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AN ANALYTIC STUDY OF ART CRITICISM IN CURRICULUM CONTEXTS (VOLUMES I AND II)

The Ohio State University

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AN ANALYTIC STUDY OF ART CRITICISM
IN CURRICULUM CONTEXTS
VOLUME I

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

Hubert George Geahigan, B.F.A., M.A.

* * * * *
The Ohio State University

1979

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<td>1966</td>
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<td>Summer, 1966</td>
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<td>1969-1970</td>
<td>Instructor, Department of Art, East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina</td>
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PUBLICATIONS


FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Art Education

Studies in Art Education. Dr. Arthur D. Efland, Dr. Evan J. Kern, Dr. Ross A. Norris, Dr. Gilbert Clark

Minor Field: Education

Studies in Education. Dr. Gerald Reagan, Dr. Paul Klchr
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Overview

In this chapter I provide a general introduction to the present study by describing the role of art criticism in present curriculum discussions and presenting the problematic situation as conceptual in nature. I then focus on the design and limitations of the present study and conclude with a summary of the subsequent chapters of this dissertation.

Background of the Problem

Although the notion of a distinctly "aesthetic education" has been present in educational literature for the last twenty-five years (cf., Broudy, 1951), recognition of the topic as a focus for intense discussion has occurred in the literature only within the last fifteen years. During this time a sizeable body of writing has been produced on the topic; seminars and institutes have been conducted dealing with various issues of curriculum reform and research\textsuperscript{1,2}; a journal has been established to explore issues relevant to both education and

\textsuperscript{1} Among others, a Seminar in Art Education for Research and Curriculum Development held at the Pennsylvania State University in 1966.

\textsuperscript{2} A Development Conference to Establish Guidelines for Pilot Programs for Teaching the Concepts of Art Appreciation which are Basic in the General Education of all Public School Students. The Ohio State University, 1967.
aesthetics (as psychological and philosophical disciplines); and several major projects have been funded to develop and implement programs of "aesthetic education" in the public schools. At the present time one may claim that the slogan "aesthetic education" summarizes the broad and rather heterogeneous concerns of a sizeable number of aestheticians, educational philosophers, curriculum-theorists, and subject matter specialists -- along with some noteworthy (although limited) attempts to change practices in the public schools.

The bulk of such writing can roughly be characterized as curricular in nature. That is, there is a typical concern with such things as the formulation of educational goals, with statements of educational content, and with methodological prescriptions for teaching this content. Within this literature, few ideas have received as much attention as the notion of criticism, or aesthetic criticism. Broadly construed, criticism as an educational topic has figured in numerous proposals to reform curricula in the arts. It has been suggested as a curriculum component for programs of public school education (Barkan, 1966; Broudy, 1966; Ecker, 1967, 1973; Eisner, 1965, 1969; Feldman, 1970, 1973; Kaelin, 1968; Smith, 1967b, 1968, 1973), as a component in the preparation of elementary and secondary teachers (Broudy, 1967; 3. Journal of Aesthetic Education.

4. Aesthetic Education Program developed by Central Mid-Western Regional Educational Laboratory in St. Anne, Missouri.

5. Arts and Humanities Curriculum Development Program of the Central Atlantic Regional Educational Laboratory, Washington, D.C.

6. The Curriculum Project sponsored by the Charles F. Kettering Foundation at Stanford University.
Ecker, 1973; Feldman, 1968, 1970; MacGregor, 1971), and as a component in higher education curricula for the specialist and non-specialist in art (Ice, 1969; Shields, 1971). In addition there has been an increased interest in empirically investigating matters related to the topic of criticism (Arnstine, 1965; see as examples Cromer, 1973; Mittler, 1972; Stumbo, 1970; Wilson, 1970, 1972). Finally two of the largest and most elaborate curriculum projects in the arts undertaken in recent years have cited criticism as a major focus for study. (Barkan, Chapman, and Kern, 1970; Eisner, et. al., 1969). It seems safe to conclude that the topic of criticism occupies an important place in recent policy discussions for education in the arts.

**Problem Situation**

In conjunction with the interest that has grown around criticism as an educational topic, there has developed a mode of curriculum theorizing which can perhaps best be termed educational metacriticism. Educational metacriticism is a form of inquiry which attempts to explain what criticism is by applying the researches of philosophical aesthetics and by a more-or-less rigorous philosophizing in its own right. In addition it attempts to prescribe certain roles or functions for criticism in various educational settings. There are a number of prominent writers in the field who are closely identified with this type of theorizing. Some of the most notable are Edmund Feldman, Ralph Smith, David Ecker, and Eugene Kaelin. These writers are generally recognized as authorities in the field and their writings are the sources cited by others as attempts are made to implement the notion of criticism in particular educational settings.
The Problem of Communication

Despite the growth of educational metacriticism as an accepted mode of theorizing, one of the characteristic features of this literature is a surprising lack of reference to other metacritical theories in the field and a consequent lack of debate among writers about the adequacy of other theories which are offered. In a sense each writer theorizes more-or-less independently and the student, teacher, curriculum designer, evaluator, researcher, or other person who would utilize such writings as a source of information is left to his own devices in choosing among various theories.

This of course would represent no problem at all if writers' explanations of criticism and their prescriptions dealing with criticism were essentially the same. Even the most cursory inspection of the literature, however, reveals that this is not the case. A first indication of this is the variation in terminology which various writers employ. Associated with the topic of criticism is a cluster of more-or-less related terms: "criticism", "description", "analysis", "characterization", "interpretation", "explanation", "evaluation", and "judgment". It is simply a fact that different sets of these terms are employed by different educational metacritics to explain what criticism is. So that different writers either (a) present notions of criticism at variance with one another, (b) use terminology in different ways, or (c) do both of the above.

Since this is the case, the topic of criticism is likely to prove troublesome indeed in curriculum settings. One of the primary reasons for this is that education is a collective endeavor in which various individuals must communicate with one another to implement ideas, to
effect curriculum research, and so forth. MacDonald (1971) sees the variety of different approaches and the ensuing confusion among curriculum theorists as a pervasive and perennial curriculum problem:

The problem that variety creates for curriculum is perhaps of a different order. It would appear that the variety is less troublesome than the confusion among theorists about the variety and of the intentions of other theorists. The result has been something like a series of theoretical exchanges which have often been at cross purposes, together with an essential lack of historical development. (MacDonald, 1971, p. 197).

The variety of critical explanations which exist in the literature, then, is a prima-facie reason for believing that communication problems such as the ones deplored by MacDonald exist in the literature but there are less obvious reasons for hypothesizing such a problem as well. In order to discuss these reasons it is necessary to more precisely characterize the tasks which educational metacritics undertake.

Explanations of criticism which metacritics offer can more precisely be construed as complex definitions (or sets of definitions). These definitions attempt to set forth the meanings of one or more of the following terms (or variations of the following terms): "criticism", "description", "analysis", "characterization", "interpretation", "evaluation", "judgment". I will hereafter refer to such terms as critical terms, critical nouns, or -- when the corresponding verb form is used -- critical verbs.

In discussing the problems of understanding and communication, a first point that needs to be made is that critical terms are both ambiguous and vague. Since critical terms can be used to express more than one concept, it is possible for educational metacritics to define the same term in different ways. Moreover even if the concept which
educational metacritics define is the same, it is still possible for separate definitions to differ with regard to borderline instances of that concept. Although the problem of variation in definitions of critical terms is one that has by and large gone unrecognized, there is a growing realization in the field of art education that a more explicit consensus over the meanings of terms employed in the literature is needed. Dobbs (1971), for example, writes that art educators suffer from a confusion over terminology and a lack of a clear technical vocabulary.

Another problem of communication and understanding arises in considering the prescriptive context in which definitions of critical terms are offered. The definitions which educational metacritics formulate are not offered in isolation but appear in contexts intended to have prescriptive force. Educational metacritics assume that the conceptions of criticism which they offer will play a role (or roles) in various kinds of educational settings. Although these assumptions are not always made explicit, it is in principle possible to do so by formulating prescriptive statements. Educational metacritics, thus, can be held accountable not only for the definitions which they offer but also for the educational prescriptions which they assume or explicitly state. Since educational definitions are commonly formulated for a variety of prescriptive purposes, it would be a mistake at the outset to assume that metacritical prescriptions for criticism are of one unitary type. Yet, if criticism prescriptions differ from one another in a variety of ways, this important fact has yet to be discussed in the literature.
Thus, a lack of consensus about the meanings of critical terms and a lack of consensus about the prescriptive role of criticism in educational settings could each prove to be a hindrance to educators in their attempts to understand the literature. If this is the case, there is reason to suspect a problem of communication with regard to the topic of criticism in contemporary discussions.

The Problem of Theoretical Adequacy

Definitions of critical terms and prescriptions dealing with criticism may be more-or-less theoretically adequate, for a number of reasons. Generally speaking there are two possible kinds of definitions which could be offered by metacritics. Each kind of definition achieves theoretical adequacy in a different way. Metacritical definitions could either be nonarbitrary stipulated definitions or reportive definitions. The former kind of definition does not describe the ordinary usage of critical terms but assigns certain meanings to critical terms under the assumption that such meanings will be adopted beyond the context in which the definitions are presented. In offering such definitions they must be accompanied by some compelling reasons for their adoption since there is always present the danger that such stipulated meanings will be confused with the ordinary meanings of critical terms. Reportive definitions, on the other hand, do purport to mirror predefinitional usage and they are appraised on their truth or falsity in doing so.

Both of the above kinds of definitions can be more-or-less theoretically adequate for a number of other reasons as well. Such

7. This terminology is taken from Garner and Rosen (1967, pp. 229-234).
definitions can differ in their freedom from inconsistency,\textsuperscript{8} in their freedom from circularity,\textsuperscript{9} and in their degree of sophistication. To discuss how and why educational metacritical definitions may be lacking in each of these areas it is necessary to consider the present context in which such definitions are presented. Educational metacritical definitions, first of all, are usually derived from a variety of sources. Second, these sources, themselves, may be presenting definitions which are theoretically inadequate. Third, metacritical definitions need to function in a variety of educational contexts. And, finally, such definitions are taken from contexts remote from prescriptive matters and presented in order to meet a variety of prescriptive concerns in educational settings. In sum, educational metacritical theorizing is characteristic of educational discourse as a whole and educational discourse as Scheffler (1958) remarks, is particularly prone to conceptual ills because it embraces a number of contexts and assumes different functions:

\textsuperscript{8} For purposes of this study inconsistency can be equated with statement incompatibility. Two statements $p$ and $q$ are incompatible (i.e., logically contrary) if and only if the truth of one statement precludes the truth of the other and both $p$ and $q$ may be jointly false. Statement incompatibility does not rule out the possibility of two statements being false together but only of their being jointly true. (See Strawson, 1952, pp. 12-25).

\textsuperscript{9} Circularity is a contextual notion which resists easy definition. In this study definitions will be considered circular when a key term in the definiendum is repeated in the definiens or when a key term in the definiens remains in need of clarification in order to function as guidance for a teacher or some other agent of schooling (for a discussion of the problems of defining "circularity", see Ennis, 1969, pp. 201-203).
Education is not only an abstract, intellectual matter but a field of practical endeavor and decision as well, in which institutional programs are put forth, criticized, justified, and rejected. The practical force of educational argument suggests, further, that educational ideas serve not only "descriptive" functions but also "policy" functions.... Educational discourse in sum, embraces a number of different contexts, cutting across the scientific, the practical, and the ethical spheres, which lend a variety of colors and emphases to ostensibly common notions. (Scheffler, 1958, p. 9).

The Variety of Sources of Metacritical Definitions. Educational metacriticism as one mode of educational discourse is vulnerable to conceptual difficulties because it attempts to bridge the gap between technical contexts of philosophical inquiry and the practical spheres of curriculum making and teaching. In formulating definitions of critical terms, educational metacritics borrow from a variety of philosophical sources not all of which have their genesis in the same philosophic tradition (or, indeed, in any philosophic tradition at all). Not only are definitions borrowed from language analysis, pragmatism, existentialism, and phenomenology but theoretical statements by working critics, and works prescribing "practical" approaches to criticism may be consulted as well. In addition, various viewpoints on occasion appear to be augmented by a given writer's appeal to his own personal experience.

To be sure, no one theorizes in a vacuum but there is a danger in such an eclectic mode of inquiry. In constructing definitions from a variety of sources, technical uses of critical terms which may well change with the particular context of use might be misunderstood. Since critical terms are ambiguous in their ordinary uses, variations in meaning might be overlooked or misconstrued. And finally, borrowing
from a variety of sources suggests the possibility of theoretical inconsistency when statements from different theories are combined within one definition.

Even if the above were not the case, however, the variation which exists in the original philosophical theories from which metacritics draw their definitions again creates a prima-facie problem for the field. The meanings of critical terms are very much a matter of philosophical debate so that, even assuming that educational metacritics have accurately and consistently represented original theories in their definitions, their definitions collectively would reflect a divergence of theoretical positions. In such a case one is entitled to ask how various definitions of critical terms differ and which of the metacritical definitions presented are more theoretically adequate.

Inadequacy of Theoretical Sources. One of the primary reasons for the formulation of definitions of critical terms by educational metacritics is to explicate the linguistic doings that critics are held to perform in their intercourse with works of art and, in doing this, to aid in the inculcation of students into the discipline of art criticism as it exists. Educational metacritical definitions, thus, might be perceived as a response to Harry Broudy's enjoinder that "the modes of analysis developed by art critics and philosophers of art be translated into curriculum contents and teaching procedures" (Broudy, 1966, p. 40) or to Manuel Barkan's observation that to the detriment of art education we have ignored the aesthetician and critic. Art curriculum is faltering, not because of efforts to attend to art history, but rather, because we have not learned to use the aesthetician and critic, nor do we properly use the art historian. (Barkan, 1966, p. 243)
An important concern of educational metacritical theory then is to give an account of critical discourse through explicating the linguistic doings held to be indicated by critical terms.

In thus defining critical terms, both educational metacritics, and the sources from which they derive their definitions, proceed under certain assumptions about the nature of language and of the appropriate ways in which critical terms may be defined. Whether such assumptions can be considered tenable, at the present time, however, would seem to be a problematic matter. Even leaving aside the question of the philosophical sophistication of educational metacritics, it is doubtful that the sources from which they derive their definitions present an adequate conception of language. In terms of the understanding of linguistic matters, the discipline of aesthetics, for example, can be considered an applied discipline, the parent discipline of which is the philosophy of language. Within this latter discipline some notable advances have been made in recent years. Austin (1962) and others following him, for example, have shown that the range of categories of linguistic doings traditionally employed by philosophers is overly simple. Moreover, they have attacked the bases upon which discriminations among linguistic doings have been traditionally made in the past. Since much of this development in the philosophy of language is of recent development, applications have yet to be made in aesthetics and the philosophy of criticism. Educational metacritics in deriving their definitions of critical terms from various sources, then, may be presenting inadequate conceptions of the linguistic doings held to be indicated by these terms.
**Educational Settings.** Another reason for believing that definitions of critical terms may be inadequate lies in the variety of educational settings in which such definitions are presented and in the changing requirements which one can hypothesize are being made, and will be made of such definitions. With the increasing acceptance of criticism as a part of curricula in the arts, there is and will be an increasing need for precision and clarity of discourse, a need which educational metacritical definitions may not be able to meet.

Perhaps this point can be made clearer by contrasting educational metacritical definitions with what Scheffler (1958, pp. 11-35) has termed "programmatic definitions". Educational metacritical definitions do not sit comfortably within the category of programmatic definitions and it is instructive to inquire why this is the case. Scheffler's conception of a programmatic definition rests upon a consideration of two separate distinctions: that between scientific or technical definitions and general definitions on the one hand, and between definitions offered in the context of policy debates and definitions which are not, on the other. If and only if a definition is a general definition and it is offered in the context of a policy debate is it programmatic.

Metacritical definitions, however, do not satisfy either criterion comfortably. It is true that metacritical definitions "are taken out of a context of professional research activity" and are "addressed to teachers or professionals of another kind". But for all of that they still function as component parts of ongoing theoretical inquiry: Instead of informal contexts of policy discussions, such definitions are increasingly found in semi-technical contexts of curriculum
implementation or curriculum research. Moreover, although, the context in which metacritical definitions are offered is indeed one of policy debates, the force of these debates is less than it once was.

One might say that the context in which definitions are presented is changing from what can be termed an argumentative context to what can be termed an informative context. One indication of this is that educational definitions of "criticism" frequently assume two forms. One form is such that it can be succinctly paraphrased e.g., "talk about art" (see Feldman, 1973, p. 50). Such a definition fits the model of a programmatic definition neatly since it is a single statement deployed for the purposes of argument. A second form of definition, however, often encompasses a more-or-less detailed and explicit account involving several definitions of critical terms.

What is missing from Scheffler's account is the way in which a given educational topic may cease to be a matter of controversy and become accepted educational doctrine in its own right. Once having been accepted, the curriculum theorizing related to that topic characteristically changes in function. One might ask why such a change typically occurs. In an argumentative context, a protagonist for an educational idea is indeed "selling" a certain policy and it seems likely that the language in which a curriculum theory is framed would naturally contain emotive elements. Even if educators were not inclined to use "persuasive" language, however, the circumstances of utterance might dictate both a brevity of expression and an avoidance of technical terms in order to be heard and understood by laymen. Once an educational doctrine has been accepted, however, curriculum theories of this kind would suffer from these very same characteristics.
Although one would hesitate to characterize education as an applied science, it is a rational endeavor in which efforts are made to secure information in order to improve this endeavor. Theories offered in argumentative contexts, therefore, might well lack the precision and theoretical adequacy needed to inform curricular practice. (For a discussion of such matters, see Komisar and McClellan, 1961.)

Metacritical definitions as one mode of educational theorizing share in this common educational dilemma. They are offered in a context which is neither completely argumentative nor completely informative. Acceptance of criticism as a component of public school curricula appears to be fairly widespread among writers but certainly this acceptance does not extend to all educational practitioners. Writers of definitions at this point in time, therefore, are in the difficult position of attempting to win adherents among practitioners and at the same time to adequately frame directions for guidance. It is unlikely that a definition could succeed equally well in both tasks. The general acceptance by educators of various curriculum definitions of critical terms may, indeed, be a tribute to their success in winning adherents but there seems ample reason to suspect that such definitions, framed for use in argumentative contexts, might be uninformative to those attempting to implement such theories in educational or research settings.

**Prescriptive Purposes.** Finally, the prescriptive purposes for which educational metacritical definitions are formulated place restrictions on the way in which critical terms can be defined. In prescribing certain roles for criticism in educational settings one makes assumptions about the nature of criticism itself. Critical
terms in their ordinary uses, however, are ambiguous and not every meaning which can be attached to a critical term is such that it would be consistent with the prescriptive role that has been assigned to criticism by that metacritic.

In summary, there are at least four reasons for holding that theories of criticism presented by educational metacritics may be theoretically inadequate. Both this inadequacy and the problems of understanding and communication discussed previously indicate the presence of an educational problem.

Problem Statement

This study is an essay in the realm of educational metacriticism. It attempts to achieve a second order perspective on a body of literature devoted to the tasks of defining critical terms and formulating educational prescriptions related to the topic of criticism. The methodology employed in this study is linguistic analysis, a methodology which for the present purposes can be construed as an array of linguistic assumptions and a body of techniques for critically examining and appraising discourse. Such assumptions and techniques will be explained and exemplified in the course of this study.

In pursuit of the general aim of clarifying criticism as a curriculum topic, four questions will be posed.

(1) What are the ordinary meanings of critical terms?

Depending upon the context and the occasion of utterance, critical terms are ordinarily used in a variety of ways. One of the problems with the curriculum literature dealing with criticism is that many writers apparently do not realize that critical terms are ambiguous
so that, as a consequence, the various senses in which critical terms are to be understood are hardly ever explicitly delineated. One would wish that educational metacritics, would have undertaken such a task in their attempts to define critical terms but this has not happened. In point of fact educational metacritics, themselves, use critical terms ambiguously. A major task which I undertake in this study is to sort out a number of senses in which critical terms can be understood and to disambiguate metacritical definitions of critical terms.

(2) What are the roles prescribed for criticism in educational settings?

One of the characteristic features of educational metacriticism is the presence of various curriculum prescriptions either stated explicitly or implied in the various accounts which are given. Prescriptions dealing with criticism may be distinguished from two other kinds of prescriptive statements sometimes found in metacritical accounts. The curriculum interests of educational metacritics often extend beyond a concern with formulating a role for criticism in educational settings. One consequence of a concern with justification of programs of education in the arts, for example, is the formulation of broad aims or outcomes of education or schooling. To those familiar with the literature, the character (if not the specific meaning) of such outcomes can be indicated by such expressions as "aesthetic experience", "enlightened cherishing", and "criticism of life in the furtherance of humane values". In contrast, one sometimes also finds educational metacritics concerned with specific prescriptive instructions or objectives. I shall not be concerned in this study with these other kinds of educational prescriptions, although the
results of this investigation would appear to be relevant to an understanding of these other prescriptions and the larger issues of justification of programs of education in the arts.

One of the common assumptions which seems implicit in the curriculum literature is that understanding and agreement prevail about the role of criticism in educational settings. This assumption can be questioned, however, because educational prescriptions differ both in the components which they specify and that which is specified in such components. In this study I shall undertake to show that prescriptions for criticism are not of one type. Curriculum prescriptions commonly specify certain active doings or acts, to be performed by certain agents, for the achievement of certain goals. Sometimes these acts involve objects and sometimes these acts and goals involve certain audiences. As I shall show, criticism itself can be construed as both an act and as a goal. I label these two roles for criticism as method and goal prescriptions respectively. I shall also attempt to show that both conceptions of criticism are present in the literature and, since these distinctions are not made explicit in the literature, that metacritical accounts are muddled. Moreover since varied specifications of curriculum components are given in criticism prescriptions, it would seem apparent that no precise consensus of agreement exists about the role of criticism in educational settings.

(3) How are critical terms defined?

Critical terms are usually defined through the advancement of reportive or nonarbitrary stipulated definitions. Such definitions
can differ in the various meanings assigned to critical terms. In this question I ask about the meanings of critical terms found in the curriculum literature and the various kinds of definitions in which they are presented.

In discussing the topic of criticism as it appears in the curriculum literature I have chosen the writings of three authors as subjects for analysis. Two of these authors are educational meta-critics. Ralph Smith and Edmund Feldman are two of the most widely recognized authorities on the topic of criticism. A third writer, Monroe Beardsley, is a philosopher in the analytic tradition and, unlike the other two writers, is generally not concerned with prescribing roles for criticism in educational settings.

Since Monroe Beardsley is not an educational metacritic, the inclusion of his account of critical terms within this study warrants explanation. Although Beardsley's work is not concerned directly with formulating educational prescriptions, I have included his work in the present study for two reasons. First, his account of critical terminology is a standard and authoritative one in the philosophy of criticism. As such, it has informed the work of at least two of the most prominent educational metacritics (Smith and Kaelin) and the work of others as well. His account of critical terms, therefore, has already some influence in educational discussions and is an important reference point in the educational literature. Second, it has been argued that educational metacritical definitions may be incapable of adequately informing educational practitioners because of a shift in the context in which such definitions are offered from one of argument to one of information. One area in which this is especially noticeable
is in metacritical discussions of the content of critical discourse. Beardsley's work represents an attempt to systematize and legislate critical discourse in this area. I shall use Beardsley's distinctions with regard to the content of critical discourse in discussing content distinctions less precisely made by educational metacritics.

After a review of the works of these three writers, the following principal works have been selected for analysis:


(4) How theoretically adequate are the definitions of critical terms and prescriptions for criticism found in the literature?

In this question I ask whether the reportive definitions of critical terms found in the literature are true or false and whether adequate reasons are given for the adoption of stipulated definitions which are presented. I also inquire into the freedom from inconsistency and circularity, and the degree of sophistication of such definitions.

Prescriptions for criticism can be appraised in roughly two ways. There is a moral appraisal in which one brings a range of ethical and practical concerns to bear in appraising the worth of a particular prescription. Although this is a legitimate form of appraisal, it will not be extensively pursued in this study. I shall, however,
attempt to appraise prescriptive statements on logical grounds. One thesis to be explored in this study is that there exists a series of analytic connections between statements prescribing criticism and the theoretical accounts of criticism offered in metacritical definitions. These connections are such that it is (logically) impossible to define critical terms in certain ways and to (simultaneously) nondefectively prescribe certain roles for criticism in educational settings. Exploration of some of these analytic connections and a delineation of these conceptual problems constitutes a final task of this study.

**Summary of the Following Chapters**

This study will consist of eight chapters.

In Chapter II I identify a number of meanings of critical terms by examining their ordinary uses in a variety of contexts. "Criticism" itself has a generic use in which it functions as a stand-in for one or a number of critical terms. All critical terms, however, I find to have a range of uses and, drawing upon a system of classification proposed by Vendler, I undertake an analysis of the verbal forms of such terms. Three major uses of critical verbs are identified and labelled as **activities**, **achievements**, and **states**. Although the two former uses of critical verbs are doings, the latter is not. Within the category of doings I make further distinctions between activity and some achievement uses of critical verbs which are active doings in the sense that such doings could be requested or commanded of an agent, and certain achievement uses of "interpret" and "judge" in mental contexts which are not active doings, and consequently cannot (logically) be requested of an agent. In general, critical verbs I find to differ
from one another in a variety of ways. Both linguistic and non-linguistic and both mental and physical uses of critical verbs as activities and achievements are identified.

In Chapters III and IV, I examine various uses of critical verbs as linguistic active doings or acts. To have performed an act indicated by a critical term, I argue that an agent must have been engaged successfully in an activity indicated by that same critical term. That is, in order to have performed an act of \( \_\)ing, a person must have been engaged in an activity of \( \_\)ing with a momentary result or outcome which can be indicated through an achievement use of that same critical verb. Successfully performed acts indicated by critical terms, then, seem to encompass both activities and achievements. In Chapter III, drawing upon a theory of language presented by Searle, I identify critical terms as a subclass of performative verbs and, hence, as indicators of various kinds of speech or illocutionary acts. These acts are discriminated from one another on the basis of the contextual conditions implied in their successful performance. Theoretically adequate definitions of the linguistic uses of critical terms, then, will state the necessary and sufficient conditions for the performance of the illocutionary acts indicated by those critical terms. Some of these conditions apply quite generally to a range of illocutionary acts and these I adapt from Searle's theory. In Chapter IV I attempt to specify conditions which are peculiarly characteristic of each illocutionary act indicated by a critical term.

In Chapter V, I identify a number of roles for criticism in educational settings. I do this by isolating four common components of a range of illocutionary acts commonly termed prescriptions. These
components I label as act, agent, goal, and audience respectively. Where the act prescribed is one indicated by a critical term, I label the prescription a method prescription for criticism. I further distinguish between two kinds of method prescriptions, teaching and learning methods. Where the goal component in a curriculum prescription is one indicated by a critical term, a second role for criticism is being presented. I label prescriptions such as these goal prescriptions for criticism and I further distinguish two kinds of goal prescriptions. I then cite passages from the educational literature which reflect each of the prescriptive roles for criticism previously identified. Finally I set forth a number of criteria for appraising method and goal prescription for criticism. These criteria are derived by considering the conditions necessary for specific types of criticism prescriptions to be successfully performed illocutionary acts of their type.

In the last three chapters, I undertake to clarify and appraise definitions of critical terms and prescriptions for criticism set forth by three writers in the literature. In Chapter VI I analyze the definitions of critical terms proposed by Monroe Beardsley. Beardsley offers definitions of (a) "analysis" and "description", (b) "interpretation", and (c) "evaluation" and "judgment". Pairs of critical terms are used by Beardsley to distinguish between linguistic active doings and performed linguistic acts. Beardsley first distinguishes such acts (or critical statements) from other kinds of external statements through a series of stipulations about the appropriate content of critical discourse. I apply Searle's concepts of reference and predication in order to clarify Beardsley's discussion.
Beardsley next distinguishes among critical statements. The distinction between (a) and (b) as nonnormative statements on the one hand, and (c) as a normative kind of statement on the other seems to be made on the basis of the function of such statements. I argue that this distinction in Beardsley's account can be construed in two ways: as a distinction between two loosely related sets of illocutionary acts or as a distinction between two generic kinds of illocutionary acts. Beardsley's distinction between (a) and (b) is once again a content distinction and here again I apply Searle's concepts of reference and predication to clarify Beardsley's account. Beardsley's definitions can be construed as both reportive definitions and as nonarbitrary stipulations. Taken in the former sense, Beardsley's definitions are false. Beardsley does offer a number of suggestive arguments for the adoption of his definitions as stipulations however. Finally, since Beardsley does not propose his conception of criticism as either a method or as a goal in educational settings, I consider his notions of criticism in both kinds of role. I conclude that parts of his concept of criticism lend themselves to being treated as a method. Other parts lend themselves to being formulated as a goal. Certain parts seem not to readily lend themselves to either kind of role.

In Chapter VII I undertake an analysis and appraisal of the definitions of critical terms and the prescriptions for criticism offered by Ralph Smith. Smith defines the following critical terms: "description", "analysis", "characterization", and "evaluation". Unlike Beardsley, Smith uses critical terms to designate both simple speech acts (statements) and critical "phases" or complex speech acts.
I discuss both aspects of Smith's metacritical theory. In distinguishing among critical statements Smith employs distinctions based upon the function, the content, and what he calls the "cognitive certainty" of critical statements. These distinctions present a number of problems of interpretation. Moreover, they do not properly characterize the linguistic acts indicated by critical terms in ordinary language and they give rise to inconsistencies in his account. The basic problems with Smith's account of critical terms as complex speech acts is that it is difficult to determine the critical statements which are the constituents of such acts.

Smith's formulations of prescriptions for criticism do not distinguish between criticism as a method and criticism as a goal. Both roles appear to be projected by Smith at various times. In examining his prescriptions as both method and goal prescriptions, I conclude that they are sometimes inconsistent with certain concepts of criticism presented in his definitions.

In Chapter VIII I undertake an analysis and appraisal of the definitions of critical terms and the prescriptions for criticism offered by Edmund Feldman. Feldman offers definitions of the following critical terms: "description", "analysis", "interpretation", and "judgment". In using critical terms, Feldman does not explicitly differentiate his concerns with formulating definitions from his concerns with prescribing roles for criticism. He does not distinguish between linguistic active doings and performed linguistic acts (artifacts), and between simple and complex speech acts. Moreover, mental as well as physical doings play a prominent role in his definitions.
In examining Feldman's definitions of critical terms as simple speech acts, I conclude that several are defective as reportive definitions. His account of complex speech acts or critical phases does not clearly present the constituent statements or simple speech acts of such phases.

As with Smith, Feldman presents different roles for criticism in educational settings. Not all of his prescriptions are consistent with the concepts of criticism presented in his definitions.

The final chapter of this study presents a summary of this study and a discussion of the conclusions reached.
CHAPTER II
THE NATURE OF CRITICISM

Overview

This chapter addresses the question "What is criticism?" by sorting out a number of senses of critical terms. There are four sections to this chapter. In the first section I describe a system of classifying verbs and verb phrases proposed by Vendler (1967). This system categorizes verbs in four ways, based upon considerations of time and human agency. In the second section, I argue that critical verbs have senses corresponding to three of the four categories of verbs. They can be understood as activities, states, and achievements. In the third section I examine activity and achievement senses of critical verbs in physical and mental contexts, and discuss linguistic and nonlinguistic senses of these verbs in each context. I argue that there is a logical difference between achievements of interpreting and certain forms of judging in nonlinguistic mental contexts and other doings predicated by critical verbs inasmuch as these are not doings that can be qualified as active. In the final section, I relate activities and achievements of criticizing to curriculum prescriptions specifying the performance of certain acts.

Introduction

A general concern of this study lies in understanding and clarifying the notion of criticism as a curriculum topic. Before considering
how such a concept figures in individual metacritical discussions, however, it is perhaps more profitable to begin with some general considerations related to the concept of criticism generally.

Analytic method hypothesizes that understanding of concepts can be attained through examination of the ordinary uses of words in the contexts in which they are employed. Understanding of the concept of criticism, however, involves more than the scrutiny of the uses of a single word. Rather, it involves the examination of the uses of a cluster of related words — words which I have previously designated as "critical terms". The reason for this is that one of major uses of the verb "to criticize" and the nouns "criticizing" and "criticism" is as generic expressions functioning as stand-ins for a variety of other critical terms. To be sure these are not their only uses (since they are used in other ways as well) but in many contexts a concern with criticizing or criticism can be construed as a concern with one or more concepts indicated by other critical terms. In this regard the concept of criticism as it is understood here is roughly analogous to the concept of analysis in philosophical contexts and the concept of reporting in journalistic contexts. Philosophers do more than analyze and journalists do more than report if "analyzing" and "reporting" are construed in the narrow senses of these terms.

1. Throughout this study, I will use such expressions as "critical terms indicate such-and-such", "critical nouns denote such-and-such", and "critical verbs predicate such-and-such", etc. Strictly speaking, such things are impossible, since it is only speakers in using words, nouns, terms, expressions, etc. who indicate, denote, refer, predicate, etc. Such expressions may be understood as metonymy for the speaker indicated, denoted, predicated, referred, in using words, nouns, terms, expressions, etc.
Analysis of critical terms has several complexities, two of which can be mentioned at the outset. One complexity is that critical terms can appear as both verbs and as nouns. As verbs, critical terms accept a variety of tenses and when employed in these tenses possess a number of different senses. So there are several concepts involved in the use of critical verbs. A major task of this chapter will be to explicate various senses of critical verbs as "activities", "states", and "achievements". As nouns, critical terms can appear in a variety of forms. One form uses the verb as a root and "-ing" as a suffix. Thus, one can speak of criticizing, describing, analyzing, characterizing, interpreting, evaluating, and judging. There are other forms of the nominal as well. One can speak of criticism, description, analysis, characterization, interpretation, evaluation, and judgment. The grammatical reasons for the variation in critical nouns are not of direct relevance here and I shall not be concerned with them.

What is of relevance, however, is the conceptual relationship between critical verbs and nouns. Many nouns such as "bird", "stone", "book" are used to refer to physical objects of some kind. Some critical nouns can also be used in this way but these uses are only of peripheral interest to this study.

Pick up the criticism (description, analysis, characterization, interpretation, evaluation, judgment) from the table.

is not ungrammatical but it is only one use of these critical nouns and one which is of minor concern here. Nominalizations of critical verbs which use the verb as a root and "-ing" as a suffix, moreover, are not construable as physical objects at all.
What, then, are those uses of critical nouns which are relevant to this study? Part of the difficulty with answering this question adequately is that it would seem to require a theoretical account of the syntactical transformations which underlie the nominalizing of verbs, a theoretical account which I am unable to offer. I would suggest, however, that it would be fruitless to search for a number of abstract entities indicated by critical nouns. As I will make clear in this chapter, critical verbs have various senses when employed in various tenses and in different contexts. There are times when one wishes to do such things as refer to a process or a state instead of using critical verbs in sentences. Critical nouns help one to do this and, hence, often are used to refer to matters predicated by a tensed version of a critical verb. There is, thus, a logical priority to the verbal form of critical terms in the sense that understanding of critical nouns in the context in which they are employed rests upon an adequate analysis being given of the meanings of critical verbs. Accordingly, I give priority in this study to an analysis of various uses of critical verbs.

A second complexity that arises in analyzing critical terms lies in the various uses which some — but not all — verbs have in mental contexts i.e., those contexts in which observables are not directly relevant in predicing a verb. Although all critical verbs are verbs of "speaking", some critical verbs are verbs of "thinking" or of "thought" as well. Broaching the mental/physical distinction raises a thicket of philosophical problems about the nature of the distinction, the ontological status of mental events, the relationship between physical and mental events, etc. These problems I shall not address
in any great depth except insofar as I attempt to elucidate the various senses in which critical verbs are used when they are employed in mental contexts. The distinction between mental and physical uses of verbs, however, is useful in understanding metacritical accounts of critical terms even when philosophical problems about this distinction remain unresolved.

In analyzing critical terms in this chapter, then, I shall be concerned mainly with verbs and I shall examine various senses of these verbs in both mental and physical contexts.

Classification of Critical Verbs

One may begin an analysis of critical verbs with an ordering of various senses in which verbs can be understood. One basic classification of such senses rests upon the way various verbs involve and presuppose temporal considerations and considerations of human agency.

In reply to the question "What are you doing?" one can reply

I am (He is) x ing e.g.:  
I am (He is) walking.  
I am (He is) building a house.

The continuous present tense of such verbs suggests that they are processes going on in time.

Other verbs, however, clearly are not processes since they do not accept the continuous present (at least in their dominant uses). "What are you doing?" cannot be answered with

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3. This classification draws primarily upon the work of Vendler (1967, pp. 97-121); but see also Kenny (1963, pp. 171-186).
Instead of the continuous present this second set of verbs characteristically accepts the present indicative tense. It is thus possible to say

I know.

I find.

but not

*I walk.

*I build.

Process Verbs

Within the first category of verbs — those which predicate processes — a further distinction is possible. For some verbs the past tense of the verb predicates a mere cessation of activity; there is no set terminal point or conclusion. If

Jones is walking (running, sitting).

for fifteen minutes and stops, at any moment it is true to say that

Jones walked (ran, sat).

Further if

Jones has been walking (running, sitting) for fifteen minutes.

it is true to say of Jones that he has been engaged in walking (running, sitting) at every moment of those fifteen minutes. With this first category of process verb uses, statements of the form

*I am knowing.

*He is finding.

4. This device (*) will be used to mark grammatically unacceptable sentences. Grammatically questionable sentences will be marked by (?).
A is x ing.

imply that

A has x d.

And statements of the form

A has been x ing for a period of time, y.

imply that

A has been engaged in x ing at every given time period within y.

In contrast to this first kind of process verb, other process verbs predicate processes which are goal oriented. These second verbs possess a climax, completion, or terminus which in some sense is a logical necessity for what they are. If

Jones is repairing a car (building a house).

it is not true that at any moment of stopping one can say

Jones repaired a car (built a house).

Only upon completion is it true that Jones "repaired a car" or "built a house".

Because this second category of process verbs implies a completion or terminus in order for them to be what they are (unlike the first category of process verbs), inquiries about time with regard to these verbs also assume a different form. Unlike the first kind of process verb, inquiries about time do not ask "For how long did Jones x?" e.g.

*For how long did Jones build a house?

but rather "How long did it take to x?"

How long did it take Jones to build a house?

With this second category of process verbs, then, statements of the form
A is \textit{x} ing.

imply that

A has not \textit{x} d.

And statements of the form

A has been \textit{x} ing for a period of time, \textit{y}.

do not imply that

A has been \textit{x} ing at every given time period within \textit{y}.

Nonprocess Verbs

Nonprocess verbs as well as process verbs can be distinguished from one another on the basis of temporal considerations. In the present indicative, some nonprocess verbs predicate states of affairs which apply over a period of time. Other verbs in the present indicative, however, predicate states of affairs which are true or false of their subject for a moment only. "To love" is characteristically a verb of the first type; "to discover" is characteristically a verb of the second type. Thus if

Jones loves.

it is possible to ask of Jones if he continues to love but if

Jones discovers the treasure.

it is not possible to ask Jones if he continues to discover the treasure. Because verbs of this latter type can be predicated for a moment only, one can characteristically claim to have \textit{x} d as soon as one can claim to \textit{x}.

Active and Nonactive Uses

There is a further important distinction which can be made among
the categories of verbs so far isolated. In conditional sentences to say

Jones could x.

with some nonprocess verbs is to say that

Jones would x.

This is true of many nonprocess verbs in which the present indicative predicates states of affairs which endure over a period of time. Thus, to say that

Jones could love (know, believe) if circumstances were right.

is to say that

Jones would love (know, believe) if circumstances were right.

The same may be said of some but not all nonprocess verbs which in the present indicative predicate momentary states of affairs. To say

Jones could discover (find, see) if circumstances were right.

is to say that

Jones would discover (find, see) if circumstances were right.

This is not a characteristic of other such momentary nonprocess verbs, however. To say that

Jones could start (stop, reach the top) if circumstances were right.

is not to say that

Jones would start (stop, reach the top) if circumstances were right.

It is to say rather

Jones would have the capacity to start (stop, reach the top) if circumstances were right.
This peculiar interaction of some verbs with "can" in hypothetical sentences is symptomatic of a fundamental distinction which can be drawn among various verb uses. Some uses of verbs predicate doings which can be qualified by such adverbs as deliberately or carefully: they are matters which can be regarded as active or voluntary i.e., matters in which the subject of the verb is an agent. Process verbs are of this kind. They predicate doings which can be commanded or requested. It makes sense to ask someone to walk, to run, to repair a car, to build a house, etc. Like these process verbs, some nonprocess verbs also predicate matters which can be requested or commanded. It is logically possible to ask someone to start a race or to stop working if he has not done those things. It is not logically possible, however, 5.

5. These same verb uses also exhibit a divergent behavior with the model auxiliary "may". With nonprocess verb uses of the "love", "know", and "believe" types and the "discover", "find", and "see" types "may" is used only in its "epistemic" or "predictive" senses. Thus, to say

Jones may love (know, believe) if circumstances are right.
or
Jones may discover (find, see) if circumstances are right.
is to claim
Jones would love (know, believe) if circumstances were right.
Jones would discover (find, see) if circumstances were right.

On the other hand, with nonprocess verb uses of the "start", "stop" and "reach the top" types and with process verbs, "may" can also be understood in its "permission-granting" sense. Thus in saying

Jones may start (stop, reach the top) if circumstances are right.
Jones may walk (run) if circumstances are right.
Jones may build a house (repair a car) if circumstances are right.

one may be granting permission for Jones to x. For discussion of these uses of "may", see Fillmore (1971, p. 374).
to ask someone to discover a treasure or find a cure. The most that one could logically command or request would be for one to attempt to discover or to find. In the same way it does not make sense to order someone to know, to believe, or to love since knowing, believing, or loving are things over which a subject has no control. One can at best only command someone to try and know, believe, or love, etc.

Up to this point, then, four categories of verb uses have been identified. Two of these verb uses can be considered processes; two are nonprocesses. They are as follows:

1. Process verbs which do not logically require a climax, completion, or terminus for them to be what they are. Such verbs predicate active doings i.e., doings in which the subject of the verb is an agent.

2. Process verbs which do logically require a climax, completion, or terminus for them to be what they are. Such verbs predicate active doings in which the subject of the verb is an agent.

3. Nonprocess verbs which can be predicated of their subject over a period of time. These are not doings and do not predicate matters which can be regarded as active i.e., in which the subject of the verb is an agent.

4. Nonprocess verbs which can be predicated of their subject for a moment only. Such verbs predicate things which a person does but these are things which one cannot be engaged in
Some of these things can be regarded active i.e., in which the subject of the verb is an agent. Some are non-active i.e., in which the subject of the verb is not an agent.

Up to this point various verbs have been considered which have characteristic uses falling into one of the four categories isolated above. However, some particularly problematic verbs have uses falling into a number of categories. Critical verbs are of this problematic kind. In the following section, I apply Vendler's criteria to critical verbs and I argue that they fit into three of the above four categories. Critical verbs as processes I will term "activities" but "activities" in the sense of (2) rather than (1). Critical verbs in their nonprocess uses (3) I will term "states". Critical verbs in

6. It is not altogether clear to me that all uses of verbs in this category can properly be characterized as doings i.e., verb uses which can answer to the question "What did x do?" For example, are nonactive matters such as seeing, finding, or discovering things that one does? One might be more inclined to consider them as happenings that befell someone. The question is whether the verb "do" presupposes that the verb use must be active in order for it to function as a stand-in. I am inclined to believe that it does not. It does seem possible to answer "What did x do?" with such nonactive nonprocess verbs as "see", "find", "discover", etc. For support of this position see White (1973, pp. 2-3). There is a distinction to be drawn in the category of momentary nonprocess verb uses between active and nonactive matters with regard to the verb "act", however. Thus while it is possible for such active doings as starting and stopping to be considered acts, there are no acts of finding, seeing, or discovering.
their momentary nonprocess uses (4) I will term "achievements".\textsuperscript{7,8}

These distinctions are given in Figure 1.

**Critical Verbs as Activities, States, and Achievements**

**Critical Verbs as Activities**

In answer to the question "What are you doing?" one can reply

I am c ing (criticizing, describing, analyzing, characterizing, evaluating, judging) ....

\textsuperscript{7} These labels depart somewhat from the terminology proposed by Vendler (1967). The terms "states" and "achievements" which he proposes for the verb uses in (3) and (4) respectively are retained in this study. His use of the terms "state" and "achievement" seems to parallel ordinary usage -- at least they do not seem unnecessarily awkward.

This is not the case with one other label that he chooses, however. Verb uses in category (1) are called "activities" and verb uses falling into category (2) are called "accomplishments". This latter label seems particularly awkward even though Vendler only presents his labels as technical terms which are meant to discriminate between categories (1) and (2). After all, there do seem to be such activities as building houses, repairing cars, and writing letters in ordinary language as well as activities of walking and sitting, whereas to call these doings "accomplishments" seems strained. Since critical verbs do not have uses falling into (1), there seems little danger of confusing the two categories and I have used the term "activity" to designate process verb uses in (2).

\textsuperscript{8} Zendler's use of the term "achievement" can be contrasted with Gilbert Ryle's use of this term. Ryle's use of the term "achievement" to indicate a "success" is broader than Zendler's notion of an achievement. For Ryle some processes (2) are successes and, hence, achievements. Thus, he would include "keeping a secret" (1), and "unearth" and "cure" (2), within the category of achievements. Furthermore, some states (3), would also be achievements in his usage e.g., "know". And finally, some achievements in Zendler's sense (4) would also match his use of this term. In another sense, however, Zendler's use of the term "achievement" extends beyond that of Ryle's since "achievement" in his use includes episodic verbs which do not connote "success" at all e.g., "lose", "die", etc. (c.f., Ryle, 1949, pp. 149-153).
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<tr>
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<th>Nonprocesses</th>
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<td>Nongoal Oriented Doings</td>
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The Class of Critical Verb Uses

Figure 1. Uses of Critical Verbs
The continuous present tense implies that critical verbs have uses as processes going on in time. This category of doings is, however, divisible. Critical verbs are those doings in which the outcome is a logical necessity for what they are. This can be shown by comparing the continuous present use of critical verbs with the continuous present of other kinds of process verbs. Consider, for example:

He is walking (running).

He is c ing (criticizing, describing, analyzing, characterizing, interpreting, evaluating, judging) the work of art.

In contrast to the first sentence which contains a verb predicking a doing which lacks a completion, climax, or terminus, it would not be true that one could interrupt the person c ing and still claim that he has c d the work of art. Moreover, one could not claim that someone has c d the work of art at any point in a given time period during which someone is c ing. Finally, the proper question to ask of critical verbs is

How long did it take to c (criticize, describe, analyze, characterize, interpret, evaluate, judge) the work of art?

in contrast to

*For how long did you c (criticize, describe, analyze, characterize, interpret, evaluate, judge) the work of art?

The above criteria, then, seem to indicate that critical verbs are activities: doings which possess a climax, completion, or terminus.

Some uses of the verb "to criticize", "to judge", and "to interpret" would seem to be exceptions to the above criteria. There are uses which seem to fit the construction "For how long did he x?" Although one usually does not ask,

*For how long did Jones describe (analyze, characterize, evaluate)?
it seems possible to ask

For how long did Jones criticize (interpret, judge)?

But consider two possible answers to such questions:

Two seconds.

Twenty years.

Only the latter response seems really acceptable as an answer because the question (in an unelliptical sense) refers to a propensity which Jones has or an occupation which he practices (these are state verb uses of critical verbs to be discussed later). The question does not refer to a process. The reason the first answer sounds odd is that two seconds is really too brief a period of time in which to ascribe a propensity. Critical verbs in the continuous present tense, then, are activities, logically requiring a completion, climax, or terminus.

Since critical verbs have uses as activities they possess some of the characteristic features of activities.

In contrast to states which endure over a period of time, and achievements which exist for a moment in time, activity uses of critical verbs take time. They may be paraphrased with the expression "bringing it about that o is c d", where o indicates the object of the verb and c indicates the critical verb itself. Thus in the statement

Smith is c ing (criticizing, describing, analyzing, characterizing, interpreting, evaluating, judging) the work of art.

Smith is bringing it about that the work of art is criticized (described, analyzed, characterized, interpreted, evaluated, judged). And in the past tense of activity verbs, a terminus, climax, or completion has been reached. Thus in
Jones d (criticized, described, analyzed, characterized, interpreted, evaluated, judged) the work of art.

a completion has been reached to the performance of "bringing it about that the work is d".

Critical verbs in their activity uses can be qualified by such adverbs as "voluntarily", "carefully", "deliberately" just as other activity uses of verbs. Compare

He is writing a book deliberately (carefully, voluntarily).

He is criticizing (describing, analyzing, characterizing, interpreting, evaluating, judging) deliberately (carefully, voluntarily).

One should note that such adverbs cannot qualify state verbs nor some achievement verbs. One cannot say

*He knows deliberately (carefully, voluntarily).

nor

*He discovers deliberately (carefully, voluntarily).

This fact about critical verb uses is important since they indicate doings which a subject can be asked or commanded to do and doings which an agent can be praised or blamed for performing well or poorly. It makes no sense to say

*I order you to know the Bible (believe in God).

*I order you to discover the treasure.

whereas, it does make sense to say

I order you to build a house.

I order you to criticize (describe, analyze, characterize, interpret, evaluate, judge) the work of art. 9

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9. In the sense of c ing under consideration here.
Because critical verbs are active doings in their activity uses, an act can be ascribed to the agent who has performed that activity. Critical verbs can thus be used to predicate acts in contrast to state and some achievement verbs which cannot be used in this way. Thus, there are acts of building a house and repairing a car, just as there are acts of criticizing, (describing, analyzing, characterizing, interpreting, evaluating, judging) works of art but there are no acts of knowing the truth, believing in God, or loving one's neighbor. Nor are there acts of seeing the truth, finding the cure, or discovering the treasure.

Critical Verbs as States

Critical verbs also accept the present indicative tense. It makes sense to say

I c (criticize, describe, analyze, characterize, interpret, evaluate, judge) works of art.

He (she) c s (criticizes, describes, analyzes, characterizes, interprets, evaluates, judges) works of art.

Although without benefit of context such sentences are often ambiguous, in one of their uses it is clear that they predicate states of affairs which extend over a period of time. In some contexts, it makes sense to ask

For how long did you c (criticize, describe, analyze, interpret, evaluate, judge) works of art?

Because state uses of critical verbs indicate matters that extend over a period of time, there is a possibility of confusing such uses with performance or activity uses of critical verbs. But the two uses are distinct. There is no contradiction in saying that

Jones c s but he is not c ing.
In contrast to activity uses of critical verbs which take time, state uses endure over a period of time. The "For how long did you c?" question which is inappropriate with regard to activities is a perfectly acceptable question with regard to states. In contrast to activities, to say that Jones has c d implies that Jones c s. With activities to say that Jones has c d implies that Jones no longer c s.

If states are not doings of one sort or another, then what are they? For purposes of this study, perhaps the best response to such a question is to construe state uses as dispositions of one sort or another. Thus, to say

Jones loves (knows, believes) such-and-such.

or

Jones c s (criticizes, describes, analyzes, characterizes, interprets, evaluates, judges) such-and-such.

is to say that Jones characteristically does such-and-such under various conditions. Dispositions, however, are of two sorts: in the above sentences, critical verbs are used to ascribe habits, propensities, or occupations. With the auxiliary "can", critical verbs may also be

10. "Disposition" here is best understood as a technical term rather than as a word used in its ordinary meaning. In its ordinary use "disposition" seems close to "propensity". If one is disposed to do something then one has a propensity for doing it. Thus, in its ordinary use it does not seem to cover capacities. My justification for using "disposition" in this extended sense is that is commonly employed in philosophical contexts in this way and it gets at the ascriptive nature of states. I also recognize that controversy exists about whether state terms can be given an adequate dispositional analysis and I qualify the claim that states are dispositions by saying merely that state terms are ascribed on the basis of one or more doings. Although, again, this may not correspond to the ordinary use of the term "disposition", "disposition" is a convenient label and will be adopted as a technical term in this study. (c.f., Vendler, 1972, pp. 44-51; and Cebik, 1970).
used to ascribe skills or capacities as in the following:

Jones can c (criticize, describe, analyze, characterize, interpret, evaluate, judge) the work of art.

Thus in their state uses, critical verbs can indicate both capacities, and propensities (occupations, habits, etc.). Although both are dispositions, they can be distinguished from one another in that propensities, unlike capacities, imply a regularity of doing. Thus, state uses of critical verbs are not doings but they are closely related to doings of one sort or another. This relationship is such that in normal circumstances, ascription of a state verb is made on the basis of doings and that (barring exceptional circumstances) failure to exhibit a relevant doing or set of doings of one sort or another is justification for withdrawing such attributions.

States may be also distinguished from one another on the basis of the particular manifestations of these doings. For some states the doings manifested typically use a different version of the same verb which is used to indicate the state. For other state verb uses, the doings characteristically involve a range of other verbs.

A person's habit of drinking is an example of the former kind of state. The fact that "Jones drinks" may underlie his "drinking the bottle of gin" (activity) or "drinking three glasses of sherry after dinner" (activity). To be sure it may also underlie his "emptying the bottle of brandy" as well but, characteristically, there is a doing of "drinking" associated with the state of drinking. This kind of state is a "specific" state.

A doctor's belief that a patient's illness is such-and-such is an example of the latter kind of state. The doctor "believes that the
illness is such-and-such" may underlie his "watching for changes in temperature" (non-climax or completion doing); his "writing a prescription" (activity); and his "seeing a connection between a drop in temperature and the prospect of recovery" (achievement). These can be termed generic states since there are no associated episodes of believing. Critical verbs in their state uses predicate the former kind of state. To (or to be able to) criticize, describe, analyze, characterize, interpret, evaluate, judge has characteristically associated episodes of criticizing (describing, analyzing, characterizing, interpreting, evaluating, judging). Critical verbs, then, predicate "specific" states.

Thus, state uses of critical verbs predicate different concepts than do activity and achievement uses of critical verbs. Like activity uses, state uses of critical verbs can be predicated of a subject over a period of time. Unlike activity and achievement uses of critical verbs, however, state uses do not predicate doings. And because state uses of critical verbs are not doings, they do not predicate matters which can be regarded as active or voluntary i.e., matters in which the subject of the verb can be regarded as an agent. Because of this, state uses of critical verbs, unlike activity (and some achievement) uses of critical verbs cannot logically be requested or commanded of a subject.

Critical Verbs as Achievements

In the present indicative tense, critical verbs can also be predicated for a moment only. It is possible to say

I criticize the work for its lack of organization.

Jones criticizes the work for its lack of organization.
I describe the work as a red and white checkerboard.
Jones describes the work as a red and white checkerboard.
I analyze the work as a series of red and green triangles.
Jones analyzes the work as a series of red and green triangles.
I characterize the work as a vivid and intense portrait.
Jones characterizes the work as a vivid and intense portrait.
I interpret the work as a defense of middle class morality.
Jones interprets the work as a defense of middle class morality.
I evaluate the work as excellent.
Jones evaluates the work as excellent.
I judge the work to be immoral.
Jones judges the work to be immoral.

In none of the above need the subject of the verb continue to c, since in all of the above the verb could function as an achievement. Like state uses of critical verbs, critical verbs in the above do not predicate processes going on in time. Unlike state uses, however, the past tense of the critical verb in the above achievement sense does not predicate an ongoing state of affairs.

Like activity uses of critical verbs (and unlike state uses), achievement uses of critical verbs in the above predicate doings of one sort or another. Unlike activity uses, however, achievement uses of critical verbs predicate momentary episodes.

Do the above uses of critical verbs predicate voluntary or active doings i.e., doings in which the subject is an agent? This is a complex question and before an answer can be given some further distinctions must be drawn between mental and physical contexts in which critical
verbs are used. I will argue that in certain mental contexts some, but not all, critical verbs predicate nonactive achievements but in physical contexts all critical verbs predicate active achievements. This question will be pursued in the next section of this chapter.

In summary, then, critical verbs have uses as activities, states, and achievements. In their process uses, they predicate goal-oriented active doings in contrast to active doings which do not possess a climax, completion, or terminus. In their nonprocess state uses, they can be regarded as dispositions of one sort or another. In their non-process achievement uses, they are doings which can be predicated for a moment only.

While these uses of critical verbs are conceptually distinct, they may be closely related especially in educational settings. The connection between states and doings has already been mentioned. Activities and achievements are the basis upon which states of c ing are ascribed. Thus, capacities or propensities to c may be manifested in episodes of c ing. However, capacities or propensities to c are also frequently acquired on the basis of c ing. And in educational settings where capacities or propensities to c may be construed as content, c ing may be one of the means by which this capacity or propensity to c is acquired. These matters, although important, will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter V. The next section of this chapter discusses linguistic and nonlinguistic uses of critical verbs in both physical and mental contexts.
Critical Verbs in Physical and Mental Contexts

Critical verbs can be used in both physical and mental contexts. By "physical" I mean those contexts in which observables are directly relevant to the determination of certain matters obtaining. These are contexts in which an observer is ordinarily on an equal footing with the subject of a critical verb in predicating that verb. By "mental" I mean those contexts in which first person reports are incorrigible in the sense that such reports provide the best evidence available that certain matters obtain and that no alternative procedure of confirmation or disconfirmation is available. These are contexts in which an observer and the subject of a critical verb are not on an equal footing in predicating that verb but priority is given to the claims of the subject of the verb being predicated.

In this section I examine activity and achievement uses of critical verbs and delineate various linguistic and nonlinguistic senses of such activities and achievements in both physical and mental contexts. I do not examine state uses of critical verbs in these contexts because the notion of "mental" applies in only an extended sense of states.


12. To be sure, the notion of "mental" does apply to state uses of some verbs; "to believe" and "to know" which are commonly state verbs are taken to indicate mental states of affairs. However, there is some reason to believe that the notion of "mental" applies in only an extended sense here (c.f., Rorty, 1970, pp. 420-421). If the criterion of paradigmatic mental matters is that first person reports are incorrigible i.e., that such reports provide the best evidence available that certain matters obtain and that no alternative procedure of confirmation or disconfirmation is available, then state uses of critical verbs bear only a family relationship to such matters since, even with such mental verbs, alternative evidence is normally available in the observable doings of
Physical Contexts

**Linguistic Activities and Achievements.** In linguistic contexts critical verbs exhibit some characteristic differences from verbs which predicate nonlinguistic activities or achievements. They are used to predicate activities and achievements, nevertheless.

In predicking linguistic activities, critical verbs exhibit a symptomatic aversion to the first person form of the continuous present tense, an aversion which is not shared by other typical activity verbs. One usually does not say "I am c ing," in linguistic contexts:

*I am criticizing (describing, analyzing, characterizing, interpreting, evaluating, judging) the work of art loudly.

is odd because of the logical difficulty in speaking and simultaneously reporting that one is speaking. By way of contrast, other activity verbs do not share this characteristic.

I am building a house (repairing a car).

is perfectly appropriate. But this difference between critical verbs and other activity verbs does not mean that critical verbs cannot be used to report or describe a linguistic activity. In the second or third person continuous present one can say

Jones is criticizing (describing, analyzing, characterizing, interpreting, evaluating, judging) the work of art.

and, in doing so, one can predicate an activity of speech or of speaking.

the subject to whom the state is ascribed. If this is the case, then, the distinction between mental and physical states with regard to critical verbs would not be a particularly fruitful distinction for this study, since with both mental and physical state uses of critical verbs, they would be ascribed on the basis of speaking episodes or other overt occurrences.
Achievement uses of critical verbs in linguistic contexts also exhibit a characteristically different behavior with regard to the first person present indicative tense than do other achievement verbs. With many other verbs

I discover the treasure (find the cure).

reports an event in the near future or the historical present. Although critical verbs can be used in this way, they characteristically are used to make *explicit* the "illocutionary force" of an utterance. So that to say

I criticize the work for its lack of organization.
I describe the work as a red and white checkerboard.
I analyze the work as a series of red and green triangles.
I characterize the work as a vivid and intense portrait.
I interpret the work as a defense of middle class morality.
I evaluate the work as excellent.
I judge the work to be immoral.

is characteristically to criticize, describe, analyze, characterize, interpret, evaluate, or judge rather than to report an episode.

This difference between critical verbs and nonlinguistic achievement verbs, however, also does not mean that they are not used to predicate an achievement. In the above, something is **done** by a speaker in uttering words and this doing can be predicated only momentarily. One does not continue to criticize, describe, analyze, etc. Furthermore, these same episodes can be reported by using the second or third person present indicative. And, as with other typical achievement verbs, using critical verbs in this way predicates a momentary episode in the immediate future or historical present.
Jones criticizes the work for its lack of organization.
Jones describes the work as a red and white checkerboard.
Jones analyzes the work as a series of red and green triangles.
Jones characterizes the work as a vivid and intense portrait.
Jones interprets the work as a defense of middle class morality.
Jones evaluates the work as excellent.
Jones judges the work to be immoral.

can all be used to predicate a linguistic achievement of Jones.

It will be recalled that, earlier, a distinction was made between two types of achievement verbs: those which predicate active doings in which the subject of the verb is an agent, and those which do not. In which category do linguistic achievements of c ing belong?

Using the test of the interchangeability of "could" with "would" in hypothetical sentences, it is evident that achievement uses of critical verbs in speaking contexts are all active doings. To say

Jones could c (criticize, describe, analyze, characterize, interpret, judge, evaluate) the work if he were able to speak.

is not to say

Jones would c (criticize, describe, analyze, characterize, interpret, judge, evaluate) the work if he were able to speak.

It is to say (roughly)

Jones would possess the capacity to c (criticize, describe, analyze, characterize, interpret, judge, evaluate) the work if he were able to speak.

Critical verbs in their uses as achievements in contexts of speaking, then, all indicate matters which are active i.e., in which the subject
of the critical verb is an agent. And, hence, they all predicate doings which a subject can be requested or commanded to do.\textsuperscript{13}

Elucidating the linguistic doings of c ing as activities and achievements of speech or speaking, of course leaves a multitude of unanswered questions. One would wish to know in a more precise way what one means by speaking or speech, how various kinds of critical activities or achievements are related to one another and what conditions underlie successful linguistic achievements of c ing. Some of these questions will be addressed by Chapters III and IV. Nevertheless, establishing the kinds of categories to which linguistic uses of critical verbs belong is a helpful beginning for analysis.

Thus, critical verbs are, and can be used to predicate both activities and achievements of speaking. The relationship between activities and achievements has sometimes been construed as a relationship between two sorts of conjoined processes (see Ryle, 1949, pp. 149-153) but construing this relationship in this way is mistaken since achievements of c ing are not processes. Rather one might say that in criticizing, describing, analyzing, etc. a speaker engages in a certain activity and when successful this speaker criticizes, describes,

\begin{itemize}
\item[13.] This is not to say, however, that in every context in which critical verbs are used to indicate active matters it makes sense to order or command someone to c or to engage in c ing. There are other presuppositional constraints on even active verb uses which make imperatives or requests logically impossible in certain contexts. For example, the active verb "to construct" in
\begin{verbatim}
*I order you to construct a house on the planet Mercury.
\end{verbatim}

presupposes certain capacities or abilities on the part of the subject who is to construct the house. Such a command is, therefore, logically odd because people at this time do not have the ability to reach the planet Mercury, survive on the planet Mercury, etc.
analyzes, etc. Achievements of \( \text{c ing} \), then, are the successful result of an activity of \( \text{c ing} \).

**Nonlinguistic Activities and Achievements.** Some critical verbs can also be used to predicate nonlinguistic activities and achievements in physical contexts. Since these uses of critical verbs are of only peripheral interest to this study, I consider them but briefly.

Some examples of such nonlinguistic activities are the following:

Jones is describing a circle with a compass.

The chemist is analyzing the substance in his laboratory.

The actor is characterizing the old man's gait.

The violinist is interpreting the score.

In none of the above need the person \( \text{c ing} \) speak or use language in any way.

Similarly one can predicate nonlinguistic achievements of describing, analyzing, characterizing, and interpreting:

Jones describes the circle with a compass.

The chemist analyzes the substance easily.

The actor characterizes the old man's gait perfectly.

The violinist interprets the score beautifully.

In the above, the person need not continue to describe, analyze, characterize, or interpret in order for someone to say that he describes, analyzes, characterizes, interprets. One can use the present indicative to predicate the successful result of a nonlinguistic activity of \( \text{c ing} \) i.e., to predicate an achievement instead of a state. These achievements in the above are also active achievements since to say that Jones could describe, the chemist could analyze, the actor could characterize, or the violinist could interpret is not to say that the person would
actually do any of these things. Thus nonlinguistic achievements also are doings over which an agent can exert control and these achievements also are things which someone can be commanded to do.

Mental Contexts

Activity and achievement uses of critical verbs can also be predicated in mental contexts i.e., contexts in which first person reports that a person is c ing or that he c s are incorrigible. Here I once again distinguish between linguistic and nonlinguistic uses of critical verbs. In this case it is the nonlinguistic uses of critical verbs which are of primary interest in this study.

Linguistic Activities and Achievements. Activities of speaking are sometimes qualified by such phrases as "to himself", "to herself", "to oneself", etc. Critical verbs when qualified in this way can be used to predicate subvocal activities and achievements of speaking.

Jones is c ing (criticizing, describing, analyzing, characterizing, interpreting, evaluating, judging) the work to himself.

does not indicate these kinds of activities.

There are achievements of c ing in this sense also.

Jones c s (criticizes, describes, analyzes, characterizes, interprets, evaluates, judges) the work to himself.

can be used to predicate a momentary episode as in contexts of speaking covertly. And in such contexts, the achievements predicated are active achievements. To say that one could criticize, describe, analyze, characterize, interpret, evaluate, judge to oneself is again not to say that one would do these things. These subvocal activities and achievements of speaking are obviously related to ordinary contexts of speech or of speaking.
Nonlinguistic Activities and Achievements. In contrast to the above, some but not all critical verbs can additionally be used to predicate nonlinguistic activities and achievements in mental contexts. "Criticize", "describe", and "characterize", however, are not verbs that can be used in this way. To say

*Jones is criticizing (describing, characterizing) the work of art silently.

*Jones criticizes (describes, characterizes) the work of art silently.

is either paradoxical or elliptical. In mental contexts these statements must be qualified as subvocal forms of speech with the expression "to himself", "to herself", etc.

"Analyze", "evaluate", "interpret", and "judge", however, are not verbs that must be qualified in this way since they can be used to predicate nonlinguistic mental doings. The relevant contexts in which such doings occur are those (roughly) in which there is some problem or puzzlement. One speaks about analyzing the grammatical structure of a sentence, the argument of an opponent in a debate, the movements of a dance step, and the disposition of a chess board; about evaluating the progress of a student, the soundness of an argument, the ability of a person to withstand stress, and the efficiency of an air conditioner; about interpreting the meaning of an utterance, a dream, the message of an oracle, and someone's facial expression; and about judging the height of a tree, a person's character, the merits of a play, and the meaning of a poem. In all of the above someone need not utter words (vocables, etc.) in order to analyze, evaluate, interpret, and judge nor need these doings be qualified as subvocal forms of speaking.
Are such doings activities, achievements, or both? This question is best approached cautiously since the nature of mental doings is notoriously the focus for philosophical dispute. Some mental verbs such as "see" have only an achievement use. Sometimes as with "observe" they can be used to predicate both a process and an achievement.

When critical verbs are considered in the above contexts as mental doings, it would seem that they all have achievement uses. In saying that someone analyzes, evaluates, interprets, or judges in such contexts one is reporting or describing the resolution (roughly) of some puzzlement or problem. Thus in saying

Jones analyzes the sentence quickly.
Jones evaluates the progress of the student quickly.
Jones interprets the meaning of the utterance quickly.
Jones judges the height of a tree quickly.

one is not reporting or describing Jones as having performed some activity quickly but rather as having achieved a resolution of the puzzlement or problem in a short amount of time.

Deciding whether there are mental activity uses of these same critical verbs poses a difficult problem. One would wish to know whether there are processes of analyzing, evaluating, interpreting, and judging which have the aforementioned achievements as the results of these processes. The grammatical criterion of the continuous present tense, here is an unreliable indicator of an activity sense because critical verbs do admit the continuous present in physical contexts and in their linguistic uses in mental contexts. Instead of this criterion let us look instead at characteristics of activities as
processes over which an agent can exert control and as episodes occupying stretches of time within the contexts of puzzlement envisioned above.

If someone is asked to analyze the structure of a sentence this seems to be both a doing for which a procedure can be formulated and something which would take a certain amount of time to accomplish. In elementary school one is taught to separate the subject, verb, and objects and to connect these with their appropriate modifiers, particles, etc. Having learned this procedure, it makes sense (logically) for a teacher to request that a student analyze a sentence and for a student to respond to the query "What are you doing?" with the answer "I am analyzing the sentence." Thus, analyzing seems to be a process that one can be in and, in the middle of which, one can be interrupted. In short there appears to be a mental activity sense of "analyze".

It also seems possible to formulate a procedure for evaluating something. Such a procedure usually involves the matching of the object or thing to be evaluated with certain criteria. As a teacher, one usually formulates certain criteria against which to measure a pupil's progress. A teacher listening to a student recital might well be engaged in such a process of matching even though he looked as if he were merely listening. He also might legitimately respond to the query "What are you doing?" with the answer "I am evaluating the student." Thus, evaluating also seems to be a process that one can be in, and in the middle of which, one can be interrupted. There also seems to be a mental activity sense of "evaluate."
When one considers "interpreting" and some mental uses of "judging", however, there do not seem to be procedures that one can devise that would enable one to interpret or to judge. Let us consider interpreting first. There are a number of contexts of puzzlement in which interpreting is said to occur. One speaks about interpreting utterances, dreams, facial expressions, and oracles. If one is asked to devise a procedure for interpreting such things, this seems to be a request that one is unable to fulfill. What procedure for example could one devise to interpret a puzzling utterance, a dream, a facial expression, or an oracle? One could, of course, be told the meaning of an utterance, a dream, a facial expression, or an oracle but this is not a procedure that one can follow in determining this meaning for oneself. If one encounters another puzzling utterance, dream, facial expression, or oracle such a telling would have no bearing on the matter. One would either know the meaning or not know the meaning, irrespective of what one is told.

It also seems impossible that one could be in the process of interpreting an utterance, dream, facial expression, or an oracle. Sometimes, to be sure, one does try to interpret but this process of trying is not a process of interpreting but one of attempting to interpret. At other times this trying is not present: one simply knows the meaning of the utterance, dream, facial expression, or oracle in question. In contrast to this, if one does not actually analyze the structure of a sentence one does not know the constituent parts of that sentence and if one does not actually evaluate the progress of a student one does not know the progress that the student has made.
"Interpret", then, seems not to have a mental activity sense in contrast to "analyze" and "evaluate" which do.

"Judging" is peculiar in that in some mental contexts it seems to have an activity use while in others it does not. This can perhaps be explained by considering that "judging" often functions both as replacement verb for other verbs of appraisal and as a replacement verb for "interpreting". One speaks about judging as well as evaluating the progress of a student, the soundness of an argument, the ability of a person to withstand stress, and the efficiency of an air conditioner. "Judging" of course does not have an equivalent meaning with "evaluating" in such contexts but one might say it is related. "Judging" also functions as a replacement for "interpreting" in other contexts. One speaks about judging the meaning of utterances, dreams, oracles, and facial expressions.

In those contexts in which judging is connected with determining matters of value, it does seem to have an activity use. Thus, there do seem to be procedures that one can devise for, say, judging the merits of a play. Criteria can be established and the play matched to these criteria. So that, as in contexts of evaluating, it seems logically possible to ask one to judge the merit of a play and it seems possible that a person could be in the process of matching a play to these criteria. A person looking at a play, for example, might well respond to the query "What are you doing?" with the answer "I am judging the play."

By way of contrast it does not seem possible to devise a procedure to judge the meaning of a play. What criteria could one devise to accomplish this? Once again one could be told the meaning of the play
but this would not enable one to judge the meaning of other plays. In judging the meaning of a play one is interpreting. Again, one would be mistaken if one construed this as a process. It does not make sense for a spectator at a play to respond to the query "What are you doing?" with "I am judging the meaning of (interpreting) the play." The most that he could say in such circumstances is that he was attempting to judge. In this use as a replacement for "interpret," then, "judging" does not seem to have an activity sense.

Thus, while "analyze", and "evaluate" seem to have uses both as mental activities and achievements, "interpret" seems to have only a mental achievement sense. "Judge" has uses as both mental activities and achievements when it functions as a "verb of appraisal" and only a mental achievement use when it functions as a replacement for "interpret".

These various senses of "analyze", "evaluate", "interpret", and "judge" helps to resolve a related problem of whether the mental achievements indicated by these verbs are active or nonactive i.e., whether these achievements are matters over which an agent can or cannot exert control. It will be remembered that with some verbs such as "find" or "discover", "could" is replaceable by "would" in hypothetical sentences. By this criterion two of the above critical verbs seem to predicate active doings. To say

Jones could analyze the structure of a sentence if a sentence were assigned him.

Jones could evaluate the progress of a student if that student were present.

is not to say that Jones would do either of those things. This is also true of "judge" when used in an "appraisive" sense:
Jones could judge the merits of the play if he were present at the performance.

is not to say that Jones would judge. On the other hand to say

Jones could interpret the meaning of the utterance if he could hear it.

Jones could judge the meaning of the play if he were present at the performance.

seems to mean that Jones would do each of these things.

This test of active and nonactive matters may also be repeated with the model "may". It will be recalled (footnote 5) that with nonactive achievement uses, "may" is only used in its predictive or epistemic sense whereas with active achievements "may" is also used in its permission-granting sense. Therefore, to say

Jones may analyze the structure of a sentence.

Jones may evaluate the progress of a student.

Jones may judge the merits of the play.

is sometimes to say that Jones has permission to analyze, evaluate, and judge (as well as, to predict that Jones will analyze, evaluate, and judge). Whereas with "interpret" and the "interpretive" sense of "judge" to say

Jones may interpret the meaning of the utterance.

Jones may judge the meaning of the play.

is not to grant permission. Thus "analyze", "evaluate", and "judge" in their "appraisive" sense seem to be active achievements and "interpret" and "judge" in their "interpretive" sense seem to be nonactive achievements.

These findings are supported by the previous findings that "interpret" and the "interpretive" sense of "judge" lack activity uses.
Since there are procedures for analyzing, evaluating, and judging (in an "appraisive" sense) these achievements must be active in nature. Since there are no corresponding procedures of interpreting and judging (in an "interpretive" sense) it seems natural that these achievements are matters over which an agent cannot exert control. Interpreting and some forms of judging, then, seem to be nonactive achievements in contrast to the active achievements of analyzing, evaluating, and judging. Interpreting and some forms of judging in a mental sense, then, are related to such things as finding or discovering rather than making or constructing. And indeed one does speak about finding or discovering an interpretation and in some contexts finding a judgment. In contrast one does not speak about finding or discovering an analysis or an evaluation. These are things which one makes or constructs. Since interpreting and judging in its "interpretive" sense then are not active achievements (in contrast to

14. Legal contexts, for example, when it is said that a judgment is found for a plaintiff or a defendant.

15. Zendler's categories thus provide a solution to the so-called "paradox of interpretation". Joseph Tussman, for example, has written of interpretation:

'"Interpretation' is a notion of great significance but it is also terribly baffling. Its paradoxical character arises from its involvement with pairs of apparently opposed notions which it tries without denying the opposition to reconcile. 'Finding' and 'making', 'discovering' and 'creating', the same and 'different' seem obviously opposed to each other." (Tussman 1960, p. 95). I would suggest that the solution to such paradoxes lies in considering uses of "interpret" as both nonactive (nonvoluntary) achievements and as linguistic activities. As a linguistic activity interpreting is a matter of making and creating. Such an activity, however, presupposes a mental achievement of interpreting and this, as I have argued, is a matter related to finding or discovering.
analyzing, evaluating, and judging in its appraisive sense, they are not doings which an agent logically can be requested or commanded to do.

Up to this point, then, I have identified linguistic and non-linguistic uses of critical verbs in mental contexts. I wish to parenthetically note that in distinguishing between linguistic activities and achievements and nonlinguistic activities and achievements in mental contexts, I take no stand on the existential status of such doings. The ontology of mental phenomena is currently the focus of considerable philosophical controversy and it is beyond the scope of the present study to adjudicate disputes about whether some version of dualism, materialism, or logical behaviorism is most appropriately invoked to explain such mental doings. I merely claim that the distinction between mental and physical with respect to critical verbs exists in ordinary language.

In summary, critical verbs have linguistic and nonlinguistic uses in both physical and mental contexts. The distinctions which have been made in this section are given in Figure 2. State uses of critical verbs, which can either be capacities or propensities, are exemplified by the overt linguistic and nonlinguistic activities and achievements indicated by critical verbs in physical contexts.

Critical Verbs and the Concept of an Act

Throughout the preceding sections of this chapter I have stressed the differences between uses of critical verbs as doings (activities and achievements) and as states. Within the class of doings, I have distinguished between those which are active and nonactive. Linguistic and nonlinguistic activities and achievements in physical contexts, and
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*Nonactive Achievements, indicative of doings in which the subject is not an agent. Hence indicative of matters which cannot be logically requested or commanded.

Figure 2. Mental and Physical, and Linguistic and Nonlinguistic Uses of Critical Verbs
linguistic activities and achievements in mental contexts were found to be active doings. Some of the nonlinguistic doings predicated by critical verbs in mental contexts were found to be active doings as well. Some, however, were found not to be active doings. Active doings are those which logically can be commanded or requested of someone. In this section, I wish to briefly relate these active doings to the generic concept of an act since in subsequent chapters I shall sometimes speak of these active doings collectively as acts of _ing.

"To act" is a verb narrower in scope than the verb "do" since it is restricted to matters which can be regarded as voluntary or involuntary. It is nonetheless a wide-ranging verb since it can function as a stand-in for a great range of other verbs including both activities ("build") and achievements ("start"). When a person is building a house he is acting and when he builds a house or starts a race he acts. To say that he acts in the former case, however, carries a different logical commitment than it does in the latter case. There are both acts of building a house and acts of starting a race. In the former case, however, it is necessary that a person who acts engage in a process of acting. In the latter case this is impossible since starting is not something that one could ever be engaged in doing.

Acts of _ing (criticizing, describing, analyzing, characterizing, interpreting, evaluating, judging) are like acts of building rather than acts of starting. To perform an act of _ing one must have been engaged in an activity or process of _ing. It must also have been possible at some point prior to someone's attributing an act of _ing to someone, to say that such a person _s. Acts of _ing are attributed to someone only with their successful completion and a person who stops or is interrupted before he _s has not performed an act of _ing.
This relationship between critical verbs and acts is important because certain curriculum prescriptions for criticism in the literature are concerned with specifying various acts of c ing. In recommending or prescribing criticism as a method one is recommending or prescribing that teachers or students c something: that is, that they engage in some activity or sets of activities having a certain successful result, a result which can be identified as a momentary episode by the achievement use of a critical verb.

The distinction between active and nonactive doings is important in this regard because the doings which figure in method prescriptions can only be active doings or acts of c ing. It is worth reiterating here that some forms of interpreting and judging in mental contexts logically cannot figure in such prescriptions since they are not matters over which an agent can exert control. There is a category mistake in prescribing or recommending that students or others interpret or judge the meaning of something when that interpreting or judging is construed as a nonlinguistic mental doing. Of the various acts of c ing which can be recommended or prescribed, educators give priority to linguistic acts in physical contexts. Speech acts of c ing, therefore, are taken up in the next chapter.

Summary

In this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate that the question "What is criticism?" is capable of receiving a variety of answers in educational settings. In one of its most common uses, "criticism" functions as a stand-in for one or a number of critical terms.
Consideration of such terms reveals them to be ambiguous in a number of ways. One important ambiguity is the so-called "process-product" or "act-object" ambiguity. Critical nouns in the contexts of relevance to this study can be construed as matters predicated by one or more tensed versions of critical verbs. For this reason analyses of critical verbs are given priority in this study.

Critical verbs have a number of uses which can be categorized according to temporal considerations and considerations of human agency. First, as activities critical terms predicate active doings which take time and in which the subject of the verb is an agent. Second, as states critical terms predicate states of affairs which are not active doings and in which the subject of the verb is not an agent. Third, as achievements critical verbs predicate momentary, nonprocess doings which are either active or nonactive in nature.

Critical verbs differ in their uses in physical and mental contexts. I examine only activity and achievement senses of critical verbs in these contexts since there is reason to believe that the notion of "mental" applies in only an extended sense to states.

In physical contexts, activity and achievement uses of critical verbs all have linguistic uses and can be used to predicate matters of speaking. Since activity and achievement uses predicate active doings, critical verbs can all be used to ascribe linguistic acts. There are a number of nonlinguistic activity and achievement uses of some critical verbs as well which can also be used to ascribe acts. Since these uses are only of peripheral interest to this study, I discussed them but briefly.
In mental contexts distinctions were made between linguistic activities and achievements involved in "speaking to oneself" and non-linguistic activities and achievements which were not matters of speaking. All critical verbs have the former uses but only the verbs "to analyze", "to interpret", "to evaluate", and "to judge" have distinctively mental uses in that they are not matters of speaking to oneself. "Interpret" and the "interpretive" sense of "judge" differ from these other verbs in that their achievement uses are nonactive and in that there exists no corresponding mental activities which results in such achievements. Interpreting and judging in these senses, therefore, are not acts and hence cannot be requested or commanded of someone. There is thus a logical mistake in using these doings in method prescriptions.
CHAPTER III
LINGUISTIC ACTS INDICATED BY CRITICAL TERMS

Overview

In this chapter I argue that linguistic uses of critical terms in physical contexts can be analyzed in terms of various distinctive kinds of speech acts. In the first section of this chapter, I introduce the concept of a speech act as this concept is presented in a theory of language developed by J. R. Searle (Searle, 1969). In the second section of this chapter I lay the foundation for an analysis of individual speech acts of c ing. I do this first by presenting, as given in Searle's text, a number of general conditions implied in the performance of all speech acts; second by discussing Searle's notions of "propositional content", "preparatory", "sincerity", and "essential" conditions as a basis for discriminating among speech acts; and, third, by classifying speech acts of c ing into two groupings of related speech acts. Finally, I discuss the significance of Searle's theory for an analysis and appraisal of metacritical definitions of critical terms. This chapter is a preliminary to an attempt to characterize each individual speech act of c ing by stating distinctive sets of necessary conditions implied in their successful performance, a task which I undertake in Chapter IV of this study.
Introduction

One of the major tasks that philosophical and educational meta-critics undertake is to explain critical discourse by providing definitions of the linguistic or speaking uses of critical terms. In this chapter I shall provide the preliminary basis for a definition of such terms by arguing that critical terms can properly be used to designate certain distinctive kinds of acts, acts involved in speaking or in speech.

In the previous chapter I distinguished linguistic activities and achievements of c'ing in physical contexts from other activities and achievements in both physical and mental contexts. Linguistic activities and achievements in physical contexts were found to be active doings i.e., doings which could logically be commanded or requested of someone. In the previous chapter I related such active doings to the concept of an act in the following way: A person who is performing an act of c'ing is engaging in an activity of c'ing. A person who has performed an act of c'ing has c'd, which means that he has engaged in an activity of c'ing with a momentary outcome or result that is describable through an achievement use of that same critical verb. Thus, to say that a person is performing an act of describing a work of art is to say that he is engaging in an activity of describing that work. To say that a person has performed an act of describing a work of art is to say that he has described a work of art i.e., that he has previously engaged in an activity of describing (successfully) that work.

In this chapter I shall not specifically distinguish between activities and achievements of c'ing but I shall speak generally of
acts of *c* in the belief that an analysis of the conditions implied in such acts can be made to apply equally to activities and achievements of *c* with the appropriate changes made in the tense of statements asserting such conditions. In speaking generally of acts of *c*, however, it is important to note that there is at least this ambiguity in the term "act of *c*": such an expression can be used to denote things that one can be engaged in performing, things that one performs, and things that one has performed.

In order to explicate the concept of a speech act, I draw upon a theory of language presented by J. R. Searle (Searle, 1969) for a basic formulation of the viewpoint I expound. Searle's theory distinguishes among several distinctive kinds of acts, acts that a speaker typically performs in using language. Basic to an analysis and understanding of speech acts of *c* are the concepts of illocutionary and propositional acts. Speech acts of *c* can be construed as distinctive kinds of illocutionary acts containing the subsidiary propositional acts of referring and predicating.

Searle's theory also enjoins a certain form of analysis (or mode of definition) upon those seeking to analyze speech acts (or define critical terms). Such an analysis is in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Using Searle's theory as a basis, I begin such an analysis by presenting certain general conditions implied in the performance of all speech acts as these conditions are given in Searle's text.

Having given such conditions, the problem remains of characterizing the unique properties of such acts. I approach this problem by discussing Searle's notions of "propositional content", "preparatory", 
"sincerity", and "essential" conditions as a basis for discriminating among different illocutionary acts. On Searle's theory, combinations of these conditions would be unique to a given speech act. Related illocutionary acts would share such conditions or would possess similar conditions. This suggests the strategy of comparing and contrasting various examples of related illocutionary acts in order to discover similarities and differences. I lay the groundwork for such a comparison by locating illocutionary acts of ing within two groupings of related illocutionary acts.

Searle's Theory

Searle's account begins by asking what it is that person does in typical speech situations. Such a question is answered by noting that a person typically utters certain words or sentences, which are construed in a certain mode or as having a certain force, and which possess a certain content. In Searle's terminology such a speaker has performed utterance acts, illocutionary acts, and propositional acts or, more generally, speech acts of various kinds.  

1. In Searle's writings it is unclear whether utterance, illocutionary, and propositional acts are aspects of one generic speech act (under different descriptions) or separate speech acts in their own right. For example, in Searle (1968, p. 407) he states "the description of the act as a happily performed locutionary act ... is already a description of the illocutionary act .... They are one and the same act." This passage would seem to favor the notion of their being one generic speech act. In Searle (1969), however, passages can be found which favor an alternative interpretation:

"The first upshot of our preliminary reflections, then, is that in the utterance of any four sentences in the example a speaker is characteristically performing at least three distinct kinds of acts. (a) The uttering of words (morphemes, sentences); (b) referring and predicating; (c) stating, questioning, commanding, promising, etc. (Continued on next page)
Unfortunately exact verbal definitions of Searle's distinctions are not provided but they can be illustrated through presentation of examples. Paraphrasing examples presented in Searle's text, one should imagine that the following sentences have been uttered by a speaker to a hearer in appropriate circumstances.

1. The work of art is symmetrically balanced.
2. Oh, that the work of art is symmetrically balanced!

Let us assign names to these under the general heading of speech acts:

(a) Uttering words (morphemes, sentences = performing utterance acts.
(b) Referring and predicating = performing propositional acts.
(c) Stating, questioning, commanding, promising, etc. = performing illocutionary acts." (Searle, 1969, pp. 23, 24).

In the above Searle seems to be treating these as separate speech acts in their own right.

If one accepts this latter interpretation — of their being separate speech acts — one must also consider emendations which Searle later makes in his text about the status of propositions as separate acts:

"Even though reference is an abstraction from the total illocutionary act, it is a separate speech act. By analogy, moving the knight is an abstraction from playing chess (because it only counts as moving the knight if you are playing chess), but it is still a separate act. Predication is also an abstraction, but it is not a separate act. It is a slice from the total illocutionary act; just as indicating the illocutionary force is not a separate act, but another slice from the illocutionary act .... If we remember the senses in which predication (and hence the propositional act) is an abstraction from the total illocutionary act, there is no harm in referring to it as 'the speech act of predication'. What we are speaking of, though, is that portion of the total illocutionary act which determines the content applied to the object referred to by the subject expression, leaving aside the illocutionary mode in which the content is applied." (Searle, 1969, p. 123).

Given this emendation in Searle's account, it unclear to me what the exact status of a propositional act is but, presumably, it is to be treated as an act for various theoretical reasons.
As Searle points out, to say that a speaker has merely uttered words and sentences in (1) and (2) is not to have exhaustively described the above as a speech situation since, in both of the above, the speaker has done more than merely utter words and sentences. In (1) he has made an assertion and in (2) he has expressed a wish or desire. And in both (1) and (2) the speaker has "picked out", "identified", or referred to an object or entity (the work of art) and has predicated the expression "symmetrically balanced" to that object or entity.

In Searle's terminology, then, the speaker has done at least three things: (a) He has uttered words or sentences or performed utterance acts. (b) He has made an assertion and expressed a wish, or performed illocutionary acts. Making assertions and expressing wishes are two examples of numerous sorts of conventional acts that speakers perform using language. Other sorts of acts are indicated by such performative verbs as "to promise", "to warn", "to prescribe", "to request", "to demand", and the critical verbs "to criticize", "to describe", "to analyze", "to characterize", "to interpret", "to evaluate", and "to judge". 2 (c) Finally, the speaker has referred to an object or entity and predicated an expression of that object or entity. And in referring, or in referring and predating, he has performed propositional acts.

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2. As typical performatives, critical verbs show a symptomatic reluctance toward the first person continuous present tense and have a first person present indicative use which can make explicit the illocutionary force of an utterance. Critical verbs, then, are performative verbs and like typical performatives can be used to denote distinct kinds of illocutionary acts.
Associated with illocutionary and prepositional acts are characteristic grammatical forms of utterance. For the illocutionary act it is the complete sentence (it may be a one word sentence). The characteristic grammatical form of the propositional act is various parts of sentences. Predicating acts are typically associated with grammatical predicates and reference acts are typically associated with proper names, pronouns, titles, and complex noun phrases.³

With regard to the three kinds of speech acts, it is important to note that not every token of the same utterance act will be used to perform the same illocutionary act. In the utterance of the sentence

3. The work of art is symmetrically balanced?

the words and the sentence are the same as in sentence (1) above, but in contrast to (1), the above sentence is used to ask a question not to make an assertion.

In still other speech situations, the utterance acts differ but the illocutionary and propositional acts remain the same. Consider, for example, the utterance of the following:

4. Joseph Alber's Homage to the Square divides equally into two parts with an axis running down the middle.

In some contexts there would be grounds for claiming that the illocutionary act which is performed is the same as in (1) since it might be an assertion. And in some contexts one might also claim that the

³ To avoid some traditional philosophical puzzles about reference, it is especially important to note that on Searle's theory the class of referring expressions is not coextensive with the grammatical categories of proper names, pronouns, titles, and noun phrases. It is instead by their function in "identifying" or "picking out" objects or entities that referring expressions are identified.
proposition is the same as in (1), (2), and (3) since the reference and predication might be the same even though the words and the sentence itself differs.

A final distinction which Searle makes is between utterance, illocutionary, and propositional acts or -- more generally -- speech acts which a speaker performs and the consequences or effects which such acts have on a hearer. By performing speech acts a speaker may persuade, edify, convince, persuade, inspire, etc., a hearer. The acts which a speaker performs by performing speech acts are termed perlocutionary acts.

In all, then, there are four possible things which a speaker can be said to do in speech situations. Of these doings it is the notion of illocutionary, and propositional acts which are fundamental in analyzing speech situations and for providing an analysis of critical terms. Before proceeding further, therefore, I wish to add a number of comments on these concepts as they are presented in Searle's text.

Searle's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts roughly parallels a familiar distinction between the act of uttering a sentence and the act of making a statement found in more traditional philosophical contexts. There is a major difference, however, in that the notion of a range of illocutionary acts is broader and more comprehensive than is the notion of stating. In Searle's theory stating, a major focus for philosophical inquiry, becomes one of a number of innumerable speech acts. The philosophical conceptions of language expounded by Searle has the effect of expanding the range of speech acts considered to be philosophically interesting.
It is important to mention, also, that "statement" as it is used in philosophical contexts sometimes possesses an act-object ambiguity, an ambiguity between the act of stating and "what is stated." Philosophers who discuss the truth or falsity of certain statements are using the object sense of "statement" since it is not the case that an act of stating could be true or false. "Criticism", "description", "analysis", "characterization", "interpretation", "evaluation", and "judgment", however, are also ambiguous in the same way. In discussing speech acts of c-ing, therefore, I shall sometimes distinguish between the act of c-ing and corresponding objects or artifacts of c-ing. In Searle's exposition (Searle, 1968, pp. 422-424) this would amount to a distinction between an act of c-ing and the act construed as performed.

Searle's notion of a propositional act deserves mention, also, since it departs from other philosophical conceptions of this notion in several respects. On Searle's notion of propositions, they can be expressed when a speaker performs numerous kinds of illocutionary acts. Traditionally, propositions have been thought to be expressed only in the making of an assertion or statement. On Searle's conception of a proposition, they are not considered to be expressed unless the speaker performs an illocutionary act of some kind. The converse does not apply in Searle's theory, however: there can be illocutionary acts which do not have a propositional content (as in the conventional greeting "Hello").
Finally, I wish to mark a distinction between simple and complex speech acts, a distinction which is not explicitly made in Searle's text. This distinction is roughly that between uttering a single sentence with a certain illocutionary force and (with or without) a certain propositional content and uttering a number of sentences with a certain illocutionary force and propositional content. It is the distinction between, roughly, the way in which a description, analysis, interpretation, evaluation, etc. can be a speech act in the sense explicitly formulated by Searle in the preceding part of this chapter and the way in which an extended utterance such as a set of sentences, a paragraph, a chapter, or even a book can be construed as a description, analysis, interpretation, evaluation, etc. In this study I shall not be explicitly concerned with an analysis of complex speech acts of ing but recognition of this distinction seems to me to be important and will be helpful in clarifying a number of points which I make in subsequent parts of this study.

Analysis of Speech Acts

Since propositions are only expressed in the performance of an illocutionary act, it is the notion of an illocutionary act which is basic for the analysis of speech situations. This raises the problem of how illocutionary acts are to be distinguished from one another. The answer to this in Searle's theory is grounded in the hypothesis

4. For example, in his analysis of the speech act of promising Searle presents his analysis in the context of a speaker uttering a single sentence (Searle, 1969, p. 57) but in formulating a rule for the illocutionary device of promising (Searle, 1969, p. 63), Searle allows that promises can be made both in a sentence and a "larger stretch of discourse".
that speaking a language is engaging in a rule-governed form of behavior. Since performance of illocutionary acts occurs in accordance with certain constitutive rules, paradigm instances of a given kind of illocutionary act will exhibit certain regularities of context e.g., speaker intentions, the relative status of the speaker and hearer, etc. Successful (i.e., nondefective) performances of such acts implies the existence of these contextual conditions. More formally: where \( p, q, \) and \( r \) are contextual conditions implied in the performance of an illocutionary act \( x \), statements asserting the existence of \( p, q, \) and \( r \) entail (and are entailed by) a statement asserting that a speaker has nondefectively\(^5\) performed illocutionary act \( x \).

