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CONCEPTS AND CAUSES:

THE STRUCTURE OF PLOTINUS' UNIVERSE

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

Michael Frank Wagner

* * * * *

The Ohio State University

1979

Reading Committee:
Ivan Boh
Peter K. Machamer
Robert G. Turnbull

Approved by:

Robert G. Turnbull
Adviser
Department of Philosophy
To my parents, Victor and Anette Wagner;
my wife, Monica;
and my adviser, Robert Turnbull.
VITA

September 29, 1952 . . . . . . . . . Born - Victoria, Texas

1970-1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . Opportunity Awards Scholarship, Texas A & M University, College Station, Texas

1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Phi Kappa Phi

1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.A. cum laude, Texas A & M University, College Station, Texas

1974-1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . University Fellowship, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1975-1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . Teaching Assistant, Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M.A., The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1978-1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . Teaching Assistant, Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

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Chapter I
SENSATION AND THE ACTIVE SOUL
IN PLOTinus AND AugustinE

The questions "What is the nature of our universe?" and "How, or in what sense, can we have knowledge of it?" have motivated Western philosophy since its beginnings in ancient Greece. Plato, in synthesizing various strands of pre-Socratic thought and producing the first systematic metaphysics and epistemology available to subsequent eras, profoundly influenced philosophers' answers to these questions. Plato especially influenced the tradition known as Neoplatonism, which dominated much of Late Hellenistic, Medieval and Early Modern thought. Though it is difficult (at best) to isolate any one philosopher who ought to be called 'the founder of Neoplatonism', the title usually goes to Plotinus.¹ For Plotinus' status in the Neoplatonic tradition seems to be much the same as Plato's in the earlier Greek tradition. Plotinus' Enneads comprise the earliest detailed and systematic Neoplatonic document available and they influenced all subsequent Neoplatonic philosophy.

Plotinus' answers to our two opening questions are the primary topics of this work. Before turning to Plotinus more exclusively in chapters 3-6, however, it will be helpful to explain some general features of Neoplatonism. I shall begin with some features of

¹
Neoplatonic views on sensation and perception. To introduce those views, it will be helpful to contrast Neoplatonism with some views common to the modern and contemporary tradition known as Empiricism. In chapter 2, we shall see that some of the central features of Neoplatonic views on sensation and perception are common to Ancient philosophers in general.

The contrast with Empiricism is interesting and helpful because Empiricism departs from certain basic metaphysical and epistemological views of preceding Western philosophers in general and Neoplatonists in particular. Empiricism's departure from the Neoplatonic views I shall be discussing thus provides a means for introducing Neoplatonism to contemporary philosophers who, on the whole, are more familiar with Empiricism than with Neoplatonism. The task of understanding Neoplatonism is made somewhat easier, moreover, by some recent work in American philosophy, whose "back to Kant" tendencies have recaptured some of the more traditional views of Western philosophers—though not without important modifications. I shall use some of this recent work (primarily, the work of Wilfrid Sellars) in this chapter.

I shall introduce one feature of Empiricism with an argument by Descartes. Though Descartes is not himself an Empiricist, he plays an important role in preparing the ground for Empiricism. My use of Descartes and Empiricists (especially Locke) is aimed at providing contrasts with Neoplatonism. Accordingly, I shall focus upon certain especially useful passages from Descartes and from Empiricists, but I shall not argue for a general interpretation of either.
We normally take ourselves to be in most intimate contact with our universe in perception. Empiricists, accordingly, take perception to be our primary faculty of knowledge. Scientific theory is generally taken by Empiricists to be, as a body of knowledge, derivative from perception (or, as it is commonly called, observation). Empiricists normally distinguish sharply between observation and theory and take observation to have a privileged claim to "getting at" the external universe. One way to give observation special epistemic status is to construe it as an essentially passive matter. The idea that the mind or soul plays a determining role in one's conception of the universe has, Empiricists suppose, unsavory consequences. Insofar as one takes an active role in determining how he shall conceive of something, the supposition goes, his conception is fictional rather than factual. But insofar as we are passive and the universe itself causally determines our conception of it, our conceptions are well-founded or factual. Thus, a theory's factual justification must come from some link it has with observation, construed by the Empiricists as passive. I shall first address the claim that there is something essentially passive about observation (for now, perception) and then, in section 2 of this chapter, I shall return to the general issue alluded to above, that of observation and theory. In particular, I shall begin by discussing the roles which the body and the soul play in perception as seen in the Neoplatonic tradition and in the "back to Kant" movement, contrasting them with the foregoing claim that the mind or soul must somehow be passive in perception.
l. The Soul and the Senses in Perception

Plotinus holds, along with many other classical philosophers, that the soul is essentially active. Passivity is characteristic of body for Plotinus and never of soul. Plotinus characterizes body as a tool (organon; Latin, instrumentum) of the soul [IV.3.26,5-6]. This relationship between the soul and the body is particularly evident in perception (aisthesis). The soul is involved in perception as a craftsman and the body is the tool used by the soul in exercising its craft. The soul uses the body, Plotinus' view continues, by using impressions (typoi) in the body's sense organs. Plotinus also calls sense impressions 'sensations' (phantasiai), and he claims that when the soul uses sensations a discernment (krisis)—"that which occurs by means of [dia] the body"—is performed [IV.3.26,6-8]. Thus, we say that perceptions are not undergoings but are discernments and activities concerned with the things of undergoings [pathemata], the undergoings in the body concerning the thing of becoming so that the body bears the qualification of the external thing and the discernments belonging to the soul, the discernments not being the undergoings. [III.6.1,1-5]

The idea that the soul plays an active role in perception would seem absurd to many philosophers. Even Descartes, who wished to maintain the traditional view that the soul is essentially active, reflectively concluded that "those ideas which are perceived by the method of thinking I call 'sensations'" [p. 70] have always
occurred without the necessity of my consent, so that I could not perceive any object, however much I wished, unless it was present to one of my sense organs; nor was it in my power not to perceive it when it was present ... it seemed that [those sensory ideas] could not be derived from my own mind, and therefore they must have been produced in me by some other things. [Med., p. 71]

Descartes' reasoning is based upon the fact that the soul does not choose what it senses. The evening sky's appearing orange to me is not something my soul has any direct control over. I may choose whether or not I shall look at the sky and I can intervene physically to influence the visual process (e.g., by wearing tinted glasses). But given that the physical conditions are such-and-such (my eyes are open and directed towards the sky, I am not wearing tinted glasses, and so forth), the sky will appear to me in a certain way and there is nothing my soul can do to make it otherwise. Moreover, the soul does not choose what it senses because the objects it senses are not caused by the soul but by the external world acting upon our sense organs. One might at this point wish to question Descartes' implicit argument that, since I cannot (freely) choose what I sense, I cannot be its cause. My concern, however, is with the claim that the soul does not produce what it "thinks" in sensation and not with whether or not any production by soul must be freely done.6 (At this point, I am also not especially concerned with the apparent claim in this passage that the ideas "thought" by sensation are not innate; we will turn to Empiricists for that explicit view.)

Plotinus would agree that external things, and not the soul, produce what we sense. But the fact that sensory items are produced
by external things and not by the soul does not by itself entail that the soul is passive. To get to the view Descartes seems to be arguing for in the above passage, one must add that the items we sense are thereby produced in the soul—e.g., that sensations are modes of having a certain sort of idea. The soul is passive on Descartes' view because sensory items are not only effects of external things but effects which occur in the soul. If sensations occurred in the body, then nothing would follow concerning the passive or active character of the soul in perception. In short, Plotinus parts company with Descartes when Descartes puts sensory items in the soul. Sensations are, for Plotinus, changes (impressions) in our sense organs.

It will be helpful at this point to compare Plotinus' view that the soul is active in perception with views of Wilfrid Sellars. In Science and Metaphysics, Sellars argues that sensations— or what Sellars calls 'sense impressions'—belong to "sheer receptivity and [are] in no sense conceptual" [p. 7], while the conceptual character of perception belongs, "as such, to spontaneity" [S&M, p. 9]. For both Sellars and Plotinus, the line between the soul and the body is drawn by the distinction between the conceptual and the non-conceptual. We are passive in sensation but, being non-conceptual, sensation belongs to the body. Perceptual discernment— or what Sellars calls 'taking' [S&M, p. 74]— is conceptual and thus belongs to the soul. But we are active and not passive in how we perceptually take something when a sensation occurs. As Plotinus has it, the soul uses the sensory changes as material for discerning things. Notice, however,
that the soul is being claimed to be active in the sense that it is causally responsible for perceptual discernment, the conceptual feature in perception. Whether the soul is, in addition, active (for Sellars, "spontaneous") in the sense that it is free in some important sense to discern whatever it might will is a question which falls outside of the present discussion. The view that the soul is essentially active in perception is by itself neutral with respect to whether or not the soul can do whatever it wills in perception.

An important source for the view that the soul is essentially active (even in perception) is Plato's *Theaetetus*. In the course of discussing the claim that knowledge is perception, Socrates "discovers" that our sense organs do not themselves perceive but rather that the soul perceives by means of (dia) our sense organs, which function as tools [184d]. For Plato as well as for Plotinus, the conceptual nature of perception proper is due to perception's being an activity of the soul. On Plato's view, it is only in virtue of the activity of the soul that we conceptually deal with the external world; it is the soul, Plato argues, which "concerns the other thing" (i.e., the external object of the perception) in "contributing its share by discerning [krinein] it" [186b6]. Thus, the soul alone determines how a thing is perceptually taken—e.g., that it is discerned as a man, as a white thing, or whatever; and it is in such perceptual takings that the objectivity of perception lies.

Plato holds that sensations are not, as such, about external things at all. Sensations' relationship to external things is solely
a causal and not a conceptual one. Plotinus' claim that our sensory undergoings are conceptual (are *eidē*) only "relative to the inside" [IV.4.23,31] is to be understood against this Platonic background, where what is "inside" for Plotinus is the soul's discerning things. And all of this contrasts sharply with Descartes' view that sensations are themselves "thinkings" of some sort of idea.

Plato's views on sensation and perception will occupy us further in the next chapter. I wish now to sharpen the contrast between sensation and perception found in Plotinus by examining its use by Augustine in his attack upon Skepticism in *Against the Academics*. More precisely, Augustine's use of the distinction between sensation and perception in his attack upon Skepticism provides an excellent example of the significance of insisting upon the non-conceptual character of sensation, in contrast with the conceptual character of perception.

Augustine takes Academic Skepticism to be primarily an attack upon the Stoics. As understood by Augustine, the Stoics do distinguish sensation from the conceptual activity of the soul in perceiving. Perception is, roughly for the Stoics, a conceptually informed "assent" to or use of sensation, by means of which one assents to or takes an external thing. But despite their recognition of there being a non-conceptual feature to perceiving, the Stoics place the burden of truth upon the sensations we use rather than upon our conceptual takings of external things by means of those sensations. A perception is veridical for the Stoics when it is an assent to a certain sort of
sensation, called a 'phantasia kataleptikē'—a sensation worthy of acceptance. The core of the Skeptics' attack upon the Stoics lies in pointing out the indistinguishability of alleged worthy sensations for unworthy (akataleptic) ones—e.g., illusory ones. Given the worthiness of sensations as the criterion for truth and given that we can never distinguish worthy from unworthy sensations—i.e., we can never determine which sensations the soul should use or "accept", the Skeptic concludes that we are never justified in claiming that a perception is veridical. A perception might in fact be veridical, but we are never justified in claiming that it is.

On Augustine's view, the Stoics' distinction between worthy and unworthy sensations, and thus the Skeptical arguments that distinction engenders, is a bogus one. Augustine uses an example in which a straight oar is partially submerged in water and, predictably, appears to be bent [Aca., p. 185]. The oar's appearance would be commonly called an illusion and would be used by a Skeptic as illustrative of the fallibility of sensation. Augustine argues, however, that illusions do not involve any error or unworthiness on the part of our sense organs or of sensations. Indeed, one can make the stronger claim that for Augustine it is meaningless to claim that a sensation is erroneous; the notions of being erroneous and being veridical are inapplicable to the operations of our sense organs.

Augustine argues that, given the conditions in which the oar is seen, it should appear to be bent. Indeed,
I should rather accuse my eyes of deception if it appeared to be straight when it is dipped in water; for, in that case, they would not be seeing what ought to be seen. [Aca., p. 185]

More precisely for Augustine, if the oar appeared straight when dipped in water, there must be some cause for that too—e.g., a defect in one's eyes or some compensating factor in the medium. Sensations are, as such for Augustine, neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy. Sensations are physical changes in our sense organs, which occur in the natural order of things and which therefore always occur as they (naturally) ought. Augustine quotes the Epicureans:

I have no complaint to make about the senses; for it would be unfair to demand anything beyond their power. [Aca., p. 185]

In particular, it is beyond the power of our sense organs to act against the natural order of things and it would, thus, make no more sense to say of a sensation that it is erroneous or veridical (unworthy or worthy) than it would be to say that smoke is an erroneous or a veridical effect of fire. Smoke is just a natural effect of fire, and so are sensations of sensible things. If one uses his sensations of an oar in water by taking the oar to be bent when it is really straight, the error is made by the soul in mis-taking the oar. One could just as well, so far as the physical order is concerned, use sensations of an oar which is not in water by mis-taking the oar to be bent when it is not; and one can also use sensations of an oar which is in water by correctly taking the oar to be straight. In all of these cases the error or veracity lies in the soul's mis-taking or correctly taking the oar and not in the sensations used by the soul.
in that activity.

The idea that sensations are non-conceptual and hence are not susceptible to praise and blame plays a major role in Augustine's refutation of Skepticism. Sensations are physical changes for Augustine and they are related to external things as effects to their causes. Plotinus is even more explicit in unpacking the claim that the soul uses sensations. On Plotinus' view, perception differs from other conceptual activities in that it requires a third item in addition to the perceptual discernment and its object [IV.4.23,2]. The reason for this requirement is that perceptual objects are always external to (or at least, in an important sense, distinct from) perceivers. Our sense organs provide the needed third item, serving as a "proportionately middle ground" between perceptual objects and what Plotinus calls 'intelligibles' [IV.4.23,26]. Our sense organs serve as a proportionately middle ground in virtue of their abilities to undergo sensations (or impressions). For, in virtue of its being related to the perceptual object (for Augustine, causally related), a sensation "tells" (apangello) the percipient about the thing; and, in virtue of its occurring in the percipient's own body, the sensation provides an occasion for the soul to perform its craft. Our sense organs thus serve as a "middle ground" by providing changes within the percipient's own body by means of which he is related to an object and which occasions the discernment of the object by the soul.\(^{16}\) Analogously, the connections between a sculptor's, or some other craftsman's, tool and a particular object of his craft (e.g., a statue) thereby
relates the discernments in the soul of the craftsman to the object of his craft and the motions of his tool provide an occasion for the craftsman to perform his craft [IV.4.23,41-42]. I shall discuss Plotinus' use of the craftsman analogy further in chapter 4.

The non-conceptual character of sensation on the view that the soul is always active has another important dimension in addition to the one discussed above for Augustine, viz., that epistemic value terms do not apply to them. In holding that sensations are special "thinkings" of a sort of idea and that they (or the ideas they "think") have physical causes, Descartes is committed to holding that something non-conceptual causes something conceptual. The intelligibility of such alleged causal interactions seems open to the same doubts which have plagued philosophers concerned with the intelligibility of alleged causal interactions between material and spiritual substances. Philosophers who have held that the soul is essentially active have also held that non-conceptual causes can produce only non-conceptual effects. Conceptual items, in other words, require something conceptual as their cause if they are caused at all. A related issue is the relationship between the various individual conceptual activities which the soul performs and concepts. The view that the soul is essentially active maintains that our individual conceptual activities are caused or determined by concepts and not vice versa. More precisely, the causes of our conceptual activities are the principles (or concepts) in virtue of which the soul acts as it does and are never the sensations used by the soul in its activities. But, on the Cartesian view, it seems that
at least some conceptual activities (viz., sensations, construed as a manner of thinking a special sort of idea) are not dependent upon any prior concepts as their causes; sensory ideas have, at least in the passage used above for Descartes, physical and non-conceptual causes.

In construing sensations as being conceptual, more importantly, Descartes thus prepares the ground for the view adopted by Empiricists such as John Locke and commonly called 'concept empiricism'. On the concept empiricist view, we acquire our concepts through some special process (or processes) of the soul, commonly called 'abstraction', which acts upon the material presented to the soul in the form of sensory ideas— or, as Locke calls them, "simple ideas". Concepts thus become joint effects of sensations and the soul's special operations of abstracting. The view that the soul is essentially active does not embrace concept empiricism and, as a result, it also does not embrace the Empiricist manner (or manners) of distinguishing between observation and theory— or, as Plotinus would have it, between perception and reason or dialectic.
2. Observation, Theory and the Conceptual Order

The non-abstractionist tenor of the view that the soul is always active can also be seen in Augustine's critique of the Skeptics—in particular, of the Skeptics' claim that, since we perceive only "probably" (probabile), the wise man can only seek but never possess truth. The key to understanding this claim, and Augustine's reply to it, lies in understanding the sense in which perception is said to be a "probable" activity for the Skeptics. In particular, the sense of 'probable' here is, according to Augustine, to be unpacked in terms of the notion of likeness or copy [Aca., pp. 219-221]. The Skeptics are not to be read as holding, for example, that in view of the indistinguishability of alleged worthy sensations from unworthy ones, the chances of a perception's being veridical is less than 1. The idea is rather that in perception we only have a copy (imago) or truth-likeness (verarum similes) to work with rather than an exemplar (exemplum) or true thing.

In the first instance, the copy or likeness being alluded to here seems to be sensations—changes in our sense organs which "copy" external things by means of being caused by them. As seen above, however, the soul's conceptual activity discerns things as perceptual objects by using sensations. Thus, in a derivative sense, the perceptual object may also be taken to be the copy or likeness being alluded to here. The claim that perception is only a "probable" activity may thus be taken to mean either that in perception we use copies or that,
since we use sensations to discern perceptual objects, our perceptions are about copies rather than exemplars (e.g., this man rather than a Form). And since, on the Stoics' view, truth is to be found for humans through perception, the Skeptic argues that the wise man can only seek but never possess real truth or the true things as such [Aca., p. 19]. Truth for humans can only be truth-like and never real truth, in short, because we only have copies and not exemplars to work with and learn about.

The gist of Augustine's reply to the Skeptics is that, in order to use sensory copies in discerning perceptual copies, we must already possess the exemplars in some way—viz., as concepts used in making an object out of sensory materials. We could not use sensations to discern a man, for example, unless we already possessed the exemplar MAN in the form of a concept which can be mobilized in discerning a man. Otherwise, we could only undergo sensations and not perceive at all. And since the wise man already possesses the exemplars in the form of his concepts, Augustine's reply continues, he can learn about the exemplars by means of learning about his own concepts.18

We are ensnared by the Skeptic only if we put the emphasis for perception's being a "probable" activity upon the sensations used in making perceptual objects and ignore the fact that it is our concepts which determine what sort of copy a perceptual object is. Perceptual objects are, in other words, not really copies in the same way that sensations are. Perceptual objects are copies of the exemplars (by way of our concepts) rather than being copies in the sense of being
effects of the things which the soul discerns as objects. In view of this, moreover, learning about our concepts is not only the means by which we learn about the exemplars; learning about our concepts (or improving our conceptual behavior) is also the means by which we correctly apprehend the external world. We do not learn about the external world by making sure we only use "worthy" sensations but by properly constructing the external world as an object for our apprehension regardless of what sensations we have. And the way to properly apprehend the external world is determined by the exemplars, possessed by us in the form of concepts.

The concept empiricist claims that the grounds for our concepts are in the items which they are abstracted from (viz., sensations or sensory ideas). But on Augustine's view, concepts use the items they are allegedly abstracted from and therefore add something to them--just as moral rules add something, according to Augustine, to our physical movements or actions. Augustine prefaces his discussion of the "probable" with an example concerning moral rules. In general, Augustine holds that if what might be called the 'moral contents of our actions' were grounded in the actions themselves, then no one could ever criticize or determine the moral contents of our actions.19 Indeed, our actions would then have no moral content. But our actions do have moral content, Augustine maintains, and so there are moral rules which determine what their moral contents are.

Augustine considers the example of a young man who commits adultery [Aca., p. 209]. Augustine argues that the young man's action does
have moral content—in particular, it is morally wrong—because of
the independently existing moral rule which enjoins us not to commit
adultery and which we use in constructing moral actions out of physical
actions. Moral rules determine the moral contents of actions, in other
words, and not vice versa. Moral rules cannot be gleaned from physical
actions because evaluations of the moral content of any action must
proceed by subsuming the action under some moral rule. In short, no
moral rules, no moral actions.

We can now arrive at Agustine's views on sensations and concepts
by substituting 'conceptual contents' for 'moral contents' and 'con­
cepts' for 'moral rules' in the above discussion. The claim is then
that what we perceive is dependent for what it is upon our concepts
and not upon the sensations used in constructing perceived men, trees,
etc. No concepts, no conceptual activities and hence no external
things discerned as objects. More fundamentally, the cause of anything
conceptual and caused must be conceptual in nature. The causes of our
concepts cannot be any of our individual conceptual activities,
however, or sensations. 20

The idea that our concepts require something conceptual as their
causes is found already in Plotinus. The exemplars (or Forms) are
more commonly called 'intelligibles' (noēta) by Plotinus. The intel­
ligibles are interrelated with one another for Plotinus in a manner
manifested in the interrelatedness of the concepts they cause—e.g.,
in our concept of triangularity's interrelating in a certain way with
our concept of plane figure-hood. Plotinus calls the interrelated
structure of the intelligibles 'Intellige' (nous) and the intelligibles qua possessed by us as a structured conceptual order caused by Intellect 'intellect-in-us' (nous en hèmeis) [see, e.g., V.1.11,1-15]. In general, Intellect possesses all of the causes (aitiai) admitted in Plotinus' metaphysics, including the causes of our concepts [see VI. 7.1,57]. Just as Augustine holds that we possess the exemplars qua causes of our concepts, so too does Plotinus hold that we are "one with Intellect" in virtue of its being the source of intellect-in-us [VI.5.1,25].

The Plotinian-Augustinian view that our concepts require something conceptual as their cause has a contemporary analogue in the philosophy of Sellars as well. The similarities can be better broached by calling to mind how Augustine would express his view in terms of truth. The exemplars which cause our concepts just are, on Augustine's view, the true things.\(^2\) A conceptual activity is true only in virtue of its being a copying of a concept caused by an exemplar. Conceptual activities (or their products) are thus true in the sense of being truth-likenesses, or likenesses of truth. The truth of conceptual activities is derivative from the truth of concepts, which derive their truth from the exemplars which cause them. Now for Sellars.

On Sellars' view, truth is not a relational property which obtains between concepts and "things" or between conceptual activities and "things". Truth is a monadic property of elements in what Sellars calls 'conceptual structures'. I shall call the elements in conceptual structures 'conceptual types' and conceptual activities 'conceptual tokens'.

More precisely for Sellars, truth is the property of being semantically assertible, where to say that a conceptual type is semantically assertible is to authorize a tokening of it [S&M, p. 101]. Truth is primarily a property of conceptual types for Sellars and not of individual uses or tokens of them. A token is asserted and not assertible; types are assertible. A conceptual token is true in virtue of its being a token of a true or authorized conceptual type. In Augustinian terms, conceptual tokens are true insofar as they are truth-likenesses or copies of true things (or types).

The conceptual content of a token likewise depends for Sellars upon its type. The sort of conceptual activity a certain token is depends, in other words, upon what conceptual type it is a token of. Consider, for example, the written English token 'snow is white'. (Sellars construes the conceptual order on a linguistic model.) The content of this token—its "meaning", if you please—is determined by its being a token of the snow is white type. If it were a token of the grass is pink type, it would have a different conceptual content. And if it were not a token of any conceptual type at all, it would have no conceptual content at all; it would be just so many marks on paper. For Sellars as well as for Augustine, conceptual tokens (as opposed to mere marks and noises) presuppose conceptual types as their causes or determinants. Sellars thus shares Augustine's rejection of concept empiricism.

Further, the assertibility (or truth) of conceptual types may itself be ascribed to conceptual types only from the point of view of
some conceptual structure [S&M, p. 141]. The causes of each of our conceptual types are thus, in the first instance for Sellars, each of our conceptual structures and then, in the second instance, the conceptual structure of the language community as a whole in which we acquire our conceptual structures.\textsuperscript{24} Analogously for Plotinus, the causes of each of our various concepts are the intellects-in-us which, in turn, are caused by Intellect itself. Intellect itself becomes, for Augustine, the illuminative mind of God. But an important difference between Sellars' views and those of Plotinus and Augustine is that neither Plotinus nor Augustine embraces the possibility of there being alternative Intellects or, for Augustine, minds of God while Sellars does wish to allow for there being alternative over-arching or community conceptual structures.

What has been said about conceptual activities generally for Plotinus and Augustine holds equally in the special case of perception. To sharpen the dependency of perception upon concepts on their view, I shall now turn to the observation/theory distinction mentioned in the introduction of this chapter—in particular, I shall discuss some related Empiricist views on truth and justification.

Fundamental to Empiricism is the idea that sensations play a central role in determining the truth of our conceptual activities. An Empiricist might go so far as to maintain that sensations also provide perception with its conceptual content as well. In Locke, for example, basic sensations are simple ideas and perception is just the noticing of those ideas. All that the soul does in perception on this
construal of Locke is notice or be aware of sensations or simple ideas. On this Lockean view, the observation/theory distinction might be drawn between those ideas which are passively caused in us and those ideas which are developed from the passive conceptual material of sensation through certain operations of the soul (e.g., comparing, contrasting and abstracting). But an Empiricist need not see such a strong relation between sensations and the conceptual content of perception in order to hold that all factual justification must be grounded in sensation. Thus, more basic to Empiricism than concept empiricism is the idea that sensation plays a determining role in the factual justification of our conceptual activities and concepts. On this more basic Empiricist idea, the observation/theory distinction may be drawn as one between conceptual activities which are justified as they stand by some linkage they have with sensations and those conceptual activities which require some reinterpretation in order to be brought into contact with sensations.

C.I. Lewis is an example of an Empiricist who is primarily concerned with the role of sensations in factual justification—or, as he calls it, "verification". "Empirical truth," Lewis summarizes the matter, "cannot be known except, finally, through presentations of sense" [p. 171]. Lewis first distinguishes between "formulations of what is presently given" [AKV, p. 182]—also called 'expressive statements' by Lewis—and terminating judgments. Linguistic formulations of terminating judgments are just complex expressive statements, where an example of an expressive statement might be 'I see a red
something' [see AKV, p. 184]. Being just a complex expressive statement, moreover, a terminating judgment is exhaustively verified by or "terminates in" (actual or possible) presentations of sense. Expressions of sensory givens and terminating judgments are together distinguished, secondly, from non-terminating or objective judgments, which do not as such express actual or possible experience at all. But, argues Lewis, objective judgments must somehow receive verification from experience, if they are to be verifiable at all, because "all empirical knowledge rests ultimately upon ... the corroboration constituted by the facts of presentation" [AKV, p. 185].

On Lewis' view, objective judgments must be reformulated in some manner in terms of expressive statements. This reformulation is done for Lewis by specifying operations which a person can perform and which bring him into contact with sensory presentations whenever he wishes to "verify" the objective judgment in question. The objective judgment that this is white paper, for example, might be verifiable in that, whenever a person directs his gaze in a certain direction, he thereupon has a presentation expressible by 'I see white here now'. But an objective judgment can never be exhaustively reformulated in such operational-cum-terminating terms, according to Lewis, and so they can never be fully verified even in this indirect manner. Objective judgments can only be rendered probable after such operational reformulation but never certain.

On Lewis' view, actual verification or factual justification—whether of the absolute kind obtainable for terminating judgments or
of the partial, probablistic kind obtainable for non-terminating judgments--occurs only in observation. Factual truth or "empirical meaning"--to be distinguished for Lewis from purely "linguistic" meaning [AKV, p. 24]--is, as Sellars puts it, "the inalienable right of the perceptual level of our current conceptual structure" [S&M, p. 144].

The language and concepts of theory are operationally dependent, on Lewis' view, upon this perceptual level for any (empirical or factual) truth or meaning (content) they might have.

But by interpreting theoretical meaning and truth as essentially instrumental [i.e., operational] with respect to the observation framework ... [Lewis' view] gives this meaning and truth an essentially derivative or second-class status. [S&M, p. 145]

On Augustine's view, the distinction between observation (perception) and theory (science) is quite different from Lewis' conception of that distinction. Sensations play a no more determining role in the justification of our conceptual activities for Augustine than they do in determining the conceptual contents of our conceptual activities. The distinction between observation and theory is, primarily, a distinction between the soul's use of concepts on sensory occasions and our learning about the principles governing our concepts. Analogously on Sellars' view, observation is possible in the first place only because our concepts themselves have "language entry roles", in view of which we can token them on sensory occasions [S&M, p. 146]. But the possession of language entry roles or sensory occasional uses is not, according to Sellars, a special prerogative of any special sort of concept but is a feature which concepts in general have. The
difference between more observational and more theoretical elements in conceptual structures is, for Sellars, a difference between conceptual types which have more language entry roles in our conceptual structure or in a given sort of language community and those which have less.

Our observation concepts are those concepts we use more often when we perceive than those which are our theoretical concepts. The difference between observation concepts and theory concepts is thus, in an important sense on Sellars' view, a matter of convention and not a matter of ontology. In neither case, moreover, does the justification of our more observationally oriented concepts or of our more theoretical concepts come from any contact they might have with sensations. Their justification comes, for Sellars, from the conceptual structures of which they are elements. The concepts of justification is a concept which, for Sellars and for Augustine, primarily applies within the conceptual order and can only be applied in a derivative sense to a relationship between a conceptual item and a non-conceptual item (e.g., a sensation).

Further, the more observationally oriented concepts of a given conceptual structure are not thereby "more justified" in virtue of having more language entry roles than do less observationally oriented concepts. All of our concepts receive all of their justification from the conceptual structure of which they are elements and the language entry uses authorized by a conceptual structure are just different from, not more justified than, the other uses authorized by that
conceptual structure.

The Kantian and the Neoplatonist share the view that we primarily learn whether or not our conceptual activities are justified by discerning the principles of our conceptual structure and not by "looking at" sensations or sensory givens. For Augustine, the paradigm of inquiry into rule-governed systems or into systems of principles (and hence into the determiners of truth) are the structural sciences of grammar, music, geometry [Aca., p. 49], mathematics [Aca., p. 104] and logic [Aca., p. 179]. Sellars, of course, recognizes more contemporary quantitative disciplines—in particular, theoretical micro-physics. In both cases, however, the order of justification goes from principles to conceptual tokens (by way of conceptual types) and not vice versa. We often suppose in the ambience of everyday language use either that our observations are their own warrant or else that they are to be evaluated by means of other past, present or future observations. For Augustine, however, the real justification for our observations—indeed, for any conceptual token whatsoever—must be supplied by appealing to laws and principles, whether construed Neoplatonically or in a more Kantian or a more contemporary fashion.

Earlier I noted that for Augustine we can learn about the exemplars insofar as we can discern the principles governing our concepts. The principles discerned by the Augustinian scientist or wise man are thus, in the first instance, principles governing conceptual structures (i.e., they are the exemplars qua causing our concepts). Now the
concept empiricist seeks to account for the factual character of science or theory through the postulation of special acts of causation in which non-conceptual things together with special mental faculties cause concepts. The "justification empiricist" accounts for the factual character of science through the postulation of a special mode of justification in which something non-conceptual (e.g., sensory givens) may be appealed to or "glimpsed" in justifying concepts. The Neoplatonist, on the other hand, adopts something like Kant's categories and maintains that the categories determining the conceptual order are also constitutive principles of nature. For many Christian Neoplatonists, like Augustine, this constitutive idea could be stated as: God both informs our conceptual structures and causes the universe by means of the same exemplars or divine ideas.

Whether or not one accepts a Neoplatonic constitutive idea depends, as does the acceptance of the Empiricist alternatives, upon whether or not one accepts the overall theory of knowledge which uses the idea. Christian Neoplatonists thus commonly hold that the acceptance of such an idea is, in an important sense, a matter of faith—a matter of opting for a philosophy—rather than a matter of reason. To this extent, such Neoplatonists are not in essential disagreement with Kant's insistence upon the regulative rather than the constitutive character of such principles so far as their rational justification goes. But, unlike Kant and more like (say) Leibniz, such Neoplatonists would hold that the principles of nature are constitutive in the sense that they do apply to Kantian things-in-themselves (or noumena)
rather than just to things as related to us by means of sensations (or phenomena).\(^\text{30}\)

There are important methodological and substantive differences between Neoplatonists and contemporary Kantians like Sellars (and between the latter and Kant himself as well). It is nevertheless helpful and illuminating to point out their fundamental and at least programmatic if not detailed agreement over the points emphasized in this chapter: the passive and non-conceptual character of sensation; the active character of the conceptual feature of perception; the attendant rejection of concept empiricism and the observation/theory distinction as drawn by Empiricists; the idea that truth is determined by conceptual structures and not by sensations; and the related idea that truth is, strictly speaking, a property of conceptual types and only derivatively of conceptual tokens. These themes, together with the additional ones hinted at in the last paragraph, frame the discussion of the remaining chapters of this work. I shall begin that discussion by looking more closely at Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics on the nature of sensation and perception and their relation to knowledge and the conceptual order. Then, in chapters 3-6, I shall turn to the Neoplatonic tradition, a tradition which both built upon and added its own distinctive ideas to those earlier Greek views (in particular, Plato's). I shall focus almost exclusively on Plotinus, though I shall have some more to say about Augustine in chapter 6.
Footnotes: Chapter I


2 Unless otherwise noted in the reference, all text references in the body of this work and in the footnotes are to the Enneads.

3 'Phantasiai' is commonly translated by 'appearances'. I choose to use 'sensations' instead to avoid a number of ontological and epistemic associations which tend to accrue to the notion of appearances in twentieth century philosophy (see chapter 2). Plotinus, for example, normally uses 'phantasmata' for sensory objects.

4 I am here translating 'pathēmata' in such a way that the distinction between pathē and pathēmata will correspond with the distinction between phantasiai and phantasmata insisted upon in note 3 above.


8 Plotinus' metaphysics is panpsychistic. That is, everything that happens in our universe—the non-conceptual as well as the conceptual—is a result of the activity of some soul or other. What is being said in this chapter about the Plotinian soul applies to what I shall later call 'individual souls' for Plotinus. The other souls in Plotinus' metaphysics are bracketed from the discussion of this chapter.

9 I shall discuss Plato's Theaetetus account of sensation and perception more fully in chapter 2.
'Krinein', the active infinitive of 'krino', is from the same root as 'krisis', the term used by Plotinus for the soul's taking of something as an object in perception. 'Classify' would also be an acceptable translation of 'krinein' (and 'classification' of 'krisis'). The more usual 'judges' (and 'judgment') is not acceptable because of its association in contemporary philosophy with propositional contexts, e.g., judging that something is a man—as opposed to the perceptual discernment of something as a man.

Plato's use of 'dia' in 184d (see above) lays the groundwork for the claim that it is not our sense organs that perceive but the soul using our sense organs. See: Miles F. Burnyeat, "Plato on the Grammar of Perceiving," The Classical Quarterly 26 (1976), 29-51. For a discussion of Burnyeat's results, see: Robert G. Turnbull, "Knowledge and the Forms in the Later Platonic Dialogues," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 51 (1978), 735-758, p. 749.

