NATION-STATE AND NON-STATE NATIONS:
THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICIES OF
BLACK AMERICA

DISSERTATION

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* * * * * *

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INTRODUCTION

One of the most challenging developments in both intranational and international political systems is the increased participation of nongovernmental actors. Nationalism and independence are sentiments that present challenges to colonial relationships, ethnic relationships, linguistic and cultural relationships and to racial relationships. National governments, international organizations, political parties and international governmental organizations such as the United Nations organization in particular are becoming increasingly sensitive to this challenge to both the structure and the function of the present systems.

Scholars of international relations and foreign policy have sought to account for these new international actors by expanding the perception of the world to encompass the activity and behavior and to offer explanations for it. By attempting to break the functional rigidity of the present paradigm of world politics, a great deal has been revealed. First, we find that overall national governments activity is a small percentage of international activity. Second, that these nongovern-
mental activities are not new, but the perception of them is new. And finally, that if we treat these actors with the same rigor and resources attended to the nation-state, a more accurate picture of international relations and foreign policy becomes visible.

One problem faced by participants and observers of world politics is that there are inadequate analytic tools for evaluating the formation, the effectiveness, or impact of their foreign policies on other actors in the international system.

One of the most important issue areas and problem areas in world politics is ethnic and racial conflict in both national and international social systems. Ethnic conflicts in China, Zanzibar, Cyprus, Canada, Northern Ireland and Switzerland, and racial conflict in South Africa, the United States, Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), Britain, and Sweden are but a small sample of this problem. Ethnic violence is defined as violence over any issue that affects the situation of one ethnic community relative to another. One estimate suggests that worldwide 20 to 30 percent of all domestic violence in 1961-65 was between ethnic groups, and another source calculates that the sum of the fatalities in ethnic hostilities during the 1945-70 period exceeded 10 million. One manifestation of this ethnic conflict is the internationalization of the conflict through international activities such as propaganda techniques, cooperation with external actors, ie. national governments, international organizations, ethnic affiliates.
abroad or any other foreign policy activity.

This study is an inquiry into the foreign policy of Black America. Black Americans, as well as others concerned about international issues and particularly U. S. African policy have encountered serious limitations when seeking to become involved in addressing these issues. For example, several Black Americans attending the Sixth Pan-African Congress in June 1974 were perplexed when asked, "whom do you represent?" by the officials of the young African states. These Black representatives constituted a mixture of labor, ideological, cultural, and academic interests in the Black American community, but none represented a government. Many returned to the United States disenchanted with the meeting, feeling that if they were not government officials, they had no basis for participating in world affairs. However, there are nongovernmental alternatives to international participation. And although the involvement of Blacks in these processes has been limited, as has research on such activity, the subject should be more closely examined. That is the objective of this inquiry. The goals here are to describe both the governmental and nongovernmental foreign policy of Blacks manifested in the activities of Black urban organizations: 1) To identify the targets of Black international concern via the activities of these organizations i.e., are they directed at the local level of government, the national level of government, international organizations or foreign governments?; 2) To describe these foreign policies with respect to their objectives and scope
3) To provide a history of the foreign policy activities of Black Americans; and, 4) To explain how this and similar developments and actors have changed and are expanding the number of participants in global politics.

Black Americans and the Emerging Racial Environment

A central thesis in this study is that race is increasingly becoming a factor in world politics. Just as racial injustice and discrimination seethed and exploded in American cities a decade ago, racial violence and conflict are becoming more prevalent in world politics. Race has linked Black Americans to world affairs throughout U.S. history, however it was the Vietnam war which most illuminated this linkage. When Martin Luther King chose to speak out against the Vietnam war he stated that it was the greatest crime against the Black man since slavery. In 1964 only 37.3 percent of Black youth age 21-26 had been inducted into the U.S. armed forces, as compared to 61.1 percent of white youth. On the other hand, 22.8 percent of all combat troops were Black and 22 percent of all casualties were Black even though Black troops made up only 11 percent of all troop personnel in Vietnam. Defense Secretary McNamara's military induction system amounted to a policy of Black male genocide.

The international racial environment i.e., the environment and the degree to which there is racial, and, or ethnic conflict, has been accelerated by innovations in
communications technology and the spread of racial and ethnic
cultural cohesion. The international racial environment
is not unique in that it is one of several international
environments. James Rosenau has identified six of these
contiguous environments that are perspectives of the inter­
national system. These are: The Regional Environment and
the Organizational Environment. Rosenau suggests that, "Look­
ed at from an international systems perspective, these
categories comprise patterns of interaction that recur, re­
spectively among contiguous polities; among polities in the
same general geographic areas; among superpolities and their
alliance systems; among those in different polities who
present, enhance or otherwise affect relations between races;
polities who develop, distribute and consign human or non­
human resources; and among and within international organ­
izations." 2 The Racial Environment can be examined by
observing the internal and the external conflict behavior of
a national government within the racial environment.

An examination of the international racial environ­
ment can also facilitate the identification of salient issues
areas within the group at the international and national
levels of social structure. For example, Holt and Turner
have examined the "International Systems of Nation-States
and Insular Polities" and include five of the environments
identified by Rosenau, excluding the racial environment.
Holt and Turner derive their hypothesis from Karl Deutsch's
study on the Internal and External Relations of State (1957).
Relations of State (1957). The important variables in their propositions are: 1) the number of linkage groups (racial or ethnic); 2) the link between the group and certain events in the international environment; 3) the strength of the tie between the linkage group and the domestic system; 4) the inertia of the domestic system; and 5) the integration of the domestic system. These variables are also very pertinent in this study for they are probable factors in the formation of Black foreign policy.

Because the nation-state paradigm of world politics, which views global interaction through the lenses of national governments does not include ethnic, religious or racial entities as actors in world politics, the international racial environment has been largely ignored. After all, race cannot be usefully conceptualized as a set of interacting billiard balls. This traditional perception of international relations is imprisoning, for it makes the individual feel insignificant in a world where the rights of national governments take precedence over the rights of individuals. Further, other factors have served to place constraints on Black international participation. Like other regions of the globe (Latin America or the Far East), Africans have not had a long lasting constituency in the United States, for that matter neither have the people of Europe. However, racial and cultural attacks on Africa and Africans by the Western media virtually guaranteed this non-development of a constituency by creating attitudes of shame and the negation of all African identity among many Black Americans for years.
A second reason is that African nations are relatively new to the family of nation-states and like the older states they subscribe to the standard perception of foreign policy and thus may take some time to realize that the cold war environment does not represent their concerns as much as the racial environment does. And thus, they may abandon the state-centric perception of foreign policy. This perception defines that concept of foreign policy as, "the formulation, implementation and evaluation of external choices within one country viewed from the perspective of that country."\textsuperscript{4} This definition of foreign policy must be expanded to include the types of activities and actors of concern here. To conceptualize this activity several new frameworks have been developed. Thus, the major types of global interaction; 1) communication, the movement of information, including the transmission of beliefs, ideas and doctrines; 2) transportation, the movement of physical objects, including raw materials and personal money as well as merchandise; 3) finance, the movement of money and instruments of credit and travel, the movement of persons.\textsuperscript{5} Because most of the everyday routine involves some subliminal foreign policy choice, a great deal of significance must be placed on "formulation", "implementation", and "evaluation" of nongovernmental foreign policy. The resources of ethnics may be far less adequate than those of the national government and must therefore be expended with far greater caution and strategized alternatives and conse-
Finally, some of the most interesting questions related to the emergency of race as an international issue area are raised by Ali Mazrui, who states that race plays an increasingly important role in both the international political and social systems. These hypotheses reflect the implications for the internationalization of race at all levels of the political system.

1) Race has contributed to the overlap in the spheres of national and international politics, this has led to situations influencing a transnational projection of racial interests and activities wherein racial groups seek to "legitimately" act as international actors.

2) The Internationalization of race coincides with an increasing interdependence in the international system (e.g., trade with Black Africa by the U.S. is now six times what it was in 1962), thus conveying a high sense of urgency for solutions.

3) The internationalization of race presents a challenge to the international organization movement, in terms of capability and effectiveness (i.e., will international organizations be able to cope effectively with escalating demands or collapse under the strain of pressure and counter-pressure?)

4) The intrusion of domestic racial issues into international politics is symptomatic of an increasing emphasis on recognition of individuals as subjects of international law.

5) The correlation between race and economic status in the international context, being the domestic situation in multi-racial societies on a larger scale, facilitates a convergence of national and international racial strivings for economic emancipation. Will the internationally organized efforts to solve problems of economic development ultimately prove sufficient to eradicate the racial cleavage; or will the presently, expressed fears of a future "race war" as a function of economic deprivations and exploitation materialize.6
Overview

The objective of this investigation of transnational relations is to determine the degree to which the international racial environment is becoming an important factor in world politics. Drawing primarily from the propositions of Holt and Turner, and Rosenau, I will seek to determine the degree to which the foreign policy activity of Black-Americans and other ethnic nationalities are impinging upon the foreign policy activity of the U. S. national government, (a secondary objective) and to determine which factors determine the transnational activities of Black America.

In the first chapter, the urban context in which Black organizations function and through which the people of the world exchange ideas, money, goods, information and culture is examined as an environment in which the racial or ethnic group (Non-State Nation) seeks to participate in international events.

The second chapter examines the phenomena of international ethnicity with respect to ethnic influence on U. S. foreign policy comparing both ethnic and racial nationalism as factors in world and domestic politics.

Chapter three provides an historic overview of Black foreign policy activity by examining the efforts of five individuals who have been instrumental in articulating Black interests, heightening American consciousness about the evils of racism, and involving Black Americans in international affairs, as well as influencing American foreign
policy to some extent. These individuals were: Edward Wilmont Blyden, Paul Cuffe, Marcus A. Garvey, William Edward Burkhardt Dubois and Malcolm X. Also, examined in the third chapter are the inroads made by Blacks into the foreign policy processes of Congress, the State Department, and the contemporary activities of some of the organizations interviewed in this study.

Chapter four, the title chapter, focuses on the most relevant recent literature in the transnational relations paradigm. Three alternative approaches to the analysis of transnational relations are examined with respect to the 1) research design 2) actors involved and 3) implications for the nation-state notions of "sovereignty" and "national loyalty." These theoretical approaches are: 1) the Linkage Politics approach of James Rosenau 2) the Non-State Nations approach by Judy S. Bertelsen and 3) the Non State Actors approach of Manbach, Lampert and Ferguson et. al.

Finally, the fifth chapter presents the field research on the foreign policy activity of fifteen Black organizations in four major cities. Also presented here are the hypotheses and their testing (research design), the descriptive statistics and the data analysis. Some suggestions for further research on the subject and conclusions are also drawn.
Introduction Notes


3. IBID. p. 39


5. Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye *Transnational Relations and World Politics* p. 40

Chapter I

The Urban Context

Urbanism and the urbanization process have been central facets of Black American history and of contemporary political development within the Black community. In this chapter, the urban context in which foreign policy activity is formulated, debated and implemented shall be analyzed. Further, the conditions which define the Black urban experience shall be examined as well as the response of ghetto and slum dwellers to those conditions. Also of concern in this chapter is the nation-state response in both policy and practice in attempts by Black people to assert themselves in the local, national, and international environments. Keeping in mind that the urban experience has been similar only for the "white ethnics" and that the "urban crisis" was a pejorative call for "law and order" and coercive control over the new Puerto Rican, Black and Chicano urban residents, we shall examine the relative powerlessness of Blacks in urban areas, and relate this to foreign policy activity.

Demographic factors are and have historically played a crucial part in the political activity of the Black community, particularly residential patterns. Today only half of the nation's Black population is urban. The estimate is that if present migration trends continue,
from 75 to 85 percent of the Black population will live outside the south. This has been checked by recent white return to the city, but the Black population has in fact become more urban than the white population. While Blacks make up 11 percent of the national population, they make up 21 percent of the population of central cities and 28 percent of the population of the twelve cities having a population of two million or more. Blacks are more concentrated in the large cities and Standards Metropolitan Statistical Areas than whites. Three out of every five Black people (58%) live in the central city of a major metropolitan area, as compared with 28 percent of the White population. Blacks make up the majority of the population in four major American cities: Atlanta, Gary, Newark, and Washington, D. C. In nine other cities, Baltimore, Birmingham, Charleston, Detroit, New Orleans, Richmond, Savannah, St. Louis, and Wilmington, more than 40 percent of the population is Black.\(^1\) In short, Blacks are eleven percent of the total population, yet 80 percent of Blacks are already urban. During the 1960's the Black population increased in the cities by 3.2 million. In the cities of 2 million and over there was a decline of 2.5 million whites and an increase of 1.8 million Blacks.\(^2\) The flight of whites from "chocolate city" has reached astounding proportions in some areas. For example, the urban white population decreased by over half a million between 1960 and 1970. Racial transformation of the central cities was accelerated. As noted by the Bureau of Census, the
"increase in the Black population of the central cities proved to be widespread, thus changing substantially the racial mixture." The increased prospect for competition and conflict over land use (as whites are moving back into some cities under the homestead program), is also a reality. For it is now that the value of the cities is being recognized in terms of convenience of transportation.

CITIES

Cities have two values as units of analysis in world politics. First, as "central places" they facilitate the exchange of goods, money, people and information across national boundaries. Each of the nations cities of over 10,000 persons is placed in one of seven categories according to its dominant productive function. The major categories are, "manufacturing." "diversified manufacturing," "industrial," "retailing," "diversified retailing," "dormitory," and "specialized." The geographers Harris and Ullman have this description:

1. Cities provide comprehensive services for a surrounding area. They tend to be evenly spaced throughout productive territory.

2. Transport cities perform break of bulk and allied services along transport routes, supported by areas which may be remote and distant but close in connection with the city's strategic location on transport channels. Such cities tend to be arranged in linear patterns along rail lines or at coasts.

3. Specialized function cities performing one service such as mining, manufacturing or recreation for large areas, including the general tributary areas and hosts of other areas.
Second, the city and local level provide a greater sense of efficacy for citizen involvement and participation in economic development and in decision making than do the state and national governments, at least as far as the individual is concerned.

The socio-economic organization of cities makes them useful as entities in this context, and as units of analysis have received some attention. One study, conducted by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), analyzes what is termed "racial stratification system." Based on a theoretical model developed by Richard Schemerhorn on comparative ethnic relations, the UNITAR study analyzed ethnic and racial systems in terms of basic superordinate and subordinate stratification patterns. Utilizing two primary independent variables; 1) Degree of enclosure (measured by ecological concentration and other demographic variables), and 2) control of scarce values by the dominant group, indicated by the comparative number of members in superordinate and subordinate groups in upper echelons of political, economic and educational or prestige hierarchies of society. In many respects the UNITAR study is strikingly similar to the efforts of Dahl (1961), Polsby (1965), Hunter (1959) and Bellush and Jewel (1972) in that they seek to determine where in these urban communities the power lies. Here the debate between elite and pluralist theories of participation is staged, however with the exception of the
Bellush and Jewel study race factors receive very little attention in these studies.

The degree of enclosure is a polite way of referring to segregation. Segregation of racial and ethnic groups is not new to American life. Anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic political movements, from the Know Nothing Party of the nineteenth century to the Ku Klux Klan and the American Nazi of today have attempted to keep others "in their place" socially, economically, physically and politically. Some data on how patterns of segregation are changing are provided by Karl and Alma Taeuber in their study of segregation indices of American cities for 1940, 1950, and 1960.

Their segregation index called the "index of dissimilarity " uses the computer to analyze census data for Blacks and gives index figures representing the proportion of nonwhites that would have to move to another block in order to have a complete balance of the races. According to the Taeubers finding, the average segregation for 207 of the largest cities in the United States was 86.2 in 1960. This means that 86 percent of all nonwhites would have to move to produce an unsegregated pattern. Such a dispersal strategy to the problems of the ghettos is unlikely, as are any significant changes in social inequity in the immediate future.

The UNITAR study strongly emphasizes the similarity between and among systems of racial dominance. George
Shepherd refers to the "Western White Dominance System" which is most evident in the urban context. The Black ghettos throughout the world have many similarities, including: rates of population growth, histories of exploitation, outlooks and values of the inhabitants, rates of unemployment, levels of education and specialized skills. They are also similar in their patterns of protest against social injustice. For example, the 1957 Montgomery Bus Boycott led by Dr. King has its counterpart in Alexandria, South Africa that same year. Forty-five thousand people participated in the Alexandria boycott, a blow was struck against apartheid. The response of the American National government and that of the South African government have been similar. A threat is perceived and reacted to with increased security expenditures. Despite the variety among the South African protest groups and liberation movements e.g., based on Bible Fundamentalism, Marxism and political liberalism; they are treated alike by the government of the white minority. Examples of this system are the pervasive suppressive power of the South African police and the "control power" of the National Guard. In the U. S., the perception allowed for the making of policy based on a definition of the minority as "the enemy." One indicator of this perception was the political mileage gotten from such terms as "law and order" and the present use of the "free speech" constitutional right to express policies of racism and genocide. In South Africa, as in urban America, much activity,
which is seemingly remote to state interests is severely constrained and those involved are killed in the war against change waged by the State of South Africa. Edward Feit explains:

The ends of disorder cannot, however, be dismissed completely. In some groups disorder may have a ritual function; it may be part of a psychodrama demonstrating to polyarchies that a rising group is not powerless, that its politically relevant sectors wish to enter the political process. Disorder is fomented, certainly by such groups, but they cannot be classed with insurgents. How then can groups engaging in ritual revolts be distinguished from those that aim at disorder and overthrow?

Feit points out that before 1960 the African National Congress was not an insurgent movement or organization and indeed, dissociated itself from anything that could be construed as insurgency. After 1960, it associated itself with Umkonto We Sizwe, a sabotage group that was instrumental in creating, and became part of, an insurgency. Similarly, with the 1968 assassination of Martin Luther King, the murders of Black Panthers Fred Hampton and Mark Clark by Cook County Sheriffs, Chicago police, the FBI and numerous other police organizations, the Black organizations were forced to change in many respects organizational purposes and strategies.

The most striking indicator of Black ghetto similarity is the disproportionate lack of power held by Black communities. A 1972 study of Black powerlessness in Chicago and Milwaukee by sociologists Karl Flaming and John Palen provides an example. They found that of the 19,997
top policy making positions in the Chicago area, only 285 or 2.6 percent were held by Blacks. Blacks were virtually unrepresented in the policy making positions of private institutions such as business, corporations, banks, insurance companies, universities and professional organizations. The highest degree of representation among Blacks was found in the voluntary sector. Using the following hypotheses, Palen and Flaming gathered data on Black decision making power in Milwaukee.

1. Blacks have a greater probability of occupying high appointive positions high elective positions or civil service positions.

2. The probability of a Black being appointed to a position having a potential for power is directly related to the similarity of his political and economic philosophy to that of whites already occupying positions of power.

3. Significant Black participation in making decisions is inversely related to the amount of resources involved in the decisions.

4. Black representation is inversely related to the relative prestige of the formal position held.
Palen and Flaming have gathered the following data to show the Black powerlessness in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

Table Number 1

Percentage of Blacks in Policy Making Positions

The Private Sector

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<th>Selected Areas</th>
<th>Number Positions</th>
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Black Urban Poverty

Another condition, analogous among urban ghettos is the poverty which trapped many of the inhabitants. Two dominant analytical themes have developed as a part of government response to the "urban crisis." The first of these involves a cluster of behavioral variables called the "culture of poverty." This image, first suggested by Oscar Lewis and subsequently borrowed by many urbanologists has received much attention. Moynihan and Glazer (1962), Moynihan (1969), Downs (1970), Banfield (1970), are among
This group. This argument holds that poverty makes their plight immune to most anti-poverty measures.\(^9\)

The second more radical analysis is presented by two Marxists, Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy. In their work, *Monopoly Capital* they invoke a theme of poverty that is radically different from those of the liberals:

In a monopoly capitalist society it thus happens that a special group at the bottom acts as a kind of lightening rod for the frustrations and hostilities of all other groups, the more so the nearer to the bottom...Such a society becomes in time so thoroughly saturated with race prejudice that it sinks below the level of consciousness and become part of the human nature of its members...status being a relative matter, whites inevitably interpret upward mobility by Blacks as downward mobility for themselves.\(^10\)

This interpretation of Black upward mobility and white downward mobility is currently manifest in the attack on affirmative action and equal educational opportunities. An attack which thus far has been successful.

The theme of Baran and Sweezy is particularly useful in the urban context where, as mentioned earlier, there is increased competition for land, housing, and jobs. In 1928, Ernest W. Burgess developed a concentric zone theory of land in the city. Inter-group competition was central to this theory and thus as in the later work of Baran and Sweezy, the existence of a lower class was necessary. Piven and Cloward argue that this underclass is controlled by local and federal bureaucrats through the
public programs i.e., health care, food stamps and subsized housing. 