Treating the subsidiary propositional components of referring and predicating as independent acts, allows Searle to isolate rules (contextual conditions) for their successful performance as well. Where a particular illocutionary act requires or contains reference and/or predication, a complete analysis of the successful performance of this act will not only specify rules for the use of the illocutionary force indicator but also the rules for referring and/or predicating. Searle's theory, then, enjoins a certain mode of analysis upon those seeking to explicate various kinds of speech acts i.e., a certain mode of definition upon those seeking to define certain linguistic meanings of various performative verbs. This analysis or mode of definition is in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.

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5. This qualification is needed because not all conditions implied in the performance of the speech act are necessary conditions for that act to have been performed. The absence of some implied conditions may not render that act null and void but only "unhappy" or defective.
Although Searle's theory would hold that successfully uttered sentences are construable as illocutionary acts of various kinds and that these illocutionary acts can be distinguished from one another, this is not to say that it is possible to precisely characterize any given utterance in terms of a particular illocutionary act being performed.

There are at least three reasons on Searle's theory why this may not be possible. First, most concepts of particular illocutionary acts are vague. Any given utterance, therefore, may be a borderline instance, correctly describable in terms of two or more illocutionary acts. Moreover, the intentions of a speaker with regard to the performance of some illocutionary act may not be clear even to himself. Second, in any given utterance the illocutionary force may be more-or-less explicit. The illocutionary force of an utterance is marked in different ways in different contexts. Facial gestures, intonation patterns, punctuation, etc. may serve to characterize an utterance as an implicit performative of a given kind. These are sometimes subject to conflicting interpretations by various hearers. Although such illocutionary acts can be made explicit through the first person present indicative use ("performative use") of the performative verb, there remains the problem of interpreting the force of these implicit illocutionary acts. Third, Searle's theory allows the possibility

6. Even where the first person present indicative use of performative verbs is present, the illocutionary act performed is not necessarily described by the same verb. Searle gives an interesting example of a person who says "I promise" but who actually makes a threat as in I promise to fail you (said to a tardy student).
that some illocutionary acts may be more general and encompassing than others. Hence, a given utterance may be correctly describable by more than one performative verb. ("Saying" seems to be an illocutionary act of this generic kind since the verb "to say" can be substituted for large number of others in correctly describing illocutionary acts.)

Thus, analysis of the rules for performance of various kinds of illocutionary acts (or the necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of performative verbs in various contexts) involves idealization of the concept of a given illocutionary act to some degree. Searle likens such analysis to model-building in the physical sciences (Searle, 1969, p. 55). The analyst seeking to explicate the concept of a given illocutionary act or to define the necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of a particular performative verb will concentrate on paradigm instances where an illocutionary can be said to have been successfully performed (i.e., upon those conditions necessary and sufficient for the nondefective utterance of certain sentences using performative verbs) and will contrast these with instances where an act could not have been said to have been performed or could only be said to have been marginally performed.

Method of Approach

In the attempt to state conditions implied in the successful performance of illocutionary acts of saying, Searle's text is useful both in providing a set of general conditions (rules) which apply to all illocutionary acts and for his discussion of various categories of rules by which different illocutionary acts may be distinguished.
from one another. General conditions in his text are arrived at by stating the necessary and sufficient conditions for the illocutionary act of promising (which includes the subsidiary propositional acts of referring and predicking for which separate sets of conditions are also stated). From this set of conditions, certain specific rules for the illocutionary force indicating device for promising (i.e., those aspects of the utterance or the context which indicate to a hearer that the illocutionary force of the utterance is a promise) are "abstracted", leaving conditions which apply to illocutionary acts quite generally.

Analysis of a number of illocutionary acts reveals similarities among the rules for the use of illocutionary force indicating devices. For example, some rules refer to the propositional content of the illocutionary act, others to the contextual conditions surrounding the performance of the act, still others to the psychological states of the speaker, and finally others to what the act counts as. These basic similarities among illocutionary acts allow Searle to hypothesize certain categories of rules peculiar to individual illocutionary acts. The categories of "propositional content", "preparatory", "sincerity", and "essential" conditions although vague, are helpful in focusing inquiry into aspects of speech situations which distinguish one illocutionary act from another. It is hypothesized that intuitively related illocutionary acts will share certain similarities in these conditions although each individual act will also present a distinctive set of conditions.
A complete analysis of individual illocutionary acts of \( \mathcal{C} \) ing, then, will include both the conditions which underlie the performance of all illocutionary acts (general conditions) and the specific propositional content, preparatory, sincerity, and essential conditions peculiar to each individual act. In the remaining parts of this section, I shall first present these general conditions as they are given in Searle's text. I include Searle's statement of conditions for referring and predicating as part of these conditions as well since I shall argue in the next chapter that these conditions are included in every successful performance of an illocutionary act of \( \mathcal{C} \) ing. Following this presentation, I shall once again resume discussion of the problem of characterizing individual illocutionary acts of \( \mathcal{C} \) ing and, then, I shall lay the groundwork for an analysis of the propositional content, preparatory, sincerity, and essential conditions underlying individual acts of \( \mathcal{C} \) ing. This analysis will comprise Chapter IV.

**General Conditions**

In this section I present general conditions as given in Searle's text along with conditions for successfully referring and predicating. Searle presents his conditions in the context of a speaker uttering (literally) a sentence \( T \) in the presence of a hearer \( \mathcal{H} \). I shall follow this format. Given such a situation a speaker sincerely and nondefectively performs an illocutionary act of \( \mathcal{C} \) ing if and only if (in addition to the particular sets of conditions implied in the use specific illocutionary force indicating devices) the following general conditions (GC), referring conditions (RC), and predicating conditions (PRC) obtain:
(GC,1) Normal input and output conditions obtain. (Searle, 1969, p. 57).

Searle treats this rule as an omnibus condition serving to rule out nonliteral utterances and other forms of parasitic discourse, as well as various impediments to communication on the part of the speaker and hearer.

(GC,2) The speaker (S) expresses the proposition that p in the utterance of the sentence (T). (Searle, 1969, p. 57).

This condition applies only to those illocutionary acts possessing propositional content but since all illocutionary acts of c ing do have propositional content, for purposes of this study this condition will be treated as a general rule.

Statement of the next rule requires reformulation from the version in Searle's text because it includes an "essential condition" for the illocutionary force indicating device of promising.

(GC,3) The speaker (S) intends (i-1) to produce in a hearer (H) the knowledge (K) that the utterance of the sentence (T) is to count as (here an appropriate modification of the essential rule for use of a particular illocutionary force indicating device must be inserted in place of the following phrase completing this sentence) "placing S under obligation to do an act (A)." S intends to produce K by means of the recognition of i-1 and he intends i-1 to be recognized in virtue (by means of) H's knowledge of the meaning of T. (Searle, 1969, p. 60).

In order to cover sentences with more than one literal meaning the next (and last) general condition cited by Searle would also need modification. But since this rule will not figure further in this study, it is presented as given in Searle's text.

(GC,4) The semantic rules of the dialect spoken by S and H are such that T is correctly and sincerely uttered if and only if the (above) conditions (and conditions underlying the use of the illocutionary force indicating device) obtain. (Searle, 1969, p. 61).
Since illocutionary acts of c ing all involve subsidiary propositional acts, of referring and predicating, Searle's analysis of rules for the use of referring and predicating expressions can be included as general conditions applying to these illocutionary acts as well. 8

Referring conditions (RC) are the following:

(RC,1) A referring expression (R) is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence (or some similar stretch of discourse) the utterance of which could be the performance of some illocutionary act.

(RC,2) R is to be uttered only if there exists an object X such that either R contains an identifying description of X or the speaker S is able to supplement R with an identifying description of X, and such that, in the utterance of R, S intends to pick out or identify X to a hearer H.

(RC,3) The utterance of R counts as the identification of picking out of X to (or for) H. (Searle, 1969, p. 96).

Predicating conditions (PRC) are the following:

(PRC,1) A predicating expression P is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence or other stretch of discourse T the utterance of which could be the performance of some illocutionary act.

(PRC,2) P is to be uttered in T only if the utterance of T involves a successful reference to X.

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8. Some qualification needs to be made about the applicability of rules of reference to illocutionary acts of c ing. Searle's theory distinguishes among (a) singular definite reference, (b) plural definite reference, (c) singular indefinite reference, and (d) plural indefinite reference. Searle's statement of rules for reference is meant to theoretically describe only (a) above. Since illocutionary acts of c ing presumably could include (b), (c), and (d) as well, some modification is in order. One may assume, however, that in all instances of referring some version of the "axiom of existence" would apply. In any act of successful referring it is a necessary condition that the object or thing exist. For purposes of this study, this is the most germane aspect of Searle's statement of conditions. I make no attempt to add the additional modifications which are needed for a comprehensive theory of reference. Hence, the general conditions stated in this section are necessarily incomplete.
The above summarizes general conditions given in Searle's theory. These conditions apply generally to all illocutionary acts of $c$ ing. In the next section, I distinguish between two groupings of illocutionary acts and relate acts of $c$ ing to each group as a preliminary to stating the propositional content, preparatory, sincerity, and essential conditions for each individual act of $c$ ing.

Illocutionary Act Groups

The hypothesis that related illocutionary acts share certain conditions suggests the strategy that I shall follow in Chapter IV in explicating and characterizing such acts. Given certain groups of related illocutionary acts it should be possible to compare and contrast them with regard to similarities and differences in their propositional content, preparatory, sincerity, and essential conditions. From a methodological standpoint this can be done by comparing performative utterances of critical verbs intuitively in terms of the conditions underlying their successful performance. Such utterances can be regarded as paradigm examples of illocutionary acts. The investigation into such conditions can also be done by explicating existing accounts of critical illocutionary acts and accounts of related illocutionary acts in terms of the categories of propositional content, preparatory, sincerity, and essential conditions. These categories, I shall maintain, illuminate attempts to analyze several such accounts in the literature revealing gaps in the authors' accounts and suggesting more precise and comprehensive ways of stating points.
that they apparently wish to make. Existing accounts of related illocutionary acts, then, can usefully be employed as models of analysis and, when modified, can serve as a basis for an analysis of illocutionary acts of c ing.

The difficulty in using Searle's categories of propositional content, preparatory, sincerity, and essential conditions as a basis for a comparison and contrast, however, lies in the vagueness of the categories themselves. Although they provide a focus for inquiry, conditions falling into each category for a given illocutionary act could still differ widely from conditions in the same category for other illocutionary acts. Comparing and contrasting just any set of illocutionary acts, then, is bound to be problematic since such acts may offer little basis for comparison.

In order to conduct such an investigation, it would seem more profitable to compare and contrast illocutionary acts which are closely related. In order to identify such related acts, I appeal to the intuitive grouping of illocutionary acts proposed by J. L. Austin (1962, pp. 147-163). A recent structural analysis by Vendler (1972, pp. 6-26) lends corroboration to Austin's grouping since first person present indicative uses (performative uses) of such verbs within each group exhibit similarities in grammatical properties. All performative uses of such verbs feature sentence nominalizations of a certain type as a direct object. However, different groups of performative verbs exhibit these nominalizations in various ways.

Of the groups of illocutionary acts discussed by Vendler, two are of direct relevance to this study. Each of these groups has a characteristically different grammatical structure in their performative
use. Behabitives exhibit a noun-sharing with the subject or direct object of the nominalized sentence and the nominalized sentence is introduced by a preposition: "for", "upon", or "against" as in

I thank you for your assistance.

I congratulate you upon your promotion.

With verdictives the nominalized sentence contains the copula rather than some other verb. This copula gets deleted or replaced by "as" or "to be". And the subject of the nominalized sentence becomes the direct object of the performative:

I call it suicide.

I appraise it as worthless.

I estimate it to be forty tons. (See Vendler, 1972, pp. 6-26).

Of the critical verbs under consideration here, "to criticize" alone exhibits the properties of behabitives. All other critical verbs fall into the category of verdictives according to their performative structure. 9 Thus, it is possible to say

I criticize you for treating your pet badly.  
(behabitive)

I analyze the work as a series of red and green stripes. 
(verdictive)

I describe the tree as tall. (verdictive)

I characterize the poem as turgid. (verdictive)

I interpret the message as a defense of racist policies.  
(verdictive)

9. One of the interesting points of Vendler's discussion is that certain performative verbs can function in more than one illocutionary act. "To judge" apparently is one of these verbs since it exhibits the properties of both verdictives and another group of acts called "expositives" by Austin. Here I shall be concerned with its use as a verdictive since it is most often aligned with "evaluate" and "interpret" in aesthetic contexts.
I evaluate the evidence as inconclusive. (verdictive)

I judge the defendant to be guilty. (verdictive)

Illocutionary acts of agreeing then fall into two main groups, of behabitive and verdictive illocutionary acts. In investigating such acts in the succeeding chapter I shall be concerned primarily with comparing and contrasting illocutionary acts falling into each of these groups.

Searle's Theory and Metacritical Definitions

One of the major kinds of tasks that metacritics undertake is to explain critical discourse or what critics do when they speak. This often amounts to providing analyses or definitions of one or more critical terms. Searle's theory of language provides insight into this metacritical task by providing a basis for categorizing metacritical attempts to define critical terms and by suggesting several criteria for appraising such definitions. Before proceeding further with analyses of critical illocutionary acts, it will be helpful, therefore, to discuss each of these points briefly.

Searle's theory provides a basis for categorizing metacritical attempts to define critical terms since the concepts of his theory encompass ways in which metacritics have traditionally sought to distinguish among critical terms. The notion of illocutionary force captures in a more precise and comprehensive way distinctions various metacritics draw among the various functions of critical utterances. Searle's notions of reference and predication more precisely delineate various metacritical concerns with the content of various critical utterances. Some metacritics attempt to distinguish among critical
utterances on the basis of their effects or intended effects on a speaker's audience and Searle's theory accounts for these effects in terms of the perlocutionary force of an utterance. Finally, some metacritics distinguish among critical utterances on their testability. In Searle's theory this latter distinction could only apply to performed acts of saying. Searle's theory here, has the virtue I believe of raising the possibility at least of their being performed illocutionary acts other than statements or assertions which can be appraised on their truth or falsity. This is done in his theory by sharply distinguishing between the proposition and the indicator of illocutionary force.

Searle's theory also provides insight into the problem of providing an adequate account of critical discourse and suggests criteria for appraising metacritical definitions on the basis of their comprehensiveness and sophistication.

Metacritics (and educational metacritics in particular) sometimes suggest that the set of definitions which they provide presents a comprehensive account of critical discourse or of what critics actually do when they speak. One of the major insights that Searle's theory provides is into the enormity of such a task and the difficulty of making such a claim. On the doctrine of illocutionary acts which Searle accepts, there are conceivably thousands of illocutionary acts which people perform in using language (the exact number is unknown). And if this is the case, there seems little reason to believe that critical discourse is much less complex. An initial doubt, therefore, may be raised about the comprehensiveness of metacritical accounts which attempt to account for critical discourse by providing definitions of one or a small number of favored critical terms.
One might ask what metacritics are doing in attempting to provide definitions of a limited set of critical terms. For some of them, certainly, there is no intention of providing a comprehensive theory of critical discourse at all. In analyzing a limited range of critical terms, metacritics themselves may view their efforts as limited attempts to provide solutions to a few definite problems, problems largely dictated by the discipline of aesthetics. For some of them, also, definitions of a limited set of critical terms may be provided for prescriptive reasons. Here, philosophical metacriticism impinges upon educational metacriticism since both may be defining critical terms in order to provide a method for such tasks as understanding works of art.

For other metacritics, however, definitions of a limited set of critical terms is thought to account for all, or at least all of the philosophically interesting discourse of critics. I think that here some preliminary doubts can be raised about this possibility since critical terms fall only into two of the possible groupings of per-formative verbs (behabitives and verdictives) and even within these categories they denote only a small fraction of the possible illocutionary acts. Of course there exists the possibility that critical terms are used to perform broad and comprehensive illocutionary acts, acts standing as genus to species to other more specific illocutionary acts. I examine this possibility more closely in the next chapter but I believe that a conclusive answer to such an hypothesis cannot be given without an exhaustive account of such acts and such an account is presently not available. Claims to comprehensiveness, then, would seem to go beyond presently available knowledge and such claims could
only be substantiated if the definitions offered by metacritics were either stipulations or false reportive definitions.

Finally, Searle's theory also provides insight into appropriate modes of defining critical terms. Since illocutionary acts are distinguished from one another on the basis of constitutive rules governing their successful performance, the most straightforward mode of definition, then, will be in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. It is worth pointing out, however, that many metacritical definitions (educational metacritical definitions in particular) often define critical terms by substituting words taken to have an equivalent meaning. When this mode of defining is used without further explanation, it is highly unsatisfactory since what it usually amounts to in practice is the substitution of one performative or illocutionary term for another. From a practical standpoint such definitions may be helpful as reminders, since people do possess an intuitive understanding of various illocutionary concepts. As theoretical accounts, however, such definitions are clearly inadequate. At best such definitions are uninformative since one would still want to know what distinguishes one illocutionary act from another and this could only be done by stating the conditions implied in their successful performance. At worst, such definitions are misleading since it is doubtful that there would be two illocutionary verbs with an equivalent meaning.

Summary

In this chapter I have argued that critical terms can be understood as designates of various kinds of distinctive but related speech acts.
In the first section of this chapter, I introduced the concept of a speech act and prepared the groundwork for an analysis of such acts. I first discussed the concepts of utterance, illocutionary, propositional, and perlocutionary acts as they are given in a theory of language presented by J. R. Searle. Basic to an analysis of speech acts of \( \text{c ing} \) are the concepts of illocutionary and propositional acts. These acts can be understood in both a performance sense and an artifact (performed act) sense.

In the second section of this chapter I discussed the analysis of such acts. Analysis of illocutionary acts involves stating the necessary and sufficient conditions (constitutive rules) implied in their successful performance. Certain of these conditions apply to all illocutionary acts quite generally. As a preliminary to analysis, I have presented certain of these general conditions as they are given in Searle's text. Since the propositional acts of referring and predicating are constituents of all successful acts of \( \text{c ing} \) as well, Searle's statements of conditions for these acts were presented also. Finally, in this section, I addressed the problem of characterizing individual speech acts of \( \text{c ing} \). In order to compare and contrast related illocutionary acts, I distinguished between two groupings of illocutionary acts. I then discussed Searle's notions of propositional content, preparatory, sincerity, and essential conditions as a basis for distinguishing among illocutionary acts within each group.

In the final section of this chapter, I discussed the significance of Searle's theory for an analysis and appraisal of metacritical definitions. Searle's theory offers a basis for both classifying metacritical definitions and for appraising them on their claims to comprehensiveness and theoretical sophistication.
CHAPTER IV
CHARACTERIZATION OF CRITICAL SPEECH ACTS

Overview

In this chapter I characterize individual illocutionary acts of criticizing by stating distinctive sets of propositional content, preparatory, sincerity, and essential conditions necessarily implied in their successful performance. To do this I examine the two groups of behabitive and verdictive illocutionary acts. In doing so I first compare and contrast the act of criticizing with other behabitive acts. Second, I compare and contrast verdictive acts of criticizing with themselves and with other verdictive acts. Because of similarities in their propositional content, preparatory, sincerity, and essential conditions verdictive acts of criticizing seem naturally to dispose, themselves, into three related subgroups. Finally, I discuss the significance of the findings of this chapter for further research and for attempts to employ concepts of criticizing in educational settings.

Introduction

In this chapter I continue with the analyses of illocutionary acts of criticizing begun previously, by inquiring into the propositional content, preparatory, sincerity, and essential conditions implied in their successful performance. In doing this I shall compare and contrast the conditions needed for performative utterances of various illocutionary verbs to be considered successful illocutionary acts of their type. I shall
also examine a number of existing accounts of illocutionary acts in the literature and sometimes I shall criticize such accounts in terms of the concepts of Searle's theory. Such accounts provide beginnings for an analysis of illocutionary acts of c ing and can usefully serve as models for the present analysis. After providing an analysis of the conditions underlying the illocutionary force indicating device for acts of c ing, I illustrate these conditions by presenting examples of illocutionary acts of c ing taken from the writings of practicing critics.

Before proceeding, a word about the scope and limitations of the present inquiry is needed. Attempts to specify necessary and sufficient conditions for concepts in ordinary language are notoriously the focus for philosophical dispute. One has only to consider the endless controversies surrounding analyses of the verb "know" to realize the difficulty of attempting to provide a complete analysis of any one concept in ordinary language. The primary reason for this difficulty lies in the vagueness of words used in ordinary language. One problem that it creates for the present inquiry is to precisely discriminate illocutionary acts of c ing from other illocutionary acts. Since many illocutionary acts of c ing are verdictives, comparison and contrast of acts of c ing, points up differences among themselves. Distinguishing between illocutionary acts of c ing and other illocutionary acts is more problematic, however, since specifications of conditions for these other acts is lacking.

A more serious limitation of the present analysis also is created by the vagueness of ordinary language. In analyzing the conditions implied in the successful performance of illocutionary acts of c ing, these conditions, in themselves, will be stated in words used in
ordinary language. There is, hence, reason to expect that these conditions as I state them are vague and stand in need of further clarification. The scope of this study dictates a breadth of approach since it is aimed at creating understanding of a set of practical educational problems in the arts. The analysis of illocutionary acts presented in this chapter, therefore, should be regarded as a tentative exploration of these concepts. Even after the present inquiry, there will be a need to reconsider the conditions I have put forth and perhaps to eliminate vagueness through the use of disjunctive conditions and the introduction of a technical vocabulary in order to present more precise primitive terms in this study.

The present inquiry, then, is aimed at providing rough characterizations of simple idealized cases of illocutionary acts of c ing. For the purposes of this study I believe that such characterizations will be adequate, if limited, since they will allow one to distinguish among paradigm cases of illocutionary acts of c ing and to appraise the truth or falsity of purportedly reportive definitions offered by metacritics.

I divide this chapter into five main sections. In the first section I shall analyze the behabitive act of criticizing. In the second section I shall analyze the related verdictive acts of describing, analyzing, and characterizing. In the third section I shall analyze the verdictive act of interpreting by comparing it with explaining. In the fourth section I shall analyze the related verdictive acts of evaluating and judging. In the final section I shall discuss the significance of the previous findings for attempts to define critical terms and to use concepts of c ing in educational contexts.
Criticizing

In this section, I analyze the propositional content, preparatory, sincerity, and essential conditions for the act of criticizing. "Criticize" exhibits the grammatical structure of behabitives in its performative use. The illocutionary act of criticizing, therefore, is related to a family of illocutionary acts which includes blaming, censuring, condemning, denouncing, praising, thanking, commending, complimenting, and congratulating. In analyzing criticizing I shall compare and contrast it with a number of these other acts. I shall also borrow two analyses of other behabitive acts which Searle gives in his text and use these as models for comparison.

Searle's text presents analyses of three behabitive acts: acts of greeting, thanking (for), and congratulating. Since the latter two acts contain a propositional content condition whereas the first does not, they are more useful as models for a comparison with the illocutionary act of criticizing. Searle's account of the propositional content conditions (PCC), preparatory conditions (PC), sincerity conditions (SC), and essential conditions (EC) for the use of the illocutionary force indicating device for each of these acts is as follows:\(^1\)

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Thank for:}
  \begin{itemize}
    \item \textbf{(PCC)} The illocutionary force indicating device for thanking is to be uttered only in the context of a
  \end{itemize}
\end{itemize}

\(^1\) In the interest of reader clarity, I have expanded the formulation of these conditions somewhat from the way they appear in Searle's text (Searle, 1969, pp. 66, 67).
sentence (or larger stretch of discourse) $T$ the utterance of which predicates a past act $A$ done by a hearer $H$".  

(PC) $A$ benefits the speaker $S$ and $S$ believes that this act benefits himself.

(SC) $S$ feels grateful or appreciative for $A$.

(EC) The utterance $T$ counts as an expression of gratitude or appreciation.

Congratulate:

(PCC) The illocutionary force indicating device for congratulating is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence (or larger stretch of discourse) $T$ the utterance of which predicates some event, act, etc. $E$ related to the hearer $H$.

(PC) $E$ is in $H$'s interest and speaker $S$ believes that $E$ is in $H$'s interest.

(SC) $S$ is pleased at $E$.


Using the above as models, conditions for criticizing seem to be the following:

(PCC) The illocutionary force indicating device for criticizing is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence (or larger stretch or discourse) $T$ the utterance of which predicates either

(a) some past act or acts $A$ of some person or persons $P$, or

(b) some property or properties $X$ of some object, thing, etc. $Q$ which in itself is a resultant of some $A$.

2. Strictly speaking, it is expressions not acts which are predicated. Therefore, the latter part of this condition (in parenthesis) can be understood as an abbreviation for the following: "the utterance of which predicates an expression, the meaning of which expression is such that if the expression is true of the object, it is true that the object has performed past act $A$." In keeping with Searle's text, I shall continue to use an abbreviated formulation in stating propositional content conditions.
Although there is a propositional content condition implied in criticizing, criticizing is unlike thanking and congratulating in that the reference of the act need not involve the hearer directly. One cannot thank or congratulate Smith if Smith is not the hearer but one can criticize Smith in such circumstances.

Like thanking and congratulating, an act or acts can be predicated of a person or persons in criticizing. Also like thanking and congratulating, these must be past acts. It would be odd to criticize someone for an act he has not yet performed. Unlike congratulate, however, a mere happening cannot be predicated of this person. One can congratulate someone for finding a hundred dollar bill. One cannot criticize a person for falling off a ledge (although, indeed, one could criticize him for treading too near to the edge).

Unlike both thanking and congratulating, again, some property or properties can be predicated of some object or thing, etc. One cannot thank or congratulate works of art, automobiles, or appliances but one can criticize works of art, automobiles, appliances for some properties which they possess. Where objects or things are criticized, however, they must be man-made objects or the resultants of human acts. An interesting contrast here is with blame. One can blame the wind for the destruction of the crops but one cannot criticize the wind for the destruction of the crops.

(\text{PC}) \quad P \text{ has performed } A \text{ or } O \text{ possesses } X; \text{ and } S \text{ believes that } P \text{ has performed } A \text{ or that } O \text{ possesses } X.

This condition states that the act of criticizing is defective if the person criticized did not perform the act or acts for which he is criticized or if the object which is criticized does not in fact possess those properties. This condition states that the act of
criticizing is also defective if the speaker does not believe that the person has performed the act or acts or that the object did not possess the properties in question. This preparatory condition is similar in some respects to other behabitive acts. If one congratulates, thanks, denounces, or condemns someone for something, such acts are defective if the person or persons did not perform the act in question. In the performance of these acts also the speaker implies a belief that the person has performed the act in question.

Criticizing differs from denouncing or condemning, however, in that the latter two acts imply differences in authority or power between speaker or hearer. Denouncing involves an appeal to a hearer with authority, a hearer who is not the person denounced. Smith cannot denounce Jones if the two of them are alone and Jones is the person denounced. There is something odd about denouncing the board of education to a teacher although there is nothing odd about denouncing the teacher to the board of education. With condemning the authority or power does not reside with some third party but with the speaker himself. If Smith condemns Jones for manslaughter, then Smith must possess some kind of relevant authority. Criticizing, by way of contrast, is neutral on the relative status of a speaker and hearer.

(SC) S believes that A or X is (are) bad (imperfect, defective, unethical, etc.).

Behabitive acts divide sharply between those acts which are "pro-" something and those which are "con-". Congratulating, thanking, praising, commending, complimenting are pro-; criticizing, blaming, denouncing, and condemning are con-. Among the latter there is a contrast in the "degree of seriousness". This increases as one moves from criticizing through condemning. Thus, although all of the following sentences are grammatically correct, in our culture they become increasingly inappropriate:
I criticize you for tearing the wings off the butterfly.
I blame you for tearing the wings off the butterfly.

are both acceptable, but

I denounce you for tearing the wings off the butterfly.
I condemn you for tearing the wings off the butterfly

sound odd.

In stating this condition I use the term "bad" to express the "negative" belief of the speaker. This term is vague and in individual contexts of utterance, it would seem that it could be replaced by other more specific expressions. Thus, someone can criticize someone for acts which are unethical, immoral, etc. and he can criticize objects because their properties are defective, imperfect, unaesthetic, etc.

(EC) The utterance counts as an expression of S's belief that A or X is (are) bad (imperfect, defective, unethical, etc.).

I believe that criticizing is essentially an expression of the speaker's belief that some act performed by a person, or property possessed by some object is bad. Criticizing I believe is not an expression that the person or object criticized is bad since I can criticize my mother even though I do not believe that she is bad.

It might be objected that criticizing is essentially a matter of "expressing one's displeasure" and thus comparable to congratulate which on Searle's treatment is an expression of pleasure. It seems to me, however, that in contrast to congratulate, one often criticizes someone in contexts that have little to do with a speaker's pleasure or displeasure. Thus, I can criticize your watch for its poor workmanship and do this dispassionately. It seems hardly possible, however, that I would criticize your watch for its workmanship and not believe that the workmanship is bad.
Examples of Criticizing

Among the many things that critics criticize are other critics and the works of other critics. It would certainly seem possible that one could find examples of critics who criticize artists and works of art and innumerable other things as well. The two examples of criticizing that I present, however, are of a piece of writing by another critic and of another critic/writer. Each of the selections in its entirety could probably be characterized as a complex speech act of criticizing. Since I am interested here in simple speech acts, however, I present them only as contextual background. I have bracketed sentences which seem to me to be properly characterized as simple speech acts of criticizing. 3 (In the first example, the utterance is also characterized this way by the writer herself.) The first example of criticizing is by the contemporary critic Susan Sontag.

Although one could undoubtedly pick up a certain amount of useful information from the book, it offers no point of view, no glimpse of any organizing sensibility. (That this could not be said of Mr. Geldzahler personally is well known in the art world.) [American Painting in the 20th Century, is, in fact, a perfect example of its genre -- the institutional publication, that seems to have been written by a machine or a committee; lifeless, tasteless; wholly uncontaminated by a human voice.] It might be objected that this criticism is misplaced. After all, the book is published by the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York (where the author is Associate Curator of American Paintings and Sculpture), almost all the illustrations are of paintings in the Museum's permanent collection, and it is in fact a guidebook to the collection. But there is ample precedent for museums sponsoring much livelier and intellectually more challenging work -- as, for instance, the recent volumes associated with exhibitions) produced by the Museum of Modern Art on Art Nouveau, Futurism, The Art of Assemblage. It is

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3. This device will similarly be used throughout this chapter to identify examples of simple speech acts.
scarcely to the advantage of even the most conservative museum to embalm and flatten out its collection by means of a book like this. (Sontag, 1966, pp. 158, 159).

The second example of criticizing is by the contemporary critic Erich Kahler taken from a series of lectures on the state of the arts in contemporary culture.

The trend of the recent generation is, as we have seen, toward emphasis on the present and presence. From pop art and the *nouveau roman* to behaviorism and the structuralist similes of L'evy-Strauss, the wind levels down evolitional stages and reduces our vista to the sight of the moment. The complexity and overcrowding of our factual knowledge have made it discontinuous and unmasterable .... [Irresponsibly, McLuhan fosters this chaotic development.] His sophistry, as all sophistry, makes use of linguistic confusion. He confounds consciousness -- which is awareness of coherence -- with perception, which is its raw material. (Kahler, 1968, pp. 98, 99).

I believe that each of the utterances underlined in the previous passages is an example of criticizing, exemplifying the conditions set forth in the previous analysis. In both passages what is criticized is either a past act or the resultant of a past act. This is emphasized in the above passages by each writer's dwelling on the possibility of the person who acted doing otherwise. When Sontag criticizes Geldzahler's book, she cites both Geldzahler's well-known predilection for particular manifestations of contemporary art and the precedent set by other museum publications which are "livelier and intellectually more challenging". In doing this she suggests that Geldzahler willfully has suppressed a point of view in favor of a bland "guidebook to the collection". Kahler is more direct: He terms McLuhan irresponsible as if McLuhan were willfully an obscurantist. Each of the above acts of criticizing also forcefully express each writer's belief that the act performed or the properties of the object criticized are
in some way bad. The negative tone of the utterances is clearly evident. In Sontag's criticism it is certain properties of the book written by Geldzahler which are bad. In Kahler's criticism it is McLuhan's fostering of cultural chaos. Both writers could legitimately be accused of insincerity if, by their prior actions, they had demonstrated that they did not believe that, for example, the blandness of the book and the use of linguistic confusion were bad (unethical, etc.) Each of the above examples of criticizing, then, illustrates the conditions previously set forth.

Describing, Analyzing, Characterizing

In the next three sections of this chapter I analyze the remaining illocutionary acts of c 1 ing. These are all verdictive acts. I believe that on an intuitive level some rough groupings can be made among such acts. In ordinary language it often seems possible to use "describe", "analyze", and "characterize" interchangeably. In many contexts it seems possible to say that one is describing, analyzing and characterizing a work of art, when one is predicing certain properties to that object or thing. "Explaining" and "interpreting" also appear to be expressions that are sometimes used almost interchangeably. For example, one can speak of explaining and interpreting the meaning of a work of art, whereas it seems intuitively more difficult to talk about describing, analyzing, or characterizing the meaning of a work of art. "Evaluating" and "judging" also are sometimes used interchangeably, primarily in contexts concerned with matters of value. 4

4. Judging is an act which is also related to interpreting. One can speak about interpretive as well as evaluative judgments.
I believe that these intuitions substantially mirror certain similarities among the conditions underlying the use of the indicator of illocutionary force for such acts. In order to bring out such similarities I group the remaining acts of saying into three groups for purposes of analysis. Nevertheless, I shall argue that there are some fundamental and important differences in the conditions implied in such acts, differences such that in certain contexts they cannot be use interchangeably.

Describing

A useful beginning for an analysis of the act of describing can be gained by considering an existing account of describing put forth by S. E. Toulmin and K. Baier (Toulmin and Baier, 1952). They provide an analysis of the act of describing that is in many ways congruent with Searle's analysis of speech acts. The categories of Searle's theory in turn illuminate many of the conditions specified in their analysis. These conditions in their own words

are concerned respectively, with John Doe's audience, the topic or subject of his utterance, his position vis-a-vis his audience and subject, the purpose which the utterance is designed to serve, and the extent to which it does in fact serve this purpose. (Toulmin and Baier, 1952, p. 15).

There are six of these conditions which hold in describing (given that a speaker "has written or uttered some string of words").

(1) There must be a speaker and a hearer.

To say of John Doe that he is describing something implies that he has an audience. (Toulmin and Baier, 1952, p. 16).

(2) There must be a "topic" of this description. This "topic", however, can consist of numerous things.
Not anything and everything can be the topic of a description. We can describe persons and things, such as Mr. Gladstone, New College garden, a chair or a dress; events and incidents, such as the opening of Parliament or a car accident; processes and techniques, such as Bessemer's method of steel production or how to make almond fingers; and much besides. But a fact which is sometimes spoken of as though it were the topic par excellence, cannot be described: it can only be stated. (Toulmin and Baier, 1952, p. 17).

(3) The thing described must be what is held out as being.

If the utterance purports to describe a material object, such as a house, chair, or dress, then this object must exist at the time the description refers to; if an event, happening, incident or episode, then this must have occurred at the material time; if a figure in a novel, a fairy tale or mythology, then there must really be such a figure in that novel, fairy tale or mythology; if some process, method or technique, then there must really be such a process, method or technique. (Toulmin and Baier, 1952, p. 17).

(4) The speaker must be in a better position to speak about the topic than the hearer.

If John Doe is to be said to be describing something to Richard Roe, he must be in a better position than Roe to speak about it. One special case is important: we should not usually talk of Doe describing to Roe something which was there in front for both of them to see .... Two apparent exceptions to this .... We can, .. speak of Doe 'describing' something to Roe, either if they both know what exactly is being described but Doe is or has been in a better position to observe it than Roe, or if both are equally well placed, but the auditor needs a description in order to identify that to which his attention is being drawn. (Toulmin and Baier, 1952, pp. 18, 19).

(5) The purpose of the utterance must be "of a kind which a picture might serve".

The purpose of a description, and equally of a picture is in many cases to act as an aid to recognition .... In other cases, a picture is drawn or painted in such a way that likeness is wholly or partly sacrificed for the sake of something else. The picture is then a success if it is 'vivid', 'graphic', 'colourful', 'stirring', 'atmospheric', 'evocative', or 'moving'.

It serves its purpose, that is, not in the way that a passport photograph, or the picture in a "wanted" notice does, but in some other way. (Toulmin and Baier, 1952, pp. 19, 20).

I believe that the five conditions listed above can plausibly be accounted for either by the general conditions presented in Searle's theory which I have discussed in the previous chapter, or by Searle's categories of propositional content, preparatory, and essential conditions. By considering how their conditions are accounted for by Searle's theory, by criticizing the vagueness inherent in some of their conditions and emending these conditions, and by adding another preparatory and a sincerity condition, a more adequate account of describing can be constructed.

The first of their conditions requires that there be a speaker and a hearer. This condition is accounted for in Searle's theory by a general condition implied in the performance of all illocutionary acts. To say that there must be an audience for the speaker is part of what is meant by normal input and output conditions for speaking. It is accounted for by general condition one (GC,1) in Searle's theory.

Toulmin and Baier's second condition requires that there be a "topic" of the description. I interpret this to mean that an act of describing is defective if nothing is referred to in this act. I believe this to be a necessary condition, also, and because I believe it to be a necessary condition I have included the conditions for the propositional act of referring in the previous discussion of Searle's general conditions. One might also add to Toulmin and Baier's condition that it incorporate the subsidiary propositional act of predicating. Just as describing is defective if nothing is referred to in describing, so it is defective if nothing is predicated of that object.
or entity. So emended, their second condition could be construed as a propositional content condition on describing. This condition in turn implies Searle's rules for referring and predicating set forth in the previous chapter.

The nature of this propositional content condition as Toulmin and Baier present it is vague, however, and I see little hope of resolving this vagueness since there are innumerable things that one can refer to in describing. This is one of the difficulties in formulating a propositional content condition. One can except abstract nouns as objects of reference, however, purely on logical grounds. Facts, which Toulmin and Baier rightly state are not "topics" of description cannot be referred to in Searle's theory, also, since facts as such lack existence in the real world. To refer to such entities would violate the "axiom of existence" formulated in Searle's referring condition two (RC,2).

Toulmin and Baier's third condition also is covered by this same referring condition. In this third condition they appear to be saying simply that the objects referred to in any act of describing must exist. This would again be accounted for by Searle's referring condition two (RC,2).

Toulmin and Baier's fourth condition refers to the relative position of the speaker and hearer. I interpret this as a preparatory condition on describing but I believe that it needs emending since the formulation of this condition is unsatisfactorily vague.

Toulmin and Baier state that a speaker must be in a "better position" to speak about something than the hearer in order to describe, but what is the force of such a claim? In one sense they apparently mean that the speaker must be in a better physical position to observe that which is being observed:
We should not usually talk of Doe describing to Roe something which was there in front of both of them to see .... Thus, John Doe can describe the view from M. Generoso to Richard Roe, provided Roe has never been up the mountain, or never in such good conditions. But if they are together on the summit we could speak of Doe describing the view to Roe only if Roe were, say, blind, and so unable to see himself. (Toulmin and Baier, 1952, p. 18).

One indication that this condition as formulated is unsatisfactory, is that they, themselves, provide qualifications. After stating that the speaker must be in a better physical position, they cite the case of a hearer who is blind or who is unable to identify the mountain in question. There is another reason, also, why mere "physical position" is an inadequate construal of this condition. If it were a necessary condition, there could be no descriptions of historical personages or events since neither a speaker nor a hearer could be in a better physical position to observe these. But clearly someone (e.g., a historian) can describe the personality of Louis IV or the opening days of the French Revolution. Physical position, then, is not a necessary factor but is a factor related to the knowledge possessed by a speaker. It is this knowledge which is the crucial determinant of the "position" of a speaker vis-a-vis his audience. I will return once again to this knowledge condition in formulating preparatory conditions on describing.

Toulmin and Baier's condition five, which attempts to state the "function" of a descriptive utterance, also suffers from obscurity. When clarified it can plausibly be interpreted as an essential condition on describing. The function of a description according to Toulmin and Baier is "of a kind which a picture might serve". This formulation, however, is unhelpful for at least two reasons. First, pictures
serve a great range of functions and this range of functions is left unexplicated in their account. Second, although the functions of pictures and descriptions might overlap, there is no reason for believing (and no reason is offered for believing) that they are coextensive.

An obvious difficulty with using the analogy of a pictorial function is that pictures can serve many functions simultaneously. Mr. and Mrs. Smith have their picture taken on their wedding day. Mr. Smith believes that the wedding picture is a memento of the occasion and functions to remind people of the ceremony. Mrs. Smith views the picture as documentation of the fact that she is married and shows the picture eagerly to coworkers in the office to prove she is no longer single. The photographer (who has high aesthetic ambitions) views the picture's function as an advertisement of his prowess as a creative artist. Surely, Toulmin and Baier would not wish to ascribe multiple functions to descriptions.

Second Toulmin's and Baier's claim that descriptions have a pictorial function, although illuminating in pointing out that descriptions often serve as aids to recognition and identification, is unsatisfactory because the range of functions which pictures serve is left unspecified. When other functions of pictures are examined, it is easy to see that the range of functions of pictures and descriptions is not coextensive. For example, leaving aside the obvious difficulty that many pictures are nonrepresentational, it is still possible to conceive of functions served by pictures which could not possibly be served by descriptions. Smith buys a picture which is representational but in order to harmonize with his living room. The
picture serves a decorative function. Surely it is too much to expect descriptions to do the same? An icon is painted to ward off evil spirits. Surely this is not the kind of function which is reasonable to attribute to descriptions?

There are problems, then, with the notion of a "pictorial function" of describing. The element of truth in the analogy is that descriptions often do serve as a means of recognition or identification but this is because "recognize" and "identify" are perceptual verbs related to knowing. If one construes the point they are attempting to make as an intention on the part of a speaker to produce a particular kind of knowledge in the hearer, one can accommodate the points they are attempting to make in a more precise fashion. The aim of describing like some other illocutionary acts is to produce knowledge in the hearer, in this case knowledge of the properties of the object referred to. Sometimes this is intended so that a hearer can identify or recognize some object or thing, and, thus, describing shares a pictorial function with pictures. Sometimes this is not the case, however. When one describes Louis IV to a hearer one would not intend that this hearer recognize or identify him. The aim here is simply to produce knowledge of the properties of Louis IV in a hearer for whatever purpose is indicated in that context. Toulmin and Baier's discussion of a pictorial function, then, can plausibly be interpreted as an essential condition or describing and when inserted into Searle's general condition three (GC, 3), it would specify the kind of knowledge that a speaker would intend to produce in a hearer.

Conditions Implied in Describing. All of Toulmin and Baier's conditions, then, can be accounted for by the categories of Searle's theory.
With this analysis and critique of Toulmin and Baier's discussion as a basis, conditions for the use of the illocutionary force indicating device for describing may now be presented. They are as follows:

(PCC) The illocutionary force indicating device for describing is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence (or larger stretch of discourse) T the utterance of which predicates some obvious or salient property of properties X of some object(s), person(s), action(s), process(es), etc., O.

Describing seems to be the least restrictive of a number of verdictive acts with regard to what is predicated of an object or entity O. If Smith describes something then there are numerous properties which can be predicated of this thing (assuming that it is logically possible for such properties to be true or false of that object or thing). It might be thought that describing is restricted to predicating what can be seen, touched, tasted, smelled, and heard and, indeed, because these often are obvious or salient, describing often is concerned with predicating just these sensory properties. The properties which can be predicated in an act of describing are numerous and seem to resist easy classification (but see preparatory condition three below). Paradigm instances of descriptive contexts are doubtless those in which someone is prevented from experiencing the object or entity or someone requests a description. Yet knowledge or belief may not be strictly necessary since descriptions are provided to instructors on examination questions. Here the student in all probability would believe that the instructor possessed the knowledge in question.

5. In other words assuming that one of Searle's rules for pre-predication (PRC, 3) is satisfied.

6. This example is used by both Toulmin and Baier (1952) and Martin (1970) to make similar points.
but he would act under the assumption that the instructor lacked such knowledge. I believe such cases to be borderline instances of describing but since such cases are clearly important in educational contexts I include them as examples of describing. In doing this I modify the above preparatory condition so that it merely claims that a speaker must act on the assumption that a hearer lacks the appropriate knowledge.

Describing contrasts with analyzing and characterizing in the nature of the restrictions placed on predicating. In analyzing something, for example, one must ordinarily predicate more than one property and these properties must be constituents i.e., components thought to comprise or exhaust the object or thing in question. Thus one can say

I describe the painting as red.

and predicate a single property but not

*I analyze the painting as red.

Whereas it is acceptable to say

I analyze the painting as a series of red and green triangles.

Characterizing contrasts with describing and analyzing in that it predicates some peculiar property or properties of that object or thing, a property not possessed by other objects of the same kind within the relevant context of concern. Smith can characterize Jones's behavior as erratic only if there exist other people's behavior which is not erratic in that context. To describe Jones's behavior as erratic carries no such implication.

(1) The speaker knows, believes, or goes on the assumption that a hearer lacks knowledge that possesses the relevant property of properties.
If Jones describes the tree as tall and graceful to Smith, in many cases he undoubtedly knows or at least believes that Smith lacks knowledge that the tree possesses just those properties.

One qualification that the above condition makes is important. The condition does not state that a hearer must lack all knowledge of the properties of the object referred to in the description but only of the relevant properties. I can describe an automobile to my brother even though he would know that the automobile possesses four tires, windows, etc. The act would be defective if I described the automobile as red, however, knowing, believing, or acting under the assumption that he knew the automobile was red.

(PC, 2) S has knowledge that O possesses X and he has evidence for his knowledge.

To describe something as such-and-such and to deny that one possesses knowledge of the properties of that object, invalidates the utterance as a description. Thus,

*I describe the bird as red but I do not know that the bird is red.

is paradoxical.

A further distinction can be made here between what Scheffler (1965, pp. 8-10) terms a "strong" and "weak" sense of "know". The first sense of "know", unlike the second, entails an evidence condition as well as a truth and a belief condition. The weak sense of "know" entails only the truth and belief conditions. Describing implies knowledge that is supported by evidence. This I believe is the point of Toulmin and Baier's contention that a speaker must be in a "better position" to speak about a topic than is the hearer. Consider what one would say in response to the following utterance:
*I describe the bird as red but I do not have evidence that the bird is red.

The likeliest response would be to deny that the speaker can describe, one would perhaps accuse the speaker of merely guessing or assuming that the bird was red.

This evidence condition is of course vague and many times one can expect that there will be no precise point at which one can claim that a speaker does or does not possess evidence. I find it difficult, also, to decide whether this evidence condition implies merely some evidence or whether it implies adequate or conclusive evidence. Doubtless in paradigm cases of describing it is the latter, since one could accuse a person who lacks adequate evidence that a bird was red of merely making a judgment about its color.

This knowledge condition also entails a belief condition and a truth condition. It is similarly paradoxical to claim that the speaker does not believe the bird to be red or that it is untrue that the bird is red, since both of these are entailed by a knowledge claim as well.

*I describe the bird as red but I do not believe that the bird is red.

*I describe the bird as red but it is not true that the bird is red.

are both paradoxical. How one would characterize the above sentences of course depends upon the context. Perhaps in the first sentence one would say that the speaker was not speaking seriously at all. Such an utterance sounds like a joke or riddle. In the second sentence one might say that the speaker was misdescribing the bird. It seems necessary to withdraw the claim that one has described. Knowledge, then, is implied in describing.
This knowledge condition contrasts with some other illocutionary acts which do not imply knowledge on the part of a speaker at all. If one states that the bird is red, for example, it need not be the case that the bird is red in order for one to state. All a speaker implies is that he has evidence and that he believes that the bird was red. Should the bird not turn out to be red one does not qualify the speaker’s utterance. He has still stated that the bird was red.

This knowledge condition serves to distinguish describing from such other verdictive acts as interpreting and judging. These also do not imply knowledge on the part of the speaker.

I interpret the poem as a defense of middle class morality but I do not know that the poem is a defense of middle class morality.

I judge the wine to be thirty years old but I do not know that the wine is thirty years old. Are not paradoxical. This is one distinction that can be drawn between describing (and, I shall maintain, between the related acts of analyzing and characterizing as well) and such other verdictive acts as interpreting and judging.

With regard to the descriptive knowledge possessed by a speaker, it is not necessary that this knowledge be gained through direct experience with some as Toulmin and Baier suggest. A speaker can describe an object from a previous description of that object having been provided to him. Having experienced an object, however, a speaker is normally in a position to describe it by virtue of the knowledge gained through this experience. By way of contrast, characterizing and analyzing something seem to require a more specialized and advanced knowledge. A person who experiences a bicycle for the first time is normally able to describe that bicycle. He would be unable to characterize it as a
bicycle, however, since characterizing implies knowledge of a least one other \( Q \) of the same kind. It is this knowledge that enables a person to provide distinctive and peculiar characteristics. Analyzing also demands prior knowledge of a set of categories which comprise or exhaust the phenomenon analyzed. In this sense it is more of a theoretical activity than is describing.

\[(PC, 3)\] The property or properties \( X \) which are predicated of \( Q \) must be of the appropriate type for that context of utterance.

This condition must be distinguished from Searle's predicating condition three \((PC, 3)\) which states that a property or properties predicated must be of a type such that it is logically possible for a predication to be true or false of that object or thing. By this he means that an utterance would be defective if, say, in a putative case of describing, a tree were "described" as false.

The above condition does not assert anything about the logical category of a predicate vis-a-vis a referred object but rather about the appropriateness of certain (logically acceptable) predicates within a particular context of utterance. Particular contexts of utterance in many cases place constraints on the kinds of properties which can be predicated of an object or thing in describing. For example, it would be inappropriate for an art critic reviewing a piece of sculpture to mention only the smell of the newly cast bronze and not to mention other visual properties of that object. It would be inappropriate for a victim describing a criminal to mention only that he smiled, that he licked his lips, and that his hair was not evenly combed and not to mention his height, weight, complexion, etc., since what is required here is a description of those relatively enduring properties by which
he might be identified. Such acts of description are defective because the properties predicated are inappropriate for that context of utterance.

(SC) \( S \) believes that \( O \) possesses \( X \).

This sincerity condition is entailed by the previously discussed condition that a speaker possess knowledge. It is worth stating separately, however, since it is analogous to the sincerity condition on criticizing.

(EC) \( T \) counts as an undertaking to the effect that \( O \) possesses \( X \).

The term "undertaking" is a descriptor used in an analysis by Searle. It would appear applicable here as well. In conjunction with Searle's general condition three (GC, 3), it specifies the kind of knowledge the speaker intends to produce in a hearer. This essential condition when finally it receives complete formulation by being included within Searle's general condition three (GC, 3) embodies Toulmin and Baiers's "pictorial function" more precisely and adequately. Searle's general condition states (among other things) that a speaker must intend to produce knowledge in a hearer (Searle, 1969, pp. 60, 61). The essential condition above specifies that the kind of knowledge is of the salient properties of an object or entity \( O \). It is this fact and not the notion that the function of describing is to enable the hearer to identify or recognize, which accounts for the fact that descriptions can either be "exact and minute", or "vivid and colorful" (Toulmin and Baier, 1952, p. 20).

Propositional content, preparatory, sincerity, and essential conditions, then, have been specified for the use of the illocutionary
force indicating device of describing. I now turn to some examples of describing taken from the writings of practicing critics.

**Examples of Describing.** I present here two examples of describing.

In the first example, a contemporary critic, Lawrence Alloway, himself characterizes his utterance as a description and I believe that his utterance is, indeed, properly characterized in this way.

Let me describe Haber's Radio City Music Hall [on the cover is a grainy photograph of the Rockettes; the front-piece shows the corner site on 50th Street and 6th Avenue, with its lunging Art Deco geometry; this is followed by maps, with blocky modernistic lettering, of the Fire Exits from the orchestra, first, second and third mezzanines]. Then Haber lists the films shown at the theatre from 1933, when it opened with *The Bitter Tea of General Yen*, through to 1969 and *The Christmas Tree* (a soap opera with William Holden that bombed). He includes contemporary ads for *Words and Music* ..., a colored postcard of the exterior, a Xerox of the program for the "week beginning Thursday, December 5, 1946" .... (Alloway, 1956, p. 219)

In the second example of describing, the simple speech act of describing is presented within a larger complex speech act that could, perhaps, be characterized as an interpretation. There seems little doubt, however, that the bracketed passage is indeed a description.

This description, is by the contemporary critic John Canaday, of Manet's famous painting *Déjeuner sur l'Herbe*.

But *Le Déjeuner* left you hanging. [It was apparently some sort of woodland scene dominated in the foreground by a young woman seated naked on the grass, casually glancing at the observer, while two fully clothed young men, half reclining near by, engage in conversation.] In the background another young woman, wearing some kind of thin shift, seems to be taking a wade. What was it all about? It offered no clues; it was and is a painting that makes sense only as an aesthetic statement. (Canaday, 1969, pp. 882, 883).

Both of the above passages exemplify the conditions for describing previously set forth. In both of the above, certain properties are
predicated of an object or entity. What precisely this object or entity is, however, is a matter which has been the topic of dispute among aestheticians. I will not enter into such disputes here but I will merely claim (vaguely) that both critics are describing works of art.

Also, in these descriptions certain properties are predicated of the objects or things described. Once again, it is beyond the scope of this study to precisely or comprehensively classify the kinds of properties which are predicated but even the two examples of describing cited above suggests that a wide variety of predicates would be acceptable in acts of describing. "Property", here, must be construed broadly. In Alloway's description it is a perceptible quality ("grainyness"), a particular kind of media or technique ("photography"), and portrayed subject matter ("Rockettes"). Canaday's description predicates what might be termed as "representational relationship" between an art object and objects existing (or objects that could have existed) outside of the work. Clearly implied in both descriptions is the critics' knowledge of these properties and both utterances are so detailed and specific that it would be difficult to believe that the critic has not experienced these works of art at first hand. It is clear from Canaday's utterance that he is only predicing that which he knows to exist within the painting. Finally, as I read the intention of these critics, it is to instill this knowledge that the utterance is undertaken.

Analyzing

Using the above analysis of describing as a model, I now proceed to an analysis of the related acts of analyzing and characterizing. Conditions implied in the act of analyzing are as follows:
(PCC) The illocutionary force indicating device for analyzing is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence for larger stretch of discourse, in which the utterance of which predicates constituents of some object(s), action(s), process(es), etc.

One characteristic way in which analyzing differs from describing is that the properties predicated must exhaust or comprise the object or entity. In analyzing one predicates constituents of that object or entity. The fact that in analyzing one predicates constituents accounts for the oddness of such utterances

*Smith analyzed the element (person).

Since in some of their uses "element" and "person" are nondivisible entities, such an utterance would violated Searle's predication condition three (PRC,3) which stipulates that a predicate must logically agree with the object of reference. One cannot analyze the unanalyzable.

(PC,1) A speaker $S$ knows, believes, or goes on the assumption that a hearer $H$ lacks knowledge that $O$ possesses $C$.

As with describing, paradigmatic instances of analyzing are doubtless those in which the speaker knows or believes that $H$ lacks the appropriate knowledge. As with describing, this condition must be loosened to accommodate "examination" analyses, performed to demonstrate the speaker's knowledge.

(PC,2) $S$ has knowledge that $O$ possesses $C$.

This condition again is analogous to a condition on describing. It differs in the kind of knowledge possessed by the speaker. It is worth reiterating that the kind of knowledge possessed by a speaker must be of a more "theoretical" sort. The speaker must possess a set of categories which comprise or exhaust the object or entity which is analyzed.
In ordinary circumstances, for example, a young child is in a position to describe a painting or a piece of coal because what is required is simply knowledge of various properties of that object or entity. This same child would not ordinarily be in a position to analyze a painting or a piece of coal because he would lack the requisite background knowledge. Analyzing, thus, often implies a kind of "expertise" on the part of the speaker.

As with describing I believe that an evidence condition is also entailed by this knowledge condition. It seems impossible to imagine someone analyzing something who had not had access to this object in some way and who, therefore, does not have adequate evidence to support his knowledge.

(PC,3) The constituents which are predicated of O must be of the appropriate type for that context of utterance.

This condition is also analogous to the one implied in describing. Although there are few if any entities existing in the real world which cannot be analyzed in some way, not every O is subject to every "mode" or "convention" of analysis. A chemist cannot analyze a block of pure gold, he can only attempt to analyze it. A critic on the other hand, who could analyze the block of gold cannot analyze a blank canvas since for him, analysis would usually consist of predicating certain perceptible parts to the object.

(SC) $S$ believes that $O$ possesses $C$.

This condition is analogous to the one on describing and is also entailed by the previous knowledge condition.

(EC) $T$ counts as an undertaking to the effect that $O$ possesses $C$. 
Insofar as "undertaking" is an appropriate formulation of the essential condition for describing, it would seem as applicable here. Once again, in conjunction with Searle's general condition three (GC,3), it would specify the kind of knowledge intended to be produced in a hearer by the speaker.

Examples of Analyzing. I present three examples of analyzing. In the first example, the complex illocutionary act is characterized by the critic, himself, as an analysis. The writer is the contemporary critic Max Kozloff.

Now, looking at this painting by Stella, has one seen any greater betrayal of the idea that forms must work together in some organic and recreative way, or of necessary relational explorations, than this painting? What we in fact see is a closed system in which the geographic location of every element is fixed by no agency more significant than the choice of format, and placed in a set sequence that almost seems an illustration of the "zero" to which Gleizes and Metzinger previously referred. Given Stella's initial decisions, the whole facade is frozen into a predictable framework which becomes essentially an anti-relationship framework, consumed, from the constructional point of view, almost immediately. [I presume that you have seen there is a four part image, or rather emblem, here, four parts symmetrically reversing each other as if they were mutual carbons, upon the whole surface of this painting.]

I choose this picture not merely because it encourages, only to reject, a certain kind of analysis, but also because it shows that the important relation in a work of art is not between two or more forms on a surface, but between itself as a complex event, and the spectator. (Kozloff, 1966, pp. 127, 128).

The second example of analyzing is by the historian Otto Von Simpson in a chapter on the cathedral at Chartres.

[Inside, the system presents itself as a series of "canopies", each composed of four piers supporting the vault over each bay.] It is an architecture designed for windows, developed from the magnificent conception of transparent walls. This appears with
particular clarity in the design of the apse. Its contour is no longer hemispherical but polygonal. This device becomes necessary as soon as the windows were no longer openings in the walls but walls themselves; their flat surfaces required the transformation of the spherical apse into a polygon. (Von Simpson, 1974, p. 204).

This final example of analyzing is by the historian Walter Friedlaender and deals with Gericault's Raft of the Medusa. The passage in brackets is a simple speech act of analyzing contained within a larger speech act which can also be characterized in this way.

In the picture as finally executed this accentuated, impressive stream of movement is opposed by a very evident countercurrent, whose importance to the composition may be judged by comparison with the sketch where the whole design is weakened by its absence. In the study the planks of the lower edge of the raft in the right corner of the picture are covered with waves and so invisible; now they are clearly outlined and drawn into the general movement, and close to the edge the body of a dying or a dead man points in the same direction. The group standing near the mast (among them the ship's doctor and engineer, the two authors of the pamphlet) is enlarged and clarified. And finally, in a last-minute revision of his picture after it had been finished. Gericault painted in the naked body that hangs over the side of the raft with its head hidden in the water — in all probability to fill in what would otherwise have been an empty spot. [Though the main axis still dominates, the result is now a system of two crossed diagonals such as is often found in the painting of the early baroque.] (Friedlaender, 1974, pp. 100, 101).

In each of the above examples of analysis, the critic goes beneath the obvious appearance of things and predicates certain constituent properties of the work of art. This I believe is what distinguishes analyzing from such other related verdictive acts as describing. In works of visual art these constituents are often the visual component parts of the work of art in their relationship to one another. Kozloff predicates four symmetrically reversing components. Von Simpson says that the constituents are a series of canopies
supporting the vault, each in itself composed of four piers. Friedlaender predicates constituents as a system of two crossed diagonals. Thus, not any properties at all are predicated in analyzing but only certain constituent properties which together present the total complexity of the work in simpler and more fundamental perceptual terms.

As with describing, moreover, each of the above passages implied a knowledge on the part of a speaker, a belief in the proposition uttered, and an intention to produce a certain kind of knowledge in the hearer. There is, thus, a close relationship between describing and analyzing.

What follows next is an analysis of the related verdictive act of characterizing.

Characterizing

Necessary conditions for the act of characterizing are as follows:

(PCC) The illocutionary force indicating device for characterizing is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence (or larger stretch of discourse) T the utterance of which predicates some distinctive or peculiar property or properties D of some object(s), person(s), action(s), processes(es), etc. O.

"Distinctive or peculiar property" in the above condition must be understood as applying only to other Os within the relevant context of concern. It is certainly possible to characterize someone's behavior as obstreperous but this does not imply that no other person's behavior is obstreperous. It only implies that within the particular context of concern to the speaker and hearer, there is no other person's behavior which is obstreperous.

Characterizing contrasts interestingly with distinguishing. Characterizing implies that there are other entities of the same kind, distinguishing does not. If Smith characterizes the hunter as ungainly,
he implies that within the relevant context of concern there are other hunters (lacking this distinctive property). But if Smith distinguishes the hunter from something, there need be no other hunters within that context. Smith could distinguish the hunter from the surrounding underbrush.

(PCI) S knows, believes, or goes on the assumption that H lacks knowledge that Q possesses D.

Like describing and analyzing, paradigmatic cases of characterizing are doubtless those in which the speaker knows or believes that the speaker lacks the knowledge in question. This condition again must be loosened to accommodate "examination" characterizations.

(PC,2) S has knowledge that Q possesses D.

This again is analogous to preparatory conditions on describing and analyzing. It differs on the kind of knowledge possessed by the speaker. Again this condition implies in one sense a greater knowledge on the part of a speaker than does describing. One can describe a chair without having seen, experienced, etc. other chairs but one can only characterize a chair as a chair if one possesses knowledge of other chairs. It is this knowledge which allows one to predicate distinctive properties. Again, this knowledge condition entails an evidence condition. It seems impossible that one could characterize something as something without having any evidence for the properties which one predicated.

(PC,3) The distinctive property or properties D which are predicated of Q must be of the appropriate type for that context of utterance.

Like the analogous conditions implied in describing and analyzing the distinctive properties must be of an appropriate type. This of course is a vague condition. Certainly in some contexts the
requirements for characterizing are not sharply defined but in other contexts they might well be precise. Think of a perfumer who attempts to characterize a perfume or a wine taster who attempts to characterize the taste of a bottle of wine. Not every distinctive or peculiar property will be acceptable in those contexts.

(SC) $S$ believes that $O$ possesses $D$.

This condition is analogous to other sincerity conditions on verdictive acts and is also entailed by the prior knowledge condition. It is inconsistent to say that one characterizes something as such-and-such but one does not believe it.

(EC) $T$ counts as an undertaking to the effect that $O$ possesses $D$.

Insofar as "undertaking" applies to describing and analyzing, it would appear appropriate here as well. Again, in conjunction with Searle's general condition three (GC,3), it specifies the kind of knowledge that a speaker intends to produce in a hearer.

Examples of Characterizing. I present two examples of characterizing. In the first example a critic discusses a series of works by the contemporary painter Richard Lindner. The whole passage I believe could be properly characterized as a complex speech act of characterizing. It is introduced by a performative use of the verb "to characterize".

[Two further works dating from 1955 are characterized by clear compositional articulation of the canvas.] The Couple, a vertical work, is divided into two sections by strips of color. The top section presents a naked man, the bottom section a naked woman, each figure being set centrally in its area of color. Symmetry is disturbed by a disk beside the man's head, by a geometric pattern above the woman's head and by a vertical strip of color in the lower section. The male figure is sinewy and muscular, and shows a certain toughness .... In contrast to this,
the female figure has more rounded planes and is more ingratiatingly presented: the flow of the contours is gentle; the hair is waved; one hand gracefully extends a finger. Were it not for the graphic arrangement of the figures and of the geometrical ornaments, the painting would almost be realistic. (Dienst, 1970, p. XIII).

The second example of characterizing is once again of a series of works, paintings by the contemporary artist Frank Stella. The speaker is the critic Michael Fried.

In Moultonboro III, for example, the shape of the support is an irregular polygon formed by superimposing a triangle and a square, the first apparently having come slanting down from the upper right to wedge itself deeply into the second. (In Chocorua III a triangle is superimposed on a rectangle; the same is true of Tuftonboro III except that the rectangle is missing its upper right corner; while in Conway III a parallelogram is superimposed on another, this time more horizontal, rectangle. [These are the only formats among the eleven Stella has used for his new paintings that have been arrived at by superimposition, pure and simple.] (Fried, 1969, p. 415).

In the above passages certain distinctive properties, properties unique within that context, are predicated of works of art. Like describing and analyzing the speaker implies knowledge that the objects characterized possess certain properties. In the case of characterizing, however, the speaker implies knowledge of a range of other objects or things of the same category. Like describing and analyzing, the critic also implies a belief in the proposition predicated and an intention to produce knowledge of a certain kind in the hearer. The particular kind of properties predicated and the particular kind of knowledge intended to be produced, however, differ. Thus, while characterizing is related to verdictive acts of describing and analyzing, it is also distinct as well.

Analyses, then, have been offered of the illocutionary acts of
describing, analyzing, and characterizing. These acts form a closely related group within the verdictive family. One can understand how they could be employed interchangeably in some contexts since in all three acts, the intention of the speaker is to produce knowledge of the properties of some objects or entities in a hearer and in each act, it is necessary that the speaker himself possess this knowledge. Nevertheless, there are crucial differences among such acts as the previous analysis demonstrates.

Having given this account of the verdictive acts of describing, analyzing, and characterizing I now turn toward an analysis of a more distantly related member of the verdictive group, interpreting. Instead of being conceptually tied to knowledge, as in the previous illocutionary acts, I believe interpreting conceptually involves an understanding on the part of a speaker. It is this understanding which accounts for the intuitive distance that one senses between interpreting and the other verdictive illocutionary acts discussed above.

**Interpreting**

In this section I provide an analysis of the illocutionary act of interpreting. In order to do this, I begin by examining a treatment of a closely related concept, that of explaining, offered by Jane Martin (Martin, 1970).

Martin's analysis of the concept of explaining offers a useful beginning for an analysis of interpreting for three reasons. First, there appears to be a fairly wide recognition that the concepts of interpreting and explaining are related (c.f., Frankel 1959, pp. 408-427; Hampshire 1966, pp. 107-108; Weitz 1964, pp. 245-268). Indeed, one philosophical metacritic who has exerted considerable influence in educational circles
(Weitz) has even subsumed interpreting under the concept of explaining. Second, Martin's analysis offers the advantages of a careful review and critique of a number of theories of explaining. It thus represents a useful way of approaching an extensive body of literature. Third, her account attempts to arrive at a statement of necessary (and perhaps sufficient) conditions for the concept of explaining. To my knowledge, no such comparable account for interpreting exists in the literature.

From the standpoint of this study, Martin's account is most valuable for her discussion of certain preparatory conditions implied in explaining. These preparatory conditions unlike those implied in describing, analyzing, and characterizing involve understanding instead of knowledge. These two concepts are different although related. It is possible for someone to know that something is the case and yet lack understanding. A teacher might complain, for example, that his pupil knows Einstein's theory of relativity but he does not understand it. On the other hand it does not seem possible that his pupil could understand this theory and not know it. Knowledge of the relevant kind does seem to be a prerequisite to understanding.

If Martin's account is valuable for pointing out certain preparatory conditions on explaining (similar conditions which I shall subsequently argue apply in the case of interpreting as well), there are several problems in utilizing these preparatory conditions for an account of interpreting. Part of the problem rests with our limited understanding of the concept of understanding itself. In this inquiry I shall be forced to talk generally about the understanding possessed by a speaker and about the lack of understanding which a speaker knows, believes, or assumes that a hearer has. This is highly unsatisfactory because of its vagueness but I believe that a more precise construal of
such preparatory conditions would rest upon a more adequate analysis being given of the concept of understanding itself, an analysis which I cannot undertake here. In the present inquiry, then, I shall be content with an explication of Martin's analysis in terms of the concepts of Searle's theory. Searle's theory I believe illuminates several obscurities in her account. I shall then relate this revised analysis of the concept of explaining to the related concept of interpreting which I believe is also concerned with understanding as well.

**Martin's Account of Explaining.** Martin's analysis offers several difficulties for an attempt to begin an analysis of interpreting with a Searlian analysis of the concept of explaining. First, the model upon which she bases her analysis is more radically dissimilar then is, for example, the analysis offered by Toulmin and Baier. Martin builds upon an analysis of explaining initially provided by Bromberger (1964) which conceives of explaining in terms of episodes containing certain "underlying questions", questions such as "Why does such-and-such behave the way he does" or "What makes tea kettles emit murmuring noises before they boil". etc. This in itself is not an insuperable obstacle to giving a Searlian analysis of her findings because the concepts of describing, analyzing, characterizing, and interpreting could be construed in these terms as well. Like "explaining" these terms also accept indirect questions. It is equally possible to say

- Smith describes what is in the work
- Smith analyzes what is in the work.
- Smith characterizes what is in the work.
- Smith interprets what is in the work.

as well as
Smith explains what is in the work. Moreover it is also possible to conceive of explaining in other terms than as an answer to an underlying question. One can say vaguely

Smith explains the work.

as well as

Smith describes the work.

Smith analyzes the work.

Smith characterizes the work.

Smith interprets the work.

or more specifically

Smith explains the unfinished state of the work.

as well as

Smith describes the unfinished state of the work.

Smith analyzes the reasons for the unfinished state of the work.

Smith characterizes the state of the work as unfinished.

Smith interprets the unfinished state of the work.

Thus, although one can construe all of the above illocutionary acts as answers to underlying questions, one need not do so. In the interest of integrating Martin's findings with the models of verdictive acts previously developed, I will not retain this "underlying question" component of her analysis.

7. It is worth pointing out, however, that the range of indirect questions accepted by the verb "to explain" is much greater than that accepted by the verb "to interpret". One can explain what, why, how, etc. One can only interpret what.
A second difficulty with using Martin's analysis is the theoretical difficulties in her account. Martin begins with an analysis of explaining offered by Bromberger. She loosens and emends these conditions to arrive at a further statement of conditions, Hypothesis Five (Martin 1970, pp. 84, 85). She then embarks upon a comparison of explaining with the concept of teaching and arrives at a further set of findings. Martin's account is for the most part reasonably clear up to this point. However, her next move is to formulate these findings into six -- what I will term "intermediate" -- conditions on explaining (Martin, 1970, pp. 123-128). At this point discrepancies appear between her earlier discussion of these findings and her formulation of these conditions. Finally, she then presumably "incorporates" these six intermediate conditions into the analysis of Hypothesis Five to arrive at her final statement of conditions, Hypothesis Six (Martin 1970, pp. 128, 129). A careful reading of her text, however, reveals it to be an entirely obscure matter just how these intermediate conditions are incorporated into her Hypothesis Six. If they appear in her final statement of conditions, they do so in a linguistically transformed guise and Martin offers inadequate clues as to where these conditions are to be found and no justification at all for the change of wording in which they appear.

To present an extended critique of Martin's work, however, would represent a disgression for this study, the purpose of which is to construct an analysis of interpreting. Martin's work does possess insights into the concept of explaining, insights which can usefully be borrowed to illuminate the concept of interpreting. These insights, however, cannot be gained solely through her final statement of conditions, but
rather they must be gained through her statement of intermediate conditions and her prior discussions in conjunction with her final statement of conditions. From these it is possible to construct notions analogous to Searle's concepts of propositional content, preparatory, and essential conditions. In doing this, I make no attempt to integrate all of Martin's final statement of conditions into a Searlian model. It is worth noting, however, that Searle's categories seem to account more plausibly with several of her intermediate conditions than do the categories of the original model of explaining provided by Bromberger. Part of the problem with her analysis might well lie in her inability to incorporate the additional findings resulting from her discussion of teaching into the model of explaining with which she begins.

Martin's final statement of conditions (Hypotheses Six) may be presented as a point of reference. It is as follows:

The essential characteristics of explaining episodes are the following:
(a) the underlying question is sound, i.e., admits of a right answer or the tutor believes, or at least assumes, that the underlying question is sound, i.e., admits of a right answer;
(b) the tutor is rational and understands \( W \) at the time of the episode, or thinks, or at least assumes, he understands \( W \) at the time of the episode;
(c) during the episode the tutor knows, or believes or at least assumes that at the beginning of the episode the tutee was in some rational predicament with regard to the underlying question;
(d) in the course of the episode the tutor states the right answer or what he believes or at least assumes to be the right answer, to the underlying question, or that part of the right answer, that in

8. "\( W \)" here occupies a position taken up by an indirect question whose corresponding direct question underlies the episode. (Martin, 1970, p. 128).
his opinion the tutee must learn in order to understand W, or for good pedagogical reasons he states what he knows or believes, or at least assumes is not the right answer to the underlying question, but is in his opinion sufficiently related to the right answer so that it will not prevent the tutee from understanding W at some later date;

(e) in the course of the episode the tutor also provides or attempts to provide the tutee with such subsidiary questions as he (the tutor) thinks necessary or effective or at least helpful for removing the basis of the predicament he deems the tutee to be in;

(f) in the course of the episode the tutor encourages or allows the tutee to exercise, or at least does nothing to prevent the tutee from exercising, his reason and judgment with respect to the underlying and subsidiary questions and the answers to them given the tutee by tutor;

(g) at the end of the episode the tutor has organized for the tutee and stated to him the answers mentioned in (c) and in (e). (Martin, 1970, pp. 128, 129).

There is of course in the above analysis a difference in terminology. Where Searle would use the terms "speaker" and "hearer", Martin retains Bromberger's terms "tutor" and "tutee". She does so, however, with some misgivings since she believes they contain undesirable connotations (Martin, 1970, pp. 87, 88).

Terminology aside, there are a number of analogues to Searle's general conditions, propositional content conditions, preparatory conditions, sincerity conditions, and essential conditions in the above analysis taken in conjunction with her earlier discussions. One may begin with Martin's partially successful attempt to establish a "normal input and output" condition comparable to Searle's general condition one (GC, 1). Part of the burden of her extended discussion of the topic of rationality is aimed at establishing precisely this point. In discussing this concept, however, there are a number of problematic areas in Martin's discussion of rationality which cannot be adequately treated here. For the sake of convenience I address these in Appendix A.
In examining the function of rationality in establishing a normal input and output condition, three conditions in Hypothesis Six are of relevance. Condition (b) contains two components which can be distinguished for purposes of discussion. One component specifies that the speaker be rational. The other component, which specifies that the speaker possess understanding, I will discuss as a preparatory condition on explaining in the next section. The other two "rationality" conditions are condition (a) which deals with the "soundness" of an underlying question and condition (c) which deals with the speaker's belief in the "rational predicament" of an explainee.

Searle's normal input and output condition (GC, 1) covers an indefinite range of cases and serves to rule out both parasitic forms of communication ("nonserious" discourse) and various impediments to communication in the successful performance of illocutionary acts (Searle 1969, p. 57). Martin's rationality conditions function collectively in an analogous manner. Condition (a) rules out at least some instances of nonserious discourse since if the explainer takes the underlying question to be unsound i.e., incapable of being answered, and still proceeds to answer it, the communication cannot be serious. As Martin explains it.

Unless he [an explainer] were, despite his belief acting on the assumption that [the underlying question] Q were sound, for example, in order to exercise his imagination or to develop his powers of creativity, I think we would call him irrational. (Martin, 1970, p. 79).

Condition (b) rules out various psychological and physical impediments to communication which could reside in the speaker since if a speaker is rational, then a host of psychological impairments are ruled out. If a speaker is rational, he cannot also have some physical impairment
that would impede communication since a rational person in such circum-
stances would not try to speak. The rationality component of condition
(b) also rules out instances where communication is defective because
the speaker knows or believes that a hearer has some psychological or
physical impediment to communication. A rational person also in such
circumstances would not speak.

Where Searle and Martin might appear to disagree is on whether it
is necessary that the hearer be free of psychological or physical impair-
ments that would impede communication. This point is covered partially
by Martin's condition (c). As she interprets this condition, a psycho-
logically impaired hearer would not constitute a barrier to explaining:

The question remains, however, whether it is possible
for a tutor to explain to his tutee if he takes the
tutee to be irrational. The tutee might in fact be
irrational without the tutor realizing it. The tutor's
task might be difficult, if not futile, in such a case,
but it could (logically speaking) be undertaken ... It
could also be undertaken if the tutor, ...believed the
tutee ... to be irrational, ... But if the tutor pro-
ceeded on the assumption that his tutee was irrational,
an explaining episode could not get off the ground.
(Martin, 1970, p. 79).

Searle's normal input and output condition would rule out the above case
as a nondefective illocutionary act.

Yet this disagreement between Searle and Martin is more apparent
than real. Searle could accommodate Martin's case under "partially
defective" illocutionary acts and, surely, if a hearer possesses a
psychological impairment, this would constitute a borderline case of ex-
plaining. Since Martin's conditions do not address the possibility of
their being a physical impairment in the hearer, Searle's normal input
and output condition (GC,1) in addition appears to be a more comprehen-
sive statement of the point Martin wishes to make. The "rationality"
components of conditions (a), (b), and (c) in Martin's Hypothesis Six, then, seem adequately covered by a "normal input and output" condition (CC,1) in Searle's theory.

The "understanding" component of condition (b) and, again, condition (c) are used by Martin to establish the presence of certain preparatory conditions relative to the status of a speaker and hearer. Like Toulmin's and Baier's account of describing, one who explains like one who describes must normally be in a "better position" to speak than is the hearer. This "better position", however, is not a matter of knowledge but rather of understanding.

The notion of understanding is reflected directly in the formulation of condition (b) of Hypothesis Six. This condition requires that the explainer possess the relevant understanding (or at least that he believe or assume that he possesses such understanding). ⁹

Condition (c) reflects the notion of understanding in a more indirect fashion. It represents an attempt by Martin, following Bromberger's model, to translate the concept "lack of understanding" into a series of "rational predicaments" which a hearer is in relative to some underlying question.

There are a number of reasons for the move from the notion of a "lack of understanding" to the notion of a rational predicament. One set of reasons for this move in Bromberger's original account was to avoid unwanted implications of "A does not understand [an underlying

⁹. This condition is qualified to accommodate historical cases where in one sense one can say that someone explained but where it later turned out that he was mistaken i.e., did not understand.
question \( Q \)" when uttered by someone who is not the explainer \( A \). A use of this expression by someone other than this person in the hypothetical explaining episode carries the implication that the underlying question \( Q \) is sound. Bromberger is willing to allow as instances of explaining, cases where an explaine does only believes or goes on the assumption that the underlying question is sound. Bromberger also believes that the above statement, when uttered by someone who is not the explaine, is ambiguous between cases (a) where none of the answers to the underlying question is an answer that the explaine can accept and (b) none are the right answers. Again, he holds that the explaine's view of the matter be dominant and not the user of the sentence if he happens to be someone other than the person mentioned at \( A \).

Perhaps a major reason for the translation of "lack of understanding", however, appears to have been the desire to separate those indirect questions ("What the height of the Empire State Building is", "Why tea kettles emit a murmuring noise just before the water begins to boil") which could function as direct objects of the verb "to explain" from those which could not. I am speculating here but perhaps implicit in this approach is as a dissatisfaction with the concept of "lack of understanding" as a logical primitive. Martin's critique of Bromberger's doctrine of predicaments, however, convincingly demonstrates that the two predicaments formulated by Bromberger are too restrictive as an attempt to parse "lack of understanding" since logically an explaine can be in a range of other predicaments with regard to some underlying question and still have an explaining episode occur (Martin, 1970, pp. 73-80).
One consequence of Martin's critique, however, is that she is left with an indefinite range of predicaments which an explainee can logically be in with regard to some underlying question (Martin, 1970, p. 78). Although she retains Bromberger's notion of a predicament, one reason for the existence of this doctrine at least seems to have been undermined. Given her conclusion, one is still not in a position to discriminate among indirect questions which could function as direct objects of the verb "to explain" any more than if one asked whether a question were one about which one could or could not possess understanding.

There is in fact a very decided disadvantage to the formulation of a "rational predicament" because one is unsure whether the range of predicaments which she cites, does in fact accurately translate "lack of understanding". What one is left with in the formulation "rational predicament", (except for the avoidance of unwanted implications and ambiguities) seems to be no more than the substitution of a technical term for one in ordinary language; one which is not conceptually linked to explaining in ordinary language for one which is. One indication of the problems in using the notion of rational predicaments is that Martin, herself, is forced repeatedly to translate "rational predicament" back into "lack of understanding" in order to be understood readily by the reader as she advances in her text (for examples see Martin 1970, pp. 107-110; pp. 114-116; pp. 124-126; pp. 130, 133).

Conditions (b) and (c) then deal with the relative status of the speaker and hearer in terms of the concepts of understanding and lack of understanding. As such they are analogous to preparatory conditions in Searle's theory and analogous to (although different than) knowledge conditions implied in describing, analyzing, and characterizing.
There is also an analogue to the propositional content condition in Martin's account and recognition of this category in Searle's theory helps to clarify some obscurities in the discussion leading to her "linguistic" condition, one of her six intermediate conditions. 10

As it was originally developed, this linguistic condition required that an explainer use language "actively and assertively". There are thus two components to the condition. As Martin interprets "actively" it merely requires that an explainer speak, since to "use" language in an acquiescent way is to listen.

[Explaining] is, in the first place, to use sentences in an active way, provided that "active" is construed broadly enough to include writing as well as speaking. Price himself seems to view his notions of an active and acquiescent use of language as applying to a speaker and listener respectively. (Martin, 1970, p. 118)

Martin's discussion of an "assertive" use of language, however, is more problematic. She distinguishes between an assertive use whereby "Sentences when uttered are used for the purpose of reporting or describing things" and an assertive use whereby "sentences state something about something". "Assertive" in her use means the latter (Martin, 1970, pp. 118, 119). In Martin's two uses of the words "assert" she appears to be trying to articulate a propositional content condition, one which holds

10. There are also problems in Martin's account about how this linguistic condition is finally incorporated into her final statement of conditions, Hypothesis Six. Is this linguistic condition reflected in conditions (d), (f), or (g)? One simply cannot be sure because if her linguistic condition is reflected in any of these, it has been linguistically transformed and Martin provides no guidance as to which of her conditions in her final statement of conditions is supposed to represent this linguistic condition.
that explaining must contain both reference and predication. One danger in using the terms "assert" and "state", however, is that these terms are performative verbs on a par with "explain". Martin's account would be clearer, had she specified the concepts of reference and predication apart from concepts indicating illocutionary acts:

When someone is engaged in explaining something to someone, the sentences he uses must state or assert something about something. Consider someone who uses sentences in an active way but none of those sentences state anything about anything, for example, they are all questions. Again we have a situation in which A may (or may not) be using an excellent pedagogical technique, but is not explaining to B. The "Socratic method", like the "discovery method" with which it is often linked, has no analogue in explaining something to someone. If A only asks questions, he may indeed be trying to get B to understand something or know the right answer, but he will not be explaining to B unless the sentences he uses state or assert things about whatever it is he is explaining to B. (Martin, 1970, p. 119)

Martin's account, then, does not precisely distinguish between illocutionary acts and propositional acts. The points she is attempting to make about explaining seem accountable more clearly by appealing to a Searlian propositional content condition (GC,2) on explaining.

There are also rough analogues to Searle's essential condition and general condition three (GC,3) in Martin's account of her intermediate "understanding condition" (Martin, 1970, pp. 124-127). This component of Martin's discussion of understanding, however, must be distinguished from her earlier discussion of understanding, reflected in conditions (b) and (c) of her Hypothesis Six. There her discussion of understanding concerned the understanding possessed by a speaker and a lack (or presumed lack) of understanding possessed by a hearer. Her intermediate "understanding condition", however, is concerned with the intention to produce understanding on the part of a hearer. This intermediate
condition seems not to be reflected at all in her final statement of conditions. \(^{11}\) (This is one example of the discrepancies in her account noted above.)

Martin's account of this intermediate understanding condition is introduced along side of her previous discussion of her linguistic condition. This understanding condition she argues is a differentia between explaining and other illocutionary acts:

There is a linguistic condition on explaining something to someone .... [which] serves ... to differentiate explaining from such endeavors as teaching, tutoring, and showing, none of which requires a particular use of language. On the other hand, this linguistic condition does not in itself enable us to distinguish between explaining something to someone and telling; nor does it enable us to distinguish between explaining and informing someone of something or reporting something to someone, all of which require an active assertive use of sentences.

When we consider the matter of A's [the explainer's] intent or purpose, however, we have no difficulty in separating explaining from those activities with which it shares the linguistic condition under discussion here .... the explainer's purpose is to create understanding. For A to have explained something to B in other words, \underline{A must have intended or wanted or been trying to get B to understand something.} [underline added] (Martin, 1970, pp. 123, 124)

There is a distinction which can usefully be employed to clarify the above account. This distinction is between the intention on the part of a speaker to produce understanding of the utterance which is a characteristic of all illocutionary acts, and an intention to produce

\(^{11}\) What is perhaps included in Hypothesis Six is an implication of this condition: that a speaker in an explaining episode organize and state for the explainee the answers to the underlying question and such answers to subsidiary questions as he thinks necessary or effective or helpful for removing the basis of the predicament he deems the explainee to be in (condition g). Nowhere is an intention to produce understanding directly mentioned in Hypothesis Six.
understanding of some underlying question which is a characteristic of explaining. Martin appears to mean the latter. In the case of explaining an engine seizure for example, (Martin, 1970, pp. 38-59) Martin would claim that there exists an intention on the part of a speaker to produce understanding of why the engine seized up.

This intention, to produce a particular kind of understanding, can be interpreted as an essential condition which, when finally incorporated into Searle's general condition three (GC,3), can be roughly paraphrased as an intention to produce knowledge that some event or state of affairs can be understood in terms of the proposition expressed in the act of explaining. In the specific case of the engine seizure this condition would appear as

\[ S \text{ intends (i-1) to produce in } H \text{ the knowledge (k) that the utterance of T is to count as an undertaking to the effect that the engine seizure can be understood as the result of a leak in the oil reservoir. } S \text{ intends to produce K by means of the recognition of i-1, and he intends i-1 to be recognized in virtue of (by means of) H's knowledge of the meaning of T.} \]

This condition seems to accurately reflect Martin's assertion that an explainer intends to produce understanding in a hearer.

Thus, in Martin's account of explaining it seems possible to identify analogues to conditions found in Searle's model analysis of illocutionary acts. Much of her discussion taken in conjunction with her final statement of conditions serves to establish the presence of (a) a "normal input and output" condition, (b) two preparatory conditions related to the status of a speaker and a hearer, (c) a propositional content condition, and (d) an essential condition. Many,
although not all of her conditions in Hypothesis Six have been accommodated in the above discussion.  

Conditions Implied in Explaining. We can now proceed with a Searlian interpretation of the findings discussed above. Necessary conditions for the illocutionary force indicating device for explaining are as follows:

(PCC) The illocutionary force indicating device for explaining is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence (or larger stretch of discourse) $T$ containing a proposition (any proposition) $p$.

Martin's discussion establishes the presence of a propositional content condition on explaining but she does not discuss any limitations that might be placed on the kind of reference or predication involved, perhaps with good reason. I, for one, can think of no proposition which could not figure in some act of explaining. There seems to be, for example, no reason to exclude utterances which seem grammatically to be straightforward descriptions from functioning as explanations:

The rose is bright red with vivid green leaves.

Which one might mistake for a description could easily be perceived as an explanation in a context in which a hearer did not understand "Why this rose was picked by the gardener for the flower show".

Again grammatical utterances which seem straightforward value judgments in other circumstances might also function as explanations.

The flower is beautiful.

12. Although not all of Martin's conditions in Hypothesis Six have been accommodated by Searle's model, it would be a digression and beyond the scope of the present study to discuss why all of her conditions are not accommodated. One of her final conditions which seems inconsistent with Searle's model, however, perhaps deserves some attention. I consider it in Appendix B.
Said in response to the query "Why was that flower picked for the centerpiece?" in ordinary circumstances is not a value judgment but an explanation also

(PC,1) The speaker $s$ knows, believes, or goes on the assumption that a hearer $h$ lacks understanding of some state(s) of affairs or event(s), $e$.

This condition formulates Martin's condition (c) of her Hypothesis Six in Searlian terms. Martin's condition it will be remembered asserts that the speaker must know, believe, or act on the assumption that a hearer is in some rational predicament with regard to some underlying question. It will also be remembered that the doctrine of rational predicaments had its origin in the attempt to parse the concept of a lack of understanding. Since the above condition does not contain an underlying question in its formulation, the notion of "rational predicament" is not needed in order to avoid unwanted implications and ambiguities in the statement "A does not understand $q$". As it stands the above formulation has the advantage of using "understanding" which is conceptually linked with explaining in ordinary language instead of a technical term which is not. It has the disadvantage of vagueness, however. "Event" and "state of affairs" do not indicate as precisely the kind of puzzlement (lack of understanding) which a hearer possesses or is assumed to possess as does the formulation employing the notion of an underlying question. There remains also the problem of attempting to provide an analysis of the concept of understanding but I will not attempt this here. For the purposes of this study, the important point is that there is a link between explaining and understanding.

As with describing and the other verdictive acts discussed previously, the above condition is loosened in order to accommodate "examination explanations" i.e., those cases of explaining in which, for
example, a student may believe that the instructor in fact does possess understanding.

(PC,2) S understands E or believes or goes on the assumption that he understands E.

This would represent a Searlian version of the "understanding" component of Martin's condition (b) with the "rationality" component deleted since it is covered by Searle's "normal input and output condition" (c).

The above condition is looser in one sense than is the analogous condition on describing, analyzing, and characterizing. There the knowledge possessed by a speaker must in fact be possessed by that speaker. To deny that a speaker possesses knowledge forces one to characterize the illocutionary act in another way, (perhaps as guessing or speculating). Understanding, however, is not as closely tied to a speaker in cases of explaining. Martin argues convincingly that a speaker in historical circumstances in one sense could be said to have explained in a historical sense, even though from the vantage point of history it could be seen that he in fact was mistaken in his explanation and, hence, did not possess understanding (see Martin, 1970, pp. 64-66). Her point can be illustrated through an example of a hunter and his guide. Consider a case in which a hunter does not understand why moss grows only on the north side of trees in a certain forest. The inexperienced guide believes this to be the result of the action of the wind and explains that the north side is more protected from the prevailing winds. He is wrong, however; the reason the moss grows on the north side is that moss needs moisture and the north side is protected from the drying action of the sun. In the above example the guide misunderstood the reason for the growth of the moss on the north side
of the tree. The hunter later learns the true explanation. At that point it seems possible for the hunter to both affirm and deny that the guide had in fact explained. He can characterize the episode as a historical event by saying that he explained (mistakenly); or he can claim that the guide merely attempted to explain.

(PC,3) The proposition $p$ must be of the appropriate type for that context of utterance.

This condition is one that is asserted only tangentially if at all in Martin's condition (d) of her Hypothesis Six. There she states that the speaker must state the "right answer" or what he believes or assumes is the right answer to the hearer. But explanatory questions are capable of receiving a variety of "right" answers and it is the individual context of utterance which dictates which answer is appropriate.

This condition may be illustrated by considering an explanation which is defective because the proposition was of the wrong type. Consider once again the case of the hunter and the inexperienced guide. The hunter wishes an explanation of why the moss grows on the north side of the trees. Instead of predicating certain causes, however, the guide provides a teleological explanation by replying that the moss needs moisture in order to grow. He has provided an explanation of why the moss grows on the north side of the trees. It is, however, the wrong kind of explanation and is, hence, defective. This condition is analogous to preparatory conditions on describing, analyzing, and characterizing in the sense that the particular context of utterance places restraints on what is appropriately referred to and predicated within that context of utterance.

(SC) $S$ believes $p$. 
This condition is analogous to other sincerity conditions on the
verdictive acts discussed above. A speaker who utters the proposition
p in any act of explaining implies that he believes the proposition.

It sounds inconsistent to say

* I explain the poem as a defense of middle class
morality but I do not believe that the poem is a
defense of middle class morality.

One would perhaps characterize the above utterance as joking or pretend­
ing to explain. Such an utterance cannot be taken seriously.

(EC) T counts an undertaking to the effect that Q
can be understood in terms of (as, as a result of,
as necessary in order that, etc.) p.

In the above formulation the relation between the explanation and
the proposition p can perhaps be formulated more precisely than by the
expression "in terms of" by giving a more precise account of the kind
of explaining episode under consideration. For example, "what" explana­
tions might use the expression "as"; causal "why" explanations might
use the expression "as a result of"; "how possibly" explanations might
use the expression "as necessary in order that", etc.

The above formulation is intended to capture a Searlian essential
condition component in Martin's discussion of an explainer's intention
to produce understanding in a hearer. When incorporated into Searle's
general condition three (GC,3), it would appear as follows:

S intends (i-1) to produce in H the knowledge (K) that
the utterance of T is to count as an undertaking to
the effect that Q can be understood in terms of (as,
as a result of, as necessary in order that, etc.) p.
S intends to produce K by means of the recognition of
i-1, and he intends i-1 to be recognized in virtue of
(by means of) H's knowledge of the meaning of T.

Conditions Implied in Interpreting. Using the above as a model,
one can now proceed to an analysis of the related illocutionary act of
interpreting. Necessary conditions are as follows:
(PCC) The illocutionary force indicating device for interpreting is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence (or larger stretch or discourse) containing a proposition (any proposition) \( p \).

As with explaining there does not seem to be any restrictions on the propositional content of an act of interpreting. This writer can think of no proposition which could not be given in an interpreting episode.

(PC,1) The speaker \( S \) knows, believes, or goes on the assumption that a hearer \( H \) lacks understanding of some state(s) of affairs or event(s), \( E \).

As with explaining, the above condition is loosened to accommodate "examination interpretations", episodes in which a student merely goes on the assumption that someone, say an instructor, lacks understanding.

One question that might be raised in the above is about the proper objects of interpreting. Interpretations are usually given of dreams, poems, works of art, oracles, people's expressions, gestures etc. Typically they are things about which one can say they possess significance or meaning. But it is not physical objects per se about which one lacks understanding but rather certain events or states of affairs denoted by the noun "dream", "poem" etc. It does not make sense to talk about "not understanding the tree" except insofar as this is understood as an elliptical expression for such events or states of affairs as "the tree's constant movement", "the tree's sudden blossoming", etc.

(PC,2) \( S \) understands \( E \) as \( p \) and \( S \) believes that he understands \( E \) as \( p \).

This condition differs from the analogous condition on explaining, it does not seem possible to attribute a lack of understanding to a speaker and still claim that he had in fact interpreted as a historical event. The above condition, thus, cannot be loosened to allow for
attributions of interpreting in historical circumstances where the interpreter was later proved wrong. This contrast between explaining and interpreting can be illustrated by comparing a hypothetical episode of interpreting.