The idea that Skepticism applies primarily to theories which, like the Stoics, locate the criterion for truth in sensations is argued by Charlotte L. Stough in Greek Skepticism (University of California Press, 1969), esp. pp. 132-136.

My understanding of the Stoics' phantasia kataleptikē has been especially aided by the work of Heinrich von Staden in "The Stoic Theory of Perception and its "Platonic" Critics," Studies in Perception, eds., Peter K. Machamer and Robert G. Turnbull (Ohio State University Press, 1978), 96-136. In particular, the Stoics' view should not be taken to imply that we apprehend sensations themselves, as suggested by F.H. Sandbach in "Phantasia Kataleptikē," Problems in Stoicism, ed., A.A. Long (University of London, 1971), 9-21, esp. pp. 13-14. The instrumental or "by means of which" character of sensation, despite its being the criterion for truth, is stated by the Stoics as follows.

The criterion by means of which the truth about things is known is in the genus of sensation, as assent and seizing and intellecction cannot occur as directed towards another thing without sensation. For the sensation leads the way to external things.

Joannes Ab Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, vols. I-III (B.G. Teubner; Leipzig, 1921-1924), II 52. Hereafter 'SVF'.

'Aca.' will refer to Augustine's Against the Academics. The translated passages quoted below are from: Denis J. Kavanaugh, ed. and trans., Answer to Skeptics (Cosmopolitan Science and Art Service, Inc.; New York, 1943). For an exhaustive explication of the many arguments in Aca., see: Bernard J. Diggins, "St. Augustine Against the Academicians," Traditio 7 (1949-1951), 73-94.
For an account of Augustine's views on the physical processes of our sense organs, see: Sister Mary Ann Ida Gannon, "The Active Theory of Sensation in St. Augustine," The New Scholasticism 30 (1956), 154-180, pp. 162f. The linkage between sensations' being effects in the natural order and our sense organs' not being the sources of error is recognized by Bruce S. Bubacy in "Augustine's "visio Intellectus" and Perceptual Error," Augustiana 27 (1977), 133-138, p. 133.

The idea of bodies acting causally upon one another will turn out to be just a first attempt at explanation for Plotinus. This will be one of the main themes of chapter 3.

Locke gives a brief summary of his concept empiricism in Book I, chapter 2, paragraph 15 of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding:

The senses at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet [of the mind], and, the mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the memory and names are got to them. Afterwards, the mind proceeding further abstracts them, and by degrees learns the use of general names.

Indeed, since a copy must be a copy of some exemplar (otherwise, it would not be a copy), it is difficult to see how a Skeptic could maintain that perception is copy-natured or truth-like unless he also held that we already possess the exemplars in such a way that we can discern perceptual copies by using sensory copies. Augustine thus makes the rather surprising claim that he is not really refuting these Skeptics but is himself propounding their real, complete doctrine. According to Augustine, Arcesilaus and Carneades (the principal "Probabilistic" Skeptics) were thought to be Skeptics because they did not propound the Platonic views which lie behind their attacks upon the Stoics. Augustine suggests that Arcesilaus, for example, concealed his positive doctrine because his audiences were incapable of understanding Platonicism due to their blind adherence to Stoicism.

Consequently, the ingenuous and erudite master resolved to disabuse those whose mis-education distressed him, rather than to teach those whom he considered unteachable. [Aca., p. 217]

The first real Skeptic in the Academy was, according to Augustine, Antiochus, who, entering the Academy at a time when it had no able proponents of Platonism, "brought with him some kind of evil which profaned the portals of the Academy" [Aca., p. 223]. And the philosophical evil wrought by Antiochus was not remedied, continues Augustine, until the

19 In chapter 2 and chapter 5, we shall again see the importance of the notion of criticism in the Platonic-cum-Neoplatonic tradition.

20 Plotinus and Augustine thus hold that our concepts do indeed have causes. There is, however, an important difference between Plotinus and Augustine on this matter. As we shall see, Plotinus holds that individual souls are ultimately unreal. In reality for Plotinus, there is just the one soul (viz., the hypostasis Soul). 'Intellect-in-us' is ultimately a way of talking about Intellect's activity as realized in various partial ways. In virtue of the unreality of individual souls for Plotinus, we are thus "one with Intellect" in a stronger sense than the terms of this chapter allow and, more importantly, than Augustine could accept. More on this difference between Plotinus and Augustine in section 1 of chapter 6. The terms used in this note will be introduced as we proceed. For a discussion of Augustine's theory of illumination and various interpretations of it, see: Ronald H. Nash, The Light of the Mind: St. Augustine's Theory of Knowledge (The University Press of Kentucky, 1969), chapters 7 and 8.

21 But see note 20 above.

22 If there is a semantical notion of truth in Augustine, it would thus be based upon the idea that the exemplars in the mind of God are the causes both of our concepts and of the universe so that our conceptual structure is a conceptual counterpart to the non-conceptual universe's structure.

23 The use of, e.g., the marks 'snow is white' to stand for a conceptual type is not to be construed for Sellars as a reification of the English sentence 'snow is white'. The idea is, rather, that one can mention a type only by means of tokening it, and one can token a type only by means of the marks or noises used in some particular language or other. Types themselves always determine or "lie behind" tokens, including the tokens used to mention them.

24 See: Sellars, "Language as Thought and as Communication," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24 (1968-1969), 506-527. The legitimacy of comparing Augustine's views to Sellars' might be questioned by someone who, like Wittgenstein, claims that Augustine holds that the meanings of terms are the things they stand for (see:
Philosophical Investigations (Basil Blackwell, 1963), Part I, para. 1). I shall argue against the Wittgensteinian interpretation of Augustine in section 1 of chapter 6. As we shall see, Augustine himself attacks a view which may be read as the very one Wittgenstein attributes to Augustine.

25 See note 17 above.


28 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans., Norman Kemp Smith (Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1929), pp. 113f. Hereafter, 'Crit.' I say "something like" Kant's categories because, though Plotinus, for example, takes his "categories" to constrain and determine thought, he rejects Aristotelian-type categories as the basic ones, even for the conceptual order. More on this in chapter 3.

29 Kant argues, for example, that the idea of a supreme being--"a concept which completes and crowns the whole of human knowledge"--can no more be proved not to be an idea of a real being than His existence can be proved [Crit., p. 531]. Such ideas or principles are thus "merely" regulative for Kant in that we cannot prove whether or not they are also constitutive of reality. A similar remark may be made about Kant's categories or their analogues in Plotinus.

30 Kant's categories are, in other words, also regulative in a second sense, which should be distinguished from the rational-justification (or, if you please, skeptical) sense mentioned in note 29--viz., in that they apply to things only by way of our "empirical employment of them" in experience [Crit., p. 259]. It is over this second sense of 'regulative' that Neoplatonists would disagree with Kant. For more in Kant on the noumena/phenomena distinction, see: Crit., p. 268.
Ancient and Medieval philosophers hold without exception that we perceive things and not our sensations and that sensations are part of the natural order (call this 'the traditional view').

Sensations are thought of as tools or instruments which the soul uses to perceive things. Even Thomas Aquinas, for example, holds that perception is an activity in a bodily organ, whose object is not the sensation occasioning it but a form qua existing in some external body.

Perceptions are made possible, on Aquinas' view, through an external thing's being related to us by means of sensations (phantasmata) [Theol., ibid.]. A sensation is, in Aquinas' terms, a "likeness" of an individual thing, which occurs in a bodily organ. The standard formula for expressing the sense of 'likeness' here for Aquinas, as for Aristotle, is: a sensation is the reception of the sensible form of a thing without its matter. But this sensible form is not itself an object of perception. Rather, in virtue of a sensation's being a reception of the sensible form—i.e., being a sensory effect, Aquinas maintains, a sensation is "that by means of which" (id quo) one perceives the external thing [Theol., I, Q. 85, art. 2].

Modern and contemporary Empiricism provides a sharp contrast with the traditional view. In Locke, for example, sensations are immaterial
effects of motions in our brain, which the mind then "notices". Locke
argues, more precisely, that certain motions are transmitted from
things by particles in the medium to our sensory organs which, in turn,
transmit further motions through the nerves to the brain, "there to
produce in our minds the particular ideas [sensations] we have of them"
[p. 54]. According to Locke, we "take notice" of something physical
in perception only in the derivative sense that in noticing sensory
ideas we are noticing effects of physical causes [Locke, pp. 64-65].
But the perception itself is, strictly speaking, just the noticing of
the sensory idea. As Locke uses words, the physical cause of our sen­sation is not itself perceived at all. Locke maintains that our common
belief that we perceive things is mistaken. We mistakenly believe that
we perceive things because we mistakenly attribute our immaterial
sensory ideas to things [Locke, p. 55].

The Empiricists' view of perception is motivated in part by
Descartes' insertion of sensations in the soul. But Empiricists are
not without reasons of their own for holding that sensations are
special objects for the mind. Two sorts of reasons which have greatly
influenced Empiricists derive from the relativity of perception and
from the nature of science. This latter reason, which probably influ­enced Descartes as well, is based upon the idea that physical science
does not use or need at least certain sensible properties (normally,
the "special" or "proper" sensibles of color, odor, and so forth) in
its causal account of the physical universe. Plato's discussion of
perception in Theaetetus addresses the former reason. I shall begin
there.
l. Sense Relativity and the Order of Becoming

Facts of perceptual relativity may be divided into two types. There are, first, those cases in which something appears different from the way we suppose it really is and, second, those cases in which something appears differently to different percipients or to the same percipient at different times. Facts of the first type more explicitly invite (indeed, use) a distinction between reality and appearances. To use an example exploited in the first half of this century, we normally believe that pennies are really round, despite the fact that they sometimes appear elliptical to us. But even without this normal belief, it would seem to be at least the case that a penny which appears round to one person and elliptical to another person cannot really be both round and elliptical. It must be one or the other—or perhaps yet some third shape. So, facts of the second type also invite a distinction between reality and appearances.

Plato was well aware of the value of distinguishing between reality and appearances for accounting for perceptual relativity. Indeed, Plato's discussion of perception in *Theaetetus* is introduced with the questions:

Is it not true that sometimes, when one and the same wind blows, one of us feels cold and the other does not? Or one feels slightly and the other exceedingly cold? Then in that case shall we say that the wind is in itself cold or not cold? Or shall we accept Protagoras' saying that it is cold for him who feels cold and not for him who does not? [152b]
My above use of the penny example, with its standard mention of shapes, anticipates my discussion of C.D. Broad in what follows. In contrast, Plato's examples of perceptual relativity do not mention shapes, sizes or any other mathematical properties but only what are commonly called, following Aristotle, "proper sensibles". But for what I am about, the difference is unimportant. In particular, I am concerned with the reality/appearance distinction which does emerge from Plato's account and not with all the details of its application.

Plato distinguishes in the above passage between the way the wind is in itself and the way it is for (or relative to) individuals with sense organs--i.e., percipients. In short, something is real for Plato when considered in itself and it is apparent when considered relative to percipients. To fully understand the point of this way of drawing the distinction, it will be helpful to see how an Empiricist might deal with the matter. I shall primarily use Broad, but first some more general preliminaries.

I shall begin by contrasting the traditional view that sensations are in the natural order and are not objects of perception with the Empiricist view that sensations are non-physical objects for the soul or mind, and the differing ways of drawing the distinction between reality and appearances which result. Two groups of Empiricists may be distinguished here. There are, first, Empiricists like Locke who put sensory objects "in" the mind. Second, there is another group of Empiricists who put sensory objects "before" the mind. This latter group may be called 'sense-datum theorists', the internal debate among
members of this second group over whether or not their sensory objects must be actually perceived (or "sensed") being unimportant for what I am about. Using words in this way, Broad is a sense-datum theorist. Broad is like Locke in that he separates his sensory objects from the natural order and reifies them but he is unlike Locke in that his sensory objects are just sensory and are not mental in nature.

Empiricists base their treatment of the distinction between reality and appearances upon taking sensory objects either to be special entities in their own right (or at least to be properties of special entities) or to be sensory ideas in the mind itself. Empiricists then suppose that in discussing how things appear to us, we are (at least partly) referring to these special entities or ideas in the mind together with some special awareness the mind has of them. The distinction between reality and appearances thus implies an ontological distinction between two sorts of items or things—physical things and sensory object-things. As a result, Empiricists maintain that in perception we are primarily aware of the sensory object-things and are aware of physical things at best in a derivative sense. I shall now turn to Broad's "sense-datum" variation on these matters. In my discussion of Broad, I shall follow the Empiricist habit of conflating appearances with the sensations by means of which (as a traditional theorist would have it) we perceive things, disentangling them again when I return to Plato.

Broad's handling of appearances employs the assumption that a property mentioned as an appearance of something must also be a real
property of something or else not be "real" at all. (I shall use
property talk as a helpful device for relating and discussing
Empiricists and traditional theorists.) Broad argues: 8

When I look at a penny from the side I am certainly aware
of something; and it is certainly plausible to hold that
this something is elliptical in the same plain sense in
which a suitably bent piece of wire, looked at from straight
above, is elliptical. If, in fact, nothing elliptical is
before my mind, it is very hard to understand why the penny
should seem elliptical rather than of any other shape.
[p. 240]

Broad maintains that being elliptical, which the penny appears to be,
must be a real property of something if it is not to be a delusion.
But it is, ex hypothesi, not a real property of the physical penny.
Hence, it must be a real property of something else, some special
entity which can have appearances as real properties. Broad calls
these special entities 'sensa'.

In an important sense, Broad gives up what he at first accepts—
viz., that the appearances (or apparent properties) of things must be
distinguished from their real properties. Apparent properties become
real properties for Broad, albeit real properties of non-physical
entities. The distinction between reality and appearances is no longer
a distinction between properties things really have and properties they
appear to have; it becomes a distinction between real properties of
two different sorts of entities—physical things and sensa. The view
that appearances are real properties carries with it the further idea
that the entities of which appearances are real properties are also
objects for the mind. We saw in Locke's case that appearances are in
fact the objects of perception itself. In whatever sense we are aware
of physical things for Locke, that awareness is not properly called 'perception'.

Broad also maintains that appearances (or the entities of which appearances are real properties) are objects of mental acts. But Broad wishes to preserve our ordinary usage of 'perceives' and so maintains that we do still "perceive" physical things on his view. According to Broad, we sense sensa. More generally, Empiricist views on appearances and mental acts require, in order to account for our having some awareness of external physical things, that there be two distinct sorts of mental acts—e.g., sensings and perceivings, or perceivings and inferrings—each with its own distinct sort of object.9

Broad focusses in his account of perceptual relativity upon cases in which something appears different from the way it really is. Plato's examples focus on cases in which something appears differently to different percipients. In both types of cases, however, the ensuing discussion is motivated by the notion of contrareity or contraries. Pursuing that notion as it motivates such discussions will flush out the contrast we are looking for between Plato and Broad.

Two properties are contraries when one and the same thing cannot possess both of them at the same time and in the same respect. Both conjuncts of this explication are crucial. I may have the two contrary properties of being candid and of being deceptive, for example, at two different times or at the same time but in different respects (e.g., I may be candid about my name and deceptive about my tax return). I cannot, however, be both candid and deceptive at the same time and in
the same respect.

The precise manner in which contrareity enters the discussion when examining cases of perceptual relativity usually goes unstated. That one and the same thing appears cold to one person and round to another, or that it appears cold and is really round, hardly occasions concern (or interest). But that one and the same thing is both hot and cold, or that its basic shape is both elliptical and round, seems clearly impossible. Facts of perceptual relativity fall somewhere in between these two extremes. But it is by assimilating facts of perceptual relativity to the second, clearly unacceptable sort that Broad leads us to separate appearances from the physical world.

Earlier I noted that Broad assumes that a property mentioned as an appearance must also be a real property of something if it is not to be a delusion. But if appearing to be elliptical were indicative of the physical penny’s really being elliptical, then the penny would have the two contrary properties of really being elliptical and (ex hypothesi) really being round. But at least one of these two properties cannot be had by the penny as they stand. In short, since Broad assumes that there is only one kind of property in the world, he is faced with the need to assimilate the ellipticality mentioned in the penny example as an appearance to the property of really being elliptical. And since really being elliptical and really being round seem to be contraries, Broad concludes that they must be had by distinct things.

Broad might then handle Plato’s example by noting, first, that being hot and being cold are contraries. Hence, the wind cannot be both hot and cold at the same time. But, second, as Plato sets up the
example, there is no reason to prefer one of these properties over the other as the real property of the wind. Hence, Broad might argue, both properties should be taken to be real properties of two (distinct) sensa.

Broad assimilates appearances to real properties because, as we have said, he assumes that the only alternative to doing so is to conclude that appearances are unreal—that there is no justification for saying that things "have" them at all. But Plato recognizes a third alternative. In particular, Plato maintains that apparent properties are relational properties. As we shall see, physical things have appearances for Plato in virtue of a causal relation obtaining between things and perceptors' sense organs. To express this, I shall follow Robert Turnbull and say that Platonic appearances are "to-a-percipient". A clear contrast can be made between Plato's to-a-percipient reading of appearances and Broad's reading of them by reformulating Broad's assumption as saying that an apparent property must be a monadic (or non-relational) property of something if its real counterpart would be monadic. The significance of this way of putting the matter is as follows.

The most important feature of contraries for my purposes is the idea that some one thing cannot possess two contrary properties in the same respect. In particular, we must examine more closely what 'in the same respect' might mean in the case of appearances or apparent properties. As mentioned, Broad may be read as assuming that apparent properties must be monadic properties of something. Now whether or
not contrary monadic properties are possessed in the same respect is determined solely by whether or not they are possessed by one and the same thing. Constrained as monadic properties, the apparent heat and apparent cold of Plato's example would be contraries just as heat and cold are. And in the case of Broad's example, it would be difficult to see why the penny's apparent ellipticality would be on a par with (hence, contrary to) the penny's real roundness unless it were construed in this monadic way. For then the possession of both apparent ellipticality and real roundness would be determined by what thing has them alone, and a problem might seem to emerge (in the manner explicated above). But in any event, the point is that perceptual relativity cases require something other than the physical thing for Broad in order to ground the property mentioned as apparent if it is monadic.

A second entity is not needed to ground the property something appears to have on Plato's account because Plato holds that appearances are relational (though not relations). The respect in which something has an apparent property is determined for Plato not only by the thing possessing it but also by the percipient to which the thing is appearing. The wind in Plato's example is not both hot and cold in itself; it is hot relative to one percipient and cold relative to another percipient. Similarly, construed in Plato's terms, Broad's penny is round in itself and elliptical only relative to some percipient. The wind example would raise problems for Plato only if the wind were said to be both hot and cold relative to the same percipient, at the same time and qua the percipient using the same sense organ or
area of his body. For Plato, however, such an imagined case would indeed be impossible or a matter of hallucination and it would not be a genuine case of perceptual relativity at all.

Plato could also be read as holding that the properties mentioned in accounts of perceptual relativity are not really contraries at all. That is, a complete and accurate description of an appearance must mention, Plato might argue, the particular percipient to which something is appearing. Thus, the properties mentioned in the wind example are not, on this construal, simply hot and cold but are rather the explicitly relational properties of being hot to percipient₁ and being cold to percipient₂. But these two properties are not contraries. The contrary of the former is the property of being cold to percipient₁ and not being cold to percipient₂; and the contrary of the latter would be the property of being hot to percipient₂ and not being hot to percipient₁. This way of stating the matter emphasizes the relational character of appearances for Plato.

The claim that appearances are to-a-percipient for Plato might conjure up the specter of Berkeley's *esse est percipi* for many readers. But while Plato's appearances exist only relative to percipients, they are still properties of physical things. The to-a-percipient nature of appearances is unpacked by Plato, not Idealistically, but by holding that physical things have appearances in virtue of interacting with the sense organs of percipients' bodies. Facts of perceptual relativity are to be ultimately accounted for, on Plato's view, in terms of the causal interactions which occur between external things
and our sense organs. The Platonic analogue to Berkeley's thesis would thus be: to appear is to cause sensations.

Plato claims that, in order to account for what occurs in cases like the wind example, we should assume that the properties we ordinarily ascribe to things on the basis of our sensory dealings with them are results of motion and mixing (kinesis and krasis) [Theaet., 152d8]. Plato focusses on vision, and couches his account in terms of an extramission theory. I shall not detail and defend a complete interpretation of what is an extremely subtle and much discussed theory of vision. I shall only give the outlines of how Plato accounts for the relational character of appearances in physical, causal terms and draw two corollaries which contrast with Broad's account.

An extramission theory of vision maintains that the eyes themselves emit some physical stuff or particles into the medium (as Plato has it in Timaeus, fire atoms). Extramission theories of vision contrast with intromission theories, the latter denying that the eyes themselves emit stuff into the medium. I shall later turn to two classical intromission theories (Aristotle's and the Stoics') to generalize on my basic points about the traditional view and to introduce some material which has a bearing on Plotinus.

On Plato's theory of vision, the physical thing and the eyes each emit motions which mix with one another. When the motions from the eyes and the motions from the thing mix, they "have intercourse" or "rub together" and "twins" are born. Plato characterizes these twins as "the object of sense and the sensing [in the eye] which falls out
in agreement with the object" [Theaet., 156b].11 One obvious way in which Plato's twins contrast with Broad's account is that the sensing is a change undergone by the eye and is not an act of the mind or soul or a special object of such an act. Two additional corollaries are:

First, the object of sense is not the sensation born on the side of the sense organ, as was just said. Strictly speaking, moreover, the apparent property born on the side of the thing is also not the object. The object of sense is, rather, the thing qua having the relational, apparent property. Plato maintains that his twins are such that the eye is no longer just an eye but is now a seeing eye and the thing is no longer just a thing but, e.g., a white thing [Theaet., 156e]. In contrast, Broad has his apparent property being a real property of a sensum which mediates the property and the thing.

Second, the twin born on the side of the percipient is not an entity (e.g., a sensum)—or a property of such an entity—which results outside of the natural order. Plato would thus deny that, in addition to the causes and effects occurring in the natural order, there comes to be one, final effect—e.g., a Lockean idea or a Broadean sensum. This seems to be at least part of the point of Plato's saying that the twins are "borne upon their parents and produced in the very carrying" [Theaet., 152d2].12

Appearances are to be accounted for on Plato's view in terms of causal relations between things and sense organs and not in terms of a monadic property of "things" or sensings on the part of percipients. Thus, Plato says:
The colour that you call white is not to be taken as something outside of your eyes, nor yet as something inside of them; and you must not assign any place to it. For then, it would at once be in a definite position and stationary and would have no part in the process of becoming [i.e., in the causal processes of the natural order].

[Theaet., 153d7]

Put in more general terms, Plato argues,

assume that nothing [in the world of appearances] exists by itself as invariably one: then it will be apparent that black and white or any other colour whatsoever is the result of the impact of the eye upon the appropriate motion, and therefore that which we call colour will be in each instance neither that which impinges nor that which is impinged upon, but something between, which has occurred, peculiar to each individual [percipient].

[Theaet., 153e5]

The account that Plato gives of vision and color is thus to be extended to the other sense modalities and at least their "proper" objects as well:

... And all the rest—hard and hot and so forth—must be regarded in the same way: we must assume, we said before, that nothing [in the world of appearances] exists by itself, but all things of all [sensory] sorts arise out of motion by intercourse with each other; for it is, as they say, impossible to form a firm conception of the active and the passive element [i.e., the appearing thing and the sensing organ] as being anything separately.

[156e8]

The main point of all this is that appearances and sensations are not items which have any position in the causal story in addition to the eyes, the thing and their causal interactions and physical results. External things appear to percipients as a result of their interacting with sense organs (or the motions emitted by sense organs) and sense organs undergo sensations as a result of their interacting with or being stimulated by external things and their motions. As a result, the
appearances and sensations associated with our five sense modalities are grounded for Plato in the natural order and not in special objects or ideas.

I should note that some of the details of the Platonic account not only contrast with Broad's account but they also contrast in different ways with what will be said for Plotinus in subsequent chapters. Plotinus does, however, adhere to the basic doctrines of the traditional view that sensation talk has its proper place in talk of bodies and that we perceive the bodies we commonly take to be the causes of our sensations and not our sensations themselves. The crucial difference between Plotinus and his earlier Greek predecessors lies in the constraints Plotinus places on talks about bodies and "physical" causal processes. But more on this in later chapters.

Plato holds an extramission theory of vision. This means that, on Plato's theory, the eyes themselves emit motions or particles into the medium. In contrast, Aristotle and the Stoics both hold an intromission theory of vision. On an intromission theory of vision, all of the physical activities or motions resulting in vision act upon the eye; the eyes do not emit anything (e.g., fire) into the medium. Despite their differences from Plato on this matter, however, Aristotle and the Stoics agree with the basic insights of Plato's theory, that appearances are to-a-percipient properties of physical things and that a sensation is a physical state of a sense organ, by means of which we are related to external things. The Aristotelian idea, for example, is that an extramission theory is not needed because, on
Aristotle's analysis of causation, an effect always occurs on the side of the thing having a passive power but the actualization of a passive power is always a joint result of both the active and the passive power (e.g., the actual thing perceived and the sense organ).

The Stoics call sensations 'impressions' (typoseis), predating Plotinus' use of that vocabulary. Impressions are physical changes in one's sensory apparatus. The Stoics do talk about sensations' occurring "in the soul" or being transmitted from the peripheral sense organs to the "central part of the soul" (the so-called hegemonikon). But the Stoics' soul is physical in nature. The soul is, on the Stoics' view, air and fire, and these are the principal bearers of motion, their motions accounting for whatever motions are ascribed to the "body" (earth and water). What is soul for the Stoics, in short, would be part of the body for Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus.

I shall emphasize the Stoics' adherence to the traditional view of sensation by focusing upon their use of the active noun 'impressions' (typoseis) in much of their discussions. As we have seen, Empiricists tend to reify sensations— and thereby appearances as well— into being objects which are ontologically independent of body. On Plato's to-a-percipient reading of appearances, in contrast, sensations and appearances are not to be reified into being special objects. Sensings are changes in the physical sense organs which are of physical things in the same sense in which an effect is of its cause. In particular, an effect need not be a literal copy of its cause. A plume of smoke is not of fire, for example, because it "looks" or "feels" like the
fire but solely because it is being caused by the fire.

Whether or not Plato fully sees this implication of a causal theory of sensation is unclear. But the Stoics' use of the active noun is designed to emphasize this feature of the view began with Plato. The Stoics' use of 'impressing' to describe sensation emphasizes that a sensation is of a sensible object only insofar as there is an ongoing causal connection between the two. Thus, physical things have appearances only qua actually causing sensations in our sense organs, and sensations are of appearing things only qua being caused by them. Whether sensations "look" or "smell" or whatever like their causes is irrelevant to the account. Indeed, to emphasize the fact that sensations are not objects on the traditional view at all, we can say that they do not, qua being sensations, look or smell or feel or whatever at all; they are essentially the means by which anything looks, smells, etc.  

A developing sensitivity to this implication of the traditional view can be seen in the Stoic Chrysippus. The use of 'impressions' for talking about sensations is introduced by Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism. A standard Stoic analogy for characterizing what sensations are is the impression a signet-ring makes upon wax. But Chrysippus, one of Zeno's followers, cautions that the Stoics' impressions should not be taken as strictly analogous to the impress of a signet-ring in wax. Chrysippus claims that Zeno does not use the term 'impression' to connote a literal impress but an alteration (heteroiosis) [I, 230]. For, Chrysippus argues, if Zeno is read in
this way,

it is no longer absurd that, when many presentations co-exist in us at the same moment, the same body should admit of innumerable alterations; for, just as the air, when many people are speaking simultaneously, receives in a single moment numberless and different impacts and at once undergoes many alterations also, so too when the regent part [the hegemonikon] is the subject of a variety of images [sensations] it will experience something analogous to this. [AL, I, 230]

The signet-ring analogy does not do justice, as Chrysippus sees it, to the scope and complexity of our sensory dealings with the world. Chrysippus feels that the transmission of sounds through the air serves as a better analogy. The transmission of sounds through the air is a highly complex and intricate process of physical interactions, culminating in stimulations of our sense organs. Sensations--visual as well as auditory--are, similarly, a highly complex structure of physical changes occurring in the sensory apparatus; and nowhere in Stoic physiology is there a need to suppose that an essential feature of these structures is the coming to be of an impress which "looks" or "sounds" anything like the things that produced them. Sensations are, on this view, of things in the manner in which alterations in the air are of the vocal apparatus which causes them. Thus, while the Stoics (and later Plotinus) sometimes use the passive noun 'typoi' in discussing sensations, they more commonly use the active noun 'typoseis', which indicates that sensations are ongoing effects of things. Sensation is thus also characterized by the Stoics as an "impression which has been occurring", so that perception occurs at the same time as "an actually occurring sensation, for this is the becoming of the
impress" [SVF, II, 59].

We have seen that on Chrysippus' view the of-ness of sensation is to be unpacked in terms of the nature of causation and not in terms of a notion like a literal impress or literal copy of the thing. Important precedence for this move is at least latent in Plato and is more explicit in Aristotle. On Aristotle's view, what an effect "looks" like--i.e., what sort of state it is--is determined by what sort of power it is an actualization of. The role of the active power or cause is one of actualizing some passive power and is not one of placing a literal copy of itself in the passive power (e.g., in our sense organs). Our sensory powers, Aristotle maintains, are parallel to what is combustible, for that never ignites itself spontaneously but requires an agent which has the power of starting ignition; otherwise, it could have set itself on fire, and would not need actual fire to set it ablaze. [Soul, II.5,417a7 (Smith trans.)]

Again, I am not interested in all the details of Aristotle's theory of vision or in offering a complete and uncontroversial interpretation of the text. The important point is that Aristotle grounds our sensory dealings with things in his account of causation.

One immediate objection to Aristotle's way of construing the of-ness of sensation would be that it difficult to see how we are to determine which of all the various causal antecedents to a sensation is the sensible thing. Aristotle handles this sort of objection by distinguishing between things which are visible and are the causes of their own visibility and things which are visible only in virtue of things of the first sort. The things commonly called 'opaque' would
be visible in the first sense and the "transparent" medium through which we see opaque things would be visible in the second sense [Soul, II.7,418b]. I see this piece of paper rather than the air between it and my eyes, for example, because the piece of paper is the cause of those activities which result in my eyes undergoing sensations (or its passive power being actualized). Extending this idea one step further for emphasis: when I see both a pane of glass and a tree through the glass, the glass serves both as a medium for the tree's causal activities (i.e., certain activities in or through the glass are due to the tree) and also as itself a cause of some of the activity in the medium between it and my eyes. A similar remark would also account for, e.g., water's functioning as a medium which is also somewhat opaque in itself.

To bring my contrast between Broad and the traditional view to closure, the connections between appearances and the objects of perception need emphasis. To begin, I have insisted for the traditional view that we do not really perceive appearances at all. The object of a perception is always the thing, albeit the thing in view of its being to-a-percipient rather than "in itself". Plato maintains, for example, that what comes to be on the side of the thing is not whiteness itself but a white thing. In the same vein, Aristotle holds that the thing is visible rather than the color- or light-activity by means of which it is made visible to us. And finally, the Stoics insist that perception is of bodies [SVF, II, 851], though of bodies qua being relative-to's (pros ti) [SVF, II, 403].
Turning to the properties associated with appearing things, Aristotle insists that actual color is the active limit (peras) of a body and is nothing (ou ti) in the body itself, and that the physical nature (physis) of color is the ability to move (kinetikos) a properly prepared medium \[\textit{Soul, II.7,418a3f.}\]. Leaving the details of Aristotle's theory of color to one side, we again have a clear contrast with the Empiricist idea that apparent properties are derivative from particular ideas or from properties of sensa, sense-data, or whatever. For, on the basis of the passages I have presented, Aristotle's so-called special sensibles (color, sound, etc.) seem to be physical things qua having the abilities to causally affect our various sense organs. "The seen, the heard and all the rest of the [special] sensibles" are certain productive abilities (poietika) of physical things \[\textit{Soul, II.5,417b20}\]; and it is for this reason (and in this sense) that we can say that

\[\text{a sensation of an individual thing is effected through the agency of the individual thing's having color or flavor or sound.} \]
\[\textit{Soul, II,417b20}\]

An Aristotelian account of perceptual relativity would thus seem to be based on the idea that color, flavor, etc. are causal properties or abilities to actualize the sensory abilities of sense organs. For, in view of this idea, the sense organ makes a difference in what is sensed. Thus,

\[\text{the individual thing is not expressed in itself to the per­cipient but is expressed in virtue of its being of a certain sort and acting in accordance with a ratio.} \]
\[\textit{Soul, II.12,42a25}\]

I shall not pursue the matter for the Stoics.
2. Objects of Perception and Objects of Science

The Empiricist views I have been discussing require the soul or mind to perform two acts in order to apprehend external things. On Broad's view, the soul first senses sensa and then makes a judgment about an assumed physical world. And Locke distinguishes between "immediate perception", in which the soul "takes notice of" sensory ideas, and "mediate perception", in which the soul attributes those ideas to assumed external cause [Locke, p. 55]. But the traditional view does not hold that sensations and appearances are objects for acts of the soul at all. The things which cause sensations in our organs are the only objects for the soul's activity in perception. On the traditional view, sensations are changes in sense organs. But we do not see, hear, smell, taste or touch our sensory changes themselves; we see, etc. by means of them. Our apprehensions of external things are, in short, unmediated by apprehensions of our sensory tools.

Sensations are not perceptual intermediaries on the traditional view because, as first seen in chapter 1, their place in the natural order of becoming has them, as such, outside of the mental order of apprehending. Thus, for example, the sense of 'indicates' in the Stoic claim that sensations and light activities in the medium indicate (deiknysis) their causes is a causal sense. In contrast with Empiricism, the traditional view does not require there to be perceiving souls in order for there to be sensations, except insofar as a sensation
without a soul to use it is like, say, a chisel without a sculptor to use it. The purpose of sensation is to provide the sensory conditions under which perception may occur, and so an unused sensation would not be fulfilling its entire purpose. But sensations do not by themselves require there to be any apprehensions in the world at all. Something more is needed to account for our perceiving the causes of our sensations.

Plato was well aware of the need for something conceptual in accounting for perception (as opposed to mere sensation). According to Plato, his "birth of twins" account does not by itself account for how it is that in perception one discerns what sort of thing something is and is not (ousian kai to me einai), similarities and differences (homoioteta kai anomoiteta), sameness and difference (to auton kai to heteron) and how many things are perceived (hen kai to allon arithmon) [Theaet., 185a-d]. Plato augments (rather than rejects) the "twins" account by claiming that, since sensations are physical effects in sense organs, we need some "thing" which uses our sense organs as tools [Theaet., 184d]. Plato calls this "thing" 'soul', and he maintains that perceptual discernments are made through souls' informing the undergoings of sense [Theaet., 186b]. In short, the aboutness—or what is commonly called the intentionality—of perception is due to the soul's using sensory effects as tools for its making objects (e.g., for its discerning a physical cause to be a man).

For it is in this that one can reach what a thing is and the truth about it. But this is not possible in the undergoings alone. [Theaet., 186d2]
Since the conceptual nature of perception is due to the soul and not to the physical cause of sensations used by the soul, moreover, Plato maintains that perception presupposes that the soul already has, prior to perception, the resources it uses in discerning things by means of sensations. I shall return to this last point later.

