. The implications were that the Shah would retire to a position of reigning, but at the same time the Amini government would be on trial and would be replaced if it failed to make good.

Amini had a small group of lieutenants and allies but had no following, and his political base was a major weakness. An alternative available to Amini was to construct a working alliance with the National Front. Amini understood this and moved immediately to gain the support of the National Front.

Before his premiership, Amini had strongly campaigned against the government's interference with Majlis' elections and had vehemently expressed his opposition to the conduct of elections; therefore, on Amini's recommendation, the Majlis once again was dissolved by the Shahanshah, in May 1961. Following the dissolution of the Majlis, the National Front and other opponents of the government insisted that elections must be held at once in order to satisfy the legal requirement that a new Majlis must be convened within three months after the dissolution of the preceding one.

In 1960, Amini was an outspoken advocate of free elections, but in 1961, he stated that the "Majlis is a consultative body, while the government directs affairs. The government should guide the Majlis, because initiative is always in the hands of the government; a representative government may well guide an unrepresentative
Generally the Prime Minister stated that in the present circumstances the Majlis was a luxury which the country could not afford: this statement compelled him to abandon his initial goal of drawing moderate leaders of the National Front into the government. Because to accept the National Front's demand for a free election would have involved a premis of eventual power for the Front, and Amini was unwilling to accept such an eventuality. The result was the isolation of Amini and the resurgence of polarization between the government and the National Front.

Following the dissolution of parliament, it became increasingly apparent that the Amini government had no intention of holding elections in the foreseeable future. And the Front, seeing no prospect of compromise, began to resort to the policy of confrontation in order to achieve its goal of free elections. Student demonstrations continued, and a futile effort was made by the National Front to close the Baazar as in earlier times. There was a massive and bloody clash between National Front students at the University of Tehran and army troops in January 1962. University students were agitated over the closing of the National Teachers' Training College following student protest there over an announced cut in scholarships. The National Front leaders were accused of agitation and inciting the students to riot. Many of its leaders were arrested, particularly the leaders of the Iran Freedom Movement. But other politicians, usually considered the Front's enemies, were also arrested.
Eventually Dr. Amini, having lost any chance to enlist the support of the National Front behind his government and also having gained the disfavor of the Shah due to the country's worsening financial situation, resigned July 19, 1962.

If Amini had been successful in bringing about a temporary alliance with the National Front, there would have been the possibility of harnessing the immense vitality of the National Front forces to a constructive program. Furthermore, there would have been a good chance that the more moderate leaders of the National Front would have gained pre-eminence in the movement. But Amini's failure to bring about this alliance may be explained in terms of inter-group distrust and suspicion which generally colors Iranian politics.

In July 1962, Assadollah Alam succeeded Dr. Amini as prime minister, and his main object was to cope with the existing political situation. The new prime minister was a member of what is called in Iran "the thousand families," and was Amini's opposite in many respects. He was not as competent as Amini and also lacked the ability for independent decision-making. He was known for the totality of his subservience to the Shah.

Surprisingly, however, Alam pursued a far more vigorous policy of approaching the National Front than Amini. The newly installed Premier paid a personal visit to Allahyar Saleh and two other leading Nationalists and reportedly offered as many as three cabinet positions. To the sheer astonishment of many within and
without the National Front, Alam told the Saleh that the Shahanshah wished to make use of opposition views in administrating the country. The Shah was also prepared to assure the election of National Front representatives to the next Majlis. After several further meetings and an invitation from the prime minister to meet directly with the King, the Front issued a memorandum outlining three conditions for joining the government: 1) it demanded strict observance of the constitution and exact enforcement of the principles guaranteeing a constitutional monarchy; 2) it called for immediate elections to be held according to law; 3) it stressed that basic legal reforms were necessary and essential for carrying out any reforms.

Obviously, Shah's acceptance of the National Front's demands would have meant an entire restructuring of the political system which the King had fashioned since 1953. For instance, political parties, including the Front, would contest free elections who could very easily dominate a Majlis outside the control of the throne. More than that, the center of power would pass to the legislature, and this was a risk that the Shah was not prepared to take. Alam particularly balked at the National Front demands for measures which would insure that the elections were free. So, negotiations broke off and the Front returned to the familiar pattern of confrontation politics.

It is worth mentioning that concerning the nature of negotiation with the government, pro-Mossadegh forces were divided broadly
into two competing camps. On the one side was the intellectual-dominated Iran Party and its allies led by Allahyar Saleh. On the other side was the merchant-religious-university coalition of NFM led by Engineer Mehdi Bazargan. Both groups claimed to be the rightful inheritors of Mossadegh's path. Some of the components of the former, such as Khalil Maleki, the leader of The Third Force, argued publicly for a policy of accepting political realities. Maleki believed that the National Front should drop its intransigent opposition and instead seek cooperate with the liberal wing of the "ruling class" (in this case, Assadollah Allam and his organization) until social evolution had progressed further. Maleki stressed that this "ruling class" should not be viewed as a monolith but as a group of men whose views range from the reactionary to the liberal. Was the National Front to throw its strength to the liberal wing, an evolutionary trend could be set into motion which might eventually bring the National Front back into a position of influence. But instead of convincing his colleagues, Maleki was charged with having sold out to the Court. Also as a result of this argument, the Third Force split into pro- and anti-Maleki factions.

Had the issues separating the National Front from the Shah been simply ideological, compromise would have been a possibility; but the National Front's belief that its antagonist was guilty of treason made any type of mutual dealings difficult.

As a result of failure in negotiations, National Front activity was intensified. A reorganization of the National Front Central
Council in December 1962 resulted in a closer relationship of the Iran Party wing and the NFM wing. The National Front as a whole turned to an open attack on the Shah and increased anti-government agitation.

His Majesty responded with fury. National Front leaders were rounded up and their gatherings were banned. Orders were issued for the immediate suppression of opposition. Many influential members of the opposition including Mehdi Bazargan, and the theologian Ayatollah Taleghani, were placed on trial.

Resistance quickly developed. In Fars a rebellion of unknown size and duration broke out in Ghashghai and Bovir Ahmadi tribal areas. The primary opposition, however, came from religious leaders. Muttering against the government was heard throughout the spring of 1963 in Tehran and religious centers of the country. Then on June 5, 1963, severe rioting broke out in Tehran, Shiraz, Ghom, and other religious centers in Iran. Thousands of people were involved; the Bazaar became a virtual battle ground. The two-day rioting was led by Ayatollay Khomeini. The religious elements, reacting to governmental restrictions on their freedom of activity, were able to strike back with considerable support from their dissatisfied followers.

Political polarization caused both the Shah and the National Front to move sharply away from a policy of moderation to a policy of direct confrontation. Following the events of 1963, the country witnessed other arrests and other trials. With the opposition
muzzled, and the two political parties, Mardom and Mellyioun being discarded, the country was headed toward another experiment in party politics, one party being the Iran Nowin Party.

Second Phase: Another Experiment in Two-party Politics

As was discussed in the previous pages, the first round of royal experiment with a controlled two-party system had been disastrous. Neither of the two government established parties, Mardom and Mellyioun, were able to demonstrate a capacity to win public confidence. They turned out to be highly ineffective instruments. The parliamentary elections of 1961 and 1962, due to Eghbal government's interference, were proclaimed rigged and consequently cancelled. The Mellyioun party almost went out of existence and the Mardom party existed only in name.

In early 1963 His Majesty was planning to hold a national referendum to approve or disapprove of this actions in favor of the peasants and industrial workers. In January over five million voted in this referendum, approving by about 12 to 1 six reform measures sponsored by the ruler. According to official figures, 5,593,826 Iranians cast their votes for the six-point reform programs, and only 4,115 voted "no."26 These measures and subsequent ones, such as female sufferage, were hailed by the regime as the Shah's White Revolution or the Shah-People Revolution.27
The Shah's referendum caused a swift reaction by the regime's opponents, particularly the National Front. In the face of growing publicity for the referendum the Front held another National Congress. After electing a new central committee, the Front urged the people of Iran to boycott the January referendum. Ali Amini, the now disfavored predecessor of Prime Minister Alam, also joined the opposition and called for non-participation. Following this request demonstrations against the balloting erupted in the Tehran Bazaar and at the universities. To fortify public opposition, the Front announced a mass meeting and demonstration on January 25 to protest the balloting, and issued a communique that read:

We warn the people of Iran that our country is now on the verge of being officially changed from a democratic parliamentary regime to that of reaction and despotism...

We must, therefore say Yes to the abolition of the feudal system; land and water for the farmers and better rewards for the workers; sovereignty for the nation and freedom for all; and destruction of colonialism and exploitation.

But we must say No to the arbitrary rule of the Shah, his interference in the affairs of the state, the rule of terror and Savak atrocities, colonial domination of the country, police violations and gendarmerie oppression and the overlordship of government officials in towns and villages.

The Shah responded with fury. National Front leaders were rounded up again and their scheduled meeting was banned. The Shah blasted his opponents in a speech in Ghom, the center of religiously inspired opposition to his rule, branding them as "100 times more treacherous than the Tudeh": ...the "Black
reactionaries" and "the destructive red elements" will not sit quietly. They cannot see the implementation of the six bills which insure the prosperity and glory of Iran and make it an advanced modern Iran.... Now these very persons whose flesh and blood belongs to the aliens present themselves as patriote merely to serve their own ends. 30

Disregarding the stiff opposition from the center, the left, and conservative religious elements, the Shah continued with his reform measures. Late in the summer of 1963 The Congress of Free Men and Free Women of Iran was called in order to nominate candidates for the Majlis. The candidates were to be broadly representative of the newly enfranchised female population, the recently landed peasantry, and workers scheduled to receive shares in the profits of factories.

The Creation of Iran Nowin Party

The Congress of Free Men and Free Women, whose main function was to nominate candidates for the parliament, was placed in the hands of a group of senior but relatively young and politically ambitious officials of the National Iranian Oil Company.

Formed in 1961 with eight members as a traditional Iranian "dowreh," or social-political circle, the group soon expanded to 40. The dowreh was led by Hassan Ali Mansour, and used to meet regularly to discuss Iran's social and economic problems. Unlike
other such groups, however, this one had been publicized as a study group and been called the Progressive Center. Shortly after, Mansour's dowreh was further distinguished by being royally chartered as the Economic Research Bureau to the Imperial Court. And subsequently, with a green light from the Shah, the group assumed a major role in the approaching parliamentary elections. At a rally of the Progressive Center held shortly thereafter, Mansour announced that members of the Center could enter the coming elections for the Majlis.

The Congress was hastily conceived to generate public interest and give the nomination process an open complexion. The list of nominees introduced in the Congress after three days of aludatory speeches was prepared as a "result of negotiation between Mansour and the Ministry of Interior." On the final list of 193 Congress nominees, nearly 70 percent of those selected were present or recent government employees, and at least 90 nominees were identified with the Progressive Center.

The list introduced by the Congress also made provision for a parliamentary opposition. As many as 60 of the Congress's nominees were expected to decline affiliation with the majority bloc, and a small contingent was authorized by the Shah to revise the Mardom party.

A local election supervisory board dutifully assured the election of nearly all the candidates designated by the Congress. The elections of the 21st Majlis were carefully managed to exclude the older politicians and to include a new breed. Less than half of the
six million voters in the previous January's national referendum participated in the September parliamentary elections. It should be noted that Alam had served the Shah by converting the turbulence of the Amini period to one of relative tranquility. He conducted the successful referendum and elections for the parliament which were unparalleled for their orderly and predictable outcome. Alam also depreciated its role in arranging the Congress, though the Prime Minister and his cabinet left no doubt of official sanction by attending the Congress's first session.

The Majlis held its first session in October 1963, and although Alam retained the Premiership, the Progressive Center had clearly captured the momentum. Its leader had already confidently declared, "when the Progressive Center forms the cabinet, all the key posts in the Government will obviously go to party members." Majlis members flocked to join the Progressive Center. Within two months the Center boasted that 150 of the deputies had joined. And by December 15 Mansour announced the conversion of his Center into Iran Nowin Party (the New Iran Party).

In March 1964, Mansour was called by the Shahanshah to form a new government. Mansour's Government was charged to push forward the reform measures. It had pledged to support the Shah-People Revolution. Thus, only months after its founding, the Iran Nowin party was in control of the cabinet and the Majlis. Within the Majlis, 150 deputies affiliated with the new party assured the new government easy passage of legislation. The Mardom party had
only 16 members; the remaining deputies were officially listed as independents. Thus, Iran Nowin Party was created to fill the vacuum left by the Mardom and Mellyioun parties.

Shortly after, the Shah received the party's Executive Committee in audience and Mansour reported to the press later that the Shah would assume "overall leadership" of the party. On the very next day the Ministry of the Royal Court reported that there had been a "misunderstanding." In a statement released by the Minister of the Court, the Shah stated that "I am entrusted with leading the Iranian people, and without doubt, the large organization of the Iran Nowin Party...which has been mobilized to execute these high aims, and has my support and interest." At the same time leaders of a number of political groupings were informed that their political activities would be sanctioned. These loyal opposition groups, such as Mardom and Pan-Iranist parties, were invited to publish their own newspapers and participate in parliamentary debates, while their roles were incompletely defined and poorly appreciated. None of them, however, were allowed the encouragement or resources accorded to the Iran Nowin party. It was not the goal of His Majesty, it seemed, to restore Iran to the political chaos of 1960-61. These smaller parties were allowed to function, but only at a level insufficient to generate the turmoil of those earlier years when the experiment in a competitive two-party system had collapsed. The National Front, the major opposition force, remained totally alienated and totally
Mansour's partisanship and personal style contributed to his mounting difficulties. Making little distinction between his role as government and party chief, he freely used the mass media and other state facilities for partisan ends. His insistence that the government guide rather than follow the public struck many people as arrogant for a party whose social base was so limited. Even his associates within the party complained of his failure to consult them in advance taking of key positions.

The shock came on January 21, 1965, when Prime Minister Mansour was shot by a student, alleged to be a member of the Devotees of Islam. His place was taken by Amir Abas Hoveyda, the Finance Minister and second in command of the Iran Nowin Party.

In early April, a conscript in the royal guard attempted to assassinate the Shah. A court found that individuals allied with the Tudeh party had planned the attempt.

The years 1964 and 1965 witnessed other arrests and other trials in the country. Numerous people were detained. A general roundup of members of the political opposition was conducted on the eve of the anniversary of Mossadegh's overthrow in 1965. Fifty-five persons were taken into custody at the end of the same year and charged with plotting the overthrow of the regime and the establishment of an "Islamic Government." Fourteen leaders of the Tudeh party were tried in absentia and sentenced to death.
At the end of 1966, due to persistent government pressures, political opposition to the regime seemed to be disorganized, with the National Front inactive. Also, the death of Dr. Mossadegh at the age of eighty-six in 1967 removed a great symbol of opposition and the only unifying factor of the Front. Religious opposition also appeared to be dying down with the exile of an outspoken figure, Ayatollah Khomeini, to Turkey.

The Iran Nowin Party: A Domineering Political Force

When the Eghbal's Mellyioun party was ruined as a result of the rigged elections of 1961 and 1962, and the Mardom party became ineffective for similar reasons a political vacuum appeared in Iranian politics which was subsequently filled with the invention of the Iran Nowin party.

Although the Shah favored the newly established party, he still seemed to be entertaining the idea of a competitive two-party system for Iran. There was a steady effort on the part of the regime to revive the already shattered Mardom party. It was strongly believed that the presence of an effective critical party was essential as a watchdog over the majority party. But as we shall observe later, the second experiment with a competitive two-party system failed to materialize, and the Iran Nowin party demonstrated an even greater tendency to dominate the political scene at the expense of the loyal opposition; that is, the Mardom
Party.

The leaders of the Iran Nowin party left the impression that it was a new brand of party and founded on a different social base. They claimed it was unlike the Mellyioun and Mardom parties, both essentially parliamentary clubs of landlords, because the new party sought worker and farmer alliances. In practice, however, Iran Nowin did not differ much from its predecessors. The party's assertions of a broad class base carried only as far as affiliated membership. The overwhelming number of members of the party were civil servants, attracted to the party by desire for job security and advancement. In terms of leadership characteristics, the party's inner circle was restricted to the upper and upper middle class and well educated Tehranis. In terms of achievement, it seemed, status-related educational and degree credentials served as substitutes for realistic performance. And family connections and Court sponsorship were significant factors for aiding advancement within the party.

In terms of relationship with other socio-economic groups, the Iran Nowin party did not differ much from the previous parties; it took a domineering approach. For instance, like the parties before it, Iran Nowin party effectively stifled the growth of Western-style trade unionism and undercut any popular movement among emancipated peasants. Workers and farmers were treated paternalistically. Within party councils, these groups received only token representation and a weak articulation of their interests.
Moreover, using government power and instruments, most of the trade unions and employer associations were brought under the Iran Nowin party. In Tehran alone, some 90 workers' associations with 100,000 members were brought under the government party in 1971. Nearly 90 percent of the nation's 8,328 farm cooperatives, with a combined membership of over one million, were similarly brought into the government party. 40

At municipal, district and village levels local councils were deliberately created, apparently to invest the masses with a sense of participation in their own governance, but gradually these councils came under the guardianship of the ruling party. Also, there were formed numerous party committees at different national levels whose major tasks were to bring out local grievances. In addition, there were 111 authorized Iran Nowin party cells in Tehran alone (most averaged 20 members), whose main functions were to deliberate, study, and exchange views on important daily problems and issues. But they were either inactive or used their energies and resources in mobilizing government and municipal employees for political demonstrations in the support of the regime. They offered the regime powerful instruments to shape the pro-system sentiment. During organized protests, such as those against student strikes and foreign critics of the regime, these units showed that they could substitute for the more informal networks that had traditionally brought people into the streets.
The mass media, particularly the press, were not immune from government interference. For instance, eleven dailies and fourteen weekly newspapers, most of them in Tehran, had their owners and professional employees brought into association with the Iran Nowin Party and functioned under its supervision. Those who did not join could not escape censorship. The party leaders were hypersensitive to and disdainful of criticism. Opposition was quickly labeled as uninformed demogogy and disciplined.

Securing the full support of Shahanshah, the Iran Nowin party during its fourteen years of ruling gradually and methodically broke all vestiges of independent power bases in the country. The implementation of the land reform program and the enforced divestiture of corporate ownership to the workers deprived landlords and industrialists of their power bases, to the extent that they represented power blocks. As was mentioned earlier, hardly an important trade union or employee-employer association remained unaffiliated with the government party or was not brought under its control. With its near-monopoly over the country's occupational, professional and voluntary groups the ruling party had practically broken the fundamental rule of the game concerning party politics to which the Iran Nowin party adhered at the outset. By early 1975, to which I will refer shortly, Mr. Hoveyda, the leader of the ruling party, had paved the way so completely for a landslide victory in the coming general elections that doubts about the effectiveness of the two-party system were widespread and
One of the fundamental aspects of Iranian political culture is the general tendency among the political actors to dominate others around them or, at the least, to bring those about them under the domain of their influence.

When the notion of a competitive two-party system was brought up in 1957 and again in 1963, the assumption behind the idea was the encouragement of the Iranian political elite to flock into two competitive groups, and by observing the "rules of the game" to alternately capture the power of government, and by their institutionalization to ensure the regime's political stability.

The concept of the "rules of the game" is generally identified with Anglo-American political culture and essentially refers to the procedural rather than substantive aspects of a particular political arrangement. The procedural aspects of these rules are commonly referred to as free elections, broad representation, freedom of the press, freedom of the opposition to organization, activity, assembly, discussion and criticism, and finally alternation of government between opposing groups through legal and peaceful means.

One of the Shah's main objectives in putting into effect his idea of a competitive two-party system seemed to be to familiarize and to accustom the members of the prevailing political elite with
the manners through which the rules of political games are conducted and observed by its participants as the rules are performed in more politically developed and matured societies. But here again, the tendency for domination among the leaders of Iran Nowin party and the control of the opposition was so strong and the desire for complete power so great that the loyal opposition was not only reduced to an ineffective political force but the idea of a competitive party system was itself a complete failure. Utilizing government resources and machinery, at different national levels, the ruling party was able to secure a facade of success while keeping the opposition party from the political limelight by all available means, even by attributing dishonesty and disloyalty to its leaders vis-à-vis the regime.

Beginning in 1964 with Alam's departure, the Mardom party's chief, the party was faced with serious external and internal problems. Externally, the party had to compete unsuccessfully with the ever-growing and omnipresent power of the government party and its manipulatory tactics. Internally, the party faced acute factionalism which was more serious than the external challenges to its political survival.

When Alam was succeeded by Professor Yahya Adl, a prominent surgeon, as the chief of the Mardom party, the party further suffered from the lack of efficient and decisive leadership. Alam had been an experienced and skillful politician; he was also one of the men close to the Shah and an influential political figure.
within Iranian ruling circles. Adl was quite the opposite. He not only lacked Alam's political experiences but also did not take his new political assignment very seriously, even though he was the Shah's favorite.

The real leadership in the party seemed to be invested with Dr. Alinaghi Kani, the General Secretary of the party. Despite Adl's political passivity, Kani was an enormously energetic and active leader.