Consider once again the case of a hunter and an inexperienced guide tracking game who stumble across footprints in the snow. The footprints are partially obliterated. The hunter asks what they mean. The guide interprets them to mean that a certain animal passed that way several days ago. He later turns out to be mistaken. An unusual gust of wind had obliterated these footprints in that area. Upon following the footprints over the hill, they discover that the tracks are really fresh and it is a different animal. In this case, as in the case of explaining, one could say that the guide had misunderstood. But in this case, unlike the case of explaining, it is not open to the hunter to claim that the guide had interpreted as a characterization of a historical event. It is not an act of interpreting at all but rather an act of misinterpreting. Interpreting, then, seems to have a stricter tie to the understanding possessed by a speaker.

The above condition also specifies that the understanding possessed by a speaker must also be something that a speaker believes that he possesses in interpreting. To say that

*I interpret the poem as a defense of middle class morality but I don't understand the poem as a defense of middle class morality.

sounds inconsistent. By way of contrast, it would not be inconsistent of a speaker to claim that he lacks knowledge:

I interpret the poem as a defense of middle class morality but I don't know that the poem is a defense of middle class morality.
is a perfectly acceptable statement. Contrast this with the oddity of, for example, describing:

*I describe the poem as long but I don't know that the poem is long.*

This again sounds inconsistent.

Interpreting then is conceptually linked with understanding on the part of a speaker. In this aspect it contrasts with some other verdictive acts previously discussed. This understanding in turns seems more rigidly tied to interpreting than it does in the related act of explaining.

(PC,3) The proposition \( p \) must be of the appropriate type for that context of utterance.

This is an analogous condition to the condition on explaining. One can use the example of a hunter and guide again to illustrate an interpretation which is defective because the proposition is of the wrong type for that context of utterance. In the previous example of interpreting, the guide was asked to interpret the meaning of the obliterated footprints in the snow. Imagine, however, the guide interpreting the footprints as a sign of God's indifference to the welfare of His creatures. In the context of the hunter and guide pursuing game, the interpretation is defective even though it is one way in which the footprints could be understood and it is an interpretation. There are restrictions, then, on the kind of proposition which can be expressed in particular interpreting contexts.

(PC,4) \( \xi \) lacks adequate or conclusive evidence for his understanding of \( \Xi \).

A major differentia between explaining and interpreting is the grounds upon which a speaker possesses his understanding. Understanding can be had on both conclusive and inconclusive grounds. For example,
someone can understand both the overall meaning of a poem and the dictionary meaning of a word. In the first kind of case, however, this understanding many times rests upon the basis of certain features in the poem: features which, in themselves, might not be conclusive support for the understanding of the poem as say a "protest against Fascist brutality". In the second case reference to what the dictionary states clearly is conclusive evidence.

Significantly, it is in the first kind of case that one would talk about interpreting. One would not talk about interpreting the dictionary meaning of a word but rather of explaining it. One might talk about interpreting this same word, however, should it occur in the text of a poem and the task was to present the meaning of that word in context. Here conclusive support for someone's understanding might very well be lacking. Cases where "interpreting" replaces the verb "explaining" are characteristically those in which adequate, decisive, or conclusive evidence is lacking or unavailable. One speaks about interpreting and not explaining the overall meaning of a poem, about interpreting and not explaining oracles, and about interpreting and not explaining dreams. In all of these cases decisive evidence is either lacking or unavailable. It is for this reason that sometimes a speaker's explanation is challenged with the comment "That's only your interpretation". It is for this reason also that one speaks about interpretive judgments but not about explanatory judgments. Judging shares this same feature of a lack of adequate or decisive evidence.

(SC)  S believes p.

Interpreting possesses a sincerity condition analogous to the one on explaining. It sounds inconsistent to say
I interpret the poem as a defense of middle class morality but I don't believe the poem is a defense of middle class morality.

In such circumstances a speaker could rightly be accused of insincerity.

(EC) \( T \) counts as an undertaking to the effect that \( O \) can be understood as \( p \).

The kind of understanding that one possesses in interpreting seems more restricted than is the kind of understanding possessed in explaining. One can understand something "as the result of such-and-such" or "as necessary in order that such-and-such" in explaining but this does not seem to be the case in interpreting. If someone interprets something he necessarily interprets it as something

I interpret the poem as a defense of middle class morality.

is acceptable. However

*I interpret the poem as the result of a desire to earn money.

*I interpret the poem as necessary in order that the poet might earn a living.

are odd. This suggests that there are not analogues of causal "why", or "how possible" explanations in interpreting.

Interpreting, then, is related to explaining in that they are both tied to the concept of understanding. This is a major differentia between this subgroup of verdictive acts and the group composed of describing, analyzing, and characterizing which are logically related to the concept of knowledge.

Examples of Explaining and Interpreting. Before presenting examples of interpreting by critics, by way of contrast, I preface these examples with an example of explaining: an utterance characterized by the critic, himself, as such. This passage is by the contemporary critic Leo Steinberg.
One well-known abstract painter said to me, "Oh, the public, were always worrying about the public". Another asked: "What is this plight they're supposed to be in? After all, art doesn't have to be for everybody. Either people get it, and then they enjoy it; or else they don't get, and then they don't need it. So what's the predicament?"

Well, I shall try to explain what I think it is, and before that, whose I think it is. In other words, I shall try to explain what I mean by "the public".

The men who kept Courbet and Manet and the Impressionists and the Postimpressionists out of the salons were all painters.

It serves no useful purpose to forget that Matisse's contribution to early Cubism -- made at the height of his own creativity -- was an attitude of absolute and arrogant incomprehension.

The academization of the avant-garde is in continuous process. It has been very noticeable in New York during the past few years. May we not then drop this useless mythical distinction between -- one [sic] one side -- creative, forward-looking individuals whom we call artists, and -- on the other side -- a sullen, anonymous, uncomprehending mass whom we call the public?

In other words, my notion of the public is functional [The word "public" for me does not designate any particular people; it refers to a role played by people, or to a role into which people are thrust or forced by a given experience.] And only those who are beyond experience should be exempt from the charge of belonging to the public.

As to the "plight" -- here I mean simply the shock of discomfort, or the bewilderment or the anger or the boredom which some people always feel, and all people sometimes feel, when confronted with an unfamiliar new style. (Steinberg, 1966, pp. 29-31)

I believe that the underlined passage in the preceding passage is, indeed, an explanation and not an interpretation. Steinberg explains what he means by "the public". He does not interpret what he means by that expression. Nor does it seem possible that he could interpret what he means since he, alone, is the final authority on what he means.
This clearly is a situation in which the speaker does have adequate evidence on hand in making the utterance.

By way of contrast, the three examples of interpreting which I present are clearly spoken in contexts in which decisive evidence is unavailable. The first passage by Herbert Read, interprets the subject matter of a painting by Bosch.

Bosch is characterized above all by his systematic symbolism — systematic in the sense that the same symbols, with obviously identical significance, appear in more than one work. But there are degrees of complexity in the meaning of these symbols; and discretion in the use of them. In The Vagabond, for example, the symbols are obvious enough. As I have already said, there is no good reason for identifying this figure with the Prodigal Son — the same figure is repeated on the exterior of the wings of the Hay Wain triptych and in this representation there is no brothel or inn, or other signs we would associate with the Prodigal Son. Moreover, the man depicted is elderly and he is seen passing through a landscape where various symbols of death (a skull, several bones, two black crows and a gibbet) are to be seen. In both versions the man is carrying a basket on his back, which is a symbol of prudence rather than of prodigality. [It is more reasonable to suppose that the figure represents a pilgrim, making his progress, like Bunyan’s Christian, through a wicked world.] (Read, 1970, p. 80)

This second example of interpreting is by the contemporary critic Max Kozloff. Kozloff, himself, (I believe correctly) characterizes his utterance as an interpretation.

Aside from the pioneer color-field artists who equated pretty much the whole pictorial zone with the artistic statement, the direction of much American painting has tended toward the enlargement of a characteristic image which then fills out or leaves mere slivers of the original ground showing.... [Quite a good deal of this development can be interpreted as a reaction against a vestigial appearance of drawing in a painting that had otherwise rejected the tenets of drawing in favor of a totally paint-conceived form of expression]. (Kozloff, 1965, p. 105).
The final example of interpreting which I present is by the noted historian Erwin Panofsky in a famous essay on a work by Albrecht Durer. By way of parenthesis, this whole passage is I believe also properly characterized as a complex speech act of interpreting as well.

[Thus Durer’s most perplexing engraving (Melancolia I) is, at the same time, the objective statement of a general philosophy and the subjective confession of an individual man.] It fuses and transforms, two great representational and literary traditions, that of Melancholy as one of the four humors and that of Geometry as one of the Seven Liberal Arts. It typifies the artist of the Renaissance who respects practical skill, but longs all the more fervently for mathematical theory -- who feels "inspired" by celestial influences and eternal ideas, but suffers all the more deeply from his human frailty and intellectual finiteness. It epitomizes the Neo-Platonic theory of Saturnian genius as revised by Agrippa of Nettesheim. But in doing all this it is in a sense a spiritual self-portrait of Albrecht Durer. (Panofsky, 1964, pp. 378, 379)

There are, indeed, similarities between the example of explaining and the three examples of interpreting which I have provided. All are attempts to inculcate understanding in an audience presumed to lack such understanding. In the example of explaining, Steinberg attempts to inculcate understanding of what he means by a certain expression. Examples of interpreting also seek to foster understanding. In the first example of interpreting, head attempts to inculcate understanding of the meaning of a depicted figure in a Bosch painting. In the second example Kozloff attempts to inculcate understanding of the development of recent American painting. And, finally, Panofsky attempts to inculcate an understanding of the meaning or significance of a Durer engraving.

In contrast to the example of explaining, however, the above three examples of interpreting are clearly spoken in a context in which decisive or conclusive evidence is unavailable to support the proposition.
uttered. In the example of explaining, Steinberg is the final court of appeal on what he means by the expression "the public". But in the first example of interpreting by Read, the meaning of the subject matter can only be gained through clues provided in the painting. These clearly are not conclusive or decisive even though they do support the interpretation of the main figure as a "pilgrim making his progress through the world". In the second example of interpreting, decisive or conclusive evidence is also lacking to support the interpretation of the development of recent American painting as a "reaction against a vestigial appearance of drawing". One wonders in this example what evidence could support such a conclusion: Perhaps the appearance of works of art or the statements of artists, but it is difficult to see how these could lend decisive support to Kozloff's conclusion. In the final example, decisive evidence is also lacking for Panofsky's claim that Durer's engraving is "an objective statement of a general philosophy and the subjective confession of an individual man". This claim also goes beyond the evidence provided by the appearance of a work of art and the historical documents cited by the critic. Interpretations in contrast to explanations, then, are given in a context in which adequate or decisive evidence is unavailable.

Having given an account of the illocutionary act of interpreting, I now proceed to analyses of the related illocutionary acts of evaluating and judging.

**Evaluating and Judging**

Evaluating along with appraising, assessing, grading, ranking and judging, etc. forms a subgroup of related verdictive acts. One way of expressing their relatedness is to say that they are concerned with
matters of value and other verdictive acts are not. This way of expressing this relationship, however, is misleading if value is taken as a grammatical notion. Although it is ordinarily the case that

The rose is red.

is not an evaluation and

The rose is good.

is quite often an evaluation, this distinction does not rest merely upon the choice of words,

The rose is good.

answered in response to "what is the meaning of that puzzling sentence?" might very well be an interpretation or an explanation. As an answer to the request to "Describe the lettering on the billboard", it could conceivably be a description.

Mitchell's Account of Value Predication

One way of contrasting acts of evaluating and judging with other verdictive acts, nevertheless, is to inquire into this matter of predicking value. One plausible account of this matter is offered by Dorothy Mitchell (Mitchell, 1973). Her account distinguishes between two types of value predication: general value predication as when one says that something is good, excellent, bad, etc. and specific value predication as when one says that something is healthy, sickly, trustworthy, grotesque, etc. Specific value expressions are used to predicate specific "virtues", "drawbacks", or "deficiencies" i.e., properties or putative properties which people "generally speaking" like or prefer, or do not like or prefer things to have (Mitchell, 1973, pp. 67, 68). The difference between these and other kinds of properties is illustrated in Mitchell's account by the contrast between "pretty" and "yellow".
"Pretty" is a value word because, generally speaking, it is the case in our society that people like or prefer things to be pretty. "Yellow" is not a value word in our society because it is not generally the case that, other things to the contrary, people prefer things to be yellow. It could conceivably become the case that people would prefer yellowness just as it could conceivably become the case that prettiness could cease to become a property that people liked things to possess. In that case "pretty" would cease to be a value word and "yellow" would become one. In making the above claims, the qualifier "generally speaking" is needed because it sometimes is the case that, for example, prettiness is not liked or preferred, and yellowness is liked or preferred.

Mitchell's account of general value predication is developed in light of an analysis of the term "good". In her account, the use of "good" as a general value predicate in an illocutionary act could be construed in a number of ways. In cases where it is usual to evaluate, (appraise, assess, etc.) a thing in a certain way, one can substitute a more specific value predicate or set of predicates for the term "good". This can happen where there exists conventions for evaluating, appraising, judging, etc.) things in certain ways. Knives, for example, are evaluated (appraised, judged, etc.) on their sharpness, ability to hold an edge, maneuverability, etc. In such cases to say that something is good is ordinarily taken to mean that it possesses just those properties. Usually this kind of general value predication occurs where objects or things have a specific use, purpose, or function.

Not all objects or things have a specific use, purpose, or function however. Towns, for example, are not things which are usually evaluated (appraised, judged, etc.) in some usual way. Where a general value
predicate such as "good" figures in these latter cases, its meaning cannot be reduced to one or a set of specific value predicates. The substitution of a specific value predicate adds to what was said in using the general value expression (Mitchell, 1973, p. 69). In these latter cases of general value prediction, one must inquire into the nature of the specific virtues, drawbacks, or deficiencies predicated where these are not clear from the context of utterance. In the performance of illocutionary acts concerned with value, then, there are two sorts of general value predicates: those which can be reduced by convention to specific value predicates and those which cannot.

13. Mitchell discusses two other cases where "good" is predicated as a general value expression. One case is where the predicate "good" means that something possesses aesthetic, moral, etc. virtues. These virtues are not discussed specifically. If an analysis of such particular virtues were undertaken it might be possible to decide whether the predication of a general value expression was linked by convention to a specific value expression or whether it was not. Without such an analysis this cannot be decided although, as with the two cases of general value predication discussed above, it seems reasonable to assume at least that a more specific value predication could be requested. If such is the case this use of "good" would be covered generally by the two cases of general value predication discussed above.

Another example of general value predication which she discusses involves cases where to predicate goodness is to claim that something is a virtue as in

Trustworthiness is a good.

I believe that this kind of value predicating occurs in acts of judging but not acts of evaluating. When one asks someone to evaluate something this "something" seems necessarily to be a thing existing in the real world. One evaluates claims, a student's performance, a method for increasing sales, etc. as in:

I evaluate John's performance as good.
I evaluate this chair as good.

in appropriate circumstances these seem straightforward illocutionary acts of evaluating.

But objects or things in the above sense are not things of which one could predicate that they are a good. One ordinarily does not say of a chair or a performance that it "is a good". The kinds of nouns which figure in such predications instead are nominalizations of adjectives. "Yellowness", "prettiness", "trustworthiness", etc. are all things of which one can say, grammatically, that it is a good. Thus
Mitchell's account of general and specific value predication is augmented by a hypothetical account of how specific properties of things come to be considered virtues, drawbacks, or deficiencies. In her account these notions are developed in learning the use of the word "good" (and, presumambly, other general value words as well). A hypothetical language learner with some things learns that certain properties or sets of properties must be possessed in order for that thing to be called good. Other kinds of things, however, are called good for quite disparate reasons. In these cases one learns to ask why something is good.

So one learns the meaning of "good" and other general value expressions by being presented with examples of specific properties which are needed by that thing in order that it be called "good", "bad", etc. A language learner in asking "What's good about it?" is presented with various paradigms of goodness. These paradigms of goodness quite

Yellowness is a good. 
Prettiness is a good. 
Trustworthiness is a good. 
are all acceptable but not 
*John's performance is a good. 
*The chair is a good. 

However, it is the latter and not the former kinds of nouns which are referred to in evaluating. One does not say 
*I evaluate yellowness as good 
*I evaluate trustworthiness as good 
nor can one say 
*I evaluate yellowness as a good. 
*I evaluate trustworthiness as a good. 

Acts of evaluating, then do not predicate general value terms in the sense of something being predicated as a virtue.

Judging on the other hand does seem to accommodate general value predications of something as a virtue. Unlike acts of evaluating, one can judge such things as yellowness and trustworthiness and

*I judge trustworthiness to be a good. 
*I judge yellowness to be a good. 

are perfectly acceptable.
conceivably could vary from language learner to language learner in a way, say, that the concept of a color could not. Such differences in people's sets of value paradigms accounts for the presence of value disputes. The fact that a value paradigm will often deal with a specific thing's efficiency or usefulness in order to fulfill that thing's use, purpose, or function, however, accounts for the fact that varying conceptions of goodness will to a large degree overlap and there will be agreement instead of dispute about the criteria of goodness, badness, etc. in particular instances.

One's conception of a virtue, drawback, or deficiency, then, is developed in light of various paradigms of these properties which one is given as a language learner. Differences in people's sets of value paradigms account for the presence of value disputes and the apparent inability at times to resolve such disputes. It would appear that in some value disagreements, dispute would arise not as much over whether a specific value property was or was not present but, rather, whether that property was or was not a virtue, drawback, or deficiency at all. Argument here would turn apparently on the "relatedness" of the given property to one's own stock of specific value paradigms. Since various people might possess difference sets of paradigms, value disputes in some of these cases might be irreconcilable.

Evaluating

Having given an account of specific and general value predication and the nature of the concepts of a virtue, drawback, or deficiency, I now turn to an analysis of the illocutionary act of evaluating. Necessary conditions for evaluating are the following:
The illocutionary force indicating device for evaluating is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence (or larger stretch or discourse) in which predicates of some object(s), person(s), action(s), process(es), or combination thereof either

(a) some specific value property or set of properties (virtues, drawbacks, deficiencies) or

(b) some general value property (for which a value property can be substituted by convention or by request).

This condition accounts for both the specific and general kinds of value predication discussed above. It is also a condition which distinguishes evaluating from such other verdictive acts as describing, analyzing, and characterizing. One can describe a billboard as having black letters on a white ground, analyze it as a symmetrical arrangement of letter forms, characterize it as vivid and colorful. One ordinarily could not predicate any of these properties in evaluating it because none of these properties ordinarily are virtues, deficiencies or drawbacks. I say ordinarily because in some contexts it might be the case that these properties are specific virtues, drawbacks, or deficiencies.

On the other hand, one ordinarily does not describe, analyze, characterize, or interpret something as good but it may indeed be possible to do this in some contexts. Consider, for example, the utterance

The sign says "good".

in response to a command to describe what the sign says, or again in a context in which the lettering is barely legible and someone requests and interpretation of the characters. In these cases it seems possible that the expression "good" could be used in both a description and an interpretation but in those contexts it is not a value property since one is not predicating a property that people prefer, like, or desire that thing to have.
The speaker $S$ knows, believes or goes on the assumption that a hearer $H$ does not know that $O$ possesses $V$ or $G$.

Preparatory conditions implied in evaluating raise the difficult question of whether it is possible to say that someone knows or does not know that some object, thing, etc. $O$ possesses a value property. In many contexts it seems to me one can make such a claim. Consider for example a context in which watches are being manufactured. Someone who inspects the watches pronounces them good or bad on specific and rigid manufacturing criteria. It seems that within this context one could say that an inspector knows that a certain watch was good or bad. Within contexts in which rigid conventions tie the attribution of general value properties to specific value properties, the claim to knowledge appears to be in order. The problem of attributing knowledge in evaluational contexts of course arises because these contexts are more limited in extent than is the case where other kinds of properties are predicated. A speaker outside of such contexts, who does not possess the same criteria of value, will reject a persons's claim to possess knowledge that such-and-such a value property applies.

It is not clear to me, therefore, that in every act of evaluating knowledge claims are in order. The above condition, therefore, although analogous to conditions on describing, analyzing, and characterizing is vague for a reason over and above the need to accommodate "examination" evaluations i.e., evaluations performed for the benefit of instructors or others who clearly do possess the relevant knowledge. The conceptual link to knowledge is not as clear or as rigid as it is, for example, in acts of describing, analyzing, and characterizing.

$S$ has adequate criteria (reasons, etc.) for predicing $G$ or $V$ of $O$. That is
(a) in cases where $\Phi$ is predicated, $S$ can support this predication by citing a more specific value property or properties and/or a non-value property or properties which are acceptable to $H$ and applicable in that context or

(b) in cases where $\Psi$ is predicated, $S$ can support this predication by citing a more specific value property or properties $\Psi$, and/or a non-value property or properties $\Xi$, which are acceptable to $H$ and applicable in that context.

This condition is analogous to preparatory conditions two and three on describing, analyzing, characterizing, and interpreting. I find it convenient to combine the notions of a speaker's status and the requirements of a particular context of utterance within one omnibus condition in this case.

This condition is weaker than analogous conditions specifying the speaker's status in describing, analyzing, and characterizing. There, analogous conditions require that a speaker possess knowledge that some $\Theta$ possesses a property. This requirement seems too strong in the case of evaluating. It does seem possible to say

I evaluate the pupil's performance as excellent but I don't know that it is excellent.

whereas with -- for example -- describing, the denial of knowledge seems inconsistent with the claim that one has described:

*I describe the pupil's performance as erratic but I don't know that it is erratic.

Mitchell's account offers one explanation of why this requirement might need to be weaker in evaluating. To possess knowledge in evaluating it would need to be true that $\Theta$ indeed possessed $\Psi$ or $\Phi$. To establish generally that value properties are present in $\Theta$, however, may be impossible in a way that is not the case with establishing the presence of other properties which are predicated. Therefore, within
a particular context in which particular conventions prevail, someone might well characterize the speaker of an evaluative utterance as possessing knowledge. Outside of such a context, however, someone might be reluctant to characterize a speaker in this way.

If the attribution of knowledge to a speaker is a context-bound affair, however, it is clearly a necessary requirement that the speaker has criteria or standards for predicating a value property and that these criteria be both acceptable to hearer and applicable within that context of utterance. To illustrate this, let us consider a paradigm example of an evaluational context. This example is taken from a text on research in education.

Evaluating the Problem

Before the proposed research problem can be considered appropriate, several searching questions should be raised. Only when those questions are answered in the affirmative can the problem be considered a good one.

1. Is this the type of problem that can be effectively solved through the process of research? Do the data exist upon which a solution may be based?

2. Is the problem significant? Is an important principle involved? Would the solution make any difference as far as educational theory and practice are concerned? If not, there are undoubtedly more significant problems waiting to be investigated.

3. Is the problem a new one? Is the answer already available? Ignorance of prior studies may lead a student to needlessly spend time on a problem already investigated by some other worker.

While novelty or originality is an important consideration, the fact that a problem has been investigated in the past does not mean that it is no longer worthy of study. There is constant need for verification of the findings of previous investigations, using newer and better devices and procedures. There is also a need for the testing of former findings under changed cultural conditions.
4. Is the problem feasible? After a research project has been evaluated, there remains the problem of suitability for a particular researcher. While the problem may be a good one, is it a good problem for me? Will I be able to carry it through to a successful conclusion? Some of the questions that should be raised are:

(a) Do I have the necessary competence to plan and carry out a study of this type? Do I know enough about this field to understand its significant aspects and to interpret my findings? Am I skillful enough to develop, administer, and interpret the necessary data-gathering devices and procedures? Am I well-grounded in the necessary knowledge of statistical techniques?

(b) Are pertinent data accessible? Are valid and reliable data-gathering devices and procedures available? Will school authorities permit me to contact the students, conduct necessary experiments or administer necessary tests, interview teachers, or have access to important cumulative records? Will I be able to get the sponsorship necessary to open doors that otherwise would be closed to me?

(c) Will I have the necessary financial resources to carry on this study? What will be the expense involved in data-gathering equipment, printing, test materials, travel, and clerical help? If the project is an expensive one, what is the possibility of getting a grant from a philanthropic foundation or agency?

(d) Will I have enough time to complete the project? Will there be time to devise the procedures, select the data-gathering devices, gather and analyze the data, and complete the research report? Since most academic programs impose time limitations, certain worthwhile projects of a longitudinal type are precluded.

(e) Will I have the courage and determination to pursue the study in spite of the difficulties and social hazards that may be involved? Will I be willing to work aggressively when data are difficult to gather and when others are reluctant to cooperate?

Will I be willing to risk the criticism, suspicion, or even opposition that a delicate or controversial study may raise? Sex education, racial integration, communism, and other controversial problems are almost certain to stir up emotional reactions in certain quarters. (Best, 1959, pp. 21, 22)
I would submit that an utterance such as

This research problem is good.

spoken by someone in the above context, someone who had understood and applied the above criteria, would indeed constitute a paradigm example of evaluating. In the above context, the speaker clearly would possess criteria and these criteria would be both acceptable to a hearer and applicable within that context of utterance.

Let us consider for a moment these criteria, their acceptability and their applicability. In the above context, the four criteria or reasons for predicing the general value property of goodness are clearly evident. They are the more specific virtues of solvability, significance, newness, and feasibility. Criteria for the predication of these specific value properties are also present. In the case of feasibility they are the more specific value properties of researcher competence, data accessibility, possession of financial resources, availability of time, and possession of courage and determination. Finally, criteria for each of these specific virtues (which, in themselves function as criteria for a more general value predicate) conceivably could be specified as well. In this final case they might not be value properties at all but rather such properties as aggressiveness, unrelatedness to sex education, racial integration, or communism, etc. A speaker in the above context, then, clearly would possesses criteria for the predication of a general or a specific value property.

In the above example of an evaluational context, the criteria would be both acceptable and applicable. The acceptability is reasonably assured because the criteria for both the general and the specific value properties are specified in advance. Before a speaker predicates
a value property both he and the putative hearer are agreed on the kind of criteria which are to be used in that context of utterance. The applicability of the criteria are reasonably assured because specific value properties and non-value properties ground more general value properties. These specific properties are not subjective properties of a speaker and/or a hearer but objective features of a putative research problem. Hence, their presence or absence can be objectively decided. Utterances predicing such properties, then, are testable.

Of course the requirements that criteria be both acceptable and applicable are vague requirements. There is obviously a great range of cases between acceptability and nonacceptability. On the one extreme we have value situations in which rigid and fixed convention between speaker and hearer link the value predicate to certain criteria. On the other extreme we have situations in which the criteria held by a speaker are personal and idiosyncratic. I would maintain that paradigm instances of evaluating are those in which there exists at least a fairly well defined convention linking the criteria to the value predicate. Such a convention is exhibited in the paradigm example of evaluating cited above. Criteria are carefully specified in advance for both general and specific value properties.

The second component of this condition is also vague. It specifies that the agreed upon criteria must be applicable in order for the value utterance to be considered an evaluation. In the paradigm example of evaluating, for example, the number of criteria needed to ground predication of a research problem as good are clearly stated. But even in this highly formalized context it is not patently clear that a problem, having satisfied all but one of the criteria superbly, and failed to
satisfy one marginally, would not also qualify as a good research problem. Moreover it seems difficult to specify precisely when some problem would or would not possess a certain specific value or non-value property. Specifications for specific criteria are in themselves vague.

However, speaking in general terms, it is a necessary condition in evaluating that both the speaker and hearer are in agreement that the criteria for the predicating the value expression are both acceptable and applicable as criteria. This condition is one that distinguishes evaluating from judging the value of something. A speaker who predicates a value property of something may, indeed, characterize his own utterance as an evaluation. But if a hearer believes that the criteria which the speaker uses in predicating that value property are inappropriate or unacceptable, or if he cannot determine when the criteria apply, then it is open to the hearer to claim that the speaker was merely expressing his judgment.

The condition specifying possession by a speaker of criteria for a value predicate clearly differentiates evaluating from describing and interpreting when expressions such as "good" or "bad" figure as predicates in such illocutionary acts. In describing what the sign says as "good", for example, one is not thereby committed to the possession of criteria for that predicate. Nor is it the case when one interprets the meaning of barely legible lettering on the sign as good. This condition also helps to discriminate evaluating from the behabitive act of criticizing. If someone evaluates something as bad, he implies that he has criteria or reasons for that thing being bad. If one criticizes something, however, no such implication is involved. This condition, then, separates evaluating from several other critical illocutionary acts being considered in this study.
(SC) _S_ believes that _O_ possesses \( V \) or \( G \).

It is again inconsistent to evaluate something as such-and-such and to claim that one does not believe that it possesses that value property. Consider the oddness of

*I evaluate the student's performance as excellent but I don't believe it was excellent.*

This sincerity condition is analogous to ones implied in other verdictive illocutionary acts discussed above.

(EC) _T_ counts as an undertaking to the effect that _O_ possesses \( V \) or \( G \).

This condition also is analogous to conditions implied in describing, analyzing, and characterizing. In conjunction with Searle's general condition three (GC,3) it specifies the kind of knowledge a speaker intends to produce in a hearer.

**Examples of Evaluating.** Evaluating I believe plays a marginal role in the discourse of critics about matters of value. This is not to say that critics do not evaluate, they undoubtedly do. It is to say, however, that the conventions linking value predicates to criteria are often fluid or nonexistent in aesthetic contexts. It is also to say that many times the criteria for the value property predicted is subjective and untestable. Undoubtedly, one of the reasons for this is that works of art in many genres (painting, sculpture, prints, drawings) either lack a single fixed, and socially agreed-upon function or else that function is taken to be one of inducing enjoyment, pleasure, interest, etc. in a viewer. In the first kind of case it would seem difficult to specify criteria that all or even many hearers could accept as appropriate, objective (extra-bodily) criteria that would allow different parties to arrive at similar value decisions and to settle value
disputes. It would take much argument to firmly establish both of these points and I do not wish to argue these points here. But I have found, however, that contemporary critics of those artistic genres noted above seldom predicate such general value expressions as "good" or "excellent". They are much more inclined to predicate specific value expressions of works of art. And in predicating general value expressions, their remarks tend to be uninformative and to stand in need of further amplification.

Such artistic genres as architecture, furniture design, and ceramics are more closely identified with certain socially agreed upon functions and the criteria for predicating value expressions tend to be more firmly established by conventions. It would, however, be a gross exaggeration to say that works of architecture, for instance, have only one function to fulfill. A single work of architecture might conceivably have several competing and conflicting functions. In many instances, then, the value predicates ascribed to even functional works of art will not be as firmly established by convention as is the case in some nonaesthetic contexts. Many, and perhaps most of the utterances predicated in aesthetic contexts, then, can be characterized as value judgments and not evaluations precisely because the acceptability and applicability of the criteria or reasons held by a speaker can be disputed by members of his audience.

In presenting examples of evaluating I begin by selecting examples taken from criticism of one of the functional arts. Works of architecture often have clear socially-defined functions and it is in such contexts that one could expect the criteria for predicating value properties to be firmly established by convention. Interestingly enough,
however, the paradigm example of an evaluational context which I present by an architectural critic is one that many people would consider of only borderline relevance to aesthetic matters. When this same critic becomes more concerned with evaluating aesthetic matters, one becomes increasingly unsure about the acceptability of her criteria as criteria.

I begin not by presenting an actual example of an evaluation but rather of an explanation offered by an architectural critic of why a construction company working on a particular building was successful. This passage, nonetheless, illustrates a paradigm example of an evaluational context and in such a context an utterance by the critic that the company's performance was successful or good would surely constitute an act of evaluating. This passage is taken from a critical review of a building constructed for the Johns-Manville Company by the Architects Collaborative.

Central to Turner's success as construction manager at J-M was its use of the fast-track schedule, which helped keep costs as low as possible in a period of rapid price escalation, as well as keeping the project moving on time by prepurchasing of materials. As an example, Joseph Consigli, general manager, real estate for J-M, cites the early purchase of structural steel well before completion of the final skin design as saving more than six months of price inflation estimated at between $250,000 and $500,000. Other prepurchased materials were stored at the site, and subcontractors and suppliers were reimbursed for advance deliveries of materials and equipment.

In all, Meyer estimates that total savings to Johns-Manville through the use of the fast-track method total over $2 million on steel and other materials and systems.

It was after consideration of all these factors that Turner prepared final estimates that were then accepted and became a guaranteed maximum price for the duration of the project. It was procedures such as these and the early and continuing interaction among TAC, Turner and J-M that produced such impressive results in terms of schedule and budgets. (Schmertz, 1977, p. 100)
In this passage, it is clear that the implied evaluation of the company's efforts as successful is based upon specific and definite criteria held by the critic. Moreover, one can hardly doubt that the criteria used by the critic could be otherwise than what they were. It seems difficult to dispute that saving money and retaining projected building schedules are appropriate criteria for evaluating the performance of construction companies.

In this next -- more distinctively aesthetic -- example of evaluating by the same critic, the criteria she uses, I suspect would not be as firmly established by convention. They appear nonetheless appropriate and, hence, acceptable as criteria. The evaluation is of the detailing and fabrication of the aluminum curtain walls of the building.

[the aluminum skin is beautifully detailed and fabricated... as are the cafeteria skylights ... and the great lines of window.] (Schmertz, 1977, p. 97)

The above utterance is clearly an example of evaluating. Specific value properties "beautifully detailed and fabricated" are predicated of the aluminum skin of the building. Although perhaps more disputable, the critic also has criteria for her predication of these value properties as the surrounding context of the article makes clear:

The J-M building has one of the most beautiful aluminum curtain walls ever seen. It is illuminated by a wide open desert sky, of course, and changes magnificently with the light, so much of the credit for its splendor must go to nature. But it doesn't "tin can", its color is even, its joints are precise. The skilled hand of man must be praised also as it labored in the drafting rooms of TAC and the fabricator. What makes this skin so wonderfully smooth and flat?

In the system developed by TAC and the fabricator's engineers, the panel skin is not welded to the stiffeners. Instead the panel is essentially "hung" on the stiffeners and allowed to ride "free" or "float". The stiffeners are anchored to the building as before, and provide the necessary bracing to meet performance specifications.
As temperatures change, the panel skin changes dimension but — since it is not confined by welds — it does not distort. Color uniformity of the panels was checked by means of electronic color quality control equipment in the fabrication plant. (Schmertz, 1977, p. 100)

The criteria which Schmertz uses are even color, precise joints, and undistorted panels, technical properties which (presumably) are difficult to achieve and ones to be desired in the construction of aluminum skin curtain walls. It seems difficult to dispute the appropriateness and, hence, the acceptability of such criteria.

By way of contrast, I now present a number of examples of value predication from critics concerned with painting as an artistic genre. Here, one would expect that conventions linking criteria to value properties would be less rigid. Here, also, there is no specific function that the work of art must perform, unless it is that of creating a subjective enjoyment. Given this, one would also expect that there would be considerable disagreement about the acceptability and the applicability of the criteria used by the critic. It is for this reason that I find it problematic to characterize many of these utterances as evaluations. The first passage that I present is characterized by the critic, himself, as an evaluation but I believe it is such in only a borderline sense of that term.

[In spite of his occasional successes in his late years, he is often a heavy-handed painter of dense, airless landscapes that, neither French nor American, reveal nothing much more than the limitations of an imagination that was more active than effective.] If this heretical evaluation escapes strenuous objections from readers of this book, it could mean that Inness's inflated reputation is on the wane. (Canaday, 1969, p. 1064)

Canaday characterizes his utterance as an evaluation and, to someone in agreement with Canaday, his utterance might, indeed, constitute an evaluation also. Canaday does possess criteria but, whereas, the
architectural critic possessed criteria which seem uncontroversial enough, Canaday's criteria are disputable as he himself tacitly admits. It seems open to someone in disagreement with him to challenge the criteria he does employ and to demand more specific and testable criteria for the negative value predicates ("heavy-handed painter", "dense, airless landscapes", "limitations of ... imagination", etc.) which are used as criteria. Someone in disagreement with Canaday, then, might well characterize his utterance as a value judgment.

The borderline status of many value utterances in aesthetic contexts as evaluations can be illustrated through the presentation of other examples. This next passage is from the writings of the artist and critic Donald Judd in a review of the paintings of Kenneth Noland. Although general value expressions are predicated in the two bracketed passages, I find it difficult to characterize either one as anything more than a judgment of value on Judd's part.

Kenneth Noland: It's obvious that Noland is one of the best painters. The earliest painting in this retrospective is one done in 1956. The next was done in 1958. There are three from 1959 and then there are the circles. There are thirty-seven paintings in the show. I would like to have seen some of the rotary ones that were shown at French and Co. in 1959 and some from the Tibor de Nagy shows of 1957 and 1958. [Most of the circles -- 1960, '61 and '62 -- are very fine]. Some of the later paintings are almost as good and some aren't. This show requires of course a fairly precise evaluation of Noland's work, but with this space, I'm not going to try it. A beginning, though, would be with the difference between the circular paintings, such as Turnsole, Inner Way, and Reverberation, and the angular paintings of the last couple of years, such as Half Way and Bend Sinister, which were shown at Emmerich last fall. [The circular paintings are more unusual, and they are very often excellent.] The angular ones are less remarkable, and a few are somewhat bland, though bland by Noland's ability, not in the usual sense. The circle is not more unusual as a form than the angle. The bands work as well in the angular paintings as in the circular ones. One difference is that most of the bands
in the circles are separated by equal bands of canvas or by breadths of it and that most of those in the angles are adjacent. Possibly this may flatten and otherwise fix the bands and the space around them. (Judd, 1975, pp. 166, 167)

Judd does offer some minimal criteria for his predication of general value predicates "very fine" and "excellent" but I believe that the criteria which he offers ("unusualness", "separation of painted bands by bands of canvas") are clearly unconvincing. They are either vague (and, hence, lack testability and applicability) or disputable (and, hence, lack acceptability). This I believe is tacitly admitted by Judd, himself, when he states that a more precise evaluation is needed.

Thus, I maintain that many of the value utterances of critics are only evaluations in a borderline sense of that term since agreement about the acceptability and/or the applicability of the criteria is lacking. This is not to say that critics do not evaluate. They do, as the paradigm examples of evaluating which I have presented show. It is to say, however, that conventions in aesthetic contexts are not as precisely fixed as in some other contexts. Having given examples of paradigm and borderline examples of evaluating, I now turn to an analysis of the related verdictive act of judging.

Judging

Judging, as it is commonly construed in aesthetic contexts is an act related -- and often thought interchangeable with -- acts of interpreting and evaluating. It is, thus, a likely candidate for consideration as a generic illocutionary act. In this section, however, I narrow the focus of inquiry. Instead of attempting an analysis of the general illocutionary act, I offer an analysis of judging in those contexts in which a general or a specific value property is predicated of some
object or thing.^{14} It is this narrow use of the term "judge" which is
dominant in the educational metacritical discussions under consideration
in this study.^{15}

Necessary conditions for value judging are the following:

(PCC) The illocutionary force indicating device for
value judging is to be uttered only in the context of
a sentence (or large stretch of discourse) T the utter­
ance of which predicates of some object(s), person(s),
action(s), process(es), O, either

14. In this analysis, I also exclude from consideration those
instances of general value predication in which something is claimed
to be a virtue as in
Trustworthiness is a good.
As I have argued above (footnote 13) these might also be judgments.
Here, however, I am interested in those instances of judging where
general or specific value properties are predicated of some object
or thing such as a work of art, etc.

15. What are the conditions for the use of the indicator of
illocutionary force for the general illocutionary act of judging?
These are I believe, the following:
(PCC) The illocutionary force indicating device for
judging is to be uttered only in the context of a
sentence (or larger stretch of discourse) T containing
a proposition (any proposition) p.
(PC,1) The speaker S knows, believes, or goes on the
assumption that a hearer does not know (understand,
etc.) p.
(PC,2) S lacks adequate or decisive evidence for the
truth of p.
(SC) S believes p.
(EC) T counts as an undertaking to the effect that p
represents an actual state of affairs.
I shall not present an argument for the above conditions nor shall
I cite examples of the general illocutionary act of judging. It
is worth remarking, however, that the above conditions are ex­
tremely vague and this vagueness accounts for the ability of
someone to say that he judges in interpretive contexts and in con­
texts in which value expressions are predicated. Judging there­
fore, is a good candidate for a general illocutionary act of the
type that Searle mentions (Searle, 1969, p. 69).
(a) some specific value property or set of properties (virtues, drawbacks, deficiencies) $V$ or

(b) some general value property $G$ (for which $V$ can be substituted by convention or by request).

This condition is the same as the propositional content condition on evaluating. Like evaluating, it seems that one can predicate both a general value expression and a specific value expression in judging. One can judge something to be good, excellent, bad, etc. and one can judge something to be trivial, lyrical, ill-proportioned, etc.

(PC,1) The speaker $S$ knows, believes, or goes on the assumption that a hearer $H$ does not know that $O$ possesses $V$ or $G$.

This condition is again the same as the analogous preparatory condition on evaluating. It, also, raises the problematic question of the conceptual link with knowledge. It is also loose for reasons over and above the need to accommodate "examination" judgments performed for the benefit of someone possessing the relevant knowledge.

(PC,2) $S$ has criteria (reasons, etc.) for predicking $G$ or $V$ of $O$ but these critiera are not adequate. That is

(a) in cases where $G$ is predicated, $S$ can support this predication by citing a more specific value property or properties $V$ and/or a non-value property or properties $X$; but $V$ and/or $X$ are either nonacceptable to $H$ or lack applicability in that context, or are both nonacceptable and lack applicability; or

(b) in cases where $V$ is predicated, $S$ can support this predication by citing a more specific value property or properties $V$ and/or a non-value property or properties $X$; but $V$ and/or $X$ are either nonacceptable to $H$ or lack applicability in that context, or are both nonacceptable and lack applicability.

Although it seems possible to deny that someone has judged the value of something if that person has no criteria or reasons for predicating a certain value expression, value judgments are made in
contexts in which the criteria for predicating a value expression are in dispute or considered in some way inadequate. Aesthetic contexts, as I have previously noted, are typical examples of such contexts since there exist few firmly-established conventions for predicating value expressions and the relevant criteria are often subjective in nature. Hence criteria for predicating general value expressions many times do not have a general acceptability and lack applicability. Criteria for predicating specific value expressions are perhaps more firmly established by convention but even here it would seem that considerable disagreement could exist about the acceptability and applicability of criteria. As in the analogous condition on evaluating, this condition is also vague. It is necessary in value judging that one has inadequate reasons or criteria for one's judgment but to say that they are inadequate leaves a great range of cases between acceptability and non-acceptability and between applicability and nonapplicability. Moreover, the balance between acceptability and applicability is imprecise.

(SC) S believes that O possesses V or G.

This also is the same as the analogous condition on evaluating. It is inconsistent to judge something to be such-and-such and simultaneously claim that one does not believe that it possesses that value property. Consider the oddness of

*I judge the student's work to be good but I don't believe it is good.

This sincerity condition is also analogous to sincerity conditions implied in other verdictive acts previously discussed.

(EC) T counts as an undertaking to the effect that O possesses V or G.
This essential condition also is the same as the one on evaluating and is analogous to essential conditions implied in other verdictive acts. In conjunction with Searle's general condition three (GC,3) it specifies the kind of knowledge a speaker intends to produce in a hearer.

**Examples of Judging Value.** I present here four examples of value judgments made by critics. All I believe are value judgments and not evaluations precisely because the criteria for predicating the value expression are either disputable and, hence, lack acceptability, or else they lack applicability. The first example by the contemporary critic Nicolas Calas is of a review of the paintings done by the contemporary painter Alan D'Arcangelo.

In a recent series of "roads", D'Arcangelo increased the distance between reality and its abstract rendition by reducing the highway landscape to a broad central green band placed between two narrow bands, a blue one above and the other below forming a geometric black-and-white pattern. At times the sky itself forms a "road" dividing the green plane in two, at others a road sign set against the green makes the work appear particularly "abstract". [These paintings are remarkably attractive; they fascinate the viewer much the way the road stretching before him fascinates the driver.] (Calas, 1968, p. 205)

The above passage is a judgment because Calas apparently uses his own subjective reaction as a criteria for predicating the specific value property of attractiveness. Such criteria lack testability and, hence, applicability.

The second example of judging is from a critical history of landscape painting by the noted critic Kenneth Clark, who in this passage is discussing early paintings of the English artist Turner:

To our eyes these pictures are successful in proportion as they depart from their originals. [Calais Pier
and the Frosty Morning, in which the Dutch models are completely transcended, are fine popular paintings; ...] (Clark, 1961, p. 98)

Although criteria are apparently used in predicking the specific value expression "fine popular paintings", Clark specifically acknowledges their disputability. At one time, apparently, other criteria were employed in determining the value of Turner's paintings.

The final example of judging is by the English critic Herbert Read. Here I believe the characterization of this utterance as a judgment rests as much upon the lack of applicability of his criteria as it does upon the acceptability of his criteria as a guarantee of the value property.

[Vermeer is also one of the supreme masters of colour harmony.] The choice of a particular gamut of colours is no doubt determined by the unique sensibility of the painter: a personal preference in colours is as arbitrary as a personal taste in food or wines. But the harmonization of the preferred colours, their disposition in proportioned areas within the picture-space, their degree of saturation, their modulated tones -- all these subtleties of application are achieved by skill, skill in the preparation or mixing of colours and in the manipulation of brushes. (Read, 1970, p. 92)

In all three of the above examples of judging, value expressions are predicated of some objects or things. Implied in all of these utterances is the critic's belief that these objects or things possess those value properties. And in each of those utterances the context suggests that the critic predicated those value expressions on the basis of criteria which are either disputable or inapplicable and, hence, inadequate as a guarantee of that value property.

Having given accounts of evaluating and judging, as well as other illocutionary acts of c- ing, I now turn toward a discussion of the significance of these findings for metacritical definitions of critical terms and their use in educational settings.
Metacritical Definitions and Their Use in Educational Settings

This chapter has been devoted to characterizing individual illocutionary acts of criticizing by stating distinctive sets of propositional content, preparatory, sincerity, and essential conditions implied in their successful performance. This was done, first by comparing and contrasting various related illocutionary acts, and second by examining and discussing various model analyses of illocutionary acts in the literature. Finally, these findings were checked by citing examples of these illocutionary acts taken from the actual writings of various critics in the visual arts. Of the various illocutionary acts of criticizing investigated, criticizing stands alone as a distinctive behabitive act. The remaining illocutionary acts of criticizing form three subgroups within the family of verdictive acts. Illocutionary acts within each subgroup appear related by the fact that they share similarities in their propositional content, preparatory, sincerity, and essential conditions.

The findings of this chapter are significant both for the metacritical task of defining critical terms and the uses which educational metacritics make of such definitions in educational settings. In this section, I resume once again my discussion of the comprehensiveness of metacritical accounts of critical terms and I discuss some metacritical problems in need of resolution. I, then, discuss the need to distinguish between the generic sense of the term "criticism" and the illocutionary act sense of the term "criticism" in educational settings. Finally, I discuss some conceptual problems that may arise in prescribing certain curriculum roles for criticism in education settings.
Metacritical Definitions

At the end of the previous chapter, I suggested that metacritical accounts which claimed to be providing a comprehensive account of critical discourse in setting forth definitions of a limited number of critical terms, were either stipulating meanings for those terms, or else were offering false reportive definitions. I left open the possibility, however, that critical terms could designate illocutionary acts of some broad and comprehensive types standing as genus to species to other, more specific, illocutionary acts. I think that the findings of this chapter cast further doubt on such a possibility. Critical terms, as I have shown in this chapter have a rather limited range of application in the total discourse of a practicing critic. There is no reason not to believe, for example, that practicing critics estimate, explain, rank, rate, classify, define, distinguish, praise, condemn, elucidate, etc. as well as perform illocutionary acts indicated by critical verbs.

As I stated previously, an inadequate set of categories is I believe at least part of the reason why metacritics have tended to fasten upon a restricted set of critical terms. Either these terms are pressed into service to cover a multitude of illocutionary acts or else a significant part of critical discourse is not considered to be philosophically interesting. Significantly enough, the usual trilogy of critical terms which form the focus of metacritical discussion i.e., "description", "interpretation", and "evaluation" fall into distinct subgroups of verdictive acts. It may well be the case that in the attempt to provide a comprehensive theory, metacritics construe critical terms vaguely in order to cover a multitude of related illocutionary acts.
There is, however, the possibility that critical terms can be construed as designates of various broad illocutionary acts, acts related as genus to species to other more specific illocutionary acts. Although the previous analysis of critical illocutionary acts has neither been precise enough nor extensive enough to provide a definitive answer to whether acts of investigating can be construed in this way, it is possible to at least tentatively consider such a possibility. Perhaps a distinction between a generic and specific illocutionary acts could be based upon a principle of "least restriction". Generic illocutionary acts of investigating would have vague propositional content, preparatory, sincerity, and essential conditions. More specific members of this class of illocutionary acts would share these conditions, but these conditions would be constituted more precisely. On such a hypothesis describing, for example, might be viewed as a generic verdicive act since the conditions governing describing appear to be less restrictive than the conditions governing acts of analyzing and characterizing. But even if this is conceded, the range and comprehensiveness of a given illocutionary act of investigating would still appear to be sharply restricted. Therefore, the claim that critical acts of investigating are generic illocutionary acts would seem to be one that is unfounded.

Problems in Need of Further Resolution. This chapter has sought to distinguish among illocutionary acts of investigating by providing characteristic sets of defining conditions. For the purposes of this study I believe that the analyses given in this chapter are adequate if limited. They provide a rough characterization of simple idealized cases of illocutionary acts of investigating allowing one to distinguish among
paradigm instances of such acts and to appraise the truth or falsity of purportedly reportive definitions offered by metacritics.

The chief difficulty in giving a totally complete analysis of illocutionary acts of saying as I have stated previously, lies in the vagueness of words used in ordinary language. I believe that the present analysis allows one to discriminate one illocutionary act of saying from another and to point out borderline cases of such acts when they impinge upon one another. When illocutionary acts of saying border on other kinds of illocutionary acts, however, distinguishing among these would be problematic since specification of conditions for these other acts is lacking. Here I believe the present analysis points to a relevant problem in need of further analysis. All but one of the critical terms under consideration in this study reside within the group of verdictive acts. A more extensive analysis of conditions underlying other members of this group holds promise for allowing one to more precisely discriminate the boundaries of acts of saying and to resolve a set of problems of traditional interest in the philosophy of criticism.

The distinction between simple and complex illocutionary acts suggests further problems in need of analysis. One problem that is raised is how complex acts of saying are distinguished from one another. Simple acts of saying are distinguished from one another on the basis of conditions governing their successful performance. What, however, enables someone to characterize a set of sentences such as a paragraph or even an article as an act of saying? This characterization can be done presumably, even when such a paragraph or article contains many kinds of simple illocutionary acts. This question perhaps reflects
a general philosophical uncertainty about how acts generally are individuated from one another. Further clarification of this problem in the philosophy of action might help to clarify this problem in the philosophy of aesthetics as well. Some of the problems that metacritics attempt to solve can also be construed as problems about the constituency of complex speech acts of c-ing. When metacritics discuss the nature of reasons used to support interpretive or evaluative judgments or the structure of critical arguments, they are not attempting to determine constitutive rules governing the performance of simple illocutionary acts. Perhaps a more complete understanding of illocutionary acts would help to resolve such problems.

Concepts of Criticism in Educational Settings

The findings of this chapter help to clarify a number of points related to criticism as an educational topic. One significant finding of this chapter is the distinction between criticizing and other illocutionary acts of c-ing. Criticizing, as I have shown is an act quite different from other acts of c-ing. Indeed, it is the only member of the family of behabitive illocutionary acts. As a member of this family it is related to such other "negative" acts as blaming, denouncing, censuring, and condemning.

From a pedagogical standpoint, it is perhaps unfortunate that the acts to be performed by students or teachers in an educational context are collectively called criticizing since it is extremely doubtful that educators or others would actually recommend that students perform illocutionary acts of criticizing. Educators are not recommending that students criticize works of art (illocutionary act sense) but rather that they criticize works of art (generic sense). The two
concepts of criticizing, however, are easily confused and this confusion could, unwittingly, be the source of considerable hostility toward programs of education in the arts. Indeed, it would be difficult to justify programs or courses of study in which students merely make negative utterances about works of art. To avoid confusion, then, it would be well to distinguish between the two concepts of criticizing. I shall, hereafter, refer to the acts performed by students when they criticize works of art by performing individual illocutionary acts of criticizing as generic acts of criticizing and I distinguish these acts from illocutionary acts of criticizing.

A second way in which the findings of this chapter help to clarify criticism as an educational topic is by making explicit certain presuppositions behind performances of illocutionary acts of criticizing. In describing, analyzing, characterizing, interpreting, evaluating, and judging certain abilities are required of a speaker. Describing, analyzing, and characterizing require various kinds of knowledge of the object or thing being described. Interpreting requires an understanding of that which is being interpreted. Evaluating and judging require that someone possess criteria for something being evaluated and judged.

To my knowledge, the fact that certain abilities are required of a speaker in order to perform illocutionary acts of criticizing is one that has not been recognized in the literature of educational metacriticism. This has serious consequences for the prescriptions made by educational metacritics since many of them construe criticizing as a method by which certain educationally desired goals can be achieved. Implied in these prescriptions, as I will make explicit in the next chapter of
this study, is that the population (often public school teachers or students) have the ability to perform the acts in question. In failing to recognize that certain specific abilities are a **prerequisite** of someone performing acts of *c* ing, educators may be advocating logically inconsistent prescriptions since it may be a moot point whether the population for which the method is prescribed actually possess the abilities required. I believe that this problem is especially acute when interpreting is construed as a method because interpreting requires that someone possess an understanding of that which is being interpreted. Yet understanding of works of art is often cited as one of the major **goals** to be achieved **through** the use of interpreting as a method of criticism. The importance which some educational metacritics attach to interpreting as a method, then, could be the result of a logical muddle. These and similar issues I take up in the next chapter of this study.
CHAPTER V
THE ROLE OF CRITICISM IN EDUCATIONAL SETTINGS

Overview
In this chapter I attempt to clarify the prescriptive role of criticism in recent curriculum discussions. In order to do this I distinguish among criticism as (a) a teaching method, (b) a learning method, (c) a teaching goal, and (d) a learning goal. In the first two kinds of prescriptions, criticism is the means by which certain educationally desired goals are brought about. In the second two kinds of prescriptions, criticism is the goal or end itself. Raising these distinctions allows one to sort out various prescriptive conceptions of criticism in the literature. I illustrate these conceptions with selections taken from various curriculum discussions. Finally, I lay the groundwork for a logical appraisal of prescriptions offered by educational metacritics by discussing certain necessary conditions implied in successfully making each kind of prescription.

Introduction
One characteristic feature of educational metacriticism is that the definitions of critical terms which are formulated are offered in a context intended to have prescriptive force. Educational metacritics assume that criticism will figure in various educational settings in certain ways. That is, educational metacritics either explicitly make certain prescriptive utterances or they assume that within the context
in which their definitions are presented, a certain prescriptive role (or roles) for criticism is understood to exist.

Although it is possible to distinguish among several logically distinct kinds of curriculum prescriptions for criticism, this has not been done in the literature. This, indeed, is one of the more serious problems with the curriculum literature concerned as it is with criticism as an educational topic. Failure to make explicit various logical distinctions in the prescriptive role of criticism raises serious problems about the intelligibility of prescriptive utterances. Utterances which employ a nominalization of a critical verb, for example, could conceivably be construed in a variety of ways. Consider, for example, the following:

Criticism should be included in newer curricula in the arts.

Where it is not clear what the prescriptive role of criticism is and where there exists a variety of roles prescribed for criticism, such utterances are radically ambiguous. Prescriptive utterances which use a form of a critical verb can also be ambiguous in the same way in those contexts in which certain "conceptual components" of such prescriptive utterances are not explicitly specified. In the first section of this chapter, I shall maintain that there exists a variety of possible prescriptive roles for criticism. Hence, there is reason to believe that some curriculum prescriptions for criticism may be ambiguous in the context in which they are uttered.

Having given an account of various logically distinct prescriptive roles for criticism in educational settings, I turn in the next section of this chapter to a discussion of the problems inherent in attempts to compare and classify various existing curriculum prescriptions for
criticism. The chief difficulties here lie not only in the ambiguity of prescriptive utterances in themselves, but also in the complex variety of possible prescriptions within the logically distinct prescriptive roles previously discussed. That is, the "conceptual components" of the prescriptive roles for criticism which I delineate can be construed in a variety of possible ways. Finally, the problems inherent in comparing and classifying curriculum prescriptions for criticism are exacerbated by the vagueness inherent in the way many conceptual components of curriculum prescriptions are specified -- when they are specified at all. I illustrate all of these problems with selections from the curriculum literature.

In the last section of this chapter, I inquire into necessary conditions implied in successfully making teaching and learning method, and teaching and learning goal prescriptions for criticism. These conditions will be used as a basis for logically appraising the curriculum prescriptions offered by various educational metacritics.

**Criticism as Method and Goal**

In classifying the prescriptive roles of criticism it is important to note at the outset that my concept of an educational prescription is not bounded by the illocutionary act of prescribing. Instead, I believe that curriculum prescriptions form a loose group of illocutionary acts, acts which include prescriptions, recommendations, advisings, counselings, enjoinings, etc. Although in a later section of this chapter I inquire into certain conditions implied in making criticism prescriptions -- using once again concepts derived from Searle's theory (Searle, 1969) -- it is not important here that I distinguish among such illocutionary acts. The conditions I discuss, I believe
would underlie all of the relevant utterances propounded by educational metacritics under consideration here.

In order to clarify the prescriptive role of criticism, I begin by formulating schematic analyses of prescriptive utterances using the generic concepts of teaching and learning. I shall then locate prescriptions for criticism as more specific examples of teaching and learning prescriptions. In using the concepts of teaching and learning, I believe that they are central concepts in the educational enterprise and comprehensive enough to capture the kinds of curriculum prescriptions with which I am interested.

"Teaching" and "learning" have a number of senses which parallel the senses established for critical verbs in Chapter II of this study. The verbs "teach" and "learn" fall into three of the four categories of verbs in the classification of verb phrases proposed by Vendler (Vendler 1967). They have uses as activities, as achievements, and as states. As activities "teach" and "learn" accept the continuous present tense in response to the query "What is x doing?" And, like other activities, teaching and learning are goal-oriented active doings since the simple past tense of such verbs implies that a climax, completion, or terminus has been reached to that activity. "Teach" and "learn" also accept the present indicative tense and in that tense can be used to predicate both momentary episodes and episodes which endure over a period of time.

1. I am here ignoring senses of "teach" and "learn" which indicate non-intentional processes of one sort or another (see Scheffler, 1965, pp. 10,11 and Hirst, 1973, p. 171). My justification for doing this is that I believe these senses are of little relevance to the curriculum prescriptions which I shall consider in this and subsequent chapters.
In formulating prescriptions using "teach" and "learn" I am interested primarily in their uses as active doings, doings which can be spoken of at two levels of discourse. There may indeed be teaching and learning prescriptions in which teaching and learning are used in a state sense but I shall not be explicitly concerned with these here. As active doings, teaching and learning can be talked about at both an "enterprise" level and a specific act level. At the enterprise level the intended goal of the active doing of teaching is to bring about learning. "Learning" here can be construed as either some activity of the learner or as some end state to be achieved by a learner. The intended goal of the active doing of learning at the enterprise level is to bring about some change in the specific state of the learner. These goals at the enterprise level define both the intentions of a teacher and learner respectively and that which needs to be achieved in order for the active doings of teaching and learning to be successfully performed acts of their type.

One also speaks of the active doings of teaching and learning at a more specific level of discourse. Here the enterprise of teaching is seen to consist in the performance of a number of more specific acts, acts which can be characterized in a variety of ways. Thus a teacher in teaching might perform acts of demonstrating, telling, citing, explaining, etc. and a learner in learning might perform acts of reporting, conjecturing, defining, comparing, etc. It is at this specific level of discourse that acts of c-ing and other illocutionary acts might be perceived as acts of teaching and learning. I shall

2. For this distinction I draw upon P. H. Hirst (Hirst, 1973).
maintain that two of their prescriptive roles can be defined in just this way. At this level of discourse, the intention and goal of the active doing of teaching is not to produce learning nor can the intention and goal of learning be adequately described as merely the attempt to bring about a change in the state of the learner. At this level, the goals and intentions of the acts of teaching and learning are those implied in the successful performance of specific illocutionary acts themselves.

Having related acts of \( \text{c} \) ing to the generic active doings of teaching and learning, there remains the problem of specifying the conditions under which an illocutionary act of \( \text{c} \) ing can be considered an act of teaching and not, say, as an act of selling or politicking. I shall not attempt to resolve this problem here since I believe that a successful answer to this problem would reside in discriminating teaching and learning contexts from other contexts. If such a discrimination rests upon the intentions held by a speaker as some appear to suggest (c.f., Hirst, 1973) then it is likely that characterizing illocutionary acts of \( \text{c} \) ing as specific acts of teaching and learning would — at least in part — depend upon the intentions that a speaker possesses.

The Structure of Teaching and Learning Prescriptions

In order to clarify the prescriptive role of criticism, I begin by discussing the "conceptual structure" of curriculum prescriptions. using the generic concepts of teaching and learning as active doings. I believe that such teaching and learning prescriptions exhibit a characteristically different structure and this structure can usefully be employed in discriminating between two major ways in which
prescriptions for criticism could be construed. By substituting various uses of critical terms in various components of each of these structures, one can distinguish four possible roles for criticism in educational settings. These roles are

1. as a teaching method
2. as a learning method
i.e., as the means by which certain educationally desired goals may be brought about;
3. as a teaching goal
4. as a learning goal
i.e., as the end or outcome of teaching or learning itself.

Using a verb in conjunction with an auxiliary such as "should" or "ought" is a conventionally accepted means of performing prescriptive illocutionary acts. When such auxiliaries are combined with the verbs "teach" and "learn", differences in the number of "conceptual components" or "arguments" are required in order for such utterances to be conceptually complete. Conceptual completeness is here distinguished from grammatical completeness. The following are grammatically complete utterances:

Jones should teach Smith.
Jones should teach English.

3. In making these distinctions I shall for the present ignore prescriptive utterances dealing with criticism which employ nominalizations of verbs in their formulation. I believe that an adequate explication of the meanings of such utterances can be given in terms of the schematic analyses of prescriptive utterances which I develop.

4. I borrow the term "argument" here as well as this general approach to analyzing prescriptive predicates from Fillmore (1974, pp. 370-380).
If in the above utterances "Jones" and "should teach" were deleted, one would have an utterance which was grammatically unacceptable. One cannot say any of the following:

*should teach Smith.

*Jones Smith.

*should teach English.

*Jones English.

Even though these utterances are grammatically complete, they may, however, be conceptually incomplete in contexts where certain information about other conceptual components is missing or is not provided.

The utterances:

Jones should teach Smith.

Jones should teach English.

are grammatically complete but they are conceptually incomplete in themselves, since here certain information about other conceptual components is not provided. Conceptually (as well as grammatically) complete prescriptive utterances using the verbs "teach" and "learn" with the auxiliary "should" are the following:

Jones should teach Smith how to criticize works of art.

Jones should learn how to criticize works of art.

The conceptually necessary components of such prescriptive utterances as the ones above may be assigned certain labels. Here, following Fillmore (Fillmore, 1974), I prefer to assign generic rather than specific labels to the "roles" fulfilled by these conceptual components.5

5. Fillmore labels these conceptual roles "cases".
I do this in the belief that there is a similarity of role between prescriptive utterances using a variety of verbs. In the first of the above utterances, for example, instead of labeling Jones as a teacher and Smith as a learner, I shall label the roles played by these conceptual components as "agent" and "audience" respectively. In the second of the above utterances Jones also is an agent even though he is a learner.

There are five roles fulfilled by conceptual components of the prescriptive utterances with which I am interested. They are as follows:

1. **Act**: the active doing(s) predicated by the verb.
2. **Goal**: that which is to be achieved as a result of the act(s).
3. **Agent**: the person(s) who act(s) or instigate(s) the event(s).
4. **Audience**: the person(s) to whom the act is directed.
5. **Object**: the object(s) or thing(s) acted upon or considered by the agent(s).

The components necessary for prescriptive utterances using the verbs "teach" and "learn" to be conceptually complete, then, may be illustrated as follows:

- **Agent**  **Act**  **Audience**  **Goal**
  Jones/should teach/Smith/how to criticize works of art.

- **Agent**  **Act**  **Goal**
  Jones/should learn/how to criticize works of art.

There are, thus, two major differences between prescriptive utterance using the verbs "teach" and "learn". In teaching prescriptive utterances, an **audience** is conceptually required and the goal is some modification in the state of this **audience**. In learning prescriptive utterances, an audience is not conceptually required and the goal is some modification in the state of the **agent**. Thus, at the outset there would seem to be two conceptually distinct kinds of general prescriptions.
which can be given in curriculum settings. Curriculum prescriptions which specify both an audience and a goal which is a change in the state of an audience, I shall label (somewhat arbitrarily) as teaching prescriptions. Prescriptions which do or do not conceptually require an audience but in which the goal is a change in the state of an agent, I shall label (somewhat arbitrarily) as learning prescriptions.  

Various distinctions among such teaching and learning prescriptions can be proposed based upon the kind of goal which is to be achieved through the act or acts of teaching or learning. There are a number of distinctions which can be profitably employed at this point. Educators often propose a variety of goals, and for a number of reasons. One can distinguish among proximate goals which are to be achieved directly through the act or acts of teaching or learning, distant goals which are to be achieved at a later point through another act or other acts, and incidental goals which are to be achieved as a by-product, as it were, of the specific teaching or learning acts in question. My concern at this point is with the proximate goals of teaching and learning prescriptions.

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6. There are thus two kinds of prescriptions which I am including in the stipulated concept of a learning prescription: (a) prescriptions in which an audience is conceptually required and in which the goal is a change in the state of the agent and (b) prescriptions in which an audience is not conceptually required and in which the goal is a change in the state of the agent. The reason that both cases are included is that "learn" as I am using it here is a generic act. Some of the specific acts which can be substituted for it conceptually require an audience but some do not.
My concern also is with those goals which are end states in the learner. Obviously, goals can be proposed which are not states but rather some further doings of an agent or audience. I shall not be concerned with such goals here. In clarifying goals of teaching or learning prescriptions, I shall use the distinctions Scheffler makes among teaching and learning that, teaching and learning how to, and teaching and learning to (Scheffler, 1958, pp. 76-101; 1956, pp. 14-21) in order to distinguish among several logically distinct kinds of goals. In using these distinctions, I do not claim that they exhaust all possible types of teaching and learning goals but these distinctions are comprehensive enough to capture the kinds of goals with which I am interested and they do offer one possible basis for analyzing proposed curriculum goals which are only vaguely specified.

Teaching that and learning that according to Scheffler involve the teaching and learning of beliefs and, under circumstances in which this belief is true, the teaching or learning of propositional knowledge.7 Thus, propositional knowledge and belief are the goals of the following teaching and learning prescriptions.

Jones should teach Smith that Washington is the capital of our country.

Jones should learn that Washington is the capital of our country.

Jones should teach Smith that Washington was the second president of our country.

Jones should learn that Washington was the second president of our country.

7. I am here ignoring "active" interpretations of teaching or learning prescriptions when the sentential complement of "teach" or "learn" is a norm. See Scheffler (1958, pp. 78-95).
In the first two prescriptions the sentential complement of "teach" and "learn" is true and, hence, the goal is a "knowledge that" goal. In the second two prescriptions, the sentential complement is false and, hence, the goal is merely a belief.

Teaching **how to** and learning **how to** according to Scheffler involve the teaching or learning of skills or trained capacities (knowledge how to"). Prescriptions illustrating these goals are the following:

Jones should teach Smith how to ride a bicycle.

Jones should learn how to ride a bicycle.

Finally, teaching **to** and learning **to** according to Scheffler involve the teaching or learning of active propensitives or attainments. Prescriptions with propensities as goals are the following:

Jones should teach Smith to attend class punctually.

Jones should learn to attend class punctually.

Prescriptions with attainments as goals are the following:

Jones should teach Smith to understand (perceive, appreciate) works of art.

Jones should learn to understand (perceive, appreciate) works of art.

Thus there are several logically distinct kinds of goals which can figure in teaching and learning prescriptions. In all of the above goals, the end to be reached through teaching and learning is some change in state of a learner or learners. These end states can usefully be regarded as dispositions (although dispositions of disparate types).

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8. I am here ignoring that sense of "know how" which does not involve practice.
The Role of Criticism in Teaching and Learning Prescriptions

I have established earlier that critical verbs parallel the verbs "teach" and "learn" in having uses as active doings and as states. Various versions of critical terms, therefore, can appear as act and goal components of teaching and learning prescriptions. Where some version of a critical term appears as an act (or series of acts) in a teaching or learning prescription, I shall say that criticism is prescribed as a teaching or learning method, that is, as a means toward the achievement of a certain goal. My conception of a method here, I believe, adequately captures the sense in which educational metacritics actually do speak about criticism as a method in curriculum settings although, to be sure, they do not distinguish between methods of teaching and learning. Where some version of a critical term appears as a goal component of a teaching or learning prescription, either by itself or in conjunction with some other expression, I shall say that criticism is prescribed as a teaching or learning goal. I believe that this conception of a goal captures the sense in which educational metacritics sometimes speak of criticism in terms of certain kinds of content to be taught or learned.

Although both of the above roles for criticism are logically distinct, it would seem possible (and sometimes, indeed, necessary) that both kinds of goals be espoused simultaneously. If an educational metacritic, for example, prescribes criticism as a skill or trained capacity, practice in criticizing would seem to be required in order for this capacity to be achieved. A student then would perform acts of
criticizing and these acts would be at least one of the means by which the end goal of criticizing came about; although as Martin (1961, p. 63) points out, these acts in the context in which they are considered practice would not be considered acts of criticizing.

The Structure of Teaching and Learning Method Prescriptions for Criticism. When acts of criticizing replace the generic acts of teaching or learning in a curriculum prescription, a characteristically different conceptual structure is required for completeness. In addition to the agent, act, audience, and goal such prescriptions conceptually require some specification of an "object" in order to be complete.

Jones should criticize to Smith in order that Smith may come to understand works of art.

presupposes some prior knowledge in the hearer of that which is to be criticized. Thus, the above sentence can be regarded as an elliptical expression of a prescription such as

Jones should criticize the work of art to Smith in order that Smith may come to understand these works.

Conceptually complete teaching and learning method prescriptions for criticism are the following; for teaching prescriptions:

agent  act  object  audience
Jones/should criticize/work of art/to Smith/in order that Smith may come to understand these works.

for learning prescriptions:

agent  act  object  audience
Jones/should criticize/work of art/to Smith/in order that/he (Jones)/may come to understood these works.

It is worth pointing out by way of digression that, whereas teaching method prescriptions for criticism require an audience, this is not
always the case with learning prescriptions for criticism. I have previ­ously established in Chapter II that there can be certain mental active doings of criticism i.e., that certain activity and achievement uses of critical verbs have uses in mental contexts. Since the goal of learning prescriptions is to be achieved or attained by the agent and not by an audience, it is conceivable that mental active doings of criticism could figure in learning method prescriptions for criticism. This is not the case for teaching methods for criticism.

In discussing teaching and learning method prescriptions for criticism, there are two complexities which can be mentioned at this point. In both teaching and learning method prescriptions for criticism, one or a series of critical acts can be prescribed. There would thus appear to be a great range of possible teaching and learning method prescriptions in the literature given that different educational metacritics employ different sets of critical terms. I shall talk more about this in the next section of this chapter.

In discussing teaching and learning method prescriptions, also, I have not treated prescriptive method utterances which employ various nominalizations of critical verbs. There are a great variety of possible formulations here, but I believe that they can be accounted for by the concepts of teaching and learning methods previously discussed. Consider for example the following:

- Criticism should be performed by students when confronting works of art in the classroom.
- Criticizing is the appropriate means to lead students to an appreciation of art.
- Criticizing of works of art is a feasible way of teaching students.
In each of the above, criticism can be construed as an act or series of acts to be performed by an agent in order to achieve a certain goal; although, to be sure, not all of the conceptually required components of method prescriptions for criticism are explicitly set forth.

The Structure of Teaching and Learning Goal Prescriptions for Criticism. Criticism can also be prescribed as the goal or outcome of teaching or learning since critical terms can be used to indicate states either alone or in conjunction with other expressions. Here, there is a great range of possible goals of criticism. I shall be content merely to illustrate some of the goal possibilities for teaching and learning that, teaching and learning how to, and teaching and learning to prescriptions. The conceptual structure of prescriptions with criticism as a goal are the same as teaching and learning prescriptions with other goals so I shall not explicitly illustrate these components here.

Criticism, first of all, could conceivably figure in certain "teaching and learning that" prescriptions. Consider, for example,

Smith should teach Jones that criticism consists of four separate steps or stages.

Smith should learn that criticism consists of four separate steps or stages.

Here, there would seem to be a great variety of possible criticism goals bounded only by the facts or beliefs about criticism that one thinks important that students learn. Criticism could also figure in "teaching and learning how to" prescriptions.

Smith should teach Jones how to criticize works of art.

Smith should learn how to criticize works of art.

Finally criticism could figure in "teaching and learning to" prescriptions as both propensities;
Smith should teach Jones to criticize works of art.

Smith should learn to criticize works of art.

or attainments:

Smith should teach Jones to understand criticism.

Smith should learn to understand criticism.

In all of the above goal prescriptions for criticism, "criticism" is being used in its generic sense. Because a variety of different critical terms are used by different educational metacritics, there would seem also to exist the possibility of a great variety of goal prescriptions for criticism in the literature.

Thus, at the outset there would appear to be at least four logically distinct kinds of possible prescriptions for criticism. Criticism can be prescribed as method of teaching, as a method of learning, as a goal of teaching, and as a goal of learning. As logically distinct prescriptions each requires a characteristicly different structure for conceptual completeness. Teaching method prescriptions for criticism require specification of an agent, act, audience, goal, and object. In such prescriptions the goal is to be achieved or attained by the audience. Learning method prescriptions for criticism require specification of an agent, act, goal, and object. In some of these prescriptions an audience is required; in some it is not required. In all learning method criticism prescriptions, however, the goal is to be achieved or attained by the agent. Prescriptions for criticism as a teaching goal conceptually require specification of an agent, act, audience, and goal. Like teaching method prescriptions for criticism, the goal is to be achieved or attained by the audience. Unlike teaching method prescriptions for criticism, no object is conceptually required. Finally, prescriptions for criticism
as a learning goal conceptually require specification of an agent, act, and goal. Sometimes they require an audience and sometimes they do not. In all learning goal prescriptions for criticism, however, the goal is to be achieved or attained by the agent.

Within these logically distinct types of criticism prescriptions, there could appear to be a great range of possible prescriptions since metacritics employ different sets of critical terms in formulating prescriptions. In the next section of this chapter I shall address more explicitly the problems inherent in classifying and comparing such prescriptions.

Classifying and Comparing Prescriptions for Criticism

There are several contributing factors to the problems inherent in any attempt to classify and compare prescriptions for criticism in the literature. As I have shown in the previous section, there exists at least four logically distinct prescriptive role possibilities for criticism. Each of these possibilities possesses a characteristically different structure and different sets of conceptual components in each kind of prescription need specification in order for them to be considered conceptually complete. Thus, at the outset criticism prescriptions can be of various logical types.

Within these types, prescriptions can still differ from one another in various ways. I have mentioned that various educational metacritics have formulated prescriptions with different sets of critical terms. This suggests that the specific illocutionary acts in method prescriptions and the specific goals in content prescriptions for criticism could differ widely in the literature. I have not discussed the
possibility of differences in other conceptual components of prescriptions for criticism but clearly such a possibility exists. Various educational metacritics could specify different groups of people as agents and audiences, and different kinds of objects might be the focus of different illocutionary acts of criticizing. It seems reasonable to expect a wide diversity in specifications of the conceptual components of criticism prescriptions.

The distinction between grammatical completeness and conceptual completeness suggests another problematic factor in the attempt to classify and compare criticism prescriptions. A given prescriptive utterance may be grammatically acceptable without, however, any specification being given of the conceptual components needed if that utterance is to be completely understood. For example, merely an agent and an act might be specified in a context in which understanding is presumed to obtain about other conceptual components. Such an utterance could be considered grammatically acceptable since it contains both a subject and a verb even though it is conceptually incomplete. Some conceptual components of a criticism prescription might never by specified by an educational metacritic under the assumption that agreement exists about these components in the literature. This problem is especially acute when nominalizations of critical verbs are used since here, neither an agent, an act, nor a goal need be specified in order for grammatical acceptability to be achieved. Consider, for example the following:

Criticism should be included in newer arts curricula.

These possibilities suggest that many prescriptions for criticism might be uninformative in the context in which they are uttered since, although grammatically acceptable, they are conceptually incomplete. Or, worse
still, such utterances could be ambiguous since different conceptions of agents, acts, audiences, objects, and goals could exist in the literature.

The ambiguity and vagueness of ordinary language is a third contributing factor to the problems inherent in classifying and comparing prescriptions for criticism in the literature. "Criticism", itself, is both an ambiguous and a vague term as I have consistently maintained in this study. The fact that it can be used to denote both active doings and states is, I would suggest, one reason why the distinction between method and content prescriptions for criticism has gone unrecognized in the literature. The vagueness of "criticism", however, is also a problem in the sense that different sets of related concepts are subsumed under this term. The use of the term "criticism" without further specification of those concepts is likely to be both uninformative or misleading. Vagueness also enters into the way various other conceptual components of criticism prescriptions are specified in a given prescriptive utterance. Agents and audiences, for example, might be specified in quite general terms or specific populations might be precisely identified. Objects of the specific teaching or learning acts of criticizing might be specified vaguely in some prescriptions and more precisely in others. Comparing different prescriptions for criticism, then, would seem to call for judgments about the similarity of, or differences in, conceptual components where these components receive different formulations in various prescriptive utterances.

Having given an account of the problems inherent in classifying and comparing different prescriptions for criticism, it nevertheless seems to me important that some attempt be made to relate various kinds
of prescriptions for criticism in the literature. I shall undertake the task of comparing the prescriptions of three metacritics in three subsequent chapters of the study by considering their definitions and prescriptions in some detail. In the remaining part of this section, I illustrate the four conceptions of criticism prescriptions previously distinguished by citing passages from the curriculum literature dealing with criticism. In citing these passages, I shall comment on problems of vagueness, ambiguity, and lack of specificity in such passages divorced as they are from the contexts in which they appear. In doing so, I intend no criticism of the authors nor do I claim that such passages accurately represent their only viewpoints (although I do claim that these passages represent at least part of their published prescriptive views of criticism whether or not these views are presently held). It would be manifestly unfair of me, however, to represent these selected passages as accurate or complete expositions of the writers whom I cite. My purpose in using these passages is to illustrate some of the apparent scope of curriculum prescriptions for criticism, some of the variety of ways in which such prescriptions have been formulated, and some of the problems inherent in assuming that there is an easily understood, or uniformly specified prescriptive role for criticism in the literature.

Criticism as a Teaching Method

Prescriptions for criticism as a teaching method conceptually require specification of an agent, an act, an object, an audience, and a goal. The two passages which I cite are examples of such prescriptions. There are differences, however, in the various conceptual components which are specified and some of the components are either vaguely indicated or are not indicated at all.
In the first selection criticism is prescribed as a teaching method used to achieve one or a number of logically different goals. That is, criticism is construed as an active doing (a physical active doing) used by teachers to bring about a change or changes in students. Since understanding and appreciating are attainments (states in Vendler's classification) and experiencing and encountering are doings, these goals are of logically distinct types. The objects in this passage are summarily specified as simply works.

Critical talk [by teachers] could function to facilitate student understanding; appreciating, experiencing, or encountering a work. (MacGregor, 1971, p. 14).

In the second passage I cite, there are several differences in the specified components when this passage is compared with the previous selection. Criticism is here construed in terms of the making of judgments (it is not construed solely in this way by the previous author). The skill of making judgments is also projected as the proximate goal of judging. Whether there is some further, distant goal comparable to the goals projected by the previous writer is not clear from this passage. The object is more precisely specified as the art works of public school students.

The public school art teacher has neither the awesome task of criticizing the work of mature professional artists, nor the difficult job of making clear the nature of criticism and art or of talk about criticism and art. Nevertheless he would do well to seek guidance from critics and philosophers for he does make judgments about the artwork of his students. He makes judgments every day. And if he is a good teacher he tries to get his students to make judgments about their own work and about the visual arts and artifacts to be found in their culture. If these are critical judgments -- judgments in some way supported or defended -- they can be improved, and hence teaching can be improved, if a clearer understanding of such a common activity in the artroom were achieved. (Ecker, 1967, p. 5).
Criticism as a Learning Method

Criticism is also frequently prescribed as a method of learning. Here, specification of an agent, an act, an object, and a goal is required for conceptual completeness but specification of an audience is optional.

In the first passage, criticism could perhaps be construed as both a teaching and a learning method. I present it here as a learning method, one that would allow students to gain "artistic knowledge" of literary works of art. What this sort of knowledge is and how it differs from other sorts of knowledge is not clear from this passage nor is it clear what sorts of active doings fall under the general concept of criticism.

I have been maintaining that the effective teaching of literature depends in the least upon two considerations. First, that teachers, and a fortiori teachers of teachers, become aesthetically more knowledgeable. Until they are capable of giving to their students a workable methodological approach to a particular art form, there will be no way of testing when claims to artistic knowledge are warranted; and the methodology of art criticism is the business of aesthetics. (Kaelin, 1964, p. 306).

Another conception of criticism as a learning method advocates four kinds of active doings. These acts differ from those prescribed in other passages which I have cited. Such acts would enable the agent (learner) to achieve or attain the goal of perception. It is not clear in this passage whether "perceive" is to be construed as an active doing or as an attainment. Neither the agent, the audience, nor the kind of object is clearly specified.

Exploratory criticism (description, analysis, characterization, interpretation) has been suggested as a set of techniques a learner can use to perceive an object as completely as possible. (Smith, 1973, p. 44)
Another conception of criticism as a learning method construes it in terms of the more specific act of evaluation. Although the agent is specified (high school students) neither the objects nor the goal of evaluating is clear from this passage.

Criticism, as it will be discussed here, is a verbally expressed act of evaluation .... Criticism also involves a general procedure followed by an individual whenever he states and supports an opinion or conclusion, ... It is suggested here that high school students can learn certain general principles of criticism and can learn to apply them in any field of discourse where evaluations are expressed and explained. (Aschner, 1971, pp. 425-426)

A rather startling construal of criticism as a learning method is proposed in this passage by Eisner. Here the "object" to be criticized is the classroom and the activity of students and teachers in a classroom. The agent in this prescription is not the public school student but rather public school personnel. It is a learning method prescription because the goal will be achieved or attained by the agent. Such a goal, however, differs widely from other goals projected in the literature. This knowledge goal has little or nothing to do with aesthetic matters.

By making these aspects of educational life visible, the teacher, supervisor, school administrator, or school board member is in a position to make judgments about them. Thus, educational criticism provides educational policy and the more narrowly defined aspects of educational decision making with a wider, more complex base of knowledge upon which to deliberate. (Eisner, 1976, pp. 148-149).

A final conception of criticism as a learning method also projects a number of "nonaesthetic" goals as an end to this method. From this passage alone one is unable to decide whether the goals are proximate, distant, or incidental goals. Nor is it clear who the agent is although the objects obviously are works of art (in reproduction).
There are certain character-building consequences of practising criticism in education. One of them it seems to me is learning how to take chances.... In addition to learning how to take chances, you have to learn how to cope with disagreement.

Every time we see a work, we see it under different circumstances. We need not apologize for the fact that we are looking at reproductions; they too afford authentic aesthetic occasions for the exercise of criticism. We learn many facts — ordinary information about man, about history, geography, economics and social relations — from the examination of art objects. Even if we are not searching for this sort of information it crops up anyway. It seems to me a very inexpensive way of finding out a great deal in a short time. (Feldman, 1973, pp. 51-54).

The above passages I believe demonstrate that two logically distinct method roles have been projected for criticism in educational settings. The above passages also demonstrate that there is no one unitary conception of an agent, act, audience, object, or goal in the literature. In what follows, I focus on the goal of teaching and learning prescriptions where that goal is construed in terms of the concept of criticism. Because the passages which I cite do not distinguish specifically between teaching and learning prescriptions, I shall concentrate here on examples of criticizing as a teaching or learning that, as a teaching or learning to, and a teaching or learning how to, ignoring for the moment the distinction between teaching and learning prescriptions.

Criticism as a Teaching or Learning Goal

The dominant way in which criticism is projected as a goal is in terms of a skill or set of skills i.e., as a trained capacity or set of capacities. Occasionally, however, metacritics speak of a goal of criticism in other terms. In the first selection I cite, criticism can be construed as "knowledge that". This passage is taken from a method
text for elementary teachers (Gaitskill and Hurwitz, 1975) and illustrates the way one educational metacritic (Edmund Feldman) approaches the task of teaching students how to criticize works of art. In this session the students are taught that "interpretation involves advancing a hypothesis".

Dr. F: O.K. Now, that's as far as we have to go in making a description and identification of what is plainly to be seen in this work .... It is a fairly complete inventory, as I call it, of what's there and to make this inventory doesn't require any special knowledge .... The next step, which is, in a way, a continuation of the inventory, is what I call formal analysis ....

Let's make an attempt now at what's called interpretation .... Now what is interpretation? Interpretation involves advancing a hypothesis, a possible idea which will be a kind of basket and contain all these things that we have been talking about, .... (Gaitskill and Hurwitz, 1975, pp. 464-467).

Occasionally, also, the goal of criticism is prescribed in terms of a teaching or learning to, that is as an active propensity, as in the following:

... Learning how to do something, say exercising an aesthetic critical skill, and actually employing that skill as a matter of habit or propensity are not the same. The schools cannot yet deliver on dispositions, aesthetic or any other kind, but this does not prevent us from projecting dispositional outcomes as ideals against which to assess learning progress. (Smith, 1967, p. 8)

The dominant way in which metacritics conceive of the goal of criticism, however, is a skill or set of skills. What I wish to stress about the following passages, however, is the apparent diversity of skills which are prescribed. It is also worth pointing out that in passages where both a method and a skill of c_ ing is prescribed, the skill to be attained is often specified by a different or narrower
critical term or set of terms than are the active doings which comprise the method.

In this first passage the goal is vaguely specified as a "critical skill".

Critical, analytical, and technical skills, perceptional awareness and historical understandings are not all that comprise artistic learning or behavior. Particularly in the productive domain, opportunities must be provided for the child to synthesize information acquired in discrete situations .... To provide a balance between the analytic and synthetic aspects of artistic behavior, we conceived of both instructional and expressive objectives and activities. (Eisner et al, 1969, p. 36)

In this second passage the skill is one of "appraisal" or critical judgment.

The responsibility for teaching criticism -- the art of intelligent appraisal -- seems to be one willingly assumed by a growing number of teachers. At adolescence, students may be presumed to have reached the point of maturation at which certain intellectual skills, among them the capacity to exercise sound critical judgment, are ready for more direct cultivation. (Aschner, 1971, p. 425).

This next passage specifies a skill in describing works of art:

This inarticulateness before the particular may be the result of an inability to perceive, steadily and whole, the aesthetic object or it may be due to the lack of an appropriate vocabulary and skill in employing it in describing or referring to that object. Certainly both skills can be developed to some degree. (Ecker, 1967, p. 6)

The following passage specifies certain capacities to "recognize" and evaluate aesthetic excellence:

One mark of an educated person is the ability to recognize and evaluate excellence independently. This ability, however, does not come from memorizing lists of so-called masterpieces. It comes from developing sound procedures for analyzing and interpreting art and then applying those procedures as well as you can. This chapter, therefore, will be devoted to explaining some techniques or procedures that you can use to develop your ability as a critic. (Feldman, 1970, p. 348).
And, finally, this last passage specifies certain capacities to make judgments:

Having aesthetic experiences and making aesthetic judgments, however autonomously we consider the objects of such experiences and judgments, make a difference in the personalities of those having or making them; and the ability to make aesthetic judgments can have tremendous social consequences. Here once again training in aesthetic judgement contributes what no other academic discipline can do so well. (Smith, 1971, p. 156)

There are, thus, a variety of skill prescriptions for criticism in the literature when criticism in construed as a goal of teaching or learning. This brief sampling from the literature also suggests that variations in the types of goal prescriptions for criticism exist as well. Given the variation that exists in method prescriptions for criticism there would appear to be a great range of possible prescriptions for criticism in the literature. It follows from this that prescriptive utterances which are conceptually incomplete in the context of their utterance will be ambiguous or uninformative.

Appraisal of Criticism Prescriptions

Prescriptions for criticism, as with all linguistic acts, are performed in accordance with certain rules. Violations of these rules render such acts defective. In this section, I discuss some of the conditions implied in successfully prescribing criticism as a teaching method, as a learning method, as a teaching goal and as a learning goal in order to make explicit certain rules underlying successful prescriptions for criticism. Some of these rules form a conceptual link between the definitions of critical terms which are offered by metacritics and the prescriptions which they espouse. For these rules I shall argue that given the four prescriptions for criticism which I have
delineated, metacritics must (logically) define critical terms in cer-
tain ways or alter the kinds of prescriptions for criticism which are
made. In what follows I present these rules and discuss their applica-
tion for the various prescriptive roles for criticism I delineate.

Rules for Criticism as a Teaching Method

Let us consider first prescriptions where criticism figures as a
teaching method. Relevant rules here are I believe the following:

1. Criticism must be defined in terms of certain physical
active doings (acts).

In prescribing criticism as a method one is predicking certain future
active doings of an agent or agents. Unless one were prepared to admit
that such things as telepathic teaching were possible, these must be
physical active doings. It is worth reiterating here that all critical
terms have uses as states as well as active doings, that critical terms
have uses as linguistic and nonlinguistic mental doings, and that some
uses of critical terms ("interpret", "judge") in mental contexts are
not active doings at all. To define critical terms in any of these ways
is inconsistent with a teaching prescription for criticism as a method.

2. The agent specified in such prescriptions must be
capable of performing the physical acts prescribed.

A prescription for criticism would be defective if the agents
specified in such a prescription were unable to perform the specific
acts of c ing prescribed. Here, I believe that certain preparatory
conditions implied in the successful performance of illocutionary acts
of c ing allows more precise formulations of this condition. The
teacher (or more generally, agent) in method prescriptions for criti-
cism is the person who would be performing the illocutionary act in
question. As I have shown in the previous chapter, to perform such
acts in itself presupposes certain abilities on the part of a speaker.
A speaker or an agent who describes, analyzes, or characterizes something in the act of teaching, for example, must have already been in possession of certain kinds of knowledge. One can readily see that it would be absurd of a teacher to attempt to describe, analyze, or characterize a work of art without having experienced that work or without otherwise having knowledge of that work. However, it may well be that a more subtle error of this kind is committed in prescribing that a teacher analyze a work of art when that teacher does not possess knowledge of the categories or constituents by which works of art are conventionally analyzed or, again, in prescribing that a teacher characterize works of art when that teacher has had a very limited exposure to works of art generally.

Interpreting also presupposes certain abilities on the part of a teacher. Not only is knowledge of the work of art required but the teacher must also possess the relevant kind of understanding. Here, I have not undertaken the formidable task of elucidating the kinds of understanding which would be relevant in interpreting works of art. However, such understandings would reflect particular puzzlements that would exist, or that would be believed to exist, in the audience of students. Although some of these puzzlements might well be addressed by a teacher who possessed a limited knowledge of art or the culture surrounding the work of art in question, others might well demand considerable knowledge as a prerequisite to understanding. Consider, for example, the case of a teacher who is asked to interpret the meaning of Picasso's Guernica in light of the events surrounding the rise of Fascism in Spain. A prescription for interpretation as a method, then, might well be defective if the agent specified lacked the requisite knowledge in order to understand and, hence, interpret works of art.
Evaluating and value judging presuppose the teacher's possession of certain criteria for predicating a value property. This condition is more demanding in the case of evaluating than it is in the case of judging since in evaluating the criteria that the teacher possesses must be both applicable and acceptable. Prescriptions for evaluation as a teaching method, then, would be defective in those contexts in which the agents lack knowledge of the appropriate criteria for evaluating.

In prescriptions for criticism as a teaching method, then, certain kinds of abilities are presumed to exist in the agent doing the teaching. The answer to the question of whether these abilities in fact do exist depends first upon determining who these agents are.

3. The act of ing specified must be such as to allow the audience to achieve or to attain the goal specified in the prescription.

A prescription for criticism as a method would be defective if the method of ing prescribed was ineffectual in allowing the audience to achieve or attain the goal prescribed. Here, however, I believe that there are substantial difficulties in any attempt to appraise method prescriptions in this way. First because the goals for criticism are varied and second because often the goals prescribed for criticism are attainments, and these are concepts about which we lack a clear understanding. When metacritics prescribe various illocutionary acts of ing as a method of teaching students to perceive, understand, or appreciate works of art, for example, the goals projected are often controversial in nature. I have suggested previously that there is a connection between the act of interpreting and the concept of understanding in that one who interprets a work of art, for example,
exhibits his understanding of that work and thus allows others to share in this understanding. Whether, however, similar connections exist between illocutionary acts of *ing and the concepts of perceiving and appreciating is something that I cannot answer at this point. Such an answer would seem to require a further analysis of these concepts, an analysis which is beyond the scope of the present study.

4. The goal must be beneficial to an audience and must be considered beneficial to that audience by both the speaker and the hearer.

This condition reflects a combination of Searlian preparatory and sincerity conditions on prescriptive illocutionary acts of the type under consideration here. Such acts are defective if the goal is not beneficial to the audience and if both the speaker and the hearer do not consider the goal prescribed to be beneficial to the audience. One problem that exists for educational metacritics lies in formulating goals which have acceptability as goals to laymen and educators outside of the field of arts education. Some of the most widely proposed of these goals are those stated in terms of understanding and appreciation.

Rules for Criticism as a Learning Method

I now turn toward consideration of rules for successfully prescribing criticism as a learning method. Here I shall comment on the first and second of the above rules for criticism as teaching method since the first rule requires modification in order to function as a rule for a learning method prescription and the second rule needs some additional commentary. The third and fourth of the above rules apply to learning method prescriptions as well but I shall not comment on them further here.
The first rule must be modified because learning method prescriptions do not conceptually require an audience and the goal which is projected is to be achieved or attained by the agent. The modified rule is as follows:

1. Criticism must be defined in terms of certain mental or physical active doings (acts).

Although mental active doings can figure in such prescriptions, these prescriptions still place logical constraints on the way critical terms can be defined. To define critical terms as states or as non-active mental doings (as in the case of nonlinguistic mental achievement uses of "interpret" and "judge") is inconsistent with a prescription for criticism as a learning method.