Urban Disorder and Nation-State Response

The increase in the size of Black urban populations has been a matter of concern for several years. The prospect of the "Black Tinderbox" explosion increases with the racial transition of the cities. The proportion of Blacks in the nation's thirty largest cities has been increasing rapidly since World War II, almost doubling between 1950 and 1966. According to Demetrios Caraley, by 1985 Chicago, Philadelphia, St. Louis, Detroit, Baltimore, New Orleans, Newark and Washington, D.C. are expected to have Black majorities. To extinguish these Black tinderboxes, Caraley writes that the police will probably be developing an even greater capacity with occasional help from the National Guard to respond quickly and with sufficient manpower to control outbreaks of urban violence. The McCarran bill, first known as Public Law 831 was dusted off for use against rioting Blacks instead of Communists. Originally known as the Internal Security Act of 1950, and Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, Title II of the Act authorizes the Attorney General, in times of emergency as declared by the President, to hold in detention centers persons he believes "probably will engage in...acts of espionage or sabotage." It is important to note that these are persons who have not yet committed an act,
but who might do so. In the aftermath of the rebellions of the 1960's, the memory of detention camps was again in the minds of some Americans, Black and white. Some Blacks feared the camps would be used against them, and some whites discussed this possibility. In its 1968 report, "Guerilla Warfare Advocates in the U. S.,” "the House of Un-American Activities Committee recommended a plan by which Black citizens, like those who participated in the rebellions of the 1960's could be 'isolated and destroyed in a short period of time." The HUAC plan is set forth as follows:  

Guerilla Warfare in the United States  

The condition of Black urban America has led many to the conclusion that Blacks in American cities are a colonized people. In a geographic analysis of Black America, Davis and Donaldson note:  

Denial of access to needs, services, and opportunities produces the kind of spatial containment which leaves a people increasingly controlled. A well contained people are ready for genocide.  

Genocide is one step beyond spatial containment. The continuation of colonial racist practices has resulted in a group of Black Americans charging the United States with genocide as defined by the Genocide Convention of the United Nations in 1948; which was incidentally signed but not ratified by the United States. Genocide is defined to be any intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a racial, ethnic or religious group. This includes:
a. Killing members of the group
b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
d. Imposing measured intended to prevent births within the group
e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.¹⁵

As with the term "colony," "genocide" is a sensitive word, one that draws primarily emotional response. Davis and Donaldson note that from the perspective of certain Black people "genocide" is an accurate description of their condition in America. Blacks have been subjected to all the conditions set forth in the five conditions above. Although these conditions may not be all inflicted deliberately, measures which are racist do not have to be deliberate to be effective. Conditions a, b, and c have the most data to provide evidence of genocide in the U. S. Further, genocide is by no means a simple phenomenon. It does not occur automatically. One group of people do not just exterminate another. It is necessary to pass through several developmental stages in which one group is defined out of humanity. The dominant group must believe they are entitled to the life and death of their victims. As William Patterson and Paul Robeson successfully did, the threat of genocide must be illuminated so that actors outside of the United States are involved. In this light, racial foreign policy is based on a survival instinct, which other minorities have demonstrated in their conflicts with the majority.
Notes
The Urban Context


7. Edward Feit, Urban Revolt In South Africa Ohio State University Press, Columbus: 1975 pp.60-66


14. IBID.

15. William L. Patterson, The Man Who Cried Genocide
Chapter II

The Ethnic Context

Race, like ethnicity may be a significant factor in both conflict and in foreign policy decision making. The historic context of American ethnicity is replete with examples of both. In this chapter, I shall discuss the emergence into the international arena, and also the influence of ethnics on U. S. foreign policy. Further, Blacks shall be viewed through the lenses of ethnicity to see if race and ethnicity differ with respect to influencing decision makers or arousing hostility from other groups (ethnics), i.e., what is the nature of the new found American ethnicity.

International Ethnicity

The multi ethnic states of the world must face the prospect of ethnic conflict, as they had to in the past. A sample of 132 states shows that only 12 or 9.1 percent had one ethnic group. Twenty-five states or 18.9 percent are comprised of an ethnic group that represents more than 90 percent of the aggregate population, and in another 25 states the largest ethnic groups account for 75-89 percent of the total population. However, in 31 states 23.5 percent of the total, the significant ethnic
group does not account for half of the states population. It has been estimated that in 52 states or 40.2 percent the population is comprised into five or more significant ethnic groups.¹

W. E. B. Dubois (1957), predicted that ethnic conflict would replace class conflict as an image through which to understand future conflict behavior. Evidence to this effect is plentiful.

The resurgence of ethnicity both in the U. S. and abroad points to the fact that the "Vanishing ethnic" only vanished in the minds of students of international relations as theories of nationalism and supranationalism rose in attention and influence. This contention is supported by the growing belief that the legitimacy of the modern nation state is struggling to overcome internal contradictions between the nation and the state, i.e., the government and the varied peoples.

Said and Simmons point to the technological revolution in communications that has permitted previously isolated groups to become more visible, and in certain cases to interact across national boundaries as the dominant cause agent in this development of global ethnicity. "The internal struggle within each state seeks its analogue in external politics. A politics of ethnicity is beginning to dominate the behavior of divergent
and anthropomorphically different cultures that will have wide impact upon their respective nation states and demand new theoretical models.  

Today there are many events reminding us of the tenaciousness of the nation state. Basque separatists are challenging the authority of the Spanish government; Flemish and Walloon militants are questioning the practicality of Belgian unity; foreign workers from Italy and Yugoslavia are straining the ties that bind Switzerland together; Scottish and Welsh nationalists are forcing Westminster to consider radical decentralization of British political authority.

Finally, ethnic groups have internal differentiations. The width of the gap between intracommunal status groups affects the community's political capacity to deal with outside pressure. Thus, the fragmentation within the Black community debilitates greatly its capacity to influence other factors in domestic and international systems.

Further, because ethnic identity is usually treated with the same rationality that occupational or regional concerns are, (in the U. S. at least), claims by ethnic groups for special status or undissected treatment are dismissed because such groups will compete for attention and public rewards on an equal footing with gun clubs, labor unions and other interest groups. Thus, for example, President Nixon for several months refused to
meet with twelve Black congressmen, saying that he did not want to acknowledge them as ethnic group delegates, although they represented interests and constituencies as diverse as Los Angeles and Brooklyn and were elected by numerical majorities.4

Ethnicity and U. S. Foreign Policy

"National interest" has always been an ambivalent concept in multi-ethnic states. The intensification of ethnic and racial consciousness, has led to fragmentation rather than to political consolidation and social integration as earlier assumed. Ethnic groups find more affinity along lines other than the national boundaries or traditional nation states. Further, as units of analysis, ethnic groups appear to be comparable anywhere on the earth's surface, and therefore constitute a real as opposed to a juridical construct for analysis.

Further, the myth of the "melting pot" and of the "national interest" have always been myths with respect to Blacks. This has been consistently pointed out through history by such foreign observers as de Tocqueville and Chateaubriand. As Abdul Said notes:

The Blacks demand for access to the mainstream of American life is causing some Americans to repudiate the myth. Those who perceive their status threatened by Blacks are falling back on what they consider to be more reliable affiliations. They emphasize the fact that they are white, white protestants, Irishmen, or Lithuanians, asserting identities that were thought to have been diluted in the melting pot, if not shed in the transmuting pot. They join with those whom they feel safe granting equal rights and duties; but this number does not
include those of alien identities today particularly Blacks.  

When ethnic consciousness is translated into attempts to influence U. S. foreign policy, we find that the Greek lobby, for example, convinces the U. S. Congress that selling arms to Turkey is against the national interest of the U. S.

Said suggests that the implications of such an absence of a stable national ethnic (unified belief system), and a non-existent set of external interests for U.S. foreign policy could conceivably mean a see-saw U. S. foreign policy response to the dominant coalitions of ethnic groups that achieve temporary prominence. This suggests a crisis of continuity in American foreign policy and helps explain variations in U. S. foreign policy toward Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East.

A specific example of ethnic influence can be seen in the Turkish arms embargo experience of 1974. This demonstrated the influence of the Greek-American community. Because none of the experts on the Kissinger staff were 'typical' or even faintly similar to the stereotype of the ethnic politician, the State Department underestimated the ethnic linkage variable. Thus, writes Clifford Hackett: the analysis ignored an important fact, ethnicity. However, in the Congress, two Greek American congressmen Brandemas and Sarbenes, aided by two mavericks
Eagleton and Rosenthal, were playing ethnic politics with a grave foreign policy matter.

Underestimating their opponents (ethnicity in this example), was the first step in the failure of the Ford Administration's proposition on the Turkish Embargo issue. In 18 votes of the House and the Senate during 1974-75, the Administration lost most of the time on this issue. The State Department at the end of 1976 attributed the Ford-Kissinger defeat on the issue to the diminished role of the Secretary of State on the issue, the quality of leadership of the pro Greek (or anti-Turkish groups on Capital Hill, and basically, the question of ethnic politics of which it knew so little. In this example, the influence of the Greek-American was made significant by ethnically conscious politicians.

Influence based primarily on ethnic considerations is considered undesirable however by some politicians. During a key debate on the Turkish arms embargo issue, one house member pleaded: "It is time we quit voting on the basis of ethnic, color or religious beliefs.... these divisions are destroying the legislative process." Other critics of ethnic politics consider it wrong for the following reasons: 1) it is not conducive to national cohesion; 2) it makes for inter-ethnic conflict in congressional politics; 3) it enhances lobbyism and makes a firmly based foreign policy impossible in the Executive branch and foreign policy strategy impossible in the Executive branch and for
other countries who can never be sure of what ethnic constituencies will object to international agreements or other national commitments.9

In an analysis of the "Hyphenated-Americans," an analysis of influence on U. S. foreign policy and Diplomacy, Louis Gerson raises questions which seem to reflect the origin of ethnic feelings and the subsequent concern and criticism of ethnicity particularly when race is a variable in these issues. These questions are: What are the causes of the dramatic awakening of this ethnic consciousness and feelings? Is it present in all American ethnic groups? It is, as some have hinted, a reaction to Black pride, Black power, and perhaps even a cover for racism? It is genuine or will it fade away like other typical American moods? And what about its effects: Will it help to eliminate discrimination and divisiveness, or will it bring more alienation and tension within American society?10 It is likely that both the possible effects noted by Gerson will occur, probably the latter before the former in that this seems to be part of the general process of political development in multi-ethnic societies. Moreover Gerson suggests that:

It is doubtful that the current revival of ethnicity will fulfill the expectations of those who have hailed it. Americanization, the acculturation and assimilation of immigrant groups has been a progressive achievement. It is unlikely to be reversed... Some immigrant groups have been absorbed, leaving only symbolic residues; others, particularly newer ones, have not.11
At the outbreak of World War I (Europeans in global conflict), Americans became increasingly interested in their native countries, invariably affecting U. S. foreign policy. Many immigrants who have no patriotic feelings toward their native lands, discovered it in America. The roots of immigrant nationalism were found not only in concern for their native countries (absent at the time of emigration), but perhaps even more in the compressed ghettos where group consciousness was fostered by loneliness, poverty and the animosities of nativists, other ethnic groups and American political parties.

Because of the U. S. doctrine of religious freedom, the church was often the cohesive factor in ethnic nationalism. Heritage groups, churches, ethnic social and fraternal organizations all helped to reinforce this ethnocentricity.

World War II saw the return of the "hyphenated uproar." The editors of Fortune magazine warned in September 1942:

"There is danger on our shores, unqualified support for war by such immigrant groups as Norwegians and Czechs; support, but with elements of confused reluctance by Poles and Slovaks; submission with traces of subversive defiance by Germans and Italians."12

The editors were most concerned about the presence of a "replica of explosive Europe" in America. Fortune questioned whether the United States could transfer this into a working model of political warfare."13
In an analysis of the Jewish influence on U. S. decision-making process during the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, Robert Trice points to what he terms the determinants of Pro-Israeli and Pro-Arab Impact. Comparing the foreign policy roles played by the pro-Israel and pro-Arab groups he identified the following factors: 1) Organizational characteristics: 2) the structure of the governmental decision-making system, 3) the relations of these groups with other actors in the domestic and 4) international environments. He attributes the effectiveness of the pro-Israel group and activity to the "multi-tiered structural pyramid" that links Jews in local communities across the country to centralized national foreign policy leadership groups in Washington and New York. The Jewish organizational ability to mobilize rapidly in a coordinated fashion on a national scale when important foreign policy issues arise, made the difference. The pro-Arab group, which was relatively small by population comparison was divided however. Split between foreign born naturalized Arabs and those born in the United States, Arab-American foreign policy influence was diminished.

In the case of Black-American ethnicity and U. S. foreign policy toward Africa, many questions raised by Gerson may be addressed, for here race (instead of or in addition to ethnicity) becomes a variable.
Investigating the influence of Blacks on U. S. foreign policy Herschelle Sullivan Challenor suggests that despite an ongoing and recently increased interest in political and economic developments on the African continent, Black Americans have historically exerted little influence on U. S. policy toward Africa but that their influence is increasing. Pointing to Michael Parentis' thesis that ethnic politics is likely to increase rather than decrease with greater acculturation into American society, Challenor considers some contemporary organizational activities and notes that:

"While the basis for interest may differ, Black attraction to Africa is a cross-class phenomenon. This period of history is witnessing increased ethnic and religious nationalism in the world's nation-states and heightened transnational activity in international affairs....

Currently, as during earlier periods, the African interest competes with four other strategic options: integration, black nationalism or international statism, emigration and cultural nationalism."15

Indeed the various strategies employed by Blacks have been diverse. They range from the efforts of Owusu Sauduaki and a small staff in Washington, D. C. to build a viable African constituency via the African Liberation Support Committee to Roy Innis' attempts to recruit Black veterans to assist the Angolan National Unity Movement (UNITA) and the National Liberation Front (FLNA) forces during the Angolan civil war.
Challenor concludes that while a Black lobby for Africa has yet to be institutionalized, clearly an effective Black constituency for Africa is emerging in the United States.

The nature and impact of ethnic politics will further be illustrated as racial politics continues to be internationalized. Black international activity in particular is and will continue to be indicative of the degree to which race can become a cohesive factor and the degree to which a countervailing influence is generated among non-Black ethnics. Thus racial international activity will further test the pluralist model of American politics, which has not yet considered race as a major factor in American foreign policy. The groups that Blacks have supported in Africa have been the revolutionary liberation movements against the Portuguese and the minority regimes of Zimbabwe and South Africa. These have clearly been against the interests of non-Africans as those interests are presently defined. Moreover, if these interests are labelled "national" they can become racially divisive. Thus, the National Security legislation of 1950, the McCarran Act stands to respond to the possibility that as Dubois, Yette, Segal, Parenti and others are correct in their assertions that race is the conflict variable of the future, i.e., Blacks involved in international racial conflict could be put into concentration camps as were the Japanese during World War II.
American ethnics have historically exercised complete liberty to urge the United States Government to support their ancestral homelands. From the very first day of the American Revolution, Latin American exiles have plotted to overthrow their various home governments and at times have invaded their homelands from U. S. bases. In this country the nativist aspirations of the Irish, Poles, Jews, Czechs, Lithuanians, Latvians, Ukrainians, Greeks, Turkish, Chinese, Arabs and many more ethnic have received both political and material support from their ethnic American counterparts. Gerson notes that this seems important, but that despite all these activities, often encouraged by U. S. political leaders, including presidents and congressmen there is no hard documentary evidence that the main courses of U. S. diplomacy were directed or altered by the influence of a specific ethnic group. However, there are a number of ways by which an ethnic lobby can bring its influence to bear as has been shown in this discussion. Summarily these are: the traditional method of interest articulation via delegations or gaining an audience with individual decision-makers. Also there is the approach which channels concern at the nations chief diplomat himself. These failing to evoke the desired response, the ethnic lobby can work within one or both major political parties, attempt to mobilize power during given elections, and as a final resort appeal to the
general public opinion in the hope that a critical mass of support will be reflected both at the polls and in the actions of government. Except for the pro-Israel lobby in the United States, ethnic lobbies as a group are pretty far down the scale of those organizations that the State Department takes seriously. As John Spanier and Eric Uslander note; "It therefore does not seem reasonable to argue that even a powerful ethnic group can reverse the course of foreign policy. At best it can create a dialogue and expedite action on a policy that has a general consensus among decision-makers."17

The influence of ethnic groups is constrained by certain factors. The relevant groups (numerically, economically and politically viable) are so fragmented and haphazard in their contacts with the State Department that they do not make a serious impression there. As one department official commented; "While Poles have lots of organizations I feel they exist on paper more than anywhere else.... These people are numerous in key midwest and northeast industrial areas, they are sought after as a political group. But when it comes to anything other than elections, as for example to bringing influence to bear on a particular issue it all gets rather amorphous."18
Another factor which limits the influence of ethnics on U. S. governmental foreign policy is the fact that officials are basically unsympathetic to giving ethnic groups any significant role in policy formation. "At best these groups have received for their congressional lobbyist efforts little more than insertions in the Congressional Record of prepared speeches supporting their cause by members of the House and Senate" notes Stephen Garettt in an analysis of the Eastern European lobby.\(^{19}\)

Finally the environment must be considered with respect to these two important factors; first, the attitudes supportive or antagonistic of the larger community, and second, the cohesion and energy with which the ethnic group expresses itself on a given policy. These aspects of Black foreign policy activity shall be more fully examined later.
Notes

The Ethnic Context

2. IBID. p. 12
4. IBID. p. 65
7. U. S. Congressional Record 94th Congress 1975 H 7439
10. IBID. p. 148
11. IBID. p. 149
12. IBID. p. 152
13. IBID. p. 154
14. Robert Trice "Domestic Interest Groups and the Arab-Israeli conflict:" A Behavioral Analysis in Abdul Said p. 207
16. James Rosenau, Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy p. 173
17. John Spanier and Eric Uslander, How American Foreign Policy is Made p. 84

Chapter III

The Historic Precedent

In a historic perspective, the variety of Black international interests and activities can be seen via the foreign policies of various movements, organizations and individuals. Attempts to influence both domestic and foreign governments are numerous. However, this historic perspective also allows the analysis of the two basic foreign policy strategies employed. The first perspective views Black foreign policy activity as a strategy to influence the decision makers on issues apropos to the interests of Africa and Africans. The second perspective views Black foreign policy activity as attempts by the U.S. government, other domestic interests groups, and foreign governmental and nongovernmental actors, to influence the foreign policy behavior of Black Americans. A chronology of Black foreign policy activity is provided at the end of the chapter.

As early as 1526, there had been slave revolts in what is now South Carolina. Alliances formed between escaped Africans and the native American tribes of South Carolina and Georgia were formed and attacks on the plantations were frequent. During the war between colonial
America and England many individual African slaves ran away and enlisted as a means of obtaining their freedom. In the French and Indian wars both northern and southern colonies used Black soldiers. One dilemma posed immediately therefore was the arming and training of men who were expected to return to chattel status. It is estimated that over one thousand Blacks were in the continental army, and that most of these were from Massachusetts and Rhode Island.\(^1\) Determined that the federal army would not become a refuge for runaway slaves, the high command, meeting at Cambridge on October 8, 1775, agreed upon a policy of exclusion for both slaves and free Negroes.\(^2\)

**Early Repatriation Strategies**

In 1773, the slaves of Massachusetts petitioned the colonial governing officials for their emancipation so that they might earn transportation money "to some port off the coast of Africa, where we proposed a settlement" as they put it.\(^3\) After the war, several African oriented organizations were formed. In 1787, a group of eighty Black Bostonians once again petitioned the state legislature for economic assistance to settle in Africa. They were anxious to leave America because, "they found themselves in very disagreeable, disadvantageous circumstances." In 1796 these "free" Africans
were interested in colonizing territory on the west coast of Africa. The African Society, founded in Boston in 1796, contained the following article in its charter: "The basis of and ultimate objects in encouraging emigration; shall be self reliance and self government on the priniciple of African Nationality the African race being the ruling element of the nation; controlling and ruling their own affairs." These early strategies were based on a "Christianization" ethic represented in the preamble of the Constitution of the African Civilization society.

One of the chief opponents to the design for African repatriation and the African Civilization Society was Frederick Douglas. Emphasizing emancipation and education as opposed to any back to Africa scheme he wrote:

The African Civilization Society proposes to plant its guns too far from the battlements of slavery for us. Its doctrines and measures are those of doubt and retreat, and it must land just where the American Colonization Society movement landed, upon the lying assumption that white and Black people can never live on the same land on terms of equality.

For Frederick Douglas, plans of repatriation were futile at best. His concern was the emancipation of some four million slaves in the United States. However, he wrote that: "If colored men are convinced that by going to Africa, or anywhere else, to find freedom, we respect them too, just as we respect others who have gone to California, Fraser Island, Oregon and the West Indies."
Early U. S. Interests in Africa

Early U. S. interests in Africa were dominated by the slave trade, extending well into the nineteenth century. Most commercial relations were with West Africa where the slave trade flourished. In 1787 the British established a colony in Sierra Leone. This marked a change in the West African, British and U. S. economies. The "free Negro" colony for ex-slaves served as a base for the Royal Navy's operation against the slave trade and served as a center for legitimate trade in goods such as rum and tobacco.

Sierra Leone was opened to American shipping in 1831, but even then there was no legal American trade for several years. In 1784, the first American ship anchored at the Cape of Good Hope. Historian, Eric Rosenthal reports that between 1795 and 1800 no less than one hundred and twenty-four vessels flying the American flag paid port charges at Cape Town, and South Africa quickly became an important point in American trade with the east and in the Indian Ocean. About this same time, missionary and colonization societies began to develop in London and in the United States.