During the local elections in 1972, Kani traveled across the country and participated in local campaigns in favor of Mardom party candidates and against the ruling party. He frequently criticized the Iran Nowin party's deep penetration into the local bureaucracies in favor of its candidates. He also was highly critical of the government party's "illegal political practices." During his relentless critical campaign against the government party and its elements in bureaucracy, it gradually became apparent that the Mardom party's chief, Adl, was dissatisfied with the manner by which Kani was conducting the campaign. Given the Iranian political atmosphere at the time, Adl was less interested in the intensification of political dispute between the parties and was probably embarrassed to see the Hoveyda government, the Shah's choice, being attacked by a party of which he was the leader. Adl did not believe that Kani should take his role as the party's general secretary so seriously. Consequently, Kani resigned on July 26, 1972.
The position of the Mardom party within the Iranian political system was reduced to such an extent that even its leaders were having second thoughts about whether a minority party, considering the then existing political atmosphere, could perform a useful function. The situation had become so desperate that the majority of the leaders did not consider the position of the party's general secretary attractive. There was no candidate for the position. When the offer was put to Hallakou Rambod, spokesman for Mardom's parliamentary faction in the Majlis, he expressed the view that under the present conditions there was no need either for a minority party or a general secretary. He forcefully rejected the offer. 48 With no apparent candidate to fill the vacated position, Adi assumed both roles, the chief and the general secretary of the Mardom party. During an interview, Adi confessed to journalists that he was completely unaware of what was going on in the party, because for the last two years he had been away and as a result had lost track of the party's activities and its problems. 49 Two days later Adi reported to the newsmen that the Mardom party had taken a new course of political strategy and would not follow the same course of action as had been pursued by Dr. Kani. He added that Kani's political approach had created many foes within and without the party and had contributed to the internal political feuds and factionalism. 50 He did not elaborate on the party's new approach but, considering the party's subsequent interaction with the Iran Nowin party, the Mardom party took a more conciliatory attitude
The real crisis within the Mardom party came into the open in October 1973, during the national elections for municipal, district and village councils. It is worthwhile to note that local councils were created to invest the masses with a sense of participation in their own governance, particularly in economic and educational areas. The Iran Nowin party took an active role in the electoral campaign on the part of its candidates for these councils, whereas the Mardom party was unenthusiastic and generally inactive in most of the constituencies. As a result, the Mardom party received 1.5 percent of the total votes cast in Tehran, while in other provinces, more than 90 percent of the votes went to the Iran Nowin party. In other words, from a total of 3786 council seats across the country, 3246 seats went to the ruling party.\(^{51}\)

The humiliating defeat created an uproar among the rank and file of the Mardom party. Members of the party's local committees were furious about the party's role in the elections. They harshly criticized the party's national leaders for not participating in electoral campaigns in favor of its candidates. There were some rumors circulating in the Mardom party centers in Tehran and other localities indicating a possible secret collusion between the leaderships of both the Iran Nowin and Mardom parties.\(^{52}\) Highly suspicious of government interference, many local party leaders boycotted the elections right from the beginning, while some others started their boycott before the voting was completed.\(^{53}\)
These events were followed by a series of resignations from the Mardom party across the country, particularly in Abadan, Ahwaz, Sari, Khomain, Takestan, Chazvin, Tabriz, and in other smaller cities. Adl responded to the rising criticisms unleashed on the party by stating that "Those party candidates who were not popular in their communities expected the party to fight for their election and do the job for them; and this was exactly what the party was reluctant to do." The Mardom's parliamentary faction in the Majlis was also critical of the party's overall leadership. Rambod, the leader of the minority faction characterized Adl's leadership as highly inefficient and ineffective. He also charged that Adl had gathered a group of unpopular and opportunistic individuals around him who were harmful to the party rather than contributing to its success. Rambod was particularly curious about why the members of this minority faction, of which he was the spokesman, were not seriously criticizing or debating the bills which the ruling party submitted to the Majlis through its leaders, especially the national budget bill which was then before the Majlis for consideration and debate. Generally speaking, the Iran Nowin domination of the Iranian political process had considerably demoralized the Mardom party and had caused extensive factionalism within the party.

In order to improve the party's public image and simultaneously to prevent the party's deteriorating internal situation, the party's political bureau, on June 28, 1973, after one year of delay, chose
Nasser Ameri, a young and highly ambitious politician, as the party's new General Secretary.

Ameri immediately undertook to revitalize the dying party and made some heroic efforts in this direction. His immediate decision was to dissolve the party's political bureau. This bureau with its 21 highly influential members constituted the party's highest decision-making body. He charged the bureau of not being the party's representative. In its place, Ameri created a Central Committee whose 15 members were chosen by the party's Central Council. To legitimize his decision and to tighten his control over the party at the same time, Ameri convened the party's National Congress, the party's supreme decision-maker, on November 23, 1974, which had not been held for eight years.

During the Congress's first session, Ameri sharply assailed the ruling party for its failure to effectively implement the fundamentals of the Shah's White Revolution Program. He called upon the Iranian people to join him in the upcoming parliamentary national elections in order to unseat the Iran Nowin government party.

Ameri's persistent attacks on the Iran Nowin party and his critical attitude of the government's overall national policies not only angered the ruling leadership, but also alienated the influential conservative elements within his own party. These elements accused Ameri of being overly critical of the government and charged him with insensitivity to the existing political atmosphere in the country. Hoveyda's government, these elements believed, was the
Shah's favorite; and the idea that the Shan-People Revolution was not succeeding was in fact a denial of the regime's propaganda theme which was indicating otherwise.

One of Ameri's unexpected decisions, which was highly controversial and greatly contributed to the then existing tension between the majority and minority parties, was his instruction to party branches in Babolsar, Kashan, and Shahsavar to boycott the elections for three Majlis seats which had recently been vacated. This was a bold act on his part to which the only precedence dated back to the events of August 19, 1953. Ameri's decision had significant political implications for the political system, one of which was the fact that it endangered the legitimacy of the system which the Shah was trying to augment. What was also aggravating the situation was the rumor in Tehran that the elements of genuine opposition to the regime were agitating the public and covertly giving support to the Mardom party.

Ameri seemed to be loyal to his principles, rejecting any compromise or retreat, and continued his attacks on the ruling party. His uncompromising stand eventually brought his downfall as General Secretary of the Mardom party. On December 29, 1974, the party's Central Committee relieved Ameri from all his responsibilities in the party, and replaced him with Mohammad Fazaeli, the chairman of the Party's Central Committee and a Majlis deputy from Shahi.
Fazaeli brought the Mardom party back to its older passive role, more characteristic of the pre-Ameri period. The new General Secretary believed that Ameri's approach to politics was individualistic and personal whereas he would stress a collective leadership in the party.

Under Fazaeli the Mardom party took a more conciliatory gesture toward the ruling party and became quite cooperative. In order to further emphasize the party's new approach to the Iran Nowin Party, Fazaeli relieved Gholam Hossein Salehyar, spokesman for Mardom and editor-in-chief of Rahe Mardom, the party's daily newspaper, from his positions. He also tried to under-emphasize the prevailing tension and factionalism within the party. But the rank and file were not satisfied with the General Secretary's new policies. They demanded a more aggressive approach toward the ruling party.

As a result of the new approach, tension was building up in the party. There was growing pressure on the leadership in the party to take a more serious stand on such vital national issues as housing, inflation, distribution of income, and corruption within the government bureaucracy. In the case of housing, it is worth noting that after twelve years in office, the Hoveyda government had failed to come up with an effective measure to deal with this major national issue. The annual inflation of over 40 percent and the rush of rural migration to urban areas had created a serious housing problem in Tehran and other big industrial cities. Rapid
economic development and social change had caused immense social dislocation and great public dissatisfaction.

The manipulation and monopolization of Iranian politics by the Iran Nowin ruling party had not only alienated the loyal opposition within the system but had also intensified the activities of the anti-regime forces outside the system. The deteriorating situation, during 1973-75, led to many acts of urban guerrilla warfare against the regime. The intense opposition to the regime was manifested by many attacks on government buildings, police and military posts and foreign personnel working in Iran.

Therefore, the Mardom party was under constant pressure from the dissatisfied groups and individuals to change its course of action vis-a-vis the government party. The upcoming parliamentary elections for the 24th Majlis, which was scheduled for the summer of 1975, was forcing the leadership of the Mardom party to push for a more serious campaign. Fazaeli, sensing the gravity of the situation, was gradually changing his attitude toward the ruling party, from a passive to a more active one. He began his electoral campaign by accusing the government of forcing the social and economic groups to its side for the upcoming elections. He also charged the Hoveyda government of making preparations to interfere in the local electoral process in favor of government candidates. Fazaeli also warned the government that the opposition would not stand still but would fight back with all its power. The bombshell came in March 1975, when the election campaign had reached its
peak, with the Shah's surprising call for a single party to replace the then existing two-party system. The Shah's decision not only broke the Hoveyda's monopoly over party politics but also proved, once more, that the Shah was still the supreme decision-maker in the country and party politics had been just a democratic façade to legitimize the Iranian political process.

Certainly, from the beginning of two-party politics in Iran no one really believed that the system represented something like a genuine two-party system, yet the Shah himself claimed to take it seriously. In his book *Mission For My Country*, he claimed: "If I were a dictator rather than a constitutional monarch, then I might be tempted to sponsor a single dominant party such as Hitler organized or such as you find today in communist countries."65 Whatever his motivation, the Shah seemed to be interested in engineering a two-party system for the country. Then the question is why had the policy failed? The answer, I think, is the same as I have frequently tried to give in the last few chapters. The group leadership of both parties, the ruling and the opposition parties in both phases, were not used to playing a fair political game. The ruling parties led by Eghbal and Hoveyda, rather than according the people the right to pass judgment on the parties and freely choose among them, concentrated power in their own hands and deprived the "loyal" opposition parties from being developed into an effective organization for constructive criticism in the direction of goals set by the system. What is surprising was the fact that
the two-party system in both phases were run by the pro-Shah forces. Their primary mission was to contribute to the continuity of the Pahlavi dynasty, assure its stability and widen its political base. But the result was exactly the opposite of what they expected.

In actual operation the parties gradually moved toward the traditional pattern of domination of one group against the others. Iranian political style and the traditional disposition for control and domination, I think, were stronger among the political actors than the "democratic rules of the game" set by the regime's leaders within which fair competition was supposed to take place. In actual political behavior, political actors could not and were not able to clear up their differences peacefully and assure the operation of a two-party system. This, it seems to me, might answer the question of why the two-party system established in 1957 was turned into a disguised one-party system at the end of 1962; and why the second phase of the two-party system established in 1963 turned into another one-party system during 1975.
NOTES CHAPTER 6

1. For devices designed for system maintanence by the Pahlavi regime, see James Alban Bill. The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes, and Modernization. (Charles E. Merrill Publishing Col, a Bell and Howell Co., Columbus, Ohio, 1972), pp. 39-44; also see Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran, op cit., pp. 80-100.

2. See Leonard Binder, op cit., pp. 70-76. It should be mentioned that the Shah would accept cooperation from any religious circle who offered it. He made some religious appointments, favored ulama or their offspring with jobs, pensions, and seats in the legislature, visited the shrines and distributed largess through religious hands, rebuilt and refurbished mosques, invited ulama to visit him on Nowrouz (the Iranian New Year), and often responded gracefully to requests for jobs and favors from religious quarters. It was during the Shah's reign that the most learned of the religious general agency was established at Ghom and its dignitary has been treated with the utmost respect and deference. In the Majlis too, it has been repeated that Iran is an Islamic state and that no law can be passed which is contrary to the tenents of the Shiite Faith.

3. Ibid., p. 192.

4. Ibid., p. 193. It should be remembered that labor legislation in Iran has always been progressive, and it is at least adequate for the purpose of making an international impression. Each successive revision of the basic law, in 1949, 1959, and also in the late 1960s, has registered a "progressive" advance, and beneficial to labor population. The forces behind these revisions, however, have not been workers themselves, but ambitious ministers and other governmental officials.

5. For further information on this and other related subjects see James A. Bill, The Politics of Iran..., op cit., pp. 94-100; also see Leonard Binder, op cit., pp. 177-201.


12. The term "Melliyoun" was obviously an attempt to confuse the public, because the term was used to label the followers of Dr. Mossadegh who have traditionally been referred to as Melliyoun.

13. For a discussion of how a two-party system came about, see Leonard Binder, *op cit.*, p. 222.


17. Ali Amini was the head of one of Iran's great landowning families with ties to the Qajar dynasty and also to Vossough al-Dowleh and Ahmad Ghavam. An early Mossadegh supporter, he had broken away and moved into the opposition well before August 10, 1953. After Mossadegh's overthrow he appeared in Zahedi cabinet as finance minister; it was he who directed the Iranian team in the oil negotiation.

18. During this time rumors were rife in Tehran that the Front was being encouraged by President John F. Kennedy's liberal philosophy. A visit by Averell Harriman to Tehran was interpreted by the public as "paving the ground for the National Front." See *Diplomat*, May 17, 1961, Tehran.

Among them were Fathollah Froud, an ex-mayor of Tehran, and his political ally, Assadollah Rashidian, a banker. Seyyed Jaafar Bahbahani and Sadegh Behdad, the editor of newspaper Jahan, were also among those being arrested.

Richard Cottam, *op cit.*, p. 305.


Marvin Zonis, *op cit.*, pp. 73-74.


Ayatollah Rouhollah al-Mousavi al-Khomeini is an influential Shiite mullah of the theological center of Ghom, first came to public attention in 1961 following the death of Ayatollah Broujerdy. Khomeini was one of the several principal contenders to succeed the venerated leader of the Shiites. He began to issue public statements in opposition to government decisions concerning the role of women in Islam and the nature of land reforms. Khomeini was arrested several times in 1962, 1963, and 1964 which resulted in his final deportation to Turkey and then to Iraq.


These reform measures were: the land reform bill; the role of state-owned factories; financing of land reform; sharing of workers in up to 20 percent of industrial profits; nationalization of forests; amendment of election law; and establishment of Literacy corps.

Marvin G. Weinbaum, "Iran Finds a Party System..., *op cit.*, p. 444.


For the granting of the royal Farman (Charter) and its text, see Marvin Zonis, *op cit.*, p. 87.

It is worthwhile to note that the slate of 193 candidates was almost unanimously elected. The balloting was held under the martial law imposed after the June riots. The martial law was not abrogated until October 23, 1963, after the elections and convening of Majlis.
34. Marvin Weinbaum, op. cit., p. 439.

35. In Shiraz, for instance, the Iran's fourth largest city, slightly more than 14,000 of the 200,000 eligible voters cast ballots. In several constituencies the voting was so light that the totals were not announced. See Weinbaum, op. cit., p. 444.


38. Ibid., June 1, 1964.


40. Ibid., pp. 447-448.

41. Ibid., p. 448.

42. For instance, when the leader of Pan-Iranist party in the Majlis misread his license in refusing to endorse the Shah's renunciation of Iran's claim to the Persian Gulf Sheikhdom of Bahrain, in retaliation, the party's activities were immediately curtailed and its deputies were denied their quota of seats for the 1971 elections. See Weinbaum, op. cit., p. 447.

43. Alam was appointed as the Chancellor of Pahlavi University at Shiraz.

44. Adl was a personal surgeon to the Shah, also an elected Senator in the 4th, 5th, and the 6th Senate.

45. Kani had served as Superintendent of the Office of the Prime Minister during Alam's premiership, and was Deputy Prime Minister in Alam's second cabinet in 1963.


47. Ibid., p. 24.


51. Generally speaking, the Iran Nowin Party swept the national elections for the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd Majlis in the same fashion. See Kayhan, December 16, 1972, p. 19.

52. Ibid., October 3, 1972, p. 19.

53. Ibid., October 3, 1972, pp. 24 and 19.


55. Ibid., October 3, 1972, p. 19.


60. Ibid., December, 1974, p. 19. It should be remembered that one month later, Ameri, then 64, was killed in a car accident. There was a rumor in Tehran that he was killed by SAVAK.

61. Ibid., December 29, 1974.

62. Ibid.

63. For instance, in less than two years as many as 150 underground anti-regime activists were either executed or killed in various skirmishes with the police and security forces. Figures disclosed by the officials of Islamic Republic after the overthrow of the Shah's regime in 1979, shows that thousands of Iranian people have been killed by the regime and their bodies destroyed. For the number of those killed before the revolution see Kayhan issues between August 1972 and late 1975.

64. Ibid., February 26, 1975, p. 27.

CHAPTER 7

The Emergence of a One-Party System: A Move Toward Total Political Power

The general theme of this project has been to analyze historically the actions and interactions of the Iranian elite since the establishment of a constitutional democracy in 1906. The aim was to demonstrate that the tendency among the elites for control, domination and even extermination of the opposition has generally prevented the institutionalization of certain democratic values which are considered to be necessary for the development of democratic institutions such as political parties. I attempted to show this in several historical cases presented in the previous chapters. Even after the fall of Mossadegh in 1953, when the genuine opposition to the regime was suppressed and the Shah gradually became a dominant figure in the Iranian political process, the tendency for domination and control among the loyal elites did not disappear, as was demonstrated during the two-party system phase.

During the period, which began in 1957 and ended in 1975, eventhough the loyal opposition was allowed to participate in the political process, rather superficially, nonetheless, in action, the ruling parties strongly resisted the idea and were not tolerant of opposition. During the first phase of the two-party system the
Eghbal's Melioun party dominated the Alam's minority party and caused the system to be deadlocked. Also in the second phase, 1963 to 1975, the Hoveyda's ruling party, the Iran Nowin, became so powerful and dominant that it actually turned the two-party system into a one-party politics. The failure eventually forced the Shah to establish a one-party system for the nation. The notion of a one-party system was more congruent with the national political culture because it resembles a pyramid model of power where a dominant figures is placed at the top of the political structure and would be in a better position to control political powers at the lower levels of the pyramid.

The Establishment of a One-Party System: The Rastakhiz Party

By 1975 the Shah had decided to finish the charade, and undertook a more active policy designed to mobilize support for the regime and to strengthen the state's political role, not merely in a passive but in an active way within Iranian society. On the evening of March 2, 1975, less than four months before parliamentary election day, when political parties had just begun their election campaigns, the Shah in an unanticipated initiative announced the establishment of a new single party, called the Rastakhiz or National Resurgence Party. All Iranians were pressured to join it; and whereas the two earlier parties had had
little real organization outside the Majlis, this was to become a mass party.

According to the Shah, democratic institutions and the notion of "representation" were not working within the Iranian context. In his interviews with journalists, he repeatedly stated that "We cannot be forced to just copy what the Western people do... We are not just going to copy the West blindly, just because it comes from the West." In a different interview he said:

Iran's political development, like its economic development, must follow its own path. Thus, the idea of political progress in Iran leading again to a multi-party or a two-party system was of questionable wisdom. The multi-party system had already been tried in Iran and it had nothing to recommend it. Furthermore, why think in terms of Western systems as the only models. After all, what rose garden have these systems provided to others? What is the logic of our following them?

The new broad-based mass party was aimed at mobilizing the country's unique human and material resources to the hilt, and was open to all Iranians who had attained maturity and were eligible to vote.

The thinking behind the establishment of Rastakhiz was probably that the regime needed a more positive means of winning support and of forcing people, especially those in state employment or state-run organizations like the unions, to declare their loyalty publicly. The Shah cited three cardinal principles for membership in the restructured political system. These were "faith in the country's constitution," "loyalty to the
In his announcement for the new one-party system, the Shah made it clear that there was no room for any one to sit on the political fence any more. All Iranians should be politically involved. Everyone must make his position clear; there will be no political loners or militants. He branded those militants who failed to subscribe to the trinity of principles as "stateless" and said that their place was either in prison or abroad. Those who preferred to leave the country would be provided with all the facilities to do so, the Shah said. And those who did not believe in the three principles, were free on condition that they had to openly express their disapproval, and if they were not anti-nationalists the government would leave them free. But if they applied double standards or played around, that would not be acceptable. "Everyone must be man enough to clarify his position in this country. If his disapproval has treacherous overtones, his fate is clear. If it has ideological roots, he is free in Iran, but he should not have any expectations," said the Shah. However, those who openly and unreservedly subscribed to the principles but preferred to remain inactive outside the political mainstream, would continue to enjoy their legal rights.
The pressure was therefore on, for everyone to be seen to join the new party. The ominous phrase "he should not have any expectations" took on a special meaning in a country where the Shah was the dominant arbitrator and source of advancement. Therefore, promotion, security, contacts, greatly depended on whether someone was a Rastakhiz party member or not.

Within minutes after the news conference, the Shah's statement was treated as a royal Farman (decree). Party leaders and non-partisan politicians, writers, labor and guild leaders, communication elites, and others hailed the Farman as a historic turning point. As was expected there was no debate on the merits of the new party system. There was only praise and exaltation. Even the partisan politicians who had vehemently defended the existing party system up until the news conference on the evening of March 2, were now vocal and, ostensibly, the true "believers" in a one-party system in Iran.

After many trials, stretching over many years, the Shah had eventually found that the multi-party and the two-party systems were "inadequate" to meet the needs of the nation. As a result the new order ended the division of politics into a "majority" party and a "minority" loyal opposition. All parties were merged to form the Rastakhiz party: a national mass party which would function as an umbrella for political activity in the whole country. By eliminating the need for traditional majority and opposition parties, said Prime Minister Hoveyda, "The Rastakhiz enables all Iranians
to come forward and assume their share of responsibility in ensuring the nation's further progress. 5

The main objective of the Rastakhiz, according to the Shah, was to serve as a two-way channel, transmitting the views and the wishes of the people to the government and carrying education in government policies and national aims back to the people. 8 Another objective of the party was to enable all Iranians to participate in the political, social and economic affairs of the country. "Nothing should be done to minimize the contribution of any Iranian to national efforts to lead the country to the Gates of the Great Civilization," said Prime Minister Hoveyda. 9 The Rastakhiz Party had as its other objectives "To create a new political mood in the country by a different political socialization, political education, political mobilization and finally direct participation of the public in the process of social transformation." 10 The party also emphasized Iranian "national unity" and "national identity."

It should be noted that the Rastakhiz party was not supposed to be a coalition of different parties and groups. It was to represent a national unity. It was assumed to be a collectivity which was formed by all Iranians regardless of their particular interests. Following the Shah's guideline Hoveyda; swiftly changing the political line, declared that "The interests of the workers, farmers, women, industrialized and all other interest groups are the same. There was no need for different parties to look after
different interests under a system that is based on the nationalization of legitimate sectoral interests. The whole idea of dividing a nation into different parties is archaic, Hoveyda said. "There is a heritage of the era of political underdevelopment when it was assumed that the interests and views of one section of the society would exclude those of another," Hoveyda told a public gathering. From its inception in March 1975 until January 1978, when the political regime went through a process of so-called "liberalization policy," the Rastakhiz Party evolved through the various stages of legitimization, organizational consolidation, and finally fragmentation. In the following passages I will discuss, rather briefly, these processes in order to demonstrate the difficulties which the ruling elite experienced, while attempting to institutionalize the party which was superimposed from above.

1. The Stage of Legitimization

The first important task facing the regime, following the creation of the Rastakhiz Party, was to legitimize it by going through a carefully engineered parliamentary election. Even though elections in Iran, except for a few rare cases, have played neither legitimate nor commitment roles in the political system, nonetheless, in order to provide a facade of a democratic process and to generate public enthusiasm for the new party, it was
considered essential to hold a parliamentary election.

On May 2, 1975, the Shah, in his address to an audience of more than 100,000 and, via television and radio to millions of people throughout the nation, emphazied the point that in the next elections every Iranian will have the opportunity to vote for his favorite candidate.14

Following the royal reference, preparations began for the elections to the 24th Majlis and the Senate. Elections were scheduled for June 20. Forty days before the election day, the Secretariat of the Rastakhiz Party issued a declaration describing regulations of the nomination of candidates.