2. The agent specified in such prescriptions must be capable of performing the acts prescribed.

Here I believe that my analysis of preparatory conditions on illocutionary acts of criticizing in the previous chapter points to some logical difficulties in prescribing such acts as learning methods in certain contexts. In making learning prescriptions for criticism, one is projecting criticism as a means toward the achieving or attaining of certain goals, goals which are changes in the state of the learner. It may well be, however, that such goals are already presupposed in the ability to successfully perform certain types of illocutionary acts of criticizing. Consider, for example, the case where knowledge of the properties of works of art is proposed as a goal that students should attain through criticizing works of art. On such a prescription, it is a logical muddle to propose description, analysis, and characterization as methods since the performance of such acts implies that the learner already possesses the requisite knowledge. One of the more frequent
goals that is proposed is understanding of works of art. On this goal it is logically impossible that explaining or interpreting could be prescribed as a learning method since the performance of such acts logically presupposes that the learner understands. I shall discuss such problems more explicitly in subsequent chapters of this study.

Rules for Criticism as a Teaching or Learning Goal

I now consider rules for prescribing criticism as the goal of teaching or learning. In doing this I shall restrict my statement of these rules to prescriptions for criticism as a skill or set of skills since this is the most prevalent conception of criticism as a goal in the literature. I believe that rules for criticism as a teaching or learning goal are the following:

1. Criticism must be defined in terms of certain states.

"Knowing how to" is not an act but rather a state to be taught or learned. In considering prescriptions for criticism as content, one would want to know whether all or only some of the critical terms which appear in metacritical accounts are to be construed as goals. Those critical terms which do appear as goals must be defined in terms of states or dispositions.

2. The agent specified in such prescriptions must be capable of performing the teaching or learning acts prescribed.

This condition in the case of goal prescriptions for criticism suggests the possibility that other doings as well as acts of c_ ing could be prescribed as teaching or learning methods. Whatever other acts are prescribed, however, the agent, whether he is the teacher or learner, must be capable of performing the acts in question.
Metacritical prescriptions for criticism as a goal more frequently than not prescribe acts of \textit{c} ing as a method of teaching or learning how to \textit{c}. Here there are two possibilities. The first is that the acts of \textit{c} ing prescribed as a method are \textit{not} manifestations of a particular skill in \textit{c} ing. The second possibility is that the acts of \textit{c} ing prescribed as a method \textit{are} manifestations of a skill in \textit{c} ing. For example, a metacritic could prescribe \textit{describing} as a method that would enable someone to teach or learn how to \textit{evaluate}; or a metacritic could prescribe \textit{evaluating} as a method that would enable someone to teach or learn how to \textit{evaluate}. In the first kind of case the agent of a teaching or learning prescription must be capable performing the illocutionary act in question. "Capability" here must be construed vaguely. I should not want to say that a prescription for a teaching or learning method was defective if, for example, the teacher or learner must read instructions about a procedure before being able to perform the acts in question. But there obviously is a point at which such prescriptions are defective: if, say, the teacher or learner must himself undergo instruction and training in order to perform the illocutionary acts of \textit{c} ing in question.

Prescribing acts of \textit{c} ing as a method where these acts are manifestations of a skill projected as a goal of a teaching or learning prescription is a more complex matter. Let us say in cases of teaching prescriptions that the agent must be able to \textit{demonstrate} the act of \textit{c} ing. Learning prescriptions where a manifestation of a skill is projected as a method present a logical difficulty inasmuch as, if an agent does not know how to \textit{c}, he cannot engage in those same acts of \textit{c} ing projected as a method. Let us say in cases of learning prescriptions
that the agent must be able to attempt to perform the act of _ing_.
It would seem important in these prescriptions that some level of competence be specified to distinguish the point at which practice does become a manifestation of know how.

3. The method specified must be such as to allow the agent (learning prescription) or audience (teaching prescription) to achieve or attain the goal specified in the prescription.

Demonstrating those acts which manifest a particular skill is one of the most accepted methods of teaching a particular skill. Practicing those acts which manifest a particular skill is perhaps both empirically and logically necessary in order to learn that skill. Here I do not believe that justification for the method is required. The efficacy of other methods, however, is not as immediately obvious. In teaching and learning goal prescriptions, where acts other than acts of _ing_ are prescribed as a method, or in teaching and learning goal prescriptions where acts of _ing_ are prescribed which do not manifest the skill projected as a goal, some justification for the methods prescribed would seem to be in order.

4. The goal prescribed must not have already been achieved or attained by an agent (learning prescription) or an audience (teaching prescription).

Although this rule applies to teaching and learning method prescriptions as well, it is more relevantly discussed here. This is a rule to the effect that the prescriptive utterance has no point if the goal projected has already been achieved or attained. For example, if it were already known that a certain group of students possessed the capacity to evaluate or judge works of art, a prescriptive utterance embodying a capacity to evaluate or judge as a goal would clearly be defective.
I believe that a more subtle error of this kind occurs, however, when metacritics waver between offering their prescriptions as both method and goal prescriptions for criticism. Let us consider the case where describing is proposed as both a method and a goal. Describing is, I believe, a likely candidate for a method since the act of describing, for example, a work of art presupposes merely knowledge of the properties of that work. This knowledge could be gained simply through exposure to the work of art itself. By these same terms, describing is not a likely candidate for a skill goal unless it is specified in what fashion or manner a given population lacks the skill in question. Unless there is some special or precise way in which one is to construe the skill of describing, one would presume such a skill to exist in an agent or audience already.

Metacritics sometimes do not sharply distinguish between evaluation and judgment but here there would seem to exist a great difference in their potential to be used in method and goal prescriptions. Evaluation of, say, works of art is an unlikely candidate for a method since it presupposes the possession of appropriate (that is acceptable and applicable) criteria for predicating value properties to that work. Judging on the other hand, might very well be an appropriate candidate for a method prescription since the criteria need not be either acceptable or applicable. It follows from the fact that the criteria must meet certain standards in evaluating, that many people might not possess such criteria. Since it is only a requirement in judging that people possess some (i.e., one or a number of) criteria, it follows that the criteria they customarily use in judging works of art or other things are sufficient in order to judge.
But, whereas judging would seem to be an appropriate candidate as a method and evaluation not an appropriate candidate as a method, the converse would seem to apply in proposing judging and evaluating as skill goals. Since people already possess the capacity to judge, it would seem beholden upon a metacritic to specify in what special or precise way the skill of judging is a skill. One can presume that the skill of evaluating consists in correctly applying the appropriate criteria to works of art in order to arrive at and defend predications of value properties.

5. The goal prescribed must be beneficial to an agent (learning prescription) or an audience (teaching prescription) and must be considered beneficial to that agent or audience by both the speaker and the hearer.

Proposing criticism as a goal I believe raises serious problems about the acceptability of such a goal to laymen and educators outside of the field of arts education. Even within the field, such a goal would not be universally (perhaps not even widely) accepted. A metacritic who projects such a goal as an end in itself would seem to have a further task of justification. Where the skill or skills of criticism are projected as a goal, however, I believe in the majority of cases it is projected as a proximate goal, one that is instrumental in achieving the attainments discussed earlier.

In this section, then, I have proposed a number of rules in order for criticism prescriptions to be considered successfully performed utterances of their types. These rules can function I believe as guidelines for appraising the prescriptions offered by educational metacritics although, indeed, I also believe such an appraisal would be difficult since many prescriptive accounts for criticism in the literature fail to distinguish among the various possible roles for criticism
and to specify clearly the conceptual components of such prescriptions. Before an appraisal can be carried out, one must first determine the role or roles for criticism which actually are prescribed, and the conceptual components of such prescriptions. Here, I believe, the general unclarity surrounding prescriptions for criticism which exists in the literature prevents evaluative considerations from ever arising and lends a credibility to the whole enterprise of prescribing criticism and defining critical terms. It also makes an appraisal of such prescriptions a complex affair. Such an appraisal, it would seem, demands a close and careful scrutiny of the writings of each educational metacritic. I shall undertake this task for two of the most influential educational metacritics in later chapters of this study.

**Summary**

In this chapter I have distinguished among four logically distinct prescriptive roles for criticism. Criticism could function as a teaching method, as a learning method, as teaching goal, and as a learning goal. Each kind of prescription exhibits a characteristically different conceptual structure. In prescriptions for criticism as a teaching method, some form of criticism is specified in the act component of the prescription and the goal is to be achieved by the audience. In prescriptions for criticism as a learning method, some form of criticism is also specified as the act component of the prescription. Here, however, the goal is to be achieved by the agent; an audience may or may not be conceptually required. Prescriptions for criticism as a teaching goal exhibit the conceptual structure of teaching prescriptions but here criticism is prescribed as the goal to be achieved or
attained. Prescriptions for criticism as a learning goal exhibit the conceptual structure of learning prescriptions and here, also, criticism is prescribed as the goal.

In the second section of this chapter, I discussed the problems inherent in comparing and classifying the prescriptive roles for criticism. The distinction between grammatical completeness and conceptual completeness suggests one sort of problem: that a given metacritic may fail to specify conceptual components needed for conceptual completeness on the understanding that agreement about these exists in the literature. The ambiguity and vagueness of "criticism" and other critical terms is another factor since different concepts are subsumed under these terms, especially under nominalizations of critical verbs. Finally, the vagueness of language itself could conceivably be a problem since other conceptual components of curriculum prescriptions could be specified in general or in precise terms. I illustrated all of these problems with selections from the curriculum literature.

In the last section of this chapter, I discussed a number of rules implied in the successful performance of prescriptive illocutionary acts and proposed these rules as guidelines for appraising the prescriptions offered by educational metacritics. Part of the difficulty with undertaking an appraisal of such prescriptions is that various role possibilities for criticism are not precisely distinguished from one another nor are the conceptual components clearly specified. This not only prevents evaluative concerns from arising in the literature but makes necessary a careful and exhaustive treatment of the writings of each individual metacritic in appraising their prescriptions.
AN ANALYTIC STUDY OF ART CRITICISM
IN CURRICULUM CONTEXTS

VOLUME II

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
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School of The Ohio State University

By

Hubert George Geahigan, B.F.A., M.A.

* * * * *

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CHAPTER VI
THE METACRITICAL THEORY OF MONROE BEARDSLEY

Overview

In this chapter I analyze and appraise the definitions of critical terms offered by Monroe Beardsley. Since Beardsley does not make curriculum prescriptions in his account of criticism, I do not analyze and evaluate the curriculum prescriptions which he makes but I discuss a number of considerations that would arise in treating his definitions of critical terms as prescriptions for teaching and learning methods and goals.

Introduction

In these next three chapters I shall analyze and appraise theories of art criticism presented by Monroe Beardsley, Ralph Smith, and Edmund Feldman. In this chapter I begin this task with an account of Beardsley's theory of criticism as it is presented in his text Aesthetics (Beardsley, 1958). Beardsley's text is a standard work in the philosophy of criticism and, as such, has influenced a number of accounts of criticism in the educational literature. His work, therefore, can be considered an important reference point in educational metacritical theory even though Beardsley, himself, does not specifically address the problem of formulating educational prescriptions for criticism.
In his text, Beardsley extensively and systematically treats a large number of issues that arise about critical discourse in the arts. In this analysis I shall selectively address only portions of his theory. One large area that I shall not deal with is his discussion of criticism in the contexts of music and literature except insofar as this part of his discussion impinges upon his account of criticism in the visual arts. A focal point of Beardsley's account of criticism is an extensively worked out theory of evaluation in the arts. I shall only briefly consider one aspect of this part of his theory. In general, I shall restrict myself to an exposition of Beardsley's account of critical acts and artifacts ignoring many peripheral issues discussed in Beardsley's text.

In doing this I shall first begin by examining Beardsley's use of critical terms. Next I shall present a speech act account of the distinctions Beardsley makes with regard to various kinds of statements or simple speech acts. I shall than consider the nature of Beardsley's definitions of critical terms and I shall offer a brief appraisal of these definitions. Finally, I shall consider Beardsley's definitions in light of the goals criticism as a teaching and learning method and as a teaching and learning goal.

**Beardsley's Use of Critical Terms**

The ways in which Beardsley uses critical terms are not always explicit or consistent. It will facilitate subsequent discussion, therefore, if some initial clarification can be given to his use of critical terminology. Beardsley's account of criticism is concerned with offering definitions of the following terms (or variations of the following terms): "description", "analysis", "interpretation", 
"evaluation", and "judgment". Beardsley also uses the term "elucidation" which in his account is related to "interpretation". Beardsley does not always specifically discuss how these terms are used but from his general conception of criticism as a whole, one can infer two main concepts presupposed in his use of critical terms.

Criticism is described by Beardsley as a linguistic activity (Beardsley, 1958, p. 8) and at times he explicitly identifies a number of critical terms with the concept of an act (see Beardsley, 1958, p.10). There is also an object or artifact sense of some critical terms which Beardsley sometimes makes explicit by using the term "statement" in the context of verification of justification. Thus, in Beardsley's account of criticism there are "internal and external statements", "normative and nonnormative statements", "descriptive", "interpretive", and "evaluative statements", etc. and Beardsley explicitly asserts that he is concerned with reasons for holding such statements to be true (see Beardsley, 1958, pp. 7-10). The general categories presupposed by Beardsley in his use of critical terms, then, is I believe reasonably clear. There are certain distinctive kinds of linguistic acts which he identifies by the use of critical terms. "Act", however, is an ambiguous term since one could mean both a linguistic active doing and a performed linguistic act. Beardsley sometimes, but not always, makes this distinction explicit by his choice of critical terms.

Mental and Physical Doings

Given these two main uses of critical terms, two problems remain in accurately fixing the meanings of the critical terms Beardsley employs. One problem is that Beardsley's use of critical terms sometimes
suggests mental as well as physical doings. Beardsley's account of "analysis" and "elucidation" are cases in point.

**Analysis as a Mental Doing.** In discussing analysis Beardsley sometimes speaks of it in terms of a mental doing. The notion of a mental doing is suggested by his choice of verbs related to perception.

To analyze an aesthetic object is precisely to get acquainted with its finer details and subtler qualities, to discover, in short, what is there to be enjoyed — to be responded to emotionally. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 76)

But to analyze in the critical sense is only to see or hear or read better; ... (Beardsley, 1958, p. 76)

It is also sometimes said that analysis is bound to "distort" the aesthetic object, and force us to make false statements about it. If this objection could be sustained, it would be serious, for the analysis would be self-defeating, but it is based upon a misleading way of describing certain important facts about perception. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 76)

It might be argued that if we observe in a painting a gray patch surrounded by red, and then consider the patch by itself, it will lose its green tint, and no longer be what it was. But again this is a misconception of analysis. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 77)

Although the interpretation of Beardsley's use of "analysis" as a mental doing of some sort seems plausible, Beardsley also quite explicitly speaks of analysis in terms of the performance of a linguistic act as in the following:

To say that the figure eight may be constructed of two tangential circles is to give an analysis in our sense, ... (Beardsley, 1958, p. 76)

Is analysis, then, to be considered a linguistic doing, a mental doing, or both? The context of Beardsley's text clearly presents it as a linguistic act but I believe that it could also be construed as a mental doing in Beardsley's theory as well. Beardsley's exposition of this mental doing, however, is casual rather than explicit. The verbs that
he uses to describe this doing: "discover", "see", "observe" are verbs of logically distinct types. "Discover" is a nonactive achievement. "See" has both achievement and state uses. "Observe" has both process, achievement, and state uses. Although Beardsley appears to use "analysis" in a mental sense, the specific nature of this mental doing or process (if it is a doing or process) is unclear from his account.

**Elucidation as a Mental Doing.** If analysis is regarded at times by Beardsley as a mental doing it may be the case that elucidation is regarded in this way as well. Some passages by Beardsley seem ambiguous between a mental doing of some sort and a linguistic act:

> A design can tell a story because we can elucidate it, that is, fill out the pattern of events to which the relations among its depicted objects belong. We see an advertisement of a man in an open topcoat standing at the ticket window in a small town railroad station. The advertisement tells us that he is "appropriately" garbed in Dacron, but it doesn't need to tell us what he is up to. On the floor beside the pot-bellied stove is a suitcase with a gift-wrapped package on it; he has another package under his arm; and there is a holly wreath in the window. Obviously he is on his way home for Christmas vacation. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 279)

Considered by itself, the above passage seems ambiguous between a mental and physical doing. Beardsley, however, also considers elucidation in other parts of his text and here perhaps the more plausible interpretation of "elucidation" is as a mental process, a process of inference of some sort:

> The situation in a literary work, or its chain of events if it is a narrative, is always more than the work explicitly states. Certain actions are reported; from them we are to infer other events and states of affairs, including characters and motives... Part of what is involved in coming to understand a literary work is this process of filling out our knowledge of what is going on, beyond what is overtly presented. I shall call this process, somewhat arbitrarily, the elucidation of the work. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 242)
The problem of elucidation in my special sense is, briefly, to determine parts of the world of the work, such as character and motives, that are not explicitly reported in it, given the events and states of affairs that are reported plus relevant empirical generalizations, that is, physical and psychological laws. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 401)

Thus, I believe the precise meaning of "elucidation" as with "analysis" is unclear from Beardsley's text. However, if mental senses of "analysis" and "elucidation" are intended by Beardsley, they receive only a cursory treatment in his text and are peripheral to his main concern with criticism as a set of linguistic active doings and artifacts. In this exposition of Beardsley's account of criticism, therefore, I shall not be concerned with them further.

Relations Among Pairs of Critical Terms

A second problem that arises in interpreting Beardsley's text lies in determining the relationships that exist between the related concepts of description and analysis, interpretation and elucidation, and evaluation and judgment. At various points Beardsley appears to use critical terms in each of these pairs interchangeably. At other points these terms are used by Beardsley to distinguish between the active doing and the artifact sense (performed act sense) of various linguistic acts. Sorting out the appropriate senses of these terms ultimately requires an act of judgment since Beardsley's text is not clear on this matter.

Beardsley's announcement that he is concerned with the meaning and truth of critical statements (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 8-10) clearly indicates one sense in which "description", "interpretation", and "evaluation" can be understood. Since he uses these terms in the context of verification and justification, one clear sense of these terms is as a
performed act or artifact. It is only performed linguistic acts or artifacts which can be true or false.

**Description and Analysis.** Although "description" can be understood as a performed linguistic act, there is a correlated active doing sense of "description" as well. This is sometimes (but not always) marked by Beardsley with a form of the verb "describe" as in this passage:

> But before these questions can be considered, we must deal, more briefly, with some problems that arise merely in describing the characteristics of works of art. Statements that inform us about the colors and shapes of a painting, or summarize the plot of a motion picture, or classify an operatic aria as being of the ABA form, are critical descriptions.
> (Beardsley, 1958, p. 10).

"Description", then, can plausibly be regarded as both an active doing and an artifact in Beardsley's account.

The relationship between analysis and description may now be considered. "Description" as we have seen has both an active doing and a performed act sense. If as Beardsley claims, descriptions, interpretations, and evaluations exhaust the class of critical statements in the sense of performed acts or artifacts (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 8-10), then there would be no linguistic artifacts of analysis in Beardsley's theory. Analysis, which in the following passage is construable as both an active doing and as an artifact, is perhaps more plausibly taken solely to be an active doing.

> Critical descriptions are of all levels of precision and specificity, but they are most helpful when they discriminate and articulate details, and thus give us an insight into the inner nature of the object. Such a description is called an analysis, and in this chapter we shall consider the problems that arise in analyzing aesthetic objects. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 75)

And, in other areas of his discussion, analysis is treated consistently as a linguistic doing by Beardsley (see Beardsley, 1958, pp. 76, 77).
Analysis, then, for Beardsley seems to be a more precise and specific form of the active doing of describing. Such a doing results in performed linguistic acts of description. Apparently one can either describe or analyze in making descriptive statements (artifacts). However, Beardsley's theory treats the active doing of analysis in great detail by stipulating a number of categories that the critic will use in performing that act (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 76-99). By way of contrast, the active doing of describing is only mentioned in a cursory fashion. It seems likely then that Beardsley would favor the use of "analysis" as the active doing counterpart to the performed act of description. I shall consider "analysis" in this way in presenting an exposition of Beardsley's theory.

Interpretation and Elucidation. As with "description", one clear sense which Beardsley attaches to "interpretation" is as a performed linguistic act (Beardsley, 1958, p. 9). Interpretation for Beardsley, however, is also an active doing, a sense which he sometimes (but not always) makes explicit with a form of the verb "interpret".

Though the act of interpreting a work is less complicated than the act of evaluating it, it is complicated enough, and raises its own set of problems. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 10).

In other passages he uses "interpretation" instead of the verb "interpret" to mean this active doing as well.

...a large part of interpretation consists in saying what the design represents, or to put it in what we shall count as synonymous terms, saying what its subject is. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 268)

Interpretation, then, for Beardsley is both an active doing and a performed linguistic act.
As with analysis and description, the precise relationship between interpretation and elucidation is not clear from Beardsley's text. If Beardsley's account of critical statements as descriptions, interpretations, and evaluations is taken to be exhaustive of the class of performed linguistic acts considered in his text (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 7-10), then clearly there are no elucidation artifacts. Hence, elucidation can be construed only as an active doing. I can find no passages in Beardsley's text that would lead one to interpret the concept of elucidation differently.

If the active doing of elucidation in Beardsley's text is construable as a linguistic active doing, it would appear to be a more specific form of the linguistic active doing of interpreting. To show this, Beardsley's account of interpreting must be considered in more detail. Interpreting for Beardsley consists of "saying what the design represents":

But a picture is two things at once: it is a design, and it is a picture of something. In other words, it presents something to the eye for direct inspection, and it represents something that exists or might exist, outside the picture frame.

It is this second aspect of the design that we are after when we ask questions like: What does it portray? What is it about? What does it mean? Or, elliptically, what is it? ... To answer questions like this is to interpret the design. And a large part of interpretation consists in saying what the design represents, or to put it in what we shall count as synonymous terms, saying what its subject is. (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 268-269)

Saying what the design represents for Beardsley consists in making statements of the following kinds:

1. The painting represents three women and two men.
2. The painting represents three Greek goddesses, a god, and a shepherd.
3. The painting represents Helen Fourment
5. The painting represents a shepherd offering an apple to one of the three goddesses.
6. The painting represents the Judgment of Paris, that is, Paris choosing the most beautiful of the three goddesses. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 269)

The act of interpreting, then, consists in making statements such as the ones above. Beardsley makes a further distinction among the above statements in the following way:

Statements (5) and (6) [in contrast to the other statements] introduce a new aspect. The point about phrases like "a shepherd offering an apple" or "Paris choosing" ... is that they stand not simply for objects, like "apple" and "woman" but for events. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 278)

If "elucidation" is used by Beardsley as a linguistic active doing (and I believe that it is unclear from Beardsley's text whether it can be construed in this way), then elucidation must consist of making statements such as (5) and (6) above, that is, in making statements about the events represented in a visual design. In discussing the events depicted in works of art Beardsley asserts

We take the static pose as the cross section of an action by reading it as having causal antecedents and consequents ... The problem here, it seems to me, is exactly the same as the problem of elucidating a literary work, ... and we are therefore justified in using the same term here. A design can tell a story because we can elucidate it, that is, fill out the pattern of events to which the relations among its depicted objects belong. (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 278-279).

If elucidation then is a linguistic active doing for Beardsley, it appears to fall within the more general linguistic doing of interpreting. Because I am unsure of the exact status of elucidation as a doing within Beardsley's theory, I shall use the more general term "interpretation" in speaking about the active doing of saying what the design represents.
Evaluation and Judgment. As with "description" and "interpretation," one clear sense of evaluation for Beardsley is as a performed linguistic act or artifact (Beardsley, 1958, p. 9). As with these other critical terms, there is an active doing sense of "evaluation" sometimes marked explicitly through the use of some form of the verb "evaluate".

Though the act of interpreting a work is less complicated than the act of evaluating it, it is complicated enough, and raises its own set of problems. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 10)

Evaluation, then, can be construed as both an active doing and as an artifact.

One problem that arises in determining the relationship between evaluation and judgment is that Beardsley appears to use "judgment" interchangeably with the artifact sense of "evaluating".

The problems to which we now come ... are the problems that arise in evaluating that is, in making normative statements about, aesthetic objects. In these last three chapters we shall inquire what, if anything, could be a good reason for asserting or believing, critical value-judgments. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 454)

Variations of the verb "judge", however, are also used in the sense of an active doing.

The plausible arguments in favor of the intentionalistc method yield to attack when we bear in mind the distinction between judging the creator and judging his creation, ... (Beardsley, 1958, p. 460)

Beardsley, then, sometimes uses the concepts of evaluation and judgment interchangeably when his text is considered as a whole. When in his text he specifically presents his theory of evaluation, however, he appears to more-or-less consistently reserve the term "judgment" for the concept of a performed linguistic act of evaluation. In discussing Beardsley's theory, therefore, I shall reserve the term "judgment" for the artifact sense of evaluation".
<table>
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<tr>
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<td>*interpretation</td>
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<td>**evaluation</td>
<td>**judgment</td>
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* elucidation may be an act within the class of interpretations

**"evaluation" and "judgment" are sometimes used interchangeably.

Figure 3. Linguistic Active Doings (Acts) and Performed Linguistic Acts (Artifacts) in Beardsley's Theory
Beardsley's concept of criticism, then, appears to consist of three kinds of linguistic active doings and performed linguistic acts or artifacts. Although Beardsley's use of critical terms presents problems of interpretation, I believe that the concepts he discusses are most accurately represented by Figure 3.

**Destinctions Among Critical Active Doings and Artifacts**

Criticism is for Beardsley both a set of active doings and a set of performed linguistic acts. These active doings and artifacts are distinguished from one another in a variety of ways. In this section I shall give a speech act account of the definitions of critical terms which Beardsley presents in his text.

There are three levels of distinctions which Beardsley makes illustrated by the diagram in Figure 4. Beardsley first distinguishes between "external" and "internal" statements. (Here and throughout this chapter I shall be using "statement" as Beardsley's term for an act, that is as having both an linguistic active doing sense and an artifact sense.) Critical statements are identified with the category of internal statements. Beardsley next distinguishes between nonnormative and normative internal statements. Finally Beardsley distinguishes between the individual nonnormative statements of analysis and description, and interpretation, and he distinguishes evaluation and judgment from other normative statements.

Certain kinds of critical statements according to Beardsley may sometimes be supported by other statements. Certain kinds of descriptive statements, for example, may call for the support of other descriptive statements. Interpretations and value judgments may also require
Figure 4. Beardsley's Distinctions Among Critical Statements (Acts and Artifacts) and the Support Relationships Among Statements
supporting statements. In the case of value judgments certain kinds of descriptions and interpretations are considered to be proper support but Beardsley allows that one kind of external statement (at least) may not be totally irrelevant as support. Finally, certain kinds of interpretation may sometimes require the support of external statements as well. Beardsley's account, then, is concerned with delineating certain kinds of internal or critical statements and somewhat peripherally with the kind of external statements needed to support such statements. These support relationships are illustrated by the dotted lines in Figure 4.

The kinds of distinctions which Beardsley makes are, I believe, accounted for within the concepts of Searle's theory of language. In distinguishing between external and internal statements, Beardsley employs a content distinction. Although Beardsley does not distinguish between reference and predication in making this distinction, I believe that various points in his account can be clarified by appealing to these concepts in Searle's theory. Beardsley's distinction between normative and nonnormative statements is I believe a functional distinction. In making this distinction Beardsley somewhat unsuccessfully attempts to articulate a difference in illocutionary force between one class of critical statements and another. Finally, within the class of nonnormative statements Beardsley distinguishes between analysis and description on the one hand and interpretation on the other. This is once again a content distinction. And within the class of normative statements Beardsley distinguishes between two kinds of normative statements based upon the illocutionary force of such statements. This is, once again, a functional distinction. In what follows I shall discuss each of Beardsley's distinctions in turn.
Distinctions Between External and Internal (or Critical) Statements

In Beardsley's account, critical statements are distinguished from other kinds of statements on the basis of their content. Beardsley asserts that critical statements or internal statements are "about" certain kinds entities which he calls "aesthetic objects" in contrast to other statements or external statements which are not (Beardsley, 1958, p. 64). As Beardsley uses this distinction, however, it becomes apparent that it can be construed in two ways. At various points in his account Beardsley is concerned to mark off critical statements on the basis of the entities which are appropriately referred to in making such statements. At other points Beardsley is concerned to demarcate critical statements from other statements on the basis of that which is predicated of such entities. Beardsley's account of internal and external statements can be clarified through the use of both the concept of reference and the concept of predication as these concepts are presented in Searle's theory. In what follows I shall first deal with his distinctions regarding the reference of critical statements. I shall then discuss Beardsley's distinctions with regard to what is appropriately predicated of aesthetic objects.

1. In discussing this distinction in Beardsley's text I shall not deal with a version of phenomenalism which he presents as part of his exposition. (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 43-56). Phenomenalism as a theory of perception has some well known difficulties, difficulties which are beyond the scope of the present study to treat. I believe that for the purposes of the present discussion, this part of Beardsley's theory can usefully be excised not only because it rests upon a controversial theory but because I believe it is inherently inconsistent with Beardsley's attempt to establish the objectivity of critical discourse.
Reference of Critical Statements. If one were to consider critical statements with regard to their reference, one would be inclined to say that they refer to works of art rather than to aesthetic objects. For Beardsley, however, using the expression "work of art" has two distinct disadvantages. First, it would limit the reference of critical statements to man-made objects and he believes that critics sometimes wish to make statements about rock formations and other natural objects. Second, the expression "work of art" sometimes has a persistent normative component (or honorific use) such that in saying something is a work of art, one is sometimes saying that it is aesthetically valuable. If one were to adopt the notion of a work of art as the object of reference of critical statements, then, some confusion would perhaps exist over whether "work of art" was being used in its honorific sense. If it were used in this way, then critics could not logically make negative value judgments of such objects because the extension of the concept would be limited only to objects which already had been determined to be aesthetically valuable (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 57, 58).

For these reasons Beardsley adopts the technical expression "aesthetic object" to indicate the entities appropriately referred to in critical statements. For Beardsley one minimum qualification which any entity must meet in order to be considered an aesthetic object is that it be perceptible, that is, capable of being perceived directly by the senses (Beardsley, 1958, p. 17). Beardsley would thus exclude as referents of critical statements such entities as facts, the class of cows, etc. because such entities are abstract.

Beardsley's next move in defining "aesthetic object" is to distinguish such objects from other perceptible entities. He considers
and rejects attempts to define "aesthetic object" in terms of the motive of a creator, the effects upon a percipient, and the attitude by which an object is approached, in favor of an "objective definition" i.e. one based upon the perceivable characteristics possessed by perceptual objects. Beardsley considers perceptual objects separately according to their sensory fields and marks off aesthetic objects from other perceptual objects within each field. The class of aesthetic objects is arrived at by grouping disjunctively the entities so discriminated:

Therefore we may consider an ... objective definition. To construct this definition, we must first divide perceptual objects according to their sensory fields; some are seen, some heard....

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

We can then group together disjunctively the class of musical compositions, visual designs, literary works and all other separately defined classes of objects, and give the name "aesthetic object" to them all. (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 63, 64)

Within the visual field, Beardsley asserts that an aesthetic object must possess both the characteristic of being perceivable as a whole and the characteristic of heterogeneity.

Not every part of one's visual field is, strictly speaking, a visual design. First it must be bounded or framed in some way, marked out for perception from its background, so that what is within its boundaries can constitute a limited picture plane. If we arbitrarily think of a couple of square feet of sooty brick in the middle of a wall, for example, we don't have a bounded area. Second, a design must contain within itself some heterogeneity, some difference in color or ... in light and dark. A blank sheet of paper is not a design. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 88)

Two comments are in order at this point about Beardsley's definition of "aesthetic object". First, Beardsley explicitly excludes from the class of visual designs works of sculpture and architecture (Beardsley, 1958, p. 88). Although such objects would be included
within the general concept of an aesthetic object, Beardsley does not specifically consider how these objects would be differentiated from other (presumably) three-dimensional perceptual entities. There is, therefore, a lacuna at this point in his theory. Second, it is worth reiterating that his concept of an aesthetic object is broader than the concept of a two dimensional work of visual art. A torn and weathered billboard whose appearance is the result of natural forces, although, perhaps not a work of art in the honorific sense of "work of art" nor perhaps in the ordinary sense of "work of art" which is limited to man-made objects, clearly falls within Beardsley's category of a visual aesthetic object because such an object presumably would be a bounded whole and would possess heterogeneity.

In general terms, then, the entities referred to in critical statements are aesthetic objects, that is perceptible wholes possessing some heterogeneity. Beardsley introduces a set of technical terms to denote the referents of critical statements. Critical statements in Beardsley's theory can be construed as referring to this perceptual whole or to complex parts or elementary parts of this whole. A complex part in Beardsley's theory is a perceptual part of an aesthetic object in which further discriminations can be made. An elementary part of an aesthetic object is one in which no further parts can be discriminated (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 82-88).

Predication of Critical Statements. Beardsley also introduces a number of terms which can be construed as terms which refer to that which is predicated in critical statements. What is predicated of all aesthetic objects are certain properties. Wholes and complex parts possess regional properties. Elementary parts possess local properties. Within
the class of properties, Beardsley distinguishes between those which are directly perceivable through the senses and those which are not. He reserves the term "quality" for these latter kinds of properties (Beardsley, 1958, p. 83). Qualities then are a subset of the class of properties.

In our descriptions of aesthetic objects we are interested in the perceivable properties, for which we shall reserve the word "qualities". Thus when I speak of the regional qualities of a complex, I mean its perceptual regional properties. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 83)

At this juncture it is perhaps worth noting parenthetically that perceptibility is construed in a special way by Beardsley. As we shall see, a major part of the effort he expends in distinguishing among various properties of aesthetic objects is spent in trying to precisely determine the line between that which is directly perceivable and that which is not.

Beardsley's discussion of the content of critical statements, then, shifts between a discussion of the reference of critical statements on the one hand, and the predication of critical statements on the other. To denote the reference of critical statements, the terms "aesthetic object", "whole", "complex part" and "elementary part" are introduced. To denote the predication of critical statements, the term "quality" is introduced and contrasted with "property". In discussing more specifically the reference of critical statements dealing with two-dimensional visual works of art, Beardsley sometimes substitutes the terms "visual design" for "aesthetic object", "picture plane" for "whole", and "area" for "part".

In separating the class of internal or critical statements from the class of external statements, Beardsley employs four sets of distinctions. These distinctions I believe can best be understood as a contrast between
the concept of an aesthetic object and certain other kinds of entities on the one hand, and between the class of directly perceivable properties (qualities) and certain other kinds of properties which conceivably an aesthetic object possesses or could possess on the other. In making these distinctions Beardsley fleshes out the concept of an external statement and, in doing so, makes the concept of a critical statement more precise.

Beardsley's distinction between intentionalistic and critical statements (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 17-29) in these terms, then, is a contrast between two sorts of entities frequently referred to in critical discourse. Beardsley's discussion of physical and perceptual objects (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 29-34) and veridical and illusory qualities (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 50-53) is appropriately construed as a contrast between kinds of properties predicated in critical discourse. And Beardsley's distinction between the phenomenally objective and the phenomenally subjective (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 37-39) is a distinction between both entities and properties. In making these distinctions, Beardsley is concerned with demarcating a class of entities and properties, from other entities and properties frequently referred to and predicated in critical discourse as it exists.

**Intentionalism.** In discussing artistic intentions (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 17-29) Beardsley does not clearly separate two issues underlying his discussion. One issue deals with the kind of evidence that is appropriately sought in supporting critical statements. The other issue -- of concern here -- deals with the kinds of statements which are appropriately excluded from critical discourse. This latter issue can be construed as a concern with the proper reference of critical statements.
What is at issue in Beardsley's discussion of intentionalism is an attempt to distinguish a statement such as the following from the class of critical statements:

His primary purpose was to make color the essential material of all his forms, and he strove to build up everything with color. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 27)

Such statements as the one above are sometimes confused with critical statements and, Beardsley claims, may sometimes be metaphorical ways of talking about the aesthetic object (Beardsley, 1958, p. 27). But, Beardsley claims, such statements, if taken literally, actually refer either to the creator of the aesthetic object or to his intention. This is defined by Beardsley as

a series of psychological states or events in his mind: what he wanted to do, how he imagined or projected the work before he began to make it and while he was in the process of making it. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 17)

As such, statements like the ones above are excluded from the class of critical statements since they refer to entities other than aesthetic objects. In Beardsley's scheme of criticism, critical statements are stipulated as those which refer to the perceptible entities made by the creator rather than to the creator himself or to his intentions.

With the help of cases like this one, we can draw a pretty clear distinction between two types of critic, in any of the arts. There are those critics who talk steadily and helpfully about the aesthetic object itself, ... There are other critics who tend to shift back and forth between the work and its creator, never quite clear in their own minds when they are talking about the one or the other. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 26)

Perceptual and Physical. Two further sets of distinctions which Beardsley makes can be construed as a stipulation about the kind of properties which are appropriately predicated in critical statements. It is this kind of distinction which is at issue, I believe, in
Beardsley's somewhat misleading distinction between a perceptual and physical object (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 29-34). The concept of predication also helps to clarify Beardsley's discussion of veridical and illusory qualities (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 51-56). Since both of these parts of Beardsley's discussion are related, I discuss them simultaneously.

The distinction between perceptual and physical objects is meant to distinguish statements such as 2 and 4, below, from statements such as 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7.

1. It is an oil painting.
2. It contains some lovely flesh tones.
3. It was painted in 1892.
4. It is full of flowing movement.
5. It is painted on canvas.
6. It is on a wall in the Cleveland Museum of Art.
7. It is worth a great deal of money.
(Beardsley, 1958, p. 29)

To articulate this distinction Beardsley employs a rather misleading metaphor. The former set of statements he asserts are about the "aesthetic object" while the latter set of statements are about the "physical object" or the "physical basis" of the aesthetic object. In making this distinction Beardsley sometimes appears to suggest that what is at issue in the distinction he is making is the reference of critical statements. But as he presents this distinction it is clear that the distinction is one between two sorts of properties.

Beardsley's characterization of these properties appears to involve two kinds of distinction. One way in which Beardsley distinguishes these

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2. Just how far Beardsley subscribes to the notion of two distinct objects is unclear from his text. He does assert that the distinction could possibly be construed as one "not between two objects, but rather [one] between two aspects of the same object". (Beardsley, 1958, p. 33)
properties is on the basis of the procedure involved in verifying their presence or absence. Statements 2 and 4 above can be verified directly by observation. Statements 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7 on Beardsley's account, on the other hand, involve a more indirect method of verification.

Suppose we should ask about each statement, "How do you know it is true?" In other words, suppose we should ask about the method of verifying the statement: What sort of evidence is required to justify us in believing it? In the case of statements 2 and 4, the answer would be, I suppose, that we can see that they are true.... But this answer will not serve the other questions. To verify Statements 1 and 5, we would have to undertake a chemical analysis, of the paint and what it is applied to. To verify Statements 3, 6, and 7, we would have to go beyond the painting itself, into history, or geography or the auction room. (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 29,30)

Beardsley gives a number of other examples of indirect verification procedures.

We call a chair a physical object, but the chair, considered as being brown, hard, smooth, etc., is a perceptual object: it is perceivable. Besides the perceptual chair, there is the physical chair, the chair whose properties are discovered not by direct sensation but by weighing, measuring, cutting, burning etc. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 32)

One way in which Beardsley distinguishes between "physical" properties and perceptual properties, then, is on the basis of the verification procedure involved in determining their presence or absence.

A second way in which Beardsley appears to make a distinction is on the basis of the knowledge possessed by a viewer or observer of the aesthetic object (here I shall use the term "perciipient" to denote an aesthetic object's audience). Some properties Beardsley argues are "directly observable". Other properties however, depend upon knowledge of the processes of creation and the nature of the artist's tools and materials.
It might be argued that if we want to achieve the fullest appreciation of works of fine art, we, too must know something about the characteristics of oil and water colors, about the methods of color-mixture, about the methods of cleaning and repairing paintings. It is a nice question exactly how such knowledge is relevant to the perception of the painting as an aesthetic object, and perhaps a debatable question. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 33)

It might be argued that what I have construed as two separate distinctions are really one in Beardsley's account. But although I do believe that many of the properties Beardsley wishes to rule out of critical discourse are properties whose verification involves an indirect procedure, other statements which he cites as predicking physical properties clearly are verified by direct inspection of the aesthetic object. Statements about the technique of an aesthetic object, made by a critic with knowledge about the processes of creation and materials of the artist, clearly are statements whose verification customarily involves no indirect procedure.

When a critic, then, says that Titian's later paintings have a strong atmospheric quality and vividness of color, he is talking about aesthetic objects. But when he says that Titian used a dark reddish underpainting over the whole canvas, and added transparent glazes to the painting after he laid down the pigment, he is talking about physical objects. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 33)

Beardsley here is ruling out statements about the technique of the aesthetic object from the class of internal statements. Yet it is clear that such statements form a part of ordinary critical discourse in the visual arts and it is not customary for critics to engage in a procedure such as dissecting the layers of paint on the canvas to determine the painting method used by the artist.

At this point, it is perhaps well to note that in Beardsley's distinction between "physical" and perceptual properties, there exists a
range of heterogenous properties falling into each class. I believe that one way in which Beardsley attempts to make the distinction more precise is by employing two separate distinctions: one to mark off properties actually related to the properties studied in the sciences (hence the term "physical"). Other properties, however, have nothing to do with physics. As Beardsley himself admits (Beardsley, 1958, p. 32), the notion of "physical" is in some respects misleading.

**Veridical and Illusory Qualities.** The distinction between properties predicated on the basis of prior knowledge of the technique of an artist and those properties not so predicated, appears also to underlie a related distinction Beardsley makes between "veridical and illusory qualities" (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 50-53). Veridical qualities are those directly perceivable within the work without a prior knowledge of the physical basis of the work, the physical processes of creation, or the biographical background of the work (Beardsley, 1958, p. 53). Illusory qualities are those properties dependent upon this prior knowledge.

I am not completely sure, here, whether the distinction which Beardsley is making is the same distinctions as the one made in his discussion of the physical and perceptual objects, or whether some further distinction is intended. In the example which Beardsley used to develop the distinction, the property of "dishonesty" is predicated of a neo-Gothic church containing a steel framework (Beardsley, 1958, p. 50). "Dishonesty" as it is used in this example is a value property and, as such, it stands in contrast to the other examples of properties which Beardsley discusses. What Beardsley perhaps has in mind here is a distinction within the class of value properties. Those statements predating value properties which are justified upon the basis of the
physical properties of the aesthetic object, its process of creation, or the biographical background of the work are excluded from the class of critical statements. In such a case predicing "dishonesty" of an aesthetic object because its creator was dishonest, or predicating "goodness" to an aesthetic object because expensive materials were used in its construction would not be appropriate critical statements.

But this inappropriateness in the end would not rest with the value properties which actually are predicated since these value properties could conceivably be predicated on the basis of perceptual properties of the painting. Rather, Beardsley's account here seems to be more concerned with the kinds of statements which can appropriately be used to justify value statements. He seems here to be ruling out certain kinds of statement as legitimate support for statements predicating value properties and perhaps other properties as well.

Phenomenally Objective and Subjective. A final distinction made by Beardsley to discriminate between external and internal statements, is one between the "phenomenally objective" and the "phenomenally subjective." In Beardsley's account this distinction is between that which is experienced as being apart from the self and that which is experienced as being a part of the self (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 37-39).

In Beardsley's account, among the things experienced as being apart from the self is the aesthetic object and its properties. What is experienced as being a part of the self are the effects of the aesthetic object upon the percipient. Beardsley uses this distinction to discriminate between "phenomenally objective" statements such as the following:

Some passages in Byron's Don Juan are funny.
This Matisse painting is cheerful.
The slow movement of Debussy's string quartet is sad.
and "phenomenally subjective" statements:

The musical composition is irritating.

The Matisse painting makes me cheerful.

I feel sad.

What is it issue in Beardsley's distinction involves I believe both the appropriate reference and predication of critical statements. Critical statements are held by Beardsley to be objective in the sense that they refer to the aesthetic object and they predicate properties of that object. Some external statements are subjective in the sense that, although they might refer to the aesthetic object, they predicate certain effects of the object on one or more percipients. Other external statements are considered such because they both refer to percipients and they predicate certain effects such as emotional states to these same percipients. Beardsley, then, would exclude from the class of critical statements those which refer to the percipients of an aesthetic object and predicate effects to this percipient, or those which simply predicate certain effects of the aesthetic object on percipients.

Having given an account of the various distinctions which Beardsley makes in terms of the concepts of reference and predication, the classes of external and internal statements may now be more precisely delimited. For Beardsley, external statements are those which

1. refer to one or more of the following
   a. Abstract entities (entities not open to direct sensory awareness)
   b. the creator or creators of the aesthetic object or psychological events or states in the mind or minds of the creator or creators
   c. the percipient or percipients of the aesthetic object
2. and/or which predicate one or more of the following:

   a. physical properties not directly perceivable in the aesthetic object i.e., those properties (i) discoverable in some roundabout way by "weighing", "measuring", "cutting", "burning", traveling to the object's location, researching its history, and value, etc. or (ii) dependent upon the knowledge of the material of the artist, the processes of creation, or the biography of the artist.

   b. properties of the percipient or percipients such as psychological states, or effects of the aesthetic object upon the percipient or percipients.

At this point it would perhaps be well to point out that Beardsley's account of the class of physical properties is vague in the sense that it is difficult from his account to determine precisely which properties are directly perceivable and which are not. There is thus not a simple contrast in Beardsley's theory between external and critical statements based on the perceptibility of the properties which are predicated in critical statements. Given this, internal statements in Beardsley's theory, then, are those which

1. refer to an aesthetic object or objects (wholes, complex parts, elementary parts)

2. and which predicate directly perceivable properties or (qualities).

Normative and Nonnormative Statements

Before considering Beardsley's account of individual critical statements, there is a preliminary distinction which he makes between normative and nonnormative statements within the class of internal or critical statements. Although Beardsley obviously relies upon the function or the illocutionary force of critical statements in making this distinction, I do not believe that it is clear from his text whether he regards the concepts of normative and nonnormative statements as multifunctional
concepts or whether he identifies them with a single kind of illocutionary force. A brief consideration of this distinction in Beardsley's account suggests different ways in which the function of critical statements can be construed.

The distinction between normative and nonnormative statements is made in the following passage:

Whatever the critic may have in mind as an ultimate purpose, he tries to achieve that purpose by telling us something about the work, and it turns out that there are three basically different kinds of things he can tell us, each of which raises aesthetic problems peculiar to itself.

First we must distinguish between normative statements and nonnormative statements about works art. Normative statements are critical evaluations. You are evaluating a work when you say it is good or bad, ascribe to it beauty or ugliness, recommend it as an object to be sought after or avoided. I know of no thoroughly satisfactory way of defining "normative statement", but for the present it will be sufficient to indicate the class in a rough way: critical evaluations are those that apply to works of art the words "good" or "beautiful", their negatives, or other predicates definable in terms of them.

A second distinction should be made between two kinds of nonnormative statement, those that interpret and those that simply describe works of art.

A critical interpretation for the purposes of this book, is a statement that purports to declare the "meaning", of a work of art...

Statements that inform us about the colors and shapes of a painting, or summarize the plot of a motion picture, or classify an operatic aria as being of the ABA form, are critical descriptions. (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 8-10).

Distinctions between nonnormative statements. In distinguishing between analysis and description on the one hand and interpretation (as act and artifact) on the other, as distinct kinds of nonnormative statements, Beardsley uses the content of such statements as the basis
for this distinction, as I shall show in succeeding sections of this chapter. One plausible way of interpreting Beardsley's account then is to say that he holds analysis and description, and interpretation to have a single function or illocutionary force. Yet if this is the case, then Beardsley must hold that analysis and description on the one hand and interpretation on the other are generic statements (illocutionary acts) since he also defines the critical statements of analysis and description, and interpretation in terms of a range of other illocutionary terms, terms such as "inform", "summarize", "compare", and "classify" (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 10, 173).

Beardsley's account, however, could also (and perhaps more plausibly) be interpreted as holding that nonnormative statements comprise a cluster of more-or-less related statements or illocutionary acts. Here Beardsley, in identifying nonnormative critical statements with a range of illocutionary terms, may be holding that the concepts of analysis and description, and interpretation (as act and artifact) are multifunctional concepts. His concern with the statement's content as a basis for discriminating between analysis and description, and interpretation, then, may be simply a proposal for separating one set of statements (illocutionary acts) from another or he may be claiming that this content distinction actually does seem to discriminate one set of statements (illocutionary acts) from another.

**Distinction between normative statements.** It seems possible to also interpret evaluation (and judgment) as statements possessing a single function or illocutionary force or multiple functions or illocutionary forces. As I shall show subsequently, Beardsley identifies these critical statements as commendations in order to distinguish them from
other value statements (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 475, 476). It seems reasonable, then, to suppose that critical evaluations and judgments have a single function or illocutionary force. Yet in defining normative statements, Beardsley also employs a range of other illocutionary terms. Normative statements are sometimes held to be evaluations, judgments, recommendations, as well as commendations (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 474-476). Beardsley also uses such other illocutionary terms as "comparison", "rate", "report", and "grading" in relation to normative statements (Beardsley, 1958, p. 455). Furthermore, when Beardsley discusses normative statements and attempts to distinguish evaluation and judgment from other kinds of value statements by representing such statements as commendations, I shall show that it remains an open question in Beardsley's account whether "commendation" is used to indicate a unique illocutionary act or whether it encompasses a range of such acts.

The distinction between normative and nonnormative statements, then, remains puzzling in Beardsley's account and one is not sure precisely how Beardsley would construe the function or the illocutionary force of critical statements. In distinguishing analyses and descriptions from interpretations, Beardsley might regard them as species of a single generic act. Or again he might regard them as having one or more distinctive functions or illocutionary forces. Similarly it seems possible to interpret evaluation and judgment statements as multifunctional or as commendations. In the next three sections of this chapter, I discuss Beardsley's treatment of individual critical statements.

Analysis and Description

In discussing Beardsley's concept of analysis and description, it will be remembered that Beardsley distinguishes between the active
doing of analysis and the corresponding performed acts which are termed descriptions. Beardsley's account of analysis and description is concerned with four things. First Beardsley locates such statements within the class of internal statements on the basis of their predication. Second, Beardsley distinguishes between two kinds of descriptive statement on the basis of the qualities predicated. Content statements predicate nonrelational qualities; form statements predicate relational qualities. Third, Beardsley proposes a number of "basic" categories of nonrelational and relational qualities. Finally Beardsley discusses certain nonrelational and relational qualities of importance in the visual arts.

In discussing Beardsley's concepts of analysis and description, it will be helpful to first consider examples of such statements as these are presented in his account. Beardsley cites the following examples as a summary of his theory of description:

"I. Description: statements about the characteristics of the painting in itself
   "A. Statements about the parts of the work
      "1. Statements about elementary areas ("This is blue").
      "2. Statements about complex areas ("This is an oval-shaped array of pink dots")
   "B. Statements about relations between parts
      "1. Statements about relations between elementary areas ("This blue is more highly saturated that that")
      "2. Statements about relations between complex parts: these are statements about form, which include
         "a. Statements about large-scale relations ("This side of the painting balances that side") structure
         "b. Statements about recurrent small-scale relations ("This shape of brush stroke appears throughout"): texture or, roughly, style
      "C. Statements about regional qualities of the whole or parts"
Within the class of descriptive statements, Beardsley distinguishes between content statements which in Beardsley's account are statements about parts of the work or about regional qualities of the whole or parts (A and C above), and form statements which in Beardsley's account are about relations between the parts (B above). How is this distinction to be construed? Beardsley asserts that there is a clear distinction that can be made between (1) those statements that describe the local qualities of elements, and the regional qualities of complexes, within a visual design or a musical composition, and (2) those statements that describe internal relations among the elements and among the complexes within the object. These latter statements we may call "form-statements"... If I say that in a certain musical composition one note is higher or louder than another, or that one movement is longer than another, these are relational statements. That is, they are statements of the type: "X has such and such a relation to Y". And so, by the above definition, they are form-statements....

If from the class of critical descriptions we abstract all the form-statements, what remains? First, there will be statements about the elements and complex parts to be found in the work: the musical composition begins with the note A, and has four movements; the painting contains some patches of coral red, or two main solids. Second, there will be statements about the regional qualities of the work or of its parts: the music is in the key of F, or is violent, or its opening is serene; the painting is bright and lively. It is convenient to have a name for these descriptions that are not formal descriptions, but there is not thoroughly satisfactory one available. "Form" naturally takes "content" as its complement, and we may accede to this custom.... a content-statement is a description that is not a form-statement. (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 166, 167)
Beardsley's account of descriptive statements and his distinction between form and content statements rests, I believe, on the content of such statements. Both his account and his distinctions, however, require clarification because he does not precisely distinguish between reference and predication. As a consequence, the above accounts of descriptive statements can be construed in two ways.

In discussing reference and predication in Beardsley's theory, it will be remembered that the technical terms "whole", "part", "picture plane", and "area" were introduced by Beardsley to identify the entities which were referred to in critical statements and the term "properties" was introduced to refer to that which aesthetic objects possess and, hence, that which is predicated in critical statements. It will also be remembered that Beardsley reserves the term "quality" for those properties which are directly perceivable within the work (Beardsley, 1958, p. 83). Given this clear sense of the above terms, Beardsley's use of the term "about" in his account of critical descriptions is ambiguous. Critical descriptions in Beardsley's account are "about" parts and areas of aesthetic objects but only because they refer to these things. Descriptive statements are "about" regional qualities but only because they predicate such properties.

This clear technical sense of the terms, "whole", "part", "property", "quality", etc., as they are introduced by Beardsley must be distinguished from their actual or possible use by critics in describing aesthetic objects. As Beardsley acknowledges, the entities designated in his theory by the terms "whole" or "part" can be referred to by many kinds of expressions:

There can be no quarrel, I think, about the meaning of the relational term "part of" when it is applied
to the musical field. In a reasonably clear and obvious sense, the figure of a nude, or a patch of pink, is a part of the whole painting. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 83).

Thus, a critic could utter the expression

This blue is brighter than the red.

and, what in many contexts would be a predicating expression ("blue"), would be used to refer. In the same way, in saying

The work has three complex parts.

the expression "complex parts" (in Beardsley's technical sense, a referent of a critical statement) would be used to predicate a property.

Having clarified these points, one can now proceed to a discussion of Beardsley's account of description and his distinction between form and content statements. It is clear from the examples of descriptive statements which Beardsley presents, that in all such statements, what is referred to are certain wholes, complex parts, or elementary parts (areas, etc.) of aesthetic objects (visual designs). One can say this despite the variety of referring expressions which Beardsley employs in his illustrations of descriptive statements. One can also say that in all descriptive statements, what is predicated are various qualities, and that a difference in the qualities predicated is the basis for the distinction between form and content statements. This assertion, however, needs to be justified because in parts of his account, at least, Beardsley treats the concept of relationships within a work as if this concept was on a par with the concepts of whole and parts in designating certain entities which are referred to in descriptive form statements. I believe that form statements are "about" relationships, however, not in the sense that they refer to such entities but rather that they predicate relationships to the whole or parts of an aesthetic object.
This unclarity in Beardsley's account is promoted by passages such as the following which talk about relationships existing in aesthetic objects as if the term "relation" had the same status as the term "part" in his theory.

We must now turn, therefore, to the question what would be a good set of categories for aesthetic analysis. It is clear that in so far as the disputable terms we have just discussed do refer to something verifiable about aesthetic objects, they refer to parts of those objects and their relations to one another. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 82)

It would be a mistake to infer from this, however, that the term "relation" has the same function as "part" in his theory: that is, in being used to designate the referents of critical statements. In the examples of critical statements which he cites, relations are among those things which are predicated of certain parts. Thus form statements in Beardsley's theory which are "about relations between parts" are such statements as

This blue is more highly saturated than that.

This side of the painting balances that side.

This shape of brush stroke appears throughout (see Beardsley, 1958, p. 399)

"Relations", then, is more properly construed in Beardsley's theory as a designate for a subset of the class of properties rather than as a designate for the entities which are referred to in critical statements.

Given this construal of Beardsley's use of "relations", there remains the problem of determining the relationship between qualities and relations in Beardsley's theory. It is clear that both qualities and relations are subsets of the class of properties. But in Beardsley's account the term "quality" is used in two ways. In an inclusive sense in which qualities are "directly perceivable" properties (Beardsley,
1958, p. 83) and in a narrower sense in which qualities contrast with relationships. If "qualities" is taken to mean those properties which are directly perceivable ("inclusive" sense) then it seems that it must include relationships since it would be difficult to see how "betweeness", "similarity", or some other relational property is any less perceivable than is, for example, "whiteness", "brightness", or "stability". Beardsley, however, also wishes to mark a distinction between qualities and relations.

There are statements about the number and local qualities of elements, about complexes and their regional qualities, about relations between elements or between complexes. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 85)

In this latter sense of qualities they are, one might say, nonrelational perceivable properties. In the following discussion I shall use Beardsley's term "quality" in its inclusive sense to mark off the class of directly perceivable properties. I shall substitute the expression "nonrelational quality" for Beardsley's "exclusive" sense of the term "quality" and contrast this with "relational quality".

Descriptive statements then, whether form or content statements all refer to wholes or parts (areas, etc.) of aesthetic objects and they all predicate certain qualities to these entities. Their status, then, as internal statements is clearly evident. Given this, one can now more precisely examine the distinction between form and content statements.

I believe that Beardsley's account here can be construed in two ways. One might say that there is a structural difference between form and content statements. Beardsley claims that form statements are of a certain type. That is, in contrast to content statements they
are statements of the type: "X has such and such a relation to Y". (Beardsley, 1958, p. 167)

These kinds of statements in ordinary language could perhaps be considered comparisons. In making such statements one must refer to more than one part of an aesthetic object and one must refer to parts of an aesthetic object instead of the whole in predicating certain relational qualities. By way of contrast, content statements clearly can refer to both the whole of an aesthetic object or to the parts. Hence, there would seem to be a difference of restriction on the entities which are referred to in making each kind of statement.

But if Beardsley's concept of a form statement requires these restrictions on the reference of descriptive statements, then the following statement

This has a triangular dominant pattern.

cannot be a form statement despite Beardsley's assertion that it can be regarded as such (Beardsley, 1958, p. 399). "Pattern" in the above statement is not a referring expression, and, hence, the above does not exhibit the characteristic structure of form statements.

I believe that Beardsley's distinction between form and content statement, then, can most plausibly be regarded as a distinction in the kind of qualities which are predicated of aesthetic objects, rather than as a distinction regarding both reference and predication. In form statements relational qualities are predicated. In content statements nonrelational qualities are predicated.

Nonrelational Qualities. Much of Beardsley's account of content and form statements is spent in discussing the qualities predicated in making such statements. Beardsley recognizes that no list of
qualities could ever exhaust all of the qualities possessed by aesthetic objects and, hence, the qualities which presumably would, or could be predicated in descriptive statements. Nonetheless, much of his account of description is spent in proposing a limited set of categories of nonrelational and relational qualities which apply to visual designs. The "basic" categories of nonrelational qualities are shape, size, position, and tone or color quality. Within the last quality he distinguishes among hue, lightness, and saturation. Beardsley's account of these categories is as follows:

Two areas can differ from each other in shape, size, position, and tone, or color. "Size" means scale, not as measured by the ruler but as relative to the frame, or boundaries of the whole picture-plane.... Position is also relative to the boundaries of the picture-plane: it includes both the location of the area ... and the lie; or orientation of the area....

Shape, size, and position are not merely respects in which areas can differ; they involve intrinsic relations in terms of which areas may be serially ordered. Positions are related to each other in that one is to the left of, to the right of, above, or below, another. One size is larger or smaller than another. But shape, size, and position -- and also, of course, color -- are independent properties of areas: each can be varied, within limits, while the others are kept constant....

Now consider two areas of the same shape and size and approximately the same position; they may still differ from each other in their tone....

In the tone of a particular area we can distinguish, though not separate a variety of qualities: it is yellow, light, bright, warm, advancing, and so on. But for the purpose of classifying and cataloging tones, it is customary to select three of the ways in which they differ and treat these as basic tonal dimensions. For it turns out that when each of these has been specified the tone and its relation to other tones is uniquely fixed, and all its other qualities are determined.... Two tones may differ in hue, as red differs from green,... Two tones of the same hue may differ in lightness or darkness as one part of the wall differs from another where there is less
light; this is sometimes called "value" sometimes "intensity", sometimes "brightness". Two tones of the same hue and lightness may differ in saturation, or color strength, as pastel shades from richer tones; this is sometimes called "hue intensity", sometimes "chroma". Black and white and shades of gray are tones, but hueless, "achromatic", ones; in other words, they have zero saturation.

To name a tone in such a way that it will not be mistaken for another tone, it is only necessary to refer to the three basic dimensions,... But to describe the tone fully you must mention these other characteristics. For they are no less "in" the tone than the basic ones. Hue, lightness, and saturation are convenient to select as basic for two reasons. First, they are among the most obvious color qualities to most people .... Second, they are the most directly correlated with the physical processes by which they are produced, and therefore most easily controlled .... (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 88-91)

Beardsley's account of the qualities predicated in content statements is neither precise nor systematic. One part of his account which is not clear is the exact number of categories of basic nonrelational qualities. Beardsley sometimes speaks as if the six categories of qualities cited above exhaust the class of basic qualities. At other points in his account, however, he appears to include a seventh kind of quality: number of parts (or areas).

There seems to be no new kind of thing that ought to be part of the description: no matter how complicated we made the figure, the true statements describing it would fall into the same basic categories. There are statements about the number and local qualities of elements, about complexes and their regional qualities, about relations between elements or between complexes. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 85)

3. Beardsley's example here is a slip. A pastel is only a lighter value of the corresponding color e.g., as pink is to the "richer" color red.
I construe number here as a kind of quality because in Beardsley's account numbers of areas would be predicated of aesthetic objects. Thus Beardsley cites the following as content statements:

The musical composition ... has four movements.
The painting contains ... two main solids. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 167)

A second way in which Beardsley's account of nonrelational qualities could be clearer is in the exact status of the basic categories of qualities which he proposes. In this study I am assuming that "size", "shape", etc. are technical terms designating certain categories of qualities rather than as individual qualities in their own right as Beardsley's account sometimes suggests. Thus, a critic need not use the expression "shape" in predicating a certain shape to an area of a visual design. And in predicating a certain shape, a variety of predicates can be used e.g., "squarish", "triangular", "irregular", etc. One might say that a range of qualities are encompassed by the concept of shape.

In Beardsley's account a clear distinction is made between basic qualities and other kinds of qualities. Beardsley does not precisely discriminate among these other qualities, however, and a range of expressions is used in their designation. A subset (or subsets) of these qualities are called "dependent", "affective", or "feeling" qualities (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 90-92). In regard to regional qualities Beardsley distinguishes between human and nonhuman regional qualities (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 328-332; p. 399). Human regional qualities are qualities of an aesthetic object that are "similar to qualities of human behavior, especially to mental states and processes" (Beardsley,
1958, p. 328). These are qualities such as "sadness", "joy", "childishness", "whimsicality", etc. The exact relationship between these qualities and dependent, affective, or feeling qualities is not clear from his account although they seem akin to one another. Perhaps in Beardsley's account dependent, affective, or feeling qualities are limited to elementary areas and, hence, are to be construed as local qualities only. But if this is the case, it is not unambiguously evident from Beardsley's text.

Because Beardsley's account is not clear in his discrimination among the qualities which contrast with basic qualities, I shall use "human qualities" to designate a certain set of qualities of both elements and complexes, qualities similar to human mental states and processes. This is an extension of Beardsley's use of the term since he appears to limit it to regional qualities. In contrast to human qualities there is a class of nonhuman regional qualities as well and I will also extend the expression "nonhuman" to refer to those miscellaneous qualities of elements as well as complexes. In Beardsley's basic catalogue of nonrelational qualities, then, there are basic local and regional qualities. There are also qualities of elements which he terms "affective", etc. but which I will say are human. There are thus human local and regional qualities. Finally, there is a miscellaneous category of local as well as regional qualities which I will term "nonhuman". To summarize, it is possible that the following nonrelational qualities are discussed in Beardsley's account:

1. Basic local qualities
2. Human local qualities
3. Nonhuman local qualities
4. Basic regional qualities

5. Human regional qualities

6. Nonhuman regional qualities

The proposal of basic nonrelational categories of qualities raises the question of the relationship between such qualities and other kinds of qualities predicated of aesthetic objects. Beardsley's account suggests that certain qualities regarded as basic, are basic in the sense that people can most easily discriminate such qualities and hence can reach objective agreement about them in communicating with other people (see Beardsley, 1958, pp. 90-92). Statements predicating such qualities, then, not only will stand independently as descriptive statements, but they will also be used presumably to support other descriptive statements about which objective agreement has not been reached (see Beardsley, 1958, p. 329).

Relational Qualities. In addition to basic categories of nonrelational qualities, Beardsley also proposes a basic set of categories designating relational qualities. He does this by discriminating between large scale or structural relations, and small scale or textural relations. Intersecting these relations is a distinction between dual relations which are relations that hold between two parts (areas) of a visual design and serial relations which are relations that hold among three or more parts (areas) of a visual design. His distinction between structural and textural relations is as follows:

There are relatively large-scale relations among the main parts [of a visual design] and relatively small-scale relations among the subordinate parts -- or, in other words, there are relations among large, and perhaps distant, regions, and there are relations among neighboring regions, of the object. Hence we shall distinguish two species of aesthetic form: structure and texture .... This is what I mean by "texture":
the texture of the visual design at any location within it consists of the relations among the small parts at that location ....

It is possible to have a design with structure but no texture, or with texture but no structure. Imagine, in the first case, a large rectangle containing two large red circular areas on a white background. This design clearly has certain main parts, and these parts are related: the circles stand out from the background, and they balance each other in a simple symmetrical way. The relations "stand out from" and "balance" are structural relations in this case, for they relate the main parts. Suppose that within the main parts, however, there are no visible differentiations, and so there are no smaller parts to be discriminated and compared. Then, there is structure, but no texture ....

Now imagine a field of white covered with small red spots, equally spaced ... If the whole field consists of such dots, there are no major divisions within it; the design does not fall into any large sections for the eye, and so it has no structure. But it has texture,... (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 168, 169)

The passages which discuss the distinctions between dual and serial relations are the following:

What are the possible relations that can subsist among parts of the visual design? The main ones we can clearly divide into two groups. First there are dual relations, that is, relations that hold between two parts of the design. These are in the logical sense symmetrical; that is, if they hold from A to B then they hold from B to A. These relations are chiefly important as constituting structure, that is, in so far as they hold between relatively large segments of the object.

Besides the dual relations, there can be serial relations within a visual design. Consider any three or more figures, whether complex or simple in relation to one another. And set aside the dual relations that may hold between any two of them. There are three possibilities that remain. First, they may all have some characteristic in common, their color, shape, size, orientation, etc. In that case we shall say that they form a series by repetition, for each is similar in the same way to all the others. Second, they may vary in some regular way, in color, shape, size, orientation, or position: for example, A may
be darker than, larger than, to the left of, $B$, and $B$ darker than, larger than, to the left of $C$. In this case the relation between $A$ and $B$ is similar to the relation between $B$ and $C$, and we shall say that they form a series by directional change ....

These purely formal distinctions can be either structural or textural,... depending on whether we are considering major or minor parts of the design. (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 174-176)

Beardsley then proposes four basic relational qualities in addition to six basic nonrelational qualities of aesthetic objects. These distinctions, along with Beardsley's general conception of the reference and predication of all descriptive statements are given in Figure 5.

In addition to proposing basic nonrelational and relational qualities of aesthetic objects, Beardsley uses these concepts in discussing a number of concepts of importance in fine arts criticism. The terms "line", "figure" and "mass" are analyzed according to the categories of parts (areas) and qualities (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 93-95). Beardsley in addition discusses a number of qualities taken to be important in fine arts criticism. Dominance and visual density are both local and regional qualities. Mass, depth, space, and visual volume are non-human regional qualities, as are implicit movement and tension. Finally, Beardsley discusses the qualities of unity and complexity. (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 190-196; 201-209; 293-309) These last qualities assume great importance in his theory of evaluation and I shall discuss them further in subsequent parts of this chapter.

Beardsley uses his proposed relational qualities also to analyze and clarify the expressions "composition", and "style" as these terms are employed in fine arts criticism. He also presents a number of examples of dual structural relations: balance and imbalance, a
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entities Referred to</th>
<th>Qualities Predicated</th>
<th>Examples of Qualities Cited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>whole (picture plane)</td>
<td>human and nonhuman regional qualities</td>
<td>depth, visual volume, mass linearity, implicit movement dominance, complexity visual density, unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>basic regional qualities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>shape position value</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>size hue intensity (number)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>complex parts (areas)</td>
<td>human and nonhuman regional qualities</td>
<td>see above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>basic regional qualities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>shape position value</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>size hue intensity (number)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elementary parts (areas)</td>
<td>human and other local qualities</td>
<td>coolness, warmth, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>basic local qualities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>shape position value</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>size hue intensity (number)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Form Statements |
|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| whole (picture plane) | serial | structural | relations |
|                      | textural | repetition/directional change of basic and other qualities |
|                      | dual | structural | relations |
|                      | textural | similarity/contrast of basic and other qualities |
| complex parts (areas) | serial | structural | relations |
|                      | textural | repetition/directional change of basic and other qualities |
|                      | dual | structural | relations |
|                      | textural | similarity/contrast of basic and other qualities |
| elementary parts (areas) | serial | structural | relations |
|                      | textural | repetition/directional change of basic and other qualities |
|                      | dual | structural | relations |
|                      | textural | similarity/contrast of basic and other qualities |

Figure 5. The Reference and Predication of Analysis/Description Statements
relationship of visual density; **harmony** or **disharmony** a relationship of color; and **equilibrium** or **disequilibrium** a relationship of movement.

A detailed discussion of all of these non-relational and relational qualities is beyond the scope of the present analysis. Since these are all qualities, they are on Beardsley's account only really definable ostensively. Beardsley's discussion of these qualities is clarified through the presentation of examples and the discussion of certain qualities which he construes as "perceptual conditions" of such qualities. It is worth pointing out before proceeding, however, that some of the qualities cited by Beardsley, notably unity and harmony, in ordinary language would be construed as value properties and, by the analysis presented in Chapter IV of this study, statements predicating such properties would not be understood as merely analyses or descriptions. Beardsley employs a limited set of categories to classify linguistic active doings and artifacts and this is one area of his account where his use of "analysis" and "description" conflicts with the ordinary meaning of these terms.

Beardsley's account of analysis and description, then, rests upon a detailed exposition of the content of such statements. Having given an analysis of his discussion in terms of the concepts of reference and predication, I now turn toward his discussion of the active doing and performed act of interpretation.

**Interpretation**

Unlike his account of analysis and description, Beardsley does not appear to distinguish between the active doing of interpreting
and the performed linguistic act in his use of the term "interpretation". Interpretation for Beardsley appears to be both a linguistic active doing and a performed linguistic act of a distinctive kind.

There are two issues of relevance in Beardsley's discussion of interpretation. One issue lies, once again, with the content of critical statements. This issue I shall separate from Beardsley's theory of representation which also forms part of his account. A second issue in Beardsley's account is the evidential basis of various interpretive statements. This issue I shall not discuss in detail here since that would involve an attempt to provide a characterization of the range of external statements that would be needed to support some interpretive statements.

Beardsley begins his account of interpretation by explaining it in terms of talk about the representational dimension of a visual design.

But a picture is two things at once: it is a design, and it is a picture of something. In other words, it presents something to the eye for direct inspection, and it represents something that exists, or might exist, outside the picture frame.

It is this second aspect of the design that we are after when we ask questions like: What does it portray? What is it about? What does it mean? Or, elliptically, what is it? ... To answer questions like these is to interpret the design. And a large part of interpretation consists in saying what the design represents, or to put it in what we shall count as synonymous terms, saying what its subject is. (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 267, 268)

In the above account of interpretation, Beardsley suggests that there is a subset of the class of interpretation statements that is not accounted for by the notion of interpretation as a "saying what the design represents, or ... what its subject is." This suggestion is borne out in Beardsley's account, I believe, by his discussion of
symbolism, since statements "about" the symbolism in a visual design can be differentiated from the other kinds of interpretive statements he discusses. Nevertheless all interpretive statements in his account can be contrasted with descriptive statements by a difference in their content. I believe this is the point that Beardsley is attempting to make in the passage above.

The nature of this content distinction can be clarified by considering examples of interpretive statements. Interpretations for Beardsley are

"II. Statements about the likeness of the painting [visual design] to other objects in the world
   "A. Statements about representation, including
      "1. Depiction ("This represents a horse")
      "2. Portrayal ("This represents Bucephalus")
   "B. Statements about suggestion
      ("This suggests a wind mill")
      "(Symbol-statements are subclasses of representation-statements and suggestion-statements)

"Those [statements above] in groups A and B are generally called "interpretations" of the painting, and there seems to be no serious danger in this usage." (Beardsley, 1958, p. 399)

Such statements as the ones above are contrasted with statements such as

This is blue.

This is an oval-shaped array of dots.

When the above examples of interpretation are considered and contrasted with these descriptive statements, what is at issue in the distinction between interpretation and description, I believe, is essentially a difference in the reference of each kind of statement. In contrast to the examples of descriptive statements cited by Beardsley, two distinct kinds of reference seems to be needed in interpretive
statements. As with descriptive statements one reference is made to the whole or parts of aesthetic objects. This reference I will say is the primary reference of an interpretive statement. Unlike descriptive statements, however, this whole or part referred to must be of a representational aesthetic object or of a borderline case of a representational object. (In Beardsley's terminology, such borderline cases are called "suggestive" designs.) In addition, interpretive statements seem to require a subsidiary reference. I take the expressions "a horse", "Bucephalus", and "wind mill" in the above examples of interpretive statements cited by Beardsley to be referring rather than predicating expressions.

It is the distinction between referring and predicating expressions which perhaps underlies Beardsley's distinctions between "formal" and "vital" classes in discussing representation in aesthetic objects. Beardsley discusses this distinction by first presenting a schema of interpretive statements.

Representation is a relation between a design and something else. In the formula

\[ X \text{ represents } Y, \]

\( X \) is the visual design itself -- the painting, etching, photograph -- and \( Y \) is the subject represented. Now we know what kind of thing \( X \) is -- it could be a statue or a building, but we shall confine our attention here to two-dimensional designs. What kind of thing is \( Y \)?

[To answer] this we must make another tricky, and perhaps in the end not very satisfactory, distinction.

We may approach the problem first by considering the way we often use the word "subject." It is natural to say of a painting that its subject is cubes, cones, or solids. In other words, we would say that a painting represents flowers, clouds, or horses, but perhaps not that it represents cubes, cones, or solids. "It is a picture of a house" is usual; "It is a picture of a material object" is not usual. It seems that we are tacitly
laying some further restriction on the classes of things that may be said to be represented — on the Y's in "X represents Y." But how is this restriction to be made explicit?

Suppose we were to list a number of classes in order of decreasing abstractness: cylinder, gray cylinder, slender gray cylinder, hollow gray cylinder, gray metal cylinder, steel pipe. We can certainly say that a painting represents a steel pipe, and if we cannot correctly say that it represents a cylinder, where and how in this series can we draw a line? There is one method we might try. Certain classes of things figure in our experience in ways that relate to practical ends and needs, or would if they could be invented or discovered: knives, knees, houses, horses, clouds, pipes, and prunes. Let us call these vital classes. Other classes are adventitious, or merely conceptual; they are logically just as good, but they do not have the same significance: torus, sphere, small red triangle, large smooth rubber polka-dotted cone. Let us call these formal classes ....

Nonexistence does not prevent the class of chimeras [and other classes of nonexistent entities] from being a vital class, either; for this concept is very concrete and full, ... (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 271, 272)

Beardsley's uneasiness, here, may rest on an inability to successfully articulate a difference between the propositional acts of referring and predicating. Perhaps his uneasiness arises because of a misidentification of differences in propositional function with differences in the expressions used. It is true that certain expressions such as "cube", "cone", or "solid" are not usually used as referring expressions but in certain contexts it seems that they might well be used in this way. In the directive

Pick up the cone (cube, solid) from the floor.

all of these expressions would be referring expressions. On the other hand in

The box is a cone (cube, solid).

these same expressions predicate properties of an entity.
In the examples of interpretive statements cited by Beardsley, then, two kinds of references seem to be required. Interpretive statements predicate what may be loosely called a "representational relationship" between the entities which figure in primary and subsidiary referring expressions. This peculiar relationship it might be noted is not an identity relationship. A representational relationship could be indicated by a number of expressions. Beardsley uses "represent", "depict", "portray", "symbolize", "suggest" in special ways. But a representational relationship of different sorts perhaps also could be indicated by such expressions as "show", "mimic", "illustrate", "tell", "relate", etc. It seems likely that Beardsley would regard all of the following as interpretative statements:

The design shows a man and a woman.
This part mimics the action perfectly.
The picture illustrates the death of Socrates.
The painting tells of the journey across the Western Divide.
The picture relates the massacre.

Interpretations in Beardsley's account, then, appear to be statements which possess both a "primary" and "subsidiary" reference and which predicate a "representational relationship" between the entities to which reference is made.

Depiction and Portrayal. Within the class of interpretation statements Beardsley makes a further distinction between depiction and portrayal statements. This distinction in his account is brought out by contrasting the following statements (made of Ruben's painting "The Judgment of Paris").
1. The painting represents three women and two men.
2. The painting represents three Greek goddesses, a god, and a shepherd.
3. The painting represents Helen Fourment.
5. The painting represents a shepherd offering an apple to one of the three goddesses.
6. The painting represents the judgment of Paris, that is, Paris choosing the most beautiful of the three goddesses. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 269)

Statement 1, 3, and 5 according to Beardsley are depiction statements.

Statements 3, 4, and 6 are portrayal statements. What is the basis for his distinction? According to Beardsley in the former set of statements what is represented (the Y factor) represents an "indeterminate and unspecified member of a class."

In this first use of the term "represent," then, what is represented is always some -- indeterminate and unspecified -- member of a class of material objects, including people. We say the painting is a picture of a horse, a baby, a cross, an eye ....

For convenience, let us introduce the term "depict" for this sort of representation .... (Beardsley, 1958, p. 270).

In the latter set of statements on the other hand

The letter Y stands for things of a different sort .... Here "represent" is followed not by "a" or "an," but by "the" or by a proper name. We say a design represents Joey at the age of two months, Napoleon, Mt. Sainte Victoire, the Prince of Monaco -- or it represents the Empire State Building, the Three Graces, David and Goliath. Each of these subjects is a particular object, or a particular group of objects, either named or referred to by a unique description. Broadening slightly a term already in use, we may call this sort of representation portrayal. (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 272, 273)

Beardsley's distinction I believe can be accounted for within Searle's theory as a distinction between indefinite and definite reference (Searle, 1969, p. 27). Subsidiary referring expressions
which are indefinite are the Y components in Beardsley's depiction statements. Subsidiary referring expressions which are definite referring expressions are the Y components in Beardsley's portrayal statements.

Within the category of portrayal statements Beardsley makes a further distinction between reference to unique entities which have existed and for which evidence exists for their appearance and between reference to unique entities which either have not existed or for which no evidence for their appearance exists. The former kind of statement he terms "physical portrayal". The latter kind of statement he terms "nominal portrayal" (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 273-278).

Objects and Events. A second major distinction between the kinds of subsidiary reference is brought out in Beardsley's account by contrasting statements 1, 2, 3, and 4 in the original example with statements 5 and 6.

Statements 5 and 6 about the Rubens painting introduce a new aspect. The point about phrases like "a shepherd offering an apple," or "Paris choosing" ... is that they stand not simply for objects, like "apple" and "woman" but for events. However, the distinction between depiction and portrayal applies to events just as to objects: a supper is depicted, the Last Supper is portrayed; a shepherd offering an apple (Statement 5) is depicted, Paris offering the apple (Statement 6) is nominally portrayed. Plainly we shall want to add to our definitions of "depict" and "portray" that [what is represented] ... may be an event as well as an object, that is, an object in motion, as well as an object in situ. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 278)

The notion of an event as it is presented in Beardsley's text perhaps deserves some more comment. Beardsley asserts that representational aesthetic objects can depict, portray, or suggest certain events as well as objects. Reference to events involves a
a process of inference which he calls "elucidation":

A design can tell a story because we can elucidate it, that is fill out the pattern of events to which the relations among its depicted objects belong. We see an advertisement of a man in an open topcoat standing at the ticket window on a small town railway station. The advertisement tells us he is appropriately garbed in Dacron, but it doesn't need to tell us what he is up to. On the floor beside the pot-bellied stove is a suitcase with a gift-wrapped package on it; he has another package under his arm, and there is a holly wreath in the window. Obviously he is on his way home for Christmas vacation. Let us call this set of motives and actions the dramatic subject of the picture.

... ...

In the elucidation of painting,... we depend upon our knowledge of causal laws about human behavior and physical processes. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 279)

Here I will not attempt an analysis of the complex notion of an event. What is important to note, though, is that subsidiary reference to objects and events requires certain capacities of a speaker and that different capacities are required in referring to events over and above those capacities required in order to refer to objects.

Reference to objects presupposes a recognition of those objects and this recognition depends upon a speaker's prior knowledge. As Beardsley states

In order for us to recognize what a visual design depicts [and portrays], we must of course have the relevant experience. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 270)

Some of this knowledge would appear to be of a specialized and advanced kind especially in making portrayal statements. Referring to some objects portrayed in an aesthetic object for example seems to depend upon a prior knowledge of history, mythology, etc. In making
a physical portrayal statement about the represented subject of an untitled work by an artist, one clearly needs knowledge of the biographical background of the artist to determine whether the artist could actually have seen the subject. Beardsley, himself, describes such a situation:

Now, whether a particular painting, of a man or a mountain has a sitter [subject] cannot be determined merely from the painting itself. Nor can it be conclusively determined merely by finding in the world a man or a mountain that is the spitting image of the painting; we further require that there be some evidence that the painter saw that man or that mountain or that picture of it.... We cannot see the features of Rembrandt's sleeping girl... but probably Hendrickje was its sitter. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 274)

In referring to events, on the other hand, an element of skill seems to be an additional requirement over and above the knowledge required to recognize objects, a skill of elucidating motives and actions of people and the actions things directly represented or suggested. What is referred to by a subsidiary referring expression in an interpretive statement, then, often goes beyond that which is obviously represented or suggested.

With regard to the subsidiary reference of interpretive statements, then, Beardsley makes two major distinctions: between referring expressions which apply to a general class of things (depiction) and referring expressions which apply to a unique thing (portrayal), and between objects on the one hand and events on the other. These distinctions are presented in Figure 6.

**Symbol Statements.** There is a further set of statements which Beardsley considers to be interpretations but which do not easily fit into the characterization of interpretive statements just put forth.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Reference</th>
<th>Subsidiary Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>representational or suggestive</td>
<td>portrayed objects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whole (picture plane)</td>
<td>portrayed events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>depicted objects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>depicted events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>representational or suggestive</td>
<td>portrayed objects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parts (areas)</td>
<td>portrayed events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>depicted objects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>depicted events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>representational or suggestive</td>
<td>abstract properties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>symbolic parts (areas)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6. The Reference and Predication of Interpretation (Act and Artifact) Statements
These statements are about the symbolism in works of visual design. Beardsley acknowledges that symbolism is a troublesome concept but he offers a narrow definition of a symbol. In Beardsley's theory a symbol is a represented or suggested part of a visual design to which certain abstract "properties" are conventionally associated:

There can be symbolism in a painting of a cross -- or of a skull, a mirror, or a balance. But when we say that a painting is symbolic, this can be regarded as an elliptical statement, which is expanded to two: (1) the painting represents a cross, and (2) the cross symbolizes Christianity. In other words, it is objects (the bald eagle, the cross, the flag) or patterns (the red cross, the red star, the fleur-de-lis, the swastika) that symbolize something; a painting is symbolic when it represents or suggests such an object or contains such a pattern....

Though, for convenience, we shall confine our attention to symbolic objects, it perhaps ought to be noted that actions, too, can be symbolic,....

It is, then, an object or pattern or act that does the symbolizing, what is symbolized is always a set of properties or characteristics: faith, hope, charity, courage, wisdom, chastity, decay. A symbolic object can denote a particular thing, but denoting is not symbolizing. The Great Seal denotes the United States, but what is symbolizes are certain characteristics that the United States has or is thought to have or ought to have. (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 288, 289)

Symbols, then, in Beardsley's account are parts of an aesthetic object in which objects or acts are represented or patterns are suggested. Such objects, acts, or patterns are linked (or can be linked) with certain properties or characteristics. Beardsley seems to explain this linkage as a matter of convention. Symbols are such, either because there is some formal agreement to regard them as such or because, simply, they are regarded as symbolic. Or again, objects or patterns are regarded as symbolic because they lend themselves to symbolic interpretation because of their intrinsic characteristics.
and because objects, acts, patterns, etc. whose presence is unusual or striking within an aesthetic object are conventionally regarded as symbolic in critical practice.

What makes an object symbolic? How does it come to take on symbolic meaning?... Consider the bald eagle. Three things, at least, seem to be involved in making it a symbol. First, there is a natural similarity in some respects between the eagle and the nation and national qualities it stands for. The eagle is strong, fiercely independent, and has a certain magnificence of form and size; it is possible, at least, to hope that the nation has these qualities. Let us call these similarities actual or believed, the natural basis of the symbolism. Second, the bald eagle did not acquire its symbolic function by chance; there had to be a decision at some point -- namely in 1872 -- to let it stand for the United States. In other words there was a kind of agreement or stipulation: let us call this the conventional basis of the symbolism. But third, the eagle might have languished on his eminence, or remained a mere token or indication of the nation.... it took some history for the eagle to become a symbol.... Let us call this the vital basis of the symbolism.

Now many symbols have all three bases, but the third, the vital, seems to be the essential or defining one. An object or pattern does not become a symbol in the full sense until it enters into human activities so that it is perceived not as a bare sign of something, but as having valuable qualities in itself, by virtue of its symbolic function....

... ...............................................................

I think that what we do in interpreting the symbolism in a painting is just to see whether it contains any symbols with a primarily conventional basis, and second whether it contains any symbols with a primarily natural basis. The first is a study of iconology. To know what the cross or the barbed wire symbolizes, we study not the intention of the painter, but the history of Christianity and of modern governments....

It will always be more difficult to agree, and to be sure we know what we are doing, when we interpret those symbols that have no conventional basis, for there is no dictionary of them, no set of rules for decoding them. Here I think it is of considerable importance to separate two questions: How do we know that an object depicted by the painting is a symbol at all? And how do we know what it symbolizes?
The answer to the first question seems to be that we use, often without explicit formulation, a methodological principle of a rather special sort. If the objects in the painting belong together, in the sense that in the normal course of events we would expect to find them in the same vicinity, we are not forced to seek any symbolic significance in them. But if an object stands out in some way in contrast to its setting, or is brought into focus by the design, then we are invited to dwell on it and treat this as a symbol....

Let us call this the Principle of Prominence: an object that is not already a recognized conventional symbol becomes a natural symbol in a painting only if its presence is unusual or striking....

The answer to the second question seems to be that we first consider the range of potential symbolic meanings of the objects as they have figured in the life of man.... we then see which of these potential symbolic meanings can be fitted into a coherent whole with the other objects in the painting, including their potential meanings, if any. This is the Principle of Symbol-Congruence. (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 289-292)

Interpretive statements about the symbolism of an aesthetic object, then, can be distinguished from other interpretive statements. The primary reference of such statements is restricted to representational or suggestive parts of aesthetic objects in contrast to other kinds of interpretive statements which can also refer to whole aesthetic objects. Moreover, these representational or suggestive parts must either be conventionally recognized as symbols or their presence must be unusual or striking within the aesthetic object: not every representational or suggestive part can be considered a symbol and, hence, can be referred to in this kind of interpretive statement.

The subsidiary reference of symbol statements also differs from other interpretive statements. In Beardsley's account symbols are
such because certain abstract properties are associated with them by
convention. Symbol statements are statements such as the following:

This symbolizes faith.

This flag symbolizes courage.

This bended knee symbolizes humility.

In each of the above statements the subsidiary reference is not
to an individual or to a particular but rather to what Searle (1969,
p. 27) says are universals. Symbol statements, then, differ from
other interpretive statements in their subsidiary reference. The
relationship between symbol statements and other interpretive state­
ments in Beardsley's account is also presented in Figure 6.

Interpretation as an active doing and performed linguistic act,
then, stands in contrast to analysis and description. This distinction
in Beardsley's account is sometimes a matter of the primary reference
of critical statements. When the parts or wholes of abstract objects
are the entities referred to in critical statements, such statements
cannot (logically) be interpretations. Interpretive statements must
have as their primary reference, the parts or wholes of representa­
tional or suggestive aesthetic objects. Interpretive statements,
however, also differ from analysis and description in their possession
of subsidiary reference to something outside of the aesthetic object
and the predication of a what has loosely been called "representational
relationship" between the entities referred to by the primary and
subsidiary referring expressions.

In Beardsley's discussion of interpretation, distinctions were
made between subsidiary referring expressions which applied generally
to a class of things and referring expressions which applied to a unique entity. In the former instance interpretive statements were termed depiction statements, in the latter instance portrayal statements. This distinction intersected Beardsley's second major distinction, between the subsidiary reference to objects and events. A final kind of interpretive statement is given in symbol statements. In these statements represented or suggested symbolic parts within an aesthetic object are referred to in the primary reference, and certain abstract properties or universals are referred to in the subsidiary reference.

The final kind of critical statement discussed by Beardsley is evaluation and judgment. I discuss his account of these concepts in the following section.

Evaluation and Judgment

In Beardsley's account the use of "evaluation" and "judgment" marks a distinction between an active doing and a performed linguistic act. Unlike his account of analysis and description, however, Beardsley is not as consistent in this distinction. Sometimes the terms "evaluation" and "judgment" appear to be used interchangeably. For the purposes of this analysis, however, I shall use "evaluation" in relation to active doings and "judgment" in relation to linguistic artifacts.

Beardsley's account of evaluation and judgment represents only a part of a larger theory which attempts to establish a reconstruction of rational critical argument about matters of value in the arts. Beardsley holds that some critical arguments offered by critics are
sound arguments in the sense that they reach true conclusion by employing valid inductive and deductive arguments from true premises. Much of his account of evaluation and judgment is concerned with a discussion of the structure of such arguments and with a justification of critical principles upon which these arguments could be based.

In this section I shall only discuss a part of Beardsley's theory. It will be helpful, therefore, to identify more precisely the components with which I shall be concerned. Evaluation and judgment as distinct kinds of critical statement can be presented independently in contexts in which no justification is required. In some contexts, however, the critic may believe, or his audience may require that some justification be offered for the judgment that is presented. Beardsley cites three contexts in which justification may be necessary: in cases where disputes arise about the value of an aesthetic object; in cases where a critic may wish to justify a judgment to people who have not experienced an aesthetic object; or in cases where a critic may have reacted in a certain way to an aesthetic object and wishes to know whether his reaction is justified (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 534, 535).

In all these cases, a rational critic will offer reasons for his judgment. He does this by stating that the aesthetic object contains one or more properties, properties which are regarded as standards or criteria of aesthetic value (Beardsley, 1958, p. 457). These

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4. Beardsley uses the term "criteria" instead of "standard" in a later article clarifying and expanding his theory. This article is "The Generality of Critical Reasons" (Beardsley, 1962).
reasons in formal terms, can be understood as minor premises of elliptical deductive or inductive arguments, the major premises of which formulate the criteria or standards into some principle, or in Beardsley's theory, canon of aesthetic value. Beardsley's theory not only attempts to account for the structure of critical argument but also for the justification underlying his choice of the criteria embodied in critical principles. To this latter end he formulates an "instrumentalist" theory of aesthetic value.

In this section I shall restrict my discussion to an exposition of Beardsley's characterization of evaluation and judgment as distinct kinds of critical statement, and to an exposition of Beardsley's discussion of acceptable critical reasons and the criteria they presuppose. A complete account of Beardsley's discussion of the structure of critical argument and of his instrumentalist theory of value is beyond the scope of the present study.

The Function or Functions of Normative Critical Statements. Two interpretations of Beardsley's account of evaluation and judgment are possible. One interpretation can be gained from Beardsley's identification of evaluation and judgment with the class of statements predicking value properties of a very general nature. Critical evaluations and judgments in one part of his account are those [statements] that apply to works of art the words "good" or "beautiful", their negatives, or other predicates definable in terms of them. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 9)

Consistent with this conception of evaluation and judgment are a number of schematic examples of such statements which he presents in discussing the arguments supporting critical judgments (in the
following examples $X$ is understood to represent the aesthetic object).

$X$ is good.

$X$ is bad.

$X$ is better than $Y$. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 456)

In this first conception of critical evaluation or judgment, then, such statements predicate general value properties of aesthetic objects. In this conception of evaluation and judgment, it is conceivable that such statements could encompass a range of illocutionary acts since, in a variety of such acts, general value properties would be predicated. Thus, not only evaluations and judgments but also recommendations, prescriptions, commendations, appraisals, assessments, gradings, etc. could be included within the class of such statements since in all of the above illocutionary acts, general value properties are predicated. Beardsley, himself, speaks of evaluation and judgment somewhat loosely in terms of the concepts of comparison, rating, reporting, and grading (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 10, 173).

Nevertheless, Beardsley also speaks of evaluation and judgment in terms of one particular kind of illocutionary act. He maintains that evaluation and judgment have a particular function which distinguishes, them, from other critical statements. This function in Beardsley's account is not that of a recommendation but rather that of a commendation:

Is it plausible to consider judgments like "This is good" in an aesthetic context as disguised imperatives? ... It does seem as though it is hard to make out a good case for saying that "This is good" (in an aesthetic context) has a peculiar imperative component.
This conclusion can, I think, be strengthened by a broader consideration. Normative statements in general, including these we make about aesthetic objects, are of two sorts. Sometimes we make practical proposals: ... Let us call such judgments Recommendations: they propose solutions to problems of actual choice.... Normative statements ... are different from outright Recommendations .... let us call them Commendations. A rational Recommendation will presumably be based upon correct Commendations, but a Commendation is not itself a proposal for action.... But critical evaluations are not Recommendations but Commendations; they provide relevant data for decisions, but they enjoin no decisions themselves, and it does not seem at all plausible to treat them as in part commands. (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 475, 476)

There are several puzzling features in the above account which must be clarified before an interpretation can be offered of Beardsley's notion of commendation. In the above passage Beardsley is arguing against the notion that critical judgments are imperatives, a type of statement that in his view lacks truth or falsity. Yet his identification of imperatives with recommendations surely is unwarranted. Imperatives imply that the speaker is in some position of authority over a hearer. Recommendations do not. Thus, a private cannot order a captain to do something, although he surely could recommend that the captain do something. In making recommendations, on the other hand a speaker implies a belief that what is recommended is in some way beneficial to a hearer. Imperatives do not. It would be odd of me to recommend that you endanger your life unless, say, you could impress your friends by your daring or benefit in some other way. On the other hand, a captain could very well order a private to endanger his life in circumstances in which the private felt that no benefit would accrue to him.
Beardsley's easy identification of recommendations with imperatives raises a number of problems about how his concept of an evaluation or value judgment is to be construed. In ruling out imperatives has he really ruled out recommendations from the class of evaluations and judgments? Plainly, if evaluation and judgment are construed as general normative statements, then, he has not, since in predicating general value properties in aesthetic contexts one certainly could be recommending a course of action to someone. Consider the following dialogue:

Connoisseur: Should I buy the picture on the wall?