In 1804, Africans of Haiti stated a revolution ending French rule there. They were assisted by escaped slaves from the United States and slave revolts
became a grave concern. As early as 1816 there were societies of colonization with their affiliates in every state and territory except Rhode Island, South Carolina, Arkansas and Michigan.9 Pressures to stop the illegal slave trade and to colonize free Negroes mounted until on December 19, 1819, President Monroe sent a special message to Congress, announcing his intentions to use his authority to return captured Africans to Africa and to establish a depot or refuge at some place on the African coasts, where the rescued Negroes could be cared for until their final disposition was determined. On January 8, 1820, a month after his message to congress, he appointed Samuel Bacon the United States agent to the Colonization Society to supervise the repatriation of captured slaves.10 However, it was not until the late 1840's that the American government and Colonization societies were successful in establishing their foothold in Africa with the establishment of Liberia.

Early Black Foreign Policy

From the time of their arrival in the United States and West Indies many Africans looked to the day of their return to Africa. Many religious, governmental and individual strategies emerged. Historically certain individuals are important because of the scope and appeal of their
efforts. Among these are Paul Cuffe, Edward Blyden, Marcus Garvey, W. E. B. Dubois and Malcolm X.

Paul Cuffe

The vision of a regenerated Africa originated in the late eighteenth century with the influential British evangelical and humanitarian movement which directed its energies against slavery and slave trade and toward the "civilization" of Africa through Christianity and commerce. Paul Cuffe, in 1808 was the first American Black leader to champion "repatriation". He made two trips to Sierra Leone. The first in 1811 was exploratory; on his second trip in 1815 he brought thirty-eight Negroes largely at his own expense.\(^{11}\)

Cuffe's trips had important consequences writes biographer Hollis Lynch because, "they demonstrated the feasibility of colonizing free American Negroes in Africa, and the idea was earnestly taken up in America by a curious combination of humanitarians and slave holders.\(^ {12}\) The humanitarians believed that such a colonization scheme would give American Negroes a sense of genuine Freedom as well as constitute them as agents of civilization in Africa, while the slave holders were interested in getting rid to the free Negroes who posed a possible threat to the institution of slavery. These
two incongruous elements founded the American Colonization society in 1817 and their efforts led to the establishment of Liberia.

Although the war with England in 1812 prevented Cuffe from implementing his full plan, he curiously received much of his support from whites. Writes historian Benjamin Quarles:

From the time of the Revolutionary war, free Blacks had been encouraged indeed advised to return to Africa. Those giving such advice were variously motivated. Some wanted merely to get rid of the "troublesome" free Negro, others viewed the movement as a means to send to Africa a Christianized population and to discharge the moral obligation to return the African to his ancestral homelands.13

Cuffe's activities also served the U. S. government's repatriation designs. When the American Colonization Society sought the aid of Congress in acquiring a place to send the Africans, Congress was responsive. Cuffe had demonstrated that colonization was the answer to the vexing problem of what to do with the Africans captured in the illegal slave trade. Congress proceeded to appropriate $100,000 to the American Colonization Society with an assist from two U. S. government agents. The society received additional funds from church groups and auxiliary societies and from state legislatures including those of Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland and Virginia. There were also strong opponents to plans for repatriation. Among them was Martin Delaney who advocated
as the establishment of a "Negro empire in the New World". Benjamin Quarles notes that not many Black people shared Cuffe's enthusiasm for colonization. By 1852 fewer than 8,000 Negroes had gone to Liberia and only 2800 of these were free Negroes. Of these, 3600 were emancipated under the condition that they go to Liberia, and finally some 1,000 African who had been liberated from slave ships.

Other plans involved emigration to Haiti. Since the Haitian revolution in 1804 led by Toussaint L'Ouverture, many new world Africans hoped the Black empire in the West would develop and negate claims of "Negro inferiority". However, Haiti was consumed with internal conflict and did not live up to outside expectations. In the late 1850's James T. Holley and other Black leaders began advocating large scale emigration to Haiti. However, the stage had been set by Cuffe.

Edward Wilmot Blyden

Another strong proponent of colonization and repatriation was Dr. Edward Wilmot Blyden. Born in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands in 1832, Dr. Blyden supported repatriation as a strategy to "elevate the Negro race." It was the humiliating condition of the "Negro" as a human being, which drove Edward Wilmot Blyden to becoming a champion of Pan-Negroism in the 19th century. Blyden believed that Liberia had to play the central
role in any attempt to improve the conditions of Africans in America.

Until its independence on July 26, 1847, Liberia was subject to the supreme authority of the American Colonization Society, and therefore not able to deal with the recalcitrant European traders who flouted the nonsovereign commercial regulations of the colony.15

Internal problems also weakened the young Liberian country. Among the internal factors retarding the progress of Liberia was the existence of social stratification based on pigmentation. The light skinned mulattoes considered themselves superior to the Black emigrants while the colonists generally speaking, believed the indigenous people inferior to themselves.16 This led to the internecine conflict which is always self defeating. Writes historian George Brown, "There was very little economic development...there were, it is true, some thriving plantations on the St. Pauls river, but the most industrious and enterprising Liberians tended to neglect agriculture for trading, which brought quick profits; these were unfortunately spent on conspicuous consumption and in a non productive way."17

In 1857, Blyden began a crusade to 'vindicate' the African race. As a writer, educator, theologian, politician, statesman, diplomat, and explorer, he incessantly propounded that African (Negroes), had a
culture and history of which they could be proud, and that with the help of the new world Negroes a progressive civilization could be built in Africa. His activities included the examination and rebuttal of theories which purported to prove Negro inferiority.

Despite its granting of independence to Liberia in 1847, the United States government did not recognize the new nation as sovereign until 1862. Blyden himself was not allowed to enter the house of representatives to plead the case because he was Black. And although slaves in the District of Columbia had been freed by an act of Congress on April 16, 1862. Blyden reported that the fugitive slave law was still operated there and that, "he had to get a white man to vouch that he was a free man before the provost Marshall gave him a written 'permishun' to leave that city." For the next five weeks a bitter and angry Blyden toured the principal cities of the north extending the Liberian invitation to American Negroes. Great was his chagrin; he found the feeling for emigration among American Negroes had perceptibly cooled in the fifteen year interim. He began to berate his audiences for lack of pride in Africa and a duty toward it. He castigated Negroes for expressing an indolent and unmeaning sympathy which put forth no effort, made no sacrifices for the sake
of advancing African interest and with having no faith in the Negroes ability to stand alone. A staunch advocate of racial purity, Blyden feared that miscegenation would obliterate the 'Negro type' in the United States. This he regarded as undesirable, because he believed that Africa needed every 'genuine' American Negro. 19

One of Blyden's major goals was to seek to persuade the British to exert their influence and jurisdiction in West Africa. Thereby helping to pacify, unite and develop in this vast territory an imperial role that Liberia had been unable to play. As Liberian Secretary and Ambassador to Britain, Blyden was instrumental in settling a dispute between Liberia and the British at Sierra Leone. The cause of dispute was identified as competition between the Liberians and the Europeans for trade with the Africans along the coast line claimed by the Liberian government. As noted earlier, one of Liberia's main reason for declaring independence was to achieve the sovereignty necessary to deal with Europeans who flouted Liberian commercial regulations. 20 Blyden was also interested and anxious that Liberia should have regular exchange with the Muslim states of the African interior. His ultimate end was to eventually incorporate them into the "Negro Republic". To facilitate this he introduced the study of Arabic into Liberia college.
The major themes of Blyden's writing seemed to mandate an eventual foreign policy concern and action among Black Americans. These were: that the Black race had special achievements of which to be proud; that there were inherent attributes which should be preserved and projected in a distinctive "African personality" (later developed as the Pan-African name of 'Negritude' in the writings of Aime Cesaire and others), that African culture—its customs and institutions—were basically wholesome and should be preserved; and finally that Christianity had a retarding influence upon the Negro race, while that of Islam had been salutary. This last and most controversial theme was one on which he wrote at length.  

Blyden's ideas on racial solidarity spurred the early Pan-African sentiments of the poet and writer Aime Cesaire of Martinique and President Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal. Blyden demonstrated his concerns with U. S. foreign policy toward Liberia. He expressed disappointment that despite frequent petitions from Negroes themselves and from the American Colonization Society, the United States government had refused to undertake the colonization of the Negro to Africa. Blyden felt that the time had come when an "earnest and united effort should be made by all sections of this great country" to persuade the government to do so. His most important
public statement was made in an address entitled, "The Origin and Purpose of the African Colonization Society". He argued that the strategy of all Negro leaders should bring about a mass Negro emigration to Africa. He predicted that as the Negro masses became educated they would grow impatient with their circumscribed lives, and must then feel an 'irrepressible desire to return to the Fatherland'. In the meantime Blyden urged the American Colonization Society 'to have a definite Negro policy for a Negro world in Africa'.

The debate over emigration reached a crescendo in the 1890's when southern legislatures having passed Jim Crow legislation, began implementation in every facet of southern public life. Apartheid gained the sanction of the U. S. Supreme Court in 1896 when segregation of the races was upheld in Plessy vs. Ferguson. As in the current debate over strategies on Pan-Africanism, this discussion created a cleavage among Black people. There were those leaders who were opposed to any emigration abroad. Others, while opposing the idea of mass exodus to Africa as undesirable (a product of the enslavement process), or impractical, favored the emigration of select groups who had no illusions about the challenge which Africa presented. For instance, many of the free Blacks in non urban Louisiana during
the 1830's and after were slave holders. The free colored people of New Orleans were more wealthy than many whites. Numbering 18,000 in 1860 they owned $15,000,000 in taxable property. Emigration to these free Negroes meant not only a change of lifestyle, but an economic loss of considerable magnitude. 25 It is ironic that those who could have been most instrumental in helping Blyden to realize his goals where either his opponents or ignored him completely. This reaction from wealthy educated Negroes contradicted Blyden's theory that strong racial instincts would impel 'pure' Negroes to separate themselves from an alien race and culture, and "hie thee hither" to the congenial fatherland of Africa. However, slowly the reality of this contradiction began to disillusion Blyden. In the absence of the expected response to his programs and policies he concluded that an alien education and acculturation process had dulled and diminished the race instinct of the Negroes. From this, Blyden came to the further conclusion that Negroes in America should be deprived of higher academic education. A viewpoint which paradoxically coincided with that of white southerners. 26 However, Blyden's reasons differed from the white supremacists in that he believed the education of Negroes should be received in institutions on African soil run by 'properly educated' Negroes.
He emphasized industrial and technical training (later argued by Booker T. Washington), over the literary education provided by such Black schools as Lincoln, Howard and Fisk Universities which he stated he would have abolished.  

Perhaps the most striking facet of Blyden's activities and philosophy was that he continued to predicate his ideas upon the conviction that emigration to Africa was the only solution to the "Negro problem" in America, and that a "Black exodus" must ultimately occur. On this policy of emigration, Blyden and the major Black spokesman of the day, Booker T. Washington found a bone of contention. On the educational and economic development of the Negro their policies were the same. However, Washington firmly accepted that Negroes were in the United States to stay. Blyden meanwhile consistently advised increasing non-participation in American politics. The activities of Blyden are most illustrative of an individual's expression of foreign policy concerns. Until his death in 1912 Blyden sought to influence U. S. governmental and the nongovernmental foreign policies of Black American.
Marcus Aurelius Garvey

Perhaps the most noted and influential individual in the history of Black foreign policy activity was Marcus A. Garvey. And the most profound fact demonstrated by Garvey was that no matter how charismatic and tenacious in organizing ability, no individual could have succeeding in organizing a mass Black exodus to Africa.

When Edward Blyden died in 1912, Garvey was a young man of twenty-five. Although so far no reference or written exchange has been found between Blyden and Garvey it is known that the latter, who was a voracious reader of works on or by Negroes was well acquainted with the writings and ideas of the former. Both were adamant and intense in their race pride and both men claimed to be 'pure' Negroes.

Born on August 17, 1887 in Saint Ann's Bay, Jamaica, Garvey worked as a printer in Kingston upon finishing elementary school. In Kingston he participated in as unsuccessfull printers strike and became interested in reform, though he was skeptical of the value of trade unions for Blacks workers. In 1912 he moved to London where he developed his life long interest in Africa. In 1914, Garvey returned to Jamaica and established the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). In 1916, Garvey entered the United States for the first time, in order to expand his Black self-help movement. He made a speaking tour of the major cities building a national following.
In 1918 he began publication of the Negro World, which quickly became a leading Black newsweekly with circulations throughout the Black world.

The 'Back to Africa' movement implemented via the Universal Negro Improvement Association and led by Garvey held its first meeting in 1919, its first international convention in 1920 both over which Marcus Garvey presided. The UNIA had a short but spectacular life span in the United States. Garvey's movement took effective form in 1919 and by 1926 he was in a federal prison charged with misusing the mails. In 1919 he had established the Black Star Line Shipping company to commercially link the Africans of the globe. He named the vessels, which were reported to be "3rd shape boats," The S.S. Frederick Douglas, The S.S. Antonio Maceo and the S.S. Phyllis Wheatly. Garvey's merchant marine was forfeited upon his indictment. Convicted of mail fraud in 1923, Garvey was deported in 1927.

In his major work, Garvey and Garveyism, the young visionary of the Pan-African movement asked; "where is the Black man's government, where are his kingdoms, his ambassador, his army, his navy, his men of big affairs?" Influenced by Booker T. Washington's teachings and activities, he had exchanged correspondence with Washington with the hope of obtaining assistance in the building of a Jamaican school similar to the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama. In 1919 the UNIA established the Negro Factories Corporation, which
succeeded in developing a chain of grocery stores, a restaurant, a steam laundry, tailoring establishments and a publishing house.

The UNIA grew rapidly. The Harlem Branch established in 1917, boasted a membership of 2,000 in two months. To facilitate a network of information dispersal and to communicate with his wide range of followers, Garvey depended on the Negro World. The publication instilled racial pride and promoted solidarity and self-reliance. The paper was published in French, Spanish and English. The UNIA was an elaborate operation. There were in addition to economic enterprises, a Universal African Motor Corps and other service branches. At its peak, the UNIA claimed nine-million faithful followers, or about 90% of the then current Black population. More realistic figures placed his support at anywhere from ten-thousand to four-million.

In preparation for the exodus of Africans to Africa, Garvey quickly declared himself the provisional president of the Empire of Africa under the banner of the UNIA. In his introduction to a biography on Garvey, historian John Henrik Clarke writes:

'Negroes were more than ready for a Moses and only a Black man could express the depth of their feelings....Negroes were faced with a choice between racialism and radicalism. Marcus Garvey settled the question for thousands by the UNIA.'
Garvey's plan for self-determination of African people are outlined in his work "Aims and Objectives of A Movement for a Solution to the Negro Problem" published in 1924. By 1919 the UNIA was an international organization with branches established all over the world preparing to send delegates and representatives to the first International Convention of Negro Peoples of the World in August 1920, Madison Square Garden in New York City. On this occasion an estimated 25,000 overflowed Madison Square Garden.32 To demonstrate the breadth of Garvey's influence, it is reported that the King of Swaziland reported to Mrs. Amy Garvey that he knew the names of only two Black men in the Western world: Jack Johnson, the Black Boxer who defeated the white man Jim Jeffries and Marcus Garvey.33

The underlying principle in the philosophy of Marcus Garvey was self-reliance and self-determination, a theme held in common with Edward Blyden and later adopted by Elijah Muhammed to build the Nation of Islam. Like Dr. Blyden, Garvey had a harsh opinion of the educated, acculturated Negro.

"It is the slave spirit of dependence that causes our so-called leading men to seek shelter, leadership, protection and patronage of the 'master' in organization and so called advancement work".34

Garvey's publications and thought also played a leading role in the Negro Renaissance. Where themes of Black pride were prevalent.
The Negro World carried his strategy and philosophy and billed itself and the "Indispensable Weekly", and the voice of the awakened Negro reached masses everywhere. The eight-point platform format, (also adopted by the Nation of Islam and the Black Panther Party in form), enumerated the UNIA's policy goals.

1. To champion Negro Nationhood by the redemption of Africa
2. To make the Negro race conscious
3. To instill ideals of manhood and womanhood in every Negro
4. To make the Negro world conscious
5. To print all the news that will be interesting and instructive to the Negro
6. To instill racial self-help
7. To advocate self determination
8. To inspire racial love and self respect

Attacked by Black and white critics as "Black Zionism", Garveyism was neither a racist nor an escapist program, writes Amy Jaques Garvey of her husbands program:

"Garveyism is neither an escapist program nor an abdication of Negroes rights in America, as suggested by his Northern critics who ridicule the real importance of the African Colonization proposals." 35

To the contrary, Garveyism called upon American Blacks to participate in American politics via his organization. For example, in order to correct misperceptions about the intentions and behavior of both the leadership and membership of the organization, (a problem confronted by
all unendorsed Black organizations) the Negro World published at different times when necessary, a code of norms if you will, to live by. This too was later utilized by later black organizations. The 'thirty don'ts' writes Mrs. Garvey "brought light and hope to our people in all corners of the world made dark by the deeds of the oppressors. However many of the ideas were impervious to attack such as the following six:

20. Always respect authority
21. Be a good citizen
22. Vote as the Association will direct for the good of the cause of the nation
23. Don't sell your vote
24. Don't sell your property without legal advice of appropriate governmental departments
25. Keep your present job, work hard and save all you can

Like his forerunner Blyden, Garvey presented a threat to certain interests in both African and American society. He also threatened European Colonial interests through Africa. A fact which neither the French or Belgians hesitated to make clear. For example, the Black Star Line was in part a response to the urgent pleas of West African farmers and producers to Marcus Garvey for a shipping service that would relieve them of being victimized by white shipping agencies and produce dealers who offered them very low prices for their produce delivered at the wharf.

All of Garvey's ships were under American registry. These initial commercial foreign policies seemed at once sovereign and yet utilized the U. S. gov't in realizing goals.
Interestingly, at present many U. S. owned oil freighters are under Liberian registry.

Like Blyden, Garvey also received much support from white racists. Their hopes that the "Back To Africa" movement would get rid of Blacks in America and thereby solve the racial problem in the north. Garvey's response was to welcome this support, arguing that; "The Klan was fighting to make America a white man's land and he was fighting to make Africa a Black man's land.....He called what they and he were doing "The Ideals of Two Races."^0

The geographic target of most of Garvey's and the UNIA's aspirations was Liberia. In 1924 Garvey organized a new maritime venture, the Black Cross Navigation and Trading Company, and acquired another ship. In that same year, the UNIA and the Liberian government reached a provisional agreement. The UNIA guaranteed the repatriation of between twenty and thirty-thousand families in the first two years...... The immigrants were to be provided free of charge thousands of acres of fertile land, and in return they pledged "to respect the established authority of the Liberian Government."

Garvey's plans were never realized. Having aroused the hostilities of the European powers who had colonies in Africa, Garvey realized that the UNIA would enjoy no legality in these territories. George Padmore suggests that it was the formation of an alliance with racist whites which provided Garvey
with this sense of sovereignty. He was able to extract promises of support for his plan from several influential politicians. The failure in his strategy was the allegation that Garvey was planning to break the power of the Liberian "True Whig Party" politicians, who had been in control of Liberian affairs since the republic's inception. The Liberian President cancelled the concession to the UNIA, seized all UNIA goods, building materials and machinery valued at hundreds of thousands of dollars which Garvey had shipped to Liberia to build houses for his followers. Apparently President King had been warned by neighboring powers that they would not tolerate the presence in Liberia of an organization working to overthrow European supremacy in Africa.

The impact of Garvey on the international and domestic politics of Black America in the 1920's and 1930's is well documented, also evident is the impact of his activity on contemporary Black organizational activity.

Between 1917 and 1940, the year of his death, Marcus Garvey galvanized the hearts and minds of millions of Africans in the western hemisphere. Even though from the outset he alienated the support of most of the influential Negroes, he convened conventions, organized a Black church, established a Black steamship company, found a newspaper and several other commercial ventures. He sent delegates to the League of Nations and to foreign states. George Padmore writing in the Jamaica Gleaner, Oct. 23, 1952 on Jomo Kenyatta, "the man with the burning spear," stated:
Kenyatta met Garvey and became converted to the philosophy "Africa for Africans", and after Garvey's death Kenyatta and other Africans formed the Pan-African federation, and called a Congress at Manchester, England in 1945 to plan a broad strategy of African Liberation.44

The impact of Garvey is evident in the contemporary Pan-African movement and in other Black institutions of social, economic and political development.

William Edward Burghardt Dubois

Another person to invest a great amount of time and energy developing strategies of international and intra-racial cooperation among African people was W. E. B. Dubois, and his activities and writings are the most prolific of those described thus far. Born in 1868 in Massachusetts, Dubois received his formal education in Sociology at Fisk University in Tennessee and Havard University where he earned his doctorate. Perhaps most noted as the founder of the Niagara Movement which conceived the NAACP, and the most active of Pan-African theorists, Dubois offered many insights that were at once astounding and prophetic.* For Dubois, the problem of the twentieth century was the problem of the color line.