A candidate to be officially nominated for the parliament had to go through several stages. First, in each constituency a committee of four persons was formed whose members were elected from local government and non-government administrators. This committee, in turn, had to choose six people who represented different local social groups.15 Together the ten individuals constituted the Council of Trustees (Hayate Motamedan). Applications for nominations was then evaluated by the Council of Trustees. And finally, the names of approved applicants were turned over to the party's Executive Board. The Executive Board, in turn, fully screened the list of nominees prepared by the Council of Trustees, and made the final recommendations.16 In a press conference, Hoveyda stated that such a candidate selection process "was necessary to avoid the fielding of an unmanagable number of
nominees; and anyone nominated by the party's Executive Board will certainly enjoy the people's trust."

Meanwhile, the government and the party introduced certain measures aimed at the highest possible rate of voter turnout. Efforts were made to invigorate the apathetic and the apolitical, to persuade the alienated, and to stimulate the habitual as well as the active voter. The mass media, particularly radio and television, which, unlike the past where they formally had to keep neutral in the political process, but now considered themselves as the loyal member of the Rastakhiz Party, resorted to numerous broadcasting programs before the upcoming general elections and energetically tried to arise public enthusiasm for electoral participation. For instance, they initiated a program, called "Dar Rah" (On the Way), in which a free time of ten minutes was given to each candidate to answer two specific questions: "Why are you a candidate?" and "What will your program be if elected?" The purpose of this program was to stir public interest and to encourage debates on the issues. But the debates were usually dull and unexciting because the candidates, instead of discussing the issues, involved themselves with describing personal qualifications; or may be they purposely avoided the central issues on the grounds that they might infuriate the government officials and ruin their chances of being elected. Also, government and party officials were constantly urging the people to register. In view of the fact that the electorate numbered around 14 million,
a high percentage of voter turnout was necessary as a mandate for the government.18

With 268 Majlis seats and 30 elective Senate seats at stake, an estimated 10,000 individuals had applied for nomination to the parliament.19 In Tehran alone, nearly 1,500 candidates came forward to contest 27 seats the capital would have in the Majlis. The new party had not, however, sufficient time to organize itself for the election. And as was already mentioned, nominations were therefore left to the voluntary announcement of some 10,000 hopefuls, 950 of whom were accepted by the party. As I said before, the candidates were sifted by the Provisional Executive Board of the party which provided a choice of two or three candidates for every constituency. Almost all the incumbent members of the Majlis and the Senate had notified the Provisional Executive Board of their willingness to run. But more than one-half of these were rejected either by the local Council of Trustees operating under the local head of the Justice Department, or the Provisional Executive Board in Tehran.

Yet the initial response to registration was somewhat cold. As of May 23, only half a million people had actually registered to vote. Hoveyda, while registering himself at the registration center in Tehran on May 24, linked voting to party discipline and stated that nonvoting was an indication of the lack of party discipline, which left the impression that those who had not registered were breaking the party discipline.20 On the same day
Rastakhiz, the party organ, went further and declared in its editorial that "non-voting is not only an act of treason against experimentation with democracy, but also an escape for social and party responsibilities." 21

Such statements received varied interpretations by the public. Rumors began circulating the non-voters could not obtain a passport, would lose their jobs, and so on. Although the impact of these rumors could not be actually measured, voter registration suddenly began to pick up at a rapid pace after May 24.

By May 28 registration reached 1.5 million. But the government and the party still seemed not satisfied with the process and the degree of registration. Therefore, on May 30, Hoveyda announced that "Those who decide not to vote are answerable to the party." 22 This statement became a front page headline in most newspapers the following day, and perhaps an effective push toward further registration. Within a week, on June 7, a total of 4 million people had registered to vote.

However, no attempts were made to deny or discredit those rumors until June 18th, the very last day of registration. On the evening of June 18, just hours before finishing registration, the state controlled radio and television networks began denying the charges that non-voting would result in deprivation of certain social and political rights.

On May 28 the Secretariat of the party announced the names of party approved candidates. Dr. Jamshid Amuzegar, Minister of
Interior and Chairman of the Party's Executive Board, explained at a news conference the procedures and the reasons these names had been approved. According to him, the Executive Board reviewed recommendations and evaluations made by hundreds of Councils of Trustees for about ten days. The list of almost ten thousand applicants, according to Amuzegar, had to be cut to 950.

The last ten days leading to election day were marked by further efforts on the part of the government to register the greatest possible numbers of people. On June 14 Tehran's newspapers ran a front page headline reading "Those Who Refuse to Vote Will be Identified." Also a special bill was rushed to the outgoing parliament which was hastily passed, allowing the non-ranking personnel of the armed forces (previously disenfranchised) and the non-ranking staff of the police to vote.

In spite of the emphasis on "new faces," almost half of the party's candidates approved by the Executive Board were former or incumbent parliament members, or held important positions in the government. In fact, all of the leading figures in the former Iran Nowin and Mardom parties were among the Rastakhiz candidates.

In selecting the candidates, the party and government apparatus had weeded out all or almost all dubious or undesirable elements. Therefore, the selected nominees by the Executive Board were all trustworthy and loyal to the regime. It really made no difference which one of them lost or won in the elections. Thus, the political system was definitely assured of loyal parliamentarians and, at
the same time, could rightly claim that elections were free.

It is worthwhile to note that no official ballots were printed. The Government instructed the people to prepare their own ballots. Many candidates had prepared xeroxed ballots containing their own names and made them available to the voters in advance. Election officials made no objection to these ballots and permitted voters to use them.

There was a great number of illiterate people who used the already written ballots, without even knowing the names of the candidates, simply to have done what they were supposed to do. The voter turnout was very high. According to official reports, for both houses, out of an electorate of 14 million, 70 percent (9.8 million) registered to vote and 52 percent of the electorate (about 7 million) cast its vote. The Government claimed that the popular participation was unprecedented and unparalleled in the history of Iranian parliamentary elections. The returns were interpreted as an impressive national mandate for the Rastakhiz party. It was translated as a vote of confidence for the political regime that also legitimized the newly established party. In an interview, the Shah stated that the wide public participation in the parliamentary elections meant that the Iranian people, in an all-out effort, had both heartily acknowledged the objectives of the Rastakhiz party and indicated their loyalty. Prime Minister Hoveyda also hailed the turnout as "the most exciting one in Iranian history."
The Stage of Organizational Consolidation

From its inception in 1975, the Rastakhiz Party seemed to have difficulty in defining its roles, objectives, and specifying the functions of its sub-system units in relation to one another and to the political system. The party leaders, predominantly from the government officials, did not exactly know how the party should be initially organized, and in what way, or on what basis the party's roles and functions should be defined vis-a-vis the larger political environment.

Four years after its creation the issue as to whether the offices of premiership and the secretary general of the party should be vested in one person still constituted a major controversy within the party and the government. Similarly, the role of political "wings" within the party was not clearly defined either. The wings' roles within the party and their relations to other sub-units of the political system was still a matter of intra-party conflict. In fact, the relationship of the Rastakhiz party to its wings, to the government, to the social and economic groups, and to the parliament still needed to be resolved.

In terms of organization, the Rastakhiz Party was still in its initial stages of growth. Since its creation in 1975, through the spring of 1978, the party was still planning to have an elective Central Committee and a Political Bureau which,
According to the party's Constitution, were considered the top decision-making bodies. Instead, most of the decisions taken were made by the party's Provisional Executive Board which itself was supposed to be elected by the Political Bureau.

Generally speaking, the Rastakhiz Party had not yet adjusted to its organizational and functional roles assigned to it by its constitution. One of the consequences of this failure has been the continuous organizational changes which the party had been involved with since its conception. The second consequence had been the ever-increasing influence of the non-party elements in the party which eventually drove the organization into the hands of top government and bureaucratic officials. One of the major results of this process has been the loss of enthusiasm on the part of rank and file, and abatement in political activity which followed the parliamentary elections of June 20, 1975.

In the following paragraphs, I have attempted to describe the chronological changes which have occurred within the party and its political environment, while explicating the organizational characteristics of the party's sub-system units, and their structures and functions in a triangular relationship between the Rastakhiz Party, the Government, and the Majlis.

**Efforts at Organizational Adjustment**

When the creation of the Rastakhiz Party was announced by the Shah in March 1975, Hoveyda, the Prime Minister and the former
chief of Iran Nowin party, was named as the Provisional Secretary-General of the new party for at least two years. He was immediately assigned responsibility for drawing up the party's constitution, organizational chart, and objectives.

Before the parliamentary elections, on March 18, 1975, Hoveyda called for a Consultative and Research Group, entrusted with the task of writing a constitution and statutes for the Rastakhiz Party. The "Conference of 500," as the gathering came to be called, included Ministers, Majlis representatives, university chancellors and professors, journalists, workers, farmers, and theologians. A manifesto was finally released by this conference which was basically a statement of overriding principles.

The Conference suggested an "interim" Central Secretariat, headed by the Secretary General of the party and his deputies. An "interim" Executive Board and Political Bureau were also suggested by the Conference to carry out essential work before the party until the coming First Party Congress. The Congress, the highest party organ, the Conference recommended, was to be elected by the rank and file. Major powers were vested in the Executive Board, which was also an elective body empowered to approve the party budget and its organization. The Political Bureau, proposed to be chaired by the Prime Minister and including as many as seven ministers and two members of parliament, would only have the task of coordinating party and government activities. It was also decided that the term of office of the Secretary-General be four
years. The draft constitution also expressed faith in the institution of Monarchy, the Iranian Constitution, and in the underlying aims of the Shah-People Revolution.

A hastily organized Party Congress, which also played the role of Constituent Assembly, met on May 1, 1975, and within thirty-six hours approved a modified version of the proposed constitution. The Congress reaffirmed the selection of Hoveyda as its Secretary General. It also elected (by lot) a Central Committee of approximately five-hundred, who in turn elected a temporary fifty-five member Executive Board.

The First Party Congress distributed the authority between the Secretary-General's Office, the Executive Board, the Congress, and the Central Committee. Thus, formally, a careful relationship was established between the party, the government, and Bureau, where representatives of all three came together.

Central Council. The Central Council was considered to be the most representative body in the Rastakhiz Party. It was supposed to provide the party with a useful channel of communication through which would be made known to the local authorities and the central government the views and aspirations of the rank and file members.

According to the party constitution, it was the Central Committee that should elect the 55 member Executive Board. The board, in turn, was to select from among its members 15 persons to serve on the Political Bureau. The fundamental assumption of the framers of the constitution was that these 15 individuals would in some sense
represent the rank and file or the members of the party, since the Central Committee itself was drawn, through a multi-tiered procedure, from the membership of the local party chapters. The Central Council met, for the first time, on May 20, 1978.

The Central Council was elected by hundreds of local councils at district, township, city, and provincial levels. For selecting local council candidates, evaluating committees were formed in provincial centers, and each committee comprised the provincial Center's Chief Justice, education department Director, Women Organization's Secretary, and Rastakhiz representative. It also included a member appointed by the Governor and another by the provincial parliamentary group.

The Executive Board. The Executive Board was a body with considerable powers. It was generally an administrative and supervisory body. Its main function was to supervise the working of the party's Secretary-General and Secretariat.

Since the membership of the Central Council surpassed 3000, it was highly difficult to convene more than twice a year; therefore, the Executive Board was purposely created to function in the absence of the Congress and the Central Committee and was invested with legislative powers. This explains why the members of the Executive Board were elected by the Central Council. Its fifty-five members included both Government officials and men and women from outside the government, both politicians from the former parties and relative new comers. The Secretary-General and his three deputies were
automatically members of the Executive Board. It has been said that to counter-balance the extensive authority of the Secretary-General, the board was created to make the necessary adjustment.

Among the prominent government officials on the Provisional Executive Board chosen by the Constituent Assembly, Jamshid Amuzegar, the Minister of Interior, headed the board. Also two other members of the cabinet, Engineer Reza Ghotbi, the Director of National Iranian Radio and Television (NIRT), the president of the Supreme Court, the Chancellors of Tehran, Pahlavi, and Isfahan Universities, as well as a number of Majlis deputies and Senators were also chosen as the board's members.

The composition of the Executive Board represented, in fact, an overlapping between government and party, parliament and government, and the party and the bureaucracy.

Since its inception, the Executive board concentrated its attention on two major areas: it drew up the regulations governing the organization of the local party chapters, internal party elections and other related affairs; it also devoted considerable time to the selection of candidates for the parliamentary and local council elections. However, some members of the board felt hampered by the fact that they were selected by lot rather than elected.

The Political Bureau. The Political Bureau was a key organ of the party and, if it was to function as initially perceived, it would have been potentially a key institution in the political
structure of the country. It was composed of one representative each from the Majlis and the Senate, of the Prime Minister (who chaired the meetings), of those ministers the Premier wished to have on the bureau, and of the Secretary-General of the party and his deputies. However, the rules stated that the ex-officio members shall be chosen in such numbers that the 15 persons elected by the Executive Board—that is, by the representatives of the rank and file of the party—shall always constitute a majority. It should be added that the Political Bureau was composed of 30 members, 15 of which were appointed by the Secretary-General and the other 15 elected by the Executive Board.

The Political Bureau, at least on paper, was the meeting place between Government, Party, and Parliament. It was conceived as the forum where the party could inform the government of the wishes of party members and the mood of the country, where the Government could get a preliminary reaction to its legislative proposals and other programs, and where government and parliamentary representatives might consult informally.

However, the Political Bureau did not play a major role. Its meetings have been infrequent. The Government never in fact placed its programs before the party prior to submitting them to Parliament and implementing them. The party itself hardly had an identifiable point of view on the major issues to present to the Government or to bring to bear on Government proposals. It was doubtful whether the bureau had served as a major channel of communication between
the party, Parliament, and government.

Four years after the Rastakhiz Party was created, an election was held by the Executive Board on June 10, 1975, to choose from among its members the 15 elective members for the Political Bureau. In this election, the parliamentarian members of the Executive Board solidly took over the Political Bureau, winning 12 out of 15 seats.28

**The Party Congress.** The Congress was the highest party organ which was elected directly by the rank and file in the country, every four years. The members of the Congress were elected by the party chapters, the grass-root party units, all over the country. Chapters were considered to be the basic units of the party, comprising the rank and file members in the small localities. The party's constitution attached much importance to the local chapters.

According to the party regulations, the delegates to the chapters, were to be selected in two stages. In the first stage, each chapter selected 10 percent of its members to electoral assemblies that met at township and district levels. These assemblies in turn selected one delegate for every 100 assembly participants. Thus, 5 million party members selected usually 400,000 to 500,000 electors in the first stage who, in turn, would select between 4,000 to 5,000 delegates to the Congress.

The Congress's main function was to chart the party's course of action for the next four years and define its position on
national issues and problems. In other words, it was a policy-making body. Also it was the Congress which elected the Secretary-General of the party. It was also the highest party organ which was invested with legislative powers and given the authority to revise the party constitution and make changes whenever it was necessary.

Informally, however, the party organization hardly fulfilled its expected role and the mission it was supposed to accomplish. For a long time, the party's major organizational units—the Central Council, the Executive Board, and the Political Bureau—were even not elected, and the vital decisions were either made by the Prime Minister or were recommended by the Shah.

In other areas, particularly at the local levels, the party organization was hardly developed; it existed only on paper. The party chapters (Kannon), which were considered to be the most significant grass-root units and constituted the party's political foundation, were held irregularly and poorly attended. They were generally under the influence of the chapters' chairmen (or chair-women) or their deputies and secretaries, who usually held important political positions outside the chapters or had connections with the high-ranking party officials. Local issues were often discussed in meetings and complaints were lodged and grievances were brought up, rather frankly, but rarely channeled to the higher organizational units to be acted on.29
Thus, despite its formal structure and organizational format, the Rastakhiz Party, it seems to me, had been highly ineffective and inefficient in terms of intra-unit communications and channelization. The Party's communication network was extensively used for propaganda and manipulative purposes, but rarely as a system for channeling demands or articulation and aggregation of interests.

The Party in Flux

The Party Congress, according to the party's Constitution, was supposed to hold its meeting every four years; but in less than two years the Rastakhiz Party had held three congresses.

The First Congress was held on May 1, 1975, and hastily confirmed Hoveyda, the Prime Minister, as the Party's Secretary-General, who was already appointed to this position by the Shah. The Second Congress was convened on October 27, 1976, three years ahead of schedule. The main purpose of holding the second congress was to separate the office of the premiership from that of the Secretary-General, which up to that time was invested in the same person.

At the time, the Shah had expressed the view that these two offices should be separated. The logic behind the view was that the party's Secretary General was a full-time job, and the person who occupied this position should be able to devote most of his
time to party affairs. But the deeper explanation seemed to be the fact that some party leaders did not favor the idea of running the government by the party. These leaders believed that the party had no need to try to take over the executive power or appoint a government. According to them, the Iranian Constitution, one of the three principles on which the Rastakhiz party was founded, had already set up procedures for forming the government. If the party dominated the government, the argument went, a different organization would then be needed to supervise the control to be exercised by the party over the Constitution.30

As a result, during the Second Congress which lasted two days, Hoveyda resigned his post as the Secretary General of the Rastakhiz Party, while maintaining the office of Premiership. Jamshid Amuzegar, the Minister of Interior and the leader of the Progressive Wing, who was nominated by the Prime Minister Hoveyda, was elected as the first full-time Secretary-General by acclamation. Meanwhile, Ahmad Ghoreishi, a member of the Political Bureau, was elected as the chairman of the party's Executive Board, succeeding Amuzegar.31 However, despite some expectations it seemed unlikely that the separation of the two offices would alter things dramatically. Close cooperation between government and the party, and considerable overlapping between the two, was already built into the structure of Rastakhiz Party.

Amuzegar named Daryush Homayoun, a veteran journalist, as Deputy Secretary-General of the party. In one of his public speeches
Homayoun said, "The party saw its chief task in building up a new political culture for our society. We are looking toward the aim of politicizing the people in the sense that they should be formulators of policies rather than being the subject of politics.\textsuperscript{32} As a team, Amuzegar and Homayoun were expected to devote the first half of their office term to strengthening and consolidating the local party chapters. "Decentralization," a policy with which Amuzegar had had considerable experience as Interior Minister, was also expected to figure prominently in all party organization affairs. Amuzegar believed that the number of chapters across the country should be spread widely enough so that all eligible Iranians could join a chapter in order to make it easier for them to take part in a "national dialogue;" they could use the Rastakhiz Party as a kind of "school" for political education, political participation and political mobilization.\textsuperscript{33}

Homayoun believed that political education should be aimed at preparing every individual Iranian to serve as a fully responsible citizen. Such training, according to him, would enable citizens to understand and advance the national interest. The other issues which both Amuzegar and Homayoun promised to work on were such issues as welfare, housing, inflation, traffic, and profiteering.\textsuperscript{34}

Generally speaking, during the Amuzegar's tenure as the party's Secretary General no sweeping transformation took place. Even though Amuzegar and his deputies frequently announced that they would seek reorganization of party's various divisions, including the
Central Party Headquarters, no genuine reorganization took place except for the minor changes at the lower levels of party organization.

On August 6, 1977, Abbas Hoveyda, Prime Minister for thirteen years, stepped down on the Shah's orders. He later told reporters he resigned "because His Imperial Majesty, Shahanshah Aryamerhr, has decided that I should serve in a different capacity." Amuzegar, the party's Secretary-General, was named by the Shah to head the government. Hoveyda was appointed as Minister of the Imperial Court. Mohammad Baheri, the Deputy Minister of the Imperial Court, succeeded Amuzegar as the party's new Secretary-General. He was elected to this post by the Executive Board of the party.

Baheri's emphasis, after being elected as the Secretary-General, was primarily on "reorganization" and "restructuring." of the party, in which he was hardly successful. He presented a new organizational chart and believed that, "Change in the party organization was necessary to give its various organs a new impetus, to create a more viable evaluation system, and to accelerate the pace of its activities." Baheri's plan for the party's reorganization provided for the Secretary-General to have the last word in the affairs of all organs of the party. Also the Rastakhiz Party would have three deputies each of which would be assigned to head specialized committees of education and propaganda, public affairs, and inspection and assessment.
Beginning in early 1977 there appeared some signs of uneasiness in the Iranian political environment. There were some indications of discontent and disillusionment within the articulate political stratum demanding a more open political atmosphere for the country, and the lifting of political restrictions. Dr. Ali Amini, a liberally oriented politician and the ex-prime minister, once more appeared on the scene, criticizing the government for its social and economic failures. Colleges and universities became a scene of political demonstrations and confrontations with government forces. Campus unrest was so widespread that it culminated in the suspension of classes for the most part of the academic year of 1977. The Society of Iranian Writers also published a statement in which the government policies in the area of human rights and the national economy was strongly assailed. The clergy in general and some of the prominent religious leaders in particular, in Tehran and other provincial centers, also showed a feeling of discontent in regard to the existing situation. Some of them even used the mosques and other religious locations, usually places of worship, to make anti-government speeches and stage anti-government activities.

In the Rastakhiz Party too, things were changing. Political apathy and indifference to current issues among the rank and file of the party were becoming widespread and alarming to party and government officials. Baberi, the Secretary-General, initiated a tough campaign against the existing mood, particularly the kind
shown during the Tehran by-elections. Referring to the low voter turnout in the Tehran election, Baheri said "the party must eliminate such cases of indifference and raise the level of popular participation in political affairs." Homayoun, the Deputy Secretary-General, also complained that "There is very little interest generated among the people. Individuals belonging to different trades and professions seldom engage in purposeful discussion among themselves." He urged the rank and file to use the party as a center for dialogue, for meaningful exchanges of ideas, information and purposeful discussions.

Dissatisfied with the existing affairs of party activity, the Shah, on December 27, told the party's Political Bureau that, "Circumstances have led me to believe that my idea about the separation of the posts of the Prime Minister and the party Secretary-General is, at least for the time being, not in our interest." The party's Constitution foresees that the succession to party leadership by the second-in-command should only be temporary, until such time as a Congress can be convened and the Secretary-General be elected by the representatives of the rank and file.