Critic: Why not, it is good.

Such a statement in ordinary circumstances clearly could be a recommendation.

Beardsley, then, is plainly working with an impoverished set of illocutionary categories in dividing normative statements into two classes. This raises the problem of how "commendation" is to be understood from his discussion. On one possible interpretation "commendation" could be construed as a general label for a multitude of illocutionary functions with the exclusion of imperatives and perhaps recommendations (although here Beardsley would be arbitrarily ruling out an important kind of function from the class of normative critical statements). Commendation, on the other hand could also be construed as a unique speech act in its own right; Beardsley's text is simply not precise on this matter.
So two interpretations of Beardsley's notion of evaluation and
critique are possible from his account. One interpretation would
identify critical evaluations and judgments with the class of state-
ments which predicate general value properties (distinct from
imperatives and, perhaps, recommendations). The other, perhaps less
plausible interpretation, would identify aesthetic evaluations and
judgments with the narrow class of commendations as these are con-
strued in ordinary language.

Critical Reasons. In contrast to some other theories of
criticism, Beardsley's theory holds that critical judgments can be
rationally supported by critical reasons. A major part of his
account is spent in identifying the kinds of reasons which can
figure in critical argument. Not every critical reason offered by
a critic is a good reason in the sense that it provides rational
support for a critical judgment. Besides giving an account of
evaluation and judgment, Beardsley's theory also attempts to account
for the kind of reason used by rational critics in support of
aesthetic value judgments. It is to an exposition of these reasons
in Beardsley's theory that I now turn.

Beardsley's account of critical reasons begins by narrowing the
class of reasons considered acceptable through a process of elimina-
tion. Reasons which attribute a moral or a cognitive value to
aesthetic objects are rejected out of hand as inappropriate
(Beardsley, 1958, pp. 456-457). Other reasons, considered by
Beardsley to be more peculiarly aesthetic are sorted into three
groups which Beardsley calls objective, affective, and genetic
reasons.
There are reasons that refer to features of the aesthetic object itself: the composition is "confused", there is "too much gesticulation." Let us call these **Objective Reasons**. There are the reasons that refer to effects of the object upon the percipient: the color is "unpleasant," that is, that gives displeasure. Let us call these **Affective Reasons**. There are the reasons that refer to the causes and conditions of the object, that is, to the artist or his materials: the drawing is "hasty," if this means it was done in haste; there was (in the painter's mind?) "too much concern for effect." Let us call these **Genetic Reasons**. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 457)

In Beardsley's account, affective and genetic reasons are members of the class of external statements, statements which I have identified previously in terms of their reference and predication. Genetic reasons are those statements which refer to the creator of the aesthetic object and predicate certain psychological events or states to this person. Beardsley objects to the use of such statements as reasons in the following way:

I want to show that these Genetic Reasons, and in particular the appeal to intention, cannot be good, that is, relevant and sound reasons for critical evaluations.... [my] argument is this: (1) we can seldom know the intention with sufficient exactness, independently of the work itself, to compare the work with it and measure its success or failure. (2) Even when we can do so, the resulting judgment is not a judgment of the work, but only of the worker, which is quite a different thing. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 458)

Affective reasons in Beardsley's account are those which predicate certain effects of the aesthetic object on the percipient. Beardsley allows that such statements are not irrelevant as reasons but they are uninformative and, hence, to be avoided in critical discourse.

I do not consider ... Affective Reasons irrelevant to the judgment of aesthetic objects in the way in which I consider the Genetic Reasons irrelevant.... Affective Reasons by themselves are inadequate, because they are uninformative.... (Beardsley, 1958, p. 461)
Beardsley, then, is left with the class of objective reasons as the only kind of reason that appears to have a prima-facie plausibility as an appropriate critical reason. Objective reasons are those belonging to the class of critical or internal statements; that is, they are descriptions and interpretations.

I call a reason Objective if it refers to some characteristic — that is some quality or internal relation, or set of qualities and relations — within the work itself, or to some meaning-relation between the work and the world. In short, where either descriptive statements or interpretive statements appear as reasons in critical arguments, they are to be considered as Objective reasons. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 462)

Not every critical description or interpretation is an appropriate critical reason, however. Appropriate reasons in Beardsley's account are those which predicate only certain kinds of properties, criteria or standards of aesthetic value, to aesthetic objects (Beardsley, 1958, p. 457; 1962, p. 485). In Beardsley's account there are two levels of such criteria or standards. Primary criteria are those whose presence always enhances the value of an aesthetic object. In Beardsley's theory there are exactly three such criteria: unity, complexity, and intensity. These are all regional qualifies of aesthetic objects. Although these qualities as criteria are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions of aesthetic goodness, their presence always enhances the value of an aesthetic object. Secondary criteria are those qualities which, either alone or in combination with other qualities, bear upon the presence or absence of the primary criteria. Where secondary criteria are cited in reasons supporting favorable judgments, they are merits. Where such criteria are cited in reasons supporting unfavorable judgments, they are defects.
Beardsley does not attempt to delimit the class of secondary criteria but he does provide examples of such criteria in the following list of reasons.

I think when we take a wide survey of critical reasons, we can find room for most of them, with very little trouble, in three main groups. First there are reasons that seem to bear upon the degree of unity or disunity of a work:

... it is well-organized (or disorganized).
... it is formally perfect (or imperfect).
... it has (or lacks) an inner logic of structure and style.

Second, there are those reasons that seem to bear upon the degree of complexity or simplicity of the work:

... it is developed on a large scale.
... it is rich in contrasts (or lacks variety and is repetitious).
... it is subtle and imaginative (or crude).

Third, there are reasons that seem to bear upon the intensity or lack of intensity of human regional qualities in the work:

... it is full of vitality (or insipid).
... it is forceful and vivid (or weak and pale).
... it is beautiful (or ugly).
... it is tender, ironic, tragic, graceful, delicate, richly comic.

(Beardsley, 1958, p. 462)

Thus, in Beardsley's account there are two kinds of appropriate critical reasons. Such reasons will either predicate one or more primary criteria directly or they will predicate one or more secondary criteria. Reasons predicing secondary criteria are justified by arguments employing a Special Canon as a major premise. These Special Canons or principles specify the context in which the secondary criterion is considered to be a merit or defect. This Special Canon or principle, then, will be supported if it bears upon the presence or absence if one or more of the three primary criteria.
Having given an account of the kind of descriptive and interpretive statements considered to be appropriate reasons in Beardsley's theory, it is worth commenting on the usefulness of the above account for someone interested in establishing a set of criteria by which aesthetic objects can be evaluated. Someone with this interest will surely be disappointed by the exposition of critical reasons and criteria in Beardsley's theory.

One difficulty that he would find with Beardsley's account is that the three primary criteria are so vague that it may be as difficult to secure agreement on their presence or absence as it would be to secure agreement about the original value properties which are to be predicated.⁵

This problem is revealed as Beardsley discusses the matter of determining the unity or complexity of an aesthetic object. Beardsley begins by presenting this as a straightforward empirical matter, subject to objective agreement. Unity and complexity are regional qualities of aesthetic objects and their presence can be pointed out and the perceptual conditions underlying their presence determined by critics (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 192-209).

What begins as a straightforward empirical matter, however, becomes so qualified as his account proceeds that there seems little reason to believe in Beardsley's optimism about the objectivity of statements predicating unity and complexity.

⁵ Michael Scriven makes this criticism of Beardsley's criteria (Scriven, 1966, pp. 78-82).
Beardsley first of all would acknowledge that, as regional qualities, unity and complexity would be more difficult to perceive than certain other basic qualities. He also acknowledges that precise determination of the magnitude of unity or complexity is not possible and that there will be an extensive range of cases in which one could not be sure that one aesthetic object possesses more or less unity and complexity than another aesthetic object (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 201, 206). Moreover, although he attempts to specify perceptual conditions of unity and complexity, he admits that no list of such conditions could ever be exhaustive since the nature of their perceptual conditions would change as the development of art proceeds (Beardsley, 1958, pp.194, 207).

Equally disturbing to the claim of objectivity is Beardsley's extensions of the concepts of unity and complexity and the qualifications that he makes in his account of these concepts. Unity as a concept is first analyzed into the concepts of completeness and coherence. Even at this point, however, Beardsley admits that some disagreement may exist over the magnitude of unity which is present in an aesthetic object because of fundamental disagreement about whether it is completeness or coherence or both which contributes to the quality of unity (Beardsley, 1958, p. 192). Beardsley also has problems with delimiting precisely the concept of coherence and establishing that the presence or absence of coherence is an empirical matter which can be objectively decided. Coherence is presented as that quality which appears in a design when it seems "to contain nothing that does not belong" (Beardsley, 1958, p.93).
Beardsley does not offer this as a verbal definition of coherence; he would hold that such a definition would be impossible since coherence is a quality. In this sense, coherence is indefinable but he asserts certain conditions can be cited which support its presence or absence. Beardsley points out focus, balance and equilibrium, and similarity of parts as conditions favoring its presence (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 194, 195). However, even the claim that the perceptual conditions of coherence can be identified is weakened, when Beardsley also admits that such conditions are only a "summary of many complex and subtle matters". In saying this he suggests that the conditions he cites are no guarantee of the presence of coherence and that agreement about the presence of coherence may not easily be reached. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 195). Although he claims that the relative magnitude of coherence is an empirical matter subject to test, as can be shown by comparing and altering simple visual designs consisting of a few geometric shapes, once again, he also admits that in confronting actual works of art, empirical decisions about the magnitude of coherence might be extremely problematic:

> When we jump from this artificial exercise [comparing simple visual designs] to a large painting by Paolo Veronese or Tintoretto, the matter [of establishing the magnitude of coherence] becomes infinitely more complicated. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 195)

In summary, Beardsley's initial claims about the possibility of objectively deciding the presence or absence of coherence in an aesthetic object seems to be greatly weakened as his account proceeds. Beardsley's extension of the concept of unity also adds to one's doubt about the possibility of objectively determining its presence.
or absence. Unity is first introduced as a regional quality of visual designs but Beardsley later applies this concept to psychological unity of characterization and to a kind of internal consistency of representational elements within the aesthetic object which he calls "dramatic unity". Finally, he talks about a unity between the visual design and representational dimensions of an aesthetic object (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 302-305). It would seem that any aesthetic object has an enormous potential for some kind of unity, then, and it would seem difficult to compare aesthetic objects with regard to the unity that they do possess.

Qualifications and extensions are also made with regard to the concept of complexity. Complexity is first defined as "roughly the number of parts, and of differences to be found within them of aesthetic objects" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 205). This notion, however, is also qualified since it later appears that only certain kinds of parts are parts which contribute to complexity.

But the complexities must be genuine complexities when we take them into account in describing the magnitude of a given work... The same may be said of visual designs; very subtle differences, as in stippling or mottling, will contribute to the complexity of the design, but not necessarily as distinct areas. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 207)

What are these "genuine" complexities? Beardsley's account does not explicitly describe those parts which may qualify in determining the magnitude of complexity. This imprecision perhaps does not matter greatly in the end, however, since he also admits that the number of such parts can never be precisely calculated in many works of art.
It might sound as though we could count the factors that made for complexity, and then assign a numerical measure, if it came to a dispute whether \( X \) is more complex than \( Y \).... But when we come to relations among the parts, we get beyond the realm of numerical reckoning, even if we are not already exhausted. For we could never be confident that we had thought of all the relations between any two parts...

(Beardsley, 1958, pp. 206, 207)

What begins as a straightforward empirical matter, then, gradually becomes so qualified that it seems doubtful that one could ever determine the actual magnitude of the complexity of an aesthetic object.

Finally Beardsley extends the concept of complexity to include "dramatic complexity" i.e., variety of personalities, attitudes and human conditions depicted in aesthetic objects, psychological subtlety of character, etc. (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 302-305). This last extension seems to bear only a passing resemblance to the original notion of complexity as a multitude of parts.

In summary, then, Beardsley's claim that determination of the presence or absence of the three primary criteria of aesthetic value is an objective matter seems to be an unwarranted extension of the notion of objectivity since it seems likely that many disagreements could legitimately exist (at least) about the presence or absence of unity and complexity in aesthetic objects. Perhaps some agreement could be reached about secondary criteria of aesthetic value but these criteria are not specified in Beardsley's account. Someone interested in the determination of a set of criteria for objectively deciding matters of aesthetic value, then, will be disappointed in Beardsley's account.
In this section I have discussed Beardsley's conception of evaluation and judgment as distinct kinds of critical statement as well as the criteria and reasons in Beardsley's theory which rationally support aesthetic judgments. Beardsley's characterization of evaluation and judgment as unique kinds of critical statement rests upon a functional distinction. As with his previous account of other critical statements, one is unsure whether evaluation and judgment encompass a range of illocutionary functions or whether he identifies evaluation and judgment with commendations. Both interpretations of Beardsley's account seem possible. Beardsley's discussion of critical reasons involves two levels of critical criteria. Primary criteria are the regional qualities of unity, complexity, and intensity. Secondary criteria are not specified in Beardsley's account although examples are given. I have argued that, contrary to Beardsley's account, objective determination of the primary criteria of aesthetic value seems not to be the straightforward empirical matter that he claims. It seems likely, then, that one might have to rely upon secondary aesthetic criteria in order to determine the presence or absence of the primary criteria. Unfortunately such criteria are not specified in his text.

Having given an exposition of Beardsley's account of critical statements, I now turn in the next section of this chapter to a discussion of the nature of the definitions which he presents.
The Nature of Beardsley's Definitions

Definitions of critical terms can usefully be sorted according to what I shall say is the mode of definition presented and the kind of definition presented. Three modes of defining critical terms which can be considered here are definition by example, definition by substitution of words with equivalent meaning, and definition by presentation of statements of necessary and sufficient conditions. Each mode of defining can differ in the kind of definition presented, in that in using each of the modes of defining, one could present definitions which are either reportive or nonarbitrary stipulations.

In discussing the nature of Beardsley's definitions, I shall consider both the modes of defining which Beardsley uses and the kind of definition which he presents.

Beardsley's Definitional Modes

The two favored modes of defining adopted by Beardsley are definitions by example and definitions by substitution of words taken to have an equivalent meaning. It is through Beardsley's presentation of examples of the statements taken to be designates of the critical terms he discusses, that I was able to offer a Searlian account of the distinctions he appears to make in discriminating between external and critical statements, between form and content statements, and between analyses and descriptions, and interpretations. I have argued that these distinctions in Beardsley's theory seem to reside in the nature of the reference and predication of the statements under discussion.
Beardsley also attempts to define critical terms through substitution of one illocutionary term for another and here his account is more problematic. It will be remembered that on Searle's theory, illocutionary terms (of which critical terms are a subset) can be understood as designates for various kinds of distinctive speech acts (or statements as "statement" is being used here). On this hypothesis, (and in accordance with the analysis of critical terms presented in Chapter IV, critical terms are not intersubstitutable with one another. Nor can they be substituted with other illocutionary terms except insofar as one is prepared to use these terms in conjunction with an added explanation of how the various illocutionary acts differ from one another.

There are several places in Beardsley's account, however, where he does attempt to substitute one illocutionary term for another without noting differences in contextual conditions which underlie the performance of these individual acts. One place where this happens, for example, is in his use of different critical terms to mark a distinction between act and artifact senses of critical statements. A second place where Beardsley substitutes illocutionary terms is in his attempt to articulate a distinction between normative and nonnormative statements. A final area is in his attempt to define evaluation and judgment by identifying such statements with the concept of a commendation. One consequence of adopting this mode of defining is that the distinction between normative and nonnormative statements is never clarified in his account and one does not know whether analysis and description, interpretation (as act and artifact),
and evaluation and judgment are to be construed as having a single illocutionary force or as multi-functional statements. Moreover, insofar as his account can be taken as a report of the actual usage of critical terminology, such a mode of defining also leads to theoretical difficulties. Since critical terms in their ordinary uses indicate concepts which are unique to themselves, by substituting one illocutionary term for another, Beardsley violates the ordinary uses of critical terms. It is to this matter and to these theoretical problems that I now turn.

Beardsley's Definitions as Reports and Stipulations

One of the problematic aspects of Beardsley's account is that one is unsure whether his definitions are presented as reportive or as nonarbitrary stipulations. Beardsley's definitions, I believe, can be interpreted in either way. In defining critical terms as distinct kinds of linguistic acts or statements, Beardsley proposes a number of restrictions which are to be placed on the content of such statements. Such restrictions are straightforward stipulations about what Beardsley holds to be the proper reference and predication of internal or critical, as opposed to external statements. In making these stipulations, Beardsley also argues for their adoption within the practice of functioning critics. One way of understanding his definitions, then, is as nonarbitrary i.e., defended stipulations about the content of critical discourse.

In defining critical terms, however, Beardsley also makes distinctions among them with regard to their function. Beardsley's distinction between normative and nonnormative statements, as I have
argued, can be understood either (a) as a distinction between two individual generic kinds of illocutionary acts, (b) as a distinction between a generic kind of illocutionary act and a group of loosely related illocutionary acts, (c) as a distinction between a group of loosely related illocutionary acts and a generic kind of illocutionary act, or (d) as a distinction between two loosely related groups of illocutionary acts. In making distinctions about the function of critical statements, Beardsley's account is unclear about whether the definitions of critical terms which he is offering are to be taken as reports or stipulations.

One way in which his discussion suggests that his definitions are reportive is that there is no overt stipulative announcement about the distinctions he makes about each kind of critical statement. An exception, perhaps, is his definition of "interpretation" when he states that

A critical interpretation, for the purposes of this book, is a statement that purports to declare the "meaning" of a work of art... (Beardsley, 1958, p. 9)

Yet, in the case of interpretation he also asserts that the statements he cites as examples of interpretive statements are interpretations in the ordinary sense of the terms:

Those [statements about representation and suggestion] in groups A and B are generally called "interpretations" of the painting, and there seems to be no serious danger in this usage [emphasis added]. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 399)

Because Beardsley's account is unclear when he distinguishes among critical statements with regard to their function, one is justified in treating his definitions as attempts to report or describe the
ordinary uses of critical terms and, to be sure, in the sense that Beardsley does conceive of critical statements in terms of certain linguistic acts, his account of critical terms does in fact reflect ordinary usage.

There are two interpretations that might be given of Beardsley's definitions then. One is that he is offering nonarbitrary stipulations about the meanings of critical terms. Such terms designate linguistic active doings and artifacts possessing a certain kind of content and either one or a set of illocutionary functions (Beardsley's account here is unclear). A second interpretation that can be given is that he is offering reportive definitions of critical terms with certain (justified) restrictions placed on the content of such statements. Since both interpretations are possible, I shall first examine whether Beardsley's distinctions among critical statements actually do reflect ordinary usage and then I shall discuss the merits of treating Beardsley's definitions as nonarbitrary stipulated definitions.

It will be helpful in assessing Beardsley's definitions as reportive definitions of critical terms, to recall once again that in physical contexts, critical verbs can be used to predicate a variety of illocutionary acts. As such they have both active doing and performed act senses. Such linguistic acts, it will be remembered are unique in themselves in the sense that the set of conditions implied in their successful performance are peculiar to a given illocutionary act. There may indeed be some relation between critical illocutionary acts in the sense that certain conditions may be
similar or even the same as other conditions, but the complete set of conditions will exhibit some difference from one act to another. Given certain allowances for modifications in the tense of statements formulating these conditions, these conditions remain the same whether one is speaking about the active doing of an illocutionary act or whether one is talking about the act as having been performed.

A first difficulty with Beardsley’s definitions, then, is his use of "analysis" and "description", and "evaluation" and "judgment" as pairs of interchangeable terms or else as terms which mark only a distinction between the active doing sense of a concept and a performed act sense. To do this would in effect be to hold that there is no difference (except a temporal difference) between conditions underlying these concepts. As I have argued in Chapter IV, however, there are some clear distinctions between each of the members of the above pairs of concepts in the conditions they imply. In analyzing, one predicates constituents of an object or entity. In describing, one predicates certain obvious or salient properties. Since one predicates constituents in analyzing, the object analyzed must contain a number of components in order for the act of predication to be successful. One cannot analyze the unanalyzable although one certainly can describe it. It is an intuition about this matter of predication in analyzing that may underlie Beardsley’s restriction of the class of aesthetic objects to the class of objects possessing heterogeneity (Beardsley, 1958, p. 88). Be that as it may, one does not need an object with heterogeneity in order to successfully describe it.
Evaluation and judgment also are different in important respects. In both evaluating and judging a speaker implies that he possesses criteria by which the value of an object or entity is determined. In judging, however, one implies that these criteria are in some way deficient, either because they are not completely acceptable to an audience, or because they lack applicability (testability), or both of the above. One makes judgments in circumstances that are less than optimal but these are not circumstances in which one guesses about the value of something. A substantial difference between evaluating and judging is overlooked by treating them as correlative concepts reflecting merely a difference between an active doing and a performed act sense.

A second difficulty with Beardsley's account appears with his distinction between normative and nonnormative statements. In order to articulate this distinction Beardsley appeals to a cluster of illocutionary terms to identify each kind of statement. I have argued that Beardsley's account is unclear and that he may construe analysis and description, interpretation (as act and artifact), and evaluation and judgment as multi-functional concepts (statements) or as generic statements possessing a single illocutionary force. In either case there are difficulties with his account. If Beardsley argues that critical terms indicate multi-functional statements, it would appear to be at odds with the unique character of acts indicated by illocutionary terms. It also seems implausible to regard critical terms as indicative of generic illocutionary acts (as I have argued in Chapter IV). In making such a claim, it would seem important that Beardsley at least present a case for regarding critical terms in this way.
A further problem with Beardsley's account lies in the distinctions which he makes between different kinds of nonnormative statements: analysis and description on the one hand and interpretation (as act and artifact) on the other. The distinction between the concepts of analysis and description and the concept of interpretation is in Beardsley's account a content distinction based upon the reference and predication in each kind of statement. In analyzing or in making descriptive statements, Beardsley would hold that one predicates certain nonrelational and relational qualities to an aesthetic object whereas in interpreting one refers to objects or events existing outside of the aesthetic object. Beardsley's distinctions here overlap ordinary usage but they do not reflect it as the analysis and paradigm examples of description and interpretation which I have presented in Chapter IV demonstrate.

To be sure, critics often do present interpretations of the subject matter or of the symbolism in works of art but that they must do this in order to interpret appears to be an untenable restriction. Critics often make interpretations of abstract works of art or a series of abstract works as one of the paradigm examples of interpretation which I presented in Chapter IV demonstrates. Moreover, if Beardsley's definition of "interpretation" were true then architectural critics or architectural historians could not give interpretations in their writings but clearly they do this as well. There is nothing odd, then, about requesting and receiving an interpretation of a work of abstract visual art. If there were, then, requests such as
Please interpret the significance of Jackson Pollock's painting.

or

How do you interpret the meaning of Arshille Gorky's Agony?

would appear intuitively odd. In fact they do not. Abstract works of art are frequently the ones about which we lack understanding and, because this is the case, these are ones that critics often feel most called upon to interpret. Contrary to Beardsley's account, on the other hand, it would be odd to request an interpretation of some straightforwardly representational works of art (in some contexts). Imagine a poster of a film star or a rock idol. One would ordinarily not request an interpretation of this even though it contains represented subject matter. It is what it represents. Here one would more likely ask someone to identify the figure or even describe it. But to request that someone interpret such an aesthetic object seems inappropriate. By way of contrast it is significant that both examples of describing which I cite in Chapter IV, also contain a subsidiary reference to objects and entities.

Beardsley's distinction between critical evaluations and judgments and other normative statements also violates ordinary usage when he construes evaluation and judgment in terms of commendation. Commendations are unique illocutionary acts of the behabitive group, distinct from the verdictive acts of evaluation and judgment. One major difference between them is that commendations, like praisings and congratulatings, are never "negative". If Beardsley construes evaluation and judgment as a commendation, it seems difficult to see
how negative value properties such as badness, could be predicated of an aesthetic object. Since on Beardsley's theory such properties are predicated (Beardsley, 1958, p. 456), evaluations and judgments cannot be commendations.

Finally, Beardsley's hypothesis of a small set of primary criteria of aesthetic value may also represent a violation of the ordinary meanings of "evaluation" and "judgment" in aesthetic contexts. It will be remembered that Beardsley argues that in evaluating or making value judgments, critics predicate unity, complexity, and intensity of regional qualities as primary criteria or else they predicate an indefinite range of secondary criteria which support assertions that the primary criteria of aesthetic value are present or absent. Thus in Beardsley's account, secondary criteria of the following sort will be used by rational critics as support for the presence of unity in an aesthetic object:

... it is well-organized (or disorganized).
... it is formally perfect (or imperfect).
... it has (or lacks) an inner logic of structure and style.

In Beardsley's theory, the following criteria would be cited as support for the presence of complexity in the aesthetic object:

... it is developed on a large scale.
... it is rich in contrasts (or lacks variety and is repetitious).
... it is subtle and imaginative (or crude).

And, finally, the following criteria will be predicated in supporting the presence or absence of intensity:

... it is full of vitality (or insipid).
... it is forceful and vivid (or weak and pale).
... it is beautiful (or ugly).
... it is tender, ironic, tragic, graceful, delicate, richly comic. (Beardsley, 1958, p. 462)
In the previous section, following a criticism made by Scriven, I argued that the primary criteria of unity and complexity as presented in Beardsley's text were so vague as to lack applicability. Taking Beardsley's account at face value, it seemed likely that there would be as much disagreement about the presence or absence of at least two of the primary criteria as there would be about the presence or absence of the original value property itself. One way in which Beardsley's theory could handle such objections would be to claim that the primary criteria would be used to justify the ascription of secondary criteria. That is, in defending a value judgment of an aesthetic object, a critic would first secure agreement about the presence of one or more secondary criteria and these criteria would be used to establish the presence or absence of the primary criteria.

In order for such a response to be plausible, however, it would seem necessary for the primary criteria, themselves, to have a greater acceptability as criteria. Otherwise there would be no point to a critic's presentation of reasons. Yet some examples of secondary criteria in the case of complexity and intensity are intuitively more value laden and acceptable than are the primary criteria themselves. To say that a work is "subtle and imaginative" is certainly praising the work more than to say that it is "complex". To say that a work is "beautiful" or "richly comic" is to predicate a more acceptable property of value than it is to say that a work is intense. In both of the above cases, it would seem that the property predicated as a secondary criterion would have inherently more acceptability as a value property than the property cited as a
primary criterion. There would be no reason, then, for a critic to
cite these secondary criteria as support for a primary criterion.
Beardsley's set of primary criteria of aesthetic value, which he
claims critics use in evaluating or in making value judgments, then
would appear to be incomplete and to need modification.

If Beardsley's definitions of critical terms, then, are construed
as technically precise reportive definitions, they fail to agree
with the ordinary usage of critical terms. It will be helpful,
therefore, to consider Beardsley's definitions as strictly technical
stipulations about the content of critical discourse. In making his
stipulations about the meaning of critical terms, Beardsley is also
arguing for their adoption in ordinary language. A proposal such as
this would seem to require some compelling arguments as justification
because of the potential for confusion that would exist between the
technical meanings of critical terms and their uses in ordinary
language. These I examine next.

Beardsley's Definitions as Stipulations

Beardsley offers a number of reasons as justification for the
limitations which he places on the reference and predication of
critical statements. One major set of arguments for his proposal is
that it would establish critical talk on a rational basis by
eliminating unverifiable propositions from critical statements. A
careful assessment of this argument in Beardsley's account would be
a complex affair and one that I cannot address here. It would raise
issues about whether all members of the set of internal statements as
Beardsley presents it, really do lend themselves to verification.
Verification of critical statements about the symbolism of an aesthetic object when these symbols have no conventional or vital basis would seem to be a very tentative affair, for example. It would seem that many of these statements might be difficult to verify. Some statements about the portrayed subject matter fall into the class of statements whose verification involves going beyond the evidence presented directly in the aesthetic object. Verification, here, would seem to depend upon knowledge that Beardsley rules out as appropriate to the perception of the aesthetic object. On the other hand, statements about the technique of aesthetic objects, which Beardsley would exclude from critical discourse, I would suggest fall within the class of statements whose truth to qualified percipients is verifiable simply by inspection of the object alone.

A second reason that Beardsley offers for the adoption of his stipulations is one that I believe has some merit despite the confusions that could exist between the technical meanings of critical terms and their use in ordinary language. Beardsley argues that a precise vocabulary of technical terms is needed in critical discourse (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 11, 12) and in his account he offers stipulations with regard to the content of critical discourse. His account, however, might also be (less happily) construed as a set of stipulations about the illocutionary functions of critical terms. Beardsley's stipulations with regard to the reference and predication of critical discourse offers, I believe, a valuable technical vocabulary needed for precise communication about the content of critical discourse. I shall employ this vocabulary in discussing the theories of criticism offered by two educational metacritics.
Beardsley's stipulations about the meaning of critical terms appear less justified because of the confusion that would likely exist between his technical sense of these terms and their use in ordinary language. Yet even here a case could be made out for the adoption of Beardsley's technical use of critical terms. His distinctions at least offer a precise and clearcut way of distinguishing among critical statements, and cover a wide range of critical utterances. By way of contrast, ordinary uses of critical terms marking a distinction in illocutionary force, have a rather narrow range of application within the total discourse of the practising critic. Furthermore, the distinctions among such acts is not well understood at the present time. As I have argued in preceding chapters, critics perform an enormous range of illocutionary acts and because of the vagueness of language, such acts are not always easily distinguishable from one another. An enormous set of categories of statements (illocutionary acts) would have to be presented, then, to account for the illocutionary acts that critics perform and exploration of the bases for distinctions among such acts has barely begun in the philosophical literature.

In this section, then, I have examined and appraised Beardsley's definitions of critical terms as both reportive and nonarbitrary stipulative definitions. If Beardsley's definitions are understood as reportive definitions, I have argued that they do not reflect ordinary usage since statements designated by critical terms would not possess more than one illocutionary function. Nor could the function of critical statements be correctly construed in terms of
the function of another speech act indicated by a different but related illocutionary term. Beardsley's distinctions between different kinds of nonnormative statements seems incorrect as a report of ordinary usage since he bases this distinction on the content of such statements. His construal of evaluation and judgment as commendations I have argued is mistaken since it substitutes one kind of illocutionary force for another; illocutionary acts are sui generis. Finally I have argued that the primary criteria of aesthetic value which Beardsley claims critics employ in evaluating and making value judgments do not seem to encompass his set of secondary criteria. This indicates that the set of primary criteria he cites may be incomplete. Beardsley's definitions of critical terms, then, are best understood as technical stipulations.

I now turn toward a consideration of how the concepts of criticism in Beardsley's theory could be employed in educational settings.

**Beardsley's Theory of Criticism in Educational Settings**

In this section I consider the application of Beardsley's theory of criticism to educational settings. Specifically, I shall ask now the concepts of criticism delineated in his definitions of critical terms can be accommodated within the four kinds of curriculum prescriptions identified in Chapter V. It will be remembered that criticism in educational settings could be construed as both a teaching or learning method and as a teaching or learning goal. In this section I shall discuss the appropriateness of Beardsley's conception of criticism for each kind of role, bearing in mind the rules
which must be adhered to for each kind of prescription to be a successfully performed illocutionary act of its type.

Teaching or Learning Method

Teaching or learning methods it will be remembered prescribe certain kinds of active doings on the part of agents as a means toward the achievement of certain kinds of educationally desired goals. In teaching method prescriptions, this goal is to be achieved by the audience. In learning method prescriptions this goal is to be achieved by the agent himself. In prescribing a teaching or learning method, one implies first that the goal prescribed is beneficial to the audience of the agent if it is a teaching method, or to the agent himself if it is a learning method. Second, one implies that the act prescribed is of such a kind that it will allow the audience of the agent (teaching method) or the agent himself (learning method) to reach the goal prescribed. Third, one implies that the act itself is capable of being performed by the agent.

Beardsley's theory of criticism, as a set of nonarbitrary defended stipulations about criticism, is a likely candidate for consideration as teaching method. Beardsley conceives of criticism first of all in terms of a certain set of linguistic active doings and performed linguistic acts. These acts do not pretend to be a comprehensive view of critical discourse in the visual arts but are restricted by the stipulations placed on their content. Such stipulations in Beardsley's theory are defended in part by the argument that they are necessary in order to put critical discourse on a rational footing. Beardsley's definitions of critical terms,
then, in one sense are offered as a proposal for a limitation on the reference and predication of critical statements. This proposal it is argued will facilitate critical discourse by limiting it to statements which are verifiable or justifiable.

In a looser sense, Beardsley's proposal can be construed as a method, one analogous to the methods proposed by educators in curriculum settings. As such it is understandable that his theory of criticism would be influential among educational metacritics. Beardsley's "method", however, is one proposed in order to achieve a goal different from that prescribed in the educational literature. Although, doubtless, educational metacritics would view the notion of rationality and objective communication as desirable aspects of classroom criticism of works of art, such a goal is not that of perception, appreciation, or understanding of works of art or other aesthetic objects.

It is not at all clear that having teachers, students, or others criticize aesthetic objects, then, would lead to the attainment of the various goals espoused in the curriculum literature or would be the most effective means of achieving these goals. And it is important to realize that no argument or evidence for such an adoption of Beardsley's notion of criticism is present in his text. An important qualification must also be made about the applicability of Beardsley's proposal to objects of study in the classroom. Interpretation, as one component of his proposal, for example, is an act that by definition could not be performed on abstract aesthetic objects. Moreover it is unclear from his discussion how Beardsley's
A more serious consideration that arises in treating Beardsley's proposal for criticism as an educational method is that parts of his proposal do not lend, themselves, to prescription as an educational method. In prescribing a method, one implies that the active doings or acts specified are such that the agent can perform these acts (or can perform them with a minimum of tuition or instruction). Beardsley's proposal for criticism is aimed at practicing critics who, one can assume, possess the kinds of knowledge and skills necessary to perform the linguistic acts of analyzing, interpreting, and evaluating aesthetic objects. In borrowing his proposal and transferring it to an educational context, however, it is certainly doubtful that the agents specified in such method prescriptions would possess either the same skills or the same degree of knowledge. Prescribing that certain agents in educational settings make certain kinds of statements, then, appears logically inconsistent.

Part of the difficulty in addressing this point precisely is that a range of people figure as agents in educational method prescriptions for criticism. Teachers trained in the arts, teachers
without specific training in the arts, college students, secondary students, and elementary students sometimes figure as agents in method prescriptions for criticism. Also contributing to this problem is that there is little factual information available about the artistic knowledge and abilities of such people. Given this, however, I would submit that on the basis of conventional wisdom, it seems doubtful that many agents specified in method prescriptions actually could make certain of the statements proposed in Beardsley's theory. In discussing these points each separate kind of critical act (statement) in Beardsley's theory can be considered in turn. It will be remembered that analysis and description in Beardsley's theory referred to the active doing and performed act of predicating certain relational and nonrelational qualities of aesthetic objects. The former were called form statements; the latter content statements. It is part of conventional wisdom in the arts that certain kinds of relations and nonrelational qualities of aesthetic objects require skill to perceive. Such skills, then, would be a prerequisite to the making of certain kinds of form and content statements. Conventional wisdom in the arts usually regards the perception of formal relations in an aesthetic object as a skill acquired as the result of training. It also regards perception of human local qualities, human regional qualities, and many nonhuman regional qualities such as depth, tension, equilibrium, etc. as matters of skill also. It is the perception of qualities such as these which separate the sensitive or the perceptive percipient from others. Beardsley seems to implicitly recognize this in proposing a set of categories of
"basic" qualities. It is through predication of such qualities presumably that statements predicating other kinds of qualities will be supported. In Beardsley's theory the nature of this support relation is not clear but his account suggests that predicating basic qualities is a conventional means employed by critics to lead other people to the perception of these other, more elusive qualities in aesthetic objects (Beardsley, 1958, pp. 90, 91). Given this, it would seem difficult to see how people untrained in the arts could be expected to make form statements on the one hand, and content statements predicating human local and regional qualities and some nonhuman regional qualities on the other. The only truly plausible candidate for a method in Beardsley's concept of analysis would be for the making of content statements predicating basic qualities. It would seem that at least some instruction would be required in order for agents not trained in the arts to make other kinds of descriptive statements as well.

Similar reservations may be had about proposing certain kinds of interpretation as a method. It will be remembered that Beardsley distinguishes between depicting and portrayal statements. Both refer to objects or events represented or suggested aesthetic objects. Symbol statements were a separate class of statements included within the set of interpretations.

Beardsley is explicit in his belief that certain kinds of knowledge are required of a speaker in referring to objects or events represented in aesthetic objects (Beardsley, 1958, p. 270). Without the appropriate knowledge, one simply would not recognize the objects
that are represented or suggested within aesthetic objects and one, therefore, could not make depiction or portrayal statements. Just what the appropriate knowledge required is, I do not think is precisely stated in Beardsley's account. In making a large class of depiction statements referring to objects represented in works of art, it would seem that the common stock of knowledge about things existing in the world would be sufficient. On the other hand, if referring to certain events represented in aesthetic objects depended upon inferring certain motives, acts, or actions, age and inexperience might also rule out certain groups of people (say elementary children) as appropriate agents. For the most part, however, making depiction statements would seem to be a feasible candidate as a method.

This cannot be said for the making of portrayal statements, however. To recognize the objects or events portrayed in aesthetic objects would seem to require an extensive knowledge of the culture surrounding the production of the aesthetic object. Many works of art, for example, portray religious, mythological, or historical characters, places, or events. The knowledge required to recognize these things cannot be assumed to be a general cultural possession. Think, for example, of the knowledge required to interpret (in Beardsley's sense) a Poussin painting or a Hellenistic sculpture. The ability to state what the aesthetic object portrays in these cases is the result of a specialized and advanced knowledge. Proposing the making of portrayal statements as a method, then, would seem grossly inappropriate as a method in many educational contexts.
Specific knowledge of the above sort is also required in making symbol statements. To interpret symbols with a conventional or vital basis would require a prior knowledge of the conventions linking the symbol with certain abstract properties or with the culture in which the represented or suggested part of the aesthetic object is considered symbolic. Although this knowledge may not be a requirement in interpreting symbols with only a natural basis, it would seem necessary in this latter case that an agent be instructed to regard unusual or striking, represented or suggested parts as symbolic and be taught to support statements predicating properties to aesthetic objects. Whatever one may think about the interpretation of natural symbols, at the very least interpretation of symbols with a conventional or vital basis does not seem feasible as an educational method either.

Serious doubts may also be raised about Beardsley's concept of evaluation as a feasible method also. Although Beardsley's theory allows that the value of aesthetic objects can be apprehended directly in the enjoyment or pleasure had by a percipient (Beardsley, 1958, p. 534), on his theory a value judgment is truly rational only if it is reached through the application of either primary or secondary criteria of aesthetic value. In proposing evaluation as a method, then, one would assume that agents with a minimum of instruction could learn and apply these criteria.

As I have argued previously, however, two of Beardsley's three primary criteria of aesthetic value are so vague that their application would be as troublesome to make as an ascription of the original
value property itself. Just how an agent could be taught these concepts except through an extensive period of training, I find problematic. Even if Beardsley should disagree about the vagueness of the concepts of unity, complexity, and intensity, however, he would certainly appear to acknowledge that these qualities, as one of the group of nonhuman regional qualities, require skill in order to be perceived. It seems doubtful, then, that application of Beardsley's three primary criteria can feasibly be proposed as a method that would enable agents to arrive at value judgments. Yet in Beardsley's theory secondary criteria, which presumably would possess less vagueness, are not specified. Although perhaps the agents specified in method prescriptions could evaluate by using their own subjective reactions to aesthetic objects as criteria, it does not appear to be feasible to propose that agents in method prescriptions evaluate by using the criteria discussed in Beardsley's theory.

In summary, although Beardsley's proposal for criticism has a prima-facie plausibility as an educational method since it stipulates certain kinds of linguistic acts, serious reservations can be had about transferring Beardsley's proposal into educational settings. Not only is the goal envisioned in Beardsley's theory not the goal generally espoused in curriculum prescriptions, there is some doubt that his proposal would apply in its entirety to goals involving abstract aesthetic objects, works of art, and functional design. An even more serious consideration arises when one considers the knowledge and skills needed as a prerequisite in order to perform
many of the linguistic acts in his scheme of criticism. Beardsley's proposal is aimed at practicing critics who it may be assumed have an advanced training in the arts. This is generally not the population who would figure as agents in educational method prescriptions.

Teaching or Learning Goal

If using Beardsley's theory of criticism as a method has a prima-facie plausibility, the same cannot be said for a construal of his theory as a goal. Beardsley defines criticism in terms of a set of linguistic active doings and performed acts, not in terms of a set of end states. Construal of his concepts of criticism as a set of educational goals, then, is not something that is given directly in his account.

Although Beardsley does not define critical terms as states, one might ask how educational goals could be extrapolated from his theory. Here I shall consider his theory in light of skill prescriptions since this is the goal most often prescribed by educational metacritics. It will be remembered that in Chapter II, a dispositional account of skills in terms of trained capacities acquired on the basis of practice was given. Although a disposition is not to be equated with an active doing, dispositions are characteristically manifested in one or more active doings. Such a manifestation in appropriate circumstances is the basis upon which a skill is predicated. Beardsley's treatment of analysis, interpretation, and evaluation as active doings might be considered as hypothetical manifestations of underlying skills.
There are several difficulties in extrapolating from Beardsley's account in this way. First, since the skill is not specified, the precise nature of the skill itself would not be clear from Beardsley's account. One can perhaps eliminate certain kinds of capacities to use words, sentences, etc. as the appropriate skills in these circumstances although such capacities are not irrelevant. But given this, would the capacity of analyzing, interpreting, or evaluating be capacities to perceive certain properties in works of art or to infer certain properties, or both? Manifestations of analyzing, interpreting, or evaluating might well be indicative of generic skills calling upon a range of capacities. It is not clear from his account, therefore, how such skills are to be improved.

Second, even if one assumes that the active doings of analysis, interpretation, and evaluation are manifestations of certain skills it is still not clear that prescription of these skills for a population in an educational setting is in order. Prescriptions specifying skills imply that the population for whom the skills are prescribed do not possess these capacities already. Once again, there is difficulty in talking about this matter precisely both because the educational populations for whom the skills might be prescribed vary and because little information is available about the skills which such populations might already possess.

In discussing description as a method, certain capacities to predicate basic local and regional qualities were assumed to be a common cultural possession. In order to prescribe a capacity to perform linguistic acts of this type it would seem necessary to specify
the directions in which greater capabilities lie. Would one prescribe a capacity, for describing in detail or with thoroughness? On the other hand, predicating other kinds of nonrelational and relational qualities does seem to depend upon a percipient's ability to perceive these qualities in aesthetic objects. Perhaps the skill manifested in analyzing would lie in this area.

Some parts of interpretation genuinely seem to involve capacities which might be developed by practice while other parts do not. It would seem too difficult to see how recognition of depicted or portrayed objects or portrayed events could be developed with practice. What appears mostly to be involved here is one's knowledge of these objects or events. This applies also to interpreting symbols which have primarily a conventional or a vital basis. Interpreting depicted events or natural symbols in aesthetic objects, however, might rest upon certain kinds of reasoning which can be improved through practice and training. In both of these latter kinds of interpretation, Beardsley sees a process of inference occurring since one predicates acts, motives, or other properties which are not overtly represented within the aesthetic object.

If parts of interpretation might be seen as a manifestation of certain skills or trained capacities, it is difficult to see how evaluation could be construed as a skill in these terms. To assume that evaluation is a skill on Beardsley's theory, it would seem that one would have to assume that a given population could improve in their ability to apply the criteria specified in his theory. To prescribe a skill of evaluation, in other words, there must be a
certain way in which one person's value predications could be said to be an improvement over another person's. But if Beardsley's criteria are so vague that their application would be as disputable as the predication of the original value property, it is difficult to see how a person could improve in his capability. In other words, Beardsley's theory does not appear to provide a way of discriminating among good and bad general value predications and his theory, as we have seen does not provide a method of improvement.

In summary, an assumption that Beardsley's theory contains proposals for criticism as a set of skills as well as a method of criticizing goes beyond what is directly given in his text. Beardsley defines critical terms as certain active doings or performed linguistic acts, not in terms of certain end states. It requires an act of extrapolation to view these active doings as manifestations of underlying capacities and in doing so it is not clear from his text what these capacities are. It is even less clear that prescribing capacities to analyze, interpret, or evaluate are in order since the population for such prescriptions may already possess the capacities in question and the capacities may be such that they are not improvable with training and practice. Analysis of the basic qualities of aesthetic objects; interpretation of depicted objects, portrayed objects and events, and symbols with a vital or conventional basis; and, finally, evaluation may not lend themselves to construal as manifestation of capacities which can be improved through training and practice. Analysis of human and nonhuman local and regional qualities, and interpretation of depicted events and symbols with a
primarily natural basis seem more plausibly construed as manifestations of capacities which can be improved through training and practice.

Summary

In this chapter I have presented a speech act account of various distinctions used by Monroe Beardsley in defining critical terms; I have evaluated the definitions of critical terms which he presents; and I have discussed the possible use of his account in formulating educational prescriptions.

In defining critical terms as statements of various kinds, Beardsley employs a number of distinctions. These distinctions I have argued can be understood in terms of various concepts given in Searle's theory. There are several places in Beardsley's account where these concepts can be employed for purposes of clarification. Beardsley's distinctions between external and critical statements could be understood in terms of the reference and predication of critical statements. His distinction between normative and nonnormative statements could be understood as a functional distinction which asserts either that critical terms designate a single kind of generic illocutionary force or that they indicate several different kinds of illocutionary force.

A final area in which Searle's concepts can be employed is in clarifying Beardsley's characterizations of individual critical statements. Beardsley's characterization of the nonnormative critical statements of analysis and description, and interpretation (as act and artifact), rests upon distinctions of reference and predication.
Analysis and description statements in Beardsley's theory seem to be those in which nonrelational qualities (content statements) and relational qualities (form statements) are predicated and, in which reference is made to the whole or parts of visual designs (aesthetic objects).

Interpretive statements as acts and artifacts in Beardsley's account differ in several respects from analysis and description statements. Interpretive statements cannot refer to parts or wholes of abstract visual designs (aesthetic objects) but must refer to representational or suggestive visual designs. Interpretive statements also appear to be those which involve a "subsidiary" reference to an object or event in addition to a primary reference to the visual design or aesthetic object. Interpretive statements predicate what I have called a "representational relationship" between each of the entities referred to in the primary and subsidiary reference of such statements. Symbol statements are a subset of the class of interpretive statements in Beardsley's theory. They are those in which the primary reference can only be to a part of a representational or suggestive design (since whole visual designs are not symbolic in Beardsley's conception of a symbol) and such statements involve a subsidiary reference to certain abstract properties or universals.

The final kind of critical statement treated by Beardsley is evaluation and judgment. Beardsley characterizes such statements by identifying them with the concept of a commendation. I have argued that in doing so Beardsley could be holding either that such statements possess a single kind of illocutionary force, or that the
concept of a commendation could be understood to range over a multitude of illocutionary acts.

One problem that arises in evaluating Beardsley's definitions lies in determining the kind of definition presented by Beardsley. Beardsley's definitions are presented at some points as straightforward stipulations about the content (i.e. the reference and predication) or critical statements. These stipulations about the content, however, still leave open the possibility that Beardsley could regard his definitions as reports about the function or illocutionary force of such statements. Since Beardsley does not make stipulative announcements in defining critical terms, one is perhaps justified in evaluating them as both reports and as nonarbitrary stipulations.

In evaluating his definitions as reportive, I have noted a number of problematic areas in his account. Beardsley experiences difficulty when he attempts to define critical terms by substituting other illocutionary terms taken to have an equivalent meaning. In treating analysis and description, and evaluation and judgment as concepts which mark only a difference between an active doing and an artifact (performed act), Beardsley overlooks some important differences between these concepts as well as neglecting the fact that each of these critical terms possesses both an active doing and a performed act sense. Beardsley's distinction between normative and nonnormative statements also depends upon substitution of other illocutionary terms. Here it is unclear whether Beardsley is holding that analysis and description, and interpretation are generic illocutionary acts or whether he holds these statements to be multifunctional. This is also the case with his treatment of evaluation
and judgment. Since illocutionary terms designate unique illocutionary acts, I have argued that it is problematic to regard corresponding critical statements to have multiple functions (illocutionary forces). And it would seem that a case needs to be made out for regarding critical statements as generic illocutionary acts, acts which summarize other more specific acts.

Beardsley's attempt to specify aesthetic criteria which support critical evaluations and judgments is defective inasmuch as two of the primary criteria at least are so vague that it seems doubtful that they could function as criteria to support particular value judgments. They thus each applicability. Moreover, some of the secondary criteria cited by Beardsley seem to have more acceptability as criteria than do the primary criteria which they are held to support. Beardsley's claim that secondary criteria are used to support ascriptions of the presence or absence of the primary criteria thus seems untrue. Since this is the case, it would seem that his set of primary criteria cannot be regarded as complete.

In summary, it seems doubtful that Beardsley's definitions of critical terms can be regarded as accurate reports of the ordinary uses of such terms. More of a case, however, can be made out for regarding Beardsley's definitions as nonarbitrary stipulations.

Prescriptions for criticism in educational settings are not given directly in Beardsley's theory. In the last part of this chapter, therefore, I discuss problems that arise in formulating his definitions of critical terms into teaching and learning method, and teaching and learning goal prescriptions.
It is more plausible to regard his definitions in terms of method prescriptions inasmuch as "analysis", "interpretation", and "evaluation" are specifically regarded as linguistic acts of various kinds. Moreover, on one interpretation of his account as a series of defended stipulated definitions, it is understood that such acts are presented in order to achieve certain desired goals of clarity and rationality of critical discourse.

Three problems arise in formulating his definitions of critical terms into educational method prescriptions, however. First, the goals for critical discourse projected by Beardsley are not the goals commonly sought by educational metacritics. Second, Beardsley specifically formulates his content distinctions in terms of two-dimensional visual objects. One is unclear, therefore, about the applicability of Beardsley's account to educational settings where other kinds of aesthetic objects are to be criticized. Third, on Beardsley's account the making of certain kind of critical statements seems to presuppose capacities which cannot be presumed to exist in the agents specified in certain educational prescriptions for criticism.

Beardsley's account does not as readily lend itself to the formulation of goal prescriptions for criticism because Beardsley does not specifically define critical terms as dispositions. In proposing that his definitions of critical terms be used in formulating goal prescriptions for criticism, one must treat the linguistic acts he discusses as manifestations of certain trained capacities or skills. There are two major problems in extrapolating from Beardsley's theory
in this way. First, the exact nature of the skill in question is still not clear since the performance of a linguistic act seems to call upon several different kinds of capacities. Capacities such as the ability to make sounds, formulate words, generate grammatically acceptable sentences, etc. It is not clear, therefore, how such a skill can be improved or trained.

A second problem arises in proposing that such skills be acquired by specified populations. Since a variety of performances (acts, statements) can be subsumed under the concepts of analysis, interpretation, and evaluation, certain populations may already possess the capacity to make certain of these statements. This problem is the converse of the problem that arose in treating various acts as likely candidates in method prescriptions. Insofar as a given linguistic act is a likely candidate for prescribing as a method, it presumes that no further training must be given for a population to perform this act. Several kinds of acts were likely candidates as methods but for the very same reason, such acts cannot (logically) figure in goal prescriptions for the same educational populations. One may conclude, therefore, that Beardsley's concepts of analysis, interpretation and evaluation do not generally lend themselves to prescription as either a method or as a goal without some further differentiation among the acts (statements) which are subsumed under each of these concepts.
CHAPTER VII
THE METACRITICAL THEORY OF RALPH SMITH

Overview
In this chapter I analyze and appraise the definitions of critical terms, and the prescriptions for criticism offered by Ralph Smith.

Introduction
One of the most influential accounts of criticism in the educational literature is that presented by Ralph Smith in two articles: Aesthetic Criticism: The Method of Aesthetic Education (Smith, 1968) and Teaching Aesthetic Criticism in the Schools (Smith, 1973). In each of the above articles, the definitions of critical terms and prescriptions for criticism which are presented, are closely related to one another but there are some significant differences as well. The earlier article by Smith (Smith, 1968) discusses a number of points which are not treated at all in the later article. The later article in turn, presents several modifications in Smith's account of definitions and prescriptions.

Thus each of Smith's articles presents a somewhat different theory of criticism. Although it may reasonably be assumed that later modifications to his earlier article represent a rethinking of points discussed in his earlier article, it is difficult to decide whether later omissions are intentional modifications or simply omissions attributable, for example, to a desire to avoid excessive redundancy between his
earlier and later publications. Without pretending to settle this issue, I shall here assume that omissions in Smith's later article simply are omissions. In giving an exposition of each of Smith's accounts of criticism I shall refer to each article occasionally for clarification and information on a number of points. I shall also occasionally refer briefly to two of Smith's other publications for clarification and information as well (Smith, 1967a, 1967b).

**Smith's Use of Critical Terms**

In comparison to Beardsley, Smith presents brief and rather casual expositions of criticism in which definitions are offered of the following critical terms: "description", "analysis", "characterization", "interpretation", and "evaluation". Before proceeding with an analysis of these definitions, it will be helpful to briefly sketch Smith's use of critical terminology since there are several possibilities for confusion in his accounts and these perhaps should be noted at the outset.

First, Smith does not always sharply separate his concern with formulating prescriptions for criticism from his concern with explicating the meaning of various critical terms. In defining critical terms, he uses a number of expressions such as "phase" (Smith, 1968), and "procedure" and "technique" (Smith, 1973) to designate critical concepts. I shall argue that the most plausible construal of these expressions is in terms of the generic concept of an act presented in the context of prescriptions for criticism as an educational method.

Second, Smith's definitions of "analysis" and "interpretation" sometimes suggest mental as well as physical doings. Since the former are only suggested, however, I shall treat Smith's definitions as definitions of various linguistic acts.
Third, although Smith like Beardsley uses critical terms in contexts of verification and justification, he does not distinguish between active doing and performed act (artifact) senses of critical terms. I shall assume that both senses are intended in his use of critical terms.

Fourth, Smith uses critical terms to indicate both complex and simple speech acts. Some of the complex speech acts in each of his accounts are comprised of simple speech acts of logically distinct types. One of the major differences between each of his articles lies in the number of terms taken to indicate such complex speech acts. In his first article, "description", "analysis", "interpretation", and "evaluation" are construed in this way. In his second article, Smith also uses "characterization" to designate a complex speech act as well.

The major effort in this section, then, will be to clarify each of the four distinctions mentioned above. In the next section of this chapter I shall discuss more specifically the distinctions Smith makes among simple speech acts designated by critical terms. In the section following that, I shall give an exposition of both his earlier and later conceptions of critical terms as complex speech acts. In the last section of this chapter I shall discuss his prescriptions for criticism.

Prescriptive and Definitional Concerns

A first distinction that must be made in Smith's accounts is between his prescriptions for criticism and the various senses of critical terms presupposed in his definitions. Smith does not always sharply differentiate prescriptive matters from his definitional concerns. Thus in discussing criticism generally, it is construed as an activity.
Individual critical terms, however, are sometimes construed, not as individual activities in themselves, but rather as "phases" of that activity or as "procedures", or "techniques" as in these passages:

Critical activity may be described first of all in terms of overlapping phases which contain statements ranging from the cognitively certain to the cognitively less certain, beginning with description and phasing into analysis, interpretation, and evaluation (Smith, 1968, p. 21).

I think that a concept of criticism which divides into two basic sets of activities -- into what may be called exploratory aesthetic criticism and argumentative aesthetic criticism -- can help create the kind of conditions for the kind of enlightened critical performance envisioned here as one appropriate outcome of aesthetic education.

Exploratory criticism may be described as an aid to and a means of sustaining aesthetic experience. Aesthetic argument, on the other hand, may be called critical communication carried on in behalf of a given critique; ...

By exploratory criticism, then, we shall mean those techniques and procedures that are helpful in realizing the aesthetic value of works of art. (Smith, 1973, pp. 39, 40)

In the above passages, "phases", "techniques", and "procedures" I would suggest can best be understood as certain kinds of active doings, to be performed by agents in certain educational settings, to achieve certain kinds of educational goals. Thus, they can be construed generally as acts and in some places Smith is more explicit in regarding them as such. At certain points, for example, he says that the activity of analysis involves discerning much more closely the ways in which elements noted in description dispose themselves into a variety of forms and patterns. (Smith, 1973, p. 41)

and, in another passage, "the act of interpreting is logically distinct from description and evaluation" (Smith, 1973, p. 42). It appears then that critical terms -- at least in some of their senses in Smith's accounts -- may be understood generally in terms of certain kinds of acts.
Physical and Mental Uses of Critical Terms

A further distinction that can be made in both of Smith's accounts is between physical and mental uses of critical terms. It will be remembered that certain critical terms in their ordinary uses can have both physical and mental senses. Although Smith clearly uses critical terms to indicate linguistic acts in physical contexts, in defining "analysis" and "interpretation" his accounts sometimes suggest a mental sense of these terms as well.

Thus for Smith, analysis is also perhaps a mental doing as well as a linguistic act in the following passages:

Analysis ... involves a close look at the components, elements, or details that make up a work, the larger groups or complexes into which they are composed, and the relationships they sustain. (Smith, 1968, p. 22)

The activity of analysis involves discerning much more closely the ways in which elements noted in description dispose themselves into a variety of forms and patterns. Thus subtle analogies as well as contrasts of color and shape may be detected, as may progressively differentiated themes.... [Analysis] should be used cautiously in the elementary grades, lest the learners become too self-conscious about the dissecutive mode of attention that typifies analysis. (Smith, 1973, p. 41)

In discussing interpretation Smith also suggests that there is a mental process of interpretation as well:

But though overall interpretation depends on the variety of local meanings discerned in the work, interpreting is not simply adding them up to get the right meaning. There is no system of aesthetic arithmetic. The interpretation of Cezanne's Card Players ..., for example, grows out of local interpretations of the main figures.... But again, the growing-out-of is not a simple additive process. Rather, local meanings fit or accord well with the larger one, and it is a highly cultivated sense of aesthetic fittingness rather than a keen feel for discursive logic that is operative in aesthetic interpretation. (Smith, 1973, p. 43)
If these mental uses of "analysis" and "interpretation" are present in Smith's accounts, however, they are only peripheral to the main senses of these terms as linguistic acts. I shall, therefore, not be concerned with them in giving an exposition of Smith's definitions of critical terms.

It is worth pointing out before proceeding, however, that if Smith construes interpretation as a mental process (as the above passage suggests) his account is mistaken. I have argued in Chapter II that interpretation in a nonlinguistic mental sense is most plausibly taken to be a nonactive achievement rather than an activity. Although both are doings in a larger sense, one indicates a "success" rather than a process. Such a success, however, is not something that an agent can willfully bring about. Interpretation in this sense, then, cannot logically figure in method prescriptions. The misconstrual of interpretation as an infallible mental process may perhaps underlie the high value which Smith seems to place upon interpretation as a method. In his earlier article (Smith, 1968, p. 24) he states that "interpretation is often taken as the most meaningful and enriching phase of transaction between a percipient and a work of art."

Active Doings and Artifact Senses of Critical Terms

The major way in which Smith conceives of criticism, then, is as a set of linguistic or speech acts. A third distinction which must be made in each of Smith's accounts is between the active doing sense of these acts and the sense in which they can be considered artifacts or performed linguistic acts. I do not believe that Smith clearly recognizes a distinction between the active doing sense and the
performed act sense of critical terms and he certainly does not make this distinction explicit as Beardsley sometimes does by a change of critical terminology. But he does speak of critical terms in the contexts of verification and justification and in such contexts it is the artifact sense of these terms which is relevant. Critical terms in Smith's accounts, then, do not designate only active doings or artifacts but appear to possess both kinds of senses.

Simple and Complex Speech Acts

A fourth distinction which must be made in each of Smith's accounts is between critical acts as **simple** speech acts and as **complex** speech acts. Unlike Beardsley's account of criticism, critical terms are used to designate both unique kinds of simple speech acts and sets of such acts, or complex speech acts. In Smith's early account, for example, (Smith, 1968) critical terms are used to designate phases. These I have argued previously can be construed as acts. Since these acts are constituted by the performance of other acts, or what Smith terms **statements** (in one use of "statement" in his accounts) they are complex speech acts. A passage which illustrates the notion of a complex speech act is the following:

1. Smith, however, also uses the term "statement" to designate complex speech acts also:
   But what more specifically, is the nature of critical activity? A survey of successful critical statements, i.e., those which have released a work's value potential previously inaccessible to untrained sensibilities, discloses little unity. The statements of critics range from crisp, schematic analyses to eloquent literary essays. (Smith, 1968, p. 21)
Critical activity may be described first of all in terms of overlapping phases which contain statements ranging from the cognitively certain to the cognitively less certain, beginning with description and phasing into analysis, interpretation, and evaluation. The division is open to challenge since the terms are used ambiguously and the boundaries between phases are not always precise. (Smith, 1968, p. 21)

Smith's later account of criticism (Smith, 1973) also uses critical terms to designate phases and these phases also can be construed in terms of complex speech acts. For example he says that criticism ... can be divided into the overlapping phases of description, in the sense of relatively straightforward noting of the more literal aspects of objects; analysis, which attends carefully to the interrelations of sensuous elements noted in description; characterization, which marks the peculiar nature of a work's aesthetic qualities; and interpretation, an effort to construe overall meaning. (Smith, 1973, p. 40)

In each of the above phases it would seem that more than one critical statement could be made and in some critical phases, (as I shall discuss in a succeeding section of this chapter) more than one kind of critical statement could be made. One way in which Smith uses critical terms, then, is to designate certain complex speech acts constituted by the performance of other acts, simple speech acts or statements. From this point onwards I shall reserve the term "statement" to designate these simple speech acts as I have used "statement" in discussing Beardsley's account of criticism.

A second way in which Smith uses critical terms is to designate certain kinds of distinct statements. Within a given phase designated by a critical term, certain statements will be given, statements also designated by that same critical term. That is, within the phase of description, one or more description statements will be made; within the phases of analysis, one or more analysis statements will be made,
etc. Smith sometimes also appears to hold that other kinds of statements will appear within certain of these phases as well. But characteristically a given phase will be exemplified by the performance of certain kinds of distinct critical statements. Much of Smith's account is spent in distinguishing one kind of statement from another.

Since Smith uses critical terms to designate both complex and simple speech acts, it would seem obligatory that he provide a clear account not only of the distinctions among distinct kinds of statements but also of the constituent statements of each kind of critical phase. In the following sections of this chapter I shall examine each of these aspects of Smith's theory in turn.

Smith's Definitions of Simple Speech Acts or Statements

As I have stated previously, Smith unlike Beardsley uses critical terms to designate phases or complex speech acts. One aspect of Smith's theory which is comparable to Beardsley's, however, is in his use of critical terms to designate simple speech acts or statements of various kinds. However, Smith unlike Beardsley, does not employ critical terms to mark a distinction between the active doing and artifact senses of the linguistic acts he discusses. Since he uses critical terms in both an active doing sense and in contexts of verification and justification, both active doing and artifact senses can be presumed in his use of critical terms.

Smith's distinctions among critical terms as statements may be regarded as attempts to define the actual usage of these terms which in their ordinary meanings are used to designate illocutionary acts of various kinds. Smith's definitions may be regarded as reportive
because, except for "characterization" in his early article (Smith, 1968), he offers no stipulative announcement for the definitions he is presenting. In the case of "characterization" the reason which he presents for his stipulation is clearly inadequate. Smith states

> The distinction between "description" and "characterization" is for convenience. I use "characterization" whenever aesthetic qualities are pointed out; whereas description is restricted to indicating the more literal properties of objects. The characterization of elements, however, may be regarded as a kind of description. (Smith, 1968, p. 31)

The problem with such a stipulation of course is that Smith wishes the meaning of "characterization" which he presents to be adopted beyond the context of his article. He is proposing that teachers, students, and others use "characterization" in the manner that he proposes in a wide variety of educational settings. More compelling reasons than convenience must be given for the disruption of normal communication that can be expected to occur in adopting an arbitrary meaning of a term being defined. Smith's definitions, then, may be regarded as reportive definitions. It is significant, I think, to note that in his later article (Smith, 1973), Smith drops the stipulative announcement for his definition of "characterization".

In this section, then, I shall give an exposition and appraisal of the definitions of critical terms, terms which Smith uses to designate simple speech acts or statements.

Giving an exposition of Smith's account of simple speech acts or statements, is in some ways a more difficult task than it is for Beardsley's definitions. One reason for this is the equivocation between simple and complex speech acts in Smith's account. A second reason is that the distinctions among different kinds of critical
statements in Smith's account are neither as precise nor as systematic as are those given by Beardsley. A third reason is that Smith, unlike Beardsley, does not consistently present examples of the statements he is discussing. It will be remembered that Beardsley's distinctions among critical statements were interpreted in the light of Searle's theory as distinctions basically between the function of critical statements on the one hand, (the distinction between normative and nonnormative statements) and between the content of critical statements on the other (the distinction between external and critical statements; and the distinction between analysis and description statements, and interpretation statements). It was possible to interpret Beardsley's account of criticism in terms of Searle's theory by considering his illustrations of critical statements as well as his explanations of these distinctions. Thus, although Beardsley did not distinguish between reference and predication in his account of the content of critical discourse, a plausible construal of his discussion of content in terms of the concepts of reference and predication was possible given the examples of critical statements which he presented. It is more difficult to give such an interpretation of Smith's account because specific examples of the critical statements which he discusses are almost always lacking. Finally, perhaps the most problematic aspect of Smith's account is that he appears to employ a number of distinctions simultaneously in characterizing critical statements. Sometimes he appears to make a distinction on the basis of the function of critical statements. Sometimes he makes distinctions on the basis of what he terms, the "cognitive certainty", of such statements. Sometimes he distinguishes critical statements on the basis of their content.
I believe that there are problems in accurately construing each of these distinctions in Smith's account.

In giving an exposition of Smith's accounts of critical terms, I shall then attempt to clarify his definitions. I shall also inquire into the truth or falsity of claims which he makes in distinguishing one critical statement from another and attempt to point out various inconsistencies among these claims. Finally, I shall point out the circularity of one of his definitions and I shall comment at various points on the sophistication of Smith's definitions vis-a-vis those given in Beardsley's account of criticism.

**The Function of Critical Statements**

Since the ways in which Smith distinguishes among critical statements in his account are not always clear or unproblematic, one might begin a discussion of Smith's definitions of critical statements with an inquiry into the bases for his distinctions among descriptions, analyses, characterizations, interpretations, and evaluations.

Although it seems possible to interpret some of Smith's distinctions as distinctions in the function or illocutionary force of critical statements, there are two problems in reading Smith's account of criticism in this way.

One problem is that it is difficult to discern how sensitive Smith is to differences in illocutionary force as a criterion for distinction among critical statements. One reason for doubting that Smith was particularly aware of such differences is his adoption of a mode of defining critical statements by substituting one illocutionary term for another. In defining "description" he uses the terms "name",...
"identify", "classify", and "note" (Smith, 1968, p. 21; 1973, pp. 40, 41). In defining "analysis" he sometimes substitutes the term "note" (Smith, 1973, p. 41). In defining "characterization" he uses "judgment" and "mark" (Smith, 1968, p. 23; 1973, pp. 40,42). In defining "interpretation" he substitutes "judgment" (Smith, 1968, p. 24; 1973, p. 43). And in defining "evaluation" the following are used: "summation", "reject", "ascribe", "recognize", "endorse", "recommend", "appraise", "estimate" and "pronounce" (Smith, 1968, pp. 25, 26; 1973, pp. 40, 44).

It is unclear from Smith's account whether he is using these terms simply to articulate the active doing indicated by a critical term or whether he attributes some theoretical significance to this mode of defining. In this latter case it seems difficult to decide whether he holds that, say, critical terms denote generic linguistic acts or that acts indicated by critical terms have more than one illocutionary force or function. Unfortunately, the problem that arises here is the same problem that was encountered in considering Beardsley's account. All of the substitute illocutionary terms employed by Smith designate unique (although related) illocutionary acts. Such terms, then, are not equivalent in meaning. As with Beardsley's account, it would appear difficult to hold either that the acts (statements) indicated by critical terms are multifunctional or that they are generic acts, acts which summarize a number of more specific acts.

Leaving aside these difficulties, one reason for holding that Smith does make a functional distinction among critical statements, however, is his explicit discrimination of critical statements into the categories of nonnormative and normative and a claim that he makes
that the acts of description, interpretation, and evaluation are "logically distinct". These distinctions in his later account are given in the following passage:

With the introduction of the term characterization [sic], we may note a problem with critical language, if only to explain the way critical terms are being used here. I said that we may characterize a relationship as jarring or harmonious. I could have said that we interpret, describe, or even that we evaluate it as such. For to say that "X elements jar" or "X elements harmonize" may be value judgments that X is good or bad because elements jar or harmonize. On the other hand, "jarring" or "harmonious" may be nonnormative descriptions which indicate that something simply has one or another of these qualities. In short, it seems that we interpret as we see, that a characterization is occasionally an interpretation, and that an interpretation can sometimes be both a description and an evaluation. Such vagaries of language usage, however, should not divert attention from the fact that the act of interpreting is logically distinct from description and evaluation. (Smith, 1973, p. 42)

The clarity of the above passage is not promoted by Smith's apparent shift from linguistic to mental matters when he claims "that we interpret as we see". Nor is clarity promoted by his apparently unconscious shift from locutionary to illocutionary matters. When Smith talks about certain terms such as "jar" or "harmonize" appearing in both evaluations and descriptions his remarks appear unexceptionable enough. When he then goes on to claim on the basis of this that

a characterization is occasionally an interpretation, and that an interpretation can sometimes be both a description and an evaluation. (Smith, 1973, p. 42)

his remarks would seem to call for explanation if they are not to be considered paradoxical. Is he claiming the existence of borderline cases of what he holds to be logically distinct statements?
What is clear in the above passage is that Smith marks a distinction between normative and nonnormative statements, a distinction reminiscent of Beardsley's theory of criticism which, indeed, was influential in Smith's accounts. However, the basis for such a distinction is not explained. Moreover, in addition to this distinction, Smith also goes on to claim that a "logical distinction" exists between descriptions, interpretations, and evaluations. The additional discrimination of critical statements into three logically distinct groups is troubling because the basis for this distinction is also not clear in Smith's account.

Is a functional distinction between different kinds of statements being employed, then, in Smith's account? And if it is where precisely is it being employed? Is a functional distinction to be drawn between normative and nonnormative statements or between descriptions, interpretations, and evaluations? These questions are difficult to resolve because Smith does not elaborate on the basis for his discriminations of critical statements into groups. He probably intends a functional distinction to be drawn at least between evaluations and other, non-normative critical statements. His claim that a logical distinction exists between the acts of description, interpretation, and evaluation suggests a functional distinction as well. But because he additionally draws a distinction between normative and nonnormative statements, his accounts suggest that a different kind of distinction is being proposed in discriminating among descriptions, interpretations, and evaluations. And, indeed, as I shall show, Smith is unable to articulate a distinction between description and interpretation except on the basis of the content and testability of such statements.
A second problem with reading a functional distinction into each of Smith's accounts lies in deciding where such a distinction would be employed. In accepting a distinction between normative and non-normative statements and in holding that the acts of description, interpretation, and evaluation are logically distinct, Smith's later account first of all offers two different possibilities for employment of such a distinction. Yet if Smith does employ a functional distinction in either of these ways, a problem arises in deciding in which category to place analysis and characterization statements. Smith attempts to define five critical statements, yet his functional distinction (if, indeed, he does employ one) can at most be interpreted as a distinction between two or three kinds of "logically distinct" statements. Analysis and characterization statements, then, would seem to fall into one or another of the categories of description, interpretation, or evaluation statements. Deciding into which category such statements belong is a problematic matter.

Smith's early article (Smith, 1968) gives some hints on this matter in suggesting that Smith might regard analysis and characterization statements as forms of description. One clue to this is that Smith talks about characterization statements as part of the phase of analysis. One of the odd features of this early article is that Smith holds that the phase of analysis, unlike other critical phases, is exemplified by two critical statements, analyses and characterizations (Smith, 1968, pp. 22, 23). Furthermore, although Smith holds

2. In his later account (Smith, 1973) Smith introduces a phase of characterization which apparently is meant to accommodate characterization statements.
that characterization statements are made during the phase of analysis in this early article, he also holds that these statements are in reality descriptions (Smith, 1968, p. 31). It seems likely, then, that if Smith would accept a division of critical statements into two or three logically distinct categories, then analysis and characterization statements would be considered descriptions. Descriptions in turn would fall within the category of nonnormative statements.

At this point it is perhaps worth noting that too much emphasis may have been placed on only one passage in attempting to determine whether Smith employs a distinction in illocutionary force and where such a distinction is to be made in his account. It is hard not to see his claim that there are two or three distinct groups of critical acts as either a casual statement or one that is inconsistent with the rest of his theory. Since he does go on to discriminate among five kinds of critical statements there would seem to be at least some "logical" differences between analysis and characterization statements and description statements. If there were no logical distinctions among such critical statements, then his further attempts to discriminate among such statements would not be successful.

In Smith's accounts of critical statements, then, it is unclear just how sensitive Smith is to a distinction in illocutionary force between critical statements. Although his distinction between normative and nonnormative and his grouping of critical statements into descriptions, interpretations, and evaluations suggest a rough functional distinction, such a distinction is not articulated. Nor is it clear where Smith would wish to draw a distinction between critical statements on the basis of their function. As I shall show, except possibly
for the distinction between evaluation and other critical statements, Smith appears to rely more upon the "cognitive certainty" and content of critical statements as a basis for distinction rather than upon other contextual conditions which actually do distinguish one critical statement from another.

The "Cognitive Certainty" of Critical Statements

Perhaps the most explicit way in which Smith discriminates among critical statements is on the basis of their "cognitive certainty". In his early article he states that

Critical activity may be described first of all in terms of overlapping phases which contain statements ranging from the cognitively certain to the cognitively less certain, beginning with description and phasing into analysis, interpretation, and evaluation. (Smith, 1968, p. 21)

This characterization of critical statements, as statements differing in degree of "cognitive certainty" is not found in his later article (Smith, 1973). However, Smith in his later article does not specifically repudiate his early claim in the above passage. Moreover, his characterization of description as a critical statement in the above passage as the most "cognitively certain" of critical statements appears to be in accord with his later article in which description is asserted to be a "relatively straightforward noting of the more literal aspects of objects" (Smith, 1973, p. 40). Since "cognitive certainty" seems to be one of the more important ways in which Smith discriminates among critical statements, it will be helpful to examine this notion and the inherent problems with this notion in Smith's account.
Two Interpretations of "Cognitive Certainty". Although Smith uses the "cognitive certainty" of critical statements as one basis for discriminating among critical statements, the meaning of this expression is not clearly given in his accounts. Smith himself appears to use it in two ways. One way is to designate the degree of evidence for a given state of affairs possessed by a speaker. Thus someone who is cognitively certain has conclusive evidence that a given state of affairs exists. A second way in which he uses "cognitive certainty" is to designate the confirmability of critical statements i.e., the degree to which their truth or falsity is objectively decideable. Supporting passages for each version of "cognitive certainty" can be found in different parts of each of Smith's accounts.

The first interpretation of "cognitive certainty" is supported by passages such as the following about descriptions in his early article:

Description. By and large description involves naming, identifying and classifying, a kind of taking stock which inventories cognitively established aspects of a work of art, e.g., knowledge concerning the type of thing the object is: triptych, symphony, or work of prose fiction, information about the materials and techniques used, and knowledge of the extra aesthetic function of the work when this is relevant. This category would further comprise art-historical data, and in the case of representational works, knowledge of mythology, cultural history, or whatever is required to identify the subject matter depicted.

Descriptive knowledge of the foregoing types is often depreciated because so-called art appreciation courses frequently degenerate to this level, or so it is said. Assuredly, memorization of dates and names, and drills in the identification of period styles and artists fall short of defensible objectives for aesthetic education. Yet descriptive information of the right sort is obviously important and relevant.
to aesthetic response. Relevant descriptive knowledge interrelates with the other, more properly aesthetic phases of criticism and thus enriches the total critique. Further, since aesthetic education as an epistemological or knowledge enterprise often seems to falter with the recognition that, on the whole, secure empirical knowledge might not be present in the arts, those areas in which knowledge is possible should be indicated. Lastly, it is conceivable that ability to talk with cognitive assurance about the descriptive elements of works of art, even though they are not necessarily the most aesthetically relevant, may give teacher and student greater confidence to venture into more ambiguous and uncharted territories. (Smith, 1968, pp. 21, 22)

I should not want to maintain that the above passage is clear. There is at least one problematic aspect in the shift of reference from the acts performed by a speaker to the capabilities possessed by a speaker in performing these acts. Yet, since descriptive statements are presumvably the most cognitively certain of all descriptive statements, when Smith talks about "cognitively established aspects of a work of art" and the "cognitive assurance" of someone making descriptive statements, it is natural to equate the meaning of these expressions with the meaning of cognitive certainty. In the above passage, then, Smith seems to be equating "cognitive certainty" with the knowledge possessed by a speaker.

Smith's identification of descriptive statements with the concept of knowledge in his articles raises a creditable point. In the analysis undertaken in Chapter IV of this study, knowledge was considered to be a preparatory condition in describing. I held that a speaker needed to know the proposition given in an act of describing but this condition applied also to the acts of analyzing and characterizing. I argued that one of the reasons why the acts of describing, analyzing, and characterizing seem intuitively related
was that they all possess such a knowledge condition. Smith's identification of analysis and characterization statements with descriptions may, in fact, reflect an intuition about this matter. However, I also went on to discriminate each of these acts from one another so I should also note that such acts are not equivalent nor does description seem to be a generic illocutionary act, standing as genus to species with the acts of analyzing and characterizing.

Part of the difficulty with interpreting "cognitive certainty" in terms of the knowledge possessed by a speaker is that it seems inconsistent with Smith's earlier characterization of critical statements as having different degrees of cognitive certainty. There are no different degrees of knowledge. Perhaps by "cognitive certainty", then, Smith means that there is conclusive evidence for the truth of a given statement. Such a claim is not inconsistent with his earlier characterization of critical statements because statements conceivably could differ in their evidential basis. Descriptive statements, then, would be cognitively certain, cognitively established, or cognitively assured because the evidence for their support is conclusive.

The other, perhaps more plausible interpretation of "cognitive certainty", is to equate cognitive certainty with the confirmability of critical statements. That is Smith seems to be stating in his general characterization of critical statements (Smith, 1968, p. 21), that the truth of statements exemplifying earlier critical phases is more objectively decideable than is the truth of statements exemplifying later critical phases. Such an interpretation of cognitive certainty also finds support in passages from Smith's account.
This seems to be the gist of Smith's remarks in talking about different kinds of statements and predicates within the phase of analysis. In the following passage, from his early article the first group of predicates is understood to be given in descriptions, the most 'cognitively certain' of the critical statements in Smith's scheme. The latter group of predicates is understood to be given in characterizations, a statement exemplifying a later critical phase (hence, a statement which is less "cognitively certain".

a. There is a first group of predicates so matter-of-fact and uncontroversial that it probably is not proper to consider them as aesthetic. A color may have a certain degree of saturation, a musical note a given pitch, a shape a geometric configuration, a word a definite meaning, and so on. These characteristics, which anyone whose sensory and mental apparatus is not impaired should be able to perceive, are literally in the work. Attribution of such characteristics is normally accompanied with the certitude distinctive of propositions cited in support of fundamental knowledge claims. That an element is crimson, circular, cylindrical, or a high C is not usually subject to further confirmation. [Emphasis Added]

b. The next class of predicates typically finds employment in aesthetic contexts but may also be used in other situations, e.g., words such as "harmonious," "delicate," "graceful," and many others. Here agreement among critics is still substantial but by no means unanimous. Some persons may detect subtle rhythms where others utterly fail to do so. Similarly, a feature appearing "graceful" to one critic may appear "flaccid" to another. Indeed, one cannot always decide whether terms like "delicate," "garish," or "harmonious" are used to describe or characterize, or even to evaluate, whether they are closer to the cognitively certain or to the cognitively uncertain end of the critical spectrum. Once more, it is sometimes impossible to maintain sharp and clear distinctions. (Smith, 1968, p. 22)

In this passage, then, Smith explicitly identifies cognitive certainty with the confirmability of critical statements and he also claims that this differentiates critical statements from one another.
Thus, there appears to be two ways in which "cognitive certainty" is used in Smith's account. One way in which one seems able to interpret this expression is on the evidential basis of the critical statement. Cognitively certain statements are those for which conclusive evidence is available. On the other hand, perhaps the most plausible way of interpreting "cognitive certainty", is in terms of a statement's confirmability. Those statements which are cognitively certain are those statements for which objective agreement about their truth or falsity is most readily obtained.

Conceptual Problems. There are problems that arise with each interpretation of "cognitive certainty". If Smith holds that critical statements vary from one another on their evidential basis, he would seem to be violating ordinary usage. As I have argued in Chapter IV, an evidence requirement exists in performing acts of analyzing and characterizing as well as describing. There is, however, no necessary degree of difference on the evidential basis of such statements.

Moreover, holding that the cognitive certainty of critical statements is to be understood as the evidential basis of such statements clearly gives rise to inconsistencies in Smith's own account. Smith would have to hold, for example, that in making analysis statements, a speaker necessarily possesses less evidence than in making description statements. Although, I do not believe that Smith's characterization of analysis statements is clear (at least in his early account), the most plausible construal of such statements is that they are "about" certain relationships within a work of art. And if this is the case, Smith himself would have to acknowledge that there is no difference of degree in the evidential basis between descriptions and analyses.
Smith's concept of analysis requires some explication since it is only in his later article (Smith, 1973) that analysis statements are clearly separated from descriptions and characterizations. In his early article he characterizes analysis statements in the following way.

**Analysis.** This involves a close look at the components, elements, or details that make up a work, the larger groups or complexes into which they are composed and the relationships they sustain. (Smith, 1968, p. 22)

This passage is certainly less than clear in identifying analysis statements apart from descriptions. In his later account (Smith, 1973), he is more explicit in separating analysis statements from description statements. In his later article descriptions are held to be "about" the work's major components, and analyses "about" the relationships existing within the work of art. Descriptions are characterized as follows:

In the effort to discern as completely as possible the nature of a work of art, it is helpful to identify and name its major components. An exhaustive inventory is not necessarily called for, although it is well to remember that in art little things can make big differences. Such identifying and naming should include not only elements of subject matter (e.g., the objects in a still life) but also an object's major areas or formal divisions. (Smith, 1973, pp. 40, 41)

While analysis statements are held to be concerned with the relationships existing within the work or art:

**Analysis**, attends carefully to the interrelations of sensuous elements noted in description. (Smith, 1973, p. 40)

Although Smith does not expand on the kind of relationships that are talked about in analysis, the following is a statement about the relationship in a work of art and hence presumably an analysis statement:
This component is larger than (bluer than) that component.

This statement clearly would be about a relationship existing within the work as the concept of a relationship in expounded by Beardsley (Beardsley, 1958). Smith's use of Beardsley's terms such as "element" and "complex" indicates the influence of Beardsley and suggests a concurrence with Beardsley's concept of a relationship.

Yet if the above statement is an analysis statement, then, there is no reason for holding that evidential basis of such statements would be less than that for description statements in Smith's account. The evidential basis for analysis statements would seem to be at least equal, and probably greater, than in making some descriptions which are held to be "cognitively assured". Critical statements are usually verified by examining the work of art itself. Thus access to the work of art is all the evidence that is required for confirming analysis and many description statements. In instances of description statements about the portrayed subject matter or about the materials and technique, however, access to the work of art is usually insufficient as evidence. One would ordinarily have to seek external support for confirmation. Here the evidential support for making some descriptive statements in ordinary circumstances would be seem to be less than for making analysis statements. Thus on the first interpretation of "cognitive certainty" as the evidential basis of critical statements, Smith's account seems inconsistent. In making at least one kind of analysis statement, the evidential basis would characteristically be the same as (or greater than) in making some description statements.
If the "cognitive certainty" of critical statements is interpreted in terms of their confirmability, there are similar problems with Smith's holding that critical statements differ in the degree of cognitive certainty as one proceeds from description through evaluation. In making this claim Smith's account seems once again at odds with the actual character of critical statements (illocutionary acts) as these statements are designated by critical terms in ordinary language. And, once again, this claim is inconsistent with other parts of his own account.

If Smith holds, as he appears to do, that his definitions of critical statements are reportive then he would have to hold that all interpretations of works of art, for example, are more objectively decidable than are all evaluations since they exemplify an earlier critical phase. Although this claim might be difficult to prove one way or another, insofar as it is provable, it seems highly unlikely that this would be the case. For example, there are many evaluations of works of art which might well be highly confirmable in appropriate circumstances. Consider an evaluation of the technique of a painting in terms of its durability or of an evaluation of a ceramic teapot in terms of its functionality. The truth of these kinds of evaluations seem to be highly confirmable. Many interpretations which could be made of works of art on the other hand seem to hold the possibility for endless dispute about their truth or falsity. A good case in point is an example of interpretation offered by Smith.

An aesthetic interpretation of The Tribute Money... delivers the judgment that the picture's significance resides in its image of human nobility, such image being the essential import of what is depicted,... (Smith, 1968, p. 25)
Although I believe that Smith in his definitions mischaracterizes interpretations, I think that the example of interpretation presented above is unquestionably an interpretation. But as an interpretation, its truth or falsity seems eminently disputable since it goes beyond the evidence presented in the painting itself. Those who are familiar with Masaccio's work know that "The picture's significance resides in its image of human nobility" is a statement which can be supported to some extent by examination of the work itself. But this support is by no means conclusive since it seems open for someone to argue that its significance resides in some other dimension of the work. In ordinary language, therefore, it seems doubtful that all interpretation statements are more confirmable than all evaluations. This claim is especially doubtful considering the extensive kinds of illocutionary acts which could fall within Smith's conception of an evaluation. As I have shown previously, Smith uses a range of illocutionary terms in articulating the function of evaluation statements.

Smith's early characterization of critical statements on the basis of their confirmability seems also to be inconsistent in some places with his own characterization of critical statements in terms of their content. To show this, his characterizations of descriptions and analyses can be considered once again. Description statements it will be remembered, in addition to their being "cognitively certain" are "about" such things as the represented subject matter of a work of art, the materials and techniques used by the artist, the name of the artist, and the period in which the work was produced. The most plausible construal of analysis statements it will be remembered is that (in addition to being less "cognitively certain" than descriptions), they are "about" relationships existing within the work.
If one considers description statements solely in terms of their content, Smith's characterizations of descriptions and analysis statements are inconsistent. For example, in making an analysis statement such as the following about a work of art

This component is larger than that component.

one would be making a statement which is eminently confirmable by simple observation of the work. On the other hand, in making some statements about the subject matter represented in a work which is semi-abstract, (or "suggestive") for example, one might well be making statements which are on the borderline of testability or else not confirmable at all. Thus Smith's characterizations of descriptions and analyses in terms of their confirmability seems to conflict with his characterization of these critical statements in terms of their content.

To make this objection to Smith's account, however, may be to read his definitions unsympathetically. Smith may in fact be holding that statements are descriptions only if, say, they are about the subject matter and only if they are more confirmable than analysis statements. To make this claim, however, would be to rule out from critical discourse an enormous range of statements which seem important to keep in. Since certain kinds of analysis statements are eminently confirmable and since some of them in fact seem to be conclusively verifiable, only statements possessing the capability of being conclusively verifiable would be considered descriptions. The problem, here, is that Smith seems not to have left room in his scheme of criticism for a range of judgments about the style, the artist, the materials and technique, the subject matter, etc. when these judgments
are not conclusively verifiable. By distinguishing critical descriptions both on the basis of their confirmability and their content, Smith seems committed to a rather narrow view of criticism. Reasoned speculation about the subject matter of a work of art, for example, might be all that is possible with some works which are semi-abstract in nature. Many statements about the materials and the technique of a work of art are only conclusively verifiable with laboratory examination, although reasonable judgments about these aspects of a work of art can be made in the usual contexts in which a critic confronts a work of art. In ruling out the above kinds of statements, Smith appears to rule out many important kinds of statements that could be made in aesthetic contexts.

There are conceptual problems, then, with Smith's notion of cognitive certainty as a basis for discriminating among critical statements. There seems to be at least two interpretations of this concept which can be given from Smith's account. Interpreting "cognitive certainty" as both the evidence possessed by a speaker and as a statement's confirmability seem to violate the ordinary usage of critical terms when these terms are taken as designates of various kinds of illocutionary acts. Moreover, each interpretation suggests inconsistencies with the content distinctions Smith also uses in characterizing critical statements. Some of these inconsistencies have been examined with regard to Smith's definitions of "description" and "analysis". Perhaps it is for these reasons that Smith in his later article (Smith, 1973) appears to shift his emphasis to a statement's content as a basis for discriminating one critical statement from another. And, indeed as I have mentioned, Smith's overall characterization of critical statements as statements differing by degree in their cognitive certainty is not formed in his later account.
The Content of Critical Statements

The third way in which Smith distinguishes among critical statements is on the basis of their content. It seems hazardous, however, to attempt to interpret this distinction in Smith's accounts in light of Searle's concepts of reference and predication. These distinctions are not explicitly presented in his theory and, unlike Beardsley, Smith does not consistently illustrate the statements he discusses with examples.

One way in which this might be attempted, of course, is by identifying Smith's theory of criticism with its progenitors in the philosophical literature. Two of the main sources underlying Smith's definitions of critical terms are Beardsley (1958) and Sibley (1959; 1965). Both writers are directly concerned with concepts of reference and predication as these concepts are presented in Searle's theory. Hence, Searle's theory seems applicable to their writings. The influence of each in Smith's account may be briefly noted with respect to the light which is shed on Smith's own views of reference and predication.

Part of the difficulty with identifying Smith's account of critical terms with the views expressed by either Beardsley or Sibley is that each of their views of criticism is modified in Smith's account. In his early article, for example, Smith does seem to adopt Beardsley's notion of an aesthetic object (although this aspect of his account is not included in his later article):
To begin with, what kinds of entities are involved in the judgmental phase of aesthetic value experience? For purposes of the present analysis such entities may be characterized as (a) aesthetic objects which are things of any sort whatever, natural or man-made, which are interesting to awareness; and (b) works of art, which are artifacts specially designed to function as aesthetic objects, whether or not they serve any other function. (Smith, 1968, p. 16)

Although Smith does seem to appeal to Beardsley's theory in this portion of his account, it seems problematic whether one can attribute to him a belief that critical statements refer to such entities. For example in some passages Smith seems to overlook the distinctions between reference and predication which seem to underlie Beardsley's introduction of the technical terms "part", "whole", "complex", "properties" and "qualities".

The distinction between "description" and "characterization" introduces different ways in which parts, complexes, and regional properties can be talked about. (Smith, 1968, p. 22)

Some passages in his writing, then, blur the distinction between reference and predication as it is found in parts of Beardsley's account.

One might argue on the other hand that Smith does specifically refer to the predication of critical statements in discussing description, analysis, and characterization statements. He states in his early article that the distinction between description and characterization raises considerations ...[which] introduce the complex notion of aesthetic qualities, concepts, or predicates -- a topic that invites analyses of the terms particularly adjectives, often used in critical talk. (Smith, 1968, p. 22)

This distinction, between aesthetic and nonaesthetic qualities, is also retained in Smith's later account (Smith, 1973, pp. 42, 43).
Aesthetic qualities in Sibley's account are specifically regarded as a subclass of Beardsley's regional qualities (Sibley, 1965, p. 155) so Smith here would seem to be making a distinction between description and characterization statements based on the predication of such critical statements.

Yet, it seems impossible in Smith's account to mark a clear distinction in this way. Unlike Beardsley, Smith also includes within the class of descriptive statements, statements "about" the represented subject matter of works of art. In his early article these kinds of statements are only alluded to when he states that description involves "knowledge ... [which] is required to identify the subject matter depicted (Smith, 1968, p. 21)." It is more explicitly asserted in his later article when he states that in describing a work of art it is helpful to identify and name its major components.... Such identifying and naming should include ... elements of subject matter (e.g., the objects in a still life) ...(Smith, 1973, pp. 40, 41)

Examples of such descriptive statements are presented by Beardsley in the following passage:

noncontroversial descriptive terms [are those terms] whose referents are relatively clear (e.g., "The still life contains a pipe, playing cards, and vase" or "The film is in color and deals with romantic love"), ...

(Smith, 1973, p. 42)

3. Although none of Sibley's aesthetic qualities are basic regional qualities in Beardsley's sense, they are perhaps not co-extensive with either the class of remaining regional qualities or with the class of human regional qualities. Sibley says that Beardsley's regional qualities (in comparison to his aesthetic qualities) have a wider range, [than aesthetic qualities] since some nonaesthetic qualities, like squarish and grinning, are examples of regional qualities, as ... [are] aesthetic qualities like graceful and gaudy .... (Sibley, 1965, p. 155)
Statements "about" the subject matter in works of art would be interpretations in Beardsley's theory. The former example of description cited by Smith in the above passage, thus clearly would be an interpretation (depiction statement) in Beardsley's theory. However, as in Beardsley's discussion of interpretation, such statements possess a subsidiary reference to objects or events existing outside of the work. The expressions "pipe", "playing cards", and "vase", indeed, are referring and not predicating expressions. So it seems impossible then to make a sharp distinction between descriptions and characterizations solely on the basis of their predication. Moreover, since Smith also includes within the category of description statements a range of statements which would be considered external statements in Beardsley's theory, and since he provides no examples of these statements, it would seem almost impossible to give an accurate account of his content distinctions in terms of the concepts of reference and predication.

Thus although Smith appears to discriminate among critical statements on the basis of the content of such statements, he does not precisely distinguish between reference and predication in his account. Nor does he consistently present examples of the statements he is discussing. Since this is the case, I shall not attempt to present his content distinctions in terms of Searle's concepts of reference and predication as I have done with Beardsley's theory.