Precisely what should (or can) be said at this point about Aristotle is unclear. At least the outlines of Aristotle’s views on the coming to be of sensations are clear enough and were sketched in section 1. But the careful distinguishing of sensation and perception, physical undergoings and conceptual activities found in Plato (and in the Stoics and Plotinus as well) is not so easily disentangled from Aristotle’s discussions in *Soul* and elsewhere. I shall not try to do so here. All that I think can be safely said—and all that I need to say for my purposes—is that Aristotle does seem to hold, first, that we are not properly prepared to use sensory undergoings or stimulations to make conceptual moves (whether perceptual or otherwise) until there are concepts or "universals" in the soul and, second, that a concept-enriched soul uses sensations to make unmediated perceptual discernments of external things. Aristotle calls these fully conceptual perceptions ‘perceptions of the universal thing’ (*hē aisthēsis tou katholou*) and gives us as an example the conceptual ability to unmediatedly discern a man [*Posterior Analytics*, 100b1-2].

The Stoics also hold, along with Plato and Aristotle, that sensations and their physical causes are insufficient to account for perception.
Perception is not vested in the sensation alone. Rather, its essence is the attachment of oneself [to some thing] in the sense of assenting [synkatathēsis], [SVF, II, 74]

This assenting—also called 'accepting' (katalepsis) by the Stoics—is a conceptual informing of sensations. Given their materialistic view of the soul, of course, the Stoics express this informing in materialistic terms:

Perception is, according to the Stoics, the pneuma from the hegemonikon filling perceivings and seizing [external things] by means of them and the apparatus of the sense organs. [SVF, II, 850]

And the pneuma from the hegemonikon, which "stretches to the five sets of sense organs," is said to be essentially "intelligent" [SVF, II, 850].

On the traditional view, the one and only mental activity performed in perception is a discernment performed by the soul. The object of that discernment is the physical thing which causes the sensory undergoings. The distinction between the physical and the mental in perception is, moreover, a distinction between non-conceptual changes and conceptual activities. Appearances and sensations are both non-conceptual. Appearances differ from the real properties of things, finally, in that things have them only relative to perceptors rather than in themselves.

This placing of sensations and appearances in the natural order brings the traditional view's conception of appearances and sensations into direct conflict with the second set of Empiricist worries mentioned in the introduction of this chapter. According to Empiricists (and Cartesians), physical science does not need or use colors, odors,
and the like in its causal accounts of the universe. Something, it might be argued, must be left out of Plato's account as well. This suspicion may be intensified when it is noted that the physical world of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics is also as such bereft of color, odor, etc. Thus, in his *Timaeus* account of color, for example, Plato claims that "what we call color" is really a flame (*phloga*) flowing from a thing [*Tim.*, 67c7]. The sort of color-appearance which results from Plato's mixture of motions is thus determined by the sizes and shapes of the particles which flow from the thing and which cause the cone of particles streaming from the eye to dilate and contract [*Tim.*, 67e]. Aristotle also, in his intromission theory of vision, conceives of colors in nature in terms of motions in the medium excited by physical things [*Soul*, II.7,18a34]. And finally, the Stoics characterize the causal activities which result in sensations or impressions in terms of motions or changes in the tension (*tonos*) of the soul or pneuma.20

Precisely how the idea that science does not need or use colors, etc. in its accounts is to be understood is a difficult matter and would itself require a detailed investigation. It is enough for my purposes to note that it is primarily colors, etc. as sensory components of perceptions that are at issue. Berkeley, for example, does not argue that heat cannot be a property of material things because the concept of heat *a priori* rules out an account of heat which uses only quantitative terms. Rather, Berkeley argues that heat cannot be a property of material things because material substance is a "senseless
being" [p. 14]. It is thus not so much heat (or color and the like) which causes problems as it is that material substances do not undergo sensations but, e.g., only mechanical motions. Sensations must therefore either be "in" the mind or at least be immaterial.

The problem, then, is that on a certain view of the correct physical science material substance is subject only to mechanical motion, and sensation as a component of perception is not (or at least does not seem to be) merely a mechanical motion. In contrast, Plato does not rule out that physical changes in our sense organs may also be sensations—i.e., may also serve as the means by which we perceive things. What Plato rules out is, first, that sensations are conceptual in nature or are objects which wear their natures on their sleeves and, second, that sensations are by themselves proper tools for a scientific apprehension of the universe. This second feature of Plato's view becomes problematic, moreover, only if one holds a view like concept empiricism (discussed in chapter 1), according to which our means of apprehending the universe must be gotten somehow out of sensations as such.

Empiricist arguments based upon the nature of science often seem to assume from the outset that the term 'sensation' refers to an object for the soul's apprehension rather than to something which may function as a tool for perceiving. That Empiricists are concerned more with the place of sensation generally than with the special sensibles alone is already seen in Locke. Thus, even when considering quantitative properties, Locke distinguishes those quantitative properties which
are sensory ideas from those which are properties of matter. The
former are in the soul (or mind) for Locke along with sensory ideas
of colors, sounds, etc. and only "resemble" the latter, without being
identical to them [Locke, p. 56]. Broad makes an analogous move.

The Empiricist views I have been discussing maintain that the
distinction between real properties and apparent properties require
a distinction between two classes of objects. One reason for this
view was discussed in section 1. We have now seen that a second
reason is based, at least in part, on the fact that physical science
does not as such use the instrumentalities of sense in its account
of the universe but only, e.g., mechanical motions. Plato, in contrast,
maintains that the things we perceive (men, trees, etc.) are not as
such the primary objects of science, and Plato's primary reason for
maintaining this is based on a critique of the sort of tools sensations
are rather than on the mere presence of sensations in the world, as
we shall now see.

The relevant discussion is again in Theaetetus. The question
of the dialogue is: What is knowledge (επιστήμη: also translatable
by 'science')? Plato rejects the suggestion that knowledge is percep-
tion on the grounds that perception is not intersubjective or subject
to public criticism. An at least necessary condition for a conceptual
activity's being a case of knowledge is that others must be able to
"sit in judgment on your decision" [Theaet., 170d]. The publicity of
knowledge condition applies as well to the objects of such conceptual
activities. That is, a bit of knowledge may be said to be public in
virtue of its object being public because in a conceptual activity "one does not just say the name but the thing named [to pragma] is intended" in the use of the name [Theaet., 177e]. Consequently, one person can criticize another's conceptual behavior by means of inspecting the object(s) of that person's activities. But perception does not meet this condition for knowledge because, in Plato's words, "no man can discern by means of another's undergoings" [Theaet., 161d].

In order to sit in judgment on another's perception, we must be able to use his sensations because it is by means of its to-a-percipient appearances that a thing is related to a percipient in such a way that it may be an object of his perceptual discernment. An object of perception is a thing qua producing sensations in a person's sense organs and then being conceptually taken by the soul by means of those sensations. Qua being a perceptual object, then, a thing is not public but is relative to different percipients. Hence, perceptual objects cannot as such be objects of science or knowledge. Perceptual objects are thus private for Plato, moreover, because what it is for a thing to be a perceptual object requires mention of the to-a-percipient activities by means of which a thing is related to percipients for perception. We can apprehend the primary objects of knowledge (for Plato, the Forms), finally, only by methods open to public usage and criticism and not by means of sensation, and it is in this sense that science does not need or use sensations.

On Plato's view, sensations are not by themselves adequate tools for scientific inquiry. Mere discussions of the correctness or
incorrect of perceptual discernments do not get us to the public
objects of science. Plato maintains that

things have some fixed reality [ousian] of their own, not
in relation to us nor caused by us; they do not vary,
swaying one way and another in accordance with our fancy,
but exist in themselves in relation to their own reality
imposed by nature.
[386a8]

But, Plato maintains, we cannot get to that reality by means of
our sensations because

at the moment when he who seeks to know it approaches [observationally speaking], it becomes something else and
different, so that its nature and state can no longer be
known.
[440]

According to Plato, however, the concepts used in perception are in
themselves independent of their being used on sensory occasions to
discern things. Perception presupposes concepts, which are therefore
prior to any perceptual uses of them. Our concepts themselves are
thus, as Plato sees it, open to public inspection; all that is needed
is the correct tools for inspecting them. Plato therefore claims that
knowledge is that which the soul possesses (echei) and which makes
discernment possible [Theaet., 186d10f].

One discerns the public objects of science for Plato by means
of inquiry into the concepts presupposed and used in perception. In
the later Platonic Dialogues, that method is collection and division.
In Republic VI, the mode of inquiry is abstract mathematics-cum-geometr)--the inquiry which composes the third level of awareness and the
first level of knowledge in Plato's celebrated analogy of the line and
the cave.
At least in his middle dialogues, then, Plato takes mathematics-cum-geometry to be the paradigm of public inquiry into the conceptual order and thereby into the world as it is in itself. Plato's resulting mathematical-cum-geometrical conception of the physical universe is most clearly laid out in *Timeaus*. Whether Plato's move to collection and division in his later dialogues requires a departure from the *Timeaus* conception is unclear. What is clear, however, is that the Neoplatonic tradition assumes that Plato's mathematical-cum-geometrical conception is of a piece with, or at least plays an essential part in, his later, conceptual-mapping method. Plotinus, for example, conceives of real bodies in rigorously structural terms, as we shall see. In *Ennead* 1.3, Plotinus calls the general method by means of which we discern the real universe 'dialectic' (*dialektikē*), which he equates with Plato's method of collection and division. Plotinus' example of one engaging in dialectic, moreover, is the music theorist who discerns the principles of harmonies and proportions in abstraction from considering them to be of any particular sounds which occasion those mathematical realities [1.3.1,20f.].

Augustine also mentions dialectic as the means by which we discern reality and takes as his paradigms disciplines concerned with the structures of things, language and thought. Among later Neoplatonists, Bonaventura maintains that the world is governed by weight, number and proportion. And even Aquinas holds that created things are governed by limit, number and measure [Theol., I,Q. 5,art. 5].
Empiricists commonly assume that the causes of our concepts of the real world are sensations together with certain special activities of the soul or mind. Empiricists therefore hold that theoretical sciences are derivative from perception. On Plato's view, however, perception's being of real things depends upon its being a use of concepts which as such are prior to and independent of actual perceivings and which are thereby public. The world of perception is thus derivative from the world of knowledge or science for Plato rather than vice versa.

Rather than pursuing the details of Plato's views on science, perception and their relationships to one another, I shall now turn to the main protagonist of this work, Plotinus. In so doing, we shall see both Plotinus' great indebtedness to Plato and, as well, some important differences between Plotinus' views and Plato's views on the nature of reality—in particular, on the nature of bodies.
Footnotes: Chapter II

1 We shall see beginning in chapter 3 that Plotinus does differ markedly from the earlier Greek and Hellenistic views on precisely what "the natural order" is and what "things" are. With this caveat in mind, however, the basic points emphasized in this chapter hold for Plotinus as well, as I shall emphasize again later.

2 "Actus organi corporalis ... et idea objectum cuiuslibet sensitivae potentiae est forma prout in materia corporali existit" (Summa Theologiae, I,Q. 85,art. 1; hereafter 'Theol'.).

3 "Similitudines individuorum et existant in organis corporis" (Theol., ibid.).

4 Such that, e.g., "colores habent eundem modum existendi prout sunt in materia corporali individuali, sicut in potentia visiva; et idea possunt imprimere suam similitudinem in visum" (Theol., ibid., reply obj. 3).


6 English passages of Theaetetus are from the Fowler translation (Loeb Classical Library).


9 For a summary in Broad's own words of all the points being made here about the essentials of his theory of perception, see: Broad, pp. 243-244. Broad offers a more detailed version of his penny argument for sensa and of his special acquaintance notion of sensing in his Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy, vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1933), pp. 34-36.

10 In "The "Special Sensibles"," Perception.
I use 'sense' and 'sensing' at this point because Plato is not yet talking about fully-fledged perception. More on this in section 2 of this chapter.

Aristotle argues, similarly, that an appearance and the sensation of it occur "simultaneously" with one another [On the Soul, III.2, 425b6; hereafter, 'Soul']. But the full intent of both Plato's and Aristotle's claims is that reference to time or to something's taking time is not at all relevant in this context. The "agreement" in Plato's account and the "one and sameness" in Aristotle's of sensory undergoings and appearances are a matter of the sensory undergoings' being effects of causal activities initiated by the thing, so that, e.g., a sensation-of-white occurs on the side of the percipient's organs to which there stands a white thing on the side of the cause. That the causal process involved when these things occur takes time is irrelevant to the sense in which the sensation is of its cause. For once the causal process is explicated, there is nothing further which then occurs in the natural order and which is needed in order to get the sensation and the appearance "agreeing".


It would be more accurate, perhaps, to classify the Stoics' theory of vision as a hybrid between extramission and intromission theories. The issue of the correct classification of the Stoics on this matter is not important, however, to the main points being made. See: David E. Hahm, "Early Hellenistic Theories of Vision and the Perception of Color," Perception, Machamer and Turnbull, pp. 60-95, esp, pp. 65-68; also, F.H. Sandbach, The Stoics (Chatto and Windus; London, 1975), p. 85; and, Samuel Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics (The Macmillan Co., 1959), p. 23.

For some general discussions of Greek and Hellenistic theories of perception, see: John I. Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition From Alcmaeon to Aristotle (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1906); and, David C. Lindberg, Theories of Vision From Al-Kindi to Kepler (University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 1-17.

For more on the Stoics' material soul, see: Sambursky, Physics, pp. 2-5. In the words of the Stoics themselves,

the pneumatic substance is the binder, the matter is what is bound. Thus, air and fire are said to bind, earth and water are bound.

[SVF, II, 439]

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, ed. and trans., R.G. Bury (Loeb Classical Library). Hereafter, 'AL'.

The Stoics also claim, for example, that sensations "exhibit what produces them". But this claim is to be cashed out in causal terms, as is a similar claim that light "exhibits" things to us. Thus:

A sensation is an undergoing occurring in the soul, exhibiting within itself what produced it. So, for example, whenever we consider a white object by means of vision, that which occurs in the soul through the sense organ of sight is an undergoing. We are said to have the undergoing in the sense that the whiteness is made to move us ... The sensation is also said to be from light because it is just like light in that light indicates itself and the other things which are surrounded by it. Likewise, the sensation exhibits itself and what produced it. [SVF, II, 54]

A sensation exhibits itself and its cause, in other words, in that it both has its own character as a impression in the pneuma or soul and is also an effect of an external thing. On this point, also see: Josiah B. Gould, The Philosophy of Chrysippus (State University of New York Press, 1970), pp. 54-55. In contrast, Stough maintains that the Stoics hold "that impressions can give us knowledge of the real nature of an object ... An impression must be an exact copy of its object" [Skepticism, p. 93].

The Stoics follow Aristotle in calling the activities in the medium 'light'. See: SVF, II, 118.

On Sense and the Sensible Object, 439a33. Essentially the same claim is made in Soul, II.7, 418a30.

For a discussion of the Stoic tonos, see: Robert T. Todd, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics (E.J. Brill, 1976), p. 86; also, Sambursky, Physics, pp. 7-9.


It should not be immediately assumed that by 'name' Plato means what a twentieth century philosopher would probably mean (e.g.,
a type of referring expression). For an argument against using such contemporary notions at least in the case of Plotinus, see chapter 5 of this work.

23 The following two passages are from the Fowler translation of Cratylus in the Loeb Classical Library.

24 See chapter 3.

25 See chapter 1.

26 St. Bonaventura, The Mind's Road to God, Trans., George Boas (The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.; The Library of Liberal Arts, 1975), p. 11. Bonaventura sums up his Neoplatonic, structural conception of the universe in the claim that "number is the outstanding exemplar in the mind of the Maker, and in things it is the outstanding trace leading to wisdom" [p. 20].

27 A standard Platonic way of expressing this is that Forms are, as Gallop puts it, "the prime bearers of names" and individual things are "called after them": David Gallop, Plato: "Phaedo" (Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 94f.

The Stoics agree with the view that the concepts used in perception are the same as those we possess "intellectually":

Reasoning and perception are the same but they are not exercised upon the same ... [Reasoning] concerns the recesses of another thing, its inner parts, while [perception] concerns the vessel of another thing, its outside ... Thus, the same power is both intellect in regard to the former and perception in regard to the latter, but the being of what they pick out about things seized in perception is not the same.

[SVF, II, 849]
Chapter III

PLOTINUS' THEORY OF PROGRESSION

The heart of Plotinus' philosophy is his theory of progression (the proodos). In chapters 1 and 2, I contrasted a number of Greek and Hellenistic views on perception and the soul's activities with Empiricist accounts. One result of those discussions, not emphasized at the time, is that mentalistic or diaphonous act-mental object models are utterly inadequate for explaining or expressing Greek and Hellenistic theories of the soul and of mental activities. We shall see much more of this result in discussing Plotinus. I shall now turn, however, to Plotinus' theory of progression.

The three principles in Plotinus' progression are the hypostases: the One, Intellect and Soul. In this chapter, I shall present the basic outlines of that theory, with some detail and with the focus on Intellect and Soul. In its most basic form, the theory of progression maintains that Intellect, which we already encountered in chapter 1, is a progression from the One and that Soul is a progression from Intellect. The world we perceive, finally, somehow comes to be for Plotinus in the second progression, that of Soul from Intellect.

Plotinus' Enneads is an imposing document indeed. It addresses a multitude of topics and issues and presents Plotinus' philosophy in a variety of ways in addressing these topics. The clarity, precision
and style of the various treatises and chapters are uneven and seem addressed to a variety of audiences and meant to perform a variety of functions: e.g., to lay out possible alternatives on various topics; to present a variety of possible criticisms and considerations; and, sometimes, even to expound Plotinus' own views to an audience capable of understanding them.

In this chapter, I shall present an interpretation of Plotinus which illuminates the greater part of the Enneads and which imposes an unifying pattern on the whole of it. I shall not pause, however, to carefully analyze particular texts or to evaluate how much of my pattern seems recognized by Plotinus himself or how consistent the Enneads are throughout its many treatises. I shall begin in section 1 by laying out the general pattern of interpretation I shall take concerning the progression from the One. Then, in sections 2 and 3, I shall fill out the pattern somewhat in addressing two of its features.
1. Schematization, Being and the Progression

The only text I shall use in this section is *Ennead VI.6*, Plotinus' treatise "On Numbers". *Ennead VI* contains, as Porphyry sees it, the most basic and philosophically precise presentation of Plotinus' philosophy. In *Ennead VI*, moreover, treatise 6 serves as a bridge between Plotinus' discussions of categorial frameworks for doing metaphysics (treatises 1-3) and of the relationship between Intellect and the world we perceive (treatises 4 and 5), on the one hand, and Plotinus' grand concluding treatises on the intelligible structure of Intellect and on the nature of the One and its relation to Intellect (treatises 7-9), on the other hand. As we shall see, the contents of Plotinus' treatise on numbers more than justifies the place Porphyry accords it in *Ennead VI*.

Plotinus recognizes that for most of us reality is (or seems to be) composed of the things we perceive and which we use our language to talk about in most contexts—viz., men, trees, colored things, eyes, arms, and so on. A philosophical theory need not canonize ordinary talk, but it must provide a basis for our talk and perceptions of our ordinary realities. Accordingly, the progression need not be couched, when presented in its strictest and most proper form, in language obviously based upon our ordinary talk of men, etc.; but it must admit of some characterization which grounds that talk. Throughout most of the *Enneads*, Plotinus does couch his theory in this latter form, using
words which ground our ordinary talk of men, etc. in a fairly straight-
forward way. Ennead VI is unique (and indispensable) in its stress
upon the derivative status of such characterizations.

In Ennead VI.6, Plotinus argues that an arithmetical character-
ization of the progression is basic. Plotinus argues that "the One
and Number are primary" [VI.6.10.50], so that Beings "come to be in
accordance with Number" [VI.6.15.24]. Thus, while we may talk about
there being a Being (or Beings) or Form (or Forms) for men—call it
(or them) 'MAN'— when basing our metaphysical account on the words of
ordinary speech, the Form(s) we are referring to must really be
arithmetical in character—i.e., be a principle or group of principles
for ordering things in a certain way.

Thus, Number, the First and the True, is the principle
[archê] and underlying source of reality.
[VI.6.15.34]

Plotinus takes the initial progression from the One to be a
breaking up of the One into a succession of numbers. As progressing
from the One, the numbers are unities (henads: VI.6.10.13). Plotinus
also calls these numbers 'the First numbers' [VI.6.15.34], and the
numbers taken in this way are to be distinguished from numbers as
actually functioning to order or "number" things (e.g., to order five
oranges into a henad, Five). Thus, the pure number Two, for example,
is to be distinguished from Two functioning to arithmetically order
dyads of trees, apples, parts of houses, etc. The pure numbers which
progress from the One function as arithmetical ordering principles by
means of Soul. Soul orders things in accordance with the pure
arithmetical order so that the numbers are no longer just the resources of pure arithmetic but become principles for actually ordering things. Plotinus calls the numbers as being principles of ordering 'schemata', or "those which measure things in accordance with the Firsts" (i.e., the numbers of pure arithmetic) [VI.6.15,39].

In Ennead VI.6.6, Plotinus argues that the real nature of Being (the Forms) is number functioning as schemata. Moreover, Soul's use of numbers as schemata is constrained by the successiveness of pure numbers as they progress from the One. Soul thus uses pure numbers so that they are related to one another in a hierarchy of schemata, with more complex schemata coming from simpler schemata. In view of the general conflation of geometry and arithmetic in Greek and Hellenistic thought, we may represent the hierarchy of the schemata in terms of the derivation of geometrical theorems from one another and, ultimately, from the axioms and primitives of geometry.

Plotinus maintains that the extensional magnitudes of geometry result from applying arithmetical principles of ordering to the phantasms of perception [VI.6.3,38]. The basis for this claim is that, as we shall see, space (or extension) is a necessary feature of using sensations for Plotinus and does not exist apart from that use. Geometrical principles are derivative from arithmetical principles in that they are really just arithmetical principles construed in such a way that they apply to the extended things of perception. But thought of geometrically, however, the hierarchical relationship between schemata may, again, be thought of as, for example, like the derivation...
of principles of triangles from the more basic principles of plane figures.

In sum, we may articulate the principles of ordering used by Soul as principles of geometrical objects. Ultimately, however, "enclosed" figures are measured by "discrete" figures (numbers) [VI.6.14,40]. Plotinus argues the point by maintaining that things of magnitude do not come from real principles (archai) except insofar as their parts form a unity which is arithmetically measurable [VI.6.1,16], the extendedness of those parts again being a result of the phantasms of sense. Two final points will complete my initial sketch of Plotinus' theory of progression.

First, I have just noted that the initial or "pure" henads function as schemata in a step-wise, orderly fashion, beginning with simpler principles from which more complex principles follow [see also: VI.6.11]. As the schemata become more and more complex, we get principles complex enough to account for the many distinctions we make and relate to singular things in our talk of men, etc. Further, we can also take the more complex schemata to be composed of arithmetical parts (sub-principles of ordering, or sub-schemata) which are each complications of unities combined into the simpler schemata from which the more complex ones come. In this way, we can break schemata down into sub-schemata which compose those schemata. As a result, the highly complex ordering principle(s) which is the arithmetical-cum-geometrical foundation for, say, a man is composed of sub-principles for what we would call the man's organs (his eyes, arms, and so on).
We now have the following picture of the progression from the One. First, the One breaks up into a succession of *henads*, or pure numbers, which provide the foundations for Soul's orderings of things [thus, also see: VI.6.10,1-4]. We now have an arithmetical-cum-geometrical foundation for explaining the things we see and describe as men, trees, etc. structurally. In using the numbers so that more complex schemata follow from simpler schemata, Soul introduces the means for talking about sub-schemata. In terms of the language we use, some of these sub-schemata are principles for ordering motions and enclosed figures into what we call 'arms'. Others are principles for ordering certain other things we perceive (or, from our own points of view, our visual sensations themselves) into what we call 'eyes'. And so on. This leads to the second point.

Earlier I noted that, while in its proper formulation Plotinus' theory of progression is arithmetical (-cum-geometrical) in character, Plotinus also feels that it provides the grounds for our talk of men, etc. As a result, we can also talk about the principles and sub-principles used by Soul in words based upon our ordinary language. In the last paragraph, for example, we talked about sub-schemata as principles for the things we call 'arms', 'eyes', etc. We might then call these sub-schemata themselves 'the real arms', 'the real eyes', and so on—or, more generally, 'the real organs'. And we might call that portion of the hierarchy of principles-cum-sub-principles which we might appeal to in "measuring" a particular man 'the real man'. Plotinus maintains that, while the metaphysical principles of the things
we ordinarily talk about—which he calls 'the body-like things'
[VI.6.17,25]—are schemata, we can refer to them in terms of "what
it is to be a certain living thing" (kath' ho zōon) or as "the First
living things" (ta zōa prōtōs) [VI.6.17,34-36]; for example, as
what it is to be a man or as the First man. Ennead VI.7, the
treatise following "On Numbers" seems designed to present Intellect
in this alternative way, justified and grounded by Ennead VI.6.

Plotinus elsewhere represents the initial progression from the
One as providing the foundation for the characterizing sorts of things
we say about men, etc.—i.e., for our characterizing things as having
qualities, quantities, and the like [see: VI.2.21]. Viewed in this
way, the initial progression from the One might be thought of as a
successive production of the basic predicates of language—perhaps,
e.g., is six-feet tall, or is red. The Soul's use of numbers as
schemata thus becomes a use of predicates which cohere into batches
of characterizings—e.g., is six-feet tall and red. The Soul's use
of those batches in informing our perceptions result in their being
applied to a subject (hypokeimenon) of a perception so that we perceive
a sortal thing by means of characterizing it—e.g., a man which is
six-feet tall and red. Accordingly, we might also call the batch of
predicates which ground our perceptions of a man—i.e., which cohere
into a certain henad, as it were—'humanity' or, in my convention,
'MAN'.

When viewed in this ordinary language-based way, the appeal to
relations between arithmetical-cum-geometrical principles and their
pure foundations and to the relations between a more primitive principle and a more derived principle to characterize the progression of Intellect and Soul will not do. Other terms are needed. To characterize the progression of Beings (MAN, etc.), Plotinus uses the language of "intellection", "intelligibles" and, more importantly, "contemplation" (theoria). As I have said, this is a less perspicuous way of characterizing the progression for Plotinus; but it is also the more common way in the Enneads, as most of the Enneads seems addressed to "the vulgar"—the philosophically less sophisticated audiences which came to learn from Plotinus.

In section 2, I shall supply more detail to the proper (arithmetical-cum-geometrical) way of viewing the progression. In section 3, I shall focus more upon the terms of the "vulgar" way. Both sections, moreover, will center around the idea that Plotinus' theory of progression is supposed to provide the proper framework for understanding our universe—in a phrase, for real explanation. Recalling the two questions with which I began chapter 1, in other words, Plotinus' theory of progression is not only Plotinus' theory of the nature of our universe but it is also supposed to provide a theory of the manner in which we can understand our universe.
Plotinus maintains that the theory of progression, outlined in the last section, is a theory of the real causes of the universe. In order to maintain this, Plotinus' conception of causation must be quite different from that of many modern and contemporary philosophers and, as well, from that of Aristotelians. I shall begin my discussion of some details of Plotinus' theory of progression with a discussion of causation, especially contrasting Plotinus' views with Aristotelian views.

The notion of causation commonly has several associations not found in Plotinus and one association which is the basis for Plotinus' denial of the others. One association is change. In preparation for my discussion of Aristotelian hylomorphism, we may distinguish two sorts of change: substantial change and changes in the state of some substance. Thus, when a stone is thrown through the air and breaks a window, the change in place (motion) of the stone is a cause and the change in the window is an effect. Substantial change occurs when a substance comes into existence or ceases to exist, and may be reduced to changes in state if a person maintains that the passing away or coming to be of a substance is really a change in the state of some perduring matter. All causes and effects thus become changes in the state of some substance or matter. Substances which cause changes in state may be called 'agents' and substances (or matter) which
suffer effects may be called 'patients'. This general discussion of causation and change leads to some further associations.

First, states of substances are datable and so changes take time or occur in time. More generally, causes and effects occur in time and agents and patients exist in time. As a result, atemporal items are commonly excluded from the causal order and references to time may be packed into analyses of causation—e.g., as in the principle that a cause must precede or occur simultaneously with its effect.

Second, substances and pieces of matter are particulars. Hence, agents and patients are commonly taken to be particulars, causes and effects are particular states or changes in state. A person can—and we often do—make general causal claims (e.g., that smoking causes cancer), but actual causal connections occur only between particulars (e.g., between individual histories of smoking and individual cases of cancer). As a result, items which are not particulars (e.g., species or principles of geometry) are commonly taken to be outside of the causal order and therefore to be "abstract" rather than "concrete".

Third, regardless of a person's position of the existence of non-physical particulars, physical bodies certainly seem to be clear instances of particulars which many be agents or patients, as in my example of the stone and the window above. (But, again, even the Mentalist's non-physical agents or non-physical datable states are particulars—e.g., selves or volitions.) The physical universe is thus commonly taken to be a prime example of a causal order.
I call a theory which associates causation with change, temporality, particularity or physicality a theory of horizontal causation. The problems with theories of horizontal causation are well known. One problem such theories have to face is how a relation between particular (hence, contingent) things or "states" (however loosely construed) could be a necessary relation. Another, related problem is how, even assuming that horizontal causal connections may be necessary, we could ever be certain that we have a necessary connection in doing science (or anything else, for that matter). In view of such problems, causation (either as such or as knowable by us) often becomes nothing more than, e.g., a conjunction of particulars or particular states in a temporal sequence. Causal laws become inductive generalizations or expressions of probabilities, subjective expectations or relations between the concepts by means of which particulars are apprehended.

Plotinus holds what I call a theory of vertical causation. On Plotinus' theory, the real causal order is atemporal (eternal) and unchanging; bodies are never causal agents and, indeed, bodies as founded upon the real causal order are not particulars or physical at all. Only principles or Forms are real (vertical) agents and are, in this sense, concrete. Real "body-like things"—men, trees, etc., as given a place in the real causal order—are "copies" of principles (at bottom, schemata). Using some Leibnizian jargon, real bodies are noumenal, where the contrast with noumenal bodies is not physical bodies but bodies as perceived by means of sensations—i.e., phenomenal bodies.¹
A common association with causation which Plotinus does accept is that appeals to causes must yield explanations. But Plotinus sharply distinguishes discernings (or makings) of a phenomenal world in perception from real explanation. Horizontal causes and effects are features of the world we make by means of the materials of sense. But the making of phenomenal bodies is an activity which as such explains nothing about the things made. Analogously, a sculptor's sculpting of a statue provides a basis for explaining the statue only insofar as his motions and the resulting statue fall under principles of craftsmanship and are considered as following in the order of principles--i.e., being noumenal.

Plotinus calls the agent which causes the noumenal universe (and in a way the phenomenal universe as well) 'Intellect' (nous). The activity by means of which the vertical progression and the end product of a universe is brought about is Soul (psychē). Body, construed as making a positive contribution to Soul's activity (viz., rendering its products phenomenal), is characterized by Plotinus as a "dumb" laborer [IV.3.26,7]. And noumenal body, or body truly considered as following from principles of ordering, is not even a "dumb" laborer but is the end product of soul's acting. Soul, on the other hand, is essentially active in that it is always the imparting of actuality to (or the making of) body, or "the other" [I.1.2,2-8]. And Soul gets its principles of making from Intellect so that Plotinus also characterizes Soul as the means by which (dia mesou) Intellect acts [IV.3.11,18].
The idea that Soul is a progression from Intellect is implicit in the last claim, that Soul is that by means of which Intellect acts. Intellects acts only and always by means of Soul so that the function of Intellect is to render the universe ("the others") intelligible. Conversely, Soul is essentially active only in virtue of its being the acting of Intellect so that the universe coming to be in Soul's activity is wholly intelligible. Intellect and Soul thus function together in Plotinus' system so that the universe is explanable and is neither physical nor wholly phenomenal.

In order to fully articulate Plotinus' framework for explanation, the *proodos*, we must distinguish four sorts of soul: the hypostasis Soul, the world soul, species-souls and individual souls. If these four sorts of soul are not distinguished for Plotinus, much of the Enneads becomes unintelligible. My discussion of the soul in chapter 1 addressed the individual souls. My use of 'Soul' in section 1 of this chapter addressed soul as the world soul. And my claim that men, etc. are ultimately to be traced into the noumenal order only as copies of the Forms or schemata and not as items which add a positive nature of their own to the causal order (e.g., a physical nature) addresses Soul. What was said in section 1 of this chapter about organs, finally, has a bearing on species-souls.

Intellect simply produces a universe by means of Soul [IV.3.11,18]. But in this role as Intellect's acting, soul is said to be a one from which the "soul of the all" and all the "other souls" come [IV.3.4,14-16]. The soul of the all is the world soul. By means of the world soul,
the universe is led into a unison (symphonia) in accordance with reason (or ratio) [IV.3.12,15]. This means that, on the one hand, the basic positive conception of the way Intellect acts is as arithmetically ordering things and that, on the other hand, the ordering activity of Intellect is most clearly seen in the regular and "symphonic" motions of the phenomenal heavens. The other souls are individual souls, the means by which Intellect acts in the schematic copies of the world soul so that we may ascribe activities to noumenal bodies themselves. The only sort of case here that Plotinus is interested in is conceptual activities of noumenal men—i.e., our discernings of a phenomenal world and our reasoning. Whether the motions we ascribe to the phenomenal stars or the activities we ascribe to phenomenal animals or plants are to be seen as due to an individual soul or whether these are somehow due just to the world soul for Plotinus is unclear in the Enneads.

Finally, in addition to the world soul and individual souls, there are also souls which are "fastened in a succession to each of the Intellects [Forms], being the rationales and unfoldings of them" [IV.3.5,9-10]. These are species-souls and they are based upon the idea introduced in section 1 of this chapter that more complex schemata follow from simpler schemata in such a way that their increasing complexity comes from complications of the arithmetic components of the simpler schemata. When this idea is articulated in the systematic way in which the world soul schematizes noumenal bodies, we have the idea of species-souls. But much more on this later.
The four-fold distinction between sorts of soul may be directly expressed in terms of the distinction between noumenal and phenomenal bodies—the products of soul's activity. Three ways in which Plotinus talks about bodies are especially relevant. First, qua produced by Intellect, bodies are simply "copies of the Beings" [III.6.11,3]. As seen in section 1, however, the most proper way of talking about the real nature of Being is arithmetically (and/or geometrically). Qua being produced according to principles of order when produced by means of Soul, secondly, bodies are "schematized things" (schema) [IV.4.33&34]. As we shall see, Plotinus takes the initial products of schematization which all more complex schematizations order to be air, earth, fire and water [V.9.3,15-18]. Third, qua being objects discerned by means of sensations, bodies are "perceptual objects"—in my words, phenomenal bodies.

A crucial step in Plotinus' argument is the claim that in using sensations to discern a phenomenal world, we are not thereby discerning the real nature of bodies. Plotinus claims that his own conception of bodies is based upon the absence of reality (hypostaseos) in phenomenal bodies [III.6.12,10]. We ordinarily suppose that bodies are colored, emit sounds, and so forth. But in reality, (noumenal) "bodies have nothing of the sorts usually supposed of them" [III.6.12,24]. Plotinus does not ascribe even sensory shape (morphe) to real bodies. Color is likewise said to be an appearance (phainesthai) of what is not really colored [III.6.12,31].
At least part of the reason for the "unreality" of phenomenal bodies lies in that they are not causes or causal agents but are wholly products of individual souls' uses of sensations. They are thus, in my words, not concrete. In particular, the men, etc. we perceive do not really cause our sensations of them as is commonly supposed. We may initially account for the origins of sensations or impressions in terms of their having external, bodily causes. We might say that color-sensations, for example, result from light activity in a medium initiated by an external luminous body [IV.5.7]. Or we might say that sound-sensations result from air vibrations, again initiated by some external body [IV.5.5]. And analogous accounts can, presumably, be given for the other senses (except insofar as we would say that a medium is not required). In general, however, Plotinus says very little about the "horizontal" mechanics of sensation. Presumably, just about any of the standard Greek or Hellenistic accounts will do.