Therefore, the Third Congress, which was termed the Extraordinary Congress, was hastily opened on January 4, 1978, attended by nearly 10,000 party activists including 5,300 delegates from the provinces. In the Third Congress which lasted only one day, Abbas Hoveyda, Court Minister, Amuzegar, Prime Minister, Baheri, the
Secretary-General, Hooshang Ansari, Coordinator of the Constructive Wing and Abdol Majid Majidi, who succeeded Amouzegar as the Coordinator of the Progressive Wing when the latter was appointed as a Prime Minister, all delivered speeches.

The Extraordinary Congress removed Baheri as the party's Secretary-General, and unanimously gave the Prime Minister, Amuzegar, the additional post of the Secretary-General. The Congress also attacked the opposition groups to the regime, rather harshly, and condemned them as being "black and read reactionaries." The Congress resolved that "the black and red colonialists" were both conspiring against Iran, and called on the nation to pursue a "ruthless combat" against the conspirators. Finally, a resolution was passed by the Congress, calling for four specific measures to counter the current colonialist campaign against Iran. They were:

1. Efforts for the mobilization of the party chapters must be strengthened and expanded.
2. The party leadership must do all in its power to broaden the scope for the participation of the young generation in Rastakhiz politics.
3. The party must mobilize all its resources against foreign-backed colonialistic intrigues.
4. Tax-payer's money for free education must be lavished on those who truly studied and devoted themselves to scholarly work, rather than on those who hide behind a facade of university attendance.

The last resolution was in response to the Shah's reference that "the Congress must decide whether it would be logical to continue to give a wide range of benefits to students who, instead of studying, took to the streets, smashed up windows and otherwise
destroyed public property.\textsuperscript{46}

The Extraordinary Congress reaffirmed its bondless faith in the Shah's leadership and the nation's political system. The Congress also unanimously reasserted its unflagging attachment to the three principles of the Rastakhiz, the Monarchy, the Constitution, and the Shah-People Revolution.

Following his election as the Secretary-General of the Rastakhiz Party, Amuzegar increased the number of deputies to the Secretary-General to four and selected the following people as his deputies: Deputy Mohmoud Jaaferian, in charge of political education, publications, public relations and news dissemination; Deputy Mohammad Reza Ameli Tehrani, in charge of relations between the party and the Government; Deputy Mohammad Hossein Moussavi, in charge of organizational affairs; and Deputy Ali Farshchi, in charge of treasure, finance, and administration. Jaaferian retained his position as Deputy Managing Director of National Iranian Radio and also Acting Director of Pars News Agency.\textsuperscript{47}

In early July 1978, three of four party deputies suddenly resigned from their posts, except for Jaaferian. In a statement later issued by the party it was announced that from now on the Rastakhiz Party would have only one deputy to the Secretary-General.
The Party's Wings

Subsequent to the opening of the Parliament on September 8, 1975, and in preparation for staging orderly parliamentary politics, two wings within the party were formed.

These wings were led by the Cabinet's two senior ministers, Jamshid Amuzegar, Minister of State and Interior, and Houshang Ansari, Minister of Finance and Economy. Members of Parliament, as well as other cabinet ministers, were encouraged to join either of these two wings. In the interest of neutrality the Prime Minister and some of the Cabinet ministers, as well as some party and government officials, were exempted from joining the wings.

The wings soon started to compete for support among the members of the new parliament and the cabinet members, as well as the general public. The Progressive Amuzegar Wing called for, among other things, the wisest and most efficient use of resources, the elimination of waste and the encouragement of honesty and conscientious work throughout the government ranks. It mainly attracted university professors and "liberal" government officials. Ansary's wing, The Constructive Liberal Wing, called for, among other things: surveying problems of youth; improvement in the quality of education, social justice, and economic welfare; and formulation of programs and supervision of their implementation. It mainly attracted the more tough-minded economists and industrialists,
The liberal orientation of both wings gave rise to speculation that the two wings would not really be different. A party spokesman responded that they were both liberal, but the term was "qualified;" the emphasis or focus of each wing was different, and the names reflected that divergence.48

After an initial period of activity, however, both wings receded into the background and their influence in the Parliament and outside the Parliament became imperceptible. For whatever it was worth, the Amuzegar wing received the majority of its support from the ministers, the deputies and the senators.

The position of the wings and their functions within the Rastakhiz Party and their roles in the Parliament and government were not clearly defined. In July 1976, Hoveyda, then Prime Minister, said that the wings, Progressive and Constructive, were not organizational entities and were not meant as vehicles for seeking administrative control of the party.49 He added that the success or failure of the wings would only be measured by their ability, or lack of it, in mobilizing, organizing, and presenting concrete views and policy proposals to the party. On a different occasion, Hoveyda expressed his view that the Rastakhiz Party as a whole, and not its two wings, would have the final word in debates and on national issues. "There will be no room for factionalism, ruling and opposition grouping in the party. The final word is that of the party."50 According to him, the wings' activities would be centered in the party while fusing various ideas expressed
by them into coherent policies in keeping with the national interests of Iran. The party needs the Progressive and Constructive views of all its members, who number in the millions.

In his different speeches and interviews, Hoveyda repeatedly stressed that "unity without uniformity" was the goal, a concept on which he never elaborated. The major aim of the wings, according to the party officials, from the beginning, had been to turn them into a popular forum for debate, discussion, planning, political education and mobilization. One of the implications was that the Secretary-General as well as other leading organs of the Rastakhiz Party would be totally independent of domination by either of the two wings, and there would be no block-voting either in the Parliament, in the Congress or at the more limited local chapters of Rastakhiz.

Dariush Homayoun, the acting Secretary-General in 1977, further elaborated on the position and functions of wings within the Rastakhiz Party. In one of his publications on the Rastakhiz's politics, he wrote that the main function of the Rastakhiz's two wings was to debate and discuss the national issues and convey the results to the government, party and Parliament, to be acted on. It would be the party which makes the final decisions. Homayoun further wrote that the party could not afford any kind of factionalism within its organization, either in government, Parliament or any other sub-unit of its organization. The main function of these wings was to formulate and suggest ideas to the party.
Concerning the relationship of party wings with social and economic groups, Homayoun wrote that, it was against the principles of the Rastakhiz to establish particular linkages with these groups. According to him, these groups have always had a tendency to take positions on issues which ultimately lead to factionalism and competition for power. And since the party's ultimate objective was centered on national integration and national unity, to allow factionalism within the party was to contradict the Rastakhiz's principles. Thus according to Homayoun, social and economic groups would maintain their organizational identities as groups outside the party, but their members as individuals would be directly members of the Rastakhiz Party.

Therefore, the party's wings did not set up party groups of their own and were not considered "factions" in the Parliament, and also did not constitute the traditional "majority" or "minority" groups within the Rastakhiz Party.

On May 2, 1976, Amuzegar, then the leader of the party's Progressive Wing, in a report to the Shah, stated that although his wing had not yet begun an intensive effort to recruit members, the Progressive Wing nevertheless had a total of 39,404 members, 887 of which held doctoral degrees, 623 who were university professors, and 1,061 holding BA or MA degrees. The leader of the Constructive Wing, on the same occasion, reported that his wing had a membership of about 37,504. The effort of the Constructive Wing, Ansari, the wing's leader said, is geared towards encouraging people to learn about the country's developments, while providing an atmosphere in
which members participate actively and meaningfully in party affairs.\(^{55}\)

On September 18, 1977, the Shah in an interview with journalists, expressed his dissatisfaction with the party's two wings. He remarked that the wings of the Rastakhiz Party have tended to alternate between spells of activity and periods of silence.\(^{56}\) The Shah added that the Constructive and Progressive wings, since their inception in 1975, had not played the role they were expected to play in the party. According to him, these wings had little impact on party structure, party operations, and the policy making process.\(^{57}\)

Immediately following the Shah's remarks, the wings became reactivated for a while. Their leaders were interviewed by journalists, appeared on television, formed discussion groups in radio, television and party headquarters, and debated the national issues and problems. But shortly thereafter, the wings again subsided into the background. Occasionally they continued from time to time, to issue declarations, setting out their points of view on various questions.

It should be noted that the wings hardly played a useful service in Rastakhiz politics. They hardly discussed and debated national issues except occasionally in formal ceremonies and assemblies. They never articulated with precision their position on issues of the day. They often declared their principles, but they did not develop them into forums of discussion and debate. At
the beginning the wings were considered to be the major pillars of the party, but they have never been seen to influence the direction of party policy or to pursue actively the implementation of the principles they articulated.

Part of the problem seemed to stem from the fact that other organs of the party, such as the Executive Board and the Political Bureau, had yet to define their roles with clarity; and partly from the fact that relations between the party and the government needed a clearer definition. At the same time, the wings had been somewhat constrained by a desire to avoid fragmentation and transformation of the wings into hardened factions.

3. The Stage of Political Segmentation

Since Amir Abbas Hoveyda stepped down as Prime Minister, on August 6, 1977, Iranian politics in general, and the Rastakhiz Party in particular, were gradually exposed to a sequence of political crises which were unprecedented in Iran since Amini's fall in 1963. One may even safely argue that Hoveyda's resignation might have been one of the consequences of this political uneasiness set in motion since the beginning of 1977.

One of the apparent reasons for this political change seemed to be the Shah's new policy of an "open political atmosphere" which had come to be known as "the liberalization policy." After 25 years of restrictive rule, during which the Shah sought to turn the
traditional society into a modern one, he began taking tentative steps toward political liberalization during late 1976. The idea was launched gradually and through a series of implicit and explicit statements on radio and television and in the form of interviews with the press. The idea was also subsequently analyzed at some length in the Monarch's book, *Towards the Great Civilization*.

The Shah's policy on liberalization was further crystallized in his recent public speeches. In one of his interviews with journalists, the Shah explained the reason for his new policy:

"A decade ago, Iran needed intense centralization to push through reform programs and industrialization schemes in the most efficient and time-saving manner possible. Now decentralization and the widest participation of the people in national affairs—starting from the villages and finally embracing the Capital—are the right methods to pursue. This process will continue and lead to maximum liberty—liberty minus treason." On a different occasion the Monarch said, "I am confident the Iranian Revolution has led to enough social, political, economic and cultural programs to sustain such liberalization policies. If such confidence did not exist, the Government would not so heatedly pursue decentralization and the promotion of individual liberties." Again in an address to the Group for the Study of Iranian Problems, the Shah said, "The pace of Iran's progress became so rapid that eighteen months ago we began to give the people greater freedom and more opportunities in every field." The Shah also emphasized
that the means of expressions will be increased in line with the growth of population and literacy. "Eventually this nation and country shall have a system of democracy where the will of the people shall rule," the Shah said. What was considered to be important in the Shah's statements was his frequent stress on the "separation of powers" between judicial, executive, and legislative branches, as it is strongly emphasized in the Iranian Constitution. These powers, the Shah said, "must be independent from one another and must not interfere in each other's affairs."  

Liberalization and the "Counter Elite"

The liberalization policy produced some trends that were not unexpected. Not only did it bring into the open the opposition groups that had been dormant for the past fifteen years; but it also released those long repressed feelings of discontent and anxiety. The new policy set into motion a series of riots and demonstrations by the groups who opposed the Shah's style of ruling.

Though united in their opposition to the Shah, the opponents did not constitute an integrated political force. Their political and non-political objectives differed from one another. First of all, there was a religious elite led by Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari, a kindly scholar honored throughout the Shi'ite world for his learning, and Ayatollah Mohammad Khomeini, who had strongly challenged the Shah's government. Khomeini had been in exile in Iraq
since 1963, when he launched a nationwide drive against the Shah. They have demanded for the application of constitutional rights, including free elections, and government by Islamic Law.\textsuperscript{65} Shariatmadari vowed that "The government must apply the constitution completely, and if they do not find a solution for our demands, I will order my followers to come into the streets and fight."\textsuperscript{66} In addition to objecting to the lack of civil liberties, the Shariatmadari and his colleagues wanted the Shah to enforce an old Constitutional provision that would allow five clergymen to sit as a watchdog committee to see that no law passed by parliament that violated the precepts of the Koran. The Iranian Constitution, according to them, provided the Islamic religious leaders with veto power over state legislation.

According to Shariatmadari, the roots of religious discontent were in "...many illegal actions in the past, such as torture, censorship of writings, the behavior of civil servants who encourage bribery."\textsuperscript{67} The religious group was not a unified force and did not constitute a compact entity against the regime. There were pros and cons and there were differences of opinion among its members vis-a-vis the regime.\textsuperscript{68} The religious group, however, was a major opposition group in Iran at the time, and had the support of Bazaris, powerful merchants who had close ties to the Moslem clergy and ordinary lower-middle and lower class people.

Another segment of the counter elite, as it was frequently referred to throughout this project, was made up of liberal
politicians who belonged to the National Front of the late Mohammad Mossadegh, the former Premier whose policies came close to changing the political regime in 1953.

The National Front, as it was mentioned in the previous chapters, also did not constitute a compact force. It was divided into the left, center, and right wings. The only unifying force which had brought these elements together was their opposition to the Shah's rule, and the establishment of a constitutional democracy in Iran.

The National Front had generally enjoyed the strong support of students, writers, intellectuals, and some segments of professionals who have been persistent critics of the Shah's regime, particularly the Security Police. It is interesting to note that, while Muslim leaders complained that Iran was rushing into the modern age too quickly, the National Front liberals were pushing the Shah to move even faster on reforms that would produce a Western-style democracy.

The third element of the counter elite, which was more active abroad than in Iran but was believed to have given latent support to all opposition groups in Iran against the regime, was the Tudeh party. It was strongly believed that the Tudeh party exerted great influence on college and university students and professors in Iran, and was a leading factor in the Confederation of the Iranian Students in the United States and Europe. As was already mentioned, the Tudeh party supported a constitutional system for Iran based on socialism, and also demands that Iran be independent of American foreign policy.
The points of difference between the Tudeh party on one hand, and the National Front and religious groups on the other, stem from the fact that the latter considered the former as a non-nationalist group. They also considered the ideology of the Tudeh to be incompatible with the fundamentals of Islamic laws, even though the National Front did not stress the religious aspect of the Tudeh ideology as seriously as the religious groups did.

There were also two significant political groups against the Shah during 1977 who strongly undertook armed opposition to the regime. They were the Mojahedin of the People, and the Fedayin of the People. The former originated amongst followers of the National Front who, in the mid-1960's, formed a political organization, the Liberation Movement in Iran, led by engineer Bazargan and Ayatollah Taleghani. In 1966 a group affiliated with the Liberation Movement established a guerrilla organization, the Organization of the People's Combatants (Sazemane Mojahedine Khalgh), usually known as the Mojahedin. After five years of preparation it began armed actions in 1971.

While it is difficult to be precise about the ideology of this group, its main concepts seem to have been drawn from Islamic thinking; it was fighting against "tyranny" and "falsehood," and for freedom. Its ideology is very close to Marxism and struggles for the classless society, but under God. They were ideologically progressive and believed that Islam is more modern than what is preached by the clergy. They generally considered the clergy
to be very conservative and reactionary. Two of the Mojahedin's prominent leaders were Sa'id Mohsen and Massoud Rajavi. The former was executed by the regime in 1973. The Mojahedin's organization provided a basis for armed actions against the Shah's regime.

The other political group, the Fedayin of the People, originated in the Tudeh Party and has always claimed that it espouses Marxism. It was founded by half a dozen or so members of the Tudeh Party who left that organization in 1963. Their leader was Bijan Jazani, a bright intellectual and scholar born in 1937, who had been imprisoned several times since the 1953 coup. He was arrested again in 1973 and was executed along with eight others in 1975.

The main features of the Mojahedin and Fedayin's activities in the years between 1971 and 1978 can be briefly listed as follows. Both groups have been confined to specific, sudden, clandestine operations: bomb explosions, bank raids, attacks on police stations, assassinations. There is no record of the number of operations carried out, nor of the number of clashes in which the initiative lay with the regime's forces; it seems that the number of incidents was considerable in 1971 and 1972, that it increased again in 1976, but that after each increase the regime was able to capture or kill a significant number of those involved. Government sources state that between February 1971 and August 1976, fifty-six of its officials died in clashes with the guerrillas, and
that at least 300 people were executed for guerrilla actions in
the same period, while a further 300 are estimated to have been
killed in clashes with the forces of the regime.\textsuperscript{70} The changing
political atmosphere in 1976-77 created a more favorable climate
for these groups to permeate college campuses, higher educational
institutions, labor unions and factories. They were able to
recruit members, particularly amongst the youth, and mobilize
support for anti-regime movements.

There was also another anti-regime group that should be
considered as a counter-elite. Its opposition to the Shah was,
however, low key. Its members called themselves "Independent."
They diverged among themselves on political issues and lacked
unity. The prominent member of this group was Dr. Ali Amini,
the ex-premier, who was well-known for his independence of thought
and ability to resist pressure from above. After his resignation
as Prime Minister in 1963, Amini left politics and took refuge
in private life. But he later made a political comeback in mid-1977
by making political statements criticizing the general economic
and political conditions in Iran. His significant move came on
July 29, 1978 when he formally embarked on his political activity
by stating that "silence is no longer permissible."\textsuperscript{71} In a
statement issued to the press, Amini assailed the government's
social and economic policies, charged the authorities with
corruption, and accused them of lacking a master plan for the
country.\textsuperscript{72}
Here we should mention another group which was generally disorganized, and its negative attitude toward the regime had forced it to the side of anti-regime forces. The members of this group were highly dissatisfied with the high inflation rate. The group lacked cohesion and its members were scattered across bureaucratic structures. They were generally salary earners whose source of income was usually fixed. Therefore, it constituted another dissatisfied force within the political system. The accumulated discontent and grievances over many years, tight bureaucratic control, over-centralization and governmental corruption had forced the members of this group to take an anti-state position.

The aforementioned groups were all different in political ideology and each of them had their own particular viewpoints concerning the national crisis, but were united on a single goal, that is, to get rid of the Shah. All demanded the establishment of a democratic system in Iran.

The Opposition in Action

Since the "liberalization" policy was still in its initial stage, the opposition was not yet given the rights to organize, publish and assemble. The only channel open to the opposition was unauthorized street demonstrations and riots.
The trouble began early in 1978, when police killed nine people during a demonstration in the holy city of Ghom, a traditional center of Shiite learning, located 75 miles south of Tehran. After observing the traditional 40 day Muslim mourning period for the victims, demonstrators took to the streets. Again several people were killed. On May 10, during observances for the death of Fatima, daughter of the prophet Mohammad, paratroopers entered the Ghom headquarters of Shariatmadari, which is considered a religious sanctuary. In this skirmish a theological student was shot and killed. The incident inflamed anti-government feelings in Ghom as never before. Realizing the sensitivity of the incident and its political implications, the government in an official announcement expressed "extreme regret" about the happening. The announcement said, "The officials were not from the local police force and did not recognize the confines of the property of the great spiritual leader."^73

Following the Ghom uprising, an anti-government riot, the biggest since Mossadegh's fall in 1953, took place in Tabriz, the provincial center of Eastern Azarbyjan, on the 28th of February, 1978. In the two-day riot, 11 people were killed and about 1000 people were arrested.^74 Damages to public and private properties were put at billions. The event which the government did not expect was very embarrassing to the Shah. The Chief of Police in East Azarbyjan was immediately dismissed for negligence, while Governor-General Eskandar Azmoudeh flew to Tehran in compliance
with an urgent summons. He later resigned from his post. In a similar development, the Tabriz Public Intelligence chief was also suspended from service. The Shah ordered that all officials found guilty of negligence during the Tabriz riots were to be punished.

Following the Tabriz disturbance, similar uprisings took place in other major Iranian cities. Nineteen big cities were struck by anti-government demonstrations and riots with the main targets said to be banks and public properties, where tens of people were killed and hundreds injured. The major cities of Ghom, Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, Tehran, Kerman, and Mashhad were the centers of unrest. During the same period, in Azarbyjan University in Tabriz, three students were shot to death as a result of a bloody confrontation with the police which further aggravated the situation. In all these cities disturbances followed religious worship services.

The opposition seemed to be more serious in its campaign against the regime than it was initially believed. It did not seem to be fading away. Resistance to government forces was becoming more frequent and almost a daily occurrence. Demonstrations and riots were breaking out nearly every day in the major Iranian cities. The recent ones occurred on July 31, in Ghom, Tehran, Shiraz and many other cities where hundreds were either arrested or injured. Different disturbances and anti-government demonstrations took place on August 1, where thousands of people across
the country were arrested and several people, including two policemen, were killed. In all of these cases, the riots broke out after mourning ceremonies for two high religious leaders both of whom had died of natural causes. These ceremonies had been followed by mass demonstrations which without exception erupted into violence.

The regime had responded to the opposition highhandedly. Besides confronting the opposition with all its forces, such as police and security forces, the regime had also resorted to psychological warfare against the opposition and had charged its leaders as foreign-inspired elements who had missions to hinder the country's progress towards its developmental goals. In a press conference, the Shah stated that, "They are the same gentlemen who raised glasses of wine in a toast to Pishevari more than 30 years ago." These people are politically bankrupt cases whose only hope is the dismemberment of Iran in the 1907 style," the Shah added. The recent riots, the Shah stressed, were the work of such people, those opposed to the very statehood of Iran. In a different statement the Shah said, "When we decided to introduce maximum freedom of expression, we knew well that the old unholy alliance of black reactionaries and red revolutionaries would get going again." The blacks and reds, the Shah added, had a common purpose: holding back Iran's progress and development. Nonetheless, the Shah stressed the point that riots were the price Iran must pay for the attainment of maximum freedom. "We will pursue our policy of liberalization because I want to do so," the Shah said.
Also in his speech at a mass rally in Tabriz, the Prime Minister, Amuzegar, referred to the root of the recent riots and disturbances and said, "the former colonial powers were now bent on creating internal discord and chaos in the Third World, in the hope that they can succeed in delaying the full political maturity and economic independence of the developing nations. These individuals have fallen victim to the instigations of the former colonial powers." 84

On May 11 the government announced it would no longer "tolerate disorder and rioting." The stern warning came after two days of bloody riots in June and July in scores of cities across the country. The announcement said, "The government has tried to be as moderate as possible in its approach to the problem. But the rioters have developed the mistaken view that the government has unlimited tolerance, and that they can continue their inhuman and anti-national activities whenever and wherever they want." 85 In a move to support the government policy the Shah, in an interview with journalists, stated that the government's pledge of tough measures against rioters in no way indicated a decision to slow down or halt political liberalization. Legal liberties would be expanded; but law-breaking and dastardly attacks on people's lives and property would be severely punished according to the law. 86

Neither of the political sides in the present Iranian conflict seemed to take a conciliatory approach to the existing inter-group problems. Each side charged the others of being a foreign-inspired
vandal and agent. Charges and counter-charges had naturally made it more difficult for the disputants to sit together and discuss their differences in a more peaceful manner and through negotiation. As a result, the politics of confrontation and violence had become the only channel of access open to the opposition.