In examining the ways in which Smith discriminates among critical statements, then, I have noted several problems in Smith's accounts. Smith appears to discriminate among critical statements upon the basis of their function, their cognitive certainty, and their content. One
problem with his articles lies in accurately construing the nature of such distinctions. It is difficult, for example, to determine the theoretical significance which is to be attached to Smith's mode of defining critical terms through the substitution of other illocutionary terms. In doing this Smith may be claiming that such terms have more than one illocutionary function or that they are generic illocutionary acts. It is more probable, however, that Smith is not aware of the likelihood that illocutionary terms designate unique illocutionary acts. On the other hand it is also difficult to say that Smith is not concerned with function as a basis for discriminating among critical statements. His discrimination of statements into the categories of normative and nonnormative probably reflects such a distinction although this distinction is not explained. Also not explained is his categorization of statements into three groups namely, descriptions, interpretations, and evaluations. His accounts are unclear, therefore, as to where a functional distinction is employed.

Smith's discussion of cognitive certainty as a basis for discriminating among critical statements is also not adequately explained. In some places he appears to identify this concept with a speaker's knowledge but this interpretation of cognitive certainty is inconsistent with a characterization of critical statements in his early account as statements which have different degrees of cognitive certainty. Perhaps, then, Smith intends that the expression "cognitive certainty" should refer to the degree of evidence possessed by a speaker? This I concluded was one interpretation that could be given of his use of the expression "cognitive certainty". A second interpretation of "cognitive certainty" was also possible,
however. In some parts of his account Smith also speaks of a statement's testability or of the degree to which a statement's truth or falsity is objectively decideable. Thus in examining a second way in which Smith discriminates among critical statements, two interpretations of his proposed criterion were possible. Moreover, as I have also shown, when each of these interpretations of cognitive certainty is considered as a criterion for discriminating among critical statements, either inconsistencies are found in Smith's accounts or else his theory is led to some unwelcome consequences.

Problems of interpretation also arise with Smith's third criterion for distinguishing among critical statements. Because Smith does not adequately distinguish between reference and predication in his account and because he does not consistently present examples of the statements under discussion, it seems difficult to precisely interpret the content distinction that Smith apparently uses to discriminate among critical statements. One way in which this might be done is by appealing to Beardsley's and Sibley's accounts of critical discourse, accounts which influenced Smith in the formulation of his own definitions. Unfortunately Smith alters the conceptions of criticism propounded by each of these writers, so it is difficult to determine how much he subscribes to the views which they have put forth.

There are problems then with accurately determining the basis for Smith's distinctions among critical statements. In the next sections of this chapter, I turn toward individual discussions of each of Smith's definitions of critical terms. But given the above problems, I do not believe that it is possible to present a clear and unproblematic account of the distinctions among critical statements
which he makes. Nevertheless, in discussing these definitions I shall attempt to record both the various ways in which Smith does discriminate among critical statements (i.e., on the basis of their function, "cognitive certainty", and content), and differences between Smith's early article (Smith, 1968) and his later article (Smith, 1973). Although there are differences between each article, these differences appear to be more differences of emphasis and omission than any substantive alterations in the definitions he is presenting. One significant exception to this may be Smith's omission of his earlier, and general characterization of critical statements as statements differing by degrees in their "cognitive certainty" as one proceeds from description through evaluation (Smith, 1968, p. 21). I have earlier pointed to some of the problems with this conception of critical statements and it may be that this later omission represents a rethinking of this part of Smith's account. Smith's various distinctions among critical statements as they are presented in both his earlier and later articles I believe can best be represented by Figure 7.

Description

Smith's characterizations of description are based on the function, cognitive certainty, and content of such statements. His earlier characterization of description statements is presented in this way.

Description. By and large description involves naming, identifying and classifying, a kind of taking stock which inventories cognitively established aspects of a work of art, e.g., knowledge concerning the type of thing the object is: triptych, symphony, or work of prose fiction, information about the materials and techniques used, and knowledge of the extra aesthetic function of the work when this is relevant. This
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<th>Characterization</th>
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<td>Smith's Early Account</td>
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Figure 7. Smith's Earlier and Later Distinctions Among Critical Statements
category would further comprise art-historical data, and in the case of representational works, knowledge of mythology, cultural history, or whatever is required to identify the subject matter depicted.

Descriptive knowledge of the foregoing types is often depreciated because so-called art appreciation courses frequently degenerate to this level, or so it is said. Assuredly, memorization of dates and names, and drills in the identification of period styles and artists fall short of defensible objectives for aesthetic education. Yet descriptive information of the right sort is obviously important and relevant to aesthetic response. Relevant descriptive knowledge interrelates with the other, more properly aesthetic phases of criticism and thus enriches the total critique. Further, since aesthetic education as an epistemological or knowledge enterprise often seems to falter with the recognition that, on the whole, secure empirical knowledge might not be present in the arts, those areas in which knowledge is possible should be indicated. Lastly, it is conceivable that ability to talk with cognitive assurance about the descriptive elements of works of art, even though they are not necessarily the most aesthetically relevant, may give teacher and student greater confidence to venture into more ambiguous and uncharted territories. (Smith, 1968, pp. 21, 22)

Smith's later characterization of description statements is as follows:

In the effort to discern as completely as possible the nature of a work of art, it is helpful to identify and name its major components.... Such identifying and naming should include not only elements of subject matter (e.g., the objects in a still life) but also an object's major areas or formal divisions. The noting of representational and formal aspects may enable later analysis and characterization to decide whether subject and form are congruent or in conflict with each other, conditions which may affect overall interpretation of meaning and assessment of merit.

It is difficult to specify in advance all a person needs to know in order to see a work effectively, but we can assume that in the case of serious works, a knowledge of art history and aesthetic theory will stand one in good stead.... In different terms, [this can be considered] a sense of an "artworld," an extensive knowledge of the cosmos of art.
Descriptive knowledge of the foregoing sort is often disparaged because appreciation courses are said to get arrested at this level. I suspect this charge is not always well founded, but doubtless it attests to confusion about the kinds of knowledge relevant to understanding art. Instruction that stops with literal description obviously falls short of what is singularly important in works of art. But this is not being proposed here; description is but a phase that leads on into more distinctively aesthetic territory. (Smith, 1973, pp. 40, 41)

Part of the difficulty with interpreting Smith's accounts of "description" as a functional distinction among critical statements resides in his ambiguous use of the term "description" to designate both a critical phase (complex speech act) and a critical statement. Smith in the first of the above passages quoted states that "description involves naming, identifying, and classifying". Is he, thus, speaking about the phase of describing or about individual critical statements? If he is speaking about a critical phase, his claim might be acceptable enough. It is conceivable that a complex speech act could encompass a range of different kinds of statements as well as description statements. Of course a problem that arises at this point is that if Smith is in effect defining such terms as "naming", "identification", or "classification" and not "description", then, there exists a gap in his theory since he does use "description" in terms of a statement and he has not, therefore, provided an account of this concept.

When both of his articles are considered, however, it seems likely that Smith is attempting to articulate a functional distinction with regard to description statements rather than giving an account of various kinds of statements which comprise the phase of describing. In his later article (Smith, 1973), the problematic term "involve" is
not used. The phase of description simply is identified solely with making statements which identify, name, and note.

In attempting to articulate the function of description statements by substituting other illocutionary terms, Smith is led to some unwelcome consequencies. It would certainly not appear to be the case either that "description" is a general illocutionary act, an act which summarizes a number of more specific illocutionary acts, or that describing is multifunctional. If the former were the case then it would seem possible that one could substitute "description" for "name", "identify", or "classify" in circumstances in which one would use one of the latter expressions. If the latter was the case, it would seem that "description" and the other terms Smith uses could be substituted interchangeably. Yet it is doubtful that one can do either. Consider a request, say, to **identify** an unknown painting. Such a request could be fulfilled by someone merely stating the artist of the work and the title of the work. It is doubtful that a response such as this could be considered a **description** of the painting. In describing a work of art, one predicates certain obvious or salient properties of the work. It is doubtful, then, that one can easily substitute "description" for the other terms Smith cites. Nor do the terms cited by Smith seem interchangeable with one another.

Since I have already discussed the problems with accurately construing Smith's use of the expression "cognitive certainty" I shall not discuss this distinction further in Smith's account of description. What Smith means by cognitive certainty I think is problematic but whatever he means, whether it is the degree of evidence possessed by a speaker, or the confirmability of a particular critical statement,
Smith appears to hold in both of his articles that description statements are cognitively the most certain. I have already examined this claim in the previous section and found it to be dubious when description statements are compared with some other kinds of statements in his accounts.

A final way in which Smith discriminates description from other critical statements is on the basis of their content. I have earlier discussed the problems inherent in attempting to construe this distinction in terms of the more precise concepts of reference and predication. There is one set of Smith's description statements for which this might be possible. In Smith's later account he asserts that in describing, an "object's major areas or formal divisions" will be identified, named, or noted (Smith, 1973, p. 42). What he means by this seems more clearly brought out by his distinction between describing and characterizing predicates. In his earlier account he states

a. There is a first group of predicates so matter-of-fact and uncontroversial that it probably is not proper to consider them as aesthetic. A color may have a certain degree of saturation, a musical note a given pitch, a shape a geometric configuration, a word a definite meaning, and so on. These characteristics, which anyone whose sensory and mental apparatus is not impaired should be able to perceive, are literally in the work. Ascription of such characteristics is normally accompanied [sic] with the certitude distinctive of propositions cited in support of fundamental knowledge claims. That an element is crimson, circular, cylindrical, or a high C is not usually subject to further confirmation.(Smith, 1968, p. 22)

It thus seems possible to identify a certain set of description statements by their predication of certain nonrelational qualities. Smith does not categorize these qualities as Beardsley does but they
are perhaps equivalent to Beardsley's categories of basic nonrelational local and regional qualities.

As I have noted previously, however, Smith, unlike Beardsley, also includes statements which clearly would be external statements in Beardsley's theory within the class of descriptions. Here it does not seem possible to accurately talk about the reference and predication of such statements. Smith's early article is explicit in including statements "about" the artist, the date the work was produced, and the materials and techniques used. These would clearly be external statements. Statements about the "type of thing an object is" and the "period style" of an aesthetic object could perhaps fit into Beardsley's class of external statements as well. In Smith's later account these kinds of statements are not explicitly mentioned but Smith does allude to the knowledge required to make statements of these kinds. This knowledge includes knowledge of art history, aesthetic theory, and of the "cosmos" of art (Smith, 1973, p. 43). It seems likely, then, that in both of his accounts Smith would include a set of Beardsley's external statements within the class of descriptions.

A final kind of descriptive content is the subject matter represented within the work of art. Statements "about" the subject matter can probably be likened to Beardsley's interpretation statements although it does seem difficult to attempt to draw a strict parallel between Smith's descriptions of subject matter and Beardsley's interpretations. Smith gives an example of such a statement in

The still life contains a pipe, playing cards, and vase. (Smith, 1973, p. 42)
This example, as in Beardsley's interpretation statements, possesses a subsidiary reference and presumably Smith would include within the class of description statements both depiction and portrayal statements in Beardsley's sense; that is, statements in which the subsidiary reference is to a general class of entities and in which the subsidiary reference is to a unique entity.

It is more difficult to decide whether Smith would include within his class of description, interpretation statements in Beardsley's theory in which the subsidiary reference is to events rather than objects. Many of these kinds of statements seem to depend upon inference of one sort or another. Hence, the evidence for making such statements would seem not to be directly given in the work of art itself. Such statements in addition might not be conclusively confirmable. Since Smith also restricts description statements to the class of conclusively confirmable statements, it is likely that he would exclude many such statements from the class of descriptions, just as he would rule out statements about all represented subject matter in "suggestive" or semi-abstract works of art. On the other hand some of these kinds of statements are confirmable and can be confirmed by appealing to external evidence, evidence not directly present in the aesthetic object itself. Knowledge of history, statements by artists, historical documents and such have often been cited in support of interpretation statements in Beardsley's sense. Since Smith seems to allow that such knowledge should be brought to bear in describing, it seems that he might, after all, allow statements referring to events within his class of description statements when such statements can be confirmed by appealing to external evidence.
Smith, then, includes a range of statements within his class of description statements. These statements not only include what would be considered external statements in Beardsley's theory but also what would be considered interpretations. The former kinds of statements are not illustrated with examples and the latter kinds of statements involve a subsidiary reference. Since both kinds of statements are considered descriptions in Smith's accounts, it seems clear that no simple distinction based upon a statement's predication will separate descriptions from other critical statements as his account suggests. Indeed, because the nature of his content distinction is not explicitly presented it is difficult to decide on the extension of the concept of a description statement.

Analysis

Smith's discrimination of analysis statements from other critical statements appears to emphasize the content of such statements. This content distinction is only alluded to in his earlier article. It is stated more explicitly in his later account. Smith's earlier characterization of analysis states that it

involves a close look at the components, elements, or details that make up a work, the larger groups or complexes into which they are composed, and the relationships they sustain. Analysis in art is not a mere enumeration or cataloging of components; it cannot be done in a meaningful way, it seems, without at the same time describing and often characterizing what is singled out for inspection. (Smith, 1968, p. 22)

Once again, as with his early definition of "description", Smith appears to be talking about the constituents of the phase of analysis rather than giving a precise characterization of analysis statements per se. I have also noted the ambiguity between mental and physical
doings in an earlier part of this chapter. In this early account it is also difficult to separate his discussion of analysis statements from his discussion of description and characterization statements.

In his later article, analysis statements are more explicitly identified with the relational properties of an aesthetic object. Analysis in this later article attends carefully to the interrelations of sensuous elements noted in description (Smith, 1973, p. 40).

Smith states further that

The activity of analysis involves discerning much more closely the ways in which elements noted in description dispose themselves into a variety of forms and patterns. Thus subtle analogies as well as contrasts of color and shape may be detected, as may progressively differentiated themes .... One cannot analyze for long, however, without noting the dramatic character of an element or relationship. Relationships are always certain kinds of relationships: elements clash or fuse harmoniously, appear in mutual or uncertain accord, attract or repel. Analysis thus tends to involve the characterization of elements and relations. (Smith, 1973, pp. 41, 42)

Smith, then, appears to identify analysis statements with those statements which are "about" the formal relationships in an aesthetic object. There seems to be little emphasis upon trying to distinguish analysis statements from other critical statements by a difference in function. The only illocutionary term which Smith uses in discussing analysis statements ("note") appears to be used more as a verb of perception than as an illocutionary verb.

There appears to be a close relationship between Smith's concept of an analysis statement and Beardsley's concept of a form statement. Form statements as a subclass of analysis-description statements in Beardsley's theory, are stipulated to be those which predicate certain
relation qualities of aesthetic objects. Presumably Smith would hold that analysis statements predicate such relational qualities also but he does not attempt to specifically categorize the kinds of relational qualities that would be predicated. For example, he does not distinguish, as Beardsley does, between dual and serial relations and between structural and textural relations. The expressions which he uses to refer to such qualities — "subtle analogies as well as contrasts of color and shape" and "progressively differentiated themes" — seem to be the serial relations "repetition" and "directional change" in Beardsley's theory.

I have earlier commented upon the notion of analysis statements as "cognitively less certain" than descriptions in arguing that there appears no warrant for the claims that a speaker in making analysis statements has less conclusive evidence than in making descriptive statements. Nor is there warrant for the claim that analysis statements as a class are less confirmable than description statements as a class in Smith's theory. To be sure, some subtle analogies or progressively differentiated themes in a work of art may in fact be difficult to perceive for some percipients of an aesthetic object but others may in fact be quite obvious. I cited one such obvious relationship in the statement

This component is bluer than (larger than) that component. Such a statement as the one above, when this relationships is obvious in the aesthetic object, would appear to be just about as confirmable as any description statement. So Smith's characterization of analysis statements as "cognitively less certain" than descriptions appears to be false.
Smith's characterization of analysis statements on the basis of their content raises the question of whether his definition does in fact accord with the ordinary meaning of the term "analysis". Do acts of analysis in fact predicate relational qualities of aesthetic objects? In the characterization of the illocutionary act of analysis presented in Chapter IV, I argued that there was a propositional content condition on analyzing. In analyzing one predicated certain "constituents" of an object or entity. I have found "constituent" to be the best general term to denote the predication in various contexts of analysis. I also argued that individual contexts of analysis placed constraints on the appropriate reference and predication which can occur in acts of analysis in that only some kinds of objects are referred to and only some kinds of constituents are predicated in certain kinds of contexts. The question that I wish to ask at this point is whether relational predicates can be considered constituents in aesthetic contexts. It seems to me that if they are not equivalent in aesthetic contexts, they often overlap. If one is asked to analyze a painting, the appropriate response seems to be something like

It is comprised of one red triangle, one blue triangle, and one red square.

or

It consists of three blue areas.

These statements predicate certain constituents of the painting and in the appropriate contexts (where, for example, a painting possessed the constituents in question) I think they would be considered unquestionably analysis statements. Such statements, however, also could be considered to predicate certain serial relations of the work.
If "relationships" in Beardsley's sense do appear to be constituents of objects in aesthetic contexts, it may be asked at this point whether "relationships" ought to replace "constituents" as the appropriate characterizing term for the propositional content condition on analysis. Here I think "relationships" is less of an appropriate term. A chemist who (verbally) analyzes a certain substance, for example, does not necessarily predicate relationships among the chemical elements. It would seem necessary for him, on the other hand, to predicate certain constituent elements of that compound.

Smith, then, seems to have hit upon a creditable point in identifying analysis statements with the formal relations existing in a work of art. There is, however, no warrant for the claim that analysis statements are cognitively less certain than descriptions.

Characterization

Smith's discrimination of characterization statements from other critical statements seems to reside, as with analysis, less on the function of critical statements than on the cognitive certainty and the content of such statements. In his early article it will be remembered, Smith specifically considers characterization statements to be a form of description (Smith, 1968, p. 31). In both of his articles, his delineation of characterization statements is fairly consistent. The nature of characterization statements is brought forth by a contrast of the predicates of such statements with certain predicates found in description statements. In his earlier article he contrasts those predicates in the following way:
a. There is a first group of predicates so matter-of-fact and uncontroversial that it probably is not proper to consider them as aesthetic. A color may have a certain degree of saturation, a musical note a given pitch, a shape a geometric configuration, a word a definite meaning, and so on. These characteristics, which anyone whose sensory and mental apparatus is not impaired should be able to perceive, are literally in the work. Ascription of such characteristics is normally accompanied [sic] with the certitude distinctive of propositions cited in support of fundamental knowledge claims. That an element is crimson, circular, cylindrical, or a high C is not usually subject to further confirmation.

b. The next class of predicates typically finds employment in aesthetic contexts but may also be used in other situations, e.g., words such as "harmonious," "delicate," "graceful," and many others. Here agreement among critics is still substantial but by no means unanimous. Some persons may detect subtle rhythms where others utterly fail to do so. Similarly, a feature appearing "graceful" to one critic may appear "flaccid" to another. Indeed, one cannot always decide whether terms like "delicate," "garish," or "harmonious" are used to describe or characterize, or even to evaluate, whether they are closer to the cognitively certain or to the cognitively uncertain end of the critical spectrum. Once more, it is sometimes impossible to maintain sharp and clear distinctions.

c. There is another, more properly aesthetic, group of characterizing predicates which cannot be certified through simple inspection. They have one thing in common: their normal application lies in a different modality of experience; hence to ascribe them to works of art is to use them metaphorically. Thus critics speak of "strident" colors, "luminous" tones, "lugubrious" movements, "taut" story lines, or "stern" passages, to take only a very few simple examples. While often construed as a source of perplexity, it should not be concluded that this kind of talk is imprecise and is to be corrected by recourse to a more accurate and purely descriptive language of criticism. (Smith, 1968, pp. 22, 23)

The above account also seems consistent with his later account of characterizing predicates.
With the introduction of the term characterization,... [a] few words are in order about the properties of characterizing terms.

Setting aside those noncontroversial descriptive terms whose referents are relatively clear (e.g., "The still life contains a pipe, playing cards, and vase" or "The film is in color and deals with romantic love"), there are terms taken from nonaesthetic contexts and used in aesthetic situations to characterize works of art. It is thus one thing to say that elements are square, equidistant from each other, or converge toward the horizon line, but quite another to say they are strong, forceful, antagonistically engaged, or cast about in an atmosphere of free-floating anxiety. Whether certain elements are forceful or antagonistically engaged can be legitimately disputed, and more than one characterization of the same elements may be acceptable. But unless a work of art is radically ambiguous, it is unlikely that its pervasive quality can be both, say, turgid and lyrical. As in judging people, it is of course also possible to mischaracterize elements, to be mistaken about an object's qualities, as I think the writer was who said that from Mondrian's late 1930 compositions "there emanates a methematical harmony that has the delicacy of precision instruments, the sensitivity of radio activity, and the power of Diesel engines."

A second property of characterizing terms is what was earlier called their occasional evaluative import: "X is graceful or disjointed" may convey a value judgment that X is good or bad because graceful or disjointed. But again, it may also simply assert a nonnormative description of an object's quality....

Another point about such terms is their wide-spread use in critical talk. It is occasionally thought odd that human qualities are ascribed to inanimate material things, but it is in fact quite natural and it would be sterile discourse indeed that tried to get along otherwise. The displacement of sensory impressions from one sense modality to another has been called synesthesia; it implies that works of art can look and feel the way human experience does. And in numerous instances there seems no good reason to doubt it. (Smith, 1973, pp. 42, 43)

In each of the above accounts of characterization statements, the emphasis appears to be placed on the content and the "cognitive certainty" as criteria of distinction rather than on the function of
such statements. Smith's use of the illocutionary term "ascribe" here as in the following passage from his early account seems to be used as a way of articulating the propositional act of predicating.

[Aesthetic predicates] have one thing in common: their normal application lies in a different modality of experience; hence to ascribe them to works of art is to use them metaphorically. (Smith, 1968, p. 23)

So in Smith's accounts, emphasis is placed upon the content (and specifically the predication) of characterization statements as a way of discriminating them from other critical statements rather than upon their function or illocutionary force. Smith of course does use the illocutionary term "judge" in relation to characterization statements but in the context in which it is used, it is perhaps not very consequential. "Judge" as I have indicated in Chapter IV, is a good candidate for a generic illocutionary act ranging over a number of acts in those circumstances in which the speaker possesses less than conclusive grounds for the proposition being advanced. Smith himself probably does not mark a distinction in function between characterization, and analyses and descriptions since, as I have remarked earlier, in one passage characterization statements are considered specifically to be a form of description. In that passage Smith states

The distinction between "description" and "characterization" is for convenience. I use "characterization" whenever aesthetic qualities are pointed out; whereas description is restricted to indicating the more literal properties of objects. The characterization of elements, however, may be regarded as a kind of description. (Smith, 1968, p. 31)

It would seem, then, that if one could give a clear account of aesthetic qualities, one could give a clear account of characterization statements in Smith's accounts as statements which predicate such
qualities vis-a-vis description and analysis statements which do not. Unfortunately, the precise nature of aesthetic qualities appears to be a matter of dispute among philosophers at this time. A precise delineation of aesthetic qualities cannot be attempted here, but some attempts to roughly characterize such qualities might be useful. Sibley (1965), as I have indicated earlier, regards aesthetic qualities as a subclass of Beardsley's regional qualities. Since he also regards these as qualities which take taste and sensitivity to perceive, one can discriminate such qualities from Beardsley's class of basic regional qualities. In Sibley's account aesthetic qualities are indicated through the presentation of examples and though a discussion of the logical nature of conditions which enter into their application. Aesthetic qualities then might be held to be roughly equivalent to Beardsley's categories of human and nonhuman nonrelational regional qualities. They also quite possibly cut across Beardsley's categories of relational qualities since taste or perceptiveness is required to predicate many such qualities also.

Are characterization statements, as statements which predicate aesthetic qualities then, less "cognitively certain" than analysis statements? As I have noted earlier, Smith seems to explicitly identify aesthetic qualities by means of their confirmability. Since statements predicating such qualities are only made by people with taste or sensitivity, it would seem that characterization statements (by definition) indeed are less readily confirmed than other kinds of critical statements. On the other hand the claim that they are less confirmable than analysis statements, I do not believe can be supported unless aesthetic qualities can be differentiated from the class of relational qualities.
Finally, are characterization statements, statements which predicate aesthetic qualities in ordinary language? I believe that Smith's identification of such statements with aesthetic qualities is a mischaracterization of the act of characterization in ordinary language. As I have pointed out in Chapter IV, in characterizing an object or entity one predicates certain distinctive properties of that object or entity. These properties are such that it allows one to distinguish that object or entity from other objects or entities of the same kind. Smith's characterization of characterization statements could only be true if one could not predicate in such an act, say, Beardsley's basic local and regional qualities. (I select Beardsley's basic local and regional qualities because if any qualities can be considered nonaesthetic qualities, it must be these.)

Although works of art are often characterized by predicing aesthetic qualities, surely it is not the case that they can only be characterized in this way. It seems possible that one could characterize an aesthetic object by citing numerous kinds of non-aesthetic qualities. Consider the following statements:

It is his only existing work which uses a circular format.

It is the only painting of the series which contains three red shapes.

It is the one piece of sculpture in the collection which employs a light green patina.

In each of the above, a characterization has been made of a hypothetical aesthetic object. In none of the above were aesthetic qualities predicated. Although in many instances aesthetic qualities might indeed be predicated in characterization statements, it is a false claim to say that they must be predicated in such statements.
Interpretation

Smith's earlier article appears to be in accord with his later article in the way in which interpretations are discriminated from other critical statements. Smith's accounts of interpretation statements as with his accounts of analyses and characterizations, appears to reside more on the basis of a statement's "cognitive certainty" and content than on a distinction in illocutionary force although at one point in his later article he does make a distinction between interpretations on the one hand and descriptions and evaluations on the other. As I have noted in the previous section of this chapter in discussing the bases of his distinctions among critical statements, his claim that "the act of interpreting is logically distinct from description and evaluation" (Smith, 1973, p. 42) may reflect a functional distinction. Smith, however, does not expand upon the nature of the distinction that he employs in this passage except in terms of "cognitive certainty" and content.

In Smith's earlier article the concept of interpretation is presented in this way:

Interpretation. The proper concern of this phase is to say something about the meaning of a work of art as a whole, as distinct from an interpretation of its parts. Judgments of this sort are frequently the first ones made of works of art, which is to say they tend not to be preceded by descriptive and formal analyses. But to justify or support interpretations a critic will often resort to description and analysis. Such activity may have the effect of amplifying, modifying, or even radically altering a viewer's, listener's, or reader's own interpretation -- or as David Hume said, such activity can correct a false relish."

Since interpretation is often taken as the most meaningful and enriching phase of transaction between a percipient and a work of art, just what and what not to expect from it should be indicated. Interpretation,
it is suggested, should not be attempted where human significance is obviously irrelevant, e.g., in the case of works primarily concerned with pattern and decoration. Further, the impression should be avoided that interpretation is merely a summing up of what is found in analysis. The interpretation of a work of art as "an image of lonely despair" seems to follow logically from the characterization of its components as "somber," "drooping," "mournful," "dark-hued," "slow-paced," etc. But not necessarily .... while the citing of analytical findings in support of interpretations is required by responsible criticism, the manner in which interpretive judgments emerge from analytical ones is complex and not productive of general agreement. Perhaps this is one reason why certain works of art continue to have universal appeal: their infinitely rich forms continually give rise to new interpretations when seen from a different angle of vision.

If the connection between interpretation and analysis is often ambiguous, the relationship between the subject matter of a representational work and its message or content is even more so. It is probably a good rule to say that a critical response is inadequate if it offers as an interpretation merely a description of subject-matter. Content, on the other hand, is a kind of distillation, abstraction, or compaction of whatever is depicted or portrayed. And often it is in the more significant works that striking discrepancies are found between what the work ostensibly represents and what it is interpreted to be, or what it is said to be a metaphor or image of. A clear-cut case is Masaccio's mural The Tribute Money which is impressive not because it depicts a particular biblical episode, in itself not high in the hierarchy of biblical events; rather it is impressive because it shows the dignity of the individual. An aesthetic interpretation of the The Tribute Money, then, delivers the judgment that the picture's significance resides in its image of human nobility, such image being the essential import of what is depicted, i.e., its content in contrast to its subject matter. (Smith, 1968, pp. 24,25)

In Smith's later article he initially characterizes interpretation as "an effort to construe overall meaning" (Smith, 1973, p. 40). He then expands upon this as follows:
Analysis and characterization phase into interpretation of overall meaning. Interpretation represents a kind of summary judgment arrived at by calling on all the pertinent knowledge, experience, and sensitivity a critic can bring to bear. But though overall interpretation depends on the variety of local meanings discerned in the work, interpreting is not simply adding them up to get the right meaning. There is no system of aesthetic arithmetic. The interpretation of Cézanne's Card Players as an "image of a pure contemplativeness without pathos," for example, grows out of local interpretations of the main figures, whose "intent but not anxious" moods, "gravity of absorbed attitudes," "intense concern" and "progressive stabilization and detachment" are apparent. But again, the growing-out-of is not a simple additive process. Rather, local meanings fit or accord well with the larger one, and it is a highly cultivated sense of aesthetic fittingness rather than a keen feel for discursive logic that is operative in aesthetic interpretation.

In brief, there can be variability among logically compatible interpretations of the same work; the sticky issue arises in the case of logically incompatible interpretations. Here I am saying that Cézanne's Card Players cannot be interpreted to mean both "pure contemplativeness without pathos" and "turbulent agitation without chaos." One meaning must be wrong, for the work is not that indeterminate or formless. The possibility must be held open, however, that new experience may turn up a more relevant, better grounded interpretation.

I have said that an interpretation delivers the meaning of a work of art. Meaning may also be construed as the content of a work, in distinction from its materials, form, and subject matter. Content, that is, implies an import which emerges from the interanimation of materials, subject matter, and form. For example, whether in Michelangelo's Captive or Delacroix's Jacob Wrestling with the Angel, subject matter and materials can be said to have been transfigured, resulting in both instances in dramatic images of primordial struggle. (Smith, 1973, pp. 43, 44)

There are two kinds of statements in Smith's accounts which he explicitly identifies as interpretations and these, perhaps, can be separated at the outset. One kind of interpretation statement is concerned with the "whole" of an aesthetic object and another kind of
interpretation statement is concerned with an object's "parts" (Smith, 1968, p. 24). In Smith's later account this distinction appears to be expressed as a distinction between "overall interpretations" and "local interpretations" (Smith, 1973, p. 43). Smith is concerned primarily with giving an account of overall interpretations since it is this kind of interpretation which he takes to exemplify the phase of interpretation.

Smith's distinction of interpretation from other critical statements I believe can best be construed as distinction based on the "cognitive certainty" and the content of critical statements. In defining "interpretation", Smith relies upon the illocutionary term "judgment" to express the function of such statements but he also uses "judgment" in defining "characterization" and "evaluation" as well. The term "judgment", therefore, seems to have little power in discriminating interpretations from other kinds of critical statements.

Besides characterizing interpretations as less "cognitively certain" than descriptions, analyses, or characterizations, Smith relies upon the terms "meaning" and "content" to distinguish interpretive statements from other kinds of critical statements. His definition of "interpretation" by means of these two expressions I believe can be regarded as inherently circular. In using "meaning" in the definiens he is relying upon a notoriously controversial expression, an expression which has no firmly established use in aesthetic contexts. If Smith relied solely upon the word "meaning" to discriminate interpretations from other critical statements, one suspects that he would have no way of establishing the meaning of that word except perhaps as that which interpretations "are about" or that which is "delivered" in an interpretation.
Smith himself perhaps realizes that the use of "meaning" is an unsatisfactory way of defining "interpretation" since he also goes on to explain "meaning" in terms of an aesthetic object's "content". In order to forestall confusion at this point, "content" as Smith uses the term is to be distinguished from the way "content" is being used here to denote the reference and predication of critical statements. Content for Smith appears to be roughly, a particular kind of represented subject matter. He says in his early account that content is a "kind of distillation, abstraction, or compaction of whatever is depicted or portrayed" (Smith, 1968, p. 25). In his later account he says

> content implies an import that emerges from the interanimation of materials, subject matter, and form. (Smith, 1973, p. 44)

Neither way of expressing the meaning of "content" appears to shed light on what quite obviously is a metaphysical concept. Smith here seems to construe content as a kind of subsidiary reference to an abstract idea.

One might ask how Smith happened to arrive at the notion of content in defining "interpretation". One can only speculate here, but perhaps his notion of "content" represents an attempt to modify Beardsley's definition of interpretation so that is more in accordance with an intuitive sense of what an interpretation is like in ordinary language. Recognizing the need to explicate the concept of "meaning" Smith seems to appeal to Beardsley's definition of "interpretation" as a definition which is at least understandable. Yet there is a problem in appealing to Beardsley's definition since his definition is quite obviously at odds with the ordinary meaning of "interpretation". For
Beardsley any statement which contains a subsidiary reference to some object or entity existing outside of the aesthetic object is an interpretation. Yet, as I argued in the previous chapter, a subsidiary reference in Beardsley's sense could be given in the act of describing as well. To accept Beardsley's definition, moreover, Smith would have to revise his own definition of "description" which overlaps Beardsley's definition of "interpretation". Smith perhaps intuitively senses that an interpretation statement is not equivalent merely to a statement which possesses a subsidiary reference to something existing outside of the aesthetic object and he attempts to articulate this distinction by a distinction between "subject matter" and "content".

It is probably a good rule to say that a critical response is inadequate if it offers as an interpretation merely a description of subject-matter. Content, on the other hand, is a kind of distillation, abstraction, or compaction of whatever is depicted or portrayed. (Smith, 1968, p. 25)

Yet despite the examples of interpretation statements that he presents (which clearly are interpretations), the concept of content is never really explicated and Smith's search for a subject matter criterion to distinguish interpretation from other statements is not successful. Interpretations are distinguished from other critical statements by contextual conditions which are apart from the reference and predication of such statements.

Evaluation

Smith's earlier and later articles are reasonably consistent in their views of evaluation but their approach to the topic is different. Smith's early characterization of evaluative statements is made by citing a range of illocutionary acts which commonly predicate value
properties, by presenting a number of value predicates, and by citing
criteria which Smith holds to be present in evaluations of aesthetic
objects. The passage which follows presents Smith's early account:

Evaluation. The term as used here implies some kind
of summation or assessment of the merit of the work
of art in question. The simplest kind of verdict is
one saying that the work is good or bad, based on an
examination of its aesthetic qualities, say, its
degree of unity, complexity, intensity, or some
combination of these.

As for import or significance, the only acceptable
aesthetic evaluation is one of sufficiency or
deficiency. A work may be judged sufficiently
expressive to reward contemplation, or, as in the
case of certain elaborate and technically brilliant
productions, it may be dismissed as shallow, insig­
ificant, not worth the percipient's time. To praise
or condemn on the basis of what a work says, however,
is to make a moral, cognitive, or extra-aesthetic,
and not a distinctively aesthetic, evaluation. To
condemn or praise a work because it depicts, say,
moral decadence would be a case in point. But an
aesthetic evaluation would arise from an assessment
of the work's parts, complexes, relations, and regional
aspects, the overall interpretation of which might give
rise to the kinds of content statements previously
referred to. However, since extra-aesthetic judgments
will be made by teachers and learners anyway, it is
no use ruling them out of aesthetic education. Indeed,
it may be necessary to know how to handle them to
understand better what is involved in aesthetic judgments.
The only stipulation would seem to be that teachers
and learners understand that different sorts of judgments
can be made of works of art.

There are at least two ways in which even a work that
rates high in expressiveness and is solid and respectable
on every other count may yet draw a negative critical
assessment. One is to find it derivative and unoriginal;
there simply are too many things of this kind around.
Secondly, an aesthetically good work may be rejected
as poor when it fails to serve what extra-aesthetic
functions it may have....

Another pair of evaluative terms are "successful" and
"unsuccessful." Now "successful" and "good" are
almost equivalent. But to ascribe lack of success to
a work appears to mean that certain expectations were
not fulfilled. This could refer to the artist's inten­
tions: he did not achieve what he set out to do.
Speculations about what the artist had in mind, however, are sometimes difficult, if not impossible, to verify, and for purposes of aesthetic evaluation it would seem that the work itself provides most of the necessary information. If "unsuccessful" indicates that a work is not quite what it might have been, then some description of what would have constituted success should be expected.

Lastly, critics will frequently sum up their reaction, the nature of their experience with the work, with such terms as "interesting," "impressive," "challenging," "stimulating," "dull," "preposterous," etc. In other words, an assessment of the value possibilities of a work may be rounded off by a statement about the nature or intensity of the liking or valuing, and the latter is not always predictable in light of the former. It is perhaps the mark of the highly educated aesthetic observer that he can recognize a work's value potential, endorse it, and even recommend it wholeheartedly to others, yet say that it is not his cup of tea. This recognition of the irreducible differences in temperament and personality which have no effect on, nor are affected by, the aesthetic evaluation of a work of art is perhaps the highest degree of objectivity one can hope for in art or in aesthetic education. (Smith, 1968, pp. 25, 26)

In Smith's later account, an evaluation statement is held to be a "Judgment in the sense of ascribing merit or pronouncing a verdict" (Smith, 1973, p. 40). This characterization is amplified in his later article through the discussion of a piece of critical writing by Meyer Schapiro:

If one examines Schapiro's critical statements carefully, one sees that they provide support for the belief that evaluative statements about a work's aesthetic goodness can be backed up with statements about its degree of formal unity, complexity, and dramatic intensity. That is, there seem to be presupposed in Schapiro's appraisal of Cézanne's painting certain aesthetic standards such as organic unity, complexity, and dramatic intensity; or to put it in slightly different terms, the qualities Schapiro singles out are special embodiments of such critical criteria. And it is believed by certain theorists (e.g., Beardsley) that the standards of unity, complexity, and intensity are in fact used to a considerable extent by the community of critics, though they do not necessarily get applied in rulelike, rigid fashion.
What must be discerned in a critic's account if one is interested in discovering his standards is not only the object (or parts therein) he has rated or evaluated but also his reasons for saying something is good or excellent (or the opposites of these). The norms or standards to which he appeals may be contained in or implied by the stated reasons. For example, a critic may say "X is good because of its tightly structured form" (in which case, the standard appealed to is unity), or "X is good because of the great variety of detail" (complexity), or "X is good because it is delicate and graceful" (degree of intensity).

More frequent, perhaps, are overall assessments that incorporate a number of these ratings, reasons, and norms;...

A single critical standard is, of course, not always sufficient to support an evaluation, and a final verdict will usually embody a careful weighing of merits and demerits as measured by a number of standards, not only distinctly aesthetic norms, but also cognitive and moral ones. In selecting works for study in schools it might be well to select works valuable for aesthetic and cognitive and moral reasons; although how much the cognitive and moral values of art should be stressed is a legitimate pedagogical question. (Smith, 1973, pp. 46, 47)

Because the concept of evaluation is explicated principally by citing a range of illocutionary terms and value predicates, Smith's distinction between evaluation and other critical statements appears to be primarily a functional distinction. As with his earlier accounts of description, Smith identifies evaluation with a range of illocutionary acts including assessments, summations, judgments, praises, condemnations, statements, recognitions, endorsements, and recommendations. In his later article he characterizes evaluations as ascriptions, pronouncements, appraisals, and estimations. Since Smith cites a different set of illocutionary terms in articulating the function of evaluation with each article, it seems reasonable to assume that he does not identify evaluation with a precise set of
illocutionary acts but rather he holds that evaluations are acts possessing a range of illocutionary functions which he only imprecisely indicates in his account. Although he perhaps distinguishes between evaluations and statements of preference, his account suggests that he would identify as evaluations all those illocutionary acts in which value properties are predicated. In his early article, he cites a range of value predicates such as "good", "bad", "poor", "successful", "unoriginal", etc.

Smith also appears to hold that in evaluating, one possesses certain criteria or standards and various kinds of criteria are mentioned by Smith including cognitive and moral criteria, as well as aesthetic criteria. Smith includes in his discussion of aesthetic criteria, Beardsley's standards of unity, complexity, and intensity as well as originality, a criterion which would be a genetic standard in Beardsley's theory.

I have earlier discussed the problems with Beardsley's conceptions of unity, complexity, and intensity as aesthetic criteria but since so much emphasis is placed upon these criteria in Smith's account, it may perhaps be relevant here to reiterate the difficulties with citing Beardsley's criteria as criteria of aesthetic evaluation. Beardsley's criteria it will be remembered are superordinate, primary criteria in the sense that they are sometimes held to justify statements embodying more specific secondary criteria. In Chapter VI, I argued that unity and complexity lacked applicability as criteria so that it did not seem possible to utilize them by themselves in arriving at value decisions. Here, one would be forced to rely upon secondary criteria of aesthetic value which unfortunately were not specified in Beardsley's
account (although Beardsley did cite examples). Beardsley's criteria of complexity and intensity on the other hand seemed to lack acceptability since the secondary criteria cited by Beardsley seemed to be more value-laden than these primary criteria. I argued from this that Beardsley's set of primary criteria must be considered incomplete and in need of modification.

In adopting Beardsley's criteria, Smith seems unaware of these difficulties. He holds, to be sure, that unity, complexity, and intensity "do not necessarily get applied in rulelike, rigid fashion" (Smith, 1973, p. 46). Yet he too fails to specify the more applicable secondary criteria which would be needed to enable someone to arrive at value decisions and to settle value disputes on an objective basis. Nor does he attempt to specify the range of criteria which actually do get employed in aesthetic contexts. In fact in Smith's theory it would seem that he would allow that almost any kind of criteria could be used as long as these criteria fall within the broad bounds of aesthetic, cognitive, or moral criteria.

Smith's conception of evaluation, as with his conception of description, seems fraught with difficulties. In holding that evaluation is a multi-functional concept (that evaluation is synonymous with a range of other illocutionary acts). Smith's account is clearly not in accord with the ordinary use of "evaluation" which designates a unique kind of illocutionary act. In Chapter IV I have earlier discussed the differences between evaluation and judgment, for example, as a difference in the kind of criteria which are employed in predicating value properties. "Judgment" is a term employed when ones criteria for predicating value are unacceptable or inapplicable. One
speaks about judgments of personal preference not evaluations of personal preference. Smith overlooks such differences in treating "evaluation" as a multifunctional act or one that can be equated with the other illocutionary acts he cites.

Summary

In this section, then, I have discussed the nature of the distinctions which Smith employs in discriminating among critical statements and I have analyzed these distinctions in both Smith's earlier and later accounts of individual critical statements. Smith appears to rely upon distinctions of function, "cognitive certainty", and content in discriminating among critical statements. Each of these ways of discriminating critical statements I argued presented problems of interpretation. Moreover, some of these distinctions at places in his account seemed to conflict with one another. Differences of function are articulated by Smith by citing one or a number of illocutionary terms taken to have a similar meaning. The problem here is that such illocutionary terms are not synonymous but instead designate unique illocutionary acts. It does not seem possible, then, to construe the statements designated by critical terms as statements having more than one illocutionary function. Moreover, Smith's account is unclear on exactly where a functional distinction is to be employed in discriminating among critical statements. Smith's concept of "cognitive certainty" seems to have two possible interpretations: as the degree of evidence held by a speaker and as a statement's confirmability, and I argued that the general claim that individual critical statements differed by degrees in their cognitive certainty
was untenable. Smith's content distinctions also present problems of interpretation. His distinctions at some points seem to rely upon a difference in the predication of individual critical statements. However, it does not seem possible to precisely distinguish among critical statements solely on the basis of their predicates.

In discussing both of Smith's accounts of critical statements, it seemed that various kinds of distinctions were employed in marking off one statement from another. Description statements are characterized by Smith by differences in function, degree of confirmability or the degree of evidence possessed by a speaker, and by differences in content. Smith's accounts of analysis, characterization, and interpretive statements seem to rely less upon an attempt to articulate the function of such statements than did his account of descriptive statements. Here Smith appears to employ distinctions based more on "cognitive certainty" and content. Critical evaluations were differentiated primarily on the basis of their function by identifying such statements with a range of illocutionary acts, acts in which value properties are predicated.

It is not difficult to see that Smith's definitions of critical terms must be false reportive definitions insofar as he relies upon a substitution of one or more illocutionary terms for a critical term in articulating the function of critical statements. Critical terms, as I have maintained, designate unique kinds of illocutionary acts. Since Smith's definitions of "description" and "evaluation" appear to be attempts to articulate the function of these critical statements in just this way, they cannot be true.
It is perhaps possible to view his definitions of "analysis", "characterization", and "interpretation" in this light also, but I believe the emphasis in his account is properly placed here on his distinctions with regard to both the confirmability and evidence of such statements, and the content of such statements. The problem in defining critical terms by means of these distinctions is that they either capture a part of the distinctive aspect of an illocutionary act, or else they are not at all relevant to the performance of a given illocutionary act. Smith's identification of analysis statements with relational qualities is close to the actual propositional content condition on analyzing. Yet his claims about the "cognitive certainty" of such statements is not warranted. Smith's attempt to articulate a content distinction for characterization statements would in certain contexts overlap the predication which would actually be made in a characterization statement in ordinary language. But the concepts of aesthetic qualities and distinctive properties are not synonymous so there are contexts in which one could characterize a work of art without predicating aesthetic qualities. Smith's attempt to formulate a content distinction with regard to interpretation, besides making to appeal to an elusive concept of "content", overlooks the actual conditions which do discriminate interpretations from other critical statements.

Having given an account of Smith's use of critical terms to designate simple speech acts or statements, then, I now proceed to a discussion of his use of critical terms to designate critical phases or complex speech acts.
Smith's discussion of critical terms as phases, can be distinguished from his definitions of critical terms as distinct kinds of statements or speech acts. In the latter case, it seemed reasonable to regard his definitions of critical terms as reportive definitions, as attempts to set forth the meanings of critical terms as these terms are used to indicate various illocutionary acts. It would be unreasonable, I believe, to regard Smith's conception of criticism as a set of critical phases as a reportive definition in this sense. He himself acknowledges that critical phases, in actual critical practice are not structured the way he describes. For example, in contrast to the ordering of critical phases in his account, he states that interpretive judgments are frequently the first ones made of works of art, which is to say that they tend not to be preceded by descriptive and formal analysis. (Smith, 1968, p. 24)

Smith's overall conceptions of critical phases, then, may be regarded as stipulations presented for prescriptive purposes. These purposes are the goals projected as those to be attained through the use of criticism as a method. In this section, then, I shall be concerned mainly with an attempt to clarify Smith's notions of critical phases and their relations to one another.

In each of Smith's articles, criticism is viewed as an activity consisting of various subactivities or critical phases designated by critical terms. As I indicated earlier these phases are comprised of a number of individual critical statements or simple speech acts and may be regarded as complex speech acts presented in a prescriptive context. One aspect of each of Smith's discussion which seems important to clarify is the constituent statements that he holds to appear
within each critical phase. For example, if one is to employ criticism as an activity in the classroom it would seem important that one be able to discriminate one critical phase from another.

I do not believe that it is possible to accurately and precisely determine the constituent statements of critical phases given the accounts of criticism which Smith presents. One of the primary reasons for this is that Smith holds that critical phases are constituted by various kinds of critical statements, statements exemplifying other critical phases as well as those exemplifying the particular phase in question. He holds that some critical statements, for example, require the support of other critical statements. I use the expression "support", here, as a theoretically neutral term which leaves open the particular kind of support relationship which holds between one critical statement and another. The kind of critical statements which require support and the statements which are to support other critical statements, however, is usually not precisely specified in each of his accounts. Nor is it clear in which critical phase the supporting reasons are to be found. So the nature of the critical phases which make up the activity of criticizing, then, is not clear in his accounts. Since Smith's views of critical phases -- unlike his views of critical statements -- are significantly modified in his later article, I shall address each of his articles separately in attempting to clarify his accounts of critical phases.

3. For example, I do not specify here that all of the critical statements loosely called "reasons" are given solely as a justification for critical statements. Nor do I specify that in all instances such, "reasons" reflect reasoning in the sense that they are premises in a logical argument.
Smith's Early Conception of Critical Phases

In Smith's earlier article (Smith, 1968) criticism is viewed as an activity consisting of four subactivities of description, analysis, interpretation, and evaluation which Smith designates as critical "phases". These phases are sequentially related to one another in keeping with the conception of criticism as a method or procedure employed to achieve certain goals.

Critical activity may be described first of all in terms of overlapping phases which contain statements ranging from the cognitively certain to the cognitively less certain, beginning with description and phasing into analysis, interpretation, and evaluation. (Smith, 1968, p. 21)

In Smith's first conception of criticism, then, the overall activity of criticism is constituted by certain "phases" sequentially related to one another in that one performs one before another. These "phases" in the body of his account, as previously noted, can be construed in terms of the performance of complex speech acts since the successful completion of a critical phase would be constituted by the performance of a number of simple speech acts (statements).

Constituents of Critical Phases. Although one can say that within each critical phase indicated by a critical term one or more statements indicated by that same critical term will be made, I do not believe that a clear exposition of the constituents of critical phases can be gained from Smith's early account of criticism. Smith apparently believes that other statements, from other critical phases will appear within a given critical phase as well. One indication of this is his sensitivity to a practical educational problem that arises with this conception of criticism. If critical phases are constituted
by statements appearing within other critical phases, then, it would seem difficult to tell one phase from another. Such a problem perhaps explains why in his early account, Smith feels that his definitions of critical terms are vague and ambiguous, and perhaps underlies the note of caution he expresses in presenting his definition of criticism. He asserts that his division of critical activities into four phases is open to challenge since the [critical] terms are used ambiguously and the boundaries between phases are not always precise. (Smith, 1968, p. 21)

What are the constituent statements of each critical phase? To answer this requires an exposition of the individual critical statements which Smith believes requires support in his theory and of the individual critical statements which can function to support other critical statements. I shall here term these latter statements "reasons". In Smith's account, some critical phases at least seem to be constituted both by the critical statements which exemplify a particular phase and by the critical reason or reasons needed to support those statements.

In interpreting Smith's account as holding that certain critical phases are constituted both by statements and their supporting reasons, it is important to note that this goes beyond what Smith states explicitly. This is an inference based upon Smith's characterization of critical activity as a sequence of phases beginning with description and moving through evaluation. If the reasons which support a particular statement are held by Smith to occur in an earlier phase, then the sequence of critical activity could not be as Smith has described since, presumably, one gives supporting reasons only after having given
the statement in question. That is, if the reasons supporting (say) interpretations and evaluations are held to appear in earlier phases, then critical phases would appear to have no sequential relationship to one another, or to move from, say, evaluation to description. 4

**Statements Requiring Support.** What, then, are the critical statements that require the support of reasons? If one part of Smith's account is to be believed, they would seem to be analysis, interpretation, and evaluation statements since these are "cognitively less certain" than are description statements:

> Critical activity may be described first of all in terms of overlapping phases which contain statements ranging from the cognitively certain to the cognitively less certain, beginning with description and phasing into analysis, interpretation, and evaluation. (Smith, 1968, p. 21)

If "cognitive certainty" can be construed in terms of the concept of confirmability this passage would seem to suggest that description statements may not need support since they are the most readily confirmable of critical statements. Smith, indeed, does not talk of support in relation to description statements but rather he claims that one can talk with cognitive assurance about the "descriptive elements of works of art" (Smith, 1968, p. 22). The phase of description, then, would appear to consist of one or a number of description statements.

It is more difficult to decide on the constituent statements of the phase of analysis. One reason for this is that the phase of analysis is

4. To further support this interpretation of Smith's account, in his later article (Smith, 1973, p. 47) he explicitly asserts that evaluation as a critical phase is constituted both by evaluation statements and critical reasons (and perhaps other statements as well).
distinctly different from other critical phases in Smith's early account in possessing two characteristic kinds of critical statements which exemplify that phase. These statements in Smith's account are analysis statements and characterization statements. Second, Smith does not talk about critical statements in the phase of analysis requiring support, although his preliminary description of analysis statements as cognitively less certain than description statements suggests that both kinds of analysis statements indeed may require support. Moreover in the philosophical literature from which Smith draws for his account of characterization statements, they are commonly presumed to require support in many circumstances.

As I have noted before in discussing the phase of analysis, Smith marks a distinction between analysis statements on the one hand, description statements on the other, and a third class of statements, characterizations:

Analysis in art is not a mere enumeration or cataloging of components; it cannot be done in a meaningful way, it seems, without at the same time describing and often characterizing what is singled out for inspection. The distinction between "description" and "characterization" introduces different ways in which parts, complexes, and regional properties can be talked about. (Smith, 1968, p. 22)

Since description statements exemplify the phase of description, analysis as a phase (unlike other phases) then appears to be exemplified by the making of two kinds of statements, analysis and characterization statements.

Characterization statements represent a problem in Smith's early discussion. It may be recalled that Smith in this discussion regards them as a kind of description (Smith, 1968, p. 31). This may help to
explain why his account is silent on the support which is to be pro-
vided to such statements despite his characterization of analysis
statements as "cognitively less certain" than descriptions (Smith,
1968, p. 21). One question that arises at this point is this: If
colorization statements are in reality descriptions are they
"cognitively assured" as are other description statements? If they
are not, there is at least one important difference between descrip-
tions and characterizations i.e., that the latter are cognitively less
certain. On the other hand if characterizations are cognitively
certain, then it would seem difficult to see how Smith's earlier
account of analysis statements as cognitively less certain could be
ture since characterization statements would be one of the statements
which characteristically exemplify the phase of analysis.

Although Smith is not clear on this point, it would seem that
characterization statements are of such a kind as to ordinarily require
the support of other critical statements. At least they are regarded
this way in the philosophical source from which Smith draws for his
account of characterizations (see Sibley, 1959; 1965). Smith, him-
self, refers to characterization statements at times as "judgments"
(Smith, 1968, p. 23) and this suggests that he also believes that
they are cognitively less certain. But if Smith believes that
characterization statements require support, he does not explicitly
state this. Nor does he state the kinds of critical statements which
would support characterization statements. Since this is the case also for analysis statements, the nature of the constituent statements of the phase of analysis, then, is not clear from Smith's early account of criticism.

Smith's discussion of the phases of interpretation and evaluation is clearer in the sense that he explicitly asserts that interpretation and evaluation statements require support in ordinary circumstances, but the nature of these supporting reasons is only sketchily indicated. In the case of interpretation statements, these supporting statements seem to be description, analysis, and characterization statements:

To justify or support interpretations a critic will often resort to description and analysis.... The interpretation of a work of art as "an image of lonely despair" seems to follow logically from the characterization of its components as "somber", "drooping," "mournful," "dark-hued," "slow-paced," etc. (Smith, 1968, p. 24)

Passages in Smith's account also explicitly assert that evaluation statements require supporting reasons.

To deal with the discrepancies that are bound to occur in student responses, clues may be sought in the appropriateness of the reasons given in support of various types of judgments and evaluations. (Smith, 1968, p. 28)

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5. In one of the curious anomalies within his article, however, he presents examples of the strategies used by critics in supporting characterization statements. These examples taken from an article (Sibley, 1958) in which the support relationships of such statements is discussed, are called techniques by Smith and never integrated within the rest of his article (Smith, 1968, pp. 27, 28). One of the reasons why Smith perhaps felt uncomfortable with presenting these strategies as part of his theory of criticism is that Sibley's discussion ranges over both locutionary as well as illocutionary and propositional aspects of critical talk. Thus, as well as "the pointing out of nonaesthetic features" which indicate the content of supporting statements, "the use of genuine metaphors and similies" is also cited as part of a critic's strategies.
Unlike his account of interpretation, however, Smith does not precisely delineate the critical statements which would function as reasons for evaluations. The passage which follows suggests (but not explicitly) that reasons used to support evaluations would be description, analysis, characterization, and interpretation statements (as well as statements perhaps falling outside of the statements comprising Smith's conception of critical statements). Smith states:

To praise or condemn on the basis of what a work says, however, is to make a moral, cognitive, or extra-aesthetic and not a distinctively aesthetic, evaluation. To condemn or praise a work because it depicts, say, moral decadence would be a case in point. But an aesthetic evaluation would arise from an assessment of the work's parts, complexes, relations and regional aspects, the overall interpretation of which might give rise to the kinds of content statements previously referred to. (Smith, 1968, p. 25)

At one other point Smith talks of the supporting reasons in terms of description statements.

If "unsuccessful" indicates that a work is not quite what it might have been, then some description of what would have constituted success should be expected. (Smith, 1968, p. 26)

At still another point he speaks of supporting statements in terms of what would be characterization statements.

The simplest kind of verdict is one saying that the work is good or bad, based on an examination of its aesthetic qualities, say, its degree of unity, complexity, intensity, or some combination of these. (Smith, 1968, p. 25)

Although Smith believes that evaluation statements ordinarily require support, then, the nature of the reasons which would constitute support for evaluation statements is not clearly stated in his account. Perhaps the best estimate of what Smith would accept as a critical reason supporting evaluations is an appropriate critical statement
which is cognitively more certain. This seems to be the general tenor of his remarks in his later article (Smith, 1973, p. 44) when he remarks that

If asked to justify his evaluation a responsible critic ought to be able to argue in favor of his assessment. This he can do by redescribing, reanalyzing, and so on, ... (Smith, 1973, p. 44)

Smith's account, then, does not precisely specify the kinds of critical statements which require support and the critical statements which are to function as reasons. Although in one part of his account he suggests that analysis and characterization statements do require support, he does not specifically talk about this support in discussing these statements. Although he is more explicit in asserting that interpretations and evaluations require support, his account does not precisely state the kinds of reasons (critical statements) that will support critical evaluations.

In Smith's early account of criticism, then, it is difficult to precisely determine the constituents of critical phases. Nevertheless, I believe that his account can most plausibly be construed in terms of the diagram in Figure 8. Within the diagram illustrated are four major blocks which represent Smith's use of critical phases (complex speech acts). The arrows between these blocks indicate the sequence of steps to be made by an agent in criticizing. Within each phase one or more statements indicated by the critical term used to denote that phase will be given. In the phase of description no supporting reasons will be required. I have indicated my puzzlement about the supporting reasons in the phase of analysis by a question mark. Interpretation and evaluation statements would seem to be supported by other, "cognitively more certain", critical statements.
Figure 8. Smith's Early Conception of Critical Phases
Smith's Later Conception of Criticism

Smith's later article bears a strong resemblance to his earlier account of criticism in that critical terms are used ambiguously to denote both complex speech acts (phases) and simple speech acts (statements). That is, as in his earlier account, Smith uses critical terms to designate both certain phases of critical activity (complex speech acts) and, the constituent statements (simple speech acts) given in such phases. Unlike his earlier article Smith sometimes calls these phases "techniques" or "procedures" (Smith, 1973, pp. 39, 40) but from his account it is clear that the successful performance of such techniques or procedures constitutes the performance of a complex speech act and these acts are sequentially related to one another in that one performs one before another. Moreover, Smith sometimes reverts back to the expression "phase" in describing these speech acts (Smith, 1973, p. 43). Despite the change of terminology, then, the underlying concept of a phase seems to appear in both accounts as one way in which Smith uses critical terms and such phases are constituted by the performance of statements or simple speech acts.

There are two striking modifications that Smith makes to his scheme of criticism as it is presented in his later article. One modification is that "characterization" is used to denote a critical phase as well as a statement. In his later scheme of criticism, then, there are five instead of four phases (complex speech acts). Within these there are five distinct kinds of statements (simple speech acts) which exemplify these phases. A second modification that is made in Smith's later article is his division of critical statements into two larger groupings which he calls "exploratory criticism" and
"argumentative criticism". This grouping as Smith presents it perhaps cuts across the grouping of critical statements into phases (at least those phases in which reasons are used to support critical statements). In Smith's later account, then, the statement or statements designated by a critical term will appear as part of exploratory criticism and the reasons which support such a statement will appear as part of argumentative criticism.

There are a number of problems with Smith's later conception of criticism. As with his earlier account, the constituent statements of each phase are not explicitly set forth. The primary reason for this, again, is that Smith is less than explicit about which critical statements are statements which require the support of reasons and which critical statements are to function as reasons for the support of other critical statements. The distinction between exploratory and argumentative criticism creates a second set of problems. One problem, is that the constituents of each larger grouping is not clear in his account. Evaluation as a statement in this later account is sometimes considered to be part of argumentative criticism and sometimes it is not. That is, Smith sometimes considers argumentative criticism to consist solely of the reasons (and perhaps other statements which could function as premises in critical argument). Sometimes he includes evaluation statements as well as their supporting reasons as part of argumentative criticism as well. The distinction

6. This at least applies to characterization, and interpretation statements. Smith's account is equivocal on whether evaluation is part of argumentative criticism or whether it is to be considered apart from either exploratory or argumentative criticism.
between exploratory and argumentative criticism creates a second problem. Such a distinction seems to conflict with Smith's conception of criticism as a series of distinct, sequentially-related phases. It will be remembered that in Smith's earlier account it seemed most plausible to regard phases as constituted both by the critical statement or statements which exemplified that phase and the reasons which would support that statement. In this later conception of criticism it is not at all evident that Smith would hold that critical phases are constituted in this way because argumentative criticism is supposed to occur after the exploratory criticism has been completed. So there are two major problems with Smith's later conception of criticism. I shall discuss each of these problems in turn in giving an exposition of his later scheme of criticism.

**The Constituents of Critical Phases.** As with his earlier account, one of the problems with Smith's later scheme of criticism lies in determining the constituent statements within each critical phase. Although it seems clear that within each critical phase designated by a critical term, one or more statements designated by that same critical term will appear, it is not clear what other statements will appear within that phase also.

With the critical phases of description and analysis, Smith simply does not talk about whether the corresponding critical statements in each phase require the support of other critical statements. Because Smith's later account is unclear on whether and how certain critical statements are supported by reasons, his account is also unclear on the constituents of the phases of characterization, interpretation, and evaluation. For example it is also not clear in
his later account whether he holds that reasons will be given for characterization statements and, if so, whether they will appear within the phase of characterization or not. Although his later account is clearer in stating that interpretation statements will be supported by reasons, he does not specifically state that these reasons will be description, analysis, or characterization statements as he does in his earlier account. One of the reasons for this is that Smith apparently has revised his thinking on the nature of the reasons which support overall interpretations. Finally, although Smith's account is not specific on the nature of these reasons given in support of evaluation statements, he does specifically include reasons within the phase of evaluation. In what follows I shall discuss each of the above points in turn in an attempt to determine the constituent statements of the phases of characterization, interpretation, and evaluation.

I have stated earlier that what Smith calls characterization statements in his early account of criticism are usually thought to require the support of reasons in many circumstances. Smith's later account of characterization statements does indeed suggest that they are frequently disputable. In giving examples of characterization statements, for example, he says

> Whether certain elements are forceful or antagonistically engaged can be legitimately disputed, and more than one characterization of the same elements may be acceptable. But unless a work of art is radically ambiguous, it is unlikely that its pervasive quality can be both, say, turgid and lyrical. (Smith, 1973, p. 42)

6. At least they are so regarded by Sibley (1959, 1965) the philosophical source from which Smith apparently derives the concept of characterization statements.
If characterization statements are disputable, then, how are they supported? Smith's account only vaguely talks about this support:

> When there is doubt about the meaning of critical characterization statements, there are a number of things one can do (e.g., the activities which comprise close contextual analysis) but if contextual analysis fails, all one can do is to ask the artist, if he is available and willing to talk what he meant. (Smith, 1973, p. 43)

It would seem, then, that at least analysis statements are held to support characterizations but one wonders whether it is analysis statements and only analysis statements which are used to support characterizations. Smith mentions no other kind of statement which could support characterization statements but in the philosophical literature, what he calls description statements (i.e., statements which "identify" or "name", "elements of subject matter" and an "object's major areas or formal dimensions") are also commonly thought to be statements which could lend support to characterization statements in Smith's sense.

Smith's later account, then, although it suggests that characterization statements would require support in ordinary circumstances, is unclear on the nature of the reasons that would support such statements. His account is also unclear on whether these supporting reasons would be included within the phase of characterization or whether such reasons would be considered constituents of some other phase.

Smith's later account is more explicit in asserting that interpretation statements do require the support of reasons (Smith, 1973, p. 44), but unlike his earlier article, he does not specifically cite descriptions, analyses, and characterizations as reasons. One reason
for this is perhaps a change in his thinking on how interpretations are supported. In his later article he suggests that *local interpretations* would function as reasons in support of an overall interpretation:

> But though overall interpretation depends on the variety of local meanings discerned in the work, interpreting is not simply adding them up to get the right meaning.... Rather, local meanings fit or accord well with the larger one,... (Smith, 1973, p. 43)

This aspect of his thinking, however, is not integrated with the rest of his article since in other parts he suggests that interpretations are in fact supported by descriptions, analyses and characterizations.

> Still, what criticism does is trying to render an object visible or aesthetically meaningful is different from what it does in backing up interpretations and evaluations.

> What it does in the latter case is aesthetic argument, which as here stipulated assumes that a strong critical evaluation of an object has been made. If asked to justify his evaluation a responsible critic ought to be able to argue in its favor of his assessment. This he can do by redescribing, reanalyzing, and so on, what he has already noticed for himself. (Smith, 1973, p. 44)

This suggests that interpretations, then, will be supported by redescribing, reanalyzing (and recharacterizing?) an art object. But if this is the case, once again Smith's account is still not clear on whether these supporting reasons would be considered part of the phase of interpretation.

> Smith is most explicit in discussing the supporting reasons and the constituent statements of the phase of evaluation. Evaluation is first of all a phase in which the reasons that support the evaluation statement are a constituent part.
The following ... may be helpful in isolating the major components of a critical evaluation. In a complete appraisal it is possible to isolate (1) the object of evaluation, or value object, (2) the rating of a value object with a value term, (3) the reason why the object has a certain value, and (4) the standard, which is explicitly stated or implied by the reason. (Smith, 1973, p. 42)

But if it is clear that evaluations are supported by reasons, Smith's account is still less than clear on the nature of the statements which are to be given as reasons. In discussing aesthetic argument, it will be remembered, he claims that evaluations are supported by "redescribing, reanalyzing, and so on" (Smith, 1973, p. 44). Is Smith, then, claiming that recharacterizing and reinterpreting will occur in supporting aesthetic evaluations as well? I find this to be the most plausible interpretation of what he means by this passage. For example, although he does not mention characterization statements as reasons, he does say that the standards (criteria) contained in critical reasons might be unity, complexity, and intensity, Beardsley's three criteria (Smith, 1973, p. 46). In these cases, at least, the supporting reasons would be characterizations on his theory because these are the statements in his theory which would predicate human and some nonhuman regional qualities. The "and so on" in Smith's discussion of aesthetic argument, then, would seem to mean that all of the critical statements (except perhaps evaluations) would be used to support evaluation statements. But again this is not explicitly asserted.

Smith's account, then, is less than clear on the constituents of the phases of characterization, interpretation, and evaluation. Because Smith includes supporting reasons within the phase of evaluation,
one is inclined to believe that he may hold that the reasons supporting characterization and interpretation statements are included within those phases also. But this is not given explicitly in his account and such an interpretation seems to conflict with his grouping of critical phases into what he calls "exploratory" and "argumentative" criticism. It is to this latter distinction that I now turn.

**Exploratory and Argumentative Criticism.** One of the more striking changes in Smith's later conception of criticism is the clustering of critical phases into two distinct groupings which he calls "exploratory" and "argumentative" criticism.

I think that a concept of criticism which divides into two basic sets of activities -- into what may be called exploratory aesthetic criticism and argumentative aesthetic criticism -- can help create the conditions for the kind of enlightened critical performance envisioned here as one appropriate outcome of aesthetic education.

Exploratory criticism may be described as an aid to and a means of sustaining aesthetic experience. Aesthetic argument, on the other hand, may be called critical communication carried on in behalf of a given critique; that is, having both aesthetically experienced a work of art and provided an estimate of its goodness (or poorness), we communicate our account and defend it if challenged to do so. Each of these two types of criticism in other words, performs a distinctive function. (Smith, 1973, p. 39)

One of the problems that arises in explicating Smith's later scheme of criticism is determining the particular grouping in which the phase of evaluation belongs. One question that arises in the attempt to place the phase of evaluation in Smith's scheme of criticism is whether the groupings of exploratory and argumentative criticism exhaust all of critical activity. The passage which I have just quoted above suggests that it does. If it does, then each of the
critical phases must belong to one or another of the major groupings of exploratory and argumentative criticism. And if this is the case then evaluation must be part of argumentative criticism since Smith explicitly excludes it from exploratory criticism:

By exploratory criticism, then, we shall mean those techniques and procedures that are helpful in realizing the aesthetic value of works of art. Such endeavor does not necessarily imply strong evaluative judgment. Rather, the central task is to ascertain an object's aesthetic aspects as completely as possible. Judgment in the sense of ascribing merit or pronouncing a verdict is temporarily suspended in favor of as full a view as possible. [Exploratory criticism] can be divided into the overlapping phases of description, in the sense of relatively straightforward noting of the more literal aspects of the objects; analysis, which attends carefully to the interrelations of sensuous elements noted in description; characterization, which marks the peculiar nature of a work's aesthetic qualities; and interpretation, an effort to construe overall meaning. (Smith, 1973, pp. 39, 40)

If the phase of evaluation clearly does not belong within the grouping of phases which Smith calls exploratory criticism, it is still not clear that he would wish to place it within the grouping of argumentative criticism since in at least one passage, he differentiates between the making of evaluation statements and the argument which supports such a statement.

Up to this point, exploratory criticism (description, analysis, characterization, interpretation) has been suggested as a set of techniques a learner can use to perceive an object as completely as possible. It is perhaps apparent, however, that once an object has been carefully described, analyzed, and so on, an appraisal of its worth or goodness has also been made or is at least strongly implicit in the detailed explorative account. The language of exploratory criticism, in other words, is typically normative. As indicated earlier, we describe, analyze, and characterize, and at the same time, prize, appraise, and estimate. Still, what criticism does in trying to render an object visible or aesthetically meaningful is different from what it does in backing up interpretations and evaluations.
What it does in the latter case is aesthetic argument, which as here stipulated assumes that a strong critical evaluation of an object has already been made. (Smith, 1973, p. 44)

In this passage, then, the making of evaluation statements seems neither to belong to exploratory criticism nor to argumentative criticism. Smith seems at a loss as to where to place the making of evaluative statements in his scheme of criticism. In the above passage he states that evaluations are made prior to a critic employing aesthetic argument. But in earlier passages he plainly excludes them from exploratory criticism. In still other passages, however, he does appear to include evaluation within the notion of aesthetic argument.

Schapiro has explored the painting's qualities, estimated the degree of its excellencies, and presented readers with an account they themselves may use in attempting to realize the aesthetic value of the painting. It is aesthetic argument in the sense that it is highly evaluative and persuasive; the account persuasively invites the reader into this remarkable field of aesthetic value. (Smith, 1973, p. 45)

Smith's account, then, is unclear on whether making evaluation statements is to be included in the concept of aesthetic argument. Here it is perhaps worth pausing to speculate on the source of Smith's equivocation about evaluation. Here, I believe one must take into account the prescriptive reasons for the two groupings. Smith believes that exploratory and argumentative criticism fulfills (or could fulfill) certain desired educational functions. Evaluation, however, fulfills neither function. On the other hand Smith recognizes that critics do make evaluation statements. One reason, then, why the making of evaluation statements would be excluded from exploratory criticism is
that this is prescribed in order to enable someone to better perceive an object (Smith, 1973, p. 40). Plainly evaluating presupposes rather than aids in such perception. On the other hand, while, it does not seem to fit the notion of exploratory criticism as a method, it does not easily fit into the concept of aesthetic argument, either, since it is certainly not an aid to "critical communication" (Smith, 1973, p. 39). Smith's equivocal stance about the proper place of evaluation, then, seems to arise from a conflict of his prescriptive concerns and his attempt to explicate critical activity.

A second source of perplexity about Smith's later conception of criticism, then, arises about the place of evaluative statements within the grouping of statements into exploratory and argumentative criticism. Smith clearly does not include evaluation statements as part of exploratory criticism. Yet just as clearly he equivocates on whether to accommodate them within argumentative criticism.

The distinction between exploratory and argumentative criticism seems also to conflict with Smith's use of critical terms to designate critical phases. Unlike his earlier account it seems much more difficult to decide whether Smith would hold that critical phases are constituted both by the critical statements exemplifying a critical phase and the reasons used to support those statements. One can interpret Smith's later account in this way to be sure. In support of this interpretation is Smith's explicit use of "evaluation" to denote

7. I shall discuss Smith's goals for the method of criticism in a later section of this chapter. It is important to note here, however, that I do not believe that Smith's account is clear on the kinds of goals which are to be achieved through employment of the method of criticism.
a critical phase constituted both by evaluation statements and supporting reasons (as well as, perhaps, other statements as well). Yet it seems difficult to interpret the phases of interpretation and characterization in a similar manner. Smith clearly includes the critical reasons that would support interpretations (and characterizations?) as part of argumentative criticism and he states that a critic will proceed to offer his arguments after having described, analyzed, characterized, interpreted and evaluated a work of art:

What criticism does in trying to render an object visible or aesthetically meaningful is different from what it does in backing up interpretations and evaluations.

What it does in the latter case is aesthetic argument, which as here stipulated assumes that a strong critical evaluation of an object has already been made. (Smith, 1973, p. 44)

Are supporting reasons in the above passage part of the phase of interpretation then? Although reasons are specifically considered to be part of the phase of evaluation, they seem not be part of the phase of interpretation. This difference in the constituents of critical phases seems intuitively disturbing. Moreover the conception of critical activity, proceeding first through all of the critical phases of exploratory criticism, then evaluating, and only then going back to support interpretations and other judgments made earlier, seems awkward as a prescription for classroom discourse. One wonders whether questions that perhaps would be raised about the appropriateness of judgments given in an earlier phase would have been forgotten. In looking closely at the distinction between exploratory and argumentative criticism it is hard not to view this whole distinction as a muddle perhaps arising out of Smith's failure to adequately distinguish among
critical phases and statements in his use of critical terms and of his failure to separate definitional and prescriptive concerns.

So there are several sources of perplexity about Smith's later account of criticism. One major area of uncertainty is in the constituents of critical phases. As in his earlier account, he is unclear about which critical statements are those which require support and which critical statements are those which are to function as critical reasons. The distinction between exploratory and argumentative criticism raises a question about the appropriate place of evaluation statements in this scheme. This distinction, furthermore, seems to conflict with Smith's use of critical terms to designate critical phases.

Smith's general conception of criticism, then, seems to consist of five critical phases divided into two groupings of exploratory and argumentative criticism (see Figure 9). Within exploratory criticism are the phases of description, analysis, characterization, and interpretation. These phases are sequentially related to one another as indicated by the arrows in the diagram. That is, one describes before one analyzes, and one analyzes before one characterizes, and so forth. I have indicated the uncertainty about whether evaluation statements are to be regarded as part of argumentative criticism by the use of the dotted line. I have also indicated the uncertainty about whether the supporting reasons are to be regarded as part of the phase of characterization and interpretation (as they are in the case of evaluation) by the use of the dotted line as well. In Smith's account it is not clear whether he holds that analysis and characterization statements require the support of reasons, and his account is not
EXPLORATORY CRITICISM

**Phase of description**
- one or more description statements (simple speech acts)
- other statements?

**Phase of analysis**
- *one or more analysis statements (simple speech acts)
- description statements?

**Phase of characterization**
- *one or more characterization statements (simple speech acts)
- **analysis statements (description?)

**Phase of interpretation**
- one or more interpretation statements (simple speech acts)
- **description analysis (characterization?)

**Phase of evaluation**
- ***one or more evaluation statements (simple speech acts)
- description analysis (characterization?)

ARGUMENTATIVE CRITICISM

*It is not clear from his account whether he holds that such a statement requires the support of reasons.

**It is not clear from his account whether he holds that the reasons which support characterizations and interpretations are to be regarded as part of the phase of characterization and interpretation.

***It is not clear from his account whether he holds that evaluation statements are part of argumentative criticism.

Figure 9. Smith's Later Scheme of Critical Phases
clear on the nature of the reasons that would figure as support for characterizations, interpretations, and evaluations. I have made notes accordingly on the diagram. Finally, it is not clear whether critical reasons are to be considered part of the phases of characterization and interpretation. I have indicated this uncertainty by the use of the dotted line.

In both of Smith's accounts, then, it is difficult to determine precisely the statements which are held to constitute each critical phase, primarily because Smith does not precisely specify the critical statements which require support and the critical statements which are to function as reasons. In Smith's earlier account it would seem that critical phases are constituted both by the critical statement or statements exemplifying a critical phase, and by supporting reasons. It is difficult to decide whether this is the case in Smith's later account since such a conception of critical phases seems inconsistent with Smith's grouping of critical phases into exploratory and argumentative criticism.

Smith's Prescriptions for Criticism

As well as presenting definitions of critical terms, certain prescriptive roles for criticism are suggested in Smith's accounts. In this section I shall discriminate three major roles for criticism in his writings. Smith prescribes criticism as a learning method, as a teaching method, and as a teaching goal. These prescriptive roles are marked in the body of Smith's discussions, not by an explicit recognition of a change in the prescription being presented, but rather by an equivocal shift from a conception of critical terms as a set of
activities to be employed by a teacher or student to achieve a certain
goal or goals, to a conception of critical terms as a set of skills or
critical dispositions to be acquired by a student. Consideration of
Smith's prescriptions for criticism as a method and as a goal reveals
several problems. One of these problems is that the proximate goal to
be achieved through the method of criticism is not clear in his
account. Other problems arise in considering the appropriateness of
his prescriptions for criticism as a method considering his proximate
goals and the concepts of critical terms presented in his definitions.
Conceptual problems also arise in considering the appropriateness of
his skill prescriptions in light of his definitions of critical terms.

Three Prescriptive Roles for Criticism

In the body of Smith's articles criticism is presented both as
a teaching and learning method, and as a goal i.e., a set of skills
that a learner will acquire as one outcome of an education in the arts.
A good example of the way in which Smith presents his prescription
for criticism, and the shift in his prescription is this early article:

The first thing to be realized about aesthetic educa-
tion is that it has to do principally with perceiving,
noting, or feeling the qualities and powers of works
of art. As in any other area, it is necessary to
recognize examples of one's domain before inquiry can
begin. In this respect we may agree that:

"Persons have to see the grace or unity of a work, hear
the plaintiveness or frenzy in the music, notice the
gaudiness of a color scheme, feel the power of a novel,
its mood, or its uncertainty of tone. Persons may be
struck by these qualities at once, or they may come to
perceive them only after repeated viewings, hearings,
readings, and with the help of critics. But unless
they do perceive them for themselves, aesthetic enjoy-
ment, appreciation, and judgment are beyond them....
The question we now propose to discuss is how one learns
to do this.
The answer that I am suggesting here is to learn to exercise perceptively the discipline of aesthetic criticism (in which aesthetic criticism implies a cluster of procedures which can be used to disclose the characteristics of works of art). To be sure, the procedures of aesthetic criticism will not prescribe how to approach a work in a precise step-by-step manner, but then we are not talking about that kind of systematic endeavor.... Aesthetic criticism is a special structure of ideas and critical skills — a kind of "inter-discipline" — called into being by the requirements for grasping aesthetic significance. The ideas, skills, and procedures of aesthetic criticism are, in fact, drawn from a variety of academic realms and from the efforts of artists, composers, writers, and critics. Once more, then, "the discipline of aesthetic criticism" does not entail a formal theoretical system or academic subject; it connotes educated effort and assent to specified ways for attending to works of art.

Furthermore, the cluster of operations subsumed by aesthetic criticism may be classified as aesthetic judgment, aesthetic description, aesthetic explanation, aesthetic interpretation, and aesthetic evaluation. Each of these, in turn, has its own "logic" or peculiar character. To explain a work of art and to evaluate it, for example, are two different operations. Learning how to appreciate works of art aesthetically thus means learning how to judge, describe, explain, interpret, and evaluate their special significance. (Smith, 1967, pp. 8, 9)

In this article criticism on the one hand is presented as a cluster of "procedures" or "operations" to be performed in order to achieve certain goals, and on the other hand as a set of skills to be acquired by a learner. This same shift from a method prescription to a skill prescription is present in the two main articles under scrutiny in this chapter. In Smith's earlier article criticism is presented explicitly as a method:

The purpose of this article is to present a concept of a teaching method appropriate for the emerging period of instruction in the arts and the humanities. (Smith, 1968, p. 12)

Yet in other passages in this article it is construed as a skill also:
It may be asked, how can it be determined whether a student is developing as an aesthetic knower? It is suggested that initial evidence of growth in this direction is found in written and oral responses to works of art.... A sense of what is reasonable and appropriate... can come only with experience; hence critical dispositions must be fashioned over a long period of time. (Smith, 1968, p. 28)

Smith appears to hover between each of these two prescriptions in coining the phrase "procedural skill".

The issue, in other works is... whether there are procedures for defending various sorts of statements which ascribe aesthetic qualities or truth claims to works of art. As procedures usually lend themselves to being taught, these questions suggest a more promising approach to the problem of knowing in the arts.

The earlier contention that the discipline of aesthetics does not appear to yield a knowledge structure reliable enough for educational adaption should now be modified, for the subdomain of the philosophy of criticism affords paradigms of procedural skills for making the most sense out of whatever can be known in a work of art. The person who typically exemplifies these skills, of course, is the art, music, or literary critic. His training, experience, and cultivated sensitivity enable him to make relevant statements about works of art which often help others to have more meaningful aesthetic experiences. While it is not the purpose of aesthetic education to train professional art critics, it is reasonable to assume that ability to communicate knowledgeably about the qualities used meanings of works of art is prima facie evidence that the skills of aesthetic criticism have been learned, or that the disposition for enlightened response and justification in the aesthetic domain has been fostered. [Emphasis Added] (Smith, 1968, p. 20)

In Smith's later article, criticism is also ambiguously presented as a both a method and goal. Smith talks about a high level of critical performance on the one hand and a set of activities on the other:
We should not, of course, expect schools to effect a high level of professional critical performance; that, after all, is a lifetime goal for professional critics themselves. Rather, we should be concerned, I propose, with a level of performance that is capable of achieving an intelligent interpretive perspective, with a capacity to perceive, understand, and appreciate works of art with quasi-professional skill. I think that a concept of criticism which divides into two basic sets of activities — into what may be called exploratory aesthetic criticism and argumentative aesthetic criticism — can help create the conditions for the kind of enlightened critical performance envisioned here as one appropriate outcome of aesthetic education. (Smith, 1973, p. 39)

Smith's prescriptions for criticism, then, seem to shift between a conception of criticism as a method for achieving certain goals and a conception of criticism as a goal or outcome in itself. Since he appears to prescribe both kinds of roles for criticism, I shall discuss each kind of role in the following.

**Criticism as a Method Prescription**

In prescribing criticism as a method, Smith envisions this method being employed principally in public school settings in the secondary grades (7-12). Elementary students he feels, lack the intellectual development to fully benefit from activities of criticizing aesthetic objects. The elementary school years are to be regarded as a preparatory stage in which traditional art activities are justified by their contribution to the future role of the student as a critic of aesthetic objects (Smith, 1967, pp. 9-11; 1973, p. 48). Criticism in the secondary grades, then, is to be employed primarily by the secondary school student as an agent in order that he may achieve certain educational goals. It is this role as a learning method which is projected (somewhat ambiguously) by Smith in saying
the young child gets ready for enlightened aesthetic criticism by constructing or "creating" aesthetic objects which later he will perceive without being tied to concrete manipulations. The adolescent practices the skills and procedures of aesthetic criticism thereby continuing the process which promotes the disposition to regard works of art aesthetically. (Smith, 1967, p. 10)

Although projecting the role of criticism as a learning method, Smith occasionally speaks of criticism in terms of a teaching method, also: that is, as a method in which someone criticizes in order to bring about some desired goal in someone other than the agent himself. In this case the secondary school teacher is projected as an agent and the secondary school student is the audience.

Since extra-aesthetic judgments will be made by teachers and learners anyway, it is no use ruling them out of aesthetic education. Indeed, it may be necessary to know how to handle them to understand better what is involved in aesthetic judgments. The only stipulation would seem to be that teachers and learners understand that different sorts of judgments can be made of works of art. (Smith, 1968, p. 26)

In Smith's account of criticism, then, two distinct roles for criticism as a method appear to be prescribed.

In projecting criticism as a method, Smith prescribes this method in order that certain educational goals will be attained. One of the problems with Smith's account is that no clear conception of a such a proximate goal of criticism is presented. Smith in fact cites several goals not all of which are clear or uncontroversial in their meaning.

Before examining some of Smith's attempts to specify proximate goals for criticism as a method, there is one kind of goal which at the outset cannot be a candidate for a proximate goal in his theory.
Since he does not define critical terms as attempts to perform various acts of criticizing, it cannot be the case that the proximate goal is a skill indicated by a critical term that he defines. That is he cannot (logically) project a proximate goal of knowing how to c when c ing is the act being defined. Until a person had mastered the capacity to c he simply cannot c. Hence he cannot perform the act of c ing.

There are a range of goals which Smith sets out as proximate goals to be attained by the method of criticizing. The clearest of these goals involves perception of aesthetic qualities (Sibley's sense) in works of art.

The first thing to be realized about aesthetic education is that it has to do principally with perceiving, noting, or feeling the qualities and powers of works of art...

Persons have to see the grace or unity of a work, hear the plaintiveness or frenzy in the music, notice the gaudiness of a color scheme, feel the power of a novel, its mood, or its uncertainty of tone. Persons may be struck by these qualities at once, or they may come to perceive them only after repeated viewings, hearings, readings, and with the help of critics. But unless they do perceive them for themselves, aesthetic enjoyment, appreciation, and judgment are beyond them. ... The question we now propose to discuss is how one learns to do this.

The answer that I am suggesting is to learn to exercise perceptively the discipline of aesthetic criticism... which implies a cluster of procedures which can be used to disclose the characteristics of works of art.... (Smith, 1967, pp. 8, 9)

Perception of a work's aesthetic qualities, then, would seem to be the

8. There may be one exception, he characterizes interpretation at one point as an "effort to construe overall meaning" (Smith, 1973, p. 40). Yet he also goes on to define it without this qualification and this qualification is not found in his earlier article.
proximate learning goal to be achieved or attained through the employment of the method of criticizing.

A closely related goal is projected by Smith as a goal of a teaching method also (although the following passage confuses the roles of criticism as a method and as a goal):

It is important to note that there can be no guarantee that such techniques will be successful in bringing others to see, hear, or feel what is to be experienced, for critical skills and procedures cannot be equated with a method which, when followed conscientiously, ensures success, i.e., a perfect judgment or appraisal: there is no such thing. The teaching of categories, concepts, criteria, and procedures, though seeming to hold out the only hope for making sense of what can be known in a work of art, constitutes no more than elements of heuristic devices, or sets of questions to ask without expectation that each of them will necessarily be revealingly answered. [Emphasis Added]. (Smith, 1968, p. 28)

The goal of perception of aesthetic qualities is echoed in other places in Smith's articles but expanded also to include notions of understanding and appreciation of works of art. For example, in the passage previously quoted, Smith rephrases the goal of perception so that it is a "making sense of what can be known in a work of art" (Smith, 1968, p. 28): "Making sense" here appears close to what might be considered understanding of a work of art.

In Smith's later article (Smith, 1973), a range of goals is projected for criticism as a method including understanding and appreciation, as well as perception of a work of art:

We should be concerned, I propose, with a level of performance that is capable of achieving an intelligent interpretive perspective, with a capacity to perceive, understand, and appreciate works of art with quasi-professional skill. I think that a concept of criticism which divides into two basic sets of activities -- into what may be called exploratory aesthetic criticism and argumentative aesthetic criticism -- can help
create the conditions for the kind of enlightened
critical performance envisioned here as one appropriate
outcome of aesthetic education. (Smith, 1973, p. 39)

In the above there appears to be a shift in meaning as well as
an expansion of goals. This shift from a perception or understanding
to a capacity to perceive or understand might possibly represent a
shift in Smith's thinking: from criticism as a learning method in
which certainly the goal for the agent would be that he perceive,
understand, or appreciate aesthetic objects, to criticism as a teaching
method in which case the goal might very well be to instill a capacity
to perceive, understand, or appreciate in a student.

In his later article, there is also a significant change in the
goals projected for criticism as a method. Unlike his earlier
article, evaluation is marked off from other critical phases and
(perhaps) placed within the grouping of argumentative criticism. In
doing this Smith projects a subsidiary goal for the phases of
description, analysis, characterization, and interpretation. These
phases

help to achieve a relatively neutral account of a work's
properties, which may serve as a basis for strong
evaluation. (Smith, 1973, p. 40)

And a different goal than perception, understanding, and appreciation
of a work of art is projected for evaluating. Evaluating, insofar as
it can be considered part of argumentative criticism is concerned with
a separate goal, that of communication:

Exploratory criticism may be described as an aid to
and a means of sustaining aesthetic experience.
Aesthetic argument, on the other hand, may be called
critical communication carried on in behalf of a given
critique; that is, having both aesthetically experienced
a work of art and provided an estimate of its goodness
(or poorness), we communicate our account and defend
it if challenged to do so. Each of these two basic
types of criticism, in other words, performs a dis-
tinctive function. (Smith, 1973, p. 39)
So there appear to be number of goals which are projected as proximate goals to be achieved or attained by secondary school students either by their criticizing works of art (learning method) or by their teachers criticizing works of art (teaching method). Smith's later article represents some significant rethinking about the goals projected for criticism as a method. In his earlier article, all of the activities of criticism are prescribed as a method to achieve the goals of perception of aesthetic qualities and of understanding. In his later article, Smith differentiates between evaluation and other critical activities. In doing so he projects a subsidiary role for the activities of describing, analyzing, characterizing and interpreting. These activities are intended to prepare the basis for the activity of evaluation (in addition to being the means whereby secondary students come to perceive aesthetic qualities in works of art, understand works of art, and appreciate works of art). Evaluation in this later article, as (presumably) part of argumentative criticism, has a communicative purpose.

Criticism as a Goal Prescription

The third major role which Smith prescribes for criticism is a goal. Smith addresses his articles to educators and in doing so speaks about a set of skills that students will acquire as the result of a series of educational experiences beginning in elementary school but continuing through the secondary grades. It is in the secondary school that criticism becomes a major goal of programs of education in the arts.
Smith does not sharply distinguish between his prescription for criticism as a goal and his prescriptions for criticism as a method, as the passages which I have quoted earlier indicate. Perhaps the clearest expression of a goal prescription for criticism occurs in his early article (Smith, 1968).

While it is not the purpose of aesthetic education to train professional critics, it is reasonable to assume that ability to communicate knowledgeably about the qualities and meanings of works of art is prima facie evidence that the skills of aesthetic criticism have been learned, or that the disposition for enlightened response and justification in the aesthetic domain has been fostered.

To elevate, moreover, some approximation of the critic's expertise into an objective for aesthetic education does not appear illegitimate in view of similar aims frequently proclaimed for other fields of instruction. Educators have been known to propose that the student learn to "think as the scientist does" or "investigate as the historian does". (Smith, 1968, p. 20, 21)

Smith, then, also prescribes criticism as a set of skills to be acquired as the result of certain experiences which are undergone by students in secondary school settings. Criticism as a goal prescription, then, is most plausibly regarded as a teaching goal since Smith addresses his articles to educators interested in secondary school curricula.

Adequacy of Smith's Prescriptions

In projecting three roles for criticism in secondary school settings, Smith presents three separate kinds of prescriptions which can be subjected to logical scrutiny and appraisal. In Chapter V of this study, I identified a number of criteria which can be used to appraise prescriptions for criticism in the literature. I did this by identifying sets of necessary conditions that would have to be
fulfilled in order for prescriptions for criticism to be considered successfully performed linguistic acts of their type. Such rules are not the only rules criticism prescriptions need to satisfy but they are important. In the following, I cite a number of these rules and I inquire into Smith's adherence to such rules in his prescriptions for criticism.

There are three relevant criteria appropriate to the appraisal of Smith's prescriptions for criticism as a method.

1. Criticism must be defined in terms of mental or physical active doings or acts (learning method); or physical active doings or acts (teaching method).

Smith's method prescriptions for the most part satisfy this criterion in that mental uses of critical terms are only a peripheral part of his account. That ambiguity between mental and physical which does exist in his account, however, is inconsistent with his prescriptions for criticism as a teaching method. Mental uses of "analysis", for example, cannot logically figure in teaching method prescriptions. Mental uses of "interpretation" cannot logically figure in either teaching or learning method prescription since they indicate nonactive doings.

2. The act of criticizing must be such as to allow the agent (learning method) or the audience (teaching method) to achieve or attain the goal specified in the prescription.

Except, perhaps, for the perception of aesthetic qualities, one of the problems with the proximate goals specified by Smith is their controversial nature. Our understanding of what it means to understand a given work of art or to appreciate a given work of art is limited at the present time. A problem arises, then, in knowing when such
goals have been achieved and whether the method used has been an effective means of reaching such goals. Since there seems to be no way of adequately evaluating the effectiveness of Smith's conception of criticism as a method for attaining the goals he projects, his proposals seem immune to criticism on their effectiveness. On the other hand, it seems difficult to justify their use as a method either, since one seems unable to establish their effectiveness one way or another.

3. The agents specified in such prescriptions must be capable of performing the acts prescribed.

Smith's prescription for criticism as a learning method (the prescriptive role for criticism most emphasized in his articles) is seriously defective in that the goals projected as proximate goals are presupposed in the successful performance of the acts prescribed as a method. One of the proximate goals projected by Smith is that secondary students learn to perceive aesthetic qualities in works of art. Yet in order to successfully perform the linguistic act of characterizing a work of art (on Smith's definition of "characterization") students must already have perceived these same qualities. That is "characterization" as he defines this term involves predicking just those qualities which he designates as aesthetic. Characterizing, then, cannot be a means toward the achievement of the proximate goal of perceiving aesthetic qualities.

A similar logical inconsistency results when interpreting is considered as a learning method in relation to the goal of understanding a work of art. Smith's definition of "interpretation" I argued was defective in appealing to expressions which were either
circular or metaphysical. His definitions, however, did present examples of interpretations which were indubitably interpretations in ordinary language. Now interpreting as I have argued in Chapter IV involves an understanding on the part of a speaker as a necessary preparatory condition for the act to be successfully performed. In this respect the concept of interpretation is similar to the concept of explanation (although interpretations are characteristically different in implying a lack of conclusive evidence). To prescribe that students interpret (in the ordinary meaning of "interpret") in order to understand a work of art, then, presupposes that students already understand that work. Hence, a logical inconsistency is involved in making such a prescription. Interpreting cannot be prescribed as a means that would enable students to understand.\footnote{One suspects that a similar conceptual link ties the concept of evaluation and appreciation but the explication of such a linkage, if there is one, is beyond the scope of this study.}

Similar problems do not arise in construing method prescriptions for criticism as a teaching method and, herein, may lie one reason why these two kinds of prescriptions are never clearly separated in Smith's articles. In equivocating between these two kinds of method prescriptions, the logical inconsistencies noted above are never brought to light.