The important points here are two. First, Plotinus does clearly hold that a noumenal (ultimately, arithmetical-cum-geometrical) backing can be given to those horizontal accounts of causation which take bodies to be structural in nature. Second, the reason why Plotinus himself shows a lack of concern for actually giving such horizontal accounts is the theory of vertical causation. On this theory, real explanations are to be given in terms of Intellect's acting by means of soul and any horizontal account must be cashed out in terms of its noumenal backing if it is to be shown to be of any value whatsoever as an explanation. Plotinus hints at doing just this in Ennead IV.5.7,
replacing the horizontal account in which light proceeds from a luminous body with an account in which the medium simply is (or has its being) in accordance with the Form of luminous body [IV.5.7,36].

Plotinus' theory of vertical causation carries with it a doctrine of the real nature of bodies, as I have already hinted. In particular, bodies are noumenal in nature, being men and the like considered solely as being orderings prescribed by schemata. As a result, Plotinus' reply to a question like "But what is being ordered by schemata?" must not introduce a material base or receptacle but must be couched in terms which can be grounded in the order of schemata alone. Plotinus thus holds what I call a noumenal hylomorphism, according to which noumenal bodies are complexes of matter and form but where this "matter" and "form" is to be unpacked in terms of the step-wise way in which the world soul acts. The noumenal universe may thus be thought of as having most basic or simple orderings, call them 'air', 'earth', 'fire' and 'water', which the world soul renders more and more complex as it mimics or copies the hierarchy of schemata. And if one asked Plotinus "But what receives the first or most basic orderings?", his answer would be that nothing does; we must start somewhere, so let us start with something intelligible rather than with any of the "bastard notions" of previous metaphysicians.

Plotinus takes Aristotle to be a prime example of a metaphysician who imports such "bastard notions" (my interpolation into Plotinus), and who takes particulars to be real causal agents. An integral part of the Aristotelian conception of causation is the doctrine of
hylomorphism, according to which particulars are informed matter.

But Plotinus rejects Aristotelian hylomorphism as a doctrine of the nature of real bodies. Plotinus' schematized things are indeed complex, but not in the manner maintained by Aristotle. And the four elements which serve as "matter" for schematization are themselves not complex at all, just being the First or most simple acts of the world soul. Being the firsts which all subsequent schematizations presuppose, the elements are called 'simples' by Plotinus. Plotinus argues that elemental fire, for example, does not come to be by a substrate's receiving some sort of shape or by something's being set on fire [III.6.12,37]. Plotinus rejects the notion of a substrate which receives shapes [III.6.12,11], and maintains that elemental fire is a feature of the vertical order.¹

Plotinus' general explication of hylomorphism in Ennead V juxtaposes his own noumenal hylomorphism for complex bodies with an Aristotelian account of the elements or "simples":

We see neither the things which are said to be wholly complex nor the simples as a one ... Thus, on the one hand, those naturally more complex things--the ones with substructures and which we call 'compounded together' [syn-krimata]--divide first according to the Form which constrains the whole compound: a man, for example, first divides into a soul and a body, the body dividing in turn into the four elements. But, on the other hand, there are also those "compounds" [the simples] which result from matter having been shaped; for the matter of the elements is by itself shapeless. And, you will ask, from whence does the form come into matter? ... But here too, the account [hylomorphism] has it, the substrate receives shape. [V.9.3,8ff.]

Plotinus shifts in this passage from using 'soul' and 'body' when discussing complex things to using 'shape' and 'substrate' when
discussing the elements. The reason for this shift in vocabulary is that hylomorphism is not wholly misguided in the case of complex bodies. Complex bodies are indeed complex, albeit not complex in being informed matter. But no such limited concession is to be made for a hylomorphic construal of the elements. Phenomenal fire (to aistheton pyr)—e.g., the fire I discern in the fireplace—may be construed as complex, being a perceived thing or subject which is hot or colored, but real elemental fire is not complex at all [IV.4.13, 19-25].

As Plotinus sees it, the doctrine that real bodies are informed matter (or shaped substrates) misuses the fact that phenomenal bodies are always taken by us to be compounds [IV.4.13,19-25]. Aristotelian hylomorphism takes our ordinary, perceptually based beliefs as serious metaphysical accounts of the real universe. We ordinarily take phenomenal bodies ("the things we see") to be compounds—e.g., round balls, red barns—and Aristotelian hylomorphism turns this belief into a metaphysical doctrine of the real nature of bodies. Being a general metaphysical doctrine, moreover, the resulting hylomorphism is then applied even to the four elements.

Plotinus maintains, in contrast, that the only sort of hylomorphic distinction which can be drawn for real bodies must be based upon something in the vertical order of the schemata. The only distinction there which would seem to do the job is the distinction between more complex and simpler schemata—or, what comes to the same thing, the coming to be of a more complex schema as composed of subschemata when that schema
is derived from a simpler one. In the case of the simplest or "first" schemata, those whose pure arithmetical foundations lie in the first numbers in the succession proceeding from the One, no such distinction can be drawn. They are therefore "simples" and may be taken as the real foundations for the four elements of Greek and Hellenistic physics.

After the simples, however, the activities of the world soul may be taken as complications on the initial elements. And at each stage in the world soul's schematization after the elemental stage, we can distinguish between the complications of the four elements (call it 'body') and the fact that the resulting complex ordering is a structural unity in its own right and in virtue of its schema, the schema used by the world soul owing its unity in turn to its being just a complication of a simpler schema. Plotinus calls the structural unity of its complex orderings 'the form constraining the whole' or just 'soul'. And the sort of soul being mentioned here would be what I have called 'species-soul'. A species-soul is a schema qua unifying an ordering by the world soul. Plotinus also calls species-souls 'capacities' (dynameis) and expresses their connection with schemata as follows.

Schemata have capacities, for the one is together with the other and vice versa. It is by means of capacities and schemata, then, that each [noumenal] thing is schematized and comes to be ... Thus, schemata are essentially such that they have capacities. [IV.4.35,46-49]

Earlier I noted that a more complex schema may be thought of either as a whole which is just more complex than the simpler schema it comes from or as a whole whose greater complexity may be broken down into sub-schemata. As a result, the noumenal (ultimately,
arithmetical) items which come to be in the world soul's ordering may be thought of either as being just items in the ordering as a whole or as items in sub-orderings which in turn are ordered into the "measurable" whole. Taken in this latter way, Plotinus calls the capacities (species-souls) which order the noumenal items into sub-orderings and then into the whole 'capacities to undergo' (pathētikoi). Taken in the former and more directly unified way, Plotinus calls the capacities just 'capacities' and does not introduce a special term. I shall call them 'capacities proper'. Expressed from the "vulgar", phenomenal side, capacities to undergo are those capacities whose actualizations--the items they order--must occur in some one organ of the body. The capacity for vision is thus a capacity to undergo because whenever it is actualized, the eyes are the patients in which it is actualized [III.6.2,53]. In the noumenal body, actualizations of the capacity for vision are those noumenal items first ordered into certain sub-orderings (the noumenal eyes) and these sub-orderings provide the noumenal foundations for ordering visual sensations into phenomenal eyes.

Unlike actualizations of capacities to undergo (call them 'undergoings'), actualizations of capacities proper (call them 'activities') are not essentially ordered into particular noumenal (and, derivatively, phenomenal) organs. Man's perceptions (krisēs) and reasonings are clear Plotinian examples of activities in this sense, so that conceptual activities differ from sensory or "bodily" undergoings (at least in part) in that their role is prescribed by the noumenal body as a whole
rather than by noumenal organs. Speaking with the vulgar, my eyes sense colors while I perceive colored things. Put in more schematic terms, Plotinus' idea seems to be that impressions are sensations insofar as they are ordered by the sub-schemata of noumenal organs and they are used by the soul to discern things insofar as their roles ordered by the unified noumenal body is such that they partially replicate certain orderings which we call 'other things'--e.g., the noumenal body grounding the phenomenal tree I am discerning or the noumenal body grounding the phenomenal moon you and I are both discerning. In this way, certain orderings in my noumenal body play roles relative to my noumenal body which replicate the roles played by items ordered into other noumenal bodies relative to those whole noumenal bodies. What we have, then, is a Plotinian "vertical" counterpart to the Aristotelian idea seen in chapter 2 that sensation is the taking on of the ratio (logos) of another thing without its matter, which in perceiving is then used by the perceiver's soul. As a result, we might say that my phenomenal body represents another phenomenal body (or some feature of it) in perception, with the caveat that my representing is really grounded in a replication of some ordering of its noumenal body and not of some really existing phenomenal thing which, say, causes my sensation. But in going a ways with the horizontal theorist, as Plotinus is prepared to do, we may talk about a sensation's being, say, a "counterpart-redness" to the redness of the phenomenal body I make when I use that sensation representationally.
I have thus far shown that Plotinus' real causes are not particulars or physical things. In addition, I have discussed Plotinus' rejection of Aristotelian hylomorphism, which is a principal source of the idea that causation involves change. In rejecting Aristotelian hylomorphism and maintaining that the basic model for causation is the coming to be of a more complex principle of ordering from a simpler one, Plotinus also rejects the idea that causation involves change. A related association which I have not explicitly addressed is temporality. I shall close this section by emphasizing that Plotinus' progression does not occur through time and that his real (noumenal) universe does not exist in time as such, though it provides the grounding for those things (phenomenal bodies) which are in time. Time and space are both relegated by Plotinus to the phantasms of sense and may be said to be in the noumenal order only insofar as those phantasms are grounded in noumenal bodies and, in turn, in schemata.

I shall discuss time and space more as we proceed. I shall begin my closing remarks for this section by returning to the four-fold distinction between sorts of soul.

I have been distinguishing in this section between Soul, the world soul, species-souls and individual souls. In reality, though, there is only one soul for Plotinus. Souls and what it is to be soul (psychei einai—i.e., the hypostasis Soul) are eternally one and the same, Plotinus maintains, where to be soul is to impart actuality to "the other" [I.1.2,2-8; IV.7.85,40-46]. The imparting of actuality, in turn, is the same as the activity of Intellect. It is, as it were,
Intellect progressing beyond itself—e.g., actually ordering rather than simply being principles of ordering. Strictly speaking, then, souls are identical with the activity of Intellect and that activity is the only activity which really occurs in the universe. How, then, do the world soul, species-souls and individual souls "come to be"?

Though Intellect's activity or production of a universe is the only activity there really is in the universe, that one activity (i.e., Soul) can be analyzed by us in various partial ways in our attempt to explain the vertical order. Since Being is really principles of ordering, for example, Intellect's production may be thought of as an ordering of schematized things, with the four elements of Greek and Hellenistic physics being grounded in the simplest or "first" stages of that schematizing. Thus, Soul is being construed as the world soul. Species-souls come to be, in turn, as by-products of the world soul's activity, being expressions of the fact that the world soul's activity reflects the systematic interrelationships between the schemata of Intellect and between those schemata and their arithmetically based components. Individual souls are the most troublesome here. Roughly, they are the whole orderings—or noumenal bodies as wholes—qua using the phenomena of sense. They are thus to be seen as also abstractions from what is really one, singular activity of Intellect—the proodos from Intellect.

The world soul, species-souls and individual souls are, as a result, not distinct from Soul but are notions derived by focussing upon (abstracting, in my sense of the word) certain features of
Intellect's singular activity. The problem with the Enneads on these matters arises from the fact that Plotinus never gives a clear account of precisely how we can move from noumena to phenomena and stay in the vertical order, e.g., how phenomena can be mere abstractions from the vertical order. Even if one maintains, as I argued in chapter 2 that Greek and Hellenistic philosophers did maintain, that our sensations are not themselves objects, there still seems to be something about the phenomenal world which renders it phenomenal rather than noumenal and Plotinus does not give an account of how that something comes to be in the vertical order. Thus, while Plotinus gets rid of the receptacle, substrates and, in general, any basis for there being a physical world, it is unclear how he gets rid of a positive foundation for there being a phenomenal world as such. It is one thing to say that men and trees are really just noumenal orderings and quite another to say that Plotinus has thereby accounted in some manner for phenomenal men and phenomenal trees as such and without remainder. I shall not pursue this issue here, but shall assume from now on that I can get on with explaining Plotinus' philosophy without settling the issue for Plotinus.

Plotinus summarizes the theme of the last two paragraphs by maintaining that one and the same soul is identically present "everywhere" [IV.2.1; IV.3.2&3], but that it can be considered as "becoming divided by reference to [first noumenal and then phenomenal] body" [IV.3.19,15]. But references to various items called 'bodies' are abstractions from the single productive activity of Intellect. Plotinus
thus emphasizes my atemporality theme by claiming that, in order to grasp bodies as they really are, we must consider the noumenal copy of Intellect in accordance with the eternal manner in which it comes to be as an entirety [IV.3.10,12]. We must think of real body as coming from Intellect "all at once" (sympanta) [V.8.7,17] and not serially or by a succession of acts by Intellect. Intellect's production of the universe is not just the only sort of real activity there is in the universe, but there is only one act of Intellectual production—the production of the noumenal universe as an eternal whole. In short, Plotinus maintains, the universe is a copy of True Substance (Intellect) only when taken as a timeless whole [VI.3.3,31].
3. Contemplation and the Categories of Explanation

In section 2, I focused on Plotinus' conception of causation, emphasizing more what it is not than what it is and relying on the discussion of section 1 for filling in the latter. In its most basic formulation, Intellect's progression is strictly analogous to the derivation of theorems of arithmetic (and/or geometry) from other, more basic theorems and these in turn from the basic axioms and primitive resources of arithmetic. Soul enters the progression as the notion of principles of ordering actually functioning to order. The progression stops with the soul's activity, however, and the question "What is thereby ordered by soul?" seems to be a bad question on Plotinus' view. As a result, however, we have noted the difficulties which Plotinus seems to be left with concerning sensations and the making (or, from the vertical order's point of view, abstracting) of a phenomenal world. In this section, I shall focus on the account Plotinus gives of the progression in terms which more directly ground our talk of men, trees, etc. But in so doing, I shall also emphasize certain features of the proper account, in particular, the idea that each lower level in Intellect is an arithmetical-cum-geometrical complication of a higher level which is "derived" from it rather than adding something to it.

Plotinus maintains that the best way for us to understand in a more ordinary or "vulgar" way how the progression of Intellect occurs
is in terms of the notion of contemplation (theoria). Plotinus argues that "natural production" is not a matter of "pushing and levering" [III.8.2,5]. It is not a matter, for example, of arranging or rearranging material atoms or of pushing on and impressing a material substrate. In Ennead III.8, Plotinus argues that natural production is a matter of contemplation. By natural production, Plotinus has in mind the production of the real universe, but, as we shall see, the same concept (viz., contemplation) is used by Plotinus for the progression of Intellect itself as well--i.e., for the progression of the intelligible structure of Intellect which grounds the noumenal universe it contemplates.

I shall focus on the more basic progression, that of Intellect itself, in this section and discuss how the contemplation account supplements the proper account seen in section 1. My discussion will have three parts. First, I shall discuss Plotinus' criticism of Aristotelianism as adequate for providing a framework for real explanation. Second, I shall discuss why an Aristotelian framework is inadequate. These two discussions will lead into an explanation of Plotinus' alternative account and of what sort of ground Plotinus feels that account gives for our more direct explanations of men, trees, etc. Explaining Plotinus' alternative account and its resources for explanation will comprise the third part of this section.

In Ennead VI.3, Plotinus discusses Aristotelian categories and argues that they are a way of categorizing the phenomenal world which, like Aristotelian hylomorphism, cannot serve as a serious metaphysical
account of the real universe. Plotinus' own Aristotelian-type categorial framework for the phenomenal world begins with two basic categories: substance and things concerning substance. A substance is that which is "neither in a subject nor concerns another subject" [VI.3.5,14-15]. Socrates or a man is a substance, for example, because in discerning something as Socrates or as a man we are discerning the subject of the perception itself rather than a subject as relative to something else. A man is not a man of some subject; rather, a subject of perception just is a man.

Plotinus then divides things concerning substance into what he calls "categories" (katēgorai) and accidents (symbebēkota). Plotinus' "categories" are the obvious relative-to's (pros ti) of Aristotle's Categories—e.g., a slave, which is relative to a master, or a cause, which is relative to an effect. To call them relative-to's means, roughly, that a slave is not a slave unless there is some other subject which is a master. In short, there are slaves in the world if and only if there are masters which the slaves are the slaves of [VI.3.3,31]. Unlike "categories", an accident is not relative-to some other subject, but it is still a relative-to. A color, for example, is always a color of something (in particular, some substance—a man, a tree, etc.). In general, a quality, for example, "is a capacity to impute by means of itself the 'what a quality is' to substances" [VI.1.10,19]. That is, qualities are essentially such that we impute the "what they are" (e.g., white) to substances. Similar remarks hold for all accidents, which include quantity, quality, space and time [VI.3.3]. As a result,
things conerning substances collapse into relative-to's, meaning that they presuppose something else for their existence in the world, and this something else is therefore needed in order to explain them rather than vice versa.

The next, and most important, step Plotinus makes for our purposes is to reduce substances to relative-to's as well. Substances are not relative to other substances or subjects of perception, as has been said, but they are still relative-to's. In particular, the substances of the phenomenal world are relative to our perceptions, our discernments of them. As a result, the substances of the phenomenal world depend for their existence upon our perceptions and they do not help explain the phenomenal world. Phenomenal bodies are items which we make and their substance is a result of that making. Plotinus defends his reduction of substances to relative-to's by cautioning that

what has been said is not absurd since the account concerns the substance of a perceptual object ... [and a perceptual object is always] relative to a perception.
[VI.3.10,12-14]

Plotinus' criticism of Aristotelian-type categories is, basically, that they apply to things only relative to our discernments of them. As a result, the phenomenal world is to be explained by means of what explains our perceptions, and it does not exist independent of our discerning it. In order to see why this result renders Aristotelian-type categories inadequate for providing a framework for explanation, a few words about the nature of relative-to's, hinted at above, are needed. As we shall see, it is not just being a relative-to which
disqualifies a category from serious metaphysical usage. It is being a relative-to which is relative to our own conceptual activities (e.g., perceptions) alone which disqualifies a category in this way. Plotinus maintains that a categorial framework for real explanation must explain or constrain our own conceptual activities as well as the things we initially wished to explain (men, trees, etc.), a theme with which I closed chapter 1. This brings us to the second part of this section.

As Plotinus sees it, explanation must consist in giving reasons (logoi), and reasons—I shall also call them 'rationales' to clearly distinguish them from the activity of dianoia—are tied up with relative-to's in two ways: first, in their internal structure and, second, in their relations to what they are reasons of. The first is based on the fact that rationales are always more complex than what they are rationales of. "Everything comes out as compounded," Plotinus maintains, "when analyzed by means of rationales and reasoning" [IV.3.9,19-20].

Using the Aristotelian example that bodies are informed matter as an example, we can say that 'informed matter' is functioning as a rationale of 'bodies' and that the items in the rationale are each relative to the other. That is, the sense of the terms 'form' and 'matter' depend upon the sense of the rationale 'informed matter', so that nothing is informed but matter and matter must always be informed. The first sense in which rationales generally are tied up with relative-to's is analogous to this Aristotelian example—i.e., a rationale is
always a complex whose parts are always relative to one another.

The significance of this point for discussing explanatory rationales and for distinguishing them from non-explanatory rationales can be brought out by considering Plotinus' example of the relative-to's Double and Half.

Double and Half exist relative to one another (for short, they are correlatives) because they

occur relative to one another ... and such that the former is not prior to the latter and vice versa, but they occur simultaneously.

[VII.1.7,34-38]

The import of this passage is that nothing is a double or a half by itself but only relative to something else. Four, for example, is a double only relative to Two, and Two is a half only relative to Four. Moreover, Four is not a double of Two in virtue of Two's being a number, being less than Four, or whatever, but only in virtue of Two's being simultaneously considered as a half. Correlative terms thus perspicuously apply only together and not separately. A further and more important point, however, is that Four may also be a half—viz., when considered relative to Eight when Eight is simultaneously considered as a double. A similar point can be made about Two's also being a double relative to One considered as a half. Thus, this particular pair of correlatives (Double and Half) are variable in their application to numbers or to things.

We have just noted two features of correlatives. First, correlatives are mutually dependent upon one another; they apply only together and not separately. Second, at least some correlatives are
variable or "mutable". Something might be a double when considered relative to one number, for example, and a half when considered relative to another number. It is this second feature of certain cor-
relatives which renders them inadequate for use in a rationale that really explains things. Plotinus feels that a real explanation must employ rationales which apply immutably. This brings us to the second way in which rationales are tied up with relative-to's—viz., in the relation between a rationale and what it is a rationale of.

The second way in which rationales are tied up with relative-to's may be introduced by saying that the correlatives internal to a rationale do not apply to something(s) in vaccuo but only from what I shall call 'a point of view'. Four is the double of Two and Two is half of Four, for example, only from the point of view of their numer-
cial ratio. More importantly, Plotinus maintains, on the basis of what was said in section 2 about Aristotelian hylomorphism and what has been said in this section, that body is informed matter, or a substance-thing concerning substance compound, only from the point of view of human percipients. In contrast, Plotinus maintains that real explanatory rationales must apply from a point of view which humans may occupy but which does not depend essentially upon them doing so. This second restriction on what rationales are explanatory is related to the first in that a test for whether or not a rationale depends essentially upon humans' occupying the point of view from which it applies is whether or not there is any variability in how we use it.
Plotinus argues in *Ennead VI.2* that a categorial framework which makes real explanation possible is provided by Being, Same, Different, Motion and Rest. I shall call these five 'the Platonic genera'. To what extent Plotinus' use and conception of these five is the same as Plato's (e.g., in *Timeaus* or *Sophist*) will not be discussed here. Plotinus' motivation, presented in *Ennead VI.2.7&8*, for adopting the Platonic genera uses the notion of relative-to's (or correlatives). That motivation may be understood as based upon the thesis that explanatory rationales must not be variable or depend essentially upon human perceivers (or, more generally, conceivers). In particular, we shall see that Plotinus maintains: (1) The items in a Platonic rationale are always differents. Thus, insofar as a Platonic rationale applies to something, it will always apply to it as a different. And (2) the point of view from which rationales of differents apply is Sameness itself. Anyone who begins with the principles of Being (the Platonic genera) as primitive must, in principle at least, always arrive at the same explanation or set of rationales. In sum, Plotinus takes the Platonic genera to provide a framework which prescribes a methodology (generally called 'dialectic' by Plotinus) for systematically and non-arbitrarily arriving at a set of rationales which therefore determines how we reason rather than our reasoning determining the way the world really is.

The foregoing introduction of the Platonic genera shows that, of the five Platonic genera, Same and Different are the most important for Plotinus' purposes. In *Ennead VI.2.7&8*, Plotinus explicates the
functions of the Platonic genera as follows. Motion accounts for the
basic progression of Intellect. But Rest applies simultaneously with
Motion, so that the "motion" of Intellect is eternal. And the nature
of Intellect's motion is unpacked in terms of Same and Different.
Intellect's motion is to be understood in terms of differentiation,
and differentiation is based upon Different, as "everything after a
differentiation stands dual [or as a dyad], destroying the One"
[VI.2.9,16]. Second, differentiation presupposes that there is some-
thing which is differentiated, something which the differents result-
ing from a differentiation are differents of. Hence, Same enters as
the point of view from which differents are. Rationales which articulate
Intellect are thus dyads of differents which each applies in virtue of
a same. This introduction of the Platonic genera has us into the
third part of this section.

Thus far in this section, I have discussed what is wrong with
the Aristotelian framework for doing metaphysics and introduced why
Plotinus things that the Platonic genera will do the job. This can
be shown more clearly by relating the foregoing discussion of the
Platonic genera to the account outlined in section 1. Recall, to
begin, that Plotinus maintains that the initial progression from the
One is a successive progression of the resources of pure arithmetic
(-cum-geometry). Similarly, we have just seen that the "motion" of
Intellect is a successive differentiation into dyads. From the One,
viewed as Same rather than as the One tout courte, Different yields
a dyad. From each different in that dyad, we get another dyad. And
so on; and so on. Viewed as the pure progression of dyades from, first, the One and then other dyads, we get the resources for pure arithmetic. Viewed as the ground for the basic resources for our language, we can take these different to be Forms or Beings. Taken in this latter way, we can take the progression of Intellect from the One to be a genus-species hierarchy of Forms.

Plotinus summarizes the dual way of construing the progression of Intellect just outlined, but in a way which also preserves the point made in section 1 that the latter ("vulgar") way is secondary to the former (arithmetical) way, as follows.

All intellectual objects are structured into one nature, such that Intellect is composed of all of them. This we call Being, and it is a system. If this is the case, then not only are they [i.e., the Platonic genera] genera but they are at the same time the principles holding for Being. They are genera because from them come other lesser genera and after those come species and finally the uncutables [atoma]. And they are also principles because Being is thus from a many and the entire thing [i.e., Intellect] comes from them.

[VI.2.2,8-14]

In this passage, Plotinus argues (1) that the Platonic genera determine Intellect as a genera-species hierarchy, but (2) this hierarchical construal of Intellect is secondary to the Platonic genera's functioning as principles—principles which, according to Ennead VI.6, generate the successive henads-cum-schemata of the proper account. Ultimately, the proper sort of rationales to be given in explaining the universe are schematic in character and they are non-arbitrary and determinative of human arithmetical-cum-geometrical reasoning for Plotinus (as truths of arithmetic and/or geometry have been for many
other philosophers as well). This same sort of necessity is shared, however, by genera-species hierarchies discerned by doing dialectic. Finally, as mentioned at the beginning of this section, Plotinus takes the counterpart of arithmetical deduction in the genera-species case to be contemplation, to which I shall now turn.

Plotinus is synsetive to what his metaphysical system will and will not allow us to say about the real universe. Two related things which his metaphysical system does not warrant us in saying are: (1) that principles and real bodies differ from one another spatially or temporally, and (2) that principles differ from one another in some more "ontologically grounded" sense than just that one is expressible by a more or by a less complex rationale than another one is—whether these rationales are expressed in the words we use doing arithmetic or geometry or in the words we use in articulating genera-species hierarchies. Contemplation is an especially useful notion for Plotinus to use in emphasizing these two points because, as Plotinus understands it, contemplation is an activity in which one seeks to understand something by producing a species or an instance of it—as when a geometer seeks to understand geometry by tracing the entailments of its basic axioms and primitives. Applied to Intellect, then, the idea becomes that Intellect progresses through contemplation in the sense that every lower level of different is an articulation of (rather than an addition to) what is implicit in a higher level, in view of the "primitives" and "axioms" of Being—i.e., the Platonic genera and how they function.
The essential feature of contemplation is that it is an articulation of something implicit in the resources being used in a particular contemplation—e.g., the differentials of one level of Being made explicit in a more complex level. Spatiality and temporality are not essential features of contemplation as they are with "pushing" and "levering". Plotinus emphasizes the atemporality of contemplation as such in saying that

producing has been revealed by us to [in reality] be contemplation. For it is the perfection of a contemplation to remain contemplation and not to be doing any particular thing. With respect to what it is, we might say that contemplation is a "having had produced". [III.8.3,21]

Plotinus emphasizes the second point above, that "ontological difference" in Intellect is solely a matter of differing complexities in the rationales used to articulate its implicit structure, in terms of contemplation as well, maintaining that a rationale is really both a contemplation and an object of contemplation [III.8.4].

A rationale is an object of contemplation in its complexity and a contemplation in the unifying character of it. As was done in the course of explicating the notion of species-souls, the distinction between the unifying measure (or henad) of a particular level in Intellect and the simpler level from which a more complex level comes is a distinction which collapses in view of the fact that throughout his account Plotinus has in mind the model of everything in Intellect really being implicit in the Platonic genera. Plotinus expresses this basic model in terms of contemplation as follows.
The One is both in itself and relative to the many others. And the One is also Being, making itself into many by means of a kind of motion [i.e., differentiation]. But the resulting whole is still a one, just as contemplation is a one which works in various ways. Thus, the Being-One does not remain in itself but is the capacity for all things. And contemplation is the cause of its appearing many, such that there is intellection. For if only the One appeared, there would be no intellection but only the One.

[VI.2.6.13-20]

In sum, when we move from the proper account of the progression to the "vulgar" account, in which Beings or Forms progress from the One so as to more directly ground the predicates and names of our language, Plotinus takes contemplation to provide the model for how the progression proceeds and what it "does"; as contemplation is the notion of articulating what is implicit in Being or, more anthropomorphically, becoming conscious of what is in one's own mind. As a result, there is a clear sense in which contemplation controls the contemplater rather than vice versa. This last, of course, brings Plotinus' appeal to contemplation as the means by which Intellect progresses in line with the two demands introduced earlier in this section for explanatory rationales. (I shall discuss the "ontological difference" theme alluded to above further in chapter 5, and I shall discuss how it is that the Platonic genera are supposed to explain our perceptions as well further in chapter 4.)
Footnotes: Chapter III

See Leibniz's *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding*, Book IV, chapter 3. For instance:

when one has certain confused ideas ..., as one ordinarily does, it is not to be wondered at if one does not see the means of solving [philosophical] questions. It is as I have remarked before, that a person who has not ideas of the angles of a triangle except in the way in which one has them generally, will never think of finding out that they always equal two right angles ..., and when we farther consider what belongs to the nature of [real things] ..., we are transported, so to speak, into another world, that is to say, into the intelligible world of substances, whereas before we have been only among the phenomena of the senses.


'Hypostasis' is the term used by Plotinus for his three metaphysical "realities": the One, Intellect and Soul. I shall discuss my reading of that term more fully in chapter 5.

Plotinus seems to part company with Plato on this point, who, as noted in chapter 2, seems primarily concerned with the so-called proper sensibles and not with the common sensibles.

In short, Plotinus rejects material causation as, ultimately, useful in real explanations. But more on this as we proceed.

Plotinus rejects a temporal or dispositional reading of dynamis in *Ennead* II.5 except insofar as that notion is employed in talk about phenomenal bodies (see Armstrong's introduction to that treatise in his translation in the Loeb Classical Library). Plotinus thus says that "this part of the [species-] soul, the capacity to undergo, is not body but a certain Form" [III.6.4,31]; and that "the capacity to undergo is a cause [aition] of undergoings" [III.6.4,44].

The distinction between undergoings and activities thus has nothing to do with the latter occurring in an immaterial entity distinct from the body in some Dualistic fashion. It is misleading
(at best) to say, for example, that for Plotinus an "immaterial soul 'inside'" does the perceiving: Henry J. Blumenthal, "Plotinus' Adoption of Aristotle's Psychology: Sensation, Imagination and Memory," The Significance of Neoplatonism, ed., R. Baine Harris (State University of New York Press, 1976), pp. 41-58, pp. 47-48.

Plotinus' use of the Stoic doctrine of cosmic sympathy (sympatheia) also has its home in the theory of vertical causation. Gordon G. Clark, for example, interprets Plotinus' doctrine of cosmic sympathy as claiming that one body can act upon another body without benefit of a connecting causal chain. Clark calls this mode of horizontal causality 'action at a distance': "Plotinus' Theory of Sensation," The Philosophical Review 51 (1942), 357-382, p. 364. But more precisely for Plotinus, the doctrine of cosmic sympathy claims that everything occurs of necessity "when" and "where" it occurs in the eternal universe and, derivatively, in the phenomenal universe. It is in virtue of this alone that one can classify one body as an agent and another as a patient without discerning an intermediate causal chain.

The eternal and non-productive (in a horizontal sense) character of what I call vertical causation is remarked on by: John H. Randall in "The Intelligible Universe of Plotinus," Journal of the History of Ideas 30 (1969), 3-16, p. 13; and, A.H. Armstrong in "Plotinus," Cambridge History, pp. 195-271, pp. 252-253. Wallis gives an account of apparently similar views in Proclus to Plotinus' views on the distinction between horizontal and vertical or real causes: Neoplatonism, p. 126. And John Rist even suggests that what I would call phenomenal and noumenal matter may be distinguished for Plotinus in terms of whether or not matter is being considered as the sort of item which can exist in time (or is eternal): Plotinus: The Road to Reality (Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 118.

It is at this point in particular that Plotinus departs from Aristotle's classic account of relative-to's in Categories. Aristotle claims that the correlatives perception and perceptual object differ from other correlatives, like slave and master, in that they need not occur together. That is, while perceptions and actually perceived things may always occur only together, the same is not true for perceptions and perceptible objects. In short, Aristotle argues, "the perceptible holds prior to perception" (7b36). But Plotinus disagrees. The perceptual world is strictly relative to our discernments of it for Plotinus. Recall, in particular, Plotinus' claim that perceptible air, earth, fire and water are not the elements called by the same name. Plotinus thereby rejects Aristotle's argument to the effect that the perceptible is prior to perception because the elements are prior to perceptive animals (8a10).

The idea that Aristotelian-type categories apply to the perceptual world while the Platonic categories apply to the real world is
noted by Merlan in Cambridge History, p. 38. That Aristotelian-type categories are, ultimately, derivative for Plotinus from the Platonic genera is discussed by John P. Anton, "Plotinus' Approach to Categorical Theory," Significance, pp. 83-89, esp. p. 88. I shall discuss the derivative character of Aristotelian-type categories further in section 2 of chapter 5.

The interdependence of Intellect's "seeing" with sames and differents is discussed by John M. Rist in "The Indefinite Dyad and Intelligible Matter in Plotinus," Classical Quarterly 12 (1962), 99-107, esp. pp. 101-102. The source of Plotinus' view that real or intellectual motion is to be explicated in terms of differentiation may be Plato's Parmenides, where Plato defines motion as "always being in a different" (146a).

The idea that the "matter" of Intellect is the Dyad is suggested by Merlan [Cambridge, p. 27]; and Rist identifies the Dyad in Plotinus with the very "urge to contemplate" ["Indefinite Dyad," p. 102].

This analogy between contemplation and geometrical derivation is, in fact, grounded in text. Plotinus offers as an example of engaging in contemplation the example of a geometer theorizing about lines [see III.8.4,8,11]. For more on Plotinus' example, see chapter 4, note 9.

Plotinus thus maintains that as one proceeds from considering the contemplation of nature to that of Soul and, finally, to that of Intellect, the contemplation becomes more unified (henoumena) [III.8.8,1-8].
The idea that Soul is essentially the activity of Intellect, with body being an abstraction from that activity, contrasts sharply with the Cartesian idea that soul is a certain sort of entity and, as well, with the idea that the soul is capable of certain diaphonous, conceptually barren acts—e.g., mere "noticings" of what is "in" or "before" it—or of making up its own concepts, arbitrarily. The first, Cartesian contrast is of special importance in light of some recent Plotinian scholarship. Randall, for example, characterizes the Plotinian soul as "life individualized and inhabiting a particular body". Mamo calls soul a "psychic stuff" for Plotinus, and O'Daly refers to the soul as "the embodied self". While some or all of the technical vocabulary used by these Plotinian scholars may be explicable in a non-Cartesian and appropriately Plotinian manner, and hence need not be at odds with my interpretation of Plotinus, they certainly tempt the contemporary reader to think of Plotinus as holding that soul is a sort of entity or Cartesian substance. To many contemporary readers, talk of individualization, inhabiting, "stuff", being embodied and the like would sound suspiciously Cartesian and ghostly indeed.