**Liberalization Policy and "Cracks" in the Rastakhiz Party**

In an interview with Iranian journalists on May 14 the Shah, to everybody's surprise, stated that "The Rastakhiz Party has failed to realize the principles of Rastakhiz;" he also said that "this is not the kind of Rastakhiz which we were expecting." This was the first remark made by the Shah since the Rastakhiz Party was established in 1975 indicating its failure. The Shah's clear statement was widely interpreted.

One of the interpretations was that the Shah had given a green light to the dissatisfied elements, within and without the Rastakhiz party, to form their separate grouping if they wished to do so. But still the riddle was not completely solved, because it was not yet clear whether the groups were to be allowed to organize "inside" or "outside" of the party. If they were permitted to be organized out of the party, then the Rastakhiz party could not be assumed to be an "all embracing party," as the Monarch had repeatedly stated at earlier times.
However, the response to the Shah's statement was unexpectedly quick. Mohsen Pezeshkpour, the Majlis deputy from Khorramshahr and the leader of the dissolved Pan-Iranist Party, in a surprise move announced in the Majlis that "I remain in the Pan-Iranist party," which implicitly meant he was no longer a member of the Rastakhiz Party. Pezeshkpour said, "As true partisans we believe in the organic unity of the Iranian people, a coherent body which is indivisible. This is what every Iranian believes in. But since the Rastakhiz Party has forgotten this sacred principle, I can no longer remain in that party and declare, at this historical moment, that from now on I will continue my struggle in the ranks of the Pan-Iranist Party." So Pezeshkpour was the first to resign from the Rastakhiz party and reactivated, shortly after, his Pan-Iranist party. Later, two other Majlis deputies, Parviz Zafari, deputy for Nahavand, and Manouchehr Yazdi, deputy for Ardekan, both former members of the Pan-Iranist party, resigned from Rastakhiz and joined Pezeshkpour. One day later, Dr. Hossein Tabib, representative for Bushehr, also resigned and joined the Pan-Iranist grouping in the Majlis.

Another split occurred when Ahmad Bani Ahmad, a Majlis deputy for Tabriz, in cooperation with two other deputies, resigned from the Rastakhiz and formed a group which was later called the Social Democrats. Bani-Ahmad, considered by the press to be the leading figure in the new formation, began his opposition to Rastakhiz by bringing out some sensitive questions in the Majlis.
Bani-Ahmad raised numerous questions to be answered by the government spokesman in the Majlis, including such questions as "censorship of the press," "the sorry state of the country's universities," and "the attack on the residence of Ayatollah Shariatmadari in Ghom."

Later, Bani-Ahmad, in a statement released to the press announced, "At the moment, the right conditions do not exist for the establishment of a new political organization in Iran."

Bani-Ahmad's statement was directed against a recent remark by the Minister of Post, Telegraph, and Telephone, Karim Motamedi, who had said that "Representatives who have been voted into office by a nation of Rastakhiz members, and who then turn their backs upon the banner under which they were elected, should, at all costs, be replaced in their constituencies by candidates more deserving of the nation's sympathies." This idea was also similar to other government and party officials who had expressed the view that "All roads lead to the Rastakhiz Party." But Bani-Ahmad and his colleagues responded to this criticism by saying that "if we decided to form a new organization we certainly do not wait for an invitation."

It should be noted that all of those who had split from the Rastakhiz party had been elected under its banner to the parliament.

There were also rumors in government circles that "Those not joining the Rastakhiz party will be penalized." But Minister of Information Dariush Homayoun, in a press interview, denied the rumor and said, "Membership in the Rastakhiz Party has never been obligatory, and if some people decide not to remain in the party it is their
own affairs. When Homayoun was asked whether those dissenting from the party could hold government posts, he said, "Since the government and the party are closely interlinked, it is obvious that those who want to hold responsible posts in the government hierarchy have to be members of the party as well."

A different splinter group also appeared on the political scene, but unlike the previous groups, this one was formed in the Rastakhiz Party and was called The Third Wing.

The new wing, based on the Group for the Study of Iranian Problems, was led by Hushang Nahavandi. He was a cabinet minister at an earlier time and, successively, Chancellor of Pahlavi and Tehran Universities, before being appointed to his position as head of the Empress Farah's Special Bureau, a non-political post. The Group for the Study of Iranian Problems was composed of hundreds of university teachers, judges, lawyers, artists, poets, writers, physicians, engineers, and experts from both the private and public sectors from Tehran and the provinces. Thus, intellectuals, scholars, and university professors were considered to be the backbone of the Third Wing movement.

Unlike the party's two other wings, the Progressive and the Constructive wings, the Third Wing took a critical stand against government policies, both in political and non-political areas. The new wing also criticized the Rastakhiz's other two wings for becoming mere statement-issuing machines.
Nahavandi claimed that the Group would retain its independent identity while acting as a Rastakhiz wing. In a letter to the party leadership, Nahavandi stressed that the Group "Considered its structure, internal regulations, mode of operations, and independent identity as non-negotiable." Nahavandi later said, "We will exact from them (the Rastakhiz leadership) an open political atmosphere if they try to deny it to us." On June 28, the Political Bureau of the Rastakhiz Party, announced a new criteria governing the activities of the party wings. The criteria set by the Bureau satisfied the conditions demanded by the Third Wing.

The Nahavandi wing immediately set up several "research committees," on different national problems, and occasionally published its findings. For instance, in reference to its findings on recent unrest in Tabriz, the Wing claimed "The Tabriz riots of last February were the logical outcome of lower class frustrations and anger resulting from false promises by the government and humiliation by government departments." According to this report government departments in Tabriz had been notified in advance about people's grievances by the Group, but paid no attention. In a different report the Third Wing claimed "...the roots of unrest and cynicism in our people are to be found in the lack of true democracy in the country as originally promised by the Rastakhiz Party....Thus, it is highly irresponsible to characterize the riots in Tabriz and Ghom as being the work of a bunch of "traitors" and "hooligans" only, since it was people's cynicism and resentment
which provided the fertil ground for the rise of reactionary forces."104 A week earlier Nahavandi had said, "Iranian governments, during the Shah-People Revolution, overdid the task of buttering anti-revolutionaries during the early stage of the revolution, a mistake that has led to a dearth of capable politicians."105

Generally speaking, at the political surface the horizon for political expression seemed to be broader, more open and peopled with more vocal actors than when Rastakhiz was first established. There was a certain pull in the direction of fragmentation and the formation of splinter groups within the Rastakhiz Party in general and in the ruling elite in particular, as the defection by several parliamentary deputies from the party had already indicated.

Iran seemed to be headed once again toward a multi-party system. But the Shah apparently was not yet prepared to do so and seemed to be looking for opportunities to bring everything under his control again. On different occasions the Shah ruled out any possibility for multipartism. Even the government spokesman while defending the existing one-party system, believed that the condition for a multi-party system was not right. But "legal" political groups were free to function within the system. Minister of Information, Dariush Homayoun, told reporters that "Iran is a one-party country, but there are groups outside the party that could be tolerated."106 Similarly, Homayoun contested the critics' view that they had a legal right to work as full-fledged political parties. "When the constitution was formed in 1906, Iran had no
political parties and the whole idea was strange to Iran," Homayoun said. According to him, the Iranian constitution provided only for the "group" but not for the parties. However, the Rastakhiz defectors faced strong opposition by the Rastakhiz leadership, Majlis and the government. The splinter groups were labeled as "traitors," "disloyal," "foreign agents," "opportunists" and "unpatriotic." For instance, the Rastakhiz Party's Executive Board condemned the defectors and harshly criticized all actions leading to division and fragmentation in the party's ranks. The Executive Board's remark was the party's first official reaction to recent defections, which was interpreted as a move to discourage further potential renegades. Condemnation of the defectors came from other quarters as well. The Majlis, for instance, witnessed a great deal of shouting and commotion. Passions were aroused, and in one of its scaffling meetings the Speaker himself quit the session thus bringing the official proceeding to a halt. Participants in a public meeting in Khorramshahr, organized by the local branch of the Rastakhiz Party, attacked Pezeshkpour, the city's representative in the Majlis, and declared that Pezeshkpour would no longer represent the city in the Majlis. Similar meetings were organized by the party in other cities where their representatives had defected from the Rastakhiz Party.
Steps Toward Further Liberalization

From the early part of June 1978, the Shah made several significant decisions which were interpreted as further steps toward the realization of his policy of political liberalization.

On June 6, General Nematollah Nassiri, Director of the State Security and Intelligence Organization, was transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Ambassador to Pakistan, by the Shah.110 The General, 71, had held many posts in his long military career. He was Commander of the Imperial Guards, the Shah's Special Adjutant, and the State Police Chief before being appointed director of SAVAK in 1965, a post he retained until his ambassadorial appointment.111

Nassiri was considered a loyal officer to the Shah. He was highly conservative and an advocate of tough measures against the opponents and dissenters. He kept tight control over the operation of the security organizations. Nassiri was frequently charged by the regime's opponents for "torturing" political prisoners, and was accused of being responsible for the disappearances and death of tens of individuals in the Iranian prisons. The charge was generally cast by the Iranian political activists living abroad, particularly in the United States and Europe.

Nassiri was replaced by Lieutenant General Nasser Moghadam as the new head of the State Security and Intelligence Organization.112 Moghadam was formerly head of Military Intelligence, and
was also Special Adjutant to the Shah. It has been said that Moghadam was a relatively liberal man and was opposed to torture and rough treatment against political prisoners. Also, General Ali Motazed, an assistant director of SAVAK resigned from his post and was given an ambassadorial position to Syria. These changes in the security organization were generally interpreted as a move by the Shah toward further relaxation of government control over the regime's opponents and dissenters.

On June 6 Minister of Justice, Gholam Reza Kianpour, reported that the procedures at military tribunals would be revised "for a better realization of the rule of law." Kianpour added that in the past only military lawyers had the right to defend those on trial by military tribunals, but this had to be challenged so that non-military lawyers will be able to defend those on trial. The proposed changes in trial procedure were detailed in a statement issued by the ministry.

On July 12 Prime Minister Amuzegar told the reporters that "Political demonstrations will be legalized." The Premier added that the Ministry of Justice will soon present to the Majlis a bill concerning the legal framework for political associations and political demonstrations.

On June 28 the government decided to give universities, colleges, and other institutions of higher education autonomous statutes. Formerly these institutions were operating under the supervision of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. Boards
of Trustees in all of these institutions generally included two or three government ministers. It was also the Minister of Higher Education who usually appointed the heads of universities and colleges. In the past, this system often culminated not only in a communication gap between the government and the faculty, but was also a source of discontent between the student and faculty, faculty and administration, and the government and universities. Bloody confrontations between the students and government forces have always been, and still are, a common feature of Iranian colleges and universities. The recent government decision to offer the higher education institutions independent status was interpreted as another step toward further liberalization.

On June 28, 1978, the Political Bureau of the Rastakhiz Party introduced new criteria governing the activities of the party wings. The announcement came in a letter addressed to the wing coordinators by the Prime Minister and Secretary General of the Rastakhiz Party, Jamshid Amuzegar. According to the new criteria the wings:

- Had the right to comment on all executive affairs and could criticize their shortcomings.

- Could organize discussion groups and publicize their views, which were the best ways to combat anti-state ideologies.

- Could have their own particular interpretation of the principles of Rastakhiz and could propose programs based on the philosophy of the Shah-People Revolution.
- Could criticize shortcomings in government policies and their deviations from the principles of Rastakhiz.

- Should play a more active role in the nation's political education.

- Could organize public discussions to propagate their views.

- Could organize their own branches in the provinces.

- Could have their own secretaries.117

The significance of the new regulations lay in the fact that they were issued at all. The Political Bureau declaration had been occasioned by the prospect of the establishment of a new party wing, the Nahavandi's Third Wing. However, there was nothing in the regulations in the past to prevent the party wings from acting with energy and imagination, and from taking the initiative in proposing programs and organizing followers.

Another event which was largely interpreted as an indication of the new liberalizing trend was the resignation of the Rastakhiz wing leaders. The coordinators of the two wings--Houshang Ansari, the coordinator of the Constructive Wing, and Abdol Majid Majidi, the coordinator of the Progressive Wing--resigned from their party position within a week. Both wing leaders found that "...the burden of their official duties in these organizations militates against their devoting as much time as they believe necessary to party affairs and the business of the party wings."118 Majidi was also Managing Director of the Empress Farah Foundation. And Ansari
headed the National Iranian Oil Company.

Shortly after, the Constructive Wing acquired as its coordinator Ghassem Mo'ini, the Minister of Labour. The Progressive Wing acquired as its coordinator Senator Nasrollah Mojdehi, a one-time university chancellor. Mo'ini, in a speech after being elected by the wing members said the wing would continue to promote the growth of legal freedom in Iran. He also added that, "Support for individual liberties, free debate, free press, a common sense approach to social problems and national unity, would continue to dominate the wing's political activities." The speech by the new wing coordinators was interpreted as a sign of change in Rastakhiz politics.

Another event which was also indicative of change in Rastakhiz politics was the resignation of some of the top party officers from the party. These officers were generally identified with the policies of Rastakhiz prior to the time when the new liberalization approach was adopted.

Deputy Secretary General of the Rastakhiz Party, Mohammad Reza Ameli Tehrani, and Deputy Secretary General Mohammad Hossein Moussavi resigned from their party positions in mid-July. In the resignation note handed to the party, they denied "any disagreement with the party." Mahmoud Jaafarian, the only remaining Deputy Secretary General of the party, was also expected to leave soon; but in a press release he denied the rumors about his resignation.
On August 5, 1978, the Shah, in his Constitutional Day message to the nation, stated that the next parliamentary elections will be "absolutely and 100 percent free, and everyone may vote, and his vote should be counted." Referring to the freedom of the press, freedom of speech and assembly, the Shah said "They will be as free as in democratic European nations, and subject to the same limits." "Democracy, in the final analysis, is the rule of the ballot box...and we accept the people's vote...but one may not turn the Monarchy, the Throne and the destiny of Iran into the playings of a handful of people."

Counter-Elite Rejects the Shah's Liberalization Policy

Political changes brought about by the Shah's liberalization policy were highly suspect by the opposition who were demanding immediate structural changes. The Shah believed that the transfer of power to the opposition should be conducted in a gradual and peaceful manner. Therefore the Shah was not prepared to satisfy his opponents because an immediate change would have been suicidal. It seemed that the Shah had failed to grasp the depth of opposition to his regime and was moving very slowly. There was nothing to indicate that a tangible political change had occurred in the Iranian political system. And the liberalization policy had never gone beyond the public statements and speeches made by the government officials. As a result, the opposition mounted its pressures on
the Shah and his government for total transition of power, while the Shah, with his back to the wall, resisted the demands by bringing his army into the streets. The stage was set for a political show-down.

Two incidents occurred during the last two weeks of August, 1978, which contributed much to the deepening of the then existing crisis. These events, which I will briefly refer to, was so sudden and unexpected that they not only caused the fall of the Amuzegar Government, but also jeopardized the very existence of the political regime.

The Isfahan Uprising

On August 10 thousands of Isfahanis in the provincial center of Isfahan, the central section of Iran, took to the streets demonstrating and shouting anti-regime slogans. They attacked buildings, set fire to banks, hotels, shops, cinemas and cars, and engaged in gunfight battles with the police. In this riot, some 200 vehicles were burned, scores of people were killed and hundreds injured. The rioters were demanding the implementation of the Iranian Constitution and government by the Islamic codes. The magnitude of the disturbance was so broad that it engulfed not only the whole city of Isfahan but affected other cities and towns around it as well. The local authorities, incapable of controlling the situation, decided to request permission to impose martial law
on Isfahan and three surrounding cities, which the request was immediately granted by the Shah. Also a night-to-dawn curfew was imposed on the cities.

Isfahan's martial law administrator, Major General Reza Naji, blamed the uprising on a "group of religious fanatics" and "Islamic Marxists." The Shah also condemned the Isfahan incident and stated that the communists were behind the recent violence not only in Isfahan but all over the country. He said the plot was the same as the one cooked up by the outlawed Tudeh Party in 1953. The Shah added that "We offer the people the Great Civilization with all its benefits. They (the opposition) offer the Great Terror." The official government view was also expressed by the Minister of Information and Tourism, Dariush Homayoun, who interpreted the Isfahan disturbance as the work of conspirators who were trying to "derail the process of liberalization."

The impression was general that the government officials were trying to underrate the significance of what had happened in Isfahan, and lately in Tabriz and elsewhere, and by doing this hoped to undervalue the actual political strength of the opposition groups. But as we shall see in the case of the Abadan Cinema Rex fire incident, the government was forced to acknowledge the depth of public discontent against the regime and accordingly tried to establish a dialogue with the opposition leaders. The Cinema Rex blaze in Abadan which immediately followed the Isfahan uprising
considerably accelerated this process and changed the government's attitude toward the opposition.

Abadan Rex Cinema Fire

On August 19, 1978, an explosion took place in the Cinema Rex of Abadan, the oil city of Abadan in southern Iran, killing about 400 people. This ranked as one of the worst "terrorist" acts in history. The holocaust stunned Iranians from all walks of life.

Government spokesman, Dariush Homayoun, immediately blamed the arson on the opposition and tried, implicitly, to implicate the communists and the clergy in this incident. Radio Iran stopped its regular programs and declared "The slaughter of innocents in Abadan has plunged all Iran into mourning." The Shah, in a message to the victim's relatives, condemned the brutal act and declared that those responsible would be punished severely. His wife, Farah, also issued strict instructions to ensure the welfare of the victim's relatives. Prime Minister Amouzegar and other prominent government officials expressed shock and indignation over the tragedy.

By the manner in which the Rex Cinema fire was treated, it was apparent that the government was trying to capitalize on the event and implicate the opposition leaders as those responsible for the blaze. For instance, Dariush Homayoun, government spokesman, and the government controlled the press, frequently cited a news report
which said "More than 2,000 people reportedly gathered in front of Abadan police headquarters demanding punishment for the arsonists. People also demanded the expulsion of preachers who had urged people to go to mosques for prayer instead of going to the movies...the demonstrators put the brunt of the blame on these preachers."133

Also, Abadan Police Chief, General Reza Razmi, told a news conference that "The anti-reform radicals were behind these brutalities."134

In a different news release the government spokesman, Homayoun, called on all political groups in the country, whether right or left, to "clarify" their position on such barbarism, since "the nation had the right to know where they stood."135 The purpose of all these interviews and news releases had been to exonerate the government and implicate the opposition.

On the other extreme, the opposition leaders quickly denied the charges. Ayatollah Shariatmadari, in a message to the victims' families said that he was "grieved, sorrowful and shocked by the tragedy." He condemned the perpetrators as "hot-headed people with whom we have no link whatsoever."136 Shariatmadari clearly stated that "the clergy bore no responsibility."137 Ayatollah Khomeini, who was then in exile in Iraq, in a message to the Iranian people said, "There are indications that the fire in Abadan was started by the government."138 Dr. Karim Sanjabi, the Secretary General of the National Front, in a news conference similarly implied that the government itself might be responsible for the blaze. "We have no proof, but it does remind me of the Reichstag," said Sanjabi.139
He charged the government with instigating a "reign of terror and deception."\textsuperscript{140}

In the meantime, a five-man commission was appointed by Prime Minister Amuzegar to look at the incident. The commission, in less than a week, reported to the Premier that the fire in Cinema Rex was "a case of arson."\textsuperscript{141} Suspecting the government's intention, Ayatollah Shariatmadari sent an inquiry team of his own to Abadan. The Ayatollah said that he would make a final judgment on the causes and those responsible after the team completed its investigation.\textsuperscript{142} Meanwhile, the Iran Association of Jurists, in an open letter issued on August 25, claimed that the government, "...sitting in the seat of the accused," was not qualified to investigate the fire.\textsuperscript{143} "Any report prepared by the government should be considered invalid," said the letter.\textsuperscript{144} Accusing the government of trying to make political capital out of the fire, the letter ended with a call to "representatives of all national associations and democratic groups," including the international jurists' associations and human rights groups, to investigate the fire.\textsuperscript{145}

At the beginning when the fire broke out in the Cinema Rex, the public reaction to the incident was one of shock and dismay, without demonstrating a tendency to attribute the responsibility for the blaze to any particular source or group. But when the government, with its full control over the media of communication in the country, particularly radio and television networks, widely
publicized the incident and shrewdly tried to implicate the opposition, public sentiment suddenly turned against the government. Rumors immediately circulated across the country that the government and the SAVAK were responsible for the holocaust.¹⁴⁶

The clergy was particularly responsible for swift circulation of the rumors. Religious centers with informal but well established organizations built around thousands of mullahs were used as sources of information by the people. It should be remembered that what made it easier for the opposition to rally the public behind itself by capitalizing on the fire incident was the fact that the tragedy of Cinema Rex coincided with the holy month of Ramazan, when Muslims gather at mosques around the country to commemorate the death of Imam Ali who was martyred more than 1,300 years ago.

Believing the government was behind the blaze incident, people took to the streets everywhere with the city of Abadan in the forefront, shouting anti-Shah slogans. In Abadan thousands of angry mourners demonstrated in the streets, charging official incompetence in dealing with disaster, and engaged in wrecking, burning and shooting. They charged the officials with slowness in tackling the blaze and rescuing those trapped.¹⁴⁷ To appease the public resentment, General Ramzi, Abadan's Chief of Police, was summoned to Tehran to give an account of the accusations that the police force blocked rescue attempts by people outside the cinema.¹⁴⁸

Within hours of the Abadan skirmish, anti-government riots quickly spread all over the country, where people attacked public...
and private properties and scuffled with police. The extent of disturbances in many areas were so serious that local police were incapable of handling the situation alone. The army was called in to help the police. What seemed to be frightening was a sequence of bomb explosions and blazes set all over the territory.

The country was in a real crisis. The government seemed to have lost its control over the nation. Police failure to settle the disturbances and the government's inability to produce any evidence to prove its innocence in the Abadan incident eventually forced Jamshid Amuzegar to resign. This was the Shah's first setback in his dealing with the opposition.