* Henry Sylvester Williams is considered the founder of the Pan-African movement. Williams was from Jamaica.
Like Garvey, Blyden and Cuffe among others, Dubois came to the conclusion that: "Negroes are not wanted; neither as scholars nor as artists nor as writers. What can we do about it; we cannot enforce the law, even if we get them on the statute books...we are cast back upon ourselves." Often in conflict with such figures as Garvey or in cooperation with such figures as Mao Tse Tung, Dubois was a controversial person. Others, most notably William L. Patterson and Paul Robeson, were also controversial as their views and values on international affairs were similar to those of Dubois. Dubois spent a great deal of effort demonstrating that concern toward domestic race problems was not confined to the citizens of that state and engaged in his own foreign policy activity to expand the arena. Writes historian Arna Bontemps: "Dubois was skilled in the use of political symbolism, to him the symbol was a weapon of unmeasured capability in the nonviolent struggle against oppression."  

Symbolism was involved in the naming of the Niagara Movement, as was the subtle significance of the selection of Harpers Ferry as the place to hold its second crucial meeting.

The Negro Renaissance generated a great deal of international activity and Marcus Garvey was at center stage during this era. Dubois did not agree with Garvey,
but his analysis of the flux in Black unrest toward repatriation schemes and Africa was based on a different sociological and economic understanding of American history. Noting that, in 1860, there were some 17,000,000 persons of African descent. The eighteenth century Africans in America had regarded Africa as their home to which they would eventually return when free.47 They named their institutions 'African' and started to organize migration to Africa as early as 1815. But the American Negroes found that Africans did not regard them as Africans; and it then became clear by 1830 that colonization schemes were a device to rid America of free Africans so as to fasten slavery more firmly on the Cotton Kingdom. Black disillusionment therefore slowly turned to a new ideal: to strive for equality as American citizens, determined that when Africa needed them they would return equipped to assist in African development. "However, in the interim, Black Americans learned from their environment to think less and less about fatherland and its folk," notes Du Bois.48 This was shown by the pressure put on Blacks to keep silent on Africa and Asia and on white working class movements, and in return accept more power to vote, abolition of separation in education, dropping Jim crow units in our military forces and gradual disappearance of the Negro ghetto in work and housing.
"It is fair to admit", wrote Dubois, "that most Negres even those of intelligence and courage, do not fully realize that they are being bribed to trade equal status in the United States for the slavery of the majority of men."49

Part of the process of "incorporating the Negro" into the socio-economic system involved using members of the Black community and Black leaders as instruments of foreign and domestic policy. This included an early version of what is now referred to as "Black capitalism". Dubois wrote:

"...now equality, began to be offered, but in return for equality, Negroes must join American business in its domination of American cheap labor and raw materials."50

Not only were these individuals and organizations tools for American business, but for governmental and foreign policy as well:

The educated and well to do Negroes would have a better chance to make money if they would testify that Negroes were not discriminated against and join in American redbaiting. American Negroes began to appear in Africa, seeking chances to make money and testifying to Negro progress. In many cases their expenses were paid by the State Department.51

An interest in the anthropological inquires of Franz Boas led to Dubois' intense inquiry into the "race"concept. His feelings were that each ethnic and racial grouping had a function which included the literature, art, science, or philosophy they contributed in
the development of the human race in its seemingly long but very short history. The questions thus became: How were those contributions of the races and cultures to be made? Since this he argued, (along with many Darwinians), was part of the flow of evolution, the flow of history. His answer was that each race must develop its leaders, organizations and attributes and bind them together. Each race he argued, "....would be saved by its exceptional men".52

This concept of racial development and consciousness laid the foundation for Dubois' subsequent thought and theory on Pan-Africanism.

For this reason, the advance guard of the Negro people—the 8,000,000 people of Negro blood in the United States of America must soon come to realize that if they are to take their just place in the plan of Pan-Negroism, then their destiny is not absorption by white Americans.53

However, unlike people of other ethnic groups and races in America, Dubois argued that the Black American faced a somewhat different dilemma. Social psychologists refer to it as cognitive dissonance. The dilemma of identity and self doubt that raises the inevitable question(s) when there is a contradiction between self and society. "What after all am I? Am I an American or am I a 'Negro'? Can I be both or is it my duty to cease to become a Negro as soon as possible and become an American? If I strive as a Negro, am I not perpetuating the very cleft that threatens and separates
Black and white Americans.... Does my Black blood place upon me any more obligations to assert my nationality than German, or Irish or Italian blood would.\textsuperscript{54} Cognitive dissonance theory is also implicit in the theories of loyalty behavior and theories of multiple loyalties or transferred loyalties. Dubois' inquires on race and nationalism also were concerned with loyalty, a question that was eventually used to discredit him and lead to his expulsion to West Africa. For Dubois, the realities of American racism were such that no Black person could call themselves American. Therefore, he began to advocate more "intelligent democracy" for progressive softening of asperities and anomalies of race prejudice. He was consequently accused of being a "socialist" or a "communist".

However, Dubois substantiated his prescriptions with impressive data on comparative racial employment and on college graduates per capita, and on the comparative occupations data of Black college graduates and their white counterparts. The picture of American racism galvanized his belief that there must be increased and institutionalized processes of African cooperation and development.\textsuperscript{55} Noting that Pan-Africanism was his mission in life, he convened five Pan-African congresses between 1919 and 1945.
His interest grew with the political revolutions stirring in Kenya, the Sudan, Ghana, Nigeria, Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), and Tanzania (Tanganyika). Dubois reported in 1955: "If a sixth Pan-African Congress meets in 1956, what may we not be able to report there?" Anxious that his mission be realized more rapidly Dubois wrote of the development of the Pan-African movement:

We held a small meeting in 1919 in Paris. After peace was declared in 1921, we called a much larger Pan-African Congress in London, Paris, and Brussels.... We tried in vain to convene a congress in Africa itself.... finally in 1945 Black trade Union delegates to the Paris meeting of trade unions called another for Pan-African Congress. This George Padmore organized and, at his request, I came from America to attend the meeting in Manchester, England. Here I met Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, Johnson of Liberia and a dozen other young leaders.

At the close of World War I, the NAACP sent Dubois to the Peace Conference at Versailles to inquire into the treatment of Black troops. At this time, he also convened the 1919 Pan-African Congress. This first Congress specifically requested that the German colonies be turned over to an international organization instead of being handled by the various colonial powers. Out of this idea came the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. In February of 1919, an editorial in the New York Herald stated: "There is nothing unreasonable in this program drafted by the Pan-African Congress which was held in Paris last week. It called upon the Allied and Associated Powers to draw up an international code for the protection of the nations of
Africa and to create, as a section of the League of Nations, a permanent bureau to insure observance of such laws and thus further the racial, political and economic interests of the natives."\(^59\)

Dubois did not receive the support for Pan-Africanism from Black people that he expected. The NAACP did not adopt the movement as its official program, but it allowed Dubois, then President of the organization to promote the effort.

The Second Pan-African Congress (1921) sent Dubois with a committee to interview the officials of the League of Nations in Geneva, one of which was the lead of the International Labor Organization. At this second congress, racial, physical, political and social equality of the races was declared, and a further request; "a man of Negro descent, properly fitted in character and training be appointed a member of the Mandates Commission" was made.\(^60\)

The third congress was called for in 1923, however, due to problems with the Secretariat was postponed. A session was held in London later that year. This small session was attended by many European personalities of the day such as H. G. Wells, Lord Oliver, and was addressed by Harold Laski.

The Fourth Pan-African Congress was impeded due to the conflict with colonial interests in Africa. Dubois explains:
I planned a Fourth Pan-African Congress in the West Indies in 1925. My idea was to Charter a ship and sail down the Carribean, stopping in Jamaica, Haiti, Cuba and the French Island. But here I reckoned without my steamship lines. At first the French lines replied that they could easily do the trip, but eventually no accommodations could be found on any lines except at the prohibiting price of fifty-thousand dollars. I suspect that the colonial powers spiked this plan.

The fourth congress was revived in 1927 by American Negro Women and the Fourth Pan-African Congress was held in New York. Thirteen countries were represented, but direct African participation had decreased. There were two-hundred and eight delegates from twenty-two American states and ten foreign countries. Africa was sparsely represented by representatives from the Gold Coast (Ghana), Sierra Leone, Liberia and Nigeria.

Desperate attempts to hold a fifth congress, in Tunis, (on the African continent) failed. First, French conditions stipulated that the Congress could take place in any French city but not in French Africa and second, the great depression.

In June 1934 a frustrated Dubois addressed a letter of resignation to the NAACP Board of Directors. His primary reason stated thusly:

Today this organization, which has been great and effective for nearly a quarter of a century, finds itself in a time of crisis and change, without a program, without effective organization, without executive officers, who have either the willingness or disposition to guide the NAACP in the right direction. To the best of my ability, and every ounce of my strength, I have since the beginning of the Great Depression, tried to work
inside the organization for its realignment and readjustment to new duties. I have been almost absolutely unsuccessful." 62

In 1934 Dubois called for a national movement for the establishment of a 49th state. Dubois wrote:

The creation of a forty-ninth state in the United States involves problems and ramifications that will require determination. Legally it can be done for Article 4, section 3, of the Constitution of the United States provides: New states may be admitted by the Congress into the Union but no new state shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other state; nor any state be formed by the junction of two or more states, or parts of states without the consent of the Legislature of the States concerned, as well as of the Congress. 63

Dubois argued that such a movement would aid the Negro in the United States by offering the nation an opportunity to reduce its debt to the Negro for past exploitation. Also, he stated the Negro had been among this country's most loyal and dependable citizens in peace and in war and as much as any deserved a True Deal. And finally, the Negro in the United States, at the bottom of the economic pyramid, by various devices and prejudices had been kept in subjection until now. He was almost helpless to make a living or participate in the free and open market of employment. If necessary, Dubois explained, this state, under the supervision of the federal government could pass into control of the new citizens of the state step by step until the entire functioning of the commonwealth would be under the dominant control of the citizens thereof.
Finally, a fifth Pan-African congress was convened in October, 1945 in Manchester, England with some two hundred delegates representing East and South Africa and the West Indies. Its significance lay in the fact that it took a step toward a broader movement and a real effort by the peoples of Africa and the descendants of Africa the world over to start a great march towards democracy for Black folk.64

At the time of his death in Ghana in 1963, no Pan-African congress had been held on African soil. However, shortly after his death and the assassination of Malcolm X, in 1965, the Black youth to which he looked, began to adopt many manifestations of Pan-Africanism in ideology and culture, politics and attitude. The resurgence of Black Nationalism in the last decade reinforced much of Dubois' efforts via the flourishing of the The Organization of African-American Unity founded by Malcolm X and African Liberation Support Committee. By the time of his death Dubois had established an ideological and functional program of Pan-Africanism in both the United States and in Africa.

Having no commitment to Doctrinaire Marxism, though indicted for being a Communist, Dubois had continuing disagreements with the American Communists over the Negro problem in the United States.
Indeed, Dubois saw the racial problem as fundamentally having nothing to do with economics. He felt that the Russians displayed an abysmal ignorance of the pattern of racial prejudice. What use was the theory of class struggle if white workers hated Negro workers and Negro capitalists indifferently. In a discussion of his position on the proposed Negro Republic in Crisis, May, 1935 he stated:

While Negro labor in America suffers from the capitalist system, the most fatal degree of suffering comes from (its) fellow white workers.

The revolt of the white proletariat, therefore was not sufficient to resolve the problems for the Negro proletariat; more would be accomplished by an alliance between Black labor and Black capital. The crucial factor for Dubois was: the necessity of unity among Negroes of all economic levels. In turn, the Communists saw Dubois sometimes as an ally, but more often as "chaining the Negro to the chariot of American imperialism," and they criticized his "disdain for the masses, his stewardship of the elite, and his reformist-nationalist darker race program." Having visited the Soviet Union in 1926, Dubois had initially been impressed by the Russian liberal attitude toward the "colored races" and for the help it had extended to them from time to time. In 1927 he watched with interest the development of a "workingman's psychology." He knew many socialists and Communists but seems not to have
read Marx until the early 1930's. He conducted a seminar on Marx at Atlanta in 1933, and his editorials in *Crisis* in the 1930's utilized many Marxist formulations. However, Marx and Marxist terms were popular during the depression with many people who had only the dimmest grasp of Marxism.

Influenced by Dubois and active in many of the efforts by Dubois was George Padmore, a Trinidadian journalist who joined the Communist party in the 1920's. He went to Russia where he became chairman of the Promintern, the trade union branch of the Comintern. He then became executive secretary of the International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers and editor of the *Negro Worker*, a Communist newspaper. Padmore broke with the Communist party in 1934 when the Negro Trade Union Committee was liquidated "in order not to offend the British Foreign Office," which wanted no unrest stirred up in England's African colonies.68

After Padmore's break with Communism, he became convinced that Marxism derived solely from Western experience and was largely inapplicable to colonial questions. In this respect, his reasoning was similar to that of Dubois in the prewar period. In 1937, in a response to the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, Padmore helped to create the International African Service Bureau (IASB). The IASB included among its officers T. R. Makonnen of British Guiana, C. L. R. James, and
William Harrison, an American Negro, formerly a student at Harvard was then studying with Harold Laski. In 1944, the IASB merged into the Pan-African Federation, the British section of the Pan-African Congress movement. This Federation formulated a program in conformity with the broad principles proclaimed at the earlier Pan-African congresses, but it added a demand for "self-determination and independence of African peoples and other races from the domination of powers proclaiming sovereignty and trusteeship over them." This was the first call for independence in the Pan-African movement.

It was during this era that Dubois' movement and Padmore's IASB joined to organize the fifth congress. The congress refocused the orientation of the Pan-African movement to the achievement of national independence, but it did not abandon socialism. The congress endorsed both nationalism and the doctrine of African Socialism based upon the tactics of positive action without violence...and advised Africans and those of African descent wherever they might be to organize into political parties, trade unions, cooperative societies, and farmers organizations in the support of their struggle for political freedom and economic advancement.
In March of 1945, Dubois returned to the NAACP as the director of special research with his main task, as he saw it, to develop a global approach to the questions of colonialism and racism. On March 12 the NAACP Board of Directors issued the following statement:

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored people earnestly desires the prevention of war and the future preservation of peace in the world. It believes that one step toward this would be an international military force to curb aggression but it also believes that above and beyond physical force must stand spiritual faith. 71

The document included the following demands:

I. A declaration at San Francisco of the racial equality of the great groups of mankind in international law.

II. A further declaration that the ownership of colonies is a frequent and repeated cause of war and oppression; therefore should only be recognized by the United Nations and international law under the following conditions:

a. national political participation by the people in their own government(s)

b. A specified date for either independence and autonomy or full citizenship or integration into the mother polity

c. That the natural resources of these countries be used for the benefits of the inhabitants of the area primarily and for the organization of industry rather than for profit of invested capital or for the welfare of people outside of the colony

d. That an International Mandates Commission be established and implemented under the supreme authority of the United Nations with the right to supervise the government of territory mandated after the first world war and any such enemy territory
territory acquired in the present war and to investigate, report and recommend action in the case of countries who do not keep their commitments in colonies or will not make such commitments, and that in such cases the conduct and administration of these colonies be placed under control of the Mandates Commission, backed by the authority of the United Nations. 72

With Dubois' inspiration, the NAACP called a conference on Colonialism, which was held in the auditorium of the 135th street branch of the New York public library on April 6, 1945. Cooperating were the Council on African Affairs and the West Indies National Council. Participating, in addition to Dr. Dubois were Kwame Nkrumah, (then of Lincoln University in Pennsylvania), and scholars from Puerto Rico, Nigeria, Burma, Korea, India, and Indonesia. This conference adopted the following:

a. Immediate steps be taken to end the ownership of all colonies and dependencies

b. A colonial commission be established composed of all permanent members of the Security Council, additional representatives elected by the general assembly, and members who represent the several broad groups of colonial people.

c. This body of experts and advisors shall be empowered to oversee and facilitate the transition of peoples from colonial status to such autonomy as they desire.

d. All such territory seized during the wars be placed under the direct control of the Colonial Commission.
The Anti-Colonialism Conference also mandated the following responsibilities to the Colonial Commission:

a. To establish economic, social and political standards to be maintained in the administration of all colonial territories.

b. To use the powers of the United Nations to insure adherence to these standards by all colonial powers.

c. To establish time tables for self-determination of each of these colonies.

d. To promote the fullest measure of international cooperation in securing the industrialization; economic advancement; improvement of education, health and other social services; transportation; communication and other similar matters in colonial areas.73

Interesting, the NAACP pointed out that, "...the welfare of developed and developing countries alike depends upon the realization of a far greater exchange of goods and services between them than has existed, and this in turn necessitates the general leveling up of the living standards of hundreds of millions of colonial subjects. Such economic progress is possible only within a framework in which the restrictions upon social development, democratic rights, and self government restrictions that are characteristic of the colonial world are removed."74 Dubois' thinking on the ensuing call for a new economic order have yet to be realized for reasons he stated in the NAACP statements.
Enroute to Accra, in 1958 to attend the All African Peoples Conference to deliver a message, Dr. Dubois was counseled by doctors upon reaching Moscow against making the journey in Africa's hottest season. Accepting the doctor's advice to spend some time in a rest home in Moscow, his message to the conference was given by his wife Shirley Graham. This message may have been one of the primary reasons for his subsequent self exile to the coast of Guinea. He wrote:

Africa has so choice between private capitalism and socialism. The whole world, including capitalist countries, is moving toward socialism, inevitably, inexorably. You can choose between blocks of military alliance, you can choose between groups of political union, you cannot choose between socialism and private capitalism because private capitalism is doomed!

But what is socialism? It is a disciplined economy and political organization in which the first duty of a citizen is to serve the state; and the state is not a selected aristocracy, or a group of self seeking oligarchs who have seized wealth and power. No! The mass of workers with hand and brain are the ones whose collective destiny is the chief object of all effort.75

Since his death in Africa in 1963, much of the enthusiasm he had for Pan-Africanism has been manifested in the growing interest in his life and writings, Africa and the domestic conditions of the poor and Black. In the decade since his death, Black American interest in Africa affairs has been greatly heightened. Caught unprepared for the
collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire, the United States foreign policy toward Africa was found lacking. But due to the leadership of Dubois and the later philosophy and organizing of such persons as Malcolm X, Owusu Sadoaki, Stokely Carmichael, Roy Innis, James Turner, President Julius K. Nyrere, and Shirley Graham Dubois, the attention to and participation in African affairs by Black Americans has significantly increased. Dubois deserves a great deal of the credit for these developments.

The resurgence of Black nationalism in the years immediately following the deaths of Dr. Dubois and Malcolm X was nurtured by many developments. Chief among these was the combination, confrontation and an explosion of cultural and nationalist ideology that peaked in 1972 in Gary, Indiana.

At the National Black Political Assembly Convention, in March of 1972, co-chairperson Richard Hatcher delivered these words in his keynote address. He urged the convention participants to press toward an "independent Black agenda." However, loyalties to the Democratic party by Black elected officials, operating as a latent political variable prevented this, despite all the nationalist rhetoric that was being slung. Hence, forces within the assembly felt they had been betrayed because of the failure of the convention to produce a Black political party. Also
a fierce debate ensued between factions in the assembly, which can best be described as nationalist in the Marxist camp led by Imamu Baraka, and the Black elected officials in congressional state, and city government positions.

This lengthy internal conflict came to a climax at the Sixth Pan-African Congress in Dar Es Salaam in June 1974. A debate on the best possible foreign policy strategy for Black America led to a seriously divided U. S. delegation. On the other hand, despite these internal differences which were eventually solved by dissolution of the Congress of African People, the core of the NBPA and the rest of the assembly as well as the elected officials had gathered a great deal of support via voter registration and political education projects.

The NBPA has continued its international involvement by holding periodic workshops on the liberation struggles. At both the 1972 and 1976 National conventions specific foreign policy platforms were drafted and presented to the Democratic party. In March of 1977, the NBPA and the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice held a conference to coincide with the date of the Sharpsville Massacre of 1961. Participation from the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity and representatives from the African and Caribbean nations demonstrated the increasingly important role of race in world politics.
The fact that Africans now see Black Americans as more internationally astute and politically viable as a linkage group is evidenced by the number of visits by African diplomats to functions sponsored by Black Americans to elicit support and/or assistance. In his statement before the House Subcommittee on Africa, with respect to the Sahelian drought, Reverend Jesse Jackson of Operation People United to Save Humanity (PUSH), stated that on June 28, 1973 six ambassadors from Sahelian countries came to Chicago to enlist the help of PUSH in raising the level of awareness of the American people to their plight. Several Black organizations have become more involved than ever in foreign policy, particularly toward Africa, than at any other point in history. This suggests the beginning of not only a permanent African constituency, but also an increase in international participation and interest articulation.

Perhaps the most familiar example of Black organizational activity is that the NAACP board, who in September 1976 mandated a task force committee on Africa with specific charge among others, to study and develop a meaningful and lasting policy on Africa for the guidance of its members and the nation. The mission of the task force was advisory only to the National Board of the NAACP. It was not a public relations mission but a fact finding effort. The members sought first hand information and
insights from the people and the leaders.