I shall begin my discussion of the nature and function of the Plotinian soul by returning to a theme introduced in chapter 1, that
body is essentially the tool or instrument of the soul. Soul uses the body, Plotinus maintains, in a manner analogous to a craftsman using his tools. But the terms of the analogy are not the soul and the craftsman's body; the soul is not being compared as a thing with the body of the craftsman. The essential feature of the analogy for Plotinus is, as we shall see, that a craftsman performs his craft in accordance with principles and standards. In view of this, moreover, a particular craftsman is himself just an instrument—an instrument for his craft, or the principles which make up his craft. Similarly, as seen in the last chapter, the Plotinian soul is essentially the means by which or "middle" (mesa) of Intellect's production of the universe.

All activities of soul are really productions or contemplations by Intellect. All activities of the soul are therefore, one might say, essentially intellectual or intellectually informed. In the case of individual souls, one would say that all activities of individual souls are conceptually informed and that the natures of those conceptual activities are caused by Intellect. As a result, both reasoning (or discursive thought: dianoia) and perception are conceptually informed by Intellect for Plotinus. In short, reason and perception have the same concepts and those concepts ultimately come from Intellect. A view commonly attributed to Plotinus (and to Platonists generally), that the activities of the soul in apprehending the Forms are wholly disparate in kind from the activities of the soul in perception, must therefore by rejected. Rather, rational inquiry (for
Plotinus, dialectic) and perception are two ways in which the soul uses one and the same conceptual resources. One way in which these two uses may be distinguished is as they were for Plato in chapter 2—viz., in terms of the distinction between the publicly inspectible and criticizable uses of concepts in doing Platonic (or, now, Neoplatonic) science and the private use of concepts in discerning things by means of sensation.

I shall explain and argue for my way of drawing the distinction between apprehending the intelligible world and apprehending the perceptual world for Plotinus in chapter 5. In this chapter, I shall further discuss the more basic claim that perception is an essentially different sort of activity on the part of soul from rational inquiry. This more basic issue is particularly important for Plotinian interpretation because Plotinus himself seems to make some such distinction at one point in Ennead IV. This more rigorous discussion of the functions of individual souls will be undertaken in section 2. In section 1, I shall clarify and defend what was said above concerning the craftsman analogy and, thereby, the essentially mediating function of soul in Plotinus' theory of progression.
1. Body as the Instrument of Soul

Plotinus' most important analogy for understanding the relationship between the soul and the body is that of a craftsman using his tools. One place where he uses the analogy is in *Ennead* I.1, where he uses it in arguing against the claim that the soul is *in* the body. Perhaps Plotinus has in mind the Stoics here, as they maintain that the soul is a material structure of air and fire which binds together and account for motions in the grosser body of earth and water. In any case, Plotinus argues that the soul is not *in* the body but rather *uses* the body as a tool [I.1.3]; the soul is not more in the body, on this analogy, than a craftsman is in his tools.

But Plotinus also claims that the soul does not "receive" the undergoings of the body any more than a craftsman receives the undergoings (or motions) of his tools [I.1.3,1-6]. This claim brings us to the heart of the matter. For Plotinus' claim that the soul does not receive the undergoings of the body might be taken to suggest that Plotinus is surely thinking of the relationship between the soul and the body as some sort of relationship between one *thing* (the soul) and another *thing* (the body). Otherwise, how could it even make sense to suppose that the soul *might* receive anything from the body? But the proper Plotinian answer to this question is that the soul does not receive the undergoings of the body for the very strong reason that, in virtue of the sort of item soul is and the sort of item body is,
it does not even make sense to suppose that it does.

Plotinus makes the claim that the soul does not receive the undergoings of the body in the context of discussing the individual, perceiving soul. The undergoings Plotinus has in mind are impressions (typoi) in our sense organs. On Plotinus' doctrine of perception, introduced in chapter 1, the soul does not receive impressions but uses them in discerning things, for performing "that which occurs by means of the body" [IV.3.26,6-8]. In Ennead I.1, Plotinus also expresses this by holding that, rather than receiving impressions, the soul engages (i.e., uses) them [I.1.2,27]. In short, the Plotinian soul is simply not the sort of item which undergoes at all.

Plotinus takes perceiving something to be strictly analogous to a craftsman making some craft-object (e.g., a statue), and the role of the body in perception is like the role of a craftsman's tools in the making of the craft-object. But this analogy is not meant to imply that the soul is a thing which uses another thing (the body) as a craftsman's body uses chisels, axes, etc. If the soul were a distinct thing from the body, Plotinus argues, then

how would the undergoings reach it [i.e., be ready for use by the soul] from the body at all? ... He who claims that the soul uses body [in this way] separates the two. But how were they before being separated by philosophy? [I.1.3,12-18]

Plotinus suggests that the relationship between the soul and the body may be more perspicuously understood in terms of the (Stoic) notion of "having been intermixed" [I.1.3,19]. After considering various possible readings of this notion, one being the Stoics' reading of it
as an actual intermixture of things (e.g., like wine in water),
Plotinus concludes that the "intermixture" of the soul and the body
is best exemplified by the imposition of the schema of AXE upon iron
[I.1.4,21]. This is, of course, an old Aristotelian example, but
we can expect for Plotinus to take it quite differently from Aristotle.

Plotinus does not reject the craftsman analogy completely in
Ennead I.1, but only a certain reading of it. Plotinus denies, in
particular, that the soul is to be taken as analogous to a craftsman's
body, as the latter is normally understood by us to be a concrete thing.
Rather, the import of Plotinus' discussion in that treatise seems to
be that the soul is to be read as being analogous to a craftsman in
such a way that we could likewise say that a schema (a principle of
ordering) uses iron to make an axe.

But Plotinus' axe example is doubly ambiguous. It is ambiguous,
first, in that being an axe can entail either having a certain structure
or having certain capacities. This first ambiguity is due to the fact,
seen in the last chapter, that

schemata have capacities, for the one is together with the
other and vice versa. And it is by means of schemata and
capacities together that each schematized thing comes to be.
[IV.4.35,46-49]

Plotinus also takes these capacities to be souls; what I have called
'species-souls' for Plotinus. Plotinus' axe example is also ambiguous
in that a capacity can be either a capacity to undergo or a capacity
proper. The basic difference between these two sorts of capacities
is that a capacity to undergo governs a particular part of the body
while a capacity proper is a capacity for the body as a certain whole
to use those parts of the body as prescribe by its unifying schema. Plotinus also calls capacities proper 'common undergoings', meaning that they do govern the body—and not a soul-thing—but that we ascribe the common undergoings to body only insofar as it is a certain sort of body in virtue of its schema.

[I.1.4,23-26]

An example of a capacity to undergo for an axe might be the capacity of an axe's blade to be sharp and an example of a capacity proper might be the capacity of an axe to chop down trees.

My use of Plotinus' axe example is, admittedly, highly contrived. First, Plotinus would not recognize the axe's blade as an organ-like or proper part of the axe. The condition of an axe's blade would be a feature of the axe's basic structure and would not be like the state of a person's eye. Capacities to undergo only accrue to those things which have proper, organ-like parts (eyes, hearts, etc.). Second, a capacity proper is a capacity to use something as a tool and is not a capacity in virtue of which something is a tool--e.g., in virtue of which it can be used to chop down trees. The two basic capacities proper for Plotinus are perception and reason—or, by a slightly different cut, imagination and memory (as we shall see in section 2 of this chapter). As a result, Plotinus' axe example is not really ambiguous. But my contrived use of that example has a point.

Plotinus' axe example may be taken to suggest three ways in which soul uses a body with organs—for example, a human body. First, the soul may use the body as material which is schematized. Second, the soul may use the body as a schematized thing which has proper parts
(sub-schematizations) in which items are sub-schematized, as with impressions grounded in our noumenal sense organs. Third, the soul may use the body by using the items sub-schematized as tools for making objects of conceptual activities. I have called soul as using bodies in the first two ways 'the world soul' and soul as using bodies in the third way 'individual souls'. And I discussed the proper sense in which body can be matter for the world soul on Plotinus' noumenal hylomorphism in section 1 of the last chapter.

Plotinus maintains, moreover, that the bodies used by soul are not really material or physical in nature. The activity of the world soul, which makes bodies as schematized things, uses the four elements as the matter for its activity. But, we have seen Plotinus maintaining, the elements are not material particles. The element fire, for example, just is fire; the idea that noumenal bodies are composed of air, earth, fire and water is based upon the idea that complex schematizings by the world soul always have certain basic or most simple resources or "first schematizings" packed into or presupposed by its more complex activities.

Thus far, I have been arguing that Plotinus' craftsman is really analogous to three different craftsmen on the side of the Plotinian soul: the world soul as schematizer of the noumenal universe, the world soul as schematizer of parts of noumenal bodies and individual souls as using certain products the second craftsman in performing their conceptual activities. Unearthing the common, unifying feature of these three will show precisely what it is about the craft idea that
Plotinus wishes to use in the *Enneads* generally.

In Ennead IV.4.23, Plotinus takes the relevant points of analogy to be, first, that a craftsman must have a certain conception or discernment (*krisis*) of his object, second, that he uses tools to related that conception to some subject (*hypokeimenon*) and, third, that the craftsman's conception of his object and the manner in which that conception is "fixed in" the subject (e.g., results in a statue) are both determined by the standards (*kanones*) of his craft [IV.4.23, 37-42]. Now a significant part of these three points of analogy is due to the fact that Plotinus' primary topic in the chapter is perception. In perception, a conception is "fixed in" a "subject" in the sense that a phenomenal body is made when we use sensations as tools. Plotinus summarizes what he calls the dual nature of perception as follows.

If in actual perceptions the living thing functions as a conjoint, then perceiving in general must also be of the same sort. Perception is thus dual and common, analogous to boring and weaving, such that the soul is like a craftsman and the body is like the tool. The body is passive and works for the soul, and the soul confiscates [i.e., conceptually uses] the impressions of the body. Something is thereby discerned by means of the body, a discernment being made out of the undergoings of the body. [IV.3.26,1-4]

When the features of the craftsman analogy which holds in the special case of perception are distilled, the residue is the idea that the craftsman's work and the results of that work are wholly determined by the standards (or principles) of his craft. As a result, we can say that a craftsman is himself just a tool for the standards of his
craft. The standards for Soul are the Forms in Intellect, so that ultimately the lone craftsman in Plotinus' system is Intellect itself. This result of the craftsman analogy has important implications for the nature of soul and of body.

First, Soul becomes just the "fixing" of the Forms "in" copies of the Forms. The various different sorts of soul (the world soul, species-souls and individual souls) become abstractions from the single craft-activity of Intellect, which we postulate in attempting to articulate a full account of all facets of Intellect's activity.

Second, body becomes, in a fourth and most basic sense of 'tool', a mere tool in that it really does not play a causal role at all in the real order (the progression). Body becomes an abstraction from Intellect's craft-activity as well, which arises when we think of Intellect's activity (Soul) as itself being a craftsman whose standards are the Forms and who must produce something. In chapter 3, this producing by soul which yields "body-like things" was seen to be the grounding of our language, of our ordinary talk of sortal things like men, trees, etc. In reality, however, Soul is the tool of the one real craftsman of the universe (Intellect), a tool which is an eternal progression from Intellect and which does not really act upon or change a material substrate or spawn a separate hypostasis (e.g., a physical universe). In reality, Soul's production of copies of the Forms does not need a material base anymore than a geometer really needs imagery when he is good at his craft and is absorbed in theoretical thought about geometrical "objects".
On Plotinus' view, a noumenal universe can be made by a noumenal agent (Intellect), but a physical universe cannot. In section 3 of chapter 3, I indicated the puzzles which this raises in the case of the phenomenal universe for Plotinus. I shall discuss in detail what can be said about the place of phenomenal bodies in Plotinus' vertical order on the basis of text in chapter 5 and to a lesser extent in the next section. I shall now turn to more detail on Plotinus' doctrine of the nature and function of individual souls. In the next chapter, I shall return to the theory of progression in more general terms, also discussing its "ontology" or philosophical nature.
2. Soul and the Empirical Use of Concepts

The most basic functions of individual souls for Plotinus are imagination and memory. All other functions of individual souls are to be explicated in terms of these two basic functions. Plotinus discusses imagination and memory primarily in Ennead IV.3, in the course of discussing perception, the objects of perception and the relationship between those objects and principles (archai). Plotinus introduces the general natures and functions of imagination and memory as follows.

The reception of a rationale coming from intelligibles occurs by means of imagination. For an intelligible is simple and not [complex] like that which advances inside where memory grasps it. A rationale displays the intelligible, unfolded and brought forth, as in a mirror. The grasping of the rationale is the tarrying and remembering. Soul is always the activity of Intellect, and so, whenever it functions in this manner, grasping [of the intelligibles] comes to us. For Intellect is one thing, grasping by means of Intellect is another, as we are always intellectual but we are not always grasping by intellection. For the [human] recipient not only receives intelligibles but also has perceptions towards the external world.

[IV.3.30,6-15]

Imagination is the function of soul for Plotinus by means of which perceptions and other activities of individual souls are conceptual, are receptions of rationales coming from intelligibles. The soul's conceptual activities are also rememberings because these activities do come from intelligibles and hence are posterior to what they are rationales of—viz., intelligibles or Forms. In its proper,
philosophical sense, memory is the capacity to grasp (antileptikos) intelligibles, and one does this by means of grasping rationales of them. One grasps or apprehends anything for Plotinus only insofar as his conceptual activities occur in accordance with principles determining the conceptual order, and our conceptual activities are ultimately of those principles as their real causes. The distinction between imagination and memory is a slippery one. One can say that memory is imagination qua its products being (vertical) effects of intelligibles, or that imagination is memory qua its rememberings being images (eikōna: IV.3.30,4) or rationales of the intelligibles.

Plotinus also draws a second and potentially more serious distinction at the end of the above passage, one between grasping intellectually and perception. In particular, Plotinus seems to claim that, though imagination informs perceptions by rationales (or conceptually), nevertheless perception is still not an intellectual process and is to be sharply distinguished from grasping intellectually. This may be taken to suggest, in turn, that the soul has two different imaginative and memorial functions, one operative in perception and the other operative in, say, understanding. Both sets of functions would have Intellect as their ultimate cause (one cannot avoid saying at least this much for Plotinus), but our perceptual discernments would then be quite different sorts of conceptual activities from our rational or intellectual activities. Metaphysically, the result would be that the phenomenal world would no longer be just another abstraction from the vertical order but, in some important sense, autonomous from it.
Plotinus distinguishes between what might be called 'empirical imagination and memory' and 'intellectual imagination and memory'. He also draws this distinction, moreover, in terms of their objects. Empirical activities concern things which are "gathered by means of the body such that they reach the soul" while intellectual activities concern things which are "of the soul alone" [IV.3.26,39-40]. The former are things "gathered" by means of sensations, in turn, and they "reach" the soul in the soul's using sensations to discern them. Perceptions are not "of the soul alone" because the soul uses sensations in discerning perceptual objects. But that the sharp distinction suggested above between perception and intellection is a bogus one is indicated by the fact that qua being a discernment (or qua being conceptual) and apart from the fact that perceptual discernments are ones which use sensations, a perception is "of the soul alone". For Plotinus, perception is a special case of intellection because, though it is an activity which is towards (pros) external things insofar as it uses sensations, it is still a reception of intelligibles insofar as it is conceptual and it is no less a reception of intelligibles than are our reasoning or "more intellectual" activities [see: IV.3.30,14-15]. But taking a closer look at precisely how the empirical/intellectual distinction breaks down for Plotinus will help clarify the sense in which the phenomenal world is an abstraction from the vertical order. This also might be put by saying that as a world, the phenomenal world is derivative from the noumenal world. The following discussion will also tie Plotinus' views on the nature of soul's
functions more clearly to the discussion of concept formation in section 2 of chapter 1.

Empirical imagination is the capacity to inform sensations. I shall call the various capacities to inform or conceptually use sensations in specific ways 'empirical concepts'. Now an Aristotelian (or perhaps a slightly modified Aristotelian) might claim that empirical concepts are dispositions which are actualized over time in response to sensory undergoings. This way of putting the Aristotelian theory of concept formation does not require the soul to somehow get its concepts out of sensations themselves as with concept empiricism (discussed in chapter 1). The soul already possesses empirical concepts for my Aristotelian, but it possesses them only dispositionally and not actually; and the fit of the Aristotelian soul with the body is just by nature such that these dispositions are spontaneously actualized in reaction to sensations. The (perhaps modified) Aristotelian view just introduced thus allows for our very first sensations to be conceptually informed by the soul. Being a response to but one sensation (or batch of sensations), our actualized empirical concepts are at first very crude and extremely limited in their actual uses. But with continued experience, our empirical concepts become more actualized or empirically refined; an increasing variety of experiences fall under the actualized uses of the soul's empirical conceptual abilities.

Empirical concepts of the sort just introduced have the feature, however, of always remaining such that they apply only to things as
we have experienced them. One can talk about a complete empirical concept only by invoking something like the Kantian notion of all possible experience, a notion which, barring anything actual to set limits to it, must indeed remain only a regulative ideal. More importantly, my Aristotelian's empirical concepts are supposed to somehow remain the same while they actualize (or sophisticate) over time and over a number of different sensory occasions. For this reason, it might be better to think of the ever-increasing scope of the empirical concepts' actual uses as the learning how to use a concept one already fully possesses rather than as the actualizing of the concept itself.

That is, Plotinus might argue, an Aristotelian dispositional concept must already be actual in its way; it is dispositional with respect to its actually being used on sensory occasions, but that is a different matter from saying that the concept itself is dispositional only and not actual. Something conceptual and actual is also needed, one can imagine Plotinus arguing, in order to determine when one is "actualizing" his empirical concepts correctly. These determinants would be, on Plotinus' view, just our concepts themselves and what they determine would be our uses of them rather than their actualization.

In short, my Aristotelian theory of empirical concept formation would be acceptable to Plotinus only if the conceptual abilities or dispositions of the soul which my Aristotelian appeals to are construed in Plotinian terms, as actual principles which determine our
discernments rather than as mere dispositions which actualize over
time. My Aristotelian notion of empirical concept formation would be,
like the notion of horizontal causation, a derivative notion which
must be cashed out in terms of vertical causes (intelligibles or,
in this case, what might be called 'intellectual concepts'). And
this derivative character becomes evident on Plotinian grounds when
one attempts to account for the sameness of empirical concepts over
time and the correctness of their actualizations or perceptual uses.\textsuperscript{12}

Plotinus introduces the empirical operation of imagination and
memory as follows.

With respect to memory, the perceptual object is a phantasm.
But in virtue of imagination, the memory and retention are
of a real thing. For the perception [as opposed to the
sensation] stops with the imagination, and the thing seen
need no longer be present to it. Now if the sensation
relativizes the imagination to the single departed thing,
so also is the memory, and the memory thereby extends over
only a few. The memory which extends over the few is,
however, weak. But the memory which extends over the many
is the capacity to remember alone, and this memory is
stronger in power ... Memory thus belongs to the imagination
and the remembered thing is also of that sort.
[IV.3.29,22-32]

At first blush, this passage may seem to make a straightforward claim
about memory as the retention over time of what one has perceived and
about imagination as the remembering of what one has perceived by
retaining the ability to imagine that thing. On my interpretation of
Plotinus, the significance of what is said here is much more than that,
however, and has an important metaphysical point about the real nature
of imagination and memory. I shall begin with Plotinus' terminology.

Plotinus elsewhere describes empirical memory as "the memory
of perceptual objects" and intellectual memory as "the memory of
intelligibles" [IV.3.29,12]. And in the above passage, empirical memory is said to be "weak" and to "extend over the few" while intellectual memory is said to be "strong" and to "extend over the many". Further, "extend over the few" is cashed out in terms of "being in accord with departed things"—i.e., with those things actually seen or perceived. Finally, intellectual memory is also described as "the capacity to remember alone", which associates intellectual memory with those things which were earlier said to be "of the soul alone".

The identification of intellectual memory as the capacity to remember alone suggests that empirical memory differs from intellectual memory in not operating "alone". Empirical memory is, more precisely for Plotinus, memory _qua_ using sensations. The "real things" alluded to at the beginning of the passage are, as "real things" always are in the Enneads, the intelligibles or Forms; and Plotinus maintains that, so far as memory and imagination are concerned, the perceptual object is only a phantasm and not the real thing. That is, discernments produced by the imagination are about external things only through using sensations. But _qua_ being produced by the imagination, such discernments are of their causes, the intelligibles. Thus, _qua_ being conceptual activities, perceptual discernments are of the intelligibles rather than of phenomenal bodies and perceptions are intellectual activities.

Since phenomenal bodies are not the real causes of our discernments, the fact that perceptions use sensations does not impugn their status as intellectual activities. The idea that the perceptual object
is not the cause of the perception also unpacks Plotinus' claim that, so far as imagination and memory are concerned, the thing seen "need no longer be present"—i.e., it need not have been present to start with except in the sense that then the conceptual activity would not have been a perceptual one. Insofar as one takes sensations to play any causal role at all, our empirical imaginings (perceptions) are thereby relativized to "departed things". It is natural to suppose that sensations play some causal role or other. At least our abilities to use our concepts do seem to develop with experience. But the real causes of our abilities to use our concepts must, ultimately for Plotinus, be eternal Forms and not the temporal phantasms of the phenomenal world.

Our abilities to use concepts do seem to be limited in some way by training and experience. My Aristotelian theory of concept formation (or actualization) accounts for this apparent fact by simply claiming that our empirical concepts do indeed develop with experience. But recall that Plotinus' real universe has no change or temporality, and Plotinus maintains that real explanation must always articulate that eternal order. My Aristotelian theory would not be explanatory for Plotinus, as it merely equates actual empirical concepts with individual conceptual activities and offers no real explanation for those conceptual activities themselves. On Plotinus' view, conceptual activities of individual souls must be explained by means of actual concepts and not vice versa.
We might try saying for Plotinus that, while we do not actualize our empirical concepts with experience, we do at least learn something about our concepts. But we cannot say for Plotinus that we learn something about our concepts in the sense of learning how to use them because Intellect is always the cause of the activities of individual souls and there is no "learning how" in Intellect's activities. We can say only, e.g., that we become aware of how imagination is in fact informing sensations or of how Intellect is in fact using our sensations to discern phenomenal bodies.

One result of Plotinus' view would seem to be that, when I am in circumstances where (as we ordinarily say) I am not sure what I am perceiving, my uncertainty is as much a show of ignorance about my own discernment as it is about a phenomenal body which I suppose is not of my making. Perceptual discernments do not falter, as Plotinus sees it; certain collateral beliefs we might have along with discerning things do.

Learning empirically about our concepts would seem to be a matter of becoming aware of how we in fact use them as perceiving animals. But becoming aware of our empirical uses of concepts, and thereby of the nature of the phenomenal universe, would require reasoning (dianoia). It follows from this that, if perceptions were our only conceptual activities, then we would not make any "errors" about our phenomenal universe. We would simply discern it. But, we might add for Plotinus, humans are hardly ever (if ever at all) in such a state of brute perception. We are by nature reasoning as well as perceiving organisms.
and so what we commonly take to be perception is often (and perhaps always) more complex in conceptual structure than being just a discernment of a phenomenal body. Plotinus calls the collateral conceptual activities which so often accompany our discernments 'with-perceiving' (synaisthesis), and we might say that other animals merely perceive while humans observe---i.e., perceive-and-with-perceive.

I shall return to the notion of with-perceiving later, and with text. The line I have been developing for Plotinus can now be used to help illuminate some of the explicitly Plotinian ideas mentioned earlier.

Empirical memory "extends over the few" in the sense that, so long as one pays attention only to the empirical uses of his concepts (his uses of them on the occasion of sensation) and does not examine his concepts themselves (for Plotinus, through dialectic), he will take the causes of his concepts to be perceived or phenomenal bodies rather than "the real things". Phenomenal bodies are "fews" because, so far as an empiric is concerned, their natures are revealed or limited by means of sensations---and for a terribly unsophisticated empiric, by actual sensations only. But if a person relies solely on his sensations, he can apprehend only a very minute amount of the universe (i.e., "the few") in his lifetime. The empirical scientist has relatively little actual evidence indeed on which to base his theories. The possibility of encountering a counter-instance or an anomaly looms at every turn, and, perhaps more importantly for getting at what Plotinus is about, such theories are ineluctably relativized.
to phenomenal bodies alone. Plotinus maintains that real explanation must not be so limited in scope and ability to get at a public, non-to-a-percipient world.

Real explanation must not apply to the universe only by means of our sensations of it, a theme seen in chapter 2 for Plato. Central to Plotinus' philosophy, however, is the belief that his own theory does not completely separate perceptual discernment from understanding or intellection, or phenomena from noumena. We saw Plotinus claim, for example, that perception is in fact of real things because the concepts used in perception are causally of intelligibles and not of perceptual objects as causes. It is just that perception is such that, when engaged in it, we are aware of the perceptual object and not of the real causes of our perception. In reality,

the capacities of the soul used in perception need not be solely of perceptual objects. Those things produced in the living thing by the perceptive capacity are in fact impressions but the capacity to grasp is also involved. For intelligibles are such that, even though perception occurs with respect to the external phantasms, nevertheless that which most truly concerns the substance [of perceptual objects] is contemplation, because Forms alone are active [i.e., are causes]. For it is from these, the Forms, that the soul qua being "alone" receives leadership over the living thing.

[1.1.7,9-16]

If a perceptual discernment were nothing more than an actualized conceptual response to sensations, then the concepts used in perception would be relativized to the "phantasms" of sense (phenomenal bodies). But perception is not determined by the phenomenal universe we discern but by the Forms—the capacity to grasp intelligibles is in fact operative in perception.
Theories of empirical concept formation presuppose, on Plotinus' view, an explanatory prior level of concepts (I have called them intellectual concepts) which guide and determine our uses of sensations and which are therefore independent of the phenomenal world as such. In short, empirical concepts are intellectual concepts qua informing or using sensations. The difference between perception and actually "grasping by intellection" lies in that sensory uses of our concepts discern phenomenal bodies rather than apprehend their intelligible causes. Simply discerning something as a man, as red, or whatever, does not tell us anything about what a man is, or what red is, or anything about what I am discerning as a man, etc. I learn about my concepts and what it is that I discern when I use them on sensory occasions through reason for Plotinus. But rational conceptual activity or "grasping by intellection" is not wholly separate from perception. A botanist who has learned about plants in botany also has a clearer understanding of what he is discerning--i.e., he has a "strong" rather than a "weak" memory. When a wise man perceives something, he is not merely receiving intelligibles on sensory occasions but he is receiving (or using) them in such a way that his conceptual activity "attends closely to" or "displays an understanding of" the intelligibles [IV.3.30,6ff.].

The idea that human perception may itself be an intellectual activity not only in that Intellect is its cause but also in that it may itself exhibit an awareness of the vertical causal order is, again, based upon the special character of human perceptual consciousness.
In particular, human perception is not mere discernment but is often accompanied by more or less sophisticated conceptions of what it is that we are discerning in perception. This use of reason in connection with perception is, as noted earlier, called 'with-perceiving' by Plotinus. And as also noted, it is in with-perceiving that the notions of truth and error have a sense for Plotinus.  

The reasoning which produces discernments alongside of the impression by means of which we perceive contemplates Forms, but it does so by way of with-perceiving. For reasoning is indeed rightfully of the soul and correct reasoning is actual intellection. Likeness and community in the external world is therefore relative-to correct reasoning. [I.1.9,19-23]

In short, perception merely discerns the external world while with-perceiving discerns in view of correct or incorrect conceptions of the nature of the world.

It should be emphasized that with-perceiving is not to be construed as a type of inferring of the external world for Plotinus. Human perception is no more inferential that are the mere discernments of perception alone. The object or correlative of with-perceiving is still the discerned phenomenal thing, just as in the case of perceiving. Human perceptual consciousness is, rather, more complex in structure than being mere discernments of things but it does not follow from this that that whole structure is not itself correlative with the external thing or phenomenal body. Indeed, I would think that this is why Plotinus calls the use of reason alongside of perception with-perceiving. An example of what Plotinus has in mind with with-perceiving might be, in a clear instance, the scientist who, vigilantly observing
something with a wealth of background knowledge or beliefs about
what the external world is really like, about how his test instruments
operate, and so forth, observes things more clearly and more discrimi-
nately than do ordinary perceivers. The scientist and the wiser
ordinary man differ from the naive empiric in the sophistication and
complexity of their observations and not in the nature of his awareness.
In all cases of perception, moreover, the causes of our perceptions
and with-perceptions are the Forms; but the wise man's beliefs, often
mobilized in the form of with-perceiving, articulate the vertical
order (on Plotinus' conception of science) while the empiric's back­
ground beliefs do not, except perhaps by accident.

In section 3 of chapter 3, I distinguished between a categorial
framework for phenomenal bodies (basically, substances and things
concerning substance) and the categorial framework for real explanation
(the Platonic genera). At the time, I was primarily interested in
contrasting a framework which makes a place for horizontal causation
with Plotinus' basic framework for vertical causation and with intro­
ducing why Plotinus takes the latter to be explanatory and the former
not. As a result, however, these two frameworks may have seemed inde­
dendent of one another—perhaps being frameworks for two different sets
of concepts (empirical and intellectual). But this is not the case.
That distinction is consistent with one of the ideas being developed
in this section, that the phenomenal order is derivative from the
noumenal order. The former, phenomenal body framework also turns out
to be derivative upon the latter, noumenal or vertical order framework.
To begin, one might try to unpack the derivative nature of Plotinus' phenomenal body framework by claiming that phenomenal substance and things concerning substance each admit of a genera-species articulation. But it is difficult to see how this approach would avoid the Aristotelian doctrine that Being is "homonymous" or, if you please, ambiguous. Plotinus would then seem to differ from Aristotle only in countenancing Form- or noumenal-Being in addition to substance-Being, quality-Being, quantity-Being, and so on.

The correct approach is suggested by my discussion of undergoings in chapter 3. Coming immediately to the point, the cuts made by differentiation in Plotinus' vertical order are so fine as to account for every difference we would wish to point out in the phenomenal universe. That Socrates is white, for example, must be grounded on some differentiation made in the vertical order, albeit not by a differentiation by phenomenal whiteness as such. In Ennead VI.2.21, Plotinus thus argues that magnitude, quality, quantity, and the rest must "contained in Intellect", "already in bloom", so that

\[ \text{The life of Intellect is intelligent, and its activity (Act) has no failing point; hence it excludes none of the constituents we have discovered within it, each one of which we now see as an intellectual function, and all of them possessed in virtue of its distinctive power and in the mode appropriate to Intellect.} \]

Plotinus' phenomenal body categories are derived from the categories of explanation by systematically abstracting various strands of differentiation from the real order and then taking each of those strands (e.g., the quality-strand) as a distinct hierarchy or category. Aristotelian-type categories are thus abstractions from Being rather
than being homonymous Beings. But the idea that Plotinus' phenomenal body framework is derivative from his framework for real explanation does more than illustrate a thesis of this section. It also provides the means for clarifying how the phenomenal world is derivative from the vertical order, as we shall now see.

Perceptions have two important features for Plotinus. First, they are correlative with perceptual objects and, second, they are caused by intelligibles and not by the phenomenal bodies they discern [see: IV.3.30,14 and I.1.7,11]. If the second feature is ignored, it is natural to suppose that the conceptual nature of perception is nothing more than that of pigeon-holing phenomenal bodies—either in themselves (substantially) or as subjects for things concerning substance (accidentally). As a result, the phenomenal bodies which perceptions pigeon-hole become the causes of the conceptual contents of our discernments. Taking accidental pigeon-holing as the real nature of our concepts is the more misleading of the two since they then do not pigeon-hole even phenomenal bodies tout court but only, in the language of chapter 2, as relative to percipients. As Plotinus puts it, accidental pigeon-holing applies

\[
\text{when we have acted in regard to the base undergoings [sensations]; when we collapse vision, for example, with the conjoint's perception.} \\
[I,1.9,8-11]
\]

Thus, Aristotelian metaphysics not only restricts its inquiry into the nature of our concepts to their perceptual uses but also confuses the sense modalities as modes of perceiving with the sorts of sensations indigenous to the sense organs used by each of them.
Some progress is made, Plotinus maintains, when the empiric realizes that substantival pigeon-holing makes for better and less percipient-relative observation that do accidental ones. Accidental pigeon-holing is a wholly private and non-criticizable matter. Substantival pigeon-holing, in contrast, is more unilluminating than "false". Substances are to-a-percipient in that substantival terms pigeon-hole phenomenal bodies, but at least substantivals do not pigeon-hole them in accordance with our sensations of them as such. But to simply pigeon-hole something as a man, for example, does not tell us anything about what a man is; and insofar as we might return to things concerning substance, we would be back in the to-a-percipient or private order and, hence, would fail to add anything explanatory.

The derivative status of phenomenal body frameworks may be partly summarized by saying that so long as we pay attention only to the phenomenal world, or look to the phenomenal world for truth (recall the Stoics from chapter 1), we cannot learn anything about the universe in itself, or even about our own conceptual order. If we do turn to the phenomenal world for truth, the two most plausible options for a philosopher in Plotinus' day would seem to have to be either a phenomenal hylomorphism or some form of Skepticism. But both of these alternatives, and the moves which lead to them, are based, on Plotinus' view, upon denying that the soul "alone" contributes anything to perception. More precisely, they deny that the conceptual activities in which we use sensations are caused by actual principles rather than by sensations or by phenomenal bodies.
As seen for Plato in chapter 2, perception presupposes concepts for Plotinus, and our concepts are therefore independent of our actually using them to perceive something and of the phenomenal world discerned by means of sensations. As Plotinus sees it, even color concepts are not to be confused with phenomenal color, as the "pigeon-holing" view does in taking phenomena to be the causes of the conceptual natures of perceptions. The roles played by color concepts in our conceptual activities are caused by Intellect and not by sensations or by phenomenal bodies just as much as are any of our other concepts.

Plotinus maintains that our concepts form a system which can be articulated by means of the Platonic genera. The phenomenal body categories of substance and things concerning substance abstract and articulate certain parts of that system—e.g., color concepts as used on sensory occasions (i.e., as things concerning substance). The Plotinian wise-man does not deny the value of perception or of actions to humans or literally live in a different world from the rest of us. Rather, he recognizes the percipient-relative nature of the phenomenal world we discern by means of sensations and that perceptions are really only partial apprehensions of the real order. He does not deny the existence of things which are, relative-to-percepients, spatio-temporal particulars but realizes that those "particulars" are really parts of the eternal vertical order. The Plotinian wise man realizes, as well, that what he articulates by means of the Platonic genera in doing Plotinian science are also the real causes of his concepts. But none of this implies that he will perceive
differently, though his awareness of the causes of the concepts he uses in perception allows him, say, to make finer and more complex or sophisticated discernments in view of the role of with-perceiving. Thus, Plotinus says:

> When the one imagination is in accord with \[\text{symphonei}\] the other, the imaginations are no longer separate. Their images become one. And the one [unsophisticated or empirical imagination] being weaker and the other [real, intellectual imagination] being stronger, the former is like a shadow cast by the latter and like a dimmer light absorbed into a stronger light ... The "two" come into a unity, and the former is borne by [is a crude form of] the latter. For the latter suspends all things from it and the former is a going out of the latter—just as one dismisses those who are of no account in his dealings, at one time being aware of them but now remembering few of them, having been filled with the best.