The Shah's New Government: Further Concessions to the Counter-Elite

The new government appointed by the Shah was headed by Senate President Jaafar Sharif-Emami, who took charge on August 27, 1978, and announced his government to be "a government of national reconciliation." From the beginning Sharif-Emami kept away from the Rastakhiz Party and had decided not to be identified with the party's past three year record. The members of his cabinet were primarily of non-Rastakhiz elements. It was like such a party had never existed before.

In his first public statement Sharif-Emami declared that all political parties, underground or otherwise, were legal and free
to organize and publicize their views. No mention, however, was made of the Tudeh party. Similarly, Manouchehr Azmoun, the new minister of State for Executive Affairs, speaking to reporters said that "from now on the Rastakhiz Party will be one among many parties in the country, and will be treated as such by the new government." According to Azmoun, political parties were free to participate in the political process because "Our Constitution has already emphasized the freedom of political parties." This statement was in contrast to the position taken by ex-premier Jamshid Amuzegar. Azmoun also acknowledged that the Rastakhiz Party had failed in its mission, and if it was to continue as a party it had to seek the public's confidence.

In a televised press conference Sharif-Emami said that his first aim was to restore calm after a long period of unrest in the country. His second aim, he said, was to establish a dialogue with the opposition leaders. Sharif-Emami also said that his government would ask the opposition leaders to organize themselves so that they could be put on a ladder of importance in the discussions with the government. "If they give us constructive suggestions we will accept them. But if they ask us to do something that is beyond our means, we will have to point out to them that their suggestion or proposal cannot be accepted because of certain reasons which we will give them." It was reported at the time that the new premier had already made contacts with religious and other opposition leaders, including the National Front. There was
also a report that the government has sent a mission to Iraq to seek the return of exiled religious leader Ayatollah Komeini.156

The new premier, in his first day of office, made several rather important decisions which were interpreted as initial concessions to the opposition, particularly the clergy. They were as follows:

- Create a ministry to handle religious affairs; the ministry will then draw its inspirations from the dictates of Islam and the Iranian Constitution.157

- The Ministry of Endowment will administer revenues from endowed properties for financing theology schools, maintaining shrines and mosques, and financing scholarships for theology students.

- The Government reverted to the Islamic solar calendar and scrapped the imperial calendar imposed two years ago by the Government of Hoveyda. Under the Islamic calendar, which marks time from the date of the immigration of Prophet Mohammad from Mecca to Medina, the year is 1357; whereas under the imperial calendar, based on the start of the reign of Cyrus the Great, the year is 2537. The calendar had been one of the points of contention between the clergy and the government since 1976. The clergy considered the imperial calendar as related to the Guebres (Zoroastrians). Government ministries, departments, organizations and private companies were asked to revert to the Islamic solar calendar.158

- Casinos and gambling houses were ordered to close down.

- Political parties were freed and permitted to operate; anyone could form a political party or belong to one "as long as he stayed within the constitution."
- The Government promised complete freedom of the press, the reinstatement of expelled university students and professors and the prosecution of those who were responsible for the bloody incidents of recent months.159

- The Government also promised 100 percent free national elections for the Majlis and an end to interference with the judicial system.

The opposition leaders, however, did not respond favorably to the new government offers. And despite the conciliatory gesture by Sharif-Emami, the opposition suspected the Premier's offer as a political trap by the Shah, and continued its opposition to the regime even more strongly than before.

Sharif-Emami, in his public speeches, frequently claimed that his government was busy trying to communicate with opposition leaders in order to clear up intergroup differences. But from the beginning his attempt was doomed to failure. Ayatollah Shariatmadari, a moderate clergyman, refused to negotiate with the government and stated that "There is nothing to negotiate; both our political and religious demands are made in the constitution which must be followed by the government. This is the solution to the Iranian crisis, not negotiation."160 The spokesman for the National Front, Dariush Forouhar, in a public statement said that his group could not compromise with "those" whose lives had been dedicated to the violation of the rights of the people.161 Referring to the new government's strategy of national reconciliation, Forouhar said it was naive to think that people had shed their blood for a simple change in the very foundation of the present political system."162
The Tudeh party too, in a statement issued by its Central Committee, on September 5, 1978, called for the formation of a "united front" government. The party in the statement urged the following 9-point plan for the proposed coalition:

- Overturning of the regime
- Trial and punishment of the principal leaders of the regime
- Abrogation of all laws contrary to the constitution as well as laws restricting liberties and fundamental rights of the individuals
- Dissolution of the Majlis and Senate and disbanding of the political police
- Convening of a Constituent Assembly
- Implementation of laws for the nationalization of oil industries
- Dismissal of American military advisors; abrogation of U.S.-Iran military pact; and Iranian withdrawal from Cento
- Expropriation of pockets of amassed wealth
- Rejecting of "open door" economic policy,163

Other smaller groups, such as the Unity for Liberty Society, led by dissident Majlis deputy Ahmad Bani Ahmad, and the Iranian Radical Movement led by Moghadam, a jurist, and a variety of different groups took a similar position against the Sharif-Emami's government.

Except for the Tudeh Party, which demanded the immediate overthrow of the regime, opposition groups had one thing in common--full implementation of the Iranian Constitution by the Shah. This meant that the Shah was to be stripped of all his political powers
which were considered unconstitutional. And this was what the Shah was not yet prepared for.

In the face of mounting pressures by the opposition and its unreconcilable position, the Shah similarly hardened his attitude. In one of his interviews with journalists the Shah clearly stated that "There is nothing to negotiate."164

National elections scheduled for July, 1978 were considered to be a significant turning point for Iranian politics. The Shah had said that the elections would be 100 percent free. And the opposition leaders had made it clear that the elections should be held under a government acceptable to them; otherwise the elections would be boycotted. But the subsequent political events which swept the country after September 1978 not only destroyed the chance for holding a national election for the Majlis but also changed the nature of the political issues at hand. There was no longer a demand for constitutional government. The issue was transformed into a slogan for an Islamic republic. Now the opposition demand was concentrated on the issue to abolish the monarchical system and replace it with an Islamic republic.

Politics of Confrontation: A Prelude to the Collapse of Pahlavi Dynasty

Based on the statements made by different group leaderships, the hope for the establishment of a government of national
reconciliation was dashed. Therefore an early confrontation between the Shah, on one hand, and the opposition, on the other was imminent.

On September 2, 1978, the opposition leaders called people for an anti-government demonstration. Over three million Iranians, after a mass prayer meeting marking Eide Fetr, the end of the holy month of Ramazan, took to the streets, marching in the cities and shouting anti-Shah slogans. In terms of the number of participants the event was unprecedented and highly impressive. At the end of the march in Tehran the opposition leaders called for a national strike and public shutdown to take place on Thursday, September 7. On Wednesday, September 6, the Sharif-Emami's government, apprehensive about the opposition's show of strength, in a communique warned that "all unauthorized demonstrations will be severely prevented." Despite the government's warning the call for the strike was totally successful. In massive demonstrations in defiance of the government over a million people in Tehran and millions in other major cities across the country observed the call while supporting the opposition by shouting anti-Shah and anti-regime slogans. These demonstrations were widely interpreted by the opposition leaders as a "vote of no confidence" for the Pahlavi dynasty. What was more important was the politicization and radicalization of the Iranian public. This was probably a reaction to the long repressed feelings for expression and freedom denied to them by the regime.
Incapable of establishing "law and order," the government, on September 8, imposed martial law and a dusk-to-dawn curfew in Tehran and eleven other major cities. Despite the martial law, street demonstrations continued. As a consequence, a bloody confrontation took place in Tehran between the demonstrators and the army on September 8, known as Black Friday. According to opposition figures, 5000 people lost their lives. This incident not only caused the fall of Sharif-Emami's government but also put the continuity of the Pahlavi dynasty in doubt.

In order to counter the mounting opposition to his rule and show that he was not going to be moved by such opposition, instead of trying to find a way out of the crisis, the Shah resorted to a military solution. In mid-November, he asked Sharif-Emami's government to resign, and at the same time appointed General Gholam Reza Azhari, chief of staff of the armed forces, as a new Prime Minister. The appointment of a military government also meant that communication between the Shah and his opponents had broken down, because the Shah's decision did not help in any way to improve the situation. In fact it had fueled the crisis. But in a televised speech the Shah said that he had "understood the public message," and he was trying hard to put together a coalition government that would be acceptable to his opponents. Therefore, he said that the military government was not going to stay long and was temporary. Meanwhile, the Shah asked Karim Sanjabi, the leader of the opposition National Front, to head a government. Sanjabi rejected
the offer and instead went to Paris and pledged his loyalty to Ayatollah Khomeini. He stated that he "would never join a coalition government under the present illegal regime." A week later the Shah asked another leader of the National Front, Dr. Gholam Hossein Sadighi, a former Interior Minister in Mossadegh's cabinet in 1953, to recruit a new government of leaders untainted by prior connections with the Pahlavi dynasty. But that effort also collapsed after Sadighi succumbed to threats or reprisal from the Shah's most relentless opponents. So the Shah made one more desperate effort to mollify his opponents through compromise. He asked one of his leading critics, Shahpour Bakhtiar, to form a civilian government that would replace the military regime. Bakhtiar was the leader of the Iran Party and acting chairman of the National Front. In intense bargaining with the Shah Bakhtiar was successful in procuring several important concessions from the Shah. The Shah agreed to relinquish his control over the armed forces and accept the proposition to take a "temporary absence" from Iran so that order could be restored.

In the meantime, Bakhtiar tried hard to win popular support for his government. He tried to put into effect the long-delayed programs for the country suggested by the National Front, since the Mossadegh government. His plan was to establish a social democratic system for Iran. He invited all political groups to help him in this task. What was important for Bakhtiar at this time was the Shah's departure from the country, which took place on January
16, 1979. With the Shah gone and the armed forces under his control, the Prime Minister invited all political groups to assist him in diffusing the political crisis. His aim, as he frequently stated in his public speeches, was to push the country toward the road to social democracy and to revive the Iranian economy. But Khomeini and a significant segment of the National Front leadership rejected Bakhtiar's bid for compromise. The National Front, instead of cooperating with Bakhtiar, expelled him from the movement.

The National Front, in a communique, accused Bakhtiar of collusion with the Shah and American imperialism and charged him with accepting the position of Premiershipt without prior consultation with the Front. Also, Khomeini contended that "the monarchical regime was itself illegal and that a government (Bakhtiar) blessed by the Shah cannot claim to have legitimacy."173 But Bakhtiar disputed the accusation and contended that his government stood by its constitutional right and had received its legitimacy to rule the country from the Majlis. However, he made a dramatic bid to break the impass between him and the clergy led by Ayatollah Khomeini. He offered to meet the Ayatollah in Paris. But Khomeini's answer was uncompromising; he refused to be "part of any deal with the illegal government of Bakhtiar." He stated that he would never receive Bakhtiar unless he first submitted his resignation.174 Khomeini told reporters that "I have said repeatedly that the deposed Shah was illegal, the Majlis was illegal, the government of Bakhtiar was illegal, and those who are illegal
I will not accept.\textsuperscript{175} Certainly this was a position that admitted of no negotiation and no compromise. It amounted to a demand that Bakhtiar should vacate the Prime Minister's office and let Khomeini's man take his place. But Bakhtiar refused to be a part of such an arrangement. He insisted on observing the constitutional legalities. Actually, Bakhtiar was privately trying to negotiate an arrangement whereby he might resign in favor of Ayatollah Khomeini's forces in such a way as to make a peaceful transition of power possible without any bloodshed. If he could have reached some kind of compromise with Khomeini and the National Front forces he could have probably brought the country peacefully to a referendum on a new constitution. Bakhtiar had publically told the Majlis that he had informed Ayatollah Khomeini that he was willing "to do everything within the framework of the constitution." But Khomeini, suspicious of Bakhtiar's motives, accused the Prime Minister of plotting with the United States and Britain to ensure foreign domination of Iran.\textsuperscript{176}

Almost two weeks after the Shah's departure, Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran. Iron-willed, he gave little hint of compromise. Instead, to counter Bakhtiar's government, he immediately created a Revolutionary Council which, in turn, appointed a caretaker government headed by Mehdi Bazargan, the leader of the Freedom Movement who "temporarily left his party" to assist the Ayatollah's movement. Bazargan was widely respected in Iran for his long record of opposition to the Shah. He was also a very religiously oriented personality but with limited capabilities.
The aim of Khomeini's provisional government was to hold a public referendum on a new political regime and a new constitution.

In a speech made at the University of Tehran, Bazargan called on Bakhtiar to step down. But Bakhtiar, while rejecting Bazargan, insisted on his previous position that any transfer of power should be done in accordance with the 1906 constitution. Bakhtiar's insistence on upholding the constitution was widely thought by his opponents to mean that he was supporting the Pahlavi dynasty. Privately, however, he had acknowledged that Iran would be better off as a republic with a new constitution, and had indicated his willingness to go along with a referendum in which the nation would vote on whether to declare itself a republic or not.177

What had aggravated the situation was the fact that the country had two governments; one was headed by Bazargan, the Khomeini-appointed government, and the other one by Bakhtiar, the Shah's appointed government. In order to keep himself in power, Bakhtiar had turned the constitution into a bastion as a means of legitimizing his regime. Bazargan similarly claimed that his government was the only legitimate government of Iran which derived its authority from the public will (the Revolutionary Council, its members appointed by Ayatollah Khomeini). Both governments claimed the exclusive right to gauge the will of the people. With no compromise in sight the country was headed toward a bloody confrontation. It should be noted that the Bakhtiar government was supported by the army and scattered forces of social democrats.
But that was exactly where his authority ended. The civil service, industry and business took its orders from the opposition. Insistence on the Constitution for Bakhtiar was, therefore, tantamount to a refusal to recognize the wishes of the people. Whereas total indifference to the constitution, for Khomeini, was a means of starting a civil war. As an observer, it seemed to me that a referendum was the best possible means to avert a civil war. To hold a referendum was the only means of deciding the issue, respecting the will of the people, and allowing all sides to get out of the impass without loss of face. In fact, positions taken by both sides were not irreconcilable. Bakhtiar had publicly stated that he would accept a republican regime provided it came about in a legal and peaceful manner. He had also assured the Ayatollah Khomeini supporters that the army would go along with the switches from the monarchy to the republic on the same condition. However, neither party was ready to compromise. Bakhtiar said "I will not leave the fortress of the Constitution," and Ayatollah Khomeini announced, "Bakhtiar should go." It was an incurable deadlock. Therefore, a confrontation was imminent.

In the early morning of February 10 a fight broke out within the air force base in Doshan Tappeh, on the westside of Tehran, between pro and anti-Khomeini air force cadets. In this skirmish the units of the Imperial Guards sided with the Bakhtiar forces. The fighting shortly spread all over the capital city. And after two days of bloody confrontation, the army withdrew to the few
garrisons it still held with a pledge to remain neutral and keep out of politics. Eventually the government of Shahpour Bakhtiar collapsed on February 12, 1979, as a result of this confrontation. The fall of the Bakhtiar government also meant not only the end of Pahlavi dynasty but the end of the monarchical system in a land ruled by kings for more than 2,500 years.

The collapse of the Pahlavi regime, I believe, was primarily due to the absence of political flexibility and compromise among the contending group leaderships. This should not mean that in Iranian politics no compromise ever takes place. It means that at the national level significant political issues which are more visible and complex and require a greater extent of mutual assistance and sacrifice, the major goal for individual political contenders, becomes one of political domination rather than cooperation.

Since 1949, particularly during the Mossadegh era, the Shah was always reluctant to have a serious political discourse with those opposed to his regime. He frequently and indiscriminately labeled all of his opponents as traitors, Russian agents, Marxists, and so on. He never trusted his opponents, even the moderate factions of the National Front who were more reformist than revolutionary. He concentrated all political powers in his own hands, dominated national politics for almost 40 years and ruled the country as a dictator. He thought he was always right and his opponents always wrong. He was highly power oriented and looked at his subjects as though they were cattle. He never thought
of any compromise with his "enemies" who were everywhere trying
to "get him." He showed signs of compromise only when he realized
that there was practically no hope to save his throne.

When the Amuzegar government resigned in mid-spring of 1978,
there came into being a situation in the country which was ripe
for the formation of a national coalition, but the Shah and his
close advisors missed the opportunity. Before the situation got
out of hand the Shah repeatedly rejected any communication with
his opponents, and frequently stated that "there was no way to
negotiate with them." He often said that he would never give up
his "constitutional role" as commander-in-chief of the army, which
was one of the demands made by Karim Sanjabi when he was asked to
head a government. And when the Shah decided to give in to his
opponents by seeking a strong premier who enjoyed widespread support
from the government, it was already too late because such a man
was hard to find. He had done so much to destroy any meaningful
opposition in the country. Besides that, the months of increasing
violence had so hardened the position of the Shah's opponents that
a desire for compromise proved to be too late.

The same things should be said about the group leaderships
who opposed the Shah's rule. They similarly lacked ideological
flexibility and missed opportunities to reach a settlement with
the Shah without destroying the regime. From his headquarters in
Nejaf (in Iraq) and later in Paris, Ayatollah Khomeini
persistently demanded his followers "to paralyze the regime,"
"bring down the Shah," "flee your barracks," and "stick to strikes."

He rejected almost every offer made by the Shah. To compromise with the Shah was to make a deal with Satan. And this was against God's will. Even a moderate National Front leader, such as Sanjabi, failed to sense the then existing political situation by being drawn into political extremism, disregarding his own principles of social democracy for which he had fought so long.

Both the Shah and his opponents had one thing in common: to destroy the other contenders in order to win the game. Each of the contenders wanted a total victory over his opponents. This has been the familiar pattern we observed in Iranian politics since the constitutional revolution of 1906.
NOTES CHAPTER 7


3. Ibid., March 2, 1975.


6. For instance, the Iran Nowin, the majority party, Mardom, the minority party, and two others, the Iranians and the Pan-Iranist parties, announced that they had failed to build a mass base or to provide effective leadership for the people. See Hassan Mohammadi Nejad, "The Iranian Parliamentary Elections of 1975," in International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 8, (January 1977), p. 105.


8. Ibid.


10. Ibid., July 26, 1976.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Political consultations in the interim period witnessed the emergence of several different trends. There was, first of all, a silent majority which either because of its particular passive political culture and also because of its past political disappointments, seemed to refuse to move into action. Second, there were the established conservatives who viewed the new party as a possible threat to their own positions; but in order to secure their
prerogatives and power positions, they supported the move. And finally, there were genuine opposition groups, who considered the formation of a single party system for the country, as either unconstitutional or as a beginning for a tighter political control.


15. These groups were: the clergy, workers, farmers, guilds, educators, and free traders.

16. For a detailed information on candidate selections and procedures, see Daryoush Homayoun, Hezbe Faragirandeye Mellate Iran (The Encompassing Party of Iranian Nation), Tehran, pp. 131-138. Also see Mohammadi Nejad, *op cit.*, p. 106.


18. The total population of Iran, in 1975, was estimated at about 35 million. The minimum voting age for the Majlis election was 20, and for the Senate 25.

19. The Senate had 60 members 30 of which were elective and the remaining 30 were appointed by the Shah.


24. For instance, Mohammad Fazaeli, the last Secretary-General of Mardom Party, Holakoy Rambod, Mardom's minority leader in the Majlis, and Mostafa Alamouti, the Iran Nowin's majority leader in the Majlis, were among the candidates. For the complete list of candidates see Hassan Mohammadi Nejad, *op cit.*, pp. 111-116.


29. I attended several chapter meetings in Tehran and found many participants disappointed with the way the chapters conducted their business. Many did not take the business very seriously. Many said they were called to attend the meetings.

30. For this argument, see Kayhan International, January 12, 1976, p. 3.

31. Amuzegar at one time was a minister of Agriculture; later he was appointed as Minister of Labor, and under Hoveyda's different cabinets, he was selected as the minister of health. At another time, Amuzegar became Minister of Finance, a position he held for nine years. It was during his term as Minister of Finance that Amuzegar succeeded in distinguishing himself as a capable negotiator in international issues related to oil. He then headed the Iranian missions to OPEC and other oil conferences in the world.


33. Ibid., November 18, 1977.

34. Ibid., January 12, 1977.

35. Ibid., August 7, 1977.

36. Mohammad Baheri had been a professor of law and criminology in political science department, at the University of Tehran for 20 years. He had also been a minister of justice in Assadollah Alam's cabinet during 1962-64. The rumor had it that Baheri, before becoming a staunch supporter of the Shah's regime, was a member of the Tudeh party who was later pardoned.


38. For a detailed information on these committees see Kayhan International, September 26, 1977, p. 3.


40. Ibid., October 5, 1977, p. 3.

41. Ibid., January 17, 1977, p. 3.

42. Ibid., December 27, 1977.
43. Ibid., January 5, 1978.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., December 27, 1977, p. 3.
47. For more details, concerning the background of these deputies see Kayhan International, January 17, 1978. It should be stated that Mohammad Reza Ameli Tehrani, Mohammad Hossein Mousavi and Mahmoud Jaafarian were executed by the Revolutionary Council in April 1979, just after the establishment of Islamic Republic.
48. Ibid., July 26, 1976, p. 4.
49. Ibid.
52. Ibid., pp. 118-124.
53. Ibid., pp. 63, 97, 79-81.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid., September 19, 1977, p. 4.
57. Ibid.
58. In Tehran's political circles, two kinds of explanations for the emerging strategy of "political liberalization" were suggested. One was a pressure allegedly was exerted on Iranian politics by U.S. President Jimmy Carter, as a result of his policy of Human Rights. And the second, was related to the existing discontent and tension among Iranian intellectuals, the clergy, and the students who had formed a united front against the Shah's regime.
59. For a review of the Shah's chronological statements on liberalization policy, see a pamphlet issued by the Progressive Wing of the Rastakhiz Party (First Booklet, 1977), Tehran.

61. Ibid.


63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.


68. See chapters 4 and 5 in this work.


70. Ibid., p. 238.


72. Ibid.


74. The official figures given by the government is contested by the opposition. The opposition claimed that the number of casualties were as much as ten times higher than the number given by the government.

75. *Kayhan International*, February 18, 1978; February 19, 1978; February 20, 1978; February 22, 1978; March 1, 1978. In Tabriz's disturbance according to the official reports, a total of 73 banks, 72 shops, four hotels, 28 cars, and 9 movie halls which were either burned or destroyed. Also the Institute of Technology (Tabriz), 11 clinics, four government buildings and a great number of public service agencies and offices were damaged.