Operating under the premise that only a full understanding and response to the problems of Africa would provide the basis for the final resolution to Black domestic problems in the U. S., the task force made the following recommendations among others:

- A national (NAACP) administrative structure on African American relations.
- The establishment of a committee on international affairs composed of leading American Africanists and experts on Black affairs in other parts of the world.
- African missions to the United Nations; to maintain contact with African embassies in Washington D. C.
- Invitations of African representatives and officials to participate in various NAACP national, regional and local meetings.
- Preparation and distribution of materials on current African problems for use at national, state and local meetings

- Inclusion in the Crisis, articles by and about Africans.
- Initiation of a comprehensive campaign to educate and inform the NAACP members and others about African affairs.
- To encourage Black professionals (lawyers, doctors, accountants, educators), to ensure the participation of Africans in their activities to enhance their organizational responses to the needs of Africans and to encourage linkage with related African organizations and institutions.
- To encourage Black Americans to seek entry at various branches of the foreign service and to use their best efforts to shape U. S. policies toward Africa consistent with the needs and legitimate aspirations of the African people.
- Encourage private people to people financial support of small development projects in African countries.
- Applaud the new emphasis of the U. S. government on Human Rights throughout the world. Condemning violations of Human Rights in Africa whether such violations are perpetrated by Blacks or whites.

- Support the application of economic sanctions against the South African government and U. S. companies doing business in South Africa.

- Work to influence the U. S. government, and voluntary organizations, to address the refugee problem in Southern Africa.

- Recognizing the U. S. provided political and economic support to Angola and Mozambique when they were Portuguese colonies, the NAACP should encourage the U. S. government to extend diplomatic recognition to Mozambique and Angola, both of which were denied aid in 1977.

- To increase the foreign aid to developing nations to represent a minimum 0.7 percent of the U. S. Gross Domestic Product.

In December of 1976 an African-American conference was held in Maseru, Lesotho, and American Black voluntary organizations and political organizations included:

- The NAACP Task Force on Africa
- The Black Council on Africa
- The Congressional Black Caucus
- The Caucus of Black Democrats
- The Black Forum on Foreign Policy

The following is an excerpt from the statement of the African-American participants adopted on December 2, 1976:

The Black American Leadership Conference on South Africa includes most major Black interests groups in the U. S. Despite our determination to effectively influence U. S. policy on Africa we are mindful of certain constraints. We are a minority in America. Twenty-five million Black Americans suffer the highest unemployment rate, earn the lowest average salaries, and control less than one-half of one percent of the economic power in the United States.
Nevertheless, African-American have an historic tradition of survival that guarantees that they can make the difference on those vital matters affecting the life and welfare of our brothers and sisters around the world.....

Beyond this we pledge our skills, our energies and resources toward the liberation of our brothers and sisters in Southern Africa.....

First, we will intensify our present planning to develop a forceful lobby on Africa. This lobby will build a broad based constituency in support of African objectives and a rational U. S. policy toward Africa.77

Malcolm X

If W. E. B. DuBois is viewed as the architect of the Pan-African movement in the twentieth century, clearly Malcolm X is credited with delivering the idea to the African people, governments and to the Black diaspora, as a viable and functional alternative to racism and exploitation.

Born Malcolm Little, Malcolm X was four years of age when the house of his family was burned by the Klu Klux Klan. His father, an admirer of Marcus Garvey and a lieutenant in the Universal Negro Improvement Association died a violent death at the hands of white racists in Flint, Michigan where they lived. Dropping out of high school at fifteen, Malcolm X worked at a variety of jobs available to Black youths. He eventually turned to crime as a means of support and to drug abuse. This led to his inevitable arrest and imprisonment, which are well described in his autobiography.
While in prison Malcolm X was converted to Islam by the Black Muslims, the sect founded by the late Elijah Muhammed. While in prison he re-educated himself academically, psychologically, and spiritually, developing in particular his skills of debate. All these changes were for his future work in the nation of Islam. After serving six years for burglary, Malcolm X was paroled in 1952. He went to Chicago and met Elijah Muhammed, and was made assistant minister in the Detroit Mosque. In a few short years, his work helped to change the then virtually unknown Nation of Islam into a well known, respected, hated and feared organization.

As the chief spokesperson for the Nation of Islam and Elijah Muhammed, Malcolm X was seen by many as the logical successor to the aging Elijah Muhammed. Because his speeches were so electric, his metaphors simple and his thoughts so provoking, he was usually a target of contempt by the press, which usually portrayed him as a dangerous "Black racist". But despite his extraordinary ability to arouse his audiences, his appeal was more rational than emotional.

After a series of international conflicts, culminating with a remark made by Malcolm X, after the death of John Kennedy, Malcolm left the Nation of Islam. Perceiving his place more with the Black masses that within Muhammads organization, he sought another type of Black unity.
Believing that the fight for freedom transcended religion, ideology, and geographic boundaries, he immediately changed his short lived Muslim Mosque incorporated into the broader based Organization of Afro-American Unity. The OAAU grew rapidly in Black urban centers.

Malcolm's gradual transformation was also evident in his thoughts on race. Partly through the influence of Islam and his later pilgrimages to Mecca, he denounced the whole Black Muslim mythology of superior and inferior races. Repudiating racism in all forms, he resolved to judge men on the basis of their deeds not race or skin color. 78

Of course, while a Black Muslim, Malcolm X was a separatist. At his first press conference, upon leaving the Nation of Islam, he stated that he thought separation was the best solution. But that separation back to Africa was still a long range program, and while it was yet to materialize, 22 million Black people in the U. S. were still in need of better or adequate food, clothing, housing, education and jobs.

On May 21, 1963, a few hours after returning to the United States from his trip to Africa, when asked at a press conference if he thought "Negroes" should return to Africa, he said that he thought they should stay and fight for what was rightfully theirs in the United States.
In his travels abroad he visited the Middle East twice, and traveled throughout Africa. After 1964 he spent half of his remaining life abroad. And when he returned to the U. S. after his initial travels he was not only a sympathizer of the global colonial revolution, but a staunch internationalist, on the side of oppressed people everywhere. He was against their oppressors and exploiters, whose central fountainhead he recognized as U. S. imperialism, the dominant force in what he called the international power structure. There is no question that his activities and philosophy were a sore spot for the U. S. foreign policy establishment. No one in the world denounced the U. S. role in the Congo more than he did.

One purpose of his trips was to mobilize African support behind the project to put the U. S. on trial in the United Nations for the continued oppression of the Black American. The State Department blamed him for a good part of the strong stand against U. S. imperialism taken by the African nations at the United Nations during the atrocities of the Congo under the U. N. peace-keeping operation largely directed by U. S. influence. The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) galvanized attention not only on the relationship of Blacks to the U. S. government, but on the relationship between the United Nations and the people of Africa. Malcolm X argued that this was a relationship which was based on
He learned from the colonial revolution, particularly from its socialist contingent. He had discussions with Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, with Algerian socialists, and with socialists in Ghana, Guinea and Zanzibar. He also learned from socialist in the United States. At most OAAU rallies, Malcolm X addressed the need for class consciousness by plugging \textit{The Militant}, the newspaper of the Socialist Workers Party. Black members of the Socialists Workers Party and the Young Socialist Alliance were welcome to join the OAAU; whites associated with \textit{The Militant} were welcome to OAAU rallies. When asked in a forum discussion what kind to a political system he wanted, he stated:

\begin{quote}
I don't know. But I'm flexible. As stated earlier, all of the countries that are emerging today from under the shackles of colonialism are turning toward socialism. I don't think this is by accident. Most of the countries that were colonial powers were capitalist countries and the bulwark of capitalism today is America, and it's impossible to believe in capitalism and not believe in racism; you can't have capitalism without racism.\cite{militant}
\end{quote}

At the time of his assassination, Malcolm X was preparing to deliver a speech that would address the program of the OAAU, its relationship with the Black militant movement in general and some possible relationship with the Organization of African Unity. The triggers pulled in the Audabon ballroom on February 21, 1964, were pulled by Black men. It is doubtful that they had
much more to do with it than that. A series of questions surround the assassination and the subsequent investigation.

Contemporary Activity

In Black America, nationalism reached unprecedented heights during the 1960's. This nationalism had many manifestations. For example, cultural nationalism which was very prolific in African dress, music, poetry, drama, and literature served as a psychological foundation for political nationalism. The political or revolutionary nationalists argued that the cultural nationalism was not adequate for addressing the larger social and international issues that confronted the Black community. The writings of psychologist Frantz Fanon, which were central to the analysis of revolutionary nationalists, suggested that cultural nationalism was not so much a self love, but a reaction to white racism, and therefore not genuine in its intent, and of little social, moral or political value. For example, according to Bobby Seale, of the Black Panther party, Huey Newton was once criticized during their days at Meritt Junior College because he held the door open for a white women. The criticism came from a cultural nationalist Black student.
According to Seale they were so engrossed in this cultural nationalism, they just hated white people simply for the color of their skin. This later led to splits within the Black students organization on the question of arming Black people. Newton spelled out his opposition to cultural nationalism in a 1968 interview. At this time he distinguished between two kinds of nationalism. For him, the Panthers were revolutionary whereas the cultural nationalists were reactionary. He continued:

Cultural nationalism, or pork chop nationalism as I sometimes call it, is basically a problem of having the wrong political perspective. It seems to be a reaction to, instead of an action against, political oppression. The cultural nationalists are concerned with returning to the old African culture and thereby regaining their identity and freedom. In other words, they feel that assuming the African culture is enough to bring political freedom. Many cultural nationalists fall into line as reactionary nationalists\(^8\)

Revolutionary nationalism as professed by the Black Panther Party was both a social philosophy and a program of behavior. In its short history, the party became the target of the most repressive machinery in the American justice system. Part of its revolutionary behavior was its community services and support programs, which provided neighborhoods with a free hot breakfast each morning before school, free dental programs, plumbing maintenance, and ambulance services. Educational policy was implemented in the Liberation schools and programs
to promote in Black and oppressed children a "correct view of themselves and their role in society." However, the issue that was the most divisive between the revolutionary and cultural nationalists appears not to be over ends, but means. The divisive issue was that of alliance and coalition formations with non Black groups. According to Alphonso Pinckney, the influence of other groups on Black nationalism was the issue which split and weakened the overall nationalist movement.

The appeal and influence spread far beyond the boundaries of North America and the Black American community. Alliances and coalitions were formed within the Black community around specific issues. Coalitions were formed with white groups and with other people in the third world. For example, during the war in Vietnam, the Black Panther Defense Minister communicated support to Nguyen Thi Dinh, Deputy Commander of the Vietnamese Peoples Liberation Forces as did other groups such as the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Assuming the role and behavior usually attributed to a national government, the Black Panther Party claimed to represent a landless people. The international aspects of the Black Panther revolutionary perspective was expressed in this open letter to Stokely Carmichael from the Minister of Information of the BPP, Eldrige
Cleaver in 1969:

One thing they (the enemies of Black people) know, and we know, that seems to escape you, is that there is not going to be any revolution or Black liberation in the United States as long as revolutionary Blacks, whites, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Indians, Chinese, and Eskimos are unwilling or unable to unite some functional machinery that can cope with the situation.\(^8^6\)

With respect to cultural nationalist demands for land for the establishment of a separate Black nation by such groups as the Republic of New Africa, Newton wrote: "We are isolated in a ghetto area, concentrated in the North, in metropolitan areas, in industrial areas, and we think that this is a very good location as far as strategy is concerned in waging war against the established order."\(^8^7\) At that time the Black Panther Party made it clear that they did not share the position of separation. However, they did call for a United Nations plebiscite for Blacks to decide whether they wanted to secede from the United States or not.

One of the individuals most involved in formulating thought and processes about the international racial environment is Stokely Carmichael. An activist who describes himself as a Pan-African Nationalist, Carmichael founded the All African Peoples Revolutionary Party and was instrumental in establishing the original Black Panther Party in Mississippi. The AAPRP, has sought to create an active supportive African constituency
in the United States. Presently the guest of President Ahmed Sesou Sekou Toure of Guinea, Carmichael argues that linkages between Africa and Black America are essential to the liberation of both. On the question of U. S. military intervention in South Africa, Carmichael states: "The best protection for Africa is the African American inside the United States, because when we start to move against South Africa (Azania), if the U. S. dares to come into this continent the African-American will burn that country to the ground." Carmichael's writing on the international struggle of Africans and people of African descent, link them to the third world. However, the emphasis on the dynamics of being African are crucial to Carmichael's strategy. He writes:

....any clear Black ideology that talks about revolution, understanding the necessity of a land base, must be pointed toward Africa, especially since we've decided that we're African people and Africa belongs to all african peoples.  

Finally, in the historical perspective, present day activities and orientations of Black Americans are better understood. The present is clearly more complex and diversified than the past. This is attributable to changes in both domestic and international environments, e.g., political enfranchisement in the major cities and in the rural south; the independence of many African nations and the general increase in non-governmental and ethnic foreign policy activity.
Some lessons from history however, are clearly more useful than others, but each contributed to present activity. For example, from each case intolerant of Black foreign policy activity. The actors and movements were systematically discredited; their ideas attacked and movements undermined. They were deported, imprisoned or assassinated.

The viability of specific types of policy have also undergone change. For example, policies based on emigration to Africa are not as likely to occur as they were at earlier points in history. This strategy appears to have been gradually replaced by one which is based on remaining in the United States and sharing the earned privileges and immunities of American citizenship. This is perhaps best exemplified in the philosophy of the integrationist. Further, the increase in the types of foreign policy activity suggests that the international activities of Black Americans should be of no greater concern to the government than those of the 13 million Irish Americans, who finance 50 percent of the guns used by the Irish Republican Army, or those of the German-Americans, Italian-Americans, Chinese-Americans, Jewish-Americans or any other ethnic group.
Another insight from historic observation is that international organizations seem to appeal to those seeking international audiences and assistance. Marcus Garvey, W. E. B. DuBois, Malcolm X, Paul Robeson, Harriet Tubman, William Patterson, and Edward Blyden all sought to influence and/or create international organizations to respond to their interests. They each sought to move the issue of racial oppression from the national to the international arena including the League of Nations and the United Nations. The role of history unfortunately reveals little about the future of the international racial environment and transnational activity in that environment.
Contemporary Black Foreign Policy

Lobbying activity, to influence American foreign policy has increased since Jimmy Carter has been in the White house. Moreover, despite the failure of the Carter Administration to respond to the major problem inflicting the Black community, unemployment, his foreign policy report card reads much better. Some respondents felt the foreign policy performance was Carter's strongest asset. He was credited with making fewer ambiguous probes into Africa, than were made during the Nixon-Kissinger era. Moreover the inquiries made by Vice President Mondale and U.S. Ambassador Andrew Young into Southern Africa have been "searching and tentative with clear purpose." Further, during the Kennedy Administration, Blacks were urging that instead of sending Black ambassadors abroad, the United States should send a Black principal to the United Nations (I doubt if Pearl Bailey was who they had in mind). "New views", they argued, "would be injected into the stream of international consciousness and the message would be spread around the globe that the United States took nonwhites, both at home and abroad seriously." Recently many more developments have expanded Black Foreign policy involvement and transnational activity.
Blacks In the Foreign Service

Involvement of Blacks in the foreign policy processes of the U. S. government have been negligible until quite recently. The foreign service, considered one of the last bastions of national and international elitism was initially a bi-bureaucracy i.e., the diplomatic corps and the consular corps. These particular branches came under attack as havens for the rich dilettantes who as diplomats were effete and ineffectual. It was not until passage of the Rogers Act in 1924, that the two services merged and began recruiting new members from wider educational and economic backgrounds.

Estimates are that there were approximately eleven Blacks in the diplomatic and consular services in 1908, but by 1938, that number had dropped to three. Presently minorities constitute an estimated 6 percent of State Department employees; most of them concentrated in low level positions. Indeed it was not until the 1960's when themes of African liberation began to diffuse throughout the African diaspora, that Black Americans in general seemed to develop a consistent interest in American Foreign policy, a time when a disproportionate number of Black men were dying in the jungles of Vietnam. Since 1949, there has been a modest increase in the number of Black senior officers of Ambassadors from five in 1964 to twelve presently.
The major point is that the number of Black career officers has increased from fewer than 50 in 1969 to almost 400 today, about four per cent of the 8,800 Foreign Service members. Figures provided to the Urban League by the State Department show that 15.32 percent of the agency's employment force is minority.\(^9^5\) For example, only two out of every forty-five career ministers, the highest level of employees are minority group individuals (among these are one Black and one Hispanic). Among the foreign service only 4.25% are minority and in the Foreign Service Reserve 9.31% are minorities. In the category titled Foreign Service staff, only 548 employees out of a total of 8,758 are minorities 6.6%.

After a history of virtually ignoring the people and nations of Black Africa, the United States has begun to persuade the racist regimes of Southern Africa to recognize the humanity and right to self determination of the African people. This initiative on the part of the U. S. has clearly been prompted by the increased Soviet and Cuban influence on African political change. Black Americans have long encouraged the U. S. government to pay more attention to Africa. Secretary of State Kissinger, sensitive to these developments and to some degree Black American concern took the initiative in the formulation of an African policy which engaged him in rounds of shuttle diplomacy to help bring
majority rule in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), during these shuttles he actively sought support for his policies from U. S. Black organizations. Never before had a Secretary of State made such a deliberate effort to explain the rationale and implications of U. S. policy to Black groups and never had one so assiduously courted Black support. In an address to the National Urban League in 1976, while seeking support for the Ford Administrations indirect Angolan intervention policy, Dr. Kissinger stated:

"History has linked America to Africa in a special bond. The heritage and the struggle of 23 million Black Americans has inspired throughout America a profound awareness of and support for the aspirations of the African peoples who seek their freedom and their future against great odds."

Congressional Influence

Another potential area of Black foreign policy influence is the legislative Branch. Though the relationship between Black electoral power and American foreign policy is not clear, there are some potentialities.

Since 1870, when the first Black entered the U. S. Congress, forty-five Blacks have served in the House and Senate. Almost half that number were members between 1870 and 1901."96 Therefore the contemporary period is not unique either in terms of the Black presence in the national legislature on the number of Blacks in Congress political environments.97
At the 1976 Democratic National Convention the Caucus of Black Democrats proposed an international relations platform. It called for a "New American Foreign Policy," which would be more open, more devoted to fostering freedom and justice in the world, more oriented toward our allies, and while continuing to pursue detente, would be less willing to oversell the benefits of such a policy to the American public. "The Party is pledged to support military forces carefully related to foreign policy demands and to our assessment of international realities. "We must be strong enough to deter nuclear blackmail."98

On the subject of U. S.-African relations, the Party platform supported the policies advocated by the Caucus of Black Democrats. These include: a recognition of the intrinsic importance of Africa to the U. S.; the inevitability of Black majority rule; the need to formulate African policy in terms of U. S. African priorities, not as a corollary of U. S. - Soviet policy; the need to disassociate U. S. policies from those of South Africa and increased bi-lateral and multi-lateral aid to Africa. Finally, it called for an end to the relaxation of the arms embargo against South Africa and for the repeal of the Byrd Amendment, while vowing to work aggressively to involve Black Americans in foreign policy processes at home and abroad.99
In 1971, the 17 Black members of the House of Representatives joined to form the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC). This was a substantial departure from past Black strategies.

Getting its members on the key House committees has been one of the most impressive achievements of CBC collective action. All of the exclusive committees (rules, ways and means and appropriations) have Black members. Seven CBC members represent districts that are more than 65% Black. Four represent districts with a minority of Blacks.

On foreign policy issues, four CBC members sit on committees which formulate foreign policy. Cardiss Collins of the Seventh Congressional District in Illinois is a member of the International Relations Committee and the African Affairs Subcommittee, as are Charles Diggs and Robert C. Nix of Michigan and Pennsylvania. The late Ralph Metcalfe of Illinois was a member of the Foreign Commerce Committee. Unfortunately, the CBC members receive little if any type of foreign policy direction from their constituencies. Marguerite Bennett suggests that CBC member committee assignments reflect peer group pressures, collective decisions of the caucus and serendipity, more than constituency characteristics. Most CBC members represent constituencies with high Black unemployment, poor housing and life quality, high crime rates and large percentages of the population on welfare. Such constituencies have yet to realize their potential for influencing the events in their local and national environments.
Other Organizations

Other organizations have taken a more definite approach to their foreign policy concerns by implementing their own foreign policies. They not only have stated the manifest goals of their activities, but have begun to develop machinery for their implementation. This is not a recent development. For years Black religious institutions and academic institutions have taken on foreign policy via their missionary activities and educational programs overseas, particularly in Africa. African students were attending Black colleges long before showing up on the campuses of the major white universitites.