[IV.3.31,10-21]

The Plotinian wise man or scientist has a view of the universe as, at bottom, an eternal, unchanging copy of principles related to one another generically and specifically (even more "at bottom", of course, as a copy of arithmetical-cum-geometrical principles). In a sense, the wise man does "lose" his relatives and friends; he loses them as particulars in the spatial, temporal, colored, etc. phenomenal world. But he does so by "finding" them in the noumenal universe of Plotinian science. The wise man also realizes that our actual concepts are not determined by the ever-increasing set of sensations which occasion our perceptual uses of them. Our concepts are caused by the intelligibles, the Forms articulated by the Platonic genera. The eternal principles cast things "in a stronger light" by explaining what the empiric can only give a running account of or summary generalization of. Insofar as the empiric seems to succeed in explaining anything, he does so
by presupposing or implicitly using principles. Insofar as the empiric admits this but insists that his principles are not real causes but only, e.g., generalizations from or which cover particular cases, Plotinus would maintain that these so-called principles do not really explain. Principles do not really explain for Plotinus unless they are more concrete than the things they are supposed to explain—i.e., unless the things they are supposed to explain come from or are derivative from them rather than vice versa.
Footnotes: Chapter IV

1 R. Baine Harris, for example, characterizes Soul as "nous in motion", in "A Brief Description of Neoplatonism," Significance, pp. 1-20, p. 5. As Plotinus himself puts it, Soul is "both a rationale and the leader of rationales, those rationales being acting in accordance with actual substance; it is thus the substantial capacity for rationales" [VI.2.5,10]. Or, again:

Soul is a copy of Intellect ... The reality [hypostasis] of Soul is from Intellect and is a rationale which is in actuality through Intellect's "seeing" Soul ... For nothing is between the two [i.e., Intellect and Soul], as they remain in a succession only as a recipient and its form. [V.1.3,7-23]


4 G.J.P. O'Daly, Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self (Irish University Press; Shannon, Ireland, 1973), p. 21.

5 Plotinus begins many of his discussions with a presentation of various alternatives on a given topic and with possible objections to at least some of those alternatives. It is often difficult, at best, to decide which, if any, of these alternatives or arguments Plotinus himself accepts. One must look to the subsequent discussion of Plotinus' own views and see whether Plotinus in fact using one of the initial alternatives (perhaps without recognizing that he is doing so), or else evaluate which alternative (if any) would be consistent with Plotinus' philosophy as a whole. In addition, Plotinus does not always suggest objections to all of the alternatives, which may suggest that he accepts the untouched alternative(s).

For a discussion of the Stoic's notion of total intermixture (antiparektasain or krasis diolou), see: Samburky, Physics, p. 15. Graeser is misled by Plotinus' invoking the Stoic notion and maintains that Plotinus takes the soul to be an immaterial entity which penetrates the body: Andreas Graeser, Plotinus and the Stoics (E.J. Brill; Leiden, 1972), p. 11. In contrast, Plotinus himself takes the notion of the soul intermixing with body to be a matter of the soul using body as
a tool, especially in perception. In the case of perception, it is thus sensation and conception which distinguishes the soul and the body and not, e.g., material substance and immaterial or spiritual substance:

From the Forms, from which the soul alone receives rule over living things, come reasons and opinions and intellects. It is here that "we" are; but since the things discussed earlier [viz., perceptions] are also ours, we must be the "from whence" thing and not be merely placed upon the living thing. Thus, nothing forbids us from calling the entire thing 'the living thing' and saying that the descending part is mixed.

There has been some debate in recent literature over whether or not Plotinus countenances "Forms of individuals" (e.g., of Socrates) in addition to generic and specific Forms. Plotinus' discussions of this issue, primarily in III.4 and V.7.3, are brief and somewhat off-hand. Two possible interpretations of Plotinus' view on this topic are: first, that Plotinus is concerned with having a Formal basis for mere or numerical identity and, second, that he is concerned with having a basis in Soul for individual personality or personhood. The first alternative is argued by John Rist in "Forms of Individuals in Plotinus," Classical Quarterly 13 (1963), 223-231, and by Henry J. Blumenthal in "Did Plotinus Believe in Ideas of Individuals," Phronesis 11 (1966), 61-80. Blumenthal also argues, however, that Plotinus is not consistent on the matter. The second alternative is also argued by Blumenthal in "Does Plotinus," and by Mamo in "Forms of Individuals".

One consequence of the discussion in chapter 3 is that the notion of bare individuality has no place in Plotinus' philosophy. I shall discuss Plotinus' notion of unity or oneness in chapter 5. A similar remark holds for Soul and Mamo's notion of personal identity. I agree with Merlan that what is essential to Soul throughout Plotinus' philosophy is its being produced by the same principles which determine the (noumenal) universe—an idea Merlan traces to Plato's Timeaus: Merlan, Cambridge History, pp. 23-25.

It would be less misleading to express the topic Plotinus addresses which gives rise to the recent literature noted above as "Are there Forms for Socrates, Plato, and so on?" rather than "Are there Forms for Individuals as such?" (Indeed, this way of putting the question is more faithful to Plotinus' own way of framing the issue in the places alluded to above.) And, at least in V.7.3, Plotinus' answer seems to be that there are such Forms because—and in the sense that—every (noumenal) body differs schematically from every other body in some way or other capturable in the vertical order, and that this must be the case even for bodies which we commonly take to be "identical" twins.
Thus, Rist, for example, argues that nature is not a separate hypostasis from Soul, in Plotinus: The Road to Reality (Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. 90-92; and Armstrong adds that nature is just Soul at its "lowest" level of activity, in Cambridge History, p. 254. Unfortunately, Rist also, in the same book, attributes a "material world" to Plotinus (p. 112).

I have already mentioned Plotinus' departure from Plato and Aristotle on the matter of there being a material or physical universe. I shall discuss Plotinus' criticism of Stoic materialism in section 2 of chapter 6.

I am here alluding to one of Plotinus' analogies in which he compares the production of an object of contemplation to a geometer's abstract theorizing about lines when he is engaged in geometrical contemplation [III.8.4,8-11]. The geometer's contemplation of lines in theorizing seems to be contrasted by Plotinus with using actual mental imagery or with actually drawing illustrations as aids.

Berkeley is a good example of a philosopher (indeed, an Empiricist) who denies that we can think abstractly without using specific imagery in an essential way (see: Three Dialogues, p. 34). Plotinus might claim, I think, that imagery is needed only by those who do not fully understand their craft. A person with true understanding and insight (e.g., into geometry) can make all kinds of moves and come up with a number of interesting truths and proofs which need not have occurred by means of imagery at all, much less in a way causative of his conceptions of the objects of his craft.

Similarly, an apprentice shoe-maker may need to visualize and repeat verbally to himself many things about his craft in order to aid his understanding—or, as Plotinus might call it, his ascent from being an unskilled empiric in the making of shoes to being a master craftsman. No such aids are needed, however, by the master craftsman. The master craftsman, who understands the principles or standards of shoe-making, simply makes shoes as he ought and with no special need for imagery about what he is supposed to be doing; he is "as a man possessed", as it were—in particular, possessed by the principles of his craft which are using him as a tool.

That the function of imagination is to produce images or expressions of the Forms is discussed by Wallis in Neoplatonism, p. 80.

Plotinus thus says that perception is "a capacity to grasp, with the impressions occurring in the living thing being the occasions for the perceiving; for the intelligibles are such that a perceiving is their outward-going image" [I.1.17,11-13]. The idea that perception is a special case of intellection is especially argued by Plotinus in Ennead III.8, where he claims that every type of soul is some type of intellection [III.8.8,14].
More generally, Plotinus maintains, "everything, to the extent that it is potentially something, also possesses what it is to be that certain thing actually, such that the capacity is already real and is said to be merely "potential" only relative to that thing" [II.5.4,1-3]. Similarly, Plotinus argues that even in the case of a human craftsman, something may be produced by him only if he possesses something which is unmoved and is that in accordance which he produces something, e.g., by his hands [III.8.2,10-13].

Plotinus thus seems to go even one step further than Augustine. In chapter 1, we saw that Augustine maintains that the notions of error and truth do not apply to sensations or to our sense organs but rather to perceptions. Plotinus, in turn, seems to hold that these notions also do not apply to our mere discernments but to our more complex conceptual activities which accompany our discernments. Of course, Augustine need not be at odds with Plotinus here, as his example of how we conceptually take an oar in water seems more complex than a mere discernment.

In Ennead III.8.2, for example, Plotinus argues that real color is that produced in the contemplative activity of nature rather than that which a human craftsman takes himself to bring to, e.g., painting [III.8.2,5-10].

Stephen MacKenna, trans., Plotinus: The Enneads (Faber and Faber Ltd., 1956), pp. 488-489.

To be sure, they need not be causes in, say, the Lockean sense of literally producing our discernments or sensory ideas but only in the sense that the conceptual content of perception would be determined solely by perception's being correlative with their objects and hence discerning these rather than those things.
The terms 'extreme realism', 'moderate realism', 'conceptualism', 'nominalism' and the like are well-known to historians of philosophy. Historians of Ancient and Hellenistic philosophy has shied away from using these technical terms, but they are widely used in discussions of the many developments and refinements of Hellenistic doctrines in early and later Medieval philosophy. In a strict and, I think, proper sense, these terms apply to theories of general terms. But they are commonly taken thereby to reveal, in some straightforward manner, a philosopher's views on the nature of extra-linguistic reality as well. But by moving so quickly from Logic or philosophy of language to ontology, the historians who use these terms in this way saddle their subjects with views about the relationship between language and extra-linguistic reality which their subjects may not have actually held. Thus, for example, an extreme realist—a philosopher who holds that the semantical functions of general terms cannot be reduced to the semantical functions of individual terms or to the conceptual lives of individual language users—is commonly taken thereby to countenance a class of special entities, to which general terms are taken to bear some sort of referential relation.
The tendency to presume referential theories of meaning (or so-called correspondence theories of truth) and to read ontology or basic entities off linguistic or semantical theory is a conspicuous trait of fairly recent Anglo-American philosophy and is not an obvious feature of any earlier philosophy. The recent views presuppose, for example, that there is a sharp distinction between language and the world which may (perhaps) be found in Descartes but which is not at all obviously found earlier. We have consistently seen with Plotinus, in contrast, that our conceptual activities are determined by principles (rather than by basic entities to which they refer) and that truth is uncovered by articulating, by means of dialectic, the order of principles which our conceptual activities "contain" or presuppose in being what they are (rather than by "seeing" basic entities which our conceptual activities correspond with). The "meanings" and "truth" of our conceptual activities, including our language, can be fully articulated, moreover, only by the full theory of progression which stands to the phenomenal world—including the marks and noises of language—as cause to effect and not as effect to cause.

The import of the Plotinian view of language for Plotinian exegesis can be seen in the picture of Plotinus' progression which may result when the language in question is that of the Enneads themselves. The three hypostases—the One, Intellect and Soul—seem to play somewhat distinct roles in Plotinus' system. There is thus a temptation among Plotinian scholars to use expository language which tempts the
reader to look for new basic entities in Plotinus' universe. Findlay, for example, calls Plotinus' Intellect "mind" and "a thinker". Rist claims that the Forms of Plotinus' Intellect are "thoughts", and Armstrong calls them "entities" of the "immaterial world". Such characterizations seem to take the terms for the hypostases as referring expressions for special entities. Perhaps Plotinian scholars do not intend for their characterizations to be taken in this way, but their choices of words are certainly misleading in this regard.

When Plotinus' progression is taken in this "ontologistic" manner, it becomes unintelligible. Plotinus' hypostases become basic entities which should therefore be independent from one another in an important sense, and each have its own distinct nature apart from the others. A host of mystifying questions follow hard upon such a picture of Plotinus' progression. What sort of entity could effulgerate mind without itself being a mind? What sort of relation could obtain between an entity which is both ineffable—whatever an entity of that "sort" could possibly be to begin with—and is also neither material nor spiritual and a mind-like entity? How could a mind-like entity produce a spiritual entity (Soul), and how could a spiritual entity produce men, trees, etc. in addition just to ideas of men, trees, etc.? And so on; and so on. Shackled with such an interpretation, Plotinus' universe seems replete indeed with ghosts, super-ghosts and non-ghosts, and it is unclear how anything illuminating in the slightest could be said about their relations with one another.
Armstrong is surely on the right track when he claims that

The relationship between the three hypostases in Plotinus is one of hierarchical distinction in unity. They are not cut off from each other.  
[Cambridge History, p. 250]

What is troublesome about this way of putting the relationship between the hypostases, however, is its suggestion that there is an underlying unity or sameness to, and in addition to, the hypostases themselves (including the One itself!), a suggestion which at best seems more suited to an account of Christian Neoplatonist doctrines of the Trinity. A suggestion to the effect that the three hypostases are not "cut off" from one another in the sense that they are really just three different ways of viewing "the same thing" would be troublesome for the same reason, again suggesting that there is some more basic sameness which Plotinus can appeal to, or which it would be useful for us to appeal to for him, which grounds the hypostases in some entity. But as the above questions indicate, it is dubious that such an importation into Plotinus will really clarify his theory of progression and, as I shall argue, Plotinus himself has no such more basic notion.

I shall begin my examination of the nature of Plotinus' hypostases with a discussion of the crucial Plotinian notion of hypostasis itself. What I shall be basically arguing is that the hypostases compose a metaphysical theory about what makes any talk of oneness or sameness possible—and thereby any explanation of the ones and sames we wish to explain (men, etc.)—to begin with and, in so doing, are themselves subject to such talk only in an exegetically useless and metaphorical way. Plotinus' theory of progression is a mapping of the logical
space or presuppositions, as it were, of reality rather than a discovering of basic entities in reality. And the logical space thereby unearthed is "just a matter of language" only in the sense that most of the Enneads are written so as to ground our ordinary talk about things rather than so as to unearth the resources needed for doing rational and structural sciences. But this is a theme discussed in section 1 of chapter 3.
1. Hypostases and Phenomena

The apparatus of referring expressions (e.g., names and definite descriptions) and values of predicates over the basic entities referred to, and its epistemic counterpart of acquaintance and "non-visual seeing" models of cognition, has dominated much of twentieth century Anglo-American philosophy. The gist of my introductory remarks is that this apparatus will not work for explaining Plotinus. It would be better to say that Plotinus' theory of progression is an account of the resources presupposed by meaningful conceptual activity and real explanation. Since they are presupposed by explanation and by a language which people do indeed succeed in communicating with, Plotinus would of course claim without hesitation that the One, Intellect and Soul are "really out there"—indeed, since they are (in Plotinus' sense of 'cause') thus the causes of things, they are more "really out there", or more concrete, than the things which presuppose them. But the further question "But what about their ontology?", or "But how many entities are really out there, and what is the ontological ground for their relations with one another?" is, I have asserted, a bad question on Plotinian grounds. Viewed in this way, Plotinus' insistence upon the One, Intellect and Soul's being hypostases rather than hypokeimena has a point.

'Hypokeimenon' and 'hypostasis' share much of the same meaning: e.g., 'support', 'foundation', 'actual existence'. But, as seen in
section 3 of chapter 3, Plotinus insists upon relegating hypokeimena to metaphysics based upon misusing certain apparent facts about how our conceptual activities function in discerning a phenomenal world. In chapter 4, moreover, we saw that at least one feature of this involves taking material bodies to be the causes of our discernments. Expressed linguistically, this can be seen as a matter of taking the subjects of perceptual reports (e.g., "this man is white", "this is a white man") to be the foundations for the discernments expressed by those reports. As a result, the subjects or *thises* of perception become the foundations of metaphysics and one is off on, for example, the Aristotelian contention, which has baffled so many scholars and philosophers, that particulars (primary substances) seem in one sense to be basic for Aristotle while either form or form and its substrate seem in another sense to be basic for Aristotle.

Plotinus rejects the metaphysical apparatus based upon hypokeimena and argues instead that the foundations of our language and of our universe are the hypostases. Hypokeimena are basic subjects of conceptual activities while hypostases are the principles or real presuppositions which make those activities possible to begin with. The hypostases are, in short, never subjects but always the causes of any alleged subjects we might wish to talk about. In the ambience of the "vulgar" way of expressing Plotinus' progression, the hypostases function *vis a vis* our language so as to provide the resources for talking about subjects at all and thereby (in a manner analogous to perceptual discernment) for our making of those subjects.
Aristotelian hylomorphism maintains that the universe is founded upon a substrate and that "secondary substances" (genera and species, or principles) are abstractions from that universe. On Plotinus' view, the hypostases or principles ordering our makings of our universe are concrete and the products of our makings are abstract. 'Appearance' (phantasia) or 'phenomenal thing' (phantasma) is a principal antonym of 'hypostasis'. To begin discussing Plotinus' notion of hypostasis more directly, I shall begin with the reality/appearance distinction this suggests.

Plotinus maintains that there is no hypostasis in perceptual objects [III.6.12,10], meaning at least in part that perceptual objects belong on the side of appearances rather than on the side of reality. One must be careful in unpacking 'on the side of' here, but at least part of its sense seems to be that things we perceive (men, etc.) are not really colored, textured, in time and so forth for all of the properties we ordinarily ascribe to them, and in the manner we ordinarily conceive of those properties, on the basis of our sensations [see: III.6.12,24]. In chapter 3, for example, we saw that real (what I called 'noumenal') men, etc. are schematizations eternally following from Intellect; and phenomenal men, etc. admit of treatment by means of the orderings of noumenal bodies. As a result, Plotinus' claim that there is no hypostasis in phenomenal bodies (or perceptual objects) cannot be taken to mean that they are wholly unreal. To see this more clearly, consider the following argument.
Bodies are perceptual objects
Perceptual objects are not hypostatic

Bodies are not hypostatic

If Plotinus endorsed this argument, then he would seem to be committed to the further view that hypostatic items must be wholly distinct from bodies. But, though Plotinus would accept the premises of this argument, he would deny that they entail the conclusion. Plotinus would reject this argument because bodies, perceptual objects and hypostases are not basic entities which can be strictly identical or non-identical with one another. As we shall see, we are able to speak about bodies, perceptual objects and the various hypostases as if they were distinct things only by narrowing the context of our discussion to certain features of the progression by taking certain words as basic, which in the full progression are not by themselves basic at all. In reality, a complete articulation of any feature of the progression can be given only in terms of the whole progression. To say something about an item in the progression (e.g., phenomenal bodies), we must always specify the context we are narrowing the discussion to (e.g., to the context of discerning phenomenal bodies alone).

One implication of the discussion of section 3 of chapter 2 is that nothing is a perceptual object in itself but only relative to perceptions or relative to peripient's concepts. As a result, the correct conclusion to be drawn from the premises of the above argument is not 'bodies are not hypostatic' tout court but rather than bodies are not hypostatic qua discerned by means of sensations. The
qualification on this reformulated conclusion narrows the context of discussion to being that of our using sensations, and it brackets from the discussion the individual soul's place in the vertical order insisted upon in section 2 of chapter 4. The presence of 'perceptual object' in the premises indicate this narrowing of the context, and this narrowing of the context must be reflected in the conclusion.

Plotinus claims that *qua* being considered solely as perceptual objects, bodies are images (eidola) or copies (eikōna) rather than originals or archetypes (archetypoi) [see, e.g., VI.4.10]. But, Plotinus continues, this philosophical use of 'copy' and 'original' must be kept distinct from their ordinary use, in which an artist, for example, may be said to make a copy of some original art object. In particular, the ordinary use of these terms suggests that two things are being mentioned, one of them (the copy) being crafted so as to resemble the other thing (the original). We saw Plotinus reject similar implications in the craftsman analogy examined in section 1 of chapter 4, and can expect him to do likewise here.

Plotinus argues that phenomenal copies (images) of the archetypes "cohere with" (synartàæ) rather than resemble their originals, and they do so in a manner more analogous to the way in which we ordinarily take the warmth of a fire to cohere with (literally, "be out there with") the fire. In general, Plotinus explicitly rejects those theories which suggest that

the image need not be knit together with the archetype because images [as ordinarily thought of] are separate from their archetypes. [VI.4.10,1-3]
In Plotinus' vocabulary, we should say that bodies generally are progressions from Intellect, resulting from tracing our talk of men, etc. into the noumenal order of schemata, and are not self-existing or basic entities in their own right. Bodies, in turn, are phenomenal bodies or perceptual objects when our talk of men, etc. is limited to the context of our using sensations in discerning them.

As we have seen, when we move out of the context of perceptual objects relativized to the phenomena of our senses, we find that bodies themselves—bodies as copyings of the order of Intellect which ground our talk of men, etc.—are not colored, textured, in time, basic particulars, and so forth. For clarity, I shall designate perceptual objects considered only in the quasi-Phenomenalist manner of being discerned by means of sensations 'phenomenal*bodies*', and I shall continue to call perceptual objects properly considered in view of their foundations in noumenal bodies, or in view of the place of our discernments in the vertical order of Soul, just 'phenomenal bodies'. My discussion of the above argument may then by summarized by saying that phenomenal*bodies* are not hypostatic but phenomenal bodies are.

In section 2 of chapter 4, I discussed the grounds for colors, textures and the like in Intellect. As for space, Plotinus tells us that the "stretching" of a hypostasis into real things is not a matter of "spread-outness" or extension; rather,

perception, relative to which we normally weigh what we say, says that there is a here and a there, and it is in the "here" and "there" of perception that spread-outness lies. [VI.4.13,1-6]
Time is also not to be found as such on the side of the originals or paradigms (paradigmata) but on the side of the images [III.7.1,18], the images mentioned here again being phenomenal bodies [III.7.11,28]. The archetypes of phenomenal bodies (whether schemata themselves or as foundations for ordering phenomenal bodies) are not in time or in space. In short, they have no spread-outness (diastaton) of any sort [III.7.2,32]. The universe is perceived by us as things related to one another spatially or temporally—as being "here" and "there" and as being in a succession (ephexēs) [III.7.11,38]; but, strictly speaking, there is not such successiveness. Spatiality and temporality thus properly accrue to phenomenal bodies* and not really even to phenomenal bodies properly considered.

Space and time differ as ordering principles for phenomenal bodies* in that spatial orderings occur in perceiving itself while temporal orderings occur in reasoning by means of sensations [III.7.11,39]. The type of reasoning which produces time seems to be what was called 'with-perceiving' in chapter 4, though synaisthesis is not explicitly mentioned here by Plotinus. Thus, if we were capable of mere perception alone, we would still discern a spatial world but not a temporal one. In any event, there would be no space or time for Plotinus were it not for perception's being a mode of partially representing the whole eternal order. Similarly, particularity is also tied by Plotinus to what he calls the 'the this', a this being a subject of perception [VI.6.13].
The hypostatic or real universe is, as noted, not in space or in time for Plotinus. In short, it is not the phenomenal*bodies* of perceptual discernments as such. But, I have claimed, it does not follow from this that the hypostatic universe is distinct from the phenomenal universe. What follows from this, rather, is that the phenomenal*universe* as such has no relations with the hypostases, being an abstraction from the vertical order which narrows the context of discussion so as to leave out all mention of hypostasis. To see how it is that the progression from the One is the most basic context of discussion for Plotinus, rather than some set of basic entities to which Plotinus refers being basic, an analogy will help. The analogy will, first, illustrate the idea that the terms from different abstracted contexts are simply unrelated rather than referring to distinct things and, second, that the theory of progression provides the basic means for talking about the relations between these contexts. The relation of the second point to the first is that the theory of progression does not introduce or presuppose the notion of strict identity or difference for Plotinus. But more on this as I proceed.

Consider the terms 'President [of the United States]' and 'father'. The senses of these terms may each be thought of as primarily dependent upon a certain context or, if you please, language game. The proper context of 'President' is discourse on political systems or government, and that of 'father' is discourse on familial relations or geneology. 'Father' has no use or sense in technical discussions on government, and likewise for 'President' in technical discussions on geneology.
So long as we have only these two distinct contexts to work with, we cannot move from claims about Presidents to claims about fathers and vice versa. We can say in the government context that the President can veto legislation or that the President is a Democrat, but not that the President is the father of Amy Carter. And we can say in the genealogy context that Amy's father is Billy's brother or Lillian's son, but not that Amy's father is the President. Equally important, however, is the fact that, just given the resources of these two distinct contexts, we also cannot say that the President is not Amy's father, and so forth. We can move from claims about Presidents to claims about fathers (or make a single meaningful claim about both) only if these two terms or their contexts are embedded in a third and inclusive context—e.g., the English language. When this embedding has occurred, moreover, we can still say that Amy's father does not veto legislation in virtue of his being a father but only in virtue of being the President. Though the term 'President' may come to have additional or secondary uses in connection with fathers, honorees at baseball games, and so forth, in other words, the primary sense of 'President'—the job it primarily performs—is still in discussing the political office it signifies and the role of that office is still governmental in nature.

Plotinus' distinction between the hypostases and, as well, between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds is the same sort of contextual distinction as that drawn above between the world of government and the world of genealogies or families. But there is a crucial difference
between the sense of 'is' in translating the Plotinianese of the *Enneads* and the sense of 'is' in English as explicated by many twentieth century philosophers which tempers the analogy in an important way. In particular, English is commonly explicated as having the resources for making strict identity and non-identity claims. 'Is' and 'is not' have a use in English commonly unpacked in terms of the '=' and '≠' of technical logic. Moves between the contexts we can isolate in the *Enneads* are made possible by those contexts being embedded in the theory of progression. But unlike English, the Plotinianese of the theory of progression does not introduce the resources for making strict identity and non-identity claims. Plotinus does not have the means for saying, if he wished, that the President is Amy's father in the sense of: the President is strictly identical with Amy's father. That is, he does not have the resources for asserting a sentence with definite descriptions which co-refer to some basic entity named by the logically proper name 'Jimmy Carter'.

The foregoing discussion emphasizes the fact that Plotinus does not take language to include basic referring expressions but rather that language is meaningful (or, in the ambience of chapter 1, is assertible) in view of the principles of the theory of progression. In the theory of progression, Intellect proceeds from the One by means of the Platonic genera, Soul proceeds from Intellect as a further Motion and the world of phenomenal bodies is a final product resulting from taking noumenal organs as ordering sensations for use by individual souls. Finally, narrowing the context of discussion to exclude...
individual souls' places in the vertical order, we have the phenomenal* world* which I have said is not hypostatic for Plotinus. And one im­portant implication of distinguishing perceptual objects construed as phenomenal*bodies* and perceptual objects construed as phenomenal bodies properly considered is that the former are private to percipients while the latter are not. In general, a hypostatic world must be the same for everyone while the phenomenal*world* is not the same for everyone. Everyone has a different phenomenal*world*, but we all share the same hypostatic world.

I have been arguing, however, that Plotinian sameness and differ­ence are not strict identity and non-identity. The difference or pri­vacy of each percipient's phenomenal*world* is to be unpacked for Plotinus in terms of each percipient's using different sensations, where 'different sensations' is also not to be read as 'strictly non­identical sensations' (as, say, a sense-datum philosopher might read it), but in terms of noumenal differences in each percipient's noumenal body. The privacy of our phenomenal*worlds* is thus to be unpacked in terms of each person's having his/her own bag of noumenal sense organs. We can then say that the hypostases are public because we do not apprehend them by means of our private bag of sense organs but by means of other, public methods of inquiry—viz., dialectic or Plotinian science. And the need for some such notion as a public mode of inquiry in order to unpack Plotinus' account of human knowledge becomes apparent when it is noted, first, that Plotinus does not have a "non-visual seeing" view of the nature of intellectual apprehension.
and, second, that his primary concern is to get at "in itself's" (things kath' auto) in contrast with relative-to's—e.g., things relative to percipients. The first point was discussed at length in chapter 4 and the second was made in chapter 2 for Plato and will be one of the primary topics of section 2 of this chapter.

An important feature of the foregoing is that while the phenomenal-world is to be sharply contrasted with the hypostases, the phenomenal world is not. The phenomenal world does differ from the hypostases proper in that the latter are articulated by means of dialectic (and, most basically, of course, by means of arithmetical sciences) while the former is discerned by means of sensations. When the role of the individual soul in the vertical order is properly understood, however, it is seen that the phenomenal world is in fact "supported by" or "founded upon" the hypostases—in the Plotian metaphors seen in chapter 4, it is "cast in a stronger light". When we broaden the context from the phenomenal-world and understand how it is that perception presupposes the progression (e.g., as Augustine does in Against the Academics), we see that perception is "trustworthy" or well founded. In the course of arguing in Ennead VI.5 that the hypostases are entirely present to and are not separated from one another or from the phenomenal world, Plotinus thus claims that

if these claims do not hold, then the doctrine of the untrustworthy thing [aristoumenon] within the complete nature of man would hold,

[VI.5.4,11]

where the untrustworthy thing mentioned here is perception as construed by certain Skeptics (in effect, perception as being just of phenomenal*
bodies*). I shall discuss this point about the trustworthiness of perception at greater length in section 2. I shall now close this section by casting Plotinus' theory of progression in terms based upon the main discussion of this section, that concerning the nature of sameness or oneness for Plotinus.

For Plotinus, the knowables are Forms or archetypes (schemata) and not phenomenal bodies as such and the Forms are articulated by means of dialectic, schemata being articulated in the public inquiries of the rational (structural) sciences. Earlier I noted (in chapter 3, note 9) that, unlike Aristotle, Plotinus does not hold that perceptibles and knowables (or intelligibles) are prior to perceptions and knowledge (or "grasping intellectually"). Something is a perceptible or a knowable for Plotinus only qua being considered in a certain context—i.e., only qua considered relative to perceptions or relative to knowledge. Perceptibles thus differ from knowables as objects for different modes of apprehension, the point about knowables and dialectic holding derivatively for noumenal bodies as well. We cannot claim for Plotinus that the knowables are basic, logical subjects which are strictly non-identical from other basic, logical subjects—e.g., those of perceptual discourse. Of course, Plotinus likewise has no resources for saying that they are not non-identical (i.e., that they are strictly identical). Rather, the hypostases and phenomenal bodies are "knit together" in the sense of following from one another in the logical-cum-metaphysical space of the progression. Plotinus' more famous analogy for this progression is that of light from its
source. Another is the analogy of the actually drawn parts of circles and the rationally discerned natures of circles. This second analogy will be discussed at the end of this chapter.

The most obvious place to look for a precise conception of strict identity in the Enneads is, of course, in Plotinus' use of 'one' and of 'same', especially in Ennead VI. Unfortunately, neither of these terms plays such a role for Plotinus. 'Same' connotes what is generic or more primitive relative to differents—e.g., in my "vulgar" convention, ANIMAL is the sameness of MAN and HORSE, or MAN is the same as HORSE in virtue of ANIMAL. 'One' also does not have the sense of 'strictly identical' for Plotinus. Plotinus' use of 'one' does allow us to say that a Form is one or that a soul is one or that a phenomenal body is one and, as well, that a number of phenomenal* bodies* are one phenomenal body or that a number of "Partial Beings" (Forms abstracted from their place in the structure of Intellect) are one Form, and so forth. But one must ask in each case for Plotinus: what sort of one? Suppose we say that the President is one with Amy's father. Does this mean, we must ask in the Plotinian spirit, that they are one as men? One as being Jimmy Carter? One as being friends? Or what? Plotinus' notion of oneness, in short, says something positive only by means of Being [see: VI.2.6,13-20]. One by itself is not any sort of one at all, much less a one of strict identity. And when we move to sorts of ones for Plotinus, we must do so by means of Being (or sames and differents) and again not by moving to self-identical objects of reference.
We can move from the basic but wholly indeterminate notion of oneness to determinate ones for Plotinus only by means of Being. In the theory of the progression, this is expressed by the fact that Intellect eternally follows from the One and that the One progresses only by means of Intellect; and the One progresses down from Intellect only by the further means of Soul. A product of Soul—in reality, an ordering abstracted from Intellect's activity so as to ground our ordinary terms—may be designated as a this-F. A this-F, taken in its most restrictive context to be a phenomenal*body*, is private but its F-ness is not. The F-ness even of phenomenal*bodies* is not itself a phenomenal*body* but a Form using an individual soul to make a phenomenal body. In sum, the hypostasis Soul is Intellect qua producing "others". In their most restrictive form, "others" are the mere subjects or thises which sensations make possible for us to discern. But we in fact do not discern mere thises but this-F's. In this progression, Soul may be designated as the F-ness of this-F's, the view that the essence or basic reference of phenomenal body talk is a hypokeimenon or mere subject resulting from severely restricting the context of discourse and taking ourselves to thereby discover a truth of metaphysics.

Three sorts of designations may thus be made for Plotinus—e.g., MAN (a Form), this-man (an "other", either a phenomenal man or a noumenal man) and the MAN of this-man (a soul). That the last (soul) is clearly hypostatic—i.e., mentions a principle presupposed by our phenomenal world and which makes talk of that phenomenal world possible—
is represented by the fact that it partially mentions a Form. As Plotinus has it, Soul is hypostatic because it receives its resources or principles from Intellect. And Soul ultimately receives its "manyness", on the other hand, from phenomenal bodies, phenomenal bodies considered solely as relative to the many sensations we use in perception. But the manyness of phenomenal bodies is not causal, as sensations are mere tools for discerning phenomenal bodies; phenomenal bodies are abstractions from what really occurs in perception itself (we might call them 'sensory objects', in contrast with fully-fledged perceptual objects).

Intellect's progression to the phenomenal world by means of individual souls may be represented "horizontally" by invoking something like Plato's Theaetetus account, discussed in chapter 2. On such an account, perceptions use sensations to perceive the physical causes of sensation. Plotinus, in contrast, distinguishes between noumenal bodies and phenomenal bodies and maintains that sensations have a noumenal foundation in certain orderings of noumenal bodies and are not really caused by any physical things. For Plotinus, this-F's are noumenal or phenomenal bodies while for Plato they are real physical things in his receptacle. And bodies in general result from using the words we normally use as sortals or as names for sortal things (men, trees, etc.) for the noumenal orderings of Soul. Viewing this use of words as grounded in the progression from the One, we may call this-F's 'terminal suches'. That is, we move to the this-F context and thereby abstract bodies from the orderings of Soul when we wish to make
partial or incomplete articulations of Being or *suches*—e.g., in the
representations by percipients or in the noumenal foundations for
those representations—seem complete. The paradigm case of terminal
*suches* is thus phenomenal body, where a complete Form (e.g., *MAN*) acts
by means of individual soul and by using sensations to discern a
phenomenal man.

But even in dialectic, we might move to *this-F's* and we may do
so even when we are not merely casting the objects of dialectic in
words which ground phenomenal bodies in a straightforward way. Thus,
we might terminate a partial articulation of the vertical order by
saying "*MAN* is the same as *HORSE* in virtue of *ANIMAL* ... and *this-man*
is just a different from *that-man*". More basically, however, *this-F's*
result from viewing Soul as terminating the causal order of the Forms,
first, in an order of *this-F's* which copies or mimics Intellect and,
second, in the representations those noumenal copyings make possible
(phenomenal bodies). By viewing the vertical order in *this-F* terms,
we thereby ground our ordinary beliefs that there are individual men,
individual trees, and so forth though, ultimately for Plotinus, this
is just the manner in which we use language along with the vertical
activity of perceiving and does not yield a distinct set of basic
entities from the vertical order of the Forms.