76. Ibid., February 27, 1978.


78. Ibid., July 31, 1978.
79. Ibid., August 1, 1978.


81. Ibid.


83. Ibid., June 8, 1978.


85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.


88. Etellaat, June 18, 1978, p. 3.

89. Ibid.


91. Ibid., June 21, 1978, p. 3.

92. Ibid., p. 3.


95. Ibid., July 2, 1978.


97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.

99. There was some semantic squabbling about the word "wing" in the group, a limb of which every bird has only two. Thus, some said, the term "Third Wing" was not a proper word for the group.

100. Kayhan, June 20, 1978, p. 25.

101. Ibid.

103. Ibid., June 27, 1978, p. 3.
104. Ibid.
106. Ibid., July 1, 1978.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid. Also see Kayhan, June 22, 1978.
111. Nassiri was executed before a firing squad in February 1978, after the establishment of Islamic Republic.
112. Ibid., June 8, 1978. Moghadam was also executed after the revolution.
115. For details of the proposed suggestions see Kayhan International, June 7, 1978.
116. Ibid., July 12, 1978, p. 3.
119. Ibid.
122. Ibid., August 6, 1978.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
126. Ibid., August 29, 1978. The clergy argued that there was no such thing as "Islamic Marxist." According to religious leaders, the label was fabricated by the regime to get a pretext in order to suppress the opposition forces. They also believed that the term "Islamic Marxist" is a contradiction in terms, since Islam and Marxism were fundamentally opposed to one another.


128. Ibid.


130. For details see Kayhan International, August 21, 1978.

131. Ibid.

132. Ibid.

133. Ibid., August 21, 1978.

134. Ibid.


140. The Guardian, op cit., p. 5.


143. The Guardian, op cit., p. 5.

144: Ibid.

145. Ibid.
146. Sharif-Emami who replaced Amuzegar as a Prime Minister, hinted out at widespread rumors that the Cinema Rex fire was the work of the government. He said that "Nothing can be more outrageous than the accusation that the government officials were behind the fires." Kayhan International, August 31, 1978. The Shah also described the accusation as "a dirty lie." Ibid., September 2, 1978.


148. Eyewitnesses had reported that the local police ordered the Cinema gates to be closed in order to trap the "saboteurs" whom the police claimed were still inside the theatre. See Kayhan International, from August 20 to August 24, 1978.

149. According to Iranian press, on August 25, 1978, the Iraqi police arrested an Iranian who had allegedly admitted being involved in the Abadan Cinema Rex arson. According to the report, he was caught while trying to enter Iraq illegally. The suspect was extradited to the Iranian government on August 30, 1978. Ibid., August 29, 1978; August 30, 1978.

150. Sharif-Emami held the Prime Minister post for a 9 month period starting in August 1960. His government fell in May 1961, in the wake of teachers' riots in Tehran during which one teacher was killed by government forces.


152. Ibid. Azmoun was executed after the establishment of Islamic Republic.

153. Ibid.

154. Ibid.


158. Ibid.


The cities where martial law was imposed included Ghom, Tabriz, Mashhad, Shiraz, Abadan, Ahwas, Karaj, Ghazvin, Kazeroun, Jahrom, and Isfahan. In Isfahan, a martial law was already in force; but it was extended for another six months.

For instance, 45,000 oil workers, 10 million students and 400,000 teachers, as well as newspaper reporters in Tehran were on strike against the military government. The strikers were demanding an end to martial law and press censorship. The Tehran bazaar was also locked up.

Bakhtiar detailed elements of a program that included support for Iran's Arab neighbors, "especially the Palestinians," and a ban on further oil shipments in Israel and South Africa. Bakhtiar also abolished SAVAK, the secret police, and announced the release of all political prisoners. He also promised to compensate families of the more than 2,000 Iranians who had been killed in the months of rioting. He also lifted press censorship and reopened the universities closed since June before and speeded up the corruption trials of former public officials.
176. Ibid.


CHAPTER 8

The Fall of Monarchy and the Establishment of an Islamic Republic in Iran

As soon as the Pahlavi regime collapsed in February 1979, a struggle for political domination among the different political groups which had fought against the Shah immediately developed, and the national unity which was responsible for the eventual downfall of the Pahlavi dynasty suddenly disappeared. The main issue which contributed to this conflict was the nature of the political regime which was to replace the monarchy.

Ayatollah Khomeini and his fundamentalist supporters advocated a genuine Islamic republic, which is based on Koranic principles. They formed a political party called the Islamic Republican Party. The Party's main objective is to clear the Iranian society of everything which is associated with Western civilization, including democratic ideas. The Ayatollah and his staunch advocates have repeatedly dismissed as irrelevant the Western models of democracy. Perception of democracy for this group is an organic one; that is, group as well as individual liberties are respected as long as they are compatible with the public good. Ayatollah Khomeini, who is believed to lead the Islamic
Republican Party, has a negative view about the "nature of man." His concept of the nature of man is one of pessimism and distrust. According to him, even though man has a free will he is susceptible to mistakes and errors. Man is constantly misled by Satan and devilish spirits who are about to get him. Thus, man is not capable of running his own life independently without being guided by God. He should be directed and told about what is good for him and what is bad. He should follow religious instructions and above all the clergy who is God's representative on earth. Therefore, based on this pessimistic picture of man, boys and girls are segregated in schools. Men and women should swim at separate beaches. Women should use a Chador (veil), otherwise it would be sexually disturbing to men who are easily attracted toward them. Alcoholic drinks are forbidden, as are most Western-made movies, because they have a corrupting effect on the public. Also music is banned from the country's airwaves, because it "stupefies persons listening to it and makes their brains inactive and frivolous."¹

The leaders of the Islamic Republican Party are also elitist in their political orientations.² According to them, people are like sheep who are in need of shepherds. Thus, it is the prime duty of the clergy to rule and guide the public. Generally speaking, the Islamic Republican Party stands for collective "democracy" and a kind of socialjustice which is diametrically opposed to the notion of civil rights as known in Western democracies. As a result, different ideas and opinions are hardly tolerated.
The Moslem People's Republican Party is another group that was formed after the revolution and is said to be related to Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari. This party also supports an Islamic republic for Iran but believes the clergy should not rule but should preach and guide. The party is not as fundamentalist as the one supported by Ayatollah Khomeini. It tries to adapt the Islamic principles to contemporary modern conditions. Therefore, there is an ideological conflict between this party and the Islamic Republican Party.

The experience of the National Front in Iran's politics today is more interesting. Following the downfall of Pahlavis, the Front was torn into pieces. Disintegration in the National Front was due to the position taken by Karim Sanjabi toward Ayatollah Khomeini during the revolution. Sanjabi's total submission to Ayatollah Khomeini's demand in Paris that the National Front should submerge into the Islamic movement was a disturbing factor to the younger elements within the Front.

The first group to leave the National Front was led by Shahpour Bakhtiar, the leader of the Iran Party. The supporters of Bakhtiar claimed that Sanjabi's political strategy was detrimental to the National Front because the Front's democratic philosophy is not compatible with that of the clergy. According to this group, Sanjabi's unconditional support of the Ayatollah's Islamic republic was done without prior consultation with the Front's leadership. The second group to break away from the
National Front was led by Dr. Matin Daftari, a grandson of Dr. Mossadegh. Matin Daftari formed a different organization called the National Democratic Front. This group opposes the Islamic republic because it believes most of the Islamic principles are outdated and irrelevant to contemporary political situations. This group's political philosophy is remarkably liberal and stands for civil liberties and human rights. Its political ideology is similar to those of the Social Democrats in most Western democracies. Another splinter group which claims to be the "original" National Front and loyal to Mossadegh's political principles is led by Darius Forouhar who leads the Iran National Party. This faction has supported Khomeini's Islamic republic and participated in Bazargan's provisional government. Karim Sanjabi, who supported Ayatollah Khomeini and participated in the provisional government of Bazargan as a foreign minister (only two months), defected from Khomeini's camp. He criticized the anti-democratic trends in Bazargan's government and announced that he advocates "a type of democracy that Mossadegh wanted to implement." Another group which split from the National Front is called Iran Today Political Organization, which is led by Sa-eed Fatemi, a cousin to the late Hossein Fatemi, a foreign minister in Dr. Mossadegh's government in 1953. This group also claims to follow the path of Mossadegh. Therefore, the National Front is not only disintegrated but also seems to have lost much of its social base, either to the
left or to the clergy. At present Iranian politics lacks a viable center force to stand against the extremism of both the clergy and the left.

To the left of the National Front there are several political groups. The most important among them are: the Organization of the People’s Combatants (Sazmane Mojahedin Khalgh), usually known as Mojahedin; the Moslems in the Struggle Movement; Jonbesh; the Iranian Revolutionary Moslems Movement (JAMA); and the Islamic Council Organization (SASH).

The political organization of Mojahedin is one of the most popular movements in Iran today, particularly among the youth and progressive Moslem social classes. Mojahedin is an Islamic organization with highly progressive social views. It supports the "true" Islamic ideology and is strongly critical of clerical domination in Iranian decision-making processes. Its ideology is a mixture of socialism and aspects of Islamic principles which generally emphasize brotherhood, equality, and social justice. They have persistently fought against the dictatorial trends set in motion by the clergy since the establishment of the Islamic republic.

To the left of Mojahedin are placed several Marxist groups, the most significant among them being the Organization of the Iranian People’s Fedayin Guerrillas (Sazmane Cherikhaye Fadaiye Khalgh), usually known as Fedayan, and the Tudeh Party. There are also a variety of splinter Marxist groups, such as Maoists,
Trotskyists, and Stalinists, who are less effective and less popular than the Fedayins and the Tudehs.

The Tudeh presently supports the Ayatollah Khomeini's leadership and his Islamic republic whereas the Fedayin is opposed to it. The Tudeh Party, which supports the Moscow line, believes that the communists should advocate the present regime because of anti-Imperialist and anti-colonialist stands taken by Khomeini's movement. The party's failure in 1953 to support the nationalist government of Dr. Mossadegh, the desertion of many of its leaders from the party and their subsequent cooperation with the Shah—and of its support of Moscow—has cost the party most of its supporters. The Fedayin organization is totally independent of Moscow and, like Mojahedin, is highly popular with the youth and secular middle classes. The Fedayin is one of the major opposition groups in Iran today which is critical of Khomeini's regime. It accuses the government of being anti-labor and dictatorial. Fedayin believes that the Khomeini movement was led by the bourgeoisie and, therefore, represents the interests of that particular class.

Monopolization of Iranian Politics by the Islamic Republican Party

As was mentioned before, the nature of the Islamic republic became a major issue for group leadership conflicts. The major questions were: what is an Islamic republic? What is its nature?
Who should rule in an Islamic republic? Should the government be limited only to the clergymen, or should the non-mullah elements also be permitted to sit on significant decision-making bodies? Is an Islamic republic a democratic government or is it going to be something like Saudi Arabia or Libya? What would happen to political freedom and social liberties? What would be the nature of the distribution of powers between branches of government? And many other questions. Generally speaking, the concept of an Islamic republic, which was vigorously pursued by Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Republican Party, was a vogue concept about which no formal document was available and no book was written.

From the beginning, the Ayatollah's Islamic Republican Party imposed its domination on the Iranian political process and monopolized the governmental powers in its own hands. First of all, no political party, except the Islamic Republican party, was permitted to participate in the Bazargan government. According to its leaders, it was the clergy who made the revolution and not secular political organizations. Also, the members of the Islamic Revolutionary Council, the supreme decision-making body in the country are selected by Ayatollah Khomeini from among the Islamic Republican Party. Its decisions are even binding on government officials. This secretive group, which is believed to be composed of high-ranking clergies, has amounted to a parallel government, and makes its decisions and carries them out without bothering to let Bazargan know what it is doing.
Next are Revolutionary Komitehs. The Komiteh is a temporary organization that in the absence of police and the armed forces would help keep close watch on individual and group activities. It also arrests the anti-revolutionary elements, searches suspected houses, keeps the peace in neighborhoods, and maintains a close connection with the Council of Revolutionary Tribunals on one hand, and penitentiaries on the other. The Komitehs are scattered all over the country, and each town and city has a certain number of Komitehs whose leaders are selected from the clergies loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini and from the members of the Islamic Republican Party. The Komitehs were supposed to be ad hoc organizations and were expected to gradually turn over their powers to the government. Instead, their authority has grown to rival that of the Prime Minister. They have taken the law into their own hands and have caused a sense of insecurity across the country, especially among the leaders of political groups who oppose the Khomeini-type regime. They persecute people, arrest those who are critical of the regime, issue orders, and even oppose government appointments and decisions. For instance, when Karim Sanjabi, the Secretary-General of the National Front, and the Islamic Republic's first foreign minister, resigned his post on April 16, 1979, he blamed "disorder created by government within government." He referred to interference in the affairs of the government in general, and his ministry in particular, by Ayatollah Khomeini's aides, the Revolutionary Council and the Komitehs. The heads of
these komitehs only take orders from the Islamic Republican Party.

There are also provisional Islamic courts known as Islamic Revolutionary Tribunals who are functionally independent and do not take orders from anyone except Ayatollah Khomeini. The members of the Revolutionary Tribunal are also selected from the loyal clergy and the staunch supporters of the Islamic Republican Party. The function of these revolutionary tribunals, which are established all over the country, has been to purge the elements of the former regime. For instance, the number of executions carried out by the Revolutionary Courts has exceeded 500 people. The trials are not carried out under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, but under the control of the Revolutionary Council. The Revolutionary Tribunal pays little attention to such legal niceties as providing counsel for the accused. The executions have outraged civil libertarians who are disturbed not only by the killings but by the proceedings by which the verdicts are handed down. Even Bazargan, the Prime Minister, denounced the secret trials as "unreligious and inhumane." The trials have generally raised serious doubts about the direction the revolution is taking.

So Ayatollah Khomeini and his Islamic Republican Party are in full control of Iranian politics. Political parties and groups who were concerned about the content of an Islamic republic and wanted more time to discuss and debate the future course of Iranian
politics and demanded further contemplation on the issue were rejected and their request ignored. The referendum held on March 30, 1979, on the country's new form of government was hastily processed without giving the public adequate opportunity to discuss the problem. The citizens were allowed to cast a ballot on only a single question: "Do you approve the replacement of the former regime with the Islamic Republic, whose constitution will be voted on by the nation at a later date?" The wording of the ballot--yes or no to an Islamic republic--drew considerable criticism on the ground that it did not really offer voters any choice. Before the referendum was held many political groups demanded that the public be given more alternative to choose from, such as "democratic republic," "democratic Islamic republic," "People's Democratic Islamic Republic" and so on. Blasting the secular political organizations, Ayatollah Khomeini replied "What the nation wants is an Islamic republic, not a democratic republic, and not a democratic Islamic republic. Just an Islamic republic."\(^7\) He added "do not use the word democratic. That is Western, and we don't want it."\(^8\) Many political groups, including the Fedayin and the National Democratic Front, boycotted the referendum.

The Fedayin announced that "The contents of an Islamic republic had not been revealed yet. We must know what we are voting for. Before a referendum is held, we think that the Constituent Assembly must prepare the Constitution so that we can assure democratic rights are guaranteed." They also demanded the "various types
of governments be introduced to the people before the referendum so they can have a choice. We must not limit selection of our future type of government to an Islamic republic." Ayatollah Shariatmadari believed that the referendum on the political future of Iran should be based on the question "What kind of regime do you want? He said the Ayatollah Khomeini's formula for referendum would lead to the establishment of an Islamic republic, and would eliminate any room for diverse opinions and free discussion and debates on the issue, based on democratic principles. However, these requests were rejected by the Minister of Interior, Ahmad Haj Seyed Javadi, who said that the referendum will be held in exactly the same procedure as "ordered by the revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini and approved by the Islamic Revolutionary Council and the Cabinet." Therefore, the referendum was held as it was prepared by the ruling party.

The next step in the process of the power conflict concerned the approval of a draft constitution which was prepared by the members of the Islamic Republican Party. At an earlier time, Ayatollah Khomeini had promised the Iranians that the fate of the Constitution for the Islamic republic would be decided by a Constituent Assembly whose members would be elected freely by all political groups. But later on the Ayatollah changed his mind and suggested an Assembly of Experts instead. The reason given for this change was that it would be difficult to handle a constituent assembly where over 500 people, who represent diverse political groups with
different ideologies, would participate. According to this argument, these representatives would then suggest and discuss their own versions of the Constitution. Ultimately these arguments and counter arguments on the Constitution would turn the constituent assembly into a chaotic forum with no constructive conclusion. Therefore, to escape that sort of assembly, an Assembly of Experts was suggested with a fixed number of 73 members.

Each political party was entitled to introduce a list of 10 candidates for the general national elections for the Assembly. The country at-large would elect 73 people from among the candidates introduced by the parties.

The decision to elect an Assembly of Experts instead of a Constituent Assembly caused an uproar among political groups. Many political leaders interpreted the decision as a plot to weaken the opposition groups and strengthen the ruling party. The opposition branded the decision anti-democratic and demanded the Constituent Assembly as it had been promised by Ayatollah Khomeini, but to no avail. The election was held on August 1, 1979, as it had been arranged by the ruling party. Many leftist and moderate political groups declined to participate in this election. Even the Moslem People's Republican Party supported by Ayatollah Shariatmadari boycotted the election. The moderate groups who declined to participate numbered more than ten and included the National Front, the National Democratic Front, and the Pan-Iranists groups.
As expected, ninety-nine percent of those elected for the Assembly of Experts were from the Islamic Republican Party, or were Ayatollah Khomeini's sympathizers. It is expected that the Assembly will soon decide on the Republic's Constitution as formulated by the Ayatollah's supporters, without critical discussions and elaboration.

The mass media also have not been immune from the ruling party's threat to impose its objectives on them. Radio and television have already been brought under the party's control. The press, which enjoyed a brief taste of freedom after the Shah's fall, today receives regular visits from the ruling party's people who dictate what can and cannot be printed. Ettelaat and Kayhan, two of Iran's largest evening papers, are placed under the supervision of two groups of clergies who directly take orders from the religious centers in Qhom and Tehran. On August 7, 1979, several Tehran newspapers known for their liberal tendencies were raided by Moslem militia and about a dozen of their journalists and directors were seized.12

Thus the opposition groups are pressured from every direction to comply with the political lines set by the dominant group. This is the traditional Iranian pattern of behavior which intends to dominate the opposition rather than to accommodate and compromise. For instance, in an explicit warning to those who differ with his views, Ayatollah Khomeini said "I advised the Shah to mend his ways 16 years ago. He did not pay attention to me, and
see what happened to him. If you don't follow the Islamic path, go back to where you came from." Since he believes that the revolution was made solely by the clergy, other political groups which, according to him, did not participate in the revolution should be dominated by those which did. Those whose opinions and ideas differ from those of the ruling party's should keep silent or return to where they came from. This is exactly what the Shah said to his opponents when he established the Rastakhiz Party. What is important is the existing feelings of distrust which run high in inter-group leadership interactions. Each side accuses the other of being "American agents," "anti-revolutionary," "pro-Israel," "SAVAK agent" and so on.

Therefore, those who were optimistic that after the Shah's fall a new era of freedom and democracy would be established in Iran have been disappointed. The revolution for democracy is turning into an Islamic authoritarianism as repressive as before. Declining to deal with opposition, the Islamic Republican Party led by Ayatollah Khomeini has become a domineering force in Iranian politics.
NOTES CHAPTER 8

1. See Newsweek for more information; August 6, 1979.

2. The prominent leaders of the Islamic Republican Party are: Hojat al-Islam Hashemi Rafsanjani, Dr. Baher, Dr. Ayatollah Beheshti, and Hojat al-Islam Khamne-ee.

3. The important leaders of the Moslem People's Republican Party are: Seyyed Hadi Khosrow Shahi, Hojat al-Islam Colesorkhi, Jourabchi, Ansari, Seyyed Sadre al-Din Balaghi, Seyyed Gholam-Reza Saidi, Shahabe Ferdowse, Ali-Ashraf-e Mohajer, Dr. Ahmade Alizadeh, Dr. Hossein-Gholi Katebi, and Hashem Shabestani. It should be remembered that the Moslem People's Republican Party is very close to Ayatollah Shariatmaderi who is thought to oppose many of Khomeini's policies and methods. At present both parties are competing for power.

4. The number of political parties and groups at the present is estimated to exceed 150. In this paper, I have tried to name only the major political organizations.


8. Ibid.


12. According to the Press Act of August, ratified by the Revolutionary Council, all papers and journals whose policies and ideologies were not compatible with those of Islamic Republic would have to be closed.
down. As a result, all opposition papers were shut down, the most significant among them were: Ayandegan, Peyghame Emrouz, Ahangar, Nedaye Azadei, Kayhane Azad.

CHAPTER 9

Conclusion

The main objective in this project has been to relate Iranian political orientations to Iran's present political style. In other words, I have tried to associate, in rather general terms, the instability of democratic systems in Iran to the underlying traditional political orientations and belief systems. It has been my argument that Iranian political orientations and values are generally incongruent with the formal and democratic structures established following the constitutional revolution of 1906.

To demonstrate this relationship several historical cases in contemporary Iranian politics were chosen. Political parties as sub-system units and group leadership interactions were the focus of this study. I tried to show that under democratic rules of the game, political contests among different group leaderships over national issues often culminates in political deadlock and the fall of those regimes. Explanation for deadlock was given as the existence of a strong tendency among group leaderships for domination over other political contestants. The tendency for domination, I argued, was in turn related to the absence of trust
in Iranian political culture and the lack of bargaining and compromise in leadership interactions.

It should be remembered that Iranian political exposure to the Western political democracies dates back long before the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. The revolution only accelerated this process. Nonetheless, the exposure has been highly superficial and lacked the necessary depth to influence the traditional political orientations and sustain the newly established political institutions. As a result Iranian group leaderships were caught between a desire to be politically modern and an inability to be detached from traditional political orientations and style. The consequence of this ambivalence has been a regular swing between the two poles of constitutionalism and dictatorship.

Therefore, as I have argued, Iranian political orientations have been a major deterrence to a successful transition to a political democracy. They have also been a hinderence toward the institutionalization of democratic structures in the country.

In two different periods Iran experienced a multi-party system. Then multipartism was considered to be "inconsistent" with Iranian political tradition, and was thus replaced by a two-party system. Later it was decided that a two-party system was "incongruent" with the country's political culture. Consequently it was changed to a one-party system because it was stated that a one-party system "fits" the Iranian political
tradition.