Most of these activities involve the dissemination of information about international events, particularly African affairs. Some serve other functions. For example, the Pan African Skills Project locates and places Americans with skills in such areas as medicine, construction, engineering, dentistry, nutrition and other skills in African countries where their expertise are both needed and appreciated. Also, nationals from the Caribbean and African countries often come to the United States seeking the educational and professional opportunities that their home countries can not provide. The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) has programs for training foreign professionals which prepares foreign nationals for administrative and managerial positions in their own countries. CORE also serves a vital function by offering them a sense of family within the Black community. In addition, CORE
presently has a contract with some Middle Eastern governments to recruit and train skilled Black Americans to work in Arab countries.

Another group, the MPLA Solidarity Committee represents organizations which are clearly issue oriented and therefore relatively short lived. The solidarity Committee formed in November, 1975 sought to gain recognition of and U. S. support to the Peoples Republic of Angola led by the MPLA. The main organ of the Solidarity Committee was its newsletter used to inform groups, media organizations and interested individuals of events during the Angolan civil war. In great disagreement with U. S. foreign policy toward Angola, the Solidarity Committee reported:

Angola is the subject of daily headlines. The MPLA is the subject of daily distortions, biased reporting and often blatant lies. If we were to accept these reports, we would have to believe that Cuba has sent over one quarter of its army to Angola and that the Peoples Republic of Angola is merely a pawn of Cuban and Soviet aspirations, rather than a revolutionary government fighting for its independence.\(^{100}\)

However, the majority of the activity of the Solidarity Committee involved organizing educational forums.

Another organization, the All African Peoples Revolutionary Party is an international organization. It has its base and headquarters in Africa, and chapters in the United States, Europe, Canada, the Caribbean, Central and South America. The AAPRP also has an ideology that makes its foreign policy goals less ambiguous
than other organizations. The AAPRP is guided by 'Nkrumhism', which defines itself as Pan-Africanism and the total liberation of and unification of Africa under 'scientific socialism'. The AAPRP regards all Africans as part of one African nation, with one history, one culture and one destiny, in every sense of the word. Basing its policy on what Socialist leader Henry Winston refers to as a 'skin strategy' to be employed by Africans in the diaspora, the AAPRP has been instrumental in articulating Black American concerns about U. S. foreign policy in Southern Africa.101
The following is a chronological summary of the major events in the history of Black foreign policy activity.

A Chronology of Black Foreign Policy Activity

1526 - Early slave revolts, escaped slaves form alliances with Native American Tribes of Southeastern America

1773 - Massachusetts slaves petition colonial governments for emancipation funds to repatriate themselves

1787 - Black Bostonians specifically request Liberian colonization

1787 - British establish colony at Sierra Leone

1795 - 1800 lucrative shipping for U. S. via Cape of Good Hope, South Africa

1796 - The African Society founded in Boston

1804 - Toussaint L'Ouverture leads the Haitian revolution ending French rule there. Support from escaped slaves from the U. S.

1808 - Paul Cuffee begins to advocate repatriation/First leader to do so

1811 - Paul Cuffee makes exploratory trip to Sierra Leone

1815 - Paul Cuffee returns to Sierra Leone with thirty-eight Black Americans to establish a colony there

1817 - The American Colonization Society founded

1832 - Birth of Edward Wilmot Blyden St. Thomas Virgin Islands

1847 - Liberian independence from colonial status

1850 - James T. Holley and other Black leaders begin emigration to Haiti
1857 - Blyden begins program of "Vindication of the African race." Urges mass emigration to Liberia/National Black Debate over emigration question

1887 - Birth of Marcus Garvey, Jamaica

1890 - Southern legislatures pass Jim Crow legislation

1896 - Segregation upheld in Plessy vs. Ferguson by U. S. Supreme court

1912 - Blyden dies/Marcus Garvey moves to London

1914 - Garvey returns to Jamaica and establishes the Universal Negro Improvement Association

1916 - Garvey enters the United States

1919 - First meeting of the Universal Negro Improvement Association/DuBois born in 1868, convenes the First Pan-African Congress in Paris

1920 - First international convention of the UNIA

1921 - DuBois convenes the second Pan-African Congress in London

1923 - Third Pan-African Congress held in London

1926 - Garvey convicted of mail fraud and imprisoned/W. E. B. DuBois visits the Soviet Union

1927 - Garvey deported from U. S./American Negro Women convene Fourth Pan-African Congress in New York

1934 - DuBois resigns from the NAACP due to a disagreement on the policy and direction of the organization/DuBois begins movement for the establishment of a 49th state for Black Americans

1935 - Paul Robeson visits the U. S. S. R. upon return establishes the Council on African Affairs

1945 - DuBois increases his affinity for the Soviet brand of Marxism. His participation in the Council on African Affairs leads to his indictment by the U. S.
1945 - Dubois returns to the NAACP as Director of Special Research, his main task to develop a global approach to question of colonialism and racism. This was in connection with the March 12 meeting of the United Nations meeting being held in San Francisco.

1945 - April 6, with Dubois' inspiration to NAACP called a conference on Colonialism in New York. Also an appeal is made by individuals and organizations from the West Indies and the Guianas and British Honduras to end their colonial status.

1945 - In May of 1945 Dubois and Walter White, representing the NAACP are accorded consultant status to the U. S. delegation at the San Francisco founding meeting of the United Nations.

1958 - 1961 Three All African Peoples Conferences held in Accra (1958), Tunis (1960), and Cairo (1961), these meetings were greatly influenced by the work of Dubois and George Padmore on Pan-Africanism.

1963 - Dubois dies in Africa.

1964 - Malcolm X announces his split with the Nation of Islam.

June 28 - Founding of the Organization of Afro-American Unity.

February - Malcolm X hospitalized in Cairo, violently ill, Malcolm X accuses U. S. agents of poisioning him.

February 9 Malcolm X was barred from France because French government suspected a plot to assassinate him.

February 21 Malcolm X is assassinated.

1964 - 1968 Urban disorder in Los Angeles, Newark, Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland and other cities.

1968 - The assassination of Martin L. King.


1974 - The Sixth Pan-African Congress, over 175 Black Americans attend in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania.
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Chapter IV

Theoretical Approaches to Non-State Actors

The study of nongovernmental foreign policies has been expanding quite rapidly. As the realization of other patterns of global interaction becomes more clear, so do the models, theory and data on such activity.

Approaches to the study of nongovernmental international relations differ with respect to the role, function and resources of the actors involved. Three of the most useful contributions to the area of study are the linkage politics approach of Karl Deutsch, James Rosenau, and the nonstate actors approach of Mansbach, Lampert and Ferguson. In this chapter each of these approaches shall be discussed.

Linkage Politics

The linkage politics theory of international relations is an attempt to break down the intellectual and conceptual barriers that constrain our views of the world. Here, there is an attempt to demonstrate the interaction of domestic and foreign affairs and actors. Scholars of international and comparative politics are challenged to transcend the functional fixedness of their paradigms and to expand their perception and
scope of inquiry. James Rosenau illustrated this concern:

It is the author's experience that each group (international relations scholars and comparative politics scholars) is essentially uninterested in the work of the other. We specialize in some fields because they arouse our interest, and we avoid others because they do not.¹

The linkage politics approach, as presented by Deutsch and Rosenau, is primarily concerned with national governments, and the internal influences on their external behavior. Karl Deutsch describes the concern with the geographic boundaries of the nation-state with respect to the market for goods, market for labor, materials and services and a multiple market for governmental services. Nations therefore seek autonomy from the outside. Deutsch describes the autonomous system as a domestic system which cannot be predicted in terms of its response behavior. Thus, national sovereignty for Deutsch is an intense type of autonomy; the states decisions can not be commanded or reversed dependably from the environment. A sovereign state therefore possesses a stable and coherent decision-making machinery within its boundaries.²

In order to maintain this notion of sovereignty, impact from the external environment must be minimized. What are some of the ways in which such external impacts can be reduced? One way, suggests Deutsch, is to break the links between domestic groups and the external
environment. For example, the strategy used to separate the U. S. civil rights movement from the events in Africa was successful for most of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries. The creation of an illusory image and pathological mentality among Black Americans toward Africa and Africans; the severing of most cultural, linguistic and religious ties; and the use of electric and print media facilitated the isolation of many Black people from world affairs.

National loyalties are also a concern of the linkage politics approach. For Deutsch, loyalties are a function of the ties of the subnational group to the domestic economic and political systems. A state must seek to keep those ties strong to ensure such "loyalty" behavior. A linkage group becomes more susceptible to the input from abroad if its ties to the domestic system are weakened if it is for instance a segregated or a discriminated minority or if it is an economic class which is disadvantaged or alienated. Loyalty is therefore measured by the government's allocation of values to the disadvantaged group to prevent their alienation, e. g., the poverty programs represented by the Office of Economic Opportunity or the C.E.T.A. programs. Another means of securing loyalties is the response of local and national governments to the foreign policy activities of groups within their boundaries.
and jurisdiction. Governments might seek to ensure loyalty by prohibiting travel to Vietnam, Angola, China or Cuba, or they might utilize control of the media to reduce external linkages with domestic groups.

Another strategy is to launch a crusade against the linkage group in question. This was the strategy used against Japanese linkages within the domestic community, input from one subnational group into other groups and the national government was terminated. Deutsch suggests that by virtue of its size and natural resources the United States may be able to withstand even major impacts of foreign policy propaganda by typing its potential linkage groups so strongly to the domestic system that all foreign policy inputs become relatively insignificant. Moreover, Deutsch notes that the system has feedback strategies that work upon and manipulate the input of the linkage group, or leave it undisturbed. Finally, the domestic system, or national government may effect a change in the international system or environment itself.4

Linkage for James Rosenau are the evidence of a "penetrated system", and of course the negation of the notion of national autonomy. A penetrated system is one in which nonmembers of a national society participate directly and authoritatively through actions
taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or in the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals. Further, nonmembers of a society must come into contact with its citizenry in order to acquire sufficient information about the society's needs and wants to participate in its value allocative process in ways that are sufficiently acceptable to be authoritative. The members of a society are not likely to regard the demands of suggestions of nonmembers as binding unless they had some firsthand acquaintance with them.
Non-State Nations

The second approach to analyzing nongovernmental foreign policy behavior is to view the actors involved in such behavior as non-state nations. This approach developed by Judy S. Bertelsen and the Comparative Interdisciplinary Studies Section (CISS) of the International Studies Association is most insightful.

Based on the empirical evidence of increased NSN activity, the participants in this effort have examined several national minorities, refugee nations, landless nations and dominated groups in general. Among these are the Palestinian Arabs, the Zionist movement, the Kurdish conflict, Basques, Welsh and the Navaho nation of North America.

Bertelsen defines the non-state nations (NSN) as any entity that operates in a manner normally associated with the nation-state e.g., organized violence, international collaborative efforts such as terrorist activity or aid to such activity. However, the entity is not recognized as a nation. The defining characteristic of the NSN is its assertion of actions implying sovereignty, while not generally being recognized as a sovereign entity. The definition is not based on the goals of the NSN, but merely on the fact that the group enters the international system taking actions usually taken only by nation-states. This somewhat general definition is necessary in order to
encompass the variance of behavior outside the nation-state system of international politics.6

Fundamental to the concept and phenomena of the NSN is the need for it to maintain existence and be perceived. Bertelsen refers to these conditions as durability and audibility. In some cases, these two goals have come into conflict both within the NSN itself and with national governments. Insofar as the NSN achieves a high degree of audibility, (especially if it is perceived as a threat by the recognized national government), it may risk its durability to the same national government actions available in the linkage model. Conjecture on attempts by the group to remain durable and achieve audibility can be made with respect to groups involved, issue area and domestic involvement.

One case study of the NSN is that of the Navaho nation of the Southwestern United States. Bertelsen defines the Navaho as an NSN for the following reasons:

1. The Navaho possess a well demarcated territory over which their government exercises all those rights of sovereignty that have not been extinguished by Acts of Congress.

2. As a "treaty tribe" the Navaho are not subject to the United States Constitution.

3. In some substantive issue areas, the Navaho are governed solely by their own laws.7
Further, even though the Navaho may not seek complete independence as a nation-state, they may prefer to deal directly with the U. S. government on the basis of international treaties rather than bargain as simply another group within the U. S. policy.\textsuperscript{8} Similar to the linkage politics approach in this respect, the NSN approach suggests that a group that has been losing battles within the domestic context, may seek to expand the scope of the conflict by moving into an international arena which offers more allies or different rules of the game and where the opportunities for success are enhanced.\textsuperscript{9}

The Navaho, like other Native-American nations were confined to reservations, and through this internal imperialism certain aspects of their culture destroyed. However, this also facilitated native American cohesiveness. Thus, the Navaho may be said to have remained durable. But audibility has been much more difficult to achieve. Until Wounded Knee, one might argue that the native American had long been quite inaudible. The Bureau of Indian Affairs of the Department of the Interior managed to keep the tribes quiet and compliant on the reservations. Bertelsen notes that perhaps the audibility was achieved in 1969 with the "shot heard around the world" the seizure of Alcatraz. The American Indian Movement can be credited with the achievement of audibility of the Navaho as a non-state nation. Richard Nixon's visit to Carson National Forest to sign a
bill returning 48,000 acres of Pueblo land was also a demonstration of increased audibility of Native Americans. Further, the Navaho have entertained prospects of becoming a 51st state via international treaty. 10

NSN's: The Diffusion of Audibility

Because of the varieties of goals, resources, decision makers and intensities of impact that the NSN approach acknowledges, it is useful in understanding the variety of Black foreign policy behavior. Measurement of the effectiveness of these foreign policies is achieved by the NSN project by enumerating the NSNs and their respective patterns of diffusion i.e., the spread of behavior traits from one group to another.

Bertelsen writes:

We know that some NSNs have been coordinating their strategies publicly. ("The Unrepresented Nation" approach to the European Economic Community and the Japanese 'Red Army' terrorists who act in behalf of Palestinian groups offer contrasting examples.) Furthermore, reports of clandestine meetings of European non-state nation groups have appeared in the press. This evidence of cooperation and coordination among NSNs would suggest not only that the number and audibility of NSNs may be increasing, but that the rate of increase may itself be increasing. The pattern may approximate the exponential diffusion process described by "innovation theory".11

Diffusion possibly occurs therefore when a number of NSNs have perceived disadvantages economically or politically at a time when hopes were rising. For
example, the Kurds, the Welsh and the Croatioans all apparently perceive their populations as receiving less than their rightful share of the public goods. These groups have exhibited similar NSN behavior. These examples suggest a possible link between relative economic disadvantage or "relative deprivation" and the diffusion of NSN audibility. Similar to the hypothesized relationship between Black foreign policies and perceptions of the environment, these ethnic groups have also been experiencing rising expectations about the possibility of greater autonomy or greater participation for the NSN in the life of their respective nations. The French Canadians and the Party Quebecoise have demanded secession from the Canadian government, which may be followed by a loosening of Canadian ties with Britain.

In Bertelsen's analysis, the possible correlates for the diffusion of NSN audibility are:

1) The relative economic advantage for members of the NSN

2) The development of movements and organizational structures may hasten diffusion, via fostering NSN activity, and the development of examples of NSN audibility that serve as inspiration.
Similar to the nation-state paradigm in one respect, the NSN also exhibits a variety of behavior through established institutions. Bertelsen refers to these as types of national sovereignty reached between the governments and NSNs. The case studies of NSN project identify three general types of "national sovereignty or autonomy"; complete sovereignty and independence, intermediate federal autonomy, and national assertion and recognition short of autonomy.14

Most of the cases in the study are of NSNs which do not seek federal status as a state and yet many may operate in the international context by doing at least one kind of activity. For example, some Black organizations may seek to participate in an international organization, or in an international governmental organization such as the United Nations. Some individuals have attempted to switch the context from national to international by identifying genocidal activity and demanding territorial concession. As Bertelsen suggests: the international context may change the rules from a domestic pluralist game of 'how many votes can you deliver?' to a question of international law or international principle.

Summarily, it can be seen that the Non-State Nation view of foreign policy offers a great deal of latitude and possibility for measuring such behavior with respect
to: 1) the levels of participation i.e., targets and sources, 2) relationships between NSNs and the nation-state in which they reside and 3) perceptions and goals of individual actors seeking NSN status and activity.

The Nonstate Actors View

Building upon the transnational relations paradigm of Keohane and Nye, (1970) "which focuses on the contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of government"15 is the Nonstate Actor Project at Rutgers University. The Nonstate Actors Project (NOSTAC) challenges the State-Centric Model by noting that many actors may behave autonomously. In order to behave autonomously in the international system an actor must have an independent capacity to solicit and receive information, to process it and refine it and finally to respond to it. Any intrusion into this process by outsiders infringes upon the autonomy of the state on non-state actor. Perhaps the only real common denominator is the legal equality of states.

The foreign policy behavior of Black Americans is a demonstration of the increasing recognition among Black people that they share common interests and common needs that transcend existing organizational fronteirs.
Seen in this functional system, the emergence of new actors provides an alternative to the national governmental foreign policy. However, this functional approach to global problems and participation has not been well received by the national government.

Because of the variety of behavior and implications for the national governments the NOSTAC considers, it provides the most theoretical value and useful model. This model is referred to as the 'complex conglomerate system' and it allows the analysis of situationally-specific alignments of different types of action using a variety of means to achieve complementary objectives. In short, the Complex Conglomerate system is a mixed actor model of world politics. As such, it is the most useful for analysis of the nongovernmental and governmental influences on Black foreign policy behavior.

Mansbach et. al. identifies six types of actors in the contemporary global system: 1) interstate governmental (IGO), 2) interstate nongovernmental (NGO), 3) Nation States (governments), 4) governmental noncentral (regional, municipal or parochial levels of government) 5) intrastate nongovernmental e.g., groups or individuals located primarily within a single state. It is this category that best describes the disparate types of foreign policy activity of concern here. 6) Individuals such as Malcolm X and Hubert Julian who advocated
and implemented foreign policies of their own in the name of global participation and responsibility for themselves and Black Americans.

Another useful aspect of the NOSTAC research is that it addresses the question of loyalties:

"...loyalties constantly shift as men perceive that their interests and aspirations are more fully represented by new groups. As Arnold Wolfers noted some years ago. ...attention must be focused on the individual human beings for whom identification is a psychological event."\(^1\)

By expanding the Keohane and Nye paradigm of the transnational relations into that of the complex conglomerate system, actors can be defined by membership and principal tasks in the international system. However, many of the earlier questions of the transnational relations paradigm remain unanswered. For example, to what extent and how have governments suffered from a loss of control as a result of transnational relations? Have the increased tensions in the international and intranational racial environments been facilitated by the creation of functional systems in that environment? Who benefits from these transnational relations, who loses, who controls the transnational networks and how is this accomplished? Using these and other questions as a foundation, NOSTAC has sought clues by examining the actors specific global task e.g., physical
protection, economic development and regulation, public interest tasks and group status. Group status, is functional in the international ethnic/racial environment referring to the identification through collective symbols that bind the individual to others, provides psychological and emotional security and distinguishes members from others. For example, the popularity of global African strategies against racism and exploitation was based in part on the efforts of Aime Cesaire, Leopold Senghor and others to raise the African self-concept via the concept of "Negritude", and Marcus Garvey's "Africa for Africans".

The specification of global tasks taxonomized by actors did not provide definite answers to the questions raised by Keohane and Nye. However, by using CREON, (Comparative Research on the Events of Nations), and WEIS (World Event Interaction Survey), definite patterns and conclusions have been drawn by the NOSTAC project which is of importance to this inquiry. First, they found that for the time periods examined, instate nongovernmental actors, were just as autonomous as nation-states across the Middle East, Latin America and Western Europe. Certainly these activities are global, expressed either in terms of cooperation, participation or conflict with some other actor in the international system. Moreover, in the last two time
periods 1967-1972 of the study, they found that both intrastate nongovernmental and governmental noncentral actors were relatively more autonomous than national governments. The democratization of global politics is a by-product of growing complex world culture and society that is making for an increasingly interdependent world. Secondly, the nonstate actors generally invested a higher level of their resources in conflict and take greater risks than states. Much of their conflict behavior took the form of action rather than rhetoric. In their efforts to influence actors, urban guerillas, ethnic or religious minorities often find that recourse to violence is necessary in order to bring their grievances to public consciousness.

Third, they suggest that national governments, which are considered the aristocracy of global politics, might seek to dissuade the participation explosion in order to maintain preeminence in decision making and in order to control those issues which enter the public arena. The use of rewards and promises is used in some instances more effectively than punishments and threats. For example, former Secretary of State Kissinger's appeal to the Urban League for support of U. S. intervention in the Angolan civil war or the recruitment of Black Vietnam veterans for mercenary activities in Angola under the auspices of the Central
Intelligence Agency represent state approaches to utilization of non state actors to maintain a status quo in Angola.18 Mansbach, et.al., note that the creation of intergovernmental organizations often represent efforts to oppose, change, and eliminate unpredictability by the formation of exclusive gentlemans clubs.

Finally, NOSTAC data revealed that governmental non-central actors such as urban governments, state governments or authorities accounted for the least amount of nonstate actor behavior.