In sum, phenomenal bodies are intelligible in virtue of Soul and
its causes. But to treat phenomenal bodies as intelligible is to view
them against a background of the progression and not as distinct from
it (e.g., as phenomenal*bones*). Thus, to move from perception to
intellection (or to doing dialectic) is not a matter of changing entities but is, at bottom, a matter of changing the tools used in our conceptual activities. In dialectic, we move from discerning the universe by means of sensations to articulating the underlying principles of our ordinary, this-such talk by means of the methodology prescribed by the Platonic genera. I shall return to the idea that this-F's (and as well the sortals of our ordinary world) are a matter of using language—more generally, conceptual abilities—in a particular way rather than a matter of referring to some basic entities in chapter 6.
2. The One, the Many and the One-over-many

In this section, I shall discuss in more detail and with text the relationship between Intellect and perceptual objects and the sense in which things may be said to be ones or sames for Plotinus. Textually, I shall focus on Ennead VI, treatises 4 and 5. The title of both treatises is "On Being's being One and the Same and everywhere whole". Plotinus' main contention in these treatises is that the progression of Intellect and Soul is needed in order to account for how it is that out of many sensations we are able to discern ones and sames and that, as a result, phenomenal bodies do have a place in the vertical order—they are intelligible. As a further result, moreover, sameness of phenomenal bodies (and bodies generally) is derivative from sameness in the intelligible order of the Forms. And this holds for all sameness claims concerning phenomenal bodies, both claims where we wish to say that the objects discerned by two percipients are the same object (e.g., Socrates) as well as claims where we wish to say that the objects discerned by two percipients are the same sort of object (e.g., men). In short, there is no difference in kind between sameness claims made by using what are commonly taken to be basic referring expressions (e.g., proper names or definite descriptions) and sameness claims made by using general terms or predicates.
Plotinus echoes part of the title of these treatises at the beginning of treatise 4, chapter 7, where he asks: "How can the Same be over all things?" This question is immediately restated by Plotinus, however, as: "How can each of the manies of perception be sames?" The topic of these treatises arises for Plotinus, in other words, because of the "manyness of perception" and a need to account for how those manies can also be sames.

Plotinus' concern with the manies of perception can be clarified in terms of the distinction drawn in section 1 of this chapter between phenomenal bodies properly considered and phenomenal*bodies*. As Plotinus sees it, we do not perceive things as manies but as ones or sames. That is, despite the fact that I perceive the marks on this page by means of different sensations from the ones you use in perceiving them, we nevertheless take ourselves to perceiving the same thing(s)— viz., a set of marks on a sheet of paper. I do not perceive them as a set of marks private to me and you do not perceive them as a set of marks private to you. We both perceive a same. Likewise, I do not perceive one set of marks by means of the color-sensations I am having and another set of marks by means of the shape-sensations I am having. I am perceiving the same thing—a set of marks on a sheet of paper—by means of both of these sets of sensations.

Perceptual objects are manies for Plotinus in that, if we limit the context of discussion to the sensations we use alone, there would be as many perceptual objects as there are uses of sensations or sensations used. In section 1, I called perceptual objects limited
in this way 'phenomenal* bodies*'. But we do not perceive phenomenal* bodies* but sames, and the reason for this is found in the resources individual souls bring to bear in using sensations, those resources ultimately being the Forms in Intellect themselves. But if we do not recognize the presence of these resources to soul, then we cannot say, e.g., that I am now perceiving the same chair that I perceived yesterday or that you and I are now perceiving the same chair or that we are perceiving something different from what Jones is perceiving (say, a mongoose in India).

The issues engendered by the manies of perception (i.e., perceptual objects narrowly construed as phenomenal* bodies*) play a major role in Plotinus' thought. Indeed, Plotinus takes the so-called one-over-many problem, which is commonly taken to lie at the heart of Platonism, to be a question of how the manies of perception can be ones. Plotinus' full answer to this question relies upon the claims, first, that something can be both one in itself (kath' auto) and many when considered in accordance with accidents (kata symbebêkota) and, second, that perceptual objects are manies when considered in accordance with accidents only (or accidentaly); in themselves, they are ones. These two claims imply, further, that perceptual objects really are ones and that they seem to be manies only insofar as our sensations are taken to be causative of what we perceive. Sensations are not causes but tools used by individual souls in their making phenomenal bodies, and so the fact that we use many sensations in discerning phenomenal bodies does not result in a real multiplicity
in the phenomenal world. Hence,

[The One] is not really divided into many by means of the things just asked about [viz., the manies of perception]. Rather, the many divided things everywhere gather into the One.

[VI.4.7,4-6]

And Plotinus emphasizes that the apparent manyness of perceptual objects when too narrowly construed is due to our using many sensations in discerning them as follows.

When you say that the One is in many, you are not saying that it actually becomes many but rather than we are relating the undergoings-of-many to that One because we see it in many.

[VI.4.8,22-25]

The undergoings mentioned here are sensations and the manies which they are said to be of are phenomenal\*bodies\* (or sensory objects). And Plotinus is claiming that the idea that the One is actually in a many at all arises from taking the diversity of sensations as basic in explicating what we perceive. But Plotinus maintains, as we saw in chapter 1 for Augustine, that what we perceive is determined by the concepts used by the soul and not by sensations used by the soul when it discerns things. Thus, Plotinus argues,\(^ \text{10} \)

when the perceptions are [said to be] different ones, the undergoings are the differenters actually being spoken about.

[VI.4.6,7-8]

Or, in short, "the manies come about from the things of accidents" [VI.5.3,25]; and perceptual objects are "things of accidents" only when their noumenal foundations are left out of account and their essence is taken to be that of phenomenal\*bodies\*. 
One way in which sensations render perceptual objects manies is, of course, in that we may have different types of sensations of them—visual, auditory, color, shape, etc. In a more basic way, however, sensations also render perceptual objects manies even when many eyes have looked towards the same thing and have each been filled with the sight of it. [VI.4.12,5]

But Plotinus maintains that this more basic sense is not one which really renders perceptual objects manies at all but merely calls attention to the fact that the soul uses different sensations—both different types of sensations and different sensations of the same type—to discern its phenomenal world of men, trees, etc.

This last passage also brings us to the second main topic of this section, however, as the question may arise: In what sense can various percipients be said to look at the same thing, or at one thing? In section 1 of this chapter, I argued that the sense of sameness here cannot be taken in a strict identity sense—e.g., as claiming that various percipients may use language (overtly or covertly) to refer to one basic entity or logically proper subject. Rather, Plotinus' ultimate answer to the question must be cast in terms of the theory of progression. On the theory of progression, the One progresses only by means of Being. Thus, things which are many *qua* phenomenal* bodies* can also be one or the same only in virtue of some Form or Being. Plotinus expresses the relationship between perceptual objects properly considered and Being and the One as follows.
The Being is not separated off from the One. Wherever there is Being, the One is itself present in it. The One, in fact, is Being considered alone, by itself ... Moreover, perceptual objects are present in intelligible objects in that perceptual objects are present by means of Sames and within Sames, and so intelligible objects are also present in a way in perceptual objects.

[VI.4.12,16-23]

As a result, Plotinus argues that

the thing of becoming [i.e., the perceptual object] has a Form completely in it, but [as a phenomenal body] it has it in accordance with accidents.

[VI.4.3,12]

Plotinus' theory of progression maintains, in short, that things which are distinct as phenomenal bodies may be ones in virtue of also being intelligible sames, their being intelligible sames obtaining when considered in their proper place in the theory of progression.

The only technically precise notion of oneness or sameness in the Enneads is one-in-Being or same-in-Being—as in claiming, for example, that the object I am perceiving and the object you are perceiving are the same through MAN. Moreover, the distinguishing feature of a public or hypostatic context for Plotinus is that it is not dependent upon sensations as such. Plotinus thus construes the "freeing of the soul from the body" as, at least initially, a matter of realizing that the spatial, temporal and other accidents we normally take to delimitate real things apply only to phenomenal or partial copies of the real universe. The real universe is the world of "purely intellectual objects wherein nothing is separated off from the Same and all is relative to the Same" rather than relative to percipients.

[VI.4.16,41-45]. Moreover, our ordinary, empirical beliefs about the
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nature of the universe do not result from the fact that intelligibles are inaccessible to us but simply from the fact that we ordinarily (and mistakenly) "place Being in the perceptual object and we also place the entire thing [i.e., all there is to the universe] there" [VI.4.2,26-28]. Further development of these views on the relationship between intelligibles and perceptual objects will also help unpack what is perhaps the most troublesome part of Plotinus' topic in Ennead 4 and 5, the sense in which Being (Intellect) is "everywhere whole" for Plotinus.

The hypostatic universe—what Plotinus also calls 'the true all' [VI.4.2,1-3]—is not in space and time. It is thus not a whole in any sense of the term which we normally associate with spatio-temporal things as such. The hypostatic universe is not, for example, a collection of distinct particulars (like an army) or a whole constructed out of particulars as parts (like a house). Nor is the notion of numerical distinctness or unity applicable to the Forms—though, in their most proper form, they are pure numbers themselves. Strictly speaking, being one in number (rather than being a one of the Numbers) may at most be ascribed to Intellect as a whole—and even then in a way derivative from Intellect's entirety and not vice versa:

The Same is one in number in its entirety. But it is not a one made up of divided things. It is rather [one in number in that it is] always an entirety.
[VI.4.12,49-50]

Moreover, since Being is not in space, it makes no sense to talk about its literally being anywhere at all in any ordinary sense. We tend to think of Intellect in spatial terms because we ordinarily look for
Being in perceptual objects as such. In what sense, then, is Being "everywhere" and "whole" for Plotinus? The answer to this question lies in Plotinus' claim that a Being is the Being it is only relative to the whole of Intellect, or through its being in accordance with the whole (kath' olou) [VI.5.6]. In unpacking this claim, I shall exclusively use the "vulgar" presentation of Intellect as Beings—MAN, ANIMAL, etc.

The entirety of Intellect may be conceived of as the progression of the One through a hierarchy of Beings—i.e., through sames (genera) and differents (species). Being becomes more and more specific as one progresses down the hierarchy until one reaches a level of differentiation which corresponds in specificity to the most specific (and complex) orderings made by the world soul—viz., those things which we commonly attribute proper names to in their phenomenal representations. To say that the lowest level in the hierarchy "corresponds with" noumenal particulars (as we might call them) does not imply that it is non-identical from them by only that qua being Forms the lowest-level species are not noumenal bodies. Of course, we have also seen that we also cannot say that it is strictly identical with noumenal particulars; neither strict identity or non-identity claims are appropriate in explicating Plotinus' philosophy. We are not here concerned with precisely what the relationship is between the "uncutables" and noumenal particulars, however, but with understanding Intellect's "entirety". And the first thing we have now seen is that Intellect's entirety is such that it proceeds from One-Being to a
"most complex" level indeed. In chapter 3, moreover, we also saw that sames and differents are correlatives. Every genus depends for its Being upon its species (plural) and vice versa. Every Form thus depends for its existence as a Being upon its generic and/or specific place in the hierarchy proceeding from the One by means of the Platonic genera.

A Form is not self-sufficient for Plotinus. It is "only in the whole that Beings come to be" [VI.4.2, 22]. Plotinus calls a Form abstractively considered apart from other Forms only a "partial Being", as the Forms are in reality not "separated or cut off from" each other or from Intellect but are essentially "Beings of the whole" [VI.4.14, 26]. Suppose, for an illustration, that the Form of men (call it 'MAN') is an uncuttable or lowest level species. To fully specify what MAN is, one must first specify the species which MAN is a different from and the genus in virtue of which MAN and its differents are the same. But in order to fully specify that genus, one must specify the Form which is its different and the genus of those differents. In fully specifying the Form which, say, ANIMAL is a different from, moreover, one must also specify that Form's differents (species). And so on; and so on. Hence, in making one's specification of any given Form complete, he must not only proceed all the way up the hierarchy from the Form, but, as he is doing so, he must also completely fill in all of the branches leading back down to the uncuttable level, so that the entire hierarchy must always be articulated.
To fully specify a Form, in short, one must specify its relative position within the entire hierarchy of Intellect. Thus, the Form or lowest level species corresponding with any given "particular" is the Form it is in virtue of its relative position within the whole of Intellect. The whole of Intellect may thus be said to be "everywhere" in that every spatio-temporal, phenomenal body has a Form which exists as a Form only relative to its noumenal relationships to every other Form. This accounts for the "omnipresence" of Intellect, and it may also be unpacked on the side of our perceptions rather than on the side of the things we discern. Suppose, that is, that one perceives something as a man. The "everywhere whole" doctrine of Intellect claims that, without benefit of any further sensory undergoings, the soul can make conceptual moves to any same or different in Intellect, and reason that the perceptual object in question is also an animal, is not a plant, and so on, and so on. And the reason why one can make such moves is, of course, that perception is not distinct from intellection but is a special case of it.

Plotinus' discussion in Ennead VI.4&5 begins with the manies of perception and argues that these manies can also be ones or sames only if they also have Forms "completely in them" [VI.4.3], or are also intelligibles [VI.4.12]. A corollary of this claim, moreover, is that Intellect is "everywhere" and "whole" when considered as the intelligibility of the spatio-temporal bodies we discern by means of sensations. As a second corollary, Plotinus also claims that his theory vindicates the trustworthiness of perception [VI.5.4,11].
Plotinus does not seem to be concerned with whether or not we ever make mistakes in perception; he is not maintaining that perception is infallible. It follows from the discussion leading up to his claim of trustworthiness that perception is trustworthy in the sense that it is a bona fide intellectual activity—i.e., that its causes are the Forms and that its objects are in fact intelligibles. Since Intellect is "everywhere whole", for example, perception is trustworthy in that if it discerns, say, a man, then it must be discerning an animal, it must not be discerning a horse, and so on, and so on. But it does not follow from this—and nor is there evidence that Plotinus thought it did—that the antecedent of this conditional is true. (We would, of course, be here discussing human perceptual consciousness, for, as seen in section 2 of chapter 4, the proper thing to say about mere or brute perception is that it is neither veridical nor non-veridical; it is just naturally what it is, and only in this sense is it necessarily "veridical".) Qua being relative-to-a-percipient, the external thing must be a man if it is discerned as such. But when considered in the noumenal macrocosm, which we try to articulate and apply to the phenomenal world in with-perceiving, the phenomenal body in question might be a horse or a dog rather than a man.

Perception seems to be "trustworthy" for Plotinus in a sense similar to the sense in which the so-called Probabilistic Skeptics discussed in chapter 1 hold that perception is a "probable" or "truth-like" activity—viz., in that its causes are the real explanatory ones
(the Forms) and not sensations or phenomenal bodies. Perception may also be said to be trustworthy, then, in that the types of discernments made in perception "cut nature at its joints" (to use Plato's phrase). I may be mistaken, so far as other percipients and so far as what my with-perceiving articulates about the real order are concerned, in discerning something as a man, but I am not mistaken in believing that there are at least men to be discerned—or at least I am not mistaken insofar I have my own conceptual order and discernments right when I express in language that there are men. The fact that I never discern anything as a unicorn in perception or that people now generally agree that no one has ever really discerned witches, in contrast, is evidence that there are no unicorns or witches—i.e., that there is no Form UNICORN or Form WITCH which could cause a discernment of an unicorn or of a witch. An empirical scientist's reliance on what we perceive would thus not be wholly off target for Plotinus as I read him. What would be off target for Plotinus would be the concept empiricist's or the Aristotelian empiricist's account of why experience can by used as evidence for what is real by us.

Perception can count as evidence for what is real or, more generally, for theory, on Plotinus' view, because perceptions are effects of the vertical order. The justifications for our experiences are not found in experience itself—e.g., in Lewis' sensory givens (discussed in chapter 1). One way to decide what discernments are warranted would be in reflecting upon what concepts are available to us for use in perception.\footnote{11} We reach the conclusion that no one has ever really
perceived a witch, for example, through conceptual analysis of what sorts of things are available for being perceived in the first place and not by paying closer attention to the phenomena of sense (or to some phenomenal bodies). Our present-day understanding of the vertical order has it that there is no Form WITCH and, hence, that no one could ever perceive or have really perceived one.

Insofar as perceptual objects are private, they cannot serve, on Plotinus' view, as objects for serious science. In chapter 2, for example, we saw Plato claiming that in order for something to be an object of science we must (at least as a necessary condition) be able to "sit in judgment on" another's discernment of it—i.e., we must be able to publicly criticize each other's beliefs about it. Perception is also trustworthy for Plotinus in that it can submit to public scrutiny since we discern phenomenal ones and sames rather than phenomenal bodies.

This returns us to a theme of chapter 4, that the Platonic genera are the principles operative even in the phenomenal order for Plotinus. (Phenomenal) substances and things concerning substance are abstractions which apply to bodies qua being to-a-percipient or qua being the subject which is to-a-percipient. Each percipient is alone qualified to pass judgment on things as they are relative to him. But the same does not apply to Being. Critical discussion can go on about perceptual objects because Aristotelian-type frameworks are ultimately misguided even as explanatory frameworks for phenomenal bodies. We discern something as a man or as a white thing, for example,
and not as the-subject-relative-to-this-perception or as the-color-of-the-subject/etc. In short, phenomenal bodies are private when narrowly construed as phenomenal*bodies*, but we do not perceive them as private, phenomenal*bodies* but as ones or sames, and in so doing we thereby lay our perceptual discernments open to public criticism. When a percipient ordinarily moves to a this-such term (e.g., 'this-man'), he does not thereby distinguish his perception as a special or sui generis mode of apprehension from his other conceptual activities but merely puts an end to (terminates) public discussion of his perceptual world—as in "maybe you take yourself to be perceiving something which is yellow but this is white!" or "maybe the man you are perceiving is yellow but this-man is white!" or "maybe you take yourself to be perceiving a dog but this is a man!" ... end of rational discussion.12

In more general terms for Plotinus, notions like this, here and now function to relativize phenomenal bodies to the sensations by means of which we discern them but not to articulate any of the conceptual content of our perceptions themselves. The discernment performed on a sensory occasion is caused by, say, MAN for Plotinus and not by an Aristotelian or a spatio-temporal material body. When the sensations by means of which you discern a man and the sensations by means of which I discern a man are disregarded, one can say that you and I are making the same discernment (or are using the same concept). Relative to the concepts used in perception, phenomenal bodies are public.

The general ability to conceptually inform all of the activities of individual souls with Beings or Sames is called 'rationality'
(logismos) by Plotinus. Using the notion of rationality to unpack the real, public character of perception, Plotinus says that whenever perceptions are [said to be] different perceptions, it is the undergoings which are the differents actually being talked about ... For what reason, then, is it that a different is not always perceived in every different discernment? The reason is that the discernment is not the undergoing ... That is, the reason is just that the eye, for example, never speaks to us by means of the ear and nor is the ear [or the eye] together with the thing actually being discerned. For rationality is above both [sense organs].

[VI.4.6,7-11]

The problem with the manies of perception is not that phenomenal bodies are in fact manines or even that we apprehend them as manies (whatever that would be). Indeed, we in fact do perceives sames and ones and not manies. The problem is rather that perception itself is such that a percipient is not aware of the real causes of his discerning sames and ones. He normally thinks that he is perceiving sames and ones because his eyes and ears "speak" to him of perduring physical things which his organs seem to be "together with". That is, he normally thinks that phenomenal bodies are real, independently existing things which cause us to discern them as sames and ones by means of our sensations. But the rational man will soon realize—perhaps by the futility of trying to reach public agreement on purely empirical grounds or by reading a Skeptic—that phenomenal bodies (i.e., physical things) are not real explanatory causes. The causes of our perceiving phenomenal bodies as sames rather than as manies are not to be found in sensations or in physical things but it public criticism (dialectic) and thereby in the Forms. It is the vertical
causes of our discernments which are "together with" the actual object rather than our sense organs being "together with" them, and one final way of emphasizing this is to recall the ultimate unreality of individual souls for Plotinus. Thus, in section 1 of chapter 4, we saw that the only real craftsman in Plotinus' universe is always Intellect. As a result, while in Kant the "transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions, and consequently also of the concepts of objects in general, and so of all objects of experience" is still a concrete self—albeit a concrete self "as an intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of combination" [Crit., p. 169], in Plotinus the transcendental unity of all our consciousness would be just Intellect itself. In Plotinus' words:

we are not separate from Being but are in it, and nor is Being separate from us, because all Being is One.

[VI.5.1,25]

If sameness-in-Being (generic or specific sameness) is also the only positive notion of oneness in the Enneads, then one might wonder about the sense in which the One and Intellect are "two" hypostases and not just one. This issue can be broached by focusing upon the contextual nature of Plotinus' hypostases and his claim that "the One is in fact Being itself, alone" [VI.4.12,18]. To understand what the One context deals with in the Enneads, in short, one must ask what "Being by itself" or "alone" contrasts with for Plotinus.

The most plausible contrast for "by itself" is always "relative to something" for Plotinus. Bodies, which by themselves are copyings of the order of the schemata, for example, contrast with bodies which
qua being relative to percipients are in space, in time, and so on.

Now Plotinus claims that Being is, qua intelligible, relative to the whole of Intellect [V.5.6]. As Intellect, that is, Being is (construed in the "vulgar" manner) a hierarchy of genera and species. Being by itself, in contrast, is not such an exfoliated hierarchy; the actual hierarchy idea is a progression from Intellect considered just by itself. Being by itself may thus be contrasted with the progressive, complex articulations of Being which occur in the context of intelligibles. Conversely, Plotinus moves from the One to Intellect by imposing the same-different game upon it, as prescribed by the Platonic genera.

The hypostatic or public character of Intellect depends for Plotinus upon there being the One to articulate or progress from. Thus, sameness-in-Being is the only positive notion of oneness found in the Enneads, but the hypostatic or public character of that notion depends upon the prior, albeit wholly vague, notion of there just being a public world independent of any positive conception of it. Plotinus thus assesses his highest or "most hypostatic" hypostasis, the One, of which Intellect and Soul are articulations or progressions, as follows.

Because of [the One], life [i.e., Soul] endures, Intellect endures, and the Beings have stood in their eternity. Nothing changes it, nor does anything divert it or disturb it. Nor is there any Being next to the One which could impinge upon it. If there were something in addition to it, it would have to be from it. And if there were something contrary to it, the One would remain unaffected by it. For if this alleged contrary were not Being, it could not make Being. Rather, there would have to be another, prior to the
One and common to both it and to its alleged contrary—and that would then be Being. On account of this, Parmenides correctly said "Being" for "One". And the One is thus unaffected—not because of some other's solitude, but because the One is Being. For in virtue of this [i.e., the One's being Being] alone, whatever is is from the One. For how could any Being—or anything else whatsoever which is in actuality and which is from it—be denied of the One? For as long as the One is, it commands. And it is eternally. Hence, so are those things [which it commands]... and so it is with every soul and all of Intellect. The One is that which is. For the One is sufficient, by itself.

[VI.6.18,35-53]

We can now bring this chapter to a close. Plotinus' solution to the question of how the manies of perception can be sames—i.e., the one-over-many issue—is that the causes of our perceptual discernments are not "given" in perception itself but require reasoning or dialectic for their articulation. Our sensations thus do not really cause the things we perceive to be manies at all, though we might mistakenly think that they do. Phenomenal bodies are manies only relative to the sensations we use in discerning them (only as phenomenal bodies*). So far as our perceptual discernments as such are concerned, phenomenal bodies are sames and ones—albeit only partially apprehended sames and ones.

The one-over-many issue may also be broached for Plotinus by noting that perceptual uses of our concepts presuppose the concepts used and do not add anything to the conceptual nature of our concepts or our uses of them. The public nature of our concepts and of the intelligibles which cause them presuppose, in turn, the basic though vague notion of publicity or "mere oneness". We can thus also get at the basicness of the One, and the nature of that basicness, through
the nature of Soul.

Soul is the reasoning [τελειος λογίμος] about correct and beautiful things. But in order for reasoning to show something to be correct and beautiful [i.e., intelligible], there must also be—and have already stood—something correct which comes to be through soul and which reasoning is about. Thus, in order for soul to reason about these things—that they are and are not [e.g., that men are animals, that men are not plants, etc.]; there must be, in addition to reasoning, things which eternally are such that reason is also Intellect-in-us. And so there must also be the source and cause and God of Intellect, which functions not by actually doling out Intellect but by maintaining it—and not by maintaining it as in space. Thus, in the many, contemplating is just the receiving of the powers individualistically, as another same. For an analogy: a center of a circle is in itself yet it also has in it every mark which might be drawn in the circle such that lines which are actually drawn bear a characteristic relation relative to it. The things in us are in us in the same manner, such that we are all fixed, united and attached. We are thus determined or settled insofar as we all converge there [in the One].

On Plotinus' analogy, our conceptual activities stand to the One as actually drawn lines or radii stand to the center of a circle, the Forms standing to the One as the "characteristic relations" (or natures) of the radii stand to the center of the circle. The phenomenal microcosms which occur "individualistically" when considered in accordance with accidents are partial apprehensions or representations of the Forms or intelligibles. And the noumenal macrocosm of Intellect is One, in turn, in virtue of the bare circle, or its center, the intelligibles being articulations of the bare circle.

Plotinus' analogy serves to bring out one of the most basic doctrines of his philosophy, that our conceptual activities are well-founded or trustworthy, ultimately, because they are activities which,
like the marks or radii actually drawn in his circle, occur in a necessary or "characteristic" manner in a wholly self-sufficient universe— one which determines our conceptual activities rather than vice versa. Emphasizing this doctrine will be one of the themes of chapter 6, as will be clarifying the non-referential character of our ordinary talk of men, trees, etc. insisted upon in this chapter.
Footnotes: Chapter V

1 Thus, in "Supposition-Theory and the Problem of Universals" (Franciscan Studies, forthcoming), I argue that the core semantical notion in Scholastic logic, signification, is not a relation (like refers to) but a property of terms, the property of being a representation. Similarly, Ockham's "realist" opponents do not claim that there exist special entities named 'universals' but rather that general terms are fully representational, play their own roles in our representational systems of language--i.e., their representational uses are not derivative from those of singular terms. Now, it might be a short step from here to claiming that there must also be basic entities uniquely represented by general terms for these realists, but that step is far from being an obvious one.


5 Randall, for example, indicates elsewhere that he takes Intellect to be a thinker in a very special sense. Intellect is not, Randall claims, an individual which thinks but the knowability of the universe, the rationality of experience, intelligibility or logical structure ["Intelligible Universe," p. 9].

6 The idea that Soul is, basically, the idea of various possible partial orderings allowed by the schematic order of Intellect is expressed by Wallis in his arguing that the primary difference between Intellect and Soul lies in that Intellect's "vision" is singular and timeless while Soul provides the ground for the idea of moving from object to object [Neoplatonism, p. 53].

7 'Knowledge' and 'knowables' are not used by Plotinus himself. Ultimately, the relevant correlatives would be contemplation and objects of contemplation; and the correlatives of intellection and intelligibles will do as well.
The issue of precisely what is needed in the logical-cum-metaphysical space of the Neoplatonic progression to, on the one hand, ground our conceptual activities and provide for real explanation and, on the other hand, to tie the abstractable contexts of that space together in a coherent and fully articulated way seems to have Exercises Neoplatonists quite a bit. For an interesting discussion of what I take to be attempts to deal with this issue, see: Wallis, Neoplatonism, pp. 126-134. Of particular interest here would be what Wallis calls the 'Triadic Principle' of the unparticipated, the participated and the unparticipated-and-participated and the 'Law of Mean Terms', according to which two (contextually?) dissimilar terms must be linked by an intermediary having something in common with both (p. 131).

Insofar as one focuses only upon those passages in the Enneads where the One, Intellect and Soul are discussed solely as they fit together into a necessary progression, the differences between the hypostases are, of course, blurred. Such locations are focused upon by, e.g., John N. Deck in Nature, Contemplation and the One (University of Toronto Press, 1967), pp. 9-11, who therefore concludes that the One is not really a different hypostasis from Intellect. For a reply to Deck's conclusion, see: John P. Anton, "Some Logical Aspects of the Concept of Hypostasis in Plotinus," Review of Metaphysics 31 (1977), 258-271.

For a presentation of the textual similarities between Plotinus' claims about the One, the Many and the One-over-many and Plato's Parmenides, see: Bernard B. Jackson, "Plotinus and the Parmenides," Journal of the History of Philosophy 5 (1967), 315-327. And for a discussion of a possible source of Plotinus' use of the notion that Intellect is "always the same while being omnipresent", see: Dominic J. O'Meara, "Being in Numenius and Plotinus: Some Points of Comparison," Phronesis 21 (1976), 120-129.

As mentioned earlier, Plotinus' appeal to sensations' being different cannot, of course, be read as a strict non-identity claim but must be read, ultimately, as claiming that for every "different" sensation there must be some foundation for it in the schematic order of Intellect; and that schematic order is, in turn, based upon the resources of arithmetic-cum-geometry and not upon, e.g., bare subjects or basic entities for reference.

Given Plotinus' notion of with-perceiving rationality, reflection upon our conceptual order need not go on divorced from observation. In view of this, we can even say for Plotinus that our present day belief about witches is in part due to more careful or sophisticated observation and not "merely" to rational reflection on what Forms there are. Again, the main point would lie in the causes or justifications for observation and not in anything an empirical scientist himself need do or not do on Plotinus' view.
If one wished to continue the discussion, he might do so by getting our obstinate empiric to retreat from his artificially private perceptual object context at least into the hypostatic, Soul context—e.g., by getting him to be willing at least to discuss the humanity of his this-man or the whiteness of his this-white-thing. Perhaps after getting him to clarify or improve his conceptual behavior in regard to men, colors, and so on more generally, some headway could be made vis a vis his perceptual dogmatism.

Chapter VI

LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND PLOTINUS' UNIVERSE

Plato's philosophy had underscored the importance of developing a general theory of human nature in doing epistemology and philosophy of mind, giving philosophical point to the Delphic inscription "Know Thyself" through his theory of recollection and his insistence upon knowing as a natural function of the human soul. It thus becomes a truism in the Neoplatonic tradition that our knowledge of the universe is conditioned by the manner in which our soul acts, the activities of soul being natural (hence, natured). But this Neoplatonic truism must be distinguished from the relatively uninteresting doctrine that knowing requires a knower by implying that the soul contributes something more than mere awareness or ontological support to our knowledge.

Plato's use of the prescription "Know Thyself" is not a recommendation to turn a mental eye inward. In the Neoplatonic tradition, for example, the primary tools for articulating the conceptual order and thereby gaining causal knowledge of ourselves and the universe is language. In contrast, John Locke sharply distinguishes ideas from language. For Locke, ideas "furnish" the otherwise empty cabinet of the mind or soul while names (and not just marks and noises) are merely "got to" ideas [p. 72]. But for Plato, thought just is
"inner speech". Indeed, Plato explicates the distinctive feature of human nature which makes knowing natural for us in linguistic terms. Thus, in Protagoras, for example, Plato sets men apart from the rest of nature, first, through our possession of the crafts of house building, shoe making and the like and, secondly and more importantly, through our possession of the special craft of articulate speech and names [322]. And in Cratylus, Plato introduces, as the conceptual counterpart to the craftsman of Timeaus, the name-giver [389-390].

Man can know his universe (or "recollect") for Plato because names are crafted so that they "carve nature at its joints" [Phaedrus, 255e].

The Platonic conception of thought as inner speech (or as linguistic in nature) persists through Medieval philosophy. Augustine, for example, claims that

though we utter no sound, we nevertheless use words in thinking and therefore use speech within our minds. [p.6]

Thought does not differ from written and spoken language for Augustine in being non- or pre-linguistic but in that it does not use marks and noises as its matter or occasions. Even in William of Ockham, we read:

there are three sorts of terms--written, spoken, and conceptual. The written term is part of a proposition which has been inscribed on something material and is capable of being seen by the bodily eye. The spoken term is a part of a proposition which has been uttered and is capable of being heard with the bodily ear. The conceptual term is ... capable of being part of a mental proposition. [p. 49]

Thus, Ockham argues:

In the case of spoken and written language terms are either names, verbs, or other parts of speech ...; likewise, the intentions of the soul are either names, verbs, or other parts of speech. [Summa, p. 52]
The Platonic conception of thought as linguistic in nature could be taken for granted in Plotinus' day, and is not discussed at any length in the Enneads. It remains for Augustine, with his prior interests in grammar and rhetoric, to reemphasize the linguistic nature of thought--or, if you please, the conceptual nature of written and spoken language--and to expand more explicitly upon Plato's conception. A discussion of Augustine's views on language can help clarify some of the more difficult points of the last three chapters--for example, the sense in which individual souls "produce" a universe in performing conceptual activities and the contextual rather than extensional nature of the hypostases and the phenomenal universe. The discussion of this chapter will also provide the means for saying something about Plotinus' notion of "union with the One"--insofar as this phrase is taken as part of his so-called mysticism--in the context of my interpretation of the Enneads.
1. Language and Things in Augustine

In "On the Teacher", Augustine relates the following story about a fellow who argues that we produce real things when we use language—or at least when we use names or terms.\(^5\)

He first asked whether what we say comes out of our mouth. That was, of course, undeniable. Then he had no difficulty in getting the other, in the course of the discussion, to mention a lion. Whereupon he made fun of him, and insisted that, since he had confessed that what we say comes out of our mouth, and since he could not deny that he had said "lion", therefore with the best intentions he had let out a horrid beast from his mouth.

We would like, of course, to think that our amusing fellow has foisted a sophism on his interlocuter. The problem, though, is to show precisely what is wrong with the fellow's reasoning. To do so is not as simply as it might at first seem.

As a first attempt, one might reply to Augustine's philosophical trickster that he has confused language with the world (or names with things). Indeed, this reply might, at a first and incautious glance, seem to capture Augustine's own reply. Augustine argues that man, for example,

\[
\text{is both a noun and an animal. It is a noun when it is regarded as a sign, and an animal when regard is had to the thing signified by the sign.} \quad \text{[p. 25]}
\]

In the above example, one might continue for Augustine, a lion does not come out of the speaker's mouth. Rather, the noun 'lion' does, and this noun signifies lions rather than itself being a lion. Hence,
the conclusion which should be drawn is not that the utterer of 'lion'
let a horrid beast out of his mouth but rather than he let a sign of
a horrid beast out of his mouth. Further, the trickster's inter-
locutor is misled because our primary, unreflective use of language
is in mentioning things rather than in mentioning language itself.
Thus,

if he asks simply what homo is without mentioning either
noun or animal, my mind, following the rule laid down for
our [ordinary] discourse, would at once turn to the thing
signified by these two syllables.
[p. 25]

Augustine's reply thus seems to be based upon distinguishing two
classes of things: terms and their referents (or signs and their
significates). Terms refer to or signify things in the world, and it
is in this referential function that terms are (at least in their
primary use) significant or meaningful. Since the primary meaning
of terms lies in their referring to things, our interlocuter's con-
fusion is understandable. We have thus explained both why the argument
is fallacious and also why an ordinary person would be confused by it.

Unfortunately, the referential or Wittgensteinian interpretation
of Augustine's views on language and meaning is incorrect. Augustine's
real views on the nature of language are in fact as critical of the
referential theory, with its oversimplified distinction between language
and the world, as they are of our trickster's collapsing of the use
of language in mentioning things with the use of language in mention-
ing language itself. The referential theorist is as naive, on
Augustine's real view, as is the interlocuter in Augustine's story, as
would become evident if one were to ask for the sense in which a noun or a sign can as such come out of a person's mouth any more than a lion can. We do not hear nouns as such but sounds which function as nouns; we do not see signs as such but marks on paper which function as signs.