In addition to these problems, Smith's characterization of critical acts raises questions of an empirical nature about the abilities of students and teachers who are to figure as agents in method prescriptions. In describing, Smith foresees the use of a range of knowledge about art history, art theory, etc. Is Smith
proposing then, that teachers and students describe only if they possess such knowledge? If so, he can hardly propose description as a general educational method for public school settings. In analyzing he presumes that students and teachers can already perceive formal relationships in works of art. Some prior teaching here may also have to occur before students especially (and, perhaps, teachers) can really analyze works of art. These questions also are not raised when it is unclear whether it is a teaching or learning method which is being prescribed. If a teaching method is being prescribed, then, perhaps one can assume that the capacities to perform this method are present in the agents specified (e.g., teachers trained in the arts). Such prescriptions, however, clearly are defective as learning prescriptions since it seems difficult to believe that public school students have these capacities which are presupposed in the application of the method. Finally, is Smith proposing that teachers and students evaluate aesthetically? Then if so, some specification of the criteria to be employed needs to be made in his account. In accepting Beardsley's criteria, Smith neglects to specify the secondary criteria which are needed in order for people untrained in the arts to reach a consensus about the aesthetic value of aesthetic objects.

There are two criteria of relevance, to an appraisal of Smith's prescription for criticism as a goal.

1. Criticism must be defined in terms of certain states (i.e., skills or capacities improvable with practice and training).

Although Smith prescribes criticism as a set of discrete skills, he defines criticism as a series of phases (complex speech acts). The construal of his prescription for criticism as a goal, then requires
extrapolation from his article. One must infer that descriptions of critical acts are to be taken as behavioral manifestations of a capacity. In doing this it is important to note that this part of his account is inconsistent with that part of his account in which the notion of criticism is considered a sequentially-related set of acts. Smith does not ever address this difficulty in his articles but it is obvious that criticism as a set of discrete skills involves no sequentially ordered set of acts. To some extent his prescription for criticism as a set of skills is inconsistent with his general conception of criticism.

One problem that seems to arise with Smith's conception of evaluation is that there seems to be no direction in which a student can improve or attain mastery. In defining evaluation, Smith allows an indefinite range of aesthetic, cognitive, and moral criteria to be employed in the act. Moreover he does not particularly distinguish between evaluations and judgments of preference (Smith, 1968, p. 26). There seems, then, to be no criteria for discriminating the person who has mastered the skill of evaluating from the person who has not.

If Smith, on the other hand is proposing that students evaluate by employing aesthetic criteria, then applicable and acceptable criteria must be specified in his account, a task that would appear to be formidably difficult. Smith has not met such a need by citing Beardsley's three criteria of unity, complexity, and intensity since these criteria, as I have argued are either inapplicable or un-acceptable.
2. The goal prescribed must not already have been achieved or attained by the audience of the teacher.

To some extent Smith's goal prescriptions for criticism are defective insofar as his concepts of criticism are acceptable in method prescriptions. Evaluation as Smith conceives of evaluation I argued, could not be construed as a skill. If it were considered a skill, then students would already have achieved mastery. Description and analysis, insofar as they have previously escaped criticism as methods, seem unlikely candidates for consideration as skill goals. If students can describe or analyze with facility having little or no tuition or training, then the onus seems to be upon Smith to specify those ways in which one is to regard their performance as inadequate and to need improvement.

In summary, then, there are several conceptual difficulties with Smith's prescriptions for criticism. These difficulties reside in the equivocal way in which his prescriptions are presented, in the unreliability of the proximate goal which is to be achieved through employment of the method of criticizing, and in the inconsistency between the concepts of criticism presented in his definitions and the roles projected for criticism in his prescriptions.

Summary

In this chapter, I have examined and appraised the definitions of critical terms and the prescriptions for criticism given in a series of articles by Ralph Smith.

Smith offers definitions of the critical terms "description", "analysis", "characterization", "interpretation", and "evaluation".
In his account such terms are used ambiguously to denote both simple speech acts (or statements) and complex speech acts (presented in a prescriptive context as "phases", "procedures", or "techniques"). In this chapter I have examined each aspect of Smith's theory in both of his accounts. Smith appears to characterize critical statements on the basis of their function, cognitive certainty, and content. I argued that problems exist in accurately interpreting the meaning of such distinctions and that his accounts are unclear as to where such distinctions are to be made since he employs more than one distinction simultaneously. Further problems arise because the simultaneous employment of such distinctions either gives rise to inconsistencies in his account or to unwelcome consequences. Finally, I concluded that Smith presents false reportive definitions of critical terms in some of his characterizations of critical statements.

Smith's discussions of critical phases are problematic in that the constituent statements of each critical phase are not clearly given. His later article (Smith, 1973) presents an added complication since the grouping of critical phases into exploratory and argumentative criticism appears to conflict with his earlier conception of critical phases as comprised of both statements which exemplify that particular phase and the reasons which support that statement or statements. This grouping also conflicts with his conception of critical phases as a set of sequentially-ordered acts. In addition one is unsure about the phase of evaluation within this later scheme of criticism.
Smith's prescriptions for criticism equivocate between conceptions of criticism as a teaching method, as a learning method (i.e., as a series of sequentially-related acts), and criticism as a teaching goal (i.e., as a set of skills). In appraising Smith's prescriptions they were found not to satisfy several of the criteria necessary for his prescriptions to be successfully performed prescriptive acts.
CHAPTER VIII

THE METACRITICAL THEORY OF EDMUND FELDMAN

Overview

In this chapter I analyze and appraise the definitions of critical terms, and prescriptions for criticism presented by Edmund Feldman.

Introduction

Perhaps the most influential metacritical writer in the field of visual arts education is Edmund Feldman. His theory of criticism, presented in a number of articles and in two texts; Art as Image and Idea (Feldman, 1967) and Becoming Human Through Art (Feldman, 1970), has become an authoritative one, widely known among educational practitioners and researchers. Unlike other educational metacritics, his prescriptions for criticism have been presented in textbook form and, as a consequence, they have been instrumental in the education of numbers of elementary classroom teachers and teachers of the visual arts.

Although the theory of criticism presented in Feldman's earlier text (Feldman, 1967) is clearly the progenitor of the theory presented in his later text (Feldman, 1970), his later text presents a number of significant modifications and emendations. It is difficult to precisely determine the motive for such modifications. They probably represent either a rethinking of certain points of his account or an attempt to simplify and clarify points in order to be better understood by the audience of potential teachers and public school students to which his
later text is addressed. It is perhaps because Feldman's later text is addressed to an audience of teachers and public school students, that the prescriptions to be found there are more related to the general direction which this study has taken. Both because his later text is probably the more authoritative one and because it is concerned directly with educational practice, I give priority in this study to an analysis of Feldman's later text for an exposition and appraisal of his theory of criticism. I shall, however, from time to time refer to his earlier text as well as to a published article (Feldman, 1973) for clarification on a number of points.

In this chapter I begin my analysis and appraisal of Feldman's definitions by discussing my reasons for treating them as reportive or descriptive definitions rather than as stipulations. I next discuss some ambiguities in Feldman's use of critical terminology, pointing out some ambiguities which explain a number of characteristics in his writing. In the sections following these I focus on Feldman's use of critical terms to indicate both simple and complex speech acts. In the last section of this chapter, I discuss prescriptions for criticism presented in his accounts.

Feldman's Definitions

In his writings Feldman offers definitions of "criticism", "description", "analysis", "interpretation", and "judgment". Although Feldman does not explicitly state the kind of definitions he is presenting, his efforts to explain the meaning of critical terms can be construed as attempts to describe or report ordinary usage by virtue of a lack of stipulative announcement. In his definition of
"criticism", for example, there is no announcement indicating a special use of the term when he states that

Art criticism can be defined as talk -- spoken or written -- about art. It is not necessarily negative or destructive talk. It can include praise, comparison, description, and explanation as well as disapproval. (Feldman, 1970, p. 348)

In a later article, the emphasis is even more explicitly upon reporting rather than upon constructing meaning:

What is art criticism? At the very simplest level, at the level where I trust we can gain some consensus, criticism is talk about art. (Feldman, 1973, p. 50)

And this same emphasis can be seen in his earlier text:

My guiding assumption is that there is a form, a systematic way of behaving like a critic, just as there is a systematic way of behaving like a lawyer.... Art criticism does not have the form of a legal debate but it does have a form. (Feldman, 1967, p. 468)

Thus, although Feldman is less than explicit about the kind of definitions he is presenting, it seems safe to assume that he is attempting to report or describe usage rather than to stipulate meanings for critical terms.

Feldman's Use of Critical Terms

In the discussion in which Feldman presents definitions of critical terms and prescribes various roles for criticism in educational settings, there are several possibilities for confusion in the way in which critical terms are used. It will facilitate subsequent discussion, therefore, if some initial attempts are made to clarify his use of critical terminology by recognizing the following distinctions:

1. The distinction between generic, and specific illocutionary act senses of the term "criticism".
2. The distinction between definitional and prescriptive concerns.
3. The distinction between act and artifact uses of critical terms.

4. The distinction between simple and complex speech acts.

5. The distinction between mental and physical doings and the distinction between active and nonactive doings.

In the following I discuss each of these distinctions in turn.

Generic and Illocutionary Act Senses of "Criticism"

Feldman uses "criticism" both in its generic sense as a stand-in for a number of critical terms and in its illocutionary act sense as an indicator of a specific active doing or state. These distinct senses of the term "criticism" are not fully recognized by Feldman. For example in this definition of "criticism" he appears to grope for a distinction between the two:

Art criticism can be defined as talk — spoken or written — about art. It is not necessarily negative or destructive talk. It can include praise, comparison, description, and explanation as well as disapproval. (Feldman, 1970, p. 348)

In the above passage Feldman wishes to distinguish the activities of criticizing (generic sense) from the activity of criticizing (illocutionary act sense). Yet he is unable to adequately do so because of the confounding of both meanings of the term "criticism". Criticism in its generic sense in Feldman's account consists of the doings (or states) of description, analysis, interpretation, and evaluation or judgment. It has nothing to do with disapproval (a separate and distinct illocutionary act). "Criticism" in its illocutionary act sense, however, clearly is related to disapproval. In the above definition,

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1. In the analysis of this act presented in Chapter IV it was held that it is essentially an expression of a speaker's belief that some act or object is bad, imperfect, etc.
Feldman probably feels compelled to add that "criticism" (in its
generic sense) includes disapproval because of an intuition about the
meaning of "criticism" in its illocutionary act sense.

Definitional and Prescriptive Concerns

Feldman does not explicitly differentiate between definitional and
prescriptive concerns in his account but moves from one context of con­
cern to another. Perhaps he does this without a conscious awareness of
a shift in his own intentions. In any event this shift sometimes
appears to be marked by changes of terminology. This holds the
potential for being confusing to readers because Feldman uses a number
of terms in his explanations of criticism and no attempt is made to re­
late one term with another.

Criticism is first of all presented as an active doing in Feldman's
account. One knows this both because Feldman specifically uses the
verb "do" in discussing criticism (Feldman, 1970, pp. 188, 350) and
because he characterizes the meanings of critical terms as both
"processes" (Feldman, 1970, p. 363) and "performances" (Feldman, 1970,
p. 187). It is, I suggest, the notion of an active doing presented in
a prescriptive context as a method which underlies a range of other
expressions that Feldman also uses to characterize the meanings of
critical terms. Thus, not only is criticism presented as a "method"
(Feldman, 1970, p. 364) but also as a "procedure" (Feldman, 1970,
p. 348), "technique" (Feldman, 1970, p. 348), "operation" (Feldman,
1970, pp. 187, 188, 359), "system" (Feldman, 1967, pp. 196, 470), and
"task" (Feldman, 1967, p. 480).
Not only does Feldman not distinguish between definitional and prescriptive concerns but he fails to sort out his prescriptive intentions as well. Thus a related problem that arises in Feldman's account of criticism is the confusion between criticism as an active doing which will enable someone to achieve a certain state (that is, criticism as a method) and criticism as an end state in itself (that is, criticism as a goal). I have illustrated Feldman's conception of criticism as an active doing or method. At some points in his prescriptive account, however, he shifts to a conception of criticism as a state. This construal of criticism as a skill or set of skills is sometimes marked in his account by treating criticism as an "ability" (Feldman, 1970, pp. 348, 351; 1973, p. 51).

Thus there are a range of terms used by Feldman in explicating the concept of criticism in prescriptive contexts. Some of these terms are related to the concept of an active doing; some are related to the concept of a state.

The failure to explicitly differentiate definitional and prescriptive concerns leads to some muddled passages in Feldman's account. For example in the following passage, Feldman is first led to assert that criticism has a particular "form" or is a "systematic way of behaving", to qualify the assertion that criticism does have a "form" or is a "way of behaving", and then to affirm his original assertion once again. He begins first of all by stating

My guiding assumption is that there is a form, a systematic way of behaving like a critic, just as there is a systematic way of behaving like a lawyer. In presenting an argument for his client, a lawyer presumably has some method of offering evidence, of refuting his adversary, of citing appropriate precedents, of appealing to his hearers, and so on. Art criticism does not have the form of legal debate, but it does have a form. (Feldman, 1967, p. 468)
He then qualifies this claim by saying:

And if we wish to be effective as critics, we must become conscious, critically conscious, of the form or process or system (if any) we use in arriving at our critical conclusions. (Feldman, 1967, p. 468)

He then continues by reaffirming, once again, his original assertion:

I have divided the performance of art criticism into four stages: Description, Formal Analysis, Interpretation, and Evaluation or Judgment. It would be possible to break down these categories further, and it is also likely that they overlap. Nevertheless, they consist of fundamentally different operations which a critic must perform,... (Feldman, 1967, pp. 468, 469)

Feldman in the above passages betrays a lack of insight into the theoretical task in which he is actually engaged at that moment of utterance. At points in his account he, indeed, does attempt to reportively define a number of critical terms. These terms are "description", "analysis", "interpretation", and "judgment". But "criticism" itself is not defined reportively in his account. The structure or form which he attributes to critical activity can best be construed as a prescription for a sequence of active doings, doings which are presented at other points in his accounts through a set of reportive definitions of these other critical terms. The difficulty that Feldman senses in his account arises because he does not explicitly sort out his intentions. He hovers in his account between a description of meaning and a prescription for a method. However, if his definition of "criticism" is taken as a reportive definition, it can only be so in an obviously false sense. Counterexamples can easily be given to the claim that critical activity as it exists possesses the sequence that he claims. Hence, Feldman feels the need to qualify this claim. Yet he resumes these claims because he believes
that the task he is engaged in is one of reportively defining when in fact it might best be construed as stipulating for prescriptive purposes.

This same confusion of intention between definition and prescription is paralleled in Feldman's later account in much the same way. This confusion underlies the uncertainty of his claims when he asserts that

The difference between a professional critic and a lay critic is that the professional person has some kind of plan (we hope) for structuring his talk, some plan for presenting his visual observations and assembling the evidence that will presumably constitute the grounds for his interpretation and judgment. (Feldman, 1970, p. 51)

Definitional and prescriptive concerns, then, are not explicitly differentiated in Feldman's accounts. The fact that each of these concerns is reflected in Feldman's account, explains some of the differences in terminology which he employs in discussing criticism. I have maintained that the primary conception of criticism present in his work is as a set of active doings. Sometimes he marks his intention to prescribe these active doings as a method through a change in the terminology by which he defines critical terms. The failure to explicitly discriminate between definitional and prescriptive concerns in Feldman's account leads to some muddled passages, two of which were cited above.

Active Doing and Artifact Uses of Critical Terms

Feldman does not sharply differentiate between active doing and artifact (performed act) senses of critical terms. Critical terms are, to be sure, presented as active doings and such a conception of
critical terms is, indeed, necessary when one considers that his definitions are presented in the context of criticism as an educational method. Yet Feldman also shifts in his discussion from a consideration of this active doing to a consideration of the support or justification which is given to individual critical acts. In these contexts it is the artifact or performed act senses of critical terms which is intended. It is not the case that an active doing itself is justified or unjustified but rather it is the act which has been performed which is justified or unjustified. Feldman, unlike Beardsley, does not mark this distinction with a change of critical terminology.

Those parts of Feldman's discussion where a shift between act and artifact is evident are in his definitions of "interpretation" and "judgment". Interpretation as an artifact or performed act is presumably intended in the following passage:

You must not be afraid to risk being wrong, that is, in making an interpretation that does not fit the facts immediately. You can change or adjust your interpretation until it does fit the visual facts, so there is no harm in being wrong or wide of the mark at your first try. It would be bad art criticism only if you changed or ignored a great many facts to make them fit your interpretation. (Feldman, 1970, p. 362)

Judgment as an artifact or performed act is presumably intended by Feldman, for example, when he asserts that "we have a choice of several philosophies of art for justifying critical judgments" (Feldman, 1970, p. 372).

Although Feldman does not discuss justifying or supporting acts of description and analysis, it may reasonably be assumed that there exist performed act or artifact uses of "description" and "analysis" as well. Thus the critical terms "description", "analysis",
"interpretation", and "judgment" have artifact or performed act uses as well as active doing uses in Feldman's account.

**Simple and Complex Speech Acts**

Although Feldman uses critical terms to indicate speech or linguistic acts of one sort or another, he does not explicitly distinguish between simple and complex speech acts in his account. This raises a problem of interpretation because, although some critical terms are explicitly presented only as indicators of simple speech acts, it seems likely from the context in which they are used that Feldman would also accept their use as indicators of complex speech acts as well. In the following I examine this possibility. In a later section of this chapter, I shall discuss some problems of unclarity and inconsistency which are raised by considering critical terms as both simple and complex speech acts.

Although Feldman makes no explicit distinction between simple and complex speech acts, there is a difference in the way in which "description" and "analysis" are defined in comparison with "interpretation" and "judgment". In order for the operations or procedures of describing and analyzing to have been completed, a critic or agent would probably be required to make a number of description and analysis statements ("statement" here is used as an indicator of a simple speech act). That is, in order to have successfully described or analyzed in Feldman's sense, a critic would probably have to have performed a complex speech of describing or analyzing. From his text this seems not to be the case with performance of the procedures of interpreting and judging.
That Feldman operates under the notions of description and analysis as complex speech acts appears obvious from the examples of description or analysis presented in his earlier text (see Feldman, 1967, pp. 471, 473-475). It is also suggested in his characterization of these operations or procedures. For example he states in his earlier text that a critical description

involves (1) making an inventory of the names of the things we see in an art object and (2) performing a technical analysis or description of the way the work seems to have been made. (Feldman, 1967, pp. 471, 472)

And, in his later text, analysis involves "describing shapes, size, color,... textural,... space and volume relationships" (Feldman, 1970, pp. 358, 359).

By way of contrast, it is not as obvious from Feldman's texts that interpretation and judgment are to be construed as both complex and simple speech acts in this manner. They are, in fact, more closely aligned in his account with single statements or simple speech acts of distinctive kinds. Thus for Feldman

A critical interpretation is a statement about a work of art that enables the visual observations ... to fit together and make sense. (Feldman, 1970, p. 362)

and judgments are presented as "assertions of aesthetic value" (Feldman, 1967, p. 488). In keeping with this conception of interpretation and judgment as simple speech acts, the examples presented in Feldman's earlier text (Feldman, 1967) suggest that a single statement or speech act could be considered in many circumstances an appropriate and satisfactory performance of the "operation" or "procedure" of interpretation and judgment although this would probably not be true of the "operation" or "procedure" of "description" and "analysis".
This raises the question of whether the operations or procedures of interpretation and judgment can, indeed, be considered complex speech acts in Feldman's account. It would seem reasonable to assume that they can be, since Feldman apparently would allow that in certain circumstances a critic might make more than one interpretation and judgment (simple speech act) in the respective operations or procedures of interpretation and judging. This, for example, seems to be the point of remarks that Feldman makes about interpretation in his earlier text when he states that

The things we see and hence value or disvalue are literally changed by historical and environmental circumstances so that we are quite justified in finding more than one satisfactory hypothesis to serve in the interpretation of a work. (Feldman, 1967, p. 481)

Thus Feldman does not specifically rule out the making of more than one interpretation or judgment in the operation or procedure of interpretation and judgment.

Given that Feldman could consider interpretations and judgments to be complex speech acts, a more problematic question is raised by inquiring into the constituent statements which would figure in the complex speech acts of interpreting and judging. The problem that arises here is the same problem that arose from a consideration of Smith's accounts of criticism. That is, in not clearly distinguishing between simple and complex speech acts, Feldman fails to clearly specify the constituent statements of the complex speech acts of interpreting and judging which he tends to treat as simple speech acts or statements in his account. Yet his account also speaks of the reasons which will support interpretation and judgment. If these reasons are considered to be description and analysis statements (which
his account sometimes suggests) there would appear to be a conflict with his conception of criticism as a sequence of stages beginning with description and analysis, moving to interpretation, and ending with evaluation or judgment since reasons are usually given after an interpretation or judgment has been made in contexts in which disagreement exists with what the critic has said. Is Feldman, then, committed to the rather awkward prescription that the reasons which support interpretations and judgments must be given only prior to making interpretations and judgments? Or is there, indeed, an inconsistency between his conception of criticism as a set of statements and his conception of criticism as a set of sequential procedures? Or, finally, are the description and analysis statements given as reasons in support of interpretations and judgments to be considered part of the complex speech act of interpreting and judging? It is this last possibility which appears the most plausible. Interpretation and judgment as complex speech acts, then, unlike the complex speech acts of description and analysis, are probably held by Feldman to be constituted both by the performance of interpretation and judgment statements but also by the reasons which are held to support such statements. I shall discuss more specifically the nature of the constituent statements of complex speech acts and the possibility of inconsistency in a later section of this chapter.

Mental and Physical Uses of Critical Terms

Despite Feldman's definition of "criticism" as "talk -- spoken or written -- about art" (Feldman, 1970, p. 348), mental uses of critical terms play an important role in his conception of criticism
and much of his exposition of the meaning of critical terms is spent in clarifying various mental concomitants of linguistic or speech acts of cing. These mental concomitants Feldman appears to construe as active doings, or mental acts of one sort or another. Before proceeding with an account of Feldman's use of critical terms to indicate such mental active doings, it will be helpful to briefly recall some of the findings of Chapter II of this study. In this chapter, I found all critical terms to have uses as linguistic active doings (activities and achievements) in physical contexts. Feldman's definition of "criticism" as "talk -- spoken or written -- about art," then, does indeed encompass these uses of critical terms. Critical terms, however, also have uses in mental contexts and, although, Feldman consistently uses critical terms to indicate mental doings of one sort or another, these doings are not captured in the definition presented above.

Critical terms it will be remembered can also be used in mental contexts to indicate linguistic active doings (activities and achievements of soliloquizing or speaking to oneself). Only some critical terms, however, can be used ordinarily to indicate nonlinguistic doings in mental contexts. "Description" and "evaluation" are not critical terms which can be used in this way. "Analysis" and "(value) judgment", differ from "interpretation" in that the former are used to indicate active doings (activities and achievements) while the latter in ordinary language indicates a nonactive doing (an achievement).

The difference in behavior which critical terms exhibit in mental contexts was perhaps the source of a certain amount of perplexity to Feldman. Perhaps because Feldman was committed to criticism as a
learning method that is, as a method which someone can apply independently of an audience in order to attain a desired educational goal, he seems committed to the notion of critical procedures or operations as mental active doings as well as physical active doings. Feldman's expositions of critical terms characteristically present what he takes to be a concomitant mental active doing of cing to the linguistic active doings held to indicated by these same critical terms. Given an intuitive understanding of the meanings of critical terms and a commitment to reporting their ordinary meanings, Feldman undoubtedly senses a conflict with his desire to present some critical terms as indicators of mental active doings in keeping with his conception of criticism as a learning method. Some critical terms simply are not used in this way in ordinary language. Such a conflict explains some peculiar characteristics of his definitions, some muddled passages in his definitions, and some of the modifications which he makes between his earlier and later texts.

There are a number of places in his accounts where one might expect such difficulties to arise. Since "description" does not have nonlinguistic mental uses, Feldman has trouble in integrating description within his conception of critical procedures as a concomitant pairing of mental and linguistic acts. "Analysis", on the other hand does have uses as nonlinguistic mental active doings as well linguistic doings in physical contexts, and Feldman's discussion of analysis shifts easily and frequently between one use of "analysis" and another. "Interpretation" for Feldman, presents special problems. Although interpretation can be considered a mental doing, it is not a doing in the sense of an activity or active doing but rather must be considered a nonactive achievement in ordinary language. The difficulty which
Feldman has in attempting to explain the nature of the "mental process" of interpreting arises from a mistake of category: of confusing a momentary episode beyond the control of the subject with a process in which the subject acts as an agent. Finally "judgment", like "analysis", has uses as both nonlinguistic mental active doings and as linguistic acts in physical contexts. As with his discussion of analysis, his account shifts from one meaning of the term "judgment" to another. In the following I discuss each of the above points in turn.

**Description.** Since "description" is not ordinarily used to indicate a nonlinguistic mental doing, there is a certain intuitive awkwardness in treating the procedure of describing as a nonlinguistic mental active doing conjoined with an active doing of speaking. Feldman attempts to resolve this awkwardness in several ways. In his earlier text, one way a shift between mental and physical matters is accomplished is through an equivocation in the meaning of the term "note" which is used as a definiens. Thus, in his early text Feldman states that

> Description is a process of taking inventory, of noting what is immediately presented to the viewer. We are interested at this stage in avoiding as far as possible the drawing of inferences, we wish to arrive at a simple account of "what is there," the kind of account about which any reasonably observant person would agree.... Likewise in critical description, interpretation must be deferred. The language of the critic should be as "unloaded" as possible. That is, it must not contain hints about the value of what is described. [Emphasis added] (Feldman, 1967, p. 470)

"Noting" is a convenient term to use in defining "description" because it is used ordinarily in both a mental sense to indicate a nonlinguistic active doing and in a physical sense to indicate a linguistic active doing (speech act). Its meaning in the above passage
hovers between that of a mental act and a speech act of one sort or another. Thus when Feldman says we are "interested in this stage in avoiding ... inferences" and "we wish to arrive at a simple account..." he is almost certainly using "noting" as a mental doing of one sort or another. On the other hand when he states that in describing "language... should be as 'unloaded' as possible" he is almost certainly using "noting" in the sense of a speech act.

The introduction of the word "noting" sets the stage for a discussion of certain mental processes which at a later point in his discussion is treated as something separate from description rather than as a concomitant part of the procedure of description:

You might say that there is no such thing as observation without value judgment, that we see everything in terms of its value or meaning to ourselves. However, I am trying to describe a system of criticism, which implies a discipline of seeing, interpreting, and judging. The natural mode of perception, which inevitably involves valuing, has to be resisted in an enterprise which claims to be disciplined and systematic. (Feldman, 1967, p. 470)

In his early text, then, Feldman attempts to resolve the awkwardness of "description" as a term lacking nonlinguistic mental uses by defining it in terms of a word which does possess such uses and by discussing certain mental processes of perception.

In his later text, Feldman adopts another strategy in addition to the two discussed above. He does, indeed, suggest that he would consider a nonlinguistic mental doing to be part of the meaning of "description" when he introduces his discussion of the procedure of describing with the heading "Attending to What We See: Description".

And certain mental processes are also treated as separate from the procedure of describing when he states
There are two ways to draw attention to a work of art you are going to criticize: the first is to identify the work; the second is to describe it. I prefer to emphasize description because that immediately involves us in using our eyes and minds to understand what we are looking at. (Feldman, 1970, pp. 384, 349)

An additional way in which Feldman attempts to accommodate describing within his conception of a learning method, however, is to treat the mental process, not as a nonlinguistic mental doing but rather as a linguistic mental doing, that is as a matter of soliloquizing or of speaking to oneself:

Describing a work of art can be done publicly, just by telling a group of people what you see; or it can be done privately by telling yourself what is there. (Feldman, 1970, p. 350)

In Feldman texts, then, the issue of whether mental processes are part of what he considers the procedure of describing or separate this procedure is never resolved. Indeed if Feldman did so, he would face two unwelcome consequences. If "description" is used to indicate a nonlinguistic mental process, Feldman would be offering a false reportive definition of the term since it cannot be used this way in ordinary language. On the other hand, if "description" is defined solely in terms of certain public speech acts, it would be an awkward prescription as a learning method, that is as a method which someone can use independently of an audience to attain a certain goal. Feldman's final strategy in his later text, then, is to treat description in part as a linguistic mental doing, that is as a matter of soliloquizing to oneself. This, indeed, is a use of "description" in accord with ordinary language and, hence, Feldman here is not offering a false reportive definitions of "description". Having students or others
soliloquize or describe to themselves, however, remains an awkward prescription as a learning method and if this interpretation of the mental component of the procedure of describing is accepted, it differs from the nonlinguistic mental active doings Feldman presents in the other critical procedures he discusses.

Analysis. The term "analysis" unlike "description" can be used in ordinary language to indicate a mental as well as a physical active doing and it is a characteristic of Feldman's account that analysis is treated in just this way. His definition of "analysis" shifts between one sense of analysis and another.

Although never explicitly presented, the shift between mental and physical matters, is apparent both in the definienda which Feldman uses and in the contexts surrounding his use of the term "analysis". For example, when Feldman introduces the section on analysis in his later text with the title "Observing the Behavior of What We See: Analysis" (Feldman, 1973, p. 357), "analysis" seems to be presented more as a perceptual process than as a matter of speaking. Yet immediately following this, "analysis" is defined as "describing the relationships among the things we see" (Feldman, 1973, p. 357). Here analysis seems to be presented as an activity of speaking. "Describing", as I have noted in the preceding section, is not ordinarily used to indicate mental matters.

The contexts in which "analysis" is used also suggests mental as well as physical matters. In his early text, for example, Feldman states

In formal analysis, we endeavor to go "behind" the descriptive inventory to discover how the things we have named are constituted. (Feldman, 1967, p. 473)
And with regard to this mental "endeavoring to go behind" he states

The idea of the viewer's expectation is very important in formal analysis. As mentioned earlier, there are certain universal expectations based on our erect posture and our experience with gravity; ... in addition to our reactions based on experience with nature, we respond to forms on the basis of our experience with other works of art as well as our cultural conditioning to what artistic forms should look like. (Feldman, 1967, pp. 475, 476)

This sense of "analysis" as a mental process contrasts with "analysis" in the sense of speaking publicly:

Formal analysis is also a type of description, but with it we are no longer engaged in naming things or describing the technical features of the work. (Feldman, 1967, p. 473)

This same shift, between a mental process and an act of speaking, is present in Feldman's later text. Analysis in addition to being a kind of description is also a process of "trying to notice":

In this stage [analysis] we want to find out what the forms do to each other -- how they affect or influence each other. Imagine two circles, one above the other. Although the forms are the same in each case, their relationships are different. One is a horizontal and the other is a vertical relationship. Obviously these relationships have a different effect on the viewer. The way forms are located, then, is one of the things we try to notice in formal analysis. (Feldman, 1970, p. 357)

Analysis is also presented as a process of observing:

We make the same kind of observation when analyzing the surface qualities of a work of art. Once again, this type of observation helps us discover the emotional qualities as well as the ideas conveyed by the art object. (Feldman, 1970, p. 358)

A characteristic feature of Feldman's treatment of the operation or procedure of analysis, then, is a shift between mental and physical matters in his discussion. Although Feldman is less than explicit on this point, it would appear that analysis as an operation or procedure
is regarded as having both a mental active doing component and a
physical active doing component. Since "analysis" in ordinary language
can be used to indicate both mental and physical doings, Feldman does
not experience the intuitive difficulty that he does in defining
"description". That is, "analysis," unlike "description," can be used
to indicate nonlinguistic active doings. Therefore, Feldman does not
need to hypothesize a separate mental process nor does he need to
treat the mental process of analyzing as a matter of soliloquizing or
of speaking to oneself.

Interpretation. "Interpretation" like "analysis" can be used to
indicate both mental and physical matters. As with his discussion of
analysis, Feldman's treatment of the operation or procedure of inter­
pretation shifts between one use of "interpretation" and another.
This, again, is in keeping with his conception of interpretation as a
learning method which a critic or other person can perform independently
of an audience.

Unlike analysis, however, special problems arise in treating
interpretation as a learning method. As I have argued in Chapter II,
"interpretation" in ordinary language is used to indicate a nonactive
achievement rather than an active doing in mental contexts. Thus,
interpretation in a mental sense must be construed as a momentary
episode (a "success" of some sort) rather than as a mental activity
over which an agent has control. The difficulties which Feldman has
in attempting to describe the mental "process" of interpreting and
the special importance which he attaches to this "process", I shall
argue arise out of a mistake of category.
As with "analysis", Feldman uses "interpretation" ambiguously to indicate both mental and physical matters. Interpretation is first of all a matter of speaking publicly. In Feldman's texts this conception of interpretation is revealed in several ways. One way is by presenting interpretation as a matter of "expression":

"By interpretation in art criticism, I mean a process through which the critic expresses the meanings of the work under scrutiny." (Feldman, 1967, p. 477)

Here "expresses" can only reasonably be construed as "linguistic expression" or as a matter of speaking publicly. A similar way of presenting interpretation is found in Feldman's later text:

"Clearly, we have been building to the stage of interpretation. This is the stage where you give expression to your natural desire to respond to an experience as completely as possible." (Feldman, 1970, p. 364)

Interpretation as a matter of speaking publicly is also revealed in Feldman's choice of definienda. "Interpretation" is defined by appealing to three illocutionary terms, terms which do not have mental uses in ordinary language. When Feldman states that an interpretation is a "statement about a work of art" or a "statement of the problem that the work seems to be trying to solve" (Feldman, 1970, p. 362) interpretation can only reasonably be interpreted as a matter of speaking publicly. This is also the case when he states that "An interpretation might be regarded as an explanation of the work" (Feldman, 1970, p. 362) and when he discusses the process of interpretation by saying that "We use words ... to describe [my emphasis] ideas -- ideas that, in turn, explain the sensations or feelings we have in the presence of the art object" (Feldman, 1970, p. 362).
A mental conception of interpretation is also present in Feldman's texts, however, although various parts of his texts present this mental doing in different ways. For example it is difficult to precisely determine whether it is the mental doing of interpreting or a joint combination of both a mental and a physical doing together which is considered to be the operation or procedure of interpretation. In his early text, he states

The work of interpretation is tremendously challenging and is certainly the most important part of the critical enterprise.... One of the faults occasionally found with art instruction is that value judgments are too rarely expressed, that the exclusive emphasis in teaching is on interpretation and explication. But such a bias or emphasis is understandable since the task of arriving at an explanation of a work of art is exceedingly stimulating to teacher and student alike. (Feldman, 1967, p. 478)

In this passage it is the mental doing of interpreting which is considered to be the method or procedure. This conception of a mental doing as a method is present in other passages as well. For example in his early text he also states that

Our critical procedure should be designed to get at those meanings which can be visually confirmed in the present work... (Feldman, 1967, p. 486)

Although it may be that the mental doing of interpreting is considered to be the method or procedure of interpretation, it is also possible to regard speaking publicly as the operation or procedure of interpretation. At some points in his texts, for example, Feldman distinguishes between the mental and physical doings of interpreting by attaching the label "forming an hypothesis" to the former. In doing this he suggests that the act of speaking publicly might also be considered interpreting:
Clearly, we have been building to the stage of interpretation. This is the stage where you give expression to your natural desire to respond to an experience as completely as possible. (Feldman, 1970, p. 364)

Perhaps it is most plausible, however, to construe Feldman's conception of interpretation as one having both a mental component and a physical component; that is, as an operation or procedure in which a mental act of forming an hypothesis precedes a physical act of giving expression to this hypothesis (and perhaps other statements as well). After speaking specifically of the "method of forming" an interpretation, for example, (Feldman, 1970, p. 364) Feldman also goes on to say

Clearly, we have been building to the stage of interpretation. This is the stage where you give expression to your natural desire to respond to an experience as completely as possible. (Feldman, 1970, p. 364)

In these passages he suggests that along with a mental process of interpreting, the act of speaking publicly would be considered an integral part of the operation or procedure of interpretation. This is also the case when he states

Explaining a work of art, which may be understood as interpreting the work, involves discovering its meanings and also stating the relevance of the meanings to our lives and to the human situation in general. (Feldman, 1967, p. 478)

Thus in keeping with the models of previous critical operations or procedures discussed earlier, Feldman appears to regard the operation or procedure of interpretation as a joint combination of a mental doing and a physical doing. That is, in interpreting a critic would first interpret in a mental sense and then interpret by speaking publicly.
Although Feldman specifically considers the mental doing of interpreting to be the method, or at least part of the method, of interpretation, his texts present various versions of this mental doing, not all of which are consistent either with each other or with the role of interpretation as a prescriptive method. For example in a number of places in his early text Feldman specifically regards interpreting as a matter of discovering or finding. About interpretation he says

> It is necessary ... to observe that an art object somehow becomes charged with ideas ... ideas which are frequently very significant. They may, indeed, be present in the works without the conscious knowledge of the artist. But it is our function as critics to discover what these ideas or meanings are. (Feldman, 1967, p. 478)

With regard to interpreting contemporary art he says

> In confronting contemporary art it is not difficult to be influenced unduly by the reputation of the artist or the quantity of written material devoted to his work. However, the literature of art and the reputability of artists should be used as a guide to the meanings to be found in specific works, ultimately the critic must discover these meanings for himself. (Feldman, 1967, p. 479)

If Feldman conceives of the mental doing of interpreting as a matter of discovering or finding, objections can be raised to his prescription for interpretation as a method. Implied in a prescription for a method is that an agent can voluntarily decide to perform the doing being presented. One cannot decide to find or discover, however, since findings and discovering although doings are nonactive in nature.

It may be that Feldman intuitively senses some difficulty with the above conception of interpretation as a method because his accounts also attempt to present this mental doing of interpretation as a process of some sort. A passage in which both of these conceptions of interpretation are confounded is the following:
Discovering the meaning of art does not involve the discovery of verbal equivalents of the visual qualities of the art object. Unfortunately, some writing about art endeavors to do just this, with disastrous results for art criticism. In critical interpretation, however, we deal with sensuous and formal qualities of the art object by examining the impact these qualities have upon our vision. As we perceive the work, the formal and other qualities become organized into a kind of unity, and it is this unity which becomes the meaning of the work, the meaning we wish, however badly, to verbalize. (Feldman, 1967, p. 479)

The mental doing of interpretation in the above passage is presented as both a matter of "discovering" (nonactive achievement) and as a matter of "examining" (active doing). In other passages Feldman is even more specific in regarding interpretation as a process or active doing of some kind.

We have offered examples of hypotheses for the interpretation of a single work, a painting executed in the 1880's one which is not very difficult to fathom, at least superficially. But how is the hypothesis formed? A hint about the process can be gained, curiously enough, from the remarks people make about very "experimental" works of art,... (Feldman, 1967, p. 482)

Two inconsistent conceptions of the mental doing of interpretation, then, are implicit in Feldman's accounts. However, in keeping with his conception of interpretation as a method, he seems to favor the notion of this mental doing as a process of some sort.

Feldman encounters many difficulties with this conception of interpretation, especially in presenting this procedure of interpretation in such a way that it can be followed by others. The process of "forming an hypothesis" is in fact a misnomer in Feldman's texts since what Feldman really describes is a process of either testing an hypothesis or else attempting to formulate hypothesis. In his early text directions for "forming an hypothesis" are given in this way
How can we begin the task of interpretation? Fortunately, the tasks of description and analysis have preceded interpretation and several possible explanations of the work may already have presented themselves spontaneously. Now we must consciously and deliberately attempt to formulate a specific explanation which will fit the evidence we have been assembling. The explanations which seemed to suggest themselves as we analyzed the art object may have been based on an incomplete examination of the work as a whole. Yet we can try one or more of them as hypotheses to see if they are satisfactory. (Feldman, 1967, p. 480)

The shift from forming to testing is also present in his later text:

Now how do we build an interpretation? As suggested earlier, it is difficult to be right at the first try. In fact, being wrong—missing the target—is very helpful in arriving finally at a convincing explanation. Testing an idea, even if it doesn't fit all the visual evidence, helps you decide which adjustments to make in your explanation, which visual features are controlling and which are subordinate, which guess or intuition is promising and which looks like a dead end. This process is what I call forming an hypothesis. (Feldman, 1970, p. 363)

In his later text also, Feldman makes another attempt to describe this process. This time, however, interpreting becomes not a process of testing but rather a process of attempting to interpret:

Since feelings are so important in art criticism, we try to pay special attention to any impression that seems to suggest itself while we are interpreting a work. Usually, such impressions come to us in the form of "looks like" and "feels like" reactions. They may be funny, illogical or absurd, but do not reject them. Try to use your far-out impressions. The way to employ these strange, even weird, ideas is to ask yourself what they have in common with the relationships you were able to describe in your formal analysis. Perhaps your "looks like" or "feels like" reaction can be modified so that it fits some or all of the formal relationships in the work of art. Your "looks like" reaction is often a very shrewd response to the work except that it does not sound like what an art critic should say. But if you work on that response — sharpen it, say it in a more general way — you can retain its fundamental insight and sensitivity without sounding silly or stupid.
This method of forming an interpretation is nothing more than a way of trusting yourself -- your observations, your hunches, your intelligence. During the stages of description and analysis, your mind and imagination were working more than you realized. But you kept them "quiet" and under control in order to concentrate on a full description of the art object. Now, during interpretation, you can draw on those impressions. They are much more useful now because there has been time for them to interact with your whole personality. Your intuitions are richer because you have given yourself a chance to combine them with a greater variety of thoughts and observations. (Feldman, 1970, p. 364)

What begins as a method or procedure for forming an hypothesis then, in the above passage becomes a "procedure" over which, in effect, one has no active control. One simply has to "trust" that interpretations will have been presented by the mind or the imagination.

Feldman, then, encounters difficulty in attempting to describe the process or procedure of interpreting or as he terms it, forming an hypothesis. In attempting to specify this process or procedure, Feldman finds that it becomes strangely elusive. What he in fact describes is not a process of forming but rather a process of testing or else of attempting to form an hypothesis. But neither the process of attempting to formulate an interpretation nor the process of testing an interpretation can in fact be considered interpreting. Feldman's attempt to specify the procedure of forming an hypothesis is in fact uninformative as a set of directions that one can follow.

Is then "forming a hypothesis" a process? I have argued that mental uses of "interpret" are not processes but rather nonactive achievements. Processes take time, achievements are momentary. Processes are things that one can be engaged in, achievements are not. Processes are things that one can decide to do, nonactive achievements
indicate doings that are beyond ones control. The root of Feldman's difficulty seems to lie in a mistake of category.

The misconstrual of certain kinds of achievements or successes as infallible processes is a familiar one in philosophy. Ryle (1949), for example, cautions against regarding seeing or finding as a special form of looking or searching. These "processes" were somehow found to lack the "tangibility" of other processes. I have commented on the elusive character of interpretation for Feldman. Here it also seems appropriate to comment on the unusual value that Feldman places upon interpreting. In his early text he remarks

The work if interpretation is tremendously challenging and is certainly the most important part of the critical enterprise. (Feldman, 1967, p. 478)

In his later text he notes that

This stage of art criticism is the most difficult, the most creative, and the most rewarding. It is the stage when you have to decide what all your earlier observations mean. (Feldman, 1970, p. 362)

This mistake of equating certain achievements with certain kinds of processes, as Ryle points out, is a mistake in category. Seeing is not comparable to running a race, it is comparable to winning a race. It is not an infallible process but, rather, something different altogether. In construing mental uses of "interpret" as special sorts of processes; Feldman violates the ordinary meaning of the term "interpret" and makes a mistake of category.

In this section, then, I have documented the shift between mental and physical matters in Feldman's discussion of interpretation. Although "interpretation" does have mental uses, such uses do not indicate active doings but rather indicate nonactive doings or achievements. Some
of the difficulties with Feldman's discussion arises from equating this doing with a process of some sort in keeping with his conception of interpretation as a learning method, an operation or procedure to be employed by an agent in the absence of an audience.

**Judgment.** "Judgment" like "analysis" can be used in ordinary language to indicate both a nonlinguistic mental doing and a linguistic doing of speaking publicly. As with his use of "analysis", Feldman's use of "judgment" shifts between one meaning of the term "judgment" and other.

In keeping with his general definition of "criticism" as "talk — spoken or written -- about art", judgment is, first of all, conceived as a matter of speaking publicly. Such a conception of judgment is revealed, for example, when Feldman asserts

> Whenever a collector, dealer, or critic says that a work is good, he is saying, in effect, that it has the power to satisfy or please many viewers for a long time. (Feldman, 1970, p.371)

Yet Feldman also uses "judgment" in the sense of a nonlinguistic mental doing. Such a conception is revealed when he introduces the section on judgment in his later text with the phrase "deciding about the value of an art object" or when he asserts

> For many of us deciding whether a work of art is worth serious attention is one of the most important problems of art criticism. Some people collect art, however, and for them the decision is complicated by the fact that they will risk their money and much of their time on their judgment. (Feldman, 1970, p. 370)

The verb "decide" in the above passages is not a verb of speaking since one can decide something without ever uttering words, sentences, etc.

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2. Feldman's assertion is, of course, false and represents a confusion on his part between locutionary and illocutionary aspects of statements.
There are at least two uses of "judgment" then in Feldman's text. "Judgment" is used both in its sense as a nonlinguistic mental doing and in its sense as a speech act. Such a shift of meaning is not made explicit in Feldman's account but rather must be inferred from the context in which "judgment" is used. As with the other critical operations or procedures which he discusses, such a shift in meaning can be accounted for by Feldman's desire to present criticism as a learning method, one that can be applied independently of an audience.

In the above section, then, I have discussed the shift between mental and physical matters in Feldman's definitions of critical terms. I have pointed out that, despite his general definition of criticism as "talk about art", mental uses of critical terms play an important role in his conception of critical operations or procedures. I have also discussed some difficulties with his account. Difficulties which Feldman has with the terms "description" and "interpretation" arise out of a conflict between his prescriptive conception of criticism as a learning method, one that can be applied independently of an audience, and his desire to report or describe the meanings of critical terms. Despite Feldman's desire to present the meanings of "description" and "interpretation" as nonlinguistic active mental doings, these terms are not used this way in ordinary language. The difficulty Feldman encounters, then, arises out of a conflict between two inconsistent motives in his account. Such a conflict explains some peculiar characteristics of his discussion, some muddled passages in his writing, and some emendations which he makes to his earlier definitions of critical terms.
Having attempted some preliminary clarification of Feldman's use of critical terminology, I now turn toward a discussion and appraisal of his definitions of critical terms as indicators of a number of distinct linguistic or speech acts of various kinds. In the next section I discuss distinctions which he makes among various simple speech acts or statements of cing.

**Feldman's Distinctions Among Simple Speech Acts or Statements**

A major way in which Feldman's later account of criticism (Feldman, 1970) is comparable to Beardsley's and Smith's accounts, is in his use of critical terms ("description", "analysis", "interpretation", and "judgment") to indicate simple speech acts or statements of various kinds. In this section, I analyze and appraise those definitions in Feldman's account concerned with such critical statements.

**Modes of Definition**

In attempting to describe or report the meanings of critical terms, Feldman favors two modes of definition both of which attempt to establish an equivalence between the definiens and the critical term being defined. Feldman for the most part does not directly present actual examples of the statements he considers to be representative of critical acts in his later account. Nor does he present conditional definitions by stating the necessary and/or sufficient conditions under which, say, acts of cing are performed. Rather, he constructs synonym

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3. Feldman approaches a conditional definition of "judgment" when he discusses the criteria to be employed in judging. One might presume that the employment of one or more of these criteria might be a necessary condition for the act of judging to have occurred. But this is not explicitly stated in Feldman's account.
definitions by proposing a substitute illocutionary term for the term being defined or he constructs classification definitions by proposing another illocutionary act as a general category and then citing a number of differentia between this general act and the more specific act being discussed.

Feldman's synonym definitions, I shall argue, are false definitions inasmuch as the terms he treats as synonymous, in fact indicate quite distinct illocutionary acts.

Feldman's classification definitions on the other hand, suffer both from a lack of clarity and a lack of sophistication. One problem with his definitions arises in his choice of a basic category. I have discussed these problems earlier in attempting to separate prescriptive and definitional concerns in Feldman's account. Earlier, I maintained that the basic category indicated by critical terms could reasonably be presumed to be an act of one sort or another. However, in defining critical terms, Feldman does not simply present the concept of an act as a basic category but rather he defines critical terms by means of other critical terms. For example "analysis" is defined in terms of the act of description (Feldman, 1970, p. 357). The problem that arises at this point is a problem that arises with Smith's accounts. In defining one critical term by means of another critical term, Feldman subsumes one critical act under another and implies that some illocutionary acts are generic to others i.e., that some critical acts are more specific versions of other acts. However, Feldman offers no reasons for construing them in this way. In the absence of any supporting reasons for considering some critical acts to be generic to
other acts (instead of being merely related to other acts), one can be skeptical of at least some of the claims implied in Feldman's definitions: Some of his definitions seem committed to a theoretical account of linguistic acts which, at the very least, goes beyond presently available knowledge and seems inconsistent with the notion of illocutionary acts as acts having distinctly different sets of conditions for their performance.

For his classification definitions, Feldman uses both the confirmability and the content of each sort of statement as a basis for distinguishing the specific act under consideration from other acts presumably falling within the same category. To make this claim, however, requires some interpretation of Feldman's text and in the following I discuss each of these differentia in more detail.

The Confirmability of Critical Statements. First, Feldman seems to hold that some critical statements, namely description and analysis statements, are more confirmable than other critical statements. That is, he appears to differentiate description and analysis statements from interpretation and judgment statements by asserting that the truth or falsity of such statements is more objectively decidable than is the truth or falsity of interpretation and judgment statements. To attribute such a belief to Feldman, however, requires some interpretation because his later account, unlike his earlier account, does not present such a claim in any straightforward manner. In his earlier account he states

In making a formal analysis, we have been accumulating the evidence which will help us to attempt interpretations of the work and also to make judgments of its excellence. (Feldman, 1967, p. 476)

4. Feldman's classification of interpretations under the concept of a statement, however, may be an appropriate classification since the conditions underlying the performance of acts of stating are very general.
And he goes on to say

Our formal analysis has begun to move now from an objective
description of the forms to statements about the way we
perceive the forms.... As our observations of the work
increase, as the information begins to accumulate, it be-
comes increasingly difficult to defer the work of inter-
pretation. However, we can undertake the task of inter-
pretation with certain modest feelings of security: we
have tried to be objective in our descriptive account of
the work; we have tried not to overlook evidence which
might affect our conclusions; and we have endeavored to
make assertions about the work which would not in themselves
be the subject of disagreement. (Feldman, 1967, p. 477)

In his earlier account, then, Feldman seems to be saying that
descriptions and analysis statements are more confirmable than inter-
pretation and judgment statements. It is for this reason that they
would be used to support these latter statements.

In a somewhat more diffuse way, this seems to be the point of
several parts of Feldman's discussion in his later text. For example,
he says the following about description and analysis:

When the description and formal analysis are completed,
the critic has probably been able to describe most of the
visible features of the art object. These critical
operations accomplish the following ....

.................................................................
4. They accumulate the visual facts that will form the
basis for a critical interpretation.
5. For public criticism, they help to establish a
consensus about which features of the art object con-
stitute the subject of interpretation and judgment.
(Feldman, 1970, p. 359)

It is apparently because description and analysis statements are held
to be more confirmable than interpretation and judgment statements, that
Feldman does not discuss justification of such statements. In contrast,
his discussion of interpretation and judgment suggests that justifica-
tion is normally called for when such statements are given:
Although critical interpretations vary, we should not make the mistake of thinking that any interpretation of a work of art is as good as any other. The best interpretation would be one that (a) makes sense out of the largest body of visual evidence drawn from a work of art and (b) makes the most meaningful connections between that work of art and the lives of the people who are looking at it. Now this second trait of a good interpretation is the one which calls for a very creative critic. Of course, he must know enough about the language of art to observe and describe the art object sensitively and completely. But also, he must know enough about people—those who are viewing the work—to understand what interests or concerns them and how a particular work of art meets those interests and concerns. If I tell you things about art that you really do not want to know, I may be speaking truthfully, but not relevantly so far as you are concerned. Therefore, the good critic must be able to persuade people of the relevance or significance for them of the observations and meanings he has found in a work of art. (Feldman, 1970, p. 363)

In Feldman's account justification is also called for in making judgments of art objects:

To become a "judge" of excellence it is helpful to know how good "judges" or critics decide whether a work is poor or excellent. In other words, you must know the reasons good critics give for their opinions about art. If a critic gives no reasons -- directly or indirectly -- then he is not a good critic. If he asks you to rely on his judgment because he is famous, important, well traveled, well educated, well acquainted with artists, and so on, then he is not giving good reasons. The reasons for judging a work excellent or poor have to be based on a philosophy of art, not on a man's personal authority. (Feldman, 1970, p. 372)

In his later account, then, Feldman also appears to hold that description and analysis statements are more confirmable than interpretation and judgment statements.

One problem in attributing such a claim to Feldman arises with his equivocation between describing or reporting the meaning of critical terms and prescribing various acts of criticism as a method. Such a shift is apparent when Feldman states that
A description ... gives the critic a chance to get the
agreement of a group of people about what they are looking
at. One of the reasons why the public may disagree with
a critic's judgment is that they have not been looking at
the same work of art; they are really noticing different
features of the same object. By describing what he sees,
the critic gets his audience or public to examine the
same work that he plans to judge. Later on, when he
tries to form an interpretation, he can be reasonably
sure that he is talking about something his audience has
really observed. (Feldman, 1970, p. 349)

In the above, Feldman indeed suggests that descriptions might be more
confirmable than interpretations and judgments but when he continues
his account, he prescribes certain actions of those who are to make
descriptive statements:

In some descriptions you can get agreement about the names
of what you see. That is, you can say that a picture
shows a man, a tree, a lake, grass, children, animals,
sky, and so on. But sometimes, it may not be clear
whether you are looking at men, for example or women.
The forms may be too indistinct to enable you to make
that decision. In such a case, you should say you see
some people. Your objective is to describe only what you
are reasonably sure of. Perhaps other details will enable
you to decide, later on, whether you see men or women,
children or adults. Right now, during the stage of
description, you are more interested in a complete and
neutral inventory than in certainty and precision. We
would prefer to be vague about some detail rather than
take the chance of making an error that might throw off
the final interpretation. (Feldman, 1970, pp. 349, 350)

Thus, because of a shift between definitional and prescriptive
matters, Feldman's account is not clear on whether description and
analysis statements are held to be more confirmable than interpretation
and judgment statements. It does, however, seem reasonable to attribute
such a claim to him given the general tenor of his remarks and the more
straightforward claims presented in his earlier text.

The Content of Critical Statements. The second major way in which
Feldman differentiates among critical statements is on the basis of
their content. It may be remembered from Chapter IV, that a distinguishing characteristic of a number of acts of cing was found to be the propositional content of such acts. In differentiating critical acts on the basis of their content, Feldman may have an intuitive sense about the characteristic features of some acts of cing. Yet Feldman is not able to articulate a theory of reference and predication in making his content distinctions. Instead his account shifts from talking about the acts involved in making certain acts of cing (specifically in this case the acts of description, analysis, and interpretation) to a discussion of various features of works of art. Or, as in differentiating judgment from other acts of cing, he mistakenly fastens upon the use of various kinds of words (instead of predicates) as a distinguishing criterion. Perhaps the most serious error is committed by Feldman when he fruitlessly attempts to find a content criterion for differentiating interpretation from other acts of cing. In this instance a distinguishing feature is not matter of the propositional content at all, as it is in other acts of cing, but rather it is a matter of the preparatory conditions underlying the act itself.

Feldman then, makes a content distinction among acts of cing but because he does not present examples of the statements he is discussing, it is difficult to accurately transcribe the content distinctions he makes into distinctions of reference and predication as they are given in Searle's theory. I shall, however, attempt to suggest some parallels between Feldman's account and the analyses of acts of cing given in Chapter IV of this study.

Feldman, then, defines critical terms by offering either a synonym or a classification definition. In the first instance he presents an
Illocutionary term taken to have an equivalent meaning to the term being defined. In the latter instance he presents another specific illocutionary act as a general category. He differentiates acts of cing from one another on the basis of their confirmability and their content. In the following, I shall discuss more specifically each of Feldman's definitions.

Description

There are possibly two definitions in Feldman's account of description each of which is open to varying interpretation. The first definition is given when he states

Describing what you see is ... listing what an art object seems to be made of .... This process of listing is description. (Feldman, 1970, p. 349)

A second definition is also perhaps presented when he discusses the later stage of analysis. Feldman states

In the first stage of art criticism [description] we named the things we saw. (Feldman, 1970, p. 357)

Taken together each of the above definitions presents a problem of interpretation. If Feldman is indeed offering two separate definitions of "description", he would seem committed to the notion of description as a multi-functional concept, a highly unlikely notion since distinct sets of contextual conditions are involved in the successful performance of different illocutionary acts.

There are two -- perhaps more plausible interpretations -- of Feldman's account: First, it may be that Feldman is holding description to be an act subsumable under, or equivalent to either the illocutionary acts of listing or naming (but not both). Or another possibility is that Feldman is using the terms "listing" and "naming"
in order to articulate a concern with content; that is, the use of "listing" and "naming" may be a way of characterizing the act of describing in terms of what is referred to and/or predicated in such acts. In what follows, I examine each of these possibilities.

Is the act of description, indeed, equivalent to or subsumable under acts of listing and/or naming? Searle's theory suggests a number of difficulties with such a thesis in holding that illocutionary acts (acts such as describing, listing, and naming) are distinguished from one another on the basis of differences in the contextual conditions under which they are performed. One may reason that if it were the case that description, listing, and naming are distinct (although possibly related) acts, then it would seem that under some circumstances certain of these acts could be successfully performed while others could not. And consistent with this hypothesis, if one considers various circumstances under which the terms "describing", "listing", and "naming" are appropriately used, it does not seem that one term can substitute for another in all circumstances nor can the term "description" be substituted in all circumstances in which the terms "listing" and "naming" are appropriate. For example, it seems intuitively odd to ask someone to name the things that he sees in a nonobjective painting whereas it does not seem odd to ask someone to describe those things. Although a person perhaps could name the painting itself, the component parts of a nonobjective painting generally do not have names (in contrast to, say, the component parts of a group portrait). Analogously, it also seems possible to give a description which is not a listing. For example imagine describing a painting as an "angry mass of seething color". Given the appropriate circumstances, one can see no reason
why this could not be termed a description, yet it could hardly be termed a listing. The intuitive difficulties that one has in substituting one of these acts for another in different circumstances suggests that the concepts of description, listing, and naming are distinct from one another.

Since there seem to be problems with Feldman's attempts to define description in terms of other illocutionary acts, perhaps a more plausible construal of Feldman's use of "listing" and "naming" in his definitions is to regard them as attempts to erect a content distinction between description and other acts of _ing. A great deal of Feldman's discussion of the act of describing is given over to a discussion of the characteristics of the words used in making descriptions and of the features of art objects which figure in such acts.

Feldman first describes the function of words used in description:

The words you use in description are like pointers; they are not intended to be the exact equivalents of what you see. Instead they draw attention, or point to, something worth seeing. They force you to pause in your race to a conclusion and they help you to notice or attend to inconspicuous details of the art object. (Feldman, 1970, p. 349)

Feldman's characterization of the function of words used in description is reminiscent of Searle's characterization of referring expressions as expressions which serve to "pick out" or "identify" any thing, event, action, or any other kind of "individual" or "particular" (Searle, 1969, p. 27). However referring expressions do not exhaust the functions of words used in acts of describing so Feldman would be mistaken in holding that all the words in descriptive utterances function in this way. Acts of description, for example, also involve the predication of certain obvious or salient properties to the thing which is referred to and predicated expressions do not "pick out" or "identify".
It may be that Feldman would wish to draw some distinction between
the functions of referring and predicating expressions in the act of
describing. At a further point, he continues his characterization of
the words used in description as follows:

Remember that the purposes of a description are to point
out what can be seen (regardless of names) and to slow
down the viewer's tendency to form conclusions too
quickly. Therefore, the critic has to adjust his language
to the level of what he sees: the more abstract the forms,
the more general the words he uses to describe them.
Fortunately, we have words that call attention to the
specific properties, of very general things -- words like
vertical, round, oval, smooth, dark, bright, square,
horizontal, and so on. As these adjectives are combined
and attached to general nouns like shape, space, and
volume, we add precision to our description of a work of
art without judging or interpreting it too early.
( Feldman, 1970, p. 350)

Thus it may be that Feldman intends to draw a further distinction
in function between nouns and adjectives as referring and predicating
expressions respectively. But if this is the case it is not a particu­
larly clear distinction in his account. So one cannot be sure whether
a content distinction is to be drawn between descriptions and other
statements based upon the reference or the predication, or both the
reference and the predication of descriptive statements.

In the analysis presented in Chapter IV of this study, one of the
chief distinctions made between description and other illocutionary acts
was based on the predication of such statements. Although this is not
the only distinction which can be made among acts of cing, it was an
important differentia. In describing it is a necessary condition that
a speaker predicate obvious or salient properties of some object (thing,
etc.). By way of contrast, in analyzing it is necessary that a speaker
predicate constituents of that object (thing, etc.) and in value judging
it is necessary that a speaker predicate value properties. There is
some grounds for attempting to distinguish between describing and some
other acts of cing, then, based upon the propositional content of the
acts in question.

It may be an intuition about the propositional content of de-
scribing vis-a-vis other acts of cing which underlies a number of
passages in Feldman's account of description. In making a description,
for example, obvious or salient properties are predicated and several
passages in Feldman's text reflect an analogous concern with the more
obvious features of an art object:

A description also gives a critic a chance to get the
agreement of a group of people about what they are
looking at. One of the reasons why the public may
disagree with a critic's judgment is that they have
not been looking at the same work of art; they are
really noticing different features of the same art
object. By describing what he sees, the critic gets
his audience or public to examine the same work that he
plans to judge. Later on, when he tries to form an
interpretation, he can be reasonably sure that he is
talking about something his audience has really observed.
(Feldman, 1970, p. 349)

Although Feldman does not mention obvious or salient qualities specifi-
cally, it is perhaps because such qualities are predicated that one is
able to secure agreement among various percipients of an aesthetic
object.

In addition to suggesting a concern with obvious or salient
properties, Feldman's account also makes a distinction between the
various words used in descriptions and value judgments. In this dis-
tinction Feldman may be groping for a content distinction based upon
the predication of value properties.
The important feature of a good description is its neutrality ....

In order to be impartial or neutral, you have to watch your language, avoiding loaded words or expressions that reveal feelings and preferences. Assume that you are going to be challenged whenever you use adjectives that might suggest your point of view -- words like strong, beautiful, harmonious, weak, ugly, funny-looking, and so on. Instead use words like straight, curved, small, large, rough, smooth, light, dark. You can use the names of colors in description, too, because colors are neutral until judged in relation to surrounding shapes, sizes, textures, and other colors. (Feldman, 1970, p. 351)

Although Feldman is mistaken in fastening upon the use of words as a distinction between acts of description and value judging, it seems possible that his concern here can be translated into a concern with the kind of properties which are predicated in such acts. As I have pointed out in Chapter IV of this study, one differentia between value judging and other acts of cing such as describing is that in the former, value properties are predicated.

Parts of Feldman's account of description, then, suggests an intuition about the predication involved in such acts although this concern is not clearly articulated. But such an interpretation of Feldman's account in the end seems implausible since he also goes on to make a further content distinction between description and other acts of cing based upon specific kinds of features of aesthetic objects. In making this further distinction Feldman blurs a distinction between reference and predication by holding that descriptions are "about" only certain features of aesthetic objects. 5

5. It may be, however, that Feldman is prescribing when he discusses these features. This is one part of his account where it seems impossible to determine his intentions.
The particular features that Feldman cites are the content of an aesthetic object (presumably the depicted or portrayed subject and the symbolism of an aesthetic object), the function of an aesthetic object, and finally the materials and technique of an aesthetic object:

In some descriptions, you can get agreement about the names of what you see. That is, you can say that a picture shows a man, a tree, a lake, grass, children, animals, sky, and so on. But sometimes, it may not be clear whether you are looking at men, for example, or women. The forms may be too indistinct to enable you to make that decision. In such a case, you should say you see some people. Your objective is to describe only what you are reasonably sure of ....

Traditional works of art show many recognizable persons and objects — making the job of description easier. (But even recognizable persons and objects may present problems if they are part of a complex system of symbols, as in medieval art. In that case, it is necessary to be a student of iconology in order to know the original meaning and function of the work.) Contemporary abstract and nonobjective works rarely show us things that have common or proper names, so we have to describe the shapes, colors, spaces, and volumes we see .... the critic has to adjust his language to the level of what he sees; the more abstract the forms, the more general the words he uses to describe them.

Fortunately, we have words that call attention to the specific properties of things — words like vertical, round, oval, smooth, dark, bright, square, horizontal, and so on. As these adjectives are combined and attached to general nouns like shape, space, and volume, we add precision to our description of a work of art without judging or interpreting it too early.

Another phase of description is technical. That is, the critic tries to describe the way the art object seems to have been made. He discusses the way the paint was brushed on, the kinds of tools or manipulation used to create a sculptural surface, the way a building's walls were erected and supported. Naturally, the critic's own experience as an artist or as a person who has studied artistic methods will be very useful in technical description. Technique is important for criticism because it is just as expressive as the shapes and forms we see. (Feldman, 1970, p. 350)
In holding that descriptions are "about" certain features of aesthetic objects, it seems impossible to attribute to Feldman a content distinction based solely upon the predication of descriptive statements. There are many statements, for example, which are about the technique or the subject matter of aesthetic objects but in which expressions refer to the subject or the technique. Consider for example

The figure of Louis IV is standing in the corner of the painting.

The oil paint is applied forcefully throughout.

In other statements it is the predication which is concerned with the technique.

The painting is composed of three layers of paint.

So it would seem that if a content distinction is made based upon the features of an aesthetic object, that such a distinction cannot be drawn upon the lines of the reference or the predication of descriptive statements.

This content distinction at times seems inconsistent with Feldman's desire to erect a distinction based upon the confirmability of description statements since there are many examples of statements "about" the subject matter, function, or technique of a work of art which might very well be unconfirmable in certain circumstances. Consider this statement again

Louis the IV is standing in the corner.

In circumstances where the painting is ambiguous, it might not be clear whether the King actually is standing. Perhaps the figure is slouching and portrayed near a wall, and one cannot be sure whether he is leaning or
standing. Thus the distinction between features of an aesthetic object and the confirmability of a critical statement is not the same.

Feldman in the end, then, seems to have a number of criteria for distinguishing a description from other critical statements. A description in his theory probably would be a statement (a) "about" the depicted or portrayed subject matter and symbolism, "about" the function, "about" the nonrelational qualities, and "about" the materials and technique of an aesthetic object; (b) one in which the past act is highly confirmable or perhaps in which obvious or salient properties are predicated; and finally, (c) one in which certainly value properties are not predicated.

If Feldman had merely presented differences in predication as differentia (assuming that one can interpret Feldman's account in this way), then his account would have paralleled the analysis of description presented in Chapter IV of this study. However, when he goes on to make a further content distinction by citing specific kinds of features of aesthetic objects as differentia, he presents a false definition of "description". Interpretations of aesthetic objects, for example, are often "about" the subject matter of the aesthetic object; interpretations often predicate obvious or salient properties to aesthetic objects; and interpretations do not predicate value properties. Consider the following utterance:

Louis the IV is smiling.

This utterance when made in the presence of a painting of an unidentified person, but a person who is clearly smiling, might easily be considered an interpretation. It is because decisions about the represented or portrayed subject of a work of art so frequently figure in acts of
interpreting that Beardsley mistakes the class of such statements for interpretations. It is also clear that statements "about" the function, and the technique of an aesthetic object might also be interpretations. Consider the archaeologist who discovers an artifact in a tomb and then from its appearance makes judgments about its former use and the way it was constructed. In appropriate circumstances these also could be considered interpretations.

Feldman, then, errs in marking a distinction based upon certain features of aesthetic objects although his account suggests some parallel concerns with the analysis of description presented in Chapter IV of this study.

In summary, there appear to be a number of possible ways to interpret Feldman's account of description. On one interpretation he seems to equate or to subsume description under the concepts of listing and/or naming. On another interpretation his use of "listing" and "naming" is construable as an attempt to erect a content distinction between description and other acts of cing. On neither interpretation does his definitions seem tenable. Listing and naming seem to be quite distinct illocutionary acts. Although the possibility remains that they may be acts related to description, they do not seem to be acts which can be equated with description, nor does it seem likely that descriptions can be subsumed under these acts in ordinary language. Construing Feldman's definitions as attempts to erect a content distinction based upon the predication of critical statements, requires a great deal of interpretation since he does not articulate a theory of reference and predication. Some of his statements when interpreted seem consistent
with the analyses of acts of cing presented in Chapter IV of this study. Yet in the end it is perhaps impossible to precisely mark a distinction based upon predication in his account since it is clear from his discussion of the features of aesthetic objects, that both reference and predication would be involved. Finally, distinguishing descriptive statements from other acts of cing on the basis of certain features seems untenable even if one were to predicate obvious or salient properties and to avoid the predication of value properties since statements "about" depicted or portrayed subject matter, symbolism, function, and technique could be interpretations in the appropriate context.

Analysis

Feldman's definition of "analysis" is similar to his definition of "description" in its attempt to define a critical term by means of another illocutionary term. And, as with his definition of "description", it seems more plausible to regard this other illocutionary act not as a basic category, but as an attempt to erect a content distinction between "analysis" and other acts of cing.

Feldman's definition of "analysis" is as follows:

We must go one step further and try to describe the relationships among the things we see. This whole process is formal analysis. (Feldman, 1970, p. 357)

This is a classification definition in which both description and analysis are regarded as processes but analysis is presented as a more specific form of description: namely, description of the relationships among things that are seen in an aesthetic object.
Feldman goes on to discuss in some detail the relationships seen in an aesthetic object as the differentia between description and analysis:

In this stage we want to find out what the forms do to each other -- how they affect or influence each other. Imagine two circles side by side, and two identical circles, one above the other. Although the forms are the same in each case, their relationships are different. One is a horizontal and the other is a vertical relationship. Obviously these relationships have a different effect on the viewer. The way forms are located, then, is one of things we try and notice in the formal analysis.

Size relationships are very important. We do not see shapes and objects in isolation, we see them in pairs, groups, or clusters. We notice the largest or smallest shapes; or we notice whether the sizes are about the same ....

Shape relationships reveal a great deal too. What happens when curved shapes are next to each other, or when they are next to square or pointed shapes? How do jagged shapes affect smooth ones? Shape also calls attention to the quality of an edge. There are hard and soft, even and uneven edges....

Color and textural relationships should also be described. You have to notice whether the colors of related shapes are similar to, or different from, each other; whether they vary slightly or contrast strongly ....

Textural and surface relationships are things we notice in everyday life. For example, when you go out on a rainy day, you can usually tell from looking at surfaces whether you are about to step in a puddle, walk on a wet but firm sidewalk, or possibly slip on a thin coat of mud. You can often tell whether a metal surface is dirty or clean, wet or dry, perfectly new or old and bruised, or even whether it is hot or cold. We make the same kind of observation when analyzing the surface qualities of a work of art ....

Somewhat more difficult than describing shape, size, color, and textural relations is analyzing space and volume relationships. In painting, we look for clues to the location of forms -- not only on the picture plane, but also in depth, in the implied space that the artist creates by using perspective, size, color, or light-and-shadow relationships. We want to find out whether this implied space is indefinite, seemingly open and endless, or whether it has limits and is enclosed ....
Consequently, a critic should look for signs of openness or density, clarity or obscurity, darkness or light, and flatness or depth in his over-all treatment of space. (Feldman, 1970, pp. 357-359)

Feldman's discussion of relationships in aesthetic objects seems reminiscent of Beardsley's notion of relational qualities. Feldman of course does not distinguish between structural and textural relations nor does he distinguish between dual and serial relations. Moreover, it seems worth noting in passing that Feldman's examples of textural and surface relationships: wetness, dryness, oldness, newness, etc., do not seem to be concerned with relationships at all but rather with certain nonrelational qualities of aesthetic objects. However this last issue I shall not pursue in detail. Unlike Beardsley's account of relational qualities, however, it does not seem possible to interpret this content differentia of relationships as a distinction in predication with any sort of certainty. As we have seen, the relationships in an aesthetic object are a certain kind of feature of aesthetic objects and presumably Feldman would hold that analyses, as a species of description are "about" such relationships in the same way that descriptions are "about" other features of aesthetic objects. Given this, both statements which predicate a relational quality to an aesthetic object such as

This part is larger than that part.

and a statement which refers to a relationship in a work of art

A contrast of shape exists in the painting.

could be considered analysis statements. Thus, it does not seem possible to draw a precise distinction in Feldman's account between
analysis and other acts of cing on the basis of simply the predication of such statements. For Feldman, then, analysis statements are descriptive statements which are "about" relations existing within an aesthetic object.

At a first reading, Feldman's definition of "analysis" appears to aim in two separate directions at once. On the one hand Feldman subsumes analysis under the concept of description and on the other hand he is concerned with differentiating analyses from the class of descriptions. Perhaps the resolution to this puzzle lies in construing Feldman's use of "description" as a way of articulating a propositional content distinction between analysis and other acts of cing. Feldman then would hold that analyses, unlike other acts of cing, either refer to relations in, or predicate relations of some aesthetic object. The questions that need pursuing then are first, whether analysis statements are properly subsumed under acts of description and second, whether the content distinction that Feldman proposes really does differentiate analysis from other critical statements.

The question of whether acts of analysis can properly be subsumed under the general category of descriptions is a difficult one to answer. Both sorts of acts are closely related. Certainly the converse is not true. All acts of description are not subsumable under acts of analysis. The concept of description seems broader than that of analysis. As I pointed out in Chapter IV of this study, one can describe a painting which has no perceptible differences in surface tone, quality, etc. but one could hardly analyze it because it has no constituent parts. On the other hand, it seems difficult to decide whether all acts of analysis are subsumable under descriptions.
One suspects that they are not because, as I have pointed out earlier, performing acts of analysis requires knowledge of a more theoretical sort than does performance of acts of description. One needs knowledge of the constituents of an object or thing. Thus one can usually request of a small child that he describe an aesthetic object but a request to analyze that same object seems inappropriate. Feldman himself seems to recognize such a difficulty when he states that a student "must try [my emphasis] to describe the relationships among the things we see" (Feldman, 1970, p. 357). By way of contrast he does not present the act of description in terms of trying; he assumes that everyone indeed can perform a description.6 Thus at the outset one has qualms about subsuming acts of analyses under acts of description.

Perhaps some clarification of the notion of a constituent is in order to understand why acts of analysis cannot be considered descriptions. Feldman asserts that analyses are about the relations existing within an aesthetic object and he differentiates analyses from descriptions on this basis. Indeed in many instances predicating a relational quality to an aesthetic object seems equivalent to predicating constituents. For example consider these statements "about" the relations in a Kenneth Noland painting:

The canvas consists of a series concentric circles.

To those who know Noland's work, such a statement does seem to be an analysis but this is because the series of circles obviously does constitute the aesthetic object. Consider, however, a huge mural in

6. Although he does say that trying is involved in making a complete description. (Feldman, 1970, p. 357)
which a large number of geometric shapes appear. In the corner of this painting is a small circle in which two smaller concentric circles are painted. The statement

The small circle in the corner has two smaller circles within it.

does not intuitively seem to be an analysis of the painting.

What seems missing in the latter case is an awareness of the parts of the aesthetic objects in their relationship to the whole. Even though such a statement is "about" relationships in an aesthetic object, these relationships in this instance are not constituents, they are simply a minor aspect of the work itself. Because perception of the constituents of an aesthetic object requires a sophisticated vision guided by "theoretical knowledge", it is for this reason that analyses are more difficult to perform than are descriptions.

Feldman's attempt to subsume analyses under the concept of a description, then, seem untenable. The above analysis also indicates why Feldman's content distinction is not totally satisfactory as a differentia between analysis and other acts of cing. It depends upon the particular context of utterance whether a statement "about" the relational features of an aesthetic object is properly construed as an analysis. Feldman's attempt to differentiate analyses from other kinds of descriptions on the basis of particular features of an aesthetic object also breaks down when in certain contexts the particular relations are not constitutive of the aesthetic object as a whole.

In summary, then, Feldman presents a classification definition in which acts of analysis are both subsumed under acts of description and are differentiated from acts of description on the basis of a distinction
in content. In this section I have examined the attempt to subsume acts of analysis under acts of description and I have examined Feldman's use of a content criterion. The attempt to subsume all acts of analyzing under acts of describing seems untenable since knowledge of a more theoretical sort is required in performing the former act. It thus makes sense to ask a connoisseur or someone trained in the arts to perform an analysis of an aesthetic object but it might well be futile to ask a child to do the same. A child, however, could normally describe a work of art without prior instruction. Feldman's attempt to differentiate analysis from other acts of seeing on the basis of the relationships referred to in aesthetic objects, or predicated of aesthetic objects seems to me not totally without foundation since in many aesthetic contexts predicing relationships might be regarded as a description rather than an analysis of that object. These instances occur when the utterance reveals an awareness of the structure of the whole.

**Interpretation**

Feldman offers several definitions of "interpretation". These follow the pattern of his previous definitions in linking the concept of interpretation with other illocutionary concepts and in attempting to differentiate acts of interpreting from other acts of seeing on the basis of a content distinction.

These definitions are presented in the following passage:

A critical interpretation is a statement about a work of art that enables the visual observations we have made to fit together and make sense. In other words, what single, large idea or concept seems to sum up or unify all the separate traits of the work? Please notice that an interpretation does not describe the object (we have already done that); and it does not try to translate visual qualities into verbal combinations. We use words
now to describe ideas — ideas that, in turn, explain
the sensations and feelings we have in the presence of
the art object. An interpretation might also be re-
garded as an explanation of a work of art.

Sometimes an interpretation is a statement of the
problem that the work seems to be trying to solve.
We pretend that the art object -- like a person -- has
aims and purposes, that it "wants" or "tries" to reach
certain objectives. The evidence we have been gathering
in our description and analysis seems to point toward
those objectives, and as critics we try to state what
the objectives appear to be. (Feldman, 1970, p. 326)

There are possibly four separate attempts to define "interpreta-
tion" in the above passage. In two of the above definitions Feldman
classifies interpretation under the act of stating. In one definition
he classifies interpretation under the act of description. And in one
definition Feldman equates interpretation with the act of explaining
an aesthetic object.

In Feldman's definitions there are intuitions about the concept
of interpretation which perhaps can be made more fully articulate by
considering the analysis of "interpretation" presented in Chapter IV
of this study. There it will be remembered, interpreting was found to
be conceptually linked with the concept of understanding. In this
respect it was similar to the concept of explaining in that one who
either interprets or explains understands and intends to bring about
understanding in some hearer. One major difference between the two
concepts lies in the grounds that a speaker acts on in making his inter-
pretation since in cases of interpreting a speaker lacks adequate or
conclusive evidence for his understanding.

There is at least one major difference, then, between acts of
interpreting and acts of explaining. Hence, interpreting an aesthetic
object cannot be considered the same as explaining an aesthetic object.
Thus Feldman errs in one of his definitions when he asserts that an "interpretation might ... be regarded as an explanation of the work" (Feldman, 1970, p. 362). The concepts of interpretation and explanation are related but they are not identical.

The conceptual link of interpretation and understanding clarifies some of Feldman's other attempts at definition. Feldman's earlier text at times reveals a concern with both understanding and interpretation.

How is ... (an) hypothesis formed? A hint about the process can be gained, curiously enough, from the remarks people make about very "experimental" works of art, works which seem "wild" or "crazy". In museums and galleries we are accustomed to the things people say when they are frustrated in their efforts to understand difficult works of art. (Feldman, 1967, p. 482)

The link between interpreting and understanding is never formally articulated in those definitions concerned with interpretation as a linguistic act. Perhaps the closest that Feldman comes to a correct definition of "interpretation" is when he defines "interpretation" as a "statement about a work of art that enables the visual observations we have made to fit together and make sense" (Feldman, 1970, p. 362). The use of "statement" as a general category is a happy choice because stating is an illocutionary act of a very general nature.

Feldman is less successful in his other attempts at defining interpretation. When he asserts that "an interpretation is a statement of the problem that the work seems to be trying to solve" (Feldman, 1970, p. 362) he is appealing to a complicated metaphor. Feldman's "explanation" of this metaphor is also unenlightening:
We pretend that the art object — like a person — has aims and purposes, that it "wants" or "tries" to reach certain objectives. (Feldman, 1970, p. 362)

Perhaps the least successful of Feldman's classification definitions of "interpretation" is given when he selects acts of description as a general category.

Please notice that an interpretation does not describe the object (we have already done that); and it does not try to translate visual qualities into verbal combinations. We use words now to describe ideas — ideas that, in turn, explain the sensations and feelings we have in the presence of an art object. (Feldman, 1970, p. 362)

The above passage clearly illustrates the equivocal use of "describe" in Feldman's account. He begins by distinguishing acts of interpretation from acts of describing but he plainly includes interpreting within the category of description when he states "We use words ... to describe ideas". This inconsistency in Feldman's account can be clarified by treating Feldman's use of "describe" as a means of articulating a content condition between interpretation and other acts of cing. Feldman, thus, appears to be asserting that in interpreting one refers to ideas in an aesthetic object or one predicates ideas of an aesthetic object. It is plain that Feldman construes ideas in this instance as one more feature of a work of art as his earlier text makes clear:

Certain assumptions underlie our work in the critical interpretation of art. We assume that art always has, clearly or by implication, some ideological (in the nonpolitical sense) content. We assume that an art object, being a human product, cannot escape some aspect of the value system of its maker. Just as a human being cannot go through life without consciously or unconsciously forming a set of values, so also an art object, which is the very intimate result of an individual's encounter with ideas, materials, and experiences, cannot avoid being the vehicle of ideas. It is necessary, ... to
observe that an art object somehow becomes charged with ideas — ideas which are frequently very significant. They may, indeed, be present in the work without the conscious knowledge of the artist. But it is our function as critics to discover what these ideas or meanings are. (Feldman, 1967, p. 478)

The problem that arises here, is a problem that arises in Smith's account. In seeking to erect a content distinction between interpretation and other acts of cing, Feldman resorts to the elusive notion of an "idea", a notion, however, which remains unclarified in his account.

In summarizing, then, there are four possible definitions in Feldman's account of interpretation. The first of Feldman's definitions is a synonym definition in which he equates interpretation and explanation. This definition is certainly false inasmuch as the two concepts, although related, are quite distinct. Feldman's three classification definitions are not equally successful.

Two of these definitions classify interpreting under acts of stating. Possibly this is an appropriate general category since stating is an illocutionary act of a very general kind. Feldman's treatment of interpretation as a "statement ... that enables the visual observations we have made to fit together and make sense" (Feldman, 1970, p. 362) is more successful as a definition because of the conceptual link between interpretation and understanding. Feldman's treatment of interpretation as a "statement of the problem that the work seems to be trying to solve" (Feldman, 1970, p. 362) unfortunately depends upon an uninterpreted metaphor in the definiens. Equally unsuccessful is Feldman's treatment of interpretation as a form of description. I have argued his definition here can most plausibly be interpreted as a fruitless attempt to erect a content distinction between interpretation and other acts of cing.
Judgment

Feldman does not offer a formal definition of "judgment" in his later text but, rather, he depends upon a number of oblique references in different parts of his account on criticism to enlighten the reader. For example, it is presumably value judgments which are contrasted with descriptions when Feldman states that

The important feature of a good description is its neutrality. That is, your list or inventory contains only the things other people would agree are there. A description does not have any conclusions about the excellence of the meaning of what you see ....

In order to be impartial or neutral, you have to watch your language, avoiding loaded words or expressions that reveal your feelings and preferences. Assume that you are going to be challenged whenever you use adjectives that might suggest your point of view -- words like strong, beautiful, harmonious, weak, ugly, disorderly, funny-looking, and so on. (Feldman, 1970, pp. 350, 351)

In the above passage, it is presumably value judgments which involve "loaded" words and expressions and which contain "conclusions about the excellence ... of what you see". Such an interpretation is corroborated in that part of Feldman's account concerned specifically with value judgments. Feldman offers an illustration of such a judgment in the following:

Whenever a collector, dealer, or critic says that a work is good, he is saying, in effect, that it has the power to satisfy or please many viewers for a long time. (Feldman, 1970, pp. 370-371)

Strictly speaking, the above assertion is false but the example of an utterance using the term "good" (and, hence, predicating a value property) is congruent with Feldman's earlier distinction between description and other acts of cing.
It seems safe to say, then, that for Feldman statements involving loaded words or conclusions of value are value judgments and, taking into account his view that distinctions in confirmability exist between critical statements, he would hold that value judgments (along with interpretations) are less confirmable than descriptions and analyses.

Feldman's main concern in his discussion of judgment, however, lies not in defining "judgment" itself but in giving an account of the criteria which "good" critics use in arriving at, and supporting their value judgments.

To become a "judge" of excellence, it is helpful to know how good "judges" or critics decide whether a work is poor or excellent. In other words, you must know the reasons good critics give for their opinion about art. If a critic gives no reasons -- directly or indirectly -- then he is not a good critic. If he asks you to rely on his judgment because he is famous, important, well traveled, well educated, well acquainted with artists, and so on, then he is not giving good reasons. The reasons for judging a work excellent or poor have to be based on a philosophy of art, not on a man's personal authority. Fortunately, we have a choice of several philosophies of art for justifying critical judgments. You may prefer one or the other, but at least you have some freedom in choosing the philosophy that suits you best: you need not depend on someone's unsupported opinion. And, if you are resourceful, you can develop your own philosophy of art as a basis for judging the merit of any work that interests you. (Feldman, 1970, p. 372)

Feldman, thus, would hold that a good critic in judging either develops his own criteria or he uses one or more of the three aesthetic criteria derived from various philosophies of art. These philosophies Feldman calls formalism, expressivism, and instrumentalism. Feldman's major effort in discussing the act of judgment lies in giving an account of these three criteria.
The criteria which Feldman presents suffer from many of the same defects as Beardsley's criteria. Criteria function as criteria when they permit people to move from agreement about one matter, to agreement on a more controversial matter. They can only function in this way if agreement can be secured about both their applicability and their acceptability as appropriate criteria. Feldman's criteria, however, are value-laden, subjective (involve feeling or emotion), or metaphysical. As such it seems doubtful that they could function in their role as criteria in allowing people to arrive at value judgments and in aiding them to settle value disputes. Value-laden criteria often represent attempts to gain acceptability of the criterion as justification for the value judgment. This, however, is achieved at the cost of applicability. Ascription of these criteria is as controversial (or nearly as controversial) as is the original value judgment. Value assertions and defenses based upon such criteria have the character of tautologies since the value judgment is implicit within the criterion itself. Subjective criteria lack applicability. As a consequence, such a criteria cannot be used to settle value disputes since both parties to the dispute would be appealing to covert feelings. Metaphysical criteria are often the result of attempts to extend the range of acceptability and applicability. But since their meaning is controversial, they would neither allow students to reach a consensus about value decisions, nor could they be used to settle value disputes.

In using the above criteria students could not reliably judge works of art, nor could they rationally settle value disputes. I discuss these points in giving an analysis and critique of Feldman's three philosophical criteria.
Formalism. Feldman presents two successive versions of this first criterion. The first version attempts to state something about the objective features of a work of art: "The formalist believes art should demonstrate successful cooperation among all the parts of a work the way all parts of a living creature cooperate to keep it alive" (Feldman, 1970, p. 372).

This version of the criterion is of course value-laden. Feldman is claiming that a successful cooperation of parts is a criterion for the attribution of some excellence. But in order to avoid the circularity of simply equating successful with good, Feldman has the additional task of explaining the characteristics of successful cooperation.

One way of doing this would be to present objective features of works of art. Feldman, however, construes "successful organization" in terms of a subjective criterion, i.e., in terms of feelings. This is his second version of formalism:

How do we know that each part has been perfectly adjusted to every other part? It is usually in our feeling that there is no excess and no deficiency in any quality that the work of art brings to our attention. (Feldman, 1970, p. 372)

Subjective criteria as I have noted lack applicability. Feldman is certainly aware that some problem exists with his first criterion:

The trouble with formalism lies in its dependence on the reactions of a certain type of person as a test of artistic excellence. It would be better if we had an impersonal rule that we could use regardless of the feelings of individuals... (Feldman, 1970, p. 373)

If Feldman is tacitly admitting that there is no uniformity among the psychological reactions of people, then the usefulness of his criterion is suspect since it would seem that people would differ in their responses to aesthetic objects.
Feldman responds to this problem by appealing to the concept of a "normal person" or a person of "moderate feeling". Essentially this involves a suggestion that, despite the lack of intersubjective agreement usually associated with a person's feelings, such feelings are reliable as criteria because they will be present in "normal" people. However, the concept of a "normal person" or a person of "moderate feeling" is in itself troublesome. "Perfect art communicates its perfection to people who have managed to develop all their potential interests -- not to a maximum degree -- but to an ideal degree" (Feldman, 1970, p. 373). The problem with the above concept arises just at the issue that it was supposed to settle. Feldman tries to suggest that value disputes will not arise, either because a majority of people will have similar feelings or because knowledgeable people will have the same feelings. But of course value conflicts do arise and in the event of a value dispute the concept of a "normal person" is of no help at all. At the point of disagreement one would have to decide upon the "normality" of the disputants. (And can anyone be said to be truly "normal" or to have "developed his potential interests to an ideal degree"?)

Feldman's explanation of formalism, then, moves from a value-laden criterion to a subjective criterion. It is doubtful that such a criterion would allow someone either to determine aesthetic merit on a predictable basis or to settle value disputes.

Expressivism. Feldman's description of an expressivist criterion is circular in explaining a value-laden criterion in terms of subjective feelings and vice versa:
How, then, does the expressivist critic decide that one effective work is better than another? Basically, he has two rules for judging excellence: (1) that work is best which has the greatest power to arouse the viewer's emotions, and (2) that work is best which communicates ideas of major significance. These two rules are related, because the expressivist believes that the power to arouse emotions grows out of the forceful communication of an important idea. (Feldman, 1970, p. 374)

Feldman then is appealing to a work's expressing important ideas as a criterion of aesthetic excellence. (The vexing problem of how or whether all works of art in fact do express ideas is not discussed.) If works of art express ideas, how can one tell which of these ideas are important? At this point Feldman resorts to a subjective criterion: important ideas are known because they arouse emotion. Arousal of emotion indicates the presence of an idea of major significance. The circularity of his explanation is obvious.

One way out of the impasse between accepting either a value-laden or a subjective criterion might be to again suggest that feelings or arousal of emotion would be present in a consensus of people (the concept of a "normal person"). By suggesting this, one could again appeal to feelings as a reliable criterion of aesthetic excellence. Feldman adopts this strategy in his earlier text, *Art as Image and Idea*. In his later text, however, Feldman is satisfied to retain the circularity of his explanation and the ultimate subjectivity of such a criterion.

**Instrumentalism.** The most complex of Feldman's criteria is derived from an instrumentalist aesthetic. Stated simply, the criterion ascribes aesthetic excellence on the basis of the work of art effectively serving a good purpose. The criterion is of course value-laden. More problematic, however, is Feldman's equivocal use of the
term "purpose". By noting separate uses of the term, two different versions of the criterion can be distinguished.

Feldman's first version of this criterion presents a somewhat troublesome attempt to clarify the notion of institutional purpose. "[An instrumentalist] wants art to serve purposes that have been defined by persistent human needs working through powerful social institutions" (Feldman, 1970, p. 375). More specifically, Feldman explains these purposes as "the interests of the church, for example, or the state, or business" (Feldman, 1970, p. 375).

The notion of institutional purposes seems plausible enough at first but reflection quickly reveals how difficult it would be to determine such "purposes" in an actual situation. For example, one can question the vagueness of the term "institution". Is Feldman using this term in a global sense to refer to church, state, or business or could the term be used more narrowly to refer to particular and specific churches, states, businesses, etc.? One would appear to be at a loss to define the concept of purpose unless one can more precisely understand the concept of "institution". Presumably the church as a global institution would have a global purpose distinct from the Roman Catholic Church as an institution. The Catholic Church as an institution, in turn, would perhaps have a different purpose than an institution of the Catholic Church on the local corner.

Besides being vague the concept of "institution" is also ambiguous in that the class of institutions (and hence purposes) is not clarified by Feldman. (What kinds of institutions and, hence, purposes would the critic need consider in evaluating an art object?)
Perhaps the most fundamental problem with the notion of institutional purpose arises because institutions usually have many purposes. Decisions about the purpose of an institution might be as troublesome and controversial to decide as the value judgment about the work of art itself. (Consider, what is the purpose of the government of the United States?)

If, however, one concedes that an institution could have multiple and contested purposes, then a simple criterion like serving the purposes of X institution could be used to both condemn and praise a work of art. Conceivably a work of art could serve one of these purposes poorly and another well. This would certainly present awkward problems in determining and justifying value judgments.

Finally, a work of art could serve the purposes of one institution well and another institution poorly. Again there would appear to be difficulties in ascribing merit as well as the contradiction of the same criterion being used to both praise and condemn the same work of art.

The whole notion of an institutional purpose, then, is troublesome. But even overlooking these objections there are still further problems in deciding whether the work of art has "effectively served" such a purpose, i.e., unpacking the value component of the criterion.

Feldman appears to suggest that this value decision be determined by (a) a subjective reaction or perhaps by (b) the conducting of an empirical (?) study.
According to the instrumentalist, art fails when you are aware only of visual forms and their interactions. You should be made conscious of certain religious teachings, or the obligations of citizenship, or the superiority of a certain political philosophy. (Feldman, 1970, p. 375)

The excellence of a work of art, according to instrumentalist standards would be its capacity to change human behavior, if possible in publicly visible ways. (Feldman, 1970, p. 375)

The problems with a subjective criterion (a) have been noted above. Empirical study of human behavior (b) hardly seems to be a practical approach to arriving at a value judgment or justifying a value judgment. Such descriptions of behavioral changes would appear to be neither readily available to support value claims nor conclusive in support even if they were known.

Thus, this first version of an instrumentalist criterion is defective in two ways: (a) The whole notion of "institutional purpose" is likely to remain a contested issue; (b) Feldman appears to offer no practical alternatives for determining the "effectiveness" of an art work serving such a purpose.

Feldman's second use of the term "purpose" stretches the meaning of the criterion to cover contemporary works of art which do not (in any obvious sense) serve institutional purposes. Most contemporary works of art, for example, are not obviously intended to serve the interests of a church, state, or business.