Summarily, perhaps the most attractive aspect of the nonstate actor paradigm is its extension of the nation-state paradigm as a frame of reference for nongovernmental international behavior. It lends itself to the variety of nongovernmental foreign policies to be examined in North America. Moreover, the NOSTAC approach considers the phenomena of interests, not a new development of international behavior but activity that has been obscured and supplanted by the nation-state actor and paradigm.
Notes

Theoretical Approaches to Non-State Actors

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9. E. E. Schattschneider *The Semi-Sovereign People* p. 175
11. IBID. p. 246
12. IBID.
13. IBID. p. 247
14. IBID.
15. Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Transnational Relations and World Politics* p. XV
17. Mansbach, Lampert and Ferguson, IBID. p. 34
Chapter V

Field Research on Foreign Policy Activity

Of Fifteen Black Organizations in Four Cities

To focus this study of Black foreign policy activity, a theoretical framework is necessary. The following discussion in which this framework is developed is drawn from several fields of study including organization theory, urban political theory, urban sociology, ethnic studies, comparative race systems theory, international relations theory and foreign policy studies. Each of these areas contributes concepts and ideas which are central into the theoretical framework. Hypotheses have been culled from these sources. Some variables which seem immediately important to this analysis are: 1) specific organizational variables, 2) variables linking the organization(s) to the domestic political system (urban and national), 3) organizational perceptions of the racial environment(s), 4) issues which are important to the organization, 5) organizational attitudes on U.S. foreign policy toward Africa, 6) organizational perception of and contact with international organizations or other external actors and other attributes such as ideology, organization membership i.e., class, age, status. Perceptions are, of course, those of individual respondents. The central thesis is that these variables
affect the type of foreign policy activities that Black organizations are likely to be engaged in, and the level of that involvement. Perhaps this will provide some insight into how these efforts might be made more effective. Then we will better understand the dynamics by which racial consciousness is transformed into international political activity.

Because race and ethnicity are inextricable from American urbanism, the biological, cultural, religious and linguistic differences of cities make them models of the global society. Many variables that contribute to the processes of urban life also are problems at the global level i.e., poverty, disease, hunger, cooperation, competition, racism, conflict, etc.... One way in which the foreign policy behavior of the national minority within the nation-state can be explained is through the institutions and organizations which are serving the interests and articulating the concerns of the group. Referring to the "linkage group" as NSN, for example, allows us to view the ties of the group to the domestic system (via electoral participation) in order to influence decision-makers and make demands upon the political system. In a discussion of insularity and international politics, Holt and Turner posit that by examining the nature of this relationship we can gain insight on the behavior of the linkage group.
or NSN. Emphasizing these factors: 1) ties of the linkage group to the domestic system, 2) inertia of the domestic system toward a specific foreign policy goal and 3) the impact of international input on the linkage group, they make the following sets of propositions.

Set No. I
1. If the impact of the international input on the linkage is high, and
2. If the ties of the linkage group to the domestic system are strong, and
3. If the inertia of the domestic system is high, then
4. The linkage group will tend to shatter, and the input will have little effect on the domestic system.

Set No. II
1. If the impact of the international input on the linkage group is high, and
2. If the ties to the domestic system are weak, and
3. If the inertia of the domestic system is high, then
4. The linkage group will tend toward greater alienation (for example its members may go into exile or become revolutionaries).

Set No. III
1. If the impact of the international input on the linkage group is high, and
2. If the ties of the linkage group to the domestic system are strong, and
3. If the inertia of the domestic system is low, then the domestic system will tend to change in response to the international inputs.
The propositions can be measured by the "latent" variables which are operating to encourage or constrain the nongovernmental actor. Rosenau has identified these "latent" variables. First, the Governmental variables measured by the degree of openness or the possibilities for access of the group to decision-makers and the feeling of efficacy held by the group toward the system. Secondly, are Individual variables, which are measured by attitudes and opinions on U. S. and domestic policy. Third, are the Systemic variables. These refer to the input into the linkage group from external actors e.g., the United Nations Education Social and Cultural Organization, The Irish Republican Army (the African Liberation Day rally on May 19, 1979 was addressed by an IRA representative) or the Organization of African Unity. These systemic variables for Rosenau are determined by the political structure of the global system, and by the degree of conflict between the domestic system and other societies and the degree of conflict within other societies. Finally, there are Role variables, which refer to the individual's status and function within the group or organization, their perceptions and the attachment of significance to external conflict situations which involve domestic actors such as the national government or U. S. based multinational firms.
Ethnicity and race are, in my opinion, opposite sides of the same coin. Despite attempts by physical anthropologists, sociologists, geneticists, biologists and psychologists to illuminate the differences between people, culture and skin color remain the most obvious distinctions. Distinctions serve not only scientific purposes, but they also provide a means of maintaining the illusion of human separate-ness. When values are distributed according to skin color, (as appears to be a widespread phenomenon with dark skin being a less rewarded quality), conflict is possible. Therefore, while ethnicity (which may serve to coagulate all white "ethnics" into a general racial group) emphasizes specific and miniscule differences which could be erased through enculturation such as, language, norms, religion and mores, race is a general and obvious emphasis of differences. Race distinctions, based primarily on skin color, have been perceived as both domestic ethnicity e.g., Black Americans and as international nomenclature e.g., Negroid, Mongoloid and Caucuso-oid categories once used widely by anthropologists.

In an international context, race has been addressed by many writers Toynbee (1963), Segal (1967), Dubois (1957), Yette (1971) Fanon (1963) and Williams (1969). Many theories
have been developed within the international relations literature as well. For example, theory on linkage politics has suggested that attempts growing out of failure of the domestic system to respond to the concerns of a racial or an ethnic minority may lead to a failure of the minority to identify itself with the domestic system Shepherd (1970), Guetzkow (1955), Isaacs (1972) and Rosenau (1973). For Rosenau, a linkage theory relates the behavior of the U. S. domestic system in terms of the foreign policy behavior of the U. S. toward people of color abroad.

Other theory which specifically addresses the racial context of international politics is developed by Bjorn Christiansen. He suggests that foreign policy affairs are conditioned by national norms and roles (latent variables), and also by exposure to other international actors. Here, the international relations and foreign policy attitudes of the group are acquired via positive communications from those to whom prestige is ascribed i.e., community leaders, intellectual, professionals, and religious leaders. For Christiansen, the organization is a very important factor because it is a socializing institution which not only molds the individuals attitude, but can influence the self concept and perception of the outside environment.2
Finally, problems of race in both the domestic and in the international context can be analyzed on at least two levels. The first, biological, which considers physical differences. The second, considers social differences which involves the complex structure of human behavior that has evolved in response to those differences of biology.

Cities and the urban context are central to the theoretical framework. For example, the degree of physical enclosure e.g., ghettos or physical boundaries may act as barriers to residential movement and may reinforce feelings of alienation and separateness from the national community and domestic system. They may also serve another purpose according to Dennis Clark.

"Physical boundaries, whether they are simple natural obstacles to movement, or socially contrived barriers are by custom something of a guarantee of a racial status quo."³

Further examples are in Washington, D. C., where the Anocostia river is an effective barrier between communities making social and meaningful contact almost impossible. The most important factor in describing the location of the Black population according to Theodore Anderson was "low elevation." "This inhibits the spill-over of Blacks at the edges of the ghetto." The largest Black residential area in Durham, North Carolina is bounded on its southwest side by a railroad. Black ghettos in Detroit, San Francisco and Chicago are at least hemmed in by major streets.⁴
The cities selected as sources of data gathering are New York, Chicago, Washington, D. C., and Columbus, Ohio. They represent a demographic mix of socio-economic, educational and attitudinal factors. Washington, D. C., and New York city are of interest because of the relatively large size of their Black populations compared to that of the white populations 71.1% and 21.2% (in Washington) and because of their proximity to the major cities of U. S. foreign policy activity. These cities are also the headquarters of the major U. S. Black organizations. Chicago and Columbus were chosen for reasons of convenience and so that as midwestern cities they might be contrasted with the eastern urban centers. Thus, these cities reflect a varied range of the international concerns of Black Americans.

Finally, the city as a unit of analysis reflects more accurately than the nation-state unit who is linked to whom, for what purpose and with what effects. If for some purpose it is deemed necessary to sum data on cities to large units, such as provinces or states, this can be done. But the reverse is not possible, i.e., the national unit cannot be reliably broken down into smaller units.
Collection of Data

The testing of hypothesized relationships between the variables and factors discussed thus far calls for a measurement of organizational attributes, attitudes, perceptions and behavior and thus a survey of the actors involved. Relative to the size of the Black population, there are relatively few Blacks involved in international relations and fewer still in international politics and foreign policy. It is fair to say that these fifteen organizations are somewhat representative of Black international activity but are not the sum of that activity.

Questionnaires were initially sent to thirty-four organizations encompassing the four cities, along with a form letter describing the research and requesting an interview appointment during June and July of 1978. These packets were followed up with telephone calls confirming dates and times and further confirming the current status (some were no longer active) of some organizations. Because eight of the organizations which received questionnaires were branches or affiliates of the national (and would be represented in one interview) they were not included in the survey sample. Five others indicated that international affairs were not a concern of their organizations and declined the interview. Those eight affiliate organizations were the NAACP (three branches), The National Urban
League (three branches) and People United to Save Humanity (two branches) The Congress of African People (Newark-New York), the Pan-African Commerce Company (New York), The National Black Media Coalition (New York) and the Coalition of Black Organizations (Harlem) declined participation in the study. Four others could not be reached due to change of address or inactive status, such as the Afro-American Institute (New York) The Institute for the Black World (Chicago) and the Leadership Conferences on Civil Rights. Contact was made with the office of the Congressional Black Caucus but no appointment could be arranged. The Organizations surveyed were:

1. The All African Peoples Revolutionary Party (Columbus, Ohio)
2. The African Liberation Support Committee (Washington, D. C.)
3. The African Information Center (Chicago, Illinois)
4. The Black Women's Leadership Caucus (Washington, D. C.)
5. The Congress of Racial Equality (New York)
6. The Institute of Positive Education (Chicago)
7. The Joint Center for Political Studies (Washington, D. C.)
8. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (New York)
9. The National Black Political Assembly (Columbus)
10. The National Council of Negro Women  
(Washington, D. C.)

(Columbus)

12. The Pan-African Skills Project  
(New York)

13. People United to Save Humanity  
(Chicago)

14. The Organization of Afro-American Unity  
(New York)

15. The National Urban League  
(New York)

The major purpose of the organizations interviewed is tabulated in table 2.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Purpose of Organizations in Field Research</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information/Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Racist, policy oriented research has led to a great amount of skepticism about social science inquiry in the Black community. Of those who were interviewed
many declined to answer some questions. I can only assume they felt the questions were too sensitive or that the respondents had no definite feelings or opinions, which they felt were representative of the whole organization. Those who declined to be interviewed either had no interest or expressed suspicion about the research. These organizations, of course, represent sectors of the Black community, and their absence from the survey limits the conclusions that can be draw.

Because the impact of transnational efforts is somewhat latent, it may be perceived by only a few who are directly involved in transnational networks or who are in contact with those who can describe the impact of those efforts. As a result, much of the effort of those concerned with these issues is spent on educating the Black community and the general public, making them sensitive to global problems rather than engaging in transnational activity to impact those problems. Moreover, those who are more perceptive of the linkage are likely to be most aware of the impact or potential impact of their efforts. The activities related to Africa provide spinoffs which impact the Black community such as subtle, yet important functions of indentification with a land base, a culture and a people.

HYPOTHESES

To help illustrate the conceptualization of the foreign policy activity described in this research and to demonstrate the hypothesized relationships presented in this chapter, a
model of transnational activity is provided on page (150). These hypotheses related to the variables identified earlier are organizational variables and individual variables linking the organization to the domestic system, e.g., electoral participation, perceptions of racial environments, electoral ties to the domestic system, attitudes on U. S. foreign policy issues and importance attached to international affairs. Again, the central hypothesis is that these variables will in part determine the amount of transnational activity. The model illustrates the hypothesized relationships. The relationships between the variables as numbered in the model are parenthesized to distinguish them from their order of occurrence in the questionnaire (see appendix).

The model hypothesizes that seven variables affect the transnational activity of Black organizations:

1. Sense of efficacy on issues concerning the Black community (H_1)
2. Organizational attitudes (agreement) with U.S. African policy (H_2)
3. Perceptions of intensity in racial environments (H_3)
4. Organizational concern with Africa (H_4)
5. Perceptions of effectiveness of various global actors (H_5)
6. Organizational ties to the domestic system (H_6)
7. Relative importance attached to international and domestic issues (H_7)
Domestic policy is defined as attempts to influence decisions and address programs which are important to the Black community domestically e.g., unemployment, health care, crime, poverty, etc.

Foreign policy is defined as attempts to influence U. S. governmental foreign policy decisions, those of decision makers in international organizations or the implementation of their own transnational policies to meet organizational foreign policy goals.
A Model of Transnational Activity

Figure 1
Variables included in the hypotheses are operationalized, or specifically defined so that they refer to a particular aspect of foreign policy behavior. This operationalization provides a functional definition of the concepts i.e., it demonstrates how the concept functions to explain foreign policy behavior. For example, "political efficacy" (Hypothesis 1) which refers to the confidence individuals have in their ability to realize their needs and express their demands effectively in politics is measured at three levels: efficacy felt toward metropolitan, and national governments as well as toward external international actors.

Organizational attitudes can be understood, or at least examined, by seeking opinions on various policies and policy propositions. In Hypothesis 2, I have used a number of African political and economic issues to get an insight into the various opinions and to measure the level of agreement or disagreement with present U. S. foreign policy toward Africa.

Another factor which is likely to affect both present and future transnational activity is the perception of intensity in the racial environments. (Hypothesis 3) This concept refers to the degree to which respondents view the environment as a racially hostile environment. For example, the influence of conservative interests in the
American political system provides many examples. There is for example an increased support for racist attitudes clothed in a new rhetoric, e.g., "Reverse Discrimination" (earlier "law and order"). The concept is in and of itself contradictory in my opinion. The very few Blacks who have benefited from the affirmative action programs have not closed the relative economic gap between Black and white families but contrary has despite the tendency of the media to point to exceptions to the rule as standards of Black economic development. This sentiment is of course communicated to elected officials who use it as a political tool. Thus there is increased support of tax cuts to limit welfare on the one hand and an end to affirmative action on the other. This perception of the racial environment also refers to the degree that there is inter-racial conflict in the United States. Recent confrontations between the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the Klan or between Black and Jewish organizations and various American Nazis are indicators of examples of such intensity.

Another factor likely to influence organizational transnational activity is the specific degree of organizational concern with Africa. (Hypothesis 4) These indicators are provided in the titles of many organizations, e.g., the All African Peoples Revolutionary Party or the Congress of African People. Other organizations may have
definite opinions within its membership but not express them collectively, while others may express their interests but have no way of directly impacting their interests. An increasingly consistent and useful strategy is the method of collective organizational action. In many urban areas umbrella organizations are being developed to encompass disparate organizations. For example, in June of 1979 a national group of Black political and civil rights leaders collectively praised the decision of President Carter for refusing to end the U. S. economic boycott of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia). The decision "was in the national interest," the leaders stated. The group was led by the Congressional Black Caucus and TransAfrica, a Washington Based lobby on U. S. policy toward Africa. Executive director of TransAfrica Randall Robinson stated:

"We want to make it clear that Black leadership is committed to respond to those in Congress who would embrace what is nothing more than a racist solution to the problems of Rhodesia." 

The Reverenced Jesse Jackson's 12 day tour of South Africa in July of 1979, once again demonstrated the increased concern of Black Americans for the problems of African people. It also indicated the impact of transnational efforts. The reaction of African youth in Soweto (where student revolts against the mandatory learning of Africans led to weeks of riots) was electrifying. As national president of P.U.S.H. Jackson's efforts directly communicated Black American organizational support for the struggle of the African
majority in their fight for human dignity and self-determination. The reactions of South African officials further underscore this impact. For example, the leader of South African conservative policy stated that Jackson had a "long record of association with communist and allied organizations". South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha attributed Jackson's efforts to his own personal frustration at being unable to do anything positive about high unemployment among Black American youth. The South Africans did not like Jackson's evocative speaking style, nor his proximity to the ear of President Carter. African youth listen to tapes and records of Martin Luther King who died in Jesse Jackson's Arms. Similarly, District of Columbia Mayor Marion Barry's tour of five African states including Zambia, Kenya and Tanzania has been fruitful in forming transnational links. He met with several governmental officials thus demonstrating a concern among Black elected officials in the U. S., and discussed creating sister city relationships between U.S. and African urban centers.
Also likely to determine the type of organizational transnational activity is the perception of which routes or means of international participation are most useful and available. (Hypothesis 5) This includes which actors are most useful in helping realize organizational interests. This may involve numerous types of activity including electoral activity, market activity, social activity, transnational activity and in some instances religious activity. At times it may be unclear as to which type of activity is involved, as in the case of the Peoples Temple led by Jim Jones; where there was a mixture of political and religious rhetoric, coercion and mind control leading to a transnational adventure and ending in mass murder. Another example is that of Hanefi Muslims "Jihad" or "Holy War" to prevent the showing of the Film "Muhammed the Messenger of God." In this instance it took the intervention of the three Muslim ambassadors to negotiate the release of the hostages.

In general, various organizations depending upon their goals and manifest function will feel more or less effective in various sectors of transnational activity. This along with organizational economic and human resources may largely determine the degree to which they can either influence governmental foreign policy and/or circumvent the centralized foreign policy apparatus of the U. S. government.
While large segments of the Black electorate may not be linked to any specific organization, many voters are. Electoral participation (Hypothesis 6) is an indicator of these to the domestic system. Few or no ties reflect both apathy, cynicism and the need to seek out other means of interest articulation. One such means is through transnational activity.

Finally, the amount of transnational activity is likely to be influenced by relative importance the organization attaches to domestic as opposed to external problems. (Hypothesis 7) Seemingly, domestic issues will receive the concern due their immediacy. External events will be chosen for more ideological, amorphous or ambiguous reasons even though they may be linked to domestic policy.
Data Analysis

$H_1$ The greater the sense of efficacy of the organization toward metropolitan decision makers on issues of importance to the Black community, the lesser the amount of transnational activity. (V2 and V1)

Hypothesis one seeks to relate the sense of efficacy felt at the metropolitan level to the national governmental level of foreign policy decision making. As stated earlier, efficacy, serves as a tie to the domestic political system and may reduce the propinsity for groups to engage in transnational activity. In the survey, respondents were asked to identify the term which best described the amount of influence they felt they had on issues of importance to the Black community. Coding the "hardly any" response as none, results are presented, in 3 and 4.

Table 3
Influence on Issues of Importance to Black Community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influence Level</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Great Deal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Significant Amount</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardly Any</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As tables 3 and 4 show, there are six organizations expressing efficacy at the local level and nine that are not. Table four relates this sense of efficacy or the absence of this sense to transnational activity. The rows express the amount of transnational activity while the columns express the feelings of efficacy. Each cell within the table individually expresses the coexistence of each of these phenomena in the sample. There is little evidence of any definite relationship between the variables. There is no strong relationship shown by the data and considerable doubt cast on the hypothesis because 6 of the 9 with no feeling of metropolitan efficacy are not engaged in transnational activity.
$H_2$ The greater the organizational disagreement with U. S. governmental policy toward Africa, the greater the amount of transnational activity. (V 3 and V 1)

This hypothesis seeks to relate organizational disagreement with U. S. foreign policy to transnational activity. When propositions concerning U. S. policy toward Africa were presented the responses in table 5 were received. Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9 illustrate the relationship between these attitudes toward policy and organizational transnational activity.

On the proposition of increasing the amount of bilateral aid to African countries, there is clearly strong agreement (indicating dissatisfaction with present levels of aid to Africa). There were three missing responses on this proposition. The same is true for the proposition that the U. S. should help Africa develop markets for African economic development. Here there were two missing responses. Respondents involved in transnational activity were more concerned with the type of economic development referred to. The All-African Peoples Party, which is a Socialist organization of course did not desire western capitalist economic development, due to the belief that imperialism inevitably accompanies it.
Table 5

Level of Organizational Agreement or Disagreement with Policy Propositions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Org Attitude</th>
<th>More Bi-lateral Aid to Africa</th>
<th>Assist African Markets</th>
<th>Tougher Policy Against S. Africa</th>
<th>U. S. Should Limit Cuba in Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Sure</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Answer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational Activity</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Transnational Activity</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. S. should provide more bi-lateral aid to Africans.</td>
<td>Total = 12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transnational Activity</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Transnational Activity</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. S. should assist Africans develop markets.</td>
<td>Total = 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transnational Activity</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Transnational Activity</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. S. should take a tougher stand in South Africa.</td>
<td>Total = 14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transnational Activity</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Transnational Activity</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. S. should limit U. S. S. R. and Cuba in Africa.</td>
<td>Total = 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transnational Activity</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Transnational Activity</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. S. should limit U. S. S. R. and Cuba in Africa.</td>
<td>Total = 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There was much agreement with the proposition that the United States should take a tougher stance against South Africa (which would include maintaining the embargo and encouraging steps toward majority rule). Those in agreement with this proposition were involved in either general international activity or, transnational activity. The general international activity refers to domestic international activities such as cultural affairs or international education seminars and workshops. There were five organizations involved in these types of international activity and six involved in transnational activity.