The principal cut made in Augustine's reply is not one between language and the world at all but one between our ordinary, pre-reflective use of language and the critical use of language by the philosopher or grammarian in discussing language itself. On Augustine's real view, when a person is asked what man is and he is told that man the animal is meant, he is not thereby put into a special relation with extra-linguistic reality. He is, rather, being informed about what sort of answer is expected to the question. The phrase (quoted above) 'when regard is had to the thing signified by a sign' does not connote a special act exersized by the mind upon a thing. Rather, this phrase connotes a particular use which terms (and language generally) have—what a contemporary philosopher might call the material use of language. As Augustine goes on to say, one "turns to the thing signified" through following a rule of common discourse, where the (ordinarily implicit) rule Augustine has in mind may be stated as: unless otherwise stated or obvious from the context, language is to be used materially—in the mode of what might be called 'thing-talk' (e.g., animal-talk) rather than in the mode of what might be called 'formal-talk' (e.g., noun-talk). The interlocuter in Augustine's story is not misled because he confused a non-referential
or self-referential meaning of terms with their more basic, referential meaning but because he confuses two different uses which terms have--e.g., that by the grammarian and that by the ordinary man concerned only with getting around in the world, avoiding lions, and so forth. He is unaware of the implicit rule of ordinary language usage and hence cannot distinguish ordinary or material usage from more sophisticated sorts of usage. Augustine's diagnosis of the sophist's confusion may be expressed more fully as follows.

As I have argued, Augustine does not take the story about the lion to confuse language and the world in some simple manner. A more perspicuous way of expressing the sophist's confusion is to say that he confuses language as a kind of physical activity with language as a kind of tool—in particular, a tool normally used, though, in practicing the craft of thing-talking. In Augustine's words, our sophist confuses speaking with teaching [p. 29]. The naive semantical realist would be right in charging that, in a sense, Augustine's view implies that reality comes to be with the coming to be of language (or, more generally, concepts). In particular, on the view I am developing for Augustine, the world does "come to be" qua signified, represented or apprehended in a certain manner. More precisely, the two-fold distinction between language and the world is inadequate for capturing Augustine's view. A four-fold distinction is needed, one between (1) language as a physical activity (marks and noises), (2) language as significant or representational, (3) the world in itself, and (4) the world as represented in language or conceptual
activities.

The second and fourth of these four do "come to be" together—in Plotinus' terms, they are correlatives. But the reasoning in Augustine's story collapses (2) with (1), so that the only possible correlative to what comes out of the utterer's mouth is something else purely physical (a bit of (3)). Thus, the lion itself seems to "come to be" with the coming to be of the noises issuing from the utterer's mouth. One way in which one might be led to collapse (2) with (1), moreover, is by, first, confusing those cases of (4) in which the things in question are the marks and noises of language itself with language as representational and, thereby, with (1). For in these cases, the distinction between a representation and what it represents seems less clear, especially to the ordinary person. It is fairly natural, for example, to think of the language of the gramarian as being about marks and noises themselves rather than marks and noises as functioning in a linguistic system. But insofar as (1) and (2)—or (3) and (4), for that matter—are collapsed, we seem forced either to our sophist's conclusion or to a wholesale separation of language from the world with, as the only alternative to semantical skepticism, a glimpse-at-the-world view of conceptual activities. And something close to this second alternative is explicitly criticized by Augustine himself, by means of which he therefore criticizes the very theory that Wittgenstein attributes to him. I shall now turn to that criticism by Augustine.
Suppose, to begin, that we learn the meanings of terms by being ostensively directed towards things which they refer to [p. 8]. In any such alleged case, however, two questions may be raised: (1) precisely what am I being asked to attend to? and (2) in what sense is the ostensive act itself "telling" me what its intended object is? Augustine's answers to these questions may be summarized in the claim that ostension itself is only a sign. An act of ostension can at best signify the information demanded in (1) and (2) and it does not wear that information on its physical sleeve:

whatever movements of his body he uses in trying to show me the thing signified by that word, [the action] would still be a sign and not the thing itself.

[p. 9]

In short, an ostensive sign is a physical action which is (conceptually) taken as itself a sign by the language student. Unless the language student himself conceptually uses the action of his "teacher", it does no ostensive work for him at all. The proper answer to question (1) is thus that a physical action ostends whatever the person performing the action conceptually takes himself to be ostending, and the proper answer to question (2) is that an ostensive act "tells" me what it is intended to "tell" me only insofar as I conceptually take it in the same way as that in which the person performing it takes it.

The same ideas apply for Augustine in cases where, instead of using an ostensive act to point something out to someone, someone tries to teach the meaning of a term by simply showing its referent to us. The class of terms which are the most plausible candidates for being taught in this way are, according to Augustine, physical action
terms (e.g., 'walking'). Thus, a person might try to teach me what 'walking' means by simply walking [pp. 9-10]. Unfortunately, the teaching-by-showing theory has the same difficulties that the teaching by ostension theory has. That is, we can always ask in behalf of the alleged student: Is he showing me walking, hastening, moving one's feet, or what? And if I do not already possess the conceptual resources needed for recognizing walking--i.e., already know what 'walking' means--then how could I recognize what he is doing as a case of walking at all?

A natural reply to the second question just posed would be that I acquire the conceptual resources needed for recognizing a case of walking by my teacher's saying "I am walking" at the time when he is showing walking to me. But the same sorts of questions would be raised by Augustine about this utterance that were raised about the showing-activity--in short, what is he telling me when he utters the noises I am hearing while he is performing some sort of activity or other? In order for his utterance to mean anything at all to me, I must already have the conceptual resources needed for recognizing the noises I am hearing as having a certain meaning. I must be able to perceive his utterance as being of the I-am-walking type. Augustine thus claims that "whenever we speak, two things happen" [p. 15]. These two things are, first, a physical process of sound production (and reception) and, second, a conceptual taking of those sounds by ourselves and by our listeners.
On Augustine's view, an alleged language teacher can at most provide us with certain marks and noises which we are to use in tokening our language. But he cannot teach us the concepts or representational abilities which those marks and noises are used by members of our community to token. For the "teaching" of marks and noises as bits of language presuppose, according to Augustine, recognitional abilities on the part of the student, and those recognitional abilities presuppose, in turn, the concept of what the marks and noises are supposed to signify or be. Thus, so far as the concept expressed by a term in a language is concerned, the language "teacher" can only provide us with the occasions or opportunities to use the conceptual resources we already possess and thereby "teach" ourselves.

A crucial element in Augustine's argument is the idea that there is no recognition or "seeing" without conceptualization and that this conceptualization is contributed by the person doing the recognizing and not by the objects recognized or by the sensations by means of which we recognize. Nor is it provided by the marks and noises provided by members of our language community.

On the contrary, we learn the [semantical] force of the word, that is the meaning which lies in the sound of the word, when we come to know the object signified by the word. Then only do we perceive that the word was a sign conveying that meaning.
[p. 33]

We come to know the object, as Augustine puts it, by using concepts which we already possess on the appropriate sensory occasions. Thus, our pantomimist "teaches" me to use my concepts on a certain sensory occasion by setting "before my eyes, or one of my other bodily senses
... the things I desire to know" [p. 33]. But he cannot even teach me which concepts are the appropriate ones to use on what sensory occasions. He can only provide me with the sensory occasions for conceptually doing what I will and thereby teaching myself.

Augustine earlier expresses his view more perspicuously by directly subjugating knowledge of signs to knowledge of things rather than to knowledge of objects:

Nothing is learned even by its appropriate sign. If I am given a sign and I do not know the thing of which it is the sign, it can teach me nothing. If I know the thing, what do I learn from the sign? ... So the sign is learned from knowing the thing, rather than vice versa. [p. 32]

And "knowing the thing" does not connote a special relation which obtains between myself and the world in itself for Augustine. Rather, it connotes an innate ability or "common rule" for materially using concepts. This knowledge of things may also become a knowledge of objects, in turn, when used on appropriate sensory occasions.

Augustine maintains that humans can apprehend the world only by means of signs or representations. Knowing reality is for humans the same as knowing how to use language or, more generally, representations (conceptual activities). Augustine therefore rejects as absurd the idea that, for instance,

we must attribute to the Apostle authority in the matter of reality but not in the use of words. [p. 17]

It would be absurd for us to do this, as Augustine sees it, because these "two" authorities are the same for humans. On Augustine's view, there is no sharp distinction between reality as apprehended by us
and our linguistic (representational, conceptual) abilities to use marks, noises or whatever materially. In mobilizing our concepts, we are, in a sense, mobilizing reality itself—reality insofar as we can apprehend or "have authority" over it. Augustine thus claims that a speech uttered by an alleged teacher (of any sort)

is nothing but a calling to rememberance of the realities of which the words are but the signs, for the memory which retains the words and turns them over and over, causes the realities to come to mind.

[p. 6]

Memory ultimately serves the same purpose for Augustine that it does for Plotinus. Memory is the governor or cause of our conceptual uses of the materials of sense and of written and spoken language; and this governor "is said to dwell in the inner man, namely Christ, that is the eternal power and eternal wisdom of God" [p. 35]. The ultimate cause of our conceptual activities is God, and He causes those activities by means of rememberance. Like Christ, our memory or innate conceptual structure may thus be viewed as the Word of God.

Augustine distinguishes two basic types of conceptual activities: perceptions and reflective or rational activities. Both are governed always and equally by memory or the "inner truth". Perceptions differ from reflections only in that their objects are "carnal" or sensible things rather than "spiritual" or intelligible things—perception's being Augustine's paradigm for the material use of concepts [p. 35]. Thus, when our reason also functions materially, as it commonly does in day to day living, its objects are also "carnal" rather than "spiritual" things for Augustine.
The naive and simple distinction between language and the world drawn at the beginning of this section becomes, at best for Augustine, a distinction between our material use of language or concepts and our reflective use of them. But it is a mistake to suppose that in using language reflectively we are discussing language by itself and in sharp contrast with the world. For in treating language or conceptual activities reflectively (or as being representations), we are thereby considering the world as apprehended by us--i.e., intelligibles rather than sensibles. It is just that we are no longer using language naively or materially--as if it were straightforwardly about things in themselves. The meanings of terms, for example, are determined by principles governing tokenings of them--Augustine's "inner truth" or "Word of God"--and not by things they refer to. Indeed, terms are of particulars (or, for Augustine, physical things) only insofar as uses of them are modeled on our conceptual uses of sensations in perceiving. But even then, terms would not be about things by themselves but by means of (or relative to) our sensory interactions with them; the sorts of things sensibles are are still determined by principles and not by the sensibles themselves. As with Plotinus, this-suches and sensibles as such are derivative for Augustine from suches or intelligibles ("realities"), though Augustine also seems to be unlike Plotinus in believing that they are somehow also really physical things and not just phenomenal bodies in our universe.

Augustine's emphasis on language is basically an extension rather than an abandonment of Plotinus' views on conceptual activities, with
one important modification. Augustine treats marks and noises in a manner analogous to Plotinus' treatment of sensations--i.e., as tools used by the soul in its conceptual activities. Marks and noises are language only insofar as the soul uses them as tokens in a representational system. And the principles which determine that system are the same as the one's which govern our other conceptual activities (viz., perception and reasoning). Overt language has precisely the same status for Augustine that our other conceptual activities have. Augustine's views on language thus do not require that, whenever we use overt language, we must in addition to that overt activity have another conceptual episode occurring in us which renders that overt activity meaningful. Indeed, we find that considerations of our overt language, construed as being by itself and without reference to other conceptual episodes an expression of principles or vertical causes, play an even larger role in some later Neoplatonists like Pseudo-Dionysius that they play in Augustine.\(^9\)

On Augustine's view, we must not misconstrue the basicness of the material use of language in our ordinary discourse, or the material use of concepts in perception, as providing us with a datum of "merely" referred to things. Thing-talk is just a mode of speech or conceptual activity and another mode of speech (e.g., doing science or dialectic) may be more suitable for explanation or apprehending intelligibles. But on the interpretation of Augustine presented in this section, the principles articulated by means of dialectic explain the world only as apprehendable by us. In contrast, Plotinus would
hold that, insofar as the methods by means of which we apprehend principles articulate them necessarily and non-arbitrarily, the resulting systems of rationales explain the world as intelligible tout court and not merely as intelligible to us. Unlike Augustine, who does not wish to hold that in knowing the principles determining our conceptual order we thereby know the mind of God Itself, Plotinus does not shy away from claiming that the conceptual order is also the real causal order of the universe, though perhaps only partially articulated by us.

The emphasis in this section upon the contextual (as opposed to referential) nature of thing-talk is also extremely helpful for understanding Plotinus' basic objections to Stoic materialism, and thereby his general conception of metaphysics. Plotinus' most sustained and explicit attack upon the Stoics occurs in Ennead VI, where he argues that the Stoic categories (like the Aristotelian ones) do not provide a framework for real explanation of the universe. Rather than pursuing that line, however, it will be more instructive to approach Stoicism for Plotinus from the point of view developed in this section.
2. Principles and Things in Plotinus and the Stoics

Probably the most influential views on the nature of the universe in the pre-Plotinian Hellenistic world were those of the Stoics. Like Plotinus, the Stoics wished to develop a metaphysics which vindicated their belief that the universe is intelligible. The Stoics also seem to have shared with Plotinus the belief that the universe is intelligible if and only if it is a system whose structure is determined by invariant principles. Scientific explanation would then be a matter of articulating those principles. But unlike Plotinus' theory of progression, the Stoics' theory is thoroughly materialistic—or so they intend. The Stoics' universe is physical and is structurally determined by a single, primal source which produces the universe in a determinate manner. And this primal source is, according to the Stoics, itself a body—the "first" body or fiery craftsman (pyr teknon). The fiery craftsman begets air, earth, fire and water by a process called 'flaming up' (ekpyros), at the same time endowing them with structure (hexis). The determinate manners in which the fiery craftsman structures the elements are called 'reasons' (logoi). These reasons are not themselves bodies but modes of production on the part of the fiery craftsman. A Stoic could thus, it would seem, try to maintain his strict materialism by maintaining that the reasons of the fiery craftsman are just f
casons de parler for the manners in which the universe flames up from it. The matter is, however, unclear—as
is the connection between the Stoics' fiery craftsman account and their better known "horozontal" account in terms of seminal reasons (logoi spermatikoi). In any event, the fiery craftsman account seems to be primarily "vertical" in intent--albeit in its own materialistic fashion--rather than being an ancestor of something like a "big-bang" theory. The matter is, again, not completely clear, however, from the Stoic fragments.

The move from Stoic materialism to Plotinus' metaphysics may be introduced by calling attention to a possible puzzle with the above Stoic account--in particular, with the Stoic claim that their primal source is itself a body. For, if the goal of the Stoics' theory is to provide a framework for explaining the nature of body, what in turn explains the fiery craftsman, if it is also supposed to be a body? Whether or not a Stoic could satisfactorily answer this question, it does serve to indicate the sort of argument Plotinus may be read as challenging the Stoics with. That argument may be expressed more fully as follows.

(1) The term 'body' applies only to the universe or to things in the universe.

(2) The fiery craftsman is introduced by the Stoics as the source or cause of the universe and is, supposedly, not identical either with the universe as a whole or with any part of it.

(3) Therefore, the term 'body' cannot be applied to the Stoics' fiery craftsman.

(4) But Stoic materialism claims that only bodies exist and, consequently, that the fiery craftsman is also a body.
(5) Therefore, the Stoics must hold that the fiery craftsman both is and is not a body.

The basic Plotinian objection to Stoic materialism is, in short, that the Stoics classify what supposedly explains, and hence is metaphysically prior to, all body as itself being a body. In summary, Plotinus and the Stoics seem to have many of the same basic predilections. The Stoics' *ekpyros* theory seems to betoken at least a vague recognition of the "vertical" character which, according to Plotinus, a theory satisfying these predilections must have. But Plotinus rejects the Stoics' materialistic construal of what "comes before" or explains the universe, replacing their theory of the universe's flaming up from the fiery craftsman with his theory of the progression of the universe from the One. And while the Stoics' flaming up is supposed to be some sort of physical process, Plotinus' progression occurs by means of the Platonic genera and, hence, does not result in a material universe.

For Plotinus, we articulate the progression of the universe by conceptually acting (e.g., using language) in a manner or context different from the ambience of everyday, material speech and thought. We articulate Intellect or the Forms through dialectic. Plotinus argues in *Ennead* I.3, that when he is engaged in dialectic a person grasps the Forms in their "separateness" from body. Plotinus uses, as his examples of dialectic, disciplines in which we reason about structures alone—i.e., about structures considered apart from their being the structures of any particular body we might be discerning.
Plotinus claims that a music theorist, for example, is a philosopher when he concerns himself with the proportions and structures (hrythmoi and schemata) of sounds generally. A musician does this by ignoring, for the purpose at hand, what Plotinus calls the 'matter of perceptual objects'—i.e., by ignoring the particular sounds he happens to be perceiving as the subjects of his discernments [I.3.1,20f.]. Instead, the music theorist treats sounds as subject to arithmetical or structural principles and treatment. Plotinus thus takes the study of arithmetic to be even more crucial—indeed, indispensible—for what he calls 'being in accordance with intellect' (katanoēsēs). Arithmetic is the discipline par excellence which deals with the structures of things in themselves, apart from particular perceptual objects [I.3.3]. As the appeal to the science of arithmetic indicates, dialectic generally does not proceed willy-nilly with structures considered by themselves or, for the "vulgar", with the order and relations of our concepts. Properly used, dialectic is a method for determining the "the what is" (to ti esti) of things by beginning with first genera or principles and methodically "weaving together" the Forms which intelligibly follow from the first genera until we have discerned all of Intellect—e.g., all derivable principles of ordering or of geometry or all genera and species of things [I.3.4,13f.]. In chapter 3, we saw that these first principles are the Platonic ones and that Plotinus maintains that they impart a structure to the Forms methodically and non-arbitrarily. Plotinus claims, that is, that they are not only genera but also principles (archai) since they provide
the very means for generating a "woven together" structure, the basic form of that structure being the resources of pure arithmetic.

Plotinus maintains that a materialism, like the Stoics', does not have the resources for really explaining the universe. Insofar as the Stoics do introduce promising moves, they immediately dilute them by reducing them to what is to be explained (body). As Plotinus sees it, we need something like Plato's Forms—real Forms and not facons de parler. Plotinus goes even further, however, and maintains that the notion of body adds nothing explanatory at all. 'Body' becomes a term used by Plotinus for tracing the items we call 'bodies' (men, trees, and phenomenal bodies in general) into his categorial framework and theory of progression. But the term 'body' is never used to refer to a positive nature in its own right. In a sense, 'body' only functions to generate the "vulgar" account of the progression. So much for bodies in general; but what about particular bodies—Socrates, Plato, Jimmy Carter and the like?

Plotinus argues in Ennead VI that the first genera and principles are Being, Same, Different, Motion and Rest. These determine (indeed, generate) the hierarchical structure of Intellect. In particular, a "lower" level in Intellect is one which, in virtue of Different, is more specific, complex or, if thought abstractively as things, particularized that a "higher" level. The basic principles in Plotinus' metaphysics (especially Same and Different) thus generate an ever-increasing order of specificity, but never creates anything like Aristotelian primary substances or like the regular solids in
Plato's receptacle. Thus, from the ("vulgar") genus ANIMAL, one might move, let us say, to the more specific level HORSE-MAN; from MAN, in turn, to ERECTUS-SAPIENS; and, finally, from SAPIENS (and skipping a very large number of dyads), to SOCRATEITY-PLATOHOOD. (The differentiation could, as mentioned in section 1 of chapter 3, also go in terms of characterizings, with my upper-case Form designations covering areas of the hierarchy rather than individual nodes.) We thus reach a level of specificity, in any event, which is so "particular" that it is therein the same as (or the sameness of) what we would ordinarily take to be particular bodies. We traverse the remaining distance to particulars as such by switching the context of discussion from dialectic or Plotinian science to perception and letting our articulations of the real universe terminate in the passing show.

Oneness or simplicity is commonly associated with being particular. But just the opposite is the case for Plotinus: "particularity" comes with complexity in Plotinus' universe. In general, the more specific something is—and hence the closer to being the sameness of men, trees, etc. it is, the more complex it is. Men are more complex than animals generally, triangles are more complex than plane figures generally, and so on. The most complex things in the vertical order are called the "uncutables" as well by Plotinus. Taken as structures by themselves (schemata), the Forms on a lower level of Intellect are more complex as arithmetical orderings or geometrical principles than are those on a higher level. Thus, when the lowest level in Intellect is taken as structural principles, it just is the sameness of structured
things or particular orderings—Plotinus' noumenal bodies.

The lowest level things in Plotinus' hierarchy, the uncutables, are still Forms for Plotinus, however, and one might ask: what accounts for the fact that while there are Socrates, Plato, Rover and the like in our universe, we do not likewise find just animal generally (i.e., any phenomenal or noumenal body of a more generic sort)? Expressed structurally, the question is: in what sense are the most specific structures the sameness of structured things? In what follows, however, I shall broach this question only in its former, "vulgar" formulation.

Forms do not stand to one another in spatial relations for Plotinus. Indeed, Plotinus' noumenal universe is not in space at all. Hence, none of the Forms could differ from particular bodies or from structured things in that they are also things but that they exist somewhere different from where particular bodies or structured things exist. A similar remark holds, of course, about the relationship between the uncutables and the higher level Forms. The Form ANIMAL, for example, does not differ from SOCRATEITY in that it is a structurally simpler thing which exists in some place apart from SOCRATEITY. The asymmetry between the uncutables at the bottom of the hierarchy and the higher Forms which accounts for why the former but not the latter are the sameness of particular bodies must therefore lie in some difference in items due to the nature of the vertical order or progression itself and not in something like spatial proximity of the uncutables to particular bodies.
Now the needed asymmetry does not lie in the greater simplicity of the higher Forms alone, but in the fact that the more complex level are more complex in virtue of their being differentiations of simpler levels. To come directly to the point, the needed asymmetry between the uncutables and the higher Forms in Intellect may be expressed by: a structure is a Form alone if it is, in turn, a genus or principle of structure for something else (viz., its species) while a structure is also the sameness of a particular body if it is not also a principle of structure for another, further level of structure. ANIMAL, for example, is a structure relative to LIVING THING and is also a principle of structure relative to MAN. But while SOCRATEITY (an uncutable) is a structure relative to MAN, it is not also a principle of structure relative to another, more specific structure—at least it is not if SOCRATEITY really is an uncutable at the bottom of the hierarchy. The uncutables thus terminate Intellect itself in a manner which corresponds to the way in which a particular body terminates all of the specific and generic features of things or the way in which a schematized thing (e.g., the noumenal Socrates) terminates all of the general schematic features of the world soul’s activities. Only articulations of the most complex level of Intellect connote the sameness of particular bodies or what I have come to call 'terminals' for Plotinus. Appealing to the terms of the last section, we can say that the wholly knowledgeable wise man would only use expressions which represent the bottom line of Intellect materially; he would terminate the dialectical uncovering of the vertical order by moving
to this-suches only after he had divided the One all the way down to the uncutables.

Section 1 of this chapter ended and section 2 began with the idea that thing-talk and Form-talk are modes of using language or are specific contexts in which we behave conceptually. An explanation of Plotinus' theory of progression does not require talk of two distinct sets of basic entities to which 'thing' (or 'body') and 'Form' each refer. Some of the ideas of section 1—especially the idea of representation—can also be used to clarify the nature of the conceptual activities of individual souls, to further emphasize the point just repeated, and to allow us to say something about the alleged Plotinian notion of a mystical or experiential union with the One. For the purpose of what I shall be about in the next section, I shall ignore the point made in section 1 that, unlike Plotinus, Augustine seems to believe in a real physical or material world. It should by now be clear how Plotinus would read any talk of bodies or things from the point of view of his theory of progression.
3. Representation and Plotinus' One

In section 1 of this chapter, I argued that Augustine's views on language require us to distinguish the marks and noises (the tools or instruments) used in written and spoken language from language as such (or as meaningful). More to the point, language is not meaningful for Augustine in virtue of any special property possessed by those marks and noises as such or in virtue of some semantical-cum-metaphysical relation which obtains between language users or linguistic tokens themselves and the particulars we ordinarily use language to mention. Language is meaningful for Augustine in virtue of marks' and noises' playing a role in the language user's conceptual life—i.e., in virtue of their being tools for his conceptual activities. Those roles or uses are specified by principles which the language user brings to a situation in which he uses language. Language is thus meaningful for Augustine insofar as a person uses marks and noises in ways specified by his "inner truth". And a person's language (and his conceptual activities generally) may be thought of as forming its own rule governed microcosm which is about the real macrocosm only insofar as the rules or principles of his language are the same or are ultimately caused by the same thing as that which governs the universe. In short, the microcosm of our conceptual lives may be said to represent rather than refer to the real macrocosm for Augustine.
A contemporary Augustinian might couch his views on human language in what might be called a nativist-cum-behaviorist account of language learning and use. In its simplest form, such an account might maintain that, in order to learn (and subsequently to use) a language, a person must (1) be raised in a community of language users actively engaged in providing the marks and noises used in their language community to prospective language learners for their conceptual appropriation, (2) possess a more or less complete set of sense organs which are in fairly good or "natural" working order, and (3) possess innate conceptual abilities to apprehend the marks and noises provided by his teachers (and then use them) in a standard, rule governed way. In view of (1), a person is trained to use the standard tools of his language community and, in view of (3), the properly trained language user does not only seem to make sense to the people of his community by aping their marks and noises but he is in fact using those marks and noises meaningfully; the marks and noises are meaningful tools for him as well. The second element in the account is needed in order for the language learner to be stimulated by all of the appropriate marks and noises and is stated so as to placate our common belief that various people's sensations of the marks and noises of their language are fairly uniform. The need for something like (2) in an Augustinian account in order to account for the efficacy of (1) also emphasizes Augustine's view that, so far as our sensations of marks and noises are concerned, the writings and utterances of other language users are no more significant than are any of our other sensations.
It is only in virtue of the native conceptual abilities mentioned in (3) that a person can respond to any of his sensations by using them as representations of his world.

The nativist component of the above account (or outline of an account) seems Augustinian enough. But I am not making a similar claim about behaviorism—at least in any of its contemporary forms. My reason for using the term 'behaviorism' at all is that behaviorist accounts of language use do not carry with them the idea that a person learns and uses language by being in any special relation to or contact with extra-linguistic reality at all. For a behaviorist, it is enough that linguistic episodes occur in response to certain stimuli—or, to open up the "black box" of the mind, that conceptual episodes occur on the occasion of certain sensations. Linguistic or, more generally, conceptual episodes are thus of external and particular things in a solely (horizontal) causal sense. Augustine also holds that the only relations which language bears to things in the natural order are causal. Linguistic episodes bear these causal relations to external things, however, only qua themselves being in the natural order—being marks and noises, or whatever else plays the role of matter or tools for one's conceptual activities. The aboutness or intentionality of language and conceptual activities can be accounted for, on Augustine's view, only by means of something like (3)—i.e., by invoking a vertical order of principles which govern the horizontal order of marks and noise (or whatever) so that they function in a rule governed system.
Wilfrid Sellars has introduced a helpful device for representing intentionality or intentional acts in a manner which underscores their non-relational character. More precisely, on Sellars' view, expressions mentioning intentional acts are, despite their relational surface structure or appearance, really sortal predicates. Just as the expression 'a statue of Socrates', for example, may be construed as functioning to classify the sort of statue which some statue is rather than to connote a relation which somehow obtains in the real world between the statue and long-dead Socrates, so too are expressions of the form 'an act of (or about) an F' really sortals in relational guise. In particular, such expressions function to tell us what sort of conceptual activity the intentional act in question is. To make this more explicit, moreover, we may convert an expression of the form 'an act of an F' (e.g., a perception of a man) into a more obviously sortal expression of the form 'an of-an-F-act'. We may use, for shorthand, 'a 0-act', where '0' indicates that we are talking about a conceptual activity—an activity qua playing a role in a representational system—rather than about a thing as such (e.g., a noise or a brain state). The logical form of the expression 'a thought of a man', for example, would thus be 'a 0-man-thought'. Its logical form is, in particular, not to be construed as 'R(self, man)'. We are commonly led to think of conceptual acts as being relational because, being modes of apprehension and not as such things apprehended, we are not normally aware of their real nature; we are, as it were, conscious in conceptual activities rather than conscious of them.
In the normal course of day to day living, we perform $\emptyset_F$-acts without being cognizant of the fact that these acts are modes of representing things rather than diaphonous awarenesses of things in themselves, or at least of the phenomenal things we apprehend by using sensations as tools in those representational acts. Hence, we are in fact more in touch with the real situation insofar as we reflect upon the nature or structure of our conceptual order and thereby upon the nature of the world as represented by us. (This would be the beginnings of Plotinus' "vulgar" way of apprehending intelligibles.) But nor can we reflect upon our own conceptual abilities through special, non-conceptually informed acts. We do so, for Plotinus at least, through continuing to perform $\emptyset_F$-acts, but in the context of doing dialectic—or some special form of dialectic, like music theory, arithmetic, geometry and the like. Training in the methodical and rigorous methods of dialectic or of the rational sciences is required to be able to become aware of the concepts which determine our $\emptyset_F$-acts; becoming aware of our concepts is not a matter of simply "looking" at what is "in the mind". By means of dialectic, in other words, one becomes aware, in the first instance, of the principles determining his conceptual activities and, by means of becoming aware of those principles, one also becomes aware of the world as representable or intelligible.

Plotinus' views on the nature of the human soul contrasts sharply, then, with standard mentalist theories of the mind or soul (e.g., what is commonly called 'Cartesian Dualism') and, as well, with standard
materialist theories. On Plotinus' view, our conceptual activities are themselves effects in the one eternal and real universe determined by the Platonic genera. There is no "parallel" but "mentalistic" universe in Plotinus. There is only one universe. Moreover, the best representations possible are those given by the rational structural sciences and not those offered by the Phenomenalists, the Mentalists, or, for Plotinus, the Materialists. The former two are the more misleading; the materialist's notion of body as a real thing is basically just derivative for Plotinus, displaying a misunderstanding of the nature of material uses of language in connection with discerning perceptual objects. Our ordinary, material use of language or of our concepts do not justify the philosophical claim that meaning or conceptual content is a matter of coming into contact with a concrete reality which is composed of real particulars or material things.

The possibility of knowledge or understanding rests for Plotinus upon our conceptual activities' coming to be in one, real universe and thereby being determined by the very principles which determine the universe as a whole. To use Plotinus' own terminology, we are not cut off from the One and its systematic progression (Intellect) but are in it. Equally important for Plotinus, however, is the admission that our knowledge can be about the universe only as representable or intelligible. Thus, when moving from reality as systematically representable (Intellect) to reality as wholly "in itself" and relative to nothing whatsoever (the One), Plotinus either embarks upon a via negativa, emphasizing that none of our concepts or language can be
used to articulate reality just by itself but only reality as representable (or "exfoliated" by means of the Platonic genera), or else Plotinus appends his remarks with something like "in a manner (or mode) of speaking". This latter way simply recognizes, again, the ineluctably representational character of discourse and thought, and is not meant to somehow get us at the One "as it really is". The former helps bring us into "union" with the One in the sense of invoking our conceptually informed apprehensions of reality and then calling attention to— or "stripping away"— what is representational about it (viz., everything).

On the experiential side, it would seem that a person comes as close as possible to apprehending the One as such to the extent that his apprehensions are as non-specific or non-representational as possible. Porphyry claims that Plotinus had such apprehensions from time to time. But this experiential side of Plotinus' philosophy of mind— his "mysticism"— need not detain us here. None of the Plotinian views I have been discussing depends upon the possibility or even the intelligibility of such non-representational episodes.¹⁴
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Woolley.

Theaetetus, 189e; Sophist, 263e.


All page references in this section are to Burleigh's translation of "On the Teacher".

In this same vein, Lloyd argues that in Porphyry's use of Aristotle's categories, the categories are neither terms nor things but terms as signifying: A.C. Lloyd, "Neoplatonic Logic and Aristotelian Logic," Phronesis 1 (1955-1956), 58-72 and 146-159, p. 151.

Of course, if the general remarks made in the introduction of chapter 5 are correct, Augustine himself had no such theories to criticize in his day. More likely, he is still concerned with the Stoic claims that conceptual activities can be explicated wholly in terms of physical things, motions and states. Nevertheless, Augustine's arguments lend themselves in a natural way to the use I shall make of them, and that use is instructive for understanding Augustine.

Compare Plotinus' notion of reason as with-perceiving when it is not functioning reflectively but materially in connection with sensations and perceptions.

This is also a point often confused in accounts of Medieval theories of language and which I argue for in "Supposition-Theory". Medieval's themselves are sometimes at fault here, however, in their presentations of their views. Ockham, for example, sometimes uses 'mental language' to refer to conceptual activities (occurrent affections of the soul) and at other times he uses it to refer to intellect, which governs the conceptual activities of the soul and is not itself a batch of occurrent episodes at all (see, e.g., Summa, p. 49). The latter (intellect) is indeed needed for overt language to be meaningful but
the former is not.

10 For a discussion of the Stoic categories, see: Sambursky, 
Physics, p. 17; and, Graeser, Plotinus and the Stoics, chapter 4.

11 In short, the Stoics maintain, "all body is matter of comes 
from matter ... such that even form [eidos] is body" [SVF, II, 354]. 
For more on the Stoic conception of body, see: David E. Haehm, The 

12 For more on the Stoics' ekpyros theory, see: Haehm, Origins, 
p. 184 and p. 200; and, Graeser, Plotinus, p. 55. Despite the 
unclarity of the relationship between the fiery craftsman account 
and the seminal reasons account, I tend to agree with Graeser's view 
that the principal difference between Plotinus and the Stoics lies in 
that the Stoics embed their principles in their material source's 
activity while Plotinus insists upon the "prior" nature of principles 
over material things (and, of course, thereby over things, which turn 
out not to really be material at all for Plotinus).

For a more general treatment of the use of 'logos' in Hellenistic 
philosophy, see: Wallis, Neoplatonism, p. 68; Rist, Road, pp. 90-96; 
De Vogel, "On the Neoplatonic," passim; and, R.E. Witt, "The Plotinian' 
Logos and Its Stoic Basis," Classical Quarterly 25 (1931), 103-111.

A possible resolution to the tension between the Stoics' two 
accounts is suggested by Sambursky's argument that in Galen, for example, 
static notions like Rest are in fact derivative from equilibria between 
(horizontal) tensional motions [Physics, pp. 32-33]. The problem with 
this as a general account of the nature of the Stoics' "vertical" 
account is that it makes all the notions of that account, including 
the fiery craftsman itself, derivative from what the account is 
suposed to be an explanation of. This seems to open the Stoics even 
more to Plotinian attack. For an account of Plotinus' critique of the 
Stoics' fiery craftsman account which fits what I have to say about it, 
see: Graeser, Plotinus, p. 92.

13 See Science and Metaphysics, pp. 65f.

14 For some standard discussions of the so-called mystical element 
in Plotinus' notion of "union with the One", see: Armstrong, Cambridge 
History, p. 239 and p. 261; John Rist, Eros and Psyche (University of 
Toronto Press, 1964), p. 183; and, Philip Merlan, Monopsychism, Mysti-
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