The failure of Iranian elite to adapt to democratic institutions, I believe, is due to their lack of political experiences in democratic exercises. They seldom found the opportunity for independent exercises in democratic principles. Their experiences in this area have always been short-lived. Under different dictatorships since the constitutional revolution of 1906, particularly those between 1921-41 and 1953 up to the fall of monarchism in 1979, the Iranian political elite was treated paternalistically. It was not given the opportunity and authority for independent thinking, management, and generally independent decision-making at the national level. Political originality and initiatives were often discouraged. Concentration of power in the hands of Shahs and strict control from above most often reinforced, rather than weakened, the traditional upward power orientations of the Iranian political elite. The result has generally been the development of generations of elites who commonly boasted of declaring themselves subservient to the rulers. Political orientations are generally upward, waiting for decisions to be made and orders to be followed.

The non-elites are in a similar situation but with a greater impotence. They clearly demonstrate a lack of political efficacy. They look at government as a superimposed structure in whose decisions they are unable to share and whose behavior they feel incompetent to influence. They are more followers than
decision-makers. They often are objects for manipulation and mobilization rather than formulators of demands and needs.

The February revolution of 1979 has once more swung the Iranian political pendulum into the world of freedom of expression and political activities with its resultant multipartism and group conflicts. But factionalism and inter-group leadership interactions in the present Iranian political situation clearly demonstrate that as it was difficult for the elite to acquiesce under the Pahlavi dictatorship, it is also difficult for them to peacefully co-exist under the present regime. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that the present system is headed toward another political deadlock, the traditional pattern we have repeatedly observed in this study.

If Iran is going to have a democratic system, and if democracy is going to be more durable and enjoy more stability, it needs new orientations which are essential for supporting democratic institutions and new forms of activity. How this can be done is a matter for speculation and judgment. A major difficulty with the Pahlavi regime was the fact that the ex-Shah, in his struggle to transform the Iranian culture, put much emphasis on economic factors at the expense of social and political factors. From one side he was tightening his control over the society by mobilizing social forces for his own interests, without providing free channels for political participation and expression. On the other side, by transforming the economy and industrializing the
society he contributed much to the rise of political expectations and demands which he was not prepared to satisfy. Thus, while the country was economically improving it was politically lagging behind. I am not deemphasizing the significance of economic factors in the process of political development. There is plenty of evidence which reveals that economic development will set in motion a sequence of social changes which are related to political development. What I am saying is that economic development in a society should not be stressed at the expense of political values whose development is essential for any stable democratic system.

One of the major reasons why countries such as the Soviet Union, China, Cuba and many others in developing areas failed to bring about genuine democracies was, I believe, in the main due to the emphasis they put on industrialization and "modernization" while overlooking political factors. Governments in these countries directly imposed their particular political ideologies on their societies in the process of cultural change. They all tried to create a "good" man or a "good party man." And this is in many ways in contrast to the very notion of political development which was formulated in the introductory section of this study.

It is my belief that investment in education will be the speediest way to facilitate the transformation of political culture in the direction of political development. The major responsibility in this task rests with the state. But the state must, as a precondition, be committed to democratic values and
procedures, otherwise the idea will be self-defeating. As facilitator, the state should be capable of providing and improving educational facilities and opportunities at the national level. The state, however, should not be directly involved in the process. Its role should mainly be that of a mediator and coordinator. It should not try to impose a particular set of values or "approved" doctrine to be internalized by the members of society.

Political development through education could probably be done by formal and informal education, that is, in formal educational systems and primary and secondary groups as well. It is likely that, in a free political environment, what people learn about citizen duties and responsibilities in formal education they could put into practice more easily than if they were under a dictatorship. Studies done in the area of social psychology, particularly those using learning theory of "reinforcement," support this statement. When people experience democracy in practice and are frequently rewarded, rather than punished, by positive responses given by government decision-makers, this tends to reinforce the effect of democratic values and procedures and helps the internalization of such values in the long run.

Many studies of political attitudes show that educational attainment has the most important demographic effect on political attitudes. The uneducated man or the man with limited education is a different political actor from the man who has achieved a higher level of education. Of course, educational differences, it might
be said, are associated with differences in other social characteristics. For instance, individuals who have achieved higher education, are likely to have higher incomes and so on. But research has shown that even when these additional factors are controlled, respondents of lower and higher education still differ substantially in political attitudes. Therefore, what people learn about democracy in formal education, would be likely to have some impact on their political attitudes and behavior in actual political situations, particularly if they experience positive responses by the official decision-makers, in the form of rewards for the betterment of their socio-economic life. Theories of political socialization tell us that what people learn in non-political situations will be generalized to experiences in the actual political environment. Thus, it is likely that participation in decision-making at home, school, neighbourhood organizations and so on, would have some effect on people's political attitudes and behavior in such areas as political parties, interest group organizations, voting, etc.

Therefore, by a simultaneous democratization of socio-political life and educational systems we might have taken the first step in the direction of democratization of political culture. We are told that system characteristics are related to one another, and a change in one aspect will produce changes in others. One may even go further, and say that this initial process of democratization would eventually contribute to the development of such system
qualities as "rationality" and "secularization." Thus, when a political culture became gradually influenced by the qualities of rationality and secularization, parties, interest groups, and other political actors would eventually move in the same direction and would adopt more flexible positions toward one-another, and would perceive politics as an arena for bargaining and compromise, rather than a matter for control and domination. In other words, political actors would increasingly stress the bargaining and adaptive qualities in the political process.

To be sure, one of the most sensitive problems in the whole process is the role of the state. Those who run the state, the elite, as a pre-condition should be committed to the democratic rules of the game. This means that the major political group leaderships, by making some sort of ideological adjustment, should come together and form a united national front government. By following democratic lines and policies, the elite would be capable of influencing the nonelite's political culture. The nonelite would be similarly capable of influencing the elite's behavior by choosing from among different alternatives available to them in the free political market. That would be a two-way political education. But the major question still remains unanswered. Would different political leadership groups be capable of forming a united national government by reaching a compromise? In the present situation the answer is "no." At no time in contemporary Iranian politics has the prospect for development been so bleak.
At the beginning of the new regime there was plenty of hope that the system might move in the direction of a genuine democratic system, and would set the initial stage for the transformation of traditional political orientations. But this hope soon disappeared. The dominant religious elite not only is opposed to the notion of political development but is taking the same political approach as its predecessors, in suppressing all political groups who adhere to such ideas.

The type of "political formula" envisaged by the leaders of the present regime is both authoritarian and elitist. From its inception the rulers of the Islamic republic, through manipulation of the political process, concentrated all political powers in their own hands. They have also launched a violent campaign against the leftist and moderate liberal groups. The goal seems to be the removal of all autonomous political groups from the scene. Political groups, which for many years relentlessly fought against the Shah's dictatorship and joined, during the February revolution, with Khomeini's forces against the regime, were not given their share of power in the new government. Even the National Front was forced to leave the government because its leader could not go along with the ruling elite's political philosophy.

The ruling group is also elitist. According to them it is the duty of high-ranking clergy to decide what is best for the society and guide the people in the direction ascertained by God.
They consider themselves as shepherds and the people as sheep.

Based on theories of political development, the present Iranian leaders could be appraised as anti-progressive and traditional. Iranian group leadership at present are divided into two camps, the progressives and the anti-progressive. The issue at hand over which political conflict is shaping is "modernism" vs."traditionalism." The result of this conflict will decide the future course of Iran's political development.

At this point I would like to say that the process of political culture change is more complicated and more complex than what I have tried to sketch here. Certainly there are many factors and relationships involved in the process of political culture transformation which were not included in this discussion. My aim here was to discuss only the general outlines, and concentrate on those factors which I thought were more effective in changing political attitudes and behavior than others.
APPENDIX A
The Questionnaire

Date of Interview _________
No. of Interview _________

I. Personal Characteristics
1. Age
2. Sex
3. Education
4. Occupation
5. Income
6. Locality (Tehran, provincial centers, other cities or villages)
7. Party position: cell chairman, cell secretary, formal member, simple member, or aloof

II. Patterns of Political Cognition*
A. The Impact of National Government
8. "Thinking now about the national government in Tehran, about how much effect do you think the government activities, the law passed and so on, have on your day to day life?" Do they have:
   - A great effect
   - Some effect
   - No effect
   - Other
   - Don't know

*Questions from number 8 to 30 used here are taken, with minor changes, from Almond and Verba's The Civic Culture, pp. 45-84, pp. 117-167.
B. The Impact of Local Government

9. "Now take the local government (provincial government, municipality); about how much effect do you think their activities have on your day to day life?" Do they have:
- A great effect
- Some effect
- No effect
- Don't know

C. Awareness of Politics

10. "Do you follow the accounts of political and governmental affairs? Would you say you follow them:
- Regularly
- From time to time
- Never
- Other
- Don't know

11. "What about newspapers (radio or television, magazines)? Do you follow (listen to, read about) public affairs in newspapers (radio or television, magazines):
- Nearly everyday
- About once a week
- From time to time
- Never
- Don't know

D. Having Information: Ability to Identify Party Leaders

12. "How many party leaders do you know? Name them."

13. "How many ministries do you know? Name them."

III. Feelings Toward Government and Politics

A. System Affect: National Pride

14. "Speaking generally, what are the feelings about this country that you are most proud of?"
(Whatever answer is given should be taken down.)
15. "People speak of the obligations that they owe to their country. In your opinion, what are the obligations that every man owes his country?"
   (Answer should be taken down)

B. Output Effect

16. "Suppose there were some questions that you had to take to a government office—for example, a tax question or housing regulation. Do you think you will be given equal treatment—I mean would you be treated as well as anyone else?"
   (Answers should be taken down)

17. "And if you explained your point of view to the officials, what effect do you think it would have? Would they give your point of view"
   - Serious consideration
   - Would they pay only a little attention
   - Or would they ignore what you had to say
   - Don't know
   (answers should be taken down)

18. "If you had some trouble with the police—a traffic violation maybe, or were accused of a minor offence—do you think you will be given equal treatment? That is would you be treated as well as anyone else?"
   (Answers should be taken down)

19. "If you explained your point of view to the police, what effect do you think it would have? Would they give your point of view?"
   - Serious consideration
   - Little attention
   - Ignore you
   - Other
   - Don't know
   (Answer should be taken down)

C. Input effect: Freedom of Political Communication

20. "What about talking about public affairs to other people? Do you do that?"
   - Nearly everyday
   - Once a week
   - From time to time
   - Never
   - Don't know
21. "If you wanted to discuss political and governmental affairs, would there be some people you definitely would not turn to, that is, people with whom you feel it would be better not to discuss such topics? About how many people would you say there are with whom you would avoid discussing politics."
(Answers should be taken down)

22. "If you wanted to discuss politics, how free or unrestricted would you feel?"
(Answers should be taken down)

IV. Civic Obligation

A. To Local Community

23. "We know that the ordinary person has many problems that take his time. In view of this, what part do you think the ordinary person ought to play in the local affairs of this town or district? How active should the ordinary man be in his local community?"
(Answers should be taken down)

24. "What role should the ordinary man play in his local community?"
(Answers should be taken down)

V. The Sense of Civic Competence

A. On the National Government

25. "Suppose a law were being considered by parliament (Majlis) that you considered to be unjust or harmful. What do you think you can do?"
(Answer should be taken down)

26. "If you make an effort to change this law, how likely is it that you would succeed?"
(Answer should be taken down)

B. On the Local Government

27. "Suppose a regulation was being considered (by provincial government, or municipality or village director) that you considered very unjust or harmful. What do you think you could do?"
(Answer should be taken down)
28. "If you make an effort to change this regulation, how likely is it that you would succeed?"
   (Answer should be taken down)

VI. The Strategy of Influence

29. "What citizens would do to try to influence their local government?"
   (Answer should be taken down)

30. "What citizens would do to try to influence their national government?"
   (Answer should be taken down)

VII. Perceptual Image of the Rastakhiz Party by Its Members

31. In your opinion, is there any major difference between the performance of RP and those parties before it?
   (Answer should be taken down)

32. Do you think decisions taken in the party cells will be taken into consideration by the party leaders?
   (Answer should be taken down)

33. In your opinion, do the ordinary members of the RP have any influence on the decisions made by the party?

34. Or rather, do you think that the major decisions are generally made by the party leaders?
   (Answer should be taken down)

35. How freely do you think participants in the party cell put forth their ideas and views concerning daily issues and problems?
   (Answer should be taken down)

36. In your opinion, how effective has the role of RP been so far in its campaign against the inflated prices?
   (Answer should be taken down)

37. Do you think the RP's efforts to find a solution to the existing landowner-tenant situation will eventually result in a just conclusion?
   (Answer should be taken down)
APPENDIX B

The Questionnaire in Persian

تأریخ مصاحبه
شرح مصاحبه گانته
۱-کسی
۲-جنس
۳-تحصیل:
۴-شغل:

۵-سمت حزبی: سوال کانون منشی کانون عضو رسمی کانون عضو ساده حزب کارگر

۶-درآمد:

۷-کانون: آمپاره مرکز استان دیگر شهرها روسا

۸-فعالیت ها و تصمیمات دولت تا چه اندازه مرکزهای روزانه از اثر می‌گذارد؟ آیا

این تصمیماها: زیاد اثر می‌گذارند کم اثر می‌گذارند اثری ندارد ، غیره ،

نیز دانم

۹-در مورد تشکلات دولتی محلی (ماعدربی‌نامداری ، استاداری ، شهرداری ،

به عقیده شما فعالیت ها و تصمیمات سازمان های دولتی محلی تا چه اندازه مرکزهای روزانه از

اثر می‌گذارند؟ آیا: زیاد تأثیر می‌گذارند کم تأثیر می‌گذارند اثری ندارد ، غیره ،

نیز دانم

۱۰-آیا اقدامات و تصمیم های دولت را در سال‌های مختلف سیاسی و اجتماعی چگونه دانال می‌کنید؟

مرتب دنیال می‌کنید یا کاهش گذار می‌کنید هر چه دنیال می‌کنید ، غیره ، نیز دانم

۱۱-در مورد روزنامه ، مجله ، رادیو و تلویزیون چطور ۲۴ ساعت روز را در این رسانه‌ها تفسیر می‌کنید؟ آیا به عقیده شما این کار را چگونه انجام می‌دهد؟

تقریباً هر روز یکبار در هفته یک‌ها یک کاهش مرکزی نیز دانم
۱۲-چند نفر از اعضای دولت را که می‌شناسید نام ببرید.

۱۳-چند نفر از وزیران سابق را که می‌شناسید نام ببرید.

۱۴-چند وزارت‌خانه را که می‌شناسید نام ببرید.

۱۵-به عقیده شما واقعی و تعمیدات طی یک فرد نسبت به ملکت چیست؟

این واقعی را نام ببرید:

۱۶-بطور کلی به چه چیزاین ملکت بیش از سایر چیزها احساس غرور می‌کنید؟

نام ببرید:

۱۷-طرف کنید برای رفع مشکلی مثالاً در مورد سلسله ملل‌ها با مقررات جدید ساختنی نیاز به اطلاعات صبح و راهنمایی دارد و بیشتر خورشید به ادارات مربوط به آن تکریم کنید که ادارات با اداره مربوط د ر مورد رفع نیاز شما با شا ها مانند دیگران و بدون تبعیض رفت‌و‌آمد کنید؟
۱۸- حالا فرض کنید مشکل خود را با طاقات مربوطه سنتیفا" در میان گذاشته‌اید، به عقیده شما این ادارات به سال‌های مورد علاقه‌شان، چگونه رسیدگی می‌کنند؟ 
بطور جدی رسیدگی می‌کنند بطور سطحی رسیدگی می‌کنند امولا، ترتیب ارتباطی دهند غیره، نمی‌دانند

۱۹- فرض کنید با اداره راهنمایی و رانندگی و با اداره پلیس دارای مشکل شده باشید، مثل،" تصور کنید از طرف اداره راهنمایی و رانندگی به سبب یک تخلف رانندگی جریمه شده باشید و بسا بطور کلی جریمه را مرتب کرده باشید، آیا فکر می‌کنید پس از مواجهه به این ادارات با شما مانند دیگران و بدون تبعیض رفتار می‌کنند؟ 

۲۰- فرض کنید مشکل خود را با اداره راهنمایی و رانندگی در میان گذاشته‌اید، آیا فکر می‌کنید که به سال‌های مورد علاقه شما بطور جدی رسیدگی کنند، سطحی رسیدگی کنند با امولا، ترتیب ارتباطی دهند، غیره، نمی‌دانند 

۲۱- آیا به عقیده شما برای فتنه درباره سال سپاسی با دسترسی و اطلاعیه‌ای باید، یک محتاطه بودن احتیاط و ندارد، غیره، نمی‌دانند 

۲۲- آیا محصل وقت به چند وقت با دیگران در مورد سائل کلی عمومی ممکن به فتنه می‌شنیدید؟ آیا نمی‌دانید چگونگی فتنه‌ها را 

نظیراً، هر زور انجام می‌دهید محتاطی یکبار انجام می‌دهید گاهی‌گاه انجام می‌دهید هرگز انجام نمی‌دهید، غیره، نمی‌دانند 

۲۳- اگر به‌واهی‌های در مورد سال سپاسی روز با دیگران صحت کنید حتما، انرژی را با شناسید که احساس می‌کنید می‌سای شرح کردن چنین سوالی را با آنها ندارید و فکر می‌کنید اگر چنین سوالی را با آنها در میان نگاه‌ریز به‌دارید. به عقیده شما تعداد این افراد ظریف‌تر از آیا اکثر شمارند، نسبتاً، زیادند غیره، نمی‌دانند
۴۴۴

۴-۳۳ ماهی که در مورد سائل سیاسی می‌خواهید با دیگران گفتگو کنید آیا فکر می‌کنید امول؟

۴-۳۴ محدوده نیک‌کنید کی احساس محدودیت می‌کنید خیالی احساس محدودیت می‌کنید هرگونه تمایلی

۴-۳۵ می‌دانم که یک فرد معمولی در زندگی روزانه دارای گرفتاری‌های زیادی است که غالباً بخشی

مهمی از اوقات روزانه او را انتقال می‌کند. با توجه به چنین شکل‌گیری‌هایی قبلاً یک فرد معمولی

چگونه این نقش خود را در مورد سائل و مشکلات مهیج خود در شهر (روسیه) پایی کنده؟

فعالیت‌های مصرف الکل کارآی کاهش شدیم باشد یا کارآی کاهش داشتم؟

به عقیده آنها یک فرد معمولی باید با توجه به مسائل امور شهر (روسیه) چه روشی را پیش

یگونه ۲۴۲ باید باشد:

با سازمان‌های دولتی در محل فعالیت‌های فکری کمک در فعالیت‌های جامعه شرکت کرد

در سازمان‌های غیر دولتی که با سازمان‌های دولتی همکاری دارند فعالیت کرد و غیرشینه

۴-۳۶ با اینکه یک فرد معمولی صرفه کافی است:

که مسئله را در کرده و از همه چیز آگاه و مطلع باشد در انتخابات کمک کند نسبت

به آنها که در اطرافش می‌گذرد علائمی باشد در سازمان‌های مذهبی شرکت حمید و غیرشینه

۴-۳۷ فرض کنید یک سلسله مقررات نازدیک در مرکز به دست، شهروندی، فرمانداری یا استانداری تحتت

مطالعه و برسی است که به عقیده شما غیر عادلانه جلوه می‌کند فکر می‌کنید برا چگونگی

از ناحیه چنین مقرراتی کاری از شما ساخته است و آیا فکر می‌کنید نیازه کشوری باعث آورده

در این راه موفق خواهید شد؟

۴-۳۸ فرض کنید قانونی در مجلس شورای ملی تحت بررسی و مطالعه است که بنام شما کاملاً "غيرعادلانه

است آیا فکر می‌کنید که اولاً " برای حل وکالاتی از توصیه آن کاری از پیش بروید؟ ناما" اگر کوششی

به جمله آورده آیا فکر می‌کنید که در این راه موفق می‌شود.
۴۴۵

به عقیده شما یک فرد از صدای راهی بهتری که بر تصمیمات دولت در سطح های ملی و محلی اثر بگذارد.

الف - با جلب همگاری دیگران و از طریق:

¬ تنکیل سابقه‌های غیر رسمی مانند تنکیل گروه‌های فشار جوین صنف‌های مختلف با تنکیب
¬ گروه‌های محلی
¬ از طریق تنکیل کانون‌های حزبی
¬ و با استفاده از اقدامات

- ایجاد طرح شرکت میان رهبران سیاسی (نواحی حاکم منصوب) و با ارتباط مبهمات
- ایجاد لزوم به یک رهبر سیاسی در سطح محلی و با انجام مسائل با او
- ایجاد ارتباط با مسئولین امور اداری (مقامات غیر منصوب)
- سازمان انتخابات

¬ انتخاب و کلیک موضوع‌های جنگی تعلیم
¬ بازرسی نامه‌های
¬ از طریق دادن این مخالف به نمایندگان مورد نظر در انتخابات بعده
¬ اعتراض نهالی
¬ راه‌های دیگر

۲۱ آیا به عقیده شما بین عملکرد حزب راست‌های در حال حاضر احترام پیش از آن تفاوتی وجود دارد؟

۲۲ آیا به عقیده شما به تصمیمات که در کانون‌های حزبی در زمینه‌های گوناگون گرفته می‌شود ترتیب انتخابه داده می‌شود؟
شما به عقیده شما عامیانه حزب در تصمیماتی که از جنب حزب قرفته می‌شود چه ناشی‌دارند؟

۲۱- بررسی‌های عمومی نمایشگاه راهبردی که می‌شود می‌تواند؟

۲۲- به عقیده شما تصمیمات عمومی‌ها با قانونهای خود مطابقت یابد؟

۲۳- به عقیده شما مسائل و مشکلات روز اجتماعی، اجتماعی و سیاسی در کانون‌ها به نحوی مطرح می‌گردند؟

۲۴- به عقیده شما نام حزب در مبارزه با جایگاه‌های که بوده است؟

۲۵- به عقیده شما کوشش و جستجوی حزب برای حق‌های پایه‌ای در مورد نشان می‌دهد یک نقش‌داران عادلانه بین بالا و متجار عاقبت؟

۲۶- به عقیده شما دلخواه خواهید رسد؟
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