Finally, on the proposition that the U. S. should act to limit Soviet and Cuban incursions into African conflicts we find considerably less agreement. This proposition which may be more relevant to the cold war environment of international politics than in the racial environment receives much less unanimity. There were two missing observations on this proposition.

Tables 6 through 9 do not support hypothesis two. There is no strong relationship between disagreement with U. S. policy toward Africa and transnational activity but rather modest evidence negating the hypothesis.

H₃ The greater the organizational perception of intensity in the racial environments, the greater the amount of organizational transnational activity. (V10 and V1)

Drawing upon the propositions of Rosenau (1969) and Holt and Turner (1969), perceptions of marginal existence
due to racial factors are likely to lead the racial minorities seeking alliances, coalitions, support or other linkages with external actors.

In this hypothesis, perceptions of intensity in the racial environments is a determinant of transnational activity. Table 10 illustrates the perceptions of four racial environments by the respondents.

Table 10

Perception of the Racial Environments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Intensity</th>
<th>Southern Africa</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Global</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dangerously Intense</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Intense</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Very Intense</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Intense</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals = 15
Table 11

Intensity in Southern African Racial Environment
And Organizational Transnational Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transnational Activity</th>
<th>Intense</th>
<th>Not Intense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Intense</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total = 13

Southern Africa's racial environment was perceived as intense by nine of the 13 respondents. The "not very intense" response was coded as "not intense". There were two missing observations on this proposition (Table 11). The hypothesis relating perception of intensity of racial environment is not supported in this case.

H4 The greater the foreign policy concerns about Africa, the greater the amount of organizational transnational activity. (V 8 and V 1)

The relationship between African foreign policy concerns and transnational activity is not evidenced here. Four of the seven expressing concern about U. S. foreign policy toward Africa were involved in transnational activity. Two organizations not particularly concerned about African foreign policy issues were involved in transnational efforts.
The amount of transnational activity the organization is involved in will depend on the degree to which actors other than the U.S. government are seen as effective in solving international problems of importance to the organization. (V 1 and V 9)

The relationship between the perception of external global actors, i.e., international organizations, or multinational firms as effective global problem solvers and transnational activity is illustrated in the following table.

### Table 12

African Foreign Policy Concern

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transnational Activity</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

H5

Table 13

Global Actor other than U.S. Most Effective Problem Solver

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transnational Activity</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The U. S. was selected as the most effective global actor by only 4 organizations, six selected others (four within the U. N. system) six of these ten engaged in transnational efforts. However, the five missing cases on this observation make any conclusion about the relationship impossible.

Table 14

Transnational and International Activity

I Transnational Activity

a) international trade
b) cooperative economic development 2
c) voluntary services abroad 2
d) cooperation with International organizations 2

II Domestic International Education 5

III No Transnational or International Activity 4

As table 14 illustrates, six organizations polled are involved in transnational networks and processes, five are involved in domestic international educational activities and four are involved in no international activity. Thus, the types of activity organizations are involved in varies greatly.
H₆ The greater the organizational ties to the domestic system (electoral activity), the lesser the amount of transnational activity. (V 11 and V 1)

Table 15

The Association between Electoral Activity and Non-Involvement in Transnational Activity

| Transnational Activity | Electoral Activity | NO | | \hline  
| \text{YES} | 2 | 3 | | \hline  
| \text{NO} | 4 | 6 | | \hline  
| Total | 6 | 9 | | \hline  

Total = 15

There is no clear relationship between electoral activity and non-involvement in transnational activity. As a tie to the domestic political system, electoral participation seems not to determine transnational activity. In fact, nine organizations (9) were not involved in electoral politics because of organizational policy. Six organizations have at some point been involved in electoral activity. Only two organizations were involved in both activities.

H₇ The amount of transnational activity will be determined by the importance attached to international as opposed to domestic issues and problems. (V 1 and V 5)
Table 16

Salience of Selected Domestic and International Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Salience Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Env. Pollution</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Desegregation Education</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunger</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racism</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 17

Relative Importance Attached to National and International Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transnational Activity</th>
<th>Domestic</th>
<th>International</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
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6 9 15

When the respondents were asked to rank order a mixed field of domestic and international issues in order of their importance, the issues of majority rule received the highest priority. Nine organizations selected international issues (Southern Africa) as most important and six domestic issues. Only four of those selecting international issues
as most important were engaged in transnational activity. Thus, hypothesis 7 is not supported because this concern is not transformed into transnational activity. Also, the fact that the respondents were cognizant of the nature of the research may have influenced their responses. More reliable may be the consistently high ranking given issues of unemployment and education.

Finally, further hypothesis testing will require not only a larger sample but also indices of the amount of organizational resources expended on international and transnational activity.

Overall, the variables selected in this analysis do not seem to be related to transnational activity. Both hypotheses and the size of the sample may account for rejection of the central hypothesis that these variables determine organizational foreign policy activity. Obviously there are other variables operating not accounted for in this analysis. Thus, a larger sample and other variables, such as organizational resources and external contacts would shed more light on the topic.
Notes

Field Research on Organizations

1. Dennis Clark, *The Ghetto Game* p. 162


Conclusion

The fact that domestic economic issues are most important to the Black community was an accepted assumption in developing the hypotheses. Black interest in international issues is largely still confined to intellectual, economic and political elites, as a result these groups were sought out in the interviews. The consumption of information, the interaction with other elites, travel abroad and contact with people from abroad, are all indicators of socio-economic status. Age is also a determinant. Generally, older people may be less likely to be interested in international issues. Not affected as much by the ideas of revolutionary nationalism as the young, they are more guided by the tenets of Civil Rights which stress integration. They would seem to be less likely to relate their beliefs and attitudes to issues addressed by "Pan-Africanism", "Scientific Socialism", or other views which internationalize the problems of the Black community.

Ideology is also likely to be a determinant of both international interest and activity. For example, The All African People Revolutionary Party, which embraces
an ideology of Nkrumaism, named after the late President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, has Pan-Africanism and Scientific Socialism in Africa as its ultimate objective. As a revolutionary socialist party the AAPRP seeks to destroy the system of capitalism, neo-colonialism and apartheid. Such an ideology embraces issues that are global in scope and thus require strategies and activities of equal magnitude. Relying largely on student support for membership and contacts, the May 19th African Liberation Day activities have been the most dramatic to date. However, non-ideological organizations such as the NAACP are also likely to be internationally involved (as discussed earlier). The interest is more likely to be cooperative as represented by Cyrus Vance's address to the NAACP in July of 1977, and President Carter's meetings with Black leaders, where international issues may be expressed. As Vance noted in that July 1977 speech, "The activities of the NAACP are a testament to the inseparability of our foreign and domestic goals."*

Black organizations have had to adapt to their environments, and as a result have had to develop strategies based on coalition building, lobbying, etc. The neo-conservative mood now engulfing American politics is less responsive to strategies of sit-ins, marches, and other demonstrations of domestic needs. The federal

*Department of State Speech, July 1, 1977
government has retreated from programs reflecting a commitment to the problems of Black Americans. This in my opinion has facilitated the need for Black organizations to embrace broader strategies which involve some in national alliances with women, labor unions, Hispanic-Americans, and other interest groups seeking to influence domestic policy. However, because African foreign policy issues are of less importance to non-Black domestic groups, transnational cooperation and internal cohesiveness have been the emphasis of present organizational efforts. In this respect, Black attitudes on international issues have come to suggest a permanence in concern for Africa, but this concern thus far has focused on issues of African liberation. Problems of neo-colonialism and African economic development are less emphasized. Those organizations that were most concerned with problems of economic development such as the Pan-African Skills Project and the Congress of Racial Equality are involved in transnational activities related to these problems.

Another reason given for the somewhat limited amount of concern and activity about international affairs, and particularly African affairs is the skepticism of U. S. media coverage of African affairs. For example, officials of AAPRP, PAC, CORE and other organizations felt the guerilla wars of Rhodesia were reported with the intent of discrediting the leadership and movements of Joshua Nkomo
and Robert Mugabe as violent unorganized mobs. This may in part explain the questionable attitude held by Black Americans toward media coverage of Uganda's Idi Amin who has been considered by many a leader of African liberation.

The combination of over 400 years of separation from the African continent, the denigration of Africa, and African heritage imposed by slavery, popular literature, the media and other institutions, commonly held myths about Africa and Africans; the embracing of values which are not inclusive of these problems, and the problems of subsistence which plague over 70 percent of Black families, all function to limit the degree to which Black Americans are able to express their international concern.

There appears to be a mixture of activity in terms of arena of activity (national or international), and with respect to whether this activity is governmental or nongovernmental. Some groups, like the National Council of Negro Women address domestic or global problems when they find it necessary. Others, such as PUSH, may be largely global in their outlook at one point, as during the 1975 African project and at another point concentrate on a domestic problems, as is now the case with PUSH's drive for academic excellence in the central cities schools and Black unemployment. Further, an organization may express a great deal of concern over an issue area, but put little effort into influencing the
outcome. Some organizations formulated policy, but did not implement, while others impelment without carefully formulating the policy goals or considering the impact of that policy. Moreover, organizations are likely to be involved in simultaneous international activities that relate to different levels of the international system.

From the data we can draw the following conclusions about the international relations and foreign policy activity of Black organizations. First, there does not seem to be any relationship between the sense of local efficacy and the organizations attempt to influence the foreign policy activity of the U. S. government. Secondly, the amount of disagreement with U. S. policy in Africa does seem to be related to attempts to influence the national government, particularly the present administration. The third hypothesis, which is rejected, leads us to conclude that perceptions of intensity in racial-interaction does not necessarily translate into Black transnational activity.

It can also be concluded that Africa is the focus of Black American global awareness. Since it was the resurgence of "Africanism", or Black ethnicity, which was largely responsible for Black Nationalism and the widespread appeal of Pan-Africanism, it is logical to conclude that consciousness and concern in this realm will continue and increase. Moreover, as trends toward transnational relations increase, and as non-state nations become more
prolific, their activities will link them closer to the changing international system. This will involve more and closer links with international organizations, e.g., the Organizations of Afro American Unity's ties to the Organization of African Unity, The Nation of Islam in the West ties to the Islamic world community, Black business links to African economic development as contractors, marketing analysts, and consultants or ties between the Black American church and the missionaries of the Christian denominations in African countries. Visiting African ministers are not uncommon in U. S. congregations now. Further, as the sense of national efficacy declines, international organizations could possibly become the targets of Black efforts to address domestic problems.

Other hypotheses which may be tested in future research relate to: 1) The levels of racial conflict in international politics and the degree to which this is contingent on domestic racial conflict. 2) The degree to which socio-economic class determines Black attitudes on U. S. African policy and the racial environment in general. 3) The degree to which decision makers in business, government and international organizations are impacted by the input of Black interest articulation on international issues, and 4) The degree to which Black concern and identity with Africa has increased and is increasing, and the degree to which this is
facilitating African linkages to the U. S. political system and U. S. foreign policy. Also, the hypothesis by Holt and Turner relating the inertia of a specific U. S. policy to the influence of a linkage group may be tested in future research. This proposition will help to illustrate the comparative foreign policy influence of ethnic groups with respect to U. S. foreign policy decision making.

Finally, whether race will play a greater role in world politics than ethnicity, is yet to be seen. However, as the domestic racial environment continues to develop, race will probably receive more consideration in the making of U. S. foreign policy. Trends in the domestic political-racial environment, such as the "home rule" struggle by the 71 percent Black population of Washington, D. C. will put more stress on this environment. In Washington, the prospects of two Black Senators representing the 700,000 people of the District of Columbia has clear implications for the conduct of U. S. future foreign policy, particularly in Africa. Should "Home Rule" or representation not be successful, the racial environment is likely to be intensified as Blacks in Washington increasingly feel the frustration of "colonial" status (i.e., taxation without representation). In addition, as affirmative action and aid to cities continues to decline as policy priorities, Blacks in U. S. cities are likely to increasingly identify with the Third World.
Abandoned by both the private sector and the public sector in increasing proportions, urban Blacks find themselves competing with other ethnics for a smaller segment of the gross national product. For the present this has tended to put urban Blacks in cities such as New Orleans, San Francisco and Washington in competition with Hispanics, Vietnamese and other refugees of recent international or intra-national conflict. In the future new patterns of inter-group and intra-group ethnic and racial group cooperation will have to be created. For the Black community this will necessitate the multiplication of present efforts and strategies in order to participate effectively. For example, linkages such as those between Blacks and those with compatible interests abroad will have to be cultivated. This has increasingly occurred in Washington, D. C. where most Black American foreign policy interests are generated. In June of 1979 The Popular Front of Joshua Nkomo conducted workshops at Howard to cultivate within the U. S. an anti-Muzorewa constituency. There is no support for the Muzorewa government among most Black leaders.

Other familiar strategies to influence decision-makers may have to be employed with greater participation from Black consumers and voters. These include selective boycotting of goods and services of firms involved in South Africa, and of banks, universities and other organizations that invest in these firms.
The inter and intra-cummunal news services developed in the last decade have been very instrumental in disseminating information about international issues. Alternative points of view on American foreign policy have opened the Pandoras box of international politics in the wake of Vietnam. The Black community which may have had no definite position on intervention in Vietnam has such an opinion on intervention in Africa. This is in part due to the access to information through transnational efforts. Such efforts must continue in order for Black international participation to be more effective.

Finally, perhaps the most useful thing that individuals and organizations could work toward in seeking international participation is to create stable networks of both international interest articulation to decision-makers and to create their own foreign policies to demonstrate the value of alternatives. Transnational alternatives directly involve the individual; they link cultures and peoples as well as organizations. This is perhaps their greatest value for the global impact on people everywhere in terms of population growth, technological and ecological destruction, and violent political conflict make the world a village.

As Frantz Fanon, considered by many to be the prophet of third world revolution notes in *The Wretched of the Earth*:

A colonized people is not alone. Inspite of all that colonialism can do, its frontiers remain open to new ideas and echoes from the world outside.¹
It is this integration of international and intra-national racial politics that will determine the behavior of race in the changing world order. National governments may greatly influence these developments, but are not likely to alter the role of race and of non-state nations in the future world order.

For the most part the transnational route to international participation has yet to be fully explored by Black Americans. The echoes and new ideas from the outside world have yet to impact all but an intellectual and business elite. The transference of these new ideas and echoes to the Black socio-economic majority is in a formative stage. At some point this process may move to a stage of mass concern and cooperation in the international system. Organizations will need to search out and form alliances with other groups and entities with common goals and values. Within the context of nation-states, the domestic political process must be addressed at points where Black input will have the most impact i.e., specific committees of Congress, business and corporations, the film, electronic and print media, the executive and judicial branches of the U. S. government when the need and/or opportunity arises. However, the transnational route to world politics is the route of the future. The increasing interdependence of the world's peoples is diminishing the role of governments and increasing the effectiveness of other actors. Transnational cooperation is thus becoming a
major means by which various interest groups are addressing their concerns. As the economic interdependence between Black Africa and the United States increases, so do the opportunities for transnational cooperation for the benefit of both. Black Americans serve as a linkage group for this process, and are challenged through their values, social, economic and political behavior and organizations to make the transition in U. S.-African relations a peaceful and mutually beneficial one.
Black Foreign Policies Questionnaire

This is a survey of Black organizational attitudes, attributes and international activity. It is designed to measure and describe the foreign policy behavior of Black organizations in urban contexts. Part of a larger field of study in nongovernmental foreign policies, it is intended to provide feedback sources for nongovernmental participants in international processes. The information provided here shall be used in aggregate to describe patterns of Black participation in the international system.

Please respond to each question as accurately as possible, and feel free to respond fully to openended questions.

1. Name of Organization (Organization Type Code

2. Year Organization was founded

3. Would you please describe what you feel is the primary purpose and function of your organization?
4. How long has the leadership (president) been in office?

5. Does your organization direct its resources toward influencing decisions and decision makers in city government or issues such as tax policy?
   _______yes ________no

6. If yes to question 5, how much of its resources are directed toward city government?

7. Of the following, which best describes the amount of influence that you feel your organization has on decisions of City Government of direct concern to the Black community?
   ______a) A great deal of influence
   ______b) A significant amount of influence
   ______c) Some influence
   ______d) A little influence
   ______e) Hardly any influence
   ______f) None
   ______g) Don't know, no answer

8. Which best describes the amount of influence that you feel your organization has on decision makers in the metropolitan government?
   ______a) A great deal of influence
   ______b) A significant amount of influence
   ______c) Some influence
(8) continued

e) Hardly any influence
f) None
g) Don't know, no answer

9. During the last 3-5 years, has your organization been involved in any electoral politics, such as voter registration, supporting a candidate or running for office?

yes______no______

10. If yes to number nine, which of the following activities did this include?

a) Sponsoring a candidate
b) Holding a rally
c) Contributing to a candidate
d) Running a candidate
e) Contributions to a candidate
f) Voter registration
g) Cooperation with a political party
h) Other

11. In the electoral political involvement at which levels of government were you seeking to elect organization candidates or choices?

City______County______State______National______
12. Now let's talk about your sources of information. Some people feel that they find out about national and international affairs by talking with others. Others prefer to rely on the mass media. How about you? Would you say you learn more by talking with other people or more from things like the newspaper and television?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National</th>
<th>International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More from people</td>
<td>More from People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More from Mass Media</td>
<td>More from Mass Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>No Answer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. On the following 1-12 scale, I would like you to rank these problem areas in order of their importance.

- environmental pollution
- unemployment
- energy
- hunger/malnutrition
- international terrorism
- inflation
- racism
- The Middle East
- South Africa
- school desegregation
- poverty
- human rights

14. Of the following types of actors on the world state, which do you think is most effective, or can be most effective, in solving the problems you have identified as most important?

- a) National Government
- b) International Government Organizations
- c) Multinational Corporations
- d) International nongovernmental organizations
- e) National Interest groups organizations
15. Concerning the media as a source of information on world affairs, from which media do you receive most information about world politics?

16. Do you or someone in your organization regularly monitor a specific media for information about world affairs?

______yes  ______no

17. If yes, which media?
18. Next, I would like to ask you about your attempts to influence the foreign policy of the national Government. Which in your opinion is the most responsive or sensitive recipient of your input?

- a) The President
- b) The State Department
- c) A Congressional Committee
- d) A Congressman
- e) Other interest groups
- f) American Public Opinion
- g) Other; please describe
- h) No answer

19. How often has your organization, or a member of your organizational staff, been contacted by the federal government or governmental official, committee or interest group seeking your input on foreign policy concerns?

20. If your organization has ever been contacted with respect to foreign policy matters, please discuss the issue area and the situational background information.
21. In expressing the international concerns of your organization, which of the following strategies is most usually employed?

i) Criticism of policy that appears erroneous.
   a) ______ most usually employed
   b) ______ sometimes employed
   c) ______ hardly ever employed
   d) ______ never employed

ii) Cooperation with those with similar goals and values.
   a) ______ most usually employed
   b) ______ sometimes employed
   c) ______ hardly ever employed
   d) ______ never employed

iii) formation of alternative policies?

IV) Implementation of own foreign policy?

22. How often are each of the following strategies used to express the foreign policy concerns of your organization to decision makers in business and government?

a) letters

b) boycotts

c) demonstrations
23. With what frequency would you say your organization is involved in some type of international activity, such as, cooperation with African governments and organizations?

24. Now, I would like to ask your opinion of a few foreign policy propositions. I would like to know how much you agree or disagree with each. If you have no opinion, please tell me that.

The United States has a responsibility of limiting Cuban and Russian involvement in Africa?

________ a) Strongly Disagree
________ b) Disagree
________ c) Not Sure
________ d) Agree
________ e) Strongly Agree
________ f) No answer

Statements 25 thru 29 use the same categories

25. The United States should provide more bi-lateral aid to the African nations.

26. The United States should help provide more markets for African economies.

27. The United States should take a much tougher stand against the South African and Rhodesian governments, by ceasing trade and athletic competition.
28. The participation of nongovernmental organizations such as the NAACP is necessary and useful in making the world more peaceful or less violent.

29. Now, I would like your feelings about the intensity of the racial environment at various levels of the global social system. Please indicate your perception of the degree of intensity at each level.

   a) Dangerously intense
   b) Very intense
   c) Not very intense
   d) Moderate
   e) Not intense at all
   f) Don't know

30. If you could, please describe the role you perceive that your organization can play in solving problems of national and international relations and politics?

31. In which of the following types of international activity is your organization involved?

   a) communicates with organizations abroad
   b) trade with businesses abroad
   c) cooperative economic and development projects
   d) voluntary services abroad
   e) cooperation with national governments abroad
   f) educating people in the U. S. about international issues
(31) continued

______g) involving people in international participation

______h) housing international events or speakers

______i) cooperation with international organizations

______j) other, please describe

______k) Don't know

32. Which of the following regions of the globe has been the focus of organizational foreign policy concerns and activity?

a) ______ Asia

b) ______ Latin America

c) ______ Southeast Asia

d) ______ Europe

e) ______ Africa

f) ______ The Middle East

33. Would you say that most of the foreign policy activity of your organizations has its origins within the organization, in response to American business interests, in response to requests from abroad, in response to requests from American governments?

34. Thank you for your time and cooperation. Are there any questions that you would like to ask concerning this questionnaire?
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