The instrumentalist, therefore, claims to see the greatness of a work in the greatness of its purpose. It is not because he knows the purpose of the work in advance, he sees its purpose embodied in its forms. He has to interpret the word "purpose" in the social, political, moral or economic meanings he can discover in the art object. (Feldman, 1970, pp. 376-77)
Plainly, "purpose" is being used in a far different sense than previously. Feldman gives no specific example of what the meanings of a work of art are. Perhaps he is referring to the "ideas" of a work? In his earlier text *Art as Image and Idea*, he states: "Ideas of death, grief, and maternal love ... are the purposes for whose expressions the forms [in Michelangelo's *Pieta*] were created" (Feldman, 1967, p. 465). But if this is the case, it seems clear that "ideas of grief" could not in any sense be equated with the purposes of, for example, Christianity or the Church. Feldman is simply stretching the meaning of the term, "purpose".

The problem with this second version of instrumentalism lies with the ambiguity of the term "meaning". In and of itself it has no clearly defined use in aesthetic contexts. Feldman explains "purpose" in terms of "meaning" but this second term is as troublesome and ambiguous as the first. Feldman does not state whether, for example, the term refers to something represented within the work; whether it refers to properties of the work; whether it refers to the effect of the work upon the viewer or something else.

There is a second problem with the notion of "purpose" as meaning. In whatever sense of "meaning" Feldman suggests, it seems possible that there could be multiple economic or other meanings. Thus, choosing the meaning would be as controversial a judgment as the original value judgment itself. If on the other hand Feldman understands the work of art as conveying multiple meanings, then the same criterion could possibly be used to both praise and condemn the same work of art. The notion of "purpose" as meaning then is as problematic as the notion of "institutional purpose".
Like the first version of instrumentalism, this second version is value-laden: A work of art must possess a "greatness of ... purpose". And this second criterion is also subjective: whether or not a work possesses greatness of purpose depends upon the reactions of the critic: "If he [the critic] cannot discover the purpose of the work in its forms, then it is a bad work of art" (Feldman, 1970, p. 377).

Each of Feldman's versions of an instrumentalist criterion, then, is problematic for two reasons: (a) because of the ambiguous and controversial nature of the concepts "institutional purpose" and "meaning", which underlie his versions of the criterion; and (b) because, ultimately, his criterion appeals to subjective responses of the viewer.

In summary, all of the criteria which Feldman derives from formalist, expressivist, and instrumentalist aesthetics are either value-laden, subjective, or metaphysical. As such they cannot function as criteria in allowing people to arrive at value judgments and to settle value disputes.

Feldman's Account of Critical Phases

In addition to using critical terms to indicate simple speech acts or statements of various kinds, Feldman also uses them to denote critical phases or complex speech acts related sequentially to one another. In this section I examine Feldman's notion of criticism as a sequence of critical phases and I attempt to determine the constituent statements of each critical phase.

Feldman's earlier text presents the most straightforward account of critical phases:
I have divided the performance of art criticism into four stages: Description, Formal Analysis, Interpretation, and Evaluation or Judgment. It would be possible to break down these categories further, and it is also likely that they overlap. Nevertheless, they consist of fundamentally different operations which a critic must perform and their sequence follows the order of the easiest operation to the most difficult operation. (Feldman, 1967, p. 469)

This same sequence of critical phases is present in his later text:

There are two ways to draw attention to a work of art you are going to criticize: the first is to identify the work; the second is to describe it. I prefer to emphasize description because that immediately involves us in using our eyes and minds to understand what we are looking at. There are four stages of criticism — description, analysis, interpretation and evaluation [judgment] — and when they have been completed, the viewer will have a critical identification of the work. (Feldman, 1970, p. 349)

For Feldman, then, critical activity consists of a sequence of four critical phases. In criticizing one proceeds from description, through analysis, to the phase of interpretation and, finally, to judgment.

Critical Statements and Critical Reasons

As I have concluded earlier, perhaps the most plausible construal of this account of critical phases is as a prescription for critical practice. Inquiry into why students should proceed in this manner, however, reveals an ambiguity in Feldman's account. On the one hand he seems to feel that preceding critical phases prepare a critic and his audience for the phases that follow; on the other hand he seems to feel that statements made in earlier critical phases are used to support statements made in later critical phases. Feldman never clearly separates these two kinds of concerns in his account for when he justifies his model of criticism he shifts between one concern and another.
The Ambiguity Between Preparation and Support. There are several passages which illustrate Feldman's concern with earlier critical phases as preparation for later critical phases. Feldman recommends that students should analyze and describe before interpreting and judging because these phases "encourage as complete an examination of the object as it is possible". "They slow down the viewer's tendency to jump to conclusions." And "for public criticism, they help establish a consensus about which features of the art object constitute the subject of interpretation and judgment" (Feldman, 1970, p. 359).

Feldman also seems to hold that interpreting prepares the critic for the phase of evaluation (judgment) but his account does not clearly specify precisely how it does so. Feldman states in his later text that

One mark of the educated person is the ability to recognize and evaluate excellence independently. This ability, however, does not come from memorizing lists of so-called masterpieces. It comes from developing sound procedures for analyzing and interpreting art and then applying those procedures as well as you can. (Feldman, 1970, p. 348).

This, however, is another passage where Feldman's failure to clearly differentiate between method and goal makes his account difficult to interpret. One is not sure whether one should describe, analyze, or interpret in order to (properly) evaluate or judge or whether one should do this in order to develop the ability of evaluating or judging. One would perhaps think the latter except that Feldman specifically presents his model of criticism as a series of activities rather than as a set of skills as in this passage:
Do not start the examination of a work of art by asking whether it meets your conditions for excellence. That is the last question you should ask. Begin, as I have suggested, with identification and description and work your way through analysis and interpretation. By then you will know which type of judgment, which philosophy of art, is most appropriate for the work you are examining. (Feldman, 1970, p. 377)

The conceptual link between interpretation and understanding in ordinary language provides one possible clue as to why Feldman believes interpretation should precede judgment. In order to interpret, a person must first understand a work of art and one who understands it is normally in a position to transmit that understanding to others by means of his interpretation. Lacking an understanding of a work of art, it seems difficult to see how one can judge it properly. So the link between interpretation and understanding may underlie Feldman's intuition that interpretation is an appropriate precedent to the act of judging. Be that as it may, it is clear that Feldman believes that interpretation appropriately precedes the act of judging and that prior critical phases prepare the critic and his audience for succeeding phases.

**The Support of Critical Statements:** In addition to holding that preceding critical phases are preparation for the ones that follow, Feldman also holds that critical statements support other critical statements and he suggests in some parts of his account that these supporting statements will be statements exemplified in earlier critical phases. This is a parallel theme in his discussion of the relationship between critical phases but it is much less explicitly presented in his account. There is a good reason for this since if Feldman holds that statements made in earlier critical phases support statements made
in later critical phases then he is committed to either (a) the awkward prescription that students justify or support statements before they are made (and, hence, before justification and support may be called for) or to (b) the implicit assertion that criticism cannot proceed in the sequence he prescribes since a critic in supporting his statements will move from the phase of interpretation to the phases of analysis or description, and a critic in judging will move from that phase back to the phases of interpretation, analysis, or description. One way in which Feldman could avoid the last consequence, the charge of inconsistency, would be to hold that supporting reasons are different than statements made in earlier critical phases (and indeed, as I will discuss later, there is reason to believe that the statements which support critical judgments cannot be descriptive, analytical, or interpretive statements, i.e., that there are statements which Feldman would acknowledge as a necessary part of the critical process but which are not accounted for within his model). Thus, although Feldman clearly asserts that interpretation and judgment statements are statements which require support, he attempts to elude the unpleasant consequences of (a) or (b) above by an equivocation on whether supporting statements are to precede or follow interpretations and judgments.

There are several passages which show that Feldman believes that certain critical statements, at least, require the support of other critical statements in ordinary circumstances. He says this about interpretations:

Although critical interpretations vary, we should not make the mistake of thinking that any interpretation of a work of art is as good as any other. The best interpretation would be one that (a) makes the most sense out of the largest body of visual evidence drawn
from a work of art and (b) makes the most meaningful connections between that work of art and the lives of the people who are looking at it. Now this second trait of a good interpretation is the one which calls for a very creative critic .... Therefore, the good critic must be able to persuade people of the relevance or significance for them of the observations and meanings he has found in a work of art. (Feldman, 1970, p. 363)

This passage indicates that Feldman believes interpretation statements require the support of critical reasons. He also speaks of supporting reasons in relation to value judgments:

To become a "judge" of excellence, it is helpful to know how good "judges" or critics decide whether a work is poor or excellent. In other words, you must know the reasons good critics give for their opinions about art. If a critic gives no reasons — directly or indirectly -- then he is not a good critic. (Feldman, 1970, p. 372)

In both of the above passages, Feldman's account is clear in asserting that interpretations and judgments require the support of reasons. And in both of the above passages it is clear that supporting statements will be given after the interpretation and judgment has been made: One could hardly seek to persuade someone of the relevance of his interpretation when that interpretation has not been uttered; nor is it necessary to provide reasons for a judgment when that judgment has not been made.

If this seems clear in one part of Feldman's account, however, other parts suggest that support for critical statements will be given before those statements have been made. For example in discussing the phases of description and analysis he says that they "accumulate the visual facts that will form the basis for a critical interpretation" (Feldman, 1970, p. 359). This statement at first glance is puzzling since the "visual facts" are features of the aesthetic object itself
and such "facts" need not be accumulated since they are present in the aesthetic object itself. Feldman also says that description and analysis "help establish a consensus about which features of the art object constitute the subject of interpretation and judgment" (Feldman, 1970, p. 359) and this again is puzzling metaphor. What Feldman appears to be trying to suggest in the above assertions is that descriptions and analysis be undertaken in such a way as to obviate the need for supporting statements in the stage of interpretation and judgment.

This seems to be the gist of other assertions made in his earlier text as well. In talking about the reasons for describing he says

The reason for deferring inferences and value judgments about what is described is to make certain that the description or inventory is complete .... Furthermore, a good critic does not wish to be embarrassed subsequently by the necessity of changing a premature interpretation, one that was made before all the evidence was collected (Feldman, 1967, p. 470)

and he also says that

In making a formal analysis we have been accumulating the evidence which will help us to attempt interpretations of the work and also to make judgments of its excellence. Under certain circumstances, the breakdown of spatial logic would justify [my emphasis] conclusions that the work we are examining is unsuccessful. (Feldman, 1967, p. 476)

So it would seem first, that descriptions and analyses are statements which support interpretations and judgments and second, that these statements are to be made prior to making interpretations and judgments in order to obviate controversy.

Yet his account also acknowledges that supporting statements would need to be given after interpretations and judgments have been made. The reason for this equivocation possibly is that Feldman is seeking to avoid the unwelcome consequences of either an awkward prescription or
of inconsistency with his overall conception of criticism as a series of sequential phases. Nevertheless, it seems likely that he must acknowledge that critical reasons would be given after interpretations and judgments have been made. Therefore his account of the support of critical statements is inconsistent with his model of criticizing if critical terms are taken to indicate both complex and simple speech acts, since supporting reasons are held by Feldman to be statements exemplified in earlier critical phases. Feldman's account of sequential phases, then, applies only to the use of critical terms as indicators of critical phases or complex speech acts.

The Constituents of Critical Phases

Critical phases in Feldman's account, then, are constituted by the performance of one or more critical statements. For the phases of description and analysis, they would be constituted by one or more descriptive or analysis statements respectively.

Although description and analysis statements do not require the support of other statements, Feldman would hold that, in describing or analyzing an aesthetic object, more than one description or analysis statement might be, and likely would be, needed to give a proper description or analysis. This interpretation of Feldman's account is supported by the examples of descriptions and analyses given in his early text (Feldman, 1967, pp. 471, 473-477) as well as by the detailed account of description and analysis given in his later text. The argument of the preceding section has also established that Feldman believes that interpretation and judgment statements require the support of other critical statements and that these statements will be made after
interpreting and judging. The critical phases of interpreting and judging, then, would seem to consist of both interpretations and judgments, respectively, and their supporting reasons. These critical phases then would seem to be constituted both by one or more statements exemplifying that phase and by the statement or statements which are used as support.

What are the statements which support interpretations and judgments? As I have shown earlier, in one part of Feldman's account he holds that description and analysis statements support interpretation statements and that description, analysis, and interpretation statements support judgments. Yet there are some discrepancies in his account and pointing these out can perhaps lead to a more accurate construal of the constituent statements of Feldman's critical phases.

There is one kind of statement which Feldman specifically excludes from the class of descriptions and analyses. These are statements "about" the emotional (expressive) properties of aesthetic objects since in such statements, obvious or salient properties are not predicated nor are such statements readily confirmed. Feldman thus seems to exclude them from the class of descriptive statements when he states

In order to be impartial or neutral, you have to watch your language, avoiding loaded words or expressions that reveal your feelings and preferences. Assume that you are going to be challenged whenever you use adjectives that might suggest your point of view -- words like strong, beautiful, harmonious, weak, ugly, disorderly, funny-looking, and so on. Instead use words like straight, curved, small, large, rough, smooth, light, dark. (Feldman, 1970, pp. 350, 351)
And since such statements are not "about" relationships he also seems to exclude them from the class of analysis statements. Here there is a problem, however, since as I have pointed out earlier, some of his examples of analysis statements that he gives are not "about" relationships at all. They seem, in fact, to be statements "about" just those emotional properties that he wishes to exclude from the class of analysis statements in the following passage:

You can often tell whether a metal surface is dirty or clean, wet or dry, perfectly new or old and bruised, or even whether it is hot or cold. We make the same kind of observation when analyzing the surface qualities of a work of art. Once again, this type of observation helps us discover the emotional qualities as well as the ideas conveyed by the art object. (Feldman, 1970, p. 358)

This passage then is equivocal. Feldman seems to present examples of qualities which might be expressive properties and which certainly are not relationships, and yet he appears specifically to include statements "about" such qualities within the class of interpretations when he states that analysis "helps discover the emotional qualities as well as the ideas conveyed by the art object."

On one interpretation of his account, then, statements "about" emotional qualities appear to be construable as interpretations. If this is so, then there is a gap in his account when he states that analysis and description statements support critical interpretations since it is clear that some critical interpretations (namely statements "about" emotional qualities) might support other interpretations. Consider for example an interpretation of Picasso's Guernica as a "protest against Fascist brutality." In supporting such an interpretation one might very well appeal to the "brutal edges" and the "harsh"
silhouettes of the figures. The constituent statements of the phase of interpretation then appear to be one or more interpretations and the supporting reasons. These can be one or a combination of descriptive, analytical, or interpretive statements.

Another problematic aspect of Feldman's account concerns the kinds of statements which he holds support judgments. Feldman says about judging that

To become a "judge" of excellence, it is helpful to know how good "judges" or critics decide whether a work is poor or excellent. In other words, you must know the reasons good critics give for their opinions about art. The reasons for judging a work excellent or poor have to be based on a philosophy of art, not on a man's personal judgment. (Feldman, 1970, p. 372)

Feldman's use of "reason" in the above is ambiguous since he uses it to indicate both the supporting statements of critical judgments and the criteria embodied in such statements. Feldman does not present a model of critical argument such as Beardsley does but perhaps he would concur with the notion of reasons as minor premises on a justificatory argument. Such a notion would be congruent with the notion that description, analysis, and interpretation statements support judgments because such statements in Feldman's account are "about" the aesthetic object.

If this is an accurate interpretation of Feldman's ideas, then there is another possible gap in his account since critical reasons i.e., supporting statements which embody criteria derived from formalist and expressivist philosophies of art, cannot be descriptions and analyses since they are "about" subjective states of the percipient of the aesthetic object rather than "about" the aesthetic object as such. Are they then to be considered interpretations? Here much depends upon
Feldman's idea of interpretation, a concept which remains elusive in his account. However, there is no prima-facie reason to hold that statements about one's inner states or feelings are interpretations in ordinary language. So at least in this respect it would seem that some critical reasons at least do not fall within Feldman's classification of descriptive, analytical, and interpretive statements: that there are at least two kinds of statements in addition to descriptions, analyses, and interpretations which can be used to support value judgments.

Perhaps the most accurate construal of Feldman's model of critical phases, then, is represented by the diagram in Figure 10. Feldman views critical activity as having four phases sequentially related to one another in that one performs one before another. These critical phases are constituted by one or more statements exemplifying that phase and, in the phases of interpretation and judgment, by supporting reasons as well. An exact specification of the kinds of statements which could function as reasons is not given in his account. He appears to hold that description and analysis statements will support interpretations and that description, analysis, and interpretation statements will support judgments. Yet, it is possible that he includes statements "about" emotional properties within the class of interpretations and such statements might very well support some interpretations of aesthetic objects. Moreover the reasons which embody the criteria derived from formalist and expressivist philosophies of art, do not seem to be either descriptive, analysis, or interpretive statements. Feldman's classification of critical statements, then, does not seem to adequately account for the supporting reasons in his account.
My uncertainty about these matters is indicated by the use of asterisks in the diagram.

**Feldman's Prescriptions for Criticism**

In addition to defining critical terms, Feldman's account of criticism is concerned with prescribing various roles for criticism in educational settings. There are four such roles in his account: criticism is prescribed as a teaching method, as a learning method, as a teaching goal, and as a learning goal. These prescriptive roles are not explicitly identified by Feldman but, rather, one is made aware of these different roles by various shifts in his conception of criticism from activities that a teacher or a learner will employ to achieve or attain various goals, to a conception of criticism as a set of skills that a learner will acquire either independently or as a result of being taught.

Feldman's account raises a number of problems in addition to the problem of ascertaining the nature of his prescriptions. One is that the proximate goal to be achieved by the use of criticism as method as not set forth explicitly. This is the educational goal which is to result directly from the application of criticism as a method. Feldman discusses proximate goals for individual critical phases or operations, as well as a number of proximate goals for critical activity as a whole. In his discussion, these proximate goals are interspersed with specifications for incidental and distant goals as well. Sorting out and identifying the proximate goals in Feldman's account requires interpretation. A second problem arises in considering the appropriateness of Feldman's prescriptions. Given certain rules for making
Phase (complex speech act) of description

one or more description statements (simple speech acts)

Phase (complex speech act) of analysis

one or more analysis and characterization statements (simple speech acts)

Phase (complex speech act) of interpretation

description statements
analysis statements
*statements "about" emotional properties

Phase (complex speech act) of evaluation

description statements
analysis statements
interpretation statements
*statements embodying formal and expressive criteria

*It is not clear from his account whether such statements are part of the phase of interpretation or whether they remain unaccounted for in Feldman's conception of critical statements.

Figure 10. Feldman's Conception of Critical Phases
prescriptions outlined in Chapter IV of this study, given his prescriptive account, and given the concepts of criticism presented in his definition, some of Feldman's prescriptions for criticism as a method and as a goal are defective.

Four Prescriptive Roles for Criticism

In prescribing roles for criticism in educational settings, Feldman alternates between conceptions of criticism as both a method and as a goal. Examples of each conception, and the shift between these two conceptions, is illustrated in the following:

The exemplar curriculum [Feldman's curriculum proposal] stresses critical skills from the beginning -- before the child knows that he is engaging in criticism. We take his natural curiosity about what an object means, or how good it is, or what it might be good for, and involve him in the same critical operations performed by professionals: description, analysis, interpretation, and judgment. A kindergarten child will perform all of these operations spontaneously but in random order. Teaching is largely a job of systematizing his almost irrepressible desire to talk about art. And talk about art is a defensible definition of art criticism. Critical study is the process of introducing order into the child's natural performance as a critic. (Feldman, 1970, p. 187)

Criticism in this passage is first of all presented as a set of skills that students will acquire as the result of the process of education. Following that it is presented as a set of operations that children can follow in encountering works of art. These two conceptions of criticism alternate in Feldman's discussion. In the next paragraph of his account, criticism is presented as a method used to achieve or attain certain educational goals:
In order to explain critical study, we must first distinguish between the objectives of the educator and the objectives of the citizen who buys art, sells art, exhibits art, or writes about art. The educator is interested in critical study because the operations it entails have a value apart from establishing the rank and worth of art objects. These operations are educationally interesting because they involve the use of human powers of observation, specification, conjecture, intuition, inference, self-correction, risk-taking, and finding out. But these critical operations cannot be seriously undertaken except in the presence of objects which have expressive power -- art. (Feldman, 1970, p. 187)

In the paragraph following this, criticism is again presented as a set of skills which children acquire as the result of practice.

Where before, Feldman asserts that children criticize spontaneously, in this passage he emphasizes the training needed in order to function as a critic:

Perhaps you have noticed the inadequacy of some of the systems erected by philosophers and aestheticians for the purpose of judging or explicating art. Despite their logical consistency, you may have difficulty in relating them in any authentic way to someone's real perceptions on genuine aesthetic occasions. This happens when a critical system becomes a substitute for critical performance .... You cannot, in other words, learn to be a critic by learning critical principles. You have to do criticism. (Feldman, 1970, pp. 187-188)

And, as with all skills, practice is a necessary ingredient in the development of critical skills:

How do children do criticism? They learn criticism the way they learn swimming -- by getting into the water. Thus, they must have an opportunity to look at art together and to report their findings to one another. (Feldman, 1970, p. 188)

7. This is another passage where Feldman shifts between criticism as a method and criticism as a set of skills. Feldman asks the question "How do children do criticism?" but he answers the question "How do children learn how to do criticism?"
For Feldman, then, criticism is prescribed as both a method and as a goal. It is on the one hand a set of activities that will be performed in order to achieve certain goals. On the other hand it is a set of skills which learners will acquire as the result of the educational process.

If criticism is a method, who will perform this method in educational settings? The format of Feldman's later text (Feldman, 1970) is somewhat unusual in that it is addressed to both prospective classroom teachers and to students in the junior high school. Feldman discusses critical study as one of four components of an "exemplar curriculum". Those chapters which introduce this curriculum are addressed to prospective classroom teachers but the last chapters of his text, those which specifically present his curriculum, are addressed to junior high school students as well as teachers (Feldman, 1970, pp. 211-213). Although it is not clear whether Feldman's text would ever be presented directly to students, he does place great stress on students as well as teachers performing critical activities. Thus when he introduces his chapter on criticism with the statement

This chapter ... will be devoted to explaining some techniques or procedures that you can use to develop your ability as a critic. (Feldman, 1970, p. 348)

he is talking to both prospective teachers and to students and it is likely that he would countenance and encourage student as well as teacher performance of critical activity, not only in dialogue with one another, but also separately. In Feldman's earlier text (Feldman, 1967) there is even more of an emphasis upon criticism as a learning activity since this text is addressed directly to high school and college students:
It is interesting to observe ... that formal education at all levels fails to devote much time to the establishment of a systematic foundation for critical judgment. Hence, even well-educated persons find themselves delivering the authoritative opinions of others, or offering their own views about art without really knowing how they arrived at them. In an effort to overcome this deficiency, I devote a section of the book to critical theory and critical method as applied to contemporary art .... Although I do not believe there are eternally valid, permanently correct evaluations of particular works of art, I do think there are systematic procedures for making evaluations which are fairly durable and defensible. Hence this discussion of art criticism as a practical activity in which one can gain proficiency as one's grounds and critical procedures are subjected to logical scrutiny. (Feldman, 1967, pp. 442-443)

Feldman, then, seems committed to the notions of criticism as both a teaching method and as a learning method. Teachers will employ this method in order to bring about learnings in their students. Students from elementary school to college can apply this method in conjunction with, or independently of a teacher in order to reach certain educationally desired goals.

If criticism is prescribed as both a teaching and as a learning method, it is also prescribed as both a teaching and a learning goal. For Feldman would hold that the skill of criticizing is not only to be learned through instruction by teachers, but also independently by students. One can see both prescriptive notions present in various parts of his account. When Feldman addresses students in his later text by saying

This chapter ... will be devoted to explaining some techniques or procedures that you can use to develop your ability as a critic. (Feldman, 1970, p. 348)

or when he says
You must learn to be a good critic yourself so that you do not become too dependent on "official" opinions ... This chapter will be devoted to explaining some techniques or procedures that you can use to develop your ability as a critic. (Feldman, 1970, p. 348)

Feldman is prescribing the learning of criticism as a skill, a skill that can be developed by a learner independently of a teacher. Yet Feldman also prescribes the teaching of criticism as a skill since he also addresses his later text to prospective classroom teachers:

Critical study is clearly a species of media study. The critic must make discriminations in one language or medium (speech) which correspond to the perceptions and discriminations he has made in another language or medium (imagery or visual form). If the child or critic knows more about the syntax of visual form than he does about the syntax of verbal language, then he can use his sophistication in one medium to build sophistication in the other ....

Why should teachers [emphasis added] struggle with the development of [such] critical skills if such skills represent a type of intermedia translation? (Feldman, 1970, p. 188)

For Feldman, then, criticism is prescribed both as a set of skills to be taught by a teacher and as a set of skills to be acquired independently by a learner. Criticism is thus prescribed both as a teaching goal and as a learning goal.

Goals of Criticism

In addition to prescribing critical skills as one outcome or goal of the process of criticizing, Feldman specifies a varied assortment of other goals which one must consider in attempting to determine the proximate goal to be reached through the performance of critical activities. There are at least four kinds of goals which can be differentiated: incidental goals, distant goals, proximate goals of
individual critical phases, and proximate goals of critical activity as a whole. Part of the difficulty with Feldman's account is that he does not discriminate among and label the many kinds of goals or outcomes that he projects. Furthermore, he projects a number of goals within each category. In both cases problems arise in accurately ascertaining the nature of Feldman's proximate goals and hence his prescriptions for criticism as a method.

**Individual Goals.** A number of Feldman's goals for criticism are outcomes that arise as a by-product, as it were, of critical activity. Feldman mentions such goals, not as ends to be achieved directly through using criticism as a teaching or learning method, but rather as additional benefits that accrue to teachers and to learners by incorporating art criticism within the curriculum. Some of the benefits to students include "character building consequences of practicing criticism" and "information" about the world gained through study of works of art:

There are certain character-building consequences of practicing criticism in education. One of them, it seems to me, is learning how to take chances. If you are a good critic you have to stick your neck out. You have to offer reasonably defensible interpretations and considered judgments of works of art. You have to support your opinions with evidence that is visible to your students. In schools we do not enjoy the luxury of journalistic critics who can discuss works the reader has never seen. We talk about the art youngsters make, or the art we project on a screen, or the art we show in other forms of reproduction. All of us look at the same object and so we engage in discourse about objects that we have seen at the same time. If you say something unconvincing about a work, you will probably get some contrary reactions. So you have a situation where you must support your assertions and reasons with evidence. Also you have to exercise a certain amount of courage. After some experience, you learn to be more cautious or bolder as the situation requires. In addition to learning how to take chances, you have to learn how to cope with disagreement. You
learn how to handle conflict, because a single work of art is capable of supporting a variety of valid interpretations. You learn that there can be honest differences of opinion among honorable men. One of the interesting outcomes of teaching art criticism is the discovery that people can arrive at different interpretations of works of art even after agreeing that they have examined the same evidence. So art criticism has values over and above what is learned about particular works, periods, or the creative expression of particular artists. (Feldman, 1973, p. 31).

There is another value in art criticism for education as a whole. Art objects from any period of history, including our own, can be regarded as exceedingly economical symbol systems. In other words, a work of art can yield a tremendous amount of information if you are concerned about data concentrated in a relatively small space or package.... We learn many facts -- ordinary information about man, about history, geography, economics, and social relations -- from the examination of art objects. Even if we are not searching for this sort of information, it crops up anyway. It seems to me a very inexpensive way of finding out a great deal in a short time. (Feldman, 1973, pp. 53, 54)

**Distant Goals.** A second set of goals which Feldman projects is concerned with broad outcomes of schooling or education. No attempt will be made here to analyze the vague notions of "learning to read the human situation", or "learning to read the visual environment", etc. These are vague outcomes subject to multiple interpretations.

Our general educational aim is to help children to confront life meaningfully. To do so, they must be able to "read" the human situation. Critical study is practice in reading works of art that are microcosms of the human situation.... Critical study tries to systematize that engagement or confrontation so that the child or youth can extend his insights to the business of living. (Feldman, 1970, p. 189)

What does art criticism have to do with education? Here again, the answers may seem obvious, but they need to be restated in the present context. We need to be able to read the visual environment....
I think education for visual literacy -- for coping with the visual environment -- has to start very early, even in kindergarten. Much of our environment constitutes a sort of fraud. It is an endeavor to limit our options, to program us into an unfree pattern of existence. I hope it does not seem paranoid to say this. Freedom cannot be defined solely by the right to vote and to exercise certain political options. Freedom also consists in being emotionally open to a wide variety of human choices and we have to be educated to keep our options open. Schooling, then, has a legitimate and crucial role in educating people to be truly free. Hence it would not be wrong to suggest that art criticism be undertaken in the schools as a means of exercising the skills needed to choose among values. (Feldman, 1973, pp. 52, 53)

Here let me state what I believe is the ultimate objective of criticism in art instruction: we want youngsters to become members of a total human community that extends far beyond the family and the physical community in which they live. We want them to know what men are capable of feeling and doing and knowing and expressing.... Mainly, we want to help educate people who can function reasonably well within the limitations imposed on them by nature and circumstance. We hope they will grow up to build and live in truly human communities. (Feldman, 1973, p. 57)

Proximate Goals of Critical Phases. A third set of goals which Feldman prescribes is concerned with proximate goals of individual critical phases or operations. For Feldman the sequence of critical phases or operations has a purpose inasmuch as one critical phase prepares both the agent and his audience (if there is one) for successive critical phases: Description, and analysis are preparation for the performance of interpreting; description, analysis, and interpretation are preparation for judgment. In presenting goals of individual critical phases Feldman does not clearly separate those which set the stage, as it were, for later critical phases and those goals which are actual learnings gained by performing particular critical operations.
In the following passage he presents both kinds of goals. The first, second, fourth, and fifth goals prepare for succeeding critical phases. The third goal is a proximate outcome in the learner which results from engaging in the particular operations of description and analysis.

When the description and formal analysis are completed, the critic has probably been able to describe most of the visible features of the art object. These two critical operations accomplish the following purposes:
1. They encourage as complete an examination of the object as it is possible for the viewer to make.
2. They slow down the viewer's tendency to jump to conclusions.
3. They help build skill in observation -- a skill that is vital for understanding the visual arts as well as for general personal development.
4. They accumulate the visual facts that will form the basis for a critical interpretation.
5. For public criticism, they help establish a consensus about which features of the art object constitute the subject of interpretation and judgment.
(Feldman, 1970, p. 359)

Proximate Goals of Criticism. The variety of goals which Feldman projects as outcomes of criticism, then, make determining the proximate goals of criticism a somewhat problematic affair. In the previous sections I have attempted to differentiate among different goals in order to isolate those goals of education which are to result directly from application of the entire critical method.

I believe that there are three candidates for proximate goals in Feldman's account. There is, first of all, the conception of criticism as a set of skills which is to result from the performance of criticism as an activity. Sometimes Feldman stresses one of these skills, judgment, as the appropriate outcome of critical activity but he seems to prescribe all of them at some point in his discussion. Feldman thus
specifies the skills of describing, analyzing, interpreting, and judging works of art as proximate goals of criticism.

In addition to prescribing critical skills as proximate goals, Feldman also specifies a number of other outcomes as well. Perhaps the one that is stressed most consistently is understanding. Feldman prescribes critical activity in order that an agent (either teacher or student) can better understand works of art himself or in order that he can inculcate this understanding in his audience. This is expressed in a variety of ways in both his early and his later texts. In his early text he states:

The chief goal of art criticism is understanding. We wish to find a way of looking at objects of art and thinking about them which will yield the maximum of knowledge about their real merits. (Feldman, 1967, p. 44)\(^8\)

In his later text he states

Our general educational aim is to help children to confront life meaningfully. To do so, they must be able to "read" the human situation. Critical study is practice in reading works of art that are micro­cosms of the human situation. Understanding visual art -- or any medium -- is more than knowing its various names or labels. Understanding means coping. It is a matter of becoming engaged with or confronting, a system of symbols. (Feldman, 1970, pp. 188-189)

There are two ways to draw attention to a work of art you are going to criticize: the first way is to identify the work; the second is to describe it. I prefer to emphasize description because that immediately involves us in using our eyes and minds to understand what we are looking at .... as critics we are mainly interested in the present meaning and purpose of a work of art. (Feldman, 1970, p. 379)

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8. Feldman here confuses the concepts of understanding and knowledge.
In addition to understanding, Feldman also mentions "satisfaction" or "enjoyment" as a proximate goal of criticism although this goal is not stressed as much. As with the proximate goal of understanding, someone criticizes in order to increase both his enjoyment, and that of his audience. In Feldman's early text this proximate goal is expressed in this way:

Another goal of art criticism, perhaps as important as the first, is quite frankly delight or pleasure. To be sure, we derive some pleasure from understanding, from knowing what it is in art that gives rise to our feelings and our total sense of approval. But the critical process enables us to carry on the search for meaning or pleasure systematically, that is, more carefully and for a more sustained period than would be the case if we had no logically organized approach to art. The trained viewer should be able to extract most of the satisfactions which a work is capable of yielding. Hence, the practice of art criticism yields a certain quantitative benefit -- the increase of satisfaction derivable from any particular work. (Feldman, 1967, pp. 444, 445)

In Feldman's later text he states

The goal of art criticism is not necessarily to demonstrate how consistent you are in your final judgments. The real goal is to increase the sum of values and satisfactions you can get from art. (Feldman, 1970, p. 377)

and

A good critic's report about a work of art can add a great deal to your enjoyment of it. He can help you to see things you would not have seen alone. (Feldman, 1970, p. 348)

Thus, there seem to be three main candidates for a proximate goal of criticism. Although it requires interpretation to sort out the various goals which are present in his discussion, Feldman seems to prescribe the practice of criticism in order to develop skills of criticism, to enlarge understanding of works of art, and to increase
the enjoyment or satisfaction gained from works of art. These are proximate goals both for the person who criticizes (agent) as well as his audience (the learner).

Appraisal of Feldman's Prescriptions

The four prescriptive roles for criticism which Feldman presents can be appraised using the criteria set forth in Chapter V of this study. Prescriptions for criticism as a teaching method are defective if

1. The acts of cing which are prescribed are mental doings.
2. The agent (teacher) cannot perform the acts of cing which constitute the method.
3. The acts of cing are ineffectual in allowing the audience (learners) to achieve or attain the proximate goals for which the method is prescribed.

Prescriptions for criticism as a learning method are defective if

1. The agent (student or learner) cannot perform the acts of cing which constitute the method.
2. The acts of cing are ineffectual in allowing the agent (student or learner) to achieve or attain the proximate goals for which the method is prescribed.

Relevant criteria for appraising prescriptions for criticism as a goal are the following: Such prescriptions are defective if

1. Criticism is not a set of states (i.e., skills or capacities improvable with practice and training).
2. Students have already mastered these skills or capacities (i.e., can already perform acts of cing).
Inconsistency Between Prescriptions for Criticism as a Goal and as a Learning Method. In appraising Feldman's prescriptions for criticism, one can at the outset note the inconsistency between his simultaneous prescription for criticism as both a learning method and as a teaching or learning goal. In prescribing criticism as a learning method Feldman implies that students (learners) can perform the acts describing, analyzing, interpreting, and judging works of art. One can readily see that it would be logically odd to prescribe that students perform activities of cing in order to reach a certain goal, if it is also held that students cannot perform these very same acts. In prescribing criticism as a goal, however, Feldman acts under the assumption that students cannot perform acts of cing since it would be logically odd to prescribe skills of describing, analyzing, interpreting, or judging works of art if it is also held that students can perform these acts. This inconsistency is partially masked in Feldman's account by the general ambiguity in his shift from a prescription for criticism as a learning method to a prescription for criticism as a teaching method for in prescribing criticism as a teaching method this inconsistency does not appear.

The inconsistency created by contradictory assumptions creates a dilemma which Feldman never fully resolves in his account. It is never made clear whether students (learners) when criticizing can perform critical activities or not. Feldman at the outset asserts that even elementary students can perform the same operations of description, analysis, interpretation, and judgment that a professional critic employs:
The exemplar curriculum stresses critical skills from the beginning — before the child knows that he is engaging in criticism. We take his natural curiosity about what an object means, or how good it is, or what it might be good for, and involve him in the same critical operations performed by professionals: description, analysis, interpretation, and judgment. (Feldman, 1970, p. 187)

If children can perform these operations, one might ask why teaching or learning criticism is necessary. Feldman's initial reply is to say that these operations are simply systematized by teaching or learning criticism.

A kindergarten child will perform all of these operations but in random order. Teaching is largely a job of systematizing his almost irrepressible desire to talk about art. And talk about art is a defensible definition of art criticism. Critical study is the process of introducing order into the child's natural performance as a critic. (Feldman, 1970, p. 187)

When Feldman makes these claims, he is of course advancing criticism as a method but in doing this he is caught on one horn of his dilemma because critical study would seem to require only a brief period of instruction: If students perform critical operations already, one need only instruct them in the order in which these operations are to proceed. It seems hardly necessary to treat these operations as skills to be acquired.

Yet as Feldman proceeds, it quickly becomes evident that more than brief instruction is needed in order for children to criticize. Criticism is presented as a set of skills requiring training and practice:

How do children do criticism? They learn criticism the way they learn swimming — by getting into the water. Thus they must have the opportunity to look at art together and to report their findings to one another. (Feldman, 1970, p. 188)
Furthermore, teachers must "struggle" to inculcate such skills in their students:

Why should teachers struggle with the development of critical skills if such skills represent a type of intermedia translation? (Feldman, 1970, p. 188)

Feldman, then, is presenting criticism not as a method but as a set of skills. It is quickly evident that more than brief instruction is needed in order for students to criticize and indeed Feldman's account, itself, is inconsistent with the assertion that only instruction in the "systematizing" of critical operations is needed. He himself specifies categories of analysis, and criteria of judgment which students are to learn before performing these critical operations. Thus Feldman presents an ambiguous account of the role of training in developing critical skills. Moreover, in prescribing criticism as a set of skills which require prior training and practice, Feldman is caught on the other horn of his dilemma since one can question the adequacy of his prescription for criticism as a method if students cannot already perform this method in order to achieve the educational goals that he projects.

Thus Feldman's simultaneous prescription of criticism as both a goal and a learning method is logically inconsistent because each prescription rests upon assumptions that contradict one another. It is plainly evident that there would be gross differences between critical operations performed by a professional and by a kindergarten child but Feldman minimizes these differences by treating these differences as only a matter of the order in which these operations are
performed. In doing this he avoids the difficult problem surrounding the specification of levels of critical performance which would indicate mastery of the skills of cing. But in a sense Feldman cannot specify these levels, for to do this would mean that his conception of criticism as a method, could only be a method for students at a certain level of learning. Feldman here would sharply limit the applicability of his method of criticism in educational settings and he obviously wants to see it applied in the widest possible range of educational settings.

Thus in the above, I have noted one kind of logical inconsistency in Feldman's account. In the sections that follow, I shall individually appraise Feldman's prescriptions in light of the meanings of critical terms given in his definitions.

**Criticism as a Teaching Learning Method.** Feldman's prescriptions for criticism as a teaching and learning method violate several of the criteria for successful method prescriptions.

Method prescriptions must specify active doings or acts: physical or speech acts in the case of teaching method prescriptions, either mental acts or physical speech acts in the case of learning prescriptions. One violation of such a criterion arises in considering the mental doings presented in his definitions. When Feldman prescribes criticism as a teaching method, he is presumably relying only on that part of his account which treats criticism as overt speech or "talk about art"

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9. Feldman here of course is assuming that critics perform the operations of describing, analyzing, interpreting, and judging in the order he prescribes. I have previously argued that there is no warrant at all for such an assumption.
although he does not make this clear. When he prescribes criticism as a learning method, however, it seems possible that he might subscribe to the mental doings of cing as nonlinguistic mental acts to be performed. If so, his prescription for interpreting as a mental operation would be defective since his conception of interpreting seems to reflect the ordinary meaning of interpreting which, I have argued, is a nonactive doing. Because it is a nonactive doing, a person who interprets is not an agent and, because he is not, he cannot decide to interpret and act upon that decision.

Method prescriptions imply that an agent (either teacher or learner) has the ability to perform the acts which constitute the method. Several of Feldman's definitions of critical terms, however, present acts which a teacher or a learner could not reasonably be expected to perform. Although it seems possible that a teacher could perform speech acts of describing, analyzing, and interpreting works of art, neither a teacher nor a learner could perform acts of judging in the sense in which Feldman presents judgment in his account. On one interpretation of Feldman's notion of judging it is an act performed by applying three kinds of philosophical criteria to works of art. But as I have shown previously, Feldman's criteria are defective as criteria. It is thus difficult to see how they could be applied to works of art in order to arrive at judgments of value. Feldman to be sure does state that students can develop their own criteria for judging (Feldman, 1970, p. 372) but, in this case, judging seems to be little more than an expression of a teacher's or a learner's value preferences.
In prescribing interpretation as a learning method, Feldman makes a second defective prescription. For Feldman prescribes criticism as a method which would enable a learner to understand works of art. In prescribing this proximate goal, Feldman assumes that students do not already possess such understanding. Yet in making a prescription for interpretation as a method (on the ordinary meaning of "interpretation" which he appears to subscribe to in his definition), Feldman implies that a learner can already understand. Thus he is committed to the contradictory assumptions that a learner both does and does not possess understanding.

Prescription of analysis as a learning method is a third problematic prescription in Feldman's account. In this case there is no inconsistency between the assumptions underlying his prescriptions for criticism as a learning method and his prescriptions for proximate goals. Yet one can seriously question whether younger children can perform the act of analysis as Feldman conceives of analysis in his definition. Analysis involves statements about various relations which exist in works of art but to make such statements would seem to involve abilities to perceive such relationships, an ability which is almost certainly beyond the capabilities of younger children and certainly beyond the capabilities of the kindergarten children that Feldman asserts can perform critical acts.

Thus there are three areas in Feldman's definitions which seem inconsistent which his prescriptions for critical activities as teaching or learning methods. Although teachers or learners might be expected to perform acts of describing, analyzing, and interpreting, they
almost certainly could not perform acts of judging in the way Feldman conceives. Although learners might be expected to perform acts of describing, for various reasons acts of analysis, interpreting, and judging might be, or would be beyond their capabilities.

A final criterion for a successful method prescription is that the acts which constitute the method be efficacious in helping the learner achieve or attain the educational goals prescribed. Feldman prescribes three such goals: the development of critical skills, understanding of works of art, and enjoyment or satisfaction with works of art. Part of the difficulty with appraising this aspect of his teaching or learning method prescriptions is that it assumes a clear understanding of the proximate goals themselves.

There may indeed be grounds for considering criticizing an efficacious method in teaching critical skills since practice and training are normally required in attaining mastery of such skills but Feldman's prescriptions of understanding, and satisfaction or enjoyment as proximate goals raises questions about interpretability. Understanding, in particular, is a controversial concept and it is unclear what it means for a learner to attain such a goal. The goals of understanding and enjoyment or satisfaction remain unanalyzed concepts in this study so it is not possible to say that Feldman's critical method is ineffective in helping learners reach the goals he prescribes. However it does not seem possible to establish Feldman's claims about the efficacy of his method either. Certainly no empirical evidence has been offered in support of his method prescriptions.

In the above I have noted a number of problems with Feldman's prescriptions for criticism as a teaching and learning method. In the
next section, I appraise his prescriptions for criticism as a proximate goal.

**Criticism as a Teaching and Learning Goal.** One requirement for a successful method prescription is that the goal is one that has not already been achieved or attained by students. Insofar as Feldman's prescriptions for critical activities as a learning method seem acceptable, one must question their acceptability as goals for learners. Since I have earlier discussed the inconsistency in Feldman's simultaneous prescription of criticism as both a learning method and as a teaching or learning goal, in this section I shall only discuss a second requirement for a successful skill goal prescription for criticism: that critical terms denote a set of capacities improvable with training and practice.

Although prescriptions for criticism as a set of skills are present in Feldman's account, his definitions do not present a conception of criticism as a set of states or capacities but rather as a set of activities sequentially related to one another. Even if there is no inconsistency between this conception of criticism and his prescriptions for criticism as a goal, there is at the very least a hiatus in his account for in order to treat criticism as a set of skills one must ignore the sequential relationship among critical acts and infer that acts of cing are manifestations of critical states. Feldman's definitions of critical terms square more easily with his conception of criticism as a teaching or learning method than with his conception of criticism as a teaching or learning goal.
Having made the inference that the activities given in his definitions are to be taken as manifestations of states, one must question whether at least one of these states can be improved with training and practice. Feldman's account of description, analysis, and interpretation, for example, do not provide information on the direction in which improvement lies. But this might simply represent an area in need of further study. Feldman's definition of "judgment", however, seems to indicate a concept which is inconsistent with the concept of a skill or capacity improvable with training and practice. As I have argued previously, his conception of judgment amounts to nothing more than the expression of personal value preferences but it is difficult to see any significant way in which the expression of one's own preferences can be improved with training and practice. One simply possesses this ability by virtue one's ability to speak the language. At least one of his skill prescriptions, then, seems defective as a proximate goal of education.

In this section then I have analyzed and appraised Feldman's prescriptions for criticism. Feldman's conceptions of criticism as a teaching method, as a learning method, as a teaching goal, and as a learning goal are not clearly differentiated in his account. Nor is it clear what goals are to be achieved or attained through the use of criticism as a method. Feldman specifies incidental, distant, and proximate goals for individual critical phases as well as a number of proximate goals for criticism as a whole. In appraising Feldman's prescriptions, I have pointed out the inconsistency between his conceptions of criticism as a learning method and as a teaching or
learning goal. Moreover, I have pointed out a number of conceptual difficulties in his prescriptions for criticism when his definitions of critical terms are considered in light of requirements for successfully performed method and goal prescriptions.

Summary

In this chapter, I have examined and appraised Feldman's definitions of critical terms and his prescriptions for criticism.

Feldman offers reportive definitions of the terms "description", "analysis", "interpretation" and "judgment". In the first section of this chapter I examined some ambiguities surrounding Feldman's use of these terms. Feldman does not explicitly differentiate between prescriptive and definitional concerns, between simple and complex speech acts, between active doing and artifact senses of critical terms, and between physical and mental uses of critical terms. Feldman's definitions of critical terms as simple speech acts or statements are for the most part synonym or classification definitions. His synonym definition I argue is false inasmuch as the term he selects is another illocutionary term and so indicates a distinct, although possibly related, linguistic act. Feldman's classification definitions for the most part suffer from an inappropriate selection of category since he also uses other illocutionary terms to indicate a general category. Feldman's differentia for the most part rely on distinctions of content and confirmability. Some of his content distinctions are analogous to distinctions made among acts of cing in Chapter IV of this study, although Feldman is not able to articulate a distinction between reference and predication.
In Feldman's discussion of critical phases, the constituent statements within each phase are not clearly specified. Moreover, the rationale for sequentially ordering critical phases is not clearly given since Feldman presents the statements of earlier critical phases both as preparation for statements made in succeeding phases, and as a support or justification for them. In the latter instance, however, Feldman's prescription for critical activities seems awkward since one would have to support or justify statements which had not been made. The solution to this seems to be to regard statements of earlier critical phases as constituents of later critical phases as well.

Feldman's prescriptions for criticism equivocate between conceptions of criticism as a teaching method, as a learning method, as a teaching goal and as a learning goal. In appraising his prescriptions they were found not to satisfy several of the criteria for his prescriptions to be successfully performed illocutionary acts.
CHAPTER IX
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Overview

In this chapter I summarize and discuss the findings of this study. I begin by discussing the tasks of defining critical terms and prescribing roles for criticism in educational settings. I then relate the findings of Chapters II through V to these tasks. Finally, having used the findings of these chapters to analyze and appraise metacritical writings of Beardsley, Smith, and Feldman, I discuss some of the conclusions reached in my examination of their accounts of criticism.

Metacritical Tasks

Inquiry into the topic of criticism is a highly visible part of the literature in arts education. In this study I have examined two kinds of activities characteristic of this literature. The first kind of activity in which writers engage is the defining of one or more of a cluster of related terms: terms such as "criticism", "description", "analysis", "characterization", "interpretation", "evaluation", and "judgment". The second kind of activity in which writers engage is the prescribing of various roles for criticism in educational settings.

Definitions of Critical Terms

In discussing the activity of defining critical terms, useful distinctions can be made between 'kinds' of definition and definitional
"modes".\textsuperscript{1} Reportive definitions and stipulative definitions are different kinds of definitions. In offering a reportive definition, one attempts to present the actual meaning of a term, as this term is used in ordinary language. Since this is the case, they are appraised by ruling upon their truth or falsity.

A stipulative definition, on the other hand, does not claim to report the actual meaning of a term as it is used in ordinary language. Rather, in formulating a stipulative definition, one assigns a meaning to a term. Thus, stipulative definitions are neither true nor false, nor are they appraised on their congruence with the ordinary meanings of the terms they define.

Although stipulated definitions are appraised, they are appraised in different ways. Sometimes, for example, a writer will offer an arbitrary stipulated definition. This is a definition which the writer presents for use only in the context in which it is presented. These definitions are usually presented for the convenience of a given writer in order to facilitate the discussion at hand. However, they are appraised on the basis of their convenience to readers. The practice of making arbitrary stipulations is sometimes abused when, for example, a writer presents a stipulated meaning for a term which is close to, but not the same as, the term's meaning in ordinary language without properly distinguishing between the two meanings. In doing this, a writer contributes to a reader's confusion. Another abuse of the practice of stipulating arises when a writer surreptitiously shifts

\textsuperscript{1} In making these distinctions I rely heavily upon Ennis 1969.
between the stipulated meaning and the ordinary meaning of the term being defined within the same context of discussion.

Another kind of stipulation is presented when a writer assigns a meaning to a given term and, in addition, proposes that others adopt this same meaning in contexts other than the one in which the stipulation is proposed. We can call such a definition a nonarbitrary stipulated definition. Such a proposal is a serious matter since, in effect, a given writer is advocating that we change our linguistic habits and adopt the meaning he proposes. In order for such a proposal to be considered seriously, good reasons must be offered by the writer for the adoption of his proposed meaning by others. Nonarbitrary stipulated definitions are appraised primarily on the basis of such reasons. Where no good reasons are offered by a writer for the adoption of his stipulated meaning, his definition must be considered unacceptable.

When we consider the purposes for which definitions are offered by writers in the literature, it is evident that definitions must be considered to be either reportive definitions or nonarbitrary stipulative definitions. That is, they cannot be considered to be arbitrary stipulations because such definitions are presented in order to be used by other educators and students in settings apart from the context in which the definition is presented. Educational metacritics, then, must either present reportive definitions or justified nonarbitrary stipulative definitions. Since this is the case, they are definitions which can be appraised either on their truth or falsity or on the reasons which they explicitly offer for the adoption of their definitions.
In addition to various "kinds" of definitions, there are various "modes" by which definitions can be presented. That is, in choosing to define a critical term either reportively or through stipulation, one has a number of options. Each option has both advantages and disadvantages both for the formulator of the definition and the audience for which the definition is formulated. One can choose, for example, to define a critical term by means of equivalent expression definitions. Two common modes of definition here are the synonym definition and the classification definition. In the synonym definition one presents a term taken to have an equivalent meaning to the term being defined. In the classification definition, one presents a general category along with differentia which discriminates the particular concept being defined from other things within the same category.

Both kinds of definitions may be helpful in teaching someone a concept that is not already known but each has disadvantages also. In formulating reportive definitions, for example, it is difficult generally to establish an equivalence between the term being defined (definiendum) and the expression used to define this term (definiens). In formulating synonym equivalent expression definitions, as a case in point, difficulties are often encountered in finding a word that is truly synonymous. Because this is so often a problem with words in ordinary language, classification definitions are generally preferred. But even here it is often difficult to select a general category and, once having selected such a category, to achieve equivalence by making the definiens neither too broad nor too narrow. Equivalence definitions
sometimes present psychological problems as well in contexts in which a definition is presented for purposes of instruction. Many definiens, for example, are circular or are simply not comprehensible to the audience for whom they are intended.

In order for someone to learn an unfamiliar concept, it is often helpful — and, indeed, it is often necessary — that the concept be presented in more concrete terms. Two modes of definition which attempt to do this are **ostensive definition** and **conditional definition**. In defining ostensively, one presents both examples and nonexamples of the concept. For example, in defining "description" one would present both examples and nonexamples of descriptions. Conditional definitions more precisely tie a particular concept to concrete instances than do ostensive definitions. These concrete instances are linked to the term being defined by means of a conditional clause, one which specifies necessary and/or sufficient conditions underlying an instance of the concept in question. Thus in formulating a definition of the critical term "description" one might try to specify those conditions under which it would be possible to say that someone has described.

Concrete interpretation modes of definition have their disadvantages also. The brevity that is a characteristic of an equivalence definition is usually lost in presenting concrete interpretation modes of definition. Moreover, they do not even attempt to achieve equivalence, so that in presenting a concrete interpretation mode, one is usually dealing with only one aspect of the concept. One particular problem that arises with ostensive definitions is that the reasons why an example or nonexample is presented are often not obvious or explicit.
Ostensive definitions, moreover, usually do not provide a clear picture of the range or extension of a concept: in other words, those areas where a concept borders on similar or related concepts. For these reasons ostensive definitions are usually more helpful when used in conjunction with some other mode of definition such as a classification definition.

Thus each of the various modes of definition has advantages and disadvantages. Equivalence modes have brevity and aim at completeness but sometimes at an unsatisfactory level of abstraction. Concrete interpretation modes tie these abstractions to concrete instances but usually do not aim at completeness. Although it is probably preferable to present both modes of definition where definitions are presented for purposes of teaching someone a concept, educational metacritics have tended to favor equivalent expression definitions, classification and synonym definitions, over concrete interpretation forms. Where concrete interpretation is done, it is done by presenting examples. No educational metacritic to my knowledge has attempted to construct conditional definitions of critical terms.

Findings of This Study. Chapters II, III, and IV relate directly to the tasks of formulating and appraising definitions of critical terms by investigating the use of critical terms in ordinary language. This was done in order to clarify the meanings of critical terms and to construct a benchmark for appraising the truth or falsity of reportive definitions which appear in the literature.

One of the basic tasks in constructing classification definitions lies in presenting a general category in order to classify the meaning
of a term being defined. In Chapter II, I discuss different categories by examining different uses of critical terms in various contexts. I begin by distinguishing "criticism" and its cognate terms from other critical terms. "Criticism" in the sense in which it is used in the literature is a generic expression used as a stand-in for other critical terms. Investigation into the concept of criticism, therefore, was conducted by inquiring into the multiple uses of critical terms in various contexts of utterance.

The major finding of this chapter was that critical nouns such as "description", "analysis", etc. are ambiguous inasmuch as they could be used to denote uses of critical verbs and these uses could be categorized in different ways. Investigation revealed three major categories by which one could classify the uses of critical verbs: activities, achievements, and states. The former two categories are different kinds of doings; the latter is not a doing. Further investigation into the doings indicated by critical verbs resulted in a differentiation between linguistic and nonlinguistic doings, and mental and physical doings. It was found that some critical verbs could be used to indicate only nonlinguistic mental achievements and that some critical verbs could not be used to indicate any non-linguistic mental doings.

The significance of these findings for the construction and consideration of metacritical definitions lies in three areas.

1. The distinctions made in this chapter give some conception of the kinds of "things" which are indicated by critical verbs and denoted by critical nouns. This is needed in order to better understand how
these terms are being used in the literature and in order to provide
general categories for classifying the meaning of critical terms.

2. It is apparent that ordinary language countenances multiple
meanings for critical terms. Therefore, critical terms, and especially
critical nouns, are likely to be used ambiguously in metacritical
accounts. Indeed, as I demonstrate in later chapters of this study,
critical terms are consistently used ambiguously and often without an
explicit awareness of these ambiguities. There is a general need, then,
for clarification of the definitions provided in the literature.

3. Because critical terms are consistently used in more than one
way, there is a need to provide more than one general category in the
classification definitions provided by metacritics: The findings of
Chapter II indicate gaps in metacritical accounts.

The predominant interest of educational metacritics in defining
critical terms is with criticism as "talk about art"; that is, with
the linguistic active doings indicated by critical terms. In Chapter
III, I investigate further the activities and achievements, or acts of
speaking indicated by critical terms by appealing to a theory of
language presented by J. R. Searle. Searle distinguishes among
utterance or locutionary acts, illocutionary acts, perlocutionary acts,
and the propositional acts of referring and predicating. These are all
acts which a speaker can perform in speaking. On the theory of language
which Searle accepts, it is the illocutionary act which is the basic
unit of discourse. These are acts performed according to certain
conventions, conventions which can be regarded as rules for the
successful performance of such acts and which can be stated as sets of
necessary and sufficient conditions. Using the general conception of speech as a matter of performing acts, I distinguish between simple and complex speech acts and between the performance of acts (active doings) and acts which have been performed (artifacts).

Searle's theory provides a framework for constructing conditional definitions of critical terms. Since critical terms are members of the general class of illocutionary terms and are held to indicate distinctive illocutionary acts, critical acts or acts of cing can be discriminated from one another by identifying and stating the rules for their successful performance. In Searle's account two kinds of rules are differentiated: general rules which apply to illocutionary acts as a whole and specific rules which distinguish one illocutionary act from another. These specific rules are categorized in Searle's account as preparatory, propositional content, sincerity and essential conditions. In this study Searle's general conditions are accepted from his text and an investigation is made into the specific conditions underlying illocutionary acts of cing. This investigation is carried out in Chapter IV.

The conception of speech as the performance of various kinds of acts is significant one for the construction and appraisal of metacritical definitions for the following reasons.

1. The distinction between locutionary, and illocutionary acts is often overlooked in metacritical definitions. Sometimes, for example, writers erroneously attempt to discriminate between one act of cing and another on the basis of the words which are used in the performance of such acts. Reportive definitions which attempt to do this, on Searle's theory are false.
2. The theory of illocutionary acts calls into question the whole attempt to encompass critical discourse by defining a limited range of critical terms. If it is thought that ordinary discourse countenances thousands of kinds of illocutionary acts and if critical terms in their ordinary use indicate only six acts among thousands, one must question the attempt to provide a range of definitions that would accurately reflect critical talk as it exists. There is no reason to believe that critical discourse about works of art is any less complex than other kinds of discourse. Metacritics, then, must be operating under a sharply restricted conception of what critical discourse is if they are attempting to report the meanings of critical terms in their definitions or else they must be stipulating special meanings for critical terms in their definitions.

3. The theory of illocutionary acts calls into the question the rather common practice of using other illocutionary terms in the definiens of reportive, classification, and synonym definitions. If illocutionary terms indicate acts which are distinct (although possibly related), metacritics who use another illocutionary term to denote a general category in their classification definitions at the very least are assuming that such an act is broader and more comprehensive than the critical acts which it subsumes. Such an assumption goes beyond our present knowledge of illocutionary acts. Metacritics who treat illocutionary terms as synonomous are almost certainly presenting false reportive definitions.
4. The distinctions between simple and complex speech acts and between active doing and artifact uses of critical terms are useful in sorting out some ambiguities in metacritical definitions. First, as I demonstrate in later chapters of this study, educational metacritics use critical terms to indicate both simple and complex speech acts. Complex speech acts are held to be constituted by the performance of simple speech acts. But as I demonstrate in later chapters of this study, it is often not clear what the constituents of these complex speech acts are, nor is the support relationship between one simple speech act and another made explicit. Second, the distinction between linguistic active doings and artifacts is marked in Beardsley's account by the use of different critical terms. To understand Beardsley's use of critical terminology, then, one must consider this distinction. Although Beardsley's text appears to have been influential in the development of educational metacritical definitions, however, these distinctions have generally been ignored or gone undetected. These distinctions, then, are generally helpful in understanding the literature.

In Chapter IV, I continue the investigation of illocutionary acts of cing begun in Chapter III by constructing reportive conditional definitions of critical terms. I do this by specifying the preparatory, propositional content, sincerity, and essential conditions for acts of cing to be successfully performed acts of their type. I also cite actual examples of acts of cing taken from the writings of practicing critics. Critical acts or acts of cing are distinguished from one another on the basis of these conditions. Although some of these
conditions were found to be similar, the total set of conditions was
distinct for each critical act.

The findings of this chapter are significant for the following
reasons:

1. The analysis of this chapter provides a clearer understanding
of the concepts indicated by critical terms and what is implied in the
successful performance of such acts. These findings supplement what
is known about such acts in the literature. For example it is only
dimly perceived in the educational literature -- if it is perceived
at all -- that to perform acts of cing requires, among other things,
certain capabilities of a speaker. For example to perform acts of
description and analysis requires certain kinds of knowledge, to perform
acts of interpreting requires understanding, etc. By not providing
conditional definitions, educators have not made this conditions
explicit with grave consequences for their prescriptions. For in pre­
scribing certain critical acts to be performed, educators have often
ignored the fact that the capabilities for performing these acts could
not reasonably be presumed to be present in those for whom the acts
are prescribed.

2. A clearer understanding of the concepts indicated by critical
terms helps to clarify and explain some of the intuitive attempts
metacritics have made to distinguish one critical act from another.
For example, some have in various kinds of ways attempted to erect a
content distinction between various acts of cing based upon features
of the aesthetic object or of the words used in performing acts of cing.
Such a content distinction may be reflected in a more sophisticated way
by the differences in the propositional content conditions of acts of
cing.
3. The findings of this chapter illuminate some mistaken attempts by metacritics to equate such concepts as criticism and evaluation, interpretation and explanation, and evaluation and judgment. Although some of these concepts may be related in that they share certain similarities in their contextual conditions, the findings of this chapter show that definitions of critical terms which rely upon other critical terms as synonyms are false inasmuch as each critical act has a distinctly different set of conditions which govern their successful performance.

4. The analysis of the illocutionary act of criticizing underscores the distinction between criticizing in its specific illocutionary act sense and criticizing in its generic sense. Metacritical definitions often do not make this distinction explicit and confuse one sort of act with another. This has serious consequences for the implementation of criticism for there may be some compelling arguments which can be made for prescribing criticism (generic sense) in educational settings but the analysis of criticizing suggests that it would doubtful that educators would want to prescribe criticism in its illocutionary act sense.

Prescriptions for Criticism

In addition to defining critical terms, educational metacritics formulate and prescribe various roles for criticism in educational settings. Considering that the major efforts of many writers in the literature have been expended in applying the definitions of critical terms embodied within the philosophical literature to various educational settings, it is somewhat surprising that little attention seems
to have been given to the various possible roles which criticism could have in educational settings. Chapter V of this study is devoted to explicating the concept of a prescription, to differentiating various prescriptive roles for criticism in educational settings, and to formulating criteria for appraising criticism prescriptions which have been made.

Findings of This Study. In Chapter V, the activity of prescribing is presented as a generic act which encompasses a range of more-or-less related illocutionary acts, acts such as prescribings, recommendings, advisings, counselings, etc. Characteristically such acts are performed by uttering sentences with "should" or "ought" used in conjunction with a verb. Therefore, a variety of utterances with "should" or "ought" used in conjunction with the educational verbs "teach" and "learn" were investigated. Such utterances were found to be "grammatically complete" when one had specified a subject and a verb i.e., when one had referred to an agent and had predicated an act of that agent. However, such utterances were not "conceptually complete" since a hearer could demand further information in order to act upon the prescription being made. Thus five "conceptual components" of prescriptions were identified. These were labeled as agent, act, audience, object (upon which the act is performed), and goal (achieved or attained as the result of the performance of the act). Using the educational notions of teaching and learning, a basic distinction was made between prescriptions which demand both an agent and an audience (teaching prescriptions) and prescriptions which do not require an audience (learning prescriptions).
Having made these distinctions the role of criticism in such prescriptions was investigated. It was found that criticism could be construed as an act or acts to be performed either by a teacher or a learner or it could be construed as a goal which is to be attained as the result of teaching or learning. Thus, four roles for criticism in educational prescriptions were identified: criticism could be prescribed as a teaching method, as a learning method, as a teaching goal, or as a learning goal. When criticism is prescribed as a goal, it could be prescribed as a "knowledge that" goal; as a "knowledge how to" goal i.e., as a skill or set of skills; or as a propensity goal. All of these roles were illustrated by selections from the literature.

Having presented various kinds of prescriptions and various roles for criticism in these prescriptions, rules which govern prescriptions as successful illocutionary acts were considered and criteria for appraising criticism prescriptions were thereby identified. Some of these rules established conceptual links between prescriptions for criticism and metacritical definitions since prescribing certain roles for criticism implied that certain meanings be given to critical terms.

The significance of the findings of Chapter V lie in two areas:

1. Since various prescriptive roles for criticism exist in the literature without being explicitly differentiated, the distinctions made in this chapter aid in clarifying one aspect of metacritical accounts. As I demonstrate in later chapters of this study, educational metacritics sometimes shift between one prescriptive role for criticism and another. The distinctions made in this chapter, aid in disambiguating prescriptions for criticism in the literature.
2. The various prescriptive roles for criticism in the literature have largely gone unchallenged. Yet in later chapters of this study I show how some parts of the prescriptions made by educational meta-critics are defective. By having knowledge of criteria appropriately used in appraising criticism prescriptions, one can begin to identify and construct more adequate prescriptions in the literature.

**Metacritical Accounts**

In the first five chapters of this study, investigation was conducted into concepts indicated by critical terms and various prescriptive roles for criticism. In subsequent chapters of this study, these findings are used in order to analyze and appraise definitions of critical terms and prescriptions for criticism in the metacritical accounts of Monroe Beardsley, Ralph Smith, and Edmund Feldman.

**Metacritics' Definitions.** When one considers these accounts collectively it is evident that these writers differ not only on the kinds of definitions and on the modes of definition which they present, but also on the meanings which are given to critical terms in their definitions. Beardsley presents nonarbitrary stipulated definitions of "description", "analysis", and "interpretation" but reportive definitions of "evaluation" and "judgment". Smith appears to present reportive definitions except for the distinction between "description" and "characterization" in his early account (Smith 1968, p. 31) which is presented an arbitrary stipulation, a kind of definition which is inappropriate considering the purposes for which his definitions are presented. Feldman's definitions can be construed as reportive definitions inasmuch as no stipulative announcement is made.
Metacritics differ on the modes of definitions which they favor. Beardsley favors classification definitions and frequently presents examples of critical statements (ostensive definition). Smith uses classification and synonym definitions and rarely presents examples. Feldman's later account (Feldman, 1970), uses only classification and synonym definitions.

Finally metacritics differ on the meanings given to critical terms. Beardsley makes distinctions between description and analysis and, sometimes, between interpretation and judgment based upon a distinction between active doings and artifact uses of critical terms; this distinction is either overlooked or ignored in Smith's and Feldman's accounts. Beardsley and Smith occasionally use critical terms ambiguously to denote mental doings; Feldman consistently uses critical terms to denote both mental as well as physical doings. Beardsley uses critical terms to denote simple speech acts; the others use critical terms to denote both simple and complex speech acts.

Although metacritics all use critical terms to denote simple speech acts or statements of various kinds, not only are different critical terms defined, but these acts are characterized in different ways in their definitions. Beardsley first uses the concept of confirmability to distinguish critical statements from other kinds of statements. He then erects a basic functional distinction between analysis/description and interpretation statements as nonnormative kinds of statements on the one hand, and evaluation/judgment as normative statements on the other. This functional distinction is expressed by identifying statements within each category with one or more other illocutionary acts, acts which are not acts of cing. Thus it is
unclear from Beardsley's account whether analysis/description and interpretation statements have the same illocutionary force (are part of the same generic act) or whether these acts, themselves, are multi-functional (encompass a range of other more specific illocutionary acts). This same uncertainty applies to evaluation and judgment. Within the class of nonnormative statements, Beardsley makes content distinctions between analysis/description and interpretation based upon various aspects of the aesthetic object. Using Searle's theory and the examples of critical statements which Beardsley presents, an attempt was made to interpret these distinctions as distinctions based upon reference and predication.

In his definitions, Smith characterizes simple speech acts differently than does Beardsley. Whereas Beardsley distinguishes two general groups of critical statements according to differences in function, Smith sometimes employs a functional distinction to separate individual critical statements. At other times he uses this distinction to separate different groups of statements as well, and he appears to adopt Beardsley's distinction between normative and nonnormative statements. The functional distinction that Smith employs is expressed in a similar way as Beardsley's: that is, by the use of other illocutionary terms to indicate synonyms, or to indicate categories which either encompass, or are encompassed by critical statements. However, the set of illocutionary terms which Smith uses to express this functional distinction is quite different. Smith also characterizes individual critical statements on the basis of what he calls their "cognitive certainty". Although it is difficult to interpret the meaning of this expression in Smith's account, it
might be related to the confirmability of critical statements. Beardsley, however, uses confirmability to differentiate critical statements from other kinds of statements. Finally, Smith uses content distinctions to differentiate one critical statement from another based upon the aspects of the aesthetic object and the words and predicates employed in critical statements. Sometimes, such as with Smith's characterization of evaluation, these distinctions are roughly comparable to Beardsley's but there are significant differences even with these. For the most part Smith's content distinctions are different; they do not differentiate among critical statements in the same way; nor are they as precisely presented.

Feldman, also uses the concepts of confirmability, function, and content to characterize critical statements or simple speech acts of cing in his definitions. There are two broad groups of statements in his account which appear to differ in their confirmability. Descriptions and analyses support interpretations and judgments and are, therefore, presumably more easily confirmed. Feldman does not explicitly specify the confirmability of individual critical statements so it is difficult to compare his account with Smith's given the lack of clarity in each. Feldman's functional distinctions, like Smith's and Beardsley's, employs a range of illocutionary terms, including critical terms, to designate general categories or synonyms for critical acts. Although Feldman sometimes selects the same critical term to function as a synonym or classification category as does Beardsley and Smith, there are many differences among their choices of terms as well. As with Beardsley's and Smith's content distinctions, Feldman's are made on the basis of the words which figure in critical
statements and on the basis of various aspects of aesthetic objects. Feldman's content distinctions are sometimes roughly comparable to the content distinctions Smith presents in his later account (Smith, 1973) but they also differ.

In summary, there are many differences in the definitions of critical terms presented by the metacritics examined in this study. Metacritics differ significantly in the kinds of definitions they present, in the modes of definition they employ, and in the meanings given to critical terms. All of these writers, to be sure, are interested in critical terms as indicators of simple speech acts or statements, but their characterizations of such statements differs widely from one another: The distinctions they use are different from one another. Those distinctions which are similar are used to characterize different critical statements. So given this and a general unclarity and imprecision in Smith's and Feldman's accounts, it is exceedingly difficult to say with certainty whether their critical acts are similar or different.

In the theory of speech acts presented in Chapter III of this study, it was held that different illocutionary terms indicated different speech acts and that such acts implied distinctive sets of contextual conditions for their successful performance. This theory is significant for the appraisal of metacritical definitions because it establishes the general principle that reportive classification or synonym definitions which use one or more illocutionary terms in their definiens must be false. It does not prove this, since such proof would require an analysis of all illocutionary acts, but it does present
an "hypothesis", as it were, that can be confirmed in individual cases. In the analysis of critical illocutionary acts or acts of cing presented in Chapter IV of this study, this "hypothesis" was supported since it was found that individual acts of cing did imply distinctive sets of conditions.

Using the findings of these two chapters, many of the reportive, classification and synonym definitions presented by metacritics were considered to be defective since most of them relied upon the use of one or more illocutionary terms either as synonyms or as general categories. In some cases, the falsity of such definitions was demonstrated through the use of counter examples. In those instances where another critical term was used in the definiens of a critical term being defined, falsity was demonstrated by citing the findings of Chapter IV.

Beardsley's nonarbitrary stipulated definitions required a different sort of appraisal: one which considered the reasons given for adopting the definitions he proposes. The more significant of Beardsley's reasons were that his definitions offered a precise and clearcut way of distinguishing among critical statements and that they covered a broad range of the statements critics make. Yet there are significant differences between the meanings he assigns to critical terms and the meanings of such terms in ordinary language. When Beardsley proposes the adoption of his definitions, he is in effect proposing that critics learn to use the technical meanings that he stipulates for critical terms. The problem with this is that in educational contexts, unlike scientific or technical contexts, laymen
as well as professionally trained people are active participants. Thus there seems to be a very great danger of confusing Beardsley's technical meanings and the ordinary meaning of critical terms.

In addition to these problems, one might also note a lack of sophistication in the content distinctions which are employed by meta-critics to differentiate one critical statement from another. These content distinctions are usually made by considering the words or aspects of an aesthetic object which figure in critical statements and seemed to depend upon distinctions based upon the reference and predication of critical statements, a distinction which was never clearly articulated in any of the metacritical accounts.

The findings of this study concerning metacritics' definitions have significance for the utilization and further development of definitions of critical terms in arts education.

1. The variation in the kinds of metacritical definitions presented should caution educators in their attempts to utilize existing definitions in both philosophical and educational accounts. Beardsley's text, for example, presents both stipulations and reportive definitions. Educational metacritics who use this influential source, should understand the kinds of definitions they are receiving from Beardsley and should discriminate between each kind of definition in his account. When educators wish to utilize Smith's definitions they should be aware that in one of his accounts, he presents his definition of characterization as an arbitrary stipulation. This is a stipulation which is usually presented only for use in the immediate context of discussion.
2. The lack of concrete interpretation suggests a needed area of study. Educational metacritics present definitions in order to teach others the concepts denoted by critical terms. However, they do this primarily by means of classification and synonym definitions, definitions which are sometimes too "abstract" for the intended audience of such definitions. There is, thus, a real need in the literature for the presentation of both examples and nonexamples, and for the construction of conditional definitions. One result of the failure to provide concrete interpretation is the general murkiness of much of Smith's and Feldman's accounts. Another consequence is the lack of awareness about what is involved in the performance of critical acts, a lack of awareness which results in logical inconsistency and faulty prescriptions.

3. The various ambiguities surrounding the use of critical terms in metacritical accounts, suggests a general need for clarification. Metacritics should clearly differentiate prescriptive and definitional components of their accounts. They should explicitly distinguish between active doing and artifact uses of critical terms, between mental and physical uses of critical terms, and between simple and complex speech acts. This is needed in order to avoid misconstrual by readers.

4. The defects in the reportive synonym and classification definitions presented by metacritics suggest that further investigation into critical concepts is needed and that further attempts should be made to construct more adequate classification definitions. This was not attempted in the present study.
Metacritics' Prescriptions. Smith and Feldman formulate and present educational prescription for criticism, one major difference between their accounts and that of Beardsley's. The prescriptive component of their accounts can be interpreted in various ways because each presents an ambiguous prescription for criticism, one which shifts from a conception of criticism as a teaching or learning method to a conception of criticism as a goal i.e., a set of skills which are to result from the educational process. Although there appear to be major points of agreement in their conception of various roles for criticism, there are significant differences in their prescriptions as well. Smith views the learner as a secondary school student. Feldman has a wider conception of a learner which ranges from the elementary school child to the adult. Although they both prescribe critical skills and understanding of works of art as proximate goals to be achieved through the use of criticism as a method, they prescribe other proximate goals as well, goals which differ in each account: Smith prescribes perception of aesthetic properties and appreciation of works of art as aesthetic goals; Feldman prescribes goals of enjoyment and satisfaction with works of art.

In this study, parts of both Smith's and Feldman's prescriptions were found to be defective. The simultaneous prescription of criticism as a learning method and criticism as a proximate skill goal was found to be logically inconsistent, for on the one hand it was assumed that learners could perform acts of cing, and on the other hand it was assumed that learners could not perform these same acts. By considering their prescriptions in light of the meanings of critical terms
presented in their definitions, other defects were found in their prescriptions for criticism as a method. Evaluation in Smith's account and judgment in Feldman's account appeared to be activities that could not be performed in the way they specified because of deficiencies in their criteria. Other acts, such as analysis and interpretation, could not reasonably be viewed as candidates for learning methods since it could not be assumed that learners would have the capabilities to perform these acts. Furthermore, although claims were advanced by metacritics about the effectiveness of their method in reaching certain educationally desired goals, these goals were often controversial in nature so that these claims and the prescriptions, themselves, could not be evaluated. Finally, Smith's prescription for evaluation and Feldman's prescription for judgment as goals were also found to be defective because in their conceptions of evaluation and judgment, there seemed to be no significant way in which such capacities could be improved with training and practice.

Although it is tempting to treat Beardsley's account of criticism as a prescription for educational practice, Beardsley does not formulate educational prescriptions directly. The arguments he presents for the adoption of his distinctions are directed at the mature critic and are intended to reform critical practice in order to achieve precision and objectivity. Beardsley's account of criticism is not presented as a teaching or learning method or goal. To interpret his account in this way requires a translation and when this is undertaken, one encounters problems similar to those which were encountered in Smith's and Feldman's accounts. For a number of the acts
given in his definitions cannot be prescribed as methods nor is it
easy to see how they could be prescribed as skill goals.

The above findings suggest three considerations for the further
development of metacritical accounts.

1. There is a need to clarify and distinguish various prescrip-
tive roles for criticism in the literature and to disambiguate meta-
critical accounts. The logical blunder that comes from simultaneously
prescribing criticism as a learning method and as a goal is an example
of the kind of problem that arises from a lack of clarity. Clarifica-
tion also could include a more precise specification of the conceptual
components of curriculum prescriptions.

2. Since many of the prescriptions for criticism as a method and
as a goal were found defective, it would seem that reconsideration of
prescriptive roles in metacritical accounts in light of the definitions
presented is in order. If the agent in a method prescription does not
have the capacity to perform an act, as this act is given in a meta-
critic's definition, there is a need to reformulate either the prescrip-
tion or the definition. For example if, as in the case of the prescrip-
tion for interpretation as a learning method, the capacity for per-
forming the act is projected as a goal to be attained, one must either
alter the prescription or change the meaning of "interpretation"
because understanding is both assumed and not assumed to be present in
the agent who interprets. Where criticism is prescribed as a skill
goal, definitions of critical terms must present a concept that is in
accord with the conception of a capacity which is improvable through
training and practice.
3. Finally, more understanding is needed about many of the proximate goals which are prescribed for criticism as a method; goals such as perception, understanding, appreciation and enjoyment of works of art. These involve controversial concepts. Without such an understanding it would seem difficult to know whether acts of criticizing had been successful. At the present time it seems difficult to either establish or disprove claims about the efficacy of criticism as a teaching or learning method.

This study, then, has sought to clarify the topic of art criticism through an investigation into critical concepts, definitions of critical terms, and prescriptions for criticism. The conclusions reached in this study indicate a need for further inquiry into this developing area of the literature in arts education.
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Martin's discussion of rationality occupies an important and prominent part of her account of explaining. Yet her treatment of this concept contains several discrepancies as her account moves from (a) an introductory discussion of this concept derived from a comparison of explaining and teaching (Martin, 1970, pp. 87-123), to (b) a presentation of six "intermediate" conditions on explaining (Martin, 1970, pp. 125-128); and finally to (c) her final statement of conditions on explaining as they are presented in her Hypothesis Six (Martin, 1970, pp. 128, 129).

Perhaps the best place to begin in pointing out the problems inherent in her discussion is by attempting to trace the rationality component of condition (b) in her Hypothesis Six, her final statement of conditions, to its original sources in the two earlier parts of her account. Condition (b) asserts the following:

(b) the tutor is rational and understands $W$ at the time of the episode, or thinks, or at least assumes, he understands $W$ at the time of the episode. (Martin, 1970, p. 128).

A reader presumes that this condition is not presented de novo but grows out arguments presented in her earlier discussions of rationality. An attempt by a reader to trace this final condition back to earlier arguments, however, is beset by problems.
These problems are not immediately obvious when one examines her formulation of the immediately preceding "intermediate" conditions on explaining (Martin, 1970, pp. 125-128). Martin claims that these intermediate conditions are "incorporated" into her final statement of conditions and indeed her intermediate "rationality$_E$" condition seems to be the source for condition (b) of Hypothesis Six.

We may view the requirement that the explainer be rational -- a requirement built into Hypothesis Four [Bromberger's model] -- as another condition on explaining something to someone. To distinguish it from the condition requiring the explainer to acknowledge the explainee's reason in the course of proceeding, let us call the former the rationality$_E$ condition on explaining and the latter the rationality$_p$ condition on explaining (Martin, 1970, pp. 126,127).

This passage would seem straightforward and her account unproblematic enough: her intermediate "rationality$_E$" condition is reflected in condition (b) of her final statement of conditions, Hypothesis Six.

Problems appear, however, when one attempts to trace the concept of rationality$_E$ back to her introductory discussion of that concept (Martin, 1970, pp. 87-123) because in this earlier part of her discussion the expression "rationality$_E$" is taken to mean something other than the rationality of an explainer. In her introductory discussion, rationality$_E$ is taken to mean the

- effectiveness or efficiency of ... [some] action, institution, or process, etc. ... the suitability of the process or activity ... for achieving certain results or objectives (Martin, 1971, p. 91).

Surely, then, there is a discrepancy between a requirement that an explainer be rational and a requirement that the activity the explainer engages in be suitable for achieving certain objectives. One must distinguish between a statement and the implications of that statement.
If one were searching for a correlate of the original notion of rationality^ in her final hypothesis (Hypothesis Six), conditions (d), (e), and (f) all would appear to be more likely candidates than condition (b) as a reflection of "effectiveness" or "efficiency" of some "action, institution, or process", etc.

There is a second major way in which Martin uses "rationality"; this is "rationality_p". It is also not clear how this concept is finally embodied in her Hypothesis Six.

Martin's introductory discussion of this notion begins by contrasting it with her original notion of rationality^E. This second form of rationality she argues places logical constraints on what is to be considered teaching. Summarily stated, it requires that the pupil's reason be acknowledged (hence the subscript "P") (Martin, 1970, p. 92). Rationality_p as it is expounded in this introductory discussion has two components: a "rationality constraint on manner" which is interpreted as a requirement allowing questioning and justification to take place in appropriate circumstances (Martin, 1970, p. 99) and a "rationality constraint on learning" which requires that the goal of teaching be to try to get pupils to acquire beliefs with proper backing if the appropriate situation were to arise. Both of these concepts which apply only dispositionally to teaching, she views as necessary requirements in every episode of explaining (Martin, 1970, pp. 102, 103).

In this introductory discussion Martin states that the rationality constraint on manner impinges on two conditions (c) and (e) of an earlier hypothesis, Hypothesis Five (later to be modified into Hypothesis Six).
Condition (c) "in effect places a rationality constraint on manner ..., for it requires the explainer to treat the explaine as being in a rational predicament." (Martin, 1971, p. 104).

Condition (e) "may also be said to place a rationality constraint on manner ..., for in requiring the explaine to shift the question in an explaining episode, in effect it requires that he acknowledge the explaine's reason (Martin, 1970, p. 105).

The rationality constraint on learning by way of contrast is apparently not reflected in Hypothesis Five since "beliefs with proper backing" is interpreted by Martin to mean understanding, and "understanding" appears only later as one of her six intermediate conditions and in her final statement of conditions, Hypothesis Six. One assumes then, that the following discussion is laying the groundwork for a later modification of Hypothesis Five.

Consider now the rationality constraint on learning. We have stated all along that one who is explaining something to someone is trying to get someone to understand something. To try to do this is not simply to try to get someone to acquire belief. Understanding does involve belief but, it merely involves more than this. For example, someone who understands why the engine seized up must do more than believe that it was due to an oil leak. At the very least the belief must have backing (Martin, 1971, pp. 107, 108).

To recapitulate, then, Martin begins by contrasting rationality_p with rationality_E. Rationality_p consists of two components: a rationality constraint on manner which affects conditions (c) and (e) of Hypothesis Five and a rationality constraint on learning which consists of the goal of attempting to get someone to acquire beliefs with proper backing -- or as she interprets it -- understanding. This is the first way in which "rationality_p" is used.
The second major way in which "rationality_p" is used occurs in her later discussion of six intermediate conditions (Martin, 1970, pp. 126, 127). A "rationality_p" condition is formulated as one of those conditions. This condition is also contrasted with rationality_e. "Rationality_p" here, however, can only plausibly be construed as a rationality condition on manner not as both a rationality constraint on manner and rationality constraint on learning. This is not clearly spelled out in Martin's account, however. One has to infer this from the fact that the rationality constraint on learning i.e., understanding, is elevated to the status of separate intermediate "understanding condition" at this point in her discussion:

There is, then, an understanding condition on explaining something to someone as well as a linguistic condition. We discussed this understanding condition in Chapter 5 for the rationality constraint on learning, which according to rationality theorists governs teaching and which according to our own view governs explaining -- requires, in effect, that the explainer try to get the explainee to understand (Martin, 1971, p. 124).

Thus, rationality_p in this later discussion of intermediate conditions, then, is narrower than Martin's earlier treatment of the concept since it must be limited to the notion of a rationality constraint on manner.

There is still a further complication in Martin's treatment of rationality_p. This complication arises when one tries to determine how the rationality constraint on manner is incorporated into her final statement of necessary conditions (Hypothesis Six). It will be recalled that in her introductory discussion of the rationality constraint on manner, Martin believed that this component of rationality_p affected conditions (c) and (e) of Hypothesis Five. That is, it
affected a condition which referred to a rational predicament which an explainee was known, believed, or assumed to be in by an explainer, and it affected a question-shifting condition. In her discussion of her six "intermediate" conditions, however, Martin also introduces a separate "question shifting condition" (Martin, 1970, p. 127) without explaining how this affects the original concept of a rationality constraint on manner which now, presumably, is reflected in her intermediate "rationality_p condition". One would wish to know if this rationality_p condition is to be construed in some other way than as a rationality constraint on manner. I believe that this cannot be answered from Martin's text.

Thus, the concept of rationality_p undergoes several transformations in Martin's discussion. How this concept is finally to be construed is a mystery to this writer. It is equally mysterious how her rationality_p condition is finally incorporated into Hypothesis Six.

To sum up, the notions of rationality_E and rationality_p in Martin's discussion contains several discrepancies as her account moves from an introductory discussion, to formulation of intermediate conditions, and finally to her final statement of conditions (Hypothesis Six).

Although her discussion of rationality has several problematic aspects, it will be maintained that her use of these concepts has two major functions. One function is to establish the presence of ordinary input and output conditions and the second function is to establish certain preparatory conditions relating to the relative status of a speaker and a hearer. Both of these functions I examine in the main body of this study.
APPENDIX B

One of her conditions in her final statement of conditions (condition e, Hypothesis Six), in particular, seems to this writer not to be a necessary condition on explaining. In Martin's analysis, there is a question-shifting requirement (condition e) on every act of explaining. Before arguing against this notion, one might begin with an inquiry into the nature of this condition as Martin presents it.

The notion of a question-shift on explaining is developed in light of a putative example of explaining presented by Dray (1957). In this example, an engine seizure is supposedly explained by a speaker uttering the sentence "It was due to a leak in the oil reservoir". Dray argues that it is possible for the utterance of such a sentence to constitute an act of explaining in appropriate circumstances: It would not constitute an explaining episode when uttered to Dray who knows nothing about engines; it would constitute an explaining episode when uttered to a puzzled assistant mechanic who is able to connect the fact of the oil leak with the engine seizure. Martin argues against Dray on this matter. For her the utterance of such a sentence is not an explaining episode because the utterance contains no "shift in question" and is, hence, in some way deficient (Martin, 1972, pp. 46-48).

The nature of this deficiency, however, remains mysterious in Martin's account. There is to begin with, something unsatisfactorily abstract about the whole concept of an underlying question. For Martin
an explainee need not ask any question at all; it is only necessary that, after the explaining episode be concluded, the explanation itself be considered an answer to what amounts to an indefinite and unexplained set of questions. Thus, Martin never really clarifies what one means by a question-shift in explaining. Apparently the real deficiency of Dray's utterance is that it could not lead to understanding of the engine seizure in a hearer who previously had lacked that understanding:

The aim of explaining something to someone, is understanding and there is surely a good deal of initial plausibility to the supposition that a shift in question is essential if understanding is to be achieved (Martin, 1970, p. 46).

For such an utterance to lead to understanding on Martin's account it would apparently need to be conjoined with some further utterance. This further utterance would in itself constitute an answer to a "subsidiary" question: a question such as "Why did the oil leak lead to an engine seizure?" (Martin, 1972, p. 48). Such an expanded utterance would then have the potential to transform someone who previously had not understood why the engine seized up into someone who did understand.

Leaving aside the troublesome matter of clarifying Martin's notion of a question-shift in explaining, it seems to me that Martin is clearly wrong in her requirement of a question-shift. She is wrong because the utterance "It was due to a leak in the oil reservoir" uttered in appropriate circumstances is one that could (on Martin's own criteria) lead to an understanding of the engine seizure in one who previously had lacked such an understanding. In referring back to the engine seizure example, even Martin would not deny that the assistant mechanic
would have understood the engine seizure after hearing the utterance "Its due to an oil leak in the reservoir." The point of her dispute with Dray seems to be that while Dray would hold that the assistant mechanic lacked prior understanding of the engine seizure, Martin would deny that he lacked such understanding. On this point this writer believes that Martin is wrong. She is wrong primarily because she is operating under an overly restricted notion of the concept "lack of understanding." A notion which she accepts from Bromberger and which she, herself, later repudiates.

Before showing where Martin is in error, however, there are some preliminary reasons for doubting Martin's conclusion that explaining must contain some shift in question. There is to begin with no reason to deny that some explaining episodes do in fact contain question-shifts. The notion of explaining encompasses both simple speech acts and complex speech acts. A complex speech act of explaining might well involve shifts in question (answers to subsidiary questions) but need this be the case for all speech acts of explaining? On the doctrine of performatives which Searle accepts, to say

I explain this engine seizure as the result of a leak in the oil reservoir.

is to perform an illocutionary act of explaining in appropriate circumstances. As a performative verb, "to explain" can be used in the first person present indicative to make explicit the illocutionary force of the act performed. But if the above is acceptable as an explaining episode it is difficult to see how it contains a question shift any more than

The engine seizure is due to a leak in the oil reservoir.

which on Martin's account is not an explanation. Martin who seems to
have had the notion of a complex speech act of explaining in mind in her analysis, seems to deny that there could be performative uses of the verb "to explain."

Second, Martin is led to some counterintuitive conclusions with her notion of a question shift. The passage where these conclusions are best exemplified is the following:

Recall now the comment Dray's mechanic made to his assistant: "It's due to an oil leak." We have made it clear that the mechanic was not explaining to his assistant why the engine seized up although he did tell him why. Did he, nonetheless, give his assistant an explanation^P [artifact sense of "explain"] of the seizure? Supposing that "It's due to an oil leak" enabled the assistant to understand why the engine seized up, must we not say that this was an explanation for him? I think we must. And the present analysis allows us to say this, for it admits instances of explanationsP in nonexplaining contexts. ... We see, then, that there can be explanationsP both suitable for and intended for someone apart from explaining contexts; indeed, we see that someone can give someone an explanationP of something without at the same time explaining that thing to him. But wait. "It's due to an oil leak" contains no shift in question. Can it, after all, be an explanationP of something for someone? I have argued that shifting the question is essential to explaining something to someone. Are we to say that it is essential to explaining, but not to explanationsP? Yes, we are, ... (Martin, 1970, pp. 133, 134).

Thus, there are several counterintuitive conclusions in Martin's account. Where the act of uttering

It's due to a leak in the oil reservoir.

cannot lead to understanding, the same artifact or performed act

It's due to a leak in the oil reservoir.

can lead to understanding; where the act of explaining must contain a shift in question, the performed act or artifact sense of an explanation need not. Finally, there is her conclusion that the artifact sense of explanation can actually be given by someone who performs some other
Illocutionary act. All of these conclusions are puzzling and seem to require explanation, an explanation which is lacking in Martin's account.

One may now turn to the genesis of Martin's question shifting condition. Apparently some suggestion for this condition was derived from Dray (Martin, 1970, p. 44-46) but the actual source seems to be condition (e) of Bromberger's Hypothesis Four:

(e) in the course of the episode the tutor also provides the tutee with such instruction as he (the tutor) thinks necessary to remove the basis of whichever of the states mentioned in (c) he deems the tutee to be in (Bromberger, 1965, p. 95).

The "states mentioned in (c)" which Bromberger cites are his "b- and p-predicaments." They are states such that with respect to some underlying question (a) it admits of a right answer on some person's view but that person can think of no answer to which there are not decisive objections (p-predicament); (b) it admits of a right answer but that answer is beyond that which such a person can provide (b-predicament). Both of these predicaments are attempts to parse "lack of understanding" into more "concrete" terms.

Bromberger's condition (e) is required in his account because someone who is in either a p- or b-predicament will not understand the answer to an underlying question on simply being presented with a direct answer to such a question. In the engine seizure episode, for example, merely being told that "It is due to a leak in the oil reservoir" would not lead to understanding of the engine seizure to one who has decisive objections to that answer (p-predicament) or to one who needs instruction in order that his cognitive state is such that he can indeed accept the answer (b-predicament).
The crux of the problem, however, is not whether a question shift is necessary for one who is in a p- or b-predicament but whether these notions exhaust specific situations in which a person can be said to lack understanding of something. Martin's own account would lead one to deny this since she would maintain that a person could be in a range of other predicaments with regard to some underlying question and still have an explaining episode occur (Martin, 1970, pp. 73-80). The assistant mechanic in Dray's episode, for example, conceivably could be a person who is in an "a-predicament": that is a person who can conceive of the right answer to an underlying question and who has no objections to this answer but who also can conceive of a wrong answer to which he has no objections. On Martin's account an explainer who took someone to be in an a-predicament could explain something to him (Martin, 1970, pp. 75, 76). But if this is the case one must also grant that the utterance

The engine seizure was due to a leak in the oil reservoir. would adequately function as an explanation since nothing additional need be uttered in order for the assistant mechanic to understand the engine seizure. The assistant mechanic neither needs additional instruction to overcome objections nor to improve his cognitive repertoire. Either Martin is denying that lack of understanding (or assumed lack of understanding) on the part of the explainer is relevant to an explanatory episode in which case it is hard to see why a putative explanatory utterance must be capable of producing understanding in the first place; or she must admit that a person in an a-predicament genuinely could be said to lack understanding. In this latter case she must also admit that utterance of
The engine seizure was due to a leak in the oil reservoir. has the potential of producing this understanding. She, in fact, seems to opt for this latter option. A person in an a-predicament can be said to lack understanding:

Suppose the prisoner wants his jailors to understand how he disposed of the dirt and recognized his jailors to be in an a-predicament relative to the question "How did he (the prisoner) dispose of the dirt?" He proceeds to tell them in great detail how he got the dirt to the window, how he opened the window, how he got the dirt out of the window, how the dirt dropped into the moat. I submit that in this case he has explained how he disposed of the dirt even though he takes the jailors to be in an a-predicament (Martin, 1970, p. 76).

But if a person in an a-predicament can be said to lack understanding, all that is necessary to remove this understanding, (witness the engine seizure example) is a simple unembellished answer to the underlying question. In such a case no question-shift is necessary.